The History of Gustavus Adolfus

Theodor Dodge

The History of Gustavus Adolfus

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR FROM ITS

REVIVAL AFTER THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE END OF THE SPANISH

SUCCESSION WAR, WITH A

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE MOST

FAMOUS CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT S7/EDE

.

.

.

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

r

42^ BOSTON AND

NEY/

YORK

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 1895

s>.-

To

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER WHO. NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY

AliE

DEDICATED

" Faites la guerre offensive

comme Alexandre, Annibal, Cisar,

Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugene et Frederic ; lisez, relisez Vhistoire de lew quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modHez-vous sur gyx, c^est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine etde surprendre le sicret de Vart ; votre ginie, airisi eclairi, vous ferarejeter des max-

—

imes opposees "

La

d,

celles

de ces grands hommes.^'

— Napoleon.

tactique, les Evolutions, la science de Vofficier de ginie, de

Vofficier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre

dans

les traitis ;

—

inais la

connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par Vexp6rience etpar Vetude de rhistoire des campagnesde tous lesgrandscapitaines."

— Napoleon.

PREFACE.

That

immense gap of sixteen and a

the

half centuries which

intervenes between the last campaign of Julius Caesar and the first /

J

campaign

must be

of

justified

Gustavus Adolphus

almost untouched,

by once more reminding the reader that the

made no attempt

author has

is left

to cover the history of war, but

seeks only to indicate the origin and growth of what to-day

we o

No

call the art of war.

preface, however long, can explain

the purpose of the volumes of which the present

ie

one, so

well as the few words of Najjoleon which have been chosen as a motto,

and which follow the dedicatory page.

" Read,

reread the history of their eighty-eight campaigns," says this last of the

A

Great Captains.

growth of the art of war

is

history of the

origin

campaigns of those leaders whose deeds have created the

The

history of

would

detail

war

call for

is

and

in reality only the story of the

beyond

limit

;

to treat

it

art.

in equal

hundreds of volumes, and the author

has contemplated no such work.

A

distinguished professor of history^ recently wrote the

author

:

"

You

will

have an embarrassing wealth of material

in the military changes

As

from Caesar

I run over the time, I see

skill

wald

to

Gustavus Adolphus.

how you can

use your narrative

on the slaughter of the legions of Varus in the Teuto;

the

hurried marches of Aurelian while his soldiers

sung that wild song of slaughter given by Flavius Vopiscus the Goths of Alaric and the 1

Huns

of Attila.

Samuel Willard, LL. D.

3 f (.17

;

and the struaale

PREFACE.

viii

of

armed mobs

the saving of

at

Chalons

the skillful

;

work

Europe by Leo the Isaurian,

of Belisarius

whose work the

to

picturesque battle of Tours was but a supplement

the cam-

;

paigns of Charlemagne, earliest in modern times to march

converging columns upon an enemy

and that greatest of

;

knights and crusaders,

cavalry battles, greatest that ever was

all

or ever will be, Dorylseum

;

the

Normans

at Hastings

the

;

Swiss piling up the rampart of ten thousand dead at St.

Jacobs

;

the vain charge of Talbot, representative of the out-

going chivalry, against cannon and earthworks at Chatillon these,

and two score more

— how can you leave them out — how

from the old to the new, can you put them in ? " in the is

of

drama

change

of the illustrations of the

And

of history hacl

just because

none of these

the Great Captains, indeed, had no such

the deeds of ;

it

Many

not within the scope of this work to narrate them.

influence

acts

any influence on the art of war,

but though these

may none

the less have found a

place in their general military history, there

is

nothing to

warrant the author in going outside of the Great Captains to dilate

upon mere

acts of heroism or

mere scenes of carnage.

Hence, though the period between the Danish campaign of 1611

is

Munda

in

45

B. C.

dismissed with a mere sum-

mary, the author does not believe that he has

any

left

war

unfilled in the actual history of the art of

;

t hat

more or

jrom

le ss

expertly by his successors,

jt

gaj)

and as

revival began wi th Gustavus Adolphus and was carried jv ard

and

w ill

its

for-

be found

the beginning of th r nrvontomith cti^ntury

down

in

1815^ the narrritive in this and future volumeswil l cover most of the inipo rtant wars

Every victories

.

nation, in gazing at the glories which surround its

and

its

standing of the

heroes, latter.

stands out unequaled

;

is

apt to lose sight of the comparative

To

the Prussian, Frederick the

to the Scandinavian,

Gustavus

;

Only to the

PRE FA CE.

ix

rrenehman, Napoleon

;

to the Austrian, Prince

Archduke Charles

;

to the

the

Wellington.

It

only when

is

Eugene or

Englishman, Marlborough or each

of

these

generals

is

grouped with the others on the theatre of war where he played his part, that one can properly gauge his place

To some

the captains.

of

us Anglo-Saxons

it

among

may seem

heresy to assume that Prince Eugene was equal as a general to the

Duke

of

Marlborough.

And

yet, such

was the

case.

Alone, he conducted more successful campaigns, he won more

and he did more

victories

first-rate

work than Marlborough

while at Blenheim, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, he bore half the burden and

won

When

half the renown.

the facts are

looked at dispassionately, the place assigned to each of the great generals in these volumes will,

it

is

believed, be borne

out by the mature judgment of any military student not suffering from patriotic astigmatism. It

is

map.

comparatively easy to write up a campaign without a

This

tell-tale

absent, errors can be

more

easily covered

a general allegation will suffice for a more specific one.

:

But

the author has striven to so illustrate his work with charts as that every statement

ence to the terrain. battle-fields,

may

The

ancient

maps

off

by

refer-

of the country and of

while full of information and suggestiveness, are

apt to be topographically

wrong and hence misleading

hoped the maps and charts acceptable.

be readily checked

The same

in this

volume

will

;

it

is

prove more

care has been exjjended on

them by

personal visits to the battle-fields as was given to former

volumes

and

;

but they are intended rather to illustrate the text

to aid in

comprehending the campaigns than as samples

The amount of ground to be covered being made on a smaller scale than here-

of the geographer's art.

has resulted in their tofore.

Little space could be spared for the exploits of individual

PREFACE.

X generals or divisions

what was

fined to

;

Dates

'

the

a clear understanding

Particular heroism has been rarely men-

except in the case of the leading generals,

into the

fit

the battle descriptions have been con-

strictly essential to

of the manoeuvres.

tioned

;

followed,

does not

and puzzling

in the old records are inaccurate

New

it

scheme of the work.

Style (ten days later than the

—

hoped without many

is

it

;

but

Old Style) has been

errors.

The

political

histoiy of the times has beeu only incidentally mentioned

the author can scarcely vouch for

he pretends

to

being free from error,

its

—

no knowledge of the intricate state imbroglios

of the sixteenth century.

The

authorities to which this

volume

Having no knowledge

numerous.

indebted are very

is

of Swedish, the author has

been obliged to rely upon German, French or Italian transla-

home

tions of the

records

have carefully covered

;

this

men

but such eminent

ground

as

Droysen

and most of the better

;

class of historical works, such as Geijer's Sveriges Historia,

or Gustavus' Letters, exist in

German.

Moreover, the cam-

paigns which made Gustavus forever great were rather a part of the history of

Germany than

The following works, among some

contribution, rain, Billow,

of

of

Sweden.

others,

them very

have been laid under

freely

:

Arkenholtz, Beau-

Chemnitz, Coxe, Desormeaux, Droysen, Duvivier,

Dudik, Feuquieres, Forster, Gallitzin, Gfrorer, Grimoard,

Gualdo Prioratp, Harte, Hurter,

Julius,

Kausler,

Keym,

Oman,

Puffen-

Khevenhiiller, Lediard, Lossau, Mauvillon, dorf, Quincy,

Le

Ramsay, Ranke, Swedish

Intelligencer, Soden,

Soldat Suedois, Sporschill, Theatrum Europseum, Viller-

mont, Voltaire, Zaber, Zanthier, a great number of memoirs, dispatches

and

letters

of

many

the

generals,

and old

German records. The aumany eminent historians and critics

Netherland, Niirnberg and other thor has drawn from too

of

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

....

FAOE

Reappearance of Infantry. 1315-1500 Sixteenth Century III. Changes in Tactics. IV. The Swedish Army-Changes. 1523-1632 V. The Swedish Organization and Tactics. 1611-

10

CHAPTER I.

The Era of Cavalry.

378-1315

II.

.

1

.

—

.

.

.

VI.

VIII.

63 The Young Prince and King. -79 The Polish Wars. 1617-1625 Religious Phase. The Thirty Years' War. 1611-1617 •

.

•

.

86

1618-1625

IX.

~

The Danish

X. The Polish XI.

XII.

28

47

1632

VII.

22

Period.

Wars Wars

1625-1630

continue.

end. The Polish The Swedish Period begins.

.

.

1625-1627

1628-1629

.100

.

.

117

•

.

.

.131

January to June, 145

1630

XIII. Gustavus lands in Germany.

June to August, 157

1630

XIV. Gustavus attacks the Enemy. September to 172 December, 1630 January, XV. Winter - Quarters at Barwalde. 192

1631

XVI. Gustavus and Tilly manceuvre.

February to 201

April, 1630

215 XVII. Magdeburg. September, 1630, to May, 1631 June and XVIII. Gustavus advances to the Elbe. •

229

July, 1631

XIX. Tilly invades Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. gust, 1631

Au244

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

xiv

XX. Breitenfeld. September 17, 1631 257 XXI. Towards the Main. September and October, .

.

.

1631

272

XXII. Mainz. November, 1631 288 XXIII. To THE Danube. December, 1631, to April, 1632 301 XXIV. The Crossing of the Lech. April 15, 1632 312 XXV. The Reappearance of Wallenstein. January .

to JxfNE, 1632

325

XXVI. NiJRNBERG. July and August, 1632 XXVII. The Assault on the Alte Veste.

.

341

.

.

September,

1632

353

.364 XXVIII. Sparring. September, 1632 XXIX. Back to Saxony. October and November, 1632 373 .

XXX.

LuTZEN.

November

.

.

1632

16,

386

XXXI. The Man and Soldier XXXII. Nordlingen. 1633-1634 XXXIII. Cromwell.

XXXIV. TuRENNE.

XXXV. CoNDE

398 412

1642-1651 1634 TO August, 1644

AT RocROY.

May

19,

XXXVI. Freiburg. August, 1644 XXXVII. Mergentheim. May 5, 1645 XXXVIII. Allerheim. August XXXIX. CoNDE AT Dunkirk. 1646

XL. XLI. XLII. XLIII.

XLIV.

XLV.

5,

421

....

1643

.

.

.

.

.

.

437

.450 458

.

1645

.

.

.

468

.478

.

September and October, 488

.

.497 TuRENNE AND Wrangel. 1646-1647 War ends. 1648 .507 Years' The Thirty 1650-1656 519 against Turenne. CoNDE 540 Arras and Valenciennes. 1654-1656 Dunkirk. The Battle of the Dunes, 1657. May 553 AND June, 1658 Army Organization and Tactics Early Seven669 teenth to Early Eighteenth Century .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.582 XLVI. Turenne in Holland. 1672 592 XLVII. MoNTECucuLi. 1673 XLVIIL Senef, August 11, and Sinsheim, June 16, 1674 602 XLIX. Entzheim, October 4, 1674. Turkheim, January .

5,

L.

.

.

.

.

614

1675

Turenne's Last Campaign.

1675

•

633

CONTENTS.

TAB] LI.

The

Siegt^ of

-

.

1683

LII.

Lux':;mburg a

;at.

LIII.

Pkince Euge:

st

LIV. Eugene agai

xv 645

1690-1693

Catinat.

.eroi

.

.

655

.

1701

.

.

and Vendome.

1702

681

LV. ViLLARS.

1703

697

LVI. Marlborough and Eugene.

August 13, 1704 LVIII. Eugene and Vendome. 1705 LIX. Ramillies. May 23, 1706 LX. Turin. September 7, 1706 LXI. OUDENARDE AND LiLLE. JuLY

1704

LVII. Blenheim.

.

September

11,

709

.

.

723

....

737

750 757 11

AND OCTOBER

1708

LXII. Malplaquet. LXIII. Spain.

668

1701-

1709

22,

....

1704-1710

769. 792

810

LXIV. ViLLARS AGAINST MarLBOROUGH AND EuGENE. 17101712

LXV. Charles

817

XII.

1700-1709

Appendix A.

Some Modern Marches

Appendix B. Index

Casualties in Some Modern Battles

831

849 .

.

.

850 853

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

Portrait of Gustavus,

after

Van Dyke (Munich Gallery) Frontispiece

(15th Century)

Knight.

7

(15th Century)

Knight.

Knight

6

(13th Century)

Dismounted Knight.

Knight.

7

(13th Century)

Armor.

in

(12th Century)

8

....... ........

(16th Century)

Swiss Halberdier.

Swiss Sergeant Halberdier

(16th Century)

Swiss Pikeman.

Lance and Halberd Heads.

Swiss Pikeman.

12

(16th Century)

(15th Century)

Genevese Mercenary.

...... ...... .....

(16th Century)

(15th Century)

Bernese Soldiers.

11 11

(16th Century)

Swiss Captain.

9 11

English Long-bowman.

(14th Century)

English Long-bowman.

(14th Century)

.

.

-^

.

.

.

.

.

.

.12 13 13

14

.14 14

Cross-bowman.

(12th Century)

15

Cross-bowman.

(12th Century)

15

Cross-bowman.

(15th Century)

15

Cross-bowmen.

(15th Century)

16

Hand Gun Bombard

of

Big Cannon. Bombardelle.

French Gun.

Hand

18

Rhodes

(calibre,

22

in.)

(15th Century)

(loth Century)

(15th Century)

Bombardelle.

Mounted Culverineer

......... ........

(15th Century)

18

18 19 19

19

19

Cross-bow.

(15th Century)

20

Cross-bow.

(loth Century)

20

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xviii

Haud

Culveriu, 1480

21

Arquebusier, 1507

.

.

(14th Century)

Officer.

Dauzig Citizeu Soldier (taking oath)

32

(16th Century)

Lansquenet.

21

27

33

Musketeer, 1572

33

.34

Pikeman, 1534 Pikemau, 1572

34

Grenadier, 1696

35

Officer of

French Foot, 1647

Arquebus and Rest.

35

(16th Century)

36

Musketeer, 1630

36

Museum Wheel-lock, Stockholm Museum

37

Match-lock, Stockholm

.... ..........

Pistol Flint-lock (1613),

Early Bayonets

Stockholm

English Soldier (unequipped)

German

Officer,

Museum

39

...... ....... ...

(17th Century)

Croat Siege-guus, Stockholm

Museum

Museum Gun, Stockholm Museum

Thi'ee-pounder Regimental Gun, Stockholm

Three-pounder Leather

38

39

.

1630

Dragoon, 1616

Hungarian Irregular.

37 37

.

.

.

40 40 41 42

43

.43

Early Mortars

44

Early Mortar

44 46

Culverin, 1500

Suit

worn by Gustavus

at the Dirschau

Combat

.

.

.

.49

Swedish Musketeer Swedish Pikeman

50

.......... ....... .......... ........ .

Swedish Officer Swedish Cuirassier

50 51

52

Swedish Ensign of Cuirassiers

53

Cannon suggested

62

Axel Oxenstiera

Sweden and the Riga Arquebus.

in the

15th Century

Baltic

(16th Century)

68 71

82

85

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xix

The Bohemian Revolt

91

95

Tilly Tilly's

MancEuvres

Baden

in

97

Halberd with Gun (16th Century)

Map

99

Denmark

Christian of

103

of Danish Period

104

105

Walleusteiu Stralsund, partly

Genevese. Polish

from an old plan

(16th Century)

Horseman

.

Ill

116

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.118

.

The Vistula-Oder-Elbe Country

120

Danzig and Vicinity

122

Mewe

Operation at

Stuhm Operation Albanese Horseman The Landing-place

124 138

..........

Oder-Elbe Country

162 of Thirty Years'

War

171

174

Ribnitz

The Attack on Garz "

158 160

Stettin

Pikeman

144

Advance Pikes

!

Swiss Pikehead.

188

"

191

(15th Century)

200

Demmin

202

Frankfort

211

Halberd Head

214

Magdeburg

221

228

(15th Century)

Swiss Sword.

The Werben Camp Burgstall Operation

.......... ........ ........ .........

Horse and Equipments used by Gustavus Elbe-Main Country

at Liitzen

.

.

.

239 241

243 245

Leipsic and Breitenf eld

249

Brigade and Half-brigade

256

The Armies

262

in

Line

Battle of Breitenfeld.

Gustavus, by

Van

(2d Phase)

Mierevelt

The Main Country

267 271

284

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

XX Mainz

292

Landskneeht.

(16tli

Century)

Statue of Gustavus Adolphus in Stockholm

300 .

.

.

.

.311

The Upper Danube Country

313

Crossing of the Lech

315

(15th Century)

Match-lock.

324

•

Nurnberg

338

Arquebus.

(16th Century)

340

The Rival Camps

342

(16th Century)

Swords.

352

Gustavus Adolphus, from Augsburg bust

363

A Burgundian.

372

......... ....... ..........

(15th Century)

Region near Liitzen

378

Gustavus praying before Liitzen

385

Battle of Lutzen

387

Musket

(16th Century)

Battle-axe.

Fusee Arrows

Battle of Nordlingen

397 411

417

French Sergeant, 1630

420

Cromwell

424

Battle of Marston

Moor

425

Battle of

Naseby

428

Battle of

Dunbar

432

Battle of Worcester

434

Pistol Sword.

436

(16th Century)

Turenne

440

The Rhine Country

446

Freiburg

448

.

French Halberdiers.

Condd

at

Rocroy

.......... (15th Century)

Battle of Rocroy"^

.

French Musketeer, 1647

449

450 452

457

Freiburg Battles ^

459

Philipsbiirg

464

.....

French Infantry Soldier, 1660 Operation of Mergentheim Battle of

Mergentheim

French Dragoon.

^

(17th Century)

.467 471

473 477

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xxi

....... .........

479

Nidda Operation

499

Kirchheim Operation

.... ........ ........

502

Battle of AUerheim'

Norman

(7th Ceutury)

Soldier.

Vicinity of Dunkirk

Dunkirk Crusader's Cannon

Breech-loading Portable Gun.

Zumarshausen Operation Battle of Lens

.

.

.

Three-barreled Carbine.

(15th Ceutury)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

(16th Century.)

Belgium and Northern France Battle of

Champ

Blanc

Vicinity of Paris

Battle of St. Antoiue

.......... .........

Campaign on the Somme

.

.

.

.

.

.

...

.

.

Dunkirk and the Battle of the Dunes

.

.

.

.

.

(15th Century)

French Dragoon.

(17th Century)

Army

on the March

Pistol

Sword.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.... ... .

(16th Century)

(late in life)

Corps, 1688

.

.

......

549 552 559 568

581

585

593

601

.603 .

.

.604

Sinsheim Operation

607

Battle of Sinsheim

Entzheim Operation

536

595

".

Battle of Senef.'

French Musketeer.

528

530

591

Turenne-Montecuculi Operation

Du

526

574

Montecueuli

Condd

520

546 .

(16th Ceutury)

Garde

515

518

542

............

Sword.

506 508

539

.

Pistol

.

........

Operation on the Scheldt

Holland

.

(15th Century)

Arras

Knight.

496

525

Paris-Orleans Country

Valenciennes

489 491

523

Operation of Gien

Portable Gun.

487

610

.......... (End

of 17th Century)

613

619

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xxii

.........

Battle of Entzheim Tiirklieim Operation

620 627

Turkheim 7

Battle of

630

(16th Century)

French Carbine.

Campaign

632

.........

Terrain of 1675 Campaign of 1675

Mounted Arquebusier.

634

.

635

(16th Century)

644

Vienna-Ofen Country

646

Turkish Soldier

647

.......... ......... ........... ............ ......... .......... .......... ..........

Turkish Soldier

'.

Siege of Vienna

651

Polish Cavalryman

653

Luxemburg

656

Battle of Fleurus "

657

Catinat

658

Battle of Steenkirke

,,

648

660

Battle of Neerwinden

663

Battle of Marsaglia

666

French Musketeer.

-

(17th Century)

Prince Eugene

Zenta Campaign

.

North Italy

Chiari Operation

Vendome

/'

Battle of Luzzara

Duke

of

Marlborough

French Cannon.

The Rhine-Danube Country Cannon Royal. French Mortar.

(16th Century)

Battle of Blenheim

Four-barreled Gun.

(16th Century)

Battle of Cassano

The Line Culverin.

........ ....... ........ ......

(16th Century)

Assault on the Schellenberg

671

672 676 682

686 689 692

(16th Century)

Villars

667

696 700 702 708

714 722

725 736 740

Dyle

747

(16th Century)

749

of the

Battle of Ramillies

752

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Northern Italy

The

Battle of Turin

xxiii

•......,.

758 763

(16th Century)

Pike Breaker.

768

Battle of Oudenarde

776

Brussels-Lille Region

,

783

Siege of Lille

785

Battle of Malplaquet

801

Bombard.

(15th Century)

Spain

809 811

........... ........

Heavy Cavalryman. Douay Region

(16th Century)

816 818

Quesnoy-Landrecies Region

824

Roofed Gun.

830

(16th Century)

Campaigns of Charles XII

832

Narva

834

The Dwina

837

Pultowa' Russian Soldier

Turkish Soldier

.......,,.

846 847 848

;:

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

THE ERA OF CAVALRY. As

the ranks

became

high estate.

Hand

into fashion,

and

to

filled

hand

ballistic

with mercenaries, the

tactics

in efficiency

beyond the

tect the vast frontier of the empire, cavalry

proved that horse could ride down

German

honorable.

foot,

cavalry, enlisted

and the footmau sank into

Roman

came

legionaries,

to be essential.

by the emperors, proved

in their great raids there

knight,

who

tactics or strategy, in

The Teutonic

was

in line of

and to proAdrianople

its

preeminence,

While the western nations

hard knocks, the Byzantines kept up a species of military

but discretion ranked higher.

little horse.

for centuries reigned supreme.

art,

relied

— one

at the

up

set ries

He knew

equaled his courage.

enemy, in

— and

which valor was

Useful in holding back the Moor,

but one

tactics,

— to charge

he was frequently routed by bad ground.

succeeded the knights, but were no better.

war

Of strategy and

of sieges.

Crusades were full of prowess

;

prized,

Feudalism introduced the mailed

deep squares, and accident often decided the day.

castles led to a

on

of form

races depended on stout infantry

the Viking and the Magyar, he was not a soldier in the best sense stability

its

and mounted service became the more

insignificance.

and stratagem, rather than pure

from

legion fell

gave way to missile weapons, the bow came

machines and portable stakes appeared

The barbarians grew

battle.

378-1315.

his in-

;

straight

Armies were

Armored mercena-

Feudalism called for tactics there

castles

was none.

The

they gave us no military lessons, except that of

blind devotion.

The

feature characterizing the history of the art of war,

from the mation,

fall of

is

the

Koman

empire to the era of the Refor-

the rise of cavalry as the main reliance of nations,

and the corresponding decadence lasted for

many

of infantry.

This condition

centuries, until the English long-bow

and the

THE LEGION DEGENERATES.

2

Swiss pike and halberd, coupled to the growth of firearms, again reduced the horseman to his true level. essential

arm

quite displace

Cavalry

is

an

even the rapid-firing weapon of to-day cannot

;

it

but

;

neither fitted to stand alone, nor

Only when the footman

to dominate infantry.

reliance of the

is

it

commander can

the main

is

the art of war reach

its his^hest

development.

We zenith

have seen how the

when

Roman

legion,

which was

at its

the burgess-soldier's stanch courage put a term

to Hannibal's splendid bid for the conquest of Italy, degen-

erated by easy and natural gradations until

mercenary body, unable

In proportion as

of the peninsula.

became burdened with and

lost so

much

ballistic

of its

became a merely

it

to cope with the barbarian invaders it

forfeited character

machines,

marching speed

that, to

forces which could effectually be transferred

it

grew unwieldy,

it

have at hand

from one

threat-

ened point on the enormous imperial frontier to another, the

Emperor Constantine began from each legion

its

to increase the cavalry

by taking

auxiliary turmai, and collecting these

into large bodies destined to serve alone.

The enemies armed savages had been

of

Rome, moreover, were no longer the

brawn,

—

Their weapons and accoutrements

of yore.

vastly improved

legion could not slash still

less

ill-

its

by contact with the empire, and the

way through a body of mere human its own diminished stanchness.

so with

That the old Roman quality had perished was abundantly proven by the numerous

ballistic

machines, and by the beams

and stakes carried along on pack-mules, not

for the ancient

purpose of intrenching the nightly camp, but to save the legion from cavalry attacks

on the

field

of battle.

These

supplementary engines and tools meant that the legion had

been reduced to an un-Roman defensive. In the battle of Adrianople (a. d. 378), the Gothic squad-

CAVALRY DESTROYS AN ARMY.

3

rons accomplished what cavalry liad never compassed since

Hannibal's Numidians waded in the gore of Cannie,

Roman

destroyed a

the belief that

than on ride

it

army.

was more honorable

foot, for the

down

Goth had found

Roman

the vaunted

— they

This battle was the capstone to

on horseback

to fight

that, unassisted,

While

legionar}'.

due more to the deterioration of the foot than

he could this

was

to the meliora-

tion of the horse, yet while the latter continued to gain, the

former continued to

For a thousand

lose.

cavalry was uppermost.

It naturally

long-bow of the hardy British yeoman

French chivalry

Adriauople made longer uphold the

With

it

this lesson in

—

mowed down

the empire.

until the

the super-

evident that the legions alone could no

supremacy.

mind, Theodosius began to enlist bands

and from now on the Roman

soldier quite

and the barbarian horseman became the

lost caste,

come

the supe-

at Crecy.

Roman

of Teutonic chiefs,

j^ears to itself

became and remained,

rior of foot, as indeed it

cilious

deemed

Indeed, he proved his right to the

title

pillar of

by riding

down the veteran Gallic legions which had risen under Magnus Maximus, and by more than one other noteworthy deed of prowess.

Another change soon became apparent.

man, already used

to the support

The Roman

of ballistic

foot-

machines and

portable stakes in the line of battle, began to rely more and

more on

missile weapons,

quarters.

The bow

ages

;

;

but

it it

to discard the

for the first time

Not but what the bow cavalry

and

is

arms of

close

became a Roman weapon.

an admirable arm, especially against

has asserted

itself

was a new thing

at intervals

to see the

Roman

from remotest legionary take

kindly to long-distance weapons, and a thing to excite one's pity.

Cavalry reigned supreme.

At

a later

day the Gothic horse-

BYZANTINE ART.

4

man

rode to and fro throughout Italy, and

Roman

that infantry, such as the

was no match for the best

further proved

had then become,

legion

mounted

of

still

troops.

All Europe

soon vied in arming and training cavalry, and infantry sank to a

still

lower

defend walls.

It

level.

was

fit

only for garrison duty,

—

The Roman cavalry ended by adopting

to

the

bow, and became the same body which had annihilated Crassus on the plains of Mesopotamia.

Horse-archers and

The

horse-lancers were the choice of the day.

latter, the

heavy squadrons, were more unwieldy, but they were able at

down

least to ride

It

the Oriental horse-archer.

was thus arose

all

over Europe the idea that cavalry

should be the chief and only arm service alone

was honorable

;

the idea that

mounted

the idea that the footman

;

was

a sloven and a coward.

The Byzantines

were, in matters military, the legitimate

successors of the old

Roman

empire.

Their armies for cen-

back the barbarian inroads from the east

turies held

were, during their

life,

the best of their kind.

;

they

They have

been much disparaged by historians, and in a sense

it is

that the Byzantines were not successful

all that,

but for

;

true

they had an art in their wars, while in the west of Europe

thews and sinews won the day. of the

Frank appeal

to our

And

Saxon

than the ambush, stratagem

while the doughty blows

instinct of manliness rather

and

studied method

of

the

Byzantine, yet the latter showed more intelligence in what

he did and in the way he did

main

to us

from

this era,

it.

Several books of tactics

and the means of successfully com-

bating the various races that might be met or

Saracen

eastern

— were

re-

— Frank, Magyar

assiduously discussed.

emperors did succeed

in

holding

Moreover the their

territory

against western assaults for generations.

The strength

of the Byzantines lay in their heavy cavalry.

THE PERIOD OF CHAOS. and

up

this tliey set

two

in

and a knowledge of how

discretion

showed a higher kii held

to utilize varying condi-

were deemed a better quality.

not so highly consider'"

as

'

Bull-headed pluck was

was in the west

it

of soldierly ability,

;

— even

A

place in the Byzantine scheme.

its

whose three

reserve,

Courage was valued highly, but

successive shocks tokl well.

tions

and a

lines

5

stratagem treachery

similar tendency

was shown in the seventeenth century in the preference manoeuvres over battles

of

and was not Hannibal called per-

;

fidious because he resorted to ruse in his unequal struggle

Rome ?

against ponderous

Despite these

facts,

which sound

worse in the telling than they actually were, the Byzantines,

war

so far as an art in ries

is

concerned, were a half dozen centu-

ahead of any nation in the west.

From

the era of the Byzantine empire onward for

centuries

it is

war or the mislead. little

—

impossible to speak with

History there

art of war.

Of war there was much as we understand it, none

—

is

none

of art in

;

many

much accuracy about

until

;

chronicles

war there was

Gustavus Adolphus

asain infused method into what others had done with no

method

at

of Csesar

all. :

Strategy had rarely shown

and never rose

to the

rank

of grand-tactics.

If a

to the

of originality

work he had

and

infantry, not horse, ;

was

It

was Gothic

which marched down the Italian peninbut

it

was the cavalry

Narses which jn-oved fatal to them

;

and

of Belisarius

and of

for three centuries

the Franks kept increasing their proportion of

The

to do, he

skill.

All nations did not go to war mounted.

sula under Totila

tribe,

commander

to pattern his battle-tactics to the gi-ound

on which he fought and

deemed a marvel

the days

was whatever suited each nation or

tactics

was able enough

itself since

mounted men.

bulk of the Teutonic forces remained foot

;

and while

Charles Martel and Charles the Great had a goodly array of

THE FEUDAL KNIGHT.

6

cavalry, their armies were really infantry, supplemented to a

moderate extent by horse.

When and the

kingdom

the

local counts

of Charles the

began

Great was broken up

to acquire a semi-independence,

feudalism arose, and horsemen acquired tance.

They had

their merits.

greater impor-

still

was they who kept back

It

that era from north, east and south. Without them Christendom might have been overrun no

the vast inroads of

;

wonder the knight

in

armor won the regard

of the whole earth.

In England the superiority of the horseman was not demonstrated until the battle of Hastings,

when William's

horse,

backed by his archers, did their share

in

overthrowing

Harold's

brave but reckless axemen

but

;

the superiority of the knight in

armor was as marked during the feudal period in Britain as

it

was

on the continent.

From

the establishment of feu-

dalism until the Swiss at Morgarten

and the

English

at

Crecy

proved the ability of good foot to withstand the best of cavalry, the Knight.

(15th Century.)

horseman was preeminent. not a good soldier

of discij^line

;

;

He

was

he had no idea

courage, a certain ability to use his cumbrous

weapons, and the sort of faith in his own invincibility which helped to render him invincible, were his only recommendations.

was

There was no art in what he

to charge

straight

at the

did.

enemy on

charged on good ground, no foe could

His only sight.

resist his

tactics

When

impact

;

he

but

he might end his gallop in a marsh, or against a palisade.

At Mansoura,

St. Louis'

knights were entangled in the streets

— CUMBROUS ARMIES. The

a town and utterly worsted.

of

kniglit

was ignorant

was formed " battles

emy

;

Each army

of art.

in three

great columns or

" these galloped

upon the

tussle of hours,

en-

and, after a

similarly marshaled,

one or the other would

be forced back, often by an accident of terrain or on account of leader.

To

set

the loss of a

a successful ambush was

a rarity which was applauded as a wonder.

For many centuries armies moved

Dismounted Knight. (13th Century.)

into the enemy's territory, not to secure

a strategic point, but to ravage the land and secure plunder

from the harassed people.

Victualing by any method was not

attempted, and so soon as one section was eaten out, another

must be sought, irrespective Battles were rare.

The

of

its

military value.

rival armies did

no reconnoitring,

and thus

at times scarcely

knew each other's whereabouts. They met by accident

more often than by

design,

and

not

infre-

quently sent word to each other to meet at a given spot and fight as

the

it

out,

had

Cimbri

in-

vited Marius to battle at Vercellae.

Even then

it

exceeded their ability to Knight.

day

to deploy

marshal their

forces

fair terms, for

it

on

(15th Century.)

a small marching column into

A modern army manoeuvres thrice as

rapidly.

took

all

line of battle.

; ;

RAIDS OR SIEGES. The feudal knight was

so utterly without discipline or reli-

ability that mercenaries gradually crept into favor.

mercenary was cast in the same mould armor,

;

But the

he was a

man

in

not a knight, and was

if

equally bold and useless, though

more

So long

loyal to his chief.

was paid, he would stay

as he

with the colors, which was more

than you could count on in the

The mercenary became

knight.

the support of autocratic mon-

archs Knight

in

Armor.

;

but when, at the end of a

war, bands of mercenaries began

(13th Century.)

to

of the country, seeking a

became

and fro over the face

and unquestionable danger.

called for castles

sieges rather than a

Many

to

lord and fresh campaigns, they

of questionable utility

The feudal system of

new

move

;

castles led to a

war of manoeuvring and

fighting.

day more

of these castles were to the armies of that

serious obstacles than Ehrenbreitstein or Gibraltar to a

ern force.

They began by being simple

they ended by being elaborate and

two ways of capturing them walls,

and to the

These

castles

gunpowder, ;

artillery

less

as this warrior

all skill,

were

adapted.

For generations after the inven-

had small

effect

on these

made

typical

work

;

solid

of the mailed knight

practically no impress on the art of

war, so the Crusades teach us no useful lessons. equally unpractical

ill

and reduced operations

than the ancient catapults and rams.

The Crusades were the and

There were but

which disregarded their existence, or to

a series of tiresome sieges.

feudal structures

solid.

mod-

in construction

starvation or undermining the

latter the mediaeval armies

robbed war of

to the scale of raids

tion of

:

war

each served

its

Both were

purpose, but neither war

THE CRUSADES.

9

nor warrior was worthy of imitation, unless less

devotion of the latter.

did feats of arms record

all

;

it

be in the guile-

There were abimdant and splen-

there was nothing to repay study.

the deeds of valor which war has evoked

record the history of the

human

race

;

our task

To

is

but to

is to

evolve

the history of the art of war from these deeds:

in

other

words, to separate from the mere acts of courage those

in-

stances of intelligent application of courage which have added to our

knowledge of what constitutes modern war.

The

thou-

sand years during which cavalry was the sole dependence of

Europe have

in this sense

few lessons for the military

student.

Knight.

(12th Century.)

;;

II.

REAPPEARANCE OF INFANTRY.

1315-1500.

who

It was the plucky peasant of Switzerland and Britain value of foot.

and

The Swiss

muscular grasp these weapons were

in their

reestablished the

carried an eighteen-foot pike, or a heavy halberd irresistible.

They fought

in

an echeloned line of three solid bodies, which cavalry could not break, nor the infantry of the day withstand, (1.31.5)

and they were hardy marchers.

(1339) one in the open later were

Only when broken could they be beaten, as they

field.

by the Spanish sword and buckler.

of the English long-bow, with

its

Eqiially splendid

;

Poitiers (1356)

proved that the day of infantry had come back. stakes could not be approached like other foot.

was not

invincible.

At Cr^ey

cloth-yard shaft.

utterly overthrew the French chivalry

was

At Morgarten

they destroyed an army of knights in a mountain pass, and at Laupen

by cavalry

;

was the record

(1346) this

weapon

and Agineourt (1415)

The long-bowman behind

his

when broken or on the march he

Swiss and Briton proved to the knight in armor that he Zisca's wagon-fort

was another link

the Hussites became a terror in Germany.

same chain

in the

The disappearance

of feudalism,

the growth of intelligence, and the invention of gunpowder all contributed to reestablish warfare as a science.

rausket

;

The cross-bow began

and the unwieldy knight gave way

kings gained power and raised their

own

to the

armies,

and toward 1600 conditions arose which might

to be replaced

more

by the

active footman.

As

war became more regular

rehabilitate the art of war.

It was the courage of the hardy peasantry of two western nations quite as

much

as the invention of

gunpowder, which

put a term to the ascendancy of the feudal knight, and reestablished infantry as the

arm which should bear

The English long-bowman with

of battle.

the brunt

his cloth-yard

shaft found that he could annihilate the best of cavalry

a distance

;

from

the Swiss pikeman proved that armored knights

could not ride

down

his steady array of protended spears.

These facts were a revelation, and at once modified the

posi-

SWISS PIKEMAN.

11

Each new development of shock and missile tactics. The Swiss array was a modern revival of the old tion of the

horseman in war.

represented

a

phalanx of Philip and Alexander; and, though the

bow was one

most ancient of weapons,

it

had never

yet been what the English

made it. The Swiss pike was

of the

yeoman

eighteen feet

long, with a steel head of from twelve

was grasped in

to thirty-six inches, Swiss Halberdier (leth Century.)

both hands, and held shoulder high, with a downward slant.

The

second,

third and fourth rank pikes protruded beyond the

front

;

application the sarissa of Macedon,

bled in length and

but

it

This arm resem-

the rest were held upright.

was

Around

differently held.

the central pen-

non of the Swiss column stood the halberdiers, who wielded an eight-foot heavy-headed

weapon which could cleave the best of armor, lop off

or even,

it is

arms or

legs,

said, decapitate

Without the up-

a horse.

land brawn and tremendous national spirit which inspired

the

Swiss,

these

even

however,

weapons

would have

availed nothing. It was hardy strength, the love of country,

and the Swiss Sergeant Halberdier.

instinct

which lent them

of

liberty

teri-or.

Swiss Pikeman.

The

Swiss were

rapidly

(IGth Century.)

SWISS TACTICS.

12

mobilized and swift on the march. early

Roman

Like the

legions, they always attacked,

wearing no armor, could

not

and

only keep well

ahead of the cumbrous armies of the day, but descend on the enemy's line with an impetus like the avalanches of their native hills.

They employed

light troops,

cross-bowmen, to skirmish ahead of the columns, and these retired into the intervals

when the charge was

opened.

The Swiss had no It

great generals.

was the courage and

steadfastness,

the weapons and skill of the

men

But they had an admi-

which won.

rable battle-field tactics.

They mar-

shaled three columns, Vorhut (van-

Swiss Captain. (16th Century.)

guard), Gewaltshaufen (power-mass)

and Nachhut (rear-guard), and launched them on the foe

in

echelon, with the advantage of successive impact, indepen-

dence of movement and the safety of each column from partaking of the repulse of another.

At

times the three columns

were marshaled with the centre or the

wings in advance,

a partial checker-wise forma-

The wedge and

tion.

hollow square, or

the

"hedge-

hog," showed that the Swiss

had

studied

the

tactical

Lance and Halberd Heads.

forms of antiquity.

(IGth Century.)

The

first

victory of

the

Swiss foot, at Morgarten in 1315, was not due to formation or

tactics.

its

superior

The feudal horsemen were lured

into

;

FOOT BEATS HORSE.

13

an icy mountain-pass, with a precipice above them on the

and a lake below them on the

right,

left

and here

:

they were destroyed by rolling logs

and bowlders down upon and thus hurling

their line,

them

into the gulf beneath.

This, coupled to a furious

attack

front

with

the

deadly halberd, gave the

no room to

knights their to

lances

in

set

rest,

or

swing their swords.

Morgarten

was not

battle

was a

;

and

prise

but

it

it

a

surBernese Soldiers.

butchery

(15th Century.)

opened the eyes

of the arrogant knight to the fact that, even

though he be afoot, a

man 's

a

man

for

At Laupen (1339) "^

infantry,

a' that.

the Swiss

unsustained

quite

f

and in the open

^

with

2

bristling pikes,

^

heavy horse backed by the

its

serried

field,

met,

ranks and

an array of

The

2

best infantry of the day.

[;

foot

was quickly dispersed,

2

and

all

power of the

the

armored knights could not drive the columns from their

ground.

Infantry,

dozen centuries of decay, had again proved

its

Bannockburn accomplished the same end of the world

and

in a different

way.

after

a

worth.

in another part

FOOT AGAINST FOOT.

14 It

was only by similar

tactics to their owii

— by dismounted

heavy cavalry, or by bodies of footmen formed on the same method, such as the Landsknechte of

Germany

— that

Later on the Span-

their match. iards,

met

the Swiss

with sword and buckler, found

that they could annihilate the Swiss

column,

the

like

if,

legionaries

against the phalanx at Pydna, they

could but once

penetrate a gap.

Foot could be matched by foot infantry had asserted

over horse, and

in

its

;

but

superiority

a combat

be-

tween the two arms, the pike was Genevese Mercenary.

useful

when sword and

shield

were

{15th Century.)

of

had a

distinct

What

no account

;

advantage over the Spanish

the Swiss column line.

placed a limit to the utility of the Swiss column was

the revival of castrametation and the improve-

ment

umn ill

A

of artillery.

adapted

carrying

to

works, nor could

under of

col-

with long spears was

well

cannon.

points,

-

it

live

salvos

plied

These weak

and yet more

inter-

cantonal jealousies, and a

consequent in English Long-

bowman. (14th Century.)

deterioration

discipline,

eventually

sealed the fate of the Swiss

English Long-

bowman.

array.

(14th Century.)

Of even more

interest

than the Swiss footman's mastery of cavalry

is

the wonderful

;

THE ENGLISH LONG-BOW. result obtained

by the long-bow

of the Englishman.

the reign of John, the cross-bowman

Whatever

ant.

its origin, it

long-bow into favor.

15

had been

was Edward

I.

Until

in the ascend-

who brought

the

At Falkirk (1298)

the long-bowmen did wonders, and while at

Bannockburn (1314) want

caused their overthrow, at

it

of support

was they who

Crecy (1346) proved to the haughty

chivalry of France that a arisen.

With

new

era had

their flanks protected

from

the charges of horse and their stakes set

up before them, the

line of

long - bowmen, vomiting

Poitiers

fire

of

(1356)

was cumulative

mony, and Agincourt (1415) made beyond

cavil

three-foot

be reached by the best of cav-

shafts, coidd not alry.

its

Cross-bowman. (12th Century.)

it

testi-

plain

that infantry was regaining

its

proper place in war.

That the French, victories against the Cross-bo'wrnan.

lish is

later in this century,

won

Eng-

due to the fact

(12th Centiiry.)

that they

had learned

to

enemy only at a disadvanand not when the long-bowman

attack the tage,

could put in his best work

upon them on the march

;

they

fell

in lieu of

Once

assaulting their chosen ground.

broken up, the long-bowmen were no

more invulnerable than any other they were in fact cavalry charges, or try led.

at

of

foot

the mercy stout

armed with good hand

to

of

Cross-bowman. (15th Century.)

infan-

hand weapons and vigorously

;

ZISCA'S WAGON-BURG.

16

That the knights recognized the growing value is

shown

well

of infantry

now

the fact that large bodies were

in

quently dismounted to fight on

foot,

and that with

fre-

their

heavy armor and weapons they could more than once bear

down

the

lighter

line

— provided

unmailed infantry,

of

always that they had not to march far or

The Germans learned another

fast.

lesson as to the efficiency of foot, in the Hussite wars

of

the

John

century.

fifteenth

was

Zisca

traordinary man.

an

ex-

He

well

understood that his

half-

armed, undisciplined peasant rabble, with religious

zeal,

all

could

their

not

cope with trained troops,

and

least of all

cavalry.

and with

bay,

he, too, helped teach the

tactics

grew

to the offensive,

over the land with more

and moved

centre

;

outside

this

would gallop up one

:

the

to

changed

and fro

to

charge

Hussites, in oj^en field, would

German army.

in five columns, the artillery

again two long ones.

rear

The

into the very teeth of a

marshaled

to

swiftness than their opponents

and woe betide the heavy horse which dared in on the wagon-burg.

tac-

This wagon-

to be so exact that Zisca's armies

from the defensive

march

wagon-

heavy-armed rider that the

footman, well used, was more than his equal.

camp

his

scheme developed into a science of defensive

fortress

at

(15th Century.)

Cross-bowmen.

tics,

with feudal

But he stood

They were

and cavalry in the

two short wagon-columns, and then

As by

magic, the short wagon-columns

form a front

line

and back

whole structure was lashed

to

form a

together

with

EXIT OF FEUDAL KNIGHT. chains or ropes

;

17

on each wagon niotinted

its

special squad

in the twinkling of

an

eye, almost a

of defenders,

and

Roman camp

in the midst of the enemy's battalions.

from out

this

lo,

camp would

whose fanatical fury was

sally

men

with

flails

and

And pikes,

So dreaded were they

irresistible.

that a handful of Hussites would sometimes disperse an army.

Nothing but

artillery could successfully

demolish these wagon-

burgs, and Zisca had always a superior equipment of guns

German armies

silence the enemy's.

This tactics was not within the domain

to face the Hussites.

of regular warfare of

means

man

to end,

but

;

it

finally

Internal dissensions

foot-

among Bohe-

broke up this remarkable method of defensive

But while

tactics.

was an instance of able adaptation

and a further proof of the value of the

jjroperly put to use.

mians

to

could finally not be got

it

existed,

it

worked towards the same

end of destroying the ascendancy of horse.

So long as the feudal power remained

in force, there

small chance of a revival of the art of war. satisfied

But

was

princes, dis-

with the untrustworthiness of the forces raised under

the feudal system, resorted to mercenaries, either in time of

war, or to protect their real or pretended rights against their

own

vassals.

plished

with

it

its

Feudalism outgrew

usefulness.

It

accom-

way to something better, taking who from one point of view is the preux

mission and gave

that warrior

chevalier of all the ages, bully,

its

and from another the typical armed

— the mailed knight.

References to explosive substances like gunpowder, or to

burning substances literally as old as

like

Greek

Moses.

fire,

Among

are to be found in works later references,

some of

the Brahmins of Alexander's time are said by Philostratus to

have been able to " overthrow their enemies with tempests

and thunderbolts shot from Syracuse,

is

their walls

;

" Archimedes, at

said by Plutarch to have " cast huge stones from

"

GUNPOWDER.

18

machines with a great noise " Ca-

his

;

ligula is stated by Dion Cassius to have had machines which " imitated thunder

Hand Gun.

;

and lightning and

emitted

and Marcus Graccus

in the eighth cen-

stones

tury gives a receipt of one pound of sulphur, two of willow charcoal and six of saltpetre, for the discharge of what

we

should call a rocket.

The use

of

Greek

fire

was understood as early

century, but powder was

as the sixth

earliest used in China, perhaps a

thousand years before Christ,

and was introduced

Euro-

to

pean notice by the Saracens. Schwartz nor

Neither

can be said to be

Early tury

in

its

Bacon

inventor.

the fourteenth

cannon

cen- Borabard

and gunpowder

of Rhodes.

Threw Stone

appear to have been known in Florence

made

of

them among the

the arsenal at

guns

Rouen

— are said

to

;

stores in the

and

in

1346

;

1338 mention

in

Tower g-uns

Calibre, 22

in.

Ball of 650 pounds.

of

is

London and

— perhaps

hand

have been used at Crecy.

It is certain that the

Spanish Moors, shortly after 1326,

had made the use of

gunpowder,

arms well

and

known

fire-

cannon in west-

ern Europe, and by the end of the cen-

tury they were the

common property of At first all armies. their high cost pre-

Big Cannon.

(15th Century.)

cluded their USC CX-

EARLY ARTILLERY. cept in sieges and the defense of towns

;

19 it

was

niucli later,

at the battle of Rosabeck, in 1382, between the

French, that tillery

At

field-ar-

appeared.

the end of the

fourteenth

century

guns

cast

were

of Bombardelle.

and

(ir)th

Century.)

and

copper

bronze, iron,

Dutch and

Some

called hombardce.

of these were

huge

speci-

mens, which consumed large charges of powder, and hurled stone balls of from one hundred to one thousand pounds

Mortars appeared in Italy about the middle of the

weight.

fifteenth century.

The French use

of

which

field

first -

made

artillery,

be trans-

could

ported in the army train. French Gun

That which accompanied

Charles VIII. to Italy in 1494 was, comparatively speaking, light,

rapid of

fell into line,

In the

fire

and well served.

Other nations gradually

and Gustavus made artillery of really light calibre.

ficfteenth

and sixteenth centupart of the

ries

infantry bore

fire-

arms. These were at first ly

extreme-

crude,

being

merely a gun-barHand

Bombardelle.

(loth Century.)

rel

stick

by a match

had

all

;

lashed

and

to

a

Mounted

Culveri-

neer.

set off

but by the end of the sixteenth centmy they

grown

to

have a lock, and the form of the weapon

began to approach the musket.

;

THE CROSS-BOW DISAPPEARS.

20

In the second half of the fifteenth century firearms and artillery

had become a necessary part

The feudal

an army.

equipment of

of the

organization was disappearing, and

power of kings received

the

more

recognition.

things combined to

Both these

make

possi-

ble a revival in the art of war.

Standing

armies had become

the rule, and war was no longer exclusive

the Cross-bow. (15th Century.)

sumed set

back to

discipline

its

proper function

;

its

prerogative

As

the nobleman.

of

infantry re-

sway and cavalry was

as artillery improved

and

was enforced, those conditions gradually obtained

on which Gustavus Adolphus exercised so marked an

influ-

Since the Byzantine art disappeared, there had been

ence.

no basis on which

to build such a thing as a science of

war

but a proper

was now

basis

formed.

By

the mid-

dle of the six-

teenth century cross-bow

the

disappeared, and

Cross-bow.

(15th Century.)

infantry

was armed with

pikes, halberds

and muskets.

musketeers were but ten or fifteen to a large the

number increased

At first the company but ;

until, early in the seventeentli century,

two thirds of the men were armed with muskets.

They

all

wore light helmets and breastplates.

The Dutch, tical

progress.

in their

wars against Spain, made marked

Particularly,

Maurice

of

tac-

Nassau improved

MAURICE OF NASSAU. the musket and lock,

made

rules for the footmen, introduced

the cadeuced step, and prescribed

and deployments. same

21

Other able

many evolutions, ployments

soldiers

were working in the

direction.

Hand

Culveriu.

(1480.)

Arquebusier.

(1507.)

;

III.

CHANGES IN TACTICS. — SIXTEENTH CENTURY. Heavy

horse had fought in column

was resumed. The foot was ployed of

then in one long ILae

;

huge squares

pikemen thirty or forty deep, with cross-bowmen or musketeers on the corners

As

or sides.

artillery

and firearms improved, the depth was reduced.

battles stood in line or checker-wise,

Up

between them. of battle

later it

;

and skirmishers operated

was mixed with

it,

From

and a reserve was kept.

;

was

Parallel order

it

invariable

;

Marches were

in close column, with

rewards

officers.

There was no

ransom then sprang up,

camps grew

into

discipline.

Uj) to about 1500 prisoners

brilliant.

vise.

Pursuit

action.

van and flankers, but at no

The

Food was got by plunder.

mercenary troops introduced rank and command

became the

;

those

who

raised the

killed

to the sad increase of the train.

;

the system of

Earthworks around

In besieging fortresses treachery was resorted

of besieging remained crude until the sixteenth century,

Prior to lip

improved

tlie

it,

and engineering began

sixteenth century

heavy cavalry in one long

grew up

it

when

to,

and

The

art

the Italians, and

to take on a better form.

had been a habit

line (e/i haye).

The

to

The

foot

draw

rule then

of marshaling all cavalry in solid columns,

opened in order to use their firearms.

use

men

Punishments were Draconic

had been

the ancient siege devices were used until the introduction of artillery.

later the Dutch,

was

fell to the

the lines were cumbrous, and battles

The tram was enormous.

great distance.

the six-

Artillery

delayed their marches, and always

were bloody because the troops once in could not be got out of

was unknown.

and

to the fifteenth century the horse stood in front of the line

too heavy to follow troops victor.

These

in front of

teenth century the cavalry was put on or beliind the flanks.

of

column

later the

;

into big battalia or " battles,"

which

was likewise

marshaled in heavy squares, called battalia or "battles."

The cross-bowmen,

later the musketeers,

rear ranks of these battles, and a rest of

file

formed the front and on each

them were posted on the four corners

flank.

The

in bodies, of

1

«

which,

when

men

23

the front rank had fired,

The depth

rest to load.

to forty

BA TTLES."

;

it

retired behind the

of these battles long remained thirty

but as artillery became more dangerous, early

in the seventeenth century,

men, and even

As

to five.

was reduced to ten and eight

it

a general rule, the pikemen and

halberdiers fought in close, the cross-bowmen and musketeers in open, ranks

hand

in other words, the long-range

;

and hand

The

fighters kept to their appropriate formations.

was opened by volunteers, or men chosen by

lot

to

fight

{enfants

perdu8^ forlorn hopes), who skirmished out in front, and

though they

rallied in

groups in case they were attacked by

cavalry, they were often ridden down.

In line of

was wont

to

battle, the cavalry,

up

to the fifteenth century,

be in front, the foot in the rear.

Later, the

columns of foot were for mutual support mixed with those of horse in the same line, as the it

fire

of the cross-bowmen woidd,

was thought, make the work of the horse more easy

reserve of heavy horse

and foot was kept in the

rear.

and a

;

C^rom

\

the sixteenth century on, the foot stood habitually in the centre, the cavalry

was no

on the flanks, or behind the flanks.

The

set battle-order.

battles

were placed

There

wind

and,

if possible,

with the sun and

in the rear.

The

artillery

was placed

in batteries at

any commanding

part of the line, and the horses or oxen which dragged sent to the rear.

were

it

It could neither follow the troops in a vic-

tory nor sustain an advance, and in case of disaster was sure to fall into the

lery

grew

enemy's hands.

in importance

:

its

Despite these demerits,

advantages outweighed

its

artil-

short-

comings.

The introduction

Open

of firearms brought about

many

/

one con-

in

tinuous line, or checker- wise, or at times in concave order.

Open ground was sought

/

changes.

order became essential, and cavalry looked on

its

fire

1

;

RANK AND COMMAND.

24

The horsemen awaited

as superior to the cold weapon.

charge and received a charge the though,

if

men

a

with salvos of musketry, while during

it

stopped to

fire

without firearms, they

a volley, or often several

still

charged as of

and fought on

dragoons dismounted

The

foot.

fought in open or closed order, according as

The

old.

infantry

bore missile or

it

close-quarter weapons.

The

rival lines

were slowly formed behind a cloud of

Duels between cham^Hons or small bodies were

mishers.

was almost invariable

Parallel order

quent.

skir-

or turning^

movements were rare or

fre-

flank attacks

;

In the four-

accidental.

teenth and fifteenth centuries battles were often sanguinary,

and ended

in the annihilation of one army.

Firearms reduced

the casualties because battles were sooner decided.

was almost never undertaken.

It

Pursuit

was in fact a traditional

habit to remain three days on the field of victory, to celebrate the event and to divide the booty.

Marches were conducted allowed

;

the

in as

heavy columns as the roads

cavalry and foot were mixed

Van- and

strongly escorted, was in a separate column.

guard and flankers were put

out,

the artillery,

;

rear-

but at no great distance.

The baggage-train grew enormously in size non-combatants and women accomjpanied the army in almost incredible numbers, and the soldiers were followed by their prisoners and Combooty, in whatever fashion they could be transported. pared to the orderliness of an army of to-day, the army of ;

three hundred years ago was worse than a mob.

During the feudal stand

it,

era,

rank and command, as we under-

did not exist; but the employment of mercenary

troops gradually evolved a system.

The monarch appointed

the army commanders and the colonels the latter selected as the captains captains the men who raised the companies ;

;

chose their lieutenants

;

and the men were often permitted to

RANSOMS. select the petty (or

25

non-commissioned)

This ancient

officers.

device was substantially the system which prevailed in raising

volunteer regiments during our civil war.

On

recruitment the

men were

expected to report with a

given number of days' rations, after which the prince they served was supposed to keep them in victual so

ill

but this was

;

done that plunder was the universal means of subsist-

There were no magazines until much

ence.

requisitions on the enemy's territory were

later

;

regular

unknown, food was

usually brought from the army's base, and this was a long and tedious process, whose irregularity forbade rapid manceuvres,

and gave

rise

Nor

plunder.

hunger and sickness,

to

was there any method

rule

ment was even more

Even

desertions

to

until long after regular armies

in feeding troojjs,

shiftlessly

and

had become the and

their pay-

conducted than the rationing.

so late as the fourteenth

and

fifteenth centuries the

feudal organizations showed no discij)line whatever

;

but the

growth of mercenary organizations made severer methods imperative.

Francis

I.

many made these

In the sixteenth, Ferdinand the Catholic in Spain,

and Henry

codes

II. in

France, and Charles V. in Ger-

codes of laws for their respective armies. the

Under

punishments were Draconic, and rewards

were allotted for courage and exemplary service

;

but unless

a general was able and much beloved by his men, no laws could keep up a discipline such as to-day we take for granted. Prisoners in feudal times had been habitually treated with

such cruelty that few escaped with their nobles could buy release.

But

little

by

little

lives.

som sprang up under which even the common hope for freedom. but

it

pered

Only the

a system of ransoldier could

This was a step in the right direction,

increased the train to a dangerous degree, and hamstill

further the

movements

of troops.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centm-ies armies camped

SIEGES.

26 without mucli

though the wagons were

artificial protection,

used as defenses

but firearms soon made

;

essential for

it

camps to be surrounded by earthworks, on which guns were mounted.

The

profiles of these

works gradually became more

marked, and bastions and outworks were the

artillery

parks were fortified

lest

erected.

Especially

the guns

should be

captured.

In attacking

fortresses, the ancient

towers, catapults

and

means

Greek

ballistas,

fire

of rams,

and

movable

like devices

remained in use until the introduction of gunpowder.

Walls

and contravallation were thrown up, and

of circumvallation

mining was commonly resorted

In the sixteenth and

to.

made in the cpnThese new methods,

seventeenth centuries great advance was

duct of sieges, especially by the Italians.

improved on

engineering.

of

up

in the Netherlands, led

Treacherous

dealings

to the

were

modern

first

art

essayed

with the commandant of a strong place, or with a friendly Secret escalade might be attempted.

party within walls.

neither was available, a regular

If

Trenches were dug, at

first

siege

Batteries were erected to

command

breaches were operated.

Powder was

mining

;

walls were

up the

from

fortress this

fire,

too costly to use in

made

in

antiquity.

threw burning substances

siege-lines, built

to disturb the operations,

selves

the enemy's walls, and

undermined by heat, as

The besieged kept up a heavy at night to light

was undertaken.

without system, later in zigzags.

sorties,

assaults with stubbornness.

outworks from which

and defended them-

To a

storm-captured

no quarter was given, and the defenders fought with

knowledge.

The wars

in the Netherlands in the last half of the six-

teenth century gave a great impetus to engineering.

Out-

works grew in extent and importance, and inner works were built to enable the besieged to hold the fortress even after

DAWN OF NEW

ERA.

Regular sieges were long drawn

the loss of the walls.

Trenches were opened beyond cannon-shot or saps nearer to

;

and breastworks

common their

command

the tops of the walls.

of our

Breaches were carried by

origin in these days.

The besieged

storming parties made up of volunteers. ually learned in a cruder

now jDut into use. The role played by

Many

mantelets, fascines, sand-bags, had

devices, such as

modern

at given distances took

All but the breaching batteries were

the place of parallels.

placed so as to

out.

covered trenches

;

way

all

grad-

the arts of defense which

are

exaggerated

;

it

the invention of

was an

gunpowder has been

not a cause

effect,

;

gunpowder was

but one manifestation of the growth of the world out of the

darkness of the Middle Ages

was another. intelligence,

It

was

;

the advance in military art

in reality the

dawn

of the

new

era of

the emergence from the ignorance which had

engulfed Europe for a thousand years, which lay at the root of all

redeem

these

improvements.

It

was time mankind should

itself.

Officer.

(14th Century.)

;;

IV.

THE SWEDISH ARMY-CHANGES. f

From Alexander

to Gustavus,

new

to Csesar, the art of

war

1523-1632.

rose to a great height

sank into oblivion; Gustavus re-created JW

it

Ancient arms were simple

direction to war.

from Caesar

;

Gunpowder gave a

armies needed no magazines,

;

When

nor trains to carry munitions, and everything tended to battle.

firearms

and cannon were introduced, the strong places where the munitions lay became so important as to be fortified,

munitions

;

raised

was heavy

artillery

could not be

made

decisive

by recruitment

Marked

or press-gangs,

tactical

and

siers

all

war was formal.

The

;

was fire.

still

deep

The musket,

shortened.

;

men

as a standing

but Gustavus reduced

The men wore

to dispense with the crutch-rest

finally the

first

pikemen gradually gave way to musketeers,

deployed to three deep to

The pike was

victories

;

Troops were

and their quality was bad. C Sweden

file

;

after

many

it

to

armor and a pot

light

grew

stages,

light

paper cartridges were introduced

The foot got organized into companies and command were settled. Fire grew more rapid, especially

bayonet was added.

regiments, and rank and

among

and

advance was soon made, and troops grew more mobile.

especially for light troops.

helmet.

;

regular army, drawn therefrom, had no mer-

its

Infantry was the bulk of the force

six, Avhieh

far from their

marches were slow and tedious

In France there were then but fifteen thousand

cenaries\

enough

Armies could not go

of sieges. ;

by pursuit

created a national militia, and

army.

and armies sought rather to capture these than

Hence a system

to fight battles.

the Swedes, but minor tactics

and dragoons

;

was

crude.

light horse existed in eastern

ized into cornets

and regiments.

Gustavus taught

it

Cavalry consisted of cuiras-

Europe only

all

;

Cavalry had grown to rely on

to charge at a gallop.

The Swedish

artillery

was organ-

its

firearms

was far ahead

of any other.

Gustavus made light and handy guns, which could keep up with

the troops and

fire

with rapidity

;

time the king used leather guns.

and h°

The

ii)Y°"*^°d ^-^pd ammiiTiitinn

artillery

was reduced

At

one

to a system of

regular calibres, and the handling of guns became a science.

It

is

desirable to review part of what has been said in

former volumes, in order to lead up to the military status of

Sweden, when Gustavus Adolphus was on the throne.

His-

ANCIENT ARMIES. tory shows us tliree

main periods to the

from remote antiquity

29

in the art of

war

Rome

decadence of

from

During the

first

period, the art of

work

first

the second,

;

during the Middle Ages, and down to Gustavus the beginning of Gustavus'

the

:

;

the third,

to the present day.

war under the Greeks and

Romans, and notably under Alexander, Hannibal and

Caesar,

attained a height such that, in view of the uncertainty in war-

and of the changeableness of

fare

tactics arising

from the

may be

said to dispute the

palm with that of the nineteenth century.

During the second

rapidity of

modern

period, the art of

invention,

war sank

it

became

intelligent

;

and

third period, the art of

rise, as

people again

to this rise the introduction of gun-

From

powder contributed.

and

to its lowest level, as letters

were forgotten, and began slowly to

arts

the genius of Gustavus in the

war acquired a notable impetus and a

which, invigorated by the great deeds of Frederick and

life

Napoleon, has brought It

it

to the present high development.

was the introduction of gunpowder into Europe which

gave the key-note to the new science of war, so different from that which obtained in

among

the ancients.

