The International Transmission of Inflation (National Bureau of Economic Research Monograph)

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The International Transmission of Inflation

A National Bureau of Economic Research Monograph

The International ' Iransmssion of Inflation

Michael R. Darby James R. Lothian and Arthur E. Gandolfi Anna J. Schwartz Alan C. Stockman

The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

The University of Chicago Press. Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London

0 1983 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1983 Paperback edition 1985 Printed in the United States of America 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 6 5 4 3 2

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: The International transmission of inflation ( A National Bureau of Economic Research monograph) Includes indexes. 1. Inflation (Finance)-Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. International finance-Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Inflation (Finance)-Mathematical models-Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. International finance-Mathematical models-Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Darby, Michael R 11. Series. HG229.163 1983 332.4’1 83-5785 ISBN 0-226-13641-8(cloth) 0-226-13642-6 (paper)

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To Jaye, Judy, Anna, Isaac, and Cindy

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Contents

Preface I.

11.

ix

...

Xlll

PRELIMINARIES

1

1. Introduction and Summary Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian

3

2. The Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System Anna J. Schwartz

14

3. The International Data Base: An Introductory Overview James R. Lothian

46

4. The Timing of Monetary and Price Changes and the International Transmission of Inflation Anthony Cassese and James R. Lothian

58

THEMARK111 INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION MODEL 83 5. The Mark 111 International Transmission Model: Specification Michael R. Darby and Alan C. Stockman

85

6. The Mark 111 International Transmission Model: Estimates Michael R. Darby and Alan C. Stockman

113

x

Contents 7. International Transmission of Monetary and Fiscal Shocks under Pegged and Floating Exchange Rates: Simulation Experiments Michael R. Darby 8. The Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation Michael R. Darby

9. Actual versus Unanticipated Changes in Aggregate Demand Variables: A Sensitivity Analysis of the Real-Income Equation Michael R. Darby 111.

CAPITAL FLOWS, STERILIZATION, MONETARY POLICY,AND EXCHANGE INTERVENTION 10. Sterilization and Monetary Control: Concepts, Issues, and a Reduced-Form Test Michael R. Darby 11. Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy under a Pegged Exchange-Rates System: An Econometric Approach Daniel M. Laskar 12. Effects of Open Market Operations and Foreign Exchange Market Operations under Flexible Exchange Rates Dan Lee

IV.

162

232

273

289 29 1

314

349

13. An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows Michael Melvin

380

INTERNATIONAL PRICEMOVEMENTS

419

14. International Price Behavior and the Demand for Money Arthur E. Gandolfi and James R. Lothian

42 1

15. Movements in Purchasing Power Parity: The Short and Long Runs Michael R. Darby

462

xi

V.

Contents

16. The United States as an Exogenous Source of World Inflation under the Bretton Woods System Michael R. Darby

478

CONCLUSIONS

491

17. Conclusions on the International Transmission of Inflation Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian

493

Data Appendix James R. Lothian with the assistance of Anthony Cassese and Laura Nowak

525

Author Index Subject Index

719 722

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Preface

In the spring of 1975the industrialized world was in the midst of its second consecutive year of double-digit inflation, for most countries the highest rates of price increase at any time during the post-World War I1 period. Anna Schwartz and Michael Darby, dissatisfied with many of the explanations then being advanced for this increase in inflation and with the dearth of hard empirical evidence to support them, decided to organize a project to study the international inflation process. At the time both were at the National Bureau of Economic Research, then at its old location in New York. Darby, however, was slated to return to UCLA the coming fall. Two research teams were therefore to be formed: one based at the Bureau in New York, the other at UCLA. Jim Lothian joined the first effort; Ben Klein, the second. In autumn 1976, the project began; close to five years later it ended when the final draft of this volume was completed in spring 1981. During that interval, two important developments occurred in personnel. The composition of the researchers in the group changed: Klein completed work on central bank reaction functions and decided to direct his research to other areas of economics; Alan Stockman, then at UCLA, took his place; and Arthur Gandolfi, of Citibank, came on in New York. In addition, the graduate students who started out as research assistants on the project matured intellectually and went on to make their own independent contributions to research on the international inflation topic. Besides the papers by Daniel Laskar, Dan Lee, and Mike Melvin, all derived from doctoral dissertations at UCLA and included in this volume, the project gave rise to dissertations by four other individuals: John Price at UCLA, Anthony Cassese and Nurhan Helvacian at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, and Robert Greenfield at Rutgers University. We consider their successes no small xiii

xiv

Preface

part of the benefits of the project and take some pride of our own in their accomplishments. As originally conceived, the project was to accomplish two goals: the construction of a consistent and temporally comprehensive data base for the eight major industrial countries we wished to study; and estimation of a theoretically sound simultaneous model that we could use to test and otherwise evaluate competing hypotheses about the genesis and spread of inflation internationally. The project accomplished both goals. The four chapters that describe the work done in these areas, however, make up less than a quarter of the volume. Excluding the introductory and concluding chapters, there are eleven additional chapters that complement the core of the study, both in the range of issues covered and in the methods of investigation employed. Given this complementarity and the corroborative nature of much of the resultant evidence we feel that the study is of considerably greater value than it would have been had we and our colleagues stuck to our original plan. We trust that the readers will therefore be better able to calibrate their own internal probability calculators when evaluating our conclusions. Before closing we wish to acknowledge those individuals and organizations that in one way or another assisted the project. Were we to list all of them here, the litany would seem virtually endless. Many individuals, however, have already been cited both in the individual chapters and in the Data Appendix. The major source of direct funding for the project was the National Science Foundation. Scaife Family Charitable Trust, the Alex C. Walker Educational and Charitable Foundation, and the Relm Foundation also generously supported our efforts. In addition, Citibank, N.A., in an arrangement that to our knowledge is unique, donated one day per week of Lothian’s time for the full period of the project’s life and one day a week of Gandolfi’s time during the period of his involvement. Leif H. Olsen, Harold van B. Cleveland, and Peter H. Crawford, who initiated and supported this arrangement, deserve special thanks. We also are grateful to our adivsory panel. The members of this panel at various times during the life of the project were Sven Arndt, Michael Hamburger, Robert Heller, Donald Matthieson, Paul Craig Roberts, Guy Stevens, Henry Wallich, and Robert Weintraub. The role of this group was to counsel us on the relevant questions to be investigated and to receive and comment critically on our interim results. The members of the panel have performed these functions exceedingly well. Their approval of, or concurrence in, our results or conclusions, however, ought not be supposed. Indeed some members of the board have been frank in their sharp disagreement with certain of our methods and inferences.

xv

Preface

We owe a special debt to the secretaries and research assistants who helped both of us in the course of our compiling various papers into a coherent whole and seeing the final manuscript through publication. Donna Bettini in New York and Henrietta Reason and Carole Wilbur did excellent jobs of typing a particularly difficult manuscript. Cornelia McCarthy did and does provide excellent research assistance in New York. Linda Dunn and Laura Nowak also were of great assistance before going into business and completing the Ph.D. degree, respectively. Andrew A . Vogel was a tower of strength in completing the Mark I11 and Mark IV estimations and simulations and is currently pursuing his doctoral studies. M. Holly Crawford did much of the preliminary work on these models before being lured away from economics by the astonishingly greener pastures of a successful career as an artist. Marilou J. Uy prepared the index. The project could never have been finished without such congenial co-workers. Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian

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PART

I

Preliminaries

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1

Introduction and Summary Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian

Inflation became the dominant economic, social, and political problem of the industrialized West during the 1970s. This book is about how the inflation came to pass and what can be done about it. To answer these questions, we must first discover the nature of the economic linkages which apparently transmitted inflation from country to country like a contagious disease. To accomplish this is a very tall order, but the interrelated and mutually supporting empirical studies reported in this volume go a long way toward filling it. This brave boast can be substantiated only by the studies themselves, but first we provide in this chapter an overview of our results and how we obtained them. Our major conclusions can be summarized briefly. As to channels of transmission, both goods and assets are substitutable internationally but neither is perfectly so. The balance of payments has had no discernible effect on the American money supply, and at least partial sterilization has been a universal practice among nonreserve central banks although lagged adjustments of their money supplies to the balance of payments are noted. Currency substitution and the traditional absorption channel provide at most weak linkages, and the main transmission occurs via the balance-of-payments effects of goods and assets substitutability. Our empirical results thus offer support for the assumptions characterizing the portfolio-balance approach. The major cause of the world inflation of the early 1970swas an upward trend in American monetary growth goals. As illustrated in table 1.1,the American inflation rate increased in the latter half of the 1960s but sterilization policies delayed the impact on the nonreserve countries until the beginning of the 1970s.' While the upward trend in American money 1. The initial resistance to the increased U.S. inflation may explain the larger increase in nonreserve inflation during 1971-75. On a decade-average basis, U.S. inflation increased by

3

4

Chapter One

Table 1.1

Average Continuously Compounded Inflation Rates 1956-75

Adjusted for Exchange-Rate Changes’

Period

’

Quinquennia 1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 Decades 1956-65 1966-75 Others 1956-70 1971-731 197311-75 1956-75

United States*

Nonreserve Countries’

All Eight Countries4

Nonreserve Countries

All Eight Countries

2.28% 1.66% 4.32% 6.74%

3.25% 3.96% 4.25% 9.22%

2.74% 2.74% 4.29% 7.90%

2.26% 3.96% 4.01% 11.84%

2.27% 2.74% 4.18% 9.13%

1.9770 5.53%

3.60% 6.74%

2.74% 6.10%

3.11% 7.92%

2.50% 6.66%

2.7570 4.50% 8.57% 3.75%

3.82% 6.46% 11.48% 5.17%

3.26% 5.4170 9.94% 4.42%

3.41% 13.50% 10.48% 5.52%

3.06% 8.71% 9.47% 4.58%

1. All inflation rates are computed from the quarter preceding the indicated period to the quarter which ends the period (e.g. average logarithmic change from fourth quarter 1955 to fourth quarter 1960). 2. The basic price index is the G N P deflator. 3. The seven nonreserve countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The deflators used are detailed in table 6.20 below. The seven-country price index is geometrically weighted by nominal income weights (see table 5.7 below). 4. The eight-country price index is geometrically weighted by nominal income weights (see table 5.7 below). 5 . In these indexes, all nonreserve deflators were divided by the exchange rate (domestic currency/U.S. dollar) before the geometrically weighted average was computed.

growth cannot be definitely attributed to any particular factor, it does not appear to be responsive in any significant way to international variables. The major increases in oil prices occurring during 197311-741 played a supporting role to money growth in explaining the more rapid inflation in the second half of 1971-75, but coincidental removal of general price controls in the United States and abroad may have been even more important. In the latter half of the 1970s, domestic inflation was determined by the monetary policy of each central bank and cannot be attributed directly to the United States except as the foreign central banks 3.56 percentage points from 1.97% for 1956-65 to 5.53% for 1966-75 while nonreserve inflation increased by 3.14 percentage points from 3.60% to 6.74%, respectively. Thus, the 1971-75 burst of nonreserve inflation may be a partial “catch-up” o f the sort emphasized in Darby (1979): a lagged initial movement in the growth rate compensated for by subsequent overshooting. The last two columns of table 1.1 demonstrate that these patterns are despite-not due t o - c h a n g e s in exchange rates.

5

Introduction and Summary

were reluctant to bear the costs of reducing the previously established inflation rate. This evidence points to two policy conclusions. One has to do with the international monetary system; the other, which partially embraces the first, with the control of inflation. As we see it, a necessary and sufficient condition for a country to reduce its trend rate of inflation is a reduction in the trend rate of growth of its nominal stock of money. Our evidence indicates that the myriad of other palliatives that have been proposed in recent years and continue to be advocated in the popular press as well as in scholarly circles are beside the point. The problem with the Bretton Woods system was that over time increases in monetary growth in the United States tended to spill over to other countries. Those countries that were more averse to inflation than the United States therefore abandoned pegged rates for floating. Those that wanted to inflate at an even faster pace did the same. Floating exchange rates are thus an integral part of an anti-inflation program in a nonreserve country confronted by inflationary policies abroad. And in our view they are the only viable longer-term alternative in a world in which domestic policy goals differ. We see no effective means for any country to eliminate inflation without the political consensus to enforce a monetary constitution, be it de jure or de facto, that limits the ability of the central bank to print money. Our preference is for a fiat monetary standard with fixed moneysupply growth, but a gold standard would also serve to provide long-run (if not short-run) stability. A third monetary constitution open to countries other than the United States would be to rigidly fix their exchange rates with a country constrained by an effective monetary constitution. The strong empirical results summarized at the beginning of this chapter could be achieved only because of the creation of a major new data bank providing consistent quarterly series from 1955 through 1976 for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. James Lothian, who was responsible for its creation, describes this data bank in chapter 3. Complete documentation and listing are provided in the Data Appendix to this volume. The major advantages of the data bank are longer coverage and somewhat higher quality than the International Monetary Fund data which are the best alternative. Two other chapters complete the preliminary part of this volume. In the earlier of these Anna Schwartz describes the historical evolution of-and revolutions in-the international monetary system. Even the expert practitioner will benefit from this review, particularly as it reminds us of events which appeared trivial at the time they happened but ultimately proved to have major consequences. The second remaining chap-

6

Chapter One

ter of part I, by Anthony Cassese and James Lothian, concludes the preliminaries by beginning the empirical analysis. Cassese and Lothian apply Granger-causality tests to a number of pairs of variables. This provides a direct method for eliminating a number of popular hypotheses from consideration and thus serves as a basis for the more structural approaches which follow it. Their tests of domestic money and prices, for example, effectively reject the hypothesis that prices adjust instantaneously via goods arbitrage and then money supplies adjust with a lag; in general the timing relation is just the reverse. The general lack of support for prices causing money is also contrary to the hypothesis that independent movements in wages or other costs have been accommodated by passive central banks. Comparison of nonreserve country prices with either American prices or an index of foreign prices provides little evidence of causality running in either direction. The strongest evidence for international transmission occurs in the asset markets, but even here nonreserve interest rates generally adjust over time rather than instantaneously to changes in American interest rates. There is some evidence of sterilization of reserve flows by offsetting changes in domestic credit, but the mostly contemporaneous nature of this issue is ill suited to the Granger tests. The second part of the book reports the results of a major effort to build a medium-scale structural model which would permit the data to choose among the monetary, portfolio-balance, and Keynesian approaches.* Michael Darby and Alan Stockman in chapters 5 and 6 report on the specification and estimation of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model. In chapter 7, Darby uses a simplified simulation version of this model to draw out its implications for monetary and fiscal policy in the United States and the nonreserve countries. He uses the same model in chapter 8 to simulate the effect of the 1973-74 increase in the real price of oil. Chapter 9 is an extended digression on the Lucas-Barro real income equation used in the model with mixed success. The Mark I11 International Transmission Model is specified and estimated in two versions, one corresponding to pegged and the other to floating exchange rates. There are sixty-seven behavioral equations in the former and seventy-four in the latter, with a nearly equal number of identities used to close each model. Each country is described by a 2. We use the term “monetary approach” to refer to the class of models in which goods, assets, or both are perfectly substitutable internationally so that the money supply adjusts under pegged exchange rates to equal the quantity demanded at the international parity values. The Keynesian approach refers to those that assume price and interest-rate linkages are negligible and concentrate instead on the absorption channel (increased foreign income implying increased domestic exports and vice versa). In between these extremes lies the portfolio-balance approach, which incorporates substantial but not perfect price and interest-rate linkages so that both foreign and domestic influences simultaneously determine a nonreserve country’s money supply, prices, and interest rates.

7

Introduction and Summary

domestic macroeconomic subsector and an international subsector. The domestic sector uses a rational-expectations/natural-rate approach to determine real income, the price level, and interest rates given exogenous real government spending and endogenous nominal money and exports. Nominal money is determined within the subsector by central bank reaction functions which are responsive to inflation, unemployment or transitory income, unexpected government spending, and (for the nonreserve countries only) the scaled balance of payments. The international subsector determines exports, imports, import prices, capital flows, the balance of payments, and (for the nonreserve countries in the floating version) the exchange rate. The model is specified so that goods or capital flows may overwhelm any attempt at independent nonreserve monetary policy, but whether this is so depends on the estimated values of various parameters. Other potential international linkages include a currency substitution channel in the money-demand functions, the traditional Keynesian absorption channel, and direct effects of the real price of oil. The estimation of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model yielded some surprising results which can be summarized by the statement that linkages among countries joined by pegged exchange rates appear to be much looser or more elusive than has been assumed in many previous studies. In particular, substantial or complete sterilization of the contemporaneous balance of payments appears to be a universal practice among central banks so that domestic credit is properly treated as an endogenous variable. Sterilization policies increase these central banks’ control of their domestic money supplies, which is made possible by the relatively weak substitutability of goods and assets as estimated in the trade and capital flows equations, respectively. Currency substitution does not appear to provide much of a link either: Foreign interest rates are statistically significant only in the British and Japanese moneydemand functions, and the coefficients are very small in absolute magnitude. The slow and weak international transmission estimated in the Mark I11 Model was explored further in a series of simulation experiments reported in chapter 7. First, a simplified simulation version, the Mark IV International Simulation Model, was created by dropping insignificant variables and combining terms where a priori hypotheses on equality of coefficients were not rejected by the data. The pegged version of the Mark IV Model is dynamically stable and appears to track the actual values of the variables well throughout the eight-year feasible simulation period. Unfortunately dynamic instabilities become important in the floating version after only seven quarters; this apparently reflects the impossibility of adequately eliminating simultaneous equation bias with the short sample available for some of the floating equations. Two types of simulation experiments were designed to illustrate the

8

Chapter One

model’s implications for monetary and fiscal policy. Care was taken that the experiments were consistent with the actual evolution of nominal money and real government spending in the sample period: The money experiments involved a one-quarter increase in the disturbance of a given country’s money-supply reaction function, and the government spending experiments considered a one-quarter increase in unexpected real government spending. The less reliable data for France, Italy, and Japan yielded mutually inconsistent results here as in a number of other instances reported in this volume. Accordingly, the discussion centers on the other five countries. Under pegged exchange rates, only the German simulations indicated an immediate if partial movement in the money supply in response to the American money-supply shock. The Netherlands money supply also adjusted but with a lag, while the British and Canadian money supplies seemed unaffected by American monetary policy. These results reflect the weakness of both the estimated international linkages among countries and the liquidity effect on domestic interest rates. British and German money-supply shock experiments both indicated considerable control of their respective domestic money supplies at least for the first several years. The instability of the floating version model precluded much substantive discussion, but the American money shock experiment was reported to illustrate a possibly perverse effect of the estimated J curves in import demand equations. Because short-run price elasticity of import demand is much smaller than in the long run, the immediate effect of a depreciation is to increase the value of imports and so worsen the balance of trade. In the simulations reported, this J-curve phenomenon in a general equilibrium setting implied that some other currencies initially depreciated in response to an unexpected increase in the American money supply. The experiments involving shocks to government spending indicated the largest temporary effects for the American case where the shock implied a permanent increase in the level of real government spending and an induced increase in the money supply. The total multiplier amounted to about 1.5 in the quarter of maximum impact. In the British case, government spending was permanently increased by only about half of the initial shock and even using this small base the peak multiplier is only about 0.75 because of perverse effects of induced money-supply changes. No significant effects were estimated in the German case. Only the American fiscal shock had significant international repercussions, and those seemed to be due as much to the increased American money supply as to the induced increases in foreign exports. In chapter 8 Darby attempts to assess the role of oil price increases in the 1970s world inflation. A formal analysis focuses on the two channels

9

Introduction and Summary

by which an effect on the price level might occur: induced decreases in the real quantity of money demanded and induced increases in the nominal quantity of money supplied. The major result is that the theoretical, estimated, and simulated results are not at all robust to changes in specification: The effect on the price levelcould be as little as 0 or as much as 5%; in terms of inflationary trends over say four years, this implies only a range of 0 to 1%%effect on the average inflation rate. Reference to table 1.1 will illustrate the sense in which this range implies that the oil price shock played at most a supporting role in explaining the 1971-75 increase in the world inflation rate. The main reason for the ambiguity in the estimated and simulated price-level effect of the oil price shock is the coincidental removal of general price controls in a number of countries. On the whole, those countries which removed price controls during 1973-74 are also those for which we obtain a significant decrease in real income (and so real money demand) as a result of the 1973-74 oil price increase. Only future research can unravel whether these estimated oil price effects are real or a statistical illusion due to overstatement of measured real income and understatement of the increased price level due to price controls.3 A disturbing feature of the Mark I11 Model was the relatively poor explanatory power of the real-income equation for nonreserve countries. This equation explains the growth rate of real income by lagged logarithmic transitory income and current and lagged values of the shocks (innovations) in nominal money, real government spending, and real exports. It is thus an extended version of Barro’s approach to solving a standard aggregate demand curve in conjunction with the Lucas aggregate supply function. Experiments reported in this chapter show that distributed lags on the actual rather than unexpected value of the aggregate demand variables do no better for the nonreserve countries and worse for the United States. While the relatively poor nonreserve country results may be due to greater measurement problems, these results do suggest a cautious approach toward application of the Barro-Lucas equation. The third part of this volume continues examination of the degree to which national economies are linked in statistical environments other than the Mark I11 and IV Models. The authors of these four chapters either apply a relatively model-free approach or else use smaller-scale models so that the results are more simply interpreted. Darby and Laskar in chapters 10 and 11, respectively, both test for the exercise of monetary control by nonreserve central banks under pegged exchange rates. They 3. As price controls are removed and hidden price increases measured, removal of understatement in the deflators would cause a decrease in reported real output and an increase in the reported price level.

10

Chapter One

show that previous tests were biased by failure to control for sterilization and that monetary control was in fact exercised by these central banks. The implied ability of sterilized intervention to affect floating exchange rates is developed by Dan Lee in a dynamic portfolio-balance model. In chapter 13, Michael Melvin provides further empirical evidence for the portfolio-balance approach by introducing exchange-rate risk covariance measures implied by the international-asset-pricing model. In chapter 10, Darby develops a convenient expositional model which includes as special cases variants of the monetary approach both with and without sterilization. This framework makes domestic credit, which is endogenous with sterilization, a superfluous concept. The analysis illustrates two points: (1) Factors (other than the current balance of payments) appearing in the nominal-money reaction function will be uncorrelated with actual growth in nominal money if either variant of the monetary approach holds. (2) Expectational instability may imply a limited feasible range within which monetary control can be exercised. The first of these two conclusions underlies Darby’s empirical test of the null hypothesis that the nonreserve countries did not exercise control over their domestic money supplies. This hypothesis could be rejected at the 5% level or better for six of the seven countries, the exception being the Netherlands. Laskar specifies a set of small-scale models to test whether offsetting capital flows defeat attempts by partially sterilizing central banks to exercise monetary control. The “offset coefficient” is significantly less than the no-control value for six countries at the 5% level and for Canada at the 10% level. Laskar goes further to measure the fraction of a shift in the money-supply reaction function which will actually be reflected in money growth when account is taken of the extent (always significant) to which the central bank sterilizes the induced capital flows. He finds that this fraction is always significantly greater than 0 and in no case significantly less than 1. Because of dynamic instabilities, the floating version of the Mark IV International Simulation Model is relatively uninformative on the effects of nonreserve monetary and exchange policy. Dan Lee provides a theoretical analysis of the effects of foreign exchange and open market operations consistent with imperfect substitutability of assets and strong expectational effects on interest rates. H e reconciles long-run neutrality with differential short-run effects on exchange rates and interest rates of the two means of creating money. Of particular interest is his analysis of the lack of overshooting in the exchange rate if rational inflation expectations cause the nominal interest rate to rise during the adjustment to an unexpected increase in the money supply. Michael Melvin demonstrates that it is feasible to specify proxies for

11

Introduction and Summary

exchange-rate risk which are consistent with standard finance theory and also contribute significantly to the explanatory power of net-capital-flow equations in the partial adjustment formulation. His attempts to replace the capital-flows equations in the Mark I11 Model with his own formulation proved unsuccessful, however, as a consequence of the absence of a satisfactory correlation between the risk variables and the instrument variables. When Melvin uses an alternative data set covering 1973-78, the empirical dominance of his formulation improves over standard formulations. His results thus provide single-equation estimation results supportive of the empirical value of the portfolio approach. Part IV addresses the question of what were the causes of the inflation of the late 1960s and the 1970s in the United States and our other seven industrialized countries. In chapter 14, Gandolfi and Lothian use a reduced-form price equation derived along the lines of Barro (1978) to assess the relative roles of domestic money, international price and monetary developments, and oil price changes. Next Darby shows that purchasing-power parity can be a useful paradigm for understanding the harmonization of inflationary trends even though the predictability of the purchasing-power ratio deteriorates over time. The same analysis explains why monetary growth variations may explain nearly all variations in trend inflation rates despite random permanent shifts in the moneydemand function such as reported by Gandolfi and Lothian. In chapter 16, Darby confirms their findings that American money-supply growth has evolved independently of foreign influences and goes further to show that variations in American money growth explain practically all variations in American inflation trends. Thus an exogenous rise in American inflationary trends operating primarily via monetary channels to maintain purchasing-power-parity growth trends is found to be the dominant source of the inflation which infected the industrialized West in the early 1970s. Specifically, in chapter 14 Gandolfi and Lothian combine a Lucas aggregate supply function and a conventional money-demand function to obtain a reduced-form price equation in nominal money, permanent income, the long-term interest rate, and a distributed lag on moneysupply shocks. International factors enter these basic equations only indirectly through expected money supply as lagged scaled balances of payments or American money growth are found significant as predictors of current money growth. The authors tried adding foreign variables which might shift the aggregate supply function directly into their basic price equations: the real price of oil, a world commodity price index, the American price deflator, and a rest-of-world price index. These variables were generally insignificant although the oil price was significant in nearly all of the cases examined. The estimated fraction of total inflation attrib-

12

Chapter One

utable to oil price increases had a median value of only 15% for 1973-74, or 9 % over the longer period of 1973-76.4 In summary Gandolfi and Lothian’s results indicate that domestic monetary developments rather than foreign price movements were the dominant proximate determinant of price behavior with at most a supporting role for the oil price increase even during 1973-74. In chapter 15, Darby focuses on the statistical paradox that the variance of average growth rate of the purchasing-power ratio goes to 0 as the prediction interval increases while the variance of the level of the same ratio goes to infinity. He uses data from 1971 through 1978 to illustrate that substantial variations in the level of the purchasing-power ratio may occur even though the (exchange-rate converted) reserve country inflation rate adequately explains the domestic inflation rates in the nonreserve countries. The point is to illustrate the dominance of systematic factors in trend inflation despite the presence of significant random-walk elements moving other price levels relative to that of the United States. Darby elaborates this theme further in chapter 16. First, he shows that world inflation trends are determined exogenously under pegged exchange rates within the reserve-currency country if both its nominal money-supply growth and its real money-demand growth are unresponsive to foreign influences. The American money-supply reaction function is explored at length in search of a response to either gold flows or the balance of payments on a official reserves settlement basis. Since only insignificant and generally perverse effects of these variables are estimated, the conclusion is that American nominal money growth is indeed exogenous with respect to foreign influences. Finally, Darby turns to the question of whether or not the foreign influences on American real money demand detected with quarterly data have any significant influence on its trend growth rate. While a substantial fraction (40 to 20%) of the variance of inflation cannot be explained by nominal money growth using quarterly, annual, or biennial observations, this fraction drops to only 3% for quadrennial observations. Thus factors-domestic or foreign-other than nominal money growth variations play no appreciable role in explaining variations in either the growth rate of the real quantity of money demanded or the American inflation rate. We conclude that American inflation caused by the Federal Reserve System was an exogenous source of world inflationary trends. Because of the unwillingness of their central banks to appreciate or float their currencies until in extremis, the nonreserve countries too caught the American disease. The lag of the nonreserve countries behind the American lead noted previously in table 1.1reflects the operation of a slower specie-flow 4. These numbers are for the estimates made with a second-order autoregressive correction.

13

Introduction and Summary

mechanism rather than the smooth contemporaneous adjustment posited by the monetary approach. This mechanism may have accentuated the variability of the nonreserve inflation rates during the catch-up period of the early 1970s as increasing balance-of-payments surpluses finally induced very rapid money-supply growth. We opened this chapter with a summary of the conclusions that we have drawn from the research reported both in thisvolume and by others. Those conclusions and the reasons for them are presented in detail in the final chapter. If the research reported here has gone a long way toward answering basic questions about linkages among countries and the causes and cures of the recent inflation, it is only because there was so much to do. More remains to be done, and we close by outlining a program of promising areas for future research. Acknowledgments

The authors have benefited in drafting this chapter from conversations with the other contributors to this volume but are solely responsible for any opinions expressed here.

References Barro, R. J. 1978. Unanticipated money, output, and the price level in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 86 (August): 549-80. Darby, M. R. 1979. Intermediate macroeconomics. New York: McGrawHill.

2

The Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System Anna J. Schwartz

The international monetary system that was designed at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 reflected professional views on the defects of the arrangements that had prevailed in the 1930s. Protectionist trade policies, exchange controls, and competitive currency depreciations’ of the pre-World War I1 period were the cautionary experiences to be avoided by the postwar world. Removal of controls on trade and payments under a system of fixed exchange rates, with adjustment of parities limited to “fundamental” disequilibrium in the balance of payments, accordingly were the goals of the system created by the delegates to the conference. Exchange rates were to be pegged within narrow margins to the dollar. Countries would buy or sell dollars in the foreign exchange market to keep their currencies from appreciating or depreciating more than 1% from parity. The United States in turn would undertake to convert dollars into gold or the reverse at a fixed price of $35 an ounce. The International Monetary Fund, to which each member subscribed 25% of its quota in gold or 10% of its net official reserves of gold and dollars, whichever was smaller, was established by the terms of the Bretton Woods charter. It was expected that lending facilities of the Fund would be available to supplement the members’ gold and foreign exchange reserves to provide them liquidity when their balances-ofpayments were temporarily in deficit on current account. The establishment of par values for currencies was an important item on the Fund’s agenda. Of our sample of countries, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States declared their par values in December 1946, Germany and Japan in 1953, and Italy not until 1960. Some of these parities were short-lived. An abortive attempt 1. We share the view of Harry G. Johnson (1978) expressed in ExchangeRafe Flexibility: “It is not clear, actually, that therc was much competitive devaluation even in the 1930’s.” 14

15

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

at convertibility of sterling in 1947 ended in September 1949, when the pound was devalued. The Netherlands thereupon devalued the guilder, and France, which had had separate rates for financial and commercial transactions, unified them, depreciating the franc vis-8-vis sterling. The pegged exchange-rate system that was created collapsed in 1971.2 Following futile efforts to restore it, in 1973 governments reluctantly turned to managed floating exchange rates. In both regimes, the United States served as the reserve-currency country, other countries primarily holding dollar assets among their international reserves. Discussion of the institutions of the international monetary system is instructive for all the theoretical channels of international transmission of price change. One of these is completely monetary in nature and is therefore directly affected by the character of the international monetary system; the other three are nonmonetary, or in one instance only partially monetary, and hence may be only indirectly affected. The four channels are (1) international money flows as a result of international payments imbalances that affect the growth of national money supplies and eventually rates of price change; (2) direct effects on national prices and interest rates through international arbitrage of prices of goods and services or of interest rates as a result either of changes in the world quantity of money and prices or of cost factors independent of monetary conditions; (3) shifts in foreign demand for a country’s output that affect its prices; (4) effects on prices of changes in international basic commodity supplies. Some comments on each of the channels follow. 1. The money-flow channel was undoubtedly available during the postwar period. For the moment consider only the non-reserve-currency countries in the international monetary system. Under a pegged exchange-rate system, central banks must buy from or sell to their nationals foreign exchange, according as countries face a surplus or a deficit in the balance of payments. Central banks may also choose to do so under a managed floating exchange-rate regime. Whenever a central bank buys foreign exchange, it issues newly created high-powered money-usable as reserves by banks or currency by the public-just as if it had purchased government securities in an open market operation or bankers’ promissory notes through discounting. Conversely, a sale of foreign exchange destroys high-powered money just as does a reduction in the central bank’s portfolio of securities or discounts. For this reason, a balance-of-payments surplus is a source of increase, a balance-of-payments deficit a source of decrease in high-powered money in a strictly arithmetic, or accounting, sense. If, however, the central bank offsets (sterilizes) the effect of a bal2. Foreshadowing that breakdown were the revaluations of the deutsche mark in October 1969and the return to floating, albeit of a heavily manged sort, of the Canadian dollar in May 1970.

16

Chapter Two

ance-of-payments surplus by reducing its portfolio of domestic securities and discounts, or increasing it less than it otherwise would, there is no effect on the growth rate of high-powered money. The sources of growth in high-powered money then are flows of international reserves and domestic credit creation by the central bank. It was thus possible for a non-reserve-currency country either to accept imported inflation or deflation, or for a time to resist such an outcome by sterilizing under pegged exchange rates.3 Under floating rates, the country had the additional option of varying its exchange rate to protect its price level. For the U.S., the reserve-currency country, the effect of deficits in its balance of payments had no necessary contractionary effect on Federal Reserve policies under either exchange system. The acquisition of dollars by foreign central banks did not reduce U.S. high-powered money. Dollars were either credited to the balance of those banks at Federal Reserve banks or else committed to the purchase of U.S. Treasury debt. Until March 1968, the gold requirement to which Federal Reserve notes were subject may have served as a constraint, but once abolished there was no legal limitation on the creation of high-powered money or moneysupply growth, even after the 1970s, when the Federal Reserve system began specifying targets for growth rates of money. Until U.S. monetary policy shifted to an inflationary course in the mid-l960s, deficits in the U.S. balance of payments provided the rest of the world with desired dollars. After the shift occurred, the defense of sterilizing undesired additions to dollar holdings as the U.S. balance of payments deteriorated was eventually overwhelmed by the magnitude of the required operation. Given the commitment to pegged exchange rates that surplus countries were reluctant to break by revaluing, dollars increased their high-powered money stocks and inflation rates. In the absence of such a commitment and the adoption of flexible exchange rates, short-run independence of national high-powered money stocks is increa~ed.~ 2. The operation of the arbitrage channels of transmission requires a high degree of, and in the extreme perfect, substitutability of goods and financial assets among c o u n t r i e ~ Applied .~ to the goods markets, the perfect-substitutability view is usually described as the “law of one price level.” Another approach stresses the effects of changes in wages, exter3. Laskar in chapter 11 provides a particularly thorough econometric investigation of this sterilization question. Cassese and Lothian in chapter 4 and Darby and Stockman in chapter 6 also present evidence relevant to this issue. 4. Some, however, view currency substitution and asset substitution as limiting national monetary independence even under floating exchange rates. See, for instance, Miles (1978) and Brittain (1981). The Darby and Stockman investigation of this question in chapter 6, however, lends considerably less support to these propositions. 5 . See section 17.2 for a summary of the evidence on the arbitrage channel contained in various papers in this volume.

17

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

nal prices, and productivity on the two sectors of tradable versus nontradable goods which characterize open economies. The law of one price level, or the “goods arbitrage approach,” emphasizes the impact of world monetary growth on the rise in prices; the second approach emphasizes “structural” factors that allow no such role for monetary conditions. Restrictions on international trade and capital flows obviously block the operation of this channel, which denies the degree of autonomy to individual countries attributed to them by the first channel under fixed exchange rates. Even if international equalizing of tradable goods prices is assumed, inflation rates can differ between countries if relative prices of traded and nontraded goods vary. Under flexible exchange rates, transmission of a different sort may occur because an immediate change in the foreign exchange value of domestic money, as a result of expectations of future domestic monetary policy, will affect domestic money prices of imports and tradable goods and thus the domestic inflation rate.6 For the alternative approach, exchange-rate changes may provide a signal to price and wage setters of changes in economic conditions. 3. Monetary growth plays no direct role in the operation of this or the following channel. Downward shifts in foreign demand for a country’s output lead to declines in prices, output, and incomes, through a contractionary multiplier effect; upward shifts, to increases in prices, output, and incomes, through an expansionary multiplier effect.’ This channel may be important under fixed exchange rates for particular countries, for example, the effects of U.S. real income changes on the demand for Canadian exports, or of German real income changes on the demand for Austrian exports, but not necessarily so for the transmission from the U.S. to European countries. Floating exchange rates may decrease the magnitude of the effects through this channel. 4. Transmission through this channel occurs because the rise in prices of basic commodities is viewed as entering either as supply components of products initially unaffected and raising their prices also or by pulling up the prices of substitute domestic inputs. Prices in all countries are affected, the effect depending on the input weights of these commodities in each economy. Some proponents of the importance of this channel also view exchange-rate changes as affecting export and import prices of basic commodities. Although thus far only the pegged and managed floating exchange-rate regimes have been mentioned, it is useful to distinguish four subperiods in the evolution of the international monetary system from 1955 to date: (1)the preconvertibility phase for nondollar currencies, 1955-58; (2) the 6 . Frenkel and Mussa (1981) discuss this and other channels. 7. The deterioration in the U.S. current account in 1971 has been identified by Harry G. Johnson (1972) as a source of increased demand by U.S. residents for foreign goods and services that raised their prices.

18

Chapter Two

heyday of the Bretton Woods dollar-exchange standard, 1959-67; (3) the weakening and ensuing collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements, 1968-73; (4) the managed floating exchange-rate phase, 1973 to date. For each of the subperiods we shall summarize developments that relate to the channels of international transmission of price change. 2.1

Preconvertibility, 1955-58

In 1955, when our data begin, postwar recovery in Europe was well under way. Wartime destruction and disruption in Europe and Asia left the countries there with limited productive capacity and swelled the immediate postwar demand for U.S. exports. Restrictions against dollar transactions were widespread, and multiple exchange rates were not unusual. In the postwar years before 1955, important steps had been taken to develop a system of multilateral trade and payments for Western European countries. Of these, the most significant was the establishment in the summer of 1950, with U.S. support, of the European Payments Union (EPU). Before 1950, the conduct of trade and payments among members of the EPU as well as with non-European countries was on a bilateral basis. By contrast, under the EPU, every month the multilateral net debtor-creditor position of each member with respect to other mernbers was determined. The dollar served as the unit of account, and each European currency was pegged at a fixed dollar parity with no band of admissible variation. Receipts and payments were expressed as claims against the clearing union, debtors paying a gradually increasing fraction of their deficits in gold or dollars, with creditor countries extending the balance as a loan to the EPU. Maximum credit lines for debtor countries were imposed, so that creditor countries were assured of eventual payment in gold or dollars. Paralleling the adoption of the clearing union, a trade liberalization program among members advanced. In trade with the United States, however, European countries applied discriminatory tariff and quota restrictions, which the United States did not protest, in order to enable them to accumulate gold and dollar assets. It was expected that the dollar gap problem, which in 1955 was widely regarded as a long-term one, would thereby be mitigated. In private gold markets until 1953, the price of gold was at a premium, but the IMF required monetary authorities to refrain from selling gold at premium prices. In March 1954, several months after the premium had been eliminated, reflecting balance of supply and demand, the London gold market reopened. For the rest of the decade the price of gold in private markets remained at $35 an ounce. Faced with deficits in its current account in 1957-58, France imposed import restrictions, devalued at the end of 1958, and borrowed mainly

19

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

from the United States, supplemented by EPU and IMF credits, which were conditioned on a ceiling on public expenditures and the budget deficit, as well as restrictive monetary policy by the Banque de France. Until 1958, all foreign exchange transactions required the approval of central banks, which were the agents under the EPU for arranging settlements. They were thus well positioned to maintain exchange controls and payments restrictions. With the dissolution of the EPU on 24 December 1958, fifteen Western European countries (including the five in our sample) made their currencies convertible for current transactions. It was not until 1961, however, that restrictions against U.S. exports were removed. Most countries maintained strict controls against capital outflows. Only Germany in 1957 authorized its residents to export capital in any form anywhere in the world and permitted nonresidents to convert the proceeds of capital transactions in D-marks into any other currency. Japan’s recovery from the war was less rapid than that of the Western European countries. Its current account remained in deficit until the mid-l960s, and it continued exchange and capital flow restrictions until 1964. Canada enjoyed special status in the international system. Although the IMF, in line with the prevailing U.S. view, set fixed exchange rates as the monetary regime par excellence, it tolerated the decision made by Canada in 1950 to float its dollar. Canada did not revert to a fixed rate until 1962. The reason for floating was to resist the inflationary effects that U.S. capital inflows produced under fixed exchange rates.8 2.2 The Heyday of the Bretton Woods Dollar-Exchange Standard, 1959-67

With the return of many European currencies to convertibility in 1958, the achievement of the Bretton Woods conception of international monetary normalcy seemed only a matter of time. The outflow of dollars in U.S. official aid, military spending, and private investment, and economic recovery in Europe and Japan had enabled foreigners to add to their holdings of dollars and gold. Apart from the 1950-51 Korean War upsurge, U.S. prices were generally stable until the middle of the 1960s, and their rate of rise generally lower than in the rest of the world (table 2.1). Money supplies in the rest of the world (except in the U.K.) grew at a faster rate than in the U.S. (table 2.2). Part of the difference between this generally faster monetary growth in the rest of the world than in the United States was not reflected in a difference in inflation rates. Real income growth in general was much more rapid in Europe and Japan, which were still recovering from the 8. See Paul Wonnacott (1965) for a discussion of the Canadian float during this period.

20

Chapter Two

Table 2.1

Quarterly Rates of Change of Consumer Prices at Annual Rates (percent per year)

Period'

CA'

FR

GE

IT

JA

NE

UK

US

19551-58IV 1958IV-67IV 1967IV-731 19731-76IV

2.02 2.07 4.13 8.85

5.37 3.54 5.57 10.68

2.05 2.41 4.45 4.89

2.01 3.61 4.58 16.09

0.88 4.99 5.87 13.19

3.32 3.32 6.17 8.92

3.75 2.86 6.86 16.36

2.04 1.73 4.58 7.95

'All rates are computed from the first quarter of each period to the quarter which ends the period. Periods mark changes in international monetary institutions. 'Throughout this volume the following country mnemonics are used: CA Canada JA Japan NE Netherlands FR France UK United Kingdom GE G e rm a n y IT Italy us United States Table 2.2

Quarterly Rates of Change of Money' at Annual Rates (percent per year)

Period$

CA

FR

GE

IT

JA

NE

19551-58IV 1958IV-67IV 19671V-731 19731-76IV

5.67 6.79 10.97 16.21

8.74 12.15 9.40 12.99

10.52 8.01 12.75 5.07

11.96 13.26 14.02 19.29

17.11 17.41 18.11 13.16

5.27 7.90 11.98 15.01

UK

US

-0.46 6.00 11.09 11.52

3.34 5.83 8.09 8.62

'Money is defined as currency plus adjusted demand and time deposits held by the public. 'All rates of change computed from the first quarter of each subperiod to the quarter which ends the subperiod.

war. Furthermore in some of these countries at least the inaome elasticity of demand for money was higher than in the U.S. (See Gandolfi and Lothian, chapter 14, for estimates.) That some difference in inflation was actually maintained over long periods without devaluations may be due to changes in the relative prices of tradable to nontradable goods in these more rapidly growing economies. Differences over shorter periods, particularly during the early 1970s, are explainable in terms of lags in the operation of U.S. reserve flows on monetary growth in the nonreserve countries. The dollar's status as the reserve currency of the international economy seemed impregnable during these years. Commercial banks and private firms could make foreign payments in their convertible currencies without the approval of central banks. Tariff and quota restrictions on commodity trade among the industrialized countries were eased, and foreign trade grew at a rapid rate during the period. International transfers of capital grew, with New York at the center of the flows and the dollar as the vehicle currency in which the borrowers obtained capital and the investors lent their savings.

21

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

The successful operation of the system depended on foreign central banks intervening with their own currencies against the dollar to maintain par values and the United States standing ready to buy or sell gold at $35 per ounce in transactions with foreign monetary authorities. The U.S. balance of payments accordingly was determined by the exchange parities other countries established. In general, other countries desired surpluses that would add to their dollar reserves, and the system tended to produce a steadily weakening U.S. balance of payments and growing doubts about the sustainability of the U.S. gold convertibility commitment. 2.2.1 Gold and the Dollar A portent of the troubled future of the system was that 1960 was the first year in which U.S. gold reserves declined below the level of its total liquid liabilities to all foreign holders of assets denominated in dollars (table 2.3). Until March 1961, the U.S. intervened to maintain the price of gold by selling and buying dollars. Concern over the continuing conversion of dollars into gold led the Treasury to activate the Exchange Stabilization Fund. In its initial operations on 13 March 1961, acting through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as its agent, the Fund sold forward D-marks to reduce the premium on that currency.yOn 13 February 1962 the bank was also authorized to buy or sell foreign currencies on behalf of the Federal Open Market Committee in both spot and forward markets. For this purpose a stock of foreign currencies in addition to those acquired from the Stabilization Fund was needed. The Federal Reserve therefore negotiated a network of swap facilities with the central banks of other countries. The swap provided a specified amount of foreign currency in exchange for an equivalent dollar credit for the foreign central bank, with each party protected against loss from a change in the par value of the other party’s currency. Invested balances of both parties earned the same rate of interest, foreign balances in special U.S. Treasury certificates, Federal Reserve balances in interest-earning deposits abroad. Balances were available for payments to the other party or for foreign exchange market transactions. The swap was a credit line, usually for three-month periods, renewable at maturity. By drawing on the credit, both parties initially raised their gross reserves. The Federal Reserve normally used the proceeds of a swap to absorb foreign official dollar holdings; these transactions in effect provided forward cover to foreign official dollarholders, reducing their incentive to convert dollars into gold. 9. See “Treasury and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations,” in the September 1962 Federal Reserve Bulletin (pp. 1138-53), for a discussion of the system’s role in the gold market during this period.

