The Gift of Generations: Japanese and American Perspectives on Aging and the Social Contract

The Gift of Generations is an inquiry into the different cultural meanings of giving and deserving help in two aging societies. Postindustrial societies today contend with population dynamics that have never before existed. As the number of older people grows, countries must determine how best to provide for the needs of this population. The constraints are real: Fiscal and material resources are finite and must be shared in a way that is perceived as just. As such, societies confront the fundamental question of who gets what, how, and why, and ultimately must reappraise the principles determining why some people are considered more worthy of help than others. This study systematically explores the Japanese and American answers to this fundamental question.

The Gift of Generations

The Gift of Generations Japanese and American Perspectives on Aging and the Social Contract AKIKO HASHIMOTO University of Pittsburgh

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521555203 © Cambridge University Press 1996 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1996 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Hashimoto, Akiko, 1952The gift of generations: Japanese and American perspectives on aging and the social contract / Akiko Hashimoto. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-48307-7 (he). - ISBN 0-521-55520-5 (pbk.) 1. Aged - Cross-cultural studies. 2. Social contract - Crosscultural studies. 3. Aged - Japan-Family relationships. 4. A g e d United States - Family relationships. 5. Aged - Services for - Japan. 6. Aged - Services for - United States. I. Title. HQ1061.H366 1996 305.26 - dc20 95-37713 CIP ISBN 978-0-521-48307-0 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-55520-3 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2009 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Information regarding prices, travel timetables and other factual information given in this work are correct at the time of first printing but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such information thereafter.

To my father and my mother, Hashimoto Kozaburo, and Hisako

Do not go gentle into that good night, Old age should burn and rave at close of day; Rage, rage against the dying of the light. - Dylan Thomas Learn to adore it in your heart The silver hair on your head. Of all the riches That I can find in this world Nothing can equal In price, no matter how dear, The silver hair on your head. - Ryokan

Contents

List of Tables and Figure Preface Acknowledgments 1

page ix xi xiii

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens The Private Discourse: Expectations of Vulnerability The Public Discourse: Responsibilities of Intervention Values, Interests, and Symbolic Equity: A Framework of Analysis

13

2

Two Communities, Two Societies West Haven Westside Odawara Comparing Communities

18 19 22 28

3

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain Entitlement, Obligation, and Equity Individual, Family, and State

34 35 43

4

The Practice of Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain Inside the Household Outside the Household Family and Network The Recognition of Vulnerability

49 51 58 64 65

5

The Japanese Viewpoint Voices from Odawara The Protective Approach

1 1 10

71 73 101

vn

Contents 6

The American Viewpoint Voices from West Haven The Contingency Approach

103 105 140

7

Cultural Assumptions and Values Trajectories of Need Conditions of Security Intergenerational Equity Primary Bonds of Affection Units of Self-Sufficiency Visions of Resource Affluence

143 145 151 153 155 157 158

8

The Social Regulation of Interests Credits, Debts, and Mutual Interests Rights, Responsibilities, and Collective Interests The Logic of Symbolic Equity Distribution of Symbolic Resources: Empowerment and Disempowerment Social and Cultural Constructions of Support

163 165 168 169 171 174

Conclusion Culture, Power, and the Social Contract Reflections on Diversity and Change

182 183 186

9

Appendix: Methods of Research Bibliography Index

195 200 215

Vlll

Tables and Figure

TABLES

2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 7.1 8.1

Profiles of West Haven and Westside Odawara page 30 Living arrangements in West Haven and Westside Odawara 52 Living arrangements by age, marital status, and sex in West Haven and Westside Odawara 55 Patterns of association with close relatives and friends by living arrangements 61 Choice of confidante by living arrangements, sex, and marital status in West Haven and Westside Odawara 63 Receiving at least one type of informal support: Logistic regression estimates 67 Cultural assumptions of helping relationships 145 Strategies of regulating interests in helping relationships 174 FIGURE

7.1

Expectations of need in old age

IX

149

Preface

H

OW are people made deserving of help? How do different cultures define the meaning of giving and worthiness of the people who "ought" to be helped? This book explores these questions by comparing Japanese and American helping arrangements and support systems. Drawing on 2 years of fieldwork, the study analyzes the cultural and structural conditions that shape the "social contract" in the case of the elderly. My analysis draws attention to the symbolic dimension of this social contract and focuses on the importance of cultural assumptions and social assignments that create the conditions of deservedness. There is more to the phenomenon of giving and deserving help than goodwill and meeting others' needs. People seemingly give help even when it is not in their interest to do so. Reciprocity also seems to matter, even when people act out of generosity. I believe that the key explanations are found in the regulation of values and interests entailed in the practice of the social contract. The cross-cultural design of this study offers an opportunity to explore systematically these values and interests in social support. My purpose is to understand how culture and society shape giving, both theoretically and empirically. This framework derives from an analysis of comparative patterns of support, the different conditions in which support is perceived to be successful or unsuccessful, and the degree to which different values and interests are prioritized in helping arrangements. I explain the crossnational differences by comparing the definitions of vulnerability, security, dependency, reciprocity, protection, intervention, entitlement, and obligation; I also account for the similarities by comparing the social practices of designating rights, responsibilities, credits, and debts. xi

Preface The study draws on fieldwork from two communities where I lived as a participant observer. The two sites I selected - Odawara City in Kanagawa Prefecture, and West Haven City in Connecticut - are comparable communities in size, demographic profiles, and socioeconomic conditions. In addition to the information from participant observation, I obtained systematically comparable data from 49 case studies and 471 survey respondents. Data collection for this project started in the early 1980s, but the core values and interests that I examine nevertheless do not change easily. If anything, the question of the social contract in contemporary societies has become even more significant in the intervening years. Chapter 1 introduces the central themes of the study - deservedness, vulnerability, and responsibility - and maps out the theoretical perspective of the book. Chapter 2 sets the scene for the study by introducing the reader to the two communities. In Chapter 3,1 explore the different social designations of rights and responsibilities in the public domain, by examining the relationship between the individual, the family, and the state as expressed in Japanese and American social policies. In the following three empirical chapters, I analyze the helping practices in the private domain, to explore the workings of entitlement, obligation, protection, intervention, reciprocity, and fairness in the support relationship. Chapter 4 examines the different patterns of interaction in the giver-receiver relationship. In Chapters 5 and 6, I present the viewpoints of the elderly themselves. In the next two synthesis chapters, which contain the heart of my argument on values, interests, and symbolic equity, I bring together the different layers of findings in a theoretical framework. Chapter 7 identifies and discusses the key cultural assumptions that shape the support practice. Chapter 8 discusses the social assignments of rights, responsibilities, credits, and debts that establishes symbolic equity in the giver-receiver relationship. Finally, Chapter 9 offers a summary and some reflections on the implications of the study. Details of research methods can be found in the appendix.

xn

Acknowledgments

I

N the years of research leading to the publication of this book, I have accrued gifts of encouragement, information, advice, and criticism from many people on both sides of the Pacific. I am grateful to all of them for giving freely of their time and knowledge. My special thanks are due to the senior citizens of Odawara and West Haven who were generous in sharing their life stories and confidences with me. I have learned much from their wisdom, courage, and kindness while I lived with them, and hope that I have portrayed their lives in a way that they recognize. The fieldwork in the two countries would not have been possible without the many people who guided me and collaborated with me. In particular, I would like to thank Lisa Berkman (Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, Yale University), Fujisaki Hiroko (Sacred Heart Women's College, formerly of Tokyo Metropolitan University), Kobayashi Ryoji (Tokyo Metropolitan University), Joanne McGloin (Yale Health and Aging Project), Nemoto Yoshiaki (Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare), Osawa Takashi (Kanagawa Prefectural Government), and Thomas Corrigan, Louis Goldblatt, and Susan Holtvedt (State of Connecticut). In Odawara, Matsuno Mitsuyoshi (City of Odawara), Morohoshi Kiyoshi (Odawara Social Welfare Council), and Saito Kiyoshi (City of Odawara) were invaluable with their help. In West Haven, Arthur Cantor, Robert Congdon, and Carla Hays (South Central Connecticut Area Agency on Aging) and Sharon Mancini and John Wheeler (City of West Haven, Elderly Services) were generous with their advice when it was most needed. Research grants from Toyota Foundation, Concilium on International and Area Studies and Council on East Asian Studies at Yale xiii

Acknowledgments University, and Japan Council and Asian Studies Program at the University of Pittsburgh have helped me carry out the different phases of this study. I am grateful for the financial resources that they made available for this project. The research assistance of Miwa Seiko, Virginia Tomlinson, Sawada Yoshie, and BunyaToshiko was also indispensable for me during or after fieldwork in the two countries. The secretarial staff of the Department of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh ably assisted me with the preparation of the manuscript for publication. Many advisors, colleagues, and friends have stimulated my thinking and conceptualization on cultural analysis during all or part of the years in which this book has been in the making. I would like to acknowledge the earlier crucial help of my advisors at Yale: Eleanor Westney, Deborah Davis, David Apter, and Lisa Berkman. Many thanks are also due to my former colleagues at the United Nations University, Nevin Scrimshaw and Lai Jayawardena, for their special support. My colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh have also been generous with their time to offer precious criticism and encouragement: Sandra Boatwright, Keith Brown, Mounira Charrad, Ellis Krauss, and Mae Smethurst. I am especially indebted to Rainer Baum, Martin Greenberg, William Kelly, and Richard Smethurst for their very constructive comments on the whole manuscript. The reviews from anonymous readers of Cambridge University Press and another press that was interested in publishing my manuscript have also been helpful in shaping the final version of this book. For their warm support, human comfort, and inspiration at various phases of this project, I must thank many special friends, colleagues, and family members. Among them are Atsumi Naoki, Darlene Berkovitz, Keith Brown, Ellen Borges, Fujisaki Hiroko, Janelle and Martin Greenberg, Romaine and Tamara Horowitz, Ann Jannetta, Sander Kornblith, Carol Krauss Bostick, Miwa Seiko, Jon and Monika Pierre, Thomas Richter, Mae and Richard Smethurst, and Robert Zinn. At Cambridge University Press, I am very grateful to my editor Elizabeth Neal for her wise guidance and special interest in this work. I am also indebted to Brian MacDonald for his patient and intelligent copy editing and production. xiv

Acknowledgments Finally, I want to express my heartfelt appreciation to Amy Remensnyder for being there at the most crucial times, and my sister Yasuko Hashimoto Richter for her loving and unfailing support throughout the journey of this project. Material appearing in the epigraph is reprinted by permission of New Directions Publishing Corporation, from Poems of Dylan Thomas, copyright 1952 by Dylan Thomas; and by Princeton University Press, from The Zen Poems ofRyokan, by Nobuyuki Yuasa, copyright 1981 by Princeton University Press.

xv

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens

THE PRIVATE DISCOURSE: EXPECTATIONS OF VULNERABILITY

OROTHY Turoski1 is a 74-year-old woman who lives in a public housing complex for the elderly in the city of West Haven, Connecticut, 80 miles to the northeast of metropolitan New York. She packed chicken at the local poultry factory for 28 years before retiring from her job, and now lives in a subsidized one-room housing unit of this complex on a small Social Security income. Dorothy has some difficulty moving around because of arthritis, and she has lived here alone for 7 years.

D

I do nothing. There's nothing to do here. I haven't got none, no friends. There's plenty of days I don't see anybody. I don't know anybody here. I don't go to City Hall [senior center], I don't know anybody here.... My husband died. My two daughters died. My son had a stroke. He is paralyzed. He's in a wheelchair. For three and a half years, I was away taking care of my daughter. I used to go at eight o'clock till four when the kids came home from school. When she died, it seemed that everything in me died. Because I didn't care anymore. She suffered so much.... I got all her children, but they're not very nice. They don't come to see me or anything. On a Sunday, the parking lot is full when they come to see their grandmother or their mother, but there's nobody there for me. . .. 1 Names, occupations, and other details identifying interviewees quoted here and in subsequent chapters have been altered to protect their anonymity.

The Gift of Generations Lots of times I wish I was 60 again. I'd be happy. I'd be working. I'd be doing something again. I could work now but I'm afraid. When I get up in the morning, I just can't hurry up and run around, because I'd fall. I'm all aches and pains now; if I had to go to the doctor for this, I'd have to go everyday.. . . I don't know where I'd go. I haven't got no money. I'll go to a convalescent home. That's where lots of people go from here. I don't know what they do when they go to a convalescent home. . . . I would be the lucky one to get one that wouldn't be very nice - because I'm not a very lucky person. We begin this book with four women - two Japanese and two Americans - who talk about the realities of later life in different environments. They are all in their late 60s or early 70s and have worked throughout their lives; but each person is different in how she defines the boundaries of her vulnerability, and in the expectations she sets for others to meet her needs. Their hopes and disappointments echo not only different expectations of dependence and independence in old age, but also their different standards of evaluating how one becomes in need of, and deserving of, protection at such a time. Dorothy's bitterness and sense of betrayal help us understand that her most acute vulnerabilities lie with her family relationships. Her laments focus on her children, none of whom are now available to love and care for her. Her husband died 15 years ago, as did her two daughters. Of her two surviving sons, one is wheelchair-bound, and the other is hospitalized for a drinking problem. After all of the care she gave to her children, none of their children, in turn, feels that she now deserves the same in later life. Dorothy feels deprived and depressed, even though public support is available to meet her most basic financial needs. To shield herself from further disappointments, she has secluded herself in a small apartment, and does not take the opportunity to socialize with neighbors and peers in the same building. Her expectation for old age is utterly unmet, as she now resigns herself to the idea of eventually moving to a nursing home, a contingency that she feels is totally undeserved. She sees herself as a person who has been dealt a bad hand - and as deserving better.

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens The public support provisions for the elderly2 that Dorothy takes for granted - subsidized housing, public meal programs, transportation services, a range of nursing homes - are not as readily accessible to her Japanese counterparts. In Japan, those without family support must seek their old-age security through alternative means. Yamada Shizu,3 also in her early 70s, lives in a rental unit in Odawara City, 50 miles to the west of metropolitan Tokyo. She has worked at the local fish-processing factory for 16 years, and now lives with her husband, a lacquer craftsman, in a two-room apartment. Like Dorothy, Shizu has arthritis and moves with some difficulty, but she has recovered from a hip operation. Shizu's strategy for old age has taken an entirely different direction from Dorothy's: It is focused on willfully masterminding the invention of family as a safety net. As we carry out the interview, she hugs and talks to her favorite doll, Toto-chan, made in the likeness of a 2-year-old baby girl. I do nothing all day. I used to like making cloth flowers. I gave them away, but I ran out of people to give them to - so, I don't do it anymore. I like singing, so I sing here by myself to the background music tape, karaoke. I don't like places where there are lots of people I don't know. I don't like talking with people I don't know. . . . I love television; I like watching baseball; and then there's wrestling, but I love baseball. We adopted a nephew who married a niece. They are the children of my sisters, and they are cousins. The adoption was arranged 15 years ago. They're very good to us. They live in Saitama with three children. We bought them land in Saitama, built them a house. That was part of our understanding, part of the adoption. We're old-fashioned people, always working hard and preparing for the future. This holiday, the Golden Week, they said they'd come to fetch me if I wanted to go. I called them this morning and told 2 Throughout this book, the term elderly refers to persons over age 65, unless otherwise noted. 3 Surnames precede given names for all Japanese respondents.