The two

periods

which war has really flourished, and which have been not

over three hundred years in length, were separated by a gap of

many

marked

centuries.

The

distinction

between the two was a

one.

The armies

of the

numerically large.

Greeks and Romans were, as a

rule, not

Their method of victualing troops was

such that food could be found almost everywhere, and

it

was

not usually necessary to establish storehouses of provisions or to bring rations

from a great distance.

ancients were simple, spears, darts

any

place,

of the

long

—

— could be readily manufactured

in

and those which did not

and arrows

and by the

The weapons

soldiers themselves.

military stores were unessential to an

army

last

Great arsenals of in the field

;

nor

;

ANCIENTS NEEDED ONLY TACTICS.

30

had powder and

ball, or other

ammunition, to be brought up

from the rear to supply the waste of

For

battle.

this reason

the ancients had no need of fortresses, or depots in their rear.

Communication with home was of

less

the introduction of gunpowder with reasons which

make

modern times were

importance than after machinery, and the

all its

the security of a base so essential in

to the ancients of

no moment whatever.

With the ancients battle was the one important feature. The nature of their weapons brought them at once into close To withdraw an army from quarters, and kept them there. battle with a moderate loss sible,

no

—

to all but the very

artillery to

things went

if

wrong was imposThere was

few great generals.

keep the enemy

at a distance

and arrest

his

pursuit while the beaten troops were retired out of action

and the possible

rival lines if

there

were too much intermingled to make

had been.

Adctory for one side

commonly

resulted in

for the other.

generals of antiquity needed no art except

The average

the art of fighting battles,

what we

Battles

and fearful massacre

this

call strategy

—

in other words, tactics.

was an unessential

They marched

art.

their armies out to a convenient plain in

To them

which to

fight,

and

everything depended on the victory they there might win.

The great

captains of antiquity were undeniably able strate-

gists as well as fine tacticians

of intellectual

them

common

;

sense,

but strategy

and

is

the very essence

their clear vision enabled

to see the advantage of doing that

reduced to rules and called a science,

which we have now

^ which

indeed

is

but

a collection of those things which the great captains have

taught us how to do.

In modern times, when the introduction of firearms, for infantry and cavalry alike, became universal; artillery

became

accompanied armies larger,

and they had

;

when

when much

their numerical force

to be fed

and supplied with

INDECISIVE VICTORIES. ammunition from magazines in

31

their rear, the importance of

these depots became so great that they were invariably turned into fortresses

;

and

an equal importance to

their vahxe lent

the lines of communication out to the

These

them.

lines

had

be protected at

to

their interruption for even a

the

army thus

cut

army depending upon all

hazards, for

few days might bring disaster to

off.

Again, the transportation of rations and material of war required long trains, and consumed

much

time.

The

loss of

a convoy or of a fortress was as harmful as the

loss of

a bat-

tle.

Thus

in a certain sense battles forfeited their original

importance, and people took instead to manoeuvring on the

enemy's communications or to capturing his fortresses. Victories, to be decisive,

orous pursuit der, loaded

;

must as a

by

rule be followed

and the armies of the early period

of

vig-

gunpow-

down, depending on depots, and followed by a

horde of non-combatants, often exceeding in number the arms-bearing men, were cumbrous and unsuited to pursuit.

A further

reason

why

battles

were followed by so

was that they were delivered only loss

on the enemy

— from

any ulterior purpose.

gain

to defeat, destroy or inflict

purely tactical reasons

The

little

art of

making

— without

battle subserve a

larger purpose in the general campaign-scheme, so that a vic-

tory shall be of due effect, was not then understood.

modern

times, of recent origin.

effort to

make war a

It

is,

in

Thus, though there was an

science, to reduce

it

to rides, the lack of

broader knowledge and the cumbrous method of the day ren-

dered the average campaigns, even up to the end of the seventeenth century, slow, long drawn-out and indecisive

;

full of

wrong, ill-digested methods, of a curious sort of formality or subservience to certain hard and fast rules.

Sweden was the

first

for herself a regular

and

country in Europe which built up at the

same time national military

MERCENARY

32 organization. small,

— had

to the king. tion, or

SOLDIERS.

In other countries what army there existed was originally served as a species of

guard of honor

In case of war, troops were raised by conscrip-

under a rude militia system, by voluntary or press-

gang enlistments, or by the purchase

of mercenaries.

In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the soldier of

fortune

was a typical character, equally useful

and unreliable

and dan-

in war,

gerous in war and peace alike. These

men earned

their livelihood

by arms

as a trade, not as a profession

expected' to live on their pay tions,

and they hoped

The

by plunder.

by

garrisoned

to

;

grow

free towns

their

they

and

citizens,

ra-

rich

were

who

were enrolled in a regular body for defense and policing of their

the city Danzig- Citizen Soldier (tak-

ing oath).

From an

;

in case they

needed additional

forces they resorted to mercenaries.

Sweden was a noteworthy excep-

old print.

tion.

As

early

as

the

sixteenth

century the Vasa kings laid the foundation of a national regular army, and Gustavus Adolphus perfected

it.

The

Swedish army was a pattern organization, in which there were no mercenaries.

It

consisted

of

a given number of

regular troops, raised, paid, fed and equipped by the state,

and back

The

of these stood a militia

kept up by the people.

regulars were intended for wars outside the national ter-

ritory, the militia for the defense of the fatherland

regulars were kept at full

The

raising of the troops

;

strength by drafts from the

and the militia.

was based on a careful system of

land-tenure, under which all able-bodied males from fifteen

years up were called into service

;

and Gustavus introduced

SWEDISH ARMY SYSTEM.

33

a novel method under which each soldier was supposed to

own and

to

be supported and equipped by a certain parcel of

land, rising in size

and imi^ortauce accord-

ing to arm and grade.

The

and

militia consisted of eight cavalry

twenty infantry regiments, each raised in

whole or in part in a given

own

and kept on foot

inhabitants,

expense of that

its

its

at the

The men

district.

liable to duty assembled

under

from

district

there

a given time

at

standard, and each district raised

from three hundred

King Eric

strove to

from each

set

of

to six

hundred men.

make

the conscripts

twelve

into

districts

regiment, but these proved too irregidar in

number

of three thousand to a regiment

to eleven

hundred and seventy-six

;

Lansquenet. (16th Century.)

a

The

size.

was

finally

early

reduced

and Gustavus equalized

companies and regiments.

The

was carefully

its full

drilled,

kept at

militia

com-

plement by annual drafts, and relieved

from taxes and some other burdens.

As

Sweden was poorly populated, and the militia contributed to the regular contino'ent

no more than twelve or

sand

men

ally compelled

to

fill

fifteen thou-

a year, Gustavus was eventuto

resort to mercenaries

his war-thinned ranks;

ments came to his army from

and

all

regi-

parts of

Germany, the Netherlands and England. Musketeer.

But the Swedes were the leaven

of the

(1572.)

lump.

The ization.

other nations of

Europe boasted no such

All middle Europe was

split

up

settled organ-

into petty princi-

;

INTELLIGENT ORGANIZERS.

34

a size which precluded armies worthy

palities, of

Of

the name.

Of

next.

German

the Catholic

were perhaps the best

lenstein's

;

troops,

German

the Protestant

Wal-

ranked

Tilly's

troops, the

Saxons were deemed to hold the palm, though they did not prove Hessians, and the

it

at Breitenfeld

army

;

then the

of Brunswick-Liineburg,

the latter being patterned on the Swedish.

mark had

pj'actically

at the time,

had only

no army system. fifteen

thousand

Den-

France,

men

as a

standing army, with cadres that could be increased to fifty thousand in case of

need, of

which ten thousand woidd be mounted.

This

was a mere fraction of what she called out under the Grand Monarque.

Though

there

had been

little

advance in gen-

eral military organization, the tactical

systems of the various coun-

tries

had improved.

Pikeman. (1534.)

Maurice

of

William and

Orange,

Spinola,

Henry IV. and Coligny each contributed something to the discipline and structure of troops

and Gustavus put on the capstone in the Swed-« ish

The wars

army changes.

lands and

Germany

in the Nether-

in the sixteenth

and

sev-

enteenth centuries had shown up the defects

which had come down from feudal times, and the bright intellects

among

riders

and

their

servants set themselves the task of supplying

the remedy.

But

to create a system

which

should permanently affect the art of war re-

mained for Gustavus Adolphus. Infantry, in the early part of the seventeenth

\1M~M~ Pikeman. (1572.)

PIKE AND MUSKET.

pikemen and musketeers, and with the

century, consisted of

from one third

efficiency of firearms the latter increased

two thirds of the dred and

fifty

35

In Swedish companies of one hun-

force.

men, there were

and

enty-five musketeers

to

sev-

fifty-nine

pikemen, the rest being petty and

commissioned keteers

The mus-

officers.

reckoned

were

as

light

troops, best fitted for scouting and

outpost service

;

they had a pot

helmet, a sabre and

The

a musket.

men were

pike-

the heavy

and

armed,

were

deemed superior

in

—

we

value,

what

should call the troops of

the

had

full

finally replaced

foot shaft,

Their eighteen-foot pikes

by

partisans, with eleven-

and two-foot double-edged head,

four inches in width.

Later, the length of the

and shaft appears

partisan

down

(1696.)

body-armor, and until the seventeenth

century thigh-pieces.

were

Grenadier.

They

line.

to

to not over eight feet.

have been cut Gusta\T.is fore-

saw that musketry was the arm of the future,

and gradually decreased the number ^5""" Foot.

men "^iTf^ (1647.)

as well as took

from the weight ° _

armor

to

add

between riflemen who

fired

hand grenades dates back was coined at the defense of

of their

_

to their mobility.

introduced entire regiments of musketeers.

of pike-

In 1631 he

The

distinction

guns and grenadiers who threw "

The w^ord " grenadier Eatisbon by the Swedes in 1G32,

to him.

FORKED REST.

36

when

who took

those soldiers

the risk of handling and easting

hand grenades from the walls were given extra pay for the riflemen could fire from behind cover as they could not. The ;

officers of

Bow-

infantry carried a partisan and a sword.

men

did not exist in Germany.

In 1623 Gustavus organized the Swedish companies of one

hundred and

fifty

men,

Four com-

in files six deep.

panies

made a

" squadron " or

battalion

;

eight

companies a

regiment

;

three

regiments

"great regiment Arquebus and Rest.

Some regiments

(IGth Century.)

up

set

a

or brigade.

enlisted in for-

eign parts had but one hun-

dred and twenty

men

to the comjjany.

The companies and

battalions stood in line with varying intervals between them.

The arming

of the infantry underwent a considerable There appears to have been a number of " double-

change.

pay " men (veterans)

as far

back as Eric's time.

and wore armor, and numbered

ried the pike

three fourths of the force.

They

The

and cross-bow,

old arquebus

heavy and clumsy, with their forked the

rest,

musket

needed a

were replaced by but

;

rest.

It

this

still

was provid-

ed with a match-lock, a device originally

the

missed latter

more

flint-lock, fire

;

reliable

which

than often

but gradually the

was improved, and drove

out the match.

About 1626

car-

at times nearly

Musketeer.

(1630.)

;

SUCCESSIVE GUNLOCKS. Gustavus lightened

tlie

musket

sufficiently to dispense with

and introduced the wheel-lock

the crutch,

37

and

;

in his

wars

against the Poles, not

/—irrii^^fl

above taking a hint

^\_

from any source, he resorted

Roman,

to

old

the

one might

or,

say, the English long-

bowman's

habit

having the

men

Matchlock.

(Stockholm Museum.)

of

carry sharpened palisades, not for camping,

but to erect a defense against the

behind which they could

Polish

upon them.

fire

from

lancers

This was a species of survival of

the musket it

finally

-

rest

became

only an iron-point-

ed rod (Stockholm Museum.

Wlieel-lock.

as

it

loaded

It

down

was carried after a while

the

men and

made

in

it

as-

the origin

in the train,

militated against rapidity.

The next important improvement first

to

have

cribed of the bayonet.

and

;

some

in firearms,

and

this

was

the

Swedish army, was the introduction of

paper cartridges. Of these the ried

men

ten,

with spare

and

ball,

car-

together

powder in

Pistol Flint-lock

Stockholm Museujn.)

car-

tridge-boxes or " bandoliers " slung across the chest from left

shoulder to right side

from right shoulder

;

while a sword

to left side.

56^(0 7 7

hung

The bayonet and

in a belt flint-lock

;;

ORGANIZATION OF FOOT.

38

were introduced in France some time after Gustavus' death

and the troops armed with

handy musket

this

though the name probably came

(^facile

from focus —

—fusil

fire,

Italian

The bayonet was mounted on

focile) were called fusiliers.

a wooden plug to be inserted in the bore of the musket.

made

first

It

appearance in the wars in the Netherlands.

its

Infantry, in all the European countries, finally got divided into regiments

and companies

numerical strength.

but these were of no especial

;

The company

occasionally ran

up

as

high as three hundred men, and the

regiment to over four thousand. tavus' regular regiments

were more uni-

The companies had one hundred

form.

and

Gus-

men, and eight

fifty

panies

made a

regiment.

to twelve

com-

In 1630 eight

companies were deemed a battalion or It goes without saying that

regiment. Early Bayonets.

the exigencies of active service often

changed

all this.

A note by Oxenstiern

which speaks of foot regiments varying between

exists

hundred and nineteen hundred men from four

to eight

much more.

companies

To one who

;

;

fifteen

cavalry regiments with

and they must have varied

has served with regiments which

from one thousand men would run down, in the course of a campaign, to two hundred or ation

;

less, this

seems a very small vari-

but Swedish recruits were used to equalize old regi-

ments, not to

make new

The Swedish

ones.

militia regiment

varied according to the population of the district in which

was

raised.

In the bulk of the countries of Germany about

two thousand men made officers

ter

it

uj)

an infantry regiment, and

its

were a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, quartermas-

and regimental clerk

;

a barber and one assistant,

were surgeon and apothecary

;

who

a provost-marshal and one as-

;

MORE RAPID sistant

;

a chaplain and one assistant

a judge advocate and

;

The infantry company had a

his clerk.

39

FIRE.

captain, a lieutenant,

an ensign, two sergeants, one muster-clerk, a quartermaster, an armorer, six corporals, two drummers and a service there were ninety to fifteen

upper and

fifer.

common

ninety-four

In active soldiers,

twenty-one lower file-leaders and four

muster-boys.

Loading and

firing,

with the constant

improvement in firearms, grew more rapid

and yet

it

took ninety-five to ninety-nine

" motions "

to

complete

the

operation,

though Gustavus had abolished a large

number

of

useless ones.

On

the other

hand, the minor tactics of the foot-soldier

was very crude, and was confined

to the

simple facings, wheelings,

ployments and de-

The

ployments.

solid

masses or phalanxes of the

Spanish style

mained

in

use by

English Soldier

re-

(unequipped).

all

but the Swedes, while Gustavus set up his

men

six deep, the

pikemen

in the centre,

the musketeers on the flanks or in small

intermingled bodies, and later three deep.

The cavalry

consisted of cuirassiers

dragoons, the latter fantry.

German Officer.

There had been mounted arque-

(1630.)

busiers, but

up

and

being mounted in-

Gustavus gave these weapons

in favor of lighter firearms in all cavahy regiments.

In the imperial armies were heavy cavalry, carbineers and Croats or Hungarian irregulars.

These three species of horse

were known by different names in different countries, and

TYPES OF CAVALRY.

4C

varied in them

came still

When Gustavus

all.

to the throne, the cavalry

was

considered the more honorable

arm; but the

nobility,

which grew

poorer as the commonalty gained in intelligence,

to

keep

this

were unable voluntarily

arm up

to its ancient

standard, and Gustavus was finally .

compelled to recruit his cavalry in the same

manner

was not strong ragoou.

As

horse-armor was discarded

efficiency,

more useful

in

as his foot.

It

Sweden were only

some thirty -five hundred mounted

(1016.)

troops.

the

;

carbine,

;

the firearm gained in the lance gave

and the dragoons, introduced

way

to

into the

Swedish army from Germany in 1611, were furnished with an infantry musket and dismounted to fight.

They were

really

bodies of infantry, comprising both musketeers and pikemen,

them

and mounted

to enable

move

They lacked

fast.

cavalryman's distinctive

to

the

boots

and spurs.

Yet they were not

bad cavalry

;

record as

their

The

such was good.

cuirassier

retained helmet, cuirass of front

and back

pieces,

sword and two

but from this time on

pistols

;

light

cavalry

has

constantly

gained in relative efficiency over

Hungarian Irregular. (ITtli

Century.)

the heavy.

Like

foot, the horse

was organized into regiments and com-

panies, the latter also called " squadrons " or " cornets."

The

Swedish cavalry regiments had a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

41

and major, a quartermaster, regimental clerk and a barbersurgeon.

Tlie cavalry cornet, or

company, had a captain with

four horses, a lieutenant and an ensign with three horses each, two corporals with two horses each, a quartermaster

with two horses, a muster-clerk, a chaplain, a provost, a barber, a farrier, each with one horse, two trumpeters and one

hundred and two common

and

men with

fifteen

dred and

one hundred

or, all told,

;

horses.

twenty-five

The strength

soldiers

one hun-

of the cavalry reg-

iments of other countries was very various, and the difficulty of procuring horses often dis-

mounted great numbers

of

The imperial companies

men. aver-

aged one hundred horses, the regiments eight hundred.

The Croat.

Swedish regiments of cavalry

had eight

cornets, aggregating one thousand horses.

The main was

its

trouble with the horse prior to Gustavus' day

slowness in charging.

when each rank would to reload.

The

light

It

would ride

successively fire

the enemy,

uj) to

and then wheel

horsemen served as scouts

;

off

the hea\y

cavalry lacked elan, never undertaking the true role of horse.

The Swedish

cuirassiers,

on the contrary, were taught to ride

at a gallop, to fire their pistols at speed,

naked weapon. in

any one point,

Gustavus' doing. discipline,

and then take

If they were superior to the it

was in

On

German

their better tactics,

and

to the

cavalry this

was

the whole, the Swedish cavalry, barring

was no better than the German

cavalry was not as good as the best

;

perhaps the heavy

German

squadrons, on

account of the smaller size of the Swedish horses, nor the light as o^ood as the Croat irreg-ulars.

;

SWEDISH ARTILLERY.

42

But there was no question artillery.

as to the superiority of

Swedish

Gustavus Adolphus introduced marked changes iu

arm, mainly by making the guns and carriages lighter

this

and handier, and by adapting their movements to those of the other arms and to the requirements of the battle-field. In this, as in all his military efforts, his

rapidity of

There were, according ship, field.

tons

;

motto was mobility and

fire.

to size, three kinds of

The twenty-four-pounder

the twenty-four-pounder field-gun

hundred pounds.

guns

:

siege,

siege-gun weighed three

only twenty-seven

The twelve-pounder siege-gun weighed a

ton and a half, the twelve-pounder field-gun only eighteen

hundred pounds.

The six-pounder

siege-gun weighed three

Siege-Guns. a,

Twenty-four pounder; calibre, 5 inches; weight, 6,000 pounds. (Stockhohn calibre, 4 inches weight, 2,600 b, Twelve-pounder Artillery Museum.) poimds. (Stockholm Artaiery Museum.) c, Six-pounder; calibre, 3.3 inches (Stockholm Artillery Museum.) weight, 1,700 poimds. ;

fourths of a ton

;

;

the six-pounder field-gun twelve hundred

pounds. There were also three-pounders and two-pounders for

The ship-guns were intermediate in heft. There was some variation in these measurements and weights. The

field

use.

heavy siege-guns took go into the

field.

thirty-six horses to

move, and could not

There were various patterns of guns, can-

;

A LEATHER CANNON. non-royal, culver 'ns, falconets, single

and

and mortars

liglit)

;

43

and double

but the latter were not

The

All these pieces w^re extremely unhandy.

heavy

(i. e.

much

used.

single cannon-

royal was twelve f oet long and called for twenty-four horses to transport

One

;

culverins needed sixteen.

of Gustavus' artillery officers, von Siegeroth, in doing

practice

and

it

work with gims, new had found

old,

that

"==^

shorter guns, properly constructed, fective.

were

equally

ef-

rz]

Three-pounder Regimental Gun.

In 1624 Gustavus

Calibre, 2.6 inches

;

weight, 450 pounds.

(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)

commanded and a year or three

old

all

unserviceable

later

men

and

ordnance to be recast into newer patterns

he himself contrived a gun which one horse

could handle to good

tended as a regimental piece later

two of them.

and the

It

cartridge,

wired to the

ball.

in-

was an iron three- and four-pounder,

which weighed

half, consisted of the

case,

;

This gun was

effect.

and eacl^ regiment had one and

less

than a pound and a

charge held in a thin turned wooden

This was the

first artillery

cartridge,

the original fixed

ammuni-

The gun was

tion.

after-

wards introduced into other

European armies

Not only

piece Suedoise.

had Tbree-pounder Leather Gun. Calibre, 2.6 inches

;

weight, 450 pounds.

(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)

it

as the

the virtue of lesser

weight,

but

its

cartridge

was always ready, and

it

could be fired eight times to six shots of a musketeer with the

awkward arm

of the day.

-Gustavus' merit thus lay in making guns which could be handled more like our own than the cumbrous ordnance then in use.

In the wars against the Poles he employed with

MORTARS.

44

leather cannon, a fact

profit the so-called

\s

hich shows

how

lacking in power the artillery of the day must have been.

These guns were invented in the early tw inties by Colonel

Wurmbrandt, and

consisted of a thin copT,er tube reinforced

by iron rings and bands, then bound with rope the whole covered with sole leather.

screw in and out, as discharges

it

set in cement,

The tube was made

grew heated by from eight

and had to be cooled.

shaped out of two oak planks.

The gun-carriage was

Three men could carry a gun,

which without carriage weighed ninety pounds, and was

Of

with a light charge.

mention made

and

to

to twelve

fired

fourteen of these cannon only

after being used in

is

1628-29 in Poland,

they disappeared in favor of the king's four-pounder castiron guns.

These

last

named

regimental guns remained in

common

use in Europe until

the artillery was reorganized

and

massed

The capacity

by Frederick. for

and the rapidity Gustavus'

evolutions of

batteries

fire

of

excited

universal admiration.

and canister were generally employed shot only in siege-guns.

Early Mortar.

Grape in the field-guns,

Gustavus used his

round

cannon in masses

EARLY ENGLISH CANNON. and the excellence of

as well as with regiments,

largely contributed J

to

his

successes.

Swedes was immensely superior any other European army /what

artillery

was

the king was the

;

into

Hand

more general use

;

German

of

fire-balls, etc.,

chemists

experts took

it

grew

made

came their

some-

to be

up, and the troops were

The regimental guns were attended by

better instructed.

panies for the reserve guns. the Swedes

show

used at the siege of

Artillery-practice

grenadiers detailed for the work

among

first

gTcnades, shells,

as the

discoveries.

thing of a science

first to

really capable.

in 1634.

many new

his artillery

This arm with the

in effectiveness to that of

Mortars throwing bombs were

Lamotte

45

;

;

and there were

special com-

Musketeers supported the guns

cavalry was wont to do so in the imperial

army.

In this connection the following extract from Holingshed's Chronicles, showing what English ordnance at the end of the sixteenth century was,

The names net,

may

not be uninteresting

of our greatest ordnance are

whose weight

is

commonly

two hundred pounds, and

and a quarter within the mouth. pounds, and his wideness

is

:

—

these

;

Minion

Falconet weigheth

five

hundred

two inches within the mouth.

Falcon

is

witliin the

poiseth eleven hundred pounds, and hath three

inches and a quarter within the

pounds, and

Rohi-

hath one inch

it

hath eight hundred pounds, and two inches and a half

mouth

:

mouth

;

Sacre hath sixteen hundred

three inches and a half wide in the

mouth

;

Demi-

Culverin weigheth three thousand pounds, and hath four inches

and a half within the mouth and

five inches

;

Culverin hath four thousand pounds

and a half within the mouth

;

Denii-Cannon,

six

thousand pounds, and six inches and a half within the mouth

;

Cannon, seven thousand pounds, and seven inches within the mouth

;

E-Cannon, eight thousand pounds, and seven inches within the

mouth

;

Basilisk,

nme thousand

pounds, eight inches and three

POWDER AND

46

By

quarters within the mouth.

come by the weight point blank, finally

The Names

of every shot,

Kobinet Falconet Falcon

Weight

.

.

Sacre

.

.

.

Demi-Culverin .

Demi-Cannon Cannon E-Cannon .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

to

scores

it

it is

doth

easy to flee

at

be had to the same, and

Scores of

of

the Shot.

1

.

Basilisk

is

Carriage.

pound.

4^ pounds. 5 pounds. 9 pounds. 18 pounds. 30 pounds. 60 pounds. 42 pounds. 60 pounds.

Culverin.

Pounds of Powder.

0^.

2 pounds. 2^ pounds.

Minion .

how many

also

inches in height each bullet ought to carry.

of the Greatest Ordnance.

Culverin

which proportions

and how much powder

how many

BALLS.

14 16 17 18

20 25 38 20 20 21

(1500.)

Height

of Bullet.

1 (inch)

2

^ 5 9 18 28

44 20 60

2| 3

4

II

;

V.

THE SWEDISH ORGANIZATION AND GuSTAVUS was unable

TACTICS.

1611-1632.

early to uniform his troops, but he gave

each a

special color of regimental flag.

In arms and equipment there was uniformity,

and the men were warmly clad

in their peasant's dress,

fur-lined boots for winter.

deep

tliree

The

in firing

;

His

first

improvement was

and had waterproof to lessen the

file

to

but the pikemen stood in close serried order, six deep.

brigades had alternate bodies of musketeers and pikemen, and foot was

mixed with horse

was ployed into column

Though

active one.

own

All changes tended towards rapid

in jjarts of the line.

The cavalry from

and mobility.

ten

was

down

also cut

From an

to three ranks,

body Gustavus made

fire

and

it

an

the artillery was used in masses, each regiment kept

its

to charge.

inert

In battle the skirmishers held the ground while the line formed

pieces.

then the cavalry cleared the front, the artillery opened, and the line advanced, to

first

fire,

rear-guard

then to push of pike.

His men were rapid goers.

made ul

;

In marches Gustavus dispensed with a

when marching toward, with a van when marching from, the enemy.

his three

In battle he paid keen heed to the terrain, and

arms work together. The

good conduct was universal

ifThe pay was small but regidar

discipline of the

the food was ample, and was obtained, not

;

by plunder, but from magazines carefully provided.

The

tered in towns or fortified camps.

V

duties were strictly observed.

Rewards and punishments were

Swedes was wonder-

the usual military crimes were quite absent.

;

train

The

troops were quar-

was much decreased.

Religious

Promotion went by seniority and just.

service.

There were regimental schools for the

many of whom, as well as their wives, went with the women were not tolerated. As an engineer, Gustavus was far day he had many experts fortification was wonderfully well

children of soldiers, troops.

Loose

ahead of his done

navy

;

;

;

and field-works were constructed rapidly and

as well as the

army was

efiiciently.

The Swedish

largely increased and brought to a state of high

efficiency.

Gustavus Adolphus nator of uniforms.

This

is is

usually referred to as the origi-

not strictly correct.

Swedish regiments were known by a

Some

color, not of the

of the

uniform

"

SWEDISH UNIFORMS.

48

but o£ the standard. for

ensign

its

blue

the

;

Ehrenreuter's regiment had red silk Vizthum regiment, old blue Winkel's, ;

Teuffel's, yellow

;

regiment, white

Hepburn's, green

;

the three

;

;

the Pomeranian

Hanse regiments,

The

black.

ensign was of one solid color, on which figured an emblem.

Such was one of white damask, with the royal crown

mounted by a and on the

rose,

other,

"

and "

Gustavus Adolphus " on one

Touch me not or you

'11

surside,

get burnt

;

a blood-red standard, with a flame and a figure

or, again,

bearing sword and scales, and the motto " For King and Justice."

For many years Gustavus had no uniforms for

At

men

the beginning of his reign the

peasant's dress in which he reported.

ment alone was there uniformity, save ants dressed alike.

his troops.

served, each in the

In arms and equipin so far as the peas-

In 1613 a uniformed royal body-guard

was organized, and in 1621 Gustavus ordered that the

sol-

diers of the line be clad, alike so far as possible, instead of in the long jerkin

and smock-frock

they should not be despised land."

A

;

of the Swedish peasant well,

carded.

among

the nations of the out-

year after he ordered that companies and regi-

ments be uniformly clad but wore

of the peasant, " so that

all this

took time.

as ill-appearing louts in

clothing

was coarse, but being hand-made

and a good garment might not be

So that even

The

in

it

lightly dis-

1626 people spoke of the Swedes

bad

clothes.

The uniformed

troops

indeed donned their uniforms only on dress occasions, as at the visit of princes, or at reviews in their honor.

They some-

times had holiday insignia issued for special use;

at the

Altmarkt Conference the men on duty wore blue and gold tabards.

When

the matter got settled, the

men appear

to

have worn a sleeveless tunic and loose knee-breeches, which, indeed, was the national cut of dress

;

and over

this their

;

NATIONAL DRESS.

An

armor and equipments.

49

undergarment covered the arms

the legs were clad in coarse woolen stockings and the feet shoes or bootees, according to season, for the foot and

in

dragoons

;

The infantryman wore

in boots for the cavalry.

at times a species of gaiter

from the knee down.

Clothing

depots were established at several of the

Swedish

cities

;

but although the work was

done in these depots, the patterns are

all

said to have

come from

Paris, then already

the centre of fashions, small and great. is

It

true that Gustavus eventually arrived at

uniforming his troops

for years his efforts

;

lay in that direction, but he aimed at providing

men had

warm and

still

more

The

useful clothing. 1

r.

.

T

lur garments and gloves, lur-lmed

boots and woolen stockings, and

many had

S^* "^o™ ^y ^^js

Combat.

a

Gusta-

at the Dirschau

(Stock-

sort of Russian bootee of waterproof leather.

These were in part issued to the troops, in part bought by the individual soldiers.

It

was the protection afforded by

such clothing that enabled Gustavus to conduct his ^^^nter

campaigns in Germany,

—

and confusion

to the astonishment

of his enemies.

^-

The

chief

improvement in the

tactical formation,

and

this

was brought about by the introduction of gunpowder, lay the lessening of the depth of the

how

file

;

and yet

it

is

in

curious

old-fashioned soldiers like Tilly stuck to their deej) bat-

when artillery was becoming effective. Gustavus made many other changes in the formation and mancEu\a'ing of the tles

troops.

Infantry had already got set up in not exceeding ten

ranks.

The musketeers

stood in closed

but with open

files

ranks, which gave space for the rank which had fired to retire to reload,

and they sometimes attacked

in

almost in what we should call a skirmish line

;

open order, the pikemen

DEPTH OF

50 stood files.

in

ranks and

closed

Gustavus

FILE.

reduced

first

the formation of musketeers to six ranks,

which for

closed into three

firing

this

;

re-

mained the pattern for many years,

and

at the close of the

Thirty Years' versal.

War

The

was

uni-

disap-

battle

peared, and was succeeded

by a proper

fire line.

In

line the pike-

men were

Swedish Musketeer.

placed

in the centre, with the musketeers

on the flanks

or grouped at the corners of the bodies

;

or else

the divisions of musketeers and pikemen alternated.

A mass of men ready for action was called a tertia, or battalion (battle), or squadron.

and

these

Sj)ain

strong;

among

battles

In Germany

were several thousand

the French they consisted of not

over five or six hundred men.

brigaded his regiments, and gave to

first

many The

Gustavus

brigades a peculiar color of standard.

exigencies of the service

demanded

fre-

quent changes, and we hear of brigades of

two regiments formed in

five lines, of

which

the two rear ones were the reserve, and in

them the

divisions of

eers alternated. in it

Lord Reay's

Swedish Pikeman.

Such a formation

set

front

;

up

Or

shown ;

but

again, the brigade

in three lines, so as to

this

is

sketch, of which later

was not universal.

was

pikemen and musket-

show more

was the formation adopted by

;

SWEDISH BRIGADES. At

Gustavus at Breitenfeld.

51

another period the brigade

still

was formed with a division of pikemen

and four

in advance,

At

divisions of musketeers in two lines in the rear.

Liitzen,

a dozen Swedish companies were ployed into column, one

behind the other, and had eight companies in one line as a

Any

reserve.

in

one of these brigade-formations was handier

movement, and

deep masses ful

and

;

endangered by

less

was particularly

it

from having the reserve

It

artillery,

than the usual

use-

to call upon.

seems odd that there should not be

more certainty minor

as to the organization

and

an army of modern days

tactics of

but matters were in a transition period,

due to the constant improvements in listics,

and there

no moment of time

is

when any one method even in Sweden.

when arms

bal-

universally obtained,

might be

It

difficult,

of precision call forth so

many

changes, to say just what the organization of infantry is to-day, or

Going back

years.

may be within

five

to include our civil Swedish

war, in view of the changes in countries,

it

might intleed puzzle one to

prolixity just

Officer.

all civilized

state without great

what a regiment or a brigade

is

;

and records

were not so carefully kept in the seventeenth century. of the foreign regiments in Gustavus'

formation and

drill,

efficiency of the

Taught by

which

it

body should be

his studies,

army had each

was wise not

Many its

affected.

Gustavus revived the ancient habit

of mixing small detachments of infantry with cavalry.

made

own

to alter, lest the

He

these composite bodies from two hundred to four hun-

dred strong, and gave each on e a field-gun. occasions he detailed

men from

form a

musketeers.

cor2}S d^ elite of

On

important

different organizations to

;

SWEDISH CAVALRY.

52

The ino-

infantry

commonly

fired in salvos

by ranks, succeed-

ranks coming forward, while the one which had fired

Gustavus introduced

retired through the intervals to reload.

the habit of having the front rank kneel so as to

fire

with-

out shifting ranks, as this was apt to unsettle the line.

On

_occasion he used what was virtually a

The cavalry had ranks.

its

by

file.

hitherto been formed in from four to ten

Gustavus cut

/jncreased

fire

mobility.

it

down to three ranks, which much The fancy skirmishing (ca^^acoles)

was abolished, as well as the use of firearms as the resource in the attack.

The king

insisted that the squadrons

should charge at a gallop with pistols or naked blade quite in accordance with his

sole

own tremendous

fire

a style

;

and energy.

The Swedish cavalry rode two or more lines, company

in in

rear of company, or checker-

wise

;

occasionally in one line

en muraille. relied

made

on

Other horse

it

still

alone,

which

excessively

slow.

its fire

There were exceptions

:

no

better cavalry stood in line

than splendid Pappenheim's but as a rule the cavalry of the day was inert.

With Gus-

tavus, on the contrary, even

the dragoon partook

more

the impulse of the

cavalry-

of

Swedish Cuirassier.

man

than of the stolidity of the infantry soldier

;

while in

the other armies the dragoon remained a mere well-trans-

ported footman.

In his intelligent management of both these

arms Gustavus soon had

imitators.

His

victories

showed

the superiority of his system so thoroughly that the whole

ACTS OF A BATTLE.

53

world turned from the ancient methods to study what he had introduced.

was the habit

It

in all armies to place the horse in the

wings; and a sort of precedence by seniority that decided the place in line

made

the con-

stant shifting of regiments awk-

ward and dangerous.

Gustavus

kept cavalry in the wings, but he also placed cavalry companies in

\

1

1

each

rear of

infantry,

of

line

where they served

to aid in re-

establishing any sudden check.

The the

artillery

or

front,

was posted along on

Under

ground.

advantageous

Gustavus

the

three arms supported each other

much

in the

modern way. Herein

consisted the value of the kind's

His army became a well-

method.

designed machine, with

Swedish Ensign of

opierating smoothly, instead of a disjointed mass,

eral parts

Cuirassiers.

all parts

worked out

of time,

and

whose

failed at the critical

sev-

mo-

ruent to -sustain gne_an other.

The

acts of a battle

were these.

The ground was

first

held by the small bodies of skirmishers, who, from their dan-

gerous calling, were called forlorn hopes, or enfants per-

Jiu8

and behind these the

;

order. ers,

the cavalry charged

tain they [alike line.

;

lines quietly

formed in parallel

Then, often not waiting to withdraw these skirmish-

had formed,

which done, the

Under

its

down

the front to clear out the cur-

to the destruction of friend artillery

opened

smoke the cavahy

would charge again

;

fire

and

foe

along the entire

— usually on the flanks —

the foot would get into musket-range,

BATTLE ORDER.

54

and

if

could unsettle the enemy, would finally come to

it

" push of pike." tactics,

There being rarely anything

a battle plan, the lines got

or

Whichever

much

like

grand-

intermixed.

side could retain the best semblance of formation,

or rather the side which

showed the

less confusion,

would be

apt to win.

An army rear-guard

;

marched usually

when

and

Light troops formed the van and

There were two or three columns, each a

and

in order of battle,

so

more ground than formerly ;

especially

;

Occasionally the

line.

Armies began

columns marched checker-wise.

good marches

line

formed that the platoons or

companies could readily wheel into

I

force

Gustavus dispensed with rear-guard when march-

ing towards the enemy. flankers.

main

in van-guard,

to get over

made

the Swedes

but the rate was not equal to the best of

this

i_century.

In battles more heed was now paid to topography, and the operations were better suited to

more decided

The

role.

While the order of

nition.

it.

Artillery played a

utility of reserves

battle

came

into recog-

remained parallel and there

was no grand-tactics, yet flanking marches, the advance of

and other

a second line through a wearied

first line,

manoeuvres, were not uncommon.

Gustavus made none but

The value

parallel front attacks.

disposition of the troops

cover the musketeers

men

;

:

like

of his tactics lay in the

in so placing the

pikemen as

to

the musketeers as to sustain the pike-

;

while each brigade sustained the other and each was

all-sufficient to itself,

jnovable

fortress.

separate'body than

with well-protected flanks, like a small

But its

it

was rather the mobility of each

solidity

which lent

it

self-sustaining

4Dower.

The parent

of grand-tactics

is

ability to

out mobility bodies cannot do this

;

manoeuvre

;

with-

and Gustavus, from the

SWEDISH PEASANTRY. new

conditions imposed

by gunpowder,

55

wrought out

first

which enabled men to move rapidly on the

details

battle-field.

Basing on his work, later commanders introduced what we

now know

Gustavus especially saw how to

as grand-tactics.

adapt his troops and position to the topography and the conditions

;

he seized the vital moment in a battle and made

the most of

it.

To him belongs

the credit of

first,

in

modern

times, forcing the passage of a rapid river in the face of a

And

strong and able enemy.

even though he failed

in his

showed the world that

assault on the Alte Veste, Gustavus

there need be no hesitancy in storming intrenchnjents or

Bath operations had

strong positions.

As

imitators.

the king's was better than any other European

organization, so

it

was superior in

fisted

and stout-hearted,

ing.

The Swedes

their walls with

it

in

men

many

;

big-

suffer-

with walls, but

" was a contemporary saying.

they had emerged from serfdom

in

esprit de

excellent

no wise feared danger or

" do not defend their

men

and

discipline

The Swedish primeval peasantry was

^coiys.

army

Since

peasants had acquired

property, and each proprietor was held to furnish a

man

to

The crown had grown to and the reason the Vasa family

the government or to the army. rely greatly

on the people,

had so strong a hold on the masses was that they always sided with the peasantry against the nobles and clergy.

The pay

of the

Swedish troops was small

;

in

1630 was twelve million rix dollars

regularly paid during the is

life of

;

and there

is

some question

several records vary greatly.

high

;

but the troops were

may

There

details the entire

as to the amounts.

The following

but we do not know what each

or what deductions

narrow

Gustavus Adolphus.

no table in the Swedish archives which

pay-roll,

the

The budget

exchequer of the country allowed no greater.

officer

The

strikes us as

had

to maintain,

have been made for rations, clothing,

/

PAY OF ARMY.

56 arms,

A lower scale

etc.

and

of the generals

a month

lars

of

;

pay

given in other records.

was

scale of regimental

of cavalry, 300.

Colonel

pay in the foot was

,

.

The

.

.

.

:

184 rix dollars a month.

80 "

"

"

Major

61 "

"

"

30 "

"

"

18 "

"

"

30 "

"

"

"

"

Chief quartermaster (2)

each

Judge advocates

(2)

each

each

12 "

Regimental clerk

30 "

Clerk of council of war

18

Surgeons

(4)

Provost-marshals

(4)

(2)

10 3

each

Hangman

The

'

scale of

company pay was

"

12 "

each

Assistant of marshal

Beadles

rate

—

Lieutenant-colonel

Chaplains

and

colonel

was presumably assimilated

of the lesser staff-officers

to that of their regimental grade.

The

;

and colonel and chief quartermaster, 500

and quartermaster

colonel

The pay

Field marshal, 1,000 rix dol-

:

colonel-general of artillery, 600

;

scouts

chief of

each

staff

is

:

.

7

"

" " "

—

Captain

61 rix dollars a month.

Lieutenant

30 "

Ensign (ancient)

30

Sergeants

(2)

9 "

each

Assistant ensign

,

7

"

" "

"

"

Assistant quartermaster

7 "

"

"

Armorer

7 "

"

"

4 " "

"

"

File leaders (15) each

5 "

"

"

Under

4

"

"

Company

clerk

7

Musicians Corporals

(6)

6

each

leaders (2) each

Privates

.

.

.

Officers' servants

"

.

,

3i " 3 "

QUARTERS AND RATIONS.

57

In the cavalry the rates were considerably higher,

— espe-

cially for the field-officers.

The

troops were fed from magazines,

— one

of the

most

important of the improvements of Gustayus, who established depots in suitable localities, and saw to full

it

that they were kept

from Sweden, or by systematic contributions from the There was a regular staff of commis-

countries traversed.

who

saries

distributed provisions to the regiments in bulk,

and they were then issued also to

up

men by the

major,

who seems

have been charged with the fatigue and policing duties

of the camp. fset

to the

Sutlers or traders were permitted at times to

their booths near by.

fwere well cared for

;

During Gustavus'

after his death things

life

the troojis

went on

in a

more

hap-hazard way, and the army was apt to be fed and paid

from the

results of plunder.

Gustavus quartered his troops in towns or tified

camps, in huts or

tents.

cities; if in for-

Wherever they were, camp

and garrison duties were obligatory, and

discipline

was never

relaxed.

The baggage-train was much decreased by Gustavus. A cavalry company was allowed ten wagons an infantry com;

pany

three, the regimental staff eight.

large allowance in the

;

To

us this seems a

but the train and camp-followers of an army

seventeenth century were far beyond any modern

limit.

The one thing which made Gustavus' army a power was the man himself into its very pith. The Swedish

infusion of the

troops were instinct with strong religious feeling, and exhibited the fjualities that spring from

it,

— good behavior, obedience, At own example, which was a

absence of crime, cheerful courage and good discipline. the root of this lay Gustavus'

never- varying pattern of soldierly bearing.

Regular morning

and evening prayers were introduced by the king

;

he

first

REGULATIONS.

58

/commissioned chaplains.

by the

priests,

Before battle there was a service

and a dedication

army

of the

to the service of

Regular days of prayer were ajipointed at intervals

[God.

in General Orders,

Germany

it

and Gustavus caused

army a

distributed to the

to

be printed and

In

special Soldiers' Prayer-Book.

was to most men

a wonderful sight to see the

distinguished field-marshal kneeling upon the ground beside the humblest private in earnest prayer.

Promotion went

strictly

by

seniority

and

services

;

nepotism

I

was unknown.

The

must begin

highest in the land

had done.

foot of the military ladder, as the king himself

At

at the

the siege of Riga, in 1621, Gustavus issued a set of field

They

regulations which long remained in force.

a regimental court-martial, of

was president and

members

;

established

which the commanding

" assessors " elected

officer

by the regiment were

and a standing general court-martial, which had

the royal marshal of

To

as members.

Sweden

the

as president

monarch was the

and higher

officers

Provost-

last appeal.

marshals might arrest on suspicion any offender, and imprison

and bring him before the court any '

;

but they might not hang for

offense, except resistance to their orders.

The regimental

court tried for thieving, insubordination, cowardice

minor crimes

;

all

the higher court had cognizance of civil causes

in the army, treason tion,

and

and the more

serious crimes.

by beheading or hanging, was the

lot of

Decima-

any regiment

which ran away in action, and the regiment was thenceforth out of

camp and do menial

held to

lie

itself.

" Riding the wooden horse " with a musket tied to

service

till it

retrieved

each foot, shacldes, bread-and-water-arrest, were common.

There was no flogging.

Even

small breaches of discipline

were severely punished, and misdemeanors were visited impartially

with regard to persons.

ished with death,

among

The higher crimes were

ptin-

others theft, plunder, violence to

;

!

DUELING.

59

women, cowardice, or the surrender extremity. The articles of war were

of a fortress, except in

testimony

is

excellent.

The

universal

:

in 1631,

Gustavus had to issue an adhorta-

toriuni to the troops on account of acts of plunder,

number

of

men were

_ish so ldiers_were

As

executed.

An

tribunal or court of

officers'

honor existed for passing on their misdoings. especially severe on dueling,

It is related that he permitted

meet

one of you

the provost-marshal at hand,

other

!

"

who

officers,

who

:

"

Now, gentlemen,

killed

!

at

it,

Moreover, I have

will at once execute the

Cheerful prospect

A soldier's wife was but the bane of the

among

is

two

that he hunself attended

;

the duel, and said to the principals till

Gustavus wasV l^"^

which was forbidden under painl

especially requested leave, to

and stop you not

and a

a rule, however, the Swed-

exemplary, in word and deed, far beyond

the soldier of that century.

of death.

But

that there were few brea,clies of discipline.

they did occur

allowed to accompany the regiment

German army, a

troop of loose

the camp-followers, was unknown.

were schools for the children of

soldiers,

women

In each regiment

many

of

whom,

according to the curious cvistom of those days, accompanied their fathers, even on campaigns. ,

lessly punished, so

motion, presents of it

was,

it

crimes were remorse-

money and

pensions.

But

excellent as

must be admitted that the perfect organization

the Swedish

^ All

As

were services adequately rewarded, by pro-

army did not

of

outlive Gustavus himself.

other European armies at this time were alike, and

characterized

by disorder and

rarely paid, ill-fed

over-luxurious

;

the

and

indiscipline.

scantily clothed.

men

barely provided

The The for.

troops were

officers

were

The troops

were carelessly quartered in the towns or wherever

it

came

easiest, and their presence was the signal of grievous oppres-

sion

;

while in the wake of a marching

army

stalked desola-

^

ENGINEERING.

60

The baggage - train was enormous,

tion.

as the

men were

permitted to carry along their plunder, and the number of

non-combatants

hard to

is

In one army of forty

credit.

thousand men, one hundred and forty thousand camp-followers are said to

The armies were

have been counted.

cut-throats, outcasts

and

soldiers of fortune,

and

full of

their con-

duct was that of highway robbers, even in the land of friends. Despite capital punishment for a number of crimes, and the penalty was often exacted, such a body could not be kept

from gruesome

woman nor

atrocities,

child escaped.

from which indeed neither man,

But prisoners had come

well treated because they were expected to pay ransoms

uncommon. Rewards were

acts of heroism were not

as punishments.

as

to ;

be

and

marked

Especially Wallenstein was distinguished

for the severity of his punishments

and the splendor

of his

rewards.

Gustavus was himseK an expert, and he organized a superb -'-eorps

of engineers.

see scores of

men

In Germany, folk were astonished to of science

accompany the army, and

to

note the way they were put to use in intrenching positions.

Franz von Traytor was the " general of should say, chief of engineers

we named Porticus was noted special corps of miners

;

;

fortifications," or, as

and an engineer -officer

for excellent work.

There was a

but the entire army was drilled in

throwing up fortifications and in pontoon-bridging. cavalry were taught to throw a bridge.

By

Even

the

spreading this

knowledge so thoroughly throughput the army, Gustavus could intrench himself on unavailable ground, and quickly repair

and make serviceable the walls of places he captured. He wrote a series of " Instructions " on this subject which are clear

had

and sound.

to teach,

He had

learned aU that the Netherlands

and had bettered on some of

Field-fortification in this era

it.

was common.

Outlying posts

RANK AND COMMAND.

61

were defended by redoubts and star-shaped forts with sades, drawbridges

and

all

manner

of entanglements.

pali-

Armies

in the field, as well as those besieging strong places, covered

themselves with works more or less complicated.

was not dissimilar

to the

Roman camp,

with

its

A

camp

wall and

parade-ground and careful divisions,

ditch, streets of tents,

the difference being mainly one of arms and organization.

/Gustavus adopted the system of

field-fortification

been brought to perfection in the Netherlands

I

in

many ways.

;

which had

but he altered

Instead of having a single line of unbroken

1

it

\^

works, he would build a series of mutually supporting isolated

works, in two or more

much

troops with a

In his camps he placed his

lines.

greater front than usual, and allowed

own rear. Rank and command were as follows The king was supreme. s

assembled at

Kalmar, Elfsnabben and other places for shipment rendezvous, in

to general

May, 1630.

Arrangements had been made for raising men abroad as

Kniphausen and Spens were recruiting to

well as at home.

good

effect in

no luck.

England

Many

Falkenberg, in the Netherlands, had

recruits were got

diers of the late

and Danzig.

;

from the mustered-out

Danish war, and

in

sol-

Brandenburg, Poland

In June, 1629, Colonel Morton arrived with

two regiments of Scotchmen. In the conquered towns of Livonia and Prussia there were twelve thousand men.

still

These were

under Oxenstiern, who recruited them up

a reserve

left as

to twenty-one thou-

Six thousand more, under Leslie, wei-e in Stralsund

sand.

and on the island

of Eiigen.

Leslie was active in recruiting,

and the Hanse towns furnished a few men.

By

the early

months of 1630 there had been organized an army of seventysix

thousand men, of which forty-three thousand were Swedes

and

in the fleet

were three thousand more.

thirteen thousand were destined for

Germany,

Of to

;

this total,

which were

added, by reinforcements during 1630, twenty-three hundred

COST PER MAN. men from Sweden,

155

twenty-eight hundred from Finland, two

thousand from Livonia, thirteen thousand six hundred fi'om Prussia,

and the

six

thousand garrison of Stralsund, an aggre-

gate of about forty thousand men.

den sixteen thousand men,

in

left in

Swe-

Finland six thousand

five

hundred, in the Baltic provinces seven thousand six hundred,

The mated

—

five

thousand, in Prussia

thirty-five

cost of the forty thousand at eighteen

There were

men

men in all. Germany was esti-

thousand

in

hundred thousand rix dollars a year, or

forty-five rix dollars per

This 'amount varied during

man.

Gustlvus' reign from forty-one and one third to fifty-two rix

man

dollars per class of

Cheap enough

per year.

men, and the Swedes were of the

service for

any

best.

Gustavus had no doubt that he would receive considerable accessions from the friendly princes of

Germany

;

and men

from the disbanded armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick,

was believed, only waited

The armies

large squads.

mustered

teen thousand

But

men

body

substantial

of

Denmark and Poland,

would furnish abundant

out,

it

his arrival to join his standard in lately

His

recruits.

thir-

woidd, he calculated, be increased to a

so soon as he placed foot

on German

soil.

as against the seventy-five thousand aggregate on Gus-

tavus' muster-rolls, of

which he led but thirteen thousand

Germany, Wallenstein and which

easily reached a

hundred thousand men.

Gustavus issued no formal declaration of war. on his

ally,

sive one.

Stralsund,

But

to

Tilly were yet afoot, with armies

made

the

war appear

to

The him a

certain negotiations between the king

emperor, which Gustavus well

knew would come

attack defen-

and the

to nothing,

were carried on for a while through the intermediation of Christian of

Denmark.

Stettin, the capital of

Pomerania,

was being threatened by the imperial army, and Gustavus felt that

he must save the town.

He was

ready to

sail

from

'

FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.

156

Elfsnabben, whither

end

of

the troops were forwarded, by the

all

May, but adverse winds kept him

in port three weeks.

His forces were embarked on two hundred transports, pro-

by thirty men-of-war. The mouths of the Oder were to be the point of debarkation, and Gustavus had made himself familiar with every rood tected

From

of the country.

this point

he proposed to

treat with, the cities

sund, and especially Stettin, and

make

latter place,

up the Oder.

The general plan was

had

Pomerania had never been comfort to the imperialists

by

his base sti'ong

fully

upon the conditions

to wait

or

from whence he could advance

a depot at the

details

seize,

along the coast on either side of Stral-

;

worked out

of the

the

;

moment.

and had given aid and

friendly,

but when the news came that

Gustavus would probably land on her shores, Duke Bogislav, a very old man, sent an embassy to Gustavus to pray him not to

make a

sedes belli on his territory.

without mincing words, that on their

He

self within

attitude

depended

Germans when he should have reached

his conduct to the

their shores.

Gustavus answered,

own

should

sail for

Pomerania, establish him-

her borders, and use her as by her future acts she

deserved to be used.

Before embarking, the king issued a proclamation appointing three days of public fasting and prayer for the success of the cause.

After making

all

arrangements for the government of his

kingdom, Gustavus' three-year-old daughter Christina was accepted as his heir

king

and

left the

to all

;

to her all

fatherland in

Swedes swore

fealty,

May, 1630, on what was

the world a holy mission,

— to

indeed, but never to return.

\

and the to

him

accomplish

it,

XIII.

GUSTAVUS LANDS IN GERMANY. JUNE TO AUGUST, GusTAVUS

Usedom and

camped

in

it

Oderburg, near by.

and

take, wliile the

to

ToUense

secure,

fortified.

As

communication between Stralsund,

and Gustavus

set to

work

to extend

blockade the places along the coast which he could not

enemy strengthened

The king

to preserve his neutrality, took

Every place taken was strongly

rest of the coast, the

and East Prussia was not

his holding,

Occupying

upon which a favorable treaty was made, and the Swedes

;

enemy held the

force.

and landed at the mouth o£ the Oder without

Wollin, he set his fleet to cruise along the coast, advanced on

and garrisoned

Stettin

30,

imperial generals retiring to Garz and Anklam.

and though Duke Bogislav sought

Stettin,

the

May

sailed

opposition, the

1630.

first

in his front

;

Garz, and there

encamped the bulk

of their

intended to secure his foothold and the line of the

but while so operating, the enemy took Clempenow and Oxenstiern, from

Pasewalk, massacred the garrisons, and seized the Tollense.

who kept steadily at work Magdeburg declared in favor of the

East Prussia, was pushing out towards the king,

making firm

his standing

on the coast

;

Swedes, and Colonel Falkenberg was sent thither to take command.

The

troops were

embarked June

9,

1630

;

and

after a delay

of three weeks, waiting for a favorable wind, the fleet set sail

with

its

weather

burden

further retarded

still

Stockholm

;

so precious to Protestant its

Germany.

progress in the open off

a stormy passage ensued, during which the ship-

ping beat about several days, and was with together

;

Heavy

but

it

finally

made

difficulty

kept

land, and anchored July

4 in

the lee of the island of Riigen, close to Usedom, near the

mouth

of the

Peene River.

The two hundred

men-of-war had aboard six thousand

sailors,

transports

and

ninety-two com-

panies of foot, one hundred and sixteen companies (half-

squadrons) of horse, and eight hundred guns of

Denmark had

recently

made

efforts to

all calibres.

purchase the island

;

THE LANDING.

158

of Riigen, an acquisition which would have

the mouth

of the

Oder

made a base

at

For some

quite insecure for Sweden.

time the imperialists had held the bulk of the island, of which a large part belonged to the city of Stralsund essential to clear the coast,

that

it

and

;

On March

Eiigen should be recaptured.

took the island of Hiddensee, and garrisoned

hundred men

;

as

it

was

was determined by Gustavus

it

13 Leslie with three

on the 29th he put over troops to Riigen, and

captured the works at the several landing-places out of hand.

The

imperialists tried in vain to eject the Swedes,

and

at the

end of April retired wholly from Riigen, except a garrison

hundred men

of three

one of the

in

/«

likewise

mS

the Swedes.

The imperial

man

and

equally

which on June 7

Riigen was thus secured to

fell.

cruel

forts,

general, Torquato

Conti, a

even among the wolves of that day, incompetent, was at Anklam,

twenty miles to the south. heard of the

fleet

So soon

as he

being sighted, he sent de-

tachments to light

fires

along the beach,

hoping Gustavus would believe that a large

was on hand.

But the ruse

hostile

force

failed

Conti lost his best chance of dealing

;

the Swedes a hearty blow as they landed, and his

The Landingplace.

parties retired

from the

coast.

Boats,

ordered some time before by Gustavus, were

on hand under control of his own

officers

;

the king headed the landing parties, and the troops were

disembarked on Usedom.

when he reached

As

Africa, so

Caesar

is

said to have fallen

Gustavus, on landing here,

stumbled on the gang-plank, and slightly injured his knee not recorded to have turned the matter into an

but he

is

omen.

The Swedish blood flowed

too calmly to need such

;

LACK OF RATIONS.

On

adventitious aid.

putting foot on shore, he knelt and

up unaffected prayer

offered

159

;

then seized a spade, and began

himself the \/ork of intrenching a line to cover the landing. It took

two days

sively set to

to

work

disembark

new ones were drawn of

the companies were succes-

;

an old line of defenses was occupied

;

up, and soon the

first

intrenchments

Peenemiinde, which place was included in the Victual issued to the

were completed.

consumed

men had been mostly

and passage

in tho long delay

circuit,

;

provisions

had

been ordered to be collected in Stralsund, but the king found

on hand only a small supply.

It

was not an encouraging

beginning.

Gustavus was wont to speak his mind

;

and for

this lack

of provision he roundly held to task John Skytte, to

he had committed the business

;

whom

he moreover sent urgent

dispatches to Oxenstiern, in Prussia, to hurry forward supplies

;

and feehng reasonably

secure,

on July 28 he sent

six

men-of-war and thirty-six other vessels to the chancellor for their transportation.

Further to protect from inroads the coast already occupied,

Gustavus ordered a suitable naval force to cruise between

Two

Travemiinde and Riigen.

days after landing, he took

twelve hundred musketeers and a small body of horse, and started out southerly towards the region oj)posite

reconnoitre the country. imperialists

had

Arrived

built a fort

there, he

Wolgast

on the island to protect the

Reconnoitring the rear of the fort from the

ing.

and sending back for a force the horse which

to

found that the

of four thousand

crosswater*,

men, and

all

had already got mounted, Gustavus prepared

to take the place

;

but the imperial garrison retired to the

mainland.

On fort,

July 11 Gustavus

left

a thousand musketeers in the

and with three thousand foot and twenty-five hundred

FIRST OPERATIONS.

160

horse set out to sweep imperialists

Usedom

to

had

built

WoUin

Usedom

two

clear of the enemy.

forts to protect the passage

across the Swine inlet.

approach the garrison

fled over to

The from

Oi\ the Swedes'

WoUin, burned

its

boats

Oder-Elbe Country.

and the WoUin defenses, and island. lin,

Gustavus managed

garrisoned the fort, and

as the

Divenow

inlet,

ing the bridge across

retired

to

the back of the

to get boats, put across to

made

Wol-

after the fugitives as far

but was too late to prevent their burnit.

Having thus secured the mouths

of the Oder, the king returned to headquarters in Usedom.

ADVANCE ON STETTIN.

161

No, sooner landed than Gustavus incorporated in his army five thousand of the garrison of Stralsund. He had made

good prOaress

for not only did his possession of Stralsund,

;

Usedom and Wollin

secure the mouths of the Oder, but it a''mosfc certain claim to Stettin, the capital of Pomerania, sfdl 15. the ha'nds of Duke Bogislav. The entire

gave him an

coast of north Germ., xy^ g;ave Stralsund, the island of

what

Gustavuj^.

Eugen, was held, however, by Happily, Wallenstein was away, and no one

had tak ^ ^ and

the imperialists.

made any

sensible effort to .irrest the

Pomerania Stettin, It

Stettin,

from

divided

is

in 00

its position,

was a natural

had been besieged by the

General Savelli

Swedish advance.

two parts by the Oder, and capital of the duchy.

imperialists, but without success.

comitry southeast of Stralsund while Conti was on the west bank of the Oder. When the v/as in the

imperial generals saw that the Swedes had actually

they retired, Savelli to

Garz on the

left

Anklam and

iccnf|g(]

Conti up the Oder to

and Greifenhagen on the right bank.

This

gave Gustavus a chance to thrust himself in between the two parts,

and he made arrangements

to

advance on Stettin.

In April, before leaving Sweden, the king had sought to influence this well-fortified city in his behalf,

seen that Stettin had stoutly defended rialists.

While Conti was

Colonel Leslie in

lax,

command

itself

against the impe-

Gustavus was

of Wollin,

dom, and both under Kniphausen,

to

and we have

active.

He

Kagg of Usewhom was committed

General

the general supervision of the territory so far taken detailed officers to patrol the

landing-places

Usedom near

;

left

;

he

coast to secure all possible

and went in person to the southern

jjart of

the Swine, to collect boats on which to ship a

suitable force for

an advance on

Stettin.

On

July 18 he had

seventy-four companies, eight thousand seven hundred and

twenty-three men, ready to be shipped.

On

July 19 they

WANT OF

162

were put aboard such

Stettin

number, as were

vessels, tifty-one in

up the

of suitable draught to sail

made

SUPPORT.

rivjiK,

—

Kext day

ttie fleet

by noon, and Gustavus landed part of the troops near the rustle of Oder-

burg Ijelow, wV.jre he took up a goodi

On'3

Evar

-

posi^^ jn.

w

'il& ^^'^ ^'

TREATY WITH HESSE.

246 Cassel,

badly

and enabled him

off as to

discipline,

watch them

to

though in

men always behaved

battle,

be

came

tunes with the Swedes

men

in

Landgrave William

and a treaty offensive and defensive

;

which Weimar was included.

could be raised by these states

their fortresses to

nobly.

definitely to cast in his for-

;

the Swedes should protect the n !W

and

Ten thousand

it

was agreed that

allies,

who would open

Gustavus and close them

The landgrave did not obligations to

commanded

events,

Werben,

to

camp

said to their credit, Tilly's

it

well, as their chief

While the king was awaiting of Hesse-Cassel

was made,

His troops were

all.

health and victual, and quite wanting in

feel that

to the emperor.

Gustavus had failed

in his

and shortly went back to watch

Magdeburg,

his territory.

For

his gallantry displayed in Tilly's

Duke Bernard

of Saxe- Weimar

ittack on W^erben,

had been made colonel of

Gustavus' body-guard cavalry regiment.

With

the landgrave

the king sent back two of his best battalions as a nucleus for drill

and

take

command of

and

discipline,

it

was arranged that Bernard should

the Hessian contingent, as the landgrave had

mucJi confidence in his military leaving in the

skill.

Then, in mid-August,

Werben camp, under Baudissin and

force sufficient to defend

king moved by his

left,

it,

Teuffel, a

with eighteen thousand troops the

back of the Havel, and took post

at

Havelberg, Brandenburg and Rathenow, in a position to concentrate and

move on any

point.

He

considered the Havel,

under the circumstances, a better rendezvous than Werben.

Each detachment had

orders

to

act

on the defensive

if

attacked, utilizing the near-by strong places, until the king

came up

to its assistance.

since the disaster at to wait on Saxony,

Gustavus had materially gained

Magdeburg, but he was

still

compelled

whose action he believed the enemy under

the positive orders of the emperor would shortly force

;

or

BOLD BERNARD.

