The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974

CENTRE FOR ASIA MINOR STUDIES FOUNDERS: MELPO AND OCTAVE MERLIER

ALEXIS ALEXANDRIS

THE GREEK MINORITY OF ISTANBUL AND GREEK -TURKISH RELATIONS 1918-1974

ATHENS 1992

tSTANBUL BtLOt UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

To Louise and Nicholas

First Edition: 1983 Second Edition: 1992

ISBN 960-85021-4-4 ©

Centre for Asia Minor Studies and Alexis Alexandris, 1992.

FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION Since its foundation by Melpo and Octave MerZier in 1930 the Centre for Asia Minor Studies has concentrated its research on the collection ofmaterialon the Greek communities ofAsia Minor in an effort to build an archive of basic information on the heritage, culture, language and mode of life in the ancestral hearths of h ellen ism in the peninsula through the exodus oj 19221924. The publications of the Centre until now reflect this general research orientation and have been intended as contributions to the knowledge ofan important section ofhellenic civilization and of the Greek tradition that came to an abrupt and tragic end amidst the upheavals of historical change and world conflict. One of the permanent objectives of the Centre is to continue this line ofresearch and to utilize its rich archive oforal history with the publication of scholarly studies dealing with Greek tradition and communallife in particular regions and communities of Asia Minor. With the publication of Dr. Alexis Alexandris's book on the history of the Greek community of Istanbul from 1918 to 1974, the Centre for Asia Minor Studies is inaugurating a new series ofmonographs which while contributing essentially to the promotion of the subject of the Centre's specialised research, appeal at the same time to a wider academic public as case studies of more general issues. It is our hope that in this manner the Centre will have its own distinct contribution to make as a living research organization to scholarship on the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The present study is of direct interest to the research subject matter of the Centre in that it examines the political behaviour and choices of the leadership of hellenism in the dying Ottoman Empire during the critical period 1918-1922 which sealed the fate of hellenism in Turkey. It is therefore an essential contribution to the understanding of the historical destinies ofAsia Minor hellenism of which Constantinople had always been the capital. Furthermore it is ofinterest to our research programmes for another substantive reason: it considers the historical sequel to the centuries-old Greek presence on the eastern shores of the Aegean and in the hinterland of Asia Minor, after the extinction of the Christian Orthodox communities in the rest of Turkey with the exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923-1924. 7

In the urban environment of the ancient imperial city of the Byzantines and the Ottomans survived to our own days the forms of communal alld social organization, the' varieties of cultural experience and economic activity, the special premium on education and the intimate involvement of the Church in the life of the community that constituted the essence of the historical experience of Asia Minor hellenism under Ottoman rule. From this point of view Dr. Alexandris's book by studying a still living sequel to an older tradition. contributes to a fuller understanding of a whole cultural configuration and of a mode of historical existence. The consideration of these concrete historical problems however has another aspect to it as well. It examines them as the experience of an ethnic minority in a highly nationalist society. As a case study in minority behaviour and minority treatment it is of interest to those concerned with this important problem in contemporary international relations and it constitutes a can .. tribution to the comparative social history of the Near East where the role and fortunes of minorities and the coexistence of diverse ethnic elements under often explosive conditions has been a dynamic factor in political and social change. The whole history ofAsia Minor hellenism under Ottoman rule constitutes an aspect of this broader feature of Middle Eastern society. The present study, by examining this problem in depth, places the historical destiny of hellenism in Turkey in its appropriate political perspective. PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES Director Centre for Asia Minor Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS Some Place Name Variants Abbreviations Preface

13 15 17

Chapter I: The position of the Greeks, in istanbul before 1918 1. The,Millet System. 2. Ottoman Reform and the Greeks. 3. The Economic Position of the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 4. The Question of the Millet Privileges. 5. The Megali Idea and the Constantinopolitan Greeks. 6. Greek educational and cultural institutions in istanbul. 7. The Constantinopolitan Greek population.

21 25 31 32 36 45 49

Chapter II: The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the Anatolian war 1918-1922 The Debate on the Future of istanbul. The Patriarchate: Spokesman of Unredeemed Greeks. The Growth of Turkish Nationalist Movement. 4. The Patriarchal Mission to London and the Death of Dorotheos. 5. Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis.

52 54 63 66 69

Chapter III: The Lausanne negotiations, 1922-1923 1. The Mudanya Armistice and the Refet Bele Mission to istanbul. 77 2. The First Exodus of Constantinopolitan Greeks, OctoberDecember 1922. 79 3. The Lausanne negotiations and the future of the Greeks in istanbul. 83 4. The Question of the Patriarchate at Lausanne. 87 5. The Work of the Subcommission on the protection of minorities. 95 6. The Questions of the Military Service and Amnesty. 98 7. The Signing of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Return of 103 istanbul to Full Turkish Control. Chapter IV: The new legal position of the Greek Orthodox community in republican Turkey, 1923-1929 1. Turkish Economic Nationalism and the Greeks. 9

105

2. The Campaign Against Professional Greeks. 3. The Question of the Etablis. 4. The Dispute over the Non~exchangeable Greeks Absent from istanbul. 5. Turkish Grievances About the Treatment of Muslims in Western Thrace. 6. Greek-Turkish Negotiations and the Agreements of 1925-1926. 7. Prolonged Greek-Turkish Negotiations. 8. Turkey and Greek Educational and Cultural Institutions. 9. The Civil Code and the Greek Reaction. 10. Various Anti-Greek Measures and the Decline of istanbul. Chapter V' The Resumption of relations between the Turkish Government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1923-1929 1. Patriarch Meletios and the Anti-Phanar Riot of 1 June 1923. 2. The Turkish Orthodox Challenge. 3. The Election of Patriarch Gregory VII. 4. The Exchangeability of the Archbishops and the Expulsion of Patriarch Constantine VI. 5. The Reign of Basil III. 6. Restrictions on the Ecumenical Role of the Patriarchate. Chapter VI: The Greek minority during the Greco-Turkish rapproch'ement, 193~1940 1. The Greco-Turkish Agreements of 1930. 2. Persistence of Greek Grievances. 3. Greek Foreign Policy on the Minority Question. The Position of the Constantinopolitan Greek Minority.

108 112 117 120 124 129 131 135 139

144 149 154 159 167 170

174 181 185 190

Chapter VII: Relations between secular Turkey and the Patriarchate, the establishment of a modus vivendi, 1930-1946 I. The Official Recognition of the Patriarch and the Visit of Venizelos to the Phanar. 194 2. Attempts to reinforce the Ecumenical Character of the Patriarchate and Turkish Secular Reform. 196 3. Patriarch Benjamin I. 203 Chapter VIII: The Varlrk Tax and its impact on the Greek community 1. The Position of Turkey During, 1939-1942. ~ The Enactment of the Varllk Tax. Discriminatory Traits of the Varllk Tax.

o

10

@ The Effect of the Varl'lk Episode on the Greco-Turkish ~

Friendship. The abolition of the tax on wealth.

Chapter IX: Cordial Greco-Turkish relations and the revival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1944-1954 1. The Strengthening of Greco-Turkish Relations. 2. Rapprochement and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 3" The Election of Patriarch Athenagoras I. 4. Improvernent in the Position of the Greek Minority. Chapter(p. The effects of the Cyprus dispute on the Greeks in istanbul 1954-1964. 1. The Emergence of the Cyprus Dispute and the Greek Minority. 2. The Anti-Greek Riots of 1955 and the Yasslada Trials. 3. The Minority Question and the Greco-Turkish Crisis, 1956-59. 4. The Patriarchate During the Settlement of the Cyprus Question, 1959-64. Chapter XI." The final exodus of the Constantinopolitan Greek community, 1964-1974. Expulsions of the Hellenes of istanbul. The Patriarchate During the Final Years of Athenagoras and the Election of his Successor Dimitrios. 3. The Muslim Minority of Greece.