22

Chapter Two

Table 2.3

United States Monetary Gold Stock and Liquid Liabilities to Foreigners (millions of dollars) ~ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

~

End of Year (1)

Total Monetary Gold Stock (2)

1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959

21,793 21,753 22,058 22,857 20,582 19,507

1960

17,804

1961

16,947

1962

16,057

1963

15,596

1964

15,471

1965

13,806$

1966

13,235

1967

12,065

1968

10,892

1969

11,859

1970

11,072

1971

10,206

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

10,487' 11,652++ 11,652 11,599 11,598

~

Total Liquid Liabilities to All Foreignersi (3) 12.454 13.524 15,291 15,825 16,845 19,428

22,853 122.936 24,068 26,361 (26.322 28,951 {29,002 29,115 29,904 129.779 33,271 (33,119 33,828 133,614 41.735 43,29 1 (43,242

78,680 87,620 120,325" 127,43244 152,468"

Sources: Col. (2), Treasury Bulletin, December 1965, IFS-1; July 1975, IFS-1; February 1982, IFS- 1. Col. (3). Treasury Bulletin, July 1975, IFS-2; February 1982, IFS-2. 'The stock includes gold sold to the U.S. by the IMF with the right of repurchase, and gold deposited by the IMF to mitigate the impact on the U.S. of foreign purchases for the purpose of making gold subscriptions to the IMF under quota increases. 'The figure excludes $259 million gold subscription to the IMF in June 1965 for a U.S. quota increase that bccame effective 23 February 1966.

23

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

Repayments of short-term swap credits meant a corresponding decline in gross reserves. For the U.S. this could entail a loss of gold. To deter this eventuality, the U.S. began issuing nonmarketable bonds, with maturities of fifteen months to two years, denominated in the holder’s currency, to fund outstanding swap debt. The bonds were, however, convertible into Treasury bills on demand.’O A further indication of U.S. concern about gold was the prohibition after mid-1961 on the holding of gold outside the U.S. by U.S. firms and households, and on 3 March 1965 the abolition of gold reserve requirements against Federal Reserve deposits. A focus of pressure on the U.S. dollar was the London gold market. In March 1960, the price rose above $35 an ounce, as European central banks and private investors bought gold for dollars. The Bank of England sold gold to stabilize the price, but the U.S. Treasury initially was not willing to restore the bank’s holdings. Hence, when a rise in the price of gold occurred in October, the bank did not intervene. On 27 October, with the price reaching $40 an ounce, the Treasury agreed to sell gold to the bank, reserving for the bank the decision on intervention in the market. European central banks soon after agreed to refrain from buying gold in the London market for monetary purposes whenever the price rose above $35.20, the U.S. price plus shipping costs. When the price fell below that level in 1961, the central banks returned to the market. However, in October 1961, when the price again was reacting to heightened demand, an agreement to create a “gold pool” was reached among the U.S. and seven European governments. Each member undertook to supply an agreed portion of net gold sales to stabilize the market, as the Bank of England as agent of the group determined to be appropriate. The members of the pool subsequently agreed not to buy gold individually on the market, but to give the Bank of England the right to buy on their joint account when gold supply exceeded demand, the amount purchased to be distributed in proportion to each country’s contribution to the pool. The 10. In addition, the United States issued nonmarketable bonds, starting in 1963.

*The total includes small amounts due to the IMF arising from gold transactions, amounts due to official institutions, commercial banks abroad, to other foreigners, and to nonmonetary and regional organizations. Nonliquid liabilities to official institutions included in the source beginning 1962 through 1973 have been deducted. Years for which two entries are shown show differences because of changes in reporting coverage. Figures on the first line are comparable to figures for preceding dates; figures on the second line are comparable to those for the following dates. “Change in par value of dollar on 8 May 1972 increased the value of the total gold stock by $822 million. ttChange in par value of dollar on 18 October 1973 increased the value of the gold stock by $1,165 million. ggIncludescategories of liabilities previously classified as nonliquid.

24

Chapter Two

pool functioned until the end of 1967, when a surge of buying led to the suspension of the agreement in March 1968. During the period of the pool's operation, the participants sold a net of $2.5 billion of gold on the London market, of which $1.6 billion was provided by the United States.

2.2.2 The Dollar's Performance A key development for the international monetary system that was not perceived as such at the time was the acceleration of the U.S. monetary growth rate and the subsequent acceleration of the U.S. inflation rate in the final years of this subperiod. What was perceived was the cumulative growth of deficits in the U.S. balance of payments. Assets denominated in dollars grew in excess of the demand for them by the rest of the world. Their conversion into gold, by shrinking U.S. gold reserves, threatened one of the basic underpinnings of the Bretton Woods structure, namely, convertibility of dollars into gold. One measure the U.S. authorities might have taken was a raise in the dollar price of gold, thus increasing the value of the stock and the flow of reserve assets. If other countries did not follow suit by adopting a proportional increase in the price of gold in their currencies, the U.S. in this way might have obtained a devaluation of the dollar that the Bretton Woods system otherwise ruled out. Had the price of gold risen, the gold demands of other countries might have been satisfied without the rundown in U.S. reserve assets. Some countries might also have revalued because of the inflationary consequences of their payments surplus, given the gold-based increase in their asset holdings. The U.S.,however, resolutely opposed a change in the monetary price of gold. Such action would have required an Act of Congress which would have produced a long and unsettling debate in the two Houses, during which time the foreign exchange markets would have been disturbed. Moreover, there was no assurance that other countries would not make corresponding changes in their own par values, and it was feared that confidence in the stability of the monetary system would be seriously impaired by a change in the official dollar price of gold. Given the fixed price of gold when national price levels were rising, gold became an undervalued asset with a resulting gold shortage. The Bretton Woods system might have been able to survive an end of gold convertibility. It could not survive inflationary monetary policy in the center country that characterized the decade from the mid-1960s on. Crisis management by the IMF and the central banks of the leading industrialized countries became the hallmark of the international monetary system during the heyday of Bretton Woods." The chief currency 11. Margaret de Vries (1976).

25

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

under pressure, apart from the dollar, was sterling. Persistent or recurring U.K. balance-of-payments deficits impaired the credibility of sterling’s external value, already insecure by reason of the size of sterling balances held worldwide relative to U.K. gold and foreign exchange reserves. Private agents displayed lack of confidence in the dollar and sterling by shifting to currencies whose external values were regarded as stable or likely to appreciate (during this period, the D-mark and guilder). Repeated rescue operations to support the exchange value of sterling were overwhelmed in November 1967. Sterling, however, was a sideshow. The main act was the dollar’s performance. A variety of measures, adopted in countries with over- or undervalued currencies to stave off devaluation or revaluation, affected the channels of international transmission of price change. ’* Surplus countries tried to avoid price increases, deficit countries price declines, both as external consequences of their balance-of-payments positions. Intermittently, depending on cyclical conditions, countries in both categories took steps to right payments imbalances.

2.2.3 Growth of World Foreign Reserves Since palliatives to improve the balance of payments proved ineffective, deficits had to be financed either by drawing down reserves or seeking external credit or borrowing facilities, while surpluses obviously increased net reserve accumulations. During the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, despite the growth of dollar assets, the adequacy of international liquidity, in the sense of the quantity of international monetary reserves, was widely debated. Discussions during this period growing out of misplaced concern for the supply of reserves ultimately led to the creation of SDRs by the IMF, but that development belongs in the account of the breakdown of the system.I3Until the end of 1967, international reserves were limited to gold, convertible foreign exchange, and reserve positions in the IMF. Contrary to the design of Bretton Woods, financing of payments imbalances for the most part was arranged through credits governments extended on a bilateral basis and through international borrowing and lending activities of commercial banks. Thus, to restore depleted reserves of countries with persistent deficits, facilities for borrowing were created in addition to drawings from the IMF. Official dollar reserves of the surplus countries were augmented at times by actions those countries took in the Eurodollar market. Dollars 12. For a description of the controls that were imposed, see the various editions of the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. 13. Underlying the emphasis upon international liquidity during this period and the subsequent introduction of SDRs, as Lance Girton (1974) has pointed out, was the real-bills doctrine, in this instance applied to the international realm rather than to its preferred habitat, the domestic.

26

Chapter Two

acquired by their central banks and deposited in the Eurodollar market either directly or through the Bank for International Settlements would usually be re-lent to private borrowers who could resell the dollars to the central banks. With the exception of the U.K. and the U.S., all the countries in our sample increased their holdings of international reserves. In sum, world reserves grew during the period, leaving greater scope for the direct monetary channel of transmission of inflation to operate (table 2.4). 2.3

Weakening and Collapse of Bretton Woods, 1968-73

The devaluation of sterling in November 1967 was not regarded as the prelude to changes in the par values of other currencies, the devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold, the realignment of exchange-rate relations among the major currencies, and the substitution of a short-lived regime of central rates for the par value system-all of which took place between November 1967 and December 1971. Instead, it was hoped that balance in the U.S. and U.K. external payments was finally on the point of achievement, and that the creation of a special drawing rights facility in the IMF would replace reserve assets that dollar and sterling deficits had provided. The hope was belied. The pattern of deficits and surpluses persisted and worsened in 1970 and 1971. The U.S. current account surplus dwindled, and the U.S. capital account deficit grew dramatically, producing current account surpluses and capital inflows in other countries. The activation of SDRs in 1970-72 provided additions to already massive acquisitions of dollar reserve assets.I4 As in the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, disbelief of market participants in the pegged external values of currencies precipitated eruptions of turbulence in foreign exchange and gold markets, but the heart of the problem affecting the international monetary system was the performance of the dollar. The failure of the U.S. to maintain price stability led to institutional change in 1968, repegging in 1971, and finally the total collapse of fixed exchange-rate parities in 1973. 2.3.1

Foreign Exchange Turbulence

In May 1968, student riots in France touched off strikes and lockouts throughout the country. The settlement raised hourly wage rates by 11%, shortened the work week, and provoked a flight of capital, primarily into D-marks but also into gold. Rumors of a revaluation of the mark encour14. By the end of the fourth quarter of 1972, the value of SDRs was slightly over $9.4 billion, o r 6% of total world international reserves as reported by the IMF (Znfernufional Financial Srufisrics, July 1974).

Table 2.4

1953- 58IV 1958IV-671V 1967IV-731 19731-76IV

Average Quarterly Change at Annual Rates and Variance in the Level of International Reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)

CA

FR

GE

IT

JA

NE

8 (9) 40 (325) 477 ( 1,026) - 248 (638)

- 301 (824) 766 (265) 619 (11,638) - 563 (20,341)

797 (83 1) 219 (1,471) 4,504 (68,212) 195 (152,624)

307 ( 126) 199 (364) 323 (1,359) 1,202 (44,234)

- 45 (238) 102 (118) 3,059 (22,856) - 664 (2,005)

56 (92) 90 (76) 538 (826) 406 (743)

Note. Variances are shown in parentheses beneath the change figures

UK

us - 297 (1,879) - 694 (1,100) - 339 ( 13,719) 537 (1,523)

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aged further shifts of funds. France imposed tighter price controls, restricted imports and some external payments, introduced subsidies for exports, and imposed exchange controls. These measures were revoked in September, and credit restrictions substituted. In November, the flight from francs to marks intensified, and on 20 November, major European exchange markets were shut down. Between April and November 1968, official French foreign exchange reserves declined by $2.9 billion. France resisted advice to devalue, Germany advice to revalue. Germany imposed a temporary export tax and an import subsidy, and in December a 100% reserve requirement on increases in nonresident deposits in German banks, but almost immediately relaxed the measure as funds flowed out. France in turn restored exchange and credit controls, the former having only been fully relaxed a year earlier, cut public spending and increased indirect taxes, and imposed ceilings on commercial bank lending and raised interest rates. The deficit in the French current account grew in the first two quarters of 1969, and capital that flowed to Germany not only from France but also from the U.K. and other countries totaled $4.4 billion in May. Again, Germany adopted measures to deter the inflow: a 50% reserve requirement for nonresident deposits received before 15 April and 15% on resident deposits. The French tightened restrictions on bank credit and raised minimum requirements for hire purchase. In July funds for public investment programs were frozen. When the drain on French reserves continued and short-term debts of $2.3 billion had been incurred, France finally gave in and devalued by 11.11% as of 10 August. Currencies linked to the French franc followed suit. Thanks to increased monetary growth in the U.S. and the resultant higher balance-of-payments deficit, France rapidly moved from $1.7 billion deficit on current account in 1969 to a small surplus in 1970, an overall balance-of-payments surplus of $2 billion in that year and of $3.4 billion in 1971. Official reserves grew correspondingly. The perception that the D-mark was undervalued in relation to the dollar, now that the French franc had been devalued, led to a further flow of funds to Germany. A few days before German elections in October 1969, the Bundesbank closed the exchange market, and a day after reopening it, permitted the D-mark to float. The spot rate against the dollar appreciated, and on 26 October, a revaluation of 9.29% was announced. Although there was a capital outflow in the last quarter of 1969, by 1970 there were large inflows of foreign funds and official reserves increased substantially. Domestic inflation in Germany was thereby eventually worsened. The persistent outflow of funds from the U.S. overwhelmed foreign exchange markets in the first few days of May 1971. On 5 May seven European countries closed their foreign exchange markets, and five other

29

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

countries on several continents withdrew their support for the dollar and suspended dealings in D-marks, guilders, and Swiss francs. On 9 May, both Germany and the Netherlands announced that their currencies would float, since they could not maintain exchange rates within the established margins. 2.3.2 Gold and the Dollar The gold market was the second market in which participants expressed lack of confidence in the dollar-based international monetary system. After the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, the vulnerability of the dollar took center stage. In the winter of 1967-68, a surge of demand for gold threatened both the London Gold Pool and the statutory backing for Federal Reserve notes that then amounted to $10 billion. On 12 March 1968 the U.S. gold reserve requirement was abolished. Ostensibly, the gold stock was then available for conversion of dollars held by foreign central banks. On 17 March, however, the London gold market was closed to avoid further U.S. gold losses. The members of the gold pool announced that they would no longer supply gold to the London or any other gold market or buy gold from the market. Official transactions between central banks were to be conducted at the unchanged official price of $35 an ounce, but the gold price for private transactions was to be determined in the market. Central banks were still free de jure to buy U.S. Treasury gold for dollars but in fact refrained from doing so. Germany had explicitly forsworn converting its dollar holdings into gold in May 1967. In March 1971, before the panic of the foreign exchange market, there was a request from several European countries for conversion of officially held dollars into gold to enable them to pay for an increase in their IMF quotas. The payout reduced the U.S. gold stock to the lowest level since 1936. The dollar outflow meanwhile accelerated, leading, as noted, to the floating of European currencies. The devaluation of the dollar vis-A-vis the D-mark as the result of the float left unsolved the dollar’s exchange rate vis-A-vis the yen. Japan’s capital controls were proof against the dollar flows that inundated European foreign exchange markets, but not against the large deficit in U.S. trade with Japan. That bilateral trade imbalance was a provocation, over and above the imbalance between U.S. reserves and outstanding dollar liabilities, for the changes the U.S. introduced on 15 August 1971 to achieve a dollar devaluation. Chief among them (besides a price and wage freeze, tax increases, and federal government spending cuts) was a 10% import surcharge on 50% of total U.S. imports. The convertibility of the dollar into gold was formally suspended, as was the use of the swap network through which dollars could be exchanged with central banks for other currencies. The effect was to oblige other countries to hold dollars or to trade them for a price

30

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determined in the market and so to revalue their currencies. Foreign exchange markets abroad, except in Japan, shut down. The Japanese initial attempt to maintain the pegged rate of the yen compelled them to purchase $4 billion in the two weeks after 15 August. The yen was then freed to float upward; other currencies floated when exchange markets were reopened on 23 August. France introduced a dual exchange market, with tradc and government exchange dealings based on the par value, financial exchange dealings at a floating rate. Restoration of a repegged system of exchange rates, however, remained the goal of the U.S. and its partners. After much negotiation, a readjustment of currency parities was arranged at a meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington on 17-18 December 1971. In return the U.S. agreed to withdraw the import surcharge. The currencies of six of the countries in our sample (plus those of nonsample ones) were revalued by percentages ranging from 2%% (the Netherlands) to 7.7% (Japan) with the proviso that 2%% margins of fluctuation (replacing the former 1% margin) above and below the socalled central exchange rates were permissible. The Canadian dollar continued to float. The Smithsonian agreement also specified that the official dollar price of gold would henceforth be $38, a concession by the U.S. for appearance' sake only, since the dollar remained inconvertible. The new price of gold implied a depreciation of 7.9% of the gold value of the dollar rather than an appreciation of the dollar value of other currencies. 2.3.3 European Economic Community Snake The notion of a European monetary union had been the subject of discussion for years. Implementing the notion had been scheduled for a start in June 1971. The floating of the D-mark in May delayed the introduction of the plan to keep fluctuations between EEC-country currencies within narrower limits than those vis-a-vis the dollar. The activation of the snake came in April 1972 in response to the 21/4% margin above and below the central rate that the Smithsonian agreement set. In relation to the dollar a European currency could fluctuate by 4'h% from floor to ceiling, but in relation to another European currency the relative fluctuation could be as much as 9% if one rose from floor to ceiling and the other fell from ceiling to floor. The motivation for the snake was to narrow margins of fluctuation between E E C currencies by a convergence of economic and monetary policies so that exchange parities among them would be fixed. Operationally, if an E E C currency premium over its central rate plus the discount on the central rate of another E EC currency reached 21/4% (half the amount permitted by the Smithsonian agreement), the weak currency was to be bought by the strong currency. The purchase could be

31

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

made by the weak-currency country, by the strong-currency country, or by both. A monthly settlement was provided, so the creditor country could exchange the weak currency acquired for a desired reserve asset and obtain repayment for its short-term credit facility if it had lent its currency to the debtor. Debtors were to make settlement in a prescribed mix of reserve assets. Six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands) originally joined the snake; three others joined in May 1972 but left in June (U.K., Denmark, Eire). Denmark rejoined in October 1972, Italy left in December 1972. France left in January 1974, rejoined in July 1975, and left again in March 1976. Sweden and Norway, non-EEC countries, joined in May 1972. Sweden left in August 1977.15 The feasibility of the snake was dubious in the absence of consensus by the national governments to yield to the union direct monetary autonomy and control over exchange-rate changes, and to seek convergence of economic policies.

2.3.4 The End of the Sterling Area Within weeks after joining the snake, sterling came under pressure in foreign exchange markets. The central banks of the EEC countries supported sterling, but on the next settlement day the U.K. would have had to repay them. On 22 June 1972 the bank rate was raised by 1%,and on the following day the exchange rate was floated. The float marked the end of the sterling area. Capital flows to overseas sterling areas were made subject to the same exchange controls as other areas, and Bank of England approval was required for official foreign exchange for direct investment in the overseas sterling area. Only a few small countries of the sixty-five that had formerly pegged their currencies on sterling continued to do so after sterling floated. 2.3.5

The End of the Convertible Dollar Standard

The central rates established at the Smithsonian meeting crumbled during the nine months following the floating of sterling. Once again, the disbelief of market participants in those rates was revealed in the gold and foreign exchange markets. The London free market price of gold rose with few reversals. Money growth and inflation rates continued to rise in the U.S., and both the balance of trade and the U.S. balance-ofpayments deficit soared, with a corresponding surge in dollar holdings of 15. Many changes in exchange rates within the snake were made. On four occasions between March 1973 and October 1978, the mark was revalued within the system. The guilder and the Norwegian krone were each revalued once. Countries other than Germany devalued in October 1976. The Swedish krona was subsequently devalued again, as was the Danish krone, and the Norwegian krone several times. For a table on these changes, see Major (1979, pp. 212-13).

32

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the industrialized European countries and Japan. Capital controls were imposed in 1972 by the Netherlands and Japan before sterling was floated, and Germany followed suit afterward. On 10 February 1973 Japan closed its foreign exchange market and suspended support of the dollar. New central values were set in a hurried round of negotiations, although the lira, yen, Canadian dollar, U.K. and Irish pounds, and Swiss franc all floated. Again, the official price of gold was raised (this time to $42.22), leaving unchanged the gold value of other currencies. The new central rates did not staunch the flow of dollars abroad, and a further crisis erupted in March 1973. This time the major industrial countries discontinued pegging their exchange rates to the dollar. The EEC countries in the snake plus Sweden and Norway agreed to a joint float, with Germany revaluing by 3% (in terms of SDRs) in relation to the other members. Canada, Japan, and Switzerland floated individually, as did a handful of other countries. Though a large group of nonindustrialized countries pegged to the dollar, the dollar currency area worldwide contracted; smaller groups of countries pegged to the French franc or to the pound. Market forces had triumphed. 2.4 Managed Floating Exchange Rates When pegged rates were abandoned in March 1973, it was initially assumed that floating was a temporary expedient to be succeeded by a reformed par value system. The U.S. took the lead in opposing the return to such a system. The dispersion of inflation rates among the industrialized countries and the higher variability of rates of inflation since the late 1960s enforced more frequent changes of exchange rates. Under the earlier system, changes in par values were delayed until foreign exchange market crises were provoked. The lesson since the shift in March 1973 was that floating provided more flexibility. The U S . view prevailed. With the suspension of official gold convertibility, and widespread departures from the IMF’s par value provisions, negotiations were held to codify, in the form of amendments to the IMF Articles, the international monetary arrangements that had evolved in practice. Under the amendments to the IMF Articles agreed on in early 1976 and implemented in April 1978, gold was formally removed from its previous central role in the IMF and IMF par value obligations were eliminated. The official IMF gold price was abolished, as were also gold convertibility and maintenance of gold value obligations. Gold was eliminated as a significant instrument in IMF transactions with members, and the IMF was empowered to dispose of its large gold holdings. Although the amended IMF Articles provide for the future possibility of establishing a system of stable but adjustable par values, such a decision by the Fund

33

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

would require an 85% affirmative vote by the members, thus giving the United States an effective veto. The provisions in the amended IMF Articles relating to the establishment of par values specify that the common denominator of the system shall not be gold or a currency. It is useful to examine the manner in which various aspects of the international monetary system have been affected by the shift from the pegged to the managed floating exchange-rate system. These aspects include ( a ) the role of reserve assets and of dollar assets; ( b ) the role of gold; ( c ) the role of central bank intervention in foreign exchange markets; ( d ) the variability of exchange rates; ( e ) the role of monetary policy. 2.4.1 Role of Reserve Assets and of Dollar Assets It was widely believed that the stock of reserve assets would contract in a world of floating exchange rates compared to a world of pegged rates. In fact, (nominal) official holdings of reserve assets have increased every year since the float. From 1950 to 1969, on average, world reserves including gold rose by less than 3% per year, the foreign exchange component by 5% per year. From the end of 1969 to the end of 1972, the average annual rate of increase of foreign currency reserves was 43%. Since 1973, the average annual rate of increase has been 15%. The main source of growth of foreign currency reserves since 1973, as in earlier years, has been in the form of dollars.I6The demand for reserves has increased even under floating rates because the system is substantially managed. *’ A significant change in the distribution of foreign exchange reserves has occurred since October 1973 as a result of the rise in the price of oil. Total foreign exchange reserves of industrial oil-importing countries have increased at a slightly slower pace than reserves of all countries, which sextupled since 1970, but the major oil-exporting countries, which in 1970 held only about 8% of total world foreign exchange reserves, by the end of the decade held about one-quarter of the total. The motivations of oil-exporting countries for holding foreign-currency denominated assets are, however, clearly quite different from those of industrial countries. Although other currencies have increased their role as reserve currencies in recent years, the dollar has continued to serve as the main reserve currency, accounting for about 80% of the world’s official foreign exchange reserves. To the extent of intervention, as under pegged rates, the 16. Although in December 1978 the IMF resumed the allocation of SDRs to member countries at a rate of 4 billion SDR per year (to be continued for aperiod of three years), the action had no immediate effect on the growth of reserves. The reason is that an increase in quotas, of which one-fourth was payable in SDRs, took effect in 1979, Accordingly, about 5 billion SDRs reverted to the IMF in that year. 17. Frenkel(1978), using time series of cross section data, provides evidence of substantial similarities in the demand for international reserves between exchange-rate regimes.

34

Chapter Two

U.S. has settled its payments deficits in dollars, which foreigners willingly add to their asset holdings and use in payments to other countries. The dollar also remains the main official intervention currency in foreign exchange markets and serves as a common vehicle currency in the interbank market for foreign exchange. In effect, the world has adopted an inconvertible dollar standard. One change in the international reserve profile was the creation on 13 March 1979 of the European Monetary System-replacing the “smaller” size European joint float-by nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Eire, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; the U.K. is a member but does not participate in intervention arrangements). The center of the system is the European Currency Unit (a basket of all nine currencies), issued by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund in an amount equal to a deposit of 20% of gold and dollar reserves of participating countries, to be used for settlement of intervention debts (see below). ECUs now included in foreign exchange holdings of the participating countries, except for revaluation changes, do not increase world monetary reserves.’K With gold valued at market price, gold reserves at the end of 1979 were larger than foreign exchange reserves. The U.S., however, values its own gold assets at the official price of $42.22 per ounce, despite the abolition of an official IMF price for gold. If a high rate of growth of world foreign exchange reserves provides evidence of an international transmission process at work, it is apparent that no change in behavior in the aggregate has occurred in that regard since 1973.

2.4.2 The Role of Gold After the float, the U.S. took the position that gold should be demonetized. An opposing view was promoted principally by France. Developments reflect the extent to which one or the other dominated international decisions. At issue was the use of gold in official transactions at the free market price, and the substitution of gold for the dollar in inter-central bank settlcments at a fixed but higher official price. The prescription against official transactions in the gold market that had been adopted in March 1968 was terminated in November 1973, but the official price of $42.22 posted in February 1973 was so far below the private market price that central banks were unwilling to buy and sell gold among themselves at the official price. The central banks were equally reluctant to sell gold on the private market in view of the possible 18. The ECUs issued value gold on the basis of either the average market price of the six preceding months or the average market price on the day before issue. whichever was lower.

35

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

depressive effect of sales on the market price or in anticipation of the opportunity to sell in the future at a higher price. In December 1973 the IMF terminated arrangements made four years earlier, under which it had been prepared to purchase gold from South Africa. In June 1974 countries in the Group of Ten (the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden) agreed that gold could be used as collateral for intercentral bank loans at a price other than the official gold price, and in September Italy obtained a loan from Germany on the pledge of Italian gold valued at a mutually agreed price. In December the U.S. and France agreed that central banks were at liberty in valuing gold holdings for balance sheet purposes to use the market price, which the Bank of France proceeded to do. Early in 1975the countries in the Group of Ten and Switzerland agreed for a two-year period not to increase the sum of their and the IMF’s gold holdings and to contribute no support to the price of gold in the free market. In August 1975 agreement was reached by an IMF committee thati9 the official price of gold would be abolished; members would not be obliged to use gold in transactions with the Fund; a part of the Fund’s gold holdings would be sold at auction for the benefit of developing countries, and another part would be returned to member countries in proportion to their quotas. The first public auction of part of the Fund’s gold holdings was held in June 1976. A four-year sales program was scheduled. In the first two years, sixteen auctions were held approximately every six weeks, with aggregate sales of 12.5million ounces. The balance of 12.5 million ounces was sold mainly in twenty-four auction lots through May 1980, and a small amount in noncompetitive sales. Restitution of 25 million ounces to member countries over a four-year period was completed in December 1979/January 1980. The U.S. repealed the prohibition against gold holding by U.S. residents as of 31 December 1974 and empowered the Treasury to offset any increase in market price as a result of this increment to private demand by offering gold at auction. The first auctions were held in January and June 1975, when the Treasury disposed of 13million ounces. No auctions were held in 1976 and 1977. They were resumed in 1978 and 1979, when the Treasury sold 4.0 and 11.8 million ounces, respectively, motivated both by the desire to reduce the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit on current account and by the belief “that neither gold nor any other commodity 19. IMF Annual Report, 1975, p. 44.

36

Chapter Two

provides a suitable base for monetary arrangement^."^" Since 1979 the Treasury has sold no gold bullion.2’ Members no longer define the exchange value of their currency in terms of gold and trade in and account for gold at any price consistent with their domestic laws. Gold is no longer the numkruire of the international monetary system. The introduction of SDRs (valued in terms of a basket of national currencies, as of July 1974, rather than in terms of gold) was intended to replace both the dollar and gold in the international monetary system. The market price of gold has increased more rapidly since the float than the prices of most other durable assets.” The future role of gold in the international monetary system as a reserve asset and as a determinant of the world’s price level may depend on the performance of the dollar. If the performance of the dollar improves, gold may be dethroned even if its use as a reserve asset continues. Failure of the dollar to perform in a stable fashion in the future leaves open the possibility of a restoration of a significant role for gold.

2.4.3 Role of Central Bank Intervention Direct official intervention to maintain the open market price of currencies within narrow limits has not lessened under floating rates compared with the pegged parity system. Intervention in some countries is assigned to nationalized industries that borrow foreign currency in order to buy their own currency on the foreign exchange market, in Italy and the U.K. with government provision of insurance against foreign exchange loss, in France with no such provision. In Japan and sometimes in France, dollar deposits held by the government at commercial banks are used for intervention. Italian and French commercial banks intervene at the government’s behest. Central bank intervention may thus be conducted by a variety of institutions at the direction of the monetary authorities. 20. See Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances, 1979, p. 491, Exhibit h0, a press release o n the increase in the amount of gold sales, announced 22 August 1978 (“The sales will make an important contribution toward reducing the U.S. balance of payments deficit o n current account”), and Exhibit 61, a statement by Assistant Secretary Bergsten before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, in which the quotation in the text appears. 21. The Reagan administration announced that its position o n the proper role of gold in the international monetary system would not be formulated until the congressionally mandated gold commission issued its report in March 1982. Testimony of Beryl W. Sprinkel, under secretary for monetary affairs, Treasury Department, at hearings of the Joint Economic Committee, 4 May 1981. 22. The price of gold from the end of 1973 to the end of 1980 increased at an average annual rate of 20.7%. By comparison the total returns on common stock and on long-term government bonds (computed according to Ibbotson and Sinquefield 1977) increased at average annual rates of 7.2% and 4.0‘%, respectively. The IJ.S. CPI over this period increased at a rate of 7.8% per year o n average, and the London Economist’s world commodity price index in dollars at a 9.5% rate.

37

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

The pattern of intervention since the float by the U.S. and its trading partners is to buy dollars both when the dollar depreciates relative to a particular foreign currency and when one foreign currency appreciates relative to another. Countries with weak currencies sell dollars. When the supply of dollars increases in foreign exchange markets, managed floaters may buy up some of the additional dollars or may permit the price of dollars to fall in terms of their own currencies. Buying up dollars has negative consequences for domestic monetary control; permitting the price of dollars to rise can have negative consequences for oil-importing countries. There was apparently little intervention during the four months following the float in February 1973. The progressive decline in the weighted exchange rate of the dollar between February and July 1973 vis-&,is a group of major currencies led to a decision by the governors of the central banks of the Group of Ten to support the dollar. In July 1973 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began to intervene in the New York spot exchange market to avoid “disorderly market conditions.” Intervention was effected with the Federal Reserve’s own small holdings of foreign currency or by activating the much larger total of foreign currency loans through swap agreements. Concerted exchange intervention was agreed to by the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank, and the Swiss National Bank in May 1974, after several months of dollar depreciation. The dollar strengthened until September, when renewed weakness developed through March 1975. The explanation given by the Board of Governors was?’ Contributing to this decline in the dollar’s exchange value was the asymmetry in intervention policies between countries with weaker currencies and those with strengthening currencies. Intervention sales of dollars by countries supporting weaker currencies exceeded purchases of dollars by countries resisting the appreciation of their currencies. The net effect of these operations was to add to the market supply of dollars, depressing the dollar’s average exchange rate. Explicit approval of management of floating exchange rates was expressed by the IMF in six guidelines it issued in June 1974.24Acceptance 23. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 61st Annual Report, 1974, pp. 65-66. 24. The first guideline stated: “A member with a floating exchange rate should intervene on the foreign exchange market as necessary to prevent or moderate sharp and disruptive fluctuations from day to day and from week to week in the exchange value of the currency.” A second guideline encouraged intervention to moderate movements from month to month and quarter to quarter “where factors recognized to be temporary are at work.” A third guideline suggested consultation with the Fund if a country sought to move its exchange rate “to some target zone of rates.” A fourth guideline dealt with the size of a country’s reserve relative to planned intervention; a fifth, with avoiding restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes; asixth, with the interests ofother countries than the intervening one. IMFAnnual Report, 1974, pp. 112-16.

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Chapter Two

of intervention as desirable policy was reiterated in a November 1975 meeting that preceded the revision of the IMF's Articles of Agreement in 1976. The dollar showed little weakness in 1976, and the Federal Reserve intervened to sell dollars on behalf of other currencies. In January the Italian lira came under pressure. The decline in its exchange value weakened the French franc within the European currency snake, leading to substantial French intervention. Massive intervention to support sterling, which declined from $2.00 in March to $1.77 in mid-September. was provided by a $5.3 billion stand-by credit arranged by the Group of Ten countries, Switzerland, and the Bank for International Settlements. Sterling's further decline later in the year led to an IMF drawing, further borrowing, and a facility to reduce official sterling balances. Interventions were also engaged in to moderate appreciations of the D-mark, the Swiss franc, and the yen. Renewed weakness of the dollar in early 1977 was masked by large intervention purchases of dollars by the Bank of England and the Bank of Italy undertaken to limit the appreciation of their currencies and to rebuild their reserve positions. The Federal Reserve intervened only occasionally during the first three quarters. When the Bank of England ended its large purchases of dollars, the dollar dropped sharply. The Federal Reserve increased the scale of intervention and in January 1978 was joined by the U.S. Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund, which negotiated a new swap facility with the Bundesbank. The decline in the weighted average exchange value of the dollar accelerated in 1978 through the end of October." An anti-inflation program announced on 24 October (contractionary fiscal and monetary policy, voluntary wage and price standards, and a reduction in the cost of regulatory actions) had no effect on the exchange market. On 1 November, the administration and the Federal Reserve took further action. A $30 billion intervention package was arranged with Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. The Federal Reserve raised the discount rate from 8%% to 9%% and imposed a 2% supplementary reserve requirement on large time deposits. During the last two months of 1978, U.S. support operations for the dollar totaled $6.7 billion, including sales of Treasury securities denominated in foreign currencies and significant purchases of dollars by Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. By June 1979 the dollar's value (measured on a trade-weighted basis) had risen from its 1978 low by about 10%, and U.S. authorities had repurchased a greater sum of foreign currency than had been sold in the last two months of 1978. The 25. The index of weighted averagc exchange values of the dollar against the Group of Ten countries plus Switzerland (March 1973 = 100) declined at an average annual rate of 9.3% between January and Novembcr 1978. From January 1976 to January 1978 it had declined at a 3.3% annual rate.

39

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

dollar then began to weaken, and U.S. intervention sales of foreign currencies, chiefly D-marks, resumed. Gross sales amounted to $9% billion equivalent between mid-June and early October. In addition, the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate to 11% in September. On 6 October 1979 the Federal Reserve announced a wide-ranging set of measures to tighten monetary control (a shift in operating procedures to place less emphasis upon control of the Federal Funds rate and more emphasis upon control of bank reserves; an increase in the discount rate to 12%; a marginal reserve requirement on banks’ managed liabilities), and the dollar began to appreciate. After April 1980, however, the dollar began to decline, a movement that was reversed in September. From October 1979on, the U.S. intervened frequently, operating on both sides of the market. When the dollar was in demand, it acquired foreign currencies in the market and from correspondents to repay earlier debt and to build up balances. The Federal Reserve was a buyer from February to March. From late March to early April and beyond, it sold D-marks, Swiss francs, and French francs. By the end of July, the U.S. was again accumulating currencies. Both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Trading Desk made net purchases of D-marks and lesser amounts of Swiss francs and French francs on days when the dollar was strong, selling on days when the dollar weakened. By the end of 1980, the U.S. was intervening in the foreign exchange markets virtually on a day-to-day basis. For 1980 as a whole, U.S. authorities were net buyers of foreign currencies in an amount of $8.7 billion equivalent. The Reagan administration soon after taking office announced its intention to reduce the scale of intervention, to discontinue the policy of building up currency reserves, and to cut back its short-term swap arrangements with foreign countries. The reason for the shift in policy is the administration’s view that intervention is both costly and ineffectual and that the way to restore exchange-rate stability is by the creation of more stable domestic economic conditions. Many foreign central banks do not share the Reagan administration’s views and continue to intervene to affect the exchange value of their currencies. This raises a question whether the degree of control U.S. authorities can exercise over the effective exchange rate for the dollar under a floating rate system is any greater than under a pegged exchange-rate system. The rationale for central bank intervention under floating rates is that the market does not move exchange rates smoothly to equilibrium levels, produces “disorderly conditions,” and sets rates at variance with underlying economic conditions. It is assumed that central banks can determine better than markets the correct level of exchange rates and the proper degree of variability. A policy of leaning against the wind is justified by advocates of intervention as slowing the movement of exchange rates in either direction.

40

Chapter Two

To stabilize foreign exchange markets central banks should buy their currencies when prices are low to drive them up and sell their currencies when prices are high to drive them down. Such operations should net the central banks a profit. Buying at high but falling prices and selling at low but rising prices are defended as needed to achieve “orderly” markets. By resisting a gradual movement in exchange rates, central banks lose reserves and money until they abandon the support operation, with a resulting sudden large movement in exchange rates. If the purpose of intervention were to reduce deviations of the market exchange rate from the equilibrium exchange rate, central bank operations would net profits but might not reduce the variance of exchangerate movements. If the equilibrium exchange rate shifts as a result of an economic shock, leaning against the wind may lower the variance of the exchange rate but will increase the size of the deviation of the exchange rate from its equilibrium level. In addition, the central bank will lose money on the operation. If there is no intervention, the variance will be larger, the central bank will not lose money, and the exchange rate will reflect the new equilibrium value sooner, thus allowing the rate to transmit undistorted information. The central banks as a group have not been conducting a profitable exercise by intervening in foreign exchange markets. An estimate for nine countries puts the loss for central bank intervention since the beginning of the float at $10 to $12 billion, far in excess of losses sustained by nationalized industries although for selected time periods a country may record a profit.26The evidence is that central banks have been suffering from an anachronistic behavior, resisting exchange-rate changes under nominally floating rates much as they did under pegged rates. Central banks have no way of knowing when there is a change in the fundamental equilibrium level of exchange rates.*’ By assuming the absence of a change in the equilibrium exchange rate and intervening to hold the exchange rate, they lose substantial amounts of money and ultimately have no choice but to permit the exchange rate to move.

2.4.4 Variability of Exchange Rates One major change since the float has been the increased variability of exchange rates of the major industrial countries (table 2.5). Critics of the floating regime argue that the variability has been excessive. Much of the movement, it is said, is unrelated to underlying economic and financial conditions which are not themselves likely to undergo rapid changes. 26. For the source of the estimate on losses and an illuminating discussion of intervention, see Taylor (1982). 27. Darby in chapter 15 of this volume presents evidence relevant to this issue. He shows that growth rates of the dollar exchange rates of the countries in our sample tend on average to a purchasing-power parity relation but that the levels of exchange rates become unpredictable.

Table 2.5

19551-581V 1958IV-67IV 1967IV-731 19731-761V

Average Quarterly Change at Annual Rates and the Variance of the Exchange Rate CA

FR

- .21 (1.58) 1.18 (1.31) - 1.45 (16.41) - .13 (33.)

6.30 (2.27) 1.12 (.46) - .43 ( 121.49) 1.05 (499.)

GE - .14

(.39) - .54 (9.18) -6.54 (161.53) -4.53 (560)

IT - .01

(.001) - .03 (0.27) - ,144 (13.90) 10.69 (413)

JA

NE

0 (0) .07 (1.42) -4.96 (89.18) 1.40 (141)

- .19 (1.68) - .51 (7.58) - 3.17 (55.04) -5.15 (403)

UK - .16

(1.82) 1.12 (39.26) .66 (87.44) 10.59 (401)

Notes. The table understates the variability of exchange rates for individual countries before 19731. For a correct measure for the individual countries, the subperiods would be chosen for each country to correspond with dates for stable or changing exchange rates. Variances are shown in parentheses beneath the change figures.

42

Chapter Two

Injury to international trade through exchange-rate fluctuation is claimed. The exchange rate is regarded as contributing to inflation, strong currencies not experiencing a reduction in exports as a result of appreciation, and weak currencies not experiencing a reduction in imports as a result of depreciation. The widening of bid-ask spreads or increase of transactions costs and the failure of forward rates to predict future spot prices as well in the 1970s as in the 1960s are offered as evidence that speculators destabilize foreign exchange markets. The impact of floating rates is said to increase uncertainty. The negative assessment of the behavior of exchange rates since the float omits a crucial factor: the market’s expectations with respect to inflation rates, monetary and fiscal policy, and general economic conditions. Unstable domestic policies contribute to unstable exchange rates.’x Exchange-rate changes are dominated by speculation about these underlying economic factors. If, despite appreciation, strong-currency countries experience growth in exports and, despite depreciation, weakcurrency countries experience growth in imports, the explanation is that costs of production in the former remain favorable if policies in the latter permit inflationary expansion of demand, wage hikes, and increase in strike activity. It is uncertainty about domestic policies that produces higher transactions costs in foreign exchange markets. With respect to the failure of forward rates to predict future spot rates, the predictions have not been biased. Despite the volatility of exchange rates, no major disruptions to trade and capital Bows have occurred since the float. In fact, floating exchange rates permitted the elimination of some capital controls. Capital controls introduced since the float are associated with the snake, where rates of exchange among the bloc were relatively fixed and moved in relation to one another only within relatively narrow bands.’y The balance-of-payments motive for tariffs is also defused by floating rates. If protectionism is perceived as on the rise since the float, it is related to stagflation rather than exchange-rate developments. A final point with respect to exchange rates relates to experience within the European Monetary System. The initial year after the activation of the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1979 reduced the range of movements of the participant currencies against the D-mark compared to the range in the preceding year. Nevertheless, two realignments of exchange rates were required as a result of divergencies in economic performance and in inflation exprience (Germany, September 1979; Denmark, November 1979). Large-scale interventions were undertaken to preserve the former exchange rates but to no avail. The continued existence of large inflation differentials among the countries in 28. Frenkel and Mussa (1980) present a particularly concise statement of this position. 29. The D-mark was revalued by 5 % % relative to other snake currencics on 20 June 1973, and simultaneously controls on capital inflow were tightened to defend the new rate.

43

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

the EMS suggests the fragility of the arrangement is not less than it was for the predecessor snake. Countries that inflate at a faster rate than their trading partners cannot avoid depreciation of their currencies. As markets have become more insistent on allowing for expected future price movements in setting nominal interest rates, wider swings in interest-rate differentials among countries are also likely to contribute to exchangerate instability.

2.4.5 Role of Monetary Policy The Bretton Woods system broke down essentially because nonreserve-currency countries were unwilling as a group to adopt the policy of inflationary monetary growth the reserve-currency country was pursuing. To achieve independent monetary policy, the only workable exchange-rate system was floating. It was hoped that flexible exchange rates would permit a country to choose its desired long-run trend rate of monetary growth and of inflation, independent of other countries’ choices. Even when autonomy exists, monetary policy may perform badly. It is in this context that the movement in a number of countries during the 1970s toward the improvement of monetary control must be viewed. Central banks have typically used short-term interest rates as the instruments to control monetary growth. Under noninflationary conditions, this conduct produced a procyclical movement in monetary growth. Under the gathering inflationary conditions since the mid-l960s, the inflation premium that became embedded in interest rates made the instrument unreliable as an indicator of restriction or ease. Reliance on it contributed to a secular rise in the rate of monetary growth. Central banks in a number of countries, some more willingly than others, in the 1970s adopted targets for monetary growth without necessarily abandoning their desire to hold down interest rates or exchange rates, so that successfultargeting has not invariably been the result. If it was hoped that public announcement of targets for monetary growth would itself reduce expectations of inflation, the failure time after time to achieve the targets has diluted any possible effect on the formation of expectations. 2.5

Summary

By the end of 1958, the idealized Bretton Woods regime of exchange rates pegged within relatively narrow bounds seemed on the point of achievement. Problems arose in the 1960s when individual countries resorted to restrictions on trade and commodities in order to contain balance-of-payments deficits which would have otherwise required lower rates of monetary growth and inflation. The United States, the reservecurrency country, was the prime destabilizer of the system. Because

44

Chapter Two

countries were unwilling to subordinate domestic monetary policies to the requirements of a fixed exchange-rate system, recurring financial crises led to occasionally large devaluations and to some revaluations of individual currencies. In the end, the system broke down and countries were free after 1973 to float their currencies or to adopt regional pegged currency schemes that floated against the dollar. Since the float has been a managed system, with substantial official intervention to prevent or slow exchange-rate movements, countries have continued to hold foreign exchange reserves and internal monetary policy independence has not invariably produced noninflationary monetary growth.

References Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1974. 61st Annual Report. . 1976-80. Federal Reserve Bulletin. Brittain, B. 1981. International currency substitution and the apparent instability of velocity in some Western European economies and in the United States. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 13, no. 2 (May): 135-55. de Vries, M. G . 1976. The International Monetary Fund, 1966-71: The system under stress, vol. 1. Washington: International Monetary Fund. Frenkel, J. A . 1978. International reserves: Pegged exchange rates and managed float. In K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, eds., Publicpolicies in open economies, vol. 9. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, and Supplementary Series to the Journal of Monetary Economics, pp. 111-40. Frenkel, J. A., and M. L. Mussa. 1980. The efficiency of foreign exchange markets and measures of turbulence. American Economic Review 70 (May): 374-81. . 1981. Monetary and fiscal policies in an open economy. American Economic Review 71 (May): 253-58. Girton, L. 1974. SDR creation and the real-bills doctrine. Southern Economic Journal 43 (January): 57-61. Ibbotson, R . G . , and R . A . Sinquefield. 1977. Stocks, bonds, bills and inflation: The past ( I 926-I 976) and the future (1977-2000), Financial Analysts Research Foundation, Charlottesville, Va. International Monetary Fund, 1974-75. Annual Report. . 1970-80. Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. Johnson, H. G . 1972. The Bretton Woods system, key currencies, and the dollar crisis of 1971. Three Banks Review, June, pp. 17-18. . 1978. Commentaries: Evaluation of the performance of the floating exchange rate regime. In J. S. Dreyer, G . Haberler, and T. D.

45

Postwar Institutional Evolution of the International Monetary System

Willet, eds., Exchange rate flexibility. Washington: American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research. Major, R., ed. 1979. Britain’s trade and exchange rate policy. NIESR Economic Policy Papers 3. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Miles, M. A. 1978. Currency substitution, flexible exchange rates, and monetary independence. American Economic Review 68, no. 3 (June): 428-36. Sprinkel, B. W. 1981. Testimony at hearings of the Joint Economic Committee, 4 May. Taylor, D. 1982. Official intervention in the foreign exchange market or bet against the central bank. Journal of Political Economy 90 (April): 356-68. United States Department of the Treasury. 1979. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury o n the Finances. Wonnacott, P. 1965. The Canadian dollar, 1948-1962. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

3

The International Data Base: An Introductory Overview James R. Lothian

The authors of most studies of foreign economic phenomena have adopted one or the other of two quite different approaches to the data. Foreign economists investigating experience in their own countries have usually gone directly to primary sources-bulletins of the central bank, publications of the government statistical office and the like-in compiling their data. In almost all respects, this is the preferred technique. On the other hand, economists who are not nationals of these countries as well as economists analyzing economic behavior in a group of countries have usually lacked the expertise necessary to compile data from the original sources. Accordingly, they generally have relied on secondary source material-publications of the IMF, the OECD, and other international agencies. Given this situation, both comparison of existing studies and replication of experiments become more difficult than usual. Not only are the data themselves apt to differ substantially among studies but so also are the sample periods. The reason is that series given in primary sources generally cover longer periods and are accompanied by better explanatory material than those in secondary sources. Problems of another sort arise, however, for researchers who try to extend data bases derived by other scholars from primary publication. Such data usually remain relatively inaccessible and lack the documentation necessary for them to be updated or backdated easily. For these reasons we have made a major effort to construct a data base from primary sources for the United States and the seven foreign countries we are studying that is of reasonably long duration (19551-761V), is as homogenous as possible among countries, and is accompanied by sufficient documentation to be used by other scholars.' 1. T h e data used in the studies that are detailed in the subsequent chapters are available o n the TROLL systcrn.

46

47

International Data Base

The remainder of this chapter first outlines our basic approach. We then discuss some of the major problems encountered and our solutions to them-both the relatively successful and the relatively unsuccessfulin order to provide future users with the flavor of the data (section 3.2). We then consider the reliability of our data across countries and concepts and relative to the IMF data (section 3.3). The Data Appendix to this volume provides more complete documentation of the individual series along with the series themselves. 3.1 Basic Approach

For both economic and statistical reasons we chose to begin our series with the first quarter of 1955. For one thing, we wanted to have data for as long a period as possible, in particular, one that encompassed as many business cycles as possible. Beginning in 1955 and even allowing for lags we would have a sample that included the U.S. and foreign recessions of 1958. At the same time (1955 or thereabouts) sources for many important series became more readily available in the various countries. By that time, moreover, wartime price controls had been removed in all countries and international trade had begun to be liberalized. At the outset we decided that wherever possible we would collect the data on a monthly, non-seasonally adjusted basis. We would then transform these underlying series to the quarterly seasonally adjusted series to be used in our subsequent statistical analyses, and we would make both the seasonally adjusted and the unadjusted quarterly data available to other researchers. Doing this seemed to us to have two advantages. It would allow future users of the data to obtain a homogeneous updated series more easily; they would not be constrained by lack of readily accessible published historical data in country sources when seasonal factors were reestimated. Furthermore, it would impose some regularity on the seasonal adjustment techniques among countries.z Our starting point in the selection of series for the foreign countries was to find out which series other economists customarily used in their analyses of these countries. To do so, we consulted economists from abroad who then were undertaking or had recently completed statistical studies of their own countries that were similar to ours as well as economists engaged in commenting on current economic developments in these countries. Two groups provided extremely valuable assistance in this regard: the academic and government economists assembled by Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer for a conference on inflation at the University of Rochester and colleagues of mine in the international section of the 2. We used the standard U.S. Census X11 procedure for these adjustments. When the data were consistently positive, we used the X11 multiplicative option; when a series took on nonpositive values, we used the additive adjustment option.

48

Chapter Three

Economics Department at Citibank. In virtually all instances, the series used by the two groups corresponded. Where discrepancies arose, we chose the series we deemed appropriate, usually on the basis of our ability to obtain reasonably homogeneous past data. After making these initial choices of data, we traced each series back in time in the individual country sources to see if the data were available on a completely comparable basis for the entire sample period on at least a quarterly and, preferable, a monthly basis. In a considerable number of instances they were not. Many series were discontinuous. Others simply contained missing observations, usually for the earlier part of the sample period and in the version of the series reported in the most recent editions of the country sources. In each of these instances, we made a considerable effort to identify the cause of the problem. We turned first to earlier editions of the country data source. In most cases, these contained at least a cursory description of the problem along with an earlier version of the series in question for some overlap period. In some cases, however, no such data were given in the sources. When that happened or if we had prior knowledge of the problem, we searched for alternative data for the earlier period that were reasonably comparable to the data for the later period. Depending upon the length of the period of overlap, we then used one or the other of a variety of interpolation technique^.^ Where the period was exceedingly short-one or only a few months or quarters of overlapping observations-we used the mean of the ratios of the new to the old series during the period to adjust the old series to the new basis. Where we had several years of monthly or quarterly observations for both series, we used ordinary least squares regression of the new on the old series as a method of interpolation. In both instances we worked in logarithmic terms when the series appeared to be trended, in arithmetic terms otherwise. Missing observations were also dealt with in a variety of ways. When there was a single observation missing, we used linear interpolation, again, depending on the nature of the series, either of the logarithmic or of the arithmetic values of the adjacent observations to estimate the intervening one. When there were a number of observations missing, due usually to a change in the periodicity of the data, we tried to take account of other information to improve on the simple linear interpolation or interpolation by a single related series.J When these various data problems were specific to components of an aggregate series, such as the currency component of M1, we disaggre3. The basic guide in our interpolation procedures was Milton Friedman’s (1962) monograph on the subject. Friedman and Schwartz (1970) contains a concise restatement of these principles together with numerous examples of their practical application. 4. These included articles on various aspects of international data, series compiled by international agencies and past statistical studies utilizing the series in question.

49

International Data Base

gated the data, adjusted the component in question separately, and then reaggregated. Insofar as possible, we tried to work with seasonally adjusted data when we were performing the interpolation.s Often, however, this was impossible. In many instances a series contained so many breaks that the resulting subseries were of too short a duration for us to obtain estimates of seasonal factors. In these cases we constructed a non-seasonally adjusted series for the full period and seasonally adjusted it. 3.2 Data Problems and Their Resolution

To illustrate some of the problems we encountered in compiling the data as well as in obtaining our solutions to them, we think it would be useful to discuss several examples. The three we have chosen are the narrow money supply (Ml) in the United Kingdom, the official settlements balance in the United States, and consumer prices in France. We view the first two as successful and relatively important contributions. In both instances there were no official published series for earlier parts of our sample period. Using other data, we were able to derive series for these earlier periods that appear to be reasonably homogeneous with the later. In the third case, the French data, we were again successful, but in retrospect the overall contribution seems to us to have been relatively minor. A simpler approach than ours would likely have produced nearly identical results. 3.2.1 British M1 Officially published British money data for years prior to 1963 are available only on an annual basis. The end-of-quarter series begin with the observation for the first quarter of 1963; the mid-month series begin in late 1971. Both sets of data moreover contain a considerable number of breaks. However, for observations prior to 1963 there are monthly data for some of the major components of M1 and M2: currency held by the public and some bank deposits. The latter consist of data on both current accounts (demand deposits) and deposit accounts (time deposits) in three major classes of domestic banks (London Clearing, Scottish, and Northern Irish). Since these data ended before the official mid-month series began, we worked with the official quarterly series, extending it back in time. As a first step, we derived monthly figures for current account deposits adjusted for float for all three categories of banks for the period 19551to 1969 IV. To estimate float for the London Clearing banks, we used the 5. In the instances in which we used seasonally adjusted component series in our compilation of the final series, we did not reconstruct an unadjusted final series.

50

Chapter Three

estimate implicit in the official figures for total deposits of this set of banks; i.e. adjusted current accounts equal gross current accounts less the difference between total gross deposits and total net (adjusted) deposits. For the Scottish Banks similar estimates of float are available only from October 1960 on; for the Northern Irish there are no net figures. Hence, to estimate float for the period prior to October 1960 for the Scottish banks, we assumed that the ratio of float to current accounts was the same for Scottish and London Clearing Banks; for the Northern Irish we assumed that the ratio was the same throughout as for the Scottish. To the sum of the monthly adjusted current accounts of all three classes of banks we added the official monthly estimates of currency. We then took quarterly averages of the seasonally adjusted monthly figures centered in the last month of each quarter to arrive at a proxy series for MI. We then regressed the official on the proxy MI series over the period of overlap 19631 to 1969IV. Using this relation and the proxy series, we extended the official series back to 1955. Prior to interpolating via regression, we adjusted the official series for the breaks in it after 1963: in 1967 IV, 19721, and 19731due to inclusion of additional banks and in 1971IV and 197511 due to changes in reporting techniques. In each instance the official sources contained figures compiled on both the old and new basis for each quarter in which a break occurred. We used the ratio of the new to the old figures during these quarters to adjust earlier data for the various discontinuities. 3.2.2 United States Balance of Payments The components of the American official settlements balance are only available from the Department of Commerce beginning in 1960. Prior to 1960, there are data on net transactions in U.S. official reserve assets but no data on other U.S. government liabilities to foreign official agencies. The Treasury Department, however, does publish data for total (government and nongovernment) liquid liabilities to foreign official agencies as reported by commercial banks. Therefore, for 1955-59, we estimated the official portion of liquid liabilities by first regressing U.S. liquid liabilities to foreign official agencies on bank-reported short-term liabilities to foreign official agencies for the period 19601 to 1975IV. We then estimated the official portion of U.S liquid liabilities on the basis of the bank-reported data reported by banks for 19551 to 1959IV. The only quarterly data for nonliquid liabilities to foreign official agencies that were available for the years 1955-59 were for a component of that total. Annual data, however, indicated that the total itself was only a small fraction of the official settlements balance during this period. Accordingly, we used the subseries without further adjustment as a proxy for the full series. We then added these estimates to our estimates of

51

International Data Base

liquid liabilities and to net transactions in U.S. official reserve assets to obtain the official settlements balance for 1955-59. 3.2.3 French Consumer Prices Before 1962, published data for consumer prices for France as a whole exist only on an annual basis. Throughout our sample period, however, there are monthly data for a Paris CPI. For the period 1957-61, there are end-of-quarter data for an urban provincial CPI, and yearly data are available for both prior to 1957. Using a variety of interpolation techniques, we were able to obtain monthly CPI data for the whole of France for the full sample period. Doing so involved the following three steps. To construct a monthly index for the period through 1957, we estimated the relation between the yearly provincial and Parisian indexes for the years 1949-56 and used this relation, together with the monthly Parisian index, to obtain a monthly provincial index. For the period 1957-63, we estimated the relation between the quarter provincial index and the Parisian index for the last month of the quarter and used it, together with the monthly Parisian index, to estimate the monthly provincial index. Using equal weights, we combined the monthly Parisian and estimated monthly provincial index for each period. That gave us two separate national indexes: a 1949-based series for the period through 1957 and a 1956/58-basedindex for the period 1957-63. We linked these indexes and the two published indexes for all of France, the 1962-based index for 1962-70 and the 1970-based index for 1970-76, by multiplying by the means of the ratios of overlapping observations in the relevant overlapping year. The result was a continuous 1970-basedmonthly series, which we then converted to a quarterly. Examining these data graphically and comparing the behavior of French inflation with inflation in other countries has, however, raised doubts in our minds about the accuracy of the underlying data. The relatively smooth pattern of French inflation throughout most of the sample period-even the part in which we made no adjustments-suggests that either interpolation played a major role in the generation of the original data or they are based largely upon (controlled) list prices rather than actual transactions prices.

3.3 Reliability of the Data The experience with the French CPI data is not unique. In a number of instances-French monetary aggregates, Canadian currency, French industrial production, the balance of payments for a number of countrieswe made a considerable effort to ascertain the nature of the data deficien-

52

Chapter Three

cies, the cause of breaks, for instance, or to collect more suitable series than commonly used. Many of these attempts resulted in “dry holes.” In some cases data did not exist in any usable form. In others, simpler methods of adjustment, such as linking the totals by the ratio of overlapping observation rather than adjusting individual components separately on the basis of related data, probably would have led to few appreciable differences in the final product. Hindsight in these instances, however, is better than foresight, or, to return to the earlier metaphor, one cannot simply eliminate the dry holes and be left with the gushers. Two additional sets of data problems are worth some discussion: the homogeneity of particular series, or groups of series, among countries, and the accuracy of one country’s data relative to those of other countries. Let us consider these two issues in order. Prior experience in working with some of the foreign data, as well as a perusal of the literature comparing particular types of data internationally, convinced us that in most instances about the best we could do would be to obtain data that were consistent over time for each country but that differed to varying and, in most instances, somewhat unknown degrees among countries. The major exception is the monetary data-Ml, M2, and especially high-powered money. The components necessary to derive these three totals are available for most countries. Moreover, there appears to be at least a broad consensus among economists on which subtotals to use for each country. Accordingly, we view these data as the most homogeneous, at least from an accounting standpoint.6 Next best, we suspect, are the series on interest rates. These data differ somewhat with respect to the maturity of the instruments within each of the two categories and also with respect to the issuer-government versus private sector. Neither set of differences, however, seems likely to create major difficulties. The one problem that may be of some importance is the tendency of some countries more than others to exercise direct control over rates during some part of our sample period.’ Most of the remaining data-income, price and industrial production indexes, balance-of-payments statistics, and government accounts-suffer from well-known difficulties such as differences in samples among countries, (e.g. price indexes), differences in concept (e.g. GNP as opposed to G D P or the French produit inttrieur brut), and differences in 6. Differences in financial development as well as in the legal restrictions imposcd upon banks-reserve requirements, interest ceilings, and the like-conceivably could cause the deposit data to differ in economic meaning among countries, as Friedman and Schwartz (1970, pp. 137-46) and Lothian (1976) point out. 7. In Japan, for instance, this appears to be a problem up until at least the early 1970s. In Italy, there are no quarterly data for short-term rates prior to that time. The major reason appears to be a desire by banks to avoid involvement with thc regulatory authorities.

53

International Data Base

types of data available (e.g. national income versus other methods of reporting government expenditures).* How severe these problems are and what magnitude of measurement error they induce in the data for the various countries is, however, mostly a matter of conjecture. One rough cross-country index is the amount of effort we had to expend deriving the series for each country. By this criterion, France, Italy, and the U.K. would score lowest in terms of data reliability. Japan and the Netherlands would come next. Canada, Germany, and the U.S. would rank highest. The obvious problems with using that index, however, is that it suggests that our own adjustments to the data of some countries made after the fact are inferior to the adjustments made beforehand by government statistical offices of others. An alternative index of data reliability, which is not without its own faults but that does not suffer from this problem, is differences among countries in the goodness of fit of some of the behavioral equations reported elsewhere in this volume. One such set of equations is the real income equations reported by Darby in chapter 9. Darby, in fact, cites measurement errors for the poorer performance of the equations in some countries than in others. He demonstrates that the existence of such errors is consistent with the pattern of coefficients estimated for several foreign countries. Grouping the countries on the basis of Darby’s results, we would rank France, Italy, and Japan as having the least reliable data; Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands would be given the middle ground. The United Kingdom and the United States we would judge to be the best. The exact ranking based on several other equations we have examined would be different. However, a broad pattern of differences among countries in data quality is evident. The simple nominal income equations in the next section of this chapter, for example, perform relatively poorly for the United Kingdom, France, and Italy-high standard errors as a percentage of the mean of the dependent variable-while those for the United States perform relatively well. The results for Canada, Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands lie in between. The one reasonably firm inference that can be drawn from all of this is that France and the United States very likely occupy the two extremes in data quality. In addition, Italy-and perhaps Japan and the United Kingdom-seems to be on the low side of the mean while Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands seem to be on the high side. 8. International agencies such as the United Nations Statistical Office, the IMF, and the OECD attempt to reconstruct some of these series on a common basis. For the most part, however, the resultant data are unavailable on a quarterly basis for anything other than exceedingly short periods. See, for example, the discussion of balance-of-paymentsdata by Erwin Veil (1975) and of consumer price data by Charlotte Vannereau (1975) in the OECD’s Occasional Studies.

54

Chapter Three

3.3.1 Comparison with the IMF Data Publications of the International Monetary Fund, in particular its International Financial Statistics and their companion tapes, have been a standard source for a wide variety of international data. For that reason we thought it would be useful to compare our data with comparable series available from the IMF. Table 3.1 provides summary data on relative temporal coverage. The individual entries in the table are means of the ratios of the number of quarters spanned by the IMF series to the number of quarters spanned by our series. We calculate these two ways: as the mean across all eight countries for each of the series and as the mean across all series for each of the eight countries. This comparison is for fourteen of the basic eighteen series available for each country in our data bank. We have omitted population and unemployment altogether, and only listed the official settlements balance or a proxy thereof instead of its separate current account and capital account components. Let us consider the country means first. Here the distribution is bimodal. For four of the countries, Canada, France, Italy and the Netherlands, the ratio of the IMF coverage to ours is approximately 0.75. For the remaining four, it is roughly 10 percentage points higher. The series by series breakdown reveals a somewhat different distribution. Approximately half the series on the IMF tapes cover 80% or more of the quarters covered by our series. The coverage of the remainder, however, is widely dispersed, ranging from roughly 43% for the overall Table 3.1

Temporal Coverage of the IMF as a Percentage of the NBER Quarterly Data a ) Country Means

Canada France Germany Italy

Japan Netherlands U.K. U.S.

,765 ,761 ,854 ,741

M1 M2 High-powered money Official reserves Short-term interest rate Long-term interest rate Nominal GNP/GDP

,849

,832

Real GNPIGDP Industrial production CPIicost of living Exchange rate Balance of payments Government expenditures Government deficit

,910 ,865 .910 ,910 ,813 ,848 ,551

c-1 Grand Mean

,851 .728

=

,798

,688 ,889 ,910 ,910 ,428 ,738 ,800

55

International Data Base

balance of payments to approximately 74% for government expenditures. In no instance, moreover, do the IMF data cover our full sample period. Not only are the IMF data available only for shorter periods, but they also appear to contain a sizable number of breaks of one sort or another. On the tapes themselves, these breaks usually are not indicated. The International Financial Statistics Yearbook, though, currently provides annual data for a twenty-nine-year period. A cross-check of the 1980 Yearbook reveals an average of 3.7 breaks per country. No country has fewer than two breaks, and three, Germany, Japan, and the U.K., each has four or more. Since the difficulties involved in compiling quarterly figures for some of the series are liable to be greater than the difficulties in compiling the yearly, these figures are likely to provide lower limits on the number of breaks in the quarterly data. To get some indication of the relative accuracy of our data and those available on the IMF tapes for the seven foreign countries, we ran a series of simple nominal income and price equations of the form n

(3.1)

A log X, = a + Z bi A log Mlt-i, i=O

where X was nominal income (or a proxy thereof) in one set of equations, the consumer price index in the other; M1 was the narrowly defined money supply; and n took the alternative values of 4 and 8. For the countries lacking nominal income data on the IMF tapes, we used the same proxy other researchers have used: the algebraic sum of the changes in the logarithms of the CPI and industrial production. In the comparisons of nominal income equations, the sample period that we used was determined by the availability of the IMF data. In the comparisons of price equations, we faced no such data constraint; hence we used the same sample period for all countries (195911 to 19761V). In general the regressions with the longer lag fitted better in both instances. Judging these on the basis of either R2or standard error of the estimate, we found that for four of the seven foreign countries the nominal income results were clearly superior with our data, the results for two were approximately the same regardless of the data used, and the results for one, France, were in both instances too poor to be considered for comparison. The price equations on the whole were less satisfactory than the nominal income equations in terms of goodness of fit. Our data did, however, tend to perform marginally better. Viewed in terms of R2,three of the foreign countries were superior with our data, three with the IMF; viewed in terms of standard error of estimates, five were superior with our data, one was the same with both. Again, France was equally poor with both data sets.

56

Chapter Three

3.4 Conclusions As we see it, our construction of an international data base from an original source has two major benefits. Data of tolerable comparability among countries and substantial homogeneity over time are now readily available for a longer time period than previously. In addition, the pedigree of these data-both their merits and their limitations-is well enough documented that future researchers need not themselves go through the same arduous process that we have. As data for new time periods become available, they can in most instances simply be linked to our series. The data nevertheless are still far from ideal. The dubious quality of some series is one problem. We doubt, however, that it can be greatly mitigated by additional manipulation of the underlying data by private researchers. Government statistical offices and central banks will have to take the lead. Intercountry heterogeneity of certain other series is a second problem. Its resolution unfortunately is far from simple. In each instance a cooperative effort by official agencies in all of the various countries would be necessary. How fruitful our efforts have been can perhaps be best judged in terms of the studies to which these data have given rise. The wide range of successful empirical investigations reported in this volume provides the best check on the data in general just as the research underlying their construction has provided a check in detail. Acknowledgments

A considerable number of individuals played a role in the construction and documentation of the international data base. At the NBER, Anthony Cassese, in particular, deserves a substantial share of the credit for whatever success was achieved. Cassese not only contributed extremely competent research assistance but also made a number of independent analytical contributions. In addition, he and Anna Schwartz, whose own involvement in every phase of the project requires special mention, provided the editorial skills that turned an, at times, haphazard rambling series of notes on the data into a concise and readable whole. Laura Nowak provided able assistance throughout. Linda Dunn and Robert Greenfield also aided in the compilation of some of the series. Connie McCarthy rechecked all of the data after the studies were completed and did a truly excellent job updating them. At Citibank, N.A., David Devlin, Thomas Huertas, Robert Leftwich, Werner Chilton, and Ryuji T a h a r a - o n leave from the Sanwa Bankprovided advice and assistance. In addition, there were a number of private and government economists from the United States and abroad

57

International Data Base

who graciously supplied us with data and patiently answered our questions. In particular, we wish to thank Jack Bame, Andre Fourqans, Charles Freedman, Michele Fratianni, Pieter Korteweg, Richard Levich, Jacques Melitz, Manfred Neumann, and Vincenzo Siesto.

References France, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. 1962-76. Bulletin Mensuel des Statistiques. Friedman, M. 1962. The interpolation of time series by related series. NBER Technical Paper, no. 16. Friedman, M., and A. J. Schwartz. 1970. Monetary statistics of the United States: Estimates, sources, and methods. New York: Columbia University Press. International Monetary Fund. 1957-76. International Financial Statistics. Lothian, J. R. 1976. The demand for high-powered money. American Economic Review 66 (March): 56-68. United Kingdom, Bank of England. 1970 and 1975. Statistical Abstract I and II. . 1963-76. Quarterly Bulletin. United States, Department of Commerce. 1955-76. Survey of Current Business. Vannereau, C. 1975. Comparability of consumer price indices in OECD countries. O E C D Economic Outlook: Occasional Studies, July, pp. 35-45. Veil, E . 1975. Surpluses and deficits in the balance of payments: Definition and significance of alternative concepts. O E C D Economic Outlook: Occasional Studies, July, pp. 23-34.

4

The Timing of Monetary and Price Changes and the International Transmission of Inflation Anthony Cassese and James R. Lothian

4.1

Introduction

Our aim in this chapter is to present evidence on two issues: the relative contributions to inflation in each of these countries of domestic and of international factors, and the relative importance of the channels through which the international factors have operated. The difficulty that arises in investigating these issues is that most, if not all, of the foreign countries we consider seem to have been neither fully open nor fully closed. Exchange rates in a number of notable instances during the Bretton Woods era underwent substantial changes; the various domestic monetary authorities often seemed to pursue policies different from those of the world at large, and the propensity of government of some of these countries to tinker with markets for international goods and capital ran high. Nevertheless, all seven foreign countries experienced the same general pattern of inflation as the United States, the reserve-currency country, for close to half the sample period. One solution to the problem would be to estimate more general models that relax some of the simplifying assumptions of the polar-case openand closed-economy models.' Darby and Stockman in chapter 5 and Gandolfi and Lothian in chapter 14 adopt that approach. Our approach, in contrast, is to conduct a series of tests of Granger-causality for each country for a number of relations, some between domestic variables alone, others between domestic and foreign variables. Anthony Cassese is a financial economist and portfolio strategist at Citibank, N.A An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the Journal of Monetary Economics 10 (August 1982): 1-23. 1. Blejer (1977). Cross and Laidler (1976), Jonson (1976). and Laidler (1978) are all examples of earlier work in this area.

58

59

Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes

The merit in this approach is that it avoids the problem of the structure of the model limiting the range of investigation. Indeed, the tests we apply are intended to provide evidence that will permit us to rule out some previous model-identifying restrictions. It therefore not only serves as a convenient point of departure for constructing and estimating more general models but provides a way of reevaluating some of the models that have been already estimated. The drawback, of course, is that the simple bivariate relations underlying our tests may themselves give rise to specification bias caused by the omission of other important variables.

4.2 Theoretical Consideration

To derive a set of testable hypotheses about the international transmission of inflation based on timing relations among variables, we first review the model underlying the simple monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP).’ We present expressions for the rates of inflation and of monetary growth in a small open economy and point out the model’s implications for both. In so doing, we point out what we believe is a popular misconception surrounding the MABP: the view that, in the context of the most basic model, changes in monetary growth will follow rather than precede changes in i n f l a t i ~ nWe . ~ then relax some of the simplifying assumptions of the model and state the timing implications of these modifications for questions of international transmission. 4.2.1 The Monetary Approach The simplest expositions of the MABP start with a money demand function of the standard form, a purchasing power parity relation, and a money market equilibrium condition. Ignoring interest rates, we can write the first as log (MIP)? = k log ypr, (4.1) where M is the nominal stock of domestic money, P the domestic price level, yp permanent income, and k the income elasticity of demand. The purchasing power parity or, if the exchange rate is assumed perfectly rigid, price arbitrage relation is simply (4.2)

P* = TP;,

where P’ is the rest-of-world price level and

T

the (constant) exchange

2. Johnson (1976) is the classic statement of the monetary approach. 3. Swoboda (1977), in discussing the monetary approach to the transmission ofinflation, states that the monetary approach may be distinguished from others in that “causation for a small open economy runs from income to the stock of money” (p. 15). For a contrasting view, see Branson (1977).

60

Chapter Four

rate. The equilibrium condition relates the nominal stock of money supplied to the nominal stock demanded, (4.3)

M, = M f .

Taking logarithms of (4.2) and (4.3), differencing the results along with equation (4. l),and making the appropriate substitutions, we arrive at the standard expressions for the domestic rate of inflation (4.4)

. .

P( = P ;

and monetary growth

M , = P: + kipr, where a dot over a variable indicates a logarithmic first difference. Equations (4.4) and (4.5) are equilibrium relations that describe the long-run growth paths of domestic money and domestic prices. This is readily apparent from the assumption of instantaneous adjustment of money demand to supply. In much of the literature, however, these dynamic relations are thought to do more: to have implications also for the time path of the adjustment to equilibrium. As the authors of one recent study using the simple MABP model have put it, “there is a clear presumption to [the] existence and direction” of the leads and lags between domestic money, prices, and nominal income in a small open economy under a fixed exchange-rate regime (Putnam and Wilford 1978). (4.5)

4.2.2 Extensions of the Basic Model What the authors of the statement seem to have in mind is something like the following. Consider a position of dynamic equilibrium in which the reserve-currency country’s money stock and prices and the domestic money stock and prices are growing at constant rates, for simplicity all assumed to be equal. Now let monetary growth in the reserve-currency country increase. Its rate of inflation will eventually follow suit. The increase in inflation will, via arbitrage, be transmitted as an instantaneous and equal increase in inflation in non-reserve-currency countries. The new rate of inflation, in turn, will mean that domestic real cash balances are now growing more slowly than desired. The rate of hoarding, the inflow of foreign reserves, will increase as a result. Therefore, after the fact, so will the rate of growth of the domestic money supply. The problem is, however, that this sequence of events does not follow directly from the model presented above. In the model everything takes place within a single period. For the reserve inflow to follow the equalization of inflation rates, the growth rates of the actual and desired nominal stocks of money would have to differ. That can be effected within the model fairly simply, but it requires replacing equation (4.3) with some form of stock adjustment relation like

61

(4.6a)

Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes log M , - log M r - l = P(l0g M f - log

M[-l),

or, equivalently, (4.6b)

log M , = P(l0g M f ) + (1 - p) log

A4-1.

Using (4. l),substituting successively for the lagged actual stock of money and differencing the result, we would then arrive at a new equation in which the current period's monetary growth would be a distributed lag, with geometrically declining weights of inflation in the reserve-currency country and of growth in permanent income: r

(4.7)

M, = p

,z(1 - p)i(kjPrpi+ i;-i).

r=O

Extending the model in this way also seems reasonable from an empirical standpoint since most demand-for-money studies have uncovered lags of several quarters or more in the adjustment process linking actual and desired money balances. To derive alternative testable hypotheses about the international transmission mechanism, one might also want to relax some of the other strong assumptions of the simple MABP model. Three possible modifications of the simple model are to relax the assumptions of instantaneous price arbitrage, equilibrium in the money market of the reserve-currency country, and full employment. Later we consider the implications of permitting short-run sterilization policies. First, let us consider the question of price arbitrage. Here the empirical evidence to date is inconsistent with convergence of overall rates of inflation within a quarter and perhaps even within a period of several years.' One reason often given is the existence of sizable nontradable goods sectors. In this instance, even if prices of tradable goods adjust quickly, prices of nontradable goods may adjust only with a substantial lag. If that is the case, then the domesticinflation equation, (4.4), and the domestic money growth equation, (4.5) or (4.7), would have to be rewritten to take account of the differences in speeds of adjustment of prices between tradable and nontradable goods across countries.s The end result is that the timing relation between domestic monetary growth and overall inflation becomes less easy to determine. Given a sufficiently slow adjustment of prices of nontradable goods, domestic inflation might not be observed to lead domestic monetary growth. The next logical step would be to relax the implicit assumption that prices in the reserve-currency country adjust fully and instantaneously to monetary changes. For example, consider the monetary transmission mechanism Friedman and Schwartz (1963~)outline for a closed econ4. Kravis and Lipsey (1978), among others, present evidence counter to the arbitrage hypothesis. 5. See BIejer (1977) for a model in which the slower adjustment of prices of nontradable than of tradable goods plays a crucial role.

62

Chapter Four

omy. The key element in their view is the series of portfolio adjustments that an unanticipated change in monetary growth engenders.h To illustrate, suppose monetary growth in a closed economy suddenly increases. Initially, market yields on financial assets and equities, and then a whole host of implicit yields on consumer goods of every degree of durability, temporarily fall as money holders desire to rid themselves of excess cash balances and as the adjustment proceeds from one sector to another. Spending in all of these areas therefore increases, and output and prices begin to rise more rapidly. Eventually stock equilibrium is reestablished; holdings of real cash balances are lower, and inflation is higher than before the increase in money growth. Suppose we now open that model to the international realm. Consider, for instance, what happens to the small country in a world of fixed exchange rates when monetary growth in the reserve-currency country undergoes an unanticipated increase.’ Initially, this excess supply of money in the reserve-currency country reflects itself in an excess demand for alternative assets denominated in both the reserve currency and foreign currencies. The prices of those assets rise, and their yields fall. The fall in interest rates produces an excess demand for money in the small country which, in part, is satisfied by the inflow of reserves as residents of the reserve-currency country reduce their excess holdings of money and then increase their expenditures on bonds and equities. Eventually the process spreads to the markets for consumption and investment goods in both the reserve- and non-reserve-currency countries. As expenditures on these goods increase, their prices and the overall price levels in both countries begin to rise more rapidly. At the same time, interest rates on bonds and on equities begin to rise and approach their initial levels. The final equilibrium position is one in which monetary growth, inflation, and the nominal interest rate on bonds, both in the reserve- and non-reserve-currency countries, are all higher; holdings of real cash balances are lower; and international payments positions are altered. The reserve-currency country now has a greater balance-of-payments deficit, and foreign countries have greater balance-of-payments surpluses or smaller deficits. If the asset approach is a reasonable expression of the adjustment mechanism, then we have a further reason to suppose that domestic monetary changes in a small open economy would not lag price-level changes. 6. If the monetary change were fully anticipated, the price-level response would be immediate. The information set used to form anticipations therefore has a crucial bearing on the exact timing relation. 7. The papers by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1975) and by Girton and Henderson (1976) describe models of this general sort. In both, however, the authors confine their analysis to organized asset markets.

63

Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes

We could also relax the implicit assumption in the MABP of full employment; then the transmission mechanism operating through portfolio adjustment provides a further rationale for small-country monetary growth actually leading its rate of inflation. For example, suppose an unanticipated increase in monetary growth in the reserve-currency country induced the portfolio adjustments described above. This would be followed by increased expenditures by residents of the reserve-currency country on foreign goods, which would lead to a balance-of-payments surplus and expansion of aggregate demand and output in the small economy. At the same time, the accumulation of reserves by the small economy’s central bank would lead to an expansion of its high-powered money and overall money supply. Initially the bulk of the increase in the nominal income of the small economy would be reflected in output. Only after some time had elapsed would the effect be manifest upon the price level alone. In conclusion, the lead or lag of money over prices, in what appears to be an open economy, is an uncertain guide to settling questions of causation and more importantly the international transmission of inflation. We would view a lead of prices over money and to a lesser extent a coincidence in movements as prima facie evidence of the importance of foreign influences. But a lag of prices behind money is consistent with either domestic or foreign monetary forces being the causative factor.

4.2.3 Other Implications of the Alternative Models Fortunately these modifications of the simple model have other empirical implications that can help us differentiate among alternative hypotheses about the international inflation process. One testable hypothesis, of course, is derived from the presumed operation of price arbitrage. For a small open economy, if arbitrage were not instantaneous, we would expect prices in the rest of the world to lead domestic prices. Similarly, if assets markets provide another linkage among countries we would expect there to be a relation among interest rates in one country and those in the rest of the world during periods of fixed exchange rates. Again, assuming that the effects are not instantaneously felt, we would expect changes in interest rates in the rest of the world, or in the reservecurrency country, to precede those in a small open economy. Analyzing the timing relations between high-powered money and its counterparts on the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheetforeign reserves and domestic assets (domestic credit)-and between those two asset components themselves can also help to clear up some of the ambiguities that surround the timing relation between money and prices. Let us consider three cases: the reserve-currency country, a completely open small economy, and an intermediate case. In the reserve-currency country, the U.S., the increase in monetary

64

Chapter Four

expansion underlying an increase in its inflation and ultimately that of the rest of the world is the result of credit expansion by the reserve-currency country’s central bank. Accordingly, its domestic assets will be positively related to, and either lead or be coincident with, its high-powered money. Indeed, the foreign component of the reserve-currency country’s highpowered money is of minor importance for that country. Changes in. its balance of payments will be a result rather than a cause of variations in the growth of the reserve-currency country’s high-powered money. Highpowered money therefore will be negatively related, and either lead or be coincident with, the balance of payments of a reserve-currency country. In a completely open small economy, movements in its domestic assets are unimportant as an effective source of monetary change. An overexpansion of domestic assets of the central bank ultimately will be nullified by reserve outflows, underexpansion by reserve inflows. Changes in foreign reserve holdings of the central bank are the channel through which monetary expansion occurs. Therefore foreign reserves will bear a positive and either coincident or leading relation to high-powered money. Changes in domestic assets will be unrelated to high-powered money growth but bear a negative and either coincident or leading relation to foreign reserve changes for a non-reserve-currency country. The intermediate case is the most difficult to handle. Changes in domestic assets and foreign reserves are both potential sources of monetary changes. Some sterilization of balance-of-payments movements is likely, and at the same time some feedback of domestic credit expansion on foreign reserves flows will be observed. We would expect therefore to see changes in both foreign reserves and domestic assets to bear a leading, or perhaps coincident, positive relation to high-powered money growth and a negative and bidirectional relation to each other. Both foreign reserves and domestic asset movements can influence highpowered money growth in the intermediate case. 4.3 Testing Timing Relations In this section we describe the technique we use to test timing relations. We define such relations as relations that exhibit a temporal precedence of one or more variables over another. In this paper we concentrate on bivariate timing relations. We believe these tests are useful for discriminating between relations which are postulated to be fundamentally different in various versions of the monetary model of transmission discussed in the previous section. To examine timing relations, we use the incremental prediction criterion introduced by Granger (1969) and developed further by Sims (1977). Granger defines a causal relation, e.g. between X and Y , on the basis of the usefulness of information on the characterization (probability laws)

Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes

65

of one stochastic process, say X,, for the description of the joint stochastic process, {Y,, X s } . This is usually stated as: series X (Granger) causes series Y if we can better predict Y by utilizing past values of Y and X than by using merely past Y alone. The criterion Granger suggests for making this assessment is a comparison of conditional mean squared errors contingent upon the information sets inclusive and exclusive of series X . Thus, if X helps to predict Y , in the sense of reducing the mean squared prediction error for Y , then X Granger-causes Y . Sims proves two theorems on (stationary) stochastic processes which are relevant in this context. Sims’s analysis begins by recognizing that the stationary processes Y and X can be represented as

(4* 8)

Y , = A(L)u,+ B ( L ) E , ,

+

x, = C(L)u, D(L)€,, (4.9) where u, and E, are uncorrelated stationary processes and A ( L ) , B ( L ) , C ( L ) , and D ( L ) are polynomials in the lag operator L. According to Sims’s first theorem, a necessary and sufficient condition for Y not causing X is that either C ( L ) or D ( L ) be identically zero. For example, Y would not cause X if, and only if, equation (4.9) could be written as (4.10)

X,= D(L)E,.

His second theorem states that the failure of Y to Granger-cause X is a necessary and sufficient condition for treating X as strictly econometrically exogenous with respect to Y . The import of these two theorems is that once we establish the existence of a particular representation between two variables (or, more accurately, once we establish that we cannot refute the existence of one) we have good reason to treat one variable as exogenous. Of course, one variable, which may be exogenous with respect to another variable in the framework of a bivariate system, may be endogenous with respect to a third variable. Nevertheless, the treatment of certain variables as exogenous lends structure to our economic models. The implied structure permits us to choose a better model from among classes of models each of which has a structure with a particular set of exogenous variables. To conduct the causality tests, we ran regressions of the general form8 m

(4.11)

Y , = a0 + .c p,Y,-, r=l

n

+ j =c1 rjx,-j + u,,

as well as the corollary regressions in which we constrained the rj to be identically zero,

(4.12)

y,=

m

(Yo

+ z p,Y,-i + u,. i= 1

8. Sargent (1976) contains a discussion of this form of the test.

66

Chapter Four

By comparing the improvement in the explanation of Y obtained from (4.11) with that derived from the companion regression (4.12), we can determine whether series X contains information useful in explaining series Y . Then, by reversing the roles of X and Y in regressions (4.11) and (4.12), we can establish whether an empirical representation of Y and X implies that one of the series is exogenous. Thus, if we can demonstrate within reasonable statistical limits that the following representation is plausible, rn

n

(4.13) and

... m

(4.14)

X , = a*

+ i =2 1 d&i,

then, according to Sims’s theorems, Y does not cause X or, alternatively, X is exogenous. This is the regression test suggested by Granger; our interpretation of it is, however, somewhat looser than the conventional one. For the most part, we eschew using the word “cause” and instead speak in terms of timing. The reason, which should be clear from the theoretical presentation in section 4.2, is that in at least one of the areas in which we deal-the money-price relations-leads and lags are a poor guide to the question of causation in economies that have an unknown degree of openness. In terms of the debate over “measurement versus theory” that has recently been rekindled (see Sims 1977) our approach can perhaps best be described as “measurement with some theory.” A related point about methodology that bears mentioning is the potential bias inherent in this type of testing procedure. Commonality of movements in the series being analyzed may be captured in the autoregressive terms; this is implicitly disregarded by the method we use. As several others have pointed out (e.g. Zellner 1977), this can lead to accepting the null hypothesis of no relations between the two series when, in fact, one actually exists. In defense of the methodology, we should point out that this bias can also be a blessing. The simple fact of the matter is that in most industrial contries inflation and monetary growth over our sample period rose dramatically and at much the same time. Analyzing innovations in the time series may be the only way to separate the influence of one factor from another. In almost all instances, we transform the data for the purpose of rendering the series stationary. In general, we use natural logs of the levels to reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity. We then difference the log levels, usually once but in some experiments twice. This procedure is intended to eliminate the trend in the mean of a series which is often encountered in aggregate economic time series. This procedure has

67

Inflation and the Timing of Monetary and Price Changes

the advantage of simply and symmetrically “prefiltering” the data without the substantial time costs and lost degrees of freedom one typically incurs when applying Box-Jenkins techniques. Moreover, it is not subject to the criticism that too much has been removed since nearly all aggregate economic time series regression analysis must consider the transformation we apply in order to come to terms with the estimation-efficiency question. The one exception to the general transformation procedure was the (net) domestic asset versus (net) foreign asset relations for certain of the countries for which the net positions took on a negative value. In these exceptional instances, we used arithmetic values of the levels and arithmetic first differences scaled by high-powered money. 4.4

Empirical Results

Our discussion of empirical results is divided into several parts: domestic money and prices, price and interest-rate arbitrage, asset components of high-powered money, and sources of monetary change. In our analysis, we cover periods beginning in 195811and experiment with a variety of lag structures. 4.4.1 Domestic Money and Prices We summarize the money-price results in tables 4.1 and 4.2. There we report the F statistics for the Granger tests of the relations between three monetary aggregates, high-powered money, M1 and M2, and two measures of prices, the GNP or GDP deflator (table 4.1) and the consumer or other similar retail price index (table 4.2), for the eight countries in our ample.^ Except for France and Italy, a significant effect of lagged money on prices exists for at least one domestic monetary aggregate and both price variables for all three periods. In the case of France, the only significant effects for all periods were for high-powered money growth on consumer price inflation. In the case of Italy, the significance of the money-price relation varies among the combinations of monetary and price variables from period to period. In most countries, however, we find a more pervasive influence than appears in either the French or Italian case; the majority of the relations prove significant for both definitions of the price level. The reverse influence (prices on money) is considerably less visible. A significant effect of prices on money without feedback only appears in Italy and the U.K. in two instances, each with high-powered money, and in France in two instances with M2. Significant bidirectional influences appear in relatively few instances. Moreover, only in the case of the U.K. 9. The data we use were compiled from individual country sources by the NBER Project on the International Transmission of Inflation.

