The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus

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The European Union and Enlargement The Case of Cyprus

George Christou

The European Union and Enlargement

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The European Union and Enlargement The Case of Cyprus George Christou Research Associate, Department of Information and Communications, Manchester Metropolitan University

© George Christou 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identiﬁed as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–1632–2 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Christou, George, 1973– The European Union and enlargement : the case of Cyprus / George Christou. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–1632–2 (cloth) 1. Europe–Economic integration–Cyprus. 2. Conﬂict management–Cyprus. 3. Cyprus–Ethnic relations. 4. Cyprus–History–Cyprus Crisis, 1974– I.Title. HC241.25.C93C487 2004 341.242′2′095693–dc22

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Contents List of Tables, Boxes and Figures

vi

Preface

viii

Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

x

1

Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor

1

2

The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context

29

3

The European Union and Cyprus

61

4

The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions

96

5

The Power of Attraction: Perceptions from Turkey

124

6

The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context

152

Conclusions

173

7

Postscript Elections in the North: 14 December 2003

188

Appendix A.1

Summary of the ‘Annan plan’

191

Appendix A.2 Process

Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation 199

Notes

203

Bibliography

212

Index

224

v

List of Tables, Boxes and Figures Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 6.1

Table 6.2

Table 6.3

Table P.1 (Postscript)

The basic framework for the emergence of EU foreign economic policy Treaty of Nice (2000): Developments in EFP The logics of conditionality EU assistance to northern Cyprus (pre-accession) Public opinion survey in the North – elections December 2003 Public opinion survey in the North – politicians, the Cyprus problem and the EU Population and voter statistics in the North Public opinion survey in the North – the percentage of those who accept the Annan plan by educational level Public Opinion Survey in the North – the percentage of those who accept the Annan plan by profession Public opinion Survey in the North – elements of the Annan plan and degree to which they are accepted Results of the elections held in Northern Cyprus: 14 December 2003

4 10 20 92 120 120 120

159

160

160 188

Boxes Box 1.1 Box 1.2 Box 1.3 Box 2.1 Box 2.2 Box 4.1

Constructive abstention The Copenhagen criteria Instruments associated with the EU’s civilising role Resolution 186: The creation of the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus United Nations – Overall objectives of the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’ Greek Cypriot political parties

vi

9 21 23 47 55 104

List of Tables, Boxes, Figures vii

Box 4.2 Box 4.3 Box 4.3 Box 4.4 Box 4.5 Box 6.1 Box 6.2

Summary: Greek Cypriot support for accession to the EU (a) Public opinion in northern Cyprus on EU accession (b) Public opinion in northern Cyprus on EU accession The common vision Of Turkish Cypriot civil society Main political leaders and parties in the North Annan plan: Greek Cypriot public opinion The Cypriot government: Set of measures for the Turkish Cypriots

107 115 116 117 119 158 167

Figures Figure 1.1 Figures 4.1 (a) and 4.1 (b)

Figures 4.2 (a) and 4.2 (b)

A framework for analysis Greek Cypriot public opinion – EU membership the Cyprus problem and security Greek Cypriot public opinion – EU membership and referendum

27

109

110

Preface The central basis for writing this book has been of a personal nature; it has been driven by the hope of witnessing a solution to the longstanding and protracted ‘Cyprus issue’. Cyprus, with its complex history of intervention and domestic strife, has been a divided island during the course of my lifetime. Attempts by the United Nations (UN) since 1974 to facilitate movements towards a solution have not been fruitful. The ‘political will’ has not been forthcoming from the involved parties: historical experience, strategic interest and political expediency have prevented the flexibility needed to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. The European Union (EU) accession process has catalysed and provided, after many years of division, stalemate and many failed attempts to negotiate a solution, a positive context and genuine opportunity for compromise and a comprehensive settlement. The EU factor has supplied, in the eyes of many, the missing leverage that was needed to persuade Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots to move towards a solution of the Cyprus issue; and the hope that the EU accession process and the UN process could naturally reinforce each other to ‘change minds’ and facilitate movement towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue based on a principles agreed by the leaders of the two communities in 1977 and 1979. The investigation in this book focuses primarily on the impact of the EU accession process on the Cyprus issue from 1990 to 2003 – reflecting a belief, and hope on my part, that the EU and its history as a peaceful and stable security community, can provide the incentive and basis for a comprehensive and long lasting solution to the Cyprus issue so that Cyprus can join the EU in May 2004 as a unified island. However, a final and important point must be made here. The contemporary nature of the topic area means that the situation in Cyprus changes on a day to day basis, and thus whilst the book covers events up until and including the important elections in the North of the island in December 2003 (postscript), it must borne in mind that the situation could be very different by May 2004 and beyond, in particular if a solution is agreed and Cyprus joins the EU as a unified island. George C. Christou

viii

Acknowledgements My collective thanks and appreciation go to those colleagues in the Department of Government, University of Manchester, that encouraged me to submit the book proposal, and to Peter Humphreys and David Farrell, who provided valuable commentary on the content and substance of the proposal. Special thanks must go to Kevin Flanaghan, Francesca Gains, Ricardo Gomez, Stephen Day and in particular Elisa Roller, for her valuable comments on various aspects of the book. Our friendship has provided me with the necessary support and motivation to complete the book. I must also thank the many officials and academics that agreed to be interviewed as part of the research for my doctoral thesis and the book, providing me with a comprehensive understanding of the complexities of the Cyprus case and the EU policy towards Cyprus. In addition I would like to extend my thanks to Joseph Jospeph of the University of Cyprus, and Zenon Stavrinides of the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs (UK), for offering their support and for providing valuable comment and advice on the draft of the book. Finally my thanks must go to my family to whom this book is dedicated. They provided the support and inspiration through my long and arduous journey in higher education, making many sacrifices on the way. My partner, Allison, must receive special thanks for her love, support, encouragement and understanding, especially in the last six months of this project, when much of my spare time was spent completing the book. I would like to acknowledge that certain aspects of this book have appeared in articles in the Journal of EthnoPolitics and Minority Issues in Europe (Issue 2/Summer2002), Hellenic Studies (Special Edition, Vol. 11, No. 2, Autumn 2003), and Agora without Frontiers (Vol. 8, No. 4, 2003).

ix

Introduction The European Union (EU) took another historic step at the Copenhagen Summit on 12–13 December 2002 when it agreed to admit ten countries from East and Central Europe and from the Mediterranean. These countries included Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta. Such a decision was consolidated in Athens on the 16 April 2003 when the same countries signed Accession Treaties. The decision was both historic and dramatic as it redefined the parameters of Europe for the future. There was one part of Europe however, which would not be redefined after Copenhagen and Athens – the ‘green line’ that has separated the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus which has existed since the invasion of Turkey in 1974. So although general euphoria surrounded the decision to admit these countries at Copenhagen, Cyprus included, there was some disappointment. For Cyprus there was satisfaction that EU leaders had endorsed Cyprus’ application, but this did not conceal the disappointment that a political settlement had not been secured prior to that decision. The fact that Turkey had not secured an opening date for the opening of their accession negotiations after Copenhagen, and indeed had only secured a review of their application in December 2004, perhaps did not encourage Turkey to move more positively towards a Cyprus settlement. An added complication was that the Turkish elections in November 2002 had seen a change of government in Ankara – a government that perhaps had not come to a coherent view on its policy towards Cyprus. The negotiation for a political settlement, of course, was not directly in the hands of the EU. The United Nations (UN), and more precisely, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, presented a comprehensive settlement plan on 11 November 2002 to the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Glafkos Clerides (Tassos Papadopoulos since February 2003) and Rauf Denktash, and to the guarantor states of Greece, Britain and Turkey. Although this was not the first plan to be presented under UN auspices, it certainly represented one of the most ambitious and holistic attempts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The hope was that a settlement could be reached before the decision at Copenhagen – the date was then extended x

Introduction xi

several times with great optimism that the ‘Annan plan’ could be a basis for negotiating a settlement – a settlement that has not yet materialised despite the signing of the Treaty of Accession on the 16 April in Athens by Cyprus, and the prospect of membership in May 2004. The search for a solution to the Cyprus problem then, is diplomatically complex – the UN has been directly involved in negotiating a political settlement for many years. The EU however, has indirectly, through its process of enlargement and inclusion, contributed much to the climate of cooperation surrounding the negotiations. Progress on a political settlement in Cyprus has been inexorably linked to the EU’s power of attraction – its ability through the enlargement process, and the tools and instruments available in the form of incentives (carrots and sticks) to prevent conflicts and promote cooperation and negotiation. In the case of Cyprus there has been an important link between the Republic of Cyprus’ application for membership, the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and the Turkish application for membership of the EU; and the incentives offered in order to create a climate of flexibility on Cyprus. The purpose of this book is to explore the impact of EU involvement in Cyprus, and indeed if and how the EU through ‘the lure of membership can help to prevent conflicts outside the EU’s borders by suggesting the advantages of good behaviour to eager candidates and by giving the EU leverage where they do not take the hint’ (cited by Hill, 2001, p. 323). A key objective is to illuminate the limitations and constraints on the EU policy towards Cyprus, but also the potential positive impact that the EU might have on the Cyprus issue and east Mediterranean regional stability in the short, medium and long term, through the inclusion of both Cyprus and Turkey as enlargement candidates. An important caveat must be added here regarding the nature of the book and the case studies. Cyprus will be the primary (and only) case study focus – and although Turkey is important in itself, it will not be looked at as an individual case study of enlargement per se – but simply as part of the analysis of Cyprus and how the enlargement towards Turkey has affected the solution of the political problem in Cyprus. This book then, is as much about European foreign policy in its ‘soft security’ sense as it is about Cyprus – although Cyprus is clearly a salient case study in which to test the EU’s ability to act. Moreover, a second aim of the book is to create a framework whereby, what can be deemed the ‘second face’ of European foreign policy, can be recognised as a distinct and primary field of study and research. This work will

xii Introduction

seek to analyse the EU’s actions within a distinct and coherent ‘analytical framework’. In other words, it will conceptualise the EU’s capacity as an international actor focusing specifically on its ‘soft security’ capabilities. This is an aspect of the EU’s foreign policy capacity that tends to be neglected by most commentators when discussing the EU’s capacity to act – their focus being on the ‘hard security’ capabilities of the EU through its Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of its defence identity (ESDI). Theoretically then, this book attempts to develop an analytical framework for understanding and assessing the EU’s ‘soft security’ actions – and it attempts to operationalise this framework through a case study of Cyprus. It is also hoped that such a framework will prove useful as a tool for analysing EU actions – not just towards Cyprus, but to other enlargement candidates as well as potential incomers and outsiders. Given the context outlined above the book seeks to answer the following central questions: • Can the EU through the instruments available to it vis-à-vis enlargement and inclusion, help to resolve conflict? • Has the EU’s policy towards Cyprus since its application for membership in 1990 helped or hindered the movement towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue? The book will offer a clear analysis of EU enlargement and the degree to which this represents a highly relevant feature of the EU’s foreign policy – theoretically and empirically through the case study of Cyprus. In order to achieve its main aims and objectives the book will be broken down into seven chapters. Chapter 1 will provide a review of the theoretical material on the EU as a global actor. More distinctly this chapter will evaluate the EU’s capabilities in the area of foreign policy and develop the argument that the EU can be an effective global and regional actor through the power of attraction and inclusion (soft security and enlargement) to the European club. This chapter will draw on themes outlined by Hill (2001), Munuera (1994) as well as Diez (2000), Sjursen and Smith (2001) and Sjursen (2002). More specifically it will outline the philosophical underpinnings of ‘enlargement’ and inclusion’ as foreign policy. It is the contention of this book that the soft security assured by EU membership or its prospect can be a positive instrument for working towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Moreover, whilst recognising that the EU is still in the process of gestation with regard to its hard

Introduction xiii

security capability, the main argument in this book is that the process of accession leading to membership of the EU can be a valuable tool in helping to resolve and prevent conflict within Europe; in particular when applied to the case of Cyprus (and by association Turkey). Overall, this chapter will develop and establish a framework for analysing the effectiveness and capability of the EU through inclusion and association. Chapter 2 will present the historical context. It will provide an overview of how the Cyprus issue came about and of the actors involved. Specifically, this chapter will review the importance of Greece, the Greek-Cypriots, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in the dispute, as well as international organisations such as the UN and countries such as Britain and the US. It will also chart the relevance of this in the context of EU involvement and the impact of this in a contemporary context. In summary, it will outline the multi-actor and multi-level nature of the Cyprus issue – and in particular how the involvement of the different actors at different levels (community, regional, international) has affected the EU’s ability to act as an interlocutor in the Cyprus ‘affair’. Chapter 3 will first, provide a historical overview of the evolution of EC/EU policy towards Cyprus, and second, outline the thoughts and expectations of EU policy-makers with regard to the EU policy on Cyprus in the post-1990 period. On a more specific level it will chart the nature of the relationship between the EC and Cyprus from the 1972 Association Agreement until Cyprus’ application to join the EC in 1990. It will then outline the developments in EU–Cyprus relations after the acceptance of Cyprus as an enlargement candidate in 1993 and illuminate in particular the reasons behind why EU policy-makers believe that enlargement towards Cyprus (and Turkey) would act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus issue. This chapter will attempt to evaluate whether there is in fact a EU ‘strategy’ (implicit or explicit) behind the idea that the accession process will act as a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus issue. Chapter 4 will review the impact of enlargement and accession on the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – in the context of the fears, perceptions and expectations of the two communities – with reference to enlargement and the Cyprus issue. The Greek Cypriot strategy is clearly based on the power of attraction – and the condition that Turkey will, eventually, want to comply with the EU in order to be rewarded for its behaviour. Moreover the Greek Cypriots hope that pressure will be brought placed on Turkey and the main actors in the self-declared

xiv Introduction

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – with the expectation that the accession process, and in particular the economic and security benefits that this will bring with it for Turkish Cypriots, will help to encourage a solution to the Cyprus issue. In addition it assesses the extent to which the ‘carrots’ being offered through enlargement to the Turkish Cypriots in the form of mainly economic but also political/security incentives, have helped to persuade the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite to change their ‘intransigent’ position on seeking a settlement in Cyprus. It also addresses and evaluates the perceptions and main fears of the Turkish Cypriot community in the North – and their view on EU accession for Cyprus and what it can do for the Cyprus problem. This is particularly pertinent, as recent events suggest an increasing conflict of visions between Turkish Cypriot civil society and their perceptions of EU membership and resolution of the Cyprus issue and the policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and its stance on membership and a solution. Overall the impact of enlargement on the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be assessed – the leadership, political parties and civil society – vis-à-vis a solution to the Cyprus issue. Chapter 5 will analyse the impact of the enlargement process on Turkey – the perceptions of Turkish policy-makers and the impact this has had on the potential for settlement of the Cyprus issue. The EU relationship with Turkey has lacked clarity since the Ankara Association agreement in 1963, and relations between the two sides have, to say the least, been volatile. This chapter will analyse the EU relationship with Turkey in relation to the power of attraction argument, to assess whether the EU has done enough or can do more to ensure good behaviour and maintain leverage with regard to resolution of the Cyprus issue. Many in the EU, US and elsewhere see Ankara as a fundamental supporter of the self-declared TRNC, and the policies of its leader, Rauf Denktash. Indeed, many view Ankara as key protagonists in the formulation of Turkish Cypriot positions and policies on the Cyprus issue. For the EU then, encouraging Ankara to change its mind and adopt a more compromising stance on Cyprus would help to create a more accommodating climate in which to resolve the Cyprus issue – although wider and more critical issues with respect to Turkish membership have often constrained the EU in its stance towards Turkey. Overall, this chapter will evaluate the perceptions of Turkish policymakers in relation to the power of attraction and its utility in changing

Introduction xv

Turkish minds for working towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue within a federal, bizonal, bicommunal framework. Chapter 6 will evaluate the extent to which the accession process has actually acted as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus issue, with a specific focus on the interaction between the EU accession process and consequent movements in relation to UN actions and policies. In short, it will evaluate the extent to which ‘enlargement’ and the imminent accession of Cyprus as a divided island to the EU, has focussed minds towards compromise and resolving the dispute on the island, under UN auspices, before Cyprus accedes. It will assess the impact of the power of attraction and inclusion in the context of its impact and interplay with the UN efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue, and examine the reality of the situation in terms of the movement this has created in working towards a solution of the Cyprus issue. Chapter 7 will draw the theoretical and empirical strands of the book together. On a theoretical level it will evaluate the utility of the power of attraction framework for analysing the EU’s soft security capabilities in relation to the case study of Cyprus. Empirically it will assess the impact of the enlargement process on ‘catalysing’ a solution to the Cyprus issue – in particular the perceptions of the different parties: the Greek-Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. It will also assess the limitations and constraints of inclusion as a mechanism for conflict resolution in relation to the power of attraction and the Cyprus issue. Finally it will highlight the resources available to the EU in oiling the wheels of compromise and working towards a solution of the Cyprus issue. A general assessment will also be made of the enlargement process as a specific form of EU foreign policy.

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1 Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor

Introduction The European Union’s (EU) ability to prevent conflict has traditionally been measured through the developments in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) capabilities, and more recently, by the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Indeed, the instruments and resources to operationalise a ‘common’ CFSP and ESDP have continued apace since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 with major innovations including the appointment of Javier Solana as the High Representative of the CFSP (1997 Amsterdam Treaty) to strengthen the identity and profile of the EU abroad, and the introduction of a European Rapid Reaction Force to strengthen the capacity of the Union to act in crisis management (agreed at the Helsinki Summit in 1999). However, although it is clear that substantial progress has been made, the ‘hard security’ instruments of the EU are, in reality, still in developmental form,1 in particular with regard to institutional innovation, decisionmaking and coordination: problems in agreeing to a position on Iraq (March 2003) bear testament to the existing problems in these areas.2 A central premise of this book is that the concentration on ‘CFSP/ESDP’ amongst analysts and academics to measure the EU’s ‘actorness’ in foreign policy matters has obscured the reality and scope of the EU’s actual foreign policy actions and capabilities. The focus on the second pillar of the EU has led to poor theorisation and indeed conceptualisation of how the EU can ‘act’ on the European and global stage (Holland, 1991, p. 2). It is the contention of this chapter that little attention has been paid in the literature to the explicit relationship between enlargement and foreign policy, and indeed enlargement as foreign policy3 – not in the conventional sense, but as a mechanism 1

2 The European Union and Enlargement

for conflict prevention – using the EU’s frame of reference to promote stability through inclusion and association. The pre-occupation with developments in ‘hard’ security, theoretically and empirically, as noted by Mike Smith, has blinded us ‘to the important elements of the development of the EU’s actorness’ (Smith, 1998, p. 78). For Smith this is observed in the EU’s foreign economic policy (FEP), but we can add to that enlargement, and by association, its soft security capabilities. This chapter will attempt to redress the balance in the literature through first, providing a justification for the enlargement as foreign policy argument; second, and more saliently for the analysis in the book, by outlining how enlargement can help to resolve conflict, or promote cooperation and conciliation; third and interrelated, it will outline the necessary conditions for the success of the power of attraction4 (enlargement) as foreign policy strategy.5 Of course it is important to note from the outset that the focus on enlargement as foreign policy, is not to undermine the importance of CFSP/ESDP in conflict prevention, management and resolution.6 It is, however, to differentiate the capabilities of the EU, and concentrate on conflict prevention – which is necessarily a longer-term project that does not imply military intervention. The argument is that an important aspect of the EU’s ability to promote and maintain peace, democracy and the rule of law, through conditionality, association and inclusion, is a principal source of its capability that is fundamentally undertheorised and under-investigated in the measurement of the EU’s impact on conflicts and ‘foreign policy’ issues. It is recognised that ‘enlargement as foreign policy’ and the ‘power of attraction’ is not applicable to all types of conflict,7 and that indeed the recent steps towards developing a ESDP forms an important strand of the EU’s capability in conflict management and resolution. Having recognised this however, the idea of inclusion and enlargement as foreign policy does have a wider applicability and importance in terms of impact – in the EU’s relationship with ‘outsiders’ – and the conditions that the EU attaches to agreements and relations beyond its borders in terms of longer-term conflict prevention and governance. In this sense the focus on the power of attraction is highlighting the EU’s capability to influence the future order in Europe by locking states and regions into its ‘framework’ and ‘structures’, whilst also highlighting the ability of the EU to frame and determine conditions for peace on a global scale for those with an association with the Union (incomers and outsiders). With this context in mind, this chapter will outline the conditions by which the EU can be successful through the power of attraction.

Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor 3

Section 1 will provide a historical context of the development of the EU’s foreign policy. Section 2 will provide a brief review of the theoretical attempts to conceptualise the EU’s foreign policy. Section 3 will discuss the philosophical underpinning and justifications for the ‘enlargement’ as foreign policy argument. The final section will then attempt to outline key conditions that will be useful in analysing the EU’s actions through the ‘power of attraction’, in order to frame the analysis for the book, but also in the hope that it will be of wider use to those interested in European foreign policy (EFP), in its broader sense. European Union foreign policy development As recognised by Gomez (2003), when seeking to evaluate the EU’s foreign policy activity and development, ‘The classification and analysis of the EU’s external activities has tended to proceed along two (supposedly) distinct lines’. The first of these lines traces the EU’s involvement in external economic relations or its ‘soft security capability’; and the second, traces the historical development of the EU’s politico-security capability from European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s to CFSP and ESDP in the 1990s and beyond (2003, pp. 1–24). In reality of course this distinction between the EU’s external economic relations and capabilities and its politico-security capabilities is erroneous given the increasingly political nature of association, trade, aid and financial flows, and the multi institutional, multi-level and multi actor nature of the EU’s foreign policy. As Rhein observed in his analysis of EFP, ‘There has always existed a political element in the external relations of the Community. It would be a mistake to treat the EC’s economic measures separately from the EPC’s dealing with political issues; because every economic measure taken by the Community is also weighed by its potential political implications. In reality there is no separation between EC and EPC external relations’ (Rhein, 1992, pp. 33). The distinction only remains valid to the extent that FEP and politico security policy have developed with distinct differences in their institutional competencies and capacities – most important being the fact that, ‘Although the Community has acquired exclusive competence over most key areas of external economic relations the member states have stubbornly resisted the transfer of authority to the EU level over military, defence and security policy’ (Gomez, 2003, pp. 1–24). This has led to perhaps a greater ‘Europeanisation’ of FEP (and the enlargement process), and an ability of the EU to speak with


one voice; more importantly, there is less scope, at least in theory, for divergent national interests to act as a disruptive force in the construction and execution of FEP as opposed to politico-security issues. Developments in foreign economic policy The sources of EU FEP are to be found in the Treaty of Rome (see Table 1.1). It was primarily through these articles that the Union armed itself with an array of external policy instruments, though they have been modified and supplemented as the organisation’s external economic relations have evolved. The stated purposes of the CCP, though the terms of the relevant treaty articles were rather ambiguous, was to contribute to the development of world trade, to work towards eliminating barriers to trade and to reduce customs barriers. Underpinning the CCP was a commitment to trade liberalisation, which was beginning to gain momentum during the 1960s. As far as the emergence of the EU as an international actor is concerned, the operation of the CCP is generally seen as one of the success stories of EU external relations. The expansion of the EU’s membership, combined with the rapid growth of the European economy, gave the Union an increasingly powerful global presence. Access to the European market, governed by the CCP, created a pole of attraction for third countries that lined up to conclude agreements. It also served as a platform from which the Union built on its competences in external relations. The 1970s proved to be a particularly fertile period in this respect, with several notable European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgements that enhanced the powers of the Community. The 1971 ERTA judgement established that, where common internal rules had been established, the member states could no longer enter into agreements with third countries that would affect those rules. Opinion 1/76 further clarified the issue of authority, stipulating that Table 1.1 policy

The basic framework for the emergence of EU foreign economic

The Common Commercial Policy (CCP) (Articles 110-16 EEC Treaty),

Relationships with the overseas territories of the member states (Articles 131-6 EEC Treaty)

The potential to accept new members (Article 237 EEC Treaty)

The power to negotiate associations (Article 238 EEC Treaty)

The procedures for the Community to enter into international agreements (Article 228 EEC Treaty)


the Community had the right to negotiate international agreements that would lead to the attainment of objectives set down in EC law. The Treaty of Rome’s provisions for associations with overseas territories were designed to preserve imperial trading patterns. The colonial origins of EU trade relations with Mediterranean third countries left a legacy of ‘preferential’ trade arrangements that were beneficial to key interests in the Community. Article 182 enabled the member states to protect imports of cheap primary products from former colonies and safeguard the access of certain colonial imports in home markets.8 Of the founding six member states, France had the most extensive network of trade relationships with former colonies. Indeed, its decision to sign the Treaty of Rome was partly conditional upon the inclusion in the Treaty of special arrangements for its overseas territories (Grosser, 1963, p. 202). The effect of these provisions was to allow the EU to insulate itself from external pressure to liberalise, leading to frequent accusations of protectionism. This tension between liberalisation and protectionism has been a key feature of EU’s FEP, and has played a particularly significant role in shaping its relationships with developing countries. The more recent development of EU’s FEP has been driven by the need to respond to changes in the global system. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for example, was a product of the increased salience of regional security in the aftermath of the cold war and the failure of past incarnations of Mediterranean to stimulate economic development.9 Dramatic and rapid change in the global political economy – particularly during the 1990s – has also forced a number of significant modifications upon the EU. Some have required recourse to legal rulings by the ECJ, but others have arisen out of temporary compromises between the institutions. Agreements made in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and rules adopted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have propelled the institutions and member states into strengthening procedures for collective action. Disputes between the member states and Commission over negotiating competences during the Uruguay Round led to the adoption of a ‘code of conduct’ between the Council and Commission. As the WTO broadened its remit to take in trade in services, the ECJ’s controversial Opinion 1/94 confirmed that competence to negotiate international agreements would continue to be shared. Although the Treaty of Nice widened the scope of Article 133 to include trade in services, the most sensitive sectors remained subject to unanimity. The broader point here is that,


where there is an absence of consensus on the more politicised trade issues, the member states retain the right to challenge. In turn, this has a significant effect upon the type of deals that the EU offers third countries, and thus to its ability to turn rhetoric into effective action. This point is particularly significant not just in terms of trade but also in relation to the power of attraction and the politics of inclusion. For Michael Smith, a process of ‘politicisation’10 has greatly enhanced the political significance of external economic relations. Trade and aid policies have gained in importance in the pursuit of strategic political objectives by the EU. As well as determining the flexibility of the EU’s position in negotiations, the political salience of certain trade issues affects the Union’s capacity to deliver on its commitments to third countries and its ability to fulfil a number of international obligations. Moreover, the politicisation of trade issues and the attachment of political conditions to EU aid and trade agreements, acts as a mechanism for exporting the EU governance model – locking states and regions not only into liberal economic rules and procedures, but also a highly prescriptive European value system that promotes peace and democracy and the rule of law. It is this particular element of EU’s FEP that is crucial to the argument in this book – the political conditions attached to EU association and membership, which clearly aims to promote long-term peace and stability in Europe and beyond. Development – politico-security The Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the CFSP in the second pillar of a three pillared structure which embedded and distinguished between the EU’s external relations conducted in the first pillar (the EC) and foreign policy proper, conducted in the second pillar. What preceded CFSP, namely European Political Cooperation (EPC), began in 1970 as an intergovernmental network among the foreign ministries of the member states, co-ordinating civilian diplomacy within the Atlantic security framework. By 1990 it had transformed the working patterns of national foreign ministries and embassies and developed a rudimentary secretariat, while the Commission had become gradually more involved. Extensive meetings and intensive communications had not, however, generated any effective common policies: preoccupation with procedures in themselves served as a substitute for policy. For the critics and analysts of EPC, extensive activity was not justified by an equal output. Additional to this various other criticisms were made: the strictly intergovernmental structure and practice of EPC did not reflect the reality of the link between Community affairs (economic) and EPC


Affairs (political); decisions were made by consensus without commitment to common action, and without communal military and financial resources, which were inadequate and without visible effect; and the intergovernmental structure did not promote a convergence of national attitudes in the foreign policy field and, procedure and activity did not compensate for a lack of coherent policy or output. These criticisms of EPC and the inadequacies of the EPC structure and operation were highlighted by external events after 1989: the transformations in Eastern Europe; the reunification of Germany; the Gulf War; and the devastation in Yugoslavia. These events alongside a renewed internal push for integration in other areas, forced the issue of foreign and security policy onto the Intergovernmental Conference agenda of 1991, resulting in the change from EPC to CFSP through the TEU. One of the main provisions of the TEU (Title V, Article 2) was for the EU to, ‘assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. It also outlined the main objectives of the CFSP: • To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. • To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member states in all ways. • To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter. • To promote international cooperation • To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the words of Ginsberg, what the TEU aimed to do was ‘bring the commercial, diplomatic, and development activities of the EC-rooted in the culture of integration and majority voting – and the foreign policy positions of the EPC-rooted in the culture of interstate cooperation and unanimous decision-making – under a single rubric’ (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 4). Indeed, Article C of the TEU stressed that ‘The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as well as a whole in the context of its external relations, economic and development policies. The Council and Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency’.11 The reality, however,


was very different – indeed the TEU reinforced the dichotomy FEP and foreign policy proper – and failed to innovate the institutional, coordination and decision-making structures to address the failures of EU foreign policy. Joint actions and common positions were introduced to increase the coherence of EU positions and allow for collective action as well as declaratory statements – and the Western European Union (WEU) was tentatively set up as the defence arm of the EU – under article J.4 (Title V). Defence was mentioned, but only in an ambiguous sense, allowing for the possibility of developing the defensive capabilities of the EU at some stage in the future. Institutionally and in operational terms however, the CFSP failed to provide the instruments and mechanisms to ensure that EU could operate in a more ‘collective’ or ‘coherent’ way. Although Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) was introduced by the TEU in some areas, unanimity remained the dominant decision-making procedure leaving foreign policy formulation vulnerable to paralysis and inaction: there was ambiguity regarding the nature of joint actions and common positions and indeed the financing of these new instruments; the ‘consistency’ between Pillar I and Pillar II was left largely to interpretation rather than embedded procedure; and finally, the defensive capabilities of the EU were left unchanged – with the future role of the WEU the subject of debate and division among Member states. The optimism behind the objectives of CFSP then was short-lived, and even amongst the most enthusiastic of supporters the observation was that, ‘Despite the lofty language in Title V of the Treaty on European Union, it is difficult to observe any significant improvement in the EU’s coherence or increased influence on the world stage’ (Delors, 1997, p. vii). The initial optimism of EU policy-makers in formulating the objectives of CFSP did not reflect the practical reality that was CFSP, and what transpired from this was simply a reinvention of the EPC wheel, with a modest tinkering of process and procedure. The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) sought to introduce incremental improvements in decision-making and in institutional innovation and identity. The operating procedure however, remained rooted in intergovernmentalism, with the control of member states prevailing in the foreign policy process. Even within the ToA the decision was to stick to unanimous voting, although several new decision-making mechanisms and instruments were introduced to try and create more flexibility in the form of constructive abstention, extended QMV, and the ‘Common Strategy’ (Whitman, 1998, p. 12). The idea behind constructive


abstention was that it would add flexibility to foreign policy decisionmaking (See Box 1.1). The ‘Common Strategy’, which was to be prepared by the European Council, implemented through joint actions or common positions and adopted by unanimity, was intended to give increased cohesiveness and purpose to foreign policy decisions made by the EU. QMV was also extended to the realm of joint actions and common positions or decisions based on ‘Common Strategies’ adopted by the European Council. In reality, however, the power of decision-making was still left to member states. The reason for this, as observed by Whitman was ‘a safeguard clause which enables a Member State to block majority voting when a Member State makes a declaration that ‘for important and stated reasons of national policy’ it opposes the adoption of decision by qualified majority’ (Whitman, 1998, p. 12). The implication again is of flexibility and cohesiveness in the formulation of EFP: an issue that will no doubt come into sharper focus after the enlargement of the EU in May 2004. Other important innovations introduced by the ToA aimed to improve the ‘visibility’, ‘identity’, and ‘strategic capacity’ of the EU’s foreign policy. The introduction of a High Representative for CFSP (Monsieur PESC), and the creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), both served to enhance the direction and purpose of the CFSP – and give it a more pro-active rather than reactive infrastructure. The ToA also provided for an ever closer relationship between the WEU and the CFSP – although again, the precise detail of such a relationship could not be agreed because of the divisions between Member states as to the nature of the relationship and its structures. In reality then, the increased capacity at European level (which some have called ‘Brusselisation’ or ‘Europeanisation’12) did not address one major institutional weakness – the control of Member State governments still remained paramount with only symbolic changes to reduce their influence. Box 1.1

Constructive abstention Constructive Abstention (Article 23)

If a Member State does not agree with a position then it can abstain without actually preventing the other Member States from acting. The Member State(s) abstaining cannot interfere in any other way to undermine a decision taken in this way. The only way a decision will not go ahead on such a basis is if more than a third of the weighted votes are represented within the abstention.


The most innovative and progressive change to CFSP, and perhaps the most surprising, was the idea to develop a defensive capability for the EU – stemming from a Franco-British initiative in 1998 (St Malo Declaration). The proposals from such an initiative quickly gained momentum and at the Cologne European Council in 1999 and the Helsinki summit respectively, there was agreement to proceed with the construction of an ESDP and to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of 50–60,000 troops by 2003. Indeed the Cologne European Council concluded that, ‘the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the TEU…[and] the “Petersberg Tasks”’13 (Hill and Smith, 2000, p. 250). The Treaty of Nice provided for the institutional innovation and reform to incorporate such developments (see Table 1.2), which were all designed to address a major problem with CFSP – its lack of any military capacity to deal with crisis situations. The fact that decisions were still to be taken unanimously, however, undermined the utility of such an innovation in terms of the EU’s ability to act in a ‘cohesive’ and more ‘pro-active’ manner. Perhaps it would be rather iniquitous to conclude that CFSP has been ineffective given the progress that has been made in developing its instruments and capabilities – and indeed the relative success it has enjoyed, with ‘Common Strategies’ developed for the Mediterranean and the Ukraine (Gomez, 2003, 1–24). Even under EPC the European Community, although not playing a decisive role in conflicts in which it attempted mediation, did make ‘a constructive and enduring contribution in the Arab-Israeli dispute, in the Central-American crisis of the 1980s, and in the endgame of South African Apartheid’ (Hill, 2001, p. 317). Unfortunately, alongside any successes for the EU in its foreign policy actions, a plethora of unsuccessful interventions or noninterventions can be identified, in conflicts where perhaps the EU Table 1.2

Treaty of Nice (2000): Developments in EFP

• Institutional machinery to serve the ESDP were agreed • The Political Committee was renamed the Political and Security Committee and given permanent residence in Brussels • A Military Committee was established with the assignment of military personnel from the member states to the Council Secretariat; they were given the title ‘Military staff of the EU’


could and should have elicited a strong collective position or action. Examples include the failure to act on a 1996 dispute between Greece and Turkey over an uninhabited Aegean Island leading to the criticism and accusations by Richard Holbrooke of the EU ‘literally sleeping through the night’. The Yugoslav crisis in 1997–8 also seriously undermined the EU’s credibility and judgement – failing to act to stop the violence in Kosovo. Other examples include the failure of the CFSP in Albania, Algeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and many other tragedies that required some form of collective action beyond ‘declaratory diplomacy’.14 It would be somewhat unwarranted to suggest that the EU was capable of intervening in all of the above ‘failed’ cases, even though a case can certainly be made that the lack of action in many cases was due to the embedded intergovernmentalism in CFSP procedure, and the EU’s lack of ability to formulate a coherent and pro-active position because of this. Although failure to intervene in many conflicts provided an impetus to reform the CFSP in many important ways, the one fundamental lesson that was not learnt and that still hinders the EU’s CFSP today, is the failure to alter how member states perceive foreign policy, reflected in the resistance of any transfer of authority and sovereignty in this policy area to the European level, and the primacy of the ‘national interest’ in the foreign policy process.15 It is because of this failure in the EU’s politico security capability that we must seek to analyse other ways in which the EU can be effective – not in conflict management, but in longer-term conflict resolution and prevention, through its power of attraction (enlargement and inclusion). Even the US has alluded to the importance of EU enlargement and ‘recognises the more subtle and wide-ranging contribution that the civilian power can make to the prevention of conflict on the old continent’ (Hill, 2001, p. 321). If we can understand that EU foreign policy is broader than its actions under CFSP/ESDP, then we can perhaps recognise that the real impact of the EU on conflict prevention and shaping a ‘new order’ might come from its association agreements, its trade and aid policies, and its overall soft security capabilities. Moreover, through emphasising what the EU can offer through its enlargement process, and in broader terms its inclusion and association, we can develop a more complex understanding of the EU’s overall impact on conflicts in the short, medium and longer term and identify realistically, where the EU might best focus its resources in the future.


Theoretical literature – conceptualising European Foreign Policy (EFP) Even for those that acknowledge the complexity of EFP (i.e. recognise that EU foreign policy spans the three pillars), the very ambiguity of structures has made it very difficult for any analyst to be able to use any specific theory or conceptualisation to describe, explain or understand fully the actions of the EU as a global actor. As Hill and Wallace have noted, ‘The failure…of the academic community…either to relate EPC into any meaningful systems theory, integration theory or international relations theory, let alone create a new EPC general theory’ stems from the elusive character of the phenomenon (cited in Hill, 1996, p. 1). There have been three generally identifiable waves of theoretical interest in EFP (Ginsberg, 1997: 8–9). The first wave was largely descriptive (Galtung, 1973; Sjostedt, 1977; Feld, 1976, 1979; Taylor, 1979; Allen et al, 1991, 1998; Hill, 1983), interest being brought about by the 1975 Helsinki negotiations. The second wave brought a more conceptual aspect to the analyses, in particular after the changes brought in by the Single European Act (Ifestos, 1987; Pijpers et al, 1988; Ginsberg, 1989; Rummel, 2003; Allen and Smith, 1991; Holland, 1991). The third wave was influenced by changes through Treaties and European Council decisions and brought about a more sophisticated analysis of the EU in the area of foreign policy (Rummel, 1992; Hill, 1993, 1996, 1997; Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994; Holland, 1997; Allen and Smith, 1991; Smith, 1996; Allen, 1998; Regelsberger et al, 1997; Whitman, 1998; Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; Hill, 2001; Ginsberg, 2001, White, 2001). The nature of the EU’s foreign policy can be broken down into various approaches incorporating many theoretical schools in trying to understand and explain the internal/external dimensions of EFP. Whitman (1997) for example, breaks the approaches up into three distinct categories. The first category uses international relations (IR) theories to account for and explain the role of the EU in the global arena (Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994). For IR theorists the emphasis in analysing the EU’s global role ‘is that the EC/EU is embedded within the domain of international relations from which it is neither separate nor separable’ (Whitman, 1997, p. 3). From such a perspective the EU’s external role has many aspects to it, which must be investigated if we are to have a greater understanding of its development and activity. The second category is that of ‘new conceptual categorisations’ of the EU to fit its international role. Examples of this for instance are


notions of the EU as a ‘superpower’ (Galtung, 1973) or ‘civilian power’ (Duchene, 1972, 1973) and also conceptualisations of the EU’s ‘presence’ (Allen and Smith, 1991) or ‘actorness’ (Sjostedt, 1977; Hill, 1993) in the global arena. The difference between these and the first category as described above, is that they actually develop criteria specific to the EU when looking at its role in the global community and assess its capability based on these criteria. The concept of civilian power is intuitively germaine to the idea of enlargement as foreign policy – even though it does not address the issue explicitly. It was introduced by Duchene as a concept that concentrated on the ‘quiet diplomacy, economic interdependence and multilateral connections’ (Lofthouse and Long, 1996, p. 182) of the EU, as an alternative to the emphasis on military power capability in solving disputes. This concept, anathema to realists, has received criticism for both the assumption that the EC is an international actor, and for its idealist notion that it could in some way lead to peace and prosperity rather than the mutual conflict and war that was predicted by realist theory. Allen and Smith, although acknowledging the concept as useful, argue that the notion of civilian power ‘could also be seen negatively as a mere rationalisation of military impotence in the face of superpower predominance’ (Allen and Smith cited in Ginsberg, 1997, p. 11). Others (Long, 1997; Ginsberg, 1997; Whitman, 1998) have gone on to develop the concept and believe that it is a useful tool for evaluating the actions of the EU. In the words of Whitman, ‘the notion of civilian power still represents a touchstone for debates on the international role of the EC/EU because of the premise that it is conducting a distinctive form of diplomacy, in both form and substance, in the absence of the ability to use military power’ (Whitman, 1997, p. 4). The concepts of ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ were developed as common sense alternatives in conceptualising the EU’s role in the world. The concept of actorness was introduced by Sjostedt (1977) and developed by Taylor (1982) and Hill (Hill, 1996a). The notion of actorness according to Hill, ‘provides us with a theoretical perspective which can incorporate both the internal dynamics of institutional development and the changing nature of the international environment in which it has to operate’ (Hill, 1996a, p. 107). He identifies three components to the concept: the first is that an international actor must be delimited from others and from its environment which is: autonomous, in the sense of making its own laws and decisions: and which possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level (Hill, 1996a, p. 107).


Allen and Smith (1991) introduce the concept of presence which takes several forms, tangible and intangible, and which recognises the multidimensional impact of the EU’s external policies. Such notions of actorness and presence, although assuming a pre-set role for the EU, help to conceptualise the messy reality of EU foreign policy in its fuller sense and also take us away from the false theoretical dichotomy created by analysts who take either an intergovernmental approach or supranational approach to analysing Europe’s foreign policy. Such concepts recognise implicitly the role of enlargement in the EU’s foreign policy – through acknowledging that EU actorness does not just flow from the second pillar (CFSP). The third strand of literature identified by Whitman is that concerning the theorisation of decision-making within the EU in the area of foreign policy. How and why do topics get onto the agenda? How and why is policy formulated, processed and executed etc? This literature tends to be pre-occupied with the separation of CFSP – an intergovernmental institution in culture and process and the EC, which operates under a more communitarian premise – and the implication that this has for the community’s external activities. In essence however, this theoretical pre-occupation and separation is very difficult to justify in an empirical sense; even more so in today’s complex web of foreign policy making at the EU level, where economics and politics are undoubtedly and unavoidably, intertwined and interlinked (for example the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean). Such theorisations and conceptualisations of EFP then, have fallen short in one way or another in capturing the nature for EFP – and more importantly for this work, they have fallen short of explicitly incorporating any notion of enlargement as foreign policy – despite the fact that empirical investigation suggests that considerable influence has been exerted by the EU through accession (and indeed association). The theorisations of EFP emanating from IR, Comparative Politics and European integration schools also illustrate this point further.16 Indeed there are various theorisations, such as the concept of externalisation emanating from neofunctionalism, that are highly relevant to the study of enlargement as foreign policy (elaborated on below). There is also no doubt that conceptualisations such as the EU as civilian power and concepts such as presence and actorness, do implicitly recognise the EU’s ‘soft’ security capabilities. What is common to the above conceptualisations and theorisations is that they do not directly address the issue of enlargement: they are not concerned with theorising enlargement as foreign policy. Why then,


is this literature important? It is important in the sense that the different approaches outlined ask questions that lead to a particular analysis of EFP (CFSP), and as Sjursen notes, ‘To better capture the EU’s foreign policy, we need to ask different questions, beyond those of whether or not we are moving ‘towards a common foreign and security policy’ (2000, p. 2). Moreover, it is not that these theories or concepts are irrelevant – we have seen that some clearly recognise – albeit implicitly – the capacity of the EU to act beyond CFSP and the second pillar – but none address explicitly, or directly, how the power of attraction can be systematically analysed and conceptualised as one of the most important aspects of EFP.

Enlargement as foreign policy The issue of European enlargement is not new, indeed its roots stem as far back as the Treaty of Rome – written in as a political obligation that called upon states to join the process of integration if they shared ideals of the European Community. From the beginning of the European integration process the Community wanted to expand its borders in order to diffuse its values and fulfil its objectives of creating a peaceful European order after the destruction of the Second World War. Even at these early stages, enlargement could be seen as a form of foreign policy activity. The argument about ‘enlargement’ as foreign policy historically and in the contemporary context has both an idealistic and pragmatic element (Cecchini, Jones and Lorentzen, 2001, p. 155). Idealistic in the sense that enlargement encourages all states that share in the ideals and values embedded in the EU to join. Indeed, the practical side of this idealism has seen the EU accepting Greece, Portugal and Spain as members, and the acceptance of the current wave of enlargement candidates for similar political objectives, albeit in slightly different contexts: to create stability and promote democracy and the rule of law as well as manage economic transformation. The pragmatic side of enlargement has also included the EU’s provision of a framework for encouraging compliance through a series of instruments and incentives for medium and long-term peace and stability – before and after accession. As Michael Smith has noted ‘the EU has the economic capacity to reward and to punish; it has the technical and administrative capacity to support and stabilise; and it has the capacity to negotiate in ways unknown to many of the other participants in the European order’ (cited by Hill, 2001, p. 329). Of course, it is


acknowledged that for enlargement to be successful as a ‘soft’ security instrument, perception is important: enlargement and integration (and the values embedded in the EU) must be seen by all parties involved as the most desirable (and legitimate) formula for creating prosperity and stability in Europe. It has been argued that the EU’s ‘very historical identity is fundamentally that of a conflict prevention system’ (Pinder, 1996). The philosophical underpinning of the success of enlargement as foreign policy (power of attraction) approach, whereby states are drawn in and socialised into a civilising constitution derives from two variants of liberalism; the first is the moral-legal variant whereby law and institutions help to bind states in an observance of common rules which increasingly mimic the principles of domestic (democratic) society; the second and most relevant in the post Cold War era, is the ‘democratic peace’ variant. The democratic peace hypothesis at a basic level is based on the assumption that nations that are democratic do not want to fight each other. Thus by promoting the emergence of groupings of democratic states within a EU setting, this will create peace and a spillover effect to other non-member states (Hill, 2001, p. 324). The success of the democratic peace hypothesis relies of course on the assumption that democracy alone is enough to secure conflict prevention, and that inclusion and institutionalisation can placate states that if excluded would be more militant. In other words, it relies on the assumption that the collective responsibility within a regional grouping of democratic states makes conflict less likely. As Hill notes on this, ‘the instinct for a politics of inclusion over exclusion is generally correct’, but he also points out that ‘democracies are a necessary but not sufficient means of preventing conflict’ (Hill, 2001, p. 325). The premise of this chapter and indeed the argument in the book is that inclusion is indeed preferred to exclusion; one only has to observe the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in order to appreciate the role played by the EU system in the consolidation of democracy and stability in these countries. The EU clearly represents a working peace system and, ‘thus far in its history the EC/EU itself has proved remarkably free of conflict’ (Hill, 2001, p. 326). Moreover, in the case of Cyprus, the EU could provide the political and legal structures for which a bi-communal state could operate in a peaceful and equal way. Indeed it has already demonstrated this in the case of Belgium – whereby a system of co-ordination and co-determination has led to equal representation of the various regions, and communities in the EU Councils.


Establishing enlargement as foreign policy The argument that enlargement is a form of EU foreign policy is not without its critics, but as noted by Sjursen and Smith, although ‘Defining enlargement as a form of EU foreign policy is not entirely uncontroversial…it is hardly novel’ (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, p. 2). As has already been noted above the theory of neofunctionalism, and in particular its concept of ‘externalisation’ developed by Schmitter and Haas (Schmitter, 1969; Haas and Rowe, 1973), and later Ginsberg (1989), recognised the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy. It covered three basic areas: the impact of outside states on EU action: the effect of this on the EU: the outcome of EU actions resulting from outside pressure. Enlargement is a case of externalisation with major implications for EU foreign policy. It is argued that as the EU develops and proceeds with its internal reforms, outside states will be directly or indirectly affected without being part of the decisionmaking bodies that affect them. The EU has the choice to ‘include’ or ‘exclude’ these states and whatever decision it takes has implications for the relationship between the EU and the outside world. The long and the short of such logic is that, ‘enlargement has been a catalyst for either the creation of new or reform of existing foreign policy-making procedures, mechanisms, meetings, and institutions as the EU is forced to adjust to the impact that its larger size and more diverse membership have on its foreign relationships’ (Ginsberg, 1997, p. 16). Of course not all academics or indeed commentators see enlargement, in particular towards Central and Eastern Europe, as reflecting a positive ‘foreign policy’ activity on the part of the EU. The EU’s initial reaction and policy to the new demands of Central and Eastern European states after 1989, and indeed its opinions and evaluations of the Turkish application for membership has often been used as an example of the EU’s inability to influence foreign policy and shape a new order in Europe and beyond (Kramer, 1993, MacManus, 1998, Allen, 1998). Moreover the EU has often been accused of looking after its own economic self-interests and reacting to external events rather than having any coherent or long-term strategy for enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and indeed towards the Mediterranean applicants, in particular Cyprus.17 The EU has been accused of creating false expectations through its enlargement policy: expectations that do not often match its capability. Sjursen and Smith, however, have argued that ‘enlargement is not merely reactive…In fact the current enlargement process is influenced


by explicitly political objectives that aim to reshape political order in Europe (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, p. 2). Other commentators have argued that enlargement should be seen as more than just external policy – indeed, they point out that it has significant internal consequences for the EU in terms of its decision-making and its development (Friis and Murphy, 1999). The internal consequences however, do not deter from the fact (or indeed contradict the fact) that the enlargement process, and the power of attraction, influences the action of actors outside the EU. For Sjursen and Smith this ‘is an example of the form of foreign policy that develops in a world where the domestic and international spheres have become increasingly intertwined’ (2001, p. 2). More importantly, conceptualising the enlargement of the EU as foreign policy, takes us away from the traditional view of the CFSP as the ‘centre’ of EU foreign policy activity. Diez argues that the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy should be understood in ‘governance’ terms, suggesting that foreign policy is an important part, or subsystem, of the European system of governance. In this sense he defines enlargement as process of ‘gradual and formal horizontal institutionalisation’, where ‘institutionalisation is defined as the process by which actions and interactions of social actors come to be structured and patterned by norms and rules’ (Schimmelfennig cited by Diez, 2000). For Diez, enlargement (as governance) involves an organisational and a sociological logic – the former involving the ‘extension of institutions of supranational governance to new member states’ and the latter, ‘the socialisation of new member states in to a governance structure guiding their behaviour’. The impact of enlargement in terms of changing behaviour, he suggests, depends on the extent to which states behave as rational actors. If states are rational, foreign policy behaviour and attitudes are not necessarily altered in the long term because the EU’s norms and rules are not internalised. Alternatively however, if EU norms and rules are internalised by states as part of the enlargement process and socialisation changes the actual context in which foreign policy decisions are made (identity transformation), then this might lead to ‘a more fundamental alteration of foreign policy as an effect of enlargement’ (Diez, 2000). The main point that can be drawn from Diez’s analysis is that we have to differentiate between the short (rationalist), medium and longer term effects of enlargement as foreign policy (constructivist/ sociological). A central question for this piece of work is whether the enlargement process and the incentives offered by the EU has changed


minds on the Cyprus question. This inevitably will result on a focus on incentives, carrots and sticks, and changes in behaviour in the short term of the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in moving towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. It is not explicitly about the internalisation of EU norms and rules and the socialisation of the involved actors in terms of identity, action and context, but inevitably, this is an important aspect of the analysis – the outcome of which is fundamental to the long term stability of any Cyprus solution within an EU governance system. The argument in this book is that the enlargement of the EU occurs within fluid governance structures (norms and rules), but more saliently, explicitly defined political objectives. Those objectives in turn are reflected and transfused to applicant states through conditionality – as well as the economic, political and security benefits that the EU can offer through association and inclusion. It is through this conditionality – and the logic that underpins such conditionality that we can understand the process of enlargement as foreign policy. More specifically the common values and universal principles that the EU espouses in its conditions for accession, defines the basis of the EU’s foreign policy. EU enlargement and conditionality The conditions for membership did not really become an issue for the Community until the enlargement to Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1981, and 1986 respectively; the only explicit condition up until then was that a state had a European identity. This enlargement of the Community did not see the explicit articulation of criteria for membership but democratisation, alongside genuine free elections, the right balance of party strength and stability of government, were all included. Economic and administrative considerations were also notable in the Commission’s opinion on the applications. The main point here is that the EU policy on enlargement entailed more than the pursuit of economic self-interest (driven by the logic of consequences – see Table 1.3), but also common values with democracy being a primary condition for allowing membership. The next set of conditions came from internal reform of the Community (creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), CFSP etc), and the external challenges that it faced after the end of the Cold War. The three basic criteria for membership outlined at the Lisbon European Council in 1992; European identity, democracy and human rights were extended to include: the acceptance of the acquis

20 The European Union and Enlargement Table 1.3

The logics of conditionality18

Utility (Logic of Consequences)

Policy makers seek legitimation through an effort to find efficient (rational) solutions to concrete problems and dilemmas within given interests and preferences

Values (Logic of appropriateness)

Policy would be legitimised through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group’s conception of itself and of what it represents

Rights (Logic of Policy would be legitimised with reference to principles moral justification) that can be recognised as ‘just’ by all parties, irrespective of their particular interests, perceptions or cultural identity Source: Sjursen and Smith (2001); Sjursen (2002).

communautaire in its entirety; a functioning and competitive market economy; and an ability to implement the CFSP. Here all three logics might be identified: in terms of the logic of consequences the EU was clearly trying to preserve the progress it had made in various policy areas (Single market, EMU, CFSP); the logic of appropriateness, in the sense that justification could come only if the promotion of the process of integration was not threatened with the assumption that states who did not agree with the underlying values of the conditions would not seek to join; and finally, the logic of moral justification in that democracy and the protection of human rights could be seen as universal principles which the EU deliberately tried to promote (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, pp. 8–9). The enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe brought further articulation of explicit conditions from the EU, initially for the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC’s), but subsequently applied to all states accepted for accession to the EU. Up until the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the CEEC’s had been unhappy at the lack of progress or expression from the EU of what was needed for them to ‘rejoin’ Europe – the EU’s preoccupation with internal reform had clearly played a role in its lack of policy in this area. The Declaration at the Copenhagen summit however, set out specific conditions that would have to be met by the Central and Eastern European applicants (see Box 1.2). In addition to the conditions in the declaration, also included were the respect for and protection of human rights, and the ability of the EU to take in new members and progressively maintain the momentum of the integration process. The Amsterdam Treaty basically rein-

Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor 21 Box 1.2

The Copenhagen criteria

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union (Bulletin of the European Communities, 26 (6) 1993, p. 13).

forced and embedded the political conditions (Article 49) articulated at Copenhagen, although the protection of minorities was omitted; the controversial nature of the treatment of minorities within the EU constrained any agreement on this issue, even though this was clearly a condition that the EU was trying to set for ‘potential incomers’ and indeed outsiders. All three logics once again, might be identified with regard to the Copenhagen conditions. In terms of utility, the emphasis on self-help in the economic and political transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe meant that the EU could rid itself of much of the burden of transformation. Second, the acquis communautaire and the adherence to EU objectives reflect quite specific values that the Central and Eastern European must accept to join the EU; finally, in terms of rights, the political conditions outlined by the EU (democracy, rule of law, human rights etc), represent universal conditions; these are conditions which the EU often justifies through reference to established international conventions (e.g. United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights) (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, pp. 9–10). The choice to exclude the protection of minorities from the Amsterdam Treaty could be tentatively tied with the logic of moral justification if it was not for the fact that internal agreement could not be reached on the issue. More convincing however, would be the logic of consequences: a rational decision taken by the EU to ensure that ethnic conflict was not imported into the EU. The EU added extra conditions in an incremental manner after Amsterdam. The condition of good neighbourliness, which first became an issue in the EU’s Pact for Stability, and was later reiterated in Agenda 2000 and at the Helsinki European Council (1999), is particularly pertinent to the analysis of Cyprus and by implication Turkey. This condition refers to cooperation with neighbours, but also to agreement on borders and border disputes. In relation to this condition the Helsinki European Council stressed ‘the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter…in


particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), at the latest by the end of 2004’ (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, p. 11). In this instance then, this condition not only reflects the EU’s values regarding the maintenance of a ‘peaceful community’ (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, p. 11), but also a universal principle regarding the peaceful resolution of disputes (as opposed to force and war). With regard to the border dispute in Cyprus, the membership prospects of Turkey are clearly dependent on them fulfilling this condition: although the justification for applying such a condition to Turkey has not yet convinced elites in Turkey, or indeed certain member states within the EU. In summary, it is important to understand the reasoning and justification for EU enlargement policy (through conditionality) in order to understand the logic of its actions, and more pertinently for the purpose of this book, to understand how the EU might influence conflicts and border disputes through the power of attraction. The EU’s enlargement policy towards Cyprus and Turkey encompasses both a moral justification and value-based justification, even though certain commentators claim that the EU has not applied these consistently (Sjursen and Smith, 2001, pp. 14–15). Policy is clearly not driven solely by utility, as importing the problem of a divided Cyprus into the EU could prove costly and have wider ramifications internally and externally. EU policy towards Cyprus and Turkey however, has reflected the desire of the EU to create a peaceful security community, through insisting on the adherence of universal and European based values and principles in the form of conditions for accession. The question that this book attempts to address is how the EU has helped both Cyprus and Turkey to fulfil these conditions – in particular the condition of good neighbourliness. How has the power of attraction helped to catalyse movement towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue?