Summary and Conclusions. Appendices A. The Minority Clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne" B. Greek parishes and associations in istanbul. C. Constantinopolitan Greek Schools. D. Patriarchs and members of the Holy Synod. Bibliography. Index.

207 211 215 II

225 229

234 237 244 248

252 256 266 274

280 298 307 316 320 324 326 332 337 368

SOME PLACE NAME VARIANTS

The same place often has a different name in Turkish and Greek. The following table may help those readers who are used to the one version and find another in the text. The first column gives the Turkish version, while the second gives the Anglicized Greek version. Throughout this work, the modem Turkish version has been adopted for place names. However, in cases where these cities constitute a diocese or a bishopric the Greek has been preferred. The Turkish words follow the official Turkish orthography. Ala~ehir

Ankara Aydin Balat BalikIi Beyoglu Bursa Biiyiikada bulk of the diplomatic corps who handled Ottoman missions abroad. The position of the Greeks, therefore, though profoundly shaken by the outbreak of the Greek revolt in 1821, was to a considerable extent restored by 5. On the Armenian delegation see M. K. Krikorian, Armenians in the Sen'ice of the Ottoman Empire 1860-1908. London 1978, pp. 7-8. 6. Greek member Stephen Vogoridis (1773-1859). Vogoridis, a hellenized Bulgarian from Kotek, received his training at the Phanariot circles in Bucharest and between 1812-1819 served as assistant to the Phanariot ruler of Moldavia, Skarlatos Kallimachis. In 1832 he was appointed prince of the autonomous island of Sam os, a position he hold until 1850. He was a close friend of the liberal Ottoman vezir Mustafa Re§id and was favoured by Sultan Abdiilaziz. 7. Greek members: Constantine Karatheodoris (1802-79), Constantine Mousouros (1807-91) and Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925). 8. Alexander Karatheodoris and John Savas, the director of the Galatasaray lycee. 9. Markos Pasha, Stavros Aristarchis, Constantine Mousouros. Constantine Anthopoulos, Spyridon Mavroyenis and Co~tantine Karatheodoris, a full list in R. Deveneux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. Baltimore 1963, pp. 276-82.

27

the middle of the nineteenth century. Together with a few surviving members of the Phanariot noblesse de robe, 10 a new class of Ottoman senior civil servants and diplomats established themselves in positions of power and influence. The most well-known istanbul Greek families of the late nineteenth century were those of the Mousouros, Aristarchis, Karatheodoris and Vogoridis. Thus, despite the execution of their father, Stavros Aristarchis (1770-1822), the last Greek dragoman of the Porte, during the anti-Greek reprisals in the 1820s, Nicholas (1799-1866), Miltiadis (l80~93) and John (1811-97) succeeded in gaining access to government office. NIcholas became the private tutor of sultans Abdiilmecid and Abdiilaziz, whi~e Milti.adis served as governor of Samos from 1861 to 1866. But itwas John Anstarchls who af~er a service of over fifty years, mainly as the Ottoman ambassador to Berlm, distinguished himself as a senior diplomat of the Porte. The son of Nicholas, Stavros Aristarchis (1834-1925) was appointed to the senate on 17 March 1877 and was one of the three surviving members to be brought back to the senate when it was reopened in 1908. Another member of the family, Gregory Aristarchis headed the Ottoman mission in Washington and was the author of a monUI~ental work, Legislation Ottomane, which appeared in seven volumes (Constantinople 1873 - 88). In token of his appreciation for the services of this family, Sultan Abdiilmecid received in audience the distinguished Greek lady, Sophia Aristarchi and gave her his portrait in diamonds. It was the first decoration ever given by an Ottoman sovereign to a lady. 11 Perhaps the most well-known Ottoman Greek diplomat of the nineteenth century was Alexander Karatheodoris (1833 -1906).J2 A close friend of reformer Mithat Pasha, he acquired prominence as Sultan Abdiilhamid II'advisor on foreign affairs. In 1874 Karatheodoris was appointed ambassador to Rome and in 1876 he became undersecretary at the ministry of foreign affairs. But his international reputation stems from his outstanding performance, as a leading Ottoman delegate, during the congress of Berlin (1878). Because of his considerable diplomatic abilities, he was promoted to minister of foreign affairs (1878), but he soon resigned from this post, when the sultan rejected the reform proposals recommended by the liberal Vezir 10. For a comprehensive list of the Phanariots who ruled the princely thrones of Walla chi a and Moldavia (l711-1821) see E.Z. Karal, Osmanll Tarihi, Ankara 1959, iv/pp. 42-77. After the death of Sultan Mahmud II (1839) few Phanariots, such as Kallimachis and Karatzas, returned to the Ottoman capital from abroad where they had found refuge after t~e Greek revolt: 1L See C. Hamlin, Among the Tlaks, New York, p. 372. For a list of non-Muslim Ottoman officials, ibid, pp. 371~75. 12. A career diplomat. A very cultivated man well-acquainted with ancient Greek, Persian and Arabic literature

28

Tunuslu Hayreddin Pasha. After serving as governor of Samos (1885 - 95), he became the first Christian governor of Crete (1895 - 96) and for a short while, he also served as minister of public works. Alexander was the son of StephanKaratheodoris, the personal physician of Mahmud II and Abdiilmecid: Beside his long services to the royal family (1827-61), Stephen Karatheodoris was also instrumental in the foundation of the first medical school in 1828, where he taught for nearly forty years. 13 Other members of this family were employed in various depmtments of government throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 14 Notwithstanding their ethnic origin, these technocrat Greeks were members of the Ottoman establishment and were closely tied to Tanzimat spirit. They were working for Ottoman goals and strongly defended the empire against European encroachments and minority separatism. Aware of their political stand, the Sublime Porte was even prepared to appoint Ottoman Greeks to the Ottoman Embassy in Athens. Thus. Co~tantine Mousouros strongly defended Ottoman positions during his eight year term as the Porte's ambassador to the Greek kingdom (1840-1848) and did not even hesitate to break off relations with Greece in 1847, when he felt that the interests of the empire were threatened. Another Constantinopolitan Greek diplomat, John Photiadis served as the Ottoman ambassador in Athens throughout the Cretan crisis-and on 17 December 1868, he departed from Athens in protest against the Greek position on Crete. Another important post which was held by Constantinopolitan Greeks for most of the later part of the nineteenth century was the Ottoman ambassadorship to Great Britain. The distinguished diplomat, Constantine Mousouros served as ambassador to London for thirty-five years (1856-91)15 and was succeeded by Constantine Anthopoulos (1891-1902)16 and Stephen Mousouros (1902-07)Y But Ottoman Greeks 13. 1789-1867. Born in a village near Edirne (Adrianople). Studied medicine in the university of Pisa and settled in the Ottoman capital in 1826. A distinguished polyglot he was noted to have been able to communicate in sixteen languages. One of the founders of the Constantinopolitan Greek Literary Society (1861), he served for many years in the patriarchal council. 14. For details on the Constantinopolitan Greeks who served the Porte see my own, «Oi "EA.A.llVE~ cr'tl'lv lJ1tllPEcria 'ii~ 'OeOlJlavtlcii~ AuroKparopia~, 1850-1922», Lle).riol' rii:; '/awPlla7:; Kai 'E'Ol'o}.O"/II>, BS 16/1 (1975) 103·12; H. Belia, «Le Syllogue pour la propagation des lettres grecques et les ecoles de Thrace», Actes du lIe COllgres International des ttl/des dusud-est Europeell (Athenes 7- I3 Mai 1970). tome IV, pp. 369-76. 2. See P. Moraux, Bibliotheqlle de la Societe TlLrqlle d'Histoire, Catalogue de Manuscrits Grecs (Fonds du Syllogos) , Ankara 1964; T. Stavrou. '0 'EI' KWl'aral'T/l'oVTiOi.el 'Ei.iJll'lKO:; 6 BEvt~EA.o, M e}.eT/lliara TUpw dno ,OV &vl,iAo Kai nlv 'EnoX'; rov, Athens 1980, pp. 427-74. 31. Full copy of the letter sent by Kanellopoulos to Politis, Cons., 2S May 1919, BMAEV/18; Dorotheos to the British High Commission, Cons., 24 May 1919, FO 371//4218/E8S639.