Table 4.1

Money and Price Deflator rn

y=ac,+ x p)-LNMNJA(-3) )+0.01423-0.41074*LNMJAU(-4)

141:

XTOYJAU == XTOYJA-XTOYJAEX

142:

: XTOYJA(-l))XTOYJAEX == 2*XTOYJA(-l)-XTOYJA(-2)-1.1134*(DEL(l DEL(1 : XToYJA(-2)))-0.38594*(DEL(l : XTOYJA(-2))-DEL(l : XTOYJA( -3) ~~-O.60316*XTOYJAU~-4~+O.36554*XTOYJAU~-9~+5.OOOOOOE-O5

=

(l-ZPJA)*XPJA+ZPJA*LNYRJA+(l-ZPJA)*LNYRJAP(-l)

LNQIMJA+LNPJA LNMNJA-LNMNJAEX

==

143:

ITOYJA

144:

LNYRTJA

145:

LNYRRJA == (DVUS*LNYRUS+DVUK*LNYRUK+DVCA*LNYRCA+DVFR*LNYRFR+DVGE* LNYRGE+DVIT*LNYRIT+DVNE*LNYRNE)*l/(l-DVJA)-6.64583

146:

LNPRJA == (DVUS*(LNPUS-LNEUS)+DVUK*(LNPUK-LNEUK)+DVCA*(LNPCA-LNECA )+DVFR*(LNPFR-LNEFR)+DVGE*(LNPGE-LNEGE)+DVIT*(LNPIT-LNEIT)+DVNE*( LNPNE-LNENE))*l/(l-DVJA)+0.617771

147:

ZlJA2

148:

SGRPXlJ2 = = 4*(KOJA+K2JA*DEL(l : LNMNJA(-l))+K5JA*RJA+K6JA*RJA(-l) +K7JA*(RUS+GREJkXZl)+K9JA*DEL(l : LNPJA(-l) ) )

149:

GRPXlJA2 = = SGRPX1J2+K14JA*Z1JA2+K15JAtZlJA2(-1)

150:

GREJAX2l == 4*(l*(MOJA+MlJA*DEL(l : LNPIMJA)+M2JA*DEL(l : LNRPOIL) +M3JA*DEL(l : LNYRRJA)+M4JA*DEL(l : ITOYJA)+MSJA*DEL(l : LNPRJA)+ M6JA*DEL(l : LNEJA)))

151:

LNPJA = BlJA+LNMNJA+BZJA*LNYRJAP+B3JA*LNYRTJA+B4JA*RJA+BlOJA*(RUS+ GREJAXZl)+BSJA*(LNMNJA(-l)-LNPJA(-l))+B6JA*LNMJAU+B7JA*LNJAU(-l)+ BBJA*LNMJAU(-2)+89JA*LNMJAU(-3)

152:

LNYRJA = Al.JA+A2JA*LNYRJAP(-l)+(l-AZJA)*LNYRJA(-l)+A5JA*LM.IJAU(-2) +A1OJA*LNGJAU~-3~+A1lJA*XTOYJAU+Al3JA*XTOYJAU~-2~+Al4JA*XTOYJAU~-3

153:

DEL(1 : LNMNJA) = E ~ J A + E ~ J A * ( L N P J A ( - ~ ) - L N P J A ( - ~ ) ) + E ~ L J A * ( ~ * ( L N P J A ( -1)-LNPJA(-3)))+E8JA*(L"PJA(-3-LNPJA-5~)+E12JA*LNYRTJA(-3)+El3JA *LNYRTJA(-4 )+E14JA*BTOYJA+E16JA'(BTOYJA(-1) +BTOYJA(- 2 ) ) +E17JA*(I*( BTOYJA(-l) tBTOYJA(-2) ) )+E18JA* (BTOYJA(-3)+BTOYJA(-4) )+E19JA* (1*( BTOYJA(-3)+BTOYJA(-4)))

154:

RJA = DOJA+D1JA*GRPX1JA2+Dl4JA*RJA~-l~+Dl6JA*GRPXlJA2~-l~+Dl5JA*T+ D2JA*LNMJAU+D3JA*LNMJAU(-l)+D4JA*LNMJAU(-2)+DSJA*LNMJAU(-3)+0* LNGJAU+37JA*LNGJAU(-l)

155:

DZL(1 : LNEJA) = FOJA+FlJA*DEL(l : LNPIMJA)+F4JA*DEL(1 : LNYRRJA)FlJA*DEL(l : LNPRJA)

156:

LNQIMJA

==

XTOYJA-4*BTOYJA-CTOYJA

==

LNYRJA-LNYRJAP

4*DEL(1 : LNPJA)-SGRPXlJZ(-l)

==

)

=

IOJA+I1JA*ITOYJA+I4JA*LNYRTJA+I6JA*LNQIMJA(-l)

225

Simulation Experiments

Table 7.4 (continued) 157:

BTOYJA = JOJA+JlJA*BTOYJA(-l)

158:

XTOYJA = HOJA+HlJA*LNEJA+HSJA*LNRPOIL+H6JA*LNYRTJA+H7JA*T+H8JA* XTOYJA(-l)+H9JA*XTOYJA(-2)+HlOJA*LNPRJA+H12JA*LNYRRJA+H13JA* LNYRRJA(-l)+Hl4JA*LNPJA

159:

CTOYJA LNYRJA)

160:

LNYRNEP = (~-ZPNE)*XPNE+ZPNE*LNYRNE+(~-ZPNE)*LNYRNEP(-~)

161:

LNPIMNE == LNQIMNE+LNPNE

GOJA+G1JART+G3JA*RJA+G4JA*GREJAX21+G5JA*RUS+G8JA*DEL(l :

162:

LNMNEU == LNM"E-LNMNNEEX

163:

LNMNNEEX == LNMNNE(-1)+0.34717*(LNMNNE(-l)-LNMNNE(-2))+0.37492*( LNMNNE(-Z)-LNMNNE(-3))-0.43951*LNMNEU(-4)+0.00681

164:

XTOYNEU

165:

XTOYNEEX == XTOYNE(-1)-0.31379*XTOYNEU(-l~-O.33862*XTOYNEU~-9~~ 0.00094

==

XTOYNE-XTOYNEEX

166:

ITOYNE == XTOYNE-4*BTOYNE-CTOYNE

167:

LNYRTNE == LNYRNE-LNYRNEP

168:

LNYRRNE == (DVUS*LNYRUS+DVUK*LNYRUK+DVCA*LNYRCA+DVFR~LNYRFR+DVGE* LNYRGE+DVIT*LNYRIT+DVJA*LNYRJA)*l/(l-DVNE)-7.17908

169:

LNPRNE == (DVUS*(LNPUS-LNEUS)+DVUK*(LNPUK-LNEUK)+DVCA*(LNPCA-LNECA )+DVFR*(LNPFR-LNEFR)+DVGE*(LNPGE-LNEGE)+DVIT*(LNPIT-LNEIT)+DVJA*( LNPJA-LNEJA))*l/(l-DVNE)+l.l838 4*DEL(1 : LNPNE)-GRPXlNEl(-l)

170:

ZlNElL

171:

GRPXlNEl == 4*(KONE+KlNE*LNMNNEEX+K2NE*LNMNNE(-l)+K4NE*DEL(l : LNYRNE(-l))+K6NE*RNE(-l)+KgNE*DEL(l : LNPNE(-l))+KllNE*LNMNEU(-l)) +K14NE*Z1NE1L+K15NE*Z1NE1L(-1)

172:

GRENEX11 == 4*(1*(MONE+Mlh'E'DEL(l : LNPIMNE)*M2NE*DEL(? : LNRPOIL) +H?.NE*DEL(l : LNYRRNE)+M4NERDEL(l : ITOYNE)+MSNE*DEL(l : LNPRNE)* M6NEiDEL?l-: LNENE)))

173:

LNPNE = BlNE+LNMNNE+BZNE*LNYRNEP+B3NE*LNYRTNE+B4NE*~E+BlONE*(RUS+ GRENEXll)+B5NE*(LNM"E(-l)-LNPNE(-l))+B6NE*LNMNEU+B7NE*LNMNEU(-l)+ BBNE*LNMNEU(-2)+B9NE*LNMNEU(-3)

174:

LNYRNE = AlNE+A2NE*LNYRNEP(-l)+(l-A2NE)*LN~E(-l~+A3NE*LNMNEU+ A4NE*LNMNEU(-l)+A5NE*LNMNEU(-2)+A6NE*LNMNEU(-3)+A7NE*LNGNEU+ABNE* LNGNEU(-l)+A9NE*LNGNEU(-2)+AlONE*LNGNEU(-3)+AllNE*XTOYNEU+A12NE* XTOYNEU(-1)+A13NE*XTOYNEU(-2)+Al4NE*XTOYNEU~-3~

175:

DEL(1 : LNMNNE) = ElNE*E2NE*T+E3NE*LNGNEU+E4NE*(LNGNEU(-l)+LNGNEU( -2) ) +E5NE*(LNGNEU(-3) +LNGNEU(- 4 ) +E6NE*(LNPNE(-1)-LNPNE(-3) +E7NE* ( 1* ( LNPNE ( - 1 -LNPNE( - 3 ) ) +EllNE*LNYRTNE( - 2 ) +El2NE*LNYRTNE( - 1 ) + E14NE*BTOYNE+E16NE*~BTOYNE(-1)+BTOYNE~-2~~+E17NE*~1*~BTOYNE~-1~+ BTOYNE(-2)))

176:

RNE = DONE+D1NE*GRPX1NE1+D14NE*RNE(-1~+Dl5NE*T+D3NE*LNMNEU~-l~+ D4NE*LNMNEU(-2)+D1ONE*XTOYNEU+DllNE*XTOYNEU~-1)+D13NE*XTOYNEU~-3~

==

177:

DEL(1 : LNENE) = FONE+FlNE*DEL(l : LNPIMNE)-FlNE*DEL(l : LNPRNE)

178:

LNQIMNE = IONE+I1NE*ITOYNE+I5NE*LNYRTNE~-1)+I6NE*LNQIMNE~-l~ JONE+J2NE*DEL(1 : LNENE)+J3NE*DEL(l : LNENE(-l))

179:

BTOYNE

180:

XTOYNE = HONE+HlNE*LNENE+HSNE*LNRPOIL+H6NE*LNYRTNE+H7NE*T+HBNE* XTOYNE(-l)+HlONE*LNPRNE+H12NE*LNYRRNE+H13NE*LNYRRNE(-l)+H14NE* LNPNE

181:

CTOYNE = GONE+GlNE*T+G2NE*LNRPOIL+G3NE*RNE+G4NE*GRENEXll+G5NE*RUS+ G6NE*(XTOYNE-ITOYNE)+G7NE*LNYRTNE

=

226

Chapter Seven

Table 7.4 (continued) COEFFICIENT AND PARAMETER VALUES (CONST-MARK4FLT)

AlCA AlIT AlUK AlOFR A10JA AlOUS AllGE AllNE Al2CA Al2IT A12UK A13FR A13JA A13US A14GE A14NE A2CA A2IT A2UK A3FR A3JA A3US A4GE A4NE A5CA ASIT A5UK A6FR A6JA A6US A7GE A7NE AKA ABIT ABUK A9FR A9JA A9US BlGE BlNE BlOCA BlOIT BlOUK B2FR BZJA B2US B3GE B3NE B4CA B4IT B4UK BSFR B5JA B5US B6GE B6NE B7CA B7IT B7UK BBFR BBJA B8US B9GE B9NE ClFR C2OFR CZlFR C22FR C23FR C24FR C25FR C26FR C27FR DVCA DVIT DVUK DOFR DOJA DOUS DlGE

0.010803 0.011699 0.005561 0.016439 -0.026697 0.067441 0.296236 0.097619 0.164836 -0.044277 0.42402 0.015316 -1.15516 -0.0415 -0.514582 -0.113143 0.134071 0.02481 0.240655 -0.264118 0.142673 0.967393 0.069415 0.094424 0.075535 0.266542 -0.026207 -0.055212 0.088371 0.935403 -0.036326 0.037422 -0.149956 0.000596 0.027366 0.049895 0.044973 0.05507 0.073547 -0.005675 -0.056102 -0.037786 0.078828 -0.018392 -0.201664 -0.022227 -0.006227 0.107645 0.244962 0.160445 0.504004 -0.996486 -0.827685 -0.9306 -1.07676 -0.977966 -0.267171 -0.191914 0.037385 0.024827 -0.312743 0.169832 -0.308631 -0.303134 0.001842 -0.033312 -0.036075 -0.024205 -0.011601 -0.003691 -0.010717 0.000474 0.0072 0.046296 0.048061 0.063287 0.003366 -0.000932 0.010089 0.231726

AlFR AlJA AlUS AlOGE AlONE AllCA AllIT AllUK Al2FR A12JA Al2US A1 3GE A13NE Zl4CA Al4IT Al4UK A2FR A2JA A2US A3GE A3NE A4CA A4 IT A4UK A5FR ASJA A5US A6GE A6NE A7CA A7 IT A7UK A8Fh A8JA ABUS A9GE A9NE BlCA BlIT BlUK BlOFR BlOJA BlOUS BZGE B2NE B3CA B3IT B3UK B4FR B4JA B4US B5GE B5NE B6CA B6IT B6UK B7FR B7JA B7US BBGE BBNE B9CA B9IT B9UK ClUK C2OUK C2lUK C22UK C23UK C24UK C25UK C26UK C27UK DVFR DVJA DVUS DOGE DONE DlCA DlIT

0.012619 0.020614 0.007884 0.013896 0.035157 0.679057 -0.383459 0.189683 -0.715374 0.349852 0.532314 -0.333226 0.104741 0.544787 -0.465483 0.006859 0.102126 -0.038396 0.088859 0.344867 0.241184 0.177733 0.079064 0.040359 0.10011 0.211515 -0.04704 0.04078 0.006819 -0.004872 -0.003348 0.174624 0.007462 -0.019563 0.138711 -0.00762 0.016572 0.11 9397 0.206264 -0.151938 0.029941 0.080375 -0.001131 -0.063613 -0.081835 -0.152691 -0.042952 -0.276035 0.462903 0.95586 0.346502 -0.335252 -0.890964 -1.07886 -1.24523 -0.689923 -0.237026 -0.356822 -0.393195 -0.311723 -0.621455 -0.635726 -0.151063 -0.167466 0.002293 -0.087536 -0.032481 -0.064932 -0.054861 -0.041132 -0.01505 -0.005127 0.000353 0.077221 0.107898 0.531464 0.003628 0.003585 0.049893 0.027008

AlGE AlNE AlOCA AlOIT AlOUK AllFR AllJA AllUS AlZGE Al2NE A13CA A13IT A13UK Al4FR A14JA A14US A2GE A2NE A3CA A3IT A3UK A4FR A4JA A4US ASGE A5NE A6CA A6IT A6UK A7FR A7JA A7US ABGE A8NE A9CA A9IT A9UK BlFR B1JA BlUS BlOGE BlONE BZCA BZIT B2UK B3FR B3JA B3US B4GE B4NE B5CA BSIT B5UK B6FR B6 JA B6US B7GE B7NE BBCA BBIT B8UK B9FR B9JA B9US ClUS c20us C2lUS c22us C23US c24us c25us C26US c27us DVGE DVNE DOCA DOIT DOUK DlFR DlJA

0.010821 0.009964 -0.01349 0.025164 -0.023974 0.213191 -1.91914 0.717539 -0.23778 -0.064686 -0.028676 -0.227114 -0.21287 0.121494 -1.09256 -0.925131 0.04147 0.090174 0.244862 OI093876 -0.18449 0.068796 0.1083 0.548935 -0.01725 -0.03886 0.193415 -0.01757 -0.126895 0.072732 0.044268 -0.034466 0.030281 -0.031181 -0.02829 -0.001628 0.118697 0.05478 0.448139 0.083905 -0.008847 0.000617 -0.218794 -6I669682 -0.046894 -0.018886 -0.065941 -0.09072 0.023618 -0.013744 -0.628784 -0.947684 -0.872932 -0.724769 -0.988582 -0.725851 -0.141736 -0.451249 -0.271711 -0.378815 -0.151933 0.04942 -0.289714 0.016405 0.004693 -0.198491 -0.187741 -0.050647 -0.063531 0.059092 0.017716 -0.027592 -0.061705 0.107001 0.018771 0.002086 -0.002471 0.003081 0.073674 0.027117

227

Simulation Experiments

Table 7.4 (continued) DlNE D1 OCA DlOIT DlOUK DllFR DllJA DllUS Dl2GE Dl2NE D13CA D13IT D13UK Dl4FR Dl4JA D14US D15GE D15NE D16CA D16IT D16UK D2FR D2JA D2US D3GE D3NE D4CA D4IT D4UK D5FR D5JA D5US D6GE D6NE D7CA D7IT D7UK D8FR D8JA DBUS D9GE D9NE ElCA ElIT ElUK ElOFR ElOJA ElOUS EllGE EllNE E12CA E12IT El2UK E13FR E13JA El 3US E14GE El4NE E15FR E15JA E16CA E16IT E16UK El 7GE E17NE 618FR E18JA E19CA E19IT E19UK E2GE E2NE E2OUS E3FR E3JA E3US E4GE E4NE E5CA E5IT E5UK E6FR E6JA E6US

-0.043995 -0.007863 0.239529 0.192508 0.12238 -0.025161 0.23597 0.0877 0.03381 -0.032712 -0.009773 0.213998 0.763452 0.983108 0.,53 9202 3.845550E-05 0.000151 0.005978 -0.019956 -0.022298 -0.49829 -0.006893 -0.230722 0.07571 -0.162029 0.092836 0.037063 0.036448 0.03674 -0.016782 0.103347 -0.02391 0.00239 ~ . ~ . -0.001992 -0.004384 0.022854 --0.01609 0.000889 0.02294 0.01666 0.01609 0.007281 0.019544 -0.00433 1.58587 0.005894 -0.116645 0.102443 0.004899 . . . .~ . . -0.077664 0.126007 5.57298 -3.24907 0.284267 -0.054576 1.628 0.403001 0.103117 -0.574234 0.670052 1.57536 0.282168 0.332797 -0.892653 0.761771 1.71901 2.14929 0.810022 -0.204191 -8.064001E-05 0.000421 0.496825 0.00301 -0.021866 0.004036 -0.014921 -0.027174 -0.003532 -0.023132 0.02989 -0.057298 -0.564806 -0.057597 ~

DlUK D1 OFR D10JA DlOUS DllGE DllNE Dl2CA Dl2IT DlZUK D13FR D13JA D13US Dl4GE D14NE Dl5CA D15IT D15UK Dl6FR D16JA D16US D2GE D2NE D3CA D3IT D3UK D4FR D4JA D4US D5GE D5NE D6CA D6IT ~ ~ D6UK D7FR D7JA D7US DBGE DBNE D9CA D9IT D9UK ElFR ElJA ElUS El OGE El ONE EllCA EllIT EllUK E12FR E12JA El2US E13GE El 3NE E14CA El4IT El4UK E15GE E15NE E16FR E16JA E17CA E17IT E17UK El8GE El8NE E19FR E19JA E2CA E2IT E2UK E2lUS E3GE E3NE E4CA E4IT E4UK E5FR E5JA E5US E6GE E6NE E7CA

0.009035 0.20013 0.007364 0.508074 -0.24158 0.06167 -0.013955 0.054745 -0.003938 0.07675 0.002267 -0.213716 0.76264 0.799926 -3.498167E-05 1 .96037OE-O5 0.000183 0.0124 0.030428 -0.154852 0.1307 0.07838 0.015319 0.004611 0.025404 -0.09139 -0.032911 0.091665 0.05852 0.00622 -0.073145 -0.005287 . -0.050417 0.01672 0.001793 0.01894 -0.0128 0.00664 0.017438 -0.003281 0.001453 0.03332 0.054274 0.00329 -0.036416 0.033838 -0.054589 -0.126347 -0.550499 4.39695 -0.158405 -0.468037 0.084755 -0.028792 -0.396027 -3 .a8655 -0.068485 0.019635 0.700825 0 .lo8524 1 .a3261 -2.84711 -0.686828 -0.521172 0.625931 0.091526 0.060458 -1.78208 0.000184 0.000454 -6.443714E-O7 -0.248602 0.043045 0.058633 0.138066 -0.03104 0.163098 -0.017824 0.026185 0.033956 0.097666 -0.316001 0.264871

DlUS DlOGE D1ONE DllCA D11lT DllUK Dl2FR Dl2JA Dl2US D13GE D13NE D14CA D14IT Dl4UK D15FR D15JA Dl5US D16GE D16NE D2CA D2IT D2UK D3FR 0351 D3US D4GE D4NE D5CA D5IT D5UK D6FR D6JA D6US D7GE D7NE D8CA D8IT D8UK D9FR D9JA D9US ElGE ElNE El OCA ElOIT ElOLX EllFR EllJA EllUS El2GE ElZNE E13CA E13IT E13UK El4FR El4JA E15CA E15IT E15UK E16GE E16NE E17FR E17JA E18CA El8 IT El8UK E19GE E19NE E2FR E2JA E2US E3CA E3IT E3UK E4FR E4JA E4US E5GE E5NE E6CA E6IT E6UK E7FR

0.434367 0.20221 0.137002 0.037268 0.161757 0.018407 0.194568 0.025661 0.544253 -0.24942 0.048054 0.961863 1.02768 0.825858 0.000154 -2.1444263-05 -6.0317963-06 -0.06953 0.04514 -0.078202 -0.020386 -0.299766 -0.154023 -0.021473 0.163077 0.10942 0.06593 0.116664 . ~ ~ . . . 0.02739 0.077159 -0.034926 0.000489 -0.020453 0.00277 0.00041 0.032561 -0.000764 0.014188 ~ ~ . -0.00794 0.000607 0.015392 0.013288 0.010131 -0.034398 0.105504 1.23133 -1.02545 -0.022105 0.426361 -0.191149 0.019509 -0.041273 -0.151066 -4.2394 0.10534 1.95052 3.68752 4.10458 0.596763 0.09378 0.292781 -0.132219 -2.53069 0.286188 -0.372264 0.187571 0.039871 -0.971241 -0.000192 -1.888251E-05 0.000243 0.10149 -0.014448 0.107434 0.011217 0.031742 0.001552 -0.0225 ...--. -0.040335 -0.197234 -0.09435 0.07705 0.574765 ~

~

~~

~

.

228

Chapter Seven

Table 7.4 (continued) E7GE E7NE E8FR E8JA E8US E9GE E9NE FOFR FOJA FOUS ~. FlGE FlNE FlOFR FlOJA FlOUS FZOFR F2OJA F2OUS F3GE F30GE F30NE FQGE F4OFR F4OJA F4OUS F50GE F50NE F6CA F6IT F6UK F60GE F60NE GOFR GOJA GOUS GlGE GlNE GlOCA GlOIT GlOUK GllFR GllJA GllUS Gl2GE G12NE G2CA G2IT G2UK GZOFR G2OJA ~~

G22CA G22IT G22UK G3FR G3JA G3US G30GE G30NE G31CA G31IT G31UK G32FR G32JA G32US G4GE

G6FR G6JA G6US G7GE G7NE G8CA G8IT G8UK G9FR G9JA G9US

-0.763707 0.206985 -0.0748 -0.226858 -0.286081 0.700672 0.062226 -0.009077 -0.008808 0.000225 ~. .. . ~ 0.822682 0.28658 -0.039353 0.124816 0.616185 0.052207 -0.07173 0.067515 -0.120761 0.290149 -0.255302 -0.731788 1.76086 3.84313 2.25319 1.20028 0.968503 -0.095084 -1 .a5255 -2.2736 0.468396 0.799582 -0.001236 0.045769 0.004428 .3.927120E-06 2.1739313-05 -0.050435 1.38277 0.757122 0.258753 -1.14262 0.347438 0.405291 0.363585 0.007542 0.000184 -0.046579 -0.654758 -0.826017 0.007598 0.132577 0.171835 -0.194408 -0.02103 0.525568 -0.249651 -0.583978 -0.100705 0.052299 -0.086553 -0.048232 0.037957 -0.076486 -0.017283 0.023627 -0.004193 0.097097 0.024806 0.525327 0.328725 -0.927833 0.184551 -0.212536 0.571938 -0.065372 0.077908 -0.115046 -0.125914 0.51128 -0.195855 0.034766 0.05499

E7IT E7UK E8GE E8NE E9CA E9IT E9UK FOGE FONE ~FlCA . FlIT FlUK FlOGE FlONE F2FR F2OGE F2ONE F3CA F30CA F30IT F30UK F4JA F4OGE F4ONE F50CA F5OIT F50UK F6FR F6JA F60CA F6OIT F60UK GOGE GONE GlCA GlIT GlUK GlOFR GlOJA GlOUS GllGE GllNE Gl2CA Gl2IT Gl2UK G2FR GZJA G2US G2OGE G2ONE G21CA G211T G2lUK G22FR G22JA G22US G3GE G3NE G30CA G30IT G30UK G31FR G31JA G31US G32GE G32NE G4CA G41T G4UK G5FR G5JA G5US G6GE G6NE G7CA G7IT G7UK G8FR GBJA G8US G9GE G9NE HOCA

0.037192 0.024239 -0.343714 0.05664 -0.001604 -0.129687 -0.074746 -0.004262 -0.01574 0.179137 0.409235 0.024094 0.242206 0.223077 0.418867 0.006946 0.09354 -0.020791 0.279496 -0.14876 0.740935 -0.66905 -0.377934 0.138543 0.270787 1.31648 1.28695 -3.23475 -2.01446 0.02143 -1.1264 0.533112 -0.012056 -0.008552 -0.000105 0.000155 -0.000265 0.636369 -0.610265 -0.299741 -0.422543 -0.687287 0.16578 0.361741 -0.680074 0.013437 0.031405 -0.001341 0.621408 0.983567 0.213911 -0.352289 -0.576376 0.386726 -0I232578 0.111434 -0.3022 -0.679133 OiO4415-0.045144 -0.342353 0.000667 0.033051 0.003961 0.051619 0.04683 0.399296 0.071244 0.444298 . . 0.332204 0.064557 -0.203762 0.679257 0.53443 0.101733 -0.006446 -0.696908 0.076835 -0.219103 -0.106903 -0.940238 -0.454351 0.203896

E7 JA E8CA E8IT E8UK E9FR E9JA FOCA FOIT FOUK FlFR FlJA FlOCA FlOIT FlOUK FZOCA F2OIT F2OUK F3FR F30FR F30JA F3OUS F4OCA F4OIT F40UK F5OFR F5OJA F5OUS F6GE F6NE F60FR F60JA GOCA GOIT GOUK GlFR G1 JA GlUS GlOGE GlONE GllCA G11IT GllUK Gl2FR Gl2JA Gl2US G2GE GZNE G2OCA G2OIT G2OUK G2lFR G2lJA G2lUS G22GE G22NE G3CA G3IT G3UK G30FR G30JA G30US G31GE G31NE G32CA G32IT G32UK G4FR G4JA G4US ~ G5GE G5NE G6CA G6IT G6UK G7FR G7JA G7US GBGE G8NE G9CA G9IT G9UK HOFR

0.415324 -0.113236 0.262491 0.156708 0.28364 0.014509 0.001373 0.001751 0.016768 0.573409 0.319091 -0.053768 0.072819 -0.002007 -0.245403 0.176537 -0.040341 -0.001183 -0.026652 0.804933 0.15222 0.784069 -0.221008 0.189983 1.25097 1.30657 0.153811 -1.95928 -1.9384 0.617717 0.710113 -0.003648 -0.003179 0.013468 -3.4071553-05 -3.6584641-05 5.279754E-05 -0.002451 0.696158 -0.298437 0.442983 -0.828963 0.908516 -0.346612 -0.480483 0.0044 0.015183 0.259146 -0.172217 0.317069 -0.994672 -0.091766 0.034483 0.546939 0.979839 -0.209463 -0.204769 0.752483 -0.002254 0.038284 -0.003303 0.046935 -0.051527 -0.06872 0.071145 0.016799 0.073793 0.05497 -0.034747 ~ ~ ~ 0.243101 0.543858 0.854509 0.4522 .. .~~~ -1.08654 0.060923 0.04405 -0.053545 0.516343 -0.045435 0.037359 -0.262394 0.080414 0.129624

~

229

Simulation Experiments

Table 7.4 (continued) HOGE HONE HlCA HlIT HlUX HlOFR HlOJA HlOUS HllGE HllNE Hl2CA Hl2IT Hl2UK H13GE H13NE Hl4FR H14JA H15CA H15IT H15UK H2GE H2NE H3CA H3IT H3UK H4FR H4JA H4US H5GE H5NE H6CA H6 IT H6UK H7FR H7JA H7US H8GE HBNE H9CA H91T H9UK I OFR IOJA I ous I1GE I1NE I2CA I21T I2UX I3FR I3JA I3US I4GE 14NE I5CA ISIT I5UK I6FR 16JA I6US I7GE I7NE 18CA IBIT I 8UX JOFR JOJA JlCA J2CA J21T J3NE XOCA KOIT XOUX XlFR K1 JA KlUS XlOGE XlONE KllCA KllIT KllUX

0.089664 0.253769 -0.152912 -0.018547 0.051451 0.010249 0.018682 0.00826 0.044574 -0.41788 0.113463 0.05552 -0.010101 -0.021665 -0.165191 -0.021497 -0.010149 0.035674

-0;iOSioi

-0.124118 -0.001326 -0.003371 -0.038753 0.164379 0.148371 -0.003771 -0.000414 0.610356 0.028759 0.032386 -0.068748 -0.116616 -0.038433 -0.00426 -0.000251 -0.008498 0.347365 0.51165 0.272154 0.229865 0.102093 4.16517 -0.358942 -0.104698 1.09201 1.04947 0.127849 0.036875 0.13774 -0.715105 0.013094 0.082842 0.014642 0.042767 -0.332617 -0.040057 -0.53198 0.348802 0.29103 0.052165 0.053553 -0.074126 0.066109 0.016146 0.014522 0.000654 0.000194 0.280069 -0.069894 -0.046984 -0.027252 -0.03672 0.030647 -0.08629 0.09518 -0.28134 -1.704 -0.05558 0.11578 0.43356 0.510238 0.7103

HOIT HOUK HlFR H1 JA HlUS HlOGE HlONE HllCA HllIT HllUK Hl2FR H12 JA H13CA H131T H13UX H14GE Hl4NE H15FR H15JA H2CA H2IT H2UK H3FR H3JA H3US H4GE H4NE H5CA H5IT H5UK H6FR H6JA H6US H7GE H7NE H8CA H8 IT HBUK H9FR H9 JA H9US I OGE I ONE I1CA IlIT I1UK 12FR I2JA I2US I3GE I3NE I4CA I4IT I4UK I5FR I5JA 15US I6GE I6NE I7CA I7IT I7UK I8FR 18JA I8US JOGE JONE J1JA J2FR JZNE J3UX XOFR XOJA

xous

KlGE KlNE KlOCA XlOIT XlOUK XllFR K11 JA XllUS

-0 .a78539 0.548739 0.073406 0.016673 0.014957 0.247567 0.586296 -0.049448 0.081144 0.306618 0.248513 -0.119308 0.08955 0.201372 0.113126 -0.066495 -0.499385 -0.077889 -0.03302 0.085196 0.001095 -0.006863 0.049731 -0.012907 -0.00087 0.003139 0.000248 0.012595 0.018264 0.014503 0.011124 -0.030056 0.010184 -0.001028 -0.002796 0.342569 0.235021 0.329246 0.250369 0.123404 0.018369 -0.265758 -0.570559 1.00269 2.3297 2.04017 0.010317 0.002864 0.018057 0.032967 0.277274 0.179301 0.295977 0.034769 0.037033 0.010134 0.036839 0.615658 0.49757 -0.055634 -0.091501 -0.031961 0.018122 -0.041865 0.004386 0.005948 0.001483 0.636045 -0.028109 -0.028487 -0.037745 -0.007933 0.066137 -0.118647 0.084483 0.074312 -0.50794 0.1779 -0.36774 -0.205692 0.10676 -0.011724

HOJA HOUS HlGE HlNE HlOCA HlOIT HlOUK HllFR HllJA HllUS H12GE Hl2NE H13FR H13JA Hl4CA Hl4IT Hl4UK H15GE H15NE H2FR H2JA H2US H3GE H3NE H4CA H4IT H4UK H5FR H5JA H5US H6GE H6NE H7CA H7IT H7UK HBFR HBJA H8US H9GE H9NE I OCA IOIT I OUK I1FR IlJA 11US I2GE IZNE I3CA I3IT I3UK I4FR I4JA I4US I5GE I5NE I6CA I6IT I6UX I7FR I7JA I7US I8GE I8NE JOCA JOIT JOUX JlUK JZGE J3IT J4GE KOGE KONE KlCA KlIT KlUK XlOFR KlOJA KlOUS XllGE KllNE X12CA

-0.060943 0.077502 0.040487 0.12252 0.025102 -0.071293 0.041918 0.239274 -0.048667 0.01138 0.1238 0.500342 0.054154 0.149767 0.085483 0.055937 -0.103932 -0.326702 0.186242 -0.000659 0.000277 0.01107 0.009901 -0.065659 0.053718 -0.000501 0.003317 0.01573 -0.000268 0.072265 0.043488 0.154034 -0.001767 -0.001111 -0.002765 0.234953 0.292216 0.067992 0.113401 0.081916 0.302888 -0.491863 -0.621571 4.01 11.8281 0.661462 0.032126 0.364942 -0.123952 0.093963 -0.08037 -0.494583 -0.531693 -0.066497 -0.007693 -0.228264 0.640689 0.655782 0.374063 -0.041407 -8.886478E-05 -0.068607 -0.028847 -0.04174 0.00023 -0.002227 -0.001317 0.404612 -0 .lo1694 -0.030714 -0.092671 -0.004188 -0.019439 -1.00189 -70.1123 -0.21725 -0 .lo998 -0.05976 -0.266557 8.54003 -0.120811 -0.16197

230

Chapter Seven

Table 7.4 (continued) Kl2FR K12JA Kl2US K13GE K13NE Kl4CA K14IT Kl4UK K15FR K15JA K15US K2GE K2NE K3CA K3IT K3UK K4FR K4JA K4US K5GE K5NE K6CA K6IT K6UK K7FR K7JA K7US KBGE KBNE K9CA K9IT K9UK LOFR LOJA LlCA LlIT LlUK L2GE L2NE L3FR L3JA L4CA L4IT L4UK L5GE L5NE L6GE MOCA MOIT MOUK MlGE MlNE M2FR M2JA M3CA M3IT M3UK M4GE M4NE M5FR M5JA M6CA M6IT M6UK XPFR XPJA XPUS ZPGE ZPNE

-0.04162 0.15317 0.222 28.5363 -5.76759 -0.2753 0.36478 -0.21338 -0.1698 0.4259 -0.1317 79.9045 -0.064781 0.06676 -10.1092 0.56026 0.0028 -0.02574 -0.055842 -0.01241 -0.04987 -0.51519 -0.004496 0.14599 0.00344 0.056447 0.008

0.01352 -0.02741 0.49477 -0.15663 0.35337 0.001753 -0.000313 -0.044797 -0.2118 -0.5398 -113.957 10.9493 0.6546 0.076104 0.510603 0.970475 0.564549 0.0106 0.024793 -0.0086 -0.00314 0.0232 0.00597 -0.95133 0.11611 -0.06955 -0.03956 0.07509 0.76727 1.20971 2.98731 -0.10364 -3.15593 -0.02198 0.31538 0.15115 -0.20116 0.01379 0.0228 0.00866 0.025 0.025

K12GE K12NE K13CA K13IT K13UK K14FR Kl4JA K14US K15GE K15NE K2CA K21T K2UK K3FR K3JA K3US K4GE K4NE K5CA K5 IT K5UK K6FR K6JA K6US K7GE K7NE K8CA K8IT KBUK K9FR K9JA K9US LOGE LONE LlFR L1JA L2CA L2IT L2UK L3GE L3NE L4FR L4JA L5CA L5IT L5UK L6JA MOFR MOJA MlCA MlIT MlUK M2GE M2NE M3FR M3JA M4CA M4 IT M4UK M5GE M5NE M6FR M6JA P XPGE XPNE ZPCA ZPIT ZPUK

21.9658 -7.00023 -0.19053 0.182301 0.28402 0.6105 0.2194 0.2778 0.5547 0.5438 -0.04238 -0.372853 -0.29567 -0.34383 -0.18028 -0.065193 0.138669 0,243143 0.34558 0.07162 0.02992 0.216151 -2.03841 -0.038 0.01888 -0.03923 -0.0327 -0.01914 -0.02842 0.11732 -0.212914 0.246549 0.001334 -0.001407 -0.736738 -0.579833 33.9022 17.655 29.8764 -0.2109 -0.192914 0.916987 0.142382 -1. -1. -0.023716 -0.3398 0.06315 0.00323 0.05183 -0.08897 0.80037 0.05737 -0.07818 -1.13931 -0.87177 -0.30121 0.1553 -2.03867 -0.13434 -1.97462 -0.39385 0.20401 4. 0.01143 0.01161 0.025 0.025 0.025

K12IT K12UK K13FR K13JA K13US Kl4GE Kl4NE K15CA K15IT K15UK K2FR K2JA K2US K3GE K3NE K4CA K4 IT K4UK K5FR K5JA K5US K6GE K6NE K7CA K7IT K7UK KBFR K8JA KBUS K9GE K9NE LOCA LOIT LOUK LlGE LlNE L2FR L2JA L3CA L3IT L3UK L4GE L4NE L5FR L5JA L6FR L7FR MOGE MONE MlFR MlJA M2CA M2IT M2UK M3GE M3NE M4FR M4JA M5CA M5IT M5UK M6GE M6NE XPCA XPIT XPUK ZPFR ZPJA ZPUS

0.196408 -0.40683 -0.07258 0,0343 0.02 0.1874 -0.2528 -0.6962 0.42363 0.5093 0.275907 0.14682 0.087633 -0.02164 -5.04602 0.06475 -0.185426 0.13262 0.05509 1.33237 0.140337 0.089455 0.108302 0.01197 -0.03065 0.04161 0.01106 0.00436 -0.009 0.579013 -0.392292 -0.000111 -0.000106 0,001221 -0.672213 -0.1362 131.55 -405.337 -0.0089 -0.032609 0.1369 0.238757 0.624358 -0.036492 -0.0779 -0.65 .... -0.35 0.00064 0.02739 0.13361 -0.03233 -0.00683 -0.029 ~.~~~ -0.02808 -0.73465 -0.66181 1.42566 3.92447 0.18038 -0.35833 -0.98978 0.18685 -0.35813 0.012 0.01218 0.0067 0.025 0.025 0.025

231

Simulation Experiments

References Bhandari, J. S . , and B. Putnam. 1982. Economic interdependence and flexible exchange rates. Cambridge: MIT Press. Carr. J., and M. R. Darby. 1981. The role of money supply shocks in the short-run demand for money. Journal of Monetary Economics 8 (September) : 183-99. Darby, M. R. 1980. The monetary approach to the balance of payments: Two specious assumptions. Economic Inquiry 18 (April): 321-26. . 1981. The international economy as a source of and restraint on United States inflation. In W. A. Gale, ed., Inflation: Causes, consequents, and control. Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers. Dornbusch, R. 1976. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of Political Economy 84 (December): 1161-76. Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. In K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, eds., The Phillips curve and labor markets, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Meiselman, D. I., and A. B. Laffer. 1975. Thephenomenon of worldwide inflation. Washington: American Enterprise Institute. Parkin, M., and G. Zis. 1976a. Inflation in the world economy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. . 19766. Znflation in open economies. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Swoboda, A. K. 1976. Monetary policy under fixed exchange rates: Effectiveness, the speed of adjustment, and proper use. In J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson, eds., The monetary approach to the balance of payments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

8

The Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation Michael R. Darby

The increase in the real price of oil during 1973-74 is widely believed to have been a major cause of inflation in the United States and abroad. In part, this belief is based on a partial equilibrium (or adding-up) approach which explains the inflation rate as the weighted sum of the inflation rates of individual goods and services without making due allowance for the general equilibrium effects on factor prices of an increase in the relative price of an imported factor. But arguments acceptable theoretically can be made which attribute inflation-or at least an upward price-level shift-to factors decreasing the real quantity of money demanded or increasing the nominal quantity of money supplied by the central banks. This chapter reports an empirical investigation of the magnitude of these possible effects consistent with general equilibrium. First, a theoretical analysis of the long-run and short-run effects of an oil price change is presented in section 8.1. It is seen there that the long-run effect on real income and the real quantity of money demanded may be quite small, if not negligible, particularly when real income is measured in terms of real GNP and money is deflated by the corresponding implicit deflator. While this result may be due to the use of a threefactor Cobb-Douglas production function in the context of a neoclassical growth model, it certainly illustrates that a long-run reduction of real GNP of even 1 or 2% is very much an empirical question. Short-run effects on real income and prices associated with shifts in aggregate demand and supply appear to be similar in magnitude to those for the long run. Central banks’ reaction to the short-run real-income and inflation effects may offset or reinforce these effects once monetary policy is allowed to be endogenous. Tests of significance of oil price variables in an extended Lucas-Barro real income equation are reported in section 8.2. The results are mixed 232

233

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

and confounded by price control and decontrol programs which were widespread at nearly the same time as the 1973-74 oil price change. Much future work is required to disentangle the effects of these two factors definitively. Section 8.3 reports simulation experiments on the effects of the 197374 oil price change. These experiments are conducted using the Mark IV-FLT Simulation Model presented in chapter 7 above. This model-a simplified version of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model'-is a quarterly macroeconomic model of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. In addition to the basic Mark IV-FLT Model, an extended Mark IV-Oil Model is used which incorporates oil price variables in the real-income equations for those five countries for which the variables were found to be significant in section 8.2. Using the basic model, some notable effects are found as a result of induced movements in exports, exchange rates, money supplies, and the like. Stronger effects are simulated using the Mark IV-Oil Model, but the price-control caveat of section 8.2 again applies. The concluding section summarizes the results of this chapter and suggests areas for future research as international data on the effects of the 1979-80 oil price increase become available. 8.1 Theory

The price level, measured in dollars per basket of goods, is the inverse of the price of money, goods per dollar. So it is convenient to classify the forces determining the price level according to whether they influence the supply of or demand for money. A standard (long-run) money-demand function explains the real quantity of money demanded md by real income y and the nominal interest rate R . The nominal quantity demanded M d is the product of this real demand and the price level:

(8.1)

Md=md(y,R) P.

Equating money supply M" to money demand and solving for the price level,

That is, the price level equals the ratio of the nominal quantity of money supplied to the real quantity of money demanded.

1. See Chapters 5 and 6 for details.

234

Chapter Eight

Although the inflationary impact of an oil price change is generally analyzed given an exogenously determined nominal money supply, this may be misleading or at least counterfactual. That is, to the extent that the oil price change increases the price level and unemployment (at least temporarily) and decreases real income for a given nominal money supply, the inflationary effect would induce central banks to reduce M” while the recessionary effect tends to increase M ” . Which effect is dominant would depend on the relative weights the individual central bank puts on inflation and unemployment. In addition, other factors-discussed below-may influence central bank policy response to an oil price change. With this warning, let us proceed for now to analyze the effects of an oil price change for an exogenous monetary policy. 8.1.1 Long-Run (Full Employment) Effects Consider first the long-run effects of an oil price change on real output. For illustrative purposes suppose real output y is produced according to a three-factor Cobb-Douglas production function using domestic capital k , labor C, and imported petroleum +:* (8.3)

y

(8.4)

u+p+y=1.

= k“CP+Y,

Let us assume that output is produced by competitors who treat all prices as parametric including in particular the real price of oil 9.3 In equilib2. A fuller specification would include a factor e6+“ on the right-hand side, but it simplifies the notation without loss to choose labor units such that the es is eliminated and to incorporate technical progress T into our measurement of labor in efficiency units. The basic results (8.8) and (8.12) below are statedinTatom (1979a, pp. 10-11) and Rasche and Tatom (1980) starting from the same production function (8.3). Their longest-run results (8.12), however, are derived from the simple assertion that the marginal product of capital is fixed in the long run by supply conditions rather than as the result of a growth analysis as is done below. Their assertion-although it is correct in this case-is generally false. They erroneously interpret the gross “rental price of capital” which is equated to the marginal product of capital as the “relative price of capital” (e.g. Tatom 1979a, pp. 10-11) and argue that this will equal its fixed supply price in the long run. In the appendix to Rasche and Tatom (1980), they instead have attempted to relate changes in output to changes in capacity of individual firms, but this seems to ignore the fact that the number of firms is not fixed. In the main body of the paper, they present evidence supportive of the usage of a Cobb-Douglas production function of this form (8.3). Kopcke (1980) argues that it is improper to include energy as an argument in the aggregate production function since energy is itself an intermediate product produced by capital and labor. This objection does not apply to imported petroleum, which is produced by foreign labor and capital. Care must be taken, as seen below, however, in going from the domesticoutput concept appropriate to the production function (8.3) to the value-added concept of real GNP. Unfortunately this last step has not been made in the three-factor analyses of the effects of oil price changes. 3. This assumption is arguable also. For example, Phelps (1978) treated the quantity of imported oil 4 as determined erogenously; the nominal price of oil is assumed fixed by Mork and Hall (1979) and by Berner et al. (1977) in their multicountry model. Rasche and Tatom (1980) argue persuasively that neither of these representations captures the meaning of OPEC’s ability to set an optimal real price of oil.