247

should Tilly advance, by confining him to the devastated strip

between the Havel and the Elbe, the king hoped to drive him

back on Saxony, and thus oblige the elector the quicker decide whose cause he would embrace.

moved on

his

Saxon border,

new

Meanwhile, as Tilly

errand, Gustavus

to be ready to help

to

advanced nearer the

John George whenever

the elector should be ready to help himself.

The

imperialists

played into his hands.

had

Tilly

definite

bring

orders to

— by the sword.

been,

German Germany had

the north

princes back to their fealty, as those of south

From Tangermiinde

he had notified

the Hessians that they must choose between landgrave and

With

emperor, and the loyal Hessians gave a noble reply.

but

five

thousand

down the

men under

gauntlet.

He

command, Bernard threw

his

captured Fritzlar at the end of

August, while the duke of Hersfeld laid Fulda under contribution.

This was bold conduct in face of the approach of

the Italian troops, eager to do by Hesse-Cassel as they had

done by the south German

and Weimar

^8

;

settled itself.

and from here, under

But the danger

states.

to

Tilly reached Eisleben his

new

Hesse

August

instructions, he ordered

Aldringer with his seven thousand men, and Fiirstenberg with his twenty thousand, to join him for an attack on Saxony.

Tiefenbach from Silesia was to demonstrate on the

Saxon

rear, while

The reason that

it

Fugger was sent against Hesse-Cassel.

of this change of plan

was time

his authority.

to

was that the emperor

He had

already

made some demands

and July, after a long correspondence dating back and he now proposed to show that It

was for

this

felt

compel Saxony to disarm and submit

his

in

to

May

to 1630,

demands must be met.

purpose that Ferdinand ordered Tilly to move

on John George and enforce the Edict of Restitution.

Between them the imperial generals had thirty-four thou-

JOHN GEORGE HARASSED.

248

sand men, and Aldringer had got as far as Jena. troops

moved towards Leipsic with

astation,

— two hundred

burning villages lay in his wake,

and reached Halle September

They

finally

Tilly's

the usual barbarous dev-

4,

—

and Merseburg next day.

went into camp between the two

places,

and

roving about, plundered the entire neighborhood of Merse-

Naumbm-g and

burg,

He demanded

Zeitz.

Here

Tilly declared himself.

John George should quarter and feed the imperial army, disband his new levies, serve under his (Tilly's) that

orders with a suitable contingent,

emperor, and disavow any and

all

formally recognize the

connection with the Swed-

ish business.

John George was

in pitiable case

;

but sympathy for him

Saxony was torn by three

would be wasted.

Swedish, the imperial and the neutral.

parties,

Between

the

his ties to

the emperor, his Lutheranism, and his desire to erect in Ger-

many

a Third Party which should grow to be strong enough

to control both the

knew

not which

at his orates.

emperor and the emperor's enemies, he

way

He

to turn.

was

at this

And

yet

fire

and sword were

moment under

the control of

Count Arnim, who was a Brandenburger and a Lutheran, had been Wallenstein's lieutenant at Stralsund, had served with Koniezpolski against Gustavus in Poland, and

become Saxon generalissimo. as

much Arnim's

had now

The Third Party notion was

pet idea as the Corpus Evangelicorum, or

union of the Protestant powers, was Gustavus'.

In

all

his negotiations with

John George, the king had

shown himself frank and aboveboard in his desire to subHe was even now serve the cause of religion in Germany. ready to leave the cause with John George and retire to

Sweden, providing his rights and those of fitly

recognized.

He

his fatherland

were

had done everything to persuade the

elector to joint efforts, but

John George could not bring him-

COURAGEOUS self to

LEIPSIC.

an alliance with Sweden until the

249

last

ray of hope was

gone of reconciling the two religions under the empire.

Nearing Leipsic,

Tilly,

on September

8,

demanded a

sup-

ply of victual from this city

;

but the

were bold

citizens

in their reply.

Un-

master,

less

their

the

elector,

sented, they

con-

would

have no dealings

The

with Tilly. imperial

general

appeared

before

the

gates,

devas-

the

entire

tated region,

and again

demanded ters

and

Again

quarrations.

refused, he

moved

on

the

town, camped near

Mbckern,

and

threatened Leipsic

with utter destruction unless

it

surLeipsic and Breitenfeld.

rendered.

More

bold than discreet, the citizens replied as before.

Tilly

opened trenches, planted a heavy battery of siege-guns and mortars at Pfaffendorf, and intrenched the heights at Eutritsch to bar the road from Diiben, by which the Swedes

might come. walls,

The

citizens

and replied with some

burned the suburbs, manned the effect to Tilly's fire,

which began

TILLY CAPTURES LEIPSIC.

250 September

After nearly a day's bombardment Tilly

14.

again demanded surrender, and threatened the city with the fate

Magdeburg

of

in

case

the gates were not forthwith

opened.

The tured

three messengers sent by the elector had been cap-

Leipsic did not

;

know how near

relief

was

and

;

fur-

ther resistance being mere madness, Tilly's idtimatum was

accepted September 16. paid, the small garrison

Four hundred thousand

marched out with the honors

and Tilly occupied the town.

on the

to the north of the city,

hills oj^posite

Leipsic in his rear.

of war,

Scarcely within walls, Tilly

received news of the approach of the

marched

were

florins

allies.

and drew up

He

at once

in battle order

Podelwitz and Gobschelwitz, and with

He would

have been glad to wait for

Aldringer and Fugger, but reinforcements were to be denied him.

The plundering and

devastation of the imperial

army had

embittered the elector, whose obstinate clinging to his impossible neutrality

vailed on

him

garrisons, he

Torgau

was now reaping

its

reward, and finally pre-

Not counting

to declare against the empire.

had some eighteen thousand men assembled

in

to prevent Tilly's reaching Dresden.

Gustavus had advanced

to

with five thousand cavalry.

Wittenberg on September

2,

Baner and Teuffel followed,

while to Tott was committed the duty of holding the bastion,

Horn was

should matters turn out badly.

to

form a new

army, on the nucleus of the Havel troops, from a promised

Brandenburg contingent, some Swedish cavalry Scotch battalions, and the to

be ready,

The

if

ordered, to

men

of

move on

;

and

Silesia.

Swedis'i army, on September

and Wittenberg.

to arrive, the

Hamilton and Leslie

3,

had reached Coswig

John George having succumbed, Branden-

burg and Saxony, from whatever motives, were arrayed on the

GUSTAVUS CROSSES THE ELBE. Swedish

251

An

and Giistavus saw daylight before him.

side,

alliance offensive

and defensive was made

at Coswig,

Septem-

ber 10, by which the elector agreed to give the Swedish

army

a month's pay, furnish

it

most important

All defiles were to be open to Gusta-

cities.

with rations, and admit

vus and closed to the imperialists affairs

was

the conduct of military

The king agreed

were given to break the colors,

uj), all

Horn was

army crossed

the

Elbe

be

to

to di'ive the impe-

from Saxony, and stand by John George

Had Brandenburg and Saxony joined him might not have been accomplished

to his

and no peace was

to be left to Gustavus,

concluded without him. rialists

;

it

to the last.

a year before, what

Hereupon, instant orders

!

available forces were called in to

instructed to join the king, and the at

Wittenberg and headed for Diiben

on the Mulde, the rendezvous with the Saxons.

The

" order of battle " in which they passed the bridge

On

interesting.

hvindred

September 9 a cavalry detachment of

men had

is

five

crossed and been spread out as a curtain

to cover the bridge

;

and on September 12 Quartermaster-

General Bouillon, with three hundred cavalry and a small wagon-train, joined them.

September

13.

First

The army

itself

marched a vanguard

began

of

to cross

two thousand

a detachment of cavalry, and twelve guns drawn by

foot,

teams of eleven to thirty-one horses

wagons came

;

ordnance and munition

next, carts loaded with cannon-balls, nine regi-

mental pieces with their munition wagons, four blue and white cornets.

all

followed by

His majesty of Sweden in

person followed, under special escort of two cavalry cornets,

with black and gold pennants, his battle-charger led behind

him

;

and then several other cornets, blue and

orange, yellow, red, blue, green.

Behind these

red, white, filed

four

royal six-horse canopy coaches and two royal baggage wagons,

and again cavalry cornets, green, blue and

red.

Then

fol-

DECISION TO FIGHT.

252 lowed

and

infantry regiments witli their pieces and powder

tlie

baggage wagons and pack-horses

ball carts, the

then the bulk of the cavalry with

all its

baggage.

;

and

Last

filed

the general wagon-column under escort of horse and foot.

The army

halted at Kernberg towards evening, and next

day, September 14,

September

reached Diiben.

it

From Torgau the

elector reached the vicinity of Diiben

Gustavus rode over

15.

warmly greeted the troops, which were

drawn up

to

the

Saxon army,

and narrowly inspected

elector,

parade order.

in

He

the

estimated

the six regiments each of horse and foot at twenty thousand

men, though they are elsewhere given

A

the Swedish

joint inspection of

at sixteen thousand.

army

There

followed.

were twenty thousand foot and seventy-five hundred horse in line.

At nials,

a council of war immediately succeeding these ceremo-

Gustavus advised a

imperial

army and seek

general battle. to Tilly's,

He

to place

he

and suggested the beyond

at a disadvantage before a

it

distress

Brandenburg and SaxFor himself, he

defeat.

seas, for which purpose he

base to embark from and a the procrastinator

out the

tire

spoke of his ability to do this as superior

ony would be in in case of a could retire

manoeuvres to

series of

fleet.

Curiously,

now urged immediate

said,

had a good

John George

battle.

He was

anxious to save Saxony from the plundering to which

it

was

being subjected, was unwilling to subsist two armies during the suggested manoeuvres, and had great confidence in the

Swedish capacity for deliver battle, to

the

relief

and of

it

fighting.

was determined

Leipsic.

marched from Diiben

Gustavus was not loth to

to

On

the

to

march without delay

16th the allied army

Wolkau.

" In the early twilight of the 6tli (16th N. S.)

we passed

through Diiben and reached the hamlet of Wolkau, one and

NUMBERS UNCERTAIN. a half

(German) miles from

253

Leipsic, near evening," writes

the king, from whose letters or dispatches comes a good bit of

information

;

"

and here we rested over

On

night.

the 7th

(17th), in the gray of the morning, I ordered the bugles to

sound the march, and as between us and Leipsic there were

no woods, but a vast

plaiu, I

deployed the army into battle

order and marched towards that

a

city.

hill in

our front, and behind

it

the bulk of his army."

It is not possible accurately to

two armies.

gauge the numbers of the

Apparently good authorities

differ,

and even

Swedish records are at variance with regard

the

On

Saxons. the

After an hour and a

march, we saw the enemy's vanguard with artillery on

half's

:

had twenty-six thousand eight hundred men

nineteen thousand one hundred foot, and seven

The

thousand seven hundred horse.

been

forty-five

Tilly's

the

the day of the battle the Swedes, according to

official list,

in line, viz.

to

army be

joint forces

may have

thousand men.

Neither can the strength of

justly given, but

it

no doubt

fell

a good deal

short of forty thousand men.

Until Frederick the Great astonished Euroj)e with his grand-tactics, there are but

few battles of modern times which

Armies met

exhibit novelty in manoeuvre.

drew up

in parallel order,

in a formal

ensued a hand to hand conflict

much wanting

in the element

of calculation or the utilization of favorable conditions

ever stood the

way,

advanced on each other, and there

hammering or staved

off

;

who-

demoralization the

longer won.

The

battle of Breitenfeld

by quick decision and

was a good sample of retrieving,

action,

an impending

disaster, of utiliz-

ing an opportunity offered, of true battle-captain's work.

was

not. noteworthy for

call grand-tactics, for it

should be

;

but

it

was

any

special exhibition of

was not fought as

it

It

what we now

was intended

it

essentially noteworthy as being the first

OLD SPANISH TACTICS.

254

great engagement in which the modern tactics of mobility,

Gustavus Adolphus was the originator and expo-

of which

nent, were opposed to the Middle Ages

tactics of

which the new Sjvedish was opposed

the

to

;

in

In this sense the contest was as interesting as the

method.

matching of phalanx against

The Spanish

tactics,

marshaling heavy bodies

legion.

as already explained, consisted in

— battalia or

battles

—

of troops in

such masses that their mere advance should be

and that they should break a charge the

weight

old Spanish

breaks

cliff

vip

The

the waves.

upon them as

of cavalry

was

line

irresistible,

set

up with

foot

heavy squares in the centre, and horse in heavy columns on

in

the wings,

and

the squares

sist

had shaken the enemy, the duty of the horse was

The

him down.

to ride

and the charge of

after the fire of the artillery

infantry battalia were wont to con-

of fifty files ten deep, of

pushing, not fighting force

which mass the bulk was mere

;

and on the four corners stood

groups of musketeers, two or three deep

;

while other musket-

eers were put out as skirmishers to protect the flanks of the

Such was the Spanish battalion

battalia.

fortress with

;

bastions at the corners, and

it

was an oblong-

surrounded by

outworks.

In these huge masses of human brawn the weapons were equally cumbersome.

The pike was long and heavy,

of use

only to keep an opponent at a distance, not to demolish him

by stroke

of

arm

;

and the old musket, requiring ninety-nine

"times and motions " to handle, and a crutch to lean fire,

was

cavalry it

had

as slow

much

less

ineffective as the artillery.

lumbering.

and had learned

carbines or pistols.

it

on to

Nor was

Like a child with a new

fallen in love with its firearms,

shock-tactics, its

and

had come

the toy,

to discard its

to rely on repeated salvos of

These salvos were delivered from

near at hand, and the squadrons lost the

momentum

of the

SWEDISH TACTICS. fiill

gallop charge from a distance.

infantry, one regiment differing

No

armor or weapons.

of

value

by

;

but set

own

its

What

it

It

255 was

really

mounted

from another only in weight

doubt

all

had a defensive

this

going at any pace, and

it

would

fall

apart

weight.

Gustavus had been introducing and practicing his

troops to use, ever since he ascended the throne, was a

which could be rapidly

fired,

and a formation

in

gun

which men

The Swedes had now next to no movements their musket was so light

could readily manoeuvre.

armor

to

hamper

their

as to need no crutch,

;

and

its

wheel-lock was vastly better

than the match-lock of the imperialists.

In addition to this,

Gustavus' artillery was immeasurably superior, and the regi-

mental pieces could actually follow the regiments. Moreover, instead of these large bodies, which were

in-

tended to act together and be mutually dependent, the Swedes

had a

line

made up

was independent and not of collecting

of smaller battle groups, each of which self-sustaining.

all his

horse in a mass on each flank, but of

alternating bodies of horse

To

soldiers

tion seems as

it

Gustavus had the habit

and

foot in parts of the line itself.

brought up under the modern system, this forma-

odd enough, but

had suited

it

well suited the

at times the ancient tactics

;

need no longer dash uselessly against the

fire

of that day,

bodies of cavalry battles,

but the

horse and foot were able to support each other in an advance.

When

the musketeers

the horse pushed out

worked equally well

;

had broken the enemy by and charged him.

their fire,

In retreat they

the musketeers protected the horse, and

the horse prevented the broken foot from being ridden down.

In the centre of the line the foot was not always mixed with horse is

;

but the units were smaller.

stated at one thousand two

The

full

Swedish brigade

hundred and twenty -four men,

and was made up of either one strong or two or three weak

SWEDISH BRIGADE.

256 regiments.

It

was a

sort of

wedge

of one

body

pikemen

of

backed by two others, and in the intervals and on the flanks

who might break out, deploy to fire, and At Breitenfeld the brigades The sketch of Lord Reay was not the

bodies of musketeers

again retire into the brigade. stood in three lines.

common

order of the Swedish brigade formation, though

may have bodies

i—-1

l^ifepl

n-MusK^TEERs

P.=

Swedish

service.

exists

in the use of the

words " half-

l"*'^"l

brigade "

what

P,^EM6N

called " brigade."

U99M.I l"***-"]

applied to foreign

in

Perhaps the difference

^XTT] |^,fep| pil \s.\bp\ ri9X7r|

Brigade and HaK-brigade.

for

half-brigade of

Lord Reay's sketch.

others

The leading

Lord Reay's ,

i

agram corresponds

usually referred to as a brigade

to

three deep in fact

for firing in battle,

the

;

fu'st

gave much more

di•

is

the rear half-brigade does not.

;

files

though supposed to be six deep

rank knelt and the other two stood. effective fire

,

what

already explained, the line had been reduced to

As

it

and reduced

casualties.

This Fire

was delivered by platoon or by rank, and each rank having fired

had but two others

In the imperial army

What

it

to pass to

go to the rear and load.

might have nine ranks to

he utilized by carefully marshaling his second line his first line lost in

by

reserves.

It

lacked strength.

gave

it

It

had nearly as many men, over

both power and

We

The

elasticity.

latter has life

shall see

and what

must not be supposed that the Swedish

as a rigid cast-iron bar differs blade.

;

weight was made up by a second line or

metre of front, as the imperialists.

lineal

pass.

Gustavus gained in men by his shallow formation,

how

Its organization

The two armies

from an

differed

elastic steel sword-

which the other

these two systems

line

six to the

lacks.

worked

in the first

general engagement where they fairly and squarely met.

XX. BREITENFELD. SEPTEMBER The

Leipsie plain

for artillery.

He had

Tilly

is

wide and

flat,

with here and there a rolling hillock good

had an admirable

line,

Swedes were not handsome, but the

flanks,

lot,

and with his guns admirably posted.

Early

Brushing away

into line with the Saxons on their left.

principally horse

;

TiUy stood

astir,

the Swedes

in a

Each regiment had

under Torstenson was on the

left centre.

battle opened with artillery,

break the Swedish right

;

and

marched

came

Tilly's outposts, they

;

the right wing under Ban^r was

the king led the centre, mostly of foot

with horse and foot.

its

;

Horn on the

The Saxon formation

restless

left,

guns, and the reserve artillery

Pappenheim rode

is

not known.

out, unordered,

but Ban^r met him manfully, and drove him

off in

Next, Fiirstenberg charged in on the Saxons, and sent them flying to

flight.

Tilly

the rear.

had viewed these unauthorized advances

and wheeled

his left,

in

dismay

;

but the

the Saxons imcovered Gustavus' flank; he prepared to strike

flight of

there,

The Saxons were a

In the Swedish wings horse was mixed

with the foot in alternate small detachments

to

The

eager to fight.

there.

but they did not know what fighting meant.

towards the enemy with cheer.

The

men were was

stuff

seventeen great battles, with Pappenheim and Fiirstenberg on the

of

line

and a splendid array of veterans.

never lost a great battle, and his

bespangled

1631.

17,

in

upon him.

him

Forming a crotchet of

Gustavus was ready.

he reinforced Horn, and then, heading the cavalry of the right, he

down the late line of battle, captured Tilly's guns, and turned them on The centre swung round so as to prolong Horn's new line, and the enemy. Torstenson's guns took Tilly's squares in flank. The battle was won; but

rode

brave Tilly with his Walloons held firm until fairly torn to shreds. thrice

The

wounded, the old hero was borne

victory

The

was complete.

by

Then,

his beaten troops (T elite.

Activity had proved superior to weight.

original intention of Tilly

sively behind the Elster

ants should arrive, but

on

off the field

had been

and Saale

to operate defen-

until his belated lieuten-

Pappenheim had been hotly urging

his chief the necessity of at once

quellmg the

spirit of the

THE TWO ARMIES.

258

Protestants by beating them in battle, as he had no doubt

unconquered Tilly could do.

Few

of the generals sustained

the chief in waiting for reinforcements, and Tilly listened to the plea of his

young and ardent

The

officers.

events around

Leipsic brought the armies together, and after the capture

down with

of the city, Tilly sat

onmarch

The

of the

new

evolutions of an army.

it

to await the

admirably adapted for the

is

It stretches for miles in either direc-

tion with but slight accentuation, if

to

allies.

plain north of Leipsic

are as

back

his

and what slopes do

created for the play of artillery.

Tilly

exist

had previ-

ously sent out and intrenched some heights at Entritsch so as to hold the road from Diiben, and

had

selected for his line

the elevation facing Podelwitz and Gobschelwitz athwart the

advance; his batteries, protected in a slight way by

allied

earthworks, lay near the turnpike.

While the Swedes and Saxons, of

in the gray of the

September 17, 1631, were preparing

bach

in their advance

column

to these

morning

to cross the

Lober-

on Leipsic, Tilly led his brilliant

same heights and out beyond; and some

time before the arrival of the

allies,

had drawn up

his long

array, with Breitenfeld to the rear of his left, a mile or so

away, and Seehausen behind his right.

The sun and wind

were both at his back, a feature much in his favor. In contrast to the rough and rusty Swedes, Tilly com-

manded a bered

splendid-looking set of veterans.

men who had

His army num-

followed him for years, and

he had never yet been conquered in a battle.

among

these were his Walloons, at the head of

knew

that

Prominent

whom

he

took his stand on his white battle-charger, which was laiown to every

man

in line.

As

the rugged old veteran of seventy-

two passed along, shouts of "Father Tilly!" rang from battalion to battalion.

There was no feeling of imcertainty

TILLY'S FORMATION.

That full-throated cheer presaged

the imperial army.

ill

259

success.

As

variously computed, Tilly had from thirty-two to forty

He drew

thousand men, of which a quarter was cavalry.

up the infantry

in seventeen great battalia, of fifteen

dred to two thousand

men

each, in the centre,

hun-

and ranged

the horse in similar masses of about one thousand men, ten

deep, on

the flanks.

cuirassiers

was on the

come up, was on the Italy,

Pappenheim with

personally

right, with the cavalry just

back from

under Isolani, in

but twenty-six guns.

Fiirstenberg,

in line batteries

credited with

is

it

seems as

there

if

difficult to handle,

new antagonist without an more nearly equal

he must well know.

effectiveness

Tilly

This was the number reported as

His guns were

scarcely meet his

line.

first

captured by the Swedes, but

been more.

famous black

his

who had

left,

must have

but he would

effort to place

to the Swedish,

whose

His heavy guns were

placed between the right wing and the centre

;

his light

guns

in front of the centre.

has been asserted on the generally plausible ground of

It

the custom of the day, that Tilly's

two

lines.

all

deep battalia, he had scarce enough

regular second line. of

army was drawn up

two

lines;

in

old pictures of the battle show but one

and Tilly covered so great a stretch of front

line,

his

But

Only the

men

Italian author

that,

to

with

form a

Gualdo speaks

other accounts mention no second one.

How-

ever disposed, the imperial line was longer than the allied, the Swedish. Tilly had many won success by wheeling in on the enemy's flank, and he may have hoped to do so here. Not prolific of novelties

considerably overlapping

times

in tactics, he based his faith

on the time-tried manoeuvre.

His men bound white kerchiefs

word was "Jesu-Maria! "

in their hats,

and the watch-

GUSTAVUS' FORMATION.

260

With

a small column of cavalry, Pappenheim had been

sent forward to arrest the allied advance at the

Loberbach,

stream

little

perchance some advantage might be had of

if

them.

At

early daylight the Swedes had fallen into line, and

advanced in battle order across the even plain from Wolkau, towards Leipsic.

After an hour and a half's march they

ran across the enemy's van, and then caught sight of the imperial array on the slopes where

To

it

had taken up

its

stand.

cross the Loberbach, the armies were compelled to ploy

and here they encountered the skirmishers of

into column,

Pappenheim

;

but they threw them back, and crossed at the

several fords.

The Swedes held

the right and centre; the Saxons the

but the two armies fought as separate organizations.

left;

no record of the Saxon formation

There

is

be of

interest.

The Saxons

;

the Swedish

may

lay on the east of the Diiben

road; the Swedes on the west.

The Swedish

centre had in

first line

four brigades of foot

under Generals Winkel, Carl Hall, Teuffel and stiern;

Ake Oxen-

in reserve to the first line the cavalry regiment of

Ortenburg, and the Scottish infantry under Monroe and

Ramsey.

In second line the centre had three brigades, of

which one Scotch under General Hepburn, and two German

under Generals Vitzthum and Thurn.

Behind

this

stood

the reserve cavalry under Schafmann and Kochtitzky.

At

the head of the right wing, which was mostly cavalry,

stood Field-Marshal Baner, second in command. line

In

first

were the East Gothland, Smaland, West Gothland, and

two Finland regiments under Tott; and the Wiinsch and Stalhandske regiments, the best of their kind.

Between each

two of the small cavalry divisions there was stationed a body of two hundred musketeers.

In reserve was the Rhinegrrave

THE SAXONS.

261

In second line stood the cavalry regiments of

regiment. Sperreuter,

Damitz, and the Courland and Livonia regi-

ments.

Field-Marshal Horn commanded the line stood the cavalry

left

In

wing.

first

regiments of Baudissin, Calenbach and

Horn, interspersed with the bodies of two hundred musketeers already mentioned.

In second

line.

regiments.

same body

There was no reserve to

Between each of

this first

came Courville's and Hall's cavah*y

line

two cavalry divisions was the

two hundred musketeers.

The regimental what we might

pieces were in

front of the regiments;

call the reserve artillery

was massed

in front

of the left centre under Torstenson.

On

the left of

Horn came

the Saxons, destined by their

utter lack of discipline, not to say cowardice, to aid in win-

ning the battle.

The whole Swedish army wore hopeful green branches their

headgear, and the pass-word was

"God

in

with us!"

Gustavus, who, despite his growing bulkiness, was always a noble figure, addressed the troops amid great enthusiasm.

He

wore but his common buff coat, and a gray hat with a

green feather.

Armor he had long ago

fortable; for the

Danzig bullet

still

discarded as uncom-

lay in his shoulder, and

he was irritated by the weight of the cuirass.

He

sought but

the protection of the Ahnighty.

The Saxon army was freshly equipped, and looked well. The imperialists wore gold and silver ornamented clothes,

— — the plunder of an hundred towns, and from their headgear nodded

fine

plumes.

Their horses were big showy Germans

the Swedish horses were small

other soldiers on this

field,

and gaunt.

Compared

the Swedish peasant

to the

made a

slender show; but the stuff was in him, as his fine friends

and foes alike found out and

lonsr

remembered.

r>-

PAPPENHEIM'S ERROR. So soon

as they

263

came within range, the imperial

artillery

began playing on the

allies,

under constant

but when the Swedish guns could be

fire;

and

their marshaling took place

got up, they were put in battery, and replied three shots for one.

The advance and dei^loyment

taken

till

of

the allied line had

nearly noon, and for two hours and a half after

that time, there was no exchange except a cannonade, which

indeed went on during the whole day.

Pappenheim's splendid cuirassiers had returned from the Loberbach and had taken place in line. All were now awaiting some incident to call for an opening attack; the imperialists expected the allies to advance,

making sure

Pappenheim was growing

Having stood

impatient.

number

and Gustavus was

that all was ready, to give the signal call. restless.

Swedish

the

He was

bold

and

artillery fire for a

of hours, he could contain himself no longer.

Gath-

ering his five thousand horse in hand, and without awaiting

down upon Bauer, who

orders from his chief, he thundered

held the Swedish right, galloping in on him at the head of the best cavalry division then in arms. lieutenant's mistake before he

"They have robbed me cried,

of

Tilly recognized his

had ridden a hundred yards.

my

honor and

my

glory!" he

throwing up his arms in despair.

In order to place his line where the disadvantage of dust

would not be so great plain

— the

wind was southwest and the

parched from a long drouth

crossing the Loberbach,

moved

— Gustavus

had, after

well to his right, to establish

his position.

The idea enough

of

Pappenheim was that he could edge

to outflank the

wheel, push in and destroy their flank.

Baner.

He

forgot,

to the left

Swedes, and then, by a half right

too,

him from the main body

that his of the

He

did not

know

advance would separate

army

at a time

when he

PAPPENHEIM DEFEATED.

264

might be sadly needed.

His action was

in every sense to

blame.

Not only was Pappenheim's advance an worse,

it

what was

error,

failed.

The Swedish formation and excellent behavior easily withThe "commanded musketeers" as the stood the shock.

—

small bodies interspersed with the cavalry were called

—

received the cuirassiers with withering salvos, and between shots the Finns

and Goths charged out on the horsemen

with a gallantry which cheered the whole right flank.

Baner

at once understood the purpose of the brave but over-impetu-

ous Pappenheim; and

from the Swedish

when the imperial commander turned

front,

and rode around

met before he was ready by a

its flank,

he was

counter-charge from one

stiff

of the cavalry regiments in reserve behind the first line.

Not discouraged, though checked, Pajtpenheim renewed and renewed

his charges.

Seven times did he

rally his

men, and

dash down upon the Swedish front and flank; but the musketeers

—

fit

prototype of Fritz's Prussian foot

ground as steadily in the hand

to

hand

— stood their

conflict as if they

been on parade, and the Swedish cavalry, thovigh far,

wavered not from their doughty resistance.

lighter

had

by

The Hol-

stein infantry regiment, which was sent by Tilly to Pappen-

heim's support, was cut to pieces, and the duke

head of

his

men.

No

fell at

the

impression whatever had been created

by Pappenheim's advance; and even

this

preux chevalier was

eventually thrown back, decimated and unnerved, was fol-

lowed sharply by Baner and driven fled

off the field.

The wreck

towards Halle, and Gustavus discreetly recalled the pur-

suers to the line. It

must be remembered that the cavalry charge

day was not delivered at a gallop. at a trot,

and

of that

The troops rather rode

at a convenient distance halted to use their

THE SAXONS RUN AWAY. So long

firearms.

draw

their swords.

as there It

"arm

they did not

left,

was not a question of

cavalry was not then the

moment;"

of the

impact

solid

fought

it

horseback, and the footman's "push of

infantry on

like

was a volley

265

pike" was much more common than the horseman's cold steel, so

steadiness,

came

broken infantry

On

When

long as the enemy showed a front.

he could not break

if

was

the allied left the result

charge of

the imperial

cavalry,

it.

different indeed.

The

under Fiirstenberg

and

back after Papj)enheim had

Isolani, could not long be held

started on his

he lost

the cavalryman's chance; he could slash up

mistaken ride; the squadrons

gallant but

drove forward, straight upon the Saxon array.

Nor did

they meet a line of Swedish veterans ; except for some efforts

by the horse and tion the

moment

artillery,

they crushed in the Saxon forma-

they reached

ners, the unseating of a

few

and the

it;

officers,

loss of

was enough

a few gunto send the

bespangled battalions of John George to the right-about.

The

was seized with an equal

elector

he and his

terror;

body-guard turned and spurred away to Eilenburg. short half hour the imperial cavalry of the right

the whole

Saxon contmgent

— nearly half

the field; having done which,

it

the

In a

had driven

army

— from

prej)ared to turn in

now naked left flank of the king of Sweden. The Swedish train behind the army caught the

upon

the

from the flying Saxons, and made

much

As non-combatants

disorder.

its

way

infection

to the rear, in

they were mostly hired

Germans, on whose stanchness no reliance could be placed.

The it

it

battle

had begun without the orders of Father Tilly;

was running

its

course without any Interference by

was going quite against his wishes.

from his position

Saxon

flight

in the centre,

But

him

at this juncture,

he was quick to see that the

had opened a chance by which he might repair

DISASTER TURNED INTO VICTORY.

266

the errors already made, and win the day. left

was open; and

Tilly's centre of

The Swedish Spanish

irresistible

now outnumbered

battalia not only overlapped

it,

king- at least three to two.

Moreover Tilly was compelled

to act, for the fire

but he

from Torstenson's quick-served guns was

He

gTOwing deadlier every minute. advance

wake

in the

the

gave

the

order

to

of Fiirstenberg, and, in the belief that

the king would not separate his left from his centre, obliqued to the right, so as to get well

beyond Gustavus'

direction of his

movement was

road; and be

said

it

the east of the Diiben

to

for the credit of Tilly's manoeuvring

capacity, that a part of his heavy line of battalia to

march obliquely

left,

and

to the right,

it

was able

partial wheel to the

started out over two hours before,

the Swedish naked flank the north, to

make a

advance in serried ranks against the position

still

where, when

The

left.

;

while Fiirstenberg rode further to

come down upon

But Gustavus was manoeuvre twice as

had stood

its rear.

alive to the danger,

and Horn could

fast as the best of Tilly's battles.

Under

Gustavus' instructions Horn smartly wheeled his wing to the

left,

threw out detachments to hold the ditches of the

Diiben road,

and was ready

to

meet the imperial general

long before he reached the spot; while the king, hastily

drawing Vitzthum's and Hepburn's brigades from the second line of the centre,

the

left.

The

threw them in to sustain the new line on

fight here

was thus established on a

safe basis,

Swedes drove the impe-

and despite

their heroic charges the

rial cavalry

back, and were ready to attack the battalia

when

they should put in their appearance.

Now came

the

moment

and the king grasped right,

it

for Gustavus

in a twinkling.

and

his mobile line,

Riding back to the

he gave hurried orders to Baner, and heading the

West Gothland

horse

down along

the front of the Swedish

SUPERB MANCEUVRE.

.4

he sent them charging at a furious gallop in on the

line,

Here

flank of Tilly's battles.

was

267

was cold

not a volley

steel;

but the squadrons dashed straight at the enemy

fired,

with the

it

momentum

of a

Gustavus

pas de charge.

himself waited but to seize

East

Smalanders,

the

Gothlanders and Finns, foiu"

regiments, — and •

—

fol-

lowed hard along, bearing

up the

to the right

where

slope

stood the im-

still

These were

perial guns.

heavy and hard

move,

to

Battle of Breitenfeld.

and

and

king

the

(2d Phase.)

his

horsemen swept over them wholesale, captured them trice,

in

a

sabred the gunners where they stood, and in a few

minutes turned the battery against the flank of Tilly's

now standing

at

Never, in modern days, had the chances

to turn the tide.

of battle been

line,

bay where the brave old soldier had hoped

improved by so rapid, so masterly,

so bold a

manoeuvre.

The temporary promise and the faihu'e of direction

to

the

its left,

Ime

of

of success of the imperial right,

had thus given a new and curious

The Swedish

battle.

almost at right angles to where

it

had

first

left

stood

been marshaled,

with Tilly, in more or less irregular order from his unwonted

manoeuvre, facing

it.

The king had

caj)tured Tilly's origi-

nal position, and was not only pounding the imperialists

with their

own

cannon-balls, but Torstenson had

his reserve artillery,

centre,

which had stood

swung round

in front of the

and was pouring the contents of

Swedish

his munition wagons,

on a line parallel to the late Swedish front, into the huge,

SPLENDID FIGHTING.

268

Gustavus now made a general wheel

defiant squares. left

of

his centre and right, so as to prolong the

by

He

Horn.

enemy

hand

off

from Leipsic, but the

won, and there was a

to be

still

fight along the

fierce

the cavalry

now It

of

hands and

;

left

was

all

the artillery

upon the

field, it

solely a question

would stand before their resistance was turned of

how tough Father

Tilly was.

way

Tilly's veterans fought in a

fame

and their general's reputation.

own

own

to preserve their

Standing at bay with

the Swedish array on two sides of them, torn by the their

was

the victory should be; of what losses the

how complete

imperialists into flight

all

battle

and prolonged hand

With

Dtiben road.

could, however, end but one way.

in his

front

had already, by capturing the imperial bat-

teries, cut the

to

to the

new

fire

of

and the enemy's guns; with their cavalry in dis-

tant flight,

no reserves to

aid,

no hope of anything but

destruction, the battles of Tilly stuck manfully to their task.

Gaps were torn

in their ranks to

no purpose.

There they

stood, partly from gallant love of their rough old

chief,

partly from the sheer inertia of their massed formation, as the ranks of Porus

had stood

at the

Hydaspes, as the

Russian hollow square would stand at Kunersdorf towards spread

nightfall, fast,

and

the

.

Finally,

Once begun, it save a small body of braves who

stampede began.

shortly,

surrounded Tilly, the infantry battalia melted into a mass of

fugitives.

There was

no organization

left.

Pappen-

heim's famous horsemen had hours ago been broken, and

with Fiirstenberg's had fled; and Tilly's battles crumbled before the activity of the Swedish onslaught.

The Saxon guns were recaptured by the Swedes. The army lost seven thousand killed, six thousand

imperial

wounded and captured, whole train. The rest

all its artillery,

of the

army

ninety flags and the

fled in

every direction,

GUSTAVUS PURSUES.

269

mostly towards Halle, wliither, thrice wounded and scarcely escaping capture, Tilly also to Halberstadt.

made

liis

way, and from thence

Here he joined Pappenheim, and

he could of his forces,

retired

to

collected

the

line

what the

of

Weser. It is related that,

so soon as the battle

was

fairly

Gustavus dismounted, kneeled on the blood-stained

and offered up thanks

to the

Giver of Victory, while

by him joined earnestly

in his pious act.

such sincerity was inbred,

—

won, field,

all

near

With Gustavus

like the unsj)oken battle prayers

of Stonewall Jackson.

The

king, whose loss had not exceeded twenty-one hun-

dred killed and wounded, ture Leipsic, and

With

his usual

left

the Saxon contingent to cap-

followed up the retreating

imperialists.

push he himself headed a body of fifteen

hundred horse, and at Merseburg, on September 19, overtook a considerable detachment, beat sand prisoners.

He

it,

and captured three thou-

occupied Halle, September 21, but did

not pursue beyond the Saale, for he wished to be secure in his

foothold in

Saxony before he moved

western or southern Germany.

decisively

into

The imperial garrison

in

Leipsic surrendered September 23, and the Saxons returned to Torgau.

After lying some time in the Halberstadt region, Tilly

moved

to the

"Whose

Weser, where he recovered his strength rapidly.

house doth burn. Must soldier turn" was true, and

he found plenty of Breitenfeld, the

recruits. first

great battle of the

modern

era,

is

more than one way. Counting out the Saxons, who were but a source of weakness, the king was heavily

peculiar in

outnumbered, and was attacked successively and in force on both flanks, in a manner which on more than one occasion has proved fatal to an army.

Attempted flank attacks some-

THE PROTESTANT HERO.

270

times open gaps in the line which delivers them, and result

more harm

in

to

than gain made against the enemy.

it

this case, the flank attacks,

met with great constancy; and Pappenheun's

vigor, were

and

In

while not lacking in direction

being delivered without orders, took the control of the battle out of the hands of the general in command.

which led up

to Tilly's

The

situation

overthrow was none of his making,

though Pappenheim afterwards complained of not being supported in his

first

charge, and

was

it

Tilly's putting all his

strength into the manoeuvre on the naked Swedish left flank

which practically broke up his

happened had Tilly been faced by a tles

and few generals,

;

in

any

apparently good an opening. led

by Gustavus' splendid

moment and

to seize the

won

the battle,

It

line of

slow-moving bat-

would have neglected so

was the Swedish mobility, and

his true

coup

d^oeil

order the manoeuvre needed, which

like

line

era,

vigor,

rather than

Against a heavy

This would not have

line.

would doubtless have been

Tilly's his

own

errors which

lost

it.

imperial general

the

victorious, despite the error of

Pappenheim. Gustavus was at once recognized as the Protestant Hero.

Those who had looked askance at him, who had likened him to Christian of

those lest

who had

Denmark, were now vociferous

heavy retribution should await them

now openly

in his praise;

feared to join his standard by word or deed,

declared for him.

All

in case of failure,

Germany was overrun

with pamphlets to laud hun, with pictures and medals of

Gustavus the Great.

For once the Catholic press and pam-

phleteers were silenced.

whelming.

The

Their defeat had been too over-

Nothing could be said

spirit of the

victory as the king

to excuse

it.

Swedes was as much heightened by

had gained

in glory.

this

The enlistment

of

prisoners and the gathering up of garrisons swelled the ranks

THE SWEDES ELATED. b£ the Protestant allies.

A

271

new army assembled on

the

lower Elbe; Tott besieged Rostock, while Landgrave Wil-

liam and

Duke Bernard

held Fiigger in

check,

cleaned

Hesse-Cassel of imperial troops, and made enterprising raids into adjoining Catholic territory.

SUSTIVE ADOLPHE, ROI DC SDICDE. m P»r Miihicl Van Micrtvtll cl gfuvt P^r W J. RtlT. |033.1

-^1

XXI.

TOWARDS THE MAIN. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, In fourteen months Gnstavus had not only securely established but at Breitenfeld had

qiiite

changed the aspect of the cause

;

1631.

his bastion,

laggards

all

now crowded around him with offers of ielp. Tilly retired behind Weser the Catholics saw in the Snow King a dangerous opponent and Protestant prospects were flattering. Even Wallenstein aspired to serve ;

;

king, but Gustavus mistrusted him.

With Saxony and Brandenburg

the the the

as allies,

Gustavus moved confidently to the Erfurt country, through Thuringia to the Main, and to the bishopries dubbed the Priest's Alley, leaving John George to

command an

Many thought

operation towards Silesia.

the king should march

was method, not temerity, which distinguished Gus-

direct

on Vienna

tavus,

and he preferred not to prejudice what was already won.

but

;

it

Tilly

was

He

used

watched by a minor column, and the king pushed on to the Main. his interior lines

;

every strip gained was carefully guarded

;

made with the lands he crossed, and with the free cities, such The Main was reached early in October, Wiirzburg and its castle butions levied, and the Jesuits banished.

marched

to AsehafEenburg, joined the

treaties

were

as Niirnberg.

taken, contri-

Tilly meanwhile raised a nfew army,

duke of Lorraine, and began

to operate

timorously in the region south of the Main, with near forty thousand men.

Only

fourteen months had elapsed since Gustavus had

landed in Germany, but by his far-seeing, cautious and well-digested plans, crowned tenfeld,

Protestants.

He had

to

of Brei-

secured a firm footing in northern

Germany, where he held

down

by the decisive victory

he had completely changed the prospects of the

all

but a few of the strong places

Saxony, and had isolated these.

tions with

Sweden were secured by the

and he had practically established

nium Maris

Baltici.

After

His communicacontrol of the sea,

his long-coveted

many and

Domi-

vexatious delays he

THE SNOW KING. Cassel and

Weimar, and was strengthened by

troops, tendered

On

Brandenburg, Saxony, Hesse-

treaties with

had concluded

273

accessions of

and promised from many other quarters.

landing, the horizon was dark and impromising

;

had now cleared, and the sim of success blazed forth the hearts of

all.

As Gustavus had gained gained in aplomb and aj)peared slow

what

is

the sky to cheer

moral weight, so

in

and cautious, but they had been

better,

were

by the

justified

with but one serious failure,

at times

sure, and,

He had met

results.

— Magdeburg, — and

this

was

Breitenfeld had placed

chargeable to the elector of Saxony.

him on the most prominent

army had

his

His operations had

confidence.

j)edestal in

Europe.

The

Catholics

He

no longer looked de haut en has on the "Snow King."

was a redoubtable opponent

as well as the Protestant Hero,

— the "Lion of the North and Bulwark of the Faith." imperialists

had

lost in spirit

and organization

all

The

that the

Their retreat to the Weser opened

Swedes had gained.

the heart of the emperor's possessions to the king's thrust,

with but a trivial force in the way.

had received from

his

"new

little

The emperor's authority^ enemy" an almost fatal

blow, and the Protestants of north and west Germany, who,

cowed of

into submission,

Swedish

aid,

now

had feared

rose,

under Gustavus' standards. distinctly shifted the

the Protestant

a great

was

to establish

These fourteen months had

Gustavus had risen beyond being

He was now

German war,

welcome the uncertainty

moral superiority from the Catholic to

party.

king of Sweden.

to

and with hearty good-will enlisted

in

the leader of the attack in

which the task he had imdertakeu

beyond

future

religions all over the land.

a condition to leave to others.

question the equality of

But the work was not yet Gustavus had put his hand

the plow, and might not look back.

It required the

in to

same

TERROR OF CATHOLICS.

274

wise and vigorous action in the future, to com2:)lete the structure which had been so well builded in the past. Tilly's lamentable failure to withstand the

Swedish advance

draw attention

who had been Bohemian The terror which

began again

to

nursing his wrath

in

to Wallenstein,

a species of court in his

nursing his gout in Karlsbad.

castles, or

had been engendered by Gustavus' successes on the Oder now sank into insignificance before the terror inspired by the battle of Breitenfeld.

The

walls of cities hundreds of miles

manned; Bohe-

distant from the scene of action were kept

mian

forests

were laid low to block the roads upon which

was feared that the king might advance; equijjped

new army;

a

the

in

in

Ingolstadt

it

Prague they they

churches

prayed to be "delivered from the devil and the Swedes, the

Vienna was said

Finns and the Lapps."

to be

"dumb

with

fright;" the emperor was so nearly at the end of his wits, say some questionable chroniclers, that he sought means of

bringing about peace, and even contemplated flight to Gratz.

Universal terror pointed the world to Wallenstein.

he could inspire confidence favor, in the It

is

Years'

army and

;

outside.

a curious fact that of the noted soldiers of the Thirty

War, only Pappenheim was

Pappenheim was a bold and able before he rose to higher

command.

Wallenstein was a Czech

Tilly a

man

;

Only

the popular sentiment was in his

of the

;

a German, and while

lieutenant, he

was

killed

Gustavus was a Swede

Walloon Turenne a French;

minor generals, the only German who won repute

was Bernard of Weimar, and he forfeited

his all at

Nord-

lingen.

Oddly, Wallenstein had been looking in another direction,

— towards

his old antagonist,

said to have been

made

to

Gugtavus.

him about

they certainly were by the

Approaches are

these days

by England;

Swedish monarch, and these

WALLENSTEIN'S OPPORTUNITY.

27o

Wallenstein had not thrust aside, though he openly denied them.

Tilly heard the runior of such negotiations

the Czech with

it;

but Wallenstein reassured him.

same way Gustavus sought reach Saxony.

He was

accomplish his

end,

Nor would

employ.

Like the

rest he

more important

and taxed

to

Arnim,

influence

to

not above any honorable means to

and Wallenstein was it

In the so as

have made any odds

was a mercenary, even to the fortunes of

if

no

in if

man's

he had been.

a great one.

Still

Germany, Wallenstein

stood in correspondence with Arnim.

was

It

keeping

in

with the spirit of the times that these secret negotiations shoidd go on.

Save Gusta^^^s, scarce a potentate in EurojDC

had a disinterested servant.

The great Bohemian, unlike

most of his contemporaries, was not hide-bound by

He had

religion.

broader aims, and would have welcomed an era of

tolerance, in

which he could

strive for a

German

empire,

under the Hapsburgs, to be uj)held by himself as military chief.

In another sense Gustavus had equal aspirations,

but not for the German, crown.

His dismissal from command had

Wallenstein hard.

hit

In the summer of 1631 he undoubtedly stood ready to enter into

an alliance with Gustavus, and

cause, to revenge his

to serve the Protestant

wrongs on Ferdinand.

Gustavus was

almost on the point of intrusting him with an army, but is

doubtful

if,

in the

Swedish

it

Wallenstein would

service,

Then came the battle of Breitenfeld; and the emperor began once more to look towards his ancient general. But Wallenstein was disinclined to listen, and for

have proved a success.

a while

it

appeared as

— Gustavus,

if

the three strongest

Richelieu, and Wallenstein

men

— were

in

to

Europe form an

anti-Hapsburg triumvirate.

Now

that Gustavus

had shown

princes joined the cause.

his strength, the

They made a

Anhalt

treaty at Halle to

WHAT ROUTE?

276

pay three thousand rix dollars a month,

by the king and

bridges as directed

to build forts

at their

own

and

cost, to

hold their strong places and defiles for the Swedes while

denying passage to the emperor, and generally to act under Gustavus' direction, in exchange for the protection afforded

by the

alliance.

As when Magdeburg was

crying aloud for succor, there

was again more than one road open

Should he move against west Germany and

choose his plan. the beaten

He must

to Gustavus.

army

of Tilly,

who was now basing himself on

the Catholic princes of the Rhine ; should he march through

Franconia

on

the Thurino^ian forest

and

"Priest's

the

Alley;" or should he move southeastward, on the emperor's

At a

hereditary possessions ?

council of

shortly after the victory, the elector of of

Weimar were

field,

own and

for Gustavus

to do, with

his army's flight

sent to congratulate

battle-

After the battle the king had

him on

the victory, and to thank

John George was

dull

from the

had treated him, as he could well afford

an easy touch.

for having suggested an immediate

— and

at Halle

John George had recovered from

present.

the disgrace of his

war held

Saxony and William

movement on

as far

him

the enemy,

from appreciating the

touch of satire in the facts as Gustavus was from intending

any

slur.

At

this

council

advised a march on Vienna. military plea for

it.

A

many

others

Count Horn made a

strono-

Oxenstiern and

summary

operation, they thought,

against the emperor in his capital would bring

peace which would set

all

There were few forces

— perhaps

Tiefenbach in Silesia, and

— to oppose ised to

care

him

to a

the questions of Europe at rest.

less in

ten thousand

men under

Bohemia under Maradas

such a march, and the elector of Saxony promfor

the

southwest.

strongly in favor of such a project

That the sentiment was is

shown by the

fact that,

AN ADVANCE ON VIENNA?

277

twenty years afterwards, Oxenstiern reiterated his opinion before the senate in Stockholm that such a

have been the wisest one to make.

march would

The chancellor could be

venturesome on occasion.

But though not slow

to see the advantages suggested, the

plan did not meet with the king's idea of a systematic

method

of carrying on the

honor, did

campaign

nor, be

;

So far

tant friends.

said to his

had come, not from the bold-

residts

ness, but the caution of his operations.

and held was by gressed,

it

chime with the pledges he had given his Protes-

it

What

and by doing nothing which had not

general plan.

he had won

intelligently securing each step as he pro-

Still,

fully all the pros

as

its

place in the

was his wont, the king weighed care-

and cons, and listened patiently

to every

suggestion.

Small confidence could be

felt in

the ability of the Saxon

army, beaten so easily at Breitenfeld, to do satisfactory work against imperial forces in the

Main

should order a concentration there. cially

Arnim, would be glad

territory;

for

John George

country,

if

Ferdinand

John George, and espe-

German

to control the south

had

political

and

financial

schemes to push there, and Arnim his Third Party business;

none of which appealed to Gustavus' common sense.

The king

preferred personally to undertake south Germany, while the

Saxons should sustain a force of twelve thousand Swedes, and a Bohemian

army

(should he be

won

to

be placed under Wallenstein's

over),

push on to Vienna,

and the

latter

command

with this force might

Moreover, Gustavus never quite

his anxiety as to his communications, for he reposed

lost

no faith

John George or George William, and conceive the possibility, even if remote, of Saxony

in the constancy of

could

still

and Brandenburg rising behind him, should he be too far distant.

A

single check in a

movement on Vienna

b}^ his

THE KING'S IDEA.

278

main force would be surely

fatal.

He knew

the iron will of

Ferdinand, and did not believe that even the sack of his

The emperor had already

woidd bring him to terms.

capital

been tried in this matter,

now

— and Vienna

day was not

at that

Like the Madrid of the eigh-

the capital which

it

teenth century,

might be taken by an enemy a dozen times

it

is.

without affecting the war.

Ferdinand might

retire to the

south and involve Gustavus in an extremely dangerous stern

Nor was a march on Vienna

chase.

the best

way

the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution.

to

compel

Nothing- but

Gustavus' presence could stay Tilly from visiting on any of the

The king

Protestant cities _ the fate of Magdeburg.

must consider the work

to be

done before winter, and decide

where he might best dispose his

troojDS.

Along the Main

lay the rich Catholic bishoprics, — and here he could not only victual his

How much

tants.

the

men, but repair the wrongs of

his brother Protes-

more negotiation was needful

Protestant princes

to

work

together was

to induce

uncertain.

Breitenfeld had changed people's faces, but the king had

not forgotten his long struggle with Brandenburg and Saxony, and he believed that a single failure would renew the

doubtful attitude of most of his present supporters.

The king's immediate

move

to the

idea was that he would personally

Erfurt cou^ntry for winter-quarters, and govern

his further operations

perse his men,

from

there.

Not that he would

dis-

but he would accumulate magazines, and

own headquarters here, while the troops lay in Thuringia, with Hesse, Weimar and Saxony near by; and from here he would move on the Franconian bishojjrics, compel contributions, recruit up an army for a brilliant cam-

make

his

paign in 1632, and quests,

and

utilize the

winter to consolidate his con-

to bring his allies to

men and money

work

as well as smiles

in unison

and promises.

and furnish Tilly

must

NO MARCH ON VIENNA. be considered; but the king deemed

own

right

his proposal

Germany would

western

sufficient to secure his

it

by defensive means against him and the Rhineland

and

princes,

279

emperor; while,

successful,

if

Germany

in western

parties agreed that

would win as firm a footing

it

as he already

it

had

his

All

northern.

in

was not worth while

Such an advance with

the Weser.

and arm south-

to occupy, free

cut Tilly off from Bavaria and the

to follow Tilly to

main force would

be taking the king away from his general direction, which should lead to southern

Germany and towards

the emperor.

Though he must not be overlooked, operations against Tilly need not be conducted by the main force; a part of the allied armies, while protecting the king's flank, could pre-

vent the imperialists gaining dangerous headway.

The march on Vienna was given ferred to operate

from

his

enemies at the same time.

interior

With

his

Germany

from which

to

into activity,

all

his

main force he would to Swabia, to rouse

and gain a vantage-gi'oimd

Bavaria.

attack

against

lines

move through Thuringia and Franconia southern

Gustavus pre-

over.

When

he

have

shoidd

secured the whole region from the lower Oder to the middle

and upper Rhine, he could operate against Bavaria and

Meanwhile the Saxon, and perhaps

Austria from the west.

Wallenstein's, campaign against Silesia, via would

up the semblance

army

of an operation against Vienna;

of Hesse-Cassel

Tilly,

prevent his

it

venturing into western

did not suit

and the

and Weimar would operate against

No doubt

secure the king's right.

though

Bohemia and Mora-

secure the king's left in his advance, and keep

all

this plan

Germany, and was the wisest,

the Swedish generals, as

it

tainly did not satisfy the king's paymaster, Richelieu. this far-seeing

port.

cer-

But

statesman did not withdraw his financial sup-

LOSSAU'S CRITICISM.

280

The plan thus finally adopted by Gustavus has been much by soldiers. Folard likens his declination to march on Vienna to that of Hannibal, who failed to march on Kome after the overwhelming victory of Cannae. The com-

criticised

parison

— though

not so intended

—

is

Both

an apt one.

Gustavus and Hannibal were right in their action.

Lossau gives a better

Tilly, he argues,

set of reasons.

was beaten, but he should, with Fugger and Aldringer, have been followed up and annihilated.

men under Horn

ten thousand

For

this purpose, eight to

or Baner sufficed; and

when

the work was accomplished, the corps could rejoin the main

army.

The

elector of

lem of the south

Saxony could

German

easily

manage the prob-

— there

states with a small force,

being no great opposition there, and could lend Gustavus a

march on Vienna, which there

large part of his forces for a

was at the moment no organized army

to oppose.

Through

Bohemia and Moravia the Swedish army coidd be victualed,

raising

easily

and such a march might have made the subsequent

of

Wallenstein's army impossible.

In the event,

he says, Gustavus was compelled to operate on the Danube

imder much

less

favorable conditions.

On

the Baltic, in

Saxony, in Bohemia, in Westphalia, in Hesse, in Thuringia, in Franconia, everything

emperor. lost

went well for Gustavus

Ferdinand had but

fifty

;

ill

for the

thousand men; he had

more than half Germany; Hungary was threatened;

Bavaria was unreliable

;

the Protestants of

Austria were in revolt.

What

Upper and Lower

better time for Gustavus to

push home than the present? All this

is

fair

tavus' advent in

and proper

criticism.

But, prior to Gus-

Germany, there had been,

of the Christian era,

many

been no methodical ones.

in the history

bold operations, and there had

It

was method that Gustavus was

to teach in war, not alone boldness.

This

last quality is

GUSTAVUS' ORDERS. common, when taken by

combined with discretion

itself;

As Alexander would

is rare.

281 it

not advance into the heart of

Persia until he had acquired as a base the entire eastern

Mediterranean coast; as Hannibal declined after both Trasi-

mene and Cannae

Rome;

march on

to

crossing the Rubicon, took all

as

Caesar,

after

the towns on the Adriatic

before he would march to the capital, so Gustavus

decided to

make

now

sure of what he had, and to risk nothino; for

In the purely military aspect, he was

a questionable gain.

right; taking the political factors into account, doubly so.

— which

In pursuance of this general scheme sighted, reckoned

on

all

demands

paid due heed to the

and had a basis of broad but judgment

— the

was

far-

the political and military factors, of

Protestant

his

allies,

to the world novel military

Swedish monarch

Baner was

work.

set to

ordered to leave a garrison in Landsberg, to deliver up possession of Frankfort

burg, to take

be

and Crossen

command

of the

in condition for the field,

Werben

garrisons,

and

to

to the elector of

Saxon army when to

draw

in the

Brandenit

should

Havel and

assume a strong position near

Calbe on the Elbe, building forts at Rosenburg and Dessau, the mouths of the Saale and the Mulde.

He was

to send

a cavalry force to take Halberstadt, and to aim at capturing

Magdeburg;

in fact,

Baner was

of the bastion of all imperialists

Tott,

who

to clear the western skirts

and then

to

watch

lay on the lower Elbe, with the

it.

same end in

view was instructed to seek helpful alliances in the Bruns-

wick-Liineburg-Lauenburg territory, and with the free

Bremen, Liibeck and Hamburg.

He was

cities

to

besiege

Rostock, and capture the outstanding towns in the

Bremen

of

region.

All recruits to arrive from England, Scotland and

the Netherlands

land in the

— and

Weser and

they were a large body join Tott.

— were

to

STRATEGIC CHANGE.

282

Oxenstiei-n was instructed to order sundry Prussian gar-

from which most

risons to Ponierania,

He had

had been drawn. king,

who was glad

of the seasoned troops

ah*eady reported in person to the

to have

him near

at

hand

as an adviser.

Starting on September 27 from Halle, the king, with

way

twenty-six thousand men, headed for Thuringia, by

Querfurt.

He

was not sure that he could push beyond

of

this

section before winter.

On

October 2 Erfurt, one of the chief

of Mainz, primate clever stratagem of

final treaty

Germany, was

of Catholic

Duke William, and

after

seized

much

by a

discus-

and was strongly garrisoned.

sion agreed to serve the cause,

Here a

cities of the elector

was made with the four brothers of the

house of Saxe-Weimar.

The operations

of the year

the strategic position.

had brought about a change

in

In securing his bastion on the Baltic,

Gustavus had a base which called for a front of operations

from say Landsberg

running east and west,

He now

Werben.

to

found himself backing on the Elbe and Saale.

His

rear was protected by the Frankfort-Crossen line, and no

enemy was near

it

except Tiefenbach in Silesia.

Along the

Elbe-Saale he lay practically facing west, with the <jentre point of operations at Erfurt, and groups of forces on his right extending

down

and Baner, on completing William

These groups, under Tott

the Elbe. their

in the Saale region

;

work would

join

while the Royal

Landgrave

Army

would

push through the Thuringian Forest to the Werra, and on through Franconia to the Main. the forces on the as

aid

But

in

their

as well

advance through Silesia and

until the imperial allies along

witli the Sj)anish

tralized,

Oder by driving back the enemy,

the Saxons

Bohemia.

This advance would help

the

Rhine,

Netherlands at their back, could be neu-

Gustavus could not safely extend

his base so as to

project a line of advance on the heart of the empire.

GUSTAVUS' FORCES.

the forces controlled by Gustavus and expected

At Erfurt

to be raised were substantially as follows

numbered eighteen thousand by eleven thousand

increase

The Royal Army

:

hundred dragoons and

foot, six

hundred cavalry, which

seventy-five

was

it

purposed

in the field

which were

and

hundred

six

thousand and twenty-six hundred respectively.

had

five

garrison,

thousand

five

thirty-

be increased by

five

in

to

and seventy-five hundred

foot

Baner had four thousand men

horse.

283

to

Tott

hundred Swedes and eight thousand

Mecklenburgers, plus ten thousand eight hundred in garrison; all to be increased by six thousand

Dutch

troops, five

thousand recruits, eight thousand in new regiments thirty

-

five

hundred Swedish cavalry.

and

Hesse - Cassel had

ten thousand men, to be increased by seven thousand; and

Weimar was

to raise eleven

the seventy thousand

men

thousand

preferred to

was

immediately under the

serve

king, Gustavus left the reigning duke, William of

command

it

These calculations were

by the promise.

As Bernard in

Thus

hundred.

already under the colors,

hoped, would be nearly doubled. well borne out

five

Weimar,

of the Thuringian territory, to recruit for the

above contingents, and gave him as a nucleus twenty-six

hundred foot and four hundred horse.

How

far Gustavus planned his advance

from Erfurt can-

but he sent embassies to Bayreuth and to

not be said;

He

Niirnberg to pave the way.

took no step in the dark.

The army advanced through the Thiiringerwald range in two colmnns one via Gotha and Meiningen, one under the :

king in

person

via

Arnstadt (October

Schleusingen (October lished.

8),

7),

Ilmenau and

where headquarters were estab-

The two columns reunited

at the fortress of

hofen, the key to the bishopric of AViirzburg,

cumbed only

to Torstenson's

a strong garrison.

Konigs-

which suc-

heavy guns, and was

left

with

284

The next

PRIESTS

AND FRIARS DECAMP.

place essential to clear the country between the

Saale and the

Main was

Schweinfvirt, which surrendered,

and received a sure commandant with a Gustavus was greeted by the

dom, but there was a great

suitable garrison.

laity as the harbinger of freeflight of priests

and

friars.

He

issued a proclamation covering all kinds and conditions of

JESUIT PROPERTY CONFISCATED.

He had

men.

from further

285

come, he said, to protect the Protestants

injustice;

but

all,

whatever their

faith,

obeyed the law, would be protected from injury.

who

Arrived

October 13 at Wiirzburg, the capital of Franconia, whose prince-bishop had

the town capitulated October

fled,

15;

but the garrison and chief inhabitants retired with their valuables to the castle of Marienburg, on the further bank,

where they deemed themselves quite beyond reach. This castle

lies

on a high rock, perpendicular on the water

but approachable from the land.

side,

tected

by a deep

The bridge over

were no other defenses.

broken down, but sent over

it,

The

ditch, with a half -moon

this

and Colonel Leslie put across

The

Main had been

the

was repaired; Colonel Ramsay was

a detachment, under a heavy considerably.

gate was pro-

outwork; there

place

fire,

in boats, each with

by which they suffered

refused terms,

opened lines and erected batteries.

and the Swedes

After the destruction

of one of the towers, on October 18, about 5 A. M., the castle Lillie

was stormed by several regiments, led by Colonels and Burt.

Though

stoutly

defended,

the

party

gained the half -moon with ladders, and drove out the garrison,

pursuing which through the drawbridge,

the fugitives, the Swedes pushed on, blew

and captured the place.

let

down

Immense booty was

down

for

the gate,

taken,

as

Marienburg was the strongest place on the Main, and had been made a storehouse for valuables

;

a vast amount of ord-

nance-stores was got; and the bishop's valuable library was sent to

Upsala University.

Wiirzburg was mulcted eighty

thousand rix dollars, and town and castle were strengthened

and suitably held.

All Jesuit property was confiscated, but

no person was injured.

The

tavus, hostis huniani generis,

Jesuit was, according to Gus-

and was treated accordingly.

Protestant worship was restored.

GUSTAVUS OUTWITTED.

286

At Wiirzburg was made a

and

came with

some regiments; and an embassy from Wiir-

offers to raise

With

temberg arrived.

and

treaty between the king

the duke of Liiueburg

the Franconian Circle;

Niirnberg, after long negotiations

delays, a treaty offensive

and defensive was concluded

October 21, and the city raised a garrison of three thousand foot

and two hundred and

defenses.