The power of attraction: conditions for the success of enlargement as foreign policy The EU has a wide array of ‘soft security’ policy instruments (incentives, carrots, sticks) at its disposal to reinforce and facilitate the ‘enlargement process’ and persuade incoming states to adhere to the conditions for accession (Box 1.3). Such instruments have been used with varying success in the past19 – and there has been a great deal of

Understanding the European Union as a Global Actor 23 Box 1.3

Instruments associated with the EU’s civilising role

Conditionality – Financial Aid, Customs Union agreements, Association agreements and trade concessions in return for compliance and co-operation with the EU

Inclusion and status into the security and defence institutions of the EU (e.g. the WEU family in the 1990s, or the ESDP structures post–1999)

Economic sanctions

Structured dialogues

Joint Actions, Common Positions and Common Strategies

Diplomatic personality (given more credence with the new post of High Representative)

debate and scepticism as to the shortcomings of soft instruments as real strategies. Such scepticism has come in particular from those who view the capabilities of the EU in the development of a CFSP (with a real defence and security capability) – as the motor of actorness in the global arena (Hill, 1993; Hill, 1996; Forster and Wallace, 1996). An important aspect of the argument in this book however, is the idea that the EU can be effective through its ‘soft security’ capabilities. The important focus in this case is the process of accession (power of attraction) and the economic, political and security incentives offered through this process to Cyprus and Turkey. Moreover, it is the degree to which the EU, not through the CFSP, but through the ‘institutionalisation’ and ‘socialisation’ of Turkish, Turkish-Cypriot and GreekCypriot elites can shape a ‘new’ and stable European order – through the incentives offered and the provision of a multi-tiered system that can accommodate and incorporate all interests. This work of course will focus on the accession process and what it can do (and has done) to catalyse a solution to the Cyprus issue through conditionality, rather than what the EU can offer if a solution to the Cyprus issue is found prior to membership on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal federation.20 In order to achieve this there is a need to articulate the power of attraction (enlargement as foreign policy) argument. More precisely there is a need to outline how the appeal of membership to the EU can prevent conflict in Europe and how conditionality can be translated into effective foreign policy. The EU first of all can prevent conflict through the power of attraction ‘by imposing self-restraint on countries that want to show their good intentions and their readiness for membership’; and secondly, ‘by providing the EU with important external leverage over the behaviour


of potential candidates’ (Munuera, 1994, p. 91). The success of such a strategy has been illustrated in various cases. In the case of Slovakia– Hungary whereby EC pressure played a key role in brokering the London Accord on Gabcikovo and encouraging Bratislava to moderate its stance on its minorities. Additionally, such a strategy has been fruitful in the case of encouraging moderation in Tallinn’s treatment of ethnic Russian minorities through discreet diplomatic démarches, not to mention the overall effects it has had on the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe (Smith K. E., 1998). Of course what is also important is the perception of the recipients of EU enlargement policy and the conditions attached to accession – applicant states need to be convinced of the legitimacy and credibility of the EU. Conditionality, as a carrot and stick mechanism, will only be effective if applied consistently, and crucially, if the potential candidate sees the carrots on offer as essential and desirable and fears the sticks (Smith K. E., 2000, p. 39). If the EU does not convince incoming states of the legitimacy of its policy, then it could find it increasingly difficult to maintain any leverage or influence over them, in particular with regard to fulfilling criteria and conditions for membership. What is at stake is the EU’s credibility, which could spillover from the external to the internal if states carry a certain perception of the EU once they accede. Enlargement and the promise of accession is essentially not enough as a lone strategy for conflict prevention and resolution. Indeed certain caveats on the effectiveness of the power of attraction as foreign policy must be explicated in order to understand its nature and its potential impact. The first is the issue of time frames; it is useful if membership is offered and granted in the near future. Given the variation in time frames for accession for candidate countries and the disillusion this may bring with it (e.g. Turkey), the carrot of accession should be combined with strategies and instruments that would work in the interim period. Indeed, if the time frame for membership is not in the near future, this may lead to frustration, and in this sense the EU should ‘find ways of providing countries earmarked for membership with gradual but effective integration’ (Munuera, 1994, pp. 91–92). It can be argued moreover, that for the EU to have leverage, the candidate country must perceive that there are potential benefits to be gained by membership of the EU; membership must be a goal worth striving for despite any short-term adjustment and restructuring that may be painful. To ease the pain of any necessary transition and preserve the power of attrac-


tion (and maintain leverage), the EU would have to provide some of the substance of integration during any transitional period such as financial assistance, customs union agreements, technical assistance, and limited forms of EU membership (Munuera, 1994, p. 92). This, in the short-term, would help to preserve the desirability of accession to the EU. A second caveat is that of ‘geographical clarity’. This is an essential requisite if the power of attraction is to be a successful strategy. It can be noted in particular that, ‘The European Union is likely to lose much of its influence…if some…countries feel that they are permanently excluded from the club, especially if they perceive this as an arbitrary decision…The European Union could even undermine regional stability if it was perceived to be drawing lines of division, or if some countries acted on the assumption that this was the case’ (Munuera, 1994, p. 92). Moreover, if geographical limits are not clear, then the enlargement to selected few states on arbitrarily decided lines could actually lead to greater instability at the regional level. Overall it can be concluded that, ‘the power of attraction of the European Union is and may remain an instrument for moderating behaviour, provided membership is forthcoming, perceived as worthwhile and clear as to its geographical coverage’ (Munuera, 1994, p. 92). These arguments are important when considering the case of Turkey and Cyprus – in particular given claims of mistreatment by Turkey in its attempts to join the Union (the inconsistency of the EU logics), and the links that have been made, implicit and explicit, between Turkish compliance to resolve the Cyprus problem and accession to the EU. The entanglement of the resolution of the Cyprus issue with the enlargement of the EU to both Cyprus and Turkey is an important factor in understanding the nature of the EU’s role in Cyprus. Of additional relevance here is the observation that ‘soft measures appear appropriate when the parties in a potential conflict show some degree of goodwill, and when the actual conflict seems still some way off’ (Munuera, 1994, p. 88). In terms of the latter criterion the dispute in Cyprus has been relatively trouble-free with regard to any military conflict since 1974. In terms of the former however, political goodwill has been questionable – in particular on the part of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot ruling elites and leadership; a factor that has been recognised by UN Reports on Cyprus (see Chapter 2), and more recently by Turkish Cypriot civil society (see Chapter 4). Inter-related is the differentiation between the power of attraction and the political goodwill of the main parties involved in the Cyprus issue.


We must distinguish between the two to maintain analytical clarity. In particular, we must acknowledge that the UN21 is the main organisation attempting to broker a political solution on the island – and the EU is the organisation hoping to catalyse the efforts of the UN through the accession process. This is important in the sense that it changes the nature of the question that is being asked and recognises the complexity of the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Moreover, when considering the impact of the EU accession process on changing minds in Cyprus, one has to consider the plethora of factors and actors involved in the process – and the nature and capacity of the EU’s role in resolving the Cyprus problem. The central question that must be asked therefore is not how the EU can solve the Cyprus problem, but how far the range of incentives offered by the power of attraction creates the necessary political goodwill in the UN process amongst Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot elites to work towards a solution of the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, when considering the EU’s role in resolving the Cyprus problem, one must consider history, in particular the accession of Greece to the Community in 1981 – and the subsequent perception of the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish elites of the EU as a non-credible actor in Cypriot affairs. This perception is also one of the primary reasons the EU has been reluctant in becoming directly involved in resolving the dispute: it simply has never had the legitimacy to do so. This is not to say that the EU has not had an effect, but that it has been limited in its capacity to act directly; it was only with the acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate country and the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue in the 1990s that the EU became more overtly involved in trying to catalyse a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Conclusion The main aims of this chapter have been to provide an overview of the central developments in EFP (FEP and politico security) and the literature in this field, and more pertinently to provide a justification and understanding of the power of attraction as foreign policy. Much of the literature on EFP, empirically and theoretically, has tended to focus on the EU’s hard security development and capability in measuring the EU’s capability in world affairs, often to the detriment of one of its main strengths, that of inclusion and enlargement. The literature on CFSP clearly did recognise the complex nature of EFP


THE POWER OF ATTRACTION

Conditions for Success as Foreign Policy (Conflict Prevention/ Peaceful Resolution) Time-Frame

Geographical Clarity Third Party and

Other EU Measures and

External Perception (Legitimacy) Influences (UN,

Influences

US, UK, Greece, NGO s, Interest Groups) The Actors Greek-Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey (Elites and civil society)

EFFECT/OUTCOME

RATIONAL – Instrumental Change Figure 1.1

SOCIOLOGICAL – Transformation

A framework for analysis

spanning across the three pillars of the EU, but essentially the theorisations and concepts outlined did not explicitly incorporate the notion of enlargement as foreign policy. Crucially there was no adequate articulation within the concepts of the dynamics of how and why the EU could act to influence third countries through inclusion and enlargement. What has been suggested in this chapter is that enlargement is indeed a valid and justifiable form of EFP – even though it does have


its limits in the sense that it is more applicable to conflict prevention than conflict management. The most important observation was that the enlargement of the EU occurred within explicitly defined political objectives – and that those objectives in turn were reflected and transfused to applicant states through conditionality. More saliently the central message of the chapter was that it was through this conditionality – and the logic that underpins such conditionality that we could understand the process of enlargement as foreign policy. In terms of a framework for the analysis of the book (see Fig. 1.1), it was suggested that the power of attraction (enlargement) could help to prevent conflict by imposing self-restraint on countries that want to show their good intentions and their readiness for membership and by providing the EU with important external leverage over the behaviour of potential candidates. It was also recognised in general level that in order for enlargement to work as foreign policy (through conditionality) the EU had to be forthcoming with clear time frame for membership, it had to be perceived as legitimate by all the actors involved the conflict, and that it had to be clear as to its geographical coverage. The questions that this book will attempt to answer in the chapters that follow, given the conditions outlined, will be how far the power of attraction has helped to catalyse a solution to the Cyprus problem. How successful has the EU approach been? Have the tools of accession and conditionality worked to persuade Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots to move towards a resolution of the Cyprus issue through agreed UN resolutions?

2 The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context

Introduction The history of Cyprus has been complex and turbulent with the involvement of many actors at local, regional and global level. Its more recent history has been characterised by tension and conflict due to the diametrically opposed interests of Greece and the Greek-Cypriots on the one hand, and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the other. In addition to this the location of the island has seen the long-term involvement in the island’s affairs by Britain, and strategic intervention by the US and the Soviet Union. International organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and more recently the European Union (EU), have been involved in trying to create a climate for resolving the conflict on the island for many years, in particular after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, and the subsequent division of the island since then. This chapter will outline the multi-actor and multi-level nature (community, regional, international) of the Cyprus issue – setting the context in which to understand the EU’s relations with Cyprus and its ability to act as an interlocutor in the Cyprus ‘affair’ in later chapters. It will briefly cover the colonial period and the impact of British policies in arguably creating the division between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Second, there will be a discussion of important events between 1950 and 1974, a period when the GreekCypriot objective of enosis (union) with Greece and the aims to set up a constitution for Cyprus by the British (and others) led to internal conflict and the internationalisation of the problem culminating in the London–Zurich agreements in 1960 – with the involvement of Greece, Turkey, the UN and the US. 29


Finally it will cover the period after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. Specifically, it will look at early attempts at European Political Cooperation (EPC) mediation after the invasion, and the implication this had for the EU’s ability to act to resolve the dispute thereafter, as well as important UN efforts to resolve the dispute from 1974 to 2003.

The British colonial regime In 1878, by agreement with the Ottoman Turks and with claims of strategic interest relating to the questions in the East (and specifically to ensure support for the Turkish Sultan), Britain acquired the island of Cyprus under protectorate status, as a place d’armes. In 1914 when Turkey sided with the Germans in the First World War, Britain annexed Cyprus as a colony, until 1960 when Cyprus became an independent Republic and Britain became a guarantor power of the constitution on the island. The early British policies saw many changes to the administration, institutions and laws of the island. According to Markides this ‘was discontinuous and inevitably created strains that provided for the dynamic growth of an anti-British movement’ (Markides, 1977, p. 6). This anti-British movement was also fuelled by the increasing sentiment for enosis with Greece, which had manifested itself in Cypriot society since the independence of Greece in 1821. The main bone of contention of the constitution introduced by Gladstone in 1882 for Cyprus was the Legislative Council and its composition, the consequence of which was that ‘Britain ruled the island through the Greek, Turkish, and other communities. There were no Cypriots’ (Horton-Kelling, 1990, p. 7). The composition of the Council and the weighting of votes in particular, meant that at any one time the Greek Cypriots who made up 80 per cent of the population could be outvoted on any measure by British officials and elected Turkish Cypriot representatives (Panteli, 1984, p. 78). This antagonised the Greek Cypriots and provided fuel for the criticism of the ‘divide and rule’ policies employed by the British. As Pollis has noted, ‘Great Britain was most instrumental in transforming identities and constructing ethnicity where it had not previously existed’ (Pollis, 1998, p. 93). Others have also been critical arguing that ‘Britain pre-empted any possibility for the achievement of a political understanding between Greeks and Turks’ in that, ‘in the actual administration of the island, Britain fostered separate Turkish institutions and indeed a substantial measure of segregation for the Turkish population which was

The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context 31

encouraged to close ranks against its Greek neighbours and to rely on the Government’s good-will’ (Polyviou, 1975, p. 3). There were also other changes stemming from the constitution that were harshly criticised, and did nothing to improve Anglo-Cypriot relations on the island, in particular among the Greeks. The traditional authority of the Church was curbed under British rule and one of the primary sources of friction came with the Tribute, which by admission from the British and in particular Winston Churchill, was seen to be unjust and unfair (Markides, 1977, p. 9). What specifically antagonised the Greeks was that the monies extracted from the Tribute, a form of double tax on the Cypriot in which they had no say whatsoever, was being used to service a debt previously incurred by the British in the days of Ottoman rule. All this antagonism of course, found its voice in the enosis movement and culminated in the riots of 1931 against Government House in Nicosia with calls for freedom from the oppressive British regime. In 1931 the constitution was eventually abolished and replaced by a new Advisory Council, and after long and complicated negotiations with the Treasury the Tribute was also abolished in 1927. Effectively, from 1931 to 1960 Cyprus was ruled by decree, and the emphasis from a British perspective, through habit and through the political deadlock which they had help to create on the island, was to curb the movement for enosis and maintain the existing state of affairs on the island. It seems that the British emphasis after 1931 was on economic development rather than political (Reddaway, 1986, pp. 20–21, HortonKelling, 1990, pp. 8–9), with the island being run through autocratic and undemocratic means. Perception in Cyprus: The Greeks and Turks For Britain, Cyprus was a strategic acquisition of debatable value, but for the Greeks Cyprus had always been part of the great Hellenic kingdom and ‘they naturally looked back with pride to the 3000 years of their history and the achievements of Greek civilisation’ (Polyviou, 1975, p. 2). Therefore, the idea of enosis that had existed since 1821, with the fight for Greek independence, held a special cultural and symbolic meaning for the Greek Cypriots, one that could and did evoke a potentially dangerous degree of emotional nationalist reaction (Adams and Cottrell, 1968, p. 8). Conversely, from the Turkish perspective, ever since the Turks ousted the Venetians from Cyprus in 1571, ‘Cyprus’s history [was] interwoven with that of Turkey’s which assumed a special responsibility or role on the island’s affairs’ (Ramady, 1976, p. 1).


This special interest in Cyprus it is claimed, was embedded in Turkey’s self-defined role that not only has a historical basis but also a legal and strategic one (these of course are not mutually exclusive but intimately linked factors). Indeed, it is the latter factor that has caused one commentator to note, ‘…its primary interest in the island has been strategic…This is why from the beginning of the post-war enosis campaign Turkey has opposed the island’s union with Greece’ (Bahcheli, 1992, pp. 62). Because of the history of occupation and oppression and the identification with a Hellenic civilisation, for the Greeks on the island any barrier to the long held dream of enosis was looked upon with great condescension. In this case the barriers were first the Turks and then the British, imposing their administrations and rules on the island – and preventing the Greeks from their real destiny, union with Greece. For the Turkish Cypriots however, it was this very push for enosis that reinforced their own Turkish identity. It added another dimension to mainland Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus: the protection and security of their Turkish counterparts, leading one analyst to note that, ‘Psychologically, it has been important for the Turks that they be able to protect their brethren in Cyprus’ (Bahcheli, 1992, p. 63). Once the British administration was established in 1878 and its various unpopular policies forced upon the people of the island, the nationalist ‘enosis’ movement intensified. This developed first through the elite and then eventually by the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century spreading through various societal channels, movements and institutions (church, education) into a political force fully endorsed and supported by the masses. Enosis was no longer a dream of the political elite in Cyprus but a potential reality for all involved in Cypriot society. It had reached not only those in the towns but also the rural communities, stirring up a fervent affiliation to what was a symbolic ideal. Indeed it has been argued that the British administration’s failure to realise how deeply embedded the idea of enosis was, not only in the minds of Cypriots, but in the institutional infrastructure of the island, actually perpetuated the nationalist tendencies of the Cypriots (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 33). The 1930s saw Greek nationalism through the impact of the ‘Megali Idea’ (reunification with the motherland) take hold in Cyprus, reaching a stage of violence and rioting in 1931 when Government House was attacked and burnt down with the incitement of the Orthodox Church leaders, who were at the forefront of the nationalist movement


(Panteli, 1990, p. 104–6). It was the British who were the enemy, the central constraint and obstacle to enosis. The role of the Church in the enosis movement gained even more credibility after 1931 when the British governor ruled Cyprus without the participation of the local population. This authoritarian rule curbed the official participation of newly emerging social groups, and permitted the church to maintain its dominant role in the incitement and endorsement of Enosis and only Enosis (Markides, 1977, p. 12). Despite trying to curb the movements supporting union with Greece (see below) the British position and policy in this period and up until 1959, served to reinforce and propel the issue of enosis. The Greeks interpreted any movement away from enosis towards cooperation with the colonial regime, as a betrayal of the national cause. Up until the Second World War and beyond then, it can be argued that certain important issues symbolised the problems on the island of Cyprus in the form of Greek nationalism, a divided populous, the Orthodox Church and its power, the strategic importance of the island, the Tribute, and finally the riots of 1931.

1950 to 1974: The domestic, regional and global context To understand the events that were to change the course of Cypriot history in the 1950s, certain important individuals and actors must be mentioned – specifically Archbishop Makarios (Panteli, 1990, pp. 155–7; Noel-Baker, 1985; Ramsbotham, 1986; Markides, 1977) who was to become the leader of Cypriot society in both a spiritual and political sense after 1950 and also George Grivas (Panteli, 1990, pp. 151–5; Xydis, 1973, pp. 69–72) who was to become the leader of EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), and who was to turn the campaign for enosis into a violent and bloody affair with particular animosity aimed at the British administration on the island. On the Turkish Cypriot side Dr Fazil Kutchuk, the chairman of the Cyprus is Turkish Party (created in reaction to the Greek Cypriot calls for self-determination through enosis) and Rauf Denktash, propagated the view that any move towards union with Greece would lead to disastrous consequences for the Turkish Cypriots on the island, leading only to antagonism and war. On another level the 1950s also saw increased involvement by Greece in both her support for the enosis campaign and in an attempt to take the Cyprus problem to the UN. In addition there was also the stubborn refusal of the British to recognise that there was a problem in


Cyprus (Averoff-Tossizza, 1986, p. 22). The US also became more involved both directly and indirectly through NATO (Katritzke and Wagner, 1979, p. 97; Hitchens, 1989) and this decade also saw the reintroduction of Turkey at a more explicit level, which of course was to have certain, now well documented, consequences for the island’s future status. The British approach Between the period 1946 to 1958 various British Governors and with them various constitutional offers passed through Cyprus with the purpose of resolving the issue of the future status of the island. In London, policy towards Cyprus was formulated by three central figures after the war, the most influential being the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. Although Bevin initially favoured the transfer of Cyprus to Greece in return for bases in Cyprus, he eventually came to settle on the belief that Cyprus should remain in British hands. This policy of the non-relinquishment of Cyprus was to characterise the British attitude in the 1950s although, as in the past, the views of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were diametrical rather than consensual on the issue (Panteli, 1984, p. 204). The Foreign Office and Colonial Office were able to agree, however, on the development of Cyprus on political and constitutional lines. The following constituted Britain’s new approach to Cyprus: • • • •

A more liberal regime Economic and social development The return of those exiled in the 1931 riots Reform of laws concerning election of the new Archbishop (Panteli, 1984, p. 208)

The Colonial Office insisted on a clear statement of intent to the effect that Britain would not relinquish control of the island (and thus never agree to enosis). It was this view which was eventually adopted in London and implemented by the Governor on the island, Lord Winster (Thomas Herbert Fletcher), when he proclaimed, ‘The Secretary of State for the Colonies said…that no change in the status of the colony is contemplated. There is no change in that policy….’ (cited in Horton-Kelling, 1990, p. 75). Following this proclamation a new constitution (The Winster constitution) was offered to Cyprus by Britain, which was promptly rejected by the Greek Cypriot population.


Britain’s aim was to maintain ‘sovereignty’ on Cyprus for her own strategic interests, whilst claiming to be working for the best interests of the Cypriot population. The Greek Cypriot population and the Turkish Cypriot reaction to proposals for constitutional reform, however, rested on the movement for enosis. For the Greek Cypriot, any compliance with the colonial regime, which did not involve movement for union with Greece, would be rejected. For the Turkish Cypriots, British rule was preferred to any form of union with Greece, although they did resent the lack of democracy in the country. British policy on Cyprus was the antithesis to what the majority Greek Cypriot population wanted and was only supported by the Turkish Cypriots as a second best solution to re-unification with Greece. The domestic level: reinforcing identities After proposals for a new constitution for Cyprus had been consistently rejected by the Greek Cypriots, attitudes on the island on all sides hardened (including the British). The movement for enosis took a violent turn despite the appointment of a new Governor, Field Marshall Harding. The election of Archbishop Makarios III in 1950 and his personal involvement in the movement for ‘union with Greece’ was to make matters even more difficult for Britain. The Archbishop channelled all his energies into the movement, and organised and mobilised his campaign domestically, regionally and internationally, always aware not to alienate any force, on any side of the political spectrum (Panteli, 1990, p. 156). Domestically, it was Makarios who organised and set up organisations such as the Cyprus Enosis Front (KEM), Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK), and others such as the Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organization (PEON), the Organization of Orthodox Christian Youth (OHEN) and the Cyprus Worker’s Federation (SEK), in order to grasp the national liberation struggle from all groupings. Although these were all right wing organisations he was also aware of the importance of the left and the support of the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL)1 in his campaign, and made sure that official contact was made and maintained throughout. Regionally and internationally Makarios invoked a campaign of awareness, and the initiative and help of Greece was pivotal to the internationalisation of the issue, particularly with regard to the UN, in which the first Cyprus appeal was to be lodged by the Greek government in 1954. Previous to this the involvement of Greece was tentative and balanced. Greece consistently supported and sympathised with the


idea of enosis, whilst simultaneously ensuring that its support did not provoke accusations of bias from western allies. Additionally, it was always made clear that support for a solution came through the human rights of the UN Charter and the right for self-determination (Panteli, 1990, pp. 156–7). The increased movement for enosis, which had been the result of oppressive and divisive British policy primarily and the push for selfdetermination (veiled in the idea of union with Greece), culminated in the rise of the militant organisation EOKA in 1955, which, under the leadership of George Grivas, undertook an armed struggle for the realisation of enosis. The violent activities of EOKA erupted on the night of 31 March 1955, when bombs exploded in the cities of Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol. This armed struggle, although primarily aimed against the British administration, was to have a deeply consequential effect on inter-ethnic relations. On the Turkish Cypriot side there were growing signs that elites were gradually swaying towards separatist tendencies in the 1940s; indeed this was confirmed when such separatist tendencies culminated in the establishment of the extremist Turkish Cyprus Resistance Organisation (TMT), the Turkish Cypriot equivalent to the pro-enosis EOKA movement (Theophylactou, 1995, p. 79; Soysal, 1992, p. 39). The effect of this was fundamental and in the words of one commentator, ‘…managed to bring the entire Turkish Cypriot community under its firm grip and to impose a monolithic singleness of purpose in promoting the objective of ethnic separation and eventual partition’ (Kitromilides, 1977, p. 48). The rise of these irredentist movements brought about a change in attitudes and a hardening of the politics of identification. The ‘Greek’ and the ‘Turk’ were clearly becoming polarised and this was becoming entrenched in the changing socio-political structure of Cyprus in which Britain still served, especially after the severity of the EOKA movement, to employ and introduce policies that reinforced and precipitated ethnic violence rather than harmony. This was especially obvious in the police force where the British set up a body of auxiliary Turkish Cypriot policemen with the consequence of juxtaposing the Turkish and the British as targets of EOKA. This led to violence and ethnic antagonism, which was also intensified by both Greece’s support for enosis and thus the Greek Cypriot community and Turkey’s support for partition and thus the Turkish Cypriot community. Indeed through both the TMT and also through declaration, ‘the Turks advocated partition as a solution for Cyprus’ (Bahcheli, 1992 p. 62).


Regional and global issues: Britain, the UN, Greece and Turkey The years 1955 until 1974 were characterised by conflict, compromise, reconciliation and inter-ethnic violence in Cyprus, as well as an increase in the number of actors involved in trying to negotiate a settlement to the problem (discussed below). The conflict was taken to another level in this period – it was effectively regionalised and internationalised – with both positive and negative consequences. The year 1955 marked an end to, what was up until then, a friendly relationship between Britain and Greece over Cyprus, although relations between the two had deteriorated several years earlier. Britain’s position on Cyprus was clearly stated in September 1953 as follows: ‘The attitude of Her Majesty’s Government, which has been firmly supported by the United States…is that in no time in the foreseeable future can HMG entertain or discuss any Greek proposals for Cyprus. On strategic grounds alone HMG can contemplate no change of sovereignty’ (cited in Horton-Kelling, 1990, p. 129). This view was fully supported and expressed by Henry Hopkinson (Minister of State for Colonies) who in 1954 stated that, ‘there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never be expected to be fully independent…the question of the abrogation of British Sovereignty cannot arise…’(cited in Polyviou, 1975, p. 4). This stance taken by Britain, was also soon to be reflected and reinforced by Sir Anthony Eden, when he insisted in a meeting with Field Marshall Papagos the Greek Premier at the time that, ‘…as far as his government was concerned there was no Cyprus problem at the present nor would there be in the future (Bitsios, 1975: 19). Cyprus had never belonged to Greece…After all, there was a considerable Greek population in Alexandra and New York, but he did not suppose that the Greek government was claiming enosis for them’ (cited in HortonKelling, 1990, p. 129). This rejection by Eden and the refusal to acknowledge that Cyprus had any right to self-determination was more significant than Eden thought. Britain’s insistence to stand firm was becoming counterproductive – the refusal to discuss the issue led to the internationalisation of the problem and the increasing involvement and concern of both the Greek and Turkish governments. The irreconcilable differences between British and Greek opinion on Cyprus led (Greece believing in self-determination through enosis and Britain arguing that


no problem existed) Greece to resort to referring the issue to the UN in 1954. The main goal of Greek policy was to secure the Cyprus issue on the agenda as a ‘request for the application of the principle of selfdetermination to the people of this crown colony’ (Xydis, 1973, p. 64). This referral however, although being passed for debate in the UN, was rejected by the General Assembly in its ninth session on 17 December 1954. It was not until the eleventh session that the Greek request along with a British request entitled Support from Greece for Terrorism in Cyprus was considered as a single item. It was finally adopted in 1957 (Resolution 1013 (XI), although it remained unimplemented by the end of that year, not supported by Britain and Turkey because of the reference to the right for self-determination for the people of Cyprus (Xydis, 1973, pp. 64–5). The referral of the Cyprus issue to the UN then, had several unforeseen consequences and effects. The first was that it would allow Turkey to become involved in the Cyprus issue and stake a claim in the island and its future. The second was that the Cyprus issue although formally defeated, would be unofficially imprinted on the agenda of the UN. By August of 1955, with the internal situation in Cyprus deteriorating, Turkish involvement in the Cyprus problem was formalised through the ill-fated London Conference called by the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, to discuss certain issues pertaining to the region in the eastern Mediterranean, which included Cyprus (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 123). The Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, put forward Britain’s main concerns over Cyprus and emphasised, ‘that sovereignty over the island rested exclusively with the British Crown’ and that this ‘must be recognised from the outset’ (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 130). He also referred to the overall strategic importance of peace and stability in the Mediterranean region and in particular the stability of NATO, which was being threatened by the Cyprus issue and the building confrontation between Greece and Turkey. No Cypriot representatives attended this Conference, Archbishop Makarios calling it ‘a trap destined to complicate the Cyprus problem irremediably’ (Bitsios, 1975, p. 27). According to Macmillan, however, the fact that Cyprus had not achieved internal self-government was not the responsibility of successive British governments. From a British perspective this was entirely the fault of the Cypriots – their argument was that if the Cypriots had achieved self-government they would have attended the Conference. It was made clear that Cyprus was much more than a ‘base’ to Britain and had much wider strategic implications as in the past.


Although Britain, Greece and Turkey found certain areas of broad agreement leading to Macmillan proposing a new constitution for Cyprus, the main bone of contention was the issue of ‘selfdetermination’. Britain insisted that her commitments as a member of NATO and in the Middle East necessitated British sovereignty in Cyprus, and favoured the early introduction of self-government without a time limit for its duration. Greece argued that the value of the bases would be increased, by granting the Cypriots selfdetermination as this would result in a friendly populous. The Greeks approved of the concept of self-government solely as a shortterm interim measure leading to self-determination. Turkey claimed that her security could only be safeguarded by the continuation of British rule in Cyprus, and failing this, by the island’s return to Turkey. Turkey refused to support self-government unless Greece gave up the demand for self-determination. In the words of Crawshaw, ‘[On the issue of self-determination]…Britain proposed that it should be shelved indefinitely. The Greeks argued that it should be granted within a reasonable time period; the Turks that it never applied to Cyprus in view of overriding considerations of geography, strategy and security’ (Crawshaw, 1978, pp. 13–36). The consequence of these stances was that the British, Greek and Turkish representatives met for discussion, with the outcome that it simply reinforced the diverging positions of the three parties involved. The Tripartite Conference in London, far from being constructive, clarified the conflicting thoughts of the three parties involved, leading to the rejection of the Macmillan proposals and increased tension between Greece and Turkey. The tension between these two nations and their conflicting positions, obviously had implications for NATO and thus strategic interest for the US who according to one analyst, ‘actively suggested political division as a solution of what by 1955 had become an inter-allied dispute’ (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 37). Following failed talks between Makarios and the new Governor on the island, Field Marshal Sir John Harding in 1956 concerning the future status of the island, Britain’s attitude changed. They no longer insisted that self-determination did not apply to the island of Cyprus (Xydis, 1973, p. 65) but that ‘Her Majesty’s Government will be ready to review the question of the application of selfdetermination…when the international and strategic situation permits, and provided self-government is working satisfactorily’ (cited in Reddaway, 1986, p. 95). This was hardly a clear statement of when it would consider self-determination, but it did indicate at least a change


in the previous inflexible position of the British administration. It was also to become indicative of the way Britain changed its position on self-determination over the coming years from ‘never’ to ‘maybe’ to ‘eventually’. In Cyprus Grivas reinvigorated the campaign of violence, although not with the blessings of Archbishop Makarios, who was to be exiled to the Seychelles (March 1956). His presence was seen as intolerable and a threat to the security of the island by the Governor, who was soon to impose emergency measures in order to control the increasingly volatile security situation. In Istanbul and Izmir, there were outbreaks of violence, with the Menderes government exploiting the anti-enosis sentiment to the full, to divert attention away from the reality of the domestic problems faced by Turkey at the time (Bahcheli, 1992, p. 64). The Harding-Makarios talks had also provoked reaction from Turkey and Turkish Cypriots who were vehemently opposed to any form of self-determination and would only be willing to discuss self-government on an equal footing with the Greek Cypriots (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 194). Official Turkish statements warned of the consequences of a change in the British position insisting that, ‘Britain must remain firm and strong. We look to her to maintain her position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. If she relinquishes the position she holds, chaos will ensue…’ (Menderes cited by Crawshaw, 1978, p. 195). In Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, was elected as the Greek premier after the death of Papagos in 1955. Although Karamanlis supported the Greek Cypriot quest for self-determination, he was also an irritant to Greco-Cypriot relations in many ways, and seen as playing the Cyprus issue ‘too soft’ for many Greeks. Both the Greek palace and the US had favoured Karamanlis over the more popular Stephanos Stephanopoulos, because of his pursuance of the policy of the national centre. This policy, a concept of the British and Americans, prioritised the interests of Greece over her interests in Cyprus. The result of such a policy was that, ‘The conflict between the national desire for absolute sovereignty and the pragmatic necessity of retaining powerful friends was at the root of the longstanding Greek dilemma over enosis’ (Panteli, 1990, p. 170). In essence, although Greece’s position on the right of self-determination for Cyprus did not change, the relationship between Greece and Britain became more amicable, in particular since Britain had reluctantly changed its tone on the issue and acknowledged the eventual right of Cypriots to self-determination.


British plans for constitution Following the events and increasing violence in 1955–56, several plans emanated from Britain as a solution to the problems in Cyprus, namely the Radcliffe plan, the Foot plan and the second Macmillan plan in 1958. Suffice to say that both the Greek and Turkish side rejected the Radcliffe plan and the Foot plan. In the case of the latter the Greeks believed that in the last analysis this provided for the island’s partition. The reason for this was that James Callaghan, Shadow Cabinet Colonial Secretary at the time, had inferred that, if when the time for self-determination came the Greek Cypriots demanded enosis with Greece, then the Turkish Cypriots would also have the right to ask for union with Turkey. Despite assurances from the British government that it was against such a solution and would do everything to avoid partition, the statement in 1956 by Lennox-Boyd, at Ministerial level (expressing the view that partition would be considered as an option for solution), was imprinted in Greek and Cypriot minds alike. The Turkish government, who were first to see the plan, rejected it outright, and there were Turkish Cypriot demonstrations in Nicosia and Famagusta against what was seen as an entirely pro-Greek policy (Xydis, 1973, pp. 68–69). The Turks were adopting the policy of partition for Cyprus with increasing tenacity above any other suggested solution, and this is something that worried the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, with Archbishop Makarios switching from calls for enosis to calls for Independence for Cyprus in 1957. Of course, as mentioned previously, the policy of the Karamanlis government towards Cyprus meant that this worry had to be handled in a less parochial way than that of which Makarios or Grivas were pursuing. The Greeks decided to urge the US to exert friendly pressure on both Britain and primarily Turkey. The reason for this was to persuade them that ‘partition’ as a solution would never be accepted, and to convey the message that until this was made clear no progress would be made in finding a viable solution. The year 1958 was eventful and saw more clashes between the Greeks and Turks on the island. The Turkish and Turkish Cypriot campaign for partition intensified, and with this an increasing concern by the US and NATO about the possibility of Greece and Turkey going to war following Greece’s withdrawal from NATO forces in Izmir. There was also another effort by Greece to take the campaign for independence for Cyprus to the UN – again without great success. Britain also stepped up the initiative, with the second Macmillan plan, which was presented to Parliament on 19 June 1958. Macmillan had changed


his previous stance on Cyprus and made it clear that Cyprus was now an international problem, not simply a colonial problem. He now suggested that the British, Greek, and Turkish governments should work together to secure a settlement to the Cyprus problem (Panteli, 1990, p. 178). Alongside this, there was a promise of the early end to the emergency on the island, a return of the exiles, and a return to some semblance of normal government. Both the Greek Cypriot side and the Turkish Cypriot side also rejected this plan, although the former made certain compromises. On the Turkish Cypriot side Rauf Denktash, standing in for the absent Fazil Kutchuk, dismissed the plan as simply a precursor to enosis. The Turkish government although willing to participate, would not consider any talks or plan that did not include partition as a solution. On the Greek Cypriot side Makarios rejected the plan as ‘unacceptable’, again because the issue of ‘self-determination’ was seen as a natural right to the Cypriot people, and the plan did not give any definite time period for the conversion from self-government to self-determination. The debate in the House of Commons that followed the Macmillan plan was both cautious and moderate whilst also indicating much scepticism among the opposition ranks as to the utility of such a plan for the future – in particular the issue of ‘self-determination’ for the Cypriots. Most significant though was Macmillan’s summary of the government’s position on the plan, and importantly the statement that failure to reach agreement would lead to the government sticking by the position expressed in December 1956 – namely that partition would be considered as an option for solution. The ultimatum to the Greek Cypriots was clear yet subtle and indirect – either cooperate or face the possibility of partition (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 300). A dialectic of intolerance Meanwhile, the violence in Cyprus continued to take a turn for the worse. It was not until an appeal from the British, Greek and Turkish leaders in July of 1958 that common sense began to prevail and the violence curtailed in favour of compromise. The violence had reached such a stage that at the NATO conference in the autumn of 1958, PaulHenri Spaak, the Secretary-General, held talks with both Greece and Turkey about disbanding the ideas of taksim (division) and enosis respectively, and discussing the possibility of a unitary federal state with shared powers for the two communities of the island (Sonyel, 1997, p. 10).


Although the British efforts for formulating a plan for Cyprus were rejected by both communities and the involved parties, internal events and British pressure, alongside the increasing international effort and pressure, eventually led to the London–Zurich Agreements of 1959, which culminated in the independence of Cyprus under a new constitutional arrangement. The utility of these Agreements, however, was debatable. For many the Agreements could only lead to the institutionalisation of division in Cyprus, rather than a long-term solution to what by 1960 had become a very ‘real’ and worrying Cyprus problem. This was a problem that had become embedded in the mind-sets of the regional governments involved (Britain, Greece and Turkey) and the policies they created, supported and employed. In addition economically, politically and socially, the traditional institutions and movements of social cohesion had been dislocated and destroyed with the consequence that ethnic tensions remained simmering beneath the falsity of independence. Kitromilides captures the full ramifications of the events up to and including independence in arguing that, ‘The dialectic of intolerance was so deeply entrenched in the political culture of independent Cyprus…On the Greek side, the dominant ideological orthodoxy thriving on the absence of a liberal political culture, was ruthless in discrediting as national betrayals, all voices of heretical criticism… On the Turkish side, the extremists, firmly rooted in the leadership of the community…went all the way in using their underground terrorist gangs to achieve the physical liquidation of dissenting critics…. It was precisely this dialectic of intolerance that accompanied the escalation of ethnic conflict, the separation of the communities, the intensification of foreign intervention that nurtured and strengthened the most reactionary elements on both sides and reached in its culmination in the tragedy of 1974. The dialectic of intolerance eventually nurtured the ideologies of national catastrophe’ (Kitromilides, 1979, p. 156). This national catastrophe in both an ideological and structural sense, far from being solved by the constitutional arrangements was, prolonged by them. The events of the next decades were to prove fatal for the unity of the island, and the goal of independence was soon to crumble to insignificant proportions following the invasion and partition of 40 per cent of the island in 1974. Cyprus: Post-independence and periods of crisis Following the Agreement between the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey in consultation with Britain in 1959,


the British finally agreed to cede sovereignty over Cyprus with one proviso – that bases could be kept there under British sovereignty. The Zurich and London Agreements led to three associated treaties, which were signed by Greece, Britain, Turkey and the representatives of the two Cypriot communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Kutchuk. These were briefly: • The Treaty of Establishment • The Treaty of Alliance • The Treaty of Guarantee Each of these treaties provided for the safeguards and interests of all the signatories – the most important and controversial being the latter of the three in which, as well as excluding any form of partition or enosis, provided for a guarantee from Britain, Greece and Turkey for the continuation and maintenance of the constitution and the independence and territorial integrity of the island (Polyviou, 1980, p. 15). After independence the British role in Cyprus changed quite distinctly. Although Britain had a responsibility in maintaining the status of the island as agreed in the London–Zurich agreements, there was no longer any direct control of the affairs of the island. The postindependence era also saw increased involvement from the US and the Soviet Union over Cyprus, and in the words of Joseph ‘the transformation of Cyprus in to a Cold War dispute led to a sharp confrontation between Washington and Moscow…’ (Joseph, 1997, p. 78). The source of this interest in the Cyprus issue from the US and the Soviet Union came from their preoccupation with considerations emanating from their global political, military, economic and ideological objectives and responsibilities, not because of any direct involvement in the affairs of the island. The US was driven by its containment doctrine, and the British government was sought as a cooperative partner in implementing US policies. The Soviet goal was simply to undermine Western interests, and counteract US goals and policies; the Cyprus issue provided an ideal opportunity for the maximum disruption of NATO and the promotion of a pro-Soviet independent Cyprus. Whatever the aims of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union in Cyprus, they were unable to prevent the crisis that escalated in 1963 – a crisis that was a direct consequence of the diametrically opposed demands of the two communities and the inadequacies of the constitution to deliver these. The process which led to the crisis began in 1961 when two issues, the rejection of the budget by the Turkish Cypriots


and President Makarios’ rejection of the idea of separate municipalities (or extension of the law to allow further separation) were referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Both issues were rejected as illegal by the Court which was presided over by neutral Presidents; it was their function to maintain the balance between the Greek and Turkish members of the courts (Crawshaw, 1986, pp. 1–2). There were three fundamental points of the constitution in which there was disagreement: the Municipalities; administrative appointments; and the separation of the army at company level (Bitsios, 1975, p. 115). These issues were to have major implications for the manifestation of division on the island of Cyprus. Indeed by 1963 the disagreements between the two communities and the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court left Cyprus without an income tax law, municipalities law and customs law and the two communities seemed to be heading for confrontation. This gradual deterioration in relations between the two communities was enough to concern both the British and Americans. The US was concerned from a NATO perspective, and the potential for conflict between Greece and Turkey. Britain was concerned from the perspective of protecting their bases on the island. Although Britain conveyed itself as an honest broker attempting to solve the constitutional conflict between the two communities, its real interest was in keeping the issues localised, so as not to provide an excuse for either Greece or Turkey to intervene. If this were to occur it would mean a greater involvement for Britain as a joint guarantor power which Britain wished to avoid (Sonyel, 1997, p. 34). The obstacles that had developed in the functioning of state and society seemed insurmountable near the end of 1963, and for Archbishop Makarios amendments had to be made in order for the rigidities of the constitution to be addressed. In the words of Polyviou, ‘There was no room in the 1960 constitutional framework for living law to develop and no room, in the communally infested arrangements set up for the notion of a responsible citizenship totally independent of ethnic origin to assert itself’ (Polyviou, 1975, pp. 38–9). Thus on 30 November 1963, President Makarios, put forward his thirteen-point plan, which aimed at changing the constitution. Predictably the interpretation of these proposals that were given initially to Fazil Kutchuk, but also to the three guarantor powers (for information purposes only), were politically irreconcilable with the views of the involved parties – namely the Greeks and Turks. While the Greek interpretations emphasised that these proposals were aimed at unifying


the structure of the ‘Cypriot State’ and had no intention of provocation, the Turkish Cypriot leadership argued that these proposals ‘would remove the bulk of Turkish-Cypriot communal rights and make enosis ultimately possible’ (Bahcheli, 1992, p. 65). The consequence of course was the rejection of the amendments by the Turkish Cypriots and the deterioration of inter-ethnic relations, culminating in inter-communal violence in December 1963. Turkey in the meanwhile threatened invasion and partition of the island if the proposals were forced upon the Turkish Cypriot population. After Makarios had unilaterally acted to condemn the treaties in 1963, he was eventually persuaded that his actions could have disastrous consequences for Cyprus and in particular he was told that Britain would not be prepared to intervene against Turkey if they decided to invade Cyprus. The Archbishop retracted his abrogation of the treaties after he had realised that he had put himself in a rather precarious position with no way out (Sonyel, 1997, pp. 45–61). The US, NATO and the Soviet Union On the island, the inter-communal violence in December 1963 saw Britain supported by Turkey, appeal to the UN Security Council, which led to the introduction of the United Nations Peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This became functional in 27 March 1964 (see Box 2.1), but despite the involvement of the UN in Cyprus the fighting continued between the two communities and the threats continued from Turkey, although now there was a new regional and global dimension. In Greece the change of government from Karamanlis to Papandreou, witnessed a hardened attitude in dealing with Turkish threats towards Cyprus (Averoff-Tossizza, 1986; Theophylactou, 1995, pp. 84–5). This of course led to heightened tension between Turkey and Greece, both members of NATO, and had fundamental strategic implications for the US, particularly with the threat of involvement and intervention by the Soviet Union. This period as is noted by Laipson would begin, ‘the era in which Cypriots perceived great American strategic designs on their vulnerable island’ (Laipson, 1992, p. 91). This greater interest in Cyprus by the US was reflected in a letter to Prime Minister Inonu in 1964 from President Johnson, warning that NATO would not feel obliged to help if Turkish intervention in Cyprus led to a Soviet response. It was also manifested in several American initiated plans. The most controversial of these plans was the Acheson plan. The two central principles of the plan were based on the fear of

The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context 47 Box 2.1

Resolution 186: The creation of the UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1102th meeting on 4 March 1964 The Security Council, Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution, Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960, Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.’ 1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace; 2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus; 3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint; 4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation; 5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions; 6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for the purpose;


7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavors with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts; 8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff. Adopted unanimously at the 1102nd meeting.

communism given President Makarios’ collaboration with the Soviets, his involvement with Egypt’s Nasser and, fundamentally, on averting a potentially disastrous scenario between Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies. Thus Cyprus was used to appease both parties with the plan no more than a suggestion of what has been labelled double enosis – the ceding of the island to Greece with concessions to Turkey vis-à-vis bases and cantonisation – creating two clear and separate structures. Makarios rejected the plan and the political division that was now starkly obvious was reinforced by several developments in the period 1964–67. The first was a gradual movement by Makarios away from the idea of enosis to independence and non-alignment for Cyprus – a policy that was diametrically opposed to that of Athens and Papandreou. This policy was also supported by the largest political organisation on the island, the communist party AKEL, which had the effective backing at that time of one third of the islands electorate and was given its rooting in communist ideology fundamentally opposed to enosis (Joseph, 1985, p. 93). Secondly, the return of Grivas to Cyprus in 1964 – led to violence and chaos until the call for a cease-fire by the Security Council was finally adhered to in the summer of the same year. There were also changes and developments at the administrative and politico-economic level that were to prove detrimental to the two communities ever creating a cooperative living structure rather than one of conflict, division and violence. This was partly due to the leaders of the two communities but also to the interference of regional actors in the internal affairs of the island. In analysing the consequences of the period 1964–67 Attalides notes that, ‘the most important element was


the vertical extension of separation to the mass of Greek and Turkish Cypriots’ (Attalides, 1977, p. 83). Indeed Coufoudakis outlines certain fundamental changes that require attention in relation to the situation that was developing in Cyprus in relation to the increasing separation of the two communities (Coufoudakis, 1976, pp. 40–41). Administratively, the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot actors from the government of Cyprus, served to challenge the legitimate ‘governance’ of the island and reinforce the gradual partition of the two communities. The Turkish Cypriots continued to control the Turkish Cypriot areas even though the international and internal affairs were still run by the Greek Cypriots. This led to administrative separation not only on political lines but also and gradually on economic lines, as the Turkish Cypriots were becoming more and more reliant on Turkish aid and support following a period of embargo imposed on the Turkish Cypriot areas by the Greeks (Attalides, 1977, pp. 84–90; Bahcheli, 1992, pp. 67–8). The second important change was territorial. Given the violence on the island following the 1963 crisis, both the British and UN forces in Cyprus, ‘created protected areas for the Turkish Cypriots’ (Coufoudakis, 1976, p. 41). It also meant that separate Turkish Cypriot enclaves were established in certain areas in the north of Cyprus, which although limiting the violence served to establish a status quo that was to become permanent after the invasion of 1974. Lastly, and importantly, the divisions on all of these levels, administrative, politico-economic and social, were emphasised and reinforced by separate military build-up and training on the island that led to the observation that, ‘The island was in the throes of becoming a huge arsenal’ (Crawshaw, 1978, p. 371). In 1965 there was a failed attempt to find a political solution through the report of Dr Galo Plaza, the new UN Mediator, who believed in an independent and unified Cyprus through the protection of both majority and minority rights and demilitarisation of the island. The reaction from the Greek and Greek Cypriot side to the proposals in the report was, in the main, positive. However, this was to prove inconsequential, as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots had rejected the proposals on two premises. First, that the UN mediator had exceeded his terms of reference and secondly, the idea that a minority rights charter would secure their interests was not acceptable to them. 1967 – The Greek dictatorship – A second crisis Just as in the past, under differing historical contexts, the above factors contributed to the separation and identification of the two communities


with differing visions and loyalties – it also had fatal consequences for the prospects of a unified Cypriot society. This was compounded by events in Greece in 1967 that propelled Cyprus not towards a positive solution, but towards the permanent partition of the island. Two factors were prominent in the crisis of 1967 that again challenged the stability of Cyprus through the threat of Turkish invasion in 1967. The first of these was the coup’ d etat in Greece which saw the overthrow of the Athens government, to be replaced by the right-wing colonels who sought to impose its policy of enosis with Cyprus by which ever means it sought possible. This policy did not exclude violence towards Greek-Cypriots and their leader Archbishop Makarios of whom several attempts were made to take his life. The second and intimately linked factor was that of the military build up and make-up of the various illegal forces circulating in Cyprus – propagating the right wing ideological view of Athens. The Cyprus National Guard, which was made up of Greek Officers from the mainland and the cream of the EOKA extremists, was to play a crucial role under the leadership of Grivas in undermining the authority of Makarios, through portraying him as a communist and a traitor to the real cause – union with Greece. These factors were important in the context of the 1967 crisis, as it was just after the colonels came to power that an incident in the Turkish Cypriot Kophinou enclave of the island brought about by the Cypriot National Guard, provoked and almost brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war (Crawshaw, 1986, pp. 6–7). This was averted at the very last moment by US intervention, but only with certain preconditions stipulated by the Turkish government. These pre-conditions included the disbanding of the National Guard, the departure of Grivas, and the withdrawal of both Greek and Turkish troops in excess of the legal quota (Theophylactou, 1995, p. 87; Crawshaw, 1978, p. 378) (although the latter two were adhered to with the withdrawal of over ten thousand Greek troops the National Guard was left intact). From the period 1963–67 the Turkish Cypriots were subject to attacks2 (as were Greek Cypriots) and this served to convince the Turkish Cypriot community that partition of the two communities was the only solution to secure them the rights they deserved on the island. The establishment of the Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (PTCA) by the Turkish leadership under the control of Turkey confirmed this view. This also, however, convinced the Greek Cypriots that the aims of Turkey were far more than simply restoring the 1960 constitution; they saw it as another step towards permanent division (Crawshaw, 1986, p. 6).


