The Emerging Politics of Antartica

The Emerging Politics of Antarctica

This book examines the post-Cold War challenges facing Antarctic governance. It seeks to understand the interests of new players in Antarctic affairs such as China, India, Korea and Malaysia, and how other key players such as Russia and the USA or claimant states such as New Zealand or France are coping in the new global order. Antarctica is the world's fifth largest continent and its territories are claimed by seven different states. Since 1961 Antarctica has been managed under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a regime which, according to its critics, by the terms of its membership effectively excludes most of the nations of the world. This book examines the post-Cold War challenges facing Antarctic governance, and is organized thematically into three sections: •

Part I considers the role of Antarctic politics in the current post-Cold War, post-colonial era and the impact this new political environment is having on the ATS.

•

Part II looks at the competing foreign policy objectives of a representative range of countries with Antarctic activities.

•

Part III examines issues that have the potential to destabilize the order of the ATS, such as unrestricted tourism and new advances in science and technology.

The Emerging Politics of Antarctica will be of interest to students and scholars of international politics, polar studies and foreign policy studies. Anne-Marie Brady is an Associate Professor in Political Science specializing in Chinese and Polar politics at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand.

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The Emerging Politics of Antarctica

Edited by Anne-Marie Brady

First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. © 2013 Anne-Marie Brady for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution. The right of Anne-Marie Brady to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The emerging politics of Antarctica / edited by Anne- Marie Brady. p. cm. — (Routledge advances in international relations and global politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Antarctica-Politics and government. 2. Antarctica-Foreign relations. I. Brady, Anne-Marie, 1966— JS8499.3.A2E64 2012 341.409989-dc23

2012025431 ISBN: 978-0-415-53139-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-07831-0 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

Notes on contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Conflict or cooperation? The emerging politics of Antarctica ANNE-MARIE BRADY

PART I Antarctic politics in the current world order 1

The Antarctic Treaty System MARCUS HAWARD

PART II Antarctica and competing foreign policy objectives 2

China's Antarctic interests ANNE-MARIE BRADY

3

India and Antarctica SANJAY CHATURVEDI

4

Cool Korea ANNE-MARIE BRADY AND KIM SEUNGRYEOL

5

The Malaysian journey to the Antarctic B. A. HAMZAH

6

United States foreign policy interests in Antarctica CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER

7

Russia, the post-Soviet world, and Antarctica IRINA GAN

8

New Zealand's Antarctica

ANNE-MARIE BRADY

9

The French Connection CHAVELLI SULIKOWSKI

PART III Burning issues on the Antarctic ice 10

Rallying around a flag? AANT ELZINGA

11

Titanic Part II? JANE VERBITSKY

12

Biological prospecting in the Antarctic JULIA JABOUR

Index

Contributors

Anne-Marie Brady is an Associate Professor in Political Science at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand. In 2008, as part of the University of Canterbury's Post-graduate Certificate in Antarctic Studies, she spent two weeks living in a polar tent facing Mt Erebus and Mt Terror. She is the founding and executive editor of The Polar Journal and has published extensively on China's domestic and foreign policy. Sanjay Chaturvedi is Professor of Political Science at the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics, Panjab University, India. He specializes in the theory and practices of Geopolitics with special reference to the Polar Regions and the Indian Ocean Region. A member of Indian delegations to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings since 2007, he has visited Antarctica as a lecturer aboard a tourist cruise ship. Aant Elzinga is Professor Emeritus at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. He has a background in physics (Canada) and then studied history and philosophy of science (London, UK) before turning to the politics of science, with particular reference to the cases of Antarctica and climatology. Elzinga is a founding member of the SCAR history group. Irina Gan graduated with a PhD from the University of Tasmania, Australia in 2009. Her thesis was entitled “Red Antarctic. Soviet interests in the South Polar region prior to the Antarctic Treaty: 1946–1958”. She participated in the 53rd Russian Antarctic Expedition in 2008 and in Australian Antarctic resupply voyages in 2006 and 2009. She has published several papers in the Polar Record and is a member of the SCAR history group. B.A. Hamzah is a Professor of International Politics at the Centre for Media and Information Warfare Studies, Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM).

Marcus Haward is an Associate Professor in the School of Government at the University of Tasmania and is a member of the Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre. He has been a member of Australian delegations to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Julia Jabour is a Senior Lecturer and Program Leader in Ocean and Antarctic Policy at the Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania. Her doctoral research investigated the changing nature of sovereignty in the Arctic and Antarctic in response to global environmental interdependence, and she has been writing and lecturing on Antarctic law and policy for nearly 20 years. Julia has visited Antarctica five times and has twice attended Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. Christopher C. Joyner was Professor of International Law and Politics at Georgetown University and a well-known specialist on Antarctic politics and law until his sudden death in 2011. He was a founding editor of The Polar Journal and his contribution to this volume was originally published in its first issue. Kim Seungryeol graduated with an MA in Political Science at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand in 2011. His thesis topic was: “Korea's Polar Strategy”. Chavelli Sulikowski is a joint doctoral student at the University of Tasmania and the L'Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer (the European Institute for Marine Studies — IUEM) at the University of Western Brittany. Chavelli's key areas of research are in the fields of Antarctic law and policy, with a particular interest in the dynamics of international cooperation within the Antarctic Treaty System. Jane Verbitsky is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, AUT University, Auckland, New Zealand. Jane teaches papers in New Zealand politics, conflict resolution, regional studies and international relations. Her research interests lie primarily in the refugee/human rights/security nexus, justice institutions and processes, and peace education and conflict resolution fields.

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to the encouragement and support I have received from my many colleagues in the polar feld who have helped this book project come into fruition. I would like to especially thank Professor Bryan Storey of Gateway Antarctica at the University of Canterbury; the many participants of the Symposium; and the ten other authors in the volume. I dedicate this book with love to my husband Z.J. and our three children: Francesca, Silas and Matteo who through my studies have now become passionate followers of polar affairs.

Introduction Conflict or cooperation? The emerging politics of Antarctica Anne-Marie Brady

The Emerging Politics of Antarctica follows Harold Lasswell's classic definition of political science in being concerned with the question of “who gets what, when, and how?”1 A further question is required to be asked in the case of Antarctic politics as to “where are these gains located?” In Antarctica, as in life, location is very important: those who come first get first choice, those who have might demand more and can do more with what they acquire, while those who come last or are weaker get the crumbs. Antarctica is the world's fifth largest continent, with a wealth of valuable resources. It is governed by no one country, though its territories are claimed by seven different states. Since 1961 Antarctica has been managed under the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), a regime which, according to its critics, by the terms of its membership effectively excludes most of the nations of the world. In international law, it is sovereignty, not population numbers, which matters most. The Treaty puts aside, but does not deny the existing Antarctic claims or any future ones. Forty-nine states have signed the Antarctic Treaty but currently only twenty-eight of them have a say in the governance of the continent. “Consultative” status is conferred by a nation having a scientific programme in Antarctica, which effectively privileges those countries with the resources to achieve this. The Antarctic Treaty was a product of the Cold War and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now that the Cold War has ended, with China and India on the rise and Russia unable to maintain the

same level of Antarctic investment as the former Soviet Union, does the ATS fit the needs of the emerging world order? The chart below reveals the Antarctic spend of some of the key players; while the budgets of traditional players such as the United States have remained static, Russia's has declined from its days when as the USSR it rivalled the USA; China, India, and Korea have made major increases in their investment and reach in Antarctic activities and Australia has also increased its spend. The change in budgets reflects relative declines and rises in hard power. China, India, and the Republic of Korea are looking for ways to assert international influence and build national pride; their relatively strong economies permit them to invest more in Antarctic affairs and all are also active in the Arctic. Australia, riding on the back of a commodities boom, is determined to protect its

Comparative Antarctic spend (US$m) interests in Antarctica; it claims 42 per cent of Antarctic territory, the largest Antarctic claim. China and India have both built new bases on the territory Australia claims. Budgets are not the only way to measure power and influence in Antarctica. Research output is a key indicator of a nation's level of influence and engagement in Antarctica. This is for two reasons: (1) engaging in

scientific research in Antarctica is the institutional fig leaf justifying a state's participation in Antarctic governance; and (2) knowledge, as always, is power, and states which can come up with scientific evidence to back up any policy changes they wish to promote are likely to be more influential. In a 2008 study surveying the scientific output of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) from 1980 to 2004, Dastidar and Ramachandran ranked the USA number one, the UK second, Australia third, meanwhile Russia was ninth in the ranking, India was ranked fourteen, China came in at nineteen, and South Korea at twenty-five.2 A 2012 study by Dudeney and Walton which built on Dastidar and Ramachandran's research ranked the UK, New Zealand, and Australia, followed by Chile and the USA, as the top performers for producing the working papers which lead to policy changes in Antarctica. In terms of academic research, according to Dudeney and Walton's 2012 study, the claimant states, the USA, and Russia continue to be the main producers of cutting edge Antarctic research. The authors say that this means that “at present the Treaty remains effectively a select club dominated by the claimant nations and the Cold War warriors (USA and Russia)”.3 In the 1950s the main preoccupation of the dominant Antarctic partners was the prevention of the threat of armed conflict spreading to Antarctica. What are the key priorities of nations engaged with Antarctica today? Does the ATS in its present form suit those priorities? Will the ATS in its current form be able to last another fifty years? Will the emergence of new state and non-state actors with interests in Antarctica upset the current system? Who are the dominant players in Antarctica today? Does Antarctic governance need to democratise? Although Antarctic affairs are highly politicised and frequently contentious, much of the debates and analysis of what goes on has been conducted by politicians, activists, lawyers, geographers, historians, and scientists. In contrast, currently only a handful of political scientists worldwide are actively engaged in research on Antarctic politics. For an area of such strategic importance this is a surprising anomaly. Political scientists are concerned with the study of political power and the production, distribution, and use of resources. Politics is, in the words of Andrew heywood, “inextricably linked to the phenomena of conflict and cooperation”.4 “The politics” of Antarctica, where conflict – and cooperation

— over resources is at the heart of the current system of governance, would appear to be a subfield ripe for exploration. Yet remarkably the 2007 Encyclopedia of the Antarctic, which has close to 500 entries, has no section on Antarctic politics or governance — though it has room for other social science perspectives.5 What work that has been done on Antarctic politics in the past is mostly scattered in papers in academic journals or gathered together in a few classic books such as the work of editors Olav Schramm Stokke and Davor vidas, Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 or Chris C. Joyner's sole-authored Governing the Frozen Continent: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection, Columbia, SC: University of Southern California, 1998. The post-Cold War challenges facing Antarctic governance require a much greater investment in new political science-based research especially to understand the interests of the new and rising players in Antarctic affairs such as China, India, Korea, Pakistan, and Malaysia and how other key players such as Russia or claimant states such as New Zealand or France are coping in this new global order. The Emerging Politics of Antarctica includes the work of both established and emerging polar political science experts and policy analysts, as well as that of political scientists who write on Antarctica from the perspective of another area of expertise such as the politics of resources. The Emerging Politics of Antarctica is organised thematically into three sections. The first section considers the part Antarctic politics plays in the current post-Cold War, post-colonial, era and the impact this new political environment is having on the ATS. The second section looks at the competing foreign policy objectives of a representative range of countries with Antarctic activities: four rising players in the Antarctic, China, India, South Korea, and Malaysia; the post-Cold War challenges of Antarctic involvement for the former Soviet states; and the interests of claimant states such as France and New Zealand. The third and final section examines “burning issues on the ice”, issues that have the potential to destabilise the order of the ATS such as unbridled tourism and new advances in science and technology. Many of the chapters in this book originated in a Symposium on Antarctic Politics held in June 2010 at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, New Zealand. Two further chapters were incorporated into the book project in order to broaden the range of perspectives. The Symposium brought together scholars and policymakers from Australia, China, Estonia,

India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. This book has tried hard to replicate the diversity of perspectives we heard in the Symposium. Part I of the book examines the relevance of the ATS under present day conditions. Marcus Haward evaluates the idealism of the Treaty provisions against the realpolitik of Antarctic nations' national interests. He argues that the Treaty has been highly successful and effective when assessed against its core provisions of managing disputes over territorial claims and sovereignty in Antarctica and ensuring that Antarctica should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, he notes that this does not mean that interests, values, and practices within the ATS have remained static or unchallenged. Haward is essentially positive in evaluating how the ATS has responded to challenges from both within the system and without in the last fifty years and is cautiously optimistic about its continued viability. And yet, the second section of the book illustrates how — despite the idealism of the Treaty rhetoric and the positive evaluation of some analysts — Antarctic politics in the past, as today, has frequently involved a clash between national interests. This continually pits those who gained rights earlier against those who came later, and effectively enables the bigger and more established powers to dominate. Demonstrating a prime example of this problem, in the first chapter in this section Anne-Marie Brady's chapter discusses China's Antarctic interests. In the 1950s in the lead-up to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, the USA expressly vetoed what it called “Red China” from working in Antarctica. The People's Republic of China did not sign the Antarctic Treaty until 1983, but by this date it was in a quasi alliance with the USA against the Soviet Union. Its Antarctic involvement built up slowly but steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, in the last ten years China has moved into a new phase in its Antarctic engagement. Beijing has dramatically increased Chinese scientific activities on the frozen continent and increased public awareness of those activities by sending high level Chinese media teams to cover them. China is critical of some of the inherent inequities of Antarctic governance, though at present it is only fghting its own battles such as when it responded to environmental concerns over China's base at Dome Argus (built in the 2008–2009 austral summer). China is keen to make up for lost time by taking a larger stake in Antarctic affairs. Some commentators fear that China's rise in Antarctica will displace

the interests of existing powers. Brady draws connections between China's expanded Antarctic programme and ongoing discussions on China's foreign and domestic policies both within China and beyond. The second chapter in this section, by Sanjay Chaturvedi, looks at the Antarctic interests of another emerging power, India. Chaturvedi argues that when it comes to Antarctica, as well as with other areas important to Delhi, India's foreign policy today can be characterised by unprecedented pragmatism, at the same time as cautious idealism. This pragmatism is part of a growing realisation that as a rising power in Asia and beyond, India's world view and self-image are due for reassessment. The chapter critically examines both the potential and the promise of what Chaturvedi refers to as India's “post-colonial” engagement with Antarctica and the ATS. He locates this analysis within wider assessments on how “post-colonial engagement” with Antarctica might play out for other nations. The third chapter, by Anne-Marie Brady and Kim Seungryeol, examines the Antarctic interests of another emerging power, the Republic of Korea (ROK), with reference to its Arctic activities. The ROK's initial engagement in Antarctica was through the activities of its fishing feet in the Southern Ocean, starting from 1978. At the time South Korea was a developing economy with only limited economic interests in Antarctica and limited resources to exploit the possibilities there. The ROK joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1986 (soon after so too did the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and was admitted as a Consultative Party to the treaty after it set up a base on the Antarctic peninsular. It was a modest commitment to Antarctic engagement, from a country that had only modest resources. However, like China, in the last decade, reflecting the tremendous economic and social progress the ROK has made, Seoul has significantly ungraded its polar ambitions. Since 2008, under the government of Lee Myungbak, South Korean foreign policy is going global. Like many politicians worldwide, current Korean leaders regard engaging in high level polar activities as a way of demonstrating that the ROK is interested in taking on more of a leading role internationally. Moreover, the Lee government wants the ROK to engage in more high tech science and the polar regions are a unique laboratory for many fields of research. The ROK wants to have a say in any future new regime in the polar regions; there is a potential that the ROK's ambitions and its strategic interests in the polar regions may challenge the norms of the

current ATS in the future, as well as in the Arctic. In the fourth chapter in this section B.A. Hamzah outlines the dramatic shift in Malaysia's policy approach to Antarctica. Malaysia went from being an outspoken critic of the ATS, seeking to create a broad international front of nations who opposed the exclusiveness of the ATS “club”, to joining that “club” itself in 2011 and pursuing its own interests there. Hamzah argues that the shift reflects in part a new emphasis in Malaysia's overall foreign policy of taking a less hostile attitude to the Western powers. The retirement of former PM Mahathir bin Mohamad in 2002 is also a factor in this shift, as too were the early efforts of New Zealand to help Malaysia establish an Antarctic science programme. As a thriving petro-economy, Malaysia now has more resources to invest in Antarctic endeavours than when it raised its ideological objections to the Antarctic Treaty at the United Nations from 1982 to 2005. It will be interesting to see how Malaysia negotiates its former status as a watchdog on Antarctic governance issues now that it has joined the Treaty and is seeking to become a Consultative Party of the Treaty. The fifth chapter in this section is by Christopher C. Joyner, who sadly passed away suddenly in 2011. Professor Joyner's chapter outlines the United States' Antarctic interests. The United States has the largest investment in Antarctic activities by far, easily outshadowing the spend of its nearest rivals by several hundred million dollars. Yet, in 2011 the crisis over the lack of a US icebreaker suitable for supporting its operations in the Antarctic revealed that the USA is not as strong as it once was, and as spending has been capped since 2008, its budgets are not keeping up with inflation. The United States Antarctic Program was eventually able to rent a Russian icebreaker for the 2011 austral summer, but it is a temporary solution. The USA needs its own icebreaker for its Antarctic operations, but it is questionable as to whether or not in a time of economic downturn in the country, that the US government will be able to come up with the funds. Joyner examines contemporary US national interests in the Antarctic and explores whether possible developments by other Antarctic Treaty parties might undermine the ability of the United States to attain its national interest objectives in the region. He argues that the Antarctic Treaty remains indispensable as a mechanism for the successful pursuit of the USA's core interests in the region. The USA regards itself as a leader in Antarctic matters and expects to continue to be one in the future.

The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 irrevocably altered the balance of power in Antarctic affairs, from an essential binary system to a unipolar one. US spending in Antarctica is now at least three times that of its former rival Russia which inherited much of the USSR's Antarctic programme. The United States Antarctic Program sends the highest number of personnel to Antarctica, around 2500 per annum; its nearest competitors send a fifth of that number. Though rising powers such as China, India, and South Korea are rapidly expanding their Antarctic budgets and research programmes, it will be a long time before any other power can equal the USA — at least on their own. However, in 2003 Asian Antarctic players broke new ground in Antarctic affairs by setting up the Asian Forum for Polar Science (AFOPS). This organisation aims to coordinate research and policies among the five member countries: India, Japan, China, Korea, and Malaysia. The European Union is, similarly, increasingly working more as a bloc in dealing with Antarctic affairs. Greater coordination and cooperation among national programmes may well prove to be the best way to enable weaker countries to participate in Antarctic affairs, thereby making Antarctic governance more democratic. In the sixth chapter in this section Irina Gan pieces together the Antarctic interests of Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Having had thirty-five years of close collaboration within the Soviet Antarctic expedition, these former Soviet states are now developing their own Antarctic policies. Russia has managed not only to maintain infrastructure and research, but to actually consolidate and broaden its presence in Antarctica. Today, Russia among all the other former Soviet states is in the strongest position in Antarctica. The other new states manage much smaller interests in Antarctic affairs. What little activities they had, have now been severely affected by the global economic crisis. In the seventh chapter in this section Anne-Marie Brady looks at the strategic interests of another state with a strong Antarctic connection, the smallest of the seven claimant states in the ATS, New Zealand. Brady argues that New Zealand's “Antarctic propinquity” (to borrow a term much used by Jack Child when describing the Antarctic interests of Southern Cone states) gives it a special sense of connection to the continent that other nations might find hard to understand or accept. Brady profiles the various bodies involved

in maintaining and negotiating New Zealand's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs. She then discusses New Zealand's core interests in the Antarctic continent that help to shape its Antarctic policy, attitude towards the ATS, and maintenance of its claimant rights. Historically New Zealand has taken a relatively mild stance on its claimant status and the government continues to take great pains to avoid offending other Antarctic players, at the same time as maintaining its claim to Antarctic heritage. The final chapter in this section, by Chavelli Sulikowski, examines the nature and extent of France's involvement in Antarctica and the ATS. France has an extensive history of involvement in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region, it is a claimant to continental Antarctic territory and sub-Antarctic islands, and is an original signatory to the 1959 Treaty. Sulikowski identifies the influences driving and shaping France's contemporary Antarctic and subAntarctic policies and how these play out in France's diplomacy at the ATS. France is an active Treaty member — most notably through its membership and participation in major ATS institutions such as the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the Committee on Environmental Protection (CeP) – and had a crucial role in bringing about a moratorium on mineral extraction in Antarctica. Whether or not to mine the riches of Antarctica was a hot topic of the 1980s and early 1990s and there are signs it may well heat up again. However, at present the issue can be regarded as at “lukewarm” in terms of urgency; in contrast, other concerns are getting close to “red hot”. The final section of the book examines some of these “burning issues”. Despite popular impressions of Antarctica being a land of snow and ice, Antarctica is, at the same time, tinder dry, and fires are an ever present danger. Similarly, the issues Antarctic governance must now face up to are also “tinder dry” issues such as how to make Antarctica more accessible to a greater number of nations, how to deal with non-state actors in Antarctica, how to regulate tourism, and how to deal with the challenge of bioprospecting. In the first chapter in this section Aant elzinga argues for a greater internationalisation of Antarctic science programmes as a means to bring about greater democracy in access to Antarctica for developing states. Elzinga reminds us that the Antarctic Treaty was established primarily as a means to balance the interests of the USA and USSR in Antarctica by limiting Antarctic engagement to science. The idealistic goal of this

arrangement was that political interests could be sublimated into science and that national rivalries could be constructively translated into competition (and cooperation) in research. Unfortunately for the developing world and smaller, less powerful, countries, these terms have set the price tag of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party membership too high. As noted earlier, this inherent inequity in the terms of membership has been at the root of historical opposition by some developing countries to the ATS as a means for governing Antarctica. In the chapter Elzinga compares multilateral collaboration in other fields such as astronomy or physics where participating nations do not primarily rally around their own flag. He suggests that in Antarctica a similar model could be followed. Rather than Antarctic research being led by national programmes as at present, international participation in Antarctic research could be greatly enhanced if there were scientific stations managed under the banner of a collective supra-national frame such as the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat. In recent years two Antarctic claimant states, New Zealand and Australia, have made small steps to increase the participation of two developing countries with an interest in Antarctica, Malaysia and Indonesia, by inviting them to share facilities at their base. The 2007–2008 International Polar year had a small programme to enable scientists in other developing countries to join in the Antarctic research of established Antarctic players. However, these small steps are still too slight to make any real progression in the challenge of how to enhance the involvement of the approximately6 147 sovereign states in the world that are not signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, yet have a right to benefit from what can be gained from Antarctica. In the second chapter in this section jane verbitsky looks at another burning issue, the environmental risks posed by rapidly increasing Antarctic tourism and the politics of regulating this activity. Although scientific research is promoted in the Antarctic Treaty as the primary activity on the continent, tourists now overwhelmingly outnumber scientists there. Tourism could now be said to be both the main source of human activity and the key utiliser of resources in the territory, yet there are very little means to regulate it. This rapid increase in tourism presents considerable challenges for the ATS and the Consultative Parties to the Treaty. These include sovereignty, resource protection, governance, regime compliance, and the problem of how to manage the activities of commercial operators based in countries which are non-signatories. Verbitsky examines how the ATS has responded thus far to

the problems caused by increasing tourist numbers, and argues strongly for a new multilateral tourism convention on Antarctic travel. As the various chapters in this book aptly illustrate, though Antarctica is formally owned by no one state, matters of sovereignty and ownership of resources are a source of much of the bones of contention. In the final chapter of the book julia jabour explores Antarctic bioprospecting, which is currently unregulated in the ATS, looking at it from an ethical point of view. Jabour uses Antarctic bioprospecting as a case study to re-examine the fundamental question as to whether the Antarctic is global commons and whether its resources should be considered the common heritage of humankind. Jabour argues that exclusive reward from bioprospecting is as legitimate as exclusive reward from fishing for the states party to the relevant instruments of the ATS. If sample collection is all that actually occurs in the Antarctic, then reporting the findings will suffice in terms of obligations owed to all humankind under the provisions that require scientific results and observations from Antarctica be shared (Treaty Preamble and Article III). Jabour asserts that the prospect of a challenge by developing countries based on commons arguments is remote, and that the supremacy of the ATCPs goes unchallenged today, fifty years into their governance of Antarctica. It certainly would be difficult to significantly change Antarctica's unique and in the eyes of its critics, antiquated, governance system under the current global order. To return to the questions initially posed at the beginning of this preface it would seem that many of our authors fear that the ATS is not coping well with the needs of the emerging world order and its power imbalance certainly reflects the realities of that order. Furthermore, despite the idealistic rhetoric of the Antarctic Treaty and the faith of its adherents, the key priority of most nations engaged with Antarctica today appears to be much as it was in an earlier era, the desire to maintain access to current and future resources there. The ATS in its present form suits the needs of the established Antarctic players, but still appears unable to meet the needs of less established states. And yet for all its failings, no other instrument of governance is available to deal with all the issues involved in governing the Antarctic continent and Southern Ocean. So far the rise of new actors with interests in Antarctica has not upset the current system as they are still working with it as it stands. Antarctic governance clearly needs to democratise, but efforts to achieve this have so far been too little, and too

late. The unspoken aim of the Antarctic Treaty was to remove “the politics” — conflict over resources — from the Antarctic continent, leaving it to the scientists and, in recent years, increasingly to the tourists. Yet politics is an intrinsic part of human society and the multiple chapters in this volume illustrate some of the many ways in which politics continue to affect Antarctica today. It is my hope that this volume will inspire still further research on the multiple dimensions of Antarctic politics and, increasingly, from as global a perspective as possible. Only by encouraging all affected parties to speak openly about interests and sources of conflict can we hope to bring about true peace and cooperation there.

Notes 1

Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How?, New York: Meridian Books, 1958.

2

Prabir G. Dastidar and S. Ramachandran, “Intellectual structure of Antarctic science: a 25 years analysis”, Scientometrics, Vol. 77, No. 3 (2008), pp. 389–414.

3

John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in politics and science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31, 11075, DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075.

4

Andrew heywood, Politics, New york: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 4.

5

Beau Riffenburgh, ed., Encyclopedia of the Antarctic, London: Routledge, 2007.

6

“Approximately” because what constitutes a sovereign state is debatable in international law.

Part I Antarctic politics in the current world order

1

The Antarctic Treaty System

Challenges, coordination, and congruity Haward Marcus

Introduction The Antarctic is a place of superlatives related to its physical environment — the coldest, highest, driest continent — but its governing arrangements are also in their own way impressive. The Antarctic Treaty1 is a remarkable instrument, providing a framework of peaceful collaboration and scientific endeavour as well as demilitarising an entire continent. It also provides a formula to address territorial claims and interests. The treaty and its key subordinate and complementary instruments form the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).2 Interaction within and without the ‘system’ centres on and has affected power relations, conflict, and questions of resource allocation.3 Such interactions have led to external challenges to and internally generated critiques of the ATS. They have also raised issues of coordination within the ATS and the extent to which values within the system provide or reflect current international norms. This chapter considers the politics of Antarctica through the examination of the development and evolution of the ATS, utilising definitions that consider politics as centring on the articulation of, and management of conflicts over, interests. Interests are never uncontested, nor are they always clearly articulated or separable. I have chosen to explore the politics of Antarctica by identifying and examining challenges, both internal and external, to the ATS; considering the ways in which interests, ideas, and actions are coordinated; and exploring the level of congruity between the ATS and other instruments, institutions, and regimes. This framework, and drawing on the insights made by other contributors to this volume, provides a means to assess the performance of the ATS in the politics of Antarctica.

The politics of Antarctica Politics is clearly a contested concept. Otto von Bismark famously likened the political process to the making of sausages: “the less people know about how sausages and laws are made, the better they'll sleep at night”.4 The inference is one should not look too closely nor enquire too deeply into the political process. While there is much to commend in a focus on outputs, focusing on the process of decision-making is a key to understanding politics. Bernard Crick saw politics “as the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power [and] where politics proves successful in ensuring reasonable stability and order”.5 A working definition of politics includes considering power relations, conflict management, and resource allocation,6 or, as Harold Lasswell noted, “who gets what, when and how”.7 Politics is managing conflicts or mediating differences over policy preferences or interests. Discussion, debate, and differences of opinion are the signs of a healthy system. Progress is made when ideas are debated, new approaches put forward and tested, even if the initial action or initiative is met with resistance or opposition. As noted also in other contributions to this volume, politics in the form of disputes and differences over territorial claims and sovereignty in Antarctica (geopolitics8) was an impetus for the Antarctic Conference that led to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. These differences and disputes — what was termed the “Antarctic Problem”9 — provided the first major challenge for Antarctic states.10 It not only involved overlapping territorial claims and disputed sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula (“the ABC dispute” between Argentina, Britain, Chile)11 but reflected broader differences between claimant and non-claimant states. A solution to the Antarctic Problem also needed to accommodate the interests of the cold war superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, both active in the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (IGY).12

Science and international collaboration — the international polar years Increased impetus for Antarctic exploration and scientific research occurred in the period following the end of the Second World War. This period, dominated by cold war tension between two superpowers — the United States of America and the Soviet Union — did not exclude Antarctica. The USA's expeditions High Jump 1946–47 and Deep Freeze 1955–56 reinvigorated Antarctic science and debates over Antarctica's geopolitics in the post-war period. Increased interest in Antarctica led, as Elzinga13 records, to the development of the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). SCAR14 was constituted in 1958. The IGY in 1957–58 followed earlier “International Polar Years”, the first in 1882–83,15 and the second established fifty years later in 1932–33, with the third in 2007–09.16 The first International Polar Year (IPY) occurred after seven years of development. This first IPY saw 12 expeditions to the Arctic and three to Antarctica, involving 12 countries. The second IPY, established 50 years later in 1932–33, involved 44 countries and encouraged the development of further international collaboration on polar science, although this collaboration was halted during the Second World War, with a concomitant reduction in Antarctic activity.17 Developments in science and technology, and the transfer of technology developed during the cataclysm of the Second World War into peaceful purposes encouraged international collaboration on polar science. Proposals for a further multi-national polar science programme to take advantage of favourable solar conditions, focusing on an emerging area of space research, led to the establishment of the IGY, with a 25-rather than 50-year interval from the second IPY. The focus of polar research was conditioned, too, by concerns over the consequences of emergent areas of space research, the “missile gap” and concerns over the relative strengths of science and technology in the West as opposed to the Soviet Union.18 The success of the IGY also ensured that the primary value of scientific research was reiterated during the Antarctic conference and embedded in the Antarctic Treaty, with science seen as “the currency” of the ATS.19 While

science was promoted, geopolitics was not forgotten in the IGY; the Soviet Union established research stations in each of the claimant states' territories during the International Geophysical Year in 1957–58, while the United States established the Amundsen–Scott station at the south geographic pole, effectively within each claimant's territorial claim.20 The broadening and deepening of multi-national scientific collaboration continued, with the third IPY occurring in 2007–09. The 2007–09 IPY was established through the International Polar Year Joint Committee of the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). The IPY focused on research on the atmosphere, ice, land, oceans, people, and space, within six broad themes,21 involving 63 nations, 400 projects, and approximately 50,000 scientists working in both polar regions.22 The 2007–09 IPY emphasised education and outreach, linking the IPY science to education programmes. While the 2007–09 IPY may not have had the same geopolitical context as IGY – the era of Sputnik and the beginning of the global space race – it nonetheless continued the pattern of major scientific collaboration in Antarctica that had been initiated by the IGY.

From science to diplomacy – the Antarctic Treaty The successful international collaboration during the IGY gave great impetus to the negotiation of the Antarctic treaty, yet the form of the treaty, or its membership, were not a given as a result of the successes of the IGY. The agreement not to pursue territorial claims during the IGY, what was termed the “Standstill Proposal”,23 was to be important in the subsequent treaty conference. Most significantly the IGY included the establishment of major scientific research programmes, stations, and facilities in the Antarctic by both the USA and USSR. The involvement of the Soviet Union in the IGY was significant but its participation in the Antarctic Conference raised some concerns, with Australia's Foreign Minister playing a major role in ensuring Soviet participation in the conference and support for the Treaty.24 The parties to the Antarctic conference had to grapple with the Antarctic Problem. The standstill proposal enabled the collaboration and linkages between claimant states25 and others essential to the success of the IGY to occur, yet other options were being proposed prior to the Antarctic conference.26 Prior to the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty in 1958–59 New Zealand Prime Minister Nash did indicate he favoured internationalisation of the Antarctic, a position at odds with other claimants and the USA, and indeed at odds with sections of his government. The Chilean standstill initiative provided a modus vivendi to resolve the differences between claimants and others, and the base of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, widely accepted as the lynchpin of the treaty and the ATS. The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 by the 12 nations that had been active in Antarctica during the IGY. Formal negotiations in Washington lasted 18 months from June 1958 and included 60 preparatory meetings and a formal diplomatic Conference on Antarctica. The conference opened on 15 October 1959 and ended with the Antarctic Treaty open for signature on 1 December 1959. The Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60° South Latitude and: •

stipulates that Antarctica should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes — military activities, such as the establishment of military bases or weapons testing, are specifically prohibited;

•

guarantees freedom to conduct scientific research;

•

promotes international scientific cooperation and requires that the results of research be made freely available;

•

sets aside the potential for sovereignty disputes between Treaty parties by providing that no activities will enhance or diminish previously asserted positions with respect to territorial claims, provides that no new or enlarged claims can be made, and makes rules relating to jurisdiction;

•

prohibits nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste;

•

provides for inspection to ensure compliance with the Treaty — a worldfirst weapons inspection system;

•

requires advance notice of expeditions; and

•

provides for the parties to discuss measures to further the Treaty.27

The twin pillars of peace and science, embodied in Articles I and II of the Treaty, are central to the operation of the treaty system. Article I: 1

Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.

2

The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.

Article II: Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.28 The commitments to peace and science have been buttressed by the solution to the Antarctic Problem that provides a means to prohibit any further territorial claims, while not derogating any existing claims, or interests in Antarctica. This elegant solution, embodied in the wording of Article IV of the treaty, has provided the basis for interaction over the following half

century. This Article has often been misrepresented, so it is important to include it in full: Article IV: 1

Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: (a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; (b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

2

No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.29

Articles I, II, and IV and the statement in the Preamble to the Treaty that Antarctica shall not become the scene or object of international discord, provide the basis for political interaction within the ATS. Peaceful use was enhanced by the inherent tensions of the cold war and science provided an important impetus for the negotiations that led to the Antarctic Treaty most notably through the IGY. The success of the Antarctic component of the IGY itself showed that the Antarctic states including the superpowers could work together, setting aside differences related to claims or sovereignty. Science is the basis for achievement of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP) status that in turn enables parties to take part in decision-making in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM). Science remains a salient feature of the ATS and its value has increased with current major research programmes being undertaken by ATCPs. Current multi-national programmes are addressing key uncertainties identified by the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change affecting projection of future sea level rise: the behaviour of the great Antarctic ice sheets.30 Other research includes ice core drilling to provide paleo-climate records (through analysis of air trapped in bubbles in the ice) back to 600,000 years before the present.31 A focus on science was reinforced by the Antarctic Treaty containing specific commitments to peaceful activity, demilitarisation, the banning of nuclear activity, and creating an inspection regime to help ensure compliance. The inspection regime has retained its central role, it is a matter taken seriously by the ATCPs and has helped ensure best practice in operational matters is shared among parties. The provision of the inspection regime where, in theory, inspections by other ATCPs can be made anywhere, anytime has provided an important model for, and contribution to, other international arms control instruments such as the Chemical Weapons Treaty.32

Interaction within the Antarctic Treaty System At one level it could be argued that the Antarctic Treaty's commitment to avoiding discord, embodying consensus, and managing territorial claims has removed much of what would be seen as traditional politics. Although the system has been seen as sui generis33 (the ATS managed for many years without much of the machinery associated with international instruments)34 politics is central to the Antarctic. Claimant states, their interests protected by the provisions of Article IV of the treaty, have been able to balance these interests and their Treaty commitments through what has been termed bifocalism.35 Bifocalism refers to the “productively ambiguous” formulation of the question of sovereignty36 allowing claimant states to act on the basis of territoriality while nonclaimants act under Article IV on the basis of their status as consultative parties.37 Bifocalism serves a number of purposes, and allows claimant and non-claimants to pursue their respective interest through the system. It provides a means for geopolitical interests to be managed within the framework of international collaboration established by the Antarctic Treaty and given effect by the number of non-claimant states acceding to the Treaty. Importantly, bifocalism buttressed by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, is the basis for the commitment of the claimant states to the goals and objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. This view is challenged by the post-colonial critique of the ATS, as elaborated by Chaturvedi in this volume.38 The post-colonial view holds that “the ATS continues to be hostage to a regressive, and of late increasingly assertive, legacy of the imperial-colonial era”.39 The heroic era, and the activities and actions undertaken during it to support territorial acquisition, was driven in large part by the motives of the imperial era. At the same time, however, the heroic era, as noted above, can be viewed as much a part of the enlightenment project, driven by science and scientific discovery. The postcolonial critique is a useful, although in my view limited, framing of the politics of Antarctica. This critique40 is not supported by much of the evidence of the claimant states' commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and their work in the ongoing evolution of the ATS, including support for states to

accede to the Treaty. The claimant states' position has altered significantly within the ATCMs over the 50 years from 1961 from a majority (seven of 12 to a minority seven of 28). They remain, however, influential parties, with a number of examples illustrating the role of claimants as advocates within the ATS and particularly in the ATCM in addressing emerging issues and topics, as shown in Brady's consideration of “New Zealand's Antarctica” and Sulikowski's examination of France's roles in the Antarctic Treaty System.41 Australia and France spearheaded the overturning of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) in favour of a more explicit environmental protection regime.42 Criticisms of the overtly inwardlooking nature of the ATCPs is countered by their support for the broadening of participation within the ATCMs, through inclusion by observers from the United Nations specialised agencies and non-governmental groups such as IAATO and ASOC.43 Malaysia — a major critic of the ATS in the 1980s (see following and Hamzah in this volume) — has been invited to observe ATCMs and has been supported in developing its Antarctic science programmes44 by ATCPs, including the claimant states of New Zealand and Australia. Claimant states “carried their weight” in the ATS in terms of contributions to the work in and between the ATCMs. Recently New Zealand hosted a meeting of experts on the management of marine-based tourism in the Antarctic Treaty area and Norway hosted a meeting of experts on climate change.45 These examples of engagement with the Antarctic agenda are in the states' national interest and are examples of bifocalism in action.

Challenges The ATS, and the Antarctic Treaty, have been subjected to challenge. Challenges have been mounted internally by ATCPs, most notably in the debate and overturing of CRAMRA. Equally important was the external challenge led by Malaysia that was initiated in the early 1980s. Malaysia urged Antarctica to be considered common heritage, a concept drawn from the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. As noted below the interaction between the ATS and both the United Nations and the Law of the Sea Convention has shaped challenges to the system.

The CRAMRA story has formed a significant literature in relation to the operation and politics of the ATS.46 It is accepted that this challenge provided major pressure on the ATS, yet this pressure was released with recognition by the ATCPs of the wide-ranging support for a more explicit commitment to environmental protection. This shift was spearheaded by international and national activity by non-governmental groups that provided a further set of challenges to the ATCPs. Non-governmental groups and their supporters, Australia and the United States, argued for more open access to the ATCM, and for observer status within the system. One outcome of the minerals debate, and the broader discussions over the Question of Antarctica (see following and Hamzah in this volume) in the 1980s was to broaden participation of non-ATCPs in key forums such as the ATCMs. The negotiation of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty addressed this challenge and, consequently, re-shaped the politics of Antarctica. In establishing a comprehensive environmental regime, and the Committee on Environmental Protection, the treaty parties encouraged the development of a focus on environmental impacts, based on multidisciplinary approaches to Antarctic science. In addition the ATCPs continued their engagement with non-governmental organisations and other international organisations. The minerals “debate” highlighted the ability of the ATCPs to resolve both internal and external challenges to the system. While the nature of decisionmaking within the ATS mediates any substantial rifts between parties, an example from within the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) indicates the way in which parties can manage internal challenges. At the 21st meeting of the Commission in 2002 Australia tabled a proposal to list toothfish on Appendix II of the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Despite having the support of key non-governmental groups, this proposal raised strong opposition within CCAMLR. Only New Zealand supported Australia, with 75 paragraphs of the report of CCAMLR XXI recording opposition to Australia's proposal.47 Australia, accepting the failure to gain consensus, withdrew its original proposal at a subsequent CITES meeting. In its place, a compromise proposed by Chile to encourage closer use of CCAMLR measures in regulating illegal and unreported and unregulated catch of toothfish was adopted by CITES.

An interesting example of politics within the ATS relates to the intersection between the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and the Antarctic Treaty.48 This example also transcends the simple dichotomy of internal challenge and internal critique. It was provisions within the LOSC, most notably that of the “common heritage of mankind” that was one of the drivers of Malaysia's long-standing (though evolving) challenge to the Antarctic Treaty and ATS. As is well recognised, however, “the LOSC does not directly address Antarctica but covers the maritime areas within the Treaty Area”.49 A number of commentators have noted that the Antarctic was not mentioned in the deliberations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, while the Antarctic Treaty does not derogate from any rights under the law of the sea.50 These factors, together with the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, have meant that the declaration of maritime zones by Antarctic claimants has been controversial. On 1 November 1979 Australia proclaimed a 200-mile Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) including the waters of the external territories such as the AAT,51 but “one month later a new proclamation was made exempting the waters around the AAT”.52 While all claimant states have declared maritime zones of their Antarctic territories these zones vary in type and on the basis of their establishment.53 This is another example of bifocalism, where enforcement of laws related to these zones is made against nationals and vessels fagged to the respective claimant state, not against foreign nationals or vessels. Commentators have noted that a number of questions arise in relation to maritime zones, including the question of determining baselines. Some have even questioned whether coastal states exist in Antarctica given the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, and the prohibitions on extending or altering a claimant's territory under the provisions of Article IV of the treaty.54 The LOSC provides coastal states with the ability to claim an extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from its coastline under certain circumstances. This includes providing scientific data to support the claim for an extended area, and for these data to be submitted for assessment by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), an expert body established under the LOSC. Given the status of territorial claims in the Antarctic, the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf by claimant

states was controversial and posed a challenge to the ATCPs. All claimant states have addressed this issue. Australia was the first to lodge its data on its claims to an extended continental shelf, but requested that the CLCS not examine the data associated with the AAT.55 The delimitation of the Antarctic continental shelf utilised a range of provisions available to Australia under Article 76 of the LOSC, including the “sediment thickness formula”, and as a result has provided significant scientific data for further research.56 One important outcome from the sediment cores drilled offshore from the AAT as part of the scientific research programme to delimit the continental shelf was to give important data on the paleo-climate record used in climate reconstructions as part of Australian research on global climate change.57 New Zealand took advantage of an alternative practice available to all parties to the LOSC in relation to the delimitation of its extended continental shelf, by lodging a partial submission to the CLCS. It lodged data related to the mainland of New Zealand and its islands but did not address the question of the continental shelf off the Ross Dependency (the official name for the New Zealand Antarctic territory). The United Kingdom and France have likewise made partial submissions. Norway has followed Australia and submitted data for an extended continental shelf off its Antarctic territory, but asked the CLCS not to examine this material.58 Chile has indicated that it will consider the issue in relation to its Antarctic claim. Argentina submitted a claim for a continental shelf that included areas claimed by the United Kingdom. Argentina has objected to the announcements made by the United Kingdom, which in turn has opposed Argentina's claim.59 These claims reflect ongoing disputes over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas located outside the Antarctic treaty area. The most substantial external critique of the Antarctic Treaty and the ATS has been that initiated by Malaysia within the context of the United Nations General Assembly on the matter referred to as the Question of Antarctica, first raised as an item for debate in 1983. Malaysia argued that the central contention was that Antarctica should be designated as the common heritage of mankind, to protect the interests of developing nations. It also claimed that the Antarctic Treaty was flawed because the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) decision-making process excluded non-consultative parties and the views of the wider international community, and that it was one of

the final reminders of a colonialist order not least because of the existence of seven claimant states including Australia and the continued participation of South Africa.60 Malaysia also indicated a concern over the ability of the ATS to protect the Antarctic environment.61 This element of Malaysia's critique anticipated the internal challenge within the ATS in the latter part of the decade to the robustness of the treaty system over mineral exploitation. This period saw the ATS undergo fundamental reform, with the ATCPs simultaneously addressing the challenges of environmental management and the scientific imperatives that go with it and opening up the ATCM to broader-based interests, while maintaining control over the system and its processes.