The Gift of Generations them that I'll be good this year. It's been a year since my hip troubles. It's not as if I don't feel well or anything, you know. But I just didn't want to trouble them. . . . Toto-chan came to us through the mail order.... I even telephoned the mail-order house, so that Toto-chan could come to us more quickly. This dress is too large for her . .. but now that it's getting warmer, I just roll up her sleeves. I don't take Toto-chan with me when I visit them in Saitama. You see, my husband would be lonely [sabishii], if he were left alone. We'll eventually move to Saitama. I even bought a plot in the temple cemetery there. You see, we're old so we don't know when it will happen. It could happen any day. And so if we buy a plot, there's no need to worry. I wouldn't want my son to have to worry about that for us. I've told him that we are now saving up for the funeral expenses. You see, we're old-fashioned people. For the funeral, about one million yen would do. . . . We'll move to Saitama when we can't work anymore.4 To the degree that adult adoption (yoshi engumi) survives in contemporary Japan as a legacy of the traditional family system iey it is today an arrangement that can secure family support for the elderly in return for an offer of inheritance.5 As a childless couple, the Yamadas' plan for this old-age security began years ago in their middle age, when they turned to this traditional Japanese option. Shizu and her husband have now invested almost all of their savings in their adopted son, consciously grooming him and his wife as their future caregivers - which is, for them, the most important part of the "understanding." Careful not to impose on the adopted couple for the holiday weekend - and for any other expenses, for that matter - Shizu spends most of her daytime alone, watching television, taking short walks, 4 All Japanese quotations appearing in this book were translated by the author. 5 Ie refers to the traditional patrilineal stem family, which practiced primogeniture until the end of World War II. In this system, families without male heirs adopted adult men (often the daughters' husbands) to preserve the family lineage. There were seven cases of adult adoption in the Odawara sample.

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens and playing with the doll. Most of the financial transfer from the older to younger generation seems to have already taken place: The Yamadas have made the downpayment for their adopted son's house, while they themselves continue to live in a small rental unit. As such, Shizu's adaptation to old age - and preparing for the likelihood of widowhood - has been deliberately planned. She has intentionally created an extended family where none existed, and has even concocted a live-in surrogate grandchild, Toto-chan. Through the series of steps she has taken over the past 15 years, she has consciously made herself a future beneficiary of this family support system. While Dorothy and Shizu can both be described as lonely women with similar physical difficulties, it is clear that they seek out different support systems not just because of different personal circumstances and social options. In Japan, where the majority of older people live with their children mostly in three-generation households, childlessness is a significant drawback in old age. When the society as a whole is geared to the availability of children in times of vulnerability, the preferred solution to old-age security for the childless lies not in the search for public or community support, but in finding the closest substitute to a family support system. The two women also bring different underlying assumptions to their own life scripts of old age from their distinct Japanese and American backgrounds. Dorothy speaks about resorting to a nursing home as an eventuality that was wholly unanticipated and unplanned. Shizu is all business as she talks about moving to, and dying in, Saitama as part of her concrete plan for the end of her life. It is clear that the support systems of these two women derive from different personal circumstances and institutional options, and, at the same time, they are also based on different expectations about the absolute need for support in later life. Thus, these expectations lead to different precautions and preparations. In contrast to these two women who are concerned about receiving care, Irene Falletta, a retired schoolteacher in West Haven, sees herself first and foremost as a provider of support to other elderly by situating herself on the other side of the fence. Far from orchestrating a plan for her own support like Shizu, Irene has created a plan to live for

The Gift of Generations others who are in need. She leads a very active life as an elderly advocate for the West Haven region, serving on boards and committees of many community organizations, and being vocal and prominent in the city's circle of volunteers. As a former teacher, she is educated and articulate, and enjoys a comfortable pension that the school system affords. Irene is also 72 years old and has been married for 40 years; and, like Shizu, she has had no children of her own. Most weeks, I'm out of the house everyday for some part of the day. I don't really think of these [volunteer work] as positions. You see, I believe that growing old is part of growing. It's the continuum of life. As far as I'm concerned, it was really just growing into it. I keep going because I was getting older, and so was the world. And then, I should find a way to contribute. My decision was that I wanted to continue to be involved. In order to be alive, I had to be involved. And to be involved would keep me alive, rather than wait and see what happens . . . no, I don't do that. I really planned to retire to do volunteer work.. . . When I can't anymore? I'll just have to find some other thing to contribute to. Our grandparents lived with us. Both my maternal and paternal grandmothers lived with us, and my paternal grandfather, too. . . . But it's not as easy today, because now people don't grow together. . . . Yes, I would like to live with the younger generations [if such circumstances were possible]. We don't have children, unfortunately, but if we did, I would ask them to live with me - rather than me with them - there's a difference here, you see. I would prefer that they lived with me.6 But for the present moment, going in to live with a relative no, I don't think so. Because, you see, they have their lives and we have ours. We didn't grow together. You can't do it. Irene's concern for her independence is a common theme emphasized by the elderly in contemporary American life. She refuses to elaborate on her own vulnerability - about the possibility some day of 6 The emphasis is Irene's.

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens becoming incapacitated, widowed, lonely, or in need of some help herself. As if such thoughts would only hasten their arrival, she takes to her retired life with a resolute sense of control. For Irene, the transition to retirement has also been part of a deliberate plan, but the plan is essentially one that focuses on the continuity of an active and independent life, not the end of it. She is fully absorbed in the social network of peers, found far more frequently among the American than Japanese elderly. Peer networks are important for Irene, because the interests and pursuits of the older and younger generations in contemporary life are far apart - a view held more commonly in American than Japanese society. Irene's sense of contribution and devotion to her peers derives from the vital notion common in American society that life does not come to a meaningful completion without living it up fully until the last moment. Finally, Suzuki Masa is a nurse in her late 60s who is still professionally active in Odawara. Like Irene, she has had an active career, nursing infants for 37 years despite the onset of a mild hearing problem. Widowed for 21 years, she lives alone in a three-room housing unit. Both of her children are married and live outside of Kanagawa Prefecture - a daughter lives in Chiba, and a son moved as far away as Sapporo on the northern island of Hokkaido to represent the central government. With a busy life-style, career, and social engagements, Masa is strikingly similar to Irene. But her notion of what follows beyond this stage of activity in old age is quite different from Irene's: Masa has designs to move in with her son in the future just like Shizu, as she said when we discussed the meaning of old age in her home. There's so much to do all day. I haven't got any quiet time for myself, oh really . . . I've got so much to do! . . . They don't want to see me go. Even if I quit the hospital work, there are still all the little babies to look after [at the nursery] and I've got all of the counseling to do, too.. .. Oh, I wish I could also take some English classes. Seriously! I really wanted to do it this year, but I never, never got around to it. And then there's all the sewing, too. There's still plenty I want to do!

The Gift of Generations People are always asking me if I don't get lonely [sabishii], living alone. You see, I never am, because I'm so busy, right now. . . . You know, it is so important to keep on doing things. We must go on doing things all the time \yaranakucha dameyo, ne\. It's so true. And we continue to grow, because we are learning new things all the time. People make people, I think. I've taken all the beatings life has to offer - all of it. When I was thirty-three, when I had my second child, I had to take to bed for six years. Times of illness, they are so hard. .. . And then, my husband died, and before he died, he was bedridden for a while, too . . . yes, for seven years. Then, making a living, bringing up the kids by myself. . . . There were some hardships I couldn't even begin to tell. So, you see, no matter what life has yet in store for me, I know I can take it. Really, any amount of endurance [gaman], I can take it. Of course, at my daughter's, they're always asking me when I'm coming to live with them. That is, with my daughter. My son is far away right now because of his transfer to Hokkaido, you see. These transfers are always so unpredictable, aren't they, even after he gets back to Tokyo again... . So, this son told his sister that while he's on the move, he's delegating my care to her. But after all, I really only want to do what's right. You see, a son is a son. I must not do things that put him in a bad light [taterutokorowa tatenakya, ne]. And his wife's mother is feeling so embarrassed about it all. Living alone in Odawara for Masa has not so much to do with carving out a new life-style for herself as it has to do with her son's geographical mobility as a career civil servant. Her concern for moving in with him in the future is obvious, and it reveals a clear sense of distinctness between her present status as a healthy person and her future status in frailty. Being fully occupied with her work and living here by herself makes sense now in this context, but as a temporary phase, not a permanent one. Masa wants to conform to the social expectations of living with a child - especially with a son, not a daughter - in an environment where a majority of her peers take the arrangement for

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens granted. She feels the pressure of social expectations for coresidence ("people are always asking me if I don't get lonely, living alone"), which she also reinforces herself ("I really only want to do what's right"). Such expectations make her similar to Shizu: Although they come from different social class backgrounds, Masa and Shizu share the assumption that making family support arrangements in old age is part of the necessary business at the end of the life course; and for both women, the sense of deserving such support is acquired through sons, not daughters. In this sense, both women subscribe to the normative regulation of intergenerational relationships in Japanese society. The four women's accounts of their later lives illustrate the main themes of this study: assumptions about vulnerability and responsibility that underlie the social ideals of helping arrangements; cultural preferences for different ways of organizing help; and the dynamics of the social contract that regulate these different choices. This book offers a case study of how culture and society shape these assumptions, preferences, and choices. This study examines these issues by exploring the meaning of deservedness embedded in the social contract in cross-national perspective. Japanese and Americans agree that old age is, on the whole, a vulnerable time of life, as one experiences deteriorating health and is pushed to the periphery of economic activity; they also agree that something ought to be done about it. But the notions of what can be done, how, and with what results differ according to the cultural assumptions and social assignments that define the value of giving and deserving help in each society. At the same time, the standard of evaluation expressed in this notion of deservedness - that some are entitled to get help, or that others are obliged to give help - symbolizes the idea of fairness that lies at the heart of the social contract in both cases. Before we elaborate on the conditions of deservedness as a means to introduce the theoretical framework that guides this study, it is useful to turn briefly to the bigger picture of which these four women are a part: the social contract of the elderly in contemporary postindustrial societies. What these women think, do, and plan to do point to the concerns of an increasing number of older people who find themselves in

The Gift of Generations similar predicaments throughout the postindustrial world. Their concern is relevant, because almost everyone is part of a support network for older relatives or friends and participates in a social security system that supports their livelihood. The concerns affect everyone, as each must also grow old. And today, these societies face a critical juncture in their demographic history.

THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE: RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERVENTION

In Japan and in the United States today, one in every eight persons is 65 years of age or older.7 The elderly population includes 16.2 million people in Japan and 32.3 million in the United States.8 They are expected to live well into their 70s and 80s, and even their 90s.9 Life expectancies in both societies have been increasing at a phenomenal rate, as improved living conditions, nutrition, public health, and medical technology have had a major impact on prolonging life. When survival was more difficult and the aged proportion of the population was still small, old age could be viewed as a bonus. Now 7 The proportion of the elderly is similar in the two countries: In 1992, it was 13.1% in Japan and 12.6% in the United States. Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 30; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 8, 15. 8 Figures are for 1992. Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 30; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 15. 9 Life expectancy at birth in Japan was 76.1 years for men and 82.2 years for women in 1992, compared with 44.5 years and 46.5 years respectively in 1930. The comparable figures for the United States were 72.3 years for men and 79.0 years for women in 1992, rising from 58.1 years and 61.1 years respectively in 1930. Life expectancy at age 60 has increased at a slower rate than life expectancy at birth in both countries. In Japan, it rose from 14.9 years to 19.9 years for men and 17.9 years and 24.0 years for women between 1960 to 1987, whereas it increased more slowly in the United States from 15.9 years to 18.2 years for men and 19.6 years to 22.5 years for women from 1960 to 1987. There is considerable variation in life expectancy between black and white populations in the United States that is not apparent in the averaged figures. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Health Care Systems in Transition: The Search for Efficiency, 189-190; Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, Health and Welfare Statistics in Japan (1990), 57; Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 35; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 87.

10

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens with tens of millions of elderly people, whose numbers are projected to nearly double in the next few decades, old age has become a "problem."10 By the year 2025, one in every four to five people will be aged 65 years and older in Japan, the United States, and other postindustrial nations.11 As both mortality and fertility rates continue to decline, "population aging" has become a social concern in regard to what is known as the aged dependency ratio in the social contract.12 As the label itself indicates, these societies share a growing recognition of the elderly as a dependent population - as a social group that requires public and private support - due to their withdrawal from the labor force and their increasing physical frailty. As great-grandparenthood becomes a more common phenomenon, so does the existence of a group of people with chronic health conditions, which often require intensive caregiving over long periods and result in high medical expenses. As the number of retirees grows, so does the need to allocate more public resources to the social security system, which must be funded by governments, employers, and current employees. Although longevity may still serve as an indicator of success in conquering many illnesses that were once lethal, it has, ironically, also created a "social problem." The public support systems in the two societies in fact originate in similar circumstances during a period of economic prosperity. Except for the social security systems, which started at different 10 The population aged 65 and over in Japan is projected to rise to 32.4 million by the year 2025. Similarly, the American elderly population is expected to increase to 61.8 million by 2025. Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 30; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 16. 11 The proportion of elderly population over age 65 is projected to rise to 25.8% and 18.1% in Japan and the United States respectively by 2025. Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 30; U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 16. 12 The dependency ratio, the ratio of those over age 65 to those between ages 15 to 64, was 18.7 in Japan and 19.4 in the United States in 1992. It is expected to reach 43.2 in Japan and 29.4 in the United States by the year 2025. Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 15-16, and Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1994, 30.

11

The Gift of Generations times,13 the important program expansions in both nations occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s in the wake of years of steady economic growth, when there seemed to be enough wealth in the nations for everyone. The range of public provisions created for the elderly at the time includes social services, employment opportunities, health care subsidies, and financial assistance. These formal social contracts in the two nations and in other postindustrial countries are similar in theory, though not identical in practice - a matter hardly surprising in light of the basic needs for food, health, and housing and the considerable cross-national transfers of welfare policies that occurred at the time.14 In the 1980s, however, the politics of resource allocation took on a particularly crucial turn in both nations, as the formal social contract came under increasing public scrutiny. Contesting claims were made on both sides of the Pacific that one could no longer allow the social security and health care expenditures to increase as they had in the past decades.15 Accordingly, both governments moved up the eligibility age for social security for future cohorts, and made efforts to cap health care expenditures by limiting the types of treatment and payments from public insurance for illnesses, a stipulation known as Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs). As the question of moderating state responsibility became a disputed issue, the notion of family responsibility for the elderly also took on a renewed significance. If the aging problem is growing, and the state will no longer expand its provisions to deal with it, then further solutions, some argued, must be sought in the family and the 13 The social security system dates back to 1935 in the United States; the Japanese system originates in 1961. 14 Virginia C. Little, Open Care for the Aging: Comparative International Approaches, 48; Stephen J. Anderson, Welfare Policy and Politics in Japan: Beyond the Developmental State, 150; Yukio Noguchi, "Overcommitment in Pensions: The Japanese Experience," 188. 15 Public expenditures for social security grew exponentially in both countries during this period. Between 1959 and 1976, social security expenditure as proportion of national income grew by 176% in Japan and 189% in the United States. International Labour Organisation, The Cost of Social Security: Twelfth International Inquiry, 1981-1983.

12

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens community.16 Whether the family and the community have the necessary resources, willingness, and responsibility for such an undertaking, however, also remains a serious point of contention.17 In both public and private domains, therefore, the future of the social contract has become a contested issue. As we look toward the projected population dynamics of the twenty-first century, it is clear that the social agreement between successive generations to help and be helped requires a critical reappraisal.18 More than just a prediction of material costs and benefits, this reappraisal must examine the fundamental cultural assumptions and social assignments that define the meaning of giving and deserving in the social contract. This book contributes to this inquiry by clarifying how these assumptions and assignments shape the social contract in Japanese and American societies, and by examining how culture and society mold the interplay of contending interests entailed in such contracts. To my knowledge, no scholarship to date has addressed this issue both empirically and theoretically on a cross-national basis.