Bayreuth.

fifty horse,

the same time a

bishop-electors of Cologne,

its

made with Anspach and demand was made on the

Similar treaties were

At

and strengthened

Mainz and Trier

to

acknowledge

Gustavus' authority; to pay forty thousand rix dollars a

month;

to furnish provisions;

open forts and

to

defiles to

the Swedes, and to deny these to the emperor; and to give

Protestants full religious equality with Catholics.

Franconia was rich;

ing had good results. little

from the war; and

gain.

its

it

Recruit-

had suffered

joining the cause was a

marked

Business kept Gustavus in Wiirzburg a month.

The progress

the Swedes began to excite terror all

of

through Catholic Germany; some of the princes were content to accept the situation, front.

The bishop

of

some

Bamberg,

fled,

some showed a bold

to gain time, entered into

feigned negotiations with Gustavus,

who decided

to press

on to the Rhine, and wished to avoid a present expedition

up the Main by which ruse the bishop managed ;

possessions until Tilly later baffled the king,

came

— as a rule a

to the rescue.

to hold his

He

cleverly

difficult matter.

After his defeat at Breitenfeld, as already narrated, TiUy

had made

his

way

north, with the relics of his army, a mere

disorganized mob, of which barely half were armed.

On

September 20 he reached Halberstadt, where Pappenheim joined him; thence he marched to Hildesheim, crossed the

Weser

at

Corvey near Hoxter, and drew

troops on September 23.

in

the Cologne

Hearing that Gustavus had headed

UNLUCKY LORRAINE.

287

south to Thuringia, after a while he himself turned towards

Early

Hesse.

in October, at Fritzlar, Aldringer,

who from

Jena had retired via Erfurt, and Fugger joined him, giving

and half

Tilly eighteen thousand foot,

Seeing that Gustavus

moved

as

much

cavalry.

continued onward to the Main,

still

same direction by way

of Fulda and move around the head of the Swedish Aschaffenburg, so as to advance, cross the Main, and work south of the king, to

Tilly

in the

He had

regain possession of Wiirzburg. his

own

forces the thirteen thousand

of Lorraine,

who had made a

As

it

view to join to

of the shifty

duke

treaty with the emperor,

had

Worms, and was moving

crossed the Rhine in September at

on Aschaffenburg.

men

in

But the duke did not escape

disaster.

happened, Gustavus had gone down the Main, recon-

On November

noitring.

not

2,

many

miles from Wiirzburg,

he ran across the enemy's van of four thousand men.

Send-

ing back for Baudissin's body of four thousand horse and

two thousand musketeers, he far

on the enemy's camp not

fell

from Bischofsheim and dispersed the entire body.

duke

retired, with the relics,

join Tilly in Miltenburg,

on his main bodj^ managed to

and the

some thirty-eight thousand men.

movements

at Wiirzburg.

ing on either Wiirzburg,

though he cared

for

little

The

He

joint forces

amounted

to

Gustavus learned of Tilly's understood that he was aim-

Schweinfurt, or Bamberg; but

him

so long as Niirnberg could

take care of herself, he was careful to protect his allied cities

and

to close all available defiles.

When

Tilly

marched away from the Weser and towards

Franconia, Landgrave William and

some good work. and the landgrave for Tilly

at

The fell

latter

Duke Bernard put

in

gave a hearty blow to Fugger;

on Vacha, took a big convoy intended

Corbach, and captured Miinden and Hoxter.

These outside operations cannot be detailed.

XXII. MAINZ. NOVEMBER, Leaving

Tilly,

Pappenheim returned

to the

1631.

Weser

;

Tilly

Maximilian to protect Bavaria, and sat down at Windsheim.

down

river to secure his hold on the

Taking

the Danube. 16.

He had

resisted

all the cities

Main and the Rhine before turning toward

on the way, he reached Frankfort November Mainz, which had a Spanish garrison,

thirty-two thousand men.

and Gustavus marched up the Rhine,

;

from the

While

bank.

left

crossed,

place,

;

city

was besieging

twenty-six thousand

men

but at Frankfort he learned that Tilly had failed before the

which had resisted

December

the place

and attacked the

so engaged, he heard that Tilly

Niirnberg, and at once started with a column of

towards his ally

was ordered by Gustavus moved

22,

Returning to Mainz, Gustavus took

all his threats.

and quartered his army there.

During

this period

Pappenheim was operating against Gustavus' lieutenants on the Weser, showing ability,

but accomplishing no substantial

Tilly took vus' troops

up

qiiarters in the

and

allies at this

resvilt.

On

retiring

The

Nordlingen country.

time shows eighty thousand

with an equal number to be raised during the winter, the thirteen thousand

men who landed

With Fugger

taken

Anspach November off

— a marked contrast to

Rothemburg and Windsheim, had

20.

crossed

it,

and

He had

to Westphalia, a territory

separated from Papchief, preferred to

some one must defend

It is asserted that Tilly intended to bring

for the emperor.

on another general engagement at an early date. perhaps doubtful

reached

Gustavus had not succeeded in

from Bavaria.

penheim, who, unable to agree with his

march back

Gusta-

the colors,

near Stralsund a year and a half before.

devastated Franconia where he

him

men under

and Aldringer Tilly had marched from

Miltenburg and

cutting

from Niirnberg,

official list of

;

This

is

for though Tilly never lacked courage, he

lacked enterprise of a certain stamp, and had scarcely yet

TILLY ENERGETIC.

When

Breitenfeld.

forgotten

had recovered

a march to the

Main

he reached the Tauber, he

and could choose a

his base

289

safe defensive, or

He

to seek his adversary.

did not do

the latter; for, whatever his intentiox^s, his master, Maximilian, nervously fearing for his borders, ordered

and not

stop at covering Bavaria,

which might lead twelve thousand

number

sent an eqtf5t

lay

down

officers

at

to

the

up

positions with

at his orders, he

was tempted

command, but was dissuaded by

his

the king,

seize

who was watching

his operations, laid

Cregiingen, and

his

it

all

Palatinate

a

;

an ambus-

and imme-

made a descent on four imperial regiments

fourteen thousand

Lower

sent

on Wertheim, but without success, for

cade for the detachment and severely handled diately after

to

immediate

He

and Maximilian's personal request.

detachment to

to

Donauworth and Guntzenhausen, the Upper Palatinate, and began to

From annoyance

recruit.

Tilly took

to battle.

men

him

to undertake operations

but destroyed them.

men

of reinforcement

at

Shortly receiving

from Alsatia, the

and Wiirtemberg, and emboldened by

numbers, Tilly advanced columns to Rothemburg, Winds-

heim and Ochsenfurt, and took up a position the king being for the

moment

at

Windsheim,

sick in Wiirzburg.

Considering the total defeat of Tilly not

many weeks

back, he had shown commendable energy in coming to the protection of his master's territory, and in tial

attacks on the

of the elector

numerical,

and

it

if

new

allies of

Sweden.

making even parBut the timidity

had prevented the veteran from

utilizing his

not actual, superiority at the points attacked;

had enabled the Swedes, without opposition,

themselves firmly on the Main.

vented the seizure of the

have made

Main

to plant

That Tilly could have preis

improbable, but he might

it difficult.

Holding Thuringia and Franconia, the king did not for the

DOWN THE

290

moment down to

care to

move on

MAIN.

Tilly; the possession of the

the Rhine seemed

more important; and

moving- to the upper Main, had yielded up

Leaving Horn with

defend the lower.

and two thousand horse

and

complete

to

started

down

the

the

Main November

power

to

thousand foot

Franconia,

of 9,

all

by

Wiirzburg bishopric,

to hold the

subjection

five

Main

Tilly,

the

king-

with eighteen thousand

men, intending to gain control of or neutralize the bishopries of

Mainz, Trier and Cologne, the other Catholic Rhine

princes and the Spanish troops, to relieve the Palatinate, and to take advantage of the richness of the country to

add

to

moving against southern Ger-

his material strength before

many, Bavaria and Austria.

His general scheme, as we

have seen, was built on procuring large accessions of troops.

Whatever

historians

march on Vienna

may

say of Gustavus' declination to

after the victory of Breitenfeld, they can-

not complain that he was not thorough in what he undertook to

do in lieu thereof

wiser.

;

and the event proves

While one cannot prove

that a

would not have brought Ferdinand

his

own plan

the

march on Vienna

to his knees,

it

remains

certain that, had Gustavus undertaken this course, the world

would have remained the poorer by many lessons in methodical war.

The

now undertaking was not difficult, for the much opposition, and Before leaving along the Main were weak.

task he was

Catholic princes were unable to offer the garrisons

Wiirzburg, he sent out Colonel Hubalcl, with twenty-two

hundred dragoons and

cuirassiers, to capture

Hanau, which

November 10; Geluhausen, Friedburg and Hbchst surrendered, and on November 17 As the enemy was at Rothemburg, Rothenfels did the like.

this

officer

did by storm on

the king personally headed a detachment and fully garrisoned

Schweinfurt; and a strong body was

left

in

Wiirzburg.

WORDY DEFIANCE.

A

The bulk of the

Royal

of the

Army marched down

291

on the

Main, a smaller body on the right bank.

gage, artillery and

supplies

between the troops.

found ready

A

to join the

were floated down

large

number

of

bank The bag-

left

on

boats

the towns were

Swedish cause, Wertheim on the

20th, Miltenburg on the 21st, Aschaffenburg on the 22d,

Steinheim on the 25th, and Offenbach on the 26th. fort, after

28th.

some delay, concluded

The

Frank-

number on the

garrisons, as a ride, entered the Swedish service.

At Frankfort stadt,

to swell this

a mild treaty was

made with Hesse Darm-

which until now had held aloof; that principality

reserved

powers, but gave up, until the war shoidd

all its

be ended, the fortress of Riisselsheim, which, standing between

Mainz and Frankfort, was

On November to

Hochst,

of

marked importance.

28, through Frankfort,

Gustavus marched

Kbnigstein, Florsheim and Kostheim;

and

at

him fourteen thousand men from HesseLandgrave William, which, as Tilly had

H(3chst there joined

under

Cassel,

moved away from

the Weser, were no longer needed there.

This gave Gustavus thirty-two thousand men, with which

he sat down on the right bank of the Rhine, astride the

Main, the bulk of the force threatening Mainz. This great city possessed a powerful bridge-head in the fortified

town of Kastel on the right bank of the Rhine

two

;

thousand Spanish troops under Count Silva which formed the garrison of

Mainz vowed they would

man

die to the last

sooner than give up the place; and on being asked by the elector if he

enough

to

had enough troops, Silva replied that he had

whip three kings of Sweden.

The

citizens

made

some advances, but Gustavus recalled to their mind their hitherto stubborn refusals to treat,

render without terms.

drove piles in the

Main

The

and declined any but

elector prepared for defense

at its

sur;

he

mouth, sank ships, and clogged

MAINZ ISOLATED.

292

river with stones; having done

up the left

Worms

to

The garrison

Cologne.

and prepared for a stout

lost heart,

was

it

it

and breastworks lay Mainz.

He

it,

Ehi'enfels

bridge of boats at Hochst

isolate

possible to take

difficult

the city in order to besiege

Mouse Tower and

ill-treated the

citizens

resistance.

The king did not deem right bank, and

site

which he

Silva to protect his capital, and fled with the bishop of

;

to

Mainz from the

cross the river below

though Bernard had taken the near Bing^en.

numerous boats

in the river,

There was a

fitted

with guns

and Gustavus began to

seized the custom-house buildings oppo-

Bingen, and Walluf, and levied on the country contri-

butions of forty-five thousand rix dollars a month.

out detachments to the Lahn, and took places, with

right

much

booty.

He

Limburg and

sent

other

Having meanwhile reduced the

bank as far up as the Neckar, he was preparing

to

GUSTAVUS' CONTEMPT OF DEATH. cross above,

when news reached him

that Tilly

293

was besieging

Niirnberg.

This was

a

Gustavus liostponed his designs

surprise.

against Mainz, left

things as they were, and started De-

cember

9,

He had

with him seventeen thousand foot and nine thousand

determined

horse of the

While

his

made a

to

relieve

Niirnberg by a battle.

Swedish, Hesse-Cassel and

Weimar

trooj)s.

columns were defiling through Frankfort, he

definitive treaty with that city

;

and learning

at the

same time that Tilly had given up the siege of Niirnberg and retired to the Danube, he again returned to the Ehine. This raid persuaded the king that Tilly might push in on

and he made dispositions accordingly.

his communications,

Horn's corps was strengthened by drafts on Teuffel and on Niirnberg, with headquarters at Windsheim, so as to sustain at

need either the king or Saxony; Duke William was

ordered to push his army from Thuringia forward towards

Horn should be suddenly armies were made

Schweinfurt, lest

Horn and

the

Weimar

Thus

detached.

a link between,

or a reserve to the king or the elector of Saxony.

While

maintaining his kingly dignity, Gustavus

strictly

was easily approached by priest

ger;

it

One

all.

day, in Frankfort, a

in the anteroom with a concealed dag-

was discovered

was currently reported that a band of Jesuits had

bound themselves with an oath

and bets

to take his life;

were laid in Augsburg that Gustavus would not months.

Much

Gustavus was urged said to have replied

the protection of in

may have been

of this

'

'

is

Then you would have me disregard

God?"

His very contempt of death was

some respects a safeguard.

About

this

time are recorded

some utterances of the king concerning his mission

many and

six

live

but when

keep a body-guard about hmi, he

to :

idle talk,

his duty to Protestantism.

One day

in

Ger-

at table with

OUTFLANKING MAINZ.

294

the king of Boliemia, the landgrave of Darmstadt and

many

other prmces, the king said: "Believe me, I love a comfortable life as well as any man, and I have no desire to die an

The emperor would

early death.

peace with not leave

Were

On

it

me to get me to so many innocent

not for

He

separate

But

I dare

me

gone."

Gustavus went seriously at the Mainz prob-

the landgrave to blockade the city from the

left

right bank,

make a

people subject to his revenge.

would soon get

this, I

his return

lem.

readily

return to Sweden.

— the Rhinegau, — and

and down on either to the south side,

side the

occupy the country up

to

Main; he himself passed over

and on December 10 made a demonstration

On December

towards Heidelberg.

he turned quickly down

13,

from Gernsheim,

Oppenheim

river to a point opposite

These refused

where was a redoubt held by Spanish troops.

to surrender; but having undertaken a piece of work, Gusta\ais

was not

easily arrested.

Despite the opposition of the

Spanish cavalry on both banks, on the night of December

16-17 he put three hundred men built a bridge near

in boats across the Rhine,

Gernsheim, probably at one of the bends

where his guns could protect the operation, crossed in the succeeding two days, December 17 and troops,

took

Oppenheim,

stormed

the

18,

castle,

towards and blockaded Mainz, and cut the city

Rhine up and down, as well as from the Main. redoubt on the right bank surrendered. here, the king

by

his reckless

properly accompanied, disregard of danger eventually

fell

On December

22,

off

his

all

advanced

from the

The

isolated

In a reconnoissance

pushing out to the front, not

was again

all

was a growing

a victim to

with

His

but captured.

evil.

No wonder

he

it.

after

two days'

siege.

Count

Silva,

despite his heroic protests to do or die, surrendered Mainz,

and the troops were allowed the honors of war.

Most

of

MAINZ OCCUPIED. them entered the king's this capture of

service.

was a question whether

It

Mainz was not an

295

act of

war against Spain,

which Gustavus would have preferred to avoid, as

But Silva had

was one against the Austrian Hapsburgs. received orders to be helpful to

his quarrel

Mainz against Sweden, and

No war had

Spain was already in the Baltic at Wismar.

been declared or was considered to

war had been committed by both

exist,

parties.

and yet

acts of

Gustavus was

ready for what must come, and the ministry and estates sustained him.

A

contribution of eighty thousand rix dollars

was levied on Mainz

;

one of forty-one thousand rix dollars

on the Jesuits, and another of forty thousand on the Catholic priests.

These were hard terms, for the Spaniards had

already plimdered the town

The king quartered surrounding country. defense, surrounded

the

it

but the money was paid.

;

his foot in

He

Mainz, the horse in the

put the city in a state of excellent

with works, built a strong redoubt on

Jacobsberg, replaced the bridge of boats across the

Ehine

to Kastel

and made a new one

to Kostheim, fortified

Main and Rhine by a strong fortress, " Gustavburg, " on the left Main bank, gave the left bank of the Rhine in charge of Duke Bernard, established his winter-quarters and his court in the city, and moved for the moment to Frankfort, where he was made happy by the queen joining him. The elector of Mainz soon after broke off his connection with the emperor. About this time, also, the duke of Lorraine withdrew his forces, much weakened the confluence of the

by sickness and

home side

desertion,

from

Tilly's army,

to defend his territory, threatened

and the Swedes on the

other.

and hurried

by France on one

His army was soon

dis-

banded by active contact with the French, who took Trier, Coblentz and Hermannstein (now Ehrenbreitstein), and he too forswore his fealty to the emperor.

PAPPENHEIM ON THE WESER.

296

The Spanish

troops were lying on the Moselle, and from

Mainz Gustavus organized an army to operate against them. Ehinegrave Otto Liidwig,

command

in

of

its

vanguard,

defeated at Creuznach a body of Spaniards with a loss of

seven hundred killed, and later captured a number of places

near by.

It is asserted that

Gustavus contemplated a march

to the Netherlands to give the Spaniards the couj) de grace ;

but Tilly was too threatening a factor, and the Dutch promised to

keep the Spanish army busy.

Whatever

his project,

he did not in fact move far from the Mainz country; nor did

it

prove essential, for in the course of January and Feb-

ruary, 1632, under the instances of

Duke Bernard,

all

the

Catholic princes of the Rhine, as far as the Netherlands,

pledged themselves to neutrality

heim did the

draw

like; the

occupied both banks of

Tilly

Sj)eyer

and the Protestant the middle

Lower Palatmate, Cologne, and

When

Worms,

and Mann-

Spanish troops were forced to with-

to the Netherlands,

in the region

;

Rhine,

allies securely

Alsatia,

the

other principalities.

marched from the Weser

to Swabia, he left

between the Elbe, the sea and the Weser

but a small body of troops to sustain the Catholic garrisons.

The most important imperial towns were Magdeburg, Rostock,

Wismar, and

D(3mitz.

Pappenheim, who,

will

it

be

remembered, had parted with Tilly in the Anspach region,

and returned sand men,

to Westphalia,

had collected some eight thou-

and, in November,

1631,

raised the

siege

of

Madgeburg, which an equal force of Swedes under Baner had

just brought to the point of surrender.

into his strong position at Calbe,

Baner

retired

and Pappenheim shortly

evacuated Magdeburg, burned the Elbe bridge and moved against Liineburg.

He

soon found himself surrounded by

the superior forces of Tott, Hamilton, Baner, and the bishop of

Bremen, and a considerable accession of men raised

for

TILLY'S

Baner

in Thuringia;

lie

MOVEMENTS.

was compelled

297 behind the

to retire

Weser, into the lower Rhenish Provinces, against which the

duke of Hesse-Cassel continued in such a

manner

Saxon Circle and Bremen by burg, Domitz, Rostock, cessively captured

from the south,

to operate

as distinctly to aid Liineburg, the lower

Then Magde-

his diversions.

Wismar and

other towns were suc-

by Tott and the Protestant

allies.

All this was not, however, accomplished without some culty;

Pappenheim operated with boldness and

for

prevented the

from joining

allies

forces, compelled Tott to

and when,

give up the siege of Stade,

Baner and Duke William joining

strained to retire to Westphalia, he sat

Saxony.

After he

the lower

left,

Magdeburg, was able tavus, as

by way

is

to

no space

down near

Cassel

to join Wallenstein in

Baudissin and Liineburg had freer

But

and Baner,

after taking-

move with a considerable part

of Thuringia

Duke William,

stadt, also did.

was con-

Elbe and the Weser region were quite

cleared of the emperor's troops,

his force

in consequence of

in his front, he

and held himself until he was ordered

play;

diffi-

skill,

and Franconia

to join

after taking Gottingen

Gus-

and Duder-

this is anticipating events;

to devote to the details of these

of

and there

minor operations.

Their object and result were to conserve the bastion which the king had erected with so

When much Horn,

men

much time and

skill.

Gustavus marched down the Main, Tilly, though

superior in force,

whom

to hold the

trary orders

still

undertook no operations against

the king had left with eight to ten thousand

upper

river,

—a

fact largely

and pusillanimity of the

due to the con-

elector of Bavaria.

contented himself with devastating the region between

He

Wind-

sheim and Anspach; and on November 28 he marched from

Anspach, via Schwabach, on Niirnberg, demanded money

and

rations,

and threatened

to lay siege to the place.

The

NURNBERG DEFIES

298

manned

citizens

TILLY.

the walls, and even sent out the newly levied

troops to skirmish with the enemy.

Magdeburg, unless

city with the fate of

demands; but the threat was Tilly's

army

Tilly threatened the

suffered

from a want

complied with his

it

and the siege

idle

short-lived.

of provisions; the elector

feared that he would get cut off from Bavaria, and ordered

him back; a portion

of his forces

Bohemia; a Protestant traitor,

officer in the

was already detached

to

emperor's service proved

and brought about an explosion

in the

ammunition

depot of Tilly's artillery park; everything seemed to conspire

December

against him, and, on

and quartered

his troops

on the

from the borders of Bohemia temberg.

It

was

to

meet

4,

he withdrew to Nordlingen, left

bank

of the

Danube,

to the upper Neckar and Wiir-

this threat of Tilly's

on Niirnberg

that Gustavus had so suddenly left Mainz.

Instead of making his winter-quarters in Erfurt, Gustavus

had advanced

Rhine and Main, had conquered a large

and could choose

territory,

would.

to the

A year

before, he

his winter-quarters

had wintered

where he

at Biirwalde in the

midst of privation and danger, with disappointment and

him

uncertainty staring

in the face;

now, he could winter in

the golden city of the Rhine, in the enjoyment of plenty,

and with the approbation

of

all

Germany.

Booty was

immense; the arsenals of Wiirzburg supplied quantities of munition and clothing; victual was abundant; and the poor

Swedish peasant reveled

He had

in

Franconian wheat and wine.

never dreamed of such luxury ; he ate and drank to

his heart's content.

A

Capua was more

to be feared than

a Valley Forge.

There

is

in the

Swedish archives an

the troops at this time under Gustavus'

official list,

giving

command, and

indi-

cating what was needed to bring the companies and regi-

ments up

to full strength.

GUSTAVUS' FORCES. Army

In the

of the Rhine, under the king's

with the colors 113 companies of foot,

companies

Hogendorf, 12

;

Vitzthum, 8 say, 8

Hepburn, 12

;

Hamilton,

;

Lunsdel, 8

up

these

viz.

Winkel, 12

;

;

men was

Bandr, 8

;

ilton's recruits

;

Wallenstein, 8

;

Ruthven, 8

;

viz.

And

a further increase of

40 companies of 3,000 men of

:

80 companies of 150 men each,

to be recruited

Solms, Isemburg and Nassau, and by Hubald and Hornig.

had

alry

Goths, 8

in

line

83 companies,

Finns, 8

;

Ussier, 10

;

viz.

Callenbach, 8

;

the rhinegrave, 12

Livonians, 5

;

;

West

Tott, 12

;

Courlanders, 4.

;

Ham-

by von

The cav-

Smalanders, 8 companies

:

Duke Bernard, 8

;

;

Ram-

;

normal strength of 150 men per com-

to

contemplated,

command, there were

the Royal regiment of 12

Munroe, 8

;

pany, there were to be raised 6,521 men.

18,000

:

men, plus 3,000 of Hamilton's re-

Total, 10,521

8.

To bring

cruits.

299

;

Total, 5,300

men, to be recruited up to normal of 9,175 men.

To

added 20 companies, with 2,500 men

by von Solms, John

The present

of Hesse, and Taupadel.

to be raised

;

total

these were to be

was 18,821 men.

The grand

would thus be 46,717 men.

total

In the Franconian Army, under Horn, were 63 companies of

Axel

Lillie,

Thurn, 8

;

8 companies

;

von Reike, 12

Oxenstiern, 8 ;

;

Erich Hand, 8

Wallenstein, 8

;

Dragoons,

;

3.

foot, viz.:

Hard, 8

von

;

Total, 5,161

men, to be increased by 12,844 men, by recruits from von Solms, Margrave Hans George, Truchsetz, Mussfeld, Canoski and Hastfelir. cavalry had 36 companies, ben, 8

;

Sperreuter, 4

;

viz.

:

Baudissin, 12

East Goths, 4

;

and 600

;

of

by

recruits

The landgrave be raised to 7,200 to 4,000. total,

He

of Hesse

total

total,

The present

to be 29,655

had 6 regiments of

Proposed

total,

foot,

for

men.

with 6,000 men, to

Present

18,400 men.

corps had 56 companies of 3,900 men, to be raised

men.

The Lower Saxon Army, under ;

was

32 companies of cavalry, with 2,000 men, to be raised

;

The Mecklenburg

foot

from Duke

proposed to raise 6 new regiments of 7,200 men.

8,000 men.

to 11,100

The grand

The

Witzle-

Brandenburg, the duke of Wei-

mar, von Dundorp, von Hoffenhiilt and Truchsetz.

duty were 8,280 men.

;

imder Hastfehr.

recruits

Total, 3,119 men, to be increased by 8,531 men,

Ernest, von Solms, the margrave

Kochtitzki, 8

Tott,

13,000 men.

Proposed

total,

had 136 companies of 12,000

To be

8 companies of 1,000 horse.

raised, 7,850

men.

Present

20,850 men.

The Magdeburg Army, under Ban^r, had 10,437 men, to be raised to 30,821

men

;

194

companies,

with

69 companies cavalry, with

AN ENORMOUS ARMY.

300

1,800 men, to be raised to 8,375 men.

posed

total,

Total present, 12,237 men.

The Weimar Corps, under Duke William, had 5 regiments men, to be raised to 6,000 to 2,500.

Pro-

39,196 men.

Present

total,

;

and 20 companies of 1,000

4,000

;

proposed

of 3,000

horse, to be raised

total, 8,500.

Garrison troops were 10,416 men, to be increased to 13,150.

In

Erfurt were 2,545 men, to be increased to 4,825.

In addition to these new German troops, Gustavus expected

in the

spring of 1632 from Sweden, 48 companies of foot, of 7,200 men, and

12 companies of cavalry, of 1,500 men.

The grand ors at the

and

total, then,

which Gustavus had under the

col-

end of 1631 was 63,700 foot and 16,000 cavalry;

this he

had good reason

to hope, for the

campaign of

1632, to increase up to 153,000 foot and 43,500 horse.

Such an army had never yet been seen

Landsknecht.

in

Germany.

(16th Century.)

Gus

.

;tandp

XXIII.

TO THE DANUBE. DECEMBER, At in

Mainz Gustavus held

At

Europe.

this

his winter's court,

yet everything hinged on the king's

whether Germany was

to

regions to reduce

army

Everything looked smUing

iibe.

that

and

shook their heads, and wondered

;

was crowded

on the surface,

Still,

to the wall.

late winter

In 1632, however,

the king rarely had under his personal

as he should.

At Mainz he had all

command

as

over one hundred thousand men,

apparently essential

burg, Hesse, Saxony, Magdeburg, Mecklenburg, lower

Main.

;

There were too many places to hold, too many

but these were in eight several parcels,

During the

;

the Protestants were in the ascendant both in a political and

;

the theatre was too extended.

new

most prominent monarch

be made subservient to Sweden.

military sense, while the emperor

large an

1632.

All Europe was agog at his wonder-

life.

ful accomplishments, but the graybeards

went well

— the

TO APRIL,

time he could have claimed the crown of Germany

he did not shows the purity of his ambition.

all

1631,

:

Mainz, Wiirz-

Saxony and

Horn and TUly did some manoeuvring on

garrisons.

the upper

Gustavus came to Horn's assistance, and Tilly moved back to the Dan-

The king

followed,

crossed the

Danube

at

Donauworth, and TUly

intrenched himself behind the Lech at Rain, to protect Bavaria.

It was a splendid court rather than the rude winter-quarters of a

campaigning army which was seen at Mainz in the

winter of 1631-32; and ambassadors from every European

power paid tiations

monarch.

Nego-

Treaties were

made

their respects to the victorious

consumed the days and weeks.

with the duke of Brunswick and the city; a new one with

Mecklenburg and formal ones with Liibeck, Liineburg and Bremen.

Negotiations

Ulm and

Strasburg.

observed of

all

were

pursued

with Wiirtemberg,

Gustavus was the centre-point, the

observers, the most powerful of the kings of

the earth, the most brilliant individual of the times.

And

EUROPE AT ODDS AND EVENS.

302 yet

t

on

G

'^eclisli

as

j)lish hi

him

standing was uncertain; everything hinged

and

his purposes;

ged on his own

for there

life,

in his peculiar work.

He

without arrogance.

and what he could accom-

was no one to succeed

Gustavus recognized

might have claimed, and without

contest have been allowed, the crown of a

Germany ation

;

—a

all

this fact

he asked was a

German

Corpus Evangelicorum

new kingdom

Protestant Confeder-

— under himself

as chief.

This desire might have taken formal shape, had the of

Brandenburg and Saxony been

of

electors

like the other allies; but

they remained intractable, the one from hebetude, the other

from envy.

The whole

of

Europe was

were buried under the

dictates of religion political motives

was if

and evens.

at odds

still

selfish personal

and

shifty; Charles I. promised nothing,

He

tion of Frederick to the

his promises,

w^as, in fact, plotting

the emperor, and would do anything Palatinate.

or

England

which governed every monarch.

made, would be worthless.

The

with

to secure the restora-

Maximilian was for

a while in league with Richelieu, who was eager to secure neutrality for the Catholic

House

of

Hapsburg.

He

League while humiliating the

sought to compass some agreement

between the League and Gustavus; but

and

finally,

this

was

when he accepted Gustavus' conditions

the League a neutrality which should reduce

twelve thousand in

men and

tie it

hand and

foot,

its

difficult;

to allow

army

to

Maximilian

anger threw over Richelieu, and thereafter clave to the

emperor.

Denmark was

jealous of Swedish successes; but

her recent punishment forbade her to followed their loadstone, gold.

war with Gustavus, tion.

Poland was

friendly.

as either

act.

The Netherlands

Spain was or was not at

saw

fit

to construe the situa-

bitter as gall, but impotent.

Brandenburg was

inert.

Russia was

Ferdinand kept on his

A GREAT TRANSFORMATION. way with

his

303

Richelieu and

usual directness.

Gustavus

were equally anti-Hapsburg, but from different standpoints.

And

finally

first to

John George

of Saxony, ruled

by Arnini, leaned

His great

Gustavus, then to Ferdinand.

foible

jealousy of the king; his worst defect was an ancient

unreasoning sense of fealty to the empire

his

;

was

and

main aim was

a Third Party in Germany, which, under his lead, should

dominate both the emperor and the king

and he alternately

;

corresponded with Gustavus and with Wallenstein. ful to neither because faithless to himself,

to be the

means

the horrors of

of wrecking his

war on

his

own

he was destined

cause,

own dominions.

Faith-

and

of visiting

And

yet

John

George believed that he was honesty personified, and in a certain sense he

was

had dropped

so; but he

the times that he could neither gauge the

so far

German

behind

situation,

nor appreciate what kind of honesty the times demanded.

Our

attention

is

constantly

drawn

to the transformation

which had taken place since the king had come upon the scene.

The

situation forces itself

upon

us.

"When Gustavus

landed with his thirteen thousand men, the Protestant cause

was on the wane, the party utterly discouraged, and the emperor everywhere successful. one hundred and field.

fifty

thousand

Recruiting was active.

were in league with the Swedes.

Now men

Gustavus had nearly in^

garrison and in the

All the Protestant princes

France was sustaining the

cause by means which neutralized the Catholic princes on the Rhine, and the rest were dominated by the conditions

surrounding them.

The Swedes were on

Bavaria, cutting the emperor from

Cologne and Trier,

— and were

nand had sent

to

of

the Rhine bishoprics, —

about to invade his domin-

ions, while his "buffer-state," Bavaria,

by the abject fear of the

the borders

was made unreliable

elector for his possessions.

Ferdi-

Poland for troops, but these were refused

ALL DUE TO GUSTAVUS.

804 on

tlie

plea of a threat from Russia,

Gustavus.

Pope Urban

alleging

war

tlie

perliaj)S fostered

Ferdinand

refused

From Spain he

could hope nothing, for she

Turkey was threatening

ness for revolt.

in readi-

Lower

to invade

Switzerland favored the Protestants.

Austria.

HajDsburg

Upper Austria was

in the Netherlands.

by

countenance,

to be not for Catholicism, but for

aggrandizement.

was busy

—

And

still

worse, the emperor had but eighty thousand men, of which

and

sixty thousand, ill-cared for left

bank

the

protect

to

inroads,

in

bad

Danube, from Swabia

of the

inheritance

and the

of

to

emperor from

the

rest in garrisons or

detachments in

lower Saxony, Westphalia, on the Elbe,

where they scarcely held their own. all directions,

but to small

effect.

heart, lay

on the

Moravia, striving further Silesia,

Weser and Rhine,

He was recruiting in And more than all, the

moral superiority had gone over to the

side of the Protes-

This astonishing change was entirely due to Gustavus'

tants.

methodical handiwork.

There had been a suggestion, hard to be traced to that

source, stated,

peace

could

be

had

on

terms

its

indefinitely

but these were not such that Ferdinand could accept

them.

It

him again

was sheer inability to

to help himself that induced

turn to Wallenstein, the

whom Gustavus had

idea of

employing

given up for fear that he could not be

trusted.

The results

casual observer might be led to say that all these

sprang directly from the victory of Breitenf eld

that

;

had Gustavus beaten the enemy in a great battle at an earlier

day, his standing would have been as good and

time saved.

and of the

But a

results as he

worked them

out, will convince the

student that the solid gain Gustavus had

from

his careful

much

careful survey of the king's problem,

method than from

made came more

his splendid victory.

A

WHY GUSTAVUS WAS

GREAT.

305

not have taught him the true

Breitenfeld in 1630 would

German situation. He would have leaned on German support; he would have taken too

inwardness of the

more heavily

favorable a view of the helpfulness of his

allies, and he might have undertaken operations which would have resulted

Had

in his overthrow. it,

and

utilized

for

it

he pushed for an early victory, won

an advance into Germany without his

carefully established base, not only

woidd he not have been

the great exponent of methodical war, but he would scarcely

have redeemed the Protestant cause.

Gustavus belongs to

the six Great Captains because of his careful his boldness

combined;

the other,

was

it

if

his scrupulous care in

method and

won him more than

either quality

doing well whatever

he undertook to do.

But

brilliant as Gustavus' standing was, splendid as

political structure

fare;

had

German

been his achievements, the conditions existing in the

promised no certainty of continuing wel-

and these conditions reacted on the military problem

more than they would

vastly

there was

in a

war

of conquest.

In 1632

altogether too extended a theatre of operations;

such, in fact, as to forbid one leadership. tions in Franconia

Gustavus' opera-

and Bavaria had small influence on those

of his lieutenants; but the outside operations were of no

great moment, except in so far as they weakened the Eoyal

Army.

What

interest there

is

centres in the

work

of the

king and of his great opponent, Wallenstein.

There

is

nowhere a crisp statement of Gustavus' plan for

the campaign of 1632 ; nor anything to lated a definite one,

down

the

show that he formu-

beyond the general scheme of moving

Danube and occupying

the lands on

its

either bank.

In no other war was the influence of petty states on the general military

scheme so prominent; no other great captain

waging an offensive war was ever compelled

to

weigh so

NUMEROUS SOVEREIGNTIES.

306

many and

— the — he might

a conqueror, Frederick,

Had

inconsiderable questions. of

role

Gustavus come as

other great captains, save

all

have brushed aside these

requirements, and have dealt

smaller

solely with the larger factors

but he came as a liberator, to restore and not take away, to build

up and not tear down; and every one

principalities

The

had

to be considered as a sovereign nation.

contrast between his patience with the

and Napoleon's brusque method marked.

It is all the

twenty-eight months

European

From

Gustavus enacted

is

that, in the short

on

part

his

the

a military point of view, his forces were in detach-

While Gustavus was

at

Mainz,

hundred thousand men was

in eight

eighteen thousand under his

thousand under Horn on the Main

Baner

princes

stage, he accomplished so vast a result.

his active roll of over one :

German

dealing with them

of

more astonishing

ments altogether too small.

armies

of the petty

in

Magdeburg;

own command

;

twenty

thirteen thousand under

;

Tott moving from Mecklenburg to

lower Saxony had thirteen thousand

;

the Saxons had twenty

thousand; William of Hesse, eight thousand; the duke of

Mecklenburg, four thousand to

twenty thousand more.

essential

where

it

;

and

in various garrisons fifteen

Every one

stood ; and yet

it

of these armies

seemed as

if

was

none of them

could stand alone, and the year 1632 shows us Gustavus striding

from place

to place to help first this

detachment and

then that, arresting a necessary manoeuvre here to save an irretrievable loss yonder; a condition due to the lamentable

division of

Germany

his difficulties, the

unequaled in

into petty sovereignties.

Still,

despite

king accomplished a year's work perhaps

all military history;

captain was happy enough to

and,

do, he

as no

sealed

other great the

deed of

conserved Protestantism which, unrequited, he gave to his

German

brethren, with his life's blood.

TILLY MOVES ON HORN. When, towards

tlie

307

1631, Tilly had withdrawn

close of

from before Niirnberg, Horn gathered what forces he could readily spare

from other work and marched from Rothemburg

along the Tauber to Mergentheim, and thence to the Neckar,

took Heilbronn and Wimpfen, and drove Tilly's troops in

Having cleaned Swabia

that region back to the Danube.

of

Catholic troops, he was ordered by Gustavus to Windsheim, to recruit, for part of his

army had been detached

to

deburg, where Paj)penheim was confronting Baner.

quota was fourteen thousand

men

;

Mag-

Horn's

but he did not reach

it,

being hindered by a two weeks' truce between Gustavus and the

League pending certain

At

negotiations.

expiration

its

Horn turned towards Francouia, where he threw back a force of a thousand foot

and

and horse coming from Forscheim,

after occupying Hochstiidt

by surrender, captured Bam-

berg and sat down there.

At

This was an open town without defenses.

February Tilly advanced against

Horn made

in Nbrdlingen.

it

from

the end of

his winter-quarters

preparations to hold out, as he

expected reinforcements from lower Saxony, and built long lines of

works around the town.

not yet in hand. thrice his force, at

Tilly

had at

But

least

his

new

troops were

twenty thousand men,

and coming from Nordlingen, had assembled

Neumarkt and thence advanced.

Horn had not

got

Bam-

berg in order for defense, when the enemy's van put in appearance. orders,

drawn

One

of

his

into action,

cavalry regiments was,

was beaten, and

bridge on the

against

in falling back,

The panic

demoralized a newly recruited infantry battalion. spread, the troojjs abandoned the works

its

and

fled

over the

Regnitz into the towai, with the enemy at

Horn headed a regiment drove the enemy back over the

their heels.

of foot

horse,

river,

until the bridge could be

and one

of

and held him

broken down; and he saved his

NEW

A

308 artillery

But he deemed

and baggage.

to Eltnian,

down

PLAN. It

prudent to retire

the Main, and then collecting his

army

at

Hassfurt (where in a cavalry combat he won a handsome success),

he marched to Schweinfurt, and later took up a

position

at

Wiirzburg.

Gustavus blamed Horn for

which he said unduly encouraged the enemy.

affair,

this

Tilly

retook Bamberg, and went on to Hassfurt to attack Horn,

but the Swede had already retired with

and had marched on ceased

his

pursuit

to

impedimenta,

Schweinfurt,

besiege

Horn had

intrenching the town,

all his

Gustavus at Geldersheim.

to join

left

Tilly

where, after

a garrison of three regi-

ments.

Early

in

1632 Gustavus seems

to

have made a plan to

base on Mainz, march up the Rhine into the Palatinate, take Heidelberg,

down

the

lieutenants

hausen,

move thence

Danube from and

Bacharach,

and had

taken

just

which tended to keep the Span-

all of

from too great activity in Alsatia, and he was about

ready to

He

His

had captured Braunfels on the Lahn, Boben-

Kirchberg

Creuznach by storm, iards

and follow

into Wiirtemberg,

headwaters into Bavaria.

its

start,

at once

when he heard

changed

of Tilly's advance on

his plan to a

Horn, hoping between them

march up the Main,

to drive Tilly

Horn. to join

beyond the Dan-

ube and to follow him into Bavaria.

Duke Bernard was

left

hold head against the

under Oxenstiern in

Spaniards.

Alsatj^a,

agree; and Gustavus soon called Bernard to his

He

to

But the two did not

own

side.

committed to the landgrave the duty of keeping watch

of the elector of

Cologne and other Rhenish princes; he

left

Weser with

the

Tott to act against Pappenheim on the

troops of the lower Saxon Circle, and Bauer on the Elbe;

and now, secure

in every step he

had so far taken, he started

from Hochst, March 15, with twenty thousand men, through

TILLY RETIRES.

309

Frankfort and Steinheim to Aschaffenburg, and across to

He had

Lohr, where he rested March 18. berg-

and Schweinfurt not

written to Niirn-

to lose heart at the fall of

He

berg, but to persevere in the good cause.

joined

BamHorn

near Schweinfurt, and concentrated the bulk of his troops at Kitzingen,

bring Tilly's

March 21-24. His avowed purpose was to army to battle, for Wallenstein was again

and the king would

afoot,

like to disable Tilly before the

He was

imperial forces could concentrate.

working

to this

end when he heard what turned out to be the false news that Tilly

had marched towards the Upper Palatinate.

On

this the

king resolved to leave three thousand men to

an outpost to Franconia, and head for the Danube,

act as

away from the more

instead of following Tilly

He

in Swabia.

and with

forty-five

(March 26-28) and the

way

did not

Up

to the

now

essential

work

ordered in Baner and William of Weimar,

thousand Fiirth

Danube.

men

set

out via

Windsheim

(March 30) towards Niirnberg, on The fact that Tilly had not moved

affect his plan.

to the 24th Tilly

had

lain in the

Bamberg

country,

but on the king's approach he declined to again tempt his fortune in a battle, gathered

all

the forces under his com-

mand, and withdrew up the Regnitz by way

Forscheim

The king's smart advance had prevented

and Erlangen. Tilly

of

from detaching any forces against Oxenstiern on the

Rhine.

Both armies were apparently aiming

but Tilly concluded to pass by the

Neumarkt

to

Ingolstadt.

city,

for Niirnberg,

and marched through

Here he crossed

the

Danube,

proceeded upstream, and sat down near the fortress of Rain,

behind the Lech.

Maximilian had conceived the notion that Gustavus would prefer battle with Tilly to an invasion of Bavaria, and had

ordered his jjeneralissimo to withdraw towards Bohemia or

GUSTAVUS ENTERS NURNBERG.

310

Austria, and manoeuvre to join Wallenstein's

new

imperial

army.

He

But

war council strongly opposed leaving the entrance

his

hoped thus to draw Gustavus from Bavaria.

Bavaria open his

army

;

and Tilly was withdrawn

to the

to

Danube, and

so placed as to prevent Gustavus' inroad.

As

the

Swedish king would probably aim for Swabia, the Lech

would be a strong this lack of

on which to defend the land.

line

purpose in the elector which had given

the rumor Gustavus had heard, and

had shaped

sion which

dictory orders, no

At

Under such

Tilly's march.

was

rise to

later deci-

wonder that Tilly was unequal

tion with which at his best he this time

was the

it

It

contra-

to a situa-

was scarcely abreast.

Gustavus would have been glad to enter into

a bond of neutrality with Maximilian, and rather expected

an embassy

sure of his ground to reliance on

he took the

was yet too

to ti'eat of peace; but the elector

make advances.

He

placed great

what Wallenstein would accomplish when once field,

and

felt

reasonably confident of the future.

Gustavus, accompanied by Frederick of the Palatinate

and other

notables, entered Niirnberg in state,

March

and was received by the population with enthusiasm.

31,

But

he could not delay; his movements were decided by the retreat of the enemy.

Having inspected the

defenses, he

turned to follow Tilly, moved via Schwabach and Monheun,

and reached Donau worth April

5.

Here he bombarded and

captured the works on the Schellenberg in front of the town, forced the two thousand infantry there to a precipitate flight across the

Danube with a

Donauworth, restored

its

which the enemy had tried the left

bank with a

had already agreed places on the way.

loss of five

works,

and

to destroy.

hundred men, took rebuilt

the

bridge

Horn was sent along Ulm, which

suitable force, to occupy

to

an

alliance,

and take other fords and

This duty Horn accomplished in good

WURTEMBERG collecting

style,

much

311

JOINS.

provision and material.

Hochstiidt

was garrisoned by two thousand foot and eight hundred horse all

;

Dillingen, Lauingen, Grundelfingen, Gruitzburg were

friendly;

Lichtenau,

taken by Sperreuter.

Pappenheim and Wiilzburg were

The duke

of

Wiirtemberg declared

against the emperor, and raised eight thousand

men

for the

cause.

Tilly

made no

Breitenfeld, lost

pretense to oppose

much

all this.

He

had, since

of his desire to cross swords with the

Swedes, and his present orders were limited to the defense of Bavaria.

Statue of Gustavus Aclolphus in Stockholm.

XXIV. THE CROSSING OF THE LECH. APRIL Having

crossed the Danube, Gustavus

was on the

left

bank

Tilly held an apparently inexpugnable position on the other side

noissance satisfied the king that the position could be forced.

unheard of

;

of the Lech. ;

but a recon-

Such a thing was

Establishing a heavy bat-

but Gustavus did unheard-of things.

tery on the river bank, under cover of

1632.

15,

and of .the smoke of burning

its fire

straw, he sent over a party to build a bridge-head, threw a pontoon bridge, and

crossed his men.

The

imperialists

met

the crossing in force, but the king

pushed on and drove them out of Rain.

From

Tilly was mortally wounded.

Rain the king moved up the Lech to take Augsburg, and then marched on Maximilian retired to Ratisbon

Ingolstadt. laid siege

to Ingolstadt.

was threatening Saxony

armies,

from thence. the country,

command

;

Danube and

of the

imperial

Gustavus marched on Munich, to draw him

Wallenstein's inroad into Saxony constrained

was tampering with the

military threat elector,

Crossing the Danube self

the king crossed the

In Swabia he seized the principal towns, and was fast reducing

when

Worse than the

north.

;

Wallenstein, again in

on the

left

bank

was

that,

him

move

to

through Arnim, Wallenstein

and thus sapping Gustavus' communications.

at

Donauworth, the king found him-

of the Lech, behind which, intrenched

north of Rain, lay Tilly and the elector, who here came up to

At a council of army was too much

direct his generalissimo's operations.

war,

it

had been decided that

Tilly's

lacking in morale to face Gustavus offensively, and that

it

should act strictly on the defensive until Wallenstein, who

was again ments.

afoot, could

at least send reinforce-

In their front was the Lech, and in their rear the

small river left

come up, or

Ach

;

the right flank leaned on the

was protected by Rain.

Danube

;

the

Redoubts had been built along

the low-lying river front and joined

by intrenchments

;

and

A BIT OF AUDACITY.

314

heavy guns

suitable batteries

in

up

fords of the Lech,

held by Tilly

;

to

stood

at

Augsburg, and

the bridges

intervals.

this city also,

The were

had been destroyed and the towns

occupied.

king might turn Tilly out of his posi-

If he so chose, the

tion at

Rain by crossing the Lech above him, or he might

coop him up in a corner where he could not victual and thus force

him out

to fight; but this

would take time, and

after

a careful reconnoissance, he assured himself of the actual weakness of the enemy's apparently impregnable position.

Both banks were a low, marshy

which to-day has been

plalin,

drained by canaling the Lech; then the marsh lay between the

Catholic

further

away from the banks.

was in a woody for

defile

Higher land lay

river.

The bulk

of

Tilly's

army

back of the low ground, waiting Gustavus chose a third course.

Wallenstein's arrival.

He had

concentrated his forces at Nordheim, ready for any

operation.

He

a bold stroke. far

and the

position

believed that the proper time had come for

From

the fact that his whole campaign thus

had been cautious and systematic, neglecting no point

from which trouble might

arise, it will not

Gustavus lacked audacity.

He was by

do to assume that

nature overbold, and

he now determined to impose on the enemy by crossing the river in their teeth,

and attacking them

in the intrenehments

behind which they believed themselves invulnerable.

The

moral advantage to be gained by such a blow he esteemed

would more than compensate for the ure.

At

Horn brought up

— and

or danger of fail-

loss,

the comicil of war preceding the

they were

all

when

the questionable conditions of the case,

many and

grave,

— Gustavus

the words of Alexander at the Granicus:

crossed a sea and so

a mere brook?"

attack,

many

replied, in

"What, have we now by

big rivers, to be stopped

The attack was decided

on.

PREP/dRSU^ONS TO CROSS.

On

315

April 13, at earJ?;^inawn, Gustavus made a reconnois-

sance close to the enemy's works.

Coming near an

imperial

outpost on the other side, the king shouted across to

"Good morning, mein Herr!

sentry:

"Thank

you, Herr, Tilly

the man, and then asked

"Oh, he

is

Where

in quartern in

v" Comrade, where

is

old Tilly?"

Rain," replied is

the

in his quarters too! " replied Gustavus.

's

the

king?"

"Why,

you don't say the king gives you quar-

s

^AVM•vw^

.,^''\.0•>»•'''''^^''•^v>,

"Oh,

ters?"

yes, /^'>•'•^•r,.v^•^'

indeed to us

have

come over

;

and you

fine quarters

laughed he

as

shall

" I

Gustavus rode

away,

merry over the adventure.

Preparations had

been

speedily

gun, a

be-

battery

seventy

-

two

of

guns

was erected on the left

bank where

it

was higher than the

and

right,

was a bend

where in

the

Crossing of the Lech.

stream with convexity

toward the Swedes; and under cover of a constant

directed

fire,

by the king

in person, a bridge was thrown in the bend in such a way that the artillery and musketeers on the banks could protect it and when it was nearly done, there was set over a party of three hundred Finns, who were con;

cealed

by burning damp straw

to produce thick smoke,

and

FORCING THEOACITyAGE.

316 to each of

whom was

promised

teiisto& dollars in case of suc-

In the night of April 14-15 the boat-bridge was com-

cess.

pleted and a bridge-head of parthworks thrown up.

The

king led the infantry atross, and sent some of the cavalry above the enemy's posi-

upstream to ford

t^\e

tion, while the rest

with the artiiV'ry

river

just

filed across

the bridge

April 16. Tilly

They

and the

elector strove to interrupt these proceedings.

issued from their

camp with

they concealed in a wood on their ish

bridge-head, and

made from

left,

this

opposite the Swed-

cover a

number

attacks on the Swedes, at the same time opening all the

fire

of

from

guns which could be brought to bear on the bridge

But the

or the advancing enemy. batteries inflicted in the

which

selected troops,

much

wood were driven out

infantry more than held

cross fire of the

greater loss on them.

its

in confusion,

and

Swedish

The troops the Swedish

own, while the cavalry made a

demonstration upon their flank.

The engagement was

of

no mean proportions; the Swedish cavalry threw back the imperial horse which was sent in successive columns against

them, and the infantry was put in to quite an extent; but the affair was in the main an artillery duel.

Tilly

had

his

thigh shattered by a cannon-ball, of which wound, though

Gustavus sent him

his body-surgeon, the

died two weeks later, and Aldringer,

was wounded thousand

in the head.

men were

killed or

From

grim old

soldier

who succeeded him,

twelve hundred to two

wounded on the Swedish

side

the imperial casualties are stated at four thousand men.

At

the loss of

and took refuge

— the elector being — the imperial troops

their leaders

small account as a soldier

in their intrenched

held of

lost heart,

camp.

The king made

no assault, owing to oncoming darkness, Ignorance of the work, and the exhaustion of his men, but remained on the

NO PURSUIT UNDERTAKEN. He

battle-field.

had

lost

had gained

The imperial army

his object.

morale and organization, and his own had gained

Though the enemy should have been able

in equal measure. to

317

hold the works, whici were Strong, against the

which Avould have been made next day, during the

tbfi.

Neubuc^ und thence

night to

at/./z.cJs

elector retired

Ingolstadt,

to

where he took up a position surrounding the fortress and intrenched.

Gustavus has been

criticised for not following the

sharply and seeking to beat fight; for their retreat

him

was made

maxim

Indeed, vigorously to pursue

any victorious general.

rarest feat of

disorder; but so

Practically, until Napoleon's day, there

of war.

was no pursuit.

much

had not yet been recognized

to take advantage of a victoiy

as a

rear-guard

in at least a in

enemy

is

almost the

It has not

been over

frequently seen since Napoleon's day.

Nor may a captain

be fairly criticised from the standpoint of the art of a later day.

He must

found

it

and

left

be tried by the standard of the art as he it.

But

it

would seem that even

did not tactically pursue the

enemy

if

Gustavus

after the victory on the

Lech, he might have been wise to follow him up as a strategic operation.

He

could have sent part of his forces to

Augsburg under Baner or Horn, and have himself sought to

inflict

a fresh defeat on Maximilian before he could

recover from his late demoralization, or be joined by lenstein.

But the king had

now repeated

his

own way

the procedure which had succeeded so well in

Pomerania and the Franconian coimtry, and began cupy the newly taken territory

He

Wal-

of doing things; he

in a systematic

to oc-

manner.

crossed the Lech, April 17, with the remainder of his

cavalry and the infantry, took Rain, seized all the towns

along the right bank of the river to Augsburg, and ordered

Torstenson and the heavy guns up the

left

bank

to

Ober-

ON TO

318

INGOLSTATjT.

hausen; and, to collect victual and contributions from tributary towns, he sent out a detachment into the

country.

on

Neuburg

Augsburg, though a free city, was held in subjection

by the imperial garrison. There wls a bridge across but this haa iij^*^n smeared with pitch, preparatory it

the

all

Gustavus mover? up

fire.

and threw

Lechhausen,

his

tlie

right bank,

pontoon

bridges

the Lech, to setting

camped

at

the

across

stream.

The

triangle

Ulm-Augsburg-Donauworth was exception-

Had Gustavus

ally strong. 6eZ^i,"

as he calls

odds.

But defense was

it,

desired

it

as a defensive "secZem

he could have held

it

agamst large

Swabia

the last thing to think of.

occupied, he proposed to

move down

the Danube, and on

April 20 he entered Augsburg, which made some opposition to his demands, took its oath of fealty

and promise of

contribution, left Lechhausen April 26, and headed

down

the river Paar towards Ingolstadt, the strongest fortress in

Bavaria.

Horn was

in advance with the cavalry.

The main column

got to Aichach on the 26th, to Schrobenhausen the 27th,

and

to within eight miles of the river opposite Ingolstadt

the 28th.

on

In reconnoitring, Gustavus found the enemy on

the north bank, with a strong bridge-head on the south to protect the stone bridge leading across Ingolstadt.

Danube from

the

Alongside of this stone bridge the enemy had

thrown a pontoon bridge, and built a redoubt as head.

At

daylight on the 29th an attack was

its

bridge-

made on

this

redoubt, but the Swedes were driven back with a loss of

twenty

killed.

The troops were put

into

camp

opposite

Ingolstadt.

Early on April 30 Gustavus made a second reconnoissance,

and riding too near the works, had

under him.

A

his horse shot

cannon-ball passed just behind the calf of

MAXIMILIAN WORRIED. his leg

319

and went througli the horse, which

fell.

Without

any expression of astonishment Gustavus extricated himself,

mounted another horse and went on with his work. Shortly after, one of the princes of Baden was killed near him by a cannon-ball, and when Gustavus returned to camp, these events were

made

the subject of discussion between

Among

his generals at dinner.

"I take God and tribulation I left

my

my

am

conscience to witness, as well as all the

undergoing and shall undergo, that I have

kingdom and

security of

my

him and

other things Gustavus said:

I

all

deem

of value, solely for the

fatherland, to put an end to the fearful reli-

gious tyranny which exists, to replace in their rights and free-

dom to

the Evangelical princes and estates of Germany, and

win for us

all

a permanent peace."

He

concluded his

conversation by referring lightly to his danger: lives

for

"Whoso

honor must know how to die for the universal

good," he said.

More status.

curious than the military situation was the political

The

elector of Bavaria

tavus' offers of neutrality;

and appealing for aid

had formerly refused Gus-

now he was

to Wallenstein,

chiefly instrvimental in causing not it

flying

whose

from the king

fall

he had been

many months

was he who now desired an accommodation.

ago; and

He made

propositions for a truce and subsequent peace, but the king-

refused these as the elector had refused his own.

He had

no confidence in Maximilian, and believed, as was the

fact,

that he desired a truce merely to wait for Wallenstein. It is

thought by some

critics that

embraced his present opportunity from Bohemia and Austria; but Tilly's death

Maximilian

it

Gustavus should have

of cutting the elector off

was no easy

lost his head,

task.

and on

May

After 2 for-

sook Ingolstadt, which, from the nature of the case, had not been yet blockaded.

He had

lost

confidence

in

his

WALLENSTEIN THREATENS SAXONY.

320

army, as his army had in him, and was eager for Wallen-

He

have some strong soul to lean on.

stein, to

unhindered by Neustadt, where he crossed the

withdrew

river, to Ratis-

bon, which, though a free city, he occupied by stratagem,

and thus secured

communications with Bohemia.

his

So soon as Gustavus saw that the garrison was being with-

drawn from the bridge-head redoubt, he stormed the Danube,

down

sat

to besiege Ingolstadt,

Horn

on to ascertain the enemy's movements. Neustadt,

it,

crossed

and sent Horn followed to

found that the Bavarian army had headed to

Ratisbon, scoured the country thoroughly, and sent detach-

ments as far as

its

gates.

While opening the Wallenstein had of Saxony,

sand men.

siege of Ingolstadt, the king heard that

left

army

part of his

worry the elector

to

and was advancing on Bavaria with twenty thouIt

was important

Saxony from imperial

to save

badgering or influence, for comparatively

might induce John George

make

to

his

of

little

either

peace with

the

emperor; and Arnim, who practically controlled him, was really

in

wise to to rouse

league with

make matters

Wallenstein away from Saxony.

left

May

4,

— he

had but

a corps of observation at

the interior of Bavaria.

WoUenzach May

5,

its

fight him,

but to entice

He

the

just

raised

gates,

Horn was

As Gustavus advanced on Munich,

its

moment

and reached

later,

Mosburg

and levied fell

He had

miscalcu-

Czech was the more intent on Saxony.

the king thought he would

May

tribute.

he heard that Wallen-

stein showed no sign of following him.

lated: the

of

—

and marched into

recalled,

took Landshut two days

and Freising surrendered and paid

siege

begun the work,

ten thousand rix dollars contribution. 6,

it

so threatening in Bavaria as not only

Maximilian to follow and

Ingolstadt

Gustavus deemed

Wallenstein.

move

For a

to the aid of this,

A RABID POPULATION. his

most important

Bavaria, to send

prepared to leave Baner in

Oxenstiern against the Span-

to help

Rhine-Main country, and himself

iards in the

While

succor John George.

news,

He

ally.

Horn

321

— that

so engaged, he

march

to

to

heard fresh

Wallenstein proposed to join the elector of This made

Bavaria with his whole force.

it

imperative that

own army, but keep well his first view and moved on

Gustaviis should not parcel out his

He

concentrated.

Munich.

The

reverted to

capital

was taken without

difficulty,

a contri-

bution of forty thousand rix dollars was levied, and there

was found great

store of material

and guns, of wdiich

latter

one hundred and nineteen buried ones were dug up.

Gus-

tavus remained here three weeks.

The

cities

received the Swedes without great difficulty,

but the poiJulation of the country districts of Bavaria and

Swabia remained

hostile,

and kept up a constant small war.

who were caught singly or away from were visited with mayhem, or death by

compa-

Soldiers

their

nies

torture,

many hundred

"God

rian churches were said to run:

the Swedish

country's enemy,

save us from our

Gustavus took no

devil."

revenge for this conduct, but levied contributions only.

Munich he

said:

Magdeburg,

— but

"I could

inflict

fear not,

and

Prayers in the Bava-

soldiers thus perished.

To

on you the penalties of

my word

is

worth more than

your capitulation papers." Gustavus'

troops

in

Swabia had captured Nordlingen,

Landsberg, Fiissen, Memmingen, Kempten, Leutkirch and other places. rose

But the holding was

and a few imperial

officers

reached ten thousand men. to handle the business, his

insecure.

and killed the Swedish garrisons

in

headed the

some

The peasantry of these towns,

rising,

which

finally

Colonel Taupadel was unable

and Colonel Rutliven from

hand with equal unsuccess.

Ulm

Towards the end

of

tried

May,

BOHEMIA AND

322

Ulm was

threatened by Ossa with detachments of troops

Gustavus

raised for Wallenstein.

and

started for

Ulm,

and that the

to his operations in

arrested Wallenstein 's of the

had taken Prague.

heed to the growth

little

and

Munich,

He had

in strength of the great

Bohemia

to

paid

Czech

and yet he could not have

;

movements without the cooperation

Saxon army, whose theatre was

but which had as miserably failed in

had

in

Here he heard

Saxons were treating with Wallen-

latter

too

Baner

left

Memmingen.

via

his great distress that the stein,

SILESIA.

to

have been Bohemia,

its

action as the elector

in his promises.

To go back some months

two imperial generals, Tiefen-

:

bach and Gotz, with ten thousand men, had pushed their way, in October, 1631, from Silesia into Lusatia and Brandenburg, had, as usual, devastated their route, and had sent parties out as far as Berlin

Ferdinand had made up his

happily of no long duration.

mind

Their career was

and Dresden.

that a policy of excoriation towards

Saxony was not a

paying one, and to try a milder experiment, recalled these raiders.

After they had

left,

there moved, in accordance

with Gustavus' general scheme, from Torgau and Frankfort

on the Oder into Bohemia and

Silesia,

a force of

Saxons

under Arnim, of Swedes from the Elbe under Baner, and of

English

under Hamilton,

twenty -five thousand men.

numbering from twenty

to

In Bohemia they received help

from the population, and no great imperial force offered resistance.

On November

10 they took Budin and Prague,

where they beat the enemy in a smart combat, thrust the imperialists

back from Nimburg on Tabor, and

ber captured Eger and Pilsen. strained to call just

to the

come up from

in DecemThe emperor was con-

business Marshal Gallas,

Italy; but this officer

thing was redolent of success.

was slow.

Bohemia was

who had Every-

friendly; impe-

THE RHINE COUNTRY.

323

rial opposition scarcely existed; the Protestants of

Austria

were gaining heart for action; the Transylvanian prince Rakoczi

—^an

fell

upon Hungary and penetrated

as far as Austria,

But the Saxon

admirable diversion.

elector, appar-

ently on the eve of success, began to listen to the wily coun-

Arnim, who was

cils of

in correspondence with Wallenstein,

and instead of pushing on towards Moravia and into Austria, to second Gustavus' manoeuvres, returned to Dresden, sat

him down, and considered whether he could not make

satis-

factory terms with the emperor and save himself from so

big a military budget.

It

was at

this

reappeared on the scene in person.

tune that Wallenstein

This trickery separated

the English and Swedish brigades from the Saxons; they retired

from the undertaking, while the Saxons under Arnim

remained in Bohemia to conduct a petty war and

to

plunder

the land.