Coordination The centrality of consensus decision-making within the ATS has a major impact on the functioning of the system. Gaining agreement or coordination within ATS forums is central to the development of system-based outcomes. The corollary to this, and an effect of consensus decision-making is that a single consultative party can effectively veto any initiative. Coordination also involves, increasingly, a number of extra-system instruments and institutions. There is an extensive array of instruments that can apply to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, and thus intersect with the ATS. These instruments include the Law of the Sea Convention, MARPOL 73/78, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the London [Dumping] Convention/Protocol, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or the Bonn Convention), the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention), and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).62 Coordination with some instruments has been accomplished easily, for example the MARPOL and SOLAS conventions have guided ATCPs in their practice and the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or the Bonn Convention) forms the basis for the Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP). Interaction with other instruments has, however, been more challenging. Whaling, for example, was

specifically excluded from coverage by the Antarctic Treaty and subsequently from CCAMLR. The Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary, established in 1994, includes much of the CCAMLR Area. The northern boundary of this Sanctuary follows the 40°S parallel of latitude except in the Indian Ocean sector where it joins the southern boundary of that sanctuary at 55°S, and around South America and into the South Pacific where the boundary is at 60°S.63 Current controversy extends over Japan's scientific whaling programme research involving the lethal take of whales that occurs within the Antarctic Treaty Area (and in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary). This has provided an interesting challenge for CCAMLR's ecosystem-based approach to management. It took many years for the scientific committees of the International Whaling Commission and CCAMLR to meet, yet each recognised the importance of the southern ocean ecosystem. Whaling has been quarantined from debate within the ATCM with the result that the operational aspects of Japan's whaling programme (for example questions over the response to, and consequences of, the fire on the factory vessel the Nishin Maru raised by New Zealand in 2007) have not been able to be discussed, despite such incidents being of concern to many parties. Treaty parties have clearly accepted that discussions on whaling would be problematic and create unnecessary tension and stress the accommodations made through bifocalism. The parties to the ATS have also resisted direct coordination with other instruments. As noted above attempts to link the management of toothfish species, and the CCAMLR catch documentation scheme, to the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) were strongly opposed. Although ATCPs have utilised the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) to nominate and manage areas on sub-Antarctic Islands, they have resisted the extension of this instrument to Antarctica. Debates on biological prospecting, “the study of genetic materials and determination of commercially important genetic codes and the harvesting of in situ organisms for extraction of biochemicals”,64 within the ATCM have resisted linking this matter to programmes and practices with the United Nations Environment Programme.

Congruity The ATS has provided important opportunities where initiatives from within the system have been taken up by other regional and international organisations. There are a number of examples that draw on the definition of politics used in this paper: ensuring reasonable stability and order. Quite apart from the Antarctic Treaty providing a model for the Moon Treaty (the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1979) the treaty provides, as noted above, a model inspection regime for arms control and limitation instruments. The latter are good examples of the way in which the treaty can address issues of power politics. In relation to resource allocation, CCAMLR pioneered a precautionary ecosystem-based approach to marine living resources management. This innovative approach has since been incorporated more widely into other international instruments and management organisations.65 The development of international instruments to address conservation of albatross and petrel species from initiatives within the ATS is a further example of its work being congruous with emerging international norms and expectations. That this issue was first addressed in the ATS, more specifically in CCAMLR, is no surprise as the majority of Southern Hemisphere albatross and petrel species occur in the CCAMLR Convention Area.66 The issue of incidental mortality associated with fishing operations was first raised at the Third Meeting of the CCAMLR in 1984. By the beginning of the next decade the issue of incidental catches of albatross received considerable attention. From this the matter of incidental catches of albatrosses and petrels was addressed by relevant pelagic tuna fisheries management organisations. In turn the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) supported the development of an International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries.67 There is a specific resource allocation issue in the Southern Ocean related to the problems of illegal unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. While “freedom to fish” is seen by many states as one of the traditional freedoms of the high seas, this freedom, since the development and codification of the law of the sea, has become increasingly fettered. IUU is defined as fishing that ignores the provisions of the law of the sea or regulations and arrangements from responsible management bodies. The concept developed in CCAMLR

to describe fishing that took place outside the relevant conservation measures set up to protect and manage fish stocks in the CCAMLR region. Concerns raised in CCAMLR meetings led to the matter being raised at the FAO's Committee on Fisheries, and in turn to the development of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing. Initiatives to tackle IUU fishing are good examples of congruity; but it is worth noting that the initiative from within the ATS builds upon the LOSC and, together with complementary actions outside the ATS, has created a new regime for high seas fisheries.68 This regime builds on the experiences of CCAMLR and includes commitments to regional fisheries organisations, a strong scientific base for decisions on catch allocation, the introduction of ecosystem approaches to management, and the use of trade and market-based management tools.

Conclusion As the foundation stone of the regime governing the Antarctic, the Antarctic Treaty has been highly successful and effective when assessed against its core provisions: that the continent be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that freedom to conduct scientific research is guaranteed and international scientific cooperation is promoted. This chapter argues that the success of the Antarctic Treaty is built on the provisions of Article IV of the treaty and the concept of bifocalism, providing opportunities for claimant states to support the ATS and pursue their interests within this framework. It is also a truism that any assessment is conditioned by the position the assessor takes. There is some concern over the ATCPs' failure to effectively engage with non-parties or other international institutions or instruments. Chaturvedi is concerned that the accommodation provided by Article IV is under potential threat from actions by “assertive” claimant states.69 These are interesting criticisms. The ATCPs have been unwilling to engage in certain topics, even when congruous to their interests. Topics such as whaling remain quarantined from discussion in the ATS. Emergent issues, too, have shown that challenges remain. IUU fishing poses ongoing challenges to the effectiveness of CCAMLR's conservation measures. Biological prospecting has yet to be addressed in an effective manner. Actions by claimant states in relation to the delimitation of continental shelf have shown the success to date of a nuanced approach to this issue but at the same time it may rekindle the ABC issue, a focal point in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. The basis of the success of the Antarctic Treaty — the outstanding feature of Article IV that balanced claimant and non-claimant interests — was reinforced by the exhortation that the parties agree that Antarctica “continue[s] forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”.70 This chapter has explicitly posed a question in relation to an assessment of the Antarctic Treaty over the half century from its signing. This question, while centred on the treaty, also allows for an exploration of the broader politics of Antarctica. The commitments to peace through demilitarisation, the banning of nuclear activity, and the establishment of an inspection regime are major

achievements. The provisions of the Antarctic Treaty have opened up a politics of Antarctica that centres on consensus and collaboration, yet at the same time addresses, effectively, the national interests that had given rise to the Antarctic Problem.

Notes 1

Antarctic Treaty (1959), 402 UNTS 7. Entered into force 23 June 1961.

2

The ATS includes the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) 1972; the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980) 19 ILM 841. Entered into force 7 April 1982; the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991) 30 ILM 1455. Entered into force 15 January 1998; as well as the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat and the CCAMLR Commission and Secretariat. The Agreement for the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), entered into force 1 February 2004, is an instrument of the Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS or the Bonn Convention) originated from discussion within CCAMLR. While not directly linked to the Antarctic Treaty ACAP has an observer at and does provide a report to the ATCM.

3

This form of politics is as significant as “geopolitics”; see below.

4

Otto von Bismark, www.ThinkExist.com (accessed 7 August 2010).

5

B. Crick, In Defence of Politics rev. edn., Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1964, p. 21.

6

A. Mason, “Politics and the State”, Political Studies 38 (1990), pp. 575– 587.

7

H. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How, New York, Peter Smith, 1950 [1936].

8

Brady, Chaturvedi, Elzinga, and Jabour in this volume each address different aspects of the influence of geopolitics on the Antarctic Treaty and Treaty System. Geopolitics clearly shaped state interests in the negotiation of the Treaty, but has continued to influence engagement within the system to the present, as discussed in the contributions in Part II of this book.

9

E. W. H. Christie, The Antarctic Problem: A Historical and Political Study, London, Allen and Unwin, 1951. The Antarctic Problem was one of a number of territorial issues in the immediate post-Second World

War period. For example the period also saw the Jerusalem, Trieste, and Berlin “Problems” in international diplomacy; see H. R. Hall, International Regime Formation and Leadership: The Origins of the Antarctic Treaty, PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1994. 10 Hall, note 10. 11 The ABC dispute also involved long-standing interactions between the “southern cone” states; see J. K. Moore, Diplomacy, Public Opinion and the “Fractalization” of US Antarctic Policy, 1946–1959, PhD Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2006. 12 This international effort occurred at the height of the cold war and rising superpower tensions that were to reach a zenith with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. 13 Chapter 10, this volume. 14 Originally termed the Special Committee on Antarctic Research. 15 The first IPY involved 12 expeditions to the Arctic and 3 to Antarctica, involving 12 countries. 16 The second IPY involved 44 countries. The third IPY, 50 years after the IGY in 2007–09, was expected to provide a significant impetus to Antarctic science, although it was unlikely to have the same impact as earlier programmes. See D. W. H. Walton, “Editorial-International Polar Year”, Antarctic Science, 19(1) (2007), p. 1. See also J. Jabour and M. Haward, “Antarctic Science, Politics and IPY Legacies”, in Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and Political Reflections on the International Polar Year, J. M. Shadian and M. Tennberg (eds), Farnham, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2009, pp. 101–124. 17 With the possible exception of the UK's Operation Tabarin in the Antarctic Peninsula, which had obvious geopolitical motivations. 18 P. Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century, New York, Berkley Books/Penguin Group, 2007. 19 R. A. Herr and H. R. Hall, “Science as Currency and the Currency of Science”, in Antarctica: Policies and Policy Development, J. Handmer (ed.), Canberra, CRES Resource and Environmental Studies No. 1, CRES, ANU, 1989, pp. 13–24.

20 Norway does not define either the southern or the northern limits of its claim. 21 These themes were: Theme 1: To determine the present environmental status of the polar regions; Theme 2: To quantify, and understand, past and present natural environmental and social change in the polar regions; and to improve projections of future change; Theme 3: To advance our understanding on all scales of the links and interactions between polar regions and the rest of the globe, and of the processes controlling these links; Theme 4: To investigate the frontiers of science in the polar regions; Theme 5: To use the unique vantage point of the polar regions to develop and enhance observatories from the interior of the Earth to the Sun and the cosmos beyond; and Theme 6: To investigate the cultural, historical, and social processes that shape the sustainability of circumpolar human societies, and to identify their unique contributions to global cultural diversity and citizenship. 22 J. Shadian and M. Tennberg, “Introduction”, in Legacies and Change in Polar Sciences: Historical, Legal and Political Reflections on the International Polar Year, J. M. Shadian and M. Tennberg (eds), Farnham, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1–6. 23 R. Hall, “Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty”, in The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, J. Jabour-Green and M. Haward (eds), Hobart, Antarctic CRC Research Report No. 28, 2001, pp. 27–33. 24 Ibid. 25 The Antarctic “claimant states” are Australia, France, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina, United Kingdom, and Norway. 26 Hall, note 24. 27 A. Bergin and M. Haward, Frozen Assets: Securing Australia's Antarctic Future, Strategic Insight No. 34, Canberra, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Canberra, April 2007, p. 3. 28 Antarctic Treaty, note 1, Articles I and II. 29 Ibid., Article IV. 30 Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre, Position Analysis: Polar Ice Sheet and Climate Change: Global

Impacts, Hobart, ACE CRC, 2009. 31 See Bergin and Haward, note 18. M. Haward, “Climate Change: Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, Science, Law and Policy”, in Climate Change and the Oceans: Gauging the Legal and Policy Tides, R. Warner and C. Schofeld (eds), Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012. 32 C. Moraitis, “Presentation at ‘Treaty Territory Seminar’”, Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery, Hobart, June 2006. 33 See, for example, P. W. Quigg, A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica, New York, New Press, 1983. 34 It was not until 2004 that a permanent Antarctic Treaty Secretariat was established. 35 G. D. Triggs, International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, Sydney, Legal Books, 1986. For claimants the ATS remains important; the first goal of the Australian Antarctic Program is to maintain the Antarctic Treaty System and enhance Australia's influence within the system. 36 C. C. Joyner, “The Role of Domestic Politics in Making United States Antarctic Policy”, in Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, O. S. Stokke and D. Vidas (eds), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 441. 37 Ibid. 38 Chaturvedi, Chapter 3 this volume. 39 Ibid. 40 See also K. Dodds, “Post Colonial Antarctica: An Emerging Engagement”, Polar Record, 42(220) (2006), pp. 59–70. As will be clear, I disagree, respectively, with the position advanced by my friend and colleague Sanjay Chaturvedi in this volume. 41 See respective chapters in this volume. 42 Australia and France did face criticism and very strong opposition from other claimants, particularly New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 43 IAATO — the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators;

ASOC — the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition. 44 Malaysia acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in October 2011. 45 These meetings were held in December 2009 and in April 2010, respectively. See w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/a​t​s​_​m​e​e​t​i​n​g​s​.a​s​p​x​?l​a​n​g​=e​ (accessed 3 December 2010). 46 See, among others, discussion in O. S. Stokke and D. Vidas (eds). Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 47 CCAMLR, Report of The Twenty-First Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia 21 October-1 November 2002. 48 M. Haward, “The Law of the Sea Convention and the Antarctic Treaty System: Constraints or Complementarity”, in Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, S.-Y. Hong and J. van Dyke (eds), Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, pp. 231– 251. 49 M. Haward, D. R. Rothwell, J. Jabour et al., “Australia's Antarctic Agenda”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 60(3) (2006), pp. 439–456. 50 M. Haward, note 49. 51 M. Haward et al., note 50. 52 S. Kaye, Australia's Maritime Boundaries, Wollongong Papers in Marine Affairs No. 4, Wollongong, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1995, p. 191. 53 P. Vigni, “Antarctic Maritime Claims: ‘Frozen Sovereignty’ and the Law of the Sea”, in The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, A. G. Oude Elferink and D. R. Rothwell (eds), The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2001, pp. 85–104. 54 C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1992. 55 J. Jabour, “High Latitude Diplomacy: Australia's Antarctic Extended Continental Shelf”, Marine Policy 30(2) (2006), pp. 197–198.

56 M. Haward, note 49. 57 Ibid. 58 M. Haward and A. Bergin, “Vision not Vigilantism: Reply to Dodds and Hemmings”, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 56(4) (2010), pp. 612–616. 59 The Guardian, 24 April 2009. 60 R. Tepper and M. Haward, “The Development of Malaysia's Position on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record, 41(217) (2005), pp. 113–124. 61 Z. A. Sulong, “Question of Antarctica: Address by Permanent Representative to the United Nations Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong on the ‘Question of Antarctica’ on November 28th, 1983”, Foreign Affairs Malaysia 16(4) (1983), p. 446. 62 M. Haward, “Governance and Management of The Southern Ocean: Approaching Assessments of Regime Effectiveness”, paper presented at International Studies Association (ISA) Conference 2008, San Francisco, 26–30 March 2008. h​t​t​p​://c​o​n​v​e​n​t​i​o​n​2​.a​l​l​a​c​a​d​e​m​i​c​.c​o​m​/o​n​e​/i​s​a​/i​s​a​0​8​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p​ (accessed 9 August 2012). 63 International Whaling Commission, “Whale Sanctuaries”, w​w​w​.i​w​c​o​f​f​c​e​.o​r​g​/c​o​n​s​e​r​v​a​t​i​o​n​/s​a​n​c​t​u​a​r​i​e​s​.h​t​m​ (accessed 3 August 2010). 64 Netherlands, Belgium, and France, “Biological Prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area — Scoping for a Regulatory Framework”, Working Paper 36, ATCM XXX, 2007. 65 M. Haward, et al., note 50. 66 H. R Hall and M. Haward, “Enhancing Compliance with International Legislation and Agreements Mitigating Seabird Mortality on Longlines”, Marine Ornithology, 28 (2001), pp. 183–190. 67 Ibid. 68 C. Joyner, “The International Ocean Regime at the New Millennium: A Survey of the Contemporary Legal Order”, Ocean and Coastal Management, 43 (2000), pp. 163–203. 69 Chaturvedi, Chapter 3, this volume.

70 Preamble to the Antarctic Treaty.

Part II Antarctica and competing foreign policy objectives

2

China's Antarctic interests

Anne-Marie Brady

China is entering a new phase in its engagement with Antarctica. During China's most recent two Five-Year Plans (2006–2010 and 2011–2015) the Chinese government significantly increased its expenditure on Antarctic affairs from around US$20 million in 2003, to the current figure of around US$55 million per annum, as well as investing in major new purchases such as a US$300 million new icebreaker. China's increased spend is being used to upgrade and extend China's Antarctic presence and, ultimately, to increase China's Antarctic influence. In 2005 Chinese Antarctic scientists successfully reached Dome A, one of the last great unexplored territories of Antarctica. In the 2008–2009 austral summer, a Chinese construction team began building a new base there, while other teams worked to upgrade China's other two Antarctic stations. China is setting up a new polar research and logistics base in Shanghai and, by 2014, they will be able to use a new icebreaker and icecapable planes, enabling Chinese researchers to fly in to Antarctica, rather than go by boat. There is even talk of China setting up a fourth Antarctic base.1 China was initially excluded from joining the Antarctic Treaty for political reasons and was not able to join until 1983. However, China's increased activities in Antarctica (as well as the Arctic) refect the country's growing economic and political power and international ambitions. In the past, China's polar programmes were restricted by a lack of available funds and of scientists with polar expertise. However, since 2010, China has been the

world's second largest economy. The current global economic downturn only accentuates China's economic importance. China now has a growing pool of experienced polar scientists to draw on and a network of polar research centres nationwide. In order to better understand what this change in China's Antarctic engagement means for other states, this chapter first surveys the range of China's Antarctic capacities and interests. I will then examine the following questions: Will China's increased investment in and engagement with Antarctic affairs impinge on the interests of other Antarctic Treaty nations or those who have not yet joined the Treaty but have expressed an interest in the continent? Is China interested in challenging the status quo in the balance of power in Antarctic governance or is it merely protecting its own interests? The chapter places China's Antarctic involvement within the context of its evolving domestic and foreign policy. It is based on a critical review of contemporary Chinese social science writing on Antarctica, articles in key Chinese government media outlets, interviews and correspondence with Chinese and non-Chinese Antarctic specialists, and a review of relevant secondary sources on Chinese foreign and domestic policy.2

China's Antarctic organisations China has a range of government organisations which participate in Antarctic policymaking and the international governance of Antarctica. The State Oceanic Administration (SOA) is the main government body engaged in maintaining China's Antarctic (and Arctic) interests. Since 2008 SOA has been under the direct leadership of the powerful Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (Guojia ziyuanbu). Other government ministries dealing with specifc aspects of China's Antarctic affairs such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Department of Treaties and Law), Fisheries, and Transport, also participate in China's Antarctic policymaking and China's national delegations to Antarctic governance meetings. The Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research (Zhongguo jidi kaocha gongzuo zixun weiyuanhui) is led by China's State Oceanic Administration, but has crossagency functions to advise all Chinese government departments with polar interests. The committee is charged with advising the Chinese leadership and bureaucracy on polar matters, organising scholarly conferences on polar themes, and evaluating China's polar research programme and its outcomes. Within the State Oceanic Administration is located the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), Guojia haiyangju jidi kaocha bangongshi. CAA has around 40 personnel. It coordinates China's Antarctic research nationwide, facilitates cooperation with other countries, and deals with administrative matters regarding China's polar expeditions as well as its membership in Antarctic Treaty organisations and committees. CAA also supervises the Polar Research Institute of China (Zhongguo jidi yanjiu zhongxin), which is located in Shanghai and is the logistics base for China's polar expeditions. The Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) is China's leading national organisation for polar-related research. In order to cope with China's expanding polar interests the PRIC has steadily expanded in the last few years to a total of 154 personnel; and it is still expanding. In 2012 PRIC advertised for 47 new staff members.3 PRIC main tasks are: (1) leading China's polar research; (2) organising China's polar expeditions; (3) arranging the logistics for the expeditions, which includes managing China's polar bases, and maintaining the Chinese icebreaker, Xue Long (Ice Dragon); and (4) data management and reporting on China's polar research.

Xue Long can carry approximately 250 personnel on polar expeditions. It was purchased second hand from Ukraine and was upgraded in 2006. Xue Long was originally designed as an Arctic cargo boat, which limits its usefulness to China's polar programme. China's annual Antarctic expeditions are called “Chinare”, followed by the number of that expedition. In 2012 China completed Chinare 28, the 28th expedition of the China polar programme. Apart from the PRIC, China's scientific researchers engaged in Antarctic research are spread out over a wide range of tertiary institutions and research centres all over the country. The international linkages stemming from China's engagement in Antarctica have proven very useful over time for improving China's relations with a wide range of countries. Beginning in the 1980s and carrying on up to the present day, China has developed an extensive programme of international collaborations including with Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Norway, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Romania, Russia, the UK, and the USA. China's Antarctic links have not only been proftable from a scientific point of view, they have also been a useful platform for track-two diplomacy. Antarctica is governed in the name of science, and it is through scientific activities there that countries can legitimately be involved in decision-making about the continent's governance and management of its resources. Thus, it is only natural that Antarctic diplomacy is also frequently conducted via scientific cooperation. As has been the case with other nations, these scientific exchanges almost always continue regardless of other disagreements between the cooperating countries; hence, whatever their scientific merit, they can serve as a useful confidence-building exercise among nations.

China's Antarctic presence China's first Antarctic base, Changcheng zhan (Great Wall Station), was established on King George Island in Western Antarctica in 1984. This station is at 62°S Lat., which is outside the polar circle. At the time, China did not have the capabilities to build on the Antarctic continent. In summer, the base can house up to 80 people, while in winter it houses up to 40; however, in recent years its activities have been considerably scaled down.4 In the 2011–2012 season only 17 scientists went to work at the base in the summer season and two were left behind to winter over. In the summer 15 support staff worked on the station and ten in the winter.5 China's second base, Zhongshan zhan (Zhongshan Station), was set up in 1989 on the eastern sector of the Larseman Hills close to a Russian base, Progress II. According to a senior Chinese Antarctic affairs official, after China set up this continental base, “[I]t was entitled to become a negotiating country of the Antarctic Treaty, having a say in decisions relating to Antarc-tica.”6 Zhongshan Station is named after the father of modern China, Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen). In summer, this base can house up to 60 personnel, while in winter it can house 25. In the 2011–2012 season it hosted only six scientists in the summer and seven in the winter. They were supported by 28 logistics personnel in the summer, and ten in the winter.7 In the 2011–2012 season at both Changcheng and Zhongshan Stations the numbers of support personnel significantly outnumbered those conducting science. During the 2006–2010 Five-Year Plan, Zhongshan Station was upgraded and fitted with new research facilities and living quarters, doubling in size from its original 2,700 square metres to 5,800 square metres. It should be noted that China, like all the major powers and many of the rising states, is increasingly interested in the Arctic and this builds on and adds to its Antarctic expertise and experience. In 1999 China launched its first ever Arctic expedition in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, followed by a second trek in 2003. In 2004, China set up a compact new polar research site, the tiny Arctic Yellow River Station (Beiji Huanghe zhan), at Ny-Ålesund, a hub for international arctic research in Norway.8 Chinese Arctic scientific teams now visit the base annually. In 2012 China negotiated with Iceland to set up a second Arctic base, on farmland close to the Icelandic port town

Akureyri. China's third Antarctic base, Kunlun Station on Dome A, was officially opened in February 2009. The early phase of the base cost 250 million renminbi (US$37 million).9 The station currently has a floor space of 236 square metres and during the current Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) it will be expanded to 500 square metres. At present the station can accommodate from 15 to 20 personnel. In the 2011–2012 season eight scientists worked at Kunlun Station.10 Kunlun Station can be used for deep ice core drilling, glaciology, astronomy, atmospheric science, weather observation, and studying the geology of the Gamburtsev mountain range that lies beneath the ice cap. Initially, the base will be a summer-only station, although in the long run it will be developed as an all-year base. The base is currently only open for two weeks a year, as it takes one month via traverse from Zhongshan Base to Kunlun and back again. The choice of name for the station is significant. Although Kunlun is an actual place in China, it also has mythical associations deeply rooted in Chinese culture. According to tradition, Kunlun Mountain is a Daoist paradise, a place where communication between humans and gods is possible. The actual location of the Kunlun Range, on the northern boundary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, marks the outer limits of the old Chinese empire. The new base name was selected by a committee of Chinese polar experts, from over 3,000 possibilities sent by members of the Chinese public. “Kunlun” was chosen as it is both the name of an actual mountain in China, and has “deep cultural associations in China”.11 Kunlun Base in Antarctica offers China unprecedented visibility for astronomical research12 — dialogue with the “gods”.

China in Antarctica: the early years China could well have been one of the founding signatories to the Antarctic Treaty if had not been for Cold War politics. The groundwork for putting together the Antarctic Treaty was forged during the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year, which launched a programme of international collaboration on polar research. The People's Republic of China (PRC) expressed an interest in being involved in the IGY, but it was explicitly excluded from participating in both activities due to unresolved issues over diplomatic recognition of the new state and the USA's objections to the participation of “Red China”.13 China began to develop its own “Antarctic strategy” as early as the mid-1960s.14However, China's own domestic turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s was a further factor in Beijing not following up its initial expression of interest in polar affairs. In the late 1970s as part of the strategic triangle forged between the USA and its allies against the Soviet Union, Antarctic programmes in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States helped China to develop polar expertise by inviting Chinese scientists to join their expeditions and offering doctoral scholarships to Chinese students. Thanks in no small part to such help, in 1983 China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty and it launched its own expedition to the Antarctic continent in 1984. China became a consultative party to the Treaty in 1985, and joined the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) in 1986. At the time it joined the Treaty, China had 35 scientists working in various international expedition teams on the Antarctic continent. Having the PRC join the Antarctic Treaty was not just advantageous for Beijing; it was also a coup for Treaty members because it kept China from lending its support to the antiTreaty movement led by Malaysia.15 Scientific activities are the main means to influence norms and garner prestige and legitimacy in Antarctic governance. Hence in the period from 1989 to 2004 China steadily focused on improving the quality of its Antarctic science and gradually increased its Antarctic spend. In the 1990s, China's Antarctic strategy was adjusted to a consolidating, rather than expansionist, phase. China shifted its priorities into building a meaningful scientific research programme in Antarc¬tica. However, expanding Antarctic research to anything like US or UK levels was hampered by a lack of funds; and this

slowed the pace of China's Antarctic efforts for a number of years. Nonetheless, steady progress was made in this period, in tandem with China's slow but steady economic growth.

China's steps up its Antarctic activities At precisely 3:16 a.m. (Beijing time) on 18 January 2005, a team of Chinese polar explorers “conquered” the peak of Dome A (also known as Dome Argus). Dome A was the last geologically signifcant unexplored territory of Antarctica.16 It is located in East Antarctica, on Australia's 42 per cent territorial claim. The expedition was China's fourth attempt to reach the dome (the first was in 1996); it had taken close to ten years to achieve the goal.17 China's successful expedition to Dome A marks the beginning of a new phase in its Antarctic engagement. Later in the same year, a Chinese expedition spent 130 days exploring the Grove Mountains, some 400 kilometres from Zhongshan Station. Like other explorers before them, the Chinese expedition recorded its presence by naming the various points of geological signifcance they observed, with names such as Gui shan (Turtle Mountain), She shan (Snake Mountain), and Xi Hu (Western Lake), refecting Chinese tradition and history.18 As a result of these two successes, Chinese scientists can now claim to be polar explorers. This new status is symbolised by the right to name Antarctic locations and is understood in Chinese sources as signiflying an important shift in China's political standing in Antarctic affairs.19 Also in 2005, Zhang Zhanhai, formerly director of the Polar Research Institute in Shanghai, was elected to a two-year term as vice president of SCAR, an important “eyes and ears” role and a first for China.20 That was also the year when two China-based scholars, Li Shenggui and Pan Min, urged Chinese social scientists to pay greater attention to researching Antarctic issues. They stated that up until this point China had focused attention on the “hard” sciences while neglecting the important role of social science in exploring and articulating China's Antarctic agenda. The authors asserted that this “neglect has been restricting China's voice, rights and interests” in international Antarctic affairs and infuencing the country's international status, making it too passive.21 Since the authors' rallying cry, there has indeed been a steady increase in Chinese social science publishing on Antarctica, compared with the output of previous years. This new emphasis is directly encouraged by senior government leaders, and the outcomes are now being utilised in China's policymaking on Antarctic issues.22

In the last ten years China has been taking an ever more active role in Antarctic affairs and greatly expanding its presence there. In 2004 Wei Wenliang, a Vice Director in the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration, boasted that China's scientific achievements in Antarctica meant that China “will soon catch up the developed countries”.23 Certainly in terms of budget increases in Antarctic activities, in a very short time, China has made rapid progress. In the period from 1983 to 2003, China spent 900 million yuan (around US$110 million) on its annual Antarctic research.24 Yet in 2005– 2008, China spent 500 million yuan (in 2010 figures around US$60 million) just to upgrade its existing Antarctic bases.25 Meanwhile China's annual expenditure for Antarctic activities in the period from 2005 to 2010 was around 300 million yuan (in 2010 figures US$44 million). This is more than twice what was spent on an annual basis in the previous Five-Year Plan.26 Pursuant to the 11th Five-Year Plan, from 2006 to 2010, China spent around 500 million yuan (in 2004 figures US$64 million) to: refurbish Zhongshan and Changcheng Stations; set up Kunlun Zhan (Kunlun Station) at Dome A over two austral summers, 2008–2010; reft the icebreaker Xue Long; and establish a dedicated berth for the icebreaker and warehouse space in Shanghai.27 In the current polar Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) by my calculations28 China will spend approximately 350 million yuan (in 2012 figures US$55 million) per annum in Antarctica. This figure includes the cost of annual expeditions to Antarctica, the running costs of PRIC and CAA, and dedicated research funds available for Antarctic research. This figure excludes other research funds available to China's Antarctica researchers and one-off expenditures such as the new icebreaker. China's increased Antarctic spend can be tracked by the increase in amounts spent on Antarctic expeditions: in the 2005–2010 period China had 50 million yuan to spend (US$7 million), while in 2011 it spent 100 million yuan (US$15 million). China's investment in new Antarctic facilities in the next five years will be substantial: a second icebreaker, a Basler ice-capable plane, helicopters, a new polar campus in Shanghai and so on. China's one (and signifcant) weakness of its increased polar spend is that the funds available for its Antarctic research do not yet match the capacity and promise of the new hardware. According to a statement by Chen Lianzeng, the Deputy Head of the China

Arctic and Antarctic Administration, in June 2011, the overall goal of China's latest five-year polar plan is to increase China's “status and influence” in polar affairs in order to better protect China's “polar rights”.29 I will leave my thoughts on the Arctic aspect of Chen's quote for further publication. But what impact might Chen's comments mean in the context of Antarctic governance? Though Antarctic governance is ruled by consensus there are dominant players: those who have greater physical presence (the USA and in the Cold War years the Soviet Union); those who publish the most policy papers (the UK, Australia, New Zealand); those who are the most politically active on ATS committees or on new challenges to Antarctic governance (New Zealand, France, and Australia over the issue of mining in Antarctica); and those who form informal blocs of like-minded states (Australia, New Zealand, the UK, USA, and Chile).30 China's stated desire to acquire greater “status and influence” in Antarctic affairs might be established through a range of means, which include increasing its physical presence in Antarctica, holding leadership positions in Antarctic bodies, engaging in leading Antarctic research, taking a leadership role on important issues such as environmental management, and making a major investment in Antarctic capacity. In the following section I will evaluate China's current progress on these aspects.

China's Antarctic ambitions versus current abilities So far, China's main achievement in terms of gaining increased status and influence in Antarctic affairs has been the kudos associated with its budgetary increases and increased physical presence there. China now has three bases and sends a reasonable number of its researchers to Antarctica. It now also has the technology to send data back to China-based researchers, avoiding the need for many personnel to go there at all. Yet when it comes to high-profile research, China is still a long way behind other countries in terms of both its contribution of policy papers to Antarctic decision-making bodies and citation rates for its Antarctic research. We can expect this to change over time, as Chinese scientists take advantage of their improved research facilities and resources. However, research outputs take a lot longer to develop than new infrastructure — and China is currently making major investments in hardware and comparatively small investments into research. With few exceptions, China is also not yet stepping up to take on more leadership roles within any of the various Antarctic governance bodies with the Antarctic Treaty System commensurate with its increased level of investment there. This is quite probably due to acute shortages of senior personnel with the requisite high-level English (the common language of Antarctic governance meetings) language skills, as well as scientific and policymaking expertise. It may also be due to China's post-1989 cautious foreign policy strategy (see more below). China will need to invest in better foreign-language training for its highlevel Antarctic representatives if it wants to increase its status and influence in Antarctic governance by means of greater participation in the various committees of Antarctic governance. In a 2004 study comparing Antarctic research output of various countries China's was ranked lower than Italy or South Africa's scientific contribution.31China's early Antarctic research was “symbolic”, meaning that it mostly served political ends, rather than scientific ones, thus the low ranking for its Antarctic science in this study confirms this.32 Eight years later a 2012 study which used the numbers of scientific working papers and information papers submitted by various ATCPs as a measure for the level of influence the various states might have in Antarctic governance showed that the impact factor of Chinese Antarctic research has not only not improved, in

terms of ranking it has been overtaken by much smaller states.33 Like many states engaged in Antarctica, China's Antarctic programme is not just about answering scientific questions; it is as much, if not more, about maintaining China's national interests.34 As Chinese polar scholar Guo Peiqing notes, regardless of the scientific signifcance of research in Antarctica, engaging in this research and launching expeditions are ways for China (and other nations) to maintain a political presence on the continent.35 However, if China really does need to improve its “status and influence” in Antarctic affairs, it will have to shift the focus of its spend and activities from “presence” to high-level scientific research. Coming up with high-impact research takes time, expertise, and sometimes a bit of good luck. Although China's Antarctic science is not yet as highprofile or widely cited as its Antarctic policymakers would no doubt wish, the new initiatives of the last decade do have the potential to take China's research to a new level. The ice underneath Dome A is over 3,000 metres thick; and researchers predict that through drilling for ice cores China could push back current knowledge about the earth's climate record to up to 1.5 million years ago. Dome A is also a prime location for engaging in deep space research. China is also very active in meteorite collection, and the Gamburtsev Mountains, which are close to China's Zhongshan station, are a good location for this research. China will be in charge of all research efforts at Dome A, working in collaboration with teams of international researchers. The research outcomes could well be ground-breaking, giving China an unprecedented opportunity to jump ahead in its efforts to garner international recognition for Chinese Antarctic scientific research and thus gain greater status and influence there. Although China is not yet meeting its goal of increasing influence and status in Antarctica, its various projects toward that goal are very useful in the domestic context. China's Antarctic programme is heavily promoted to Chinese-language audiences as part of ongoing political education efforts. The stress on China's Antarctic triumphs boosts government legitimacy and distracts the population from more pressing issues such as unemployment and social inequity. Hence, in addition to their scientific duties, leading Chinese Antarctic scientists are given the task of promoting their research in thousands of talks to Chinese youth. The stated aim of these talks is to teach Chinese youth to “love science” and “love their country”.36 PRIC has a ten

million renminbi (US$1.5 million) budget for these activities.37 The Chinese media is also heavily involved in this endeavour. The Chinese government requires the domestic media to “guide public opinion” (zhidao yulun) on certain issues.38 China's Antarctic expeditions have always been incorporated into the government's ongoing mass persuasion activities. The first Chinese Antarctic expedition was commemorated with a television documentary announcing, “Antarctica Here We Come!” (Nanji women lai le!).39 Watching this documentary one gets a strong sense to what extent national pride, then as now, plays in China's desire to work in Antarctica. China's increased engagement in Antarctica has been matched by a big push to promote Chinese public awareness of China's Antarctic activities as well as on the political issues surrounding Antarctica (and the Arctic) and the government's strategy for dealing with them. A CCTV (China Central Television) camera crew was part of China's 17-man team to conquer Dome A in 2005 and provided live coverage of the successful expedition. China's polar bureaucrats are well aware of the need to convince the government and Chinese public about the importance of China's polar programme; in order to attract the funding they need to sustain its recent growth.40

The Taiwan factor in China's Antarctic activities As it is in many other aspects of Chinese diplomacy, Taiwan has been a factor in China's involvement in Antarctica. In the 1950s, the USA was allied with Taiwan (as the ROC) and supported it in its efforts to lock the PRC out of international organisations. It was US opposition to “unrecognised Communist regimes” that helped bar China from being an early Treaty signatory.41 China joined the Antarctic Treaty in 1983 in a period when the PRC was taking over the China seat from the ROC in a wide range of international organisations. For Chinese political leaders, joining the Antarctic Treaty was initially more about the PRC's need for international recognition and status than about pursuing serious science. The political side to China's Antarctic science was adumbrated early on, when from 1988 the PRC made use of its Antarctic activities to invite Taiwanese and Hong Kong scientists to participate in joint projects.42 Such exchanges continue up to the present day. In early 2009 at the end of the 2008–2009 austral summer, the Xue Long made a “courtesy” call to Taiwan, before returning to the Chinese Mainland. During the 2009–2010 austral summer, three Taiwanese scientists participated in China's annual Antarctic exploration. These activities are all part of current cross-Taiwan Strait bridge¬building efforts. In 2005 Taiwanese legal scholar Li Ming-juinn wrote that as a sovereign state, the ROC is entitled to apply to join the Antarctic Treaty and may try to do so in future.43 Taiwanese scientists have been engaged in Antarctic research for many years, so the ROC could conceivably apply to be a consultative party in the Treaty. Thus far, the ROC has made no formal attempts to join the Antarctic Treaty. But in 2006, Taiwan applied to become an observer at the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).44 There are no Taiwan boats fishing legally in the Southern Ocean (though some may have been involved in illegal fishing in the past). However, CCAMLR signatory countries were lukewarm on the issue of Taiwan becoming an observer. They did not want to offend China because of the “One China” principle the PRC insists on. China acceded to CCAMLR in 2006 and became a full consultative member in October 2007.45 Previously, PRC boats had been involved in

illegal fishing activities in the Southern Ocean.46 As a result, countries such as New Zealand and Australia, whose territories border on the Southern Ocean, were keen for the PRC to join CCAMLR and come under its jurisdiction.47 It is signifcant that China's membership in CCAMLR does not include Hong Kong. This is probably because the former colony is the main base of multinational fishing company Pacific Andes, which through its own activities and those of its subsidiaries is heavily implicated in the illegal fishing of the highly endangered Pat-agonian Toothfish.48 When it joined CCAMLR, China declared that its membership would not include Hong Kong.49 This is perfectly legal according to the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region's unique status in the Chinese polity, which permits Hong Kong to establish and maintain a separate international legal personality from the PRC's.50 However, the fact that Beijing has not made more efforts to urge Hong Kong to sign up with CCAMLR shows that China is not as serious about dealing with illegal fishing issues in the Southern Ocean as its membership might imply. It appears Taiwan's interest in obtaining observer status in CCAMLR was the main impetus to China's decision to join. This is a familiar pattern that has occurred in countless international organisations. The lack of cooperation from the Chinese government in August 2007, when four Chinese vessels were caught fishing illegally in the Southern Ocean, was a symptom of this situation. During this incident, in contravention of the norms of CCAMLR, the Chinese government refused permission for Australian fisheries offcers to board the four vessels and inspect them.51 However, since that low point, Beijing has in fact been fairly cooperative in bringing Mainland Chinese illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean under control, although the problem of Hong Kong remains unresolved. Chinese scholars have even been studying the Australian approach to illegal fishing control and the lessons China can learn from it.52 China now has a fishing quota from CCAMLR to fish for krill in the Southern Ocean and its scientists are assisting in research efforts to monitor fish stocks there.53 When it comes to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, it appears that as with other international organisations, it is still better to have China inside the tent than out.

Chinese scholars' critique of the Antarctic Treaty System In the past, China was quiescent on the political status quo in Antarctica and the management of resources there. However, an underlying theme of the current phase of China's engagement in Antarctica is dissatisfaction with the existing order and a different set of views on resource extraction than those of many other Antarctic stakeholders. These alternative perspectives are mostly still being expressed publicly through Chinese-language publications, both scholarly and journalistic. So far, there is a clear disjunction between official statements and policy debates in Chinese. Although Chinese officials may have expressed concerns about the status quo in Antarctica in conversation, the requirements of governance necessitate that Beijing work within the existing structures and follow the current policies of the ATS. However, these scholarly debates should not be ignored. They refect the fact that China has concerns about some aspects of the Treaty and is allowing Chinese scholars to explore various options. In the China context, where social science is closely supervised within parameters set by the CCP, situations with this kind of disjunct between official foreign policy and scholarly discourse should be regarded as “watch this space”. In the following section I will summarise some of the contemporary critiques of Antarctic governance espoused by leading Chinese polar social scientists, whose work informs polar policymaking in China. In Chinese-language sources, leading Chinese Antarctic specialists are extremely critical of the ATS. Some describe it as a “rich man's club” (furen de julebu)54 or a zone for “collective hegemony” (jiti baquan),55 and assert that in the past China has been a “second class citizen” (er deng gongmin) within the Treaty.56 Despite being an Antarctic Treaty partner since 1983, Chinese scholars portray China as on the outer rim of the ATS power structure. In theory, Antarctica is owned by no one and open to all nations. But economic limitations effectively exclude most of the developing world and many middle-income countries, and the best Antarctic locations for research bases and resource exploitation were long ago taken by earlier Antarctic powers. Moreover, as Dudeney and Walton's 2012 paper indicates, policy debates in Antarctica are dominated by the countries who submit working papers to ATS meetings and China is producing very little of

these.57 Because of this, China, like many other ATCPs, can only resist new initiatives, not set the agenda. In a 2005 article discussing the political future of Antarctica, Yan Qide and Hu Lingtai asserted that the Antarctic Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) were still the best means to manage Antarctica. But they noted that the question of who actually owns Antarctica remained unresolved and is an issue that will not go away.58 The official position of the China Arctic and Antarctic Administration is that is that Antarctica's sovereignty is not determined.59 Some social scientists have advocated that the UN should have an increased role in Antarctica, but Guo Peiqing asserts that the UN is “powerless” in Antarctica and is not the right body to resolve any disputes.60 Guo is one of many voices urging China to take a much more active role in Antarctica, both to defend its existing interests and to keep up with the activities of other Antarctic nations. According to Guo, the impact of everincreasing numbers of tourists visiting Antarctica, as well as the perceived weakness of measures to deal with breaches of environment protocols, are among several reasons why Antarctica needs to be governed by a set of international laws covering all nations, not just signatories to the ATS.61 In the course of this research, I spoke with numerous Chinese polar scientists and policymakers. Many regard the tougher environmental protections required for Antarctic activities and the setting up of Antarctic Specially Managed Areas as a ruse to maintain the assets of more-established powers there.62 An article in the semi-offcial periodical Liaowang noted that these changes in the environmental regulations “had made the struggle over resources in Antarctica all the more complicated, more covert, and more extreme”.63 The article noted that the skirmish over Antarctic resources was being waged through scientific, diplomatic, and legal measures, rather than through force, and said mineral exploration is continuing, disguised as scientific activity. The article asserts that the current ATS is unfair to developing countries that lack the resources to engage in scientific research. Engaging in Antarctic scientific research is the means by which a nonclaimant nation attains a governance role in Antarctica.

However, China's central critique of the ATS revolves around the issue of the distribution of resources. Deciding who can control polar resources is a matter of global political and economic importance. As an energy-hungry nation, China is extremely interested in the resources of Antarctica (and the Arctic) and any possibilities for their exploitation. The notion of “resources” has a broad meaning in the Antarctic context. It could include minerals, meteorites, the intellectual property of Antarctic bioprospecting, locations for scientific bases, marine living resources, and access to the continent for Antarctic tourism. Chinese-language polar social science discussions are dominated by debates about Antarctic resources and how China might gain its share; and mostly they are referring to access to mineral resources.64 Such discussions are virtually taboo in the scholarly research of more-established Antarctic powers. Nowadays (it was not always the case), scholars in those countries tend to focus on preserving the environmental heritage of Antarctica and the Southern Oceans. Yet, as Guo Peiqing rightly points out, “No nation or Antarctic researcher has ever negated the possibility that Antarctic resources could be utilized.”65 Zhu Jiangang, Yan Qide, and Ling Xiao-liang assert that the main reason various nations are engaged in Antarctic research is to fnd a way to get access to the riches there.66 Numerous newspaper reports in Chinese have alleged that some countries are already prospecting in Antarctica, under the cover of scientific research.67 These days Chinese foreign policy is dominated by the quest to acquire more resources.68 In Chinese-language debates, social and hard science scholars, government offcials, and journalistic commentators all appear to agree that the exploitation of Antarctica is only a matter of time and that China should prepare itself. China's preparations include ramping up its scientific research as well as investing in relevant social science research. A section on the website managed by the Polar Research Institute of China to publicise Chinese polar science features a series of maps outlining Antarctic resources, including oil reserves off the coast of Antarctica.69 It does not breach the Antarctic Treaty to create such a map, but it does send a signal of interest which other states avoid. The focus of the maps on oil reserves in the seas surrounding the Antarctic coastline puts a new light on China's strident and antagonistic response in 2007 to the UK and six other Antarctic sovereignty claimants setting in place the paperwork for future claims to seabed rights in Antarctica to the UN Commission on the Limits of the

Continental Shelf. China does not recognise territorial claims in Antarctica and regards the sovereignty status of Antarctica as unresolved. Hence in 2007 Beijing accused the UK of using the International Law of the Sea to gain non-sovereignty-related rights in Antarctica.70 The China Arctic and Antarctic Administration's Antarctic oil map and other resource-related maps were produced as part of a wider governmentsponsored research project on China's marine resources, the 908 Project. The existence of the maps implies that China is likely preparing for the eventuality that global oil shortages may lead to a change in the current ban on oil extraction in Antarctica. Currently there are many technical challenges involved in oil exploitation in the seas off Antarctica. However, in 2012 China signed an agreement with Iceland to cooperate in Arctic oil exploration;71 if it is possible to overcome the hurdles of oil extraction in the Arctic, then Antarctic oil extraction one day would also be technically feasible — though currently it is banned under the Protocol on Environment Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. The ban on mining can only be changed by consensus, but who can predict how states might vote in the future? According to the International Energy Agency, global peak crude oil production was reached in 2006.72 In the years to come, China is certainly not going to be the only country interested in revisiting the question of Antarctic mining. Beijing needs to develop the specialist knowledge that will enable China's representatives at Antarctic forums to defend its interests during any future change in Antarctic governance. Previously China did not have the economic and technical ability to exploit such resources, so the ban on mineral exploitation suited its interests. However, according to a 2006 paper written by PRIC-based policy analysts, China aims to be poised to take advantage of any opportunities to exploit the resources of Antarctica — with trained personnel and infrastructure in place.73 China's interest in Antarctic resources is inevitably going to cause tension with other nations.