60

the peace conference with memoranda and appeals. 32 By far the most illuminating piece of evidence on the prelate's views concerning the future of istanbul was a letter addressed to Lloyd George on 14 February 1920. Claiming that neither in origin, culture or population istanbul was a Turkish centre, Dorotheos asselted that to the Greeks it had remained the most sacred city. He then went on to explain that: «The idea of a Greek nation will not be realised so long as Constantinople is not united to Greece by a strong tie ... We, therefore, ask for the union of Constantinople with the Mother Country, and we propose this argument, together with the internationalization of the Straits, as the best solution, because it guarantees the right of self-determination and the interests of the Powers concerned. If for reasons which we can appreciate, this solution appears to be of too radical a nature we should propose that Greece should receive a mandate to govern the state of Constantinople».33 This document was followed by many other ones. 34 Meanwhile, Dorotheos' claims were endorsed by many influential Greek organizations. In February 1919, the prestigious Greek Literary Society terminated its long-standing non-political character by addressing a memorandum to the peace conference. It once again reiterated the wish to incorporate istanbul into an enlarged Greece. 35 Expressing the same desire, the influential body of the Ottoman Greek deputies submitted an appeal to the Allied representatives in Paris on 30 April 1919. 36 A year later a petition signed by no less than 154 Greek associations, parish councils and other community organizations in the capital demanded a «radical solution» for the future of istanbul. 37 Besides his correspondence with the Allied political leaders Dorotheos sought the support of the Anglican church, with whom the Patriarchate had already developed good relations. From 1919, Dorotheos showed keen in-

32. De Robeck to Curzon, Cons., 19 October 1919, FO 371/41S9/EI43405. See also OM 1 (1921-22) 136. . 33. Dorotheos to Lloyd George, Cons., 14 February 1920, FO 370/5190/EI990 (partly printed D.B.F.P.(7) no. 19). 34. Dorotheos· to Lloyd George, Cons., FO 371/SI90/ES50 (18 February 1920), FO 371/S190/EI883 (7 March 1920), FO 371/5190/EI698 (1S March 1920). 35. Memorandum by the «Syllogos Litteraire Grec de Constantinople» to the Peace Conference, signed by M. Afthentopoulos and E. Mavridis, tstanbul, Feb. 1919, given in M. Afthentopoulos, Aoyot5oaim M'll'u AliBel'ronov).ov JIpoet5pov 1"06 BV Kwvaravrlvovno}.81 'E)).'lVIKOU 26 August 1931. FO 371/15232/06712: 'Opeo6o~ia, 7 (1932) 449-52. 2. Oakley (0. Douglas. Cons .. 16 April 1939. LPA/DgP/22/112-2: The Times, 15 April 1939. 3. 'OpOoc5o~ia, 23 (1948) 118-20. gives det~ils of this visit which took place in December 1930.

196

the murder of King Alexander. 4 As a result the hitherto isolated Patriarchate was able to enhance considerably its ecumenical image. The new patriarch, moreover, was committed to drawing the various Orthodox churches into a closer spiritual union. Resting on his position as primus inter pares between the heads of the fourteen autocephalous churches that made up the Orthodox communion, Photios did much to reestablish the unshakable dignity of his throne. Thus in 1930, he convened a Pan-Orthodox conference, in which all the churches, save the Russian and Bulgarian, participated. This conference held fifteen meetings at the monastery of Vatopedion on Mt Athos during which a number of purely ecclesiastical questions were discussed. s The Ecumenical Patriarchate was represented by Chrysanthos Philippidis, the archbishop of Trebizond and representative of the Phanar in Greece, and Germanos Athanasiadis, the archbishop of Sardis. The patriarch also sought closer relations with the Anglican church and, together with the archbishop of Canterbury, initiated the two OrthodoxAnglican theological conferences in Lambeth in 1930 and 1931. All Orthodox delegations, present in various international theological conferences, were headed by the far-sighted ecumenist Germanos Strinopoulos, the archbishop of Thyateira. 6 At first the Turkish authorities did not discourage the increasing international activity of the Patriarchate. The Phanar delegate at the Athos conference Germanos Athanasiadis was permitted to travel with a regular Turkish passport. This constituted a marked departure from the previous Turkish stance in 1926, when the authorities warned the Phanar that any archbishop who left Turkey in order to participate in an international conference would not be allowed to return. But soon the Turks realized that the Phanar, despite its considerable loss of power and prestige, still played a crucial role in the Orthodox world. Further, the patriarch's enthusiasm for a union of the Orthodox and Anglican denominations worried the Turks. In an interview with the n pwfa of 21 October 1931, Photios reiterated his support for this movement and on another occasion talked of his wish «to bring about the reunion with the Anglican church during his Patriarchate».7 The Turkish disapproval of such activities was manifested wht!' the authorities turned down a request for the representation of the Phanar in the first Pan-Orthodox congress on theology in Athens (November-December 1936).

4. 5. 6. 7.

Oakley (0 Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88.. B. Stavridis. «The Ecumenical Patriarchate», GOThR 16 (1969) 210. Ibid, pp. 213-15. Pollard to Douglas. Conso> 12 January 1930, LPA/DgP/22/144-145.

197

By seeking to enhance. the prestige of the Patriarchate Photios tried to reverse an eclipse of the historic church. The latter, relying exclusively on some 100,000 Greeks in Turkey, was unable to find competent clerical and academic personnel. This decline was visible in the Theological school of Chalki (Heybeli) which, barred from employing eminent theologians from outside Turkey, was transformed into a basically training college for bishops and priests. This trend was accelerated after the deaths of the distinguished theologians, Pandeleimon Komninos and Basil Andoniadis. With their loss, the college was unable to maintain its traditional standards, thanks to which it had met effectively the needs of the Patriarchate by providing a succession of outstanding prelates between 1884 and 1923. 8 In a letter to Rev. J.A. Douglas, Edward Every, an Anglican priest studying Greek and theology at Chalki, described vividly the declining standards of the Theological school. 9 Between 1932 and 1937, the college had only 65 students with 15 teachers of which three were Turks.IO Equally serious were the severe financial difficulties encountered by the Phanar during the 1930s and 1940s. Deprived of its extensive estates in Anatolia, Macedonia and Thrace, the Phanar became increasingly dependent on the subsidies from abroad. Consequently, in 1934, according to the official patriarchal accounts, the Phanar was 281,397 TL. in debt. II Faced with such a serious lack offunds, Photios took a number of austerity measures including the abolition of the traditional distribution of free meals for the poor students of the Phanar schools (IIa'lpzaPXIKa Iuaairza). N or were the Turks prepared to allow the Greco-Turkish detente to interfere with their wish to regulate the position of religious institutions - both Muslim and Christian - in accordance with the Kemalist program of secularization. Part of this general program was the law forbidding individuals to wear religiously significant clothing. Introducing the new law in the assembly on 3 December 1934, the minister of the interior, .sukrii Kaya, declared that this measure was part of the policy of secular reform. In a private conversation with the British ambassador, .sukrii Kaya explained that since Muslim clerics (hocalar) were forbidden to wearing their religious garb outside the actual place of worship, it would cause «justifiable discontent» if nonMuslims were exempted from such restriction. 12 Commenting on the ban, 8. B. Stavridis, 'loropio. rou OiKOUf./f:l'/KOU flGTPlapl.dou, (Athens 1967) p. 120 f. 9. Every to Douglas, Chalki, 24 September 1933. LPA/DgP/19/291. 10 . Zervopoulos, op.cit., ii/pp. 138-41. II. Mavropoulos. op.cit . , p. 227 . 12. Loraine to Simon, Ankara, 5 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7432. Law no. 2596/1934 is given in Resmi Gazete no. 2879, 31 December 1934.