VALUES, INTERESTS, AND SYMBOLIC EQUITY: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

To learn how the social contract is forged in different cultures, it is useful to distinguish between two theoretical dimensions: the subjective and objective conditions of support relationships. The subjective 16 For example in Japan, the Ohira government issued a well-publicized report in 1980, "Kateikiban jyujitsu no tameno teigen," hailing the family as society's "hidden asset" ifukumi shisan) to develop a "Japanese-style" welfare society that relies on family values and responsibilities. Similarly, the Reagan administration also sought to evoke more family responsibility for elder care by attempting to "reinterpret" the federal Medicaid regulation that prohibits the application of family responsibility laws in local states. These attempts have had mixed results. 17 Robert M. Moroney, Shared Responsibility: Families and Social Policy, chap. 1; Eugene Litwak, Helping the Elderly: The Complementary Roles of Informal Networks and Formal Systems, chap. 1; Marvin B. Sussman, "Family, Bureaucracy, and the Elderly Individual: An Organizational/Linkage Perspective"; Naomi Maruo, "The Development of the Welfare Mix in Japan." 18 Vern Bengtson, "Is the 'Contract across Generations' Changing? Effects of Population Aging on Obligations and Expectations across Age Groups."

13

The Gift of Generations conditions refer to the perceptions, assumptions, attitudes, and values that constitute the vision of reality of individuals and groups alike. In Berger and Luckmann's terms, this symbolic universe shapes our social construction of reality, which is taken for granted in our everyday life.19 The objective conditions of support, on the other hand, refer to the unequal conditions of access to (material and instrumental) resources between the helper and the helped. The support relationship mirrors the social difference between those who are in a position to give and those who are not, because it relies on this intrinsic distinction that makes the very act of giving possible. The support practice is shaped by these subjective and objective conditions that define the meaning of action, and the boundaries of structural possibilities. The meanings to which individuals subscribe define their values, expectations, and beliefs about what support "ought" to do. On the other hand, the asymmetrical relationships of individuals constrain the interests and choices that they make. These subjective and objective realities are intertwined in a process that Pierre Bourdieu calls double structuration - the notion that actors make subjective choices among options limited by objective conditions.20 In the support practice, individual actors thus seemingly choose freely from a range of support options defined by their values; yet these options are constrained by the structural inequity of the support relationship that is shaped by their interests. This study incorporates these two key dimensions in its framework of analysis. The social contract is shaped by the confluence of these values and interests that are embedded in the cultural and social contexts where the support practice takes place. Accordingly, this study compares and contrasts Japanese and American support practices, and their corresponding notions of deservedness, in terms of both the subjective and objective conditions of giving. In empirical terms, these values and interests will be examined by deciphering key cultural assumptions - about vulnerability, security, equity, and self-sufficiency 19 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge, part 2, chap. 2. 20 Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays toward a Reflexive Sociology.

14

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens and by identifying the social assignments of rights, responsibilities, credits, and debts in the support relationship. Social support is based on a set of cultural assumptions about need, security, equity, and self-sufficiency that influence the notion of giving. These expectations and presuppositions influence our vision of reality, and our vision of what support ought to do. These are cultural dispositions that shape the subjective reality in which we make sense of the nature of life, human relationships, and the life course. These dispositions, which Pierre Bourdieu calls habitus,21 come into relief when we compare the meaning of helping arrangements in different cultures. Since these perceptions and expectations are defined culturally, it follows then that the outcomes - the way support is organized - are also different from one culture to another. In other words, "who is deserving of help" is defined to a large degree by our values, which differ from one society to another. Social support also involves means to regulate self-interests, which is, in turn, influenced by cultural assumptions. Although spontaneous goodwill exists,22 altruism is not an enduring quality that ensures regular support over a long term, as Richard Titmuss has shown.23 To regularize giving, we therefore construct notions of collective interests and mutual interests in the giver-receiver relationship. As we will see, typically the arrangement of reciprocal intergenerational support establishes notions of mutual interests; likewise, the social designation of rights and responsibilities establishes notions of collective interests. Japanese and American helping arrangements both entail these mechanisms to regulate the interests of givers and receivers. To regularize everyday acts of giving, a support system must do more than invite generosity with incentives and rewards; it must routinize giving through the social assignments of rights, responsibilities, 21 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, chap. 3; and Outline of a Theory of Practice, chap. 2. 22 R. G. Simmons, S. K. Marine, and R. L. Simmons, The Gift of Life: The Effect of Organ Transplantation on Individual Family and Societal Dynamics; J. A. Piliavin and H. W. Charng, "Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research." 23 Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, 225. See also Alvin Gouldner, "The Importance of Something for Nothing," 268.

15

The Gift of Generations credits, and debts - to regulate our tendency to keep rather than to give. Practices of entitlement, obligation, and reciprocity in support are therefore central to both Japanese and American systems. These practices effectively assign different symbolic resources to givers and receivers, so that the receiver becomes deserving by earning the right to be helped, and the giver remains obliged to give. As we will see, these assignments restore the equity in the support relationship by a logic of fairness, which I call symbolic equity. Symbolic equity refers to the nexus of values and interests that shapes the logic of fairness in the gift relationship. As cultural values of gifts vary from one context to another, the formulas of regulating interests by matching particular responsibilities with certain rights, and by canceling particular debts with certain credits, also differ from one society to another. Yet this logic of fairness remains central to each support practice regardless of such contexts.24 The difference between Japanese and American social contracts is therefore found neither in a generic tolerance for dependency nor in a critical mass of goodwill; it is found in the different standards of evaluation as they apply to fairness. Japanese and American support systems therefore contain features distinct from one another, yet similar in their logic of practice.25 This book explains these distinct features and similarities in the logic of practice by creating a conceptual scheme of interpretation. I derive the synthesis at the cross-national level by relying on two strategies of analysis, which Charles Tilly calls individualizing comparisons and variation-finding comparisons.261 use individualizing comparisons in Chapters 3 to 6, which systematically compare the differences of the two helping arrangements, to identify the special empirical features of each case. I then use variation-finding comparisons in Chapters 7 and 8, which synthesize the differences and similarities, to establish the 24 For discussions on the centrality and plurality of the notion of justice in allocation, see Jon Elster, Local Justice: How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens; Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility; and Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. 25 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, chap. 5. 26 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, chaps. 5 and 7.

16

The Social Designation of Deserving Citizens principle of variation that applies to both cases. The intent of this book is therefore to conceptualize the link between culture and the social contract at a level of generality that accounts for both cross-national differences and similarities.27 Although this comparative approach at times requires me to pay less attention to variation within each case - for example, by gender, class, and ethnicity - 1 nevertheless believe that a cross-national synthesis can offer a parsimonious explanation of the values and interests entailed in the social contract. By adopting Marcel Mauss's approach to the gift relationship,28 the social contract in this study refers to the reciprocal arrangement to give and receive gifts in turn, based on a tacit standard of evaluation that defines their symbolic equivalence. Although the term also brings to bear a long-standing tradition of liberal political philosophy from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls,29 it is a multifaceted concept with many variations.30 The social contract in this study has a wide definition that includes both the explicit, public contract between the state and its citizens and the implicit, private contract of individuals and collectives. This study examines the tacit standard of evaluation - deservedness - for these multiple arrangements, to uncover the meaning of fairness expressed in the symbolic equivalence of gifts. As Alvin Gouldner once suggested, ascertaining such equivalence of value in reciprocal relationships is an empirical question.31 Thus, on this note, we are ready to begin our comparative inquiry in the two communities, Odawara and West Haven. We will start by first describing the historical and national contexts, then proceed to the community contexts where givers and receivers negotiate the value of giving, receiving, and deserving in their social contracts. 27 Melvin Kohn, "Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy," 85. 28 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies, 2-5. 29 Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, chap. 8; Peter Laslett, "Is There a Generational Contract?"; Norman Daniels, Am I My Parents' Keeper? An Essay on Justice between the Young and the Old, chap. 3; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 30 Michael Lessnoff, Social Contract, 4; Peter Laslett, "Is There a Generational Contract?" 25. 31 Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," 172.

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Two Communities, Two Societies

This street was the busiest around here, but now all business is gone to Station Plaza. . . . Land Reform even changed the name of this place. - Shimada Toshio (67), former company employee

W

HEN older people talk about their past, one is immediately struck by the broad range of history they have witnessed in their lifetimes. The elderly provide a special fascination, because their retrospective accounts of the past often point to continuities and changes that lead to the present and also project into the future. In this sense, the elderly are historians, and in some ways they act as the barometer of social change. Their individual responses to change usually encompass a range of feelings and thoughts that relate to satisfaction with their present lives. In this study, the Japanese elderly often noted a sense of progress and social change, referring to new production technologies and household conveniences that have become widely available. The American elderly, in general, tended to express nostalgia for the past, some sense of loss, and a concern that new values represented something of a decline. This sense of change must be understood within the contexts of the history and the community characteristics of West Haven and Odawara, which this chapter illustrates. The changes that each community has encountered - new job opportunities, residential options, modern life-styles - have influenced the social relations and support networks of the elderly and represent the background in which their helping arrangements are forged. We will first explore the history of the American site, West Haven, and then that of the Japanese site, Odawara. We will also examine the demographic and socioeconomic 18

Two Communities, Two Societies profiles of the two communities, to ascertain the comparability of these two settings in the study. WEST HAVEN

Right here,rightwhere this house is, was an amusement park. This is where I made my living and made my money, right. The reason I bought this house here is because one of my stands wasrighthere. I worked here since I was nine years old. - Joseph Brown (71), former amusement business owner American cities rarely retain the same appearance, organization, and people over a long period of time: West Haven is no exception. Given the mobility of the labor force in the region, few elderly residents have lived in West Haven as long as Joseph, who has worked there for more than 60 years. The community has undergone a dramatic transformation in size and character. Jobs have come and gone with the changing times for Joseph and for others; old stores and manufacturing enterprises have been gradually replaced by new modes of production and sales. Whether as a result of economic recessions, changing markets, or outmoded production techniques, when the West Haven elderly speak of their job changes, they often refer to their shops or firms as having "gone out of business." Social change in recent decades has also involved much urban growth and development. Within the lifetimes of these elderly residents, West Haven has grown first from being part of the town of Orange to being the town of West Haven, and subsequently to the city of West Haven. West Haven dates back to 1648 when, as "West Farms," it formed an agricultural community within the original New Haven Colony, a Puritan settlement founded in 1638 on the Long Island Sound between New York and Boston.1 From the beginning, the history of West Haven has been closely linked to the growth of neighboring New Haven, a city on the Old Boston Post Road that prospered in the nineteenth century as a manufacturing and commercial center of diversified hardware. West Haven remained a traditional Yankee community 1 For the history of New Haven, see Rollin G. Osterweis, Three Centuries of New Haven, 1638-1938.

19

The Gift of Generations until the middle of the twentieth century, partly as a residential suburb of New Haven, and partly as home to its own small- and midsized manufacturing industries, and also its farming and oystering enterprises. While the larger-scale industrial plants concentrated in New Haven continued to draw labor from West Haven, West Haven's own productive enterprises - ranging from lumber, shipbuilding, rubber, and machines to elastics, paper, and buckles - also absorbed much of the remaining labor force.2 Major recent changes came about as a result of New Haven's massive urban renewal efforts in the 1950s and 1960s.3 As New Haven changed, so did the interdependent communities immediately surrounding it. West Haven expanded and developed as it absorbed large numbers of migrants from New Haven in newly constructed rental units. It strengthened its own manufacturing force and commercial base as transportation and communication facilities developed and improved in New Haven. Essentially, West Haven became a community constituting part of Greater New Haven, sharing much of its economic activities and social infrastructure such as transportation, communications, public facilities, medical and social services, and entertainment outlets. Today, West Haven is one of the 15 towns and cities comprising the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) of Greater New Haven. With over 53,000 residents within an area of 11.2 square miles, it remains one of the more populous and urbanized sectors within the region. In recent decades, West Haven has shed much of its early identity, essentially becoming a multiethnic community. Italian, Irish, and Polish Americans now make up a substantial proportion of its total population. The largest ethnic group is of Italian descent (41%), followed by those of Irish (10%) and Polish (7%) origin. The survey population in West Haven was predominantly Catholic (72%), a slightly higher percentage than in other New England urban areas, according to a 2 West Haven League of Women Voters, This Is West Haven; West Haven Chamber of Commerce, West Haven; Connecticut Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Report, 1979. 3 David Birch, Reilly Atkinson, Sven Sandstrom, and Linda Stack, Patterns of Urban Change: The New Haven Experience.

20

Two Communities, Two Societies Gallup survey.4 Family relations of the elderly respondents are therefore more typical of a Catholic population, if not exclusively of a dominant ethnic group. Most of the older residents of West Haven were born and raised in the state of Connecticut, and continue to consider this part of the United States their home; over half of those interviewed were born in Connecticut, and one-sixth were born in neighboring states such as Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York. A fifth were born outside the United States, mainly in Italy, and have settled in the northeastern region of the United States where many of their fellow immigrants had made their home. The majority of these foreign-born moved to the United States before the age of 20 and have continued to live in this region throughout their lives. With urban renewal, influx of new business, and intrastate migration, the West Haven elderly have rarely remained at the same address for a long period of time. A quarter of the respondents had lived at the same address for less than 10 years, and two-thirds for less than 30 years. Some of the more recent moves can be accounted for by the fact that 20 people in the sample lived in a public housing unit that was built in 1972. The average period of local residency among the elderly was 30 years; the majority had lived in the community for less than half their lives. Residentially, if not geographically, the elderly in West Haven have been a comparatively mobile population, experiencing losses of old homes and neighborhoods in a way that the Odawara elderly did not. West Haven's lower-middle-class and working-class character has become more enduring with these developments. Over two-thirds of the older men and women worked in blue-collar jobs throughout their lives, often spanning over 50 years, with the remainder employed in white-collar jobs. Most of the sample respondents (84%) were retirees. On the average, they have had 9 years of formal education. With no significant concentrations of wealth or poverty, West Haven is a relatively safe place for senior citizens to walk or drive, a city where they can go about their daily routines without undue difficulty. The streets are well kept and never too busy to exclude those 4 Gallup Report, Religion in America.