The threats of the Turkish government and the actions of the Greek dictatorship alongside the ideologically and strategically driven interests of the Western powers who had an inherent distrust of Makarios and his policy of non-alignment, certainly limited the options open to the government at the time (or separate administrations). In the colonial phase of development, Britain was the main force of influence and constraint. Through the 1960 agreements there had been an institutionalisation of not just British interest in the domestic affairs of the island but also of Greece and Turkey. The Americans, for which up until then Cyprus had not been ‘a pivotal country in the East-West struggle’ (Laipson, 1992, p. 91), replaced Britain as the central actor in the dispute (directly and indirectly) once it became apparent that the Soviet threat was very real and potentially damaging to US interests in the region. By 1968 and after the incidents at Kophinou in which Makarios had little or no control, he announced that it was necessary to seek a solution, ‘within the limits of what is feasible which does not always coincide with what is desirable’ (cited in Crawshaw, 1986, p. 7). With this, talks were set up between the two sides under the auspices of the UN and it seemed that progress at last was being made in the reconstruction of the Cypriot state and the reconciling of the wants and needs of the communities within a restructured constitution. This progress however, was somewhat nullified by the actions of the Greek junta, who adopted terrorist tactics to both pressurise Makarios and to fulfil the aim of enosis. This led to violence against Greek Cypriots and also attempts on the life of Makarios in 1970, of which the National Front disclaimed all responsibility. Pressure against Makarios was also building internally, not from the people who re-elected him for his third term in office in 1973, but from the three Cypriot Bishops who still advocated a pro-enosis stance. The negotiations that looked so promising up until 1974 were adjourned, and with them any prospect of an integrated Cyprus.

1974 –The invasion of Cyprus The relationship between Makarios and the military dictatorship in Athens, tenuous as it was, deteriorated further in the months preceding the coup, which took place on 15 July 1974. It was then that the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Army officers that had infiltrated and controlled the Cypriot government since 1964 looked to overthrow it. By the 20 July 1974, after the replacement of Makarios by


a ‘puppet’ government under the leadership of Nicos Sampson (the government was restored soon afterwards), Turkey had invaded Cyprus. The plan for the partition of the island along the ‘Attila line’ had been activated to be finally executed in August of the same year, after negotiations in Geneva between the concerned guarantor parties (Britain, Greece, Cyprus) and the leaders of the Cypriot communities had broken down. Although there was global condemnation of the invasion from both international organisations and individual countries and an attempt to immediately resolve the issue through talks in Geneva (on the 22 and 30 July 1974), Turkey, ignored all. It was argued that the coup had given them the legal excuse to intervene and restore the constitution. No explanation however, was given for its continued invasion and eventual division of the island, especially given the fact that constitutional government was restored almost immediately and the Greek junta in Greece forced to resign. The consequences of the invasion and partition are well documented and had catastrophic implications socially, politically, and economically for the island in the aftermath of partition (Panteli, 1990, pp. 230–266; http://www.kypros.org). Turkey had invaded and occupied nearly 40 per cent of the island (North) that was to be inhabited by the Turkish Cypriots, with the southern side of the island becoming the home of the Greek Cypriots. This status quo situation has remained anathema to those that have sought to seek out a solution to the problem. Economically and politically the Greek Cypriots were able to recover much faster and with spectacular results compared to the Turkish Cypriots (Cuco, 1992). Within a few years the Greek-Cypriot sector had adapted itself structurally to the situation with the result that the problem of the refugees, employment and the building of new enterprises and business sectors was successfully operationalised. For the Turkish Cypriots in the North certain factors, both internal and external, contributed to economic stagnation in terms of the development of the occupied area, which remains under-resourced and far below its growth potential. The first of these factors (external) was the reliance on mainland Turkey for resources and the attempts to integrate northern Cyprus with the Turkish economy. Internally the Turkish Cypriots lacked both the expertise and experience to take advantage of the rich resources that had involuntarily been left behind. Also, through partition and illegal occupation, they had cut themselves off from trading relations


and markets that would otherwise have been available; an economic boycott and blockade was instituted after Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. Overall, these two factors combined with the displacing of many authentic Turkish Cypriots with mainland settlers, has meant that standards of living and economic growth after the invasion and today lag behind those in the south. Internationally, since the invasion, there have been many efforts and initiatives largely under the auspices of the UN to find a viable, longterm and peaceful solution to the conflict in Cyprus.3 The de facto partition of the island metamorphasised the nature of negotiations on all levels; negotiations focussed on agreeing a durable and workable structure within a federal framework to re-unite all Cypriots (Salem, 1992, p. 123; Crawshaw, 1986, pp. 11–16).

After 1974: Cyprus and ‘political action’ in the EC The reaction of the nine members states of the EC to the events in Cyprus in 1974 proved a crucial test for the relatively new tool of EPC. However, it was a test that ultimately the European Economic Community (EEC) would fail for several reasons. The first was the fact that the two permanent members of the UN Security Council, the British and the French, the latter holding the Presidency of EPC at the time, took the lead in the matter. As a consequence of this the condemnation, action and reaction of the nine member states was to follow established UN resolutions on Cyprus, rather than an independently formulated position. As is noted by Nuttall, ‘The French Presidency of EPC took immediate and forceful action to co-ordinate the action of the nine’, pointing out that, ‘the policy lead was given by the United Kingdom, happy to secure multilateral support for its efforts in dealing with an intractable problem’ (Nuttall, 1992, p. 119). The second and interrelated problem was that the actions of the member states to the Cyprus issue were based entirely on Britain’s initiatives. Britain was active both bilaterally as guarantor power and as permanent members of the Security Council: with the Security Council having already condemned the Turkish action in Cyprus. EPC however, was perceived as another forum in which Britain could try and pressurise the relevant parties to come to a solution on the Cyprus problem – the framework had already been established at the UN. By securing the support of the nine, who issued several démarches and communiqués based on the British initiative and on Security Council


resolution 353, the British had been able to exert additional diplomatic force on the issue, which it welcomed. There was a major flaw in the strategy adopted by the member states in EPC however. Taking the British initiative to convene talks in Geneva between the three guarantor powers meant that if that particularly initiative failed, then the basis of their action would be lost. The events that followed confirmed this view. Shortly after the coup in Cyprus, the Colonels were forced to withdraw and democratic government was restored in Greece. They immediately sought membership of the EC, which was perceived as a good idea by the member states at the time (although not the Commission). This was not the perception of Turkey however; and the credibility of the EC as an impartial interlocutor was substantially reduced. When the Geneva talks collapsed, the legitimacy of the nine was also lost as independent participators in trying to resolve the dispute (Nuttall, 1992, p. 121). This has been the case ever since, and the EU has had to follow and adopt the resolutions of the UN and support the efforts of the UN Secretary General on Cyprus, rather than being able to pursue any independent policy formulated by the member states.

The United Nations: Efforts to find a solution after 1974 Many talks and initiatives have taken place since 1974 under UN auspices, of which the 1977 and 1979 high level agreements between Archbishop Makarios and Rauf Denktash, and President Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash respectively, the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’ (See Box 2.2), and the Annan plan in 2002, form the linchpin of a settlement to the Cyprus problem. The 1977 and 1979 High Level agreements provided the basic guidelines for a solution, and were particularly important, according to Joseph (1999, p. 6) because, ‘for the first time, the two communities agreed to seek a settlement on the basis of a bizonal bicommunal federal Republic’. The Agreement reached on the 12 February 1977 between Makarios and Denktash established the following principles for a solution: • Establishment of a bicommunal Federal Republic • The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership • Questions of principle, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open

The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context 55 Box 2.2

United Nations – Overall objectives of the 1992 ‘Set of Ideas’

1. The overall framework agreement is an integrated whole which, when it is approved by both communities in separate referendums and the provisions contained in the transitional arrangements have been implemented, will result in a new partnership and a new constitution for Cyprus that will govern the relations of the two communities on a federal basis that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards the territorial aspects. The overall framework agreement is based on the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolutions 367 (1975), 649 (1990), 716 (1991) and 750 (1992), and the guiding principles set out below. 2. The overall framework agreement recognises that Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community and that their relationship is not one of majority and minority but one of two communities in the federal republic of Cyprus. It safeguards the cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identity of each community. 3. The overall framework agreement ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Secretary General’s report of 3 April 1992 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. 4. The overall framework agreement acknowledges and ensures the political equality of the two communities. While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all branches and administration of the federal government, it will be reflected in the fact that the approval and amendment of the federal constitution will require the approval of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated states. 5. The overall framework agreement provides for functions and powers of the federal government, including its structure, composition and functioning of its three branches, that will ensure the effective participation of the two communities and the effective functioning of the federal government, which will require an appropriate deadlock-resolving machinery. 6. The two communities acknowledge each other’s identity and integrity, and commit themselves to work actively to achieve a new relationship based on mutual respect, friendship and cooperation. Toward this end, the two communities agree to change all practices incompatible with this commitment and to refrain from any action which would impair the efforts for a negotiated settlement. They pledge to launch immediately a programme of action to promote goodwill and closer relations between them. Source: http://www.yenicag-net.com/kitap/belgeler/ghali.htm


for discussion, taking under consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community. • The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bicommunal character of the State. The 1979 High Level Agreement, upheld the same central principles, but expanded on key issues by including respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens, the demilitarisation of the island and adequate guarantees for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The efforts deployed by the UN Secretary-General (and his Special Representative) on Cyprus, have not been unilateral over the years – but have been supported on a bilateral level by Special Representatives appointed respectively by the US, the Britain, Germany, Sweden, Finland, France, Canada, Australia and Russia. Several EU Presidencies have also appointed a Special Representative to Cyprus (the last of which was Sir David Hannay), as well as a European ‘observer’ in 1994 (Serge Abou), to report on the implications of political developments in Cyprus. Despite the efforts of the UN, with the personal involvement of the Secretary General at various stages4 a resolution to the Cyprus problem still remains an elusive objective. The fault for this failure, however, does not lie with the UN, even though it has been at the forefront of all efforts – indeed as Joseph notes, ‘blaming the UN for failure on Cyprus is an unfair simplification…’ as ‘the UN has no power of its own and cannot do anything that countries are not willing or determined to do’ (Joseph, 1999, p. 5). Moreover, UN efforts have been stifled by the lack of any political will on the part of important actors in the dispute internationally, and saliently within Cyprus, to find a solution. Indeed attitudes on the island were less than constructive despite many UN efforts and rounds of talks to resolve the issue in the 1980s and 1990s. In May 1993 for example, just prior to the publication of the Commission’s opinion on Cyprus, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali met President Clerides and Rauf Denktash to call for the resumption of talks between the two communities based on the proposed 1992 ‘set of ideas’ in order to resolve the dispute. Despite all the efforts undertaken by the UN Secretary General however, and notwithstanding an initial encouraging attitude by President Clerides, both leaders finally rejected all the proposals.5


In one of the Secretary General’s reports to the UN Security Council in 1994, it was pointed out that it would be unlikely that the situation on Cyprus would change, and solution found on an agreed basis as there was clearly a ‘ lack of political will for such change’ (UN 1994, para. 52). Furthermore the UN Secretary General specifically pinpointed the ‘lack of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side’ (UN 1994, para. 52). The Turkish Cypriot leadership was clearly, in the eyes of the UN, not playing a constructive role in trying to bridge the divide between the two communities on the island – and thus contributed significantly to the continuation of the status quo situation on the island. Subsequent talks, despite all the UN’s efforts to bring the two sides closer, backed by the members of the Security Council, saw no substantial progress on reaching a solution to the island’s problem, even with the addition of the EU as another actor and potential force for change on the island. Talks were held under UN auspices between the leaders of the two communities in Troutbeck (New York) in July 1997, and in Glion-sur-Montreux in August 1997, but both failed to live up to expectations. Once again the necessary political will for change was not forthcoming. After the failed talks in 1997, the leaders of the two were not able to agree to a renewing of the dialogue to find an equitable political solution to the problem. On 31 August 1998 the Turkish Cypriot leader, despite the High Level Agreement establishing the principles for a solution, proposed a ‘confederal’ solution to resolve the longstanding conflict, with the prior acknowledgement or recognition of two equal states. The proposed confederation would be a ‘partnership settlement’ that would also entrench the special relationship between Greek Cypriots and Greece and between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey; it would also include Cyprus’ accession to the EU. The proposal by Denktash was primarily driven by Ankara (Ugur, 2000, p. 236), but the change in policy was also influenced by the EU’s acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate country and the beginning of accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus, without Turkish Cypriot representation – and parallel developments in Turkey–EU relations (see Chapter 5). This approach however, clearly contravened the longstanding UN position on the island, a position agreed by Denktash himself in the High Level agreements for a solution based on bizonal, bicommunal federation, with a single sovereign identity. The proposal by Denktash then, was unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots (who saw this as another sign of Turkish Cypriot intransigence)


and the international community – and his initiative certainly did not change the UN’s approach. Indeed following separate talks in New York with the leaders of the two communities (1999–2000), the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, asked his representative in Cyprus, Dame Ann Hercus, to make every effort to bring the two sides closer with a view to establishing a bi-communal, bizonal federation on the island. Direct talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem restarted in 2002 (with Alvaro De Soto taking over the role as Special Representative), in large part due to the pressure created for a solution by the EU enlargement process (and subsequent international pressure emanating from this from the US and UK). Talks resumed between the leaders of the two communities with the emphasis that a solution must be sought within the UN framework, on the basis of the UN Resolutions on Cyprus and of the High-Level agreements, which provide for a demilitarised, federal state with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship, with respect of the fundamental freedoms and human rights of all citizens. Given the renewal of the talks between the leaders of the two communities, and the momentum created by the EU enlargement process, the UN Secretary General became personally involved in the efforts to resolve the dispute on the island. Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive settlement plan (see Appendix A.1) on the 11 November 2002 to the then leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Glafkos Clerides (replaced by Tassos Papadopoulos after Presidential elections in February 2003) and Rauf Denktash, and to the guarantor states of Greece, Britain and Turkey. The hope was that a settlement could be reached before the decision to enlarge the EU to include Cyprus at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. The date was then extended several times, and the Annan plan amended in the light of comments from both sides – with great optimism that the ‘Annan plan’ could be a basis for negotiating a settlement. However such optimism was to be short-lived after a final meeting at The Hague in March 2003 in order to secure solution based on the Annan plan resulted in failure, with the UN Secretary General concluding that ‘we have reached the end of the road,’ adding that it would clearly not be possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement before Cyprus signed Accession Treaty to join the EU on 16 April 2003. Although the Annan plan still remained on the table as a basis for a long lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem, the UN Secretary General subsequently ‘washed his hands’ of becoming directly involved in mediating negotiations unless serious ‘political will’ to find a solution was demonstrated on both sides.


Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with an idea of the complexity of the Cyprus issue – how it evolved, who the key actors were in provoking the division on the island, and those involved in trying to resolve the problem. What it has shown is that the Cyprus issue must be understood in its historical context – as a multi level and multi actor problem. Moreover what this chapter has highlighted is that the perceptions of the actors involved in negotiating the dispute in Cyprus are a direct consequence of the way in which the dispute on the island developed – first at local level (the British Colonial regime, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots), then at regional level (Greece and Turkey) and eventually with the involvement of third countries (US, Soviet Union) and international organisations such as NATO, and in particular the UN, who has been heavily involved since 1964. The EC, historically, was not an important actor in Cyprus – indeed its relationship with Cyprus was strictly economic – and began formally in 1972 in the form of an Association Agreement (see Chapter 3). However, when it did attempt to intervene after 1974, the EC was disadvantaged by the fact that it pursued a purely British line on the issue. Because of this it lost any legitimacy it might have had in the eyes of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to act as a neutral interlocutor in the dispute – in particular when Greece was accepted as a candidate country when democratic government was restored in 1974. Added to this of course, was the EC’s lack of power and instruments to act beyond declaratory diplomacy under the relatively young EPC mechanism. The UN has been the primary organisation responsible for the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem since 1974, and despite the failure of the UN to mediate a solution on the island it has been the dominant interlocutor because of its perceived neutrality by all parties. The efforts of the UN were clearly complicated by the lack of political will on the island and regionally (e.g. Turkey, Greece) – and the UN clearly did not have the instruments or ability (leverage) to be able to influence or ‘change minds’, and move towards a long lasting solution to the division on the island. The history of the dispute then is critical, as it helps us to understand the dynamics of the negotiations, and the mediators involved in pursuing a solution to the Cyprus issue. Moreover, it facilitates an understanding of the EU’s role in Cyprus in the 1990s – the embedded


constraints it faced in changing minds in Cyprus and the opportunities it could offer for catalysing a solution to the longstanding problem, over and above the efforts of the UN – but critically, in parallel to the UN process.

3 The European Union and Cyprus

Introduction The previous chapter provided an overview of the historical origin of the Cyprus issue – and outlined the first political efforts of the EC, through European Political Cooperation (EPC), to address the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, which ultimately failed because of a perceived bias towards the Greek position. The EC–Cyprus relationship however, actually began before this time, in the form of an Association Agreement signed in 1972, and up until the 1990s the relationship was predominantly economic. It was only after the Commission’s favourable opinion (1993) on the application of the Republic of Cyprus to join the European Union (EU) that the relationship effectively became ‘politicised’ – and the EU’s relationship with Cyprus took on a new complexity – that of addressing the implications of enlargement to Cyprus if a solution to the island’s problem was not found. The Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue in the 1990s forced the EU to become involved once again, as another international actor aiming to catalyse a solution to the Cyprus problem through the accession process. Indeed since the positive Opinion on Cyprus’ application to join the EU in 1993 the EU institutions have reiterated the view that the accession process could act as a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus issue. The EU has consistently argued that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could benefit from the accession process if a solution was found before Cypriot’s entry to the EU family. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999 the EU confirmed Turkey’s eligibility to join, in the expectation being that this would aid the drive to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. Turkey had been waiting for confirmation of its eligibility since it first applied in 1963 – and had 61


been denied such status in several Commission Opinions and Reports (1990, 1997) and European Council decisions (for example at the Luxemburg Summit 1997), which had a detrimental effect on the Cyprus issue (whether justified or not). The EU clearly believed that by linking the Turkish accession process with progress on the resolution of the Cyprus issue, they could bring pressure to bear on Ankara. Following both the Helsinki (1999) and Copenhagen (2002) European Councils, regular statements and declarations have reflected the EU’s optimism that the power of attraction (for Cyprus and Turkey) would act as a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. At the Copenhagen European summit (2002) the member states of the EU agreed to review the Turkish application as early as December 2004. The EU clearly indicated that this decision and the timing for reviewing Turkish progress was important in order to maintain the most powerful leverage on Turkey in moving towards a Cyprus settlement. Since Copenhagen, the European Commission has also made certain concessions in order to encourage Turkey – one Commission official hinting that ‘the criteria would be assessed at different levels and that if all political criteria are met then the economic criteria would not be an obstacle for opening negotiations’ (http://www.euoberver.com/index.phtml?aid=9087). Given this context the question this chapter aims to address is that of why EU policy-makers believe that enlargement towards Cyprus (and Turkey) would act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus issue. In order to fulfil the aim this chapter will first, provide a historical overview of the evolution of EC/EU policy towards Cyprus. Second, it will outline the thoughts and expectations of EU policy-makers with regard to the EU policy on Cyprus in the post-1990 period. On a more specific level it will chart the nature of the relationship between the EC and Cyprus from the 1972 Association Agreement until Cyprus’ application to join the EC in 1990. It will then outline the developments in EU–Cyprus relations after the acceptance of Cyprus as an enlargement candidate in 1993. Throughout the chapter there will be a continuous evaluation as to whether there is in fact an EU ‘strategy’ (implicit or explicit) behind the idea that the accession process will act as a catalyst for the solution of the Cyprus issue.

A context: Europe and Cyprus: an economic relationship – 1973–1990 The relationship between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Cyprus, in the form of an Association Agreement signed in 1972,

The European Union and Cyprus 63

was an economically motivated one with only implicit political connotations attached. From the EEC perspective it made sense to draw Cyprus into the European club and make it economically interdependent. The reason for this however, was more strategic than economic from a European point of view. It had little to gain economically from Cyprus at that time, but the importance of attaining political stability in the region and the strategic importance of Cyprus as a bridge to the Middle East overrode any economic argument (Gaudissart, 1996, p. 11). The aims and interests of the EC have been longstanding and have not changed substantially since then. The Commission has succinctly noted these interests: …The stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean region are essential to the stability and prosperity of the Community. In a wider sense, the security of the community is at stake (local or regional conflicts, political instability, and terrorism) (cited in Redmond, 1992, p. 2) There was no uniform agreement in Cyprus between the political parties or between the two communities as to the benefits of EC association. There was also internal argument over with whom the EC should be negotiating, as the constitution by this time had effectively collapsed. The EC however, following UN resolutions, chose to negotiate with the recognised Cypriot government (Greek Cypriots), although it did manage to avoid positioning itself on either side, with EC Commissioner Christopher Soames stating clearly that the agreement would be to the benefit of the whole population on the island (Redmond, 1993, p. 66). The policy of neutrality towards each community on the island was a stance that would become prominent in the EU’s strategy and thinking towards Cyprus in the future. From association agreement to customs union The EEC–Cyprus agreement1 was divided into two parts, one covering the trade aspects and the other covering the general and final provisions. This latter part, containing institutional provisions, was to be implemented and monitored by the European Parliament, an Association Committee and an Association Council that included members of the Commission, the EC Council and members of the government of Cyprus. There were also provisions for inter-Parliamentary contact (EP to Cyprus House of Representatives) as well as for the trade aspects and concessions that were necessary (Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC, 1982, p. 4). How far the EU concessions to


Cyprus within the agreement actually helped Cyprus economically and politically is debatable. The Agreement made no reference whatsoever to potential membership, even though this was the case with Greece and Turkey and as Redmond notes about the economic concessions they ‘were more apparent than real (Redmond, 1993, p. 67). Whatever the inadequacies of the Association Agreement between the EEC and Cyprus at the time, it did provide for the establishment of a Customs Union in two stages. The first stage provided for the phased reduction of tariffs on industrial goods and agricultural products. This stage was interrupted by the 1974 invasion2 and was extended to 1987 by which time all criteria were met and all aims achieved. The interruption that the invasion brought with it did, however, result in a cautious and neutral approach by the member states in continuing to the next stage of the agreement. This impediment took two forms, economic and political. The economic aspect culminated directly from the economic and social destruction that the invasion had brought (http:// hri.org/Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html), which led to the EEC and even Cyprus covertly admitting that proceeding to the next stage would not be a viable or sensible step (Tsardanidis, 1984, p. 359). There was also the fact that some member states did not want further association as they produced goods, which were in direct competition with Cypriot products. The political aspect stemmed from the fact that the member states wanted to remain neutral in the eyes of the parties involved in the dispute, namely Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. What happened in effect was that the first stage was extended through Additional Protocol Agreements, a method that would be used repeatedly until 1985,3 when a mandate was issued to the Commission for negotiations with Cyprus on the second stage of the Agreement. The Protocols and the financial assistance that came with them were to be used in the period 1976 to 1988 in order to enhance training and technology, industry and the infrastructure and for other economic and social developments in the Cypriot economy, for the benefit of all Cypriots (Cyprus–EC Relations 1989: 4). A third Financial Protocol, worth ECU 62 million was signed in 1989, to develop projects in Cypriot industry and to help the Cypriot economy adjust to the changing competitive structure brought about by the EC–Cyprus Customs Union Agreement (Meale and Erotokritos, 1998). The role of Greece, which acceded to the Community in 1981, along with the euphoria of completing the Single European Act (SEA) (with a revision of policy towards Mediterranean countries) was to be decisive in this phase of EC–Cyprus relations (Gaudissart ,1996: 15). The con-


sent and support of Greece within the EC institutional structure for a Mediterranean policy which gave a mandate for negotiating a Customs Union agreement with Cyprus (Interview MEP, Rothe, 1998), coupled with the positive political climate, led on 22 May 1987 to a Customs Union Agreement between Cyprus and the EEC (Iacovou, 1986, p. 5). The Customs Union Agreement, which came into effect on 1 January 1988, provided for two stages. The first stage was for a period of ten years, affecting all of Cypriot agriculture and industry, terminable on ratification by the Association Council. The second stage was completed in 2002, and saw products from the Community flow freely from the Community to Cyprus with the Common Agricultural Policy applying fully to Cyprus. The problems faced by the EC in dealing with Cyprus in this period were both of an external and internal nature. It was clear that the EC had to tread a fine line, accommodating member states (and nonmembers such as Turkey) and their conflicting views and all parties already historically involved in the dispute in Cyprus, two of which became members in 1973 (Britain) and 1981 (Greece) respectively. This was made even more difficult by the fact that the EC did not want to become directly embroiled in the political conflict and hinder its neutrality (Interview, Hannay, 1999). The economics and the politics however, were not easily disentangled and Turkey had already voiced its disapproval of the acceptance of Greece as a potential member in the 1970s. The EC when dealing with Cyprus had to balance the demands and views of Turkey as well as those of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Externally, the United Nations (UN) had been in Cyprus since 1964, and had been negotiating for a settlement since 1974 – adopting and passing many resolutions with regard to the political problem in Cyprus.4 The UN had the perceived neutrality to break the deadlock on the island and had established positions on the legality and illegality of the Cyprus situation, a major reason why the EC member states were reluctant to become involved directly in the dispute after its failed attempts in 1974 to formulate a coherent action and policy towards Cyprus. The EC did, however, have a vested interest in preserving and enhancing the peace and stability of the region by drawing Turkey, Greece and Cyprus closer to the European home through economic interdependence and linkage. It was clear that in this particular period the involvement of member states in a situation that was ‘historically constructed’ on many levels, served to sharpen rather than placate national interests. This was


particularly true of Greece, which after joining in 1981 became the ‘voice’ and sole defender of Greek-Cypriot rights in order to try and bring Cyprus closer to the EC (Interviews MEPs, Rothe 1998; Tsatsos, 1998). This early period in EC–Cyprus relations suggests that first, history, in the form of already established international positions and perceptions on Cyprus by the actors involved in the dispute and importantly by the UN, served as the constraints and set the parameters for the EC in its action and attitude towards Cyprus. Second, strategic concerns relating to stability and peace in the Mediterranean region also influenced the positions taken by the EC on Cyprus, in particular with regard to the implications for Turkey (and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Finally, the internal processes and politics of the EC, and in particular the steadfast positions formed and taken by Greece in the Council, determined by their own historical relationship with Cyprus, (as well as differing positions taken by other member states and their perceptions of the Cyprus problem) had implications for the direction of European policy towards Cyprus.

Developments in 1990: the community and Cyprus The context The decisions taken by the European Community (EC) on Cyprus have to be understood in the context of the changes that had swept across Europe in 1989 and the EC’s perception of and interest in the Mediterranean region at the time. When Cyprus formally submitted an application to join the EC on 4 July 1990 the government of Cyprus perceived that membership was a natural progression from its previous association, and that involving the EC in the Cyprus problem provided another avenue and form of pressure in seeking a solution. The belief was that it would ‘create a more positive context’, and that, although it was not regarded as a sole vehicle for finding a solution it could, through supporting the UN initiatives, be a ‘major contributor by creating an incentive to both sides’ (Interview, GreekCypriot diplomat, 1998). Given the fact that the Berlin Wall had come down just months before, the climate for highlighting division in Europe was ripe. There was also the fact that Greece, holding the Presidency at the time, would push the Cyprus application through the Council of Ministers by whatever means it thought appropriate. For the EC it was more a matter of procedure, reflected in the fact that it took almost three years for the Commission to produce an


opinion on the application. In reality, the period of the application saw the EC tackling problems of immense proportions on its borders and internally. Until these were resolved and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) signed, Mediterranean enlargement was a secondary thought (Gaudissart, 1996, p. 21). Decisions and resolutions from the EC/EU On 26th June 1990, the European Council (Dublin) issued the following declaration with regard to Cyprus (in the light of the impasse in the inter-communal dialogue): The European Council, deeply concerned at the situation, fully reaffirms its previous declarations and its support for the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus in accordance with UN resolutions. Reiterating that the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations, and bearing in mind the importance of these relations, it stresses the need for the prompt elimination of the obstacles preventing the pursuit of effective inter-communal talks…on the basis of the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General, as it was recently re-affirmed by Resolution 649/90 of the Security Council (European Stand on the Cyprus Problem, 1994, p. 64). This statement set a precedent and highlighted two key factors for future decisions on Cyprus, including the application made by the government of Cyprus on 4 July 1990. First, it tied relations with Cyprus inexorably to the Community’s relations with Turkey.5 Second, it deflected responsibility for the political problem to the previously agreed UN initiatives. It was not that the Community did not recognise the implications of the political problem for Europe, but that the resolutions and principles for solving the problem in Cyprus had already been ‘set in stone’ by the two communities on the island under the auspices of the UN. This meant that although the EU had, ‘clear responsibilities towards Cyprus’ and were willing to throw their full weight behind UN efforts, ‘no separate initiatives that deviated from this would be taken’ (Interview, Hannay, 1999). Hans van den Broek, president of the EC Council of Ministers at the end of 1991, confirmed the view that the EC would not play a direct or active role in Cyprus but would only support UN efforts (Theophylactou, 1995, p. 117). The 12 member states were not inactive on Cyprus – however, there was a certain path-dependency reflected in EU policy towards the


Cyprus problem created by established ‘rules of the game’ at global level and the perceptions of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the EU’s credibility as an interlocutor. As a consequence there was an agreement in principle that the UN was best placed to mediate in the Cyprus dispute given their historical involvement and the Agreements reached in 1977 and 1979 under UN auspices concerning a formula for resolving the political problem in Cyprus. Political dialogue was established between the Community and Cyprus in 1988 in the context of relations with third countries, and the Commission established a delegation in Cyprus with the aim of monitoring the implementation of the Association Agreement and other initiatives provided for by the Commission. The thinking from Brussels and in particular from the Commission on the political problem and the issue of enlargement in Cyprus was voiced by Jean Joseph Schwed, Head of the Northern Mediterranean Unit in 1991 when he stated: …if for Cyprus I do not foresee any significant economic problems, the same cannot be said on the political level because of the division of the island. I have stated that the policy of the Community is not to recognize a partition of the island and to treat the two parts of the island on an equal footing. We can nevertheless not avoid taking into consideration that the north of the island is not under the authority of the government which has applied…This is not merely a theoretical obstacle, but has practical…consequences …With this problem of the political situation on the island added to the general consideration about not embarking on any enlargement negotiations, the Commission thus came to the conclusion that it would be more sensible not to hurry examination of Cyprus’s application (Schwed, 1991, pp. 7–9) It was clear that the Commission approach, at this stage, reflected a reluctance to commit itself to an ‘inflexible’ position on the Cyprus situation – the political problem and the EC’s purported neutral approach towards the involved parties, clearly obfuscated any possibility of a clear and coherent position within the EC. The complex internal reforms provided the EC with a justification for ‘stalling’ on Cyprus, so as not to provoke any adverse reactions internally and externally. From the Commission perspective it had to deliver an opinion that was fair to all sides but did not anger the Greeks nor unduly punish the Greek Cypriots and their credibility for membership


because of the division of the island. It also had to ensure that Turkey was compensated for any positive decision given on Cyprus. Given the sensitive issues surrounding the situation, the Council of Ministers were willing to continue supporting the Commission in its quest and to reiterate the fact that with reference to Malta and Cyprus, ‘The Union will consider each of these membership applications on its own merits’ (European Stand on the Cyprus Problem, 1994). The EC rather than taking a pro-active stance on Cyprus chose what it perceived as the most ‘diplomatic’ route through non-decision. It deferred what would otherwise have been a difficult decision, but it meant that a positive message was given to both Cyprus and Malta, whilst simultaneously, not alienating Turkey so soon after their application for membership had been rejected by the Commission. The opinion of the Commission (June 1993) The Commission’s opinion, when it arrived on the application of Cyprus to join the EU, was favourable and re-affirmed Cyprus’s European orientation and eligibility for membership (Commission Opinion, 1993). There were three important areas in which the Commission’s opinion focused: the eligibility of the Republic of Cyprus for membership; the ability of Cyprus to adopt the acquis communautaire; and the political problem and the implications for accession. The Commission, having recognised that the Cyprus question had never left the agenda of the UN Security Council since 1960 and that, ‘diplomatic efforts conducted under United Nations auspices to bring about a mutually acceptable institutional solution had been blocked by the intransigence of both sides’ (Commission Opinion, 1993) confirmed, ‘beyond all doubt, [Cyprus’s] European identity and character’ and was willing to validate ‘its vocation to belong to the Community’ (Commission Opinion, 1993). The opinion also recognised and rejected the Turkish Cypriot challenges to the legality of the application by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. The Union following decisions made by the UN in the past on Cyprus stated clearly that, The Community…following the logic of its established position, which is consistent with that of the United Nations where the legitimacy of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and nonrecognition of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ are concerned, felt that the application was admissible (Commission Opinion , 1993)


There was also recognition, however, that when assessing the eligibility of Cyprus the greatest respect and regard would be paid to the links between the two communities and other countries, namely Greece and Turkey. With reference to Turkey specifically the opinion reflected its ‘major strategic, political and economic importance to the Community’ (Commission Opinion, 1993). On the issue of the adoption of the acquis communautaire, the report stipulated that although the north and south would face several problems, (the former more than the latter) it appeared that none of these would prove insurmountable in the context of an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Commission was very optimistic that the south had the instruments and the political will to adapt to the challenge of integration and that accession, if perceived in the right manner by the north, would help close the economic gap between the two communities. The Commission was rather more ambiguous on the issue of the Cyprus problem and accession. There was for the first time however, a recognition that inter-communal talks under the direction of the Secretary-General could fail and that the Commission would have to reassess the situation in light of the positions adopted by each party in the talks. Accession would then have to be reconsidered, it concluded, in January 1995. Other than this, however, a solution was still at this stage an implicit pre-requisite for accession. The Commission was convinced ‘that the result of Cyprus’s accession to the Community would be increased security and prosperity’ but that the practical problems that would be encountered without a solution would make it very difficult to apply certain parts of the community legislation. It noted in particular that, The fundamental freedoms laid down by the EEC Treaty, and in particular freedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital, right of establishment and the universally recognised political, economic, social and cultural rights could not today be exercised over the entirety of the island’s territory. These freedoms and rights would have to be guaranteed as part of a comprehensive settlement restoring constitutional arrangements covering the whole of the Republic of Cyprus (Commission Opinion, 1993) The Commission thus concluded that, ‘Cyprus’s integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question’ (Commission Opinion, 1993). It was hoped that by


sending out a positive signal to the people of Cyprus and attaching with it a time-frame for assessment, this would act as a catalyst for finding a solution to the problem under UN direction and smooth the road for accession by the whole of the island. The reaction – General Affairs Council – October 4th 1993 The Council fully endorsed the opinion of the Commission, both in its July 1993 conclusions which, ‘welcomed the positive message …regarding the eligibility and suitability of Cyprus…to be part of the European Union’ (Council Conclusions, July 1993) and more importantly at the meeting of the General Affairs Council when it was confirmed that a wide consensus existed among member states ‘on the various aspects of the analyses put forward by the Commission and on the approach proposed in its conclusions’ (Council Conclusions, July 1993). The Council invited the Commission to ‘open substantive discussions6 forthwith with the government of Cyprus to help it to prepare for the accession negotiations to follow later on under the best possible conditions’ (Conclusions of the General Affairs Council, 1993). The Commission opinion on Cyprus reflected, endorsed and reconfirmed the ‘general feeling’ of the member states and thus there was no conflict of interest between the Commission proposals and the Council. The Council re-affirmed its full commitment in supporting the UN in the search for a political solution on the island and concurred with the Commission that the accession process would be reviewed on the date given. Economically, the Council concluded that all the instruments of the Community, in close association with the government of Cyprus would be used to help towards efforts for integration (Council Conclusions, October 1993). Overall the centerpiece of the emergent EU approach to Cyprus at this stage was the power of attraction (enlargement) – but the strategy was nothing more than that of hope based on a functional logic. Such a hope manifested itself in the belief that ‘Cyprus’ accession to the Community…would help to bring the communities on the island closer together’ on the basis of ‘international norms’ established7 by the UN. The UN norms and process however, also contributed to the EU’s procrastination in developing a coherent approach to the Cyprus question. Moreover, the EU, although endorsing Cyprus’ eligibility as a candidate country, hoped that a solution could be found before any crucial decision had to be made on the beginning of accession negotiations for Cyprus. The complexity of the Cyprus case confined the EU to


a reliance on the UN process for a political solution, whilst simultaneously providing a justifiable excuse for not committing to any date for the beginning of accession negotiations for Cyprus.

The European Union and Cyprus: 1993–1999 Many important decisions were taken between 1993 and 1999 on Cyprus and Turkey, which had implications for the Cyprus issue. These included a decision in 1995 to proceed with the Turkey–EU Customs Union and an agreement to allow Cyprus to begin accession negotiations six months after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC); Agenda 2000; the acceptance of Cyprus as a candidate country at the Luxembourg European Council Summit in 1997; and the beginning of accession negotiations in 1998. The EU thinking on Cyprus however, did not change radically – the power of attraction was still at the forefront of the EU approach with the belief that ‘the accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about peace and civil reconciliation. The Accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution’ (Luxembourg European Council Conclusions, 1997, para. 28)8. There was one important detail that became much clearer and unequivocal however, in the EU’s approach – that the settlement of the Cyprus problem could not be regarded as a pre-condition for Cyprus’s entry to the EU (at the Helsinki European Council 1999) – despite unilateral assertions by certain member states to the contrary (France) (Interview, CFSP official, 1998). The EU upheld its position of ‘neutrality’. Dick Spring, the President of the EU in the latter part of 1996, stated that, ‘accession is in the interest of both parts of the island and we want to work in that direction’ (Spring, 1996). 9 Commissioner van den Broek also adopted this line and the insistence that ‘Cyprus’ accession to the EU could also act as a catalyst for the efforts under UN auspices to finding a solution to the Cyprus question’ (van den Broek 1997, p. 3, my emphasis). From the European perspective, the optimal scenario would almost certainly have been accession talks with a unified Cyprus, but on many occasions Commissioner van den Broek had gone to great lengths to emphasise that this was ‘not a condition which you can put on the table’ (Cyprus News (b), 1998). He had also made it clear however that, ‘both communities of Cyprus [would] derive considerable political, economic and social benefits from EU membership’ although he said he could not envisage this


scenario ‘without any movement on the political side’ (van den Broek, 1997, p. 5). This view is one that both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots had always maintained and in the case of Greece, promoted within the EU.10 Turkey, however, did not see it in this light, despite Commissioner van den Broek’s message that, ‘the opening of the accession negotiations with Cyprus is not directed against the Turkish Cypriot Community or Turkey’ (van den Broek, 1997, p. 4). Indeed in a speech to Turkish Cypriot businessmen and politicians in February of 1997, he gave a clear message that ‘Cyprus is being offered the considerable prize of EU membership’ going on to say to the Turkish Cypriot audience, ‘Whether you accept it and all it has to offer is for you to decide’ (Cyprus News (b), 1998). Despite the many assurances from the EU about the guaranteed security of the Turkish Cypriots within a EU umbrella if there was agreement on federal solution, for Turkey, the position was resolute and clear as far as EU accession was concerned. There could be no entry of Cyprus to the EU without the permission of Turkey first being granted and without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots. Once again it seems that the Cyprus issue within the EU could not be detached from the question of Turkey and Greece. The EU’s involvement in the Cyprus issue was hardening the stances of all sides concerned and raising the question of how far the line between accession and a solution to the political problem was becoming increasingly blurred. It was clear that disagreement within the EU on how to tackle the triangular question of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus was also a major hindrance to future thinking on the situation with regard to action and strategy – it would require diplomatic coherence and a consistent and common stance. The EU possessed this ability in principle through its power of attraction strategy towards Cyprus. However, given the international constraints (credibility), the diversity of opinion institutionally and between member states in the Council of Ministers, added to the incremental nature of EU foreign/external policy and its procedural inadequacies, it seemed that the EU was incapable of any form of long-term strategy to deal with the ramifications that this brought with it concerning the political problem in Cyprus. In particular, there was no alternate ‘real’ strategy to deal with the scenario of Cyprus’s accession negotiations being completed before any political solution was found. One Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) diplomat dealing with the Cyprus issue captured the problems


in formulating policy towards Cyprus in the EU in the following statement, In terms of the enlargement process and what happens if there is no political solution to the Cyprus problem once and if negotiations have been concluded – this has not been adequately or sufficiently discussed in the Council and its various official fora. This poses a very difficult question for the Council …The Council prefers to play a waiting game and hold to the position and principle that the accession process may act as a catalyst and contribute to a solution – this is in the hope that something or somebody (Turkey) will eventually give. The attitude is – why discuss it now because anything could happen that could contribute positively in finding a solution (Interview, CFSP official, 1998, my emphasis). In other words the EU’s implicit strategy was that of enlargement and inclusion – and the hope that the involved parties, in particular those seen as intransigent (Turkey, Turkish-Cypriots) would realise the benefits of such a process, and move towards a more conciliatory stance on the Cyprus issue. However, although the EU was aware of the link between the Cyprus issue and progress in EU–Turkey relations – EU thinking on Turkey encapsulated a debate which had far more serious connotations than that of resolving the Cyprus issue – and in this sense the EU had to proceed with caution – with the result that attitudes towards the Cyprus issue effectively hardened until the Helsinki European Council in 1999. EU positions and reactions: Agenda 2000 and the Luxembourg European Council (1997) After the bargain struck at the 1995 General Affairs Council allowing progress on the Turkey–EU Customs Union and Cyprus-EU relations, Agenda 2000 was to be perceived in very different ways and result in both positive and negative repercussions with regard to accession, and a potential solution to the Cyprus problem. The issue of enlargement was again to prove controversial – in the sense that enlargement and the political solution – despite the obvious link – were treated as separate processes. Although the Commission was aware of the implications of enlargement for a political solution in Cyprus, they chose to disassociate themselves from it and concentrate on the economic, social and legal issues that confronted them. There was a consensus that the political question, which raised difficult and un-


resolved questions in the Council, would be left in the capable hands of the UN. The EU was neither willing nor able to discuss future scenarios in relation to Cyprus – the thinking remained very much in the short term and a concentration on completing accession negotiations. What would happen after this the EU and its member states had not and could not decide – their hope was that the power of attraction would lead to a solution, thus absolving them of any difficult decision once the accession negotiations with Cyprus had been finalised (Interview, CFSP official, 1998; Interview, Senior Commission official, 1998; Interview, Maurer, 1998; Interview, Hannay, 1999). Both Greece and the Greek Cypriots perceived Agenda 2000 in a positive light. Following the Opinion issued in 1993 by the Commission, it confirmed and reiterated the view that for the south there would be no major obstacles or problems in the adoption of the acquis communautaire, although changes would still have to be made in the financial sector and in the area of Justice and Home Affairs.11 It also noted that the Turkish Cypriots were much less well off per head than the Greek Cypriots in the south and that there had been signs of an increasing dependence on financial transfers from Turkey. In addition there was a reiteration of the fact that the EU fully supported all UN efforts to secure a settlement on the island and the belief that opening accession negotiations and including the Turkish Cypriots in the enlargement negotiations would promote a political settlement (Andrews, 1998, p. 17). The Commission stated that: If progress towards settlement is not made before the negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as the only authority recognised by international law (in Andrews, 1998, p. 17). For Turkey this development was neither desirable nor acceptable, in particular since they were still angry with a European Commission Report in July 1997 that recommended excluding it from the first wave of applicant countries for ‘technical’ reasons. This was particularly irritating for Turkey, as it had come after re-affirmation from the EU–Turkey Association Council in April 1997 that Turkey was eligible for EU membership and would be judged by the same objective criteria as the other applicants.12 In Agenda 2000 the Commission, after reviewing the economic, social and political climate in Turkey concluded, ‘that the EU should continue to support Turkey’s efforts to


resolve its problems, using the Association Agreement and the customs union as the foundations for developing closer political and economic relations’ (cited in Andrews, 1998, p. 25). The Report also highlighted the importance the EU attached to the resolution of ‘Regional problems’, although it strangely neglected any direct responsibility in helping to achieve this. It was stated that: Tensions in the Aegean can be overcome only through the settlement of the issues between Greece and Turkey in accordance with international law…and…the UN Charter. Moreover Turkey should contribute actively to a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question in accordance with the relevant United Nations resolutions (in Andrews, 1998, p. 25). The EU approach sent out contradictory messages to Turkey, condemning it for its behaviour and violations whilst also making sure not to ‘exclude’ it from the European club. At the same time, however, the EU showed no desire (or indeed capability) to become embroiled in the resolution of these problems other than through the power of attraction. Immediately after Agenda 2000, a Commission communication on the further development of EU–Turkey relations reaffirmed the eligibility of Turkey for membership whilst also making other suggestions for further consolidating relations in certain policy areas and the CU.13 In the midst of the developments in EU–Cyprus and EU–Turkey relations, August 1997 also witnessed another failed attempt by the UN, in meetings in Troutbeck and Glion, to persuade the two leaders of the communities to agree on a package deal to resolve the long-standing dispute in Cyprus.14 The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, citing the EU accession process as one of the major stumbling blocks to progression, attached extra conditions to the potential success of the UN (see Chapter 4). For the Greek Cypriots, the international community and the UN in particular this was unacceptable. For the Greek Cypriots, EU accession provided another excuse for the intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot leader. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership were not interested in a solution previous to these developments, so the argument that the EU was now a stumbling block, for them, was erroneous (Interview, Greek Cypriot diplomat, anonymous 1998). This was the view adopted by the EU and one that subsequently became a source of contention at the Luxembourg summit in December 1997.


Luxembourg – December 1997 The Luxembourg European Council proved a significant and controversial affair in the relations between the EU and Cyprus, and the EU and Turkey. The assumption that the EU could act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus problem would be dismissed by the perception and reaction of Turkey to the conclusions reached at the Council. On the other hand, the perception of the EU, Cyprus and Greece was altogether more positive and consistent; they saw it as a ‘historic’ decision that would benefit all parties. For the EU the European Council conclusions reflected a consistent and fair policy for all the actors concerned. On Cyprus, the summit’s Presidency conclusions stated that Cyprus’s accession, …should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation [adding that] the accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution of the Cyprus problem under the aegis of the United Nations [which it stressed] must continue with a view to creating a bi-communal, bizonal, federation (http://www.kypros.org/Embassy/Jan98/text.htm). The Council also reflected on a positive gesture by the Cypriot President, Glafkos Clerides, to include Turkish Cypriots in the negotiation team and requested that this should be ‘acted upon’, as it was an important development in helping international efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Although under the Luxembourg Agreement a single framework for the negotiations for the countries selected for accession was outlined, Turkey’s hopes that it would be included in this were disappointed. Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the EU was confirmed once again by the member states, but they also reiterated that Turkey would be judged by the same objective criteria as those candidates selected. In this sense they also made it clear that Turkey neither economically nor politically met the (Copenhagen) criteria for entering the accession process. The member states did, however, view the relationship with Turkey as significant and important and thus the EC considered that it would be, ‘…important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the EU in every field’ (in Andrews, 1998, p. 26). In this context it was also made explicit in the Presidency conclusions that Turkey was invited to the European Conference that was to take place on 12 March 1998 in London, in advance of the launching of the accession process for new applicants.