235

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

rium, one of the first-order conditions requires that the marginal product of petroleum be equated to its real price:

It is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium usage of petroleum as a function of 8, k , and C:

+

If we now substitute this equilibrium into the production function (8.3), we obtain equilibrium real output as a function of the real price of oil and given, fully employed resources of capital and labor: (8.7)

Taking logarithms and differentiating, we find the elasticity of equilibrium output with respect to the real oil price for given capital and labor resources:

:;:; lk,e

(8.8)

-

Y

cw+p

--

Y 1-y'

If, for example, y were on the order of 0.01, a 1%increase in the real oil price would decrease real output by only 0.01% (1basis point) for given resources and given the assumptions of this ill~stration.~ The full, long-run equilibrium effect would be slightly larger due to a reduction in the steady-state capital-labor ratio for a given growth path of labor. To see this, suppose that saving and investment R is a constant fraction u of domestic factor income:

L = u ( y - e+). (8.9) Dividing both sides of (8.9) by k and noting that y (8.10)

+ P)y,

- 84 = (a

k = u(a + PI;.

k

Thus the growth rate of capital is a fixed proportion of the output-capital ratio. In view of (8.7), this latter ratio is 4. The value of y is discussed at some length below. To the extent that capital is in the form of existing machines which cannot be readily modified and which require fixed petroleum inputs, the quasi rents of existing machines will fall without any reduction in output or petroleum usage. A possibly offsetting factor would be the premature obsolescence of machines on which the quasi rents fall below zero. Neither of these factors is operative in full long-run equilibrium discussed immediately below, and the two factors are taken as negligible on net here.

236

Chapter Eight

(8.11) The simple neoclassical growth model can therefore be applied, which, after tedious manipulations, yields the result that (8.12) This effect, which allows for the (proportionate) reduction in the capital stock, would be about a third larger than that in (8.8) for given resources and a labor share equal to three-quarters of value added. We should note that since income and capital fall proportionately in full steady-state equilibrium, there is no long-run effect on the real interest rate.5 A curiosity of national income accounting proves important in applying the analysis to empirical data. Gross national product is a value-added concept so that imported inputs are subtracted from total output to obtain GNP. This works fine for nominal GNP or Q: (8.13)

Q=PY-(PB)+=P(l-y)y.

So nominal GNP is simply the price of output P times real domestic factor income (1 - y)y. However, in computing real GNP or q , imported inputs are valued at base-year relative prices 8:

(8.14) Thus measured real GNP rises relative to factor income (1 - y ) y when the real oil price 0 is increased. Nominal aggregate demand as measured by nominal GNP is not affected since there is an offsetting measurement error in the measured GNP deflator D:

We can differentiate (8.14) to find the elasticity of real GNP with respect to the real oil price as (8.16)

5. Before capital adjusts, but with resources fully employed, the marginal product of capital ak"-'tp+Y falls (slightly) with Q and hence so does the real interest rate.

237

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

For small changes in 0 before the capital stock adjusts,6 (8.17)

-

Y

=o.

Thus we see that in the neighborhood of the original oil price, the output effect is completely masked in measured GNP. However, for large changes in 0 relative t o e such as those occurring in 1973-74, there would be a negative effect on measured real GNP.' Using A for the change relative to base-year prices we have

where

d 1% Y d log 0 is from (8.8) or (8.12) depending on whether or not the capital stock is presumed to have adjusted.' Note that the deflator is decreased relative to the price of output by

just as real GNP is increased relative to real factor incomes. In summary, an increase in the real price of oil is predicted to decrease real output by the logarithmic change times yl(1 - y) before capital adjusts or times y/P when capital is fully adjusted. However, such an oil price change will cause a partially offsetting overstatement of measured real GNP (and understatement of the GNP deflator). Obviously the values of y and P are of considerable interest. For current illustrative purposes, only petroleum imports will be c ~ n s i d e r e d . ~ To the extent that petroleum imports are for resale to consumers rather than used in production, they have no effect on output or measured GNP (real or nominal). Thus the ratio of the value of petroleum imports to GNP serves as an upper limit on y. If we use prechange U.S. data, this 6. That is, 8=e so that yG/(O -ye) = y/(l - y). 7. Although (d log q ) / ( dlog 8) = 0 initially as seen in (8.17), as 8 increases, the positive RHS term in (8.16) decreases while the negative RHS is unchanged. The negative effect is yet greater if capital is allowed to adjust. 8. Note that the first RHS term in (8.18) is approximately equal (for small y) to y(1 - (We)), which illustrates that as 8 becomes large the adjustment for imported inputs in measured GNP becomes trivial and all output is included in measured GNP. 9. It is possible to apply the analysis to energy more generally, but the increase in y is largely offset by a reduced logarithmic change in 8.

238

Chapter Eight

upper limit would be about 0.003 for 1970. In 1976, this share had risen to 0.02. This rise in the share could indicate inelastic consumer demand for imported petroleum products, a problem with the Cobb-Douglas production function, or both. So while 0.003 should be an upper limit for y if the Cobb-Douglas function is correct, 0.02 will also be considered as an upper-upper limit. Finally suppose that d(a + p) and p / ( a + p) have their traditionally estimated values of Y4 and %. Then the multiplier - y / ( l - y) is -0.003 or -0.020 depending on y. The corresponding multipliers allowing for capital stock change are - 0.004 and -0.027, The real price of a barrel of crude oil increased some 3.57fold from 19731to 19741 (a logarithmic increase of 1.273). This is surely an upper limit on 0/6 for all petroleum products. Table 8.1 presents estimates of the maximum effects on output and measured real GNP. We see that the maximum full adjustment effects on real output range from a decrease of 0.5 to 3.5% according to whether one takes a prechange or postchange estimate of y. For measured real GNP the corresponding decreases are only 0.3 to 2.0%. Even smaller changes correspond to the intermediate period corresponding to full employment of resources but no adjustment of the capital stock. Rasche and Tatom have long argued for much larger real-income effects of the oil price change. They rely upon regression estimates of the quasi-production function (8.7) and find much larger values of y than considered here. Part of that difference is illusory: They use a much broader energy price index which has a logarithmic increase of only 0.408 from 1972 to 1974'"compared to the 1.273increase for a barrel of oil used here; so the larger elasticity is offset by a lower value of log(0/8). Further they do not take account of the biases in reported real GNP so that their estimates may refer to the output effect rather than the GNP effect. Finally, in their (1980) paper, they report an equation (6) in which they estimate the production function (8.3) directly (after taking logs) and also add log 0 separately. The estimated y is 0.05 while the coefficient on log 0 is -0.07. Using y = 0.05, p = 0.70 (as reported), and log(0/8) = 0.408, we get an output change of -0.0215 with no capital adjustment and of -0.0291 with capital adjustment, which is in the same ball park as the figures in table 8.1. It is the things other than in the production functioncaptured in the log 0 coefficient of -0.07-which permit such big estimates. These other things may have to do with cyclical factors, induced monetary policy, or fortuitous removal of price controls at roughly the same time as discussed below. Further the 0.05 estimate of y may be biased upward if energy usage (relative to capital and labor) serves as an indicator of whether the economy is in a boom or recession. Thus the Rasche and Tatom conclusions may have weak empirical foundations. 10. Rasche and Tatom (1980, table 6).

239

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

Table 8.1

Illustrative Calculations of Maximum Long-Run Effect of 1973-74 Real Oil Price Increase

No Capital Adjustment

Full Capital Adjustment

y = 0.003

y = 0.02

y = 0.003

y = 0.02

Change in log output (A 1% Y )

- 0.0038

- 0.0260

-0.0051

-0.0346

Change in measured real GNP (A 1% 4)

-0.0017

-0.0114

-0.0029

- 0.0200

0.0022

0.0146

Difference (A log 4 - A log y A log P - A log D)

0.0022

0.0146

This exercise has shown that even a huge change in the real price of oil such as in 1973-74 may result in very small if not negligible effects on real output and especially upon measured real GNP. Different assumptions would result in different results, but the model used is surely a standard one in practice. Thus it would appear to be an empirical question as to whether the oil price change had any significant long-run effect on measured real GNP. We can now return to our original question of the long-run effect of the oil price change on the real quantity of money demanded and hence, given the nominal money supply, on the price level. First, we note that in long-run equilibrium real income is reduced by a constant fraction but the growth rate of real income is reduced only temporarily during the transitional period. Second, we note that the real interest rate is unchanged. Under these conditions, in long-run equilibrium the real and nominal interest rate will be unchanged and the real quantity of money demanded will behave similarly to real income-a downward parallel shift in its growth path. The logarithmic downward shift will equal the elasticity of real money demand with respect to real income times the logarithmic shift in real income. Thus, if this income elasticity is around 1, there will be a long-run increase in the price level equal to the long-run decrease in real income." If during the early part of the adjustment period the price-level effect exceeds this long-run effect, then the inflation rate must be reduced (ceteris paribus) below what it would otherwise be to reach long-run equilibrium. Two problems may arise in econometric work based on real GNP as 11. A formal solution to this problem is presented in Darby (1979, chapter 5 ) .

240

Chapter Eight

measured in the national income accounts. First, the reduction in measured real GNP will understate the output reduction which actually occurs. A second problem arises only if the income elasticity of the demand for money differs significantly from unity: Then the offsetting measurement errors in real GNP and the GNP deflator would cause an apparent shift in the money-demand function equal to the product of the measurement error and the difference of the elasticity from 1. This latter problem is a second-order matter which will not be pursued further in this chapter. 8.1.2 Short-Run Effects Short-run effects of the 1973-74 oil price shock have been analyzed in terms of induced shifts in aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves under the assumption that nominal wages are predetermined (or at least sticky) in the short run. As with the long-run analysis, the analysis of the short-run effects proceeds on the assumption that the government’s monetary and fiscal policy is unaffected by the unexpected oil price increase. The aggregate demand effects of an oil price shock can be viewed as analogous to that of an increase in taxes.I2Assume for simplicity that in the short run both producer and consumer demands for imported petroleum are perfectly inelastic. For producers, this means that higher import prices will be paid out of reduced quasi rents, reducing private income. For consumers, higher oil prices would directly reduce expenditures on other consumption goods for given private income and these expenditures would be further reduced by the reduction of private income.I3Thus, at initial levels of real income and interest rates, aggregate expenditures would fall unless increased demand for exports by oil exporters equals or exceeds the induced reduction in consumption. When we allow for some elasticity of demand for imported oil and for increased exports of goods to oil producers, the plausible magnitude of these basically distributional effects is sharply reduced and could even be reversed.l4 In what follows, we shall nonetheless consider the possibility of a small decrease in aggregate demand. The aggregate supply effect would appear more substantial and has been analyzed on varying assumptions by Bruno and Sachs (1979), Hud12. This tax analysis is given little if any weight in recent analyses. Rasche and Tatom (1980), for example, term it the “1974 view,” and the belief that aggregate demand shifts were important appears to have been an ephemeral phenomenon. It is included here for the sake of completeness. 13. The exact amount of these reductions depends on consumer expectations, but the direction is unambiguous. 14. There is no long-run effect on output or interest rates via this channel unless differences between foreign and domestic propensities to save cause a shift in the domestic investment-output ratio.

241

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

son and Jorgenson (1978), Mork and Hall (1979), Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze (1979), Phelps (1978), and Rasche and Tatom (1977a, 1980). Following the latter authors, suppose that the short-run conditions underlying the aggregate supply curve are fixity of the capital stock, the nominal wage W, and the real price of oil. Using the aggregate production function (8.3), one can readily derive output as (8.19) On comparing (8.19) and (8.7), we note that for a given price level there is a much greater output effect with nominal wages fixed than when labor is assumed to be at its natural unemployment rate. Specifically (8.20) Note that the elasticity of the aggregate supply curve is (8.21) It is convenient to plot aggregate supply and demand curves in terms of log y and log P so that slopes and elasticities have a simple correspondence. The logarithmic aggregate supply curve corresponding to equation (8.19) is

+ 2a log y + log k

(8.22)

- -log Y a!

0

+ -log P

1

P.

01

This is plotted as S in figure 8.1 for given values of k, W , and the base-year relative price of oil 3. The slope of S is the inverse (a@) of the elasticity of aggregate supply. An aggregate demand curve D is also drawn to determine short-run output and the price level, 7 and 5I., As can be seen in equation (8.22) an increase in the real price of oil shifts the aggregate supply curve horizontally by - ( y / a ) log(0/8), as illustrated in figure 8.2.16This can alternatively be described as an upward shift equal to minus the slope of S times the horizontal shift: (8.23)

15. The aggregate demand curve is derived by solving the IS relation forR and substituting in equation (8.2). 16. A negative sign indicates a shift to the left.

242

Chapter Eight

log

Fig. 8.1

9

Determination of base output and price level.

If any shift in the aggregate demand curve is negligible, the new equilibrium output and price level are y and P. The short-run displacement in output from that corresponding to the base real oil price is

e

(8.24)

5 Determination of changes in output and price level from base values with no aggregate-demand shift. 1% Y log

Fig. 8.2

243

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

where qD is the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve so that a/p and l / q D are the slopes of the aggregate supply and demand curves, respectively. Suppose that the aggregate demand curve is unit elastic (qD= -1); then

(8.25)

A l o g y = -iog(e/8), 1-Y which is identical to the long-run effect implied by (8.8) before the capital stock adjusts. The increase in the price level,

(8.26) reduces real wages just sufficiently to maintain employment at the natural level. Thus, in the absence of a shift in the aggregate demand curve, employment rises or falls (and output is greater or less than the givencapital long-run level indicated by (8.25)) according to whether the elasticity of aggregate demand is smaller or greater than 1 in absolute value. If aggregate demand were inelastic, increased employment would lessen the short-run decline in output. In Darby (1976c, pp. 161-63) I argued that short-run and hence transitory movements in output will induce much less than proportionate movements in money demand, which suggests that the short-run aggregate demand curve is in fact elastic.” This would imply a short-run reduction in employment, which would accentuate the initial fall in output predicted by the fullemployment analysis. Once expected nominal wages are reduced,’this 17. Purvis (1975) displays the correct formula for q D ,which is -1

TLJ =

J log

md

J logy

+

+-

J log md J log

’

R

where +is (d log R ) / ( dlogy) or the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to output on the IS curve. For a normal negatively sloped IS curve, +(a log r n d ) / ( alog R) will be positive but insufficient to bring the denominator of q Dup to 1 if short-run interest elasticity of money demand is small and the IS curve is rather flat as argued by Hall (1977). Rasche and Tatom (1980) make a convoluted version of Gamb’s error (which Purvis corrected) to conclude that the aggregate demand curve was inelastic. Rather than accept the implication of increased employment, they repeat their (1977a) assumption that nominal wages rise freely once the natural unemployment rate is reached. I can see no justification for this appendage to a basic search view of the labor market. It is of course irrelevant if q D < - 1 or the aggregate demand curve shifts to the left sufficiently to reduce employment despite an inelastic aggregate demand curve. 18. If the elasticity of aggregate demand is less than - 1 but greater than - p/(p - a) (about - 1.5), the short-run effect will be greater than the full-employment effect for a given capital stock but less than the long-run effect allowing for capital adjustment. That is, in the absence of significant shifts in aggregate demand, the long-run effects with full capital adjustment such as calculated in table 8.1 exceed the short-run effects unless q D < - p/ (p - a) = -1.5.

244

Chapter Eight

log Y

log?

Determination of changes in output and price level from base values with shift in aggregate demand.

Fig. 8.3

difference would disappear. In addition, the aggregate demand curve may shift to the left as previously argued if there is a distributional effect due to faster decreases in consumer spending than increases in oilexporter spending; this is illustrated in figure 8.3. Again it must be emphasized that these calculations are only illustrative of the sort of effects which might be expected. If, for example, we assumed partial adjustment of nominal wages to their equilibrium values, the aggregate supply curve would be less elastic and the output change would be more closely tied to the change in the given-capital long-run level of output. The aggregate demand curve is derived using our price-level equation (8.2) so the short-run price-level effect j9

(8.27) is valid for the short-run period in which IS-LM analysis is applicable. If -l/-qD is less than the long-run elasticity of demand for money with respect to output, the short-run increase in the price level would be less than that associated with an equal long-run decrease in output. Note that the same accounting problem in relating output and the price level to real GNP and the deflator apply in the short run as in the long run. 19. More wage flexibility implies less employment variation, so output would be lower than indicated by equation (8.24) if qo > - 1 and less if q,, < - 1 .

245

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

8.1.3 Endogenous Monetary Policy The time has now come to consider effects of the oil shock upon monetary policy. Suppose that we can write the money supply reaction function of the monetary authorities as (8.28)

log M = log M* + h,log(y/y*) f h p log(P/P*) + E M .

In logarithms, actual money equals expected money as predicted by lagged variables systematically affecting central bank behavior plus negative coefficients times the innovations in output and the price level and a random disturbance.2"Write the semireduced forms for output and the price level as =f

w B,M, M*

(k,

(8.29)

y

(8.30)

P = n ( k ,W,6, M , M * , E

>

9

~ ) .

Denote the real-oil-price and money elasticities of these equations by f e , no,and n M .Then taking the log changes in equations (8.28) through (8.30) and solving for A log M yields

fM,

(8.31) We have seen above that f e is negative and neis positive while h, and hp are both negative. Whether money is increased, decreased, or left unchanged by the central bank depends both on the relative sizes of the output and price effects and on the relative aversion of the central bank to recession and inflation. The denominator of (8.31) allows for attenuation of money changes to the extent that there are within-period (positive) responses in output and prices. Finally, the price-level effect is obtained by substituting (8.31) into the log-change form of (8.30): (8.32) Here neis the value of (A log P)/(A log 6) such as is computed in (8.27) for a given nominal money supply and the ratio term is the additional (ambiguously signed) effect due to endogenous nominal money supply changes. 20. The lack of a term in the balance of payments implies that we are dealing with either a reserve country (the U.S.), a freely floating country, or a country which can and does sterilize balance-of-payments effects in the relevant period; see chapter 10. By the time of the first oil shock (1973-74) this is probably a reasonable characterization although current balance-of-payments effects will also be present for some countries in the simulations reported in section 8.3 below.

246

Chapter Eight

Simulation experiments which allow for such endogenous movements in the nominal money supply are reported below in section 8.3. It is perhaps understandable why most analyses assume that the ambiguously signed change in nominal money must be negligible and proceed on that basis. One can at least explain the effect if the central bank were to hold money supply unchanged.

8.1.4 Conclusions from Theory Considering first the results of our analysis conditional upon a given monetary policy, with resources at their natural employment levels, the output elasticity with respect to the real price of oil is - y/(l - y) before capital adjusts and - y/p with full capital adjustment. The parameter y, the value share of oil imports used in producing domestic output , may be quite small, certainly less than 0.02 for the United States, for example. The labor share p is on the order of 0.7 to 0.8, so the long-run elasticities vary from about y to 1.3y or 1 . 4 ~In . the short run, unemployment will increase slightly (if aggregate demand is elastic), but the short-run output elasticity seems to lie in the same range as for the long run. The price level is shifted up in the long run by the long-run income elasticity of money demand (around 1) times the output elasticity. In the short run the price level shifts less than in proportion to output since the short-run aggregate demand curve is elastic. These shifts in the levels of output and prices affect their growth rates only during the transitional period. They may be reinforced or offset by endogenous money supply reactions of the central bank. These reactions depend on the relative aversion of the central bank to decreases in output and increases in prices and so are ambiguous in sign a priori. Biases in the calculation of real value added imply smaller elasticities in absolute value for real GNP and the implicit price deflator than for real output and the price level. Indeed, an increase in the real oil price of the size which occurred in 1973-74 implies that the logarithmic change in real GNP would be less than half that for output. 8.2 Tests for Structural Change in the Real-Income Equation

The behavior of the real price of oil is dominated by a downward secular trend from the 1950s until the early 1970s as illustrated for the United States in figure 8.4. There was a small upward movement in 1971-72, but the major increase occurred in the second quarter of 1973 and especially the first quarter of 1974. Widespread recessions in 1973-75 provide the major empirical evidence in support of a large real-income effect of oil price increases. However, several alternative hypotheses focus on other major events occurring roughly coincidentally. The first of these alternative hypotheses points to the final breakdown

247

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

1.

1.

1.

1.

0.

0.

0.

0.

0.

-0. 1955

Fig. 8.4

1958

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

197.9

The logarithm of the United States real price of imported oil. Source: The dollar price index of Venezuelan crude oil is taken from various issues of International Financial Statistics and rebased to 1.00 in 1970. This is then deflated by the U S . GNP deflator (1970 = 1.00) to obtain 0 = 1.00).

of pegged exchange rates in 1973 which permitted (previously) nonreserve countries to regain control of their money supplies and to stop the inflation imported from the United States. In the United States, meanwhile, the Fed reduced money supply growth in mid-1973 and again in mid-1974. The average reduction in the growth rate of the money supply in the eight countries in our sample exceeded 5 percentage points. Obviously any estimate of the effect of oil price changes must account for the effect of these restrictive monetary shocks. A second alternative hypothesis points to the widespread adoption of price controls, following the U.S. lead in August 1971, and their subsequent dismantling in the period 1973-75. Such controls may have caused overstatement of real GNP (and understatement of the GNP deflator)

248

Chapter Eight

compared to true values.*' When the controls were relaxed during 197375, measured real income fell back to its true value giving an illusion of a deeper recession than was actually occurring or the occurrence of a recession when there was none. Although it is possible to develop corrected estimates for real GNP and the deflator using physical unit series such as employment, car-loadings, and components of the industrial production indices, that is a very large job. The present paper will only examine whether estimated effects of oil price changes appear to be larger in those countries with coincident price-control relaxation. If so, future research will be indicated to disentangle these oil and price-control effects. In examining the empirical data, it is also important to note that the normal or natural growth rate of output has declined generally in the postwar period. In the late 1940s, after a decade and a half of depression and war, the world capital-labor ratio was very low relative to its balanced-growth or steady-state value.22As the capital stock approaches its steady-state level, the growth rates of capital and hence real income decline toward their steady-state values. If we were to impose a constant natural growth, a spurious negative coefficient might be estimated for oil to account for slowing growth in the 1970s. The real GNP equations of the Mark 111 International Transmission Model provide a convenient starting place for estimating the effect on output of changes in the real price of These equations were derived, following Barro (1978), by combining a standard Lucas (1973) aggregate supply function with an aggregate demand function with nominal money, real government spending, and real exports as arguments. Specifically, they express the rational-expectation/natural-rate approach as

where the time subscripts are made explicit, y, is the natural-employment g,, I, and , i,are the innovations in level of real output in quarter t , and & the aggregate demand variables log M,, logarithm of real government 21. See Darby (1976a, b ) . 22. Even for the relativelyunscathed United States, capital grew by only about 0.4% per annum from 1929 through 1948 compared to a normal growth rate of 3.2%; see Christensen and Jorgenson (1978, p. 56). This implies that by 1948 the actual U.S. capital stock was less than 60% of the steady-state capital stock. 23. See chapters 5 and 6 above for a description of the model and chapter 9 below for a detailed analysis of the real-income equations.

249

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

expenditures for goods and services, and exports divided by GNP, respecti~ely.~~ Thus, in the absence of innovations or stochastic disturbance E,, log yt adjusts toward its natural level at the rate u2 per quarter. Innovations in the determinants of aggregate demand affect logy, with an unconstrained four-quarter distributed lag to allow for any inventory adjustment lags. To estimate the effect of the real oil price, it remains to specify log y, appropriately. A form which allows for both declining natural output growth as just discussed and for an oil price effect is

(8.34)

log 7, = bl

+ b2t + b3t2 + b410g 8,.

A positive b2 and negative b3implies a declining natural growth rate. The parameter b4 estimates the full long-run value of (d log y)l(d log 8). If the expression (8.34) were simply substituted in equation (8.34), an oil price change would implicitly be assumed to have no immediate effect and then a partial adjustment effect at the rate u2 per quarter. This is inconsistent with the analysis of section 8.1 in which it was shown that the short-run effect is similar in magnitude to the long-run effect.25So, as with the aggregate demand variables, a four-quarter distributed lag on the first difference of log 8 is included to capture a rapid short-run adjustment process. Substituting equation (8.34) in (8.33) and adding the short-run adjustment process yields the estimating equation (8.35)

1%

Yt = a1

+ az(b1 - b2) + (1 - a2)log Yr-

+ a2b2t + u2b3(t - 1)2

1

4

This equation has been estimated using the 1957-76 quarterly data set and instruments for the eight countries in the Mark I11 International Transmission Model. The regressions are based on the two-stage leastsquares principal-components (2SLSPC) technique because of the large 24. The scaling of exports as a fraction of income rather than in logarithmic terms was done to permit application of the balance-of-paymentsidentity in the model. In the results reported here all the innovations are defined as residuals from optimal ARIMA processes applied to log M,,log g,, and ( X / Y ) , ,respectively. 25. Immediately after an increase in the real oil price, the capital stock is greater than in full long-run equilibrium while labor utilization is less. The net effect depends on the elasticity q D of the aggregate demand curve, but approximates the full long-run effect on plausible assumptions.

250

Chapter Eight

number of predetermined variables in the The coefficientsof the aggregate demand variables, not at issue here, are substantially the same as those discussed in chapter 6 above, and so are omitted for the sake of brevity from the present discus~ion.~’ The regression results are summarized in table 8.2. The coefficient of log 9, is negative in every case although only four of the t statistics meet conventional levels of significance. The implicit estimate of the long-run oil effect is reported in the ninth row as ranging from a 2 basis point decrease in real income per percentage point increase in the real price of oil for the U.S. to 19 basis points for Japan. Table 8.3 indicates the implied long-run reduction in real income for the eight contries based on the 19731-761V increase in the real price of oil. Rasche and Tatom (1980, table 7) prepared similar estimates for their model (discussed in section 8.1) on the basis of 1973-77 energy price increases, and those estimates are reported for comparison. Despite some differences in detail, the calculations here tell broadly the same story as those of Rasche and Tatom. However, this strong story does not do so well under closer examination. Let us first consider the possibility that the share of imported oil in total output is so small that any effects are in fact negligible. This is tested by computing the F statistic for the hypothesis that all the oil coefficients are zero (Ho:~ 2 b 4= c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 0). As reported in table 8.2, only five of the countries have any statistically significant oil effect at the 5% level2*and for one of these (the United States) the significant response is due to short-run movements which might be related to various panic policy responses, briefly adopted here and abroad, to the temporary OPEC embargo at the end of 1973. Further, the significant French effects imply that French income was higher throughout 1973 as a result of rising oil prices and so does not really support the hypothesis. Since experience indicates that the French, Italian, and Japanese data may be quite ~ n r e l i a b l elet , ~us ~ focus on the results for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. Of these five, the F statistic is insignificant for Canada and Germany and significant for the United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. In26. The only current endogenous variables in equation (8.35) are idr,.& and log 0,. Time t and government spending shocks are exogenous in the model, but idrand f r are endogenous. The price of oil in base-year dollars is exogenous, so log 8, is exogenous for the U.S. For the other seven countries endogenous movements in the purchasing power ratio make the real price of oil in base-year domestic currency units endogenous, but they are dominated by movements in the U.S. real price. 27. To the extent that these aggregate demand variables were correlated with any significant oil variables added here, their numerical values were of course affected. However, the general pattern and conclusions remained unaltered from those in chapter 6. See also the simulation equation coefficients in section 8.3 below. 28. Only France is significant at the 1% level. 29. See discussions in chapters 3, 6, and 7 above.

251

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

terestingly, these three countries with significant F statistics all removed general price controls coincidentally with the 1973-74 oil price increase while Canada and Germany had no price controls during the relevant period.30If, as I have argued elsewhere (1976a, b), the decontrol process results in the elimination of overstatement of real GNP built up during the control period, then the spurious drop in reported real GNP relative to true GNP will be captured as part (or all!) of the effect of the coincidental increase in real oil prices. Certainly the pattern of significant oil effects only where simultaneous decontrol occurred strongly indicates the value of research to formulate real GNP estimates unbiased by pricecontrol evasions which overstate quantities and understate prices. In summary, these empirical results give a rather ambiguous answer to the question of whether a large increase in the real price of oil will reduce real income significantly for given nominal money supplies, real government spending, and real exports. Such a reduction is estimated for half the cases, but this may be a spurious result due to the simultaneous removal of price controls in those countries. 8.3 Simulation Experiments To assess the effects of the 1973-74 oil price increase on real incomeand ultimately the price level-we must allow for induced changes in nominal money supplies and real exports aside from any possible direct effects such as examined in section 8.2. To take account of these indirect effects, one must resort to a simulation model of some sort, and this section reports results from the Mark IV Simulation Model described in chapter 7 above.3i The results of any one simulation model cannot be 30. The United States took the lead in imposing price controls in August 1971, which Darby (1976a, b ) argues led to an increasing overstatement of real GNP (and understatement of the deflator) through the first quarter of 1973. Controls were then relaxed in phases through the third quarter of 1974 with progressive elimination of overstatement in real GNP. That is, real-income growrh was overstated from 1971111 through 19731 and then understated from 197311 through 1974IV. According to Parkin in Shenoy (1978, pp. 150-51), the United Kingdom followed a similar pattern: controls instituted with a freeze in November 1972 peaked in their effect on the data with the end of stage I1 in August 1973 and eventually were abandoned entirely after the Conservative loss of February 1974. Shenoy (1978, pp. 132-35) reports a similar albeit more complex pattern for the Netherlands beginning also with a 1972 price freeze. Carr (1976, p. 40) points out that Canada was free of general price controls until October 1975, too late to cause any biases in the oil price coefficients. West Germany imposed no price controls on the ground that such policies distract attention from the real problems (Shenoy 1978, pp. 138-41). 31. The Mark IV Simulation Model is a simplified simulation version of the Mark 111 International Transmission Model described in chapters 5 and 6 above. The main simplifications involve (1) deletion of insignificant variables except where they are required apriori to permit international transmission and (2) combining variables to reduce multicollinearity where a priori hypotheses on equality of coefficients were not rejected by the data. The resulting model is thus both consistent with the data and tractable for simulation. The Mark IV Model exists in versions corresponding to pegged and floating exchange rates, but only the latter (Mark IV-FLT) is used in this paper since we are concerned with 1973-74.

Table 8.2

ZSLSPC Regression Estimates of Oil Price Effects in Real-Income Equation (8.35)

us Adjustment coefficient ( a Z )

UK

CA

FR

GE

JA

IT

NE

0.180 (0.049) 3.656

0.448 (0.1 12) 3.985

0.171 (0.070) 2.446

0.613 (0.120) 5.089

0.176 (0.080) 2.205

0.260 (0.083) 3.127

0.206 (0.082) 2.529

0.334 (0.087) 3.850

0.00196 (0.00058) 3.349

0.00284 (0.00095) 2.978

0.00203 (0.00080) 2.529

0.00892 (0.00173) 5.163

0.00236 (0.00116) 2.035

0.00404 (0.00145) 2.785

0.00485 (0.00179) 2.711

0.00284 (0.00083) 3.418

2.449 (6.089) 0.402

1.293 (5.283) 0.245

-0.0253 (0.0093) -2.717

-0.0081 (0.0073) - 1.097

- 0.0581

(0.0052) - 0.732

(0.0168) - 3.455

0.0068 (0.015) - 0.456

-0.0092 (0.0073) - 1.252

-0.021 (0,011) - 1.897

-0.047 (0.018) - 2.602

-0.005 (0.016) - 0.304

0.038 (0.021) 1.823

0.002 (0.026) 0.074

0.010 (0.0 14) 0.749

Coefficient of t

( t - 1)2 x 10-6'

- 3.215

(3.389) -0.949 1% 0,-

1

A log 0,

- 0.0038

- 1.977

(7.316) -0.270

-5.581 (6.748) -0.827 ~

- 11.474 (6.440) - 1.782

-2.244 (6.043) -0.371

11.646 (7.465) 1.560

- 0.0393

-0.0394 (0.0138) -2.862

(0.0178) - 2.205 - 0.048

(0.018) -2.711

-0.027 (0.016) - 1.672

Long-run oil effect (u,b4/uz)

-0.022 (0.011) -2.074

0.025 (0.017) 1.489

0.004 (0.015) 0.273

0.083 (0.026) 3.167

0.013 (0.020) 0.678

0.005 (0.015) 0.333

0.007 (0.020) 0.345

0.035 (0.019) 1.839

- 0.009 (0.010) -0.092

0.019 (0.016) 1.127

- 0.010 (0.015) -0.642

0.062 (0.024) 2.576

0.022 (0.019) 1.187

0.010 (0.015) 0.617

0.014 (0.018) 0.788

0.018 (0.018) 0.967

-0.018 (0,011) - 1.650

0.007 (0.017) 0.433

-0.004 (0.016) - 0.260

0.009 (0.023) 0.373

-0.010 (0.020) - 0.492

0.001 (0.014) 0.073

0.010 (0.018) 0.562

0.009 (0.017) 0.534

- 0.021

- 0.057

- 0.047

-0.095

- 0.039

-0.035

-0.191

-0.118

F(5,59) statistic'

2.54*

3.32*

0.49

4.40*

0.56

0.54

2.27*

2.38'

R'

0.9984

0.9943

0.9982

0.9976

0.9975

0.9982

0.9994

0.9981

S.E.E.

0.0082

0.0120

0.0121

0.0159

0.0131

0.0120

0.0135

0.0122

h [D-W]+'

- 0.53

1.10

-3.40

[2.33]

0.26

-2.02

- 1.74

1.59

Note. Period: 19711-76IV. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates; t statistics are below standard errors. Coefficient estimates for the constant and the aggregate demand shocks (a3, . . . , uI4)are not reported for brevity's sake. 'Note that the coefficients and standard errors in the third row are a multiple lo6 of those for ( t - 1)'. $The F(5,59) statistic is for the test of the hypothesis that ~ 2 b 4= c1 = c2 = cg = c4 = 0. The 0.05 significance level (indicated by $) requires F > 2.23. The 0.01 significance level (indicated by #) requires F > 3.34. '+The biased Durbin-Watson statistic is reported in square brackets in those cases in which Durbin's h cannot be computed (is imaginary).

254

Chapter Eight Implied Estimates of Long-Run Decrease in Real GNP due to 19731-76IV Increases in Real Price of Oil