China's increased engagement in Antarctica and current foreign policy China's efforts to increase its engagement and presence in Antarctica are in tune with recent debates among some Chinese foreign policy scholars who want Beijing to engage in a more active foreign policy overall. In 1989, after the Chinese government was shunned on the international scene following the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, Party senior leader Deng Xiaoping set a new strategy for Chinese foreign policy of “hiding our strength, biding our time, and doing what we can” (tao guang, yang hui, you suo zuo wei). China's overall foreign policy strategy of the 1990s was to consolidate and keep a low profile. However, beginning in 1999 after the US bombing of Kosovo, Chinese foreign policy moved to an “active defensive position”.74 This meant that China would become proactive in both political and economic affairs in order to combat perceived strong attacks from the West on both fronts. In the early 2000s, as China's economic and political power grew, Chinese scholars debated the relevance of Deng Xiaoping's 1989 maxim. In 2008 the Chinese foreign policy line was adjusted to focus on the more proactive “do what we can” (you suo zuo wei) aspect of Deng's foreign policy rule.75 Beijing is on the brink of moving from a defensive to a more proactive approach in its overall foreign policy. Its expanded activities in Antarctica and stated desire for more “status and infuence” to defend “polar rights” refect this. China's resurgence is often viewed negatively by Western analysts as the “China Threat”. Some commentators fear China as a rising power because of the nature of its political system, which is at odds with the dominant liberal democratic model of the current leading global powers. Journalistic comment is frequently similarly negative. A 2007 article on the BBC website made the (spurious) connection between China's announcement that it was going to construct a new inland base in Antarctica and the controversial announcement that the UK and Chile planned to claim the parts of the Antarctic sea bed that relate to their territorial claims on the continent.76 Online commentary about China's Antarctic interests reveals comment after comment tinged by hostility and suspi-cion.77 A 2011 report by an Australian researcher which highlighted the potential threat China's increased Antarctic interests posed to

Australia's Antarctic claim was widely cited in the international media.78 Since the events of 1989, the Chinese government has suffered from an international image problem. From the point of view of China's foreign critics, the recent drive to expand activities in the Antarctic only increases that negative perception. Will China's increased engagement in Antarctica threaten the governance structure there? The Antarctic Treaty sets out to manage Antarctica in the interests of peace and science; and all disputes are meant to be resolved by consensus.79 As noted, the requirements of governance in Antarctica necessitate that Beijing work within the existing governance structures and follow the current policies of the ATS. The only alternative to this is leaving the Treaty, a step China is unlikely to take. So inevitably, China's increased engagement in Antarctic affairs will require cooperating with the other Antarctic states and gaining a consensus for any policy change. So far the Chinese government's current behavior in the various forums of the ATS is similar to its behavior in many other multilateral organizations and international regimes: it may not like the current order but it prefers to work within that order to bring about the change it ultimately seeks. This is why, while recent Chinese-language scholarly and media analysis of the ATS have been openly critical, in international meetings Beijing has continued its offcial acquiescence to the status quo in Antarctic management. Where China has expressed an alternative point of view, it has only been with regard to defending its own interests. At the 2007 ATCM in New Delhi, China was very assertive. It rejected attempts by Australia and other concerned nations to issue a resolution criticising illegal fshing in Antarctic waters. China's delegate stated that IUU fshing could not be discussed at the ATCM.80 The fnal report of the meeting diplomatically recorded these conficts: “consensus could not be reached”.81 However, at the next ATCM in 2008 in Kiev, China's delegates were in a more cooperative frame of mind, keen for approval of their plans to build a base at Dome A. The only objection they raised was to wording in the feedback on China's plan that it “met requirements in most respects”. It appears that on this question, China wanted unqualifed support for its new base.82 This debate was not recorded in the fnal report, refecting the Antarctic tradition that stresses consensus at all costs.83 According to the formal

records of the Kiev meeting, China took a very low profile, providing only factual information on its activities in Antarctica and not contributing to debates on sensitive issues such as bio-prospecting or regulating tourism.84

Conclusion China's increased Antarctic engagement is part of “China's rise” in the global community. When any shift of power occurs, there is sure to be some tension; there may even be open confict. China is emerging from being a medium power to becoming a major power in the global system. It is even, in some parts of the world, becoming a dominant force. However, when it comes to Antarctica, despite its signifcant increases in spending, China is still only a medium power and, in terms of setting the policy agenda, it is as yet a minor power. The balance of power in Antarctica would have to shift enormously for China to challenge US physical dominance there (if this is in fact a goal) and the dominance of states such as Australia, the UK, and New Zealand in setting the policy agenda. China's emergence as a new leading player on the world stage — in Antarctica as elsewhere — is not (yet) about challenging existing powers. Rather, Beijing's behaviour to date in Antarctica refects the Chinese government's ongoing efforts to act in ways commensurate with the country's new global status and to use its increased fnancial resources to extend its international infuence and protect its national interests. National pride is also a big factor in China's increased engagement. As a country which was once great, and is returning to a prominent position on the world stage, China has a lot to prove. Antarctica is a site where China can demonstrate its regained strength to domestic audiences, as well as international ones. China's behaviour in Antarctic affairs provides us with many clues to better understand Beijing's attitude to the international system and to help answer the debates over whether or not the government is a “reluctant stakeholder” in current international arrangements and whether China will continue to support current international norms and institutions as it becomes more dominant. In China's Antarctic affairs there is a clear disjunction between offcial statements and policy debates in Chinese. Although Chinese offcials may be unhappy with the status quo in Antarctica, the requirements of governance there necessitate that Beijing work within the existing structures and follow the current policies of the ATS. However, the scholarly policy debates should not be ignored. They refect the fact that China wants change in some aspect of the international order and it is exploring its options.

Despite the carping about the ATS in Chinese-language debates, China does beneft from the way that Antarctic governance is currently managed. There is very little oversight of states' behaviour there — technically any state can inspect other countries' Antarctic bases but few devote the resources to do this with any seriousness. Moreover, most states ignore the legal requirement to make fully public all their Antarctic activities and capabilities, while some ATCPs are engaging in very low-level Antarctic research. Technically this should make them unsuitable to be consultative states on the Treaty. This virtually non-accountable governance environment is as amenable to China's interests in Antarctica as it is to many other states. This situation is no doubt an important factor why, in a situation where there is at present no possibility of changing the international governance arrangements, China is publicly accepting of them, meanwhile still continuing to pursue its own interests. The Chinese government's current behaviour at the various forums of the ATS is similar to its behaviour in many other multilateral organisations and international regimes: it takes such benefts as it can from the existing order.

Notes 1. w​w​w​.c​h​i​n​a​d​a​i​l​y​.c​o​m​.c​n​/w​o​r​l​d​/2​0​1​0​–09/27/c​o​n​t​e​n​t​_​1​1​3​5​1​8​3​6​.h​t​m.​ 2. This paper expands on, and updates, information which was first published as “China's Rise in Antarctica?” Asian Survey, 2010. 3. w​w​w​.o​i​e​g​g​.c​o​m​/v​i​e​w​t​h​r​e​a​d​.p​h​p​?t​i​d​=1​0​8​3​1​4​9​. 4. “Report of 21st Chinese National Antarctic Research Expedition, 2004– 05”, Beijing: Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research, 2005. 5. w​w​w​.s​c​a​r​.o​r​g​/a​b​o​u​t​/n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​r​e​p​o​r​t​s​/c​h​i​n​a​/C​h​i​n​a​_​2​0​1​1​–12.pdf. 6. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”, 3 November 2004, china.org.cn, http://china.org.cn/English/2004/Nov/111106.htm. 7. w​w​w​.s​c​a​r​.o​r​g​/a​b​o​u​t​/n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​r​e​p​o​r​t​s​/c​h​i​n​a​/C​h​i​n​a​_​2​011–12.pdf. 8. Polar Research Institute of China, “Zhongguo beiji zhan Huang He jieshao” [An introduction to China's Arctic Yellow River Station], Shanghai, 2006, w​w​w​.p​r​i​c​.g​o​v​.c​n​/n​e​w​i​n​f​o​.a​s​p​?s​o​r​t​i​d=4&subid=39&id=465. 9. Jane Qiu, “China Builds Inland Antarctic Base”, Nature (6 January 2009), w​w​w​.n​a​t​u​r​e​.c​o​m​/n​e​w​s​/2​0​0​9​/0​9​0​1​0​6​/f​u​l​l​/4​5​7​1​3​4​a​.h​tml. 10. w​w​w​.s​c​a​r​.o​r​g​/a​b​o​u​t​/n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​r​e​p​o​r​t​s​/c​h​i​n​a​/C​h​i​n​a​_2011–12.pdf. 11. “Wo guo shouge nanji neidi kaocha zhan mingming Kunlun” [Our nation's first continental station is named Kunlun], 16 October 2008, Xinlang keji, http://tech.sina.com.cn/d/2008–10–16/09512513402.shtml. 12. Jane Qiu, “China Builds Inland Antarctic Base”. 13. Dian Olsen Berger, Deep Freeze: The United States, the International Geophysical Year, and the Origins of Antarctica's Age of Science, Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2006, pp. 38, 373. 14. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”. 15. Wei-chin Lee, “China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So Near”, Asian Survey 30:6 (June 1990), p. 585. On China's first decades of Antarctic research, see also Zou Keyuan, “China's Interests in and Policy toward

Antarctica”, in Bruce Davis and China's Antarctic interestsRichard Herr (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Australian National University Center for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1994. 16. Guan Xiaofeng, “Explorers Conquer ‘Inaccessible Pole’”, China Daily, 18 January 2005. 17. “The Draft Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation for the Construction and Operation of Chinese Dome A Station in Antarctica”, Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) 6(a), Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Kiev, 2008. 18. Yu Dawei, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’” [Triple jump in Antarctica], Caijing [Finance], 16, 4 August 2008. 19. “‘Kongzi’, ‘Kangxi’, ‘Cao Xueqin’, deng you wangcheng wei nanji zhongwen diming” [Confucius, Kang Xi, and Cao Xueqin, et al. become Chinese Antarctic place names], Xinhua News Agency, 29 March 2006. 20. “Zhang Zhanhai churen nanji yanjiu kexue weiyuanhui” [Zhang Zhanhai takes up a post at SCAR], Zhongguo haiyang bao [China Ocean News], 1429, 20 March 2007, w​w​w​.s​o​a​.g​o​v​.c​n​/h​y​j​w​w​/j​d​s​y​/2​0​0​7​/0​3​/2​0​/1​1​7​4​3​8​1​0​1​1​5​1​2​8​1​7​.h​t​m​. 21. Li Shenggui and Pan Min, “Zhongguo nanji ruankexue yanjiu de yiyi, xianzhuang yu zhanwang” [The signifcance, status quo, and prospect of Antarctic soft science research], Jidi yanjiu [Chinese Journal of Polar Research] 17:3 (September 2005), pp. 214–231. 22. Discussions at the Polar Research Institute in December 2009. See also Zhang Jian-song, “Zhuanjia chengying zhengzhi nanji ziyuan fenzheng, qi guo you guafen lingtu yaoqiu” [Experts call for facing up to the struggle over Antarctic resources, seven countries put in a request to carve up the territory], Liaowang [Outlook], 18 June 2007, at http://news.sohu.com/20070618/n250625161.shtml. 23. Wei Wenliang of CAA quoted in, “China to Build 3rd Station in Antarctica”, China Daily, 14 October 2004, w​ww ​ ​.c​h​i​n​a​.o​r​g​.c​n​/e​n​g​l​i​s​h​/s​c​i​t​e​c​h​/1​0​9​3​9​4​.h​t​m​. 24. Wang Qian, “Twenty Years of Antarctic Research”. 25. Ibid.

26. The previous amount was “roughly 20 million” per annum. See “China Takes Bold Steps into Antarctic's Forbidding Interior”, Science 306 (29 October 2004), p. 803; w​w​w​.l​d​e​o​.c​o​l​u​m​b​i​a​.e​d​u​/~x​y​u​a​n​/x​b​t​/N​e​w​s​I​n​S​c​i​e​n​c​e​.pdf. 27. Ibid. 28. Based on interviews and information available online. 29. http://news.hexun.com/2011–06–21/130754620.html. 30. Interview with Trevor Hughes, former head of NZ's Antarctic Policy Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2 February 2009. 31. Prabir G. Dastidar and Olle Persson, “Mapping the Global Structure of Antarctic Research Vis-à-vis Antarctic Treaty System”, Current Science 89:9 (2004), pp. 1552–1554. 32. Zou Keyuan, “China's Interests in and Policy toward Antarctica”, p. 97. 33. John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and Science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31 11075 DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075. 34. Yu Dawei, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’”. 35. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji ziyuan yu qi ziyuan zhengzhi”, p. 70. 36. State Bureau of Survey and Mapping, “Zhongguo nanji cehui kexue kaocha 22 nian chengjiu yu gongxian” [22 years of achievements of China's Antarctic mapping], 2007, w​w​w​.s​b​s​m​.g​o​v​.c​n​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​/z​t​z​l​/j​d​c​h​/j​d​c​h​/2​0​0​7​1​1​/2​0​0​7​1​1​0​0​0​2​7​8​6​7​.s​h​t​m​l. 37. Huigen Yang, “Developing China's Polar Research Capacity”, 6 March 2008, w​w​w​.s​c​i​e​n​c​e​p​o​l​e​s​.o​r​g​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​_​d​e​t​a​i​l​/h​u​i​g​e​n​_​y​a​n​g​_​d​e​v​e​l​o​p​i​n​g​_​c​h​i​n​a​s​_​p​o​l​a​r​_​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​_​c​a​p​a​c​i​t​y​/. 38. See Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefeld, 2008, p. 79. 39. See the flm http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTkyNjAwNjQ=.html.

here:

40. “Interview of Dr Huigen Yang, Director of PRIC and Leader of

Chinare”, www. w​w​w​.s​c​i​e​n​c​e​p​o​l​e​s​.o​r​g​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​_​d​e​t​a​i​l​/i​n​t​e​r​v​i​e​w​_​o​f​_​d​r​_​h​u​i​g​e​n​_​y​a​n​g​_​d​i​r​e​c​t​o​r​_​o​f​_​t​h​e​_​p​o​l​a​r​_​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​_​i​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​e​_​o​f​_​c​h​i​/. 41. Dian Olson Belanger, Deep Freeze, pp. 38, 373. 42. China Arctic and Antarctic Administration, “Guoji jiaoliu yu hezuo” [International exchange and cooperation], Beijing, 2008, www.chinare.gov.cn/caa/gb_article. php?modid=06001. 43. Li Ming-juinn, “The Possibility of Taiwan's Participation in the Antarctic Treaty”, Taiwan haiyang fa xuebao [Taiwan Ocean Law Review] 4:1 (June 2005), pp. 73–99. 44. CCAMLR manages marine living resources in the seas around Antarctica. It is part of the body of international law governing Antarctica. A total of 32 nations have signed the convention. 45. CCAMLR, meeting www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/cr/07/i02.pdf.

notes,

2007,

46. Megha Bahree, “Blue Waters, Gray Areas”, Forbes, 12 November 2007; email, Antarctic Policy Unit (APU), New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (NZ MFAT), 14 September 2007, APU/CHN, Part 3. 47. Email, APU, NZ MFAT, 18 July 2006, APU/CHN, Part 1. 48. Coalition of Legal Toothfsh Operators, “The Alphabet Boats: A Case Study of Tooth-fsh Poaching in the Southern Ocean”, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia, 2007, w​w​w​.c​o​l​t​o​.o​r​g​/b​a​c​k​g​r​o​u​n​d​_​w​h​y​_​c​a​s​e​_​s​t​u​d​y​.h​t​m.​ 49. Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, “Port Visits of Vessels on CCAMLR's IUU's [Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated] Vessels Lists: Lessons on Port State Performance”, Washington, DC, 2009, p. 6, w​w​w​.k​r​i​l​l​c​o​u​n​t​.j​p​/C​C​A​M​L​R​2​0​0​9​/C​C​A​M​L​R%20Ports%20performance%20paper092709%2​0​F​I​N​A​L​.pdf. 50. See Roda Mushkat, One Country, Two International Legal Personalities: The Case of Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997. 51. Email, APU, NZ MFAT, 14 September 2007, APU/CHN, Part 3. However, the following article demonstrates that some in the Chinese fshing sector were sympathetic to requests to control IUU fshing: Lin

Zhifeng and Zhang Mei, “Nanji haiyang shengwu ziyuan yanghu gongyue dui woguo nan dayang yuye de yingxiang” [The effect of CCAMLR on Chinese distant water fsheries in the Southern Ocean], Haiyang yuye [Ocean Fishing] 28:1 (2006). The 2007 contretemps is more likely to be related to different branches of the Chinese government having conficting interests over the issue of IUU. 52. Yuan Hua, Tang Jianhua, and Huang Shuolin, “Aodaliya kongzhi IUU bulao de guojia cuoshi ji qi dui woguo yuye guanli de qishi” [Analyses on Australian national action to deter IUU fshing and its illumination for China's fsheries management], Shanghai shuichan daxue xuebao [Shanghai Fisheries University Journal] 17:3 (2008). 53. w​w​w​.i​m​r​.n​o​/n​y​h​e​t​s​a​r​k​i​v​/2​0​1​1​/j​a​n​u​a​r​/n​o​r​s​k​-k​i​n​e​s​i​s​k​_​k​r​i​l​l​s​a​m​a​r​b​e​i​d​_​i​_​s​o​r​i​s​h​a​v​e​t​/e​n.​ 54. Guo Peiqing, “Jidi zhengduo weihe xiaoyan zai qi” [Polar confict: Why the smell of gunsmoke has returned], Liaowang 45 (November 2007); h​t​t​p​://g​b​l​.c​h​i​n​a​b​r​o​a​d​c​a​s​t​.c​n​/1​8​9​0​4​/2​0​0​7​/1​1​/0​5​/2​1​6​5​@1829761.htm. 55. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji bainian de zhengduo” [A hundred years of fghting over Antarctica], 1 August 2007, Huanqiu [Global]. 56. Yu, “Nanji ‘sanji tiao’”. 57. John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and Science within the Antarctic Treaty”. 58. Yan Qide and Hu Lingtai, “Nanji zhou zhengzhi qianjing qianxi” [Analysing the political future of Antarctica], Jidi yanjiu 17:3 (September 2005), pp. 157–164. 59. w​w​w​.c​h​i​n​a​.c​o​m​.c​n​/c​h​i​n​e​s​e​/z​h​u​a​n​t​i​/n​k​/7​3​3​7​6​5​.h​t​m.​ 60. Guo Peiqing, “Lianheguo ‘wu quan’ guanxia de nanjizhou” [The United Nations is powerless in the Antarctic Peninsula], Haiyang shijie [Oceanic World] 12 (December 2006), pp. 34–37. 61. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji luyou guanli zhidu xingcheng milu” [An outline of Antarctic tourism management], Zhonggong qingdao shiwei dangxiao qingdao xingzheng xueyuan xuebao [Qingdao Party School Journal] 6 (2006), pp. 45–48.

62. Discussions with Chinese polar offcials and scholars in Wuhan, Shanghai, and Qingdao, December 2009, and Christchurch, January 2010. 63. Zhang Jiansong, “Zhuanjia chengying zhengzhi nanji ziyuan fenzheng”. 64. See, for example, Yan Qide, “Nanji ziyuan yu guoji fenzheng” [The international struggle for Antarctic resources], Kexue [Science] 43:4 (1991), pp. 261–272; Zhu Jiangang, Yan Qide, and Ling Xiaoliang, “Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangy-ing duice” [The dispute of Antarctic resources and our countermeasures], Jidi yanjiu 18:3 (2006), pp. 17–22; Zou Keyuan, “Guifan weilai nanji kuanwu ziyuan kaifa liyong de falu yuanze” [The legal principles behind standardizing the future use of Antarctic mineral resources], Haiyang kaifa yu guanli [Oceanic opening up and management] 3 (1994); Zou Keyuan, Nanji kuanwu ziyuan yu guoji fa [Antarctic mineral resources and international law], Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1996. 65. Guo Peiqing, “Nanji ziyuan yu qi ziyuan Zhengzhi” [Antarctic resources and the politics of their management], Haiyang shijie 3 (2007), p. 71. 66. Zhu et al., “Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangying duice”, p. 215. 67. See, for example, “Beiji bingrong dui Zhongguo yiweizhe shenme” [What the melting of the North Pole means for China], cippe.net, 28 July 2008, http://news.cippe.net/news/10054.htm (this website collates news for the Chinese petroleum industry); “Yingguo shuaixian daoxiang nanji zhi zheng” [UK fres the first shot in Antarctic confict], Xinhua, 22 October 2007. 68. See David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China's Global Hunt for Energy”, Foreign Affairs 84:5 (September/October 2005), pp. 25–38. 69. http://908.chinare.org.cn:8088/njyq/. 70. “Yingguo shuaixian daoxiang nanji zhi zheng.” 71. w​w​w​.f​n​a​n​c​i​a​l​p​o​s​t​.c​o​m​/r​e​l​a​t​e​d​/t​o​p​i​c​s​/C​h​i​n​a​+I​c​e​l​a​n​d​+r​e​a​c​h​+d​e​a​l​+e​x​p​l​o​r​a​t​i​o​n​+a​r​c​t​i​c​+r​e​g​i​o​n​/6​4​9​5​9​5​1​/s​t​o​r​y​.h​t​m​l.​ 72. “Is ‘Peak Oil’ Behind Us?,” New York Times, 14 November 2010. 73. Zhu et al., “Nanji ziyuan fenzheng ji woguo de xiangying duice”, p. 220.

74. Chen Junhong (ed.), Jiaqiang he gaijin sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo xuexi duben [A reader of strengthening and reforming political thought work], Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1999, p. 169. 75. “Xianggang wenhui bao: Zhongguo junshi ‘geng you zuo wei’” (Hong Kong's Wen Wei Po newspaper: The Chinese military is “doing more of what it can”), 4 January 2009, w​w​w​.c​h​i​n​a​n​e​w​s​.c​o​m​.c​n​/h​b​/n​e​w​s​/2​0​0​9​/0​1​–04/1512366.shtml. 76. “China Bolsters Antarctic Posts”, 6 November 2007, BBC; see also “China to Finish Interior Antarctic Station in 2009”, Reuters, 20 April 2008. 77. See, for example, Nature News, w​w​w​.n​a​t​u​r​e​.c​o​m​/n​e​w​s​/2​0​0​9​/0​9​0​1​0​6​/f​u​l​l​/4​5​7​1​3​4​a​.h​t​m​l;​ The Register, w​w​w​.t​h​e​r​e​g​i​s​t​e​r​.c​o​.u​k​/2​0​0​6​/0​3​/3​0​/c​h​i​n​a​_​a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/; Socialist Courier, h​t​t​p​://s​o​c​i​a​l​i​s​t​-c​o​u​r​i​e​r​.b​l​o​g​s​p​o​t​.c​o​m​/2​0​0​7​/1​1​/c​h​i​n​e​s​e​-i​n​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.h​t​m​l​. 78. w​w​w​.l​o​w​y​i​n​t​e​r​p​r​e​t​e​r​.o​r​g​/p​o​s​t​/2​0​1​1​/0​6​/0​8​/A​u​s​t​r​a​l​i​a​-m​u​s​t​-r​e​-a​s​s​e​r​t​-i​t​s​-i​n​f​u​e​n​c​e​-i​n​-A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.a​s​p​x.​ China's People's Daily mentions the report, without going into much detail: http://news.cntv.cn/20110811/112276.shtml. 79. Antarctic Treaty, 1959, w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/i​n​f​o​_​m​e​a​s​u​r​e​s​_​l​i​s​t​.a​s​p​x​? lang=e. 80. Interview with Trevor Hughes, New Zealand delegate to the 30th ATCM, Wellington, 2 February 2009. 81. “Antarctic Treaty: Final Report of the Thirtieth Consultative Meeting”, New Delhi (30 April–11 May 2007), p. 21. 82. Interview with Trevor Hughes. 83. Ibid. 84. An electronic version of this report is available on the ATS site, at w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​o​c​u​-m​e​n​t​s​/a​t​c​m​_​f​r​_​i​m​a​g​e​s​/A​T​C​M​3​1​_​f​r​0​0​1​_​e​.p​d​f.​

3

India and Antarctica

Towards post-colonial engagement? Sanjay Chaturvedi

“India remains committed to scientific research and technical cooperation in the Polar Regions. Antarctica being a common heritage of mankind and the foremost symbol of peaceful use and cooperation needs to be protected for poster-ity.”1 This is how India's then External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, chose to describe India's engagement with Antarctica at the closing session of the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), hosted by India in New Delhi, on 11 May 2007. The reference to ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ might have prompted a mixed response. On the one hand, it might have revived, with some measure of anxiety, the memory of India's attempt to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at UN General Assembly in the mid-1950s. On the other hand, it might have sounded rather reassuring to those who still believe that India would (and should) act as a major catalyst for critical post-colonial engagement with the southern polar region, leading to a greater democratization of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), including its knowledge-power interface, in the best interests of entire humankind. I have argued elsewhere2 that India's foreign policy today is characterized by unprecedented pragmatism as well as cautious idealism. The realism is rather visible in the growing appreciation in the corridors of power that as a rising power in Asia and beyond, India's world view and self-image are due for a thorough revision. The normative thrust relates to a critical reassessment

of the country's geopolitical location on the globe, especially with regard to the Indian Ocean Region facing Antarctica. The much overdue process of decolonizing the geographical imaginations inherited from the colonial era as well as the Cold War can neither be arrested nor reversed. However, according to some analysts, despite apparent change in India's geopolitical vision, the foreign policy elite remains overwhelmed by the demands posed by India's immediate challenges, especially those emanating from its near neighbours. Conspicuous by its absence is a grand strategy that could provide the nation's multiple policy strands a cohesive form, consistency and orientation.3 Since India lacks a strategic culture, institutionalization of the country's foreign policymaking has not been possible.4 The link between the absence of institutionalization of India's foreign policy and the absence of coherent Antarctic policy, even after three decades of substantial scientific engagement with the Southern Polar Region, calls for some serious thinking. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) today finds itself at the crossroads while gearing up to meet the challenge and dilemmas posed by the forces of globalization as well as the ‘rise of Asia’ in the era of climate change and scarcities.5 Correspondingly, the ethical, geopolitical and legal dimensions of the so-called ‘Antarctic exceptionalism’ are now exposed to critical scrutiny. Undoubtedly the normative considerations flowing from the imperative of protecting and conserving polar attributes through Antarctic-specific instruments of governance (i.e. the ATS) remain compelling in their own right. These considerations also furnish a fair amount of legitimacy to the trinity of knowledge-expertise-capacity (and related claims) of a group of Antarctic Treaty powers to govern the Antarctic. However, the geopolitics of exceptionalism, having remained instrumental all these decades as a spatialgeographical strategy for deciding and dictating the inside/outside of the Antarctic governance (both in terms of issue-areas and membership) is now increasingly being questioned by the growing penetration of Antarctica by the forces of globalization6 Whereas the old world order of Cold War ideological geopolitics has collapsed, the new world order is yet to be born.7 Despite the uncertainties associated with the state of geopolitical transition in the international system, a period described by some as interregnum,8 there is no denying the fact that Asia is ‘rising’. As the global geopolitical tectonic plates shift in the course

of the ‘Asian Century’,9 the two polar regions will also be impacted in various ways. In my view it is worth exploring the extent to which the rise of Asia, especially China and India, in global geopolitics is also fnding its due place and the weight in the governance and management of Antarctica, and in providing new interpretations and understandings of its guiding values and norms. Whether the physical and scientific presence of the Asian newcomers on Antarctica since the early 1980s is duly matched by their geopolitical influence within the ATS deserves scrutiny. My key intention in this chapter is to further broaden and deepen the discus-sion on post-colonial engagement with Antarctica. Whereas my overall focus remains on India's geopolitical engagement with the southern polar region, I am particularly interested in exploring the overall prospects of a post-colonial engagement with the Antarctic, where India remains a major, but not the only, Asian Antarctic Treaty member that deserves attention. The chapter begins with a brief refection on what does the term ‘post-colonial’ imply in the case of the Antarctic. The discussion then turns to a brief comment on India's engagement with the ‘Question of Antarctica’ in the United Nations during the 1950s. This is followed by a section that maps out the continuity and change in the geopolitical trajectory of India's role in the ATS as a consultative member. I do so against the backdrop of a persisting (perhaps even widening) mismatch between Asia's growing physicalscientific presence on Antarctica and the knowledge-power-driven geopolitical influence within the ATS, especially at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). After a brief discussion of the Indian Ocean dimension of India's Antarctic engagement I conclude with the argument that India, along with China, Korea and Malaysia, will have to proactively engage with the increasingly complex and crowded agenda of the ATCMs, especially the issue-areas of biological prospecting and climate change, and failure to do so might result in wide-ranging implications for both the ATS and the role that India is expected to play as a rising and responsible power in world affairs.

Decolonization of Antarctica: conceptualizations and contestations In an important article on ‘post-colonial Antarctica’ Klaus Dodds10 raised a number of issues that demand further critical attention of all those who perceive a link (at times rather fuzzy) between the established claims related to the authority-legitimacy effectiveness of the ATS and the need for further ‘democratization’ of this regime in terms of both norms/values and practices of governance. The first and foremost issue in the context of post-colonial engagement with the southern polar region concerns the discursive suspension of disputed territorial claims and counter-claims of sovereignty on Antarctica (a continent larger than India and China combined) in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. As Dodds put it, The colonial map was effectively ‘frozen’ for the duration of the Treaty – a ‘holding pattern’ was established. A short section of the Antarctic Treaty (Article IV) was carefully drafted to ensure that transition. But it also facilitated a form of historical amnesia, which ensured that Treaty members would neither challenge nor substantiate those territorial claims.11 The manner in which the symbolic-territoriality of the imperial-colonial claims/rights in the challenging natural environment of the ‘white continent’ has been defended, despite occasional questioning over half a century – in a world that has witnessed various waves of decolonization and the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa – invites attention to the pivotal role played by the subtle but signifcant geographies of domination. These have been negotiated through a science-diplomacy, conducted through certain privileged languages, and sustained through the principle of consensus dictated by the knowledge-power nexus. A carefully chosen politics of ambiguity is also at play and suggests a rather para-doxical situation where the ethically regressive colonial legacy enshrined in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty has come to be largely perceived as a geopolitical guarantee against the unravelling of delicately maintained politico-legal equilibrium and consequently of the entire political architecture of governance. In short, this reveals how an apparently progressive legal regime such as the ATS

continues to be a hostage to the regressive, and of late increasingly assertive, legacy of the imperial-colonial era. The contradiction between the norms enshrined in the preamble to the Antarctic Treaty (“Recognizing that it is in the best interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”, emphasis given) and the indefinite geopolitical accommodation secured through Article IV of the Treaty in the context of the Cold War (“Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica”) appears to have become increasingly recalcitrant. It is useful to be reminded that it was Walter Nash, then a leader of the opposition party in New Zealand, who proposed the most radical decolonization of Antarctica in January 1956.12 He went to the extent of suggesting that New Zealand should consider abandoning its claim and Antarctica should belong to the entire world. There was a stiff opposition to his proposal from both within New Zealand and other claimant states. Nash later on signed the Antarctic Treaty as Prime Minister of New Zealand. Today, as Anne-Marie Brady points out in her contribution to this collection, New Zealand “has a strong interest and a vital need to maintain its foothold in Antarctica” and believes that “the current ATS is the most effective and effcient means to maintain its interests in Antarctica”13 in general, and the Ross Dependency in particular. New Zealand, given the obvious geographical proximity to Antarctica, perceives a vital stake in the security and stability of the southern polar regions and remains “fully committed to maintaining its strategic interests there at almost any cost”.14 Among various pertinent issues raised by Dodds,15 that will continue to generate scholarly debate for a long time, the one that interests me the most for the purposes of this chapter relates to what he calls “the production of a genuinely post-colonial engagement with Antarctica”16 against the backdrop of hopes raised by the interventions by India and more recently Malaysia to call “into question the ability and capacity of the ATCPs to manage and know Antarctica”.17 With Malaysia having recently acceded to the ATS are we not about to witness yet another round of the Antarctic regime “co-opting the post-colonial critics?”18 Is the post-colonial engagement with the

‘Question of Antarctica’ on a steep decline, if not already over? The issue of “co-opting the post-colonial critics” deserves further discussion and this is where some critical introspection on the part of the socalled ‘co-opted’ countries is the need of the hour. Before proceeding further on this issue, it is important to note the first exception to the rule applied in the case of the Netherlands. One might wonder whether with the entry of the Netherlands as an ATCP in 1990, the criterion of ‘substantial scientific interest’ was ‘substituted’ by demonstration of cooperation with some of the existing Antarctic Treaty parties and their programmes? Up until then, In contrast to the obligations of the acceding states to carry out ‘substantial scientific research activity’ in Antarctica, understood to mean the establishment of Antarctic station or the dispatch of scientific expedition (Article IX), the original signatories were not obliged to do so.19 Is co-optation simply a matter of an opponent or a critic joining, as a result of allurement or persuasion, a regime which is marked by asymmetries in terms of scientific-political capacities and agenda setting? How does one map the degree or the extent of co-optation? Is co-optation of former critics as new members by the long-standing regimes a regressive or a progressive step in terms of the legitimacy of that regime? What about its effectiveness, principle of consensus and assurances against co-optation? Does it matter whether the consensus is a genuinely negotiated one or imposed from above? How important is the collaborative approach to critiquing/questioning the geographies of domination? To what extent are the actors that have been coopted, or perceived by some as being co-opted, responsible themselves for the lack of much-needed capacity, continuity and consistency in their national Antarctic programmes? Is co-optation inevitable and/or irreversible? Dodds20 is at his persuasive best when he says that social scientists are yet to devote a more serious and systematic attention to how various, allegedly objective and neutral scientific discourses and practices have contributed to the colonization of Antarctica and its knowledge-production. We need to further explore how the consolidation of certain forms of geopolitical power has been achieved (even challenged) through what David Livingstone has described as the ‘hidden geographies’ of research/field stations, ‘national’

expeditions, research ships, laboratories, etc.21

The IGY (1957–58) and the Indian intervention in the UN In a recent influential article Adrian Howkins22 has critically examined at some length the rise and fall of the Indian intervention on the ‘Antarctic Question’ in February 1956 on the floor of the UN General Assembly. India's permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Arthur S. Lall, under instructions from Krishna Menon (one of the leading figures in India's foreign policy during the 1950s) conveyed India's preference for some kind of a trusteeship for Antarctica.23 Ambassador Lall requested, on 19 February 1956, that the ‘Question of Antarctica’ be included on the provisional agenda of the Assembly. The explanatory memorandum read in part: Modern science is likely to reveal many possibilities for the peaceful utilization of a region hitherto regarded as unproductive. At the same time, the influence of Antarctica on climate and related conditions throughout the world, while obviously considerable, requires further study. Any disturbance of the equilibrium of natural forces in this area might lead to incalculable consequences for the world as a whole involving the deterioration of the conditions for human and other forms of animal and plant life. In view of these facts and bearing in mind the size of the area, its international importance and the growing interest in it, the Government of India considers that in order to strengthen peace, it would be appropriate and timely for all nations to agree and to affirm that the area will be utilized entirely for peaceful purposes and for the general welfare.24 Besides questioning the European-colonial imprint of territorial claims on Antarctica, the Indian intervention also expressed serious concerns over the strategic fall-out of overlapping claims on the Antarctic Peninsula and, to quote Howkins, “raised fears that nuclear weapon testing in Antarctica could adversely disrupt global atmospheric systems and stop the monsoon”.25 On 14 November 1956, the withdrawal of India's proposal was announced at the organizational meeting of the eleventh General Assembly. According to the offcial transcript sent to London by the British delegation, Mr Krishna Menon had explained that the Indian delegation had decided to withdraw the

item in view of the heavy and urgent agenda of the UN General Assembly with regard to the Middle East and Hungary. It was further clarified that the decision to withdraw the item should not be interpreted as India abandoning the issue or undermining its importance.26 On 15 July 1958, Ambassador Lall reiterated the Indian offcial position that the UN should have a chance to comment and offer suggestions on possible participation of non-signatory governments in any regime provided by the proposed Antarctic Treaty. Apparently, the Indian bid to introduce an alternative imagination of the space and resources of Antarctica at the UN had failed to forestall the growing alliance among a handful of state actors with diverse national positions on the sovereignty issue but identical geopolitical interest in maintaining the status quo with regard to the colonialimperial legacies. However, as Adrian Howkins has forcefully argued, the Indian intervention did leave “a tangible impact upon the history of Antarctica in the second half of the 1950s”.27 There was much more at stake in the Indian intervention at the UN on the ‘Question of Antarctica’ than simply questioning the colonial legacy of claims and counterclaims. The very fact that the most resolute resistance to the Indian proposal, especially its underlying principle of trusteeship, came from the two developing, ‘postcolonial’, South American states (i.e. Argentina and Chile), with overlapping claims on the Antarctic Peninsula, implied, among other things, that there would be a perennial constraint on the alternative ‘post-colonial’ visualization and representation of Antarctic geopolitics in ‘South-South’ terms. As Howkins puts it so aptly, Latin American opposition to the Indian proposal fragmented a potential anti-imperial alliance in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile, both of which had initially presented their claims to Antarctica in anti-imperialist language, were co-opted into the post-colonial project of the Antarctic Treaty System, leaving other ‘third world’ nations frmly on the outside.28 The rise and fall of short, but critical, post-colonial Indian engagement at the UN needs to be recalled with reference to the fact that Indian scientists did take considerable interest in the IGY. Even though India did not show interest in its Antarctica programme, the IGY provided the newly independent country with an opportunity to “join the world club of science as

an equal, modernize its existing institutions, support basic sciences unapologetically, and prepare ground for new initiatives directed towards nation-building and national prestige”.29The IGY exposure no doubt enormously helped India's space programme but “accentuated the dependence of Indian science on the West for assessment and encouragement”30 at the same time. In India's first meaningful engagement with Antarctica in the UN during the 1950s, India's first Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs Jawaharlal Nehru had played a key role. As a key architect of India's foreign policy, Nehru was of the view that India's foreign policy and diplomacy should go beyond enlightened national interest and address larger issues of global concern.31 The normative-pragmatic interface of India's foreign policy was duly refected in Nehru's address to the Indian Parliament in May 1958 on the issue of Antarctica: We are not challenging anybody's rights there [in Antarctica]. But it has become important, more specially because of the possible experimentation of [sic] atomic weapons and the like, that the matter should be considered by the UN … the fact that Antarctica contains very important minerals – especially atomic energy minerals – is one of the reasons why this area is attractive to various countries. We thought it would be desirable to have a discussion about this in the UN.32 In hindsight one could argue that the Indian stand at the UN, under the personal supervision of Nehru, fell quite short of a direct questioning of the colonial claims and rights but challenged in a signifcant manner the selfassigned authority and legitimacy of a handful of Antarctica powers to conceptualize and construct the nature-science-sovereignty interface for peaceful utilizations of Antarctica. For Howkins, “This represented a subtle challenge to one of the British Empire's justification for its sovereignty in Antarctica: environmental stewardship through good management”.33 In other words, what India had questioned in a forceful manner was not only how a particular perception of ‘nature’ (one to be approached and explored through the natural science spectrum of the IGY) in the Antarctic was made pivotal to the justification for retaining territorial claims and rights but also how in turn adventure, science and power were ‘naturalized’. As Sally Eden

has pointed out, “elaborating how nature is constructed should help us to appreciate better the diversity of ‘natures’ and ‘environments’ that we carry in our heads, in our policies and institutional structures”.34 The manner in which ‘nature’ was constructed in the Antarctic-specific context with the help of collaborative IGY science and geopolitical contestations were enveloped within the territorial-jurisdiction scope of the Antarctica Treaty (i.e. south of 60 degrees south) pre-empted to some extent the scope for any critical enquiry into how the ‘Antarctic scientific community’ will accumulate and validate knowledge and the related framing of the ‘white’ continent as ‘global knowledge commons’. I will return to this point towards the end of this chapter. When the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959, the newly set-up foreign policy institutions of India, overwhelmingly influenced by the personalized style of foreign policy and charisma of Nehru, 35 chose not to react. Arthur S. Lall, in a personal communication to Peter J. Beck,36 is reported to have said that India was reasonably satisfied with the objectives of the Treaty, as it felt that most concerns that India had expressed in the United Nations in 1956 and 1958 stood covered. Lall did subsequently criticize the Antarctic Treaty on the grounds that, it tended to foster the idea that general international agreement can best be negotiated by a small group of countries, and in this respect the manner in which it was made is somewhat out of step with the requirements of an interdependent and shrinking world.37 The issue of India's accession to the Antarctic Treaty was raised perhaps in some quarters after the Treaty came into force in 1961. The matter was not pursued in view of India's strong criticism of the apartheid in South Africa.38 For India's foreign and defence policy the 1960s and 1970s were most challenging and the three wars that India fought (including the 1962 war with China) kept India's attention diverted from matters Antarctic. In the corridors of power in New Delhi “insuffcient attention was paid to the development of institutions for the conduct of foreign policy”39 and India's geopolitical orientation remained largely continental and focused on the Himalayan frontiers and borderlands. Both the Indian Ocean and Antarctica became rather peripheral to India's world view and strategic concerns. Some Indian

scientists did however participate in their individual capacity with Australian (1960–61) and Soviet (1971–73) Antarctic expeditions.