The Luxembourg Council also made it clear that if Turkey wished to develop further and strengthen its relationship with the EU it had to vigorously pursue political and economic reforms, ‘including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the EU; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (cited in Andrews, 1998, p. 26). The EU’s approach sent out two clear messages for Turkey. The first was that Turkey and its relations with the EU were valuable and important – the development of a ‘European Strategy’ for Turkey and a reconfirmation of its eligibility demonstrated that it was important for the EU to keep Turkey close to Europe and the door open. The second message, however, was that relations with the EU were conditional on certain values and principles being upheld. The EU was not going to be blackmailed or threatened by Turkey, in particular with regard to the accession of Cyprus. British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook15 reflected this in a statement when he said that no party was ‘going to concede any kind of veto to Turkey over the application for Cyprus which should be judged on its own merits…’ (in Andrews, 1998, p. 26). Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Council, also made it clear on 12 December 1997 that Turkey ‘must cease impeding Cyprus accession to the European Union. Turkey must make it clear that Cyprus can become a member’, going on to add that requests to stop Turkish threats to use military force in Cyprus from the international community and the EU had been ignored and that this was not acceptable (in Andrews, 1998, p. 26). The EP was more severe than this regarding Turkey’s attempted interference with the development of relations between the EU and Cyprus. Jan Willem Bertens characterised the feeling of many in the EP when he said about Turkish behaviour, ‘no one is going to give in to those threats…it is not Europe that needs Turkey but it is Turkey that needs Europe. Only if the EU will really stick to this policy, will the illegal occupier, Turkey, give way and allow for a fair solution to be found’ (in Andrews, 1998, p. 26). The post-Luxembourg reaction from Turkey was of anger and disillusionment with the EU stance. However, from an EU perspective the conditions stipulated for Turkey, embodying European principles,


could hardly have justified the harsh Turkish reaction, given that the UN had already formulated the declarations concerning territorial disputes and Cyprus at bilateral meetings between Greece and Turkey. The EU view was that Turkey could have seen the decisions made at Luxembourg in a more positive light and exploited the potential for Turkey to move closer to Europe (Interview, Senior Commission official, 1998). The EU’s strategy was clearly a balancing act, and the thinking behind it lay in the different member states’ perceptions of Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Although all agreed on a process of rapprochement rather than a full pre-accession strategy for Turkey, countries such as Britain, Spain, Italy, Austria and France were all anxious to placate Turkey as far as possible, even if it was not necessarily because they wanted to see Turkey as an immediate member. The main motive behind this was strategic and the fear that if Turkey was left behind this would lead to resentment of the EU and a turn away from the west and towards more fundamental forces in Turkey. There were also of course individual member state interests concerning trade and access to markets in the Middle East. Germany and Greece, although having no objection in principle to Turkish membership had domestic, regional and cultural reasons, for denying Turkey any part in the EU structure. Specifically, Greece had consistently used the EU as a forum and lever for trying to solve its own disputes with Turkey, in particular involving territory in the Aegean and the illegal occupation of Cyprus. Germany’s Chancellor Kohl had been unusually frank about Germany’s objection when he stated after the summit ‘a dramatic change in the number of Turks in Germany would not be tolerable to German public opinion nor to those in the rest of the EU’ (Mortimer, 1997). Both Greece and Germany wanted Turkey to be excluded from enlargement of the EU unless certain concessions were made in advance (Tucker, 1997; Mortimer, 1997). The aftermath and the European Conference The German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, certainly hoped that after the initial anger Turkey showed at the decision made in Luxembourg, it would begin to view the process towards EU membership more calmly and in a more positive manner. The power of attraction was clearly the only frame of reference for the EU approach, although there was no indication of anything more concrete than hope for believing this approach would work as Turkey continued with threats


to disassociate itself from the EU, annex the north of Cyprus, and halt all negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus under the UN proposals (Barnham, 1997). The British took over the Presidency of the EU in January 1998 with optimism and a determination to keep developments for enlargement on track and with the aim of placating Turkey both bilaterally and through the EU Presidency. A speech made by the Foreign Secretary on the objectives of the British Presidency illustrated the importance of these aims for Britain stating that, At the end of last year the European Union agreed to start negotiations in the spring with those countries most ready for membership…Britain played a key role in making this decision possible…we will do everything we can to make them a success and were are determined to ensure that the other applicants feel included in the process…Ensuring that Turkey finds the right place in this process is one of the key challenges of our Presidency. Turkey matters, as a long-standing ally and friend, and a major player in an important region (http://www.fco.gov.uk). On the issue of Cyprus the following statement was made, The position that we have taken both as Britain and also as Presidency of the European Union is that Cyprus is one of the six countries at the front of the enlargement process and the government of Cyprus has made a lot of work itself to prepare itself for membership…we also want to see, and are working to see progress on the UN talks to bring and end to the division of the island based on bicommunal, bizonal federation with single sovereignty and that has always been our objective and will continue to be our objective (http://www.fco.gov.uk). The European Conference of EU members and applicant states that took place on the 12 March 1998 in London, however, saw a conflict of views between Greece and France that threatened to delay the enlargement process and create a crisis in the EU. President Chirac and the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, questioned whether the EU should go ahead with accession talks with Cyprus in the absence of a political settlement on the island. They called for tougher language on the issue and in particular, a warning that made clear that accession negotiations could be suspended if there was no progress on the polit-


ical front. The reaction of Greece was to threaten to block the start of accession negotiations with the whole of Central and Eastern Europe if the negotiations with Cyprus did not go ahead. This was a threat that the EU members had to take seriously, given Greece’s strong feelings over Cyprus. At the Edinburgh summit, which took place on 14 March 1998, the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, brokered a compromise deal. The deal meant that the French had to accept the already agreed EU stance that there be no link (or a weaker one at the very least) between accession and a political settlement. Greece, on the other hand, had to accept that the European Commission would make regular evaluations on all accession negotiations and report back to ministers on progress being made. In this sense the threat of suspension was still there, but made rather more implicit so as to pacify Greece (Barber and Buchan, 1998). It was clear however, that such disagreements would not simply disappear and raised questions in the longer term of the potential for Cyprus’ membership without a political solution. The Council had no clear or coherent position on this issue (Interview, CFSP official, 1998). Other developments at Edinburgh also saw from the British and the French an attempt at reconciliation with Turkey through symbolic gesturing and a signal to Turkey that it was part of the ‘European family’ even though it did not meet certain criteria at that time. Indeed, after the European Conference the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, reflecting the strong aim of the UK Presidency with regard to Turkey said, ‘I very much hope that Turkey understands that the door remains open…it is important that we have good and close relations between the European Union and Turkey’ (in Andrews, 1998, p. 28). Relations between Germany and Turkey, however, deteriorated as Mesut Yilmaz, the Turkish Prime Minister, accused Germany of trying to carve out Lebensraum to their east – this was another complicating factor in the EU’s attempts to provide help in the search for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, as it hardened the stance of the Turkish Cypriot leader whose actions were strongly determined and dictated by Ankara. On a more positive note, Britain made clear its position on Cyprus during its Presidency of the EU. The position reflected its full support for the beginning of accession negotiations with Cyprus and also recognised and welcomed the offer made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafkos Clerides, of ‘full participation’ by the Turkish Cypriots in the negotiating team for accession. The Foreign Secretary expressed hope that the ‘proposal from President Clerides’ would ‘meet with a positive response on the part of Mr. Denktash’


(Andrews, 1998, p. 19). There was also recognition by Britain and other ministers that a mixed delegation including Turkish Cypriots would be much more beneficial as the EU was determined to see both communities benefit from the process (http://www.fco.gov.uk). On the question of the political problem, Britain emphasised the importance of the UN process running parallel to the accession process with the objective of bringing together one island based on a bicommunal, bizonal federation with a single sovereignty, stating that ‘at the end of that process the countries of the European Union would have to make a judgement on whether the terms of membership’ (Ibid) had been satisfactorily achieved. Although Britain made it clear that they did not make Cyprus’s accession and membership conditional on the resolution of the ‘political problem’, this approach clearly left the door open for other countries to change their minds at the end of the accession process. This issue left many ambiguities and unanswered questions to the EU’s Cyprus approach, and it was increasingly becoming apparent that it was based on ad hoc improvisation and hope rather than calculated strategic thinking – even though it was underpinned by a power of attraction logic. 31st March 1998 – The beginning of enlargement negotiations The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, swiftly rejected the offer made to him at the European Conference in London to include a Turkish Cypriot delegation in the accession negotiating team, although the UK Presidency indicated that the offer would remain open (Andrews, 1998, p. 19). What was secured at Edinburgh, however, was the agreement to proceed with accession negotiations for Cyprus. The Council Presidency made the following statement on 31 March 1998 at the opening of the negotiations: The Union regrets that it has not been possible to achieve a political solution to the continuing division of Cyprus in time for the accession negotiations on which we embark today. The Union believes that Cyprus’ accession to the EU should benefit all communities, including the Turkish Cypriot Community, and help to bring about civic peace and reconciliation on the island. In that context, our objective remains a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation on the basis of the comprehensive political settlement in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions …Progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem will naturally reinforce each other (in Andrews, 1998, p. 19)


After this development, both the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot stances hardened on the issue of Cyprus (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). The stance of the US helped to legitimise the Turkish views of mistreatment by the EU, when it criticised and called into question the EU strategy on Turkey. This was despite the many efforts by Britain (bilateral and joint) to persuade the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reconsider its stance towards the EU. While the EU had been making its decisions on enlargement and integration, concrete steps were also being taken by Turkey to integrate the north of Cyprus into its structures. Threats were made by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, who called upon to ‘evaluate its future steps very carefully’ before it was too late, with the Turkish Cypriot Rauf Denktash adding about the EU’s actions, ‘Whatever you have done has led to division, not unification…Carry on …the end is complete division’ (Denktash, 1998).16 The EU, however, adamantly refused to respond to the Turkish threats although making it quite clear to them that Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the EU had been confirmed and that they would be judged by the same criteria as all other countries. This attitude and policy however, was not one that the Americans agreed with. US special envoy Richard Holbrooke accused the EU of making a tactical error in their decision at the Luxembourg summit in the December of 1997 by not accepting Turkey on an equal status as the other applicant countries. He stated that, The European Union made two decisions in Luxembourg on 13 December. One was to invite Cyprus to begin talks to join the EU. We think that was a good decision. The other was not to start a process with Turkey. We think that was a mistake. I don’t see how Cyprus can move forward without Turkey’s support’ (Holbrooke quoted by Turner, 1998, p. 2). Officials in the Commission and EP were irritated with the comments by the US, and with the pressure being exerted on them from Washington to offer a better deal for Turkey. A leading Commission official argued that the US was not necessarily the best placed to comment on developing relations between the EU and Turkey as it only looked at situations from a NATO point of view. That is, the US looked at the situation according to the geo-strategic position of Turkey and its desire not to create any ripples or problems within NATO. This was not only shortsighted, but it also meant that the US, ‘did not have to look at the more fundamental questions’ that had to


be answered if the Turks actually did become members of the EU (Interview, Senior Commission official, 1998). From an EU perspective the Luxembourg conclusions provided Turkey with an opportunity and the perception was that the EU had actually been very forthcoming in its offers. The EU had to be cautious so as not to create expectations that could not be met by either the EU or Turkey (cited in Turner, 1998, p. 2). The EP also condemned the US comments arguing that ‘the EU…would not be told by the US who should or should not be part of the European Union’, as the EU in this sense had ‘its own principles and would not be dictated to’ by a country that did not have to face the consequences of Turkish membership. It did concede however, that the US was an important player and in particular in putting pressure on Turkey and working more closely with the EU. For the EP (and many others) the solution of the Cyprus problem lay in Ankara and in this context the US were crucial – but the EU had to continue with the accession in the hope that this would facilitate a solution (Interviews MEPs, Tsatsos 1998; Vandamelebrouke, 1998; Rothe 1998). The EU then, hardened its stance and defended its decisions made with regard to Turkey and the accession of Cyprus. It also, however, kept the door open for Turkey. The offer to go ahead with the Association Council with Ankara was kept open but the Turks did not attend this despite the best efforts of the UK presidency. Efforts were also made at the Cardiff European Council (6/98) to build bridges, but some officials were beginning to question the efforts of the EU in trying to placate Turkey while receiving no positive signals from them that they would alter their position. Hans van den Broek, the EU Commissioner responsible for External Affairs in particular, sent a stark message to Turkey, ‘that failure to end the division of Cyprus may well mean the end of Turkish aspirations for membership’.17 He stated that no country would be allowed to veto the aspirations of others who wanted to become members of the EU and that threats to wreck the UN peace process unless the EU terminate accession talks with the Cyprus government, were falling on deaf ears in the EU member states (Cyprus News (d), 1998). Despite this, however, the French scepticism about Cyprus as an applicant country emerged once again at the Cardiff summit when a French spokeswoman said, ‘Admitting a country which is split in two is hard to envisage. Negotiations make no sense if reunification is not on the cards’.18 The UK Presidency and other member states, however, quickly dismissed these statements. A British spokesman confirmed


that although everybody agreed it would be easier if a political settlement was more forthcoming, it had been agreed by all member states in the past and present that nobody would be given a veto in the process including Turkey. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, also confirmed this view saying that there would be ‘no preconditions’ attached to the accession negotiations. The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council summit in Cardiff, reflected both the positive development of the accession negotiations with Cyprus and other applicant countries, but also welcomed the Commission’s line on Turkey for membership, saying that this strategy could be enriched in time, taking into account Turkey’s own ideas (http://www.pio.gov.cy/news/1998/980617.html). The EU approach to Cyprus then, did not change despite pressure from the US and threats from Turkey, although once again there was a recognition that Turkey had to be placated and kept within the European home – even though arriving at a policy on this took much intensive bargaining and give and take on the parts of the member states involved.

The Helsinki European Council 1999 Up until the Helsinki European Council it could be argued that the power of attraction was the only policy that the EU possessed with regard to resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, the linkage between a Cyprus settlement, Turkey’s EU membership and Cyprus’s membership meant that this approach was not exactly proving a catalyst for a solution to the political problem in Cyprus. On the contrary Cyprus’ application for membership could be characterised as a ‘serious headache for the EU’ (Yiangou, 2002, p. 4). EU policy had hardened the attitudes of all sides in the dispute, with no signs of compromise from either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots. Although Turkey aspired to become a member of the EC/EU for many years, Turkish applications to join the European club were consistently rejected by the EP, the Commission and the member states of the EU because Turkey did not meet the conditions set by the Copenhagen criteria (and for other veiled reasons as revealed above). This sent out negative signals to Turkey about its European orientation, but more fundamentally it had a detrimental effect in terms of changing Turkish minds on moving towards a Cyprus settlement. However, there is no doubt that a major factor in the improvement of relations between the EU and Ankara (and thus Cyprus) was the EU’s decision to accord Turkey candidate status at the 1999 Helsinki European Council


summit.19 Indeed, according to Gordon, it ‘was a historic turning point that will have long-term benefits for the entire eastern Mediterranean region’ (Gordon, 2000). There was a clear realisation on the part of the EU, (aided by a more positive climate of relations between Greece and Turkey), that in order to achieve a settlement in Cyprus, incentives had to be offered to Turkey if the promise of accession was to change minds in Ankara. The EU saw Ankara as a fundamental supporter of the illegal northern regime in Cyprus, and the policies of its leader, Rauf Denktash. Indeed, many in the EU and elsewhere viewed Ankara as key protagonists in the formulation of Turkish Cypriot positions and policies on the Cyprus issue. For the EU then, encouraging Ankara to change its mind and adopt a more compromising stance on Cyprus, in their minds, would help to create a more accommodating climate in which to resolve the Cyprus issue. The hope was that the benefits of accession to the EU for Turkey, which has been a long-standing ambition, would far outweigh the importance of its occupation of Cyprus for mainly strategic reasons.20 As is pointed out by Bahcheli ‘western officials believe that – since EU membership is so highly prized by Turkish leaders – Ankara would agree to a negotiated Cyprus settlement along federal lines if it were given a clear timetable for accession’ (2001, p. 218). Indeed the Turkish Ambassador to the EU in December 1999 suggested that ‘all the problems with Greece, the Cypriot question…could be resolved rapidly… and easily if the EU agreed…to admit Turkey in to the European family’ (Akyal, 1999). An important stimulant to the more constructive EU approach on Cyprus and Turkey was the earthquake diplomacy of 1999, which provided for a more positive climate for cooperation between Greece and Turkey (see Avci, 2002, p. 97). Such a climate catalysed the decision at Helsinki, confirming Turkey, after many years of trying, as a candidate for membership of the EU. In the words of one commentator, ‘The Helsinki summit finally broke the Luxembourg deadlock, marking the end of one of the darkest periods in EU–Turkey relations’ (Tocci, 2000). The Helsinki European Council concluded that: Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue,


with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a) (Helsinki European Council Conclusions, 1999). In addition to recognising Turkey as a candidate state the EU also confirmed that there would be no requirement (it would not be precondition) for a solution to the Cyprus problem for Cyprus to be admitted to the EU: The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors (Helsinki European Council Conclusions, 1999). This statement did not explicitly exclude solution as a precondition – the fact that the Council could take into account ‘all relevant factors’ left room for manouevre in the final decision, and indicated a cautious approach from the EU. However, the fact that it was implicitly stated served the purpose of satisfying the demands of Greece (and the Greek Cypriots of course) – who was clearly opposed to any such preconditions. This decision by the EU then, as well as appeasing Greece, served to ensure that the enlargement process as a whole continued on a progressive path. At Helsinki the EU clearly acted upon a recognition that they had made years before, that for there to be any progress in moving towards a resolution on the Cyprus issue it had to be more forthcoming in providing the necessary climate for cooperation and reconciliation. As Turkey was a key actor in the dispute the EU hoped that the power of attraction – and the incentives that came with that – would change Turkish minds on Cyprus. Not only this, but Helsinki also sought to encourage the more positive climate of cooperation between Greece and Turkey (again with the hope that this would have a spillover effect on the Cyprus issue) that had begun with the earthquake diplomacy of April 1999. However, although a brief period of euphoria pervaded EU–Turkey relations after Helsinki – the EU did adopt a more cautious approach thereafter, which in the words of Tocci, ‘…led to the proposal…of a “special relationship” between Turkey and the EU as an alternative to


full membership as an ultimate end-point of Turkey-EU ties’ (Tocci, 2000, p. 2). There were also, as in the past, criticisms from the EP on the failure of Turkey to fulfil conditions on human rights and the Kurdish issue. The nascent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was also a cause of controversy; Turkey was not satisfied with its assigned role within its structures, and threatened to veto the use of NATO assets unless it could be more actively involved in the decisionmaking process. The EU’s cautious approach was justified through a reiteration of the fact that Turkey had not fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria (or the condition with regard to resolution of the Cyprus problem) – in particular the political aspects. However, such justifications did not work to placate those in Turkey who already had a deep-seated suspicion of European motives, and who believed that the insistence on fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria simply veiled the real reasons for the EU’s reserved approach; that of religious and cultural prejudice (see Chapter 5). Despite such problems however, and the internal disputes regarding Turkish membership, there were positive developments after Helsinki. The EU continued with its approach in developing and enhancing the relationship with Turkey in the belief that this would in turn, lead to greater Turkish pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership to move towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The EU approach was clearly embedded in the belief that EU membership for Turkey, in the long term, would be more valuable than its ‘strategic’ interests in Cyprus. Perhaps the most important reason why the EU believed Turkey would want to work towards a Cyprus settlement was because the day of accession for Cyprus loomed ever closer – and that the ramifications of a divided Cyprus joining the EU would be potentially disastrous for Turkey and its interest vis-à-vis the EU. First, what is effectively an intercommunal or Greco-Turkish dispute would become an EU-Turkey dispute – presenting grave political, security and military implications in the context of the development of an ESDP. Second, if Cyprus acceded as a divided island, this would effectively, alongside Greece, give the Greeks greater scope to block Turkish accession to the EU without a resolution of the Cyprus issue (Tocci 2001, p. 4; Bahcheli, 2001, pp. 215–6). The EU’s hope was that because such high costs were attached to intransigence vis-à-vis movement towards the resolution of the Cyprus issue – Turkey would become more pro-active in the search for a solution. Added to this were the positives for Turkey of a unified island joining the EU. As


Barkey and Gordon have noted ‘the inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in the EU would have the added benefits of making Turkish and official EU language, and perhaps help to lower the psychological barrier to Turkey’s eventual accession’ (Tocci, 2001, p. 7).

The Copenhagen European Council 2002 and beyond Events preceding the Copenhagen European Council were characterised by internal disputes on the issue of when accession negotiations should begin with Turkey, and by inflammatory and controversial remarks by the former French President, Valery Giscard d’Estaing (President of the Convention), stating that Turkey must never be allowed to join the EU because it had ‘a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life’ (Black, 2002, p. 16). In addition to this there was also great pressure from the US for a positive decision on early Turkish membership to the EU – pressure that, once again, was not appreciated by many inside the EU. Given the irrevocable link made by the EU between progress on its own accession and positive movement on the Cyprus problem, this did not provide for the most agreeable climate for discussion and negotiation at Copenhagen. The internal disputes were predominantly between Britain and Italy on the one hand, who favoured an early date for negotiations to begin with Turkey (January 2004), and France and Germany on the other, who favoured a longer period of evaluation and a date in 2005. Turkey’s hopes of course were of an early date in order to reinforce their European orientation and confirm a progressive road to membership. However, the reality and complexity of the issues concerning Turkey and the EU, and inevitably Cyprus and the EU, led to a cautious compromise – and an agreement to review the case for beginning negotiations with Turkey in December 2004. This of course was disappointing from a Turkish perspective, and only served to reinforce Turkish suspicion of the underlying prejudice of certain EU leaders with regard to Turkish membership of the European club. The EU attempted to assuage Turkish misgivings and disappointment in the final conclusions of the Copenhagen Council. In terms of the eligibility criteria the EU welcomed ‘the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the criteria’ and acknowledged ‘the determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform’ (Presidency Conclusions, 2002, p. 5). Moreover,


through persuasion by Britain the final text was more positive. It made clear that: If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay (Presidency Conclusions, 2002, p. 5) The conclusions also indicated that, ‘In order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened’ (Presidency Conclusions 2002, p. 6). This would involve a revision of the Accession Partnership, an extension and deepening of the Customs Union, and greater pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey 21 in order to help Turkey to meet the political and economic criteria for membership. From a EU perspective Turkey had been given a firm date for opening negotiations: the only condition was the fulfillment of the ‘eligibility criteria’ for membership. One senior EU official stated of the Copenhagen European Council that the ideal outcome would have been to ‘bag a Cyprus settlement, the accession of a united Cyprus, significant forward movement in EU-Turkish relations and a deal on EU defence policy’ (cited by Black, 2002, p. 17). The only concrete achievement was in the latter of these objectives, where Ankara agreed to lift a long-standing veto on plans for the EU’s embryonic rapid reaction force to have guaranteed access to NATO’s planning capabilities. Marginal progress was made on Turkey–EU relations, and no tangible progress was made on a Cyprus settlement and the accession of a united Cyprus, despite renewed UN efforts and pressure, under the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to resolve the dispute – with the full support of the EU as in the past. In terms of the EU’s approach to Cyprus the European Council confirmed its strong preference for a united Cyprus to join the EU, but as in the past it was reliant on the UN process in order to negotiate a settlement. In this context the EU welcomed: …the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem … on the basis of the [United Nations Secretary General’s] UNSG’s proposals


In addition to this the EU also reconfirmed ‘its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is founded’ (Presidency Conclusions, 2002, p. 3). The primary tool available to the EU was once again the power of attraction in helping to promote the correct climate for a positive outcome in any UN-led negotiations. The EU’s approach reflected a primarily economic-functional logic – it hoped that by promoting development across the island, in particular in the North, that this would facilitate political negotiations for a solution under the new UN plan (‘Annan plan’). Indeed the European Council decided that: …in the absence of a settlement…the Council invites the Commission, in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing to closer to the Union (Presidency Conclusions, 2002) In this context the European Commission has been willing to assist in any further efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue. It has repeatedly stated its strong support for a comprehensive settlement on the basis of the UN plan, and in the event of a settlement an additional amount of €206 million is foreseen for the period 2004–2006 to support the northern part of Cyprus. After the failure of the talks between the leaders of both Cypriot communities in March 2003 (in The Hague) the peace plan of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, remained on the table as the basis for negotiation. The Secretary General communicated the fact that he did not propose to take any new initiative unless there was solid reason to believe that the necessary political will existed for a successful outcome. The signing of Accession Treaties in Athens on the 16 April 2003 seemed to be a catalyst for certain positive developments on the Cyprus issue – not a solution, but the easing of restrictions on crossing the UN buffer zone so that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could move around the island for the first time in 30 years (within certain restrictions). Turkey also made a decision to allow Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey for the first time in 40 years (see Chapter 6). In response to these changes the EU stepped up its initiative to promote a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan. The EU’s approach and role in this context, once again, was to try and create a climate of reconciliation, cooperation and


understanding between the two communities on the island in order to facilitate movement towards settlement of the Cyprus problem (in addition to the incentives offered to Turkey to fulfill membership conditions). In June 2003 the European Commission, at the initiative of Commissioner for enlargement, Günter Verheugen, proposed a package of measures that were aimed at promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the EU. This initiative consisted of financial assistance worth €12 million (see Table 3.1) and alongside this, measures promoting trade between the northern part of Cyprus and the rest of the Union. Commenting on the decision by the Commission, Günter Verheugen stated that: There is a window of opportunity for a united Cyprus joining the European Union by 1 May 2004. The Commission is ready to assist any further effort to contribute to a comprehensive settlement on Table 3.1

EU assistance to northern Cyprus (pre-accession)

EU Financial assistance

Amount (€)

Project support

Economic Development

€ 9 million

Bringing the Turkish Cypriot Community Closer to the EU

€ 3 million

• Infrastructure projects for the main cities in the northern part (Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia) focusing on wastewater, drinking water, sewage or rehabilitation issues • Grant schemes for support to SMEs • Feasibility studies to prepare economic integration of the northern part of Cyprus with the EU after a political solution • Information seminars on the acquis communautaire • Visits of selected groups to the EU institutions organised by the Commission to provide more information on the EU • Consultation with the Cypriot authorities on finding ways to encourage participation of Turkish Cypriots in EU programmes • Support to civil society and social partners; continuation of the translation of the acquis communautaire into Turkish


the basis of the UN plan, which remains on the table. Meanwhile, in line with the request of the European Council, we should do all we can to help the people of the northern part of Cyprus (Verheugen, 2003).22 In terms of trade promotion the Commission has proposed that the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce is given the authority to issue movement certificates prior to accession of Cyprus to the EU, on the basis that there is a solution on the Cyprus problem so that the northern part of the island has preferential access to the EU markets. Since a 1994 judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), movement certificates issued by ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) authorities’ have not been accepted under the Association Agreement between Cyprus and the EC. The de-facto division of the island has thus prevented direct exports of goods produced or obtained in the northern part to benefit from the customs preferential treatment under the Association Agreement. The EU approach on Cyprus at Copenhagen and since Copenhagen has followed a familiar pattern in terms of its two separate but intimately linked strands. First it is clear that any EU strategy on Cyprus is inexorably linked to the EU’s relationship with Turkey – and its progressive development. Thus the EU approach has been to promote and encourage Turkey to reform in order to meet the criteria for membership – although the EU has been constrained in this sense by internal disputes and the reservations of member states and prominent individuals in the EU, who are clearly sceptical about Turkish membership of the EU, some on legitimate grounds (in the sense that Turkey has not yet fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria), but others on grounds beyond that of the eligibility criteria. In terms of Cyprus itself, the prominent EU approach has been to emphasise the benefits the EU can offer to both communities on the island (in particular the north) and to attempt to encourage a greater climate for cooperation and agreement between the communities primarily through economic and financial assistance.

Conclusions Overall it would be too strong to conclude that the EU has had clear strategy23 on Cyprus vis-à-vis the political problem, due to the complexity of the politics of linkage between Cyprus’ EU membership, a Cyprus settlement and Turkey’s EU membership, and the precarious


nature of the negotiations through the UN process. The EU however, has had an implicit strategy based on a specific logic of ‘inclusion’ (power of attraction) as a method of aiding the movement towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. There has been no attempt to develop a clear and separate EU strategy for the ‘solution’ of the Cyprus problem – the primary reason (or constraint) for this being the established UN frameworks and resolutions for resolving the dispute, as well as structural problems relating to EU foreign policy decision-making. The EU strategy for resolving the Cyprus issue has always been through the power of attraction – where it has had an established and embedded frame of reference. The EU thinking on Cyprus has reflected the primacy of the UN process and framework for resolving the political dispute on the island, whilst consistently promoting the EU process of accession (in parallel) in the belief that this would act as a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Although the EU has never actually spelt out an explicit rationale for this stance, since 1993 there have been regular statements and reports eluding to the very idea that ‘the result of Cyprus’ accession to the Community…would help to bring the communities on the island together’ (Commission Opinion, 1993) or that ‘progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem will naturally reinforce each other’ (European Commission, 1999). Such a belief has been grounded in the view that accession to the EU for Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, is much more desirable than that of conflict and division – and in particular the strategic interests Turkey has had in Cyprus historically. The EU strategy therefore, through accession and enlargement, has had to balance the interests of the three key actors in the dispute: the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey: not forgetting Greece inside the EU. Moreover having adopted UN positions on Cyprus, the EU recognised the legitimacy of the Cypriot government of Cyprus, and believed that the central cause for the deadlock on the island was Turkish Cypriot intransigence, with the support and backing of Turkey. Therefore, the EU’s strategy and implicit reasoning was that it could offer appetising incentives through accession to these two parties, on the condition that movement was forthcoming on the settlement of the Cyprus problem. In this sense then the EU hoped that through the logic of inclusion a climate for cooperation and compromise would be constructed, which would in turn catalyse a settlement.


Of course the enlargement strategy of the EU has not always been straightforward or consistent – in particular because the prospect of Turkish membership raised many wider issues than that of its involvement in Cyprus. Indeed, despite the synergy between progression in Turkish EU relations and the resolution of the Cyprus problem, and precisely because of it, EU policy towards Turkey was cautious and pragmatic, based on legitimate concerns about the fulfilment of economic and political criteria, but also unofficial concerns about the religious and cultural implications of Turkey joining acceding to the European club in the future. On the two communities in Cyprus the EU’s strategy has been to convince the Turkish Cypriot community of the political, economic and social benefits open to them upon membership of the EU if a settlement was agreed – whilst consistently reiterating that the accession negotiations with Cyprus were not directed against the Turkish Cypriot community or Turkey. The EU’s strategy here primarily took the form of an economic-functional logic, with the allocation of not only postaccession funds for the reconstruction of northern Cyprus, but substantial sums of money at the pre-accession stage to create the necessary political will for a solution on the island. Overall the EU strategy for catalysing a solution to the Cyprus problem has been the power of attraction. It was hoped that such a strategy, although by no means coherent or consistent due to the complexities of linkage and parallel processes (UN) for resolving the dispute, would help to ‘change minds’ towards a settlement in Cyprus based on a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution. The chapters that follow will aim to evaluate and assess the extent to which the EU logic and approach has actually created any movement and brought us closer to the solution of the Cyprus problem, and ultimately greater stability in the near eastern Mediterranean region.

4 The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions

Introduction When the European Commission delivered its favourable Opinion on the application of the government of Cyprus in 1993, it noted that, ‘the adoption of the Community acquis would present no insurmountable problems, but that the division of Cyprus meant that the freedoms provided for under the EU Treaties could not be exercised fully throughout the island’ (Andrews, 1998, p. 17). Nevertheless, the Opinion also expressed the view that the process of accession would help to bring the communities in Cyprus closer together (Commission Opinion, 1993). By sending out a positive signal to the people of Cyprus and attaching with it a time frame for assessment the expectation was that the power of attraction would act as a catalyst for finding a solution to the problem under UN direction and a unified Cyprus inside the European Union (EU). Since then, regular statements and declarations have reflected the EU’s optimism in the accession process and the incentives that accompanies this as the ‘best tool’ for ensuring a peaceful coexistence of the two communities. The power of attraction and with it the tool of conditionality (carrot and stick) has clearly been at the forefront of the EU ‘approach’, and its belief that the accession process would act as a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It is the purpose of this chapter to assess the perceptions of the two communities on the island, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, on the utility of the power of attraction in helping to create a positive and conciliatory climate for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The theory is that the power of attraction (enlargement) could help to prevent or resolve conflict by imposing self-restraint on countries that 96

The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions 97

want to show their good intentions and their readiness for membership by providing the EU with important external leverage over the behaviour of potential candidates. It was also recognised however, that in order for enlargement to work as foreign policy the EU had to be forthcoming with a clear timeframe for membership, it had to be perceived as legitimate by all the actors involved in the conflict, and that it had to be clear on the prospective geographical coverage. A key interrelated ingredient relating to Cyprus was also that of political will – enlargement could only work to catalyse an agreement if the actors involved actually showed the necessary inclination to move towards ‘a united Cyprus’ within a bizonal, bicommunal federal framework. How successful has this approach been? Have the tools of accession and conditionality worked to persuade the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to move towards a resolution of the Cyprus issue through agreed United Nations (UN) resolutions? How has the power of attraction been perceived by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots? Has it created the necessary political will for a solution to the Cyprus problem? Given these questions this chapter will be broken down into the following sections. Section 1 will provide a brief historical context for understanding the Greek Cypriot perception of the EU. In addition to this it will outline the perceptions and motivations of the Greek Cypriots for applying to the EU in the context of the Cyprus issue. Section 2 will then set out and evaluate the Turkish Cypriot position and perception on the benefits of EU accession for Cyprus, and for the Cyprus question. The final section will then draw some preliminary conclusions on the utility of the power of attraction as an approach for resolving the Cyprus issue.

The Greek Cypriot position In order to understand the Greek Cypriot motivations for pursuing EU association and membership and involving the EU in the Cyprus dispute, one must understand the historically established approach of the Greek side of utilising international fora and involving sympathetic third parties in order to exert pressure on the intransigent parties in order to solve the Cyprus issue (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots). Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side has sought to endorse and enhance the legitimacy of its position through the UN since the 1950s through the accumulation of many resolutions in the General Assembly and condemnation through the Security Council, and more recently through the EU.


The success of the Greek Cypriot strategy in using the UN as an instrument of national policy, in particular after the 1974 invasion, legitimised their perspective within the international community. The approval of the international community in turn, meant that the UN resolutions ‘came into play in support of the Greek Cypriots’ (Joseph, 1997, p. 113). Resolutions were adopted that attached blame for the Cyprus invasion and problem to Turkey, and that condemned and declared illegal the attempts to create a ‘Federated State of Cyrus’ in 1975, and the unilateral declaration that established the ‘Turkish Republic of Cyprus’ in 1983 – recognised only by Turkey in the international community. According to Joseph the Greek Cypriots ‘managed to turn the UN into a powerful and effective political weapon’ (1997, p. 113). Moreover, the Cypriot government through its strategy at the UN, not only became the dominant force in the international political and diplomatic scene, but also the only recognised legitimate authority in Cyprus. In contrast, both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were marginalised diplomatically, politically and economically – with the Turkish Cypriot north relying solely on Turkey for its representation and economic well being (Joseph, 1997, p. 113). Of course these observations are subject to certain qualification. Although the Greek Cypriots were successful at UN level, the Security Council never adopted an overt pro-Greek Cypriot line. Indeed the Turkish invasion was never explicitly condemned and the UN allowed the voice of the Turkish Cypriot representative, Rauf Denktash, to be heard through Turkey. Furthermore the UN always recommended negotiations between the two Cypriot communities, thus somewhat absolving Turkey of its responsibility, in the hope of encouraging a compromise. The UN perceived the Turkish Cypriot community as a legitimate side and Rauf Denktash and his advisers as equal representatives of one of the two sides in the dispute, even though the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was not recognised (Informal interview, Greek-Cypriot academic, 2003). Nevertheless it was in this international context, alongside the immense changes sweeping across Europe, that the legitimately recognised Cypriot government applied to join the EU in 1990. The position of the EU on the Cyprus problem, as noted in the previous chapter, was strongly determined by the many UN resolutions and condemnations on the Cyprus problem. Given the influence of the Greek Cypriots at UN level it can be no surprise that the Greek Cypriot position was also one with which EU decision-makers sympathised,


because it was a position embedded in established UN resolutions delineating the norms and ‘rules of the game’ for Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot strategy to apply to join the EU must be understood in this context – a policy of referal to international organisations pursued in the 1950s when the Cypriot government sought to take the issue to the UN, and repeated in the 1990s through seeking the involvement of the EU. This is not to say that the government of Cyprus had lost faith in a UN solution, but that the perception of the Greek Cypriots was that it could act as an extra dimension in helping to resolve the Cyprus issue – in particular at a time when borders in Europe were disintegrating. The EU added credibility and legitimacy to the Greek Cypriot strategy and their desire to resolve the Cyprus issue through a bizonal, bicommunal federation solution. With the Greek Cypriots then, they did not need to be convinced that EU accession was beneficial, their strategy was clearly based on the power of attraction – and its potential effect of giving the Greek Cypriots extra leverage to resolve the Cyprus issue. Greek Cypriot motives for association with the EC Cyprus, since independence, had started its European-oriented policy by becoming a member of the Council of Europe in 1961 – under the joint administration of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Its relationship to the EEC however, evolved in close parallel with Britain’s. Thus in 1962 when Britain submitted its application for membership, Cyprus expressed its first interest in developing an association with the European Economic Community (EEC). Cyprus was heavily dependent on Britain through Commonwealth preferential trade agreements for the export of its goods, and if Britain were to join the EEC, then this would severely disadvantage the Cypriot economy. It was economically logical that through seeking association with the EEC, Cyprus would continue to enjoy access to British markets and in the longer term re-orientate its policy away from reliance on Britain and towards the EEC (Redmond, 1993, p. 64; Gaudissart, 1996, p. 9; http://hri.org/ Cyprus_ Problem/europeanunion.html). As Gsanger has noted, Cyprus’s association with the EEC was, ‘an economically rational step to ensure continued access for her traditional exports to her main trading partner, the United Kingdom’ (Gsanger, 1980, p. 280). Although General de Gaulle vetoed the application of Britain in 1963, the EEC–Cyprus relationship was, with the exception of 1967,1 developed in tandem with renewed British interest in joining the EEC. Britain, like Cyprus, had come to realise that there were economic


benefits to be gained through membership and when Britain re-applied in 1971, the Cyprus initiative was also reactivated, culminating in British membership and an Association Agreement for Cyprus that was to become active in June 1973. Cyprus also had other reasons for seeking association with the EEC. First, the Cypriot government2 was convinced that opening its economy to the European market would help revitalise the Cyprus economy. Second, assistance from and trade with the EEC would assist economic development in Cyprus. Finally, Cyprus did not want to fall behind its neighbours in the Mediterranean who had all concluded some form of agreement with the EEC (Greece 1961, Turkey 1963 and Malta 1970). Politically, Cyprus was in crisis and the independence and international integrity of the Republic of Cyprus was under threat. From a Greek Cypriot perspective, the belief was that the EEC, through its already proven economic status would bring much needed political attention and interest to an area that deeply needed help. The Customs Union agreement between Cyprus and the EC in 1986 was of political as well as economic significance for Cyprus, the reason being according to the Cypriot Foreign Minister at the time, ‘because our entering a Customs Union is a practical implementation of the declarations of the EEC, which recognizes the Cyprus government as the sole legitimate government of Cyprus…It should be noted that this development constitutes a practical reply to the recent illegal actions of the Turkish Cypriots and strengthens the Cyprus state politically and diplomatically…’ (Iacovou, 1986, p. 5). For the Greek Cypriots this Agreement reaffirmed the support of the European Community for Cyprus’ European orientation and also for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem based on UN resolutions. The movement towards Europe did not detract from UN resolutions, but rather Europe would provide a rational framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The reasoning behind this was that, ‘the rules and principles regulating political conduct in Europe [would] lead to a solution in harmony with democratic notions and justice – and eventually benefit both Greek and Turkish Cypriots’.3 It was thought by the government of Cyprus that this would give greater leverage for the EEC to influence Turkey and find a solution by abiding to international norms of justice and decisions made by the UN.4 The Turkish reaction to this process was of intense disapproval. Given the turbulent relationship between Turkey and the EC up until then, the Turkish view was that any Agreement likely to favour the Greek Cypriots without recognising the Turkish Cypriots would under-


mine any efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem and would cause further problems. Indeed this view was extended to the application of the Cypriot government to join the European club in 1990. For the Cypriot government it became clear that it was ‘the continuation of the Cyprus problem which was leading to a continuous postponement of the issuing of the Avis’ on the part of the EC. It was also observed that this was a ‘gross misconception’ and ‘unreasonable to penalise Cyprus because Turkey continued its intransigence’ (Michaelides, 1996, pp. 4–5). The central argument from the government of Cyprus was that whatever reservations member states had about the end of the process, this was no justification for blocking the opening of the process of accession. The Greek Cypriot application to the EC: The Cypriot government perspective When the government of Cyprus5 submitted its application to join the European Community on 4 July 1990, it was clearly felt the benefits of this decision would serve the interests of the entire people of Cyprus. The motives were both of a political and economic nature – although the former objective was clearly primary. Politically, at the time of the application, there existed a belief that membership represented a natural progression from its association with Europe, and that involving the EC in the Cyprus issue provided another avenue and another form of pressure in seeking a solution. The expectation was that it would ‘create a more positive context’ and that although it was not regarded as a sole vehicle for finding a solution it could, through supporting the UN initiatives, be a ‘major contributor by creating an incentive to both sides’ (Interview, Greek Cypriot diplomat, anonymous, 1998). Economically, ‘Cyprus enjoyed one of the most advanced relationships between an associated country and the Community’ (Gaudissart, 1996, p. 20), and there were several perceived benefits from accession including benefits from trade, encouraging and increasing foreign direct investment, and helping to secure the goals of low inflation, low interest rates and high economic growth. Furthermore it would assist in the modernisation (liberalise) of the Cypriot economy – Europeanisation would help to legitimise necessary but difficult reforms and move them forward at a much faster pace than allowed otherwise. Overall, one of the central economic motives for the application was, ‘the secure climate, together with the monetary stability that is expected as a result of the anticipated Economic and Monetary Union


in Europe [that] created stable conditions for the long-term planning of production and investment’ (Cyprus: The Way to Full Membership, 1997, pp. 10–11). It was the security element however, that was most significant in the Cypriot government’s strategy and the expectation that the EU would act as a catalyst to a solution for the Cyprus issue. The expectation amongst Greek Cypriot elite policy-makers was that the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue through accession: • Would put pressure on non-interested and intransigent parties to find a solution to the Cyprus issue (e.g. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots) • Would involve another key global actor in the equation of resolving the Cyprus issue where the UN has thus far not been successful, despite many attempts in the past • Would provide security against any potential further armed intervention by Turkey – in particular when Cyprus became an EU member. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot strategy was clearly based on the assumption that Turkey would, eventually, want to comply with the EU in order to be rewarded for its behaviour. The incentive for Turkey was that it would be allowed to continue on its road to accession, with the economic and political support that this entails (through EU association, aid, funding etc). Additionally, Turkey, from a Greek Cypriot perspective, might feel pressurised to be more compliant, as the alternative would mean that it would lose any bargaining power once Cyprus joined the EU. Similarly, it was expected that through accession, pressure could be brought on the main actors in the self-declared TRNC – the Turkish Cypriots who were there before 1974 (87,600), the Turkish settlers that were brought in after 1974 (115,000), and the Turkish army (35,000) (European Parliament Committee Report, 2003, p. 2).6 Indeed, the expectation was that the power of attraction and in particular the economic and security benefits that this would bring with it for Turkish Cypriots would help to encourage a solution to the Cyprus issue. There is clear evidence that Turkish Cypriots (civil society) have already realised the benefits of such incentives – with nearly 3,000 Turkish Cypriots applying for Cypriot passports in order to be able to take advantage of future accession.7 Additional to this Turkish Cypriots have led mass protests against the Denktash regime – some 30,000 took


to the streets of northern Cyprus in December 2002 for example – demanding a solution based on the Annan plan, and membership of the EU along with the Greek Cypriots (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 27.12.02–10.01.03, p. 25). For the Greek Cypriots then, EU accession clearly brings with it benefits in the political, economic and security domains – and even more so given the renewed effort by the UN in the form of the Annan plan, which the Cypriot government has accepted, in principle at least, as a basis for negotiations to achieve an agreed settlement of the Cyprus issue.8 The Greek Cypriot strategy, vis-à-vis the EU angle, is based on what the power of attraction could do – and what it has clearly done to date. The EU has provided the government of Cyprus with a clear timetable for accession, provided the necessary incentives (economic, financial, security), and consistently confirmed Cyprus’ European credentials and orientation. More importantly, the GreekCypriots perceive that the benefits of EU membership add to the potential for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, as well as the economic and security advantages of belonging to the European club. The Greek Cypriot side clearly place a great deal of value on membership of the EU – and from their perspective, it is for this reason that they have been determined to show the necessary ‘political will’ through the UN process in order to find a solution. In the words of the President of the Republic, We always counted on U.N. support and involvement and we will continue to do so. We are always ready whenever the SecretaryGeneral invites us to engage in serious negotiations on the basis of his plan in order to reach a settlement as soon as possible, in conformity with relevant United Nations Resolutions. We hope that soon it will be possible for the other side to realise that they have to return to the negotiating table, cooperate constructively with the Secretary-General and demonstrate the necessary political will to yield a settlement (Papadopoulos, 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Speech 25/9/2OO3, my emphasis) Indeed in the event that a solution was not found under UN auspices a key Greek Cypriot objective was ‘not to leave hesitation to any third party that the Greek Cypriot side is not the responsible side for this failure’. The primary reason for demonstrating political will for a solution from the perspective of the Greek Cypriots was because they ‘wanted to safeguard [their] course to the European Union’ (Papapetrou,


2002). From a Greek Cypriot perspective the two processes – the UN process for solution and the EU process of accession – were mutually reinforcing, but they did not want to be derailed from their primary objective of becoming a EU member by what they perceived as an obdurate Turkish and Turkish Cypriot stance on the solution of the Cyprus issue. Political parties, public opinion and the EU As has been clearly shown by the above analysis the Greek Cypriot elite perspective on EU association and accession – and in particular its effects or potential effects – have been positive. Indeed Greek Cypriot elites clearly saw the benefits of adopting a power of attraction logic, in order to facilitate the movement towards the solution of the Cyprus problem. Political parties The view of the Greek Cypriot political parties (see Box 4.1) in Cyprus has been almost fully consensual on the issue of both EU membership and accession as a means of resolving the Cyprus issue. Having said this however, this was not always the case. Historically, there was variation and diversification in the degree to which certain political parties accepted Cyprus’ European orientation and its utility in aiding a solution to the Cyprus issue (Stavridis, 2002), and even today certain parties have only reluctantly accepted the EU factor. All political parties on the Greek side are relatively recent phenomena, most founded after 1974. The exception to this is the progressive party of the working people (AKEL), which descended from the

Box 4.1

Greek Cypriot political parties Main Parties AKEL (Communist – Progressive Party of the Working People) DISY (Democratic Rally, Right) DIKO (Democratic Party, Centre) KISOS (Social Democrats, Socialist) Smaller Parties EDI (United Democrats, Centre) New Horizons (Nationalist Party) ADIK (Democratic Movement, Centre, DIKO splinter) GREENS (Kinhma Oikologon Perivallontiston)

Source: Stavridis, 2002.


Communist Party of Cyprus and which held its first congress in 1926 but was declared illegal by British authorities in 1931. Constituted in 1941, AKEL absorbed the Communist party. Thus today AKEL works for a fully independent, sovereign, non-aligned, demilitarised, democratic and federal Cyprus, and for socialism. The General Secretary of the party is Demetris Christofias, who is also currently the President of the Vouli (Cypriot House of Representatives).9 The view of AKEL on EU association and membership has traditionally (historically) been negative due to their ideological grounding (anti-capitalist) – indeed they were for a long time against association due to serious concerns and reservations about the economic and social effects of pursuing accession to the European club.10 Indeed AKEL which helped George Vassiliou to become President of Cyprus is 1988 through its support, was initially against his policy of applying for EU membership. Effectively, it was only after 1995 that they began to accept, albeit reluctantly (they had to yield to the decision of the other political parties), the prospect of acceding to the EU – with the political dimension of accession (rather than economic or social) representing the primary concern, for the potential contribution that it could make to the struggle for a just solution of the Cyprus problem. In this sense the European course and accession to the EU is still not the main strategic objective for AKEL, although they have accepted, ‘in light of the new world facts’, that the EU could be a positive force for a just, viable and functional resolution of the Cyprus issue (which remains their primary objective). Indeed AKEL has reformulated its position on the EU, and is prepared to speak in favour of Cyprus’ accession to the EU, but only ‘on the precondition that the EU would help the correct resolution of the Cyprus problem, that the whole of Cyprus accedes to the EU and important social and economic achievements…would be safeguarded’ (http://www.akel/org.cy/English /eu.html). The Social Democrats (KISOS) (formerly EDEK, founded in 1969 by Vassos Lyssarides), again because of their Socialist orientation, did not favour association with the EU. Historically, the party favoured a national health care system and nationalisation of banks and foreignowned mines. Importantly, EDEK was opposed to NATO and very much in favour of the Middle East and favoured a nonaligned foreign policy, although these positions did soften in the late 1980s. Since then it has shown consistent support for EU membership, with increasing enthusiasm for the EU as another vehicle for facilitating movement to a solution of the Cyprus issue.


In terms of the centre and right wing political parties, Democratic Rally (DISY),11 created in 1976 and led by Glafkos Clerides (now led by Nicos Anastasiades), has always favoured a pro-EU policy. This is not surprising given that DISY was founded on pro-Western and pro-NATO principles, with a perception of Cyprus as Western European state. Indeed DISY pioneered the Western and European orientation of Cyprus and it was the first Cypriot political party to participate in Western, European and global organisations. DISY has always supported the need for stronger links with the European Community, the Council of Europe and other EU institutions in more recent times. Indeed under Glafcos Clerides, President of Cyprus until February 2003 (from 1993), Cyprus’ European orientation continued apace, and there was clearly a view, as already outlined, that membership of the EU would bring substantial benefits to Cyprus, in particular with regard to the future security of the island. The Democratic Party (DIKO), also formed in 1976, was historically the closest party to President Makarios, and was initially headed by his successor, Spyros Kyprianou. DIKO’s position can be located on the left of centre of the political spectrum – with their views representing a balance between the left and right political parties of AKEL and DISY (see Tsardanidis, 1989, pp. 74–75). Spyros Kyprianou was replaced as leader of DIKO in 2000 by Tassos Papadopoulos, who in February 2003 won the Cypriot presidential elections (replacing Glafcos Clerides), gaining 51.51 per cent of the votes as opposed to Clerides who mustered 38.8 per cent. Although the leader of the Democratic Party had focussed his campaign during the election on the island’s domestic problems, accusing the outgoing President of only being interested in the country’s reunification of the island, one of DIKO’s main goals after the election was ‘to continue efforts to conclude the procedure for Cyprus’s accession into the EU, as well as the essential negotiations on the basis of the Annan plan for the solution of the political problem, a solution that should be operational, viable, and compatible with the European acquis’.12 So although historically, different views prevailed as to the benefits of an EU orientation, especially amongst the parties of the Left, it is fair to say that in the present climate, all Greek Cypriot political parties accept and support EU membership, although views do differ on the potential ramifications and implications of accession. Indeed the four main political parties in Cyprus have expressed their full support for Cyprus’ bid to join the EU, and acknowledged the potential impact of this on the


peace process. Not only this, the very same parties have lent their support to the President of the Republic of Cyprus in negotiations and talks to reach a solution to the protracted Cyprus question (Cyprus News Agency, http://kypros.org/News/Data/cna20020125_1.html). Public opinion Despite the fact that there are no Euro-sceptical parties in the Greek Cypriot community, there are sizeable groups which are not happy with the prospects of EU membership, such as highly conservative Hellenic fundamentalists who always disliked decadent Western Europe and businessmen involved in manufacturing industries who do not believe they can survive competition from Europe. In terms of public opinion on the Greek Cypriot side however, there is a large majority in favour of membership and a general consensual view on the benefits that the EU will bring to Cyprus economically, politically and in terms of the future security of Cyprus.13 A ‘Public Opinion Survey’ carried (see Box 4.2) out on behalf of the Office of the Chief Negotiator for Cyprus’ Accession to the EU in July 2002, revealed some interesting conclusions, not least of which was that 85 per cent believed that accession to the EU would contribute positively to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Only eight per cent believed that EU accession would have a negative effect on the solution of the Cyprus problem, with seven per cent not knowing either way. Of the eight per cent that believed EU accession would have a negative effect on the solution of the Cyprus issue, a variety of reasons were given, many relating to internal perceptions of the Greek Cypriots on Box 4.2

Summary: Greek Cypriot support for accession to the EU

➢ 78 per cent believe that accession to the Union will have positive effects on the island ➢ 2 in 3 expect advantages from Cyprus’ accession ➢ 68 per cent state that they will feel more security upon accession ➢ Approximately half of the people believe that accession will contribute towards economic development ➢ 71 per cent would vote in favour in a referendum ➢ 85 per cent believe that accession will have a positive effect in the efforts of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem ➢ 68 per cent believe that Cyprus will become a member of the EU even without a prior solution to the Cyprus problem Source: Government of Cyprus, Office of the Chief Negotiator, 2002.


external actors in the Cyprus problem. Reasons did not necessarily relate directly to Cyprus’ EU accession, for example, 21 per cent believed that any solution would only be serving the interests of the US and other larger nations with 16 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, perceiving that the EU and US are more interested in Turkey and thus any solution would reflect the needs of those parties, rather than the Greek Cypriots. Also important are the results relating to the security of the Greek Cypriots after EU accession. As was noted above the security factor is one of the major reasons, from a Cypriot governmental perspective, for the application for the Republic of Cyprus to the EU – in particular with reference to security against any future aggression by Turkey. The results of the survey suggest that 68 per cent of the Greek Cypriot population would also feel more secure once Cyprus accedes to the EU – in line with governmental thinking, although 16 per cent would feel less secure, 11 per cent would feel no difference in terms of security, with five per cent not knowing if they would feel more secure or not. On a more general level there is strong support for EU membership with 75 per cent agreeing with the decision to pursue EU membership and 25 per cent disagreeing. The percentage of those who agree is higher among the higher and middle socioeconomic layers of the society and also among men. In addition 71 per cent would vote positively, in favour of EU membership in a referendum, whilst only 22 per cent would vote against Cyprus’ accession to the EU: 60 per cent also believe that EU membership would bring more advantages to Cyprus, whilst 30 per cent believe that it will bring more disadvantages.