The new

set

of conditions centring

about Wallenstein

induced Gustavus to return to Ingolstadt with his main force.

William of Weimar was right

bank

of the

left

with a corps in Bavaria, on the

Danube, and Horn with a corps was

occupy the upper Rhine and Swabia.

to

Recruiting for the

Swedes went on even as far as Switzerland.

Meanwhile the Rhine was a scene Swedes, French, Spanish and Germans

French army had appeared

in

of conflict in all

Lorraine to chastise

for joining Tilly a year before, and, isolated, he

return to his fealty on any terms.

Main, he gave the control of the French hands

;

for

it

When left

bank

which

bore a hand. its

duke

was glad

Gustavus of the

A to

left the

Rhine into

was better that Richelieu should have

control here than to let the section lapse into the hands of

the Spaniards or Austrians.

Oxenstiern had orders to respect the French holdings, little

as

Gustavus liked the attitude of Richelieu; and the

OUTSIDE OPERATIONS.

324

operations of the prince of Orange came to the chancellor's

But meanwhile the

aid.

imperialists

and Spaniards were

idle.

Generals Ossa, Fiirstenburg and Montecuculi gave

trouble;

and Count Embden moved up the Rhine capturing

not

sundry places.

At Speyer a Swedish

colonel capitulated,

but the place was later evacuated by the imperialists.

Pap-

penheim moved from the Weser on the Rhine country. the other hand Horn,

from the confines

who had been ordered

of Bavaria, took

to the

On

Rhine

Lahneck, Stolzenfels and

Coblenz in July.

agam induced

These Hapsburg successes

despite their strained relations with Sweden, to

the

common enemy; and what

had the

effect of

making

lighter for Oxenstiern

work on the

orders,

to conduct the Moselle campaign,

To

of

to his support in Niirnberg.

available troops to the

the

forces

of

work against

they did west of the Rhine east

bank the

and Horn.

Then came the king's march

the

French,

the

which more anon, to Oxenstiern

and prepared

left

Horn

to send all

main army. the

duke

of

Wiirtemberg,

who had

declared against the emperor and raised eight thousand men,

Gustavus added some Alsatian regiments and some of Oxenstiern's

old

troops,

and

this

army, under Horn, reduced

Baden-Durlach, and made a handsome campaign in Alsatia.

The

details of these operations cannot be given.

They

were merely the policing of the outside of the arena, within

whose bounds the giants struggled for the mastery.

Match-lock.

(16th Century.)

XXV. THE REAPPEARANCE OF WALLENSTEIN. JANUARY TO JUNE, Despite

1632.

Gustaviis' open-handed dealing,

many

Unselfish devotion to any cause

was too rare

trust bim.

honorable conduct seem great disaster

was

suspicion

;

Too great

real.

bad

as

success

princes of Europe did not

make

to

had the same

as abject fear.

When

Ferdinand found

himself so hard beset he returned to Wallenstein, the only soldier

stem the engulfing in 1630,

The great

tide.

would make none but

emperor's transfer of

all his

his

in their

own terms

;

and these were practically

it

in

offset Gustaviis' Corpus

first role

in

Evangelicorum

Germany, clung ;

Bohemia, attacked the

John George,

to his

;

jeal-

Third Party to

Brandenburg was uncertain

was fearful of too much Swedish influence

the.

Thus equipped,

powers on the theatre of war.

weakest point by tampering with Saxony.

ous of Gustavus' playing

who might

Czech, stUl smarting from his deposition

Wallenstein soon raised an army, and assembling

Swedes

the king's

effect as too

;

France

other powers held aloof.

WTien

Wallenstein entered Saxony, John George called for aid, and leaving Ban^r to continue his

men.

work

He was

was marching

in Bavaria, the

own

action

tenants, he finally

moved

Works were

new commander-in-chief, but was two days

to join the

who late.

Gustavus was unable to fathom his design so as to

Wallenstein lay at Eger.

determine his

king started north with eighteen thousand

anxious to interpose between Wallenstein and Maximilian,

;

but, having ordered reinforcements to Niimberg,

erected all round

it,

and put the place

from

all

his lieu-

in a state of defense.

and here Gustavus awaited

his opponent.

Instead of smartly attacking the king near Eger with his threefold larger force, Wallenstein slowly followed, reaching Niirnberg the

The

success

without

its

won by Gustavus Adolphus had not been

disadvanta^ies.

As

his brothers in the faith

looked on him with distrust when he

many,

so

end of June.

now both

first

had

landed in Ger-

the Protestant and Catholic extremists

began to fear that the astonishing victories he had won might lead the king

to

extend his empire over Germany.

GCISTAVUS' INSECURITY.

326 Self-control

and honest purpose were not the common

attri-

butes of the rulers of that clay; and however frank and consistent

Gustavus had been, few people but fancied that there

was something back of

generous,

his

outspoken conduct

which they could not fathom, but none the

less dreaded.

In

addition to this the Catholics harbored an especial fear for

They knew

their religion.

that the Lutherans

When

hardly dealt with.

had been

would their own turn

come?

France, too, had begun to see a danger in Swedish victories; Richelieu wanted an agent,

not a tool; he had no use for

if

a master, and he was already half inclined to enter the to

or to France. if

He would

put a limit to Gustavus' career of trimnph.

surely do so, should

it

lists

reach a stage dangerous to Europe

Richelieu was able to understand Gustavus

any one could, but he acted on the theory of distrusting

every one until he proved himself honest; of not trusting too far either honest It

man

or rogue.

•

was true from the other standpoint that Gustavus had

reached the highest cess,

pinnacle of

fame and material

and that the emperor had correspondingly

nand's case at the end of 1631 was desperate.

lost.

suc-

Ferdi-

He had

not

only been beaten in the game of war, but he seemed to have forfeited all his friends.

He had

turned to England, France,

the Italian princes, the pope, and could get help from none.

Even

the pope was an out and out Gustavus man.

Ferdi-

make peace with the elector of Saxony, but Wallenstein, who was smarting from his dismissal, had Arnim vmder his thumb, and Arnim swayed Jolm George. His position had grown worse and worse. From the Baltic

nand had

to the

tried to

boundary

of

erland, the Swedish

and now stood

in

France and to the

foothills

of Switz-

king had carved his victorious path, absolute

control.

France was threat-

ening Trier, whose elector had been forced into neutrality.

WALLENSTEIN'S TERMS. The

elector of Mainz, the bishops of

burg had

The

fled.

The duke

hemia.

Saxony had overrun Bo-

The

Lorraine had been disarmed.

of

Ems

the

in

of

Bamberg and Wiirz-

everywhere under arms,

Protestants were revolution

elector

327

country.

and there was

Bavaria was imreaMable.

The Spaniards had been beaten out of the Lower Palatinate. The Turks threatened. The Swiss had all but joined Gastavus.

Ferdinand was not himself capable of commanding^

his armies.

What

could he do?

was too dangei'ous.

Under

He must win him

back or succumb.

these circumstances, towards the close of

emperor turned

to the

1631 the

Bohemian, who alone seemed able

save him from a further

We

Wallenstein against him

downward

to

coui-se.

have seen how Wallenstein had been sowing by

all

how near he had come to entering into the service of Gustavus; how he had sought means, by negotiations with his enemies, of paying back Ferdinand in his own coin. waters;

Now

that he was needed, Wallenstein was not to be had on

any but the most humiliating terms.

He

took rather than

The imperial treasury was empty

was given the command.

Ferdinand was at the very end of his resources, material and moral; and he stood out against no conditions to buy back the only soldier in ish hero. lists

Germany

capable of matching the Swed-

Before Wallenstein would consent to enter the

emperor formally agreed to leave

again, the

to

him

the exclusive military power over all imperial possessions; the civil power over all imperial territory in the possession of the

enemy, including the right to confiscate lands; the

absolute right

to

dictate operations;

and

in

all

cases

of

reward and punishment the emperor's action was to require Wallenstein's consent.

Ferdinand agreed to stay personally

away from the army, and sion,

money and

material.

to

keep

it

furnished with provi-

In addition to this Wallenstein

WALLENSTEIN'S WOLVES.

328

was

have Iree entry into

to

imperial lands, to be rein-

all

duchy of Mecklenburg, and

stated in tHe

at the expiration

of the wav, of whose event he had no manner of doubt, to

be rewa^rded by one of the imperial hereditary dukedoms.

He

received, in January, 1632, a provisional appointment

to su-preme

command

months

for three

;

in April

it

was made

j)ermanent.

Such a contract with a subject was was unusual; and

it

of necessity

as

meant

degrading as

that,

when

it

his use-

fulness should have past, Wallenstein would be put out of

harm's way by

outcome to cally put a

means

fair

or foul.

There could be no other

Wallenstein, in assuming command, practi-

it.

term to his own career, however

brilliant

it

might

meanwhile be.

The promise

to victual the

new army was

a mere farce.

Ferdinand had no money, and both he and Wallenstein

knew

that the

must

forces

live

by plunder.

Magdeburg wolves were tame compared of Wallenstein's

many

brutes

new

in

On the

the

to the wild beasts

Never, perhaps, have so

divisions.

under one standard disgraced the name of

soldier, in every act except the

age.

Even

mere common virtue

of cour-

appointment, Wallenstein at once began to recruit,

Netherlands,

Poland,

Austria,

— everywhere.

Croatia, the Tyrol,

It

Silesia,

Moravia,

was not long before

his reputation, his riches, his generosity,

brought about him

These he assembled near Znaim in

forty thousand men.

Moravia, twenty -five miles north of Vienna. This activity soon changed favor of Ferdinand. as an able soldier,

the political conditions

in

Wallenstein was a real power as well

and

his apparent reconciliation with the

emperor brightened the Catholic horizon beyond anything since

the horror

of

Magdeburg.

The

situation,

already

colored by jealousy of Gustavus, seemed to shift as by the

THE SAXON WEATHER-COCK. tiu-ning of a kaleidoscope.

329

France was an uncertain

ally.

Brandenburg and Saxony could not be counted on: John George had already invited George William to join in an Gustavus' friends in Germany feared

anti-Swedish alliance.

These circumstances tended

the result of the reconciliation. to put

an end to the king's bold offensive, inclined him to

greater caution

warned him

than he had exhibited since Breiteiifeld,

to hold fast to the position

he had conquered in

Bavaria and Swabia, on the upper Danube, on the Main,

and the Rhenish country, rather than press farther on into the bowels of the land.

The most uncertain element was Saxony. was born

to

plexity.

On

John George

keep his friends and his enemies in equal perthe very eve of destruction,

he had tlu'own

himself into the arms of Gustavus, and the king had treated

him with exceptional seemed oblivious.

to

first

off

by money

would do

it.

;

now

he

He

his every effort

could not bear

in Protestant

role

Ger-

believed that an accession

forgot his

of the days of sore distress;

own solemn compact

he could not appreciate the

danger Sweden was running in

He

which he now

George had long imagined that Gustavus could

Jolui

of territory

He

influence.

have Gustavus enact the

be bought

fact of

Under the suasion of Arnim,

was to rid himself of Swedish

many.

—a

generosity,

this

war on German

soil.

claimed support from Gustavus; he forswore in the same

breath the fealty he had pledged to the

Saxony from tion of

fire

and sword.

John George

;

man who had

Gustavus foresaw the

and he did

his best to prevent

saved

vacillait.

He

ceased not in his negotiations; he kept a diplomatic agent at the elector's elbow; he wearied not in urging to hold fast to the right,

lenstem, even as he had delivered evil star rei2:ned

John George

and he promised rescue from Wal-

him from

over the court of Dresden.

Tilly.

But an

SAXONY INVADED.

330

JMaximilian, fearful of Wallenstein's revenge for his share in the latter's dismissal, begged the emperor to forbid his

Bavaria; but Ferdinand's voice had no weight

entering

with the new generalissimo.

Bohemia from the Saxons, tavus, to

and it

to

Wallenstein's desire to rescue to break their treaty with

weaken the king's communications with

draw him out

Gus-

his base,

Germany, was more potent

of south

;

constrained the Czech to march to Bohemia rather than

This he did in February, 1632, and without a

Bavaria.

pretense of opposition, the Saxons fled from Wallenstein's

army on its first appearance. For many months Wallenstein had been tampering with Arnim, who practically controlled John George. The Czech

now

represented that he was anxious to keep peace with

Saxony; he showed the emperor's formal authority, and assured the elector that the Edict of Restitution should be

He

annulled in his dominions.

pretended that his warlike

advance was but a matter of form,

lest the Jesuits

should

suspect his design ; but that he was ready at any time to

who might also percompact. The elector was

conclude an alliance with John George,

suade Brandenburg to join the disposed to an accord,

if

it

would save

slow in making up his mind.

Prague on

May

18,

his land; but he

was

Meanwhile Wallenstein took

and drove the Saxons back

to their

own

borders.

By

this time the

king had moved into Bavaria, and Maxi-

milian again appealed to the emperor,

now praying

for

Wallenstein's aid, and agreeing to serve under his com-

mand.

Placated by this concession, Wallenstein

thousand

men under Maradas

marched with

his

army

to Eger.

to

protect

From

left ten

Bohemia, and

here he

made an

inroad into Saxony, plundering and burning as he advanced.

He

wished to show John George the sort of thing he might

APPEALS TO JOHN GEORGE.

331

Then, hearing that

expect in case he delayed too long.

Maximilian was seeking a junction with him, Wallenstein returned to Eger, and thence advanced to Tirschenreut, to receive the elector,

and

to gain the advantage

which the

Bavarian army would lend him.

John George had eighteen thousand sand horse.

He

other side.

lay at Leitmeritz, and a march for Gustavus

from Munich thither was far from easy. there was enough of an

Danube

leave the

what had been

at this

and urged,

Corpus Evangelicorum.

weighed against what

Properly employed,

army to defend Saxony, while to moment looked like a sacrifice of Gustavus ceased not

so far accomplished.

his negotiations, his

and eight thou-

foot

This was a large body to throw from one to the

in lieu of every other matter,

But no appeal

John George

to

this shortsighted potentate

deemed for

the present advantage of Saxony.

When

Gustavus at Memmingen learned of the

fall

of

Prague, he also heard of a raid on Munich by Colonel

who had been

Craatz,

disaster to the land,

down

of a small

could,

body

marched

Here he

elector to spy out the

his way barred, sat The king had at once deterHe returned to Munich at the head

and who, finding

march north.

to

by the

Weissemburg.

to besiege

mined

sent

of horse,

called in

regiments from

and gathering

Baner with troops from Munich, and some

Memmingen.

He was

too late

Weissemburg, which had capitulated June 7 articles of capitulation

Of

the

;

to

save

but as the

were broken,' he wrote to Maximilian

demanding Craatz 's punishment, or he would of faith on

the news he

all

Donauworth, which he reached June 12.

to

visit the

breach

Munich. first

importance was to sustain John George, as a

political

and military

Weimar

to

necessity.

Magdeburg

The king

sent

William of

to collect all the available troops

and

GUSTAVUS NOT CONCENTRATED.

332

inarch to Saxony, where he would hhnself join him, and

wrote the elector that he should rely on him for victual to the daily

amount

of sixteen thousand pounds of bread,

eight

thousand pounds of beef and sixteen thousand "measures" of beer, at the places mentioned on the itinerary, viz.

15th of June, Aschersleben

;

16th, Eisleben

the

:

and Friedsburg

17th, Halle; 18th, Skeuditz; 19th, Leipsic; 20th, Wiirzen; 21st, Oschatz; 22d,

Meissen; 23, Dresden.

As

matters even-

tuated, these supplies were never sent.

His mind once made up

to

march north and interpose

between Wallenstein and the Bavarians, Gustavus

left

ten

men under Bauer in Bavaria, and Bernard at Memmingen, with orders to keep the enemy out of Swabia

thousand

and Bavaria by every practicable means, paying especial heed to Augsburg; and started June 14 from Donauworth, with ten thousand foot and eight thousand horse, in pursuit of Maximilian.

On

June 16 he was

at

Schwabach

;

on the

18th at Fiirth.

During the spring ciently concentrated.

of

1632 Gustavus had not kept

He

cannot well be held to have fore-

seen the turn affairs were to take, but credit

to

suffi-

it

is

scarcely to his

be forced to move against two armies number-

ing at least sixty thousand men, with only eighteen thousand of all arms, If the

and no reinforcements within many days' march.

monarch

is

subject to criticism at any time during his

German campaigns, it is at this moment, and for this lapse. Where were the one hundred and fifty thousand men with which he was to open the campaign of 1632? pacificator, protector,

had induced him

over the theatre of war. friends led

him

His

The

to spread

role of

them

all

desire to rescue his Protestant

to prejudice his military standing.

The immediate task was

to interpose

between Maximilian

and Wallenstein: nothing more helpful could be done

for

GUSTAVUS TOO LATE. John George.

was June 20 that Gustavus learned that

It

Maximilian had

left

garrisons in lugolstadt and

and was marching by way

Amberg, and

of

had started from the Eger country If he could reach

just one chance.

head

He

333

to

Ratisbon

that Wallenstein

meet him.

There was

Weiden first, he might

still

and beat Maximilian before Wallenstein came up.

off

On

could reckon on both of these generals being slow.

June 21 he

Fiirth via Lauf,

left

and on the 22d was

at

Hersbruck, with van at Sulzbach, which the Bavarians had reached June 17.

where

On June

25 the army was at Vilseck,

could threaten the road leading from

it

Weiden, over which the Bavarians must pass

Amberg

to

Wallen-

to join

But despite good calculation and good marching,

stein.

Gustavus was just too

late.

He

learned at Vilseck that, the

day before, the Bavarian van had met Wallensteiu's van

at

Weiden.

Now

comes what some historians have characterized as

a curious phase in Gustavus'

character.

Throughout

his

campaigns he had shown caution as remarkable as Caesar's; but he had exhibited a boldness and a power of taking and holding the initiative which were as wonderful as Alexander's.

All Europe looked with open eyes at this Lion of

the North,

who

in

two short years had marched from the

seacoast well up the Oder, to the Elbe, to the Main, to the

— even

to the confines of

ground as

to hold against all

Rhine, to far beyond the Danube, the Alps

;

who

opposition the

so covered his territory he

traversed;

who had not only

beaten the best armies of the empire and the League, but

had reduced Ferdinand stood,

still

to the very verge of ruin.

Here he

with the initiative in his hand, and though with

small numbers, yet with troops flushed with success, able to compass the almost impossible.

What would

and

he do ?

For some days Gustavus hesitated; he shifted plans contin-

WHAT COURSE SHALL BE TAKEN?

334 ually,

and

He had

for the first time appeared to forfeit his initiative.

never done this before, except when Saxony stood

between him and Magdebnrg

more than want

To

valid excuse.

of troops; he

and there had then been a

;

be sure, he was hampered by

must wait

for reinforcements,

necessarily reduced to a role of extreme caution

slower to decide than first

we have been wont

;

and was

but he was

to see him.

His

idea was that Wallenstein and Maximilian purposed to

overrun Saxony; and in lieu of marching the Royal to the aid of the elector, he bethought

Danube, lay siege

to Ingolstadt,

him

and seek

Army

to return to the

draw the enemy

to

away from Saxony by a smart diversion on the hereditary possessions of Ferdinand.

the

enemy

with his

Again, he thought that should

actually enter Saxony, he would

own column,

march

to

Dresden

sustained by the Rhine and Thurin-

Again, he planned to march via Coburg, draw

gian armies.

in the Liineburg

and Hesse

forces,

and head for Meissen.

Again, after a couple of days, as the enemy

still

remained at

Eger, Gustavus imagined they might be aiming for Franconia, or perhaps for Bavaria,

and he would stand where he

was and wait developments.

He

called in

Duke William

and the duke of Liineburg by rapid marches, via Coburg to the

Bamberg

while Landgrave

country,

remain as a check to Pappenheim.

William

should

But Hersbruck, where

he now lay, lacked victual, and was a bad point for a rendezvous, and

if

Gustavus was to give up offensive action,

was evident that he must

retire.

— the

natural rendezvous?

up Bavaria, and

especially Niirnberg,

Should he move to the Main

That would be

to give

it

which was not to be thought

of.

Finally, Gustavus settled

on Niirnberg for concentration, as the place where he was nearest to all the points

demanding

his attention.

This apparent indecision has been much discussed, and by

A HYPERACTIVE MIND. some

critics

335

has been held up against the king.

appear to need much notice, except because

It does not

has already

it

Gustavus with his small force had merely been

provoked

it.

mentally

alert,

while his bulky opponents, Wallenstein and

Maximilian, had inertly lain in quarters, waiting for the

The

king to decamp. active

fact

is

that Gustaviis

mind; we have seen evidences of

continually conjuring

up some new idea

it

had a hyper-

He was

before.

as to

what the enemy

He

was,

an anchor to windward.

He

Sweden, or to Oxenstiern, or to some

inti-

might do, and framing schemes to coimteract so to speak, constantly casting

it.

wrote

much

mate

he was free in stating his plans to his correspondents

and it

;

this

to

amplitude of resources looks like indecision, when

was a mere discussion of hypothetical

Gustavus

cases.

did not, like Caesar, write commentaries at the close of his

campaign, in which he could state motives which accorded with the event; he wrote as and when he thought, in the

midst of the utter uncertainty of events, and he voiced his every idea.

The apparent

What

thinking aloud.

indecision

great captain

was a mere habit of

who always

thoughts would escape the charge of indecision?

voiced his

We judge

the captain Alexander from the records of his friends;

nibal from the story of his enemies;

Han-

Caesar from what he

himself penned after the achievement; Frederick from his silent

now

deeds alone; and we are but even

finding what

the real Napoleon was, from the memoirs of his contemporaries.

his

own

What we know

of

Gustavus

letters written at the

is

largely

moment.

drawn from

Let us be slow to

criticise.

Consistency

is

a jewel, no doubt

with himself, and

false

but a

who keeps up with

times, cannot always be consistent.

may prove

;

man who

is.

honest

the events of stirring

What

seems true to-day

to-morrow; the wise step of the morning

KEEPING FAITH WITH NURNBERG.

336

As

be a fatal one at sundown.

may

events chase each other

onward, no one can long remain of the same mind. In a certain sense consistency is narrowness, and in this sense the

Swede was broad he took no pains purpose when he made it.

great of

at Hersbruck, or in the Niirnberg region, were

Royal Army, uow numberiug

Duke

of

....

Weimar, from the Saale

Oxenstiern, from the Rhine

Duke

of Luneburg,

from the Weser

Landgrave of Hesse, from Cologne

.

.

.

.

.

.

Baudissin, from lower Saxony

Total

change

by mid-

forces Gustavus reckoned on concentrating

The June

to conceal a

;

:

—

Foot.

Horse.

9,000

6,500

4,000

1,500

4,000

1,500

2,000

1,500

2,000

1,500

3,000

2,000

24,000

14,500

In addition to which Saxony was to furnish 6,000 foot, 4,000 horse.

Grand

total,

30,000 foot, 18,500 horse.

and Ban^r from Bavaria were ordered

When

enemy's junction had

that Wallensteiu might

with north Germany, he

was

from Swabia

Gustavus definitely ascertained that his operation

to hinder the

He had

berg.

Later, Bernard

to Niirnberg.

at Fiirth,

now all

failed,

and comprehended

operate on his communications the

more stood firmly

visited the place

June

19,

when

for Niirn-

the

army

had inspected the walls and works, and

dis-

cussed peace and the Corpus Evangelicorum with the council.

To

protect this city, to lure Wallenstein from Sax-

ony, and to act on the defensive until he could recruit his forces,

A

was now

his manifest role.

strong sense of fidelity was mixed with the king's deci-

sion to.

march

had agreed as there

to Niirnberg:

he could not desert the city he

to stand or fall by.

was

at

Magdeburg.

There was no force majeure

He had

no choice.

Niirnberg

was at that time the cross-roads of the areat routes between

i

CORPUS EVANGELICORUM.

337

Saxony and the Main, the upper Rhine and the Danube The city was Gustavus' choicest ally, and held

countries.

not only a Swedish and friendly garrison, but a large supply

and material of war.

of victual

Despite place.

Niirnberg was not his best

advantages,

these

From

a military standpoint, Mainz or Wiirzburg

At Mainz

was preferable.

the

king was more

strongly

posted; at Wiirzburg, with Oxenstiern in the Palatinate,

and Bernard

in Swabia, he

would have been

apex of

at the

and the only outside enemy was Pappenheim on the Weser, and he was neutralized by Tott. a strong triangle;

Maximilian would not have moved far from Bavaria, and of Wallenstein

up against

Gustavus had no

Once

his reserves.

dinand would be hopeless. aspect, but the

Niirnberg.

Germany,

lest

could not

he backed

defeat Wallenstein, and Fer-

This was the purely military

moral fact remained that he might not desert

Moreover the king was unwilling

to leave south

he should create an imfortunate impression,

lose the fruits of his

new-made

fear, so soon as

hard-won successes, and prejudice his

The alternative of battle remained but he allies. now advance on Wallenstein, having no more than ;

For Wallenstein numbered more than

a third his force. sixty thousand

men, and rumor ran that Pappenheim was

on the march to join him. Quite apart from the military situation, Gustavus was ready to make a universal peace,

Evangelicorum.

George some time since

and

it

if

it

included the Corjjus

This project he had submitted to John ;

he now again did so to Niirnberg,

was made a subject of careful consideration as

to

Gustavus could certainly have made

means and terms.

peace with Ferdinand, and have kept for himself Mecklen-

But what then became of the Corjnis which he had sacrifieed so much ?

burg and Pomerania. Evangelicorum, for

ARRIVAL AT NURNBERG.

338

Gustavus had sent ahead his engineer, Hans Olaf,

examine the defenses of Niirnberg.

to

Arrived there June 29,

he inspected the works in person, and gave directions where to bniki

new

intrenclunents.

He made

requisition on Niirn-

berg for fourteen thousand pounds of bread a day; the balance he expected to get from Franconia.

Returning to

Hersbruck, he started with the army on July

1.

The

foot

Niirnberg'.

marched

direct; the horse via Altdorf

;

on July 3 the army

arrived at Niirnberg, and with the aid of the citizens, Gus-

tavus began to surround the town with a cordon of redoubts.

Niirnberg southwest, west.

The

is

irregularly oval in shape

from northeast

to

from east

to

and the Pegnitz runs through

it

walls were good, and the citizens had already

done much to strengthen them.

Gustavus planned a new

set of outer works, according to the

most approved Swedish

I

DEFENSES OF NURNBERG.

339

theory; soldiers and citizens were alike told off in fatigue parties; all

worked with a

and

will,

in fourteen days the

These works, destined to contain the Swed-

task was done.

army, were strongest on south and west, for Gustavus

ish

rightly conjectured that Wallenstein,

was hardly

to

if

he followed him, as

be questioned, would camp on the

hills

at

the foot of which the Rednitz ran, and which lay on the

southwest

and four miles from, the town across the

of,

The moat was twelve line

A

feet

plain.

wide and eight feet deep, and the

was strengthened by a great number of minor works.

new redoubt was

into the city,

built at the entrance of the river Pegnitz

and one

at its outlet,

and a ravelin and a horn-

work were constructed between the

Spittler

and the Lady

Gates on the south of the town.

A

of

line

earthworks

extended around the entire place, from the market village

Wbhrd

of

on the east to the Judenbuhl on the north, and

round to the Pegnitz at the

On

St. John's.

the other side of

Pegnitz were two extensive redoubts, at the

Lead Garden

" and the Gostenhof,

works and ditches, and

in front of

the Gostenhof redoubt

were several outworks and half-moons. gates was

works,

meadow

one

land, which

between

South of the

was protected by extra

Steinbiihl

between Steinbiihl and the city

"White

connected by suitable

;

and

Schweinau,

city

strong-

another

and on the Rotenbach road,

on the edge of the wood, there was a strong redoubt, and still

another on

the

Altdorf

speaking, formed a big

bow on

the outlet of the Pegnitz to

the north of the city from

its inlet.

were two bows, one from the Pegnitz outlet,

The works, broadly

road.

On

inlet

both ending at the main gates.

the south there

and one from

On

Gustavus mounted some three hundred guns of captured Bavarian and Swabian guns

The good

spirits

its

these works all sizes,

the

among them.

and the determination of the Niirnber-

WALLENSTEIN ARRIVES.

340 gers to stand

eighteen to

by Gustavus were marked.

fifty

All citizens from

The

years old were put under arms.

men undertook guard duty

elderly

town and on the town

in the

For the outworks, there were made up of the enrolled young men twenty-four bodies of from eighty-one to one hundred and fourteen men, each known by a red and white walls.

flag,

in the

and on a blue square

letter of the alphabet.

The

militia

strong, plus two regiments of

upper corner a golden

was about three thousand

recruits,

one being of three

Thus from the

thousand, one of eighteen hundred men.

Niirnbergers Gustavus had eight thousand foot and three

hundred horse.

The Swedish troops

the city were at

outside

first

well

supplied with rations; but these soon rose in price, and some

These breaches of discipline

excesses were complained of.

were treated summarily, by hanging the common

and making the

officers

pay heavy damages.

soldiers,

There was, no

doubt, cause of complaint; but the Swedes were angels com-

pared to the fiends in Wallenstein's army.

The king

dered the population to bring into the town

the provisions

of the adjoining country.

The

ments had already been ordered

The king pushed out a part reconnoitre. lenstein

all

several armies or reinforceto

head towards Niirnberg.

of the cavalry to

This party was, however, driven

moved with more than

sixty thousand

berg, reaching the place early in July.

^^^^^^ Ai'quebus.

or-

(lOth Century.)

Neumarkt in,

to

and Wal-

men

to Niirn-

XXVI. NURNBERG. JULY AND AUGUST, If Gustavus

is

taxable with

ill

management

1632.

for being in Wallenstein's front

with but a third his force, his activity made up for lack of numbers. stein erected a vast

every means

known

He was more

camp

to the military art

than cautious.

were sixty thousand

men

ing towns.

Gustavus waited for his reinforcements.

in the imperial

Nothing but small war

In the crowded city sickness supervened.

In this starving-match

Gustavus was not certain that Wallen-

might not decamp and march toward Franconia or the north, and

ordered his arriving reinforcements as to head off either movement. in

Tliere

camp, one hundred and twenty thou-

Gustavus captured a convoy, and Wallenstein took some adjoin-

neither side could claim an advantage. stein

by

it

but he showed no symptom of attack.

;

sand souls in Niirnberg, and supplies soon ran short.

was waged.

Wallen-

four miles from Niirnberg, and strengthened

By

niid-Augiist, Oxenstiern arrived.

every rule of warfare Wallenstein

should have attacked Oxenstiern or Gustavus before the junction neither.

but he did

;

Gustavus marched out, ready for battle, but there was no

imperial camp, and he

met

his lieutenant at

If caution as a general solid merits of

so

Finally,

stir in

the

Bruck.

may be said to have been one of the may it be called one of the glar-

Gustavus, so

ing defects of Wallenstein.

Though outnumbering

his oppo-

nent three to one, the imperial general remained at Eger until

Gustavus withdrew from his front.

his course for this waiting: ijame.

Wallenstein had not the instinct of battle

which inspired Gustavus

:

and

whom

enemy whom he had drive from before him with a

against an

contemptuously threatened to rod,

Having argued out

campaign, he had concluded to play a

he ought to have crushed in the

first

engage-

ment, he deliberately declined to undertake the offensive.

So

soon as the Swedish army left his front, he followed on sev-

TA UPA DEL PUNISHED.

342

eral roads via Tirsclienreut,

Weiden, Amberg and

whicli place he left July 5 for Lauterliofen.

Gustavus had

left

In

Sulzbacli, this

town

a detachment under Taupadel, who, out

with a regiment of dragoons and some squadrons of cuirassiers

on a reconnoissance, learned that the enemy's

artillery,

covered by four thousand men, was in Neumarkt.

More

brave than discreet, Taupadel sallied forth to attack Neumarkt, ran across the enemy, was lured into an ambush, and

on July 6 was

all

The king heard

but annihilated.

of his

The Rival Camps.

dilemma and sought

to cut

him

out,

but the harm was done

before he could come up.

On

July 10, at Neumarkt, the Bavarian and imperial

armies were completely merged. ities

As

to their strength, author-

vary between sixty and eighty thousand men.

Roth and Schwabach were occupied.

seized,

Marching out with

Next day

and the upper Rednitz was

his cavalry

by way

of Fiirth,

Gustavus carefully observed his opj)onent, and drew up line at

in

Cadolzburg, in a position whose flanks were secure.

WALLENSTEIN'S CAMP. Far too weak for

battle,

343

he yet invited attack, which Wallen-

" There has been enough fighting

stein declined.

show them another method,"

;

I will

said the Czech.

Gustavus' road to Donauworth was

now

cut

After a

off.

enemy advanced to Stein, and here and at Zirndorf they intrenched a camp some four miles from Niirnberg, which in three days, by employing large details, was two days'

rest, the

It stretched

completed.

bank

Rednitz

of the

;

from Stein

and was cut in halves by the

miles,

The south and

camp were

The

the

and

fortified at its southeast extrem-

Opposite Gerbersdorf the trees were cut down, and

A

redoubts built along the Rednitz. lay on the southwest corner.

The

strong square redoubt

smaller north half, around

Zirndorf, was the strongest part of the

wooded

where

it

;

it

leaned on

had three redoubts, with a fourth one

made

as safe as art could do

enceinte,

it.

above the Rednitz, lay a ruined

the Alte Veste, with a lodge near culiarly strengthened,

ditches

;

by

;

and the

In the wood at

the northern extremity, on the Burgstall, a hill two fifty feet

east

in front

Three strong batteries were estab-

most northerly point of the

lished at the

heights were

camp

and was especially well defended on the

hills,

and opposite Dambach.

and

east

more strongly intrenched.

larger half contained the villages of Kreutles

and Altenburg, and was well

side,

a dozen

stream Bibert,

were a wagon bridge and a foot bridge.

north sides of the

ity.

little

of

Over the Bibert, within the

which empties into the Rednitz. lines,

to Fiirth along the left

had a circumference

it

hundred

castle, called

and these were

pe-

being surrounded by palisades and

heavy guns were mounted, and through the woods

slashings were cut for their

more strong, square single wall

and

fort.

fire.

The

Further to the west lay one rest of the

camp had only a

ditch.

The Swedes had sought

to interfere with these operations,

WALLENSTEIN'S WEAK METHOD.

344

but had, whenever a small party ventured out and crossed the Rednitz, been thrust back

;

head of a big division of horse,

enemy from

of luring the

and when Gustavus, filed

his defenses,

induce a single regiment to come forth.

method manifestly excluded into

at the

out one day, in the hope

he was unable to Wallenstein's

new

unless he was forced

fighting,

it.

Despite his vast superiority of numbers, and though the elector urged

an attack,

out, the imperial

lest his

land should be entirely eaten

commander refrained from a vigorous

against the king, fancying that he could blockade

policy

him

in

Niirnberg and compel him by hunger to submit to a peace.

He

had already cut him

off

from Swabia and Bavaria, and

he harbored great faith in this Fabian policy.

The conception

of the j)lan cannot be said to do credit to Wallenstein's intelligence or energy

;

but the execution was consistent and

The method was weak, but Wallenstein was

thorough.

adapted to the task.

He was

fact that the king's fortified

and

brought to

camp was

it,

exceptionally strong,

that, according to the ideas of the times, it

to attack intrenchments even with overwhelming

was Wallenstein's habit not

— or he had

against

held,

and was unwilling

him by any but the very

man

not to be questioned.

and

He had

safest system.

Snow King to operate

No

really

it is

soldier

—

is

much more

limited than

it

really

alleged that, being a devout believer in astrol-

ogy, he had had last only till

— a great

Again, Wallenstein estimated the pro-

vision of the allies to be ;

It

ever more markedly lacked the fighting instinct

and that Wallenstein was a great man

was

forces.

to.

conceived a different opinion of the ability of the

great

was unwise

to fight unless all the conditions

were beyond question in his favor,

from what he originally

well

moreover, by the

it

foretold

him

that Gustavus' fortune would

toward the close of the current year.

For some

AND

HIS POSITION

TROOPS.

months the king had shown a willingness

345

to conclude peace,

on terms which should protect both Sweden and the

German

Protestants, a fact which Wallenstein misconstrued.

Pie was from understanding the firm character of the monarch,

far

and the impossibility of compelling him would

feel to

be harmful to his

own

slightest degree derogatory to his

man and an

able soldier

which he

Sweden, or in the

Gustavus

dignity.

He knew him

better understood Wallenstein. tious

to a peace

allies or to

to be

an ambi-

but he did not credit him

;

As Wallenstein had originally Gustavus, so Gustavus now erred but

with being a great general.

—

erred in underrating

— in

a lesser degree

in

underrating Wallenstein, for the

Bohemian had a marvelous power

of biding his time,

and a

conception of strategy leagued to politics beyond that of any

man

of his day,

— save

That the quality of

only the king.

Wallenstein's troops was not high Gustavus knew, while his

own, though few, were of the very

He

believed that,

own

until his rein-

best.

despite his small force, he could hold his

forcements arrived, and, as he was habituated to do, he put his trust in Providence,

own

and

relied

upon

Wallenstein was surrounded by his old

it

cannot be said that his

was not the leaven honest Swede

although

It

men were

in the imperial

made

this, too,

lenstein's position

one.

army and

his

in the

had was

commanded

its

of almost

;

it

Gallas and

of the best.

army which

There

the rugged,

body commanded by Gustavus,

questionable elements.

strategically

and

But Wal-

tactically a strong-

the road from Niiruberg to the

and the middle Rhine country, and Swabia

officers,

Sparre and Piccolomini among them

Aldi'inger, Holcke,

but

his

genius.

Main

as well as those to Bavaria

was, in the light of those days, in the light

any day, inexpugnable

;

and the Czech was strong

on the defensive, and believed that he was so placed as to

A BRILLIANT FORAY.

346

await events longer than his enemy.

Detachments of

restless

Croats were sent out to the north, south and even east of Niirnberg, to seize and keep the roads the more effectually,

and with orders

to hold the

Swedes to

their defenses

and pre-

vent their foraging. this situation the rival

In

armies lay for weeks, waging

only a small war, in which the Swedes were generally suc-

The most important

cessful.

of

these operations was an

attack of Wallenstein's, July 15, on a part of the Swedish defenses erroneously pointed out to

him

as a vulnerable spot,

which, not driven home, failed with a loss of three hundred

men

;

but on August 6 the imperialists captured the fortress

of Lichtenau,

by which they could threaten the king's com-

munications with Wiirtemberg.

To

Gustavus sent

offset this,

out Taupadel, with three regiments of dragoons and cuirassiers, to

capture a train of a thousand wagons of victual which

was on the way

to Wallenstein's

camp from Bavaria, and on

August 9 Taupadel escaladed Freistadt and captured the On his way back he met Gustavus, who had gone convoy. out to sustain him with three thousand men.

had dispatched a force

to intercept Taupadel, but its com-

mander, Sparre, was not fortunate.

He

of cavalry, twenty companies of Croats

The king attacked him with

his

had four squadrons

and

five

force.

hundred

foot.

customary fury, riding into

the midst of the combat, in which he lost a escort,

Wallenstein

number

of his

but after a short, sharp fight he corraled the whole

Sparre was himself taken prisoner.

The

officers en-

gaged were rewarded with gold medals, and each man was given a rix dollar.

The opposing far

beyond

forces remained inactive.

Gustavns waited

his calculation for his reinforcements

;

and

it

was

fortunate that Wallenstein was unwilling to attack, and preferred the slower process of starvation.

So far-seeing had

HUNGER AND

DISEASE.

347

the king's preparations been that for some weeks there

no scarcity of food in the

mon

any beleaguered

in

city

and camp beyond what

many

was

com-

There was, however, lack of

place.

forage for the beasts, and

is

died.

Wallenstein's Croats

were the more able foragers, and soon had better mounts to keep up the work.

Foreseeing want of bread, should the

imperial general persist in his policy, Gustavus offered to

make peace stood to

berg

its

Niirnberg so elected, but the city bravely

if

Actual hunger

guns.

first

then in the Swedish camp

;

;

appeared in Niirn-

last

in Wallenstein's.

This general's severity and natural lack of feeling stood him

good stead in holding down

in

his

men.

It did not take long to reduce

condition.

both armies to a pitiable

There were one hundred and thirty-eight bakers

in Niirnberg, but they could not

bake bread

fast

enough to

the hungry mouths of citizens, soldiers and numerous

fill

refugees.

All told, there were one hmidred and twenty-five

thousand souls set in,

;

the companion of hunger, disease,

by and by

and ere long deaths grew beyond the capacity

Corpses lay in the streets ditch were filled

;

;

to bury.

the graveyard and the pauper's

lack of f oi'age had killed half the horses,

and the stench of decaying carcases and unburied bodies bred a pestilence. Under circumstances like these, order could not

always be preserved so well. ter

;

;

it

was a wonder that

it

was preserved

In the imperial camp matters were not much bet-

hunger and disease claimed an almost equal number of

victims.

This sitting down to starve each other out seems an unwarranted method of conducting war, as well as a costly one

but

it

was with good reason that Gustavus remained

for he could

quiet,

neither desert Niirnberg nor strike until he

could gather his forces.

Whatever the king's excuse, there

was no good reason for Wallenstein's

failure to bring about

HEADING OFF WALLENSTEIN.

348

work before Gustavus could be

active

Those who

reinforced.

claim for the Bohemian an ability beyond his contemporaries are called on to explain this singular

want

of enterprise, as

well as other lapsed in the Niirnberg campaign.

Gustavus had not been, and

still

was

not, certain as to

When

Wallenstein's movements would be.

what

at Niirnberg he

heard of his march on Schwabach, he imagined that his purpose might be to march to the Rhine or to Wiirzburg, or to interpose between Qxenstiern and himself.

and Gustavus altered

serious matter,

He

lieutenants:^

This would be a

his former orders to his

Instructed Oxenstiern to

march

to Wiirz-

burg, and to keep in touch with the enemy, hold the Main,

and prevent Wallenstein from getting victual from that region.

Baner he ordered

to

leave

Ulm and Augsburg

strongly garrisoned, and to join Oxenstiern at Wiirzburg.

Loth

to give

up

his hold

on either the Main or the Danube,

the king's idea was to keep a line of strong j)laces between

— Mergen-

these rivers, along the Tauber and the Wormitz,

theim, Rothemburg, Dinkelsbiihl, Nordlingen, —

Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine. Niirnberg would cut him

off

Upper

Palatinate,

to victual

and perhaps

of food, as Wallenstein was seeking to

Swabia proved a weak first

done

well,

them back and

to

Fiissen,

Augsburg.

link.

and had extended

Craatz, sustained

head

off

position at

from the Bamberg and Culm-

bach country, and compel him eaten-out

to

The

from Bavaria or the to retire

make him

from want

do.

Baner and Bernard had their holdings, but

at

General

by the Catholic population, had then forced

Augsburg

;

had taken Friedberg, Landsberg

and had even entered

into secret dealings with

Baner found that neither he nor Bernard could

leave the country until Craatz was definitely beaten.

On

July 30 Bernard was

at

Fiissen,

Baner

in Dietfurt.

Oxenstiern had reached Wiirzburg July 23 with seven thou-

OXENSTIERN'S PLAN. sand men,

— none

349

too soon, as Wallenstein's light cavalry

was overrunning the region

;

and the landgrave joined the

more on the who was marching on Saxony, on

Duke Wilnew

chancellor with four thousand

28th.

liam,

receiving his

orders,

headed for the Main, and on the 27th was at

Ilild-

burghausen, where he received a reinforcement of four foot

and two horse regiments from Saxony.

From the news made up his

received from Baner and Bernard, Oxenstiern

mind

He

that

it

was

no't

possible to carry out the king's orders.

could not hold the line from Wiirzburg to Donauworth

with his own troops alone. landgrave, of

In view of the approach of the

Duke William and

plan of his own,

viz.

:

the Saxons, he adopted a

to hold the strong places

leave a free corps to manoeuvre in the region,

Bamberg

with the rest up river to the

on the Main,

and

territory.

to

march

Duke Wil-

liam from Schweinfurt, which he had reached, was to meet

him near Hassfurt, and between them they would use up Holcke, who was assembling in the vicinity. Should Holcke from Bamberg, they would follow him up, beat him,

retire

and be ready

to join

The chancellor began

Gustavus at Niirnberg when desired. to execute this

did actually drive back the

scheme July 31, and

enemy towards Bamberg, and

recapture Hassfurt.

This change Gustavus did not approve. to

He

still

desired

keep Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine, or from

victualing on the

He

Main

country, as he imagined he might.

preferred a concentration near Rothemburg, with an ad-

vance on Anspach or Lichtenau, from whence Oxenstiern could either join Gustavus or push the enemy.

The advan-

tage of this plan was the control of a rich country for victual-

Holcke could be disregarded

ing.

in the

plish

Bamberg country held by

no permanent harm.

;

for with the strong places

the Swedes, he could accom-

Gustavus' plan would keep Wal-

OXENSTIERN'S ROUTE.

350

away from Swabia, which Oxenstiern's plan would and if the game was to be famine, the king was anxious

lenstein

not

;

him

to confine

to a limited area.

Still

Gustavus, who reposed

him

the greatest confidence in his chancellor, wrote

appeared most advantageous

main intention

;

to act as

but urged him to keep the

in view, to get together the troops,

keep up

commmiications with Niirnberg, and not to be drawn into battle before joining the king.

Duke

This Oxenstiern did.

William joined him August 16

Kitzingen

at

;

and

all

Swa-

bian forces which coidd possibly be sj^ared marched towards him, Ruthven being

Baner had

lately

left to

hold the land.

been successful in that region.

He had

recaptured Friedburg and Landsberg, and pushed Craatz out of the country.

On August

dience to Oxenstiern's

call,

and August 15 both stood

To to

7 he reached Nordlingen in obe-

awaited Bernard from Ottingen,

at Kitzingen.

reach Gustavus, three roads were open to the

move

or via

direct towards the

Anspach

enemy and intrench

to the south of

him

;

new army

in his front

Windsheim or Aurach at Ems-

or to

Neustadt on the Aisch, then down to the

kirchen, and the Rednitz at Bruck, and thus pass to the north of him.

Gustavus preferred the

last because,

the enemy could not hinder the junction the decision to Oxenstiern, bidding

down upon himself.

;

him not

once at Bruck,

but he wisely to call the

left

enemy

In case of attack he must hold himself

at least a day, the king

would come

to his relief,

them they would give the enemy a beating.

and between

These prelimi-

nary instructions were rendered nugatory by Wallenstein's remaining

and

inert,

but they were much in the king's style

so soon as he concluded that Wallenstein

;

would venture

nothing, he bade Oxenstiern hurry forward his troops.

The

chancellor broke

the 19th he was at

up from Kitzingen August 17

;

on

Windsheim, and rested two days. Receiv-

OXENSTIERN ARRIVES.

351

ing Gustavus' orders to march direct to Bruck, after a day of prayer on the 22d,

orders,

— he

moved

— rather

an odd delay under existing

Neustadt the 23d, and on to Brack,

to

where he foimd that Gustavus had built a bridge across the Wallenstein could now no longer prevent the junc-

Rednitz. tion, if

he wished to do

thousand

The

so.

men had been

king's small

reinforced

army

of twenty

by Oxenstiern's

thirteen

thousand, the landgrave's four thousand, the duke's six thou-

more than double

sand, and five thousand Saxons, to

its

strength.

By '

every rule of the

art,

even in that day, Wallenstein

should have taken steps to prevent these reinforcements from reaching the king.

That he would do

provided for in Gustavus' movements

so ;

was anticipated and

that he did not was

made a matter of sneering criticism in the Swedish camp. Gusta^ms now welcomed a general engagement as an outlet to a situation which every day and every additional mouth rendered more lines,

and

it

critical.

is

But Wallenstein kept

distinctly to his discredit to

close to his

have done

His conduct has been called Fabian, but the phrase

happy

is

so.

not a

Fabius had no troops which could encounter

one.

Hannibal's.

He

in fighting.

Hannibal had shown the Romans

refused to fight, because there was no gain

that he could beat

them under any conditions

all too

often

in the field

;

Fabius chose a policy of small war, of cutting Hannibal's communications, of fighting detached forces chosen

it,

he carried

it

out,

hamper the Carthaginians.

and

so

and, having

;

worked as

seriously to

But Wallenstein had a huge

overweight of men, not, to be sure, the equals of the Swedish veterans, but troops which

had been under

his

command

for

months, largely composed of mercenaries who were

six to eight

old soldiers,

and men who shortly

could fight

he had always boasted that he was in every mili-

;

at Liitzen

showed that they

WALLENSTEIN LETHARGIC.

352

tary respect Gustavus' superior

ing the Snow King, at

whom

;

his one

had but a fraction of

delivering battle while Gustavus force,

and

chance of annihilat-

he had jeered for years, was in

on his lieutenants

in then turning

and

;

to

his

do this

he had had abundant opportunity, gallantly offered him by the battle-eager Swede. in his

own way was

The utmost

But Wallenstein did nothing. active

;

Wallenstein was lethargy

that can be said for

confidence in his troops

;

Deliberately to starve any

army

is

ill

chosen time and place.

a poor way of preparing

After this criticism, however,

to say that to the plan

it is

but justice

which Wallenstein had with premedi-

tation adopted, he clung with perfect consistency. itself

itself.

that he lacked

he desired opportunity for

If

organization and discipline, he had

for battle.

him was

but he was not occupymg a position

where he could better them.

it

Fabius

ranks him low as a general

;

The plan

the execution of the plan

was masterly.

Having heard that Oxenstiern had reached Bruck, the king, with part of his forces,

moved out

to

meet him,

fully

prepared for attack in case Wallenstein should interfere with his manoeuvre.

But there was not even a show

king and his lieutenant safely joined hands.

Swords.

(16th ("entury.)

of

it,

and the

XXVII.

THE ASSAULT ON THE ALTE VESTE. SEPTEMBER, Additional

forces

consumed more

Gustawis sought

armies.

battle.

food.

Starvation was depleting both

On August

31 he drew up in order along the

Rednitz to invite Wallenstein out, but the Czech would not

Gustavus bombarded his camp, but with no better to

have the matter

He

out.

September 2 he captured point,

could

Fiirth.

would command the enemy's

would not do

On September

so.

had calculated

could be hauled up

;

fight,

To

distress.

On

lodgment here, the strongest

camp

to force an entrance elsewhere

;

3 the king assaulted the Alte Veste. hill to force his

way

in,

He

but no guns

the Swedes had but their muskets, pikes and brave hearts

down

defenses

day and

night,

and next morning, they stood

Still

Next day

stir.

The king was bound

but not bear his men's

to break

loss of

result.

effect a

entire

up the

to get artillery

1632.

manned by cannou and equal numbers.

perhaps four thousand

men

;

to their

but in vain

;

work

For a whole a

like heroes, at

Gustavus retired

baffled.

he nearly succeeded, and he deserves credit for showing the world that

good infantry may attack stout works heavily manned, with the hope of carry-

The Swedes were

ing them.

On September battle,

17 the king sent Wallenstein a formal challenge to

and drew up on the 18th

Disheartened, Gustavus stein

beaten, but not demoralized. Wallenstein took no

The armies remained two more weeks on

advantage of his victory.

meet him.

to

But the Czech did not budge.

moved towards Wurzburg.

decamped and marched

The

to

the spot.

come out

Three days

later

Wallen-

to Forseheim.

concentration of his forces gave Gustavus nearly fifty

thousand

men

but

;

it

ran up the number to be fed, including

Niirnberg, to thrice as many.

There was

little

food

the whole vicinity

made big gaps citizens.

left,

The

situation

critical.

and no forage within twenty miles

had been eaten up.

in the

grew

Disease and hunger

Swedish ranks, and yet more among the

Matters were not better in Wallenstein's camp.

Fugger had arrived from Bavaria with eight thousand men.

GUSTAVUS BOUND TO FIGHT.

354

and tliough Wallenstein sent Holcke with Saxony, he

still

had over

thousand to

six

thousand men in camp.

forty-five

Here were two hundred thousand mouths crying for bread. The exhaustion of the country, the small war waged by the Swedes, and the capture of his great convoy brought grave

At Eger, Wallenstein had had

distress to the imperialists.

sixty thousand

want

The number thousand

Sundry detachments and depletion from

men.

of victual is

had run down

;

there

:

forces,

— Bruck and Niirnberg — had, say this

and the bald

tion aloof, induced

force

from Niirnberg.

may

It

to

move on from

was on Tuesday, August

The

outlet,

and he

camps

31, that out of both the

army debouched

Bruck.

beat or

his intrenchments.

for battle. militia,

The

about

lines

and a camp guard

forces united in Kleinreut,

into battle order opposite the imperial nitz,

hard to

To

the enemy.

him back from Niirnberg was the only

left at

letters of

is

fact that he could not long hold starva-

him

Niirnberg were occupied by the

was

This

be, the king's present equality of

souo-ht to entice Wallenstein

the Swedish

Both

in the estimate.

convoys might have come from the Main coun-

However

try.

some error

is

that day, to be rationed

understand

by a good quarter.

given in the Swedish archives as thirty-six

men but

Swedish camps

this force

and went

camp along

the Red-

with three heavy batteries suitably posted.

Here was a challenge stein raised not a finger.

to

tempt any

A mere

soldier.

But Wallen-

artillery fire, not

severe one, was all he condescended

to.

even a

A couple of

small

bodies issued from the gates, and advanced to skirmishing contact, but

within walls.

on being pressed by the Swedes, retired quickly In one of these skirmishes Baner was unfor-

tunately wounded.

up intrenchments

Remaining

in position, the

Swedes threw

for the batteries during the night

next day bombarded the enemy's camp.

;

and the

But on account

of

HE CHOOSES its

area

vast

was

fire

tlie

A POINT.

355

and the reply was

ineffective,

weak.

As nitz,

Wallenstein's

an attack upon

f;ble, lest

camp it

lay close to

by fording the

the men, disarranged

edge of the Red-

tlie

river

was hardly

by crossing

advis-

in the teeth of

But the The king lacked the

the enemy, should be unable to resist a stout sally.

matter must be brought to a head.

Whatever we may say

jiatience of Wallenstein.

of audacity of the imperial general

opposite of Napoleon's " toujours de I'audace

!

"),

De

of the

want

(and he was the very

I'audace, encore

de I'audace,

we cannot deny him

the ability to

hold in hand a large body of the most insubordinate elements

during a period of the utmost distress

;

or the persistency to

carry through his plan without swerving, however tempted

by

his

enemy

to the arbitrament of battle.

This

no small

is

honor.

During the night battle,

of

September 1-2, Gustavus, intent on

broke up from camp, captured Fiirth, crossed the

Rednitz, and, opposite Wallenstein's fortifications, encamped close to the

on his

enemy, so disposed that the cavalry should attack

right,

where was the weakest part of the wall, while

the foot, under his

Why

own command, should

assault on the

left.

Gustavus chose this, the strongest place in Wallen-

stein's line, is

key of the

not certain

position,

nate the camp.

;

but he accurately gauged

it

as the

from which, once taken, he would domi-

If he ruptured the wall at

any other

he would not succeed in the same measure as

if

point,

he forced an

entrance on the north, where on the Burgstall lay the Alte Veste. such,

From no

advantage

his victory.

demned

;

;

other point could he use his artillery to

from no other point could he be

The

front along the

so sure of

Rednitz had been con-

the side furthest from the city was too distant as

a tactical point; to gain a foothold on the south end gave

A SUPERB ASSAULT.

356

Be

but promise of a half success.

he chose

up

this place, not

his reasons as they

may,

doubting that his guns could be got

to aid in the attack.

All day long on the 2d Gustavus was busy fortifying tho

new camp and making approaches to the formidable lines While so engaged he received word from scouts and some prisoners that Wallenstein was on the point of retiring, and

would leave a strong rear-guard behind

The work was hurried

on,

The news proved

Wallenstein was in truth moving, but

clear the

the

trenches.

and the Swedish approaches were

got close to the camp-ditch.

of quarters,

in

it

to

be false

was only a change

from the north end further down the camp,

ground for the coming attack

;

to

but Gustavus stood

to his decision for an assault next day.

On

Friday, September

the Swedish foot,

1632, somewhat before 10 a. m.,

3,

who had stuck green boughs

good cheer, were launched against the heights

as a token of

The

crowned by the Alte Veste.

with great effort only could a few

hand and got It

in their hats

into position

;

hill

was steep and rugged

light

guns be hauled up by

most of them remained behind.

the Swedish side, entirely an infantry battle.

was, on

Practically the artillery accomplished nothing, and while the

horse aided what

could,

it

had

to fight

dismounted and not

The Swedes advanced with

as cavalry.

siasm and

it

confidence.

Had

the utmost enthu-

they not defeated better troops

What were intrenchments to whom had stormed breaches time and

than these at Breitenfeld? them, every again

?

man

The

at this point,

fire

of

grew deadly.

Aldringer,

who commanded

was sharply reinforced by Wallenstein with

six

infantry regiments, on whose heels came speeding almost all the rest of the army. his

Gustavus was omnipresent, leading on

men, putting in regiments here and companies

laboring hard to get guns up the slope.

there,

and

This was all-impor-

DESPERATE FIGHTING. The enemy afterwards confessed

tant.

357

that a good battery

at the Alte Veste would have driven them out of camp.

Swcides acted the part of men.

from the imperial cannon, of which there were over a

ister

hundred

in line,

and the volleys

so constant as to

musketry from the

of

make one continuous

oAvn '^ith utter contempt of death.

Fug'ger

fell,

ter

The

Despite the grape and can-

:

among

Many

imperial officers

The Swedes fared no

the number.

scores of superior officers ^ere killed

in the thick of

it.

Toi'steason was captured

was shot under him

;

Bernard's horse

;

the king's boot-sole was shot away.

The

and from time

to

to time

seemed

To meet one

just within their grasp.

bet-

every one was

;

general officers were doing their fidl duty. freely put in,

walls,

roar, they held' their

The

troops were

have success

desperate advance,

Wallenstein launched one of his best cavalry regiments, the

Kronberg, at the Swedish thrust

it

line,

but Stiilhandske's Finns

back decimated.

Thrice the gallant Swedish foot captured the Burgstall

were they hustled out with grievous

thrice

followed each one that lost ground.

No

loss.

A new line

troops ever showed

better heart, but the Alte Veste could not be held

They

took, however,

the castle,

if

taken.

under gallant Bernard, a height facing

and had they been able

to get

guns up

there, they

coidd have pounded the castle to pieces, and raked AVallenstein's

camp.

courage.

— as

Scandinavian grit well seconded a Viking's

For twelve mortal hours the bloody work went on,

Wallenstein expressed

" caldissiraamente^^ gain.

— but

in a letter

it

Breitenfeld

;

the

emperor,

Swedes had made no real

the

— the Swedes

said

imperialists, hotter than

the

All agree that the fighting was hot,

hotter than

to the

battle of the AVhite Hill.

At dusk

a slow rain began to

and slopes too slippery

to leave

fall,

which made the roads

any hope of

success.

Had

HEAVY

358

LOSSES.

the fight been continued two hours more, said prisoners, the imperialists

would have run out of ammunition and been com-

pelled to retire.

But Gustavus

The Swc des

called a halt.

held their ground through the night, and the firing betwgen

Early next morning the king

the lines never ceased. the eliances of one

but to no

more

effect.

sally

WaUenstein saw

his advantage, ar^d re-

By

doubled the force of his counter attack.

pushed the Swedes out of the

down the

wood they had

The

the slope and back to Fiirth.

twenty-four hours.

Many

The Swedish

field.

In the

had

battle

lost half as

lasted

left

given at from two

many

There

Though

it

failed,

is

no

as the Swedes.

Swede belonged the honor, to the Czech the victory. and the king had not won.

it

But

;

had been the only means

break the deacUock,

upon

between WaUenstein and Gustavus, to

this first battle

not to win here was to lose

had

along held,

dead and wounded W6re

loss is variously

WaUenstein

10 a. m. he

all

thousand to four thousand killed and wounded. official list.

tr;'ed

from the woods which he hold,

was none the

and with a heavy

king to

left to the

less true that the assault

Like

loss.

cessful assaults, like Fredericksburg,

similar misuc-

all

Kenesaw, Cold Harbor,

in our civil war, Gustavus' attack

on the Alte Veste has been

denounced as reckless and out of

place.

was a

distinct gain to the

modern

art of

But war

for

aU

that, it

and as a

;

first

attempt to compass what was then deemed impossible, should

may sometimes be

be exempt from the blame which

on other

failures.

It

had

at that

day been usual

ate a breach in the wall of a fortress,

a column perhaps the

entire

assault It

many

times

and then

greater

in

garrison of the place to storm

to

to launch

numbers than it,

was attempted unless the breach was

had been considered impossible

visited

to oper-

but no such practicable.

storm a fortified camp,

not because the walls could not be breached, but because the

/'

359

GUSIbLE'E ^'uSTIFIED.

defenders were presumably as numerous as the attacking

And

force.

yet

^7as essential that attacks

it

should find

tions

modern called

-^eir

Some brave

soid

was

and

thf t his

;

posi-

on to prove that such an attack was feasible,

art could not be developed.

therefore justifiable +^iis

on such

Without them, the

place in war.

;

Gustavus' very failure demonstrated

men were

shortly proved

by

not disheartened by the failure, they

their gallantry at Liitzen

;

and

since the

introduction of firearms, the king deserves credit for

showing the world the

ability of

first

good infantry to attack and

hold themselves in front of strong intrenchments manned by equal nimibers and mounted by plenty of great successor, Frederick,

made

attempted was achievable

and the heroic

and

his gallant

was

as distinct a step

splendid

nor

is

Swedes

;

way

it

was a

it

Had

the attack on

woidd have won unstinted

Gustavus understood his failure in his front, he

king

not always a disgrace or loss

victory always a gain or glory.

the Alte Veste succeeded,

mander

effort of the

into the Alte Veste

forward in the art of war as is

His

artillery.

plain that what Gustavus

to force their

Defeat

exj^loit.

it

;

praise.

with a vigorous com-

would be rimning a grave risk

;

with

Wallenstein he was, barring loss of men, no whit worse

In a

letter to the

of his assault, acknowledged his failure,

the

wounded and continued

seven thousand Fiirth.

He was

off.

Niirnberg council he explained the reason

workmen

and asked care for

issues of bread, as well as six or

to finish his intrenchments near

determined not to leave Niirnberg so long as

there was any hope of success. Gusta\T.is had, since his negotiations with Wallenstein in

the fall of 1631,

made

the imperial general.

several further attempts to influence

In the spring of 1632 he

is

have approached him, and he did so again when Niirnbero'.

But

at this time Wallenstein

was

said to first

in

in nesrotiation

UTTER

360

S'lAOSSE^ION.

with Jokn George, and would listen to no advances, though

Gustavus

is

In July there were renewed

crown.

him

said to have offered to help

stein's willingness to

to the

Bohemian

e-^^idences of

work toward a peace

;

Wallen-

and now Gusta-

vus sent Colonel Sparre, recently captured, to AVallenstein,

with overtures for the exchange of prisoners and incidentally

Exchanges were

to treat of peace.

effected,

but Wari;ensiei^-'

referred the other question to Vienna, where

delayed that

it

was so long

it

was practically dropped.

Gustavus worked uninterruptedly on

tiie

Fiirth intrench-

ments, which he prolonged from the Rednitz above the village

with a northerly sweep to the rear, a distance of over two

So long

miles. success.

as there

was any chance, he

Rations had grown so short that the

but once in three or four days

;

still

hoped for

men

got bread

no forage could be had within

Yet the Swedes had open communications

a day's march.