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Cllmhllriyet opined that Turkey was simply following the example of other

secular European states such as France. The abolition of the clerical gar'ment, it went on to suggest, would be beneficial to clerics who would be able to do away with their awkward garb and long hair which had caused them unnecessary duress in the past. 13 On 8 December, appealing directly to Greek public opinion, Milliyet explained that the new measure was part and parcel of the general Turkish transformation. It was certainly not directed against the Orthodox clergy in Turkey. The Greek press, Milliyet hinted, might have been provoked by «certain elements residing in Turkey who endeavoured to misinterpret the scope and aims of the law».14 Finally, the Yeni Giin of 20 December reaffirmed the Turkish commitment to peaceful co-existence with its neighbours, and particularly with Greece, and concluded by asserting that modern Turkey treated its minorities fairly. I5 As early as 29 November, the Greek foreign minister, Dimitrios Maximos, in an interview with the Turkish ambassador in Greece, requested the exemption of the Greek Orthodox clergy from the ban. But in a telegram from Geneva. Foreign Minister Ru~tii Arasdeclined to make such a concession. 16 The Turkish rejection of this request wounded Greek susceptibilities and created a widespread feeling of disappointment. The Greek press argued that the law, which was part of a wider plan to create a uniform population, seriously compromised the cultural traditions of the Orthodox community in Turkey. 17 Pointing to the oppressive nature of the law, some papers went so far as to wonder whether the friendship of Turkey was not almost as inconvenient as its hostility. 'E)).llVI/":O\, Me;).ov, a paper closely in touch with the Greek prime minister, declared that «not even the worst enemies of the Greco-Turkish friendship could have dealt it a deadlier blow». 18 The treatment received by the Greeks in Turkey was regularly contrasted with the «privileged position of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace».19 So great was the bitterness against the Turkish government that the president of the Greco-Turkish league in Athens, formed to develop friendly relations bet-

13. ClIm/llIrivet, 6 December 1934. text given in AT 13 (1935) 93. I·t. Ibid .. p. 94. 10. 'EhvOr.pov Blif.lG. 9 December 1934. 17 . Walker to Simon. Athens. I December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7322. 18. Quoted in Walker to Simon, 6 December 1934, FO 371/17962/E7397. 19. Ibid.

199

ween the two countries, resigned and the secretary called a meeting to consider whether the league should continue to exist. Among the Constantinopolitan Greeks it was the patriarch who seemed to have resented most this latest attempt of secularization. At first Photios appealed directly to Premier ismet inonii requesting the exemption of the Orthodox from the law, but he did not even receive a reply.:!o With the eventual application of the law in June 1935, he was noted to have cancelled all public audiences save those taking place after liturgy and to have regarded himself in mourning over the ban. 21 Apparently, he even contemplated the transfer of the patriarchal see to Mt Athos.22 His strong feelings on this issue were somewhat balanced by the majority of the members of the holy synod who took a more realistic view and were ready to comply with the new regulations. On the whole, the Greek community, too, adopted a reasonable attitude and disapproved of the intransigent attitude of the conservative body centered around the patriarch.:!3 The almost hysterical reaction of the higher echelons of the Phanar clergy illustrated that the Greek Orthodox church in Turkey was as reluctant as the conservative Muslim Turks to accept the principle of secular nationality pursued by the Kemalist regime. It should be emphasized that the ban on clerical garb was aimed primarily at reducing the prestige of the Muslim clergy. If there were any single conclusion to be drawn from the whole affair it was the enthusiastic anti-clericalism of the Turkish regime, the extent of which could perhaps be compared with that of the Soviet leadership in Moscow. It should be remembered that only few months later, the government converted St Sophia. the most visible symbol of Ottoman Muslim victory over Christian Byzantium, to a museum. On the other hand, by forbidding the wearing of ecclesiastical garb outside the places of worship, Ankara was pushing forward with its avowed aim of bringing about a homogenous population - both culturally and emotionally. This, however, coupled with the interference in the purely spiritual affairs of the religious minorities. engendered by the act of 1934, constituted at least a technical violation of the Lausanne clauses. Alarmed by these developments liberal Greek politicians did not think that Orthodox ecclesiastical susceptiblities should be allowed to influence the

~O .

~1. 2~.

~3.

Mavropoulos. op.ciL, p. ~34. Oakley to Douglas. Cons .. n January 1935, LPA/DgP/22/65. Mavropoulos. op.cit .. p. ~35. Cited in The Times, [8 January [935.

200

close friendship between Greece and Turkey.24 Venizelos was particularly critical of the way the Tsaldaris government dealt with the whole affair. He complained that, instead of trying to come to an understanding with the Turks, the Tsaldaris government allowed a highly emotive press campaign whose only impact was to harden attitudes both in Greece and Turkey. The Turkish measure, he insisted, was not introduced in a spirit of hostility towards the Patriarchate. 25 Even Meletios Metaxakis, the patriarch of Alexandria, warned that it was foolish to upset Greco-Turkish friendship on account of such a relatively minor matter. The Greek government, too, had to give priority to wider commercial, military and political considerations and thus come to terms with the new Turkish measure in the same manner as it did a year earlier when some 10,000 Hellene Greeks in Turkey were forced out of their jobs. On its part, the Turkish government agreed to exempt the head of the Orthodox church, together with another seven leaders of other religious orders in Turkey, from the ban. 26 Ankara also consented to the wearing of the clerical garb during the meeting of the holy synod.27 The view that the Turkish government would not desist from its course of secular uniformity was further reinforced when Ankara adjusted the legal position of religious foundations (evkaf or vaklflar) in Turkey. On 5 June . 1935, in accordance with the stipulations of the civil code of 1926, the Turkish t-I government introduced a far-reaching law covering the entire issue of vak/f property. 28 Stating that all religious establishments - Muslim and non-Muslim- were Turkish institutions, the law made all religious foundations accountable to the Turkish government. As a result, the department of Religious Foundations (EvkafGenel Miidurlugu) was instructed to supervise the property owned by religious, cultural and benevolent institutions of all creeds. Such property was divided into two categories. The first, the mazbut property, was administered directly by the state through the department of Evkaf All Muslim property was included in this category. By contrast,

Yn

24. A. Papanastasiou. Ml:i.iTI::;, AOi'Ol, "ApOpa, Athens [957, p. 789. ~5 . Anastasiadou. op.cit .. p. 4[4; 'EhvOl:pol' Blitw, 8 and 9 December [934. Tsaldaris and his Populist party came to power after the elections of March [933. ~6. Annual Report: Greece, [935. Waterlow to Hoare, Athens, FO 371/20392/RI432. 27. The order of the exemption received by the Phanar on ~~ June 1935 (prot. no. 11322) can be found in 'OpOoooi")a, 10 (1935) 211- 13. The other seven leaders who benefitted from the exemption were: Rlfat Bey (Muslim). Mesrup Naroyian (Armenian/Gregorian). Vahan Kocarian U\rmenian!Uniate). Vaton Mighirdich (Armenian/Protestant). Ishaq Shaki (Jewish). Dionysios Varougas (Greek/Uniate) and Eftim Karahissaridis (Turkish/Orthodox). 28. The law no. 276~/l935 is published in the Resmi Gazete, no. 3027. I3 June 1935.