India enters the ATS: 1980s It is useful to recall that India's scientific-geopolitical engagement with the Ant-arctic during the early 1980s began at a time when the southern polar region was going through a major discursive transformation, especially with respect to its actual and imagined resource endowment, with far-reaching implications for the following norm enshrined in the preamble to the Antarctic Treaty: “… it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord”. Despite the success achieved by the major Antarctic powers in keeping the issue of Antarctica off the agenda of discussions related to ‘common heritage of mankind’ during UNCLOS III, the implications of both the principle and the negotiations were enormous, as the events that unfolded during the 1980s would reveal. Here was a direct and substantial challenge to Antarctic exceptionalism, which was also marked on the one hand by a rather limited number of Antarctic Treaty memberships and growing interest in the resource potential of the Antarctic on the other. The first Indian expedition to Antarctica landed on the Queen Maud Land on 9 January 1982, with Dr S. Z. Qasim as the leader of the expedition. In an inter-view given about twenty years later Qasim said in retrospect, When the first expedition to Antarctica was finalised, the scenario in the world about Antarctica was very different from what it is today. Antarctica was a monopoly of the rich and the developed countries at that time. And the only developing countries which had their presence in Antarctica were Argentina and Chile, because of their proximity to the icy continent. India's entry into Antarctica broke this monopoly. India was the first Asian country and one of the foremost developing countries to have its entry into Antarc-tica. Soon after India's entry many developing countries like Brazil, China and South Korea made efforts to land in Antarctica and build stations there. The main rationale behind our Antarctic programme was geopolitical and the other one was to open a new science for India, namely, the polar science which was nonexistent before the first expedition landed in Antarctica.40

The decision to set up the Department of Ocean Development, directly under the Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi in July 1981 (more recently reorganized, expanded and renamed as the Ministry of Earth Sciences), in the wake of UNCLOS III, was facilitated by the fact that the Indian Parliament too was positive towards India's involvement in Antarctic research. The same year China also set up the National Antarctic Expedition Committee to coordinate the national Antarctic research programme and facilitate international cooperation. We may note in passing, as pointed out by some analysts, Mrs. Gandhi continued the personalized approach of her father, and made the dubious contribution of undermining the weak foreign policy institutions she had inherited. It was during her time that the office of the Prime Minister (PMO) became a source of enormous power.41 According to the Department of Ocean Development Annual Report for the year 1982–83: The possibility of sending a scientific expedition which combines the deep sea exploration and the study of living and non-living resources in the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic region (an area which is divided from our country only by a few islands and a continuous stretch of water of the Indian Ocean) has been under consideration for some time. After looking into the various implications of such a project, the Department of Ocean Development decided that it would be useful from a scientific point of view to send a scientific expedition as, it would add to our knowledge of factors relating to Indian Ocean and the monsoon phenomenon on which the economy of the country is critically dependent. In addition, there may also be several other advantages in the evaluation of several aspects of life in the ice-bound regions which are akin to areas on our northern frontiers. It would also help in taking concrete steps for environmental protection in the surrounding ocean areas as well as in other linked surroundings…. A study of the Antarctic waters, apart from the immense scientific interest it provides would also be of much economic value.42 On 13 July 1983, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs gave its consent

in favour of India joining the Antarctic Treaty and seeking Consultative Status. As noted earlier, India acceded to the Treaty on 19 August 1983 and within a month was accorded Consultative Status, much to the delight of the then ATCPs. India acceded to CCAMLR on 17 July 1985 and became a member of SCAR on 5 October 1985. It participated in the CRAMRA negotiations from January 1984 onwards, signed the fnal Act of the Convention on 2 June 1988 and was very much a part of the ATCMs that witnessed the loss and restoration of consensus on the minerals issue. India ratifed the Madrid Protocol in 1997 India's ‘intentions’ were indeed a matter of speculation among the major Antarctic powers when New Delhi decided in favour of acceding to the Antarctic Treaty. Peter J. Beck wrote at the close of 1983: “of course it might be argued that India intends to exploit entry in order to destroy the Antarctic club from within or to exacerbate the existing internal divisions. Only time will tell.”43 In 1986, Beck offered his revised assessment of India's motives in his later work as follows: In the event, even if there are signs of concern about certain aspects, such as the practice of secrecy, India has emerged as an effective participant in the system and as a supporter of its retention. India's advocacy on behalf of the treaty system has served to disarm the impact of criticism from the developing world.44 That national prestige was a key driver behind India's Antarctic engagement was evident when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told Lok Sabha, the lower house of Indian Parliament, on 19 February 1982, that by pursuing “this advanced work India has now joined a select band of country”.45 The remaining key considerations that influenced India's decision to accede to the Antarctic Treaty were conveyed by the Government of India to the Indian Parliament on 17 August 1983 along the following lines: (a) through exchange of information with other members of the Treaty India will be in a much better position to enhance its analytical capabilities; (b) India will be in a position to effectively project its own views as well as the views of the nonaligned countries; (c) “it would be able to participate in the ongoing discussions on the resources of Antarctica and ensure that any regime that might be set up there would be in harmony with its overall policies and

objectives”.46 That there was an important geo-economic rationale behind India's interest in the Antarctic was also highlighted in the foreword written by Indira Gandhi to the scientific Report of the First Indian Expedition to Antarctica, dated 4 August 1993.47 It said in part: “The number of tasks completed and the amount of scientific data generated clearly showed that with dedication and pioneering spirit Indian scientists can accomplish more than what is initially expected. It also proved India's capability to undertake Antarctic explorations of high order leading to long-term gains to our national economy.”48 It is important to pause at this point and note that at the time of its accession to the Antarctic Treaty in 1983, India appeared fully conscious of her broader and deeper obligation vis-à-vis the developing countries. While articulating full support for the retention of the political architecture of Antarctic governance it expressed concern over the need for wider participation of international com-munity in the ATS. In November 1984, the Indian delegate expressed this concern in the UN General Assembly in the following manner. The Antarctic Treaty System … is an evolving institution whose structural and organizational framework is conceived in a flexible manner … which is gradually evolving further, taking into account the legitimate concerns of all…. It would be unrealistic and counterproductive to think of a new regime in the present situation…. The Antarctic Treaty System is an open system … and should be broadened by the accession of more States. The evolving Treaty System should be made more open and responsive to the viewpoints of all States.49 In retrospect it is quite reasonable to assume that India's decision to join the Antarctic Treaty might have been seen as unsettling by some in the Global South and even perceived as seriously undermining the bid made by Malaysia under the leadership of Mahathir bin Mohamad in the UN on the ‘Question of Antarctica’. Some keen analysts did express their concern in the early 1990s that, “India may fnd it rather hard to reconcile its membership of the Antarctic Treaty System with the views of the United Nations and the nonaligned movement, in which it still plays a leading role.”50 Dr S. Z. Qasim,

who besides leading the first Indian expedition to Antarctica was the Secretary of the newly set up Department of Ocean Development, when India acceded to the Antarctic Treaty, was quick to point out that, “India's accession did not imply any change in its basic stand either regarding territorial claims or regarding the treatment of the natural resources of Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind.”51 Equally reassuring did Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sound when she proclaimed that, “India will not do nor allow others to take any step which would be considered detrimental to the interests of [the] developing countries.”52 As far as the then ATCPs were concerned, India's accession, and China's accession soon thereafter,53 was nothing short of a diplomatic coup and a big boost to the authority and legitimacy of the ATS. As Peter J. Beck54 argued with remarkable insight, one of the paramount considerations on the part of the ATCPs was the likely effect of a new membership on delicately as well as zealously maintained geopolitical equilibrium and the overall stability of the Antarctic regime, even if some expressed anxieties over issues such as overstretch and over-expansion. At a time when the ATS was under a Malaysia-led attack in the UN on account of its alleged exclusive nature and scope, the then ATCPs were quick to grasp the ‘strategic’ advantage of expanding the inner circle of membership in 1983 by letting India, China and Brazil in. The simultaneous admission of two major players from Asia and South America as consultative parties would not only take some wind out of the sails of Malaysia in the UN on the ‘Question of Antarctica’ but also strengthen the treaty system. The very thought of India, an advocate of an active UN role in Antarctic governance during the mid-1950s and now a leading member of the nonaligned movement, joining the ATS must have appeared most reassuring to many in the ATS, especially those anxious about India's intentions and objectives behind a more direct Antarctic engagement. No surprise therefore, the addition of India represented a considerable coup for the treaty powers since it reduced the chances of India either leading or supporting the anti-treaty campaign initiated by Malaysia. Conversely, India perceived membership to be advantageous, since it would enable a more effective way of presenting Indian and Third World interests in Antarctica.55

In the light of the discussion so far, it is to state the obvious perhaps that India's accession to the Antarctic Treaty in August 1983, against the backdrop of the intricate mineral resource diplomacy, and subsequent grant of consultative status within six weeks in September 1983 accorded a unique geopolitical complexion to India's Antarctic engagement as one of the insiders. All it had taken for India to ‘meet’ the criterion of ‘substantial scientific interest’, right in the middle of ongoing minerals negotiations, was the dispatch of two scientific expeditions and the setting-up of a permanent research station called Dakshin Gangotri; imaginatively, but purposefully, named after the mythical source of the sacred river Ganges in the Himalayas. India's participation in the ATS is therefore likely to remain hostage to widespread perception that India was co-opted into the ATS and the criterion of ‘substantial scientific interest’ was deliberately compromised by the Antarctic Treaty powers due to geopolitical expediency. This obviously raises the expectations in the ATS and elsewhere with regard to the nature, scope and stature of India's Antarctic science profile. Second, the overall value of India's presence in the ATS continues to be judged in terms of the extent and effcacy of India's claim to represent the interests of developing countries in the governance and management of Antarctica as the ‘common heritage of mankind’. And this raises the expectations in terms of a proactive intervention by India in Antarctic policy matters, especially in the ATCMs.

India and polar science: emerging bipolar perspectives India built its second permanent station, Maitri (meaning friendship) during 1988–89. The National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR), under the Ministry of Earth Sciences, is the nodal agency (located in Goa) to undertake, organize and coordinate the Indian polar science programme and the logistics support for Antarctica scientific research. The mission mandate of the NCAOR is To plan, promote, co-ordinate and execute the entire gamut of polar science and logistic activities of the country in order to ensure a perceptible and influential presence of India in Antarctica and to uphold our strategic interests in the global framework of nations in the southern continent and the surrounding oceans.56 India currently has a budget of US$33 million for its Antarctic programme. The Indian Antarctica research programme is concentrated in the felds of, but not limited to, atmospheric sciences, meteorology and climate change, biology and environmental science, earth science, glaciology and engineering and communication. India's first ever scientific expedition to the South Pole, covering a total distance of 4,680 km, was successfully accomplished during November and December 2010.57 Widely reported in the Indian media the expedition was also aimed at enhancing India's scientific-logistic profile on Antarctica. India's scientific interest in the Arctic is growing and the possibility of her applying for observer status in the Arctic Council in the near future cannot be ruled out. For the time being India's interest in the Arctic is dictated by scientific studies related to polar ice, climate and weather. In the context of climate change, India's future interest and involvement in the Arctic are likely to be driven by resource geopolitics and energy security considerations as well. According to some analysts, as a strong supporter of global nuclear disarmament, India is concerned about the growing militarization of the Arctic seas by the littorals, particularly the deployment of nuclear submarines, and could actively promote the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for the Arctic region.58

In July 2008, the then Union Minister of Science and Technology and Earth Sciences Kapil Sibal inaugurated India's first permanent research station in the Arctic region, located at the old school building in the Norwegian town of Ny-Ålesund, once famous as a coal mining settlement. Situated on Svalbard (Spitsbergen), midway between Novaja Zemlja and Greenland, and called Himadri, the research base is equipped with state of the art facilities that are used for conducting year-round scientific research in contemporary felds of Arctic science with special emphasis on climate change. Current areas of research in Ny-Ålesund include marine science, aurora physics, biology, glaciology, geology, environmental science, geodetic studies, rocket probe studies, atmospheric physics, terrestrial studies, climate change monitoring, among others. The Himadri base station is managed by the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR). A highlevel delegation led by Prithviraj Chavan, the then Minister of Earth Sciences, visited Svalbard, Norway on 6 June 2010 to review scientific activities being carried out in the Arctic region by the Indian scientists from Himadri.

The Indian Ocean dimension of India's Antarctic engagement In a message to the first expedition team Indira Gandhi said in part, “The Indian Ocean links India to Antarctica. The entire area is of deep interest to us, and ocean studies are of vital importance.”59 After nearly a decade-long strategic low profile and invisibility,60 the Indian Ocean is once again becoming an area of geostrategic rivalry among a number of major powers and littoral states.61 The social construction of the Indian Ocean-space as a force-feld or battlefeld is being currently reinforced by the great base race in the region. The ‘Indianoceanic arc of militarization’ stretches from Egypt to Indonesia and Australia. A number of military-naval infrastructure projects are being undertaken by India, Pakistan, Myanmar and Malaysia, among others. The strategic dynamism behind this power projection refects the new economic prosperity and confidence of some of these states, increased importance of mobility and connectivity in the era of globalization, strategic natural resource endowment of the region (especially oil and gas) and the ‘rise’ of India.62 According to some analysts, the identity and coherence of the Indian Ocean as a geostrategic region are likely to be deepened due to new naval bases being established in the area.63 On 30 June 2007, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, while delivering ‘The Admiral A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture’, entitled ‘International Relations and Maritime Affairs: Strategic Imperatives’, highlighted the importance of Antarctica to India in the context of India's maritime diplomacy: Because it is so far away and a subject of much romanticism, the importance of Antarctica as a major maritime interest of India is very often underestimated by policy-makers. In actual fact, not only is Antarctica vitally important for the environment, it is a treasure house of potential mineral resources, including petroleum. Moreover, it is an enormous marine storehouse of the foundation of the human food chain, thanks to its abundant holdings of krill. Finally, and this is of the most immediate and continuing importance to India: Antarctica determines, in signifcant measure, the Indian monsoon – upon which our agriculture, and hence our economy, depends. In this context, we were

privileged to host the 30th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Mechanism meeting in New Delhi recently and we continue to be actively engaged in international cooperative activities on preserving Antarctica as a unique and common heritage of mankind. It would, by now, be obvious that the primary area of Indian maritime interest ranges from the Persian Gulf in the north, to Antarctica in the South, and from the Cape of Good Hope and the East Coast of Africa in the west, to the Straits of Malacca and the archipelagos of Malaysia and Indonesia in the east. It would be equally obvious that as India's economy and her international role grow, the area of this benign but active engagement will also grow.… Our maritime diplomacy, like our broader diplomatic effort, radiates out in expanding circles of engagement, starting with India's immediate maritime neighbourhood. As a mature and responsible maritime power, we are contributing actively to capacity building and operational coordination to address threats from non-state actors, disaster relief, and support to UN peacekeeping and rescue and extrication missions.64 There are two specific references to Antarctica in the above quotation that demand and deserve critical reflection. The first relates to Antarctica as a spaceof strategic value to India's maritime interests and maritime diplomacy. And the second relates to the visualization of the southern polar region as the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and site of India's benign but active engagement The Indian Ocean dimension of Antarctic geopolitics in general is also likely to be reinforced by the growing geostrategic importance of the Indian Ocean to the United States of America, described by Joyner and Theis as the “chief archi-tect of law and policy for the Antarctic”.65 The dominant social construction and visualization of the Indian Ocean space both as a site of geo-economic rivalries and as a battlefeld for naval power projection is central to the argument advanced by Robert Kaplan that “Like a microcosm of the world at large, the greater Indian Ocean region is developing into an area of both ferociously guarded sovereignty (with fastgrowing economies and militaries) and astonishing interdependence (with its pipelines and land and sea routes).”66 Kaplan also talks about the relative decline of Western power and anticipates that “the Indian Ocean is where the

rivalry between the United States and China in the Pacifc interlocks with the regional rivalry between India and China”.67 Whereas it is diffcult to predict the impact of unfolding dynamics of Indian Ocean geopolitics and geostrategy on the future of international cooperation in Antarctic governance, the boundary between the Southern Ocean and the Indian Ocean will become increasingly blurred, especially against the backdrop of climate change being increasingly perceived by some of the major Antarctic powers as some kind of a ‘threat-multiplier’.68 The 2009 SCAR Climate Change and the Environment Report (cited hereaf-ter as the ACCE Report)69 provides a comprehensive assessment of the implications of Antarctic climate change on the rest of the world. It points out that a reduction in sea ice would lead to the likely decline of certain species such as Adelie penguins on a warmer Antarctic Peninsula; seals, albatross and penguins producing fewer young, and a reduction in krill. Even though sea ice is increasing in certain regions of Antarctica due to changes in large-scale atmospherics, the continental sea ice is decreasing in other parts of the continent. On the Antarctic Peninsula nearly 87 per cent of glaciers are decreasing and the ones that are increasing are doing so only due to increased regional precipitation. By 2100 the West Antarctic ice sheet may discharge enough ice to raise sea levels up to 1.4 m (+) with a signifcant challenge for Antarctica and for coastal populations across the globe. Jan-Gunnar Winther of the Norwegian Polar Institute has pointed out that, “the impacts of climate change in the polar regions over the next 100 years will exceed the impact forecasts for many other regions and will produce feedback with signifcant global consequences”.70 The Indian Ocean region is likely to be affected in a profound manner by some of the above-mentioned impacts of climate change. I will return to the Indian Ocean theme briefy in the concluding section of this chapter.

“Antarctica as the common heritage of mankind”: the Indian Antarctic dilemma Hosting the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) in New Delhi, in May 2007, was a landmark in India's Antarctic engagement and programme. The then External Affairs Minister of India, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, in his closing address delivered on 11 May 2007, was quick to acknowledge that “The Treaty has certainly grown in stature and strength in the last forty-eight years with newer entrants joining its fold.” The 1991 Madrid Protocol was hailed by him “as a testimony of farsightedness and a global vision of mentors of the Antarctic Treaty” especially in the light of the fourth assessment report of the IPCC. The path shown by the Antarctic Treaty System by forging ties in collaborative research and enforcing a strict regime of environmental protection through a detailed consultative process, is not only unique to the Treaty but needs to be followed in other areas as well. … India remains committed to scientific research and technical cooperation in the Polar Regions. Antarctica being a common heritage of mankind and the foremost symbol of peaceful use and cooperation needs to be protected for posterity. (emphasis given) The emphasis supplied to the quotation above is intended to highlight on the one hand India's frm commitment to the ATS as a model of cooperation that is worthy of emulation in other areas as well. On the other hand, it is worth noting that India continues to perceive Antarctica as a ‘unique’ but ‘common’ heritage of mankind but largely within the framework of the ATS. Quite conspicuous by its absence however is any intermediary reference to the interests and stake of developing countries from Afro-Asia bordering the Indian Ocean in emerging issue-areas such as bioprospecting. Neither India nor China has presented so far either a working paper or an information paper on this important issue at the ATCMs. Apparently the normative edge of India's Antarctic engagement (quite pronounced during the 1980s) has somewhat withered away over the years even in terms of rhetoric. Maybe

some explanation lies in the more fundamental shift in India's overall foreign policy, as a rising power in the international system, from ethical-normative to realist-pragmatic, as observed by a number of ana-lysts.71 C. Raja Mohan would argue that, Since the 1990s, India could no longer sustain the presumed idealism of its foreign policy. India had to come to terms with the painful reality that its relative standing in the world had substantially declined during the Cold War. Much like Deng Xiaoping who prescribed pragmatism for China, the Indian leaders began to emphasize practical ways to achieve power and prosperity for India.72 However, as far as Antarctica is concerned, in comparison to China, Indian off-cial pronouncements continue to place more emphasis on the ‘scientific’ and much less on ‘political’ dimensions of its engagement. The Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations sent notes to the Divi-sion for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (between 13 July 2005 and 31 August 2009) in response to submissions made by Australia, Argentina and Norway to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf. The note sent in response to the Australian submission73 stated: India recalls the principles and objectives shared by the Antarctic Treaty and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 [Convention] and the importance of harmony between the Antarctic Treaty and the Convention and the continuing cooperation, security and stability in the Antarctic area. India while referring to Article IV of the Treaty, wishes to inform that it does not recognize any State's right or claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic area and consequently over the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the continent of Antarctica.74 The note further said, Acknowledging with appreciation Australia's request to the Commission for not taking any action on the portion of its submission relating to the areas of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to Antarctica, India requests the Commission not to take any action accordingly.75

The notes sent by India in response to the extended continental shelf claims were the first and so far the only vivid and emphatic expression of India's non-recognition of the territorial claims and counter-claims on Antarctica after joining the ATS.

Conclusion With Malaysia having acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011 the number and presence of the Asian countries in the ATS is likely to further increase. Accord-ing to B. A. Hamzah, “The signing of the Treaty [by Malaysia] will close a chapter in the North-South divide on the question of Antarctica at the United Nations.”76 Hopefully Malaysia's active engagement with the ATS and effective participation in the ATCMs will further contribute to the democratization of Antarctic governance. Asia's rise in the international system, and its implications for the Antarctic, can legitimately be approached and analysed in the light of the “forthcoming era of shortages in five vital areas governing economic activity: food, commodities, energy/oil, water, and clean environment”.77 According to the Food and Agri -culture Organization, global food production will need to increase by more than 40 per cent in 2030 and by 70 per cent in 2070. Whereas India is just above self-suffciency, China, Japan and Korea remain net importers of food. If the scenarios offered by the IPCC turn out to be correct, global warming and climate change will further aggravate these problems. Given such realities, some observers of polar resource geopolitics might be tempted to argue that the resource endowment of Antarctica is likely to be further politicized by some of the rising Asian powers and might even ‘threaten’ the moratorium on mining under the Madrid Protocol. In my view, there is no reason or evidence thus far to suggest that some of the leading Asian member states in the ATS will behave as the ‘spoilers’. Writing in 1990, Wei-chin Lee argued that, Despite allegations that China is not serious about its scientific mission, it is indeed interested in Antarctic affairs. No matter what China's motivation – self-interest or global commitment – the PRC apparently believes that a seat at the Consultative Party sessions [ATCMs] will provide a better opportunity for it to infuence Antarctic developments.78 However, the question as to whether China's interest in Antarctic affairs (and for that matter India's interest in Antarctic affairs) has been persuasively demonstrated through a proactive approach to infuence the agenda and the

outcome of dialogue and deliberations at the ATCMs deserves critical refection. Writing twenty-two years on from that statement, in her chapter in this volume AnneMarie Brady notes, China still has a very long way to go before it can catch up with the other established Antarctic powers, let alone overtake them. Increases in budgets alone will not be enough for China to match the Antarctic activities of many other nations. It will take decades to build up the requisite talent pool of senior scientists and social scientists who can engage in internationally competitive polar research and garner the language skills that will enable them to freely participate in international efforts.79 What Brady has to say about China is quite apt perhaps for other Asian member countries in the ATS and their ‘national’ Antarctic pursuits as well. Maybe the challenge for Asian countries in the ATS is to pool their strengths and efforts at the service of the collective spirit behind the Antarctic Treaty, especially its Preamble, that calls for international cooperation, collaboration and complimentarity. I would like to argue that India (and perhaps China too) would continue to perceive a vital stake in further enhancing the authority and effciency of the ATS, though not without feeling the tension arising out of the growing realiza-tion to further ‘democratize’ the ATS (which calls for a greater proactive partici-pation of and contribution by the Asian countries to knowledge-production and Antarctic governance) and apparently unsettling effects emanating from the questioning of existing asymmetries of power and capacity in the Antarctic regime. Far more problematic and questionable in my view is the reasoning, abetted by the growing climate of fear around terrorism and various global risks, that imagines a ‘new great game’ between India and China in and around the Indian Ocean and fears the prospects of a spillover in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. Those who harbor such anxieties and fear might derive solace from the ‘realist’ argument that, “The Indian navy's attempt to come up with its own strategy and doctrine, though welcome in many respects, has little meaning in the absence of a national security strategy from the Indian government.”80 India's commitment to Antarctic science is frm and obvious and is likely to

further expand in future. India is all set to acquire a 500 crore polar research vessel (PRV) by 2013. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs has approved the acquisition of an ice-breaker class cum supply vessel for Antarc-tica, the Arctic and the Indian Ocean. However, the task of securing science as the first order value in the Antarctic in the wake of changing resource-science interface, however, is going to be rather diffcult. The role of science and the sci-entists in the case of Antarctic bioprospecting is going to oscillate between the appeal of fundamental science and the imperatives of commercial-corporate interests. As Alan D. Hemmings notes, Here, for the first time, science wears two hats, its traditional Antarctic bonnet, and the hard-hat of commercial self-interest. Some formal mechanisms to avoid confict of interest seem called for, and some deliberate mechanism to ensure that the interests of science as exploiter are not laundered through its standing as privileged participant in the ATS. As in so many other areas, the maintenance of a viable Antarctic Treaty System will require us to periodically update it and not blithely assume that mechanisms established half a century ago will suffce.81 The challenge of bioprospecting before the ATCPs is hugely complex, involves intricate but critically important issues of equity and public good, and demands an early and effective intervention from India. Even a cursory look at the list of working/information papers submitted on tourism, bioprospecting and more recently climate change by India and other Asian countries suggests that these countries are yet to develop and articulate their perspectives and concerns on these issue-areas. And this in my view is a matter of concern, which further underlines the need for introspection by these countries and timely joint collaborative interventions in order to ensure that the views of developing countries from Afro-Asia are adequately represented in the ATS. The future of India's geopolitical infuence in the ATS will no doubt continue to be intimately related to the nature, scope and quality of India's ‘substantial sci-entifc interest’ in the southern polar region. India's plans to set up its new research station, named Bharati, on the Larsemann Hills (69°S, 76°E) in the Prydz Bay region of East Antarctica (on the ‘Australian Antarctic Territory’) are progressing as per schedule. The new research base is expected to be operational by 2012 and will be able to accommodate about

twenty-five scientists/technicians. The huge task of positioning the required infrastructure for building the research base Bharati was accomplished in December 2009 by the 29th Indian scientific expedition to Antarctica. In view of the geopolitical connotations of the new Indian station, certain sections of the Australian media have expressed their concern as follows: “Australia is losing control of its Antarctic territory as an energy-hungry world prepares to move in.”82 Antarctic science, with an obvious “Eurocentric” tilt has always been a cur-rency of geopolitical clout in the ATS83 and is bound to acquire new complexities in the context of bioprospecting and climate change.84 Many issues raised in a seminar study on ‘Asia in Antarctica’85 published in the mid-1990s are still relevant today and need further critical engagement. A lot more needs to be achieved in my view in terms of building, articulating and exercising the necessary geopolitical capacity of the Asian states, including India, to infuence the governance and management of increasingly diverse, and growingly commercial, human activities in the Antarctic. The recent, more or less unrecorded, assertion on the part of the claimant states86 in relation to the extended continental shelf in the Antarctic Treaty area, was discussed and realized on the ‘margins’ of the ATS rather than through the ‘mainstream’ channels of Antarctic diplomacy such as the ATCM. This is yet another reason perhaps as to why the ATCMs, as a critical site of postcolonial engagement, demand and deserve a far more proactive Asian assertion and cooperation. I would like to conclude with a brief reference to David P. Fidler's work where he has examined the implications of an Asian century for international law around the concept of a “Concert of Asia”.87 According to him Asian countries need to understand that Asia's ascendance to power and prominence creates both opportunities and burdens and the only way in which they can maximize the former and manage the latter effectively is “through a strategic approach to global governance”. He further envisions a framework created by the Concert of Asia through which Asian countries can “build on existing cooperative mechanisms to make Asia a laboratory of global governance in the 21st century”. What the Asian nations can and should do is to “create a new legal and governance order unlike anything seen before in international relations”.88 The question is not whether but when the spirit underlying the

‘Concert of Asia’ will be realized in the domain of Antarctic governance. The sooner this collective post-colonial engagement with the Antarctic is achieved the better I believe it would be for all those who remain committed to the principle that Antarctica shall forever be governed for peaceful purposes in the best interests of humankind and shall never become the site of international discord. I am not suggesting here some kind of an inward-looking Asian Antarctic geopolitics, based on a ‘block mentality’. Far from it; what I do wish to argue is that it is important for the Asian member states, including India, to realize that along with high-quality polar science, the capacity to meaningfully contribute to agenda setting and policymaking is critically important for turning the norms and promises into meaningful dialogues and practices in the ATS. The ATCMs, in short, demand and deserve more serious attention, ‘burden sharing’ along with ‘beneft sharing’, and a greater involvement on the part of all those who are committed to the principles, norms and values enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty and would like to see the ATCMs respond to the emerging complex challenges in an effective, proactive and transparent manner in the best interests of mankind. Let me conclude by briefy revisiting some of the points I raised at the outset in this chapter. If the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is at the crossroads today, which I believe it is, so too is India's foreign policy. India's rise to power and the quest for strategic autonomy at the same time, in an international geopolitical economy, which is both unipolar and multipolar, has led to a visibly tense debate between the realist-pragmatic and moralnormative traditions/trends/tenets in India's foreign policy. According to one critical perspective, In its foreign policy India can and must play its role as consciencekeeper of the world. The realist or pragmatic school of foreign policy that holds sway in India today scoffs at any suggestion that morality has a role in world affairs…. Half a century ago, a comparatively weak India had a stronger voice in the world because there was a certain morality and therefore a welcome boldness in India's foreign policy…. Today regrettably, India is being seen as a camp follower. Perceptions do matter perhaps more than reality. As a junior partner, India will not make it to the high table. Leadership implies not just economic and

military strength, but also ideas that inspire and motivate.89 While still lacking a coherent policy on the southern polar region, India's future Antarctic engagement will no doubt be infuenced to some extent by the emerg-ing trends in India's foreign policy. With India choosing to pursue an independ-ent foreign policy, that remains frmly anchored in normative moorings and the resolve to retain the autonomy to judge each issue-area in international/global affairs on its own merit, the prospects of a genuine postcolonial engagement and further democratization of the Antarctic governance through an able, open, inclusive and adaptive ‘Concert of Asia’ in the ATS remain alive despite certain trends and challenges to the contrary.

Notes 1

The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not refect in any way the views of the Indian delegation to Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2007. ‘Address by External Affairs Minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, at the closing session of the XXX Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting’, New Delhi, 11 May. [Accessed 10 November 2010], http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550312696.

2

Sanjay Chaturvedi, ‘India's Quest for Strategic Space in the “New” International Order: Locations, (Re)Orientations and Opportunities’, in Purnendra Jain, Felix Patri-keeff and Gerry Groot (eds), Asia-Pacifc and New International Order, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006.

3

Harsh V. Pant, ‘A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy’, Orbis(2009), pp. 250–264.

4

Ibid. Also, Rajiv Sikri, Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Sage, 2009.

5

Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Also see Jorgen Ørstrøm Møller, How Asia Can Shape the World: From the Era of Plenty to Era of Scarcities, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010.

6

See Alan D. Hemmings, ‘Globalization's Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation’, in Lorne K. Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D. Hemmings (eds), Looking South: Australia's Antarctic Agenda, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2008.

7

Sanjay Chaturvedi and Joe Painter, ‘Whose World? Whose Order? Spatiality, Geo-politics and the Limits of the New World Order’, Cooperation and Confict (Sage) vol. 42 (2007), pp. 375–395.

8

Georg Sørensen, ‘What Kind of World Order? The International System in the New Millennium’, Cooperation and Confict (Sage) vol. 41 (2006), pp. 343–363.

9

See Surjit Mansingh, ‘Rising China and Emergent India in the 21st

Century: Friends or Rivals?’ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis vol. 19 (2007), pp. 117–142; David Scott, ‘The 21st Century as Whose Century?’ Journal of World-Systems Research vol 5 (2008), pp. 96–118; Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, New York: HarperCollins, 1999. 10 Klaus Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica: An Emerging Engagement’, Polar Recordvol. 42 (2006), pp. 59–70. 11 Ibid., p. 61. 12 Ibid., p. 68. 13 Anne-Marie Brady's chapter on New Zealand in this volume (Chapter 8). 14 Ibid. 15 Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica’, p. 69. 16 Ibid., pp. 59–70. 17 Ibid., p. 68. 18 Ibid., p. 65 (emphasis given). 19 Sanjay Chaturvedi, The Polar Regions: A Political Geography, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, p. 112. 20 Dodds, ‘Post-colonial Antarctica’, pp. 59–70. 21 David N. Livingstone, Putting Science in its Place, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003. 22 Adrian Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire: Opposition to India's Proposal to Raise the “Antarctic Question” at the United Nations in 1956’, Polar Record vol. 44 (2008), pp. 35–44. 23 Sanjay Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis, New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990. 24 UN 1956, General Assembly, 11th Session, Peaceful Utilisation of Antarctica. Doc. A/3118/Add. I: 13 September 1956; Doc. A/3118/Add. II: 17 October 1956; Chaturvedi, Dawning of Antarctica. 25 Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire’.

26 Ibid., p. 42. 27 Ibid., pp. 35–36. 28 Ibid., pp. 35–44. 29 Rajesh Kochhar, ‘Science as a Symbol of New Nationhood: India and the International Geophysical Year’, Current Science vol. 94 (2008), pp. 813–816. 30 Ibid. 31 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 336. 32 Cited in Anita Dey, ‘India in Antarctica: Perspectives, Programmes and Achievements’, International Studies vol. 29 (1992), pp. 173–185 (emphasis given). 33 Howkins, ‘Defending Polar Empire’, p. 40. 34 Sally Eden, ‘Environmental Issues: Nature versus the Environment?’ Progress in Human Geography vol. 25 (2001), p. 82. 35 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy. 36 Peter J. Beck, ‘India in Antarctica, Science-and-Politics-on Ice’, Nature vol. 306 (1983), pp. 106–107. 37 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 175. 38 Ibid., pp. 173–185. 39 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 260. 40 ‘Interview with S. Z. Qasim’, Dream: Monthly Newsletter of Vigyan Prasar, September, vol. 4, no. 2 (2002) p. 22. [Accessed 21 July 2012] w​w​w​.v​i​g​y​a​n​p​r​a​s​a​r​.g​o​v​.i​n​/d​r​e​a​m​/s​e​p​t​2​0​0​2​/e​n​g​l​i​s​h​.p​d​f.​ 41 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 262. 42 Annual Report 1982–83, Department of Ocean Development, Government of India, New Delhi (emphasis given). [Accessed 10 February 2011], w​w​w​.d​o​d​.n​i​c​.i​n​/a​n​n​8​2​–83.pdf. 43 Peter J. Beck, ‘Antarctica's Indian Summer’, Contemporary Review vol. 243, no. 1415 (1983), p. 299.

44 Peter J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm, 1986, p. 196. 45 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 177. 46 Ibid. 47 scientific Report of the First Indian Expedition to Antarctica, Technical Publication 1, Department of Ocean Development, Government of India, New Delhi. [Accessed 8 January 2011], h​t​t​p​://d​s​p​a​c​e​.n​c​a​o​r​.o​r​g​:8​0​8​0​/d​s​p​a​c​e​/b​i​t​s​t​r​e​a​m​/1​2​3​4​5​6​7​8​9​/1​2​6​/3​/I​N​T​R​O​D​U​C​T​I​O​N​.p​d​f​ 48 Ibid. 49 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 178 (emphasis given). 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Anne-Marie Brady, Chapter 2 in this volume. 54 Beck, International Politics of Antarctica. 55 Ibid., p. 198. 56 See the offcial website of the National Centre for Antarctic and Ocean Research (NCAOR), Goa. [Accessed 21 July 2012] http://ncaor.nic.in/. 57 Ibid. 58 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘China Breaking into the Arctic Ice’, Issue Brief, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 2010. 59 Cited in Dey, ‘India in Antarctica’, p. 177. 60 See Christian Bouchard and William Crumplin, ‘Neglected No Longer: The Indian Ocean at the Forefront of World Geopolitics and Global Geostrategy’, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region vol. 6, no. 1 (2010), pp. 26–51. 61 Donald Berlin, ‘The “Great Base Race” in the Indian Ocean Littoral: Confict Prevention or Stimulation’, Contemporary South Asia vol. 13 (2004), pp. 239–255.

62 Ibid. 63 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India and the Indian Ocean: Growing Mismatch Between Ambitions and Capabilities’, Pacifc Affairs vol. 82, no. 2 (2009), pp. 279–297. 64 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2007. ‘International Relations and Maritime Affairs.’ The Admiral A. K. Chatterjee Memorial Lecture by the External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee (emphasis given). [Accessed 10 November 2010], http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=550312961. 65 C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice, Hanover, NH: University of South Carolina Press, 1997, p. 1. 66 Robert D. Kaplan, ‘Centre Stage for the Twenty-First Century’, Foreign Affairs vol. 88 (2009), pp. 16–29. 67 Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, New York: Random House, 2010, p. 9. 68 Sanjay Chaturvedi and Timothy Doyle, ‘Geopolitics of Climate Change and Australia's Reengagement with Asia: Discourses of Fear and Cartographic Anxieties’, Aus-tralian Journal of Political Science vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 95–115. 69 ACCE, ‘Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment: A Contribution to the Inter-national Polar Year 2007–2008’, Cambridge: SCAR, 2008. 70 Cited in ATCM, ‘Report from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Implications of Climate Change for Antarctic Management and Governance: Co-Chairs’ Executive Summary with Advice for Actions’. XXXIII Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 3–14 May. Punta del Este, Uruguay. WP 63 (2010), p. 9. 71 See Harsh V. Pant (ed.), Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, London, New York, New Delhi: Routledge, 2009. 72 C. Raja Mohan, ‘India's New Foreign Policy Strategy’. Paper presented at a seminar in Beijing, organized by China Reform Forum and the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, Beijing, 26 May 2006, p. 4.

73 For a discussion on the Australian Antarctic submission see Andrew Serdy, ‘Towards Certainty of Seabed Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline: Australia's Submission to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf ’, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 36 (2005), pp. 201–217. 74 Republic of India: Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations: ‘Notifcation Regarding the Submission Made by Australia to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ’, 13 July 2005 (emphasis given). [Accessed 21 July 2012] w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/d​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/c​o​m​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​_​s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​.h​t​m​. See Karen N. Scott, ‘Managing Sovereignty and Jurisdictional Disputes in the Antarctic: The Next Fifty Years’, Yearbook of International Environmental Law vol. 20 (2009). 75 Ibid. 76 B. A. Hamzah, ‘Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the Question of Antarc-tica’, Ocean Development and International Law vol. 41 (2010), p. 186. 77 Jorgen Ørstrøm Møller, ‘Asia Redraws the Map of Progress’, The Futurist, September–October 2010, p. 17. [Accessed 21 July 2012] w​w​w​.r​e​a​l​d​a​n​i​a​d​e​b​a​t​.d​k​/S​i​t​e​C​o​l​l​e​c​t​i​o​n​D​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/E​r​h​v​e​r​v​s​f​o​r​u​m​/9​.%2​0​n​o​v​e​m​b​e​r​%202011/Jørgen%20Ørstrøm%20 artikel%20Futurist%2​0​2​0​1​0​.pdf. 78 Wei-chin Lee, ‘China and Antarctica: So Far and Yet So Near’, Asian Survey vol. 30 (1990), p. 585. 79 Anne-Marie Brady, Chapter 2 this volume. 80 Pant, ‘India and the Indian Ocean’. 81 Alan D. Hemmings, ‘Does Bioprospecting Risk Moral Hazard for Science in the Ant-arctic Treaty System?’ Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics vol. 10 (2010), p. 11. 82 Andrew Darby, The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 July 2007. 83 See Bruce Davis, ‘Science, Environment and Development: Conficting or Com-plementary Aspects of Asian Antarctic Programs’, in R. A. Herr and B. W. Davis (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Centre for Resources and Environmental Studies, The Australian National

University, 1994. 84 Duncan French and Karen Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for the Polar Regions: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late?’ Melbourne Journal of International Law vol. 10, no. 2 (2009), pp. 631–654. 85 R. A. Herr and B. W. Davis (eds), Asia in Antarctica, Canberra: Centre for Resources and Environmental Studies, The Australian National University, 1994. 86 Alan D. Hemmings and Tim Stephens, ‘Australia's Extended Continental Shelf: What Implications for Antarctica?’ Public Law Review vol. 20 (2009), pp. 9–16; Klaus Dodds and Alan D. Hemmings, ‘Frontier Vigilantism? Australia and Contemporary Representations of Australian Antarctic Territory’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 55 (2009), pp. 513–528; Donald Rothwell, Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 87 David P. Fidler, ‘The Asian Century: Implications for International Law’, Singapore Year Book of International Law vol. 9 (2005), pp. 19– 35. 88 Ibid., p. 20. 89 Sikri, Challenge and Strategy, p. 298.

4

Cool Korea

Korea's growing Antarctic interests Anne-Marie Brady and Kim Seungryeol

From 2004 to 2010, the Republic of Korea (ROK)'s budget for polar research increased an incredible five times over, from US$10 million to the current amount of US$50 million. Korea currently has strong geostrategic, scientific, environmental, economic, and political interests in Antarctica, as well as the Arctic. However, for the first twenty-five years of its involvement in the Antarctic continent, the ROK's research programme and activities in Antarctica were very modest, focusing on fishing, seismic activity, and weather observations. Yet in a very short time the dramatic increase in the ROK's polar budget has brought it from being a minor to a medium player in Antarctica. Korea is currently the fifteenth largest economy in the world and is looking at ways to expand its global influence. Since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008 Seoul has adopted a “global Korea” and “climate diplomacy” foreign policy which is aimed at increasing the ROK's global influence, commensurate with its economic importance.1 Its increased engagement in Antarctica refects that global strategy. This chapter outlines Korea's current interests in Antarctica. It examines the reasons behind Korea's increased involvement in and commitment to

Antarctica; profles the various bodies involved in maintaining and negotiating Korea's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs; and discusses Korea's core interests in the Antarctic continent that help to shape its Antarctic policy.

Korea's Antarctic organisations The Republic of Korea (South Korea) became the 33rd signatory to the Antarctic Treaty in November 1986. Three months later, in January 1987, the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) also signed up to the Treaty. It is likely Pyongyang acceded to the Antarctic Treaty more as a result of the rivalry between the two Koreas for international recognition, than due to any demonstrable engagement with Antarctic affairs (though recently boats listed as being registered in the DPRK have been involved in illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean2). At the time that the two Koreas joined the Antarctic Treaty, neither was a member of the United Nations and both were striving for international status. A further factor for both Koreas in signing up to the Treaty was that the 1980s was the decade when Antarctic Treaty signatories were debating a possible minerals extraction regime for Antarctica, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Minerals Resource Activities (CRAMRA). In these years there was a rush of nations with no previous Antarctic activities to sign up to the Treaty: Uruguay (1980); Italy, Papua New Guinea, Peru (1981); Spain (1982); the People's Republic of China, India (1983); Cuba, Finland, Hungary, Sweden (1984); Austria, Ecuador, Greece (1987); Canada (1988); Colombia (1989). However, only consultative partners to the Treaty, those who had been recognised as having a genuine scientific interest in Antarctica, were allowed to have a say in the new minerals regime or other governance issues. Of the eighteen countries that signed up to the Treaty in the 1980s, only nine were admitted to consultative status. South Korea was among these few, being accepted as a consultative party to the Treaty in October 1989, the same year the CRAMRA agreement was dealt a deathblow by the decision of the Australian and French governments not to ratify the agreement. Yet South Korea had other interests in the Antarctic region which went beyond the rivalries of the unfnished Korean civil war or the negotiations over CRAMRA, through their fishing interests in the Southern Ocean. South Korean scientists first began studying Antarctic issues in 1978, the same year that government-subsidised South Korean boats first entered the Southern Ocean to fsh for krill. The Korean government's subsidies to Korean krill boats ended the year the ROK joined the Treaty.3

In 1988 Korea's first Antarctic station, King Sejong Station (Sejong Giji), was completed on the Barton Peninsula of King George Island.4 The base was named after Sejong the Great (1397–1450), renowned for his efforts to end Korea's cultural dependence on China by creating the Korean alphabet, and for promoting many new developments in the area of science. Initially it was planned to have King Sejong Station used by both South and North Korean scientists,5 but subsequent political developments have put that plan on hold so far. Also in 1988 the Ministry of Science and Technology set up an Antarctic Science Research Team and sent the first overwintering group of scientists to the new base.6 In October 1988 Seoul held the First International Antarctic Science Symposium, inviting forty scholars from ten leading countries in Antarctic research to share their findings with Korean specialists.7 The following year, on the basis of these scientific activities, South Korea was accepted as a consultant party to the Antarctic Treaty.8 In 1990 it joined the scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR).9 In 1995 the 19th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) was held in Seoul. The Korean government invited sixteen non-consultative nations including North Korea and Cuba.10 At the time it was making great efforts to improve its relations with communist and former communist states through its “Nordpolitik” policy. The ATCM became a vehicle for this goal. Korea's Antarctic research programme is conducted by several government ministries and government-supported research institutes with overlapping interests. Korea is active in both Antarctica and the Arctic. A key body among Korea's various governmental organisations working on polar affairs is the Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI), an autonomous organisation of the Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute (KORDI).11 KOPRI was founded in 1987, initially as the Polar Research Laboratory of the KORDI.12 After being raised to the status of a polar research institute in 2003, it became an autonomous institute affliated to KORDI in 2004.13 KOPRI falls under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). The objective of KOPRI is to contribute to the nation's political and economic interests in the Arctic and Antarctica, and improve the nation's international status by continuously conducting research in the polar regions.14 KOPRI focuses on five main tasks: (1) to research basic and

applied science in the polar regions; (2) to operate South Korea's Arctic and Antarctic stations, and support research programmes there; (3) to collaborate with foreign polar research institutes; (4) to foster polar research programmes with domestic academic and corporate partners; and (5) to raise awareness of the importance of the polar regions among the Korean public.15 There are four ministries involved in polar affairs: the Ministry of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs (MLTM); the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT); and the Ministry of Environment (MOE). MLTM is in charge of establishing Korea's basic plan for Antarctic research activity every five years and the annual plan for cooperation with the other relevant ministries and KOPRI. The five-year plan for polar research must be endorsed by the National Commission of Science and Technology. MTLM also supports setting up new infrastructure such as Korea's new icebreaker and second Antarctic base with its research and development funds. MEST has an important role in Korea's Antarctic programme in funding Korea's scientific research in Antarctica and promoting awareness about Antarctica in Korea through KOPRI.16 Korea's Ministry of Environment is responsible for establishing domestic law related to Antarctic activities and environmental protection in the region.17 It also has the task of ensuring all Korean activities in Antarctica are in accordance with international and domestic environmental laws.18 The ministry evaluates the operation and maintenance of the King Sejong Station.19 KOPRI organises government inspection teams of the base, in coordination with the relevant ministries. In 2008 Korea set up its own Antarctic Special Protected Area close to King Sejong Station.20 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) represents the Republic of Korea in the Antarctic system by regularly participating in ATCM. MLTM and Ministry of Environment staff also take part in these meetings; as do KOPRI staff. MOFAT staff research Antarctic current affairs, producing regular policy papers to negotiate the ROK's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs.21 The Ministry also works with the Ministry of Environment to establish Korea's domestic laws for Antarctic activity and environmental protection in line with the requirements of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.22 MOFAT also represents

the ROK at annual meetings to discuss the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) with the objective of enhancing Korean fishing companies' rights and interests as well as joining the international effort to protect Antarctic marine living resources.23 The Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MFFAFF) and the National Fisheries Research and Development Institute (NFRDI) attend meetings of CCAMLR alongside MOFAT officials. MOFAT also promotes the ROK's bilateral strategic cooperation with other nations in polar scientific research and resource development.24 Korea currently spends US$50 million on polar activities, with US$30 million devoted to Antarctica. The table below outlines how the Korean government's spend on Antarctic affairs is divided. As noted, Korea's budget for polar research increased by over 400 per cent in a very short time: from US$9 million in 2004, to US$50 million in 2010.25 Polar spending suffered a minor blip in 2008 when the government cut back spending by 10 per cent after the global financial crisis; however, it has now recovered and is likely to continue to rise. The budget for the icebreaker and the new base came out of a separate one-off budget line from MTLM. A number of major Korean corporations have been heavily involved in Korea's Antarctic endeavours. Hyundai Corporation has taken part in Korea's Antarctic activities from the earliest days, constructing Korea's first Antarctic base.26 Lee Myung-bak, the current president of the ROK under whose leadership Korea's Antarctic programme has greatly strengthened, was formerly CEO of Hyundai for twenty-seven years. Samsung Heavy Industries and STX Offshore and Shipbuilding designed Korea's new icebreaker Araon,27 and Hanjin Heavy Industry built the icebreaker.28 The Korean Supporters Association for Polar Research (KOSAP) was founded in 2005 as an NGO aimed at supporting Korea's polar activities.29 It has a webpage and publishes a popular magazine to provide information on the polar regions. It also helps educational institutions to develop teaching materials on Table 4.1 Korea's Antarctic budget (2010) Activities Agency

Funds (unit: millions of

KOPRI annual funds Contract-based

projects within ministries

Contract-based projects with other agencies Total

Korea Polar Research Institute Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs Ministry of Education and Science Technology Ministry of Environment Korean Meteorological Administration Rural Development Administration Public Institutions Universities Private Enterprise 42,709 (US$30,465,807)

won) 21,277 19,104

40 213 714 50 1,311 40 100

Source: Annual Report 2010, Korea Polar Research Institute, Issue Paper, 2010.

the polar regions.30 Funded by its members and sponsoring businesses, KOSAP supports not only KOPRI but other research institutes and researchers engaged in the polar regions.31 It operates a scholarship to train polar research professionals and provides aid for research institutes to launch polar projects.32 The absence of a central organisation of polar affairs hinders Seoul from pursuing its scientific, economic, and political interests in Antarctica in a more integrated way. The ROK's scattered Antarctic organisations with different aims seem to have an insufficient understanding of the real potential and diverse values of Antarctica and sometimes of the nuances of ATS agreements. The lack of experience of many of the personnel in the various government agencies which deal with Antarctic matters and their frequent rotation into other roles make them heavily depend on KOPRI for advice.