Table 8.3

d log q t

d log 0

Country ~~

us UK CA FR GE IT JA NE

log @19761V - log 0,973,

Long-Run Decrease in q 9

Rasche-Tatom Long-Run Estimate*

1.2119 1.2749 1.1045 1.1477 1.1101 1.3995 1.1402 0.9856

-2.5% - 7.3% -5.2% - 10.9% -4.3% -4.9% - 21.8% - 11.6%

-7.0% -3.5% -4.4% -4.1% - 1.9% NA - 17.1% NA

~~~

-0.021 -0.057 - 0.047 -0.095 - 0.039 -0.035 - 0.191 -0.118

'This is the ratio of the estimated values of a2b4to a2 from table 8.2. 'Product of the previous two columns. *From Rasche and Tatom (1980, table 7 for 1973-77 energy-price increases.

taken too seriously except as they illustrate the possible importance of channels not inconsistent with the data which might otherwise be overlooked. So, with a spirit of healthy skepticism, let us turn to the specific experiments. To assess the effects of the oil price increase, we compare the results from simulating the model in one case with the actual real price of oil and in another case with the real price of oil held constant at the 19731price. The assumed difference in the logarithm of the real price of oil (log ( O / e ) ) is plotted in figure 8.5. The dynamic simulations begin in 197311 and continue for six quarters thereafter.32 In view of the mixed evidence for direct oil price effects on real income as reported in section 8.2, the basic Mark IV Model does not incorporate such effects. An alternative simulation model, the Mark IV-Oil, was therefore estimated. It differs from the basic Mark IV Model only in two ways: ( a ) The variables listed in table 8.2 for those five countries for which the oil variables were significant (United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Netherlands) are added to the real income equations. These five countries are listed with their estimated coefficients in table 8.4. (6) Corresponding identities are added to define the logarithm of the domestic price of oil as the sum of the logarithms of the dollar price and the purchasing power ratio. 32. In a dynamic simulation, the input series are the exogenous variables plus the initial conditions (endogenous variables at the beginning of the simulation). The values of endogenous variables within the simulation period are assigned their predicted values. Dynamic instabilities become important in the Mark IV-FLT Model after seven quarters as discussed in chapter 7. These instabilities apparently arise from our inability to eliminate simultaneous equation bias in the short estimation period. Therefore the previous caveat that these results are only illustrative must be reemphasized.

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

255

- 0 . 10I

I

I

1913

19711

1975

Fig. 8.5

Logarithmic increase in U.S. real price of oil from 19731.

Figures 8.6 and 8.7 illustrate the simulation results for the five countries with reliable data. The basic Mark IV Model is used to simulate the effects of the oil price increase as displayed in figure 8.6 for six major macroeconomic variables for each country. The effect is estimated as the difference between the simulation values based on the actual real price of oil and the values based on a constant post-19731 price. Figure 8.7 displays the corresponding simulated effects when the Mark IV-Oil Model is used to perform the basic simulations. Figure 8.6 illustrates that in the basic model without direct real income effects, real income (panel a ) generally rises due to increases in export demand (panel e). Whether this raises or lowers the price level depends on the simulated movements in interest rates (and so the net change in real money demand) and in the nominal money supply.” The money 33. Recall that P = M ” / m “ ( y , R ) Increases . in real income tend to raise m a and hence lower the price level, other things equal. Increases in M” or in R , on the other hand, tend by themselves to raise the price level.

256

Chapter Eight

Table 8.4

Alternative Real-Income Equations for Mark IV-Oil Model a)

Equation Form

Note. The country index isj, logy: is permanent income, and log 0, = log PRO + log PI + log Ej - log 6,where PI and 6 are the price levels for the U.S. and countryj, respectively, E, is the exchange rate, and P R O is the index of the real price of a barrel of Venezuelan oil in 1970 U.S. dollars.

b ) Coefficients Values by Country ( j ) Coefficient Name

us

UK

FR

-0.0016 0.1472 0.8335 0.4271 0.9220 0.1320 0.0960 0.0852 1.4624 1.0743

-0.0148 0.4631 -0.1410

0.0843 0.5351 -0.2414

0.1464

0.0487 0.0531 - 0.1536

0.0005 -0.0000 0.0003 -0.0187 -0.0231 -0.0064 -0.0200

0.0959

0.5147 0.0005 -0.0000 - 0.0188 - 0.0294 0.0236 0.0213 0.0073

JA

-

0.0007 -0.0000 - 0.0447 0.0089 0.0500 0.0402 0.0084

0.2338 0.2122 0.2152

-0.0522 -0.8308 -0.6263 -0.8518 0.0006 -0.0000 - 0.0351 -0.0481 0.0024 0.0105 0.0022

NE 0.0668 0.2869 0.1542 0.0679 -0.0676 -0.1044 0.0625 -0.0239 0.0222 0.0398 0.0352 -0.0231 0.1660 -0.0236 -0.0004 +O.oooO

- 0.0307 -0.0269 0.0257 0.0096 0.0032

Notes. The Mark IV-Oil Model replaces the real-income equations in the Mark IV-FLT Simulation Model with these five equations. The only other changes are the addition of identities for the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Netherlands defining their domestic real price of oil as log 6, log PRO + log PI + log E, - log 5. A coefficient for a suppressed variable ( t statistic less than 1 in absolute value; aj3through aj,14 only) is indicated by dash.

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

257

1973

Fig. 8.6

1974

1975

Simulated effects of the 1973-74increase in the real price of oil using basic Mark IV model. a ) Real income-log

yi

258

Chapter Eight

1973

1974

Fig. 8.6 (continued)

b ) Price level--log P,

1975

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

259

\

t 0.000'

-

U:

i

-0.0202

1973

197U

Fig. 8.6 (continued)

c) Nominal money-log

Mi

2 1975

260

Chapter Eight

x 2.75

2.25

1.75

1.25

0.75

0.25

1

-0.25' 2 1973

2

2

1974

1975

Fig. 8.6 (continued) d ) Short-term interest rate-&

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

261

0.120

0.100

0.080

0.060

0.0110

0.0207

0.000

2 1974

2 1973

Fig. 8.6 (continued)

e ) Scaled exports-(X/Y)i

2 1975

262

Chapter Eight

x 3.00

2.00 1.00

0.00 -1.00

-2.00

-3.00

-4100 -5.00

- G . 00

L GE

-7.00

2 1973

2 19711

Fig. 8.6 (continued)

f ) Scaled balance of payrnents-(BIY)i

2 1975

263

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

x 4.01

2.

0.

-2.

-4.

-6.

-8.0' 2 1913

Fig. 8.7

2 1974

2 1975

Simulatedeffects of the 1973-74 increase in the real price of oil using Mark IV oil model. a ) Real income-log

yi

264

Chapter Eight

X 7.

6.

5.

4.

3.

2"

1.

0.

-1.

-2.

1974

1973

Fig. 8.7 (continued)

b ) Price level-log

P,

!975

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

265

0.020

2

2

2

266

Chapter Eight

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

267

i

-0.020; 1973

2

2

1974

1975

Fig. 8.7 (continued) e)

Scaled exports-(XIY),

Chapter Eight

268

-4.5

-5.5.

GE I

-6.5’

2 1974

2 1973

Fig. 8.7 (continued)

f ) Scaled balance of payments-(BIY)i

2 1975

269

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

supply movements are generally small except in Germany where strong simulated balance-of-payments effects cause a sharp but temporary increase in nominal money. Figure 8.7 illustrates just how sensitive the results are to the inclusion of direct real-income effects. Notice in panel a the considerable realincome declines which occur in the three countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) with direct real-income effects included. For the United States and the United Kingdom, the price level rises due to the lower real income and hence real money demand and, for the U.K. only, due to a rise in nominal money.” The anomalous fall in the Dutch price level occurs because of a perverse, statistically insignificant negative coefficient on transitory income in the money-demand equation. For Canada and Germany the results differ little from the basic Mark IV simulations. These simulation results illustrate the large difference it makes whether or not we take at face value the estimated real-oil-price effects in the real-income equations: Real-income effects vary from slightly positive to as much as -7% by the end of 1974. A smaller variation in simulated price-level effects also occurs in the alternative simulations. It is both the sorrow and challenge of our nonexperimental science that other things were not held constant when the oil price change occurred. One factor which may explain the estimated real-income effects in 197374 was identified in section 8.2: the coincidental removal of price controls in those countries for which real effects were found. Only much further research can show whether the large simulated effects in the Mark IV-Oil Model have a basis in reality or are the result of other changes-such as price decontrol-occurring in the same period. 8.4

Conclusions

The effects on real income and the price level of the 1973-74 increases in the real price of oil are subject of strongly held but diverse opinions.3s Unfortunately the results of this paper indicate that a wide range of opinions is indeed consistent with the data. Perhaps we should not be surprised that with effectively one degree of freedom it is difficult to have much confidence in estimates of both an oil price coefficient and its standard error. The oil price shock of 1979-80 will provide us data on a second major 34. There is a significant rise in British money because only unemployment and not inflation is important. In the American case these factors are offsetting. 35. Taking two of the best studies for the long-run U.S. real-income effect as examples, Norsworthy, Harper, and Kunze (1979, p. 412) report an average reduction in productivity growth of 0.18% per annum for 1973-78, which implies a total reduction in real income of 0.9%,while Rasche and Tatom (1980), in contrast, as reported in table 8.3, estimate a 7.0% long-run effect.

270

Chapter Eight

move in the real price of oil.%But these data are unlikely to resolve the empirical question. It seems to me that a more fruitful avenue may be to develop quantitative measures of the biases in official real output data due to price controls and then to see what oil price effects are estimated using these corrected data. This approach is feasible because price controls were generally imposed much before the oil price change. Thus historical relations between labor input, electricity production, carloadings, and other physical unit series can be used to estimate the biases up to the oil price change. If this chapter has demonstrated that the effects of the real-oil-price increases in 1973-74 remain an open question and thus stimulates research toward answering it, then I will be amply recompensed for having to report such inconclusive conclusions. Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges helpful comments received at a seminar at the International Monetary Fund and the able research assistance of Michael T. Melvin and Andrew A. Vogel. The calculations were performed on the TROLL system at MIT. The bulk of the empirical results appeared with additional evidence in Darby (1982).

References Barro, R. J. 1978. Unanticipated money, output, and the price level in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 86 (August): 549-80. Berner, R.; P. Clark; E. HernBndez-Catti; H. Howe; S. Kwack; and G. Stevens. 1977. A multi-country model of the international influences on the U.S. economy: Preliminary results. International Finance Discussion Papers, no. 115, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December. Bruno, M. , and J. Sachs. 1979. Supply versus demand approaches to the problem of stagflation. NBER Working Paper, no. 382, August. Carr, J. 1976. Wage and price controls: Panacea for inflation or prescription for disaster. In M. Walker, ed., The illusion of wage and price control. Vancouver: Fraser Institute. Christensen, L. R., and D. W. Jorgenson. 1978. U.S. input, output, saving, and wealth, 1929-1969. Unpublished paper, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, December. Darby, M. R. 1976a. “Price and wage controls: The first two years” and “Further evidence.” In K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, eds, The 36. When these data for the United States alone were used in Darby (1982), no statistically significant effects of oil prices on real GNP were detected in regressions which also included labor force and price-control variables.

271

Importance of Oil Price Changes in the 1970s World Inflation

economics of price and wage controls. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 2, supplement to the Journal of Monetary Economics, April 1976. . 1976b. The U.S. economic stabilization program of 1971-1974. In M. Walker, ed., The illusion of wage and price control. Vancouver: Fraser Institute. .1976c. Macroeconomics: The theory of income, employment, and the price level. New York: McGraw-Hill. . 1979. Intermediate macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill. . 1982. The price of oil and world inflation and recession. American Economic Review 82 (September): 738-51. Hall, R. E. 1977(1). Investment, interest rates, and the effects of stabilization policies. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 61-103. Hudson, E. A., and D. W. Jorgenson. 1978. Energy prices and the U.S. economy, 1972-1976. Natural Resources Journal 18 (October): 87797. Kopcke, R. 1980. Potential growth, productivity, and capital accumulation. New England Economic Review, MayIJune, pp. 22-41. Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1973. Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs. American Economic Review 63 (June): 326-34. Mork, K. A., and R. E. Hall. 1979. Energy prices, inflation, and recession, 1974-1975. NBER Working Paper, no. 369, July. Norsworthy, J. R.; M. J. Harper; and K. Kunze. 1979(2). The slowdown in productivity growth: Analysis of some contributing factors. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 387-421. Perloff, J. M., and M. L. Wachter. 1979. A production functionnonaccelerating inflation approach to potential output: Is measured potential output too high? In K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, eds., Three aspects ofpolicy andpolicymaking, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series in Public Policy, vol. 10, supplement to the Journal of Monetary Economics. Phelps, E. S. 1978. Commodity-supply shock and full-employment monetary policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 10 (May): 206-21. Purvis, D. D. 1975. A comment on “The use of the aggregate demand curve.” Journal of Economic Literature 13 (June): 474. Rasche, R. H., and J. A. Tatom. 1979a. The effects of the new energy regime on economic capacity, production, and prices. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 59, no. 5 (May): 2-12. . 1977. Energy resources and potential GNP. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 59, no. 6 (June): 10-24. . 1980. Energy price shocks, aggregate supply, and monetary policy: The theory and the international evidence. Paper presented at the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, April.

272

Chapter Eight

Selden, R. T. 1980. The inflationary seventies: Comparisons among selected high-income countries. Paper presented at Conference on Inflation through the Ages, Brooklyn College CUNY, 10-12, March. Shenoy, S. R., ed. 1978. Wage-price control: Myth and reality. Turramurra, Australia: Centre for Independent Studies. Tatom, J. A. 1979a. Energy prices and capital formation: 1972-1977. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 61, no. 5 (May): 2-11. . 1979b. The productivity problem. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 61, no. 9 (September): 3-16.

9

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes in Aggregate Demand Variables: A Sensitivity Analysis of the Real-Income Equation Michael R. Darby

A large, if not dominant, body of recent research in macroeconomics incorporates the Barro (1977,1978) variant of the Lucas supply function. The analytical convenience of this approach is well known. For empirical work it has considerable attraction as well: It imposes restrictions upon how changes in money affect real income, and it may be stable despite a change in the monetary regime governing the money supply process.’ In particular, an empirical investigator can define expected money growth by an ARIMA process, a transfer function, or other parsimonious means and then include in the real-income equation only a few money shocks (innovations)-the difference between actual and expected money growth. Thus a great saving in parameters estimated is to be achieved compared to estimating a long distributed lag on actual money growth rates as would be required to obtain effectively the same equation.* This paper investigates whether the Barro restriction that only money shocks (not anticipated money growth) affect real income is supported by the data for other countries and for two other factors affecting aggregate demand: real government spending and real exports. The empirical An earlier version of this chapter, entitled “Unanticipated and Actual Changes in Aggregate Demand Variables: A Cross-Country Analysis,” was published in the Proceedings of Fourth West Coast AcademiclFederal Reserve Economic Research Seminar, October 1980, the November 1981 Conference Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review, pp. 160-89. 1. If a change in monetary regime does not alter the predictability of the future money supply, then the coefficients on money-supply innovations (or shocks) in the Barro variant would apparently remain unchanged. 2. See Sargent (1976) on the equivalence of these two approaches in the absence of identifying information in a money-supply transfer function which is not present in the real-income equation. See also McCallum (1979) on testing for the validity of the Barro variant even in the absence of such a priori identifying information on a change in monetary regime.

273

274

Chapter Nine

results suggest that the data are not inconsistent with the Barro restrictions. However, except for the United States, it makes very little difference whether one-year distributed lags on unanticipated or actual changes in aggregate demand variables are used in the real-income regressions. Certainly the results would not suggest use of the unanticipated variables in the absence of a priori preference. While these results can be rationalized by greater measurement errors in the foreign datano real-income regression explains much-they are sufficiently surprising to warrant further investigation and cautious application of Barro’s approach. The Mark I11 International Transmission Model’s real-income equations ( R l ) and (Nl) are derived in section 9.1 as a generalization of the familiar Barro real-income equation. These equations are subjected to a sensitivity analysis in research reported in section 9.2. A summary and suggestions for future research conclude the chapter. 9.1 A Generalized Barro Real-Income Equation

The real-income equation is derived by combining a Lucas supply function with a standard aggregate demand function to obtain real income as a function of lagged transitory real income and shocks in nominal money, real government spending, and real exports.3 Other aggregate demand variables such as taxes are not included because of lack of adequate international data.4 The aggregate supply function is of the Lucas (1973) form: (9.1)

A l o g y = a , -~210g(y_llyP,) + a 3 P + + ,

where country subscripts are omitted for simplicity, y is real income, yP is the natural-employment or permanent value of real income, al is the periodic growth rate of yp, E is a white noise disturbance, and P is the price-level shock: (9.2)

P = log P - (log P)* ,

where P is the price level and an asterisk denotes expectations based upon the previous period’s information set. The aggregate demand function is assumed semi-log linear: (9.3)

log y

= 61

+ b210g(MIP) + b310g g

+ b,x + v ,

3. For similar derivations, see McCallum (1978), Korteweg (1978), and Horrigdn (1980). 4. No bias will result from including the effects of these variables in the error term unless their innovations are correlated with the innovations in the included variables. Were this the case, the expected values of estimated coefficients would be augmented by the product of the omitted coefficients and the regression coefficients of the omitted variables on the included variables. See Theil (1971, pp. 548-56).

275

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes

where M is the nominal money supply, g is real government spending, x is exports divided by i n c ~ r n e and , ~ v is another white noise disturbance uncorrelated with E. Familiar manipulations yield the semi-reduced-form real-income equation (9.4)

A log y = a1 - ~210g(y - 1IyP 1 )

a3

where &, g, and 2 are the differences between the actual and expected values of log M , log g, and x , respectively. It is generally argued that inventory fluctuations will lead to some lags in the adjustment of output (as opposed to final sales) so that some short distributed lags on A,g, and R are permitted as well as the contemporaneous terms.6 For example, using quarterly data and assuming any inventory lags are corrected within a year, (9.5)

where e is the combined residual disturbance. This is the form of the real-income equation used in the Mark I11 International Transmission Model’ and investigated in section 9.2 below. The empirical basis for including only innovations in money and not anticipated changes in money is by now well known, but it is perhaps worthwhile to comment briefly here on the corresponding basis for real government spending and exports. The real-income equation (9S)-assuming positive short-run effectsimplies that unexpected increases in government spending or exports cause a short-run increase in real income, but this short-run increase is eliminated over time. That is, there is complete long-run real crowding out. I have argued elsewhere (1979, pp. 225-27) that this pattern represents a rough consensus of empirical results for the United States. As with money growth, however, alternative anticipated levels of real government spending and of real exports may imply different steady-state values of the capital-labor ratio so that their anticipated levels may belong in the 5. Recall from chapter 5 above that exports are scaled by dividing by income instead of by taking logarithms because in the Mark I11 International Transmission Model a balanceof-payments identity involving sometimes negative numbers is imposed. This should only cause an offsetting change in the magnitude but not the significance of the estimated export coefficients. 6. See particularly Haraf (1979). 7. The lagged value of logy is moved from the left to right side in the Mark I11 Model, but this has no effect on estimated coefficients and standard errors.

276

Chapter Nine

real-income equation even though they do not affect the naturalemployment level of labor input. Further, there may be incentive effects on labor supply and efficiency effects associated with different sizes of government, but again empirical evidence is lacking to date. As specified, the real-income equation (9.5) embodies a hypothesis that the effects of anticipated M ,g, and x on y via capital or otherwise are negligible. 9.2 Empirical Results

Our empirical investigation is based upon the 1955-76 quarterly data bank described in chapter 3 and the Data Appendix to this volume. Data are available for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. Two years are lost due to lagged variables which appear in the real-income equation (9.5) and in the definitions of expected values, so all estimations are for the eighty quarters from 19571 through 1976IV. Table 9.1 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation ( 9 . 9 , where &l, g, and R are defined as the residuals on univariate ARIMA processes fitted according to the methods of Box and Jenkins (1976) using the programs described in Nelson (1973). As reported in chapter 6 above, these equations were also fitted by the two-stage leastsquares method using principal components (2SLSPC) to take account of the endogeneity in the Mark I11 Model of the current money and export shocks &l andR. The results reported here differ little from those 2SLSPC results, and certain bugs in the TROLL system make them more useful for sensitivity analyses.8 Examining the results in table 9.1, we can first observe that, with the exception of the United States, the explanatory powers of the regressions are very weak: Only 10 to 20% of the residual variance around the mean growth rate of real income is explained for five countries, and for France and Japan less than 10% is e ~ p l a i n e dWhile .~ some of the individual t statistics would be quite significant given the maintained hypothesis that all the other variables belong in the regression, this is less true for groups of coefficients. Table 9.2 reports F statistics for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients applied to a particular shock variable are zero;'O these are reproduced from the 2SLSPC estimates reported in chapter 6. Only the 8. The basic problem is that it is impossible to recover in TROLL the sum of squared residuals based on the fitted values of the endogenous variables. Work is under way to correct this. 9. The F(13166) value of 1.634 for France is right at the border of the critical region for rejecting the null hypothesis a, = c , = c2 = . . . = cIz = 0 at the 0.10 significance level, while the F value of 1.491 for Japan fails even this test. For all the other countries, this null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.05 significance level or better. It should be noted that data reliability is a particFlar problem for France, Italy, and Japan. 10. That is, the F for M variables is for testing the null hypothesis c1 = c2 = cj = c4 = 0.

277

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes

U.S. money shock variables as a group reach significance at the 0.01 level or better. In addition, British and Canadian government spending shocks reach significance at the 0.05 level while Canadian and Italian money shocks and American and German export shocks are significant at better than the 0.10 level. I conclude that in an absolute sense the explanatory power of the generalized Barro real-income equation is weak other than for the United States. One question is whether the use of only unanticipated changes in the aggregate demand variables is consistent with the data. Table 9.3 reports the standard errors of estimate for regressions in which actual changes are substituted for unanticipated changes for each group of aggregate demand variables." The form of the regression is indicated by a combination of three U's and/or A's, where U represents unanticipated and A represents actual changes and the ordering is M, g, x . Thus a UAA specification has unanticipated changes in log M for the cl, . . . , c4 terms and actual changes in log g and x for the c5, . . . ,c12terms. The main message of table 9.3 appears to be that except for the United States it makes very little difference whether one uses actual or unanticipated changes in the real-income equation specified. If we examine the minimal-sum-of-squared-residuals regression for each country, half of the cases involve money shocks, another, partially overlapping set of four have government spending shocks, and only two have export shocks. While tests on nonnested models are difficult, it is clear from the small or no increase in the SSRs for the UUU regression form as opposed to the best alternative that a null hypothesis that UUU is the correct form is not inconsistent with the data. Since the addition of insignificant variables may increase the standard error of estimate and reduce the (corrected) R2, the real-income regressions were also run with money shocks only as suggested by Barro.'*The results reported in table 9.4 show that the explanatory powers of all the regressions, in fact, deteriorate slightly. The last row of the table gives the 1;(4/74)statistic for the null hypothesis c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 0; the U.S. money shocks as a group are still significant at the 1%level and the Italian at the 10% level, but now the German and Dutch money shocks are significant at the 5% level and the Canadian money shocks not at all. If these regressions are slightly encouraging for the money shock approach, the results of replacing the money shocks with the actual changes as 11. The alternative procedure of adding additional terms for anticipated changes and testing whether they belong is not feasible in this case because the estimated ARIMA processes frequently imply extreme multicollinearity. Only variables known a priori to determine anticipated money but not to belong in the real-incomeequation would make this alternative approach usable. 12. That is, with coefficients c5, . . . ,cIzin equation (5) all set equal to 0. This would follow if b, and b4 were 0 in the aggregate demand equation (3) due to short-run demandside real crowding out.

Table 9.1

Generalized Barro Real-Income Equation (9.5) 3

A logy = a ,

us

~

a210gb-,/yP,)

UK

>

3

1

+ ,-nZ c , + , M - , + rX= nc5+,g-, + ,=n c g + , L ,+ e CA

GE

FR

IT

NE

JA

Coefficients a1

- a2

,0079 (.0010) 8.206 - .0662

(.0341) - 1.940 C1

c4

c5

,0056 (.0016) 3.539

- ,2165 (.0826) - 2.621

,0109 (.0013) 8.075

- ,0437

- ,0182

( ,0423) - 1.031

(.0435) - ,418

.0219 (.0342) ,641

- ,0180 (.1829) - ,098

(. 1129)

3.078

,0972 (.0966) 1.006

,0322 ( ,1140) ,283

,2522 (. 1037) 2.431

.0689 (.1105) ,623

,0853 (.0981) ,870

,1060 (.1138) ,932

,1098 (. 1109) ,990

,2630 (. 1001) 2.627

,1883 (. 1131) 1.665

- ,0278 (. 1130) - ,246

(. 1044) - ,342

.0759 ( . 1118) ,679

,0093 (.1076) ,086

- ,0019 ( .O 103) - ,189

,0489 (.0350) 1.399

,0370 (.0348) 1.064

.1450

,6338 (.2145) 2.955

,0439 (.0986) ,446

,7679 (.2247) 3.417

- ,1249

- ,0255

(.0535) - ,476

(.0914) - 1.366 ,1788 (.0528) 3.388

.0100 (.0015) 6.762

(.0660) - .893

(. 1073)

(.0947) - ,296

,0204 (.0017) 11.791

- .0590

(.0923) - 1.431

- ,0281

,0114 (.0015) 7.658

(.0584) -2.160

- .1321

(.2254) - ,093

,0108 (.0015) 7.245

- .1262

,6354 (.2127) 2.987

- ,0210

,0125 (.0020) 6.334

1.351

,3476

,1842 (.1014) 1.816

.1263 (. 1763) ,716

,1128 (.1020) 1.106

,0923

- ,0187

(. 1736)

(.1092) - ,172

,1670 ( ,0980) 1.704 ,0194 ( .0517)

,375

.531 - ,0900

(.1707) - ,527 ,0367 (.0396) ,925

,0387 (. 1099) ,353 - .0361

(.0272) - 1.326

- ,0358

- ,0880

(.0527) - 1.672

- .1572

- .0114 (.0356) - .319

- .0352 (.0354) - .992

(.0100) - .125

.0480 (.0357) 1.347

.0139 (.0353) ,395

.0133 (.0271) .491

,0271 (.0100) 2.700

- .0369 (.0362) - 1.020

.0327 (.0358) ,912

,8552 (.3571) 2.395

.3643 (.2225) 1.637

- ,2336 (.1953) -1.196

-2.0498 (.8332) - 2.460

.0666 (.0884) ,754

.loo1 (.2260) .443

- .7501 (.3730) -2.011

- ,2456 (.2202) -1.115

- ,0368 (.1890) - ,195

.5237 (.8636) .606

- .0727 (.0899) - ,809

- .2149 (. 1861) -1.155

,0190 (.2264) ,084

,0095 (.3798) ,025

- .3378 (.2279) - 1.483

- ,2348 (.1938) - 1.212

- 1.7616

,1031 (.0853) 1.208

.0067 (.1900) ,035

,4470 (.2298) 1.945

- .0383 (.3864) - .099

- ,5199 (.2258) -2.302

- ,4591

,1045 (.0551) 1.898

,0138 (.0563) ,245

,0388 (.0531) ,732

,1003 (.0555) 1.807

- .0303

Cs

,0742 (.0544) 1.363

c9

c10

c6

c7

c11

.0064 (.0397) ,160

.0289 (.0273) 1.059

(.0522) - .581

.a466 (.0392) 1.189

- .oo73 (.0270) - ,272

- .0224 (.0564) - .398

- ,0112 (.0529) - .212

.0293 (.0372) ,788

.2766 (.3815) .725

,1476 (.1870) .789

.3557 (.2225) 1.599

.3674 (.3933) .934

.4153 (.1791) 2.319

- .0021 (.4131) - ,005

c12

-

- ,9809 (.4119) -2.381

(.0549) -2.864

,0010 (.0102) .loo - .0013

(. 1979) -2.320

(.9134) - 1.929 - .7920

(.9213) 0.860

- ,1160

(.0811) - 1.431

R2

,3694

.1867

.1297

,0944

.1409

.1273

.0748

.1339

S.E.E.

,0086

.0140

.0119

.0175

,0133

,0131

.0153

,0130

D-W

1.72

1.95

2.41

2.13

1.94

2.23

1.99

Note. Period: 19571-76IV. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates; t statistics are below the standard errors.

1.67

Chapter Nine

280

F Statistics for Groups of Demand Shock Variables for ZSLSPC Estimates

Table 9.2

F(4/66) Statistics

Country

fi Variables g Variables

us

7.128 1.164 2.315 0.341 1.473 2.201 1.152 1.530

UK CA FR GE IT JA NE

1.820 3.531 3.191 0.783 0.748 2.004 1.141 1.137

i Variables

2.188 1.763 1.858 1.006 2.353 1.766 1.660 1.675

Notes. The reported Fstatistics are appropriate for testing the joint hypothesis that all four of the demand shock variables of the type indicated have a coefficientof zero. Such a test is conditional upon the other variables entering in the equation. For F(4/66), the 10% significancelevel is 2.04, the 5% significancelevel is 2.52, and the 1% significance level is 3.63.

reported in table 9.5 are not. Again, only for the United States is there a dramatic fall in E2 or rise in S.E.E. when actual changes are substituted for unanticipated changes. Among the other seven countries it makes little difference whether actual or unanticipated changes are used, but the R2 is higher for four countries when actual changes are used. So the money-only-matters equations tell essentially the same agnostic story as the generalized Barro real-income equations. Errors in the independent variables are an obvious explanation for the poor explanatory power of the money and other shocks. These errors might arise from the fact that the shocks are based on constructed expectations series or from the apparent fact that the data for the other seven countries have larger measurement errors than are present in the United States data. Table 9.3

Country UUU

us UK CA

FR GE IT JA NE

0.0086 0.0140 0.0119 0.0175 0.0133 0.0131 0.0153 0.0130

-

Standard Errors of Estimate for Alternative Real-Income Equation Specifications Specification of Aggregate Demand Variables

AUU

UAA

AAA

UAU

AAU

UUA

AUA

0.0098 0.0141 0.0117 0.0175 0.0133 0.0130 0.0153 0.0131

0.0083 0.0133 0.0118 0.0176 0.0133 0.0132 0.0151 0.0126

0.0091 0.0134 0.0116 0.0175 0.0134 0.0131 0.0150 0.0126

0.0086 0.0138 0.0119 0.0174 0.0133 0.0132 0.0154 0.0128

0.0098 0.0139 0.0117 0.0174 0.0133 0.0131 0.0153 0.0129

0.0083 0.0134 0.0119 0.0176 0.0133 0.0131 0.0150 0.0127

0.0091 0.0136 0.0116 0.0176 0.0134 0.0130 0.0149 0.0126

Basic Barro Real-Income Equation

Table 9.4

A logy = a ,

us

-

a210g@-l/yP1) +

UK

2 cl+Jk,

,=O

+e FR

CA

GE

IT

JA

NE

Coefficients a,

- a2

,0080 (.0010) 7.906

.0061 (.0017) 3.554

,0107 (.0014) 7.608

,0125 (.0021) 6.010

- .0756 ( .0330) -2.286

- ,1946

- ,1307

- .0918

(.0757) -2.569

(.0574) - 2.276

(.0692) - 1.328

,7694 (.2034) 3.782

- ,0629 (.0911) - ,690

,0131 (.0977) .134

c2

.6413 (.2026) 3.165

- .0057 (.0936) - ,061

c3

,1868 (.2138) .874

c4

.7213 (.2261) 3.190 ,3048

C1

-

RZ S.E.E. D-W F(4/74)+

,0090 1.53 9.82

- ,0213 (.0403) - ,527

,0114 (.0015) 7.385 - ,0151

.0208 (.0018) 11.767

(.0420) - ,360

.0120 (.0341) ,353

,0101 (.0015) 6.813 - ,1010

(.0515) - 1.961

(.1828) - ,659

,3534 (.1117) 3.163

,1627 (.0966) 1.685

,1022 (.1081) ,946

,3095 (.0972) 3.184

,0960 (.0961) ,999

,1194 (.1817) .657

,1024 ( .1107) .925

,1305 (.0964) 1.353

.0843 (. 1060) ,795

.0n2 (.0946) 359

- ,0321 (.0934) - ,343

.0768 (.0962) ,798

,0862 (. 1785) ,483

- ,0470 ( .1107) - .424

,2132 (.0966) 2.206

,2033 (. 1055) 1.927

,0114 (.0955) .120

- .1376

,1181 (.0967) 1.221

- ,0278

(.0931) - 1.478

(. 1775) - .156

,0448 (.1121) ,400

,0773 (. 1084) ,713

.0045 (.0938) .048

.0414

,0391

- .0215

,0749

,0234

.1111

,0151 1.97 .68

,0125 2.35 .77

- ,1204

.0108 (.0015) 6.988

,0186 2.36 .28

,0138 1.89 2.83

- .0557

(.0974) - .572 ,0567 ,0136 2.01 2.39

,0158 1.99 1.40

,0132 1.73 2.67

Note. Period 19571-76IV. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates; f statistics are below the standard errors. 'The F(4/74) statistic tests the null hypothesis that c1 = c2 = c3 = c, = 0. Critical values are 2.03 (10% significance level), 2.43 (5%), and 3.61 (1%).

Actual Money Growth Real-Income Equation

Table 9.5

3

A log y US

= al

- a210g(y- I l y ! UK

+ ,=n Z c1+ , A log M - + e FR

CA

GE

IT

JA

NE

Coefficients a,

- a2

,0026 (.0026) ,998 - ,0356

(.0389) - ,916 CI

c2

c3

c4

.0070 (.0025) 2.789

- .1836 (.0768) - 2.391

,0068 ( ,0024) 2.829 - ,1404

(.0569) - 2.467

,0095 (.0059) 1.612 - ,0813

(.0688) - 1.181

,0057 ( ,0040) 1.441 - ,0175

( .0414) - .421

,0049 (.0047) 1.039 - ,0058

(.0422) - ,137

,0100 (.00.58) 1.716

1.897

,0106 (.0350) ,303

- ,1013 (.0514) - 1.969

.0061 ( ,0032)

- ,0629

- ,0370

- ,0198

(.0923) - .681

(.0839) - ,441

(. 1700) -.116

,3431 (.1111) 3.090

,1925 (.0944) 2.039

,0555 (.2836) ,196

,0079 (.0961) ,082

,1442 (.0864) 1.669

,1712 (. 1745) ,981

.0708 (. 1048) ,676

.1119 (.0943) 1.186

(. 1136)

,0329 (.2851) ,115

,0400 (.0963) .415

,0272 (.0868) ,313

- ,0068 (. 1738) - ,039

-.1166 (. 1049) - 1.112

,0978 (.0947) 1.033

,1247 (.1121) 1.112

- .0828

- ,0665 (.0941) - ,707

,0919 (.0831) 1.105

- ,0354

- ,0726

- ,2112

(. 1646) - ,215

(. 1147) - ,633

(.0948) -2.227

- ,0347 (.1067) - ,325

- .0251

( ,2402) - ,233

,0505

,0192

,0734

- ,0218

,0699

,0790

,0366

,1120

.0186

,0138

,0134

,0157

,0132

,4805 (.2291) 2.097

- ,0560

.lo84 (. 1064)

1.019 ,0767 ,675

,3032 ( ,0930) 3.261

- ,0373 (.0915) - ,408 (.0926) - ,893

(.0905) - ,278

-

R2 S.E.E.

,0105

,0153

,0123

D-W

1.21

2.00

2.32

2.38

1.89

2.08

2.02

1.73

F(4/74)'

2.24

.25

1.48

.28

2.72

2.89

1.68

2.69

Note. Period 19571-76IV. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient estimates; I statistics are below the standard errors. 'The F(4/74) statistic tests the null hypothesis that c1 = c2 = c3 = c4 = 0. Critical values are 2.03 (10% significance level), 2.43 (5%), and 3.61 (1%).

283

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes

Consider first the extremely limited information set (past values of the variable only) used to divide log M , log g , and x into expected and unanticipated components. If the true expectations are based on a broader information set, the actual change might be as good as or a better measure of the unanticipated change than our ARIMA innovation. To investigate this question, I constructed transfer function estimates of expected money using Nelson’s TRANSEST program applied to the variables appearing in the Mark I11 Model’s money supply reaction function: the inflation rate, log( ylyp) or unemployment rate, g , and, except for the U.S., the scaled balance of payments. However, in six cases out of eight, the univariate ARIMA processes resulted in lower SSRs that these transfer estimates.I3Further, chapter 6 reports on checks of correlations (among others) of the residuals of the real-income equations with the residuals of all the other domestic equations and of the reserve-country (U.S.) nominal money, real-income, and price-level equations. There was no apparent pattern of significant correlations which might suggest other variables for expectations transfer functions; so the approach was not pursued. It may be rational for individuals not to use costly information even if it has some predictive value (see Darby 1976 and Feige and Pearce 1976), but this may constitute some evidence against the costless-information interpretation of rational expectations. Appeals to measurement error, like appeals to patriotism, have a deserved reputation as a last resort of scoundrels. Nonetheless, in any particular case they may be correct. Measurement error in the dependent variables (A logy) could account for the generally low explanatory power of the regressions and significance levels of the explanatory ~ariab1es.I~ There may be greater danger of measurement error in the independent variables in general and in money in particular. Table 9.6 presents the standard deviations around the mean of each of the shock variables plus the dependent variable. For each of the independent variables, the U.S. standard deviation is only about one-third of the average standard deviations for the seven countries, but for the dependent variable the U.S. standard deviation is about three-quarters of the mean for the other countries. Now there are good reasons why money shocks in nonreserve countries

13. The six out of eight dominance of univariate expectations occurred in the UUU regressions; in one case (France) the use of transfer expectations shifted the minimum-SSR regression from the AAU to the UAU form. 14. Measurement error in the dependent variable if it is uncorrelatedwith measurement error in the independent variables does not bias the coefficients but does increase sz (the S.E.E.). It might be that measurement error due to deflation would cause a spurious positive relation to appear between A log y and g while measurement error in nominal income might create a spurious negative relation between A logy and f . Such a hypothesis would find some support in the estimates reported in table 9.1.

Chapter Nine

284

Table 9.6

Standard Deviations of Real-Income Growth and Shock Variables

Standard Deviation of Country

M

8

f

A 1% Y

us

0.0052 0.0188 0.0146 0.0119 0.0139 0.0159 0.0168 0.0155

0.0197 0.0329 0.0283 0.0566 0.0562 0.1583 0.0537 0.0448

0.0028 0.0090 0.0066 0.0059 0.0070 0.0083 0.0023 0.0196

0.0108 0.0155 0.0128 0.0184 0.0143 0.0140 0.0159 0.0140

UK CA FR GE IT JA NE

would be greater than in the reserve c o ~ n t r y .Suppose ’~ that nonetheless we assume that all of the difference between the standard deviations of for the United States and the average of the other countries is accounted for by a normally distributed error component. Table 9.7 illustrates for ten drawings what such a measurement error does to the summary statistics and money shock F statistic for the regression estimates of equation (9.5).16 Certainly the range of reported summary statistics is similar to that for the other countries appearing in tables 9.1 and 9.2. The means of the ten drawings are very similar to the means for the other seven countries noted at the bottom of table 9.7.’’Thus an assumption that all the differences in the standard deviations of M across countries are due to measurement error is sufficient to account for the weak results observed for countries other than the United States. Doubtless other more reasonable assumptions as to measurement errors would do likewise. While this is no proof that measurement errors are the reason for the weak results outside the United States, it is evidence that measure15. For example, under the strictest version of the monetary approach to the balance of payments and under the assumption of independence of the sources of shocks, the variance of a nonreserve country’s money shocks would equal the sum of the variance of the reserve country’s money shocks, the variance of changes in the purchasing power parity, and the variance of the disturbance term to the money-demand equation. 16. That is, table 9.7 reports regressions for the United States where fi is replaced with A? = M + N where N is a computer-generated normal deviate with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.014389. To explore sampling variation, ten different drawings of N were made with the regressions computed for each one. Alternatively, an analytical examination of biases based on an assumed variance-covariance matrix of the errors might be pursued as suggested by Garber and Klepper (1980). 17. This similarity is also apparent in the (unreported) individual coefficients and f statistics. Note that the two mean S.E.E.’sare in the same ratio as the standard deviations of A logy for the U.S. and the other countries. The hint of negative autocorrelation implicit in the nonreserve countries’ mean Durbin-Watson statistic of 2.29 is consistent with greater measurement error in the levelof logy which would induce negative autocorrelation in A log y. By construction, autocorrelation due to measurement error is removed from the shock variables.

285

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes

Table 9.7

Summary Statistics for United States Generalized Barro Real-Income Equation with Artificial Money Shock Measurement Error

Drawing Number

RZ

S.E.E.

D-W

F(4/66)+

Std. Dev. of ni

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean Mean of other 7 countries

0.1613 0.1265 0.1744 0.1153 0.1397 0.1879 0.1105 0.1874 0.0827 0.1366 0.1422

0.0099 0.0101 0.0098 0.0102 0.0100 0.0097 0.0102 0.0097 0.0104 0.0100 0.0100

1.60 1.60 1.63 1.52 1.46 1.44 1.49 1.61 1.49 1.59 1.54

1.885 1.153 2.176 0.928 1.423 2.406 0.835 2.474 0.309 1.358 1.495

0.0152 0.0146 0.0130 0.0149 0.0154 0.0152 0.0149 0.0143 0.0142 0.0152 0.0147

0.1268

0.0140

2.29

1.453

0.0153

Not:. The first ten sets of summary statistics are for the U.S. equation (9.5) with M replaced N,where N is normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation by M = M 0.014389. The next line is the mean of the first ten lines, and the final line is the mean of the corresponding values from tables 9.1 and 9.2 for countries other than the United States. 'The F(4/66) statistic is for the test of the null hypothesis c1 = c2 = cj = cq = 0. The critical values are 2.04 for the 10% significance level, 2.52 for 5%, and 3.63 for 1%.

+

ment error in the basic data'* is a tenable defense for those who believe that the Barro approach is a correct description of the real world. An alternative structural argument based on Lucas (1973) could be made: Countries which have larger prediction variances will be characterized by steeper aggregate supply curves. As u3 in equation (9.1) approaches 0 so do the coefficientsof &,g , and2 as seen in equation (9.4) above. However, Lucas required huge variations in nominal income variance to detect this effect, so it would not appear to be a viable defense for the current results. In sum, the empirical estimates indicate that, with the exception of the United States, actual and unanticipated changes in aggregate demand variables do about equally poorly as explanations of real-income growth. While these poor results may be due to measurement errors in both the dependent and independent variables, they are disappointing to support18. If the measurement error is not in the basic data but is instead due to the inadequacy of the expectations functions as representations of the true market expectations, then the Barro approach will not be useful even if the Lucas supply function is a true description of the economy. Leiderman (1980) reports that the rational-expectations approach to specifying expectations works for the United States. Figlewski and Wachtel(l981) and Urich and Wachtel (1980) report mixed results in reconciling survey data with rational-expectations proxies.

286

Chapter Nine

ers of the Barro approach to modeling the joint hypothesis of the naturalunemployment rate and rational expectations. 9.3 Implications for Economic Policymaking

In the 1960s the analytical and empirical elegance of the Phillips curve gave it wide currency as a tool for both evaluation and formulation of macroeconomic policy. It was not realized generally until the beginning of the 1970s that despite its aesthetic appeal, the Phillips curve did not work. The Lucas supply curve-particularly in the Barro reduced formhas similarly become a major tool for policy formulation and evaluation largely on the basis of a priori appeal rather than a solid foundation of empirical work. Needless to say, both the theoretical appeal and preliminary empirical work suggest that this approach is a good bet. But the results of this chapter suggest that there is less reason to adopt the approach when we examine data sets other than the one used to formulate the hypothesis. Thus policy prescriptions or evaluations which rely on the Lucas-Barro approach should be clearly labeled “Unproved; use at your own risk.” Surprising or anomalous results are our best clues to promising areas for future research. Other results casting doubt on the empirical robustness of the Lucas-Barro approach have been reported by Pigott (1978), Barro and Hercowitz (1980), and Boschen and Grossman (1980). Further research is required so that we can either use the approach with confidence or proceed to a more workable analysis. Acknowledgments

The author acknowledges helpful comments from David Friedman, Milton Friedman, Dean Taylor, and members of the UCLA Money Workshop and from his colleagues Arthur Gandolfi, James Lothian, Anna Schwartz, and Alan Stockman. Michael T. Melvin and Andrew A. Vogel provided able research assistance.

References Barro, R. J. 1977. Unanticipated money growth and unemployment in the United States. American Economic Review 67 (March): 101-15. . 1978. Unanticipated money, output, and the price level in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 86 (August): 549-80. Barro, R. J . , and Z . Hercowitz. 1980. Money shock revisions and unanticipated money growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 6 (April): 257-67.

287

Actual versus Unanticipated Changes

Boschen, J. F., and H. I. Grossman. 1980. Tests of equilibrium macroeconomics using contemporaneous monetary data. NBER Working Paper, no. 558, October. Box. G. E. P., and G. M. Jenkins. 1976. Timeseries analysis: Forecasting and control. Rev. ed. San Francisco: Holden-Day. Darby, M. R. 1976. Rational expectations under conditions of costly information. Journal of Finance 31 (June): 889-95. . 1979. Zntermediate macroeconomics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Feige, E. L., and D. K. Pearce. 1976. Economically rational expectations: Are innovations in the rate of inflation independent of innovations in measures of money and fiscal policy? Journal of Political Economy 84 (June): 499-522. Figlewski, S., and P. Wachtel. 1981. The formation of inflationary expectations. Review of Economics and Statistics 63 (February): 1-10. Garber, S . , and S. Klepper. 1980. Extending the classical normal errorsin-variable model. Econometrica 48 (September): 1541-46. Haraf, W. S. 1979. Inventories, orders, and the persistent effects of monetary shocks. Proceedings of 1978 West Coast AcademiclFederal Reserve Economic Research Seminar. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Horrigan, B . R. 1980. An estimation and test of the Brunner-Meltzer model of inflation and output fluctuations. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economics, UCLA. Korteweg, P. 1978. The economics of inflation and output fluctuations in the Netherlands, 1954-1975: A test of some implications of the dominant impulse-cum-rational expectations hypothesis. In K. Brunner and A. H. Meltzer, eds., The problem of inflation. Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, vol. 8. Leiderman, L. 1980. Macroeconometric testing of the rational expectations and structural neutrality hypotheses for the United States. Journal of Monetary Economics 6 (January): 69-82. Lucas, R. E., Jr. 1973. Some international evidence on output-inflation tradeoffs. American Economic Review 63 (June): 326-34. McCallum, B. T. 1978. Price level adjustments and the rational expectations approach to macroeconomic and stabilization policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 10 (November): 418-36. . 1979. On the observational inequivalence of classical and Keynesian models. Journal of Political Economy 87 (April): 395-402. Nelson, C. R. 1973. Applied time series analysis for managerial forecasting. San Francisco: Holden-Day. Pigott, C. 1978. Rational expectations and counter-cyclical monetary policy: The Japanese experience. Federal Reserve Bank of Sun Francisco Economic Review, Summer, pp. 6-22. Sargent, T. J. 1976. The observational equivalence of natural and un-

288

Chapter Nine

natural rate theories of macroeconomics. Journal of Political Economy 84 (June): 631-40. Theil, H. 1971. Principles of econometrics. New York: Wiley. Urich, T., and P. Wachtel. 1980. Market response to the weekly money supply announcements in the 1970s. Unpublished paper, New York University, July.

PART

111

Capital Flows, Sterilization, Monetary Policy, and Exchange Intervention

The central issue in understanding the international transmission of inflation is whether or not national borders make a real difference: Is the world economy an aggregate of individually perfectly open economies, or is it an aggregate of linked, but partially independent economies? Channels of transmission among countries were examined within the context of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model in part 11. There the channels were found to be surprisingly weak, but, as with any large-scale model, these results might be an artifact of some unknown peculiarity in the model’s specification. So the research on the openness question reported in chapters 10 through 13 is either relatively model free or at least based on alternative, smallerscale models. Thus the reader can assess these results without substantial investment in evaluating the model. Darby and Laskar in chapters 10 and 11, respectively, test for perfect openness by examining its implication that nonreserve central banks under pegged exchange rates have no control over their individual domestic money supplies. They argue that previous analysts, with a few notable exceptions, have not adequately dealt with the sterilization activities of the nonreserve central banks and, as a result, have performed tests which have little power to distinguish an alternative hypothesis of monetary control from a

290

null hypothesis of no control. New tests are presented which confirm the exercise of monetary control by nonreserve central banks during the Bretton-Woods era. Nonreserve monetary control under pegged exchange rates implies that a pure foreign exchange operation can influence the country’s floating exchange rate. Dan Lee develops a dynamic portfolio-balance model in chapter 12 and uses it to contrast the effects of a central-bank exchange of domestic bonds for foreign bonds with those of an exchange for domestic money. Many economists-including perhaps most persuasively William Branson-have used a portfolio-balance approach to argue that international assets are not perfect substitutes. Since perfect substitutability of assets is the most popular assumption leading to perfect openness, the issue is an important one. In chapter 13, Michael Melvin advances the portfoliobalance approach by introducing with some success the exchange-rate risk covariance measures implied by the international-asset-pricing model into the capital flows equation. This analysis provides an alternative to the capital-flows specification presented in chapter 5 and used in the Mark I11 lnternational Transmission Model. Thus part 111 supplements the results of part I1 by first presenting alternative and more formal tests of monetary control under pegged exchange rates. The implications under floating exchange rates of the lack of perfect openness are then examined. Finally, an empirical advance is made in the implementation of the portfolio-balance approach-the underlying theoretical explanation for the observed imperfect substitutability of international assets.

10

Sterilization and Monetary Control: Concepts, Issues, and a Reduced-Form Test Michael R. Darby

Monetary-approach models characteristically assume that goods, assets, or both are perfect substitutes internationally. For a nonreserve country maintaining pegged exchange rates, this implies that the central bank has no control over or influence on the country’s money supply but only determines how the demand-determined quantity is supplied by reserve flows and domestic credit creation. The successful exercise of monetary control under pegged exchange rates therefore contradicts the monetary approach and the assumption that goods, assets, or both are perfect substitutes internationally. The above argument provides the basis for this chapter’s tests of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.’ Before proceeding to the empirical tests, it is necessary to formulate a general model which is consistent with the possible exercise of monetary control but which subsumes the monetary approach as a special case. Because the observed negative correlation between reserve flows and domestic-credit changes can be explained by sterilization policies as well as the monetaryapproach channels, it is important that the general model allow for sterilization policies whether or not monetary control is present. Standard monetary-approach discussions assume that no sterilization operations are attempted by the central banks of nonreserve c0untries.l Although a number of authors have noted that sterilization policies may 1. These tests supplement-and confirm-the empirical results from the Mark I11 International Transmission Model. As reported in part I1 of this volume, direct structural estimates indicated that neither goods nor assets were perfect substitutes internationally. Thus, contrary to the monetary approach, nonreserve central banks exercised a degree of monetary control within the quarter. 2. To cite the locus classicus, see, for example, Frenkel and Johnson (1976, passim, esp. pp. 152-53). An important recent exception is a theoretical analysis by Boyer (1979) which uses a portfolio-balance approach.

291

292

Chapter Ten