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non-Muslim communal foundations were attached to themulhak (dependent) category. Property belonging to this category was to be administered by committees of trustees (miitevelli heyetleri/Koll'OTlKai £rpopeiaz) elected by the members of each parish. The trustees would fulfil their responsibilities under the overall control of the department of Evkaf The non-Muslim minorities viewed the 1935 law with suspicion. In particular they were apprehensive about the wide powers given to the department of E\'kaf Accordingly no transaction of property could take place without the approval of this department and the money acquired from such sales had to be deposited in the Vakljlar Bank. The capital was then frozen and the communal organizations could not get it back. Instead they were allowed a nominal interest on the actual capital. But of more serious nature was the take over by the Evkaf department of eight churches and a hospital belonging to the Uniate Armenian community on the ground that they were not administered in accordance with the new law. 29 The Greek community, though subjected to sporadic official interference, did not suffer any permanent confiscation of property. On 5 August 1929, the Patriarchate furnished the authorities with a list outlining all the estates registered under its name in the Ottoman title deeds (tapular). The rest of the Constantinopolitan Greek parishes followed suit. Yet the Greek community did not receive an official acknowledgement on their'title deeds before April 1949. 30 Thus during an interval of some twenty years, the Greek community had to live with the uncertainty as to whether the government would recognize its property rights. This uncertainty culminated in 1936-37 when the appointment of a single trustee (tek lI1iitevelli) for every communal establishment was made obligatory. Further, the right of the department of Evkaf to appoint directly such trustees deprived the community of all effective participation in the administration of their institutions. Taking advantage of this law, the authorities appointed Istamat Zihni Ozdamar, a man with a notorious reputation and a close associate of Papa Eftim, as the trustee of the Ballkll hospital. The future of the minority institutions looked so bleak that the Phanar appealed, through the chaplain of the British Embassy in Turkey Austin Oakley, to the Foreign Office. The Phanar asked Britain to try to dissuade the Turkish government from carrying through the religious foundations law of 1935. This measure, it was maintained, did not only create tremendous difficulties for the minority but also threatened Greco-Turkish

29. The Times. 26 September 1936. 30. Document no. 2470/978 given in Glineri. op.cit., p. 90.

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relations. 31 Legally, however, there was little that the Patriarchate could do on behalf of the Greek minority. With the Lausanne settlement, the patriarchal authorities were stripped of all administrative functions and the Greek minority had to seek a separate rationale from the church for its dealings with the Turkish government. Under these circumstances, and pending the appointment of a thoroughly objectionable character as the trustee of Zappeion, the Greek government protested to Ankara. This intervention was successful and no other Greek minority establishment received a government appointed trustee. In fact, the Greek parish committees, elected in 1928, remained in office with the tacit consent of the government throughout the 1930s and 1940s. This irregularity was finally settled in 1949, when the system of government appointed trustees was abolished. Instead, community institutios were to be administered by persons elected by the members of the minority.32 Quite clearly, the whole question of seeking an appropriate code for the administration of non-Muslim, as well as Muslim, religious trust property stemmed from the government's wish for centralization. A reduction in the influence of non-secular institutions in Turkey was a major component of the Kemalist policy of secularism (layikllk). Inevitably, the pursuit of such a policy went counter to the freedom of religious minorities to manage their communal affairs without any interference from the Turkish authorities. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation had wholeheartedly subscribed to the freedom of minorities in the running of their communal institutions. Further, this right was enshrined in the minority clauses of the Lausanne treaty. As a result, throughout the interwar period, Turkey had to compound two mutually exclusive policies - i.e. to create freer conditions for the minorities in accordance with the Lausanne and Greco-Turkish agreements and to persist with the secular reforms.

3. Patriarch Benjamin I. The desire to achieve this delicate balance was reflected in the government's decisions to send the vdli of Istanbul as its official representative to the funeral of Patriarch Photios II. With his moderation and quiet dignity Photios, who died on 29 December 1935, appeared to have gained the sympathy of the Turkish government. Accordingly the presence of a highly placed Turkish official in a patriarchal funeral was indeed an unprecedented 31. Oakley to the archbishop of Canterbury. communicated to the Foreign Office by Dr Don. 0 February 1940. FO 371/25021/R210L 32 . Law no 5404/1949 for details see chapter IX:3.

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event in the history of the Patriarchate and epitomized the healthier atmosphere in which the Phanar was allowed to operate during the 1930s. Expressing satisfaction with the Turkish attitude, the Greek press interpreted this gesture as a sign of Ankara's respect for «this ancient religious institution which is held in veneration by every Greek».1 To find a successor favourable to both Turkey and Greece, however. proved a rather complicated task. From the very beginning Ankara hinted at the suitability of Jacob Papapaisiou, the archbishop ofImbros and Tenedos. In particular, the Turks approved of the prelate's proficiency in Turkish and his lack of enthusiasm for the movement for the union of the Christian churches. 2 The Greeks, on the other hand, favoured the archbishop of Chalcedon, Maximos Vaportzis. Only thirty-eight years old and with outstanding abilities, Chalcedon was popular with the Constantinopolitan Greeks. Having worked closely with Photios, the archbishop of Chalcedon shared the patriarch's concern about the declining international position of the Patriarchate. Just before the new election, the authorities stated that the election of Chalcedon and Dercos - the two most likely contestants - would be unpalatable to the Turkish government. Doubting the administrative capacities of Jacob, the Greek government opposed his election and endorsed the candidature of Maximos Vaportzis.3 On 19 January 1936, unable to elect the energetic Chalcedon, the holy synod compromised by elevating to the Patriarchal throne Benjamin Christodoulou, the aged archbishop of Heraclea. 4 The mixed feelings of the Greek Orthodox about the new patriarch became only too obvious when a demonstration of disapproval took place at the church of the Phanar, while the results of the election were being announced. Subsequently the Turkish police had to intervene in order to prevent a free fight and the new patriarch, visibly shaken and unable to make himself heard, left the church immediately after his election. Equally resentful were the Greeks with the Turkish effort to influence the outcome of the election and the independence exhibited by the patriarchal authorities. The renewed interest of the Turkish government in the internal affairs of the Patriarchate was probably due to the feeling in Ankara that,

L Waterlow to Hoare, Athens. 9 January 1936, FO 371/20087/E227, 2. Oakley to Douglas, Cons .. 6 February 1936. LPA/DgP/22/83-88. See also Mavropoulos. "p.cit .. pp. 241-42. 3. For details on this prelate see chapter IX:3. 4. Loraine to Hoare, Ankara, 3 February 1936. FO 371/20087/E766. See also The Times, 20 January 1936.

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despite a considerable loss of power, the Phanar still played an important role in the Orthodox world. The Turks associated this upsurge of the Phanar's prestige with the ecumenist policies of Patriarch Photios. After his death they appeared determined to step in and discourage the persistence of Photios' policies. But unlike his predecessor, Benjamin was reluctant to pursue an active ecumenist program. Perhaps the most important international step taken during the Benjamin reign was the granting of autonomy to the Albanian (1937) and Bulgarian (1945) churches. s Of some importance was also the visit of the British ambassador, Sir Hughes Knatchbull-Hugessen, to the Phanar on 14 October 1940. This was the first official contact between the British Embassy and the Phanar since 1923. 6 The Patriarchate was quite content with the reestablishment of official relations with Britain for it enhanced the Phanar' s aspiration to remain an international institution. While at first it raised no objection to the ambassador's visit, later on the Turkish government expressed its «annoyance» with the whole affair. 7 Notwithstanding the Turkish displeasure with the visit of the British ambassador to the Phanar, the fact that such a meeting could take place at all indicates the freer conditions under which the Patriarchate was allowed to operate during the 1930s and 1940s. This was also reflected in the success with which the Phanar was able to contain the challenge of Papa Eftim. Ever since 1927 Eftim was unable to make any serious impact. Not only was he boycotted by the Constantinopolitan Greeks, but even Turkish public opinion was increasingly impatient with the behaviour of the Anatolian priest. With sarcastic comments about the pompous titles that he had assumed, the Turkish press ridiculed Eftim' s opportunism and arrogance. The Vakil of 8 April 1926 even questioned the sincerity of his Turkish nationalist sentiments and wondered why a patriot sent his daughter to a Greek school (Zappeion). Under these circumstances Papa Eftim entered a period of obscurity which culminated with the establishment of Greco-Turkish co-existence. Unable to obtain government encouragement after 1930, he adopted a cautious attitude. He thus postponed the occupation of another Galata church, St Nicholas and kept a low profile during the patriarchal elections of 1929, 1936 and 1946.8 As the Eftimite movement faded into obscurity, Eftim faced yet another challenge. During the Greek-Turkish negotiations in 1930-31, the Greek government attached considerable importance to the pacification of Papa 5, 6. 7. 8.