However, KOPRI is more of a scientific research institute by nature than an integrated policy-making organisation. Most members of KOPRI are scientists who do not have specialised knowledge of Seoul's varied strategic interests in Antarctica. Although KOPRI has a Department of Strategy and Policy, the Department does not represent the integrated vision of the ROK's Antarctic enterprise. It usually makes its own plans on the research activities and operation of its polar infrastructure. KOPRI lacks staff from a social and political science background to engage in policy work. Although KOPRI leadership realised years ago the importance and necessity of multidisciplinary approaches to Antarctica, there have been very few changes in the way Korea carries out its Antarctic research.

Korea's Antarctic presence As noted, the ROK set up its first base on the Barton Peninsula of King George Island, 120 km off the coast of Antarctica. During the peak summer season King Sejong Station can house ninety personnel, while during the winter personnel numbers drop to eighteen. The station is located just outside the latitudinal boundaries of Antarctica, which puts some limitations on its usefulness as a base for cutting-edge Antarctic research. scientific research is the basic currency of Antarctic politics, so without a strong research output South Korea won't be taken seriously as an Antarctic player. While Korea's Antarctic budget increases mean it is a medium player in terms of spend; Korean Antarctic science contributions still tend to replicate the work of other national programmes. Having a rapid increasing budget at a time when other more traditional players in the Antarctic, such as New Zealand, the UK, the USA, and Italy are cutting back on theirs, makes Korea an attractive partner for international collaboration, but it will take a few more years' work before there is a pay-off from this budget in terms of top-level science. In 2003, Seoul announced plans to build a new 10,000 ton icebreaker, the Araon, which would be used as a multi-purpose vessel for transportation, research, and housing.33Araoncost US$1 billion and was completed in 2009.34 In 2006 the Korean government announced it was setting up a second Antarctic base.35 The ROK is only the ninth state in Antarctica operating more than one base. In 2011 the Korean government announced it had decided on a location for the new base, Terra Nova Bay, in the Victoria Land of the Ross Ice Shelf area. Jang Bogo Station will be in operation by 2014. In January 2012 a government delegation visited there to officially announce the construction site.36 Construction will start in the 2012/2013 austral summer. The total budget for the new station is 106,675 million won (US$90.7 million). Jang Bogo (?–846 ad) was a powerful maritime leader from the Unified Silla era of Korean history. The new station will apply the latest in renewable energy technologies to reduce its carbon footprint in Antarctica. Thirty per cent of its energy needs will be provided by wind and solar power.

Political influences on Korea's Antarctic policy There have been seven different Korean governments in power since the ROK began engaging in Antarctic affairs. Although the basic themes underlying Korean Antarctic policy have remained unchanged, the political colour of each administration has been refected in its polar policy, intertwined with Korea's internal and external social and political circumstances. Throughout the years since the ROK joined the ATS, the ROK's Antarctic enterprise has frequently been politicised in domestic politics in order to strengthen the position of each government. President Park Chung-hee (1963–1979) had an uncomfortable relationship with the US government in the early period of his presidency. This uncomfortable diplomatic relationship affected the US response to Korea's deep sea fishery in the northern oceans. In the 1970s increasing restrictions were imposed on South Korean vessels fishing in the northern oceans by the USA as well as the Soviet Union. Seoul began turning its fishing attention to the Antarctic Ocean and Korean boats were sent there, subsidised by the government. After Park's assassination, President Chun seized power through a military coup.37 President Chun Doo-hwan's (1980–1988) Antarctic policy was focused on joining the Antarctic Treaty, in order to demonstrate South Korea's increased national strength to both internal and external observers. His successor President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993) came to power at the end of the Cold War era. In this period Seoul's Antarctic policy served as a nonpolitical tool to establish diplomatic links with the Soviet Union and China, and to indirectly put North Korea under pressure to open up, what was known as the “Nordpolitik” policy. Under the Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) administration Seoul's Antarctic policy was shaped by the concept of “segyehwa” or “globalisation”. Due to bilateral and multilateral pressures, South Korea has suffered from trade barriers being imposed against its relatively closed economy.38 In response, “segyehwa” was promoted as a survival strategy for Korea to become an influential nation in the world. In particular, the Kim government noted the importance of a nation's ability to have a say on global agendas.39 Witnessing many other emerging nations fail to join the ranks of developed nations because of their weak voice in the international arena despite their rapid

economic development, the Kim government's “segyehwa” took the initiative by addressing global environmental issues. In support of the “segyehwa” policy which focused on securing Korea's global influence by being a leading nation on global environmental preservation, in 1995 Seoul criticised the weak environmental regulations of the Antarctic Treaty System and urged other consultative members to follow its initiative in establishing domestic Antarctic environment laws.40 President Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) took Office when the ROK was still recovering from the effects of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997. The top priority of the Kim administration was to repay the debt from the IMF as soon as possible by boosting Korean exports and tightening the government's expenditure in the areas which were not expected to produce immediate results benefcial to the Korean economy. As a result Korea's Antarctic programme became neglected. Since the Kim administration emphasised applied science, KORDI failed to secure enough research funds to construct an Antarctic continental station and build an icebreaker.41 Even after repaying the loan from the IMF in full, the government's priority was not Antarctic affairs; it was focused on improving its relationship with North Korea. It was not until 2002 that the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries announced the “Polar Research Long-term Development Plan” whereby US$70 million would be spent to construct a second station in the Antarctic Continent in 2006.42 However, funding diffculties meant that this plan was delayed for a few more years. President Kim's successor, President Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), increased Korea's investment in, and commitment to, Antarctic affairs in order to win back popular support after the death of a Korean researcher in Antarctica in 2003. The publicity about the poor researching conditions of the King Sejong Station and the government's lack of commitment to Antarctic research (at the time it had a budget for Antarctic activities of only US$10 million), led to public pressure for the Korean government to step up its investment. The Roh government (facing an election) announced that it was going to make the Polar Research Institute in KORDI an independent affliated organisation and increase the size of the new icebreaker from 5,000 to 10,000 tons.43 In addition, with public ratings hitting rock bottom, on 28 June 2007, the Roh government announced that within the year it was going to decide the location for where Korea's second Antarctic continental base

would be built, and vowed to complete the construction of the base by 2011.44 President Roh's response to public pressure sparked off Korea's rapid increase in spending on Antarctic affairs and the current administration under Lee Myung-bak (2008–) has continued this initiative. Lee has also been seeking to popularise Korea's activities in Antarctica in order to win public support and justify Korea's on-going efforts there. Since President Lee took Office the South Korean government has regarded global environment issues as its most important agenda and attempted to use environmentalism as a force for economic growth.45 The Lee government has been actively seeking creative and original solutions to global climate change and its effects through its green growth policy and climate change diplomacy.46 The Lee government has been actively promoting its so-called “climate change diplomacy”,47 and its increasing Antarctic research on climate change is meant to justify the leading role of South Korea in international negotiations by providing a symbolic and theoretical background in addressing global climate change. In this sense, Antarctica has become of great value to the Lee government. The Korean government is investing in the development of environmental technology in order to overcome global climate change and pursue long-term economic growth.48 The government hopes the new technology will help to create new jobs and export markets.49 Since Korea is poor in natural resources, the Lee government has also been investing its environmental technology and capital in developing nations which are rich in natural resources, so as to secure permanent energy sources.50 In addition, as part of its “climate change diplomacy”, South Korea has volunteered to play a bridging role between developed and developing nations in dealing with legal obligations on climate change.51 Research has shown that due to negative international perceptions of South Korea, the products of Korean firms are valued lower than firms in other countries.52 A nation's positive image enhances the competitiveness of its products.53 While Korea's transnational corporations such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG have already independently secured a positive global image, the images of its small and medium enterprises and their products (90 per cent of Korean workers are employed by such companies) are directly related to international perceptions of the ROK. In January 2009 President Lee launched the Presidential Council on National Branding, with the goal of

reducing the so-called “Korea Discount” through Korea's re-branding.54 It is believed that the high level of South Korean science and technology — as evidenced by Korean scientists' achievements in Antarctic research — will enhance the nation's brand image, and this will ultimately contribute to the credibility of the nation's small and medium enterprises.

Korea's political interests in Antarctica Despite different agendas and motivations in Antarctic policy among the various administrations since Korea has been a signatory to the Treaty, a number of aims have been consistently pursued.55 One of these aims is to maintain and negotiate the ROK's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs. With a strong awareness of the huge potential geopolitical and economic value of Antarctica, but at the same time being conscious of the great uncertainty regarding future developments in the region, Seoul has attempted to win vested rights there and to increase its rights to maximise its national interest in the future development of Antarctica. All of the ROK's Antarctic activities including scientific research, international academic conferences, and diplomatic efforts to address environmental issues, have been carried out with the theme of securing a vested interest there. The ultimate goal of Korea's polar research is to be able to take a leadership role in any future new legal order in the polar regions. South Korea is aware of the importance of producing high-quality research outputs in order to maintain its vested right in any new regime in the Antarctic or the Arctic. A further objective in the ROK's Antarctic policies is to exercise more influence in the international political arena. As noted, the ROK's international status has never been commensurate with its economic power. In order to improve its national prestige in the world community, in recent years Korea has hosted international sporting events and international summit meetings such as the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the G20 Summit. Seoul views its Antarctic enterprise as an investment to help foster international perceptions of Korea as a first-class nation and enhance its international status. Seoul, like other rising states, seeks to improve its international political status by actively participating in global organisations such as the Antarctic Treaty System. Antarctica is one of the arenas where South Korea expects to faunt its national strength,56 its contribution to the world community, and exercise its global leadership.57 Antarctica is an arena where Seoul is able to play a leading role in the international community by means of its advanced science and technology; which is a non-political means for influence.58 Korea has strong Antarctic linkages with a number of countries which help

to improve bilateral connections in other aspects. It works on scientific projects with Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Russia, the UK, Norway, Chile, France, New Zealand, and the USA. It has also offered berths on its icebreaker to countries with whom it is not yet collaborating on Antarctic projects. In 2004 the ROK took the lead in organising the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFOPS). China and Japan were the other initial participants in this group. Malaysia and India joined AFOPS in 2006. The ROK proposed AFOPS with the goal of establishing a mutual-assistance system for Asian polar programmes and as a counter-measure to the regional grouping phenomenon of European and Central and South American Antarctic states.59 The Director-General of KOPRI was elected to be the AFOPS chairman for the first two years.60 AFOPS aims to provide a foundation for cooperative research activities among member countries, to present Asian achievements toward international polar kcommunities, and to encourage non-polar Asian countries' involvement in polar research.61 AFOPS has five Working Groups: Earth Science, Life Science, Planetary Science, Engineering and Logistics, and Public Relations and Data Management with representatives from all the member countries.62

Korea's Antarctic science The ROK's current six major scientific research areas in the polar regions are geology, biology, oceanography, paleocryology, cosmology, and information science. The main accomplishments of South Korea's polar research are classifed into four fields: securing continent-based fundamental technology, studying polar environmental change, securing practical polar application technology, and establishing an advanced polar research infrastructure.63 These accomplishments have taken years for the ROK to build up. Below we will highlight a few of the ROK's current key Antarctic research projects. Korean scientists have been developing technology to investigate the polar paleoclimate and paleoocean, examining the record of past climate change in order to forecast trends for the future.64 The first objective of this research is to establish the paleoclimate and paleoocean record of the polar regions by using the sediment of polar ocean and land, and to understand the main factors that caused paleoclimate change. The second objective is to understand the correlations between global climate change and regional climate change by comparing the paleoclimate change of the mid-latitudes, including the Korean peninsula, with that of the polar regions.65 Korean scientists are verifying geological evolution and tectonics of the South Shetland Arc-Trench system in the Northern Antarctic Peninsula Region since the late Palaeozoic.66 Korean researchers who have been studying the tectonic evolution processes and the structure of the lithosphere beneath West Antarctica describe the Antarctic continent and its neighbouring waters as a “storeroom” of the history of Earth.67 Korean scientists are investigating the characteristics of living organisms in the polar regions and their adaptive mechanisms in extreme temperatures.68 They have also been observing the distribution and numbers of the indicator organisms so that they can develop barometers to monitor and predict changes in the eco-system.69 The ROK has established a polar observation network with the objective of developing polar ocean observation and hydro-acoustic observation equipment.70 Other researchers will explore the hydrothermal system in Antarctica.71

In 2006 South Korea was ranked the first in emission increase rates for green-house gases among OECD states.72 Working under the assumption that a much stricter global standard on greenhouse gas emission will be set in the near future, the government has been keen to find new ways of reducing and isolating carbon dioxide. Since the Southern Ocean absorbs most of the greenhouse gases produced by humankind, Korean scientists have been assessing the greenhouse gas disposal capacity of the Southern Ocean to see if it could absorb still more.73 The ROK has a strong interest in biological research in Antarctica. Polar living organisms have unique physical characteristics with possible commercial applications. Hence ROK scientists are currently investigating the properties of a variety of polar organisms and plant genetic resources, hoping to develop future biomaterials such as low temperature enzymes, cosmetic ingredients, and metabolism activators.74 ROK scientists are also attempting to replicate polar living organisms and establish the means to utilise these creatures for commercial purposes.75 The specifc objective of this research is to secure and culture low temperature polar microalgae, marine algae, microorganisms, marine creatures, land creatures, and freshwater creatures; to select highly cultivable polar creatures and establish a mass cultivation system; to establish a polar creature bank and theme park in Korea; and to support the applied research for commercialising these polar living creatures.76 The ROK participated in an IPY (International Polar Year) glacier programme, the International Trans Antarctic scientific Expedition (ITASE) to explore Antarctic glaciers and develop basic technology for glacial studies.77 From Korea's perspective the objectives of this research were to train professionals in glacial environment exploration and develop domestic glacial research infrastructure;78 to develop the analysis technology of environmental tracer or climate proxies to restore the global climate system;79 and to explore, drill, and study the glaciers nearby to Korea's newest base.80 South Korea has developed its own Antarctic meteorite collection programme and organised the Meteorite Classifcation/Distribution/Research Committee that consists of members from KOPRI, Seoul National

University, and the University of California at Los Angeles.81 It has registered its five Antarctic meteorites in international organisations (TIL06001-TIL06005).82 With the establishment of an infrastructure to manage and study meteorites, Korea has entered the stage of doing research on the formation of the solar system and universe in preparation for the coming era of space exploration.83 It has also become the fifth leading nation in Antarctic meteorite research.84

Korea's economic interests in Antarctica The ROK's economic interests in Antarctica include current, prospective, and purely speculative aspects and activities. Korean scientists are cautious to avoid using terms such as “resources development” or “resources exploration” to discuss their projects in Antarctica. However, much of their current research is focused on locating economically exploitable resources and making more accurate maps of Antarctic resource distribution. In the following section we will discuss the ROK's current, prospective, and speculative economic gains from its Antarctic investment. The ROK's initial interest in the Antarctic region began when the Fisheries Agency subsidised a fishing company to catch krill off the coasts of Enderby Land and Wilkes Land from 1978 to 1979.85 Seoul is very interested in exploiting polar marine products. Polar marine products surpass the total production of marine products from all the other waters in the world.86 Korean boats currently catch krill and Patagonian toothfish in the Southern Ocean. Korea's annual catch of krill is about 100,000 tons, which are made into processed food and farming feed.87 According to Korean fgures there are 5,000 million to 7,500 million tons of krill, Patagonian toothfish, and squid in the Southern Ocean.88 There are plans to expand the Korean krill catch in the Southern Ocean still further. South Korean researchers believe that krill is a food resource that will not run out.89 KOPRI has been researching the volume and distribution of krill in the waters around the South Shetland Islands, which has been one of the main krill fsheries.90 ROK scientists have been conducting marine acoustic surveys using a science fishery detector and general oceanographic investigations in order to find out the physical, chemical, and biological traits of the krill's living environment.91 As the volume of the krill signifcantly fuctuates every year due to the changing marine environment, Korean scientists have been conducting research on the causes of this environmental change so as to effectively manage krill resources.92 Considering the quantity and nutritional value of krill, Korean researchers believe that it is a food resource that will not run out and expect a great economic effect once Korea fnishes establishing the infrastructure on which to begin fishing in earnest.93 Yet recent reports by NGOs predict that

the Ross Sea and other Southern Ocean fishing stocks may be nearing exhaustion.94 New Zealand and the United States are proposing that the Ross Sea become a Marine Protected Area; though traditional fishing areas will be excluded.95 The Korean government has not yet stated its views on this new initiative.96 The ROK has a strong interest in the potential of Antarctic mineral resources. ROK scientists have already discovered that an enormous amount of methane hydrate, which Korea could use for 300 years at the same rate as its current use of natural gas, is buried around the King Sejong Station.97 ROK scientists have discovered a gas hydrate sedimentary layer in the Northern waters of Antarctica.98 Based upon its accumulated experience in Antarctica, South Korea is now conducting research on gas hydrate development in the Arctic.99 Scientific research on mineral resources in Antarctica is permitted under the terms of the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic Treaty (commonly known as the Madrid Protocol); though mineral exploitation is banned. Many Korean polar specialists interviewed for this research believe that in 2048 the Madrid Protocol will expire and a new minerals exploitation regime will be set up. In fact the Protocol on Environmental Protection won't necessarily expire at this date, but it will be open for renegotiation from 2048 if a signatory country requested it.100 One leading Antarctic specialist, Dr Jang Soon Keun, also told us he thought sovereignty claims over the Antarctic would eventually disappear.101 The seven claimant states in Antarctica would certainly take a different view on that topic. These different understandings by Korean polar specialists on Antarctic legal issues should be noted and acknowledged by other Antarctic states, not simply dismissed as “ignorant”. With peak oil having been reached in 2006, world public opinion on oil extraction in Antarctica may well be very different to how it was in 1991. South Korea has had three major achievements in its research on polar submarine geological features. The first achievement is that it has obtained high resolution data on the Antarctic submarine strata.102 This high resolution data has enabled the ROK to select potential areas blessed with submarine resources.103 Antarctica holds fifty-five billion barrels of petroleum and 221

trillion m3 of natural gas. Second, South Korea has collected surface deposits from the Northeast continent through gravitational drilling cores.104 It has analysed the organic compounds of the surface deposits and accessed the probabilities of submarine resources. The third accomplishment is the establishment of a database for polar submarine geological features and completion of a resource map.105 The ROK will use this information to draw up a broad submarine resource map of Antarctica and choose areas to enter that are in the best strategic interests of Korea to prepare for the point of time when Antarctica and its submarine resources will start to be developed.106 Of course, this all depends on whether or not the regime banning mineral extraction in Antarctica will change. South Korea also expects that the development of underground and underwater exploration equipment used for its Antarctic research will contribute to its location-based services and defence-related industries.107 A further economic benefit Seoul hopes to garner from its polar science activities is the accumulation of fundamental technology through which to transform the Korean economy from a traditional manufacturing-based one into a knowledge economy. The ROK government is developing a knowledge economy with cutting-edge science at its core, based on the assumption that increased innovation and improvements in productivity will come from its scientific investments.108 Seoul has dramatically increased investment in scientific areas from which it could develop fundamental technologies and South Korea's Antarctic research has a key place in this new strategy. Biotechnology is one of the areas that the current administration is concentrating its efforts on as a future growth engine.109 Moreover, Korea's polar exploration, as one of the key disciplines in its big science plan, is expected to stimulate growth in many scientific and industrial sectors.110 There are five disciplines in Seoul's big science plan: space, aviation, ocean, nuclear fusion, and polar exploration.111 Big science is a systemic scientific field where each discipline interacts with, and reinforces, one another. If successful, big science will give birth to a raft of new industries.112 Among Korea's many polar science disciplines, biology is the most connected to industrial development.113 Although like other nations engaged in Antarctica, Seoul is reluctant to explicitly promote the industrial application of its findings, it has been actively conducting biotech research in

Antarctica.114 Seoul views the polar regions as a repository of future life engineering.115 Scientists have been conducting research on cold region life engineering, cellular antifreezing substance, cold-active breakdown enzymes, and cold-active genetic replicas, and hopes to apply the findings to industrial use.116 For example, ROK scientists have been attempting to secure biomedical cryopreservation technology.117 They have extracted anti-freeze protein from polar organisms, in order to utilise this in pharmaceutical and medical industries for preventing the destruction of cells when preserving sperm, stem cells, and blood.118 Scientists are also planning to develop cold region medicine and human physiology-related technology through research that will be conducted at Korea's Antarctic continental station.119 Another key industry that South Korea's polar biotech will benefit is the cosmetic industry. As Antarctica is exposed to strong ultra-violet radiation ROK scientists are extracting ultra-violet radiation-resistant substances from Antarctic organisms for utilisation in the cosmetic industry.120 Seoul is hoping to solve issues of food shortage, disease, and energy shortages by utilising undeveloped Antarctic biological resources.121 South Korea is also establishing an environmental infrastructure for analysing and forecasting climate change based on its polar climate research.122 As climate change affects the whole planet, the environmental changes in the polar regions affect the climate and environment in the middle and low latitudes. Therefore, South Korea seeks to understand global atmospheric circulations, the course of typhoons, and Asian monsoon climate change from its polar climate research.123 KOPRI's research on the ocean and atmospheric circulation in the polar regions will enhance Korea's climate or weather-related industries who aim to prevent natural disasters and reduce damage by providing short-term and long-term forecasts of climate change.124 For example, the active volcano Mt Baekdoo, located on the boundary of China and North Korea, is likely to explode in the next few years. The estimated damage and restoration period can be established by the knowledge of the paleoclimate gained from Antarctic glaciers.125 In addition to reducing loss of life and property damage, as a 2009 report from Samsung's Economic Research Unit notes, information about climate, weather, oceans, and polar ecosystems will benefit a variety of Korean businesses such as tourism, industries, disaster, and weather information

services for agriculture and fishing, and maritime information services for safety in the seaways.126 Since climate and weather have a great effect on many industries, “Industrial Weather Information” has recently been commercialised.127 The climate and weather information gained from polar climate research enables businesses to adjust output of their products in order to maximise their profts.128 The ROK aviation and electronics industry will likely benefit from Korean scientists' space observation in the polar regions.129 The polar regions are the optimum places for the operation of a polar satellite tracking system as well as for space research.130 KOPRI scientists have been observing the polar upper atmosphere in order to predict space weather hindrances that affect communications and the orbit of satellites and to prevent damage from electromagnetic waves.131 The ROK plans to experiment with the equipment and technologies needed for the space industry in the polar regions, as preliminary polar research is necessary in order to develop an advanced space industry.132 Korea's new continental Antarctic station will have the facilities to enable scientists to develop anti-freezing liquid and long-distance satellite communication technology, and to test the performance of telecommunication and semiconductor materials.133 Seoul is seeking to develop Korean construction technology and contribute to its construction industry through the construction of the second permanent base in Antarctica.134 Constructing and operating the continental base structures will enhance Korea's structural matter technology to prevent fuid, liquid, and solid matter from being destroyed in low temperatures.135 Many new technologies have been tested in preparation for the construction of the continental base, such as the effect of having permafrost under building structures.136 South Korea's new base will be environmentally friendly.137 Korea is planning to build a wind power plant and structures to utilise solar energy for the base,138 which will contribute to the technological development of Korea's domestic energy industry.139 The accumulated technology of permafrost and extreme-cold engineering, and experience of operating construction equipment in an intense cold land will help raise the quality of Korea's wind-resistant building design and heat-conservation materials, which will ultimately lead to the technological development of

South Korea's construction and its related industries.140 For many years South Korea has been the top ranking nation for commercial shipping construction. Constructing an icebreaker domestically was suggested in order to boost Korea's shipbuilding industry and other related industries. Considering the global environment in which polar research and commercial activities in those regions is increasing, the market for polar sailing vessels and relevant structures has increased.141 Hence Seoul decided to seize the momentum, believing that the domestic construction of its first multi-purpose vessel would increase the competitiveness of its shipbuilding and other domestic industries. South Korea expects economic benefits in three areas from designing and building the Araon. First, in terms of its shipbuilding industry, it is confident in winning more contracts for icebreaking vessels. Although the demand for special ships is not great in the overseas market, Seoul estimates it could gain US$300 million sales for three years by obtaining an order for an icebreaker.142 Second, shipbuilding-related industries such as the steel industry, paint industry, and in terior design businesses are likely to benefit from building an ice-capable vessel.143 To illustrate, the body of an icebreaker must be built with high performance thick steel plate that is strong enough to endure minus 60 to 70 degrees Celsius.144 Weld zones should also be able to endure the same external environment, which will lead to the development of construction technology. Likewise, the development of special paint and advanced construction technology are required to minimise the damage done to the body parts that often bump against the ice.145 The construction of icebreaking vessels may also have a follow-on effect on Korean companies winning a contract for the construction of steel buildings and offshore plants for other states in the polar regions.146

Conclusion The ROK government's motivations behind its dramatic increase in spending and activities in Antarctica are various and complex. First of all, ROK polar policy has been determined and shaped by the level of its scientific research in the regions. The ROK has been busy catching up with the scientific level of leading polar research nations in recent years. It has set a variety of scientific goals and has carried out research in many different polar scientific areas. As its research has become more and more fruitful, the scientific gap between leading nations and itself has been narrowed, and meanwhile its presence as a research nation in the regions has been strengthened with the passage of time, Seoul has been embodying its strategic polar interests into more concrete economic and political policies. A core justifcation for the ROK's involvement in the polar regions has been a belief in the unlimited economic potential of the Antarctica and Arctic. Seoul is interested in locating energy resources such as crude petroleum and methane hydrate, and marine products such as Antarctic krill. The ROK's research and presence in the polar regions is accelerating the shift of its economy from manu-facturing to technology and knowledge-based industries, and helping to enhance its national brand image so that it can boost the exports of its small and medium businesses. The ROK is working hard to maximise connections between its polar research and domestic industries. Seoul is seeking more concrete and practical ways to relate its Antarctic enterprise to industrial development. One aspect of Korea's Antarctic biological research has been to apply some of its findings to Korea's pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries. There are many other domestic industries that the ROK attempts to boost through its Antarctic research including the aviation and electronics industries from space observation in the polar regions; disaster and weather information services for agriculture and fishing; and maritime information services for safe seaways, by providing climate and weather information. Like other Antarctic players, the ROK is active in Antarctica because it desires to win vested rights there and increase its right to maximise its national interest in the future development of Antarctica. Antarctica is

understood as one of the international political arenas where a nation can exercise leadership. Seoul views its participation in the Antarctic Treaty System as a stepping stone to taking on leadership roles internationally and playing a more vital role in the world community. Unlike previous administrations, the Antarctic policy of the current Lee Myung-bak government is not clearly divided into domestic and international purposes. Since his national vision is “green growth”, Korea's Antarctic policy serves this vision and combines domestic and international political elements. Korea's Antarctic research serves as a theoretical basis to foster Korea's green technology and green industry. ROK scientists' research on climate change in Antarctica will assist the development of climate change adaptation technology and climate change reduction technology. The Lee government has been attempting to standardise its newly developed environmental technology and legal support system for the adaptation of this technology in other parts of the world. Second, the ROK's presence in Antarctica and efforts to study climate change have entitled Seoul to continue to have a leading role in shaping a new global structure through “climate change diplomacy”. In this sense, ROK's Antarctic research could be interpreted as a symbolic gesture of Seoul's effort and willingness to lead a global environment-oriented civilisation. A further political objective for the Lee government's Antarctic enterprise is to promote the image of “Global Korea” to both internal and external observers. The government has emphasised its bridging role between developing and developed nations in dealing with global economic and environmental issues. The government is also showcasing Korea's scientific achievements to international audiences. The ROK's Antarctic and Arctic involvement is helping to imprint a positive new image worldwide of itself as a globally mature nation that is truly “cool Korea”.

Notes 1

The chapter draws on the research in Kim Seungryeol, “Korea's Polar Strategy”, MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2011. Scott Snyder, “Lee Myung-bak's Foreign Policy: A 250-Day Assessment”, Asia Foundation Report, 2008, h​t​t​p​://a​s​i​a​-f​o​u​n​d​a​t​i​o​n​.o​r​g​/r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/p​d​f​s​/S​n​y​d​erLMBForeignPolicyKJDA.pdf.

2

DPRK registration has been used as a fag of convenience by a Spanish company Vidal Armadores, engaged in illegal fishing for Patagonian toothfish, which are managed under the Convention on Antarctic Marine and Living Resources (CAMLR), one of the agreements within the ATS. The company has previously registered boats in countries such as Sierra Leone and Panama which are also not members of CAMLR. See Kate Wilson and Mar Carbra, “Spain hands out millions in aid despite fishing company's record”, 5 October 2011, The Cutting Edge, w​w​w​.t​h​e​c​u​t​t​i​n​g​e​d​g​e​n​e​w​s​.c​o​m​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p​?a​r​t​i​c​l​e​=5​2​8​5​2​&pageid=89&pagename=F​e​a​t​u​r​e​s​s​.

3

“The krill catch in the Antarctic Ocean is going to stop”, Mail Kyungje, 13 October 1987.

4

KOPRI, The 20 Year History of the King Sejong Station, Incheon: KOPRI, 2008, pp. 79–80.

5

“The science circle actively cooperates with the communist blocs”, Kyunghyang, 13 January 1989.

6

w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/e​B​o​o​k​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​.c​m​s.​

7

KOPRI, The 20 Year History of the King Sejong Station, p. 155.

8

w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/w​w​w​/a​b​o​u​t​/k​o​p​r​i​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​/k​o​p​r​i​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​.c​m​s​.

9

Ibid.

10 “ATCM is scheduled to be held in Seoul in May”, Dong-A Daily, 23 March 1995. 11 Phone interview with Lee Jinyong, Team Leader, Office of Research & Management, KORDI, 26 March 2010.

12 w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/w​w​w​/a​b​o​u​t​/k​o​p​r​i​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​/k​o​p​r​i​_​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​.c​m​s​. 13 Ibid. 14 Interview with Jin Dong Min, Director, Department of Strategy and Policy Development, KOPRI, 19 February 2010. 15 w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/w​w​w​/a​b​o​u​t​/k​o​p​r​i​_​v​i​s​i​o​n​/k​o​p​r​i​_​v​i​s​i​o​n​.c​m​s.​ 16 See, for example, Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, the first, second and third year investigation report on the environment around King Sejong Station in 1988, 1989, and 1990; also the first, second and third year research reports on the property and preservation of Antarctic environment in 1994, 1995, and 1996. 17 See Ministry of Environment, “The Current Situation of Environmentrelated Laws and International Treaties”, Seoul, 2008. 18 The Office of Global Environment in the Ministry of Environment is responsible for making Antarctic management plans and issuing official documents to relevant departments and institutes. 19 See, for example, Office of Global Environment, Ministry of Environment, “The Early Environmental Assessment on the Renovation of the King Sejong Station in Antarctica”, Seoul, 10 October 2007. 20 Office of Global Environment, Ministry of Environment, “The Plan on the Participation in the International Workshop for the Appointment of Antarctic Specially Managed Area (ASMA)”, Seoul, 17 April 2008. 21 Kim Chan-woo, Officer of Environment and Science, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The Environmental Diplomacy for Tomorrow”, Hwankung Daily, 6 July 2007. 22 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Announcement No. 2003– 11”, Seoul, 26 April 2003. 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “The General Outlook of Antarctica”, Seoul, 2008. 24 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Diplomacy Journal for January 2009, Seoul, 2009. 25 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp.

26 Oh Ki-se, “Antarctic Exploration”, Sea Explores of Korea, 29 May 2001, w​w​w​.s​e​k​v​a​.o​r​.k​r​/t​t​b​o​a​r​d​/t​t​b​o​a​r​d​.c​g​i​?a​c​t​=v​i​e​w&code=4&bname=OBM00JD&page=5. 27 Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, “Araon, the Icebreaker, is Ready to be Built”, Seoul, 2008. 28 Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. 29 http://kosap.or.kr. 30 http://kosap.or.kr/business5.html. 31 Phone interview with Shin Sunglan, Secretary of KOSAP, 26 March 2010. 32 Ibid. 33 “Araon, the Icebreaker, is Ready to be Built.” 34 w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/w​w​w​/k​o​p​r​i​z​o​n​e​/n​o​t​i​c​e​/u​s​e​r​B​b​s​/b​b​s​V​i​e​w.do? bbs_cd_n=13&bbs_seq_n=448. 35 w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/i​n​f​r​a​/c​o​n​t​i​n​e​n​t​a​l​/c​o​n​t​i​n​e​n​t​a​l​_​a​b​o​u​t​/c​o​n​t​i​n​e​n​t​a​l​_​a​b​o​u​t​.c​m​s.​ 36 “Korea breaks ground on second research base in Antarctica”, Choson Ilbo, 12 January 2012, h​t​t​p​://e​n​g​l​i​s​h​.c​h​o​s​u​n​.c​o​m​/s​i​t​e​/d​a​t​a​/h​t​m​l​_​d​i​r​/2​0​1​2​/0​1​/1​8​/2​0​1​2​0​1​1​8​0​1​1​1​6​.h​t​m​l.​ 37 “The end of the reinvestigation on the 5.18 incident, tomorrow under indictment”, Chosun Daily, 22 January 1996. 38 Cabinet Office, 2003, h​t​t​p​://c​o​n​t​e​n​t​s​.a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​.g​o​.k​r​/n​e​x​t​/c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/l​i​s​t​S​u​b​j​e​c​t​D​e​s​c​r​i​p​t​i​o​n​.d​o?id=000845&pageFlag=. 39 “The policy direction in the 21st century”, Kyunghyang, 18 November 1994. 40 “Kong Nomyung, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered his opening speech in the Seoul ATCM”, Kyunghyang, 16 May 1995. 41 “It's urgent to enter into the Antarctic continent”, Han Kyurye, 12 July 2000.

42 “The second Antarctic base is going to be built”, Dong-A Daily, 25 June 2002. 43 “Building a 10,000 ton icebreaker”, Seoul Shinmoon, 9 February 2004. 44 “Too aggressive to build an Antarctic base”, Segye Daily, 30 June 2007. 45 Phone interview with Kim Woohyun, Expert Advisor, Division of Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 27 October 2010. 46 Phone interview with Shin Yunsung, Ambassador of Climate Change, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 October 2010. 47 Ibid. 48 Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science: Polar Research as a Big Science”, Science and Technology Policy Institute, Future Horizon Summer 2010, 2010, pp. 4–5. 49 Phone interview with Kim Hyunok, Deputy Director, Division of Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 28 October 2010. 50 Phone interview with Kim Woohyun, Expert Advisor, Division of Climate Change Response, Green Growth Committee, 27 October 2010. 51 Phone interview with Shin Yunsung, Ambassador of Climate Change, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 October 2010. 52 Suh Jung-won, “Korea Discount: Diagnosis and Remedy”, Korean Securities Association, Asia-Pacifc-Journal-of-Financial-Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2007, pp. 621–655. 53 Yu Jae-woong, National Image: Theory, Strategy and Programme, Seoul: Communication Books, 2008, pp. 46–50. 54 Uh Yundae, Chairman of PCNB, “The Korean national brand value underestimated by 30%”, The Asia Economy, 17 March 2009. 55 The following section is based on a phone interview with Yang Heecheol, Principal Researcher of Ocean Policy Research Division, KORDI, 18 May 2010. 56 Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. 57 Phone interview with Yang Heecheol, Principal Researcher of Ocean

Policy Research Division, KORDI, 18 May 2010. 58 Phone interview with Park Sunghwa, Director for Planning and Management, PCNB, 11 May 2010. 59 Ministry of Land, Transport http://blog.naver.com/mltm_ocean? Redirect=Log&logNo=60095328924.

and

Maritime

Affairs,

60 AFOPS, “AFOPS Short History for COMNAP-EXCOM”, 2004, http://afops.org/documents.html. 61 http://afops.org/terms%20of%20reference.html. 62 Ibid. 63 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 64 Kim Jung-chan, “Korea's Research on Paleoclimate and Paleoocean: The General Outlook and Future Research Direction”, Jijilhakhoiji, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 1–4. 65 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 66 Choe MoonYoung, Geological Evolution and Processes of Antarctica, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2001, pp. 26–30. 67 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 68 Ibid. 69 Kim Yeadong, Annual Report of Environmental Monitoring on Human Impacts at the King Sejong Station, Ahnsan: KORDI, 1998, pp. 129– 140. 70 See, for example, Park Byung-kwon, Research on Natural Environments and Resources of Antarctica, Ahnsan: KORDI, 1992. 71 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 72 Kim Chan-woo, 21st Century Environmental Diplomacy, Seoul: Sangsang Communication, 2006, p. 96. 73 Kang Yung-chul, Oceanographic Studies on Antarctic Marine Living Resources and Ecosystems, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2002, pp. 10–11. 74 Lee Yun-ho, Research on the Development of Antarctic Marine Living

Resources, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2000, pp. 87–92, pp. 307–342. 75 Goryungjinongupyungooso, 2008 Experimental Research, Pyungchang: Rural Development Administration, 2008, pp. 232–235. 76 Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Division of Polar Life Sciences, KOPRI, 4 April 2010. 77 Hong Sung-min, “Glacier Exploration on the Antarctic Continent”, Gwahakgwa Gisool, No. 452, 2006, pp. 50–53. 78 Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Researcher, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 79 Lee Joohan, “GPR Investigation of Glacier on Livingstone Island, Antarctica”, 2005 Thesis Collection of the Korean Society of Earth and Exploration Geophysicists, 2005, pp. 151–154. 80 www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 81 Ibid. 82 See Han Jang-mi, “The Changing Temperature of the O-Chondrites Collected in Korea's First and Second Antarctic Meteor Expeditions”, The Journal of the Geological Society of Korea, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2009, pp. 157–171. 83 See Kim Kyung-ja, “Development of New Technique to Trace Active Landscape Change Using Multiple Cosmogonic Nuclides”, The Journal of Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources, 2008, pp. 15– 36. 84 “The first exploration of Antarctic meteors by the domestic academic circle”, Yunhap News, 29 October 2009. 85 Chang Soonkun, Captain of the 8th Winter Research, “The Antarctic Continent and Korea's Antarctic Research”, Gwahak Sasang, No. 34, 2000, pp. 184–199. 86 Lee Hong Kum, President of KOPRI, “Pay more attention to Araon to be a leading polar research country”, Dong-A Daily, 14 September 2009. 87 w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/e​B​o​o​k​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​e​c​o​s​y​s​t​e​m​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​e​c​o​s​y​s​t​e​m​_​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​n​e​a​r​t​h​_​e​c​o​s​y​s​t​e​m​_​r​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​.c​-

m​s.​ 88 Chung Hosung, Principal Researcher, Division of Polar Life Science, KOPRI, “2005 Experience of Antarctica”, 2006, http://cafe.naver.com/poletopole2.cafe? iframe_url=/ArticleRead.nhn%3Farticleid=1701. 89 Phone interview with Yang Eun Jin, Principal Researcher, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. See also Kim Doo-nam, “Distribution of Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus Eleginoides) by Bottom Longliner in the Southeastern Atlantic Ocean”, Journal of the Korean Society of Fisheries Technology, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2008. 90 See for example, Kang Donhyug, “Acoustic Estimate of the Krill (Euphausia Superba) Density Between South Shetland Islands and South Orkney Islands, Antarctica During 2002/2003 Austral Summer,” KORDI, Ocean and Polar Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2005, pp. 75–86. 91 Shin Hyung-chul, Research on the Development of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Ahnsan: KORDI, 2007, pp. 166–179. 92 Ibid., pp. 228–239, p. 430. 93 Phone interview with Yang Eun Jin, Senior Research Scientist, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. 94 w​w​w​.p​a​c​i​f​c​e​c​o​l​o​g​i​s​t​.o​r​g​/a​r​c​h​i​v​e​/2​0​/p​e​2​0​-r​e​m​o​t​e​-f​i​s​h​e​r​y​.p​d​f​; http://lastocean.word-press.com/2011/08/04/the-last-pristine-ocean-theross-sea/. 95 w​w​w​.s​t​u​f​f​.c​o​.n​z​/e​n​v​i​r​o​n​m​e​n​t​/5​7​6​8​2​2​7​/N​Z​-t​o​-v​e​t​o​-t​o​t​a​l​-p​r​o​t​e​c​t​i​o​n​-o​f​R​o​s​s​-S​e​a.​ 96 Jin Dong Min, email communication, 2 February 2012. 97 Lee Hong Kum, President of KOPRI, “Antarctica, a natural proving ground full of resources”, The Newsis, 5 March 2008. 98 Hong Jong Kuk, “Distribution of Gas Hydrates off Northern Antarctic Peninsula”, 2007 Spring Meeting of the Korean Society for New and Renewable Energy, Seoul, 2007, Seoul: KSNRE, 2007, pp. 524–527. 99 Kim Bo-yung, “A Study on the Climate Change and the Policy of Natural Gas Exploitation on the Arctic Region”, Journal of the Korean

Resource Economics Association, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2009, pp. 787–815. 100w​w​w​.a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.a​c​.u​k​/a​b​o​u​t​_​a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/g​e​o​p​o​l​i​t​i​c​a​l​/t​r​e​a​t​y​/u​p​d​a​t​e​_​1​9​9​1​.p​h​p​. 101Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Adviser, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 13 May 2010. 102Jin Young-keun, “Interpretation of Gravity, Magnetic and Highresolution (3.5 kHz) Seismic Data in the Powell Basin, Antarctica”, Korean Society of Earth and Exploration Geophysicists, Jigu Mooli, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1–10. 103Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Research Scientist, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 104Phone interview with Jang Soon Keun, Research Advisor, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, of KOPRI, 13 May 2010. 105www.kopri.re.kr/index.jsp. 106Hong Jong Kuk, “Distribution of Gas Hydrates”. 107Phone interview with Jin Young Keun, Principal Research Scientist, Division of Polar Earth-System Sciences, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 108Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 577 Initiative, Seoul, 2008. 109High-tech Information Analysis Institute, New Growth Force Industries and Business Strategy, Seoul: Jinhan MNB, 2009, p. 110Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”, Samsung Economic Research Institute, CEO Information, No. 719, 2009, p. 14. 111Phone interview with Ha Taejung, Captain of Technology Fusion Research Team, New Growth Engines Research Centre, Science and Technology Policy Institute, 23 June 2010. 112Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”, p. 14. 113Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010.

114Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Polar Life Sciences, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 115Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”. 116“Antarctica and science and technology in the 21st century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 117Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”. 118Phone interview with Lee Yoo Kyung, Director, Division of Polar Life Sciences, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 119“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 120Phone interview with Kim Seoung Joong, Director, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 121Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”. 122Phone interview with Ha Taejung, Captain of Technology Fusion Research Team, New Growth Engines Research Centre, Science and Technology Policy Institute, 23 June 2010. 123Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 124Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Scientist, Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 125Phone interview with Jung Hyunhee, Principal Researcher, Division of the Basic Research in Science and Engineering, NRF, 21 June 2010. 126Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”. 127Phone interview with Lee Bang Yong, Principal Researcher, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 6 August 2010. 128Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Scientist, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 129Lee Won-hee, “The Big Sciences and Technologies We Should Note”, p. 4. 130Lee Hong Kum, “The Future of Big Science”.

131Phone interview with Lee Bang Yong, Principal Research Scientist, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 6 August 2010. 132Ibid. 133“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 134Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 135Phone interview with Lee Sang Hoon, Principal Research Scientist, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 17 August 2010. 136Phone interview with Yu Don Yun, Principal Specialist, Department of Antarctic Continental Station Construction, KOPRI, 25 August 2010. 137Interview with Jin Dong Min, Director, Department of Strategy and Policy, KOPRI, 19 February 2010. 138Phone interview with Yu Don Yun, Principal Specialist, Department of Antarctic Continental Station Construction, KOPRI, 25 August 2010. 139Phone interview with Kim Seong Joong, Director, Division of Polar Climate Research, KOPRI, 4 August 2010. 140“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 141“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 142“Antarctica and Science and Technology in the 21st Century”, KORDI, 2000, http://oceanus.hhu.ac.kr/ice/resinfo/news2000_6a.htm. 143Phone interview with Lee Chanu, Leader of Ship Operation Team, KOPRI, 25 August 2010. 144w​w​w​.k​o​p​r​i​.r​e​.k​r​/i​n​f​r​a​/a​r​a​o​n​/a​r​a​o​n​_​a​b​o​u​t​/a​r​a​o​n​_​a​b​o​u​t​_​i​c​e​b​r​e​a​k​e​r​/a​r​a​o​n​_​a​b​o​u​t​_​i​c​e​-b​r​e​a​k​e​r​.c​m​s​. 145Phone interview with Lee Chanu, Leader of Ship Operation Team, KOPRI, 25 August 2010. 146Ibid.

5

The Malaysian journey to the Antarctic

A glimpse at public policy dynamics B.A. Hamzah1

The story of Malaysia's historic antagonism towards the Antarctic Treaty System is well documented. One has only to flip through the pages of The Polar Record2 and the minutes of meetings of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 1982 to 2005 to have a feel for the debates on the Question of Antarctica which ensued from Malaysia's critique of Antarctica. However, hidden from the public domain are the internal bureaucratic dynamics that changed the course of Malaysian policy and led to it eventually signing the Antarctic Treaty in 2011. This dramatic policy shift began when the Government of New Zealand kindly opened its Scott Base to Malaysian scientists in the late 1990s. Ten months after the Malaysian Cabinet gave the green light to do so, Malaysia deposited the instruments of accession at Washington, DC on 31 October 2011. The shift in policy approach on Antarctic affairs from a diplomatic initiative to scientific engagement has coincided with Malaysia's new emphasis in its foreign policy of taking a less hostile attitude to the Western powers.3 This chapter explores the internal dynamics behind Malaysia's dramatic policy shift and the impact and implications of this new policy for Malaysia and the Antarctic Treaty states.