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The Gift of Generations who might need or choose to organize their lives at a different pace. The geographical range of the community is also small enough so that older residents retain a measure of familiarity with their neighbors and many others, despite their relative mobility. For those who have rooted themselves in the community, West Haven seems to be a comfortable place to live. Some people talk about retiring to the Sun Belt where the climate is more agreeable, but they are the exceptions. The quality of relative security and integration makes West Haven more readily comparable with a Japanese city than other U.S. cities; external environments are rarely similar in a cross-national study, but choices must be made to ensure as much comparability as possible in qualities of life. Both West Haven and Odawara have experienced economic growth and expansion in the past decades, in the context of their respective nations; the relative stability of both communities amid these changes is also one of the factors that makes the comparison feasible. WESTSIDE ODAWARA

We were farmers here. We worked hard and had little time to sleep. We had to pay taxes. .. . But now we don't farm here anymore. . . . Now my son goes into the office. He gets paid to do that. - Sada Kiyo (80), former farmer

Like their counterparts in West Haven, the elderly in Westside Odawara have witnessed dramatic changes in their city over their lifetimes. The technological innovations of contemporary life - from the mechanization of the workplace to the introduction of household appliances - have had a profound impact on the lives of the Japanese elderly like Kiyo. Convenient tools have simplified work inside and outside the household, and have changed the organization of daily life. Miso (soybean paste), for instance, is no longer produced from scratch at home, but is instead bought as a simple commodity from the local grocery store. Yet the new appears to have a way of blending smoothly with the old. The changes are real and conspicuous enough, yet they have not really "replaced" the old order. The internal structure of Odawara life still retains many of the dynamics of traditional Japan. 22

Two Communities, Two Societies The social history of Odawara as a town dates back to 1495, when the Hojo Clan of the Kanto District plundered the Odawara Castle to begin the full-scale development of a castle town.5 Its location was strategic in a variety of ways. Directly facing Sagami Bay at the foot of the Hakone Mountain, and sandwiched between two rivers, the Sakawagawa and the Hayakawa, the area provided the natural resources essential for the development of a commercial town; the town could readily subsist on its own supply of rice, fish, and processed foods. Of even greater importance was the political significance of its location. Control of Odawara meant control of the Sagami Region on the T6kaido Road connecting eastern and western Japan - by far the most important of the seven ancient road networks. During the Edo Period (1600-1868), Odawara grew in importance to become a key town for the Tokugawa regime, both politically and geographically. As a post town 50 miles to the west of the capital Edo (Tokyo), Odawara was an important element in the plan for Edo's tactical defense. The town also became an essential point of respite for travelers, before and after the vital inspection barrier of the steep Hakone Mountain Pass. As the importance of the Tokaido Road grew, the town prospered. At the height of its prosperity, Odawara could count over 100 inns and a range of industries catering to the needs of travelers. Notable among these industries were those concerned with the processing of durable foods such as kamaboko, tsukemono, and umeboshi (fish paste, pickled vegetables, and fruits), and those given over to the production of tools and equipment necessary for long-distance journeying (palanquin, medicine, lanterns, footwear, souvenirs, etc.). Some of the more prestigious family concerns dating from this period still continue their businesses today, even though the handing down of occupations to successive generations in the family is no longer economically viable for most Odawarans. The tradition of household successions - where the family property and homes are handed down to successive generations in line - is, however, still found in the community at large. 5 For the history of Odawara, see Fukuda Ikuo, Uchida Tetsuo, and Iwasaki Sojun, Waga machino rekishi Odawara; Iwasaki Sqjun, Uchida Kiyoshi, and Uchida Tetsuo, Edojidai no Odawara; Uchida Tetsuo, Odawara; Shinokosho no seikatsushi; Uchida Tetsuo, Nenpyo; Odawara no rekishi.

23

The Gift of Generations Odawara's prosperity ended when the new Meiji regime came to power. The Meiji Period (1868-1912) represented a period of economic and demographic decline for Odawara, which lost its primary businesses when the Odawara Castle and the Hakone inspection barrier were closed down. The new regime ushered in the era of modernization and industrialization, but bypassed Odawara; it did not extend the new national railway to Odawara because of the steepness of the Hakone Mountain. Toward the end of the Meiji Period and the beginning of the Taisho Period (1912-26), small-scale industrial manufacturing and sales began to grow, with products such as silk, cotton, and processed fish; but the truly modern industrial development of Odawara on a larger scale did not really begin until the opening of the Tanna Tunnel through the Hakone Mountain. The vital national railway finally reached Odawara with the opening of the tunnel in 1934. Odawara was incorporated as a city in 1940 with a population of 55,000 inhabitants. It has since doubled in size and trebled in population through natural growth and a series of annexations of neighboring villages and towns in 1960, 1970, and 1975. Today Odawara is a midsized Japanese city covering a geographical area of 44 square miles with a population of over 180,000. In addition to its traditional cottage industries, agriculture, and fisheries, Odawara is also the home of major factories producing photographic supplies, as well as plants manufacturing automobile parts, batteries, electric appliances, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals. Some traditional practices also survive within the new economic structure. Odawara retains its centuries-old status as a regional distribution center of fish and agricultural products, and the shopping districts are still lined with a variety of specialized stores run by selfemployed shopkeepers and their families. And tourists still stop in Odawara on their way to the Hakone Springs. Most of the old people of Odawara today have borne witness to the city's growth from the Meiji slump to today's industrial prosperity. With a marked residential stability that spans 50 years on average, many of the Odawara elderly have experienced the dramatic effects of rapid urbanization and testify to the impact of these changes on their daily lives. They have seen rice fields turn into large factories, 24

Two Communities, Two Societies old wooden and straw houses become modern high rises, and orchards give way to large convenience stores. Over the years, they have experienced the acceleration of technological sophistication and the influx of new modernity. Gas, electricity, and telephones, which were introduced to a limited number of Odawara households during their childhood, are now available in all housing units. Roads have been paved, waterworks and sewage systems installed, and production, transportation, and communications networks developed. All of these developments have brought about fundamental changes in their life-styles. Partly as a result of this rapid modernization, old people in Odawara generally describe their lives as being much easier than those of their parents or grandparents. They describe the changes in terms of growing comfort and affluence. They often speak of their greater control over the natural environment - a particularly welcome development for a generation that has repeatedly had to build and rebuild its lives and homes in the wake of earthquakes, seaquakes, fires, floods, and air raids. This sense of progress is especially striking, considering the many losses that old age often tends to bring about. More jobs came to Odawara as the industrial composition of the city's economy changed. In 1980, the primary industry accounted for only 7% of all industries, while the secondary industry grew to 39% and the tertiary industry to 54%.6 The transition to greater occupational diversity has had an effect on the working lives of the middle and younger generation in Odawara and, by implication, on the lives of today's elderly. On the whole, the city now accommodates a broad range of occupations, from small-scale woodcrafters and farmers, to industrial workers, executives, and bureaucrats. Some occupations, such as the production of kamaboko and the running of specialized stores, have existed for centuries; other jobs in factories, bureaucracies, and private enterprises became available after World War II. This diversity extends even to individual families, where it is not uncommon to find a blend of occupations existing side by side, such as in Kiyo's household. More members of the younger generation than the 6 Japan Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Population Census of Japan, 1980.

25

The Gift of Generations older have worked in the new, salaried occupations; conversely, more members of the older generation have worked in the traditional, selfemployed occupations of shopkeeping, cottage industry, and agriculture. Some of the children of today's elderly have followed in their parents' footsteps, and many others have moved into newer occupations. And in turn, their children - more educated than the generations preceding them - can also pursue fast-track careers in business and local government. Much of family life was bound to change as a result, yet the normative content of family relations has remained curiously intact. It is remarkable that even with these dramatic transformations in the economic structure of postwar Odawara, the community still strongly conveys an impression of calmness and stability. When talking with the older residents of the community, one is particularly struck with this sense of stability. Most older residents of Odawara lived in homes that they or their families owned.7 The majority have lived in Odawara well over half of their lives;8 of these, over half have even lived in the same house throughout these past decades. Consequently, many older Odawarans relate to each other with the ease of persons who have known one another for over half a century. This aura of familiarity also means that many of the younger people in the community are known; they are the children, grandchildren, and in-laws of acquaintances. Most of the elderly in Odawara report that they have no plans to move out of the community. Most say they would move only if something unforeseen were to happen to their families. When asked why they have lived in the community as long as they have, they typically respond, "because we've always lived here." Many of these Odawarans have held only one job all their working lives, unlike their West Haven counterparts. Over a third continue to work into old age, and few have experienced formal, mandatory retirement.9 As in most 7 In Odawara, 89% of the survey respondents lived in houses that they or their coresident family members owned. 8 In the sample, 73% already lived in Odawara before World War II. 9 In Odawara, 38% were still working, and 20% were retired. This labor force participation rate was comparable to the national average of 39%; Soda and Miura Fumio, Zusetsu rojin hakusho 1983, 144.

26

Two Communities, Two Societies of ethnically homogeneous Japan, the majority had no formal religious affiliation, but followed a few basic Buddhist customs.10 On the average they have had 8 years of schooling, similar to the level of their West Haven counterparts. The site and the people selected for this study were confined to a section of Odawara that might be called Westside Odawara, situated west of the Sakawa River and east of the Hayakawa. This section is an administrative unit known as Honcho-chiku,11 the core of old, central Odawara before the annexations of neighboring villages took place in recent decades. With an area of 16 square miles, it constitutes approximately one-third of what is Odawara City today, excluding the sparsely populated, less developed sections (e.g., vast areas of woods, fields, and hills). Honcho-chiku is a commercial and residential district consisting of 13 town sections (owaza). Some social class segregation exists only insofar as the very affluent live apart from other residents; but the working-class and middle-class residents are generally interspersed, the former living in rental units scattered throughout the city. Neighborhood organizations (chonaikai) that provide residents with a sense of community are well established throughout Odawara, adding to the feeling of security and integration. Like West Haven, it is quite safe to move around Odawara, both downtown and in the residential neighborhoods. Since buses are infrequent and local trains reach only limited destinations, the common means of transportation for the local elderly is the taxi, if their families cannot provide rides. Few older people in Odawara drive their own automobiles; driving has hardly been an option for these people unlike their American counterparts, because cars have not been commonly available for this generation.

10 Only 25.6% of Odawarans reported their affiliation with Buddhism, but 53.6% followed Buddhist customs. See Hayashi Chikio, Nihonjin no kokoro o hakaru, 141-143, for the characteristic discrepancy between religious affiliation and religiosity in Japan. 11 Honcho-chiku ( *WT), the administrative unit, should not to be confused with Honcho( jfcffilkK), a town section in central Odawara City.

27

The Gift of Generations COMPARING COMMUNITIES

Japan and the United States are two highly industrialized nations, with the world's largest gross national products. Both are also "aging societies" with high proportions of older people.12 In many respects, the life-styles of the older citizens in the two societies are similar, given the comparable levels of affluence, technological development, education, and urbanization. Yet these common features do not outweigh the distinct historical, geographical, and cultural dynamics. Comparing the similarities and differences between Japan and the United States thus offers an opportunity to explore the influence of socioeconomic and cultural conditions on social support in two distinct contemporary societies. Comparing such countries offers the advantages of identifying both the cultural assumptions that underlie the different helping arrangements, and the common requirements that postindustrial societies must meet to reproduce the social contract. The reasons for comparing the helping arrangements of the elderly in Westside Odawara with those of the elderly in West Haven may seem less obvious. Why compare this conventional Japanese community and this lower-middle-class American community? In a crossnational study of communities in Japan and the United States, the researcher must search for the best approximate "match" according to key relevant criteria. The key to comparability lies in seeking out sites that share similar demographic and economic conditions as well as political positions, in their respective societies. Any differences identified in the analysis can then be attributed to the more fundamental cultural and social dynamics in each society, according to John Stuart Mill's method of difference.13 It would not make sense, for instance, to compare the elderly of rural Japan and urban America, since village life and metropolitan life promote entirely different social characteristics - occupational and 12 A country is defined as an aging society when its proportion of those aged 65 and over reaches 7%. 13 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic. See Neil J. Smelser, Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences, 62-70.

28

Two Communities, Two Societies economic differences above and beyond national differences. Rural Japan and highly urban America, for example, also have disproportionately large numbers of elderly people, and conversely, many newer Japanese communities have disproportionately small elderly populations. By the same token, a conservative Japanese community and a liberal American community are incomparable, since the range of social services and programs available to the elderly in these communities would likely differ, not for cultural but for political and ideological reasons. What must be standardized, accordingly, are key demographic, economic, and political indicators of the two communities, to generate a controlled comparison. The key criteria in the selection of comparable communities for this study were, accordingly, demographic and geographical characteristics, level of urbanization, industrial composition, average wage, level of commitment to social services, and administrative jurisdiction. What I have sought is not the unlikely "perfect fit" for each of these characteristics, but a balanced, approximate "overall fit" with respect to all of these indicators. I examined 10 cities in the Kanto Region and 5 towns and cities in Greater New Haven to select the acceptable "match."14 Table 2.1 shows the profiles of West Haven and Westside Odawara, with corresponding descriptions for surrounding Greater New Haven and Odawara City. West Haven and Westside Odawara are of similar scale in population, number of households, and geographical size, as medium-sized communities situated in larger urban environments. The elderly populations were similar in size and proportion, and both proportions corresponded closely to the respective national averages.15 The proportion of older people today is 14.8% in West Haven, 14 Yale University's Department of Epidemiology and Public Health decided to conduct its pilot study in West Haven after I began my fieldwork at the Area Agency on Aging located in West Haven; the logistical decision to choose West Haven therefore came first, for practical reasons. I then chose Odawara as the Japanese counterpart by searching in the Kanto Region. For further details, see the appendix. 15 The national average was 11.2% in the United States, and 9.0% in Japan. U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1985); Japan Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Population Census of Japan, 1980.

29

The Gift of Generations

Table 2.1. Profiles of West Haven and Westside Odawara West Haven City Total population Population 65 and over Population 65 and over (%) Population density (per square mile) Area (square miles) Number of households Primary industry (%) Secondary industry (%) Tertiary industry (%)

Westside Greater Odawara New Haven Odawara (Honcho-chiku) (SMSA) City

53,184

417,592

81,165

177,469

6,860

51,518

8,148a

15,969

12.9

12.3

10.0*

9.0

4,748 11.2 20,182 — — —

1,322 315.9 149,574 0.5 33.5 66.0

4,961 16.4 23,715 — — —

4,023 44 A 51,802 7.0 39.0 54.0

"1982 estimates for Honcho-chiku by Department of Social Welfare, Odawara City. Sources: U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population, 1980; Japan Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Population Census of Japan, 1980; Odawara City, Shisei tbkei yoran, 1980. and 13.1% in Odawara, which are both still consistent with their respective national means.16 Communities of similar population size and density may nevertheless differ in socioeconomic and geographical aspects, especially when they are in different countries; I therefore sought further comparability. Sites were "matched" according to industrial compositions

16 These figures are for 1990 in West Haven, and 1994 in Odawara; U.S. Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population, 1990, and Odawara City, Odawarashi no koreisha fukushi. The average annual population growth rates in the interim years have been 0.5% in Greater New Haven and 0.8% in Odawara; calculated from U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994), 40; Kanagawa Prefecture, Kanagawa kensei yoran 1988, 47; Kanagawa kensei yoran 1993, 45.

