The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations. (European Studies)

EUROPEAN STUDIES 25 EUROPEAN STUDIES An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics Executiv...

Author: Peter Anderson | Georg Wiessala

39 downloads 794 Views 1MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

EUROPEAN STUDIES

25

EUROPEAN STUDIES An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics

Executive Editor Menno Spiering, University of Amsterdam [email protected] Series Editors Robert Harmsen, The Queen’s University of Belfast Joep Leerssen, University of Amsterdam Menno Spiering, University of Amsterdam Thomas M. Wilson, Binghamton University, State University of New York

EUROPEAN STUDIES An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics 25

The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations

Edited by Peter Anderson and Georg Wiessala

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007

Le papier sur lequel le présent ouvrage est imprimé remplit les prescriptions de "ISO 9706:1994, Information et documentation - Papier pour documents Prescriptions pour la permanence". The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of ‘ISO 9706: 1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence’. ISBN: 978-90-420-2295-9 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007 Printed in The Netherlands

NOTE FOR CONTRIBUTORS European Studies is published several times a year. Each issue is dedicated to a specific theme falling within the broad scope of European Studies. Contributors approach the theme from a wide range of disciplinary and, particularly, interdisciplinary perspectives. Past issues have focused on such topics as Britain and Europe, France and Europe, National Identity, Middle and Eastern Europe, Nation Building and Literary History, Europeanisation and Euroscepticism. The Editorial board welcomes suggestions for other future projects to be produced by guest editors. In particular, European Studies may provide a vehicle for the publication of thematically focused conference and colloquium proceedings. Editorial enquiries may be directed to the series executive editor. Subscription details and a list of back issues are available from the publisher’s web site: www.rodopi.nl.

This book is dedicated to the faithful members of the European Studies Dining Club in Preston, Lancashire.

Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; Where knowledge is free; Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls; (...) Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit; (...) Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake. Rabindranath Tagore., from Gitanjali, 1910.

CONTENTS

Authors in this volume PETER ANDERSON AND GEORG WIESSALA Introduction

9 15

FOUNDATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS APIRAT PETCHSIRI Asia in the Making of Europe, Europe’s Heritage in Asia and Asia as Europe’s Other

31

NATALIA CHABAN, MARTIN HOLLAND AND CHRISTIAN ELIAS SCHNEIDER International News and Local Contexts: Framing of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy in New Zealand Newspapers (2004-2005) 55 PETER ANDERSON Speaking the East, Framing the East or Shaping the East?

83

MICHAEL SMITH AND NATEE VICHITSORASATRA The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor in Asia: Defining and Theorising EU-Asia Relations

103

POLICIES AND PATTERNS DAVID FOUQUET AND PAUL LIM Constructive Engagement and the Policy of Disposition: Three Case Studies of EU-Asia Policy

127

CARLO FILIPPINI Beyond the Triadic World Order: the Role and Patterns of Trade and Economics in EU-Asia Relations

147

8

EUROPEAN STUDIES

YEO LAY HWEE The Inter-regional Dimension of EU-Asia Relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process 173 JOHN QUIGLEY EU-Asia Relations and the Role of European Union CFSP Special Representatives

193

ISSUES, REGIONS AND PARTNERS CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS EU-Central Asia Relations and the New World Order

215

GEORG WIESSALA Political Morality, Normative Territories and Non-interference: Human Rights as ‘Enabling’ and ‘Inhibiting’ Agents in EU-Asia Relations 239 PHILOMENA MURRAY The EU and Australia: Beyond the ‘Tyranny of Distance’?

261

GEORG WIESSALA ‘Re-orienting’ the Global Learning Experience: Higher Education in the Relations Between the European Union and Asia and the Subject of ‘European Studies’ 287

AUTHORS IN THIS VOLUME PETER J. ANDERSON is Journalism Research Coordinator at the University of Central Lancashire. He has published a variety of books, articles and book chapters on both Communication and Politics, including (with Geoff Ward, eds.) (2007) The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies, Aldershot: Ashgate; (with Anthony Weymouth) (1999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union, Harlow: Longman; (with Christopher Williams and Georg Wiessala, eds.) (2000) New Europe in Transition, London: Continuum; and (1996) The Global Politics of Power, Justice and Death, London: Routledge. He taught previously at the Universities of Lancaster and Southampton and runs a small Consultancy on the EU, the news media and the citizenry. Contact: [email protected] NATALIA CHABAN is a Lecturer and a Deputy Director at the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. She is actively pursuing her research interests in cognitive and semiotic aspects of political and mass media discourses, image studies and identity studies in the European Union context. She is currently coordinating a comparative cross-national research project on Public, Elite and Media Perceptions of the EU in Asia Pacific Region. Contact: [email protected] CARLO FILIPPINI is a Professor in Economics and the Director of ISESAO, a Research Centre devoted to East Asian economic and social aspects, at Bocconi University, Milan. After graduation in Economics and Management he spent two years at the University of Cambridge, UK as a research student. He has visited East Asia many times, to contribute short courses, seminars and conference papers to Universities and research centres in the region, in particular Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam. His research interests focus on regional integration and trade relations between East Asian economies and the rest of the world. In 1993–2002 he was the Director of the Master in Economics Programme at Bocconi University and in 2002-2004 the European coordinator of the European Studies Programme Vietnam. In 2004 he was awarded the Japanese Order of the Rising Sun (3rd class). Contact: [email protected] DAVID FOUQUET is a life-long European-based journalist who is the Director-Editor of the Asia-Europe Project Information Service, headquar-

10

EUROPEAN STUDIES

tered in Brussels. He has also travelled, lectured and been a consultant in Europe and Asia and served for several years with the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels, including as its Secretary-General. Specific fields of interest include international and economic relations, arms control, conflict management and environmental protection. Contact: [email protected] MARTIN HOLLAND holds a Jean Monnet Chair ad personam and is the Director of the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He has taught EU courses in South Africa, Australia, Thailand, Switzerland and Germany as well as in New Zealand: in 2006, he introduced the first B.A. major in EU Studies offered by a tertiary institution in New Zealand and Australia. He has held several fellowships including Jean Monnet Research Fellowship at the European University Institute, an Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship at the University of Freiburg and was, most recently, a Rockefeller Bellagio Fellow in 2000. He has published 19 books and over 100 chapters and articles. His publications include: The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays on Theory and Practice (ed. Macmillan, London, 1991); European Union Common Foreign Policy: CFSP Joint Action in South Africa (Macmillan, London, 1995); Common Foreign and Security Policy: the Record of Reforms (ed. Pinter/Cassells, London, 1997); The EU and the Third World (Palgrave/ Macmillan EU Studies Series, London, 2002); and Common Foreign and Security Policy – The First Decade (ed. Continuum, London, 2004). Contact: Martin.Holland@ canterbury.ac.nz PAUL LIM is presently a Visiting Professor at Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, Malaysia. He coordinates a new Masters in International and Diplomatic Studies (European Studies) at the Centre for International Studies. His teaching duties cover International Relations, Globalization, Regionalism, ASEAN and the European Union. He was previously Senior Research Fellow at the European Institute for Asian Studies, Brussels and remains a Senior Research Associate of that Institute of which he was one of the co-founders. Contact: [email protected] PHILOMENA MURRAY is Associate Professor in the School of Political Science, Sociology and Criminology and Director of the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne, Australia. She was awarded a Jean Monnet Chair in 2001 and an ad personam Jean

AUTHORS

11

Monnet Chair in 2006. She was a diplomat, from 1984 to 1989, for the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, in Dublin and Paris, and also worked in Brussels and Ravenna. A founder President of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia, her research interests are in European Integration; EU-Australia relations; EU-Asia relations, EU governance and comparative regional integration. She was joint editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science, from 1996 to 1998. Her publications include the co-edited volumes Citizenship and Identity in Europe (1999), Europe – Rethinking the Boundaries (1998), Visions of European Unity (1996) and Europe in the 1990s: Australia's Options (1994). Her book, Australia and the European Superpower: Engaging with the European Union, was published in 2005. Philomena is Director of a trans-national research project, funded by the EU, investigating The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Models and Linkages and editor of Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux, Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming, 2007. She is also currently working on her book The EU’s Political Persona. Contact: [email protected] APIRAT PETCHSIRI, LL. B, LL. M, J.S.D is Associate Professor of Law, in the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. He is an Advisor to the Multidisciplinary Programme on European Studies at Chulalongkorn University. Hew was born in Bangkok, Thailand and received his first Honours Degree in Law from Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. He holds a Master’s Degree in Law in Criminal Justice and a Doctorate in Juridical Science from New York University’s School of Law, USA. His first academic appointment was in 1976 at the Faculty of Law of Chulalongkorn University. He has held Visiting Appointments at the Faculty of Law, Melbourne University, Victoria, Australia, and at Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, USA. Presently he is also President of the European Community Studies Association of Thailand (ECSA-Thai). He is actively participating in discussions surrounding the legal dimension of the relationship between Asia and Europe, particularly legal reforms in Asia and lessons to be learned from European Integration. Contact: [email protected] JOHN QUIGLEY is the editor of the EurAsia Bulletin, published by the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) in Brussels. Publishing widely on the nature and scope of the European Union’s policies to engage Asia, his research interests include the CFSP, ESDP and the political

12

EUROPEAN STUDIES

framework that governs the relationship, including inter-regionalism. Contact: [email protected] CHRISTIAN ELIAS SCHNEIDER is a Graduate Research Assistant at the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE), University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand MICHAEL SMITH is Professor of European Politics and Jean Monnet Chair in the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies at Loughborough University. His principal areas of research are transatlantic relations, relations between the EU, the US and Asia, the making of EU external policies and the role of the EU in post-Cold War Europe, as well as more general issues of international political economy and international relations. Among his recent books are Europe's Experimental Union: Rethinking Integration (2000, with Brigid Laffan and Rory O'Donnell); The State of the European Union, Volume 5: risks, reforms, resistance and revival (2000, edited with Maria Green Cowles); International Relations and the European Union (2005, edited with Christopher Hill); and The European Union’s Roles in international Politics: Concepts and Analysis (2006, edited with Ole Elgström). He is currently working on a jointly-authored text on EU-US relations, and on the early stages of a project dealing with the European Union and international regimes. Contact: [email protected] NATEE VICHITSORASATRA, a PhD candidate at Loughborough University, is conducting a doctoral research project under the supervision of Professor Michael H. Smith. The project is focused on international political economy theory and the “evolution of cooperation” between the European Union and Asia. Natee undertook his undergraduate studies in International Relations at Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) and completed an MA in International Political Economy at Warwick University in 1999. Currently at Loughborough on a Thai Foreign Ministry Scholarship, Natee worked as a journalist for The Nation newspaper (Thailand) where he specialised in politics, corruption, technology, and social issues. He continues to contribute to The Nation as a guest columnist on a regular basis. His wider academic research interests include international political economy theory, the global information society, and external relations of the EU. Contact: [email protected]

AUTHORS

13

GEORG WIESSALA is a Reader in International Relations and Director of Research in the Department of Education & Social Science of the University of Central Lancashire in Preston, United Kingdom. He has co-edited The European Union: Annual Review, Journal of Common Market Studies from 1999 to 2003, and has acted as a Committee member of UACES, the UK’s University Association for Contemporary European Studies. He teaches on European Studies, Criminology and International Relations courses in both the Asia-Pacific and Europe and holds Visiting Appointments at a number of institutions, such as the Multidisciplinary Programme on European Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. His main research interests revolve around European Union Foreign Policy, Human Rights, EU-Asia-Pacific Relations and the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM). Amongst his recent writings is a piece on New Approaches to the Antipodes: Some Themes in EU-Relations with Australia and New Zealand (Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, Vol.2, No.1, 2004). His latest book publications include: The European Union and Asian Countries (UACES/Sheffield Academic Press, 2002) and Re-Orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations (Ashgate, 2006). He is currently working on a project involving the roles of educational and academic exchange in Asia-EU relations. Contact: [email protected] CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS is Head of Politics in the Department of Education and Social Science, University of Central Lancashire, having previously worked at the Universities of Amsterdam, 1988; Helsinki, 1988-89 and Cork, 1989-91. In 2000, he was awarded an Honorary Degree in Political Science by the Institute of Socio-Political Research, RAN and made a member of the Russian Academy of Political Science, Moscow. He served as Secretary of the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies from 1998-2001. He has published articles in Revolutionary Russia; the Sociology of Health and Illness and the Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. His recent books include Youth, Risk and Russian Modernity (Ashgate 2003); (ed.), Sotsial’naia politika: Istoriia i sovremenost´(Social Policy: Past and Present) (Udmurtskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, Izhevsk, 2005) and Casualties of Change: The rise and fall of the Russian Welfare State (Ashgate, 2007). His other works include ‘The Modernisation of Russian Health Care: Challenges, policy, constraints’ in J.R. Smith (Birmingham) and M. Kangaspuro (Helsinki) (ed.), Modernisation in Russia since 1900, (SKS

14

EUROPEAN STUDIES

Helsinki, Studia Fennica Historia 12 2006), pp. 206-220; with Zoya Baranova, ‘Zashchita prav detei i profilaktika sotsial’nogo sirotsva v postprestroechnoi Rossiii’ (The protection of child welfare and the fate of social orphanages in post-Soviet Russia) Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta: Seria Psikologoya I sotsial’naya pedagogika 2007 and with E. Luchinskaya), “Developing and sustaining social work education and training in Russia – Lessons from a Tempus project in Udmurtia” in Matthias Bürgel and Andreas Umland (ed.), Higher Education in the Humanities and Social Sciences in Eastern Europe III: Transition and Stagnation at Post-Soviet Universities” (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2007) Contact: [email protected] YEO LAY HWEE, M.A (University of Canterbury), Ph.D (National University of Singapore) is Senior Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) and Honorary Fellow at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC), University of Melbourne. The focus of her research includes peace and development in ASEAN, ASEAN’s external relations, in particular, with the European Union, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process and comparative regionalism. Prior to her present positions at the SIIA and CERC, Dr Yeo worked in the Ministry of Defence, Information and the Arts. She taught at the University of Macau and the National University of Singapore. She has worked in other research think tanks such as the Institute of Policy Studies and the Danish Institute of International Affairs in Copenhagen. She was a Senior Visiting Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies at the University of Leiden. Contact: [email protected]

EUROPEAN STUDIES 25 (2007): 15-28

INTRODUCTION

Peter Anderson and Georg Wiessala Aims, Structure and Organisation of this Book Sketching Asia, as one of the contributors to this volume rightly asserts, is by no means an easy task. Defining what ‘Asia’ or ‘Europe’ are, borders on the impossible. The contributors to this volume will, nevertheless, attempt to showcase and examine a number of aspects which form part of the rich tapestry of contemporary EU-Asia relations. This collection of essays is divided into three main sections. The first one, Foundations and Representations, offers the wider picture, as it were, and opens up a number of pathways towards a better understanding of the East-West dialogue. The contributors to this part seek to address what may be called the unspoken rules of Asia-Europe dialogue. These could equally be termed the ‘iceberg-issues’ of intercontinental cooperation. We call them ‘iceberg-issues’, because in this area much is about views, stereotypes, perceptions, images. Those matters, in short, which are never at the surface of EU-Asia policies, but form the seventy per cent of the iceberg underneath the surface of relations. Those seventy per cent, which can lead to serious collisions of policies, values and assumptions if they are, wilfully or unintentionally, neglected. It should not be surprising then that matters such as historical legacies, underlying theories, intellectual baggage, language, representation, media images and perceptions form the principle concerns in this first part of the book. The subsequent section, entitled Policies and Patterns, seeks to distil the very significant, but less tangible, findings of the first section into the more concrete facts and figures, policy prescriptions, dimensions

16

European Studies

and dialogues of EU-Asia relations. Here, then is an overview of some of the ‘bedrock’ of EU-Asia interaction, in terms of business and trade, security and engagement, investment and inter-regionalism, foreign policy and ‘people-to-people’ involvement in East-West dialogue. What motivates the contributors to this part of the book, even unites them, to a certain degree, is a search for patterns, channels of communication, policy habits solidifying into good practice, method and institutionalisation. May the reader cast their eyes back occasionally, to the chapters on theory and image when digesting this part of the book; perhaps they will also be inclined to cast a glance forwards, curious, hopefully, about how EU policies towards Asia can work, what implications they may have, and, last, but not least, which areas and regions they can, and should, extend into. Where does the EU’s concern with ‘Asia’ end, what should it comprise of? These questions are, of course, very much at issue in the third part of this book, which is called Issues, Regions and Partners. Here, the choice of topics has been influenced by the need to make new contributions to EU-Asia Studies in hitherto sadly ‘under-researched’ corners, and by the desire to stretch intellectual and geographical boundaries and disciplines. This explains the inclusion of much original research on Central Asia and on Australia, and on Human Rights and Education, both relatively un-trodden avenues and alleyways of scrutiny in the Asia-Europe context. The organisation of this book is such that a number of themes are ‘woven’ through its fabric. Those leitmotivs are part of the underlying dynamics of this collection. They appear in individual chapters and also link individual contributors with one another. They are, principally, embodied in the following notions: a concern with ‘ideas’ and ‘identities’ as drivers of Politics; an interest in ‘norms’ and ‘human rights’; a belief in the power of education and exchange, shared learning experiences and joint practices; and a mindful remembrance of the legacies and stereotypes of the past. The inclusion of these themes stems from the need, shared by all contributors to this volume, that EU Asia policies need to be put on a more coherent footing, and that they need to be informed, to a much higher degree, by a new, and more inter-connected approach to Asia-Europe collaboration. Arguably the best way to delineate this new method is to state that the EU’s interaction vis-à-vis its interlocutors across Asia is in dire need

INTRODUCTION

17

of a little élargissement et approfondissement, or some widening and deepening. It is the contention of the editors that, in its present and future engagement with Asia, the European Union needs to take in the wider picture, cut across rigid budgetary and policy boundaries, emphasise horizontal connections and enable more ‘switched-on’, lateral, modes of thinking. In part, this is already happening: the latest EU policyinitiatives and strategy-papers on Asia are beginning to bear witness to a more integrated, ‘holistic’, way of thinking. This appears particularly evident in terms of the educational and cultural dimensions of EUAsia relations but has a ‘spill-over’ effect into other sectors. As in most areas of Politics – and life – the ‘lust of knowing’, to borrow a phrase, fuels the advance in the inter-continental dialogue; people in Asia, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere, are the real drivers of progress and evolution. It is them who weave the new ‘world-wide-web’ of AsiaEurope and who, ultimately, form the ‘software’ of societies and of the Politics between societies. Overview: The Individual Contributions to this Book With these few points firmly in mind, this, then, is the itinerary the editors are offering in this volume: in the introductory chapter, Apirat Petchsiri sets the scene for what follows in a number of ways: he looks at Asia-Europe contacts from the time of the ancient ‘Superpowers’ of Eurasia onwards and finds much evidence that many earlier periods of globalisation originated on the Asian Continent. Throughout his chapter, Petchsiri investigates the ideas of ‘learning from one another’, in the sense of cultural advancement, and ‘diffusion’, in East and West. He places a particular emphasis on the evolution of legal traditions, from the Mongol Great Yasra system and the Corpus Iuris, and on the reception of European legal and cultural traditions, such as the ‘rule of law’, in Asia. His chapter makes a vital contribution to the way we can understand both Asia’s role in the ‘Making of Europe’ and Asia as ‘Europe’s “Other”’, paving the way to a more advanced understanding of how Asia has been reflected – and refracted – through European eyes. Petchsiri argues that European cultural diffusion, imperialism and processes of ‘voluntary concession’ to Western influence, of Asian sovereignty, can be interpreted as both a ‘threat’ and a ‘mentor’ to Asian Civilisation. Looking at the ‘legalism of relations’ between Asians and Europeans, Petchsiri takes his examination into the

18

European Studies

period of European Integration of the 20th and 21st Centuries, demonstrating the lasting effect of Asian responses to Colonialism and Ideology on the ‘drivers’ of cultural diffusion. Petchsiri sees the latest example of these processes in current Asian ambitions directed at finding new systems of regional integration, and in the debates about ‘styles of negotiation’, legal and cultural ‘values’ in Europe and Asia. In a word of warning to modern policy-makers in the EU and Asia, he concludes that cultural diffusion may not, of and by itself, lead to better East-West relations. Throughout Chapter Two, Martin Holland, Christian Elias Schneider and Natalia Chaban, also look, in a way, at how Asia and Europe perceive, and can learn from, their histories and interactions. This is the case, in particular, in the shape of news discourses outside of the EU. The focus of the investigation in this article is on the question of how perceptions of Europe and the European Union are shaped by the News Media in New Zealand. Their assessment of the ‘dominant media framings’ of the EU, created in reputable national newspapers in New Zealand, extends also to ‘primed conceptualisations’ of the EU in NZ public opinion. In their analysis, the authors employ the ideas of ‘media frames’ and ‘images’, in order to provide a frame of reference for their study. The EU is seen here in the mirror of its representation as an international actor in a range of New Zealand papers and through a range of diverse news categories, ‘angles’ and ‘framings’, including the ‘localisation’ of ‘foreign’ news about the EU. The outcomes of the study which underpins this chapter yielded a number of surprising results in terms of the EU’s ‘visibility’, ‘actor-ness’, roles and activities on the international scale, in the context of EU-Asia relations, and in connection with the Union’s interaction with the Pacific region and with New Zealand in particular. The authors’ investigation of how ‘meanings’ of EU foreign policy activities are ‘assigned’ by media reports and, subsequently, ‘consumed’ and transported into the formation of public opinion, impacts on much wider issues of ‘perception’, ‘presence’ and ‘representation’ in the context of International Relations, East-West dialogue and EU Foreign Policy. Continuing a media-centred analysis of EU-Asia relations, the chapter by Peter Anderson also looks at how the multi-faceted field of EUAsia political, economic and cultural interaction is represented and ‘constructed’ in the media. By contrast to the previous chapter,

INTRODUCTION

19

though, the focus of examination in this section is on what goes on ‘behind the language’ of ‘official’ EU documentation and of selected key international news media when Asia-EU is the subject matter in question. The EU documentation Anderson analyses, focuses particularly on Press Releases relating to human rights issues, trade deals and general political relations involving Asia. The selected news media, widely-read in both Europe and Asia, are the Financial Times and the Economist. In Anderson’s investigation, these two news products are indicators of the way in which EU elites have EU-Asia relations ‘framed for them’, by the specialist pan-European/international news media which they use. The language of EU Documentation, according to Anderson, provides useful clues as to how the EU wishes to describe and structure its relationship with Asia. One of the avenues the author investigates in this chapter is the degree to which the ‘language’ and ‘framing’ of EU press releases is reflected in the above-mentioned specialist news media and vice versa. The chapter further examines the ways in which ‘values’ and ‘identities’ are used within the discourses examined and what Smith, Vichitsorasatra, Wiessala and others in this book describe as the ‘ideational’ construction of the EU-Asia political space. The case studies Anderson uses, are chosen to be representative of carefully researched trends. The Critical Discourse Analysis framework offered here by the author is one specifically designed to be much more flexible than a full-blown analysis represented, for example, by the work of Fairclough and others. The final chapter in the first section of the book, contributed by Michael Smith and Natee Vichitsorasatra, provides the necessary theoretical grounding of EU-Asia interaction. The starting point for the authors’ analysis in this chapter is an apparent paradox: although the EU has had, for at least the last decade, a mixed set of ‘Asia-Strategies’ in its foreign policy arsenal, it is not clear that these strategies demonstrate either a clear commitment to EU collective action on the part of Member States and EU Institutions, or a coherent set of policy instruments with which to address the underlying principles of EU-Asia relations. Smith and Vichitsorasatra approach this situation by separating material interests, ideas and institutions as theoretical elements of the EU’s ‘Asia-Policies’, and by means of employing the concepts of ‘diversity’ and ‘complexity’, in regard to matters such as the historical legacy, geo-politics, political institutions and foreign policies of Asia-

20

European Studies

Europe. Against this background, the authors investigate EU collective action and ‘projection of policies’ across Asia. They achieve this with reference to a number of pertinent theoretical frameworks, for instance, Neo-Liberalism, Institutional Theory and Neo-Mercantilism. Significantly, they also examine the important dimension of ‘ideas’ and ‘norms’ within EU-Asia relations, a theme taken up in other chapters of this volume, e.g. by Anderson and Wiessala, in regard to Human Rights and Media Representations. As Smith and Vichitsorasatra show, this approach can provide key clues to the question of an EU ‘Asia-Policy’ and in regard to the Union as a coherent dialogue partner and ‘pro-active cosmopolitan’, and when it comes to the assertion and dissemination of EU norms. Having thus covered some of the groundwork of past and present Asia-EU cooperation, the second section of this book addresses a number of key Policies and Patterns which characterise this inter-continental dialogue. The section opens with a chapter by Paul Lim and David Fouquet on the patterns and policy-practices of EU-Asia. In their chapter, Lim and Fouquet offer a conceptualisation of EU Asia Policy which hinges on interpretations and perceptions of EU foreign policy as ‘soft power’ and ‘constructive engagement’. The authors define ‘constructive engagement’ as ‘the opposite of confrontation’, examining the difference between an ‘engagement-oriented’ approach and contrasting alternatives, such as the method of ‘pre-emptive deterrence’. According to the authors, the EU tends to emphasise its foreign policy preferences, across the Asian Continent and elsewhere, through liberal and idealist approaches. In this chapter, Lim and Fouquet analyse these points with regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and to the EU as a ‘normative power’, and a ‘residual’ and ‘symbolic’ presence; aspects also looked at in the chapters by Smith and Vichitsorasatra and Wiessala in this book. Against this background, Lim and Fouquet offer three case studies of EU foreign policy interaction with Asia. The focus of these lies on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK – North Korea), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Indonesian province of Aceh; it does, however, also embrace other Asian regions and countries. The investigation offered here has wide-ranging implications for the study of the CFSP and of the involvement of the EU in matters of conflict-prevention and human security. The authors argue that the roles and policy-pat-

INTRODUCTION

21

terns chosen by the EU in these regions and countries frequently followed a pattern which could be described as ‘the policy of disposition’. In the view of Lim and Fouquet, the Asian ‘political toolbox’ used by the EU contained a variety of roles. These ranged from that of a more ‘detached, honest broker’ in North Korea, to a ‘facilitator in the case of the PRC, and a ‘builder of credibility’ in the example of Indonesia. Carlo Filippini, in the subsequent chapter, looks at the role and patterns of trade and economics in EU-Asia relations. Offering insights which transcend the rather restrictive idea of a ‘triadic’, or ‘triangular’, economic world order, Fillipini’s analysis starts with the key assertion that economic relations are ‘interlaced’ with cultural, historical, political and social issues. On this basis, Filippini’s examination encapsulates the problems implied by the term ‘legacies of the past’ – a strand of analysis which also appears throughout the chapter by Petchsiri in this volume. Having thus set the scene for a more ‘holistic’ understanding of EU-Asia economic interaction, the author moves on to investigate the economic dimension of the relations between the EU, Japan and the Newly Industrialised Countries of Asia, the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’. Covering the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China and South Asia, the author focuses, in particular, on economic developments in EU-Asia relations after 1990, and following the inauguration of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. The scope of Filippini’s investigation embraces foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and patterns in Asia, the issue of EU Aid Policy and a number of contemporary problems, such as regional, bilateral free trade agreements (FTA), EU trade priorities and social dumping. Filippini’s concern with the ‘bundling of economic relations and human rights’, and with the ‘switching on and off’ of its relations with one or the other Asian partner, links his chapter with similar issues explored in Wiessala’s human rights chapter in this book. Filippini concludes that in many economic respects, as, indeed, in other matters, Europe will, ultimately, be the ‘master of its own destiny’. Nowhere is the shaping of economic, political and cultural ‘destinies’, ‘agendas’ and ‘futures’ more apparent – and more significant – than in the EU’s variable, ‘inter-regional’, dialogue with Asia. The relations between the EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains the proclaimed ‘cornerstone’ of all intercontinental collaboration in the scope of this book. Although both the

22

European Studies

EU and ASEAN are changing – re-engineering themselves, one might say, in the light of pressures of globalisation and the changing demands of global world (dis-) order – EU-ASEAN is the bedrock and anchor of an ‘alphabet-soup’ of programmes and initiatives, linking the two Continents, and too numerous to mention here. In her chapter on the Inter-Regional Dimension of EU-Asia, Yeo Lay Hwee offers an in-depth critique of this aspect of Asia-Europe, covering also the process of Asia-Europe Meetings, or ASEM. The author critically accompanies the changing dynamics of, first, the institutionalisation of ASEAN, and then the ASEM summitry, which began to provide a supplementary channel of EU-Asia dialogue from the mid-1990s. Yeo carefully contextualises her analysis through a theoretical investigation of the contested concepts of ‘regionalism’ and ‘inter-regionalism’, looking at divergent levels and intensities of policy-making, diplomacy and Asia-Europe relations. She shows how both the ASEAN and the EU are facing parallel challenges, such as ‘enlargement’, ‘soul-searching’, ‘credibility’ and ‘community-building’, and she examines contemporaneous and future processes of ‘constitutionalisation’, embodied in both the EU Constitution and the ASEAN Charter. The author finishes with a critical examination of ‘images’, interrogating the ‘gulf’ between ‘the reality’ and ‘the potential’ of ASEM. Her analysis encompasses a look at ‘constructivist’ interpretations of ASEM, a point which links this chapter with the more theory-based chapters in earlier sections of this book. In the last chapter concerning the political, economic and social policies and patterns of interaction between the EU and Asia, John Quigley offers an in-depth case study of matters of security. In his chapter, Quigley explores the security-related aspects of EU-Asia relations. On the one hand, the author embeds his analysis in the wider institutional and political frameworks of EU-Asia; on the other hand, he offers a detailed critique of a very under-researched area of EU-Asia interaction: the role of the Special Representative as an instrument of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Arguing that there is a significant ‘Asian Branch’ of the CFSP, and that the EU is ‘engaging’ Asia in this way, Quigley traces the structures and processes of decision-making in this area within the EU. Utilising a significant amount of hitherto unavailable information, the author examines, in particular, the roles, functions and activities of the EU Special Repre-

INTRODUCTION

23

sentatives (EUSRs) for Afghanistan and Central Asia. Quigley’s concern with a ‘new era’ in EU-Central Asia relations, and his arguments about Europe’s political, economic and security interests in the Central Asian region, form a link between this chapter, and the chapter by Christopher Williams, elsewhere in this book. Quigley concludes that the functions of the EUSRs are still evolving; they have, nevertheless, in Quigley’s opinion, played a valuable role in engaging key Asian countries outside of the more ‘formal’ and established EU-Asia external relations structures. According to Quigley, the appointments of EUSRs have also been instrumental in publicising and underpinning the work of the EU in their host regions, in resolving EU inter-institutional tensions, and in guiding the relevant EU institutions towards greater co-ordination and credibility as regards EU external relations actions. Staying with EU-Central Asia relations, the first chapter in the section on ‘Issues, Regions and Patterns’ of this book is a contribution by Christopher Williams, concerning the development, contemporary manifestations and challenges of EU interaction with Central Asian countries. Locating the place of EU-Central Asia dialogue in the new world order, Williams interrogates, first, the idea of ‘transition’ in Central Asia, the Soviet legacy and the changing political context within the region. He argues that part of these processes of transition were, in particular, issues of human rights, economic integration and civil wars, and that individual political leaders’ preferences in Central Asian countries have played a vital role in policy selection and implementation, not least towards Europe. Williams’s chapter provides detailed research material for a region which is frequently, and surprisingly, overlooked in studies of the EU-Asia context. The author critically accompanies the political journeys of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the context of the wider US-EU-Russia-Central-Asia geo-political condition. His frame of reference is delineated by issues such as ‘economic development’, ‘democratisation and repression’, ‘relations with the former USSR and Russia’, ‘leadership and personality-cult’ and ‘crime and corruption’. Williams places a particular emphasis on EU policies in Central Asia and on the relations between Central Asia and Russia. He also offers a critique of the development and meanings of the Shanghai Cooperation Association (SCO) as a regional framework for Central Asia,

24

European Studies

arguing that the US and its EU partners cannot afford to become complacent, as the activities of the SCO, especially through Russian and Chinese involvement, represent a potential challenge for US and EU strategies in Central Asia, and the EU is doing ‘too little too late’. William’s chapter should be read in conjunction with the previous chapter by John Quigley, on EU Special Representatives in Asia. On the ‘issues’ side of this section, the following chapter by Georg Wiessala, investigates then role of human rights in EU-Asia relations. Wiessala offers a critique of the ways in which matters of human rights underlie, give shape to, and provide agendas for, the EU’s foreign policy interaction with its dialogue partners across the Asia Pacific. The general theoretical perspective adopted by the author argues for a much stronger consideration of selected social-constructivist perspectives with regard to the development and future of relations between the Asia-Pacific and the EU. In this way Wiessala’s argument places into context the pivotal function of ideas and identities, values and norms, learning, educational exchange and human rights in EU foreign policy towards countries and non-state actors across the Asia Pacific. Through a number of short, country-specific and regional, case studies (covering, amongst others, ASEAN, the ASEM, Burma/Myanmar, China and Indonesia), the author demonstrates that there is both a significant ‘enabling’ and a considerable ‘inhibitory’ potential of human rights and human rights debates in the Union’s relations with Asian interlocutors. He suggests some ways in which this can be translated into concrete policy-prescriptions for the EU and its Asia-Pacific partners. In particular, the analysis sheds light on a number of detailed scenarios for future EU-Asia cooperation over human rights. To this end, this essay proposes and promotes a more inclusive, ‘holistic’, understanding of the significance and the potential of norms, values and the human rights discourse in the framework of future political, economic and cultural East-West contacts. The penultimate chapter in this collection turns, very nearly, fullcircle, returning to Australasia – this time to Australia, instead of New Zealand. Continuing one of this book’s main strands – a critical investigation of perceptions in Europe’s relations with the Asia-Pacific, Philomena Murray examines EU relations with Australia, taking as her point of departure Geoffrey Blainey’s famous 1966 phrase of the ‘tyranny of distance’. Murray’s analysis embraces the long-standing bête-

INTRODUCTION

25

noire of the Australia-EU relations – the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), but also argues that, while conflict marked the EU-Australia relationship for some decades, there is now also evidence that ‘singleissue-approaches’ are changing and that increased opportunities for cooperation are developing. The author explores the inconsistencies and asymmetries, as well as, the various patterns of opportunity and constraint in EU-Australia relations. She argues that Australian lack of attention to the EU has been striking, given the Union’s importance as a major trading partner for Australia and the increasing international role that the EU has carved out for itself. Contextualising relations between the United Kingdom and Australia, Murray expands the scope of her investigation to include such issues as ‘national identity’, ‘engagement’, ‘visibility’ and ‘comprehension-deficits’. She provides a matrix of Australian engagement with key EU Institutions. Her chapter links in with many other contributions to this volume, through her examination of the role of ‘identities’, ‘ideas’ and ‘perceptions’ in EU-Australia relations. The chapters by Anderson, Holland, Chaban and Schneider, Smith and Vichitsorasatra, Petchsiri, Wiessala and Yeo in this book are all concerned with similar strands of enquiry. Murray concludes that Australia is under pressure to further develop the institutional, procedural, educational and diplomatic tools to make the most out of developments in the EU, and to advance its own interests and concerns more fully and fruitfully. The theme of a ‘learning-dimension’ – of shared ideas and joint practices of European relations with the Asia-Pacific – is further addressed and developed in the last chapter of this book, by Georg Wiessala. Wiessala’s second contribution to this volume investigates the place of academic exchange, higher education, human resources and, in a wider sense, cultural interaction, in the Asia-Europe relationship The author’s investigation takes as its point of departure the European Community’s general policies on education, youth and culture and the European Commission’s recent communication on ‘Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Higher Education’. The subsequent survey focuses on the ‘learning dimension’ of EuropeAsia dialogue. It evaluates the Commission’s ‘strategy papers’ on Asia between 1994 and 2003 and the ‘cultural pillar’ of the new process of ‘Asia-Europe Meetings’ (ASEM). The main part of Wiessala’s chapter examines the prominent position educational exchange has assumed,

26

European Studies

and continues to hold, in the relations between the European Union (EU) and Asia. Wiessala scrutinizes underlying assumptions regarding the requirement of a ‘stronger educational dimension’ in the EU-Asia relationship and looks at issues such as ‘cultural presence’, ‘stereotyping’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘values’. Against this background, the chapter proceeds to analyze the work of a number of education-related initiatives and institutions linking the EU and Asia, such as the UK’s University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) or the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). In terms of sector-specific educational collaboration, the chapter considers dedicated ‘European Studies’ programmes in Asia, selected European and Asian networking and funding mechanisms and related projects dedicated to the dissemination of knowledge amongst different cultures. A brief case study of a European Union Study Programme in the Kingdom of Thailand represents a particular emphasis in the chapter. Wiessala finishes by drawing some conclusions on the relevance of education in the Asia-Europe context, and by pointing to a number of future scenarios for EU-Asian Higher Education cooperation. Lateral Perspectives on EU-Asia Relations and the Challenges of the Future The contributors to this book have attempted to provide a searching interrogation of a number of aspects which exemplify the contemporary relations between the European Union and the Asia Pacific. In so doing, we have emphasised key channels of investigation. This is by no means an exhaustive method, rather a tentative first attempt at organising a vast topic. The three categories put forward by this book have encompassed, first, the general theme of how relations have developed; how, in other words, Asia and Europe have, over time, been reflected – and refracted – in the mirrors of mutual perception, and in what way mutual ‘images’ and ‘imagined communities’ continue to be invented, and remade, in the 21st Century, by the media and elsewhere, in the processes of global transformation. Seen in conjunction with theoretical models of international relations, this has thrown into relief the role of the key interests, ideas, institutions and instruments which lend shape to this diverse and complex inter-continental dialogue. The world of EU-Asia contacts – and much more besides – is, in the end, just what we make of it. If

INTRODUCTION

27

this means that this text is seen as an encouragement to start thinking of Asia-Europe in a more social-constructivist, ‘ideational’, mould – then we feel we have succeeded in getting one key message across. Looking further into East-West relations, the contributors to this volume have also focused on the many, inter-linked, layers and levels of EU-Asia interaction and have searched for discernible patterns in this web. The term of ‘constructive engagement’ has been central to the development of an understanding of how the EU chooses to advance its foreign policies in the Asia-Pacific. Engagement, though, must not be seen as an end in itself, it is merely a point of departure. Behind the European Union’s ‘Asia-Strategies’, it may be concluded, the ‘staple-diet’ of EU-Asia relations is still, largely, determined by economics and trade, investment and security, diplomacy and summitry. New areas of concern, however, are shifting the focus and are changing agendas irrevocably. Representation and imagination has been seen, throughout this collection, as two significant, agenda-setting topics. To this can be added: human rights, people-to-people contacts, identitybuilding through inter-regionalism, and, perhaps above all, education and learning. We have, last but not least, looked at some of the issues in the EU-Asia dialogue that could be described as ‘cross-cutting’. These reflect contemporary concerns, but are also instrumental in the re-orienting – and re-orienteering – of relations between Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It seems to us that this synthesis – or a sense of synthesis at the very least – is needed for the future prospering of EU-Asia relations. This requires dialogue partners, who observe issues through more than one single-lens perspective, who make more ‘lateral’ connections and employ ‘joined-up thinking’ to the problems of our day: poverty, human rights violations, the overcoming of geographic and mental distance and many others. If this book is helpful to policy-makers in both Asia and Europe, who are trying to do this – then we have reasons to be a little proud. The final word goes to Thai poet A. Chai Na Pol and his syncretic – and idiosyncratic – book The East – The West – The Universal. This is what the author has to say on the subject of ‘Vision’:

28

European Studies

In the west, People’s visions are short, Envisioning only this life and ignoring new incarnations. They put their effort to make the present best, And live enjoyably. In the east People’s visions are far forward-looking, Envisioning new incarnations, hoping for a better living, Ignoring the present reality of life. They put away their effort and live with illusive hope, In the universal, What the present reality is, so is the future. To manage the present well is to build a good foundation of the bright future, To ignore the present reality is wearing away the future’s success.1

1 Chai Na Pol A. 2006, 150. The West – The East – The Universal. Bangkok: Asia Books.

FOUNDATIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS


ASIA IN THE MAKING OF EUROPE, EUROPE’S HERITAGE IN ASIA AND ASIA AS EUROPE’S OTHER Apirat Petchsiri Abstract This chapter looks at the ways in which Asia and Europe have interacted with, perceived and influenced one another in the past. It focuses on earlier eras of globalisation, on inter-civilisational processes of learning and on Asian responses to the import and diffusion of Western cultural and legal norms. Embracing the concept of the ‘ancient superpowers’ of Asia, what follows examines in some detail how Asia – and the powerful idea of ‘Asia’ – have been instrumental in the ‘making’ of Europe and how this has continued to shape European understandings and misunderstandings of the ‘East’. The section argues that cultural and legal diffusion constitute phenomena which have their roots firmly in the past, but which continue to shape many aspects of contemporary relations of the EU with the Asia-Pacific. The chapter emphasises, in particular, the issue of ‘legalism’ in the relations between East and West. It also sheds some light on recent and ongoing mechanisms aiming at further regional integration in Asia and Europe. Historical Memories of Eurasia: Centuries of Cultural Diffusion As Europe ‘discovered’ Asia, during the era of Alexander (‘the Great’), Asia also got to know Europe, although this occurred centuries later, from the time of the Han Dynasty of China and the Mongol Khans onwards. During these ancient relationships, the ‘discoverers’ and the ‘discovered’ mostly enjoyed the benefits of discovery. Exchanges among civilizations improved and nurtured cultures and encouraged

32

Apirat Petchsiri

the knowledge transfer among nations. Land and sea trade routes were established to bring people of different backgrounds together to exchange goods and novelties. It was, one might say, the Golden Era of Eurasia. Superpowers of the Past It is not an exaggeration - though perhaps a bit arrogant - to say that the ‘Superpowers’ of ancient times were from Eurasia. The truth is Eurasia, a term given to the combined landmass of Europe and Asia, forms the largest single land area of the earth: 54,745,000 sq km (21,137,400 sq mi). Historians seem to agree that in every era there are superpowers that exert influence in world military, economic, political, and cultural affairs and, in the past, most of them were Eurasians (Lockard 2005).1 Among the ancient nations of Eurasia there were a few countries which could accurately be labelled as superpowers. These superpowers came from all directions of the continent. The ancient Persian Empire, Greece’s Macedonia, glorious Rome, the Maurya of India, and the Han of China were those that dominated, respectively, the western, southern, and eastern regions of Eurasia. Successively, the Arabs, Mongols, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch achieved powerful positions in a premodern world, followed by the British and the French in the 18th and 19th centuries.2 Historically speaking, the eastern empires of Eurasia – or Asia – were imperialistic and as commercialised as their western counterparts in Europe in later periods. Cultural diffusion in the remote past, in a manner similar to that of later periods, occurred through imperial and commercial mechanisms. The difference was that it was reciprocal. Perhaps the best words to describe the past activities of these superpowers are ‘discovery and exchange.’ It is possible to label (very loosely) the period from 300 to 1000 AD as the period of the discoverers, since it was a time of intensive exchange and interaction across Eurasia. Several civilizations stand out as major influences. Some world historians view the years from about 600 to 1 Craig Lockard, e.g., points out that China’s status as a superpower began in the middle of the first millennium AD. 2 In the last half of the 20th century the dominant nations were the United States and the former USSR.

ASIA IN THE MAKING OF EUROPE

33

1500 as the Chinese Millennium, with China as the largest, strongest, and most populous civilisation in Eurasia. Of course, other major influential powers in existence during the period were Gupta India, Byzantium, and the Islamic states of the Middle East. It was the famous Silk Road (Rossabi 2005)3 that led historians to agree that the Romans and the Chinese were among those responsible for its construction during the second century. Thus, it was then that true discovery and exchange originated. The cultures of Far Eastern Eurasia and the Mediterranean thereby diffused. It was the Han Dynasty that had the first contact with the Romans, but not much diffusion was noticed during the period. China’s success began under the great Tang dynasty (618-907), which is regarded by many historians as the most glorious period of Chinese history. It was during this time that discovery and exchange intensified. During Tang rule, China had its greatest influence on eastern Asia and, at the same time, carried out active trade with peoples across Eurasia. For more than 100 years, the Tang Empire stretched deep into Central Asia, and various aspects of Chinese culture spread eastward to Korea and Japan as well. Eurasia and the Beginning of Inter-continental Cultural Diffusion During the 8th and 9th centuries, Tang China was ‘the greatest of all of the large and small empires stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific.’ Chinese culture and products travelled as far as the limits of the Tang dominion. The political impact of the Tang dynasty was also extended beyond the Chinese border. The Dynasty is said to have built an empire comparable in size to that of the great Han dynasty half a millennium earlier. The Tang brought Asia, Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, and parts of Siberia under Chinese domination. In the area of 3 Rossabi (Rossabi 2005) gives credit to both Asians and Europeans for the long existence of the famous route as follows: ‘Existence of the Silk Road is due mainly to the success of political developments of the road’s guardians. Caravans were vulnerable to wars, thieves, and other forms of economic and political turmoil. As interest in trade was rising during the 2nd and 1st centuries BC, China’s Han dynasty and the empire of Parthia in Persia were the first guardians who ensured the road for its optimal conditions for commerce. At the same time, the Roman Republic (and later the Roman Empire) was flourishing. The Romans controlled parts of western Eurasia and thus provided a large market for luxury products, such as silk. As a result, both the Han and Roman emperors built roads within their own domains to facilitate caravan travel. See: Elisseeff (1998).

34

Apirat Petchsiri

commerce, the wealth and economic power of Tang China was so immense that it stirred commerce throughout much of Eurasia. As a result of the economic success during the rule of the Tang dynasty, China was not only open to the world, but was the defender of free trade in the ancient times. In this regard, there is evidence which indicates that Tang military garrisons protected the Silk Road trade routes of Central Asia, encouraging the flow of goods, ideas, and people between China and Western Eurasia. East Asian goods, such as silk and porcelain, reached Europe from the 8th century onwards. Tang porcelain has been found in Egypt (part of the Roman Empire) and Turkey (the Byzantium of Justinian). Sea trade also flourished, as sea routes4 linked China with India, Persia, and various Southeast Asian countries. During Tang rule, merchants from all over Asia formed temporary or permanent communities in several Chinese cities. These were ancient traders who were familiar with the people from the West. We may not know the extent to which the people from the different limits of the same continent interacted, but we know that they learnt from each other. Another period when visitors from the east made an impact on the continent is during the 13th and 14th centuries. The great Mongol Khans had some bearing on all of the major Eurasian civilizations during this period, in both negative and positive respects, their domination severely disrupting some, while revitalizing and ‘globalizing’ others. Craig Lockhard, the Ben and Joyce Rosenberg Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Greenbay, contends that the first globalised undertaking was the work of Asians: Some historians consider the Mongols the great equalizers of history because during their rule, they permitted the transfer of technology from the more developed East Asia to the more backward Western Europe. They did this by reopening and protecting the Silk Road, however briefly. During the Mongol era, Chinese inventions such as gunpowder, printing, the blast furnace, silk machinery, paper money, and playing cards found their way to Europe, as did many medical discoveries and such domesticated fruits as the orange and lemon. The Mongols paved the way for greater global com4 This sea route is not the same as the European ocean route of the 15th century, which undermined the land route of the same period. For the history of the Tang Dynasty see: Benn, C. 2002: China's Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty.


35

munication, opening China's doors to the world. One Chinese monk, a Nestorian Christian, became the first eastern Asian visitor to Rome, England, and France. In addition, some Chinese people settled in Persia, Iraq, and Russia. This movement was possible because travel from one end of Eurasia to the other was easier than ever before. (Lockart 2005)

Genghis Khan, for example, is said to have invented a communications system which relied on a series of postal relay stations that stretched across his vast empire, called yam. Along this route, important news and intelligence rapidly reached the king himself. The system can be described as a form of mounted courier service which included rest stations, fresh horses and fresh riders at regular intervals along the main travel routes. The system of yam was utilized for diplomacy and trade enhancement as well. All ambassadors and envoys to the Khan were allowed use of the yam stations for food, lodging and mounts while travelling to and from the Khan on official business. The yam system not only facilitated the rapid dissemination of news throughout the large empire, but also encouraged travel and trade across the vast territory controlled by the Mongols. Advancement was evident in the area of legal and judicial affairs. Genghis Khan also embarked on the task of codification. The revered king collected existing Mongol law and modified or supplemented it with his own decrees. Genghis’ code was called the Great Yasa, which was a comprehensive code that dealt with not only prohibited behaviour and punishment, but also rules of procedure, jurisdictional limits, and ownership rights. The Great Yasa remained the basis of Mongol rule of law and public order long after Genghis’ death. Consequently, the relations between the Mongols and others were assured by law as well. It has often been claimed that during ‘the great Mongol Peace,’ the long period of extensive interaction between the four major coastal civilizations, the Mongols changed permanently the nature and vitality of Eurasian civilizations. Of course the Romans’ Corpus Iuris is the best known legal achievement of the western hemisphere. Yet the contribution of Mongol nomads to civilization cannot be denied. If the 12th-13th centuries were the period of the great Mongol influence, the 14th-16th centuries were the period of Asians’ internal exchanges of cultures. Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam spread from their respective birth places to other parts of the continent. Between the 8th and 15th centuries, it was predominantly Islam which ventured

36

Apirat Petchsiri

out of its Arabian heartland in the Middle East to become the dominant religion in many parts of Africa, Asia, and in Iberia. Muslim groups emerged in such different and geographically distant locations as China and the Balkans. Its influence was felt from the north of Africa to the islands of Indonesia. The Reception of European Civilisation in Asia: Europe’s Heritage By the end of the 1400s, the reputation of the Asians’ natural treasures and luxuries were made known to European traders. Cities such as Melaka, Canton, Calicut, and Hormuz were recognized on the maritime trading map. The Portuguese were the first to make their way to India in 1498, and Melaka in 1509. The activities marked a new era of cultural diffusion in history.5 Cultural diffusion in this period was the result of the earlier forms of colonial expansion. Since the 16th century, cultural diffusion in Eurasia had been asymmetrical. The flow of Western culture to the East continued ceaselessly. European ideas of civilisation were brought into Asia through different channels and epochs, with different necessities. It was the Europeans who began to feel perturbed by the early discoveries. The Asian perception of European civilization in these early times was mixed but not antagonistic – describable as puzzling at worse and amusing at best – but these views were changed during the 19th-20th centuries. Europeans also had different views toward the livelihood of Asians: confusing, perhaps, but not amusing. There were many instances where European tolerance ran low during the next centuries of Asia-Europe relations. The Europeans’ outlook had been changed much more radically after they went through the period of Enlightenment and rebirth (Renaissance), as well as political revolutions and economic reformations. Eastern cultures were viewed through the Europeans’ eyes as archaic and unrefined, and thereby unimpressive to modern man. 5

cf: Lockard, on the Europeans’ approach: ‘Indeed, the Portuguese seized Melaka in 1511. Despite Portugal’s superiority in ships and weaponry, its standard of living was probably inferior to that of people in the more developed societies of Asia. This no doubt contributed to the tendency of Europeans to use armed force to obtain their commercial and political goals. This tendency ensured that the globalization of the world over the next five centuries would be under the auspices of Western Christians rather than the Muslims, Indians, and Chinese who established the basic framework between 1000 and 1500.’ (Lockard 2005)


37

Historical accounts of the development of friction between Chinese and Westerners between the 18th and 19th century given by Burn et al. demonstrate the point well: As the volume of Western trade increased [in China], however, friction was bound to arise. Two fundamentally different civilizations were coming into contact with each other. There were wide gaps between the Western and the Chinese concepts of justice and legal procedure. Westerners regard as barbarous the Chinese view of group, rather than individual, responsibility for misbehavior and the use of torture in obtaining confessions. Consequently, misunderstanding occurred over the apprehension and punishment of criminals. Perhaps even more serious was the fact that the character of the trade began to change in a direction that was disadvantageous to China. In early days Chinese exports – tea, silk and cotton cloth in lesser quantities – far exceeded the value of imports into China; and the difference was made up in silver payments to Chinese merchants. Western traders would have preferred to make the exchange in goods, but they had difficulty in discovering any appreciable Chinese demand for the commodities which they could supply. (Burns et al 1987, 1176)

Often quoted is Ch’ien Lung’s (Emperor of the Ming Dynasty) retort to Western trading behaviour as follows: The Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own products 6 (from Fitzgerald 1961, 557-559).

The Ming Emperor probably made a mistake in concentrating his attention on imported manufactured goods as it was not material produce which was later brought into China. The Quing Dynasty which succeeded the Ming was forced to accept an unequal treaty,7 which is known as the Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking). The first Western legal instrument was prepared by the British to be signed and put to the Chinese. It was so imbalanced that the Chinese refused to comply 6

Quote also found in Burn et al.1987, Vol. 2, 1176. The treaty is unequal because it more than fulfilled England’s goals on monopolizing opium trade in China. Through this treaty, the Co-hong (a small Chinese merchant guild in Guangzhou authorized to control all foreign trade with China) was abolished, more Chinese ports were opened to trade (Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai, and Xiamen), and the island of Hong Kong was ceded to the British. Treaty of Tien-Tsin, Peace Treaty between the Queen of Great Britain and the Emperor of China. Signed at Tien-tsin, China, June 26, 1858. 7

38

Apirat Petchsiri

with the terms (only to be forced into the even more unequal Tianjin Treaty in 1860). The Chinese were said to agree to negotiate, and signed the treaty at gunpoint on August 29, 1842. It was also the beginning of the horrific reputation of Western-induced negotiations. Early modern colonialism brought in many of the new types of cultural diffusion from Europe. Using the 15th century8 as the beginning, Western Europe, led by Spain and Portugal, expanded their influence in the East Indies and the Americas. Later on, Britain spearheaded the European expansion into Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to make their way around the southern tip of Africa, and towards South and East Asia, during that time. They brought with them the desire to monopolize the Spice Trade, and built coastal trading posts and fortresses instead of setting up settlement colonies. By the late 16th century, through force and might, European nations clung to their national interests as the Dutch established themselves at the Cape of Good Hope and eventually drove out the Portuguese. Peace in Eurasia lasted only for so long. With the advent of the colonial powers, the rules of cultural diffusion changed almost entirely. The Western Hemisphere had gradually monopolised developments. It was the first encounter of the pre-modern form of European domination. Commerce, colonial expansion, and imperialism were among the first lessons taught or learned that directly were affiliated with the word ‘Europe.’ European influence in Asia could not help being mingled with European evangelism, domination, and exploitation of natural resources. Since the 15th century, the diffusion of European civilization had grown to such a magnitude that it inhibited any diffusion in the opposite direction. Trade and missionary influences, colonialism, and the imperialism of free trade, World Wars, and the Cold War were associated much more intensively with European culture. The intensity of the past two hundred years of Western cultural diffusion produced an enormous impact upon every aspect of the Eastern Eurasian region. It all began in 1800, when the Dutch took control of Java and Ceylon. The English brought new ideas of com8

Modern European Colonialism dates from the 15th century and can be divided into two overlapping phases: the first from 1415 to about 1800; the second from about 1800 to World War II.


39

merce, by the time the East India Company was established in India, and not so long afterwards, a commercial enterprise, for the first time in history, formally began the conquest of mainland India in 1757. Here was, in the shape of the East India Company, the first incorporated enterprise and capitalist venture known to Asians. By 1914, many European nations, led by the British Empire which was by far the largest and most diverse colonial power, but also by France, Belgium, Germany and Portugal, constituted significant colonial powers, contributing to the diffusion of European culture into Asia. Regrettably, cultural diffusion through colonialism was equated, with very convincing reasons, with imperialism, as in this period many competing states established political control over territories in South and Southeast Asia, and in other parts of the world. Imperial systems were organised according to the doctrine of mercantilism: each imperial state attempted to control the trade of its colonies in order to monopolize the benefits of that trade. Imperialism brought in imperial laws, politics and economics. Colonies adopted them to the extent that the imperial rulers’ interests remained intact. As the majority of the imperial nations were European, it is not an overstatement to say that colonialism, imperialism and European cultural diffusion in Asia are related. European Cultural Diffusion in Asia Early forms of European imperialism were seen as a threat to Asian sovereignty. Also, the imperial laws, politics and economics that were imposed eradicated Asian forms of government and their control of the local economy. Yet, there were ways chosen by Asians in order to elude direct western influence.9 Voluntary concession to western culture, in order to maintain a decent level of sovereignty, was among those paths taken by states in the Near East as well as the Far East. The concession of certain portions of state sovereign power to Western imperial powers occurred in Turkey, Siam (present-day Thailand), China, and Japan, in exchange for independence and advancement (European style). 9 Religious expansion and missionary work also brought with them European civilization. Territories were subjected to missionary influences and many local religions were restrained and sometimes abolished. See, Walls, Andrew F. 1996. The Missionary Movement in Christian History: Studies in Transmission of Faith.

40

Apirat Petchsiri

Japan and Siam were cases in point. These two independent states embarked on the experimental adaptation of European science to the local community. European experts in various fields were employed to give advice to the local government. Reform of the political, legal and economic systems in accordance with European civilization was the major goal. It was relevant to the situation, as Japan and Siam were spared from being colonized. Yet, the imperialists seemed to pursue their objective of the systematic plundering of Asia’s valuable resources with ceaseless demands for concessions. Elsewhere, in China and Turkey, changes of local governments were also popular choices at the time. Moreover, in the mid -19th century, together with political diffusion, another variant of imperialism appeared – the imperialism of free trade. The practice was also European, especially that of the British, whose power and influence were extended informally, mainly through superior diplomatic and economic means, rather than formally, through direct colonial rule. The imperialism of free trade, however, gave way by the end of the 19th century to imperialism in the form of overseas territorial annexation. European powers were once again expanding into Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Everywhere in Asia, the imprint of European legal and political influence was found. European Politico-legal Diffusion Together with cultural phenomena, the legal systems and the rule of law of the West diffused into Asia during the 19th century more directly than at other periods of time. Asians have long been amazed by the advancement of Europeans in the area of democratic government. Many view the European social order through the method of comparative analysis among civilized societies. Comparative studies of the European social structure and its development with other societies were trusted to bring solutions to various Asian social problems. Asians hoped to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the societal aspects of European advancement. Mechanisms for social order, such as the legal process and its institutions, were one of the Europeans’ oldest forms of influence which were adopted – voluntarily or otherwise – by Asian nations. The European legal process, as one of the necessary corollaries to civil society, has, since colonial times, been an interest of Asian rulers.


41

To revert back in time just for the sake of clarification, the introduction of European laws to the traditional ethics of Asian countries began at a much earlier time, with the introduction of Christianity to the East in the 16th century when the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines. The Indonesian islanders began their encounter with British law during the nineteenth-century and later on were left with the legal system of the Netherlands. During the same period, the then Straits Settlement – today Malaysia and Singapore – together with Brunei (part of the Former British Protectorate of Borneo States) was ruled by the Common Law of England. So was Burma, which was annexed to British India, while Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were under French legal codes and the continental justice process. Turkey, Japan, and Thailand (formerly Siam), adopted a series of European legal codes voluntarily during the beginning of the twentieth-century. Of course, numerous reasons were used as justifications to adopt or impose these new legal orders for Asians. Notable explanations could be found, for instance, in the idea of ‘Christian Justice’, as expounded by missionaries of the Christian faith. Many legislators in Asian countries were led, either by Western advisors or by their own Western trained nationals, to accept the notion that the influence of Roman Law on European national legal systems was ‘omnipresent’, and that the success of their Western counterparts depended, to a certain degree, upon the assimilation of Roman legal principles. Hidden from them was the fact that Christianity was also the most crucial mould of European legal culture during the Dark and Middle Ages (5-12th century) through the ecclesiastical invention of Canonical Law. Therefore, the rule of law taken from the Europeans has more than a Western jurisprudential meaning, but Western morality as well.10 It was the diffusion of Roman law and 10 Note on differences among the legal systems of Europe: In the past, at least before the introduction of uniform laws in present day Europe, there were differences among the patterns of legal development. One clear distinction can be found in the differences between the British Common Law system and the Continental Civil Law tradition. In fact, there are many more sub-categories of legal systems on the Continent. Clearly, fundamental differences among these systems lie in the different levels of Roman legal influence, the way the systems developed their legal training, etc., and this may add to the diversity of European legal systems. Just for illustration, one difference between the French and German legal ideologies took the form of different ideas on the separation of church and the state. Differences in religious denominations contributed greatly to the development of the constitu-

42

Apirat Petchsiri

Christianity, together with European values and the Europeans’ rule of law. European ‘Legalistic Influence’ The legalistic nature of European Civilisation is not new to Asia. It was felt in the East in the 16th century. In the Ottoman Empire (present-day Turkey), the French had concluded a treaty of capitulation with the Empire in 1535.11 In the beginning, the objectives of the instrument were to promote trade between the two great nations. It was later on to be exploited, through the rise of European colonialism and capitalism. It cannot be denied that European Colonial legalistic regimes diffused into Asia originally as tools to rule, convert, and exploit Asian politico-economical and social structures. From Turkey to China, the European powers protected their colonial interests, by directly imposing their own systems of law, and by establishing a regime called capitulation or extraterritoriality in non-colonized countries. Eric Hooglund describes the case of Turkey: The newly industrialized European states preferred to keep the Ottoman Empire as a source of cheap raw materials and a market for their manufactured goods. Using the Capitulations – treaties by which, since the 16th century, the sultans had allowed Europeans to live and work in the empire according to their own laws and under their own consuls – the Europeans were able to prevent the Ottomans from restricting foreign imports and thus kept them from protecting their own nascent industries. Because the Ottomans depended largely on foreign industrialists for capital and knowhow, the Europeans could also undermine and destroy what industrial efforts were made (Hooglund 2005).

tional philosophy of various European nations on the continent. Lutheran ideology, for example, is different from Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic ideologies. After the emergence of the Protestant movement in the 16th century, many common features of European law seemed to disappear. Take Latin, for example. Formerly, European lawyers were able to communicate with each other through the common language of Latin. When the language ceased to be popular, many common features of the law also vanished in time. Furthermore, after the turn of the century, because of the rise of nationalism, lawyers in continental Europe faced difficulties in communicating with one another, as national languages gained popularity. Also important is the influence of many European wars, which drove the legal systems even further apart. 11 Treaty of 1535 between Sultan Soliman II and Francis I. See Brown 1914: 33.


43

Despite the repugnant character of earlier legal diffusion, European legal ideologies (or formats) seemed to be favoured by Asians in later times. Naturally, the approaches pertaining to subsequent legal diffusion varied. They can be divided into two major categories: direct and indirect diffusion. The first category involved the complete annexation of Asian territories as colonial possessions, settlements, pays de souveraigneté, or pays de protectorat,12 whose legal systems were determined by the colonial powers. The second category involved claims of extraterritorial and capitulatory rights, by virtue of which the colonial powers applied their own laws in independent countries, in accordance with treaty agreements. These two types of legal diffusion differed only in the extent to which European laws were operative in Asian territories. Their purposes were similar everywhere. I t is also possible to recognize two types of legal diffusion according to the extent to which European laws were applied to Asians – diffusion of value and diffusion of form. David and Brierley (David and Brierley 1978) have pointed out that two major differences can be observed between the practice of the British and that of the French, Spanish, and Portuguese. The British in Asia, particularly in the Indian Subcontinent and in other areas, were said to believe in indirect rule; they usually did not make much of an attempt to incorporate their own ideas of law in the territories they established. To a certain extent, the British provided for the continuation of self-rule according to local customs, but under British supervision. This was the case in India where the British attempted to apply their own concepts of Hindu law to the natives, without much success however. The French and Latin countries were said to believe in the total imposition of their own laws on the colonies. According to this view, the extent of European legal diffusion varies according to the will of the countries of origin. Intensity in the case of indirect diffusion was less prevalent than in instances of direct diffusion. The degree of form may have varied, but the degree of value may not have differed much. 12

These terms were employed by the colonial powers for purposes of colonial administration. The autonomy of the local governments varied. (See generally Hooker 1978). There is no consensus regarding the explanation of why complete annexation did not occur in particular instances. One possible explanation is that in such instances the colonial powers were satisfied with the local situation and realized that a certain degree of political, economic, and social advantage would result from maintaining it.

44

Apirat Petchsiri

In some places, the intensity of both value and form was stronger than in others. For intensity in the case of direct diffusion of European law, the Philippines, which was colonized by Spain in 1521, illustrates this point well: Spanish law, which included medieval Spanish law, Roman and Teutonic laws, was imposed following the conquest. When the movement for the scientific codification of the laws of Spain was completed, most of the codes and special laws promulgated in Spain during the period from 1810 to 1820 were then extended to the Philippines (and, needless to say, the present-day majority of the Filipinos are Catholics). In India, even though the attempt to change the indigenous Mohammedans’ criminal law operating there during the eighteenth century occurred gradually (Bannerjee1963, 68),13 in the end, the English-style codes were promulgated. Thus, the concept of one legal system for the former Maharaja states sounded more familiar to Europeans than to Indians. British legal influence was prevalent in the Straits Settlements, the Federated and un-Federated Malay states, British Borneo, and Burma. Similar European practices can be found in the late nineteenth century. The French legal system was imposed on the people in the French colonies of that time. For example, in French colonies such as Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, French law was imposed with some minor amendments. Even though the French Napoleonic format was stronger here, European values were not so prevalent during the French occupation. Legalism of Relations Indirect diffusion started with the legalistic regimes described earlier as ‘capitulation’ or ‘extra territoriality’. Most of the regimes applied to Asia originated in the form of international instruments – treaties of various natures.14 When the arrangement with the West used legal 13 It began in 1772 when Warren Hastings, the British administrator, decided to interfere with the indigenous criminal law. 14 Treaty Ports are one example of earlier treaties which opened Asian cities to foreign trade and residence. Signing of the treaties of this type began in the mid1800s. In treaty ports, foreigners controlled the tariffs on all international trade and had the right to be governed exclusively by their own laws, a system known as extraterritoriality. These treaties forced Asian countries to relinquish part of their national sovereignty and they became known as ‘unequal treaties’. The first treaty ports were established in China by Britain, after the British defeated the Qing government in the first of the Opium Wars (1839-1842). In China, which had more


45

instruments, Eastern countries usually assumed a disadvantaged position. The Siamese King, for example, signed one of the earlier treaties with a Dutch company on 22 August 1664, in which considerable commercial, diplomatic and extraterritorial privileges were guaranteed to the Dutch, in order to prevent reprisals resulting from earlier conflicts between Siamese and Dutch subjects. Japan in the Edo era was also forced to sign treaties that opened trading ports and granted special privileges to the United States and other European powers in the 19th century. By the end of the 1850s, Japan had been coerced into full diplomatic and commercial relations with the West, mainly through these types of legal instruments. Signing these treaties was always a problem for Asians. For example, Noda, the famous Japanese legal scholar, viewed the case of Japan as ‘ignorance of international law.’(Noda 1976) To quote him: These treaties, concluded as they were on the basis of an inequality of bargaining power, could not but hurt the pride of Japanese people, and the Meiji government … was obliged to try to do away with them (Noda 1976,42).