bias empirical tests of the monetary a p p r ~ a c hadherents ,~ of the approach have argued that sterilization is neither significant in magnitude nor an important source of bias.4 Other authors are less sanguine about the impossibility and insignificance of sterilization.’ In particular, the estimates of the Mark I11 International Transmission Model, reported in chapter 6 above, indicate that the direct effects on national money supplies are very largely sterilized by offsetting transactions in domestic credit instruments. Since the no-sterilization (or exogenous-domestic-credit) assumption is both factually untrue and controversial, it appears to be an obfuscating rather than simplifying assumption. It will be shown in section 10.1 below that a simple monetary-approach model can be presented without any reliance on this assumption or the ancillary concept of domestic credit. Only if sterilization is complete can one infer anything about the presence or absence of monetary control. Section 10.1 outlines the general model incorporating sterilization which encompasses as a special case a modified version of the monetary approach in which both reserve flows and domestic-credit flows are endogenous variables. Generally, nonreserve central banks can exercise control over their domestic money supply in the short run unless certain conditions which imply validity of the monetary approach are met. In this monetary-approach special case, central bank attempts to exercise monetary control are futile and instead simply induce exaggerated reserve flows. Section 10.2 presents a simple direct test of whether determinants of monetary policy other than the current balance of payments influenced the nominal money supply given foreign variables determining money demand. For quarterly data of seven countries in our sample (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), all but the Netherlands showed clear evidence that monetary control was, in fact, exercised under the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates. This evidence is strongly inconsistent with the validity of 3. See, for example, Argy and Kouri (1974), Magee (1976), Maddala (1977, p. 253), and Darby (1980). 4. I can find no substantial basis for the denigration of the existence of substantial sterilization policies (implicit in money growth or interest-rate goals) beyond the assertion that they are impotent and therefore irrational (see, for example, quotations in footnotes 7 and 9). In much cited pieces, Argy and Kouri (1974) and Genberg (1976) used rudimentary reaction functions and quarterly data to obtain significant estimates of sterilization, but this did not lead to substantial changes in the relevant monetary-approach coefficients. Connolly and Taylor (1979) came to similar conclusions using both annual and biennial observations. Stockman (1979) used a sophisticated reaction function, but again came to the same conclusion. The basic flaw in these tests is discussed below in footnote 16. 5. For example, from their review of the earlier literature on sterilization and monetary control, Sweeney and Willett (1976, p. 444) conclude that “there is little evidence that such autonomy is impossible in the short-run, and considerable evidence it is possible.” See especially the careful work of Herring and Marston (1977) on Germany.

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Sterilization and Monetary Control

the monetary approach to the balance of payments in either its standard or its modified form for analysis of quarterly data. Thus there is a relevant “short run” within which central banks can and have exercised monetary control under pegged exchange rates. 10.1 Analysis

The analysis proceeds in four steps: First, sterilization is formally defined in terms of the money supply reaction function of the central bank. Next, a modified monetary approach is presented which is consistent with partial sterilization. Then a more general model is developed in which the central bank may control its domestic money supply; if this control is not present, the model reduces to the modified monetary approach. Finally, the conditions for monetary control are interpreted in terms of responsiveness of capital flows, trade flows, and the expected depreciation of the exchange rate. 10.1.1 Sterilization and the Money Supply Reaction Function The central bank of a nonreserve country will resist an incipient appreciation (for example) of its exchange rate by buying some foreign reserves with its domestic base money.6This new base money increases the domestic money supply. Standard central bank procedure involves offsetting sales of domestic assets (for example, government bonds) for base money. These offsetting transactions are said to sterilize the effect of the balance of payments on the money supply. In the standard monetary approach, the construct of domestic credit (base money less reserves) or its change has been assumed exogenous. This assumption is unwarranted if monetary authorities sterilize the balance of payments in whole or in part so that a balance-of-payments surplus induces a decrease in domestic credit. But, of course, the immediate sterilization might be reversed so rapidly that for all practical purposes no sterilization occurred over a period of observation such as a quarter. Then the exogenous-domestic-credit assumption would be acceptable for analysis of quarterly data. A money supply reaction function provides a formal statement of the behavior of the monetary authorities working through the banking system. The existence and extent of sterilization are measured by the coefficient of the contemporaneous scaled balance of payments in the reaction function. A general form of this reaction function is (10.1)

A l o g M = a -B+ X p + u , H

6. The analysis is properly applied only to nonreserve countries if the reserve country (such as the United States) is on a fiat standard as discussed in Darby (1980).

294

Chapter Ten

where M is the nominal money supply, B the balance-of-payments surplus, H nominal base or high-powered money, and X a vector containing all other variables which systematically affect the monetary authority’s behavior. Note in particular that lagged balances of payments may appear in X since the issue of ultimate concern is monetary control within the period of observation. If a is 1, then there is no sterilization since the balance of payments leads to a proportionate increase in the money supply. If a is zero, then complete sterilization is practiced. Values of a between 0 and 1indicate partial sterilization. By way of information, the Mark I11 estimates reported in table 6.8 above suggest that a lies in the range from 0 to 0.2. The meaning of equation (10.1) may be clarified by restating it in terms of domestic credit D . Assuming a constant money multiplier, we have

A log M = A log H (10.2)

A log M E

B H

-

AD +H

Substituting into equation (lO.l), we have (10.3)

B H

AD - - (a- 1)-

H

+xp+ u

Thus we see that if (Y = 1 (no sterilization), then the reaction function determines domestic credit exogenously with respect to the balance of payments. If (Y < 1, then the central bank adjusts domestic credit in whole (a = 0) or part (0 < a 0 > -m. If money growth were greater than Z6 + E so that interest rates fell and prices rose relative to foreign values, the balanceof-payments surplus would fall through movements along noninfinitely elastic net-capital and net-export flow schedules. The empirical tests in section 10.2 do not require a list of the elements in S so that we need not specify a full general equilibrium model here. ’” Solving equation (10.5’) for A log M yields

(10.9) 9. In a particularly relevant example, Genberg (1976, p. 322) argues that a sterilization policy “is implausible for several reasons. Firstly it implies an extraordinary stability of the central bank’s behaviour with respect to policy formation. Secondly it implies that the sterilization is always of a magnitude consistent with the demand for money, since with prices, interest rates and output determined by exogenous forces, the money market must be equilibrated through either reserveflows or domestic credit creation” (emphasis added). We have already seen that Genberg errs in supposing any difficulty in reconciling sterilization to lack of monetary control. But note the absolute certainty that the arguments of the money demand function are exogenously determined. 10. One particular version of equation (10.5’) or (10.9) would be the semireduced form obtained by solving for BIH and A log M in the non-reaction-function equations in a country submodel in the Mark 111International Transmission Model. Since those results have met monetary-approach skepticism, a less model-dependent approach is followed here. In chapter 11 below, Daniel Laskar specifies a smaller-scale model and obtains similar results.

299

Sterilization and Monetary Control

When equation (10.9) is combined with the reaction function (lO.l), we obtain a truly simultaneous system determining A log A4 and BIN together. The (reduced-form) solutions for the equilibrium values are (10.10)

A log M

1 xp 1 - (Ye

=-

+SX + -2 6 1-1 (Ye

(Y

(Ye

(Ye

1 (Ye u+ f1-a0 (Ye-1

€ 2

(10.11)

B 0 ---

/Yo+- 1

1 - (Ye

SX

+Z6 -1 (Ye

e u+- 0 E. +-1-010 (Ye-1 It can be readily verified that as the balance-of-payments elasticity goes to negative infinity, the solutions (10.10) and (10.11) go to the modifiedmonetary-approach solutions (10.6) and (10.7). Thus the modified monetary approach is, indeed, a special case (for 8 = - 03) of this more general model. The more general model is illustrated by figure 10.3. The vertical line of figure 10.1is replaced with a negatively sloped line relating the balance of payments to money growth, the trade factors Sh, and the demand variables 2 6 + E . The intersection of this line with the reaction function determines both the balance of payments and money supply growth. In this case, as seen in figure 10.4, a desire to increase money growth (due to increased unemployment, say) in fact does increase money growth as well as decrease the balance of payments. The relative size of the two effects of course depends on the slopes of the two equations. But unlike the modified-monetary-approach case, there will be a correlation between movements in the domestic policy goals ( X p + u ) and changes in the money supply. Note that our model deletes the concept of domestic credit entirely. One can derive the equilibrium value of the scaled change in domestic credit from equations (10.10) and ( l O . l l ) - o r (10.6) and (10.7) in the modified-monetary-approach special case-and the usual identity (10.2). Trivial manipulations yield a domestic-credit equation, but only if it is exogenously determined (a= 1) does domestic credit have causal or analytical significance. As an endogenous variable it adds nothing to the exposition. As will be discussed further in section 10.2, the negative correlation between the scaled change in domestic credit and the scaled balance of payments makes for easy confusion in empirical analysis. 10.1.4 Conditions for Monetary Control Unless the balance of payments is infinitely elastic with respect to money growth, the central bank of a nonreserve country does exercise a

300

Chapter Ten

(a)"' log M

Fig. 10.3

Simultaneous determination of balance of payments and nominal money in the more general model.

degree of monetary control. This control is not absolute (if a > 0) in the sense that the balance-of-payments effects will enter the bank's choice of money growth, but neither will these effects completely overwhelm all other influences such as domestic unemployment or inflation goals. Since lagged balances of payments may be counted among those other influences, the pegged system may be quite stable dynamically via specieflow types of adjustments, but this is a different process than envisioned by the monetary approach. This subsection examines in more detail the crucial parameter

d (BIH)

€I=

d A log M

'

301

Sterilization and Monetary Control

A log

M

Fig. 10.4

Effect of shift in domestic policy goals in the more general model.

Whether 8 is negative infinity has generally been addressed in terms of either assets or goods being perfect substitutes internationally. If assets are perfect substitutes and the derivatives of the interest rate R with respect to money growth is negative due to a liquidity effect, then overwhelming net private capital flows will force the domestic interest rate to its parity value. Similarly if goods are perfect substitutes and the derivative of the contemporaneous price level P with respect to money growth is positive, overwhelming trade flows will force the domestic price level to its parity value. Either of these cases is sufficient, but it is not necessary for either or both to hold in order to obtain 8 = --me To see this, write the scaled balance of payments as the difference between the scaled balance of trade and the scaled net private capital outflows:

302

Chapter Ten

(10.12)

B-T H H

_=_-

C H

Scaled net private capital outflows will be a function of the current covered interest differential (adjusted for expected exchange-rate changes) and other variables which may be taken as given for the current period:" (10.13)

c - =f ( R - p

-RF) ,

H

where p is the expected depreciation of the exchange rate ( p < O implies an expected appreciation), RFis the given foreign interest rate, and SO^ is negative. We can find 0 by differentiating equation (10.12):

o=

d(BIH) d A log M +f'-

(10.14)

-

d(T/H) d A log M

-'

dR d A log M

dp d(BIH) d(BIH) d A log M ' 1

O= 1 -f'-

dp

d(T/H) ( d A log M

-'

d A log M

The multiplier

states that if the expected depreciation p responds to the size of the balance of payments (as an indicator of the probability and size of a revaluation), then the direct trade and capital-flows effects will be reinforced by induced "speculative" capital flows. These induced speculative capital flows will be overwhelming unless (10.15)

dp p>0.001]

4.999 (7, 47) [0.001>p]

CA

3.312 (5, 21) [0.025>p>0.01]

1.958 (5, 22) [p>0.10]

FR

3.413 (9, 40) [0.005>p>O.001]

4.869 (9, 41)

GE

3.205 (3, 49) [0.05>p>0.025]

3.658 (3, 50) [0.025>p>0.01]

IT

2.401 (6, 47) [0.05>p>0.025]

3.082 (6, 48) [0.025>p>0.01]

JA

4.463 (6, 47) [0.005>p>0.001]

7.021 (6, 48) [0.001>p 1

NE

1.432 (8, 44) [p>0.10]

[0.001>p]

1.705 (8, 45) [p>0.10]

Note. Each F statistic is followed in parentheses by the associated degrees of freedom. Significance levels are indicated in brackets below the F statistics.

311

Sterilization and Monetary Control

Two reservations should be noted: (1) The money supply demand functions do not fit very well by U.S. standards and may be misspecified. However, since they are the standard forms in the literature and a stable, known money demand function is essential to the monetary approach, this provides little comfort to adherents of the monetary approach. (2) The variables in X might enter because they are correlated with the exogenous parity shifts o and +. This could conceivably be the case, but an examination of the list in the notes to table 10.3 provides no obvious or, to this writer, even plausible candidates. 10.3

Summary and Conclusions

Recent empirical research on sterilization had demonstrated that standard monetary-approach models which assume domestic credit exogenous are invalid. This paper presents a modified-monetary-approach model which retains the message of central bank impotence despite extensive sterilization activities. A more general model was also sketched under which the central bank’s policy objectives do influence the change in the money supply. Whether a nonreserve central bank can determine its domestic money supply in the short run was shown to depend on whether one or more of the conditions are met: goods are perfect substitutes, assets are perfect substitutes, or expected depreciation is too responsive to changes in the balance of payments. The responsiveness in this new third condition may depend on the size of the balance of payments so that central bank monetary control is feasible only within a limited range. The reduced-form tests showed strong evidence of the exercise of monetary control within the quarter for the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Only for the Netherlands could we not reject the restriction on the more general model which implies the applicability of the modified monetary approach. These results confirm in a relatively model-free manner earlier findings based on specific structural models. They therefore answer suggestions that those earlier results are due to peculiarities in the structural model. There is no reason for predetermined money supply reaction function variables to be correlated with realized money growth unless the nonreserve central bank could and did exercise a degree of monetary control. These results need not indicate any long-run monetary control; indeed, even short-run monetary control may be feasible only between the limits at which overwhelming speculative capital flows are induced. But the strong implications of the monetary approach (in standard or modified form) no longer appear tenable for use with quarterly data. Instead, more general macroeconomic models must be specified and tested to explain the simultaneous determination of nominal money and the balance of payments under pegged exchange rates.

312

Chapter Ten

Acknowledgments

Valuable comments on earlier drafts were received from Anthony Cassese, Michael Connolly, Robert Engel, Daniel Friedman, Clive Granger, Dan Lee, James Lothian, Michael Melvin, Jurg Niehans, Anna Schwartz, Alan Stockman, Dean Taylor, and Mark Watson, and in seminars at the Claremont Colleges, Emory University, the NBER-New York, University of California, San Diego, and UCLA. The calculations were performed on the TROLL system at MIT by Michael Melvin and Andrew Vogel.

References Argy, V., and P. J. K. Kouri. 1974. Sterilization policies and the volatility in international reserves. In R. Z. Aliber, ed., National monetary policies and the international financial system. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Blejer, M. I. 1979. On causality and the monetary approach to the balance of payments: The European experience. European Economic Review 12 (July): 289-96. Boyer, R. S. 1979. Sterilization and the monetary approach to balance of payments analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 5 (April): 295300. Chow, G. C. 1966. On the long-run and short-run demand for money. Journal of Political Economy 74 (April): 111-31. Connolly, M., and D. Taylor. 1979. Exchange rate changes and neutralization: A test of the monetary approach applied to developed and developing countries. Econornica 46 (August): 281-94. Darby, M. R. 1980. The monetary approach to the balance of payments: Two specious assumptions. Economic Inquiry 18 (April): 321-26. Dooley, M. P., and P. Isard. 1980. Capital controls, political risk, and deviations from interest-rate parity. Journal of Political Economy 88 (April): 370-84. Frenkel, J. A., and H. G. Johnson, eds. 1976. The monetary approach to the balance of payments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Genberg, A. H. 1976. Aspects of the monetary approach to balance-ofpayments theory: An empirical study of Sweden. In J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson, eds., The monetary approach to the balance of payments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Herring, R. J., and R. C. Marston. 1977. National monetarypolicies and international financial markets. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Johnson, H. G. 1976. The monetary approach to balance-of-payments theory. In J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson, eds., The monetary

313

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approach to the balance of payments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Laskar, D. 1980. Sterilization behavior and independence of monetary policy under a pegged-exchange-rates system: An econometric approach. Ph.D. thesis, UCLA Department of Economics. Maddala, G. S. 1977. Econometrics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Magee, S. P. 1976. The empirical evidence on the monetary approach to the balance of payments and exchange rates. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 66 (May): 163-70. Mussa, M. 1976. Tarrifs and the balance of payments: A monetary approach. In J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson, eds., The monetary approach to the balance of payments. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Niehans. J. 1974. Reserve composition as a source of independence for national monetary policies. In R. Z . Aliber, ed., National monetary policies and the international financial system. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stockman, A. C. 1979. Monetary control and sterilization under pegged exchange rates. Unpublished paper, University of Rochester, Department of Economics, August. Sweeney, R. J., and T. D. Willett. 1976. The international transmission of inflation: Mechanisms, issues, and evidence. In M. Fratianni and K. Tavernier, eds., Bank credit, money, and inflation in open economics, supplement to Kredit und Kapital, Heft 3, pp. 441-517.

11

Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy under a Pegged ExchangeRates System: An Econometric Approach Daniel M. Laskar

The extent to which a pegged exchange-rates system undermines the independence of an open economy’s monetary policy has not been satisfactorily examined. Current empirical literature on the subject presents conclusions that are often contradictory and difficult to compare. In this paper we reevaluate the relevant empirical data and reestimate the degree of independence of monetary policy within the period of a quarter. The literature presents three different views relevant to the independence of monetary policy under pegged exchange rates. The empirical literature on the monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP) emphasizes the extreme situation in which the prices of goods and securities are dictated by the international market. Then the demand for money is given exogenously, and the money stock cannot be changed. Under such circumstances, monetary policy can determine only the level of international reserves. The MABP position consequently implies that no independence of monetary policy is possible. On the other hand, literature analyzing the sterilization behavior of the central bank finds that sterilization is important, suggesting that some monetary control exists.’ Finally, the literature on capital flows argues that these flows are determined mainly by interest-rate differentials. A s Z. Hodjera (1976) noted, the estimated interest-rate elasticities are small, which indicates that some independence of monetary policy is possible, Daniel Laskar is with CEPREMAP, Paris, France An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the Journal of International Money and Finance 1 (April 1982): 57-79. 1 . The empirical study of sterilization behavior was first analyzed without any formal model by Nurske (1944) and Michaely (1971). Then reaction functions of the central banks were estimated (see Price 1978)for a survey and an empirical study of reaction functions for six main industrialized countries).

314

315

Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy

A number of authors, however, have questioned the single-equation context of these analyses. Kouri and Porter (1974) pointed out that the estimates of the interest-rate coefficient in capital-flow equations are negatively biased because of the effect, emphasized by the MABP, of capital flows on the money supply. Consequently, they estimated a “reduced-form” capital-flowsequation that showed the amount of offsetting capital flows generated by a change in domestic credit and estimated this “offset coefficient.” Their approach tries to synthesize the MABP literature and the capital-flows literature.* H. Genberg (1976), V. Argy and P. J. Kouri (1974), G. L. Murray (1978), and A. C. Stockman (1979) integrated the MABP or Kouri and Porter type of analysis with that of sterilization behavior. In their studies the reserve flow equation and the central bank reaction function are simultaneously estimated. Unfortunately, no clear picture of the independence of monetary policy emerges from this l i t e r a t ~ r eThere .~ are two main reasons why: none of the authors estimate a simultaneous-equations structural model, and all treat expectations of exchange rates unsati~factorily.~ When variables to reflect exchange-rate expectations variables are left out of the analysis, the degree of independence of monetary policy is apt to be underestimated. The cause of this problem is downward bias in the coefficient of change in domestic credit in an MABP or Kouri-Porter type of equation in the presence of sterilization. If a structural model were estimated, however, it would appear that interest-rate elasticities of capital flows are not actually as large as the biased estimates of the offset coefficient have suggested. Because the exchange-rate expectations variables are correlated with the instruments, the use of 2SLS cannot eliminate this bias. Recently, scholars have attempted to address these two difficulties. Herring and Marston (19774 estimated a structural model of the financial sector of Germany. However, they developed such an analysis only for that country. For other European countries they used an interest-rate reduced-form equation. S. W. Kohlagen (1977), using endogenous expectations, estimated a Kouri and Porter type of capital-flow equation, also only for Germany. M. R. Darby (1980) made two separate contributions which were based on studies of seven main industrial countries. First, on a theoretical level, he emphasized the possible loss of monetary control which could occur because of some effect on exchange-rate expectations. In particular, he showed that outside some range, monetary policy can cause overwhelming capital flows. Second, he derived a 2. Other empirical studies using the same approach are Porter (1972), Kouri (1975), and Neumann (1978). 3. A detailed critical review may be found in Laskar (1981). 4. Usually authors introduce dummy variables for “speculative episodes”; Argy and Kouri (1974) take a purchasing power parity equation.

316

Chapter Eleven

money stock equation typical of those that can be obtained from a general structural model. Using such an equation, he showed that monetary objectives do have an effect on the money stock, and hence he rejected the strict MABP hypothesis that monetary policy has no independence. This chapter will attempt to resolve some of these issues with respect to the short-run independence of monetary policy under pegged exchange rates. To do so, we will first specify an appropriate structural model, which we will then estimate for seven industrial countries during the period of pegged exchange rates. This model will then be used to analyze the (partial) loss of monetary control due to the substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, when exchange-rate expectations are taken as given. We will then evaluate how the imperfection of knowledge about exchange-rates expectations affects the issues we have posed, consequently examining how sensitive our results may be to different treatments of exchange-rate expectations. The model will be estimated both with and without exchange-rate expectations variables. Then, since the measurements of exchange-rate expectations we use are likely to be faulty, we will try to determine how much their inaccuracy affects the correctness of our results. Because estimates about the independence of monetary policy may be biased differently depending on whether we use the structural equations estimates, the Kouri and Porter type of equations estimates,s or the reducedform money stock estimate, we will estimate all three types of equations. Finally, because estimates of sterilization behavior may be sensitive to the specification of the money supply reaction function, we will consider alternative specifications. Section 11.1 will present the model, derive three alternative estimates of independence of monetary policy, and analyze biases in these estimates when speculative variables are left out. Each of the two subsequent sections will consider one side of the issue: section 11.2 studies offsetting capital flows, and section 11.3 analyzes sterilization behavior of the central bank. Finally, section 11.4 synthesizes and presents new conclusions about the independence of monetary policy. 11.1 Presentation of the Model and Alternative Estimates of Independence of Monetary Policy

Independence of monetary policy will be taken as the possibility of the central bank’s objective to affect the money supply in the short run. In this section we present our model, more precisely define and interpret what we mean by independence of monetary policy, and give three ways 5. Hodjera (1976) pointed out that, if we use OLS, the simultaneous equation biases of estimates are likely to be in opposite directions in these two kinds of equations. He also tried to compare the two approaches to capital flows but did not obtain very significant results.

317

Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy

of estimating the coefficient which is an indicator of such an independence. For that, first we will present the basic structural model. The estimation of such a model will give a first estimate of our coefficient. In the next subsections we will derive two other equations. One is a semireducedform capital-flows equation like that used in the Kouri and Porter approach. The other one is the money stock reduced form of our model. The purpose is twofold. First, we will make explicit the reasons why monetary policy may not be fully realized in an open economy. Second, we will thus obtain two other alternative estimates of our coefficient. An interesting feature of the three estimates we obtain comes from the fact that they are differently biased when exchange-rate expectation variables are left out. Therefore the last subsection analyzes these biases.

11.1.1 Basic Model The model we are presenting contains three structural equations: a money demand equation, a capital-flows equation, and a money supply reaction function of the central bank. The money demand equation is the first difference of the short-run money demand function introduced by Chow (1966):

(11.1)

= a.

+ alAr + a2A log y

In this equation, r is the interest rate, y is real income, M is the money stock, P is the price level, and el is the residual. Capital flows are created by the portfolio choices of residents and foreigners who consider domestic and foreign bonds as imperfect substitutes. The composition of their portfolios depends on domestic and foreign interest rates, real income, and the expected exchange-rate change. The portfolio adjustment is supposed to be completely realized within the period. Capital flows are then a function of the variation of these variables. The capital-flows variable is scaled by high-powered money,6 and the equation is

(11.2)

-CF H- 1

- bo

+ blAr + brAr* + b2A log y + b,*Alogy*

+ b3A(log E - log E") + e 2 .

6 . This may not be the best deflatorif the portfolio choice model of a stock of assets B for residents is B / W = f ( r , r * , y ) , where W is wealth. Some (foreign or domestic) wealth variable may have been better. But apart from the fact that these variables are difficult to introduce, the error made is probably comparatively small, because the main observed variations of CFIH- are due to variations in CF and not to variationsin H- Furthermore, as the coefficient of r - , is let free in the estimation, the error may be partially corrected if the ratio of high-powered money to wealth is explained by the interest rate.

318

Chapter Eleven

CF are capital inflows, H i s high-powered money, E is the exchange rate (value of one dollar in terms of domestic currency), r* is the world interest rate, y* is foreign real income, and E" is the expected exchange rate of next period. In this equation the coefficients b l , (-bf) and b3 might be seen as equal. However, due to some lack of homogeneity in the quality of data,7 these coefficients will not be constrained. Estimates of the coefficients may also be biased differently under some specification error, such as when a speculative variable is excluded. Furthermore, in order to account for any flow effect we are eliminating constraints on the coefficientsof r, r*, and log E - log E 'which would require that they be equal to the opposite of the coefficients of the lagged variables. The equation can thus be rewritten as (11.3)

+ b2A log y + b,*A log y * + b3(log E - log E') +&(log E - log E")-] + e,. The specification for the money supply reaction function is close' to that used by Darby and Stockman in the Mark I11Model of chapters 5 and 6. According to this specification, the money supply responds to domestic variables such as past rates of inflation, past rates of unemployment or past values of transitory real income, depending on the country, and current and past real-government-spending shocks. It also responds to balance-of-payments variables such as the current balance of payments scaled by high-powered money BPIH- 1, the level of reserves over highpowered money of the last period (RIH)- 1 , and past changes in the balance of payments also scaled by high-powered money (BPIH- l ) - i , i = 1, . . . ,k. Because we introduce the level of reserves (RIH)- we allow all the past values of the balance-of-payments variables to have an effect on the money supply. However, as the past changes of these variables (BP/H-l)-i also enter the equation, the effect of the more recent values is allowed to be different. When past values of variables

,,

7. All rates of interest are short-term rates except the rate of Italy, which is a long-term rate. For five among the six countries, the short-term interest rates used are three-month treasury bill or money market rates. The rate of Japan is a bank-loan rate which is higher and has a much lower variance than the others. 8. IfBIW =f(r,r*,y), thendB =f(r,r*,y)dW Wdf(r,r*,y). Thefirsttermgivesrise to the flow effect while the second corresponds to the stock effect which was previously discussed. Also, because we are mainly interested in the estimation of the coefficients of interest rates and of log E - log E', and because the effect ofy and y* is probably small, the flow effect due toy and y* is neglected in the analysis. That is the reason why only A logy and A logy* enter equation (11.3). 9. The main difference between the two specifications lies in the introduction, here, of the variable ( R / H ) - , , where R is the level of reserves. Thus we may account for the balance-of-payments effects for more than four quarters. Also, the deflator of the balance of payments is different: H- is used instead of nominal income. Finally, for some countries (Germany and the Netherlands), unemployment rates are used instead of real income.

+

319

Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy

enter our analysis, four lags have been taken. To reduce the number of explanatory variables, the lagged values, except for the unemployment rate or real income, have been aggregated two by two: ( x - ~+ xP2) and ( x - ~+xP4). A time trend has also been introduced.’” The resulting equation is (11.4)

+ C3LBP3 + C4t + Csg + C,jLgl+ C7Lg3 + C*LPl+ C,LP3 + c,,u-, + c,,u-, + C12u-3 + C,,u-, + e3,

whereLBP1 = (BP/H_l)-l + (BP/H-1)_2andLBP3 = LBP1L2. Lgl, Lg3, LP1, LP3 are defined in the same way and correspond to government spending shocks g and rates of inflation. As in the Mark 111,u is the unemployment rate, though logy‘ or transitory income is substituted for u in the cases of Italy, Japan, and Canada. The equation can also be written more completely: (11.4’)

A log M = k

E + G3+e3. H- 1

In order to introduce the domestic component of the money supply in the model and define the sterilization coefficient, we consider the following two identities: (11.5)

AD + BP=AH,

(11.6)

AlogH+Alogp,=AlogM.

The first identity comes from the central bank balance sheet; D is “domestic credit.” The second identity defines the money multiplier p. Then we define the variable DDM in the following way: (11.7)

D D M = z H- 1

+ A log p.

With this definition of DDM, the previous identities imply that (11.8)

BP DDM + - A log M . H- 1

DDM is the domestic component of the money supply growth rate. We are presuming that the monetary authorities can control DDM. In an open economy, however, they may not have a similar control of A log M because they create money when they intervene in the foreign exchange market, in order to peg the exchange rate. Using (11.8), the money supply reaction function (11.4’) can also be written as 10. In the equation of France, the lagged dependent variable is also introduced.

320

Chapter Eleven

DDM= - ( 1 - k ) z + G 3 + e 3 H- 1 The sterilization coefficient (c) is the coefficient of BPIH- in this equation. Therefore we have (11.9)

(11.10)

c = - (1 - k ) .

If 0 Ik 5 1,then - 1 Ic I0. A strictly negative value for c indicates that the central bank has tried to get more control on the money supply by sterilizing reserve flows, If sterilization is complete (c = - l ) ,full control of the money supply is realized. The model is completed by adding the identity (11.11)

CF+BT=BP,

where BT is the balance of trade. The system of five equations given by the three equations of the model (11.1,11.3,11.4) and the two identities (11.8) and (11.11) determine the five unknowns (A log M , r, CFIHP1, BPIHPl, DDM). This means that in our model contemporaneous variables BT/HP1, A log y , A log p , and (log E - log E") are regarded as givens. As we explained in the introduction, we are focusing on the pure substitutability of domestic and foreign assets effects and are not considering, for example, the channel which goes through exchange-rate expectations. However, in the estimation procedure of the model, the four contemporaneous variables (BTIH- 1, A logy, A logp, and (log E log E')) will be considered as endogenous. Therefore some exogenous variables used to explain these variables more fully are added to the set of instruments. These instruments are explained in more detail in appendix 1. The three equations ( l l . l ) , (11.3), and (11.4) can be written more compactly: (11.1')

A log

(11.3')

-CF -

(3

- = al r

-

+ u2A log y + G1 + e l ,

b l r + b2A log y

+ &(log

E - log E')

+ G2+ e 2 ,

H- 1 BP A log M = k + G3 + e 3 . H- 1 All the variables contained in G1, G2, and G3 are exogenous in the estimation. As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, independence of monetary policy is taken as the possibility of the central bank's objective to affect the money supply in the short run. In our model an indicator of this independence is given by the coefficient, say A , of the objective G3 in the money stock reduced-form equation. Such an equation and the exact (11.4')

321

Short-Run Independence of Monetary Policy

meaning of coefficient A are presented in detail in subsection 11.1.3 below. For the moment we can just note that coefficient A is a function of the three structural parameters a,, b l , and k (or c). From (11.16) below, it is equal to - a l / ( b l k a l ) . Therefor: i + Z ( L t ) +X(efp;c/pr,Y,r738 C,>O, C,>O, Z I > O , x,>o,X,o,

7. The assumption that the government increases the money stock at a constant rate by printing and transfer payments in the steady-state is crucial here. If it were assumed that the money supply is increased by continuous open market purchases and foreign exchange market purchases, we might not get this asymptotic long-run neutrality, depending on the specific assumptions about the situation. 8. Some readers might wonder about the absence of any variable that is associated with the inflationary finance in the steady state, because it was assumed that the government increases the money supply at a constant rate in the steady state by printing and transfer payments. However, this absence can be justified in the following way. The disposable income can be expressed as

where T is the transfer payments financed by printing money, ignoring taxes and government spending, and g, the growth rate of nominal money. This should be equal to the expenditure, i.e. yp'"

=

c,+ I, -t 5! A&,

I

AM:' +,

P, where the last three terms represent additions to each asset holding. We know that in the steady-state equilibrium, PI

360

where

Chapter Twelve

C = real consumption, I = real investment, X = value of net exports in domestic output = exports - imports, P, = expected price level in time t as expected in time t-1,

y f = aggregate demand for real output,

y,"= aggregate supply of real output, j j f = planned output for time t with price expectation of Pt

which is assumed to be equal to F!, the long-run steady-state output level, PT= foreign price level = price of imports in foreign currency units, FT= foreign steady-state level of real income at time t , Et = steady-state level of real wealth that would otherwise have prevailed at time t , e, = exchange rate. Consumption is a function of the deviation of the real wealth from its steady-state path and the real income which grows at the rate gl. It is assumed that C i s unit-elastic with respect to the permanent income in the steady state, so that C grows at the same rate as real income in the steady state. It is essential in building a macroeconomic model to have a nontrivial investment function. The investment part of equation (12.6) is derived as follows. Recall that the economy produces a single type of output which can be used for either consumption or investment. Also, assume that capital does not depreciate. Let us distinguish investment from capital formation. The former can be regarded as the input requirement for the latter in terms of consumption goods. Assume that the marginal cost of capital formation above the steady-state level g,K, is an increasing function of the input requirement, i.e. 1 -g,M:=

1 -AM:, p, i.e. government cannot force the private sector to hold a real balance larger than desired, and pr

Therefore, by equating the income with the expenditure, we get Yt

=

c, + 11 + x,

which is equation (12.6).

1

361

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

~ - g l z , = k ( Z , - ~ ) , k'>O, k < O , k ' ( O ) = l , At where 7 is the steady-state level of investment. Profit maximization implies that the marginal cost of capital formation k' is equal to the price of capital in terms of consumption of goods P,. Then the level of capital formation over and above the steady-state level becomes a function of P,, and

= h(P,),

h'>O, h ( 1 ) = 0;

i.e. investment over and above the steady-state level is a positive function of the price of capital in terms of consumption goods. Recall that the steady-state price of capital in terms of consumption goods was assumed to be equal to unity. This implies a horizontal longrun stock supply curve in a (P,, K ) diagram. In this diagram, the steadystate growth of capital stock would be represented by continuous outward shifts of the stock demand curve for the capital stock. Now, because only the private sector invests, the resulting investment function would actually look like

(12.9) where El is the long-run steady-state growth rate of private capital stock and KPlthe steady-state level of private capital stock at time t. Investment is a positive function of the deviation of Pk from unity plus the long-run growth of the capital stock. And it can be readily seen from equation (12.9) that I grows at the same rate as capital stock g,. This investment function specifies investment as an adjustment to the stock disequilibrium. Net exports are a function of the terms of trade and real income. Income elasticities of net exports with respect to domestic and foreign incomes are assumed to be identical. However, there is a specific role for net exports to play in the model. Because foreigners are not assumed to hold domestic money and vice versa, the only way to alter domestic holdings of foreign bonds is to accumulate current account balances over time. The current account balance in terms of domestic output is

(12.10) + i*(&-1+

Fg,,-d(et~PJ;

i.e. it is the sum of the trade account balance (net exports) and service account balance.

362

Chapter Twelve

If we assume that the domestic steady-state real interest rate is equal to that of the rest of the world, i.e. 7 = 7* = gl, and that the government lets its foreign bond holdings increase by the interest income and any capital gains,' it can be shown that, in the steady state, the service account surplus is just enough to meet the steady-state growth requirement of demand for foreign assets, i.e.?'*F(ZlP) = A(eF/P)d, and thereforex, the steady-state level of net exports, is equal to O . ' O These assumptions and the resulting implications for X not only simplify the model but also are intuitively plausible. Therefore we adopt this assumption here. The sufficient condition for X to be on its steady-state path, i.e. 0 in equation (12.6), is that the purchasing power ratio is equal to the steadystate value (purchasing power parity), which is a constant, and that the domestic and foreign real incomes are on their steady-state paths. Equation (12.7) is an aggregate supply function in the spirit of Lucastype rational expectations." According to this type of aggregate supply function, the supply reacts (deviates from its steady-state path in this model) to price changes only if the changes are unexpected. This specification seems to be superior to the usual specification in MA that assumes real output is constant at the full-employment level or that in which output is strictly demand-determined as in Dornbusch (19764, simply because it seems to be a more accurate description of the real world.

x=

12.2.4 Expectations In this model, we have two expectations, one for the forward exchange rate and the other for the expected rate of inflation.

?r;=

E ( P , + , ) - pt.

9. The question is what the government does with the interest income from asset holdings. If the government spends its foreign interest income on foreign goods, the steady-state trade balance will be a negative constant in real terms, which will not change the substance of the model; we can simply replace the zero with a constant for the steady-state trade account balance. 10. By definition, i* = r* + Ee*. The steady-state growth rate of the domestic value of foreign assets in terms of domestic output is equal to g,, which is equal to F in the Golden Rule situation; i.e.

denotes the percentage growth rate. From this we beca-useZ = ?i - E * , where an overdot get Fg = T + ;ii*= T* + ** = I'* . Assuming that the government lets its foreign asset holdings grow by the interest payments, i.e. =?,and substituting these into (12.10), we get X=O. 11. See R. E. Lucas (1973) for an explanation of this type of supply function. 12. Forward premium is actually the expected rate of depreciation plus risk premium. However, following Stockman (1978), the risk premium is assumed to be a constant and is ignored here. This contrasts with Dooly and Isard (1979), where the risk premium is crucial in the determination of asset composition between domestic and foreign assets.

363

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

This is different from existing models, which usually have expectation mechanisms for only forward exchange rates (e.g. Dornbusch 1976a, b). But as discussed previously, when the adjustment period is sufficiently long, as some empirical studies show, IT' is likely to be revised temporarily during the period of adjustment. l3 An adaptive expectations mechanism is adopted here which has been widely used in open macroeconomic models by Dornbusch and others. The forward premium is given by (12.11)

E, =

-0

(e, - e,) + 7Fe - +'* -

.

et where overbars denote steady-state values of variables and the asterisk denotes foreign variables. According to this type of specification, the private sector knows what the new long-run steady-state paths will be as soon as a government action takes place. The private sector revises its expectations according to the discrepancy between the actual and the new steady-state value which would have prevailed otherwise at the time, on the presumption that the value will eventually return to its steady-state path but not immediately. It is usually assumed that the revision is a constant fraction of the discrepancy between the actual and the steadystate value, and therefore the resulting expectation is not necessarily correct. Equation (12.11) is similar to the equation used in Dornbusch (1976b). It is a version modified for use in the present model in which domestic and foreign price levels continue to rise instead of being stagnant as in Dornbusch. In the steady state, the real demand for money grows at the rate g l , and Tr:=g, - g [ , where gM is the steady-state growth rate of nominal money supply. And the same is true for the rest of the world. Because PPP holds in the long run in this model, the exchange rate depreciates at the constant rate of 5"- Tr'* in the steady state. The adaptive expectations mechanism like equation (12.11) gives the well-publicized result of overshooting (e.g. Dornbusch 1976~1,b). When the forward premium must change in response to asset market disturbances, (12.11) implies a change in the exchange rate that is larger than the shifts in the long-run steady-state exchange-rate path. By extending the same expectations mechanism as in equation (12.11) to expectations about future inflations, the expected rate of inflation between this period and the next would be (12.12) 13. See, for example, Barro (1978). 14. The apparent inconsistency between equation (11.12), in which the current price level seems to be known to everybody, and equation (11.7), in which producers do not seem to observe it, can be resolved by assuming a discrepancy in the information available to

364

Chapter Twelve

where p, is the steady-state price level that would have prevailed otherwise according to the new steady-state time path of P. 12.2.5 Summary of the Model We have nine basic equations in the model. (12.1)

(MIP):' = m(rr,nf,P+ ~ ~ , y ~ w , ) w ~ m,< 0,m2< 0,m3< 0,m4> 0 ,

(12.3) (12.4) (12.6)

(12.11)

E,

=

-

0 e,

+

= (e, - 2,) E'

-

?*,

(12.12) Note that one of equations (12.1), (12.2), and (12.3) islinearly dependent on the other two, and we really have eight independent equations. We can eliminate E, and .rrf by using expectations (12.11) and (12.12). And because of equation (12.8), in the end we only have one independent equation in the real sector. We end up with four independent equations producers and that available to the participants in the financial market. In this paper, producers are assumed to have expectations only about the current price level, based on the past values of the prices of their output and other relevant variables. Any price higher than this expectation is interpreted as a genuine increase in the relative price and the production is increased. However, the people in the financial market, who determine the nominal interest rate, are assumed to have a better information set, which includes the current price level as well as those pieces of information available to producers.

365

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

and four unknowns-r, unknowns.Is

P, y , and e-which

we can solve for the

12.2.6 Steady-State Properties In the steady state, every asset grows at a constant rate; i.e.

Kp = (M/P)

=

(eF,/P)

=

w

=

gl,

where the overdot denotes the growth rate of a variable. Also, real output and its components grow at the same rate; i.e. . -. -. L=C=I=g,. The steady-state rate of inflation is determined by the relative growth of money supply and real money demand, which is identical to the expected rate of inflation; i.e.

The long-run PPP is assumed to hold, which is consistent with the steady-state specification of X ;i.e. (eP*/P) = a ,

X

= X(a,L,Y*) = 0

,

where the overbar denotes a long-run steady-state PPP ratio, and L and levels of domestic and foreign real income. Therefore the steady-state level of the forward premium, ignoring the risk premium, is equal to the difference between the domestic and foreign steady-state rate of inflation; i.e.

y* are the steady-state

E = *-.Ti*,

c&

where %* = - 81; (& is the fixed growth rate of foreign money stock, and gT is the natural growth rate of foreign labor). 12.3 Effects of O M 0 and FXO In this section, using a diagram and without using mathematics, a simple analysis of OMOs and FXOs is conducted.I6 In discussing dynamics, it will be assumed that the dynamics are stable. 15. Using appropriate functional forms, the model can be solved for the levels of the four endogenous variables-r, P, y , and e . There could be problems in doing this, but it can be done by assuming linear asset demand functions and a linear aggregate demand function. However, the level solutions are not important in the present context, because we are interested mainly in the short-run dynamics. For present purposes, it is sufficient to know that there exists a set of level solutions for the steady state. See Henderson (1979) for the level solutions using linear functions. 16. For mathematical analysis of the short-run dynamics, see Lee (1980). It is omitted here because of its length. This section is a nonmathematical summary of the analysis.

366

Chapter Twelve

12.3.1 Definitions of OMOs and FXOs An O M 0 is defined as a once-and-for-all exchange of domestic money for domestic bonds between the government and the private sector. This implies a permanent parallel shift in the time path of In M ,because the government is assumed to continue increasing the money supply at a constant rate after the one time level shock in money stock by an OMO. The analysis of OMOs will be concentrated on open market purchases, because the results for open market sales can be obtained simply by reversing the signs. An FXO is similarly defined as a once-and-for-all exchange of domestic money for foreign assets between the government and the private sector.” It implies a permanent parallel shift in the time path of In M and a temporary deviation of Fp from its steady-state path. Here also, the analysis of an FXO is concentrated on the foreign exchange market purchase, because the results for foreign exchange market sales can be obtained simply by reversing the signs. In terms of notations, an O M 0 is represented by AB,= - A B , = A M and an FXO by (e + Ae)AF,

= - (e

+ Ae)AF, = A M .

12.3.2 Long-Run Effects Long-run effects of an O M 0 are easy to see given the asymptotic long-run neutrality discussed previously. The condition for the long-run steady-state equilibrium is that all the real variables MIP, Pk K p ,eFpIP, y , C , and Z grow at the constant rate gf.After an OMO, which is a permanent level shock in M , proportional shifts in the time paths of the endogenous nominal variables p and e are consistent with all the real variables on their original steady-state paths, given the asymptotic longrun neutrality. The long-run effects of an FXO are identical to the above results for an OMO, except that the neutrality is an exact, not an asymptotic one. Therefore we have a typical MA result here for the long-run effects. As in an MA model, regardless of the asset on which the government operates to increase the money supply, the results are identical in the long run. That is, money is neutral regardless of the method of changing it in the long run. 17. This specification of FXO may seem too restrictive because there can be other types of FXO, such as exchange of domestic money for foreign monies, etc. However, in this model it is the only type of FXO that is allowed because foreign bonds are the only type of foreign assets held by the private sector. This seems to be the most representative case of FXO .

367

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

i*+E

Fig. 12.1

12.3.3 Open Market Operation Given the historic level of wealth, and assuming that demands for domestic and foreign assets are more elastic with respect to their own returns, and that the partial derivatives for r and r eare identical, the whole asset market (equations (12.1), (12.2), (12.3)) can be represented in a single diagram as in figure 12.1.'*Each curve represents the combination of i (= r + r e )and i* + E that will hold the shares of assets, money (m), domestic assets (b), and foreign assets (f) at constant levels. Curve m is negatively sloped because when i rises, it must be compensated for by lower values of i* E to keep m from declining. Both 6 and f are positively sloped because when i rises, it must be compensated for by an increase in i* + E to keep b andf from increasing and decreasing, respectively. Curvef is steeper than curve b, because it is assumed that an asset demand is more elastic with respect to its own returns than to returns from other assets. Also, it is clear that one of the three is redundant; i.e. we need only two curves to get equilibrium values of i and E. And because i* is assumed to be fixed, it is E that adjusts when i* + E must adjust. An open market purchase of domestic assets with money shifts b and m downward to bl and mlin figure 12.1 because it implies a reduction in b

+

18. A diagram similar to this was first used by Girtdn and Henderson (1977).

368

Chapter Twelve

and an increase in m , i.e. an excess supply of money and an excess demand for domestic assets at old levels of i and E. As shown in figure 12.1, this will unambiguously reduce i, but it is ambiguous whether E will increase or decrease, because excess supply of domestic bonds implies upward pressure on E while excess demand for money implies the opposite. However, if we assume that f stays constant, b, and ml must intersect on the f curve and therefore E must fall unambiguously. With adaptive expectations like (12. ll),a decline in E means more than a proportionate increase in e, because the new long-run rate has increased in proportion to the increase in the money stock. This is the well-publicized result of overshooting. Usually in portfolio balance literature (e.g. Girton and Henderson 1977), the analysis ends here, making it an impact analysis. Obviously there is more to it than this impact analysis, especially when we consider the relation with the real sector. First, there is an effect of the change in eon asset demands because of a higher exchange rate (e) implies a higher value of a given stock of foreign assets, which in turn implies a higher wealth level, triggering a wealth effect on asset demands. This revaluation effects raises f, creating an excess supply situation and shifting the f curve downward to fi in figure 12.1. However, the increase in wealth in this case involves an actual decrease in m and b , becausef increases through revaluation, implying a strengthening of the excess demand for domestic assets and a reduction in excess supply of money. The reduction in the transactions demand term ylw that results from the revaluation effect would further strengthen the excess demand for domestic assets and the excess supply of money. Therefore the net effect of this wealth increase on the excess supply of money is not certain. In figure 12.1, this wealth effect on money and domestic assets is shown by the movement of the m curve from ml to m2 (assuming that the effect through the transactions term is relatively small), and that of the b curve from bl to b2.It might seem possible that E could even increase if the downward shift of the f curve were large enough, but it is impossible because it was the reduction in E that caused e to increase and the f curve to shift downward in the first place. The net result of this revaluation effect is that it dampens the effect of an O M 0 on E and e, but never reverses the sign.19 Second, there are interactions with the real sector: i) An increase in wealth will increase consumption directly through a conventional wealth effect. ii) A decrease in the real interest rate, which means higher Pk( = p / r ) , increases investment. 19. This revaluation effect hinges upon the relative increase in e and p . The above analysis depends on the implicit assumptionthat the price level does not change. When the price level is allowed to change, it is possible that the value of foreign asset holdings (eFIP) might even fall if the percentage increase in P is larger than that in e.