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Two Communities, Two Societies and average wages that created similar occupational conditions.17 Both West Haven and Westside Odawara are also old communities that developed historically along major roads of transportation, the Old Boston Post Road and the Tokaido Road, which promoted early commercial and cultural development. Both are located by the sea and are within an hour and a half's drive of major metropoles (New York and Tokyo), a distance that makes for a demanding daily commute but easy occasional access. Some important parallels therefore exist for the purpose of comparison, even though the histories and traditions of the two communities are obviously very different. Since the study extends to the role of community services for older people, I also selected communities that maintain active social service programs relative to the respective national standards. Both Connecticut and Kanagawa Prefecture are comparatively progressive providers of social services for the elderly, earmarking larger amounts of expenditure for social security programs than their respective national averages. The social security expenditure in the state of Connecticut was $750 million (23.4% of total expenditures), and $160 million (4.6% of total expenditures) in Kanagawa Prefecture.18 Each of these proportions is high by national standards, though they are not comparable cross-nationally due to the use of different classification schemes. Nevertheless, it seems clear that both Greater New Haven and Odawara have generally benefited from the relatively progressive policies of their local governments over the recent years. Direct services develop as much according to demand as supply. Because communities on the scale of West Haven and Westside Odawara could not realistically develop a network of formal services independent of the finances and economies of scale generated by their larger 17 The primary industry in West Haven, however, was somewhat smaller than in Odawara. At the time of the surveys, the average wage was $16,000 in Connecticut and $15,000 in Kanagawa (1982 exchange rate of $1 = ¥250). More recently, average wages were still comparable at $22,500 in Connecticut and $24,500 in Kanagawa (1986 exchange rate of $1 =¥190). U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1985), and Statistical Abstract of the United States (1990); Kanagawa Prefecture, Kanagawa kenseiyoran 1988. 18 State of Connecticut, Budget, 1982-83; Kanagawa Prefecture, Kanagawaken no fukushi (1981). The expenditure of $160 million was equivalent to ¥40 billion. 31

The Gift of Generations outer affiliates, it is useful for the purpose of the study to look at West Haven as part of the Greater New Haven complex, and Westside Odawara as part of the Odawara City complex. Since the administrative unit of a "city" is entirely different in Japan and the United States (being generally larger in Japan, through a succession of mergers and annexations, and smaller in the United States through repeated divisions), I have found a compromise by selecting a city for the American case study and a section of a city for the Japanese case study. Neither community represents its country, and neither was selected for this purpose. Nonetheless it is true that each is basically an average, medium-sized, stable community of a type not uncommon in Japan or the United States; at the same time, both communities have qualities of life that are comparable with one another. All things considered, West Haven and Westside Odawara "match" satisfactorily, within limitations, for the purpose of this study. The divergence between the communities, the result of their location within different national entities, continues to remind us that we are dealing with approximate comparisons. Social class and gender relations, for example, are different in the two communities, given divergent national and historical conditions; however, these relations are not pivotal themes of this study. The ethnic diversity of the American community also poses a challenge for identifying an "American" pattern, which the Japanese counterpart does not;19 most cross-national research designed to explore the relative significance of cross-national variation compared with national variation, however, has shown that, despite its heterogeneity, an American pattern is indeed salient;20 and other American social scientists who have conducted well-known studies in Greater New Haven have also pointed to general conclusions relevant 19 This point on diversity is also relevant in the Japanese context, if not in the ethnic sense. See Christie W. Kiefer, "The Elderly in Modern Japan: Elite, Victims, or Plural Players?"; and David Plath, Work and Lifecourse in Japan. 20 See for example Robert J. Havighurst, B. L. Neugarten, J. M. Munnichs, and H. Thomae, Adjustment to Retirement: A Cross-National Study. For an example of a study comparing American culture with another Western culture that draws similar conclusions about the relative significance of cross-national variation over national variation, see Michele Lamont, Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class.

32

Two Communities, Two Societies to understanding American society as a whole.21 With these thoughts on comparability in mind, we will now turn to the support arrangements in public and private domains in the two communities. 21 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City; Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does; Jennifer L. Hochschild, What's Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice.

33

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain

If only we had adequate nursing facilities, you know - families like us with bedridden elderly could have our peace of mind. We would have our peace of mind, but, still - we'd be neglecting them, wouldn't we? I think, well - they can't go there. - Sugino Waka (66), former city employee

W

AKA'S ambivalence about relying on formal institutions for her husband's care is frequently shared among families with physically dependent elderly persons, both in Japan and the United States. The decision to entrust such care to institutional services1 requires much appraisal of moral obligations, priorities, and capacity, for caregivers like Waka and others.2 As such, the question of support responsibility is a normative evaluation as well as an assignment of instrumental tasks. The appraisal hinges on our values about who ought to help, and how we ought to order our priorities and interests to do our "fair" share. The rights and responsibilities in the social contract are forged by such normative considerations grounded in the context of specific political and fiscal conditions.

1 The rates of institutionalization among the elderly are relatively small in both countries and have remained stable over the past decade. The American figure, however, is over three times higher than the Japanese figure: in 1990, 1.65% were institutionalized in Japan, and 5.2% in the United States. These figures are calculated from Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1992, 119-120; and U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1990), 55. 2 David Plath, " 'Ecstasy Years' - Old Age in Japan." For predictors of institutionalization, see Vicki A. Freedman, Lisa F. Berkman, Stephen R. Rapp, and Adriean M. Ostfeld, "Family Networks: Predictors of Nursing Home Entry."

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Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain As Robert Pinker noted, public policies ultimately rest on fundamental assumptions about the order of a "good society."3 The legal framework of the social contract is created by human choices that derive from these fundamental assumptions and institutional constraints.4 This chapter explores the normative conditions and institutional frameworks that underlie the social contract for the elderly in the public domain. It examines the expectations and goals that are specified in the policies, programs, and practices in Japan and the United States. The analysis suggests that expectations of entitlement, obligation, and equity shape the rights and responsibilities of the individual, family, and state differently in the two societies. We will first explore the question of deservedness and equity in the state policies, and then turn to the conditions of access to social services in Odawara and West Haven. ENTITLEMENT, OBLIGATION, AND EQUITY

In the 1960s and early 1970s, both Japan and the United States took a series of legislative measures such as the Law for the Welfare of the Aged and the Older Americans Act to enhance the well-being of their older citizens. The aged shall be loved and respected as those who have for many years contributed toward the development of society and a wholesome and peaceful life shall be guaranteed to them. The aged shall be conscious of their mental and physical changes due to aging, and shall always endeavor to maintain their mental and physical health to participate in society with their knowledge and experience. In accordance with their desire and ability, the aged shall be given opportunities to engage in suitable work or to participate in social activities.5 3 Robert Pinker, Social Theory and Social Policy, 105. 4 See Frank Upham, Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan, for the relationship between traditional values and legal doctrine. 5 Full text in Rojin fukushiho, Law for the Welfare of the Aged, Law No. 133, July 11, 1963, revised 1990. Chapter 1: General Provisions, Articles 2 and 3.

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The Gift of Generations The Congress hereby finds and declares that, in keeping with the traditional American concept of the inherent dignity of the individual in our democratic society, the older people of our Nation are entitled to . . . secure equal opportunity to the full and free enjoyment o f . . . 1. adequate income in retirement. . . . 2. best possible physical and mental health . . . without regard to economic status. 3. suitable housing . . . designed and located with reference to special needs and available at costs which older citizens can afford. 4. full restorative services for those who require institutional care. 5. opportunity for employment with no discriminatory personnel practices because of age. 6. retirement in health, honor, dignity - after years of contribution to the economy. 7. pursuit of meaningful activity within the widest range of... opportunities. 8. efficient community services . . . which are readily available when needed. 9. immediate benefit from proven research knowledge which can sustain and improve health and happiness. 10. freedom, independence and the free exercise of individual initiative in planning and managing their own lives.6 In response to what both nations saw as the burgeoning needs of the elderly population, a series of laws and amendments were enacted to allocate additional resources.7 Increasingly larger shares of the national budgets were committed to these programs; in the few decades between 1959 and 1986, Japan increased its social security expenditure by 298% and the United States, by 231%. 8 By 1987, public health 6 Full text in Older Americans Act of 1965, reauthorized in 1988. Title 1: Declaration of Objectives, Section 101. 7 For excellent comprehensive analyses of these policy developments, see John C. Campbell, How Policies Change: The Japanese Government and the Aging Society; Martha Derthick, Policymaking for Social Security; Theodore Marmor, The Politics of Medicare. 8 The proportion of social security expenditure over national income in Japan increased from 4.9% to 14.6% between 1959 and 1986. The growth was similar in the United States for the same period, when it rose from 7.0% to 16.2%. Since national definitions of "social security" vary, cross-national comparisons are approximate.

36

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain care expenditures also comprised 5.15% of GNP in Japan and 4.58% of GNP in the United States.9 The similarities of these policy trends conceal differences of fundamental principles that underlie old-age policies in the two nations - normative differences that directly affect the effectiveness of the provisions. Collectively, the set of policies targeted to the older population in both nations covers similar grounds: income maintenance, health care, social services, and employment opportunities. With the exception of old-age pensions, these policies were also established around the same time in both countries. In both societies, social security systems ensure financial security for retired persons who may otherwise have no regular income or private funds on which to rely.10 Whole or partial subsidy programs are available for the health care of older persons who are otherwise unable to meet the higher medical costs often incurred in old age.11 Employment laws encourage the continued labor force participation of senior workers.12 Direct service programs in both countries offer a range of social services for older persons who are unable to carry out basic daily tasks by

9

10

11

12

Changes within a nation over time, however, are usually measured by the same definition. Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kosei hakusho 1989, 223; International Labour Organisation, The Cost of Social Security: Twelfth International Inquiry, 1981-1983. Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, Health and Welfare Statistics in Japan, 1990, 109; and calculation from U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1990), 93. The standard of living has also improved for the elderly of both nations; the average income of an elderly couple reached approximately half of that of all households in both countries by 1985. Calculated from Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kokumin seikatsu kiso chosa (1987), 130; Miura Fumio, Zusetsu koreisha hakusho 1992, 43; and U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1990), 445. The Social Security Act in the United States was established in 1935. The Universal Pension Plan in Japan was established in 1961. The Japanese social security system was subsequently revised in 1985. Medicare and Medicaid were both established as part of the Social Security Act in the United States in 1965. Medical Subsidies for the Aged in Japan was established in 1973; it subsequently evolved into the Health Care for the Aged Law in 1982, which was also revised in 1986. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act in the United States was established in 1967. In Japan, the Law for the Promotion of Employment for Middle-Aged and Older Persons was enacted in 1971.

37

The Gift of Generations themselves.13 Programs to encourage social participation also constitute the core of services provided for the healthy elderly population in both nations.14 The convergence in the scope of coverage - given the similarity of basic needs - is evident in Japan, the United States, and other postindustrial nations.15 Yet underneath the convergence of scope are fundamental differences in the basic assumptions that shape the practices of old-age policies in the two nations. The differences are most pronounced in policies affecting the direct, instrumental services. The distinct normative underpinnings in the declaration of objectives of the Law for the Welfare of the Aged and the Older Americans Act are evident. The Japanese declaration concerns itself with the notion of guarantee, whereas the American counterpart is geared to the entitlement to independent life. In Japan, the subject is responsibility; in the United States, the subject is rights. Moreover, the Japanese preamble also prescribes that senior citizens must modify their behavior to adapt to changes "due to aging." The American counterpart, by contrast, pronounces the equal rights of individuals to self-sufficiency, for a continuation of independent life into old age. Different notions of rights and responsibilities, change and continuity - and, by implication, of deservedness - permeate the rhetoric of these two legislations. The notion that Japanese and American social security policies entail different assumptions about individual rights and state responsibilities has been noted by different scholars. Hye Kyung Lee identifies a paternalistic ideology underlying public policies in Japan, in contrast to the individualistic ideology she observes in the United States.16 Both Ronald Dore and Ishida Takeshi suggest that, historically, individual rights in Japan have been consistently restrained in the interest 13 The Older Americans Act of 1965, and the Law for the Welfare of the Aged in Japan of 1963, revised in 1990. 14 Older Americans Act and Law for the Welfare of the Aged. 15 James Schulz, Allan Borowski, and William Crown, Economics of Population Aging: The "Graying" of Australia, Japan and the United States, 341. 16 Hye Kyung Lee, Development of Social Welfare Systems in the United States and Japan: A Comparative Study.

38

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain of the state, especially when compared with Western societies.17 Indeed, Hashimoto Hiroko observes that the Ministry of Health and Welfare's guidelines accompanying the Law for the Welfare of the Aged refer to the measure explicitly as a responsibility of state institutions, not the rights of the elderly.18 As such, it is not surprising that the Japanese legislation frames its requirements in the obligations of individuals and the state. The Older Americans Act, on the other hand, frames the rights of older people in the ideology of equal opportunity and freedom common in American society. In keeping with an egalitarian notion that lies at the core of the American belief system,19 the legislation in effect seeks to ensure that no person, on the basis of age, be denied opportunities to attain the basic necessities and goals of independent life. Because older persons may be more physically and socially handicapped than younger persons, the government would try to offset any obstacles by offering specific advantages in the form of services and subsidies. Older Americans are entitled to all forms of social participation without discrimination, to seek and sustain an autonomous social existence.20 And as we will see, these different prescriptions of obligation and entitlement symbolized in the Japanese and American preambles are operationalized into different practices at the community level. The underlying prescriptions of obligation and entitlement in Japan and the United States derive from differences in the meaning of equity that the two societies establish in the social contracts. Japanese 17 Ronald P. Dore, City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward, 72; Ishida Takeshi, "Nihon ni okeru fukushi kannen no tokushitsu: Hikaku seijibunka no shiten kara." 18 Hashimoto Hiroko, Roreisha hosho no kenkyu: Seisaku tenkai to hbteki shikaku, and "Rojin fukushiho ni yoru fukushi no genkai," 9. Hashimoto Hiroko refers here to the Shosetsu rojin fukushiho published by the Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare. 19 Carl N. Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America, 157-160; David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character, 91. 20 For a critical account of the development of the Older Americans Act and its problems of implementation, see Carroll L. Estes, The Aging Enterprise: A Critical Examination of Social Policies and Services for the Aged, chaps. 3 and 6.

39

The Gift of Generations old-age policies, taken together, embrace the fundamental idea that the elderly are different as a group of people characterized by the ascriptive status of age. As such, the notion of social justice entailed in the measures is framed in the practice of what I call compartmentalized equity. American old-age policies, on the other hand, embrace dual notions of equity that are not readily reconciled. This dilemma lies in recognizing age as a criterion for allocating social resources, while at the same time not recognizing the same criterion as a legitimate basis for marking social differences. The dynamics of American policies lie partly in the wide variation of social needs that exists in the unified group defined by age. But the fundamental problem is grounded in the ambivalence inherent in the dual nature of American equity: the advancement of the ideal that all Americans are equal among peoples who are different. The dilemma lies at the heart of the American thinking about the problem of old age, a point also made by Bernice Neugarten and Dail Neugarten.21 On the one hand, some legislation such as the Older Americans Act and Medicare defines older people as a special group with special needs and circumstances. They are to be treated differently, on the basis of age, and special measures are introduced to improve their standard of living. On the other hand, legislation such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims at the same time that older people are not to be treated any differently from anyone else merely on the basis of age; they must not be discriminated against as a special group in seeking gainful employment, just because they are old. The goal of this legislation lies in establishing conditions of social equity not corresponding to natural inequities of age. Under these principles, the old must receive special attention and, at the same time, the old must not receive special attention. As far as the Japanese are concerned, the problem of discrimination does not arise. In Japan old age is different. Age remains a legitimate criterion for differentiating social participation particularly in this 21 Bernice L. Neugarten and Dail A. Neugarten, "Age in the Aging Society." For a theoretical treatment of the contradictions of goals in American social policy, see also James S. Fishkin, Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family.

40

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain society where the principle of seniority has historically been used as a safeguard to social order.22 But even after Japan formally embraced the principles of social equity in the new constitution of postwar democracy, the question of natural inequities has not become a central social dilemma as it has in the country that introduced the new constitution to Japan. Competition is encouraged, and meritocracy is promoted, but they are confined and compartmentalized within each social unit that can be biologically defined. Far from resolving unequal competition arising from natural differences through a unified ideology of meritocracy, compartmentalized meritocracy in Japan accepts the order of natural differences and confines competition to people who are equal within each ascriptive class. This strategy has serious implications, particularly to minorities defined by the ascriptive statuses of gender and ethnicity. With few exceptions, Japanese women rarely compete in the same job market as men;23 occupational segregation of minorities is also rampant. But age has survived as a preferred criterion for allocating resources and distributing rewards in the society as a whole, because of the social recognition that there is something inherently fair about the process of aging. Age, unlike gender or ethnicity, is not a permanent characteristic attached to a set of people throughout life.24 Every young person moves on to take his or her turn in old age with time. It is fair because everyone ages: This appeals to the Japanese sense of justice. This principle of compartmentalized equity25 serves well in removing an ideological overtone from old-age policy in Japan, at least in comparison with its American counterpart. If old people are defined as a special class of people who do not stand on equal footing with the 22 Thomas Rholen, "The Promise of Adulthood in Japanese Spiritualism," 129-130; Chie Nakane, Japanese Society. 23 Mary Brinton, Women and the Economic Miracle: Gender and Work in Postwar Japan, chap. 5. 24 Nancy Foner, Ages in Conflict: A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Inequality between Old and Young, 130. 25 Ishida Takeshi also points to the notion of closed competition {tozasareta kyoso) in describing a similar phenomenon in the context of conformity and competition in the Japanese political culture. See Nihon no seiji bunka: Docho to kyoso, 116; and also Japanese Political Culture: Change and Continuity.