In Siam, after the King of Ayutthaya signed the treaty with a Dutch company, he complained that the terms of the treaty, in which the company had obtained diplomatic immunity and the prerogatives of extraterritoriality, had caused him to ‘lose face.’(Van der Cruysse 2002, 71) The notorious character of legalism prevailed long after the end of the Colonial era. Diffusion during the Period of the World Wars and the Aftermath Indirect diffusion gained more ground during the 20th century when the legalistic approach, despite its historical reputation, was considered as a shortcut to development and progress. Asia followed the pattern of European nationalism in the 20th century. As colonialism does not treaty ports than other Asian countries, ‘there were 16 treaty ports opened by 1860, including Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou (Canton), and more than 50 by the early 1900s’. Ruth Rogaski explains further: ‘While some treaty ports became vital centers of commerce and industry, Asian nationalists considered them symbols of foreign imperialism. Japan ended the system of treaty ports in 1899. In China, the system of treaty ports came to an end during World War II (1939-1945).’ See Rogaski 2005. For early 20th century Treaties see also Axelrod and Phillips 2001, and Grenville 2001.

46

Apirat Petchsiri

end easily, it took two World Wars to emancipate most of the European colonies. Since the end of World War II, when most of the formal empires were dissolved, what might be called modern economic imperialism has come to predominate. Control was now exercised informally and less overtly. The economic divide became obvious and the affluent Western world (Western Europe and the USA), exerted considerable influence over certain poorer Third World nations, as a result of their national economic power and their dominance of certain international financial organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Similarly, European powers continued to affect significantly the politics and the economies of their former colonies.15 Post-1945 was also the period when the world witnessed the struggle between the United States and its European allies, and the group of nations led by the Soviet Union. Even though direct military conflict did not occur between the two super powers, intense economic and diplomatic struggles erupted. Suspicion and hostility between the two sides stemmed from different interests and from the conflict of ideologies. In 1985, Soviet and American leaders agreed to cut back their presence in Europe and to moderate ideological competition. The Cold War ended in Europe, as the newly freed East European nations elected non-Communist governments and the two German States (FRG and GDR) united in 1989/90. The arms race was cut back, and ideological competition decreased as communism was discredited. Again, the Cold War was partially to blame for the division of Europe into East and West. Many countries in Asia were divided into similar factions as well. Eastern as well as Western Europe was not slow in taking up allies in Asia. The political and legal cultures inspired by liberalism and Marxism were also adopted by Asians. For the case of the liberalist countries of Asia, it seemed that a market economy system was a better choice than the systems adopted by Marxist countries, which favoured planned economies controlled by the state. Putting ideological differences aside, it was the diffusion of European politico-economic and legal theories, but with different drivers.

15

Neocolonialism is usually defined as the exercise of effective sovereignty without the formality of colonial rule. Theorists have accused Western nations of the act of neocolonialism during the last half of the 20th century.


47

However, Europeanised Asian legal systems do not make Asia Europe’s ‘followers’. Instead, they support the idea that Asia is ‘Europe’s Other,’ as European laws directly imposed upon Asian countries resulted in the transformation of local legal systems into new legal ‘hybrids’. More often than not, they were discriminatory, exploitative, and confusing to the local people. At one point they served the interest of colonial powers and at another point served to benefit the ruling classes. In summary, the European legal systems were thought of only as tools – politically, economically and socially. This is contrary to the accepted legal norms of Europe where legal systems are thought of as safeguards which guarantee citizens’ basic rights. Asians were not familiar with the term ‘rights’ in the European context. In the reality of the Asian legal realm, European legal civilisation is commonly regarded as a form which can be adapted to suit local Asian thought. Western values do not seem to have a strong hold in Asia when compared to its glamorous outward appearance. M.B. Hooker, the noted Asian legal historian, once pointed out that, when the British tried to introduce a gradual change of local legal concepts in their Asian colonies, there were processes leading to an accommodation between English legal principles and indigenous laws, ‘resulting in the latter being absorbed within the English legal system by way of both statute and case law’ (Hooker1978). When the English left, statutes and case law remained, but there is doubt about the English legal principles. Diffusion at the End of the 20th Century Overlapping with the period of the Cold War was the European integration period when the Single Market of Europe was successfully created. By the time European integration started, it was not of much significance to the lives of Asians. Asians were busy recovering from the Second World War. Many former colonies were occupied with the task of collecting what was left for them as the colonial powers had departed. News of integration spawned interest only after it became clear from the late 1990s onwards that the Union was about to become a truly enormous collection of European states. (Twelve more countries are now part of the EU. They are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.) As European integration gained popularity,

48

Apirat Petchsiri

interest in European matters outside Europe shifted to emphasis on the process of integration of Europe and its repercussions on the economies, laws and politics of other regions. The voices of influential Asians are often heard advocating Asian regional integration in a form that would be similar to that of the European Union. The most Recent Diffusion of European Culture in Asia It is frequently pointed out that the countries of Asia, particularly those of ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (‘ASEAN+3’), are looking for the best model of integration for themselves. In reality, most integration processes outside of Europe are still in their infancy. ASEAN, for example, is now undergoing the process of trade liberalization among members. It will take a while longer to complete the undertaking. Individual Asian countries seem to maintain their own interpretation of the term ‘Free Trade.’ Amidst differences, recent developments indicate that ASEAN has agreed to undergo a path of integration along European lines, with the European approach to integration appearing as the popular choice. As the EU has often been referred to as an ‘economic giant’, Asian leaders find that its success is phenomenal. Equally interesting is the fact that the EU is highly regarded and very active in the world economy, in terms of global trade and commerce. Asian leaders view the EU as a major world economic player, similar to the USA, Japan, and newly emerging economies such as China. Asian leaders also observe that European-style regionalism may be used as a model to nurture some form of Asian economic integration. Once again, the diffusion of culture is taking place in Eurasia. This time it is the culture of integration. It will not be easy to identify precisely what the definition of European integration is. Equally difficult is the question of whether the process of ‘integration’ qualifies for being treated as a ‘culture’. If one were to treat European national law and political systems as ‘culture’, one should have no problem in doing the same with EU institutions and legal systems. The diffusion of the EU model of integration in Asia began in 1991 when 15 European nations signed the Treaty on European Union (often called the Maastricht Treaty), which founded the EU. This is the legal framework for the expansion of political, economic, and social


49

integration among the member states.16 Since its inception the European integration process has generated some interesting legal concepts. One of the most appealing, if unfamiliar, areas of jurisprudence to non-EU legislators or judges is the principle of Acquis. According to the Acquis principle, differences among national legal systems will be eliminated. The direction of supra-nationality in the jurisprudence of the EC Court seems to fulfil the objectives of homogeneity and to ensure that individuals and economic entities across the EU receive equal treatment for their business undertakings, and that these are on an equal footing with regard to such things as competition. Scholars agree that supra-nationality was created by the type of international agreement which was an international treaty sui generis. In practical reality, European integration is a very legalistic undertaking. It is a culture of laws and regulations, values and ideologies, and not a mere form. A myriad of legal instruments were created as ways and means of achieving the integration goals. These legal instruments are very complex and technical. Above all, they are statements of European values. Asians are not legalistic and their memories of treaty negotiations since the colonial times are still unbroken. Western legalistic ideas, and perhaps values, are still too foreign to Asians, and the approach to integration using similar legal means should be adopted in Asia with caution. In recent years, words of caution have seemed futile. For example, when the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and the Trade Commissioner of the European Union met in Ha Long, Viet Nam on 27 April 2005 for the 6th AEM-EU Consultation, Mr. Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, asserted his view on some of the successful developments in EU integration, including steps taken to build on the current EU Single Market. His view is reinforced by the EU’s official view on the promotion of the EU model for ASEAN. The office of the Commissioner on External Relations of the EU said on its website: It is clear that the enlarged EU is more than ever a reference-model for Southeast Asia in their desire for prosperity and stability within Asia. The EU's ‘New Partnership with South East Asia’ strategy was again confirmed as being at the origin of enhanced relations. The Meeting [the 15th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta, Indonesia on 10 March 16 After lengthy negotiations, it was accepted by the European Council at Maastricht, The Netherlands, in December 1991.

50

Apirat Petchsiri 2005] acknowledged its concrete results; increased support for ASEAN integration by making available EU's proper experience, start of negotiations with Singapore and Thailand on bilateral agreements, concrete joint co-operation in the fight against terrorism, substantial progress under the TREATI (trade) initiative, launch of tri-lateral co-operation, a joint EUASEAN visibility strategy, etc (Commission of the European Communities 2007).

ASEAN leaders seem to be convinced, now more than before, that the EU model of integration is among the ‘best of its kind’. ASEAN used to be proud of its achievements in the past and thought that the EU model might not be the right answer to the needs of Asian countries. Towards the end of the 20th century, when the EU was aiming for a single currency and monetary union, ASEAN had been taking a less ambitious path toward regional integration and seemed to be satisfied with the model they were taking. ASEAN has always refrained from merely ‘imitating’ the EU model of a legalistic approach, involving formal, regional, institutions and the sacrificing of national sovereignty. A correspondent for the International Herald Tribune observed: When leaders of the 10 countries of Southeast Asia met for the first time in December 1995, Goh Chok Tong, Singapore's prime minister, noted that although rapid progress was being made toward a ‘common house of Europe’, the extended family home of Asia may be 50 years or even 100 years away. Officials say that when ASEAN was formed nearly 30 years ago, it set itself different goals to those being set then in the EU. ASEAN is not aiming for supranational government. Instead it wants to strengthen political cooperation among its members so that trade, investment and economic growth can occur in a favorable climate – one that is peaceful and predictable. To that end, officials and ministers of the group meet regularly – at last count, about 240 such meetings a year – to chart practical collaboration. So far, the results of this limited integration approach have been impressive.(Richardson 1997)

ASEAN is a good example of Asians’ cautious move toward the legalistic model of integration. Asian scholars and diplomats seem to agree on the differences between EU and Asian integrations in the past. It was always the ‘Asian Way’ of doing things which kept ASEAN alive for so many years. Ambassador Lim Chin Beng, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to Japan during 1997, gave a special lecture at a


51

UNU Public Forum on 8 May 1997 at the United Nations University, Tokyo. He stated: Firstly, ASEAN’s success owes much to the political will and vision of its leaders. Realizing that they had to meet the regional challenges in the crucial years of the 1960s, they decided to work together despite their differences. More importantly, their cooperation was not merely an immediate response to short-term challenges, it was also motivated by a vision of a united and strong South-East Asia. Secondly, as a regional organization, ASEAN is nimble in response to the changing international and regional political reality but not blind to its long-term aim. Reconciliation with Viet Nam took place almost immediately after almost 15 years of confrontation. ASEAN's active participation in APEC, its initiation of the ARF and ASEM are examples of its timely response to globalization and intraregional cooperation. And thirdly, the golden rule of mutual respect in the conduct of international affairs has been strictly observed by members of ASEAN. Territorial disputes continue to exist among ASEAN members but they never dominate ASEAN's agenda. Realizing the inherent diversity among the members, every member state has learned to respect each other’s political system and domestic affairs and appreciate the fact that no single state has the right to impose its will on fellow members (Beng 1997).

A decade has passed, since Ambassador Lim emphasised Asians’ ingenuity. But it will not be long before the European integration model prevails. ASEAN leaders met in Cebu, the Philippines, in January 2007, in order to formulate various legalistic instruments for the association.17 Asians again will move toward ‘Europeanised’ integration – the path which they thought ‘un-Asian’ and have long avoided. As mentioned earlier, legal instruments implemented by European nations in Asia were strongly felt during the period of colonization (16th - 19th centuries). The ‘forceful’ diffusion of the kind that was once shunned by Asia thus seems to be making a comeback. There are good reasons for its return, too: European integration contains many aspects of problem-solving. The EU’s social structure and its development may 17 At the 12th Annual Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Cebu, the Philippines, January 11-12, 2007, leaders of ASEAN are discussing the drafting of a charter for the Association which will change its longheld policy of ‘non-interference’ in domestic affairs of member countries. Sanctions may be imposed on members who violate common policies. Comments on Asean’s integration always make news headlines. For e.g. Carlos H. Conde recently wrote ‘Asean leaders chase dream of integration’ (2007. International Herald Tribune (January 13-14).

52

Apirat Petchsiri

bring solutions to various social problems which occur as a result of integration. Asians also see the EU as a champion of social order, and they hope to discover the strengths and weaknesses of the societal aspect of integration, as integration appears as the key for global survival. To achieve similar results, Asians must take note of substance and not only of mere form. Conclusion: Diffusion and Relations In conclusion, even though Asia and Europe share with each other the remote past and both are known as the cradles of world civilization, in reality there is at least one major difference: Asians are more comfortable with dialogue based on friendly indirect negotiation, but Europeans are more direct and literal. An indirect approach to an agenda is often considered by Europeans as a waste of time, but the opposite may be considered by Asians as rude and humiliating. Cultural diffusion may not necessarily lead to better East-West relations. Indeed, in many cases it weakens them. Aside from political differences – which are numerous but not peculiar – there also appear to be conflicting traditional practices in the use of rule-based negotiations to foster friendly relations. Legal relations are regarded by Asians as a ‘necessity of last resort’, to be relied upon only in time of desperation. The Asian past indicated mistrust in legal-led relations, while Europeans insisted on dialogue under a legal framework. Enforcement of international norms by the Europeans relies heavily on a legal-led regime, while Asians believe in conciliation to avoid loosing face. This is the interplay between the two great civilizations of the world – East and West of the great Eurasia – Europe and Asia. When it comes to legal cultures, finding the middle ground for Asia and Europe may not be easy. The future success of Asia-Europe relations depends on how both sides take notice of this vital difference and adjust their approaches accordingly. References Axelrod, Alan, and Charles Phillips. 2001. Encyclopedia of Historical Treaties and Alliances. Facts on File. Bannerjee, T.K.1963. Background to Indian Criminal Law. New Delhi: Orient Longmans.


53

Beng, L.C. 1997. European and ASEAN Integration Processes: Similar Models? UN University Lectures: 18, Presentations made at a UNU Public Forum on 8 May at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan (www.unu.edu/ nupress/ ecture18.html). Benn, C. 2002. China's Golden Age: Everyday Life in the Tang Dynasty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brown, P.M. 1914. Foreigners in Turkey: Their Juridicial Satus. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Burns, M.E., P.L.Ralph, et al. 1987. World Civilizations, 7ed. New York: Norton and Co. David, R. & J.E.C. Brierley. 1978. Major Legal Systems in The World Today (2nd ed.). London: Steven & Sons. Elisseeff, V. Ed. 1998. The Silk Roads: Highways of Culture and Commerce. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. (Reprint: 2000). Commission of the European Communities, DG External Relations. 2007. ASEAN, a key partner for Europe. In The EU & the Assoc. of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ asean/intro/index.htm, access January 10, 2007. Fitzgerald, C.P. 1961.China, a Short Cultural History. 3rd ed. New York: Praeger. Grenville, J. A. S. 2001. The Major International Treaties 1914-1973: A History and Guide with Texts. 2nd ed. New York: Stein & Day. Hooglund, E. 2005. Turkey (country). Microsoft® Encarta® 2006. [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. Hooker, M.B. 1975. Legal pluralism: an introduction to colonial and neo-colonial laws. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hooker, M.B. 1978. A Concise History of South-East Asia. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lockard, C. 2005. Tang Civilization and the Chinese Centuries. Encarta Historical Essays. Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. Noda, Y. 1976. Introduction to Japanese Law.(A.H. Angelo Trans. Ed.). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Richardson, M. 1997. Unlike EU, It Moves Slowly on Integration: ASEAN: Less Is More. International Herald Tribune (Friday June 6). Rogaski, R. 2005. Treaty Ports. Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. Rossabi, M. 2005. Silk Road. Microsoft® Encarta® 2006 [DVD]. Redmond, WA: Microsoft Corporation. Van der Cruysse, D. 2002. Siam and The West, 1500-1700, (Michael Smithies Translation) Bangkok: Silkworm Books. Walls, Andrew F. 1996.The Missionary Movement in Christian History: Studies in Transmission of Faith. New York: Orbis and Edinburgh.


INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND LOCAL CONTEXTS: FRAMING OF THE EU’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND NEWSPAPERS (2004-2005) Natalia Chaban, Martin Holland and Christian Elias Schneider Abstract This chapter continues one of the core themes of this book, by looking at perceptions of Europe, and of the European Union (EU), from the outside. The section offers a framework which helps to analyse selected news reporting surrounding European integration and the European Union in New Zealand. It investigates the ways in which the presentation of European Union related topics in New Zealand news media helps to shape public opinion relating to the conceptualisation of the EU as an international actor. The piece is based on an investigation of dominant media framings and angles of reporting of the European Union and of perceptions and representations of Europe in New Zealand. The chapter sits in a wider context of mutual perceptions – and misperceptions – across Asia and Europe. The focus of the argument lies on the ways in which meanings and understandings are formed and conveyed, in the context of the visibility of the European Union in selected New Zealand print media. For most scholars of the European integration the global importance of the European Union (EU) is presumed to be self-evident, both in de facto and de jure terms. Whatever the measure – development assistance, world trade, values and norms – the EU is a leading player: even its emerging European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has witnessed the EU undertaking some 17 operations since its inception in 2003 with the geographical scope stretching from the Balkans, to Africa and

56 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland even to Aceh in Indonesia. Thus the new millennium has seen a relatively rapid transformation of the EU’s image away from the 1980s/ 1990s caricature of an inward focused ‘fortress Europe’ to one that demonstrates an international role. The ‘EU as a third force’ in global affairs has also begun to permeate the media’s representation of the EU. This chapter explores this theme within the context of a casestudy of the New Zealand media’s framing of the CFSP. Research Framework In order to assess the imagery of the EU as an international actor through the eyes of a third party this study will assess the dominant media framings of the EU created by in the reputable national newspapers and compare them with the primed conceptualizations of the EU existing in the public opinion. This paper uses the definition of media frames suggested by Gitlin (1980, 7): ‘persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual’. The concept of image used in this paper was interpreted in a broad sense, similar to the definition by Boulding where image is a ‘the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and the universe’ (Brecher 1972, 13, citing Boulding). Inspired by classification of the foreign news suggested by Schulz (2001)1, this study argues that when a foreign actor (the EU for New Zealand in our case) is reported outside its borders, three types of media framing surface. The first one is reporting the EU contextualising it in its internal context – events happening inside the Union and actions of the EU on the international arena are represented as having direct consequences to the EU in the first place. This type was called in this study ‘EU news’. The second type of media framing contextualizes the actions of the EU as an international agent whose activity influences foremost the third party – neither the EU, nor New Zealand in our case. This type of framing was titled ‘EU news 1

Schulz (2001) identified four different types of foreign or international news: (1) stories with a foreign dateline and without involvement of own country; (2) stories with a foreign dateline and with significant involvement of own country; (3) stories with a domestic dateline and without involvement of own country; (4) stories with a domestic dateline and with significant involvement of own country.

INTERNATIONAL NEWS AND LOCAL CONTEXTS

57

abroad’. Finally, the third type of framing depicts the EU’s actions as having direct consequences to the local stake-holders and grounds the EU as an international actor in the domestic discourses. This type of framing was labelled ‘EU news at home’. The two first types of framing the foreign news, namely ‘EU news’ and ‘EU news abroad’ are further combined under the category ‘pure foreign news’, since they do not present a dateline for grounding the news in the local discourse. The remaining type of framing, ‘EU news at home’, constitutes a second category, namely, a local angle of reporting.2 Most of the ‘pure foreign’ news was observed to originate from international sources – either overseas correspondents, or international wires, or reputable international media outlets which are often sought after as a source of foreign news. The latter, local aspect, predominantly surfaces in the news stores written by the local journalists. According to Cohen, ‘foreign policy news of domestic origin looms larger in the total flow of foreign affairs news’ (1963, 10). If the first angle of reporting an indication of a cosmopolitan orientation of the foreign news reporting (Schulz 2001, 9), the second angle is argued to bring the ‘foreign’ closer to home and indicates the immediate consequences of international developments for the local audiences (see e.g., Ginsberg 2002). Even though this strategy risks overlooking international developments that have no direct grounding in domestic discourses, it still raises the visibility and salience of the Others to the local audiences. The strategy of ‘domesticating’ foreign news is argued to turn distant spaces and nations into ‘zones of relevancy’ (Schutz 1964) in audiences’ minds. One may question the need and relevancy of drawing a boundary between ‘pure foreign’ and the so-called ‘domesticated’ foreign news stating that sometimes the boundary between the two angles of reporting international events and actors is vague. Yet, this study argues that differentiation between the two foci of domestication and three types of framing within them is a vantage point in a study 2

The three types of framing building two angles of foreign news reporting are conceptually close to the foci of domesticity in international news reporting as a notion brought into attention by Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. (1985) in the comparative UNESCO study of international news media. The focus of domesticity of news used in this paper is also similar to the ‘concept of domesticity of EU stories’ used by Peter et al. (2003, 310, 313, 318) and the ‘domestic or European’ focus used by de Vreese (2003, 81, 85-86, 92,103-105).

58 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland attempting to reconstruct the media images of the important Others reported in newspaper’s of one’s own country. Correspondently, this paper will attempt to analyze the discursive constructs that surface in the three types of framing of the images of the EU as an international actor. This study will also investigate the consequences of this imagery for the foreign policy-making environment in the country. The four leading research questions are: What are the leading framings of the EU’s foreign policy in the ‘EU news’ frame of reporting the EU in a third-party media? What are the leading images of the EU as an international actor in the ‘EU news abroad’ frame of reporting the EU in a third-party media? What are the leading images of the EU as an international actor in the ‘EU news at home’ frame of reporting the EU in a third party media? What are the pragmatic implications of the various framings of reporting the EU on the image of the EU’s foreign policy in public discourses of a third party? Methodology This study analysed the EU’s representations as an international actor in five New Zealand newspapers, namely the New Zealand Herald, the Waikato Times, the Dominion Post, The Press, and the Otago Daily Times. New Zealand has no national daily newspaper, but is instead characterised by regional newspapers. The Waikato Times, the Dominion Post and The Press all serve different regions of the country (ranging from the middle and south of the North Island to the middle of the South Island) and are all owned by the Fairfax Corporation. Though the Dominion Post serves the nation’s capital, it is the New Zealand Herald that is considered to be the more popular choice among politicians and policy makers.3 3 The Herald has the largest circulation of all NZ newspapers, and has been owned by Tony O’Reilly’s Independent Newspapers and then by its APN subsidiary. While the NZ Fairfax newspapers have recently been known for a high emphasis on cost-cutting, reducing editorial staff, and focusing on local news (Drinnan 2004, 22), the Herald is regarded for its priority given to maintaining and improving editorial quality. The final newspaper chosen for the NZ sample, the


59

The choice of newspapers as a medium for this analysis was grounded by its unique profile of its relations with other media and audiences. In relation to other media, in the environment of media’s ‘hyper-competition’ (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999, 218), characterized by two leading trends, namely ‘the overall decline in circulation over the last half-century and the concentration of ownership of titles, in the same period, into the hands of a small number of powerful business groupings’ (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, 15), and quite often leading papers serve as news leaders for other mass media (Larson 1979). As such, they set the news agenda as well as the journalistic standards of a media system as a whole (Schulz 2001). In relation to its audience, newspapers remain a key source of political information in New Zealand (Mulgan 2004, 293) serving an important news source of a country’s elite and opinion leaders (Schulz 2001). As such, according to Schulz (2001), ‘among all mass media a country’s leading newspapers have a central role in forming foreign images and influencing the character of international relations’. According to Huang and McAdams (1995), the ritual view of communication considers newspaper reading less as sending or gaining information and more as a portrayal and reinforcement of a particular view of the world. On this background, according to Schulz (2001), news analysis may indicate the structure of international relations and, more specifically, of power relations. The news texts constituting the sample all referenced the ‘European Union’ and/or ‘EU’ in the context of international affairs, even if that reference was made only once and en passant. The total sample included 303 articles. To ensure reliable and rigid content analysis (Hofstetter 1981, 531), this research systematically accounted for sentences containing reference to ‘(the) European Union’ or ‘(the) EU’. Identified sentences including either of the two search terms were treated as ‘propositional units’ (Krippendorf 1980), or units which assumed a certain structure; specifically, the inclusion of actors, objects, and actions (Holsti 1968). Based on the actor component of the proposition, the propositional units were grouped into conceptual Otago Daily Times, is owned by its NZ shareholders and is published out of the university city of Dunedin in the south of NZ. It takes an editorial approach designed to differentiate it from its Fairfax counterparts, and routinely wins national journalism awards.

60 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland clusters reconstructing the leading actors of the EU performing on the international stage on behalf of the EU, namely ‘the EU itself’, ‘EU institutions’, EU officials’, ‘EU Member States’, ‘EU Member States Officials’. Other possible actors (e.g, ‘EU Enlargement Candidates’, ‘EU Enlargement Candidates Officials’, ‘EU citizens’) were not found in the monitored news texts. Based on the action component of the proposition, the propositional units were classified into conceptual clusters reconstructing the leading roles of the EU as an actor on the international stage, namely a ‘negotiator’, a ‘judge’, an ‘aid donor’, a ‘diplomat’, a ‘mediator’, a ‘model’, and a ‘victim’. Based on the object component of the proposition, the propositional units were classified into conceptual clusters reconstructing the leading counterparts of the EU on the international stage, namely ‘North America/USA’, ‘Middle East’ ‘non-EU Europe’, ‘Africa’, ‘Asia’, ‘the Pacific’, and ‘Latin America’. Results I. Visibility of the EU as an international actor according to an angle of news ‘domestication’. Table 1:

Total number of news articles Average number of words per article Total number of propositions referencing the EU Average number of propositions referencing the EU per article ‘Major’ focus on the EU ‘Secondary’ focus on the EU ‘Minor’ focus on the EU

‘Pure’ Foreign News ‘EU focused news ‘EU news abroad’ 23 (7.6%) 217 (71.6%)

‘EU news at home’

518

366

489

209 (24.1%)

512 (59.1%)

146 (16.8%)

91

24

23

17 (73.9%)

11 (5.1%)

5 (7.7%)

2 (8.7%)

70 (32.3%)

21 (32.3%)

4 (17.4%)

136 (62.7%)

39 (60.0%)

63 (20.8%)


61

Despite low numbers (only 23 articles, see Table 1), ‘EU focused news’, which centred its attention on the role the Union plays on the international stage, averaged in a relatively high number of words (518) and propositions (9) referencing the EU (if compared with the other angles of reporting the EU). The news in this angle tends to be long and detailed, providing a multifaceted description of the EU’s involvement into world affairs. Almost three-quarters of ‘pure’ EU news articles were solely focused on the EU. The remaining quarter of the articles were reporting the international affairs of one of the EU Member States, yet subsequently conceptualizing it in the common EU’s foreign policy context. The second category, ‘EU news abroad’, built up a lion’s share of the sample – almost 72%. In those articles, the EU was presented as one of the actors taking part in the global or regional political events on par with other actors and in the context of a third party (either a country or an international organization). Notably, these news articles were comparatively short (365 words on average) and featured a low number of references to the EU (2.4 propositions per article). In nearly two thirds of the ‘EU news abroad’ articles the degree of centrality of the EU was minor, i.e. the EU was mentioned in a brief and fleeting manner. Approximately one quarter of the ‘EU news abroad’ articles featured the EU from a secondary degree of centrality, as one of the several main actors depicted. Only 11 articles in this category portrayed the EU as a major actor seen from a third party perspective. Significantly, 59.1% of all propositions related to the EU as an international actor were found in this particular angle of reporting the EU. This indicator serves as a rationale as to why news not focused on the EU (and often mentioning the EU in passé) should be necessarily considered when reconstructing media framings of important international counterparts. News constituting the third group, ‘EU news at home’, was the second most visible group after ‘pure’ EU news in terms of the news texts and average number of words per article (see Table 1). Yet, the average number of propositions per article was the lowest among the three angles of reporting - 2.3 propositions. This particular angle of reporting the EU featured the lowest number of propositions across the three angles. This finding suggests that the EU’s media images in a local, New Zealand, context were neither particularly detailed nor

62 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland extensive. Illustratively, 60% of the articles in this category pictured the EU from a minor perspective. 32% featured the EU’s representations as secondary in their intensity – predictably, the EU was depicted there as an equal participant of the EU-New Zealand dialogue. Only 7.7% of the articles contemplating the EU’s foreign policy from New Zealand’s point of view reported the Union from a major perspective. These articles usually presented an in-depth substantial analysis of the EU’s activities as an international actor. II. Object Component of the EU propositions according to an angle of news ‘domestication’. Table 2: ‘Pure’ Foreign News ‘EU focused news’ EU interacting with the world’s major powers (USA, China, Russia, and Japan) EU interacting with the countries that have been or are involved in conflicts (Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Zimbabwe) EU reactions towards global terrorism

‘EU news abroad’ EU actions at the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Israeli-Palestinian conflict) EU actions towards ‘non-EU’ Europe (former Yugoslavian states, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus)

‘Localized EU news’ EU relations with the Pacific region in general EU relations with New Zealand in particular

EU actions towards the USA EU actions in developing or disadvantaged areas in the world (Africa, South-East Asia, the Pacific). Activities with the UN.

EU focused news Analysing the object component of the located representations conceptualizing the EU as an international actor, the study established that the ‘EU focused news’ framed the EU’s interactions on the world stage mainly with three groups of interlocutors, all three being external to New Zealand. Firstly, the EU was depicted as an audible partner of the world’s ‘major powers’ (almost 68% of all propositions in the category) (Table 2). In this group, the most prominent EU’s interlocutor was the US (45.4% of all propositions pictured US-EU relations). The second most visible object of the EU’s actions on the world stage was China (11% of all propositions), followed by Russia (6.7%), and, finally, Japan (4.3%).


63

US-EU relations were described in terms of two ‘friends’ who used to be intimately involved with each other during the ‘Cold War’ years, but went ‘sour’ in their relations and became involved in ‘rows’, ‘battles’, and ‘feuds’. They are not shy expressing dislikes of each other and occasionally cause ‘stresses’ and ‘headaches’ for each other. In the context of the foreign policy, the bigger EU was sometimes seen as ‘sidelining’ the USA in NATO. The EU’s foreign policy initiatives, namely the creation of the CFSP, ESDP, and RRF, were occasionally seen as ‘ultimately challenging’ the US’s dominance. However, the two sides were also shown as willing to restore the ‘battered friendship’, to ‘mend the bridges,’ and to ‘forget’ the unpleasant moments in communication in the recent past. Similar themes of two parties being ‘frenemies’ appear in the depiction of the EU-Russia relations. The Russian President was seen as ‘no buddy’ for the European leaders, and the EU was ‘fighting’ Russia on some issues. However, at the same time, the two sides were shown as ‘strengthening their ties’, ‘improving relations’, ‘repairing damages’ and ‘saving faces’. Metaphors of ‘bargaining’ and ‘games’ were also used to describe the state of relations between the EU and Russia. The description of the EU’s relations with China features images of ‘movement forward’ and ‘evolution’, as well as ‘building’ and ‘construction’. Yet, these overall positive images were shadowed by more negatively flavored metaphors of the EU ‘dangling carrots’ of incentives in front of China, as well as the EU’s ‘gambling’ with China. The images of the EU’s relations with Japan were exceptionally neutral. Secondly, the EU was seen as an influential force acting towards countries that had been or are involved in conflicts. These representations made up for 18.7% of all propositions. The most prominent relations depicted were the ones to Palestine Authority (5.7%) followed by the ones to Iran and Libya (4.8% each), Iraq (3.35%), Sudan (1.9%), and Zimbabwe (1.4%). Acting towards this second category of its interlocutors, the EU was often depicted in terms of an actor who ‘exerted pressure’, ‘gambled’, ‘bargained’, or (in contrast) attempted to ‘build up’ trust. The third category of the EU’s international interlocutors was less geographically consistent and dealt with the EU’s attitudes and actions

64 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland towards international terrorism – 7.2% of the total 209 propositions were devoted to the EU’s reactions to terrorism. EU news abroad Analyzing the object component of the propositions located in the ‘EU news abroad’ angle of reporting, the EU common foreign policy activities were the most prominently featured in the context of reporting events from the Middle East (37.5% of all positions). This region included the portrayal of the EU’s actions towards Iran, Iraq, and Israel and Palestine when events in those countries were covered. The second most visible recipient of the EU’s attention was non-EU Europe (almost 18% of all propositions). When covering news from the former Yugoslavian states, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, the EU was featured as one of the actors interacting with those states. 15% of the propositions referenced the EU and its actions towards the USA in the context of news reporting events from or about the USA. Finally, 12% of the propositions mentioned the EU acting as an aid donor including news about various economically disadvantaged regions or poor countries around the world (e.g., Africa, the Pacific, East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia), as well as news covering the UN’s activities. Featured in the context of news on the third party, the EU was often depicted as an international player who steps into very dramatic and sometimes tragic scenarios. As an actor on the Middle East theatre, the EU was pictured using a wide arsenal of tactics and strategies to stop the conflict (e.g., Israeli-Palestinian conflict), to prevent dangerous developments (e.g., negotiations with Iran to stop its nuclear programme), or restore normality (e.g., post-war missions in Iraq). Acting in the region, the EU was represented as ‘persuading’, ‘warning’, ‘denouncing’, ‘condemning’, ‘exerting pressure’, ‘accusing’, issuing ‘tough worded’ notices, ‘insisting’, ‘praising’, ‘congratulating’, ‘bargaining’, ‘dangling a carrot’ of economic inducements, and ‘delivering packages of economic and political incentives’. Seen as acting in an explosive and inflammable Middle Eastern region, the EU’s line was persistently pictured as ‘pursuing a diplomatic track’, ‘seeking diplomatic solutions’, and ‘playing a good cop’ in contrast to the US who was cast into the role of a ‘bad cop’ in the region. Seeking a resolution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the EU was seen as


65

performing on the stage in a ‘quartet’ with the US, Russia, and the UN. It was also pictured being engaged in constructive activities drawing a ‘blueprint’ of the ‘road map’ to peace. In its interactions with non-EU Europe, in particular with the former Yugoslavia, the EU was portrayed as having missed ‘the wakeup calls’ about possible violence in the region. On the eve of the possible accession of some former Yugoslavian states into the EU, the Union was shown as looking for ‘leverage’ in its relations with those states, ‘exerting pressure’, and ‘improving ties’. The ‘progress’ in relations was registered, and the EU promised those states not to ‘let them down again’. Call for ‘closer ties’ was also noticed in the EU’s relations with Ukraine where the EU’s Foreign Policy Officer Javier Solana flew in to resolve the conflict about the fraudulent presidential elections in December 2004. In its actions towards some African states, the EU was noticed to be involved in events surrounding undemocratic practices in the region (e.g., actions of the Zimbabwean regime, or events in Sudan). The EU was seen as ‘warning of penalties’, ‘being critical’, ‘pushing’, ‘adding pressure’, ‘branding’, and ‘threatening sanctions’. Similar EU’s reactions were noticed in media reports of the situation in Myanmar (Burma) and Belarus. In relation to the Pacific region, the EU was pictured as ‘sending aid packages’, ‘moving humanitarian supplies’, and helping to cope with the consequences of major natural disasters (e.g., hurricane in Niue). Similar ‘aid packages’ were sent to the USA to help the survivors of Hurricane Katrina and to Asian countries to assist people after the devastating Tsunami. Yet, the EU officials were seen warning the world that aid in these cases was ‘not a beauty contest’, or in other words, not a competition for popularity between donors giving more money. Media reported the EU’s view that the aid initiatives should have been thought through and their distribution should be well planned. EU news at home Analysing the object component of the EU representations in ‘EU news at home’ perspective, the EU’s relations with the Pacific were by far the most visible. If we count New Zealand itself into the ‘Pacific region’ category, the references to this particular object of EU’s international

66 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland attention accounted for 90% of all propositions. In this group, New Zealand alone accounted for 75% of all propositions. The EU was pictured as an entity which New Zealand ‘meets’ with, ‘talks’ to, ‘consults’ with, and ‘visits’ on a regular basis. As a result of this intense dialogue, the relation between the two were mentioned to ‘strengthen’, ‘deepen’, and ‘have good prospects’ long-term. New Zealand was also assured by the EU that it ‘has nothing to fear and a lot to gain from the growth and development of the European Union’. Two partners were noticed to be ‘closely aligned’ and see ‘eye-to-eye’ on many issues. They were reported to have a ‘lot in common’ in their foreign policies, namely international aid, environmental issues, and peacekeeping operations. For example, New Zealand was a liaison to the EU in Bosnia where it sent an observation team attached to the EU Force in Prejidor. Moreover, Europe’s top security chiefs want to involve New Zealand in a closer relationship to counter global terrorism. The EU was also depicted as an active player in the Pacific region. In this context, the EU was seen as assigning an overseas development assistance budget for the Pacific nations and proposing regional economic partnership agreements (e.g., in Papua New Guinea). In many of those initiatives, the EU was acting together with two other major Pacific donors, such as New Zealand and Australia. For instance, the three-way project between New Zealand, the EU, and the Solomon Islands will see New Zealand and the EU provide development aid to the education sector – millions of dollars over three years for books, teachers, and training. The three OECD partners were seen launching specific rebuilding projects in the region (e.g., in Fiji and in the Cook Islands). Yet, the EU in the Pacific was sometimes described as the ‘dominant fish in our pond’. While New Zealand and Australian leaders were seen to promote regional approaches, the EU was ‘stealing a march’ in the region imposing a free trade vision for the world in the one place where Australia and New Zealand can assert control. As a result, the two big South Pacific players were seen as ‘losing ground’ to the EU in terms of forging an economic future for the region.


67

III. Action component of the propositions referencing the EU according to an angle of news ‘domestication’. Table 3:

diplomat negotiator role model victim judge mediator aid donor

‘Pure’ Foreign News ‘EU news’ or ‘Pure EU News’

‘EU news at home’ or ‘Third party focus’ or ‘Localized EU news’ ‘EU news abroad’

45.5% 29.7% 12.4% 7.2% 5.3% n/a n/a

17.0% 49.4% 1.4% 1.4% 13.9% 9.0% 8.0%

58.2% 24.7% 2.1% n/a 8.2% 1.4% 5.5%

Analysing the action component of the representations of the EU in the ‘EU news’, the diplomatic role was traced in the EU’s representations establishing a formal dialogue with the international powers listed above (for example, the relations of European countries and the EU with the USA before and after the re-election of US President George W. Bush, or the European relations with Russia during the Beslan hostage crisis). Role model appearance featured the EU’s experiences being emanated by their international interlocutors (for example, the EU being suggested as a role model for the USA). The EU as a negotiator was pictured when interacting with other actors in the conflict driven parts of the world (for example, negotiations with Iran about its uranium enrichment programme, or EU’s contribution into the negotiation process around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and EU’s negotiations with China about lifting the arms export embargo). The EU as a judge was pictured when expressing its views on various developments in international affairs (for example, EU’s reactions to Iran’s uranium enrichment program, and EU interactions with the governments of Sudan and Zimbabwe). The EU was seen as condemning, warning, praising, etc. Finally, the EU was cast into a role of a victim when the news reported on the terrorist attacks in London. Different roles of the EU were visible in the second group of news, ‘EU news abroad’. The study observed that the EU was painted as an important negotiator on the world stage and in the ‘hot spots’ (the Middle East, ‘non-EU’ Europe, Africa, Asia, or Pacific) which tries to

68 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland establish good diplomatic ties with other parties. It was also shown as an actor who is confident to posses the right to judge other actors, especially those who sponsor undemocratic developments (e.g. Zimbabwe) or facilitate conflict (e.g. Iran or Israeli-Palestinian conflict). On the world stage, the EU was mostly shown to be a part of discussions in its role as a negotiator, rather than standing between the conflicting sides as a mediator. The role of the EU as the world’s biggest aid donor was reflected, but turned out to be less prominent than other roles (see Table 2). Assessing the action component of the propositions located in the third angle of reporting, ‘EU news at home’, a third set of EU role priorities was observed. In most of the propositions, the EU was seen as establishing diplomatic contacts (see Table 2). This share had the heaviest load across three categories and across all roles. Numerous examples include references to visits by New Zealand ministers to the EU, as well as European ministers and heads of states visiting New Zealand. The second most popular role was the one of a negotiator (for example, Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations of the EU with the Pacific Islands, NZ-EU negotiations on visa-arrangements, and other agreements). Other roles were much less visible – a judge (for instance, the EU ‘quizzed’ New Zealand PM Helen Clark about having a Foreign Minister outside the Cabinet); an aid donor (mostly providing developmental aid to the Pacific states), a role model (e.g., for the ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum as a possible moddel for regional integration), and a mediator (e.g., EU’s peace-keeping mission in cooperation with New Zealand). IV. Actor component of the propositions referencing the EU according to an angle of news ‘domestication’. Analysing the actor components of the EU’s representations, this study observed that in all three angles of reporting the EU’s foreign policy, the numbers of references towards particular EU officials and institutions were very low. In the ‘EU focused news’, the most frequently mentioned EU actor was Romano Prodi, the former leader of the Commission, with 4 (!) references. Other EU officials mentioned were the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, the former President of the EU Parliament Josep Borrell, and the former Presidents of the EU


69

Parliament Pat Cox. Each was mentioned only once. The most visible EU officials in the second angle of reporting, ‘EU news abroad’, were the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana (15 references) and the EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso (4 references). Evaluating the actor component of the propositions located in the ‘EU news at home’ angle, it was observed that the most visible EU actor was the former EU Development Commissioner Poul Nielson (3 references), followed by Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson (2 references). The most ‘visible’ EU institution acting in the domain of international politics was the EU Commission - 6 references in the ‘pure’ foreign angle category, and 2 references in the ‘local’ angle category. The EU Parliament ‘enjoyed’ only 3 references across 303 news texts of the sample. It was the EU Member States who were represented in the EU focused news as the most visible actors on the world stage in the context of the EU’s foreign policy. The EU’s ‘Big Three’ were found to be the most prominently featured in the ‘pure’ foreign angle of reporting the EU. In this particular angle of reporting, they shared almost equal number of propositions – France was referred to in 38 instances, Germany in 40 references, and the UK in 41 references. The most visible actor among the new EU states was Poland (with 7 references in total in the ‘pure’ foreign angle of reporting). Others mentioned more than once were Italy (3 references), Ireland (3), and the Netherlands (2). Accordingly, the leaders of the above mentioned countries were among the most visible actors featured in the EU news. In the ‘pure’ foreign angle of reporting, Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair were the most visible actors – 14 and 13 references respectively. They were followed by German Chancellors Gerhard Schroeder (8) and later Angela Merkel (2), former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (4), and the former Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot (2 propositions). It was the EU Member States again who ‘stole the limelight’ of New Zealand journalists’ attention presenting the EU’s international activities in New Zealand context. Yet, in contrast to the ‘pure’ foreign angle of reporting which prioritized in its representations the EU’s ‘Big Three’, the ‘EU news at home’ perspective presented a rather different ‘gallery’ of the EU countries. The most visible EU Member States were the UK (6 references), followed by Belgium (5), Germany

70 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland and France (4), Sweden (3), Netherlands, Malta, Hungary, the Czech Republic (2), and Ireland, Luxembourg, and Poland (1 reference each). The heightened visibility of some smaller EU states can be explained by the fact that local media extensively reported on various diplomatic meetings and visits that took place in the time of media monitoring (for instance, former Swedish Prime Minister’s visit to New Zealand in February 2005, as well as several visits by New Zealand high-ranked officials to Belgium and to the EU). The most visible EU Member States politicians were Goeran Persson, the former Swedish Prime Minister (3 references) and the Dutch Prime Minister Jan-Peter Balkenende (2). The former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, Germany’s former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the former Dutch Foreign Minister Bernard Bot and the former UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw were mentioned only once. To conclude, when the news painted the EU as an international actor, the most visible actor was not the united EU-25 sharing a common position, but EU Member States and their leaders. In contrast, the images of the EU as a united EU actor tend to be rather ‘faceless’ and ‘ethereal’. It is worth noticing that the EU’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana got a relatively visible profile in comparison to other EU officials. In addition, the EU’s representations in the ‘pure’ foreign angle extensively featured anonymous EU actors – ‘security monitors’, ‘inspectors’, ‘election observers’, ‘peacekeepers’, ‘investigators’, ‘negotiators’, or ‘European diplomats’. They seemed to be omnipresent in those articles, although rarely named. This representation arguably adds to the ‘anonymity’ of the EU’s images. Discussion This paper argues that images and perceptions of international actors and their foreign policies provide the basic framework within which the conduct of international relations and conflict resolution takes place. Mass media in general, and news media in particular, play an important role in this process. Holding the status of almost an exclusive informant, the news media paint the portrait of the country’s important Others, influencing public opinion and evaluations, and creating a ‘reality’ to which national decision-maker are prone to react. Weaver and Wilhoit (1983) citing relevant studies (Altheide & Snow 1979; Tuchman 1978; Epstein 1973) argued that the news media


71

unavoidably structure their representation of social and political events in ways which are not pregiven in the events themselves. This chapter attempts to reconstruct media framings of the EU’s actions as an international actor created by news discourses outside the EU. This paper considered one specific case study – it traced the images of the EU as an international actor in the reputable metropolitan dailies of one Asia-Pacific country, New Zealand. The study monitored daily coverage of the EU for two years (2004-2005) in five leading New Zealand newspapers. A forth-coming analysis will include a comparative aspect and will bring together the media framing of the EU’s actions as an international actor from other AsiaPacific countries involved in the project. Davis (1990) argued that the meaning that is imposed is limited by and relative to the context in which meaning is generated. Media reports assigned meanings to the EU’s foreign policy placing those events in two referential contexts, namely domestic (or internal) grounding of the foreign news and ‘pure’ foreign (or external) strategy of reporting this news. The latter media strategy arguably caters to a more educated and cosmopolitan readership who are argued to constitute a loyal readership of the ‘prestigious’ national newspapers. The latter strategy targets the general public. This study reconstructed the EU’s media framing as an international actor from these two perspectives. Two angles of reporting the EU’s foreign policy in New Zealand newspapers arguably resulted in differing framings of the EU. When reported from the ‘pure’ foreign angle (an angle that dominated EU reporting in New Zealand both in terms of number of articles and number of propositions), the EU was most frequently framed as a ‘third party’ – an ‘out-there’ interlocutor engaged in dialogues with various Others. Yet, in those representations the EU was not pictured as an actor whose international agenda directly ‘touched’ on local interests. As a world actor, the EU was shown being busy establishing diplomatic contacts with other major world players, most notably the USA, China, and Russia. This representation is arguably identifying the EU-25 as a respected partner in the dialogue of the world’s ‘superpowers’. The EU was also shown as a global actor who is extensively engaged in negotiating with politically unstable countries, preferring negotiation techniques over conflict actions. The EU was

72 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland sometimes depicted as a judge of other international counterparts acting from a self-perceived position of being on a ‘higher moral ground’. Notably, a role of a victim also received some publicity due to terrorist attacks in the EU in 2004-2005. In this angle, the EU was sometimes depicted by the newsmakers as a large, supra-national state-like actor on the international stage. On the other hand, it was more often represented as a ‘motley’ collection of individual states united by economic imperatives, aspiring to have common foreign policy, yet ending with joined political initiatives with various degrees of success. A failed common stance on the Iraq War got very ambivalent and controversial imagery in New Zealand newspapers. The negative assessments highlighting the difficulties in creating a common foreign policy for the 25-member Union were observed in the analytical articles in the ‘pure’ foreign context. Nevertheless, the EU’s actions on the world stage were not depicted in particularly negative terms – the representations of the EU’s role as a negotiator and a diplomat were prevalent in the framing, often opposing a ‘hard’ power approach more typically observed in the US’s international actions. Yet, many of the EU’s actions and attempts were depicted as failing (for example, its fruitless negotiations with Iran; the repeated undemocratic practices in Zimbabwe despite EU’s negative reaction to them; or no major progress in Israeli-Palestinian conflict). As a result, in the ‘pure’ foreign angle of reporting, the EU was not framed as a political international ‘superpower’ able to counterbalance the USA. The image of the EU was summarised in one news story: The EU likes carrots, and the Americans like sticks. If the European Union continues to expand, and the euro remains strong, a real counterbalance to the US will properly emerge - a strong set of countries, with a competing political stance. Political scientists have started to talk about the EU as a superpower in its own right. The EU are a nice bunch, and they seem to have global-friendly policies. The tragedy is the world needs a superpower that combines the qualities of both Europe and the US, a power that has the military capability, political leverage, and dog-headed commitment of the US to intervene in nations, and the judgment and even-headedness of the EU to know when to do so. (Otago Daily Times, 2005)

The EU reported from a ‘pure’ foreign angle predominantly entered the New Zealand newspaper agenda only if and when the EU was involved in some international conflicts or controversies, and acted in a timely manner. Arguably, the virtual absence of the EU officials (other than


73

Javier Solana) and institutions in the reports from the list of the most visible actors created an image of the EU as a ‘faceless’ unity. This impression was only intensified by the always present anonymous groups of ‘observers’, ‘inspectors’, ‘monitors’, and ‘European diplomats’ increasing the sense of the anonymity of the Union to the average news consumers outside the EU. The fact that the EU’s ‘Big Three’ were extensively and repeatedly featured as the EU’s foreign policy ‘leading faces’ ignored the changing reality of the EU, for example, the contributions of its smaller Member States into world affairs, as well as the EU expansion in 2004 which was claimed to significantly improve international security. Arguably, news makers in reporting the EU’s international actions played to the rule of ‘no cognitive challenges’ – attested to as the resistance of human thinking and imagining to sudden environmental pressures (Berelson and Steiner 1964). The ‘local’, New Zealand, grounding of the EU as an international actor resulted in the images of the EU as a major diplomatic force and a negotiator in the Pacific region. The EU was pictured as being engaged in the diplomatic exchanges with New Zealand. It was also presented as being involved into the regional activities, sometimes acting as a partner to New Zealand, sometimes presenting a competition to a small Pacific state which tends to think about itself as a major player in the Pacific region. The role of the EU as a victim was not featured in the ‘local’ framing. Prominently, the EU’s activities as a leading development actor assigning major amounts of aid in the world and in the region were non-prominently featured by the New Zealand newsmakers. The local angle in reporting the EU is argued to give the public greater access to the complex issues, decisions, and debates in the realm of the international politics, as well as expose the public to the international actors and institutions. Yet, this study suggests that very often local angle in reporting foreign news often serves to project and re-play self-gratifying self-images instead of introducing new information grounding it in the local discourses. Media representations are known to be involved in the construction of a point of view, ‘(...) discourses are both enabling as well as constraining: they determine answers to questions, as well as the questions that can be asked’ (Barnes and Duncan 1997, 7). These discourses are not

74 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland realised impartially or objectively, but are ‘projected instead into a known and understood political perspective from which they and their particular public present and make sense of the external world’ (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, 15-16). The media projections of the EU as an important Other on the international stage, probably said more about the news producers (New Zealand media in this case) than about the international counterpart images of which they were constructing. The images of the EU as an international actor were ‘mapped out’ on foreign policy identifications available in New Zealand society – in the depictions of the Other, the Self sees itself. In terms of foreign policy, New Zealand sees itself firstly as an actor who ‘keeps its eggs in many baskets’ equally prioritising its ‘key relations’ with the USA, the EU, and Asian countries (O’Brien 2004; NZ MFAT). Secondly, New Zealand sees itself as an important player in the Pacific region. These two visions are projected into the media images of the EU and its foreign policy. The former perspective is reflected in media descriptions of the numerous and various diplomatic encounters enjoyed between New Zealand and the EU. It is important to reiterate that New Zealand cherishes strong trading relations, enjoys historical and cultural ties, and shares many positions in foreign policy approaches and interactions with the EU. The latter perspective is seen in the media reporting of the EU as an actor in the Pacific cooperating with New Zealand (and Australia) while administering development aid in the region. This perspective also incorporates images of the EU as a competing player against the two Pacific nations, ‘stealing a march’ and imposing its trade rules on the region. This chapter suggests that a frame of reference cemented by ‘localising’ foreign news could induce some unsettling implications for New Zealand news consumers. It is recognized that the agenda of international affairs has become more varied and complex, and ultimately more ‘domesticated’ (Stairs 2000). However, the ‘domestication’ strategy in EU news reporting does not construct a ‘reality’ in which the New Zealand news consumers feel that they are more involved into the EU-New Zealand dialogue, and that their voice and contributions are welcome. NZ foreign policy in relations with the EU was still pictured by newspapers as being executed by a few elites – a traditional view that international political and security


75

aspects should be left to the professionals. In this scenario, the readers are left with a role of a passive consumer of information whose daily life is seemingly not affected by economic, social, and environmental consequences of such policies. According to Kellner, citizens ‘become spectators of media presentations and discourse which mold public opinion, reducing consumer/citizens to objects of news, information, and public affairs’ (Kellner on-line). To sum up, the pure foreign angle in reporting (the most visible one across five New Zealand newspapers across two years) featured images of the EU as an international ‘third actor’ profiled as a ‘faceless’ entity ‘existing somewhere out there’ – an abstract international power. Theses representations highlighted actions that were not pictured as having significant consequences on the country of newspapers’ reporting. The local angle in reporting (arguably, the more meaningful one for local audiences) presented the EU’s role as an international actor as a projection of a set of New Zealand’s self-gratifying images reiterating country’s national foreign policy priorities and picturing interactions with the EU as a prerogative of a small group of national elites. This particular framing yet again alienated the EU as a performer on the international stage from the circle of immediate interests of the readers. Conclusions This chapter argued that the workings of EU’s international images, perceptions, and attributions in the conduct of foreign policy are discursively shaped. One of the discourses that construct the ‘reality’ of the EU’s foreign policy is international news media. Focusing on the images of the EU outside its border – EU’s external identity case study – this study attempted to understand how that EU’s ‘reality’ was constructed by the news reporting of the Union while employing different ‘domestication’ strategies. Addressing the absence of a long-term EU image building strategy outside its borders, this chapter viewed external images as crucial for an organisation grappling with its internal identity. The findings of this paper could be helpful for the EU practitioners working in the communication field. The images produced by the Others, New Zealand media in our case, could be processed, integrated and fitted into the system of the EU’s self-identification, ultimately contributing to the

76 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland ‘cognitive mobilisation’ of EU citizens (Inglehart 1970). The findings of this paper could be also used by EU foreign policy professionals currently debating the possibility of the EU’s next CFSP initiative, namely, the creation of the EU’s common diplomatic service. In this context, external images of the EU could be described, using the concepts of economics, as intangibles (Zambon 2005) – immaterial assets building the substantial foundation of the institution. Mismeasured or undermeasured intangibles are argued to have serious policy consequences. An imperfect set of indicators may result in inappropriate policy, misallocation of resources, and under- or overevaluation of the organization’s performance; though the belief is irrational, the impact of that belief is anything but unreal (Leerssen on-line) Chris Patten, EU former external relations commissioner, once said, ‘Foreign policy isn’t just about being nice to people and getting on. It’s about trying to secure objectives’ (cited in: Pesek 2004). One cannot secure those objectives if one is dealing with unspecified perceptions or vague images. After all, it was Einstein who once noted, ‘Imagination is more important than knowledge’.

References Aldrich, J. H., J. L. Sullivan, and E. Borgida. 1989. Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates Waltz before a Blind Audience? American Political Science Review 831: 123-142. Altheide, D. L. and Snow, R. P. 1979. Media Logic. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Anderson, P. J. and A. Weymouth. 1999. Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. Longman: New York. Arnett, P. 1998. Goodbye, World: International News Reporting in U.S. Papers. American Journalism Review 209: 50-68. Barnes, T. J. and J. S. Duncan. 1992. Introduction. Writing Worlds. In Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape, eds. T.J. Barnes and J.S. Duncan, 1-17. London, Routledge. Belknap, M. H. 2001. The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project, at www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/ resources/cnn-effect/Belknap_M_H_01.pdf> [accessed 14 August 2006]. Berelson, B. and Steiner, G. A. 1964. Human behavior: An inventory of scientific findings. Oxford, England: Harcourt, Brace and World.


77

Blumler, J. G. and D. Kavanagh. 1999. The Third Age Of Political Communication: Influences And Features. Political Communication 16: 209–230. Boulding, K. 1959. National Image and the International System. Journal of Conflict Resolution III: 120-131. Brecher, M. 1972. The Foreign Policy of Israel. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bunce, M. 2005. Leaders shake hands, smile, and compliment each other (...). Otago Daily Times (24 February 2005). Campbell, D. 1992. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Glasgow: University of Minnesota Press. Carey, W. J. 1989. Communication as culture. Boston: Unwin Hyman. CIA World Factbook, at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html [accessed 11 August 2006] Chaban, N. and M. Holland, eds. 2005. The EU Through the Eyes of the AsiaPacific: public perceptions and media representations. NCRE Research Series 4. Clark, H. 2002. Annual Europa Lecture to the National Centre for Research on Europe, presented 20 November 2002, Christchurch, New Zealand, at www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/europa/pdf/2002_clark_address.pdf [accessed 9 June 2005]. Cohen, B. C. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Davis, D. K. 1990. News and Politics. In New directions in political communication, eds. D. L. Swanson and D. Nimmo, 147-184. Newbury Park, Ca: Sage. Delli Carpini, M. X. and B.A. Williams. 1998. The politics of popular media. Paper presented at the Mediated Politics workshop. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. Deutch, K. and R.L. Merrit. 1965. Effects of Events on National and International Images. In International Behavior, H. Kelman, 132-189. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. Drinnan, J. 2004. Sundays, Bloody Sundays: Sunday Newspapers Prepare for War. National Business Review (August). Epstein, E. 1973. News from nowhere: Television and the news. New York: Random House. Fairfax Holdings Limited. 2004. Fairfax Annual Report 2004. Sydney, Fairfax. Fiske, S.T. and S.E. Taylor. 1984. Social Cognition. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Foucault, Micehele. 1972. The Archeology of Knowledge, (translated by SheridanSmith). London: Routledge. Galtung, J. and M. H. Ruge. 1965. The Structure of Foreign News. Journal of Peace Research 21: 64-91.

78 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland Gentile, A. 2005. Break Loose from your ball and chain. Humbolt Kosmos, Aelxander von Humboldt Foundation, no.86:6-17. Ginsberg, R. H. 1999. Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap. Journal of Common Market Studies 373, 429-454. Ginsberg, T. 2002. Rediscovering the World: September 11 Showed All too Clearly what a Terrible Mistake it was for America’s News Media to Largely Ignore Foreign News. American Journalism Review 241: 48-53. Gitlin, T. 1980. The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gross-Stein, J. 1996. Image, Identity, and Conflict Resolution. In Managing Global Chaos, eds. C. Crocker, F.Hampson, and P. Aall. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Guttenplan, D.D. 1997. Britain: Dumb and Dumber? A Transatlantic Spat over the Quality of the Quality Press. Columbia Journalism Review (July/August):18-19. Habermas, J. 1991 [1962]. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MASS: The MIT Press. Habermas, J. 2006. Towards a United States of Europe, at www.signandsight.com/features/676.html> [accessed 11 August 2006] The full version of this speech originally appeared in German in Der Standard on March 10 and March 11, 2006. Hall, Stuart. 1996. Who needs cultural identity? In Questions of Cultural Identity, eds. S. Hall and P. du Gay, 222-37. London: Sage. Hall, Stuart. 1997a. The Spectacle of the Other. In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, ed. Stuart Hall, 223-290. London: Higgins, E.T. and G. King. 1981. Accessibility of social constructs: Information- processing consequences of individual and contextual variability. In Personality, cognition, and social interaction, eds. N. Cantor and J. Kihlstrom, 69-121. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Holland, M., N. Chaban and M. Benson-Rea. 2003. External Perceptions of the European Union: A Survey of New Zealanders Perceptions and Attitudes towards the European Union. University of Canterbury: NCRE Research Series, no.1. Holland, M., N. Chaban, J. Bain, K. Stats, P. Sutthisripok. 2005. EU in the Views of Asia-Pacific Elites: Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. University of Canterbury: NCRE Research Series, no.5. Hofstetter, R. 1981. Content Analysis. In Handbook of Political Communication, eds. D.D. Nimmo and K.R. Sanders, 531. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Hoge, James. 1994. Media Pervasiveness. Foreign Affairs 734: 136 – 145. Holsti, O. 1968. Content Analysis. In Research Methods: The Handbook of Social Psychology, eds. L. Gardner and E. Aronson, 651-653.


79

Holsti, O.R. 1969. The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study. In International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. J. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press (revised edition). Huang, L.N. and K. C. McAdam. 1995. Ideological Manipulation Via Newspaper Accounts of Political Conflict: A Cross-National Comparative News Analysis of the 1991 Moscow Coup. Paper submitted to the Newspaper Division for presentation at the annual conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Washington, D. C. (August). Hurwitz, J. and M. Peffley. 1997. Public Perceptions of Race and Crime: the Role of Racial Stereotypes. American Political Science Review 41: 374-401. Inglehart, R. 1970. European Identity. Comparative Politics 3: 45-70. Kellner, D. Habermas, the Public Sphere, and Democracy: A Critical Intervention , at www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html Kelman, H. C. 1966. International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. Khanna, P. 2004. ‘The Metrosexual Superpower’. Foreign Policy (July/August). Krippendorf, K. 1980. Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Larson, J. F. 1984. Television’s Window on the World: International Affairs Coverage on the U.S. Networks. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing. Leerssen, J. National identity and National Stereotype. Online documents at URL www.hum.uva.nl/images [accessed on 09/09/05]. Lippmann, W. 1922. Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt. Livingston, S. 1997. Clarifying the CNN effect: an examination of media effects according to type of military intervention. Harvard University Kennedy School of Government,Joan Shorenstein Center for Press and Politics, at www.ksg.harvard.edu/presspol/Research_Publications/Papers/Research_Pa pers/R18.pdf [accessed 14 August 2006]. Manners, I. and R. Whitman. 2000. The Foreign Policy of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Fisher Boel, M. 2006. Annual Europa Lecture to the National Centre for Research on Europe, presented 6 March 2006, Wellington, New Zealand, at www.europe.canterbury.ac.nz/europa/ [accessed 7 June 2006]. Merritt, R. 1972. Transmission of Values across National Boundaries. Communication in International Politics. in Merritt, R. ed. Champaign: University of Illinois Press. Moisy, C. 1997. Myths of the global information village. Foreign Policy 107, at http://search.epnet.com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/login.aspx?direct=truean ddb=anhandan=9708190354 [accessed 21 July, 2006]. Database: Australia/ New Zealand Reference Centre. Movahedi, S. 1985. The Social Psychology of Foreign Policy and the Politics of International Images, Human Affairs 8, atwww.faculty.umb.edu/siamak_

80 Natalia Chaban, Christian Elias Schneider and Martin Holland movahedi/Library/social_psychology_of_foreign_policy.pdf [accessed 11 August 2006]. Mulgan, R. 2004. Politics in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press. Naveh, C. 2002. The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework. Conflict and Communication Online 1, no. 2, at www.cco.regener-online.de [accessed 11 August 2006]. Neumann, I. B. 1996. Self and Other in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 22: 139-174. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. New Zealand Foreign and Trade Policy. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Official Website, at www.mfat.govt.nz/for.html [accessed 22 July 2006]. OBrien, T. 2004. New Zealand: Does Distance Lend Enchantment? In Global Views on the European Union, Chaillot Paper 72, ed. M. Ortega, 103-110. Paris: Institute for Security Studies (November). Owen, W. 2003. Fairfax Man in his Comfort Zone. Independent (3 December): 26. Patterson, T. 1998. Political Roles of the Journalist. In The Politics of News: The News of Politics, eds. D. Graber, D. McQuail and P. Norris, 17-32. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Peña, M. 2003. News Media and the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process, CNN or Washington. Razón y Palabra 32, at www.cem.itesm.mx/dacs/ publicaciones/logos/anteriores/n32/mpena.htm [accessed on June 21, 2006]. Perry, David K. 1990. News Reading, Knowledge About, and Attitudes toward Foreign Countries. Journalism Quarterly 672: 353–8. Pesek, W. 2004. Drop the song and dance, and do it in a phone-call. New Zealand Herald (8 July 2004). Peter, J., H. Semetko and C. de Vreese. 2003. EU Politics on Television News. European Union Politics 43, 305-327. Salwen, M. B. and F. R. Matera. 1992. Public Salience of Foreign Nations. Journalism Quarterly 693: 623–32. Schutz, A. 1964. Collected papers Vol.2. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof. Scott, W.A. 1965. Psychological and Social Correlates of International Images. In International Behavior, ed. H. Kelman, 71-103. New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. Shoemaker P.J. and S.D. Reese. 1996. Mediating the message. In Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content, eds. P.J. Shoemaker and S.D. Reese. White Plains, NY: Longman (second edition). Shoemaker, P. J. 1983. Bias and source attribution. Newspaper Research Journal 519: 25-31. Smith, A. D. 1992. National identity and the idea of European unity. International Affairs 681: 55-76.


81

Sreberny-Mohammadi, A. with K. Nordentreng, R. Stevenson and F. Ugboajah, eds. 1985. Foreign News in Media: International Reporting in 29 Countries. Paris: UNESCO. Stairs, D. 2000. Foreign Policy Consultations in a Globalizing World : The Case of Canada, the WTO, and the Shenanigans in Seattle. Enjeux publics (Décembre 18) atwww.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol1no8.pdf Statistics New Zealand. 2005. www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/Articles/ census-snpsht-cult-diversity-Mar02.htm [accessed 10 June 2006]. Stempel, G. and T. Hargrove. 1996. Mass Media Audiences in a Changing Media Environment. Journalism and Mass Communication 733: 549-558. Stråth, B. 2002. Introductory report. In Intercultural Dialogue,76-81. Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Union. Sutton, Jim. 2005. New Zealand Minister of State and Associate Minister for Trade Negotiations, interviewed by an author. Tonra, B. 2001. The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish Foreign policy in the European Union. Aldershot: Ashgate. Tuchman, G. 1978. Making news. New York: The Free Press. Vreese de, C. 2003. Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration. Amsterdam: Aksant. Walker, M. 2000/01. Europe: Superstate or Superpower? World Policy Journal 17, no. 4. The abstract is available at http://worldpolicy.org/journal/ sum00-4.html#2 [accessed 11 August 2006]. Weaver, D. H. and G.C. Wihoit. 1983. Foreign news values in two U.S. wire services: an update. Journal of Communication 332: 132-148. White, B. 2001. Understanding European Foreign Policy. Houndsmills: Palgave. Zambon, S. 2005. Visualizing Intangibles as Company Drovers of Innovation and Growth: Some Recent European Developments. Presentation at the NCRE, University of Canterbury (22 July).


