The Framework of Operational Warfare (Operational Level of War Series)

THE FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR Edited by Michael Krause, Deputy Chief of US Army C...

Author: Clayton Newell

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THE FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR Edited by Michael Krause, Deputy Chief of US Army Center for Military History, and Andrew Wheatcroft

The Operational Level of War series provides for a theory of armed conflicts in the present and the immediate future. Unlike many theories, it is not rooted in abstractions but the practice of war, both in history and the immediate past. The books in the series all contribute to the clearer understanding of the potentials and the dangers of war in the 1990s. The key contribution of the operational theory of war is to provide a link between strategy and tactics, a connection which is of unique importance in modern warfare. Forthcoming: UNHOLY GRAIL The US and the wars in Vietnam 1965–8 Larry Cable


Clayton R.Newell

London and New York

First published 1991 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 1991 Clayton R.Newell All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Newell, Clayton R. The framework of operational warfare. 1. Warfare I. Title 355.02 ISBN 0-415-05045-6 (Print Edition) Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Newell, Clayton R. The framework of operational warfare/Clayton R.Newell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references Includes index. 1. Operational art (Military science) I. Title. U162.N46 1991 355.02–dc20 90–48001 ISBN 0-415-05045-6 (Print Edition) The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US Government. ISBN 0-203-20492-1 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-20495-6 (Glassbook Format)

To Gwendolyn A true companion and fellow campaigner

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgments

xi xiii

1

THE STUDY OF WAR

1

2

THE PERSPECTIVES OF WAR

13

3

UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION IN WAR

35

4

SETTING OBJECTIVES IN WAR

57

5

CONDUCTING WAR

76

6

SUPPORTING WAR

98

7

CONTROLLING WAR

121

8

THE UTILITY OF WAR

142

9

EPILOGUE

152

Appendix I THE FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

162

Appendix II A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE US ARMY’S FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

168

Notes Bibliography Index

174 179 182

ix

PREFACE

In 1986 the Army published a revised edition of its Field Manual (FM) 100–5, Operations and I was assigned to the faculty of the US Army War College. While these two events are not directly connected to each other except by coincidence, they did eventually lead to this book. The 1986 edition of FM 100–5 introduced the term “operational art” into the US Army’s doctrine, and when I arrived at the War College I learned that operational art was one of the things I would be teaching. Since then I have become increasingly interested in studying operational art, initially in an attempt to stay ahead of the students and later from a desire to better understand war. FM 100–5 defines operational as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” It is one of the three broad divisions of war, strategy and tactics being the other two.1 I have reached the conclusion that while operational art may be new to many students of war, the concept of operational art is not. Although tactics and strategy are more familiar terms which have been used for years to plan and conduct war, they alone are not adequate to explain many of war’s activities. Indeed, as various authors have used modifiers attached to strategy and tactics or even introduced other terms in an effort to explain more clearly their views on war, the concept of operational art as a division of war frequently appears, although not necessarily under that name. Alfred Thayer Mahan refers to “wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy,” which would seem to be something like the FM 100–5 definition of operational art.2 Clausewitz defines strategy as something very much like operational xi


art when he writes that strategy “means the combination of individual engagements to attain the goal of the campaign or war.”3 Jomini divides war into six distinct parts, one of which is “strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.”4 Liddell Hart uses the terms strategy and grand strategy to differentiate between the conduct of campaigns and the conduct of war.5 In this book I have used the term perspective to define the different views of war presented by strategy, operational art, and tactics. Thus operational art is the operational perspective of war. The operational perspective of war cannot, however, be properly studied in isolation from the tactical and strategic perspectives of war. Since this book presents all three perspectives in a five-part framework there is a sort of matrix with the perspectives along one axis and the five parts of the framework on the other. This matrix is not rigid, but extremely flexible in its application to the study of war. Although the lines within the framework are fuzzy and they move up and down and from side to side in order to accommodate war’s many variations, the matrix is a useful tool to study war. The five-part framework I have used in conjunction with the three perspectives of war is really only a very broad interpretation of the five-paragraph format originated by the United States Army almost one hundred years ago. Even that format originated in a single sentence from the 1871 edition of the German Army’s Field Regulations. The five paragraphs are the Situation, Mission, Operations, Service Support, and Command and Control. In the broader application used in this book I have modified the five parts of the framework to situation, objective, conduct, support, and control. Appendix I shows the present detailed format of the five paragraphs and Appendix II includes a brief history of the evolution of the five paragraphs. While I have used the US Army’s FM 100–5 definition of operational art and the five paragraphs as a starting point the discussions and conclusions I have drawn from those discussions are mine alone. They should not in any way be construed to be the views of the United States Army. CRN Baltimore March 1990 xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the result of a number of years of sporadic effort during which I have received encouragement from a number of people. It is, of course, always dangerous to single out any specific names to acknowledge, for two reasons: one is the danger of omitting someone and the other is that the people who do receive mention may not necessarily agree with everything in the book. To the former I apologize, to the latter I assume full responsibility for whatever distortions I may have made in interpreting your ideas. Since I started thinking about the book while at the Army War College I must acknowledge the efforts of Colonels Ralph Allen and Don Lundy to convince the College bureaucracy that I had a contribution to make. Ralph Allen further assisted by reading an early draft of the book, which contributed greatly to its present format. While at the War College I shared an office for about three years with Colonel Dwight “Hooper” Adams, a virtual legend in his own time. We spent considerable time discussing operational art in its various forms over history, and I owe him a great debt for his contribution to my understanding of war. To another War College faculty member, Colonel Art Lykke, must go the credit for the concept of balancing the ends, ways, and means. While he confined the concept to strategy I have stretched it a bit further. In a more general sense I must thank the other two members of the Seminar 13 teaching team, Professor Jay Luvaas and Colonel Len Hardy, for their support. They were instrumental in furthering my education in the study of war and instilling an enthusiasm for teaching in me. Colonel Hal Nelson also provided wise counsel in my occasional lapses of enthusiasm. My thanks also to all the students and faculty I had a chance to meet; I learned something from each of them. xiii


In closing I must acknowledge the influence of the late Colonel Jack Smith in providing the example of what a soldier should be. He was a good friend and leaves an empty spot in many lives. I must also acknowledge the editorial efforts of Moira Taylor and Beth Humphries in guiding me through the production process of making a book. Finally to my wife, Gwendolyn, and the rest of the family must go the highest thanks for putting up with more dinnertime lectures on operational art than any war college student should ever have to tolerate.

xiv

1 THE STUDY OF WAR

War is a matter of ritual importance to the State; the providence of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War Wars have been used to resolve disputes for all of recorded history; they are among the earliest events recorded by historians. Indeed, the major work of Herodotus, “the father of history,” was on the Persian wars, and Thucydides’ narrative of the Peloponnesian War continues to be essential reading for aspiring military historians.2 War has been, and continues to be, a major feature of how the nations of the world interact; it must be studied and understood not only by its practitioners, the military, but by everyone who might be touched by its effects. There are few things which present a greater challenge to a nation’s survival than war, and by the same token there are few things other than war which can unite conflicting political factions within a nation. Wars have built great nations, and wars have destroyed great nations. As nations waged war, man developed the profession of arms to specialize in the conduct of war. Although the conduct of war is generally considered to be the exclusive province of the military, war’s effects will touch the entire nation. War always has national implications; it cannot be isolated from other national undertakings. Whether challenging or unifying a nation, war ultimately demands a high price from its participants. War never provides a cheap solution to a nation’s problems, no matter how isolated the problem or how powerful the nation. The world today is more complex than it has ever been. There are more nations in the international community than at any time 1


in recorded history and their number is still growing. With the worldwide communications systems that cover the globe nations are able to interact on a global basis frequently and rapidly. Not only are there more nations in the world, but the overall world order is changing more rapidly than at any time since the end of the Second World War. The Second World War ended with a world which was essentially bipolar, with an east-west orientation. By the 1950s the two military alliances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the west and the Warsaw Pact in the east dominated discussions of war. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, nominally headed by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, each focused on the other in their study of and preparations for war. Over forty years later, however, as the nations of Eastern Europe begin to seek their own way in the world and move out from under the umbrella of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact will become less of a threat to NATO. As the Eastern European nations begin to rebuild their economies they will have to determine how much they are willing to spend on defense and how closely they want to align with the Warsaw Pact in the future. At the same time the nations of Western Europe will be moving to develop an unprecedented economic unity. While it remains to be seen how these economic developments will affect international relations, it also remains to be seen how they will affect the possibilities of war. Economic reorganization in Europe in a multi-polar world could spawn close economic ties which could virtually eliminate war in Europe; it could also conceivably generate the possibility of intra-European wars as some nations progress faster than others and seek to advance themselves by force. While Europe seeks to develop closer internal economic ties, the Pacific nations, led by Japan, will undoubtedly continue their dramatic economic development. Although Japan presently has virtually no military muscle, there remains the possibility that future economic growth may eventually require development of an increased military element of national power to complement her other elements of national power. China, a potential superpower, has thus far not been a factor in the economic community of nations, although on paper she maintains one of the largest military establishments in the world. It remains to be seen how long China will continue her isolation from the rest of the world, economically or militarily. 2

THE STUDY OF WAR

Historically, strong economic growth has gone hand in hand with a strong military capability. As the economic power of the world shifts and changes so will the military power. The majority of the world’s extant military power presently remains concentrated in and focused on Western Europe in the alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As these two European alliances perceive themselves to be less of a threat to one another they will undoubtedly reduce their military potential in favor of greater economic growth. This reduction in military power in Europe will have the concurrent effect of more evenly distributing military power throughout the world as nations outside the competing east-west oriented spheres of influence continue to maintain and even increase their military forces in hopes of someday attaining more of the world’s wealth. While the reduction of tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and between the United States and the Soviet Union may reduce the probability of a global war, at the same time there will be an increased possibility of small wars between nations trying to improve their lot in the world economic order.3 In spite of the apparent end to the so-called cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union and their European allies, there remains a very great need to study war in the modern world. Indeed, the need may be greater than in the recent past since much of the attention paid to preparing for war has focused on central Europe. With the probability of war in that relatively small area of the world declining, the military forces of nations with world-wide responsibilities will discover that there is an extremely wide variety of geographical and climatic areas of the world where they may have to fight a war under circumstances rather unlike those of central Europe. Wars since the Second World War have generally been small and restricted to a small area of the world. With tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union relaxing it would appear that small wars will continue to characterize the use of military force for the foreseeable future. Just because a war appears small, however, does not mean that it will be simple to plan or conduct. It may even be true that fighting small wars may be more of a challenge for large military forces used to having an abundance of firepower and supply close at hand than it will be for a small military establishment more used to fighting with what they have at hand. As the world changes so will the character of war, and it will require continued study by both military and 3


political leaders to ensure they are aware of the potential risks of using military force to resolve disputes. Studying war should not in any way imply advocating the use of war as a universal method of settling international differences. Rather, studying war may lead nations to consider alternatives to war. Although there is a great deal of truth in the cliché that war is too important to be left to the generals, the generals and admirals, as the senior members of the profession of arms, do have a responsibility to understand war and be able to clearly explain its implications to their political leaders. The political leadership, in their turn, must be willing to heed the advice of their generals and admirals when considering war as a method of settling disputes or attaining national goals. By the same token, the civilian leadership of any nation, no matter how peace-loving, certainly ought not to leave the study of war solely to its military professionals. It is imperative to the future of any nation which maintains any sort of standing armed force that both its civilian and military leadership understand what waging war means to the nation. Although understanding war need not necessarily be difficult, like conducting war, even the simplest aspects of studying war can end up being rather complex. In the case of war, simply finding an acceptable definition can present a bit of a problem. A brief definition of war will tend to oversimplify the phenomenon, while a definition of war which attempts to include all of its many variations will eventually become so complex as to be virtually unintelligible and therefore useless for all practical purposes. On War, a classic work on the theory of war by the nineteenthcentury military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, illustrates this paradox of definitions. On the first page of his lengthy study of war, Clausewitz defines war as “…nothing but a duel on a larger scale.”4 At first glance this is surely a simple definition, but the book goes on for hundreds of pages as Clausewitz elaborates on this apparently simple definition of war. The difficulty with Clausewitz’s concept of war as simply a duel is that it oversimplifies the definition of war at the outset, which then makes his detailed and voluminous explanations appear overly complicated for such an apparently simple idea. Although any definition of war will eventually require considerable explanation to deal with the virtually infinite variations of war, by starting with a rather more comprehensive definition 4

THE STUDY OF WAR

than Clausewitz’s the requisite explanations may not have to appear so complex. According to Robert Leckie, a twentieth-century American military historian, “…war is socially sanctioned armed conflict between hostile groups.”5 Leckie’s definition includes the word hostile, which is certainly a basic characteristic of war, but just as important are the words “sanctioned” and “group”, which make this definition a bit more complex, but at the same time more comprehensive, than that of Clausewitz, where duel implies only one individual on each side. The idea that groups must be willing to sanction hostility toward other groups makes Leckie’s definition of war a great deal more useful as a starting point for understanding war than the implied simplicity of Clausewitz’s duel. Both Leckie and Clausewitz do agree, however, on a fundamental concept of war; it must be two-sided. There must be a group of people who have elected to use force, or at least the threat of force, in an attempt to impose its will on another group of people. The threatened group must then have elected to overtly challenge the threat or actual use of military force with their own use of military force. There must be at least a plausible threat of the use of force on one side and a comparable response from the other side for there to be war. The size of the threat and response does not necessarily determine whether or not there is war, nor does it make a great deal of difference whether or not either side actually admits to being at war. If there is a challenge by force on one side and a response with force on the other side, it is war. Since the world is presently organized into groups of people generally known as nations or states, it is these organizations which usually wage war on one another, either as individual nations or alliances of nations. There may also be groups of people other than the recognized nation states which elect to use force to impose their will. War in the modern world is something of a paradox because while it is historically a fairly common method for organized groups of people to resolve differences, most modern-day nations and other groups of people capable of conducting some form of war will generally claim they really do not want war, but peace. But even while that claim is being made, more of the world’s wealth probably goes into supporting the large number of standing armed forces around the world than into any of man’s other, perhaps more worthwhile, endeavors. So even with no apparent desire for war there is preparation for war. 5


Preparation for something apparently unwanted must necessarily be theoretical, and in the study of war the laboratory becomes the battlefield of past wars, the record of which is military history. Unfortunately, as historians reach into the laboratory of the the past for specimens to study they necessarily provide a sense of order which tends to mask the inherent confusion and chaos of war. The chaos of war, frequently referred to as the fog of war, is now and always has been, a fundamental characteristic of conducting war. This inherent chaotic character is a recurring theme in the literature of war. Memoirs and reminiscences by writers who have experienced war at first hand, whether glorifying war or decrying it, frequently stress the impact the chaos of war had on them.6 One of the goals of using the fruits of modern technology in the conduct of war has been to reduce, or even eliminate, the chaos of war. Ironically, as military scientists have made greater and greater use of the computer to quantify the study of war in their search to penetrate the fog of war, a wide variety of other scientists have also been using the computer to arrive at the conclusion that “chaos seems to be everywhere.”7 The search for order in the universe has been going on for at least as long as man has been waging war. Man began recording the history of war and searching for a universal order at about the same time in history. Aristotle developed his concepts of order in the world over 2,400 years ago, just over a century after Thucydides began the first record of war in his chronicle of the Peloponnesian War. There is something of a common beginning for the study of war and the study of science since Aristotle was the tutor of the first man to conquer large portions of the world by the use of military force, Alexander the Great.8 While it is difficult, if not impossible, for scholars to determine with any degree of certainty just what influence Alexander and Aristotle may have had on each other, the juxtaposition of their lives provides a unique opportunity to examine where the respective studies of science and war have led. Aristotle’s successors have searched the world of science for a universal order only to determine recently that there is an inherent chaos in the universe which cannot be explained by classical mathematical methods. Alexander’s achievements have provided students of war with a classic laboratory specimen of just how much a determined leader could accomplish by military force, and his campaigns have been studied by virtually all of the great captains who succeeded him in the Western world. 6

THE STUDY OF WAR

Even as the study of war since Alexander has become more oriented toward technology to search for order in the chaos of war, Aristotle’s embryonic search for order has resulted in science’s acceptance of chaos. The study of science developed into a search for a universal order about the time one of the students of Alexander’s achievements, Napoleon Bonaparte of France, used military force in an attempt to conquer a large portion of the world. While Napoleon turned his considerable talents to building an empire, a French physicist named Laplace imagined that scientists would eventually develop a mathematical equation which provided a universal order.9 Not unexpectedly, given the intellectual climate of the scientific community’s search for order in the nineteenth century, Napoleon’s campaigns gave rise to a scientific search for order in studying war. A Swiss-born member of the French Army, Baron Jomini, was one of the first military thinkers to look at war scientifically. He studied Napoleon’s methods of war and finally determined that “[w]ar is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art.” Although Jomini is sometimes characterized as seeking to define universal principles of war by which war could be conducted according to a formula, he did qualify his findings by cautioning that applications of his principles depended on the situation or “circumstances of the case.”10 While the search for universal order in science has resulted in a recognition of the existence of a universal chaos, the search for an underlying order in war goes on. But the search for order in war is in vain; chaos is inherent in war, just as science has deduced is the case for chaos in the universe. The proper study of war focuses not on a search for order, but on how to understand its inherent chaos. If war is chaos then the absence of war must logically be order. War is chaos; peace is order. By not waging war nations and other groups of people tacitly accept the order of peace, even though they may not all be happy with the existing order. When the desire for a new or different order becomes great enough, nations or other groups may opt to resort to the chaos of war to change the order of peace. When, however, a nation does resort to the chaos of war to effect a change in the order of things, there is no certainty of just what that new order will look like. That there will be a new order is virtually certain, since the chaos of all wars in history has so far eventually ended in some sort of peaceful order. The difficulty is that the new order which will eventually result from the chaos of war is simply not predictable. 7


As the fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War unfolds it provides a vivid reminder of war’s unpredictability. Hitler, like Napoleon before him, caused Europe to experience years of the chaos of war. Both attempted to use the military power at their disposal to develop a new order of peace in Europe. While both the Second World War and the Napoleonic Wars did result in a rather different order as a result of war’s chaos, neither of the resultant orders resembled anything like what the respective instigators of the chaos had imagined when they began their conquests. Napoleon set out to create a French empire which would dominate Europe, and Hitler dreamed of a “Thousand Year” German Reich and a German-dominated European “New Order.” Even though both warlords were successful in changing the order of Europe, neither of them could possibly have contemplated the results of their efforts, and neither had any hand in building the new order their chaos created. Napoleon contemplated the new order in exile; Hitler took his own life as his dreams of a new order went up in flames.11 After almost fifty years of order and peace in Europe since the end of the chaos of the Second World War it would be difficult to determine the winners and losers of that war based only on contemporary evidence. Although winners and losers may sometimes be self-evident at the cessation of the chaos of war, in the event there is no assurance that one side or the other will attain the new order it seeks. One of war’s fundamental characteristics is that both sides must be capable of at least some freedom of action which will affect the activities of the other side. Much of war’s chaos results from the fact that each participant’s activities will have an effect on the other participants. Since the intent of war is to force a new order on a nation or a group of people which resist that new order by force of their own, chaos becomes the predictable result. Characterizing war as chaos does not mean that there will be no constraints on its conduct. In the Second World War, for example, the conflict was global, and hostile groups of states waged concurrent wars on each other to the utmost of their national capabilities with apparently no restraint on the use of military force. In reality, however, there were a variety of constraints on both sides which limited their use of military force. Both sides, for example, honored diplomatic constraints in the recognition of selected neutral states in that global conflict, and psychological or cultural constraints prevented extensive use of chemical weapons by any of the participants. All participants also had economic constraints imposed 8

THE STUDY OF WAR

on them by such factors as geographic location and climate, which influenced the availability of essential natural resources for weapons manufacturing and food to feed and maintain not only the armed forces, but the civilian populations as well. War, even though it invokes chaos on a global scale, will virtually always have constraints, either voluntary or involuntary, placed on the activities of the opposing hostile groups. Having characterized war as chaos does not negate the necessity of studying war. It could be construed as a paradox of war that within its chaos there can be order. Building a theoretical order to war allows a systematic approach to its study. The paradox is that no matter how orderly a theory of war becomes, the actual practice of war will always be chaos. Arranging knowledge about a subject into some sort of order or framework can be construed to be a theory. Arranging facts and principles which apply to war into a logical order provides a convenient method of studying and understanding war. If the theoretical arrangement is to have any real meaning, however, it must apply to war in all of its myriad forms. Man’s fertile imagination has developed a wide variety of ways to wage war, all of which must be considered in any sort of useful theoretical framework. There are five basic questions which must be asked about any war: What is the situation surrounding the war? What is the object of the war? How to conduct the war? How to support the war? How to control the war? These five questions constitute a relatively simple, yet comprehensive, framework for studying, planning, and conducting war; when asked in the past tense they provide an analysis of past wars, when asked in the future tense they will provide a guide to preparing for war, and when asked in the present tense they can guide the actual conduct of war.12 War, whether one is studying it, planning it, or conducting it, can be viewed from three different perspectives, each of which can provide a significantly different picture to the viewer. The five question framework applies to each of the three perspectives of strategy, operations, and tactics. The strategic perspective of war provides a view of the nation at war, using all of its capabilities in coordination to attain national goals by the use of force. This perspective includes not only the military element of national power, but also any other element of national power a nation or group of people has at its disposal. These elements of power include, but are not limited to, the diplomatic, economic, technological and 9


military. Since all of these elements contribute to the attainment of national goals the strategic perspective of war must consider each one of them. Perhaps the best contemporary example is the world’s reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The result was a global effort of national strategies of many nations generally coordinated by the United Nations of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, technological isolation, and direct military pressure to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. National strategy is the conduct of war by the national leadership of a country. It consists of developing and using the military, political, economic, psychological, technological, and other elements of national power during both peace and war to attain desired national goals. Although the elements of national power are applied by the national leadership to attain national goals, the national leadership must have popular support for the expenditure of national treasure and, in the case of the military element of power, lives. Gaining and maintaining popular support for the conduct of a war is a key element of national power. Military force is but one of the elements of national power available to a state to pursue its policy goals, and it should not be planned or used in isolation from other elements of national power. Military strategy, one part of national strategy, consists of planning and conducting war by the employment of the armed forces of a nation to secure strategic military objectives which support national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force. The operational perspective of war, perhaps the most critical perspective of war to understand, concentrates on coordinating the activities of the military element of national power to attain those national goals directly attainable by military force. This perspective of war is the essential link between the desired new order seen from the strategic perspective and the chaos of war seen from the tactical perspective of war. The tactical perspective is the domain of the military. This perspective focuses on using military force to attain military objectives which will contribute to the nation’s desired new order. Although the five-question framework applies to each perspective, the answers to the question may well vary depending on the perspective.13 As with most any endeavor the logical first question to ask about studying, planning, or conducting wars is about the situation. The war under consideration whether past, present, or future must be put into appropriate context. Political leaders charged with the 10

THE STUDY OF WAR

responsibility for making the decisions to wage war and the military commanders who plan and conduct war must know and understand to the best of their ability what is going on around them and how those activities will affect the contemplated military actions. A clear analysis of the situation is the first step in planning and conducting war. Analysing the situation in war, however, largely depends on the perspective from which one views war. The situation from any of the perspectives will change during the course of the war as the order of peace succumbs to the chaos of war. Understanding the view of war from any of its three perspectives begins with an analysis of the situation. After understanding the situation, the next question to answer from each perspective is what to accomplish by the war. Attaining the desired new order in war is essentially a matter of balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. The new order which would ideally emerge from the chaos of war is the desired end; it becomes the objective of war. Any military action must have a clear and militarily achievable objective. This objective must be clearly identified to the military force. The objective may be relatively imprecise from the strategic perspective of war, but it must be crystal clear when viewed from the tactical perspective. The military commanders who view war from the operational perspective play a critical role in establishing militarily achievable goals. After analysing, and hopefully understanding, the situation and establishing appropriate military objectives, the next question to answer is how to conduct the war. The conduct of war constitutes the methods of balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. Each of the three perspectives of war has a different view of conducting war: the strategic perspective sees the entire war; the operational perspective sees one or more campaigns within the war; and the tactical perspective sees one or more battles within the context of a campaign. From each perspective the desired ends must be balanced with the way the war, campaign, or battle can be conducted. Concurrent with studying the ways of conducting war in a specific situation to attain a specific desired end, the means of war must be considered. In balancing the ends, ways, and means of war the available means will generally determine what can and, perhaps even more importantly, what cannot be accomplished. Success in war depends primarily on how well military leaders and commanders can balance the ends, ways, and means of war. Selection of desired ends which are beyond the capability of the means 11


available could result in a new order unfavorable to both sides after the chaos of war. Balancing the ends, ways, and means is critical before deciding to endure the chaos of war to seek a new order, and maintaining an appropriate balance during the actual conduct of war is the responsibility of military leaders and commanders at all perspectives of war. The final question to answer is how to maintain control over the chaos of war. Maintaining an appropriate balance of the ends, ways, and means of war requires a method or system of control. Clear, logical command and control of military forces is essential not only to success: clearly defined command lines provide the essential order required to actually conduct war. The chaos of war cannot be eliminated, but it must be controlled if the war is to result in a favorable new order. Success in war depends simply on balancing the ends, ways, and means of war from each of the three perspectives of war. Because war is inherently chaotic, however, any orderly method of maintaining that balance will be the first victim of war. War’s apparently endless variations make it a subject in which more understanding leads to the necessity for more study. Since any war in the modern world could conceivably lead not only to a new world order, but to the end of mankind, there is no such thing as too much study of war. Indeed, given war’s inherent unpredictability, perhaps the best time to re-emphasize the study of war is when the probability of war appears low.

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2 THE PERSPECTIVES OF WAR

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. Clausewitz, On War War is a paradox; it is both simple and complex. It is simple when a nation uses war to attain clear objectives with only a small loss of life and treasure. But in reality war will always be complex because it is inherently unpredictable and its basic characteristic is chaos. Unfortunately the historical record of warfare generally presents an orderly picture of war since, to make any sense at all of what happened in past wars, historians must necessarily record war’s chaos in an orderly fashion. The orderly record of war tends to mask the chaos and confusion which invariably accompanies the conduct of war. Relying solely on an historical record which portrays battles, campaigns, and wars as a series of neat red and blue lines and boxes on a map which in many cases may not have even existed at the time of the conflict is not enough to understand war. Understanding war means understanding its inherent chaos. From the earliest history of war man has tried to reduce its chaos to manageable proportions. Virtually every effort to reduce the chaos of war has involved an organizational or technological change or a combination of the two. Even when armies consisted simply of dismounted warriors armed with only one or two types of weapon it became necessary to impose some sort of organization on the conduct of war. The Greek phalanx was one of the earliest organizational systems for dealing with the chaos of war.1 Because the warriors or hoplites of early Greece were essentially militia they needed a relatively simple method of reducing the chaos of war. So rather than the hoplites wandering about on the battlefield 13


doing battle on an individual basis in a series of duels they formed into a disciplined phalanx of ranks and files standing shoulder to shoulder to face the enemy. This formation provided a number of advantages over the individual duels and made the chaos of war more manageable, since the phalanx was trained to move as a unit. Although by modern standards the Greek phalanx appears to be a rather simple, even crude, organization for waging war, in its time it was a very sophisticated approach. Even the simplest phalanx was a complex system of people and equipment working in close concert and, over time, experience in organization and advances in technology combined to increase its complexity. The earliest phalanx, for example, had little or no capability to maneuver since it was simply a large block of warriors packed tightly together, so, as a result of experience in war, the earliest changes were probably organizational, made to increase the flexibility of the phalanx on the battlefield. Subdividing the phalanx into smaller elements enabled it to respond to threats to its flanks by facing parts of the phalanx in different directions as necessary. While experience changed the organization of the phalanx to provide more flexibility on the battlefield, technology also forced changes in the conduct of war. Missiles in the form of arrows, slings, and javelins increased the chaos of ancient warfare, which then spurred further organizational changes. From the Greek phalanx centuries of experience in war and advances in technology have combined to produce modern armed forces with their innumerable organizations of people and equipment all of which have been designed to cope with the chaos of war. While changes in organization and advances in technology have continued to reduce the chaos, they have also made war more complex. It is one of war’s many paradoxes that attempts to reduce chaos in war generally also make war more complex. In a Greek phalanx virtually all the hoplites shared the same perspective of war. Initially the phalanx had little or no capability to maneuver, so once battle was joined the leader simply fought alongside his troops, setting an example. Tactics were nonexistent so the perspective of war for leaders and followers was essentially the same: fight until one side or the other quit the field. As experience and technology made war more complex the perspectives of war of both warriors and leaders began to change; leaders had to take a wider view. The perspective of the warrior was simply to fight, while the perspective of the leader had to 14


include such things as where to fight, when to fight, and even how to fight. Eventually, as organizational and technological changes combined to increase war’s complexity, professional warriors and leaders appeared. These professionals developed a rather narrow perspective which concentrated on how best to use military force to attain specific objectives. As war continued to grow more complex so did the societies which used war to attain their goals, and the leaders of these societies took a wider perspective than the professional soldiers. For the first few thousand years of organized warfare there were two general perspectives, the tactical perspective of the professional warrior and the strategic view of the leaders of the various societies as they evolved into today’s nation state. The tactical and strategic perspectives of war evolved slowly and it is not always clear where one left off and the other began, especially when the leaders of the military and leaders of society were the same. While it is certainly an oversimplification of history to cover centuries of evolution of warfare in one or two sentences, it is also true that until recently the study and conduct of war had but two categories, tactics and strategy.2 The complexity of modern warfare, however, requires a third perspective of war. The operational perspective of war, which fits between the tactical perspective and the strategic perspective, probably has its origins somewhere in the eighteenth century, but since it overlaps both the strategic and tactical perspectives it is no easier to determine exactly when it appeared than it is to determine exactly when tactics and strategy became separate perspectives. Napoleon Bonaparte may have been the originator of the operational perspective of war, although the term did not appear until well after the Napoleonic Wars. The concept first appears in the twentieth century in Soviet literature as operational art, an idea Soviet writers trace to the imperial Russian Army. The United States Army spurred the most recent interest in the operational perspective of war when it published its Field Manual 100–5, Operations which included an operational level in its three levels of war. Even though it is all but impossible to credit a single nation or individual with developing this perspective, it is clear that there came a point in the evolution of war when the long-serving perspectives of tactics and strategy simply proved inadequate. Centuries of changes in organization and technology finally made war too complex for its chaos to be managed by only two perspectives. The lines between the present 15


three perspectives, however, are no clearer than they were when there were only two.3 Modern war presents a rather different picture from each of its three perspectives. Each of these pictures must be studied both independently and in conjunction with one another. Concentrating on one perspective of war to the exclusion of the other two, while certainly simplifying the study of war, will not lead to an understanding of war. Only by understanding each of the perspectives and how they interact with each other is it possible to understand why war is both simple and complex. In reality war is always chaos, but by understanding some sort of theoretical basis of what happens in war, it is possible to bring some order out of it. No matter how orderly the study of war becomes, however, there are no sure things when nations turn to war to settle arguments. Each perspective has distinctive characteristics which separate it from the other two. The three perspectives of war, tactical, operational, and strategic, each present a different view of war, and the activities of war will vary according to the perspective from which it is viewed. The three perspectives will always be present, regardless of the size of a war. In very small wars the perspectives may be so converged that they may not be readily apparent, but they will be there. Recognizing the three perspectives and the different views of war they present is the first step to understanding war. The operational perspective, the newest of the three perspectives of war, originated with land warfare. While armies tend to explain the operational perspective of war in terms applicable primarily to ground warfare, relevance to air and sea warfare must also be considered. In this age of modern joint and combined warfare where air, sea, and ground forces must cooperate, any useful theory of war must include all elements of the armed forces of a nation.4 A proper explanation of the operational perspective, which includes air and sea warfare, is that it must concentrate on attaining strategic objectives. Although this explanation suffices to explain the operational perspective of war, it assumes that there is a common understanding of the strategic and tactical perspectives. Unfortunately that may not necessarily always be the case. Simply by viewing war from three, rather than two, perspectives will confuse the meanings of the traditional terms of strategy and tactics. Attempts to precisely define each of the three perspectives of war usually end up as descriptions or comparisons of one with the 16


other rather than concise definitions which stand alone and make sense. While the meanings of tactics and strategy have a variety of long-standing definitions and are generally fairly well understood the apparent clarity of those definitions produces something of a problem in defining the operational perspective of war. The problem is that the long-standing acceptance of strategy and tactics may create the impression that the operational perspective of war unnecessarily intrudes into the traditional, well established order of the two traditional perspectives, strategic and tactical. Even though the origins of the operational perspective can be traced to the eighteenth century, it remains a new idea in warfare when compared to the hundreds of years of warfare which have been studied from only the two perspectives of strategy and tactics. If there is indeed any validity to viewing and studying war from three perspectives then the operational perspective should be readily apparent. Rather than forcing the operational level of war between the strategic and tactical perspectives, a more useful, or at least more rational, approach must be to define all three perspectives in terms appropriate to the planning and conduct of war in general. The differences between the three perspectives become a bit clearer when it is understood that they will necessarily overlap. Indeed, in order to adapt to the chaos of war the three perspectives must be flexible and work together. Trying to keep them completely separate implies a rigid structure or framework to war which is simply nonexistent. While there is a framework which can be used to study war, it is a flexible framework and adapts to the virtually infinite and unpredictable forms war can take. War will always be unpredictable, but just as science is recognizing that there is order in chaos, it is possible to find order in the chaos of war. Recognizing that chaos in war is inevitable and that there are different perspectives of war which may present different and even contradictory views of that chaos is the first step to understanding war and bringing order to its chaos. The inherent chaos of war is virtually unintelligible unless the viewer can begin to separate it into the three different perspectives. In fact the chaos of war can actually be exacerbated if the viewer does not understand that there are three perspectives of war. If, for example, the viewer is actually viewing war from a strategic perspective but tries to apply tactical solutions to strategic problems those solutions may well exacerbate the chaos of war rather than making it more orderly. 17


In recent years the study of war has so concentrated on the operational perspective of war that this perspective seems to have virtually dominated the modern literature of war. Indeed the recent interest in the operational perspective has triggered renewed effort in the entire study of war. Simply trying to deal with three perspectives rather than two makes the study more complex, however, and there has yet to be universal acceptance of the concept of three perspectives of war. Properly viewed, the three perspectives become virtually self evident, and they actually simplify rather than complicate the study and understanding of war. Each perspective is essential in planning and conducting war, although the operational perspective, with its central position in this theoretical hierarchy, is perhaps the most critical. Understanding the operational perspective, however, first requires understanding the tactical and strategic perspectives of war. While the conduct of war has always been both complex and chaotic, modern warfare, with its increasing emphasis on high technology solutions, has become virtually impossible to understand without distinguishing between these three perspectives and understanding how they interact. The operational perspective of war is the essential link between the strategic and tactical perspectives. The strategic perspective provides the widest view, and includes all the elements of national power at the highest level of planning and conducting war, while at the lowest levels of execution the tactical perspective provides the narrowest view of war as it concentrates on the direct application of military power. Between the narrow tactical perspective and the broad strategic perspective lies the operational perspective. Military commanders viewing war from the operational perspective must take broad direction from the national political and military leadership with its strategic perspective of war and translate that broad direction into the specific military action to be taken by commanders with a tactical perspective of war. Each view must complement the other two. Taken separately, any one perspective will provide a deceptively simple view of war. In relative terms the tactical perspective is the simplest. The view from each perspective becomes more complex as one moves from the tactical through the operational to the strategic perspective. Seen from the tactical perspective success in war simply equates to survival on the battlefield. But since that survival is itself very 18


complex, it points out that since the tactical perspective is the simplest of the three, the whole of war is extraordinarily complex. The point is not to underestimate the tactical difficulties of war, but to understand that tactical solutions do not directly apply to the problems of war as viewed from the operational or strategic perspectives. The relative simplicity of the tactical perspective can be seen as two companies of tanks, for example, fighting each other for a piece of terrain. One company wins by retaining the disputed terrain while the other loses by retiring from the field, all of which produces a fairly simple view of war. While the tactical perspective may be the simplest, it is also the most obviously chaotic. One of the paradoxes of war is that as the perspective of war becomes more complex the chaos seen from that perspective apparently diminishes. From the operational perspective the view becomes more complex even as the chaos becomes less apparent. The operational view of war may be that of a military commander-in-chief of a vast air and amphibious armada who must move that force across hostile seas ultimately to invade an enemy’s homeland. This is not a simple task, and it cannot be accomplished without understanding the complexities of the relatively simple tactical perspective of war. Indeed, the operational perspective becomes understandable only after mastery of war from the tactical perspective. While the operational perspective of war is more complex than the tactical perspective it will actually appear more orderly as the military commanders and staffs plan and conduct their campaigns rather well removed from the chaos of the tactical perspective. Finally, from the very complex strategic perspective of war, heads of states must deal with things such as balancing the requirements for the conduct of war with the domestic requirements of trying to keep a nation fed. Ironically, the leadership which views war from this most complex perspective frequently has little or no idea of how complex and chaotic the tactical and operational perspectives of war really are. Planning and conducting war from the operational perspective usually comes as a result of success from the tactical perspective, but the responsibility of planning and conducting war from the strategic perspective is but one of a myriad of responsibilities that senior national leaders acquire upon their assumption of office. It is incumbent, therefore, on the senior military leadership of a nation to understand all the perspectives of war, how they relate 19


to one another, and be able to explain that simply to the national political leadership. One of war’s larger paradoxes is that success in modern war may well depend on the professional military leadership of a nation being able to explain the complex strategic perspective of war in terms simple enough for the comparative military amateurs who lead today’s modern nations to understand. Before the advent of today’s modern world-wide communications the national leadership sent armed forces on campaign and then awaited the results, or they had some personal experience of the conduct of war and assumed direct command of their military forces and actually conducted the campaign. On the one hand it may be an advantage for modern civilian strategic leadership to be unburdened by having had the personal experience of the chaos of war to influence decisions. On the other hand, however, trying to explain why the actual results of war will virtually always be at least somewhat different than expected becomes more difficult since war’s chaos is generally far removed from strategic planning and conduct. Concentrating on one perspective of war at the expense of the other two will produce an oversimplified and distorted view. Just as a three-legged stool provides a solid seat when all three legs are even, understanding these three perspectives, their basic differences, and how they interact will provide a firm foundation for explaining the complexities and chaos of modern war. If, however, one of the legs of this theoretical stool is shortened, the seat becomes more precarious. So too will a nation’s success in war, unless the study of war includes all three perspectives. In a general sense, military commanders who have a tactical perspective fight, military commanders with an operational perspective define where and how to fight, and national political leaders and military commanders with their strategic perspective decide whether or not to fight. There is, however, no clear distinction between these three perspectives. The distinct possibility of self-destruction applies not only to the superpowers’ use of nuclear weapons, but to smaller countries which arm themselves with the very latest in conventional weaponry. The proliferation of modern conventional weaponry around the world makes so-called small wars very dangerous indeed to the participants. Border disputes between the countries of Chad and Libya, for example, may be essentially insignificant to the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, but to the 20


participants they are a matter of survival as a state. The size and importance of a specific war will be relative. A small nation’s national goals for which it wages war may appear insignificant in the view of a global power. Indeed, as the nations of the world grow closer to being able to destroy themselves, to say nothing of the entire world, with their military power the voluntary constraints on the application of military power become ever more important. One way to look at the variety of ways military force can be used to attain national goals is by using a spectrum which has a low application of military power at one end and global nuclear war, which is a virtually total application of military power, at the other. This so-called spectrum of conflict portrays warfare as ranging from low intensity at one end to high intensity at the other. Lowintensity conflict has a relatively low use of military power as nations vie with one another to attain conflicting national goals. Although the use of military force may be low on the low-intensity end of the spectrum, it does not mean that when combat occurs between military forces it is not violent and chaotic. The conduct of war from the tactical perspective is distinguished by chaos no matter where it may be on the spectrum of conflict. Moving along the spectrum to mid-intensity conflict brings what might be described as classical or traditional warfare into view, where organized military forces confront each other in relatively well-defined and organized theaters of operations. It can include the use of air, ground, and sea forces. The Second World War, the Korean War, the continuing series of Arab-Israeli wars, and the lengthy Iran-Iraq War, are all examples of the wide variety of forms mid-intensity conflict can take in modern warfare. At the upper end of the spectrum is high-intensity conflict. Depending on exactly how it is defined, high-intensity conflict may be in reality simply a theoretical form of warfare. Here the military element of national power dominates virtually everything else. If high-intensity conflict implies that there are no constraints on the use of force, then its use in the twentieth century could well be the end of the world. That possibility itself places enough constraint on high-intensity warfare to make it rather implausible, if not impossible. The paradox of theory virtually constraining reality is the result of nuclear weapons. If war is to have any rational meaning then the order that results from its chaos must present an advantage to one side or the other. The only result of the chaos which will result from the widespread use of nuclear weapons may be continued 21


chaos, which has no advantage to either side. Nuclear weapons present a further paradox in that nations do not feel secure unless they actively continue to develop them and plan for their use in order to provide some form of insurance that they will not be used. As long as there is no clear and obvious advantage to using nuclear weapons it is highly improbable that they will ever be used. An exception to this could be terrorism, a form of warfare which is ironically at the low intensity end of the spectrum of conflict. Nuclear warfare is the subject of much debate, but that debate is largely theoretical since there is only one example of nuclear weapons actually being used in war. The United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in an effort to bring the Second World War to an end without having to invade the home islands of Japan. Another form of warfare which is also the subject of much debate is terrorism. Unlike nuclear warfare terrorism is replete with examples. Acts of terrorism are isolated and unpredictable; they are unpredictable in where they will occur, when they will occur, and unpredictable in their results. Terrorism faces the same unpredictability as any other form of warfare. When the terrorist hijacks an aircraft or a ship it is unpredictable whether the act will engender world sympathy or world condemnation. It is both ironic and paradoxical that the one use of nuclear weapons in war represents both ends of the spectrum of conflict. The American use of its brand new atomic bombs in the Second World War was certainly a form of high-intensity conflict since the new weapons so completely devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it was also a form of terrorism since the early end of the war depended on the Japanese government reacting with such a strong emotional reaction of fear that it would surrender immediately. Nuclear weapons and terrorism share an emotional reaction; both cause a higher emotional reaction against their use than do the so-called conventional forms of warfare. The conventional or more familiar face of war is two regular or at least semi-regular military forces facing each other on a reasonably well defined battlefield. Recent examples of conventional war around the world can be found in abundance: in the Middle East Israel and various Arab countries periodically wage conventional war, Iran and Iraq spent eight years waging a conventional war (although Iraq did use chemical weapons) with their respective armies and air forces confined to a fairly restricted theater of operations, and even the Soviet and American experiences against guerrilla forces in 22