Malaysia's Antarctic policy evolution The Malaysian journey to the Antarctic started with a stormy beginning in New York in 1982 when Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammed Mahathir (henceforth Mahathir) addressed the UNGA meeting and informed the august assembly that the United Nations should get involved in the governance of Antarctica, which, in his opinion, had become the privileged territory of the few. Mahathir argued that the resources of Antarctica should benefit all of humankind. He objected to proposals to exploit the mineral resources of the Antarctic and he was concerned about the adverse impact on the global environment from unregulated mining activities there. He called for the setting up of an oversight mechanism in the United Nations to oversee the activities of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Malaysia's involvement with Antarctica involves three overlapping phases.4 The first phase (1982–1998) was mainly political and diplomatic in nature and most of the activities took the form of debates under the auspices of the Question of Antarctica agenda in the UNGA. Mahathir's policy on Antarctica — which he cleverly sold to like-minded countries from the South as non-transparent, anti-colonial, and opposed to the perpetuation of political dominance of a few privileged powers — depended on diplomatic support from the Third World. Mahathir also invoked the popular concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind (advocated by the Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo) at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and requested the United Nations to recognise its applicability to the resources over Antarctica. However, the signatory states of the ATS refused to acknowledge the relevance of such a concept on a territory governed by a multilateral Treaty system. Malaysia's Antarctic policy was singlehandedly driven by Mahathir (Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003) from day one. Mahathir conceived the idea and, with the support of Malaysian diplomats at the United Nations, he mobilised the South-South countries for this enterprise. Antarctica became a convenient diplomatic tool for Mahathir to malign the members of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP) for their “exclusivity” (in reference to the dominance of an exclusive group of countries managing the affairs of Antarctica) at the United Nations General Assembly.

At the UNGA (1982–1990) Mahathir criticised the attempts by the Treaty parties to produce a framework regulation for mining of minerals on the Antarctic continent. Malaysia and other international environmental organisations (such as Greenpeace) separately placed pressure on the ATS not to adopt the proposed mining convention, which was in the final stages of signature by 1998. The proposed Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (CRAMRA) would have been carried out but for the decision by Australia and France not to ratify CRAMRA. The coming into force of the Madrid Protocol (which replaced CRAMRA) in 1991 had a significant influence on Malaysia's policy. Malaysia had made it known during the discussions on “The Question of Antarctica” at the UNGA that it was not in favour of mineral mining or exploitation, beyond research, in Antarctica. Malaysia welcomed the ATS decision to ban mining for fifty years under the Madrid Protocol. The second phase of Malaysia's Antarctic involvement began in 1998 when Malaysian scientists took up the New Zealand government's offer of the use of Scott Base to conduct Antarctic research. It received further impetus in 2002 when Mahathir took his Cabinet members to visit Antarctica, also at the invitation of New Zealand. Prime Minister Mahathir had come under much pressure from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties at the UN to change his outlook towards the Treaty System. New Zealand's offer reflected a new tack on the part of a key Antarctic player. However, as Mahathir began to change his thinking on Antarctica, he was concerned that his policy shift might lead to loss of face with the Third World countries that had previously supported him on the Antarctic issue. There was a risk Mahathir's credentials as an exponent of the South would be put into question if he were to cave in to the ATS pressure. Back home in Kuala Lumpur, Mahathir had to deal with his own diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whom he had sent out to many capitals to champion his policy on Antarctica. Faced with their passive resistance after 1998, he was in a dilemma: how to exit gracefully from the UNGA over the Question of Antarctica without antagonising his own “foot soldiers” and without losing face and support from the Third World. Mahathir knew that his crusade against the ATS had not made much headway beyond a successful exercise in public relations and promoting some transparency in the ATS governance system. He also knew that his Antarctica policy put Malaysia at odds with the ATS,5 many of whom are Malaysia's close trading and defence partners. For example, the United Kingdom,

Australia and New Zealand are all members of the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangement that includes Malaysia. Malaysia put up a strong diplomatic face at the UNGA from 1982 to 2005; right up until a graceful exit strategy could be found. The decision of India to join the ATS in 1983 and China in 1986 together with the involvement of the United Nations institutions like the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)6 and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the work programmes of the ATS would make the eventual exit strategy less painful. Nonetheless, these actions were not enough to convince Malaysian diplomats of a withdrawal policy. After he changed his Antarctic strategy, Mahathir had to come up with a strategy to convince his diplomats that the withdrawal from a combative policy at the UNGA would not harm Malaysia's foreign policy and that the migration of strong supporters like India and China to the ATS had made the Question of Antarctica redundant. Hence around the time that Wellington invited Malaysian scientists to Scott Base (1996–1998), Mahathir adopted a dual or parallel policy: (1) partner with ATS members like New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Argentina on the ice; and (2) allow the Question of Antarctica to remain on the UNGA agenda until it was “suspended” in 2005.7 Although this dual policy was not popular with Mahathir's foreign affairs bureaucrats,8 it was not openly challenged until after he had left office. Although by 1998 Mahathir had started to distance himself from pressuring the ATCP countries, he was unable to disengage from the UNGA process for diplomatic reasons. He was evidently worried that his supporters from the South and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) would accuse him of betrayal if he were to throw in the towel and formally withdraw the Malaysian support at the UNGA on “The Question of Antarctica”. As a trading nation with strong South-South credentials and a member of the NAM, Malaysia could not afford to lose their support at the United Nations. When Mahathir spoke at the UNGA in September 1982, it was a clarion call for the ATCP to be more inclusive and more transparent in its governance system. When the ATS began to admit India (1983), China (1983) and South Korea (1986), Mahathir had lost legitimate ground to be critical of the ATCP's exclusiveness. As indicated earlier, the events in 1998

and 2002 when he visited the continent provided strong evidence of a shift in Malaysia's policy towards Antarctica. As early as 2000, Mahathir had seen the value of Malaysia's participation in scientific research there. To his credit, even after he stepped down as prime minister in 2003 he retained an interest in the situation in Antarctica. In 2004, he called on the government to accede to the Treaty. The third stage came in after Mahathir left office in 2003 and includes a non-active period under Abdullah Badawi as prime minister. It was during Prime Minister Najib Razak's watch (from 2009) that some within Malaysia began to push for Malaysia's formal application to become a Treaty signatory. However, the internal process to get the Cabinet to approve accession to the Treaty was fraught with resistance from some overzealous bureaucrats (known locally as the Little Napoleons). These bureaucrats attempted to delay Malaysia's signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty right up until the very last day. In September 2005, “The Question of Antarctica” was removed from the active Agenda of the UNGA by consensus vide Resolution 60/47 without any protest from Malaysia. By this time, Malaysia had begun to send signals to the international community that it would soon accede to the 1959 Treaty. The statement from the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in Pakistan in May 2007 had raised hope among the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) states and Malaysian scientists that Malaysia would eventually sign the Treaty. There were unilateral statements from senior governmental officials that Malaysia would one day sign the 1959 Treaty. On 5 May 2009, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tabled a position paper at the intra-agency meeting concerning accession to the Antarctic Treaty. This paper has provided further proof of a policy shift in Malaysia; that it was shifting “from criticisms of and confrontation, to that of engagement and cooperation with the ATCP”.9 Due to bureaucratic resistance and the government no longer prioritising Antarctic affairs as it had done under Mahathir, it was not until 2011 that a series of meetings were held to discuss the active participation of Malaysia in the ATS.10 The process was difficult, with the representatives of the AG Chambers, for example, insisting on national legislation before acceding to

the Treaty. Some officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not happy with the policy shift that in their opinion lacked a graceful exit strategy. Unfortunately, no one ever defined the criteria for a graceful exit. The opposition sounded like sour grapes and it appears to me that many of them were unhappy with the decision to embrace the Treaty, which they had had to champion at the UNGA and other international forums for some twenty-three years (1982–2005). The Government of Malaysia took cognisance of the contribution of its Antarctic scientists as the primary reason for acceding to the Treaty. The Malaysian scientists made a strong impression on the government by their contribution. The following events made it easier for the government to support the new policy of engagement with the Antarctic Treaty System.11 First, the decision of the ATCP in 2002 to invite Malaysia to observe its meeting was seen as a special privilege and a conciliatory gesture. Malaysia was aware that the ATCP went out of its way to bring Malaysia on board as the 1959 Treaty has no provision that would permit the participation of a nonstate party in meetings organised by the ATS. Second, four years later at Hobart in 2006, South Korea in its capacity as Chair of the Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFoPS) invited Malaysia to join Japan, China and South Korea in AFoPS. Malaysian scientists were elated by the confidence of their Asian peers. Malaysian scientists have established a strong rapport with their Asian counterparts, especially South Korea, and saw this as an opportunity to deepen scientific cooperation with them. Third, encouraged by the positive contribution of their scientists to polar science, Malaysia welcomed the rare opportunity to be a full member of the scientific Committee of Antarctic Research (SCAR) from 2008, even though it had not yet acceded to the Antarctic Treaty. SCAR is a non-governmental organisation created in 1958 to: initiate, promote and coordinate international scientific activity in the Antarctic; to review scientific matters pertaining to the integrity of the Antarctic environment, including the conservation of its terrestrial and marine ecosystems; and to provide scientific and technological advice to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) and other organisations, both governmental and non-governmental. Although its recommendations are advisory, SCAR usually addresses issues before they are considered at ATCMs. The appointment of a Malaysian scientist to SCAR has put Malaysia on the polar scientific map. Fourth, apart from SCAR, which

advises the ATCM, Malaysian scientists also earned respect from their peers when they were invited to sit on the programme dealing with Evolution and Bio-diversity in the Antarctic (EBA), the steering committee on Climate Change System (AGCS) as well as becoming a member of an action group on katabatic wind studies in the Ross Sea, also known as the Modelling & Observational Studies of Antarctic Katabatics (MOSAK).

Policy coordination During his watch, Mahathir had a firm grip on Antarctic policy. Mahathir relied on officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to champion his policy, mainly at the UNGA. Malaysian diplomats were also active at the meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) seeking their support for the agenda at the UNGA on the Question of Antarctica. After Mahathir left office in 2003, Antarctic policy was mainly driven by the Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM), which was established in 1995 by an Act of Parliament (Academy Sciences Act, 1994). ASM is answerable to the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI).12 MOSTI has sought assistance from the highest levels of political power in Malaysia in order to fast-track political acceptance of the new Antarctic policy. For example, at the request of the ASM, with blessing from the prime minister, MOSTI arranged with the High Commissioner of New Zealand in Kuala Lumpur for the Malaysian king to visit Scott Base and McMurdo station on 20–24 November 2011. This working visit was arranged by New Zealand at the request of the National Task Force of the Academy of Sciences Malaysia. The United States of America also provided logistics support for the visit. The Cabinet gave approval for His Majesty to visit the Antarctic on 12 January 2011, subject to Malaysia's accession of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the submission of a joint Cabinet paper by MOSTI and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of MOSTI, the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research accompanied His Majesty to Antarctica on 20–24 November 2011. The current Minister of MOSTI, Dr Maximus Ongkili, and his senior staff have been very supportive of ASM's initiative of using science to re-engage with the ATS. It was partly through his personal effort and intervention that the Cabinet gave the green light for Malaysia to accede to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. MOSTI is also working closely with the AG Chambers, the Prime Minister's Department and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to provide a legal infrastructure for the establishment of a National Polar Science Agency to

undertake research both in the Antarctic and in the Arctic. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment oversees environmental matters and policies for Malaysia. Once ratified, the 1991 Madrid Protocol, for example, will come under the purview of MORE and not MOSTI. Malaysia's interest in the Arctic is very recent. It has to do mainly with opportunities which could result from the reduction in ice coverage in the Arctic. This Arctic shrinkage could make some waterways (e.g. the Northwestern Passages) in the Arctic navigable in the summer. The opening of this passage could reduce vessel traffic from Europe to Asia and this would have a positive impact on vessel traffic congestion in the Strait of Malacca. Beyond this navigational issue, Malaysia has scientific interests, which include establishing the impact of the warming of the Arctic waters on global climate change. A Malaysian scientist, teamed up with a scientist from the Korean Polar Research Institute, went on a familiarisation visit to NyÅlesund in July 2007. Professor Siti Aisyah Alias from UM and Dr Hii Yi Siang of UNiSZA visited also Horsund Base in August 2010. This team has collaborated with a scientist from the Department of Biodiversity, Institute of Nature Conservation at the Polish Academy of Sciences, Krakow on a joint project “Studies of Arctic fungi and bacteria as indicator for nutrients and hydrocarbons contamination at Horsund, Spitsbergen”. The ASM has established a Task Force on Antarctic Research comprising members from MOSTI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AG Chambers and relevant universities. The implementing agency for polar research is the National Antarctic Research Centre, which has established the Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme at the University of Malaya. The Director of the Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) is also Deputy Chairman of the Task Force on Antarctic Research at ASM. The chart on page 102 illustrates the organisational structure for Antarctic policymaking in Malaysia.13 By January 2013 or so, once the national legislation to give effect to Malaysia's accession of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1991 Protocol is in place, Malaysia is likely to adopt an Act of Parliament to establish a statutory body to oversee research in polar science. Once this National Agency on Polar Science is formally established, it will assume all responsibilities for scientific and public policy research on Antarctica and the Arctic. While the terms of reference for

the proposed National Polar Agency have not been made public, in all likelihood, this Agency will supplant the work of the Task Force on Antarctica Research at the ASM. The proposed National Agency on Polar Science, which will be answerable to MOSTI, will become the new focal point for all Malaysian scientific activities in the Antarctic and the Arctic. Malaysia's Antarctic current budget is small, only US$85,000 per annum. Due to the bureaucratic wrangling which delayed Malaysia from signing the Treaty, the funds, which had originally been set aside for establishing an Antarctic base, are no longer available. The current approach is to secure berths with a number of national programmes on the continent willing to cooperate with Malaysia on a fee basis.

Malaysia's Antarctic Research Programme The National Antarctic Research Centre (NARC) in conjunction with the Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) is required to submit a progress report annually to the Task Force on Antarctica Research, ASM. The last report was in 2011. From these NARC Reports, it is possible to divide the areas of research conducted by Malaysian scientists in Antarctica into two areas: biological sciences and physical sciences. According to the Deputy Director of MARP,14 Professor Dr Siti Aisyah Alias, Malaysian scientists are actively involved in the following projects: ten in biological sciences and eight in physical sciences. The ten biological science research projects are quite diverse. They fall under four groups: bacteria, fungi, algae and benthic, and include the following: adaptive mechanisms of Antarctic, tropical and temperate microalgae to UVR and temperature stress; nitrogen cycling in Antarctic ecosystems: ecology, physiology and biodiversity; the diversity and metabolic abilities of polar bacteria in ecologically distinct environments; biodiversity, adaptation and characterisation of the Antarctic; bioremediation of xenobiotics using Antarctic microbes; studies on psychrophiles from Antarctica and the Arctic with special reference to their anti-microbial and enzyme activities; the effects of isolation on the genetic biodiversity of shallow coastal benthic communities in Antarctica; the effects of cultural euthrophication on the benthic primary production of tropical, temperate and polar ecosystems; the human impact on the evolution and diversity of Antarctic flora with special reference to invasive species; and the biodiversity of the benthic invertebrate faunas from the Antarctic marine ecosystem. Under the physical sciences heading, the following projects are ongoing:

modelling and observational studies of Antarctic Katabatic (MOSAK); polar ice monitoring and parameter retrieval with microwave remote sensing; geochemical study of rock weathering in the polar regions; profiling hydrocarbons deposition, vertical transport and mobilisation in Antarctica; radiochemical and chemical changing in glaciers and sediments in polar regions: implications for the past and present global oceanography cycles; geological and geophysical investigations in Antarctica; polar-equatorial-polar geo-space ionospheric, magnetic storms and water vapour characterisation for the advancement of space weather; and profiling hydrocarbons and nutrient deposition in Antarctica. One local scientist (from Universiti Putra Malaysia) is working on bacteria biodegradation and bioremediation of hydrocarbons in the Antarctic.15 The scientist is waiting for the green light from the ASM to patent the methods or processes of this unique remediation process using bacteria isolated from Antarctica. According to one study,16 the returns from the four patents will be more than what the Government of Malaysia has spent on supporting scientists to the ice. The achievements of Malaysia on its policy on Antarctica must be evaluated at two levels. The first level has to do with the research and benefits accrued from Malaysia's scientific programme on Antarctica and the second level concerns the political and diplomatic dividends from its policy at the UNGA, i.e. on the Question of Antarctica. According to Professor Azizan Abu Samah, currently Head of MARP at University Malaya, it is difficult to quantify the work of Malaysian scientists in the Antarctic, as they are ongoing and one cannot ascribe an economic value to research activities that have not resulted in any form of commercialisation. Besides scientific research activities, the work of scientists at MARP also involves public relations and raising public awareness of the importance of Antarctica to global climate change, arms control and as an area free from nuclear weapons. Malaysian scientists are working closely with the world's leading scientists in the fields of global warming, atmospheric sciences and biodiversity to advance knowledge in polar science.17

At the local level, in terms of public awareness, MARP has organised many workshops, talks and seminars on Antarctica including the Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA) series. The Fifth MISA seminar was held in Kuala Lumpur in June 2011 and drew a large crowd of scientists as it was held together with the 22nd Pacific Science Congress. In 2008 MARP sent two university students to Antarctica. Not all these activities can be quantified; nonetheless, they are important to the nation. At the international level, apart from seminars, MARP has sponsored one Indonesian scientist to Antarctica and it has taken in postgraduate students from India, Jordan and Iraq.18 Besides this, there is also a student exchange programme. For example, in 2010 a student from the University of Brest of Belorussia spent four months with MARP working on Antarctica algae. MARP has also introduced a Visiting Professor Exchange Programme. In 2010, for example, MARP hosted two scientists from BAS. Ten foreign scientists participated in MARP's Visiting Scientist/Professor Research programme (2008–2009); they were nationals of India, the UK, Australia, Taiwan and South Korea. Apart from the Visiting Research Programme, which brings in foreign experts, fifty postgraduate students (including ten from overseas) have registered with the NARC.19 To undertake research in Antarctica, the NARC has also established strong networking relationship with scientists from the following states and organisations: Antarctica New Zealand (Antarctica NZ) Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) British Antarctic Survey (BAS) Instituto Antarctico Chileno (INACH) Instituto Antarctico Equatoriano (INAE) of Ecuador Korean Polar Research Institute (KOPRI) South Africa National Antarctic Programme (SANAP) Alfred Wegener Institute of Polar and Marine Research (AWI) of Germany Polish Antarctic Research Scottish Association for Marine Science (ASM) Instituto Antarctico Argentina or the Argentina Institute of National Antarctic Programme.

Malaysian scientists are also working closely with their counterparts in Japan and China. The political dividends arising from the Question on Antarctica Agenda are discussed elsewhere;20 the detail of what Malaysia has achieved from “twenty criticisms” is discussed in the Tepper and Haward paper21 and in the work of Peter Beck. From Malaysia's foreign policy perspectives, its biggest achievement from the Antarctic policy is the ability to raise the level of awareness of the international community of the exclusiveness of the ATS. Mahathir was able to capitalise on the “Question of Antarctica” Agenda to promote a sense consciousness among the South countries to rally around him to put pressure on the ATS to open up and to be more transparent in its activities in Antarctica. In the process, Mahathir was able to strengthen his credentials as a champion of the South. This point was important for Mahathir who had just assumed the premiership of Malaysia. The Antarctic policy was a personal triumph for Mahathir. Beyond the personal triumph, it is possible to argue that the decision of the ATS to admit India, China and South Korea as members resulted from the pressure that Malaysia placed on the former vide its Question of Antarctica Agenda. The ATS decision to invite the International Maritime Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme to participate in their programmes is perceived by Malaysian diplomats as resulting from the Question of Antarctica agenda, which they were asked to champion at the UNGA. Although Malaysia cannot claim full credit for the ATCP decision to shelve the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) in 1988, the fact that it happened five years after the Question of Antarctica Agenda was debated at the UNGA shows some positive linkages between the two activities. Likewise, the ATCP decision to adopt the 1991 Madrid Protocol was arguably an acknowledgement of the official stand of Malaysia and other international NGOs on the question of banning mining activities on the continent and the need to preserve the Antarctic in its pristine condition and for scientific research. In my view, the decision of the leading ATS party members like New Zealand, Australia and the UK to give recognition to Malaysian scientists by inviting them to sit on important committees like SCAR and encouraging them to actively

participate in their research programmes has further emboldened Malaysia to adopt a more participatory approach towards the ATS programme. The Task Force on Antarctica Research has not dealt in any great length on how Malaysia could achieve economic benefits from its involvement on Antarctica along the lines of New Zealand as described by Anne-Marie Brady in her chapter in this volume (Chapter 8). Malaysia is opposed to any form of mining in Antarctica and this policy is irrevocable. Malaysia has an indirect economic interest that could result from its research activities on Antarctica. For example, it could benefit from its scientific discoveries from using a microbe isolated from Antarctica to biodegrade and bioremediate hydrocarbons in cold weather. Unlike South Korea and Japan, for example, which have demonstrated an entrenched capacity in distant fishing, the fishing industry in Malaysia is still in its infancy and its fshermen have limited regional reach. Even in its own exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Malaysia has permitted foreign fshermen, from Thailand, for example, to exploit the surplus fshery resources.

Conclusion Kuala Lumpur's signing of the 1959 Treaty marks the beginning of a new era for Malaysia's scientific research leadership. It also signifies a shift in Malaysia's foreign policy focus from an aggressive diplomatic approach on the question of Antarctica to a more pragmatic scientific relationship with the international community working on the continent. Unlike the past, scientists are now driving Malaysia's Antarctic strategy. Malaysia's shift on Antarctic policy signals a new policy of international engagement in response to changing global political dynamics and a new emphasis on science and technology. It augurs well with Malaysia's long-term commitment to the global community on the conservation of the frozen continent to be exclusively used for peaceful purposes. The outlook for Malaysia's scientific engagement in the Antarctic is bright. Once the Parliament passes the proposed Antarctica Act and a National Agency on Polar Science is established, it will be much easier to manage research and other activities on Antarctica. Malaysia is keen on bioprospecting for anti-microbial and novel chemicals. Tourism will also feature strongly in Malaysia's programme. Malaysia's scientific relations with the ATCP are expected to be smooth. Malaysia will continue to attend the ATCM meetings as it has done since 2002, subject, of course, to invitation from the host state. Its active participation in SCAR will give it some advantages when it applies for ATCP status in due course. It is unlikely that Malaysian scientists will engage in any further political polemics over the governance of the continent. Malaysia will need to deepen contacts with New Zealand, Australia, the UK, the USA, China, Japan, South Korea and India in order to strengthen its Antarctic programme. While Malaysia's relations with the ATS are expected to be cordial, Malaysia needs to regain the confidence of the Third World countries that supported its initiative on Antarctica at the UNGA. Though Malaysia may emulate the “silent policy” adopted by India and China, Malaysia should also help sponsor scientists from these countries to participate in polar science research either by inviting them to join the activities on the ground or by giving them training at the NARC. In Antarctica Malaysia should be able to

capitalise on the good relations it has established with Argentina, Ecuador, Chile and South Africa. The loose caucus that Malaysia was able to lead at the United Nations included those from the OIC, ASEAN and the Nonaligned Movement. Without their votes at the United Nations General Assembly debates on the Agenda on “The Question of Antarctica” (1982– 2005), the Malaysian initiative would have been defeated. Hence, the challenge to Malaysia in the immediate future is how to re-engage with the South countries who must have felt betrayed by Malaysia's policy to abandon or jettison “The Question of Antarctica” at the UNGA. Malaysia cannot abandon the South countries, as in the future, it may need their support at the United Nations and other international forums. The signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the proposed ratification of the 1991 Protocol will further reinforce Malaysia's credentials on preserving Antarctica as a nuclear weapon-free zone and the promotion of sustainable development. The fragility of the world climate and the vulnerability of Antarctica to the global processes on environment and climate change are global issues of importance to Malaysia. By depositing the instruments of accession of the Antarctic Treaty on 31 October 2011, Malaysia has made a 180 degree turn in its Antarctic policy — from being intransigent to seeking engagement — for very good geo-political and geo-scientific reasons. While the decision to embrace the ATS is unilateral, Malaysia acknowledges scientific, educational as well as logistical support mainly from New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, India, South Africa, Argentina and Ecuador. While the South countries gave Malaysia political and moral support at the United Nations and other international forums that discussed the “Question of Antarctica”, it was the support and encouragement from some members of the ATCP that assured Malaysia a place in Antarctica. The membership of the Treaty gives Malaysia a locus standi in the ATS, which it can use to promote, among other things, the interests of countries from the South, the OIC and ASEAN. Yet, on its own Malaysia's membership is unlikely to change the two-tier decision-making structure in the ATS. Nevertheless, for Malaysia, the membership of the Treaty will put an end to its current ad hoc arrangement. It will also close a chapter on its ambivalent relationship with the ATS and signify a new era of permanent engagement in geo-science and geo-politics on the Antarctic continent.

Notes 1. Department of Strategic Studies, National Defence University of Malaysia and member of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research, The Academy of Sciences, Malaysia (ASM). The author wishes to graciously acknowledge assistance from the Academy of Sciences Malaysia. This author has benefited from discussion with Tan Sri Salleh Mohd Nor, Chairman of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research at the ASM and Professor Azizan Abu Samah, Director of MARP and Deputy Chairman of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research, ASM. The funding of this paper comes partly from the Long Range Research Grant Scheme (LRGS) established by the Ministry of Higher Education (2011) to support research on Malaysia's participation in the Antarctica Treaty System. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Associate Professor Anne-Marie Brady of the University of Canterbury, New Zealand, for reading the earlier manuscript and suggesting suitable changes. The author is solely responsible for the paper. 2. See a series of articles by Peter Beck from 1983 to 2005, in particular Peter Beck, “Twenty Years On: The UN and the Question of Antarctica?” Polar Record 40 (2004) and also the article by Rohan Tepper and Marcus Haward, “The Development of Malaysia's Position on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record 41 (2005). See also B. A. Hamzah, “Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the Question of Antarctica”, Ocean Development and International Law 41 (2010) and B. A. Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty: A Geopolitical Interpretation”, The Polar Journal 1(2) (December 2011). 3. B. A. Hamzah, “The Charm Offensive”, Malaysian Business, 16–30 June 2010. 4. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty”. 5. See observations by Andrew Jackson, “Cooperation Characterises Antarctica Future”, 4th Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA 4), Petaling Jaya, 1–3 April 2009. 6"6.See Donald Rothwell, “UNEP and the Antarctic Treaty System”,

Environmental Policy and Law 29(1) (1999). 7. Discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah in August 2010. See also Azizan A. Samah and Nasaruddin Abdul Rahman, “Sustaining Malaysia's Interest in Antarctica”, Proceedings of International Symposium on Asian Collaboration in IPY 2007–2008, Tokyo: Nippon Institute of Polar Research, 2007. See also Peter Beck, “The United Nations and Antarctica, 2005: The End of the Question of Antarctica”, Polar Record 42 (2006) and B. A Hamzah and Azizan Abu Samah, “Claiming Antarctica for scientific Research”, The Edge, 22 December 2008. 8. Author's observations at various meetings of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research, 2010–2011 and it is also the view of many diplomats and bureaucrats in Malaysia that the author talked to. 9. Ganeson Sivagurunathan, “An Overview of Malaysia's Foreign Policy on Antarctica”, paper presented at the Inter-Agency Meeting Concerning Accession to the Antarctic Meeting and Related Conventions/Protocol, Wismaputra, 5 November 2009. 10. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty”, for a discussion on some of the meetings in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOSTI and the ASM. 11. Discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah of MARP at various times (2010–2012). The most recent interview was conducted on 27 January 2012. Professor Azizan Abu Samah represents Malaysia at SCAR, AFoPS and MOSAK. 12. The Minister met up with the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the National Task Force on Antarctica Research and the author on various occasions to discuss the way forward in 2011. 13. Not all the twenty public universities have an active an Antarctic programme, nonetheless, are all entitled to draw on the fund provided by the government for research on the Antarctica. The universities with active research programmes in Antarctica research are UM, USM, UKM, UPM, UiTM, UNIMAS, UTAR, UNiSZA and UTM. 14. Discussion with Professor Dr Siti Aisyah Alias at MARP, Universiti Malaya on 2–3 February 2012.

15. The matter was discussed at the National Task Force on Antarctica Research Meeting on 7 November 2006. This research on bacteria bioremediation was conducted in collaboration with a scientist from Instituto Antarctico Argentino. 16. Anurdin AbdulGhani, “Analisa Kos-Faedah Penyertaan Sistem Triti Antartika” (ATS), 2010. This document is available at the Secretariat of the National Taskforce on Antarctica Research, ASM. (In English, “The Cost-benefit Analysis of joining the ATS”.) 17. Professor Azizan Abu Samah is working with Dr John Turner from BAS (British Antarctic Survey) on the Antarctic wind field; Professor Phang Siew Moi with Professor Andrew McMinn (AAD) and Professor John Beardall of the Monash University on sea ice algae and the effect of ultraviolet ray and temperature on algae; Professor Siti Aisyah Alias has teamed up with Dr Peter Convey from BAS and Professor Bryan Storey from New Zealand Antarctic Gateway on biodiversity and the ecology of Antarctic fungi. 18. See NARC Report, “Pencapaian Pusat Penyelidikan”, National Antarctic Research Centre (NARC), University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (2009). 19. Author's discussion with Professor Azizan Abu Samah on 27 January 2012. The affiliation with MARP's counterparts is published in “Pencapaian Pusat Penyelidikan”, National Antarctic Research Centre (NARC), University Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (2009). This progress report was submitted to the ASM and MOSTI to justify funding and to inform them of the NARC activities and programmes including its achievements. 20. See Hamzah, “Malaysia and the Southern Ocean: Revisiting the Question of Antarctica”, Hamzah, “Malaysia and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty”. See also the articles by Peter Beck in Polar Record; the article by Rohan Tepper and Marcus Haward, “The Development of Malaysia's Position on Antarctica: 1982–2004”, Polar Record 41 (2005). See also Report of a Study Group under Sir Anthony Parsons, Antarctica: The Next Decade, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1987). Parsons has alluded to the need to take heed of “an outside challenge to the continuation of the Treaty … led by Malaysia”. But to the best of the author's knowledge Malaysia has never made public its achievements at

the UNGA. 21. Tepper and Haward, op. cit.

6

United States foreign policy interests in Antarctica

Christopher C. Joyner

The United States has salient national interests in Antarctica and its circumpolar oceans. This is clearly highlighted by the leading role the United States has assumed in the conduct of scientifc research on and around the continent – research that provides valuable insights essential to the understanding of the planet. Moreover, US interest in Antarctic science has been matched by the evolution in recent decades of important political, security, economic and environmental interests there, expressly as they relate to maintaining the viability of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty1 and the associated agreements that comprise the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),2 the indispensable regime framework through which the United States pursues and achieves those interests. This study aims to examine US national interests in the Antarctic as they relate to contemporary American foreign policy objectives in the region. Appreciating this, over the past decade certain issues involving the Antarctic Treaty parties have surfaced that could pose fundamental challenges to US national interests in the Antarctic. At the same time, these challenges might generate political pressures that could adversely impact on legal components of the ATS, including the core treaty itself. Signifcantly, such developments might negatively affect fundamental US interests in the polar south and thereby exacerbate political tensions between the United States and other

Antarctic Treaty parties, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties.3 This realization points up the central puzzle of this study: What are the dimensions of contemporary US national interests in the Antarctic and what possible developments by other Antarctic Treaty parties might undermine the ability of the United States to attain its national interest objectives in the region? The study now turns to address these questions.

United States’ interests and challenges in the Antarctic US policy in the Antarctic traditionally and currently has embraced certain primary national interest priorities, within which other secondary interests are incorporated. Three agencies in the US Government are responsible for securing and executing policies upholding these Antarctic interests: the Offce of Ocean and Polar Affairs, which is part of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientifc Affairs (OES) in the Department of State;4 the National Science Foundation (NSF );5 and the United States Antarctic Program (USAP).6 Diplomatic matters involving US interests in the Antarctic primarily accrue to the OES. These responsibilities include negotiation of multilateral Antarctic agreements and participation in international fora dealing with polar issues. Spe-cifcally, OES strives to promote protection of the Antarctic marine environment from pollution and other manmade threats through its role in the International Maritime Organization and special fora associated with the Antarctic Treaty System.7 The Office of Polar Programs in NSF is chiefy responsible for managing funding for basic research and its operational support in the Antarctic. Within NSF is the USAP. This agency fosters cooperative research with other nations and develops measures to protect the Antarctic environment and ensure prudent use of resources there.8

The Antarctic Treaty As offcially articulated, during the past ffty years, the United States has embraced four general national interests in its Antarctic policy as related to the Antarctic Treaty System. These are: (1) to maintain the Antarctic as a region of international cooperation that is reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; (2) to preserve and undertake unique opportunities for scientifc research in order to better comprehend both Antarctica's and the Earth's geophysical and environmental systems; (3) to protect the relatively pristine environment of Antarctica and its associated ecosystems; and (4) to ensure the conservation and sustainable management of living resources in the

southern circumpolar ocean.9

International cooperation and peaceful purposes Paramount among US national interests in the circumpolar south is to maintain the Antarctic Treaty as an instrument of international cooperation and ensure that the continent does not become an area or object of international discord.10 In the American view, the Antarctic should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, in which great importance is placed an ‘active and infuential US pres-ence in Antarctica designed to support the range of US antarctic [sic] interests’.11 Implicit in this overarching objective is the US interest in preserving its position of nonrecognition of claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.12 The Antarctic Treaty, negotiated in 1959 in the spirit of the highly successful 1957/58 scientifc research programme known as the International Geophysical Year (IGY), was opened for signature on 1 December of that year and entered into force on 23 June 1961. The United States’ head of delegation, Ambassador Herman Phleger, was selected as permanent chairman of the negotiating Confer-ence on Antarctica.13 The United States became the ffth state to ratify the treaty, and the Senate gave its advice and consent by a vote of sixty-six to twenty-one on 10 August 1960, but only after heated discussion on its merits. The treaty was praised in the Senate as ‘containing all the provisions which the US believed were required for the protection of its national interest and as setting a precedent in the feld of disarmament, prohibition of nuclear explosions, and the law of space’.14 Fifty years on, this accord has proved to be an extraordinary and unique mul-tilateral legal agreement. The treaty text is simple, uncomplicated and concise. It consists of 2,364 words gracefully set out in a preamble and fourteen articles. Despite this brevity — and the complicating fact that seven of the original treaty parties assert national claims to territory on the continent — what the Treaty pro-vides for in those legal provisions is impressive indeed. The United States played a critical role in the diplomatic development of each provision in the 1959 treaty text. Not only was the United States the chief sup-porter of the treaty text, it was also the principal architect of it as

well. The Eisenhower administration believed that such an agreement would well serve US national interests, and it was this perception that prompted the United States government to assume a leading role during the summer of 1959 in negotiating the treaty instrument. In this regard, the United States first elaborated its national interests in Antarctica in a March 1958 policy statement, which subsequently became prominently integrated throughout provisions in the fnal treaty text.15 The Antarctic Treaty formally guarantees opportunities for free access without restriction on the continent and for scientifc research rights that had characterized the highly successful IGY experience.16 Largely through US efforts, the negotiated treaty text establishes a legal framework for all participating governments to collaborate closely in order to achieve the shared ambition of preserving scientifc research in the region, as well as for the mutual exchange of plans, information and personnel.17 While the Treaty agrees in its famous Article IV to disagree on the legal status of the national claims to the continent (i.e. it does not recognize, affrm, dispute or negate those claims),18 it does declare that no new claims may be asserted while the treaty is in force.19 All these provisions serve US national interests by promoting international cooperation in scientifc research, freedom of access and peaceful uses of the Antarctic region without the complicating impediment of national sovereignty. The treaty further declares that Antarctica can be used only for peaceful purposes. Consequently, both the establishment of military bases and the conduct of military activities in the region are prohibited.20 Moreover, all areas and stations within the Treaty area are made subject to unannounced, onsite inspection, including aerial observation, by Contracting Treaty Parties for possible violations of the agreement, the reports from which are to be shared with all parties.21 Importantly, nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes are pro-hibited south of 60o South Latitude,22 making this area the largest nuclear freezone in the world.23 These provisions are critical for ensuring US national interests in upholding compliance with the Treaty's requirement for the peaceful use of Antarctica and environmental protection on the continent. In sum, these provisions are vital ingredients that contribute to making pres-ervation of the Antarctic Treaty a salient national priority for the United

States. The treaty and its subsequently elaborated regime system of instruments fundamentally contributes to making US scientifc activities more possible throughout the continent and its circumpolar waters; the treaty fundamentally contributes to demilitarizing and denuclearizing one-tenth of the earth's surface; the treaty serves as the political and legal lubricant that permits claimant and nonclaimant governments to coexist and cooperate in their activities in the Antarctic region; and, under the umbrella of the emergent Antarctic Treaty System, parties to the agreement have cooperatively worked to negotiate a constellation of agreements that strive to protect, preserve and conserve the Antarctic environment and the living resources in the circumpolar marine ecosystem.24

Sovereignty and claims to Antarctica How the issue of sovereignty on the continent is treated and applied by the seven claimant states remains a constant, albeit undeclared, concern of the United States. The United States has never made a claim to the continent, nor does it recognize the legitimacy of the claims already asserted there, even though for seventy years it has been the most active government in terms of manned physical presence and support for scientifc research on and around the continent.25 The United States does, however, reserve the right to make a claim in the future if circumstances so warrant.26 That said, a fundamental interest of the United States remains the goal of sustaining the Antarctic Treaty to facilitate international cooperation in order to preclude the continent from becoming a region of international competition and confict. In the view of US Department of State policymakers, key to attaining this objective is the ability to preserve the ‘agree to disagree’ legal status of the claims to Antarctica in Article IV. The critical issue here is whether national claims made to the continent can generate the qualities of sovereign control and ownership. Do the claimed sectors on Antarctica actually qualify as territories internationally recognized as suffciently sovereign to generate legal rules for managing civil and public affairs on the continent and regulating offshore activities? Under international law, a state refers to a specifc territory with recognized borders that is occupied by a population under an organized government and which, in its foreign affairs, possesses the qualities of sovereignty and independence.27 Clearly, the claimed sectors

have never qualifed as states. On the other hand, might they qualify as sovereign territories owned and administered by governments of the claimant states? The offcial position of the United States is that ice-covered land areas within the Antarctic sector claims do not entail lawfully owned sovereign territories by their claimant governments and thus do not qualify as valid entitlements of sovereignty or national ownership.28 This conclusion is grounded in the belief that the claimant governments have fallen short of fully demonstrating fulflment of the requisite condition of effective occupation, the critical criterion for determining sovereign ownership of territory. Put simply, the sector areas must be occupied by a population that has permanently settled the claimed territory, a government must be in place to administer civil affairs and there must be inter-nationally recognized borders separating the claims. In the view of the United States (and 184 other members of the United Nations), none of these qualifcations has been fulflled by any of the claimant states on the Antarctic continent. That said, it must be realized that national law does apply to the Antarctic, in particular to nationals of treaty parties visiting the continent and to the management of national research stations on and around the continent. For the United States, this is true of both civil and criminal law as they relate to activities by US citizens, both in research stations and working on US vessels or in feld camps in the polar south.29

Offshore continental shelf claims This ambiguity of the sovereignty situation is codifed by Article IV in the Treaty, which allows all parties to agree to disagree over the legal status of the claims. Moreover, paragraph 2 of Article IV asserts clearly that, ‘No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.’ This begs a critical consideration; namely, might outer continental shelf claims offshore Antarctica implied in a claimant state's submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) legally take the form of a ‘new’ or an ‘enlarged’ claim? Might it be considered an extension of the old claim referred to in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty? Or if it merely ratifes the already existent claim, does that status change if the offshore claim is

acted upon though national legislation by the claimant government? These conundrums have thus far escaped legal resolution or consensus agreement by the ATCPs, and consequently could pose serious impediments in the future to the Treaty's ongoing success. In terms of current policy considerations, the United States should be concerned about the potential for confict between claimant and nonclaimant governments over access to possible hydrocarbon resources offshore the continent, although it has made no offcial statements in this regard. At the regulatory heart of this potential rush to secure access to as yet undiscovered south polar hydro-carbons lies Article 76 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Indeed, Article 76 provides the procedural conduit by which coastal states can gain legitimacy for making sovereignty claims over vast areas of submarine continental shelf areas offshore their coasts — areas that might hold enormous reserves of hydrocarbon resources.30 To this end, Antarctic claimant states have made either full or partial submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, as provided for in Article 76, concerning the possibility of asserting continental shelf claims offshore their claimed Antarctic territories. Australia was the first claimant to make a submission to the CLCS and did so in November 2004.31 The submission by New Zealand was fled with the CLCS in April 2006, although it excluded a prospective outer continental shelf claim offshore its claimed sector in Antarctica.32 Argentina made its submission with the CLCS in April 2009, which included a map and geographical coordinating for outer continental shelf limits overlapping the Antarctic Peninsula.33 Norway fled a partial submission to the CLCS in May 2009, in which Dronning Maud Land was included.34 Chile made its submission in the form of a ‘Preliminary Information’ statement to the CLCS in May 2009.35 The United Kingdom made two public communications concerning its outer continental shelf claims in the Antarctic, one in a Note of 9 May 2008 to the UN Secretary General that indicated the United Kingdom would be making in 2009 ‘a partial submission’ that ‘will not include areas of the continental shelf areas appurtenant to Antarctica, for which a submission may be made later … ’.36 Although France has not formulated any specifc outer continental shelf claim offshore its clamed territory in Antarctica (Adélie Land), it did

note in a ‘partial submission’ to the UN Secretary General in February 2009 that such an offshore zone might well exist, for which a submission may later be made.37The problem with all these submissions is that the United States does not recognize the validity of sovereign territory on the continent from which such offshore jurisdictional claims might be asserted. The critical point for US national interests in preserving the Antarctic Treaty would come if a claimant government were to act to effect its offshore claims through the proclamation of executive decrees or adoption of national legislation to that end. US policymakers are well aware that these potential continental shelf claims, if legislatively acted upon by claimant governments, coupled with the onset of mineral and hydrocarbon resource development, could be damaging to multilateral cooperation underpinning the Antarctic Treaty. This was demonstrated in April 2009 in the Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, issued at the beginning of the 32nd Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meeting. In that document, the United States strongly supported two important paragraphs38 to which the Consultative Parties pledged to ‘Reaffrm the importance they attach to the contribution made by the Treaty, and by Article IV in particular, to ensuring the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica.’39 The ATCPs also pledged to ‘Reaffrm their commitment to Article 7 of the Environmental Protocol, which prohibits any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientifc research.’40 In effect, no drilling or mining activ-ities could take place with the Antarctic Treaty area for ffty years after the Protocol entered into force, or in 2048.41 The declaration was designed by the United States to have the ATCPs formally reiterate support for the basic tenets of the Treaty System, especially key elements such as Article IV of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Environmental Protection Protocol.42 These twin aims were emphasized because the United States in particular wanted to underscore their adherence as being fundamental to the continuing health of the Antarctic Treaty regime in light of the claimants’ offshore claims submissions.