SPEAKING THE EAST, FRAMING THE EAST OR SHAPING THE EAST? Peter Anderson Abstract The following discussion continues the exploration of the role of the written word and the media in the context of selected aspects and case studies from within Asia-EU relations. This contribution proposes a look ‘behind the scenes’, as it were, of the language used to delineate, critique and develop EU-Asia relations. The author looks, in particular, at the ways in which the political, economic and cultural facets of EU-Asia interaction are represented, ‘framed’ and ‘constructed’ in selected key international newspapers, namely the Financial Times and the Economist. The piece also de-constructs the language used in a representative sample of official EU documentation, in order to characterise, and give shape to, EU-Asia relations. The author offers an analytical perspective informed by social-constructivist approaches and discourse analysis. He focuses on the ways in which ‘values’ and ‘identities’ are used in the ‘ideational’ construction of the contemporary EU-Asia political space. This study comprises an investigation of what is going on behind the language used both in EU documentation and in selected key international news media relating to EU-Asia relations. The EU documentation analysis focuses particularly on material relating to human rights issues, trade deals and general political relations involving Asia, and includes the accompanying press releases. The selected news media are the London editions of The Financial Times and The Economist. The Financial Times, often referred to as the ‘house

84

Peter Anderson

journal’ of the EU Commission (a description The FT is not comfortable with), is chosen because it is the business newspaper/website that is most widely read by European business and political elites across the EU and also has a strong base and elite readership in Asia. While matters are complicated by the fact that The FT now produces both an Asian edition and an online edition (and, indeed, an online Chinese language edition), our resource-constrained ability to monitor only the London edition is not a significant weakness in so far as the key Asian stories make it into both the Hong Kong and London editions. They do so simply because of the importance of the issues to which they relate for both of the increasingly heavily inter-connected continents. The Economist is also read by relevant sectors of the elites on both continents and is the publisher also of the European Voice, another EU elite and insider publication. While The Financial Times group has a 50% stake in The Economist, the editorial policies of both publications remain completely distinct. These two news products are useful indicators of the way in which EU elites have EU-Asia relations framed for them by the specialist pan-European/international news print media which they use. The fact that they both aim at Asian elite markets means that they are useful also as case studies of the extent to which key news products headquartered in the EU engage in constructivist discourse with those elites. The language of the chosen EU documentation in turn potentially should provide useful clues as to how the EU wishes to describe and structure its relationship with Asia. One of the avenues investigated is the degree to which the language and framing of EU press releases is reflected in the above mentioned specialist news media. The paper examines the ways that values and identities are used within the discourses examined and what Wiessala, drawing on Fairclough (2001), describes as the ‘ideational’ construction of the EU-Asia political space. As far as the news media are concerned, one of the great debates has been the extent to which the frames that they use and the overt and/or covert bias within them actually influence and shape the views of their audiences. It has been argued frequently, for example, that most newspaper readers are ‘pre-prejudiced’ in so far as they prefer to buy the newspaper that most suits their political viewpoint. From this point of view, the written and online news media most generally

SPEAKING THE EAST, FRAMING THE EAST OR SHAPING THE EAST?

85

reflect and reinforce rather than re-shape their audience’s view of the world. It is reasonable to assume cautiously that most of the regular readers of the two selected publications choose them because they find that the way they report and comment on the world largely fits their own view of how the job should be done, or at the very least, is closer to such a view than competing news sources. Should they not report events and issues in this way then it would be expected that their circulations would show significant declines over a twelve months period and that, unless editorial policy dictated otherwise, their readers’ dissatisfaction would be highly visible within their letters pages. While, mindful of the limitations of available evidence, it is not intended to make the case any more strongly than this, it is useful to bear such considerations in mind when analysing both the ways in which The FT and The Economist frame EU-Asia relations and the potential importance of their efforts. The means that will be used to detect the relevant key characteristics of language use in the framing of EU-Asia relations by both the chosen news media and EU documentation/press releases is a specially adapted form of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The details of the framework that will be used here are set out below. Methodology One of the most methodologically refined means of attempting to unpick the role of language in shaping and in turn being shaped by social, economic, cultural and political practices is Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis framework as set out in ‘Media discourse’ (2001). His framework defines the critical discourse analysis of a communicative event as the analysis of relationships between three dimensions of that event, namely text, discourse practice and sociocultural practice. It demonstrates the crucial way in which discourse practices, which include both news production processes and the way in which the audience interprets the news, are the means by which texts and sociocultural practices affect each other. Fairclough goes on to argue that: Language use is, moreover, constitutive both in conventional ways which help to reproduce and maintain existing social identities, relations and systems of knowledge and belief, and in creative ways which help transform them (Fairclough 2001, 55).

86

Peter Anderson

Overall, Fairclough concludes that while the application of the comprehensive, multilayered framework that he sets down in ‘Media Discourse’ is the ideal practice in the pursuit of good quality critical discourse analysis, it is often impractical to use it all. Indeed, in Media Discourse he excuses himself from an application of the comprehensive framework. He states that this is justified, providing the analyst keeps the overall framework in mind while carrying out selective applications of its constituent parts. It was this logic that provided the justification for the selective application of ideas largely drawn from Fairclough’s work in the 1999 study of the relationship between the EU and the British press, Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union (Anderson and Weymouth). In its ‘full blown’ form Fairclough’s framework would have been simply too consuming of time and wordage to have made it a practical means of analysing the large number of texts that were examined within that study. The success of the Anderson and Weymouth ‘offshoot’ in facilitating a highly productive analysis of a large number of newspaper texts has prompted the decision to use a similar approach to the construction of a framework here. Resources dictate that the number of texts examined will not be as large, but the job still far exceeds the capacity of the full-blown Fairclough framework to handle it. The framework employed here requires the application of the concepts of representations and identities, given the importance of the ideational dimension. Time, resource and space limitations mean that it is not possible to investigate also the impact of such key influences as discourse practices and sociocultural practices, but the application of the two core analytical tools mentioned above should enable us to uncover the key ideational functions of the texts that are examined within the study. To help us in this task we will be applying the concepts of overt bias and covert bias as defined in Anderson and Weymouth (1999), together with the understanding of ideology also used in Anderson and Weymouth and defined originally within Fairclough (Anderson and Weymouth 1999). For our purposes here this might be roughly defined as, ‘those presuppositions and assumptions within a particular discourse style which are realised linguistically and assumed to be held in common between writer and


87

public relating to what Habermas has called a shared ‘lifeworld’ (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, 17). In line with the purposes of the wider study, of which the present paper is a part, this framework will be employed to try and establish the ways that values and identities are used within the discourses examined and the ideational construction of the EU-Asia political space. The resources available to the author have made it feasible to: i) analyse, in the manner described above, the weekly Economist over a six months period (June-October 2006), with the June, September and October issues all being analysed in-depth, and then back this up by random sampling analysis of the issues from the intervening months; ii) analyse The Financial Times (published six days a week) on a daily, in depth basis during June, September and October 2006, and then back this up by supplementary random sampling analysis during the intervening months (which was later extended to November and December as resources permitted); iii) analyse a large and representative selection of EU-Asia documentation and press releases during June-October 2006 to determine the extent to which the language of the chosen EU texts provides useful clues as to how the EU wishes to describe and structure its relationship with Asia. As pointed out in the introduction, one of the avenues that will be investigated is the degree to which the language and framing of EU press releases is reflected in the above mentioned specialist news media. Given the strict word limit for the paper and the detailed analysis required by the use even of this partial application of a CDA framework, the case studies and examples selected from the above research programme necessarily are limited in number, but are chosen to be representative of carefully researched trends. Now that the research methodology has been explained the results of its application can be discussed. EU official documentation and press releases concerning Asia The key themes at the heart of much of the documentation focusing on EU-Asia relations analysed here have been around for some time. In a broad sense, the EU documentation publicly available during the study period is very explicit regarding the underlying aims of EU-Asia policy. They are multifaceted, multilayered and often linked and show very clearly the ways in which, at a declaratory level at least, the EU

88

Peter Anderson

hopes to change and shape its Asian partners. Some of those aims can be seen to underlie even apparently simple and straightforward press releases on emergency aid to Asian states, as will be shown in the next section. First, it would be useful to provide a summary of the overt aims that detailed analysis of official documentation and press releases on EU-Asia relations reveals. This shows how, in its various written texts, the EU demonstrates a desire to help Asia to become more wealthy and more stable economically and politically, via various forms of bilateral and multilateral assistance and cooperation agreements, to: 1. help fulfil the EU’s external development obligations and benefit the poorer states; 2. turn the lesser developed and emerging Asian states into new markets for the EU; 3. strengthen Asia overall so that it can become a partner that is sufficiently strong to help redress the economic and political power balance that currently operates too much in US interests; 4. make the EU’s border areas more secure; 5. do this partially via the encouragement of moves towards democracy and human rights in return for economic assistance in places like Kazakhstan, but to pursue also the goal of human rights for its own sake; 6. further secure the EU’s borders by being able to encourage increasing cooperation in the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. The aim is also to: 7. promote human rights, wider democratic values or at the very least closer political relations and cooperation through raising the profile of the EU as a significant provider of economic, educational, technical assistance, etc. so that it becomes more readily identified as a political role model in Asian eyes; 8. facilitate support for the EU’s Asian policy at home by raising its profile and awareness of its positive aspects within member states.


89

Prior words of caution and qualification It is not possible to judge the precise extent to which all of these aims are pursued as priorities by looking at the texts of the press releases and the relevant official documentation alone. For example, a degree of caution needs to be displayed when viewing the clearly stated concerns about human rights that are present within key EU documentation concerning, for instance, China. In this regard Fairclough’s three stages of a communication process – the production process, the text itself and the interpretation of the text by the reader (Fairclough 2001) – need to be borne in mind. When we consider these one problem becomes apparent immediately. This derives from the fact that textual analysis alone doesn’t allow us to see the degree to which the governments of each key member state agreed on the relative priority of various aspects of Chinese human rights policy – relative to aspects of trade policy and other major concerns – during their part in the production process of the official texts of relevant documentation. Nor can we see how the Commission, as an intimate participant in the text construction and negotiations that formed part of this process, has in turn translated any nuances that it has observed in key member state positions into the way it negotiates with the Chinese on behalf of the EU. Equally, an examination of the publicly available text alone does not allow us to see how the Chinese government in turn might interpret it, particularly in the light of their own knowledge of any differences between EU states relating to such priorities. Maybe the fact that some of the documentation notes that the Chinese have not been delivering anything near the anticipated level of reforms (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 4) is indicative that they perceive the EU’s priorities to be rather more oriented towards trade and international politics and that human rights concerns are in practice lower down the list than these pressing concerns. While it is not the job of this paper to investigate what the Chinese and various EU governments think in private about the relative importance of the human rights concerns pointed to in publicly available EU documentation, the fact that those thoughts might have a substantial impact upon the real constitutive power of the language within that material needs to be kept constantly in mind.

90

Peter Anderson

The real constitutive power as opposed to the constitutive nature of the language used in EU documentation and press releases also obviously is affected by the strength of the bargaining position of the EU relative to the various Asian states that it engages with. The documentation demonstrates clearly and unsurprisingly that the major relationship is with China, for whom the EU became its largest trading partner in 2004 (Commission of the European Communities 2006b). Paradoxically it is the Union’s ideological commitment to economic globalisation that has helped boost China’s economic strength so dramatically and in so doing has both increased Chinese importance to the EU’s economy and China’s importance and leverage as an emergent superpower whose help and cooperation is needed on issues ranging from the proliferation of nuclear weapons to climate change. The EU’s commitment to globalisation, recently reiterated by Commissioner Mandelson (Commission of the European Communities 2006c), together with its citizens’ desire for the cheap manufactured products that economic globalisation allows China to export into the Union, leaves the EU with a much reduced armoury in its attempts to rebalance its trade with the oriental giant. In turn this leaves it with less leverage across all of its relationships with Beijing than otherwise would been the case. Such considerations should cause analysts to be cautious therefore about the real constitutive power of the clearly constitutive language used within official publicly available documentation concerning relations between the EU and China. The discourse itself Bearing in mind the above caveats, it can be noted that the constitutive nature of EU discourse towards the Asian states with which it conducts significant relations is almost entirely overt. Just as the Union insists that prospective member states meet a minimum set of requirements relating to their economic and political practices, so it holds itself up as a model to those Asian states to whom it is an aid supplier and/or a significant trading partner – a liberal democratic/economic ideal which it expects they should move towards in the conduct of their own internal affairs. This displays obviously both a clear notion of self identity as a well functioning model of political and economic best practice and an equally clear vision of many of its Asian partners as ‘The Other’, those who fall significantly


91

short of the ideal and are therefore impeding key goals of the EU relating to the underlying conditions necessary for global political, economic and social stability. Some brief but pointed examples can be given to illustrate the nature of the discourse that characterises the EU’s public projection of its relations with Asian states. In a communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning China of October 2006, for example, it is stated that: To tackle the key challenges facing Europe today – including climate change, employment, migration, security – we need to leverage the potential of a dynamic relationship with China based on our values’ (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 2).

The last three words of this quote state very explicitly the EU’s intention of utilising discourse that will spread its values in preference to Asian values and of reshaping aspects of Chinese policy in the process of so doing. Similarly in the same document it is noted that: The EU must consider how it can most effectively assist China’s reform process, making the case that better protection of human rights, a more open society and more accountable government would be beneficial to China, and essential for continued economic growth. Democracy, human rights and the promotion of common values remain fundamental tenets of EU policy and of central importance to bilateral relations. The EU should support and encourage the development of a full, healthy and independent civil society in China. It should support efforts to strengthen the rule of law – an essential basis for all other reform. At the same time, the EU will continue to encourage full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms in all regions of China; freedom of speech, religion and association, the right to a fair trial and the protection of minorities call for particular attention – in all regions of China. The EU will also encourage China to be an active and constructive partner in the Human Rights Council, holding China to the values which the UN embraces, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 4).

Again, the intent to pursue a constitutive discourse in EU-China relations is completely overt in the above quotation. However, the Commission’s awareness that the constitutive power of such discourse so far has been limited is shown both in straightforward statements that this has indeed been the case and via the observation that EU dialogues with China on human rights and those of individual

92

Peter Anderson

member states on the same subject ought to be better coordinated. The latter is perhaps a tacit recognition of the point made earlier, that it is possible for individual member states to send messages to the Chinese government that are different to those of the EU, potentially undermining the force of its discourse on human rights. However, the above is not just a statement of the Commission’s desire to pursue a particular form of constitutive discourse. The very fact that it is made within an open access document that it knows very well will be read by Chinese officials and politicians as well as the EU institutions makes it already part of a discourse between the EU and China. On this level of analysis it can be seen as a prior statement of intent to the Chinese concerning the changes that the EU Commission at least wishes to see them make in their system of governance and law, a reiteration of the expectations that the EU has in its relationship with ‘the Other’ that states like China constitute, and a statement of dissatisfaction with China’s performance in the field of human rights so far. On yet another level it is constitutive with regard to the other EU institutions, in so far as it is attempting to persuade them of the need for changing key aspects of the EUChina dialogue in order to try and make the process more effective in terms of results. It offers specific prescriptions to this end (Commission of the European Communities 2006a, 4-5). The expectation of the Commission would be that journalists on both of our case study news products would read such documentation in full (not least because The Economist has as its sister publication European Voice). Its press releases concerning new official documentation therefore have the main job of alerting such journalists to the availability of the same, and the range and importance of the material covered within it, in order that they may then prioritise it for reading and a possible report, commentary, etc. For some journalists on other quality newspapers the press release will be as far as they go unless there appear to be angles that will be of major interest to their home news desks. What the press release relating to the above Commission communication (Commission of the European Communities 2006c) tries to get across is the extremely broad range of issues on which the EU and China are now engaging and thinking of engaging and the fact that China represents a major opportunity as well as a challenge for the Union. What is notable however is that it is


93

made clear that China can only become the desired opportunity if it changes significantly in line with Western principles and that the incentive for this on China’s part is the EU’s argument that to do so would be to the benefit of both sides and not just Europe’s. Whenever such aspects of the EU-China discourse are picked up by The FT or/and The Economist this fact will be noticed by those charged with monitoring the Western media in Beijing and will become one more part of the constitutive discourse between the EU and China. Another example of clearly constitutive discourse can be observed in a press release relating to relations between the EU and Kazakhstan. This contains the text of a speech given by the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy in Kazakhstan. The discourse is entirely overt and portrays the EU in its self-proclaimed identity as a democratic role model speaking to The Other, in the form of a state that it claims could benefit from becoming more in tune with the EU mode of democratic governance. In this regard the discourse is very much one of the carrot and the stick. The carrot, for example, is visible in the following extract: You may already be aware of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s foreign policy instrument designed to help our direct neighbours to our east and south come closer to the EU and benefit from our area of stability, security and prosperity. It contains many attractive elements, like a stake in our internal market, and participation in EU networks and programmes. We are currently thinking about how we could make some of these elements available to our neighbours’ neighbours who demonstrate a real commitment to implement genuine democratic and economic reforms. We hope Kazakhstan would be one of those who could benefit. (Commission of the European Communities, 2006d).

The stick, on the other hand, is equally visible towards the end of the speech: Kazakhstan has made clear its desire to hold the OSCE Presidency in 2009 (…) OSCE Presidencies must, however, uphold the values of the organisation, and be seen to hold the civil and political rights of their citizens in the highest regard. For that reason, we are hoping for signals from the highest level in Kazakhstan that the necessary political reforms, for example to the media and electoral laws and to the Constitution, will be carried out in the coming year. We would very much like to support Kazakhstan’s OSCE Presidency bid (…) But that cannot be at the expense of the OSCE’s core values. We hope that Kazakhstan takes the initiative

94

Peter Anderson and shows us that it will be a Presidency that we can be proud of (Commission of the European Communities 2006d).

Most of the other press releases monitored during the June-October 2006 study period mentioned many of the aims of the EU’s Asia policy listed at the beginning of this section, but not all contained the same worries about human rights as the documentation relating to countries like China or Kazakhstan. The press releases detailing the state of relations between the EU and Singapore and Malaysia, together with the purposes of the imminent visits of the External Relations Commissioner to these countries in October 2006, for example, contain no mention whatsoever of human rights concerns. The focus entirely is on many of the other aims of EU policy set out at the beginning of this section with, in the case of Singapore, a particular emphasis on its economic importance within the context of ASEAN (Commission of the European Communities 2006e; Commission of the European Communities 2006f). When the focus returns to Central Asia, in a press release issued on the same day as those relating to Malaysia and Singapore, however, the identity of ‘The Other’ emerges once more in its full form. It does so with a key reminder of the EU’s self-appointed mission to help remould the region in an image that is more reflective of the Union’s concerns for human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law (Commission of the European Communities 2006g). Covert aims within EU press releases Finally, it is important to bear in mind that while most of the aims underlying the EU’s Asia policy and the ways in which it hopes to remould specific Asian societies are overt within its publicly available discourse, it is also possible to identify discourse that quite probably contains covert messages. For example, when two of the EU’s previously stated aims are considered, namely those which make clear its concern to: 1. promote human rights, wider democratic values or at the very least closer political relations and cooperation through raising the profile of the EU as a significant provider of economic, educational, technical assistance, etc. so that it becomes more readily identified as a political role model in Asian eyes;


95

2. facilitate support for the EU’s Asian policy at home by raising its profile and awareness of its positive aspects within member states; then apparently innocuous, straightforwardly factual press releases on emergency aid assistance provided to Asian countries recently can be argued to have other layers of communication built into them. In addition to simply providing necessary information about EU spending, such documents could be argued to be intended to pursue the agenda set out in the last two points above, as well as the Union’s stated policy goal of helping lesser developed states for humanitarian reasons. They could also be seen as means of advancing the Commission’s general goal of associating the EU with positive things in the public eye. A lengthy and detailed press release on the European Commission’s response to the South Asia earthquake is a particularly good example of all of this (Commission of the European Communities 2006h). We can now turn to see, from a comparative point of view, how our chosen news media portrayed EU-Asia relations during the same period and beyond and the extent to which official documentation fed through into their reporting. The EU-Asia discourse of The Financial Times and The Economist There was evidence suggestive of a direct feed through from parts of the EU’s documentation into the coverage provided by both The Financial Times and The Economist, in so far as stories in both echoed the EU’s concerns to promote reform in the economic practices of key Asian states, particularly with regard to such things as the removal of trade barriers, the improvement of infrastructure and the lessening of the problems of corruption (for example, The Economists of June 10-16: 65, June 3-9: Leader; September 9-15: 98, September 30-October 6: 4950, October 21-27: 54, and The Financial Times of June 29: 1, June 23: 24). However, given The Economist’s noticeable Atlanticist slant (as well as its ‘free trade’ origins historically) and the fact that some of these concerns are also US concerns, together with the fact that EU documentation is rarely mentioned by its journalists, some degree of caution ought to be exercised in its case regarding the extent of EU as opposed to US influence over its story agenda.

96

Peter Anderson

EU concerns with the potential role of the major Asian industrial powers in helping to deal with the problem of climate change are also echoed in the discourse of both of these titles, and the fact that this is more of an issue in Europe than in the USA, means that it might be reasonable to assume that in this case the influence on The Economist’s story agenda is more European than American. For example, it notes: ( ...) Coal is cheap. Coal is dirty. America has lots of coal and China has vast reserves to fuel its economic boom. And rocketing natural-gas prices have led to a boom in the building of coal-fired power plants in recent years. When it comes to the contribution of individual countries, America is still the principal source of greenhouse gases, but China is closing in and India is coming up from behind. If those three and Europe took the problem seriously, there would be a good chance of solving it (The Economist, September 9 2006, 53).

On some occasions, in the FT, specific references are made to relevant EU documentation as the main source for a report (for example, The Financial Times of 25 October, 2006). But even where such references are not made the FT’s coverage often suggests that it is informed by the reading of relevant background EU documentation. While there are occasional references to democracy and human rights in both publications, most specifically with regard to China, for example, the main focus of coverage is on the enormous economic potential of key parts of Asia and the obstacles that are perceived to stand in the way of this being fully recognised, as one might expect from such business oriented publications. A key difference between them exists however in that, mindful of its large American conservative readership, prescriptively presented conservative Western liberal economic values are very visible at both an overt and a covert level in The Economist’s coverage of the economic and political practices within Asian states. For instance, speaking of the situation in India in October 2006 it noted that The government’s economic reformists (…) promote a liberalising measure that will help boost investment, fix India’s lousy infrastructure and create jobs. They find themselves howled down by a coalition of their Communist allies, leftists in Mr Singh’s own Congress party and other activists, who accuse them of being anti-poor. The latest confrontation, however, over the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), is different. This time the criticism comes not just from the usual suspects


97

but also from some of the reformists, many economists and even some leading industrialists (The Economist, 10-16 October, 45-46).

At a simplistic level the overt bias in the above passage could be translated as ‘western free market measures = good news for Asian economies, localised political/cultural etc. opposition to such measures = bad news.’ The covert bias is present in the use of such words as, ‘the usual suspects’, ‘howled down’ and ‘create jobs’. The term ‘the usual suspects’ suggests that opposition to western economic liberalism comes from a group of long established conspiratorial trouble makers who are intent on damaging local interests. It fails totally to take into account or deal with the reservations that the opposition might have about the impact that liberal measures could have on things that are highly valued within the local culture as opposed to a western culture. To say that the reformists were ‘howled down’ is to imply that the opposition to western liberal prescriptions comes only from a bullying and unthinking mob incapable of engaging with matters on a sophisticated level. Finally, even such a simple notion as the suggestion that the western liberal measures will ‘create jobs’ and, by implication, be beneficial is problematic in so far as again, it fails to mention or engage with the serious local concerns that might counterbalance the apparent benefits of the jobs that allegedly would have been created. In another report with the headline, ‘Can India fly’, the conservative western bias is so heavy it hardly needs to be analysed: Despite its high potential market (…) India has been a daunting place to do business, its entrepreneurs chained down by the world’s most bureaucratic bureaucracy, lousy infrastructure and lousy Fabian economic ideas (…) (The Economist, 3-9 June 2006, Leader).

The presence of ideological sub-texts is obvious, with ‘lousy infrastucture’ and pervasive bureaucracy being ongoing themes for The Economist. However, the distaste for left of centre views is perhaps the most telling presence in this extract with the reference to ‘lousy Fabian economic ideas’ and the idea that India’s entrepreneurs are ‘chained down’ by them. These themes are echoed in yet another report with the headline, ‘Battle on’: Cutting subsidies (…) is among (…) the most important reforms to India’s hobbled public finances (…) ‘Left’ parties such as the communists have

98

Peter Anderson called a national protest for July 13 (…) Not for the first time this government’s opposition seems to come from its notional supporters (The Economist, 10-16 June 2006, 65).

Once more, The Economist makes clear its view that local ‘left’ inspired ideas on the running of the Indian economy are ‘hobbling’ its economic growth. In The Economist’s coverage overall there is little attempt to provide the reader with an understanding of matters from an Indian perspective or the reasons why liberal economics might be viewed with caution for reasons that are not purely ‘communist’ or ‘Fabian’. Theirs is very much an analysis based on clearly Western values with an implied, constitutive prescription deriving specifically from these. If The Economist’s coverage of India and China were to be summarised in a proverbial nutshell then it would be as follows. Western ‘capitalism’ has engaged vigorously with the economies of both countries and the potential for further involvement, if not limitless, is massive. The market is both wary and impatient at the same time. As one of the project’s research assistants noted in his summary comments accompanying the texts monitored within The Economist during June 2006, ‘The Economist seems to be saying if only China was not centrally governed by a communist regime! If only India was undamaged by its colonial past and less suspicious of foreigners. If only both countries could bring the internal opposition to freeing up the market to heel, and if their respective banking systems could be accessed as freely as those in the west or elsewhere in the world!’ As has been noted above, all these reservations are presented within a wholly western system of market values. The Financial Times on the other hand has an arguably more sophisticated readership to satisfy and that is reflected in coverage that at its best attempts to see matters from both local and Western viewpoints and sometimes to suggest ways in which Western businesses might solve problems by tuning in to local political, social and cultural concerns. Its stories were not found always to be of a consistent standard with regard to background, context and balance during the monitoring period, but the high points of that coverage clearly demonstrate its commitment to the kind of balanced and locally informed reporting that the investors and policy makers among its (from an advertiser’s point of view) extremely high value readership


99

demand. The FT, in other words, makes a serious attempt to ‘speak the east’ as well as frame it, whereas The Economist for the most part contents itself with simply framing the east within its own value structure. The Financial Times’ relatively balanced approach might be summarised as one that adopts a ‘warts and all’ selection process in the news room. Concerns about China’s approach to human rights or corruption both at home and abroad, most particularly in Africa, are covered with appropriate rigour ( see, for example, The Financial Times of 27 and 28 October 2006 and 1, 2, 10, November 2006) , while at the same time China’s own problems and worries in its dealings with the West are explored. This was particularly the case in its excellent special report on China of December 2006. Whereas in one part of the supplement the more dubious aspects of China’s approach to its Africa policy were reiterated, in another, focusing on China’s automotive sector, the difficulties that sections of Chinese home grown industry are facing when trying to compete with giant foreign multinationals are explained sympathetically. For example: One difficulty for domestic car-makers is the heavy foreign presence. When Toyota and Honda in Japan and Hyundai in Korea were learning their trade, they enjoyed relatively insulated domestic markets. But the Chinese companies are up against almost every international car-maker in their own back yard (…). In other words, the Chinese brands have a huge fight on their hands to remain relevant (Financial Times 12 December 2006).

As far as thinking sensibly and sensitively about the local culture is concerned, in the main body of the London edition of the newspaper, on the same day, a report on Deutsche Bank’s Chinese arm emphasises the benefits for Western companies of tuning into the Asian political and social cultures in which they operate instead of complaining about them. It quotes approvingly a senior bank official who states that: Banking is not about wining and dining but being client-focused. In China, we give executives advice about macroeconomic and social issues. For example, the current focus [among politicians in Beijing] is on the need to create a harmonious society in which farmers and rural society also benefit from economic growth. To be good corporate citizens, companies need to be aware and act on this (Financial Times 12 December 2006).

100

Peter Anderson

Conclusion Overall, several clear findings can be drawn from this investigation. First, during the study period it was clear that a multilayered constitutive discourse was present in EU publicly available official documentation and press releases relating to Asia. This was directed both at Asian elites and relevant sectors of the domestic EU audience and while predominantly overt contained covert elements as well. Much of it was written from the point of view of a strong EU self identity, in which the Union is a political and economic exemplar communicating directly and indirectly with an Asian ‘Other’ that often fails to meet Western standards in economic or political behaviour. At its most pronounced this discourse contained clear ‘carrot and stick’ elements, as in the attempt to persuade the Kazakh government of the advisability of moving more towards Western European behaviour and standards. Second, a clear overt and covert constitutive discourse was present in The Economist also, the starting point of which was a clear idea of the superiority of Western political and economic practices over those of the major emerging Asian economic powers. Both China and India were framed very much as an ‘Other’ that was subject to irrational inefficiencies and problematic political-economic ideas together with large amounts of corruption. While offering the West huge potential profits, both societies can not fully deliver on these until they themselves become more like the West. Third, The Financial Times, mindful of the need of the elite investors and policy makers at the heart of its economically high value readership for balanced and accurate information, sets out not only to frame the East but also to speak it. As far as its general reporting and analysis is concerned, the constitutive elements of its discourse are more directed at trying to persuade its Western readers of the advantages of tuning into Asian political, social and economic cultures in order to most successfully access the business opportunities on offer. Its reporting overall (bearing in mind earlier comments about occasional exceptions) is characterised by the balanced (in relation to the specific contexts of Western liberal and Asian values) presentation and analysis of the information that its target audience needs to know. Many of the aims of EU official discourse on Asia set down towards the beginning of this analysis are reflected thematically in the


101

news coverage of both The FT and The Economist. In the case of the latter, there is undoubtedly some overlap with the constitutive aspects of the EU discourse relating to the need for economic and environmental reform, for example. As pointed out previously, however, the fact that there is also some overlap with Atlanticist agendas needs to be remembered when making judgments about the sources possibly behind Economist reports. In the case of The Financial Times, while EU documentation is sometimes referred to explicitly, it is doubtful that this is done with a constitutive intention on the part of the newspaper, for the reasons outlined above. However, the fact that the sentiments that characterise the documents or other official EU sources used by FT journalists, such as the Commission’s spokespersons service, are reported and then read by the newspaper’s Asian audience, could be argued to add to the subtle pressures on the Asian governments concerned and therefore to be potentially constitutive in their effect. Finally, the above findings should be treated with a degree of caution because both of the limitations of the project’s finances, which restricted the data monitoring period, and of the word limit for this analysis, which necessarily restricts the predominant focus to the two emerging giants, India and China. However, it is believed that the study was of a sufficient scale to yield results that are both useful and suggestive in their own right and which will provide a constructive foundation for future studies.

References Anderson, Peter J. and Anthony Weymouth. 1999. Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. Harlow: Longman. Commission of the European Communities. 2006a. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities, 24.10.2006. COM(2006) 632 final. Commission of the European Communities. 2006b. The EU’s relations with Asia: Overview. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ external_relations/ asia/index.htm Commission of the European Communities. 2006c. Press release, EU-China relations: Commission sets out its strategy, 24 October. IP/06/1454. Available at:

102

Peter Anderson

http:/europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1454& format=HTML Commission of the European Communities. 2006d. Press release, The European Union and Central Asia – building a 21st century partnership. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/ 615&forma Commission of the European Communities. 2006e. Press release, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to visit Singapore on 10th October, 6 October. IP/06/1335. Available at: http//europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference =IP/06/1335&format=HT Commission of the European Communities. 2006f. Press release, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to visit Malaysia on 9th October, 6 October. IP/06/1336. Available at: http//europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference =IP/06/1336&format=HT Commission of the European Communities. 2006g. Press release, Council appoints new EU special representative for Central Asia, 6 October. PRES/06/277. Available at: http//europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference= PRES/06/277&format= Commission of the European Communities. 2006h. Press release, ‘One year on: the Commission of the European Communities’s response to the South Asia earthquake’, 6 October. MEMO/06/366. Available at: http//europa.eu.int/ rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/ 06/366&format Fairclough, Norman. 2001. Media Discourse. London: Arnold. The Economist – various issues as cited. The Financial Times – various issues as cited.


THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR IN ASIA: DEFINING AND THEORISING EU-ASIA RELATIONS Michael Smith and Natee Vichitsorasatra Abstract This chapter provides a wide-ranging, theoretical, ‘grounding’ for many aspects of current EU-Asia interaction. It looks at the roles of ‘material interests’, ‘ideas’ and ‘institutions’, in the framework of EU-Asia collaboration in the 21st Century. What follows is derived from an examination of the ‘diversity’ and the ‘complexity’ of current East-West dialogue. The analysis in this section is further set against the background of the historical legacies, geo-politics, political institutions and foreign policy choices of Asia-Europe. The authors investigate both EU collective action across Asia, and the ‘projection’ of EU policies into the region, with reference to concepts drawn from classical political theory, such as Neo-liberalism, Institutional Theory and Neo-mercantilism. However, the chapter also embraces an in-depth examination of the place of ‘norms’ and ‘ideas’ in EU-Asia contacts. The authors offer some key conclusions as to the European Union’s functions as a policy-planner, a coherent dialogue partner and a ‘pro-active cosmopolitan’, across much of the Asian Continent. This chapter aims to provide a dissection of the ways in which the European Union relates to Asia in the broad sense, to appraise the ways in which the EU forms and pursues actions in relation to Asia, and to identify the key levels and forms of interaction that take place between the EU and Asia. The starting point is an apparent paradox: although the EU has had a strong recent tendency to develop strategies

104

Michael Smith and Natee Vichitsorasatra

for dealing with and engaging in Asia (see Annex), it is not clear that these strategies demonstrate either a clear commitment to EU collective action on the part of Member States and EU institutions or a coherent set of policy principles and policy instruments with which to address the principles of EU-Asia relations. As a result, the EU is still beset with problems of policy preferences, priorities and instruments in its relations with Asia, and this connects with wider problems of ‘European foreign policy’ and European identity in the global arena. Partly, these problems are those of conceptualisation, both on the part of the EU itself and on the part of policy analysts; partly also, they are problems of policy evaluation and the ways in which EU-Asia relations have been ‘learned’ by both the EU and its Member States. As a result, the EU faces persistent questions about policy definition, policy implementation and policy management, and about the ways in which EU-Asian cooperation can be pursued and developed. The central argument in the chapter thus rests on two pillars: first, the difficulty for the EU of establishing stable preferences and translating them into collective action in relation to a complex and dynamic ‘target’, and second, the extent to which EU relations with Asia can be characterised a cooperative. The first part of the chapter investigates this issue by asking the question ‘how many Europes, how many Asias?’ in an attempt to uncover the sources of the EU’s collective action problems and the complexity of the challenges and opportunities offered by the Asian region. The second part of the chapter extends this analysis by exploring questions of collective action and cooperation: how is it possible to conceptualise the questions faced by the EU when it comes to acting in respect of Asia, and establishing stable patterns of cooperation with Asia? In addressing this question, we make use of a range of ideas from international relations, international political economy and European integration studies, in particular those that focus on the differences between ‘logics of consequences’ and ‘logics of appropriateness’ in processes of international collective action and cooperation, and we introduce the notion of a ‘logic of engagement’. We also make an important distinction between two types of theory: ‘analytical theory’, as applied to EU-Asia relations, and ‘practitioner-theory’, as generated by, and embedded within, EU policies towards Asia.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR IN ASIA

105

How Many Europes, How Many Asias? As noted above, the past decade has seen a high level of EU activity aimed at defining and developing the Union’s relations with its Asian partners (Smith 1998; Dent 1997, 1999; Forster 2000; Preston and Gilson 2001; Wiessala 2002). As a result, significant resources have been committed to Asia strategy, and considerable attention has been paid to the development of policy principles, frameworks and agendas. At one level, this process can be seen as part of the evolution of institutions and policy-making within the EU itself – that is, as part of an emerging ‘European foreign policy’. There is also no doubt that this activity has been a response to the growing economic, diplomatic and security issues emerging from developments in Asia itself and in the relations between Asia and Europe. This means that EU-Asia relations essentially reflect the impact of dynamic processes of institutional and policy change at two levels – the European level and the inter-regional level – and that analysis has to take account of the complexity and diversity thus created. We argue that there are three essential elements to this evolution, and that these feed directly into the problems of conceptualisation and operationalisation that we will explore later in the article. Each element can be conceived in terms of diversity and complexity. The first relates to ‘voices’ and ‘histories’; the second to institutional engagement and structure; and the third to issues, both within EUAsian relations and between them and the rest of the global arena. The overall nature of EU-Asian relations as shaped by these forces can be characterised as a form of multi-dimensional inter-regional relations raising problems of policy-making and governance for all of those involved in it. Let us look first at diversity and complexity of ‘voices’ and ‘histories’. At the European level, we are confronted with a policy-making process and a series of intergovernmental constellations that can seem bewildering (Hill and Smith 2005; White 2001; and many others). This is not the place to chart in detail the long history of moves towards a ‘European foreign policy’, but a number of important baseline points can be made. First, there has been an intimate link between the development of what might be termed the ‘EU order’ and the projection of ‘Europe’ as an international actor. Indeed, as some have argued (M.E. Smith 2003), the development of ‘European foreign

106


policy’ can be seen as a means of cementing the internal ‘EU order’ itself. Second, in this process, there has occurred the mutual entanglement of national ‘histories’ and ‘voices’ and those that express a collective ‘European’ narrative. There are thus inescapable problems of collective action in the context of ‘European foreign policy’, and these have deep historical and cultural roots as well as pragmatic expressions. Third, the process by which external policies have been ‘Europeanised’ through the integration and cooperation process is uneven: the strong Europeanisation visible in commercial policies broadly defined can be compared with the less strong but still considerable Europeanisation characteristic of foreign and security policies (Hill and Smith 2005, Introduction and Conclusion). Finally, the diversity of ‘histories’ and ‘voices’ is reflective of the variable engagement of European Union Member States with the outside world, and the extent to which they have established stakes in particular sectors or regions of global activity. This diversity and complexity of ‘histories’ and ‘voices’ in the EU context is paralleled if not exceeded by developments in Asia (Smith 1998; Preston 2001; Wiessala 2002, Chapter 2). As a target region for ‘European foreign policy’, Asia exhibits a number of key characteristics. First, the Asian region is vast, complex and at times even chaotic, to such an extent that it is often more convenient to divide it into a number of sub-regions – Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Asia-Pacific, for example. Whilst the ‘EU order’ can be seen as problematic and contested, it is actually much more difficult to talk in any sensible way about an ‘Asian order’ encompassing the entire continent. From the EU perspective, this poses challenges of responding to diversity, and also creates the temptation of ‘creating your own Asia’ in response to internal needs (see below). Second, there are only limited ‘islands’ of collective action going beyond the national level in Asia: this reinforces the point made above, and it means that collective action (or inaction) in Asia is a very uneven process. In terms of EU policy-making, when it comes to Asia there is no self-evident ‘it’ to relate to, and this reinforces the challenge for the EU in developing its own understanding – or misunderstanding – of the Asian region(s). Third, the development of foreign, security and commercial policies in Asia has been extraordinarily uneven in the recent period, with successive waves of


107

‘emergence’ by different national economies and the persistence of political tensions alongside attempts to foster cooperation. Despite the oft-touted notion of an ‘Asian model’, the reality of economic and political development in Asia is that of different, but co-existing national trajectories accompanied by immense dynamism but also at times by potential or actual instability. Finally, the effects of external intervention over a long historical period are clearly visible not only within Asian countries but also – and significantly – in their patterns of connection with other parts of the world, especially Europe. The presence of the Europeans, and the traces left by previous generations of involvement and intervention, is one of the inescapable properties of contemporary Asia. But it is also another source of unevenness and diversity. Alongside complexity and diversity of ‘histories’ and ‘voices’ in EUAsia relations is to be found a considerable diversity and complexity of institutions. At the European level, as already hinted, there is a complex interplay of national and ‘European’ institutional contexts, which creates a constant process of negotiation within and between agents and structures. When it comes to policy-making for external relations and foreign policy, the first set of such institutions established at the European level was those of external commercial policy. But these remain uncompleted, especially if one takes a broad definition of commercial policy that includes such areas as investment (Young 2002; Smith 2004). Although trade in goods and services is largely if not entirely handled through ‘European’ institutions, other areas of economic policy are unevenly Europeanised and manifest a complex series of relationships between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ institutional developments (Smith 2004; Vanhoonacker 2005). If one moves beyond external commercial policies, the ‘mixity’ of European institutional arrangements is notable, for example in the area of development policy and humanitarian activities. Here, the persistence of strong national institutions coupled with significant resources and with historical institutional engagements creates a continuous interplay of the national and the European (Arts and Dickson 2004; Lister 1999; Holland 2002). If one moves further into ‘foreign policy’, then the institutional balance is still further penetrated by the persistence of strong national policies and preferences, coupled with national control of key resources and operational control of their deployment (M.E.

108


Smith 2003, 2005). At the same time, this picture is further complicated by the presence of broader international institutions in which EU Member States often play central roles. In commercial policy, the WTO, in aid and development policy the UN and its specialised agencies, in foreign and security policy NATO, the UN and other international bodies all contribute to the policy calculations and to the formation of preferences and expectations that are central to the pursuit of a ‘European’ policy (see for example Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Elgström and Smith 2006). Just as Europe presents a picture of institutional diversity and complexity, so does Asia. We have already pointed to the diversity of constellations that can be assumed by Asian countries in different fields of activity, but we must point out here that this finds expression in institutional competition and overlap, which has important policy consequences (Preston 2001). There is a plethora of ‘Asian’ international organisations, but there is effectively no ‘Asian’ international organisation. Different sub-regions (or sub-continents) have developed different patterns of institutional growth to express the potential for collective action and cooperation; these coexist, they sometimes interpenetrate and often they compete for the attention of policy-makers. There is no regional or sub-regional organisation in Asia that approaches the institutional density or the transfer of policy competences that has been achieved in Europe. The reasons for this are many: historical, cultural, developmental, domestic and regional. The result is that the continent viewed as a target of ‘European’ policy presents many faces and thus many opportunities and challenges. The result of this, and one of the key aspects for our later investigation, is that the development of EU-Asian relations itself presents a picture of institutional diversity. ‘Trans-regional’ organisations coexist with ‘inter-regional’ organisations and with bilateral relations, both between the EU and Asian countries and between the EU’s Member States and individual countries (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; Forster 2000; Preston and Gilson 2001). Not only this, but these institutional links are themselves embedded within broader global and multilateral institutional contexts that often come into play, for example on issues of trade policy (Preston and Gilson 2001; Young 2002). As a result, hybrid forms such as ‘bi-multilateral’


109

relations, where bilateral and multilateral links overlap and intersect to form distinctive institutional contexts, can also proliferate. A final area of complexity and diversity that we need to outline here is that of diversity and complexity of issues. At the EU level, it is a given of policy making that the handling of any given issue will generate complex processes of linkage and of politicisation. This is true in commercial policy, where different national traditions, the interplay of national and European institutions and the demands of a changing global economy all contribute to the development of strong issue-linkages and the intensification of political competition on apparently technical questions (Smith 2004; Collinson 1999; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2005). It is true also in development and humanitarian policy, where the coexistence of strong national traditions and patterns of action coupled with differential sensitivities to developments in the broader global arena creates the potential for complex and often fraught negotiations over principles, priorities and resources (Lister 1999; Holland 2002). Not surprisingly, it is also a strong and consistent theme in foreign and security policies, not least because of the changing nature of diplomacy and security in the post-Cold War and now post-9.11 era (Hill 1998; Smith 2006). Indeed, these global trends and tendencies have contributed to a range of much broader, and more all-encompassing, processes of linkage and politicisation than were present in the earlier stages of ‘European foreign policy’. European collective action in external policy areas has grown up alongside the global developments that have politicised sectors such as trade, the environment and energy policy, and the intensification of European cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy field has been inextricable from the post-Cold War ‘disorder’ that was ratcheted even further up by the events of 2001. As the EU has developed new areas and a new intensity of external policy coordination, it has had to deal with a world in which new challenges and risks are ever-present. These trends towards issue diversity and complexity are also a characteristic both of the international relations of Asia and of the relations between the EU and Asia (Preston 1002; Tseng 2001). In the Asian context, the presence of political and economic dynamism and institutional diversity has contributed to what might at times appear a chaotic policy arena, with islands of cooperation coexisting with

110


intense competition and occasional overt conflict. There is a strong linkage between the international order of Asia and the rapidly changing internal orders of many Asian countries, which are themselves then linked pervasively with broader global issues. Simply to state this problem is to demonstrate the challenge facing EU policymakers in developing collective and consistent policy principles and priorities towards Asia. In terms of the classical development of EU external policies, the politicisation and linkage of issues in Asia (and elsewhere) has posed a major challenge to the established notion of ‘civilian power Europe’ at the same time as it has provided opportunities to move beyond a purely commercial involvement in one of the world’s most dynamic regions. This part of our argument has in effect only outlined the problem for policy and analysis. We have suggested that diversity and complexity both within the EU and within Asia create important challenges and opportunities for EU-Asia relations. We see the challenges and opportunities as centring on two key aspects of the EU’s international relations: first, the possibility of collective action at the EU level, and second, the potential for EU-Asia cooperation. In the remainder of the chapter, we outline ways in which we can establish a conceptual framework for the analysis of these problems, and we suggest some of the analytical and policy implications of such an analysis. Theorising EU-Asia relations In this part of the chapter, we explore the ways in which ideas from theories of international relations, international political economy and European integration can be mobilised to provide a framework for the analysis of EU-Asian relations. As noted above, our aim is to address the two key problems of EU collective action and EU-Asian cooperation. Our argument here relies upon three theoretical insights and their accompanying logics: first, the study of material interests and the logic of consequences; second, the study of ideational factors and the logic of appropriateness; finally, the study of institutional factors and the logic of engagement. These ideas are well-established in the literature, but we are combining them here to provide a series of propositions specifically directed towards the analysis of EU-Asian relations. In addition, we will pay attention to the two types of theory


111

noted earlier in the article: on the one hand the analytical theory that provides tools for investigation, on the other hand the practice-based theory that finds expression in the principles and practices of EU policies towards Asia. Our first concern is with analytical theory, and with theories based on the identification and analysis of material interests. What do these tell us about EU collective action and EU-Asian relations? The most clearly stated ideas here are those from Neo-Realism and NeoMercantilism. Neo-Realist thought, as represented classically by the ideas of Kenneth Waltz (1979), is grounded on a number of basic assumptions about the international system (anarchic), the primacy of one type of political unit (states) and the significant of the distribution of material capabilities among the units. States are conceived as equal, functionally undifferentiated actors, distinguished mainly by their relative capacity to carry out similar tasks. Preferences are ‘given’ and unchanging, and the purpose of policy is to pursue them with the most rational deployment of material capabilities. The close cousin of Neo-Realism, Neo-Mercantilism, extends this into the commercial realm, with an emphasis on the pursuit of relative gains in terms of prosperity and national economic stature (Gilpin 1987; Grieco and Ikenberry 2003; Stubbs and Underhill 2005). From this basic position can be deduced a series of propositions about the ways in which states will respond to shifts in the distribution of capabilities and to challenges from other states or groups of states. At first glance, the essentially state-centric focus of Neo-Realism and Neo-Mercantilism offers little in relation to the potential for EU collective action. The EU itself can be conceived of in Neo-realist and neo-Mercantilist terms as a form of peculiarly persistent alliance between European states, with the aim of maximising their individual power positions and extracting national advantage. This does not, though, mean that EU collective action is uninteresting: it is precisely because the EU has come together in such a persistent way, and has been granted certain transfer of national competence, that it can be conceived of as a potent actor in the global arena. It is a peculiar blend of the Westphalian, regulatory and post-modern state (Caporaso 1996) in which state power is an object of internal competition and external activities. It is a repository of interests that some might see as ‘second order’ (Hyde-Price 2006) but which have become of great

112


importance in the post-Cold War and globalising world. So EU collective action is of importance inasmuch as it (a) expresses significant national interests and alignments among EU Member States and (b) expresses the exercise of essentially state-like powers by the EU as a body. In relation to the EU’s policies towards other regions of the world, this means that there is likely to be a rather uneasy blend of collective and national interests, and that EU positions themselves are likely to express the ‘internal’ international relations of the Union and competition among Member States. When we extend this analysis to EU-Asia relations, we find that it provides interesting insights into the ways in which the EU might handle diversity and complexity. Because of those qualities, which are at a high level in the Asian region, we would expect the tensions between national and collective EU positions to be exacerbated. Put simply, there are important differences of material interest between EU Member States, and these are intersected by the diversity and complexity of the Asian arena. Not only this, but there are differences of material capabilities among EU Member States that will condition their willingness and capacity to engage in collective action, and differences of material reward that will accompany national or ‘European’ activity. When this is added to the dynamism and fluctuations of the Asian arena, we can see that the potential for collective EU action is likely to be uneven. By extension, this potential is likely to be greatest where there is the greatest material transfer of state-like powers to the EU, and least where this transfer is least. It is also likely to suffer badly where rapid changes of circumstances place a premium on the search for national advantage, and to persist where change is contained within manageable limits. To put it very crudely at this stage, we would expect under Neo-Realist and Neo-Mercantilist assumptions that EU collective action towards Asia would be most likely in the area of trade policy and least likely in areas of foreign and security policy, and especially in crisis situations. But this is only a proposition for testing. In similar fashion, we would expect that the prospects for EU-Asian cooperation under Neo-realist and Neo-Mercantilist assumptions would be at their strongest where there was a convergence of material interests and the capacity to muster material capabilities on a consistent basis. So where there is the strongest basis for collective


113

action by EU Member States, and the strongest material interest in cooperation, that is where cooperation is most likely to occur. Again, to put it crudely, we would expect EU-Asia cooperation to take place most consistently in trade policy and in bilateral relationships; the former, because that is where the EU’s collective action capacity is greatest, and the latter, because that is where in a diverse and complex Asian arena the calculation of material interests and possible advantage is most practical. We would expect that attempts to develop cooperation on a broad inter-regional basis would at best deal with second-order objectives and be liable to reverse or stagnation when the material interests they embodied ceased to be of any interest to the principal protagonists. Multilateral cooperation between the EU and Asia would at best lead to ‘cheap talk’ and at worst to diversion of attention from the real material interests of those involved. In a world where the logic of consequences is a key touchstone, it is only where material interests can be identified and acted upon, and where there are material payoffs or risks, that EU-Asian relations can be seen as significant. The second area of analytical theory to be explored here is ideational.1 As many scholars have pointed out since the end of the Cold War in particular, there are areas of international relations and international political economy that cannot be explained by the study of material interests and material capabilities (Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Glaser 2003). The study of the EU itself has attracted analysts working in this tradition, since approaches such as those of social constructivism offer the possibility of transcending state-based explanations and of understanding what is going on for the participants (see for example Bretherton and Vogler 2006). In place of material interests and capabilities, these approaches focus on communication, social learning and understanding within a framework of norms and values, which may be expressed in institutions (Wendt 1999: 7); by doing so, they promise to provide accounts of developments that do not seem to fit within the materialist and rationalist frame proposed by Neo-Realists and their close relatives.

1

See also the contribution by Peter Anderson in this book (the editors)

114


Ideational approaches offer important insights into the pursuit and achievement of EU collective action. Even where calculations of material interest and material capabilities seem to point in the direction of defection, of stagnation or of unilateral national action the presence of interaction, communication and social learning can provide the basis for collective action, and long-run expectations of the payoffs from cooperation can trump short-term incentives to defect (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1984). This is essentially a normative approach in which processes of mutual problem-solving and the formation of collective identity can achieve movement even where there is no apparent or immediate material payoff. Conceived in this way, the EU position towards Asia is not based (solely) on material calculations of interest by EU Member States or on temporary solidarity in pursuit of material advantage best gained through collective action. Rather, having an Asia policy is part of the means through which expectations about ‘Europe’ are formed and consolidated, and thus part of the development of a collective EU identity. Not only this, but the collective adoption of principles and positions in relation to Asia becomes part of the way in which the EU can project the power of its normative positions themselves; so the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002, 2006), whilst not completely unconnected with the calculation and pursuit of material interests, has important implications for the communication of the EU’s position to the world – and in this case, Asia. As a result, analysis in this vein needs to focus on the debates and policy development processes that take place within the EU, as part of the development of a broader EU collective understanding of its appropriate role in the world. On this basis, how do we deal with the possibilities of cooperation in EU-Asia relations? One simple way of approaching the question is the proposition that ‘it’s good to talk’. The establishment of regular dialogue between EU representatives and those from Asia is an essential underpinning of the kind of normative convergence that underpins successful cooperation (Gilson 2000, 28; Bridges 1999, 43; Kapur 1986, 8-15). This is not to assert that material interests should be, or can be, ignored in such dialogue; rather it is to argue that from an ideational perspective, the formation of an EU ‘Asia policy’ and its pursuit through regularised dialogue within an agreed normative


115

framework is one of the keys to stable cooperation. Important here, as might be seen, is the establishment of consensus within the EU on what ‘Asia’ actually is. This gets us very close to the point raised earlier in the paper, about the development and embedding of certain images of ‘Asia’ within the EU discourse. And in turn, it raises important questions about the extent to which ‘Asia’ is seen as differentiated or undifferentiated, as subject or object of EU policy-making and as a coherent dialogue partner when it comes to the assertion of EU norms. As Karen Smith has argued, partly in relation to Burma/Myanmar, the self-ascribed status of the EU as a ‘proactive cosmopolitan’ can come under severe and often disabling pressure when confronted with the diversity and intractability of other (normative and material) positions (K. Smith 2006). Where does this leave our argument in terms of the propositions suggested by an ideational approach? First of all, we would propose that exploration of the EU’s ‘Asia policies’ can be understood in terms of the search for a common EU understanding of the Union’s role in the world, and of its normative positions. At its extreme, this might mean that ‘Asia policy’ is simple part of an internal discourse, rather than operational policy. More realistically, it means that the element of ‘self-identification’ and ‘self-representation’ is likely to be prominent in EU policy positions towards Asia. Thus there is an element of ‘imagining the EU’ in what has been proposed in successive Asia policies. In similar fashion, there is a strong element of ‘imagining Asia’ with different representations of its diversity and complexity appearing and disappearing as the EU’s internal discourse develops. When it comes to the practice of EU-Asia relations, ideational approaches suggest that the process of communication and interaction set up by the EU’s ‘Asia policies’ is in itself an important outcome of the process. Material gains and losses are in this perspective less important than the developing discourse and understandings. In the much longer term, it can be argued from an ideational perspective that the continuation of EU-Asia interaction will lead to subtle, but powerful shifts in perceptions of material interest themselves, through the privileging of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ which shifts expectations and images of the acceptable in EU-Asia relations. The third area of analytical theory to be explored here is that of institutional theory. As we have seen, institutions have their place in

116


both of the two previously-presented theoretical approaches. But in both, it could be argued that they assume a secondary position. For Neo-Realists and Neo-Mercantilists, institutions are significant only insofar as they act as receptacles for material (state) interests (Glaser 2003, 410), although it is possible, we would argue, for them to assume a certain permanence and material impact. For ideational approaches, institutions can be a powerful factor in the shaping of interactions, communications and expectations about the appropriate forms of behaviour (and in some areas of institutionalist theory, such as sociological institutionalism it is hard to see the boundary between institutions, ideas and behaviour) (Ruggie 1998, 11). But we want to argue that institutions are important in themselves, partly because they can shape processes and outcomes in both materialist and ideational perspectives. Thus, many approaches to institutions see them as based on essentially rationalist and materialist assumptions, as in theories of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism or Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Here, the importance of institutions is that they express the impossibility of independent (state) action and that they actively shape the interests and the activities of states, either through formal rules or through perceptions of material advantage that are shifted because of the presence of institutions (Keohane and Nye 2001). On the other hand, as pointed out above, institutions can act as powerful expressions of norms and values and as shapers of patterns of communication and discourse. They can in effect develop a life of their own, and go beyond the limits apparently imposed upon them by either state preferences or the initial norms and values of those who engage within them (Wendt 1999, 370; Hay 2004). The ‘logic of engagement’ through commitments to international institutions and their workings is thus a key aspect of analysis. To say this is not to say anything particularly original, of course. But it is in the application of institutional approaches to EU-Asian relations that we can expect to gain further perspective on the ways in which those relations ‘work’. In terms of EU policy-making and collective action, there has been consistent attention to the roles and impact of institutions and of institutional change. As pointed out at the beginning of the article, the accumulation of institutions and in particular of those dedicated to external European action has been a central feature of the study of ‘European foreign policy’. Indeed, it has


117

been suggested by some that institutions and procedures have at various times become almost a substitute for policy – either that, or the institutions are the policy (Allen and Wallace 1977 and many since). More recently, it has been argued persuasively that the institutional morphology of the EU, and the successive laying down of institutional frameworks in ‘European foreign policy’, has been a key ingredient in the ‘deepening’ of Europeanisation around the foreign and security policy area (M.E. Smith 2003). In this context, the development of ‘Asia policy’ by the EU since the mid-1990s has an institutional explanation: it was made possible by the accumulation of policy instruments and resources at the EU level and by mechanisms of coordination that enabled those involved to bring together previously separate areas of commercial, development, humanitarian and security policies. In this context, it is no accident that policies towards Asia were closely followed by policies towards Latin America, Africa and other regions. These represented developments in the institutional capacity of the EU itself to develop and to frame such policies. In similar fashion, there is an institutional explanation for the external projection of policies towards Asia and other regions of the world outside Europe. The EU, conceived of as a ‘trading state’, has always favoured stability established through institutions, regulation and rules, both internally and externally (Smith 2004). The development in the 1990s of elaborate institutional frameworks for inter-regional relations, of which Asia was the fore-runner, is thus a continuation of an inherent tendency within the EU itself – the externalisation of multilateral institutionalism. In turn, the frameworks established incorporate extensive institutional demands upon those with whom the arrangements are made, and embody differentiation and conditionality in important areas of institutional contact. But it must also be remembered that these multilateral interregional frameworks were laid down alongside existing bilateral and mini-lateral arrangements, and that those types of institutional frameworks have continued to develop alongside the inter-continental ‘grand designs’. A cursory scan of the European Commission’s Annual Report indicates the extent to which the nurturing and maintenance of these institutional arrangements dominates the external relations of the Union. Institutional theory would also point out that this activity

118


has to be considered in the context of global rules and conventions, to which EU-Asia and other such arrangements have to conform (for example WTO rules) (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2003; Young 2000, 2002). What does this suggest in terms of propositions about institutional approaches to EU-Asia relations? First, we would propose that the establishment of institutions in EU-Asia relations reflects the internal institutional capacities of the EU and their development, especially in the 1990s, and we would ask whether this effort can be sustained in an era of relative stagnation in the EU institutions themselves (or alternatively, whether it might present an alternative avenue for institutional development in the circumstances of EU stagnation). Second, we would propose that EU-Asia relations constitute an EU attempt to institutionalise at several different levels their links with a diverse, complex and dynamic region, and we would expect that there would be ‘management problems’ in handling this complex set of institutional arrangements. This brings up the issue of what Stephan Keukeleire has termed ‘structural diplomacy’ in EU external relations (Keukeleire 2003): can the establishment of institutions and rules really produce the stability and predictability which are central to the EU’s external aims? Third, we would argue that the ‘logic of engagement’ implicit in EU commitments to a growing network of international institutions in EU-Asia relations would go beyond simple strategy to create new processes likely to shape those relations more generally. This in turn can create new opportunities (on the one hand) or new costs and constraints (on the other hand) for EU policy-making, as the maintenance of the institutional framework becomes distanced or detached from its original aims. In concluding this section, we should emphasise two points that have emerged from this exploration of theoretical approaches. First, although we have separated material interests, ideas and institutions as elements in the EU’s ‘Asia policies’, in reality they are likely to be deeply intertwined, reflecting the diverse and complex realities of the relationships themselves. Second, in each of the areas reviewed, it is clear that there is an element not merely of ‘analytical theory’ but also of ‘practitioner theory’. That is to say, the agents involved – be they EU or national officials, public or private actors – are not inert instruments of some unknown political scientist. There is a powerful sense in which ‘theory’ about the nature of Asia, the challenges it


119

poses and the means to meet those challenges is embedded in the range of policy positions and actions taken by the EU and by its agents (for approaches that throw light on this in the context of EUAsia relations, see for example Preston and Gilson 2001, Part II; Wiessala 2002). Most obviously, this theory is embodied in successive policy papers and ‘Asia strategies’, whether these are bilateral, minilateral or multilateral in nature. But they are also powerfully embodied in less formal perceptions of interest or assumptions about norms and behaviour that loom large in any consideration of EU-Asia relations. Conclusions The initial aim of this chapter was to dissect EU-Asia relations and to identify theories that might help us to investigate them, and to suggest how we might apply those theories in at least a preliminary way to explore the nature of EU-Asia relations in the early twenty-first century. Initially, we characterised EU-Asian relations as diverse and complex, and we looked for theories that might help us to understand the ways in which this diversity and complexity has been handled both within the EU and in the context of the inter-regional relationship. We presented three bodies of theory – material, ideational and institutional – each of which generated a number of general propositions about the evolution and the management of EU-Asia relations, and with particular attention to the possibilities of EU collective action and stable cooperation between the EU and Asia. In addition to the conclusions presented in each of the main areas explored, we can conclude the following in terms of the broader analysis of EU-Asia relation: first, the complexity and diversity of EUAsia relations makes theory necessary, not just to analysts but also to policy-makers. Indeed, one of the most significant issues uncovered in the paper is the existence of powerful ‘policymaker theories’ that are embedded in EU strategies. Second, the distinction between material, ideational and institutional theories is useful as a means of generating propositions, but one of the most significant aspects of EU-Asian relations is the way in which these three elements become entangled in the practice of the relationships. Thus, one of the key analytical findings is the need for awareness of the ways in which the three elements intersect, link and reinforce or contradict each other. Third, and by extension in relation to the underlying complexity and

120


diversity of EU-Asia relations, an important aspect of the ways in which different elements of the relationship coexist and interact is the multi-level character of EU-Asian relations. Bilateral, multilateral and ‘bi-multilateral’ features characterise all of the areas we have explored, and will continue to do so.

References Aggarwal, Vinod and Edward Fogarty. Eds. 2003. EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Allen, David and William Wallace. 1977. Political Cooperation: Procedure as a Substitute for Policy? In Policy-Making in the European Communities, eds. Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Carole Webb. Chichester: Wiley. Arts, Karin and Anna Dickson, eds. 2004. EU Development Cooperation: From Model to Symbol? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd edition. London: Routledge. Bridges, Brian. 1999. Europe and the Challenge of the Asia-Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Caporaso, James. 1996. The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, regulatory and post-modern. Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no.1: 29-52. Collinson, Sarah. 1999. ‘Issue-systems’, ‘multi-level games’ and the analysis of the EU’s external commercial and associated policies: a research agenda. Journal of European Public Policy 6 no.2: 206-224. Dent, Christopher. 1997. The European Economy: the global context. London: Routledge. Dent, Christopher. 1999. The European Union and East Asia: an economic relationship. London: Routledge. Forster, Anthony. 2000. Evaluating the EU-ASEM Relationship: a negotiated order approach. Journal of European Public Policy 7, no.5 (Special Issue): 787805. Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gilson, Julie. 2000. Japan and the European Union: A Partnership for the TwentyFirst Century? Basingstoke: Macmillan, New York: St Martin’s Press. Glaser, Charles. 2003. Structural Realism in a More Complex World. Review of International Studies 29: 403-14. Grieco, Joseph and Ikenberry, John. 2003. State Power and World Markets. New York: Norton.


121

Hay, Colin. 2004. Ideas, Interests and Institutions in the Comparative Political economy of Great Transformations. Review of International Political Economy 11, no.1: pp. 204-26. Hill, Christopher. 1998. Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP. In Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy, ed. Jan Zielonka, pp 35-51. The Hague: Kluwer. Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith. 2005. International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holland, Martin. 2002. The European Union and the Third World. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. ‘Normative” Power Europe: A Realist Critique, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no.2 (Special Issue): 217-34. Hwee, Lay Hwee. 2003. Asia and Europe: The Development and Different Dimensions of ASEM. London: Routledge. Kapur, Harish. 1986. China and the European Community: The New Connection. Dordrecht: Nijhoff. Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Priceton: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence. 3rd edition, New York: Longman. Keukeleire, Stephan. 2003. The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy. Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no.3: 31-56. Laatikainen, Katie and Smith, Karen, eds. 2006. The European Union and the United Nations. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Legro, Jeffrey and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security 24, no.2: 5-55. Lister, Marjorie, ed. 1999. New Perspectives on European Union Development Cooperation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Manners, Ian. 2002. Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no.2: 234-58. Manners, Ian. 2006. Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy 13, no.2 (Special Issue): 182-99. Meunier, Sophie and Nicolaidis, Kalypso. 2005. The European Union as a Trade Power. In International Relations and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 247-269. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Preston, Peter. 2001. East Asia: emergent regional dynamics. In The European Union and East Asia: interregional linkages in a changing global system, eds. Peter Preston and Julie Gilson, 198-215. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Preston, Peter and Gilson, Julie, eds. 2001. The European Union and East Asia: Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

122


Ruggie, John. 1998. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. London and New York: Routledge. Smith, Karen. 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity. Smith, Karen. 2006. The Limits of Proactive Cosmopolitanism: The EU and Burma, Cuba and Zimbabwe. In The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, eds. Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, 155-171. London: Routledge. Smith, Michael. 1998. The European Union and Asia-Pacific. In Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, eds. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook, 289315. London: Routledge. Smith, Michael. 2004. The European Union as a Trade Policy Actor. In Trade Politics, eds. Brian Hocking and Steven McGuire, 289-303. 2nd edition, London: Routledge. Smith, Michael. 2006. The Shock of the Real? Trends in European Foreign and Security Policy Since September 2001. Studia Diplomatica (forthcoming). Smith, Michael E. 2003. Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Michael E. 2005. Implementation: Making the EU’s International Relations Work. In International Relations and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 154-178. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stubbs, Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey, eds. 2005. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. 3rd edition, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Tseng, Su-Ling. 2001. The EU’s Commercial Policy-making Towards China. In The European Union and East Asia: interregional linkages in a changing global system, eds. Peter Preston and Julie Gilson, 170-188. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Vanhoonacker, Sophie. 2005. The Institutional Framework. In International Relations and the European Union, eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, 67-90. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA and London: Addison-Wesley. Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, Brian. 2001. Understanding European Foreign Policy. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. Wiessala, Georg. 2002. The European Union and Asian Countries. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. Young, Alisdair. 2000. The Adaptation of European Foreign Economic Policy: From Rome to Seattle. Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no.1: 93-116.