Mavropoulos, op,cit., pp. 245-46: 'Op8or5o~ia, 12 (1937) 111-18. Nicols to Hugessen. London, 19 April 1940, FO 371/25021/R541. Morgan to Halifax, Ankara, 16 October 1940, FO 371/25021/R8626. Ergene, Op.cil., pp . 214-21.

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Eftim and some other twenty-six militants. As previously remarked, Athens was ready to reciprocate by expelling from Greece the leaders of the antiKemalist core in Greek Thrace. Thus in a gesture of goodwill, in 1931 Athens expelled from Greece the leader of the conservative Muslims in Thrace, Mustafa Sabri. Although prepared to discourage further anti-Phanar activity in istanbul, the Turkish government did not wish to see the total elimination of the Turkish Orthodox movement. Thus as had been said, Papa Eftim was one of the eight religious leaders allowed to wear the ecclesiastical habit in public after the ban of 1934. 9 Evidently, the Ankara government continued to regard the Turkish Orthodox church as one of the major religious orders in Turkey. Further, while Papa Eftim was encouraged to keep a low profile, his one time lieutenant istamat Zihni OZdamar gained considerable prominence during the 1930s. Not only did he enter the Turkish parliament in 1935, but he was also appointed by the government as trustee of the Ballkll hospital. When between 1935- 37, istamat Zihni brought to the administrative council a number of Eftimite partisans, the Patriarchate warned that the hospital would soon fall into the hands of the Turkish Orthodox. These fears, however, did not materialize and by May 1937, the influence of Istamat Zihni on Greek parish affairs was on the wane. I 0 This was mainly due to Greco-Turkish cordial relations which, in turn, obliged Turkey to pay attention to Greek susceptibilities. The Turkish concern with Greek sensibilities was illustrated by Ankara's willingness to take the advice of the Greek Embassy on matters affecting the Patriarchate. I I From 1930, therefore, the Turks allowed the Patriarchate to operate in a freer atmosphere which corresponded to the spirit of Greco- Turkish friendship, while on the other hand they strove to contain any growth in the Phanar's ecumenical character. To achieve this delicate balance, the Turkish government on numerous occasions demonstrated its goodwill towards the Patriarchate and at the same time, in pursuit of its secular policies, it promulgated some far-reaching measures courtailing the powers of the religious institutions in Turkey.

9. Jiischke, «Die Ti.irkische-Orthodoxe Kirche», pp. 126-27. 10. «General conspectus of events during the period January 1935 to May 1937», memorandum prepared by Oakley, Cons., '27 May 1937, LPA/DgP/22/104-7. 11. Minutes by Helm, 25 March 1933. FO 371/16986/1534.

CHAPTER VIn THE V ARLi K TAX AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GREEK COMMUNITY. 1. The position of Turkey during 1939-1942.

During the first months of World War II, Turkey had more to fear from the USSR than Nazi Germany, as Soviet-Turkish relations appeared rather shaken. Turkish apprehensions were further intensified when on 23 August 1939 the Germans signed a pact of non-aggression with the Soviets. Fears of Soviet intentions and the expansionist ambitions of Germany and Italy pushed Turkey into an alliance with the anti-revisionist Anglo-French block. Thus, the successor of Atatiirk, Ismet Inonii entered a mutual assistance agreement with Great Britain and France on 19 October 1939. Yet after the fall of Rumania and the expansion of the Axis influence to the Thracian I border of Turkey in May 1941, Ankara began to reconsider its policy. Declin-;=:;-i ing to participate actively in the war, Turkey embarked upon a policy of. neutrality. 1 Isolated from the Allies, an increasingly nervous Turkey sought to avoid provoking a German invasion. To secure German goodwill, the Turkish government signed on 18 June 1941 an agreement of friendship and commerce with the Nazis. At this early stage of the war the Turkish government seriously questioned the ability of the British to provide them with adequate military assistance. In this Ankara was influenced by the Greek experience. After six months of heroic resistence to the Italians, Greece capitulated to the Axis Powers. Despite its commitments to Greece, Britain did little to prevent the fall of Athens to the German forces on 27 April 1941. Nevertheless, the Turks were able to reconcile their recent agreement with the Nazis, with their continued alliance with Great Britain by exempting from the Turco-German pact any obligations previously assumed. Through this device and by their continued affirmation that they would resist attacks against Turkish territory, Turkey appeased its hard-pressed British ally. By

1. For an excellent treatment of Turkish foreign policy during World War II see F.G. Weber . The El'Gsil"e Neutral, Columbia 1979.

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207 14

counterbalancing the pressures exerted upon them by both blocks, the Turks successfully maintained a somewhat uneasy position of non-belligerence throughout the war. 2 Given the sensitive strategic position of Turkey, the avoidance of an active commitment to the war was a remarkable achievement of Turkish foreign policy. Although Turkey avoided direct involvement in the war, it was unable to escape the severe economic strains felt throughout Europe during 1939-44. Despite notable efforts at industrialization, the Kemalist vision of economic self-sufficiency was far from being accomplished. On the eve of World War II, Turkey was still dependent on Europe for its basic commodities such as raw materials and spare parts. War activity and blockades in the Mediterranean dramatically curtailed the volume of Turkish imports, and although Turkish export trade retained its vitality, the disruption of commercial exchanges with the Axis had particularly severe consequences. 3 Under these circumstances essential imported commodities, which had long been taken for granted by Turkish consumers, became grossly inadequate. Dissatisfaction in the urban centres was particularly strong among the civil servants with fIxed incomes and the working class. 4 The Turkish peasant, who still made up over 75 per cent of the population, was also discontented. Meanwhile, because of the imminent threat of invasion fIrst by the USSR and then by Germany, the Turkish army had been on a war footing since 1939 and a force of about one million men was mobilized. The mobilization was a tremendous burden on the economy exceeding the sum of 1,000,000 TL per day. Thus, while Turkish national defence expenditure was 163,941,000 TL in 1939, it was increased to 542,516,000 TL by 1943. 5 Only one third of this expenditure could have been covered by the existing taxatiOl,l. Coupled with 2. Ibid. 3. Annual values of foreign trade ($ 1000). Year 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

IlIlporrl 118899.:2 92497,6 50034,6 55348,9 112878,8 155340,2 126230,1

Erport5 115018.7 99647,2 80904,9 91056,3 126115,3 196734,5 177952,4

Difference - 3880,4 + 7149,6 + 30870,3 + 35707,4 + 13236,5 + 41394,3 + 51722,3

VoluJIle of foreign trade 233917,8 192144,8 130939,5 146405,2 238994,1 352074,7 304182,5