Afghanistan and Vietnam respectively were pretty much conventional, mid-intensity conventional conflicts, at least as they were fought by the superpowers. In Vietnam and Afghanistan the ultimate victors used low-intensity conflict to eventually wear down the will of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively until they withdrew their forces and simply left the field to their opponents. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was conventional warfare, and at least up to the time of writing the military build-up and confrontation between Iraq and the combined military forces of various members of the United Nations, remained conventional. That confrontation, however, has the potential to include the use of chemical or even nuclear weapons, since Iraq does have a record of using chemical weapons in its war with Iran and may even have a small nuclear arsenal. Moving away from the center of the spectrum of conflict toward either nuclear weapons at the high-intensity end or terrorism at the low-intensity end apparently brings out feelings alien to the sense of fair play which somehow clings to the conduct of war in the Western world. Both nuclear weapons and terrorism are apparently perceived as something improper in warfare. Both, however, are realities of the late twentieth century. Modern technology has produced the power to literally destroy the world, and it has also produced the capability for apparently random acts of terrorism to be woven into the fabric of the strategic perspective of war for those nations which are willing to risk the condemnation of the world in order to attempt to enforce their policies and attain their national goals through the use of terrorism. The spectrum of conflict may eventually become a circle if an act of terrorism uses a nuclear weapon, a possibility which looms larger as the capability for nations to produce nuclear weapons continues to increase throughout the world. Any decision to use nuclear weapons or terrorism from the strategic perspective of war has stronger implications for the operational and tactical perspectives than decisions regarding midintensity conventional warfare. For the more familiar forms of midintensity conventional warfare the three perspectives of war can be separated fairly easily, although the lines between them will always be somewhat blurred. With nuclear weapons and terrorism, however, decisions which might be considered more appropriate for military commanders with a tactical or operational perspective might well be made from the strategic perspective. The employment 23


of nuclear weapons, like the employment of a terrorist attack, will generally be against a specific target selected from the strategic perspective of war to attain a national goal. For both terrorism and nuclear weapons the means of actually applying the military element of national power will probably be by other than conventional military professionals. In the case of terrorism it will be very highly motivated individuals or small groups of individuals who will carry with them the resources available to modern conventional military forces and who will be in extremely close contact with the strategic target. In the case of nuclear weapons it will be highly trained technicians who will prepare and employ the weapons at great distances from the actual target. Even though the tactical perspective of war for terrorism may be extremely close to the strategic target, while the tactical perspective of war for nuclear weapons could be thousands of miles from the strategic target, terrorism and nuclear weapons have the common characteristic that the three perspectives of war will be compressed when they are employed. Generally war cannot be an effective method of gaining national goals unless a nation effectively coordinates all of its elements of national power. Exceptions to this general rule may find large, powerful nations waging war against a significantly smaller nation. Although even when the comparisons are extremely lopsided, failing to take into consideration the effects of all the elements of national power may lead to unexpected results. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have learned in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively that overwhelming military power by itself is simply not enough to achieve national goals. The elements of national power include, but are not necessarily limited to, military, economic, diplomatic, psychological, and technological capabilities. Each of these elements of national power can contribute both directly and indirectly to the ability of a nation (or other political group) to wage war. Resorting to war to achieve national goals does not automatically subordinate the other elements of national power to the military element of power. The national leadership of a country, in deciding to resort to war, must select exactly which of its national goals are to be achieved by the use or threat of use of military force and coordinate all of the elements of national power toward achieving those goals. War waged with little or no idea of the precise goals to be attained can rapidly deteriorate into an exercise in futility as nations expend lives and treasure for no apparent reason. In his rather complex 24


explanation of his simple definition of war Clausewitz warned against going to war without knowing the objective. Although it may seem to be self-evident that nations would not go to war, much less drag it on and on, unless there was a good reason for that war which could be expressed clearly, it is not at all unusual for wars to go on at great length with one or even both sides confused about what the war was all about. The American experience in Vietnam is a case in point. Years after the war participants and analysts still debate why the United States fought that war. While it is apparently not at all clear why the war was fought from the American point of view, North Vietnam apparently knew all along exactly why it was fighting its war and did coordinate its elements of national power to good effect. Perhaps in this example national patience would have to be included as one of North Vietnam’s elements of national power.5 The ultimate object of war is for one nation to compel another nation to do its will by the use of military power. Since war is inherently chaotic, the successful way to compel another nation to do something it does not want to do by the use of military power is to use simple plans. Complex plans may look good on paper, and they may even go well in rehearsal in the absence of any opposition, but they generally only compound the already chaotic nature of war. Two inherent elements of war make the object of compelling another nation to do something by force difficult no matter how good the military forces employed or how simple their plans. First, the results of war are always unpredictable, and second, opposing military forces will take actions to prevent accomplishment of the plan. Planning to wage war without considering the opponent’s potential means planning in vain. War’s greatest danger may not be the death and destruction it necessarily brings in attempting to achieve national goals by force, but that it will become an end in itself, subject to emotion rather than rational and logical decisions. Decisions to start wars in the first place, and then to continue them, should always be based on a rational analysis of the national resources available. Ideally, the leadership which views war from the strategic perspective will give some consideration to how much treasure and how many lives the nation will invest before determining the desired national goal is not worth the cost. Because there is virtually no way to determine the ultimate order which will come out of the chaos of war (reviewing the winners and losers in the Second World 25


War fifty years after the war is a case in point), using military force to attain national goals is always a dangerous decision. Even in its results war can present a paradox. Germany and Japan, for example, both relied almost solely on their military power to achieve national goals in the Second World War and failed dramatically. Neither country considered that the costs had risen too high even when it became apparent that the goals were far beyond attainment from any of the three perspectives of war. Fifty years after that war, however, both of those countries, the obvious losers, are stronger in terms of the non-military elements of national power than they ever were before the war. All nations have national goals. A nation strives to achieve these by using all its national elements of power in concert. Not all nations or groups will have the capability to influence their opponents with each one of its elements of national power, and not all nations will necessarily have the same elements of national power. The number of nations in the world with the capability to bring all elements of national power to bear in attaining national goals is actually relatively small. In the present world order virtually no nation has the capability to exert all its national power unilaterally. In the absence of a full complement of national elements of power, one of the quickest ways for a nation to achieve dominance over a neighbor or region of the world is to develop a large and powerful military element of power, often at the expense of other potential elements of national power. Although military force remains a viable element of national power, it is not a panacea to difficult foreign policy questions. Military power should not simply be used as a last resort of national policy when all else has already failed or when using another element may take too long. Even the threat of the use of military power must always be a reasoned decision made only after a clear analysis of the entire situation, and it should be used only in concert with all the other elements of national power. Relying solely on the use of military force to the exclusion of other elements of national power will almost certainly result in failure. Even at best a successful use of military power may bring unexpected results. When Argentina used military force in an attempt to take the Malvinas Islands from Great Britain in 1982 the occupation by military force was initially a success, but the British response was apparently unexpected. The Argentine national leadership, in not fully exploring the situation, apparently did not consider that the British would respond to the challenge of military force with 26


military force of its own to achieve its national goal of keeping the islands. Unlike the Argentine national leadership, the British leadership, although initially surprised, balanced its elements of national power, focused them on a specific objective, and ultimately prevailed by using its military power in conjunction with the other elements of national power available. The conduct of war is really simply a matter of balancing the ends, ways, and means: national goals are the ends; national resources are the means; and the methods of applying the resources to achieve the goals are the ways. War is but one way to achieve national goals, and the decision to wage war should always be based on the same sort of analysis that goes into the use of any other elements of power. The decision to resort to war should be based on a rational analysis of the ends, ways, and means of all the elements of national power and their relationship to the military element. Although war, by definition, is unpredictable, the opponent will strive to upset any rational planning, this does not lessen the necessity for rational decision making from each of the three perspectives of war. Another of war’s paradoxes is that the order demanded by detailed planning must always consider the chaos of having that detailed planning disrupted by the enemy. Detailed planning cannot of itself impose order on the conduct of war, but it can reduce the impact of the chaos. If a nation’s leadership properly wages war then it will calculate the ends, ways, and means from the strategic perspective. There will be a calculated point at which the nation should consider ending the war. This point could be the achievement of a specific aim or when the cost, measured in terms of lives and national treasure, exceeds the value of the desired national objective. War’s unpredictable nature may ruin even the most careful planning. War must have passion. It simply cannot be waged without passion since that is what ultimately drives the fighting at the tactical perspective of war. But too much passion at the operational or strategic perspectives could well overwhelm the rational planning which goes into balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. The military leadership from any of the three perspectives must understand the necessity for striking a balance between the passion needed to instill the will to fight in the chaos of the tactical perspective of war and the need for objective decision making in the conduct of the war from its higher perspectives. A further paradox is the requirement for objectivity in balancing the ends, ways, and means even while fighting with the passion 27


required to cope with the chaos of war. When to stop the war while ahead is part of the analysis of the situation before starting the war. Presumably a nation begins a war with great hopes of success, but passion feeds on success. Passion can overrule rational planning until the war gets so far out of control that it is waged just to gain more success. Conversely initial failure in war can also inflame passion to continue the war until there is at least some success. The chaos of war can grow more insidious the longer the war drags on, as both sides succumb to the passion of waging war simply for the sake of waging war. War is appropriately considered both an art and a science. The art of war deals with passion and chaos; the science of war deals with rational planning and maintaining order. This makes developing a useful, or even reasonably understandable theory or framework of war difficult. If, however, the armed forces of a nation or coalition of nations do not share some sort of theory of war then the communications for planning and conducting war may well be so garbled that success cannot be achieved or in some cases even recognized when it does come. A theory of war need not be complex, but there must be some method of ensuring that those involved with planning and conducting war really do understand one another. War is more than the apparent order which results from the quantitative analysis of the size of the armed forces, the cost of the defense budget, or performance figures on battlefield machinery so appealing to practical and scientific minds that want precise plans to be executed flawlessly. It is also more than a rather abstract set of principles which apparently appeals to military artists who are willing to simply make up plans as they wander their way into and along war’s deadly pathways. The study of war is a balance between order and chaos. There cannot be one without the other. The science of war is rational and works to bring order to the planning and conduct of war, while the art of war is intuitive and reacts to the chaos of war. It requires both the order of science and the intuition of art to bring order out of war’s chaos. Many, perhaps most, military professionals have a practical approach to the planning and conduct of war. They simply want to get the job done without wasting a lot of time on theory. The general desire of most military professionals is to concentrate on things practical, not theoretical. The so-called military mind apparently craves order even though the essence of war is chaos. 28


As computers and quantitative analysis have come to dominate planning for wars, military scientists increasingly look to mathematical models and sophisticated computers to validate their ideas and plans, a very orderly approach to war. In some instances these computer models of war are called upon to validate the doctrine or the methods by which a country plans to actually fight its wars. Doctrine, like history, has the potential to mask the chaos of war by presenting an unrealistic order to the battlefield in order to make the doctrine work. The apparent order presented in doctrine, however, should be treated with caution. Doctrine prepared in the relative order of peacetime war games may not stand up to the unpredictable chaos of actually conducting war. While the order imposed by doctrine is essential for preparing military forces to deal with the chaos they will encounter in war, doctrine cannot be so rigid in its order as to be unalterable in the changing circumstances of war. Writing doctrine appropriate to the conditions and machinery of war is more science than art; executing doctrine in the chaos of battle is more art than science. The Second World War provides the Western military mind with the ultimate model of how wars should be fought. In that war the major powers of the world spent up to six years fighting a collection of wars which are now gathered together under the rubric of the Second World War. This collection of wars varied considerably and has left differing impressions on Western military minds. For ground forces, the most memorable war occurred in Western Europe from June 1944 to May 1945 when American, British, and Canadian forces finally invaded the continent of Europe and crushed what remained of the once invincible German war machine in the European theater of operations. In that theater of operations (only one of many in the Second World War) two vast military machines lined up virtually shoulder to shoulder across Europe to confront each other. The stronger Allied forces simply used brute force to push their way across Europe and rolled over the worn-out German forces. In his decision to pursue the broad-front strategy Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, apparently codified the right way to fight a war on the ground. Since the end of the Second World War the United States Army has focused its doctrine and force structure on Europe. Even though it has had to fight two wars in Asia—Korea and Vietnam—US Army doctrine remains firmly grounded on the plains of Europe. Even though the European theater of operations was actually one of the smaller theaters in the Second 29


World War and one of the few where the war was fought with comparatively tidy front lines, generally short advances, and relatively safe rear areas it has become, for many military minds, the very model of how to conduct modern warfare properly. Indeed, it is apparently the war that NATO ground forces have been planning to fight again someday. If the United States has looked to the war in Western Europe as its model of how to fight, then the other current superpower in the world, the Soviet Union, has looked to the war in Eastern Europe. While both the Soviet Union and the United States fought the same opponent, Germany, in Europe in the Second World War, each came away with a slightly different model. For the Soviets the war in the East was four years long, their homeland was invaded and ravaged, they had to rely on help from the West, and they lost somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 million people during the course of the war. The “Great Patriotic War” left an indelible impression on the Soviet national leadership. Today the Soviet Union’s claim to superpower status rests almost solely on its military element of national power, since virtually the entire economy of the nation has gone into being prepared to fight the war in the East all over again. Even the organization of the Soviet military force structure reflects the memory of the struggle in the East as both air and sea forces are subordinate in importance to the Soviet Army. In contrast to the dominance of ground forces in the Soviet Union, the United States Navy and Air Force has each developed its own model of war from the Second World War. The US Navy looks to the Pacific theater in the Second World War for the right way to fight a war; the large carrier battles of Midway and the Coral Sea provide the naval model for modern warfare. Today the large carrier battle groups of the US Navy reflect the Pacific model. Like the US Navy, the US Air Force has developed its own model from the Second World War. The Air Force uses the bombing campaign of Western Europe as its model for war, and since the Second World War it has been searching for the perfect bomber, the latest version of which is the rather expensive B-2, or so-called “Stealth” bomber. In most scenarios of future war the Air Force will use manned bombers in some form. The interesting thing about these various selections of the model war is that probably none of them will be exactly right for the next war. Certainly none of the wars fought since the Second World 30


War, whether by the United States, the Soviet Union, or any other nation have reproduced any of the theaters of operations in the Second World War. It will be fascinating to study how the models of war will, or will not, change as a result of the social and political changes evolving in Europe and other parts of the world. In spite of the almost endless varieties of war fought during and since the Second World War there is apparently one theater of operations which dominates Western military minds, but it is not the same theater for all minds. The models do, however, share one common characteristic: large armies, navies, or air forces directly opposing each other to gain and hold large areas of territory. But since the Second World War few of the world’s many wars have followed any of these models. Indeed, one of the most common forms of warfare in the late twentieth century, terrorism, would seem to be unrelated to any of the more familiar methods of waging war. Repugnant though it may be, terrorism must be considered in any framework of war since it fulfills the basic definition of war: using force or the threat of force to attain a national objective. In the case of terrorism this national objective could be defined as a favorable change in the international order of things; favorable to the nation which advocates terrorism, that is. Terrorism can also be viewed from each of the three perspectives of war. If it is statesponsored terrorism or even a nationalistic group which perceives itself as a nation of people without a territorial state then the leadership of the nation or state views terrorism from the strategic perspective of war, and that leadership will use terrorism in conjunction with the other elements of available national power to impose its will on the world by use of violence. Terrorists may not look like conventional military forces, but since force or the threat of force is what they use to impose their will then they must be considered a form of military force. From the strategic perspective of war terrorism is particularly effective when it can take advantage of the international network of television to publicize its activities. Part of the strategic perspective of terrorism includes appropriate publicity from the international news media. Like other forms of warfare, terrorists’ acts are much more effective when coordinated with other elements of national power. Although it may sometimes be difficult to understand how an act of seemingly random violence can support the national goals of a nation, from the point of view of the national group supporting terrorism the resultant publicity is an opportunity to 31


voice its position. If there is no coordinated effort by a terrorist group viewing war from the strategic perspective to tie its goals into the individual terrorist act then those acts have no particular meaning in the context of national goals. From the operational perspective terrorism is not essentially different from other forms of war. The focus of the operational perspective is selection of a strategic objective which, when attained, will contribute to the overall political goals of the state or national group. Some considerations for terrorists viewing war from the operational perspective might include the specific nation against which an act of terrorist violence would make the biggest news impact, the location in the world where there would be widespread, even sympathetic, press coverage, or the best time of year to make an impact on the world. Terrorism may vary from more conventional forms of warfare in that the strategic objective of a specific terrorist act may also constitute the tactical objective. Since terrorists will generally make even very minor decisions from the strategic perspective of war, selection of the objective leaves little room for variation from the operational or tactical perspectives. The execution of the terrorist act itself is the tactical perspective of war. The terrorist who actually hijacks a ship or airplane, assassinates a national or world figure, or blows up a building conducts terrorism from the tactical perspective of war. These activities constitute the use of military force in the sense that they are focused entirely on the terrorist act. At the moment of detonation of the bomb, kidnaping of the hostage, or hijacking the vessel, terrorists concentrate on force and the threat of force, as do conventional military forces when they actually employ force to attain a tactical objective. War in any of its forms is unpredictable and chaotic, and terrorist warfare is no exception. When a terrorist group resorts to violence or the threat of violence against specific nations or groups of nations it is an act of war, and the order which ultimately results from that act of war cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. While a terrorist group or state may want to elicit sympathy for its cause by committing an act of terrorism, there is always the possibility that they will instead be condemned. Probably the most accurate way to describe the model of recent war is to say that there is no easily observable universal model. Because war is essentially chaotic and current computer models 32


require a high degree of order it is difficult to develop a mathematical model of war. Understanding war requires more than simply building a model and then making plans which fit that particular model. There are many models of war, but one common denominator is that they can all be viewed from three perspectives. The three perspectives of war provide a broad, if somewhat abstract, model of war. The view from these perspectives may be infinite in their variety, but the perspectives do remain constant. This abstract model can provide a means of communicating between the military and civilians about the planning and conduct of war. The military mind sometimes holds to the erroneous idea that war is something clearly different from peace, and that once a war starts the military must be given a free hand to do whatever is necessary to win, thereby bringing the order of peace out of the chaos of war. In most nations of the world, however, civil authority of some sort establishes constraints on the use of military force. The basis of those constraints will depend on the coordination of the elements of national power with the desired national objectives. Military leaders and commanders must understand and adhere to both the specified and implied constraints on the use of their military force. Achieving a mutual understanding of national goals and constraints requires that the military and civilian leadership share the same broad theoretical concept of war. It falls to the military to provide that theory and explain it to the civilians; the military has the corporate experience and the societal obligation to understand war which, after all, is the sole reason for the state to maintain a standing military element of national power in the first place. Being subordinate to civil authority does not relieve the uniformed military of the responsibility to understand war, rather it incurs the additional responsibility of preserving and passing on that understanding to successive civil governments. Abrogation of that responsibility to institutions which have no responsibility for the conduct of a nation’s wars is simply inexcusable for the profession of arms. From any of its three perspectives, modern war remains an unpredictable, chaotic, and dangerous method of settling disputes between nations, groups of nations, or other international groups. The chaos and unpredictability of war demand that the decision makers holding the reins of military power understand what they are doing when they decide to use war to gain national goals. 33


Knowing that there are three distinctive perspectives from which to view war can go a long way towards understanding war. The more nations understand about war, the less they may be tempted to use it as a solution.

34

3 UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION IN WAR

If you want peace, understand war. B.H.Liddell Hart, Strategy There must be a logical sequence to the study of war. Just because war is inherently paradoxical and chaotic does not mean that there cannot be a logical approach to its study. Indeed the only way to understand war’s paradoxes may be by using a systematic approach. Basic to any organized group being able to understand what it is doing is a shared theoretical body of knowledge which guides it. For the application of military force to attain national goals this body of knowledge is a theory of war. A theory of war does not have to be very complicated, in fact, the simpler the theory the better the chances it might be understood and even used by the people actually involved in the planning and application of military force. Using a theoretical matrix with the three perspectives of war from Chapter 2 across the top and the five questions relevant to the study of war introduced in Chapter 1 down the side, understanding war becomes a relatively simple matter of filling in the framework. This framework becomes simple, however, only after first understanding the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives and knowing to ask the questions about the situation, objective, conduct, support, and control of war. Each of the five questions must be posed from each perspective in the appropriate order. The first question is simply “what is the situation?” Regardless of their perspective of war, military leaders and commanders responsible for making decisions involved with the planning and 35


conduct of war must always understand the specific situation facing them as well as what the chaos of war will allow. While there may be patterns to planning and conducting war, the patterns constantly change and will never repeat themselves exactly. Studying the situation involves gathering and analysing information which might provide insight to both patterns and changes to those patterns. Answering this first question about the situation must concentrate solely on information. This is essential, so that decisions on the use of military force are not made before the entire situation has been examined. It is also important to understand that each situation involving the possible use of military power is unique. While it is certainly valuable, even essential, to use historical analogies to help understand the situation, the solution to a previous similar situation is not necessarily going to work again. Not only will each situation be unique, but the interpretation of previous solutions may also vary depending on the personal and national experiences of the commanders and planners involved. From each of the three perspectives the situations facing decision makers will be both changing and unique. Indeed, the same situation will frequently present a dramatically different view from each perspective. An important aspect of gathering information is keeping the quantitative data which tends to proliferate in modern decision making from dominating the analysis. The progress which has been made and will undoubtedly continue to be made in developing quantitative data and mathematical calculations provides valuable assistance to decision makers in applying military force, but since even the most powerful computers have thus far been unable to approach the capabilities of the human mind in sorting out the intangibles of war, quantitative analysis remains simply one of many tools available. The computer model with its seductive visual images on a full-color screen does not reflect reality, and its apparent predictive powers must always be used with caution. While quantitative analysis and mathematical models can provide tremendous insight into what might happen with the use of military power in a specific situation, war viewed from any of its three perspectives will present a variety of intangible factors, and remains inherently unpredictable. From the strategic perspective it is critical that the national leadership examine the situation carefully before making any decisions on using military force to attain national goals. Understanding the situation before taking any military action may 36


be self-evident, although for some reason nations do decide to use military force apparently without the national leadership fully understanding the specific situation facing them. The strategic situation may be the most difficult perspective to understand primarily because it involves considering much more than simply the military element. Military power is but one element of national power available to a state or nation to achieve its goals and enforce its policies. A coherent strategic perspective requires that military power be clearly integrated into the application of all other elements of national power to achieve national goals. Military and civilian decision makers ideally will work together to ensure that they share a common understanding of the desired objectives and that they coordinate all the elements of their national power to focus on achieving those objectives. Military leaders responsible for the strategic perspective of war must ensure that their employment of military power works in concert with all the other elements. One of the most important results of studying the situation from the strategic perspective before making decisions will be to understand the parameters within which the military and civilian decision makers will have to work in balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. A critical aspect of the situation from the strategic perspective should be a careful examination of the desired order, and balancing that desired outcome against the many possible undesired orders which might result from the chaos of war. Postulating undesired outcomes from the strategic perspective may reveal the need to establish parameters on the use of military force in order to reduce the probability of unwanted results. The decision to use military force to attain national objectives is made from the strategic perspective. That decision should include consideration of what parameters will be imposed on the use of that force. These parameters, which will generally appear restrictive when viewed from the operational or tactical perspectives, will actually help focus the situation for those military commanders who will be responsible for eventually attaining the assigned strategic objectives. The operational perspective does not consider directly employing other elements of national power except when those elements may impact on the use of military force. Military commanders viewing war from this perspective may find that the situation facing them will be a complex analysis of terrain, enemy forces, and weather 37


within which an expeditionary force must conduct an amphibious assault on a fortified, hostile shore. While this is certainly a complex situation, it is generally simpler to deal with than the situation viewed from the strategic perspective, because the operational perspective focuses only on how to attain the assigned strategic objective and will be further narrowed by the imposition of strategic parameters on the use of military force. From the operational perspective the decision becomes what kind of military force to use within the established strategic parameters, the decision to actually use force having been made from the strategic perspective. From the operational perspective, the very senior military commanders of a nation responsible for employing the military element of power must be aware of the activities of the other elements of power as they pursue their strategic military objectives. Although these senior military commanders do not directly control the other elements of national power, they must understand that every element of power may have an influence on the others. Military commanders with an operational perspective receive and pursue strategic military objectives. In fact, an important element of analysing the situation for those commanders should be to ensure that they receive militarily achievable objectives from their superiors who view war from the strategic perspective, be they military or civilian. If military objectives which support the desired political aim are not clear when viewed from the operational perspective then it is doubtful that the use of military power will contribute to attaining the desired goal. Ill-conceived strategic military objectives established with a flawed strategic understanding of the situation will make any success viewed from the operational perspective of war irrelevant regardless of the brilliance with which military commanders may execute their operational art.1 Operational art is popular catch-phrase for how military commanders conducting war from the operational perspective balance the ends, ways, and means of war. The German Second World War military machine, for example, frequently receives high praise for its conduct of operational art. While German military commanders who viewed the situation in the Second World War from the operational perspective generally did very well, the lack of a coherent strategic analysis made the successes of the military element irrelevant in the end. Advocating the German model of the Second World War as a good example of conducting war from the operational perspective simply ignores the flawed strategy, and 38


the fact that the German military commanders viewing that war from the operational perspective failed in their responsibility to convey those flaws to their superiors who viewed the war strategically. Analysis from the operational perspective must include questioning whether or not the assigned strategic objective can actually be attained by military force.2 From the lowest view of employing military power, commanders who wage war from the tactical perspective must be able to concentrate on purely military objectives. Their responsibility is to destroy enemy forces, seize specific objectives, or otherwise apply military force to accomplish the missions prescribed by the military commanders who view war from the operational perspective. In reality, the bulk of any nation’s armed forces actually train to wage war with a tactical perspective. It is the military commanders who view war from this perspective who must ultimately ensure that actual force of arms makes the decision. From the tactical perspective, analysis of the situation becomes relatively simple when compared to either the strategic or operational perspectives. The situation viewed tactically might be as simple as an infantry squad leader telling his soldiers that they will be facing a similar sized enemy force dug in around a farmhouse in front of them. This is, of course, the view of war seen from the very lowest tactical perspective. As the tactical forces involved become larger commanders will face much more complex situations. These, however, will generally be limited to a single medium of military power: air, land, or sea. Tactical analysis will also ideally exclude virtually all but military considerations in the application of force, although in modern warfare this ideal will rarely be seen. Gathering information and understanding the specific situation facing the application of military force from each of the three perspectives brings reality and theory together in the study of war. When analysing the situation from any perspective of war the emphasis must be on reality, on what is actually known about the employment of military force and the implications of employing that force. Theory establishes an understanding of the situation as a necessary prelude to the application of military force; reality provides the information to understand the actual situation. Regardless of the perspective of war, studying the situation must be restricted to objectively gathering and analysing information. This is certainly not the time to indulge in wishful thinking or assuming away any known shortfalls on the friendly side or potential 39


strengths on the enemy side. The situation includes analysing information on both enemy and friendly forces. Although the emphasis from the strategic perspective is on preparing for the use of military force to achieve a national goal the situation cannot be limited simply to military forces. The higher the perspective of war the more information a realistic analysis of the situation will require. From the strategic perspective this information must include, but should not necessarily be limited to, such items as climate, weather, geography, and the political and diplomatic situation not only in the anticipated theater of operations, but as it may pertain to other nations or groups which may be able to influence the desired outcome. The goal of objective analysis is to provide the basis for making realistic decisions. The analysis should not be used simply to justify decisions by examining only that information which confirms what decision makers may want to believe. From any perspective of war decision makers must realistically confront the situation even if they do not like what they may see. There is a considerable amount of basic information that decision makers, both civilian and military, with a strategic perspective of war, may require to understand some of the complexities of war in the modern world. At the national level of command, military leaders and commanders and their civilian and military planners must understand that they view war from the strategic perspective, and that they must consider incorporating all elements of national power into achieving national goals. From the operational perspective military commanders must be able to understand the situation from the strategic perspective and be able to translate the desired strategic goals into appropriate military objectives which will complement the efforts of the other elements of national power. Military commanders with a tactical perspective concentrate primarily on the military situation, leaving the complexities of coordinating their activities with other elements of national power to those military commanders with an operational perspective. Senior leaders, be they civilian or military, of any nation or group of nations that aspires to use military power to attain national goals must understand how the use of the military element will be coordinated with the other elements of national power. Whenever the leadership of a nation contemplates the use of military power, or even threatens the use of military power, they should first understand the situation facing them from the strategic perspective 40


of war and how the use of military power will influence that situation, both positively and negatively. The situation in war changes constantly, and therefore requires constant analysis. Not only will circumstances change the situation in war, but it will change with each perspective of war. Each of the three perspectives will see the same situation a bit differently, and a situation that appears optimistic when viewed from the tactical perspective may appear altogether different from the strategic and operational perspectives. In the spring of 1940, after wrestling with the situation as viewed from the strategic perspective of war facing Germany, Hitler finally decided to employ military force against France. While the strategic decision to use military force to gain German national goals in France had, in reality, been made shortly after German military force overwhelmed Poland in 1939, the German military leadership who viewed the war from the operational perspective and would be responsible for attaining the designated military goals could not agree on the best way to employ their available means to attain the desired ends. They were unable to balance the ends, ways, and means of war as they attempted to analyse the situation from the operational perspective. This problem of balancing the ends, ways, and means from the operational perspective was complicated by the incomplete analysis of the situation viewed from the strategic perspective, which did not include consideration of other elements of German national power. When the German military leadership finally came to an agreement on how to accomplish the military strategic objective of invading France, from the operational perspective they succeeded brilliantly. In the event, however, the absence of a clear and commonly understood strategic view ultimately caused confusion from all three perspectives. When the German panzer divisions raced across France faster than even their most avid supporters had hoped, the German tank commanders with their tactical perspective saw the way to achieve rapid and complete victory as simply continuing the drive through France as rapidly as possible, disregarding for the moment any concern about their unprotected flanks, since the French Army was apparently incapable of any organized resistance. The situation viewed tactically was that the French and British resistance would crumble as the German panzer forces reached the command and control systems deep in France. 41


The German operational perspective, however, resulted in a more cautious analysis. The success of the invasion went so far beyond even the most optimistic predictions that there was concern among the senior military leadership that a continuing drive to the west by the leading panzer divisions without waiting for the follow-on infantry divisions (still primarily a walking force) to secure captured territory could eventually end in disaster. The German military leadership viewing the situation from the operational perspective saw the possibility of French and British forces eventually cutting the fast-moving panzer divisions off from their infantry support, so the panzer divisions were ordered to halt until the infantry could come up. This decision prompted a debate over the differences in the situation as seen from the tactical and operational perspectives. The result was a series of stop and go decisions for the advancing panzer troops. The cautious analysis by the German military leadership viewing the war from the operational perspective was a combination of inexperience with rapidly moving panzer forces and continuing uncertainty over the situation when viewed from the strategic perspective. As the German military leadership debated the differing tactical and operational views of the situation, their view of the strategic perspective, with its incomplete analysis, also intervened to halt the German advance. The order to halt came from the German national leadership, who viewed the war strategically. They apparently had some hope of using the diplomatic element to aid in attaining German national goals, but the Germans’ faulty strategic analysis did not recognize that it was already too late to bring other elements of national power to bear.3 The German invasion of France culminated at Dunkirk where the British gained enough time to evacuate the bulk of their ground forces, albeit with huge losses of equipment. The German military leadership viewing the war from the operational perspective was caught between tactical success and strategic indecision which foreshadowed their conduct of the remainder of the war. Although the German confusion in understanding the situation from the three perspectives of war led to an inconclusive new order after the chaos of war, they apparently decided that their tactical perspective with its rapid, constant pressure on the enemy would be the path to success. The retrospective tactical analysis in this early success for the Germans may have contributed to their lack of any coherent strategic perspective for the remainder of the Second World War. For the 42


better part of the war the German national leadership was content to view the strategic situation in light of its operational and tactical successes. Using the German view of the situation from the operational perspective in isolation only confuses the understanding of war. No single perspective of war can be analysed in isolation. Nations resort to using military power to wage war in order to attain national objectives that they believe cannot be gained by any other means. If the chaos of war does not result in the desired order, or at least something close to that order, then the decision to wage war was questionable at best. Since the Second World War eventually virtually destroyed Germany, the brilliance of her military commanders within the narrow operational perspective actually only prolonged the destruction. A better use of the German success from the operational perspective might have been to point out that its isolation from the strategic perspective was counter-productive to German national interests. Without a clear strategic view of war all else is for naught, and war becomes an exercise in futility. Germany’s experience in the Second World War provides sober testimony to the necessity for national civilian and military leadership to share a common understanding of war. In the Second World War the German military leadership abrogated their responsibility to the nation by refusing to challenge Hitler’s flawed view of the situation from the strategic perspective. As the war ground on, and Hitler began to analyse the situation from the operational and tactical perspectives the German military leadership further shunned its responsibilities by simply following orders. Indeed, Correlli Barnett is correct in the view that the “judgment on the German generals of the Hitler era…is that professionalism is not enough; technical brilliance is not enough; obedience to an oath and to orders is not enough.” The military leadership of any nation must learn from the failure of the Second World War officer corps that they must develop “a wider sense of political and social responsibility.” If the military leadership of a nation does not fully understand war, they leave open the possibility of repeating the German failures.4 An essential element of understanding war is the enemy. Studying the situation from any of the three perspectives of war must include an objective study of the enemy. There is a very good reason for carefully studying the potential enemy before making any decision to use military force. There may be a tendency on the part of planners to assume that enemy forces will always react in accordance with their plan, but, since one of the inherent 43


elements of defining war is an unpredictable enemy with the capability of freedom of action, that is at best a dangerous assumption. The enemy’s essentially unpredictable behavior and the chaos of war will often combine to make an apparently simple situation into a complex problem. Understanding that the enemy forces may have a greater influence than the planners on how friendly forces react to a specific situation is crucial to understanding the potential results of resorting to war. Just as studying one of the perspectives of war to the exclusion of the others will lead to a flawed understanding, analysing any situation in war without including a thorough consideration of the enemy is simply an invitation to disaster. One of the very first things to consider is information on enemy forces. Whether in theory or practice, the first consideration of war must be the enemy. Concentrating on the enemy first also serves to remind decision makers viewing war from any of its three perspectives that there will be a tangible opposition to their use of military force. This fundamental truth of war cannot be overlooked, although at times it obviously is. In April 1982 the national leadership of Argentina took it upon itself to use military force to right a wrong they perceived had been done by Great Britain. Since 1833 Argentina and Great Britain had been at odds over ownership of a small group of islands located some 300 miles off the eastern coast of South America. Known to the British as the Falklands and to Argentina as the Malvinas, the islands became the object of a short war between the two countries in 1982. That war points up the necessity to analyse the situation before using military force to attain national goals.5 After about 150 years of claiming ownership of the Malvinas Argentina put aside the use of diplomacy in favor of taking the islands by force. In analysing the situation from the strategic perspective of war Argentina apparently did not seriously consider that Great Britain would actually use its military force to counter the Argentine occupation of the Malvinas Islands by the use of military force. Even though Argentina may have had good reason to believe this from the strategic perspective, the military leadership of Argentina neglected to analyse the situation adequately from the operational and tactical perspectives of war. Had they done so they would either not have embarked on their ill-fated journey or they would have been better prepared to meet the British military challenge when it finally came. 44