123

Young, Alisdair. 2002. Extending European Cooperation: The European Union and the ‘New’ International Trade Agenda. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

124


ANNEX List of the European Union’s Bilateral and Multilateral Strategies with Asia Bilateral Strategic Documents 1973 1978 1981 1985 1991 1994 1995 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2001 2003 2004

EC-India Cooperation Agreement EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation EC-India Agreement on Commercial and Economic Cooperation EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation Political Declaration on relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan (Hague Declaration) EC-India Cooperation Agreement ‘A Long Term Policy for China Europe Relations’ Commission Communication ‘Europe and Japan: The Next Steps’ Commission Communication ‘EU-India Enhanced Partnership’ Commission Communication ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’ Commission Communication Report on the Implementation of the (1998) Communication ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’ of September 2000 ‘EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy’ Commission Communication ‘Shaping Our Common Future: an Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation’ Commission Communication ‘A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations’ endorsed by the European Council on 13 October 2003 ‘An EU-India Strategic Partnership’ Commission Communication

Multilateral Strategic Documents 1980 1994 1996 2001 2003 2005-06

ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement Towards a New Asia strategy Commission Communication Bangkok Declaration EU & Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership Commission Communication ‘A New Partnership for Southeast Asia’ Commission Communication EU Commission Asia Strategy Paper

POLICIES AND PATTERNS


CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND THE POLICY OF DISPOSITION: THREE CASE STUDIES OF EU-ASIA POLICY David Fouquet and Paul Lim Abstract This chapter is the first contribution in this volume which approaches the EU-Asia ‘inter-continental dialogue’ by means of a detailed and focussed policy-analysis. The authors argue that a number of the European Union’s policies towards Asia can be conceptualised using the term ‘constructive engagement’, a policy-method which is here defined as the ‘opposite of confrontation’. Anchoring their main argument in liberal and idealist theoretical approaches to international relations, the authors of this contribution offer an analysis of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and as a ‘symbolic presence’ in Asia, especially in the areas of security and conflict-prevention. To underscore this, this section offers a number of case studies relating to the Union’s policies towards The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Indonesian province of Aceh. These examples show that the EU’s policy arsenal towards its Asian interlocutors can be characterised in terms of a flexible and pragmatic range of roles, and by what the authors call the ‘policy of disposition’. Since the conflicts in the Balkans and Kosovo and the gradual establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP), the European Union (EU) has defined and explored a component of this overall policy, generally referred to as Constructive Engagement, in parts of Asia and other regions of the world.

128

David Fouquet and Paul Lim

Although the Security Policy CFSP had its roots in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, it was not until another, less formal Franco-British agreement at St Malo in 1998 (that led to establishment of the Common European Security and Defence Policy involving military cooperation) that work began in earnest to develop policies and doctrines to accompany such a distinct EU security identity. While the EU undertaking in this newly-defined security area included a military dimension, it has been generally characterised as a more civilian-oriented application of what has been termed ‘soft power’. It may be seen as being less aggressive, dynamic or competitive, but more prudent, tolerant and cooperative. It places a higher priority on human security than on the traditional concept of state security. European military or civilian monitoring forces have been spread probably to the point of overstretch from the Balkans, Afghanistan, Indonesia’s Aceh and Iraq, to Congo and elsewhere in Africa. The CFSP has also been applied through project initiatives and policies, rather than the deployment of civilian or military personnel in a number of other countries, as will be demonstrated in the case studies that follow. This approach should be compared to, and differentiated from, other policies, primarily the more recent American doctrines of ‘preemptive deterrence’ and Washington’s more extensive reliance on military power projection and the application of sanctions or other policies of ostracism or confrontation. Both the USA and the EU profess to have the objective of establishing more democratic systems of governance in the target countries – the US by imposition or pressure in a more immediate time frame, the EU by gradual persuasion. The EU’s approach also transcends the traditional notions and practices of development or humanitarian technical assistance. The evolving strategies, tactics, methods and resources Europe has devoted to crisis and conflict prevention have resulted in the development of a sophisticated array of policy tools and supports. The EU also seems to emphasise more the liberal or idealist approach in international relations than the realist school, with its emphasis on power balance and specific self-interest, although the Union does also behave in a realist fashion, when it speaks of ‘strategic partnerships’ with some countries of major significance. In practice, its

THREE CASE STUDIES OF EU-ASIA POLICY

129

behaviour frequently fluctuates between liberalism and realism. There have also been many instances where, while EU engagement has involved declarations of disapproval of conditions within the countries concerned, capacity-building activities and other forms of assistance have continued simultaneously. Such policies and practices have largely been extended and modified, from beyond their original applications in EU relationships and strategies in nearby regions such as the Balkans and former Soviet bloc states, to the Mediterranean, the Middle East and to the former European colonies in the complex group of the African-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Constructive Engagement could be defined as the opposite of confrontation, sanctions or hostility in international relations, or, alternatively, as the opposite of refusing to deal with a country or regime; the presumption is that, through engagement, the other party can be drawn into more internationally accepted norms of behaviour. This approach or policy can address normal diplomatic relations, or can be used specifically in relation to a crisis or conflict situation. It may materialise in phases of post-conflict reconstruction or, further upstream, in attempts at crisis avoidance or containment, or institutional capacity building. Indonesia, East Timor and Cambodia could be examples of the first category and Nepal somewhere more in the second group of categories. In another instance, the EU has provided discreet assistance in the background, while more visibly mediating in the decades-old conflict in Sri Lanka. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, the EU’s approach has cut across several lines – the application of sanctions, while seeking engagement, in a conflict situation and, simultaneously, attempting to look forward to regime transition. By contrast to this, the Union stayed largely out of the complex problems between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and the preinsurgency unrest in the Philippines and Thailand. Sometimes it preferred to deal essentially through the UN or another institution, in the context of what has been coded as ‘effective multilateralism’, essentially on its own initiative, or in concert with other powers. The EU’s engagement with China may be seen as providing an example of the Constructive Engagement policy adapted to the reality of an emerging world power. It has been transformed into a so-called Strategic Partnership which provides the Asian giant with recognition of its rightful new place as a responsible and non-threatening member

130


of the international community. Having been adjusted, to take into consideration the reality of limited EU power and influence and China’s size, weight and resistance to forced change, the EU approach is a longer-term one of attempting to persuade the country to undergo a voluntary transition to something rather more akin to Western-style human rights policies and democracy. The EU policies and actions in such areas are not only extensions of the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, but originate more specifically in policy documents presented by the European Commission on conflict prevention and human rights and democratisation.1 The European Council summit in Gothenburg, under the Swedish presidency, adopted the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. But the concept of using economic, social and other civilian projects as means to the end of securing stability and development also has its roots in the evolution of the European Union itself as an example, if not overtly a model, of how economic integration and cooperation may overcome a legacy of conflict and instability. As a result, the EU has become known as a ‘normative power’, one that seeks to influence those with which it engages, so that they will adopt specific preferred norms and standards with regard to, for example, human rights, governance and social and labour standards. This has been the case for prospective members who must assimilate into the existing EU system; it applies also to other neighbours, who are seeking normal or close relations. But beyond the border regions, it further extends to other states that also wish to have close trade relations, EU financial aid, or technical assistance. For example, the EU attempts to spread key standards and norms via specific projects carried out in recipients of EU assistance. And these ‘missionary’ objectives also manifest themselves outside official diplomacy in countless ways that range from academic exchanges, foreign students in the EU, the work of NGOs and Think Tanks, to cultural, sports, business and economic contacts. This type of non-violent, ‘constructive’ EU policy undertaking may assume wider support as an alternative to realist options in view of the stalemating of the US ‘hard’ power projection in Iraq and the inability 1

In April and November 2001.


131

of the Americans’ recent hard line negotiating postures to get results in such confrontations as Iran and North Korea. To date, the EU has been officially involved in strategic conflict prevention or other policy actions directed towards the preservation or enhancement of human security in some 12 out of 30 Asian countries. The word limit for a chapter such as this inevitably means that it is possible only to select for examination a small number of case studies from these 12 interventions (in this case we chose three). However, one thing that has become apparent from our wider study of these various EU involvements – in Cambodia, East Timor and Burma, for example, as well as the three case studies to be examined shortly – is that there is as yet no one discernable European ‘model of engagement’ in Asia. Rather, what one finds is that the Union has built up a ‘tool box’ of variable policy options that may be selected as appropriate. What is ‘appropriate’, of course is, at least in part, determined by the ideological and general political configurations within both EU institutions and the member states at the time when policy tools are selected. Before the case studies are examined and the objectives underlying such an examination explained, it is first necessary to look at the concept of Constructive Engagement in a little more detail. Defining Constructive Engagement Although the EU’s notion of Constructive Engagement may be regarded as still evolving, it is often equated with, or at least compared to, the concept of soft power as enunciated by Joseph Nye of Harvard University. In his seminal 2004 work on the subject, Nye remarked: A measure of the EU’s emerging soft power is the view that it is a positive force for solving global problems. In the wake of the Iraq War, Eastern Europeans and Turks gave the EU higher marks than the United States for playing a positive role on a variety of issues — ranging from fighting terrorism to reducing poverty to protecting the environment.

He also concluded that: ‘The new constitution of South Africa bears more resemblance to the European Convention on Human Rights than to the American Bill of Rights ... The European preference for multilateral cooperation has generated a few successes that have increased Europe’s soft power — as well as its economic power’ (Nye 2004).

132


One senior EU official speaking at a conference in Brussels in 2006, under Chatham House rules, noted that, ‘(…)EU soft power has an attraction to our partners. We represent a new recipe. It is not always successful, but the demand for EU cooperation is immense, immense, in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere.’ Although speaking directly about the EU approach to Burma/Myanmar at the ‘Burma Day’ conference sponsored by the EU on 5 April 2005, Deputy Director for External Relations, Hervé Jouanjean, also formulated the general proposition and definition of Constructive Engagement. He said: As the EU was strengthening its sanctions against the military regime, it also recognised that it did not mean to hurt the ordinary people of Burma/Myanmar. This is why article 5 of the Common Position not only confirms the EU’s commitment to continue providing humanitarian assistance but also open assistance for longer term development in sectors such as health, education and livelihoods.

In addition, he continued: If we, as international donors, want to assist the Burmese population in facing these immense development challenges, there is no choice but to engage in some form of policy discussions with the Government. Only through a dialogue on sector policies will donors be able to jointly influence decisions on policy which have a direct bearing on the long-term situation of the population. Engaging in a policy dialogue with the Government sounds ambitious, and it is ambitious and controversial, but it is probably also our best opportunity to make an impact on the lives of ordinary Burmese.

He concluded that: In the past, one has often called approaches either ‘soft’ or ‘tough’. Alternatively, we have heard about some sort of ‘flexible’ or ‘Constructive Engagement’ Today, I see no need to invent a new qualifier. Instead, I propose to ask simply a few questions when checking response strategies and foreign assistance:Does foreign assistance help address the fundamental needs of the people in the country, and is it likely to decrease their vulnerability? Does such assistance contribute to empowering people and communities, do we therefore contribute to lifting the isolation of the citizens, and can we, in some way and with much patience, help achieve national reconciliation? Finally, can we, through our assistance promote a process of gradual change?

Summarising its approach to conflict-prevention in 2001, the European Commission observed:


133

The list of EU instruments directly or indirectly relevant to the prevention of conflict is long: development cooperation and external assistance, economic cooperation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic and other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP (including information gathering and anticipating potential conflict situations and monitoring international agreements (Evans 2006).

Addressing specifically the EU relationship with Indonesia and Aceh at a 2006 conference on these subjects, European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, indicated the wider application of the EU approach: ‘The biggest challenges to democracy in our time,’ she noted, ‘come from economic and social stagnation and fragile institutions.’ In noting ‘the contribution democratic and pluralistic societies can make to conflict resolution,’ she added that, ‘we know that peace is sustained more effectively by better public services and reliable institutions than by robust responses from the military.’ It is in these various commentaries and pronouncements that the outlines of the overarching conceptual framework which defines the EU’s policy of Constructive Engagement can most clearly be discerned. It is now possible to move on and examine the case studies. Three Case Studies: North Korea, China and Aceh As stated previously, it is not possible in a chapter of this length to examine all of the EU’s interventions in Asia. Some potential case studies seem to reveal more frustration and/or failure than success, those in Cambodia, East Timor and Burma/Myanmar being reasonably obvious examples. The case studies that have been selected for this analysis are EU policies of Constructive Engagement towards North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Aceh. The first example has been chosen because of the potential that the North Korean ‘problem’ presented for a contest and comparison between EU and American approaches to dealing with such issues. The second has been selected because the huge and growing power of China as an international actor makes it the biggest challenge of all for the EU’s Constructive Engagement policy – in terms of the

134


potential consequences, should the policy fail. The third case study is interesting on account of the challenge it presented to the EU’s Engagement policy in its capacity as one of Asia’s most ‘stubborn’ conflicts. Each intervention will be analysed further, in order to discover what particular insights it may yield as regards the merits, or otherwise, of the EU’s ‘flexible tool box’ approach to Constructive Engagement. The overall conclusion will then combine those insights with others drawn from the authors’ study of various EU interventions across Asia, in order to arrive at a broader view of the successes or failures of the Union’s approach to Constructive Engagement in the region. Brief Sunshine on North Korea North Korea, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), remains one of Asia’s most longstanding and potentially dangerous problems. Not only does the nuclear weapon issue present a worry and potential threat to South Korea, in addition to the basic issue of the continuing separation of the two Koreas, but a nuclear armed Korea could destabilise the whole Asian power-balance in the future, by provoking Japan into developing nuclear weapons. It is therefore very much in the EU’s interest, given the breadth and depth of its business relationships with Asia, to contribute to the containment, reduction and even eradication of the various points of tension involved. For a brief period in the early part of this decade, Europe may be considered to have been involved in an active, significant and productive policy of engagement toward North Korea. In fact, viewed from a European perspective, it appeared as an audacious and generally welcomed effort by the EU to extend the use of its toolbox of so-called ‘soft power’ civilian initiatives to assist other partners in a distant region to transform and integrate a troublesome state into something closer to the global mainstream. However, in the case of EU policy towards North Korea, as well as in other cases throughout Asia, major policy initiatives vis-à-vis a ‘problem-country’ did neither generate, nor benefit from, full unity among EU member states. By contrast, policies were often determined by external forces. With regard to the thorny nuclear issue, largely at the behest of the US and Japan, and in return for their assistance in the earlier crises in the Balkans, the EU became a full member of the Korean Energy


135

Development Organisation (KEDO) created as part of the agreement that eased the North Korean nuclear controversy of the mid-1990s. The Union’s involvement in the North Korean issue afterwards was in a sense ‘shadowing’ the positive initiatives of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’ towards Pyongyang. Following his historic visit to Pyongyang in mid-2000, President Kim conferred with his Asian and European partners in the framework of the Asia-Europe Summit Meeting (ASEM) as host of the ASEM III gathering in Seoul in October 2000. The summit focused to a large extent on this Korean rapprochement and on prospects for the future. President Kim, who had spent some of his earlier exile in Europe and studied the example of German reunification, had close relations with European leaders and stimulated them to become actively engaged in his efforts to improve relationships with the north. Another part of this more direct EU involvement, decided at the highest level at an EU Summit in Stockholm in March 2001, was the sending of a delegation to both Koreas in May. The group was composed of Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, acting President of the EU Council of Ministers, the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, and Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten. The delegation’s encounter with DPRK leader Kim Jong Il in May led to assurances by North Korea on nuclear proliferation issues and inspections, missile testing, human rights and the introduction of new economic policies (Commission of the European Communities a). During that period of intense activity and involvement, the European Commission prepared a Strategy Paper on the DPRK for 2001-2004 and a number of Member State governments opened embassies and initiated diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. The EU strategy document was a moderate, yet ambitious, proposal for EU technical and advisory assistance to the DPRK, with the aim of gradually supporting economic transition towards integration into the global system and towards sustainable development (Commission of the European Communities 2002). A number of DPRK delegations visited Europe in the ensuing few weeks, looking forward to developing projects involving their country and the EU and to extending their new dialogue. In brief, there was a widespread feeling that Europe, with its history and experience of reconciliation, not to mention its participation in the Korean Conflict

136


of the 1950s, could, at various official, business and civil society levels, continue to play an active and constructive role in the dialogue and rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula. That rapprochement and the possible opening up of the North Korean regime were completely sidetracked, however, when the incoming Bush Administration ended its internal review and slammed shut the door opened during the preceding Clinton Administration, by suddenly and publicly accusing the DPRK of conducting a covert and illegal uranium enrichment programme in October 2002. Since then, the region and the rest of the international community, including Korea’s neighbours and the EU, have seemed compromised, if not completely overwhelmed, by the brinksmanship and vitriol between Washington and Pyongyang over the nuclear issues, and more recently, by US allegations of DPRK illicit counterfeiting and drugs trafficking activities. Although difficult, frustrating and, at times, temperamental multilateral discussions on the nuclear issue have been conducted in Beijing in the format of the Six-Party Talks, and the EU has continued to grant considerable amounts of humanitarian aid to the DPRK, it has not been a part of these Six-Party Talks and the KEDO project has been terminated. It appears that the Union was ‘shut out’ of the Beijing talks, although the circumstances remain unclear. Although it was initially thought that the US, or some other participant, might have rejected EU participation, some experts have suggested that there was no such US or other objection. There are at least some indications that the EU excluded itself from playing an active role, either wilfully, through some unexplained logic, or as a result of the objections of one or more EU member states, or simply as a result of failing to formulate a policy. One informed Washingtonbased analyst has suggested in private that the EU participation had ‘no one country promoting the idea. It didn’t have a sponsor.’ He added he was not sure about a US veto as such, but that the ‘idea was floating about.’2 In any case, the EU has not been transparent in publicly explaining the details of this absence from crucial international talks that it might have legitimately been involved in as a KEDO member, at least, or as 2 Private interview with leading non-official US expert on relations with North Korea, May 2006, Washington, D.C.


137

an active participant in the diplomacy towards the DPRK prior to the latest crisis. The EU also seems to have been largely silent and acquiescent in the liquidation of the KEDO system demanded by the previous US Administration. In short, the EU’s €116-120 million in contributions to the KEDO exercise and its position as an active participant in the international effort to resolve a pivotal global and Asian security dilemma had to be written off as virtually a complete loss. On the other hand, it could be argued that by remaining aloof from these difficult negotiations, the EU might preserve a potentially more useful role as a detached ‘honest broker’, or more trusted and neutral actor, in any future North Korean transition process, aiming, perhaps, at normalising its political system and external relations. Through its general silence, with the exception of general declarations by Foreign Ministers and EU Summits, the EU has mostly taken on the role of a silent partner only following the trend set by more articulate and determined parties. The Union’s cautious, but regular, grants of humanitarian aid have been sufficient to fulfil its basic instincts toward a desperate North Korean population without overly contradicting or antagonising the US. These keep open the possibility that the EU as a donor could eventually return to a more active role, should it choose to do so, and should there be signs that a peaceful settlement can be achieved in the future. Whether it would choose to do so, is another matter. Its critics in the region accuse it of timidity and of displaying only limited initiative of its own in having first chosen to do little more than shadow the South Korean government’s efforts and then merely to acquiesce in Washington’s raising of regional tensions over the North Korean issue. Coping with the Rise of China A major element of the EU’s policy of ‘engaging’ China has evolved from a significant point of discord and confrontation into one marked by discretion and a considerable degree of compromise. In what might be regarded as a typical politico-diplomatic contest, it appears that China negotiated from a position of some strength and held relatively firm, while EU unity crumbled in a fashion that led it to moderate its initially strong demands. The European Community had concluded a cooperation agreement with the Peoples Republic of China in 1975, while some individual

138


member countries had previously established separate diplomatic and commercial relations. Human Rights emerged as an important issue for the European side in the 1990s in the aftermath of the Tiananmen episode in 1989 and following the end of the Cold War, which had tended to muffle such debates when they were inconvenient in the search for allies, such as China. Beginning in 1990, the EU, with the US, co-sponsored human rights resolutions in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), the only kind of political sanctions towards China initially decided on by the EU following the Tiananmen Square massacre. But in 1997 EU Member States could not reach agreement on the sponsorship of a resolution criticising China at the UNCHR. EU Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan expressed disappointment over the lack of consensus on the resolution describing it as a weakness (Agence Europe 22 May 1997, 8). Denmark then submitted a resolution to the UNCHR co-sponsored by the majority of EU Member States, the US, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (Agence Europe 12 April 1997, 2). China’s response was to suspend exchange visits with Denmark and the dialogue on human rights. Beijing also postponed a visit by a Dutch trade mission to China (Agence Europe 16 April 1997, 3 (bis). In September 1997, it was reported that the EU Troika sought to relaunch a dialogue on human rights with China by proposing to finance concrete co-operation projects, such as the training of lawyers and prison guards (Agence Europe 16 April 1997, 9). The Chinese were ready to re-start the human rights dialogue, on condition that the EU should renounce presenting a resolution on human rights to the UN. The EU Presidency stated that the EU ‘promised nothing in exchange’ for the resumption of the dialogue and that tabling another resolution in 1998 remained open (Agence Europe 26 September 1997, 3). China agreed to ‘normalize’ relations with Denmark in October 1997 (Agence Europe 16 October 1997, 6). From that time onward, the EU, as the record shows, did not co-sponsor or co-table any human rights resolutions at the UNCHR which were critical of China. The EU has repeatedly updated its strategies and policies toward China, by means of a series of documents from 1994 to 2006, but since the end of the difficult period of the 1990s has steadfastly stuck to a policy of Constructive Engagement. This has involved a regular series of annual summit meetings, the declaration, in 2003, of the intention to


139

establish a Strategic Partnership, and the doubling of bilateral trade between the two between 2000 and 2005.3 The emergence of a highly interdependent economic relationship between the two political powers, which saw the EU becoming China’s largest trade partner and China becoming second only to the US as an EU commercial partner, has been accompanied by a substantial expansion of the process of dialogue between the two. These ongoing consultations and conversations, along with the EU programme of specific assistance projects in such fields as the rule of law, village elections, nuclear proliferation, social and environmental issues and numerous other fields, seek to apply the EU concept of Constructive Engagement probably more comprehensively than in the case of any other Asian partner, including India (which was also declared a strategic partner). While this has not altogether eliminated friction and disputes in political or economic and trade relations, it has implied a more mature and non-confrontational approach to addressing such difficulties. In 2005, when the EU, under tremendous US, Japanese and other political pressure, failed to fulfil its promise to China to remove the arms embargo it had decreed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen killings in 1989, relations continued to develop normally despite the Chinese irritation. In casting doubt on what he refers to as the EU’s ‘conditional engagement’ toward China, one European academic analyst has remarked that ‘Europe expects the People’s Republic of China to take a benign and favourable stance that encapsulates its own norms and standards. It assumes it will be able to steer China’s development gently in a way that is suitable to its own interests.’ But he concludes that ‘Europe’s influence on China’s track record has been limited with regard to economic liberalization, democratization and its international posture. What is more, China’s growth is starting to affect Europe’s interests in a disadvantageous way’ (Holsag 2006). It is these kinds of doubts that must raise the biggest questions with regard to the EU’s policy of Constructive Engagement towards China. It is most certainly the case that in facilitating general good relations with 3 References to European Commission Country Strategy and other documents in 1998, 2001, 2003 and 2006, on the Commission of the European Communities Directorate General for External Relations website at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/e xternal_relations/china/intro/index.htm.

140


Beijing, and most particularly with regard to trade, the EU is helping to build up a new potential military and economic superpower. If, ultimately, its attempts to lead the ‘new giant’ towards a more democratic and politically humane path fail, then it will simply have helped in the construction of a powerful new competitor with an incompatible political system, with all of the problems and risks that that will entail. An Evaluation of the EU’s Peace Role in Aceh The EU’s involvement in Aceh needs to be seen in the context of its wider policy of Constructive Engagement towards Indonesia. As early as 1999, the EU Commission, two member states and other donors provided more than €14 million for a Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, set up by the UNDP, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. A trust fund was established with the aim of facilitating cooperation with the Indonesian government in judicial and civil service reform, electoral management, legislative empowerment, media strengthening, regional autonomy and decentralisation, and anti-corruption (Commission of the European Communities 2001). The elections of 2004 to the national Parliament and the Presidency, the success of which the EU facilitated considerably, were almost universally regarded as a remarkable achievement for the country. Yet many of its institutions still remained in a formative stage after that milestone. The longer-term success of EU involvement will, in part, be determined by how democratically they evolve. The Republic of Indonesia faces considerable challenges and contradictions in the positions of key players within its polity that make it difficult to determine whether it will live up to the aspiration of being a moderate, stable and modernising Muslim power. Nevertheless, and in the shorter term, the EU’s positive involvement was helpful in that it won the trust and credibility it needed in developing further its emerging new role in crisis management and prevention, by becoming active in seeking to resolve one of Asia’s most stubborn conflicts in Aceh. This role was widened to include a major EU Monitoring Mission, after talks between the Indonesian Government and Acehnese rebels produced a settlement in 2005 (Commission of the European Communities b). Despite the


141

Indonesian Government’s declared rejection of the need for international mediators, or monitors to help guarantee any peace agreement between Jakarta and Acehnese rebels, it agreed to let the EU provide a monitoring force to oversee disarmament and conflict settlement. Following rapidly on a July 2005 agreement in Finland between representatives of the Indonesian Government and the Free Aceh Movement known as GAM, EU policymakers rapidly deployed an unarmed EU mission of around 200 to the troubled province. These included unarmed soldiers as well as police and civilian experts. The mission also was incorporated in a wider international presence that revolved around ASEAN. The EU Council of Ministers sent a smaller preliminary assessment mission to Indonesia in June at the invitation of the Government in Jakarta. Representatives of the EU joined the talks during the May negotiation round in Finland as an indication of the growing EU participation in the peace process. The EU had in previous years been actively involved in other aspects of Indonesian political, economic and social developments and funded numerous projects, which included a large monitoring presence during all phases of the country’s national elections in 2004. The peace negotiations, conducted with the assistance of nongovernmental organisations such as the Swiss-based Henri Dunant Centre in the past and, more recently, the Crisis Management Initiative in Finland, received substantial financial backing from the European Commission. The talks in Finland, headed by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, focused on greater autonomy or self-rule for the province and on other modes of ‘decentralisation’, including even matters relating to the area’s oil resources, which in the past were a mainstay of the Central Government and the Indonesian military which controlled the province. The EU’s role and mission was unusual; it did not fit into the general pattern of previous EU peacekeeping, enforcement or stabilisation initiatives in either South Eastern Europe or Africa. It was to be the first such mission in a number of years in Asia since the Union’s involvement in the Cambodian peace process, and it became its biggest test in the region since the inauguration of a more structured Common Foreign and Security Policy. The sensitivity and risk of such an engagement was underlined by a well-known history of violence and lawlessness in the region which had, for example,

142


required international intervention following the Plebiscite on independence in East Timor when Indonesian militias went on a bloody rampage in that former Indonesian Province. To complicate matters, and as pointed out above, both the Indonesian Government and President had also voiced unease or outright opposition concerning a possible international role in any Acehnese settlement. But sources noted that the objection had focused on the UN and that the Indonesian President had proposed a role for regional organisations. But, to add to the risks for the EU, there were also divisions within Indonesia regarding policy toward the talks and dealing with rebels, possibly reflecting splits between civilian and military approaches. Any such international involvement was complicated by the tensions witnessed in the follow-up to the international aid effort in the province following the Tsunami disaster. Despite these various potential problems and risks the EU involvement went ahead and stands as a response – albeit a limited one – to those who have accused it of being ‘timid’ or ‘ineffective’ in its various Constructive Engagements within Asia. The EU-ASEAN mission mandate was to expire following the elections in Aceh in December 2006, which led to the clear victory of the Acehnese GAM rebel leader as head of the local government. The EU let it be known clearly that it would be willing to remain in the province in whatever capacity was deemed useful, if the Indonesian Government was fundamentally open to this. The fact that the elections were able to be held and to deliver an honest result would seem to suggest that certainly in that limited but important objective the EU mission was a success. Conclusions Overall, when the above case studies are combined with the findings surrounding other EU interventions across Asia which, for reasons of space, we could not cover here (East Timor, Cambodia, Burma/Myanmar), they appear to confirm the general observation made at the beginning of this chapter that the EU’s approach to Constructive Engagement may be considered less of a clearly-defined strategy or policy, but more of a general ‘disposition’, implemented as the EU and its member states see fit at the time, by employing various elements of a general political ‘toolbox’.


143

That policy of disposition has seen only a limited number of successes so far, despite the expending of considerable effort by the EU and the deployment of significant resources. It is clear that, in many cases, other international or regional actors remain the most significant players in influencing the actions of the governments targeted by the EU (as shown in the case of North Korea in this chapter). However, that does not mean that, apart from involvements in cases such as Indonesia and Aceh, the policy has been a complete failure. As the summary surveys below demonstrate, there are some successes – or potential successes – to be found also within what often seems to be a wider picture of frustration or failure. But even here judgments must be cautious, as too often there are ambiguities and potential reversals attached to those successes which need to be kept in mind when trying to assess how substantial, or sustained, their impact will really be in the longer-term perspective. In the case of Indonesia and EU policy towards Aceh, it is too early at this stage, to make a final judgment. What is happening there is a major test in an important state that is not only the world’s fourth most populous country, but a potential leader in the region and home to the world’s largest Muslim community. From a short term perspective, however, the EU’s ‘engagement’ initiatives seem to have been quite significant and valuable in helping to produce successful elections in both Indonesia as a whole and Aceh. Such small, but nevertheless politically significant, impacts not only advance the EU’s goal of advancing the cause of democracy and human rights in the region, but also help stabilise it as an economically important trading partner. North Korea, with its potential as a nuclear-armed threat to the entire region, is a test for the contrasting approaches of engagement or confrontation, with any discernable outcome nowhere in sight following the last nuclear crisis in 2006/7. The EU contribution of considerable humanitarian aid, limited economic training and capacity-building, along with some diplomatic contact, is in clear contrast to other, more hostile, confrontational, policies aimed at regime change, most particularly that of the United States. However, the EU’s rapid ceding of ground, in the face of the hostility towards the DPRK of the Bush administration, has left it without any current

144


major political role regarding the future of the divided country. It is likely that the DPRK’s neighbours in South Korea, China and Russia will have more of an impact in the present and immediate future. It is noteworthy, that following the 2006 phase of the nuclear crisis, many in South Korea considered their own ‘sunshine policy’ to have failed. The EU’s ‘residual’ and ‘symbolic’ presence, however, could make a difference, should circumstances change for the reasons described earlier in this chapter. China represents a ‘world in itself’, not only as the planet’s most populated country, but because of its rising economic presence and its political influence through an alternative model of development. Progress has been slow with regard to the Chinese government’s efforts to improve the position on human rights and other EU concerns. Most critics argue that the EU has ‘given away too much’ in terms of potential levers for too little in return. However, both the size and culture of China militate against rapid change. It is, perhaps, too early to make any substantial judgments about the results of EU engagement policy. At the very least the EU may console itself with the thought that without its engagement and without the extra ‘eyes’ that it makes the Chinese government feel are watching their behaviour, Beijing’s human rights record may have been considerably worse. In any case, the rapidly growing economic and political power of China in itself limits greatly the potential impacts of any ‘levers’, whether they be American or European. In the end, it is up to the people and the countries themselves investigated here to chart their course, face their challenges, resolve their problems and meet their destinies. But it may be done with the assistance and advice of neighbours or others within the ‘international community’. The latter rarely have a decisive role, except collectively. The UN, the US, the EU and other regional organisations may have the resources to play such a role. Yet in many instances, it may only be to avoid the worst-case scenarios. The positive case for engagement has yet to be completely proven and validated. But just as Constructive Engagement may be regarded as a relatively new approach to international relationships, especially involving relations withy states perceived to be ‘difficult’, it has also evolved quite rapidly into higher levels of sophistication and application. At the very least, the development and further application of the EU’s approach to crisis


145

prevention or capacity-building in general in Asia could be seen as potentially useful and constructive in view of the relative absence of regional institutional capacity in ASEAN or other parts of Asia, capable of dealing with such security or governance needs. The engagement policy also seeks to address in a low-key – probably underestimated – fashion the widespread global perception that Europe has no role or presence in Asian security issues. Finally, the European role could also be seen as a more civilian-oriented supplement to the widely-discussed stabilising force of the US military presence in the region.

References Agence Europe, various issues as cited. Commission of the European Communities. 2001. Commission on Conflict Prevention. 11.04.2001. COM (2001) 211 Final:13. Brussels: European Commission. Commission of the European Communities a. Directorate General for External Relations. The EU’s relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – DPRK North Korea. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ external_ relations/north_korea/intro/index.htm. Commission of the European Communities b. Directorate General for External Relations. EU relations with Indonesia. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/indonesia/intro/index.htm. Commission of the European Communities. 2002. The EC - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Country Strategy Paper 2001 – 2004. Brussels: European Commission. Evans, Gareth. 2006. Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation: From Crisis to Peaceful Governance. Presentation to a seminaron Channels of Influence in a Crisis Situation – How can Development Co-operation Support Conflict Resolution and Democracy? The event was sponsored by the Crisis Management Initiative, the Finnish Parliament and Foreign Ministry, and the Democracy Cooperation Forum of Finnish Political Parties, Helsinki, on 9 May. Holsag, Jonathan. 2006. The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion. European Foreign Affairs Review 11: 555-580. Nye, Joseph S. 2004. SoftPower: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs.


BEYOND THE TRIADIC WORLD ORDER: THE ROLE AND PATTERNS OF TRADE AND ECONOMICS IN EU-ASIA RELATIONS Carlo Filippini Abstract This section offers a detailed critique of the patterns of trade and economics which underlie contemporary EU-Asia relations. One of the key arguments of this contribution is the assertion that the various economic, political, social and cultural aspects of EU-Asia contacts are 'bundled, inter-related and interwoven. Against this general background, the author analyses in some depth the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) in Asia – known as the ‘Asian Tigers’. He places a particular emphasis on China, South Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and on the economic ‘pillar’ of the process of ‘Asia-Europe Meetings’ (ASEM), the EU-Asia summitry which was inaugurated over a decade ago. The issues encompassed by the investigation which follows range from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to European Union Aid and Development Policy. The evaluation offered here includes a critique of EU trade policies, and an examination of the wave of new, bilateral, Free Trade Agreements now being concluded throughout many parts of Asia. Economic relations are strictly interlaced with cultural, historical, political and social ones and one can understand them only remembering the whole picture. In this chapter we shall try to present some recent aspects and certainly will forget many others; moreover the EU point of view will be adopted in most instances: the space constraint is a weak justification for these shortcomings. We shall

148

Carlo Filippini

always use the name European Union (instead of the various official denominations adopted over time); Europe will be a short name for EU and/or other European countries not (yet) members of the EU. It will be immediately evident that quite often there is no common EU policy but many different national strategies. If Europe is ‘unity in diversity’, as far as the economic relations with Asia are concerned, one can find a lot of diversity and very little of unity. A few Legacies from the Past For many years after the end of WW II the economic relations between the EU and Asia were rather limited and certainly were much less extensive than was warranted by the size of the two regions – whether represented by GDP or by population – or by their past colonial links (Slater and Strange 1997). Cultural and even political relations continued to be strong between France and Indochina or even Holland and Indonesia, notwithstanding the wars staged by the Asian countries in order to become independent. The same can be said of the ties between the United Kingdom and its former colonies: commercial flows continued to be strong and flourishing. These countries were an important source of raw materials, both mineral and agricultural ones. At the same time, negative factors also were at work in EuropeanAsian relations. First of all, Asia (more East Asia than South Asia, in general) seemed more distant and politically vulnerable to the communist threat than Africa or Latin America. Trade and/or aid might have been a solution in order to develop these countries and keep them away from the Soviet or Chinese influence. However, the European countries quickly left the burden of helping Asia withstand these threats to the United States (Grilli 1993). Development cooperation was mainly focused on former French colonies; the APC countries have grown in number from 18 to about 80 in the various Conventions signed with the EU and include former British, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies; however, the larger and quite poor economies (e.g., Bangladesh or India) were excluded. In addition, Asian countries were poor and overpopulated. In 1950, Chilean per capita GDP was twice as big as that of Japan and Zimbabwe was twice as rich as the Philippines – then supposed to be the most promising economy in the region (Maddison 2001). The

BEYOND THE TRIADIC WORLD ORDER

149

European perception of these states was generally speaking, negative and pessimistic: their size, poverty, and ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity made most opinion leaders believe that it was impossible to cope with these challenges. Indian independence was marred by blood and forced migrations. Their human capital (now reputed to be one of their strongest assets and most important causes of their economic ‘miracle’) was quite limited: in 1960 the percentage of the population aged 20-24 enrolled in higher education in Singapore and Korea was about half of, respectively, Uruguay and Argentina (World Bank 1978). Last but not least of the factors that helped restrict the extent of EU-Asia relations, the United Kingdom (the state that kept the strongest relations with her former Asian colonies) joined the EU only in 1973. EU, Japan, and the NIEs In the early 1960s, Japan was still considered a developing country and was easily accorded MFN status by the EU without any problem. It is interesting to remember that quotas agreed on many manufactured goods (Italy’s quotas on cars lasted up to the end of the 1990s) were explained in conflicting ways: according to one side, Japan asked for them in order to protect her industry, according to the other, the very opposite is true. By the 1970s the (East) Asian economic competition became evident. Japan first and, with a time-lag of a few years, the four NIEs or ‘tigers’ (a Western, not an Asian, description) reached a high stage of development and exported manufactured goods in many world markets, including the European ones. The very same products, consumer durables and cars, that were the basis of the German and Italian rapid post-war recovery, were increasingly substituted by Asian products. The EU attitude towards Japan changed and became hostile. Voluntary export restraints were imposed on many Japanese products with mixed results; on the one hand, VERs limited the quantity of imports, on the other hand they often increased their value and the profits of Japanese corporations because the higher value-added items were traded in each category. The EU adopted a defensive attitude because of the rapidly increasing competitive advantages shown by the East Asian economies;

150

Carlo Filippini

a very surprising aspect was their ability to accumulate human capital and technological capabilities. Traditionally competitive advantages were supposed to be more of a natural endowment rather than being ‘produced’; however manufactured imports from this area progressed quickly from textiles to vehicles, to machinery (Turner and McMullen 1982). The pattern of the East (North, and later South) Asian growth was interpreted using the ‘flying geese’ model. These economies had rather hierarchical relations and were not integrated; trade with the United States has been greater than intraregional trade up until recently (even if Singapore acted as a hub for most ASEAN countries). Akamatsu wrote his seminal papers in Japanese in the 1930s, from which the West might have gained a greater understanding of Asian ways of doing things, but only some 25 years later were they read by Western economists in an English translation (Kojima 2000), a sad account of the European ignorance of these realities. The cultural explanation (‘the Japanese are different because of their culture, religion, ethics’) was an easy way out to avoid a painful understanding of the deep causes of the productivity differentials, not to speak of the costs and benefits of the European social systems. As we have just said, the EU policy towards Japan was applied to the NIEs too. The Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) replaced a similar agreement in 1974 and was tightened in 1979. Steel, chemical products and consumer electronics were targeted and the subjects of discriminatory trade measures. In the 1980s the EU directed about 30 anti-dumping actions against the four NIEs. EU and ASEAN The ASEAN countries received at the beginning of the 1970s a better treatment than Japan and the NIEs because of many reasons. First of all, they were less developed than Japan and the NIEs and so less threatening to EU interests. Secondly, the United Kingdom kept substantial interests in the area. Thirdly, the expectations of a communist takeover in Indochina – the ‘domino theory’ – were strong and prevalent. The birth of ASEAN in 1967 was mainly due to this factor. The dialogue was from the very beginning a group-to-group one: EU and ASEAN held regular formal meetings from 1975 onwards (and


151

informal but regular meetings even earlier); a Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1980 (Dent 1999, chapter 3). At the same time, the actual results of this dialogue, at least in terms of trade volumes, remained quite modest during the 1980s. The ASEAN economies grew rapidly (also because of Japanese FDI) and were likened to the NIEs. In addition to this, the ‘domino theory’ proved true in a very limited way: only Laos and Cambodia changed their political structures. The ASEAN countries were not given additional trade preferences beyond the GSPs. On the contrary, a few agricultural products were discriminated against. One can notice that the GSPs became increasingly relevant, in a positive way, to these countries because they were industrializing and so exporting manufactured goods in a greater proportion than agricultural products. Earlier this system benefited the NIEs too that showed a similar pattern of growth (Akrasanee and Rieger 1982, Kulessa 1990). EU and China Economic and cultural relations between Europe and China date back to some 2,000 years ago or more. Chinese silk was worth more than gold in ancient imperial Rome; missionaries (mainly, but also traders and ‘ambassadors’) travelled very long journeys to establish links between the two civilizations. The Jesuit Father Li-ma-teu (Matteo Ricci, 1552-1610) is one of the best known (non contemporary) European names in China. He, and his successors Ferdinand Verbiest and Johann Adam Schall von Bell, actually brought to China knowledge and scientific instruments, a counterevidence to the common belief that up to last century everything was invented in China and later passed on to Europe. Jumping to the recent past, EU-China relations were very limited in scope due to factors originating from both sides, not least the Cold War and deep ideological differences. Most European countries had no diplomatic relations up to the 1970s, and formal ties were established only in 1975, following the improvement in relations between China and the United States that had begun under Nixon. China began the reforms that led to the gradual opening up of trade relations with the West three years later. After a slow start, marked by a Trade Agreement signed in 1978, the economic links became stronger, even if from time

152

Carlo Filippini

to time the political climate was rather chilly. Hong Kong (and Macau, but to a very limited extent) was the gate through which trade and investment passed. It is worth noticing that Hong Kong was never subject to harassments (most water came from the mainland) and the offer of the new Portuguese government in 1975 to give back Macau was refused. With the improvements in Chinese economic performance that followed the reforms trade and investment flourished too and an ‘Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China’ was signed in 1985 (Council 1985; Taylor 1990). EU and South Asia As we have said already, the EU very seldom adopted a common policy or strategy towards Asian countries. ‘Common’ here has two meanings: the first refers to the same policy relative to all the countries of the region; and the second refers to a policy shared by all the member states concerning a problem or a state. The South Asian economies were never supposed to be a problem or to pose any danger to the EU, even if their numbers were quite high and on the international stage they often did not side with the Western powers. Earlier in the 1960s the EU introduced a few concessions relating to some of the agricultural and textile products of the region. Later on in the 1970s, Commercial Cooperation Agreements were signed with some South Asian countries, giving them the usual and traditional most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. In addition, technical and financial assistance programmes were activated, mainly relating to the rural and agricultural sectors (Grilli 1993, chapter 7; Wiessala 2002, chapter 7). In the 1980s, the EU upgraded the Agreements with India and Pakistan. It was mainly a formal decision with very little substantial content. While the EU was in this period the main trade partner for India (about 25 % of total trade), India accounted for less than 2% of the EU exports to, or imports from, non-European countries. In addition, the EU preferential treatment for agricultural products – e.g. Indian cane sugar – was at times suspended depending on internal EU problems. The MFA limited, to a certain extent, exports to the EU but generally speaking the European sectoral policies did not seriously


153

affect this region. The creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 was not significant in deepening economic relations between the two groups. On cultural, historical and humanitarian grounds the EU gave South Asia a large share of total Asian aid: in the 1960s, mainly food to overcome famines and since the late 1970s, funds too as a partial way to compensate the countries of the region for being excluded from the benefits given to the APC countries. The most important objective was to secure food sufficiency and to avoid famines: almost all the resources were directed towards this aim. But if we take into account the size and poverty of the populations, EU aid was quite small, particularly when it is compared to the aid given to Africa or Latin America. Individual European countries were more generous. EU and Asia after 1990 Since 1990 the EU has been giving Asia a lot more attention and trying to adopt a more effective policy. Many factors can explain this change of mind, not least the fact that the economic dynamism of the East Asian countries was not only evident, but clearly perceived as such by almost everybody. Japan, the NIES, the second tier of ‘tigers’ (belonging to ASEAN), and (last but not least) China were by now world economic powers. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and with the end of the Cold War released energies and interest towards other regions of the world. The transition from GATT to WTO meant that new rules were coming and compelling the EU to change its commercial policy, at least partially. The APEC was established without even inviting Europe – a quite serious snub. On the EU side of the equation, the ‘euro sclerosis’ of the 1970s was over and the Single Market process was progressing quite well (Maull, Segal and Wanandi 1998; Bridges 1999, Dent 1999). The results of this change were the ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’ document in July 1994 (COM 1994), outlining the six objectives of the EU in the continent. In the document it is stated that Asia is a complex and diverse region. Its countries are grouped into three subregions: South Asia, South East Asia, and East (actually North East) Asia. The importance of Asia to the EU, as far as politics, economics, and cooperation are concerned, is stressed. To some critics this was not

154

Carlo Filippini

a new European strategy, but a ‘first time’ strategy because, prior to this, the EU did not have a common position with respect to Asia. The strategy focuses on six objectives: to contribute to peace and security in the region and globally; to strengthen mutual trade and investment flows; to promote the development of the less prosperous countries in Asia; to contribute to the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law; to build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries; and to help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia and vice versa. This strategy was reaffirmed in 2001 (COM 2001a). Almost at the same time, Singapore proposed a new entity in order to forge solid links between Europe and East Asia. The result was ASEM, the first meeting of which was held in Bangkok, November 1996. The original partners were the 15 members of the EU, the European Commission, and the 7 members of ASEAN, plus China, Japan, and Korea (AEGV 1999; Gilson 2002). One of the most important factors explaining the birth of ASEM was the convergence of similar needs: the European side was avoiding being left out completely from the Pacific region after the emergence of APEC and the Asian side was counterbalancing the American influence and hegemony by ‘using’ Europe. In proposing the new grouping, Singapore was also responding to the worries of a few Asian countries (e.g. Malaysia) that had wanted a pure Asian entity instead of APEC (Dent 1996; Drysdale and Vines 1998). ASEM’s objectives went far beyond pure economic aims. They encompassed many aspects or ‘pillars’: political, economic, and sociocultural ones. Another (unusual) aspect of ASEM was its informality: the organizational structure was very light and the meetings held every other year, in an Asian and European capital alternatively. Up to now, the results have been quite modest: ASEM lacks visibility, does not have a clear agenda or priorities, and has not been able to gather the support of the business communities or civil society groups. European top political leaders have often missed the meetings held in Asia (ASEM 6 2006). Actually NGOs have set up a competitor: the AsiaEurope People’s Forum, AEPF: It aims to bring the voice of the civil society in the official Asia Europe Summit, ASEM, and to create alternatives to its neoliberalistic agenda. The


155

AEPF was created in 1996 and it has held forums every second year parallel to the ASEM summit (from the AEPF website).

It is difficult to forecast future developments of this entity. In 2006, the members are the 25 EU countries, the Commission, the 10 ASEAN ones, plus China, Japan, and Korea. Many countries in Europe and Asia are queuing to be admitted (e.g. India, Pakistan). It might become a forum for discussions and informal proposals for the solving of problems of any kind (Wiessala 2002). EU and Japan After the burst of the ‘economic bubble’, around 1990, Japan has been in a ‘desperate but not serious’ condition for some 15 years and lost its leadership role in East Asia. At the same time, it achieved the positive result of being no longer perceived in Europe (and in America too) as an unbeatable competitor in world markets. The long period of low, and even negative, growth has persuaded people to consider Japan like a normal economy (Gilson 2000). In July 1991, a Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the EU’s Member States was signed (EC-Japan Summit 1991) and yearly EU-Japan Summits have been held since then. In addition, around the beginning of this millennium an Action Plan for ‘Shaping the Common EU-Japan Future’ (EU-Japan Summit 2001) and a Mutual Recognition Agreement to facilitate market access were signed and entered into force – leading the EU to state that relations with Japan in politics, economics and trade, and cooperation on common challenges, have never been better than today. The Summits have been (and are) quite useful in dealing with, and often solving, common problems. The new approach is quite evident, due of course also to a better and deeper reciprocal knowledge: education and culture are essential, not simply relevant, even in trade. Common characteristics and interests are quite evident. To limit the discussion here to economics, without taking into account international politics and security, we might note that the EU and Japan account for some 40% of world GDP between them, but that their growth rates have been disappointing. In international trade negotiations they tend to protect their own agricultural producers and to ask for greater openness in manufacturing and services. Security in energy is crucial to both and both are big aid donors (with a much

156

Carlo Filippini

smaller political clout in international affairs). Some big, global challenges are of common interest to both (e.g. air pollution or pandemic and infectious diseases, like avian flu). Economic relations between the two sides are now more cooperative and less confrontational also because of the political changes and the reform of the bureaucracy that the Koizumi governments have (partially) implemented. A second factor that is helping things is the governance and organizational evolutions that the Japanese keiretsu have been experiencing. The Action Plan signed in 2001 has four objectives. The second objective is directly and the third one is indirectly concerned with economics, trade specifically. The main aim is to encourage bilateral trade and FDI, supporting private sector exchanges and direct contacts between SMEs. The SMEs issue is becoming quite important not only in Japan but also in many Asian countries, as we shall see when discussing ASEAN; it is more evidence of the shifting character and power of the business groups. A few well-publicized cases of European investments are quite significant, but certainly not the norm, the involvement of Renault in Nissan being one example (actually the French corporation was chosen because it was not big and so relatively easy to dispose of, if necessary). In order to increase EU-Japan bilateral, exchanges it is relevant to reduce unnecessary and obstructive regulation. One of the major complaints by European firms has been the closed nature of the Japanese markets. Many specific rules or standards were seen as artificial non-tariff barriers rather than being derived from cultural differences. One of the many examples is the habit of stamping food items with the make, not the end date. On the Japanese side the push to cut red-tape is quite real and strong, being part of the Koizumi reforms. Besides this the Action Plan is partially convergent with the ‘Japan’s 21st Century Vision: A New Era of Dynamism’ (Japan Government 2005). In order to achieve its objectives, Japan has to create a virtuous cycle of rising productivity and growing income, with a small and efficient government. Given the aging population all human resources will be mobilized; protected sectors and groups will find it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to keep their privileges.


157

Of course the EU will only be one of the beneficiaries of the reforms and changes going on in Japan. Other countries, in particular the Asian ones, are there, ready to reap the rewards as well. It will rather difficult to beat them. Moreover in the past a confident Japan was reluctant to let foreign corporations in (Keck 2006). EU and ASEAN The ASEAN-EU Vision Group (2006) recommended the creation of a FTA between the two entities. In the past few years the ASEAN has concluded or is negotiating many FTAs with neighbouring or distant countries and similarly the EU. But oddly enough nothing has been proposed to strengthen their reciprocal links. If nothing is done the two groups will lose an important opportunity because their shared interests are relevant in most fields beyond the purely economic ones. They are similar in size and complementary in what they produce. Their members are different in size, income levels, and language while sharing common values. Both have a ‘big brother’ – the USA and China – that is at the same time a source of attraction and repulsion. Their geographic distance has been made almost irrelevant by innovations in transport and, even more, communications. In past years the income growth rates have not been matched by comparable growth rates in trade and investment. In order to get most of the potential benefits the proposed FTA must be included in a larger economic cooperation framework. Even if the benefits are substantial, only careful preparation, different treatment for poorer countries, and a rather long transition period will ensure that they are distributed to all member states in a satisfactory way – given the wellknown and large differences in development levels. The agreement ought to be quite comprehensive, covering most goods and services as well as investment. Some priorities are: trade and investment facilitation and promotion; standards and conformity assessment; the development of efficient service sectors and institutional cooperation. Waiting for the FTA is a basis for reciprocal cooperation that the EU has put in place in the form of a European Commission Communication, ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’ (COM 2003a). This details a previous document (COM 2001a) and is

158

Carlo Filippini

complemented by TREATI – The Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative. These documents were issued to revitalize relations that suffered badly from both the 1997 Asian crisis and tensions over human rights. That crisis might have been a good chance to deepen common ties, not only via financial help (actually the EU provided large sums) but also by proposing medium-term solutions – for example the role of SMEs in generating employment was keenly studied in Asia (Chirathivat, Filippini, and Molteni 1999). However, at this stage a few words on values are needed. Compromise or postponement is the way of solving sensitive problems in Confucian societies and this is an approach that has irritated the EU in many instances and got in the way of deepening ties. The most relevant example is the problem of Myanmar. Currently, however, ASEAN countries too are taking a stronger position against this government, even if they are using a subtle argument, and this has the potential to further improve EU-Asia realtions. They have been arguing that it is Myanmar that is embarrassing the other members, not because of her internal repressive policies, but because of her uncooperative stance. Another factor working in favour of an improvement in relations is the EU’s quick and generous response to the 2004 tsunami disaster, which has been widely appreciated in the region. Finally, going back to the beginning of the 1990s, one must remember that the EU’s new attitude towards Asia (COM 1994 and 1996b), that resulted partially from the greater self-confidence of the Union after the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, produced an approach that was pragmatic and multi-directional. Multi-directional meant that the cooperation was based on mutual interests, both private and public; it complemented member states’ projects; it stimulated the participation of the private sector. Many information and consultation points, technology centres and business networks were established jointly with the Asian countries. It is worthremembering also the European Studies Programmes – the first of which was in Thailand – networks between European and local Universities set up in order to support research and teaching on the EU (COM 1997) and thereby to facilitate greater medium and long


159

term understanding and closer links between the educated sectors of both Europe and Asia. EU and China The massive amount of coverage that currently is being given to China is not surprising, given its size (1.3 billion people), its rapid economic growth (8-10% GDP annual rate since 1978), and its future prospects. The mere size of the country as a rapidly emerging market has impressed ordinary people, politicians and businessmen alike, leading to statements (or dreams) like the following: ‘If I succeed in selling one item of my production to 10% of Chinese consumers, I shall be selling 130 million units: what a success!’ The EU-China dialogue was temporally halted in June 1989 following the Tiananmen Square events. However, European sanctions did not last because of the growing importance of the partner economy – only EU exports of arms are still prohibited. Many Commission papers have been issued in the past ten years outlining the policy towards China (COM 1995, 1998, and 2001b). This is a clear indication of its relevance and rapidly changing status. The more recent ones are ‘A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations’ (COM 2003b) and ‘EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities’ (COM 2006a), which marks a rather major shift from the traditional appeasing EU attitude. The EU has always been quite keen to maintain good relations with China and welcomed its accession to the WTO in 2001. To a certain extent this was due to a desire to become the privileged economic (and political) partner in competition with the USA. A few relevant problems linked to WTO membership were left unresolved and were remitted to specific Committees still at work, without significant results (van der Geest 2006). The EU and China favour similar approaches to the attempted solution of some similar difficulties. More specifically: in competition policy in both China and the EU there is a trend to create a level playing field for state-owned and private enterprises; a single, internal market is seen as presenting many benefits as compared to a fragmented one; and regional convergence is seen as a quite important objective (e.g. China’s ‘go west’ policy to avoid spatial imbalances and bottlenecks). Recently inequality in income distribution is becoming

160

Carlo Filippini

an important issue in China on three levels: the regional, urban-rural, and sectoral ones. The EU-China dialogue is detailed in some 20 different areas, under various formal denominations – ‘dialogues’, ‘regular exchanges’, ‘cooperation’ and so on. The areas cover competition policy, industrial policy, energy, environment, transport, tourism policy and many others. In some of these China is also creating a new legal and regulatory framework. In the past, there were no laws concerning private property or consumer protection, to give just two examples. The European experience of cooperation can be useful to the Chinese authorities. Total trade has grown more than forty times since Deng’s economic reforms began in 1978, but the European Union’s deficit is now almost twice as big as the total EU exports to China. Two contrasting visions are now competing in Europe: on the one hand, many people think that China is in a deep transition, both politically and economically. When the process is completed it is believed that China will be a golden opportunity for everybody – the present problems and costs are temporary – in any case a substantial slow down of Chinese growth would have dangerous consequences for the whole world. The legitimacy of the present Communist leadership is seen as being based on the wealth it is delivering to most of its citizens – an economic crisis would entail a political one too. The competing vision is stressing the economic success that is by now too evident to everybody. Just to give one figure that is often cited: at the end of 2006 the amount of China’s foreign reserves was about 1,000 billion USD, the highest in the world, surpassing those of Japan. This vision argues that China is not a developing country any more, and that some costs ought to be borne by it – ranging from those relating to pollution and counterfeiting, to those involved in smaller aid to trade concessions. EU member states are divided over specific issues (as shown by the case of duties on shoes in 2005), because of the different impact on their economies of Chinese imports: cheap imports are at the same time a bonus to consumers and a deadly threat to producers. Because competence over many aspects related to trade is still a national one – export or tourism promotion, custom clearance and so on – it is quite difficult to pursue common positions or strategies. As a result many voices are advocating protectionism or, in a more sophisticated way,


161

strict enforcement of all agreements, regulations, and standards. The new document (COM 2006a) marks this shift. EU and India India has been often compared to China with good reasons. Not only are their population sizes similar but also their economic reforms. Since the 1991, elections Indian governments have radically modified their country’s economic policies, pushing for liberalization and the free market, as opposed to economic planning, in February 1992, for example. 1992 to India is like 1978 to China – although India has now more socialist features than China. There is, however, a deep difference between the two societies: democracy versus one-party rule. This is a liability and a great asset for India, at the same time: in fact the Indian reform process has not been linear (Kapur 1999). The attractiveness of India is on the increase for many reasons. First of all, it can be an alternative to China, with the same main positive characteristics (a well educated and cheap labour force, a free market economy, size) and an additional one: the rule of law, and an independent judiciary. Secondly, India is trying to reinforce its relations with ASEAN and more generally the Pacific region. In making this effort, India is getting a sympathetic ear. Thirdly, India is the main actor in South Asia and the key to any real regional integration and for the effectiveness of SAARC – to which the EU was admitted with observer status in 2006. Finally, the Asian crisis, in 1997, did not affect at all this economy (Wiessala 2002, chapter 7). In the WTO India is an active member (but usually the least distant from the EU) of a group of developing countries asking for a more substantial role and weight in taking decisions, a group that is quite confrontational towards the QUAD group (USA, EU, Canada, and Japan). The common economic relations between India and the EU are in effect regulated by the European Commission’s communications ‘EU-India Enhanced Partnership’ (COM 1996a) and ‘An EU-India Strategic Partnership’ (COM 2004), plus the ‘EU-India Joint Action Plan’ that was signed at the 2005 Delhi Summit. These agreements cover many sectors and areas and are often supplemented by more specific ones in the space industries (the GALILEO Programme), energy, ICT and so on.

162

Carlo Filippini

Indian tariffs are still rather high and the EU would like to see them lowered, especially on manufactured goods. Non-tariff barriers and complex red-tape in customs clearing proceedings are additional problems. IPRs are still a sensitive problem – in the pharmaceutical sector, for example. There is a large scope for increased EU-India cooperation both in trade and investment; many firms have been outsourcing IT-related activities and call-centres to India with few troubles about the use of English. At the same time big Indian corporations are setting up joint ventures and even investing abroad – in the steel sector quite recently. At the end of 2006, news about a FTA between EU and India was circulated. If signed, the FTA would represent a more effective way to improve economic links and a departure by the EU from its multilateralism. Indeed, this consistent trade strategy has been recently questioned in statements by top EU officials. Foreign Direct Investment Trade and FDI are, generally speaking, complementary. Of course the trade structure changes in response to investments, but very often they move together, at least in size – the latter does not kill the former. Without entering into theoretical analysis, we can be quite certain that the same will happen between the EU and Asia in the future. FDI responds to three main factors: political and macroeconomic stability, profitability, and reciprocal knowledge and interest. While the first two ought to generate large investment flows, the last one is lacking in key parts of Asia. It is not, therefore, surprising that the European corporations have invested rather little in the region. To be fair to the European corporations, up to the mid-1990s, Asian countries were quite hostile to foreign investors. East Asian economies have not been ‘free market’ and ‘free trade’ champions, as a naïve and widespread opinion puts it. On the contrary Asian governments and businesses played a joint game with a strategic, longterm objective of liberalization but instrumental, short-term, protectionist tactics. East Asia was different from Latin America in keeping the final goal in its sights without confusing tactics and strategic behaviours. In merchandise trade liberalization was generally achieved much earlier than in service trade and even earlier than in foreign investment. In the past Japan always quoted the three cases of


163

American FDI dating back to the post-war period and Japanese critics were quick to point out that those were the only cases (Maurer and Regnier 1990). A World Investment Report (Unctc 1991) analysed the pattern of FDI from the USA, Japan, and EU to selected world regions, with interesting results. Looking at stock data in 1987, the EU was dominant in Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India and competing with Japan in Malaysia (while the USA and Japan were more present in other countries). This pattern is contrary to economic theory: the explanation rests in cultural, historical, commercial, and political links. Notwithstanding these cases, the EU was relatively absent in Asia: the explanations focused mainly on the supply-side. EU firms were small or medium-sized and preferred direct exports to investment. In addition, the EU’s Eastern enlargement prospects helped to direct FDI to European (but non-EU) countries that were also less ‘difficult’ and distant. Quite recently, a few key factors have been shaping the pattern of FDI: first of all, production fragmentation, by means of which a good is now produced in two, three or even four different locations; secondly, the relocation of manufacturing and some services from the USA and the EU to Asia, mainly due to its lower labour costs (taking into account labour productivity, of course); thirdly, China’s rapid growth, coupled with a deeper integration and interdependence in East Asia; and last, but not least, globalization and liberalization. The first two are not quite new in their essence, but the speed and scale on which they are happening now is. FDI liberalization has been fostered by competition between host countries: China relaxed her rules around 1994, compelling other (mainly South East) Asian economies to follow suit. However ASEAN countries are losing investment to China. Now all cooperation agreements signed by the EU and Asian entities cover both trade and investment. The EU is the primary source of world FDI. According to Unctad in 2003 (including intra-EU investment) the EU-25 stock was 3,198 billion EUR, or about 62% of the world total and the EU-25 flow was 261 billion EUR, or 66% of the world total. If (more meaningfully) one considers only extra-EU figures, at the end of 2003 EU-25 stock was 1,976 billion EUR; South and East Asia hosted 13%

164

Carlo Filippini

only. The four main EU contributors to Asia were Britain, Germany, France, and Holland (Eurostat). The 2004 flow was equal to 115 billion EUR. South and East Asia got 26% of it, while China, including Hong Kong, was the main destination country. If we look for profitability, in 2004, Asia performed rather well and accounted for 18% of total income, while the stock share was 13% (Eurostat). A novel feature ought to be noticed: developing economies, and in particular Asian ones, are a growing source of FDI. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, and Korea are in the top 10, with a combined stock of 805 billion USD in 2005, which is equal to 58% of the developing countries’ total (Unctad 2006). Financial centres, like the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, are prominent too in this list (11% of the total). They are at the same time a source and destination of FDI and represent the first or second recipient of FDI originating from Hong Kong, Singapore, and China (Unctad 2006). EU Aid Policy ‘Trade not aid’ is quite a famous slogan. However, it is much easier to give aid rather than trade concessions, and almost all the developed countries are in various measures both donors and trade partners. The EU is quite a generous donor, even if the criteria used in allocating aid are far from evident and consistent. There are different ways in which assistance is given and various units or committees implementing the policies. Taking into account all the funds – official and private – given to developing countries, the EU has been consistently providing in the past few years, more than half of the total net disbursements by all donors. One must remember that, in addition to Brussels, individual EU member states too are providing aid. In 2005 it amounted to more than 65 billion USD out of a total of 117 billion USD. If we limit ourselves to the official aid, the EU share by recipient region ranged from about 35% (South and East Asia) to 65% (Sub-Sahara Africa) in 2004 (OECD). One can identify two main kinds of EU policies and actions towards developing economies. On the one hand, there are the special relations with the APC countries under the many Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou Conventions. On the other hand, there is the development cooperation, assistance, and humanitarian aid. In the 2006 EU budget APC states got 1,073 million EUR, external relations (a very broad


165

item) 3,167 million, and humanitarian aid 496 million – not small figures, but a mere 3.9% of the total expenditures. EU development assistance policy was rather occasional and without a clear strategy for many years. By the mid-1970s, the Lomé I Convention had been signed, establishing some order in this important sector. The EU member states, too, were signatories, reflecting the country approach to aid. Even if coordination with EU policy was required, in general national interests prevailed. A consequence of this was the exclusion of the big former British colonies in South Asia. The Convention was meant to be a comprehensive development strategy, including trade preferences (but which were very limited for CAP products), assistance, and aid. Quite new and potentially effective tools were the systems aimed at the stabilization of the earnings of the APC states deriving from primary products exports – Stabex and Sysmin (Holland 2002). At present EU development policy is centred on reducing and, if possible, eradicating poverty and attaining the Millennium Development Goals, while promoting common values in a multilateral approach (COM 2005). The motives are not simply moral but political too: poverty is generating international instability and crisis (Kermarec 2003). In Asia, the two main regional groups – ASEAN and SAARC – are specific partners of the EU and many focused programmes are funded in order to facilitate cooperation between Asian and European actors – be they research centres, cities, business associations, or corporations, in addition to bilateral activities. It is worthwhile mentioning the EU involvement in quite serious recent events: the EU reacted immediately and substantially to the tsunami disaster in December 2004, to SARS and avian flu, and to the needs of the refugees and displaced people, earmarking funds for them. In the recent past, the EU provided a substantial part of the financial support following the 1997 Asian crisis. Some Contemporary Issues A few points are and will be central to any future development of EU–Asia relations (Chirathivat et al. 2001). First of all there is the choice between multilateralism and bilateralism. It is well known that

166

Carlo Filippini

regional agreements are condoned by the WTO only as a first step towards global free trade. Multilateralism has been the basic tenet of the EU commercial policy. The EU has up to now refused to sign a bilateral FTA with Singapore, stating that the priorities were: first of all to conclude positively the Doha Round; then to deal with ASEAN as a whole. Other major economies – the USA and Japan, for example – have been more pragmatic, choosing solutions to economic and trade problems on a case-by-case basis, without having to stick to a general principle. Anyhow the EU is losing on both fronts after the stalemate reached in the Doha Round. Recently statements by top EU officials have hinted at a possible change of mind, not excluding any more the bilateral approach. Secondly, the EU will have to define its priorities in trade issues. The protection accorded to agricultural products is becoming quite costly: the new group of developing countries in the WTO is depicting the EU as a closed market and is using this argument to oppose any further opening of their markets to manufactured goods. The only solution to Asian competition for the EU is to upgrade its technological level and to continue moving along the well-known growth path described by Kuznets almost fifty years ago: from agriculture to the food and textile industries, to the steel and chemical sectors, to consumer durables with strong economies of scale, to services and knowledge (Jones and Plummer 2004). Another decision linked to the previous one is the fixing of priorities when dealing with Asian countries. When ASEM was established infrastructures were the most obvious choice. In the 2006 Helsinki Meeting energy was given the first place, and close to it there was the environment (Park 2004). A third point is the ‘social dumping’ issue, a quite complicated and often confused set of problems, ranging from work conditions to health and safety considerations. It is certainly not correct to ask the developing countries for the same conditions and regulations prevailing only now in the developed ones: one must remember how Europe was fifty years or one hundred years ago. At the same time, the EU can rightly support social progress and protect its own citizens. When imports of shrimps from East Asia were blocked because they were too ‘healthy’, due to an excessive amount of


167

antibiotics, Vietnamese officials said that the EU was simply hostile. A similar story is offered in both the SARS and ‘avian flu’ cases. A fourth important topic is the bundling of economic relations and human rights. Human rights are essential to, and distinctive of, the European culture. Neither the individual nor the group are predominant: the person, that is, an individual living in a social context, is. The EU’s ambiguity in switching on and off its emphasis on human rights – strong with the weak (see the Myanmar case) and weak with the strong (see the China case) – is the real problem. Maybe the solution lies in using different tools to reach different targets: trade agreements on the one hand and NGOs or civil groups on the other. And last but not least, an important area for joint action is education in its several aspects. Firstly, a deeper reciprocal knowledge about each other will dramatically help Europe and Asia to cooperate economically and to create a more secure world. Understanding the way of thinking of other people reduces uncertainty and the fear that derives from it. Secondly, attracting bright and intelligent persons makes a country more efficient and innovative. The USA has been a model in this respect. Thirdly, educating young foreign people creates a strong set of links between countries. In the case of most Asian societies, personal long-term relations are still – and will be in the future – essential for business. A final (too short) comment needs to be made about the Euro: its international role is growing rapidly and it is becoming a complement to the USD as a peg or part of a currency basket – for example, for the Chinese currency. This in itself should help to increase the EU’s importance in the eyes of Asia. In addition, the European experience is quite interesting to Asian countries in deciding whether and how to adopt a common currency: of course it is not a problem of copying the Euro, simply of understanding what was wrong (and what was right) in it (Fabella 2002, ECB 2006). Conclusions A few concluding comments are in order. Some think that the past 200 years are a parenthesis in history: up to the 18th century, Asia, and China in particular, were economically very developed; its population and income were similar as a share of the world total.