369

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

iii) A depreciated exchange rate, given a constant price level, implies an improvement in the trade balance, i.e. an increase in X, through a change in the terms of trade. iv) Now-(i), (ii), and (iii) above imply higher demand for real output, as can be seen from equation (12.6). This in turn implies a higher price level, as can be seen from equations (12.6) and (12.7). v) These increases in output and the price level affect asset demands, and a new chain of reactions described in (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) follows. Increases in the price level and output reduce the original excess supply of money by reducing the real increase in the money supply through increase in P, and by increasing the transactions demand through the increase in real income. They reduce the original excess demand for domestic assets through the increase in the transactions demand for money, which implies a reduction in demand for domestic assets. As for foreign assets, the net effect is not clear because a price increase tends to reduce the value of foreign asset holdings in terms oi domestic consumption while the increase in the transactions demand for money tends to reduce the demand for foreign assets. In terms of figure 12.1, all these imply a further reduction in the impact effects of an O M 0 on E (and therefore on e) and i, by upward shifts of b and m curves to b3 and m3, assuming that the f curve does not shift. If the income effect is large enough, i.e. if the shift of the rn curve is large enough, it is possible that an open market purchase will cause appreciation as Henderson conjectured. These real sector reactions will be further strengthened because the increase in the price level will raise T', reducing r for a given decline in i and therefore increasing investment and aggregate demand further, as can be seen from equation (12.12). This would be true even if a more general form of rational expectations mechanism were assumed instead of the adaptive expectations. Over time, the whole system moves toward the new long-run equilibrium steady state, as shown in figure 12.2. First, the price level continues to approach the new long-run path after the initial level shock in the nominal stock of money is gone and the money supply resumes its normal growth rate As long as there remain deviations in asset holdings from their steady-state paths, there will be residual effects on aggregate demand through r and E (and therefore through Z and X)that are lower than the long-run steady-state levels. It is even possible for the real output and price level to overshoot their new long-run paths in approaching them, as depicted in figures 12.2b and 12.2f.21Eventually, 20. At the time of OMO, M = g + k , where k represents the once-and-for-all level shock. 21. This is because when price level and real output approach their new long-run paths for the first time after a shock, depending on the speed of investment the capital stock may still be below its long-run path and require more investment, therefore requiring a level of consumption lower than, and a level of net exports higher than, the respective steady-state levels.

370

Chapter Twelve

O

FIGURE 12-2a

p O

'Irne

In

FIGURE 12-2e

time

In

v

I

0

FIGURE 12-2b

__ _____

time

FIGURE 12 2f

rime

- e:

I I

I

FIGURE 12-2c

0

time

FIGURE 1229

time

time

FIGURE 12-2d

Fig. 12.2

Dynamic effects of an OMP.

however, when asset markets return to the long-run steady state, r (approximately) and E will return to the original long-run steady-state values. The time paths of d' corresponding to those of the price level are shown in figure 1 2 . 2 ~ Given . any rational or adaptive expectations mechanism such as equation (12.12), there will be a temporary deviation of T' from its long-run steady-state level, which is given by the steady-

371

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

state growth rate of the nominal money supply EM minus the steady-state growth rate of the real demand for money gl. As long as there is a deviation from the long-run steady-state path in domestic asset holdings and therefore Pk f 1, there will be a flow adjustment in the form of investment. Given the asymptotic long-run neutrality with respect to O M 0 discussed in the previous section, the real interest rate r will approach its old long-run level over time, as K p approaches its long-run steady-state level. This is depicted in figure 12.2d. And given an investment function such as equation (12.9), investment will gradually decrease over time until it reaches the steady-state level, as depicted in figure 12.2e. Under the simplifying assumption that the partial derivatives of r and r ein asset demand equations are identical, the nominal interest rate must fall after an open market purchase. Given that the real interest rate approaches its long-run level monotonically and r efollows the time path shown in figure 12.2c, paths u and b in figure 12.2d are possible for the nominal interest rate. However, if we drop the assumption that the partial derivatives with respect to r and -rre are identical, the nominal interest rate will not necessarily decline after an open market purchase. It is possible that the increase in -rre will be large enough to offset the decline in r , such that i will increase after an open market purchase as depicted by path c in figure 12.2d. The time path of K p implied by the above analysis is shown in figure 1 2 . 2 ~The . actual domestic asset holdings of the private sector approach the long-run steady-state path over time. As discussed earlier, the effect of O M 0 on r will eventually be washed out (in the sense that r approaches its long-run level asymptotically), because the one-time increase in K ( = Kp + K g ) diminishes as a proportion of the total K , as K grows over time. The effects of an open market purchase on the foreign asset market are not clear-cut. However, it is obvious that when the long-run PPP holds and elP is restored to its original level in the long run, 4 must be restored to its long-run path. In other words, if the current account turns to surplus first, increasing F p for a while, it must be followed by a period of deficit or lower-than-normal surplus to restore F p to its long-run path. And the opposite is true if F p first decreases. Given the net export function implicit in equation (12.6), (12.13)

X = X(eP*/P,y),

it is ambiguous whether X would increase or decrease after an open market purchase. Given the initial overshooting of e and the undershooting of P, the terms of trade (eP*IP)should initially increase and would be

372

Chapter Twelve

followed by a monotonic decrease as they approach the long-run path, implying a continuous but declining pressure toward trade surplus. However, there is an offsetting pressure from the increase in y , making the net effect on the trade account ambiguous. The time path of Xmight be one with an initial increase and a subsequent monotonic decrease followed by a period of negative X, keeping the foreign bond holdings on the long-run path in the long run.22 Given the dynamic time paths of I , C , and X as discussed above, the real income y would follow the time path shown in figure 12.2f. 12.3.4 Foreign Exchange Market Operation Using the same diagram as in figure 12.1, we can analyze the effect of a FXO in asset markets. Consider a foreign exchange market purchase, in which the central bank purchases foreign assets with domestic money. This means an excess demand for foreign assets at the old levels of r and E, shifting thef curve upward tofi, and an excess supply of money, shifting m downward to ml in figure 12.3. These lower E unambiguously and probably i too, assuming b stays constant. Note that in this case the effect on i is smaller and that on E is larger than in the case of an O M 0 of the same size. Now a chain reaction similar to the case of O M 0 follows, but with different relative magnitudes for different variables. First, a decline in E would imply an increase in e (an overshooting given the adaptive expectation in equation (12.11)). This increases the value of the remaining foreign asset holdings of the private sector and causes a revaluation effect. In the present context, this means downward shifts o f f and b curves tof2 and b2 in figure 12.3 and an upward shift of them curve to m2, which results in dampening the original impact effect on E. Again, this revaluation effect hinges on the relative strength of rises in E and P. In the real sector, the increase in Pk, due to lower r and higher e , tends to increase investment and net exports, resulting in a higher aggregate demand for the real output. Now the price level and output increase. Whether the increase in output and the price level caused by a foreign exchange market purchase is larger or smaller than that caused by an open market purchase of the same size depends partly on the relative strengths of the effects of Pk and e on investment and net exports, because a FXO works mainly through its effect on e and an O M 0 through its effect on Pk. It might seem that the effect of a FXO on the real sector is smaller than that of an O M 0 of the same magnitude because there is an offsetting pressure on X resulting from the increase in y . However, it is 22. Sometimes it is argued that an increase in the money supply would deteriorate the trade balance because of the resulting increase in real income which raises import demands. In the present context, this means that the income effect dominates the substitution effect, i.e. improvement in the terms of trade.

373

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

Fig. 12.3

still possible that the terms of trade effect dominates the income effect so that a FXO is more effective than an O M 0 in influencing the real sector. Also important is the relative speed of the reactions to OMOs and FXOs in this regard. These are basically empirical questions because there is no a priori reason to believe one or the other. Whatever the sizes of the initial increases in output and the price level are, they will reduce the excess supply of money through a reduction in the real money supply and through increases in the transactions demand for money, and probably create an excess supply of domestic bonds by the negative transactions demand. The latter makes it possible for i to even increase, because this means an upward shift of the b curve, contrary to what is generally believed. However, even in this case, Y is likely to decline because IT^ would be adjusted upward. When r does increase, we must assume that the increase in X dominates the resulting decline in investment in order to have an increase in real output and price level in the first place. In that case, it is less likely that a FXO is more effective than an O M 0 in influencing the real sector. The effect of increases in output and price level on the foreign asset market is ambiguous because the former reduces the demand for foreign assets by increasing the transactions demand for money and the latter reduces the value of foreign asset holdings in terms of domestic output.

374

Chapter Twelve

Over time, all the variables would adjust in a way that is similar to the case of an O M 0 in general, except that this time the main disturbance is in the foreign asset market and in e rather than in the domestic asset market and in Pk.Although it is ambiguous whether the effect on output and the price level is larger or smaller than the case of an O M 0 of the same magnitude, the long-run effect must be the same; i.e. they must be on the same long-run path eventually. Now, let us investigate the implied time paths of individual components of the aggregate demand. As for the trade balance, a larger drop in E implies a larger increase in e than the case of an O M 0 of the same size. Again, given the overshooting e and undershooting P, the temporary change in the terms of trade in favor of the domestic country is guaranteed, as shown in figure 12.4e. If the negative effect of an increase in y on X i s sufficiently strong, it is possible that the net effect on X by a foreign exchange market purchase will be negative, making the dynamics unstable, because y could still increase through increases in C and I. However, this is unlikely, because the wealth effect on C , through the revaluation effect, and the fall in r are likely to be relatively small ( r could even rise). It is also possible to have something like the well-publicized J curve, in a different context. If, due to rigid contracts, it takes a considerable length of time to change the effective terms of trade, it is possible for X to be negative for a while after a foreign exchange market purchase, dominated by the income effect until the effect of the change in the terms of trade materializes. In the normal case in which the effect of a change in the terms of trade outweighs that of an increase in real income, the time paths of X and 4 are as shown in figures 12.4f and 1 2 . 4 ~ . As for the I and K,,, because the reduction in the real interest rate would be small and could even be positive when the increase in the transactions demand for money is strong enough, the effects on I and Kp are likely to be negligible. In any case, r could take one of the time paths depicted in figure 12.4g. The important thing here is that a period of above (below) the steady-state real interest rate must be followed by a period of below (above) the steady-state rate to make the capital stock (K,,) return to the long-run path. 12.3.5 O M 0 versus FXO One way to compare the relative strengths of an O M 0 and a FXO in influencing the economy is to combine an O M 0 with a FXO of the opposite direction. Consider an open market purchase combined with foreign exchange market sales of the same magnitude, which is equivalent to the purchase of domestic assets with foreign assets leaving the

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

375

I

I

0

FIGURE 1 2 4

FIGURE 12-4b

time

FIGURE 12-4e

time

I I

I

0

time

FIGURE 1 2 4 ~

0

time

FIGURE 1 2 4

Fig. 12.4

I

time

iI I

1

0

0

0

FIGURE 12-4s

time

time

FIGURE 12-4h

Dynamic effects of a FXP.

money supply constant. This implies an excess demand situation for domestic assets, shifting the b curve in figure 12.5 downward, and an excess supply situation for foreign assets, shifting the f curve downward also. Assuming that the rn curve does not shift, this would lower i and raise E, which implies a fall in given e. Lowering i increases investment

376

Chapter Twelve

F+ E Fig. 12.5

and lowering e decreases net exports, making the net effect on aggregate demand ambiguous. As mentioned above, the net effect depends on the relative strength and speed of the effects of an increase in I and a decrease in X . If the response of investment is faster and stronger than that of net exports, then aggregate demand would increase; i.e. an O M 0 is more effective than a FXO in affecting the real sector in this case. 12.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications In this chapter, effects of the two alternative instruments in the conduct of monetary policy, OMOs and FXOs, were discussed using a portfolio balance framework with a real sector in the context of a small open economy, for the short run and the long run. i) Regardless of the short-run effects, both O M 0 and FXO have (asymptotically) identical long-run effects under the steady-state assumption. In the long run, all the variables except the price level and the exchange rate return to their original steady-state paths. The long-run PPP holds, and the changes in the exchange rate and the price level, which are proportional to the monetary shock, take care of all the disturbances in the long run. ii) In the short run, it is true that an O M 0 exercises greater influence on the interest rate than a FXO of identical size and a FXO exercises

377

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

greater influence on the exchange rate than an OMO. Therefore the short-run response to an O M 0 in the real sector occurs mainly through changes in investment, while that to a FXO occurs through changes in the trade balance. iii) The relative strengths of effects of O M 0 and FXO on output and price in the short run are ambiguous. If the response of the trade balance to changes in the terms of trade is relatively slower and weaker than that of investment to interest-rate changes, we might be able to say that the immediate short-run effect of an O M 0 is stronger than a FXO. Or, if the foreign sector is relatively large and responsive, we might be able to say the opposite. All these are basically empirical questions, because there is no a priori reason to believe one thing or the other. iv) Given our inability to resolve the question posed in (iii) without satisfactory empirical evidence,23the choice between OMOs and FXOs is at present a choice between short-run investment and short-run trade balance, as conjectured by Niehans. v) When we assume a stationary state in which long-run stock values are constant rather than growing at a constant rate, the asymptotic long-run neutrality with respect to an O M 0 disappears. In this case, an O M 0 leaves a permanent mark on the capital stock, the relative importance of which does not diminish over time, and therefore on the real interest rate and real income as long as the public does not fully “internalize” the government. A FXO poses no such problem, because foreign assets can be replenished by the private sector at constant prices. Although the short-run relative effects of an O M 0 and a FXO may be ambiguous, the long-run relative effects are obviously different. An OMO, which is equivalent to a financing of domestic investments by the central bank, raises the capital stock permanently, while a FXO, which is equivalent to a financing of foreign investment, does not leave any permanent mark on the domestic economy under the small-country assumption. Acknowledgments

This chapter was written when the author was a graduate student at UCLA. The author wishes to thank Professor Michael Darby for helpful comments. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the IMF.

23. See Darby (1980), for example, for an international study of balance of payments and exchange rates. Also see Lee (1980) for some preliminaryempirical evidence regarding the hypotheses derived here.

378

Chapter Twelve

References Barro, R. J. 1978. A stochastic equilibrium model of open economy under flexible exchange rates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, pp. 149-64. Baumol, W. J. 1970. Economic dynamics, 3d ed. London: Macmillan. Bilson, J. F. 0. 1978. Rational expectations and the exchange rates. In J. A. Frenkel and H . Johnson, eds., The economics of exchange rates. Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley. Darby, M. R. 1980. Sterilization and monetary control under pegged exchange rates: Theory and evidence. NBER Working Paper, no. 449. Dooly, M. F., and P. Isard. 1979. The portfolio-balance model of exchange rates. International Finance Division Papers, no. 141, Federal Reserve Board. Dornbusch, R. 1975. A portfolio balance model of the open economy. Journal of Monetary Economics 1: 3-20. . 1976a. The theory of flexible exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic policy. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78: 255-75. . 19766. Expectations and exchange rate dynamics. Journal of PoIitical Economy 84: 1161-76. Frenkel, J. A. 1976. A monetary approach to the exchange rate: Doctrinal aspects of empirical evidence. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78: 280-304. Frenkel, J. A., and H . Johnson, eds. 1978. The economics of exchange rates. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Frenkel, J. A . , and C. Rodriguez. 1975. Portfolio equilibrium and the balance of payments: A monetary approach. American Economic Review 65: 674-88. Girton, L., and D . Henderson. 1977. Central bank operations in foreign and domestic assets under fixed and flexible exchange rates. In P. Clark, D. Logue, and R. Sweeny, eds., The effects of exchange rate changes. Washington. Girton, L., and D. Roper. 1977. A monetary model of exchange market pressure applied to the postwar Canadian experience. American Economic Review 67: 537-48. Henderson, D . 1976. Modeling the interdependence of national money and capital markets. American Economic Review 66: 190-99. . 1979. The dynamic effects of exchange market intervention policy: Two views and a synthesis. International Finance Division Papers, no. 142. Kouri, P. 1976. The exchange rate and the balance of payments in the short run and in the long run: A monetary approach. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 78: 280-304. Lee, D . 1980. Effects of open market operations and foreign exchange

379

Effects of OMOs and FXOs under Flexible Exchange Rates

market operations under flexible exchange rates: A dynamic theory and some empirical evidence. Ph. D . dissertation, UCLA. Lucas, R . E. 1973. Some international evidence on output-inflation trade-offs. American Economic Review 63: 326-34. Niehans, J. 1976. How to fill an empty shell. American Economic Review 66: 181. Roll, R . 1978. Violations of the law of one price and their implications for differentially denominated assets. Mimeographed paper, UCLA. Stockman, A . 1978. Risk, information, and forward exchange rates. In J. A . Frenkel and H. Johnson, eds., The economics of exchange rates. Reading, Mass. : Addison-Wesley. . 1979. Monetary control and sterilization under pegged exchange rates. Discussion paper, UCLA.

13

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows Michael Melvin

Since the mid-1960s, the standard literature on international capital flows has been characterized by the use of the Tobin-Markowitz type of portfolio choice models to determine the portfolio shares devoted to foreign and domestic assets. In this framework, the stocks of assets held depend on risk and return measures associated with alternative assets. Thus the change in the stocks, the capital flows, will depend on changes in the risk and return measures. This stock-adjustment approach is generally considered an advance beyond the earlier studies that related capital flows to levels of return measures. However, the newer models, with their theoretical frameworks including risk terms, have created new problems that have yet to be adequately dealt with. While the risk terms are included in the theoretical models and it is generally recognized that risk reduction through portfolio diversification provides an incentive for capital flows,' the empirical treatment of risk has been the low point of the literature to date. One aim of this chapter is to incorporate in a capital-flows equation a measure of risk suggested by a standard finance model. Besides the introduction of an explicit risk proxy, this chapter will also derive and estimate a theoretically consistent functional form for the capital-flows equation. The existing literature has in many cases not even considered the matter of proper functional form, but instead assumed a simple model where all variables enter in an additive fashion. The approach taken here will differ from most of the previous studies in two additional ways besides the treatment of risk: (1) net capital flows will be the variable of interest, whereas other studies have estimated the Michael Melvin is an assistant professor of economics at Arizona State University. 1. See Grubel (1968). Even with constant return differentials there would be capital flows to maintain the optimal portfolio shares.

380

381

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

domestic demand for foreign assets separately from the foreign demand for domestic assets (and have usually disaggregated the capital account into components yielding the best empirical fit) ; (2) the capital-flows equation will be placed in the framework of an eight-country macromodel allqwing for simultaneous equation estimation techniques.z 13.1 Empirical Predecessors

The leading literature on capital flows generally develops a portfolio model where capital flows are a function of interest rates, wealth, and risk. For example, Miller and Whitman (1970) have a model where long-term portfolio foreign investment is determined in part by the variance of returns on domestic and foreign assets. Since these variances are unobservable, they examine the likely determinants of each, concluding that the variance of domestic returns moves inversely with domestic transitory income. So they use national income and time to proxy for the unobservable transitory income and we have one unobservable proxying for another unobservable with the result that observed income and time are supposed to represent the variance of domestic returns. Likewise foreign return variability should be a function of foreign transitory income, but they also argue for including domestic income and dummy variables for U.S. capital controls and European currency convertibility. Then, by assuming that U.S. and foreign income generally move together, they have the variance of foreign returns represented by U.S. income, time, and the dummy variable. One could easily argue that these variables in a demand for foreign assets function will more likely represent the portfolio scale variable than the determinants of the variances of the domestic and foreign returns. In such a case, the fact that the variables entered significantly should not be surprising, even if they in no way represent variability of returns. Kouri and Porter (1974), in an oft-cited article, developed a portfolio approach model where capital flows were viewed as equating money demand and money supply. The model included a measure of risk which was supposed to derive from a Markowitz-Tobin formulation, but rather than develop some measure of variability of returns, Kouri and Porter assume that in their model the risk variable should measure changes in exchange-rate expectations. Facing the difficult problem of measuring 2. Most of the existing studies have assumed interest rates and exchange rates exogenous and so used OLS. Since the focus here is on one equation of some larger model, a suitable set of simultaneous equations is provided by the NBER International Transmission of Inflation Model (see part I1 of this volume). The NBER model contains a capital-flows equation, so the proposed equation may be inserted in place of the existing model equation as no new endogenous variables are introduced and only the exogenous risk terms are added. Note that three of the countries in the NBER Model are not investgated here (France, Japan, and the Netherlands), due to poor quality or unavailability of some data.

382

Chapter Thirteen

exchange-rate expectations in the fixed-rate period, they decide to use dummy variables for “periods when there were definite expectations of parity changes” (Kouri and Porter, p. 452). In an early application of the portfolio approach to capital flows, Lee (1969) developed a theoretical model based on mean and variance and then in the empirical section estimated a regression where portfolio shares are run on interest differentials letting the estimated coefficients represent the risk terms (which assumes the risk is constant). In most instances, while risk is mentioned in the theoretical arguments, it is ignored in the empirics. Bryant and Hendershott (1970) dismissed the problem by saying, In actual practice, researchers never have adequate information (if they have any at all) about the probability distributions economic units associate with various returns and costs . . . As a result we have not developed proxies for. . . the risk associated with each of the expected costs and returns. (p. 27) Branson (1968), in what is considered a pioneering effort, developed the application of the portfolio approach to capital flows. His theoretical analysis incorporates risk, but then he ignores the problem in the empirical section. In a follow-up article, Branson and Hill (1971) mention that they are assuming risk to be constant throughout the analysis. In the more recent literature it is apparent that authors are increasingly concerned over the shortcomings of their empirical work. Hodgson and Holmes (1977) stated Recent critics of empirical work have complained that the risk variables are wrongfully ignored when moving from theory to specific estimating equations and applying them to data. While this is true, our market rates of return are unadjusted for risk premia, due to the practical difficulty in obtaining quantified risk data. (p. 267) While the problems of incorporating a “good” measure of risk in the capital-flows literature are considerable, it appears that even in the most highly regarded articles, the authors have chosen to reach for simple ad hoc formulations that are often hard to relate to the cited portfolio choice theory. As Bryant (1975) has pointed out in an excellent critique of the literature, there appears to be a large gap between the theory and the equations actually estimated. The failure to develop better risk proxies is rather surprising considering the wide-scale use of ad hoc proxies permeating all the applied econometrics literature. Rather than use time trends and dummy variables to “explain” our ignorance, in the next section we will explicitly enter proxies to attempt to capture the measures of risk discussed in the literature.

383

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

13.2 The Traditional Framework Following the standard framework of studies based on a portfolio selection approach (see Branson and Hill 1971 for instance), we can write the portfolio share devoted to foreign assets as a function of risk and return variables:

FIw = f (Rd,Rf ,E ) , where F is foreign assets, W is domestic wealth, Rd and Rf are domestic and foreign interest rates, and E is the risk attached to F relative to domestic assets. Multiplying (13.1) through by W, we get the desired stock of foreign assets: (13.1)

(13.2)

F = W .f ( R d , R f , E ) .

The ( f ) function is then assumed to be linear, and we have our estimating equation: (13.3)

F = b,wRd

+ b,WRf + b3WE + b4W,

where the b4 term represents a constant added to equation (13.2). The stock of domestic liabilities to foreigners is similarly written so that we may write net foreign asset holdings of country i as

Nj= bIWiRi + b*w.Rf+b,WiEj+ b4w. - b5WfRj- b,WfRf- bTWfEf- bgWf, or by assuming that it is the return differential that matters, we can write3 (13.4)

N . = b , K . ( R i - R f ) + b,W,Ej+ b4w. -b,Wf(Rj-Rf)-b?WfEf-bsWf.

Differencing (13.4) gives us the net capital-flow equation: (13.5)

AN, = blA(w.(Ri- R f ) )+ b3A(w,El)+ b4Aw. - bsA(W$(Ri- R f ) ) - b,A(WfE’) - bsAWf,

where ANi represents net capital outflows from country i (ANi> 0 is a net capital outflow from i). The foreign return variable has often been an interest rate unadjusted by expected exchange-rate changes. We should, however, consider the return on a foreign security to be the interest rate plus the expected change in the exchange rate. Theoretically, of course, all return and risk variables in the portfolio belong in the equation, but there are practical constraints that would caution against such practice. Besides the obvious problem of few degrees of freedom for the flexible exchange-rate period, there is also the problem of collinearity among the 3. The imposition of such a reasonable restriction seems desirable given the limited degrees of freedom available for the flexible exchange-rate period.

384

Chapter Thirteen

variables. Usually researchers just include one alternative return variable and proceed as if they had a two-country world. While such a solution is theoretically inappropriate and really doesn’t “cure” the multicollinearity problem in that theory suggests all assets be represented, it is the “traditional” solution, and is therefore consistent with the spirit of this section (for i # U.S., the U.S. interest rate will be the foreign rate, while the Canadian rate will serve as the foreign rate for the U.S.). The risk variable (E)is the missing link between theory and empirics. Measures of variance are the risk proxies discussed in papers like Miller and Whitman (1970) and Lee (1969), yet such risk measures are hardly consistent with the finance models cited by the authors (we shouldn’t care about the variance of a portfolio asset, but rather the contribution of that asset to the overall portfolio variance). In order to preserve the spirit of the capital-flows literature (we will abandon this approach shortly), equation (13.5) will be estimated using the concept of variance of returns as the risk proxy.4 The domestic and foreign wealth measures are, respectively, real domestic permanent income and a nominal income weighted average of foreign real i n ~ o m eThe . ~ interest rates are represented by the ninety-day treasury bill rate for the U.S., and a similar short-term rate elsewhere. The expected change in the exchange rate is taken from the exchangerate equation of the NBER model, and is defined as the systematic part of a regression of the change in the exchange rate on lagged values of the exchange rate, the change in import prices, the prices of foreign oil, rest-of-world income, imports, rest-of-world prices, and the current change in the exchange rate. An alternative to using observed interest rates and the expected change in the exchange rate is to calculate the “risk premium” in the forward rate. Such an approach will be used below. Defining the correct risk proxy is not strictly an empirical question, but making the simplifying assumption that the nominal return in each currency is certain so that only the exchange-rate uncertainty is important, 4. There are other kinds of risks besides the market risk considered here, such as default risk, but in keeping with the “traditional” approach, only the variability of return risk will be considered here. 5. For a further description of this and other series see the Data Appendix at the end of this volume. The model includes eight countries with the following i subscript assignment: 1. U S . , 2. U.K., 3. Canada, 4. France, 5. Germany, 6 . Italy, 7. Japan, 8. Netherlands. We should note that the data for each country are in terms of domestic currency, so that the estimated coefficient magnitudes reported below tend to reflect the differences in currencies as measuring devices. For instance, Italian capital flows, measured in lira, have a larger numerical magnitude than U.S. capital flows measured in dollars. Since the income series in the NBER model (used in the simultaneous estimation) are in logs, the wealth measures used in the present paper will also be logs. A weighted average of foreign permanent income was also tried, but since the results did not improve, it was decided to use the real income weighted average, as this series appears in the NBER model.

385

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

we can estimate equation (13.5) using the variability of the expected exchange-rate change as the relevant risk measure. This proxy is created as the standard deviation of the expected change in the exchange rate, where the standard deviations are computed over the last eight quarters. Table 13.1A presents the estimates of (13.5) omitting the risk proxies, and table 13.1B gives the results with the risk terms included. The overall explanatory power of the regressions is generally poor in terms of R2 when compared to the earlier literature. However, the equations estimated here differ from the earlier literature in that net capital ffows are the dependent variable, whereas earlier works generally looked at the foreign holdings of domestic liabilities apart from domestic holdings of foreign liabilities. More important, however, is the fact that the present study looks at the entire capital account--current account minus official settlements balance of payments. Previous researchers have found that by eliminating certain components of the capital account they could improve the fit of their equations. An exception to these generalities is provided by Branson and Hill (1971), who used disaggregated capital account data for the U.S. but net capital-flows data for the U.K., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.6While their study is conducted over the fixed rate period excluding certain “crisis” quarters and departs from a strict portfolio distribution approach by including trade balance and “monetary indicator” variables such as velocity, their results might serve as a crude standard. Comparing unadjusted R2 (since this is what they report), we find the following:

U.K. Canada Germany Italy

B and H .78 .55 .79 .74

Table 13.1B .50 .93 .79 .41

Given the amount of experimentation carried out by Branson and Hill, we may consider their R2 measures as an upper bound on the explanatory power of capital-flows equations run over the fixed rate period. With similar ad hoc searching, the flexible period results in table 13.1B, which in some cases compare favorably already, could perhaps run a close race 6. Herring’(l973) used the net capital account for the U.S. plus the same countries used by Branson and Hill (1971). In his study, very high R2values were achieved by including an additional variable, “unusual capital movements.” These “unusual” movements he first identified, and then, by normalizing all of the estimates on the largest estimated movement, he created a dummy series of relative magnitudes of unusual capital movements. While this is most definitely a way to explain much of the variability in capital movements, it represents no theory and essentially states that capital movements are “explained” primarily by random shocks. Since the goal of the current paper is to estimate a systematic component of capital flows, such approaches are not very useful.

386

Chapter Thirteen

Table 13.1A

Equation (13.5) without Risk Variables

us Coefficients bo bt b4

UK

GE

CA

IT

63.58 (2.95)

7.22 (2.41)

-44.72 ( - 13.29)

64.90 (2.10)

17.64 (.46)

-4.00 ( - 1.73)

-4.83 (- 1.13)

18.13 (.96)

618 ( ,991

3516 (12.58)

- 5340 ( - 1.81)

124538 (.SO)

-6318 (-2.30)

- 1284 (-2.74)

- 2657

( - .97)

( - 1.75)

( - .65)

730.00 (.79)

32015 (.65)

( - 1.29)

-95.09 ( - 3.01)

4.20 (.27)

1048 (3.06)

-51271 ( - 1.82)

Error process

AR2 - .oo, - .20

AR2 .38, - .54

AR2 .31, - .72

AR1 - .21

AR2 .88, - .15

S.E.E.

11.63

1.70

.96

19.45

993

b5

- 270

- 114.0

( - .15)

6,

- 319

- 106.79

-

R2 D-W

.15

.40

.88

.40

.02

1.99

2.36

2.36

1.90

2.05

with the Branson and Hill findings. Because of the few degrees of freedom available, equation (13.5) remains a basic portfolio distribution approach, as I have refrained from further ad hoc experimentation. Given the disclaimers above, the variables of interest are the risk terms. While the traditional approach leads to an estimating equation like (13.5), actual estimation using proxies for E has not been carried out by past authors. The usual procedure is to estimate an equation omitting the risk proxies as reported in table 13.1A. When the risk proxies are included, the results are somewhat mixed as reported in table 13.1B. In four of the five countries the fit (in terms of standard error of estimate) is improved when the risk terms are included, and six of the individual risk coefficients enter significantly at the 10% level of significance. In terms of a joint F test of the hypothesis b3 = b7 = 0, only for the U.S and Italy are both b3 and b7 significant. Regarding the signs of the various coefficients, we must remember that wealth enters interactively with both risk and return. Thus, to determine the sign of any individual effect, we must evaluate the partial derivative of the function with respect to the particular argument. Interaction terms also have implications for hypothesis testing. The test that a variable has no effect on capital flows would involve an F test of the hypothesis that all regressors involving that variable have coefficients that are jointly zero.

387

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

Table 13.1B

Equation (13.5) with Risk Variables

us Coefficients b" bl b3

b4

UK

75.13 (4.76)

8.06 (2.33)

-45.93 ( - 14.43)

28.04 (1.15)

- 1780 ( - .70)

36.63 (1.14)

- 5.29 (- 1.92)

-5.56 (- 1.27)

24.90 (1.29)

297 (.50)

6297 (3.47)

55.82 (.83)

- 8157

( - 4.00) b5

b7

IT

GE

CA

607 (.38) 2 . 6 lo5 ~ (3.38)

- 1456 (-2.61)

- 145

-32.95 (-.13)

- 1095

(-2.81)

37802 (1.87)

3622 (13.63)

- 1188 ( - .49)

21116 ( - .09)

917 (1.01)

- 3730 ( - .08)

- 157

(-1.89)

(-.89)

1001 (.59)

1701 (.22)

- 37798 (-2.20)

3862830 (2.18)

bn

- 2248 ( - 3.77)

- 126 (-2.28)

1.58 (.03)

Error process

AR2 . l l , - .62

AR2 .45,-.54

AR2 .34,-.85

S.E.E. -

9.87

1.77

.95

17.87

.49

.32

.90

.71

.19

2.60

2.28

2.50

1.74

1.97

RZ

D-W

bo Constant b , A(Product of domestic wealth and return differential) b, A(Product of domestic wealth and risk) b4 A(Domestic wealth) b, A(Product of foreign wealth and return differential) b, A(Product of foreign wealth and risk) b, A(Foreign wealth) AR1 First-order autoregressive process AR2 Second-order autoregressive process Estimation period 197111 to 1976IV t statistics in parentheses

2169 (4.49) AR2 -.67,-.13

- 140277

( - 3.07)

AR2 .83, - .07 908

388

Chapter Thirteen

Considering first the risk variable ( E ) , in each equation this variable appears twice, as the risk proxy enters in both the domestic demand for foreign securities and the foreign demand for domestic securities. Under the theory considered in this section, the net effect of an increase in E is uncertain. As the risk associated with foreign assets increases, the domestic demand for foreign assets falls as does the foreign demand for domestic assets so that the net effect could go either way. Thus, ceteris paribus, the effect of greater exchange-rate variability would be to reduce the overall level of activity with no clear effect on the net capital flows of any country. Analyzing the partial 6ANi/6E,at each point in the sample space we find mixed results. For the U.S., the U.K., and Germany the sign is positive, but for Canada and Italy the effect is negative. While intuition is of little use in determining the expected sign of the risk term, on the basis of the joint F test mentioned above we assert that this variable can be important in explaining capital flows along the lines of the traditional approach. For the return differentials, we would clearly expect a negative effect as we are measuring the return on a country i security minus the return on a foreign security. As this differential increases, ceteris paribus, capital outflows should fall. Examining the derivative 6ANi/6(Ri- Rf)at each point in the sample space indicates that only for Canada is the sign overwhelmingly negative while for the U.K. approximately half the signs are negative. However, the individual t statistics on bl and b5 suggest that the estimated coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. Finally, for the domestic and foreign wealth terms we expect positive and negative signs respectively according to the portfolio theory, as increases in the portfolio scale lead to asset purchases. Thus an increase in domestic wealth would increase capital outflows while an increase in foreign wealth would lead to increased capital inflows. Examining the derivatives with respect to domestic wealth, only for Canada and Italy are the signs positive while the U.S., the U.K., and Germany have surprisingly negative signs. An examination of the derivatives with respect to foreign wealth reveals negative signs for Canada and Germany and positive signs for the U.S., the U.K., and Italy. Thus in each case only two of the five countries have the sign expected by the portfolio theory. Previous authors have told stories about wealth entering with signs opposite to what would be expected from a portfolio theory. Prachowny (1969) has suggested that capital flows should be a function of the growth rates of domestic and foreign income in that the demand for foreign assets is related to the general level of economic activity. In his analysis, higher domestic income and lower foreign income are associated with capital inflows. Branson’s (1968) analysis allows for wealth effects to go either direction as the portfolio effect of increasing the demand for foreign securities could be offset by an increase in the domestic supply of securi-

389

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

ties via a wealth effect on the desired stock of liabilities. Kreicher (1981), in a study using the Branson approach, found that in his sample the sign of the wealth effect did indeed vary across countries. Taken together, the results presented in table 13.1B are interpreted as offering promise with regard to specifying empirical proxies for risk as defined in the traditional capital-flows literature. Had we just examined the results for the U S , Germany, and Italy, we would have made a much more impressive case. But considering a wider application of the approach allows us to draw more useful conclusions. First, we know that specifying a proxy variable for risk involves a great deal of arbitrariness. No doubt what works well in some countries won’t work in others so that a persistent searcher could probably find more significant risk proxies. A second point regards the theoretical consideration of portfolio risk. As mentioned above, the capital-flowsliterature has generally spoken of risk in terms of the variance of returns on individual assets. This is certainly not the risk discussed in the modern finance models where the risk of an individual asset is a function of not only’its own variance, but also the covariances with other assets. So we see that the inclusion of proxies like the standard deviations included here may not provide a useful test other than to illustrate the naive notion of risk portrayed by the earlier literature. The next section attempts to develop an alternative proxy consistent with a well-known finance model. Before proceeding to the next section, we should reconsider the return differential used above, as this same variable will be of interest throughout the analysis. In specifying appropriate interest rates to be used in international comparisons, we always run into the problem of finding comparable rates. The author has no a priori confidence in comparing U.S. and U.K. treasury bill rates, for instance, but uses such rates on the basis of their availability. Rather than be forced into specifying domestic interest rates for each country in order to create a return differential, we could instead construct a series for the “risk premium” contained in the forward rate. In order to proceed along these lines we need the preliminary assumption that interest parity holds. In equation (13.5), the return differential was written as (Ri - Rf), where Ri was the domestic interest rate, and Rfthe foreign rate. Now let’s explicitly write Rf = Rj pji, where Rj is the interest rate in foreign country j and pji is the expected change in the exchange rate, or

+

where Sjiis units of i’s currency per unit of j’s. The investor in country i can then earn (1 Ri) at home by investing 1 unit of currency i or [(l + Rj)l$/Sii] by investing the unit of i currency in country j securities (4iis the relevant forward rate at which the j currency earnings are sold).

+

390

Chapter Thirteen

Arbitrage results in the following:

or

+

1 Ri 1 + Rj

Ji

qi'

subtracting one from both sides, we get - S.. RI. - RI. - F.. I' I'

+

1 Rj

qi

'

which is usually approximated as

Since the relevant return differential is (Ri - Rj - p j i ) ,by subtracting pji from each side of the above equation we get

Thus, if interest-rate parity holds (and careful studies seem to indicate that it does), we can write the return differential strictly in terms of the risk premium in the foreign exchange market. Note that there exists some controversy over the very existence of this risk premium. The controversy stems from a debate centering on whether the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. The question is considered in detail elsewhere (Melvin 1981), but this author feels that the evidence is not yet overwhelming on either side, as there exists empirical support both for the existence of a risk premium and for no premium. The risk premium series was created from spot and forward rate data provided by Richard Levich to the NBER international model effort (the data are originally from Harris Bank). Assuming efficient markets, the realized future spot rate should only differ from the expected future rate by an additive error term, so the realized rate was used as a proxy for the expected rate. Then the risk premium series was used in place of the return differential in reestimating tables 13.1A and 13.1B as shown in tables 13.1C and 13.1D respectively. 7. No doubt there is measurement error involved here. If the risk premiums alone were measured incorrectly, then their coefficients would be biased downward. However, if some other variables involved measurement error, then the effect on the risk premium coefficients would not necessarily be downward.

391

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

There is a striking similarity between table 13.1A and table 13.1C.Just as the return differentials were insignificant in explaining capital flows in 13.1A, so are the risk premiums insignificant in 13.1C.’ The other coefficients remain just about the same in 13.1C as they were in 13.1A. Comparing table 13.1B to 13.1D, we find that the results are generally alike here also. The similarity of the results seems to bode well both for the domestic rates chosen for the original return differential and for the assumption of interest parity holding for these particular rates. Since the results are so similar (there certainly is no reason to prefer the risk premiums over the return differentials), the analysis will proceed in terms of the return differential rather than the risk premium, as the NBER model to be used for simultaneous equation estimation contains the interest rates. The novel approach to capital-flows estimation to be developed in the next section will also be phrased in terms of the return differential. So far the period of analysis has conformed to the data base used in the NBER model. Alternative results estimated through 1978 using IMF International Financial Statistics data are presented in section 13.4. 13.3 An Alternative Framework

This section will develop an estimating equation consistent with the utility-maximizing behavior of individuals. Previous studies have started with a general notation as in equation (13.1), asserting that theory suggests that capital flows are some function of returns and risks. With such a beginning, the author declares the hunting season open for the “proper” fuctional form. Usually the assumption of linearity is made. As Branson and Hill (1971) say after writing down their general form, “Since we have, at this point, no particular a priori information on the form of the portfolio distribution function f( . ), we may assume it is linear” (p. 7). It is my contention that the estimating equation derived from the portfolio theory will in general have variables not entering in a strictly additive fashion. Rather than merely assert that portfolio theory suggests capital flows are some function of risks and returns, it would be preferable to derive the functional form suggested by the theory. Then, if the researcher proceeds to move away from this form, it is clear that the estimating equation is not exactly consistent with the underlying theory. After developing what I believe to be a theoretically consistent estimating equation, I will investigate its empirical possibilities. A measure of risk more consistent with theory than that of the previous section may be found in Solnik’s international asset pricing model. Solnik (1973) developed an “international asset pricing model” (IAPM) by extending Merton (1973) to encompass international portfolio diversification. Included in the model are demand functions for foreign assets.

392

Chapter Thirteen Equation (13.5) without Risk Variables, with Risk Premium

Table 13.1C

us

UK

CA

GE

IT

Coefficients

b”

63.71 (1.86)

6.74 (2.22)

-44.97 ( - 12.56)

72.29 (3.01)

bl

8.62 (.W

11.28 (1.20)

1.54 (.24)

-29.69 ( - .44)

- 6403

b4

( - 1.49) b5

b8

Error process S.E.E. R2

D-W

-

- 1223

(-2.59)

3534 (11.90)

- 5887 (-2.56)

- 2757 ( - .96) - 1666

(~ 1.23) 1.4~10~ (34)

879 (.34)

279 (1.29)

18.48 (.lo)

- 428 (~ .14)

( - 1.14)

- 423 ( - 1.48)

- 103 ( - 3.23)

2.42 (.I51

1299 (4.63)

- 45037 ( - 1.74)

MA2 .24, - .26

AR2 .36, - .57

AR2 .37, - .79

- .19, - .29

11.85

1.75

1.01

18.12

- ,004

.39

.87

.61

2.34

2.03

1.93

2.01

AR2

LOX

lo5

AR2 .88, - .16 1000 - ,004

2.05

Rather than reproduce the entire derivation (which is lengthy and published elsewhere), I will begin from one of the optimality conditions (Solnik, p. 22) keeping all of Solnik’s assumptions except for his initial assumption that the expected change in exchange rates is zero. In my version I will assume that the expected return from holding foreign assets is equal to the foreign rate of interest plus the expected change in the exchange rate. The optimality condition is then

where

Ri= the risk-free interest rate in country i; p,jk = the

expected change in the exchange rate, in units of k’s currency per unit of i’s: ( S z , t + l $k,t)/Sik,t; W k= the wealth of k ; J k = the utility of wealth function, where .Tiwand J; are second and first derivatives respectively so that - J ~ , , , / J represents ~ absolute risk aversion for k investors; ?!= the proportion of k’s wealth invested in j’s liabilities; +$ = the elements of the covariance matrix of exchange rates for country k ; for instance, I /+$I I n - l x n - l ,

393

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows Equation (13.5) with Risk Variables and Risk Premium

Table 13.1D

us Coefficients b0 bl

UK

4.73 (1.44)

-45.55 ( - 13.21)

37.17 (1.61)

- 2669 ( - .97)

5.12

19.66 (1.85)

3.69 (.60)

39.49 (.46)

- 650 ( - .41)

-30.03 ( - .55)

-107 (- .47)

- 1038 (-2.33)

3591 (12.50)

- 2144 ( - .94)

6025

(3.12) b4 b5 b7

IT

72.08 (3.34)

(.W) b3

GE

CA

7822 (2.83)

- 940

( - 1.83)

511 (1.99)

352 2.4 x 105 (3.00)

102 (56)

2552 (.65) - 39307 ( - 1.89)

- 1926 ( - 1.24)

- 649 (- .09)

-76.05

- .65, - .40

2264 (4.38)

35515 (1.60) 1 . 2 105 ~ (.46) -27716 (- .26) 3.4 x 106 (1.72)

-1.1x16

Error Process

AR2 .30, - .48

AR2 .34,- .58

14.88 (.29) AR2 .41, - .92

S.E.E.

11.09

1.72

1.00

17.62

.29

.42

.89

.77

.07

2.45

2.28

2.07

1.88

1.93

b8

-

R2 D-W

- 2193 (-3.29)

(- 1.67)

AR2

( - 2.52)

AR1 .75 986

bo Constant bl A(Product of domestic wealth and risk premium) b, A(Product of domestic wealth and risk) b4 A(Domestic wealth) bS A(Product of foreign wealth and risk premium) b7 A(Product of foreign wealth and risk) b, A(Foreign wealth) MA2 Second-order moving average process AR1 First-order autoregressive process AR2 Second-order autoregressive process Estimation period 197111 to 1976IV t statistics in parentheses

where 4: is the covariance of the change of i’s and j s exchange rate where both are stated relative to k. Since ?&is equal to the proportion of k’s wealth invested in j’s liabilities, or ?!‘= e,!’/W”,where $is the demand for j’s liabilities by k, we can use (13.6) to solve for the asset demand. Rewriting (13.6) in matrix form,

394

Chapter Thirteen

I IRi + k i k

-

Rk

II

= $kYkAk,

where WkJkw A k = -~

JI:

.

We can solve for Y k by matrix inversion:

y k = ($&)-'I IRi + pik - R k l I ( A k ) - ' , or, for illustrative purposes (assuming k is the nth country), (13.7)

$4'1

. . .g.n-1

$4'2.

R2

....

+~

2 n Rn

....

Writing (13.7) in summation notation and multiplying through by W k ,we get the demand for i's liabilities by k : (13.8)

e f = ~ k wZ. i] # k q$(Rj + k j k + BOWk,

-

Rk)

where the q$ are elements of the ( $ k ) - ' matrix, Bk = - [J$/WkJI:,],and BOrepresents a constant term inserted in (13.7).* The total demand for foreign assets by K is found by summing (13.8) over i. The total foreign demand for i's liabilities is found by summing over k . Thus net holdings of foreign assets by i can be found as total foreign assets minus total liabilities to foreigners: (13.9)

Ni=xk+iei-Ck+ief

or by substituting (13.10)

Ni = BiW' Z

Z,+j

k

f

@W'-

(R, f

$,(R,

ck+j

plk

-

+ p,i - R f )

BkWiC,$k q$

R k ) - B$Wk.

8. The constant is inserted in recognition of the fact that we are dealing with the entire capital account of a nation. The portfolio theory presented here determines the portfolio shares for individual investors. But the capital account data include flows besides portfolio assets (for instance, foreign direct investment and errors and omissions) so that we would expect to observe flows not explained by the theory. It should be noted, however, that in correspondence with the author, John Makin indicated that his recent work has led him to believe that "errors and omissions" are in fact capital flows.

395

An Alternative Approach to International Capital Flows

Ni gives the total net demand for foreign assets by i. The change in Ni would represent i’s capital flows. If dNi> 0, we have a net capital outflow from i; if dNj