From any of the three perspectives of war an analysis of the situation would surely have given the advantage to Argentina in 1982. A strategic analysis showed the islands to be closer by far to Argentina, which would make them easier to defend; the islands were of no great economic significance to Great Britain; the Argentine military occupation of the islands was met with enthusiastic public support in Argentina whereas the initial reaction in Great Britain was to ask where the Falklands were; and the Argentines apparently believed that they would have the upper hand diplomatically, hoping the United States would support the their claim of ownership. An analysis of the situation from the operational perspective would also have shown an Argentine advantage. The proximity of the islands to the Argentine mainland would allow the defenders on the island to be supported by air and sea forces stationed on the mainland. The military element could conduct its invasion and subsequent occupation of the islands secure in the knowledge that the other elements of national power were working toward the same objective: restoration of the islands to their rightful owners. The situation viewed from the tactical perspective of war for air, land, or sea forces would also produce an analysis which favored Argentina. Argentine air power could operate from both the islands and the mainland; sea forces could operate at short distances from their support bases and could receive air cover from both carrierbased and land-based air power, and the ground forces would have plenty of time to build up adequate defenses on the islands in terms of both troops and equipment. While an analysis of the situation from each of the three perspectives could show that Argentina held many advantages, unless this analysis includes an objective assessment of the potential enemy it is flawed. The Argentine analysis has to be judged as flawed, since there was apparently little consideration of the enemy or that enemy was assessed as mirroring friendly capabilities, a crucial error in considering any enemy. Attributing to an enemy force the same characteristics as friendly forces can only lead to problems. An Argentine analysis of the enemy, the British, in 1982 should have encouraged caution in selecting military force to resolve the Falklands/Malvinas dispute. From the strategic perspective of war Britain has for centuries been able to move small forces hundreds of miles over the sea to project her military power in defense of British subjects, the British have consistently been masters of the 45


art of diplomacy, and they have virtually never let a military occupation of British territory go unchallenged. For these reasons the Argentine national leadership should have considered war with Great Britain a probable result of their occupation of the islands. An operational analysis also gives reason to believe that Great Britain would eventually meet force with force. The British have successfully coordinated their elements of national power to attain national objectives for centuries, so Britain’s military element could proceed to war confident that it had all necessary support. While the distances were great, the British military had experience in virtually all aspects of warfare that an invasion of the Falklands would entail, and the British military has an unsurpassed reputation for “muddling through” when presented with unusual circumstances. Argentina’s military leadership may have overestimated the difficulties that Great Britain would face based on Argentine experience and capabilities. Tactically, the British are among the world’s best on the ground, in the air, or on the sea. A tactical analysis would have given the advantage to Great Britain once she could bring her forces to bear on the islands. Argentina made a fatal mistake in failing to consider the situation from the tactical perspective of war even though a strategic or operational analysis might have argued that tactical forces would never come into contact. The situation must be considered from all three perspectives, since each will have an effect on the other two. In the Falklands/Malvinas War a flawed strategic analysis led Argentina to neglect the operational and tactical perspectives until it was too late. Neglecting the potential enemy situation led eventually to Argentina’s downfall, as it soon became apparent that the military forces which occupied the Malvinas Islands were simply not equal to the task of defending them. Even when the enemy is taken into consideration the estimate of the situation may prove incorrect in the event, which simply confirms that the chaos of war is always unpredictable. For example in the Second World War the Japanese analysis from the strategic perspective apparently did not consider all of the elements of national power of their potential enemy, the United States, as they prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The Japanese strategic estimate was flawed because they hoped that the surprise attack would so demoralize the United States that the attack would actually deter war, not begin it. As it turned out, however, “Remember Pearl 46


Harbor” became the rallying cry for American unification behind the war effort. In 1941 Japan saw the way to her conquest of the Pacific blocked by the United States and Great Britain. Japan had taken advantage of Western preoccupation with the problems caused by the German invasion of France in 1940 by putting military forces in Indo-China and Burma in a bid to become the dominant power in Asia and the Pacific. This military occupation was promptly protested by the United States who demanded a Japanese withdrawal. Japan’s strategic analysis of the situation showed that she would have several advantages if she refused to give in to American demands: Japan was closer to Asia, the part of the world she wanted to dominate; US and British forces in the Pacific and Asia were small, scattered, and far from home; oil from the conquered areas would only strengthen Japan; and Germany, in late 1941, appeared about to overrun the Soviet Union as she had France in 1940. While the advantages were substantial, they rested on two critical assumptions which would, in the chaos and unpredictability of war, be proven false: German strength and American weakness.6 The Japanese estimate of American actions could well have been a matter of allowing what the strategic leadership wanted to happen dominate an objective estimate of the situation and become the estimated order, because the alternatives were simply too unpleasant to contemplate. Any objective estimate of Japan’s chances of ultimate victory in a war with the United States in 1941 should have led to the conclusion of an ultimate Japanese defeat. Japan, however, apparently wanted war, so the strategic estimate provided the view of war that the national leadership wanted to see, not what was really there. If understanding that there will be an enemy which will use armed forces to challenge the use of military force is important, it is at least equally important to understand that the friendly armed forces must know what they are doing. To be effectively employed a military force viewed from any of the three perspectives of war must have a clearly defined chain of command with distinct levels of responsibility. These practical and very real levels of command, however, do not necessarily correspond to the theoretical perspectives of war which, though real, are not always clearly distinct from one another. Military commanders must understand not only the three theoretical perspectives, they must also clearly understand the levels of command and where they fit into the 47


so-called chain of command. The relationship of the perspectives of war and the levels of command is one place where the theory and reality of conducting war come together. The perspectives of war are theory, while the levels of command are reality. Determining and understanding the three perspectives of war require the attributes of the artist, while sorting out the levels of command can be done scientifically. The levels of command depend on order, but war is essentially chaos. Art, the perspectives of war, can deal with chaos more effectively than science, the levels of command, can. The levels of command, however, are essential to the actual conduct of war. Although war is chaos, it cannot exist unless there is order. A theory of war must have enough order to be understandable, but at the same time be flexible enough to deal with chaos. The order derived from a clear chain of command makes it easier to deal with the inherent chaos of war. It is simple enough for military commanders to know where they are in the levels of command by looking at an organization chart. Sorting out the perspective for which they view war may be a bit more difficult, since the perspective of war changes depending on the situation, not on the level of command. There are also theoretical orders which can make the chaos of war less confusing. The spectrum of conflict which presents war as having various levels of intensity also provides a theoretical order to the chaos. At the low-intensity end of this theoretical spectrum, the military forces involved are small and play a relatively minor role in supporting the other elements of power. In so doing, however, commanders at lower levels of command, trained to view and analyse the situation from the tactical perspective, may well find themselves actually analysing the situation from the operational or even strategic perspective. Normally decisions to move separate companies or platoons on land, individual airplanes in the air, or specific ships at sea are properly made from the tactical perspective. If, however, they directly affect the national goals of low-intensity conflict these same decisions could be appropriately made strategically. The levels of command and their relationships to the perspectives of war will change depending on the situation along the spectrum of conflict. The position of a specific war on this spectrum conflict is not fixed, which may result in the same levels of command having different perspectives. Moving along the spectrum from low to high intensity, the military forces involved grow larger and play a more 48


dominant role in conducting war as the other elements of power become less influential. But at no time should the military element be allowed to completely control the situation in war. At the highintensity end of the spectrum military force effectively prevails over the other elements of power. Military power, in the form of nuclear weapons, so dominates the strategic perspective of war at the highintensity end that the actual use of nuclear weapons becomes essentially meaningless since their use in quantity would effectively destroy the other elements of national power. When faced with the potential of achieving complete destruction of an enemy, man has so far been reluctant to use that power. Even on the modern battlefield man finds his actions limited by moral or psychological constraints. The fear of mutual destruction may apparently preclude the United States and the USSR from exchanging nuclear blows, and in spite of the proliferation of nuclear weapons they have not been used in anger since their dramatic introduction which ended the Second World War. Wars do not necessarily move to a higher intensity on the spectrum of conflict. In fact, they have virtually always stayed in the so-called low- to mid-intensity range. In any case, at all points on the spectrum all three perspectives of war will be present to a greater or lesser degree. Regardless of where a specific war may be on this spectrum, commanders and planners at all levels of command must be able to analyse the situation in the light of their perspective of war. In the center of the spectrum, the socalled mid-intensity of conventional war, the perspectives of war will generally be fairly clear, but at the extreme ends of the spectrum the perspectives of war can become very fuzzy indeed. It is also more critical that the levels in the chain of command be very clear at the extreme ends of the spectrum of conflict where tactical actions can have a large impact on the situation when viewed from the operational or strategic perspectives. In low-intensity conflict even very small unit commanders may make decisions with implications for the situation viewed from the operational, or even strategic perspective as they coordinate military activities with the other elements of national power at a very low level of command. By way of contrast, at the global nuclear war end of the spectrum, very senior national officials may properly be involved in making what could be defined as decisions with a tactical perspective as they select specific targets for individual nuclear weapons. Between these two theoretical 49


extremes the situation will present a wide variety of interactions of the perspectives of war. Anywhere along the spectrum, the three perspectives of war are useful tools to ensure proper application of military power in the pursuit of national objectives. Part of analysing the situation is determining where the contemplated use of military force fits into the spectrum of conflict. The actual application of military force may well vary depending on the intensity of the war. Knowing the position on the spectrum of conflict will assist the civilian and military national leadership viewing war strategically to establish the necessary parameters for the operational use of military force. Simply maintaining a standing armed force is evidence that a nation considers military power a viable means of achieving national policy goals. That being the case, national leadership, including the senior military leadership, has an obligation to apply that military power properly to legitimately further national interests in the world. This obligation includes pointing out when it is not appropriate to use military force and whether goals or objectives assigned to the military element of power are not appropriate. This is possible only if national leaders truly understand how the various perspectives of war interact. If the national leadership and its military leadership do not share a common theory of war, then the use of military power could well be a liability to state policy rather than an asset. Although the three perspectives of war do not have clear, distinctive lines to separate them, they do have functional differences. Because of this, a course of action appropriate to the situation as seen from one perspective may not apply to another. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a clearly stated strategic goal of deterring war. This is an entirely appropriate objective when viewing the situation from the strategic perspective, but it does not properly apply to the situation when viewed from either the operational or the tactical perspectives. Although the strategic goal of deterrence will certainly influence the preparation for war from the lower perspectives, the military forces in NATO must be prepared to face a situation where they will actually have to fight. Preparing for that eventuality from the operational and tactical perspectives means assuming the strategic goal of deterrence has failed. Decisions on whether or not a nation or alliance will use military force are made by the leadership analysing the situation from the strategic perspective. A strategic decision to use military force to achieve a national objective must carry with it the intent to actually 50


fight to attain and hold on to that objective. Once that strategic decision is made the commanders viewing war from the operational perspective must be given appropriate military objectives and the military resources to achieve them. Determining how to achieve those objectives must not be encumbered by forcing commanders to worry about deterring the fighting as a part of their analysis of the situation, the decision to fight having already been made by the national leadership with its strategic perspective. The strategic decision to use military force carries with it the recognition that fighting will probably be required to accomplish the assigned objectives, since the intent to use force to achieve a national goal implies the failure of the other elements of national power. From the operational perspective it is, at best, distracting for commanders to concern themselves with deterrence and combat simultaneously. It is irresponsible for commanders charged with conducting war from the tactical perspective to be fettered in their analysis of the situation by being distracted in trying to deter the fighting that is their sole reason for existence. The raison d’être of tactical forces is to fight, and military commanders viewing war from the tactical perspective of war must be free to concentrate on analysing the situation to ascertain the most effective employment of their forces. Once committed to hostilities, tactical forces must be allowed to pursue the fight, not avoid it. Successful deterrence of war is in fact contingent on effective fighting forces. Effective fighting forces are born of training to fight, not deterring the fighting. The military force is the element which fulfills the diplomatic threat of force when necessary. The diplomatic element of power deters war, the military element of power conducts it. Any analysis that confuses deterring war with conducting war can only add to the chaos of war. The paradox that deterring war from the strategic perspective relies on the capability to fight from the tactical perspective resolves itself in the operational perspective of war. Viewing and analysing the situation from the operational perspective are senior, welleducated, and experienced commanders who have access to the national intelligence picture and an understanding of the international and regional situations in those areas of the world for which they are responsible. From this perspective they are able to make decisions on how best to employ their assigned tactical military forces to achieve the desired strategic military aims. The military leadership entrusted with the operational perspective of 51


war must fully understand their responsibility to the nation and recall the dismal failure of the German officer corps of the Second World War to live up to that responsibility. The strategic view requires military leaders and commanders to consider situations in which they must effectively integrate military power with the other elements of national power. They are not free to concentrate solely on the military conditions necessary to achieving military success. Military commanders viewing the situation from the operational perspective concentrate on the coordination of the air, land, and sea forces assigned them to achieve strategic objectives. In so doing, however, they must analyse the situation within the parameters defined by strategic decisions and the employment of the other elements of national power. It is only when commanders view the situation from the tactical perspective of war that they are free to concentrate solely on fighting. Tactical commanders, specialists in air, land, and sea operations, must be as free of as many constraints as possible in the employment of their forces as the operational and strategic commanders can make them. When the national leadership, analysing the situation strategically, makes the decision to use force then the use of that force must be well thought out and integrated with all other elements of power. The national civilian and military leadership must analyse the situation together to select specific militarily achievable strategic objectives which contribute to the desired national goals. The military leaders who share this strategic perspective of war have the responsibility, both to the nation and to their military subordinates, to insist on clear military objectives. If there are no clearly identifiable military objectives then it is highly questionable that military force is the proper element of power to employ in that specific situation. After selecting the objectives, or the ends portion of the formula of balancing ends, ways, and means, the strategic leadership must then consider the ways and means available to achieve those ends. From the strategic perspective the military ways and means of modern military powers are at once vast and limited which provides yet another paradox of war. The military forces of nations with world-wide interests may be considerable, but they may be limited because they may be strewn about the globe to uphold various alliances. Time available to concentrate and deploy forces will frequently limit the ways and means that can effectively be used. This was certainly a critical charcteristic of the situation when 52


Great Britain had to virtually strip her world-wide military cupboard bare in order to prosecute the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War with Argentina, and even then the commanders with an operational view of the situation were acutely aware of the parameters the strategic situation put on them. In that conflict, although the strategic leadership of Great Britain did not actually make tactical decisions, the limited resources available from the operational perspective did have a great influence on the situation viewed tactically. In the event, the objective or end of forcing Argentina to give up the Islands was barely achieved by the available means. After an analysis of the situation which considers the ends, ways, and means of military power from the strategic perspective, and the integration of military power with the other elements into achieving a desired national goal, the actual attainment of the desired military objective must be assigned to a commander who views the situation from the operational perspective. From this perspective the situation is in the hands of the military. The operational commander, while knowing what the other elements of power are doing, concentrates on achieving the assigned military objective, the desired end. This includes considering the available means, the combat and support forces assigned, and developing the way, a specific plan or campaign which will achieve the desired ends. If the commander cannot achieve his objective with the assigned forces then intermediate tactical objectives may have to be selected or alternative methods considered, which may entail a higher risk of failure. In any case, from the operational perspective of war, the military commander must maintain an open and candid dialogue with his strategic superiors as they analyse the situation and develop courses of action. This dialogue between the leadership viewing the situation from the strategic and operational perspectives is essential. The strategic leadership needs to know the results of its military decisions in order to coordinate these other elements of national power. The commander viewing the situation operationally must keep the strategic leadership informed of both requirements and progress (or lack thereof, often a more difficult report to make). The strategic leadership, for their part, having made the decision to use force, should leave the application of that force to the operational commanders as much as possible. Too much interference by strategic leaders will generally do more harm than good. 53


Military commanders with an operational perspective deal with the strategic leadership, informing them and interpreting their guidance, while at the same time providing direction to subordinate tactical commanders. These tactical commanders directly control the forces which comprise the various elements of air, land, and sea forces. The operational commander must meld the apparently disparate tactical forces of the land, sea, and air forces into an integrated whole in the campaign plan in deciding where and how to conduct the fight. Although operational commanders will be selected by the strategic leadership from different branches of the military services, land, sea, or air, they must put aside any parochial interests they may have developed in the course of their military experience and education. The view from the operational perspective of war integrates air, land, and sea forces into one effective fighting force. Tactical commanders may indulge in service rivalries; operational commanders do so only at the risk of a failed mission. The United States is apparently particularly susceptible to allowing service parochialism to affect the analysis of the situation in war. In the American military each of the services—army, navy, air force, and marines—prepares for war essentially in isolation. They may have the occasional joint exercise, but the study of theory and development of doctrine is done in virtual isolation from each other. This is in contrast to the Soviet Union, where all theory and doctrine comes from the top down. An example of the differences in the two systems is that in the United States it simply does not occur to anyone that a US Air Force organization could ever be subordinate to a US Army command. In the Soviet Union commanders with an operational perspective will routinely have air forces under their command. When viewing the situation tactically, commanders should be virtually free of having to consider the other elements of power as they conduct their analysis of how best to employ their forces. Because they are, or at least should be, experts in applying a particular form of military power, land, sea, or air, they must be allowed to concentrate on the direct application of military force to achieve their assigned objectives. Tactical forces must have adequate means to achieve their assigned ends. While tactical commanders must decide the appropriate ways, the commander with the operational perspective must provide the means. If adequate means to achieve tactical success within acceptable levels of risk are not available 54


then the operational commander must communicate this situation to the strategic leadership. Decisions to limit the ends or increase the means must be made from a strategic perspective, where the national leadership can consider the situation as it affects all elements of national power. From its strategic perspective the national leadership must decide whether or not the specific situation warrants expending lives and treasure. When the national decision makers of a country make the strategic decision to commit forces to a hostile situation the country must be fully prepared to fight. It is the responsibility of the national political leadership to develop the support of the country. The military’s role in developing popular support for the use of force is only to attain their assigned objectives. The place to argue the right or wrong of military objectives is between the civilian and military leadership who view the situation strategically. The military leadership should have no role in directly justifying the use of force to the citizens of the nation. The national leadership must convey the intent to fight and develop the public will necessary to support the fight to both its own armed forces and their potential opponents. Potential opponents, whoever they are, must understand that they will have to pay a price for obstructing national policies, and the armed forces must understand that there will come a time when they will be called upon to fight and perhaps die for their country’s national policies. In the case of the Falklands/Malvinas War, the British national leadership maintained the necessary popular support, while the Argentine national leadership, except for the initial occupation of the islands, did not; once the British armada began to gain the upper hand, Argentine public support rapidly waned. The British and Argentine experience demonstrate that success on the battle-field generally makes it easier to develop popular support for a war than failure. If the strategic leadership of the nation does not prepare for the use of force by developing positive public support well in advance, then its desired deterrence value is doubtful. A critical element in analysis from the strategic perspective is the determination of whether the population of the nation will support the prospective use of military force. This public support is necessary in all nations. Although it may be a bit easier initially to conduct a war with a totalitarian government where the national leadership controls the information which gets to the populace and can develop popular 55


support by providing only good news which puts the conduct of the war in a favorable light, eventually the chaos of war will bring the bad news home. In a democracy, however, where uncensored information allows virtually the entire population to second guess national and battlefield decisions, gaining and holding public support for a war can be more difficult right from the beginning. The primary method of gaining and holding public support is to define and actively pursue well-defined national goals that the population can feel are worthwhile. A critical product of the analysis which leads to the strategic decision to use military force is determination of the national goal to be achieved by that application of force. Unless both sides truly believe that the nations have the will to use force, then the aim of deterring war has a hollow ring. To paraphrase Liddell Hart, if you want to deter war, be prepared to fight. Even though it is from the tactical perspective of war that the armed forces of any country actually fight, the decisions which shape that fight are the result of analysing the situation from the strategic and operational perspectives. It is imperative that the national leadership involved in the formulation of military strategy understand that there are different perspectives from which to view war. The development of a theory of war is more than just an academic exercise, it is the key to understanding how to deal with the paradox of effectively applying military force to maintain peace. Understanding the situation is simply the first step to understanding the preparation and conduct of war.

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4 SETTING OBJECTIVES IN WAR

Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined decisive, and attainable goal. US Army Principle of War FM 100–5, Operations The decision to use the military element of national power to attain a national goal is only the first of many decisions which must be made if the chaos of war is to result in anything close to the desired new order. If, after an analysis of the situation, the national leadership decides to use military force they must then determine exactly how best to employ that force. The more specifically the desired order can be described to the military leadership the better the chances of keeping the chaos of war under some semblance of control. In modern warfare military forces must also be told what they are not to do, since the weaponry available to them will frequently have the power to expand war’s chaos beyond the attainment of a specific goal. Any military force, from the highest national formation of air, ground, and sea forces to the smallest infantry squad or flight of two aircraft, receives its instructions to attain a specific goal in the form of a mission. The mission is the foundation for military planning; it specifies the goal or objective the attainment of which will authorize military leadership from all perspectives of war to expend lives and materiel. Defining the mission and establishing the specific objective, therefore, requires careful consideration from all three perspectives of war. The order which eventually results from the chaos of war is always unpredictable, and military forces of any size must work within that chaos to achieve the desired order or objective. Although the 57


actual conduct of war is chaos, it begins and ends in order. From any of the three perspectives of war the objective defines the desired difference between initial order and the resultant order. In the Second World War, for example, the initial order in 1944 was Germany’s domination of the continent of Europe. When the Allied forces of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, stormed ashore on the beaches of Normandy on 6 June to rekindle the chaos of war their desired new order was to eliminate Germany’s domination and return control to the individual sovereign nations on the continent. By May 1945 the combined military forces of the Allied powers attained that desired order with the unconditional surrender of Germany. It should be obvious that the chaos of war will more often than not result in an unpredictable and unexpected order simply because war is, by definition, two separate forces attempting to impose their will on each other. Since each side is seeking a different desired order one or the other, or even both, is bound to find that the war will end in less than their desired order. Both sides simply cannot attain their desired order because each is seeking a new order unacceptable to the other side (that is why they are fighting after all), and any sort of compromise must result in a less than desired new order for both sides. The longer the chaos of war drags on, the less chance that either side will attain the new order they desired at the beginning of the war. Europe experienced six years of war’s chaos in the Second World War, and while that war eventually ended with the Allies realizing their desired order it was obvious that it was not the order that Germany desired when it initiated the chaos in 1939. Indeed, the chaos of the Second World War ultimately resulted in a new order in Europe in 1945 which was significantly different to the order extant in 1939, an order which was not necessarily what any country would have desired. One example is Great Britain. Even though that country was on the winning side in 1945, the years of war’s chaos considerably reduced her ability to influence global events, which for Great Britain was certainly an undesirable aspect of the new order.1 The mission assigned to any size of military force, from any perspective of war or level of command, must be a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished and the military objective to be attained. The military objective described in the mission statement establishes the end in the balance of ends, ways, and 58


means. Military objectives must be unambiguous and within the capabilities of the military force. The mission statement which stipulates the military objective may simply be a restatement of the mission assigned by a higher authority, or it may be a mission statement derived by the commander of the force receiving the mission based on an analysis of what the military force has been directed to accomplish. In any case, a clear and concise mission statement which includes a specific militarily achievable objective should be a fundamental requirement whenever a nation contemplates using military force to attain a national goal. Although the military objective may be only one element of the overall assigned mission, it is the most critical element because that is how the success or failure of the use of military force will be measured. The mission statement must include some way to measure the effectiveness of the use of military force; the best measure is a specific militarily achievable objective. The more specific the military objective, the easier it will be to define success or failure. Without a definite measure of success the war could very well deteriorate into an open-ended use of military force. In the Second World War Germany initiated the war with a vague strategic objective of gaining additional territory and after waging a series of successful campaigns continued to fight it so that Hitler could remain on the offensive; it then became a simple matter of continuing to fight with no particular objective except to win more and more military victories.2 In this day of world-wide communications systems, including live television from virtually anywhere in the world, a nation opting for the use of military force must be ready to justify using that force not only to its own citizens, but literally to the entire world. A specific, militarily achievable goal not only provides the national leadership with the opportunity to explain what they hope to achieve by the use of force, but that they will end their use of military force when the objective has been attained. The concurrent risk of specifying a military objective is that it might not be attained, thereby leaving the national leadership with an obvious failure in the use of military force. Understanding the risk of failure, however, should be part of the analysis of the situation. There is no reason for going to war with vague military objectives from any of the three perspectives of war. Initiating war without a clear idea of what the desired order should look like only makes war more unpredictable. Although there are three perspectives of war, there are really only two types of military objective, strategic and tactical. Strategic 59


objectives, established from the strategic perspective of war, define the military objectives which contribute to and support the other elements of national power. Tactical objectives are purely military objectives which will be attained by military forces viewing war from the tactical perspective. From the operational perspective military commanders and their staffs plan and conduct war to attain the assigned strategic objectives. Strategic objectives, however, can rarely, if ever, be attained without first defining and attaining tactical objectives. Selection of the tactical objectives which contribute to the attainment of the assigned strategic objectives initiates campaign planning, the process by which operational military commanders actually plan and conduct war. From the strategic perspective the mission statement given to the military element of national power must include a militarily achievable objective. The strategic military mission must be integrated into the efforts of the other elements of national power. Operational commanders must carefully analyse the assigned strategic objectives in the context of the situation and determine what tactical objectives will be necessary. Tactical objectives, like the strategic objectives, must be clearly defined and within the capabilities of the assigned military forces. While strategic objectives may require some coordination and cooperation of elements of national power other than the military, tactical objectives must be as close to purely military objectives as possible. Tactical forces should be freed from as many constraints as possible on their employment of military force. A military force, no matter what its size, must receive its assigned mission in the context of a specific situation. Each plan or order is written for a unique set of circumstances to attain a specific military objective. Planners developing the mission statement from any perspective of war will encounter a dynamic tension between levels of command. On the one hand, the issuing authority for the mission statement will always want to be as specific as possible in order to maintain control over the forces carrying out the mission. On the other hand the military force receiving the order or directed to carry out the plan would prefer broad instructions so as to have as much freedom of action as possible. This creates a dynamic tension between the perspectives of war. This constant tension requires a constant re-evaluation of the situation which may, in turn, result in a change of mission as the situation changes for better or worse. One of the few constants in war is that there will always be changes in the situation. 60


A constantly changing situation during the German invasion of France in 1940 presented rather different views of that war from each of the different perspectives of war. From the tactical perspective the situation demanded rapid advances, and the tactical leadership wanted appropriate tactical objectives which would allow them to make these. From the operational perspective the broader view saw only open flanks and the danger of the lead panzer elements being cut off from their infantry support who, moving only as fast as they could walk, were rapidly falling further and further behind the leading invasion forces. This dynamic tension between the tactical and operational perspectives of war caused the attacking tactical forces first to stop and then to resume their attack, and could have cost Germany a decisive victory had not the national leader, Hitler, with his strategic perspective, intervened. In the event, the unexpected parameters Hitler set on attaining the strategic military objectives (which were not all that clear to begin with) halted the panzer forces before they reached Dunkirk. This modification in strategic objectives apparently was made in the hope of reaching some sort of favorable agreement with the British. While this change in strategic objective eventually came back to haunt Germany, since Great Britain remained a viable enemy, having evacuated the bulk of her ground forces from Dunkirk while the German forces simply watched, at the time the strategic view included the possibility of using diplomacy to achieve Germany’s desired order after the war.3 Whenever national leadership contemplates using military force, it is essential that an appropriate military strategic objective be given to the operational military commanders. The military objective should be one which the available military force has a reasonably good chance of achieving. Although the inherent unpredictability of war means that there are no guarantees of success, there are degrees of chance which can be evaluated during the analysis of the situation. In the process of translating national goals into appropriate military missions and objectives it is the responsibility of the senior national military leadership to ensure that they do not simply pass on vague, indefinite missions in the hope that the operational military commanders will somehow muddle through and intuitively do the right thing. Success in war must begin with a clear strategic view, which sees a military mission with clearly defined military strategic objectives. 61


One of the most critical aspects of war from any of its three perspectives is what the military force is supposed to do. This is especially critical from the strategic perspective because that is where the decision to use military force is made. This decision carries with it the decision to fight. The mission statement, if properly conceived must always be concise. If it cannot be clearly stated in one or two simple sentences, regardless of the size of the force involved, then it is certainly not clear enough. This rule applies from all perspectives of war. From the strategic perspective, if the objective of the war cannot be simply and clearly stated then war may not be the answer. At this highest perspective a clear, concise mission statement serves two purposes. It provides the military element with clear instructions from which to base its planning for and conduct of war, and it allows the national leadership to explain what they hope to accomplish by the use of military force. In the Western democracies the national leadership must always be able to gain the support of the population in the use of military power. This support includes whatever body the government employs to represent the people whether it is known as a congress, a parliament, or some other term. The elected administration must win the support of the legislative body and if it cannot explain clearly what the use of military force is supposed to do it will probably not get that support. When the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, stood in front of Parliament to explain the use of military force in 1982 in response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands, she initially met criticism of how the government had allowed the crisis to develop, but when it eventually became clear that military force was to be used to return the Falklands to British control Parliament supported the expedition.4 Although there were other elements of national power at work to resolve the Falklands/Malvinas war between Great Britain and Argentina (primarily diplomatic, although the economic and technological elements were also involved as Great Britain was able to convince her European partners to limit their dealings with Argentina for the course of the war) it eventually fell to the military element to settle the issue. All other issues of national power aside, the national leadership of both Argentina and Great Britain did issue clear and concise strategic missions and objectives to their military forces. Indeed, the clarity of the two strategic missions provides an excellent example of why war will always be chaos; 62


both Argentina and Great Britain intended to take and hold the same small patch of land by force. Although the chaos of this war has resulted for the moment in the order Great Britain desired, that order is not quite the same as it was before Argentina challenged the British order by the use of military force. Since the long-term results of war are no more predictable than the immediate result, only time will tell whether or not the new order in the Falklands will remain stable. Perhaps in another half-century there will a new order in the South Atlantic which will find the Malvinas under Argentina’s protective wing. The chaos of war will always result in a new order, although that order may not correspond to the desired objective of either party to the war. When Iraq used military force to occupy and annex Kuwait the strategic military objective was easily obtained. The Iraqi military element of national power had little or no difficulty occupying Kuwait. While the chaos of war has not resulted in a new order in the region, it is clear that the eventual order will not be what Iraq had hoped it would be. Iraq gained a clear military objective which it hoped would translate directly into the attainment of a national goal, the annexation of Kuwait as a province of Iraq. That goal, however, aroused the ire of much of the rest of the world whose collective goal is the removal of Iraqi control over Kuwait. While, as in the case of the Second World War, it may take some years yet to resolve the chaos of the latest war in the Middle East, it is clear that the resultant new order will be rather different from the old order and in all probability the new order will also be different from what either side presently desires. Half a century ago the results of the Second World War would have presented a rather different picture of Europe and the world than is evident today. The beginning of the end of the Second World War in Europe began with the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June, 1944. The ultimate result of that invasion was a clear success in achieving a clear military strategic objective which contributed to the political goal of the Allied powers. The invasion by the Allied Expeditionary Force initiated one of the most decisive campaigns in the history of warfare. Although it was a very complex undertaking, one relatively simple sentence sufficed to state the objective for the entire campaign. The mission directed Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, to “enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of 63


her Armed Forces.” The succinct wording sets the standard for stating a military mission. In unambiguous language it clearly identified to the responsible commander the objective of the operation and left no doubt of the ultimate goal. The clearly defined military objective also established a definite measure for success. Setting a clear objective is a fundamental principle of war, and the mission statement defines the military objective to the force commander at all levels of command. When a commander receives a mission statement there must be no doubt about the objective. A good mission statement contains no ambiguity. The mission of the Allied Expeditionary Force and its stated objective, destruction of the German armed forces, meets these criteria. The objective was clear; its accomplishment was decisive because with no armed forces Germany would be unable to continue the war; and it was attainable given the greater overall strength of the Allied military, economic, and technological elements of power by 1944. The principle of defining a clear, militarily achievable objective is paramount regardless of the size of the force or perspective of war. All levels of command, from an infantry squad leader with a tactical perspective to a joint task force commander viewing war from the operational perspective, to a country’s national leadership with its strategic perspective of war, must know and understand the desired military objective. It is a clearly understood military objective which provides the focus for military forces as they attempt to shape a favorable order out of war’s inevitable chaos. The military objective must always be so clear that it requires little or no explanation. A complex mission statement from any perspective of war generally indicates an obscure or vague military objective. When a state decides to use military force, a clear and militarily achievable objective must be given to the commander of the forces involved. The military objective may be the destruction of another armed force, the capture and occupation of a specific piece of territory, the denial of a designated location to another country’s use, or any similar objective. It may involve massive forces or only a few hundred troops, but, regardless of the size of the forces involved, the mission and the objective of the operation must be clear before it begins. Both the authority assigning the mission and the commander designated to execute it must have a clear and mutual understanding of the military objective if there is to be any chance of success in war. 64


The assigned military objective must be specific and attainable by the forces available. Without a specific goal a military operation lacks focus, and eventually any lack of focus will lead to questions of competence on the part of the commanders involved because they have no way of demonstrating any progress toward accomplishment of their assigned tasks. This question of competence from the operational perspective is especially significant since the questioning will come both from strategic superiors and tactical subordinates. From the strategic perspective there will be questions of how to measure progress and from the tactical perspective there will be questions of why they are fighting. The now infamous “body-count” experience of US forces fighting in Vietnam was in part a result of searching for a method of measuring progress in the absence of a clear military mission with a definite militarily achievable objective. No matter how complex the actual military mission may prove to be, the mission statement and the military objective must be clear and concise. From the strategic perspective of war the 1944 Allied invasion of Europe had a simple and clearly stated strategic objective even though it would prove to be a massive undertaking consisting of a series of campaigns conducted from the operational perspective of war each of which had a series of tactical objectives. Each tactical objective had to contribute to attaining the ultimate strategic objective. The plan which establishes the tactical objectives and organizes their attainment is a campaign. In a very complex and lengthy campaign the campaign itself may have phases which allow for build-up of forces, changes in weather, or other factors which influence the actual conduct of war. Planning and conducting campaigns are the focus of the operational perspective of war. In the campaign the operational perspective reconciles tactical capabilities with strategic requirements. Military organizations habitually subdivide the military objectives. Beginning with the strategic military objective set by the national leadership from the strategic perspective, military planners and commanders with the operational perspective will design the campaign by setting tactical military objectives which will have to be attained by the tactical military commanders. Eventually virtually every member of the military force will have a specific objective which supports the overall mission. Two fairly recent examples of the United States’ application of military power in support of national policy illustrate the necessity 65


for clearly defining military objectives before beginning military operations. Although the overall foreign policy goals in Lebanon and Grenada in 1984 were not the same, some observations can be made about using the military element of national power in support of those goals. In early 1984 the United States dispatched a battalion of marines to Lebanon on what was then called a peace-keeping force. That description was apparently the only strategic mission statement given to the American military forces involved. That mission does not, however, contain the essential elements of a good mission statement required by the principle of the objective. There is no clearly defined or decisive goal, and although peace is certainly a desirable objective, its attainment by a small military force in an area as volatile as Lebanon was doubtful at best, especially since military forces are designed and equipped expressly to achieve violent solutions in the chaos of war. As a result there was a public debate over exactly what that battalion of marines was really expected to accomplish. That mission has yet to be defined in terms of the basic principle of war, the objective. An ill-conceived use of military force such as the United States sending a battalion of a renowned fighting force on a peacekeeping mission where they were not allowed to fight, itself reflects rather poorly on the American national leadership’s understanding of war. In spite of all the clarification offered after the disastrous destruction of a battalion of US marines there was simply not a clearly defined military mission for the military commanders involved in the Lebanon débâcle to execute. There was no goal to achieve which could signal the completion of the mission. The United States eventually extracted its military forces without apparently ever having achieved anything positive in the way of national goals. In the absence of a clear military mission there was no way for commanders from any perspective of war to know what their forces were expected to accomplish. In virtually any nation military organizations and the people in them are objective oriented. If there is no clear, militarily attainable objective, there is simply no orientation for military forces; a confusing situation for both military and civilian leaders regardless of their perspective of war. The proper orientation must come from the strategic perspective and flow clearly through the operational to the tactical perspectives of war. The objective is the focal point which provides a point of reference for military forces fighting the war. 66


Standing in contrast to America’s Lebanon experience is the successful military operation in Grenada, also in 1984, ironically within weeks of the Lebanon débâcle. What public debate there has been over the Grenada operation focuses on the techniques of the American military forces involved, a debate which sometimes overlooks the simple fact that the operation was a military success; a success due in large part to the simple statement of the mission. This is not to say that the mission itself was simple or neat or tidy, but that the mission statement of the military objective to be accomplished was simple.5 Although the missions given the military forces involved in the Grenada invasion changed during the planning phase and even into the initial execution of the operation, the mission statement eventually included clearly identified militarily achievable objectives. This meant that the tactical commanders could focus their energies on execution, rather than interpretation, of the various missions. The mission to land a military force on a remote island to rescue a group of American citizens and then occupy and control the island was a difficult assignment, but it was one which was clearly defined and attainable. It had a clearly recognizable objective which, when accomplished, ended the military combat mission and provided a positive situation for withdrawal of the forces. It did meet the criteria of a good mission statement. Clear mission statements and specific objectives serve both to focus military planning and to impose parameters on the use of military force simply by being specific. The national leadership with a strategic perspective may include additional parameters or restrictions such as limiting the area of fighting or the use of specific weapons. Selection of a specific strategic military objective must also include a consideration that the cost of achieving this by force will in all probability include the loss of human lives. Any contemplation of the use of military power must consider the potential human cost. It is this loss of life which, if not considered before the deployment of military force, may let emotion run away with the conduct of war. It may well be that from the strategic perspective one of the parameters of employing military force is a restriction on loss of life. When the United States invaded Grenada one of the additional parameters which the strategic leadership imposed on the use of military force was a specific limitation on friendly losses. That restriction in turn had an effect on the planning and conduct of the 67


war in Grenada from the operational and tactical perspectives. Strategically, however, it had the advantage of being able to present the results of the use of military force as being worth the relatively low loss of friendly life. Such public debate as continues to take place in the aftermath of Grenada does not, as in the Lebanon debate, raise questions of clarity in the mission, simply because it did meet the criteria of the principle of the objective. The debate about Grenada may question whether the invasion was even necessary, but it cannot question whether or not the military force accomplished its assigned strategic mission and objective within the designated parameters. The Grenada debate does, however, raise questions of military competence as it focuses on things that went wrong. But since virtually all the military commanders involved in Grenada count that operation a success, critics who raise questions of competence might want to review one of the basic paradoxes of war: even the simplest thing is difficult to execute in the chaos of war. The only way war eventually achieves a new order is by first going through a period of chaos, chaos in which even the most beautifully conceived plans involving forces equipped with the latest technology will go awry. In the Lebanon debate the question of defining the strategic military mission is the crux of the matter. Because of the lack of a clearly stated strategic military objective and a plethora of strategic parameters which restricted the use of even the most basic elements of self-defense the marines never really had any chance of success when they became engulfed in war. There was virtually no way that the use of military force could be successful under such circumstances, because there was no specific goal which would have signaled success and provided an opportunity to withdraw the engaged tactical military forces on a positive note. Withdrawal of engaged military forces—and the US Marines in Lebanon were indeed engaged in war from the tactical perspective even if this was not recognized from the American strategic or operational perspectives of war at the time—under negative circumstances is generally always regarded as failure, and this appears to have been the outcome in Lebanon. In Lebanon the American military forces were the victims of the chaos of war rather than being able to overcome this chaos to achieve a favorable order. The tactical failure in Lebanon was virtually preordained by the strategic failure of the national leadership of that war to 68


understand and agree on the most basic elements of planning and conducting war—establishing a clear strategic military objective and issuing a clear mission statement. It was also a failure of the operational military commanders to demand a clear militarily achievable objective from the national leadership of the United States. Without a real understanding of how the military element was contributing to national goals the operational commanders simply saw no way to provide any sort of clear mission statement or tactical objective to the tactical military forces who eventually bore the brunt of ultimate failure, huge loss of life for no apparent reason. While employment of the military element demands clear attainable objectives expressed concisely, foreign policy goals which the diplomatic element may find useful are generally not precisely defined since diplomats require flexibility as they carry out national policy. Indeed, diplomats probably function better in an atmosphere of ambiguity. Keeping peace in the Middle East may certainly be a legitimate foreign policy goal for the United States, but it is simply too vague a mission to be given to a military force with any expectation of tangible results. The military setbacks of the United States in the Middle East in the 1980s have not been due so much to the incompetence of the military forces involved, as to the questionable wisdom of the national leadership in using the military to achieve a national goal which may not be appropriate for the use of military force. The employment of military force requires strict controls, the most important of which is a definite military strategic objective which begins with the national leadership responsible for the strategic perspective of war. The engagement of military forces in combat inevitably results in losses to both sides, regardless of who attains what objectives. In Grenada the military force sustained losses of both lives and materiel, but by accomplishing its mission, it provided a rationale for those losses. The strategic leadership apparently considered those costs beforehand, as evidenced by their imposition of a parameter limiting the number of friendly casualties. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the lack of a clear and decisive objective provided very little rationale for the extraordinarily high death toll suffered by the military force. In fact the high number of marines lost for no apparent reason exaggerates the absence of an objective because there appears to be no way that either the military or the public can rationalize those losses. 69