168

Carlo Filippini

From 1820 to 1950, Western countries grew much more rapidly leaving, behind all the other economies; however, since then there has been a surprising recovery in Asia. A well-known prediction says that by 2020 Asia will revert to its past role (Radelet and Sachs 1997). The way (East) Asia will integrate is relevant to the EU. In the past, China imposed tributary relations on neighbouring states. Now many Asian states have adopted a stance not very different from the one of the European nation states in the 17th century. Will this region become a ‘fortress Asia’ under Chinese leadership, or a loose federation of a few rather big actors? (Oerstroem Moeller 2006) What can Europe offer to Asia, and China? The USA is a big market, with millions of wealthy consumers; Japan is generating again technology and innovations; and Europe? (Engammer and Lehmann 2005). The chances are there, Europe will be the master of its own destiny.

References ASEM 6. 2006. European Background Study – ASEM in its Tenth Year. Helsinki: ASEM. Asia-Europe Vision Group (AEGV). 1999. For a Better Tomorrow: Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century. Seoul: AEVG. Asia-Europe Vision Group (AEGV). 2006. Transregional Partnership for Shared and Sustainable Prosperity. Ha Noi: AEVG. Akrasane, Narangchai and Hans C. Rieger, eds. 1982. ASEAN-EEC Economic Relations. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Bridges, Brian. 1999. Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific: Change, Continuity and Crisis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Chirathivat, Suthiphand, Carlo Filippini, and Corrado Molteni, eds. 1999. ASEAN-EU Economic Relations: The long-Term Potential Beyond the Recent Turmoil. Milan: Bocconi University, EGEA. Chirathivat, Suthiphand, F. Knipping, P. H. Lassen, and S.Y. Chia. 2001. AsiaEurope on the Eve of the 21st Century. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University/Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Commission of the European Communities. 1994. Towards a New Asia Strategy.COM (94) 314. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.


169

Commission of the European Communities. 1995. A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations. COM (95) 279. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 1996a. EU-India Enhanced Partnership. COM (96) 275. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 1996b. Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations. COM (96) 314. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 1997. EU-Asia Relations: Higher Education. COM 97. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 1998. Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China. COM (98) 181. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2001a. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership. COM (2001) 469. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2001b. EU Strategy Towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a More Effective EU Policy. COM (2001) 265. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2003a. A New Partnership with South East Asia. COM (2003) 399. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2003b. A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations. COM (2003) 533. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2004. An EU-India Strategic Partnership. COM (2004) 430. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2005. The European Consensus on Development. Joint statement by the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. COM (2005). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2006a. EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities. COM (2006) 631. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2006b. Global Europe: Competing in the world. COM (2006). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

170

Carlo Filippini

Council of the European Communities. 1985. Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China. Council (1985). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Dent, Christopher M. 1996. EU-East Asia Economic Relations: Completing the Triangle?. European Dossier Research Paper 42. London: European Research Centre. Dent, Christopher M. 1999. The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship. London: Routledge. Drysdale, Peter, and David Vines, eds. 1998. Europe, East Asia and APEC: A Shared Global Agenda? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. EC-Japan Summit. 1991. Joint Declaration on Relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan. The Hague. Engammare, Valérie, and Jean-Pierre Lehmann. 2005. A Eurasian Economic Vision for the Twenty-first Century. Global Economic Review 34, no. 1: 1-19. EU-Japan Summit. 2001. Shaping our Common Future: An Action Plan for EUJapan Cooperation. Brussels, at: ec.europa.eu/external_relations/japan/ summit_12_01/ actionplan.pdf European Central Bank. 2005. Review of the international role of the Euro. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. EUROSTAT. Statistics available at www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ Fabella, Raul. 2002. Monetary Cooperation in East Asia: A Survey. ERD W P 13. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Gilson, Julie. 2000. Japan and the European Union. London: McMillan Gilson, Julie. 2002. Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Grilli, Enzo R. 1993. The EC and the Developing Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holland, Martin. 2002. The European Union and the Third World. Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan. Japan Government. 2005. Towards the Realization of a Dynamic, Stable Society. Tokyo: Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, Cabinet Office. Jones, Erik, and Michael G. Plummer. 2004. EU-Asia links and lessons. Journal of Asian Economics 14: 829-42. Kapur, Jagdish C. 1999. India. A Cosmic Vision for the Sixth Millennium. World Affairs 3, no.4 (Special Supplement): 1-64. Keck, Jörn. 2006. Renewed strength of the Japanese economy and Japan-EU relations. Asia Europe Journal 4: 323-31. Kermarec, Bruno. 2003. L’UE et l’ASEAN: mondialisation et integrations regionales en Europe et en Asie. Paris: L’Harmattan. Kojima, Kiyoshi. 2000. The ‘flying geese’ model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional policy implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11: 375-401.


171

Kulessa, Manfred. 1990. The Newly Industrializing Economies of Asia. Prospects of Co-operation. New York: Springer-Verlag. Maddison, Angus. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD Publications. Maull, Hanns, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanadi, eds. 1998. Europe and the Asia Pacific. London: Routledge. Maurer, Jean-Luc, and Philippe Regnier, eds. 1990. Investments flows between Asia and Europe, What strategies for the future?. Geneva: Modern Asia Research Centre. OECD. Statistics available via Source OECD, at www.sourceoecd.org/ Oerstroem Moeller, Joergen. 2006. Risk and opportunities. Global trends affecting Asia. Asia Europe Journal 4, no. 2: 121-27. Park, Sung-Hoon. 2004. ASEM and the future of Asia-Europe relations: Background, characteristics and challenges. Asia Europe Journal 2: 341-54. Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1997. Asia’s Reemergence. Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6: 44-59. Slater, Jim, and Roger Strange, eds. 1997. Business Relationships with East Asia. The European experience. London and New York: Routledge. Taylor, Robert. 1990. China, Japan and the European Community. London: Athlone Press. Turner, Louis, and Neil McMullen, eds. 1982. The Newly Industrializing Countries: Trade and Adjustment. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs/George Allen & Unwin. United Nations. 1991. World Investment Report 1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment. New York: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Various years. World Investment Report. Geneva. van der Geest, Willem. 2006. Shaping factors of EU-East Asia relations. Asia Europe Journal 4, no. 2: 131-49. Wiessala, Georg. 2002. The European Union and Asian Countries. London: Sheffield Academic Press. World Bank. 1978. World Development Report. Washington, DC: The World Bank. World Trade Organization (WTO). Various years. World Trade Report. Geneva.


THE INTER-REGIONAL DIMENSION OF EU-ASIA RELATIONS: EU-ASEAN AND THE ASIA-EUROPE MEETING (ASEM) PROCESS Yeo Lay Hwee Abstract The following chapter continues several of this book’s major themes, by investigating the inter-regional dimension of EU-Asia relations, and by examining the European Union’s relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This section also offers a critical evaluation of the Union’s role in the process of Asia-Europe meetings (ASEM). In the course of this chapter, the author interrogates the changing identities and dynamics of both these fora, and provides an in-depth look at the parallel challenges and institutional developments they both face, for instance through processes of further consolidation and constitutionalisation. This chapter also offers a thorough contextualisation of these two key channels of Asia-Europe interaction, by means of an analysis of the widely debated, and contested, concepts of ‘regionalism’ and ‘inter-regionalism’. This includes a critical assessment of the ‘people-to-people’ dimension of Asia-Europe relations, and of social-constructivist approaches to the relations. The section closes with a perceptive analysis of the reality and the potential of ASEM. The inter-regional dimension of EU-Asia relations can be traced back to the early 1970s with the establishment of the dialogue between the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the then European Economic Community (EEC). But EU-Asia relations is of course much more than just EU-ASEAN.

174

Yeo Lay Hwee

Sketching Asia is not an easy task. Asia’s sheer size and diversities in cultures and religions, differences in its political systems and stages of socioeconomic development constitute a set of circumstances that makes it difficult to devise any one policy prescription or description for the entire region. However, if we stick to the classification that the EU used in framing its relations with Asia in its first comprehensive communication ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’, Asia is grouped according to three geographic regions – East Asia comprising China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao; Southeast Asia comprising the 10 ASEAN member states; and South Asia comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan. In the later Communication from the Commission ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’, Asia was to include Australia and New Zealand under the subregion of Australasia. Taking Asia as defined by the EU, several frameworks of cooperation exist. Broadly there is the EU with the individual countries such as EU-Japan, EU-China, EU-South Korea and EU-India, there are also group-to-group dialogues such as EU-ASEAN and EUSAARC and finally the hybrid inter-regional framework of ASEM. The chapter here will focus on two of the inter-regional dialogues, the EU-ASEAN partnership and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process. It will however begin first with a brief examination of the theoretical underpinning and functioning of inter-regionalism before looking into the development and institutionalization of the EUASEAN partnership and the ASEM process. The theoretical underpinnings & functioning of inter-regionalism Regionalism and inter-regionalism are contested concepts. In this chapter, I interpret inter-regionalism (‘institutionalized’ relations between world regions) as a generic term to cover two broad types of relationships. The first type is what would be termed pure interregionalism which is a group to group relationship such as EUASEAN, where two defined regional entities interact with each other. The second can be termed ‘hybrid’ inter-regionalism (and some analysts used the term ‘trans-regionalism’) such as ASEM, APEC and FEALAC in which the two ‘regions’ that relate to each other may not

THE INTER-REGIONAL DIMENSION OF EU-ASIA RELATIONS

175

be clearly defined. Membership is more diffuse and may not coincide neatly with regional organizations. Theoretical work on inter-regionalism is fairly new and sparse as inter-regionalism is a relatively new phenomenon that followed the rise of the concept of new regionalism in the late 1980s. However, the practice of ‘inter-regionalism’ can be traced back to the 1970s with Europe’s precursor role in establishing group-to-group dialogue. Early studies on inter-regionalism concentrated on the European Union and its hub-and-spoke system of external relations. Edwards’ & Regelsberger’s (eds.) book on Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and Inter-regional Cooperation (1990) provided a wellinformed overview of the EC’s group-to-group dialogues. In examining the trends in EU inter-regionalism, Vinod Aggarwal and Edward Fogarty (2004) believed that a synthesis of market-driven globalism and politically-driven regionalism and an exploration of the dynamics of the interplay of market forces and political actors may help explain the evolution and future trends of the EU’s inter-regional regimes or cooperation frameworks. In international relations and diplomacy, the proliferation of interregional frameworks in the 1990s is explained by institutionalists as a result of the need to manage the increasingly complex interdependence brought about by globalization. It has the potential to become a new layer in an increasingly differentiated global order. With the emergence of inter-regional dialogues, at least five major policy-making levels can be identified in the international arena – the global, multilateral level (such as UN, WTO); inter-regional dialogues such as APEC and ASEM; regional groupings such as the EU, ASEAN; sub-regional dialogues such as the Greater Mekong subregion; and bilateral relations. All these different layers of interactions in different ways help to manage the complexities of globalization and contribute to the evolution of global governance. For the realists, inter-regionalism arises as a reaction to increased regionalism and the fear of ‘fortress regions’. Inter-regionalism is therefore seen as arising from the need to balance regionalism in other regions as well as inter-regionalism between other regions. Thus to the realists, ASEM is a direct reaction to APEC and APEC in turn was a response to the fear of a fortress Europe and the implications of the Asia-pacific countries being left out because of NAFTA.

176

Yeo Lay Hwee

Depending on which school of thought one subscribes to, interregional dialogues can serve different functions. For the realists, the primary function of inter-regional dialogues or cooperation frameworks is balancing. Institutionalists on the other hand, highlight the potential of inter-regional dialogues serving as rationalisers or agenda-setters in global multilateral forums, and most importantly, their contribution to overall institution-building in an emerging multilayered system of global governance. Finally, there are also the social constructivists who essentially see inter-regional forums as identitybuilders as they claim that inter-regional dialogues can trigger and stimulate processes of intra-regional coordination and cooperation. We must now ask ‘to what extent have the EU-ASEAN partnership and the ASEM process performed the functions of inter-regionalism and to what extent is the potential for inter-regional dialogue/cooperation fully realized in these two processes?’ EU-ASEAN partnership and inter-regionalism ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, amidst uncertain times in Southeast Asia. At the time of its formation, ASEAN was scoffed at by many political observers, both in the region as well as beyond. In a region marred by war and intra-regional conflicts, it was difficult to perceive that the leaders of these independent, sovereign states with different historical experiences would have the political will to overcome their suspicions and latent hostilities. ASEAN’s growth as a regional organisation proceeded at a slow pace in the initial years. There was very little in the way of real integrative efforts as sovereignty was jealously guarded. In any case, ASEAN was never intended as an instrument of integration with supranational authority. ASEAN was only an instrument to manage and contain intra-regional conflicts in order to maintain the overall regional peace and stability that was necessary to allow the individual member states to focus on their own domestic developments. ASEAN from its onset has been an outward-oriented organisation. Most of ASEAN’s success really came by way of common stance vis-àvis third parties. This was reflected, for instance, in the role it played in the Cambodian issue in the 1980s. It has also sought to establish friendly ties with key players in the region and the world in order to


177

secure its own interest. One channel which ASEAN used to articulate its interest was the dialogue partnerships that it established throughout the years with the major powers and other key countries in the region. Its dialogue partners include the EU, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, South Korea and most recently, Russia and India. In many ways, it was such interaction with the others that helped ASEAN define its identity. It is particularly interesting to note that in the first three decades of ASEAN’s relationship with the EC (later EU), ASEAN’s identity was defined in some way by the rejection of the integration model provided by the European Community. This was to change in subsequent years when ASEAN began to re-examine its ‘ASEAN way’ as it sought a way forward to become more institutionalized and integrated in order to respond to the challenges posed by the external environment. The EU integration model is now viewed in a different light in which lessons can be drawn, and not something to be rejected totally. An overview of EU-ASEAN relations The EEC was ASEAN’s first dialogue partner. Informal dialogue between ASEAN and the EEC first took place in 1972 between ASEAN Ministers and the Vice-President and Commissioner of the European Commission. Initially, the dialogue was intended exclusively to achieve greater market access for ASEAN’s exports and a price stabilisation scheme for ASEAN’s primary commodities. After a few annual informal meetings, it was decided in 1975 that an ASEAN-EC Joint Study Group be set up not only to look into trade matters but also to evaluate other possible areas of cooperation, such as, joint ventures in the exploration of ASEAN resources, the possibility of encouraging some degree of EC participation in ASEAN manufacturing activities and of mobilising capital for financing ASEAN projects (Luhulima 1993). ASEAN-EC relations were given a boost and greater political significance with the inaugural ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) in 1978. Under the direction of the AEMM, the ASEAN-EU Cooperation Agreement was formulated and signed during the 2nd ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980.

178

Yeo Lay Hwee

The signing of the ASEAN-EC Cooperation Agreement in 1980 was to mark the beginning of a new stage of cooperation. With the signing of the Framework Agreement, links between ASEAN-EC were institutionalized. The main emphasis of the Agreement was on economic cooperation and development. The Agreement extended the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to the contracting parties. More importantly, it opened up an exclusive channel for the exchange of information and requests that paved the way for EC assistance in several development projects. It opened up a second track of cooperation which specifically covered the EC and the signatories of the Cooperation Agreement. Under the Agreement, objectives for commercial, economic and technical cooperation were established and a Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was formed as a mechanism to monitor ASEAN-EC cooperation. However, despite all these positive developments in general, economically, ASEAN until the 1980s remained at the bottom of the EC’s hierarchy of relations, below even that of the African, Caribbean & Pacific (ACP) and Latin American countries. The low priority accorded to ASEAN was reflected in the fact that the ACP countries received more favourable trade benefits covered by the Lome Convention and the irregular attendance at the AEMM of the EC ministers. The ASEAN-EC relationship was seen very much as a donorrecipient relationship. It was an unequal relationship in which the ASEAN countries were inevitably in a weaker bargaining position (Rueland 1996, 16-17). In contrast to this unequal economic relationship, political cooperation between ASEAN and the European Community in the 80s was markedly more successful. Political cooperation was stepped up to deal with what was seen as the Soviet expansionist threat. Specifically, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia (then Kampuchea) in December 1978, and the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 were the impetus for the two regions to work closely to coordinate their positions and support each other’s positions on the Cambodian and the Afghanistan issues in international fora such as the United Nations. Indeed, during the 1980 AEMM, an unprecedented joint statement was issued deploring the armed interventions in Cambodia and Afghanistan. An analysis of the votes for the UN General Assembly Resolution from 1979 to 1984 showed that ASEAN and the


179

EC did indeed vote as a bloc in support of calls for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Robles 1998, 16). These two issues also remained dominant subjects of political discussion at every successive AEMM till their resolution in 1991. Political relations, however, took a turn for the worse in the early 90s because of the East Timor incident in 1991 and differences over how to treat Burma in the midst of the Burmese ruling junta’s violent suppressions of pro-democracy movements. It was also the triumphant mood in the West following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of Soviet Union and the wave of democratisation movements in the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, that led the Western countries to start pushing other developing countries toward greater democratisation. Free from the Cold War necessities of courting authoritarian but pro-Western countries, Europeans introduced a policy of conditionalities linking trade and aid to issues on human rights, democratisation and environmental protection. This period coincided with a period of dynamic growth of ASEAN countries. ASEAN’s success as a diplomatic community has also made the latter more confident and assertive. This confidence and dynamism was reflected in a more pro-active and positive response to the challenges posed by the post-Cold War world and the realities of the regionalization process in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN undertook its first real step towards greater regional integration by proposing in 1992 the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by the year 2005, and this was later brought forward to 2003. Work also commenced on drawing up an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to attract more direct investments into the region. On a bilateral basis, when ASEAN examined the past twenty years record of its relations with the EU, it could not help but note that while promotion of economic cooperation has translated into increases in the absolute values of trade and investments, it has not altered the relative importance of each region to the other. The challenge then is to imagine new channels and identify new areas for cooperation. In the midst of EU reassessment of its strategy towards Asia, ASEAN was quick to cash in on this and promote itself as the gateway to the wider Asia-Pacific region, and as an interlocutor for the wider dialogue between Asians and the Europeans. ASEAN also

180

Yeo Lay Hwee

recognised that future efforts to create a new dynamic would have to involve European production in Southeast Asia. Hence, the relentless efforts to drive home the message that peace and stability in the region and the launch of AFTA and AIA would provide a secure and profitable environment for Europe’s direct investments. Against the background of the economic success and growing selfconfidence of the ASEAN states, the EU was sold the idea of ASEAN being the linchpin of its wider Asia-Europe relations. ASEAN’s attraction as a rapidly growing market of 500 million people (in anticipation of an ASEAN-10) was also in the minds of key European decision-makers when a consensus decision was taken by the EU (especially by the four big powers – UK, Germany, France and Italy) to put aside sensitive political issues and return to a pragmatic course of focusing on economics. This, of course, must be seen in the context of the EU’s general shift in policy towards Asia as reflected in the July 1994 EC Communication ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’ (NAS). The pragmatic course taken was reflected in the 11th AEMM held in Karlsruhe in September 1994 which showed that ASEAN had gained the upper hand in determining the topics, style and procedure of the meeting (Rueland 1996, 31). The meeting was congenial unlike the past few meetings. East Timor was not raised and human rights issues were only briefly mentioned. Another concrete example of this pragmatic approach was the sidestepping of the issue of a new agreement that was blocked by Portugal. The Ministers resolved to continue and expand their dialogue through other existing channels, and also commissioned an ASEAN-EU Eminent Persons Group to develop a comprehensive approach with regard to ASEAN-EU relations towards the year 2000 and beyond. The European Commission’s Communication ‘Towards a New Asia Strategy’ also pinpointed ASEAN-EU relations as the cornerstone of the new partnership that Europe would seek in Asia. However, recommendations in both the 1996 report by the EEP on ‘A Strategy for a New Partnership’ and also the Communication from the Commission to the Council on ‘Creating a New Dynamic in EUASEAN relations’ on revitalizing the ASEAN-EU ties did not have a chance to be translated into concrete measures. A series of events, notably the Asian financial crisis, the launch of ASEM, the enlargement of ASEAN to include Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and


181

the enlargement of the EU changed the whole dynamics and further impacted on the state of ASEAN-EU relations. There was a period of stagnation, but from the beginning of the 21st century, the changing dynamics within both regions and the wider global context ‘forced’ ASEAN and the EU to relook into their partnership. Changing dynamics and ASEAN’s institutionalisation ASEAN’s historic enlargement in 1997 – its 30th birthday – to encompass the whole of Southeast Asia coincided with an unprecedented series of challenges. The Asian financial crisis that developed in 1997 and the political crisis in Cambodia in July 1997, and the haze that enveloped the region in the latter half of 1997 brought about the most serious challenges for ASEAN as a regional organization. ASEAN’s inability to respond quickly and effectively to the region’s political, economic and ecological shocks led to criticisms that ASEAN was becoming irrelevant and on its way to becoming a sunset organization. Most analysts attributed ASEAN’s inability to find a solution to the economic meltdown and the smothering haze to a number of factors related directly to a code of conduct known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. By operating on the basis of consultation and consensus, ASEAN has fallen into a ‘lowest common denominator’ syndrome which limits ASEAN’s effectiveness, and under the principle of noninterference and non-binding agreement, ASEAN cannot impose discipline on any of its members. The decision to go ahead and enlarge to include Myanmar and Laos at the end of 1997, despite the looming economic crisis, compounded the problems. Jeannie Henderson noted that ASEAN’s marginal position in the face of the crisis revealed the limits of its post-Cold war success. Originally formed as an experiment in regional cooperation predicated on security concerns, after the Cold war, ASEAN placed a new priority on deepening economic integration and creating a community. This raised expectations, both within the Association and outside it, that it could manage regional problems such as economic crises and cross-border pollution. It has failed to do so because, despite the illusion of integration, the compact between its members has remained based on loose inter-governmental cooperation. The culture of avoiding problems, instead of trying to solve them, has

182

Yeo Lay Hwee

persisted. ASEAN’s sleight of hand regarding the difference between ‘commonality’ and ‘integration’ was exposed most clearly by the economic crisis. The incorporation of countries like Myanmar with its military regime and closed economy represented a new extreme in ASEAN’s diversity. This in itself would have tested the Association’s claim to deeper integration as ASEAN has not found a way to reconcile its new breadth with its attempts to achieve a greater depth of integration (Henderson 1999, 74-76). From July 1997 till the beginning of 2000, ASEAN went through a lot of soul-searching. While it was widely criticized for not facing up first to the economic crisis, and then the ecological crisis caused by the haze and in 1999, the humanitarian crisis that unfolded in East Timor, ASEAN did not really stand still. After an initial period of paralysis, ASEAN countries began a process to exchange and review financial information with increasing levels of openness by establishing the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). The ASEAN Secretariat, with the help of the Asian Development Bank, provided support to the operation of the ASP. In response to the environmental crisis caused by the Indonesian fires and haze, regular meetings of senior environment officials were instituted. ASEAN also increasingly opened its meetings on the haze to international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their offers of assistance and advice to the ASEAN Secretariat on the issue have also largely been accepted by Indonesia and the other member states (Tay 2002, 11-12). In the case of East Timor, as the humanitarian crisis unfolded, and the UN stepped in, ASEAN did provide a tenuous role in helping Indonesia to override the strong sentiments against intervention by taking up the invitation to send peace-keepers. The point to be made here is that while the multiple crisis did make ASEAN look ‘helpless’ and the initial uncoordinated response made it look ‘disunited’, ASEAN did not fade into oblivion as some analysts predicted. The Asian financial crisis also provided some impetus for positive change. ASEAN took small steps to re-invent itself in order to retain its relevance for the region and the member states. The ASEAN Secretariat was strengthened with more permanent scientific and technical staff, and regional technical groups are increasingly entrusted with the formulation of regional-level policies. ASEAN also actively engaged its


183

Northeast Asian neighbours, China, Japan and Korea through the ASEAN + 3 process in an effort to remain open and as a response to the rise of China. At the turn of the century, as most ASEAN members celebrated their return to growth, ASEAN as an organisation also slowly began to regain its confidence after the devastating Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. ASEAN’s minimalist approach to cooperation and preference for informality rather than institutions and rules accounts for the difficulties in formulating a collective response to prevent economic and political disruptions in the region. After being called irrelevant because of its seeming inability to respond collectively and effectively to the Asian crisis, ASEAN has made some attempts to salvage its reputation and repudiate the claim that ASEAN is a sunset organization. Egged on by the lessons drawn from the Asian financial crisis, and fuelled by the rise of China and the democratizing process within Southeast Asia itself, ASEAN has embarked on building new regional capacities inspired by the European experience. Calls for more institutionalized processes and mechanisms to govern ASEAN’s affairs and to hasten the process of economic integration have become louder and more prevalent. In 2002, consultant company McKinsey & Co was commissioned to do a study on ASEAN’s competitiveness. One of its key findings released at the end of the study in early 2003 is that ASEAN’s competitive edge vis-à-vis China and India is fast eroding. ASEAN therefore must move faster towards economic integration and ultimately a single market if it is to compete effectively. The recommendations made by McKinsey & Co were taken seriously and hence at the ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003, ASEAN leaders agreed to work towards a community with three pillars – the ASEAN Security Community; the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community. The detailed plan of action to achieve an ASEAN Community was spelt out in the Vientiane Action Programme adopted at the 2004 Summit in Laos. Of the plans for building the three pillars, the most comprehensive and concrete proposals are in the Action Plan towards an ASEAN Economic Community. Indeed to show the seriousness of the whole project of creating an ASEAN Community, the foreign ministers agreed during their July

184

Yeo Lay Hwee

2005 meeting to start drafting an ASEAN Charter which will provide a basis for the bloc to meet the demands of the times. An Eminent Persons Group (EPG) has been set up to recommend to leaders what ASEAN should do to keep in tune with the changes so that the bloc can continue to be a relevant player in the region. Some analysts believed that the drafting of the Charter would provide an opportunity for the review of its decision-making structures and strengthen the organization by making members legally-bound to adhere to collective decisions. With the EU as a forerunner in regional integration, ASEAN switched from the earlier position of declaring the EU’s experience in integration as irrelevant to one of embracing the need to understand better the European integration process so as to draw lessons that can be useful for ASEAN as it seeks a way forward. While the longstanding EU-ASEAN relationship did not directly contribute to a policy shift in approaches to regional cooperation within ASEAN, the fact that the EU has been an obvious subject for study and for lesson-drawing clearly has had an indirect impact. It also directed its development aid to help strengthen and build capacity within the ASEAN Secretariat. Through its ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support (APRIS), a facility from which the ASEAN Secretariat obtains flexible and responsive technical assistance from the EU, the EU also sends a signal of its understanding that inter-regional ties can be enhanced through intra-regional cooperation. ASEAN is certainly more open to dialogue on the institutionalisation of regional cooperative mechanisms. Attention is now focused on what the final draft of the ASEAN Charter will be, and the accompanying tools and mechanisms that will help ASEAN achieve its potential as a regional organization. The success of ASEAN’s integration will in turn be a big boost to the inter-regional character of the EU-ASEAN partnership and serve as a model for other group-to-group dialogues. The ASEM process and inter-regionalism ASEM was launched in 1996 with a summit in Bangkok that brought together leaders of 10 East Asian states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan and South Korea) and the 15 EU member states plus the President of the


185

European Commission. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was conceived in Singapore as an informal meeting between Asian and European leaders to enable the EU to engage dynamic Asian economies in a wide-ranging dialogue. The early 1990s saw the unilateral liberalization of various Southeast Asian economies and the opening up of the Chinese market. At the same time, the European Union was integrating further with the 1986 Single European Act and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. There were therefore strong economic reasons for the two regions to strengthen dialogue. The EU wanted to partake in the benefits of the strong growth in Asia, and not to lose out to the Americans and Japanese. The Asians worried about Fortress Europe with the creation of the Single Market, its focus on Central and Eastern Europe and the internal debates on the Maastricht Treaty. They wanted to be sure that they would not be shut out of Europe. Engaging Europe is also a way of diversifying their economic and foreign policy dependence away from the Americans. The strategic reason behind ASEM was the concept of closing the triangle – balancing the relations and creating strong links between the three engines of growth – America, Europe and East Asia. The argument was that strong transatlantic ties exist between Europe and the US and transpacific ties were also increasingly dense because of APEC and other bilateral relations that exist between the US and its various Asian partners. But ties between Europe and Asia were weak and lacking, and hence the need to have a forum under which linkages could be built and strengthened. The further argument was that only close links among the three key economic players would forestall the spectre of closed, competing blocs, and ensure the continued openness of the global economic order powered by the three engines. This would in turn contribute to the global stability and prosperity. The multi-faceted nature of ASEM and its brief history, plus the gulf in perceptions between academics and policy makers, has presented an enormous challenge to the theoretical conceptualisation of ASEM. There are at least three images of ASEM that have surfaced since its launch in March 1996. The three images of ASEM ASEM is of such a nebulous character that it defies clear definition. In the realm of international relations, some scholars look at ASEM as an

186

Yeo Lay Hwee

inter-regional dialogue. However, other scholars point to the fact that the initial Asian component of ASEM is merely a collection of 10 countries that could not be effectively coined as a region and hence argue that ASEM cannot be called an inter-regional dialogue, but instead is merely a state-driven inter-governmental forum. In the policy realm, the different expectations and views on ASEM further compound the problem of defining ASEM. Is ASEM a cooperative regime, or is it an exercise in diplomacy? Is ASEM about balance of power between competing regions, or is it about promoting multilateral principles in global governance? Is ASEM already an interregional dialogue or is it a regional integrator? For the realists or neo-realists, ASEM is about balancing. Scholars such as Juergen Rueland and Heiner Haenggi have argued that the creation of ASEM itself was an act of balancing. Rueland argued that by the mid-1990s, the Europeans felt increasingly besieged by what they perceived as a gravitational shift in world economics and politics from the Atlantic to the Pacific. A decade of rapid growth of East Asian economies in contrast to the protracted recession in Europe in the 1980s and early 1990s sparked this fear. Compounding the problem was the declining share of European investments into East Asia compared to the US and Japan, suggesting that the EU was losing out in the Triad competition (Rueland 2000, 186). ASEM was thus seen by Europeans as a forum to gain a stronger foothold in East Asia and a balance to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. For the Asians, it was also an avenue to balance the role of the US in the region, and a measure to diversify their economic links. Constructivists, however, view ASEM from the angle of identity building. They note that though, officially, states participate in an individual capacity in ASEM, in practice they frequently act along regional lines based on existing or incipient collective identities. Identity building primarily has occurred on the Asian side.1 Here, ASEM has helped to construct the notion of an East Asian region through a series of coordinating mechanisms and the fact that the East Asian countries are dealing with a much more defined regional entity like the EU. In turn, EU acceptance and treatment of the ten East 1 Julie Gilson and Heiner Hanggi are two scholars who were amongst the few who propounded this viewpoint with regards to ASEM.


187

Asian member states as a collective entity has reinforced the conception of East Asia as a region. Some also argue that it is not only the East Asians who have used ASEM as an identity-builder. The Europeans are also using ASEM to help in the fostering of a common foreign and security policy and to reinforce a European identity that could be presented to the outside world. Seen from the perspective of constructivists, ASEM is essentially an instrument for intra-regional integration. Institutionalists examine ASEM with regard to its role as an institution-builder, agenda setter, and rationaliser. ASEM is seen to have made a modest contribution to international institution building on three levels. Firstly, by establishing a ‘missing link’ between the EU and East Asia in the triangular relations between the three economic power centres of North America, Western Europe and East Asia; secondly by a creeping institutionalisation of ASEM itself, and thirdly, by institutionalising East Asian cooperation (Rueland 2000, 186-7). Besides being an institution-builder, ASEM has also been able to serve as a rationaliser and agenda-setter in the international political system. The gulf between reality and potential A decade after ASEM was first launched and with six summits to its credit (Bangkok-1996; London-1998; Seoul-2000; Copenhagen-2002; Hanoi-2004; Helsinki-2006), ASEM did not seem to have really lived up to any of its images. In a joint research exercise sponsored by the Japanese and Finnish Foreign Ministries to evaluate ASEM in its first decade, it was concluded that, after ten years of ASEM’s efforts, while progress has been made in improving dialogue between Asia and Europe on a wide range of issues, the dialogue, while broad, has not been deep. The dialogue process remains very much stuck at the information-sharing level and has not moved into substantive cooperation. Little institutionalization has taken place, and the intraregional integration of East Asia seems to be coming under a cloud of uncertainty as a new regional entity, the East Asia Summit (EAS) comprising the ASEAN + 3 members plus Australia, New Zealand and India, has appeared on the horizon to challenge the ASEAN + 3 (APT) process. ASEM’s ability to balance APEC or to strengthen the AsiaEurope link vis-a-vis the Asia-Pacific link is also unproven. The fact that the US did not seem to get excited about, or show any interest in,

188

Yeo Lay Hwee

the ASEM process contributes to the perception that ASEM is not seen as a genuine balancer. ASEM’s relevance to the broader international context has been questioned in the evaluation done by the research team. ASEM has not been able to affect the balance of power in the triangle remarkably. Nor has it been successful in coordinating or harmonizing the interests of its partners efficiently vis-à-vis larger international organizations and bodies. The idea that ASEM could produce a much more efficient and effective inter-regional dialogue between two distinct entities, Europe represented by the EU and East Asia in the form of the ASEAN + 3 (APT) framework was also dissipated as ASEM enlarged on the Asian side to include India, Pakistan and Mongolia. Earlier academic discussions suggesting that ASEM could develop into a well-established inter-regional forum with the ability to act as a rationaliser of international relations under conditions of complex interdependence were based on two pre-requisites – first, that the Asian component of ASEM must become more integrated to act as a single regional entity and that the European component of ASEM, second, that the EU, must increase its ‘actorness’. The latter is happening with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), though many obstacles continue to plague the cohesiveness and actorness of the EU. East Asian integration, however, is in doubt and with the enlargement of ASEM to include India, Pakistan and Mongolia on the Asian side, regional coherence in further diluted. Essentially therefore ASEM will remain as a loose, open forum and in competition with other forums such as EU-Japan, EU-China, EUKorea and EU-ASEAN for attention and resources. It will be just one of the various strands of EU-Asia relations. Conclusion: The inter-regional dimension of EU-Asia relations EU-Asia relations will no doubt be an important component of international cooperation as Asian countries such as China and India grow in economic power to claim their rightful place in the regional and global arena. EU-China relations for instance will likely become a central pillar in EU-Asia relations as China is already the fourth largest economy in the world, and is the EU’s biggest trading partner. China is also gaining in diplomatic stature and influence and trying to develop its soft power. EU-Asia relations will most likely be dominated


189

by the EU-China cooperation framework, though ASEM will retain its usefulness as a multilateral forum in which China not only learns to play the role of responsible stakeholder, but also how to use ASEM to promote the broader and longer term interests of China. The pace and quality of the truly inter-regional or group-to-group dialogue between EU and ASEAN will depend very much on the capacity and political will of ASEAN to deepen its integration. ASEAN has never been more unanimous on the need for greater integration, but the capacity to make the necessary domestic political and economic adjustments to implement the reforms that are necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of integration is uneven amongst the different ASEAN member states. The supply of ‘know how’ in the development of policies that will help overcome these problems by external partners, and external assistance towards capacity building, are therefore important components that can strengthen EU-ASEAN cooperation.

References Aggarwal, Vinod and Edward A. Fogarty. 2004. Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism. In European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and Regionalism, eds. Vinod Aggarwal and Edward A. Fogarty. London: Palgrave. Prime Minister’s Office, Finland. 2006. ASEM in its Tenth Year: Looking Back, Looking Forward – An evaluation of ASEM in its first decade and an exploration of its future possibilities (Research report commissioned by the Japanese and Finnish Foreign Ministries), at www.asem6.fi/news_and_ documents/en_GB/1146144206909/ Chairman’s Statement of the Sixth Asia-Europe Meeting, Helsinki, 10-11 September 2006. Commission of the European Communities. 1994. Communication from the Commission to the Council. Towards a New Asia Strategy. COM (94) 314 Final, 13.07. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 1996. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

190

Yeo Lay Hwee

Commission of the European Communities. 2001. Communication from the Commission. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. COM (2001) 469 Final, 4.9.2001. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2003. Communication from the Commission. A New Partnership with Southeast Asia. COM (2003) 399/4. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Dent, Christopher M. 2004. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Interregionalism: Towards a Theory of Multilateral Utility. Asian Survey 44, no.2: 214-225. Edwards, Geoffrey and Elfried Regelsberger, eds. 1990. Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and Inter-regional Cooperation. London: Pinter Publishers. Gilson, Julie. 2002. Asia Meets Europe: Inter-regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Gilson, Julie and Yeo Lay Hwee. 2004. Collective Identity Building through Trans-regionalism: ASEM and East Asian Regional Identity. In The Eurasian Space: Far more than two Continents, eds. Wim Stokhof, Paul van der Velde and Yeo Lay Hwee, 23-38. Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and International Institute for Asian Studies. Hanggi, Heiner. 1999. ASEM and the Construction of the New Triad. Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 4, no.1: 56-80. Henderson, Jeannie. 1999. Reassessing ASEAN. Adelphi Papers 328. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Hettne, Bjorn. 2004. Interregionalism and World Order. Paper presented at Fifth Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, Netherlands (911 September). Luhulima, C.P.F. 1993. ASEAN-European Community Relations: Some Dimensions of Inter-regional Cooperation. In ASEAN and the European Community in the 1990s, eds. Lee Lai To and Arnold Wehmhoerner, 79-101. Singapore: Singapore Institute of International Affairs. Robles, Alfredo C., Jr. 1998. ASEAN and the European Union: Conceptions of Inter-regional relations and regionalization in Southeast Asia. Paper presented at the Joint Conference of the International Studies Association, Vienna (16-19 September). Rueland, Juergen. 1996. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Towards a new EuroAsian Relationship, Rostocker Informationen zu Politik und Verwaltung Heft 5, Germany: Universitat Rostock. Rueland, Juergen. 2000. Asia-Europe Cooperation – the ASEM Process: A European View. In Asia and Europe: Regional Cooperation in a Globalising World, eds Magnus Jerneck and Ulrich Niemann, 183-197. Singapore, AsiaEurope Foundation.


191

Tay, Simon S. C., Jesus P Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro, eds. 2002. Reinventing ASEAN. Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 1999. The Role of ASEAN in EU-East Asian Relations. In ASIEN 72: 19-28. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2002. The Three Images of ASEM – A Conceptual Analysis. In NIASnytt, 2: 6-8. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2003. Asia and Europe: The development and different dimensions of ASEM. London and New York: Routledge. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2006. Ten Yearsof ASEM: Changes and Challenges. In Multiregionalism and Multilateralism: Asian-European Relations in a Global Context, eds. Sebastian Bersick, Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde, 14156. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


EU-ASIA RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION CFSP SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES John Quigley Abstract This chapter represents a detailed exploration of many security-related aspects of EU-Asia relations. It offers, first, an analysis of the ‘Asian Branch’ of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is embedded in a survey of the wider institutional and political aspects of EU-Asia relations. In this contribution, the author develops his material through a research-led critique of a relatively little-known instrument of the EU’s CFSP: the role of the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The chapter investigates the EU’s engagement of its Asian partners through Special Representatives, by means of two key case studies on Afghanistan and on Central Asia respectively. The chapter argues that, while the roles, functions and activities of the EU’s Special Representatives in these cases and in others, are still evolving on a number of levels, their work represents a valuable complement to the more formal channels of Asia-Europe contact. This constitutes a policy-alternative with direct implications for the European Union’s regional credibility, its presence and wider policy coordination. The political, economic and security interaction of the European Union with Asia, in terms of individual countries or on a region-toregion level, has particular defining characteristics which set Europe apart in an era of globalisation, post-industrialisation, multilateralism and the promotion of democracy and the rule of law. The sheer diversity of Asia’s governing administrations, political systems,

194

John Quigley

economic structures and security interests has historically made it difficult for the EU to identify clear objectives for its ‘engagement policy’, and this has been evident in the unwieldy and often unfocussed European attempts to pursue its primary objective of economic and trade exchange. Equally, the colonial and historical experience of individual EU Member States with particular Asian States continues to influence the wider EU-Asia relationship. With these constraining parameters in mind, the nature of the EUAsia relationship has developed slowly and, yet, in recent years, the quality and breadth of Europe’s interest and ability to engage Asia has improved remarkably. National politicians and senior European representatives and diplomats have recognised clear strategic interests of the EU, in Asia, that are generally unique, if not at least separate from, American intentions and expectations. Indeed, Europe has identified a number of strategic partners in Asia including India, China and Japan. In turn, the recognition within Asia that there can be a difference between European and American outlooks has been slow to emerge, but the response of Asia to European engagement demonstrates that such an evolution in thinking has occurred, at many levels; even if this has not always been with the best of intentions. The development of EU-Asia relations has taken on a greater significance as the structures available to the EU have grown and as the objectives of EU policies have become comparatively clearer. In terms of external relations, the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been extremely valuable to the EU in helping to facilitate the emergence of an overall policy and implementation framework with regard to the EU’s efforts to engage third countries through four main areas, including diplomatic, economic, development and security policies. This process of coherence at EU level was, in part, driven by the need to tackle the deficit between the EU’s obvious and growing economic power and its poor political and security focus in relations with third countries. This focus now includes head of State or Government- level summits, region to region contact through formal links with SAARC or ASEAN and multilateral interaction through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). Tucked under such high-level engagement, a little-known political instrument – the EU Special Representative – has been established under the CFSP to help Europe engage third countries across the four

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION CFSP SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES

195

policy areas. Operating with few resources and evolving mandates, the office of a Special Representative is emerging as an important facet of European involvement in specific third countries. An EU Special Representative undertakes a role in external relations policy implementing agreed and common aspects of EU objectives, thereby providing a mechanism for the co-ordination of EU engagement, typically in a conflict-ridden country, or a location in which the EU is running a military or civilian crisis-management mission. The EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Asia The emergence and cautious development of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has provided the EU with some of the institutional structures it needs to exert greater influence in the world, and to marry its economic weight with a sense of political responsibility for projecting stability and the rule of law into third countries. Although the objective of EU foreign policy has been described as ‘first and foremost’ to promote ‘stability and security in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood’, this attitude is changing over time. There has been a recognition, particularly by the Member States, that many of the challenges facing Europe in the 21st Century can only be addressed on a global level and that the limitations of foreign policy, starkly apparent in the 1990’s, can never be repeated. The structural emergence1 of the CFSP through the 1990s and into the early 2000s was a complicated and prolonged period in the development of common EU policies for relations with third countries. Through a process culminating in several EU Treaties and guidelines issued by EU leaders during quadri-annual Summits, the Member States created a system regulating a common foreign policy based on power resting largely with the governments, rather than at the EU institutional level. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht introduced the concept of the three-pillar2 structure for the EU, placing the CFSP as a second pillar and introducing procedures for common action 1 See Wiessala 2006, 19-21, for a discussion of the theoretical place of the CFSP in the EU’s External Relations ‘rationale’. 2 The three pillar structure includes (1) Community actions (2) CFSP and (3) justice and home affairs. The authority of the second and third pillars rested on intergovernmental control, thus removing the European Parliament from the policy formulation and implementation process.

196

John Quigley

(Laursen 2006). Building on concepts outlined in the 1992 Treaty, the operation of the instrument of the Special Representative emerged after the Treaty of Amsterdam was agreed in 1996 and adopted formally in 1997. This new instrument reflected the significant development Amsterdam meant for the CFSP as a whole. Accordingly, for 10 years now, starting in 1996, the EU has been appointing Special Representatives to a range of third countries and with an equally diverse range of policy mandates. Primarily, this instrument of the CFSP has been used to engage countries inside the EU’s traditional remit in external relations namely the near abroad and Africa. Thus, the EU has serving EUSRs in the African Great Lakes region, the Middle East, Kosovo, South-East Europe, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Southern Caucasus, Moldova and Sudan. Reflecting the evolution of thinking in foreign policy formulation and operation, there are two more envoys outside this original and traditional remit, serving in Afghanistan and in Central Asia. It would be several years, however, before Javier Solana, then serving as Secretary General in the Council, would be appointed as the High Representative for the CFSP. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council of Ministers was given the authority to appoint Special Representatives3 as the need arose, thereby formalising a process that had gone on whereby Presidencies periodically appointed individuals on a temporary and ad hoc basis. Other structures also emerged out of the Maastricht Treaty that, over time, would impact on the evolution of the position of Special Representatives. The operation of the Political Committee, established under the 1992 Treaty, was meant to provide the Council with analysis of world events and recommend appropriate policy responses within the CFSP. By 2000 however, it was clear that this was not fulfilling its role to the satisfaction of those who most wanted good advice. To overcome the limitations apparent in the Political Committee, the then fifteen Member States reflected on the need for a higher-level and more strategically-focussed format. The Political and Security 3 Treaty of Amsterdam, June 1997, Title V, ‘Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy’ Article 18, paragraph 5 (formerly J.8, paragraph 5 in the Treaty of Maastricht). The wording of Article 18, paragraph 5, is extremely basic and probably reflects the initial lack of clarity about what SR’s would actually do.


197

Committee4 (PSC) emerged out of these discussions with the principal goals of helping ministers define EU policy and co-ordinating the work of the working-groups active on CFSP. Chaired normally by the rotating Presidency of the EU Council, the PSC can otherwise be chaired by Solana as the High Representative, particularly if the EU is responding to an identified crisis. During a crisis, the PSC would exercise political control and strategic direction for a range of subordinate bodies including the Military Committee, the Military Staff and the High Representative. The Chair of the PSC could attend meetings of Member States’ Ambassadors (COREPER). Outside a crisis, the PSC is required to ‘maintain a privileged link’5 with Solana and the EU Special Representatives which, in practice, means regular briefings from the envoys and consideration of the policy implications of their periodic reports to the Committee. Despite this substantial level of institutional progress, the theoretical framework to fit over it was a long time in coming. In fact, it would be another 5 years after the Amsterdam Treaty before the EU was able to elaborate a vision of how Europe saw its place in the world order and how it wanted to exert its growing influence in promoting the multilateral system, based on the rule of law and the promotion of democratic norms. During the summer of 2003, the Council’s Policy and Planning Unit – which had been set up by the Amsterdam Treaty – proposed a European Security Strategy. This Strategy presented, for the first time, a coherent set of priorities for European foreign policy and suggested how these objectives should be met; by making Europe more active, more capable, more coherent and to work with partners. The Security Strategy was formally endorsed by EU Member States during the European Council in December 2003 (Solana 2003). Although the Strategy outlined a series of threats facing the EU, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, State failure and organised crime, for the Member States, the rationale behind the objectives was to promote European

4

Council Decision setting up the PSC, Official Journal of the EC, L27 30th January 2001. 5 Ibid, see the Annex to the Council Decision, paragraph 1, section (d), which largely follows the mandate set out in the Nice European Council meeting from the previous December.

198

John Quigley

values into third countries by emphasising that EU security would be enhanced in a world of well-governed, democratic States. As mentioned, one of the means to help Europe meet the changed international security situation was to use the Security Strategy to work increasingly with partners at the regional level and the Special Representatives have become part of this vision. However, one of the difficulties faced by the instrument of the Special Representatives is the competing responsibilities at European level under the CFSP that has emerged out of the EU Treaties. As appointees of the Council, Special Representatives would be expected to adhere to Member States’ vision of what informs and controls the common foreign and security policy. However, when working in the field, Special Representatives often find themselves working with, or rely upon, the European Commission Delegations representing the Community interest. Indeed, such Delegations in third countries have frequently been operating for many years before the EUSR enters. The tension evident at the institutional level can then be reflected in the field. There has been a feeling in Brussels that Special Representatives have trodden on the prerogatives of the Commission and this has, in some cases, negatively informed the Commission’s attitude to SR’s. The Commission’s position on SR’s was starkly laid bare during a debate in February 2002 in the European Parliament on the possibility of establishing an SR for the Southern Caucasus countries. Representing the Commission, Loyola de Palacio said there had to be limits to what the EU could achieve and that ‘instead of creating new instruments, we [the EU] should focus on maximising the benefits of already existing instruments’ (European Parliament 2002). And yet, when the Council went ahead one year later and created the position, Commissioner Chris Patten told Parliament that the appointment was ‘very welcome’ and that the Commission would be ‘pleased to be associated with his work’ (European Parliament 2004). Engaging Asia through the CFSP: Special Representatives in Action The decade-long development of the Special Representative instrument from 1996, has taken place amidst a much broader evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The strengthening of the CFSP at institutional and political levels has placed a greater burden on the function and operation of the SR’s but has been successful in


199

presenting a common, if not united, position of the EU to Asian countries. The EU’s interest in engaging Asian countries has been several-fold but includes human rights, security issues, stability (Wiessala 2006, 98), the promotion of regionalism, trade and political dialogue on the international order. At different times, these policies have had greater or lesser significance to the EU. Some several years after the introduction of the EUSR instrument, the Council finally got around to proposing a series of guidelines on their role and function. Adopted in March 2000, the Guidelines were nevertheless in place for the appointment of the first SR in Asia (Council of the EU 2000). The Council was motivated to act in light of the changes to the CFSP introduced under the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the steady growth in the number of appointments. The early Guidelines stipulated that the funding of EUSRs would come from the Council administrative funds, beginning in January 2001. When the Guidelines were revised and expanded6, in October 2003, the funding procedure was amended and, thereafter, Special Representatives would be funded directly from the CFSP budget (Council of the EU 2003). The change was the result of a joint initiative from two EU institutions, namely Javier Solana (dating from around the time he presented his draft Security Strategy) and Chris Patten as Commissioner for External Relations. The continued institutional development of the EUSR instrument, in particular in Asia, will be dependent upon the possible entry into force of the draft European Constitution – or parts of it – with, for example, the proposed EU Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was intended that the EU Minister would wear two hats, one for his role in the European Commission as a Vice-President and another for his role in the Council, chairing meetings of national foreign ministers in Brussels. Otherwise, the political development of the EUSR system is ongoing, with new functions being added to their mandates including participating in high-level political dialogue, co-ordinating ESDP Missions that are either military or civilian in nature and helping the PSC directly in the formulation of CFSP strategy. As will be discussed, to date, the EU has appointed two Special Representatives in Asia. Their role and function as it develops over time can be taken as useful 6

The new Guidelines entered into force from 1st January 2004.

200

John Quigley

indicators for the development of the CFSP, and its offshoot the ESDP, as a whole. The EUSR for Afghanistan The decision to appoint an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Afghanistan was arrived at, in principle, during the General Affairs Council that took place in mid November 2001 (General Affairs Council 2001). This was some two months after the attacks on the United States of America of 11th September and the mood in Europe was one of total solidarity with the US and of the urgent need to combat terrorism. The 19 members of NATO were preparing for the first time to invoke the terms of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in response to the perceived global threat. Later that November, the EU would attend the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, held under the auspices of the United Nations, and would make substantial political and financial promises for the eventual reconstruction of the country. At the institutional level, in November 2001, the Council of Ministers, which was then under the chairmanship of Belgium’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Louis Michel, agreed in principle to create the post of EUSR for Afghanistan with the general goal of working under the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and to assist the Presidency, which would change from Belgium to Spain in January 2002. With the support of the General Affairs Council, the EUSR was given formal legal status in a Council Joint Action on 10th December 2001, with a six month mandate (Council of the EU 2001). The December decision endorsed the suggestion of Germany7 and appointed Klaus Peter Klaiber making him the first EUSR ever for an Asian country. The appointment had particular significance at the time because it would be the first time the EU strayed outside its traditional foreign policy mindset. Klaiber was a career diplomat with the German Federal Foreign Ministry, having joined the service in 1968. The prevailing political and security atmosphere in Afghanistan was largely reflected in the specific mandate the EU Council granted to 7

Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had suggested the need for an EU envoy and, in the aftermath of the Bonn Conference, promoted the candidacy of Klaiber.


201

Klaiber. His initial role was to assist the United Nations and its operations in Afghanistan, particularly through support to Lakhdar Brahimi. This included helping Afghan leaders in establishing a representative government, liaising with other international donors and regional actors and reporting to the EU Council on issues including terrorism, drugs, the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. With clear political and economic objectives to follow, Klaiber focussed on ensuring that the interim administration adhered, as far as possible in light of the security situation, to the processes established in the Bonn Agreement. Just days into his new role, Klaiber left Brussels for Kabul on 17th December declaring that Afghanistan represented the stiffest challenge yet to the international community in a crisis management mission. During his time in Afghanistan, Klaiber certainly saw a key element of his list of priorities as overseeing the transition from the Taliban era to the interim government and overcoming the challenge of delivering – and spending appropriately – the international aid that began to flow into the country. Although he occupied the post for only a short time, Klaiber believed that the role of the Special Representative had made a difference. In terms of his political mandate, Klaiber thought that he had helped the EU particularly in convincing Afghanistan’s interim leaders of the necessity of following the international standards on the introduction of representative government procedures, in order for donor aid to be released. At a time when individual Member States were providing assistance in particular sectors, for example Germany in training the police force, Britain in tackling drug production and France assisting the development of the Constitutional Commission, Klaiber understood his role to include briefing the Afghan administration of what was happening; he saw these activities as part of a larger plan, including the Commission’s Representation Bureau that opened in Kabul in February. Alongside the Commission’s humanitarian aid office – ECHO – Klaiber indicated that the Afghan government had been presented with a single voice from the EU, for once8. However, Dr Klaiber’s tenure was unexpectedly short after he was offered a diplomatic post by the German government. In May 2002, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to 8 Comments from a Press Conference, Brussels, 27th June 2002. See Agence Europe Bulletin. 2002. Quotidien Europe. No. 8243 (28 June): 7.

202

John Quigley

extend the timeframe of the EUSR mandate and made an allowance for the early departure of Klaiber. Building on the work achieved by Klaiber, it is possible to emphasise that the function of the EUSR in Afghanistan has benefited from the sheer length of time that his successor, Francesc Vendrell, has held the office. However, a review conducted in the PSC during late 2003 exposed some of the potential weaknesses of the SR instrument, with officials noting the need for greater co-ordination between Member States’ diplomatic missions and the office of the SR. The Political and Security Committee was also left to decide whether the EUSR should be allowed to propose concrete policy recommendations for EU interests in Afghanistan, at the time a controversial proposal. Over time, it has become clear that Vendrell himself has advocated a greater role for the position as a means to improve EU relations with the Afghan government. Thus, EU Foreign Ministers granted Vendrell a role in formulating, with the European Commission, a framework for EU-Afghanistan relations in the post-September 2005 election scenario. These discussions with Vendrell eventually led to the adoption of the November 2005 Joint Declaration. Earlier, in June 2004, the Council asked Vendrell to prepare an assessment of the Presidential elections that were to take place in October. This process of ascribing additional functions to the EUSR office has been going on almost since the inauguration of the position. In December 2002, under the Danish Presidency of the Council, Vendrell was asked to monitor the aid commitment of donors and to report back to the PSC with recommendations on what the EU might do further to support the then interim Kabul government. And the ‘ever-expanding-role’ continues. Emphasising the growing importance of the EUSR in EU-Afghanistan relations, the Council of Ministers have been discussing extending Francesc Vendrell’s mandate possibly to include an ESDP mission. Javier Solana has made his interest in a potential ESDP mission to Afghanistan quite clear. Speaking at the joint meeting of EU Foreign and Defence Ministers in mid November Solana said that a Mission ‘could be of great value’ (Solana 2007). As part of the preparations to taking any decision, the Council of Ministers sent a Joint EU Assessment Mission to Afghanistan, between 10th and 21st September 2006. So, while NATO and ISAF are extending their capabilities in Afghanistan, the EU is


203

considering establishing an ESDP Mission to support the Kabul government on police sector reform and on the rule of law at both central and provincial levels9 (Council of the EU 2007). If the example of missions in other countries10 was followed, this would greatly extend the mandate of Vendrell as the Special Representative. It is quite clear that Vendrell possesses very substantial access to a wide range of domestic, regional and international actors active in Afghanistan. The culmination of this success rests with Vendrell’s membership of the elite Policy Action Group (PAG) chaired by President Hamid Karzai, and composed of Afghan government and international officials. The PAG was inaugurated in August 2006, with the aim of providing collective advice to Karzai on a range of topics including development and reconstruction issues and on the expansion of ISAF operations into Southern Afghanistan. For the paltry financial outlay, this represents an amazing policy of engagement and influence. The EUSR in Central Asia11 Historically speaking, the EU has not had obvious strategic political or security concerns in Central Asia. This trend continued even after the Central Asian Republics secured their independence from the Soviet Union, when EU co-operation was limited to the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) programme, which started in 1991, and to humanitarian aid. Through TACIS, the EU hoped to promote the transition towards market economies and to reinforce democratic norms. Despite being well funded (particularly so in comparison with EU programmes in other regions), to the tune of

9

See also: European Council Conclusions. Document No. 16879/06. (14th-15th December): 27, stating that the EU is considering a potential civilian ESDP mission in policing with links to the Rule of Law. 10 The EU launched its first-ever Police Mission in January 2003 in BosniaHerzegovina, where police officers from the EU Member States provide assistance and training to local law enforcement. Or, in July 2004, the EU launched its first ESDP Mission for the rule of law, in Georgia, where legal staff from the EU supported their Georgian counterparts. Both regions have serving EU Special Representatives. 11 On aspects of Central Asia-EU Relations, see also the Chapter by Chris Williams in this book (the editors).

204

John Quigley

EUR7bn between 1991 and 2006, the TACIS programme has had a difficult life cycle and many have questioned its real value.12 Indeed, even until 2004, the then Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, felt it necessary to talk about the EU ‘rediscovering Central Asia’ (Patten 2003). The intervention in Afghanistan, according to Patten, demonstrated the significance of Central Asia as a ‘zone of the highest geo-strategic importance’. Patten’s speech could be taken as the dawn of a new era in EUCentral Asia relations, with the slow realisation that Europe did, in fact, have political, economic and even security interests in an integrated and democratic Central Asia. While such interests might not reflect the same serious strategic political and security concerns as elsewhere, there was a concern in Brussels that Central Asia should not be abandoned to the influences of the Chinese or the Russians. Also, as was eventually made clear in the European Security Strategy, the EU model demonstrates that regional co-operation is a strong factor towards limiting conflict. In the year before the adoption of Solana’s Security Strategy, the European Commission adopted a framework approach for the countries of Central Asia declaring that regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations and regional integration are ‘important means to peace, stability and security’ (Commission of the European Communities 2002). While the Commission expected such regional co-operation to generally take place through TACIS, measures to support regional economic co-operation initiatives through regional organisations were also explicitly mentioned. One of the lessons the EU identified after 11th September 2001 was that conflict increasingly emerges, on a trans-national basis, from failed and failing States. Therefore, EU foreign policy would have to target such States and/or regions, in order to help prevent such instability affecting Europe. More than ever before, European foreign policy would have to be co-ordinated across political, economic, security and development goals. Lacking the over-riding regional format, the EU opted to engage the countries of Central Asia in a bilateral manner. Thus, one of the main instruments the EU uses to develop and promote bilateral relations with third countries is Partnership and Co12 For example, see Special report No. 2/2006. Official Journal of the EU. C119 (19 May 2006): 1-16.


205

operation Agreements. The EU has signed Partnership Agreements with all five Central Asian Republics, although just three are fully active. In May 1998, under the British Presidency of the EU Council, the first Agreement with a Central Asian state was signed in Brussels with Turkmenistan. Almost one year later, in July 1999, under the Finnish Presidency, three further agreements were signed to include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. However, it was not until October 2004 that the Agreement with Tajikistan was signed, under the Dutch Presidency and some six months after Patten had toured the region, visiting all countries except Turkmenistan. The entry into force of the agreement with Turkmenistan has been held up in the European Parliament and, in October 2005, the EU suspended the implementation agreement with Uzbekistan, as part of its response to the Andijan massacre. As part of the drive to increase its influence in the region and responding to current political events, including the massacre of civilians in Eastern Uzbekistan some months previously, in July 2005, the EU Council of Ministers appointed Ján Kubiš, a former head of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as EUSR for Central Asia. This was the first-ever appointment of a EUSR on a region wide basis, reflecting in part the EU’s desire for regional co-operation in its external relations objectives. The EU appointment represented a bold move to try and bolster European influence in the region beyond the Co-operation Agreements, which stress commitments to human rights and the rule of law. EU Foreign Ministers agreed in mid June to the creation of the post for Central Asia and adopted the CFSP Joint Action (Council of the EU 2005) just one month later, noting that the EU needed to play a more active political role in the region. Considering the political background, the Joint Action gave the EUSR position a wide mandate to promote EU policy objectives in the five Republics. The mandate can be split into two parts, one relating to internal EU manoeuvring and a second with a focus on actions in the region. Firstly, the Joint Action specifies that the EUSR should help ensure the consistency of EU action in Central Asia, in part by promoting the political coordination of EU level operations. The Special Representative would also be tasked with a policy formulation role helping the Council to develop a comprehensive policy towards the region. Regarding

206

John Quigley

operations by the EUSR in the region itself, the mandate is broad. It includes monitoring political developments, promoting regional cooperation, developing links with other actors active in the region and contributing to conflict prevention and resolution. In early July 2006, Ján Kubiš resigned his position as EUSR some months before the formal end of his extended mandate. Ahead of his resignation, Kubiš had submitted the Progress Report required by the CFSP Joint Action adopted in February. This Report was assessed by the Political and Security Committee just several days after the Council received notification from Kubiš of his intentions. The assessment of the work of the EUSR instrument was favourable and Solana recommended a Frenchman, Pierre Morel, as a replacement. The Council of Ministers endorsed Solana’s proposal and appointed13 Morel in early October to the position without changing the mandate (Council of the EU 2006). The position of a Representative for Central Asia is the most recent appointment under the CFSP instrument. As noted, it was also the first time that the EU appointed a Representative on a region-wide basis, interacting with five very different Republics in terms of economic development, political systems, international outlook and conflict resolution concerns. In choosing to focus largely on the political issues arising in Central Asia, the EU sought to bridge the gap that the Co-operation Agreements, which focussed on trade relations, could not make. Since July 2005, both Kubiš and his successor Morel have been very active in implementing the political aspects to the mandate. Almost directly after his appointment, Kubiš visited Uzbekistan meeting with President Karimov14 on 9th September 2005, in order to reflect on the EU’s position on the events in Andijan and the Uzbek government’s response to the May and June Council Conclusions. President Karimov failed to make any impression and, to the surprise of many, the EU actually imposed sanctions against his government, on 3rd October. After this ‘baptism of fire’, the work of EUSR Kubiš got underway towards all five countries in the region. In the course of several visits 13 The Justice and Home Affairs Council approved his appointment, without debate, on 5th October. 14 see http://www.uzbekistan.de/en/2005/e_n0910.htm which also reports that Kubiš met the Speaker of the ‘Legislative Chamber’ the same day.


207

to the region, he made contact at the political level with most heads of State/government, ministers for foreign affairs and speakers of Parliaments and with civil society with NGO’s and human rights defenders. Internationally, Kubiš interpreted his role to include starting a dialogue with the Americans, Russians, Chinese and the government of Turkey as key partners of the Central Asian countries. At the regional and multilateral level, these contacts included the EurAsian Economic Community (EAEC), the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD). The value of a single voice representing common EU foreign policy interests across such a broad level of institutional and civil society organisations is inestimable. Indeed, so successful has the implementation of the EUSR instrument been in Central Asia that the demand for ‘more Europe’ is growing. Speaking in the European Parliament in May 2006, Ján Kubiš, noted that the Central Asian countries were moving beyond the ‘nation-building’ phase and wanted more sophisticated assistance from the EU. Marking the divide between the responsibilities under the CFSP between the Council and the Commission, he said that the imprint left by the Commission’s operations was obviously not sufficient15 for the governments. While Morel has only been in office several months, he has already made several visits to the region, primarily to make contact with NGO’s and to follow up contacts initiated by his predecessor. His visit to Uzbekistan, in late October, was certainly a helpful part of the process of EU efforts to try and engage the Uzbek regime and resolve the Andijan and sanctions issues. The Political and Security Committee met with Morel in November to discuss possibilities for the further development of contacts between the EU and the SCO and the implications of the work of the SCO in Central Asia, primarily in economic terms. Following that meeting, Morel travelled to Turkmenistan for a meeting with President Saparmurat Niyazov and Germany’s Chargé d’Affaires Astrid Wolf. The two sides reportedly discussed gas sales to Europe and the trans-Caspian pipeline. The 15 Observation of the author from comments made by Kubiš in the European Parliament on 3rd May 2006.