41

The Gift of Generations young regarding their abilities and privileges, the task of old-age policy may be a relatively straightforward one of promoting "welfare," rather than "welfare and justice." The Law for the Welfare of the Aged sets out governmental guidelines to address the interests of old people without invoking the question of independence and equity, as does the Older Americans Act. Japan's Law for the Promotion of Employment for Middle-Aged and Older Persons seeks to safeguard the labor force participation of older Japanese without invoking the question of discrimination as does the American Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Social justice in old age is less problematic because aging itself is considered egalitarian in nature. What remains for an old-age policy to accomplish, then, is to dispense the appropriate provisions.26 The promotion of equity and social justice is more central to American old-age policies than the Japanese not only because democratic principles are at stake, but also because the dignity of the elderly is more easily threatened in the environment of undifferentiated competition. To depend on social provisions has always come at a cost to one's independence and dignity since the beginning of social welfare history.27 Many of the past developments and progress made in the field of social welfare have been related to removing the social stigma from the benefits by turning them into entitlements. The question of degradation and dependency, however, is less serious in Japan, because old-age policies need not be legitimated with equity concerns. Although the stigma created by relying on social services is not eliminated, the dignity of the old does not depend on the same conditions as the young - on social activity, participation, and resourcefulness. The demands made on the old are different from those made on the young; after all, "the aged shall be loved and respected" because they are in an ascriptive class by themselves, to be judged by the accumulated credits and contributions they have made in the past. The credit builds up over a lifetime and remains in good standing so that the old become deserving of the benefits in a way that 26 Fukutake Tadashi also suggests that Japan has historically paid little attention to promoting distributive justice through its welfare policies. See Shakai hoshoron dansho, 137. 27 Margaret K. Rosenheim, "Social Welfare and Its Implications for Family Living."

42

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain the untested young are not. If individual responsibility requires that "the aged shall be conscious of their mental and physical changes due to aging," then they are a class of people who can legitimately expect protection from others. INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, AND STATE

Although the notion of independence is made more explicit in the American policies, the concern is relevant to the Japanese context as well; it refers, however, to different units of self-sufficiency. In the comparative analysis of social provisions at the community level, two distinct notions of self-sufficiency emerge. In Japan, self-sufficiency refers to the independence of the family from the state. In the United States, it refers to the independence of the individual from the family and the state. The distinction primarily concerns the role of the family vis-a-vis the state, with significant implications for the way local administrators recognize and meet individual needs in the two communities. The different assignment of responsibilities to the individual, family, and state was evident in the practices of direct services in Odawara and West Haven. Formal services available to the elderly in West Haven were extensive in variety and range. The community directory listed approximately 450 nonprofit (provider) community organizations in the Greater New Haven region alone.28 Of these, more than half provided services that directly or indirectly benefited the elderly residents of the region. Notable among the programs were daily congregate meals, meals-on-wheels, transportation, day care, health care, employment services, legal aid, housing, fuel assistance, senior centers, and referral and coordination services.29 These services met an extensive range of needs, from nutrition and accommodation, to health care and companionship. The range of professional staff and volunteers who 28 INFOLINE, Directory of Community Services: South Central Connecticut, 1st ed. In 1993, there were more than 550 services listed; see INFOLINE, Directory of Community Services: South Central Connecticut, 5th ed. 29 Social services in West Haven discussed here are not distinguished by sources of funding from the federal government, the state of Connecticut, the Greater New Haven agencies, the city of West Haven, and the private nonprofit agencies in the New Haven and/or West Haven area. Some services are jointly sponsored by

43

The Gift of Generations provided the services on a day-to-day basis, accordingly, was also remarkably diffuse. The eligibility for these services was almost uniformly set with age - mostly at age 60 (by provisions of the Older Americans Act), and some others at ages 55 or 62. A few required recipients to be below a certain income level (e.g., public housing, legal aid), and some direct services obviously assumed physical need (e.g., day care, meals-on-wheels, transportation services). From a comparative standpoint, these eligibility criteria were minimal and allowed a greater number of senior citizens to utilize the community services in West Haven.3o The formal services available to the elderly in Odawara, by contrast, were smaller in scale, and also directed toward target populations according to stringent eligibility criteria. The groups especially targeted for the Odawara services were the bedridden (netakiri) and those living alone (hitorigurashi).31 Services were run primarily by two central organizations - the Division of Elderly Services of Odawara City and the Social Welfare Council - and by a small group of voluntary organizations. Notable among these programs were congregate meals, home helpers, friendly visitors, employment, telephone reassurance, and senior centers. Unlike in West Haven, there were also mobile bathing services, bedding rentals, and elderly festivals (keiro gydji).32 multiple providers, others by single providers. I cite what appear to be the most effective services regardless of organizational initiatives, because such distinctions are of little concern from the perspective of the recipients themselves. Today, the budget of the city of West Haven's Department of Elderly Services has increased in proportion to total expenditures. Although the city experienced a financial crisis in 1992 which required loan guarantees from the state of Connecticut, the department's operations remain relatively intact. See City of West Haven, Budget Adopted by the City Council, 1980-1981, A-41; Budget Adopted by the City Council, 1985-86, A-44; Approved Operating Budget, 1994-1995, 192. 30 For a discussion of the trade-offs between age and need eligibility criteria in the American context, see Bernice L. Neugarten, "Policy for the 1980s: Age or Need Entitlement?" 31 More recently, limited services targeted at the frail elderly {kyojaku rojin) and elderly with senile dementia (chiho rojin) have also been added. 32 Social services described for Odawara are funded and/or operated by the national government, Kanagawa Prefecture, and Odawara City. Private nonprofit organiza-

44

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain Most of these programs were targeted toward those aged 65 and over. More important, however, most were also targeted to those with limited family assistance. The marker of vulnerability for service provisions was not only need - low income and high disability - but also family status. In different town sections, congregate meals were available from twice a month to once every four months, only for those living alone.33 Home helpers (katei hoshi-in) were available for those affected by "adverse family circumstances."34 Friendly visitors attended to those living alone or only with a spouse. Telephone reassurance services were available for those elderly residents who were living alone and were below poverty level.35 Bathing and bedding services were also offered to those living alone or those who were bedridden.36 The implementation of such stringent criteria is impossible without the provider's knowledge of the exact whereabouts of the elderly and the status of their families and health. The target population37 was listed in a special registry, which was constructed, updated, and reported to the city by 209 welfare commissioners (minsei-iin)}% This listing, based on a roster of registered local residents, was then

33

34

35

36 37

38

tions of the region also fund services to a limited extent, separately or jointly with the public sector. Since 1993, Odawara City has begun a daily meals delivery service for 200 residents; again, over 90% of the beneficiaries comprise elderly persons living alone or with spouse only. The home helper program covered 30 cases in 1982, and 35 cases in 1994. See Naomi Maruo's "The Development of the Welfare Mix in Japan," 70-71, for a discussion of the drastically low helper-client ratio in Japan compared with the ratios in other postindustrial societies, This program, which covered 25 cases in 1982, was recently updated. The new emergency alarm service covers 316 cases, and it is again targeted toward elderly residents living alone or with spouse only. The coverage for this program ranged from 48 to 60 households in the past decade. In April 1982, there were 189 bedridden elderly in Odawara City (80 in West Side Odawara), and 412 elderly persons lived in single households (255 in Westside Odawara). These figures have increased in proportion to the growing elderly population in the city; in June 1994, there were 286 bedridden elderly, and 1,058 elderly residents living in single households. Minsei-iin are statutory voluntary workers. The Welfare Commissioner Law of 1948 stipulates that minsei-iin, designated by the minister of health and welfare, monitor the needy in each town district. Minsei-iin are unsalaried (i.e., reimbursed only for

45

The Gift of Generations made available to welfare council professionals, local police stations {kobari), elderly counselors (mjinsodan-in), and community organizations (chonaikai) to allow them to focus their efforts on those who fit the designated criteria. The use of family status as a criterion for provisions in Odawara was notable for access to direct instrumental services and nursing home facilities. Since demand continually exceeds supply in a climate of limited resources, Odawara service providers consistently referred to this criterion in selecting their clients and allocating their resources. Social services presuppose the primacy of family support and thus efforts were compartmentalized to those who have no family to live with them. The family as the unit of self-sufficiency was thus both legitimated and reinforced through these practices. Two legal guidelines have been especially significant in the practice of these direct services: the principle of private initiative (shiteki fuyo no gensoku) and the principle of household unit (setai tan 'i no gensoku). The former principle refers to the notion that private support takes precedence over public support, that is, individuals must exhaust private resources before resorting to public funds.39 The latter principle refers to the notion that individuals must first exhaust household resources before turning to state intervention.40 Service providers in Odawara adhered to these principles for the most part, and at times sought appropriate family members to solicit their cooperation. For American providers, no comparable prescriptions existed to restrict their services to specific groups of people among the elderly. These observations at the community level shed light on the different meaning of family responsibility and security in Japan and the United States. While family responsibility laws exist in Japan, the expenses), but they carry prestige and exercise discretionary power in the community. The West Haven counterparts - municipal agents - are fewer in number and carry less authority. In 1994, the number of minsei-iin in Odawara increased to 248. For a historical account of this system, see Stephen Anderson, Welfare Policy and Politics in Japan: Beyond the Developmental State, chap. 5; and also Eyal Ben-Ari, Changing Japanese Suburbia: A Study of Two Present-Day Localities, 125. 39 Daily Life Security Law 1950 Article 4 Section 2. 40 Akaishi Toshimi, "Kazokuho tono kakawari: Kotekifujo to shitekifuyo no kanren to mondaiten."

46

Rights and Responsibilities in the Public Domain United States, and other Western societies, the Japanese law is applicable to a wider range of family members than elsewhere:41 lineal relatives and siblings and, under special circumstances, all other relatives within the third degree.42 Although disputed cases brought to family court are limited in unlitigious Japan,43 the stipulation is well known among the general public. By contrast, few Americans are aware that the stipulation even exists. In the United States, family responsibility laws exist in 27 states, including the state of Connecticut, stipulating the responsibility of support to spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, and siblings.44 These state laws, however, remain virtually impossible to enforce across state boundaries.45 They are also at odds with federal regulations such as Medicare and Medicaid that proscribe the application of family responsibility laws to their recipients.46 The reason cited most commonly for effectively eliminating the legal responsibility of children is the elderly's own desire not to burden their children.47 Although family concerns remain an important component of support, expectations with respect to obligations between the elderly parent and adult child defy clear social definition in the United States.48 41 Yuzawa Yasuhiko, "Rojin fuyo mondai no kozo to tenkai," 22-28; Max Rheinstein, "Duty of Children to Support Parents," 442. 42 Civil Code Chapter VI, Article 877. For a discussion, see Daisaku Maeda and Youmei Nakatani, "Family Care of the Elderly in Japan," 196-197. 43 Toshitani Nobuyoshi, "Fukushi to kazoku: Roshin fuyo o chyushin to shite." Toshitani reports that, on average, only 600 charges concerning the elderly are brought forward annually. 44 The Family Responsibility Law in the state of Connecticut originated in 1958. See W. Walton Garrett, "Filial Responsibility Laws." 45 Alvin Schorr, Thy Father and Thy Mother: A Second Look at Filial Responsibility and Family Policy, 27-28; Eugene Litwack, Helping the Elderly: The Complementary Roles of Informal Networks and Formal Systems, 240; Max Rheinstein, "Motivation of Intergenerational Behavior by Norms and Law," 237-238. 46 Theodore Marmor, Politics of Medicare; David G. Smith, Paying for Medicare: The Politics of Reform; Robert Moroney, Shared Responsibility: Families and Social Policy, 11-12; Alvin Schorr, Thy Father and Thy Mother: A Second Look at Filial Responsibility and Family Policy, 28. 47 Alvin Schorr, Thy Father and Thy Mother, 11. 48 Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation, 85.

47

The Gift of Generations As John Campbell and James Schulz and colleagues have emphasized, the broad outline of contemporary old-age policies in Japan and the United States today is relatively similar;49 the social security and health care systems for the elderly, in particular, mainly provide comparable benefits with roughly similar eligibility requirements.50 Nevertheless, the normative conditions of social policy that I have discussed for the two societies affect the area of direct social services quite differently. These conditions have also influenced the public discourse over the social provisions: The establishment of the "Japan-style welfare society" - which induced a series of legislative reforms to curb rising social security expenditures in the 1980s - relied on normative prescriptions such as compartmentalized equity and self-sufficiency of the family for its legitimation.51 Although the attempt to invoke familism to legitimate social policy directions can also be seen in the United States and elsewhere,52 its impact on the popular discourse was far greater in Japan, because it resonates with cultural assumptions that are more readily recognized. 49 John C. Campbell, How Policies Change; James Schulz et al., Economics of Population Aging: The "Graying" of Australia, Japan and the United States, 341. 50 This assessment applies to the current provisions as a whole. However, since the Japanese universal pension system was established only in 1961, many elderly of the older cohort today receive substantially lower social security benefits from the National Pension or the National Welfare Pension; the recent pension reform has not altered these benefit levels. 51 Sato Susumu, "Nihongata fukushi kokka no hoseisaku no tenkai katei: Koreika to shakaiteki fuyo no genjittai to sono mondai o chyushin toshite," and Sekai no koreisha fukushi seisaku: Kyo, asu no nihon o mitsumete; Ogawa Masaaki, Shakai hoshoken: Ayumi to gendaiteki igi 52 Robert Moroney, Shared Responsibility: Families and Social Policy, chap. 1; Alan Walker, "Intergenerational Relations and Welfare Restructuring: The Social Construction of an Intergenerational Problem," 162.

48

The Practice of Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain We were both born and brought up in New Haven. My husband's father had a grocery store. We used to shop in that store as girls. . . . My husband was born a couple of blocks away from me. . . . We're basically always together. - Elsie Bowen (71), former clerical worker It was an arranged marriage. I was his second wife, so there was a big age difference between us. Some relatives became our go-betweens. - Sada Kiyo (80), former farmer

S

ECURITY, equity, and self-sufficiency, important to the discussion of the public contract, are also central issues for understanding the private contract in both Japan and the United States. Helping arrangements in the private domain consist of the noninstitutional, informal support offered to the elderly by their family and social networks, which usually includes relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. These networks of private life are complex, because they are based on the dynamics of life cycle transitions, cohabitation, affection, intimacy, and companionship that lie at the heart of these interdependent relationships. We will explore these dynamics of private helping arrangements here and in the following two chapters. In this chapter, we will explore the conditions of helping arrangements in the two communities by examining the junctures of giving and receiving help at the aggregate level. As we will see, the objective conditions of proximity and the subjective conditions of evaluating vulnerability both play an important role in the practices of social support. Both of these conditions are essential in shaping the private contract, of which 49

The Gift of Generations we will identify two distinct types: the protective approach in Japan, and the contingency approach in the United States. The narratives of Elsie and Kiyo in the opening of this chapter demonstrate the different historical traditions of the Japanese and American family systems, which many scholars of the family have also described. Chudacoff and Hareven, for instance, have documented the prevalence of the nuclear family in the United States, dating back to preindustrial times.1 By contrast, the Japanese family originates in the extended stem family system, ie, illustrated also by social scientists like Chie Nakane, Kawashima Takeyoshi, and Keith Brown.2 Although American families are ethnically varied and Japanese families have also become increasingly nuclear in recent decades, family relationships in both societies do not escape these cultural influences. In the two communities of our study, the marriages of older people originate in entirely different notions of mate selection; it is therefore not surprising that the primary bonds of affection and interdependence differ in the two cultures along conjugal and filial ties. As we will see, these different priorities have distinct implications for relationships of reciprocity, obligation, and dependency forged in the private contract. It would be rather obvious to attribute the difference between filial family support in Japan and social network support in the United States to cultural and historical particularities. After all, the past experiences of primogeniture have been quite different in the two societies.3 As we map out the differences and similarities of helping arrangements in the two communities, however, we will find that more factors than different family traditions are at work. Anticipated life course trajectories and assumptions about the nature of security and self-sufficiency play an important role in shaping such helping arrangements; socioeconomic factors - such as geographical mobility, occupational changes, 1 H. P. Chudacoff and T. K. Hareven, "Family Transitions into Old Age." 2 Chie Nakane, "An Interpretation of the Size and Structure of the Household in Japan over Three Centuries"; Kawashima Takeyoshi, Nikon no kazoku seido; L. Keith Brown, "Dozoku and the Ideology of Descent in Rural Japan." 3 The formal abolishment of primogeniture in the United States predates that of Japan by 170 years. Carole Shammas, Marylynn Salmon, and Michel Dahlin, Inheritance in America: From Colonial Times to the Present, 208; Shimazu Ichiro, Shinzoku sozokuho, 179.