Not only does a clearly identified objective provide a focus for military efforts, it provides a reason for men and women to die. Members of the profession of arms understand the unlimited liability the state demands of them, but there is a tacit understanding that the state will not demand the lives of its military forces without good and sufficient reason. By not attaining a clear military objective visible from all perspectives of war which will rationalize heavy casualties, withdrawals become defeats. In the United States, for example, it is apparently easier to reconcile the American deaths incurred in the Second World War, which attained its clear objective of defeating Germany and Japan, than it is to understand the American lives lost in the Vietnam War with its more ambiguous strategic objectives. Clear objectives provide clear explanations for fighting both to the military forces doing the fighting and to the civilian populations supporting the fighters. Ultimately, any military fighting force will be judged on whether or not it achieved its assigned objective. The rationale which provides the reason for loss of life is important for maintaining morale in military units, but its importance goes well beyond that. It explains to the public what the military is doing. The military forces of virtually any country needs the public support of its citizens when it fights, and the national leadership must do whatever it can to gain and hold that support. A very important part of gaining public approval is the ability to show that lives were lost for a good reason. That reason is best explained when there is a clearly defined military objective which directly supports attaining a national goal. The American experiences in Lebanon and Grenada provide two extremes in public support. By virtually all accounts, Grenada won wide public support among the American people, while the feeling about Lebanon is one of confusion. These reactions are due in large part to the ability of the public to understand why military force was used to attain national goals. In Grenada, rescue the students; in Lebanon, keep the peace. It is easier to understand how military forces can accomplish rescues than it is to understand how they can keep the peace, especially in a confined and confused environment like Lebanon. It is also easier to understand why lives were worth losing in a positive mission like a rescue than in what is perceived as a negative mission where military forces were under enemy fire for no apparent reason. Even without a full understanding of the complexities of conducting war, the requirement for a clearly defined objective 70


before committing military forces to war is really one of simple common sense. Knowing what you are supposed to be doing before setting out to do it is something the public knows intuitively, and they certainly have every right to believe that the increasingly expensive military forces that they maintain with their taxes would know the same thing. The use of military force results from decisions made at the highest levels of government where leaders view war strategically. The goals of the nation determine the national policy which, in turn, determines military strategy. The subordination of military strategy to political authority from the strategic perspective of war simply means that the policies of the civilian government provide direction to the military leadership. The guidance provided by the civilian leadership is political. When this guidance directs the execution of military operations it becomes military strategy, and military strategy must support the political goals. The objectives of military strategy, however, must be attainable by the military forces available or those objectives fail the criteria of the principle of the objective. The basic requisite of successful military strategy is the designation of clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives. When viewing war from a strategic perspective the militarily achievable objectives must be clearly integrated with the other elements of power to achieve national goals. Without a clear and achievable military objective any use of military force will rapidly become an exercise in futility. In this day and age of virtually instant communications throughout the world news of the success or failure of military operations reaches the public television screens almost as fast as it reaches strategic and operational command posts. One of the first questions from news commentators will virtually always be “what is the military objective?” Even if it is not phrased exactly in that form, both broadcasters and viewers have enough common sense to wonder just what the military force is supposed to accomplish. Hopefully the national leadership will also have thought of that before the shooting starts. Although responsible for maintaining a strategic perspective of war as they offer advice to the national political authority, military professionals frequently have a tendency to take their tactical perspective (where they will generally have the most personal experience with the preparation and conduct of war) with them to solve strategic and operational problems. Indeed, most of any 71


country’s armed forces very properly train, plan, and actually conduct war from a tactical perspective. While tactical experience is certainly essential for senior military leadership, it is not in itself adequate to understand war as viewed from the operational and strategic perspectives, where the view must include an understanding of the other elements of national power. The military’s strategic role is to advise civilian leadership on the capability of military forces to execute specific missions. Whether they are large or small those missions must have a definite military objective. Without it any advice about required military capabilities becomes a wild guess without any real basis in fact. A thorough understanding of the situation surrounding the designated military objective is necessary for military planners to determine force requirements and for the military and civilian leadership to weigh the risks involved. Military leadership, regardless of the perspective of war, cannot blame its failures on political restrictions. There will always be political parameters placed on military operations, since the use of military force results after all, from political decisions. Those restrictions are more properly seen as parameters to be included as a part of the analysis of the situation which the military force will face, and they may actually be included in the mission statement. In fact a good mission statement establishes its own parameters. The mission statement given to Eisenhower which directed him to invade the continent of Europe established parameters when it directed him to aim at the heart of Germany and destroy its armed forces. That mission statement both focused the efforts of military forces and precluded them from simply concentrating on destroying German forces wherever they were. The operations were to aim toward the heart of Germany, and in the event that is what happened. Having this goal also provided a method of measuring progress in the form of advancing forces. It is incumbent on the highest military leadership to insist on a clear definition of the assigned mission, within the necessary political constraints. The chances of success increase with a clear objective and adequate forces. The military must make clear to the political authority that the new order which will result from the chaos of war is unpredictable. Having the military subordinate to civilian authority does not mean that there is a built-in excuse for military failure simply by blaming it on following the orders of civilian leadership. 72


Military officers, from whichever perspective they view war, have a responsibility both to their subordinates and to their superiors to ensure that their orders are clear; both the orders they receive and the orders they issue. The basis for issuing orders to military forces in war is the mission statement and the military objective. Unless both are clearly defined and militarily achievable, orders issued from any of the three perspectives of war will simply add to the chaos. Confusion in what the military forces are trying to achieve coupled with the chaos of war does not engender loyalty from the people who stand to lose their lives in trying to attain vague or ambiguous objectives. In order to cope with chaos in war individual members of any military force must have a strong foundation of confidence which manifests itself in loyalty to established authority. Loyalty, however, works two ways, top to bottom and bottom to top. The loyalty from the bottom so necessary to establish and maintain effective military forces will come only when there is a strong assurance of loyalty from the top. Loyalty from the top manifests itself by ensuring that the tactical forces who must ultimately fight and die will do so with a clear idea of their mission and objective. One of the most important facets of loyalty to subordinates from any perspective of war is ensuring that a military force has the best possible chance for success and survival before setting forth to do battle. This kind of loyalty starts at the very top, which means that rather than simply saying “yes sir” to every order they receive, the senior military leadership of a nation, with its strategic perspective, must analyse those orders for clear military objectives which have a reasonable chance of being achieved by available forces. If there is not such an objective, then those military leaders who directly advise civilian authorities must insist on one. Simply because there may be no guarantees of success when resorting to war to attain national goals does not mean that the decision to use military force should not be a reasoned one. War may be viewed as a last resort for resolving international disputes, but that does not mean that it has to be a futile, emotional decision. A clear objective will enhance the probability of success, and it will provide a measure of whether or not there has been success. The senior military leadership of a country not only has a responsibility to the national leadership, but to the nation itself. Part of its responsibility to the nation’s population is to ensure that the lives of its military forces will not be squandered for no apparent 73


reason. In spite of the proliferation of technology, waging war remains very much dependent on direct human participation. Indeed, one of the arguments for using manned strategic bombers instead of potentially more accurate missiles is that the manned bomber can be recalled if necessary whereas the missile, once on the way to its target, cannot come home. Whatever the technology of the future it will require a “man in the loop” to maintain control, at least for the foreseeable future. As the sole element of a society which has the responsibility to expend the lives of its citizens to achieve national goals, the profession of arms must ensure that the military leaders charged with that responsibility clearly understand their loyalties, both up, to the national political leadership, and down, to the people who will ultimately pay for obscure objectives and muddled missions with their lives. By its nature the military mind would really prefer to deal in black and white; victory or defeat. Although combat is in reality a series of shades of gray, its ultimate outcome will be hailed as victory or lamented as defeat. History, as it seeks to explain the past, will necessarily tidy up the battlefield so that virtually all battles will eventually be analysed to have had a clear winner and a clear loser. In fact, as quantitative analysis becomes more sophisticated, its demands for establishing methods to differentiate clearly between winners and losers of battles, campaigns and wars in the data base of historical experience can only increase. The difference between winners and losers can be measured most easily in terms of whether or not a military objective was achieved. Rescuing American students established a clear military objective, and the American military forces in Grenada produced a victory by accomplishing their assigned mission. Peace-keeping is a desirable, even noble, national goal, but it does not translate directly into a military objective. In Lebanon, with no other apparent objective than keeping peace, which obviously did not happen, there was very simply no victory. If there is no victory in war then there can only be defeat. Withdrawal with heavy losses and no clear objective having been attained must certainly be lamented as defeat. Military force must not be squandered in no-win situations with no clearly defined objective just because it appears there is nothing else to do. The senior military leadership of a nation has a loyalty to their civilian superiors to carry out appropriate military missions, but not at the cost of the loyalty they owe to the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen who will pay the ultimate price for obscure 74


objectives. The professional military prides itself on accepting all missions with a “can do” attitude, but in so doing may not always check for an achievable military objective. In an age of increasingly powerful weaponry there is a real danger that the senior leadership of a nation, both civilian and military, may choose to blast its way through any vague areas in the mission rather than take the time to analyse the situation to determine if the use of military force is the right choice. Responding to sniper fire with a salvo or two of 16-inch naval guns does not make the objective any clearer; when the smoke clears with no apparent effect on the sniper it only reemphasizes the apparent lack of a definite goal in the first place. In the absence of a clearly defined mission statement and no decisive and attainable military objective, the nation’s military leadership must have the moral courage to question the suitability of the use of military force. The most powerful military force in the world is useless without an appropriate objective on which to focus its energy. As military power increases around the world random use of military force can only be detrimental to the global community. As the means of war become more powerful and available its usefulness to attain desirable ends becomes more problematic. In the nineteenth century a well equipped and organized military force from an industrialized state could have a high level of confidence that it could overcome a more primitive military force in spite of vague mission statements which might have involved a variety of national elements of power. Today, however, virtually every country in the world which lusts after the sophisticated machinery of modern war will find a way to get it, often even at the expense of their own national economy. The latter half of the twentieth century has seen more than one military superpower humbled by what was perceived as a primitive military force. More than ever before the use of military force demands a clear mission statement and a military objective. The forces of modern war are simply too powerful to be used indiscriminately.

75

5 CONDUCTING WAR

Therefore I have heard of military operations that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and lasted a long time. It is never beneficial to a nation to have a military operation continue for a long time. Sun Tzu The Art of War The precise nature of the order which will eventually emerge from the chaos of war is always unpredictable. Maintaining some semblance of control over war’s inherent chaos is essential if there is to be any hope of influencing the emergent order. Virtually the only way to control the chaos of war is to keep that chaos as brief as possible. While the conduct of war involves all the elements of national power, it is the military element of power which directly confronts the chaos of war. Even when wars drag on for long periods of time the actual chaos of direct military confrontation will generally comprise only a small portion of that time. In long wars most of the time will be spent preparing for and recovering from the chaos of war. During the periods of order in the midst of a war, and during times of peace when there is no real war, military leaders and commanders analyse the situation facing them to determine how the use of military force might best assist the attainment of national goals. Analysis of the situation and consideration of appropriate military missions is a continuing process for any nation which maintains a standing military establishment. The actual use of military force, however, must not be allowed to drag on into lengthy periods of chaos. The longer the periods of chaos, the less predictable the resultant order. The application of military force from any of 76

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the three perspectives of war should be short, decisive, and directed toward a definite objective. Rapid execution of plans and orders to attain a decisive objective is the proper way to use military force in pursuit of national goals. Once the mission and military objective have been established within a specific situation military force must actually be employed to attain the desired goal. The details of how a military force will execute its assigned mission constitute operations plans and orders wherein a military commander explains to subordinate commanders how they will all work together to accomplish the assigned mission. Operations plans and orders describe and transmit the ways of the ends, ways, and means of applying military force. The heart of an operations plan or order from any of the three perspectives of war is the military commander’s concept of the operation. A good commander’s concept of the operation will be a concise description of the way that commander plans to conduct the battle, campaign, or war depending on the perspective of war. In the concept of the operation the commander paints a picture of how all the elements of a military force must work together to accomplish the assigned mission and attain the designated military objective. In the concept of the operation the commander expresses the way he plans to impose his will on the enemy force. Although it may sometimes appear that technology dominates the vision of modern warfare, the chaos of actually conducting war continues to require, as it has always required, human will to shape the order which will come from the chaos. War is a contest of human wills wherein each side seeks to force the opponent to accept an unfavorable order. Regardless of the perspective of war, success will ultimately go to the commander who can dominate the will of the other. The commander’s concept of the operation expresses the way that will translates into military action. The concept of the operation is a concise statement of how the commander plans to use military force to impose the desired order on the opponent. Just as a clearly defined objective is essential to success in war, so is a clearly stated concept of the operation essential to the decisive use of military force. The objective and the concept of the operation together provide the essence of actually applying military force to attain an objective. A clear concept of the operation, however, can only come from a clear objective, so if the commander cannot clearly identify the objective the resultant concept of the operation will more than likely be vague, providing little useful 77


guidance to subordinates. A concise concept of the operation based on a clearly defined military objective leaves no doubt about the way a commander intends to use military force to impose his will on the opponent. The concept of the operation provides the foundation for planning and conducting successful military operations. Expanding the concept of the operation into operations plans and orders gives specific instructions to the subordinate elements of a military force. Operations plans and orders integrate the myriad activities required for a modern military force to accomplish its assigned mission. Based on the commander’s concept of the operation, operations plans and orders identify each subordinate element in the military force and concisely state what each of those elements will be expected to accomplish. Each subordinate element will receive a mission to accomplish which contributes to the accomplishment of the larger force’s mission. Military planners consider the desired ends and the available means as they develop the ways to use military forces to attain the desired order. While providing direction to today’s large, complex military forces has the potential for developing into a very complex description of how to accomplish the mission, commanders must continually strive to keep the description of the ways as simple as possible. The simpler the plans, the more likely they will be successful from any perspective of war. Although simplicity is desirable from any of the three perspectives of war, it is something of a paradox that operations plans and orders tend to become more detailed and specific as the perspective of war becomes less complex. Viewing war from a higher perspective requires more consideration of the non-military elements of national power and the focus should not be on precise, detailed instructions. As the perspective of war becomes more focused on the military element then more detailed instructions become both proper and necessary. The tactical perspective of war, focused as it is on the purely military concerns of the chaos of war, and indeed contributing directly to that chaos, requires firm control. Therefore, detailed instructions are more appropriate for the tactical perspective of war than they would be at the operational or strategic perspectives. Strategic or operational commanders and leaders simply must resist the temptation to become too involved in those details of planning and execution more properly left to the tactical military commanders. Military commanders with an operational perspective must maintain enough distance, both physically and psychologically, to gain a 78

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reasonably objective view of the conduct of the war and be able to evaluate the progress or lack thereof toward accomplishing the assigned mission. The conduct of war from the operational perspective has perhaps the most impact on the ultimate success of using military force. It is this perspective which links the national goals set by the strategic perspective with the tactical military forces which actually use force to attain the desired order. Although there are no set rules, there are three basic characteristics which make the operational perspective of war the essential link between the strategic and tactical perspectives. First, the planning and conduct of war from the operational perspective has strategic aims which link it to the strategic perspective of war. Operational commanders establish the tactical objectives to be attained by the tactical forces, which links the operational perspective to the tactical perspective of war. Second, the operational perspective encompasses the air, land, and sea armed forces which comprise a nation’s military forces. The strategic perspective of war coordinates all elements of national power, while the operational perspective of war focuses on integrating and coordinating the activities of disparate tactical forces toward a single military objective. The tactical perspective of war focuses on the activities of only one of the three services of the armed forces: air, land, or sea. Third, maneuver, in the broadest sense of the term, is the essence of conducting war from the operational perspective. The operational commander designs a campaign to attain the strategic goals, so that when the tactical forces fight their battles, they will pit their strength against their opponent’s weakness, rather than pitting strength against strength. This maneuver of friendly strength against enemy weakness directed from the operational perspective provides the greatest potential for a successful end without squandering the precious means of lives and national treasure. Because of the natural desire to maintain as much order as possible in war, from any of the three perspectives commanders issuing orders will be tempted to provide detailed instructions in an effort to maintain close control, while commanders receiving orders will want to see less detailed instructions so as to give them a freer hand in their conduct of war. Resolution of these two essentially contradictory desires requires a combination of doctrinal instructions and understanding between the commanders involved. Developing close working relationships between commanders and a mutual 79


understanding of doctrinal requirements well before actually going into the conduct of war can eliminate much of this potential problem. Because the chaos of war will exacerbate even minor misunderstandings, military commanders, planners, and subordinate commanders must maintain a close and constant dialogue from the initial stages of planning through the execution to the actual accomplishment of the mission. The conduct of war from the operational perspective has the greatest potential for problems and misunderstandings, because the operational perspective of war is where senior military commanders must integrate the military forces of air, land, and sea. Whenever these different military forces have to work together it will be inherently more difficult to resolve problems of doctrine and personality than if the force was from only one medium. The difficulties arise simply because the very different environments provide different backgrounds for the military officers who have to work together. The operational perspective focuses on so-called joint operations, which consist of military forces from air, land, and sea working closely together. While the concept of joint operations is essential to successful planning and conduct of modern war, it also presents problems because the rather different cultural environments of the air, land, and sea services develop or grow their respective officers in rather different ways. As a result, when officers from these different cultures come together to organize, plan, and execute joint operations in wartime they can often have difficulty understanding each other. Each service’s culture produces different patterns of professional knowledge, belief, and behavior which in turn influences the way officers learn and transmit information among themselves. Officers of different services may have difficulty in communicating with each other. These different cultures are the natural product of years of operating in one of three specific functional areas. Indeed, much of the service-specific culture may in fact be essential to survival in its own environment. While each military service in any nation will have its own peculiarities and unique culture which allow its officers to function effectively in its peculiar medium, the same attributes which provide for the effective conduct of war from the tactical, or service, perspective, may actually cause problems when those officers try to work together from the operational perspective of war. In fact, because the view from the strategic perspective of war is so broad, 80

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officers from different services may find more agreement there then they can from the operational perspective. The necessity for military commanders to put aside their cultural differences frequently makes cooperation between the services difficult from the operational perspective. Some of that difficulty may be resolved by developing a bit of understanding of other cultures. Just as the various races of mankind sometimes have difficulty understanding each other unless they take the time to learn something about each other’s cultural differences and similarities, so do military officers of different services. Armies are land forces which fight as combined arms teams. Each member of the team must do its part while relying on the other members of the team to do theirs. The teams, which can range in size from four soldiers in a tank to the literally hundreds of different kinds of units in an army group, are interdependent; one cannot effectively do its job without the assistance of others. In armies the enlisted or other ranks do the actual fighting, while army officers are planners, coordinators, and leaders. From their day of commissioning army officers learn that they must rely on others to support them in the conduct of war even while they must support others. Army officers, therefore, expect to work together as they plan and conduct war, so they are often surprised when they meet with what they might perceive as a lack of cooperation from officers of other services. The land environment is also very dirty; there is dirt everywhere, and an army’s machinery and weapons must operate effectively in that dirt. This dirty environment means that low technology solutions may frequently prove more useful to an army officer than the latest in high technology, which may be allergic to all that dirt. In contrast to armies, navies are by nature much more technology oriented. Man cannot even exist at sea without technology of some sort. From the first day that a sailor sailed out of sight of land navies have been on the lookout for new and better technology to serve them at sea. The sea is not man’s natural habitat, and sailors welcome any technological advance which will give them an advantage over the sea. This desire for a technological advantage becomes even more acute when sailing into war where not only the sea, but a hostile enemy will be trying to do harm to the navy’s ships, their machines of war. Navies, in fact, fight as individual machines. Officers and enlisted ranks become coordinated pieces of a fighting machine, the ship, which the captain, after years of preparation, leads. At sea the captain of the ship rules with complete authority. When a 81


navy captain directs his ship to change direction the crew carries out the order and the ship simply moves off in the desired direction. When his counterpart on land, an army colonel commanding a brigade, orders a left turn, the best he can hope for is that most of the brigade will eventually turn left, and even then it will be hours before he knows with any certainty who turned where. While a number of ships will certainly work together as a team, that team really consists only of the captains of the ships, rather unlike army teams where every soldier from private to general is a team member. Naval officers revere their ship captains, and they tend to look to a single strong leader to make decisions in a crisis. As a result they may be reluctant to enter into discussions about cooperation that they may perceive as lacking strong individual leadership. Where navies are technology oriented, air forces are high technology oriented. While ships have been known to survive at sea for considerable periods of time even if much of their technology fails, airplanes simply do not have that luxury. When an airplane fails in the air it simply falls to the ground, hard. Air force officers demand perfection from the technology which makes them, as pilots and weapons officers, the air warriors. Generally, the enlisted ranks in air forces provide their support before and after the air battle, while the officers do the actual fighting. These air warriors depend on their ability to fight with the high technology weaponry at their command in the conduct of war, and they soon develop a very high degree of confidence in high technology. Air-force officers tend to look for technological solutions to solve tough problems of all types. In a joint environment they may shun the Navy’s strong leader or the army’s cooperative approach to problem solving in favor of a technical answer. The cultural differences in military officers outlined above are, of course, general and to some degree exaggerated to make the point, but they are none the less there. When officers from different services work together conducting joint operations from the operational perspective of war they have to understand that there may be deep-seated cultural reasons why they may have different ideas on how to solve problems. To an air-force officer, for example, it may seem that an army officer is resistant to high technology, while at the same time the army officer may be critical of the airforce officer for always seeking the high technology solution. The solution is not to change each other’s cultural point of view, but to understand that each will have a different cultural background. 82

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This necessity for cultural understanding is a fundamental characteristic of the operational perspective of war. Military commanders who view war from this perspective must be able to rise above their relatively narrow cultural backgrounds to integrate air, land, and sea forces to attain the assigned strategic objectives. The operational perspective of war requires officers to temper the tactical experience they bring from their service as they advise the national leaders who view war strategically. Since civilians with a strategic perspective of war may have little or no personal military experience they may not be aware of the potentially divisive cultural differences in their military advisors. It is therefore up to senior military leaders to understand these differences and rise above them when they conduct war from the operational perspective, which demands service coordination. Coordination of a different sort defines the strategic perspective, where the activities of all a nation’s elements of national power must be focused on attaining the desired new order. With its strategic perspective the national leadership should provide only those general instructions regarding the movement and employment of military forces necessary to coordinate those movements with the other elements of national power also directly involved with achieving the same or complementary national goals. Leaders viewing war strategically have the responsibility for the decision to actually use military force. From the strategic perspective planning and conducting war consists essentially of coordinating a wide variety of systems which constitute the national elements of power. The strategic perspective of war creates an environment favorable to the application of military force to attain national goals. It then falls in the purview of the military commanders viewing war from the operational perspective to determine exactly when and where that military force can be used to best advantage within the parameters set by the national leadership. After the strategic leadership creates an appropriate environment for using military force, the senior military leadership with the operational perspective shapes that environment to provide an advantageous time and place for the tactical forces to actually fight the war. Shaping the environment is part of controlling the chaos of war and contributes to establishing the desired new order which will come after the war. The very senior military commanders viewing war operationally will determine the tactical objectives necessary to accomplish the strategic mission and attain strategic 83


objectives. They may provide some details of how to accomplish the tactical objectives they assign to their subordinates, but from the operational perspective the details of the way to conduct the war tactically must remain general. Operational commanders concern themselves primarily with moving their assigned tactical forces into position to fight and then supporting those forces; they do not meddle in the details of exactly how to conduct the fighting. After the national leadership, both civilian and military, with its strategic perspective decides to use military force, and the senior military leadership with its operational perspective decides when and where to fight, it is up to tactical military commanders and leaders to actually conduct the fight successfully. The tactical perspective of war works within the environment created by the strategic leadership and then shaped by operational military commanders. Within this shaped environment military commanders viewing war from the tactical perspective may well direct their subordinates with considerable detail in the employment of their forces as they seek to conduct the actual fighting of war with utmost effectiveness. The tactical leadership generally deals with the forces of only one service, air, land, or sea. The tactical perspective faces directly into the chaos of war. Generally speaking, when viewing war from this perspective there is simply no such thing as too much force. Once the decision is made to use force then adequate force must be applied to attain the assigned objective quickly and decisively. Modern war is not a fair fight where each side tries to apply equivalent force with specific rules to govern its conduct. The goal in war, especially when viewing it tactically, is to execute the plans and orders to attain the objective quickly and decisively. The higher the perspective of war, the less specific the instructions contained in operations plans and orders will be. Generally, the higher the perspective from which a military commander views the war the further away from the fighting that commander will necessarily be. While decisions at the strategic perspective do have the benefit of a wider view of war, at the same time they lack the focus on the actual fighting that the tactical perspective provides. Although modern communications give the military leaders and commanders who view war from the strategic and operational perspectives the capability to intervene in tactical decisions, they must resist the temptation to try and do everything themselves. Current technology tempts military leaders and commanders at 84

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all levels of command to become involved with the very lowest of command in the conduct of war, but involvement with decisions best left to the tactical perspective of war means getting emotionally involved with the chaos of war. This emotional involvement endangers the objective analysis and decisions required of the higher perspectives of war. There are a variety of reasons why leaders and commanders should strive to stay within their appropriate perspective of war when making decisions. Senior military leaders have a responsibility to train their subordinates, and part of this training is making decisions under stress. If, however, junior leaders continually have a higher authority making those tough decisions for them they will never have the opportunity to face the challenge of decisions under stress. While it may appear to the higher, and more distant, decision makers that they understand the situation viewed from the tactical perspective, the crucial intangibles such as morale and effective leadership can be sensed only by the tactical leaders on the ground, doing the fighting. The senior military leaders of a nation select their successors from within the ranks of their subordinates. By not leaving decisions at the appropriate perspective of war senior military leaders do their subordinates a disservice and may even be weakening the capabilities of future senior national military leaders. Dealing with the chaos of war depends largely on the confidence of those who actually conduct war. Regardless of their perspective, military leaders and commanders at all levels must know that their superiors have confidence in them to make the right decision. Just as loyalty is a two-way street, with responsibilities which run from higher to lower as well as from lower to higher, so is confidence. A national military leadership which displays confidence in its subordinates to make tough decisions in the conduct of war will in turn gain the confidence of their subordinates as they understand that they will be allowed to make decisions and conduct their portion of the war with a minimum of interference. The command climate must include, however, holding commanders at all levels of command responsible for their decisions, both good and bad. The necessity to allow the freedom to make decisions from the various perspectives of war and the levels of command within those perspectives constitutes another of war’s paradoxes. Within and between each of the three perspectives of war there is a dynamic tension between giving subordinates freedom to conduct war as 85


they see fit and retaining control of their actions at the highest possible level of command in an effort to reduce the unpredictability of war. This tension between centralized and decentralized conduct of war affects all military activities. There is simply no single solution which will apply to all situations. Resolution of the tension depends as much on personalities of the leaders and commanders involved as it does on textbook solutions. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War provides the opportunity to compare the effects of centralized and decentralized conduct of war. The Egyptian command structure on the one hand was very centralized with decisions made at the very highest levels of national command. The Israeli system, on the other hand, decentralized decisions to a very low level of command. In the event neither system was able to cope adequately with all the situations which presented themselves during the course of that short war in October 1973. As it turned out, the two different approaches tended to complement each other, since a failure on one side frequently contributed to a success on the other. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War was really a period of chaos in a war which has been going on for over forty years. Prior to the 1973 war the protagonists had had sixteen years of relative order, although the operative word here is relative, since relations between Egypt and Israel from 1967 to 1973 could hardly be called good. The decisions which led to how to conduct the 1973 war on both sides stem from the results of the 1967 war. In 1967 Israel so soundly defeated the Egyptians that the Israeli high command contracted a case of victory fever. Israel believed “her armed forces were invincible.”1 Egypt’s armed forces, for their part, “acquired a stimulus towards the improvement of their professional capabilities.”2 The conduct of the 1967 war had been marked by inspired leadership and initiative at all levels of command in the Israeli forces, while the Egyptians suffered from a distinct lack of leadership in their conduct of the war, especially at the lower levels of command.3 The Israeli success in 1967 led her to leave her basic doctrine on how to conduct war essentially unchanged, but the Egyptian failure prompted that country to examine her doctrine for the conduct of war rather closely. To demonstrate their ability to conduct war to Israel and the rest of the world the Egyptian forces concentrated on developing a doctrine to conduct war under stringent controls which would reduce the chaos and 86

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unpredictability of war. This necessitated a highly centralized system of conducting war. During the opening assault of the war across the Suez Canal the Egyptian Army conducted a highly centralized battle. The complex canal crossing included thousands of troops and pieces of war machinery, all of which had to be in the right place at the right time. The Egyptian high command imposed a rigid order on the chaos of war which endured with great success during the offensive phase of the campaign. The Israeli system of conducting war in a very decentralized manner floundered in the opening days of the Suez campaign as individual strong commanders from all levels of command sought to have their will done. Forced to react to the surprise of simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian attacks, the Israelis’ decentralized conduct of the war simply could not adequately cope with the chaos of war. In fact it may well have exacerbated the chaos as the Israeli high command tried to figure out who was in charge. Only when Egypt halted her offensive into the Sinai and adopted a defensive posture did Israel manage to regroup. During the initial Egyptian offensive the ineffectiveness of Israel’s inept decentralized conduct of the defense played nicely into the Egyptian centralized conduct of the offense. By the time the Israelis dispensed with the Syrian threat in the Golan Heights and were able to turn their full attention to the Suez, their decentralized method proved its effectiveness as Israeli armored forces were able to find a weak point in the Egyptian defense and conduct a counter-crossing of the Suez Canal. The successful Israeli canal crossing was due in large part to the inability of the Egyptians to coordinate the counterattacks launched by their two armies as the Israelis exploited the boundary between them. While the Israeli decentralized conduct of the war allowed tactical commanders to make their decisions on the ground without recourse to higher and higher headquarters, the Egyptians attempted to react with decisions from the leadership viewing the war from the strategic perspective. Unlike the opening assault of the war, the centralized Egyptians could not dominate the chaos of war in a constantly changing situation, whereas the Israeli decentralized conduct of war had the flexibility to shape the chaos to its advantage. Although the situation was reversed, as with the opening offensive of the war, the two approaches to conducting war worked against each other; the Israeli decentralized conduct of their offensive 87


was actually helped by the centralized defense of the Egyptians, which simply could not react in a timely fashion. Although war in general is usually thought of as the actual application of force by the military element of power, clashes between armed forces are really only one aspect of the broader framework of war. All of a nation’s elements of power—political, economic, psychological, technological, and whatever else a particular nation can bring to bear on an opponent—contribute to its capability to wage war; strategy is the coordination of those elements to attain the desired national goal. In the context of war’s three perspectives the national civilian and military leadership with their strategic perspective of war conduct the national war effort; the senior military commanders with their operational perspective conduct the coordination of the military forces of all services, air, land, and sea, to attain military strategic goals; and the tactical military commanders conduct the actual fighting. Regardless of their perspective, military commanders concern themselves with three things: what they are to do, how they will do it, and what they will have to do it; as we saw earlier, these are the ends, ways, and means of war. The ends, the ways, and the means of war must always be in balance. If a commander from any perspective or level of command receives an objective, or end, but does not concurrently receive adequate means to accomplish that end then it is doubtful that the objective will be attained no matter how skillful the ways employed. While there will always be risk in war, inadequate means, ill-defined ends, or unclear ways will quickly increase prudent risk to reckless gamble. Statesmen have properly warned that war is much too serious to be left to the generals, but war is also too serious for gamblers, in or out of uniform, who do not carefully consider the proper balance of ends, ways, and means in their decision to conduct war. At the national level of command a state conducts war from a strategic perspective. For the so-called superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, national strategy sets global priorities for the elements of national power. National strategy establishes how the various elements of power will be used in conjunction with one another to secure national goals or objectives. Military strategy is the plan for using the military element of national power to attain national goals. Civilian and military leadership at the national level conduct war from a strategic perspective. They 88

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determine which national goals can and will be achieved by the application of military power within a specific situation, and they define the militarily achievable objectives which will support those national goals. Only after determining that there are suitable militarily achievable objectives to be attained by military power can they decide how and what military power they will apply or threaten to apply to achieve the desired strategic objectives. When the national leadership balances the strategic ends, ways, and means of waging war there are a variety of factors to consider involving more than just the military element of power. Regardless of their perspective of planning and conducting war, the essential role of military leaders and commanders is balancing the ends, ways, and means. In general, the techniques for doing this are essentially the same from any of the three perspectives. The specific considerations, however, will vary depending on the perspective. The strategic perspective, where there is generally a longer view of planning and conducting war, must take into account such things as the state’s industrial mobilization capability, the ratio of reserve forces to active forces, and the percentage of gross national product devoted to maintenance of standing armed forces. In the course of deciding whether or not the use of military power is appropriate, the national leadership with its strategic perspective must consider exactly how using military force will support attainment of national political goals. Because wars can easily take on a life of their own wherein states find themselves waging war simply for the sake of waging war, the national leadership should consider whether or not the war will be long or short. While most wars probably start with the expectation of being short (after all if there is any sort of rational analysis one would not start a war unless one knew precisely the goal and presumably had the wherewithal to attain that goal fairly rapidly), they frequently end up being rather lengthy affairs. Wars have a tendency to drag on as the desired strategic goals, frequently intangible and ill-defined at best, require more and more time, treasure, and lives to attain. The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s is perhaps an example of a war which dragged on for no readily apparent reason except to attain the intangible goal of making the other side quit fighting. In the event both countries simply managed to exhaust themselves just to maintain the ante bellum status quo. 89


The television images of the Iran-Iraq War reflected a war apparently waged primarily on emotion. Emotional haranguing of the fighting forces by the national leadership preceded major offensives, which then ended with marginal gains in territory by one side or the other along with long lists of casualties. Neither national leadership apparently had any clearly defined objective except to win the war. With no clear definition of winning available to the military forces involved, however, the war simply ground on until the balance of ends, ways, and means from the strategic perspective of war on both sides got so far out of kilter that the war simply stopped. It is not clear whether either side actually attained any desired ends since these were never clearly defined; the ways of conducting the war were generally conservative, as Iraq used technology to offset the manpower disadvantage while Iran used manpower to offset the technology disadvantage; and both countries managed virtually to destroy their economies as they eventually exhausted their means of waging war. The order that eventually emerged from the chaos of that war is not so very different from the order that preceded it except that both Iran and Iraq are both considerably the worse for all the wear and tear. The Iran-Iraq War, however, is simply the most recent example of why long wars are so undesirable.4 Conducting war with any sort of rational basis requires a clear objective or reason for the war. From the strategic perspective, attainment of this objective may require application and co-ordination of all of the elements of national power. While establishment of strategic military objectives is a cooperative effort between military and civilian leadership, attainment of those objectives is clearly the responsibility of the operational military commanders. The necessary military forces, both human and materiel, must be provided to operational military commanders at the same time as they receive the strategic objectives. The military commander must then design the campaign, which outlines the ways in which the allocated means will be used to gain the assigned ends. From the operational perspective military commanders plan and conduct campaigns to attain strategic objectives. A campaign is a series of military operations which forms a distinct phase of a war. Although in recent years the word campaign seems to have become more closely associated with domestic politics than the conduct of war, its original meaning was definitely military. Campaign is also a verb meaning to go on a campaign. While campaigning has a 90

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vaguely old-fashioned air to it in this age of high technology, it remains the essence of how military commanders view the planning and conduct of war operationally. Planning and conducting war from the operational perspective consists of designing and executing campaigns which determine where and when tactical forces will fight. Campaigning in the modern world includes ensuring that tactical commanders have the appropriate forces to conduct their fight successfully in concert with the other elements of national power. The operational perspective focuses on the campaign while the strategic perspective coordinates the activities of the elements of national power to attain the desired national goal. Military campaigns can have a variety of purposes, but they will always have as their proper goal a militarily achievable, clearly identifiable, and decisive strategic objective. These strategic objectives come from the national military and civilian leadership. Frequently the strategic aim will be an intangible goal such as defeating the enemy by destroying his will or ability to make war. When the strategic goal is such an intangible, senior operational military leaders must develop specific militarily achievable tactical objectives for their subordinates which will contribute to the intangible strategic goal. In the case of such intangible goals the operational military leadership must maintain a close and continuous dialogue with the strategic leadership to ensure that the specifically selected tactical objectives are appropriate to the intangible strategic goal. Military commanders conduct campaigns in a specified time and space and in a specific situation. Planning for a campaign from the operational perspective begins upon receipt of a strategic objective. At the same time as a military commander receives the strategic objective there will usually also be constraints or limitations on how to use the military force provided for the mission. These parameters influence campaign planning and help ensure the coordination of the national elements of power to achieve the desired goals. This is especially true when the strategic goals are intangible. For example, an enemy’s will to fight could be destroyed by the use of nuclear weapons, but the commander planning the campaign to achieve the strategic objective will, in all probability, not receive authorization to use nuclear weapons. That lack of authority is a parameter or limitation for planning and execution of the campaign. After receipt of the objective and any parameters for the planning and conduct of the campaign the operational military commander conducts an analysis of the situation to determine exactly what 91


must be done and what is available to do it. He analyses the assigned ends and available means to determine the ways of his campaign. In his concept of the operation, he visualizes the way the campaign will unfold to achieve the assigned ends, the strategic objective. To facilitate future operations he may divide the campaign into segments or phases each of which will be directed toward a specific end, a tactical objective, which contributes to eventually attaining the ultimate strategic goal. Operational commanders must design campaigns which become the ways they use the assigned means to attain the desired ends. A campaign plan is simply war viewed and planned from the operational perspective; it is how the operational commander prepares to cope with the chaos of war. In viewing war from the operational perspective, the commander does not fight battles. Rather, he organizes and maneuvers forces and allocates resources so that his subordinate commanders viewing war tactically will be in a position to fight the battles which will contribute to the success of the campaign. The operational commander generally controls and maneuvers military forces from two or more of the separate services of the armed forces of a country. In general terms the operational commander maneuvers air, land, and sea forces in coordination with one another. Tactical commanders deal only with the forces of one service. Ideally a commander could maneuver his forces in such a way that the enemy force would be rendered ineffective without ever resorting to battle. Sun Tzu, writing over 2,000 years ago, observed that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Although in maneuvering forces “to subdue the enemy without fighting,” it must be apparent to both sides that the forces are actually ready and willing to fight. There can be no valid threat of force from any perspective of war without both sides being clearly aware that there is the intent to fight. The operational commander uses his campaign plan to pass the concept of the operation along with specific assignments to his tactical commanders so they will know his intentions and therefore how to react to unexpected situations on the battlefield without having to interrupt the momentum of a successful battle. The campaign plan is a sort of road map from the operational perspective which outlines how tactical military forces will achieve the necessary tactical objectives which will eventually lead to the strategic objective. 92