208

John Quigley

meeting, on 18th December, came just several days before the selfstyled Leader of all Turkmen died of a heart attack. If Morel is able to remain in office long enough, similar to his counterpart in Afghanistan, the EU may yet achieve some substantial foreign policy objectives in Central Asia and allow the region to resist the influences of the Chinese and Russian governments. Conclusions The performance of the Special Representatives in Asia has been very well regarded; as their mandates and influence continue to grow, it is certain that the EU Council will face greater demands for ‘more Europe’ across many parts of Asia. The EUSRs have played a valuable role in publicising the work of the EU in their host country/region and an equally valuable role in guiding the Political and Security Committee towards greater co-ordination of EU external relations actions. However, on the downside, the appointments to Afghanistan and Central Asia demonstrate that there has been an evident tension between the implementation of the instrument of EUSRs as a Council mechanism and the European Commission. To a certain extent, the role and function of the EUSR crosses policy areas that impinge upon the activities of the Commission – reflected, for example – in the role of the Commission in the formulation of CFSP and in the execution of the CFSP budget. Certainly, as the role of the Head of Delegation – the representative offices of the Commission in third countries – increases, there could be a further strain on the relationship between the EUSR, who represents the political ambitions of the national governments and the Commission16, which represents the collective EU. Despite the setback to the adoption of the proposed European Constitution following the French and Dutch referendums, planned reforms to the external representation of the EU may well go ahead separately. The Constitution text had proposed a merged External Action Service combining the Commission, Council and Member 16 For example, there is no mention of the role of the EUSR for Central Asia on the website of the European Commission Delegation for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, nor on the Commission’s Europa House website for Uzbekistan. The Commission has no formal links with Turkmenistan.


209

States’ missions in third countries into a single EU office. Certainly, the European Commission from the start presented the merger quite favourably, suggesting that the transformation of these external delegations would have important benefits for strengthening the coherence and visibility of EU foreign policy in third countries (Barroso 2004). The growing prominence of the Special Representatives in Asia may seem to threaten that. Additionally, there will eventually have to be some level of improved co-ordination with national representatives who are active in a particular country. For example, the United Kingdom has a national level intermediary in Afghanistan. On 16th February 2005, Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary, appointed Lieutenant General John McColl as the Prime Minister’s ‘Special Envoy to Afghanistan’. Britain’s presence, alongside other EU Member States, at this diplomatic level in Afghanistan is understandable in light of their national military and development aid commitments to the Kabul government. However, the proliferation of such representatives necessarily dilutes their impact and the value. At the functional level, the instrument of the Special Representative, within the CFSP, has been extremely useful in helping to engage countries outside the more formal and established external relations structures. The SR system has allowed the EU to pursue policy objectives quietly and unobtrusively. The adoption of sanctions against the Uzbek regime of President Karimov has not prevented the EU from continuing to engage with senior political figures inside Uzbekistan. Indeed, during his term of office, Ján Kubiš seems to have been used as a diplomatic messenger when formal contact at official level was undesirable. The ongoing development of the CFSP structures, including the delay, for the moment, in adopting the proposed European Constitution, means that the role and functions of the Special Representative instrument continues to evolve, albeit slowly. Thus, while the instrument was created in 1996, the Political and Security Committee to which EUSRs now regularly report, was not formally established until 2001. And, in order to bolster its oversight of the foreign and security policies of the EU, the European Parliament has shown greater interest in monitoring the activities of EUSRs. Changes adopted in Summer 2006 to the Inter-Institutional Agreement, which

210

John Quigley

governs how the Council, Commission and Parliament co-operate on the EU budget, gives the Parliament a much greater role in CFSP matters. At least five joint consultation meetings should be held annually between the Council and Parliament as part of a ‘regular political dialogue on CFSP’. These discussions will review, inter alia, the role and performance of EU Special Representatives. Despite these valuable institutional developments, however, it is clear that a sense of realism will have to prevail. Although the instrument of the EUSRs is favoured in the European Parliament, it may be less well understood in practice. Regarding the level of existing appointments, to a large extent the success of the office has depended on the quality of the office holder. Francesc Vendrell in Afghanistan and Ján Kubiš in Central Asia were considered to be doing a very reasonable job in challenging circumstances. Ján Kubiš was able to make good use of his contacts from his former positions in Central Asia as Special Representative of UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and through his work with the OSCE. Although he was only appointed in October 2006, Pierre Morel has not shied away from the more difficult countries – playing a valuable role in Uzbekistan and trying to expand EU links in Turkmenistan. Equally, his links with China, as a former Ambassador, will stand him in good stead in building links with the SCO, for example. The relative success of the office has also depended on EU Member States’ representatives in a particular country or region allowing the SR to represent collectively EU policy. It has been a criticism by certain Asian governments in the past that trying to decipher EU foreign policy was very difficult, with the EU level saying one thing and national governments saying another. The relative paucity of national missions in the region has obviously been a helpful factor for the EUSRs. In both instances, the appointments for Afghanistan and Central Asia reflected, to a large degree, the EU’s inability to engage with the specific third countries, and, indeed, other neighbouring countries in the region, through its traditional foreign policy mechanisms. In this light, both appointments were crisis-driven reactions rather than the result of planning. Although both Vendrell and Morel have been able to establish good contacts in the execution of their respective mandates, it might be useful to consider future appointments on a


211

long-term interest basis, enabling the appointee to be in a particular region or country ahead of any possible crisis. A key element of their success has been presenting EU policy, in as far as possible, with one voice. Bearing this criterion in mind, the Council should consider streamlining the present system, which risks becoming unwieldy and losing its focus. The system17 of Special Representatives, Personal Representatives, Co-ordinators and Presidency Representatives18 needs to be restructured and simplified or the EU will risk losing the vital factor which has made the EUSRs a success in Asia. Since 1996, the EU has built up substantial experience with the instrument of Special Representatives, particularly for Europe and the near abroad, and more latterly, with Asia. In 2004, coming to the end of his mandate as External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten spoke of the need for the EU to rediscover Central Asia – by which he also meant Afghanistan. Since then, the Commission and the Council, through their respective powers and responsibilities have tried to develop a more strategic and long-term sense of what the EU may be trying to achieve in the region. The EUSR instrument has given the EU greater visibility in Central Asia and equally demonstrated to the Afghan government that the EU is serious about its long-term engagement. Clearly then, Special Representatives have been an important element in making the EU more credible as a potential international partner and more credible as an actor in regional affairs, for both the Central Asian region and for Afghanistan.

17 The difference between the various offices being that EUSRs are solely appointed under Article 18(5) of the TEU; others either work directly for Solana or are appointed, on an ad hoc basis, by a Presidency. 18 In July 2004, the Dutch Presidency of the EU Council appointed Hans van den Broek, a former Dutch Foreign Minister and a Member of the 1995-2000 European Commission responsible for External Relations, as a Special Envoy of the Presidency, to engage Asian governments in ASEM on the question of Burma’s participation in the October 2004 ASEM Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam.

212

John Quigley

References Barroso, José Manuel. 2004. The European Union and the Emerging World Order: Perceptions and Strategies. Speech delivered in Brussels (30 November). Available at: www.delarm.ec.europa.eu/en/press/speech_barroso04_11_30.pdf. Commission of the European Communities. 2002. Strategy Paper for Central Asian Region (October). Brussels: European Commisssion. Council of the EU. 2000. EU Special Representatives: Guidelines on appointing procedure and administrative arrangements. Document No. 7089/00 (30th March). Brussels: European Council. Council of the EU. 2001. Council Joint Action (2001/875/CFSP) concerning the appointment of the Special Representative of the European Union. Official Journal of the European Communities. L 326 (11 December). Council of the EU. 2003. EU Special Representatives: Guidelines on appointment, mandate and financing. Document No. 13833/03 (28th October). Brussels: European Council. Council of the EU. 2005. Council Joint Action (CFSP/2005/588). Official Journal of the European Communities. L199 (18 July): 100-102. Council of the EU. 2006. Council Joint Action (CFSP/2006/670). Official Journal of the EU. L275 (6 October): 65. Council of the EU. 2007. ESDP Newsletter 3 (January): 6. European Parliament. 2002. Plenary Debates (27 February). Available at: http://www.europarl.eu.int (accessed 14th September 2004). European Parliament. 2004. Plenary Debates (26 February). Available at: http://www.europarl.eu.int (accessed 14th September 2004). General Affairs Council. 2001. Document No. 13802/01 (19th-20th November). Brussels: European Council. Laursen, Finn. 2006. The EU from Amsterdam via Nice to the Constitutional Treaty: Exploring and Explaining Recent Treaty Reforms. In Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe: Convergence or Divergence? eds. Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber. Oxford: Routledge. Patten, Christopher. 2004. The EU and Central Asia. Speech delivered on 15 March in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Available at: www.europa-euun.org/articles/en/article_3297_en.htm Solana, Javier. December 2003. A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy. Available at: www.ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/ en/reports/76255.pdf Solana, Javier. 2006. Council of the EU, Document No. S306/06 (13th November). Brussels: European Council. Wiessala, Georg. 2006. Re-orienting the Fundamentals: Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations. Aldershot: Ashgate.

ISSUES, REGIONS AND PARTNERS


EU-CENTRAL ASIA RELATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Christopher Williams Abstract This section stays with the area of EU-Central Asia relations and looks at another, significantly under-researched aspect of EU-Asia relations: the past and present developments in the Central Asian region, and in the European Union’s approaches towards Central Asia. The author derives the key arguments of this chapter from the idea of transition of Central Asian countries, from a Soviet- to a post-Soviet political, economic and security context. In his evaluation of EU-Central Asia policy-selection and policy-implementation, he is guided, in particular, by an analysis of the principal themes of economic integration, human rights protection, political preferences of regional leaders and conflict resolution. Against this background, the chapter offers a critical assessment of a range of topics, such as: democratic development and political repression, Russian and EU interests in the region, the geo-political significance of Central Asia and the development and ambitions of the relevant, new, regional bodies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). ‘Central Asia as a region poses serious headaches for any policy-makers because it seems to contain all the ingredients for a volatile mix: vast energy resources, ethnic and interstate strife, great power rivalries and encroaching religious extremism’ (Tang 2000, 360).

216

Christopher Williams

The Soviet legacy and changing context within Central Asia Prior to 1991, the Central Asian countries explored here were all Union republics of the USSR and to varying degrees under Moscow’s control. Since 1991, however, they have all become countries in their own right and each Central Asian state has faced a triple transformation. In political terms, the Central Asian governments were largely run by ex-communist leaders and so the process of creating new democratic regimes in Central Asia out of so-called totalitarian states has been extremely difficult. Many of the Central Asian governments are associated with the violation of constitutional and human rights, corruption, instability, nationalism, with talk of a ‘Great Uzbekistan’ and similar notions elsewhere in Central Asia. As a consequence ‘progress towards liberalisation and democratization….in all the Central Asian states has been limited’ (Gleason 2001, 169). In economic and social terms, the Central Asian states have been pursuing policies stressing neo-liberal or structural reforms or both. Gleason writes: Prominent leaders of all the countries of Central Asia identified marketbased economies with democratic governments as their desired goal in the transition process. Yet the development paths adopted (…) were significantly different. Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy postures illustrate a version of the neo-liberal; approach (…) In contrast, Uzbekistan’s and Turkmenistan’s (…) illustrate exaggerated forms of a structural approach. Tajikistan’s approach lies somewhere between these two (Gleason 2001, 168).

Gleason also believes that ‘individual leaders’ preferences (have) played a significant role in the selection and implementation of (different) policies’ (Gleason 2001, 169). In the case of Kazakhstan, for instance, significant progress was made towards integration into the world economy (via membership of the IMF, ADB, EBRD and WTO) and market style reforms (a convertible currency, liberalised prices and partial privatisation) despite major economic problems in 1998. Kyrgyzstan has made the greatest strides towards liberal reform, as it was: (…) the first Central Asian country to adopt a western style civil code, a modern legal and regulatory framework; to liberalise prices, to overhaul its financial and banking system, to privatise large industrial enterprises and to adopt a relatively open, competitive political system (Gleason 2001, 173).


217

Tajikistan – the poorest of the Central Asian states – has suffered from civil wars and border disputes with Uzbekistan and this has hampered economic reconstruction. Turkmenistan, which was highly underdeveloped in the Soviet era, suffered greatly when the USSR collapsed. Turkmenistan’s best assets are gas and oil and Niyazov tried to develop a ‘Kuwait style emirate’ (Gleason 2001, 176). Whilst this economic strategy has created major foreign currency earnings, incomes in Turkmenistan are low and poverty levels high. Furthermore, structural reforms have only been implemented slowly so the EBRD suspended its funding to Turkmenistan in April 2000 (Gleason 2001, 177). Finally, Uzbekistan has taken ‘a gradual step by step approach to the adoption of macroeconomic reform and other market oriented structural reforms’ (Gleason 2001, 178). This strategy has only had limited success due to an overvalued currency, an unfavourable climate for trade and a highly restrictive political situation (Gleason 2001, 179). One of the biggest areas of concern overall is the abuse of human rights. A recent Amnesty International report states that ‘deaths while in state custody, torture, arbitrary detentions, harassment and the jailing of opportunists continue in the (Central Asian) region’ (cited in O’Rourke 2007, 1). This has occurred despite most Central Asian states signing human rights treaties (O’Rourke 2007, 3). It is now essential to provide a brief assessment of each Central Asian country in order to establish the challenges facing the EU in the region. Azerbaijan Azerbaijan in the post-USSR collapse phase has been ‘relegated to the category of a third world nation’ meaning that ‘the promise of peace, freedom and prosperity which seemed to come with the end of communism, has disappeared into the distance a mere ten years later’ (Rasizade 2002, 349). Azerbaijan is faced with rising corruption, declining living standards, the end of an oil boom and the failure to deliver a second Kuwait. As a result, ‘Today, Azerbaijan is neither a democracy nor a clear cut authoritarian state of the sort found in Central Asian republics’ (Rasizade 2002, 352). Consequently: An active and diverse opposition, a relatively free press and a vibrant political life exist in Azerbaijan (…) Opposition leaders (can) criticise the regime openly and harshly; they even organise demonstrations and rallies

218


(…) but since Aliev returned to power in 1993, the country’s political opposition has been plagued by disorganisation and in- fighting (…). In addition, opposition parties lack a comprehensive political platform that could (…) attract large numbers of supporters (Rasizade 2002, 352).

Many Azeris live below the poverty line because the government has failed to maintain even minimal levels of public services and social welfare provision which has caused great social inequality and lawlessness in Azerbaijan (Rasizade 2002, 352-357). In foreign policy: For all his rapprochement to the West, Aliev was always careful not to antagonise Moscow and to recognise Russia’s geopolitical interests (Swietochowski 1999, 427).

Azerbaijan has had to tread carefully as its other neighbours include Iran, with which it shares a 500 mile frontier; Turkey, which also has interests in oil pipelines and finally Armenia, which is in constant conflict with Azerbaijan. Petersen argues that the late Azerbaijani President Aliev and Putin developed ‘a close personal relationship’ and that this trend continued under the current President Ilham Aliev (Petersen 2007, 1). Despite the rhetoric, Azerbaijani-Russian relations are tense with unresolved issues over oil, gas and military cooperation (Socor 2006, 1-2). At a 27 March 2007 meeting Putin tried to repair the rift following an increase in the price of Russian gas to Azerbaijan and a corresponding fall in Azerbaijani imports to Russia (Blagov 2007, 1), but Ismayilov argues that: (…) while Russia has used its energy assets as (a) tool of coercion against many former Soviet states, Azerbaijan’s own energy abundance and export capability enables it to engage Russia on more of a parity basis (Ismayilov 2006, 1).

Whilst relations with Russia are fraught, Aliev signed an energy cooperation agreement with the EU and has been trying to lobby the EU for ‘support on Nagarno-Karabakh peace talks’ (Ismayilov 2006, 1). Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s transition has occurred in four phases: 1992-94 – liberalisation; 1994-95 institutional in-fighting; 1995-96 executive consolidation and 2001 to date elite fragmentation within a growing authoritarian context (Cummings 2002, 7). In the post-independence


219

phase, Kazakhstan has been ruled by Nazarabaev. Thus ‘By 2002, executive dominance had supplanted the attempts at pluralism in the early years of independence’ (Cummings 2002, 9). Nazarabaev was reelected in December 2005 with 91.15% of the vote but it is widely believed that the results were falsified (EIU 2006, 7). Kazakhstan has become an increasingly Presidential regime riddled with high level corruption. Members of Nazarabaev’s family occupy senior positions and a number of pro-government parties (such as Otan, AIST bloc and Asar Party, headed by Nazarabaev’s daughter Daria) have been created. One EIU report concludes ‘The (Kazak) authorities have proved themselves adept at breaking up and neutralising opposition parties’ (EIU 2006, 12). As a result, Nazarabaev was able to hold onto power but also brought into question, Kazakhstan’s judicial system and human rights record. Kazakhstan is landlocked and has 2 major neighbours Russia and China, but it also has growing links with the West and Middle East. According to Cummings: As in domestic politics, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been multifaceted, straddling various interests, its directions devoid of strong ideological content (Cummings 2002, 16-17).

During the Yeltsin era, Kazakhstan did not have a close relationship to Russia but this has changed under Putin due to Russia’s concerns with instability from Kazakhstan’s southern neighbours as well as the perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism (Cummings 2002, 17). Kazakhstan now has a good relationship with Russia and is building another one with China. In May 2004, for example, Kazakhstan signed a joint agreement on a 1,240km pipeline with China (EIU 2006, 15). Kazakhstan has been viewed positively by the EU. Thus one 2006 Europa report stated: Kazakhstan has been extremely successful since the collapse of the Soviet Union in maintaining political stability, harmonious interethnic relations and more recently in achieving sustained economic growth (Europa 2006a, 1).

This assessment overlooks the fact that Kazakhstan is among the top 15 most corrupt states in the world. On top of this, the ban on the political party Democratic Party of Kazakhstan in January 2005 followed by the closure of the independent newspaper Respublika in May 2005, together with laws restricting the operating capacities of foreign NGOs

220


in July 2005, point to a more negative picture of the situation in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless the EU still sees Kazakhstan as a ‘reliable partner for promoting…. regional stability through regional cooperation in Central Asia’ (Europa 2006a, 2). Consequently, Kazakhstan is a major beneficiary of EU aid – 42,670 million Euros between 2001-2005 alone – and the EU’s biggest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching 10 million Euros by 2005, or 0.3% of the EU total overall (Europa 2006a, 4-5). Competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for supremacy and leadership in Central Asia is rife. This has led to border disputes (as they share a common poorly defined 230km border), fears of drug smuggling and widespread illegal immigration which has sometimes produced armed clashes, as in January 2000. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also clashed over the fate and treatment of their respective minorities – 400,000 Uzbeks in Kazakhstan and 1.2 million Kazakhs in Uzbekistan (Zardykhan 2002, 170-171). Kazakhstan’s 2001-2010 strategy demonstrates that it sees the world as uni-polar, with 3 major economic centres (USA, EU, Japan) and that it wishes to build friendly relationships with Russia, China and the Central Asian states but also wants to keep the door open to ensure that Western aid comes into Kazakhstan (Kassenova 2005, 157-158). To keep its options open, and gradually reduce its dependency on Russia, Kazakhstan has courted China as the main market for Kazak oil and gas and because it also provides Kazakhstan with cheap basic consumer goods. Both countries have consequently been active participants in the Shanghai 6 since 1995. Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan has sought to make a transition by prioritising economics (Abazov 1999, 197), but it has struggled to implement its economic reforms because of division between conservatives, moderates and radicals. Conservatives favoured an unregulated market, moderates wanted Kyrgyzstan to be more closely integrated within the Central Asian region whilst radicals pushed for an open door policy and full liberalisation. In the end, Akaev opted for the radical option and went ahead with rapid internal and external liberalisation and the decentralisation of state control in Kyrgyzstan (Abazov 1999, 203). Although well intentioned, the consequences were severe for


221

Kyrgyzstan during the 1990s – recession, rising unemployment (officially around 6% but in reality closer to 30%) and poverty, a declining GNP, hyperinflation, lost tax revenues and a massive brain drain. Nevertheless, strong government and state institutions and the lack of a powerful opposition and trade unions together with a ‘relatively dynamic business environment’ led to growing ‘international investment and cooperation’ (Abazov 1999, 219). Kyrgyzstan has also played a role in the War on Terror by allowing US military bases to be located in its country as part of the fight against Al-Qaida. However, Kyrgyzstan has suffered from border disputes – 170 with Uzbekistan, 70 with Tajikistan and others with China with which it shares 500km of territory (Dukanbaev and Hansen 2003, 8) and the fact that it is based on pre-modern forms of governance were regional, clan and tribal loyalties prevail and were personalistic patron-client relationships thrive ‘related to ethnic and geographical factors’ (Dukanbaev and Hansen 2003, 6, 25) has generated problems. Kyrgyzstan was initially viewed as ‘the most liberal state in Central Asia’ (Dukanbaev and Hansen 2003, 28) but this changed in the mid1990s due to the reconsolidation of conservative forces, instability in Tajikistan and Afghanistan and increased authoritarianism in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Dukanbaev and Hansen 2003, 28). Akaev won the 2000 Presidential election with 75% of the vote and there has been gradual authoritarianism since with Akaev’s Presidential powers strengthened at the expense of the Kyrgyz parliament. Furthermore, press freedoms have been curbed (leading to the closure of Moya Stolitsa), the political opposition imprisoned, corruption is rife and regional conflict on the rise (Cummings and Nøgaard 2003, 16; Dukanbaev and Hansen 2003, 31-33). Since 2002, however, Kyrgyzstan has started making moves towards democracy by creating a better balance and separation of powers and by ensuring power sharing between President and Prime Minister in Kyrgyzstan (Cummings and Nøgaard 2003, 17-18). The parliamentary elections on 13 March 2005 showed that in Kyrgyzstan political parties ‘are centred on a single individual rather than focused on a party policy platform’ (OSCE 2005a, 3-4). A number of parties competed for the new uni-cameral parliament including pro-government ones such as Alga Kyrgyzstan associated with Akaev’s daughter Bermet and Adilet

222


which was run by the head of the Presidential Administration (OSCE 2005a, 4). OSCE observers highlighted problems with the accuracy of voter lists, allegations of vote buying, and stressed ‘restricted voter access to an independent information source at a critical time of the campaign’ with most coverage focusing on President Akaev and benefiting pro-government parties (OSCE 2005a, 9, 13, 15, 220). Overall, the March 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan fell ‘short of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections’ (OSCE 2005b, 3). Akaev resigned on 7 April 2005 and fled in the face of mass demonstrations following the March elections. Pannier concludes: (After Akaev fled to Russia) it was a period of hope for Kyrgyzstan’s people. The dominance of the Akaev family was broken and many people hoped (the) new leadership would benefit the country. Two years later, there are still questions about whether the ouster marked a change for the better (under Bakiev) (Pannier 2007b, 1).

A new Presidential election was called for on 10 July 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiev was made acting President of Kyrgyzstan. In the Presidential elections that followed ‘The candidates were generally able to conduct their campaigns without obstruction and were limited only by their financial resources’ (OSCE 2005b, 12). Bakiev ran on a joint ticket with Kulov, an oppositionist under Akaev, who was given the Prime Minister post, and won with 88.71% of the vote (OSCE 2005b, 23; Saidazimova 2005). The July 2005 Presidential election results were seen not as a vote for Bakiev but as a vote against the previous Akaev regime (Saidazimova 2005). After the elections ‘many Kyrgyz believed Bakiev’s ascent to the Presidency would launch a dramatically improved era’ (Pannier 2007a, 1), but this has not proved the case. On 19 December 2006, the Kulov led government resigned due to executive-legislative conflict (Pannier 2006, 1) and the 30 December 2006 constitutional amendments did not do enough to curb the strong Presidential authority in Kyrgyzstan. Azim Isabekov became Kyrgyzstan’s new Prime Minister on 29 January 2007 but there were already signs of discontent in April 2007, the time of writing, with mass anti-government rallies taking place ‘demand(ing) reforms and early elections’ (Pannier 2007a, 1).


223

Tajikistan Tajikistan has been independent since 1991 and borders Afghanistan to the south, China to the East, Kyrgyzstan to the north and Uzbekistan to the west. Tajikistan was initially run by Rakhmon Nabiyev, but a civil war broke out in 1992, and a new President, Emomali Rakhmonov, was elected in 1993, who is still in power (Lillis 2006, 1). Since 1992, Tajikistan’s main aim has been to achieve political stability and to restore the crippled economy. Over the last decade and a half only limited economic recovery has been achieved. As a 2006 Europa report puts it: Unlike some of its Central Asian neighbours, the country [Tajikistan] lacks natural resources such as oil and gas (…) (but) since 2001, the country [Tajikistan] has enjoyed robust recovery (Europa 2006b, 3).

Economic growth of 8% over the last 4 years, a rise in industrial production of 14.4% and a reduction in poverty to one in six people in Tajikistan, are signs for optimism though (Europa 2006b, 3-4). Politically, Tajikistan has had border disputes with Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, most recently in May 2006. Rakhmonov and his allies in Tajikistan have resorted to ‘flawed and unfair’ elections and a clampdown on rivals to retain power (Europa 2006b, 2). In terms of its foreign policy stance, Tajikistan is pro-Russia, China and Iran (Europa 2006b, 3), but it has still managed to develop a relationship with the EU via trade and cooperation and other agreements. In the period from 1992 to 2002, EU aid to Tajikistan totalled 350 million Euros (Europa 2006b, 2). Up to 2006, the total of 410 million Euros has been poured into Tajikistan largely in the form of humanitarian and food aid (Europa 2006b, 8). In April 2007, President Rakhmonov dropped the ‘ov’ ending from his name supposedly to ‘support and revive our [Tajik] national traditions’ (Arman 2007, 1). This is viewed as an attempt to de-Russify Tajikistan and is seen as a dangerous tactic because: Any move that antagonises Russia is sure to cause economic pain for Tajiks. Russia can retaliate by potentially placing restrictions on Tajik guest workers, whose remittances are critical to the economic welfare of a large number of families in Tajikistan (cited in Arman 2007, 2).

Finally, there is a fear in Tajikistan that President Rahman might be generating a cult of personality (Arman 2007, 3).

224


Turkmenistan Turkmenistan, since independence in 1991, has been a Republic and the former Communist Party (now renamed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan) dominates the government of Turkmenistan. Saparmurat Niyazov, the former head of the Communist Party, ruled Turkmenistan from June 1992 until his death in December 2006. Turkmenistan is probably the most Soviet-style state in Central Asia. The President controls the government and media, there was a widespread cult of personality during Niyazov’s reign, severe restrictions existed on freedom of speech, press and association and although on paper there was a separation of powers, in practice, the President ruled and opposition was virtually impossible. There are two main opposition parties Gundogar (run by Boris Shikhmuradov) and Erkia (run by Abdy Kuliev) (Turkmenistan Country Watch report 2006, 25), but opposition is viewed negatively. Thus, Shikhmuradov was fired from his post as Foreign Minister in the summer of 2000 for criticising government policy and in July 1999, Pirimguli Tanrykuliev, an opposition leader, was arrested on false embezzlement charges and given an 8 year jail sentence (Turkmenistan Country Watch report 2006, 10, 12). Turkmenistan is a member of the World Bank, IMF, Partnership for Peace, OSCE, WTO and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation (Turkmenistan Country Watch report 2006, 29) and has few regional alliances. Turkmenistan’s main emphasis has been on Russia and Ukraine due to its energy exports. However, Niyazov’s regime had disputes with Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia over the Caspian sea boundaries and with Russia over the supply and price of gas. In general terms, however, Turkmenistan is viewed as ‘relatively stable’ but on the downside it has been slow to implement serious economic reforms as mentioned above. In December 2006, Niyazov died of a heart attack, leaving behind ‘neither a designated successor nor even a legal procedure for selecting one’ (Mishra 2007, 24). With military backing, the Deputy PM, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, was quickly named Acting President and later ran for President in February 2007. According to Mishra, ‘The new ruler has vowed to continue Niyazov’s policies, including providing free gas, electricity, water and bread for all people’ because:


225

(…) this policy (…) has kept it [Turkmenistan] from becoming a breeding ground for Islamic extremism. The US and other western countries had supported Niyazov’s agenda considering the fact that Turkmenistan is located next to Iran and has a long border with Afghanistan, where two million ethnic Turkmen live (Mishra 2007, 24).

Niyazov’s death leaves the issue of authoritarianism open and on top of this there is also question of Turkmenistan’s future energy policies and relationships, in particular whether or not the US and EU successfully can woo Turkmenistan ‘to join their strategic Nabucco project to build a gas pipeline from Central Asia across the Caspian to Europe bypassing Russia’ (Mishra 2007, 25). Russia has certainly deepened ‘bilateral ties’ with Turkmenistan in recent months and the EU will have to work hard to win Turkmenistan over, as Berdymukhammedov recently commented: (…) democracy (…) cannot be imposed by applying ready imported models. It can only be carefully nurtured by using wise national experience and (the) traditions of previous (Turkmen) generations (cited in Blagov 2007, 2).

There is clearly underlying criticism of the West here. The risk for the EU is that Turkmenistan might align ‘not only economically but also politically with Russia’ (Blagov 2007, 2). Uzbekistan Uzbekistan is landlocked and has boundaries with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 1). It is ruled by Islam Karimov who has adopted an autocratic style of government, carried out major human rights abuses and assisted the US in the War on Terror. Before 2004, Uzbekistan was considered ‘a fairly stable country’, but after 2004 there has been increased unrest and rising Islamic fundamentalism. In July 2004, suicide bombers attacked the US and Israeli embassies in Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 12). Elections in Uzbekistan have been ‘neither free nor fair’. The 1999 parliamentary elections were considered ‘seriously flawed’ whilst the 2000 Uzbek Presidential elections only ran two candidates (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 9-10). Karimov has successfully used the War on Terror to clampdown on alleged al-Qaida links in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Herb-ut-Tahrir parties and in April 2004, 6,000 so-

226


called ‘Islamic extremists’ were imprisoned (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 11, 33). Economically, Uzbekistan is largely an agricultural country and a major cotton exporter and producer. The Uzbek government under Karimov has been pro-market but only made ‘a cautious shift towards it’ (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 37). Consequently the EBRD cut its aid to Uzbekistan because of its ‘poor record on economic reform and…. (its) failure to deal with human rights abuses’ (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 12). One 2006 report on Uzbekistan concluded that: The current economic system retains the key features of (the) Soviet command economy, with the state exercising active control over (…) production and distribution (Uzbekistan Country Watch report 2006, 38).

Karimov’s reluctance to embrace market reforms and other difficulties, such as the Andijan massacre in May 2005, has led to the EU’s Council of Ministers renewing and extending ‘the range of sanctions currently in place’ for another year (EurAsia Bulletin, EIAS SeptOctober 2006, 16). Since Andijan, ties between Uzbekistan and Russia have become stronger and in November 2005, a Treaty cementing their relationship was signed providing for military assistance in the event of an ‘act of aggression’ against either side (Kimmage 2007, 1). However, Uzbekistan also wants, despite EU sanctions, to ‘create new, promising, opportunities for cooperation’ with the West and the EU welcomes this (Kimmage 2007, 2). Having discussed the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in Central Asia since 1991, we can now explore what this means for Russian and EUrelations in the region. Central Asian-Russian relations Since 1991, Central Asia has had to renegotiate its relationship with Russia and also build links with new partners such as the EU. Regionally, the Central Asian countries have also been cooperating with one another. The main premise of this chapter is that during the Yeltsin era, Russia lost much of its influence in certain Central Asian countries whilst the EU became a much stronger global actor in the Central Asian region. However, since Putin’s rise to power in 2000, Central Asia has been made a higher priority. Thus Russia and the EU,


227

as well as China, are now actively competing for influence in Central Asia. Russia, the EU and China all have common interests over Central Asia and concerns about ‘Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and terrorism’ (Tang 2000, 365). However, given Central Asia’s close proximity to Russia ‘an economic collapse in these states could lead to a serious refugee problem that Russia would not be able to handle’ (Tang 2000, 366). It is therefore natural that Russia wants to reassert itself in Central Asia. Yeltsin’s attitude towards Central Asia was shaped by the collapse of Communism, the transition to market, the fall of one party-state and the rise of opposition to his rule from 1993 (LDPR) until 1999 (CPRF). Yeltsin was largely pre-occupied with domestic policy due to the end of Cold War and Russia’s loss of superpower status. Russia’s foreign policy was aimed at reducing the prospects of nuclear war; protecting Russians abroad and combating problems in the ‘Near abroad’ such as Chechnya. There were three foreign policy strands in Yeltsin’s Russia. The first school, the so-called integrationalists and reformers, such as Andrei Kozyrev, closely identified with the West, promoted Russia’s integration into world economy, argued in favour of extending the European security system to include Russia and wanted Russia to be accepted as an equal partner to the West. The second school – the centrists and Eurasianists – associated with Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yevgeny Primakov and Igor Ivanov stressed the need to take into account Russia’s history, culture, geography and to protect Russia‘s national interest. These theorists wanted to forge links between Russia and Asia [e.g. Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Asia, China]. Finally, there were the traditionalists and nationalists, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov, who were anti-Western; proRussian/Slavophile in orientation and highly critical of Yeltsin and Kozyrev for conducting a foreign policy which passively duplicated Western policies. The traditionalists and nationalists wanted either to restore the old USSR [Zyuganov] or build strong links with other Slavs [Zhirinovsky]. Yeltsin’s foreign policy went through various stages: from 1990-95 Russia was integrationalist under Andrei Kozyrev; from 1996-98 Eurasian under Yevgeni Primakov and finally more nationalist under Igor Ivanov between 1998-99. Under Yeltsin, there seemed to be no clear direction for Russian foreign policy which was driven by

228


expediency, had little unifying logic, consistency or continuity. There was also division over the best way forward. Russia under Yeltsin sought alliances with other powers resentful of American supremacy (e.g. China, India) but did not go as far as to totally undermine its relationship with Washington (Williams and Hanson, 1999, 257-277; Williams 2000, 248-266; Williams 2001, 15-38, 288-290 and Williams with Golenkova 2001, 204-225, 298-300) . As Allen Lynch points out that: Russian influence has proved greatest where the Western stake is least intense and weakest where the Western stake is most intense (Lynch 2001, 25).

Throughout the Yeltsin years (1991-99), Russia had a complex relationship with the Central Asian states. Although in theory the 1992 Tashkent Treaty of collective security was supposed to ease RussianCentral Asian relations, this Treaty was never realised because the USSR crumbled and the Tajik civil war broke out. As a consequence: (…) the Soviet Union’s collapse left a power vacuum in Central Asia. For a brief period, Russia was relieved to rid itself of its Central Asian burden. External powers (such as the US, EU and China – author) took full advantage of Russia’s negligence (…) And plunged into the struggle for influence in this vast region (Tang 2000, 365).

All this changed under Putin. Holmes argues that there are four pillars to Putin’s foreign policy: first, the desire to expand the Russian sphere of influence in the ‘Near abroad’, to secure oil and other resources, to enhance Russian political control over its neighbours and to create a buffer zone against Islamic extremism in Southern Russia’; second, to develop the EU as a major energy market and a key source of technology and foreign investment; third, to use China, Iran and India as its main arms market and finally to pursue a pragmatic relationship with the USA to gradually restore Russia’s great power status (Holmes 2001, 1-4). The first of these pillars is the most crucial element in relation to this chapter. Tang argues that under Putin: (…) it did not take Moscow long to realise that ignoring the (Central Asian) region was a blunder and so it (Russia) sought to re-impose order on what is now its so-called Near Abroad (Tang 2000, 365).

The threat of terrorism after 9/11 and the increasing de-stabilisation of Central Asia meant that Moscow gradually reassessed its stance on


229

Central Asia especially after Putin’s re-election in March 2004. Blum and Saivetz argue that Putin’s foreign policy has become more coherent and the Caspian a higher priority, as the appointment of Viktor Kalyuzhny as the Kremlin’s envoy in Central Asia shows. Putin has shifted the emphasis from ‘macro ties (state to state) to a combination of macro and micro (i.e. trade and economic ties)’ (Blum and Saivetz 2001, 1). Putin has had greater success in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan than in Turkmenistan, which has better relations with Iran (Blum and Saivetz 2001, 3). Russia views conflict in Central Asia as external (Afghan) in origin rather than evidence of a desire for greater independence from its former ally Moscow. According to Malashenko, Russia sees Islamic opponents in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as a threat to its national security due to the strong Islamic movements aiming to ‘dispose the secular regimes and introduce the Sharia’ (Malysheva 2003, 91). This led to growing conflicts in the Fergana valley since 1999-2000 and growing concerns that the continuing tension in Afghanistan might de-stabilise Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Malysheva 2003, 91). Russian foreign policy analysts believe that Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to Russia as well as to stability within Central Asian states (Malashenko 2004, 12). To try and eradicate the impact of these challenges, a number of steps have been taken including increased military expenditure (for instance in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan); the creation of regional organisations such as the Black Sea Economic Union (including Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) and the creation of the Shanghai Six (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyryzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) (see below). Kuklina points out, however, that as a result of ‘multiple overlapping’ layers the (Central Asian) region finds itself in a zone where security structures with different objectives and different levels of institutionalisation and political weight often come into conflict and interact’ (Kuklina 2003, 89). Russia itself might be an obstacle to Central Asian stability because of its failure to completely abandon its ‘Soviet legacy’ and mind set. However, Russia is not solely to blame because many Central Asian states contribute to the tension by rejecting or ‘seeking liberation from Russia’ (Kuklina 2003, 90). A possible solution, according to Kuklina, is a ‘new model of ties and cooperation’ in Central Asia which allows Russia a role whilst permitting the Central Asian states room for manoeuvre (Kuklina

230


2003, 90). This is a difficult tightrope to walk, especially given Russia’s long standing conflict with Chechnya and the instability in neighbouring areas such as Dagestan, Nagarno-Karabakh, Abkazia and Southern Ossetia (Kuklina 2002, 92; Malysheva 2002, 64). This problem has been further exacerbated by Central Asian conflicts, such as Azerbaijan and Georgia over Abkazia (Malysheva 2002, 69). Security concerns in Southern Russia have also increased rivalry between Russia and other countries such as Iran and Turkey (Malysheva 2002, 70-76). The problem is that, unlike Georgia under Saakashvili or the Ukraine under Yushchenko, the Central Asian nations have few people capable of pushing for and maintaining regime change. The use of force cannot solve instability in the Central Asian states, neither can money buy a Russian military presence in the region ‘instead greater leverage has to be developed from influencing neighbouring states’ which involves greater cultural ties, the adoption of common political practices and building international social institutions throughout the Central Asian region (Tsygankov 2006, 162). The importance of Shanghai 6 in Central Asia In addition to Russia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is another one of the multilateral, regional players in Central Asia. According to Misra, the SCO was created on 26 April 1996 (Misra 2001, 305). The main concerns of the SCO are regional security and border control with the aim of eradicating ‘terrorism, extremism and separatism’ (Yom 2002, 1), The SCO has been used by ‘Russian and Chinese policy-makers …. (as) a way to seal the strategic Sino-Russian dominance over Central Asia’ (Yom 2002, 2). The SCO is seen as important because ‘it fused Moscow’s long-standing quest to increase control over the (Central Asian) region with Beijing’s desire to create a multi-polar world’ after the Cold War ended (Yom 2002, 3). Over time SCO goals have shifted from ‘security to economic integration’ via the promotion of intra-state trade (Misra 2001, 314). Alongside China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia, Uzbekistan joined the SCO in June 2001 (Cummings 2002, 18) and it also includes India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as observers (Cohen 2006, 1). The SCO has been used to ‘reduce US influence in Central Asia’ (Cohen 2006, 1). Thus, the Economist noted recently that:


231

(…) membership (of the SCO) offers hydrocarbon trade, stronger defence links and, for those who want it, a way to counter the influence of the Americans (Economist 2006, 66).

However, despite these sentiments events since 9/11 have meant a stronger US presence in the region and the Central Asian states themselves ‘have shrewdly maintained links with America to counter Russian and Chinese power’ (Economist 2006, 66). Thus the US has a base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan hosted the NATO steppe Eagles exercises in September 2006 (Economist 2006, 66). However the USA and its EU partners must not become complacent as the SCO, and especially Russian and Chinese involvement, poses a ‘serious threat’ to US and EU strategies in Central Asia (Cohen 2006, 2). This leaves us with the final key question – how might the EU fit into this picture? EU and Central Asia The EU has moved cautiously towards Central Asia. Since the early 1990s, the EU has established diplomatic relations with Central Asia and started developing political and economic ties. The EU has gradually expanded its trade with Central Asia and during the Yeltsin era tried to full the vacuum left by Russia. Whilst not altogether successful, it is evident that some economic integration via regionalisation has occurred over the last decade or so between the EU and Central Asian states. The volume of trade has increased and EU aid to Central Asia has risen dramatically since the early 1990s. The EU’s policy on Central Asia is outlined in its regional strategy paper dated 30 October 2002. This covers the period 2002-6 and builds upon assistance given since the 1990s. The EU’s main areas of concern are: slow progress towards democracy; human rights problems; demographic decline; poor implementation of economic reform and widening income disparities and increased poverty (EU 2002, 3). The EU is keen to cooperate with the Central Asian states in combating trans-national crime (e.g. drug trafficking); improving border management to control arms smuggling and to increase intra regional trade (EU 2002, 3). Since the mid-1990s, the EU has provided 944.4 million Euros in assistance to Central Asia in the form of humanitarian aid, financial loans and rehabilitation assistance. The EU’s strategy has been ‘to promote the stability and security of the

232


countries of the Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of sustainable economic development and poverty reduction’ (EU 2002, 3). 50 million Euros per annum was allocated between 2002-6 and the goal was to ensure the development of democratic principles, the protection of human rights and transition to a market economy in the Central Asian states (EU 2002, 4-5). These goals gave been pursued via Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), and Trade and Cooperation Agreements (TCAs) between the EU and individual Central Asian states. For instance, the EU has been in partnership with Kazakhstan since independence and has PCAs since 1999 in various areas such as energy, transport and the new area of justice and home affairs (JHA). Kazakhstan is keen on regional cooperation and is an active partner in several initiatives with the EU in oil and gas, agriculture, food processing, engineering, construction and banking. According to EU reports, progress has been achieved in relation to internationally agreed borders, the creation of functioning government structures and the establishment of public administrations, law enforcement, economic and financial management bodies but there is still a need to reduce poverty, improve governance, cut corruption and implement the rule of law (EU 2002, 6). Among the successes in EUKazakhstan relations, for example, are public administration reform, the growth of SMEs, the development of NGO activity, improved border management (e.g. BOMCA) and reduced drug trafficking via CADAR. The largest donors to Central Asia are Germany, Japan, Switzerland, USA and to a lesser extent the UK, France, Nederland, Norway and Canada (EU 2002, 15). In addition to the EU support, the World Bank gives 300-500 million Euros per annum and the EBRD 500-600 million Euros each year to the Central Asian states in a range of areas including agriculture, health care, education, finance, energy, IT, transport, water and the environment, public sector and SME development (EU 2002, 15-16). Since 2007, under the German Presidency of the EU, a number of high level meetings have taken place between EU and Central Asian delegations to build stronger ties between the two regions. The key areas of concern have been energy resources, especially in the Caspian sea region; security, especially the fight against international terrorism; human rights; cooperation in developing democracy and strengthening


233

civil society and the introduction of the rule of law (Pannier 2007c, 12). Criticisms have been made of the EU, however, because it often ignores human rights ‘violations in Central Asia in order to improve its chances of receiving energy exports’ (Pannier 2007c, 2. My emphasis). Ruslan Khaidarov argues that: The EU is the (…) only geopolitical force that does not have economic geopolitical and geo-strategic interests in the Central Asian region (…) Russia and China come to (Central Asia) to protect their geopolitical interests and (…) look at what is happening and change their stance (cited in Pannier 2007c, 3).

There are signs that the EU is starting to recognise the need to put Central Asia higher up on its agenda. Thus, in March 2007, five Central Asian and various EU foreign ministers met in Astana to discuss energy cooperation because: The EU currently imports half of its energy needs and the bloc’s dependence on external sources is expected to climb to 70% by 2030. It is estimated in Brussels that the Caspian sea region (…) could provide up to one-quarter of total EU energy needs (Eurasia Insight 2007, 1).

To facilitate closer EU- Central Asian ties, it is estimated that the EU’s contribution to Central Asian development will reach 700 million Euros over the next five years (2007-2013) (Eurasia Insight 2007, 2). Although the EU’s push will be viewed with suspicion in Moscow, time is of the essence. Conclusion According to Simon, despite all the aforementioned EU efforts, a recent Crisis Group Report entitled Central Asia: What role for the EU? concluded that the EU was doing too little, too late ‘to shape developments in a region (Central Asia) that has mostly seen marked declines in its economic fortunes, political freedoms and social development in recent years’ (Simon 2006, 1). Part of the problem is that the EU has relied too much on technical assistance when measures directly targeted at, for example ‘the collapse of public health systems in the (Central Asia) region, rampant drugs trafficking and a general trends towards authoritarian governance’ are more appropriate (Simon 2006, 1). The EU’s approach up to 2006, which favoured regional cooperation, has, according to Crisis Group Report, ‘proven

234


to be a non-starter due to the reluctance of Central Asian states to work together’ (cited in Simon 2006, 1). For the EU to ensure a stronger presence in Central Asia, the 2006 Crisis Group Report advocates the following strategy: a tougher stance on human rights; tackling the potential refugee crisis; training regional experts well acquainted with Central Asia; adopting policies to ease transition away from dictatorship; extending the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to Central Asia; and using EU structural aid more effectively in Central Asia (cited in Simon 2006, 1-2). These EU shortcomings, plus the fact that Russia has now recovered its lost ground under Putin, whilst China has also gained a foothold in Central Asia, will make it increasingly difficult for the EU to influence trends in Central Asia in the years to come.

References Abazov, R. 1999. Policy of economic transition in Kyrgyzstan. Central Asian Survey 18, no.2: 197-223. Arman, K. 2007. President attempts to give Tadjikistan a cultural makeover. Eurasia Insight (10 April). Blagov, S. 2007. Russian moves to repair ties with Azerbaijan. Eurasia Insight (4 February). Blum, D. and C. Saivetz. 2001. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Putin’s Caspian policy, at http://www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu Cohen, A. 2006. What to do about the Shanghai cooperation organisation’s rising influence. Eurasia Insight (September). Commission of the European Communities. 2002. Strategy paper 2002-2006 & Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia. Brussels. Commission of the European Communities. 2006. EU relations with Kyrgyzstan, at http://www.delkaz.cec.eu.int Cummings, S. 2002. Understanding politics in Kazakhstan. Demstar Research Report No. 10. Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus (November). Cummings, S. and O. Nøgaard. 2003. State of the State in Kyrgyzstan. Demstar Research Report No. 13. Department of Political Science. University of Aarhus (March). Dukanbaev, A. and W.H. Hansen. 2003. Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan. Demstar Research Report No. 16. Department of Political Science. University of Aarhus/Department of International and Comparative Politics, American University, Central Asia (September).


235

The Economist. 2006. The Shanghai Six at Five. The Economist (10 June 2006): 66. EIU. 2006. Economist Intelligence Unit Report, Kazakhstan 2006, at www.eiu.com EurAsia Bulletin. 2006. Political relations – Uzbekistan. EIAS (SeptemberOctober):16. Eurasia Insight. 2007. Central Asia: EU takes case to Astana (28 March). Europa. 2006a. Kazakhstan Country profile, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ external_relations/kazakhstan/intro/index.htm Europa. 2006b. Uzbekistan Country profile, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ external_relations/Uzbekistan/intro/index.htm Europa. 2006c. Turkmenistan Country profile, at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/ external_relations/Turkmenistan/intro/index.htm Gleason, G. 2001. Foreign policy and domestic reform in Central Asia. Central Asian Survey 20, no.2: 167-182. Holmes, K. R. 2001. Understanding Putin’s foreign policy. Heritage Foundation Web Memo no 22 (12 July), at www.heritgae.oorg/Research/Russiaand Eurasia/WM22 Ismayilov, R. 2006. Azerbaijani Presidents visit to Moscow: Tough talks over the energy issues. Eurasia Insight. (10 November). Kassenova, N. 2005. Kazakhstan’s national security: Conceptual and operational aspects. Central Asian Survey 24, no.2: 151-164. Kimmage, D. 2007. Uzbekistan: Is Tashkent’s foreign policy going multivector? Eurasia Insight (11 March). Kuklina, I. 2003. Security issues in the Black Sea-Caspian region. Russian Politics and Law 40, no. 6 (November-December): 80-93. Lillis, J. 2006. Kazakhstani opposition leader goes on trial for fraud. Eurasia Insight (5 December). Lynch, Allen C. 2001. The realism of Russia’s foreign policy. Europe-Asia Studies 53. Malashenko, A. 2004. Islam, Politics and the security of Central Asia. Russian Politics and Law 42, no. 4 (July-August): 6-20. Malysheva, D. 2003. Security issues in Southern Russia: Regional and global aspects. Russian Politics and Law 40, no. 6 (November-December): 62-79. Mishra, M. 2007. Post-Noyazov Turkmenistan – Continuity or Change? Asian Affairs (February): 24-25. Misra, A. 2001. Shanghai 5 and the emerging alliance in Central Asia: The closed society and its enemies. Central Asian Survey 20, no.3: 305-321. O’Rourke, B. 2007. Central Asia: Rights group highlights regions problems. Eurasia Insight (March). OSCE. 2005a. The Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary elections, 27 February and 13 March 2005. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission final report.

236


OSCE. 2005b. The Kyrgyz Republic: Presidential election, 10 July 2005. Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR Election observation mission final report. Pannier, B. 2006. Kyrgyz government resigns. Eurasia Insight (19 December). Pannier, B. 2007a. Kyrgyzstan: Protests gain steam ahead of major antigovernment rally. Eurasia Insight (9 April). Pannier, B. 2007b. Kyrgyzstan: Revolution anniversary highlights political failures. Eurasia Insight (24 March). Pannier, B. 2007c. Central Asia: EU seeks energy, presses on rights. Eurasia Insight (31 March). Petersen, A. 2007. Azerbaijan and Georgia: Playing Russian roulette with Moscow. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst (10 January 2007). Rasizade, A. 2002. Azerbaijan after a decade of independence: Less oil, more graft and poverty. Central Asian Survey 21, no.4: 349-370. Saidazimova, G. 2005. Bakiev wins Kyrgyz election by landslide. RFE/RL (11 July), at www.rferl.org Sershen, D. 2007. Kyrgyzstan’s politicians pick up in 2007 where they left off last year. Eurasia Insight (11 January). Simon, S. 2006. Recent report calls for stronger EU presence in Central Asia. Eurasia Insight (5 January). Socor, V. 2006. Putin in Azerbaijan. Eurasia Daily Monitor (22 February). Swietochowski, T. 1999. Azerbaijan: Perspectives from crossroads. Central Asian Survey 18, no.4: 419-434. Tang, S. 2000. Economic integration in Central Asia: The Russian and Chinese relationship. Asian Survey 40, no.2 (March-April): 360-376. Tsygankov, A. P. 2006. New challenges for Putin’s foreign policy. Orbis (Winter): 153-165. Turkmenistan. 2006. Country Review. Country Watch Report 2006 at www. countrywatch.com Uzbekistan. 2006. Country Review. Country Watch Report 2006 at www. countrywatch.com Williams, C. and Stephen E. Hanson. 1999. National socialism, left patriotism or superimperialism? The Radical right in Russia. In The Radical Right in East-Central Europe, ed. Ramet, Sabrina P., 257-277. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press. Williams, C. 2000. The New Russia: From Cold War strength to postcommunist weakness and beyond. In New Europe in Transition, eds. Anderson, P. J., G. Wiessala and C. Williams, 248-266. London: Continuum. Williams, C. 2001. Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting. In The Kosovo Crisis: America’s last war in Europe? eds. A.Weymouth and S. Henig., 15-38, 288290. London: Reuters/Pearson Education.


237

Williams, C. with Z.T. Golenkova. 2001. Russia: Walking the tightrope. In The Kosovo Crisis: America’s last war in Europe? eds. A.Weymouth and S. Henig., 204-225, 298-300. London: Reuters/Pearson Education. Yom, S. L. 2002. Power politics in Central Asia. Harvard Asia Quarterly VI, no. 4 (Autumn), at http://asiaquarterly.com Zardykhan, Z. 2002. Kazakhstan and Central Asia: Regional perspectives. Central Asian Survey 21, No.2: 167-183.


POLITICAL MORALITY, NORMATIVE TERRITORIES AND NON-INTERFERENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS AS ‘ENABLING’ AND ‘INHIBITING’ AGENTS IN EU-ASIA RELATIONS Georg Wiessala Abstract This section offers a critical overview of the position, and meaning, of human rights in the context of EU-Asia relations. The chapter adopts a social-constructivist perspective on the European Union's human rights promotion activities across Asia, emphasising the role of values and identities, norms and educational interaction in EU-Asia foreign policy interaction and implementation. The author argues that the majority of EU-Asia debates on the issue of human rights shows evidence of both the enabling and the inhibitory potential of the issue for East-West dialogue. This is borne out in the short case studies in this chapter, which evaluate the EU’s Asia Policies towards Burma (Myanmar), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Indonesia, in terms of the potential and the challenges reflected in their human rights content. The chapter closes with a call for a more coherent, lateral and holistic integration of human rights issues into EU-Asia relations. There are, perhaps, three principal reasons for the investigation which follows: first, put quite straightforwardly, EU-Asia relations still appear, at the beginning of the 21st Century, as a large underresearched subject-matter. Sporadic media attention on Avian Flu,

240

Georg Wiessala

Tsunamis1 and the (so-called) ‘war against terrorism’ aside, Asia occupies, more often than not, a position of ‘low policy salience’ (H Smith 2002, 201) on the agenda of the European Union (EU). Secondly, EU-Asia relations as a whole are a mixed bag, with light and shadow, possessing, as I would term it, both ‘enabling’ and ‘inhibitory’ potential. Human rights are thus an apt prism through which to observe the dynamism and the lethargy inherent in contemporary Asia Pacific dialogue with the EU. It seems to me that the European-Asian discourse on ‘individuality’, ‘rights’, ‘liberties’, ‘entitlements’ and, conversely, on ‘communality’, ‘duties’, ‘restrictions’ and ‘commitments’ to society, explains and illustrates almost perfectly why there is so much that is promising and empowering in EU-Asia political, cultural and broader, ‘civilisational’, cooperation – and why, on the other hand, there is also so much that is inhibiting and obstructive, weighing down the other side of the scales. Thirdly, when seen from a social-constructivist perspective of International Relations, a closer interrogation of human rights matters in Asia-Europe interaction is particularly helpful in explaining the pivotal role of values and rights, ideas, ‘mind-maps’ and identities, communication and ‘people-to-people-contacts’ in EU-Asia relations. ‘Social Constructivism’, or simply ‘Constructivism’, throughout this article is assumed to mean that political ideas and perceptions form a part of cognitive structures which imbue the material world with meaning (Aggestam 2004, 82). And what one might call ‘the power of ideas’ and the roles of ‘identities’, ‘structures’, ‘learning, social interaction, communication and alternative lines of enquiry’ loom large in the EU-Asia political, human rights and ‘ideational’ spheres. This article seeks to ask questions such as: do human rights and civil liberties play a meaningful role in contemporary EU-Asia relations? What are the underlying theoretical concepts, value-judgments, normative assumptions and ideas of identity which have shaped the EU-Asia dialogue over human rights on both sides? And what scope, if any, is there for wider, more ‘holistic’, human rights concerns, to contribute to a coherent and systematic expansion of EU policies towards Asia? And, of course, in focusing awareness on matters of 1 See, for instance, the ‘Special Tsunami Issue’ of the EurAsia Bulletin, Vol. 9, Nrs. 1 & 2, January-February 2005.

HUMAN RIGHTS AS ‘ENABLING’ AND ‘INHIBITING’ AGENTS

241

human rights in EU Asia cooperation, I intend to highlight, the insidious, global, erosion of liberties in the wake of the so-called ‘international war on terrorism’. Last, but not least, when perusing the following pages, I strongly urge the reader to bear in mind the overall ‘geography’ and the ‘historical baggage’ of Asia-Europe relations; to consider its pitfalls and ‘Icebergs’ – those areas which are rarely outspoken, can easily be overlooked, and lie largely below the surface of day-to-day Asia-Europe interaction. The ‘foundations myths’, and centuries of mutual cultural references of Asia and Europe, are part of this wider picture – as are the enduring stereotypes from the ages of the ‘Silk Road’ and the ‘Spice Trade’ (Davies 1996, xv-xvii; Wilson and van der Dussen 1995). Themes like ‘The Eastern Roots of Europe’, ‘Europe in Asia’ and ‘Asia in the Making of Europe’ represent long-established foci of East-West scholarship.2 Some of the leitmotivs of a longstanding cultural interaction still reverberate today: misperceptions surrounding ‘clashes of civilisations’, ‘Orientalism’, the ‘China-threat’, ‘Asian Values’, ‘Eurocentrism’ and ‘Islamophobia’ were as well known to Herodotus and Aeschylus as they are today to Mahbubani (1996; see also: Pagden 2002, 16) and Huntington. They have, one might say, travelled very well down the centuries in one way or another; they continue to make themselves felt in the 21st Century, by influencing the way our very notions of ‘values’, ‘modernity’ and ‘human rights’ are perceived, by shaping some EU Member States’ (the former colonisers’) contemporary priorities in Asia, and by holding up to Europe a mirror. But this mirror reveals that Europe’s identity itself lies, more often than not, in how it imagines itself in ‘contra-distinction’ to an ‘exoticised East’ and in how it distorted Oriental ‘agency’ in world affairs (Goody 1996; Lawson 2001; Curtin 2002; Hobson 2004; Petchsiri 1987, 2004, 2005; Ravi 2004). This is, of course, a ‘challenging’ basis, to say the least, for modern diplomatic interaction 3 between the EU and Asia, as regards such issues as Turkey, China,

2

See: Ravi et al 2004; Pagden 2001; Curtin 2002; Corn 1999; Lach and van Kley 1998; Embree and Gluck 1997; Goody 1996; Lach and Flaumenhaft 1965; Nakamura, Hajime and Wiener 1964. 3 On Europe-China intellectual exchange: Gregory 2003, 43-8 and 116-7; Brotton 2002; Spence 1998; Lach 1994.

242

Georg Wiessala

Islam in Asia, the ‘Asian Century’, and, indeed, the universal validity, or otherwise, of human rights. Human rights and the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor in Asia Before we move into the main discussion and begin to examine critically key aspects of the EU’s policy on human rights in Asia it is a necessary precursor that we say something about both the Union as a foreign policy actor and the EU-Asia political space. However, the ever present imperative of adhering to the word limit for each section of this discussion means that on occasion it is necessary to ‘cut to the chase’ and refer only briefly to some key considerations that would otherwise have been included. One such consideration is the depth of insight provided by those theoretical perspectives that have sought to extend social-constructivist viewpoints to an investigation of the position of human rights in EU-Asia relations and to bring to the fore the essentially ‘ideational construction’ of the EU-Asia political space. When viewed through the prism of such approaches, identities, discursive practices and processes of learning and ‘communicative action’ become much more central analytically (Rosamond 2000, 173; Risse 2004, 164; Knodt and Princen 2003, 43/4; White 2004, 22; Andreatta 2005, 31). In EU-Asia relations, human rights are thus norms constructed through interaction. An understanding of the processes of construction can help to explain, in the sense of March and Olsen (1998), how EU human rights policy works as an institutionalised system, structured by norms, rules, routines and conceptions of identity. Moreover, it reflects how EU efforts to ‘socialise’ Asian elites into a more consensual adherence to democratic rules, invest them with a particular pre-eminence as an international actor. Last but not least, an investigative focus on the ‘interaction of three strands: ideas, institutions and policies’ (Michael Smith 2004, 82; Haltern 2004, 184186) brings to the fore the ‘strengths and the ‘flaws’ (Sung-Hoon Park 2004: 343) of EU-Asia human rights interaction, analysed in some detail later in this article. Turning finally to the EU as a human rights polity, few observers doubt today that the Union has assumed a human-rights-guided ‘foreign policy identity’, turning it into a ‘normative’, as well as an economic and political power. The ‘enabling’ dynamics of human rights in this process, and in the wider EU-Asia dialogue, can be seen


243

at work in the successful, deliberate, combination of an ‘ideational’ component of EU ‘identity’, with an incremental integration of human rights into the Union’s legislative and political agendas (Sedelmeier 2004: 128/9). They also lie in the synthesis of the EU’s own human rights programme with those of other international bodies.4 Documents such as the 1973 Declaration on European Identity or the 1977 Declaration on Human Rights5 illustrate this amalgamation. They also prefigure the progressive, conceptual and practical, widening of EU competencies over human rights, a phenomenon which is often identified as the single most significant feature distinguishing the Union from other international organisations (e.g.: Whitman, 1998: 179). Human Rights and the Emergence of Bilateral Policy-Patterns Now that the sections above have laid the necessary foundations for the main discussion, ideally, it would be useful to look in detail at both the enabling and inhibitory potential of human rights in EU-Asia relations. However, the word budget for the project does not permit this and it is only the latter that can be given detailed examination here, although the enabling function will be mentioned wherever relevant. While there is little doubt that processes of EU ‘institutionalisation’, ‘legalization’ and ‘constitutionalization’, as well as the ‘policy-reservoirs’ embedded in the EU’s declaratory ‘AsiaStrategies’, are catalysts in integrating human rights more fully into mainstream EU policies, Development Aid and general EU external relations, it is clear that, in a number of areas of EU-Asia relations, human rights continue to have a tendency to ‘slow things down’ – bring them to a halt even. This happens because matters of human rights clauses, values and ideas, have significant potential for dissent; nothing demonstrates this better than the ‘Asian Values’ debate of the last few decades (Alston 1999: 591, fn. 144; Tseng 2001: 180). More specifically, the eclectic ‘policy-mix’ which the EU chooses in regard to some Asian regions, countries or individuals is conditioned, not only by a ‘universalist’ or ‘particularist’ discourse over values, but also by 4 5

See: Rapid Database, IIP/01/497. See: OJ C 103, 27 April 1977.

244

Georg Wiessala

different positions of human rights in the context of the EU’s policychoices on both the bilateral and the inter-regional levels. This section looks, in particular, at those parts of EU-Asia dialogue, where human rights have developed into an ‘inhibitory’ dynamic. Subsequently, the section holds up an analytical mirror to both the ‘enabling’ and the ‘inhibitory’ facets of the EU-Asia dialogue over human rights, by offering a – definitely non-exhaustive – survey of the diverse methods and policy-paradigms which emerge as parts of a human rights guided ‘EU Asia Policy’, and which appear, at times, to be compelling the EU to shift its Asia-related policies in different directions at the same time. This prepares the ground for a more detailed consideration, in the final section of this paper, of possible, more ‘holistic’, human rights developments in future EU-Asia cooperation. The evidence surveyed for this paper suggests that human rights are amongst the most significant fields of intellectual debate, advocacy and contention within the conglomerate of EU-Asia relations. However, it also appears that, the more Asia-Europe cooperation moves into the ‘inter-regional cooperation ventures’ (H Smith 2002: 210) of AsiaEurope, the less significant human rights become. Far from being ‘enabling’ conduits for political agency and advocacy in EU-Asia relations, in the more formalised areas of EU-Asia dialogue and in Asia-Europe ‘group-to-group dialogue’, human rights appear as ‘brakes’ and ‘impediments’, rather than ‘accelerators’, of East-West dynamism. This can be demonstrated in the case of the EU’s relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which go back to 19676, as well as for the parallel context of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), organised since 1996. This phenomenon of ’marginalization’ of human rights in the context of regionalism represents a revealing example of the constraints inherent in a progressive ‘institutionalisation’ of EU-Asia dialogue. EU-ASEAN relations are a first significant case in point: the relationship has been framed in numerous contexts, ranging from ‘triadic’ world orders, ‘diplomacy’ and ‘leadership’, to concepts of ‘rôle-models’, ‘regional communities’, ‘identity’, ‘comparability’ and others (e.g.: Phatharodom 1998; Chirathivat et al 2000; Solidum 2003; 6 The accessions of Vietnam (1995), Burma (1997), Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999) brought ASEAN membership to 10.


245

Stokhof et al 2004; Doidge 2004; Fort & Webber 2006; Wahlers, 2006). Although a debate over ‘values’ and ‘rights’ emerges from this, the dominant discursive channel in EU-ASEAN is the study of ‘regionalism’ and of the diversification of ASEAN’s functional cooperation with Northeast Asia through the new ASEAN + 3 mechanism (McMahon 1998; Dent 1999; van der Geest 2004 Eckhardt, 2005). In the context of ASEAN + 3, investigations of ‘non-traditional’ security issues represent an opportunity for a reflection on the rôle of human rights in EU-ASEAN.7 However, EU-ASEAN relations also encompass an ambivalence which inhibits further development in the human rights arena. Many would see its origins in the changed nature of relations between the EU and South East Asia, evolving from the ‘donor-recipient paradigm’ to wider political, cultural and economic linkages (McMahon 1998: 238; Bonnet 1999: 257; Pattugalan 1999: 43; Dent 1999: 49/50). But the ambivalence extends to practical EUASEAN cooperation and human rights. Robles (2004: 131) even stated: ‘from an examination of the conceptions of human rights dominant in Europe and Southeast Asia, it is tempting to conclude that no other area seems less suitable for forging interregional relations’. This ‘repeatpattern’ in EU-ASEAN ties is evident in the contradiction of the avowed, declaratory, ‘cornerstone-nature’ of the relationship on the one hand, with, on the other hand, the loss of human rights ‘streetcred’ over East Timor, Burma (Robles 2004), the Asian Financial Crisis and other matters. In addition, although EU-ASEAN acts as a principal pivot for wider EU-Asia cooperation, there are very few initiatives embracing a meaningful human rights dimension, targeting, for example, urban living conditions, local government, higher education, environmental protection (Tingsabadh 1999), and health promotion.8 It appears that further obstacles to the integration of the ‘human challenge’ into EU-ASEAN (Muntarbhorn 2001: 73) lie in divergent conflict-resolution methods (Petchsiri et al 2001) and in variant perspectives over issues of ‘interference’ and ‘identity’ (cf: Christie and Roy 2001: 126; Eldridge 2002: 60, 82; Haacke 2006: 150171). There is, furthermore, a lack of a ‘precedent’ for human rights 7 The ongoing EU/ASEAN+3 Think Tank Dialogue (last session: Berlin, October 2006) investigates these and other issues. 8 For example: Asia Invest, Asia IT & C, Asia Urbs, Asia-Link, ECAP II, EU-Asia Pro Eco. ASEAN-EU University Network.