Scientifc research and cooperation A second major national interest for the United States in Antarctica concerns sci-entifc research. The United States government strives to undertake opportunities for cooperative scientifc research to understand Antarctica and other global physical and environmental systems. To this end, the United States pursues unique opportunities that Antarctica offers as a laboratory for basic scientifc research — research that provides insights essential to the understanding of our planet.43 This national interest has been defned to include the conduct of US scientifc research in major disciplines and year-round occupation of four permanent US research stations, Amundsen—Scott Station at the geographical South Pole, Palmer Station on Anvers Island, Siple Station near the earth's magnetic pole and Willard Research Station near the geographical South Pole. (A ffth station, Byrd Station in Marie Byrd Land, is a summer station.)44 Of particular scientifc and strategic importance to the United States is the Amundsen—Scott South Pole Station. It is located on the summit of the polar ice cap and at the point of intersection of the territorial claims that the United States does not recognize. As a consequence, the United States occupies the apex of Antarctica, a symbolically critical location where all the claims (save for Norway's) converge on the continent.45 The United States also fnances the presence of two scientifc research vessels in the Antarctic, the ARSV Laurence M. Gould and the RVIB Nathaniel B. Palmer.46

Global climate change With regard to this overarching scientifc research interest, four problematic issues are percolating in current US Antarctic policy considerations. First, there is the aim of increasing research on global climate change in the polar south. Antarctica is covered by two ice sheets. The larger East Antarctic ice sheet covers the majority of the continent, while the West Antarctic ice sheet has signifcant ice shelves foating in the ocean. Taken together, they contain 90 per cent of Earth's ice and 70 per cent of its freshwater. If this ice were to melt completely, the world sea level would rise an estimated seventy metres or over 200 feet.47

Of all the world's regions, the Antarctic Peninsula is particularly sensitive to small rises in the annual average temperature, which has increased there by nearly 3° Centigrade since the Antarctic Treaty was negotiated. This is about ten times faster than the average for the rest of the world, which makes the peninsula area worthy of serious scientifc scrutiny. The rapid disintegration of the Larson Ice Shelf in 2002, the collapse of the Wilkins Ice Shelf in 2008 and the calving since 1995 of giant icebergs the size of the US states of Delaware, Rhode Island and Connecticut all graphically demonstrate the impacts that warming waters are having around Antarctica's perimeter ice shelves.48 In addition, a British Antarctic Survey report indicated that within the last ffty years, 87 per cent of the 244 glaciers studied on the Antarctic Peninsula retreated due to climate change, and 40 per cent of the sea ice off the West Antarctic Peninsula has disappeared in the last twenty-five years.49 In the peninsula area, these climate changes have disrupted local penguin colonies and even compelled some of them to migrate south. The remaining 96 per cent of the continent, however, shows no notable signs of either temperature rise or loss of ice, circumstances largely attributable to the cooling effects of the ozone hole over East Antarctica.50 How might the ATCPs deal most effectively with global climate disruption in the Antarctic? The answer US offcials often suggest lies in mobilizing more extensive scientifc research efforts through the Antarctic Treaty's Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) to better understand the nature of the climate change problem and to publicize its impacts on the continent, circumpolar waters and the indigenous wildlife, especially in the peninsula region.51 A recent report by SCAR on climate change in the Antarctic focuses on variations in the geology of the region over the last ffty years, discusses the consequences of climate change for the Antarctic biosphere, and reveals how current math-ematical models project future impacts on the Antarctic ice mass and indigenous wildlife from human interference through the release of greenhouse gases and chlorofuorcarbons into the atmosphere.52 Ways and means must be devised to achieve closer coordination and collaboration in the ATCPs’ efforts to tackle the serious effects of climate change on marine resources in the Southern Ocean, including Antarctic krill — the critical prey species in the Antarctic marine ecosystem. Global climate disruption has intensifed the urgency of these concerns as rising temperatures continue to melt sea ice, thus destroying key

habitat and nursery areas for Antarctic krill. Less sea ice means fewer Antarctic krill, and fewer krill means less food for penguins, seals, whales, fnfsh and squid in the region.53

Biological prospecting A second scientifc research-related issue now seems of little concern to the United States, but that situation could change. This is the nascent onset of biological prospecting — bioprospecting — in the Antarctic.54 Nearly 200 research organizations and companies, many of which are American-based, are engaged in preliminary research on living resources for commercial purposes in the Antarctic.55 Several complications seem apparent should bioprospecting become a pervasive activity in the Antarctic. For example, do claimant states possess the legal authority to regulate access of commercial bioprospectors? Would this ‘authority’ give claimant states the right of refusal to a prospective bioprospector? Who retains how much of the profts, if any, that are derived from bioprospecting research? The companies? The claimant states? The ATCPs? The international community? Important to remember is that the United States still refrains from acceding to the framework 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity56 for similar reasons, driven by concern that American pharmaceutical frms would be obligated to transfer biotech information to the host country where the research was conducted. Would claimant states enjoy that same right under an Antarctic bioprospecting regime? Finally, regarding the freedom of scientifc research within the Antarctic Treaty area, should a distinction be made between basic scientifc research, applied scientifc research and commercial use of resources within the context of beneft-sharing? These critical considerations have yet to confront the United States or other ATCPs, mainly because bioprospecting efforts in Antarctica are in such an embryonic stage of development. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility of conficts arising between governments in the Antarctic. Consequently, prudence would seem to dictate that the United States should remain actively engaged in monitoring the escalation of bioprospecting activities in the Antarctic and what implications they might hold for generating confict among the ATCPs.

Environmental protection A third key US national interest is to protect the pristine environment of Antarctica and its associated ecosystems. The United States’ intentions to fulfl these environmental protection priorities on the continent are clearly seen in that government's salient role among the Consultative Parties over the past five decades to strongly support the negotiation of two major agreements in the Antarctic Treaty System, namely the Agreed Measures on the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora57 and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.58 At the 3rd ATCM in Brussels in 1964, the United States assumed a leading role in negotiating the Agreed Measures.59 The main aim of this recom-mendation was to ensure that it contained mandates to protect Antarctica's indi-genous fauna and fora from man's increasing activities on the continent, foster collaborative scientifc research and encourage the ‘rational use’ of Antarctic animal and plant life.60 For the United States, implementing legislation for the Agreed Measures was adopted as the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (PL 95– 541).61 For US nationals, these regulations govern the taking of fauna and fora, entry into protected areas and provide for a permit system that permits investigators to apply to collect specimens and enter protected areas for compel-ling scientifc purposes. The core instrument designed to protect the Antarctic environment is the 1991 Environmental Protection Protocol. The protocol serves as a framework instrument that sets out broad principles to protect Antarctica's environment. The protocol's main objective is the ‘comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems’.62 In addition, the same provision designates Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve, devoted to peace and science’.63 Central to realizing this precept is Article 3, which asserts that protection of the Antarctic environment as a wilderness with aesthetic and scientifc value shall be a ‘fundamental consideration’ of activities conducted in the area. Perhaps most signifcantly, Article 7 mandates that ‘Any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientifc research, shall be prohibited.’ This effectively prohibits any mining or drilling activities for mineral or hydrocarbon resources on or around the continent for at least ffty years after the protocol enters into force (i.e. in

2048). Moreover, the Article 7 ban on mining may not be repealed unless a future agreement establishes a binding regulatory frame-work for such activity.64 Environmental assessments are required for all activities, including tourism,65 and a special Committee for Environmental Pro-tection was created to recommend policies for protecting the continent.66 Finally, member states should be prepared for emergency response actions in the area67 and arbitration arrangements should be made to resolve international disputes regarding the Antarctic environment.68 Implementation of the environmental protocol is provided by its six annexes. Annex I deals with the need to conduct environmental impact assessments before activities are conducted in the Antarctic, with the intention of producing comprehensive environmental evaluations of proposed activities.69 Annex II incorporates and updates the 1964 Agreed Measures on the Protection of Antarctic Fauna and Flora.70 Requirements for waste disposal, waste removal, incineration and waste management in the Antarctic is the focus of Annex III71 while Annex IV provides binding measures for protecting the circumpolar ocean's environment from marine pollution.72 Annex V concerns protection and management of particular areas on the continent, namely specially protected and specially managed areas, as well as historic sites and monuments.73 Finally, Annex VI, which is not yet in force, deals with liability in the event of environmental emergencies.74 This annex sets up a regime that mandates an operator that fails to take prompt and effective response action to environmental emergencies arising from its activities will be liable to pay the costs of response action taken by other parties. In drafting and negotiating all these annexes, the United States delegation played a key role, with the aim of articulating and activating strong environmental protection policies for the Antarctic continent. Prior to US ratifcation of the Protocol in April 1997, the US Senate deemed it to be a non-self-executing agreement. Consequently, special legislation would be needed to implement its provisions into US national law.75 This was accomplished by adopting the Antarctic Science, Tourism and Conservation Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–227), which amended the Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978.76 The US government also assumed a pivotal role in orchestrating the

negotiations from 1982 to 1988 for drafting the Antarctic Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA).77 This ambition came largely through the efforts of R. Tucker Scully, head of the US delegation. In Mr Scully's view, the rationale for such a minerals treaty was not that it sought to encourage mineral exploitation on or around the continent. Rather, CRAMRA was to be the framework agreement that would fll the practical need to have a very strict regulatory regime in place should mining or drilling ever go forward in the Antarctic.78 In sum, creating a minerals treaty did not guarantee that mining or drilling would necessarily go forward, but it would ensure that a regulatory regime would be available to regulate such activities if they ever become feasible within the Antarctic Treaty area. Regardless, concerns by environmentalists infuenced Australia and France — claimant ATCPs whose participation was needed for CRAMRA to enter into force — and they refused to participate after the draft text was opened for signature. That circumstance rendered the minerals agreement moribund, since all claimant governments had to ratify CRAMRA for it to enter into force.

Conservation of marine living resources A fourth broad US national interest is to ensure the conservation and sustainable management of the living resources in the oceans surrounding Antarctica. To this end, American offcials in the Department of State's OES, the Marine Mammals Commission and the National Science Foundation assumed notably active roles in drafting two key instruments, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals79 and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).80 The Seals Convention was negotiated in 1972 to dissuade governments, especially the Soviet Union, from authorizing commercial seal hunting in the Antarctic. Accordingly, this instrument sets limits on harvesting seals, protects fully some species of seals and limits the method, season and areas for seal hunting in the area south of 60o South Latitude. It also affrms that parties must exchange information and provide annual reports to the contracting parties and to the Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research.

Unlawful fshing The United States and other ATCPs realized in the late 1970s that fshing feets from certain states, namely the Soviet Union, Japan and Poland, were increasingly engaged in harvesting krill in the circumpolar marine environment. Krill is the critical prey species in the Antarctic marine ecosystem, on which whales, seals, squid, penguins and other fauna feed. Unlimited krill catches in the Southern Ocean, however, could dangerously deplete their biomass and thus produce deleterious impacts on populations of those other marine life dependent upon krill for food. Consequently, the United States assumed an active role in negotiating a special agreement, CCAMLR, designed to conserve and regulate the harvesting of krill and other marine life (excluding whales and seals, whose conservation was treated by separate conventions) in the oceans around Antarctica. The convention's cardinal objective is the ‘conservation of Antarctic marine living resources’. Importantly, to this end CCAMLR obligates parties that conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and decisions about their rational use must be based on an ecosystem approach to resource management. In contrast to other fsheries agreements that concern only the status of one commercial

target species, CCAMLR requires that consideration be given to all species in the ecosystem and to conserving ecological relationships. That is, CCAMLR seeks to maintain ‘the ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources’81 as well as to prevent decreases in the size of any harvested population ‘to levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment’.82 The precautionary approach is subsequently stipulated by a directive which avers that ‘of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades’ must be prevented.83 Again, the United States played a central role in getting this instrument negotiated, drafted and implemented. With regard to conservation and management of Antarctic living marine resources, important for the United States is the critical interest of ensuring access for American fshers in the Southern Ocean.84 In this regard, the United States government remains seriously concerned about the need of preventing and discouraging illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fshing vessels within the CCAMLR area,85 as well as watching the rise of the Chinese fshing feet as it increasingly enters the Southern Ocean in the coming years.86

Whaling in Antarctic waters Another issue concerning Antarctic living marine resources is the political tension between Australia and Japan — both original Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties — arising over Japanese lethal whaling in waters offshore the Australian Antarctic Territory. Australia's steadfast antiwhaling position over the past twenty years concentrated on Japanese efforts in the Southern Ocean and boiled over into Australia's Federal Court in 2004. In May 2010 these tensions prompted a case being brought by Australia against Japan's ‘scientifc research whaling’ before the International Court of Justice.87 While the United States has voiced no offcial position on this dispute, US policy traditionally refects strong support in favour of the moratorium against whaling, as well as serious suspicion about the legitimacy of Japanese ‘scientifc whaling research’ used to justify its continued catch operations in the Southern Ocean.88 The impetus for this position stems from strong political pressure in the United States applied by its Humane Society,

Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Federation organizations. Even so, the United States did take the lead in putting together a new proposal in June 2010 at the International Whaling Commission meeting in Morocco. This proposal would have lifted the blanket ban on commercial whaling, but would reduce by half the number of whales caught each year by Japan, Iceland and Norway and add further regulations on commercial whaling. Nevertheless, this policy of lifting the whaling ban was opposed by Australia and the other nonwhaling ATCP governments. Consequently, the agenda item was deferred with the effect that no vote was taken on the proposal to reform the IWC.89

Regulation of tourism Finally, with regard to protecting the Antarctic environment the United States has been a leading advocate of adopting strong measures for regulating tourist vessels in the region. In the 2008–09 season, more than 36,000 shipborne tourists visited the polar south, a ninefold increase since 1994.90 Given this escalation in visitors, it is not unreasonable to presume that the more vessels that make more voyages carrying more passengers through the Antarctic, the greater likelihood there is for serious accidents to occur on their voyages. The recent past bears out this reality. During the 2008–09 season, two ships became grounded. In early December 2008, the MV Ushuaia ran aground while entering Wilhemina Bay near Cape Anna in the northwest Antarctic Peninsula. This acci-dent resulted in hull damage to the vessel, an unknown amount of fuel being spilled and evacuation of its crew and passengers.91 In February 2009, the Ocean Nova became grounded, reportedly driven by high winds, onto the Western Ant-arctic Peninsula.92 In addition, several other incidents involving tourist vessels in the Antarctic have occurred in recent years. The M/S Explorer, a commercial tourist ship, sank in November 2007. Although all passengers and crew were rescued safely, an unknown amount of fuel was spilled.93 Two other cruise ships, the M/V Lybov Orlova94 and the M/V Nordkapp,95 ran aground at Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands in November 2006 and January 2007 respectively. The cruise ship M/S Fram lost power on 30 December 2007 off the Antarctic Peninsula and drifted into an iceberg.96 The Nisshin Maru, a Japanese whaling vessel, suffered an onboard explosion and caught fre in February 2007, which killed one person and left the ship powerless for several days.97 The United States assumes a major interest in Antarctic tourism since more than one-third of all tourists visiting Antarctica by ship are American citizens and almost half of all Antarctic tourist expeditions are subject to US regulation because they are organized in or proceed from the United States. The Department of State through the OES makes determinations with respect to whether particular tour operators are subject to US regulations;98 the US Environmental Protection Agency reviews environmental impact assessments

submitted by such operators;99 and the National Science Foundation issues permits to tour operators related to waste management on their voyages.100 At the 30th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) at New Delhi in 2007, the United States proposed and the meeting adopted a resolution recommending that countries discourage or decline to authorize tour operators that use vessels carrying more than 500 passengers from making any landings in Antarctica, and limiting the number of vessels conducting or passengers participating in landings at any one time.101 The United States has actively assisted in establishing visitor guidelines for landing sites, and led efforts in 2008 at the 31st ATCM at Kyiv to begin systematic assessment of the possible cumulative impact of tourism on these landing sites.102 At the 32nd ATCM in Baltimore in 2009, the US proposed requiring Antarctic Treaty parties to ensure that their Antarctic tour operators bar ships with more than 500 passengers from landing sites, restrict landings to one vessel at a time per site and limit passengers on shore to 100 at a time.103 It would also mandate a minimum of one guide for every twenty tourists while ashore, according to the documents. This US proposal, however, did not contain any specifc enforcement mechanism or penalties for limiting tourist operations.104 This resolution was augmented in May 2010 at the 33rd ATCM in Punta del Este by a third resolution that was adopted that increased the number of sites subject to Site Guidelines.105

Conclusion The international peace and political stability established in Antarctica by the Antarctic Treaty parties remains indispensable for successful pursuit by the United States of its core interests in the region and has become an important objective in its own right. For all these reasons, maintenance of health of the Treaty continues to be an important foreign policy and national security objective of the United States. It may seem ironic to apply a national security yard-stick, with its military connotations, to an area that is effectively a demilitarized and nuclear-free zone. However, the potential for international discord and confict over Antarctica territorial claims which would exist absent the Treaty today seems greater than was the case in 1959. More than any other ACTP government, the United States considers itself to be a vital player in Antarctic affairs such that it substantially benefts from effective operation of the Antarctic Treaty. As much as any other ATCP government, the United States views its policies as being politically prudent for the effective multilateral operation of the Antarctic Treaty. This leadership role is founded upon the active and infuential presence in Antarctica that is maintained by the United States through its diplomatic and scientifc activities. This presence accords the United States a decisive role in the Treaty's activities-based decision system and in maintaining the political and legal balance that makes the Treaty function effectively. Hence, continued leadership by the United States in Antarctic matters, including serious diplomatic efforts to head off challenges to the Treaty before they fester and become politically disruptive, should continue to well serve US national interests in the Antarctic well into the twenty-first century.

Notes 1

The Antarctic Treaty, done 1 December 1959, entered into force 23 June 1961. 12 UST 794, TIAS No. 4780, 402 UNTS 71. On the evolution of US national interests in Antarctica, see Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998).

2

See Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998).

3

Seven states make national claims to portions of Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom. These seven, plus Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States, were the original states negotiating the Treaty in 1959. By 2012 ffty states had become Treaty parties. Of those, the original twelve and sixteen others hold the status of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), which are the participant decision making governments that negotiate and adopt policies under the Treaty. The acceding ATCPs are: Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Ecuador, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and Uruguay. The twenty non Consultative Parties are Austria, Belarus, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Korea (DPRK), Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Monaco, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela.

4

4 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientifc Affairs, www.state.gov/g/oes/ (last visited 14 January 2011).

5

Offce of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, w​w​w​.n​s​f​.g​o​v​/d​i​r​/i​n​d​e​x​.j​s​p​?o​r​g​=O​P​P​ (last visited 14 January 2011).

6

United States Antarctic Program, www.usap.gov/ (last visited 14 January 2011).

7

Offce of Polar Affairs, US Department of State, w​w​w​.s​t​a​t​e​.g​o​v​/g​/o​e​s​/o​c​n​s​/o​p​a​/i​n​d​e​x​.h​t​m​ (last visited 14 January 2011).

8

Offce of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, w​w​w​.n​s​f​.g​o​v​/d​i​r​/i​n​d​e​x​.j​s​p​?o​r​g​=O​P​P​ (last visited 14 January 2011).

9

Presidential Decision Directive NSC 26 of 9 June 1994 (classifed), cited in US National Science Foundation, Chapter II United States Antarctic Policy, Antarctica, w​w​w​.n​s​f​.g​o​v​/p​u​b​s​/1​9​9​6​/n​s​t​c​9​6​r​p​/t​o​c​.h​t​m​ (last visited 26 August 2010). See also Statement of President Richard Nixon on US policy in Antarctica in October 1970, available at National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA Quest), Live from Antarctica: US Policy for Antarctica, http://quest.arc.nasa.gov/antarctica/back-ground/NSF/facts/fact06.html (last visited 25 August 2010).

10 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23 March 2010. 11 Ronald Reagan, President’s memorandum regarding Antarctica, Memorandum 6646, 5 February 1982, at h​t​t​p​://q​u​e​s​t​.a​r​c​.n​a​s​a​.g​o​v​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/b​a​c​k​g​r​o​u​n​d​/N​S​F​/p​r​e​s​i​d​e​n​t​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 14 January 2011). 12 Testimony of R. Tucker Scully, Director of the Offce of Oceans Affairs, Department of State, before the Subcommittee on Basic Research, Committee on Science, US House of Representatives, 23 July 1997, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy071002.000/hsy071002_0.HTM (last visited 14 January 2011). 13 See Christopher C. Joyner, ‘US-Soviet Cooperative Diplomacy: The Case of Ant-arctica’, in Nish Jamgotch (ed.), United States-Soviet Cooperation: An Untold Story (New York: Praeger Publications, 1989), pp. 39–61. 14 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Antarctic Treaty: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 June 1960, p. 45. 15 Four American national interest objectives were set out in this 1958 statement: (1) to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes; (2) to provide for freedom of scientifc investigation; (3) to establish an orderly joint administration of Antarctica by the countries directly concerned; (4) to preserve Antarctica for peaceful purposes only.

Department of State, ‘Statement of US Policy on Antarctica’, NSC 5804/1, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), p. 485. These interests have largely been carried over into US foreign policy objectives since then. 16 Antarctic Treaty, Article II. 17 Ibid., Article III. 18 Ibid., Article IV. 19 Ibid., Article IV (2). 20 Ibid., Article I. 21 Ibid., Article VII. 22 Ibid., Article V. 23 The area of the Antarctic region is 20.327 million sq. km or 7.84829 million sq. miles. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (Southern Ocean), w​w​w​.c​i​a​.g​o​v​/l​i​b​r​a​r​y​/p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/t​h​e​ w​o​r​l​d​ f​a​c​t​b​o​o​k​/g​e​o​s​/c​o​u​n​t​r​y​t​e​m​p​l​a​t​e​_​o​o​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 24 August 2010). 24 See Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons, pp. 54–82. 25 See the discussion in Joyner and Thesis, Eagle Over the Ice, pp. 37–40. 26 EnglishInfo, Antarctic Territorial Claims, at Information about Antarctic Territorial Claims, http://english.turkcebilgi.com/Antarctic+territorial+claims (last visited 14 January 2011). Russia asserts the same legal position of non recognition, coupled with its reserved right to make a future claim on the continent. 27. 27 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, done 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934, Article 1, w​w​w​.t​a​i​w​a​n​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​.o​r​g​/m​o​n​t​e​v​i​d​e​o​0​1​.h​t​m​ (last visited 12 January 2011). 28 Oliver Lissitzyn, 1959, ‘The American Position on Outer Space and Antarctica’, American Journal of International Law, 53, pp. 126, 128. ‘The United States neither asserts a claim nor recognizes the claims of others. At the same time, the United States has maintained a basis of

claim, deriving originally from early US expeditions of exploration and discovery in Antarctica.’ National Science Foundation, United States Antarctic Policy, Antarctica, op. cit., Chapter II, para. B. 29 US law, including particular criminal offences such as murder by or against US nationals, may apply to areas not under the jurisdiction of other states, inclusive of Antarctica. Some US laws directly apply to the continent. For example, the Antarctic Conservation Act, 16 USC section 2401 et seq., provides civil and criminal penalties for several activities, unless authorized by regulation or statute: the taking of native mammals or birds; the introduction of non indigenous plants and animals; entering into specially protected or scientifc areas; the discharge or disposal of pollutants; and the importation into the United States of certain objects from Antarctica. Violation of the Antarctic Conservation Act carries penalties of up to $10,000 in fnes and one year in prison. The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Transportation and Interior share enforcement responsibilities. Public Law 95–541, the US Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, requires that expeditions from the United States to Antarctica notify in advance the Offce of Oceans and Polar Affairs in the Department of State, which reports such plans to other states as required by Article III (b) in the Antarctic Treaty. CIA World Factbook, Government, Legal System, w​w​w​.c​i​a​.g​o​v​/l​i​b​r​a​r​y​/p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/t​h​e​-w​o​r​l​d​-f​a​c​t​b​o​o​k​/g​e​o​s​/a​y​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 14 January 2011). 30 The importance of Article 76 in development of hydrocarbon exploration in polar regions was dramatically triggered by Russian activities in the Arctic in 2007. See Christopher C. Joyner, 2009, ‘The Legal Regime for the Arctic’, Journal of Trans national Law & Policy, 18(2), pp. 198–199. 31 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer limits of the con-tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by Australia, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​-s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​_​a​u​s​.h​t​m​ and Executive Summary w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/a​u​s​0​4​/D​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/a​u​s​_​d​o​c​_​e​s​_​w​e​b​_​d​e​l​i​v​e​r​y​.p​d​f​ (last visited 14 January 2011). 32 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Outer limits

of the con-tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: Submission by New Zealand, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​-m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​_​n​z​l​.h​t​m​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 33 See Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf, Argentine Submission, Executive Summary, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/a​r​g​2​5​_​0​9​/a​r​g​2​0​0​9​e​_​s​u​m​m​a​r​y​_​e​n​g​.p​d​f,​ pp. 11–16, 22 (last visited 13 January 2011). 34 Continental Shelf Submission of Norway with respect to Bouvetoya and Dronning Maud Land (Executive Summary), w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/n​o​r​3​0​_​0​9​/n​o​r​2​0​0​9​_​e​x​e​c​u​t​i​v​e​s​u​m​m​a​r​y​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 35 Continental Shelf Preliminary Information of Chile, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/p​r​e​l​i​m​i​n​a​r​y​/c​h​l​2​0​0​9​p​r​e​l​i​m​i​n​a​r​y​i​n​f​o​r​m​a​t​i​o​n​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 36 United Kingdom, Note No. 168/08 (9 May 2008), w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/g​b​r​0​8​/g​b​r​_​n​v​_​9​m​a​y​2​0​0​8​.p​d​f.​ ; Submission by United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 11 May 2009, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​_​g​b​r​_​4​5​_​2​0​0​9​.h​t​m​ (last visited 14 January 2011). 37 Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, Note No. HR/cl No. 69, February 2009, w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/D​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/c​l​c​s​_​n​e​w​/s​u​b​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​s​_​f​l​e​s​/f​r​a​0​9​/f​r​a​_​n​o​t​e​_​f​e​b​2​0​0​9​e​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 38 Personal correspondence to the author from the US Department of State, 18 May 2009) (on fle with the author). 39 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXXII, Washington Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, in Report of the 23nd Antarctic treaty consultative Party Meeting, Appendix 1 (17 April 2009), para. 3 (emphasis added). 40 Ibid., para. 5 (emphasis added). 41 Environmental Protection Protocol, op. cit., Articles 7 and 24. 42 Personal correspondence from the US Department of State, op. cit.

43 See generally, The US National Science Foundation, Antarctica, w​w​w​.n​s​f​.g​o​v​/p​u​b​s​/1​9​9​6​/n​s​t​c​9​6​r​p​/t​o​c​.h​t​m​ (last visited 24 August 2010). 44 Peter Rejcek, ‘Byrd History’, The Antarctic Sun, 12 June 2009, http://antarcticsun.usap.gov/features/contentHandler.cfm?id=1793 (last visited 14 January 2011). 45 This point is repeatedly made during US Congressional Hearings for funding American scientifc activities in the Antarctic. See, e.g. US Department of State, Appendix II: Antarctica: Funding of the United States Antarctic Program, including South Pole Station, Memorandum for Andrew D. Sens (9 March 1996), in ibid. and Statement of Norman Augustine, Chairman, United States Antarctic Program External Panel, the National Science Foundation, Arlington, Virginia, in US House of Representatives Committee on Science, Hearings on the United States and the Antarctica in the 21st Century, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (12 March 1997). Norway's claim has no terminal points to avoid misinterpretation that it accepts the validity of the sector principle. 46 United States Antarctic Program, Vessels and Operations, w​w​w​.u​s​a​p​.g​o​v​/v​e​s​s​e​l​S​-c​i​e​n​c​e​A​n​d​O​p​e​r​a​t​i​o​n​s​/ (last visited 13 January 2011). 47 Jane G. Ferrigno, Alison J. Cook, Amy M. Mathie et al., Coastal Change and Glaciological Map of the Palmer Land Area, Antarctica: 1947–2009 (US Geological Survey, British Antarctic Survey, Scott Polar Research Institute, 2009), http://pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i-2600-c/ (last visited 14 January 2011). 48 See, e.g. Holly Hartman, ‘Icebergs Ahoy: Monster Bergs on the Loose’, Infoplease, www.infoplease.com/spot/kidsiceberg1.html (last visited 13 January 2011). 49 British Antarctic Survey, ‘Antarctic Peninsula Glaciers in Widespread Retreat’, 21 April 2005, w​w​w​.e​u​r​e​k​a​l​e​r​t​.o​r​g​/p​u​b​_​r​e​l​e​a​s​e​s​/2​0​0​5​_​0​4​/b​a​s​-a​p​g​0​4​1​8​0​5​.p​h​p​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 50 See Gary Braasch, ‘Antarctica: Ice Under Fire’, 16 July 2007, w​w​w​.w​o​r​l​d​v​i​e​w​o​f​-g​l​o​b​a​l​w​a​r​m​i​n​g​.o​r​g​/p​a​g​e​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.h​t​m​l​ 2007 (last visited 24 August 2010); Greenpeace, ‘Antarctica and Climate Change’, 9 May 2009, w​w​w​.g​r​e​e​n​p​e​a​c​e​.o​r​g​/i​n​t​e​r​n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​/c​a​m​p​a​i​g​n​s​/o​c​e​a​n​s​/p​o​l​a​r​-s​e​a​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​-c​l​i​m​a​t​e​-c​h​a​n​g​e​/ (last visited 25 August 2010) and

Joel M. Carter, ‘Quick Facts about Climate Change in Antarctica’, 22 September 2007, http://people.cornellcollege.edu/JCarter09/QuickFacts.html (last visited 24 August 2010). 51 See US Antarctic Program, 2009–2010 Season, w​w​w​.n​s​f​.g​o​v​/o​d​/o​p​p​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​/t​r​e​a​t​y​/o​p​p​1​0​0​0​1​/b​i​g​_​p​r​i​n​t​_​0​9​1​0​/b​i​g​p​r​i​n​t​0​9​1​0​_​1​.j​s​p​ and Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research, www.scar.org/ (last visited 14 January 2011). 52 See J. Turner, R. Bindschadler, P. Convey et al. (eds), Antarctic Climate Change and the Environment: A Contribution to the International Polar Year 2007–2008 (SCAR, 25 November 2009), w​w​w​.s​c​a​r​.o​r​g​/p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/o​c​c​a​s​i​o​n​a​l​s​/A​C​C​E​_​2​5​_​N​o​v​_​2​0​0​9​.p​d​f​ (last visited 25 August 2010) and SCAR’s Antarctic Climatic Change and the Environment (ACCE) Review Report. Information Paper 5, Doc. ATCM 13, CEP, 32nd ACTP, Baltimore (6–17 April 2009), www.scar.org/treaty/atcmxxxii/Atcm32_ip005_e.pdf (last visited 24 August 2009). 53 Greenpeace, ‘Krill: The Food that Keeps Antarctica Alive is Under Threat’ (2 May 2009), w​w​w​.g​r​e​e​n​p​e​a​c​e​.o​r​g​/i​n​t​e​r​n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​/e​n​/c​a​m​p​a​i​g​n​s​/o​c​e​a​n​s​/p​o​l​a​r​-s​e​a​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​/k​r​i​l​l​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​-f​o​o​d​c​h​a​i​n​-u​n​d​e​r​-t​h​r​e​a​t​/; Antarctica Krill Conservation Product, Global Climate Change, Antarctica and Krill, www.asoc.org/Portals/0/AKCP%20KrillClimate%20Factsheet.pdf (last visited 23 August 2010). 54 See Alan D. Hemmings and Michele Rogan Finnemore, ‘Access, Obligations, and Benefts: Regulating Bioprospecting in the Antarctic’, in Michael I. Jeffery, Jeremy Firestone and Karen Bubna-Litic (eds), Biodiversity Conservation, Law and Liveli hoods: Bridging the North South Divide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 529– 551 and A. Guyomard, ‘Bioprospecting in Antarctica: A New Challenge for the Antarctic Treaty System’, in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), Biotechnology and International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006), pp. 147–170. 55 Belgium, ‘An update on biological prospecting in Antarctica, including the development of the Antarctic Biological Prospecting Database’, Doc. WP 11 ATCM XXXI (2008), pp. 8–9, w​w​w​.b​i​o​p​r​o​s​p​e​c​t​o​r​.o​r​g​/b​i​o​p​r​o​s​p​e​c​t​o​r​/R​e​s​o​u​r​c​e​s​/a​c​t​m​/A​t​c​m​3​1​_​w​p​0​1​1​_​e​.p​d​f​ (last visited 24

August 2010). 56 Convention on Biological Diversity, done at Rio de Janeiro 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 December 1993, 1760 UNTS. The United States is the only non party in the international community. 57 Recommendation III–VIII, approved (1964), 17 UST 996, TIAS No. 6058 (1965), as modifed in 24 UST 992, TIAS No. 7692 (1973). The Agreed Measures were superseded by Annex II to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty when the Protocol entered into force in 1998. 58 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Doc. XI ATSCM/2, 21 June 1991, adopted 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998. [Herein after Environmental Protection Protocol.] 59 In presenting its views on the House Resolution 7749, the US Department of State mentioned this fact. See House Committee on Science and Technology, Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, report to accompany HR 7749, 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 18 May 1978, p. 11. 60 Signifcantly, the Agreed Measures document was incorporated into the Environmental Protection Protocol as its Annex II. See Note 70 infra. 61 Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978, 16 USC §§ 2401–2413, 28 October 1978, as amended 1996. 62 Environmental Protection Protocol, Article 2. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., Article 25(5). 65 Ibid., Article 80. 66 Ibid., Article 11. 67 Ibid., Article 15. 68 Ibid., Articles 18–20. 69 British Antarctic Survey, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Annex I to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty Environmental Impact Assessment, w​w​w​.a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.a​c​.u​k​/a​b​o​u​t​_​a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/g​e​o​p​o​l​i​t​-i​c​a​l​/t​r​e​a​t​y​/u​p​d​a​t​e​_​1​9​9​1​.p​h​p​ (last

visited 14 January 2011). 70 Ibid., Annex II to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. 71 Ibid., Annex III to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Waste Disposal and Management. 72 Ibid., Annex IV to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Prevention of Marine Pollution. 73 Ibid., Annex V to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Area Protection and Management. 74 Ibid., Annex VI to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies. 75. 75 The Antarctic Conservation Act, Public Law 95-541 (as amended by Public Law 104-227), authorises US regulations for compliance. See http://nsf.gov/od/opp/antarct/aca/aca.jsp (last visited 14 January 2011). See the publication Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95541), with Regulations, Descriptions and Maps of Special Areas, Permit Application Form, Agreed Measures for the Conser-vation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, and Protocol on Environmental Protection (NSF 01– 151 at nsf01151/stArticlejsp). 76 110 Stat. 3035, PL 104-227 (2 October 1996), 104th Cong., An Act to Implement the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. 77 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, done 2 June 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand, opened for signature 25 November 1988, Doc. AMR/SCM/88/78 of 2 June 1988, reprinted in (1988) 28 ILM 859. For discussion, see Christopher C. Joyner, October 1987, ‘The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process’, American Journal of International Law 81(4), pp. 888-905. 78 See Christopher C. Joyner, January 1988, ‘The Evolving Antarctic Minerals Regime’, Ocean Development and International Law, 19(1), pp. 73-95. 79 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, done in London 1 June 1972, entered into force 11 March 1978. 29 UST 441, TIAS No.

8826. 80 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done in Canberra on 20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982, 1329 UNTS 47. 81 CCAMLR, Article II(b). 82 Ibid., Article II(a). 83 Ibid., Article II(c). 84 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23 March 2010. 85 See Christopher C. Joyner and Lindsay Aylesworth, 2008, ‘Managing IUU Fishing in the Southern Ocean: The Plight of the Patagonian Toothfsh’, Ocean Yearbook of International Law, 22, pp. 241–290. 86 Background interview with OES offcial, US Department of State, 23 March 2010. 87 International Court of Justice, ‘Australia Institutes Proceedings Against Japan for Alleged Breach of International Obligations Concerning Whaling’, Press Release No. 2010/16 (1 June 2010), w​w​w​.i​c​j​-c​i​j​.o​r​g​/d​o​c​k​e​t​/f​l​e​s​/1​4​8​/1​5​9​5​3​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 88 America.gov, ‘US Protest Japan’s Announced Return to Whaling in the Antarctic’, 26 November 2006, w​w​w​.a​m​e​r​i​c​a​.g​o​v​/s​t​/w​a​s​h​f​l​e​-e​n​g​l​i​s​h​/2​0​0​6​/N​o​v​e​m​b​e​r​/2​0​0​6​1​1​2​0​1​7​1​9​1​3​l​c​n​i​r​e​l​l​e​p​0​.9​0​3​3​3​1​9​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 89 See IWS Quotas, Submitted by Denmark and the USA, IWC/62/26, Agenda Item 3, w​w​w​.i​w​c​o​f​f​c​e​.o​r​g​/_​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/c​o​m​m​i​s​s​i​o​n​/I​W​C​6​2​d​o​c​s​/6​2​-2​6​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 90 International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators, ‘2009-2010 Tourism Summary’, 1 May 2010, ht​t​p​://i​m​a​g​e​.z​e​n​n​.n​e​t​/R​E​P​L​A​C​E​/C​L​I​E​N​T​/1​0​0​0​0​3​7​/1​0​0​0​1​1​6​/a​p​p​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​/p​d​f​/t​o​u​r​i​s​m​_​s​u​m​m​a​r​y​_​b​y​e​x​p​e​d​i​t​i​o​n​2​.p​d​f​r​ (last visited 26 August 2010). 91 Antarctica and Southern Ocean Coalition, ‘MV Ushuaia Runs Aground’, The Ant-arctica Blog, 5 December 2008, http://antarcticablog.blogspot.com/2008/12/mv-ushuaia-runs-

aground.html (last visited 13 January 2011). 92 Gene Sloan, ‘Another Expedition Cruise Ship Runs Aground in Antarctica’, USATo-day, Travel, 17 February 2009, http://travel.usatoday.com/cruises/legacy/item.aspx? type=blog&ak=62974821.blog (last visited 13 January 2011). 93 Monte Reel, ‘Cruise Ship Sinks off Antarctica’, Washington Post, 24 November 2007, w​w​w​.w​a​s​h​i​n​g​t​o​n​p​o​s​t​.c​o​m​/w​p​-d​y​n​/c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/s​t​o​r​y​/2​0​0​7​/1​1​/2​4​/S​T​2​0​0​7​1​1​2​4​0​0​3​6​7​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 94 ‘IMO Backing Antarctic Ship Review’, The Maritime Executive, 10 April 2008, w​w​w​.m​a​r​i​t​i​m​e​-e​x​e​c​u​t​i​v​e​.c​o​m​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​/2​0​0​8​-0​4​-1​0​-i​m​o​-b​a​c​k​i​n​g​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​-s​h​i​p​-r​e​v​i​e​w​/ (last visited 13 January 2011). 95 ‘Cruise Ship M/V Nordkapp Run [sic] Aground in Antarctica’, 31 January 2007, w​w​w​.c​r​u​i​s​i​n​g​t​a​l​k​.c​o​m​/m​s​-n​o​r​d​k​a​p​p​/6​4​4​4​-c​r​u​i​s​e​-s​h​i​p​m​-v​-n​o​r​d​k​a​p​p​-r​u​n​-a​g​r​o​u​n​d​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.h​t​m​l​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 96 Carolyn Spencer Brown, ‘Bad News for Fram Passengers in Antarctica’, Cruise News Archive, 29 December 2007, w​w​w​.c​r​u​i​s​e​c​r​i​t​i​c​.c​o​m​/n​e​w​s​/n​e​w​s​.c​f​m​?I​D​=2​3​3​9​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 97 Michael Perry, ‘Japanese Whaling Ship on Fire off Antarctica’, Reuters, 15 February 2007, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKSYD30495820070215 (last visited 13 January 2011). 98 US Department of State, Antarctic Tourism, w​w​w​.s​t​a​t​e​.g​o​v​/e​/o​e​s​/o​c​n​s​/o​p​a​/a​n​t​a​r​t​i​c​-t​o​u​r​i​s​m​/ (last visited 13 January 2011). 99 US Department of State, ATME paper #5, US Policy on Private Expeditions to Ant-arctica and Current US Framework for Regulation of Antarctic Tourism, w​w​w​.s​t​a​t​e​.g​o​v​/d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/o​r​g​a​n​i​z​a​t​i​o​n​/7​8​2​1​4​.p​d​f​ (last visited 13 January 2011). 100Ibid., Attachment B, US Framework for Regulation of Antarctic Tourism www. state.gov/documents/organization/78214.pdf (last visited 13 January 2011). 101Resolution 4 (2007), ATCM XXX, CEP X (11 May 2007, New Delhi).

102Resolution 2 (2008), ATCM XXXI, CEP XI (June 2008, Kyiv). 103United States, Proposal to Make Binding Certain Limitations on Landing of Persons from Passenger Vessels, ATCM 11, WP, 17, Attachment: Draft Measure on Landing of Persons from Passenger Vessels in the Antarctic Treaty Area, w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/ats_​m​e​e​t​i​n​g​s​_​m​e​e​t​i​n​g​.a​s​p​x?lang=e (last visited 13 January 2011). 104Resolution 4 (2009), ATCM XXXII, CEP XII (17 April 2009, Baltimore). 105Resolution 1 (2010), ATCM XXXIII, CEP XIII (14 May 2010), w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/i​n​f​o​_​m​e​a​s​u​r​e​s​_​l​i​s​t​i​t​e​m​.a​s​p​x​?l​a​n​g​=e&id=471 (last visited 23 August 2010).

7

Russia, the post-Soviet world, and Antarctica

Irina Gan

Introduction1 From the time of the USSR's first venture into the Antarctic, when the Slava whaling feet set sail for the Southern Ocean in 1946, the people of the USSR were encouraged by the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to look upon Antarctica as a new frontier to be conquered by the victorious socialist motherland. Not only was the motherland to profit from the newly initiated whale harvesting operations, a more important benefit was the geopolitical advantage of resuming a presence in the South Polar region after a 125-year hiatus since Captain Bellinghausen's Russian Antarctic expedition. Notably, a scientific group attached to the feet was to provide systematic hydrographic, meteorological, biological, and other technical data for any potential expanded future Antarctic operations. For nine years prior to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957– 1958, investigations conducted in the Southern ocean by the Slava whaling feet (with a total contingent of up to 800 men and women) were to contribute towards building a substantial basis for further and more comprehensive research proposed by the Soviet participants in this international scientific endeavour. The first Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), after leaving the USSR for Antarctica in late 1955 in preparation for the IGY, carried out operations in collaboration with the Slava. The Soviet Government looked upon its activities in the South Polar region as one of the essential components (the others being its nuclear and space programmes) of its superpower status and generously supported wide-ranging Antarctic research within the framework of the IGY. The scale and capacity of the Soviet Antarctic programme was such that it rivalled that of its Cold War opponent, the USA, with the result that by the end of the IGY it had firmly established itself on the Antarctic continent. In 1959, it became one of the twelve original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty (AT)2 with long-term plans to expand its presence in the South Polar region. Logistic support for Soviet Antarctic research was sourced from USSRwide plants and factories; scientific programmes were formulated by a range of research institutions, with the majority of Soviet republics participating in these Antarctic programmes. There were, however, two exceptions: expedition members from the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and

the Tajik SSR worked on programmes put together by Estonian and Tajik institutions respectively, as they had specific research interests and experience. Estonia, with its abundance of lakes, chose to investigate the lakes found in the Antarctic oases and conducted upper atmospheric research; Tajikistan's experience with alpine areas was useful in research conducted in the Antarctic highlands.3 In the early 1990s, however, Soviet Antarctic activities were brought to a halt: December of 1991 saw the once monolithic USSR split up into fifteen separate political and economic entities. This resulted in a dramatic reduction of funds available for continuation of any sort of presence in the South Polar region. Lev Savatyugin, head of the Polar Geography Department in the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute in St Petersburg (AARI) asserts that there was a very real threat that all research on the icy continent would cease and that the entire Antarctic infrastructure, which had been developed over many years, would have to be totally forsaken.4 Fortunately for the Institute, this threat did not eventuate. The following chapter examines this difficult period of the emerging Antarctic policy of the newly formed nations after the disintegration of the USSR: it looks at the republics that have maintained or developed an interest in the Antarctic, the strength of that interest, and their approaches to achieve a practical implementation of their policy.

The Commonwealth of Independent States After the breakup of the USSR, twelve of the former fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics agreed to create an organization known as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The long-latent desire of the three Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to pursue full independence and to develop closer ties with Western Europe resulted in their decision to choose their own political destiny separately from the others. In August 2005, Turkmen President Niyazov called for the country's ties with the CIS to be altered due to his policy of permanent neutrality — Turkmenistan withdrew from full membership, while remaining an associate member. Three years later, on 18 August 2008 (immediately following the Russia-Georgia conflict in South Ossetia), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia informed the CIS Executive Committee of its intention to completely withdraw from the CIS. The decision came into effect on 18 August 2009.5 Consequently, at present, there are eleven CIS members: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan including one associate member, Turkmenistan. The former USSR's assets were to be distributed among the initial twelve members of the CIS according to a formula whereby each member received a certain percentage of the assets, while the Russian Federation agreed to assume all debts.6 The Russian Federation, where all the previous Soviet government institutions were located, also agreed to assume the rights and obligations ensuing from all international agreements and treaties signed by the USSR, including the AT. The Soviet government institution responsible for the Antarctic, the Chief Administration of the Hydro Meteorological Service, was based in Moscow; the coordinator of Soviet Antarctic science, the SAE, a department attached to one of the world's oldest and largest institutions researching the polar regions, the AARI (which marked the ninetieth anniversary of its foundation in March 2010), was based in Leningrad.7 As for dividing the Antarctic assets among the former republics, Valery Lukin, the head of the now renamed Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE), explained that the network of Soviet bases was an indivisible whole and

could not therefore be redistributed in any way; hence, the Russian Federation assumed responsibility for the totality of Antarctic infrastructure. Nonetheless, he did suggest that a continuation of scientific collaboration with members of the CIS was possible: cooperative research could be conducted by sharing Russia's Antarctic facilities.8 In fact, up until 1996, a number of individuals from other former Soviet republics took part in the work of the RAE. The newly acquired independence and developing political propensities of the former Soviet Republics, however, manifested themselves in a variety of attitudes of CIS members towards formulating their own Antarctic policies and their relationship with the Russian Federation. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia have chosen to further integrate their economies by forming a Customs Union, which came into effect on 1 January 2010 leading to the creation of a Common Economic Space, which came into effect on 1 January 2012. These two agreements will facilitate the free flow of capital and labour within the new entity, allowing personnel from the member countries to become fully fledged participants in the RAE. Not all CIS members have displayed an interest in the Antarctic; the following section will deal only with those that have: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. It will also mention a nonCIS member, the former SSR of Estonia. They are discussed according to the present extent of their Antarctic operations.