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This map of the campaign is how the tactical commanders learn where and when they will fight. From the tactical perspective war becomes paradoxically both simpler and more complex. It is simpler because commanders deal only with military forces, generally from a single service, to attain specific tactical military objectives. Tactical military commanders deal with the other elements of national power only peripherally, if at all, although as war moves to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict the tactical and the strategic perspectives of war tend to collapse toward each other. On the other hand, war is more complex from the tactical perspective because tactical commanders must deal directly with the enemy. While all perspectives must consider the enemy and its capabilities, generally only from the tactical perspective of war will commanders directly confront the enemy. Even without the enemy the employment of a modern military force with its vast array of complex weapons and equipment is difficult at best. The addition of an enemy who wants to disrupt that already complex employment of military forces makes the difficult become next to impossible without detailed plans to provide at least a starting point for tactical commanders, since virtually no plan survives its first contact with the enemy in the chaos of war. This is true of all the perspectives of war, and all military commanders must be able to deal with the fog of war. Although the planning process is important, it is the fog of war, featuring incomplete intelligence on the enemy and imperfect information on friendly forces, which dictates that commanders have the flexibility and capability to be able to change plans even in the midst of the chaos of war. In fact, good military planning from any of the three perspectives of war must include plans to change plans. This is simply a method of saying that military leaders and commanders, regardless of their perspective, must be prepared to adapt their plans to the situation. They must also constantly evaluate whether the desired ends must change as the available means fluctuate according to the course of the conduct of war. Military leaders and commanders must provide clear guidance in the concept of the operation so that subordinates will be able to carry on in the fog of war. The specific instructions must provide flexibility for freedom of operation by subordinates while concurrently ensuring that all elements of the command will work together. 93


Between the fog of war, which provides only an incomplete picture of what happens in battle, and the chaos of war, which confuses the results of battle, even an apparently simple application of military force will be difficult. While it may sometimes appear easy from the strategic perspective to envision conducting surgical strikes where high technology weapons always hit their military targets and leave noncombatants alone, military commanders from any perspective must be aware that the enemy would like nothing better than to snatch away the surgeon’s scalpel before he has a chance to make the incision. The inherent chaos of war dictates that conducting even the most successful application of military force to attain a desired order will virtually always be a rather messy affair. Some sort of doctrinal framework which guides all military commanders in the planning and conduct of war is essential to ensure that operations plans and orders are clearly understood at all levels of command. Doctrine alone, however, cannot provide any guarantee of success in the conduct of war. The chaos of war is inherently unpredictable and decisions from any perspective of war must take that unpredictability into account. Although war may be unpredictable, it can also be understood, and the more leaders and commanders understand it, the better they can effectively apply military force to achieve national objectives. This understanding, however, requires study in addition to practical experience, since actual experience in war is difficult to acquire and may, in fact, be misleading. This has been especially true since the end of the Second World War and the advent of nuclear weapons, which has caused militarily powerful nations to adopt national policies of deterring war. The military must understand war in order to deter war, and the only way to effectively deter war is to be prepared to conduct war. The more successful the deterrence, the less opportunity the military has to gain experience in conducting war. This means that the pursuit of understanding war cannot be confined simply to personal experience for either the individual or the country. As a result of this necessity to widen the study of war, the United States, for example, periodically changes its doctrine for conducting war in response to its experiences and the experiences of other nations on the battlefields of the world. Starting in the late 1970s, continued study of campaigns and wars conducted throughout the world during and since the Second World War prompted the 94

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United States Army to widen its narrow focus on the tactical perspective of war. Although the vast majority of any country’s military force will have a tactical perspective of war there is a danger that over-concentration on that perspective will result in ignorance (at best, incompetence at worst) in viewing war from either the operational or strategic perspectives. The danger is especially applicable to the operational perspective since that is a wholly military responsibility, and the senior military leadership who view the conduct of war from the operational perspective may want to over-rely on their personal tactical experience. Solutions appropriate to problems viewed from the tactical perspective may not be useful, and may even be counterproductive, when viewing war from the operational perspective, since the tactical perspective concentrates on the activities of only one military service while the operational perspective requires the integration of air, land, and sea forces to be successful. The many years the Unites States Army spent fighting in Vietnam left it with a definite tactical perspective on war. This tactical focus reached its culmination in 1976 when the US Army’s doctrine concentrated almost exclusively on tactics. About the same time critics, both inside and outside the US Army, began to comment on the absence of doctrine applicable to the operational perspective of war. Since then the US Army has spent considerable time studying and designing doctrine appropriate for the operational perspective. The resultant doctrinal debate has also sparked an examination of the art and science of war. While the terms “art of war” and “science of war” are frequently mentioned in these doctrinal discussions, there is no agreement on which is the better descriptor. They are not, however, mutually exclusive. The conduct of war is both an art and a science. Although war is both art and science, depending on the perspective of war, it may be either more art or more science. From the strategic perspective it would appear that war is primarily science as would-be strategists often fling numbers around with gay abandon with the apparent idea that matching numbers on one side with numbers on the other will determine the outcome. The application of force from the strategic perspective is a balance which is probably as much art as science. Making the basic decision of whether or not to conduct a war is laden with emotion, although science certainly finds its way into the strategic balancing of ends, ways, and means as the national leadership brings all elements of national power to 95


bear. Balancing the ends, ways, and means of war from the strategic perspective is more than mathematical calculations no matter how sophisticated the computer technology available to today’s military leadership. Viewed from the operational perspective, the planning and conduct of war tends to be more art than science, since it depends largely on the situation at hand. There are no precise or exact scientific rules to use when planning and conducting the campaigns which integrate the military forces on air, land, and sea. Successful campaigns depend heavily on the imagination of operational commanders, and imagination is more the realm of art than science. The tactical perspective is clearly more science than art, although the actual chaos of battle does not generally appear all that scientific. In fact, in some military establishments such as the Soviet Union, the tactical perspective is virtually all science; military commanders do not so much make plans as simply choose from doctrinal options developed by a scientific study of war. Tactical commanders in the Soviet Union simply make scientific decisions based on the situation. While the Soviet solution may appear to be the extreme application of science to tactics, virtually all other tactical doctrines will rely heavily on battle drills or other such repetitive training so that tactical plans and decisions made in the midst of the chaos of war have some semblance of predictability. As with the strategic perspective of war, however, the tactical perspective is not completely devoid of art, since even in the Soviet system humans will make the decisions and humans will carry out the instructions, and in the chaos of war there is no guarantee how humans will really act. As war and modern military forces continue to become more complex it is important to understand how the application of military force fits into national strategy. This is especially important to armies because historically they must ultimately secure the victory by putting their soldiers on the ground in the face of the enemy. Modern, wellequipped, well-trained, and well-led armies can be inspired or cajoled to do virtually anything their leaders ask. In return, the least the leaders can do is understand what they are doing when they use military force to pursue national strategic goals. The Falklands/ Malvinas war of 1982 offers an interesting contrast in this regard. Initially Argentina had virtually all the advantages in that war: the theater of war was close to the national homeland of Argentina; Argentine military forces achieved strategic surprise in their occupation of the islands; and Argentina had adequate time to 96

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garrison the islands. Great Britain, on the other hand, had to gather together adequate military forces to attempt an invasion on a group of islands far away from the British Isles. In the event, however, Argentina squandered her advantages. The Argentine soldiers on the islands were neglected as the military leadership apparently did not understand that soldiers not only must have a good reason to fight, they must feel that their officers care about them. In spite of the surprise, available time, and proximity of the war, Argentina did not take the war seriously until the British invasion forces actually arrived, and by then it was too late to correct the deficiencies in the Argentine Army. In sharp contrast to Argentina, Great Britain managed to overcome tremendous odds to retake the islands. Even though a scientific analysis of the war from the strategic perspective which relied primarily on numbers would probably give the advantage to Argentina, the art with which the British military conducted the campaign operationally overwhelmed the science of war. The chaos of war guarantees that its outcome cannot be predicted with certainty. Therefore, whenever the national leadership decides to resort to war the result may not be what it either desired or expected. This uncertainty, and the cost of war in lives and treasure, makes any decision to start a war, even one which appears small at the outset, of national import. With the cost of war rising with every technological advance no nation can afford a long war. The Second World War is no longer useful as a model for conducting war. With the nations of Eastern Europe finally regaining their national sovereignty, the Second World War should finally be over, and it can finally be put to rest as a model. With the world becoming more and more interlinked by economics and communications a long, global war in the manner of the Second World War is highly improbable. Rather, future wars will be short and decisive as the decision by a country’s national leadership to conduct a war becomes more informed. Resorting to war means relying on an uncertain outcome. The only way to reduce that uncertainty is to start with a clear objective and conduct the war with vigor to attain that objective. If the goal is uncertain or the support of the country is doubtful then war is not the answer. War cannot be conducted simply for the sake of conducting war, to anyone’s advantage.

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6 SUPPORTING WAR

The onus of supply rests equally on the giver and the taker. General George S.Patton, War As I Knew It The modern popular television image of the employment of conventional military force may be attack planes dropping smart (by now they are brilliant) bombs, infantry troops jumping from helicopters in complete darkness flown by pilots wearing nightvision goggles, or an aircraft carrier launching its myriad highly specialized aircraft. While these images are certainly the leading edge of modern military forces, the larger part of modern warfare consists of providing logistical support of all types to that leading edge of the military element of national power. That the preponderance of military forces is not actually fighting forces is a relatively new phenomenon. As recently as the nineteenth century the combatant forces of armies and navies were expected largely to support themselves, but this can no longer be the case in the twentieth century. No matter how simple the employment of military forces may appear to the casual television viewer, in the event there will be extensive requirements for support forces. The non-combat, but none the less essential, support forces must provide the logistical and administrative support necessary to maintain the actual fighting forces conducting today’s high technology warfare. Although they may sometimes be overlooked, the non-combat means of the ends, ways, and means balance more often than not will determine what the military element of national power will actually be able to accomplish. With the technological and political complexities of modern warfare, the actual combat forces will generally be in the minority. 98

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As the perspective of war moves from the tactical, through the operational, and up to the strategic, the combat service support elements, both in and out of uniform, of a nation’s armed forces will rather significantly outnumber the actual fighting forces. This is certainly the case in those countries which maintain the most modern military establishments. The most sophisticated military weapons systems now even require highly trained civilian technical experts to be well forward in the combat zone with the fighting forces to provide essential technical support. This increased reliance on high technology makes supporting war at least as important as fighting war. Clausewitz, a nineteenth-century philosopher of war sometimes criticized for apparently not considering support an essential element of war, did write, however, that “a prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources, doing neither too much nor too little.”1 This is really Clausewitz’s way of expressing the necessity for balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. His objectives and resources become the ends and the means of war, while “managing the campaign” constitutes the ways of war. Military commanders trying to balance the ends, ways, and means of modern warfare will frequently find that it is the means, or resources in Clausewitz’s terms, which most affect that balance. Although a narrow definition of the term campaign currently refers to viewing war from the operational perspective, balancing the ends, ways, and means of war is a requirement of each of the three perspectives of war. This requires a mixture of art and science. Because of the propensity to use numbers to calculate requirements, supporting modern war tends to rely more heavily on science rather than art. There will, however, always be an element of art to supporting war, just as there is an element of art in conducting war, even though the trend in war is toward high technology for both combat and support. Because war is inherently unpredictable science has yet to develop any sort of guaranteed method of predicting precisely what means of war will be needed to ensure the order which will eventually result from war’s chaos. As war becomes more dependent on science and technology, military leaders and commanders may find themselves relying more heavily on their supporting logisticians to keep the delicate machinery of war operating. In their understandable desire to take advantage of the latest developments in science to provide the best support possible to 99


the fighting elements in war, logisticians increasingly appear to concentrate their efforts on calculations, or science, rather than art. Despite this, the art of supporting war cannot be ignored. Logistics has always involved calculations, although not to the exclusion of art. Indeed, the word logistics actually originates from the Greek word, logistike—the art of calculating. Unfortunately, as modern warfare has become more involved in developing quantitative methods of providing information, the art element of calculating requirements has gradually slipped away. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), for example, emphasize the science of calculating to the exclusion of any mention of art when defining logistics in their Dictionary of Military Terms as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.”2 It is interesting to note in passing, however, that the same dictionary does recognize that there is still an element of art in the planning and conduct of war, since it does include the phrase “art and science” in its definition of strategy. Ironically, in modern warfare strategy probably involves more logistics than anything else. Historically, logisticians would appear to be the unsung handmaidens of war. While there are any number of lists of great strategists, great tacticians, or great captains, there is no similar recognition of the great logisticians. This is not because there have never been any great logisticians, it is simply because the great captains of history have themselves been the great logisticians. A great, or even just good, commander from any of the three perspectives of war must also be at least a competent logistician. The so-called great captains of war have generally understood that logistics, both as an art and a science, is a critical element of war. James Huston, writing in the The Sinews of War, his classic study of the history of logistics in the United States Army, echoes Clausewitz when he draws the conclusion that balancing the ends, ways, and means of war depends on a commander who can “take into account all available resources, at home, in the theater, or wherever they are found, and to balance his requirements and his mission so that his objective may be gained with the least possible time with the least possible loss of men and supplies.”3 In other words, “resources,” or the means of war, become the critical element in balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. As the trend to look to science and technology for answers in planning, conducting, and supporting war continues, military commanders and leaders from all perspectives will find themselves 100

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turning more of their logistics problems over to logisticians rather than dealing with them personally. Logisticians, however, may have become so logical and scientific in their calculations that the intuition or art so essential to cope with the inherent chaos of war may no longer be a factor in their calculations. While military commanders want, and indeed need, logisticians who can use to best advantage the science of logistics, it is up to those same commanders to understand that there is an art to logistics, an art for which they, the commanders not the logisticians, must bear primary responsibility. All military leaders and commanders, must consider the art of logistics, as well as its science, in conducting war. While logistics is important from each of the three perspectives of war it presents a rather different picture depending on the perspective from which it is being viewed. From the strategic perspective logistics is an inseparable component of military strategy; it will have a strong influence on the course of national strategy. Logistical planning from the strategic perspective focuses on the development and deployment of the military materiel and manpower necessary to implement the military strategy of a nation. The technological and economic elements of national power must be considered a part of logistics from the strategic perspective of supporting war. The combination of technological and economic power of a nation will in large measure determine how well that nation’s military power can be supported during the course of conducting a war. Indeed, in planning and conducting war the industrial establishments of a nation could well be primary strategic targets as each side in war seeks to cripple the other’s capability to support the war. For those nations with a global strategic perspective of war strategic planning and logistics planning are essentially synonymous. When military power is to be used the military forces must be able to deploy, be supported, and fight in places far outside their national boundaries. This means that the support and fighting forces must first be deployed into the theater of operations, and once there they must be supported for the duration of the war. Ironically, in the less well developed countries of the world the supporting forces must arrive at the same time or even ahead of the fighting forces simply to provide a means for the machinery of modern warfare to get into battle. Contemporary fighting forces use large sophisticated aircraft and ships for transport which require equally sophisticated facilities to receive, unload, and support them. 101


Supporting war from the strategic perspective entails close and continuous coordination with the diplomatic element of national power, which must be used to obtain friendly bases for military forces and seek allies who, if they don’t provide actual assistance, will at least not be overtly hostile to the military forces operating in areas of the world far from home. The logistics considerations of supporting war tend to include most of the national elements of power of a country in both planning and conducting war. Simply maintaining a credible capability to fight throughout the world requires that nations with global interests develop and maintain a significant amount of logistics resources just to get a useful fighting force and its support elements into the potential theaters of operations around the world where they may be needed. Global deployment entails both strategic and logistic planning. Unfortunately, the strategic perspective of logistics fits almost too neatly into scientific planning with its seemingly endless time-phased deployment lists, which start out as precise schedules of air and sea movements of everyone and everything necessary to conduct and support a war most anywhere in the world. The deployment of military forces from the homeland into far-away theaters of operations is part of the strategic perspective of war. Once those forces, both fighting and supporting elements, arrive in the theater of operations, the operational military commander assumes responsibility for supporting war. Supporting war from the operational perspective frequently governs what can, and perhaps even more importantly, cannot be accomplished by the military power within the theater of operations. Viewing war from the operational perspective requires the senior military commanders to base their campaign plans on the logistical support immediately available within their theater of operations. If there is not adequate support immediately available to accomplish the assigned strategic aim then the commander may have to develop a campaign plan wherein tactical objectives, achievable with the available logistics support, become intermediate goals in a phased campaign which will eventually lead to the assigned strategic goal. If the operational military commander determines that the logistics situation dictates a phased campaign then planning can begin for all phases of the campaign, but the phases can be executed only when the necessary logistical means actually become available in the theater of operations. In balancing the ends, ways, and means from the operational perspective, senior military commanders will 102

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find that logistics are most often the constraining means to supporting war. Finding ways to achieve the desired ends requires operational military commanders to be versatile in the art of logistics as well as its science as they seek to balance ends, ways, and means. Operational military commanders cannot expect their subordinate tactical commanders to fight without adequate logistics support, although this does not mean that the tactical commanders will always have everything they desire. They will often have to make do with less than they may consider adequate. Deciding just what constitutes adequate support falls more in the realm of art than science, and like art, which varies in value depending on who sees it, adequate logistics from an operational perspective may not always coincide with the view from the tactical perspective. Communica-tions between commanders who view war from the operational and tactical perspectives in dealing with logistical matters is as important as any other aspect of planning and conducting war. Just as commanders must maintain an open dialogue in ensuring they understand their assigned mission and how they are to accomplish that mission, so too must they clearly understand the logistics ramifications. In both supporting war and conducting war, success or failure may rest on how the personalities of commanders interact. Supporting war from the tactical perspective concentrates on feeding, arming, and maintaining the people and machines which actually conduct the battles of war. Tactical commanders must receive the logistical support necessary to accomplish their assigned missions at the same time as they receive the combat forces. Although tactical commanders concentrate their efforts on fighting battles, an inherent element of fighting is ensuring that the combat forces have the necessary support. While tactical commanders must ensure that their fighting forces have the necessary means to fight, they cannot be expected to be responsible for how that support actually reaches them on the battlefield. This is the responsibility of the operational military commanders. Tactical commanders, because they are generally commanding forces from only one service, deal with their logistics requirements in only one of the three media of modern war: air, land, and sea. On the one hand, this makes their logistics problems a bit less difficult than those of the operational or strategic perspectives, since there is but a single service logistics system. On the other hand, however, the tactical commander must understand in some detail how that 103


support system works in order to understand how best to influence its effectiveness. Regardless of their perspective, military leaders and commanders must understand that the art of logistics exists and will affect their conduct of war. With the increasing reliance on high technology solutions in conducting and supporting war, the need to understand the relationship between art and science is essential to all aspects of war, and logistics is indeed an essential element of war from all three perspectives. Interest in the art of supporting war probably began to fade about the same time that the industrial revolution began to change the conduct of war. During the nineteenth century conducting war became reliant on the products of technology and science. With its greater emphasis on the science of war, study of the art of war, including the art of logistics, declined. Nineteenth-century scientists sought to explain the world in mathematical terms, and war was no exception. Both science and war were able to develop mathematical equations and principles which would approximate in theory what could be observed in practice. A French physicist, Laplace, imagined that one day a powerful mathematical formula would explain everything, and the Swiss military theorist Jomini proposed that there was “one great principle underlying all the operations of war.”4 In both war and science, however, there were still some mysteries which numbers could not completely explain. The linear equations of science could come close to, but could not account for, the small discrepancies in observed results, and Jomini qualified his great principle by including “necessary applications for its application upon the field.”5 Yet science’s faith in linear equations continued unshaken until the 1970s, when the highspeed computer gave scientists the means to examine what went on inside non-linear equations.6 Ironically, as science recognizes the existence of chaos, the study of war seeks to eliminate its inherent chaos with technological solutions. There is certainly a science to supporting war, but there is also an art to coping with the chaos of war. Supporting war is more complex than it was in the nineteenth century when the science of war began to displace the art of war. The logistics considerations in German field orders, for example, relied on a simple, short reminder for “instructions about the train.”7 As war became more scientific logistics considerations continued 104

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to become more complex. Prior to the twentieth century armies were generally unable to support themselves unless they kept moving, so they could literally eat off the land. Halting to conduct a deliberate attack or lay siege to a stubborn fortress meant that an army could rapidly lose much of its capability to fight as it had to concentrate more of its attention on supporting itself rather than fighting. The longer an army stayed in one place, the more of its manpower had to be used for foraging at greater distances from the battle. Both men and beasts required food. The further the distances, the greater the requirement for transporting the food from the foraging area to the fighting area, which effectively depleted the army’s forces. Supporting naval operations in the days of sail was relatively simple. Wind provided the motive power and virtually every ship in the fleet was capable of fighting. Technology, however, has complicated supporting war at sea much as it has supporting war on land. Fleets no longer rely on the wind to take them where they want to go; oil now frees ships from the fickleness of the wind, but oil has a price in terms of increased support requirements. Fleets now routinely sail with oil tankers to slake the thirst of modern technology at sea. Although there have been many changes in support requirements for conducting war at sea and on land, transportation remains the essential element of logistics. Where armies used to transport themselves to the food by constantly moving or fleets used the wind to move, now extensive transportation systems which can include air, land, and sea from the strategic perspective of war move the consumables of war to the fighting forces. Transportation has been, and continues to be, the most common limiting factor for supporting war. This is true from any perspective of war where the biggest problems of supporting the fighting forces, be they air, land, or sea, are generally ones of getting the right stuff to the right place. By the latter half of the nineteenth century railroads were helping solve the transportation problems of land warfare as seen from the strategic perspective of war. The development of extensive railway transportation systems across Europe and the United States set the stage for scientific logistics planners to virtually dictate the planning and conduct of war from the strategic perspective. The strategic use of railroads to move military forces and materiel during the American Civil War in the United States and the 1870 Franco105


Prussian War in Europe were the precursors of the scientific strategic support of the First World War. As the steam locomotive and railroad tracks were changing the support considerations of land warfare, so too was the steam engine changing the logistics considerations of war at sea. Steam power was seen as a mixed blessing for sailors; while it freed them from dependence on wind for motive power, it also limited the time a ship could stay at sea. With wind providing power to move sailing ships they could stay at sea virtually indefinitely, putting to shore only to load food for the sailors and power and shot for the guns. The advent of steam, however, meant that fuel for the engines had also to be loaded periodically. The steam engine’s huge appetite for fuel required nations with a global strategic perspective of war to develop a world-wide system of fueling stations. Whether at war or not the fleets needed fuel to make their presence felt around the world. A dramatic example of naval world-wide presence was the United States Navy’s “Great White Fleet,” which sailed around the world in 1907 to demonstrate American naval might. While steam power changed the face of seapower, it also changed the face of land warfare. The First World War began in 1914 with elaborate rail movement schedules, precisely calculated and inextricably tied to military mobilization plans, which transported large armies in Western Europe into position to confront one another for four years. The railroad made this rapid mobilization possible. Both sides in the war used their respective railroad systems for strategic logistical transportation, but the railroads with their fixed tracks were simply not flexible enough, when viewed from the operational perspective, to allow a war of movement. The result was a war which stalemated on land soon after the gigantic initial deployments of men and materiel on to the battlefield. Once science delivered the means of war the generals seemed unable to exercise the art of war, and they spent four years simply trying to use a preponderance of numbers to overpower the opposition. At sea the steam engine provided navies with the capability to prosecute their war virtually anywhere in the world, but their efforts were largely concentrated on protecting their networks of refueling stations and attempting to interrupt the re-supply of troops and materiel to the land war in Europe. Since the strategic deployment and re-supply of the huge armies in the First World War depended almost entirely on the railroad, where the tracks went determined where the war went. The fixed 106

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front lines of the Western Front were in large part a result of the limits of strategic land transportation. The Eastern Front, with its relative lack of railroads, did in fact see some large battles of maneuver. From both the operational and tactical perspectives of war on land military commanders saw the transportation of materiel and troops from the railhead to the battle as primarily a matter of walking for the troops and horse-drawn wagons and caissons for the materiel; trucks, still in their infancy, had relatively little impact on the conduct of the First World War. While both the truck and the tank first saw active military service in this war, they did not have their major impact on the conduct of war until the Second World War. Where the First World War relied on steam for the motive power of the railroad, the Second World War saw the internal combustion engine become the dominant factor in transportation on land and in the air. Between the World Wars armies all over the world introduced both tanks and trucks into their force structure based on the experience of the First World War and the refinement of the internal combustion engine. Virtually all armies recognized that tanks were for fighting and trucks for transporting, but it was the German Army which first designed and fielded an effective tank-truck team. The technology which perfected the tank-truck team eventually revolutionized land warfare in general and logistics in particular, and as it became more technical, logistics continued its evolution into more science and less art. Development of the internal combustion engine opened a third medium for conducting war. No longer were warriors bound to the surface of the earth. The heavier than air flying machine made its wartime debut in the First World War, but like the tank-truck team, the airplane would have its greatest influence in the Second World War. Airpower provided the belligerents in the Second World War with new ways to conduct war. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was made possible by the marriage of air and sea power; the German invasion of France was a spectacular success as a result of the marriage of land and air power; the Battle of Britain would not even have happened without airpower; and certainly the American introduction of the atomic bomb to conducting war was made possible by airpower. At the same time as these dramatic new developments in the conduct of war were taking place the airplane, simply by its very nature, increased the technological complexity of both conducting and supporting war. The increased flexibility of conducting war in 107


the air carried a price tag of increased complexity in supporting war. The science of war came to the fore in the Second World War as countries mobilized their technological elements of national power as never before in the history of warfare. The art of supporting war, however, was not lost on all military planners and commanders in the Second World War. There were some who understood the value of the art of logistics. It is not simply a coincidence that one of the more successful innovators in the German Army, Heinz Guderian, spent much of the period between the two World Wars as a transportation officer dealing, as he put it, “with the problem of troop transportation by lorry.”8 Although the Second World War began with the horse still very much a transportation mainstay of both the German and Soviet logistics systems, during the course of the war the truck eventually provided the large, modern armies on both sides with the capability to wage effective large-scale maneuver warfare with modern weapons. In spite of their relative freedom of movement at sea, the naval forces of the First World War were generally unable to exert any direct influence on the land war in Europe. As naval technology progressed, however, the submarine provided an indirect threat in the form of interrupting the sea lines of communication into Europe which supplied the needs of the land war. Between the two World Wars naval technology continued the development of the submarine which, like the tank, truck, and airplane, was introduced in the First World War, but which did not have a significant impact until its widespread use in the Second World War. As with the land war of the Second World War, at sea support considerations also dominated the conduct of the war. In the Atlantic Ocean the war at sea concentrated on transporting men and materiel from the United States to the land war in Europe. The key to Allied success hinged on the continuous flow of troops and materiel from the United States to support the conduct of the war in Europe. This support became the focus of the German naval campaign in the Atlantic. German U-boat fleets swept through the Atlantic seeking to stop the support, while Allied forces used scientific analysis techniques in their eventually successful effort to thwart the underwater war.9 In the Pacific Ocean, although there were some decisive sea battles between opposing fleets (conducted mostly at very long ranges with sea-based airpower), much of the war at sea 108

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concentrated on moving and supporting land and air forces as they fought a series of small land wars during the so-called islandhopping campaign which eventually overwhelmed the Japanese forces. This campaign was actually driven by requirements for supporting war. The basis for selecting the tactical objectives in that campaign was the potential of the objective island to provide airfields and harbors which would support launching the next battle. In the Pacific the power of steam and the internal combustion engine combined to revolutionize war at sea. The advances in both the European and Pacific theaters of war made supporting war even more reliant on science. The Second World War saw the blossoming science of logistics develop the capability to make very precise forecasts of virtually any commodity needed in battle. Commanders prepared their battle plans while logisticians developed the requirements to support those battles. It was sometimes difficult to determine which had the greater influence. Although the science of logistics was not new to warfare, it came into its own during the Second World War as scientists and soldiers joined forces to apply the scientific method to the conduct of virtually all aspects of war. Warfare experienced a dramatic increase in the use of machines on, over and even under the battlefield in the case of naval warfare. Mechanization revolutionized the logistics of war as much as it did warfare itself. From the tactical and operational perspectives of war on land the truck was to logistics what the tank was to battle. The tank’s freedom of movement on the battlefield may have prevented the Second World War from stagnating into the opposing trench lines of the First World War, but it took the truck to give the tank freedom of movement in the land war of Europe. Allied scientific logistics planning in the Second World War reached its zenith in 1944 with Operation Overlord, the campaign which began with the invasion of France and ended with the Allied armies occupying the very heart of Germany. Logisticians labored for years preparing detailed plans for the invasion, while the vast industrial capability of America, untouched by the chaos of war, supplied the vast quantities of war materiel which would eventually crush the Nazi war machine. In the event however, it was not so much the logistics planning that measured the success of the Allied invasion of Europe, but the initiative and imagination of commanders to ignore, change, and improvise supporting war as the European land campaign progressed into the heart of Germany. 109


Realistically, a campaign simply cannot begin without a reasonable assurance of adequate logistic support to accomplish at least the first phase. The determination of adequacy is probably more art than science. In fact, determining adequate logistic support for a campaign before it begins is perhaps the essence of the art of supporting war. Adequate support in war is not simply a matter of multiplying the distance to the objective by the fuel consumption rate by the number of vehicles to determine the required amount of fuel, for example. That is a technical problem performed admirably by logisticians and is certainly one important factor in campaign planning. However, when calculating requirements logisticians generally tend to be somewhat conservative. In the Second World War, for example, Allied logistics planners preparing for Overlord in 1944 grossly overestimated what would be needed to conduct operations when they calculated in their planning that an Allied division would consume 650 tons of supplies per day. As it turned out, divisions conducting the campaign actually consumed only 300–350 tons of supplies per day.10 The Allied experience supporting the Second World War was not without some skill in the art of logistics. In the actual conduct of the Overlord campaign for example, the Allies were successful not as a result of sticking slavishly to a rigid support plan developed during the preparation for war for their advance across Europe, but by taking risks and practicing the art of logistics when the Channel ports were not opened according to the pre-invasion schedule. Commanders also found that they did not really need the volume of materiel predicted by the planners, and were able to do with less logistical support. Logisticians found that once again transportation was the limiting factor, as the Allies were forced to disband combat divisions in order to establish the famous Red Ball Express, an example of art overcoming a potential flaw in the science of supporting war.11 The very success of the tank-truck team in Europe continues to influence how Western armies prepare for war today. In spite of the fact that the European theater of operations was only one of several theaters in the Second World War and that there have been almost fifty years of experience in preparing and conducting war around the world the success of the tank-truck team on the plains of Europe and the steppes of Asia dominated the armies of the two most powerful military alliances in the world, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the West and the 110

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Warsaw Pact in the East. At sea the United States Navy emerged from the Second World War as the dominant naval force in the world, and its Pacific victories were the most impressive jewels in its crown of victory. Like the armies of NATO, the US Navy continues to refine its combination of air and sea power to be ready to re-fight its Second World War experience in the Pacific anywhere in the world. For all intents and purposes both NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances continued to prepare to fight not the last war, as the popular cliché would suggest, but the war they see as their greatest success, the Second World War in Europe and in the Pacific. But while massive technological support is essential to the conduct of modern war, it can also be a disadvantage. The disadvantage of detailed support planning is that it can become a combination of rigidity and conservatism. Left to themselves logisticians will generally prefer a plan which can be executed in a precise and predictable manner; a plan immune to changing circumstances, so that they can ensure that they will have enough of anything anybody might want. While precision execution may appear to be possible during the preparations for war it is certainly not a realistic expectation that the chaos of war will allow plans to be executed flawlessly. Although related, preparing for war and conducting war are two rather different things. Separating the preparation for and the conduct of war is important to the art of supporting war because the organizations responsible for planning for war and the actual conduct of war are not the same. In the military structure of NATO, for example, each nation providing fighting forces to the Alliance is responsible for supporting that force. Each member country must develop the materiel and support for the armed forces it supplies to NATO. The employment of these forces in battle, however, is in the hands of the Alliance’s integrated command structure, which includes participation from all nations that provide military forces to the organization. Although from the strategic perspective of war there has been some effort to standardize or develop interoperability within NATO, actually supporting war from either the operational or tactical perspectives appears slightly fragmented. The separation between the preparation for, and actual support of war may be acceptable from the strategic perspective in NATO, but from the operational perspective, where military commanders must use the strategic logistics preparation as a means of determining 111


how to attain the desired ends during the initial conduct of the war, not having any real control over that support presents a problem. Without a clear idea of what support will actually be available, the NATO military operational commander will have a difficult time balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. While separating the responsibility for supporting war from the planning and conduct of war may make problem solving simpler from the strategic perspective of NATO, where the national concerns of a variety of countries have to be considered, from the operational perspective, where the commander must focus on attaining the strategic objective, supporting war must be an integral element of planning and conducting war. Perhaps while the logisticians are trying to use the science of logistics to solve NATO’s strategic problems, the key to success may rest with the ability of tactical commanders to use the art of logistics. The integration of so-called host nation support into war plans of even the smallest tactical elements of NATO may be an example of the art of logistics. It is not unusual to find battalion commanders in NATO with plans to use the trucks of the local brewery for transporting ammunition in time of war. The logistics lesson of the Second World War may not be that science will have every answer to the problems of supporting war, but that the potential of the art of logistics ought not to be underestimated. Support planning, like any other planning in war, will be likely to go awry in the chaos of actually conducting war. The ordered atmosphere of peacetime provides logisticians with the luxury of designing elaborate force structures for postulated theaters of operations, and pre-positioning war reserve stocks based on theoretical projections of consumption. A difficulty, however, in predicting realistic support requirements is the enemy. One goal of the enemy will be to disrupt friendly support systems, and it is inevitable that the enemy will meet with at least some success. The actual conduct of war requires continual planning according to a changing situation. Preparations for war must necessarily be made in peacetime, prior to the conduct of war, simply because without preparation there can be no effective conduct of war. One cannot prepare for war without assuming that one will eventually conduct war. Even during the preparation for war, however, commanders and planners must be cognizant of the art of supporting war. There have been 112

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instances, however, during the acquisition of new materiel when the developers apparently did not always take logistics factors into consideration. Such a situation developed in the 1960s when the US Army modernized its jeep fleet with a replacement vehicle two inches wider than the previous model. This was a seemingly trivial addition until it came time to transport the jeeps in the US Air Force’s C-141 cargo plane. The additional two inches meant that only one row of the new vehicles could fit into the plane rather than the two rows possible with the narrower jeep. The US Army experienced a similar problem with the Bradley fighting vehicle, which must be partly disassembled before it can be transported by air. Since most of the scenarios which commit American ground forces to combat are outside the continental United States, transport by air is a primary consideration of deployment.12 The lack of foresight by US Army planners that resulted in equipment which increased rather than decreased the difficulties of air transport would seem to indicate that logistics planners failed to analyse the situation properly before developing a solution. It may also indicate that the science of logistics, which apparently demanded development of the best vehicles with little or no regard for other requirements, overwhelmed the art of logistics, where a little imagination should have indicated that the US Army’s equipment has to fit on US Air Force aircraft. During their preparations for war planners must recognize that military commanders view the conduct and support of war from three rather different perspectives. Since the tactical perspective is essentially service oriented then the development of materiel, a service responsibility, will have that same relatively narrow perspective. An army, therefore, can develop a jeep too large for its air force to carry because the army’s developers probably concentrated on the requirements of conducting land warfare and did not consider how the army might get to the war in the first place. If the army can drive to the war the fact that it has vehicles which do not fit into the air force airplanes is of little or no consequence. If, however, the country has global interests which may require the application of military force in an area of the world where the army must rely on the air force for logistical support then having vehicles too large, even by two inches, is a tactical peacetime error which could lead to strategic problems in wartime. Recognizing support implications such as the potential requirement 113


for strategic transportation during the development process of new materiel is but one aspect of the art of supporting war. An example of the science of supporting war overwhelming the art of supporting war is the American experience in Vietnam. In that war the American support system became so centralized that the headquarters which should have been viewing the war from an operational perspective actually lost track of what materiel was available for use by the tactical commanders. Centralization of the support planning at the theater of operations level of command made accurate forecasting virtually impossible for commanders viewing and actually fighting the war with a tactical perspective. From the operational perspective, American logisticians in Vietnam concentrated their planning on the science of logistics while commanders responsible for the conduct of the war virtually ignored the art of logistics. The American support for the Vietnam War, which featured centralizing supplies from the operational perspective, never quite adjusted to the actual conduct of the war, which was decentralized combat activities conducted tactically. As a result, tactical commanders who should have been routinely provided with the necessary logistics support found themselves exercising their own version of the art of logistics as they sent their logisticians all over the theater of operations to find for themselves what they needed to conduct the war. Where the science of logistics failed, the art of logistics ultimately prevailed. The American experience of supporting war in Vietnam, however, was not entirely devoid of examples of art; floating aircraft maintenance facilities, De Long piers, and floating power barges have all been cited as “innovative solutions to major obstacles.”13 All these examples, however, were designed primarily to provide more and more support to the American build-up of overwhelming brute force. There was a deliberate concentration on the science of logistics rather than its art. The goal seemed to be simply more support, with little or no consideration given to determining the means appropriate to achieve the desired end. Logistically the ends, ways, and means of war in Vietnam were not balanced. In the absence of a clearly defined end from which to proceed there was simply no way to know how to balance anything. The unbalanced logistical support was simply a symptom of not having a clear, militarily attainable goal in the first place, and so with no way to measure the appropriate level of support the logisticians 114