246

Georg Wiessala

protection in ASEAN, and many Post-Asian-Crisis-Initiatives, such as the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (AHRM), suffer from problems of definition and enforceability. Moreover, notwithstanding a recent adjustment of the ASEAN’s focus on non-interference, the Association’s ‘normative terrain’ has not been ‘significantly revamped or abandoned’ (Friberg 2004: 2; Haacke 2006: 152). The resulting EUASEAN ‘value-system-friction’ (Dent 1999: 51, 61, 71) is anything but conducive to a more ‘active’ furtherance of human rights on the EUASEAN agenda. It remains to be seen how the planned ASEAN Charter, which contains references to collective responsibilities and human rights, will affect this situation.9 What Muntarbhorn (2002: 56) aptly describes as human rights ‘ambivalence’ in the physiognomy of human rights in EU-ASEAN also appears to permeate the process of Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), under construction since 1996. The ‘Cinderella’ status of human rights in the summit-diplomacy of ASEM, with its ethos of ‘partnership’, uniqueness’, ‘equality’ and ‘informality’ persists to the present day, in spite of lobbying by both the EP10 and the Asia-Europe Foundation (Brennan et al 1997; Forster 2000: 797; Yeo and Latif 2000: 129; Karen Smith 2003: 104; Gilson 2003). Seeking to account for this systemic weakness, many analysts employ ‘regionalist’, ‘constructivist’ or ‘trilateral’ theoretical models familiar from the EU-ASEAN relationship (Pelkmans and Shinkai 1997; O’Brien 2001: 14/15; Gilson 2002; Nguyen Duy Quy et al 2004; Boisseau du Rocher and Fort 2005). Others go further, seeking to identify the particular reasons for the human rights failure of the ASEM format. A perceived ‘overlap’ between ASEM and other interregional fora figures prominently in these analyses (Lim 2001: 103), as do the shortcomings of the ‘political pillar’ of ASEM, seen as the ‘least successful’ of the three ‘pillars’ of cooperation (Nguyen Duy Quy et al 2004: 129). Others trace the predictable EU-Asia disagreements over human rights to the ASEM spirit of ‘armchair-dialogue’ (e.g.: Paribatra 2000: 147-153), to the mushrooming ‘alphabet-soup’ of ASEM initiatives (CAEC 1997: 25; AEVG, 1999) and the relative neglect of the ‘missing link’ of civil 9 The ASEAN Charter was the focus of analysis of the 8th EU-East Asia Think Tank in Berlin in late October 2006. 10 European Parliament: minutes of 4 October 2000 (provisional edition): B50768, 0769, 0770, 0773, 0774 and 0775/2000.


247

society in ASEM (van Reisen 1997: 54/5; Lim 2003, 7; Ridzam 2003; Milliot 2005, 138). The ‘hijacking’ of the ASEM summit diplomacy by wider, geo-political developments such as terrorism is also often criticised (Fouquet 2002, 3) and so is the phenomenon of ASEM becoming a ‘shop-window’ for the host nation. But there is, arguably, a bigger mismatch of expectations, inherent in ASEM from its inception: the different ‘worlds of negotiation’ over human rights represent, perhaps, the most basic design fault within the fabric of ASEM (Serradell 1996: 198; Cacnio 1996: 7/8; Pelkmans and Shinkai 1997: 10; Forster 2000: 799). Indeed, the idea of ‘human rights dysfunctionality’ in ASEM is a powerful explanation for the more than ambivalent nature of many ASEM pronouncements.11 A number of those attempt a ‘mission impossible’: bridging the gap between ASEM’s ‘non-agenda’ spirit and the existence of sensitive human rights issues. Predictably, ASEM’s mainly exclusionary human rights agenda produces what is interchangeably termed a ‘dialogue of difference within a self-other-discourse’ (Gilson 2001; 2003: 58, 62), an ‘Asian Way with a Western agenda’ and ‘pirouettes sémantiques’ over human rights (Yeo 2000: 120; Gilson 2002: 161; 2003: 61). Holland summarises (2002, 72) that implied moral hierarchies are often ‘explicitly eschewed’ in favour of a desired equality of partnership. In spite of a series of ASEM Informal Seminars on Human Rights,12 a stronger human rights ‘pillar’, akin, perhaps, to the ACP context (see above), is ‘conspicuous by its absence’ (Gilson 2002: 161). Consequently, human rights are marginalized by consignment to the ‘cultural’ pillar (Drake 2003:35), where the ‘light refreshments of interregional exchange’ are served (Gilson 2003: 50). It is striking that exactly this risk – of a ‘sidelining’ of human rights concerns for the sake of inter-regional pragmatism – was forcefully predicted (Forster 2000: 800; Gilson, 2005: 223). Human rights thus emerge as a major inhibiting agent for the ASEM, pointing to the ‘paralysing effect of relativism’ (Thio Li-ann 1997: 70) and to the limited potential for policy conversion, in much the same way as has happened in the EUASEAN context (McMahon 1998: 245).

11

For ASEM I, see: point II/7; for ASEM III: points 8, II/5, IV/12. The 5th ASEM Informal Seminar on Human Rights, for example, took place in Bangkok, Thailand in 2003. 12

248

Georg Wiessala

The question of how – against this background of both an ‘enabling’ and an ‘inhibitory’ human rights dynamic within EU-Asia relations – the Union arrives at concrete policy-choices vis-à-vis Asia, constitutes a significant portion of a present and future research agenda in this area. In this context, some criticise the Union for showing Asia ‘two faces’, and for failing to design a consistent policy on human rights, on account of an overall primacy of trade interests (van Reisen 1997: 48-53; Yeo and Latif 2000). Whilst this criticism may be justified, and certainly affects the EU’s human rights promotion in other world areas, it remains to be asked how this situation affects the EU’s relations with its partners across Asia, and whether it is possible to stand back for a while and search for some ‘common denominators’. This article does not attempt to embrace the Union’s Asia policies in their entirety; that would be too much of a ‘moving target’. I would argue, however, that human rights can be seen to have contributed to the emergence of at least four overall EU-Asia ‘policypatterns’. I would further posit that, in terms of human rights concerns, those paradigms of EU Asia policy are drawn from a traditional arsenal of foreign policy, ranging from ‘constructive engagement’ and incentives-based, ‘political conditionality’ to ‘coercive’ pressure (See: Youngs 2001: 192; K. Smith 2003: 110/1, 198). They are, in other words, situated on a sliding strategic scale between Realpolitik and what one might term Moralpolitik. They cannot be subsumed into an exhaustive listing, are often incoherent and contradictory and, more often than not, they are subject to political expediencies. On one side of the scale, is to be found the ‘Eastern Chapter’13 of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a system of combined coordination, focusing on principally security-related issues. Here, human rights play a part in the EU’s policies towards Afghanistan,14 Burma (Myanmar, see below), North Korea15 and others, because the EU aims to see an end to specific abuses such as gender-based persecution and forced labour (cf: Lim 1999a and b; Gilson 2000: 60; Wiessala 2004: 98-109). Whilst EU CFSP across Asia is often ‘catalytic’ 13

Asia and the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: A one-day conference at the EP (24/11/1999). 14 Common Position 2001/56/CFSP; 2001/154/CFSP, 2001/771/CFSP. 15 Joint Action 96/195/CFSP, OJ L 63, 13 March 1996; Common Position 97/484/CFSP, OJ L 213, 5 August 1997


249

for wider EU-Asia relations, the EU’s coordinated coercion towards Burma, by contrast, is more pin-pointed: here, human rights issues illuminate a ‘punitive’, sanctions-led policy, inhabiting a triangle of problems, involving ASEAN, the EU and degrees of deliberate ‘interference’. Do sanctions ever work? In the case of Burma, in any case, ambiguity still remains ‘the handmaid of consensus’ (Antolik 1990: 157) and Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house-arrest beyond 4000 days. The EU’s coercive legislative arsenal towards the Burmese ‘generals of mass destruction’ is changing, but it appears, even so, still set apart, by some distance, from the Union’s relations with China16, unique in all EU Asia Policy in their breadth and institutionalisation. The Union’s constructive engagement of the PRC embraces a plethora of areas, including a Human Rights Dialogue. It stands described as somewhere ‘between love and pragmatism’ (Far Eastern Economic Review 12 February 2004; cf also: Bersick, 2005: 9). But the Achilles-heel of this ‘engagement’ is twofold and exposes a gulf between European rhetoric and reality: it lies, firstly, in the disarticulation of human rights from the lure of business and the instrumentalisation of human rights when considered against a background of commercial rivalry (e.g.: Ward 1998: 505; Baudin 2006: 49). Secondly, it appears in the contested assumption that economic development will, almost automatically, yield more freedom in China. Arguably, the elements of ‘conditionality/progress on the ground’, ‘increasing expectations/ responsibility’17 and the ‘mushrooming’ of sector-specific dialogue are distinctive features of the EU’s policy of ‘engaging Beijing’. The EU’s acknowledgement of the ‘One-China-Principle’, by contrast, harmonises with the Union’s human rights policies in other Asian countries. It is also a mark of the EU’s respect for the ‘territorial integrity’ of Indonesia, for instance.18 But EU policy methods in Indonesia and East Timor are recent: they are 25 years younger than the EU-China dialogue, and are, perhaps, best characterised as a form 16

There were six Commission policy-papers on China in the last decade. At the time of writing, the latest one – EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities was from November 2006. 17 Increasing ‘mutual responsibilities’ are a particular feature of the Commission’s China paper of October 2006. 18 On independence movements in Indonesia, see: Guardian, 10/12/02: 6; Rapid Database: IP/02/618.

250

Georg Wiessala

of constitutional consolidation. This paradigm, based on the notion of ‘shared interests’, aims at an equilibrium of conflict prevention, anticorruption and the institutional entrenchment of human rights policies. EU Asia Policies of the Future, Human Rights and ‘Holistic’ Policies The last part of this paper looks beyond the ‘enabling’ and the ‘inhibitory’ aspects of human rights in EU-Asia, beyond their consequences in the multilateral and bilateral, the intergovernmental and supranational of EU-Asia relations; it speculates about the future potential and development of the Asia-EU relationship. My main argument for this concluding part of this paper is that there is no ‘seachange’. Nevertheless, there are noticeable paradigm-changes in EU approaches towards Asian interlocutors over issues of human rights and democracy. I would tentatively suggest the term of comprehensive extension for this phenomenon. What this means is that there is enough evidence to suggest that the EU, in its policy-choices in Asia, is increasingly employing more ‘lateral’ thinking, consolidating ‘horizontal’ connections and approaching issues like human rights (and others) from a variety of perspectives at the same time. What cannot, at the end of 2007, be established with certainty is whether these changes of paradigm come about because the EU finds itself torn in a number of different directions at the same time, or whether there are more deliberate, strategic, choices lurking behind this. But there is emerging a very definite trend towards ‘cross-cutting’ themes, programmes and ambitions, connecting human rights with much wider concepts and challenges in EU-Asia relations. Apart from the ‘cultural networking’ happening through ASEM, the two examples of EU-Asia dialogue which, perhaps best serve to illustrate these shifts – albeit in different stages of development – are education and counter-terrorism. Again, strict word limits dictate that only the former can be examined and then only briefly. What is interchangeably called the ‘East/West www of learning’, the ‘people-topeople-dimension’, the ‘interaction between cultures and institutions’ and the ‘long march to mutual understanding’ (Stokhof et al 2004, 3), is particularly amenable to the constructivist viewpoint suggested in this article, bringing to the fore, as it were, the rôles of learning, the academic community and alternative lines of enquiry in East-West


251

relations. There is a twofold ‘learning-dimension’ in EU-Asia dialogue, especially in the area of political and human rights education: learning about and with one another makes inroads into minds and EU policies, into civic responsibility, social cohesion and last but not least economic success (Reiterer 2004b, 368). Academic and ‘epistemic’ communities make for dynamic contributors in rejecting any clash-ofcivilizations-theories (Voicu 2002). The Cultures and Civilizations Dialogue in the Asia-Europe Foundation and the ASEM Interfaith Dialogue are potent examples of how education can become embedded as a ‘pillar’ of the dialogue between the two regions (Niemann 2001), helping to formulate more ‘holistic’ policies regarding, inter alia, values and human rights. This is reinforced by the Commission’s relevant policy-papers,19 by the ‘social progress’ function of EU Education Policy (Moussis 2000, 167) and by some of its leitmotivs, such as ‘intercultural dialogue and communication’20 and the ‘knowledge economy’ (Archibugi and Coco 2005). These precepts, much as they can be criticised at times, impinge directly on EU-Asia relations because they stimulate debates about the EU’s identity and cultural vision, on the ‘transformative’ rôle of education and the development of ‘democratic societies’ through educational exchange (Korthals-Altes 2003; Subhan 2004, 8). In addition to education and anti-terrorism, a comprehensive extension of EU-Asia human rights dialogue occurs increasingly in other areas too: de-mining-education and assistance to landmine victims in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos are just a few examples of ‘cross-cutting’ security- and human rights concerns making a growing contribution to the EU’s Asia policies (cf: Muntarbhorn 2002, 243). Beyond restorative activity, EU policies, especially across post-crisis and post-tsunami South East Asia, are beginning to embrace issues of prevention, awareness and education, thus interweaving human rights concerns and ‘quality-of-life’ issues with broader processes of socialisation and economic integration.21

19

See, for instance: COM (2003) 399/4, at p. 4. COM (2000) 318; COM (2001) 172; COM (2001) 678;COM (2002) 401 Rapid Database, IP/03/481, IP/03/619. 21 See: EU-Cambodia Multilateral Trade Project (EU Delegation to Cambodia, 2005). 20

252

Georg Wiessala

Conclusion By way of a conclusion to this article, it can be noted that, beyond terrorism, the ‘people-to-people’ pillar, inter-regionalism and the rôle of human rights as ‘catalysts’ and ‘inhibitors’ of EU-Asia dialogue, recent comments of Gjis de Vries, the EU’s counter-terrorism officer, prefigure an EU Asia policy which uses ‘cross-cutting’ human rights themes to address underlying causes of violence and discontent, through the establishment of stronger linkages between political agency, security, development, structural violence and human rights. There are signs that, in East-West collaboration, a more ‘socialconstructivist’ understanding of international relations is bearing fruit: ‘dots’ are increasingly being ‘connected’ over human rights in EU Asia policies; there is evidence that the EU is re-focusing – or better, ‘defocusing’ – its human rights policies in Asia, in order to encompass East-West discursive practices on ‘norms’, ‘values’ and ‘ideas’ and to enhance its own potential for a value-based, normative polity. Perhaps these developments are, in part, a response to criticism of an EU which ‘lacks conviction’ and ‘loses the plot’ in Asia’.22 But it is also very likely that, through the vehicle of human rights, the EU is incrementally exploiting a number of ‘synergetic’ connections which were hitherto invisible, and that policy-practices and identities do constitute one another. True, this is bound to expose contradictions, overlaps and inconsistencies between policy-choices and bilateral and multilateral levels of dialogue, especially where divergent interpretations of human rights are concerned. But it also shows how the actors in this process are learning through their interaction and developing new cooperation strategies, joint practices and institutions, as a result of the learning process. These represent the essence of a redirection, ‘Re-orientation’ even, of the EU’s Asia Policies. Whether, in the future, the EU’s Asia policies succeed or fail, will, ultimately, depend on the ways in which the participants of this great, ongoing, East-West dialogue manage to transcend the economic exchanges of the day and to engage in a much wider, more meaningful, open, unbiased and respectful exchange about ‘cultural software’, religions, civilizations and the place of human rights in politics. 22

See the contributions to the EurAsia Bulletin by David Camroux (OctoberNovember 2001: 3) and Malcolm Subhan (December 2001: 9; November to December 2002: 1; January, May and December 2003: 1).


253

References AEVG - Asia-Europe Vision Group. 1999. For a Better Tomorrow. Asia-Europe Partnership in the 21st Century. AEVG. Aggestam, Lisbeth. 2004. Role identity and the Europeanisation of foreign policy: a political-cultural approach. In Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, eds. Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen, 81-98. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Alston, Philip, ed. 1999. The EU and Human Rights. Oxford: OUP. Alston, P. and J.H.H. Weiler. 1999. An Ever Closer Union in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights. In The EU and Human Rights, ed. Alston, Philip, 3-66. Oxford: OUP. Andreatta, Filippo. 2005. Theory and the European Union’s International Relations. In International Relations and the European Union, eds. Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith, 18-38. Oxford: OUP. Antolik, Michael. 1990. ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation. Armonk, New York: East Gate Books: M.E. Sharpe Inc. Archibugi, Daniele and Alberto Coco. 2005. Is Europe Becoming the Most Dynamic Knowledge Economy in the World? Journal of Common Market Studies, 43, No. 3: 433-459. Baudin, Pierre. 2006. China und die Europäische Union: zwiespältige Beziehungen; KAS Auslandsinformationen 5/06. Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Bersick, Sebastian. 2005. Taking Responsibility: The EUs Security Interests in East Asia. EurAsia Bulletin, (September – October) Brussels: EIAS: 9-11. Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Bertrand Fort. 2005. Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International. Bonnet, Mercedes. 1999. EU-ASEAN Relations. In The European Union and Developing Countries – The Challenges of Globalization, ed. Cosgrove-Sacks, Carol, 254-267. London, Macmillan. Brennan, Brid, Erik Heijmans and Pietje Vervest, eds. 1997. ASEM Trading New Silk Routes: Beyond Geo-politics and Geo-Economics: Towards a new Relationship between Asia and Europe Amsterdam: Trans-National Institute and Focus on the Global South: 48-56. Cacnio, Paul. 1996. ASEM: Fostering Economic and Social Cooperation in Asia and Europe. Bangkok Bank Monthly Review, 37, 3: 7-12. CAEC - Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation. 1997. The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia-Europe Cooperation. London: CAEC. Chirathivat, Suthiphand and Corrado, Molteni, eds. 2000. EU-ASEAN Economic Relations: The Impact of the Asian Crisis on the European Economy and the Long-Term Potential [sic]. Asia-Europe Studies Series, Vol. 1. Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Christie, Kenneth and Denny Roy. 2001. The Politics of Human Rights in East Asia. London: Pluto Press.

254

Georg Wiessala

Curtin, Philip, D. 2002. The World & the West – The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire. Cambridge: CUP. Davies, Norman.1996. Europe – A History. Oxford: OUP. Dent, Christopher M. 1999. The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship. London: Routledge. Doidge, Mathew. 2004. Inter-regionalism and Regional Actors: The EU-ASEAN Example. In The Eurasian Space; Far More Than Two Continents, eds. Stokhof, Wim, Paul van der Velde, and Lay Hwee Yeo, 39-57. Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and International Institute for Asian Studies. Drake, Michael S. 2003. Representing Old Countries – The Strategic Representation of Culture as Heritage in the Asia-Europe Summit Meetings. In Europe and the Asia-Pacific – Culture, Identity and Representations of Region, ed. Lawson, Stephanie, 33-49. London: Routledge Curzon. Eckhardt, Jappe. 2005. Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism – What Implications for the EU? EIAS Policy Brief 05/01, (January). Brussels: EIAS. Eldridge, Philip J. 2002. The Politics of Human Rights in Southeast Asia. London: Routledge. Forster, Anthony. 1999. The European Union in South-East Asia: Continuity and Change in Turbulent Times. International Affairs 75, No. 4: 743-758. Forster, Anthony. 2000. Evaluating the EU-ASEM relationship: a negotiated order approach. Journal of European Public Policy 7, no.5: 787-805. Fort, Bertrand and Douglas Webber. 2006. Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe – Convergence or Divergence? London: Routledge. Fouquet, David. 2002. ASEM IV in Copenhagen Seeks to Establish Identity. EURAsia Bulletin 6, Nos. 7 & 8, (July-August). Brussels: EIAS.: 1, 3-4. Friberg, Erik. 2004. Burma/Myanmar and ASEM Enlargement 2004: What Lessons from Cambodia and ASEAN Enlargement in 1997? EIAS Policy Brief 04/03, (July) Brussels: EIAS. Gilson, Julie. 2000. Japan and the European Union. London, New York: Macmillan. Gilson, Julie. 2001. Europe-Asia: The Formal Politics of Mutual Definition. In The European Union and East Asia. Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, eds. Preston, Peter W. and Julie Gilson, Julie, 109-21. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Gilson, Julie. 2002. Asia Meets Europe – Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Gilson, Julie. 2003. Making Uncommon Cause – Forging Identities on the Margins of ASEM. In Europe and the Asia-Pacific – Culture, Identity and Representations of Region, ed. Lawson, Stephanie, 50-65. London: Routledge/Curzon. Gilson, Julie. 2005. Asia Meets Europe: the View from Europe. In Enlarging European Union and Asia – Proceedings of the 10th ASEF University, 22 May to


255

5 June 2004, Tokyo, Japan, Mantaha, Zainal and Toshiro Tanaka, 217-229. Singapore and Tokyo: Asia-Europe Foundation and Keio University. Goody, Jack. 1996. The East in the West. Cambridge: CUP. Haacke, Jürgen. 2006. The development of ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture. Not Beyond Flexible Engagement. In Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe – Convergence or Divergence? eds. Fort, Bertrand and Douglas Webber, 150-171. London: Routledge. Haltern, Ulrich. 2004. Integration Through Law. In European Integration Theory, eds. Wiener, Antje and Thomas Diez, 177-196. Oxford: OUP. Hobson, John M. 2004. The Asian Origins of Western Civilization. Cambridge: CUP. Korthals Altes, Edy. 2003. Spiritual Values in European Public Life. In Socially Engaged Spirituality: Essays in Honour of Sulak Sivaraksa on his 70th Birthday, ed. Chappell, David W., 30-44. Bangkok: Sathirakoses-Nagapradipa Foundation. Lawson, Stephanie. 2001. The Cultural Politics of Contemporary Asia-Europe Relations In The European Union and East Asia. Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, eds. Preston, Peter W. and Julie Gilson, Julie, 29-45. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Letta, Corrado G.M. 2003. EA-EU Partnerships. The Future Dynamics of the East Asia – European Union Relationships. Seoul: The Sejong Institute. Lim, Paul. 1999a. Political Issues in EU-ASEAN Relations. Panorama: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs 1, 5-41. Manila: Konrad-Adenauer Foundation. Lim, Paul. 1999b. The Unfolding Asia-Europe Meeting ASEM. Process: Issues for ASEM III. Briefing Papers, EIAS BP 99/04: 1-17, Brussels: EIAS. Lim, Paul. 2001. The Unfolding Asia-Europe Meeting Process. In The European Union and East Asia: Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, eds. Preston, Peter W. and Julie Gilson, 91-108. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Lim, Paul. 2003. A Hindsight Look at ASEM, EurAsia Bulletin, (December). Brussels: EIAS: 5-7. Mahbubani, Kishore. 1996. The Asian Values Debate Revisited. The Straits Times (28 January). March, J. and J.P. Olsen. 1998. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press. McMahon, Joseph A. 1998. ASEAN and the Asia-Europe Meeting: Strengthening the European Unions Relationship with South East Asia. European Foreign Affairs Review 3: 233-251. Milliot, David M. 2005. Asia-Europe Meeting on the International Stage. In Paths to Regionalisation – Comparing Experiences in East Asia and Europe, eds. Boisseau du Rocher, Sophie and Bertrand Fort, 128-144. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International.

256

Georg Wiessala

Moussis, Nicholas. 2000. A Guide to European Policies. 6th ed. Rixensart: European Study Service. Muntarbhorn, Vitit. 2001. Strengthening ASEAN Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights: Lessons for ASEAN-EU Relations? In Strengthening ASEAN Integration: Lessons from the EUs Rule of Law, eds. Petchsiri, Apirat; Alfred E. Kellermann, Charit Tingsabadh and Pornsan Watananguhn, 65-73. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University. Muntarbhorn, Vitit . 2002. Dimensions of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region. Bangkok: Office of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand. Nguyen Duy Quy; Thu My Nguyen and Phu Hiep Duong, eds. 2004. AsiaEurope Cooperation and the Role of Vietnam. Hanoi: National Political Publishers, Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences and European Studies Programme Vietnam, ESPV. Niemann, Ulrich. 2001. The Dynamics of People-to-People Exchanges between Asia and Europe. Chulalongkorn University Journal of European Studies 9, no. 2, (July-December): 28-34. OBrien, Nicholas. 2001. ASEM: Moving from an economic to a political dialogue? Briefing Paper BP 01/02, (September). Brussels: EIAS. Pagden, Anthony. 2002. The Idea of Europe – From Antiquity to the European Union. Cambridge: CUP. Paribatra, Sukhumbhand. 2000. ASEM Political Dialogue – Now and in the Future. In The Seoul 2000 Summit: The Way ahead for Europe Partnership, ed. Lee, Chong-wha, 147-153. Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. Park, Sung-Hoon. 2004. ASEM and the Future of Asia-Europe Relations: Backgrounds, Main Characteristics and New Challenges. Asia-Europe Journal 2: 341-354. Pattugalan, Gina. 1999. The European Union in Southeast Asia: Trends, Shifts and Issues. Panorama – Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs 1: 43-65. Pelkmans, Jacques and Hiroko Shinkai, eds. 1997. ASEM: How Promising a Partnership? Brussels: EIAS. Petchsiri, Apirat. 1987. Eastern Importation of Western Criminal Law – Thailand as a Case Study. Publications of the Comparative Criminal Law Project 17. Littleton, Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co. Petchsiri, Apirat. 2001. The Rule of Law and Traditional Society: A Footnote on ASEANs Legal Culture. In Strengthening ASEAN Integration: Lessons from the EUs Rule of Law, eds. Petchsiri, Apirat; Alfred E. Kellermann, Charit Tingsabadh and Pornsan Watananguhn, 49-64. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University. Petchsiri, Apirat. 2004. How European Integration is Perceived in Asia. AsiaEurope Journal 2: 373-386.


257

Petchsiri, Apirat. 2005. How European Integration is Perceived in Asia: The Academicians Point of View. In Enlarging European Union and Asia – Proceedings of the 10th ASEF University, 22 May to 5 June 2004, Tokyo, Japan, eds. Mantaha, Zainal and ToshiroTanaka, 109-127. Singapore and Tokyo: Asia-Europe Foundation and Keio University. Petchsiri, Apirat, Paveena Sutthisripok and Pakprapai Thontiravong, eds. 2001. Comparative Regional Integration: ASEAN and the EU. Monograph Series 2. Bangkok: Interdisciplinary Department of European Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Petchsiri, Apirat, Paveena Sutthisripok and Pakprapai Thontiravong . 1998. EU and ASEAN in the 1990s: A New Era of Relationship. Chulalongkorn University Journal of European Studies 6, No. 2: 59-83. Petchsiri, Apirat, Paveena Sutthisripok and Pakprapai Thontiravong. 2005. Theorizing EU Policy-Making. In Policy-Making in the European Union, eds. Wallace, Helen, WilliamWallace and Mark Pollack, 13-48. Oxford: OUP. Ravi, Srilata, Mario Rutten and Goh Beng-Lan, eds. 2004. Asia in Europe – Europe in Asia. Singapore and Leiden: Institute for South East Asian Studies and International Institute for Asian Studies. Reiterer, Michael. 2004. The Role of Education and Culture in Contemporary International Relations: A Challenge for the Asia Europe Meeting. Asia Europe Journal 2: 365-371. Ridzam, Dato Deva Mohd. 2003. ASEM and Civil Society – Need for a new Dynamic. EurAsia Bulletin (October-November). Brussels: EIAS,. 3-5. Robles, Alfredo C. 2004. The Political Economy of Interregional Relations – ASEAN and the EU. Aldershot: Ashgate. Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Sedelmeier, Ulrich. 2004. Collective Identity. In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, Walter; Helene Sjursen, and Brian White, 123-140. London: Sage. Serradell, Victor. 1996. Asia-Europe Meeting ASEM.: A Historical Turning Point in Relations between the Two Regions. European Foreign Affairs Review 2: 185-210. Sjursen, Helene. 2003. Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy: Analytical Building Blocks, Arena Working Paper. Series 09/2003, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. Smith, Hazel. 2002. EU Foreign Policy – what it is and what it does. London: Pluto Press. Smith, Karen E. 2001. The EU, human rights and relations with third countries: foreign policy with an ethical dimension? In Ethics and Foreign Policy, eds. Smith, Karen and Margot Light, Margot, 185-203. Cambridge: CUP. Smith, Karen E. 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Cambridge: Polity Press.

258

Georg Wiessala

Smith, Michael: 2004. CFSP and ESDP: From Idea to Institution to Policy? In Common Foreign and Security Policy – The First Ten Years, ed. Holland, Martin, 78-88. London: Continuum. Solidum, Estrella D. 2003. The Politics of ASEAN. Singapore: Eastern University Press. Stokhof, Wim; Paul van der Velde and Lay Hwee Yeo. 2004. The Eurasian Space: Far More Than Two Continents. Singapore and Leiden: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and International Institute for Asian Studies. Subhan, Malcolm. 2004. Asia and the EU – Back to the Future. EurAsia Bulletin (September to October). Brussels: EIAS.: 7-8. Thio, Li-ann. 1997. Human Rights and Asian Values: At the Periphery of ASEAN-EU Relations? European Studies Journal, Chulalongkorn University, 5, 2: 27-70. Tingsabadh, Charit. 1999. Notes on ASEAN-EU Cooperation on Environmental Issues. In ASEAN-EU Economic Relations: The Long-Term Potential Beyond the Recent Turmoil, eds. Chirathivat, Suthiphand, Carlo Filippini and Corrado Molteni, 181-192. Milan and Bangkok: Institute of Economic and Social Studies for East Asia, Bocconi University. Tseng, Su-Ling. 2001. The European Union’s Commercial Policymaking Towards China. In The European Union and East Asia. Interregional Linkages in a Changing Global System, eds. Preston, Peter W. and Julie Gilson, 170188. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. van der Geest, Willem. 2004. Sharing Benefits of Globalization through an EUASEAN FTA? Asia Europe Journal 2: 201-219. Van Reisen, Mirjam. 1997. The Two Faces of the European Union towards the East: The Relationship between its Domestic and External Policies. In ASEM Trading New Silk Routes: Beyond Geo-politics and Geo-Economics: Towards a new Relationship between Asia and Europe, eds. Brennan, Brid, Erik Heijmans, and Pietje Vervest, 48-56. Amsterdam: Trans-National Institute and Focus on the Global South. Voicu, Ioan. 2002. Unity in Diversity – The Educational Component in ASEM is Taking Quiet But Significant Strides to Smooth Relations Between Europe and Asia. Bangkok Post (6 October). von Bogdandy, Armin. 2000. The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the Core of the European Union. Common Market Law Review 37: 1307-1338. Wahlers, Gerhard, ed. 2006. ASEAN and the European Union. Singapore: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Ward, Angela. 1998. Frameworks for Cooperation between the European Union and Third States: a Viable Matrix for Uniform Human Rights Standards? European Foreign Affairs Review 3: 505-536.


259

White, Brian. 2004. Foreign Policy Analysis and the new Europe. In Contemporary European Foreign Policy, eds. Carlsnaes, Walter; Helene Sjursen and Brian White, 11-31. London: Sage. Whitman, R.G. 1998. From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. London: Macmillan. Wilson, Kevin and Jan van der Dussen, eds. 1995. The History of the Idea of Europe. London & New York: Routledge. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2000. ASEM: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, 1: 113-144. Yeo, Lay Hwee. 2003. Understanding the Asia-Europe Meeting Process. In Asia and Europe – Towards Greater Inter-Cultural Exchanges, eds. Mantaha, Zainal and Charit Tingsabadh, 149-165. Proceedings of the 6th ASEF University, 27 July to 11 August 2002, Bangkok, Thailand. Singapore and Bangkok: Asia-Europe Foundation and Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University Bangkok. Yeo, Lay Hwee and Asid Latif, eds. 2000. Asia and Europe: Essays and Speeches by Tommy Koh. Singapore: Asia-Europe Foundation. Youngs, Richard. 2001., The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy; Europe’s Mediterranean and Asia Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


THE EU AND AUSTRALIA: BEYOND THE ‘TYRANNY OF DISTANCE’? Philomena Murray Abstract This chapter returns to an investigation of one of the leitmotivs of this book: the role of perceptions in the European Union’s relations with the Asia-Pacific. Adapting Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey’s famous 1966 adage about the ‘tyranny of distance’, the author examines both the theory and practice of the Union’s relations with Australia. The author goes beyond the long-standing, single-issue, rhetoric which surrounds the role and the implications of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in those relations. The chapter instead points to the much wider opportunities for cooperation now evolving between the two continents. From an assessment of the evolution of UK-Australia relations, the chapter expands into a critical account of issues such as identity, engagement, institutional collaboration and visibility, which give shape to the contemporary EU-Australia relationship. The author further investigates the many asymmetries and contradictions in EU-Australia relations, arguing for a necessary reduction of persistent comprehension-deficits. In this context, many of the inter-institutional, diplomatic and educational tools of the new EU-Australia cooperation assume a particular significance. The term ‘Tyranny of Distance’ has been utilised to describe Australia’s relative remoteness from other parts of the world – and often from like-minded countries. The term was first used in a famous book in 1966 by the controversial Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey (1966), entitled Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped

262

Philomena Murray

Australian history. Australia’s geographical distance from many parts of the world has been a defining feature of its history. Distance has long characterised the Australia relationship with Europe. The geographical distance was so immense that the journey took months to complete. The geographical distance also meant that close cooperation with many of the countries of Europe was not easy. There was one notable exception: the place that many Australians used to call ‘home’ – even if they had never set foot on it, the United Kingdom. The special relationship with the UK was based on the colonial relationship and on the fact that Australia was ‘British’. In 1997, former prime minister Paul Keating said of Australia, ‘We were exiles from a home—and that home is Great Britain’ (Keating 1997). Writing in a special edition of Granta, Australian historian Ian Jack (2002, 10) presents Australia’s modern and European origins as being those of a ‘society with harsh and improbable origins as a far-flung British prison’. In the same volume, Australian writer Peter Conrad (2000, 17) is more blunt in his portrayal of Australia as a country that ‘began as an imperial amenity, a tip for Britain’s refuse, and it remained a place of last resort, literally a terminus’. Although Australia was distant from the UK in geographical terms, there was a closeness on many levels. This is indicated in numerous pronouncements from both sides. The current Australian Prime Minister John Howard, for example, stated that ‘there are no two countries respectively in Europe and Asia who know each other better, trust each other more, and can contribute to each other more than Britain and Australia’ (Howard 1997). While this bond has been important for political reasons, engagement with the UK has also influenced the relationship with the EU. There is a sense that the UK is the natural habitat for Australian business and that the UK is the most appropriate market for Australian goods. This view is not held by all Australians: some regard the UK as having betrayed Australia, in war or in joining the then European Community in 1973 – although the latter is contested by some analysts as ‘the myth of the British betrayal’ (Spenceley and Welch 1998). The British prism – especially the Tory prism – has long been the means to understand the relationship with the EU for successive Australian governments and for the media, which largely received its reports from the predominantly Euro-sceptic UK media.

BEYOND THE ‘TYRANNY OF DISTANCE’?

263

On the other hand, Australia has not always been at the forefront of British or European thoughts. Ludlow (2001) refers to past European views of Australia as too far away, too remote and too prosperous. There is a mutual distance problem in a way. Australia’s stability, relative wealth and geographical distance have, in the past, meant that the EU and Australia heard each other as only distant voices. Its status as a producer of primary products, especially agricultural goods, meant that the EU and Australia were at loggerheads for decades following the UK accession to the EU. So has anything changed? This chapter argues that while challenges and conflict marked the Australia-EU relationship for some decades, there is evidence of increased opportunities for cooperation. This may seem somewhat surprising when one considers that the primary and longstanding cause of the conflict was the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Nevertheless, the single-country and single-issue approaches to negotiations with the EU are changing – there is a considerable transformation taking place, but this is a quiet transformation. In fact it is so subtle that some analysts are surprised that it is happening. This makeover is taking place within parts of the current government apparatus and has occurred in distinctive industry sectors over time – such as wine, science and technology and mutual recognition of products for entry into the EU market. There has always been resistance to the EU in Australian policy circles and among those who seek to influence them, for a number of reasons. This resistance has not evaporated. It is still evident in some parts of government, among business elites and in the media. For example, journalist Greg Sheridan has regarded the EU as ‘a distinct nuisance in the international system, a negative in the economic development of Europe itself, a force for discrimination in world trade and, worst of all, a rank bully in its international dealings’ (Sheridan 1997). He sees the EU as aggregating ‘power to a ruthless bureaucracy that will want to impose its power on other international institutions’ (Sheridan 2004). There is an inconsistency in Australia’s relationship with the EU. On the one hand, Australia is profitably enmeshed in many bilateral relationships with European states. The EU is Australia’s major trading partner – Australia trades extensively with the EU and there are healthy two-way flows in investment. Yet, there has long been little

264

Philomena Murray

public, media, academic, government and political attention paid to the EU by Australia, except with regard to agricultural trade, and then that focus has been vehemently critical. The EU increasingly impacts on Australian policy, both directly and indirectly. The EU has expanded its scope, reach and influence, and has significant weight in international and multilateral forums. Ignoring it is not an option. Dismissing it due to its many crises will not serve the interests of third countries – as Australia has recognised in an official capacity. The EU is an international actor, in trade, development aid and in promoting its own globalisation agenda and priorities. It is also, like Australia, dealing with significant 21st century challenges: counter-terrorism, illegal migration and people flows, security and police cooperation. One of the ways of dealing with these challenges is seen in the current negotiation for an agreement for cooperation between the Australian Federal Police and Europol regarding the exchange of intelligence. Australia is increasingly working with the EU – and it is a European Union that has carved out a new role in world politics. The ways in which it exerts power and negotiates are distinctive, setting it apart from other international actors. In Australia, however, the EU is not normally regarded as an international actor. Although not a state, it is increasing its global role, moving from what Chris Patten called a foreign policy of ‘strong nouns and weak verbs’ to more active international stances (Marsh and Mackenstein 2004, 259). Yet Australia’s key relationships with the individual EU states, particularly the UK, have been more important than engagement with the EU. The EU has been portrayed in the media and many public pronouncements during past years as arrogant and pushy, seeking for itself recognition as a state-like actor that many consider it does not deserve. Australia has not always fully recognised the EU as a global player or a single bilateral interlocutor in many aspects of trade policy. Australia now is taking note of this and engaging with the EU on an increasing number of levels. In the post-September 11 era, Australia seeks allies in multilateralism, interdependence and counter-terrorism. Europe is confronting similar concerns. Australia is forging alliances based on both security and trade and it is increasingly clear that the EU features in that strategy. The EU’s strengths and competences have extended across an increasing number of policies, with considerable


265

influence on the global rule-book, and Australia is increasingly cognisant of this. The relationship is increasingly broad and multifaceted. While there are shared values, on some issues they are distant and worlds apart, as in the case of Kyoto, for example. Patterns of ‘opportunity and constraint’ in EU-Australia relations The relationship between Australia and the EU has long been characterised by both opportunity and constraint. Opportunity is evident in significant market access, developing trade and investment links and sectoral agreements on wine and uranium, for example. There has been broader and high-level engagement too in educational links and increased and sustained dialogue on security, immigration, police and security cooperation, counter-terrorism, development aid and exchange of expertise.1 Not all past opportunities for collaboration with the EU were seized by Australia with enthusiasm, due to the relationship with the UK and the role of the CAP in determining the tone of negotiations over several decades, resulting in a less than fulsome embrace of the opportunities to collaborate and engage in dialogue. For example, there has been a pattern of what Groom (1989) refers to as ‘lost opportunities’ due to a lack of understanding of the EU. Groom attributes this loss of opportunities to what he calls a ‘collective amnesia’ about Europe among otherwise well-informed elites. This lack of attention to the EU has been evident in a number of ways. One is that the EU has not featured prominently in addresses and reports regarding Australia’s foreign policy or national interests. It has rarely featured as an economic or political entity for successive Australian governments, whose bilateral state-to-state realism has determined their foreign policy orientation. For example, it is a recent phenomenon for the EU to be accorded a chapter of its own in reports on Australian foreign policy. Recently, entire speeches regarding Australian foreign 1

For example, Australia worked on progress in bilateral cooperation by seeking and securing EU support for the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. The Agenda for Cooperation, adopted by the Australian government and the EU in 2003, set the groundwork for agreement with the Australian Federal Police and the European Police Office (Europol) regarding the objectives of combating terrorism and transnational crime, including drug trafficking and people smuggling. See DFAT Annual Report, 2004-5, Section 1.1.3. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/dept/ annual_reports/04_05/performance/1/1.1.3.html

266

Philomena Murray

policy objectives, by Australia’s top diplomat, completely omitted any mention of the European Union (Julien 2006b, L’Estrange 2006a; L’Estrange 2006b). The past lack of attention to the EU has been striking, given its importance as a major trading partner for Australia and the increasing international role that the EU has carved out for itself in development aid, external relations and trade negotiations. It is remarkable given the increasing extraterritorial impact of the EU’s regulations and norms. Dislike of the EU has often been expressed in a determination to ignore it – a point not lost on Groom in the late 1980s! It is commonplace for official speeches now to state that the EU ‘taken as a single entity’ is Australia’s largest economic partner.2 The government’s trade promotion agency, Austrade, is one agency which endeavours to promote the opportunities in a Single Market, referring to the EU in the following terms: ‘The new expanded Europe is now the world’s largest trading block, larger than the US, Japan and Canada combined. (Austrade 2006). Other aspects of the EU’s international persona, such as political aspects, have been accorded scant attention in the past. Traditional bilateral state-to-state relations have been the ‘bedrock’ of Australia government policy towards Europe (DFAT 2003). Foreign Minister Downer (1997) has stated that: The Australian Government has redressed the recent neglect of Europe by revitalising bilateral relations with the EU and the key member countries of the European Union – none more so than with the United Kingdom.

Bilateral relations have thus taken the form of reliance on the historic relationship with the UK and on the development of other bilateral relationships with EU member states. A recent media commentary noted: Britain dominates Australia’s relationship with Europe. Europeans are either unaware of this relationship’s depth, or else find it puzzling, particularly the fact that Australia’s head of state is the Queen of England. The historic ties, the language, the business connections and the deep penetration of British ideas and thinking into Australian society mean that 2

e.g. ‘The EU, taken as a single entity, remains our biggest trade and second largest investment partner.’ Speech on the Occasion of European Union Enlargement to 25, delivered by DFAT Secretary, Dr Ashton Calvert AC. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/040503_eu_enlargement_calvert.html, accessed 29 October 2006.


267

Australia still sees much through the prism of its Britishness (...) The strength of the British connection is understandable. But it may be time for it to be reviewed and recast (Kitney 2005).

Now, calling the UK home for young Australians means something different than what it did a generation ago. It means being able to get a UK passport so that they can work anywhere in the countries of the EU – the UK serves as a springboard for Australian tourists, workers and companies into the rest of Europe. The UK link remains the basis of trade and investment strategies in the EU–Australia relationship, providing a safety net for Australian businesses that are anxious to trade with Europe but are not confident in dealing with Europe beyond the British Isles – its different languages, traditions, laws and regulatory systems. However, reliance on the UK as a primary two-way market is declining for a number of reasons. Firstly, Europe has a large number of English speakers, which is encouraging Australian businesses to trade and invest more outside of Britain. Secondly, all market-related laws and regulations are EU laws and they apply as much in any of the other 26 member states, as they do in the UK. EU regulation is EUwide. It has been suggested that, for the UK, ‘Englishness’ is still defined in contrast to European-ness, whereby ‘Europe’ always constitutes the ‘other’ in the identity of the British nation-state (Risse 2000, 15). In a sense, Australia still regards the EU as the ‘other’, and this reinforces the sense of distance and the fact that Australia has not made the most of opportunities in the rest of the EU. The tense engagement over a number of decades regarding agricultural trade has led to a perception of the EU as a bully in the global trading playground. ‘Everything,’ according to one observer ‘always comes back to agriculture’ (Moore 2004). From the European Community’s reluctance to moderate the negative effect on Australia of British accession, to subsequent conflict over the CAP in the 1970s and 1980s and in WTO forums, the relationship has been marred by incompatible interests regarding agricultural trade (Murray 2005). Several analysts have argued that a degree of diplomatic mismanagement in the past only served to exacerbate the problems (Benvenuti 1998–99; Gelber 1966). This conflict cast a blight over all perceptions of the EU – and recent memory for many Australians is of

268

Philomena Murray

European intransigence in the retention of unacceptable agricultural trade protectionism. CAP reforms have often been greeted with suspicion in public debates and the media. The perception of a distant, recalcitrant, aggressor that engages in irrational protectionism reinforces the impression of distance on policy issues. Australia’s lack of understanding of the immense market opportunities in a European market of 27 countries and over 490 million people, with only one set of regulations, is evident in interviews and surveys carried out by the author, which suggest that Australia-EU engagement has been characterised by considerable past lack of political will in Australian government circles. A measure of mutual comprehension deficit is also evident (Murray 2002a, 2005). An incomplete knowledge of the EU has been regarded as having serious negative outcomes for Australia (Elijah et al 2000; Groom 1989). There has been, however, a marked shift among officials and ministers in recent times. Perceptions of the EU among many in business circles tend to be limited to the UK and some larger member states. Many small to medium-sized enterprises are often unaware of opportunities in the Single Market. A government commissioned report in 2002 stated that the scope of the EU as an integrated market has not been adequately exploited by the Australian Government (Azarias 2002). This is due to a number of factors: the reliance on trade patterns with the UK; a lack of comprehensive understanding on the part of both Australian negotiators and traders of the EU; perceptions of difficulties in trading with non-English speaking Europe; and lack of understanding of the common trading and market conditions and legislative norms of the Single Market in each of the twenty-five EU member states (Murray 2005). Despite these constraints, the EU became the most important trading partner for Australia some 16 years ago. There have been very substantial opportunities for Australia in its engagement with the EU. Two-way trade and investment flows have increased over the last two decades. The opportunities of market access for non-agricultural goods has led to Australian adaptation to EU market conditions. While there is considerable asymmetry, with a wide trade gap, economic cooperation agreements that have been signed and implemented, or are under discussion, range widely to include, for example, uranium,


269

science and technology, wine and mutual recognition of products, consumer issues and veterinary issues. Furthermore, over the last decade, there has been a remarkable deepening of engagement and broadening of agendas in EU-Australia engagement. This has been accompanied by some alteration of how engagement is perceived, but, as will be illustrated in this discussion, the public perceptions of the EU remain quite negative. At the working level of diplomats, negotiators, educators and researchers, there is considerable innovation, mutual understanding and an understanding of opportunities for collaboration across a number of sectors. In addition, there are shared values and norms, many common approaches to global challenges, and the development of a sense of commonality in international forums over many years. EU-Australia rivalry has accompanied friendship, distance has accompanied commonalities, but the interlocutors do not disregard each other. Rather, they interact regularly. Foreign Minister Downer stated in May 2006: As a long-time friend and partner, we look forward to seeing the EU assume its rightful place on the international stage, as a strong, outward-looking and competitive global player….Europe’s and Australia’s close relationship is founded on a rich history of partnership and achievement. We must now turn our attention to what more we can achieve together in an era littered with challenges, but full of opportunities. The opportunity is evident in positive developments in the evolving and reinforcing dialogue between Australia and the EU, in the increasing number of policy areas that are the subject of, for example, officials meeting at a number of levels and the sectoral exchange of ideas. There is substantial Australian agency engagement with the key EU institutions – including engagement with individual European Commissioners, the European Parliament and Senior Officials. Table 1 below illustrates the ‘top of the iceberg’ of this extensive dialogue, in the form of those engagements that involve the most senior political figures. Similar tables twice the length of that provided below can be drawn up to represent those engagements that occur also at parliamentary and senior official level.

270

Philomena Murray

Table 1. Australian Engagement with the key EU Institutions3 Australian agency Prime Minister

Foreign Minister

EU agency

Topics

President of EC EU-Australia relations

Agriculture Minister

Commissioner for External Relations Commissioner for Agriculture

Foreign Minister

Presidency of the Council

Trade Minister

Commissioner for Trade Relations

EU-Australia relations Common Agricultural policy, WTO talks Foreign policy, security Trade, WTO

Minister for Commissioner Immigration for Justice and /Justice Home Affairs

Immigration, Security

Minister for Commissioner Development for Aid Development

Development Aid to South Pacific

Regularity of meetings Irregular. Provided for in 1997 Political Declaration Annual

Type of meeting Prime Minister-EC President summit. Ministerial Consultations

QUINT Periodic.

Ministerial Consultations

Biannual (each EU Presidency) Regular, in the margins of WTO/ OECD meetings Annual

Troika, since May 1998.

Regular

Ministerial Consultations & visits to Brussels & Canberra Ministerial Consultations & visits to Brussels & Canberra Formal visits to Brussels & Canberra

The point can, however, be made that although there are provisions for some of these meetings on a regular schedule, there have been difficulties, largely related to distance, with the scheduling of the highest level meetings. There have been relatively few visits by Australian Prime Ministers to the Commission in Brussels. No Commission President has visited Australia over the last 30 years or so. At the level of Foreign Minister, the Australian Foreign Minister does 3 I would like to thank the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the European Commission Delegation in Canberra for their comments on the table.


271

not always attend Presidency Consultations twice each year, although he generally does so once a year. There have been difficulties in holding the annual Ministerial Consultations each year, in alternate capitals, due to difficulties with distance and timetables on the European Commission side. For example the last Ministerial Consultations were in 2004. This is not to suggest that Downer and EU External Relations Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner do not meet – they do so in multilateral fora. While traditional, bilateral links with individual Member States remains important, engagement with the EU as chief interlocutor is fruitful. A rare constructive comment by the current Prime Minister was that ‘Making Australia’s voice heard in Brussels is one of the most important diplomatic tasks we face’ (Howard 22 August 2001). The Australian government has recognised that the enlarged EU’s strategic weight is likely to increase steadily and that ‘a more unified Europe is already having a noticeable impact on the processes and agenda of international diplomacy’. (DFAT EU brief 2005). Identities, ideas and perceptions in EU-Australia relations This section examines the mutual misunderstandings and the aloofness of perceptions between the EU and Australia and seeks to understand how they are colliding continents. It draws in part on elite surveys spanning the years 1998 to 2005, as well as interviews I have conducted. Australian commentary on the EU often suggests that the EU punches below its weight, yet, on the other hand, there is a reluctance to acknowledge that the EU actually might have any weight in the global arena. This apparently contradictory stance is evident in much media and government discourse. For example, the EU punches below its weight in foreign policy, according to Downer (Downer 2000; Kitney 2004a), while the Prime Minister stated in the national parliament: Whenever you are criticising restrictive and anticompetitive agricultural policies, never exclude the European Union because the EU’s predatory trading behaviour is infinitely worse than that of countries.4

4 Comments made by Prime Minister Howard to the Commonwealth Federal Parliament, 14 May 2002.

272

Philomena Murray

In a survey of attitudes to the EU and EU-Australia relations that I conducted in 2001-2, one respondent referred to ‘difficulties arising from EU ‘coercive’ attitudes on Human Rights, industrial standards’ while another stated: ‘The UK remains the major EU member which understands Australia best and has the most regard for Australia.’

Another respondent, however, was more constructive: Australia and the EU have much to learn from each other in many areas of governance, public policy, business and civil society. Australians have limited knowledge and understanding of the nature and extent of European integration, except for a well-informed small minority.

A further respondent lamented: Limited knowledge in the Australian public about the EU as a whole and the non-British member states of the EU, their cultural identities, political systems, and specific interests in Australia and the Pacific.

In 2005, in a new set of interviews, there was still a lack of understanding of the EU: I think Australian companies tend to trade with individual trading partners, not the EU as a bloc (...) I think it’s just (...) it’s bilateral. We don’t trade with EU, we trade with Britain, France, Germany. I was just looking back through some statistics in one of those little brochures that the EU puts out that I see from time to time, about the impact of the EU if you conglomerate it for the Australian economy. Now that’s pretty significant but we probably still don’t see it in those terms. We pretty much see it as the individual countries.

The relationship has been influenced by distance in at least four ways. The first is the actual geographical sense of remoteness from the EU – evident on both the European and Australian sides. There is not the familiarity that comes from movement from one country to another, such as exists among European nation states for example. Secondly, there is a sense of remoteness from the activities and concerns of the EU, which appears to be opaque, incomprehensible and over-complex – it even can appear to be obstructionist and undermining of Australian interests. This is particularly the case in agricultural dialogue. Thirdly, there is a need to focus Australia on the EU,


273

according to some in the policy community. A distance from continental Europe is perceived in the comments made to a respondent in the 2001-2 survey: By identifying closely with US and the UK in our business and political approaches, we tend to distance ourselves from continental Europe.

More recently, a trader who was interviewed in 2005 commented: When John Howard goes to Europe he talks to the Brits as if they’re almost outside the EU, not realising that all of our business relationships are still covered by EU law first and foremost.

A fourth sense of distance is evident in the lack of symmetry in the relationship (Murray 2003b). This is evident in Australia’s large trade deficit with the EU and in the EU being a more powerful negotiator in international forums, with considerable voting clout in international relations. There is also the fact that the EU may be far away but it also has extraterritorial impact. There is an enduring perception of the EU as remote and relatively inaccessible to Australia. While this relates to geographic distance, which is a key theme in elite interviews, there is a mind-set difference evident. The respondents regarded the EU as remote, inaccessible and hard to understand. Viewed from Australia, the EU appears peculiar and unfamiliar, using terms and practices that are difficult to comprehend. In 1976, writing of the EC-Australia relationship Miller (1976, 97) commented that Australia was regarded in Europe as ‘remote, prosperous and irrelevant’ and interview responses suggest that this European view still pertains. Further, on the Australian side, there is ignorance regarding the volume of Australia-EU trade and an overwhelming consensus that Asia is far more important to Australia, and is growing in importance compared to the EU, especially where trade is concerned. Kitney (2005) argued that the EU remains crucial to Australian interests, however: It is easy to dismiss Europe as increasingly irrelevant next to the dramatic transformations in China, India and South-East Asia, all of which are much more directly in Australia’s line of sight. But however the European Union manages its own evolution (...) it remains the world’s largest trading bloc, the manager of the world’s second most important currency and a

274

Philomena Murray

bloc increasingly keen to assert itself in world affairs. Australian decision makers have to take it seriously.

The EU is regarded in the elite surveys as obstinate, over-regulating, protectionist and obstructionist in its policy approaches. The emphasis on agriculture by some respondents reveals ignorance regarding the scope of the broader relationship. The close UK relationship remains pivotal, too – old loyalties remain strong, as seen in the reticence in dealing with the EU as a whole. Many recent interview respondents have alluded in very critical terms to the EU’s complexity. Yes, the EU presents a number of opportunities for Australia, in trade and investment and shared global and transnational concerns. While the past relationship was dominated by trade disputes, this is no longer the case. Has this led to an alteration of public perceptions? No. Has it radically altered media coverage? No. Has the government changed its tune, even if that tune is being played very softly and largely behind the scenes? Here, the reply is in the affirmative, as there is considerable convergence of perspectives. There is value in the EU and Australia continuing dialogue and agreements, despite the fact that the EU remains largely invisible on Australian elite and public radar screens. The discussion here illustrates that the EU is often regarded as arrogant and pushy, seeking for itself recognition as a state-like international actor that many consider it does not deserve. The EU’s problems of effective foreign policy cohesion have given credence to this perspective, as seen in the interviews and surveys. Although accepted as an important trade actor, many in Australia consider that the EU’s international role has been over-stated. There is a continuity of perception in regarding the EU as a Fortress Europe (although this is not borne out by trade and investment figures), due to the fact that the CAP symbolises trade relations and a view that the Single Market constitutes closed regionalism and a closed shop as far as Australian products are concerned. This view was certainly prominent when the Single Market was introduced, a time when British analyst A.J.R. Groom (1992) recommended that the intellectual baggage of past conceptions of the Australian relationship with Europe should be cast aside. He argued that a new assessment should be made of a fundamentally different Europe, a comment that still has resonance for contemporary relations.


275

The surveys of Australian perceptions reveal significant elite understanding of aspects of the EU on the part of many respondents. The 2001-2 and 2005 responses indicate that the broader EU-Australia relationship is not well understood. It can be argued that the elite perceptions are not in step with some important initiatives in the understanding of the EU by the government and its policy community. It has long been argued that Australian governments have been both slow and reluctant to recognise the value of the relationship with the EU. This reluctance is still evident in the attitude of the Australia Prime Minister. However the attitude of the Foreign Minister is more nuanced, as seen in a more constructive approach by his Department, including training for officials on EU issues. The role of learning and education, shared ideas and joint practices Both Australian and EU officials and ministers draw attention to the ‘rich network of connections throughout many sectors including the arts, in science and technology, innovation and education’ (Downer May 2006). This section examines current debates relating to the role of learning and education, shared ideas and joint practices. It is here that a considerable change is taking place, based on a habit of cooperation at policy levels, with ‘vigorous and multi-faceted exchange’ that ‘serves us well in focusing the EU on Australian interests and in developing strategies to pursue shared international interests’ (Downer 2006). The EU’s relatively complex nature can present a challenge – especially as perceptions of the EU as a negative force have prevailed for so long. There is evidence that past assumptions of state-to-state bargaining are being substituted by a new approach as negotiators and businesses come to grips with intensive and extensive regulatory mechanisms and a combination of diverse political and administrative traditions in Europe. Australian government officials are cognisant of the need to keep abreast of EU developments and are being trained to this effect. It is important to ensure that the government does not ‘virtually ignore the EU as an international player because it is not a state’ (Ginsberg 1999, 41). It is precisely because the EU is not a state, although it possesses some state-like qualities and is a relatively novel entity, that a full grasp of EU policies, institutions, market structures and regulatory mechanisms is crucial for Australia. It is clear that,

276

Philomena Murray

until relatively recently, Australia had not come to terms with the EU’s regionalisation of its economic transactions. This lack of adequate knowledge of the EU among some Australian stakeholders has constituted a matter of concern (Murray 2002a, 2003a, 2003b). There is, however, recent evidence in Australia of new ways of thinking about the EU that could dismantle misconceptions about Europe. Strategic choices for Australian policy makers increasingly take into account EU foreign policy and trade and diplomatic strategies. As the EU continues to acquire new powers and develop existing ones, with an increasing range of policy options, the expanded EU of twenty-seven states is an increasingly important international player. Therefore, it is in Australia’s long-term interest to ensure improved knowledge of the EU, even though some Australian perceptions of the EU are determined by high-profile trade issues and diplomatic fallouts, as evidenced in speeches by successive Australian governments that regard EU protectionism as predatory. There are shared visions regarding the need to confront challenges that go well beyond national boundaries, such as terrorism, and common concerns with both advancing and managing globalisation. The contemporary dialogue features new security and societal agendas, incorporating hard security (including counter-terrorism and defence) and soft security and immigration, as well as educational linkages, in a distinctly different context. This is exemplified in the Australia-EU Agenda for Cooperation, which is summarised in Table 2 below. There has been substantial official recognition that distances can be overcome in educational cooperation. DFAT recognises that educational cooperation ‘is about many things including building people-to-people linkages’ (DFAT 2006). One way to do this is to provide official assistance for the purpose of ‘increasing the flow of Australians undertaking a portion of their study in Europe’ as an important priority. For this reason, the Australian government (Department of Education Science and Technology) and the European Commission Delegation in Canberra took up an initiative of the University of Melbourne’s Contemporary Europe Research Centre (CERC) to contribute funding to establish a website (Australians Study in Europe)5 that provides comprehensive information to students who intend to study in Europe (DFAT EU brief 2006). 5

Australians Study in Europe at www.asie.unimelb.edu.au.


277

Table 2. The Agenda for Cooperation, April 20036 Policy area Security & strategic issues Trade

Education, Science and Technology Transport Environment Development cooperation

Migration and Asylum

Counter-terrorism, infrastructure protection especially in Asia-Pacific. Enhanced dialogue on non-proliferation & export control. Develop police cooperation & cooperation of law enforcement authorities. Supporting LDCs through: policies to grant duty & quotafree market access, medicines, technical assistance & capacity building. Resolving differences on bilateral agricultural and trade issues (Wine Agreement, Sanitary and Phytosanitary). Working on internal and international (‘global’) regulatory frameworks. Pilot projects on higher educational cooperation. Exploring Australia participation in Erasmus World. Stimulate Science and Technology (S&T) collaboration within 6th Framework Program for Research. Strengthen Forum on Europe Australia Science and Technology cooperation. Cooperation with Galileo Joint Undertaking. Cooperation on Intelligent Transport System and sustainable transport strategies. Aviation liberalization. Collaboration on climate change: technology development. Climate science & adaptation, harmonization of emissions monitoring, reporting. Setting up international standards. Assisting recovery and nation-building process in East-Timor and Solomon Islands. Supporting good governance and economic growth Funding for Asia Pacific Leadership Forum on HIV/AIDS and Development in the Pacific, especially Papua New Guinea. Manage global people flows, asylum seeker and refugee readmission; improving capacity-building. Nexus between development and migration. Fight people-smuggling, human trafficking, transnational crime. Use new technologies to combat irregular migration

The objective is to provide a single place for information about courses, course requirements, eligibility and scholarships. Both the EU and the Australian government ‘hope to expand the opportunities for Australians to build vital friendships with Europeans that will have social, academic, commercial and cultural value.’ This is a clear expression of an intention to overcome distance. This collaboration is

6 Joint Declaration between Australia and the EU in 1997 and 19th Ministerial Consultations in April 2003.

278

Philomena Murray

complemented at nation state levels by bilateral education agreements and university level agreements. At the University level, there are several centres that deal with EU issues, or Europe more broadly. The University of Melbourne’s CERC, a designated Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, was created in 1997 and the National Europe Centre (NEC) at the Australian National University in 2001. A recent development has been the provision of European Commission external relations (RELEX) funding to support three Centres in Australia, with the objectives of curriculum development; provision of information about the EU, its policies and institutions; development of research work and studies on EU related topics and their dissemination; outreach and awareness activities (DFAT EU Brief 2006).7 The effects of educational projects such as Erasmus Mundus and the Bologna Declaration are immense. The tyranny of distance and the differences – as well as profitable collaboration – between the EU and Australia can be illustrated by recent attempts to bring Australian and European universities, scholars and students closer together. There was, until recently, no educational agreement between Australia and the EU, unlike the US and Canada. Nevertheless, there have been success stories in recent years. These experiences are generally worthwhile and valuable. They speak volumes of the interest of both academics and students in improving mobility at student and staff levels and of the desire for transnational co-operation on research projects and conferences, for example. Despite differences of distance, time zones and seasons, of semesters and teaching styles, there is a wealth of co-operation for Australia to tap into. There are far more opportunities than constraints in education and learning in Australian cooperation with Europe. These include the Jean Monnet projects, the EU-Australia annual pilot mobility projects of A$1 million, Framework VI and VII Research projects, Marie Curie and Erasmus Mundus. While many academics maintain robust research relationships with European colleagues, there is relatively little uptake on networks such as the Jean 7 These are the European and EU Centre, Monash University; the Innovative Research University Network Centre led by La Trobe University and Macquarie University with Newcastle University, Griffith University, Flinders University and Murdoch University and the National Europe Centre (NEC) in Canberra.


279

Monnet project, although, on the whole, educational co-operation constitutes an important means of collaboration between Australia and the EU.8 An important initiative in recent years has been the opportunity for Australian scholars to tap into the jointly-funded Australian government-European Commission pilot projects for student mobility, accounting for approximately $1 million per annum.9 8

Australia has been awarded one Jean Monnet Chair and one Personal Jean Monnet Chair; four Modules, one Centre of Excellence and two transnational research grants. 9 The first pilot project is LEAFSE – Learning through Exchange – Agriculture, Food Systems and Environment (www.leafse.kvl.dk/). Consortium partners are: the Universities of Western Sydney; New England; Western Australia and Queensland; The Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University (KVL), Denmark; University of Wales; Wageningen University and Research Centre, The Netherlands; University of Kassel, Germany. The second pilot project is the Coursework Masters Exchange Programme in International Relations: A European-Australian Asia-Pacific Nexus (EAAPN) (see www.gu.edu.au/school/gbs/eaapn/). Consortium partners are: the University of Melbourne; Griffith University, Queensland; University of Queensland; Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris; University of Birmingham; University of Trento, Italy. The third pilot project is SOH – Sharing Our Heritages: Master Classes in Cultural and Natural Heritage Management (see www.uws.edu.au/ about/acadorg/ cste/heritage/soh). Consortium partners are the University of Western Sydney; Charles Darwin University, Northern Territory; Curtin University of Technology, Western Australia; Deakin University, Victoria; Brandenburgs University of Technology Cottbus, Germany; Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium; Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Spain and University College Dublin, National University of Ireland. The fourth round’s projects include the Building and Interdisciplinary Collaborative Programme in Business, Environment, Science and Technology. Consortium partners are: Macquarie University; Flinders University; Griffith University; La Trobe University; Murdoch University; University of Newcastle; University of East Anglia, United Kingdom; Bodenkultur University of Natural Resources and Applied Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria; Linköping University, Sweden. A further project is Global Citizenship: European and Australian perspectives. Consortium partners are: Macquarie University; Flinders University; La Trobe University; Malmö University, Sweden; University of Cyprus; University of Rome Tre; Utrecht University, The Netherlands. The others in this round are Governance and Security: Challenges to Policing in the 21st Century, with consortium partners: Griffith University; Flinders University; Monash University; University of Western Sydney; Keele University, United Kingdom; Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, France; Univerza v Mariboru, Slovenia and Network of Undergraduate Degrees in Ethics, Human Rights and Institutions, with consortium partners: Charles Sturt University; Australian National University; University of Adelaide; University of Melbourne; University of Lancaster, United Kingdom; Luiss University, Rome; University of Bielefeld, Germany; University of Helsinki, Finland. My thanks to the Department of Education, Science and Training for this information

280

Philomena Murray

In 1994, the EU–Australia Science and Technology Agreement was signed after years of negotiations. The first agreement of its kind to be negotiated by the EU with a third country, it was designed to encourage ‘mutually beneficial research collaboration’. For the first time, Australian researchers were given access to the EU’s framework programs (FPs) on research and technological development, although this was at their own cost, and, in turn, it ensured access for European researchers to Australian research programs. Under FP4, the first in which Australians participated, thirty-four projects had a combined value of 40 billion euros and this increased to thirty-eight projects worth a considerable 200 billion euros under FP5, and then to fortynine projects. More recently, some 54 projects, valued at $440 million under FP6 have been put in place and this trend is set to continue (Julien Nov 2006). There have been difficulties in finding linkages and locating potential projects and partners and this was recognised with the creation of a supporting project, the Forum for European–Australian Science and Technology Cooperation (FEAST), which garnered substantial support from the European Commission and its member states as well as Australian research agencies. It has been recognised that it is imperative that funding be provided from both sides, as the importance of obtaining funding from the Australian side became evident in the first years of the agreement’s implementation. Further, the creation of Erasmus Mundus has led to 16 Australian students being selected under the 2006-2007 call, an increase from six in 2005-2006 and two in 2004-2005. Ten Australian academics participated in 2006-2007 and nine in 2005-2006. There have been 60 Marie Curie fellowships to date. There remain major challenges. The first is actually finding and developing links with reliable partners in Europe and establishing a relationship of trust, often by email. The need to develop contacts is crucial. A further factor is that of time – on a number of levels. The dates for semesters in each hemisphere are very different and so, for example, student mobility projects need to take this into account. A crucial aspect of time is also the very labour-intensive and timeconsuming nature of collaboration with a university or a consortium of universities in both hemispheres.