The Turkish Cypriot position It is important at the outset that we distinguish between the view of the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite – and the views of the opposition party leaders14 and Turkish Cypriot civil society, as recent protests in the north of Cyprus have suggested that there is a widening schism between the two with regard to the benefits of EU accession and the resolution of the Cyprus issue. There has also been a suggestion that the Turkish settlers (see below) that were brought into the North after 1974 are becoming increasingly dismayed with the complete disregard of their welfare by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The regime in the North: The Turkish Cypriot ruling elite Developments in EU–Cyprus relations in the 1990s have been viewed with extreme scepticism by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.15 From a


Will the prospect of accession contribute positively or negatively towards the solution of the Cyprus problem?

7% 8%

85%

Positively

Negatively

Do not know

Upon Cyprus' accession to the EU would you feel more or less security?

5% 11%

16%

More

Less

68%

No difference

Do not know

Figure 4.1a and b Greek Cypriot public opinion – EU membership the Cyprus problem and security Source: Government of Cyprus, Office of the Chief Negotiator, 2002.


Do you agree with the decision to pursue membership to the EU? Men/Women

45%

Strongly agree

53% 30%

Agree

24% 9% 7%

Disagree

13% 15%

Strongly disagree

Do not know

3% 1%

0%

10%

20%

30%

MEN

40%

50%

60%

WOMEN

If tomorrow there was a referendum for Cyprus' accession, would you vote for or against it? Total

7%

22%

71%

Certainly for/Probably for Certainly against/Probably against Do not know

Figure 4.2a and b referendum

Greek Cypriot public opinion – EU membership and

Source: Government of Cyprus, Office of the Chief Negotiator, 2002.


Turkish Cypriot ruling elite perspective the application of the government of Cyprus to join the EU was both illegitimate and illegal. Illegitimate because Turkish Cypriots were not involved in the application process, and illegal,16 it is claimed, because of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which stated that Cyprus could not become a member of an international organisation of which only one of the motherland countries (Greece) was a member.17 This, however, has been rejected by the EU, which has argued that such a restriction does not apply to a sui generis organism such as the EU (Bahcheli, 2001, p. 10). Indeed, it is pointed out by the EU that Austria’s 1955 State Treaty has a similar provision (preventing union with Germany), but this has not stopped Austria from joining the EU. After Cyprus’ inclusion as an enlargement candidate at the Corfu European Council (1994), and the subsequent decisions to begin negotiations with Cyprus were taken (1995, 1998) the Turkish-Cypriot position hardened. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the self-declared TRNC, cited the EU accession process as one of the major stumbling blocks to progression. From the outset, he attached extra conditions to the potential success of the UN in brokering a solution to the Cyprus issue. These preconditions included: • The recognition of the illegal TRNC as a separate and independent state • A confederal solution to the Cyprus issue • The postponement of the EU accession process until a political solution was found and the Turkish Cypriots could contribute to their future The position taken by Denktash was in contravention to the established UN agreed basis for a solution; namely that of a federal, bizonal, bicommunal framework – a framework that had been agreed by Denktash himself in the High Level agreements of 1977 and 1979. Denktash effectively rejected any invitation to attend direct intercommunal talks until after these conditions had been met, following unsuccessful attempts at negotiation in Troutbeck and Glion (1997), and the beginning of accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus in 1998. Denktash also refused an invitation by the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafkos Clerides, to join the Cypriot negotiating team in March 1998, arguing that this would only be possible if a solution was first found and the illegal TRNC was recognised as an equal negotiating state. The Greek Cypriot position remained unchanged, and rejected any such preconditions.


Certain commentators have criticised the terms of the offer for a place alongside the Cypriot delegation to negotiate the accession process. Indeed, it has been argued that by ‘extending the invitation through the recognised RoC [Republic of Cyprus] and only mentioning Turkish Cypriot participation without veto rights as members of the Greek Cypriot negotiating team, the initiative merely served to alienate TRNC officials and enhance the status of the recognised RoC’ (Tocci, 2001, p. 16). Tocci has argued that, ‘If instead Turkish Cypriot officials were invited directly as Turkish representatives of the future “common state” of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot reactions may well be different’ (2001, p. 16). Additionally, others have argued that invitations to participate should be ‘issued directly by the EU (rather than the Republic of Cyprus government) for Turkish representatives to take part on an equal footing in accession talks; the island’s team to be called simply “Cyprus”’ (Ludford, 2002, p. 1). How far such gestures would make a difference to the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s attitude given that economic and politico-security incentives (see below) have been ignored, and more saliently, given Rauf Denktash’s minimum conditionality of recognition of the TRNC is, however, questionable. Furthermore neither Denktash nor his supporters in the Turkish politico-military establishment wanted to concede any ground vis-à-vis their representational claims, as this would effectively confer full legitimacy to the Cyprus government. The Turkish Cypriot ruling elite maintained and hardened its position between 1998 and 2001. For example on 30 June 2000 it imposed restriction on the movement of UN forces, and in addition to this Denktash refused to attend the sixth round of talks that were scheduled in 2001 (Tocci, 2001, p. 5). The ‘carrots’ being offered by the EU in the form of mainly economic but also political/security incentives were clearly not enough to persuade the Turkish Cypriot leadership to change its intransigent position on seeking a settlement in Cyprus. Although Turkish Cypriot ruling elites were not persuaded however, the same cannot be said of Turkish Cypriot civil society. The ‘EU sought to overcome Turkish Cypriot resistance by emphasizing the considerable economic benefits that membership would bring to the island’s poorer Turkish Community’ (Bahcheli, 2001, p. 204) and segments of the Turkish Cypriot population, including Turkish settlers, clearly recognise the economic benefits of a united Cyprus in the EU.18 Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish businessmen and politicians have also chastised Denktash for his rigidity with regard to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue and joining the EU (Economist, 2001, p. 16).


Having said this, however, ‘even if a majority of Turkish Cypriots want a deal – which may be the case – their leaders (and more importantly, leaders in Turkey itself) are unprepared to accept one on the terms being offered…’ (Barkey and Gordon, 2001, p. 5). Economic incentives, for the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite at least, are not a primary incentive – and certainly not an incentive that will change the minds of the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite given that they have endured economic hardship over the last 35 years. In this sense, even though there is a promise of greater riches for the Turkish Cypriots in the EU, the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite is willing to endure economic subsidisation by Turkey, in order to avoid federal union within Cyprus (and thus solution under established UN principles). The Turkish Cypriot ruling elite clearly prefers to have its own state in order to secure the future of the Turkish Cypriots, even though they realise that lack of recognition and isolation has impeded economic development (Bahcheli, 2001, p. 211). The key issue here for Denktash and his inner circle of advisers is related to ‘societal identity and security’ (Diez, 2002, p. 4) – economic security, although important, is of secondary importance if in the long term the ‘identity’ of the Turkish Cypriots is not secured (through, in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the establishment and recognition of a separate Turkish Cypriot state with political equality). Although the issue of ‘identity and societal security’ is also important to the Turkish Cypriot public and Turkish Cypriot civil society – they do not adhere or agree to the Denktash policy and thinking on how to achieve this (see below). Moreover, they have manifested their frustration from many years of economic isolation through mass demonstrations in northern Nicosia in July 2000 and a public sector workers strike in December 2000 (Tocci, 2001: 10). In addition to this, between 2002 and 2003 several protests and demonstrations were held19 focusing their ire on Rauf Denktash for his intransigent stance on the settlement of the Cyprus issue and EU accession. As well as economic incentives, the EU has ‘pointed out several opportunities available to national minorities to protect their interests within the EU’, given Turkish Cypriot fears over Greek Cypriot domination (Bahcheli, 2001, p. 204). The EU has assured Turkish Cypriots that they would enjoy the same benefits and protection as any other minority within the EU. Various concerns have been espoused with regard to the future security of Turkish Cypriots, stemming from a belief that as a smaller community they would be extremely vulnerable in a re-united Cyprus. Once again, however, given the views and


opinions that have been voiced by Turkish Cypriot civil society more recently, one must differentiate between those that are genuine concerns, and those that are simply propaganda – barriers erected and veiled as concerns by Denktash and his ‘circle of elites’ to secure their own political aims and objectives vis-à-vis their vision of a solution in Cyprus. There is no doubt that Turkish Cypriots have had genuine fears in the past due to their historical experience (see Chapter 2) in Cyprus, and that many concerns still exist with regard to property rights, compensation, freedom of movement, representation, and equality – and ultimately their ‘social identity and security’ in a re-united Cyprus. However, public opinion surveys (see below) carried out in the North suggest that these concerns are not a constraint to EU membership for the majority of Turkish Cypriots – and indeed that most of these concerns can be overcome through a solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan and EU membership. It seems the security issue is only a major stumbling block to agreement for the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite, who believe that if a reunited Cyprus entered the EU without Turkey being a member, this would effectively negate the power of Turkey in intervening and protecting Turkish Cypriots on the island. The Turkish Cypriot ruling elite (and those that still support the leadership) did not accept EU assurances that Turkey’s role as guarantor power of the island would not be affected by EU membership, even though ‘complete’ withdrawal of Turkish troops was never an issue in the negotiations for a solution. Neither do they accept that the EU will provide them with framework to protect their rights as a minority in Cyprus, despite consistent reassurances from the EU that Turkish Cypriot security concerns would be addressed. Moreover, as one senior Commission official pointed out: ‘In terms of security the EU does not regard it as an EU issue…and will not interfere with any security or constitutional arrangements agreed as part of a solution through the intercommunal talks’ (Interview, Senior Commission official, anonymous, 2002). In this sense then, the argument and fears about the future security of Turkish Cypriots can clearly be resolved prior to EU accession – and the EU will offer the same security offered to all member states. Indeed, as an important concession to Turkish Cypriot security needs the Greek Cypriot negotiating team accepts (as does the Annan plan) that a future constitution would include a Treaty of Guarantee and therefore a Turkish right to intervene (Report, 2002: 13).


The security fears of each community are clearly a matter for the two leaders of the communities in the intercommunal talks and negotiations for a solution.20 In this context, the genuine fears of the Turkish Cypriots can be addressed before EU membership – in particular with regard to derogations on movement (which can be incorporated into the EU framework), property, and the protection of Turkish Cypriots through the maintenance of a Turkish military presence after a solution has been negotiated. In this instance, in the event of a solution based on the Annan plan, the EU would have to clarify clearly which derogations could be incorporated and supported by the EU framework, and stipulate the duration of any such derogations (permanent or temporary) in order that its commitment is perceived as credible by the Turkish Cypriot community. Opposition in the North: their views on the EU factor As indicated above, surveys conducted in the North have suggested high levels of support for EU membership (Box 4.3 (a) and (b)). 21 Such high levels of support, juxtaposed against the intransigent stance taken up by the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite, have led to regular mass protests in 2002 and throughout 2003 against the status quo situation on the island. Turkish Cypriots have not only voiced their opposition to the position of Rauf Denktash and his ‘inner Box 4.3 (a)

Public opinion in northern Cyprus on EU accession

Generally speaking, do you think that Turkish Cypriot membership of the EU would be..? per cent (%) 1. a good thing 88.4 2. a bad thing 3.5 3. neither good nor bad 7.9 4. DK – no opinion (spontaneous) 0.2 TOTAL 100 Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Turkish Cypriots could get advantages or not from being a member of the EU? per cent (%) 1. yes it could 88.9 2. no it could not 7.3 3. DK – no opinion (spontaneous) 3.8 TOTAL 100 Source: Cyprus Social Research Education and Consultancy Center (KADEM) Northern Cyprus 2002.

116 The European Union and Enlargement Box 4.3 (b)

Public opinion in northern Cyprus on EU accession

Do you think that becoming a member of the EU would bring you personal advantages or not? per cent (%) 1. Yes 90.8 2. No 6.6 3. DK – no opinion (spontaneous) 2.7 TOTAL 100 And, if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of the Turkish Cypriot’s membership of the EU, would you personally vote for or against it? per cent (%) 1. For 87.4 2. Against 6.8 3. Would not go to vote 1.7 4. DK – no opinion (spontaneous) 4.1 TOTAL 100 Source: Cyprus Social Research Education and Consultancy Center (KADEM) Northern Cyprus 2002.

circle’ of elites, but made certain demands of them 22 (see Box 4.4 and Appendix A.2): • For the Turkish Cypriot leadership to negotiate on the basis of the Annan plan and sign it • To negotiate a sustainable peace settlement and EU membership • To facilitate movement towards an internationally recognised society within the EU, that is not isolated from the rest of the world • To stop mass emigration from the North by Turkish Cypriots Moreover, their perception of Denktash is largely negative; he is viewed as the main obstacle to their future in the EU and a solution to the Cyprus issue under UN auspices. Not only have Turkish Cypriots taken to the streets in protest, there has also been increasing dissatisfaction expressed by the Turkish settlers on the island against the Turkish Cypriot leadership regarding their treatment on the island during the last 29 years. Dr Nuri Cevikel, the President of the settlers’ organisation in the occupied North, in a statement reported in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper ‘Kibris’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 07.06.03–13.06.03), declared that the settlers would show their dissatisfaction with the regime in the forthcoming elections of 14 December 2003. The primary complaint of the

The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions 117 Box 4.4

The common vision of Turkish Cypriot civil society

We support the direct talks aimed at finding a political settlement in Cyprus and the EU membership of the new Partnership State that will be formed with the solution. The fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved affects the Turkish Cypriots adversely and leads to large-scale emigration. In order to solve our problems, we need a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership. The Cyprus problem must be solved before the end of year 2002. Currently, conditions are more conducive to settle the Cyprus issue than ever before. After the end of the year 2002, the chance for Turkish Cypriots to reach an agreement based on equality and obtain the right for equal representation in the EU will be lost. If a solution is not reached by the end of year 2002, and the Greek Cypriots achieve unilateral EU membership, Turkish Cypriots together with the people of Turkey will bear the greatest costs. ‘Solution and European Union membership’ in Cyprus will eliminate one of the most difficult problems in front of Turkey’s EU membership, which is the most important project of the people of Turkey after the War of Independence. The solution of the Cyprus problem will enhance Turkey’s relations with the EU and will make it easier for a date to be given to Turkey to start the accession negotiations. The main criteria for a solution: • The establishment of a new Partnership State that will have specified responsibilities and use of sovereignty, based on the political equality of the sides. • The establishment of component states (component state /constituent state) with equal rights, one in the north and one in the south of the island, each with its own specified responsibilities and use of sovereignty. • Transfer of those use of sovereignty required by the EU membership. • The formation of a solution as a package, whereby the Treaty of Guarantee is preserved. • The new Partnership State should have effective legislative, administrative and judicial structure, sufficient enough to carry out its relationships with the EU, with single international legal identity. • The settlement of the land and property issues in Cyprus should be in a way that will not give rise to new refugees, at a large scale. We, as the Turkish Cypriot Non Governmental Organizations, believe that it is possible to solve the Cyprus problem by the end of year 2002 and achieve EU membership.

settlers was that the regime had exploited them to its own political ends, stressing that they no longer supported the situation in the north and supported a solution to the Cyprus problem. Although the role of the settlers and their rights in northern Cyprus is a matter of controversy amongst many Turkish Cypriots (with regard


to their identity and rights), this development is important in the sense that the regime has historically relied on the votes of the settlers to maintain power. If the settlers do decide to translate their anxiety and discomfort by electing a new leadership in northern Cyprus – this could represent a ‘critical juncture’ for Turkish Cypriots, not only for the prospects of reunification of the island, but for membership of the EU by May 2004 as a unified Cyprus. In addition, current and past opposition party leaders (see Box 4.5) have openly criticised Denktash for his stand on EU accession and on negotiations for a Cyprus settlement. Mustafa Akinci, former leader of the Communal Liberation Party (now leader of the Peace and Democracy Movement Party), and Ferdi Sabit Soyer, General Secretary of the Republican Turkish Party, have both argued that he has lost his legitimacy as a negotiator for the Turkish Cypriot people and have called on him to resign (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 27.12.02–10.01.03, p. 19). Addressing a rally in December 2002, Akinci charged that ‘Rauf Denktash is dragging the island to permanent division’ and observed that Turkish opinion is divided into two with regard to Cyprus. Akinci also asserted that, ‘the fate of the Turkish Cypriots will be determined in the squares of Nicosia’, not in the hills of Cankaya, the seat of the Turkish president. A declaration issued at the end of the rally said, ‘we are announcing to the world that Denktash does not represent the Turkish Cypriots’ (Ibid). Izzet Izcan, General Secretary of the United Cyprus Party, has reinforced this general feeling towards Rauf Denktash, stating that ‘Denktash, at this stage has completely lost the support of the Turkish Cypriots…He is usurping by force the right of the Turkish Cypriots to decide about their own future by preventing the Annan plan to be submitted for a referendum’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 07.06.03–13.06.03). Huseyin Angolemli, the chairman of the Communal Liberation Party, has also strongly criticised Rauf Denktash, in particular his aggressive behaviour towards the Turkish Cypriots political parties and civilian groups in relation to the forthcoming elections of December 2003. He has accused the Turkish Cypriot leader of trying to create a climate of pressure against the Turkish Cypriots preventing them from fulfilling their central aim, which is to secure peace and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. In his own words he has stated that ‘Mr Denktash is trying to divide the forces that are in favour of peace and secure his own political future’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 07.06.03–13.06.03).


Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the Republican Turkish party, and the largest threat to the current regime in the forthcoming elections, has stated in no uncertain terms that Turkish Cypriots could no longer tolerate the behaviour of the ‘puppet regime’ and the non-solution policy of the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Indeed he has argued that it is only after the victory in the December 2003 elections that, through consultation with Turkey, ‘we shall both solve the Cyprus problem and pave the way for Turkey [for EU membership]’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 22.08.03–29.08.03). Indeed Mr Talat is optimistic that pro-solution and pro-EU forces will win the elections and estimates that these forces ‘will get all together about 70 per cent of the total votes’. An opinion poll conducted and published by the Cyprus Social Research Education and Consultancy Center (KADEM) between 28 June and 18 July 2003, seems to lend support to such optimism (see below). The poll suggests that a large majority of Turkish Cypriots would vote with the main opposition parties, the Republic Turkish Party and the Peace and Democracy Movement Party, with only approximately 20 per cent indicating that they would vote for those parties supporting the current ‘Denktash’ regime in the North (Table 4.1). In addition there also seems to be a large degree of personal support for opposition party leaders in favour of a solution to the Cyprus issue (Annan plan) and EU membership (Table 4.2). Rauf Denktash’s dismissive attitude to the opposition in the North has raised questions about the nature of the elections, in particular with regard to their free, fair and transparent conduct. It is estimated that since the municipal elections in June 2002 in the North, the number of voters has risen from 134,628 to 140,832 (up to November 2003) with the expectation of further rises by the time of the elections in December 2003 (see Table 4.3).

Box 4.5

Main political leaders and parties in the North23 Main Parties supporting a solution and EU membership Republican Turkish Party (Mehmet Ali Talat) Peace and Democracy Movement Party (Mustafa Akinci) Solution and EU Party (Ali Erel) Main Parties supporting Rauf Denktash and the status quo National Unity Party (Dervish Eroglu) Democratic Party (Serdar Denktash)

120 The European Union and Enlargement Table 4.1

Public opinion survey in the North – elections December 2003

Q: If the elections were held tomorrow which party would you vote for? Republican Turkish Party (RTP) (M. AliTalat) Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) (M. Akinci) National Unity Party (NUP) (D. Eroglu) Democratic Party (DP) (Sr. Denktas) Solution and EU Party (SEUP) (Ali Erel) Undecided-Did not reply Total

27.9% 15.2% 14.9% 6.8% 6.7% 28.4% 100.0%

Table 4.2 Public opinion survey in the North – politicians, the Cyprus problem and the EU Q: Who of the following politicians can do better on the Cyprus problem and on the Turkish Cypriots joining the European Union? Leader Dervis Eroglu (NUP) Mehmet Ali Talat (RTP) Mustafa Akinci (PDP) Sertar Denktas (DP) Ali Erel (SEUP) Alpay Durduran (PUM)

With great success

With success

With failure

12.8% 35.8% 26.7% 16.7% 19.6% 9.6%

21.1% 22.1% 26.3% 28.2% 23.4% 16.9%

53.1% 27.9% 27.1% 40.7% 33.8% 42.5%

UndecidedDid not reply 13.0% 14.2% 20.0% 14.4% 23.3% 31.0%

Source: Cyprus Social Research Education and Consultancy Center (KADEM) Northern Cyprus 2002.

Table 4.3

Population and voter statistics in the North 1976

1981

1985

1990

1993

1998

2003*1

Populous in 130,136 134,586 143,307 151,836 155,994 164,190 the North Voters

75,824

84,721

95,124 103,218 108,622 120,758 140,832 (*2)

*1 – No final statistics are available in 2003 in terms of population. However the statistics compiled by the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite in 2000 estimates a population of 210,047 – whilst statistics compiled by the government of Cyprus in 2002 suggest a figure of 212,500. *2 – figures up to end of September 2003. Source: Cyprus Press and Information Office, Views on the elections of 14 December 2003, 06.11.03.


In addition, a survey conducted by KADEM found that of the 20,784 voters that have registered since 1998, there were 9,000 who registered because they had reached the legitimate voting age (18), whilst the other 11,000 were voters that had arrived from Turkey between September and November 2003 in order to register specifically for the elections in December 2003 (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 14 December 2003). Given these statistics fears have been voiced about the tactics of Denktash and possible interference from Turkey in the elections, by opposition quarters in the North. A central concern has been the number of settlers who have been granted citizenship in northern Cyprus; the fact that this has been taking place in such numbers immediately before an election has undermined confidence in the electoral process. So much so that the opposition in the North has applied to the ‘Higher Electoral Council’ (YSK) for an injunction barring those who have become citizens since the municipal elections in June 2002 from voting in the elections on 14 December 2003.24 Indeed the Turkish Cypriot courts have already barred 200 people from voting in the elections who had been granted citizenship by the ‘Council of Ministers’. The elections of 14 December 2003 clearly represent a ‘critical moment’ – but only if the elections are conducted in a free, democratic and transparent manner, and the results are acknowledged, recognised and respected by all in the North and in Turkey. If the opposition forces in Cyprus win with a substantial majority (and can form a governing coalition in order to remove Rauf Denktash as negotiator) and are bestowed their democratic authority to ‘legitimately’ negotiate on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, then there is the possibility of a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan (as a starting point at least, as both sides do not agree completely with certain elements of the Plan), and membership of the EU as a united Cyprus in May 2004.

Conclusions: The power of attraction – preliminary observations Where then does this leave us with the enlargement as catalyst argument? If we try and evaluate this in terms of the conditions for the success of the power of attraction – the EU affinity with the Greek Cypriot cause and argument has meant that the EU has provided the government of Cyprus with a clear timetable for accession, provided


the necessary incentives (economic, financial, security), and consistently confirmed Cyprus’ European credentials and orientation. More importantly, the Greek Cypriots perceive that the benefits of EU membership clearly add to the potential for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, as well as economic and security advantages of belonging to the European club. In terms of political will, the EU has not always had a great deal of leverage or scope for creating flexibility in the Greek Cypriot negotiating position – in particular as a solution to the Cyprus issue was not a precondition for accession. However, the EU did create extra conditionality for Cypriot accession in Cyprus’ Accession Partnership, in order to put greater pressure on the Greek Cypriots to work towards a solution. A general consensual view in terms of public opinion and party political support for EU membership on the Greek Cypriot side has meant that the Greek Cypriots have been able to maintain and present a united front on the benefits of EU accession for Cyprus, and a solution of the Cyprus issue through UN initiatives. However, with both, there has been a great deal of debate and interpretation at the specific level – in particular with regard to the implications of EU membership for the different political parties and segments of society, and in relation to specific issue areas and proposals outlined in the ‘Annan plan’ (for example, property). In the Turkish Cypriot case the EU has clearly offered them financial/economic incentives for the short, medium and long term. Indeed, Turkish Cypriot civil society and opposition political parties have recognised the benefits of joining the EU economically (as have Turkish settlers more recently) – with offers of special financial packages if a solution is found previous to accession, allocated pre-accession funding of €12 million to facilitate movement towards a solution (see Chapter 3), and an agreed allocation of €206 million of financial aid for the post-accession reconstruction of northern Cyprus.25 The accession process also opened up opportunities for political protest by Turkish Cypriot civil society in favour of EU membership and a solution to the Cyprus issue. In this instance then, it is clear that the EU enlargement process and its timing, has been an important factor (amongst others) in catalysing action and protest from the Turkish Cypriot opposition parties and Turkish Cypriot civil society (Labour Unions, Civil Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) etc), and more importantly, in catalysing a movement towards the solution of the Cyprus issue. The benefits offered to Turkish Cypriots through membership of the EU and the inexorable link


between accession and a solution to the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan, has proved a fruitful ‘strategy’ for changing minds. The Turkish Cypriot ruling elite however, has been less convinced by economic or security incentives offered by the EU – indeed there has been a serious lack of political will on the part of Rauf Denktash to cooperate or negotiate. Denktash has continued with his policy of ‘self recognition’ and ‘independence’, with his own vision of the future of Cyprus, which does not sit well with established UN resolutions or EU membership. The power of attraction, in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite, has simply added the EU to the list of irritants and actors that wish to impose a Greek Cypriot solution to the Cyprus issue. Although the EU factor has not been successful directly in changing the minds of the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite however, the power of attraction has certainly been a crucial contributor to creating channels of political protest from Turkish Cypriot opposition, to the Denktash regime – which rejects the solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan. Indirectly, if the opposition forces in the North gain ‘negotiating power’ (after the elections), and such protest can be transposed to action, the power of attraction might very well result in a more positive negotiating pathway for achieving a solution on the basis of the Annan plan and a united Cyprus as a EU member in May 2004.

5 The Power of Attraction: Perceptions from Turkey

Introduction The European Union (EU) relationship with Turkey has been vague and ambiguous since the Ankara Association agreement in 1963, and as noted by Gomez and Peterson ‘relations between the two sides have swung, pendulum-like, between periods of intense discord and amity’ (2000, p. 14). Turkey aspired to become a member of the EU for many years, but Turkish applications to join the European club were consistently rejected by the EP, the Commission and the member states because in their view, Turkey did not meet the conditions for membership, which after 1993, were clearly articulated in the Copenhagen criteria. Although it can be argued that this position to some degree was justifiable, the Turkish perception was rather different – indeed the Turkish perception was that the conditions attached to its eligibility and the inconsistent manner by which they were applied – veiled the real reasons behind the rejection of Turkey’s application to join the European club (cultural, religious). Historically, this sent out negative signals to Turkey about its European orientation, but more fundamentally, it had a detrimental effect in terms of changing Turkish minds on moving towards a Cyprus settlement. In terms of the power of attraction framework it could be suggested that the EU, in its relations with Turkey historically, and in relation to the accession of Turkey to the European club, did not do enough in order to ensure good behaviour and in particular, to maintain leverage with regard to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. In turn, Turkey did not perceive the EU to be a credible interlocutor in its affairs – in particular in relation to Cyprus.1 The reason for this was fundamentally due to the politics of linkage between Turkey’s accession to the EU, Greek-Turkish relations, Cyprus’ 124

The Power of Attraction: Perceptions from Turkey 125

accession to the EU, and the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The inexorable link (although Turkey has frequently refused to acknowledge such a link)2 between these developments meant that the effectiveness of EU strategy was clearly compromised – to the detriment of both Turkey and the Cyprus issue. Due to this linkage any negative decision of the EU on Turkey based on the Copenhagen criteria and conditions for membership, whether justified or not, would impact on the ability of the EU to maintain leverage, and change minds in Ankara regarding Cyprus. Conversely, any positive developments in Cyprus–EU relations (and enlargement to other states that Turkey felt were in no better condition to accede), without parallel positive development in Turkey–EU relations, would culminate in perceptions of distrust in Turkey – as to the real motives and thoughts of EU policy-makers on Turkish membership. Given this context, this chapter will attempt to unravel and analyse the perceptions of Turkish elites on two separate but inexorably linked processes – the EU’s relations with Turkey and the EU’s policy towards Cyprus. More specifically, it will attempt to evaluate how far conditions of clarity, consistency, time-frame and legitimacy have been fulfilled with regard to maintaining leverage and ensuring good behaviour on the part of Turkey – and in turn on changing minds in Turkey on the Cyprus issue. Section 1 will provide a historical review and analysis of the development of Turkey–EU relations. Section 2 will then address the linkage between EU–Turkey relations and the Cyprus issue. Section 3 will provide preliminary observations on the Turkish perception of the power of attraction as a solution to the Cyprus issue.

Turkey, Europe and the EU: a complex relationship The Cold War period: Turkey and the EC Turkey’s aspiration to become part of Europe have been longstanding, dating back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the new Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was Atatürk’s belief that ‘Turkey’s future lay with Europe and the West’ (Sofos, 2000, p. 245), and his intentions were clearly to modernise and civilise Turkey through embarking on a political project to transform Turkish society into a secular and democratic society on the basis of European norms (Müftüler-Bac, 1997; Kirisci, 2002; McLaren, 2000).3 However, some have questioned the extent to which Atatürk’s modernisation project based on Western modernity was coterminous with European modernity and indeed Europeanisation (Sofos, 2000, p. 245).


Indeed Kemalism, the state doctrine on which the modernisation of Turkey was based, incorporated values which conflicted with western liberal democratic regimes and engendered domestic practices which conflicted with core European norms of human rights and democracy (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003, p. 506). Buzan and Diez (1999) suggest that the differences in perception in Turkey and the EU as to what ‘Westernisation’ (modernisation) implies in the context of EU membership, has been a major cause of the problems between Turkey and the EU over the years. Indeed one could argue that such differences in perception still exist in the twenty-first century with regard to democratisation and human rights: with the EU believing that Turkey is still insufficiently democratic by ‘Western’ standards. Nevertheless, for those that promoted and undertook the Kemalist project, the European pathway was both a justification for their programme of reform, and a key ingredient to the Westernisation project in Turkey. It is for this reason that Turkey embarked upon securing membership of several organisations of a western and European nature. As early as 1948 Turkey was admitted to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), followed by the Council of Europe in 1949 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1952. As well as joining such organisations, Atatürk’s ‘civilisation’ project, in due course, also came to mean, for Turkish elites, being a part of the integration process in Europe, with the aim of eventual membership of the European club. The relationship between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC) officially began in 1959 when the Turkish government applied for associate membership to the then emerging European bloc. The early relationship was cordial, and Turkey was granted associate status in the form of the Ankara (Association) Agreement in 1963. However, the Turkish application and motive for joining the EEC went beyond the internal ‘Westernisation’ project. Indeed Turkish-Greek relations also proved a primary incentive for Turkey to seek association with the EEC.4 Turkey’s application for association was submitted only two months after that of Greece – ‘prompted largely by concern that a successful Greek application might upset the delicate balance of power upon which the good and cooperative relations between the two…European neighbours had been premised since the 1923 Lausanne Treaty’ (Sofos, 2000, p. 246). A second motivation was intimately linked to the ‘Westernisation’ project; Turkey wished to embed itself in the institutional infrastructure of the Western alliance.


The Association Agreement was officially signed in September 1963 and came into force in December 1964, with a promise of full membership for Turkey at a later date. The Agreement consisted of three phases at the end of which full economic integration between the EEC and Turkey would occur. Due to economic objections and disagreements on both sides, the original Agreement was eventually modified through an Additional Protocol in 1973, which stipulated that the customs union (CU) between Turkey and the EEC would be established by the end of 1995. Even at this early stage of Turkey’s relationship with the EEC – internal conflict existed as to the efficacy of pursuing the Kemalist project through EEC association. The State Planning Organization (SPO) and the Foreign Ministry, the two main government departments involved in the formulation of the Turkish position in the negotiation of the Ankara Agreement, held diametrically opposed views. The elites in the SPO, a product if the 1961 constitution, advocated development along the lines of the Kemalist principle of statism – which they did not necessarily see as intimately linked with the neoliberal projects of the West and the EEC. Indeed as Müftüler-Bac observes, their stance was grounded in the belief that ‘any association [with the EEC] would hamper economic development in Turkey’ (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 55). The Foreign Ministry on the other hand, accused the SPO of misinterpreting Atatürkism’s secular and modernising heritage – and the principles of Kemalism. Officials in the Foreign Ministry clearly linked Turkey’s development with an association with the EEC and wider Western and European organisations and processes. In the words of Sofos, Foreign Ministry officials and their supporters, in order to gain the political high ground in their confrontations with the SPO ‘mobilised the elements of Kemalist ideology that would legitimise their strategy of coming closer to the EEC’ (2000, p. 247). The overall consequence if this division between the Foreign Ministry and the SPO was, according to Müftüler-Bac, that Turkey ‘was unable to present the Community with a unified set of proposals and demands’ (1997, p. 56). An additional consequence was that the Ankara Agreement represented a less than satisfactory outcome in terms of its dynamism and direction than certain quarters in Turkey would have wanted. Whatever the outcome of the Agreement and its inadequacies the primary motivation in signing it for both Turkey and the EEC was of a politico-security nature. From a Turkish perspective the position of Greece was important – in particular after the Greece-EEC relationship was activated in 1961. Traditions of Turkish foreign policy required


that a ‘hawkish eye’ be kept on Greece’s movements in order to protect Turkey against any attempts by Greece to exploit her embryonic relationship with the EEC, against Turkey. Second, was that the political aspects of the Agreement constituted ‘…a formal recognition and final consecration of Turkey’s European vocation’ (Ugur, 1999, p. 3). Association with the EEC opened the door to Europe and the door to modernisation of Turkish economic and political structures. From an EEC perspective ‘it was a way of drawing a strategic ally into its ranks as well as preserving the balance between Greece and Turkey’ (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 56) – even at this early stage the EEC’s strategy for regional stability was that of the power of attraction. In the words of Walter Hallstein it was also importantly, ‘a recognition of Turkey’s political importance for the free world’ (cited by Ugur, 1999, p. 3) – the ‘sick man of Europe’ had become ‘part of Europe’. After the Ankara Agreement of 1963 Turkey’s relationship with the EEC could be characterised as somewhat in the nature of a ‘rollercoaster’ ride (Yesilada, 2002, p. 1) caused by economic and political crisis, misinterpretations and misperceptions, and the inherent volatility and instability of the Turkish political system. Although the EEC had afforded Turkey associate status, it had simultaneously expressed many concerns about Turkey’s eligibility for membership, concerning its Europeanness, social and cultural differences, its economic situation, and Turkey’s political and democratic credentials (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 55). Many of these concerns emerged as matters of contention and conflict in the decades that followed – placing the EC–Turkey relationship under immense strain – and not doing anything to suggest that the EC might be able to maintain leverage over Turkey and ensure its compliant behaviour in matters of economic and political reform internally – and matters if regional stability and global stability externally. The relationship between Turkey and the EC in the 1970s was driven by internal and external factors – with overall harmful consequences – in particular with regard to Turkey’s perception of the EC as a credible commercial and political actor. Indeed the turbulent relationship between the EC and Turkey led in September 1978 to a unilateral declaration by the Ecevit government, freezing Turkey’s relationship with the Community (Avci, 2002, p. 93). Internally, there was disagreement between Turkey and the EC on two issues: the first was related to the harmonisation of agricultural products and the second, to the EC’s developing Mediterranean policy. Both issues had implications and raised questions of the validity of the


Additional Protocol signed by Turkey and the EC in 1970. In terms of the first issue, there was a clear misunderstanding as to the meaning of harmonisation of agricultural policies between Turkey and the EC. The EC’s interpretation was that of trade liberalisation, whereas for Turkey, it meant enjoying the full benefits and concessions of joining the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Essentially, the national interests of certain member states (Italy, France) were prioritised – due to fears that granting concession to Turkey would have harmful effect on their own farmers. On the second issue the Mediterranean policy invoked by the EC in 1975 essentially cancelled out any preferential treatment that Turkey derived from the Additional Protocol. This, combined with the EC’s refusal to grant concessions on agriculture and industrial products,5 perplexed Turkish officials, and led to the perception that the EC far from benefiting Turkey, was reneging on its obligations under the Protocol, and having a harmful effect on Turkish development and interests. Not surprisingly then, relations between the two deteriorated rapidly – and events regionally and globally did not help to assuage Turkish misgivings about the EC politically or economically. Enlargement to include three member states that did not view Turkish membership as important, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil crisis which diverted the attentions of the community to the oil-producing countries, the Cyprus crisis, and Greece’s application for full membership of the community, all served to enhance a perception in Turkey that the EC lacked integrity, credibility and capability. For Turkey their complaints were being ignored by the community – with a suspicion that ‘the Europeans were reverting to nineteenthcentury Euro-Christian discriminatory practices against the Muslim Turks’ (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 60–61). More importantly, the application for membership by Greece in 1975 to join the EC, and the EC’s inability to deal with the Cyprus crisis (see Chapter 2) had the effect of promulgating the perception of the EC as an ‘agent’ of Greek and British interests. Greece’s potential membership of the Community also caused dismay amongst Turkish officials, in particular after the introduction of European Political Cooperation (EPC), as Turkey feared that ‘Athens may use its position inside the European institutions to hinder Turkey’s association with the EC and block its eventual entry’ (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 61).6 Greece’s application to the EC in the meanwhile culminated in them signing an Accession Treaty in 1979. The Turkish retort was to


announce intention of making its own formal application, but such intentions were thwarted after a military coup in 1980 led to the ‘thawing’ of relations between the EC and Turkey. Relations between the Community and Turkey only returned to some semblance of normality in 1986, under Turgut Özal. As Prime Minister, Turkish membership of the EC was one of his central policy aims, and his government pursued a stringent strategy of economic reform in order to prepare Turkey for that eventuality. Indeed the Özal government’s application to join the EC was submitted in 1987 because it felt that Turkey had achieved economic success after extensive restructuring to make its economy more congruent with global markets (Yesilada, 2002, p. 1). However, when the Commission eventually responded to this application two years later – it was only to announce that Turkey was not ready for membership for several reasons: the need to further modernise its economy; the need to improve its human rights record and treatment of its minorities (the Kurdish problem); and the need to resolve differences with Greece, including Cyprus. Furthermore, the EC’s pre-occupation with internal reform and implementation of the Single European Act, meant that accession negotiations with Turkey were low on the European agenda. Up until the end of the Cold War period then, it is not difficult to deduce that from a Turkish perspective, the EC had not done enough for the power of attraction to be an effective strategy for regional securitisation and stability. In terms of the power of attraction framework – the EC had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Association Agreement and Additional Protocol – Turkey perceived no clear benefits deriving from Association, and the EC, constrained by member state interests and motives, could not offer anything of ‘substance’ in order to ease Turkish reform and transition of its political economy. In addition, although Turkey’s relationship with the EC began in 1963 with the possibility of membership in the future, and under the premise that it was ‘part of Europe’, no clear time frame was developed or forthcoming from the EC – a problem that was aggravated further when Greece’s application for membership was accepted and Greece joined the community in 1981. Related to this were perceptions that EC policy on Turkey was based on arbitrary decisions and reasons that stretched beyond that of economics or politics – namely that of culture and religion.7 The EC, although constantly re-affirming Turkey’s ‘Europeaness’ geographically in official statements, continued to draw lines of division with regard to Turkey’s cultural-societal suitability.


From a European perspective of course, the EC policy reflected an attempt to treat Greek and Turkish membership in an even-handed manner, and the reasons for Turkey’s lack of progress with regard to membership related to genuine concerns and deficiencies relating to Turkey’s internal and external ‘political economy’ (see Chapter 3). From an EC perspective Turkey’s failures included: Turkey’s suspension of tariff dismantling and her failure to adopt the EU’s common external tariff (CET) vis-à-vis third countries; introduction of new surcharges on imports from the EU; lack of protection for intellectual and industrial property; weak democratic institutions and violation of human rights; and Turkey’s continued occupation of northern Cyprus (my emphasis, Ugur, 1999, p. 5). The key focus here of course is not of where to lay the blame, or whether the EC was justified or not in its actions – but of the perception created amongst Turkish officials of the EC – as this would ultimately affect the leverage the Community would have over Turkey in matters internal and external. EC-Turkey relations and their development were clearly characterised by misperceptions, misunderstandings and ambiguities with regard to the requirements of the conditions for membership economically and politically, internally and externally.8 The consequence, despite the EC intention that Association would draw ‘a strategic ally into its ranks as well as preserving the balance between Greece and Turkey’, was that EC decisions on Turkey resulted in minimal leverage for the Community in ensuring good behaviour on the part of Turkey in its efforts to reform internally, and cooperate externally – in particular with regard to Cyprus. Turkey and the EU in the 1990s Although the decision was taken to reject Turkey’s application to join the EC in 1989, European leaders, recognising the economic and political significance of Turkey following the end of the Cold War, did not shut the door for future membership. However, the clarity of the EU’s approach to Turkish membership did not improve in the 1990s, and indeed only served to sharpen the attitudes and perceptions constructed historically with regards to the EU’s credibility. It was only after the Helsinki European Council’s (1999) decision to grant Turkey candidate status that a more progressive climate for cooperation and reconciliation, on all levels, began to take shape. Indeed, it was heralded as not only ‘a landmark event for Europe, but for the world as well’ (Ecevit, 1999). In the early period of the 1990s developments in Turkey–EU relations were cumbersome. The Turkey–EU relationship up until the


decision to proceed with a CU agreement for Turkey was negotiated in 1995 was in a state of deadlock, due to the Greek government’s rejection and veto of such an agreement. The Greeks, living up to their ‘awkward’ reputation9 as far as relations between Turkey and the EU were concerned10 vetoed the development for two reasons. The first was the issue of human rights abuses. The second was the continued illegal occupation of Northern Cyprus (Yesilada, 1997, p. 181). It could be argued that there was substantial justification for the stance of Greece on these two issues given that they were based on the European principles or norms that any other country had to adhere to. Where the objection lay was in Turkey’s perception and other member states’ distrust of the Greek position; Greece was quite obviously, despite trying to veil their views in the European context (Interview, MEP, 1998), pushing their own agenda in the context of Greek-Turkish relations. Collectively and individually the EU member states were also pushing their own economically and strategically driven agenda, in particular with the importance attached to Turkey in the post-Cold War era. From an EU perspective, it was clear that for a consensus to be reached on the issue of a CU with Turkey, concessions would have to be made for Greece to lift its veto. The importance of achieving closer relations with Turkey was recognised by Klaus Kinkel, the German Federal Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the Turkey–EU Association Council, when he categorically stated that, ‘We have to succeed in implementing the CU between the EU and Turkey now’ (Kinkel, 1995). The reason for this was not just economic, but eminently of great political significance as Turkey was, ‘of immense political, strategic and economic importance for the whole of Europe’ (Kinkel, 1995). The EU, urged also by the US, saw Turkey as a stabilising factor in the region (Yesilada, 1997, p. 182, Coufoudakis, 1997, pp. 14–15). Rather than its status decreasing after the Cold War, in the eyes of the EU, ‘Turkey gained in importance…as a bridge to the Islamic world, as a NATO partner, associated member of the WEU’ and a long-time friend. Both the German and the French Presidencies had worked hard in achieving this goal and they were determined that Greece would have to set its concerns aside on this matter (Kinkel, 1995). As was the case in the past on issues of such sensitivity, Greece and the other member states, under intense negotiations with the French Foreign Minister, Alan Juppe, finally agreed to lift the veto in return for specific concessions from the EU. The concessions included, most significantly, allowing Cyprus to begin accession negotiations with the


EU six months after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and giving Cypriot participants an equal footing as the eastern European states in negotiations with the EU (Yesilada, 1997, p. 181). Greece also agreed to lift a veto on the implementation of the fourth EU–Turkey Financial Protocol, which provided substantial financial assistance for Turkey (Joseph, 1999). It was not just Greece however, that proved an obstacle to finally reaching agreement on the CU with Turkey. The European Parliament also objected strongly to such a development on both humanitarian and constitutional grounds, arguing that, ‘the state of human rights in Turkey is too grave to allow for the formation of the proposed CU at present’ (EP doc, 1995). Their agreement to the CU with Turkey would be made conditional on improvements in the areas of the constitution and human rights, to be reported back to the EP in the form of interim reports. Agreement was finally reached after changes to the constitution in Turkey and the CU came into effect on 1 January 1996.11 Despite the politics of the negotiations for the CU Agreement, from a Turkish perspective, it opened up access to European markets and importantly, it symbolised their membership in Europe. Turkey had made a considerable effort to adapt and reform its legislation in relation to certain human rights and anti-terrorism laws in the face of EU (especially EP as above) criticism, and believed that the CU agreement represented a critical step towards full membership of the EU. From an EU perspective however, a CU agreement was the most Turkey could have hoped to expect for the short to medium term (Yesilada, 2002, p. 17) – an attitude that would be reflected in decisions taken at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 – and the onset of a period of intense discord between Turkey and the EU. From a Turkish perspective the expectation was that the Luxembourg European Council decisions would confirm Turkey’s European orientation and accept it as an eligible candidate for accession. Indeed so strong was the feeling and expectation that Tansu Ciller, Turkey’s Finance Minister at the time, went as far as to say that if Turkey’s reapplication for membership of the EU (in January of 1997) was not seen in a positive light then there would be serious consequences. More specifically Turkey threatened that if they were not admitted into the EU structures the planned enlargement of NATO would be vetoed (Mather, 1997, p. 5). The source of these threats was Turkey’s frustration with the West’s acknowledgement and use of Ankara during the ColdWar era in defending Western values, only to be rejected by the EU in the 1990s because they were not good enough (Mather, 1997, p. 5).


Despite such warnings and threats however, the decision was taken at Luxembourg to proceed with accession on 30 March 1998 for all the applicant states – with the exception of Turkey. The EU deemed that Turkey had not fulfilled the economic and political conditions necessary in order for accession negotiations to begin, whilst paradoxically, from a Turkish perspective at least, emphasising the importance of Turkey to the EU. The EU called for a European strategy to be drawn up for Turkey, and stipulated certain conditions for strengthening links between Turkey and the EU that included: a continuation of economic and political reforms on which it had embarked; improving its human rights record; respect for the protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN of a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolution; not objecting to Cyprus’ membership of the EU; persuading the Turkish Cypriot community to join the Greek Cypriots at the accession talks with the EU (my emphasis, Presidency Conclusions, 1997). The perception from Turkey after the summit was overtly negative – officials in Turkey perceived this to be yet another (unjustified) rejection by the EU and in issuing a government statement expressed the view that, ‘The EU’s attitude is far from constituting a solid and credible base to develop relations with Turkey’ (Tucker and Barnham, 1997). In addition, Turkey discerned that ‘partial, prejudiced and exaggerated assessments were made about Turkey’s internal structure and its foreign policy including the issue of Cyprus and that, ‘attempts have been made to impose unacceptable political conditions which have concealed intentions’12 (cited by Biscop, 2002, p. 6). Moreover the perception amongst Turkish officials was that there existed a certain fait accompli about the decisions taken at Luxembourg: decisions that indicated that full membership of the EU for Turkey was no longer being coveted in EU decision-making circles, for reasons that Turkey suspected were little to do with objective criteria. Despite being invited to the subsequent European Summit in March 1998, Turkish officials refused to attend and the Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, announced that political dialogue with the EU would be suspended. He rejected both the conditions attached to Turkey’s association with the Union and the significance of the Conference for Turkey, whilst also warning the EU that after the Luxembourg decision his government would not discuss either


the issue of Cyprus, its relations with Greece, or human rights issues with the EU. More saliently the politics of linkage had a detrimental affect on any prospect of a solution to the Cyprus issue, and on the power of attraction in terms of providing a catalyst for such a solution. Indeed as a rebuff to the EU conditionality on Cyprus, Yilmaz also threatened to further integrate Northern Cyprus with Turkey and asserted that, ‘from now on the responsibility for all the negative developments to do with Cyprus …will belong to the European Union’ (Yilmaz cited in Tucker and Burnham, 1997). Furthermore there was also the issue of Greece – and the perception amongst Turkish officials that the decisions taken at Luxembourg represented a victory for longstanding Greek foreign policy disputes with Turkey (Cyprus and the Aegean disputes), through the diffusion and institutionalisation of the Greek position at European level and its subsequent transmission as the official position of the EU. Given the historical association between Greek and Turkish foreign policy formulation (as noted above), such developments re-affirmed long held fears and suspicions, and most definitely did not help to improve the credibility of the EU as a neutral and capable interlocutor in disputes between the two countries. In addition to the deteriorating relations between the EU and Turkey in this period regarding accession, several other important issues regarding foreign and security policy remained unresolved – GreekTurkish relations were plagued not only by a lack of progress on issues concerning the Aegean, but also of Greece’s involvement in the Abdullah Ocalan affair. There were also problems relating to the future reformulation of NATO-European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) relations. The latter dispute was particularly important and centred around Turkey’s demand for greater involvement in the nascent security relationship. More specifically, Turkey wished to be included in the decision-making structure of the ESDI, from which, it was excluded as a non-member. Given Turkey’s longstanding role in NATO, Turkey felt that it should clearly be given a greater role in the ESDI. The suspicion from a Turkish perspective was that unless greater involvement was forthcoming with regard to how resources were deployed, resources would be used against their interest – with an important bone of contention being that of crises involving a dispute between NATO allies e.g. in Cyprus and in the Aegean Sea, disputed between Turkey and Greece, the latter of which is both a NATO as well as EU member. For


this reason Turkey chose to veto assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities, hindering the EU’s plans to operationalise the planned Rapid Reaction Force of some 60,000 troops. Greece also implied that it would veto an accord on the ESDI if Cyprus and the Aegean were excluded from the proposed army’s purview. Given this negative climate, a period of rapprochement followed at the Cardiff European Council in June 1998 – as the EU realised (or certain member states at least) it was in danger of losing its leverage on Turkey through the power of attraction. The conditions that the EU had stipulated at Luxembourg were not removed or modified, but efforts to create an improved climate for cooperation and a greater sense of inclusion in the accession process were made (see Chapter 3). However, the critical moment or turning point in EU–Turkey relations did not arrive until the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when the EU, after years of procrastination, accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership. From a Turkish perspective such a decision initially invoked scepticism among Turkish elites. Particularly concerning for the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, was the stipulation that Turkey could only become a member of the EU after the resolution of the Cyprus issue. According to McLaren (2000, p. 120) Ecevit was only persuaded to accept EU conditionality regarding the improvement of the economy, political reform, as well as the resolution of the Cyprus issue, ‘by a last-minute visit from Javier Solana’. In the words of Ecevit, ‘there may be details that are hard for us to digest, but in general the acceptance of our candidacy on equal terms is a great success for Turkey’ (Black, 1999). The Helsinki European Council decision clearly marked a significant juncture and critical step for addressing the anomaly that had existed in EU–Turkey relations for Turkish elites and EU policy-makers. It officially confirmed the candidate status of Turkey, reinforced its European orientation and confirmed its European credentials – a subject of bitter dispute up until then, with severe ramifications with regard to leverage and progress in influencing Turkish behaviour. In turn this provided a greater incentive for Turkey to pursue the reforms required by EU conditionality. Furthermore the confirmation of candidate status also implied that Turkey would realistically be able to consider membership as long as it fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. It also meant that Turkey would receive and benefit from pre-accession strategy and the instruments and packages related to this (e.g. financial aid, participation of Turkish


delegates in EU organs) – which would help to facilitate the painful short and medium term reforms that Turkey needed to undertake (Interview, Commission official, 2002). Such a strategy also provided for an enhanced political dialogue which had two fundamental effects: first, it provided for a focus on Turkey’s convergence towards EU standards; second, it indicated that the political dialogue would include progress on the Cyprus issue, compliance with the condition of good neighbourly relations, and referral of disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (European Council, 1999). Following the decision at Helsinki the European Commission prepared an Association Partnership for Turkey, which was eventually adopted on 8 March 2001. Domestically, the Turkish government announced its own National Programme for the Adoption of the acquis (submitted to the EU 26 March 2001) which was formulated in order to meet the short and medium term priorities stipulated in the Partnership Agreement. It also undertook the task of introducing a number of important reforms with regard to fulfilling the required political and economic conditions. In October 2001 the Turkish government succeeded in adopting historic constitutional amendments, opening the way for political reforms to improve the quality of democracy and respect for human rights, and for Kurds to use their language in education and broadcasting. In addition the Turkey EU-Associative Council met regularly, with a number of decisions taken on Turkish participation in European programmes and activities. Indeed after the Laeken European summit in December 2001 the decision was taken to invite Turkey to participate in the Convention on the Future of Europe (to debate the future of the Union) on an equal footing with all other candidate countries. Such a development, at the time, was considered in Turkish elite circles as a sign that the EU was clearly committed to Turkey’s eventual membership of the European club (Kirisci, 2002). Despite its success in adopting amendments to the constitution however,13 during the course of 2002 the coalition government in Turkey experienced major difficulties due to differences between its partners over critical reforms such as the removal of the death penalty and the adoption of legislation that would actually open the way to education and broadcasting in Kurdish. In addition to this according to Kirisci, ‘a good part of the first part of 2002 was also dominated by a public campaign against the advocates of reform and European membership’ (Kirisci, 2002). Although the reforms were eventually pushed through by the Turkish Parliament, arguments within the coalition led to the decision to call for early elections.