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simply and properly provided more of everything. It is not up to logisticians to balance the ends, way, and means of war; that is the commander’s responsibility. More support, however, does not automatically mean better support. If the essence of supporting war is transportation, then certainly a good chunk of the art of supporting war must be supply discipline. Supply discipline requires limitations on the build-up of unnecessary stocks at all levels of command. The less materiel the transportation system has to move the better that system can react to the needs of the combat forces. At the same time, the tactical forces fighting the war must resist the temptation to order more of everything just because that is easier than analysing what they really need. Supply discipline can only be achieved when both logisticians and commanders understand there really is an art to supporting war. One of the reasons that the American system of supporting its war in Vietnam became so clogged with oversupply was the lack of supply discipline. Lack of supply discipline will be a continual problem for any military force unless commanders and leaders viewing war from all of its perspectives can rid themselves of simply demanding more of everything rather objectively balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. Providing too much support to the conduct of war has the potential to be detrimental for two reasons. First, an overabundance of support can breed poor planning and indifference to supply discipline on the part of the fighting forces, and second, support units themselves require support. In the first instance when fighting forces become complacent about not having to concern themselves with supply discipline, they will be ill-prepared to fight under conditions of reduced support. As war becomes more technologically complex the number of weapons systems available actually goes down, and when the latest equipment is gone forces may find themselves having to rely on older, less capable systems. Demanding supply discipline in times of plenty can extend the time the newest systems will be available for fighting. Although not firing until one sees “the whites of their eyes” is not necessary, the thought behind that admonition, making every shot count, is, in fact, a basic element of supply discipline. In the second instance, providing an overabundance of support means providing more support to the units that provide the support in the first place. It is conceivable that a theater of 115


operations could have more support units dedicated to supporting the logistics system than actually providing support directly related to the conduct of the war. The same technological advances which have tended to reduce the numbers of weapons systems on the battlefield have also increased the amount of support required to keep the modern battlefield functioning. Paradoxically, the better the stuff gets, the less there is of it, but the more support it takes to keep it working. Certainly there may be times when the emphasis should be on developing and maintaining an abundance of support forces in a theater of operations, especially in a low-intensity conflict environment where logistical support to the local population may be a primary element of the strategic goal of nation building. The point is, however, that operational commanders must understand the actual requirements for adequately supporting their campaign plans and then be able to tailor their support structure to those requirements. Supporting war can easily become an exercise in empire building if commanders assume that all theaters of war, all theaters of operations, and all types of environment require an equal amount of support. Planning and maintaining adequate support for the conduct of war from any of the three perspectives is a function of both science and art. During the conduct of war operational and tactical commanders must be constantly aware of what their requirements for support actually are if they are to have any hope of successfully balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. This is not an easy task. Tactical commanders actually fighting the battle and being used to the abundance of support available in a sophisticated logistics system may tend to demand simply more of everything rather than applying supply discipline to request only what they really need. Commanders, not logisticians working alone, must determine what and how much constitutes the adequacy of support needed to accomplish assigned missions. Simply adding and multiplying predictions based on the last war fought somewhere else may be useful in the general preparation for supporting war, but commanders charged with conducting war must maintain a grasp on their current situation. Supply discipline must be the rule in the conduct and support of war if commanders hope to accomplish desired and assigned ends given the ever-present constraints on available means. The complex equipment on today’s battlefields means that there is just not going to be an inexhaustible supply of 116

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materiel available, and the chaos of war can only have a detrimental effect on very sophisticated modern support systems. Indeed, in their 1973 war both the Arabs and the Israelis had to turn to their respective superpower sponsors to provide essential support from the strategic perspective. Both sides had made a prewar planning assumption that they would receive strategic support from outside their own resources, and planning from the operational and tactical perspectives reflected that assumption. It was the support they provided as much as anything else which allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to exert their considerable influence on bringing the war to an end. The flashes of brilliance from the operational perspective and the skill in execution from the tactical perspective exhibited by both the Arabs and the Israelis were simply overshadowed in importance by support requirements from the strategic perspective. Faced with a finite and limited capability of supporting the war from their own resources, in the final analysis both sides had to heed the instructions of the sources of their support, the United States and the Soviet Union, on when to end the war. Support considerations also dominated the planning and conduct of war during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Great Britain and Argentina. Because Britain had to transport its forces and their support over 8,000 miles of open sea it provided Argentina an opportunity to deal a potentially decisive blow against the lengthy and delicate support system which could cripple Britain from both the operational and tactical perspectives. In the event, however, when the Argentine Air Force did in fact sink the British support ship Atlantic Conveyer, the British forces were able to carry on in spite of the loss of both supplies and tactical air and ground transport thought necessary to support the war from the tactical perspective. It was a form of the art of supporting war in which the Royal Marines had to revert to the low technology of carrying their essential supplies and equipment on their backs which overcame the Argentine high technology victory against the British support system seen from the strategic perspective. By instituting tight supply discipline the British were able to accomplish their strategic goal in 1982 even though a scientific analysis of their capability to support the war from the strategic perspective would probably have demonstrated they were in an untenable position. Supply discipline, or the lack thereof, affects more than just the amount of materiel; it affects the amount of transportation required to move that materiel. One of the biggest problems in 117


the Allied advance across France in the Second World War, as noted earlier, was not lack of supplies, it was getting those supplies into the hands of the troops who needed them to continue the fight. The transportation and distribution of supplies poses problems from any perspective of war. Strategically, the problem may be getting necessary materiel and troops from the depots and arsenals of Great Britain, across the Atlantic Ocean, and into the theater of operations around the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. The operational problems of distribution can be losing track of exactly what is in the actual theater of operations, as happened to the United States in Vietnam. From the tactical perspective, the problem may be simply getting the means of war from ships offshore into the hands of the fighting units on the battlefield. Obviously the more materiel requested, the higher the transportation requirements will be. If commanders simply request more of everything with little or no thought of priorities, it will by default fall to the logisticians who, if they have no other guidance, will simply prioritize what goes first according to their capability to transport it; alternatively they may attempt to force rigid prewar support plans into a changing situation during the conduct of war, which may do more harm than good. Commanders practicing good supply discipline must have confidence that they have a responsive support system which will not let them down. Commanders and their logisticians must develop the kind of realistic and achievable requirements for adequate support to conduct their war, campaign, or battle, depending on the perspective from which they view war. The United States, for example, has an excellent military logistics system, perhaps the best of any country in the world. Its scientific methods of determining requirements are extensive. It provides more luxuries to the American fighting forces overseas than most other military forces enjoy at home. Its most serious potential shortcoming may be neglect of logistical art by commanders who do not fully understand their role in supporting war. It cannot be left solely to logisticians preparing for war to guess what commanders need to actually conduct war. Commanders must know what constitutes adequate support and logisticians must be able to tell them whether or not they can provide it. Both commanders and logisticians must have confidence in the other’s abilities to understand and practice the art and science of supporting war. 118

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During the peacetime preparation for war determining what constitutes adequate support may well be a scientific exercise, but during the conduct of war this determination must become an art. As Clausewitz noted, it is the way the general can best demonstrate his genius. Neglect of the art of supporting war opens the door to disaster, from any perspective. Determining adequate support and exercising supply discipline is an essential part of balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. The United States and the Soviet Union are both countries which have successfully waged war in the twentieth century by taking advantage of the science of war and dominating their enemies. Their victories in the Second World War ultimately depended on being able to overwhelm their opponents with numbers, and the lessons each has learned from those victories continue to influence their plans to conduct war. Conducting war with brute force tends to relieve military commanders of worrying too much about determining adequate support or supply discipline, as they become habituated to virtually always having everything they need or even think they need. Unlimited resources, in and of themselves, however, are no more a formula for success in war than is brilliance in battle isolated from the ultimate strategic goal. The dominant military powers in the world today reflect very strongly the influence the Second World War exerted on them, since in the end it was resources, the means of war, which ultimately led to Allied success. The United States was able to stay out of the war long enough to build up its industrial base and the Soviet Union was able to outlast and wear down German forces before they were themselves overwhelmed. In today’s resource-constrained environment, however, the key to success in modern war is exercising the art of supporting, not simply dominating the opponent. The use of overwhelming military power did not lead the United States to victory in Vietnam any more than it did for the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In the unlikely event of an encore to the Second World War in Western Europe the forces of the Soviet Union may well have the advantage in bringing brute force to bear, while the United States’ military forces will find themselves counting virtually every round of ammunition as they look back to see if the lines of communications remain open. The barrier of the Atlantic Ocean, lack of NATO and American strategic transport, and the general inattention paid to such logistics issues as ammunition availability all contribute to 119


giving the Soviets an apparent edge in supporting war in Europe. The success of applying military force to the achievement of national goals in Europe, or anywhere else in the world for that matter, may depend on how well the military’s philosophy of supporting war matches reality. The late twentieth-century military establishments may no longer be able to afford a support philosophy that allows its military commanders and planners to simply rely on applying brute force which assumes an endless supply of everything. Ironically it may well be that the less developed countries that field low technology military forces which are well versed in the art of supporting war with basic necessities may well have the upper hand in the conduct of future wars. They can simply fight for a long, slow war while waiting for the high technology weaponry and materiel of the better developed countries to break down. This would put the fighting forces on a level where the art of war, not the science of war would decide the issue. Supporting modern war requires vast national resources. Even countries with relatively small standing armed forces find they require sophisticated support. In countries with large military forces a significant portion of the economy goes to support them in a state of readiness to go to war; actually conducting war increases the price dramatically. It may well be that the economics of simply supporting large armies, navies, and air forces in the relative order of peace, much less using them in the chaos of war, will contribute more to deterring future wars than anything else. Any decision to risk those expensive forces in the chaos of war will be difficult to make for any national leadership responsible to its citizens. This used to be a potential problem only for the few democracies that existed, but with democracy apparently breaking out all over the world that problem may turn out to be a contribution to continued world peace.

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7 CONTROLLING WAR

Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command. Napoleon, Maxims of War When a nation’s leadership makes the decision to pursue national goals by the use of military force it means, or at least it should mean, that the order the national leaders want to emerge from the chaos of war will be worth the expenditure of both lives and treasure. The potential cost of reaching that desired new order should be a part of the analysis of the situation prior to deciding to resort to to the use of military force. No matter how the war goes, at some point the chaos will end and give way to a new order of some fashion which may or may not be what the national leadership had in mind, so the decision to plunge into the chaos of war should not be open-ended. The national leadership should consider how much of its national treasure and how many of its citizens’ lives the goal of a new order is really going to be worth to the nation. While the limits on expenditure may not be established precisely when the decision to use military force is first made, the national leadership must retain enough control of the conduct of the war to be able to end the chaos when the goal has been attained or the costs of attaining it become too high. The necessity for national leaders to retain some control over the chaos of war creates something of a paradox in waging war. While there must always be control from the highest level of command in order to keep the expenditure of lives and treasure in proportion to the national goal, even lowest levels of command must have enough freedom of action to employ their tools of war 121


to best advantage. Between the highest level of strategic control and the lowest levels of tactical control each of the intervening military commanders will want both to retain control over their subordinates and to have freedom of action. The dilemma of control in war is giving enough freedom to subordinates for them to attain the assigned objective while retaining sufficient control to limit expenditure of lives and treasure. From any of the three perspectives of war military commanders must always maintain a balance of the ends, ways, and means as the battles, the campaigns, and the war move toward attaining the desired strategic objective. In order to accomplish this, commanders at every level must be able to communicate to subordinates how they will monitor balancing the ends, ways, and means. In assigning the objective a commander specifies the desired ends; in the concept of the operation a commander outlines the way to conduct war to achieve the desired end; and in determining how to support the conduct of war a commander outlines the means required. Before combat can be joined, however, there must be procedures for maintaining control over the essential balance of ends, ways, and means during the actual conduct of war even while the enemy is doing its best to disrupt that balance. There was a time in war when the considerations for control consisted simply of knowing where the commander would be during the battle. As recently as 1924, for example, the field service regulations of the US Army specified that instructions for command in operations orders should contain simply a statement of where the commander could be found or where messages could be sent.1 From that early narrow focus, the control of war must now include wide-ranging instructions on signal operations and electronics policy, which in the case of nations with world-wide national interests must cover vast areas of the globe. Considerations for control apply to all three perspectives of war, although unlike some other aspects of the preparation and conduct of war the considerations are generally the same regardless of perspective. From the perspective of the lowest tactical leaders in war it may not be much more complex than in 1924: ensuring that subordinates know the location of their leader or commander and a place (or in the case of radios, a station or callsign) where reports may be sent. From the highest strategic perspective, control may also be fairly straightforward; there should be clearly identified military commanders with specific responsibilities to conduct the 122

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war. NATO, for example, has three military commanders who report directly to the Military Committee for their strategic guidance in the preparation and conduct of war. Each of these commanders has responsibility for a specific geographical area within NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) commands NATO forces in the Atlantic Ocean, the Commander-in-Chief, English Channel (CINCCHAN) is responsible for defending the English Channel, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) commands NATO forces in and around the continent of Europe. Each of these military commanders has the mission of defending NATO territory (a relatively simple mission to state, somewhat more complex to accomplish). Regardless of their perspective of war and the complexity of their mission, however, military leaders and commanders at all levels of command must consider how they will both control subordinates and give them the freedom of action necessary to accomplish their assigned missions. Although the control of military forces from the national strategic perspective of war may be simple to state, it reflects the paradoxical nature of war in that it also requires an extraordinary amount of complex equipment and skilled operators, both military and civilian, for a theoretically simple scheme to work. Between the two extremes of being able to control military forces from the lowest tactical perspective of an infantry squad leader by simple hand arm signals, and the highest strategic perspective of controlling world-wide air, land, and sea forces lies a wide variety of communications systems of varying complexity. Simple control from the strategic perspective of war and simple control from the tactical perspective, although similar in concept, are rather different in reality. The common goal of military control systems is simply to bring order to the chaos of war; a goal which, while highly desirable, is an essentially impossible task. While modern technological systems may give the appearance of order in war, war cannot exist without chaos. Since war consists of two opposing military forces, each trying to force the other to do something it really does not want to do, the situation cannot be orderly, must be chaotic, and therefore forever beyond the control of even the most sophisticated control system. In this paradoxical atmosphere it is essential for all military commanders to maintain an orderly state of mind, hopefully with the aid of a functional control system. Military forces of all types, sizes, and functions constantly strive for order. Indeed, in many military minds the picture of a truly 123


professional military organization will consist of tidy ranks and files of people and equipment on parade. This picture is consistent with war’s paradoxical nature of being at once both simple and complex, since lining up the many diverse elements of modern military units into simple arrangements of ranks and files tends to make even the most complex organization or weapons system appear relatively simple and orderly. This simple picture, however, is mainly one of preparing, not conducting, war. The picture of tidy ranks and files goes back to the very beginnings of organized warfare. Greeks, Persians, and hosts of other warriors on land and sea have arranged their armies and navies in a variety of ranks and files to make the best use of available combat power to overwhelm their opponents. Although air forces came into existence only recently in the history of warfare, they too have at times arranged themselves in neat formations to conduct complex bombing raids. Even today, the most modern and complex military forces will use simple and orderly schematic diagrams to explain their organization as they prepare to conduct war. Orderly preparation is essential. The more orderly the preparation, the better will be the chances of maintaining some semblance of order in the actual conduct of war. While there is some validity to equating orderliness in military units to competence in the conduct of war, too much emphasis on order may contribute to failure when confronting the chaos of war. This is especially true as military forces grow more reliant on technology for controlling the conduct of war. Technological jargon with its apparently precise meanings tends to create a false sense of orderliness when used to describe broad, intangible concepts of conducting war. In the current lexicon of military literature there is a widespread use of the expression C2. This expression represents command and control, the rubric the modern military mind currently uses to refer to controlling war. C2 has become a pseudo-mathematical expression which suggests a theoretical order to war that simply does not exist in reality. Using the apparently orderly expression C2 as military jargon can imply that command and control is above the chaos of war. It is chaos, however, the antithesis of order, which characterizes the conduct of war; it is chaos which makes the battlefield a place where uncertainty prevails. Commanders from all perspectives may see the expression C2 as a means to provide certainty when making decisions during their conduct of war. There is, however, simply 124

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no certainty to be found in the chaos of war. Uncertainty is an essential and eternal element of war. This desire for certainty in the chaos of war produces a dynamic tension between what commanders would like to have happen and what actually happens. Two fictional vignettes from the First World War serve nicely to illustrate the fundamental tension between the desire for control and the reality of chaos. The first is from The Soldier, a collection of historically based fictional accounts which relate how soldiers in the ranks have both changed and remained the same over the centuries. Lance-Corporal Verrall, a British “other ranks” or enlisted soldier, represents the visceral experiences of trench warfare. Verrall views war from the very lowest tactical perspective, and at one point he finds himself caught in the chaos of war between British and German lines: “there was now so much smoke drifting over the ground that it was impossible to know where the enemy was or where his own lines were. In the middle of that storm of death he stood there, wondering in which direction he should move.”2 The second vignette, in contrast to Verrall’s confusion, presents the orderly perspective of a newly appointed British corps commander. In The General, C.S.Forester’s classic tale of how one fictional British general achieved success in the First World War, Lieutenant-General Curzon, experiencing the same war from a slightly different perspective, sees order where Verrall saw chaos. From his higher, yet still tactical, perspective of war as an army corps commander, Curzon assures himself that “there was going to be no muddling in his corps. Everything was going to be exact, systematic, perfect—to Curzon the adjective ‘systematic’ implied a supremely desirable quality.”3 While Verrall existed in the reality of uncertainty and war’s “storm of death,” Curzon sought the comfort of certainty and order by being “systematic.” In the First World War the misguided, systematic, even scientific, search for certainty of control by commanders and staffs from all three perspectives of war, on both sides needlessly killed thousands of soldiers. In their four-year search for the perfect system to control with certainty their conduct of the war, the military leaders and commanders apparently did not understand or consider that chaos and uncertainty, not order and certainty, are the norm in war. The years of frustration on the Western Front of the First World War are testament to the futility of trying to impose an artificial order on the chaos of war. 125


In spite of the potential confusion surrounding the introduction of yet another new term to the vocabulary of war, the modern military lexicon could stand to benefit from a convenient way to convey the ambiguity of the battlefield. The expression F2, for fog and friction, provides a useful contrast to the well established C2. Fog and friction, two intangibles of war, have always been present. They are, however, relatively new concepts in the literature of war considering the 3,000 and more years man has spent trying to organize armed forces to eliminate himself from the face of the earth. One of the earliest references to the fog of war is in 1724, when one Chevalier Foulard observed that “the coup d’oeil is a gift of God and cannot be acquired; but if professional knowledge does not perfect it, one only sees things imperfectly and in a fog.”4 The concept, of course, goes well beyond the literal reference to fog. It includes the very accurate concept that military commanders and leaders, regardless of their perspective of war, simply cannot know with any degree of certainty exactly what an opponent will actually do until it happens. The fog of war includes the simple, albeit unpalatable, fact that military commanders cannot even be certain of exactly what is happening to their own forces in the chaos of war, much less expect to know what the opponent is doing with any degree of certainty. The coup d’oeil translates from the French as a glance or glimpse. As Foulard used it, it refers to the ability of an educated and experienced military commander to quickly and intuitively understand complex and chaotic situations in the absence of certainty or order. Even today, in spite of the electronic suites available to commanders from all perspectives of war, perfection of the coup d’oeil by constant professional study remains virtually the only way a commander can realistically hope to penetrate the fog of war in any real way. Friction, the second factor in the proposed expression F2, is a Clausewitzian concept. “Friction,” wrote Clausewitz, “is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.” He elaborated on this theme by expressing the idea that while the concept of war is indeed very simple, even the simplest task is difficult.5 The theoretical concept of friction in war helps explain war’s essentially paradoxical nature of being both simple and complex. No matter how systematic the preparation for war, there will inevitably be friction, which will reduce the effectiveness of the conduct of war by even the most 126

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orderly and best controlled armies, navies, and air forces. Military leaders and commanders viewing war from any of its three perspectives must learn to cope with the ambiguity and uncertainty which results from F2 as they prepare for and conduct war. Since the First World War technology has intensified both Verrall’s “storm of death” and Curzon’s desire to be “systematic.” Modern weapons systems, sensitive detection devices, and electronic deception methods, to name but a few technological advances, make today’s battlefield many times more lethal than the one Verrall knew. Concurrent developments in communications and computers also make Curzon’s goal of being systematic appear even more attainable. However, the dynamic tension between certainty and ambiguity in war is as real today as it was in the First World War. Success in battles, campaigns, and wars will go, as it has always gone, to the side which can best cope with the omnipresent uncertainty and chaos of war. By its very nature, and in spite of technology, war must always remain chaotic. It is simply unrealistic to expect too much order in an activity where the whole point is for armed opponents to destroy one another. The expressions F2 and C2 help explain the two rather different views of war presented by the two fictional, but none the less typical, soldiers Verrall and Curzon. F2 describes the ambiguity of Verrall’s very personal experience of war’s chaos, while C2 represents the systematic method which Curzon, who could well be most any commander who is a bit detached from the immediacy of war’s chaos, uses to search for order and certainty in war. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff convey the commander’s eternal search for certainty in their Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms when defining a C2 system as “the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned.”6 The Joint Chiefs’ definition, while comprehensive, does not mention that any military C2 system must be prepared to function in the unsystematic, ambiguous, and chaotic environment of war. Even in peacetime simply trying to move military personnel and equipment from one point to another produces an ambiguous situation. It is virtually impossible to know exactly where every person or piece of equipment will be at any one time even if all the elements of a complex C2 system function perfectly. Whether it is simply moving an infantry squad through a patch of woods or the 127


slightly more complex task of deploying a joint task force of air, ground, and sea forces from Great Britain to the South Atlantic to invade a small group of islands thousands of miles from home, the fog and friction of just preparing for war make even the simplest task difficult. Add an opponent on that small island who will try very hard to disrupt an already ambiguous situation and F2 can very quickly overpower even the most sophisticated C2 system unless the military leaders and commanders of a country are realistically prepared to deal with the chaos of war. In the final analysis success in war will depend on military forces having a C2 system which can cope with war’s F2. The US Army, in its Field Manual 100–5, Operations, apparently recognizes that same phenomenon when it states (the emphasis is in the manual): “the ultimate measure of command and control (C2) effectiveness is whether the force functions more effectively and more quickly than the enemy.”7 Stated a bit differently, a commander’s C2 system must overcome the effects of F2 to be effective during the conduct of war. In the course of conducting war C2 systems will always face the challenges of F2. To put the challenge simply, the essential function of a C2 system is to reduce the F2 a commander must face from any perspective of war. A C2 system, no matter how effective, however, will never completely eliminate F2 from war, nor does the educated and experienced military leader or commander expect that it will. Experienced military leadership should, however, expect their C2 systems at least to be able to cope with the F2 and provide enough control for them to maintain a balance of their ends, ways, and means of war. That becomes a realistic expectation by expanding the term C2 to become C3. C3 is the addition of communications to command and control to become command, control, and communications. Modern communication systems help commanders lubricate the friction of war and penetrate its fog. According to an American general with considerable experience commanding NATO forces from a variety of levels of command, and who retired as the commanderin-chief of the Central Army Group, it is this C3 system which “is central to the conduct of battle.”8 Essential though communication is to effective command and control, there is more to it than simply moving information around. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, define communications as “a method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person 128

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or place to another.”9 While there may be nothing particularly wrong with this definition, it is inadequate to cope with the F2 of war. While information per se is important, it is the idea behind the information that actually provides the lubricant which allows the commander’s vision and will to overcome F2. This distinction between ideas and information is crucial to military commanders. Simply having a great deal of information about the enemy does not guarantee success. The human mind deals with more than just information; it takes information and produces ideas which it then must convey to other minds. Technology has yet to produce a computer or machine which can have an independent, original idea; only the human mind can do that. Will is a state of mind, so the essential thing in imposing one’s will on an unwilling opponent is the idea behind that will. Commanders must be able to control both their own forces and the opponent’s forces in the chaos of war by strength of will. Strength of will stems from the ideas they communicate to their subordinates, not simply pieces of information. If commanders are to have any hope of imposing their will on the enemy, the concept of communications in the C3 rubric must include conveying their ideas as well as simply information. In fact, this idea forms the essence of the concept of the operation which communicates the commander’s vision of how to conduct the battle from the tactical perspective, the campaign from the operational perspective, or the war from the strategic perspective. Expanding the definition of communications to include ideas provides a more complete picture of what must happen in an effective C3 system. Using the United States Army’s doctrinal standard established in FM 100–5 which postulates that C2 is effective when the friendly force functions faster than the enemy force means that military leaders and commanders themselves, not just the C3 system, must be able to react rapidly to unexpected situations by developing the ability to decide what to do based on available information. Commanders and leaders, regardless of their perspective of war, simply cannot afford to wait for certainty in their conduct of war, which they will probably never attain in any case. All commanders must be capable of acting in the face of virtually always having much less information than they would like to have. Incomplete information from both friendly and enemy forces, like F2, is an omnipresent feature of war. 129


Ideas and vision must always accompany the information which flows through sophisticated C3 systems. Gathering information about the status of bridges across a particular river in the theater of operations and then presenting that status on a briefing chart which merely records the number of bridges may not really be very helpful to the commander unless the briefing chart can also convey the idea of the bridges’ importance to the commander’s concept of the operation. Without communicating the idea along with the information the effort spent moving data through a C3 system could well be simply an exercise in futility. It may be that in reality bridges have nothing to do with the commander’s concept, it just happens to be a titbit of information that the staff can keep track of with some degree of certainty and they just want to keep the commander informed about something with some certainty. Great masses of information which may or may not have any applicability to the situation facing a commander can make control in war more, not less, complicated since extraneous information only adds to the inherent chaos of war. An American division commander, writing some years ago in the US Army’s Military Review cautioned that “an inordinate amount of staff time is consumed in gathering and filtering the data that must fill in the blanks on the chart.”10 The warning provided by this experienced division commander writing from his tactical perspective is just as valid for operational and strategic commanders. Communicating the data or information just to fill in blanks on a chart or a form or a video monitor is not enough, the idea behind wanting the information is the essential thing. Commanders must determine why they want specific information, and they must also be able to let their staffs and subordinates know what information they do and do not want. One of the problems of modern C3 systems is that they now generally provide more information than a commander can actually use. Just as more logistics does not necessarily equate to better logistics, more information is not necessarily better information. Information discipline is as necessary to the successful conduct of war as supply discipline, and just as the commander must establish the supply priorities, it is the responsibility of the commander, not the so-called communicator on the staff, to sort out what information is important and what is not. Simply demanding “all the information I need,” as some commanders may be tempted to do, is as useless in helping the communicator set priorities as the guidance to “give 130

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me enough of everything” is to the logistician. Communications specialists can handle the science of high technology communications systems, but military commanders and leaders must be masters of the art of communications. Unfortunately, with the ever-increasing advances in communications and automatic data processing there is frequently a tendency for commanders and staffs to concentrate on the volume of information or data their C3 systems can transmit and receive. In the confusion and chaos of war from any of its three perspectives, be it the fictional Curzon in the First World War with his tactical perspective, or one of NATO’s supreme allied commanders, modern military leaders and commanders tend to derive great comfort from the systematic organization, collection, and collation of information their staffs display for them on charts and television monitors. Once neatly displayed for the commander this plethora of information creates a sense of order and control which is simply never going to be present in war. Generally speaking, the higher their perspective of war, the further removed military leaders and commanders will be from the chaos of war. On the one hand this is good, because their decisions can be made objectively and are less likely to be influenced by the passion and emotion so necessary to the actual fighting in war. On the other hand the information about the fighting is more likely to be presented in such an orderly manner that there may be a tendency to forget the chaos and confusion that actually exists in the conduct of war. On occasion, it would appear that even senior military leaders and commanders may have succumbed to their desire to believe that order and certainty can be achieved in war. Partly this stems from a very real desire on their part to be able to employ military force surgically with little or no risk to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen they must send into the chaos of battle. Yet chaos in war has not been eliminated. In 1985 when the United States used military force against Libya in retaliation for terrorist activities the chaos of war was apparently about as much under control as technology could get it. In that war, brief though it was, the three perspectives of war merged so closely that they were virtually inseparable in the event. The specific tactical targets were selected from the strategic perspective of war, military commanders viewing the attack from the operational perspective had instant communications with both the strategic leadership in the United States and the tactical forces conducting 131


the war in the Mediterranean Sea. The results of the attack by tactical forces were available virtually instantaneously to commanders from both the operational and strategic perspective. The latest sophisticated electronics systems controlled the routes into and out of Libya, determined the methods used to attack specific military targets while virtually eliminating collateral damage to surrounding areas, and provided instant communications. Sophisticated high technology attack aircraft delivered so-called smart, even brilliant, bombs within very strict parameters and into precisely defined targets. In spite of all this control there was still collateral damage from the raid, and there were losses of American aircraft and pilots. Regardless of the amount of control employed, the actual conduct of war will remain surrounded by chaos. Although the raid on Libya was indeed as systematic as Curzon could have wanted, it still had an element of Verrall’s chaos about it. The American attack on Libya was in retaliation for a terrorist attack Libya conducted against American servicemen in Germany. Terrorism relies on the chaos of war in directing that chaos very precisely and unexpectedly, with the goal of influencing the will of an opponent. Both the Libyan and the American attacks share the characteristic of using the chaos of war to influence the will of their opponent. The difference was that the Libyan attack provoked the American attack, whereas the American attack apparently influenced Libya to reconsider the use of terrorism in the pursuit of its national goals. Both the low technology terrorist attack and the high technology air raid were modern versions of what war has always been, a battle of wills. In 1805, almost 200 years before the American raid on Libya, another battle of wills took place at sea when the chaos of war claimed the British admiral, Lord Nelson. Nelson died in the Battle of Trafalgar standing on the open quarterdeck of his flagship Victory directing his fleet against the Spanish Armada. His death, however, did not decide the battle. The British were successful at Trafalgar because well before the battle Nelson met periodically with his ship captains to discuss and analyse every conceivable situation they might face against the Spanish Armada in battle. Nelson’s powerful will and detailed preparations for war continued to control the battle even after his death. The individual British captains knew what Nelson wanted because he had communicated his ideas, not simply information through his C3 system, even though that system 132

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may now appear crude when compared to what naval fleets use today to exchange information. Unlike Nelson, modern naval commanders may never see their fleets during the conduct of war. Sophisticated C3 systems allow ships to remain out of sight of each other, unseen except electronically by both friend and foe. Although modern fleet commanders now communicate their ideas to their captains electronically rather than in person as was the case in Nelson’s day, they must still control the conduct of war with their will. Even with modern communications, however, fleet commanders, like Nelson, need to meet personally with their captains. The commander-in-chief of the American fleet which invaded the island of Grenada wanted to meet with his immediate subordinates personally before the invasion even though there was very little time for such meetings because he wanted to “get their measure” in person. He wanted to know the person he would be dealing with electronically during the conduct of war.11 Meeting his tactical commanders personally was especially important in Grenada because the invasion force was a joint force consisting of US Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force elements which were assembled rapidly with no rehearsals. Since there were bound to be cultural differences among the senior commanders as a result of their different service backgrounds, it was important for the admiral in overall command of the joint force to understand his subordinates personally and to let them know his will. The personal touch is still an important part of the conduct of war even though technology would sometimes seem to make it unnecessary. Not only do admirals of fleets rarely see their individual ships, modern ship captains rarely even see their own ships in the conduct of war. Captains of modern ships of the line must hunker in electronic combat information centers deep inside the bowels of their ship rather than on an open quarterdeck in the manner of Lord Nelson. When the chaos of war visits an individual ship, however, whether the captain can see his opponent or not, the crews must work in Verrall’s “storm of death” to save their ship just as Nelson’s sailors had to. Witness the conclusion that it was the dedication of the crews, not simply the ship’s technology, which saved the United States Navy combatant ships attacked in the Persian Gulf during the course of the Iran-Iraq War. Computer simulations after the fact demonstrated that the USS Samuel B.Roberts could not have 133


survived the mine it hit in April 1988, and a senior US Navy officer was of the opinion that “her crew was able to save the ship and most knowledgeable people would say that we probably should have lost her.”12 That the crew saved the ship was due in no small part to the will of the captain, who had prepared and trained his crew for just such an eventuality. While technology may appear to be changing the face of war, the face of battle remains as chaotic as ever. Commanders, regardless of the perspective from which they view war, whether at sea, in the air, or on the ground, cannot afford to be lulled into thinking that war is in any way less chaotic simply because the glow of the television monitor is so soothing or the electronic intelligence picture appears to be accurate. While the action of the US Navy in the Persian Gulf to save its ships from the chaos of war reflects man’s small triumph over chaos, that same campaign produced evidence that the chaos of war will still triumph over the highest technology. The apparent intelligence picture painted so convincingly by the USS Vincennes’ suite of electronic sensors and computers led to tragedy when it destroyed a civilian airliner in flight. Regardless of what the captain of the Vincennes thought he saw in the chaos of war the fact is that the picture he saw was very wrong. Unavoidable though the attack may have been in the mind of the captain, the fact remains that his C3 system failed to overcome the F2 of war in the Persian Gulf. With the vast potential for collecting and distributing information provided by modern C3 systems it can be very tempting to overindulge a bit on information, especially as headquarters grow larger and larger. Even if a commander can personally get by on less than certainty, the staff may not be so willing to reduce its appetite for more information. Indeed, larger staffs need more information to keep themselves busy, which in turn can generate even larger staffs. Technology appears to be adding to the size of staffs, not reducing them as was once thought possible. In the staff’s understandable desire to create the impression for the commander that their charts and monitors actually reflect reality there may sometimes be a perception that information exists primarily to service the C3 system, rather than the system’s existence being to provide information to commanders. This erroneous perception may be what caused technicians writing in the US Army’s Signal magazine in 1985 to express the view that the C3 system actually “requires a steady stream of accurate and reliable operational/ logistical reports.”13 Military 134

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leaders and commanders may require a steady stream of information to maintain the proper balance of the ends, ways, and means, but the C3 system itself certainly should not expect a steady stream of anything except confusion. The information passing from lower echelons of command to higher echelons will be sporadic at best, in spite of the higher command’s desire for a steady stream. This sporadic reporting is simply part of the F2 inherent in the chaos of war. Experienced commanders will be familiar with this phenomenon, although familiarity makes it no less frustrating. General Eisenhower, when he was commanding the British and American forces which invaded North Africa in the Second World War in 1942, reflected this frustration with sporadic reporting when he wrote in a memo the day after the invasion started: “How I’d like a few reports.”14 In spite of an extensive C3 system designed to keep him informed, on the day after the beginning of the largest military invasion the world had seen up to that time, Eisenhower, the commander-in-chief of the invasion force, knew very little of the progress of the invasion. His experience is not unusual. For a C3 system to actually require a steady stream of information implies that the system has become an end in itself. The C3 structure of people and equipment must exist to exchange information and, more importantly, ideas. Along with their proper role of gathering and filtering information for the commander, staffs can become preoccupied in simply maintaining and feeding the C3 system rather than using available information to generate the ideas needed for the successful conduct of war. Certainly the more information commanders and leaders have about their battles, campaigns, and war the better, but moving information around cannot become an end in itself. Commanders will virtually never have all the information they would like to have. They must be prepared to act with decision in the uncertain environment of war. General George Patton, a wellknown American military commander in the Second World War, wrote in his memoirs, War As I Knew It, of once demanding that an attack be conducted without delay over the objections of “all the generals concerned” because his “sixth sense told (him) it was vital.”15 In the event Patton was correct. Attacking without delay resulted in breaking up an enemy attack before it started. Patton’s “sixth sense” was Foulard’s coup d’oeil. While the time may be approaching when there is enough information to present an accurate picture of war even as it is 135


happening, military commanders and leaders may not always have the time to wait for the system to analyse the data before they must act. Too much information can paralyse a force as quickly as too little if commanders are hesitant to act in ambiguous situations. The commander’s coup d’oeil remains a key ingredient in success in battle; the commander must control his C3 system, not be a slave to it. Martin van Creveld, in his classic study, Command in War, notes in his conclusions about command systems that an organization, when “confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to perform that task,” has two options. “One is to increase its information-processing capacity, the other to design the organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information.”16 The fascination that military establishments throughout the world apparently have with the latest high technology solution to virtually every problem tends to focus on van Creveld’s first option, increase capacity, while in reality, the uncertain nature of war should be driving them toward the second alternative, operate on less information. To be successful, commanders must develop the ability to strike a balance between their “sixth sense” and the necessity for a “steady stream” of information. They must organize their C3 systems, which include both people and equipment, so that they can function on uncertain and sporadic information. A key factor in the ability of a C3 system to overcome F2 is planning. Planning while both preparing for and conducting war is essential from all three perspectives of war, tactical, operational, and strategic. Planning based on a thorough analysis of the situation before a battle, a campaign, or a war should enable commanders to anticipate many of the problems presented by F2. Anticipating the problems of F2 provides an opportunity to design a C3 system suited to both the situation and the commander. No matter how detailed the plan, however, it is virtually certain that F2 will cause it to change once the fighting begins. Commanders must be prepared to make changes in plans with less information than they would like, from any perspective of war. Planners, especially pre-war or peacetime planners, must always bear in mind that their plans must accommodate changes when the situation changes during the conduct of war, as it certainly will, from that postulated in their assumptions. Change is a constant factor of war, and must never be forgotten by military leaders and commanders and their staffs. While planning can be a great asset 136

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to the C3 system’s capability to cope with F2, there is a concurrent danger that military commanders and leaders may become so enamored with their plans that they will resist changes to them regardless of the inevitable changes which will occur in the chaos of war. It is worth noting here a comment from George Patton, a general known for his ability to take advantage of opportunities in war, that “successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.”17 Once committed to conducting war, commanders and leaders will naturally want to believe that their plan is really working and may even be reluctant to accept information which appears contrary to that supposition. The military mind’s unswerving desire to attain order will virtually always want to see the situation in a positive light. Objective analysis of available information, though essential, is frequently difficult. Simply assuming that things are going well because there is no news to the contrary does not always work while conducting war. The old adage that no news is good news does not necessarily apply. According to one German field marshal, Erich von Manstein, a successful commander who viewed most of the German conduct of the Second World War from both an operational and strategic perspective as a planner and commander, “whenever things are going well, news usually finds its way back quickly enough. If, on the other hand, the attack gets stuck, a blanket of silence descends on the front, either because communications have been cut or those concerned prefer to hang on till they have something encouraging to report.”18 Another reason that it may take longer for reverses on the battlefield to become known to higher headquarters according to the US Army’s Infantry School, a place where junior officers learn the fundamentals of a tactical perspective of war, is the human characteristic that “no one wants to pass bad news upward, especially if it reflects unkindly on him.”19 Bad news, important though it may be, will generally always be hard to come by. The military mind is apparently eternally optimistic that its desired new order will eventually prevail over the chaos of war, it may simply take a bit longer than originally planned. If the bad news in war is hard to come by, then the good news may be so abundant that it will be hard to believe. Indeed, a pretty good rule of thumb about information in war is that the first good news, or even news of any sort, will probably be wrong. Military organizations of all sizes and functions are necessarily success137


oriented and seek to report as much good news as they possibly can. Historically, this phenomenon can be seen when examining the records of losses on both sides in a specific battle. Nearly always each side will report having destroyed more than the other side will have reported losing or even having in the first place. In the chaos of war every report must be questioned and when viewing war from its higher perspectives military leaders and commanders must be patient as they attempt to penetrate the F2 of war. The old phenomenon of the first news probably being inaccurate presents new problems in the age of live television coverage of war. Military commanders used to have some time to sort out their reports and develop an assessment of what happened before it became news. Now, however, reporters report events in living color from the tactical perspective of war as fast or faster than commanders viewing the same events from the operational and strategic perspectives can assess them. Once television has reported its tactical perspective it often becomes difficult for senior military authorities to put the television reporting into the context of the larger view of war. A perceived tactical failure does not necessarily mean failure from the operational or strategic perspectives. In 1968 American television networks widely reported the Tet Offensive in Vietnam as a resounding defeat of American forces. The networks, however, in reporting what they saw immediately from the tactical perspective did not consider the view from the higher perspectives of war before rushing to judgment. As the offensive gradually wound down it became apparent that it had to be considered an American success, since the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong failed to attain any significant strategic objectives and eventually lost the few tactical objectives they initially attained. By the time the overall view of the situation became clear, however, the television interpretation had become accepted as reality in the United States. From North Vietnam’s perspective reality presented a rather different view. Tran Van Tra, a North Vietnamese general during the Tet Offensive, wrote of the offensive that North Vietnam forces “suffered large losses in materiel and manpower, especially cadres at various echelons, which clearly weakened us.”20 Although the camera, according to an old cliché, may not lie, what it sees from the tactical perspective of war may not reflect the operational or strategic points of view. Not only must the military leadership understand war, so must those who would seek to explain it. 138

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In light of the expected reluctance of subordinates to pass on the bad news while at the same time emphasizing the good news, military commanders must actively seek out the real situation in order to find out when plans need changing. Commanders, through the C3 systems, must be able to receive and transmit both ideas and information to evaluate progress or the lack thereof. This must be accomplished with a combination of personal desires of the commander tailored to the equipment available. However it happens, the commander must have some method of monitoring the situation without imposing impossible requirements for information on subordinate commanders. Most commanders of any service will spend most of their careers viewing war from the tactical perspective where planning time will be short and decisions must be made rapidly. The tactical perspective of war is one of trying to maintain some semblance of order in the midst of chaos where information is very perishable due to the generally rapidly changing tactical situation. As commanders move up to higher operational and strategic levels of command they must adapt to longer planning times and a concurrent lag in receiving accurate information. While the considerations for control are generally pretty much the same from all perspectives of war, less so-called real-time information will be available from the operational or strategic than from the tactical perspective. This perfectly normal situation wherein those closest to the action will know more about what is happening than those further away is sometimes difficult for military leaders and commanders to understand. Unrealistic reporting requirements from commanders at higher levels who demand information simply for the sake of information themselves contribute to the F2 of war. This tension between wanting information but not wanting to interfere with subordinates is a corollary to the tension between wanting to control subordinates closely while also leaving them latitude for some freedom of action in conducting war. Military leaders and commanders must be able to make decisions in the absence of certainty and they must be able to make changes in their plans as the situation changes. Analysing the situation is an ongoing process in conducting war; the ways of war must change as the situation changes in order to attain the ends of war. The ability of a commander to adapt plans to the situation is flexibility. Flexibility provides a sort of lubricant to ease the friction of war 139


and reflects a commander’s ability to penetrate the fog of war. Like communication, flexibility helps commanders overcome the F2 in war. Combining F2 and flexibility produces the expression F3. F3 represents combining the fog and friction of war with the flexible attitude that all successful commanders must develop. No matter how sophisticated the C3 system may be, there will still be those times when F2 so overwhelms the forces that operations will bog down for no readily apparent reason. It is then that the experienced commander who understands the intangibles of war will be able to develop new ideas based on limited information to achieve his objective. This is Patton’s “sixth sense” or Foulard’s “coup d’oeil”; it is commanders balancing the ends, ways, and means of war in the midst of chaos. Although experienced military leaders and commanders may eventually learn that they cannot hope to eliminate F2 from the conduct of war, they should also learn that they can reduce its potentially detrimental influence on the conduct of war. F2 affects both friendly and enemy commanders. An enemy’s F2 can provide a friendly advantage and indeed increasing the F2 with which the enemy must contend is an important part of the conduct of war. Likewise, however, what friendly forces seek to do to the enemy, the enemy will seek to do to friendly forces. Military forces, their commanders and leaders, and their staffs exist not to simply accumulate and manage information, but to fight wars. Clausewitz reminds us (and the emphasis is his) that “the end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time.”21 This is a relatively simple idea, but like the conduct of war itself, one which is rather complex to accomplish. With the concept of deterring war gaining popularity and peace breaking out all over the world, it is easy to lose track of just why a nation maintains standing armed forces in the first place. The only good reason for a nation to burden itself with standing armed forces is that it may someday need to fight a war. At the same time only by being ready, willing, and able to fight at the right place and time will the concept of deterrence have any credibility. Determining the “right time” to fight is the responsibility of the strategic military commanders and leaders; determining the “right place” is the job of operational military commanders; while the tactical commander concentrates on being able to fight. Planning 140

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will establish when and where the fight should be. But once the plan goes into execution, all commanders must be prepared to contend with F2. The planning process includes designing a C3 system which will provide commanders with the information and ideas necessary for actually conducting war. C3, however, can only assist commanders; commanders must prepare themselves to deal personally with the intangibles of F2. Designing and operating C3 systems is relatively simple compared to understanding F3. Not even a lifetime of study may be enough to prepare some military leaders and commanders to deal effectively with the chaos of war, but relying solely on technology will certainly guarantee failure. War, in spite of the glitz high technology brings to it, remains a matter of will. Controlling war, in the final analysis, is controlling will. People, not machines, have the will to control war.