50

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain and housing options - also influence the practices of support. The difference in these expectations, commitments, and social constraints will become evident as we examine the practices of giving and receiving in the two communities. We will find that these conditions also effectively recreate and reinvent the historical traditions.4

INSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD

Ordinarily people spend much of the day with those who share the household with them. In old age, when less time is spent outside the home at full-time work, much of daily routines - eating, sleeping, talking, playing, and working - are also shared by those living together. Through these shared experiences of daily living, people who live together reach a level of intimacy that is entirely different from that of close relationships established outside the home. People who live together tolerate and bear one another's habits, flaws, idiosyncrasies, and needs, both at their best and their worst; among themselves, they develop a more committed pattern of reciprocal care, one that is not easily retractable even in times of conflict. People most often rely on household members when in need - emotionally, instrumentally, and financially - whether out of affinity, responsibility, or necessity. Household members, then, represent the most essential resources of help in everyday life; and the household is, in this sense, the most basic social unit of sufficiency. People living together are usually, but not always, members of a family.5 Thus living arrangements vary, mostly depending on 4 See Robert Smith, Japanese Society: Tradition, Self and the Social Order, chap. 1, and "Presidential Address: Something Old, Something New - Tradition and Culture in the Study of Japan." See also Eric Hobsbawm "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," 1-4. 5 The definition of "family" varies not only from one society to another, but also from one individual to another. This is especially true regarding the inclusion of married children and their spouses who live away. People also shift their definition of family situationally, depending on their perception of intersubjectivity: When addressing outsiders, the family membership tends to be more inclusive, and when addressing insiders, the membership tends to be more exclusive. Thus, the term family in this study refers to the members whom each individual chooses to include according to his or her own definition; in both societies, it usually refers loosely but not rigidly to those sharing the household.

51

The Gift of Generations Table 4.1. Living arrangements in West Haven and Westside Odawara, in % (N) Living arrangement by household type

West Haven

One-generation Living alone Living with spouse Two-generation Living with unmarried child/children Living with married child/children Three-generation Living with children and grandchildren Four-generation Living with children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren Other Total

Westside Odawara

27.1 (71) 42.4 (111)

10.0 14.8

(21) (31)

17.9

(47)

12.9

(27)

2.7

(7)

6.7

(14)

6.1

(16)

46.9

(98)

0 (0) 3.8 (10) 100.0 (262)

4.3 4.3 100.0

(9) (9) (209)

whether or not individuals are married and have children.6 These family circumstances, in turn, relate to age and the stages of one's life cycle. In the later stage of the life cycle, living arrangements can be classified broadly into three categories: living with spouse, living with children,7 and living alone. We will examine these three arrangements in turn. In Odawara and West Haven, the living arrangements of the elderly are remarkably different (Table 4.1). In Odawara the majority of the elderly (70.8%) lived with their children, mostly in three-generation households, and sometimes even in four-generation households. By 6 U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1979); Japan Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Nihon no tokei 1982, 21. 7 In this study, respondents classified as living with children do so regardless of their marital status.

52

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain contrast, the most common living arrangement among the elderly in West Haven was the husband-wife household. Living with children was the least frequent living arrangement among the Americans, and indeed more lived alone than with their children.8 Moreover, the group of West Haveners who lived with their children did so under substantially different conditions from their Odawaran counterparts: They lived with unmarried children in two-generation households.9 The contrast between the prevalence of filial households in Odawara and that of conjugal households in West Haven is evident, confirming trends that are documented also at the national level.10 These different conditions of coresidence have profound implications for the way in which the elderly access their family members for help. The more people there are in the household, the more potential resources it has to share the earning, driving, cooking, cleaning, and caring for the ill. On average, there were twice as many family members in the Japanese household as in the American household,11 8 The small group classified as "other" in West Haven lived with siblings and siblings' spouses, and none lived with more distant relatives or with friends. 9 The higher proportion of West Haveners living with their children relative to the national average is likely to be due to ethnic factors. Of those living with their children, 48.5% were of Italian descent, whereas the corresponding proportions of Italian Americans among those living alone and those living alone nationally were smaller (35.4% and 39.1% respectively). In a study of 66 Italian American elderly in New England, Colleen Leahy Johnson also found that a higher proportion (22%) lived with children compared with the national average, although the proportion of those living alone was about the same (35%). See Growing Up and Growing Old in Italian American Families, 146. 10 National figures for Japan at the time of the survey were: living alone 8.5%; living with spouse 20.5%; and living with child 68.0%. The corresponding national averages for the United States were: living alone 32.0%; living with spouse 53.3%; and living with child 14.4%. See Soda Takemune and Miura Fumio, Zusetsu Rojin hakusho 1983, 41; and Carole Allan and Herman Brotman, Chartbook on Aging in America, 100. The 1982 national surveys conducted by the Japan Prime Minister's Office show fewer filial households in both countries (Japan, 52.1%; United States, 9.9%), but these figures were likely to have been deflated by the inclusive use of the "other" category (Japan, 17.0%; United States, 8.8%); see Rojin no seikatsu to ishiki: Kokusai hikaku chosa kekka hokokusho, 52. 11 The average number of persons per household was 4.2 in Odawara and 2.1 in West Haven. The Odawaran household members were also on average 17 years younger than their American counterparts.

53

The Gift of Generations although they both lived in the same size dwellings.12 These different patterns show the significant concentration of potential support resources in the Odawara household compared with that in West Haven. Our concern for identifying available resources also extends to the variation by individual circumstances, and in this connection, it is useful to observe the distribution of living arrangements by gender,13 marital status,14 and age. In both communities, significantly more women than men lived alone, due to their longer life expectancies and the fact that men are usually older than women at marriage. The two communities, however, show different patterns of association between living arrangements and age. In West Haven, living arrangements change significantly with age;15 in Odawara, they remain the same across different age groups (Table 4.2). The apparent increase of Americans living alone in the older age group is not surprising, considering the fact that the ability to maintain the conjugal household, the most common living arrangement, is contingent on the longevity of the spouse. Predictably in West Haven, the conjugal household was most common only for those aged 79 and under; the average age of people living with their spouse was

12 The average number of rooms per household was 4.9 in Odawara, and 4.8 in West Haven. 13 A note on the gender proportions derived from the stratified sampling procedure in West Haven is in order. The survey was designed to obtain an equal proportion of men and women for the purpose of investigating health status; this sample therefore entails a small overrepresentation of men (52% men, 48% women). The 1980 census showed that 40.0% of those over age 65 in West Haven were men and 60.0% were women; on the other hand, a Regional Planning Agency Survey conducted in 1977 showed a more even breakdown48% men and 52% women. To obtain even gender proportions, this sample also somewhat overrepresents married persons (who were men). My analysis of gender in this study is limited because of these constraints. See the appendix for details of the sampling procedures in both communities. 14 Of the unmarried category, 84.3% were widowed. 15 Associations described throughout this chapter are based upon tests of significance for /-statistics, chi-squares, Pearson correlation, or b coefficients. Results reported are significant at/? < 0.05.

54

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain Table 4.2. Living arrangements by age, marital status, and sex in West Haven and Westside Odawara, in % (TV)

West Haven Age** 65-69 70-74" 75-79" 80+ Total Sex** Men Women Total Marital status Married Unmarried Total" Westside Odawara Age 65-69 70-74" 75-79" 80+ Total Sex** Men Women Total Marital status Married Unmarried Total

Alone

With spouse

With child (2 generations)

With child (3 & 4 generations)

18.2 26.4 30.6 50.0 27.9 (70)

53.5 54.2 36.1 13.6 44.2(111)

23.2 13.9 27.8 25.0 21.5(54)

5.1 5.6 5.6 11.4 6.4(16)

14.4 43.3 28.2(71)

55.3 31.7 44.0(111)

23.5 19.2 21.4(54)

6.8 5.8 6.3(16)

— 72.6 27.6 (69)

71.6 — 44.4(111)

23.2 18.9 21.6(54)

5.2 8.4 6.4(16)

11.1 9.4 12.2 8.8 10.5(21)

23.6 17.0 7.3 5.9 15.5(31)

19.4 22.6 17.1 23.5 20.5(41)

45.9 50.9 63.4 61.8 53.5(107)

4.6 15.0 10.5 (21)

26.4 7.1 15.5(31)

20.7 20.4 20.5(41)

48.3 57.5 53.5 (107)

— 21.0 10.6(21)

31.6 — 15.7(31)

20.4 20.0 20.2 (40)

48.0 59.0 53.5(106)

Note: "Other" category of living arrangements is excluded. "Figures do not add up to 100.0 due to rounding. **Chi-square statistics are significant at 0.01 level. 55

The Gift of Generations 6 years younger than those in other living arrangements.16 By contrast, half of the West Haven elderly aged 80 and over lived alone, and they were predominantly women - a well-known phenomenon among the American elderly nationally.17 However, the three-generation household was common among the Odawaran elderly of all ages. The Japanese elderly lived with their children regardless of whether or not their spouses were still alive, and regardless of how many children they had.18 Although the incidence of coresidence in three-generation households is generally higher for those in older age groups, this increase was not statistically significant. It indicates that although living alone was as much a widow's experience in Odawara as it was in West Haven, the Japanese women were also somewhat more likely to move in with their children than live alone in advanced old age. By viewing the serial cross section of age groups as synthetic cohorts with some caution,19 we can surmise household transitions of the elderly by age - transitions that will also be confirmed in the case studies of the following chapters. West Haveners make a transition from conjugal household to single household with increasing age; the Odawara counterparts retain the same living arrangement across age 16 The average age of couples living in conjugal households was 71 years. As one would expect from their shorter life expectancy and marriage to younger wives, more men lived in conjugal households than women. In the American sample, the age of respondents ranged from 65 to 95 years. 17 See Karen Holden's "Poverty and Living Arrangements among Older Women: Are Changes in Economic Weil-Being Underestimated?" for an account of the drastic increase in single households among the American elderly during 1950-1980. Additionally, the small group of West Haveners living with their children were diverse: Some still had children of school age, and others lived with single, middle-aged children. In some cases, the parent and child had always lived together; in other cases, they had merged their households at the onset of a parent's illness. 18 The fact that there were fewer childless Odawarans than West Haveners (6% compared with 13%) has a small bearing on the greater Odawaran proneness to filial coresidence. This trend reflects the practice of adult adoption {yoshi engumi) discussed in Chapter 1, not a natural difference in the rate of childlessness. Adopted children were grouped together with natural children in the analysis. 19 The cross-sectional nature of the data makes the synthetic-cohort approach necessary. For an overview of methods in life course research and synthetic cohorts, see Angela O'Rand, "Stratification and the Life Course."

56

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain groups. Whereas in West Haven widowhood is an important marker that creates household transitions, in Odawara it does not. These patterns are consistent with trends found also at the national level.20 With the predominance of husband-wife households in the earlier years of old age among Americans, a major change in household structure is inevitable in the event of a spouse's death. Many people, especially women, must change their living arrangements to single households in advanced old age; only in exceptional cases does widowhood in the older age group seem to result in coresidence with (married or unmarried) children. In this way, the elderly in West Haven continue to make adjustments in living arrangements even late into their life cycle; finally, there is the possibility of making a further transition to a nursing home. As we will see in Chapter 6, relations with children, friends, and acquaintances also undergo changes as a result of widowhood. This anticipation of uncertain future transitions fundamentally affects the way in which Americans prepare for their security and self-sufficiency in old age. The Japanese three-generation household, by contrast, is seemingly more resilient in these life course transitions.21 The same life events that affect American households do not alter the basic household conditions in Japan, because filial households are the building blocks to which in-laws and grandchildren are added as a result of the child's marriage: Widowhood does not change this structure. Thus the tradition of primogeniture is reproduced in postindustrial Odawara, but today it is recreated as an arrangement that regulates interests in filial relationships, as we will see in Chapter 5. The different patterns of living arrangements in the two communities invite a series of questions regarding differences in the nature of helping arrangements of the elderly in the two societies. The durable nature of Japanese households, in contrast to more transient American 20 Jacob S. Siegel and Cynthia M. Taeuber, "Demographic Perspectives on the LongLived Society." 21 The lower incidence of divorce in Japan also induces stability and fewer household transitions. The divorce rates were 1.32 in Japan and 5.19 in the United States per 1,000 population. Japan Prime Minister's Office, Statistics Bureau, Kokusai tokei yoran 1982, 24.

57

The Gift of Generations households, suggests that older people in Japan come to rely on their children over a very long time span. On the other hand, the prevalence of the smaller-sized, transitional conjugal households and single households in the American community suggests that relationships with friends, relatives, and nonresident children may substitute for what is not found inside the boundary of the household. This is the subject to which we will turn in the following section.

OUTSIDE THE HOUSEHOLD

As we map out the patterns of older people's social ties outside the household, we discover more differences between the two communities: The Americans maintain much stronger peer group ties as part of their social network than do the Japanese. These networks outside the household represent potential support resources that are contingent on the availability of resources inside the household - a relationality that Ethel Shanas refers to as the principle of substitution.22 These networks play a key role in instrumental help and companionship for older Americans. As Marjorie Cantor, Virginia Little, and others23 have pointed out, this phenomenon speaks to the larger division of labor - among spouse, children, relatives, and friends that takes place in the American context; Toni Antonucci has also referred to this social network over the life course as the convoy of social support.24 The social network outside the household usually consists of nonresident children, relatives, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances. Most elderly in both communities are close to their nonresident chil22 Ethel Shanas, "The Family as a Social Support System in Old Age." 23 Marjorie Cantor and Virginia Little, "Aging and Social Care." See also Ethel Shanas, "The Family as a Social Support System in Old Age," and Eugene Litwak, Helping the Elderly: The Complementary Roles of Informal Networks and Formal Systems. 24 Toni Antonucci, "Personal Characteristics, Social Support, and Social Behavior." See also Toni Antonucci and Hiroko Akiyama, "Social Networks in Adult Life and a Preliminary Examination of the Convoy Model." Examining the case for Japan, David Plath refers to these associates over the life course as consociates; see Long Engagements: Maturity in Modern Japan, 8-9.