The election, held in November 2002, ushered in a single party majority government for the first time since the 1980s led by the ˇ an. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), and Recep Tayyip Erdo g AKP and its leader, although having somewhat of a controversial past, was very quick to demonstrate its commitment to Turkey’s European orientation and the political and economic reforms needed in order to open accession negations for membership of the EU. Indeed on election Erdogˇan actively embarked upon ‘diplomatic missions’ to visit European leaders and US officials in order to mobilise support for a definite time frame for the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey. Despite the various reforms that had been undertaken in Turkey however, in its 2002 Regular Report on progress in Turkey, the Commission concluded that Turkey had not yet fully met the political criteria, that there were serious deficiencies in implementation of reforms, and that generally, much more progress needed to be made in all areas. This Report, followed by unhelpful remarks by Valerie Giscard d’Estaing on Turkey’s ‘Europeananess’ before the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, meant that old suspicions were once again aroused. More specifically, Turkish officials felt that they were being discriminated against, and that the Commission did not really appreciate the significance of the reforms pursued by Turkey in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Such a feeling was not just limited to the Turkish elite, but resonated widely with the Turkish public, who in a public opinion survey carried out in May/June of 2002, showed majority support for EU membership, but deep mistrust about the sincerity of EU officials about Turkey’s membership. At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002, Turkish expectation was of an early date for the beginning of accession negotiations (2003). The EU however, did not oblige in meeting Turkey’s expectation, despite the effort of member states such as Britain and Italy, to secure an early date. France and Germany stated a preference for a starting state of mid-2005, and in a classic compromise the eventual date decided upon for a review of the Turkish case was December 2004. If Turkey was deemed to have met the stipulations of the accession criteria by this date, then negotiations would begin without delay (see Chapter 3). Turkey viewed the overall outcome of the Council as generally positive, despite what they perceived as the ‘double standards’ being applied by the EU: accusations of discrimination and of prejudice were levelled against EU member states by various Turkish elites. The EU


promised to strengthen the accession strategy for Turkey, which was prepared by the Commission on 26 March 2003, and adopted by member states on 15 April 2003 in Luxembourg, with pre-accession assistance increasing following the conclusions of the Copenhagen Council. The Commission proposed that with the Accession Partnership, Turkey would be provided with a total of 1,050 million Euro; 250 million in 2004, 300 million in 2005 and 500 million in 2006. Since Copenhagen Turkish reforms have continued apace – and Turkey has been determined to finalise pending legislative measures and intensify its efforts towards not just the adoption but implementation of reforms in order to comply with the EU’s political criteria. Indeed one of the main objectives of the Turkish government was to secure a favourable ‘Opinion’ from the European Commission in its 2003 Regular Report – a report that Turkish officials hoped would lead to the conclusion that accession negotiations would begin after December 2004. However, whilst the Report14 acknowledged that Turkey had shown great determination in accelerating political reforms needed to win EU membership, it also concluded that implementation of reform was uneven. More specifically, the Report showed that Turkey had made progress on human rights issues, freedom of expression and assembly, and of religion, but it also stipulated that Turkey needed to boost the efficiency and independence of courts and limit the role of the military in the administration. Economically, the Commission also urged Turkey to continue reforms to achieve macroeconomic stability, reduce high inflation, and keep fiscal discipline. It argued that Ankara should privatise state banks and companies more speedily, simplify bureaucratic procedures, lift key barriers to foreign investment, and combat piracy and counterfeiting. On Cyprus the Report stated that Turkey should demonstrate support for the UN plan (Annan) to end the division on the island, and its also noted (despite the propaganda of Turkish Cypriot ruling elite in northern Cyprus) that Turkey had no plan to establish a customs union with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (European Commission, Nov 2003).

Turkey, the EU and Cyprus Where then does this general analysis of EU-Turkey relations leave us with the power of attraction argument? More saliently, where does it leave us in terms of the Turkish position on Cyprus?


Given the assumptions and predictions of the power of attraction framework, we would have expected a lack of movement on the Cyprus issue by Turkey prior to the Helsinki European Council Decision in 1999 as the EU clearly did not deal with the Turkish accession question with any great clarity: financial assistance to facilitate Turkish reform in order to meet the EU ‘criteria’ was poor in the eyes of Turkish officials, and there was no clear time frame for Turkish membership of the EU. Added to this, the EU was perceived to be making arbitrary decisions on the Turkish candidacy – which hindered its credibility and ultimately leverage with regards to Turkish behaviour. Conversely, once Turkey was granted candidate status, the power of attraction framework would predict progress in Turkey–EU relations and movement on the Cyprus issue. Indeed this was suggested by the Turkish Ambassador to the EU before the Helsinki European Council decision when he stated that ‘all the problems with Greece, the Cypriot question…could be resolved rapidly…and easily if the EU agreed…to admit Turkey in to the European family’ (Akyal, 1999). Given the decisions taken at Copenhagen, and the strategies put in place thereafter in order to facilitate Turkey in its reform financially and politically, some of the fundamental conditions for the success of the power of attraction were fulfilled. Moreover, Turkey was also given a clear indication that accession negotiations would begin without delay in December 2004 if they meet the (Copenhagen) criteria stipulated by the EU (subject to agreement of the member states of course, which will include Cyprus by December 2004). Thus it would have been expected that positions in Turkey would have ‘moved’ on the Cyprus issue. However, the power of attraction framework would also predict that certain fundamental conditions have still not been met in order to secure leverage over Turkey on Cyprus – Turkey has still not received a clear time frame for its accession negotiations to begin and remarks by European and member state officials regarding Turkey’s suitability have been unconstructive. Such actions have not helped to increase the credibility of the EU in the eyes of Turkish elites, moderate and conservative, and have thus hindered the process of changing minds. In addition there has been a problem with the lack of clarity on the conditionality of a Cypriot solution for Turkish membership – the EU has made it clear that non-solution would hinder Turkey’s membership aspirations, and that conversely, progress towards a solution would facilitate Turkey’s accession to the EU. However, a solution is not


officially a precondition for Turkish membership – despite the fact that the Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey in October 2003 made the most explicit link yet between Turkish accession aspirations and a solution of the Cyprus issue. The consequence has been that Turkish elites have been reluctant to accept the politics of linkage between Turkish accession and a Cyprus solution (extra conditionality on Cyprus) – they view this as inconsistent and discriminatory and thus, in the eyes of certain elites in the Turkish establishment, it is not a condition for membership. Of course it should be quite evident from the preceding analysis that the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus is more complex than just the power of attraction (enlargement/integration) dynamic – and that it cannot be understood outside the wider regional and global environment – in particular in relation to Greek-Turkish relations, security and strategic interest. One factor that also needs to be added to this is the inner workings of the Turkish political economy – in particular with regard to Turkish foreign policy and the power of the military in Turkish security and military affairs (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 76). These points perhaps need explaining further as they are of great importance when assessing the EU affect on changing minds in Turkey with regard to the Cyprus issue. In terms of the first factor, it needs to be pointed out that Turkey’s interests in Cyprus were well established historically, independent from their relations with the EU in order to serve two primary aims: to ensure strategic balance with the Greeks and Greek Cypriots is maintained; and to ensure Turkey a guaranteed role in the security and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean region. The second and interrelated factor is the role of the military in Turkey, labelled as ‘the guarantor of the Turkish State…the Guardian of the political structure shaped by the Kemalist reforms’ (Müftüler-Bac, 1997, p. 76). The point here is that given Turkey’s established aims in Cyprus independently of the EU – it is reasonable to assume that Cyprus might well be more valuable and of greater importance to Turkey than it relations with the EU (for the conservatives within the Turkish politico-military elite at least), contra EU and other Western actors’ thinking on the issue. Therefore in the words of Ogˇuzlu, ‘any trade-off between Turkey’s respective interests in the EU and Cyprus would in no way be possible to conceive as far as Turkey’s foreign policy preferences are concerned’(2002, pp. 11–12). A conflict clearly exists between Turkish perceptions of its own strategic role and interests in the region and the EU’s perceived role for Turkey as an ‘Europeanised’ state. For Turkish elites there is no contradiction


between these two interests – that of EU accession and its concerns in Cyprus. For the EU, it is this contradiction that is a major impediment to Turkey’s membership of the EU. Moreover, the military has intervened in many instances in the past in order to preserve perceived Turkish security and strategic interests and to bring about significant changes in Turkish democracy and protect the Kemalist principles that the Turkish state was based upon. This in itself is problematic to an ‘Europeanised’ conception of democracy and thus Turkey’s European ambitions, but central to an explanation of perhaps why there has been minimal movement on the Cyprus issue. In the case of Cyprus, changing the minds of Turkish political and military elites (the more conservative forces in the Turkish establishment), in particular the latter, has been difficult as they have been extremely sceptical of the real intentions of the EU. On a general level the Turkish military have not been in favour of Turkey’s EU accession and European orientation,15 and have therefore been more reluctant to adhere to EU conditions – in particular where this has conflicted with Kemalist principles. More specifically, they do not see why they should provide any concessions where Cyprus is concerned; they argue that if the EU was seriously committed to Turkey’s EU membership it would not need to stipulate the prior resolution of the Cyprus issue as one of the fundamental preconditions for Turkish entry. Their reasoning and claim has been that this is not necessary, as Turkish membership of the EU would eliminate border restrictions creating a zone of peace and cooperation between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, as EU members. Once again however, a clear conflict exists between the views of the European Commission and the various elements within the Turkish ruling establishment – Günter Verheugen has stipulated clearly (in October 2003) that if the Cyprus problem is not resolved (despite it not being a precondition), Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU will be blocked. Changing minds? Turkey’s relationship with the EU since Helsinki has been of a more positive nature. The EU has been keen to ensure progress with Turkey’s pre-accession preparations through the development of a clear strategy for Turkey – consolidated at the Nice European Council (2000) and culminating in Turkey’s Accession Partnership in March 2001. Turkey has received an abundance of funding from the EU16 – and has been earmarked to receive additional monies in the improved Accession


Partnership (see above) in order to facilitate the difficult economic reforms required to comply with EU criteria for membership (Interview, Senior Commission official, anonymous, 2002). There is evidence to suggest that the Turkish accession process, in particular since 1999 and the decision taken at Helsinki, has served as a trigger for creating a more progressive attitude amongst Turkish elites – in order to improve its relations with Greece and the EU. Indeed, according to Gordon, it ‘was a historic turning point that will have long-term benefits for the entire eastern Mediterranean region’ (Gordon, 2000). It must be noted however, that the accommodating stance at Helsinki was also influenced by more cooperative developments in the wider regional political economy between Greece and Turkey. After severe earthquakes in Turkey in August 1999 and earthquakes in Greece in September 1999 to which both countries reciprocally sent aid and help, there was a change in attitude and relations between the two countries. This engendered a new climate in which relations between the two countries could be improved, and culminated in Greece fundamentally changing its position in the EU on Turkey through dropping its veto on Turkey and becoming a member of the EU (at the Helsinki European Summit in December 1999). This, of course, was on the precondition that Turkey reciprocated this goodwill with a commitment to settle its differences with Greece. Subsequently, Turkey has moved to a more accommodating stance on various issues with regard to Greek-Turkish relations17 and its incorporation into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – creating a more positive climate for negotiation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders over Cyprus.18 More specifically – accommodation of Turkey into the ESDP structures, through an agreement reached between Turkey, Britain and the US – has helped to allay Turkish Cypriot security fears and improve Turkey–EU relations. Additionally the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey met in February 2002 to open talks to end their differences on important issues. Talks have been opened on the thorny issue of the (alleged) oilrich seabed of the Aegean, as well as issues concerning territorial waters and control of airspace, which has brought the two countries to the brink of war on several occasions.19 The driving force behind this was no doubt the decision taken at the Helsinki European Council and the positive climate created subsequently. As one Greek official noted ‘Now that we have set up a climate of greater trust and the Cypriot talks are under way, we feel that the time is ripe to try and resolve some of the bigger, thornier issues’ (cited by Smith, 2002).


Other positive movements have also seen the first visit of a Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, to Turkey in over 38 years, as well as bilateral agreements on a range of issues including trade and investment, organised crime, illegal immigration, tourism and the environment. As Hikmet Cetin, a former Turkish Foreign Minister has acknowledged about these movements, ‘People in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus now see that the two governments can deal with each other in a positive way’ (cited by Gordon, 2000). Despite the improvement however, subsequent developments have raised questions about Turkish government and military motivations with regard to the more recent steps to improve rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, and their European orientation. Indeed it has raised significant questions about how far the new positive relationship between Greece and Turkey has actually led to any substantive change or resolution of Greek-Turkish issues and disputes. Tensions were reignited between the two countries by a growing number of incursions of Greek airspace by Turkish aircraft in June 2003, leading to threats from Greece to block Turkey’s membership to the EU. Although the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, played down these incursions, they have important implications with regard to Turkey’s European orientation, and the political forces hindering such an orientation in Turkey. Moreover it has raised questions as to the sincerity of the Turkish government in improving its relations with Greece – with suggestions that Turkey has simply altered its foreign ‘preferences’ (rationally), in order to fulfil a fundamental condition for EU membership. In addition many suggest that the policy of ‘incursions’ into Greek airspace was a product of hardliners within the Turkish military, whilst others have suggested20 that the situation was driven by moderates in the government and military who hoped to force Greece to the negotiating table in order to settle the Aegean disputes. Either way, this raises fundamental issues and questions about Turkey’s European orientation and aspirations and its motives for pursuing its current reforms. Despite this incident, overall, the prospect of accession has clearly provided a greater incentive for Turkey to undertake a more positive stance on key issues of contention which it otherwise might not have taken – although many issues remain unresolved despite the policy of rapprochement pursued by the Simitis government in Greece. The important question here is how significant this has been on changing minds towards reaching a solution in Cyprus in Turkey. In general it could be said that there has been a more positive rhetoric


amongst Turkish officials, in particular since the election of the AKP, but in substance the stance and policy has remained unchanged. Although Turkey–EU relations improved after Helsinki, attempts to launch United Nations (UN) proximity talks in order to negotiate a settlement (August 2000) failed, due to a demand from the Turkish Cypriot leader that he be recognised as the legitimate head of government – a demand fully supported by Ankara. However, in November 2001, progress was made due to two factors: first, the pressures of the accession timetable and Cyprus’ near completion of accession negotiations; second, because of pressure from Turkey who wanted to progress on their road to EU membership and recognised that they had to be seen to be doing something with regard to movement on the Cyprus issue. In this context, there was an agreement to resume talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus under UN auspices. The talks in themselves were a positive development given the stalemate that had existed before, even though no solution was agreed by the agreed deadline date of June 2002. According to one senior Commission official, these movements were directly attributable to the ‘prospect of accession for Cyprus’ and were ‘delivered by the EU accession timetable’ (Interview, anonymous, 2002). In addition to this, in a bid to secure its place in the EU bloc, Turkey announced in May 2003 that Greek Cypriots would be allowed to visit Turkey for the first time in nearly 40 years. Abdullah Gül also hinted that Turkey would seek a fair solution to the Cyprus problem and apply the necessary pressure to the Turkish Cypriot side. This initiative followed a policy shift on the 23 April 2003, when the regime (ruling elite) in the northern part of Cyprus took the decision, for the first time since 1974, to open up the dividing line (Green Line), enabling Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to move around the island on a daily basis. There is no doubt that the accession process was a key catalyst for this symbolic gesture – as it happened only one week after the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession agreement to join the EU in Athens on 16 April 2003. However, these gestures, although welcomed on a general level have been met with certain reservation – not just by the Greek Cypriots, but also by Turkish Cypriot civil society, the UN and the EU. The consensual view that has emerged is that such measures although no doubt creating a more cooperative climate, have not resulted in the resolution of the Cyprus issue – and such gestures fall short of the requirements for comprehensive and long-lasting solution to the division on


the island. In short the view has been that such measures cannot be seen as a replacement for a solution based on the Annan plan. The suspicion has been that such gestures from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite in particular, have only been launched in order to divert attention away from a ‘real’ solution. So although since Helsinki and Copenhagen appetising financial ‘carrots’ and incentives have been offered to Turkey, and it has continued on its road to reform internally (although a lot still remains to be done), it has not progressed with regard to Cyprus. One of the conditions stipulated (although not a precondition) for Turkey to become a member is ‘to strongly support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring a successful conclusion to the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem’ – a condition expressed in the Commission’s Accession Partnership document formulated in November 200021 – and reiterated in the Commission’s Regular Report on Turkey in November 2003 – with a more explicit link being made between a solution to the Cyprus problem and Turkish accession prospects. Clearly, Turkey has not fulfilled this condition thus far, mainly because of a distrust of EU intentions amongst Turkish elites (and thus reluctance to accept the link between Turkish membership and a solution) due to a perceived lack of credible commitments in relation to Turkish accession and membership. However, this alongside the fact that the conditionality of solution before accession for the Republic of Cyprus does not exist, means that Cyprus could enter the EU divided – with grave consequences for Turkey’s European aspirations. The effect of the power of attraction then, at least until the Turkish elections in November 2002, was negative in terms of Turkish movement on the Cyprus issue – and even after the elections, Turkish elites were deeply divided on their policy on Cyprus. The new government made reconciliatory and cooperative gestures with regard to their European orientation and resolving the Cyprus issue, although they did not (and still do not) perceive that the resolution of the Cyprus issue was (is) a condition that was fundamental to their EU orientation. The leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdogˇan, for example, has alleged that the Cyprus problem is not within the conditions of accession for Turkish entry to the EU, stating that ‘this is a de facto condition and nobody has the right to create this’. In addition to the governmental position it seems that the more conservative forces within the politico military Turkish establishment, whose vote is crucial in changing any policy on Cyprus, have also not been entirely convinced.


Turkey has not been concerned about converging towards the EU’s approach to Cyprus, which supports the resolution of the Cyprus issue through the creation of a bizonal, bicommunal, federated Cyprus with a single sovereign identity (UN agreed). Indeed Turkey has backed the Turkish Cypriot (Denktash’s) line on Cyprus, supported his change of policy and a proposal for a confederal solution to the Cyprus issue, and more importantly, taken concrete steps to integrate the illegal TRNC with Turkey, both economically and politically. Such a policy was pursued as early as 1992 when Turkey concluded the Matutes Package with the EU with the aim of strengthening the association between the two parties. In the same year intercommunal talks broke down, and the UN proposal for a bizonal, bicommunal solution to the Cyprus issue was rejected by Rauf Denktash because such an agreement did not give recognition to the TRNC as a sovereign state (Ugur, 2000, p. 235). Subsequently, a number of steps were taken to strengthen the enmeshment of the TRNC’s with Turkey. First Turkey signed the 13th economic protocol with the TRNC in September 1994 for the primary reason of circumventing the ECJ ruling which required the exports from the North to be certified by the internationally recognised Cypriot government. In addition the protocol provided for: the use of the Turkish Lira as national currency in the TRNC and application of the Turkish foreign exchange regime; a change in the traffic system to comply with the right hand lane driving in Turkey; and the incorporation of Turkey’s telecommunications code in to that of the TRNC’s. The integration of the TRNC with Turkey then gained new momentum in 1995 through a joint declaration – which stated that Cyprus should join the EU only when Turkey becomes a member. This declaration followed the decision to begin negotiations with Cyprus six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996, and led to subsequent developments that included a joint declaration in 1997 and the establishment of an Association Council between Turkey and the TRNC, with the aim of drawing up measures relating to economic and fiscal integration of the two countries, as well as partial integration in foreign policy, defence and security. On the basis of the 1997 joint declaration, there was agreement in 1998 to move towards a Turkey-TRNC ‘joint economic zone’ – thus formalising the virtual de facto position (Nugent, 2000, p. 143). The Turkish President (Demirel) also declared in early 1998 that ‘one could no longer speak of a single Cyprus as there were two nations and two states on the island’ – subsequently triggering a change of policy in the


TRNC by Rauf Denktash and a proposal to solve the Cyprus issue through a confederal rather than federal structure as agreed by Denktash and the Greek Cypriot leaderships in 1977 and 1979 (see Chapter 2). Annexation threats were also consistently made by the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite and importantly by Turkish elites. In November 2001 the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Bulent Ecevit, threatened that ‘taking southern Cyprus in to the European Union means handing over to the south the TRNC… ’, going on to assert that, ‘in that case, a decision for annexation with the TRNC may be taken’ (cited by Boulton, 2001). Ismail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, also warned that Turkey might soon be forced to take a ‘definitive decision’ on Cyprus with a heavy cost (cited by Boulton, 2001). It seems that even in 2003, and the change of government, Turkey has not receded on its policy of further annexation and integration with the TRNC. There were threats to sign a Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the TRNC22 and second, a Compensation Commission was established in the North with the consent of Ankara in June 2003. Clearly these developments do not suggest that the power of attraction has had a major effect on changing minds on the Cyprus issue amongst Turkish elites. Furthermore it seems that any positive developments and statements on Cyprus are, at this stage, little more than rhetorical (or rational) gestures: gestures engineered to indicate a ‘change of preference’, in order to demonstrate some form of conformity with EU accession conditionality, rather than ‘longer term policy change’ on Cyprus.

Conclusions: The power of attraction – preliminary observations The accession process and the EU conditions and incentives that accompany this have not worked to persuade Turkish elites (or at least a crucial part of the Turkish elite) to take a more conciliatory stance on Cyprus. The reasons for this are varied: the continued strategic significance of Cyprus to Turkey; the diversity of views amongst Turkish elites and the power of the military in Turkish politics; and third, and most important in terms of the power of attraction framework, the perception of Turkish elites with regard to EU promises and conditions – and in particular with regard to the EU’s credibility. This credibility can partly be understood through historical events – Turkey was given no time frame for accession to the EU, its applications were


rejected on often ambiguous as well as genuine grounds, and funding and financial incentives were blocked or withheld. However, this does not explain why Turkey still has not changed its mind on Cyprus given the decision taken at Helsinki and Copenhagen, and the subsequent positive developments and incentives offered to Turkey. In terms of the power of attraction framework there are several possible reasons for Turkey’s continued attitude to Cyprus. The EU has still not been forthcoming with a clearer timetable for Turkish accession – it has promised to review Turkey’s progress in December 2004 – but Turkey clearly expected a much earlier date and suspect that there are reasons above and beyond the criteria (cultural-political) that such a date was not given. In addition to this, Turkish perceptions of the EU as a credible actor with regard to accession and in relation to Cyprus were not helped by statements suggesting that ‘Turkey will never join’ the EU because it has ‘a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life’. In terms of financial incentives, the EU has clearly provided the funding for Turkey to pursue painful structural change in the medium and long term – albeit based on clear conditionality for internal reform and management of the Turkish economy. However, the EU could do more financially to help Turkey in the short term – as they have clearly been unhappy about the levels of funding that they have received from the EU in order to fulfil the economic criteria for accession and membership (compared to certain CEEC’s). Additionally, the EU could further integrate and include Turkey into EU structures and policies, in the short and medium term. This has been achieved to some extent with ESDP, and Turkey’s participation in the Convention – but could also, perhaps, include encouragement for Turkey to adopt the Euro prior to membership (Tocci, 2001, p. 18). Of course the power of attraction can only succeed if, on a general level, the EU project is perceived as legitimate amongst all Turkish elites (the EU is seen as a credible actor) – in other words, if there is a consensus among those that hold ‘power’ that there is no alternative to EU membership and a European orientation. On a more specific level there must exist agreement and a political will amongst Turkish elites on a solution of the Cyprus issue based on the Annan plan. Both these conditions for success however, do not exist, and are complicated by the volatile nature of Turkish politics, the influence of the military on Turkish politics and more importantly, the diversity of opinion amongst Turkish elites on benefits of pursuing EU membership and a solution to the Cyprus issue.


Attitudes in Ankara have been afflicted by a perception of mistrust amongst those at the elite level, with a diversity of attitudes and opinions. This in turn has led to an asymmetric impact in relation to movement on Cyprus. On the one hand, there are the moderates and reformists that are pro-European, and are also favourable to a solution of the Cyprus issue because they recognise that this will not, in any real sense, compromise any Turkish national interest (for example business elites, media and academics). This is because these groups are aware of the clear benefits of the accession of Turkey to the EU, and importantly, they recognise that the absence of a solution to the Cyprus question is a clear impediment to accession. In addition, there are those moderates and reformists that are pro-European (for example the AKP government), but who have a fundamental distrust of EU commitment to Turkish membership, and thus perceive the extra conditionality attached to Turkish accession in relation to Cyprus as inconsistent and unfair. On the other hand, the conservative forces (for example the politicomilitary establishment) in the Turkish elite establishment are neither in favour of Turkey’s EU accession and general European orientation, or accommodating a solution to the Cyprus question within the remit of the Annan plan. They are not in favour of the accession process, and see this as detrimental to the Turkish national interest based on Kemalist principles; they hold a fundamental mistrust of EU intentions and policies and thus do not see why they should adhere to EU conditions. More specifically, they do not see why they should provide any concessions where Cyprus is concerned (Interview, Senior Commission official, 2002; Tocci, 2003). So although the new pro-European Turkish government has clearly been more reconciliatory in its rhetoric with regard to European integration and Cyprus – such rhetoric has not been translated into any substantive change in policy on Cyprus. In the case of the AKP government the EU has not provided a commitment credible enough to eliminate suspicion of EU intentions and subsequently catalyse movement on the Cyprus issue (for example, a definite starting date for Turkish accession negotiations). The lack of credible commitment to Turkey’s European aspirations in turn has played into the hands of the eurosceptics in the military and political elite and their arguments against the benefits of EU membership and a solution to the Cyprus issue.23 In other words the expectation amongst EU elites that Ankara would value the benefits of accession to the EU for Turkey, which has been a long-standing ambition, more than the importance of its occupation of


Cyprus for mainly strategic reasons, has not materialised. This is because of a lack of consensus amongst Turkish elites, and the consequence with regard to the power of attraction has been an asymmetric impact on changing minds on Cyprus. Moreover there seems to exist the belief in crucial quarters of the Turkish political and military elite, amongst moderates and conservatives, based on a suspicion of the EU’s intentions vis-à-vis Turkish membership, that its interests in Cyprus can be dealt with independently of Turkey’s accession process. Their perception is that the conditionality attached to Turkish membership with regard to Cyprus would not exist if the EU had genuine intentions for Turkish accession in the near future. The conclusion is that movement thus far on the Cyprus issue has been uneven. On the one hand the EU failed to fulfil certain fundamental conditions relating to the success of the power of attraction and thus failed to convince powerful Turkish elites of their credibility. On the other hand the views within the Turkish establishment on the utility of the power of attraction and resolution of the Cyprus issue were also underpinned by different logics; no consensus existed on either issue with the result that the prospect of enlargement had a differential impact on changing minds and attitudes. Thus far, movement seems to have occurred in relation to Turkish fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria for membership – the views of the pro-European AKP government have prevailed in this instance and they have continued to pursue reforms internally to meet the strict conditionality. The politics of linkage between Turkish accession and solution of the Cyprus issue, however, has not served to change minds or create any movement on accepting the Annan plan as a basis for a settlement. Indeed, such linkage without a credible commitment from the EU on a time frame for accession, has only served to fuel the arguments of the euro-sceptics and perpetuate the suspicions of the AKP government visà-vis EU intentions. On this evidence some might argue the power of attraction has not changed long standing Turkish objectives vis-à-vis the Cyprus issue amongst elites that clearly still hold considerable ‘power’ in Ankara. What is also clear, however, is that the power of attraction is only likely to have a positive affect, and a consensus is only likely to emerge, through the pursuit of internal reform in Turkey – and the limitation of the influence of the Turkish military in the Turkish political system.

6 The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context

Introduction Preliminary observations were made in the previous two chapters on the utility and impact of the power of attraction on changing minds on the Cyprus problem. Key events and movements attributable to the power of attraction were touched upon, both positive and negative. The overall observation was that the power of attraction had an asymmetric impact on the parties involved in negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus problem: the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. It was generally observed that decisions taken at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 represented a ‘critical moment’ in encouraging movement on the Cyprus issue. The acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country, alongside more positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations, created a climate in which cooperation and reconciliation became more of a possibility. Moreover the accession timetable thereafter, triggered a series of events and developments that perhaps would not have materialised in the absence of Cyprus’ potential inclusion to the European Union (EU) without a solution. The accession process and timetable no doubt changed the parameters of the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem, and brought a sense of added urgency to negotiating a settlement through UN auspices. The power of attraction was a key factor influencing the resumption of talks between the leaders of the two communities in December 2001 after many years of stalemate, and it also played a crucial part in the formulation of the Annan plan, and the interjection of the Secretary General to find a solution to the Cyprus problem prior to Cyprus’ membership of the EU. Moreover, much of the substance of the Annan plan was dependent upon Cyprus’ accession to the EU as a unified island. The 152

The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context 153

signing of the Accession Treaty by Cyprus on the 16 April 2003 also culminated in efforts by the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite and Turkey to facilitate movement towards a solution through various measures, such as the lifting of border restrictions in Cyprus for the first time in 30 years. It is the central aim of this chapter to analyse such developments in a more substantive way, in order to ascertain whether any real movement has occurred in the positions of the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey in relation to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It will evaluate the extent to which the accession process and developments that have emanated directly or indirectly from such a process, with a specific focus on the interplay between the EU process and the UN process, have resulted in any substantive change of attitude and policy vis-à-vis resolving the Cyprus issue. In short, it will assess the extent to which the power of attraction and the imminent accession of Cyprus as a divided island to the EU have focused minds towards compromise and resolving the dispute, under United Nations (UN) auspices, before Cyprus becomes an EU member in May 2004. The chapter will be structured in the following way. Section 1 will evaluate developments on the Cyprus issue that have evolved as a direct or indirect consequence of the accession process and the accession timetable – with a focus on the Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and Turkish perceptions on the Annan plan. Section 2 will then consider the interaction between the UN process and the EU accession process and its overall impact and effect vis-â-vis changing minds on Cyprus. Section 3 will conclude with preliminary observations on how far the interplay between the power of attraction process and UN process has led to a more conciliatory climate and change in approach on the part of the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

Events 2001–2003: Catalysing catastrophe or solution? Intercommunal talks The first important development was the agreement to resume the intercommunal talks between the leaders of the two communities in December 2001. The talks represented the first direct meeting between President Glafkos Clerides, and Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, following failed attempts in August 1997 in Glion, Switzerland. After December 2001 the talks continued apace. In 2002, the two leaders had completed 56 separate sessions by September, all held face-to-face within the UN buffer zone under the presence of the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto.1


After a three month lapse following the Turkish Cypriot leader’s indisposition following major heart surgery, talks resumed on 15 January 2003, with the meetings up to the end of January yielding an agreement for an UN-sponsored competition in order to find a flag and a national anthem for a reunified Cyprus. Parallel to the main talks, two ad hoc committees consisting of both Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives were set up to undertake substantive work on the legislation and treaties that would underpin the ‘common state’ of Cyprus after a settlement had been agreed. Clearly the accession process was an important reason for this change of mood on the part of the Turkish Cypriot (and Turkish) leadership. There is a general consensus that the decision taken at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 was a trigger to the developments in EU–Turkey relations and subsequently the resumption of intercommunal talks between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in December 2001.2 The Accession Partnerships, signed by both Cyprus and Turkey since 1999, included clear conditions under the political criteria (short-term priorities) to work towards a solution of the Cyprus issue. For Cyprus there was a condition to maximise its efforts for a solution to the Cyprus issue, and for Turkey to do everything in its power to encourage the movement towards a solution of the Cyprus issue. There is also no doubt that the Copenhagen European Council summit in December 2002, determined to an important degree, the timing of the renewed efforts of the UN through the Annan plan to solve the Cyprus issue. According to one senior Commission official, these movements were directly attributable to the ‘prospect of accession for Cyprus’ and were ‘delivered by the EU accession timetable’ (Interview, 2002). Moreover, it was suggested that after Romano Prodi’s visit to Cyprus on October 2001, confirming the inevitability of the accession of Cyprus to the EU, both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership took the implication of this occurring without a solution to the Cyprus issue more seriously. More specifically, the pressure of the potential accession for Cyprus without a solution in May 2004, and the implication this might have for future EU–Turkey relations and the North of Cyprus, forced the hand of Rauf Denktash to return to the negotiating table – and agree, at the time, to a target date of June 2002 for a solution.3 The Accession Timetable and the Annan plan Suffice to say that no agreement could be found as hoped for by the UN and the EU before the Copenhagen European Council took its his-


toric decision in December 2002 to admit Cyprus to the EU. However, although the accession timetable did not catalyse solution at Copenhagen, it did catalyse movement at the UN level – and the personal intervention of the UN Secretary General through the ‘Annan plan’ as a basis for negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus problem. The accession process triggered new efforts at the UN and global level (US, UK), with the objective of securing a settlement on the basis of the comprehensive plan tabled by Kofi Annan – a plan that still remains, at the time of writing, a basis for negotiating a settlement. What then have been the views of the involved parties on the plan? Why has this plan, formulated and presented specifically to take advantage of the accession timetable not led to a solution of the Cyprus problem and the potential for a unified Cyprus entering the EU in May 2004? The Greek Cypriot perspective: Government, parties and public opinion The Cypriot government has fully supported the UN plan as a basis for a settlement in Cyprus – although always consistently stating that certain elements had to be changed to make it acceptable, operational and viable. Such a view was also echoed in wider political circles in Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriot public taking a much more critical view than that of the main political parties and governmental elites. Indeed, opinion polls showed that a majority of Greek Cypriots would actually vote against the plan in a referendum unless amended – many see the plan as legitimising the Turkish invasion of 1974 – in particular with regard to the issue of repatriation. In terms of the main political parties in Cyprus, there was a general consensus and willingness to support the government in negotiating on the basis of the plan – although they were keen to stress the negative as well as the positives of the plan. The elements of the plan that were identified as the most unsatisfactory were: • The issue of the Turkish Anatolian settlers who will remain in the area to be administered by the Turkish Cypriots • The plan’s formula for three centres of government and its recipe for potential political deadlock at the common state level Demetris Christofias, the leader of the main opposition party Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) (and House President) voiced concern over several issues commenting that, ‘we should neither demonise nor bury this plan without a second thought, nor make it


look like the best that Cyprus could ever get’. On a more constructive note Democratic Rally, Right (DISY) leader, Nicos Anastassiades, urged all political parties and their leaders to consider the consequences of a negative response to the UN plan. He pointed out in particular the reality of the link between Cyprus’ accession to the EU and a solution of the Cyprus issue. George Vassiliou, leader of the United Democrats, also saw the UN plan as an acceptable basis for beginning negotiations for a Cyprus settlement (Cyprus News, Nov 2002, p. 1). Other leaders belonging to the smaller parties in Cyprus, Nikos Koutsou of New Horizons and George Perdiks of the Cyprus Greens, both rejected the UN plan as a basis for negotiation, arguing that it could be potentially catastrophic for the future of Cyprus. Before his election as President of Cyprus on the 16 February 2003 one of the most sceptical of party leaders was Tassos Papadopoulos of the Democratic Party, Centre (DIKO). He argued that the link between EU accession and a Cyprus settlement should cease to be made, although urging that a unified stance was needed at what he called a critical juncture in the negotiations for a Cyprus settlement. Since his election his tone has been somewhat more conciliatory in the continuing negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus issue based on the Annan plan. A central objection of the Greek Cypriot leader with regard to the Annan plan (including the revised version) had been the issue of the refugees – the Greek Cypriot side thought too few refugees were being given the right to return home. The position of Tassos Papadopoulos in October 2003 was that the Annan plan still remained a basis for a solution to the Cyprus problem, but that changes needed to be made to make it more ‘functional and viable’, and to make it ‘workable’ and ‘operational’ on a practical level. Papadopoulos has also argued that international mediators were also increasingly recognising the need for such changes. When the Annan plan was put to the two sides for signing in March 2003 it was made clear that the changes could only be minimal. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash refused to sign the Annan plan (discussed below): the Greek Cypriot side however, argued that it was willing to negotiate on the basis of the Annan plan, but on the condition that it could make some changes within the parameters of the overall plan (Christou J., 2003). The nature and detail of the changes that the Cypriot government wishes to make remain within the confines of the negotiating elites. However, of importance here is that whatever the nature of the changes, they will have to satisfy more than


just the requests of international mediators and representatives. Moreover they will have to balance the demands of the Turkish Cypriot negotiators (whoever they will be) and Greek Cypriot civil society – which might prove a much more difficult task. It is unlikely that negotiations will restart on the basis of the Annan plan until after the December 2003 elections in the North – and even more unlikely if Rauf Denktash remains as chief negotiator and continues to pursue his own ‘plan’ and policy for Cypriot solution, with the support and backing of a significant element of the powerful Turkish military and the senior ranks of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy. In the event that the opposition forces win the elections (by a substantial enough majority to form a governing coalition) and remove Denktash as the negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots however, any Greek Cypriot changes must reflect the needs of the ‘new’ negotiators – in particular with regard to political equality and identity. It would be detrimental to ‘Cypriot interests’ if the Greek Cypriot side were to purposefully procrastinate agreeing a settlement on the Annan plan, believing that they could secure many more concessions and a much better package once they join the EU. Of more immediate importance any changes that the Cypriot government might want to make to the plan must be agreeable to the Greek Cypriot public and political parties. From a Greek Cypriot party perspective, a general consensus exists amongst the major parties on the overall utility of the plan – but objections do exist in terms of the details. In terms of Greek Cypriot society however, the signs are that substantial changes will have to be made to the UN plan if there is to be a positive vote in any future proposed referendum (assuming there is agreement). A public opinion survey on the Annan plan conducted in November 20024 (results of which were published in the Cypriot daily Simerini on 11 December 2002), indicated that 86 per cent of Greek Cypriot public opinion did not accept the Annan plan, 88 per cent supported the prior approval of the National Council before the Cypriot President signed any settlement agreement on Cyprus, and 58 per cent had very little or no faith in the Greek Cypriot negotiating team.5 In addition 81 per cent agreed that a popular referendum was necessary before any solution was agreed on behalf of the Greek Cypriot public (see Box 6.1). The Turkish Cypriot perspective: ruling elite and opposition views Rauf Denktash has called the UN plan a ‘crime against humanity’, and has repeatedly stated that he is not optimistic that a solution to the

158 The European Union and Enlargement Box 6.1

Annan plan: Greek Cypriot public opinion

Do you accept the Annan plan as is? No Yes Don’t know/No answer

86% 10% 4%

Is a prior approval by the National Council necessary, or does the President have the right to sign a possible settlement agreement on Cyprus? Prior National Council approval is necessary 88% The President has the right to sign 7% Don’t know/No answer 5% Is a popular referendum necessary prior to the signing of any settlement agreement, or does the President have the right to sign? Prior popular referendum is necessary 81% No prior referendum is necessary 18% Don’t know/No answer 1% Do you trust the negotiating team? Not at all Very little Very much Absolutely

18% 0% 23% 19%

Cyrus issue can be found on the basis of such a plan. In his own words he has argued that, ‘the main stumbling block is the fact that the 1960 Republic was based on the existence of two national communities…. The administrative arrangement [is] worse than the 1960 set up…and is taking away the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots and making them a protected minority’ (Denktash, 2002). In addition he has dismissed the territorial adjustments in the plan as ‘utter nonsense’ and unjust. Denktash has argued that if the Annan plan is signed and implemented it will result in the loss of Turkish Cypriot people’s state and sovereignty. He has also insisted that that implementation of the Annan plan will also result in Turkey losing her own rights on the island – despite provisions to maintain a Turkish military presence and the rights of the original guarantor powers on Cyprus. The view of the opposition in the North, not surprisingly, was very different. The Republican Turkish Party (RTP), led by Mehemet Ali Talat, has argued that, ‘the Annan plan has been the most realistic proposal ever put forward for a solution of the Cyprus problem. Hence it is worth negotiating and finalizing it as a comprehensive settlement’.6 Such a view was also echoed amongst the other main opposition parties and their leaders who opposed the Denktash regime, the Peace


and Democracy movement led by Mustafa Akinci, and the Solution and EU Party led by Ali Erel. Indeed they formed an alliance on 4 September 2003 in order to fight the elections in the North (14 December 2003) on a ‘collective’ aim: that of ousting Rauf Denktash as chief negotiator and reaching a settlement that would allow a unified Cyprus to join the EU. Moreover the coalitions’ accord sets as their primary objective ‘the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic within the framework of a solution to be found on the basis of the Annan plan and based on the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot constituent states’ (my emphasis, Cyprus News, Sept 2003, p. 1). The coalition clearly accepts the Annan plan as a starting point and basis for negotiations whilst also acknowledging that details need to be changed and elaborated upon; although again the nature of any such changes remain ambiguous and unclear due to the precarious situation in the North – and the fact that Denktash is still in power and chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots. In terms of public opinion, results of an opinion poll conducted by the Market Research Company KADEM (see Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3), between 27 December 2002 and 3 January 2003, revealed that 65.4 per cent of the participants voted ‘yes’ to the UN plan, indicating that two out of three of the Turkish Cypriots supported the UN plan. Particularly high rates of support for the plan came from professionals such as teachers (78 per cent), the police and soldiers (83 per cent), and Civil Servants (77.5 per cent), and those of high educational attainment, with those at Lyceum level (73.4 per cent) and University level (69.6 per cent) showing the highest level of support. Lower levels of support came from housewives

Table 6.1 Public opinion survey in the north – the percentage of those who accept the Annan plan by educational level

Illiterate Literate Elementary school Secondary school Lyceum University General

Yes

No

Not replied

54.8 60.5 49.3 62.4 73.4 69.6 65.4

38.7 36.8 39.9 29.2 21.9 25.7 28.2

6.5 2.7 10.8 8.4 4.7 4.7 6.4

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100


160 The European Union and Enlargement Table 6.2 Public opinion survey in the north – the percentage of those who accept the Annan plan by profession Civil Servant Worker Farmer Housewife Industrialists Retired Student Policeman/ Soldier Teacher

77.5 65.5 55 55.3 63.6 56.5 62.7 83.3 78


Table 6.3 Public opinion survey in the north – elements of the Annan plan and degree to which they are accepted Yes

No

No reply

Total

The percentage of the total territory that will be left to the Turkish Cypriot component state

56.6

37.7

5.7

100

The creation of the six-member Council of Ministers

68.2

20.7

11.1

100

Joint presidential system

80.5

16.2

3.3

100

The limitation of the return of the G/C who will return to the T/C component state at the rural area 14 per cent and at the urban area 9 per cent

45.1

41.3

13.6

100

Property exchange

62.9

31.1

6

100

The creation of the Supreme Court

78.1

17.5

4.4

100

The laws on the Security issues

62.3

25.1

12.6

100

Laws on the citizenship issues

69.6

20.7

9.7

100

The arrangements on the issues of the sovereignty of the component states

62.7

22.1

15.2

100

The number of Turkish and Greek military units to be deployed between 2500–7500

64.9

23.6

11.5

100



(55.3 per cent) and farmers (55 per cent) and those at Elementary School level (49.3 per cent) and the illiterate (54.8 per cent). With regard to the various elements of the plan the most support was indicated for the Joint Presidential System (80.5 per cent), with the least support for the percentage of the total territory that would be left to the Turkish Cypriot component state (56.6 per cent) and the limitation of the return of the Greek Cypriots (45.1 per cent). Denktash’s attitude to the Annan plan is a major obstacle to negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus problem – he has declared in fact that that such a plan ‘is dead and buried’. However, given that many Turkish Cypriots do not agree with his objections and are willing to negotiate on the basis of the Annan plan, Denktash’ attitude may not be as important as in the past, as it clearly lacks legitimacy; a situation that might be rectified if the coalition alliance win the elections in December 2003 with a significant enough majority to terminate the duties of Rauf Denktash as chief negotiator. More importantly, whoever wins in the December 2003 elections it is still probable that the key to a Cyprus settlement will lie in Ankara. Moreover, its seems that if the UN proposals are properly revised in conjunction with the Turkish Cypriots to satisfy Turkey’s strategic and security concerns, and if the EU provides a credible commitment for accession negotiations to begin with Turkey in the very near future, the power centres in Turkey may well give their blessing for a speedy solution and clear Cyprus’ way to join the EU as a unified island. It would not harm either, Turkish ambitions of beginning accession negotiations with the EU after December 2004. Developments in Turkey and Turkish views on the Annan plan There is evidence to suggest that the Turkish accession process, in particular since 1999 and the decision taken at Helsinki, has served as a trigger for creating a more progressive attitude amongst Turkish elites – in order to improve its relations with the EU. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 was also very important in terms of fostering a more positive climate for a Cyprus settlement in several ways. First, the pressure of Copenhagen was instrumental in getting the types of revisions to the Annan plan, which came about on 10 December 2002. Such revisions did not reflect any bias – indeed there were some that favoured the Greek Cypriots and some that favoured the Turkish side. Second, and even more important, was the participation of the new government of Turkey in Copenhagen, as a candidate country.


There it was made crystal clear to the new government of Turkey that finding a Cyprus settlement was critical to Turkey’s European aspirations – and this in turn was very important in creating the sort of atmosphere that made it more likely that a Cyprus settlement would come about. The prospect of accession clearly provided a greater incentive for Turkey to undertake a more positive stance on key issues of contention, which it otherwise might not have taken. The Turkish elections on 3 November 2002 also added to this positive climate of cooperation, with Tayyip Erdo˘ gan, asserting that Turkey ‘absolutely support negotiations’ on the Annan plan and, Abdullah Gül, confirming that the Turkish side would negotiate on the plan so that Cyprus would become ‘an island of peace’ (Cyprus News, Nov 2002, p. 2). Turkish Foreign Minister, Yasar Yakis, announced in January 2003 that certain changes would be made in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. According to the policy change, the Turkish side would no longer insist on maintaining the existing status quo in Cyprus and would aim at reaching a solution after making the necessary changes to the Annan plan. What was clear from the new Turkish government was that it did not want to be the side that avoided sitting at the negotiation table, and as Erdo˘ gan himself stressed, ‘Rejecting the UN plan altogether should be out of the question…We should display an understanding, which will solve this issue…We should not adopt the 40-year-old approach to this issue…’(Cyprus Press Information Office, 03.10.03). Erdo˘ gan stated that Turkey did not completely reject the Annan plan and stressed that the Cyprus problem can be solved through negotiations, in the framework of the Annan plan, ‘We accept the Annan plan as a framework. We did not reject completely the Annan plan. There are positive aspects and we accept them and we discuss the negative aspects too’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 03.10.03). However, the support of the AKP government for the Annan plan as a basis for negotiation has been questionable and inconsistent to say the least. Despite Tayyip Erdo˘ gan’s reiteration that he did not favour Ankara’s long-standing policy on Cyprus, in a visit to northern Cyprus on 15 November 2003, he endorsed Rauf Denktash’s rejection of the plan even as a basis for negotiation. Denktash clearly enjoyed the support of many senior ranking officials in the Turkish politicomilitary establishment, as well as that of opposition parties, and those who opposed Turkish membership of the EU. The pro-European AKP government, despite its rhetoric, has also adopted the Denktash line on a solution to the Cyprus issue and the demand for separate recognition and sovereignty for the occupied area.


The AKP, regardless of its initial positive rhetoric, has thus far yielded to the position and views of the more conservative voices in the Turkish politico-military establishment on Cyprus, with the implication that, in reality and substance, Turkey’s Cyprus policy has not been transformed. Whilst the more moderate and reformists (the AKP government) voices within the Turkish establishment clearly recognise that a rejection of the Annan plan is detrimental to Turkey’s own membership prospects, they have been reluctant to commit to a Cyprus settlement on the basis of the plan until the EU provides a more credible commitment for definite date for accession negotiations to begin with Turkey. In turn, the scepticism regarding EU intentions has provided conservatives with the fuel to pursue their anti-solution and anti-EU policies: it has provided the justification to reject the Annan plan, and with that, to ensure that another obstacle is erected to Turkey’s EU accession.

The UN process and the EU accession process The Hague: March 2003 Given the impasse between the negotiating parties on the Annan plan, the UN Secretary General on 10 March 2003 extended invitations to the leaders of the two communities to go to The Hague in the Netherlands. The purpose was to secure agreement on the Annan plan (amended) – and a commitment that such a plan would be put to a referendum in the north and south once agreed – crucially, before Cyprus signed its Accession Treaty with the EU on the 16 April 2003. The Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, was prepared to submit the ‘Annan plan’ (amended 26 February) for approval by referendum on 30 March 2003 on the condition that ‘the people knew what they are being asked to vote on’. The Greek Cypriot leadership had several reservations about various elements of the plan and more specifically, wished to be sure that gaps regarding federal legislation and constituent state constitutions would be filled. In the words of Papadopoulos ‘we were ready to go to referendum as long as the whole legal framework was in place and in particular the legislation related to the common state’. The proviso, he explained, was ‘to avoid the possibility that the only states that would be functioning in Cyprus would be the constituent states, whilst the central government would decline through the lack of proper legislations and institutions’ (Cyprus News, March 2003, p. 3) The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, however, made it clear that he was not prepared to agree to put the plan to referendum, and


that he had fundamental objections to the plan on basic points. Indeed Denktash suggested at The Hague that the parties should return to a discussion on principles, despite the UN Secretary General’s insistence that there should be no trade-offs in the plan or re-opening of the basic principles outlined in the plan (De Soto, 2003 in Cyprus Press Information Office, 12.04.03–18.04.03). The Turkish Cypriot leader held the belief, in line with his confederal vision for a solution, that further negotiations were only likely to be successful if they began from ‘a new starting point’ – maintaining his view that ‘the plan was unacceptable’ and ‘not a plan we could ask our people to vote for’. Denktash’s view was ultimately backed by powerful elites in the Turkish politico-military establishment who support the status quo situation in Cyprus and were not convinced of the benefits of EU membership. The ruling AKP, the pro-EU sectors of the populace and the press however, expressed disappointment at the failure of the negotiations. Although many in Turkey had hoped that the electoral success of the AKP in November 2003 and its formation of a single-party government would herald real democracy in Turkey, the military once again demonstrated its domination of Turkish politics. The AKP although initially supporting the Annan plan, was soon persuaded to reverse its initial positive reaction to such a plan and to accept Denktash’s vision and line on Cyprus. Such a stance was taken in Turkey despite the fact that Denktash’s view was opposed by many Turkish Cypriots who supported the Annan plan as a basis for negotiating a settlement. Indeed, Mustafa Akinci, a leading Turkish Cypriot opposition figure argued that Ankara, backed Denktash’s rejectionist stance because the ‘Turkish establishment doesn’t want real democracy…The army doesn’t want to see [its] power watered down by EU-instigated reforms. The reality is that Turkey is unable to sort out its own problems. It can’t create the conditions for initiating change’. He argued in addition that Turkey had ‘no strategy to defend its own interests, let alone those of the Turkish Cypriots’. From a regional and international perspective, the events at The Hague had negative repercussions not just for the Cyprus problem, but also for Turkish prospects of membership of the EU. Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, observed that, ‘[As long as] the Cyprus problem remains open and without a solution, there can be no European prospect for Turkey’. The EU’s enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, reiterated that Cyprus’s EU accession process would ‘go ahead as foreseen according to the accession timetable’, despite the failure to secure a solution (Cyprus News, March 2003, p. 3).


Moreover, from a European Commission perspective the EU’s priority was to see a solution to the Cyprus problem within the parameters of the Annan plan, so that a unified Cyprus could secure its future in the EU after May 2004. Importantly, Günter Verheugen, expressed the view that Turkey had an important role to play in such process in several ways: to support the Turkish Cypriots in their efforts to become EU members, and to play an active role in securing a Cyprus settlement which, represented a major barrier to Turkey’s attempts to secure a date for the beginning of its accession negotiations. The European Parliament similarly, called on the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey to increase their efforts to find a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem, based on the principles of the Annan plan. The view of the UN Secretary-General was that failure at The Hague signalled ‘the end of the road’ – indicating that it would clearly not be possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement before Cyprus acceded to the EU on 16 April 2003. Kofi Annan acknowledged that the issues raised by the Greek Cypriot side were within the parameters of the Annan plan – and that, Rauf Denktash, on the other hand, had wanted to make basic, and radical, changes to the plan, and to alter the underlying philosophy of the plan. Moreover, the lack of agreement at The Hague, in the opinion of Alvaro De Soto, was attributable to ‘the failings of political will rather than to the absence of favourable circumstances’ (my emphasis, De Soto, 2003, cited in Cyprus Press Information Office, 12.04.03–18.04.03), created by the EU enlargement process. The UN and the international community (EU, UK, US, Greece) placed primary responsibility for the breakdown of the talks with the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktash, because of his rejection of the ‘Annan plan’ – and his failure to accept the plan as a basis for negotiation. The Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, perhaps did not make things easier by adding further conditions to the UN proposal, but the plan was accepted as a starting point for negotiations – and the Greek Cypriot side was content to accept the basic principles of the plan and agreed to take it to a referendum. Moreover, in his report on the negotiations at The Hague, the UN Secretary General, asserted that he would not get involved in the efforts for a solution again unless the ‘political will is shown for a successful outcome’ – expressing the hope in particular, that the ‘Turkish Government will lend its full support to the search for peace’ and acknowledging that ‘Without that support it is difficult to achieve a solution’ (Annan Report 2003, cited in Cyprus Press Information Office, 05.04.03–11.04.03).