M.. Diizgiine~. Tiirkiye'de Toplumsal VI' Ekollomik Geli:Wlenin 50 ym, Ankara 1973, p. 3:26 4. Text of the speech by the Turkish prime minister. Refik Saydam, 2 February 1942, in FO 371/33375/R810; Jordan to Foreign Office, Ankara, I December 194:2. FO 371/33389/R8684. 5. F. Okte, Varllk Vergisi Facias!. istanbul 1951, p. 23 f[

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this, the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of active men from productive capacities adversely affected the agricultural output and industrial production of the country. The mobilization not only engendered a severe labour shortage but also the huge armed force provided a new source of competition on the market. consuming goods and foodstuffs needed by the civilian population. As supplies were unable to meet demand, severe shortages in such staple articles as wheat, sugar and coal became commonplace. The scarcity of basic commodities in turn resulted in a steep rise in prices. 6 Owing to the upward tendency of the price index hoarding and speCUlation became rampant. Both speculators and consumers indulged extensively in such practices aggravating the market trends. A number of retailers, wholesalers. agents. brokers, middlemen, exporters and importers, known as the «war-rich» (harp zenginleri). in the larger cities were able to dominate a flourishing blackmarket and amass large fortunes in a short space of time. Nor was speculation and hoarding restricted to the urban capitalist and commercial classes. The government policy of offering progressively higher values for wheat and other cereals led a section of the farmers to hold onto their stocks in the hope of benefiting from the ever-increasing prices. Describing the condition of the peasants, the British ambassador, Sir KnatchbullHugessen remarked that «the peasants who are hoarding grain and selling at high prices are virtually as well off as are many numbers of peasants in the North (Black Sea region)>>. 7 6 . The wholesale price index:

Year 1938 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Foodstuffs \·egetable.l 100 123..3 179.8 424.9 8945 539..4

Raw materials industrial 100 1345 1763 26L2 319 355.6

meat 100 12L8 IR8 386 . 6 752.8 520.9

General index 100 126.6 175.3 339 . 6 590.1 458

7. Hugessen to Foreign Office. Ankara, '27 April 1942, FO 371/33388/R2814. An index of agricultural production in Turkey based on the most important crops gives the (1938: 100) 1935 .. "'. 72 1936 ..... 93 1937 . . . ,95 1938 ..... 100 1939 ..... 105 1940 ..... 106

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He also noted that in the Adana district, the cotton farmers and textile manufacturers were «prosperous», and that «is:el enjoys a local prosperity». 8 At the same time heavy expenditure occasioned by mobilization and the constant rise of the price index resulted to a considerable increase in note circulation. During the month of October 1942 alone note circulation had increased by 35,500 TL. Increased money circulation indicated inflation and all indices affirmed that Turkey was in the midst of a serious economic crisis. 9 1941.. ... 95 1942 ..... 103 1943 ..... 90 1944 ..... 86 1945 ..... 74 1946 ..... 96

2. The enactment of the varl'ik tax.

According to a wheat price index cmpiled by the Turkish statistics department (istatistik Umum Miidur/iigu) prices fluctuated as following 1935 ..... 5.50 1936 .... 5.72 1937 ..... 5.47 1938 ..... 5J6 1939 ... " 508 1940 ...... 6.05 1941 .... JO.58 1942 .... .30.76 1943 .... .47.23 1944 .....28.40

(kg/Kuru:j)

V. Eidem, «Mill! Gelir», jstanbul Univesitesi jktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasl. 9/1-2 (1948) 82-83. 8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 27 April 1942, FO 371/33389/R2814. 9. Money supply and wholesale prices, 1936-1944. (TL million)

Years 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

Bank notes ill circulation (1) 170 180 194 281 404 512 733 802 960

On 24 October 1942, the British ambassador in Turkey expressed his anxiety about the economic situation in Turkey. In a telegram to the Foreign Office, he reported that «he anticipated a more or less complete breakdown in the Turkish economy by the end of the present year (1942)>>.1 0 Turkish leaders were equally alarmed by the gloomy prospects of the economy. This nervousness was expressed by the president, ismet inonii, when on 1 November 1942 he condemned the widespread profiteering and hoarding practices. He accused such unscrupulous traders of «attempting to undermine the national life».l1 The new Turkish prime minister, -5iikrii S~as:oglu shared the views of President inonii. 12

Sight deposits at banks

Total (1 +(2)

jstanbul wholesale price index

133 157 205 201 202 285 399 400 500

303 337 399 482 606 797 1,132 1,202 1,460

101.4 105.5 100.0 100.9 123.1 166.5 325.9 699.4 486.7 (1938: 100)

These estimates are based on the nearest available data. See Anlluaire Statistique. 1935·36, Ankara 1937, p. 275; Annuaire Statistique, 1942-45. Ankara 1945, p. 299.

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-/ By drawing a deliberately depressing picture of the economy, the president hoped to prepare his countrymen for the drastic legislation against warprofiteering contrived by the Saras:oglu government. As early as 1 January 1940, the government attempted to check the situation through rationing wheat, imposing rent controls and finally by giving extensive emergency powers to the authorities with the promulgation of the National Emergency law. On the whole, these measures proved ineffective and speculators were able to circumvent government controls. 1 Now, on II November 1942, a new emergency tax measure was promulgated in order -to curb the galloping inflation. Claiming that the sole purpose of the new emergency measure was to put some order in the economy, Prime Minister Saras:oglu declared before the Turkish assembly that «we are neither the pupils of Adam Smith nor the apprentices of Karl Marx. We are the children of a political party whose social religion is populism and whose economic doctrine is etatisme». He concluded his account by stressing that an emergency act was necessary for the control of the unabated inflation as well as for the assessment of the. hitherto untaxed wealth. 2 Thus, the varl'ik vergisi (capital tax) was duly approved by 350 out of 429 deputies in the Turkish assembly. Among the 76 who abstained (three seats were vacant), there were the Greek and Jewish deputies, Nicholas Taptas and AbravaYl1 MannaralP 10. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 24 October 1942, FO 371/33389/R7117. 11. AT lOS (1942) 21-24 for the complete text of the speech. 12. Ibid .. pp. 39-41. 1. E. Clark, «The Turkish Varllk Vergisi Reconsidered», MES 8/2 (1972) 206. 2. He called the tax «a revolutionary step», for the text of the 11 November speech seeAT 108 (1942) 25-41. See also TBMM Zablt Ceridesi, 28-29 (1942) 33-35. 3. Official translation Loi de l' Impot sur fa Fortune, no. 4305/1942.

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This extraordinary levy was mainly designed to tax the abnormally high profits amassed by a number of individuals and companies since the outbreak of the war. Four categories of the population seemed to have been largely affected by the new levy. These were: (a) companies and individuals engaged in business since 1939 (b) middlemen and commissionaires (c) owners of immovable property, and (d) salaried private employees (government employees were ex empted). Through a fiscal measure, the government intended to deflate the economy by providing the treasury with funds. Deflation, it was hoped, by withdrawing surplus purchasing power in circulation would cause a fall in prices. Given the extensive profiteering and tax evasion which had taken place since 1939, the proposed tax was in principle legitimate. It was also desirable for the purposes of both revenue and social justice, for a relatively small section of the population had been able to profit from the economic crisis at the expense of the Turkish people. While, therefore, the necessity of a drastic fiscal measure was indisputable, certain traits of the new bill created apprehension from the very start. Such misgivings were widespread among Turkish citizens who wished to see the establishment of democratic values and civil freedoms in Turkey. Thus, although taxes were to be levied in proportion to wealth and ability to pay, no declarations of resources were sought by the assessment boards. Such committees (mahallf takdir komisyonlarl) were comprised of high-ranking government officials and influential personalities in each district, who conducted their inquiries «in well-guarded secrecy». 4 Equally disconcerting were the almost unlimited powers bestowed upon these committees to estimate the amount of tax imposed upon every individual. Further, a clause forbidding all appeals except through the assembly was also inserted in the tax. The payments were to be deposited within fifteen days of assessment and, although fIfteen days grace was granted, this was subject to high interest payments of one per cent on the value of the original tax during the first week and two per cent during the second. Those who were unable to pay off the tax within the prescribed month were liable to immediate confiscation and public auctioning of their property. If the price obtained was still insufficient, defaulters were liable to forced labour on non-military projects under the direction of the ministry of public works. Aware that a large body of opinion in Turkey associated the prevailing 40 kE, Yalman. Turkey in My Time. Norman 1956, p. 205.