58

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain dren regardless of living arrangement.25 However, the characteristic difference in the network patterns is found not in the role of children, but in the centrality of peer group ties. On average, the West Haven networks included almost 3 times as many close friends, and 1.5 times as many close relatives, as the Odawara networks.26 The fact that these American networks included many peer relationships attests to the importance of the old-age subculture that Arnold Rose and Arlie Hochschild have suggested.27 Although the Japanese are more noted for their regard for age grading than the Americans,28 they paradoxically maintain weaker peer group ties among their age-sets. These peer group ties are limited partly because filial attachments are strong, and also because adult peer relations in an age-stratified environment are competitive. Takie Lebra suggests that vertical alliance in Japan is indeed forged at the expense of horizontal alliance.29 Conversely, the stronger age-group solidarity among the elderly in the less age graded of the two societies, the United States, may be accounted for by the relative absence of clear definition about intergenerational differences.30 Along these lines, Jennie Keith has argued that age homogeneity among older people is often evoked when intergenerational relations no longer work to their relative advantage.31 The relative advantages of age segregation versus age integration is a controversy discussed more commonly among West Haveners than Odawarans, who conceive the matter more as a choice between two equally feasible alternatives than as nonnegotiable social imperatives. This perception of choice, and its connotation of voluntarism 25 Of the elderly not living with children, over two-thirds in West Haven reported having at least one child in the same city region, compared with one-half in Odawara. The average number of surviving children was 2.3 in West Haven and 3.4 in Odawara. The number of children does not differ significantly by age in either sample. 26 The average number of close friends was 5.1 in West Haven and 1.8 in Odawara. The same for close relatives was 3.1 in West Haven and 2.1 in Odawara. 27 Arnold Rose, "The Subculture of the Aging"; Arlie Hochschild, The Unexpected Community: Portrait of an Old Age Subculture. 28 For a description of age grading and rank order by seniority in Japan, see Edward Norbeck, "Age-Grading in Japan," and Chie Nakane, Japanese Society. 29 Takie Sugryama Lebra, Japanese Patterns of Behavior, 11. 30 Bernice L. Neugarten and Dail A. Neugarten, "Age in the Aging Society." 31 Jennie Keith, "Age in Anthropological Research," 253.

59

The Gift of Generations and autonomy, lies at the heart of the formation of extensive networks in West Haven, which we will turn to in greater detail in Chapter 6. In Odawara, by contrast, the local network is perceived only as a second choice for support at best, something that the elderly resort to when all possibilities of family help have failed to materialize.32 The elderly in the two communities usually refer to the same people as close relatives and close friends: siblings, brothers- and sisters-inlaw, cousins, and friends from former workplaces, social clubs, neighborhoods, and even old schools. Despite their longer residence33 and greater rootedness in the community, the Odawarans had limited ties with their lifelong peers who grew up in the community with them. Many had no close relatives and friends in their local network; over one-third had no close relatives and almost one-half had no close friends at all (Table 4.3). By contrast, the majority in West Haven had many close relatives and friends in the local area, and over a quarter reported more than 10 close friends.34 The importance of friends in West Haven is rooted in the "peer group society," which Herbert Gans observed,35 and in the strength of community bonds in American society, which Rubin, Bellah and his colleagues, and others have also described.36 32 Marvin B. Sussman and James C. Romeis's comparative study of Winston-Salem and Tokyo also shows that Americans are much more open to the possibility of assisting friends than the Japanese, which is consistent with my findings in West Haven and Odawara. See "Family Supports for the Aged: A Comparison of U.S. and Japan Responses." 33 The average length of residence was 50.7 years in Odawara, compared with 33.5 years in West Haven. 34 In the American sample, 27.3% cited that they had more than ten friends, compared with 3.1% in the Japanese sample. Although many, especially Italian American, elderly tended to socialize with relatives as "friends," the survey specifically requested that they separate these network members into the two nonoverlapping categories. 35 Herbert M. Gans, Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian Americans, 93. His observation is relevant in this context, because 41% of the West Haven respondents were second-generation Americans of Italian descent, as described in Chapter 2. 36 Lillian Rubin, Just Friends: The Role of Friendship in Our Lives', Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 116. There is no comparable work on Japanese friendship patterns, which partly reflects the relative weakness of such intimate, peer group ties.

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Table 4.3. Patterns of association with close relatives and friends by living arrangements, in % (N)

West Haven Alone" With spouse With child Total

(AO Westside Odawara Alone With spouse With child Total

(AO

No close relatives

No close relatives in same city region

At least one close relative in same city region

21.7 15.5 25.7 20.1 (50)

24.6 19.1 12.9 18.9 (47)

53.6 65.4 61.4 61.0 (152)

(69) (110) (70)

25.0 34.5 38.1 36.2 (71)

25.0 24.1 20.4 21.4 (42)

50.0 41.4 41.5 42.4 (83)

(20) (29) (147)

Relatives

(AO

(249)

(196)

No close friends

No close friends in same city region

At least one close friend in same city region

Friends

(AO

14.7 9.2 14.5 12.2 (30)

5.9 1.8 2.9 3.3 (8)

79.4 89.0 82.6 84.5 (208)

(68) (109) (69)

33.3 38.7 47.6 44.6 (87)

0.0 12.9 6.3 6.7 (13)

66.7 48.4 46.1 48.7 (95)

(21) (31) (143)

(246)

(195)

Note: "Other" category of living arrangements is excluded. City region for West Haven is Greater New Haven; for Westside Odawara it is Odawara City. "Figures do not add up to 100.0 due to rounding.

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The Gift of Generations At the same time, the significance of friendships also makes sense as an extension of the close conjugal (peer) ties that are part of the American couple culture.37 American couples living by themselves tended to have more friends than those living alone or with children; this distinction was not found among Japanese couples. The distinct boundaries of the support networks also become more evident when we observe how the elderly in the two communities chose their confidantes ("special person") in the surveys. The most common confidante - the person to whom the elderly felt closest - in West Haven was a friend; in Odawara, it was a child (Table 4.4). Conversely, the least common choice among West Haveners was a child; and in Odawara, a spouse. In West Haven, friends were consistently important for all categories of living arrangements, and especially for women and for widows. Spouses, for those who had them, were favored less than relatives, perhaps because they were more easily taken for granted and because confidantes, at least in the United States, require a valued place outside the household. By contrast, the special person in Odawara lived inside the household. Coresident children (especially sons) mattered consistently more than others - spouse, relatives, and friends - especially for women and for widows. The small group of Japanese elderly who lived alone, however, favored their friends over children, and those living with their husband or wife confided more in their spouse than they did in their children or friends.38 37 Both Gans and Johnson observe that Italian Americans are characteristically adultcentered and maintain relatively weak conjugal ties, compared with other ethnic groups; Gans has attributed this pattern to social class, and Johnson to ethnic culture. The strength of husband-wife ties in West Haven on a whole, however, remains remarkably significant especially in cross-national perspective. See Herbert J. Gans, Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian Americans, 229, and Colleen Leahy Johnson, Growing Up and Growing Old in Italian American Families, 46. 38 Surveys conducted by the Japan Management and Coordination Agency also confirm these differences between Japanese and American confidantes at the national level; see Rojin no seikatsu to ishiki: Dai 3 kai kokusai hikaku chosa kekka hokokusho, 35. For further details of interpersonal relationships in Odawara and West Haven, see Akiko Hashimoto, Old People in Japan and America: A Comparative Community Study, and "Rqjin kea no nichibei hikaku"; and Fujisaki Hiroko, "Ronenki no shakaiteki nettowaku."

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Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain Table 4.4. Choice of confidante by living arrangements, sex and marital status in West Haven and Westside Odawara, in % (N)

West Haven Living arrangement** Alone With spouse" With child Total Sex** Men" Women" Total Marital status** Married" Unmarried Total Westside Odawara Living arrangement** Alone With spouse With child Total Sex** Men" Women" Total Marital status** Married" Umarried" Total

Spouse

Child

Relative

Friend

16.7

13.4

20.4

49.5

— 27.4 16.1 16.7(35)

19.0 9.5 16.1 13.9(29)

20.7 21.1 19.6 20.6 (43)

60.3 42.1 48.2 48.8(102)

24.1 9.3 16.7 (36)

9.3 17.6 13.4(29)

20.4 20.4 20.4 (44)

46.3 52.8 49.5 (107)

27.3 — 16.7 (36)

11.4 16.7 13.4(29)

19.7 21.4 20.4 (44)

41.7 61.9 49.5 (107)

13.2

41.2

25.7

19.9

— 36.8 10.4 13.1(17)

33.3 15.8 47.9 41.5(54)

20.0 31.6 24.0 24.6 (32)

46.7 15.8 17.7 20.8 (27)

26.5 5.7 13.2(18)

26.5 49.4 41.2(56)

34.7 20.7 25.7 (35)

12.2 24.1 19.9(27)

26.6 — 12.7(17)

31.3 51.4 41.8(56)

31.3 21.4 26.1 (35)

10.9 27.1 19.4 (26)

Note: Respondents who claimed no confidantes (West Haven 15.6%, Odawara 27.2%) and those who cited "others" (West Haven 0%, Odawara 7.5%) were excluded from this analysis. "Other" category in living arrangements is excluded. Child category includes children-in-law. "Figures do not add up to 100.0 due to rounding. **Chi-square statistics are significant at 0.01 level.

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The Gift of Generations FAMILY AND NETWORK

The different resource networks of West Haven and Odawara are thus evident in comparative perspective. In the American context, children, relatives, friends, and neighbors39 are all essential members of the resource network. There is a greater degree of triangulation of resources in West Haven, extending widely outside the confines of the household. If seeking help can be spread among a wide network of people, then the relative independence of the elderly person at the center of that network can be enhanced as a result. In other words, the extensive network can help to facilitate the autonomy of the elderly in the American context. The network in Odawara, on the other hand, shows a greater concentration of resources in the household. The strength of filial ties is evident in contrast to the weakness of community ties we have observed. If the triangulation of resources in the American network can reduce the dependency of the elderly on each individual in the network, the concentration of resources inside the household in Japan can also intensify the dependency of the elderly on a few, specific individuals. Thus greater independence as an individual can be attained in a triangulated network, yet greater independence as a household unit can be more easily attained in a concentrated network where the boundary of mutual obligations can be more clearly defined. Different boundaries of "self-sufficiency" operate in the two communities around the individual, couple, family, and community, and in this connection we can also point to the weaknesses of the American and Japanese networks. Where a concentration of resources is the norm, as it is in Japan, those with no children or distant children can be vulnerable, because 39 The significance of American neighbors also merits special mention at this point. As Marjorie Cantor has observed, the elderly in American communities receive extensive help from their neighbors, especially when they have no family nearby. Even though many West Haven elderly received support from their children, a large proportion (69.9%) also reached out to their neighbors for instrumental help (e.g., borrowing, shopping, checking mail); a similar proportion of Odawarans (68.5%), by contrast, reported that they never or rarely did so. See Marjorie Cantor, "Neighbors and Friends: An Overlooked Resource in the Informal Support System."

64

Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain there are fewer alternative resources that can substitute for filial relationships. Where a triangulation of network is the norm, as it is in the United States, those who survive spouses and friends and still depend on an increasingly shrinking peer network are likely to be vulnerable. At the same time, the extensive network in West Haven seems more suited to a society that embraces household transitions as a necessary condition of changes in the family cycle. Since "leaving home" is a concomitant of adulthood,40 a shared expectation on the part of both parents and children, individuals and couples form extensive networks outside the household to promote diffused security that does not depend only on children. The filial orientation found in Japan, on the other hand, is conducive to forming a concentrated network focused on coresident children, which promotes structured security inside the household. THE RECOGNITION OF VULNERABILITY

In comparing the objective conditions of household and network compositions in Odawara and West Haven, the different patterns of association inside and outside the household appear evidently enough; understanding the nexus of need, protection, and intervention, however, requires a clarification of how these potential resources among family and friends are converted to actual helping arrangements. Thus, in this section, we will ascertain how much help these family and friends actually gave in the two communities. We will find that the helping practices differ according to the distinct ways in which helpers recognize the vulnerability of individuals who require support. These distinct patterns of recognizing need reveal the different subjective judgments - and criteria of "eligibility" - applied to those deserving help in the private contract. In both communities, the elderly received a great deal of support,41 but the characteristics of those who receive help, compared with those 40 Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life, 57. 41 The informal support index was constructed from responses to three questions regarding financial, instrumental, and emotional support received in the past year. An

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The Gift of Generations who do not, differ. We find that Odawarans take a.protective approach, one in which the elderly receive help in anticipation of need. West Haveners, by contrast, take a contingency approach in which the elderly receive help directly according to need. Thus, Odawarans and West Haveners receive protection and intervention according to different patterns of recognizing vulnerability and criteria of need. In their general profiles - such as age, living arrangement, marital status, gender, employment status, past occupation, education, and length of residence - the elderly who received help were similar to those who did not receive help in both communities (Table 4.5). The significant difference between the West Haven and Odawara receivers of help lies not in these general characteristics, but in their conditions of need: income42 affirmative answer in at least one category classified the respondent as a receiver of informal support for our comparative purpose. In West Haven, 88.9% received at least one type of support, and in Odawara, 73.1%. The higher proportion of support in West Haven compared with that in Odawara can be explained partly by the different notions of support that respondents had in mind. While it is relatively easy to solicit comparable information on instrumental help cross-nationally, the same is not true for emotional and financial help. The Japanese tended not to recognize emotional support as "support," especially when they shared the household with those who provided it. They also tended not to perceive financial help as "help" when it did not come in regular and explicit monetary forms. This is the primary reason I have aggregated and dichotomized the support index, instead of developing the accumulated responses into an ordinal scale index. 42 Income was reported in 6 categories: $0-1,999, $2,000-4,999, $5,000-6,999, $7,000-9,999, $10,000-14,999, and $15,000 and over. Yen equivalents were also reported in 6 categories, using the exchange rate of January 1982 ($1 = ¥250). Although the response categories were comparable in the two samples, the reporting units were not: West Haven respondents reported the couple's income if they were married, but Odawara respondents reported individual income regardless of their marital status. To correct this discrepancy in the two surveys, I calculated the effect of being married on income for the West Haven sample, subtracted it from the original responses, and made separate estimates for male and female respondents. The regression equations that yielded the highest proportions of explained variance included education, employment status, age, disability, and marital status (male: R2 = 0.38, female: R2 = 0.33). The estimation equations for males was: Y = 12,884 + 490*EDUC + 1,334*EMPLOY - 116*AGE - 229* DISABIL + 1,687* MARITAL; and for females: Y =8,583 + 321*EDUC + 2,604*EMPLOY 75*AGE - 1*DISABIL + 2,968*MARITAL. As a result, the incomes of 100 married persons in West Haven were classified downward. Of these, 63 were men and 37 were women. The majority of men (59%) moved down one category while the majority of women (81%) moved down two

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Protection and Intervention in the Private Domain Table 4.5. Receiving at least one type of informal support: Logistic regression estimates

West Haven

Age Living with children Married Female Blue-collar Years local residency Children within city region Close friends within city region Close relatives within city region Close neighbors Income Disability Constant Chi-square d.f. N

Coefficient

(SE)

.02 .76 -1.67 .59 -.70 .01 .38 .22* -.14 .09 -.95* 1.42* 3.91

(.07) (.72) (1.09) (1.00) (.72) (.02) (.34) (.10) (.10) (.14) (.42) (.72) (6.52)

33.49** 12 189

Westside Odawara Coefficient -.07 -.05 .22 .88 -.18 .00 .08 -.17 .02 .06 -.16 -.05 6.55*

(SE) (.04) (.50) (.56) (.61) (.47) (.01) (.17) (.09) (.14) (.09) (.16) (.52) (3.20)

12.69 12 152

*p < 0.05. **/?