The Accession Treaty and new initiatives: changing minds or old wine in new bottles? Only days after Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty to join the EU in Athens on 16 April, Rauf Denktash, (23 April 2003) took the decision, for the first time since 1974, to open up the dividing line (Green Line), enabling Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to move around the island on a daily basis. In addition the leader of the AKP, Tayyip Erdo˘ gan, called for new Cyprus talks based on the failed ‘Annan plan’, despite the fact that such a plan had been rejected by Denktash and conservative forces in Turkey at The Hague in March 2003. The Turkish government also announced that it would allow Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey for the first time in 40 years. There is no doubt that the accession process was a key catalyst for such symbolic gesturing – as it occurred only week after the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession agreement to join the EU. The question remained, however, of the meaning of such changes in terms of moving towards a Cyprus settlement based on the Annan plan. After signing the Accession Treaty the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, announced that he did not view this as a victory for the Greek Cypriots and a defeat for Rauf Denktash but rather ‘a victory for all Cypriot people’, whilst reasserting his commitment to finding a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. Indeed the Greek Cypriot government announced the preparation of measures for the Turkish Cypriots (Box 6.2) in order to facilitate movement towards a solution and to demonstrate that ‘there [was] hope for them to share the fruits and benefits from Cyprus’ accession’ (Cyprus Weekly, 18.04.03–24.04.03, p. 1). Rauf Denktash took the view that the signing of the Accession Treaty effectively sealed the partition in Cyprus and that reunification was only possible with Turkey’s entry into the EU. Turkey also failed to recognise the Accession Treaty, whilst reversing the stance (superficially at least) that it had eventually taken on the Annan plan at The Hague. Indeed Tayyip Erdo˘ gan argued that the Annan plan ‘could yet form the basis of a settlement’, and called for new talks in order to discuss the concerns of the two sides and agree to any necessary amendments. From a Greek and Greek Cypriot perspective there was a great deal of scepticism regarding such a vault face on the part of the regime in the North and Turkey in opening the border crossing. The Cypriot government welcomed the freedom of movement in principle; and there is no

The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context 167 Box 6.2 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

The Cypriot government: Set of measures for the Turkish Cypriots

Movement of Goods Movement of Persons and Vehicles Employment of Turkish Cypriots Contacting/Subcontracting Employment of Professionals Professional training of Turkish Cypriots Participation of Turkish Cypriots in International Sports Events Participation of Turkish Cypriots in Events Abroad Measures regarding relatives of missing persons and killed non-combatants Joint Contact committee for humanitarian issues Issue of certificates and other documents Medical Care Cultural Heritage Upgrading of Turkish Cypriot Programmes of the Cyprus broadcasting corporation De-mining of the buffer zone Cooperation at the local authorities level Telecommunications with the occupied area and Turkey Participation of Turkish Cypriots in elections Office for Turkish Cypriot Affairs

Source: Government of Cyprus, April 2003.

doubt that there have been many positive effects from the opening of the borders with regard to reconciliation. However, it also described it as a way for the ‘Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to deflect attention away from his negative attitude to the UN-led reunification talks’ (Spiteri, 2003). The Greek Foreign Minister, George Papandreou, observed that, ‘following the lifting of restrictions on free movement, thousands of Cypriots seized the opportunity to cross the so-called Green Line, meet with each other and demonstrate that it is possible for them to share a common future’, whilst also reiterating however, that the ‘easing of restriction is not a substitute for a comprehensive settlement to the island’s political problem’ (Papandreou, 25 April 2003). From the perspective of Rauf Denktash the situation created by his policy of limited freedom of movement represented the basis for a settlement of the Cyprus issue, a ‘model of the future’. A settlement based on such a model, however, was not reflective of the key principles outlined in the Annan plan. Indeed one of the key motives for allowing the limited movement for Denktash was to reinforce his vision of a Cyprus solution consisting of two states in Cyprus, under a confederal agreement.


It clearly was a conciliatory measure – not for working towards settlement within the Annan plan however, but to creating, in his words, a ‘being together situation’ rather than a ‘living together situation’, where Greek Cypriots being settled in the North and getting hold of property there ‘would be adjusted according to the laws of the recognised “TRNC”’. Indeed in a statement issued by Denktash after the border restrictions were lifted he declared that he felt very relieved that ‘he had got rid of the Annan plan’, which in his opinion, would have led to Greek Cypriot domination of the North and loss of equilibrium between Greece and Turkey ensured by the 1960 agreements (Cyprus Press Information Office, 17.05.03–22.05.03). Rauf Denktash subsequently put forward proposals (11 July 2003), conveyed to the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, for a comprehensive package of confidence building measures (CBM) that in his opinion would form the basis of a durable agreement between the two sides in Cyprus. He has also announced that an alternative to the Annan plan, prepared with Turkey, is almost complete and said that a new model was being put together based on the basic principles of the Turkish Cypriot side. The proposals put forward by the Turkish Cypriot leadership included the opening of Nicosia International Airport, under UN supervision, to joint use by the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots; and the opening of the closed sector of Varosha, again under UN supervision. Neither Turkey nor the Turkish Cypriot leadership have revealed their final ‘plan’ for solution – arguing only that it would be disclosed ‘when the time is right’. It can only be suggested that Turkey is playing a waiting game given the distrust of the EU’s intentions (and the power of the conservative forces within the politico-military establishment that do not want to see solution or accession to the EU), even amongst those that are pro-European and in support of the Annan plan. Indeed it’s plausible to suggest that movement towards fully accepting and endorsing the Annan plan as a basis for a settlement in Cyprus will be reliant on three factors: confirmation by the EU of a date for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey; internal reform within Turkey to limit the role of the military in Turkish politics; and the ability of Turkish elites to reach a consensus on the Cyprus issue, and on EU accession for Turkey. The ‘game’ being played at the moment by Turkey however, could very well ‘backfire’ if movement is not forthcoming before May 2004, with a plethora of consequences for Turkey. Moreover the failure to accept the Annan plan as a basis for negotiating a solution could be the very factor that


hinders Turkey’s aspiration of beginning accession negotiations and becoming an EU member. Certainly the opinion of the UN Secretary General was that he would only make a new effort to achieve a settlement in Cyprus if the parties were genuinely interested in finding a solution based on the Annan plan. The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot opposition in the North have both taken a sceptical view on the initiatives proposed by Denktash. The Greek Cypriots once again, perceived such movement as a delaying and diversionary tactic – and ‘a manoeuvre to divert international attention from his [Denktash’s] responsibility for sabotaging the previous UN initiative at The Hague’, which would ‘unavoidably lead to the postponement of talks’ (Cyprus News, July 2003, p. 1). From a Turkish Cypriot opposition party perspective, Mehemet Ali Talat, described Denktash’s efforts and proposals as a strategy for gaining time. Moreover, whilst not rejecting the proposals, he has argued that such measures could not be a substitute for a real solution. In addition he has pointed out that such measures were not new, and in fact were included in the CBM’s of 1992 and 1994 by the then Secretary General Boutros Ghali – which Denktash refused to accept. Mustafa Akinci has argued that it is simply a ‘new element’ of Denktash’s delaying tactics, agreed with certain circles in Turkey, to divert attention away from the Annan plan, with the general feeling amongst opposition groups that it is the renewal of an old idea within a different context and time – old wine in new bottles – that would not lead to a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

Conclusions The EU’s accession process and timetable has clearly been a key stimulant for new policies, initiatives and proposals at the global, regional and community level – in efforts to ‘create’ the conditions for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Unfortunately such efforts, catalysed ultimately by the prospect of Cyprus’ accession to the EU without a solution, and its potential ramifications, seemed to have reinforced entrenched positions, in particular in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leadership’s case – despite initial signs from Turkey that it might not ‘adopt the 40 year old approach to the Cyprus problem’. Notwithstanding the most favourable circumstances for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem for many years, it seems that the political will for a UN based solution was not forthcoming.


Moreover the accession process, which catalysed the intervention of the UN Secretary General through the Annan plan, did not alter the vision of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and ruling elite, with Turkish support, for a confederal solution to the Cyprus problem. The Annan plan, proposed at what was deemed a critical and historical moment with the EU’s decision on the accession of Cyprus pending, was received with mixed reaction by the parties involved – and within the two communities in the south and the north. From a Cypriot governmental and party political perspective (main parties) the Annan plan, although containing certain problematic elements in its initial form, was perceived as satisfactory basis for negotiating a settlement. The Greek Cypriot public however, were less than enthusiastic about the nature of the plan in particular with regard to repatriation and compensation – a problem that would clearly need to be rectified if agreement was eventually forthcoming on the basis of the plan and put to referendum. The Greek Cypriots, consistent with their historical approach, have worked within the parameters of both processes and conveyed a positive approach to reconciliation and negotiating a solution on the basis of the Annan plan – whilst also proposing and implementing initiatives to reintegrate Turkish Cypriots into the south – with the benefits that this entails. This does not imply that the Greek Cypriots have been content with the provisions of the Annan plan, as clearly they also conceive of changes to make the plan ‘functional and viable’, even though the nature of these changes remains concealed within the Cypriot ‘negotiating’ establishment. In the eyes of the international community the Greek Cypriots (acting within the parameters of international law) have clearly been more cooperative and have accepted the underlying principles of the Annan plan as a basis for negotiating a just and viable settlement to the Cyprus problem. On the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite side the Annan plan provoked a negative and unconstructive reaction. Despite containing central elements that Rauf Denktash had agreed to in the 1977 and 1979 agreements, it did not fit with his vision of a solution based on two separate and sovereign states in Cyprus – a position adopted in 1998 with considerable influence from Turkey. The Turkish position once again was ambiguous and contradictory at different stages of the accession process timetable. There was great optimism initially and a positive rhetoric from the newly elected Turkish government that the Annan plan was an acceptable basis for negotiating a solution and that it contained positive elements, but also negative elements that needed to be changed.


This policy position however, was not apparent at The Hague in March 2003 – the Turkish government was clearly persuaded to adapt the same stance as Rauf Denktash in rejecting the Annan plan (although it did reverse its position again after Cyprus signed its Accession Treaty). The suggestion is that elements of the powerful military in Turkey had used its ‘subtle’ powers of persuasion to interfere in policy on Cyprus. Subsequent activities and policy on Cyprus coming from Turkey have reflected the ideas of the conservative forces within the Turkish politico-military establishment – over and above the more moderate voices that clearly recognise that the rejection of the Annan plan is a serious impediment to Turkey’s European aspirations. Thus far the EU accession process has resulted in an asymmetric impact with no substantial change in the Turkish approach to Cyprus amongst conservative elites in the Turkish bureaucracy vis-à-vis the Annan plan. Indeed their views have clearly dominated, providing support for Rauf Denktash in his quest to undermine the Annan plan and bring to fruition his vision and ‘model’ for a Cyprus solution through the formulation of new ‘plan’. It seems that the conservative cleavage within the Turkish elite establishment has simply paid lip service to the Annan plan, despite the views and worries of those Turkish officials (reformist and moderate pro-Europeanists) who realise the potential ramifications of such a stance. These worries over potential consequences for Turkey are particularly salient given the importance the EU attaches to Turkish movement and effort to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan. In terms of the power of attraction framework the inexorable link between the power of attraction and the UN process has not served to catalyse any significant movement in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leadership position in substance – despite stimulating initiatives (opening of borders) which have served to dispel certain myths about the ability of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots ability to live together, that perhaps would have not been forthcoming in the absence of the accession process and the UN process. Political will seems to be the key missing ingredient in negotiating a settlement, based on the Annan plan. Moreover, negotiation on the Annan plan has been dependent on Turkish perceptions of EU intentions in relation to Turkish membership – which, as noted in the previous chapter, have been marred by distrust and a lack of credibility because certain conditions salient to the success of the power of attraction have not be fulfilled. As the situation stands at the moment the possibility of a unified Cyprus joining the EU in May 2004 seems like a distant prospect – in


particular with the position taken by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, with clear support from powerful forces in Turkey. The December 2003 elections in the North in this sense, take on a very important and significant relevance to the future of Cyprus – the accession process has clearly changed the minds of the opposition forces in the North on EU membership and negotiation of a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. Whilst the elections should not be seen as a ‘panacea’ even if the opposition forces win and secure enough seats in ‘parliament’ to form a governing coalition and oust Denktash – they do bring the hope that there would be a different approach from the Turkish Cypriot side with a new negotiating team, and perhaps a more reconciliatory stance from Turkey, in particular if the EU provides the ‘credible commitment’, in the form of a date to begin accession negotiations, that Turkey so desires. If there is a change in the political situation in the North and particularly the ‘negotiating’ elite, a positive decision from the EU on the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey and internal reform within Turkey could bring about a win-win scenario that might serve to change minds in critical quarters in Ankara on the solution of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan. A negative decision on the part of the EU, will be perceived as another rebuff in Turkey, whether justifiable or not, and will have long-term repercussions in Cyprus and on the broader regional security context – there will be no incentive for Turkey to cooperate, negotiate or reconciliate if it believes that it has once again been unfairly rejected by the European club that it so aspires to join.

7 Conclusions

Europe may not have a magic wand that can solve all crises but we have proved that it is possible to build a stable and democratic continent. It is this prospect that now unites us in the Balkans…Gives hope to Greek–Turkish relations and creates a common vision for Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Papandreou, 2003)

Introduction The European Union (EU) has long been described as one of the most successful models of conflict resolution the world has ever known. As a security community Europe has experienced an unprecedented period of peace and stability since the Second World War and there is no doubt that European integration and enlargement – the processes of deepening and widening – have been crucial to this ‘civilised’ environment. Since the end of the Cold War and the concomitant enlargement of the EU and subsequent attempts to develop a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the EU’s contribution to conflict resolution and the transformation of border conflicts has faced immense challenges. The search for a solution to the Cyprus issue was one such challenge that was given a new impetus in the early 1990s when Cyprus applied to join the EU. The primary reason for the unbounded optimism surrounding Cyprus’ accession, at least for the Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, was that the power of attraction could help to facilitate movement to a solution of the Cyprus problem – the EU could provide ‘leverage’ where the UN had previously failed to do so. Indeed the European Commission was convinced ‘that the result of 173


Cyprus’s accession to the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem would naturally reinforce each other’ (Commission, 1993). This final chapter will discuss the lessons of the power of attraction’s logic and its role in conflict resolution in relation to the case study of Cyprus. It will attempt to provide answers, albeit tentative, given the dynamic nature of the Cyprus issue, to the key questions posed at the beginning of the book: Can the EU through the instruments available to it vis-à-vis enlargement and inclusion, help to resolve conflict? Has the EU’s policy towards Cyprus since its application for membership in 1990 helped or hindered the movement towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue? Moreover it will seek to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the power of attraction approach and the logics that underpin such an approach, theoretically and empirically. Section 1 will discuss the effect and impact of the power of attraction on the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. Section 2 will assess the utility of the power of attraction as a mechanism and concept for conflict resolution in the case of Cyprus in order to enhance our understanding of the EU’s role in Cyprus. The final, concluding section, will comment on the way forward in relation to the Cyprus issue and the role of the EU in conflict resolution and prevention.

The Power of attraction: impact and effects The Greek Cypriot strategy reflected a power of attraction logic, demonstrating a certain historical continuity with regard to involving international institutions to try and resolve the Cyprus problem. For the Greek Cypriots the accession process was viewed as an additional tool that might help to catalyse a political settlement on the island – a view that generally resonated with most political parties and the Greek Cypriot public; even the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL), who were initially opposed to Cyprus’s application for full EU membership and the efficacy of the power of attraction approach for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, had to eventually yield to the decision of the other political parties. The EU view and the Greek Cypriot view were synonymous on resolution of the Cyprus issue and how to achieve it (through the diffusion of United Nations (UN) norms on Cyprus to EU level). The EU also adopted the Greek Cypriot view on accession (with the help of Greece inside the EU) – namely that the

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Greek Cypriots should not be unduly punished for the division on the island caused by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence. The Greek Cypriot side perceived that EU accession would be beneficial politically, economically and in relation to the future security and stability of the island. The EU confirmed Cyprus’ status as an accession candidate, provided the necessary incentives (economic, financial, security), and consistently confirmed Cyprus’ European credentials and orientation. The effect in terms of the EU’s leverage on the Greek Cypriot side was that minimal conditionality was applied – the general view in Europe and the international community was that the Greek Cypriots demonstrated the political will necessary to negotiate a settlement to the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution. The effect on the Turkish Cypriots was more complex – there was a clear demarcation between the impact of the power of attraction on the Turkish Cypriot leadership and supporting ruling elites, and opposition parties and civil society in the North. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has not been convinced of the benefits of EU accession – economically, politically or in terms of security. The EU accession process has been perceived as illegal and illegitimate – and has thus had a detrimental effect on the position taken by Rauf Denktash on the solution of the Cyprus issue. The major stumbling block has been that of the future ‘identity’ of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s belief that only through recognition of the ‘TRNC’ (i.e. as a sovereign state) can the political rights and representation, security and identity of the Turkish Cypriots be guaranteed in the long run. The power of attraction, in the eyes of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, simply added the EU to the list of irritants and actors that wish to impose a Greek Cypriot solution to the Cyprus issue. The EU approach was predominantly characterised by an economic logic, and sought to work within the defined UN parameters for finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. For the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite the issue was predominantly about ‘societal security and identity’ – and although the UN parameters for a solution (bizonal, bicommunal federal solution) were agreed by Denktash himself in 1977 and 1979, the EU accession process, dealing only with the recognised Republic of Cyprus, effectively hardened the position of the Turkish Cypriot leader. Indeed with support and encouragement from Turkey after what they perceived as certain negative decisions at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 on their membership aspirations, his position on a settlement changed, and he demanded a ‘confederal’ solution


to the Cyprus problem, with a separate internationally recognised TRNC. Thereafter, it was only on this basis that the Turkish Cypriot leadership was prepared to proceed on a solution and the question of EU accession. The power of attraction had a fundamentally different effect on the Turkish opposition parties and Turkish Cypriot civil society in the North. Although the issue of ‘societal identity’ and ‘political equality’ is no less important for these groups, their perception of the accession process and the EU has led to fundamentally different attitudes than that of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. They have recognised the economic benefits of EU membership, and although concerns exist on issues of representation, security, relocation, compensation and identity, they clearly believe that such issues can be resolved prior to EU membership on the basis of the Annan plan (as a starting point for negotiations), and secured, accommodated and consolidated inside the EU framework. For them the accession process did not represent a threat to their Turkish Cypriot ‘identity’ and their sense of ‘self’ – the power of attraction represented an opportunity to reconstitute and consolidate such an identity within an environment that would ensure their longer term security. The accession process has increased the opacity of the opposition forces in the North domestically, regionally and globally – and created the climate and opportunity for an alternative view and increased political protest in favour of EU membership and a solution to the Cyprus issue. The EU enlargement process and its timing, has been an important factor in catalysing action and protest from the Turkish Cypriot opposition parties and Turkish Cypriot civil society (Labour Unions, Civil Organisations, Non Governmental Organisations (NGO’s) etc), and more importantly, in catalysing a movement towards the solution of the Cyprus issue. The benefits offered to Turkish Cypriots through membership of the EU, and the inexorable link between accession and a solution to the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan, has proved a fruitful ‘strategy’ for changing minds. The impact in Turkey has been both ambiguous and complicated. Despite positive developments in EU–Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations, powerful Turkish elites have still supported the position of the Turkish leadership under Rauf Denktash, and have moved to integrate the north of Cyprus with Turkey’s structures at every opportunity. Important political and military elites in Turkey, although recognising it, have refused to accept the reality of the link between a settlement of the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s EU orientation. Tayyip Erdo˘ gan, for

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example, has alleged (October 2003) that the Cyprus problem is not within the conditions of accession for Turkish entry to the EU, stating that ‘This is a de facto condition and nobody has the right to create this’. Similarly the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, has constantly repeated that the Cyprus issue is not ‘crucial’ to Turkey’s relations with the EU. This is despite the fact that the latest progress report (October 2003) on Turkey’s accession prospects made a more explicit link between a Cyprus solution and the beginning of Turkish accession negotiations and the fact that statements issued by the EU Commissioner in charge of enlargement, Günter Verheugen, have clearly indicated that Turkey should solve the Cyprus problem before the next stage of the EU’s enlargement process begins. Gül has insisted that Cyprus is not a precondition for EU membership and has stressed that only the fulfilment of the economic and political criteria will be influential in EU–Turkey relations, not the Cyprus issue. The power of attraction, because of the diversity of interests and influences within the Turkish state (and the dominance of conservative forces thus far), has not changed the actual context in which foreign policy decisions are made (identity transformation) and thus has not led to a fundamental alteration of Turkish foreign policy in general or in relation to the Cyprus issue.

Theory: conditionality and the power of attraction The case study of Cyprus has given us several insights into the power of attraction as an approach to conflict resolution, peace and stability. It has revealed its overall limitations, in the sense that it has not catalysed a solution to the Cyprus problem as yet, for reasons internal and external to the EU. On the other hand, the case of Cyprus has also demonstrated that rather than catalysing catastrophe, the accession timetable has created the necessary climate to focus minds on negotiating a settlement before Cyprus accedes to the EU in May 2004. In addition the longer term effects of a power of attraction strategy could secure peace and prosperity throughout the southern Mediterranean region and Middle East providing that a real identity transformation takes place during the accession process; this in turn would enhance the credibility of the EU as a ‘civilian’ actor in world affairs and demonstrate the effectiveness of association and inclusion as foreign policy per se. How then, can the power of attraction framework shed light on the reasons for the stances taken by the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey? What are the merits of the power of


attraction approach and what, if any, are the limitations, vis-à-vis the Cyprus conflict? The view propounded by the EU was that the power of attraction, underpinned by the philosophy and logic of inclusion, could catalyse a solution to the longstanding division of the island and create stability not just in Cyprus, but in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. EU policy towards Cyprus and Turkey reflected the desire of the EU to create a peaceful security community, through insisting on the adherence of universal and European based values and principles in the form of conditions for accession. The EU’s enlargement policy towards Cyprus and Turkey predominantly encompassed both a moral justification and value-based justification, although clearly there existed a lack of consistency in application, in particular in relation to Turkey. The motive for the EU clearly went beyond that of utility, in the short and medium term at least, as associating the Cyprus problem with the EU enlargement process or importing the Cyprus problem into the EU had a wide array of potential ramifications, not least for the future security and stability of Europe. The EU’s approach to the Cyprus problem, whilst explicitly supporting the UN framework for a resolution, was the power of attraction – reliant on the adherence to conditionality – underpinned by the logics of enlargement. There was a clear functional logic to the EU’s approach, based primarily on offerings of economic carrots for persuading the Turkish Cypriots to move towards a solution of the Cyprus issue, and the stick of isolation if movement was not forthcoming. For Turkey the primary strategy was that of financial ‘incentivisation’ and the appetising carrot of inclusion to European forums and governance structures – with delays in beginning accession negotiations and the threat of exclusion if Turkey did not meet EU requirements. For both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots inclusion was based on the fulfilment of strict conditionality, in particular the condition of good neighbourliness which stressed ‘the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter…in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote…settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004’. From an EU perspective the lack of a settlement to the Cyprus problem, although not part of the Copenhagen criteria per se, would represent a major impediment to Turkey’s membership aspirations – it clearly represented a breach of the condition of ‘good neighbourliness’ and an affront to an important ‘value’ that formed the basis of the EU security community.

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The EU strategy was to offer conditional carrots and sticks to what it perceived to be the intransigent parties in the dispute in order to facilitate movement on the Cyprus problem and create the conciliatory climate necessary for a solution based on the UN agreed frameworks. Conditionality and therefore leverage however, was not as forthcoming or evident in relation to the EU’s approach to the Greek Cypriot side for several reasons. The permeation of the Greek Cypriot view to EU level, internally through the membership of Greece, and externally with regard to established UN resolutions defining the ‘norms’ associated with a solution to the Cyprus issue, created widespread opinion in the EU that the Greek Cypriot side was more willing to participate in the search for a political settlement. Thus the view was that the Greek Cypriots should not be unduly punished through extra conditionality due to Turkish intransigence. The power of attraction and the conditions attached to its success as a strategy for conflict resolution have been rather complex in the case of Cyprus, not least because accession has been inexorably linked with the wider politics of association and securitisation. Enlargement to Cyprus and the resolution of the Cyprus issue was inevitably subject to a complex mix of pressures inside and outside the EU; Greece’s membership of the EU; Greek-Turkish relations, and importantly Turkey–EU relations and the question of Turkish membership. In addition the EU approach, reflecting an economic-functional logic, was inadequate for changing the minds of the Turkish Cypriot leadership who perceived the problem within an ‘identity’ and ‘sovereignty’ discourse, which was historically constructed and locked-in to the politics of the Cypriot dispute. The expectation from an EU perspective in Cyprus, was that issues of socio-cultural and identity preservation would follow economic transformation and development. The EU clearly fulfilled the conditions for the success of the power of attraction in the financial sense through offering economic incentives for the short, medium and long term, in order to reconstruct Northern Cyprus. In addition there existed a clear time frame for Cypriot membership with consistent statements affirming the European identity and orientation of a united Cyprus. The constraint was that of perception and political will – the conditionality attached to the ‘carrots’ offered by the EU was a settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation. For Turkish Cypriot opposition groups and parties this was an acceptable condition. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership and ruling elite, however, such conditionality implied an inequality in the representation of the


Turkish Cypriots and non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – a major reason why an invitation to join the Cypriot delegation to negotiate the accession process was rejected. Arguments about the terms of the invitation seemed rather erroneous in this sense, as the only term that Rauf Denktash would have accepted as a starting point was a recognition of the TRNC as a separate state, which he saw as paramount for securing the longer-term identity of the Turkish Cypriots. In relation to Turkey there was a question of credibility and legitimacy – the inherent conflict between the conditions required by the EU for membership and Turkey’s own perception of such conditionality – and the consistency in which they were applied. A major impediment to the power of attraction strategy was that of the mistrust of Turkish elites of European intentions. Such a mistrust, constructed historically through a perceived lack of European interest in Turkish accession and membership, was by no means endemic amongst all in the Turkish elite establishment – but it clearly provided justification for the most conservative forces that disagreed with EU membership to reject EU conditionality and the reforms connected to accession. A condition for the success of the power of attraction approach and for the EU to maintain leverage was that the candidate country must perceive that there are potential benefits to be gained by membership of the EU. Moreover the effectiveness of conditionality is dependent on two crucial factors – first, the consistency in which it is applied and second, the extent to which the country in question desires the carrot on offer or fears the sticks (Smith, 2000, p. 39). In the case of Turkey there was a perception of inconsistency, and no ‘collective consensus’ existed on the merits of EU membership. This was complicated even further by the politics of linkage – between that of Turkish accession and the resolution of the Cyprus dispute. As a consequence the obstacles in the path of Turkey’s European orientation, through conditionality, in addition to the potential of a divided island acceding to the EU, resulted in an ‘overlap between hardliners on the Cyprus conflict and the nationalist and euro-sceptic forces in Turkey’ (Tocci, 2003). Not only this but the lack of a committed EU policy towards Turkey strengthened the arguments of euro-sceptic elites in Ankara and northern Cyprus that argued against an early settlement within the EU. It also impacted negatively on the moderates and reformists amongst Turkish elites: they accepted that that Cyprus’ EU membership would occur prior to Turkey’s, due to Turkey’s own shortcomings in reforming politically and economically, in particular in terms of implementation.

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However, ‘they could not accept that because of allegedly unchangeable features of the Turkish state and society, Cyprus would mark the borders of the united Europe, keeping Cyprus and Turkey on opposite sides of the European divide’ (Tocci, 2003). So long as such a fundamental distrust of the EU’s intentions persisted amongst Turkish elites, a Cyprus solution would represent a lose-lose scenario not a win-win agreement. In this sense the belief that Turkey would value accession to the EU more than the strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkish securitisation, was fundamentally flawed, as it pre-supposed that Turkish elites would eventually come to a ‘consensual’ agreement on the merits of EU accession and policy towards the Cyprus conflict – which clearly, at the time of writing, does not exist. The politics of linkage actually served to perpetuate the mistrust between the EU and Turkey rather than change the minds of either the euro-sceptics or moderates. The conservative forces within the Turkish establishment perceived the EU accession process as a threat to Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Furthermore, for them, an intransigent position on Cyprus added another obstacle in Turkey’s EU path, and thus dampened the momentum in favour of what some viewed as threatening domestic reforms. Even for those in Turkey that had displayed a more moderate stance, and indicated a fundamental shift with regard to EU accession and Turkey’s Cyprus policy (the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government) – this was only on the strict condition that the EU provide a firm date for accession negotiations to begin with Turkey. This conditionality indicated a mistrust of European intentions, of which the lure of membership would not be enough to change minds; it was a minimum condition that the Turkish government was willing to accept, although there were no guarantees that if such a condition was met, an agreement would have been reached on Cyprus. What is clear is that a crucial factor in changing in movement towards a solution of the Cyprus conflict will be Turkey’s attitude to forthcoming events in northern Cyprus. If the parties supporting the status quo (the policy of Rauf Denktash) win the elections on 14 December 2003, then any change of position will depend heavily on the nature of the pressure placed on Denktash from certain quarters in Ankara. As Denktash himself has stated, ‘I do not think about tendering my resignation. I will withdraw, if pressure is exerted on us from Turkey in order to force us to accept a document that we cannot adopt’ (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 27.12.02–10.01.03). The nature of the pressure exerted on Denktash however, will depend on


Turkey’s own perception of the EU’s commitment to its membership. Moreover if the EU’s commitment is perceived as credible amongst moderates and reformists, then this might lead to endorsement of the Annan plan. This in turn could lead to the necessary pressure to accept such a plan as a basis for negotiation, in particular if conservative forces within the Turkish state can be assuaged or a consensus can be reached on Cyprus policy (which will be dependent on internal reform within Turkey in particular legislation that will limit the role of the military in Turkish politics). If the opposition forces in the North win (with a significant enough majority to form a parliamentary coalition and remove Rauf Denktash as leader) in the elections with a clear mandate to seek EU membership and a resolution of the Cyprus issue through the Annan plan, then it will be difficult for Turkey to resist taking a more conciliatory position. Indeed the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdo˘ gan, has acknowledged ‘that it is the expectations of the Turkish Cypriot people that would shape…the final solution’ (Erdogan, Ankara Anatolia News Agency 2003). However, such a victory will not automatically remove Turkish interests from the Cypriot equation or create consensus on the Cyprus issue within the Turkish state – Turkey will still play a key role in a settlement agreement, and a key part thereafter, because as emphasised by Erdo˘ gan, ‘as a guarantor state and as the motherland…the Turkish Republic enjoys historical and treaty rights and responsibilities in Cyprus’ (Ankara Anatolia News Agency, 2003). Obviously it would be extremely difficult for Turkey to deny the Turkish Cypriots their democratic and legitimately endorsed vision for a solution, and indeed such a move would be detrimental to Turkey’s European aspirations and EU–Turkey relations in general. However, a victorious opposition in itself would not guarantee movement in Ankara unless a credible commitment is forthcoming from the EU on a definitive date for the beginning of accession negotiations for Turkey; and more importantly, unless Turkey pursues reforms to reduce the role of the military and strengthen its democratic credentials. What it would do, however, is present a political opportunity for Ankara to build on the important reforms it has pursued thus far, the positive outcome of the opening of the borders in Cyprus and the subsequent reconciliatory climate that exists in Cyprus. The extent to which this opportunity will be seized will depend on whether, by May 2004, there is a change of perception within the Turkish establishment and a movement towards a ‘consensus’ concerning a settlement of the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s EU membership. The

Conclusions 183

responsibility for change is not only reliant on the EU, but also elites within the Turkish establishment – and whether they can resolve to reconcile their differences on Cyprus and the EU. At present a consensus is yet to emerge, and crucially it is the views of the conservatives in Turkey and in northern Cyprus, that have prevailed, to maintain the status quo situation.

Conclusions: the way forward The analysis in this book has illustrated the complexity of the Cyprus case and the effects of the EU’s enlargement process on the solution of the Cyprus issue. Movement towards a solution has not just depended on what the EU has offered the two communities on the island in the form of incentives and conditions – but also Turkey – seen as a key actor and supporter of the regime in the North. In this sense Turkey’s path to accession – and the incentives offered by the EU to encourage Turkish elites to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria – were inexorably linked to movement on the Cyprus issue and encouraging a more compromising stance on Cyprus. The EU accession process has had an asymmetric impact on changing minds on Cyprus. On the one hand, Turkish Cypriot opposition parties and civil society have clearly been persuaded by the accession timetable, and what the accession process offers in terms of economic, security and political incentives to join the EU. Moreover Turkish Cypriots have been convinced that a solution to the Cyprus issue through the Annan plan, followed by accession to the EU, more than adequately meets their expectations for their future security and prosperity. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and ruling elites, thus far, has been less convinced of the benefits offered by EU accession and eventual membership – and have been obstructive in negotiations to settle the Cyprus issue through the Annan plan. The process of accession and the EU’s strategy of conditionality and incentives have not worked to ‘catalyse’ a settlement to the Cyprus issue as yet – but it has not catalysed catastrophe either, as suggested by more pessimistic analyses (Olgun, 2002). Indeed the timetable for accession has been instrumental in the most recent efforts to resolve the dispute under UN auspices – the opening of the border after 30 years, and Turkey’s offer to allow Greek Cypriots to travel Turkey after 40 years. Such movements in themselves, although not a substitute for a comprehensive settlement, have provided a catalytic effect in terms of the context for resolving the protracted dispute on the


island. In this sense, it could be argued that the accession process is beginning to change minds or at least create a focus for resolving the Cyprus issue, in order to avoid catastrophic consequences in relation to Turkey, Cyprus and the Aegean disputes, if it is not solved before May 2004. The EU can certainly continue to encourage the Greek-Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to reach a compromise on Cyprus. The EU thus far, has certainly fulfilled the conditions for the success of the power of attraction in relation to the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The lack of leverage and conditionality with respect to the Greek Cypriots has perhaps led to less flexibility in their negotiating stance at crucial times. In the Turkish Cypriot case the political will and vision did not exist on the part of the Turkish Cypriot leadership – the EU lacked both credibility and legitimacy in the view of Rauf Denktash and his supporting elite circle – a situation that might well be reversed after the elections in December 2003. In relation to Turkey the EU position has been less consistent and it has often oscillated due to the diversity of views between EU member states, the EU institutions and individual EU officials on Turkish suitability for membership. Although Turkey accepts that it must implement the political reforms necessary to comply with the Copenhagen criteria – it is the unofficial comments about Turkish suitability, related to the nature of Turkey’s culture, religion, state and society that have led to the negative perception relating to the EU commitments and their credibility. This in turn, through the correlation between Turkish accession and a Cypriot solution, has led to a lack of movement on the Cyprus issue amongst Turkish conservatives and moderates, with the outcome that it has not been conducive to providing the EU with important external leverage over the behaviour of Turkey as a potential candidate for membership, or over its policy towards Cyprus. Since the Helsinki European Council in 1999 the EU has sought to create a more positive climate in order to persuade Turkey to move towards a more conciliatory stance on the basis of extra conditionality, short and medium-term incentives and further participation and integration into the EU’s decision-making structures. Whilst the decision at the Copenhagen European Council 2002 did not match Turkish expectations in relation to a definite date for accession negotiations to begin, there was agreement that if Turkey was deemed to comply with the Copenhagen criteria by December 2004 accession negotiations would begin without delay (on the basis of agreement between

Conclusions 185

member states at the time). The response from the pro-European Turkish government was to continue to undertake many difficult reforms in order to ensure that it complied with the Copenhagen conditions required to begin accession negotiations, with clear guidance and recommendation from the EU on issues and polices that needed attention. However, this did not secure enough leverage in order to create a consensus on a Cyprus settlement within the Turkish establishment – the EU had failed to fulfil two essential conditions of the success of the power of attraction: first there was no definite time frame for accession negations to begin; second, it had fundamentally failed to persuade Turkish elites of its credibility. The effects after the decision at Copenhagen were a continuation of the debates between the moderates and conservatives in the Turkish elite establishment. The latter euro-sceptic group persisted with their arguments against a settlement of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan, and Cypriot membership of the EU. Within the moderates and reformists, there were those that were not satisfied by the Copenhagen decision but supported EU membership; their view was that until greater clarity was forthcoming on Turkey’s accession status a settlement on Cyprus would be delayed. Other pro-Europeans supported a settlement based on the Annan plan, in the realisation that a divided Cyprus inside the EU could create further obstacles and create further constraints to Turkey’s membership ambitions (Tocci, 2003). The EU can clearly do more in order to ‘oil the wheels’ of compromise further in relation to the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish elites, before May 2004; but change is also reliant on the internal politics in Cyprus and reforms in Turkey. The EU must encourage the Greek Cypriots to continue to pursue a solution through the Annan plan, and more importantly, in the event of opposition victory in the North, to ensure that the Greek Cypriot side exercise ‘flexibility’ and not ‘rigidity’ in proposing the changes they deem as necessary to ensuring the functionality of the plan, in order to reach agreement before May 2004. The Cypriot government, in turn, must maximise its efforts to change the minds of an extremely sceptical Greek Cypriot public on the merits of the Annan Plan, as this could prove to be a most serious stumbling block if agreement is reached and such a plan is put to referendum. In relation to Turkey, establishing credibility is paramount. The EU must articulate with clarity a time frame for the beginning of accession negotiations to begin with Turkey, providing that the necessary


reforms outlined by the EU have been implemented and the conditions for membership fulfilled. It must also ensure consistency in its conditionality and provide a lucid position on the politics of linkage – between the solution of the Cyprus issue and Turkish membership. Clearly a Cyprus settlement would facilitate Turkey’s membership aspirations, but the EU should make it clear that this is a ‘necessary’ condition, as are the Copenhagen conditions, if Turkey wishes to progress. At the moment the conflicting positions coming out of the EU are validating the views of euro-sceptics in Turkey, and are also accentuating the scepticism amongst the more moderate elites favouring EU membership, who perceive an inequality and inconsistency on the part of the EU in the extra conditionality on a Cyprus settlement. The necessary carrots should be offered to Turkey in the form of a clear timetable for accession and encouragement to reform, and the necessary sticks to ensure fulfilment of all conditionality, including resolution of the Cypriot dispute, which should be clearly defined. Such a combined strategy might help to ‘transform’ Turkish policy on Cyprus before May 2004. There is no doubt that once again, a window of opportunity exists for solving the Cyprus issue between December 2003 and May 2004 – and there is no doubt that the power of attraction has thus far played a substantial part in helping to create the progressive climate that exists at present. In addition, as we have noted above, the EU can further oil the wheels of compromise in order to facilitate further movement towards a solution. Critically the Greek-Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey must buy into the concept of the EU as a stable security community, and demonstrate the necessary ‘political will’ and ‘vision’ in order to achieve a win-win scenario for all parties involved. If the necessary political vision is not forthcoming before Cyprus accedes to the EU in May 2004 it will invite an unstable scenario for the future. EU laws and regulations will come into force in the south, but not in the Turkish Cypriot north. Northern Cyprus will remain underdeveloped through its reliance on Turkey, and the economic boycott and blockade, instituted after Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, will remain in force and could even be intensified. Turkish Cypriots, whose numbers have been reduced by emigration will continue to leave and be replaced by more mainland Turkish settlers, fundamentally altering the demographics of the island – and adding more complexity to any solution that might be negotiated. Relations between Turkey and the EU will clearly be strained – and Ankara’s hope of acceding to the EU will most definitely be put on

Conclusions 187

hold, whether they fulfil the Copenhagen criteria or not. While this might suit the Euro-sceptics and conservatives in the Turkish elite establishment – it will raise many more challenges for Turkey in the future – vis-à-vis its leverage on the Greek Cypriots once they become members of the EU in May 2004, and in relation to a future solution of the Cyprus issue – the Annan plan will almost certainly become redundant and any new deal negotiated might well involve a greater sacrifice on the part of the Turkish Cypriots left on the island. On a more positive note, if the EU can provide the necessary credible commitments and other important international actors such as the UN the US and the UK (not forgetting Greece of course) can use their leverage to persuade the Greek and Turkish Cypriots (and Turkey) to negotiate a settlement prior to Cyprus’ accession on the basis of the Annan plan – the EU can certainly provide the necessary framework, guarantees and legal and institutional structures to accommodate a ‘common’, federal state of Cyprus and the interests of the two communities on an equal basis. A solution to the long-standing Cyprus issue would certainly be a very welcome by-product of the EU’s power of attraction. A unified Cyprus as a member of the EU would certainly enhance Turkey’s aspirations for joining the European club, and facilitate its progressive integration into European governance structures in the medium and long term, leading to fundamental transformation of Turkish state and society. Finally, it would certainly do much to enhance the EU’s credibility as ‘soft security’ actor in the twenty-first century and provide invaluable lessons to the EU in extending its power of attraction and association beyond European borders. Europe may indeed not hold a magic wand for resolving conflict, but if the power of attraction catalyses a solution to the Cyprus issue, it will augment an already impressive record in conflict prevention and resolution.

Postscript Elections in the North: 14 December 2003 Since the completion of the main body of the manuscript, the elections of 14 December 2003 in northern Cyprus have taken place. The pro-European Turkish Cypriot opposition parties won the election, but their mandate was too slim to gain a majority in Parliament and form a governing coalition. There was hope that the opposition parties, which also support the Annan plan as a basis for negotiating a settlement on the island would secure a significant enough majority to form a coalition in Parliament, which would have effectively given them the mandate to remove Rauf Denktash as chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots. Table P.1 2003

Results of the elections held in Northern Cyprus: 14 December

Party National Unity Party Democratic Party National Peace Party Peace and Democratic Movement Republican Turkish Party Solution and EU Party Cyrus Justice Party Independents

Percentage (%)

Seats

32.93 12.93 3.23 13.14 35.18 1.97 0.60 0.01

18 7 0 6 19 0 0 0

Source: Supreme Election Council, Northern Cyprus, 2003.

However, with all of the 554 ballot boxes counted, the election effectively ended in a draw, which due to the nature of the voting system, meant that the opposition parties secured 25 seats in the 50 member Parliament, as did the parties supporting the status quo situation on the island. According to the ‘Supreme Election Council’ in the North, participation rates for the election reached 84.46 per cent. The pro-EU Republican Turkish Republican Party (Mehmet Ali Talat) and the Peace and Democracy Movement (Mustafa Akinci) together had 48 per cent of the vote; these two parties (and the Solution and EU Party led by Ali Erel) formed a coalition (Chapter 6) to fight the elections and vowed to form an alliance if they won with a substantial majority. The National Unity Party (Dervish Eroglu) and the Democrat Party (Serdar Denktash) had 46 per cent of the vote, but both these parties oppose a UN sponsored reunification plan and both serve in the coalition government. The Solution and EU Party (SEUP) of Ali Erel, Nationalist Peace Party (NPP) of Ertugrul Hasipoglu and Cyprus Justice Party (CJP) of Oguz Kalelioglu, were not able to get the five per cent threshold and enter the ‘parliament’. 188

Postcript Elections in the North: 14 December 2003 189 What the election results indicate are mixed feelings in the North on a solution based on the Annan plan. On the one hand there are those Turkish Cypriots that have made it clear they are against the status quo and importantly, the results show that the underlying current on the divided island is towards reunification. The comparison with the previous elections of 1998 indicates a substantial shift in the electoral preferences of the Turkish Cypriots. The ruling bloc consisting of the two parties led by the Turkish Cypriot ‘premier’, Dervish Eroglu, and the ‘deputy premier’, Serdar Denktas, had constituted 65 per cent of the vote in 1998. Eroglu’s National Unity Party (NUP) had around 40 per cent, while Denktas’s Democratic Party (DP) had roughly 22 per cent. In the elections on 14 December 2003 the NUP dropped to 32 per cent and its partner, losing nearly 40 per cent of its former support, to 12 percent. On the other hand, Mehmet Ali Talat’s Republican Turkish Party (RTP), with a significant upsurge, moved from 13 per cent in 1998 to over 35 per cent to become the leading party in the North. There is no doubt that a major reason for this change in attitudes in the North was the prospect of EU membership and the UN (Annan plan); the latter of which presented the most comprehensive blueprint for the resolution of the Cyprus question and the reunification of the island, thereby clearing the path for Turkish Cypriots to accede to the EU in May 2004. The elections were clearly a referendum for the Annan plan and EU accession. However, the opposition did not receive as many votes as expected (see Chapter 4), which also indicates that a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots were hesitant and sceptical about their arguments – and their strategy for negotiating a settlement to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan in its current form. Effectively the political situation and practical reality in the North has not changed – although significantly, the underlying attitudes have – with a majority, albeit marginal, indicating their preference for a solution to the Cyprus issue and membership of the EU. The election resulted in political deadlock and political impasse – with Rauf Denktash remaining as chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots – although unexpectedly, Denktash did appoint the leader of the pro-EU Republican Turkish Party, Mehmet Ali Talat (29 December 2004), to form the next government in the North. If it is the case however, that parties cannot come to an agreement and form a ‘governing’ coalition, then ‘new’ elections are scheduled to take place in the North (60 days after the initial elections). More important however, will be the Turkish reaction to the elections results and subsequent developments in the North. The elections have demonstrated that the status quo situation is not sustainable and that there has been a fundamental shift in the attitudes of Turkish Cypriots since 1998 towards solution. Turkey now has a critical role to play in determining the future of the Turkish Cypriots given that a marginal majority wish to see a reunified Cyprus inside the EU by May 2004. If it chooses to support the opposition parties, and negotiate within the remit of the Annan plan, then this could result in a positive scenario and a ‘Cypriot State’ inside the EU – and help to fulfil Turkish ambitions of securing a start date for accession negotiations to begin after December 2004. If Turkey however, chooses to continue supporting Rauf Denktash as negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots (statements in January 2004 by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül, seem to

190 The European Union and Enlargement indicate this is the case) then it is seems very unlikely that a solution to the Cyprus issue will be agreed before Cyprus accedes in May 2004. If Cyprus enters the EU divided this will make negotiations for a settlement more difficult and complex, and have negative repercussions for Turkey’s EU membership aspirations.

Appendix A.1 ‘Annan Plan’

Summary of the

Note that this is a summary of the main points of the Annan plan - however, the full plan was revised and updated four times before being submitted to the parties for agreement in April 2004. The plan was first presented on 11 November 2002. Revisions were subsequently issued on 10 December 2002, 26 February 2003 and 29 March 2004. The Secretary-General presented the final version of the plan to the parties on 31 March 2004, in Bürgenstock, Switzerland. Corrigenda and clarifications were issued on 18 April and incorporated in the 31 March text, the corrected version of which was authenticated by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Cyprus and submitted to the parties on 23 April 2004 (See http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan_Plan_Text1.html, for full text of final plan). i.

Affirming that Cyprus is our common home and recalling that we were co-founders of the Republic established in 1980. ii. Resolved that the tragic events of the past shall never be repeated and renouncing forever the threat or the use of force, or any domination by or of either side. iii. Acknowledging each other’s distinct identity and integrity and that our relationship is not one of majority and minority but of political equality. iv. Deciding to renew our partnership on that basis and determined that this new partnership shall ensure a common future in friendship, peace, security and prosperity in an independent and united Cyprus. v. Underlining our commitment to international law and the principles and purposes of the United Nations. vi. Committed to respecting democratic principles, individual human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as each other’s cultural, religious, political, social and linguistic identity. vii. Determined to maintain special ties of friendship with, and to respect the balance between, Greece and Turkey, within a peaceful environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. viii. Looking forward to joining the European Union, and to the day when Turkey does likewise. ix. Welcoming the Comprehensive Settlement freely reached by our democratically elected leaders on all aspects of the Cyprus Problem, and its endorsement by Greece and Turkey, along with the United Kingdom. We, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, exercising our inherent constitutive power, by our free and democratic, separately expressed common will adopt this Foundation Agreement.

191

192 Appendix A.1

Summary of the ‘Annan Plan’

The new state of affairs 1. This Agreement establishes a new state of affairs in Cyprus. 2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the treaties listed in this Agreement shall be binding on Cyprus, and the attached «common state» legislation indispensable for the functioning of the «common state» shall be in force. 3. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance remain in force and shall apply mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, Cyprus shall sign a Treaty with Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, along with additional protocols to the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. 4. Cyprus shall sign and ratify the Treaty of Accession to the European Union. 5. Cyprus shall maintain special ties of friendship with Greece and Turkey, respecting the balance established by the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance and this Agreement, and as a European Union member state shall support the accession of Turkey to the Union. 6. Any unilateral change to the state of affairs established by this Agreement, in particular union of Cyprus in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession, shall be prohibited. Nothing in this Agreement shall in any way be construed as contravening this prohibition.

The State of Cyprus, its «common state» government, and its «component states» 1. The status and relationship of the State of Cyprus, its «common state» government, and its «component states» is modeled on the status and relationship of Switzerland, its federal government, and its Cantons. Accordingly: a. Cyprus is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a «common state» government and two equal «component states», one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. Cyprus has a single international legal personality and sovereignty and is a member of the United Nations. Cyprus is organised under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bizonality, and the equal status of the «component states». b. The «common state» government sovereignly exercises the powers specified in the Constitution, which shall ensure that Cyprus can speak and act with one voice internationally and in the European Union, fulfill its obligations as a European Union member state, and protect its integrity, borders and ancient heritage. c. The «component states» are of equal status. Within the limits of the Constitution, they sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the «common state» government, organising themselves freely under their own Constitutions. 2. The «component states» shall cooperate and coordinate with each other and with the «common state», including through Cooperation Agreements, as

Appendix A.1

Summary of the ‘Annan Plan’ 193

well as through Constitutional Laws approved by the legislatures of the «common state» and the «component states». In particular, the «component states» shall participate in the formulation and implementation of policy in external and European Union relations on matters within their sphere of competence, in accordance with Cooperation Agreements modeled on the Belgian example. The «component states» may have commercial and cultural relations with the outside world in conformity with the Constitution. 3. The «common state» and the «component states» shall fully respect and not infringe upon the powers and functions of each other. There shall be no hierarchy between the laws of the «common state» and those of the «component states». Any act in contravention of the Constitution shall be null and void. 4. The Constitution of Cyprus may be amended by separate majority of the voters of each «component state».

Citizenship 1. There is a single Cypriot citizenship. Special majority «common state» law shall regulate eligibility for Cypriot citizenship. 2. All Cypriot citizens shall also enjoy internal «component state» citizenship status. Like the citizenship status of the European Union, this status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship. A «component state» may tie the exercise of political rights at its level to its internal «component state» citizenship status, and may limit the establishment of residence for persons not holding this status in accordance with this Agreement. Such limitations shall be permissible if the number of residents hailing from the other «component state» has reached one per cent of the population in the first year and 20 per cent in the twentieth year, rising by three per cent every three years in the intervening period. Thereafter, any limitation shall be permissible only if one third of the population hails from the other «component state».

Fundamental rights and liberties 1. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution. There shall be no discrimination against any person on the basis of his or her gender, ethnic or religious identity, or internal «component state» citizenship status. Freedom of movement and freedom of residence may be limited only where expressly provided for in this Agreement. 2. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots living in specified villages in the other «component state» shall enjoy cultural and educational rights and shall be represented in the «component state» legislature. 3. The rights of religious and other minorities, including the Maronite, the Latin and the Armenian, shall be safeguarded in accordance with international standards, and shall include cultural and educational rights as well as representation in «common state» and «component state» legislatures.