Kitziiigen and Wiirzburg, while Wallenstein

the road to Neumarkt.

It

to

had not even

was reported September 9 that he

could not hold himself over three days more.

Wallenstein did not budge.

He

For

all that,

sat sullenly in place.

It

was

a game of patience.

The

rival armies

— starving though

on the spot two weeks after the

they were

battle, the

— remained

Swedes alone

carrying on a small war, while Wallenstein forbade replies to their attacks.

Hunger was now

at its height,

haps the worse in the imperial camp. state the loss of each

in the

and was per-

Contemporary writers

army to have been twenty thousand men

two and a half months they lay near Niirnberg.

number,

in

the Swedi.ili

army

at least, is exaggerated.

the city ten thousand people are said to have died. cattle all perished,

and the

vicinity

This

In

The

was transformed into a

desert.

It

was evident

to the king that

no further advantage could

/

A NOBLE'E Mol^LENGE.

He

be gained by remaining atilreal'nberg. entice nor force Wallenstein

He

ture his camp.

reestablish himself

Germany, or

else

o'l /

to battle

could neither

he could not cap

;

determined to cut the knot

upon

his direct

to go

on with

liis

strung to play longer at this game. ;

either to

;

communications with north operations in Swabia,

He was

basing on the Mainz-Wiirzburg country.

he had offered battle

361

He

had

too high-

tried assault

he had sought negotiation.

All had

Wallenstein was the colder-blooded, and, in such a

failed.

Niirnberg was

contest, the stronger.

men, — eight regiments of

foot,

left well

numbering

supplied with

forty-four

hundred

men, and three hundred horse, under brave old Kniphausen while Oxenstiern was to remain in the city to represent the king.

Having done

this,

Gustavus sent Wallenstein, on September

17, a formal challenge to

day

at the appointed

;

come out

to battle

on the next

hour he drew up the entire army and

marched past the imperial camp, stopping on the way nonade

But Wallenstein would not be tempted

it.

;

to can-

he did

not even answer the defiance.

There

is

a touch of j^athetic gallantry in Gusta^'us'

which appeals

to the heart of every

intoxication of battle

;

there

is

man who

has ever

moved by any taimt.

of enthusiasm the

erence the

manes

memory

the

a touch of sullen grandeur in

the refusal of the challenge by the proud Czech,

not be

felt

act,

The veteran

of the noble

who woidd

salutes with a thrill

Swede

;

he cannot rev-

of his foeman.

Failing in every effort to obtain an advantage over Wallenstein,

Gustavus concluded to leave the

camp and marched unchallenged ments towards Wiirzburg. zenn

;

the next at

Weinsheim

His ;

field

he broke

:

past Wallenstein's intrenchfirst

camp was

at

Langen-

he then marched to Neustadt,

whence he started September 23 for Windsheim.

The army

WALLE^J^OyN WINS.

362

with detacliments had shruil

men.

Here occurred a curious tary reached the king, to to congratulate

was

lisi

about twenty-four thousand

'5^-Dunbar.

thousand, Irishmen passed as professional soldiers to the continent.

As

a mere soldier Cromwell had done well in Ireland, and

with no great means

;

as

man and

soldier,

he would have

done better to heed the lessons of Gustavus.

His conduct

was the very essence of narrow Puritanism.

But he had

intentionally cut

down none but men

Fairfax resigned

made

;

captain-general

Cromwell ;

and

in

retired to England,

and was

Jidy he crossed the Scotch

border with sixteen thousand men. of the Scotch army,

in arms.

Leslie was in

command

some twenty-two thousand strong, and

A SHARP HOUR'S WORK. sought to

tire

433

out Cromwell by a Fabian policy.

This

all

but succeeded, and, worn by wet and hunger, the English

army on a

Dunbar,

retired to

to

be near the

The

fleet.

city

was

and a haK wide, and the only

sort of peninsula, a mile

As

they

approached Dunbar, Leslie followed and held the road.

He

road to

ran over

it

hills

had trapped Cromwell

;

otherwise

inaccessible.

and drawing up along the Lammer-

hills, he cut him off from the only road to England. Cromwell's " poor, scattered, hungry, discouraged army " of

muir

thousand

eleven

number

men was

sad

in

case,

with twice

their

Had

Leslie

of well-provisioned Scots in their front.

kept to his Fabian strategy,

it

might have gone hard with

But fearing that the English might embark and

Cromwell.

escape him, he pushed out his right wing to the coast, hoping to surround

and cut them

Leslie's left lay its front,

on the

to pieces in the operation. hills,

with an impassable ravine in

but the brook which ran through the ravine to the

sea broadened out lower down so as to be easily fordable.

Cromwell was not slow bilities

;

he made

to see the lapse,

and

his plans accordingly.

1650, before daylight, he got his

to grasp its possi-

On

men under

guns in a position to keep up a heavy

September

fire on,

and thus

vent Leslie's left from deploying, and marshaled his to attack his right in force.

By

line

and crossing the ravine

covered the disgarnishing of his

Cromwell initial

fell

lustily

upon

pre-

army

6 A. M. Cromwell advanced the Scotch left from

the artillery fire sufficed to prevent

forming

3,

arms, put his

in their front,

own

Leslie's

right;

and thus

and meanwhile

right wing.

Bar an

check which was quickly repaired, the onset met with

entire success.

Cromwell sent a column around by the sea

take the Scotch line in flank, and within an hour the

was fully routed. the left finally

The

came

right flank

to its support,

to

enemy

was crushed, and when it

was but

to

be ridden

DISPARITY OF LOSSES.

434

down by

its

own

demoralization.

The all

victory

flying squadrons,

and

partake of their

to

The whole Scotch army

fled

dismay.

in

was completed while singing " O praise the Lord,

ye nations."

There were three thousand Scotch

slain,

only two officers and twenty

men had

ten thousand

Of

taken, with all the baggage and material.

the English It

had been

discipline

which had

fallen.

won over numbers, and undoubted cour-

The

age.

battle

one to

leads

look

the

overin

faults

preceding

strategy

Edinburgh and

it.

Glasgow

surren-

dered.

Next

year, after

some operations

made

II.

dash Worcester.

Charles found

him.

little

for

in

Charles

Scotland,

a

bold

England.

Nothing

abashed,

Cromwell

followed

of the support he anticipated,

and

reached Worcester with not over fifteen thousand men, while at the

end of August Cromwell arrived with

Charles took up a position in the angle as

it

runs into the Severn.

thirty thousand.

made by

Just above, on the

the

left

Teme

bank

of

the Severn, lay Worcester, well fortified, with the Eoyal Fort

on the southeast corner, and a bridge across the river Charles also held in force the bridge over the

road leadino' to the Malvern Hills.

;

Teme and

The Severn

and the

bridsre lower

ABLE TACTICS.

His Worcester bridge ena-

down, at Upton, he destroyed. bled

him

to cross quickly to

435

and

fro,

and here he prepared

to

play his last card, expecting that Cromwell would assault

from the north.

With

of troops

his excess

safely divide

He

having in this a manifest advantage.

his forces,

in the town, set

up

his batteries

river,

and cannonaded

lucky

daj^,

lines in

Cromwell coidd

it

on the

hill

closed

on the east of the

for nearly a week, waiting for his

the 3d of September, but meanwhile drawing his

He had

more and more.

down

the

bridge,

and

sent Fleetwood

Severn to cross and hold the enemy to the Teme.

On

the day set Fleetwood attacked the

under cover of

this

across the Severn

Teme

attack two bridges were thrown, one

and one across the Teme,

close together,

thus taking Charles' triangle in reverse, and obliging him to

withdraw into Worcester, which he did in the afternoon.

From and

here he broke out on Cromwell's force on the left bank,

for a

Cromwell ter

;

moment gained

success

to reinforce this

wing

and the

royalists

;

but the bridges enabled

in season to prevent disas-

were forced within walls, after a hearty

The Royal Fort was taken by

struggle.

storm, and by eight

The

in the evening the city gates were captured.

mere massacre

rest

was

three thousand Scotch were killed, ten thou-

Cromwell

sand taken.

The

;

lost

tactics of this battle

two hundred men.

was admirable.

was a

It

fit

clos-

ing to Cromwell's military career, which had lasted from his forty-third to his fifty-second year.

Judged by if

success,

Cromwell was a greater

gauged by the rules

strategist ble.

;

in

tactics,

of

the art.

He was

soldier than

not a skillful

within a certain limit, he was admira-

Following immediately in the steps of the great conti-

nental captain, he organized and

army, which none of the

disciplined

a wonderful

less well-drilled royalists

could ever

CROMWELL NOT A GREAT CAPTAIN.

436

The

resist.

forces

opposed never stood his blows long

lie

and judged by opposition, he does not stand high. losses in

storming strong places, except at Clonmel, were

At

always small, testifying to poor defense.

he lost

men

fifty

;

at

Dunbar twenty-two

While mere

hundred.

general, they

had

His

must

still

losses

;

at

Preston Pans

Worcester two

do not necessarily measure the

be considered in the light of what he

to oppose him.

That Cromwell was one undeniable

;

that for

England he wrought

of its rulers ever did

highest standard, he certain.

He

of the great

is

but a truism

may be

;

men

of history is

as almost no other that, tried

called a great general

by the

ington, for instance) have been, eminent in arms

;

but that

he deserves to rank with the great captains no capable familiar with their history has ever pretended

rank with the second

Eugene and

less

is

was what some other truly great men (Wash-

— with — can

class

their fellows

;

critic

that he

may

Turenne, Marlborough,

scarcely be allowed.

That

he did such splendid work for England came from his exceptional

equipment of character and

He was

intelligence.

a worthy follower and, like

all

an imitator of Gustavus Adolphus.

Pistol

8 word.

(16th Century

the rest of Europe,

XXXIV. TURENNE. Three ries

:

TO AUGUST,

sets of great soldiers exist in the seventeenth

those grouped about Gustavus, about

Eugene and Marlborough. and by narrating the

1634

first set,

and-

It

now come

Swedish generals

whom

and eighteenth centu-

Cond^ and Turenne, and about

was they who created the modern

we

their deeds

1644.

are writing

to the second.

art of war,

have dealt with

After the death of Gustavus, the

— Bernard,

he had trained

We

its history.

Ban^r, Torstenson

connection with France conducted brilliant campaigns over

aU Germany

— in

;

lacking the solid method of their great chief, their work had no result.

but,

In

1646 the last of these generals, Wrangel, operated successfully with Turenne.

Born

in 1611,

Turenne

first

saw

service in Holland with his uncle, the prince

of Orange, proved himself gallant

and

intelligent,

and rapidly rose

under successive commanders on the Khine and

fession,

in his pro-

His

in Italy.

first

independent campaign as field-marshal, in 1G44, opened with a successful raid across the

Rhine and towards the upper Danube

;

this

was followed by a march

on Freiburg, which was blockaded by the Bavarian Mercy.

tempted to relieve

it,

Turenne

but his army, which had been given over to him

worst order, proved weak, and his operation failed.

Cond^ was sent

at-

in the

to his aid.

In the military era to which Gustavus Aclolphus by right of eminence

and

priority gives the

ods into which our subject-matter

The

first

title,

there are three peri-

may conveniently be

includes those generals

divided.

who were grouped about

Gustavus, and the events in which they enacted their brilliant

The second

parts.

stage

includes those generals

when Turenne conducted

his

who were on

the

campaigns in the Thirty

War, the War with Spain, and the Wars in the Netherlands. The third period includes the generals who acted with or against Prince Eugene and Marlborough in the War of

Years'

the Spanish Succession.

By narrating the military life

of Gus-

SWEDISH-FRENCH PHASE.

438 tavus,

we have already covered the

make

clear the second

narrate

all

the

We can best

period.

first

and third periods not by an attempt

war history of

their times, but

to

by keeping more

or less closely to the masterly campaigns of Turenne, Prince

Eugene and Marlborough themselves to the skillful work of Conde, Vendome, Villars and Montecuculi; to the campaigns of Luxemburg and Catiuat for it was the novel and ;

;

useful elements in what they did which so distinctly enriched

way for that greater we depart from the History of the Art of War,

the art of war, and which prepared the teacher, Frederick, king of Prussia.

course thus prescribed by this it

of

will

If

be but to notice such a splendid event as the defense

Vienna by John Sobieski, or such an

erratic genius as

Charles XII.

In this design, space limits us to the narration of a portion Part must be

only of the campaigns of these able captains.

omitted to

still

;

another part can be sketched with but few strokes

other parts more time will be allotted

ground thus covered we

;

and from the

shall conceive a fairly

good idea of

what was done by them towards developing the art

of which

they were past masters.

From 1635 Years'

War

to the

was

French phase.

in

Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Thirty

what

is

called the French, or the Swedish-

Because of Gustavus' death, or of the defec-

tion of Saxony,

Brandenburg and other

late Protestant allies,

the Swedes were none the less intent on carrying out the

purpose bequeathed to them by their great monarch, though indeed Sweden was compelled to fight her " bastion " on the Baltic.

if

she would preserve

France would make no peace

on terms acceptable to the empire, and so the war went on.

The north German

potentates were to an extent eliminated

from the problem, and the theatre of war was somewhat changed even

as the ideal of the

war was modified, but Riche-

BANER AND TORSTENSON. lieu

and Oxenstiern never wavered.

439 Nord-

Bj' the battle of

lingen Bernard had forfeited his duchy of Franconia, and he

was glad

to serve

under the

carving for himself a

France, with the hope of

segis of

new duchy out

in 1639 the French retained

his

On

of Alsatia.

his death

army.

After the battle of Nordlingen, the operations of the Protestant allies

had been mainly

in

The Swedes

two bodies.

under Baner, based on Gustavus' bastion, had manoeuvred

toward Saxony and Bohemia, while the army of Bernard, properly a part of the Swedish forces, but entertained by

France, had operated on the Rhine, in Alsatia and Swabia,

sometimes in connection with the French armies, sometimes alone.

In 1638 Bernard crossed the Rhine above Basle, captured

many towns

in Swabia, besieged Breisach

imperial armies of

and beat

off several

His other campaigns were rather

relief.

weak.

The

operations of Baner from 1636 to 1641 showed great

energy fine

;

but his boldness was misplaced, and despite

forays into

Saxony and Bohemia, and even

many

as far as

Ratisbon, he was invariably forced back to Pomerania by the larger imperial armies

won some

and

their allies.

No

victories,

and he

him a

splendid ones, as at Wittstock, secui'ed

foot-

hold beyond the bastion, which Wrangel meanwhile defended.

In 1641 Baner died and Torstenson assumed command.

Extending over the entire territory from Denmark

to Vi-

enna, the latter's manoeuvres were in a high degree bold and brilliant

won a

;

but they were quite without

victory at Leipsic

;

again in 1644 at Juterbok, and in

1645 at Jankowitz, over the imperial

much which

is

In 1642 he

result.

trooj)s;

admirable characterized his work

markedly aided the operations of the French, cannot be jirouounced successful.

but though ;

his

though he

campaigns

Like that of the others,

CONTRASTED WITH GUSTAVUS.

440 liis

work lacked the

As

a lieutenant, especially as an

yond

solidity

shown by

king and teacher.

his

artillerist,

he had been be-

criticism.

This want of permanent success by the generals he had

brought up, and who had no superiors at the time, emphasizes the value of Gustavus'

own

careful method.

covered the same ground which he had as far

they

;

opponents

heim

;

won

His lieutenants

won

;

they marched

victories apparently as splendid

less able

they had

;

than Tilly, or Wallenstein, or Pappen-

and yet the result of

all

they did was naught, or at

best they merely kept the ball in

play until exhaustion put an end

drawn out match

to the long

of

nations.

In

1646

Field

-

Marshal

Wrangel, the

last of

lieutenants,

commanded

Gustavus' the

Swedish army, and worked in connection with Turenne. spired

In-

by the great Frenchman,

their joint

campaigns were quite

out of the ordinary.

Turenne.

Henri de

la

Tour d'Auvergne,

Viscount of Turenne, was born in 1611 in Sedan, son of the

Duke

of Bouillon

and Elizabeth, daughter of William of

He was

a sickly youth, and up to his twelfth year

Orange.

gave no promise of

ability.

But

his father,

who

superin-

tended his education, roused the lad's latent ambition, and he finally excelled in his studies. estant.

He was

educated a Prot-

Like Gustavus Adolphus, he was fond of reading

the heroic deeds of Alexander the Great in Quintus Curtius,

and from these romantic pages he imbibed

his early love

of war, then as always the noblest of professions, but then

I

TURENNE'S EARLY TRAINING. more highly considered,

as

it

was more

441

essential,

than

it

is

to-day.

When

twelve years old, his father died, his elder brother

inherited the

and Henri was sent

title,

But soon

Maurice of Orange.

this

much

guardian also died

own

that Henri was thrown on his

to his uncle. Prince

service as a private in 1625, he rose within a year

by distinguished conduct

to a captaincy, and, especially

Herzogenbusch of Prince

in 1629,

at

earned the respect and approbation

Maurice, who then said of him that he would

become a great French

and

Entering the

to develop his extraordinary character.

Dutch

;

contributed

resources

When

leader.

service as colonel,

at the siege of

La

for bravery that he

and

in

nineteen,

he entered the

command

of his regiment,

Motte, in 1634, he so approved himself

was promoted on the spot

marechal

to be

The next year he served imder Cardinal La Valwho went to the aid of the Swedes and, in connection with Duke Bernard, relieved Mainz. On the retreat of the army Turenne was noted for his untiring activity and his de camp.

lette,

intelligence in procuring rations.

In 1636

special request for Turenne's services,

La

and

Vallette

made

at the siege of

Zabern, while Bernard, after two failures, captured the upper town, Turenne stormed and took the lower town and citadel,

doing wonders of courage and receiving a serious wound.

Towards the end Franche Comte

of the

campaign he forced Gallas from

in a rapid, dashing style, defeating his vet-

eran opponent near Jussey, following him up and taking

many siege

prisoners.

When

later Gallas

endeavored to raise the

which Bernard was conducting against

intercepted and drove

him back

Joinville,

Turenne

across the Rhine.

In 1637 Turenne took part in

La

Vallette's

campaign in

Pieardy, and during the rainy season at Landrecies,

when the

trenches were constantly full of water, was again promiJfcut;

AN UNPARALLELED

442

working incessantly himself and en-

in rationing the troojDS,

This solicitude for the welfare

during privation cheerfully.

men was

his

of

through

a trait which distinguished Turenne

Demanding much

life.

good

all his efforts to their

— sometimes

health,

for a

;

all

of the soldiers, he devoted

he was singularly careful of their

own

to his

moment thought

At

SIEGE.

strategic loss

and he never

;

His men were devoted to him.

of self.

the age of twenty-six, for the capture of the castle of

Solre in the Hennegau, and the heroic defense of the fortified

camp

Maubeuge, Turenne was given

at

and as such

general,

in

During the eight months

at the siege of Breisach. siege,

of this

he fought in three combats and three general engage-

ments

;

and a long attack

his energy. fort

his step as lieutenant-

1638 led reinforcements to Bernard

of intermittent fever did not abate

Finally, he stormed

which was a key-point

and captured an isolated

of the investment,

and the

fortress

of Breisach surrendered.

Sent to Lombardy in the spring of 1639, to serve in the

army

Count Harcourt, Turenne covered

of

Chieri,

and fought successfully

La

at

the

of

siege

Next year he

Route.

pursued the enemy, after the siege of Casale, and captured

many

trophies

and

Hereupon he induced Har-

all his train.

court to invest Turin, where Prince

command,

while the citadel

Singularly, General Lleganes

Thus the French

Harcourt.

by the prince Lleganes,

driven court

—a

off

;

of Savoy, he

Thomas

in

now came up and blockaded

force in the citadel

was besieged

by Harcourt, and the

quite unparalleled

situation.

latter

by

Lleganes was

Turenne, though again wounded, victualed Har-

by bringing a large convoy

safely

shortly thereupon Turin surrendered. to Paris,

Savoy was

of

was held by a French garrison.

and during

his absence,

from Pignerol

;

and

Harcourt was called

Turenne captured Moncalvo

and besieged Ivrea, which surrendered

to

Harcourt on his

WHAT TURENNE HAD LEARNED. Prince Thomas

return.

Turenne was appointed

army

in Italy

;

now to the

443

entered the French service

command, under him,

and recognizing the remarkable

of the

qualities of

him with the main To induce the Spaniards to evacuate Piedmont, Turenne made apparent arrangements to transfer ojaerations

the young general, the prince intrusted direction.

to the

duchy of Milan, and

laid siege to Alexandria,

which

he blockaded, so disposing his troops as purposely to leave a gap in his lines.

Through

gap the Spanish general,

this

at

the head of almost the entire garrison of the fortress of Trino,

essayed to relieve Alexandria.

Allowing

this to take place,

Turenne sharply turned on Trino and captured skillful feat of

for

which

arms he was made field-marshal, and

here,

after seventeen years' active apprenticeship, vices

it,

ended

his ser-

under other generals.

Turenne had learned leader,

his trade,

and understood how

was well equipped for a

to distinguish the true

false in military situations.

he owed certain qualities to those under

From

the prince of

and especially how

plans, to maturely consider them, so long as

and then

was possible to carry them

it

whom he

Orange he had learned how

positions, the besieger's art,

from the

In his memoirs he has said that served.

to choose

to

draw up

to alter nothing

out.

From Bernard

he had learned not to be blinded by success nor cast down

by

failure

errors,

;

neither to blame himself nor to forgive his

but to correct these and strive to change

From La

Vallette he

ill

own

fortune.

had learned the importance of keeping

in touch with his soldiers in the field.

From Harcourt he

had learned that matui-e consideration of the problem,

fol-

lowed by unceasing activity and rapid decision, were the surest elements of success in war.

We know more we do

of the detail of Turenne's

of those of Gustavus,

campaigns than

— indeed, we have

the memoirs

TURENNE'S VALUE.

444

of the Frencli marshal,

of the king

we

are dealing with

which the whole

and welfare

ress

— and there

is

civilized

a

immense

difference in

—

issues,

world depended for

on

issues

future prog-

its

Turenne we deal with

in narrating that of

;

marked

In narrating the work

in which they wrought.

the manner

the operations of bodies which occupied a position of less

prominence on the theatre of war, and form a tunity of working on so broad a

few

rivals

;

of his lesser operations deserve the

War

wont to depend as much on smaller

work well done is it

is

as on the labors of the giants

allotted to

expend

their efforts

Like Stonewall Jackson or Sheridan

fields.

soldier with

and many

closest study.

generals

of the oppor-

was yet a

field,

important

less

But Turenne, though deprived

page in history.

war, Turenne, in his early campaigns, of large-sized armies

;

and

;

to

few

on the broadest in our

was not in

own civil command

nor indeed was he often allowed that

complete independence of action which breeds the highest results

;

but whether in

command

No

liant.

command

an army corps or

of

an army, he was always

of

solid, original

better pattern exists in military annals

;

and

in

bril-

no captain

has done more uniformly excellent work. If we were to select

we

the material

which to study the grand, turn. first

It

it

possess of all

is

must

any one

soldier's

campaigns from

the operations of war, from the minor to

perhaps to those of Turenne we might best

be, moreover, borne in

mind that he was the

great soldier to succeed Gustavus, and that as such he

was called on

to create

much

of

what he

did.

Turenne

is

one of the most sagacious, profound of our teachers.

As an independent commander, Turenne began his campaigns towards the close of the Thirty Years' War, 1644 to 1648.

him

His

first

army, as field-marshal, was given over to

in the worst possible condition.

It

was the army of the

upper Rhine, which had been beaten at Tuttlingen, had

lost

PROPORTION OF CAVALRY. the bulk o£

its

together with

all its artillery

officers,

or

six

445

seven thousand prisoners,

and baggage

;

and had made

its

way, with difficulty and in utter disorder, back to Alsatia.

This force, as a mark of confidence, was intrusted by Cardinal Mazarin to Turenne for the purpose of reorganization

but

it

won

Had

was a sad compliment to pay him.

a

name

for exceptional ability, he

he not already

would scarce have

been awarded so onerous a duty. In December, 1643, though not long back from the siege of Trino, less task,

and

had been devastated ters in the

Turenne undertook

invalided,

still

and joined the army

at

use his

own

;

in January, he

went into

his winter-quar-

mountains of Lorraine, and began his labor by

The French government was

salutary and sensible methods. illiberal in

his thank-

Colmar and because Alsatia

moneys, and Turenne was compelled to largely capital

and

credit,

which happily were excellent.

His cavalry became good, but though

his infantry could not

be put on an equal footing, in four months he was able take the

It will be noted, in all the wars of the period

we

are

to

field.

now

upon which

entering, that the cavalry was the principal arm,

ahnost always equal, often superior, in numbers to the infantry,

and

thus, in the line of

battle or in other operations,

occupying a space and a position unduly prominent.

It

was

a final flickering up again of the mediaeval idea of the supe-

mounted men, which Gustavus had proved be erroneous, and to which Frederick, with the wonder-

rior efficiency of

to

ful battalions drilled

by

his father, gave the death-blow at

MoUwitz.

The enemy had

lain

quietly

in

winter - quarters, doing

nothing except to besiege Ueberlingen, which

fell in

May.

Early in the same month Turenne assembled his army in Alsatia, and, crossing the

Rhine near Breisach with a part of

446

RAID ON BLACK FOREST.

The Rhine Country.

his trooiDS,

ing in the

marched toward the sources hills of

of the

Danube.

Hear-

the Black Forest of a body of two thou-

sand raiding Bavarian horse, he hunted

it uj)

;

and attacking

RESISTANCE OF SMALL GARRISONS. it

smartly, beat

and captured many

it

The

dred men.

rest retired

had captured Hohentwiel.

This the

of

and four hun-

on the Bavarian army, which

heightened the

spirits

officers

447

foray instructed and

little

French

army, which then

returned to Lorraine, and enabled Turenne to gauge

its

quality.

The enemy had number

enlisting a lingen,

rested

in

good winter-quarters, and by

French prisoners taken

of the

had materially increased

their strength.

of July Freiburg in the Breisgau

varian field-marshal, Mercy,

through the Black Forest. to eight

at Tutt-

In the month

was blockaded by the Ba-

who had marched on

the place

The garrison had been

increased

hundred men, which then was beyond the usual

Artillery at that time was not powerful,

works was greater,

them was

so.

— or

and the

size.

belief in

rather the disinclination to attack

In the siege of a place, the inhabitants were

apt to serve on the walls as well as the garrison

;

and many

defenses of towns in which even big breaches had been

were long and gallant in the extreme.

The smallness

made

of the

garrisons of important places, and the stanch resistance of

which they were capable, Freiburg section of

lies at

country

the foot of the mountains of that rugged

known

where they inclose the of a crescent.

strike us to-day with wonder.

as the

Black Forest, at a place

alluvial plain of the

Rhine in the form

This inclosed level has high and inaccessible

rocks on the right as you come from Breisach, and at that

day had a wooded swamp on the

left

;

it

was apf)roachable

from the Rhine by only a single road through a ran several miles between the

hills,

defile

which

and might be

easily

defended.

Turenne had a short

five

thousand foot and the same num-

ber of horse, with twenty guns. at

Breisach, and

He

again crossed the Rhine

moved on Freiburg, hoping

to

surprise

DISGRACEFUL RETREAT.

448

Mercy and

The enemy had

to raise the blockade.

large foraging party,

sent out a

and did not learn of the approach of

the French until the latter

came within

six miles of them,

when, recalling his foragers, Mercy prepared for action.

Turenne reconnoitred the enemy's occupy a

hill

near

j)osition,

and sought

Uf haufen which commanded

it

;

to

but the

infantry sent forward proved inefficient, and, owing to the

cowardice of two color-bearers, got panic-stricken and

back

in disorder

from the

hill,

which

at the

fell

moment was held

Freiburg.

by only a picket

The enemy

of twenty men.

at once rein-

forced the picket, but did not follow the French.

remained on the

combat having

fell

field

out to his advantage

failed, the

Turenne

some time, during which a cavalry ;

but his plan of a surprise

dominant force of the enemy induced him

to retire after these slight

engagements, and Freiburg surren-

dered to Mercy, being, however, allowed the honors of war. This failure was perhaps

less the fault of

Turenne than of

the miserable condition of his troops, especially the infantry.

NAPOLEON'S CRITICISM.

And

yet

tliis

same infantry,

stood decimation quailed. tion,

as

we

449

shall see, shortly after

under which even veterans might have

Napoleon casts a slur at Turenne for

which was, indeed, rather

pitiable,

this opera-

and suggests that he

should have taken up a strong position and gone into camp, so as to

annoy the enemy.

But Turenne probably saw

after

the panic that he could not count on his foot to serve

and preferred

well at this juncture,

to

harden

manoeuvres before encountering larger forces.

down

opposite an

ity.

The news

it

of the backset

by minor

Merely

enemy he could not attack was

him

to sit

of no util-

having reached Versailles, he

was, morever, ordered by the court to suspend operations until he could be reinforced

the Great Conde, of Rocroy,

by the duke of Enghien,

— who had leaped

and despite

his

into

—

later

fame by the victory

youth was deemed able to accom-

plish all things.

French Halberdiers, (15th Century.)

XXXV. CONDE AT ROCROY. MAY BoKN

Cond^ distinguished himself

in 1621,

siege of Arras,

command

and

19, 1643.

in his nineteenth year at the

his royal connections rapidly

advanced him.

by the Spaniards under Marshal Melos, and attacked the enemy difficulties.

With

meanwhile broken up the French

left,

pletely around the Spanish army,

The Spanish

Cond^ rode with

his cavalry

thus dispersed both cavalry wings of the Spaniards.

work

once

of a

young commander,

made Cond^

Louis

But

was dearly bought and

this

was a doubly famous

marked left,

and

right having

column com-

and took the successful enemy

resisted so stanchly that the victory

the

despite

he destroyed the Spanish

his right -wing of cavalry

turned in on the infantry centre under Fuentes.

He

In 1643, in

of the northern frontier of France, he advanced to Rocroy, besieged

in the rear.

the centre of foot

As

at grave risk.

victory

;

and

it

at

the national hero.

of Bourbon,

duke

of Enghien, and,

on

his father's

He

death, prince of Conde, was born September 8, 1621.

was

and

early,

all

through

life,

noted for diligent application to literature

as

and

man

a

broad

of

ability.

himself

in

and ranked

arts,

culture

fine

He

and

distinguished

war as early as

his

nineteenth year, at the siege of

Arras

;

and two years

later,

the campaign of Roussillon,

commendation for ery.

Cond^ at Rocroy.

skill

in

won

and brav-

His royal connections

yield-

ed him exceptional opportunities,

and

in

1643 he was given charge

of the defense of the northern frontier of France.

ADVANCE UNOPPOSED. The preceding camijaign here had been army had been destroyed

disastrous

at Honnecourt,

Low

Melos, governor-general of the the head of a splendid

army

duke

until 1646,

thousand were horse, I'Hopital side to

stood at

lie at his feet.

him, though he remained

was able

— and

and Gassion.

who

Countries,

to concentrate forces

twenty-three thousand men,

to

a French

of twenty-seven thousand men,

will continue to call

Enghien

of

amounting

;

and Field-Marshal

already imagined Picardy and ChamiDagne to

Conde, as we

451

—

which seven

of

had under him Marshals de

The former had been placed

which he was, however, unable

Melos had opened

full of forests,

to do.

woods and marshes,

Melos had occupied

all

where the

was unap-

it

the avenues,

and had

Conde

bodies of scouts patrolling the country on every side.

had a strong

enemy was

to-day

it is

side,

In a military sense

less extensive.

proachable.

—

— and was aj)proachable only through long and

narrow paths, except from the Champagne

woods were

The town lay

his trenches before Rocroy.

in a plain then covered with

mined

at his

check any possible excess of youthful ardor, a thing

He

instinct for battle.

the

way

felt that to

destroy the

to secure the safety of France

to relieve Rocroy,

;

even at the risk of fighting

he deter;

and

in

order to reach the three or four miles wide plain near the city,

where alone there was room

to manoeuvre, at the

head of

a body of cavalry, suitably sustained by foot, he forced his

way through

the woods early on

May

18, took j)OSsession of a

height at the outlet to cover his columns, and successfully

debouched into the open.

Melos did not oppose

his passage

because he himself desired battle, was not averse to winning

a Aactory when the enemy had no chance of retreat, and believed the French ally was.

He was

army

to

be much smaller than

well seconded

it

actu-

by Field-Marshal Fuentes,

a veteran of experience and proven courage.

IMITATION OF GUSTAVUS.

452

Concle had fully matured his plans the day before, had issued exact instructions, and the troops all filed into line in

He

the prescribed order.

himself

commanded

the right with

Gassion as his second; de I'Hopital commanded the

left;

d'Espenant was at the head of the foot (corps de hataille) in

Battle of Rocroy.

the centre

;

and there was a reserve under Marshal

Between each two squadrons was a body

manded musketeers," ful at Breitenfeld

— Gustavus' old

and

Liitzen.

of

fifty

Sirot.

" com-

disposition, so success-

Dragoons and

light cavalry

were on either flank, and the baggage had been sent to

Aubenton. Melos, who harbored no doubt that with his veteran army

SLOW MARSHALING.

453

he could beat the unseasoned French troops of his young and inexperienced opponent, drew up his army, but with the sensible belief that on the

who

lay a day's

march

to the rear, to

his six thousand men.

that on which of

day of battle you should have

man, he sent word to General Beck,

in line every available

Conde had marshaled

Albuquerque commanded the

right.

come up rapidly with

Melos' line occupied a height facing his army.

left,

The duke

and he himself the

Count Fuentes, whom many years of war had crippled

so that he could not ride, like Wallenstein at Liitzen, led

the famous Spanish infantry from a

To marshal an army affair of time

;

and

it

litter.

was, in the seventeenth century, an

was

six o'clock in the evening before

the rival generals were ready to join issue, though an

had been going on

lery duel

of the French,

who

all

lost three

artil-

day, rather to the disadvantage

hundred men

for the Spanish

;

Even though late, Conde was about to attack, and, accompanied by de I'Hopital, was busy with his final dispositions, when La Ferte, inspired by the foolish idea of making a brilliant coup and of throwing a force into batteries

were the

Rocroy,

left his post in the line at

cavalry,

and enabled Melos, who had a keen military

better.

sharply advance his boldly

in,

ture his

;

the

own

the head of the left wing

Had

right.

eye, to

the Spaniard pushed

day would have been beyond a peradven-

but he did not do so

;

La

Ferte was recalled,

and the gap he had made was patched up. gone, however, and

Conde reluctantly put

Daylight had

off his attack to

the

morrow.

Between the two armies lay lower land, and underbrush opposite the Spanish thousand musketeers, hoping to

left,

fall

on Conde's flank when

he should lead out his right wing of cavalry got wind of the ambush, and his

first

here, in the

Melos had hidden a

;

but Conde had

act in the

morning

twi-

''NOT LOST, SIRS!"

454 was

light

men and

on these

to fall

them

cut

which he sent Gassion forward and well first line

of his cavalry to attack

to pieces

after

;

to the right with the

Albuquerque

in flank, while

he himself with the remainder should attack in front.

back of

line of retreat lay

his right,

and

this

His

he must protect

Surprised at the manoeuvre, Albuquerque

at all hazards.

nevertheless detached eight squadrons against Gassion, and

prepared to receive Conde with a firm charge was too fiery

Conde drove

;

the fury of hot-headed youth

impulse of the prince of the blood

was ridden down and suit,

in

fled

upon the enemy with

horsemen followed the

his

;

But the French

foot.

in

;

Albuquerque's cavalry

and Conde sent Gassion

;

in j)ur-

while he himself turned in on the flank of Melos' infantry,

which he wrought fearful carnage among the Germans,

Walloons and was beyond

Not

cavahy out

at too fast a

winded and

in

gait, so that it

some disorder

counter-charge and drove

and Melos pursued

pieces,

the French right the success

Victory seemed near at hand.

Marshal de I'Hopital had started

so on the left.

his, fell

On

Italians.

all expectation.

his

it

Melos met

;

back

;

by a sharp

it

de I'Hopital was wounded,

advantage just as Conde had done

on the flank of part of the French infantry, cut captured

La

his

reached the enemy

Ferte and

all

it

to

and actually

his guns,

The enemy had purchased a promise of with equal ease as Conde. The case looked desperate.

reached the reserve. victory

The merest

who

accident would turn the scale either way.

was urged by many

led the reserve,

retire, for the battle

was

lost, said they.

of the

"

Not

Sirot and his companions have not yet fought

brave

officer,

and manfully held

chance on either

his ground.

!

Sirot,

runaways to

lost, sirs

;

for

" replied the

It

was an even

side.

But Conde, learning of the what only the true

disaster to his

own

left,

now did

instinct of war, the clear soldier's eye

and

A SUPERB GALLOP. heart, could dictate.

If

455

he did not win with the squadrons he

personally led, he saw that the battle was lost

;

and with the

energy of a Coenus or a Hasdrubal he spurred on, and

back of the Spanish

foot,

round

to the

still

on,

enemy's right, out to

the front, took Melos' victorious cavalry in the rear, sent whirling back in the wake of the fugitives of the

tured

La

it

recap-

left,

Ferte and the guns, and took every one of the

Spanish batteries on that flank.

Few

been made

Gassion ably seconded his

chief field

by any squadrons.

by completing the

rout,

such superb rides have

and nothing remained on the

except the splendid old Spanish infantry, which, like

Father Tilly's Walloons at Breitenfeld, refused to decamp. It

his

had been confronted by d'Espenant, who, however, with newer battalions, had not dared to come hand

with the veterans. their guns,

and

to

hand

These, grouped with teeth set around

in the mid^t of panic

and

disaster, resolved to

pluck victory from defeat, or to die where they stood.

Who

knew what so brave a body might yet accomplish ? Beck was near at hand with six thousand fresh troops, dreaded factor in the uncertain problem.

—a

Detaching gallant

Gassion with his handful of cavalry to hold him in check at every hazard, Conde himself prepared to beat resistance

of

the

Spanish battalions.

taken his place in line after having of the Spanish centre

He

down

the stern

had now again

made an

entire circuit

and having destroyed both

its

wings.

Reassembling his squadrons, with the superb battle decision

which always characterized him, and inspiring them with

his

own undaunted courage, he drove them home upon the Spanish foot. But he had not counted on what these men could Masking his guns do, nor on the iron will of old Fuentes. by a thin

line of foot,

squadrons were within batteries,

and reserving fifty paces,

his fire until the

French

the veteran uncovered his

and opened upon the approaching horsemen

his

456

.1

BATH OF BLOOD

eighteen pieces charged with grape, while the line gave so

withering a volley that even Conde's men, flushed with victory and their prince's ardor, could not face the hail, but fell

back

squadrons, he might

still

Fuentes possessed but a few

have wrested a victory from the

Not a Spanish sabre was on the

French.

had

Had

in grave disorder.

Every man

field.

fled.

A

second time the prince headed his horse, a second time

A

he was thrown back.

third charge was no

Fuentes, from his

the crisis was doubtful.

more successful

litter,

could watch

with grim satisfaction his youthful antagonist breaking his

on the Spanish square as the waves break on the rock.

lines

He

had not

But

lost yet.

at this

moment

Conde changed

the reserve under

came up.

Sirot

his tactics to a less reckless one, as he should

have sooner done

:

with the gendarmes he rode round the

flanks of the Spanish foot,

and put

his infantry in in front.

Fuentes saw himself surrounded by superior numbers on

To

The day was

This was decisive.

sides.

save a remnant of his men, the old Spaniard

attempt to surrender

;

all

irretrievably gone.

made an

but the French either understood not

or could not be restrained, and a frightful butchery ensued.

The

battle of

Rocroy ended

in a bath of blood

learning that there was no more Spanish

came

to a right-about

and precipitately

army

;

and Beck,

left to rescue,

retired, leaving be-

hind some guns.

The Spanish

losses

were immense.

Out

of eighteen thou-

sand foot, nine thousand are said to have been killed where they stood, and seven thousand were taken, with three hundred flags and

The French

losses are stated at

only two thousand killed and wounded. it

the guns,

Splendid Fuentes

died where he had fought.

correct,

all

immense booty.

If the figures are

was but a modern sample of the butchery usual

in

THE HERO OF FRANCE. "

ancient warfare.

How many

are

a Spanish officer after the battle. prisoners,

— they are

all

" !

457

you?" asked a French "

of

Count the dead and the

was the answer.

After this magnificent victory, in which Conde exhibited singular courage battle

-

captain,

and energy, and proved himself a born

he took Diedenhofen (Thionville) on the

Moselle and returned to Paris, where he was the hero of the hour.

His princely blood, coupled

ability,

made

to

marked courage and

too rare a combination to be overlooked.

French Musketeer.

(1647.)

XXXVI. FREIBURG. AUGUST, Aftkr

On

mand.

hj a long

circuit

around his

made on

The

left flank.

and the French were divided attack was

men

;

fighting

days after, a second and rather miscalculated

new works and was

retired definitively.

the Rhine, taking Speyer,

Cond^ returned

To

;

and again

it

;

to France,

was jealous

of the other

;

but

;

to Philips-

upon which Turenne moved

Worms, Mainz and other towns; and and Turenne resumed

The two French generals were warm

Philipsburg. neither

equally sanguinary

The French commander then marched

burg, and after a handsome siege eairtured

Landau.

Turenne

was prolonged and bloody,

After four days a turning manoeuvre was attempted

Mercy withdrew.

down

him and take com-

in his works,

but Mercy withdrew to another position, and

Two

the

believed equal to any

to reinforce

two generals attacked Mercy

his arrival the

allowed them to reunite.

Mercy

who was

Turenne's failure at Freiburg, Cond^,

emergency, was sent with ten thousand

1644.

his

friends throughout life

each was active in his colleague's

return to Turenne's operations.

later

position at

interests.

Shortly after his

fail-

ure at Freiburg, Conde crossed the Rhine at Breisach with his

in

army

of ten thousand

He

command.

men and Marshal Grammont

had marched

second

from the Moselle, one hun-

dred and eighty miles in thirteen days, then a rapid progress.

Conde joined Turenne, August had taken up

fifteen or

2, at

camp which

the

the latter

twenty miles from Breisach, and, as

command of the combined forces, he moved forward to Freiburg. Mercy had fortified the height which Turenne had tried to seize some weeks before, and now held superior taking

it

in force.

He had

eight thousand foot

horse, excellent troops, discipline

and had added

had given the regiments

their position.

The

hill

and seven thousand

to the strength

all

which

that art could do for

he occupied was strongly intrenched

UNWISE DIVISION OF FORCES.

459

with a redoubt on the right and a line of works and abatis

and with

the

other, he

camp

swamp on one

side

The main

quite shut out approach to the city.

lay in the rear of the intrenched

noissance was at once undertaken to the enemy's position,

and

it

;

and the mountains on the

hill.

A careful recon-

by Conde and Turenne up

was determined that the chief

should advance against the height in front while, mider cover of his sharp demonstration,

through the woods and in

Turenne should make

defiles

round Mercy's

his

way

left flank,

push

The main

on the plain, and thus take him in reverse.

Freiburg Battles.

attack was set for five o'clock in the afternoon of August 3, so as to give his

way by

Turenne what was deemed ample time

the long and difficult circuit mentioned.

to

make It

was

known that the enemy had made the route almost impassable by an intrenchment at the outlet of the defile, and by trees felled across the jjath. The plan was made in the not then

dark.

If

Mercy's

Conde or Turenne could break through or turn

line,

they could reach the Fi-eiburg plain

;

but by no

other means could this be done from the direction on which

they were operating.

Their division was extra hazardous,

even on the assumption that Mercy would keep to his works.

A GALLANT ASSAULT.

460

Conde had

six

thousand foot and three to four thousand

and among

horse,

were Marshal Grammont

his lieutenants

and Generals d'Espenant and Marsin. thousand men, half horse, half

At 5

foot.

Conde launched

M.

P.

Turenne had ten

his

men

to the attack, there

him and

having- been no special signal agreed on between

Turenne.

was held

It

in reserve on the flanks, to protect

possible.

The

common on

so

was work for infantry only, and the cavalry it

so far as

of those vine-terraced slopes,

Up

the Rhine.

and took the

order,

was one

hill

the troops went in gallant

it

line of abatis

;

but their

loss

was consid-

erable, and they paused at the foot of the works, and began

and

to spread in their uncertainty to right shelter. This pause looked

generalissimo in the face to hesitate.

;

search of

and there was too much

Dismounting, with

and they dashed up the

left in

Failure stared the young

critical.

all his

slope on foot,

the troops for a fresh assault.

No

generals and

at stake staff,

he

and personally headed

nation responds to gal-

lantry of this sort quicker than the French; the battalions

again knit ranks, took fresh heart, and poured over the

intrenchments like a flood. the three thousand Bavarians

The

hill

who had

was won, and out of so bravely defended

a bare hundred escaped the ensuing massacre.

it,

The

situation

was

still

Not knowing the ground,

desperate.

Conde feared a night attack by Mercy with fresh troops on his

own men, who were

the fort he had taken

up the

slopes,

the morning.

;

unsettled

by

victory.

He

occupied

with immense exertion got his cavalry

and there waited anxiously for Turenne and

Had

he known the situation, he might have

taken the enemy who lay in front of Turenne in reverse

but the uncertainty of darkness precluded any further

Turenne had started

much

at daylight,

had made

his

action.

way with

exertion for sixteen or eighteen miles through the rug-

MERCY WITHDRAWS. ged ground defile

much

Unable

where

to

him behind

their stout line

open ground

to get his cavalry out into

could deploy to suj)port him, he was baffled.

it

as the best

Both

of the

larger force of the Bavarians than

had faced Conde held head of works.

mouth

to within a short distance of the

but here a

;

461

way out

lines stood in close fighting contact,

forty paces,

— and

But

of a desperate position, he boldly attacked.

— the reports say

the battle lasted fiercely through the late

afternoon and evening, and scarcely ceased at night.

French troops behaved dred

men without

well,

At

this spot the

hmidred men.

some

since before a picket of twenty

phenomenon constantly occurring

curious.

In

Bavarians

in war,

at

hun-

men,

and always

two thousand

lost

fact, the casualties of

stated

authorities

Each army was

The

loss of fifteen

These were the same men who

flinching.

had decamped not long

—a

and stood a

five

both sides are by

an aggregate of

six

thousand.

severely punished.

Haply, the action of Mercy cut the knot of the French leaders' difficidty.

On

account of his depletion he dreaded

a fresh battle under the same conditions night, lest between the prince

;

and during the

and the marshal he should

not be able to hold himself on the lower ground and should suffer a

tion

more marked

defeat,

he withdrew to a new posi-

back of the old one, leaning

horse, on

which was of

his right,

the outworks of Freiburg.

Turenue and Conde

were able to join hands and once more breathe situation

had been a bad one, but Mercy's

freely.

retiring

Their

had saved

them harmless. Turenne advised an attack on the to

make one on

4th, but

Conde declined

the score of the exhaustion of the troops.

Mercy threw up stronger than the

fresh works. first

His position was

one, but cramped.

His

if

possible

artillery, sus-

tained by four thousand foot, was posted so as to sweep the

PARTIAL ATTACKS.

462 approaches of the

and he was able

hill,

had erected in the

late

the right to

Turenne

make room

and with

logs,

The succeeding day, August contested battle.

5,

felt

abatis.

brought on another hotly

enemy

the

Conde on

for

he

His front he covered with

siege.

works constructed of rough

to utilize the lines

early,

his left,

troops were got into touch with the enemy.

edging to

and the

latter's

During a

lidl in

when the two French commanders

the opening of the fighting,

were reconnoitring with a view to a combined assault on the Bavarian

lines,

and had ordered that no manceuvres should

be undertaken in their absence, the restless commander of Conde's French infantry of the ried

away by imprudent

front that seemed weakly held

who understood

padel,

left, also

tial

met

General d'Espenant, car-

;

work

in his

seeing which, General Tau-

that he was to follow the lead of the

threw forward his

attacks were

left,

ardor, advanced on a

in force,

first line

from the

and brought on a

Both

right.

series of par-

engagements quite lacking ensemble; the French bat-

talions lost heart

and

fell

back from work which, well inau-

gurated, they would have cheerfully done

was

to disturb the tactical plans of the

and

to bring about ,

an indecisive

result.

heavy

losses

and the

result

French commanders,

on both

Turenne confesses

had the enemy known the French

;

sides,

followed by

memoirs

that,

situation, they could

have

in his

destroyed the army, as the losses during the day had been

between two and three thousand men in the wasteful ing.

had

But the Bavarians were lost

in equally

some twelve hundred

killed,

bad and

case, for

his

fight-

Mercy

men were

apparently more demoralized than the French, who had Conde

and Turenne

The

line of

of retreat, of

Abbey

to sustain their flagging zeal.

communications and supply, and now

Mercy was through

in his rear to Villingen.

sole line

the valley of St. Peter's

Conde, being unable to see

MERCY RETIRES FOR

GOOD.

463

success in another front attack, on the 9th essayed to cut this line

by a flank march

This march

via Langendenzlingen.

was conducted expertly, but Mercy

at once perceived its pur-

ground was open and revealed the direction of

pose, for the

He

the French columns.

promptly withdrew, and marched

on his base in Wiirtemberg.

Conde and Turenne on the 5th had

If the joint attack of

not been spoiled by the folly of d'Espenant, there was promvictory.

As

had been reduced by nearly

half,

of a

ise

by over

meaux

handsome

five

thousand men, in

French

states the

it

was, the Bavarian

and the French

this three days'

loss in killed

Desor-

work.

and wounded at

thousand men, and the Bavarian at nine thousand.

French had captured

all

army

joint forces

six

But the

Mercy's guns.

The French followed Mercy, but

their

van under Rosen

suffered a check in a gallantly sustained cavalry

combat

;

and

the extent of their present gain was the capture of a part of

Mercy's

The country was

train.

pursuit profitable,

too mountainous to

make a

and lack of victual drove them back

to

Freiburg, as well as the fact that they were not equipped for

lengthy operations and considered themselves too far from their base, the Rhine. five

hundred men

They concluded, though

had but

it

in garrison, not to lay siege to Freiburg,

whose possession Conde thought would bring no marked advantage, and would scarcely save the army from the necessity of retiring to Alsatia

and Lorraine

to winter.

Conde, whose ideas were always broad, deemed

it

wiser to

turn downstream on Philipsburg, to capture which fortress

would

result in

commanding a

large section of country on

the right bank of the Rhine, on which the readily subsist one, but the to

head him

till

spring.

The

siege

army might more

would be a

enemy could not now reach the place off

;

difficult

in season

Strasburg would furnish victual by boats

MARCH ON

464

down the

river

;

and in

PHILIPSBURG.

this city

he eoukl, on his own

borrow money for the paymasters. try

was the main objection

Lack

to the plan.

Batteries were prepared in Breisach

Rhine on pontoons, with as could be gathered.

credit,

of sufficient infan-

much

and

floated

down

Cavalry parties were sent out to

places likely to offer opposition

the

material and food as

on the march

;

seize

and the van

Philipsburg-.

under Kosen followed.

On August

16 the army broke up,

with Turenne in the lead, and advanced valley to Philipsburg,

Turenne

down

the Rhine

where they arrived August 25, and

at once blockaded

the place.

The garrison was

probably under a thousand men. Philipsburg was one of the most important places on the

Rhine, and lay in a plain surrounded by woods and marshes. It

had only earthwork defenses, but these were very strong,

mounted with one hundred guns, and the water from the

river

PHILIPSBURG SURRENDERS. flowed into wide and deep ditches. side,

south, —

— the

manded

the river.

had a

it

Approachable on but one which

fort

and Conde saw the

it,

fairly well

com-

had been acquired by France

Philipsburg-

from the Swedes, who had captured retaken

465

but the emperor had

it,

strategic advantage of its

possession.

In order to control the

was

first

vallation

redoubt there situated

river, the

captured by Turenne in a night attack.

and circumvallation

approaches were made,

were then opened.

lines

by Grammont

one

Contra-

Turenne, on the 7th of September

;

and

Two

one by

next day a sortie was

driven back, and a few days later an attempt to relieve the

The approaches were

place was successfully resisted.

vigor-

ously j)ushed, and the commander. Colonel Bamberg, despair-

ing of holding out, and anxious to save the large stores and treasury for the emperor, finally accepted terms, and Philijjsburg surrendered

During the

September 12.

siege, the

French sent out a small detachment, which took Germersheim and occupied Speyer. In his memoirs Turenne complains that the French infantry

had

heart in

lost

behaved well of discipline

at times, ;

and

ill

They had

at times, proving a certain lack

and yet they had shown exceptional

stand hammering, requisite of

the Freiburg campaign.

— not

the

heavy percentage of men

o\\\j,

but the most essential

They had

the soldier. ;

ability to

lost

an exceptionally

and those who served through our

1864 campaign in Virginia

will

remember that the extreme

depletion of a rapid succession of battles will sometimes react

on even the best of troops.

The day

after the

surrender Turenne, under instructions

from Conde, crossed the Rhine with

man

cavalry and a chosen body of

his

five

two thousand Ger-

hundred musketeers,

and learning that a Spanish column was on the march

to

/

A GAINFUL CAMPAIGN.

466

Frankenthal, he sent a suitable detachment, which attacked this

body, captured five hundred, and dispersed or killed the

rest.

to

The marshal then moved

Worms and

his infantry

on boats down

Opj)enheim, of which he took the former out

of hand, while

the latter fell to Rosen's

cavalry

disem-

;

barked, and advanced by forced marches without baggage to

Mainz, which was at the moment disgarnished of troops.

This important

city,

whose possession secured the highway

between France and her

ally Hesse,

though a Bavarian dra-

goon force under Colonel Wolf sought

to relieve

some negotiations surrendered, on a threat

Wolf

surrender was refused or

to

it,

storm

after it

if

Conde shortly

admitted.

put in an appearance with the army, and took possession.

The

elector

of

Mainz had gone

French occupied the whole Creuznach, which held out.

Frankfort

Small forces were

Oppenheim and Worms, and to Philipsburg.

to

;

and the

vicinity, except only the castle of

Mainz,

left in

the French generals returned

After reducing Creuznach, Turenne under-

took the siege of Landau, where the French forces had just lost their

commander, and on September

only a few days, the place

19, with a delay of

fell.

After the capture of a few more smaller fortresses (Neustadt,

Mannheim, Bacharach and

others)

Conde withdrew

to

France by way of Kaiserslautern and Metz, and Turenne remained at Philipsburg, with a much reduced

campaign had eventuated

force.

The

in decided gain.

Conde and Turenne were worthy

of each other.

Except

for a later temporary estrangement during the wars of the

Fronde, they remained firm friends through

life,

neither jeal-

ous of the other's accomplishment or ability, and able when together to work in perfect accord.

Conde, who in these

early campaigns

knew how to utilize to his own advantage,

was

his superior in rank,

Turenne's experience, energy and

skill

GENEROUS EN. FRIENDS. but he never begrudged

was

liis

lieutenant the appreciation which

his just due, nor denied

the victories

won by

our own

firm, as civil

him

his share of the

And

their joint efforts.

was the case with many of the generals

war.

As

fail to see

how

largely

Turenne contributed

justice requires, as in the case of

— though these

;

yet no one

to this

generals were equal in

and

battles of

command,

mand, our thoughts the credit of

which the glory

Though Lee was

instinctively

the flank

and

— that we

is

There

universally

yielded rather to the lieutenant than to the captain.

was Chancellorsville.

;

Marlborough and Eugene,

should award to each his good half of the glory won. are campaigns

in

general in command, Conde was of

course entitled to the teclinical credit of success

can

honor in

while opposed

the wars of the Fronde, their friendship

to each other in

remained

467

award

in

Such

supreme com-

to Stonewall

Jackson

march and attack which were the

beginning of the end in that, from the Confederate aspect, superb campaign.

It

was so in some of the campaigns of

Turenne and Conde.

French Infantry Soldier. (1660.)

/

/

XXXVII. MERGENTHEIM. MAY Before going

into winter-quarters,

5,

1645.

Turenne once more crossed the Rhine

but as he found Mercy quiet on the Neckar, he undertook nothing.

;

Next

spring (1645) he again put over his army, and turning Mercy's position by the left,

him

cut

off

by

But he sians

retired to Dinkelsbiihl

;

Turenne followed

Here, for ease of victualing, he spread out his forces over

too wide an area

ensuing,

Mercy

from Swabia.

to Mergentheim. ;

Mercy and Werth moved sharply on him, and

his troops

in the battle

behaving badly, Turenne was defeated with heavy

loss.

where he was joined by ten thousand Hes-

skillfully retired to Hesse,

and Swedes, and again immediately advanced on the enemy, who was

besieging Kirchhain.

command sand men. position,

Cond^ with eight thousand men now came up, and took

The Swedes

of the joint army.

retired, leaving

him seventeen thou-

Crossing the Neckar, the French at Heilbronn turned the Bavarians'

who

retired to

Dinkelsbiihl.

Feuchtwangen, and after a few days' manoeuvring to

Following them up, the French generals forced them back to

Allerheim, where they determined to attack them.

Shortly

after

Conde's departure, Turenne ascertained

that, after repairing his losses,

Mercy had

left

Wiirtemberg,

and was marching on Heidelberg and Mannheim. pected that

away

to

the

Bavarian general designed to entice

cover Speyer,

Worms and

ingly left two thousand

men

sus-

him

Mainz, in order mean-

while to seize Philipsburg by a couj) de main.

(?amp,

He

He

accord-

near this fortress in an intrenched

threw a bridge, and crossed the Rhine near Speyer

with his cavalry and a few musketeers, sent small detach-

ments to

Worms and

tect all four places.

as

it

cies.

was of

Mainz, and took It

Gustavus,

full precaution to pro-

was a common habit of Turenne, to provide

for remote contingen-

Mercy, however, had no such far-reaching intention

;

he

HANDSOME MANCEUVRE.

A

469

Mannheim, and

remained quiet between Heidelberg and

Turenne assumed that for want of provision he preferred not

He

to cross the Rhine.

therefore sent the bidk of his troops

to Lorraine into winter-quarters, keeping but a few cavalry

regiments

near the Rhine, and these he

The two thousand

towns.

what remained

of the foot

billeted

Turenne marched

several

the

to Alsatia.

Soon afterwards Turenne heard that the duke had passed the Moselle with

in

foot remained at Philipsburg

six

of Lorraine

thousand men, had captured

and Simmern among them, and

places, Castellaun

Hurriedly marching with

was investing Bacharach.

five

hundred horse on Mainz and Bingen, he spread the rumor that this was but the van of the entire army, which in truth

he made arrangements to mobilize, and forced the duke back.

Then taking the

castle of

Creuznach, which had held out in

the last siege, he definitely retired, in December, 1644, into

bank

winter-quarters along the left

quarters in Speyer.

of the Rhine, with head-

The year had been

full of activity,

and

fairly successful.

In early April of 1645 Turenne again entered the with six thousand

foot, five

thousand horse and

fifteen guns,

crossed the Rhine on a bridge of boats at Speyer,

on Pforzheim. pate Mercy,

He hoped

who

in

whose troops were yet spread

With

all

his cavalry alone,

antici-

Neckar with a force which

to six or seven

ing reinforcements to the imperial

ments.

and moved

opening the campaign to

lay beyond the

had been diminished

field

thousand

men by

army

Bohemia, and

in

send-

over the country in canton-

and leaving

his foot to fol-

low on by rapid marches, Turenne crossed the Neckar near

Marbach, April 16, through a ford which was not watched

by the enemy, and marched along the right bank past Heilbronn

to

Schwiibisch-Hall, in order to throw Mercy,

had intended

to

move southward

into

who

Swabia, back in a

ITS SUCCESS.

470 northerly direction.

manoeuvre

and

;

had cut him

Danube

This was a neat

and well-executed

now

to follow out his plan,

off,

and recover

his

communications with the

Mercy was obliged

country,

Turenne

that

move

at once to

easterly,

towards Dinkelsbiihl and Feuchtwangen, by a considerable circuit.

At one moment during

his

advance with

Turenne feared that Mercy would

umn, which was

far in the rear

and turned back towards a chance to

slip

by him

attack the column of foot.

and separated from the horse,

he did not, however, venture to

But

for thus retracing his steps,

Turenne would have earned the chance his horse,

and

col-

This afforded watchful Mercy

it.

;

cavalry

his

on his infantry

fall

to follow

Mercy with

to give his rear-guard a hearty slap

but

;

through his career he was noted for scrupulous care

;

all

and

while this in the long run served him admirably, at times looks like over-caution.

it

In this case Mercy gained abundant

leisure to escape.

Turenne had accomplished any danger

and had warded

his object,

of the enemy's invasion of Alsatia

;

off

but as Mercy

had got away from him without a blow, Turenne assembled all his forces at

Hall, and

moved north on Mergentheim

(or

Marienthal) on the Tauber, so as to have in his rear and

open

to

him the

allied

to hope that before

from there

;

He had good

Hessian country.

summer he should

reason

receive reinforcements

on the arrival of which he counted on pushing

into the heart of

Germany, a thing which

did not feel strong enough to attempt.

at the

Near

moment he

this

town he

put the foot and artillery into camp.

By

his able turning

manoeuvre he had hustled the enemy

out of a position threatening to France, and then reestablished himself by a change of base where he could rely either upon his holdings in Alsatia or

on his Hessian

allies.

The

entire

A SURPRISE. operation was skillful

;

in

it

we

see a

471

gleam of the purposeful

manoeuvring of the future.

From Mergentheim Turenne

sent General

Rosen with four

or five cavalry regiments as an outpost up the Tauber towards

Rothemburg, and quartered the convenience of foraging, in rear.

rest of his cavalry, for greater

towns two or three hours in the

This was a manifest error, for the enemy was not far

distant,

was

good heart and ably

in

led,

and Turenne knew

Operation of Mergentheim.

nothing of his intentions centrated.

In

effect,

;

he ought to have kept well con-

within a day or

so,

he learned that the

Bavarians had broken up at Feuchtwangen, and were moving

on him at Mergentheim. parties out,

Rosen had not had enough scouting

and the information preceded the enemy's van

but a few hours.

Immediately ordering Rosen back

to a position

where he

could be sustained, Turenne called in his outlying cavalry parties,

and instructed Rosen

to take position in rear of a

FIGHTING IN THE WOODS.

472

wood

lay some distance in front of Mergentheim, at

wliicli

wliicli obstacle

and

he could conveniently assemble

all his forces,

He

desirable retire to a better point for battle.

if

should,

observes Napoleon, have ordered his forces to assemble at

Mergentheim, which was behind the Tauber and nearer for all

the outlying regiments, certainly at a point further behind

But

the outposts than the one he chose.

to

make matters

worse, by misunderstanding his orders, Rosen took position in front of the

wood, where, as alleged by Turenne, he could

neither hold himself, nor easily retreat, nor be readily supported,

and where the enemy,

if

he attacked him, was sure to

bring on an engagement on unfavorable ground.

This was

Mercy advanced on him, and Turenne

in fact what occurred.

found himself compelled to sustain his lieutenant under awk-

ward

conditions.