281

As Australia is a small country, it is not always apparent to partners in Europe that it is worth developing a project with it, as the funds are normally limited and the Australian academic seeking co-operative links with a counterpart in Europe may not necessarily be known to the European side. Again trust and personal contacts are essential. It is important to be in a strong position to prove that Australia has a significant contribution to make—a different, additional or distinctive one. Given a significant level of scepticism about working with nonEnglish–speaking and non-British scholars in Australia, it is also important to prove to Australian partners that the EU has something to contribute, too, as the EU is not understood by many academics and it is often considered too formidable. A significant inhibiting factor for educational collaboration is the cost factor. Not only are there significant costs, from the perspective of an academic, in terms of airfares and travel costs; trips to Europe come at a cost of being away from a home base for some time. This means that time spent away from Australia can be profitable but costly. So is co-operation worthwhile? It is, despite a still-prevalent Australian perception of the EU’s complexity and opaqueness— not to mention its ability to confuse, with its twenty-one official languages. Co-operation enables Australian researchers and students to collaborate with educational institutions from 27 states. While transnational research projects and student mobility projects are certainly worthwhile, it is clear that distance remains a problem for postgraduate students. A clear message has been received from students that what they seek most, in their research for their theses dealing with the EU, are funded study trips and research field-work, based on travel grants. They require access to specialists in their field in the academic world and to the expert officials in the EU institutions. Students need to be able to tap into the best of European scholarship, to complement Australian scholarship on Europe, through conference participation in Europe, access to contacts, specialists and non-state agencies, as well as regularly available funding. This begs the question – what sort of strategies might be considered at the government level? While there have been successful pilot projects and short term funding available, it is essential that consideration be accorded to cooperation and projects that are at least

282

Philomena Murray

medium-term with some long-term stability and possibilities. Consideration could also be given to increased support of the teaching of European languages and European Studies in schools, universities and institutions of post-compulsory education. There is already significant collaboration at University-to-University level, state-to-state level and among consortia of educational establishments. There have been encouraging developments in many areas, with Jean Monnet projects. There is a need to emphasise the value of the EU-Australian relationship to Australians. In order to target over-busy academics for such ventures, it is essential to show them the advantages of such collaboration, drawing on the expertise in European Studies and teaching set out in the three Registers of European Studies in Australia, in 1993, 1998 and 2004, under the auspices of the Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia (CESAA) (Horvath et al. 2004). Future strategies could include provisions for short periods of student mobility, incorporated into Masters, PhD programs, young researchers’ and early careers researchers’ experiences. A commitment to further foster ties with EU universities is crucial. A formal EU-Australia government educational agreement could provide for grants and research periods at European institutions of learning. The potential for cooperation in education and Science and Technology has not been fully explored, according to some Australian participants. One reason for this is a perception by some government departments as well as academics that the EU is too complex and not close enough to Australian interests. This is not helped by a perception that the EU is not very interested in cooperating with Australia in these areas, which has been recounted in anecdotal evidence. The tyranny of distance still has validity. That said, there is a small but significant sea change taking place, although it is not comprehensive across government departments or across educational institutions – for example if an institution has won some grants it is likely to apply for more. So trust needs to be built up and an approach adopted that signifies that cooperation does make sense. While a perception of distance is present, engagement is increasingly fruitful. It is clear that distance, memory and myth all play important roles in understanding EU-Australia relations, and in particular identities, perceptions and, in the widest sense, ‘learning’


283

from one another. This discussion has illustrated that the contemporary engagement is a fruitful and multi-dimensional one, with increased emphasis on opportunity rather than constraints, although challenges remain. In the future, the EU will continue to dominate the relationship. Australia is under pressure to further develop the institutional, procedural and diplomatic tools necessary to deal with developments in the EU fruitfully and fully, by advancing its own interests and concerns. The EU and Australia have shared values and global goals (such as human rights, trade liberalisation, liberal democracy, counterterrorism) and will pursue these both within and outside the framework of the EU–Australia relationship. As the EU moves into new policy areas, Australia will adjust to these changing circumstances. Australia will most likely continue to attack the CAP and to monitor developments in EU decision making, rightly making its views known. The EU and Australia have shown that they can work jointly in a number of policy areas and broad-ranging forums, such as: the WTO; the dialogue on immigration and refugees; trafficking in people; climate change and research; and science and technology. There is no need for Australia to privilege the relationship with the EU, but equally no need to ignore or attack it. There is more in the relationship that unites than divides the two. The relationship is more than agriculture and more than Britain. It is more than distance.

References Austrade. 2006. Austrade Export Update (November). Available at: www.austrade. gov.au/corporate/layout/0,,0_S1-1_CORPXID0019-2_-3_-4_-5_-6_7_,00.html#New Europe, accessed 31 Oct 2006. Blainey, G. 1966. Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped Australian history. Melbourne: Sun Books. Conrad, P. 2000. New New World. In Australia; The New New World. Granta 70 (Summer). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). 2003. Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/ ani/index.html, accessed 11 April 2005.

284

Philomena Murray

DFAT. 2005. European Union Brief. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/geo/european_union/eu_brief. html, accessed 7 March 2005. Downer, A. 2006 Australia and Europe: Sharing Global Responsibilities. The Schuman Lecture, Canberra, 11 May. Downer, A. 2002. Media Release, FA15 / 1 February, Australia and the EU Establish New Strategic Dialogue. Available at: www.foreignminister.gov.au/ releases/2002/fa015_02.html, accessed 20 Oct 2006. Downer, A. 1997. Australia and Europe: A Revitalised Relationship. Address to the Australia-British Chamber of Commerce, Sydney, 17 September. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/foreign/1997/europe17sept97.html, accessed 29 Oct 2006. Groom, A. J. R. 1989. Europe: A Case of Collective Amnesia. Australian Outlook. 42 (1, April 1989): 1–15. Groom, A. J. R. 1992. The European Community in Context. Canberra: Australian National University, Australian Foreign Policy Publications Programme. Horvath, D., and F. Machin, with P. Murray and R. Wilson. 2004. Register of Contemporary European Studies in Australia, Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia, with Australian Universities Europe Network, and the Delegation of the European Commission, Melbourne and Canberra. Available at: www.cerc.unimelb.edu.au. Howard, J. 1997. Address to the Confederation of British Industry, Landmark Hotel, London (24 June). Available at: www.pm.gov.au/news/media_releases/ 1997/cbi.html. Howard, J. 2001. Australia’s International Relations – Ready for the Future. Address to The Menzies Research Centre, Canberra (22 August). Available at: www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2001/speech1183.htm Jack, I. 2000. Introduction. In Australia: The New New World, Granta 70 (Summer). Julien, B. 2006a. European Australian Relations. Speech to International Business Council of Western Australia, 22 November. Available at: www.delaus. cec.eu.int/pressandinformation/speeches/WA_InternationalBusinessCoun cil.htm, accessed 30 Nov 2006. Julien, B. 2006b. The European Union: Dwarf or Giant? Remarks at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre, University of Melbourne, Melbourne 5 October. Keating, P.J. 1997. A Prospect of Europe. Speech at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 9 May. Kelly, P. 1998. Let’s court the newest big player. The Australian (24 June): 15. L’Estrange, M. 2006a. Continuity and Change in the Pursuit of Australia’s International Interests (6 July) . Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/ department/060706_international_interests.html, accessed 29 Oct 2006.


285

L’Estrange, M. 2006b. Responding to Twenty-First Century Challenges: DFAT in a Changing World. Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 27 September. Available at: www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/ 060706_international_interests.html, accessed 29 Oct 2006. Ludlow, P. 2001. Too far away, too rich and too stable: The EEC and Trade with Australia during the 1960s. Australian Economic History Review 41, no.3: 267–86. Marsh S., and H. Mackenstein. 2005. The International Relations of the European Union. London: Pearson Longman. Murray, P., and T. Szlachetko. 1998. Register of Contemporary European Studies. In Australia. Melbourne: Contemporary European Studies Association of Australia. Murray, P. 2003. Problems of Summitry and Symmetry in the EU–Australia Relationship. In Europe and the Asia Pacific: Culture, Identity and Representations of Region, ed. S. Lawson. London: Curzon Routledge. Sheridan, G. 1997. Canberra mustn’t yield to EU bluster. The Australian (12 February): 11. Sheridan, G. 2004. Bigger the Better—Europe—A Worldwide Special Report—Australia and the EU. The Australian (3 May 2004): T08. Spenceley, G., and C. Welch. 1998. The Myth of the British Betrayal: A Reassessment of Australia and British Accession to the EEC. In Modern Europe: histories and identities, eds. P. Monteath and F. Zuckerman. Adelaide: Australian Humanities Press.


‘RE-ORIENTING’ THE GLOBAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE1: HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ASIA AND THE SUBJECT OF ‘EUROPEAN STUDIES’ Georg Wiessala Abstract Staying with the themes of people-to-people contact and educational exchange, the last chapter in this collection argues that there is an important, two-fold, learning-dimension in EU-Asia relations: partners in East and West learn both from, and with one another. Against this background, this chapter offers an exploration of the roles of learning and exchange, and of cultural and academic interaction, within wider EU-Asia cooperation. The author examines, in particular, the relevant EU strategies in regard to Higher Education, and their potential for the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policies towards Asia. This section also critically assesses the educational content, and practical relevance, of many of the Union’s Asia Strategies, in term of academic EU-Asia collaboration and research. It further examines issues such as cultural presence, entrenched stereotypes and dissemination of values in the EU-Asia relationship. The chapter includes a number of shorter case studies, which focus on the dynamic, inter-disciplinary and expanding, subject-area of European Studies in Asia.

1 The Title of this paper was adapted from an article by the same author in the European Voice (‘EU Study Programmes’ supplement 2002).

288

Georg Wiessala

‘Tout homme éclairé est un homme libre.’ (Voltaire)

This chapter examines the role of education in the relationship between Europe and Asia. In it, I use the term reorientation in a twofold sense: Re-orientation – with a small ‘o’ – stands for re-thinking, or re-direction of European policies concerning educational and cultural matters; in this sense, the term denotes an adaptation to the challenges posed by economic, social and cultural globalization and mounting international inter-dependence. This meaning extends, in particular, to the twin dangers inherent in the new hyper-terrorism and in the escalating erosion of people’s liberties through global policies, which are becoming more hegemonic and unilateralist. Spelt with a capital ‘O’, however, the term Re-Orientation can reveal a second level of meaning: in this second – but not secondary – sense, it signifies, quite literally, a stronger prioritization of educational interaction towards the Orient. Regardless of which meaning one might prefer, this paper aims to demonstrate how educational interaction between Europe and Asia, can, by its very nature, become a catalyst, or dynamic contributor, in rejecting a so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ (cf. Voicu 2002). What has become known as ‘people-to-people-contacts’ between continents can, arguably, lead to a more mutual appreciation of cultural differences; educational cooperation may thus go some way towards counteracting a wholesale equation of ‘terrorism’ with any race, religion or creed in East or West. Following a critical review of the European Union’s principles and main programmes in the areas of education, vocational training, youth and culture, this article moves on to discuss, in some more detail, the position of education and training in the framework of the European Union’s ‘Asia Policy’. It will show how this policy emerged from earlier, more fragmented, programmes, which were implemented by an élite of the EU’s Member States, in particular the UK, France and Germany. This article will also demonstrate in which way matters of educational and cultural cooperation between Europe and Asia became more firmly entrenched in overall political and economic, East-West dialogue, how it was ‘institutionalized’ and grew into an official ‘pillar’

‘RE-ORIENTING’ THE GLOBAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE

289

of Asia-EU relations. This latter development will be investigated, firstly, through the prism of Asia-related policy-initiatives of the European Union Executive, the European Commission, and, secondly, from the point of view of the participants of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). In order to illustrate these points, I will look at a number of educational actors in Europe and Asia, which were instrumental in the inter-continental dialogue about cultures and education, and proved to be successful in combining implementation of EU policy with a dialogue that was sensitive to a variety of cultural norms and values. The paper will close with a brief examination of the main cooperation initiatives, institutions and programmes, which provide a link between contemporary Asian and European educational actors and will look briefly at the future prospects of Euro-Asian exchange. A European Dimension of Education The vitality and efficiency of any civilization can be measured by the appeal that its culture has for other countries. We need to ensure that the European higher education system acquires a world-wide degree of attraction equal to our extraordinary cultural and scientific traditions. (Source: Bologna Declaration, June 1999)

This section will discuss the outlines of education policies in the European Union (EU) in as far as they impinge on EU-Asia relations. The main principles of European Union activity in the field of education are contained in articles 3 I (q), 149 and 150 of the EC Treaty. Social Policy, or ‘Social Progress Policies’ (Moussis 2000, 167), constitutes one of the key activities by means of which the Community fulfils its tasks. Initiatives concerning ‘education’, ‘training’ or ‘youth’ form only a small part of a larger bundle of policies. Inside this policy-amalgam, most European initiatives in the area of education are connected with the idea of a diverse and ‘social’ Europe, emphasizing peoples’ skills and entitlements. This is a concept which gained stronger currency throughout 2002/3, both internationally and on the agendas of national research bodies (e.g. ESRC 2003, 8, 19). At the most fundamental level, EU Education Policy thus aims to make ‘a contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the member states’ (articles 2 and 3 ECT). However, in view of the very significant

290

Georg Wiessala

unemployment figures within the EU, education and training must also be conceived of as instruments of an active labour market and ‘employability policy’, and as a pre-requisite of technological progress and advancement in the diverse regions of Europe. In this line of argument, the Council of Ministers of the EU acknowledged in 2002 that education is an indispensable part of the member states’ employment strategies (Decision 2002/177/EC). It forms a wider, ‘market-building’, policy and can address existing socio-economic disparities in Europe. It possesses the potential to contribute to regional competitiveness, equality of wealth and social cohesion. In the wider perspective of East-West relations upon which this paper is based, education, by means of cultural exchange, also forms part and parcel of the EU’s widening arsenal of external relations and global diplomacy. As far as Asian countries are concerned, this is particularly evident in the European Union’s cultural and academic contacts with the People’s Republic of China. The various layers and initiatives of the burgeoning EU-China cooperation (Meissner 2002; Wiessala 2002, 93-4; Hodges 2003) reveal a plethora of educationrelated programmes. Most of them aim at the support for legal and financial reform, democracy, human rights or local governance in China. In 2003, selected examples of these bilateral initiatives comprised: the Euro-China Academic Network (ECAN), the ChinaEurope International Business School (CEIBS), the EU-China Vocational Training Programme, the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme and the EU-China European Studies Centres Programme. In its key policy papers on China, Hong Kong and Macau from 1995,2 the Commission confirmed this agenda: it envisaged Sino-EU higher education networks, European Studies Programmes and human resource development as essential tools for nurturing incipient democratic change in the PRC and called for a ‘redoubling’ of European efforts in the area of higher education.3 Educational cooperation thus evolved into a policy for the benefit of a wider EU agenda of ‘constructive engagement’. More intense educational exchange, information networks, as well as European 2 See, for example: COM (95) 279 (at point B 2, C 1, D 1); COM (1998) 181 (at point C 2, pp. 19/20 and E); COM (2000) 552 (at points B 2, p. 7, C 2, pp. 10/11); COM (2001) 265 (at point 3, p. 5, point 5.5., p. 19). 3 COM (95) 279, at point D 1, p. 14 and D 2, p. 15.


291

cultural visibility and ‘profile’, all aimed to foster transition from within China towards economic and social reforms and a more open society. The Amsterdam Treaty acknowledged the wider role of education in European politics in a more significant way than any previous Treaties had done. One of the more notable achievements of the Treaty was the addition of a new key objective to the European Community Treaty (ECT, Preamble, recital nine). The new insertion, or ‘recital’, tasked the European Community to ‘promote the development of the highest possible level of knowledge for their peoples through a wide access to education and through its continuous updating’. For some observers this confers on education something akin to a ‘constitutional’ status within the European Union (Church and Phinnemore 2002, 334). But the proponents of ‘constitutionalization’ in European education have so far failed to address a more fundamental issue: what exactly are the underlying ‘European’ values that can inform a European ‘knowledge-based’ economy and how can appropriate political guidelines for their implementation be formulated? Observers and policy-makers alike should be aware of the need for much more reflection on these issues. Taken at face value, a further ‘upgrading’ of education within the EU framework appears to be a development worth supporting in the long term. But, ironically, there is an attendant danger of an increase in ‘narrow-mindedness’ in the EU’s striving towards an all encompassing ‘Europe of Knowledge’ or ‘European Knowledge Society’ (European Commission, DG Education and Culture 2002, 3). This ultimately has to do with what kind of values the Union seeks to embrace or disseminate, and touches on the question of whether or not the EU possesses a ‘vision’ an ‘identity’, or even an underlying ‘metaphysical’, even ‘spiritual’, dimension. This risk becomes evident on closer inspection of the relevant EU statements on education policy. Edy Korthals Altes expressed this unerringly, when observing (2003, 41): (…) it seems unlikely that the EU will succeed in setting itself free from the narrow-mindedness, so typical for an economic cocoon. Indicative for this state of mind was the triumphant declaration – at the European summit meeting in Lisbon – that the EU should become the ‘most competitive and knowledge intensive economy in the world’. A rather meagre vision if this is compared with the broad perspective of the funding fathers. Schuman,

292

Georg Wiessala

Monnet, De Gasperi, Adenauer, Spaak, Beyen and many others never thought about integration as an objective in itself but as a means to serve the great cause of peace, reconciliation, prosperity and justice in our world.

These arguments are, of course, equally pertinent regarding the ultimate guiding impulse of other EU policies, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Trade Policy or Development Assistance. However, the entrenchment of key principles of EU educational collaboration in the relevant policy areas is, arguably, much further advanced than the academic debate about their ideological justification or constitutional status. Beyond the ideological debate, there are significant legal limits to EC involvement in the sensitive area of education. The Union itself acknowledges that (e.g. Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand 2000, 5). While harmonisation and integration across the European Union remain overriding objectives in a number of policy areas, such as the Internal Market or the Single Currency, the dictum of vive la différence definitely rings true in the field of education The member states retain primary responsibility for educational policy within the Community, and at the Community level, education – including higher education – do not form part of a ‘common’ or ‘unified’ European policy. Competencies for both content and organization of learning remain firmly within national remits. More than that, the Community is expressly banned from impinging on ‘content and organization of educational systems’, and from interfering with member states’ competence in the areas of ‘linguistic and cultural diversity’ (article 149 (1) ECT). This basic rule is a direct derivative of article 6 (3) [ex 6] of the TEU, compelling the Union to ‘respect the national identities of its Member States’. Within this framework of what might be termed educational subsidiarity, provided by Community Law, action at EU level is thus only justified where it can provide ‘added value’, where, ‘by acting together, the members states can achieve more than if they were to act alone’ (COM 2001 385, at 1.1.). The European Commission, as the Community’s executive, thus assumes a complementary role. It is responsible for implementing the ‘European dimension’ of education, which was first called for in the Magna Charta Universitatum (1988), the Sorbonne Declaration (1998) and the Bologna Declaration (1999). Many of these initiatives emphasized the role of Universities as sources of a


293

‘world-class reference’ standard4 for the development of a European ‘cultural dimension’. The EU’s own ambitions towards a European Higher Education Area by 2010 acted as a catalyst for the gestation of these Europe-wide approaches to education. In September 2003, a conference in Berlin further investigated the implications of these new schemes, promoting the theme of ‘Realizing the European Higher Education Area’.5 Individual European Council meetings, such as the summits of Lisbon (March 2000), Stockholm (March 2001) or Barcelona (March 2002), helped to highlight the impact of the strong trends of globalization and internationalization in education. Last, but by no means least, the Council of Europe, in its role as observer, promoter and mediator in educational matters, contributed significantly to the growing ‘European-ness’ of learning (Council of Europe 2002). Over the last decade, the Bologna Process, named after the original document of 1999, bound together more than 40 European countries as signatory states, reflecting an ambition to attain what was termed educational conversion ‘from all directions’ (Davies 2003, 23). The Bologna Process was very successful in articulating and fine-tuning the main goals of overall European educational collaboration. These encompassed the promotion of a number of parallel developments: The ‘European’ dimension to education and of a European cooperative effort. The widest possible access to education and quality of provision. European benchmarking and quality assurance. Student and staff mobility, exchange and an increase in language proficiency.6 More transparency and the Europe-wide recognition of diplomas and qualifications.

4

See: Rapid Database, IP/03/194. The conference website was at: http://bologna-berlin2003.de/haupt1.htm 6 See: Commission Report: COM (2002) 597; Commission Action Plan COM (2003) 449 on Promoting Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity (Brussels, 24 July 2003). See also: Rapid Database, IP/03/1112; the year 2001 was designated the ‘European Year of Languages’. 5

294

Georg Wiessala

The processes of life-long learning, distance education, ‘e-learning and ICT.7 The vocational relevance of education and training8 and matters of employability. The development of ‘democratic societies’ through educational exchange. The communication and dissemination of the European Union’s ‘cultures’ and ‘values’.9 Opening up education and training systems to the wider world, exchange and mobility and mutual recognition of qualifications became in themselves vital, legally enforceable, parts of the Single Market and of the Four Freedoms (in particular: the freedom of movement for persons and freedom of establishment). By contrast, the terms ‘development of democratic societies’ and ‘values’, contributed to a frequently contentious debate about the scope and contents of EU educational policy, especially in relations with the EU’s partners in China and in other Asian countries (cf. infra). By the end of 2003, a large number of new and established EU programmes existed in the three key areas of ‘Education’, ‘Training’ and ‘Youth’10. In its Guide to Programmes and Actions (European Commission, DG Education and Culture 2000), the Commission surveyed over 20 initiatives Amongst those, the JEAN MONNET, LINGUA, COMETT, TEMPUS,11 LEONARDO I and II,12 YOUTH FOR EUROPE, ERASMUS13 (SOCRATES AND COMENIUS) and ERASMUS MUNDUS (ERASMUS WORLD) programmes14 formed some of the more prominent and well-known examples. The European Commission was 7

COM (2001) 172, of 28 March 2001; see also: Rapid Database, IP/03/168, IP/03/481, IP/03/619 and: http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/ elearning/index. html 8 Article 149 ECT; see also: Rapid Database, IP/03/481 and: European Commission, DG Education and Culture, 2002, 4; COM (2002) 214. 9 Rapid Database, IP/02/1066. 10 See: General Report 2002, points 521-550 for details. 11 Rapid Database: IP/02/567, 667. 12 See: COM (2002) 315. 13 In 2003/2004, over 2000 Higher Education institutions participated in the ERASMUS Programme (Rapid Database, Press Release IP/03/542). 14 Commission proposal at: COM (2002) 401, Brussels, 17 July 2002; Rapid Database, IP/02/1066.


295

proficient in shaping this area through its legislative initiatives and concept papers, such as the 1997 strategy, ‘Towards a Europe of Knowledge’,15 covering the period from 2000 to 2006. In the last decade, the Commission’s ‘action plans’, ‘work programmes’, ‘green’ and ‘white’ papers and ‘strategies’ covering educational and vocational initiatives reflected a range of ambitions and priorities. Some of the main concepts were: Teaching and Learning – Towards the Learning Society (COM (95) 590). Education, Training and Research: Trans-National Mobility (COM (96) 462. Towards a European Research Area (ERA) (COM (2000) 6).16 ‘E-Learning’ (COM (2000) 318; COM (2001) 172).17 Making a European Area of Life-Long Learning a Reality (COM (2001) 678, 1939; General Report 2002, at point 516). ‘Inter-Cultural’ Dialogue and Understanding (COM (2002) 401; Rapid Database, IP/02/567). Investing Efficiently in Education and Training (COM (2002) 779) The Role of Universities in the Europe of Knowledge (COM (2003) 58). EU Educational Cooperation with Third Countries and with Asia When planning for a year, plant corn; When planning for a decade, plant trees; When planning for life, train and educate people.’ (Chinese proverb, Guanzi (ca. 645 BC). European educational collaboration with third countries is not a new phenomenon: it was included in the provisions on education of the Treaty of Rome (article 149, III). In a number of cases (e.g. USA, Canada) educational cooperation was made the subject of explicit bilateral agreements between the EU and the countries concerned. Moreover, a series 15

At: COM (1997) 563. ERA has provided grants since 1984, with a total value, up to the present, of more than € 43 billion. 17 The ‘E-Learning Action Plan’ (COM (2001) 172 promoted the three ‘priority areas’ of ‘bridging the digital divide’, ‘virtual universities’ and ‘school-twinning via the Internet’ (cf. General Report 2002, at point 520). 16

296

Georg Wiessala

of EU Research Framework Programmes18 targeted the area of multinational academic cooperation and promoted the extension of the European Research Area (ERA, cf. supra) and the construction of international academic ‘networks of excellence’. In this context, Framework Programme 6 (FP 6) was particularly relevant for EU-Asia relations since it opened up the possibilities of the European Research Area to developing countries and thus stimulated more, and easier, ‘intercontinental mobility’ between Asian and European researchers. The initiative also encouraged cooperation in a number of ‘priority areas’ pertinent to the EU-Asia dialogue, such as ‘international cooperation’, ‘citizenship and governance’ and ‘the knowledge-based society’.19 The agenda for international educational collaboration was expanded and advanced by specific policy prescriptions of the European Commission, most notably the July 2001 paper on Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Higher Education.20 In this communication the Commission stressed the role of world wide educational cooperation in the eradication of poverty and called for a stronger collaborative effort amongst Universities. The strategy emphasized, in particular, the need to strengthen ‘European Studies capacities in third countries’ (cf. infra) and paved the way for the extension of relevant Community activities (e.g. Action Jean Monnet) to non-European partner countries. The strategy was implemented by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament through the ‘co-decision procedure’ contained in article 251 ECT. In addition to the Commission in its role as the Union’s initiator of policies, a significant number of outside bodies also contributed to the formulation of pan-European educational policies. The following agencies specialized in educational matters, to varying degrees: the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Committee of the Regions, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, the European Training Foundation,21 the European Voluntary Service for Young People

18

At the time of writing: FP 6 covered the period of 2002-2006 and operated on a funding base of around €17 billion. 19 See: http://www.cordis.lu/fp6/citizens.htm 20 COM (2001) 385 of 18 July 2001; Report at: COM (2002) 323; General Report 2002, at point 519. 21 Turin, founded in 1990; see reports at: COM (2001) 810 and COM (2002) 440.


297

and the European University Institute.22 The European Eurydice education network formed an essential resource for the work of these and other bodies through its monitoring of education systems in 30 European countries, and in its coordinating function, with the help of the comprehensive Eurybase database. As far as the Asian continent is concerned, a large part of the contemporary EU-Asian cultural and educational interaction is embedded in the EU’s widening academic and technical cooperation with ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations (Wiessala 2002a, 72). However, before there was any coordinated, supranational, European Union activity, Euro-Asian cultural exchange was a diverse field. Few common denominators existed, except, perhaps, the basic subdivision of all cooperation into language-based, educational and cultural spheres. Other than this, Euro-Asia contacts were typically defined by contrast. The intensity of inter-cultural contact was as diverse as its targets and duration (ECCC 1996a, 1996b). The strong, ‘privileged’, presence, in Asia, of the UK, Germany and France, for example, continued to shape international education in 2003. In the case of Sino-UK educational joint ventures, few have identified the rationale for this as clearly as Hodges (2003): Now, China’s leaders are ready for education change. Britain’s leaders, for their part, are keen to establish a relationship with a country that could well turn out to be the next world superpower, and to ensure that the UK plays a part in that development.

These and other cases of educational cooperation in the service of the national interest continued to contrast with a less powerful involvement of other European nations. Strong attention to some Asian countries, such as China or India, stood out against less exhaustive cooperation with others, for example those in South East or West Asia. More often than not, these ‘historical recurrences’ (ECCC 1996b, 106), were a direct reflection of the European colonial heritage. They mirrored the cultural and economic impact of the five EU member states with a colonial history on the Asian Continent (The UK, France, Spain, Portugal and The Netherlands). But historical recurrences also came to mean an increased awareness of a historical phenomenon: European expansion and colonization had depended on the growth and spread of education and the ‘scientific 22 Florence, founded in 1976; the EUI was funded with € 5.3m in Commission contributions in 2002.

298

Georg Wiessala

revolution’ which had been such a vivid characterization of post-Renaissance Europe. This was what Goody (1996, 224) termed the ‘great burst forward’ in knowledge, fuelling, for better or for worse, the reality and perception of the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘superiority’ of the West in relation to Asia. Contemporary events with a global impact, such as the successive wars in Afghanistan or the enduring economic links between former colonizers and former colonies can be explained against this background: they contribute to the existence of a number of ‘special ties’ between selected European countries and some Asian ones, which have endured to the present day. They can also explain the continued existence of ‘traditional’ Euro-Asian patterns of trade and exchange. Before there was such a thing as a more integrated EU involvement in international cultural affairs, a plethora of cultural relations existed on a bilateral level between the member states of the EU and Asian countries. Conceptually these cooperation projects were situated within a Euro-Asian dialogue framework for which Meissner (2002, 194-5) coined the term ‘enlarged culture’. Despite the variety of such programmes, significant disparities between them conditioned both the policies and the means of the intercontinental bilateral cultural exchange. The less institutionalized, development-oriented, short-term- and grant-based, approach taken by many Northern European countries, for instance, contrasted starkly with a more formal method by Southern European partners, which favoured a more lasting cultural presence, or ‘establishment-effect’ (ECCC 1996b, 105), leading to more long-term economic cooperation and investment. Moreover, while some European countries preferred ‘direct intervention’ in the educational field, others relied more on the presence of their national ‘operators’, opinion leaders or Multiplikatoren (educators) in Asia. As a comparison between, for example, the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD) and the British Council shows, ‘cultural diffusion’ and ‘cooperation’ – the two ‘traditional’ types of cultural and educational action – were both present, to varying degrees, in the emerging exchange between European actors. While these bilateral exchanges between European Union member states and Asian countries led to a welcome degree of ‘Europeanization’, and frequently manifested itself in spontaneous collaboration between European actors in Asia (ECCC, 1996a, 108), the overall impact of Euro-Asian educational initiatives was, on the whole, insufficient, uneven and fragmented. University cooperation, for instance, which targeted mainly European and Asian élites, was extremely


299

varied in relation to the Indian subcontinent, but almost unheard of in South East Asia. In terms of direct, coordinated, EU involvement, three points should not be overlooked: firstly, the European Union acted mainly as a (financial) catalyst for increased cooperation, essentially harnessing existing synergies between member state activities. This developed in connection with earlier initiatives and through the Union’s emerging, wider, framework of EU-Asia cooperation. Secondly, ‘equality’ had to be established as a solid base for EUAsian cultural partnerships. Rothermund (2001, 9) summarized what needs to be remembered most: ‘for cultural partnership, both hegemony and exclusiveness would be unacceptable. If hegemony is accepted, the partner who can only aim at acculturation soon ceases to be one. If exclusiveness is taken for granted, there can be no partnership at all’. Following this line of argument, the EU placed calls for a ‘partnership of equals’ between Europe and Asia at the centre of its Asia-related policies since 1994.23 And, last, but not least, EU-Asia relations acquired what may be called a two-pronged ‘learning dimension’. The first aspect of this learning dimension – perhaps the more important one – was the fact that people from the two continents began learning about one another, learnt to appreciate one another’s cultures and values. They had to begin to appreciate their commonalities and differences and to experience what I defined elsewhere as the underlying ‘software’ of each other’s societies (Wiessala 2002b, 18). Only in this way did it seem possible, in the longer term, to shed the ‘historical baggage’ of Colonialism, to overcome what Edward Said termed ‘Orientalism’ and to look beyond a euro-centrist, isolationist or unilateralist, view of the world. What became known as academic links, ‘people-to-people-contacts’, or as the ‘human face’ of EU-Asia contacts, could thus be interpreted and promoted as a valuable tool in ‘getting to know’ partners in Asia or Europe better and in overcoming intractable stereotypes and differences in value-systems. In the post-colonial context of Asia-Europe relations, this was a significant exercise. For better or worse, the debate about ‘Asian Values’ both facilitated this new Euro-Asian discourse, and was, in turn, fed and driven by it. It also demonstrated that the practical, ‘people-to-people’ approach to educational exchanges could bear rich fruit. Against this more philosophical background, it was equally as important to the EU that people from Europe and Asia also started to learn with one 23

For example in: COM (94) 314, at pp. 1 and 2.

300

Georg Wiessala

another, in practical, day-to-day contact, in debate and discussion and in a healthy discourse about methods, styles of negotiation or argument. This was a ‘long march to mutual understanding’ (cf. Hodges 2003, 4). It was predicated on the fulfilment of an essential condition: the considerable physical, as well as conceptual, distance between Europe and Asia had to be bridged, by means of the provision of funding and the organization of – and continuing support for – common programmes, initiatives and courses. The main benefit of this part of the ‘learning dimension’ of Asia-Europe relations was soon evident, in that participants in the new EU-Asia exchanges could use their specialized knowledge in order to enhance their career prospects and acquire a higher profile in preparation for first post-University employment destinations (Wiessala 2003). Initiatives such as the EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme (1997-2001) or the China-Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in Shanghai demonstrated the potential of this variety of cultural networking (cf. also Meissner 2002). This twofold ‘learning dimension’ of Asia-Europe relations was vital in constructing more productive East-West contacts and in spinning what one observer called ‘the original world-wide web’ (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 43), i.e. a network of learning, which could link Europeans and Asians. The emergence of this East-West ‘www of learning’ was accompanied by intense scholarly debate as to its purpose and merits. The discourse of the last decade emerged from a realization of the ‘double-edged sword’ (IEES 2001, 142) of increased European-Asian interdependence and the urgent need to overcome the many stereotypes and information deficits. Representative of many similar viewpoints, Ioan Voicu (2002) summarized: (…) education is crucial in overcoming and preventing pre-conceived opinions and stereotypes. Human resource development, including educational exchange, fosters mutual understanding and the concept of lifelong learning.

This recognition entailed the provision of expertise about international relations and the EU, and the upgrading of human resources to spread the message. In this context, University cooperation between European and Asian institutions of higher learning was increasingly seen as ‘not a goal in itself’, but as a component in the building of the store of knowledge and understanding that was deemed necessary for dialogue and cooperation (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 32). The resulting, increased, commitment in this area created a new demand for ‘educational connectivity’ and knowledge. This development was consolidated by the appearance of the new, ‘cultural’


301

pillar of the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) from 1996 (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 32, 69; IEES 2001, 21). The debate that ensued coalesced around four main issues: it comprised, firstly, a more general discussion as to the nature of area studies, or, more specifically, ‘European Studies’. Educationalists and policy-makers alike pointed to the nature of these subjects as essentially ‘multi-disciplinary’ and raised important questions about their nature, scope and methodology (e.g. Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 9, 15, 21; IEES 2001, 77, 81, 160-166). The argument extended, secondly, to an analysis of how the educational dimension in EU-Asia relations could contribute to the construction of ‘world order’ and stabilize an increasingly uncertain world, characterized by financial crises, globalization and terror (IEES 2001, 96). A third branch of the dispute focused on socio-cultural issues, asking whether Euro-Asian educational exchange was, in fact, truly beneficial for large groups of the respective populations, or for their respective ‘élite elements’ only. Large states, such as China or India, were often used as examples of the disproportionate dissemination of the yields of educational exchange (e.g. IEES 2001, 102). A last faction of observers investigated the potential for collaborative research between Asian and European scholars and among Asian academics. Analysts examined, in particular, the desirability of ‘denser Asia-Europe networks’ (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 39 et seq., 74-5, 79, 97104, 105-110; IEES 2001, 145-6). In terms of contents, a large number of contributors to this group focused on different degrees of economic integration within the EU and in Asia / ASEAN, while others looked more towards the future of the EU as a global actor and the element of ‘reciprocity’ in EU-Asian exchange, thus closely connecting with strands of similar research in Europe (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 32, 59 et seq.). This energetic debate among scholars and educationalists was stimulated by a number of European Commission concept papers concerning academic and other relations with Asia. The core of the Commission’s ‘Asia Strategy’ (cf. Wiessala 1999, 2002) is comprised of three substantial policy blueprints: Towards a New Asia Strategy of 1994 (COM (94) 314), Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (COM (2001) 469) and A New Partnership with South East Asia (COM (2003) 399/4). The ‘learning dimension’ encompassed by these and related communications was significant on account of the strong emphasis they placed on the ‘human’, cultural and educational dimension in Asia-EU relations. This was done deliberately, in order to complement the otherwise overwhelmingly

302

Georg Wiessala

economic and political thrust of the EU-Asia partnership. On the surface of it, the prioritising of educational links between Europe and Asia served an overtly political purpose: it was meant to carry forward the European Union’s desire to increase its ‘potential’, ‘presence’ and ‘profile’ in Asia. A closer look at these policy frameworks also revealed their more long-term aims. And amongst those aspirations, the desirability of improved higher education and training links with Asian partners figured prominently. Achieving these ambitions, according to the 1994 New Asia Strategy, would necessitate: ‘support to European and Asian Studies Centres and joint Management and Technical training programmes, implemented’ whenever possible’ with the active participation of European and Asian companies’.24 Other parts of the Commission’s 1994 New Asia Strategy emphasised the importance of intensified Euro-Asian collaborative research and development (R&D) (ibid, at point IV, 2.2.5). The Commission’s 2001 follow-up paper (COM (2001) 469) further acknowledged the need to strengthen mutual awareness (at page 3). This was to be achieved by means of: Educational, scientific and cultural exchanges with Asia, through support for enhanced cooperation between higher education institutions, an intensification of academic, research and student exchanges between our two regions, and the 25 promotion of structural networks enabling mutually beneficial cooperation.

Recent regional programmes with a wider remit, such as the Commission’s new Asia Link Initiative, are amongst the first tangible results of these suggestions. The subject of Higher Education in the EU’s foreign relations received a major new impetus through a key Commission proposal of 2001, which covered Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Higher Education (COM (2001) 385). Referring to established Community Programmes, such as ERASMUS or SOCRATES, this document was innovative because it stressed a ‘value-added’ interpretation of the EC Treaty’s provisions on education, vocational training and youth (cf. articles 149 and 150 ECT). It concluded: ‘the Community should ensure that its education activities include the international dimension in a more systematic way’.26 This was to be achieved mainly by means of ‘added-value-‘, high-quality- human resource development, university cooperation and staff/student exchanges.

24

COM (94) 314, at point IV, and at point 2.1.4 (p. 19). COM (2001) 469, at point 4.2. F (p. 19). 26 COM (2001) 385, at point 10 (page 4). 25


303

Over the last few years, Asia-Europe educational cooperation increasingly took its cue from these priorities. From 2002 onwards, the area of education was further promoted through a series of Country Strategy Papers (CSP), in which the Commission presented the perspectives and prospects for the improvement of its relations with individual partner countries in Asia.27 Education figured prominently in the majority of these papers, although, given the heterogeneity of the Asian continent, it was not surprising that individual country strategies carried different priorities and plans. Mindful of the dangers of generalisation, it is possible to summarise the main thrust of these policies. In this context, two points are worth making: firstly, the Commission’s Country Strategy Papers on Asia encompassed all branches of education, from primary to post-University level and life-long learning. And secondly, ‘education’ in the EU’s dialogue with Asian countries was reconceptualised in two main ways. It became either a tool of Development Policy aiming to improve an Asian country’s infrastructure and the fight against poverty. Alternatively, educational exchange with Asia helped with the building of democratic institutions, thus informing the deepening EastWest dialogue about human rights and political matters. The Commission’s newest communication on Asia, ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’ (COM (2003) 399/4), of 9 July 2003 broadly reconfirmed these trends. Furthermore, it stressed the ‘added-value’ dimension in educational exchange between the two continents by elevating education and culture to the level of one of its six ‘key priorities’ (COM (2003) 399/4, at page 4). In the communication, observers also found the continuation of a significant new rationale for EU educational cooperation with Asia: next to the wellestablished aims of increasing awareness and European presence, education becomes a tool for the alleviation of suffering and poverty in Asia, and an instrument of scientific and infrastructural development, covering, in particular, areas such as health and private sector development.28 This is where the Union’s ‘Asia Policy’ and ‘Education Policy’ showed signs of both overlap and convergence, and it was at this point that they could be conceptually linked to the more ‘traditional’ field of the Community Development Policy, with its emphasis on ‘progress through learning’ and 27

By mid-2003, the Commission had published Country Strategy Papers on the following countries and regions in Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Central Asia, China (PRC), East Timor, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. 28 COM (2003) 399/4, at pp. 17/8, 21 and Annexe III, pp. 43-44.

304

Georg Wiessala

the endorsement of self-help through stimulation of private enterprise.29 It is worth mentioning here too that this educational and development ethic can also be derived from, and is informed by, the wider context of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG).30 The ‘added-value’ argument also emerged from the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM), held from 1996 onwards. In fact, ASEM – which is a biennial process of summit meetings, an interface, between Asian and European leaders, rather than an international organisation – has become one of the main channels for social, cultural and educational concerns in the EuropeAsia relationship. East-West cooperation in education already benefited from the work of relevant international bodies, such as UNESCO, the European Universities Association (EUA), the Association of Universities of Asia and the Pacific (AUAP) and the International Association of Universities (IAU). However, it was, arguably, only the institutional networking instigated by the ASEM which began to establish a genuinely inter-continental culture of understanding and dialogue between Asian and European participants. As a consequence, ASEM-related human resources initiatives, such as the AsiaEurope Foundation (ASEF), the ASEF University,31 the ASEM DUO Fellowship Programme, the ASEM Education Hubs Education and Research Network (AEH-EARN 2000), and the Asia-Europe Classroom (AEC) initiative helped to intensify the vital, ‘inter-civilizational’, contact between the Asian and European continents (Yeo 1999, 13-4). A thriving Asia-Europe educational exchange is now established as the third ‘pillar’, or ‘cluster’, of the ASEM process, with the other two clusters consisting of economic topics and political matters. The ASEM 4 summit in Copenhagen in 2002 reemphasised the value of educational interaction and afforded high priority to the areas of academic exchanges, inter-University co-operation and the facilitation of electronic networking between schools and other education providers in Europe and Asia. At this stage, a first, general, conclusion can be drawn: although policy research in the service of industry and finance is important, Asia-EU educational contacts do not exist exclusively to facilitate the promotion of 29

See: Communication on the Commission’s approach to Future Support for the Development of the Business Sector (COM (2003) 267) and: Communication on the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises in Developing Countries with Focus on Public Utilities (COM (2003) 326). 30 UN 2000, United Nations ‘Millennium Declaration’. 31 The Eighth ASEF University was held from 7-21 September 2003 in Coventry, UK. (http://www.asef.org/asef-uni/2_asefuni/asefuni_2003.html).


305

European business and investment. The European-Asian relationship is overcoming the constraints of a purely economic involvement. A Commission communication for ASEM 1 in 1996 put into place much of the ideological groundwork for this: ‘ASEM could express support for the two-way development of scholarship and university exchange programmes, taking into account projects already established under our economic cooperation programme.’32 And in an additional 1997 ‘working paper’ in preparation for ASEM 2,33 the Commission stressed that: ‘Particular emphasis should be put on building key networks, particularly in fields such as University cooperation, student exchanges, science and technology.’ The Asia-Europe Young Leaders’ Symposium is one, tangible, result of this ongoing ‘people-to-people’ process. Educational Actors and the Subject of ‘European’ Studies (…) the separation of Asia and Europe was the basis for the creation of Europe and its Renaissance – that is, that Europe could only be defined against the east, in opposition to it. But looking back at the Renaissance today, we can see that this approach is inaccurate. It excludes the peoples and cultures whose presence was central to creating the spirit of the Renaissance, a Renaissance more diverse and less unified than has often been assumed (Brotton 2003, 34).

From the point of view of the European Commission and a large number of Universities across Europe, the global promotion of the subjects of area studies, or specifically ‘European Studies’, was an obvious conduit for these policy frameworks and blueprints. The ‘opening-up’ of the Jean Monnet funding programme to institutions of higher education in non-European countries has its roots here. In this context, the Commission pledged that: (…) it is important to strengthen European Studies capacities in third countries. For example, the Commission will extend the network of European Union Studies Centres and Jean Monnet Chairs around the world, so as to provide a full service to interested academics and to demonstrate the activity of the EC in this field within universities.34 In a more general context, Shararil Talib (1999, 45) pointed out that the study of European integration in Asia was ‘historically relevant’ for the Asian intellectual and political élites, simply because ‘nothing remotely comparable 32

COM (96), 4, at point 5c), page 8. Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM Process, SEC (97) 1239, at point 3.2, p. 4. 34 COM (2001) 385, at point 4. 23.

33

306

Georg Wiessala

happened’ in Asia. And, in spite of much research on the subject, political groupings such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) remain considerably less ambitious – and less committed – than the EU in their efforts towards regional integration. But the emergence of ‘European Studies Programmes’ and ‘Centres for European Studies’ in at least a dozen Asian countries also shows that this exchange represents, essentially, an evolutionary and dialectical encounter. One of the most significant statements in the Commission’s 2001 Asia strategy demonstrated a modest recognition of this and highlighted the amount of work still to be accomplished: Europe has a great deal to offer in the field of higher education and scientific research, yet the great majority of Asian students studying abroad tend to go to North America and Australasia as a first priority. Equally, the number of European academics or students with links to Asia remains very small, while 35 European Studies remains an underdeveloped field in most Asian countries.

The Commission’s educational strategy represented an important test for a number of educational actors, such as the worldwide network of European Union Studies Associations (ECSA, EUSA), or, in the case of the UK, the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES).36 The challenge of developing European Studies research and teaching was also the concern of a number of relevant ‘think-tanks’ and NGOs, such as the AsiaEurope Vision Group or the Singapore-based Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). The scope of activities developed by these and other associations in response to the Commission’s funding guidelines was extremely broad and varied. It included significant institutional adaptation, such as the foundation in 1999 of an ‘Asia Portfolio’ on the part of the UK’s UACES. The Asia Portfolio was tasked with establishing and maintaining contacts with partner associations, Universities and other Europe-related institutions in Asia, through promotional and conference activities, guest lectures, joint workshops and research. In many other cases, programmes similarly aimed at funding and consolidating the ‘people-to-people-contact’ called for by the EU’s strategies. The field of European Studies in Higher Education thus developed into a naturally suitable vehicle for the promotion of the ‘human dimension’ in EU-Asia relations. 35 36

COM (2001) 469, at point 4.2. F, and at p. 19; COM (2003) 3994, at p. 25. http://www.uaces.org


307

As a number of observers pointed out, (e.g. Yeo 1999, 27), the continuation of this development was, however, predicated on the condition that the subjects of ‘European’ and ‘Asian’ studies were made more ‘relevant’ and ‘contemporary’. The number of educational initiatives connected to the EU-Asia relationship, which fulfil these initial requirements is relatively small. The following is a non-exhaustive selection of the most significant of them. In the context of this paper these initiatives are defined as ‘significant’ if and when they fulfil three main criteria: (1) the participation of significant numbers of students, stable retention-rates and satisfactory ‘first-destination’ results; (2) the provision of significant amounts of EU funding, and; (3) a significant potential for long-term academic exchange, self-sufficiency and research collaboration, both inside Asian academe and internationally. Bearing these provisos in mind, the following cultural and educational programmes, networks and institutions represent some of the most significant achievements, reflecting the evolving ‘learning dimension’ within EU-Asia relations: The ASEAN-EU University Network (AUN, value: € 7.767.500, AUN Newsletter, 2002). The Southeast Asia-Europe University Network (ASE-Univ). The ‘Campus in Asia’ and ‘Campus in Europe’ proposals (Rothermund, 2001, 10-11). The Asia-Europe Classroom (AEC) initiative.37 The ‘Asia-Link’ Scheme. The MA Programme in European Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. The EU-China Higher Education Programme (1997-2001) and the EUChina European Studies Centres Programme (ESCP, from 2003). The European Union Studies Programme at Universiti Malaya (UMESP). The European Union Studies Programme in the Philippines. The European Studies Programme in Vietnam (ESPV, 2002-2004). The Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) in Singapore. From within this variety of programmes and initiatives, the case of European Studies in Thailand is both instructive and exemplary; the 37

The Third Asia-Europe Classroom International Teachers’ Conference was scheduled to take place, from 28 September to 2 October 2003, in Bogor, Republic of Indonesia.

308

Georg Wiessala

Interdisciplinary European Studies Programme at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok is widely seen as one of the ‘most successful’ EU-related educational projects in the Southeast Asian region (Chirathivat and Lassen 1999, 1-9, 15-29; IEES 81, 160-166). It evolved against the background of a number of favourable social and historical conditions: the Kingdom of Thailand is one of the few Asian countries which has never been subjected to European Colonialism. In the view of many observers it has evaded this mainly by skilful diplomatic manœuvring in relation to the 19th and early 20th Century European colonial powers and by what Curtin (2000, 150) called ‘defensive modernization’: the ‘acceptance and assimilation’ of European cultural and technological influence in order to escape European conquest (cf. also: Pavanarit 2000, 127-130; Chitrabongs 2000, 119-125). Modern Thailand thus possesses a rich and diverse tradition of interest in, and lively exchange with, Europe particularly symbolized in the person of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, reigned: 1873-1910), who visited Europe in 1897, and after whom the oldest, and most prestigious Thai University is now named. At the time of writing, the Thai Higher Education system is in flux and is undergoing a process of reform in the areas of quality assurance, staff development, student skills acquisition and University autonomy.38 In mid-2003, the study and research components of the programme functioned within a framework determined by three overlapping ‘pillars’: the Thai European Community Studies Organization (Thai ECSA) – the Thai equivalent of UACES in the UK – the Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University and the Interdisciplinary Master of Arts Programme in European Studies (MAEUS). The MA Programme drew on the disciplines of history, economics, law and political science and successfully married a one-year intensive programme of study – including tuition by visiting European lecturers – with a study-trip to Europe for the participants of the programme. Conclusions and Outlook This chapter has shown that cultural, educational and academic cooperation has become an increasingly significant and, indeed, indispensable part of Asia-Europe cooperation. What is now established in political parlance as ‘people-to-people-exchange’ between Asian countries and the EU has moved out from the shadow of predominantly political and economic patterns of 38

See: Thai Higher Education Review 1, no. 4 (April-June): 2-3, 13-17.


309

interaction, to become another constituent part of the relationship. The high priority both sides are now affording to issues of cultural exchange has a mixed parentage and can be traced to a number of main contributories. Most notable amongst those is the value both the European Union and Asian countries have traditionally put on matters of education and selfimprovement. Within the last decade the Community’s policies on education and culture had to become progressively more open to the outside world under the influence of globalization, a changed international security environment and the EU’s democratization- and human rights- agenda. Moreover, the enhanced attention the EU has given Asia since 1994, through a large number of policy blueprints, white papers and ‘country-strategies’, has moved matters of educational cooperation much higher up the agenda of East-West relations, capitalizing on the valuable, parallel, bilateral experience of some member states in the field of cultural exchange. As a result, Asian and European partners realized, to a much higher degree, the value of learning in the context of doing business, while recognizing at the same time the many gaping lacunae in the understanding of each other’s cultures and value systems, which remained to be filled. Last, but not least, this process of prioritization was accompanied by a deliberate promotion of educational matters which were now targeted through new channels of Europe-Asia communication, such as the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM). The new geopolitical situation after 11 September 2001 and the fight against terrorism in both Europe and Asia have been major catalysts for these developments. Within this framework, a large number of academic and educational initiatives co-exist, bringing Asian and European participants much closer together at an ever-accelerating pace. Most of these schemes illustrate a number of significant common features, such as a high degree of institutionalization, and a concentration on the study of European politics, business, law or history. By encompassing, in particular, an element of ‘European Studies’, or ‘EU Studies’, these programmes prove that this field is the most appropriate, and, to-date, most fruitful, area of cooperation between European and Asian nations. While the duration, funding and participation rates in these programmes and study centres exhibit a degree of variation, there are some prominent examples which successfully combine the twofold ‘learning dimension’ of EU-Asia relations – learning from and with one another – with a more practical approach to teaching and research in European Studies in general. The Interdisciplinary Master of Arts

310

Georg Wiessala

Programme at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand is a notable example of these. In terms of the future of educational cooperation between Asia and Europe (and the EU in particular) it is to be expected that the picture will become considerably more diversified and complex, commensurate with the growth of the EU’s stature and self-perception as an international actor and diplomatic player on the global stage. The process of compartmentalization, or ‘pillarization’, of education in EU-Asia relations shows few signs of abating in the foreseeable future. However, a burgeoning proliferation of academic exchange between European and Asian partners will increasingly be seen as a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it carries the undeniable potential to overcome misunderstandings, avoid breakdowns of communication and bring about enhanced international awareness, or simply better career prospects. But on the other hand, it will also be seen as a ‘mushrooming’ phenomenon and will lead to confusion, competition, overlap and manifestations of ‘forum-fatigue’ amongst the participants in the dialogue and the many institutions, think-tanks and other bodies involved. The educational dimension will continue to make measured but momentous progress on its way to nurturing relations between the EU and Asia. It now represents a major challenge for Universities, governmental and research institutions involved in this process on both continents, to try and respond to these tensions and to strive towards more ‘product’ and less ‘process’.

References Altes, Edy Korthals. 2003. Spiritual Values in European Public Life. In Socially Engaged Spirituality – Essays in Honor of Sulak Sivaraksa on His 70th Birthday, ed. David W. Chappell, 30-44. Bangkok: Sathirakoses-Nagapradipa Foundation. Asia-Europe Foundation. 2002. Promoting Better Understanding between the Peoples of Asia and Europe. Singapore: ASEF. ASEAN University Network AUN. 2002. ASEAN, We Are One. AUN Newsletter 3, no. 1 (January). Bainbridge, Timothy. 2002. The Penguin Companion to the European Union. London: Penguin (3rd edition). Brotton, Jerry. 2003. The Renaissance Bazaar. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.


311

Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University (CES). 2003. CES Newsletter 10, no. 4 (October-December); and Vol. 11, no. 1 (January-March). Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University (CES). 2003. The Center for European Studies. Chirathivat, Suthiphand, with Poul-Henrik Lassen. 1999. European Studies in Asia. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies at Chulalongkorn University (CES). Chitrabongs, M. R. Chakrarot. 2000. European Cultural Influences: Stand-Off, Acceptance and Assimilation. In King Chulalongkorn’s Visit to Europe – Reflections on Significance and Impacts, ed. Charit Tingsabadh, 119-125. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Church, Clive H. and David Phinnemore. The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties. London: Penguin. Commission of the European Communities.1995. EU-Asia Relations: Higher Education. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities. 2003. General Report of the Activities of the European Union 2002 (cited as General Report). Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Education and Culture. 2000. Guide to Programmes and Actions. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Education and Culture. 2002. The Europe of Knowledge – New Horizons for Education and Training. Le Magazine – Education and Culture in Europe no.18. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities Council of Europe, Steering Committee for Higher Education and Research. 2002. The Bologna Process. Achievements and Challenges. (13 August) CD-ESR 2002 6. Curtin, Philip D. 2000. The World and the West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davies, Howard. 2003. Bologna: Converging from all Directions. European Voice ( 2329 October): 23. Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand Delegation. 2000. Education in the EU:15 Ways of Teaching and Learning. European Union News 18, no. 6 (September-October): 5. Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 2003. Annual Report and Accounts 2002-03. London: TSO, at www.tso.co.uk/bookshop European College for Cultural Co-operation. 1996a. Educative, Linguistic and Cultural Policies of Co-operation with the ASEAN – A Study of the European Union Member States’ National Policies. Study Report to the European Communities, Commission, D.G. 1. Luxembourg: ECCC (September). European College for Cultural Co-operation. 1996b. Educative, Linguistic and Cultural Policies of Co-operation with the Countries of South Asia – A Study of the European Union Member States’ National Policies. Study Report to the European Communities, Commission, D.G. 1. Luxembourg: ECCC (November).

312

Georg Wiessala

European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research. 1999. Fact Sheets on the European Union - Section 4.16.0. Education, Vocational Training and Youth Policy, available via: www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/ European Studies Programme Vietnam (ESPV). 2002/2003. Newsletter (December/January). Hanoi: ESPV. Goody, Jack. 1996. The East in the West. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hodges, Lucy. 2003. Long March to Mutual Understanding. The Independent, Education Supplement (20 November): 4-5. Instituto De Estudos Europeus De Macau (IEEM). 2001. European Studies in Asia. Macau: IEEM. Instituto De Estudos Europeus De Macau (IEEM), with the University of Macau and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. 2002. Master in European Studies, 2002-2004 (leaflet). Islam, Shada. 2003. A New Era in EU-ASEAN Relations? The Nation (Bangkok) (27 July): 7A. Journal of Southeast Asian Education. 2000. Challenges in the New Millennium. Journal of Southeast Asian Education 1, no. 1 (July). Meissner, Werner. 2002. Cultural Relations Between China and the Member States of the European Union. The China Quarterly, no. 169 (March, Special Issue: China and Europe since 1978. A European Perspective): 181-203. Ministry of University Affairs, Thailand. 1995. International Programs in Thai Higher Education Institutions. Bangkok: International Cooperation Division, Ministry of University Affairs. Ministry of University Affairs, Thailand. 2003. Thai Higher Education Review 1, no. 3 (January – March); Vol. 1, no. 4 (April – June). Moussis, Nicholas. 2000. Guide to European Policies. Rixensart: European Study Service (sixth revised edition). Pavanarit, Apinan. 2000. What Are the Lessons for Asia-Europe Relations Today? In King Chulalongkorn’s Visit to Europe – Reflections on Significance and Impacts, ed. Charit Tingsabadh, 127-130. Bangkok: Centre for European Studies, Chulalongkorn University. Rothermund, Dietmar. 2001. Cultural Partnership between Asia and Europe. In AsiaEurope on the Eve of the 21st Century, eds. Suthiphand Chirathivat, Franz Knipping, Poul Henrik Lassen and Chia Siow Yue, 9-16. Bangkok and Singapore: Centre for European Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP). 20022003. Eastern Horizons – News on the Fight Against Drugs and Crime in East Asia and the Pacific no. 11 (September 2002); no. 12 (December 2002); no. 13 (March 2003). Voicu, Ioan. 2002. Unity in Diversity – The Educational Component in ASEM is Taking Quiet But Significant Strides to Smooth Relations Between Europe and Asia. Bangkok Post (6 October). Wiessala, Georg. 1999. An Emerging Relationship. The European Union’s New Asia Strategy. World Affairs 3, no. 1: 96-112.


313

Wiessala, Georg. 2002a. The European Union and Asian Countries. London: Sheffield Academic Press. Wiessala, Georg. 2002b. Reading the Software of Asian Society. European Voice 8, no. 22, (6-12 June: EU-Asia Relations Supplement): 18. Wiessala, Georg. 2003. Beyond Distant Neighbours: Keeping Asia-Europe Relations in the Focus of Your Career. European Voice (March: EU Study Programmes Supplement). Yeo, Lay Hwee. 1999. ASEM. Beyond Economics. Panorama – Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs no. 4. Manila: Konrad Adenauer Foundation: 5-38.

r o d o p i [email protected]–www.rodopi.nl Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 XII-233 pp. (At the Interface/Probing the Boundaries 31) Paper € 50 / US$ 68 ISBN-10: 9042021489 ISBN-13: 9789042021488

Suffering the Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune International Perspectives on Stress, Laughter and Depression Edited by Bernie Warren

The book Suffering the Slings and Arrows Of Outrageous Fortune: International Perspectives on Stress, Laughter and Depression highlights topics covered at an inaugural inter-disciplinary conference Making Sense of Stress Humour and Healing held in Budapest in May 2005. The chapters provide a truly international and inter-disciplinary perspective on the subject. Contributors to this volume come not only from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds but also from many parts of the globe. They speak of universal truths and of sitespecific concerns. They do not all speak with one voice and some of their points diverge one from the other but each sheds their own light on the topics, allowing readers to form a richer picture of the issues than might otherwise be possible.

USA/Canada: 295 North Michigan Avenue - Suite 1B, Kenilworth, NJ 07033, USA. Call Toll-free (US only): 1-800-225-3998 All other countries: Tijnmuiden 7, 1046 AK Amsterdam, The Netherlands Tel. +31-20-611 48 21 Fax +31-20-447 29 79 Please note that the exchange rate is subject to fluctuations

r o d o p i [email protected]–www.rodopi.nl Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 361 pp. (Avant-Garde Critical Studies 21) Bound € 73 / US$ 99 ISBN-13: 9789042021525

Avant-Garde and Criticism Edited by Klaus Beekman and Jan de Vries

Avant-Garde and Criticism sheds new light on the complex aims, functions, practices and contexts of art-criticism in relation to the European avant-garde. Although many avant-garde works and the avant-gardes of various countries have been analyzed, considerably less attention has been given to the reviews in newspapers and journals on avant-garde literature, art, architecture and film. This volume of Avant-Garde Critical Studies will look at how art critics operated in a strategic way. The strategies of avant-garde criticism are diverse. Art critics, especially when they are artists themselves, attempt to manipulate the cultural climate in their favour. They use their position to legitimize avant-garde concepts and to conquer a place in the cultural field. But they are also markedly influenced by the context in which they operate. The position of fellow-critics and the ideological bias of the papers in which they publish can be as important as the political climate in which their criticism flourishes. The analysis of avant-garde art criticism can also make clear how strategies sometimes fail and involuntarily display non-avant-garde characteristics. On the other hand traditionalist criticism on the avant-garde offers new insights into its status and reception in a given time and place.


r o d o p i [email protected]–www.rodopi.nl

Education for a Democratic Society Central European Pragmatist Forum, Volume Three Edited by John Ryder and Gert Rüdiger Wegmarshaus

This book is the third volume of selected papers from the Central European Pragmatist Forum (CEPF). It deals with the general question of education, and the papers are organized into sections on Education and Democracy, Education and Values, Education and Social Reconstruction, and Education and the Self. The authors are among the leading specialists in American philosophy from universities across the U.S. and in Central and Eastern Europe. Studies in Pragmatism and Values (SPV) promotes the study of pragmatism’s traditions and figures, and the explorations of pragmatic inquiries in all areas of philosophical thought.

Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 XVII-194 pp. (Value Inquiry Book Series 179) Paper € 43 / US$ 58 ISBN-13: 9789042021532



Wrestling with God and with Evil

Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 VI-240 pp. (Currents of Encounter 31) Paper € 50 / US$ 68 ISBN-13: 9789042021556

Philosophical Reflections Edited by Hendrik M. Vroom

The fact of evil continues to raises questions – questions about the relationship between God and evil but also questions about human involvement in it. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, it is now time to see the existence of evil not just as a problem for belief in God; it is a problem for belief in humanity itself as well. For human involvement in evil is not simply a matter of coping with evil but also concerns the fact that humans themselves often seem to do wrong and evil inevitably. Human finitude, ignorance and the unforeseeable consequences of good intentions as well as of neglect can often lead to tragedy. This volume contains contributions from an equal number of male and female scholars in Western Europe and America. It contains discussions of thinkers like Kant, Kierkegaard, Barth, Weil, Levinas, Naber, Caputo and Johnson. It deals with issues like tragedy, finitude, critiques of Western culture, violence and God, and the question of whether theodicies are needed or are even honest. This volume offers an interesting survey of ‘wrestling with God and evil’ from a variety of perspectives in the philosophy of religion on both sides of the Atlantic.



Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union Edited by Katharine Sarikakis

The areas of media and cultural policy offer a unique prism through which to understand wider processes of European integration. Questions of European identity, citizenship and community or polity-building clearly resolve themselves as questions of the (non-)emergence of a European ‘communicative space’. At the same time, as a more specific area of policy study, the role which has or may be played by the European institutions themselves in the fostering of such a ‘communicative space’ raises questions as to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of their interventions. This volume in the European Studies series brings fresh, interdisciplinary insight into this relatively understudied area, making the case for a renewed look at the trajectory of cultural and media policies in the EU.

Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 249 pp. (European Studies: An Interdisciplinary Series in European Culture, History and Politics 24) Bound € 50 / US$ 68 ISBN-13: 9789042021754


r o d o p i [email protected]–www.rodopi.nl Amsterdam/New York, NY, 2007 XIII-215 pp. (The Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studies 8) Paper € 46 / US$ 62 ISBN-13: 9789042021570

‘Immortal Austria’? Austrians in Exile in Britain Edited by Charmian Brinson, Richard Dove and Jennifer Taylor

Immortal Austria was the title of a theatrical pageant devised by Austrian refugees in wartime London, the name summarizing their collective memory of their homeland as a country of mountain scenery, historical grandeur and musical refinement. The reality of the country they had left, and the one to which some of them returned, was very different. This volume contains various studies of the representations of their homeland in the cultural production of Austrian exiles, including those projected by émigrés working in the British film industry, those portrayed in the historical novel and in the literary works of such notable authors as Stefan Zweig, Elias Canetti and Robert Neumann. It opens with a survey of the make-up of the Austrian exile community and concludes with a study of attitudes to returning exiles, as reflected in the post-war literary journals. The volume thus offers students and teachers a vital cultural link between the pre-1934 Austria of the First Republic and the post-1945 Austria of the Second.


The European Union and Asia: Reflections and Re-orientations. (European Studies)

Legitimacy and the European Union

The Central and Eastern European Countries and the European Union

Air Transport and the European Union: Europeanization and its Limits (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics)

The European Union Decides

The European Union Decides