194 Appendix A.1


The «common state» government 1. The «common state» Parliament composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, shall exercise the legislative power: a. Each Chamber shall have 48 members. The Senate shall be composed of an equal number of Senators from each «component state». The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed in proportion to population, provided that each «component state» shall be attributed no less than one quarter of seats. b. Decisions of Parliament shall require the approval of both Chambers by simple majority, including one quarter of voting Senators from each «component state». For specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting Senators from each «component state» shall be required. 2. The Office of Head of State is vested in the Presidential Council, which shall exercise the executive power: a. The Presidential Council shall comprise six members elected on a single list by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The composition of the Presidential Council shall be proportional to the population of the two «component states», though no less than one-third of the members of the Council must come from each «component state». b. The Presidential Council shall strive to reach decisions by consensus. Where it fails to reach consensus, it shall, unless otherwise specified, take decisions by simple majority of members voting, provided this comprises at least one member from each «component state». c. The members of the Council shall be equal and each member shall head a department. The heads of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and European Union Affairs shall not come form the same «component state». d. The offices of President and Vice-President of the Council shall rotate every ten calendar months among members of the Council. No more than two consecutive Presidents may come from the same «component state». The President, and in his absence or temporary incapacity, the Vice-President, shall represent the Council as Head of State and Head of Government. The President and Vice-President shall not enjoy a casting vote or otherwise increased powers within the Council. e. The [executive heads] (Observation: Terminology to be adjusted when the governmental structures of the «component states» are decided) of the «component states» shall be invited to participate without a vote in all meetings of the Council in the first ten years after entry into force of the Agreement, and thereafter on a periodical basis. 3. The Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the Attorney-General and the Office of the Accountant-General shall be independent.

The Supreme Court 1. The Supreme Court shall uphold the Constitution and ensure its full respect. 2. It shall be composed of nine judges, three from each «component state» and three non-Cypriots.

Appendix A.1


3. The Supreme Court shall, inter alia, resolve disputes between the «component states» or between one or both of them and the «common state», and resolve on an interim basis deadlocks within the institutions of the «common state» if this be indispensable to the proper functioning of the «common state».

Transitional common state institutions 1. The «common state» institutions shall evolve during transitional periods, after which these institutions shall operate as described above. 2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the leaders of the two sides shall become Co-Presidents of Cyprus for three years. The Co-Presidents shall exercise the executive power during the first year, assisted by a Council of Ministers they shall appoint. For the following two years, the executive power shall be exercised by a Council of Ministers elected by Parliament, and the Co-Presidents shall together hold the office of Head of State. 3. «Component state» legislatures to be elected within 40 days of entry into force of this Agreement shall each nominate 24 delegates (reflecting the political composition of their legislature) to a transitional «common state» Parliament to operate for one year. 4. A transitional Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Co-President for one year.

Demilitarisation 1. Bearing in mind that: a. The Treaty of Guarantee, in applying mutatis mutandis to the new state of affairs established in this Agreement and the Constitution of Cyprus, shall cover, in addition to the independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of Cyprus, the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the «component states»; b. The Treaty of Alliance shall permit Greek and Turkish contingents, each not exceeding [insert 4-digit figure] all ranks, to be stationed under the Treaty of Alliance in the Greek Cypriot «component state» and the Turkish Cypriot «component state» respectively; c. Greek and Turkish forces and armaments shall be redeployed to agreed locations and adjusted to agreed levels, and any forces and armaments in excess of agreed levels shall be withdrawn; d. There shall be a United Nations peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of this Agreement and use its best efforts to promote compliance with it and contribute to the maintenance of a secure environment, to remain as long as the government of the «common state», with the concurrence of both «component states», does not decide otherwise; e. The supply of arms to Cyprus shall be prohibited in a manner that is legally binding on both importers and exporters; and f. A Monitoring Committee composed of the guarantor powers, the «common state», and the «component states», and chaired by the United Nations, shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement, Cyprus

196 Appendix A.1


shall be demilitarised, and all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces, including reserve units, shall be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island, in phases synchronised with the redeployment and adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces. 2. There shall be no paramilitary or reserve forces or military or paramilitary training of citizens. All weapons except licensed sporting guns shall be prohibited. 3. Neither «component state» shall tolerate violence or incitement of violence against the «common state», the «component states», or the guarantor powers. 4. Cyprus shall not put its territory at the disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of Greece and Turkey.

«Component state» boundaries and territorial adjustment 1. The territorial boundaries of the «component states» shall be as depicted in the map which forms part of this Agreement. 2. Areas subject to territorial adjustment which are legally part of the Greek Cypriot «component state» upon entry into force of this Agreement, shall be administered during an interim period no longer than three years by the Turkish Cypriot «component state». Administration shall be transferred under the supervision of the United Nations to the Greek Cypriot «component state» in agreed phases, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Agreement with the transfer of administration of largely uninhabited areas contiguous with the remainder of the Greek Cypriot «component state». 3. Special arrangements shall safeguard the rights and interests of current inhabitants of areas subject to territorial adjustment, and provide for orderly relocation to adequate alternative accommodation in appropriate locations where adequate livelihoods may be earned.

Property 1. Claims by property owners dispossessed by events prior to entry into force of this Agreement shall be resolved in a comprehensive manner in accordance with international law, respect for the individual rights of dispossessed owners and current users, and the principle of bizonality. 2. In areas subject to territorial adjustment, properties shall be reinstated to dispossessed owners. 3. In areas not subject to territorial adjustment, the arrangements for the exercise of property rights, by way of reinstatement or compensation, shall have the following basic features: a. Dispossessed owners who opt for compensation or whose properties are not reinstated under the property arrangements shall receive full and effective compensation on the basis of value at the time of dispossession plus inflation; b. Current users, being persons who have possession of properties of dispossessed owners as a result of an administrative decision, may apply for and

Appendix A.1


shall receive title if they agree in exchange to renounce their title to a property, of similar value and in the other «component state», of which they were dispossessed; c. Current users may also apply for and shall receive title to properties which have been significantly improved provided they pay for value in original condition; d. There shall be incentives for owners to sell, lease or exchange properties to current users or other persons from the «component state» in which a property is located; e. Properties not covered by the above shall be reinstated five years after entry into force of this Agreement (three years for vacant properties), provided that no more than X per cent of the area and residences in either «component state» and Y per cent (Observation: The figures X and Y shall depend on the agreed map) in any given municipality or village (other than villages specifically designated in this Agreement) shall be reinstated to owners from the other «component state»; and f. Current users who are Cypriot citizens and are required to vacate property to be reinstated shall not be required to do so until adequate alternative accommodation has been made available. 4. Property claims shall be received and administered by an independent, impartial Property Board, composed of an equal number of members from each «component state», as well as non-Cypriot members. No direct dealings between individuals shall be necessary.

Reconciliation Commission 1. An independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission shall promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 2. The Commission shall be composed of men and women, comprising an equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as well as at least one non-Cypriot member, which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to appoint in consultation with the two sides.

Past acts 1. Any act, whether of a legislative, executive or judicial nature, by any authority […] whatsoever, prior to entry into force of this Agreement, is recognised as valid and, provided it is not inconsistent with or repugnant to any other provision of this Agreement, its effect shall continue following entry into force of this Agreement. No-one shall be able to contest the validity of such acts by reason of what occurred prior to entry into force of this Agreement. 2. Any claims for liability or compensation arising from acts prior to this Agreement shall, insofar as they are not otherwise regulated by the provisions of this Agreement, be dealt with by the «component state» from which the claimant hails.

198 Appendix A.1


Entry into force and implementation 1. This Agreement shall come into being at 00:00 hours on the day following confirmed approval by each side at separate simultaneous referenda conducted in accordance with the Agreement. 2. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, there shall be ceremonies throughout the island at which all flags other than those prescribed in the Constitution are lowered, the flags of Cyprus and of the «component states» raised in accordance with the Constitution and relevant legislation, and the anthems of Cyprus and of the «component states» played. 3. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Co-Presidents shall inform the United Nations that henceforth the membership rights and obligations of Cyprus in the United Nations shall be exercised in accordance with the new state of affairs. The agreed flag of Cyprus shall be raised at United Nations Headquarters. 4. This Agreement shall be implemented in accordance with the binding timeframes laid down in the various parts of the Agreement and reflected in the calendar of implementation.

Appendix A.2 Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation Process For the first time since 1974, the dividing line in Cyprus the so called ‘Green Line’ was opened with the decision of the regime in the northern part of Cyprus on 23 April 2003, enabling Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to move around the island on a daily basis. This happened one week after the Republic of Cyprus signed the accession agreement to European Union (EU) in Athens. The partial opening of the dividing line was a historical moment since after the war of 1974, this was the first time ever that people on both sides of the island were allowed to move in big numbers to ‘the other side’ that was banned to them for the last 29 years. Every day thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been crossing the ‘line’ and visiting towns, villages, homes and friends that they left 29 years ago. The ‘banned’ part of their land is now starting to have a human face; every day thousands of people go in search of the homes they left, in search of their memories; remembering how the ‘distant’ past was like, and seeing for the first time, what it looks like today. There has been many emotional moments when a friend from the distant past knocked one’s door or when one went to the Kyrenia harbour for a cup of coffee or visited Paphos to watch the sea. When the old inhabitant came to the door and the current inhabitants of the house opened the door saying ‘Kopiaste’ or ‘Hosgeldin’ (Welcome in Greek and Turkish) these two words also opened channels to the hearts and minds of our people. This process is showing many things to us and to the world: what is described as the ‘Cyprus problem’ between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is not something that cannot be solved. The important issue is not the problem but how you deal with it: the reconciliation process, if continued, will have an effect that will last for long years to come in the hearts of the people. Despite media campaigns painting hostile images of ‘the other’, despite repression and persecution against those defending peace in the northern part of the island, despite ‘state policies’ against any solution, the two communities very clearly and strongly have shown their wish to live together in a common country in this short period of time. Our communities clearly showed their wish to embrace each other, putting what is called ‘the Cyprus conflict’ aside and creating their own means of communication, taking bolder steps than the politicians of this country ever could. Therefore any provocation to set back this process of reconciliation will not come from within our two communities but will come from outside. We call on many bi-communal groups of the past and the present to be aware of such provocations and to ‘take sides’ in order to prevent these. We call on thousands of people who had been and who are involved in the conflict resolution and peace activities to consider themselves as important players in this process and be alert to any provocation, not to stay silent but to speak out, to encourage and help reconciliation. We call on the international community, the United Nations (UN) and the EU to help the solution of the problems that 199

200 Appendix A.2

Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation Process

exist in the current crossings in order to expand this process. We suggest that a few practical measures can be taken to improve the situation: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

Currently thousands of people are in long queues waiting for hours to cross. There are only three ‘check-points’ where they can cross from. We demand the opening of new crossing points. We support the existing initiatives to improve this problem. While Greek Cypriots are free to take their vehicles to the northern part of the island, Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to go to the southern part with their own vehicles. A formula must be developed for the flow of Turkish Cypriots with their own vehicles addressing the humanitarian issue at hand as well as the car-safety related issues. We welcome the ongoing efforts by Republic of Cyprus to this direction. The crossings between north and south can only take place between 09.00 and 24.00 hours. This restriction must be lifted and people should be allowed to stay as long as they like in both parts of the island. The local authorities and municipalities on both sides of the island must be encouraged to take practical measures to help to ease the free flow of the people: practical information guides about how to get around in towns and villages, where to eat, where to find hospitals or police in case of emergencies etc must be provided. The crossings should become less formal. There should not be visas, stamps or long queues. This should become as close as possible to a crossing within one’s own country. The international community, especially the EU must encourage the ‘reunification’ of the communication systems. Currently people can call each other by using the telephone lines controlled by the UN, these lines are far from sufficient. The GSM (mobile) systems must be ‘united’ since it is not possible to use the GSM of one side on the other. Local telecommunications authorities are capable of re-opening the existing infrastructure. ‘Reconciliation centres’ must be encouraged to be opened on both parts of the island, where those people, including many women and young people, who have been working voluntarily in mediation and conflict resolution for many years, can use their skills for the benefit of our communities. Such centres will be valuable resources within civil society for dealing with any problems that may come up during the process of change.

On longer term, keeping in mind that we consider this as one step in a series of steps for a final lasting solution of the Cyprus issue, we demand that the process be further extended, for example, to the teaching of Turkish and Greek languages must be in the school curriculums on both sides in order to encourage communication among the two communities. Common elements of antichauvinist and anti-sexist education for shared citizenship should be devised and introduced to schools, so that our children can grow up in equality and mutual respect. Cypriots should be able to exercise their basic rights for organisation and registration of joint organisations should be encouraged. The international community, especially the EU must encourage joint business ventures on both sides of the island and people must have the right to be able to work on both parts

Appendix A.2

Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation Process 201

on the island, with social security and other labour rights, including employment equality for women, regardless of where they reside. Negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem have been going on for decades. Despite the efforts of the UN, EU and the international community especially for the last two years, reaching a solution based on the Annan plan has not been possible due to the intransigence of Rauf Denktash, leader of the regime in the north. Many international resolutions, as well as numerous decisions of the EU summits and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have pointed out Turkey’s responsibility over the northern part of the island. Therefore we call on the international community, the UN and EU to remind Turkey of its responsibility for a solution. Fresh efforts must be made for the signing of an agreement before May 2004 when Cyprus will become a full EU member. Until then, we will continue our struggle for peace and reconciliation in a free and united Cyprus.

Cypriots for a Common Country Supported by: Hands Across the Divide, Cyprus Action Network (http://www. cyprusaction.org, www.peace-cyprus.org), German-Cypriot Forum.

Platform of Peace Organisations Bicommunal Citizens Movement Bicommunal Coordinating Committee Bicommunal Dialogue Forum Bicommunal Choir Bicommunal Conflict Resolution Trainers Group Brussels Group Business Womens Group Citizen’s Movement for Re-unification and Co-existence Co-Villagers Project Cyprus Neuroscience and Technology Institute Dali Municipality Bicommunal Committee Hands Across the Divide HasNa (CYPRUS) Interactive Management Facilitators Group International Eco.peace Village International World Affairs (Cyprus and Middle East) Internet Group Leaders I Group Leaders II Group Management Center New Cyprus Association NGO Resource Center Peace Center Platform Solution, Re-unification Now Reconciliation Now Initiative Steps For Peace

202

Appendix A.2

Call for Deepening of the Reconciliation Process

Teachers Group Technology For Peace The Association of Management Studies The bicommunal citizens action group for peace in Cyprus The Brussels Womens group The FOSBO Group The Language Group The Olso group The Peace Center The SIT2002CY group University Students Westminster Foundation Cyprus Women for the Prevention of Domestic Violence Youth Encounters for Peace (15 sub groups) Youth Promoting Peace ZEYTIN DALI Foundation 28.4.2003

Notes Chapter 1 Actor

Understanding the European Union as a Global

1. See Rummel (2003) for latest developments in EU foreign policy. 2. Also see Hill (2002) for an assessment of European foreign policy and its strengths and weaknesses in the light of the events of 11 September 2001. 3. For literature on enlargement as foreign policy see Munuera (1994), Friis and Murphy (1999), Hill 2001, Sjursen & Smith (2001), Sjursen (2002, 1998), Smith K.E. (1998, 2000, 2003), Diez (2000), Christou (2002, 2003). 4. A term borrowed from Munuera (1994), in his discussion of how potential membership of the EU could help in conflict prevention. 5. For a thorough analysis and definition of what might constitute ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic behaviour’ on the part of the EU see Gomez (2003, pp. 1–24). 6. See Hill (2001, p. 330) for differentiation between the three. 7. For example conflict management – which is directed towards preventing escalation once conflict has begun. 8. The relevant articles established the procedures for establishing customs unions with the associates. They included provisions on Community investment, rights of establishment and the mutual protection of workers’ rights. 9. See Gomez (2003) and Gomez and Christou (forthcoming 2004) for analysis of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership. 10. Defined by Smith as ‘The addition or accretion of political meanings, understandings and consequences to particular areas and instruments of policy’ (Smith M., 1998, p. 83). 11. The principle of consistency is referred to in Art. A, Art. C, and Title V, Art.J.8 (2) and is described by Krenzler and Schneider as having two elements: Vertical consistency – which is between the Union and its member states and horizontal consistency between the European Community’s external relations and CFSP. See Krenzler and Schneider (1997, Ch 8). 12. For Brusselisation see Allen (1998, p. 77). For Europeanisation see Hill and Wallace (in Hill, 1996) and Michael E. Smith (2000). 13. The Petersburg Declaration in 1992 stipulated that ‘The CFSP will cover ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking’ and that ‘the WEU may call upon NATO resources where the US decides not to act’. 14. The EU launched ‘Operation Concordia’ the first ESDP military mission in Macedonia in March 2003, marking the start of a new strategic partnership between the EU and NATO – and complementing other existing EU activity in the area. However, in terms of its military capability it is too early to judge the difference that this might make to the EU’s ‘actorness’ in more controversial areas of conflict; particularly given the primacy of ‘unanimity’ in the agreement process. 203

204 Notes 15. Several proposals have been put forward at the European Convention for the reform of the EU’s foreign and security policy for the purpose of enhancing its role on the world stage. See Rummel R., (2003). Also see Preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty, CONV 369/02. 16. See Holland (1991), Carlsnaes and Smith (1994), and Ginsberg (1997, 2001), for an excellent review of the utility of such theories for EFP. 17. For a critique of EU policy on Cyprus see Stavridis (1999, pp. 95–112). See also Melakopides (1992). 18. Sjursen and Smith (2001) outline three analytically distinct ways in which foreign policy can achieve legitimacy (applied to the EU enlargement process) that are grounded in three logics of action or justification for an individual actor: a logic of consequences; a logic of appropriateness; and a logic of moral justification. Furthermore, they present three different criteria that identify these logics: utility, values and rights. They suggest that the importance of each of these logics and the criteria that underpin them is relative to the type of foreign policy examined. Their findings, in relation to enlargement as foreign policy, suggest that whilst traces of all three logics can be found in the EU’s conditions for membership, the logic of moral justification appeared to be dominant in justifying the EU’s enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the Mediterranean applicants however, this conclusion was not tenable, and they suggest instead that a mixture of the logic of consequences and logic of values might be identified in the EU’s enlargement policy. With regard to values in particular, they suggest that the treatment of Turkey is influenced by value-based assumptions about who is European and who is not. See also Sjursen (2002) for an extended discussion of these logics and justification for the EU’s enlargement policy. 19. See Hill (2001, pp. 323–329) and Munuera (1994, p. 96). See also Ginsberg (2001) on the instruments of EU foreign policy. 20. See Emerson and Tocci (2002a and 2002b) for comprehensive coverage of how the EU could accommodate a ‘common state’ of Cyprus – institutionally and legally. For a critique of Emmerson and Tocci see Carras (2002). See also Diez (2002) on other ways in which the EU might provide a framework for a solution of the Cyprus conflict. 21. Other important actors include the Greece, the US, and the UK.

Chapter 2 The Complexity of the Cyprus Case: The Historical Context 1. AKEL had the solid support of around 40 per cent of the ‘Cypriot’ population. 2. It is estimated that 79 Turkish Cypriots were killed in 1963 and 136 in 1964. 3. See http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/UNdocs). 4. Dr Kurt Waldheim brought out his ‘Evaluation’ paper at the end of 1981; Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar produced three major documents between January 1985 and March 1986, and his ‘Food for Thought’ in the summer of 1989; Dr Boutros Ghali presented his ‘Set of Ideas’ (including a map indicating territorial adjustments) in August 1992; and Mr Kofi Annan revived part of the

Notes 205 ‘Set of Ideas’ and presented it through his Special Representative Mr Diego Cordobez to President Clerides and Mr Denktash in Troutbeck, New York State and Glion, Switzerland in the summer of 1997 http://website.lineone. net/~acgta/Stavrinides.doc. Kofi Annan also presented a comprehensive plan for settlement of the Cyprus issue in November 2002 to the leaders of the two communities and the guarantor states, which has come to be known as the ‘Annan plan’. 5. Both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots had criticisms of the ‘Set of Ideas’ and disagreed with certain elements contained within the ideas, and the associated map presented by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to the two sides in August 1992. The Greek Cypriots in particular saw certain elements as divisive and negative, elements which they put down ‘to the pernicious influence of the United States, Great Britain and certain other Western countries’ http://website.lineone.net/~acgta/Stavrinides.doc

Chapter 3

The European Union and Cyprus

1. Which was concluded on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC (containing only trade provisions) rather than on the basis of Article 113 concerning the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements (Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC, Cyprus Press and Information Office, 1982). This may suggest that in comparing the Cyprus Agreement to others of its type at the time, the EEC–Cyprus trade agreement was approached much more moderately in terms of long-term association. 2. The European Commission did however present proposals for enhancement of the Association Agreement in 1976 although member states were reluctant to adopt these proposals given the fragility of the situation in Cyprus at the time (Redmond, 1993: 68). 3. Within the period 1976–1985 the following protocols were signed: On the 15 September 1977 an Additional Protocol Agreement was signed in Brussels which provided for the extension of the first stage until 31 December 1979. At about the same time Cyprus signed the First Financial Protocol worth ECU 30 million. On the 11 May 1978, Cyprus and the EEC, also entered into two new protocols: a special supplementary protocol which settled some additional agricultural issues in line with Mediterranean policy of the Community and another laying down certain provisions relating to the trade in agricultural products. A new transitional protocol was again signed on 7 February 1980 extending this Agreement and in July 1983 yet another special Protocol was signed which made additional concessions on customs duties and quotas on a number of agricultural products and lifted quotas on certain industrial categories. In addition, in December 1983, Cyprus and the EEC signed the Second Financial Protocol, which totalled ECU 44 million. See Cyprus–EEC Customs Union (1986); Cyprus–EC Relations (1989); The Cyprus Problem: Cyprus Towards the European Union, http://hri.org/ Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html For a more detailed analysis of the economic measures see Tsardanidis (1984). 4. All UN resolutions on Cyprus can be found on: http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/ Cyprus_Problem/Undocs.html

206 Notes 5. In reality this precedent had been set much earlier in as far back as Greece’s application to the EEC in the 1970s. Turkey had previously submitted its application for membership to the EC in 1987 and the Commission in December 1989 issued an opinion. The opinion gave as one of its reasons for not granting Turkey early EC membership the various disputes with Greece, in particular over Cyprus, as obstacles. See Survey of Turkey (7) (1992). 6. These substantive talks started on the 26 November 1993 and involved close coordination between the Commission and the government of Cyprus who, for the purposes of the talks established twenty-three working groups (and many sub-groups) composed of civil servants, delegates of semigovernment agencies and the private sector (Joseph, 1999, p. 8). 7. See for instance Stephanou and Tsardanides, (1991, p. 207). 8. See http://www.kypros.org/Embassy/Jan98/text.htm 9. See for details: http://www.pio.gov.cy/update/english/news/1996/96_09/ 960926) 10. For the Greek-Cypriot position see Michaelides (1996). For the Greek position see http://www.MFA.GR/foreign/ 11. For assessement on adoption of the acquis communautaire in Cyprus up to November 2003 see Commission Monitoring Report on Cyprus (Nov, 2003): http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_cy_final.pdf 12. A reference was also made to Cyprus in the meeting through a joint position, which also acknowledged that lack of progress in solving the Cyprus problem would be to the detriment of Turkey, the EU and EU-Turkish relations. See: http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9705/ 970502.htm 13. See http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9707/070716. html) 14. For the reactions of both the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot leadership see Cyprus Weekly, 22–28 August (1997) p. 1. 15. Britain’s special envoy for Cyprus (who has now stepped down), Sir David Hannay however, voiced the following opinion with regard to the EU’s handling of the Turkish relationship, ‘I think that the handling of the Turkish candidacy has been a-bit clumsy frankly and I feel it has not been …the EU has shown a tendency to try to answer questions that weren’t being posed…nobody is asking the question at the moment …can Turkey join the European Union now…The Turks aren’t asking it…no-one is asking it …and yet we seem to spend half the time try to answer that question when it is not being posed….its not being posed because the Turks accept that they do not fulfill the criteria’ (Interview, Hannay, 1999) 16. See http://www.cynews.com/March/31/news033113.htm, 31 March 1998 for details. It is important to note here that the three leading opposition leaders in the north of Cyprus have all attacked Denktash for this intransigent stance towards the EU and the UN sponsored talks. This view was also confirmed when I interviewed Mehmet Ali Talat on a visit to London. He said that there was much support on the part of the Turkish Cypriot Community for accession to the EU. He also said that he believed in accession of Cyprus to the EU but only after a federal solution had been agreed

Notes 207

17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

upon. He would have preferred Cyprus to apply after a solution so as to include the whole island from the outset. The main problem in the North was that although they did not like what was happening, ‘they were not being given any choice’, because of the support enjoyed by Denktash from Turkey and the Turkish settlers. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the views of the opposition parties and leaders in the North. I was informed in an interview with a Council official that this statement made by Commissioner van den Broek was an independent statement that was not coordinated with the other EU institutions e.g. the CFSP Secretariat, Council etc. This illustrated one of the great difficulties for the EU in terms of trying to establish a ‘coherent’ line or policy on issues such as Cyprus given the diversity of people and positions involved within the EU structure. See http://www.pio.gov.cy/news/1998/980615.html As were the more positive relations between Greece and Turkey after the earthquakes of 1999. Even more so given the fact that certain quarters in Turkey do not believe Cyprus is of great strategic relevance for Turkey any longer (Kiyat, 30 Dec 2002, Translated interview, in Cyprus Press and Information Office, 10.01.02–17.01.02). The Council adopted on 17 December 2001 a regulation concerning preaccession financial assistance for Turkey. The regulation reiterated the Commission’s objective to establish pre-accession financial assistance, on average, at an annual level of €177 million. See http://www.deltur.cec. eu.int/english/e-mali-view-new.html The support for actions aiming at bringing the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the Union is based on the idea that this community should be informed on the implications of joining the EU. The legal basis for the expenditure will be the existing regulation on pre-accession support to Cyprus and Malta (Council Regulation (EC) No.555/2000), applicable until 31 December 2003. In the event of no comprehensive settlement before 2004, the Commission will ensure further specific and targeted actions. If we take strategy to mean purposive, goal directed behaviour to pursue more or less specified objectives, themselves as a result of the identification, prioritisation and articulation of interests. See Allen (1998, p. 46), Gomez (2003, pp. 1–24).

Chapter 4 The Power of Attraction: Greek and Turkish Cypriot Perceptions 1. Cyprus at this time was in the midst of much internal strife and crisis, which meant that the policy of European orientation had to be temporarily put on hold (see Chapter 2). 2. By this time, the joint administration had effectively collapsed, and was being run by the Greek Cypriots. 3. See http://hri.org/Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html. 4. See Joseph (1999) for the argument that the EU can provide a rational and conducive framework through the acquis communautaire in the search for a political settlement on Cyprus.

208 Notes 5. The internationally recognised Greek Cypriot government which controls southern Cyprus 6. See also previous documentation – EP Task Force Enlargement, 29 October 1998 – PE 167.238/ rev.3: 4 and Recommendation 1197 (1992) on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities. 7. According to Cyprus Government figures 1,521 passports were issued in 2002, and 1,192 in 2001 (Cyprus News, 2003). Of course, this might also have a negative consequence if Turkish Cypriots get passports and migrate to Europe this will impact on the Turkish Cypriot community in the North (and the maintenance of). This in turn might prove detrimental to finding a solution. 8. Although the Cypriot government does accept the Annan plan in principle, it does have certain reservations about the details, and thus, for the Greek Cypriots, changes must be made to certain elements of the plan in order for it to be viable; the nature of these changes, however, remain undisclosed at the time of writing. The important point here is that the Greek Cypriots accepted the Annan plan – at least as a basis for negotiating a settlement (see Chapter 6) – in order to demonstrate that they were showing the necessary ‘political will’ to find a solution. 9. See Stravridis (2002) for details and analysis of the Vouli and its role in Cypriot politics. 10. See http://www.akel/org.cy/English /eu.html for an explanation of AKEL’s position on the EEC/EU. See also speech by Dimitris Christofias at a panel discussion on Copenhagen and Beyond: building a Common Future, 07.12.02, Pyla, Cyprus http://www.akel/org.cy/Archive/English /arch-om071202.html 11. See http://www.disy.org.cy for more details (Greek and English) on the history, formation and development of the party. 12. See:http://www.papandreou.gr/papandreou/content/articlepage.aspx?articleid=1082&language=0 13. See also Eurobarometer Report (2002) on ‘Attitudes with Regard to the prospect of Membership in the applicant countries’, p. 143. It must also be noted here that Cyprus was the only one of the ten accession countries that did not hold a referendum on accession. 14. Governmental elites, who served in the TRNC (e.g. Talat, Akinci, Ozgur). 15. See Brewin (2000, pp. 172–207) 16. The Turkish government commissioned a legal ‘opinion’ on this issue that was drawn up by a London QC, Maurice Mendelson (Prof. of Law, University College London), and circulated at the UN in October 2001. Prof. James Crawford of Cambridge University, Professor Gerhard Hafner of Vienna University and Prof. Alain Pellet of Paris-X University, however, have categorically rejected Turkey’s contention that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would be illegal in a unanimous further legal opinion. This opinion was published on 8 January 2002 and forwarded to the UN by the government of Cyprus (Cyprus News, Jan 2002, p. 2). 17. Of course in 1960 neither Greece nor Turkey were members of the EEC. 18. According to the post-accession financial aid for new EU members in 2004–2006 (published by the Commission, 30 January 2002) the total amounts foreseen in commitments to the north of Cyprus are €39 million

Notes 209

19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25.

in 2004, €67 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006 (Cyprus News, January 2002, p. 2). For details of the demonstrations against the Denktash regime and for membership of the EU and a solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the Annan plan, see Cyprus Press and Information Office, Feb–Sep 2003. See for example also Report, Friends of Cyprus, No. 45, Autumn 2002, pp. 12–14, for concessions on security arrangements by the two sides. See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer, Spring 2002. Diez (2002) has argued that although Turkish Cypriot non-governmental organisations have criticised Denktash, their criteria for a settlement included a number of aspects, such as component states on the basis of political equality, which are not different from the position of Denktash. However, this is not entirely accurate, as one of the central provisions of the Annan plan, accepted by both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (not the ruling elite), is the existence of a common state of Cyprus consisting of two equal component states, each with its own administration and legislature. Furthermore, opinion polls in the North have indicated that there is widespread support amongst Turkish Cypriot civil society and opposition parties for the ‘Annan plan’ as a starting point for negations at least (as is the position of the Greek Cypriots) – a position that is completely at odds with the view of Rauf Denktash who has on many occasions stated that the Plan is completely unacceptable and that nothing could be achieved with this Plan. Indeed more recently Denktash has attempted to formulate his own plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue (Cyprus Press and Information Office, 04.09.03–12.09.03). Other parties include (at the time of writing): the Cyprus Justice Party (Oguz Kalelioglu); the Patriotic Unity Movement (Alpay Durduran); the United Cyprus Party (Izzet Izzcan) and the Nationalist Peace Party (Ertugrul Hasipoglu). See also CPIO, Cyprus elections, Special edition, 2003. See Guven- Lisanviler and Rodriguez (2002, pp. 181–202).

Chapter 5 Turkey

The Power of Attraction: Perceptions from

1. Indeed Turkey preferred to leave the Cyprus issue to interminable intercommunal talks, or to discuss it as one of many issues with regard to GreekTurkish differences – which was not acceptable to Greece and the Greek Cypriots. 2. For example, in reaction to the terms of its Accession Partnership with the EU Turkey stated that it ‘has never accepted any linkage between the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue and its candidacy to the EU’ (cited by Biscop, 2002, p. 28). See also McLaren (2000). In her work on Turkish elite perspectives on the EU, she finds that many do not consider the Cyprus issue to be a major stumbling block to Turkish membership. 3. Although it could be argued that in terms of the ‘democratic’ element Atatürk’s attempts to allow opposition parties were hindered by his own reluctant attitude and backtracking.

210 Notes 4. See Müftüler-Bac (1997, p. 65), for historical context of Turkish-Greek relations 5. For a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of Turkey–EU trade relations see Ugur (1999, Ch 5). 6. In order to resolve this fear the EC came up with a formula whereby Turkey would be informed of any issues discussed within EPC that affected its interests. 7. However, Turkey did have supporters in Europe who argued that Turkey as the only secular and semi-democratic Muslim state deserved to be given a special position in the European system (see Chapter 3). 8. For a greater insight and understanding of why see Buzan and Diez (1999). 9. A major reason for Greece’s perceived ‘awkward’ attitude was the Greek Prime Minister, Papandreou, (1981–89 and 1993–1995), who was less than cooperative due to his own personal anti-western agenda. 10. In 1984 the Greeks also blocked funds in the amount of 400 million ECU’s to Turkey. See Wood and Yesilada (1996, p. 208). In 1988 the Turkish government was ‘displeased’ with the fact that both a declaration by ministers and a European Parliament resolution had stated that the Cyprus issue ‘affects the relations of Turkey with the EC’, see Meinardus (1991, p. 162). 11. The EP in actual fact was not very happy with the link made between the acceptance or continuation of the CU with Turkey (by Greece) and the commitment made to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the IGC of 1996. They would have preferred to keep thee two issues separate – but not for the first time it was national interest and national positions that determined the policy on Cyprus (Interview, MEP, 1998). 12. See EU/Turkey: Ankara rejects offer from European Council of Luxembourg and breaks political dialogue with the EU, Europe, Vol. 45, 1997, 7122. p. 6–7. 13. See Tanlak (2002) for details of amendments that Turkey made to its constitution in order to comply with the EU acquis (EU harmonisation Laws adopted by the Turkish National Assembly in 2002). 14. See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/ 15. This is a generalisation and perhaps an oversimplification, as there are those, such as the Chief of the General Staff, General Ozkok, that are known to be pro-Western and moderate in their orientation. However, as pointed out by a senior EU Commission official, it is difficult to gage the attitude and policy of the Turkish military, as views change on a day-to-day basis according to political opportunity (anonymous, 2002). In addition, the Turkish military have often been perceived as the major constraint on reform in Turkey with regard to EU conditionality, not least in relation to the Cyprus issue (see Spiteri, 2003) 16. See http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/e-mali-overview.html for details of planned and implemented financial assistance to Turkey. 17. See also The Economist (14 April 2002, p. 44) on the renewed cooperation between Greece and Turkey. 18. This has been mutually reinforcing – the resumption of the Cyprus talks in 2002 led to more positive climate for resolving Greek-Turkish disputes. Indeed the ‘new’ positive relationship is something that has been asserted repeatedly by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, who were said to have developed good personal working relation-

Notes 211

19. 20.

21. 22.

23.

ships. It must also be said however, that despite this there have been question marks as to how far this has led to any substantive results in terms of settling the disputes between Greece and Turkey, including Cyprus. See McDonald (2000) for more detail on these disputes. For a more complex analysis and exploration of explanations for these incidents see, Turkey: Growing Danger of Military Incident with Greece in the Aegean, Civilitas Research, 24 June 2004. For full details of the Accession Partnership document, see http://europa. eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm Although it must be noted that no evidence of this was found in the Commission’s Progress Report (2003) on Turkey. See http://www.europa. eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm A survey by McLaren (although attitudes have changed since 2000 when it was conducted it still remains valid and reflective of current positions) is illustrative and confirms the view amongst important elites in the Turkish establishment that the Cyprus problem was not a factor keeping Turkey out of the EU. Turkish elites held the belief that there were more fundamental problems with Turkey’s application than the opposition of Greece and the solution of the Cyprus issue.

Chapter 6 The Power of Attraction and the United Nations Context 1. See Savvides (2003, p. 19–24). See also Emerson and Tocci (2002). 2. This is not to argue that other external factors have not been important, but that the decision taken at Helsinki was an equally, if not more important contributory factor in creating a more positive climate for negotiation and reconciliation. 3. Alvaro de Soto did, however, state that the June 2002 target date for the conclusion of the intercommunal talks envisaged by the UN Security Council was a ‘desirable goal’ accepted by both leaders, but not a deadline. 4. Conducted for an Athenian newspaper by the polling company Evresis Call Centre. The telephone survey used a multistage, stratified and random method on a Cyprus-wide scale amongst men and women over 18 years old who live in urban and rural areas. An opinion conducted by the Greek Cypriot daily newspaper in November 2002 revealed that opposition stood at 64 per cent (Reported in The Cyprus Weekly, ‘Greek opposition to UN plan grows’, 29 Nov 2002). 5. This was, however, prior to the election of Tassos Papadopoulos as President in February 2003. 6. See http://www.ctpkibris.org/English/271202.htm

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Primary documentation Agence Europe, 16/17 March 1998. Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC, 1982, Cyprus Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus. Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 26, No. 6, (1993) 13. Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership (1993), Commission of the European Communities, COM (93) final /2 (English Version), Brussels, 1 September 1993. Cyprus: The Way to Full Membership, Cyprus Press and Information Office, 1997. Cyprus–EC Customs Union, Cyprus Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, (1986). Cyprus-EC Relations, Cyprus Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, (1989). Cyprus News, November 2001 to November 2003. Issues 147–170. Cyprus News, Issue No. 100, 1–31 December 1997. Cyprus News (a), Issue No. 101, 1–31 January 1998. Cyprus News (b), Issue No. 90, 1–28 February 1998. Cyprus News (d), Issue No. 104, 1–31 April 1998. Cyprus Press and Information Office, Weekly Bulletin, June 2002–December 2003. Cyprus Weekly, August 22–28, 1997, p. 1. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, Cyprus, 3rd Quarter, 7, (1998) 29. EP Task Force Enlargement, PE 167.238/ rev.3: 4, 29 October 1998. Let’s be Friends (2002), The Economist, 14 April 2002, p. 44. European Commission Regular Report on Cyprus (Brussels, 13 October 1999): http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus European Stand on the Cyprus Problem, Cyprus Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus (1994).

222 Bibliography European Stand on the Cyprus Problem, Cyprus Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus (2002). Iacovou, G. ‘Cyprus–EEC Customs Union’, Cyprus Press and Information Office, (1986). Opinion on Cyprus’ Application for Membership – COM (93) 313, EC Bulletin 6–1993. Report, Friends of Cyprus, Issues 45, Autumn 2002. Turkey: Growing Danger of military incident with Greece in the Aegean, Civilitas Research, 24 June 2004. UN document, S/1994/629, para. 52, Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 30 May 1994. Schwed, J.J. in ‘Report’, The European Community and Cyprus, Issue No. 32, Autumn (1991) 7–9, Friends of Cyprus. Weston, T. US State Department Representative on Cyprus, Interview, cited by Cyprus Press and Information Office, (25–31 Jan 2003) 15.

Internet sources Accession negotiations begin 31st March 1998: http://www.cynews.com/March/31/news033113.htm Agenda 2000 – Cyprus and Turkey: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ag2000_opinions.htm http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9705/970502.html http://www.kypros.org/PIO/english/update/news/1997/9707/070716.html Cyprus News Agency, Cyprus parties express backing for direct talks, EU accession; http://kypros.org/News/Data/cna20020125_1.html Ecevit B, Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in Helsinki on Turkey’s Candidacy to the EU, 11 December 1999: http://www.kobinet.org.tr/kosgebabm/english/lib/tr/001g-a1.html Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions (2002): http://europa.eu.int/european_council/index_en.htm The Cyprus Problem: Cyprus Towards the European Union http://hri.org/CyprusProblem/europeanunion.html Cyprus’ Accession Partnership document: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/docs.htm Cyprus-EU negotiations: http://www.cyprus-eu.org.cy Enlargement Negotiations for Republic of Cyprus: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/stateofplay_ jan2002.pdf Enlargement Negotiations for Turkey and Turkey’s Accession Partnership document: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm European Commission Monitoring Report on Cyprus (Nov, 2003): http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_cy_final.pdf European Commission Regular Report on Turkey (Nov, 2003): http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/rr_tk_final.pdf European Union Takes Historic Decision on Cyprus: http://www.kypros.org/Embassy/Jan98/text.htm

Bibliography 223 European Parliament Committee Report, 2003 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus Gordon, P.H. ‘Post-Helsinki: Turkey, Greece and the European Union’, The Strategic Regional Report, (February, 2000): http://www.brook.edu/views/articlaes/gordon/20000231.htm Greece’s foreign policy page: http://www.MFA.GR/foreign/ KADEM/Cyprus Social Research and Education Consultancy Centre: http://www.ka-dem.com/ KADEM/Cyprus Social Research and Education Consultancy Centre, Sample Surveys: http://www.ka-dem.com/sample_2.htm and http://www.ka-dem.com/sample_ 3.htm Opinion on the Republic of Cyprus and its eligibility for EU membership http://www.kypros.org/PIO/documents/other/9710140en.html Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions on Cyprus (1997): http://www.kypros.org/Embassy/Jan98/text.htm Prodi, R. ‘Speech to the Cyprus House of Representatives’, Cyprus, 25 October 2001 Spring, D. (1996): http://www.pio.gov.cy/update/english/news/1996/96_09/960926 United Nations Plan for Cyprus (2002) (original and revised) http://www.can.org.cy/data/var/sxedioen.htm http://www.pio.gov.cy UN resolutions on Cyprus: http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/Undocs.html Cyrus after the 1974 invasion: (http://hri.org/Cyprus_Problem/europeanunion.html) The London-Zurich Agreements: http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_zurich.html http://www.kypros.org/Bibliography

Index Accession Treaty Cyprus 58, 153, 166 Greece 129 Acheson plan 46, 48 acquis communautaire 19–20, 21, 69, 70, 75, 106 ‘actorness’ 1, 2, 13, 14, 23 Additional Protocol Agreement 64, 127, 129, 130, 205 Agenda 2000 21, 74–6 Akinci, Mustafa 118, 159, 164, 169 Anastassiades, Nicos 156 Angolemli, Huseyin 118 Ankara Association agreement 1963 124, 127, 128 Annan plan, 2002 54, 58, 91, 103, 114, 116, 121, 122–3, 146, 150, 152–3, 164–5, 166, 167–8, 169, 176, 182, 188, 189, 191–8 Greek Cypriot views on 155–7, 163, 170 Turkish Cypriot views on 157–61, 163–4, 170 Turkish views on 161–3, 170–1 Annan, Kofi 58, 90, 91, 165, 168, 204–5 Association Agreement, 1963 (Turkey) 124, 126, 127, 130 Association Agreement, 1972 (Cyprus) 61, 64, 93, 205 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 125 Bevin, Ernest 34 bizonal, bicommunal federal framework 97, 111 Blair, Tony 81, 85 Britain and Greece 40 in Cyprus 30–1, 32–3, 34–5, 37, 39–40, 43–4 ‘Brusselisation’ 9 ‘civilian power’ 13, 14 ‘code of conduct’ 5

‘Common Strategy’ 8–9, 10 ‘confederal’ solution 57, 111, 147, 148, 164, 170, 175 Callaghan, James 41 Cardiff European Council, 1998 84, 136 Carrot and stick mechanism 19, 22, 24, 96, 112, 178, 179, 180 Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 20 Cetin, Hikmet 144 Cevikel, Nuri 116 Chirac, Jacques 80 Christofias, Demetris 105, 155–6 citizenship, Cypriot 45, 58, 121, 193 Clerides, Glafkos 56, 58, 77, 81–2, 106, 111, 153 Cologne European Council 10 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 65, 129 Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 4 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 1, 6, 9–11, 23 objectives of 7–8 confidence building measures (CBM) 168, 169 conflict management 2, 28 conflict prevention 1–2, 10, 16, 27–8 conflict resolution 2, 11, 173, 174, 177, 179 constitution 30, 31, 34, 39, 43, 45, 55, 63, 114, 192 constructive abstention 8–9 Cook, Robin 78, 81 Cooperation Agreements 192 Copenhagen European Council, 1993 20–1 Copenhagen European Council, 2002 58, 62, 89–91, 138–9, 140, 154, 161, 184, 185 Corfu European Council, 1994 111

224

Index 225 Customs Union (CU) agreement 64–5, 72, 74, 90, 100–1, 132–3, 148 Cyprus 29 1963 crisis 44, 46, 49 1967 crisis 49–51 British regime 30–1, 32–3, 34–5, 37, 39–40, 43–4 demilitarisation 195 reconciliation process 199–201 Turkish invasion 51–3 United States’ interests in 34, 39, 44, 46, 47 Cyprus Enosis Front (KEM) 35 Cyprus Justice Party (CJP) 188 Cyprus National Guard 50 Cyprus Social Research Education and Consultancy Center (KADEM) 119, 121 Cyprus Worker’s Federation (SEK) 35 decision making theorisation 14 ‘declaratory diplomacy’ 11, 59 De Gaulle, Charles 99 Democratic Party (DP) 189 Democratic Party, Centre (DIKO) 106 ‘democratic peace’ hypothesis 16 Denktash, Rauf 33, 42, 54, 56, 57–8, 76, 82, 83, 98, 111, 112, 113, 115–6, 118–9, 121, 123, 147, 148, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163–4, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 175, 181–2, 188, 189 Diez, T. 18–9 ‘divide and rule’ policy 30 double enosis 48 Ecevit, Bulent 136, 148 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 19, 101 Eden, Sir Anthony 37, 38 Edinburgh summit, 1998 81, 82 Elections in Northern Cyprus 119–21, 172, 188–90 enlargement as foreign policy strategy 1–3, 13, 14–9, 22–6, 27–8, 97 enosis movement 31, 32–3, 35–6, 41, 46, 48 role of Church in 33

Erdogˇan, Recep Tayyip 138, 146, 162, 166, 176, 182 European conference (London), 1998 77, 80–1, 82 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 201 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 4, 5, 93, 147 European foreign policy (EFP) 1, 3–6, 9, 10, 12–5, 26–7 see also Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) European Political Cooperation (EPC) 3, 6–7, 8, 10, 12, 30, 53–4, 129 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 1, 10, 90, 136 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 135, 136, 173 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDF) 1, 88, 143 European Union 80, 173 and Britain 80 and Cyprus 53–4, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67–9, 72, 90, 91–2, 93–5, 99–100, 165, 173–4, 178 accession negotiations 71, 82, 132–3 association agreement 63–4 Customs Union agreement 100 financial assistance 92 membership 66–7, 69, 70–1, 85, 101 strategic interests 63 and Greece 80, 81, 132 membership 129, 131 and Turkey 61, 73, 76, 77–9, 83, 86, 88, 124, 126, 133, 149–151, 180–1, 185–6 Customs Union agreement 72, 132, 133 deterioration in relations 128–9, 134–5 membership 75, 79, 85, 86–7, 89–90, 130, 131, 134, 140 United States support 83, 84 rapprochement 136–7, 142–3 enlargement 3–4, 11, 15, 17–9, 74–5 governance model 6

226 Index European Union – continued membership criteria 19–21 political objectives 18, 19, 28 politico-security policy 3–4, 6–12, 127–8 Foot plan 41 fundamental rights and liberties 193 ‘geographical clarity’ 25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 5 Geneva talks 52, 54 Ghali, Boutros Boutros 56, 204, 205 good neighbourliness 21–2, 178 Greece 80 and Britain 40 and Cyprus issue 31, 38, 39, 64, 65–6, 73 Greek Cypriots 32, 35, 76, 91, 97–8, 145, 166–7, 170 and European Union membership 99–100, 102, 103–4, 122, 174–5 public opinion 107–8 ‘Green Line’ 145, 166, 167, 199 Grivas, George 33, 36, 40, 48, 50 Gül, Abdullah 145 High level agreements 1977 54, 55, 111 High level agreements 1979 54, 55, 56, 111 ‘Higher Electoral Council’ (YSK) 121 Hopkinson, Henry 37 Harding, Sir John 35, 39 Holbrooke, Richard 11, 83 Helsinki European Council, 1999 1, 10, 21–2, 61, 85–9, 131, 136–7, 143, 152, 154, 184 ‘institutionalisation’ 18, 23 intercommunal talks 111, 115, 147, 153–4 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 21–2, 134, 137, 178 Izcan, Izzet 118 Johnson, Lyndon 46 Juncker, Jean-Claude 78

Juppe, Alan 132 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 138, 150, 162–3, 164, 166, 181 Karamanlis, Constantine 40, 41, 46 Kemalism 126, 127, 142, 150 ‘Kibris’ 116 Kinkel, Klaus 79, 132 Kohl, Helmut 79 Kutchuk, Fazil 33, 42, 44, 45 Kyprianou, Spyros 54, 106 Lausanne Treaty, 1923 126 Lennox-Boyd 41 liberalisation 4, 5 liberalism 16 Lisbon European Council, 1992 19–20 London-Zurich agreements 29, 43, 44 Luxembourg European Council, 1997 72, 77–9, 83, 84, 133, 134, 139, 175 Maastricht Treaty 1 Macmillan plan, 1958 41, 41, 42 Macmillan, Harold 38, 41–2 Makarios, Archbishop 33, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 54, 106 Matutes Package 147 Mediterranean policy 65, 128–9 ‘Megali Idea’ 32 National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) 33, 36 National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 137 National Unity Party (NUP) 188, 189 neofunctionalism 17 ‘new conceptual categorisation’ 12–3 Nice European Council, 2002 142 Nicosia International Airport 168 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 29, 34, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 59, 83, 88, 90, 105, 126, 133, 135–6

Index 227 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 126 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 129 Özal, Turgut 130 Panagrarian Union of Cyprus (PEK) 35 Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organization (PEON) 35 Papadopoulos, Tassos 58, 106, 156, 163, 165, 166 Papagos, Field Marshall 37, 40 Papandreou, George 48, 144, 167 Peace and Democracy Movement Party 118, 119, 188 “Petersberg Tasks” 10 Plaza, Galo 49 political parties Greek Cypriot 104–7 ‘power of attraction’ strategy 2, 3, 11, 15, 18, 22–6, 27 (fig), 28, 62, 71, 72, 75, 79–80, 87, 91, 94, 95, 96–7, 102–3, 121–3, 124, 130, 136, 140, 141, 146, 148–9, 151, 152, 171, 173, 174–83 ‘presence’, concept of 13, 14 Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) 35, 104–5, 174 property rights 54, 114, 115, 168, 196–7 protectionism 5 Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (PTCA) 50 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)

8, 9

Radcliffe plan 41 ‘reconciliation centres’ 200 Reconciliation Commission 197 Republican Turkish Party (RTP) 158, 189 St. Malo Declaration 10 Sampson, Nicos 52 Schwed, Jean Joseph 68 self determination 33, 36, 37, 38, 39–40, 41, 42 Simitis, Costas 144, 164

Single European Act (SEA) 12, 64, 130 Smith, Michael 2, 6, 15 Soames, Christopher 63 ‘soft security’ capability 2, 3, 14, 15–6, 22–3, 187 Solana, Javier 1, 136 Soviet Union and Cyprus issue 44 Soyer, Ferdi Sabit 118 Spaak, Henri 42 Spring, Dick 72 State Planning Organization (SPO) 127 State Treaty of Austria, 1955 111 Stephanopoulos, Stephanos 40 Supreme Court 194 Supreme Election Council 188 Talat, Mehemet Ali 119, 158, 169 trade promotion Cyprus 92, 93 Treaty of Alliance 44, 192, 195 Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) 1, 8–9, 20–1 Treaty of Establishment 44, 192 Treaty of Guarantee 44, 111, 114, 192, 195 Treaty of Nice 5, 10 Treaty of Rome 4, 5, 15 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 6, 7–8, 67 Tripartite Conference 39 Turkey 137–8, 149 and Cyprus issue 31–2, 39, 41, 69, 141, 146–7, 181 invasion of Cyprus 51–3 political reforms 139 Turkish Cypriots 32, 33, 35, 102, 170 and European Union membership 108, 110–4, 122–3, 175, 179–80 and Rauf Denktash 115–9 Turkish Cyprus Resistance Organisation (TMT) 36 Turkish-Greek relations 143–4 Turkish Lira 147 ‘Turkish Republic of Cyprus’ 98 ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) 69, 93, 98, 102, 111, 112, 139, 147–8,168,175, 180

228 Index United Cyprus Republic 159 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) 46, 47–8 United Nations (UN) and Cyprus issue 26, 38, 46, 54–8, 59, 65, 68, 69, 98, 103, 145, 165 and Greek Cypriots 97–8 United Nations (UN) plan see Annan Plan United States and Cyprus issue 34, 39, 44, 46, 47

van den Broek, Hans 67, 72–3, 84 Vassiliou, George 105, 156 Vedrine, Hubert 80 Verheugen, Günter 92, 142, 164, 165, 177 Western European Union (WEU) 8, 9 Winster constitution 34 Winster, Lord 34 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 5 Yilmaz, Mesut Yugoslav crisis

81, 134, 135 11

The European Union and Enlargement: The Case of Cyprus

The Enlargement of the European Union: Issues and Strategies

Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement

Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement

Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement

Conflict, Negotiation and European Union Enlargement

The Legitimacy of the European Union After Enlargement

European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History

European Union: Challenges and Promises of a New Enlargement

The EU and the Economies of the Eastern European Enlargement

The EU and the Economies of the Eastern European Enlargement

Legitimacy and the European Union

The European Union Decides

The European Union Decides