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Cry “Havoc!” and let slip the dogs of war! Shakespeare, Julius Caesar War has always been a paradox—something terrible yet glorious. Indeed, Yeats makes the point succinctly in his description of war as “a terrible beauty” in his poem “Easter 1916”. In spite of the lessons of history which is replete with examples of war’s horrors there is no indication that man has any intention of abandoning the use of military force to resolve differences between nations. While the last decade of the twentieth century may have dawned with “peace breaking out all over,” the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 vividly demonstrated that the chaos of war is never far beneath the surface of order in the world. Ironically, Iraq’s invasion has provided a situation where the United States and the Soviet Union find themselves on the same side in a war for the first time since the end of the Second World War. Even if the superpowers are successful in convincing one another that they don’t really need to maintain large military establishments, there will remain enough smaller armies, navies, and air forces around the world for war to continue as a viable option for attaining national goals. Even though it would appear that the so-called “cold war” between the United States and the Soviet Union may have ended, it does not necessarily mean that the dogs of war will cease their havoc. Indeed, with the threat of global war between the superpowers gone, or at least considerably reduced, the dogs of war may actually become more difficult to control. For almost forty years the superpowers and their allies have concentrated on preparing for war in Europe using their experiences in the Second World War as a model. The strategic goal for the Allies in Europe was unconditional 142

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surrender of Germany, which meant destroying the German capability to wage war. This goal set very few restrictive parameters on operational military commanders, which resulted in virtually no restrictions on the use of military force from the tactical perspective. The dogs of war, from the tactical perspective in the Second World War, were free to wreak their havoc to the utmost of their capability. The Second World War, for virtually all participants, was seen as a war for survival wherein the entire nation had to support the effort. The national strategic military objective was to destroy the opposing military force and occupy as much ground as possible. There were virtually no limited objectives as first one side and then the other mounted massive invasions of coordinated air, land, and sea forces to seize and hold territory. In Europe the war did not end until Germany was literally rendered incapable of resistance, and in the Pacific Japan capitulated only when faced with the awesome firepower of the atomic bomb. The chaos of this world war eventually resulted in a new world order unanticipated by any of the participants at the outset. For over forty years the world order has been dominated by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The competition between the two nations and their allies resulted in a continued build-up of both nuclear and conventional forces centered on central Europe. The preparation for war by both sides also centered on central Europe. Both sides drew on their experiences of the Second World War to prepare for another round of linear warfare which would initially feature extended front lines stretching from the North Sea to Switzerland. In the twentieth century linear warfare has come to be accepted as conventional warfare. The First World War was linear warfare with massive armies lined up shoulder to shoulder from the English Channel to Switzerland. The generals who commanded the troops in the Second World War were junior officers in the First World War, so linear warfare in Europe was not unfamiliar to them. When the Allied forces of Great Britain and the United States launched the invasion of Europe with the landings at Normandy the plan was to establish a wide front to confront the German defenders, and in the event the Allied forces moved across Europe on a wide front with virtually every foot of front covered by both sides. It was linear warfare, even though it moved along a bit faster than the First World War had. 143


On the Eastern Front where massive German and Soviet armies faced each other for four years the war was generally linear, although it did feature movement back and forth as first one side and then the other gained an advantage. The Soviets, like their allies on the Western Front, advanced into Germany on a wide linear front as they eventually crushed the German Army. Since the end of the Second World War in Europe, and their subsequent falling out, both superpowers have been preparing their military forces across Europe on a linear front, although in opposite directions. With all the attention on central Europe linear warfare conducted to attain the unlimited objective of unconditional surrender has apparently become accepted as the normal course of events in the conduct of war. Linear warfare, however, may be the exception in war, and unlimited objectives give the dogs of war too much freedom. No matter how noble the cause, the dogs of war must be kept under control on a short leash, and giving them specific limited objectives to attain is an effective leash. One of the reasons for the continuing popularity of linear warfare may be that it is relatively easy to reduce it to scientific study. Virtually every computer model used to simulate war uses this linear concept. The measure of success in such models is the movement of the front lines, not attaining assigned objectives. Ironically, the study of war using the computer relies on an orderly concept of war whereas the basic characteristic of war is chaos. Although unleashing the dogs of war will always result in chaos, there will always be circumstances when a nation will find military force useful. The three perspectives of war apply to any military force, but they will vary according to the cultural, social, and political influences of the nation. What the nation and its national leadership believe will affect how they view war from the strategic perspective. The Soviet Union, for example, believes it will be invaded because this has frequently happened before, so the national leadership prepares to resist that inevitable invasion with large land forces. Since in their view that invasion includes the possibility of nuclear ballistic missiles launched by the United States, the Soviets maintain a large nuclear capability to retaliate, or even launch a pre-emptive strike if necessary. For their part the national leadership of the United States believes that the Soviet Union maintains its missile force to destroy the United States. The national leadership makes the decisions to start and stop the fighting in war from its strategic vantage point. If that leadership 144

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properly analyses the value of using war to gain national goals then it must calculate the ends, ways, and means of war before deciding to use military force. Evaluating the situation and analysing the desired ends, the possible ways of realistically attaining those ends by the use of military force, and the military means available to wage a war may result in a decision to use another element or combination of elements of national power instead. War, viewed from any of its three perspectives, can be a very expensive way for countries to attain their national aims. The costs of war, even if it is successful in attaining a desired national goal, should be weighed objectively and without passion against the potential costs, both tangible and intangible. The tangible costs include the lives and national treasure which must be expended, while the intangible costs include such things as the reactions of the international community of nations which could jeopardize favorable diplomatic relations and the reaction of the population, which could withdraw its support for the war. Ideally there should always be a calculated point at which the nation will end the war when it achieves specific aims or when it becomes too expensive in terms of lives and treasure for the nation to achieve those aims. In any case the national leadership must always maintain control of the war. While the national leadership should make unemotional decisions regarding war and the employment of military force, that same leadership must be able to appeal to its civilian population to support the war and encourage the armed forces to fight the war from the tactical perspective with passion. Ironically, success in war may present a greater threat to losing control of war than failure. The passion required to fight a war successfully and achieve the desired goals may affect the decision on when to stop. A military victory arouses the passions of the victors, both military and civilian. It creates the impression of invincibility and can create the illusion that war is really a useful tool to attain national goals. Victory from any perspective of war, especially if it comes a bit more easily than expected, will virtually always raise the expectations and increase the confidence of the warriors, the supporting civilian population, and the national leadership. The problem then becomes more of when and how to stop, a problem which should be addressed before the decision to use military force is made. A public declaration of national aims to be achieved by war may be helpful to the strategic leadership’s decision on when to stop. There is, however, a 145


disadvantage to a public declaration because if the announced goal cannot be readily achieved by force the national leadership must admit defeat or continue the war in hopes of eventually reaching the desired goal. Neither option is particularly appealing to any national leader relying on public popularity to continue in power. There is a perplexing problem when the use of military force meets with failure, since a war can end only when both sides decide that it is over. Wars have been known to continue for years with only sporadic periods of actual fighting as one side or the other tried to gain an advantage. For over fifty years the Middle East has been a caldron of war waged between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations. Since neither one side ever wins or loses so decisively that the other side will agree to end the fighting the war goes on sporadically. While history records a series of wars between Israel and the Arabs in that troubled area of the world, it is really the same war with alternating periods of chaos and order. Neither side is apparently prepared to declare the other a victor; certainly neither side will admit to being the loser. The circumstances of when to end the war, considering both success and failure, should be considered before making the decision to wage war. While it may be true that war is the last resort of nations trying to settle their differences, it does not necessarily mean that war should be waged in ignorance. A state should not contemplate war unless it knows exactly what it is doing. Unfortunately the very nature of war makes knowing exactly what one is doing impossible. As often as not the nation which starts a war will eventually lose it, even though it would appear that the initiator would have considered exactly what it wanted to accomplish by the war, how it would conduct the war to achieve the desired aims, and how it would take actions to stop the war. The decision to go to war ideally should be an unemotional decision which carefully weighs the potential costs against the desired goals. Once the decision to wage war is made every effort must be made to prevent its becoming controlled by passion. Early success should not encourage further attempts at using military force for further gains, but success can instill a feeling of invincibility in the victors which may result in conducting war for the sake of conducting war even though there is nothing but continued chaos to be gained. In the Second World War Germany and Japan continued to fight even when it was obvious that they were going to be soundly defeated. In that war, however, the Allied demands of unconditional surrender may have 146

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complicated rational decisions by the national leadership of both Germany and Japan. The decisions made from the strategic perspective of war must always consider not only military factors but the implications for all elements of national power. As the relationships of the international community become more complex, and the capability to literally destroy the world increases, the need for some theoretical basis for waging war has become essential. The bipolar world in which the two superpowers and their closest allies faced each other with powerful military forces across a clearly marked front in central Europe is now giving way to a multi-polar world where elements of national power other than military force may determine world leadership. Ironically, the two designated losers in the Second World War, Germany and Japan, are clearly among the leading economic powers in the world, and they attained that role even as the victors of the war labored to ensure that their military power was kept on a short leash. The chaos of war remains in check only by a functional world order that discourages war. When a nation grows too powerful militarily it may decide to wage war as a national policy. The Mongols, for example, were able build a huge empire by force of arms. War for them was both an end and a means, and there were virtually no restraints on their application of military power. The Mongols determined the world order by force because there was no counter to their military power. In today’s world there is no one nation which has the capability to dominate the rest of the world. The Mongol way of war was devastating, but while it did cripple huge areas of the world, in comparison to modern capabilities the Mongols did not threaten the existence of mankind as today’s technological marvels do. While there will always be some members of the international community of nations who will use military force to attempt to impose their will on neighboring nations, today’s network of information interchange exerts considerable influence on the unrestrained use of military power. In today’s modern world nations, no matter how potentially powerful militarily, are generally constrained to waging a very limited form of war. Where the Mongols could wage their war at their pleasure, today’s superpowers frequently find themselves at a loss in trying to use their military elements of power to good advantage. Now the use of military force must meet the approval of the community of nations and apparently weak nations do not automatically succumb to stronger ones as logic would have us 147


believe. The United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan bear witness to this. Paradoxically, the weaker the military power a nation has, the better it may be able to wage war with little or no constraint on that power. A nation which has the potential capability to destroy the world must be extraordinarily careful in using its military power, while a nation which only has enough effective military power to destroy a few people or buildings can do so with fewer constraints. Yet technology has provided such powerful weapons even for small forces that the developing nations of the world frequently use a build-up of military force as a sign of their strength as a nation. Ironically, the result can be to weaken the nation, even though its military power may make an impressive sight on parade. Even in periods of order or peace the chaos of war makes its presence felt as nations devote huge chunks of their gross national product to maintaining impressive armies, navies, and air forces. The paradox that more military power produces less opportunity for its useful application makes a theory of war essential. With no theoretical basis for the application of military power a nation runs the risk of simply waging war for the sake of waging war. Whereas in the past perhaps powerful nations could engage in waging war as a national policy, today the risk of destroying not only one’s enemy, but one’s self in the process, makes the use of military power a more delicate proposition for the stronger military powers of the world. Even the world’s smaller nations, although they may not destroy the world, run the risk of destroying themselves economically by waging war indiscriminantly. While the strategic perspective for small nations may be essentially insignificant from a superpower point of view, even the smallest nations must still consider all elements of their national power in planning and conducting war. More than ever before, the strategic decision-makers of all nations must understand the consequences of using military power to achieve national goals, and they must be prepared to make unemotional decisions in both starting and ending war. War is an intellectual exercise which must be a lifelong effort for the members of the profession of arms. Generals and admirals who command and control the armed forces of a nation cannot simply abrogate their responsibilities under the guise of simply following the orders of their national leadership. Strategic decision makers, whether military or civilian, must collectively understand some common theoretical underpinnings of the phenomenon of 148

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war. If it is otherwise, they will simply not be able to communicate between civilian and military leaders or even between the military leaders of different services. A theoretical framework of war is more than simply a method of relaying information; it will assist both civilian and military leaders and commanders in balancing the ends, ways, and means of war, and provide a logical basis for decisions in war. If war is to have any utility there must be some logic to why nations resort to its chaos. A theoretical framework which examines the situation, establishes a militarily achievable object, determines the way to conduct the war, provides the necessary support, and maintains control over the war provides the basis for a theory of war by planning and using military armed forces to achieve national goals by force in consonance with national policy. The framework provides a guide for preparing and conducting war from any of its three perspectives, strategic, operational, and tactical. National policy determines the way in which a state will pursue its national goals. In developing its national policy a state must be able to distinguish between national goals appropriate to the use of military force and national goals inappropriate to the use of military force. The view from all three perspectives of war must contribute to the assessment of appropriate goals. The military must be an essential part of the decision to use force. The military element of national power has limited use, and that use, as we have seen, can actually be less as the potential military power becomes greater. In extreme cases a large nation’s tactical perspective of war may actually have a wider scope than a small nation’s strategic perspective. This may require the larger nation to behave more responsibly in its use of military force than the small nation, because in the eyes of the world even the legitimate use of military force on a smaller nation can be seen as somehow unfair, even though the concept of fair play is alien to the chaos of war. The United States apparently recognizes this paradoxical situation, as it has a stated national policy of deterrence. Deterring war, however, is not a military mission; it is a national policy goal carried out by having a credible military force which the nation is willing to use. By maintaining a strong combination of both nuclear and conventional forces the United States can pursue this policy. Once the national leadership needs to use force to attain a particular national goal, however, the military element should not be shackled 149


by a mission of deterrence. The use of military force will necessarily have a variety of constraints on it, but requiring the military to refrain from doing the only thing it is supposed to do is simply too great a paradox. Even with the best of intentions a national policy of deterrence cannot deter all war, since deterrence itself requires the periodic use of military power to demonstrate that there is a capability to enforce the policy. There will always be situations where military force may be required to demonstrate the resolve necessary to maintain a credible national policy of deterrence. The paradox is that the way to deter a big war is periodically to conduct a small war. In supporting a national policy of deterrence, the proper role for military forces is be prepared to wage war. The national leadership which determines the policy of deterrence must also demonstrate willingness to use military power in the pursuit of its goals. Implementation of deterrence is not the responsibility of the military element of power, although the military leadership charged with the strategic planning and waging of war should certainly have a role in the policy decisions regarding deterrence. The military simply cannot realistically have unilateral responsibility for deterrence. The dogs of war must be kept fierce even as they are kept on a short, tight leash. Requiring them to hold their own leash can only tame them to a less than effective enforcer of deterrence. Describing and using a theory of war to plan military actions does not mean advocating that war is the most expedient way to achieve national goals. A theory of war, understood by all of the diverse elements which may play a role in the decisions to wage war, helps ensure that methods other than war are considered and used to settle international disputes. If parties, both pro-military and anti-military, understand the framework of analysis used for preparing and conducting war and the three different perspectives from which to view war, it may actually reduce the probability of war. While no one may actually seek to advance war as a positive national policy, it is fair to say that if members of the military, whose proper role after all is to prepare for war, may sometimes appear eager to go to war, it may be the result of wanting actually to execute what they spend lifetimes preparing. Fighting seen from the tactical perspective can be a highly emotional experience which should not influence decisions from the operational or strategic perspectives of war. Military commanders and planners must not allow their 150

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personal tactical experience of war to overly influence their operational and strategic responsibilities. Tactical solutions are simply not appropriate; the view from the operational and strategic perspectives of war is not simply tactics writ large. When the national leadership makes the decision to use military force, the force must be adequate to do the intended job. Indeed it should be more than adequate, since a long war only prolongs the chaos. The idea that there are equivalent levels of force leads to the gradual employment of military force, which generally only prolongs the war. A state must use its military force ruthlessly, not fairly, in pursuing national objectives. Once the decision is made to use military force the national leadership must use it decisively and quickly, bringing its use to a definite end. Used in this manner military force provides a final paradox of war; the best way to ensure peace is to be prepared to fight the war. Simply preparing for peace is the surer road to war. A simple framework of analysis viewed from the three perspectives of war allows both those who will decide when and where to wage war and those who will actually fight the war to better understand each other and the phenomenon of war. Since there are no guarantees when a country uses military force, it is imperative that the national leadership, both military and civilian, understand that war is always chaotic and unpredictable before they embark upon its uncertain seas. The only thing remotely certain about war is that its price is always high.

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War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operation to be under-taken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case. Jomini, The Art of War Early on the morning of 20 December 1989 the United States loosed the dogs of war in order to gain a national goal which it had sought in vain by the use of the non-military elements of national power. In a surprise attack on the country of Panama the United States resorted to the chaos of war in the hope of establishing a new order more conducive to American national interests. Although it is too early to determine what the ultimate order in the country of Panama will turn out to be, early indications are that the war has thus far resulted in something close to the order the United States hoped would come out of its use of military force. For a number of years prior to this use of military power the United States had tried to remove Manuel Noriega from power in Panama. Economic and diplomatic efforts had resulted only in varying degrees of failure. Noriega was almost literally thumbing his nose at the United States, and indeed he eventually actually declared war on the United States. Whether it was the declaration of war or simply frustration with the lack of progress on the economic and diplomatic fronts toward removing Noriega from power which led to the United States’ decision to employ military force, the result was the same. The United States was able to accomplish by force of arms what it had failed to accomplish by more peaceful means.1 The US invasion of Panama provides the opportunity to examine contemporary warfare and indeed what the face of war may be 152

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for the foreseeable future. As the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, begin to deal with each other on a friendlier basis, the possibility of yet another world war in the twentieth century recedes dramatically. Instead of preparing to face each other across the plains of Europe the two superpowers will have to begin to restructure their military forces to be able to intervene in areas around the world to protect their national interests or be able to attain their national goals by the use of military force when necessary. The military forces necessary to attain national goals in a multipolar world may turn out to be rather different than those needed in a bipolar world. Indeed, not only the superpowers, but any country in the world which has the capability to project effective power beyond its boundaries is in the position to use that military power to achieve specific and limited national objectives by the use of military force. Great Britain’s recapture of the Falklands from Argentina, and the United States’ invasion of Grenada are both examples of the use of military power in conjunction with other elements of national power to attain limited national goals, and the military forces used in both of these examples differed from those presently deployed on the plains of central Europe. In both Panama and the Falklands/ Malvinas invasions the tactical forces were relatively small and consisted of a combination of air, land, and sea forces under the control of a single operational commander who worked very closely with his national leadership with its strategic perspective of war. In preparing to apply military force in situations like Panama or in the Falklands/Malvinas the model of the Second World War in Europe provides little guidance. The forces in Europe in that war were larger and faced each other across a well-defined front while the invasion forces in Panama and the Falklands/Malvinas were small and had no clear front lines to separate friend from foe. But the framework of analysis which examines the situation, selects a militarily achievable objective, determines how to attain that objective, provides the necessary support, and maintains appropriate control, does provide a method for preparing and conducting short, decisive wars. The framework will also be useful from all three perspectives of war in balancing the ends, ways, and means of war. Strategically, the decision by the United States to invade Panama came only after extensive use of other elements of national power had failed to remove Noriega from power. The decision to use military power, however, did not mean abandoning the other elements of 153


national power. Diplomatic efforts were under way even as the invasion was initiated, as the United States informed its primary allies of the invasion in advance and told them its purpose. Diplomacy continued to be used during the course of the invasion as the United States worked to extract Noriega from the Vatican embassy where he had taken refuge. Shortly after the invasion began the President of the United States in his role as the political leader and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces used his strategic perspective of war to go on national television and explain to the people of the United States and the rest of the world the purpose of the invasion. In so doing he began to develop the support of the American public, an internal element of national power essential to the successful use of military force in modern democracies. Resorting to war to attain national objectives will invariably lead to loss of life and the expenditure of national treasure, and the citizenry of a democracy will properly demand to know if the gains were worth the cost. Because the President was able to explain the situation clearly and define a specific militarily achievable goal he could convince the American people that he had virtually no choice in resorting to force of arms to attain an elusive, but essential, national objective. During the course of explaining the situation and defining the objective the President also identified the circumstances necessary to end the war. In the context of the framework of war the situation and the military objectives as viewed from the strategic perspective of war were clearly and publicly stated by the President. Prior to resorting to war to seek a new order in Panama the national command authority which controls the military forces of the United States, the President and the secretary of defense, apparently considered how to end the war before they started it. Once having established the objective of the war the actual conduct of the invasion was left to the operational commander-in-chief of American military forces in Panama. He had command of all the air, land, and sea forces involved and reported directly to the national command authority of the United States. Because the war was limited and fairly small in comparison to the military capabilities of the United States, more than adequate support was made available to the operational military commander in Panama. The national command authority viewing the invasion strategically demanded close control of the chaos of war; they wanted to ensure the leash was kept very tight on the dogs of war. The 154

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clear definition of the strategic objective to be attained made it apparent that the war was to be limited. The American national leadership who viewed the invasion of Panama strategically therefore established parameters on the operational military commander in order to limit the loss of lives and damage to the country of Panama. The fact that the American forces in the invasion did suffer casualties and that Panamanians died during the chaos of war must be balanced against the success of the United States attaining its national goals for the invasion, taking Noriega into custody for eventual trial in the United States. Whether or not that goal was in fact worth the lives and treasure expended will be left to the future to determine. One thing, however, is certain; any time a country resorts to military force, the cost will be measured in human lives and suffering and the loss of national treasure. Viewed from the operational perspective the invasion of Panama reflects some of the recent changes the United States has made in its methods of controlling its military power. These changes have come by and large from the renewed study of war in the United States. The specific plan for the invasion of Panama was prepared by the operational headquarters for the invasion, based on guidance from the national leadership with its strategic perspective. It was apparently a relatively long-standing plan, which received only minor adjustments to be effective for the invasion. The operational situation was that military force was to be used in Panama to remove Noriega, the de facto head of state, from power, which meant that the military commander had to coordinate the activities of both military and diplomatic elements of American national power very closely. In this invasion the strategic objective given to the operational military commander was about as clear, concise, and militarily achievable as a strategic objective can be. The invading forces were to safeguard the lives of American citizens in the area, protect US vital interests, depose a dictatorship and establish an elected government, and capture Noriega for trial in the United States. On this list the most tangible objective was the capture of Noriega. With such a limited strategic objective the operational military commander had no need to develop any interim sequence of tactical objectives, since these objectives, developed and assigned from the operational perspective, were all things directly associated with removing Noriega from power. The removal of Noriega from power actually accomplished the majority of the assigned strategic objectives and was the key event which ended the war. 155


This short and decisive war consisted of one campaign which had only one battle and attained one specific military strategic objective, which was also the desired political objective. The new order that the United States wants to see as a result of this war—a stable democratic government friendly to the United States—may be a long time coming, but the military strategic objective of removing Noriega from power provided the first step toward that new order. The actual conduct of the invasion viewed from the operational perspective was relatively simple. The strategic objective was such that the campaign necessary to attain it required only one battle, although it was a battle which consisted of many disparate parts which had to be coordinated operationally. The plan for the employment of tactical forces was again simple, and once the operation started, operational control consisted primarily of monitoring the activities of the tactical forces as they attained their assigned tactical objectives. The culmination of the invasion was Noriega’s surrender. As far as can be determined at this point, no significant decisions had to be made once the campaign was under way until it was learned that Noriega had taken refuge inside the Vatican embassy. Tactical forces were able to fight their battles and achieve their assigned objectives with little or no operational interference. The support allocated for the invasion from the operational perspective was certainly more than adequate to do the job. War, even limited war for limited goals, must never be considered in terms of what is fair and what is not. The employment of military force demands that sufficient force be employed to accomplish the assigned mission. One of the best ways of limiting the spread and duration of a war is to use overwhelming force at the outset so as to bring it to a conclusion as soon as possible. Limited war does not necessarily mean limiting the force to be used. Because war is unpredictable and chaotic it requires that force be applied with a significant margin for error. It is better to have too much force initially and not use all of it than to find that insufficient force was allocated to accomplish the assigned mission. Using large amounts of military force will not diminish the chaos of war, but it will increase the chances of quickly bringing the desired order out of the chaos. Beginning a war with too little force to resolve the issue quickly may result in a long-drawn-out war detrimental to national interests. In Panama the United States used sufficient force to resolve the issue quickly and favorably before public support 156

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waned. Public support hinges on success in war. Early failure or the appearance of failure in not quickly gaining announced objectives will rapidly erode public support, especially since television provides the public with information on the progress or lack thereof almost as soon as the national leadership can receive it. Whether or not the war in Panama will eventually result in the order desired by the United States, the period of chaos was relatively short and did receive the support of the American people. Operational control of the invasion of Panama had to be very tight. As well as removing Noriega from power, the goal was to restore a government recognized by the United States as elected by the people of Panama. Militarily, once Noriega was in custody about all that was left was to establish control over the looters. In Panama one of the unpredicted results of the war was the lingering chaos of looting. As much, and in all probability more, damage resulted from the looting by Panamanians than was done by American military forces. The chaos of war ended well before the chaos of looting. The US military forces on the scene then found themselves in the paradoxical situation of reducing the chaos caused by the looters rather than being the cause of the chaos, their more usual role in war. In any case it is apparent that there was very close control on the American military forces since they were able to change rapidly from invaders to policemen even though that role had not been anticipated in the analysis of the situation. The relationship between the national leadership with its strategic perspective and the American commander-in-chief in Panama with his operational perspective was certainly conducive to success. Having once assigned the strategic military objective, established the desired parameters and provided the necessary forces, the national command authority of the United States left the actual conduct of the war to the operational military commander. The civilian and military leaders who had the strategic perspective of the war spent their time reporting the progress of the war to the civilian population of the United States and the rest of the world, primarily through the medium of television. In so doing the strategic leadership developed and maintained the popular support essential to the success of the invasion. During the invasion the President of the United States with his strategic perspective of the war also used his diplomatic element of national power as he addressed other world leaders both publicly and privately to assure them that the United States was indeed pursuing limited strategic objectives in 157


Panama and would end the war as soon as those objectives, primarily the capture of Noriega, were attained. The relationship between the operational and strategic leadership was apparently good since the strategic national leadership did not try and impose its views directly on the operational commanderin-chief of the invasion. Perhaps the reason was that the invasion was very successful, did accomplish its stated objectives in a very short time, and did not drag on into any sort of protracted war which would have caused the strategic leadership difficulty in maintaining public support for the war. From the operational and strategic perspectives of war the invasion of Panama appeared to have followed the plan in a fairly orderly manner. Perhaps the only unexpected aspect of the invasion was the length of time and the diplomatic negotiations it took to actually bring Noriega into custody. That aspect, however, simply points up the unpredictable nature of war, and the necessity to coordinate the activities of the various elements of national power, in this case military and diplomatic. While that coordination took place from the strategic perspective, the military commander-in-chief viewing the invasion operationally had to be very much aware of what was happening on the diplomatic front so that he could employ the military forces on the scene properly. Although the eventual capture of Noriega was not as quick and clean as perhaps the strategic leadership of the United States had hoped it would be, the fact that the stated strategic objective was accomplished marks the invasion as a success. Nevertheless, the chaos of war was certainly very much in evidence when viewed from the tactical perspective. In the age of modern communications television provides viewers around the world with a glimpse of the tactical perspective of war along with the participants. During the invasion of Panama television audiences were able to see the chaos of war from the tactical perspective. They saw things that appeared to be very simple accomplished only with great difficulty while experts in television studios provided a running commentary on what they thought the events meant. Television in Panama provided instant analysis of the progress of the invasion based primarily on its tactical perspective of war. The situation in the invasion of Panama as seen from the tactical perspective was not particularly complicated. While there were myriad tactical objectives which had to be attained in order to secure the strategic objective of capturing Noriega, none of those objectives 158

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was beyond the capabilities of the tactical forces employed. Although these objectives were attained in Panama there was one aspect of the situation which has become a characteristic of modern tactical warfare, the requirement to keep loss of life to a minimum. In Panama this influenced the actual conduct of the war in that weapons and tactics were sometimes employed in unfamiliar ways. Tactically, not only did the military forces have to secure their objectives quickly, they had to do it with minimal damage and loss of life, especially to the invading American military forces. Although the cost of the invasion in terms of American lives and national treasure can be interpreted as minimal it still points out that using military power to attain national objectives will always exact a precious price. In the continuing analysis of the invasion of Panama whether or not the goal attained was worth the price paid will be decided by future historians. The fact that the Panamanian Army did not put up too much resistance and that the US had air superiority throughout the invasion made it possible for American forces to use their advantage in firepower to accomplish objectives with a minimum loss of life. In one instance US Army infantry forces were spared the cost of a building-by-building fight by standing off while artillery pieces fired point blank into the objective until the defenders eventually gave up the obviously one-sided fight. While this is neither classic infantry nor artillery procedure it is an example of how the ways of war must be flexible in using the available means to attain the desired ends. The support from the tactical perspective of war was simply and appropriately overwhelming. From both the strategic and operational perspectives it is apparent that the decision was to provide overwhelming tactical force in order to attain the strategic objectives of the invasion quickly and decisively. There is always the possibility that there may well be criticism by analysts, from the comfort of distance in time and space, that too much military force was used in Panama. War, however, is not a game where the opposing sides are expected to have some sort of parity; war is an unpredictable and chaotic method of attaining national goals and applying overwhelming force is one way of reducing the unpredictability. Tactical control of the invasion was apparently good. Tactical forces attained assigned objectives without undue interference or assistance from the operational perspective. In the event the most 159


unexpected activity from the tactical perspective may have been the widespread and persistent looting. Once having seized their assigned tactical objectives American forces found themselves having to deal with trying to pacify looters. It is a positive reflection on the tactical forces and the tactical leadership that both were able to adjust from the chaos of waging war to the chaos of keeping peace, two rather different activities. The relationship between the tactical leadership and the operational leadership was apparently as positive as the relationship between the strategic and operational leadership in that in both situations the higher authority allowed the subordinate military commanders to conduct the war with minimal interference. The fact that the war was short and decisive in the United States’ favor no doubt contributed greatly to this state of affairs. As wars drag on with no apparent progress the strategic leadership generally will become more involved with both operational and tactical activities as it searches for good news to deliver to the supporting civilian population. While the strategic leadership can certainly use television to good advantage to gain public support for the use of military force, television can also provide the public evidence of lack of progress. The potential influence of television or any of the news media must be part of the analysis of the situation in modern war, and that influence must be considered from each of the three perspectives of war. While it remains for the future to determine if the United States really attained the desired new order of a stable and friendly government in Panama, it seems that the use of military force provided a successful prelude to reaching that national goal. The American invasion appears to follow an emerging pattern for wars in a multi-polar world where the use of military force by large nations will be actively discouraged by the international community of nations. To gain any sort of approval in the world, wars must have clearly defined objectives which are seized quickly. The war must be short and decisive, which requires the use of overwhelming force under strict parameters to limit the loss of life and materiel. As the Second World War fades into the past, as military forces facing each other in central Europe grow smaller, as the world moves away from a bipolar orientation based primarily on the military forces of the Soviet Union and the United States, and as nations rely on other elements of national power, especially economic, to 160

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attain their national goals, war should become less popular as a method of settling national disputes. To maintain the order of peace, however, nations must be prepared to endure the chaos of war. War will always be chaos and its price will always be high.