Our own

habit of frequently fighting in the woods during

the civil

war breeds among American

soldiers a belief that a

forest

not so marked an obstacle as

it is

is

ered in Europe. times, a

But

wood even

free

from the underbrush

forest

was considered a very serious post

foot

and so

;

was

difficult

wont

to be consid-

Turenne's days, and in fact at

in

it

deemed

of the

to attack,

to get troops

all

American if

held by

through an

open wood in good order, that a few squadrons posted beyond it

were believed to be able

troops emerging from rally

much

to

it.

break up the organization of

to

The nature

do with the matter

;

of the

wood had natu-

but on such a terrain as

our " Wilderness," no European army would for a think of manoeuvring. plain

;

and

posed to

it

fall

They

are too

to the

open

was under such conditions that Turenne pro-

upon

his

enemy

after

through the wood and was apt to be

The

much used

moment

in

the latter had passed

broken order.

three thousand infantry which had arrived Turenne

placed on the right of the cavalry, equally in the wood, and

THE FRENCH DEMORALIZED. As

in the left wing.

command

of

the Bavarians advanced in two lines, the

Mercy and the

led forward his

own

on the Bavarian

right,

much

disorder.

French infantry

himself took up post

and the horse on the wings, the right under

foot in the centre

in

He

by two other squadrons.

sustained

473

left of

cavalry, fell

and threw

John de Werth, Turenne

upon the horse

it

back on the second

But meanwhile Werth

in the

in first line

wood, and the

latter,

attacked

line

the

which had been

hurried into action

and

felt as if it

had

been surprised, and

was

moreover

poor

in

from

order

having been pushed

through the wood, after but

a single

salvo seemed to lose heart, and, attacked in front

and on both

flanks,

fled,

ing with

it

squadrons

carry-

,^;;;;;2

(±icic±)d3d3i±)i±ii±ii±id3c±icicb cbtbcb

Battle of Neerwinden.

beck, both of which streams unite to the north and form a triangular plateau

five

miles

long.

Here

William

had

camped, between Neerwinden and Romsdorf, and, hearing of

Luxemburg's approach, had the position Impregnable.

fortified his

The

line

lines,

and believed

was convex. Neerwinden

and a small ravine with a quickset hedge from the village to the Geete protected the allied right

;

the centre was covered

FIERCE COMBATS.

664

by somewhat lower land was thrown back en

in its front to

jyotence.^

Romsdorf

and proved

the left

;

useless

in

the

The weakness of the position was that it was a The right was made esjjecially strong, Neer-

battle.

crowded one. winden was

filled

with

One hundred guns

foot,

and Romsdorf was intrenched.

stood in battery along the line.

horse

was in reserve or on the

south

is

left.

The land

to

The the

than the Neerwinden plateau, but

slightly higher

gently descends towards

The beds

it.

of

the brooks are

sixty to eighty feet lower than the rolling hills.

On

the afternoon of July 28

Luxemburg

liam's front with his van of cavalry first

His

duty was to expel the enemy from Landen, which he did,

as to lean his right on

so

arrived in Wil-

and reconnoitred.

it

in the battle

he proposed to of foot.

At

daylight of July 29 the guns opened, and under a severe

fire,

deliver next day,

and here he put forty battalions

They were

the French formed for the attack. in

two

lines of foot with

two

substantially

lines of horse in their rear,

and

cavalry on both flanks in three lines.

The main

attack was opened at 6 A. M. by the French left

The French pushed vigorously

on Neerwinden. village,

but were fiercely met and driven out.

right the fighting was less marked.

On

A second

took the

in,

the French

time

Luxem-

burg assaulted Neerwinden and successfully gained an entrance, but only to be a second time ejected, partly because

the assault on the

Romsdorf was not pushed home,

enemy more

Luxemburg

so as to give

to do.

deserves great credit for not losing courage at

these two failures.

He

prepared for a new assault on Neer-

winden, and as he saw that in anticipation of

it

were disgarnishing their

Neerwinden

left centre

to protect

the allies

with more troops, he directed Marquis Feuquiere to assault the intrenchments on the west of

Romsdorf

in force.

This

CREDIT DUE WILLIAM. was done

in

665

good form, and Feuquiere made a lodgment on

the highest jjart of the ground hekl

by the

allied line,

and

thus took the foot defending Neervvinden in reverse, and in a

determined assault at the same time the duke took Neerwin-

den and held

This was the

it.

;

and had

for the allied cavalry

There had been and was nothing

of the left to put in its work. in its front

moment

been well commanded,

it

it

could have

changed front and hustled the French under Feuquiere back

by a charge on

But

their flank.

this

body

out firing a salvo or drawing a sabre, saw

of cavahy, withto retire to

Lean,

and between the duke and Feuquiere the bulk of the

allied

foot

fit

on the right was driven into the Geete, with a

eighteen thousand

men

killed,

wounded and

loss of

prisoners, one

hundred and four guns and numberless trophies. The French loss

was heavy.

There was no attempt at pursuit

burg was held by from the king

The

;

his orders to

and

finally

mischievous system ingrained in

is

The taking

a remarkable fact,

Luxem-

he sat down to besiege Charleroi.

result of this splendid victory

Louvois.

;

obtain further instructions

all

of Charleroi

and much

these defeats William kept the

was naught, owing to the the French generals by

ended

this

campaign.

It

to his credit, that despite all field.

It

would have been

otherwise had Turenne stood in the place of Luxemburg.

Luxemburg

died in

1695.

accomplished nothing.

Neerwinden

in the

Low

duke

of Savoy,

succeeded him, but

The year which saw

the victory of

Countries added one more victory to

the French arms in Italy. assist the

Villeroi

In 1691 Prince Eugene came to

and the French accomplished

In 1692 the duke raised

his forces to fifty

little.

thousand

and made a raid into the Dauphine, but without much

men

result.

In 1693, as he was besieging Pinerolo, Catinat, who had been pushed well back into the mountains, escaped from his trap, turned the duke's flank

and obliged him

to retire,

and

A CRITICAL MISTAKE.

666

then forced battle on him October 4 at Marsagiia, southwest of Turin.

When

the duke

became aware

French, he crossed the

army, leaning his

little

on

left

of

the ajoproach of the

river Cisola

this stream,

and drew up

and extending

his

his right

across to a small patch of woods which lay near another small

On

stream, unnamed.

his left

which he might have leaned ing to do

so,

he

was the height of Piosaca, on

this flank to effect

left it for the

threaten his line in reverse.

enemy

;

but neglect-

and thus

to occupy,

Both streams were almost dry at this

season,

wood

the

on

and the

duke's right was so

open that even cavalry could ride through it.

Catinat at once

seized

on the

errors

of

salient

the

duke,

and occupied the Piosaca

heights.

He

then pushed a stout

Battle of Marsagiia.

attack all along the

Savoyard

line,

and followed

Success began here.

it

up by enveloping

The duke's army was

rolled

its

left.

up on the

centre and right, and so badly defeated that some time after

he concluded peace.

During nificant.

this period the operations

The war on

by the conquest of

James was

La Hogue

on the Rhine were

insig-

the border of Spain was enlivened only

of Barcelona (1697).

lost in the battle of the

In Ireland the cause

Boyne

;

and

at

Cape

the English fleet destroyed the French fleet in

1692.

There

is

no denying

to the

French a number of

brilliant

PEACE OF RYSWICK. on land

victories

;

they were in a sense almost as splendid

as the later victories of the allies under

But

Eugene. erally did

;

667

the latter

knew how

Marlborough and

them and gen-

to utilize

And

not so the Louvois-taught French.

the result

of all their victories did not offset the general downhill ten-

dency of the fortune of France.

France had

lost so

much

that

it

would seem as

could have imposed harsh terms on her.

But

if

in the

the allies

Peace of

Ryswick (1697) she was no further mulcted than to make her yield up, except Alsatia and Strasburg, all her conquests in the Netherlands, on the Rhine and in Spain.

William

III.

In

this

peace

was acknowledged king of England and Anne

as his successor.

The main

fortresses in the Spanish Nether-

lands were to be garrisoned by the Dutch.

Freiburg, Brei-

sach and Philipsburg went to the empire; Zweibriicken to

Sweden

;

was made

Lorraine was restored to

Duke Leopold

;

the Rhine

free.

Except the work of Luxemburg and Catinat, nothing the operations since the death of Turenne

tended notice.

French Musketeer.

(17th Century.)

is

in

worthy of ex-

LIII.

PRINCE EUGENE AGAINST CATINAT. The

death, cliildless, of Charles II. of Sixain left France, Austria and Bavaria

to claim the throne

Eugene

of Savoy

;

War

and the

was French by

home, he sought

at

served throughout

of the Spanish Succession resulted.

birth, but,

By

his exceptional skill, courage

and

in

against Catinat.

He

cut a

new road down the Adige,

and gradually forced the French back.

and had not been able

Eugene regained

The

to

whom

men was

sent to Italy

crossed below Verona,

Catinat was restricted by his orders,

By

manoeuvre as he otherwise might.

all

thereafter he

and services he early

1G97 won the splendid victory of Zenta against

In 1701 Prince Eugene with thirty thousand

the Turks.

Prince

unable to get military preferment

his fortune at the court of the emperor,

life.

rose to be field-marshal,

tions,

1701.

skillful opera-

northern Italy as far as the Oglio.

intermarriages of

tlie

reigning families of Europe

have generally resulted in rival claims of territory or in

jeal-

In the opening

ousy of a preiDonderating political influence.

year of the eighteenth century a serious European question

A genealogical

arose from the death of Charles II. of Spain. table best explains the facts. Philip III. of Spain, d. 1621.

I

Anna

= Louis

\

XIII.

I

I

Maria Anna

Philip IV.

of France. !

Louis XIV. = Maria Theresa.

of Austria.

I

t

I

Charles

= Ferdinand II. Emp. I

-

|

I

Margaret Theresa

II.

= Leopold I.

d. 1700. I

]

Louis the Dauphin.

= Maria Antoinette. I

Elector of Bavaria

|

j

Joseph

I.

I

Philip of Anjou or V. of Spain.

Emp. 1705-

I

Joseph Ferdinand,

1711.

Charles VI. Emp. 17111740.

El. Prince of Bavaria.

Inasmuch

as Charles II.

Hapsburgs threatened

to

was

childless,

become extinct

and the Spanish after the general

settlement of the Peace of Ryswick, the question as to

who

''PLUS

DE PYRENEES!"

669

should succeed to the Spanish throne became the leading

one among-

made a

In 1698 the powers

the nations of Europe.

all

by which Spain, the Indies and

treaty of partition,

the Netherlands should go to the electoral prince of Bavaria

Naples and Sicily and some other minor places to the

;

Dauphin

Milan

;

to the

Archduke Charles.

This treaty,

concluded without the consent of Charles II., provoked this

monarch

into

making the prince

elector of Bavaria his sole

heir; and to this the naval powers "agreed; but the death of

the prince in 1699 reopened the entire question.

In 1700

another treaty of partition was made, by which Spain and the Indies should go to the

and Lorraine

Archduke Charles

;

Naples, Sicily

Dauphin, and Milan to the duke of

to the

Lorraine as a compensation for his own land.

changing his mind, Charles

II.

made a

possessions to Philip of Anjou,

XIV.

and

But again

will leaving his entire

in

1700 died.

Louis

then chose to disregard the treaty of partition and to act

under the

will

;

and the duke of Anjou was proclaimed as

Philip v., and started for Spain amid the cries of " II n'y a " plus de Pyrenees !

The complex nature

War of

the

of this question,

the Spanish Succession, thus had a legal and a po-

litical aspect.

On

the throne of Spain of Philip III.

the one side there were three claimants to :

Louis XIV., son of the elder daughter

and husband

of the elder daughter of Philip

IV., both of which princesses

Leopold III.

I.

which was what led to

had renounced

their inheritance

of Austria, son of the younger daughter of Philip

and husband

of

the younger daughter of Philip IV.,

both of which princesses had reserved their inheritance

Joseph Ferdinand, electoral prince of Bavaria, great-grandson of Philip IV.

Louis

XIV.

claimed the throne for his second

grandson, and Leopold for his second son. side, the

On

the other

balance of power forbade that either France or Aus-

THE CONTESTANTS.

670

tria slioulcl succeed

to the

enormous Spanish

England and Holland joined hands

The naval powers and (and

to enforce this

and

view.

estates of the empire, with Prussia

later Portugal), joined the

to prevent

territory,

emperor in a Grand Alliance

As

France from securing Spain.

allies

France

had Savoy and Mantua, Bavaria and Cologne, but in 1703

The

Savoy deserted France.

men

three great

of the

Grand

Alliance were Eugene, the emperor's general, Marlborough, the

commander

Anglo-Dutch, and A. Heinsius, pen-

of the

Holland.

sionary of

After the death of William III. in

1702, Spain played no great part in the war, and being safe

on her weakest point, the Pyrenees, France could devote her energies to Italy, the Rhine and the Netherlands.

had

interior lines

rior lines

and a single purpose

and very divergent

In population the

purj)oses.

two contestants were about equal

;

France

the allies had exte-

;

but Austria was kept busy

by her Hungarian troubles and the Turkish wars.

England

was wholly in earnest; Holland needed to defend herself against France, from whose ambition she had in the late wars suffered so much.

The other members

of the

Grand Alliance

were not easy to persuade into giving active succor. in the

work

War

of the Spanish Succession that

of Eugene, Marlborough,

Prince Eugene of Savoy was

we

Vendome and fifth

It

was

find the best

Villars.

son of Prince Maurice of

Savoy-Carignan, count of Soissons, commander of the Swiss in the

French

service,

and governor

of

mother was niece of Cardinal Mazarin. Paris, October 18, 1663,

obtain

ten,

and

Eugene sought admittance it,

He was

His

born in

and early destined for the church.

His father died when he was favor.

Champagne.

his

mother

fell into dis-

to the army, but could not

and slight physique spoke But from childhood up he had pored over Plu-

as his diminutive stature

against him. tarch's Lives

:

his firm desire

was

to

be a soldier

:

his studies

PRINCE EUGENE.

tended in this direction, and he made himself proficient in

all

every technical branch of the military

Unable

—

671

as

many

other young noblemen did

Emperor Leopold was seeking

the

art.

to get military preferment in France,

resist the incursions of the

Turks.

—

to

Eugene went

Vienna, where

well-trained volunteers to

Here, in 1683, he especially

distinguished himself in the relief of

Vienna by Sobieski, rose

speedily to

be colonel, did a

great deal of

earned tion

staff

commenda-

universal

from

duty, and

In the

his superiors.

wars against the Turks, Prince

Eugene showed himself

to

have

not only a true military eye,

but a quite uncommon courage,

moral and of

j^hysical.

His acts

Prince Eugene.

gallantry were exceptional,

and he proved that he could shoulder

responsibility.

In 1686

he rose to be major-general, and two years later field-marshal lieutenant, being then but twenty-five years of age.

He had

already been several times wounded.

The Netherlands

War

had again broken out

The

in 1689.

emperor, with Bavaria, Sweden and Spain, took the part of the prince of Orange against France, and Leopold sent Prince

Eugene deus.

to

Turin

The

to negotiate a treaty with

Duke

prince would have preferred to

Victor

Ama-

remain in

ser-

vice against the Turks, but he accomplished his mission well.

(1689-1690.)

Learning of twelve thousand

this treaty,

men

Louis

XIV.

into Piedmont.

dispatched with eighteen thousand

men

sent Catinat with

Prince Eugene was

duke Eugene fought

to reinforce the

and, in connection with him, or at times alone,

;

EUGENE'S EARLY WORK.

672

tandsomely

in the Italian

by mutual agreement

XIV. now

Louis

campaigns of 1690

Italy

tried to

became

to 1696,

neutral.

win Eugene back, by offering him

the grade of marshal of France, the governorship of

pagne and two hundred thousand

who had

clave to the emperor,

for this act of loyalty

His

first

thousand

when

livres salary

;

Cham-

but Eugene

steadily befriended him,

was placed

in larger

independent campaign was in 1697 with

men

and

commands.

the Turks under the Sultan against *&'

fifty

Kara Mus-

''f.

Zenta Campaign.

who had advanced on the empire a hundred thousand strong. He moved down between the Save and the Drave

tapha,

rivers to the

Danube-Theiss region, where, after some ma-

noeuvring between these two rivers, he checked the Turks in the siege of Peterwardein and of Szegedin.

Among

the most

interesting campaigns of this great soldier during his long

laborious life are those against the Turks, but they do not

within the scope of this work.

ended

this

campaign

is,

The

battle

and

come

which practically

however, characteristic of the man.

.ING RESPONSIBILITY.

673

bank

of the Theiss,

theianned to cross to the

Tiie''t/jS8

left

intending to pillage and devastate upper biirgen (Transylvania)

attack his

before

army

Hungary and Sieben-

and Prince Eugene determined to

;

at the passage of the bridge

At

had completed the operation.

it

which

attack the prince received dispatches, but he

it

held,

moment

the

of

said, rather

is

doubtfully, to have refused to open them, rightly guessing that they were orders not to be led into battle.

The Turkish army was drawn up

in a great

bow

in front of

the bridge near Zenta, protected by earthworks, by the bag-

gage wagons lashed together Zisca-fashion, and with an inner bridge-head.

About one hundred guns were

Zenta was near the ports,

The

right.

position.

was covered with trans-

river

and a part of the Turkish army under the sultan had

already crossed to the other side

was anxious

Having

to attack.

It

— he

;

the right on the Theiss, and

four hours of daylight.

Eugene

11.

and ascertaining that the Turks

—a

fact

at once brought his

enveloped the enemy's

this reason

under arms, the prince

left his infantry resting

were hastening to get across, confusion,

and for

;

was September

rode forward to reconnoitre

it

in

swung

it

which was apt to breed

army

into position, with

by a right wheel

His concentric

fire of artillery

highly effective and that of the Turks the reverse,

f(^r

guns were big and cumbrous and their ammunition

The attack was begun by the grand

sorted.

so that

There were but three or

lines.

was

their ill-as-

vizier sending

out a cavalry detachment, which was, however, quickly driven

back

General Rabutin on the Austrian

;

assault

;

the centre under Prince

Count Stahremberg followed.

left

opened the

Eugene and

right under

The Turks

resisted stoutly,

but the Austrians, though outnumbered two to one, stormed the earthworks and an hour later the bridge-head. fighting

was desperate and the Turkish

Here the

loss fearful, for the

A SPLENDID VICTO.HK.

674

The

Austrians gave no quarter.

victory

was

c.to 169B,

-

1 xoiu

ten thousand to twenty thousand Turks are said to have

among them many pashas and the grand camp on the other bank and an enormous booty fallen,

Austrian hands

guns and

;

flags

The

vizier.

were captured wholesale

The Austrian

the Turks retired east to Temesvar.

the

fell into ;

loss

and was

but two thousand killed and wounded.

This

first

victory of Prince Eugene's does

him great

especially in view of the responsibility he took.

credit,

After a three

days' rest he followed the Turks, but they had retired south

garrison in Temesvar.

to Belgrade, leaving a strong

occupy so much time that

siege of this place promised to

would practically consume the

Eugene preferred

of the

rest

to quarter his troops

dition with twenty-five

The

hundred

foot,

it

campaign; and

and undertake an expe-

four thousand horse and

twelve guns into Bosnia, to capture the capital, Bosna-Seraj.

The Turks were

far

from expecting an incursion, and

in less

than three weeks the prince overcame the whole province and

The

returned. the

citadel

caj)ital

held out.

was captured and accidentally burned

On

destroyed the defenses of

all

the

home march

;

the Austrians

captured towns, and the army

then went into winter-quarters.

On

returning to Vienna Prince Eugene found that his ene-

mies, under the lead of Field-Marshal Caprara, had

him

to rouse the anger of the emperor against of orders in fighting the battle of Zenta, arrest.

The

managed

for disobedience

and he was

j)laced in

people, rejoiced at the splendid victory, were,

however, with him

;

the disfavor of the emperor lasted but a

short while, and resulted in the justification of the prince,

who next year was again placed in sole command in Hungary, and made independent of the Austrian council general of war.

His short humiliation, which

wise harmed his eventual reputation.

is

also doubtful, in

no

ARMIES IN

1701.

In 1698 the Austrian army continued under command oi Prince Eugene, tory

who manoeuvred over much

the same terri-

but we cannot detail the operations, and the war event-

;

ually languished into a truce

and peace.

Prince Eugene was next employed in the

War of

the Span-

ish Succession.

At

the opening of 1701 the emperor had under his control

Of

not exceeding eighty-five thousand men.

thousand, one third horse, were sent under

and assembled the

at

Roveredo

;

these

Eugene

thirty

into Italy,

twenty-one thousand were on

Rhine, and the rest were in Austria and Hungary.

Louis

XIV. and

men, of

whom

his allies

had over two hundred thousand

seventy-five thousand were in Flanders, not

including the garrisons of the strong places, fifteen thousand

on the Moselle, forty-one thousand on the Rhine, three thousand in Alsatian garrisons, and in Italy thirty-three thousand in the field

and eleven thousand

in garrison, not to count

some twenty thousand Savoyards and Wolfenbiittel troops. Louis' large preponderance of force and his

alliance with

Bavaria opened a promising chance for a summary march on

Vienna with

his

main army, which should

join the Bavarians

by the advance

sustained on the right gent.

Such an operation might have

favor in one campaign.

succumbed, and the

him

of France,

;

Rhine and to

be

of the Italian continsettled the

war

in his

The emperor would probably have

allies

But Louis chose

been dispersed.

to act on the defensive, for he

advise

cross the

and Wolfenbiittel troops, the whole

no longer had a Turenne to

the emperor joined hands with the other enemies

and during the long war which followed, the empire,

England and Holland were held together by the splendid abilities of Eugene, Marlborough and Heinsius. In the early part of 1701 there were then in Italy some thirty-three thousand

French

in the field

;

five

thousand in

CATINAT'S POSITION. Mantua, and

six

thousand in the strong places of Mirandola,

Cremona, Pizzighetone, Lodi, Lecco and other towns.

They

were of good quality, but scarcely as able as the imperial troops,

who had

ened.

Marshal Catinat, who was

seen war in

Hungary and were

in

command, with orders

remain on the defensive and not to cross to the the Adige,

—

— took up

his stand at Rivoli

in other

words not

service-hard-

to invade

left

bank

to

of

Venetian territory,

between the lake of Garda and

the Adige, where he lay athwart the imperial advance from

NEW ROAD

A

the Tyrol into northern Italy.

was at

to drive the

Roveredo

French from

May

BUILT.

677

Prince Eugene, whose task Italy,

20, at once

perceived that he had no

by crossing

resource but to violate the neutrality of Venice

her territory, and determined to move of the Adige,

it

and who joined the army

down on

and cross the river below.

bank

the left

This was a thing

he would scarcely have dared to do unless he had known by

means

of a secret understanding with the

happy

relic of their

duke of Savoy, the

recent joint campaigns against Catinat,

that the French marshal had orders not to cross the

Eugene

for without this certainty

laid himself

absolutely cut off from his base.

that day, lay over the foothills of right bank,

and was

Eugene proposed

open

Adige

to

;

being

The only good road, at Monte Baldo along the The route

enemy.

in possession of the

was then a mere footpath, and a

to take

proper road over thirty miles long had to be built at vast

A force

exertion.

of six thousand pioneers

was

set to

and within a week several roads down the valleys Adige

affluents

were made practicable

so poor that the cavalry single at

file,

some

this

road,

and

south,

and on

May

be dismounted

his

raised

by

rocks.

ability.

sur-

Prince Eugene

28 reached Verona imdiscovered

by Catinat, whose orders not only must have relaxed

to

the difficulties, which were

despite

mounted by wonderful persistence and

moved

to lead the horses in

at others to be lowered or

down perpendicular

of the

but they remained

and the wagons and guns had

places,

windlasses up or

On

was compelled

;

work,

tied his hands, but

usual vigilance

;

for

while

who

Eugene

worked and marched behind the mountains, a proper system Eugene of spies or scouting would have revealed his project. quite outwitted his opponent.

So soon

as the

French general

discovered the imperial manoeuvre, he left part of his Eivoli and marched

down

the right

bank

army

at

of the Adijie with

PRECEDENT FOR OUR CAVALRY.

678 the rest

down

but Eugene had disposed his troops from Verona

;

in such a

way

make Catinat

as to

He

forces over a long line.

string out his

own

utilized the soutiiwesterly

bend

of the Adige below Cologna so as to compel Catinat to occupy the

bow on bad

he himself held only the chord

terrain, while

on good, and by

managed

skillful feints

to convince his oppo-

nent that he would pass the river above Verona, though his troops already reached

down

as far as

Legnano.

Catinat did

not fathom Eugene's scheme, and tired his troops by restless

marching up and down

;

and the prince, meanwhile keeping

Catinat busy at Rivoli by a small detachment, bridged the swollen Adige and the several canals to the west, put his

and taking Carpi,

forces over at Castelbaldo on July 9,

in

front of which he beat a large French cavalry party with loss of one thousand men, he crossed the Tartaro and threatened

In

Catinat's right flank.

was wounded.

this

engagement Eugene himself

Like Gustavus, he was always

the fray, and his

in the thick of

wounds were frequent, but happily not often

severe.

In

this

employed

wont

combat

at Carpi,

it

noteworthy that Eugene

is

his dragoons in exactly the

to use our cavalry in the civil

same manner as we were

war

:

he dismounted them

on ground unsuitable for cavalry, and on good terrain sent

them

in at a

better precedent for our

When

We

charge against the enemy.

could ask no

American method.

Catinat found Eugene in force below Verona, he

imagined that he was about to push towards the Po, cross

and enter the Modena his forces, leading

territory,

a strong

and he

party

still

down

to Ostiglia.

had started on a wrong theory, and could not cast

Had Eugene pushed home

at this

it

further divided

it

He off.

moment, he might have

turned his flank and rolled up the entire French army like

a

scroll

;

but bad roads, which made concentration

difficult,

CATINAT RELIEVED. and the delay

in the crossing of his

held him back, and Catinat

mary

managed

and trains

artillery

to save himself

where he concentrated

retreat on Villafranca,

tered forces.

heavy

679

Eugene made preparations

hy sumhis scat-

him the

to attack

next day, but Catinat had now gauged the enemy's purpose, gathered his dispersed forces, withdrew in the night across

His main force he posted between

the Mincio and escaped.

The

Goito and Vallegio.

prince's whole operation

had been

admirably planned and executed, and deserves study in In

fact,

detail.

one can scarcely appreciate the niceties of Eugene's

strategy otherwise than by following every one of his move-

ments day by day. Shortly after, Prince Eugene

cross the

made a

flank

movement up

and near by the French army and purposing

river past

;

to

Mincio and aim for Castiglione, he assembled his

bridge-material at Salionze, where on July 28 he put over the

army.

and

He

expected a French attack, but Catinat declined

While

retired behind the Chiese.

tried one of his fertile

treachery, but

it

in this region,

it,

Eugene

schemes to get hold of Mantua by

quite failed

;

the

enemy kept

the place.

Louis XIV., dissatisfied with Catinat's apparent neglect,

and unmindful

of

how he had been hampered by

his orders,

replaced him by Villeroi, until the arrival of whoin the duke of

Savoy as senior assumed supreme command.

The

latter

brought a reinforcement of seventeen thousand troops, which increased the French-Savoyard

By advancing a wing Eugene securely regained Tyrol, but the French tlren

to

army

to fifty

thousand men.

Peschiera and Lonato, Prince

his direct

made no

communications with the

signs of attacking him.

He

pushed forward to Castiglione and Montechiaro, and

thence to Brescia, a manoeuvre w^hich turned the

left flank of

the French and threatened their communications with France

through the Milan

district,

but which in turn laid him open

ON THE

680

OGLIO.

same danger from the larger French army, that could

to the

The duke, however, thought not

always base on Mantua.

of

any such bold scheme as a grand turning operation, but behind the Oglio, drawing in the troops from

retired

upper waters down to Caneto, so as

to present a

new

its

front to

the imperial army.

Eugene had been

now

victualing out of the

duke

of

Mantua

He had

transferred his commissariat.

Savoy that Villeroi had fighting

region, but

learned from the

orders,

and though

always active, had kept to small war only, for the enemy,

But

reinforced, quite outnumbered him.

in

now

order to hold

himself better, he advanced to the Oglio, took up a strong

down to await some ten thousaiid reinforcements of his own which were to arrive from the Tyrol along the road west of Lake Garda, and via Salo down and

position at Chiari,

to Brescia,

which

sat

He

city his position protected.

lay in the

open country, but he could lean his flanks on small streams

Po

too deep to ford, of which the basin of the in his front, he threw

To

up some works.

all

is full

and,

;

appearance

fronting oddly in a strategic light, he was tactically well

Though Chiari belonged to Venice and was occupied by a Venetian garrison, Eugene put his own troops in it by placed.

force

;

he had already violated the Venetian territory by

marching on the Chiari

left

bank

made matters no

of the Adige,

worse.

and

The enemy

this seizure of

lay opposite

him

on the other side of the Oglio. Catinat had in

good

officer,

many campaigns shown

had no merit.

and got

Eugene

his

Vendome, I

me."

At

shall fight

that time he

command on

Villeroi

was a

that score, for he

quoted as saying before the cam-

is

paign opened, " If Villeroi if

his king.

and deserved better of

favorite at court,

himself to be a

is

my

opponent, I shall beat him

with him

;

if

knew Catinat

Catinat, he better than

may

;

beat

Vendome.

LIV.

EUGENE AGAINST VILLEROI AND VENDOME. ViLLEROi's thousand

men

out result

;

first

act

was

to attack

Eugene

to Eugene's thirty thousand

and

in

;

at Palazzolo.

1701-1702.

He had

forty-five

but his attack was weak and with-

Jiovember he went into winter-quarters.

paign had been a brilliant one on Eugene's part.

The

year's

cam-

Early in February he

made a sudden attack on Cremona, broke in and captured Villeroi, but could not hold the city. Vendome was sent to take command of the French army, now numbering

fifty

Vendome, by a

skillful manoeuvre, cut

revictualed the place across the Fo.

Eugene had

thousand men.

;

him

A battle

One of the greatest generals

and served with

Turenne.

by

skill

Under James and courage

;

blockading Mantua, but his

communications and

ensued at Luzzara, which was drawn, and in Novem-

Born

peared on the theatre of war. soldier,

beeti

from

then moving around Eugene's fiank, he forced him back

ber both armies went into winter-quarters.

campaign.

off

in 16.50,

distinction in the II.

and William

was made duke

became general-in-chief

Vendome held

of this era,

the honors of the

John Churchill, now

ap-

he early approved himself a good English corps uuder Cond4 and

III.

he rose in his chosen profession

of Marlborough,

of the allies in the Netherlands.

and

finally, in

1701,

His campaigns of

1701 to 1703 were not remarkable.

Villeroi

shortly

came upon the

scene,

and as he was

ordered, determined to attack the prince before he was reinforced.

some

Catinat, his junior, remained with the army.

forty-five

With

thousand men, Villeroi crossed the Oglio at

Rudiano on August 28 and

29,

and so certain was he of easy

victory that he neglected to fetch most of his artillery with

him.

Much

in accordance with his character, this

be a foolish error.

moved on the

imj)erial

a reconnoissance.

made good

On

With

proved to

the afternoon of September 1 he

army, after the barest semblance of his thirty thousand

dispositions,

and

his

men, Eugene had

outposts gave

him

early

VILLEROI DEFEATED.

682

He had

notice of the coming of the French.

three lines, the

cavalry in the third, and in Chiari, on his left flank, and in a

number

of houses near by, he placed foot

and

line faced nearly east,

His position was strong. never doubting victory tion,

;

and

on two brooks.

his right leaned

Villeroi

His

artillery.

advanced

in

good heart,

but his attack on the prince's posi-

though heartily enough delivered and followed up, was

PAlAZXOL-OAj

Chiari Operation.

beaten five

off

by the imperial

forces,

hundred men and many

The prince declined existing

;

to

slightly

changed

right on Palazzolo,

while Eugene lost

little.

pursue the advantage against the odds

Villeroi retired in

and intrenched between

Eugene

with the loss of over twenty-

officers,

and

good order

that

place

to

Urago, near by,

and Castrezato

his position

to

his left on Chiari.

;

and

one leaning his

Autumn was

at

hand, and the rest of the year was eaten up by small war,

conducted by the imperialists with great vigor and constant success.

Each day some expedition

against the enemy's foragers,

outposts or convoys was undertaken, but Eugene,

ered that he had

won enough

who

consid-

for this campaign, did not care

A BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN. to risk

683

what he had already gained by uncertain operations on

a larger scale against so superior a force.

some bolder manoeuvres

Catinat suggested

French excess of

to utilize the

forces,

but Villeroi was not abreast of them.

At

the end of these small operations, Villeroi, on

Eugene had small chance

Urago

so carefully that

and the French

went into winter-quarters

and down

to

Novem-

of attacking him,

ber 13, retired across the Oglio below

in the country along

the Oglio

The Venetians refused Eugene

Cremona.

the

right to winter on their territory, but as he could not well retire to the

Tyrol and have

work

all his

to

do over again

next spring, in order to drive the enemy out of the Mantua region he undertook operations which secured him a

number

of places, including Marcaria, Rodondesco, Torre d' Oglio, Ostiglia, Borgoforte

and Ponte Molino,

dola,

in fact all the

towns

Mantua and Goito he captured Miranwhere was much material, in the middle of December,

of importance save

;

and Guastalla shortly after

;

strengthened the crossings of the

Oglio, nearly all of which he controlled, cut the French off

from Mantua, and himself went lines along the Oglio

into

and Mincio, with

cantonments in three his left resting on the

Headquarters were at San Benedetto, and a big outpost

Po.

lay in the

Parma

territory, while

Parma

though against the consent of the duke. eral

had a good country

concentrate.

to victual

itself

was occupied,

The imperial gen-

from and could quickly

The Savoyard army marched back

to

Pied-

mont.

According to the ideas of the day. Prince Eugene's campaign had been exceedingly brilliant tive at all times

;

but

it

is

;

he had kept the

true that he was aided

limitations of the generals opposed to him. cross the Adige, a fact

bank

;

by the

Catinat could not

which allowed Eugene

of action he desired on the east

initia-

all the liberty

the secret understand-

MANTUA SHUT

684

IN.

ing with the duke of Savoy, which gave the prince access to all

the news he desired, was a vital point in his favor; and

finally the

breaking up of the French army into small detach-

ments, together with the poor management of Villeroi,

But he had shown exceptional

in his favor.

enterprise dierly,

his

;

work

in all respects

activity

and

had been able and

sol-

and the campaign redounds much

had taken advantage of him, and

if

we should gauge

all

It is rare that great captains

enemy had given

generals

tion they encountered, there would be

He

to his honor.

the openings the

all

made

by the

ojjposi-

few great reputations.

have been matched by equal

talent.

In 1702 Prince Eugene was again in command of the imperial forces with which he had in the previous campaign

pushed the French back to the Milanese, and which he had

withdrawn towards winter to the neighborhood of Mantua.

He had

kept up an activity

of Villeroi tua,

all

winter to which the inertness

formed a great contrast

;

he had blockaded Man-

which at the beginning of January he proceeded with

some twelve thousand men

to shut in

in order to hold his lines securely, he his position with

much

care,

and

more thoroughly

;

and

watched the Po above

collected supj)lies in the

towns of Brescello, Guastalla, Luzzara, Mirandola and Borgoforte.

The enemy considerably outnumbered him; and

his

task in this campaign was to hold himself in Italy rather than to

push the enemy out

tioned in the

On

the

Parma

1st of

of

it.

General Vaudemont was

February Prince Eugene carried out a

scheme which he had for some time had fortress of

tioned,

in view, against the

Cremona, where the bulk of the French were

and where

Villeroi

was an admirable corps information.

By

sta-

country.

had

his headquarters.

of spies,

sta-

In his pay

from whom he got much

corrupting a priest, whose house was near

VILLEROI CAPTURED.

685

the north city wall, a few imperial soldiers got admitted

through a drain into the

city,

and

at the preconcerted hour of

3 A. M., opened one of the adjacent gates to a force headed by

Within a few minutes the

Prince Eugene.

latter

was

inside,

with two thousand infantry and somewhat more cavalry, and before the garrison was aware of any danger the place was taken, and Villeroi, Avhose quarters were close at hand, was

made a

prisoner.

But the event was not eral

Vaudemont (the

Villeroi)

as fortunate as the beginning.

son, for the father

had been instructed

Parma by

to

aid the

attacking and taking the

Gen-

was serving under stratagem from

Cremona bridge-head

from the south, and thus opening communication with Eugene

and an

outlet for retreat

;

but he failed to do

this,

and when

the scheme was on the very eve of success, the garrison got

under arms, and during the whole day energetically fought to expel the enemy.

Eugene, with a retire.

Finally the French gained their point, and

loss of twelve

The marquis

of Crequi was on the

the garrison, and had he

captured himself

;

hundred men, was obliged

march

to

to help

come up, Eugene might have been

but on hearing a report that Cremona

had been taken, Crequi pusillanimously turned back without attempting to verify the rumor, and Eugene got away by the

Margaret gate on the

east, crossed the Ogiio,

and

retired to

camp with his prisoner. When, on March 1, Vendome, the successor of Villeroi, arrived in Cremona and took command of the French army lying on the Adda, he first sat down to wait for some twentyfive

thousand reinforcements to arrive, and then planned to

march

to the Mincio, place himself

on the communications of

Eugene with the Tyrol, and either force him to battle, or compel him to throw up the blockade of Mantua. While waiting his accessions and the proper

moment

to act, he

made

VENDOME IN

686

ITALY.

Mantua by moving on Eugene's

an attempt

to help

on the Po

but Eugene outmanoeuvred him, met him at every

point,

;

and not only held

position

the blockade, but kept up

fast

a series of annoying raids into the Milanese and Cremona districts.

Louis Joseph, Duke of Vendome, was born in 1654, had early served

in the

Gardes du Corps in the Netherlands, under Turenne on the Rhine, and

He

under Conde in Flanders.

came familiar with

by serving

Italy

a junior in the campaigns con-

as

ducted by Catinat.

manded lona. life

in private

indecorous and

shiftless,

ambition;

little

in Spain,

and captured Barce-

A splendid soldier,

he was

showed

In 1695 he com-

French army

the

freed Palamos,

Vendome.

be-

required

it

the stimulus of arms to rouse his naturally indolent nature

and sometimes even

this failed to

do

In the

so.

often showed determination unsurpassed, as well as a

gallantry and intelligence

guard the secret of

Having had

;

field

he

marked

but he was not always careful to

his operations.

his forces raised to over fifty

thousand men,

line of the Vendome left Adda and Po sufficiently posted, and with twenty thousand men marched. May 12, over the Oglio at Pontevico, crossed

Cremona well garrisoned and the

the Mella,

May

15, at

Manerbio, turned to the right over the

Chiese at Medole, and reached Goito

May

This hand-

23,

some march, made before Eugene could do aught

to interrupt

was a clear check

commander,

or neutralize for

it

tions,

it,

to the imperial

not only cut him off from his main line of communica-

— the direct road

raised the blockade of

to the Tyrol,

Mantua on

— but

at the

the north.

The

same time prince at

MANTUA RELIEVED. He might

once recognized his situation.

drawn

into fatal manoeuvres or a

he quietly withdrew

687

more

still

to his lower

readily have been

Mantua

fatal battle

but

;

lines with troops

which had been reinforced up to thirty-nine thousand men, took up a strong position, tatone, intrenched cies of blockade.

it,

May

and here

17, near

Montanara and Cur-

held

still

But Vendome's presence

between Goito and Mantua could not

Mantua

in a spe-

in superior force

fail to

become

dangler-

ous to the imperial army, and Eugene concluded to draw in

from the towns surrounding Mantua, and

his forces

to

watch

for further developments while victualing his forces over the

bridge at Borgoforte from the magazines which he had so judiciously established in the side of the Po.

From

Modena country on

the other

Brescello to Ostiglia his possession of

Po was made secure. Upon this withdrawal

the

revictual

Eugene, Vendome was enabled to

of

Mantua, and then took up

his post opposite

Eugene

near Rivalto, where both armies remained in situ for a month, indulging only in small war and cannonading. to duplicate the capture of Villeroi

quarters at Rivalto

came

by

so close to

An

attempt

Vendome in his success as to make the seizing

French general careful where he established himself. Eugene's position was peculiar.

He

stood between the

and the Mincio, the enemy, who outnumbered him, front,

had

and Mantua on

his right, against

to intrench himself.

whose

sorties

The neutral Venetians

he

Adige with twenty-six thousand men for

their

protection,

and Eugene could have a

on

bank by marching over

their territory

of retreat was gone.

Now

Spain,

Vendome was anxious

again

;

;

own

its left

but his original line

heavily reinforced from

to oust

Eugene from

but, as he did not like to make a front Vaudemont with twenty- three thousand men tion

now

held the

line of the

line of retreat

Po

in his

his posi-

attack, he left

in his Rivalto

VENDOME ACTIVE.

688

lines astride the imperial

July

communications, and boldly started,

with the van of other twenty-three thousand, towards

7,

Cremona and Casal Maggiore, proposing by

a flank attack

Modena

seek to cut

holdings and

capture

thought, he would force

compel him to leave the

Po

him

Po and

to cross the

opponent from his

magazines.

his

into a situation

Thus, he

which would

His object in marching so far up

Italy.

Cremona was perhaps

as

his

oft

to

meet Philip V. of Spain,

who was coming on a visit to the allied armies. Eugene guessed his opponent's intention, and his detachments at Borgoforte

increased

and Brescello, where he had

bridges over the Po, and at Guastalla.

Crossing the river, July 14, in two columns, at Cremona

and Casal Maggiore, Vendome met

Eugene

imperial horse which

beat

Santa Vittoria some

at

sent out to watch the operation,

with a loss of six himdred men, captured Reggio,

it

Modena and

Carpi, and having got together thirty-six thou-

sand troops, marched to Luzzara, August 15, hoping to seize

on Eugene's bridges over the Po.

He was

doing brilliant

work.

Matters looked threatening for Eugene. battle with a sujaerior

By

he determined.

drew most

1,

men and

army

and on

if

this

Vaudemont, he with-

Po

at Bor-

from garrisons

fifty-seven guns, also

on Luzzara, and on August 3 reached

south of the crossing.

seemed as

his front, crossed the

reinforced his

twenty-six thousand straight

from

It

his only outlet,

skillfully deceiving

of his forces

August

goforte

enemy was

Strong garrisons were

up

to

marched

Sailetto, just

left in his

mag-

azine towns.

Vendome had

called on the

surrender, and on refusal citadel

by.

;

and then, heedless

The

commander

of the place to

had taken the town but not the of

Eugene, prepared

to

camp near

old accounts of this battle are a good deal confused,

DESPERATE BATTLE.

A

689

and the old

ciiarts do not show the tojiogTaphy of to-day. Along the Po near Luzzara there was said to be a canal or an embankment to arrest the frequent inundations of the

river,

and high enough

old charts call

it

to conceal a considerable army.

At

the Zero Canal.

much

that the country was

cut up by embankments, dikes,

ditches, hedges, patches of woods, so ful

The

all events, it is certain

scouting would discover

much

so that only care-

On

an enemy.

this

terrain

Eugene, who with his entire force of infantry and cavalry

had advanced

two columns along the Po, and now lay in a sort of ambush, hoped to fall suddenly on the French when in

they should go into camp, as he was advised by his scouts they

were

about to do.

Ven-

that

dome's people were exceedingly less

in

care-

outjDost

and

duty,

the

French army had

marched

up

was preparing

camp without

and

-'/

_j>i-^ACe._^

^TAft^ ^

^-.^^

^

veNaoHE

to disNDOME.S

COUUHrjS

OP

MAf^CH

covering the pres-

ence

my.

of

the ene-

Just before Battle of Luzzara.

Eugene was ready to

debouch from hiding and curiosity of

enough

to discover the

got his

men through

had Vendome.

It

fall

upon the French, Vendome,

an outpost commander, was fortunate

by the

ambush, and by the time Eugene had

the difficult country and into line, so

was 5

P.

M.

The

imperialists of the right

wing worked their way through the many obstacles and on the French

left

with great fury

;

fell

but they were met by

A DISPUTED VICTORY.

690

equal gallantry, and for hours a bloody strug^'le was maintained.

Eugene reported that

cer

and that the fighting was kept up under command

fell,

in several regimeni;' every

offi-

In the centre Vendome opposed Eugene,

of the sergeants.

On

but the latter gained some ground.

the left

tlie

imperial

gain was more marked, as the ground was more open and the

In every respect

could better operate.

cavalry

fiercely contested

Up

grand-tactics.

it

was a

but without any special show of

battle,

midnight the struggle went on

to past

along the line in places, breaking out at intervals on either side

and

;

thousand

on

it

had been hot enough

killed,

the imperial side

army some two

to cost each

and on the French

side four thousand

two thousand wounded.

and

Eugene had by

no means m.ade the gain he had anticipated, which was to drive the French from his vicinity

;

nor indeed had he

lost

the battle, for both sides claimed a victory.

Eugene, who he kept the

French it,

is

field

unusually accurate in his reports, says that

and collected

v/ere driven

all his

wounded, while the

more than one thousand paces back from

a statement which seems to vouch for an imperial success.

Both armies remained near enough together cannonading next day.

At

all

events,

summary

plished his end by putting a

to indulge in

Eugene had accomstop to

Vendome's

advance and to the danger of being driven out of the Modena country.

Vendome ordered Vaudemont Eugene kept raids,

raid

free

enough

to

to

blockade Borgoforte

even so far as into the Milanese.

is

worth mentioning.

;

but

send his light horse out on

A party

of six

One

enterprising

hundred hussars

under General Davia started from camp, rode up the Po, crossed the Enza, Parma, Taro,

Rura and Trebbia,

seized the

bridge at Arena, crossed, forced a heavy contribution on Pavia, and marched on and into Milan.

Thence easterly

IN FAVOR OF VENDOME. they crossed

Adda

tlie

691

at Cassano, the Oglio at Calcio, the

Mincio at Valleggio, and arrived safe and laden with enor-

mous booty tremendous

For

This was the sort of work Eugene's

at Ostigiia. vitality

fifty-five

was

aj^t

to inspire in his subordinates.

days the armies stood en face near Luzzara,

and Vendome only captured Guastalla. Eugene was too weak

own

to do moi-e than hold his

;

but

He made

though not Mirandola.

Vendome was

able suc-

Eugene's Modeua magazines,

cessively to seize several of

an attempt on

this place

by moving on Bondanello on the Secchia but while on the march to this latter place, Eugene quietly drew in most of the Borgoforte garrison, rapidly moved across the Secchia, ;

and on November 8 drew up

Vendome had much But he

got

shortly

to defend the river

;

and though

the larger force, he declined to attack.

Borgoforte, whose garrison was thus

depleted.

Prince Eugene attemjsted later to gain possession of the Guastalla bridge, as well as

made an

failing in both efforts, he gave

up

attack on

all his

Mantua

;

but

holdings on the left

Po and went into winter-quarters in the vicinity of Mirandola. The French, in November, also put their fifty-six thousand men (not counting garrisons) into winterbank

of the

quarters, with headquarters in Guastalla.

The campaign had been decidedly in favor of Vendome, who with his superior forces had conducted it with much ability,

and may be said

to

have gained substantial repute by his

boldness and intelligence. sure his

army was but

forced back to the right

half that of his opponent,

bank

in the Mirandola country Italy

;

and

all his

Prince Eugene, though to be

;

of the

but he had not been driven out of

operations were active and able.

Vendome had accomplished more, greater ability.

An

had been

Po and been cooped up

yet

Though

Eugene had shown the

exceptional circumstance in the cam-

EUGENE'S THEORIES.

692

paigns of 1701-1702

is

that Prince

for scarcely any support.

He

down, and subsisted his

men on

Eugene

called

built his road

on Austria

from the Tyrol

He

the enemy's territory.

so disposed his magazines that being cut off from his direct

communications with the Tyrol by no means fatally comproAll this was an unusual thing in those days.

mised him.

The operations had cost Austria little in men or Eugene had, considering his force and the fact that

material. his oppo-

nent was one of the best soldiers of the day, conducted a very handsome campaign.

campaign

of the 1702

is

Perhaps the most noteworthj^ fact that

Eugene grasped and acted on

the theory that the weaker of two generals must never await attack, but himself ick's great

power

;

assume the

and Eugene

This was Freder-

offensive.

distinctly exhibited

Luzzara he advanced on the enemy

;

during the whole cam-

paign his activity in small war never relaxed

;

and he always

managed to keep a central position with interior was

recalled to Vienna, received with enthusiasm,

president of the imperial council of war.

ceeding year he was not in the

ish Succession a soldier as remarkable as

whom

his

name was

He

lines.

and made

During the

suc-

field.

There had come upon the theatre of the

with

At

it.

War

of the Span-

Eugene, and one

John

to be imperishably coupled.

Churchill was born in Devonshire July 5, 1650, thirteen years before his colleague, his father being a royalist, his

mother a daughter of Sir Francis Drake. Paul's school, he entered the

army

the patronage of the duke of York, and the

Educated

at sixteen years old, first

at St.

under

saw service

war against Tangiers, where he was distinguished

volunteer in

all

hazardous exploits.

in

as a

In 1672, at the begin-

ning of the second Netherlands War, he was captain in the

English corps, and at

complimented him.

A

Nymwegen Turenne

highly and justly

certain position under a

French

officer

MARLBOROUGH'S EARLY WARS. had been

by a Dutch

lost

Turenne

attack.

693

said to have

is

bet a champagne supper that " son hel Anglais,^' with half the troops which had just been driven back, would take it

and Churchill gallantly won him

his bet.

earned the public thanks of Louis

XIV.

for services at the

was soon

siege of Maestricht,

made

Next year he

colonel, and, as such, in

1674, served under Turenne

on the Rhine.

Four years cipated

he

after,

in the

parti-

campaign

in

Flanders, and for three years

succeeding was with the banished duke

Netherlands

His

fidelity

of

York

and

in

the

Belgium.

earned him his Marlborough.

baronetcy and promotion and ;

when the duke became James Engaged

French ambassador.

II.

at

he was made peer and

Sedgmoor against the

surgents, he afterwards went over to

made At

lieutenant-general the battle of

William

III.,

and duke of Marlborough

in-

and was

in 1686.

Walcourt (1689) against the French, in marked skill, and the king desired

the Netherlands, he showed

him

to go to Ireland in 1690, to serve against

Marlborough declined left that country,

when he drove back

Kinsale and Ulster.

James

to go thither until after

II.

But

James had

the insurgents in Cork,

Notwithstanding his treasonable corre-

spondence with James, the king kept him in favor, and took

him he

to the Netherlands in

fell

1691

;

afld

though in the next year

from favor and was imprisoned

in the

Tower, he was

again called to court, showered with honors and dignities,

made

captain-general,

potentiary, in 1701.

and sent

to the

Netherlands as pleni-

Queen Anne, on her

accession, com-

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

694

Mm general-in-cliief

missioned

of the English forces, and, in

1702, conferi-ed the Garter on him.

Although, under the

common

belief that the divine right

many

of ruling confers like military skill, there were

ants to the

command

Prussia, the

Archduke Charles, the

duke

of

Zell,

of the

own

choice,

— the

this action there

of the

Dutch

midsummer, the

engaged

and

in

and

com-

Owing to reach his army

Marlborough did not

Athlone having meanwhile been

earl of

Kaisersworth, which

later

troops.

raid

fell

on

June

15,

Nymwegen.

Marlborough crossed the Maas at Grave

with his sixty thousand men,

Boufflers,

was

the confidence

:

their desire to have a

checking Marshal Boufflers'

and Dutch

upon

in 1702,

the Netherlands.

the allies in

of

in the siege of

Three weeks

estates insisted

their field deputies could control.

political complications, till

Dutch

were two good reasons

in his ability,

mander whom

Hanover, the

and the duke of Marlborough,

made commander-in-chief For

elector of

claim-

king of

and especially Prince George of Denmark,

husband of Queen Anne, their

— the

armies,

allied

He was

made up

of English,

German

anxious for battle with Marshal

who had some forty thousand men, but the Dutch held him back, and he was reduced to a cam-

field deputies

Capturing Venlo, Roermond, Stevensweert

jjaign of sieges.

and

(Liege), he forced

Liittich

Mehaigne.

the

French behind the

This was already a marked gain

ation in the Netherlands on a

cut off from what they had

new

deemed

footing

;

;

it

put the

situ-

the French were

their highway, the Rhine,

and a secure waterway was open from the Dutch ports the

army

of the allies at the front,

allied position

— no mean

to

The

success.

moreover threatened Brussels and Cologne,

and Marlborough began

to be looked on as the saviour of

Had he much future

the Netherlands.

been given his own way, he might

have spared

waste of lives and treasure

;

for

U.NIMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS. Marlborough belongs

to those generals

695

who only now and

then were given an opportunity of doing their very best

whom

;

of

cannot be said honv great they might have become had they possessed unlimited power. it

Next year (1703) was a repartition of the same story. Holland at that day bristled with fortifications, built under the eye of the most distinguished engii.^eers, the

Vauban and

Dutchman Coehorn

the

presence of these interfered with free manoeu gle fortress in

rear

its

may

Frenchman

at their head,

and the

A

vrino-.

not be dangerous to an

sin-

army

;

but when they are so numerous that detachments fivom their

make up a body able to threaten the commuarmy advancing beyond their lines, great^.'^r required and unless a commander had sufficient

garrisons can

nications of an

caution

is

;

troops to detail large observation parties for each

strong

could scarcely be deemed wise to leave them behind

place,

it

him.

This view, then universal, was warmly espoused by the

Dutch

They constantly

deputies.

who had

restrained Marlborough,

and Ostende, and who

designs on AntwerjD

in

event was inclined to fight as the best military policy

he was now fain to be content with besieging Bonn.

who had returned from fell

May

15,

—

sought meanwhile to interfere

Italy,

off.

Yilleroi

tived his attempt in

and

;

but

Marlborough, who

in season to allow

with his lieutenant Overkirk had

head him

and

Villeroi,

with Marlborough's siege by an advance on Maestricht

Bonn

;

any

thousand men, to

fifty-five

Boufflers, however, quite nega-

June on Antwerp,

in

which operation

Dutch who formed the the concentrically operating forces, and Marlborough

Boufflers beat a large force of the right of

had no

Later he

success.

fell

August and September took Prussians, under

back behind the Maas, and

Huy and Limburg, and

in

the

Count Lottum, Geldern.

This campaign

is

neither of especial interest, nor does

it

THE DUTCH DEPUTIES^.

696 reflect

any great credit on

it its trivial character

the

Dutch deputies were

view of the military matism.

its

managen^-ent

;

but from giving

Marlborougti must be absolved consta^iitly at his elbow,

necessitifc;s of

and

;

for

their

the case savored of astig-

Tired of his slrow-moving masters,

— for

he saw

other generals winnin.^ victories, and felt conscious of his

—

Marlborough determined to own power to do ^Jhe like, march into Germany in 1704, and there conduct his campaign.

It wPiS evident to all that

Bavaria was the key of

the theatre^ of war.

French Cannon.

(16th Century.)

LV. VILLAES.

1703.

In 1703 Vendome opposed Staliremberg vred him, and

On

around his position to Piedmont.

by a

lines,

but the

allies,

the Rhine Villars

capturing everything on the way.

latter

made a

Crossing at Hiiningen, he marched

brilliant foray.

StoUhofen

in Italy,

Savoy having joined the

finally,

opt. .

men were

it,

x

retired to ii.^

and Danzig and Elbn.^

Having

mulcted for interference with his transports.

...

finally

got control of the land, Augustus was legally deposed and the

Protestant Stanislaus Lesczinski was elected king of Poland.

During these three years devoted

to the control of Poland,

Charles had lost sight of Peter and his doings

;

but this most

dangerous opponent had not only been creating an army, but

had founded

He

1704.

St.

Petersburg in 1703 and captured Narva in

i^romised to give a better account of himself

when

he next met the Swedes.

Augustus made one more still

engaged

in

effort for

Poland.

Charles was

reducing the land, of which hundreds of

towns sent him the keys so soon as he approached.

While

he took Leopold in September, 1704, Augustus advanced

on Warsaw, from which the new king Charles and Stanislaus advanced

Schulenburg was he needed long

fight

And

ill-success.

it

men

and captured

against his

the troops, discouraged

as

Charles said,

observed, Charles so far had

by

of Poles, half-hearted

to fight for either king,

raw Saxon

seen no war, and vagabond Cossacks.

was,

it.

army, of which

This was an able general, but

They were made up

and ready

who had

such

be

command.

all his skill to control

in his cause recruits,

in

fled,

hunting,

To

not war.

met no one worthy

of

^burg, his first able oppointaet for his master than

His was a policy really

Warta, Schulenburg learned

whom arch of

he thought far

fifty

thousand

j^ht

man

same countries), he

sq in these

in extra close order on

ground where he could not

be surrounded, but had his retreat open

pikemen and musketeers mixed, kneeled over the

stooping, fired

To

the

first

;

;

his first

;

rank of

the second, slightly

the third over the two others.

Charles and

of

surprise

of his day.

and one thousand

foot

he could make his foot stand up to

^Gustavus had done

drew up

had

leagues in nine days.

jps faster than any

relief that

off,

Stanislaus, their

cavalry

could not be driven in upon this array of pikes vomiting

Schulenburg,

lead.

five

times wounded, held himself

retired in a hollow square to

and at night

Guhran,

all

day,

east of

Glogau, not far from the Oder.

The kings followed him up far as the

half.

;

led his army,

now reduced by

The Swedes followed through almost impassable

Near Rutzen, the

as

Oder the country was heavily wooded and through

wood the Saxon general

this

Beyond Guhran

sharply.

at the outlet of the woods,

little river

Bartsch just in time to escape Charles

this indefatigable

monarch found

and penned Schulenburg up and Oder.

paths.

Schulenburg crossed

in the confluence of the

Schulenburg seemed

rear-guard, he got across the

;

but

fords, led over his cavalry,

lost,

Bartsch

but by sacrificing a

Oder the succeeding

night.

Schulenburg had saved Augustus his army, but the Saxon king made no use of sonally

retired

to

it.

He

again abandoned Poland, per-

Saxony, and

fortified

Dresden.

While

841

CHARLES IN LEIPSIC.

Charles and Stanislaus were busy driving back sundry Muscovite raids on the eastern border of Poland, Sehulenburg

But he

again assembled an army and reerossed the Oder.

was met by Rhenskjold (the " Parmenio of the Northern Alexander ") at Frauenstadt, February 12, 1706, and though he had twenty thousand men to Rhenskjold's ten thousand, was the Saxon recruits decamping as at Breiutterly defeated,

—

The unequaled

tenfeld.

discipline

which Gustavus Adol-

phus had introduced among the Swedes had lasted one hundred years.

down

to a

The Russians

man

in Sehulenburg's

army were

In Sej^tember, 1706, Charles invaded Saxony.

who had Saxon

Augustus,

shut himself up in Cracow, dared not return to his

At

capital.

Leipsic Charles

His army, be

Liitzen.

cut

to save taking prisoners.

it

camped on the

the same splendid disciiDline he had inherited. dictated at Altranstiidt, near

Leipsic,

field of

was governed by

said to his credit,

Peace was

by which Augustus

renounced the Polish crown and recognized Stanislaus

;

ab-

jured his treaty with Russia and provisioned and paid the

Swedish army for the winter. Thei'e

dier

was some question as

would take

visited

him

to

what part

the Succession

in

this year,

and with

War

;

this brilliant sol-

but Marlborough

his persuasive

tongue and some

English gold, well laid out, won him to the cause of the

allies.

Charles, however, took no part in the war.

Comparisons have sometimes been drawn between Charles

The

and Gustavus.

structure erected

by the

Protestantism to Germany, and the wreck

who found Sweden it,

and

left it

left

Merely

1700

1707

—

to

who saved

by the

other,

kingdom Gustavus had made

stripped of all save honor, speak

selves.

to

the great

one,

for them-

compare the work done by Charles from

his period of success

Gustavus from 1630

to

1632

— with

that done

suffices to ffauae the

by

two men.

ALL OR NONE.

842

Gustavus, opposed by the best generals of the day, in twenty-

Germany; had he

eight months reduced to control all lived Liitzen, he

out-

would have at once dictated peace in Vienna.

Charles, against opposition barely worth the name, in seven

years reduced Poland and invaded Saxony

was insecure

;

;

but his holding

what he took he did not keep, and what he

had received from

his ancestors he lost.

At

same time

the

As

Charles was a brilliant soldier within his limits. tenant, guided

by the discretion of some great captain, he

He

would have been incomparable. rian,

was a good disciplina-

an untiring worker, gallantry personified in

with the true soldier's ambition and

one thing,

a lieu-

— the breadth which

He

skill.

battle,

and

lacked but

puts aside prejudice, which

gauges things as they really are, and which truthfully forecasts the future.

While lead

him

Chai'les

was permitting his hatred of Augustus

to the Elbe,

he

lost sight of the fact that his

to

worst

enemy, Peter, had been given years in which to build up an army, and had utilized the time

now numbered many German

well.

officers

The Russian army of experience. The

czar invaded Poland with sixty thousand men,

to

which

force Charles' lieutenant, Levenhaupt, with his regiments scat-

tered along the border in Livonia, Lithuania and Poland,

could not hold head, and sat

down

at

Lublin to gain control of Poland.

Leopold and later at

Between conquering

Swedes, and pillaging Russians and Poles, the poor land gi'oaned under fearful oppression.

Charles might even

now

have made a peace with Peter at the price of allowing him a port at his

new

capital

;

but he would have

all or

none, and

the Baltic belonged to Sweden. Stanislaus returned to Poland with Rhenskjold in August,

1707

;

Peter prudently retired into Lithuania.

a year in Saxony, Charles

left for

Having spent

Russia in September, 1707,

CHARLES CHOOSES

head of forty-three thousand men

at the

twenty thousand in Poland

;

843

ILL. ;

Levenhaupt had

there were fifteen thousand in

Finland, and recruits were coming from Sweden.

no longer an army soldiers

and

the force

officers

This was

So many

of the old

had been sent home that the

solidity of

But

still

a Swedish

mind

of Charles

of Swedish veterans.

had been impaired.

it

was

army, and with

it

that he would

dethrone Peter as he had done Auoustus.

At

this point

there was no doubt in the

began

his miscalculations.

Peter was at Grodno on the Memel, and here Charles sousrht

him out

in January, 1708, at the

head of his cavalry

;

and

though, riding on with his wonted recklessness, he reached the place at the head of but six hundred horse, Peter,

was almost taken prisoner, precipitately

retired.

who

A^^ith pru-

dent foresight the czar had made up his mind not to fight Charles, but to starve

him

What

out.

he lacked in brilliant

conduct he more than made up in good judgment. routes were open to Charles

:

on newly founded

burg via Pleskow and Novgorod, safe and apt results

;

ert the

to yield

good

on Moscow via Smolensk, a marsh part way, a desrest

the first he

was

Three

St. Peters-

peril

a southern route, the least good of

;

was always near

enough; to

his base

;

select the third

all.

On

on the second there

was a leap

in the

dark.

The whole Russian army had rendezvoused ince of Minsk.

in the prov-

Despite the perilous route and the sparsely

peopled country, quite unequal to subsist an army, Charles

pushed on, and by June 25, 1708, he had reached the Beresina at Borissov, where the czar had assembled to defend his land.

Charles,

by a march up

river,

turned him

out of his intrenchments, and he retired, devastating every-

thing on the

way

to retard the

Swedes.

Charles followed,

defeating by a bold attack a body of twenty thousand Rus-

MAZEPPA FAILS CHARLES.

844

marsh

sians intrenched behind a

at HoUosin,

and crossed the

Dniej)er (Borysthenes) at Moghilev, then the most easterly

Peter retired by way of Smolensk along

of the Polish cities.