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economic crisis with their business practices, the non-Muslims were particularly worried by the unlimited powers vested with the assessment committees. They strongly feared that they would be treated less favourably than their Muslim counterparts. The Turkish press had launched an extensive campaign against Christian and Jewish businessmen accusing them of speculation, blackmarketing and stockpiling. In a characteristic article entitled «Yorgi, you will no longer be allowed to do what you wish», the Ulus of 24 Novembei:1942 accused the Yorgis, Salamons,Kyriakos, Artins, in other words, the non-Muslims in general, for bringing about the economic ills which had befallen the country. Finding the liberties enjoyed by the minorities in Turkey too wide, the press demanded restriction. Before long, the campaign took a distinctive anti-Jewish character. 5 Stimulated by the adverse economic conditions, historical prejudice and mistrust of nonMuslims in Turkey surfaced once again. The renewed antipathy towards religious minorities was shared by the Turkish government. Notwithstanding the lip-service paid about the equality of all Turkish citizens, Ankara manifested a willingness to place the responsibility for the economic crisis on the shoulders of the minorities. Thus, in a conversation with the British envoy Sterndale Bennett, the Germanophil Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu claimed that «the minorities were a rich commercial community. They did nothing for the country. They lived extremely sumptuously and well, while the Turkish peasants were half starving and even the Turkish officials lived like the proletariat in comparison with the rich merchants of istanbul and izmir». 6 By portraying Turkey as the victim of a number of unscrupulous entrepreneurs, the government sought to conceal its shortcomings in the economic field. Chanelling discontent to an unpopular target such as the non-Muslim minorities would, the government felt, divert criticism and satisfy emotionally the hard-pressed Turkish masses. Even before the varllk taxation, the Turkish government had shown signs of sympathy with discriminatory attitudes towards the minorities. An early manifestation of this inclination was the decision to mobilize all non-Muslims between the ages of 18 and 45. Just about the time of the signing of the Turco-German agreement in June 1941, these men were sent to special camp~ in Anatolia each containing about 5,000 men. There, the men were instructed 5. For a resume of Turkish press repOIts, Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 29 January 1943, FO 371/37401/RI212. 6. Sterndale Bennett to Foreign Office, Ankara, 10 March 1943, FO 371/37403/R3391.

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!

to engage themselves in non-combative capacities such as roadbuilding. 7 The concentration of all non-Muslim males in such camps aroused great apprehension in minority circles in Istanbul. 8 Their fears were intensified when reports of harsh conditions and high mortality rate reputed to have prevailed in the camps reached Istanbul. 9 On 8 December 1941, however, those men between the ages of38 and 45 were allowed to return to their homes: The rest spent another six months before they were eventually released. It is reasona. ble to assume that the whole operation was a device engineered to get the minorities out of the strategically sensitive area of istanbul and the Straits. There is also some evidence to suggest that the Turkish government suspected a number of non-Muslims, almost all Armenians, to be involved in «fiftp column» activities against Turkey. 10 The mistrust of the government towards the minorities was best illustrated during the varlik episode. There is no doubt that a section of the non-Muslim businessmen deserved this mistrust. For they did accumulate large fortunes out of the economic difficulties in the years 1939-42. This was particularly so with those who were in a position to exploit both the highly valued Turkish exports and the scarcity of essential imports. Non-Muslim merchants also showed a particular aptitude for transmuting their profits into goods, real estate and gold, thus making full use of the inflationary market conditions. Speculation and hoarding was by no means restricted to non-Muslims. Turkish businessmen were as prone to such activities as their minority counterparts. It was during these inflationary market conditions that a considerable number of Turkish merchants managed to expand substantially their business concerns. Yet both the government and the press chose to direct their frustration with the economic ills against the minorities. Reduced to mere scapegoats, the latter found themselves accused of disloyalty, tax evasion and exploitation. Anticipating the foml of a future tax measure, A. K. Helm, an experienced observer of Turkish affairs and a British diplomat in I Ankara, predicted that «it need not cause surprise if in a few years ... a violent campaign is

7. Cornwallis to Eastern Dept., Bardad, 2j4 Novembe 1941, FO 371j30031jRlOO81. 8. Hugessen to Foreign Office, Ankara, 19 May 1941, FO 371j30031jR5357. 9. Interviews with twenty Constantinopolitan Greeks who served in such camps. There are, however, no reliable statistics as to the overall mOitality rate in these camps. More information is given in the Ankara Chancery to Southern DepL, 4 June 1941, FO 37Ij30031jR58I3. 10. As pointed out in Foreign Office minute dated 19 May 1941, «the Armenians are extremely fruitful ground for German activity. The non-Muslim elements with their pre-Kemalist mentality are always viewed with mistrust by the Turkish authorities», in FO 371j30031jR5357.

214

directed against the Jews or if the minorities are again mulcted of the profits which they have been buildingup in the recent years of relative tolerance» .11 3. Discriminatory traits of the varl'lk tax.

When the varl'lk assessments were eventually made public the discrimination feared by many was not only established but it even exceeded all expectations. 1 The majority of the assessments levied on non-Muslims was set at confiscatory figures bearing no relation to declared profits or capacity to pay. In the case of firms they amounted from four to seven times the nominal capital of the company or four to five times the declared profits in 1941. Likewise, taxes imposed on property owners often exceeded the total value of their estates as registered with the government department. 2 Influenced by the commonly held view that non-Muslims evaded paying taxes, the assessment boards taxed the minorities over their declared wealth. Defending the wholly Muslim local assessment boards, the director of finance (defterdar) in istanbul, Faik Okte presented evidence indicating that the tax rates were ordered by Ankara. He also attributes the conception of the bill to the prime minister, ~iikrii Sarauvupiq> l1a'tpwPXIKO'; OlKO'; KUt Nuo.; 'tOU 'Ayiou reropyiOU» (The Patriarchal Building and Church of St George in the Phanar) in 'Op()or5oc,ia 16 (1941). «'0 I1U'tPWPXIKO, Middle East Economic Papers, Beirut, 1968.

Lane, Winthorp, «Why Greeks and Turks Opposed being Exchanged», Current History, 18 (April 1923). Lannou, Yves Ie, «La Fin de l'Empire Ottoman vue par la presse frans:aise (1918-1922)>>,

Turcica, 9-10 (1978). Laourdas, Basil, «'0 "Icov ~payoUjll]e; lCai 1') 'E1t0XTJ 1:0U» (Ion Dragoumis and his period), in 'Emrarpza L.:riJ}.J7 arb v 7wva .dpayov/1'l (Commemorative Column on Ion Dragoumis), Athens, 1980. Lender, D. and Robinson, R.D., «Swords and Ploughshares: the Turkish Army as a modernizing Force» in World Politics 13 (1960). Leondopolis (Efstratiadis), «To1toypacpIlCCr. 1:fie; Kcovomvnvou1toAeCOe;» (About the Topography of Istanbul), 'Op()o, in International Relations 7-8 (1964-1%5).

«The Diplomacy of Theodoros Pangalos, 1925-1926» in BS 13 (1972).

Newman, E.W. Polson, «Italy, Greece and Turkey» in 19th Century and After 100 (October, 1926).

Rustow, D. A., «Politics and Development Policy» in Four Studies all the Economic Development of Turkey, F. C. Shorter (ed.) London, 1967.

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