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Appendix I THE FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

1 SITUATION Information of the overall situation essential to subordinate commander understanding of the current situation. This paragraph will always contain paragraphs a, b, and c as shown below. a Enemy Forces. Information concerning enemy forces such as composition, disposition, location, movement, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities will be considered. Reference to a published intelligence document, overlay, or annex may be sufficient. b Friendly Forces. Information concerning friendly forces, other than that covered by the operation plan (order), that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. This information usually is listed in order by higher, adjacent, supporting, and reinforcing units. c Attachments and Detachments. When not shown under “Task Organization,” list here or in an annex units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters, together with the times that attachments or detachments are effective. If these units are indicated in “Task Organization,” an appropriate reference is entered. In the case of a unit that has been attached for some period of time, the term “Remains Attached” may be used. d Assumptions. Include those situations/conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the operation plan becomes an operation order [applicable only to a plan]. 2 MISSION A clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished by the command and its purpose. The mission statement is derived from 162

THE FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

the commander’s mission analysis. The mission is stated in full, even if shown on the operation overlay. Paragraph 2 never has subparagraphs. 3 EXECUTION a Concept of Operation. This is a statement of the commander’s visualization of the execution of an operation from start to completion—how the selected course of action is to be accomplished. It accurately provides subordinates the commander’s intent in order that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. The concept clarifies the purpose of the operation and is stated in sufficient detail to ensure appropriate action by subordinates. Style is not emphasized at the expense of substance, but clarity and conciseness must prevail. The amount and detail should be sufficient to indicate what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole. If an operation overlay is used, it is referenced here. (1) The concept of operation may be a single paragraph, may be divided into two or more subparagraphs, or, if unusually lengthy, may be prepared as an annex. The concept normally includes consideration of the close in battle as well as the deep battle and aspects of rear area protection. It should describe— * The employment of major ground and, when available, air maneuver elements in a “scheme of maneuver.” * A plan of fire support or “scheme of fires” supporting the maneuver with air, artillery, and air defense fires. * The integration of intelligence and electronics warfare (IEW) efforts. * The integration of obstacles, mines, and fortifications. * Other aspects of the operation (for example, deception operations) that the commander considers appropriate to clarify the concept and to ensure unity of effort. The scheme of maneuver covers the employment of major maneuver units and is derived primarily from the commander’s decision and from staff planning. It includes the priority of fires and also may include the employment of nuclear weapons, chemical consideration, and targeting priorities. If a preparation is to be fired, its starting time and duration are stated. The IEW concept describes the commander’s intelligence collection priorities and electronic warfare priorities. The obstacle, mine, and fortification 163


concept describes the extent of preparation of the battlefield required, to include mobility, countermobility, and survivability considerations and priorities, and the employment of enemy air defenses (SEAD) [suppression of enemy air defenses]) rear area protection. (2) When an operation involves two or more distinct phases, the concept of operation may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Usually, phases are designated as follows: phase I, phase II. b In subsequent separate lettered subparagraphs, the specific tasks to be accomplished by each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical missions are given. Tasks for subordinate commands that are described adequately on the operation overlay need not be repeated in these subparagraphs. However, when time permits, tasks also may be stated here to ensure clarity. When instructions are multiple, they are itemized. If there is a priority or a sequence for accomplishment, it is stated. Units not solely in reserve [see b.(6) below] are listed in the following order: (1) Major subordinate maneuver commands. List numerically or alphabetically in order of decreasing size by type of unit (infantry, mechanized infantry, air assault, airborne, armor— tank, attack helicopter armored cavalry, air cavalry), if applicable. When established, task forces which are a major subordinate command (of equal size to numbered commands) are listed first in numerical or alphabetical order as appropriate followed by numbered commands in numerical sequence. (2) Maneuver elements not categorized in (1) above are then listed numerically by type as indicated in (1) above. When listing units that have both a parent unit numerical designation and an alphabetical identity, list by parent numerical sequence and alphabetically within parent unit if more than one unit is from the same parent unit. (3) The fire support subparagraph follows tasks to maneuver units. The fire support subparagraph may contain a sub-subparagraph of each fire support means (for example, Air Support, Chemical, Field Artillery, Naval Gunfire, and Nuclear). Sub-paragraphs are arranged in alphabetical order, by means, if practicable. As a minimum, the fire support subparagraph will contain the organization for combat and assigned tactical missions of organic and attached FA [field artillery] to include priorities of fire, if not already announced in the Concept of Operation 164


(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

and a reference to the fire support annex if one is used. A fire support annex should be used if data required is too extensive to be placed in this subparagraph. Other elements providing combat support, as applicable. These elements are listed alphabetically by size (for example, Air Defense, Aviation, Engineer, Military Intelligence). It is not necessary to list all the combat support units in the command nor is it necessary to give instructions for the total employment of a particular unit. The air defense subparagraph contains, as a minimum, a sub-subparagraph reflecting the organization for combat and assigned tactical missions of organic and attached air defense artillery to include priorities of fire, if not already announced in the Concept of Operation and reference to the air defense annex if one is used. The engineer subparagraph contains the organization for combat and assigned tactical missions of organic, attached, and OPCON [operational control] engineers to include priorities of engineer effort, if not already announced in the Concept of Operation and refers to the engineer annex if one is used. CSS Commands. List alphabetically in order of decreasing size (support command, group, battalion, company, detachment). Commands falling in the same alphabetical position will be listed in numerical sequence. Units with normal CSS missions are not included in these commands. Reserve elements. Composition of the reserve and instructions appear in the next to last subparagraph of paragraph 3, titled “Reserve.” (When there are no coordinating instructions, instructions to the reserve are the last subparagraph). In the case of a unit totally in reserve at the time the order becomes effective, this is the only subparagraph in which such a unit will appear. (This is true even when subordinate elements of the reserve unit are attached or support other units that have assigned missions in the above paragraphs). Units not in reserve at the time of the order but designated as reserve at some future time are listed initially in their appropriate subparagraph above and also in this subparagraph, with a qualifying phrase telling when or under what conditions the unit will be in reserve. The listing of two or more units in this subparagraph does not indicate an attachment. The last subparagraph of paragraph 3 is titled “Coordinating Instructions” and contains details of coordination and control 165


applicable to two or more elements of the command. Troop safety measures appropriate to the nuclear battlefield and the operation exposure guide may be shown here. Restrictions on use of nuclear weapons may be included. Defense criteria for nuclear and chemical weapons should be stated if different from SOP. In a chemical environment, the level of missionoriented protective posture (MOPP), when different from that in the SOP, must be stated. Priorities and necessary coordination procedures for use of the airspace are shown here if not specified in SOP or in an airspace management annex. The commander’s essential elements of information (EEI) are stated in this subparagraph when an intelligence annex is not included in the plan or order. Annexes not listed elsewhere will be listed here.

4 SERVICE SUPPORT This paragraph contains a statement of the CSS instructions and arrangements supporting the operation that are of primary interest to the units and formations being supported. It also will give the commander’s direction to CSS commanders. If lengthy, details may be included in an annex and referenced here. At higher levels of command, reference may be made to an administrative/logistics order. At lower levels of command, this paragraph or the service support annex may eliminate the need for an administrative/logistics plan or order. Subparagraphs are titled “Materiel and Services,” “Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization,” “Personal,” “CivilMilitary Cooperation,” and “Miscellaneous.” 5 COMMAND AND SIGNAL This paragraph contains instructions relative to command and to the operation of C-E [communications-electronics]. It normally has two subparagraphs: “Command” and “Signal.” Command instructions may include command post (CP) locations and axis of CP displacement if not shown on an accompanying overlay. Liaison requirements, designation of alternate CP and succession of command will be entered in this subparagraph if not adequately covered in the SOP. C-E instructions may include rules concerning the use of communications and other electronic equipment (for example, radio silence). C-E instructions may refer to an annex, 166


but, as a minimum, should list the current CommunicationsElectronics Operation Instructions (CEOI) index. (This format is found in FM 101–5 Staff Organization and Operations, Annex G, Headquarters, Department of the Army, dated May 1984.)

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Appendix II A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE US ARMY’S FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT In its insistence on practicality the United States Army has for almost a hundred years used a relatively simple, standardized format for relaying information from the highest levels of command to the lowest level of execution. This format, in five paragraphs, is used for both plans and orders. It has the flexibility to bridge the gap between planning for war and the conduct of war. The deceptive simplicity of the five-paragraph format belies the way they can address the most complex elements of war. An essential element of army doctrine since the beginning of this century, the five-paragraph format reflects the basic paradox of the concurrent simplicity and complexity of war. The format is simplicity itself, five clearly defined paragraphs in which essential plans and orders pass easily between the different and varied levels of command. The five paragraphs also recognize the complexity of war in that each paragraph can be expanded as necessary to meet the needs of any level of command from the tactical perspective of an infantry squad to the strategic perspective of a Unified Command in the United States system of organization for war. Virtually from their inception these five paragraphs have been simple, but they have the flexibility to handle the complexities of war from virtually any perspective. The five-paragraph format also combines the contradictory concepts of the science of war and the art of war. The format is itself scientific in that it is basically systematized knowledge. It organizes the essential information and instructions of American experience in the preparation and conduct of war. The art of war lies in how the commander uses the five paragraphs to provide instructions and information to his subordinates and how they, in turn, carry out the will of the commander. 168

THE US ARMY’S FIVE-PARAGRAPH FORMAT

Starting with a description of the situation in its first paragraph, the second paragraph then provides a clear statement of the goal or mission to be accomplished. Following the statement of the mission the third paragraph describes how the mission will be accomplished, and the fourth paragraph outlines what support will be required. Finally, the fifth paragraph describes how it will all be controlled. Simply stated in terms of ends, ways, and means, the five paragraphs of war set forth the ends or the mission to be accomplished, the way or concepts of how to achieve those ends, and the means or what will be required to achieve the desired ends. The higher the level of command, the more complex, and therefore longer the order or plan may have to be. The fiveparagraph format remains in daily use from infantry squads to the highest level of military command in the United States. They provide a logical, even common-sense, approach to applying military force for appropriate tasks at any level of command. At the highest levels of setting and achieving national goals if the ends, ways, and means cannot be balanced in these five paragraphs then there is an excellent chance that the use of military force may not be appropriate. During its growth over a century filled with the most rapid technological advancements in the history of war the five-paragraph format has proven its value and flexibility. Its longevity also demonstrates the basic paradox of war. Like war, the five paragraphs are simple on the surface or from the lowest tactical perspective of war, but from the perspective of war where the large unified commands of the United States wage war with integrated forces of air, land, and sea, the plans and orders can expand within the five-paragraph format into extraordinarily complex documents covering virtually all aspects of modern war. The five paragraphs of war have their roots in the German general staff system, but the design is purely American. Major Eben Swift, a uniformed military reformer long before the current crop of civilian reformers were even born, designed the format after his study of warfare revealed that orders were as frequently mis-understood as they were properly executed. His thesis was simply that “the whole fabric of the art of command rests on the issue of orders.” His solution was a scientific method of issuing orders in a prescribed format so that both the officer issuing the order and the officer receiving the order could be sure that the order contained all pertinent information. The methodology was scientific in the broad sense of 169


the term since it organized knowledge into a system by which it could be accurately transmitted from one person to another. The basis for Swift’s original five paragraphs of war was the 1887 Order of Field Service of the German Army. During the nineteenth century the German general staff began its rise to what some consider to be the most efficient military organization in the world. It was therefore natural for educated army officers in the United States to look to the German model for lessons that could be applied to American use, since during the period between 1820 and 1920 there was a remarkable transfer of scholarship from German universities to America as some 9,000 American students studied in Germany. Swift was drawn to the German methodology by studying the applicatory method of tactical instruction while he was an instructor at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. There he was an assistant to Arthur L. Wagner, also an army officer and reformer who spent much of his career studying and writing about tactics. Wagner had traveled to Europe to study the German military schools and campaigns. Swift and Wagner subsequently worked together to adopt the German applicatory method of teaching tactics wherein students were required to present solutions to hypothetical situations both in the classroom and in field exercises. Wagner’s interest was tactics, while Swift encouraged standardizing doctrine and standard tactical terminology, part of which was the five paragraphs of war. The germ of what Swift eventually developed into the enduring five paragraphs of war appears in a single sentence of a 1893 English translation of the 1887 German regulations. In the composition of orders for operations the following sequence is recommended: Intelligence regarding the enemy (so far as important to the recipient), so much of the writer’s own general intention as is requisite for the troops to know, the task of each unit of command affected by the orders, the order for detached baggage, commissariat, and ammunition columns (so far as it is important to the troops), and finally the position of the commander at the commencement of the movement. The 1893 English translation was published by the Manchester Tactical Society in England. Swift, however, apparently used a French 170


translation since he did not read German. But it is interesting to note how closely the English translation parallels Swift’s original five paragraphs of war. The foundations of Swift’s model are apparent in the German regulation. “Intelligence regarding the enemy” becomes paragraph one, “the writer’s own general intention” becomes paragraph two, “the task of each unit” becomes paragraph three, “the order for detached baggage” becomes paragraph four, and “the position of the commander” becomes paragraph five. Swift first proposed standardizing orders into a five-paragraph format in two lectures he delivered at Fort Leaven worth in 1894. In 1897 he put the format on paper in an article for the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States entitled “The Lyceum at Fort Agawam.” His proposal for a standard model grouped information in such a way that the eye would catch details at the same place in every order and thereby lessen the chances of omitting necessary information. The 1897 model was a series of five numbered paragraphs without headings: I contains information of the enemy and so much of the general situation as it would be desirable for the subordinates to know. II contains so much of the general plan as may be considered necessary for proper cooperation of all parts of the command. III contains dispositions to be taken for carrying out the second paragraph, and the tasks assigned to each of the several fractions of the command. IV contains all necessary instructions about the train, care being taken to keep it where it will not interfere with troops or be involved in the confusion of battle. V gives the place of the commander or the place where reports should be sent. Prior to Swift’s innovation there was little or no attention paid to a standard format for orders, or even what should be included in an operations order. US Army regulations in the nineteenth century simply recommended that commanders entrust the transmittal of 171


orders to trustworthy officers. While the quaint and gentlemanly orders of the armies in the American Civil War are interesting to read today, it is difficult to imagine that they would work on today’s high technology battlefield. The five paragraphs of war, like modern armies, were conceived in the nineteenth century and actually entered active service in the twentieth century. Swift’s five paragraphs of war next appeared in a 1903 book published by the General Service and Staff College. The author, Captain J.C.Dickman, credits Swift’s 1894 lectures, the Order of Field Service of the German Army, and the Maneuver Orders of the Royal Army as the source of his information. Dickman’s five paragraphs contain essentially the same meanings as Swift’s 1897 version, although the words do vary a bit. This is of interest since even though Swift published his lectures in 1905 it is Dickman’s version of the five paragraphs of war which appear in the 1905 edition of the US Army Service Regulations, thus apparently making them doctrine for the first time. The five paragraphs of war became part of US Army doctrine in 1905 when they appeared in the Field Service Regulations of that year. Although the Regulations followed Swift’s model, it used Dickman’s words: 1 Information concerning the enemy and our own troops in the vicinity. 2 Intentions of the commanding officer. 3 Duties of the various fractions of the command. 4 Orders for baggage trains and ammunition columns. 5 Location of the commander at the beginning of the operation; also when necessary, place for delivering messages. Also in 1905, the Staff College Press at Fort Leavenworth printed a text entitled Orders in which Swift presented his version of the five paragraphs of war virtually unchanged from the 1897 article. In Orders Swift credits the Order of Field Service of the German Army with providing the basis of his model. The Army’s five paragraphs remained virtually unchanged through the First World War, which testifies to their usefulness. In fact the only major change in the five paragraphs of war came shortly after the Second World War when paragraph two became the Mission and the information in the old paragraphs two and 172


three merged into a new paragraph three known as Execution. This revised paragraph three contains the Concept of the Operation in its first subparagraph which equates to “the intention of the commanding officer.” Subsequent subparagraphs contain the “duties of the various fractions of the command.” The third paragraph of war, more than the other four paragraphs, has evolved into its present format. It is a combination of Swift’s original paragraphs two and three. Where Swift prescribed that the commander would outline his plan in paragraph two, in the present five paragraphs of war the first subparagraph of paragraph three provides concept of the operation for that purpose. Combining Swift’s paragraphs two and three happened when paragraph two became the mission rather than the general plan of the commander as it had before. The commander’s general plan, or concept of the operation, in turn became the first subparagraph of the present third paragraph of war, Execution. At about the same time paragraphs two and three changed, the five paragraphs of war picked up the headings by which they are now known. Although there have been some changes in the paragraph headings over the years since the Second World War, and there continues to be some variation in headings from command to command in the unified commands today, the changes have not been particularly significant. In fact as the five paragraphs of war approach their hundredth birthday they are used not only by the US Army, but in joint and combined commands around the world. Although not as glamorous as some of our latest weapons systems Eben Swift’s contribution to the American way of war may be more significant than all of them put together.

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NOTES

PREFACE 1 US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–5, Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 10. 2 A.T.Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 12th edn, 1918, p. 7. 3 C.Clausewitz, Principles of War, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, The Stackpole Company, 1960, p. 45. 4 A.H.Jomini, The Art of War, Philadelphia, J.P.Lippincott & Co., 1862, p. 11. 5 B.H.Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York, Frederick A.Praeger, Publishers, 1968, pp. 17–18. 1 THE STUDY OF WAR 1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963. 2 P.K.Conkin and R.N.Stromberg, The Heritage and Challenge of History, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971, p. 11. 3 P.Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1987. Kennedy provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the military power and the economic power of nations as the order of the world has changed over the last 500 years. 4 C.von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 75. 5 R.Leckie, Warfare, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970, p. 169. 6 C.B.MacDonald, Company Commander, New York, Bantam Books, 1984. G.Sajer, The forgotten Soldier, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971. S.Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, London, The Folio Society, 1974. These are three classics of memoirs which vividly portray the chaos of war. 7 J.Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, New York, Viking, 1987, p. 5. 8 J.Keegan, The Mask of Command, New York, Elisabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1987, p. 18.

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NOTES 9 J.Briggs and D.F.Peat, Turbulent Mirror: An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1989, p. 21. 10 A.H.Jomini, The Art of War, Westport, Connecticut Greenwood Press, Publishers, originally published 1862, p. 13. 11 C.Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, New York, Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, p. 1. 12 The five-question format is generally the same as the five-paragraph field order format which has been in use by the United States Army since the late nineteenth century. The five-paragraph format is itself based on the 1887 edition of the German Army’s Field Regulations. 13 The three perspectives of war are a variation on the three levels of war introduced in the 1982 edition of the US Army’s Field Manual 100–5, Operations. The concept of perspectives more accurately reflects the necessity for flexibility in studying war than the term “levels” still in use in US Army doctrine. 2 THE PERSPECTIVES OF WAR 1 A.Jones, The Art of War in the Western World, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 2–8. 2 Although the modern terms strategy and tactics come from the Greek strategia and taktika respectively, it is not clear just when they came into the military lexicon. 3 The term operational art first appears in Soviet military writing, but the concept can be traced to the eighteenth century when the combination of organization and technology began to allow armies to move to the battlefield by multiple routes and converge for a battle as opposed to having to move simply as one large army. 4 Joint forces are any combination of air, land, and sea military forces operating under the command of a single commander-in-chief. Combined forces are forces of two or more nations working together, usually under a common commander-in-chief. 5 H.Summers, “The Objective,” Chapter 9, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1981. 3 UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION IN WAR 1 Operational art is a relatively new term for Western military doctrine, but the Soviets have been using it since the 1930s. It equates to the operational perspective of war, although its precise meaning varies from country to country and in some cases even within the same country. 2 J.Record, “Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and the German Model,” Parameters, vol. XVI no 3, Autumn 1986, pp. 2–8. 3 B.H.Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, New York, Perigee Books, 1982, p. 81.

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THE FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE 4 C.Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals, New York, Grove Weidenfeld, 1989, pp. 114–15. 5 Insight Team of The Sunday Times of London, War in the Falklands: The Full Story, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982. Chapters 5 and 6 outline how Argentina decided to use military force to attain their national goal of returning the Malvinas Islands to their control. 6 R.Leckie, The Wars of America Volume II: San Juan Hill to Tonkin, New York, Bantam Books, 1969, p. 205. 4 SETTING OBJECTIVES IN WAR 1 P.Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1987. Pages 425–35 provide an analysis of the new economic order in Europe resulting from the Second World War. 2 B.H.Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York, Frederick A.Praeger, Publishers, 1967, p. 236. 3 B.H.Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, New York, Perigee Books, 1982, p. 83. 4 Insight Team of The Sunday Times of London, War in the Falklands: The Full Story, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982 pp. 92–6. 5 “JCS Replies to Criticism of Grenada Operation,” Army, August, 1984, pp. 28–37. This article replies to specific criticisms of the way the United States military forces handled the invasion of Grenada. 5 CONDUCTING WAR 1 E.Monroe and A.H.Farrar-Hockley, The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973; Background and Events, Adelphi Paper No. 111, 1975, p. 11. 2 ibid., p. 14. 3 M.Howard and R.Hunter, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, Adelphi Paper No. 41, 1967, p. 28. 4 At the time of writing there is little agreement or understanding on exactly what brought the Iran-Iraq War to an end, although mutual exhaustion would seem to have been a major factor. Ironically, Iraq has apparently given up virtually all of what it gained in that eight-year war with Iran in a thus far futile bid to gain Iranian support for Iran’s invasion of Kuwait. 6 SUPPORTING WAR 1 C.von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 177. 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 213. 3 J.A.Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953, Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 153. 4 J.Briggs and D.F.Peat, Turbulent Mirror: An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, New York, Harper & Row,

176

NOTES

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Publishers, 1989, p. 21. A.H.Jomini, The Art of War, Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, Publishers, originally published 1862, J.B.Lippincott & Co., p. 63. Jomini, op. cit., p. 63. Briggs and Peat, op. cit., p. 23. The Order of Field Service of the German Army (1887), London, Edward Stanford 1893, p. 23. H.Guderian, Panzer leader, New York, E.P.Dutton & Co. Inc., 1952, p. 22. C.B.MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 50. M.van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 215. MacDonald, op. cit. p. 329. J.Record, “View From the Fourth Estate, ‘Getting There’,” Parameters, June, 1988, p. 93. The BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. VI, Conduct of the War, book 2, “Functional Analysis,” 1980, pp. 10– 61 and 10–62. 7 CONTROLLING WAR

1 United States Army, Field Service Regulations, Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1924, p. 9. 2 P.Warner, The Soldier: His Daily Life Through the Ages, New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1975, pp. 140–1. 3 C.S.Forester, The General, Annapolis, Maryland, The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1982, p. 207 (emphasis original). 4 R.D.Heinl, Jr, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Annapolis, Maryland, United States Naval Institute, 1966, p. 121. From Chevalier Foulard, Nouvelles sur la Guerre, 1724. 5 C.von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 121. 6 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 77. 7 FM 100–5, Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 22 (emphasis original). 8 G.K.Otis and R.F.Driscoll, “Making the C3 Pieces Fit in Central Europe,” Signal, November, 1986, p. 19. 9 JCS Pub. 1, op. cit., p. 80. 10 R.L.Prillaman, “Command and Control in the 2d Armored Division,” Military Review, July, 1982, p. 41. 11 Joseph Metcalf III, “Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation,” Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decisions, eds James G.March and Roger Weissengen-Baylor, New York, Ballinger, 1987, pp. 283–4. 12 R.O’Rourke, “Gulf Ops,” Proceedings, May 1989, p. 44. 13 M.A.Platz, “Technological Advances For Enhanced Battlefield Leadership,” Signal, November, 1986, p. 67 (emphasis added).

177

THE FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE 14 H.C.Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, New York, Simon and Schuster Inc., 1946, p. 178b. 15 G.S.Patton, Jr, War As I Knew It, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947. Patton mentions this incident in his narrative on p. 207 and again as an example of how he earned his pay on p. 387. 16 M.van Creveld, Command in War, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 269. 17 Patton, op. cit., p. 248. A slightly different version of the same idea is on p. 116. 18 E.von Manstein, Lost Victories, Chicago, Henry Regency Company, 1958, p. 48. 19 J.A.Olmstead, “Processes of Command Influence: Communication,” Selected Readings in Modern Leadership, Fort Benning, Georgia, US Army Infantry School, 1971, p. 227. 20 S.Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York, Viking Press, 1983, p. 544. 21 Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 95 (emphasis original). 9 EPILOGUE 1 The information and opinions about the invasion are based on open sources and are the author’s own interpretation. As this was written there were few published sources from which to draw information. Two are: D. Steele, “Operation Just Cause,” Army, February, 1990, pp. 34–44. R.R. Ropelewski, “Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama Successes,” Armed Forces Journal International, February, 1990, pp. 26–32.

178

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Army, “JCS Replies to Criticism of Grenada Operation,” August, 1984, pp. 28– 37. BDM Corporation, A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, vol. VIConduct of the War, book 2 “Functional Analysis,” 1980, pp. 10–61, and 10– 62. Barnett, Corelli (ed), Hitler’s Generals, New York, Grove Weidenfeld, 1989. Bellamy, Chris, The Future of Land Warfare, London, Croom Helm, 1987. Briggs, John and Peat, David F., Turbulent Mirror: An Illustrated Guide to Chaos Theory and the Science of Wholeness, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1989. Brodie, Bernard and Brodie, Fawn, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973. Butcher, Harry C., My Three Years With Eisenhower, New York, Simon and Schuster Inc., 1946. Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976. ——, Principles of War, ed. and trans. Hans W.Gatke, The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1960. Conkin, Paul K. and Stromberg, Roland N., The Heritage and Challenge of History, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971. Eisenhower, Dwight D., Crusade in Europe, New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948. Forester, C.S., The General, Annapolis, Maryland, The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1982. Gleick, James, Chaos: Making a New Science, New York, Viking, 1987. Guderian, Heinz, trans . Constantine Fitzgibbon, Panzer Leader, New York, E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1952. Heinl, Robert Debs, Jr, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, Annapolis, Maryland United States Naval Institute, 1966. Howard, Michael and Hunter, Robert, Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, Adelphi Paper No. 41, London, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. Huston, James A., The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1966.

179

THE FRAMEWORK OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE Ikle, Fred, C., Every War Must End, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971. Insight Team of The Sunday Times of London, War in the Falklands: The Full Story, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1982. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The, Development of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987. Jomini, Antoine Henri, The Art of War, trans. G.H.Mendel and W.P.Craighill, Philadelphia, J.B.Lippincott & Co., 1862. Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987. Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History, New York, The Viking Press, 1983. Keegan, John, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare, New York, Viking, 1989. ——, The Mask of Command, New York, Elisabeth Sifton Books, Viking, 1987. Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, Random House, 1987. Leckie, Robert, Warfare, New York, Harper & Row, 1970. ——, The Wars of America Volume II: San Juan Hill to Tonkin, New York, Bantam Books, 1969. Liddell Hart, B.H., History of the Second World War, New York, Perigee Books, 1982. ——, Strategy, 2nd revised edn, New York, Frederick A.Praeger, Publishers, 1967. Luttwak, Edward, N., Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987. MacDonald, Charles B., The Mighty Endeavor: American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969. ——, Company Commander, New York, Bantam Books, 1984. McNeill, William H., The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A, D. 1000, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1983. Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 12th edn, 1918. Metcalf, Joseph III, “Decision Making and the Grenada Rescue Operation,” Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decisions, eds James G.March and Roger Weissengen-Baylor, New York, Ballinger, 1987. Monroe, Elizabeth and Farrar-Hockley, A.H., The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973: Background and Events, Adelphi Paper No. 111, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975. Morgan, David, The Mongols, New York, Basil Blackwell Inc., 1987. O’Connell, Robert L., Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons, and Aggression, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. Olmstead, Joseph A., “Processes of Command Influence: Communication,” Selected Readings in Modern Leadership, Fort Benning, Georgia, US Army Infantry School, 1971. Order of Field Service of the German Army (1887), The, trans. J.M.Gawne and Spenser Wilkinson, London, Edward Stanford, 1893.

180

BIBLIOGRAPHY O’Rourke, Ronald, “Gulf Ops,” Proceedings, May, 1989. Otis, Glen K. and Driscoll, Robert F., “Making the C3 Pieces Fit in Central Europe,” Signal, November, 1986. Patton, George S., Jr, War As I Knew It, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947. Platz, Michael A., “Technological Advances For Enhanced Battlefield Leadership,” Signal November, 1986. Prillaman, Richard L., “Command and Control in the 2d Armored Division,” Military Review, July, 1982. Record, Jeffery, “View From the Fourth Estate, ‘Getting There’,” Parameters, June, 1988. ——, “Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence: The Military Reformers and German Model,” Parameters, Autumn, 1986. Ropelewski, Robert R., “Planning, Precision, and Surprise Led to Panama Successes,” Armed Forces Journal International, February, 1990. Roszak, Theodore, The Cult of Information: The Folklore of Computers and the True Art of Thinking, New York, Pantheon Books, 1986. Sajer, Guy, The Forgotten Soldier, trans. Lily Emmet, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971. Sassoon, Siegfried, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, London, The Folio Society, 1974. Steele, Dennis, “Operation Just Cause,” Army, February, 1990. Summers, Harry G., Jr, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1981. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. and intro. Samuel B.Griffith, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd, 1975. United States Army, Field Service Regulations, Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1924. United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–5, Operations, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1986. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985. ——, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978. ——, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, New York, The Free Press, 1989. Von Manstein, Erich, Lost Victories, Chicago, Henry Regency Company, 1958. Warner, Philip, The Soldier: His Daily Life Through the Ages, New York, Taplinger Publishing Company, 1975.

181

INDEX

Afghanistan 22, 23, 24, 119, 148 Alexander the Great 6–7 America(n), attack on Libya, 132; Civil War, 105, 171; experience in Lebanon 67, 70, 74; experience in Vietnam 25, 114–15, 138; fiveparagraph format 168–73; in Second World War 29, 47, 109; invasion of Grenada 67, 70, 74, 133; invasion of Panama 152–60; Joint Chiefs of Staff 100, 127–8; use of atomic bomb 22 Arab(s)22, 117, 146 Arab-Israeli Wars 21, 86 Argentina 26, 27, 44–6, 53, 55, 62–3, 96– 7, 117, 153 Aristotle 6 art of war 28, 95 Asia 30, 47, 110 assumptions in five-paragraph format 162 Atlantic Conveyor 117 Atlantic Ocean 108, 118, 119, 128 attachments and detachments in fiveparagraph format 162 atomic bomb 22 B-2 bomber 30 balance of chaos and order 28 balancing the ends, ways and means 11–12, 27–8, 89, 99, 100, 115, 119 Barnett, Correlli 43 Battle, of Britain 107; of the Coral Sea 30; of Midway 30; of Trafalgar, 132

body count (in Vietnam) 65 Bradley fighting vehicle 112 British, at Trafalgar 132; in First World War 125; in Second World War 29, 135; invasion of Falkland Islands 26–7, 45–6, 55, 62, 97, 117 Burma 47 Campaign(ing) 20, 90–3, 96, 102–3, 110 Canada 58 Canadian 29 Central Army Group 128 Chad 20 Channel ports 110 chaos in war 6–8, 13, 17, 21, 27–9, 35, 48, 57, 68, 76, 80, 85, 94, 97, 99, 123– 4, 131, 134, 143, 159 chemical weapons 22, 23 China 2 CINCCHAN, see Commander-inChief, English Channel Clausewitz 4–5, 13, 99, 100, 119, 126, 140 Command, and control (C2) 124, 127–9; and signal in five-paragraph format 166–7; control and communications (C3) 128–36, 139–41; levels of 47–8 Command in War 136 Commander-in-Chief, English Channel 123 communications, see command and control complexity in war 13–15, 18–19 concept of the operation 77–8, 130; in five-paragraph format, 163–4, 172

182

INDEX constraints in war 11, 18, 19 controlling war 12, 122 conventional war 20, 22, 31 Coral Sea, Battle of 30 coup d’oeil 126, 135–6, 140 Creveld, Martin van 136 cultural differences in officers 80–3, 133 Curzon, Lieutenant-General 125, 127, 131, 132 De Long piers 114 deterrence 94, 149–50 Dickman, Captain J.C. 172 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 100, 127, 128 doctrine 29, 86–7, 94 dogs of war 142, 144, 150, 152, 155 duel(s) 4, 13 Dunkirk 42, 61 “Easter 1916” 142 Eastern Front 107, 143 Egypt(ian) 86–7 Eisenhower 29, 63, 72, 135 elements of national power 9, 24–6, 37, 88 emotion in war 25, 85, 95 ends, ways, and means 11, 12, 53, 58, 89, 144, 149 enemy, 43–4 enemy forces in five-paragraph format 162 England 170 English Channel 123, 143 English translation of German regulations 170 Europe 120, 147; Eastern 97; development of railroads 105–6; economic reorganization 2–3; in First World War 108; in Second World War 8, 30, 63, 65, 72, 109–11, 142–4, 153, 161 Falkland Islands 44, 62 Falklands/Malvinas War 46, 53, 55, 62, 96, 117, 118, 153 flexibility 139 Field Manual (FM) 100–5 15, 57, 128–9 Field Service Regulations 121, 172

First World War 106–9, 125, 127, 131, 172 five-paragraph format 162–7; history of 168–73 fog of war 6, 93, 94, 126, 139 Forrester, C.S. 125 Fort Leavenworth 170–2 Foulard, Chevalier 126, 140 framework of war 9, 17 France 41, 42, 47, 61, 107, 109, 118 Franco-Prussian War 106 French Army 7 Friendly Forces in five-paragraph format 162 friction 126, 139 fog and friction (F2) 126–9, 134–41 fog, friction, and flexibility (F3) 139– 41 General Service and Staff College 172 German(y), actions at Dunkirk 61; development of tank-truck team 107–8; economic power 147; field orders 104; forces in the Second World War 29, 38, 72; influence on US Army 169–71; invasion of France 41–3; military commanders 38–9; officer corps 52; Reich 8; results of Second World War 58, 64, 109–10, 142–3, 145–6; strength in Second World War 47 goals in war 84, 91 Golan Heights 87 Great Britain, forces at Dunkirk 61; Falklands/Malvinas War 26, 44–6, 53, 62–3, 97, 117–18, 128, 153; in Second World War 47, 58 “Great Patriotic War” 30 “Great White Fleet” 106 Greece 13 Greeks 124 Greek phalanx 13–14 Grenada, American commanders before invasion 133; as example of limited war goals 153; United States invasion 66–70; United States policy goals 66 Guderian, Heinz 108

183

INDEX Herodotus 1 high-intensity war 21 Hiroshima 22 history 13, 29, 74 Hitler 7, 8, 41, 43, 59 hoplites 13 Huston, James 100

logistics, art of 100, 104, 110, 112; as part of strategy 101; science of 100– 1, 109, 113 losers in the Second World War 8, 26 low-intensity war 21 loyalty 73 “Lyceum at Fort Agawam” 171

imperial Russian Army 15 Indo-China 47 information in war 129–30, 135–8, 140 intensity of war 21 internal combustion engine 107 Iran 22, 89, 90 Iran-Iraq War 21, 89–90, 133 Iraq(i), invasion of Kuwait 10, 23, 63, 142; Iran-Iraq War 22, 89–90 Israel(i), Arab-Israeli Wars 22, 146; 1973 Arab-Israeli War 86–7, 117

Malvinas Islands (also see Falklands/ Malvinas War) 44, 46, 63 Manchester Tactical Society 170 Manstein, Eric von 137 matrix 35 Maxims of War 121 media 31 Mediterranean Sea 131 Middle East 22, 63, 69, 146 mid-intensity war 21, 23 Midway, Battle of 30 military, committee of NATO 122; history 5; mind 29, 31, 33; objective(s) 58–60; strategy 10 Military Review 130 mission, 57; in five-paragraph format 162–3, 172; statement 59, 60, 62 models of war 31, 33 (see also Second World War as model of war)

Japan(ese), attack on Pearl Harbor 47, 107; only example of nuclear weapons in war 22, 143; economic power 2, 147; in Second World War 70, 146; military power in Second World War 26; strat egicestimate in Second World War 46–7 Joint Chiefs of Staff (American) 100, 127–8 Jomini 7, 104, 152 Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 171 Julius Caesar 142 Kansas 170 Kuwait 10, 23, 63, 142 Korea 30 Korean War 21 Laplace, French physicist 7 leadership, civilian 20; military 33; national 19, 31 Lebanon 66–70, 74 Leckie, Robert 4, 5 levels of command 47–8, 64, 86, 123 Libya 131–2 Liddell Hart, B.H. 35, 36 logisticians 99–101

Nagasaki 22 Napoleon 7, 8, 15, 121 Napoleonic Wars 8, 15 national, goals 9, 24, 25, 26, 31, 40, 121; leadership 25, 30, 47, 55, 89, 121; strategy 10, 16 Nelson, Lord 132–3 Noriega, Manuel 152, 154–8 Normandy 58 North Africa 135 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 2, 3, 50, 111, 112, 119, 122, 123 North Sea 143 North Vietnam(ese) 25, 138 nuclear, warfare 22; weapons 20, 21, 23, 24, 94 object(ive) 9, 11, 15, 25, 58, 59, 64, 65, 71, 97, 144 On War 4, 13

184

INDEX operational art 15, 38 Operations 15, 57, 128 order 8–9 Orders 172 overlord 109–10 Pacific (Ocean) 2, 30, 47, 108–9, 111, 143 Panama, American invasion of 152–60 Panamanian Army 157, 159 paradox(es) of war 13, 20, 21, 27, 28, 35, 51, 53, 78, 116, 121, 123, 142, 148, 150, 151, 157 parameters of war 37, 50, 67, 72, 83, 91, 92 Parliament 62 passion in war 27, 145 Patton, George S. 98, 135, 137, 140 Pearl Harbor 47, 107 Peloponnesian War 1, 6 Persian Gulf 133, 134 Persian Wars 1 Persians 124 perspectives of war 9, 11, 15–19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 33, 48 phalanx 13, 14 planning 18, 19, 25, 27 Poland 41 President of the United States 154, 158 principle of war 57, 64 quantitative analysis 29, 36 railroads 105–6 Red Ball Express 110 Russian Army 15 SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) 123 SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic) 123 science of war 28, 95 Second World War 2–3, 7–8, 161, 172–3; Allied invasion of Europe 29, 63–5; Allied objective 70; example of mid-intensity 21; German military forces 38, 43, 52, 59; Japanese analysis 46–7; information 135, 137; model for war 30–1, 97, 142–4, 153; nuclear weapons 22, 49, 94;

supporting war 107–11, 118–19; winners and losers 25–6, 58, 146–7 sequence of five-paragraph format 162–7 service support in five-paragraph format 166 Shakespeare 142 Signal 134 simplicity in war 25, 78 situation 11, 35; in five-paragraph format 162 Sinews of War 100 sixth sense 135, 136, 120 South America 44 South Atlantic 63, 128 Soviet Union, and Arab-Israeli War of 1973 117; doctrine 54; in Afghanistan 22–4, 148; and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 142; logistics in Second World War 108; military forces 161; operational art 15; science of war 96, 119; and Second World War 2, 30–1, 144; superpower 20, 88, 153; supporting war in Europe 120; and Warsaw Pact 2–3 Spanish Armada 132 spectrum of conflict 21, 48 Staff College Press 172 “Stealth” bomber 30 steam power 106 Strategy 35 strategy 10 success in war 18 Suez Canal 87 Sun Tzu 1, 76, 92 superpower 20, 30 Supreme Allied Commander 63; Atlantic, 123; Europe 29, 123 support 9 supply discipline 115–18, 130 Swift, Major Eben 169–73 Switzerland 143 Swiss 7, 104 Syria 87 tank-truck team 107, 110 technology 14, 81–7, 90, 99, 104–5, 107, 127, 131, 134, 141

185

INDEX USS Vincennes 134

television 59, 71, 98, 138, 157–8, 160 terrorism 22, 23, 24, 31, 32 Tet Offensive 138 Thatcher, Margaret 62 The Art of War, Jomini 152; Sun Tzu 1, 76 Theater of operations 31 The General 125 Theoretical framework viii, 149 theory of war 9, 28, 33, 35, 48, 148 The Soldier 125 Thucydides 1, 6 Trafalgar, Battle of 132 Tran Van Tra 138 transportation 105

Van Creveld, Martin 136 Vatican 154, 156 Verral, Lance-Corporal 125, 127, 132, 133 Viet Cong 138 Vietnam(ese) 22–5, 30, 65, 70, 114, 115, 118, 119, 138, 148 victory 145 Victory 132 vision 129

U-Boat 108 Unified Command 168 United Nations 10, 23 United States (US), Air Force 30, 133; and Arab-Israeli War of 1973 117; Army 14, 29, 30, 54, 57, 95, 100, 113, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 168, 171–2; Army Infantry School 137; and Civil War 105; deterrence 149; five-paragraph format 162–7, 168–73; invasion of Grenada 66–70, 153; invasion of Panama 152–61; Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 142; and Lebanon 66–70; Marine Corps 66, 68, 133; and NATO 2–3; Navy 30, 105, 111, 133, 134; and nuclear weapons 22, 49, 144; and science of war 119; and Second World War 30–1, 46–7, 70, 142; as a superpower 20, 88, 153; and Vietnam 23–5, 65, 70, 118, 148 USS Samuel B.Roberts 133

Wagner, Arthur L. 170 war (see also chaos of war), definition of, 4–5; as an intellectual exercise 148; models of 31, 33, 36 (see also Second World War) War As I Knew It 98, 135 War(s), Afghanistan and Soviet Union 22, 23, 24, 119, 148; American Civil 105, 117; Arab-Israeli wars 21, 86; Arab-Israeli War of 1973 86–7, 117; Falklands/Malvinas 46, 53, 55, 62, 96, 117, 118, 153; First World 105–9, 125, 127, 131, 172; Franco-Prussian 105; Great Patriotic 30; Iran-Iraq 21, 89–90, 133; Peloponnesian 1, 6; Persian 1; Second World (see Second World War); Vietnam and United States 22–5, 30, 65, 70, 95, 114–15, 118–19, 138, 148 Warsaw Pact 2 Western, democracies 62; military mind 29, 31; Europe 2, 30, 119; Front 107, 125, 144 winners 8 Yeats 142

186

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