He

the great highway to Moscow.

On September

as Charles lost.

was gaining in strength

22 Charles came near meet-

ing his death in one of the numerous vanguard fights which daily occurred,

and

in

which he exposed himself as Gustavus

used to do.

His position was becoming a perilous one, but he could not see

To

it.

enemy

fight an

enemy who

will stand, to pursue a flying

into a populous country,

is

one thing

ever-retreating foe into a desert

is

safe to

scarcely doubtful that Charles later the great Corsican,

worse

still,

would have been

had he pushed on

to

an

to follow

;

no captain.

It

lost, as

Moscow

;

is

was but,

he was persuaded to turn aside from the straight

road to a southerly one into the Ukraine, by the Cossack

hetman Mazeppa, who proposed

who promised

to join

him with

to revolt

czar,

and

men on

the

Allies

and

from the

thirty thousand

Desna, and with abundant provisions and gold. food were what Charles

now most

needed.

On

the Desna

Charles purposed to winter and prepare for a march on Mos-

cow

in the spring.

But anticipating the

destroyed Mazeppa's preparations, and the rendezvous,

it

plan, the Russians

when Charles reached

was to find only a fugitive demanding help,

not a prince with reinforcements.

Charles' only hope was

now based on Levenhaupt, who was following with fifteen thousand men and a convoy of eight thousand wagons. But the Swedish general had already fallen a prey to Peter's

army

men, who day after day forced battle now much better troops, though at fearLevenhaupt's numbers down to five thousand

of forty thousand

on him, and with his ful cost, cut

men, and seized the convoy. a wreck of brave

men and

Levenhaupt joined Charles with

without victual or munitions.

The

CHARLES DISABLED.

845

Swedish monarch was cut

off

was reduced

thousand half-starved men, was

to twenty-four

obliged to abandon

from Poland and Sweden,

guns from lack of horses to haul

his

them, and had no prospects for the future unless Stanislaus

new army. which had led him

could reach him with a

with caution

It

was boldness unmixed

to this

inability to

;

gaufe

The winter was

facts as they were, to foresee contingencies.

passed amid constant attacks by the roving bodies of liussians.

In April, 1709, Charles had but twenty thousand

Swedes

left,

still

aimed

—

at

but, with a courage

Moscow.

worthy of a better

Towards the end

of

May

fate,

he

he under-

took the siege of Pultowa, with the aid of native tribes which

about doubled his numbers

;

the place was of no importance,

but contained an abundance of victual.

how

Charles had tauoht

make war, and he found Pultowa well garrisoned and hard to take. The czar came to its relief with eighty thousand men of regular troops, plus forty thouthe Russians

to

sand Calmucks and Cossacks.

Charles went out to meet the

enemy, and on the 7th of July beat one of but he was unfortunately wounded.

its

detachments

Peter came up, and

Charles had to confide the attack of the

8th to Rhens-

kjbld, he himself being carried on a litter.

The Swedes had been besieging Pultowa from one side The Russians approached from the other and, after

only.

crossing the Vorskla, built an intrenched camp, which shortly

they gave up for a second one nearer the town. to this, opposite

the

As

a wing

Swedish camp, a number of redoubts

were constructed between two patches of woods, a body of troops was sent to attempt a crossing of the Vorskla at a point nearer the

down

town held by the Swedes, and Peter

to await events, as

he could weU afford to do.

usual, Charles determined on

parity in

summary

sat

As

attack, despite dis-

numbers, and on the morning of July

8,

1709,

PULTOWA.

846

the Swedish foot in four columns advanced to assault the redoubts, followed

by the horsemen

Between

in six columns.

the redoubts had been set up a large body of Russian horse

was summarily attacked and driven

this

back beyond the large camp.

;

in confusion well

The two woods were

too near

together to afford a chance to form line, and the king's intention

was

between the redoubts without attempting to

to pass

,//"

//

Piiltowa.

capture them, form opposite and assault the intrenched camp.

The bulk left

of the

wing took

army

finally, after great loss,

Backing on one the

fire

of

carried out this programme, but the

to assaulting the redoubts in its front,

and

got cut off from the rest of the army.

of the woods, the king

formed

one hundred and twenty Russian

line,

under

guns,

and

advanced to the assault of the camp.

Parts of his line

reached

But

it,

penetrated

line the gallant

sians

it

;

parts did not.

all

along the

Swedes encountered opposition such

had never yet shown.

as Rus-

Peter's seven years had borne

CHARLES AMONG THE TURKS. and he now had a stanch army.

fruit,

847

Gradually falling

back, the Swedes were followed up, and a heavy battle ensued Charles, on his

at the edge of the plain. little

;

litter,

could do but

General Rhenskjold was captured, and after sacrificing

a large number of his men, the king saw that the battle

was

lost.

in fairly

Vorslda.

He

retired

good order

by the way he had come, and moved

to the confluence of the

There he counted,

The

sixteen thousand men.

all told,

Dnieper and

invalided and for duty,

loss in the battle

had been

fully

four thousand.

The

battle of

Pultowa ended the career of Charles XII., so

far as any but trivial operations were concerned. tion of

The

posi-

Sweden was rudely disturbed Peter ;

established that of Russia.

Having taken

refuge with the Turks, Charles remained

with them until 1714, obstinately seeking

through their means to conduct further

campaigns against Russia.

In 1711 he

did succeed in placing Peter in a questionable situation

czar cleverly

on the Pruth, but the

managed

the Turks, in which

to it

buy a peace from

was provided that

Charles might return unmolested to Sweden.

But, angry at the peace, the king

would not leave Bender, a camp

in Bessara-

Russian Soldier.

bia where he played the role of a species of royal captive, and which, indeed, in 1713, he undertook to de-

fend against an army that sought to compel him to withdraw.

Nothing militates

so

greatly

against the

reputation

Charles XII. as a soldier, as this refusal to return home. this era of danger,

ability enough,

Sweden needed her

Sweden had

to bring matters

elasticity

king.

of

In

Charles had

enough, between them

back to some kind of satisfactory

basis.

LACKING ONE TRAIT.

848

His strategic errors in given

:

Russian campaign are easily

his

another and greater soldier committed such.

strategy

is

sound which has not patriotism as a greatest

have sought

soldiers

for-

But no

basis.

The

primarily the

good of the fatherland: Alexander made Mace-

don govern the earth

;

Hannibal had Rome

his feet, but stupid Carthage

the gift of

Caesar and Napoleon, on the theory

;

L'Etat

were patriotic strategists

c'est moi,

Gustavus and Frederick were truly such. this

dice

shattered.

is

—

military reputation

the

test

XII.

at

would not accept

spite

is

return to his

From mere

the better

word

country when

On

Charles

of

childish preju-

— he would

his country

not

needed

him, because a free return was given him, not Turkish Soldier,

conquered.

He

remained in Bender yet three

years, wearing

out his welcome, but treated

with great magnificence.

Many arch

;

volumes have been written about this singular mon-

nothing

is

easier than to

fill

others.

genius, without a balance-wheel, and in

greater part of genius.

Brilliant as

He was

war the

a

man

of

latter is the

few men have ever been,

a soldier to his finger-tips, he remains on the page of history as holding no greater rank than a magnificent corps-com-

He

mander.

returned to Sweden in 1714, and was shot, by

an assassin probably,

Sweden was despoiled minor power. Charles

What

XII., — a

abundant

skill,

which he needed

in

front of

Friedrichshall, in 1718.

of all her provinces,

she

owed

to

and became a

Gustavus she

lost

through

monarch possessing abundant courage,

abundant means, but lacking the one to

make him

truly great,

—

discretion.

trait

APPENDIX

A.

SOME MODERN MARCHES. Marches,

in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were apt to

be slow, owing to bad roads, long trains, numerous non-combatants,

and the habit

of ploying

which roads had

to

an army into several columns, for some of Following are a few samples,

be prepared.

most of which, tried by our standard, are ordinary a few, good for any era. 1. In October and November, 1632. Gustavus, with about 20,000 men of all arms, marched over bad roads, from Donauworth to Naumburg, some 270 miles by the route he took, in 18 days, or 15 ;

miles a day. 2.

In August, 1644, Cond^, with about 10,000 men of

marched from

the Moselle to Freiburg,

210 miles

in

all

arms,

13 days, or 16

miles a day. 3.

In 1657, Turenne, with over 30,000

from the Scheldt-Sambre region or 25 miles a day. 4.

In June, 1674, Turenne, with 9,000

from the Rhine 5.

to Sinsheim,

90 miles

in

men

of all arms,

marched

Lys, 75 miles in 3 days,

to the

4

men

marched 17^ miles a day.

of all arms,

days, or

In October, 1704, Charles XII., with 20.000

men

of all arms,

marched from the Vistula to the Oder, over bad roads, 180 miles in 10 days, or 18 miles a day. 6. In August, 1706, Eugene, with 25,000 men of all arms, marched from Reggio to Villa Stellona, 240 miles in 16 days, or 15 miles a day. Counting out a rest-day, owing to intense heat, the rate was 16 miles a day. 7.

In July, 1708, Marlborough, with 65.000

men

of all

arms,

marched fi-om near Brussels on Oudenarde, 40 miles in 48 hours, or 20 miles a day. 8. In September, 1709, the duke of Hesse-Cassel, with 10,000 men of all arms, marched from Douaj' to Obourg and Havre, 49 miles in 56 hours, or 21 miles a day.

APPENDIX

850

^

m H
! artillery, 43. Casimir, John, 66, 153. Cassano, battle of, 740-742. Casualties, not a sure test of discipline, 484. Catinat, wins victory at Staffarda, 658, ;

et seq. ;

in Italy,

by Eugene, 677

676

;

outflanked

679

retires,

;

;

re-

lieved, 679, 680. Catholic League, 92. Cavalry, rise of, 1 displaced, 2 ; cannot stand alone, 2 massed by Constantine, 2 ; destroys an army, 3 upjiermosfc, 3 barbarian, 3 Roman adopts bow, 4 tactics in 16th century, 22 prefers firearms, 24 ; how divided in 16th century, 39, 40; irregular, 40 slow, 41 Swedish fast, 41 improved by Gustavus, 52 position in line, 53 the jjrincipal ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

arm, 445; improvements in, 571; uses firearms too much, 573 numer;

ous, 576.

Champ Charles Charles Charles Charles Charles Charles

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

sieges Pultowa, 845 wounded, 84.5 beaten at Pultowa, 846 takes refuge with Turks, 847 at Bender, 847, 848 criticism of, 847, 848 ; his death, 848. Chiari operation, 682. Christian of Anhalt, 90, 95. Chi-istian of Brunswick, 97, 99. Christian of Denmark, attacks Sweden, 74 101 entei-s war, 103 defeated, 109; sues for peace, 114; let off easUy, 114; helps Stralsund, 134. Circles, German, 89. Citizen soldier, 32. Clempenow, 168. Coehorn, 578, 695. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Colberg, 181, 184

seq.

et

captured,

;

207.

Company, size of, 38 officers of, Cond^ the Great, his youth, 450

39.

;

advances on Roeroy, 451 in line before Rocroy, 452 at the battle of, 454 et seq. ; joins Turenne, 458 divides forces, 460; attacks Mercy, 460; rejoins Turenne. 461 attacks again, 462 outflanks Mercy, 463 advances on Philipsburg, 464 friendship for Turenne, 567 marches up Neckar manoeuvres with Turenne, 475 against Mercy, 476 at AUerheim, 479 et seq. ; serves under Duke of Orleans, 488 succeeds to command, 489 takes Furnes, 490 moves on Dunkirk, 492, 493 opens lines, 494 opposed by Spanish army, 494 caprelieves Courtures Dunkirk, 495 wins in Catalonia, 514 tray, 495 battle of Lens, 515, 516 imprisoned, 520 leads army of the princes, 524 attacks Turenne at Gien, 525 operates near Paris, 529 et seq. ; at battle of St. Antione, 530 et seq. ; at in Champagne, Corbeil, 532, 533 533 invades Picardy, 535 his campaign on the Somme, 536 et seq. beseiges Arras, 540 et seq. ; defeated his operations on at Arras, 545 Scheldt, 546 relieves Valenciennes, re548 et seq. ; able work of, 55 1 lieves Cambray, 555; proposes to reaches relieve Dunkirk, 560, 561 Dunkirk, 563 compared to Turenne, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Blanc, battle I.

defeats Schulenburg, 840 dethrones Augustus, 840 dictates terms in Leipsic, 841 influenced by Marlborough, 841 compared to Gustavus, 841, 842 follows Peter, 843, 844 his strategic mistakes, 844 moves into the Ukraine, 844 be-

;

Cambray, siege and

665

839

of,

523

et seq.

at Naseby, 429.

Worcester, 434 IX. 66 death of, 73.

II. at

et seq.

;

Philip, 76, 77, 83. William, 170, 171. XII., his character, 832;

com-

bination against him, 832 attacks and defeats Denmark, 833 ; relieves Narva, 836 crosses Dwina, 837 defeats Augustus of Poland at Klissow, 838 ; defeats Saxons at Pol tusk, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

855

conquers Franehe Comt^, with army invading Holland, 586, 587 against Prince of Orange, 600 at Senef 602.

Dunbar, 433. Dunes, battle of the, 563 et seq. Dunkii'k, captured by Cond^, 488 et seq. ; description of, 490, 491 siege

Conti, T., 158, 161, 170, 176. Corbeil, operations near, 532, 533. Corpus Evangelicorum, 113, 248,302, 331, 336, 3-i7Courtray, 495. Craatz, 331. Cr^cy, foot at, 6, 15.

of, by Turenue, .553; its situation, 559 surrender, 566. Dwina, the battle of, 837. Dyle, lines of the, 747 et seq.

539, 567

588

;

;

;

,

;

;

Cromwell, 421 et seq. ; begins New Model, 422 imitator of Gustavus, 422 his yeomen, 422 at Edgehill, 422 how he learned his drill, 424 at Grantham and Gainsborough, 424; at Marston Moor, 425 his soldiers really regulars, 427 New Model, 427 at Naseby, 428 in south of England, 430; in Wales, 430; at Preston Pans, 430 in Ireland, 431 et seq.; at Drogheda, 431 at Wexford and Clonmel, 431 his " massacaptain-general, 432 at cres," 431 Dunbar, 433 at Worcester, 434 et gauged seq. ; as a general, 435 etseq., ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Edgehill. 423, 424. Edict of Restitution, 115, 147, 330. Electors, 88.

Empire, German, its constitution, 88. Engineering, Swedish, 60 grows, 578. English long-bow, 10. Entzheim, battle of, 614 et seq. ; losses ;

at,

('.24.

Eric, King, 65. Essex, 422. Estates, Swedish, 65. Estates of the empire, 89. Etampes, siege of, 526 et seq. Eugene, Prince, 645, 665 his early services, 670, 671 at Zenta, 673, 674 ;

;

in arrest, 673, 674 seq. ; builds road down ;

675 et Adige, 677

in Italy,

;

outflanks Catinat, 678 advances to the Oglio, 680 his victory at ("hiari, 682 captures Cremona and Villeroi, 685 retires south of the Po, 687, 688 at Luzzara, 689 compared to

553.

;

Cross-bow, 15, 16, 20. Crusades, contained no lessons, Crutch for musket, 37.

;

8, 9.

;

;

Culverin, 19. Custrin,211, 217,23.5. Cutts, Lord, at Blenheim, 726.

;

;

meets Marlborough, 712 at StoUhofen, 712 marches to joins Marljoin Marlborough, 717 borough, 719; reconnoitres, 720; 724 his record as battle, decides on a general, 730 et seq. ; Italy, 737 et seq.; checked on the Mincio, 738;

Vendome, 691

;

;

;

;

Damitz, 162, 163, 165.

Dammgarten,

175.

;

Dampierre, 93 et seq. Danzig, JSigismund in, 85 its 122 value, 123 naval fight at, 128 ;

;

;

;

Daun, General, 765

Demmin, 180, 202, De Witt, 583, 587.

et seq.,

770.

tries to cross

;

;

;

;

;

Diet, German, 88. Dinkelsbiihl, 476, 484. Discipline, none till 16th century, 25, 57 of Swedish army, 58, 59 ; improved, 578. Dominium Maris Baltici, 121, 151 established, 272. Donauworth, 91, 312, .331, 716. Don John, 555, 556, 560 et seq. ;

Douay, captured by allies, 818 et seq. Villars and Berwick at, 818 cannot ;

relieve, 819.

;

;

204.

Dragoons, 24, 40, 52. Drogheda, 431. Dueling, 59.

young Vendome's position, Adda, 739 attacks Cassano, 740 twice wounded, manceu\Tes on retires, 742 741 Adda, 743 unable to reach Savoy, 743 had manceuvred cleverly, 744, turns

739

siege raised, 133. D'Areo, Count, 714, 715.

in Turin campaign, 759 et seq. ; starts for Savoy, south of Po, 760

745

;

his rapid march, 761 et seq. ; reaches reaches Turin, 763 Stradella, 762 beats enemy, 766 liis march against joins Marlborough, Toulon, 770 at advances on Lille, 784 773 Lille, 785 et seq. ; over-gallant, 789 opposes Villare in Flanders, 793 and Marlborough reconnoitres, 794 and Marlborough at Tournay, 795 advance on Mons, 796 turn Villars' line, 796; at Malplaquet, 799 et seq.; compared with Marlborough, 809 at Douay, 818 et seq. ; advances with ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

856

Marlborough on Arras, 820 with Marlborough captures Bethune, St. Venant and Aire, 820, 821 on the Rhine, 821 succeeds Marlborough in command of Dutch army, 822; suffers from bad faith of 'English, ;

;

;

823

;

captures Quesnoy, 824

;

his po-

Marchiennes-Denain-Lan825 broken by Villars, 82(j on Tournay, 827 operates campaigns against on Rhine, 828 victory at Belgrade, Turks, 829 sition

at

drecies, retires

;

;

;

;

Grand-tactics, 55. Great Elector, 584, 589, 607, 625, 643.

Greek

fire, 18.

Greifenhagen, 170, 188 et seq. Greifswalde, 206, 235 captured, 236. Grenadiers, how armed, 35. Gunpowder, substances like, ancient, 17; references to, 17, 18; in 14th century, 18; at Cr^cy, 18; used by Moors, 1 8 an effect, not a cause, 27 keynote of new science of war, ;

;

;

29.

Gunlocks, 37. Guns, kinds of Swedish, 42

829.

Fairfax, 426, 428, 432.

Falkenberg, 171, 220 et seq. Ferdinand, ilmperor, 92, 94 his suchis opincesses, 111; his ideal, 113 ion of Gustavus, 1 44 his situation in ill case, in 1630, 147 277, 278 303 turns to Wallenstein, 304, 322 at end of his resources, 326 turns the winner at to Wallenstein, 327 Liitzen, 397 413 makes peace with Saxony, 420. Feudalism, encouraged horseman, 6 ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

:

;

disappears, 17.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

File, decreases, 49, 572. Flag, Swedish, 48.

Footman, main

reliance, 2. Forlorn hopes, 23. Fortification, permanent, 61. Fortresses, necessary to store war material, 31 their influence, 579. Frankfort on Main, 291. Frankfort on Oder, 211. Frederick of the Palatinate, 93 ; chosen king, 94. ;

;

;

;

;

Fleurus, battle of, 657. Flossgraben, 388, 391 et seq.

et seq.,

Gustavus, no art until his day, 5 first perfects system, 34 organizes infantry, '.}& lightens muskets, 37 his organization, 39, 40 his cavalry organization, 41 speeds up cavalry 41, 52 his artillery, 42 lightens guns, 42, 43 introduces uniforms, 48 orihis method of ginates brigade, 50 originates mobility, battle, 54, 55 55 decreases train, 57 introduces prayers and strict promotion, 58 his regulations, 58 a clever engineer, 60 his " Instructions," 60 birth of, 66; as a child, 67 growing qualities, 67 his education, 67 his tutors, 68 his studies, 68, 69 enters army, 69 his favorite studies, 69, 70 his first glimpse of war, 70 declared of age, 70 his first command, 70; his clever ruse, 70; his first campaign, 70, 71 ascends throne, 73 his war with Denmark, 74 et serj. ; his novel method, 74 nearly drowned, 75 his success at Waxholm, 75 makes peace, 76 his loveaffairs, 76 his war with Russia, 77, 78 invades Ingria, 77 gains reputation, 78 his peace with Russia, 78 travels, his truce with Poland, 79 8U his love for Countess Brahe. 80 organizes finances his morality, 80 and troops, 81 invades Livonia, 82 ; captures Riga, 83 marches through Courland, 83 conquers truce, 83 ; compels Danzig to neutrality, 84 his work his support at home, 85 his in Thirty Years' War, 87, 88 views on German struggle, 101 ; his proposes to help military plan, 102 Protestants, 1 03 aids Stralsund, 1 12 et seq. ; his ideal, 113; determines to enter Germany, 114, 136; sails for Dwina, 117; defeats Poles twice, 118; his victory at Walhof, 119; ;

Field fortifications, 61.

Freiburg, 447, 448

leather,

;

43.

operations at, 458

829,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Fronde, wars of the, 519 ; ended, 534. Fuensaldegna, Count, 541 et seq. Fuentes, Count, 453, 456. Fugger, 244, 288. Furstenberg, 244, 324.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Gall&s, 321, 322, 345, 365, 371, 381, 441.

Galwav, Lord, 811. Gardie de la, 68, 76, 153. Garz, 170, 187 Gassion, 452.

;

;

et seq.

;

George William, elector of Brandenburg, 121, 193, 195, 2 Gien, operation of, 525. Gosiecovvski, 118. Grammont, 458, 479

17.

et seq.,

484.

;

INDEX. 119; his blunt talk his plans, Erandeuburg-, 121 121; besieges Danzig', 122; revicthis reverses uals Mewe, 12o, 124 sails for Pillau,

to

;

;

rejoins army, 126; captures Prussian forces, 12(j; wounded at Danzig, 126 too ven•while

absent,

12()

;

;

again wounded, 127 not well storms Wormditt, 128 naval enplaced at Danzig, 121) gagement near Danzig, 131 victory near Danzig, loo raises siege of Danzig, 13o too little known of his excluded from Conbattles, 133 appealed to by Germany, gfress, 136 136 fails in IStuhm operation, 138 wins his victory at Nogat, 138 six years' truce from Poland, 139 end, Polish wars 140; his trainhis ing in, 141 his improvements in, 141 his motives in entering Geroutlook in Germany, 143, 150 many, 146 et seq. ; demands on France, 149 his high tone, 149 his plans, 151, 152 issues no declarasails from Sweden, tion of war, 155 lands in Germany, 157 156, 157 turesome. 127

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

reconnoitres,

1(>0

and Wollin, 160

;

clears

Usedoni

captures Stettin, his conquests, 162, 163; his position, 165 captured, 164 166 extends his conquests, 166 extends his occupation. 166 et seq. moves on Mecklenburg, 173; receives no German help, 174; his five column plan, 177 his caution, 180 defeats Savelli. 180 manoeuvres near Stettin, 184 ; his councils of war, 18.5 attacks Garz, 187 storms Greifenhagen, 189 defeats Schaumberg, 190 forces neutrality on Brandenburg, 193 camps at Biirwalde, 193 his gain so far, 194 makes treaty with France, 195 his treaty with Magdeburg', 198 moves on Demmin, 202 captures Loitz, 204 captures Demmin, 204 his strongline, 205 contemplates winter-quarters, 205 moves on Frankfort, 210 captures Ciistrin, 211; storms Frankfort, 212 his audacity, 212 captures Landsberg, 213 his plans, 214 plans ;

fortifies

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

relief of

;

Magdeburg, 216

starts for his road barred, 218. 220, 224 ; retires, 230 his position on the Spree-Havel, 231 ; forces Brandenburg to his plan, 235 receives reinforcements, 237 ; hLs bastion, 238 marches on Elbe, 238 crosses, 239 ;

Elbe, 218

;

;

;

;

;

857

almost disheartened, 240; attacks Tilly's cavalry parties, 240 defeats Tilly at Werben, 242 his position safe, 243 on the Havel, 246 advances towards Saxony, 250 makes treaty with Saxony, 251 crosses the Elbe, 251 advances on TLlly, 2-53; wins at Breitenfeld, 260 the Protestant hero, 270 what he had gained, 273 et seq. ; his approaches to Wallen stein, 275 what route ? 276 rejects suggested march on \"ienna, 2*7 his plans, 278, 279 criticised, 280, 281 heads for the Main, 282 new strategic position, 282 his forces at Erf urt283 captures Wiirzburg, 285 storms Maiienbiu-g, 285 new treaties, 286 moves down the Main, 290; captures places down to Frankfort, 291 attempts to assassinate, 293 crosses Rhine, 294 captures Mainz, 294 levies contributions, 295 fortifies Mainz, 295 drives Spaniards away from Main, 296 forces, 299 et seq. ; holds court at Mainz, 301 might have become king of Germany, 302 had entirely changed affairs, 303 his situation, 305; too many detachments, 306 moves against Tilly, 308 enters Niirnberg, 310 crosses Danube, 310-312 his chances on the Lech, 314 reconnoitres, 315 throws bridge over Lech, 316; forces Lech, 316; does not pursue, 317; moves up to Augsburg, 318 advances on Ingolstadt, 319 besieges Ingolstadt, moves on Munich, 320 his 320 honesty misconstrued, 326 politics turn against him, 329 labors with John George, 329-33 starts for Saxony, 332 not sufficiently concentrated, 332 too late to prevent junction of enemies, 333 his uncertainty as to action, 334 its cause, 335 his forces, 336 fidelity to Niirnberg, 337 intrenches Niirnberg, 338 cautious, 341 offers battle, 343, 3.52, 354, 361 orders in his lieutenants, 348 his plans for Oxenstiern, 349 roads open to his reinforcements, 3-50; his reinforcements join, 351; captures Fiirth, 355 determines to attack Wallenstein, 355 storms Alte Veste, 356 criticised for his attack, 358 negotiations with Wallenstein, 359; breaks the deadlock, 361 frank acknowledgment, 363 moves to Swabia, 365 contemplates ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

1

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

858

movement down Danube, 366 and on Constance, 866 compared to Wal;

;

373 his plans, 376 dang-er his relations with to his base, 376 other nations, 376 marches north, 377 urges John George to action, 380 his council of war, 382 enerlenstein,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

getic,

383

decides on battle, 3S5

;

Ireton, 428. Ironsides, 422, 425.

;

Jesuits, 90, 113, 122, 133.

John George, Elector

of Saxony, 90, refuses Gustavus passage, 219 blamed for disaster to Magdeburg, 230; his Third Party,

248;

gence, 399

et

;

;

;

;

will, 399 quick temper, 399; piety, 399; poetry, 399; his character, 400 justice, 400; his intimates, 400 busy habits, 401 opinion of his opponents, 401 courage, 401, 402 his method, 402 his work in Thirty Years' War, 402-406 as opposed to Wallenstein, 406 his ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

his position at Liitzen, 396 et seq. his tactical purpose at Liitzen, 392 his slow manoeuvring, 392 killed, 394 too little known about him, intelli398 his appearance, 399 ;

317

92, 96, 195,

treats with Gustavus, 251; joins hiin with his army, 252 ; urges battle, 252; 277, 303, 321,326; his

treachery, 329 seq.

;

Wal-

;

makes peace with Ferdi-

ence, 379 nand, 419.

;

Jolin,

negotiates with

;

.330 ; his vacillation, 365 faithless, 372 his indiffer-

lenstein,

King, 65.

;

;

;

;

;

alternating boldness and caution, 407 his councils of war, 408 his decisiveness, 408 ; his broad method, 408 his vigor, 409 the secret of his successes, 410 his work made toward civilization, 410 father of the miodern art of war, 411; his lieutenants' failure emphasizes his method, 440 his clear-cut purpose, 486; his method, 517; imitated, 576 unintelligently so, 579 chief of his era, 581 his influence on battles, 733 compared to Charles XII., 842 a pati-iot, 848. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Kagg, 161,

167.

Kara, Mustapha, 646 et seq., 829, Kirchheim, operation near, 502. Klissow, battle

of, 838.

Knight, his value, 6 at Hastings, 6 had no art, 6 irresistible on good ground, 6 useless on poor, 6 unreliable, 8 dismounted, 16. ;

;

;

;

;

;

Kniijhausen, 161, 182, 203, 207, 361, 381, 391.

Koniezpolski, breaks siege of Danzig, 125 127, 129 operates against Danzig, 132 defeated near Danzig, 132 ;

;

;

135, 137.

Konigsberg, 121.

Kosen

defile, 379, 381.

;

Gustavus Vasa, 63, 64.

La

Halberd, Swiss, Hamilton, 237. Hand gun, 18.

La FeuiUade,

Fert^, 454 et seq., 528 et seq., 548 554, 556. 738, 760. Landsberg, 190, 193; captured, 213. et seq.,

11.

Hesse, prince of, in Italy, 760 et seq. Hesse-Cassel, invaded by Tilly, 244. Hocquincourt, .524 et seq., 557. Holeke, 345, 349, 365, 371, 414. Holland, invasion of by France, 582 seq.

;

Landsknecht, 14. Lauenburg, 183. Lech, the, 314. Legion, degenerates, 2 et

peculiar terrain, 588.

Horn, Field-Marshal Gustavus, 82, 173, 182, 185, 201, 290, 293, 306, 368, 414, 417.

207-209, 231, 261, 307, 318, 323, 324,

Infantry, loses caste, 4 Gothic in Italy, 5 Teutons used, 5 reappears, 10 reasserts itself, 1 1 16tli century tactics, 22; in 17tli century, 35; ;

;

;

;

;

Swedish, how armed, 36 how it fired, 52 Turenne complains of French, 465 improvement in arms of, 570. ;

;

;

Ingolstadt, 319, 320.

;

relies

on mis-

siles, 3.

Leipsic, convention of, 196, 2.34 captured by Tilly, 250 the plain of, 258 captured by Wallenstein, 375. Lens, battle of, 515, 516. Lesczinski, Stanislaus, 839. Leslie, at Dunbar, 433. Leslie, Colonel, 134, 158, 161. ;

;

;

Levenhaupt, 824 et seq. Leyden, 491, 495, 565. Lille, siege of, 784 et seq. ; first convoy reaches, 785 lines opened, 786 French attempt at relief, 787 met by allies, 788; heavy fighting at, 788, 789 Boufflers surrenders town, 789 losses at, 789. ;

;

;

;

;

INDEX. Logistics of Thirty Years' War, 513. Loitz, 203. Longbow, English, 10, 14, 1.5. Lorraine, Charles of, at Vienna, 646 et seq. ; in battle of Vienna, 652. Lorraine, duke of, 287, 295, 327, 469 et seq., 495, 527 et seq., 532, 607, 621, 643. Lottuni, Count, 695, 781, 799 et seq. Louis XIV., 519, 527, 553, 557, 568, 582 et seq., 588, 643, 644, 654, 659, 669, 672, 699, 737, 790, 792. Louvois, 588 his system, 656. Liibeek, peace of, 136. Liineburg, 367, 370, 380. Liitheranism, 89. Latter, battle of, 108. Liitzen, vicinity of, 378; strength of uncertain records of, armies, 384 387 description of terrain, 388 position of armies at, 388 et seq. ; the course of the battle, 392 et seq. ; a Swedish victory, 396. Luxemburg, Duke of, 589, 600; at Fleurus, 657 at Steenkirke, 660 at Neerwinden, 663 his death, 665. Luzzara, battle of, 689. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

859

Manoeuvring, supplants battles, 31 slow, 575 highly considered, 580. Mansfeld, Count, 95-99, 105, 107, 108. Maradas, 371. Marches, how conducted, 24, 54, 573. Marlborough, Duke of, early services, 692 et seq. ; in the Netherlands, 694 restrained by Dutch deputies, 695 moves into Germany, 710 not an exceptional march, 711 meets Euoperates with Prince gene, 712 Louis, 712, 713 assault on the Schellenberg, 714 et seq. ; devastates Bavaria, 717; joins Eugene, 719; joint forces, 719 they decide on battle, 723 his record as a general, 730, 736 his plan to invade France, 74() breaks retires from Moselle, 747 through Dyle lines, 748 at Ramillies, 750 et seq. ; operates against Vendome, 769 manoeuvres against Vendorae, 771 et seq.; marches on Oudenarde, 773 et seq. ; success of desires to invade his strategy, 782 at held back, 783 France, 782 Lille, 785 et seq. ; relieves Brussels, Flanders, opposes Villars in 791 793 reconnoitres, 794 and Eugene and Eugene adat Tournay, 795 vance on Mons, 796 turn Villars' line, 796 at Malplaquet, 799 et seq. ; his brilliant career at an end, 808 compared with Eugene, 809 at Douay, 818 et seq. ; advances with Eugene on Arras, 820 with Eugene captures Bethune, St. Venant and Aire, 820, 821 invests and takes Bouchain, 822 influences Charles ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

:

;

;

;

;

;

blockaded, 197; treaty with Gustavus, 198 Gustavus' 216 et seq ; siege of, plans as to, 213, 221 et seq.; disagreements within, 221, 222; its defenses, 221 et st-q. ; storming of outworks, 223 Tilly Falkenberg withdraws arrives, 223 within walls, 224 Gustavus cannot suburbs leveled, 225 reach, 225 treats with Tilly negotiates, 225 Tilly, 2^6 et seq. ; stormed, 227; plundered, 228 burned, 228, 297. Mainz, siege of, 291 et seq. ; Gustavus' court at, 301. Malchin, 204. Malplaquet, terrain of, 798 et seq. battle of, 799 et seq- ; Marlborough and Eiigene reconnoitre, 799 Vilplan of lars heavily intrenches, 8U0 the battle, 801 Schulemberg attacks, 803 Lottum attacks. 803 both thrown back, 804 the Prince of Orange assaults, 804 defeated with heavy loss, 804 Eugene pushes back Villars, 805 Withers attacks Villars' left, 805 Villars weakens his centre, 805 Marlborough pushes in Orkney, 805 Orange again assaults, 806 Boufflers' fine retreat, 806 immense losses, 807 without

Magdeburg,

170, 171

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

result, 808.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

XII., 841. Marsaglia, battle of, 666. Marsin, 479 et seq., 705, 707, 721

;

at

Blenheim, 725 et seq., 760. Marston Moor, 425. Maurice of Nassau, his improvements. 21, 34.

Maximilian, 90 made elector, 98 his ideal, 113; rewarded, 114; 302,310; appeals to retires from Rain, 317 Wallenstein, 319 retires to RatisAVallenstein, of bon, 320; afraid 33i) starts to join Wallenstein, 332 joins Wallenstein, 342. Mazarin, 445, 519, 527 et seq., 530. Mazeppa, 844 et seq. Mecklenburg, 172 dukes reinstated, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

236.

Melos, Field-Marshal, 451. Mercenary, favored, 8 ; dangers

of.

INDEX.

860

Mercy, Field-Marshal, 447, 458, 460 et seq., 470 et seq., 479 et seq. Mergentheiiu, operations at, 468 et seq. battle of, 478 et seq. Mewe, operation at, 12o et seq. Monroe, 166, 182. Mons, besieged by Marlborough and Eugene, 71*7. Montecuculi, 175, 324, 509, 589 early moves life and services, 592, 593 on the Main, 593 evades Turenne, 59(') crosses Main, 597 joins Prince marches on Rhine, of Orange, 600 633 et seq. ; moves on Philipsburg, 636 crosses llhine, 637 recrosses, 637 moves back of Rench, 639 turned out of his position, 64 645. Morgarten, horsemen destroyed at, 6 Swiss victory at, 11, 12. Morner, 68. ;

;

;

;

;

ough sends Overkirk to turn French 779; Marlborough and Eugene envelop enemy, 780 French right,

;

781

defeated,

781 Marlborough pursues next day, 781. ;

losses,

;

Outpost service, 575. Overkirk, 695, 747. Oxenstiern, Axel, 68 prime minister, 73; 127, 152, 159, 166, 169, 178 j advises march on Vienna, 276 281, ;

;

308, 323, 348, 352, 361, 366, 367, 375, 377, 413, 439.

;

;

;

;

1

,

;

Mortar,

9, 44.

Munich, 321, 331. Musketeer, appears, 20 how armed, 35 position in line, 50. ;

;

Palatinate, devastation of, 616 succession war, 644 et seq. Pappenheim defeats Lauenburg, 183, blockades Magdeburg, 197, 196 209 attacks Magdeburg, 223 his activity at Magdeburg, 225 et seq. ;

;

;

;

storms Magdeburg, 227 retires from Elbe, 239; at Breitenfeld, 260 et in seq. ; separates from Tilly, 288 Westphalia, 296, 367-369 et seq.; marches towards Wallenstein, 375, ordered 378 sent to Halle, 381 back, 384 killed, 395. Pasewalk, 169. Passau, convention of, 89. Pay, of troops, 55, 56. Peterborough, Lord, 811. Peter the Great, his character, 832 besieges Narva, 834 invades Poland, 842 retires before Charles, 843 buys peace at Pruth, 847. Philipsburg captured, 465. ;

;

;

Narva, battle

of,

835

et seq. ;

losses at,

836.

Naseby, battle of, 428 et seq. Naiimburg, 379. Navy, Swedish, 62. Neerwinden, battle of, 663. Netherlands, develop engineering, 26. Nidda, operation on, 499 et seq. Non-combatants, 60. Nordlingen, 412 et seq. ; battle of, 417 et seq., 475 et seq. Niirnberg,293, 297, 298, 336 et seq. ; its defenses, 339, 340 its troops, 340 ;

small operations near, 34(5 et seq. forces in ana famine begins, 347 famine grows, 354 about, 354 famine in, 360, 377 relieved, 362. Nymwegen, peace of, 643. ;

;

;

Orange, William of, made stadtholder, 587 inundates Holland, 588 joins at Senef, 603 et Montecuculi, 600 ;

;

;

.seq., 660, 663, 667, 670. Organization, uncertainty as to, 51. manoeuvres in Orleans, duke of, 760 front of Eugene, 762, 813. ;

Ormond, Lord, commands English on the defensive, 823.

775 et seq. ; Burgundy hesitates, 776 Vendome deCadogan seizes sires to attack, 776 Eyne, 776 French right attacks too Eugene and Marlborough late, 777 throw back attack, 779 Marlbor-

Oudenarde, battle

of,

;

;

;

;

Piccolomini, 345, 392, 414, 495, 511, 512. Pike, Swiss, 10. Pikeman, Swiss, 11-13; how armed, 35 position in line, 50. ;

Plunder, main object,

7.

Poitiers, 15.

Pomerania, 161 Porticus,

et seq.

()0.

Prayer, 58. Preston Pans, 430. Priests' Alley, 280

et seq.

Prisoners, ill-treated, 25, 60.

Protestantism, its extent in 17th cenproscribed, 115. tury, 89 Protestant Union, 91. ;

Pultowa, battle Pultusk, 839.

of,

845

et seq.

Punishments, in Swedish army, 58. Pursuit, rare, 24, 575 31. ;

;

;

Quarters, 57.

;

;

;

Rain, 314. Ramillies, positions at, 751,752; Marl-

861

INDEX. feints on 753 attacks Villeroi's breaks it, 755 Villeroi right, 754 results losses at, 756 retires, 755

borough advances on, 753 Villeroi's left,

;

I

;

;

;

;

^

;

;

j

of, 75tj

;

Rank and Ransoms

Villeroi relieved, 756. command begins, 24.

arise, 25, 00.

size of,

38

Stahremberg at Almanza, 812 reaches, 813; defeats French near marches on MaSaragossa, 814

way

officers of, 38.

;

;

;

845, 846.

Spandau, 217, 235. Spanish succession, war of the, 670. Spanish sword and buckler, 14.

Ribnitz, 175. Richelieu, Cardinal, 115, 140, 148,195, takes up the 275, 302, 323, 326

Sparre, 346, 360. Spinola, 95-97. Squadron, organization and officers of,

;

412

43i).

;

Riga, siege of, 82, 83. Rocroy, battle of, 451

seq.; losses

et

Rohan, duke

41.

Stadtlohn, battle of, 99. Staffarda, battle of, 658.

457. of, 514.

Rosen, General, 470 et seq., 505. Rostock, 173, 176, 236, 297. at Edgehill, 423 Rupert, Prince, 421 at Marston Moor, 426; at Naseby, ;

;

Stahremberg, at Vienna, 647 et seq. ; in Italy, 698; his splendid march, 699; in Italy, 738; in Spain, 8l3 et seq.

Antoine, battle of, 530. Steenkiike, battle of, 660 et seq, Sternskjold, 128. Stettin, 162 et seq., 176, 181. Stralsund, defies Wallenstein, 111 siege of, 112, 113; 174. Strategy, none in Middle Ages, 5 unnecessary to ancients, 30. Styrum, Marshal, 704. Swabia, overrun, 321; country people St.

428.

Ryswick, Peace

of, 667.

Sapieha, 118. Savelli, 161, 169, 180, 203, 204. Schaumberg, 181, 187, 189, 203. Scheldt, fortified by French, 790 ; allies break through, 791. Schellenberg, assault on the, 714; losses at, 716; not justifiable, 716.

Schools in Swedish army, 59. Schulemberg, General, 801 et seq. Schulenburg, General, 837, 841. Schweinfurt, 284. Senef battle of, 602 et seq. ; losses ,

606. Sieges,

8

of,

;

hostile, 321. first to

King, 65

;

at,

deposed, 69 ;

;

war, 85 appears near Danzig, 122 weak conduct at Mewe, 124 imagrees to six years' placable, 193 ;

;

;

;

truce, 139.

Gustavus' plans as Sinsheim, battle of, 608 et Silesia,

608 et seq. Marshal, 454.

to, 213,

seq.

;

;

;

;

;

;

plots against Sweden, 79 truce with, 79 at Danzig, 84 his reasons for ;

;

;

;

course of, 579.

Sigismund,

make National Army, her method, 32, 33 condition of, condition of, in her wars, 72 72 1630, 149 preparations in, 153. Swedish army, 47 et seq. ; recruitment cost distribution of, 155 of, 154 31

castles, 8 advanced, 578

26, 61;

;

Sweden,

from feudal

arose

method

at,

815;

arrives,

coast, 816.

Rhinegrave, the, 135, 137, 138.

Sirot,

Vendome

815;

Stahremberg retires from Madrid, 815 Vendome beats him at Brihuega. 815; Stahremberg retires to

Rewards, <J0. Rhenskjold, General, 836, 841, 842,

at,

;

drid,

Regulations, (Swedish, 58. Reserves, found useful, 54.

reins,

;

;

Rations, how supplied, 25, 57. Ratisbon, 178. Reconnoitring, rare, 7.

Regiment,

Skytte, John, 68, 159. Sobieski, John, 645 et seq. ; reaches attacks enemy, (j51 Vienna, 650 behavior of emperor to, 654. Soldier of Fortune, 32. Spain, operations in, 810 et seq. ; allies take Madrid, 811 Berwick retakes Madrid, 812; Berwick defeats Gal-

214.

of, 155.

Swedish peasantry, 66. Swedish soldier well clad, not uniformed, 48 his national dress, 49 how clad and armed, 48 et seq ; well what he learned in behaved, 78 ;

;

;

how recruited, Polish wars, 142 154 cost of, 155 how set up, 255 revels in Franconia, 298. Swiss pike, 10 tactics, 11, 12. ;

;

;

;

;

losses to 16th century, 24 necesTactics, minor for solsary to ancients, 30

up

;

;

INDEX.

862

39; old Spanish, 254; new Swedish, 255 of Breitenfeld, 254, diers,

;

255. Tallaid, Field-Marshal, his charge, 706 707, 717, 721 ;

;

bayonet at Blen-

;

heim, 725 et seq. Tangermiinde, 2oy. Taupadel, 346, 369. Teuifel, 165. ;

;

;

91

its

of,

license in, 93, 97, 103, 116, 170,

;

transferred to Weser, 98 Danish period, 101; no method, 116; condition in 1630, 145 et seq. ; noted generals of, 274 how carried on after Gustavus' death, 413 et seq. in 1633 and in following years, 414 ;

;

;

;

French phase

of,

438

et seq.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

moves 287 Maximilian ;

after Breitenfeld, 286, south of Main, 288 interferes with, 289

commendably

active,

289

attacks turns against ;

Niirnberg, 293, 297 Horn, 307 captures Bamberg, 308 retires, 309 his position on the Lech, 312; resists Swedish passage, 316; wounded to death, 316. ;

;

;

;

Tokoly, 047

;

:

;

;

shal,

445

;

raid into

Black Forest,

moves on Freiburg, 447 fails at Freiburg, 449 reconnoitres with Cond^, 459 di\ades forces, 460 rejoins Cond^,4()l attacks again, 462 captures Philipsburg, 465 captures Mainz and other towns, 466 friendship for Cond^, 467 in winter-quarters, 469 ; crosses Rhine, 469 out446

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Thnrn, Count, 92, 94. Tiefenbach, 247. Tilly, 95; victor at White Hill, 96; his campaign in Baden, 98 beats Mausfeld, 99, 105; follows Christian, 108; beats Christian, 108; moves into Holstein, 109 155, 178 in command, 196 at Franlifort and ixianceuvres Landsberg', 199, 200 against Gustavus, 203 et seq. ; aims at Neu-Brandenburg, 206, 207 capmarches on Magdetures it, 208 burg, 209 his method, 216 his proceedings at Magdeburg, 225 et seq. ; his treachery at Magdeburg, 227 weak after Magdeburg, 232 moves on Hesse-Cassel, 233, 237 his character, 233 his reinforcements, 233 attacks Werreturns to Elbe, 240 ben camp, 241 defeated, 242; reinforcements, 244 moves on Leijisic, 248 captures Leipsic, 250 his intentions, 257, 258 defeated at Breitenfeld, 259 et seq. ; based on the 276

;

;

Thiiringervvald, 283, 378.

Fthine,

;

;

Traytor, 60. Triple Alliance, 583. Turenne, Marshal, his youth, 440 his early gallantry, 441 his early campaigns, 441 in Italy, 442 what he had learned, 443 his lack of opportunity, 444 an exceptional pattern, 444 his first army as field-mar;

Thirty Years' War, causes, 87 phases, 88 beginning motif, 88

248

Tournay, siege of, by Marlborough and Eugene, 795. Train, 24 essential to transport war material, 31 decreased by Gustavus, 57 immense, 576.

et seq.

Tollense, 168. Torstenson, Field - Marshal Leonard, 82, 203, 396, 4;;9. Tott, Ike, 236, 271, 281, 297, 306, 368, 370.

;

;

flanks enemy, 470

moves

;

to

Mer-

gentheim, 471 defeated at Mergentheim, 473 skillfully retires to Hesse, 474 frankly acknowledges defeat, 474 gets reinforcements and drives enemy back, 475 manceuvi-es agamst Mercy, 476 Turenne at Allerheim, 479 et seq. ; retires to Philipsburg, 485 captures Trier, hampered by Mazarin, 498, 486 504 joins Wrangel, 498 turns enemy on the Nidda, 499 moves into Swabia, 500 takes Rain, 501 turns enemy at Kirchheim, 502 invades Bavaria, 503 detaches Bavaria from emperor, 504 suppresses mutiny, 505 defeats enemy at Zuraarshausen, 508 moves on Rain, 510 crosses Lech, 510 crosses Isar, 511 reaches the Inn, 511 devastates Bavaria, 511; retires behind Lech, 512; his conduct reviewed, 513 flies to Holland, 519 joins Spaniards and inhis operations vades France, 521 on the Aisne, 521, 522 defeated at Champ Blanc, 523 returns to France, 524 commands armv of the court, 524 checks Cond4 at Gien, 525, 526 besieges Etampes, 526, 527 forces Lorraine out of France, 528 operates near Paris, 529 et seq. ; at St. Antoine, 5:!0 et seq. ; at Corbeil, 532, 533 recaptures Paris, 533 on the Somme, 536 his manoeuvres against Cond^, 537, 538 compared to Cond^, at539, 567 moves on Arras, 542 tacks the lines of Arras, 543, 545; ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX. manoeuvres Cond^ out of position on 546 et seq. ; his misunderstanding with Cond^, 547 mauceuvres on northern border of France, 547, 548 besieges Valenciennes, 548 moves elasticity under defeat, 551 blockades on Dunkirk, 554, 558 takes St. Venant, Cambray. 554 attacks and Mardyk, 557 550 Cond^ and the Spaniards, 5G;5 his victory at the Dunes, 5(34 captures Dunkirk, 506 his capture of many towns, 507 overruns Flanders, 583 plans invasion of Holland, 585 invades Holland, 580 operates against Great Elector and Montecuculi, 590, 591; raauceuvres on Main against Montecuculi, 594 et seq. ; advances towards Nlirnberg-, 596, 597 ; retires to Aschaffenburg, 599 ; at Sinsheim. 608 et seq. ; manoeuvres on the Rliine, 615 et seq. ; at Entzheim, 618 et seq. ; his letter to the king, 618 advances on Entzheim, 619; attacks enemy, 020 conducts winter campaign, 026 et seq. ; his winter turning - manojuvre, 627 et seq. ; attacks enemy, 628 et seq. wins victory at Tiirkheim, 6o0 et seq. ; drives enemy out of Alsatia, 631 et seq. ; compared to other generals, 632 manoeuvres against Montecuculi on Rhine, 634 e< seq. ; crosses Rhine, 635, 637 mauceuvi-es in front of Strasburg, 038 operations on Rench, 639, 640 forces Montecuculi -to battle, 641 ; estimate of his charkScheldt,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

8G3

Adda, 739 and at Casano, 741 ; great credit due him, 744 attacks Eugene's army, 759 in the Netherlands, 770 et seq. ; manoeuvres against Marlborough, 771 tt seq. ; seizes Ghent, 772 seeks to fight Marlborough, 774 held back by Biu-gundy, 775 mantBuvres before Bruges and Ostende, 790 in Spain, 815 et seq. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Victories, indicisive, 31.

Victualing,

method

of, 25, 57, 576.

Viemia, a marcli on 276 the siege of, 045 et si-q. ; defenses of, 647 battle of, 052 losses at, 054. Villars, early services, 700 his foray in Baden, 701 operates with Bavaria, 703 et seq. ; manoeuvres against Prince of Baden, 7( >5 740, 747 defends northern France. 793 his lines, 794 his lines turned, 790 advances on Marlborough and Eugene, 797 reaches Malplaquet, 798 fortifies, his numbers, 798 798 at Malplaquet, 799 et seq. ; checks Eugene and Marlborough in advance on Arras, 820 his strong lines, 820 captures Denain and breaks Eugene's position, 820 operates on Rhine, 828. Villeroi, 665 in Italy, 079 defeated at Chiari, 682; captured, 685, 717; captures Huy, 740 his lines on the Dyle, 748 broken thi-ough, 749 at Ramillies, 750 et seq. '.*

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

acter, 641, 042.

;

764

;

battle,

104 early history, 105 hismilitarv method, 100 beats Mansfeld, 107;" follows him, 107; moves into Jutland, 110 opposition to him, 110 his ideas. 110, 11 1 baffled at Stralsund, 113; his ideal, 113 his success, 114 his failure before Stralsund, 134; 155; displaced, 179 indiscipline of his troops, 179 Tilly's failure, his gain, 274 his approaches to Gustavus; 274, 319; 321 et se(i. ; his terms to emperor, 327 placed in command. ;!28 i-aises an army, 328 its indiscii)line, 328 marches into Bohemia, 330 negotiates with John George, 3;!0 moves to Eger, 330 plundei-s in Saxony, 331 on Gustavus' communications, 336 follows to Niirnberg, 340, 342 over-cautious, 341 declines to fight, 343 his camp, 343 merely blockades Niirnberg, 344 criticism on 78, 130, 135, 144

Turin, battle of, 757 tion of, 763

Walhof, battle of, 119. WaUenstein, his ojjinion of Gustavus,

descripFrench fight defensive et seq. ;

Eugene

ably selects

points of

attack, 765 beats the French, 766 discussion of battle, 706 et seq. Tiirkheim operation, 027 et seq. ; battle of, 630 et seq. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Uniforms, 48 introduced, 571. Utrecht, Peace of, 828. ;

;

;

Valenciennes, siege of, 549 Vasas, the, (33 et seq.

et seq.

;

;

Vauban, 578, 695, 784. Vendome, duke of, early services, 086 in Italy, 680 outflanks Eugene, ;

687 689

crosses

;

;

Po, 688

compared

to

;

at Luzzara,

Eugene, 091

against Stahremberg, 698

737

et seq. ;

;

;

in Italy,

checks Eugene on the

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

/ INDEX.

864

345 his officers, 345 his 345 does not attack Guslethtavus' reinfofcenients, 351 refuses battle, 354 deargic, 352 fends his position, 357 leaves Niirnberg, 362 his letter to emperor, 362 moves on iSaxony, 364 et st q. ; disregards Giistavus' movements, 368 enters ISaxony, 369 thrusts at Guscompared tavus' weak point, 372 his general plan, to Gustavus, 374 374 attacks Leipsic, 375 his council of war, 382 inert, 382 his strategic situation, 383 could have had better position at LUtzen, 390 retreats to Bohemia, 396, 414 his last campaign weak, 415 assassinated, this, 344,

;

;

position,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

415.

Werben camp,

;

;

;

;

287, 291, 302, 306, 369. William of Orange, 34. William of Weimar, 297,

369

323,

Hill, battle of, 96.

et seq.

Women

173, 236, 297.

with army,

Woods, fighting

.59.

in the, 472.

Worcester, 434 et seq. Wrangel, Field-Marshal Gustavus, 82, operates 135, 137, 153, 439, 440 with Turenne, 497 et seq. ; continues to operate with Turenne, 507 et seq. Wiirtemberg, 324. Wiirzburg, 285. ;

Zenta campaign, 672 et seq. Zisca wagonburg, 16, 17. Zumarshausen, operation at, 508.

\i)\'fAU)\^

\\\

349,

et seq.

Wismar,

239.

Werth, John de, 473 et seq., 479 Westphalia, Peace of, 512, 517.

White

William III., 659 at Steenkirke, 661 at Neerwinden, 663 667, 670. William of Hesse, assists Gustavus, 234, 246 defies Tilly, 234, 237 282,

'^\

1?'

LIST OF DATES.

A. D.

B vttle

of Battle of

3J8 ]-^° l^J^ 1^1» circa l^-U

Morgarten

•

Passau Convention Peace of Augsburg of Sweden king Eric XIV. John UI. king of Sweden of Sweden king Sigismnnd, Dec. Gustavus Adolphus born of Sweden king Charles IX. Donauworth put to the ban Prote.stant Union formed Catholic League formed Matthias seizes Bohemian throne Gustavus' first campaign Gustavus ascends throne Matthias elected emperor Gustavus' Danish campaign Peace of Knarod Gustavus begins army organization Gustavus' Russian campaign Peace of Stolbowa Ferdinand elected king of Bohemia of

Storm

•

15:25

— —

.

nm

Iw7

of Stuhmsdorf Prepafrations for war Leslie takes Riigen

Truce

}008 lOOJ Ibll

IJ;!-

1012 o}^ f 1015 lojo l*;!"

•

.

manoeuvres

in

Treaty with France

Demmin movement Capture of Demmin

Baden May-June, 1622

Mansfield and Brunswick defeated on A.ug. We.ser Christian of Denmark undertakes war. Treaty with Stralsund June, Gustavus lands at the Dwina July-Aug. Livonia reduced .

Two

battles at Riga Courland reduced

Walhof

Wallensteiu defeats Mansfeld

I

1(.25

1620 April, 10.0 6,

19, 1029 Spring, 1629 27, 1629 July 16, 1629 Aug. 1629

Winter, 1629-16.^

Jan. 18,

Jan. 23, Jan. and Feb. Feb. 15,

.

Ciistrin surrenders Storm of Frankfort

!

Fall, 10'_5

Jan.

May

1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630

1630 1630 l(i30

1630 1630 1G30 1630

1630 1630 1630 1630 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

March 2, Capture of Colberg Feb. and March, Leipsic Convention March 23, 1631 Neu-Braudenhurg massacre

1

1623 102o 1625 102o

Summer. 1025

16'£J 1627 1028

June

Tilly reaches Frankfort 1

1627

July 24, 1628 May 22, 1629

March and April, Gustavus sets sail for German" .June 9, July 4, Lands at Usedom .July, Takes Usedom ana WoUiu July 20, Takes Stettin August, begins Colberg of Siege Capture of coast towns July and August, August 28, Savelli besieges Tollense August, garri.soned Magdeburg Ang.-Sept. Advance on Mecklenburg Sept. Gustavus 27, taken by Ribnitz Nov. Congress of Ratisbou ends Nov. W.vUenstein succeeds Tilly Gustavus defeats Savelli at Demniin Nov. Nov. 11, Battle of Schievelbein Nov. Ratzburg Battle of Dec. 26, Capture of Garz Feb. and Jan. Camp Barwalde

1

•

Fall, 1627 Fall, 1627

Danzig

Edict of Restitution issued Sweden determines on war Operation at Stuhm Victory at the Nogat

War

—

off

Wormditt

Peace of Lvibeck

•

lb' loj

of

^Kl"^' 1027 May, VrVr May-June, 1627

Wmter, Baltic treaty vvitli Denmark Tilly invades Holstein WaUenstein defeats Cliristian Sprmg, Defeat of Koniezpolski WaUenstein defeated at Stralsund

l^?15o» 1500 1568 l&a^ 19, loJi

•

Battle of

Naval battle

li-^ 1523

1017 1 018 begins 1019 Ferdinand II. elected emperor king elected Palatinate Frederick of the ?619 of Bohemia Maximilian of Bavaria joins Ferdinand lOiO Nov. 8, 1620 Battle of the White Hill 1019-1620 / Gustavus travels in Germany Polish War Aug. 1621 Defeat of Radziwill .Sept. War. 16, 1021 Polish Capture of Riga Polish War Livonia captured Sept.-Dec. 1621 l^^l Palatinate reduced June, 1022 Danzig agrees to neutrality Tilly's

Battle of Lutter Swedish reverses Gustavus arrives at Danzig Gustavus twice wounded

1-|15

—

Aug. 1020 Aug. 27, 1626

Relief of Me we by Gustavus

J^^^ J^^o J^O" IdSi

of Cr6cy of Poitiers Field artillery .... of Rosabeck of Agincourt Zisca of Deutsch Brod Gustavus I. Vasa, king of Sweden circa Swedish National Army begun

—

Siege of Danzig begins

• •

•

Gunpowder introduced Battle of Laupeu

Thirty Years'

July, 1G26 July, 1626

10J;°

Binnockburn

Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle

June, 1626 by Gustavus Konigsberg and Prussian towns taken

Pillau taken

Battle of Adrianople Battle of Hastings Battle of Falkirk

!

I

.

.

March

31, 16,31

April 3, April 16, Landsberg falls Siege of Magdeburg .. Sept. 1630, to May, Pappeuheim captures outer forts of city April 9, Falkeuberg retires within walls April 30,

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

LIST OF DATES. A. D.

May Suburbs burned Storm and burning of Magdeburg May

4,

June, marches on Hesse-Cassel June 25, Capture of Greitswalde of Mecklenburg restored. .July 5, July 10, Capture of Tangermiinde Camp at Werben July- Aug. Burgstall combat Aug. 1, Tilly

Gustavus

Werben

fortifies

Aug. Aug.

7, 8,

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

Havel-Spree line

Aug. Tilly moves on Hesse-Cassel. ..End Aug. Till}' moves on Saxony Early Sept. Gustavus' treaty with Saxony .. Sept. 10, Armies join at Diiben Sept. 15, Tilly captures Leipslc Sept. 16, Battle of Breitenfeld Sept. 17, Gustavus heads for Thuringia. .Sept. 27, Gustavus at Erfurt Oct. 2, March through Thiiringerwald Oct. 8, Wlirzburg captured Oct. 15, Marienburg captured Oct. 17, Gustavus defeats duke of Lorraine .

.

Nov. 2, Saxons move to Prague Early Nov. Gustavus starts down the Main Nov. 10, Frankfort surrenders Nov. 28, Tilly attacks Niirnberg Dec. 4, Mainz surrenders Dec. 22, Winter-quarters in Mainz Dec. 1631, to March,

1631 1631

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

1632 Jan. 1632 Wallenstein reappears Feb. 1632 Wallenstein invades Bohemia End Feb. 1632 Tilly captures Bamberg March 15, 1632 Gustavus joins Horn March 31, 1632 Gustavus enters Niirnberg .April 5, 1632 Guotavns takes Donauworth . .

WaUensteiu

""efinitely in

.

command April, 1632 April 15, 1632

,

of the ^ecn April Gustavus takes Augsburg Gustavus moves on Ingolstadt

The crossing

20, 1632

April 29, 1C32

Siege of Ingolstadt

May, 1632 May 10, 1632 Gustavus takes Munich May 18, 1032 Wallenstein takes Prague Gustavus reduces Swabia and Bavaria May-June, 1632 June 12, 1632 Gustavus starts north June 18, 1632 Gustavus at Furth Wallenstein and Maximilian join June 24, 1632

End

of April, beginning of

Gustavus at Hersebruck

June 17-July July Gustavus reaches Niirnberg

1, 1632 3, 1632 .July 1632 Niirnberg. reaches 13, Wallenstein Wallenstein fails in a surprise.. July 15, 1632 Niirnberg Starving match at July-Aug. 1632 Wallenstein captures Lichtenau Aug. 6, 1632 Aug. 9, 1632 Gti.stavus captures convoy Oxenstiern arrives with reinforcements Aug. 23, 1632 Gustavus offers Wallenstein battle Aug. 31, 1632 Gustavus attacks the Alte Veste Sept. 3, 1632 Sept. 17, 1632 Formal cliallenge to battle Sept. 19, 1632 Gustavus leaves Niirnberg Wallenstein leaves Niirnberg. Sept. 21, 1032 .

.

Gustavus on the Danube Early Oct. Wallenstein starts for Saxony Oct. 15, Gustavus starts for Saxony Oct. 18, Wallenstein takes Leipsic Nov. 2. Gustavus at Erfurt Early Nov. Gustavus crosse Saale Nov. 9, .

.

Dukes

Tilly defeated at Tilly retires

1631

20, 1G31

Battle of Liitzen

.

— Gustavus' death

Nov.

1632 163",

1P32 i632 1032 1632

1632 1633 1633 1633 Wallenstein assassinated Feb. 25, 1634 Battle of Nordliugen Sept. 16, 1634 Duke of Rohan in the Valteline 1635-1637 16,

Bernard operates on the Danube Horn operates in Swabia Wallenstein operates on the Oder

Ban^r and Bernard command Swedish

army 1634-1641 Torstensou commands Swedish army 1041-1642 Cromwell begins " Ironsides " discipline Winter, 1642 Battle of Edgehill Oct. 23, 1042 Battle of Grantham May, 1643 Battle of Rocroy May 19, 1643 Battle of Gainsborough July, 1643 Battle of Winceby Oct. 1643 Turenne takes command of French army Dec. 1643 Turenne's raid into Swabia May, 1644

Turenne's failure at Freiburg June, Battle of Marston Moor July 2, Battle of Freiburg Aug. 3-9, Capture of Philipsburg Sept. 12, Capture of Mainz and other places

" New Model " array voted Turenne crosses Rhine Battle of Mergentheim Battle of Naseby Cond^ joins French army Battle of Allerheim

Cromwell at Bristol Nidda operation

Memmiugen operation Cond>

•

•

.

:

LIBFA!'-

o ,