Russia At the outset, it must be noted that the Russian Federation has more than an academic interest in the Polar regions, the North Polar region in particular. Russia's vast northern coastline directly borders the Arctic Ocean, making it a ‘polar state’, with all the strategic, economic, political, and scientific repercussions that this implies. According to the Russian Government, the total area of the Russian Arctic (including territorial seas) exceeds six million square kilometres. Although its population is less than 1 per cent of the total population of the RF, its resources account for approximately 20 per cent of Russia's GDP and 22 per cent of its export earnings. The Russian Arctic holds a unique position in questions of national security and economic development.9 No other former Soviet Republics border the Arctic and are therefore not ‘polar states’. Consequently, their interest in the North Polar region is related neither to matters of national security nor to a direct economic interest. The fact that, for the Russian Federation, the Arctic continues to play a substantial role in its economy, strategic planning, scientific research, and geopolitical manoeuvring means that the majority of experienced polar scientists, personnel, polar research institutions, and the logistic capacity for operating in polar environments have remained within Russian borders. Its status as a ‘polar state’ and the resources associated with its polar activities provide Russia with the potential capability of continuing operations not only in the polar North, but in the South Polar region as well. The South Polar region is seen by the Russian Government as one of the essential components of foreign policy of countries seeking to play an active role in contemporary world politics, just as the Soviet Government had in the past. By maintaining an active presence in the region and asserting their intention to participate in decisions on the future of the continent, nations display their ability to determine the future of the planet as a whole.10 The USSR had already established an active presence in the Antarctic — it was now up to the Russian Federation to maintain this achievement and continue operations on the icy continent in order to uphold its own geopolitical interests and status as a world power. The first President of the independent Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin,

addressed this question on 7 August 1992. In view of the substantial role that Russia had played in the discovery and exploration of the Antarctic, the importance to Russia's economic interests of its scientific research in the region as well as the international obligations of the Russian Federation as a party to the AT of 1959, he issued Decree Number 824 ‘Concerning the RAE’.11 The Decree declared that the former SAE be reorganized and named the RAE; that the committee of Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring, a department of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, assume responsibility for the RAE; and that the responsible Ministry, together with the Ministry of Science, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other interested institutions formulate a programme for Antarctic research up until the year 2000. For these institutions, which had run the Antarctic programme in Soviet times, formulating a programme was not too onerous a task; the difficulty lay in the government providing reliable funding for the programme when the country was in such dire economic straits. Erratic and insufficient funding, inflation, and non-payment of salaries to RAE staff led to a strike that lasted four months (15 May–25 September 1992) with many expedition members pulling out at the last minute.12 In the mid-1990s, the situation became critical: no funds were available to repair the expedition's vessel and bases could not be resupplied. Russkaia, Leningradskaia, and Molodezhanaya stations were abandoned; work at Vostok station came to a standstill; research projects were abandoned due to a dramatic cut in personnel at the stations.13 Maintaining even a greatly diminished presence, let alone conducting research, became almost impossible. Headlines in Russian newspapers reflected the disastrous state of Antarctic affairs: ‘Russian Antarctic programme under threat of being shut down’; ‘Akademik Fedorov unable to reach Antarctica due to lack of fuel’; ‘It's easy to leave, but difficult to return’, ‘Antarctica is drifting away from Russia’. On 28 August 1997, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin attempted to stabilize the deteriorating situation. He issued Decree Number 1113 of the Government of the Russian Federation ‘Concerning the activities of the RAE’, which defined the ‘minimal allowable’ operations of the RAE that were essential to continue research in the Antarctic, taking account of the ‘current economic circumstances and Russia's geopolitical interests’ in the South Polar region.14 The ‘current economic circumstances’, however, had

not improved. There was a further reduction in operations until 1999, when the Finance Ministry eventually managed to allocate sufficient funding for the expedition to leave on schedule, the first time it was able to do so since 1991. Improving economic conditions and the election of a new president in 2001 seemed to bode well for the RAE: the Russian Government appointed by President Vladimir Putin once again turned its attention to the South Polar region. Decree Number 685 of 24 September 2001 ‘Concerning the measures to be taken to ensure the Russian Federation's interests in the Antarctic and the activities of the RAE in 2002–2005’, outlined the Russian Government's more confident Antarctic policy. The aims were now to increase the efficiency of high-priority Antarctic scientific research; consolidate the Russian Federation's presence in the Antarctic; fulfil multifaceted environmental protection obligations in line with the Madrid Protocol; and, notably, to update and modernize the RAE's logistics and infrastructure and ensure the operational health and safety of expedition members.15 A major project in the modernization of infrastructure was the adoption in 2003 of the Hydrometeorological Service's plans for constructing a new icebreaker for use by the RAE. Notwithstanding the optimism of Decree Number 685, by 2004 the personnel at Russian stations were reduced by 30 per cent16 and the building of the new vessel was taking longer than anticipated, with the Akademik Tryoshnikov to become fully operational by the end of 2012. The year 2005 marked the end of the period covered by Decree Number 685; consequently, on 10 March 2005 the government turned its attention to the outlook for the Russian Federation's activities in the Antarctic for the next five-year period, 2006–2010. It noted that the future operations of the RAE, due to the increasing interest of other countries in the Antarctic, could no longer remain the ‘minimal allowable’. The approaching International Polar Year (IPY) of 2007–2008 and other international obligations required that operations for the period 2006–2010 be upgraded to ‘optimal’. The government also noted that the multifaceted nature of Antarctic operations required a more effective coordination between the Academy of Sciences and the federal departments involved in work relating to the AT.17 A politically symbolic, and some would say ostentatious, demonstration of Russia's upgrading of interest in the South Polar region was the expedition of

prominent Russian officials to the South Pole in January 2007 immediately prior to the commencement of the IPY. This undertaking was organized by the Russian Association of Members of Polar Expeditions and led by the special representative of the President of Russia responsible for international cooperation in the Arctic and the Antarctic and the IPY, Artur Chilingarov. It also included the president of the World Meteorological Organization and head of the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring of the Russian Federation, Alexandr Bedritsky; the director of the Russian Federal Security Service, Nikolai Patrushev; his deputy Vladimir Pronichev; and St Petersburg journalist Vladimir Strugatsky.18 This highprofile group few from Moscow to Punta Arenas (Chile), continued on to King George Island and then to the Patriot Hills on the Antarctic continent. On reaching the Patriot Hills, they transferred to a Federal Security Service Mi8 helicopter for the final 1,000-kilometre fight to the South Pole, where the Americans at Amundsen–Scott base invited them for coffee, after which the Russian fag was planted at the point of convergence of all the world meridians. Strugatsky declared that such a high-profile expedition was undertaken to once again emphasize the huge importance that Russia, as a leading polar state, places in the research conducted in the coldest and harshest continent. He explained that the directors of the Federal Security Service were exhibiting a greater interest in the polar regions due largely to the fact that Russia directly faces the Arctic Ocean where her northern borders lie. Patrushev was quoted as saying that the prestige of our country depends, among other things, on how actively Russia participates in polar research. We hope that by participating in the extensive scientific programmes of the IPY, Russia will extend its presence in the Arctic and Antarctic.19 In order for the ‘extended presence’ to conform to international obligations, on 24 April 2008, the Russian Government introduced draft legislation regulating the activities of Russian national and legal entities in the Antarctic with the aim of ensuring that these activities correspond to international norms and standards in line with the AT. At the same meeting, the government considered the forecasts of overseas analysts regarding the continuing competition of the leading countries for economic and political

influence in the Antarctic, ‘the escalating discussions about territorial claims by certain countries’, and decided to devise and implement a strategy for Russia's activities in the Antarctic up until the year 2025.20 Two and a half years later, in October 2010, this strategy aiming to restore Russia's position as a world leader in Antarctic research was finally adopted. It identifies existing failings, among them: poor progress of all Antarcticrelated disciplines including astrophysics, microbiology, and biochemistry in comparison with research conducted by other countries; lack of important marine research; aging Antarctic infrastructure; and poor personnel training. The strategy aspires to renovate all stations and construct additional research vessels and airplanes over the next fifteen years; promote aerospace disciplines; as well as to conduct geological and geophysical research of the mineral and hydrocarbon resources in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.21 Ambitious plans indeed, although their realization remains at the mercy of appropriate funding. Although definitive budget figures are difficult to obtain from official sources, according to one online newspaper, approximately US$183 million is planned to be spent on the Russian Antarctic programme up until 2013.22 Of this amount, about US$800,000 will be spent specifically on scientific research in 2012 and US$1,130,000 in 2013.23 Currently Russia maintains five all-year-round stations and four field bases, two of which, Leningradskaia and Russkaia (opened in 1971 and 1980 respectively) were reopened in 2008 as sites for automatic meteorological and geodesic data collection after being mothballed in 1990–1991. All the stations are established in sectors of Antarctica which had been claimed by other countries (only the French sector has no Russian stations): •

Bellingshausen, 82°12'S 58°56'W, is situated in the overlapping BritainArgentinean-Chilean sector;

•

Novolazarevskaia, 70°46'S 11°50'E, is in the Norwegian sector;

•

Mirny 66°33'S 93°01'E, Vostok 78°27'S 106°52'E, Molodezhnaya 67°40'S 45°51'E (field base), Progress, 69°23'S 76°23'E, and Druzhnaia 4 69°44'S 72°42'E (field base) are located at the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT);

•

Leningradskaia (field base) 69°30'S 159°23'W is in the New Zealand sector and

•

Russkaia (field base), 74°46'S 136°52'W, is in the unclaimed sector of Antarctica.

The majority of all-year-round Russian stations are located in the AAT. This remains a major concern for the Australian Government which fears that Russian (as well as Chinese and Indian) research stations in its territory ‘would lessen Australia's influence’.24 At the same time, this could be of benefit to all concerned: Russian–Australian logistic cooperation might be a logical step towards lessening expensive resupply costs whether by sea or by air. The widespread distribution of Russian Antarctic stations allows Russia not only to conduct scientific observations and research in different areas of the Antarctic continent, but, according to Lukin, has the potential to influence the possible extension of national sovereignty of other countries in the region.25 Both Russia and the USA, the two largest players in the Antarctic, have a policy of non-recognition of Antarctic sector claims and can, he argues, ‘effectively occupy’ areas of Antarctica which are valued due to their scientific, economic, and political importance, irrespective of claims.26 ‘Effective occupation’ is ensured not only by the network of permanent stations and field bases, but also by regular voyages of the two Russian vessels the Akademik Fedorov and the Akademik Karpinsky which conduct oceanographic, geological, and geophysical research in the Antarctic as well as by conducting fights and traverses in Antarctica.27 Such a position seems to be a direct continuation of previous Soviet Antarctic policy.28 This position is not inconsistent with Russia's vigorous support of the AT. Anatoly Laiba from the Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting Expedition believes that maintaining the AT is undoubtedly in the Russian national interest.29 However, the possibility of a future inability to negotiate a continuation of the AT and the consequent food of claims to Antarctic territory should be a scenario for which Russia must be prepared. He suggests that it would be wise to strengthen Russia's presence in those parts of Antarctica discovered by the Russian Antarctic Expedition under the command of Bellingshausen and Lazarev in 1819–1821 by establishing two new permanent stations or summer field camps in the area of the prime (0°) meridian in East Antarctica and in Alexander I Land in West Antarctica.30

Laiba echoes the long-held Soviet desire to build a station in an area first discovered by Russians which was mooted at a meeting of the Academic Council of the AARI in 1958.31

Ukraine Ukraine, the next largest former Soviet republic after Russia, had a sizeable input into the Soviet Antarctic programme as early as 1946. The Soviet Antarctic whaling flotillas, the Slava, and the Sovetskaia Ukraina were based in Odessa;32 ice class vessels were built in the shipping yards of Kherson and Nikolaev; powerful tractors manufactured specifically for conducting transAntarctic traverses, the ‘Kharkovchankas’ were built in the city of Kharkov; the An 2 and other airplanes used in polar aviation were developed at the Antonov design bureau in Kiev. Ukrainian research institutions and scientists were well represented in the SAE. Although not living in a ‘polar state’, Ukrainian scientists, seamen, and whalers had accumulated extensive Antarctic experience with the Antarctic whaling flotillas sailing from Ukrainian Black Sea ports and with the SAE. Relations between Ukrainian and Russian scientists have always remained warm and friendly, asserts Valery Litvinov, the head of the Ukraine Antarctic Centre (UAC), although the difficulties between the Russian and Ukrainian political leadership has resulted in Ukraine following an independent course in realizing its Antarctic interests.33 Ukraine became a signatory to the AT in 1992, one year after declaring independence. In line with its independence, Ukraine sent a Note to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, requesting that two former Soviet Antarctic stations Novolazarevskaia and Progress be transferred to the Ukrainian Antarctic Expedition (UAE) as part of the redistribution of former Soviet assets, of which it was to receive 17 per cent. The Russian side replied that these two stations were worth much more than 17 per cent: according to the head of the RAE, only a small part of one station was worth that amount. Instead, he suggested that the UAE share one of the Russian stations to conduct their operations.34 The two sides failed to reach an agreement, and the Ukrainian expedition was forced to look elsewhere to find an outlet for its Antarctic ambitions. As it happened, in the early 1990s the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) was looking for a suitable partner to take over operations at its Faraday station (65°15'S 64°16'W) built in 1953 on the west of the Antarctic Peninsula on Galindez Island. Apparently, both Ukraine and Estonia showed an interest in

acquiring the station, but the research potential and Antarctic experience of the former was judged by the British to be more suitable for operating Faraday.35 As a result, a Memorandum of Understanding between BAS and UAC was signed in June 1995 and the station was transferred to Ukraine, which renamed it Akademik Vernandsky. Work commenced in February 1996 and, during the first ten years, Ukrainian scientists continued the research and observations which were previously carried out at Faraday by the BAS, sharing the results of their observations with the former owner of the station. Currently about fifteen people work at the station, among them ten scientists, and another ten to fifteen people participate in marine investigations on the way to and from Antarctica.36 In 2001, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers decided to adopt a national programme for scientific research in Antarctica for the years 2002–2010 in addition to their collaboration with the BAS. The UAC and other state scientific and educational institutions of Ukraine took part in developing the programme. The main scientific directions are: oceanography, hydrometeorology, atmosphere physics, space physics, nuclear physics of the Earth and atmosphere, biology, and medicine.37 On 9 January 2007 the Ukrainian Parliament ratified a Law ‘Concerning Antarctic activities’ which specifies Ukrainian interests in the Antarctic and governs the basic principles of its activities there, bringing the latter in line with international obligations according to the AT. In May 2008 at a briefing prior to the opening of the XXXI ATCM in Kiev, the Deputy Minister of Education and Science, Maksim Striha, indicated that Ukraine's primary interest in the Antarctic was in fact geopolitical.38 Funding is to be provided through the government and from ‘sources not forbidden by law’.39 According to the national representative in the SCAR Standing Committee on Antarctic Geographic Information, Andriy Fedchuk, after hosting the ATCM in Kiev in 2008 (which was partly sponsored by the UAC), the government has almost tripled the funds available for Antarctic operations.40 On 3 November 2010, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national programme for scientific research in Antarctica until 2020. The current budget, according to Litvinov, is US$2.5 million per annum, of which 85 per cent is spent on logistics.41

Belarus Though not as substantial as the Ukrainian, the Belarusian input into the SAE was nonetheless considerable: from 1956 to 1991 more than a hundred and ffty specialists from Belarus took part in the SAE.42 There is a dearth of source material regarding Belarusian Antarctic plans after the collapse of the USSR. However, the attention devoted to formulating Antarctic policy is demonstrated by a most comprehensive programme entitled ‘Monitoring of Polar Regions of the Earth and Support of the Activity of Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions for the years 2007–2010 and for the period until 2015’, which was ratified by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus in August 2006, two months after President Lukashenko signed a decree ratifying the AT.43 The Polar regions programme specified that a Republican Centre of Polar Investigations under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection be created to ensure Belarus's ‘status as an equal participant in international research and exploitation of the polar regions’ and to establish a Belarusian Antarctic station.44 In a ‘Short report on scientific and technical research conducted by the Belarusian Antarctic seasonal expedition of 2008– 2009’, the Belarus Government further outlined measures to be taken to ensure the Belarus interests in the polar regions: to develop and strength international cooperation in the sphere of exploration of polar regions; to expand scientific research; to build Belarusian Antarctic infrastructure equipped with modern technological equipment and instrumentation for scientific observation; and to train competent personnel for the Belarus Antarctic Expedition (BAE).45 Bearing in mind the lack of experience in conducting independent expeditions, it was deemed necessary to initially utilize the expertise of the RAE as well as that of Belarusians with past polar experience.46 A step towards closer cooperation with the RAE occurred in 2007, when Belarus and the Russian Federation formed the Union of Russia and Belarus. This enabled members of the BAE to join the RAE on board the Russian vessel Akademik Fedorov to conduct their own research programme in the area of the Gora Vechernyaya Russian field base (67°39'S 46°09'E, Thala

Hills, Enderby Land), which is in close proximity to the Russian Antarctic station Molodezhnaya. Gora Vechernyaya is considered a potential site for Belarus's Antarctic station, although some scientists argue that it would be more practical to build a new station and not take over the old Soviet field base.47 A Belarus–Russian Federation intergovernmental agreement regarding cooperation in polar regions is under review in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and Belarus and it is anticipated to be finalized by the end of 2011. According to BAE Head and Deputy Head of Department of Hydrometeorology Aleksei Gaidashev, it will provide Belarus with a solid foothold for its future actions in Antarctica.48 As with other countries, the Global Financial Crisis has affected Belarus's Antarctic plans: the government has been forced to reduce funding of the BAE by over 30 per cent, from 15.44 billion Belarusian roubles to 10.37 billion.49 Notwithstanding the cuts, the Belarus Government in May 2011 ratified a new state programme ‘Monitoring the Polar Regions and Support for Arctic and Antarctic Activities in 2011–2015’. No details of funding for the programme are available at this stage.

Azerbaijan Azerbaijan's post-Soviet Antarctic interests were demonstrated in a somewhat curious manner in December 2008 when the country's Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Honorary President and Founder of Western University in Baku and President of the Aerial and Extreme Sports Federation of Azerbaijan, Professor Huseyn Bagirov, as a member of a twoman Azerbaijani team departed for the South Pole ‘in parallel with a group of four people who travelled to the pole under South Africa's “Peace for Africa” fag’.50 After spending several days at the Chilean summer base Arturo Parodi at Patriot Hills (80°20.0′S 81°20.0′W) and conducting various observations, the team reached the summit of Mount Vinson and proceeded to the South Pole, where on 26 January 2009 they planted the fag of Azerbaijan and a bronze gilded plaque with a depiction of the former President of Azerbaijan (1993–2003) Heydar Aliyev and his saying ‘I am proud to be an Azeri’, and a depiction of the current President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, on the obverse with the words ‘Azerbaijan, go forward with Ilham Aliyev!’ Bagirov, who after this undertaking also led an expedition to the summit of Mt Kilimanjaro and to the highest peak of the Andes, Aconcagua, declared that his Antarctic expedition was a means to strengthen Azerbaijan's position in the international arena. The main aim of the expedition was to add the names of Azerbaijan's scientists to the record of research conducted in Antarctica.51 Azerbaijan intends to build its own research station in Antarctica for studying global climate change and to join the AT.52 The expedition's activities resulted in the publication of three books: Antarctic Diary; Antarctic Climate: Global influences; and A Frozen Piece of Gondwana, which provides information about the mineral resources of Antarctica, perspectives regarding their exploitation, and ecological problems.53 Azerbaijan's media reported that the Azerbaijani Antarctic expedition was the first from among the Islamic, Turkic, and CIS countries which had reached the South Pole on foot.54 With a reasonably strong economy based on oil production, an active minister responsible for the Antarctic, and a supportive President,55 Azerbaijan may be able to acquire the

necessary government funding to achieve its ambition of establishing a base on the icy continent.

Tajikistan As mentioned previously, Tajikistan's input into the SAE was not insignificant: expedition members from the Tajik SSR worked in Antarctica on programmes formulated by Tajik institutions. Tajikistan declared its renewed interest in the Antarctic in 2009, when the President of the Tajik Academy of Sciences Mamadsho Ilolov reported that the government had allotted funding for Professor Abdulhamid Kayumov to conduct a threemonth research project on an aspect of climate change in association with the 54th RAE. Professor Kayumov had planted a Tajik fag at the Russian station Mirny in January of that year. Cooperation with the RAE seems to be the method adopted by Tajikistan to advance its own Antarctic programme.56

Kazakhstan An analogous method has been adopted by Kazakhstan in the same Antarctic season. The Director of the Kazakhstan Service for Hydrometeorology, Tursynbek Kudekov, explained Kazakhstan's desire to become ‘an active member of the Antarctic community’ so that it would not be left behind and could, in future ‘lay a claim to [Antarctic] resources’.57 He reported that an agreement with the Russian Hydrometeorology Service would enable two scientists from the Kazakhstan Service, Kadyrbek Bektursunov and Anton Chirkov, to join the 54th RAE to take ice core samples from five Russian stations in order to compare them with samples taken from glaciers in Tajikistan and thus determine the effects of global warming on local climate and ecosystems.58

Estonia Prior to gaining independence in 1991, about thirty Estonian scientists and writers participated in the SAE, where they worked on their own programmes. In 1985, they formed a Club of Estonian Members of Polar Expeditions in association with the Maritime Museum in Tallinn. After independence, Estonia followed its political ambition of greater integration with Western Europe and did not join the CIS. Over the following decade, these ambitions also led it to become a signatory to the AT, which Estonia joined in 2001. Estonians are proud of the fact that the leader of the first Russian expedition to the Antarctic (1819–1821), Captain Faddei Bellingshausen, was born on the Estonian island of Esel (present day Saaremaa).59 Even before the breakup of the USSR, the scientist Enn Kaupp ran up the Estonian fag at the Soviet Antarctic station Molodezhnaya in 1988.60 After the breakup, individual Estonian scientists showed a desire to emulate their compatriots’ exploits by organizing a privately funded expedition to Antarctica in 2006 and 2008. An adviser to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, oceanologist Mart Saarso formulated plans for building a base in Victoria Land on an icefree area of the Ross Sea coast.61 Other enthusiastic Estonian scientists continue to pursue their desire to establish a presence on the icy continent, but the government is not yet prepared to provide any funding for such a costly enterprise.62 In this regard, Kaupp and Tammiksaar's proposal that Estonian research could be carried out in cooperation with other countries sounds eminently sensible.63

Conclusion The country with the largest and the most active presence, the Russian Federation, considers that maintaining the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is in its own national interest; its parliament has consequently legislated to strengthen the Russian Federation's adherence to AT conventions. It remains staunchly opposed to any Antarctic territorial claims. By maintaining stations in almost all sectors claimed by others, it hopes to influence the processes of possible extension of national sovereignty of other countries over these areas. While a steadfast supporter of the AT, the Russian Federation is preparing for any eventuality: by consolidating and broadening its long-term presence in Antarctica, it puts itself in a strong position in case of a future breakdown of the ATS and the inevitable subsequent territorial claims. Russia's position would be further bolstered by the support of those former Soviet republics whose presence in the Antarctic is dependent on utilizing existing Russian Antarctic infrastructure and logistics. Belarus and Kazakhstan, while unable to achieve a presence in the South Polar region independently, will certainly be able to do so with Russian support. The fact that both are parties to the Customs Union with Russia (they became part of a Common Economic Space in January 2012),64 will facilitate closer collaboration. Tajikistan, while interested in the Antarctic, has shown no intention of joining the Customs Union or Common Economic Space; this will make future cooperation with the RAE more difficult. It appears that Kazakhstan intends to become a signatory to the AT, while Tajikistan has not yet stated its intentions. If the latter somehow manages to continue with its Antarctic programme, it will most likely choose to participate in the ATS. Ukraine, which has ambitions of building its potential as a great sea power65 and expanding its independent Antarctic operations, is a steadfast supporter of the ATS. It is open to opportunities for collaboration with other nations. The Ukrainian Antarctic Centre and other research institutions involved in Antarctic science have a strong interest in their historical role in polar activities and are active in conducting as much research as funding permits. By maintaining a presence on the icy continent, they are at the same time furthering Ukraine's broader geopolitical interests in the region.

Azerbaijan's pioneering Turkic and Islamic CIS venture to the South Pole on foot may lead to its securing a toehold on the icy continent in the near future as well as to the emergence of a new signatory of the AT. For Estonia, it may be more practical to follow the example of other smaller nations in finding an established partner to gain access to Antarctic infrastructure. Evidently, the breakup of the USSR has had a detrimental effect on the Antarctic interests of the Russian Federation as well as all the previous Soviet republics. The Russian strategy of increasing its presence in the Antarctic and collaboration with willing former republics has the dual aim of restoring its role as a world leader in polar research and gaining influence in any potential future negotiations on a new regime for the region. The influence of those nations with a minimal or nonexistent presence in the South Polar region will obviously be commensurate with that presence.

Notes 1

Acknowledgements: My sincere gratitude is due to Aant Elzinga, Professor Emeritus, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Andriy Fedchuk, UAC, Ukraine; and Alexander Ovlashenko, Professor, Baltic International Academy, Latvia, for helpful reviews of my paper. I would also like to thank Valery Lukin, Head of RAE, Russia, for making himself available for an interview; Valery Litvinov, Director of UAC, Ukraine, for his interview and continual willingness to assist with my requests for information; Gennady Milinevsky, Taras Shevchenko University, Ukraine, for his suggestions; and Anatoly Laiba, Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting Expedition, Lomonosovo, for making his paper available to me and sharing his extensive polar knowledge. Finally, I would like to thank the National Library of Belarus for assistance in locating recent national Antarctic publications.

2

More about Soviet IGY efforts in: I. Gan, 2009, ‘The Soviet preparation for the IGY Antarctic program and the Australian response: politics and science’, paper presented at the second SCAR workshop on the history of Antarctic research entitled ‘Multidimensional exploration of Antarctica around the 1950s’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Santiago, Chile, 21–22 September 2006. Boletín Antactico Chileno ‘2nd SCAR Workshop on the History of Antarctic Research’: 60–70, which you could also read online w​w​w​.i​n​a​c​h​.c​l​/I​n​a​c​h​W​e​b​N​e​o​/C​o​n​t​r​o​l​s​/N​e​o​c​h​a​n​n​e​l​s​/N​e​o​_​C​H​6​2​3​1​/d​e​p​l​o​y​/b​o​l​e​t​i​n​%2​0​h​i​s​t​o​r​i​c​o​.p​d​f​; I. Gan, ‘The reluctant hosts: Soviet Antarctic expedition ships visit Australia and New Zealand in 1956’, Polar Record 45(232), 2009, pp. 37–50; I. Gan, ‘Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 … or will they stay?’ Polar Record 45(233), 2009, pp. 167–175.

3

V. Lukin, interviewed 5 November 2009, Australia; E. Kaupp and E. Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’, Polar Record, 2011, doi:10.1017/S0032247411000234.

4

L. Savatyugin, Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in the Antarctic], Moscow: Gorodets Press, 2004, p. 151.

5

CIS,

w​w​w​.e​u​r​a​s​i​a​n​h​o​m​e​.o​r​g​/x​m​l​/t​/d​a​t​a​b​a​s​e​s​.x​m​l​?

lang=ru&nic=databases&intorg=7 &pid=20. 6

Lukin, interview.

7

Both the Scott Polar Research Institute and the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute were founded in 1920.

8

Lukin, interview.

9

K zasedaniyu Pravitelstva RF 24 April 2008 [The sitting of the Government of the Russian Federation of 24 April 2008], Press release, w​w​w​.m​i​n​f​n​.r​u​/r​u​/o​f​f​i​c​i​a​l​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p​?i​d​4​=6​0​4​0.​

10 Ibid. 11 Ukaz Prezidenta RF nomer 824, 7 August 1992 ‘O RAE’ [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Number 824 of 7 August 1992 ‘Concerning the RAE’], h​t​t​p​://p​r​a​v​o​.l​e​v​o​n​e​v​s​k​y​.o​r​g​/b​a​z​a​r​u​0​9​/u​k​a​z​/s​b​o​r​1​6​/t​e​x​t​1​6​8​4​9​.h​t​m.​ 12 L. Savatyugin, Rossiiskiye issledovaniya v Antarktike. Tom III, 31SAE — 40 RAE [Russian research in the Antarctic. Vol III, 31 SAE — 40 RAE], St Petersburg: Hydrometeoizdat (Hydrometeorological Service Press), 2001, p. 186. 13 Ibid., p. 287. 14 Postanovleniye Pravitelstva RF 28 August 1997 nomer 1113 ‘O deyatelnosti RAE’ [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation Number 1113 of 28 August 1997 ‘Concerning the activities of the Russian Antarctic expedition’], w​w​w​.b​u​s​i​n​e​s​s​p​r​a​v​o​.r​u​/D​o​c​u​m​/D​o​c​u​m​S​h​o​w​_​D​o​c​u​m​I​D​_​5​3​0​4​1​.h​t​m​l.​ 15 Postanovleniye Pravitelstva RF 24 September 2001 nomer 685 ‘Ob obespechenii interesov RF v Antarktike’ [Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation Number 685 of 24 September 2001 ‘Concerning the measures to be taken to ensure the Russian Federation's interests in the Antarctic’], w​w​w​.m​e​t​e​o​.r​u​/p​u​b​l​i​s​h​_​l​a​w​/i​z​d​a​n​/d​o​c​s​/2​–71.htm. 16 Savatyugin, Rossiiskaya nauka v Antarktike [Russian science in the Antarctic, pp. 151, 87. 17 O perspektivah deyatelnosti RF v Antarktike na 2006–2010 [Outlook for the Russian Federation's activities in the Antarctic in the years 2006–

2010], w​w​w​.e​c​o​i​n​d​u​s​t​r​y​.r​u​/n​e​w​s​/v​i​e​w​/1​0​3​1​.h​t​m​l​. 18 Chilingarov and Bedritsky were also co-chairs of the Russian organizing committee for the IPY 2007–2008. 19 V. Strugatsky, ‘Na samom donyshke Zemli’ [At the very bottom of the world] (St Petersburg, Smena), 12 January 2007, http://smena.ru/news/2007/01/12/9782/. 20 K zasedaniyu Pravitelstva RF 24 April 2008 [The sitting of the Government of the Russian Federation of 24 April 2008], Press release, www.minfn.ru/ru/official/index.php?id4=6040. 21 Strategiya razvitiya deyatelnosti RF v Antarktike na period do 2020 i na bolee otdalennuyu perspektivu [Strategy for developing RF activities in the Antarctic till 2020 and beyond], 30 October 2010, http://lawsforall.ru/index.php?ds=42338. 22 Rossiay zaplatit 60 milliardov za Antarkticheskyuyu zashitu [Russia will pay 60 billion for protecting its Antarctic interests], 22 October 2010, www.utro.ru/articles/2010/10/22/931415.shtml. 23 http://news.mail.ru/economics/7071298/. 24 ‘PM told to defend Antarctic territory’, The Australian, 21 December 2010, www. theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/pm-told-to-defendantarctic-territory/story-fn59niix-1225974139407). 25 V. Lukin, ‘Poisk nevedomogo kontinenta. K 185-letiyu podviga russkih moryakov’ [‘Quest for the unknown continent. 185th anniversary of the exploits of Russian sailors’], Vlast, October 2005, p. 81. 26 Ibid., p. 80. 27 Ibid., p. 80. 28 I. Gan, ‘Soviet Antarctic plans after the IGY: changes in policy’, Polar Record 46(238), 2010, pp. 244–256. 29 A. Laiba, ‘Raiony vozmozhnih Rossiiskih prioritetov v Antarktike’ [‘Regions of possible Russian priorities in the Antarctic’], in: Yu Kariakin (ed.), Geologiya polyarnyh oblastei Zemli. TOM I (Materialy 42-go tektonicheskogo soveshchaniya, posvyashchennogo predvaritelnym rezultatam issledovaniy po programme tretiego

mezhdunarodnogo polyarnogo goda) [Geology of the polar regions of the Earth. Vol I. Proceedings of the 42nd tectonic conference dedicated to the preliminary research outcomes of the third International Polar Year], Moscow: GEOS, 2009, p. 348. 30 Ibid., p. 351. 31 Gan, ‘Will the Russians abandon Mirny to the penguins after 1959 … or will they stay?’, p. 171. 32 I. Gan, ‘The first practical Soviet steps towards getting a foothold in the Antarctic: Soviet Antarctic whaling fotilla Slava’, Polar Record 47(1), 2011, pp. 21–28. 33 V. Litvinov, phone interview 29 October 2009. 34 Lukin, interview. 35 Ibid. 36 V. Litvinov, personal communication, July 2011. 37 Postanovleniye Kabinata Ministrov Ukrainy nomer 422, 13 September 2001, ‘Ukrainskie nauchnye issledovaniya v Antarktike v ramkah gosudarstvennoi programmy issledovaniy Ukrainy v Antarktike na 2002–2010’ [Decree of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Number 422 of 13 September 2001, ‘Ukrainian scientific research in Antarctica within the framework of the State Antarctic Research Program in the years 2002–2010’], w​w​w​.u​a​c​.g​o​v​.u​a​/i​m​a​g​e​s​/i​n​t​c​o​o​p​/2​5​I​P​0​1​7​_​R​.d​o​c​; V. Litvinov, phone interview, 29 October 2009. 38 S. Gorchakov and A. Ovlashenko, ‘Morskaya politika Ukrainy: iz glubin ambitsiy na mel realnosti’ [‘Ukraine's marine politics: from the depths of ambition to the shallows of reality’], 2010, http://zvezda.ru/politics/2010/10/05/ukrseapolitics.htm. 39 Verhovnaya Rada Ukrainy prinyala zakon ‘Ob Antarkticheskoy deyatelnosti’ [Ukrainian Parliament ratifes the law ‘Concerning Antarctic activities’], http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/175153. 40 A. Fedchuk, personal communication, August 2010. 41 V. Litvinov, personal communication, July 2011.

42 Short report on scientific and technical research conducted by the Belarusian Antarctic seasonal expedition of 2008–2009 as a part of the Russian Antarctic expedition no. 54, www.ats.aq/devAS/..%5Cdocuments%5Cie%5Cbyann09e.pdf. 43 Zakon Respubliki Belarus 19 July 2006 nomer 157–3 ‘O prisoedinenii k Dogovoru ob Antarktike’ (Decree of the Republic of Belarus of 19 July 2006 Number 157–3 ‘Joining the Antarctic Treaty’] w​w​w​.l​e​v​o​n​e​v​s​k​i​.n​e​t​/p​r​a​v​o​/r​a​z​d​e​l​2​/n​u​m​1​/2​d​1​2​5​4​.h​t​m​l.​ 44 Postanovleniye Soveta Ministrov Respubliki Belarus 31 August 2006 nomer 1104 ob utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy tselevoi programmy ‘Monitoring polyarnih raionov Zemli i obespechenie deyatelnosti Arkticheskih i Antarkticheskih expeditsiy na 2007–2010 i na period do 2015’ [Decree of the Council of Ministers of Belarus Number 1104 of 31 August 2006 ‘Monitoring of Polar Regions of the Earth and Support of the Activity of Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions for the years 2007– 2010 and for the period till 2015’], w​w​w​.s​y​s​t​e​m​a​-b​y​.c​o​m​/d​o​c​s​/b​i​t​b​4​/d​k​-g​v​4​u​b​d​.h​t​m​l​. 45 Short report on scientific and technical research conducted by the Belarusian Antarctic seasonal expedition of 2008–2009 as a part of the Russian Antarctic expedition no. 54, w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/..%5Cdocuments%5Cie%5Cbyann09e.pdf. 46 Postanovleniye Soveta Ministrov Respubliki Belarus 31 August 2006 nomer 1104 ob utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy tselevoi programmy ‘Monitoring polyarnih raionov Zemli i obespechenie deyatelnosti Arkticheskih i Antarkticheskih expeditsiy na 2007–2010 i na period do 2015’ [Decree of the Council of Ministers of Belarus Number 1104 of 31 August 2006 ‘Monitoring of Polar Regions of the Earth and Support of the Activity of Arctic and Antarctic Expeditions for the years 2007– 2010 and for the period till 2015’], w​w​w​.s​y​s​t​e​m​a​-b​y​.c​o​m​/d​o​c​s​/b​i​t​b​4​/d​k​-g​v​4​u​b​d​.h​t​m​l​. 47 A. Trofmovich, ‘Belarusi nuzhna polyarnaya stantsiya v Antarktide’ [Belarus needs a polar station in Antarctica] Argumenty i fakty v Belarusi [Arguments and facts in Belarus], 11 May 2010, w​w​w​.a​i​f​.b​y​/e​n​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/s​o​c​i​a​l​/i​t​e​m​/5​5​1​-a​n​t​a​r​k​t​i​d​a​.h​t​m​l.​

48 E. Kazyukin, ‘Antarktida, Gora Vechernyaya’ [‘Antarctica, Gora Vechernyaya’], Respublika, Gazeta Soveta Ministrov Respubliki Belarus [The Republic, Gazette of the Council of Ministers of Belarus], 17 November 2009, w​w​w​.r​e​s​p​u​b​l​i​k​a​.i​n​f​o​/4​8​8​2​/s​c​i​e​n​c​e​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​3​5​2​6​8​/. 49 N. Berkli, ‘Pravitelstvo Belorussii urezalo polyarnuyu programme’ [‘The Belarus government cuts its polar programme’], 2009, w​w​w​.e​j​.b​y​/e​c​o​n​o​m​y​/2​0​0​9​–11–04​/p​r​a​v​i​t​e​l​s​t​v​o​_​b​e​l​a​r​u​s​i​_​u​r​e​z​a​l​o​_​p​o​l​y​a​r​n​u​y​u​_​p​r​o​g​r​a​m​m​u​.h​t​m​l​. 50 ‘Azerbaijan Antarkticheskaya expeditsia oboshlas primerno v 300 tysiach dollarov’ [‘The cost of the Azerbaijani Antarctic expedition was approximately 300 thousand dollars’], w​w​w​.a​z​e​r​i​.r​u​/papers/newsazerbaijan/38399/. 51 Ibid. 52 ‘Azerbaijan plans base in Antarctica’, w​w​w​.p​o​l​a​r​c​o​n​s​e​r​v​a​t​i​o​n​.o​r​g​/n​e​w​s​/p​c​o​-n​e​w​s​-a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/a​z​e​r​b​a​i​j​a​n​-p​l​a​n​s​-b​a​s​e​-i​n​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​. 53 ‘Books about first expedition to Antarctica published in Azerbaijan’, 2010, http://en.trend.az/news/sports/1637313.html. 54 ‘The expedition team from Azerbaijan has planted the state fag on the South Pole’, 2009, www.wu.edu.az/index.php?sid=176&lang=en. 55 ‘Azerbaijan Antarkticheskaya expeditsia oboshlas primerno v 300 tysiach dollarov’ [‘The cost of the Azerbaijani Antarctic expedition was approximately 300 thousand dollars’], w​w​w​.a​z​e​r​i​.r​u​/p​a​p​e​r​s​/n​e​w​s​-a​z​e​r​b​a​i​j​a​n​/3​8​3​9​9​/. 56 V. Kondrashova, ‘Flag Tajikistana rasvivaetsia na prostorah Antarktidy’ [‘Tajikistan's fag futters over Antarctica's expanses’], 2009, www.2shanbe.tj/publ/1–1–0–800. 57 ‘Kazakhstan toropitsia podelit Antarktidu’ [‘Kazakhstan hastens to claim its share of Antarctica’], w​w​w​.a​n​t​a​r​k​t​i​s​.r​u​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p​? mn=def&mns=1dsy69r96ra8ikksnxtl. 58 ‘Kasakhstanskie meteorologi vernulis iz Antarktidy’ [‘Kazakh meteorologists have returned from Antarctica’], http://kazembassy.ru/press_service/news/?newsid=3777.

59 Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’; A. Juske, Estonianborn admiral F. Bellingshausen, the discoverer of Antarctica, Tallinn: Kasmu, 2003; Bellingshausen (1778–1850) was educated in St Petersburg and served in the Russian Navy all his life. Bellingshausen was appointed Commander of the port of Kronstadt and military Governor of Kronstadt, a position he held until his death. A statue was erected in his honour in St Petersburg on funds subscribed by the public. In 1968 a Soviet Antarctic station was named after him. 60 M. Rachinskaya, ‘Estonia–Antarctica: ne tak uzh daleko’ [‘Estonia– Antarctica: not such a great distance’], Molodezh Estonii [The youth of Estonia], 1 August 2007, w​w​w​.m​o​l​e​s​.e​e​/0​7​/J​u​l​/2​6​/7​–1.php. 61 ‘Expeditsiya v Antarktidu sostoitsia’ [‘The (Estonian) expedition to Antarctica will go ahead’], w​w​w​.c​a​t​a​l​o​g​m​i​n​e​r​a​l​o​v​.r​u​/n​e​w​s​4​9​0​.h​t​m​l​; Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’. 62 Kaupp and Tammiksaar, ‘Estonia and Antarctica’. 63 Ibid. 64 The Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union, which came into effect on 1 January 2010, offers trade privileges to its members, including lower exportimport tariffs and reduced prices on many goods. The Ukrainian and Tajik governments have also expressed an interest in joining the union. w​w​w​.r​f​e​r​l​.o​r​g​/c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/k​y​r​g​y​y​s​t​a​n​_​w​a​n​t​s​_​t​o​_​j​o​i​n​_​r​u​s​s​i​a​_​b​e​l​a​r​u​s​_​k​a​z​a​k​h​s​t​a​n​_​c​u​s​t​o​m​s​_​u​n​i​o​n​/3​5​5​3​4​3​9​.h​t​m​l.​ 65 ‘Kluev: Ukraina mozhet vozraditsia kak velikaya morskaya derzhava’ [‘Kluev: It is possible for Ukraine to become a great sea power’], h​t​t​p​://k​o​r​r​e​s​p​o​n​d​e​n​t​.n​e​t​/u​k​r​a​i​n​e​/p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/1​2​3​5​5​7​7​-k​l​y​u​e​v​-u​k​r​a​i​n​a​-m​o​z​h​e​t​v​o​z​r​o​d​i​t​s​y​a​-k​a​k​-v​e​l​i​k​a​y​a​-m​o​r​s​k​a​y​a​-d​e​r​z​h​a​v​a​ [Andriy Kluev — Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine. Head of the Governmental Committee on the Economy Sectors Development].

8

New Zealand's Antarctica

Anne-Marie Brady

New Zealand has important strategic interests in Antarctica that are as much about geography and the country's geostrategic needs, as they are about history and the politics of maintaining rights gained in an earlier era. This chapter outlines the reasons behind New Zealand's involvement in, and commitment to, Antarctica; profiles the various bodies involved in maintaining and negotiating New Zealand's Antarctic presence and voice on Antarctic affairs; and discusses New Zealand's core interests in the Antarctic continent that help to shape its Antarctic policy.

New Zealand's geographic and historical links to Antarctica New Zealand has strong geographic and historical links which tie it closely to Antarctica. There are ancient geological connections between New Zealand and Antarctica that can be traced back to Gondwanaland. Fossilised trees found in Antarctica are related to New Zealand's modern-day beech forests.1 Even today, New Zealand is one of the closest and most convenient locations to launch an Antarctic expedition into the Antarctic interior. Unlike most other Antarctic nations, New Zealand's Antarctic researchers need only to board a plane to visit the Antarctic, and they can go for short and frequent stays, rather than spend a whole season there. The geographic environment in Antarctica and any changes which may occur there are felt very personally by New Zealanders. When New Zealand weather forecasters talk of a cold Southerly sweeping up the country the television weather maps show it as coming from the icy Antarctic zone just to the South of New Zealand. In 2005 and 2006, large icebergs broke off from the Ronne Ice Shelf and they floated up along the New Zealand eastern coast, within clear sight of land.2 The largest was over 1 km long. The same phenomenon occurred in 2009.3 For New Zealanders, more than the citizens of most other Antarctic nations, the melting of the poles seems a very real and present threat. The historical links are equally close, and they are a direct result of New Zealand's proximity to the Antarctic continent. Many Antarctic expeditions have been launched from New Zealand or have visited New Zealand after a visit to the ice and many explorers have also incorporated New Zealanders into their team. For example early explorers such as Fabian Gottlieb Von Bellingshausen (Russia), Charles Wilkes (USA), James Clark Ross (UK), Carstens Borchgrevink (Norway), Robert Falcon Scott (UK), Ernest Shackleton (UK), Roald Amundsen (Norway), Shirase Nobu (Japan), Douglas Mawson (Australia), Richard E. Byrd (USA) and New Zealand's own Edmund Hilary all began their expeditions from New Zealand or returned there after visiting Antarctica, and almost all employed New Zealanders in their crew.4 All these connections mean that New Zealanders have a stronger sense than the citizens of most other Antarctic players that Antarctica is an intrinsic part of their national history and heritage.

A further important influence on New Zealanders' sense of a close relationship to Antarctica is the 1979 crash of Air New Zealand fight 901 at Mt Erebus on Ross Island. The crash of fight 901 has left a deep scar on the New Zealand psyche regarding Antarctica and, in particular, Mt Erebus. Flight 901 was a scheduled tourist fight over Antarctica, which had operated from 1977. A total of 257 people died in the Erebus crash, including 200 New Zealanders, as well as travellers from Japan, the UK, United States, Canada, Australia, France and Switzerland. The crash was New Zealand's largest ever air accident. The public inquiry after the crash, which extended over three years, raised serious questions about Air New Zealand's handling of its Antarctic fight and its public response to the disaster.5 After the crash, both Air New Zealand and Qantas suspended their Antarctic tourist fights. In November 2009 New Zealanders commemorated the Erebus crash with memorial ceremonies at Scott Base and in Auckland, which were extensively covered in the New Zealand media, as were follow-up stories on Erebus victims.

New Zealand as a claimant state in Antarctica On his 1841 expedition to Antarctica, the British explorer James Clark Ross discovered and named the Ross Sea, a deep bay in the Southern Ocean with convenient access into the Antarctic continent. Once charted, this area became the launching site for many later expeditions into the Antarctic hinterland. In 1923, competition for whaling rights led Britain to announce a claim to the area it called the “Ross Dependency”. Britain handed over the responsibility for the dependency's “governance” to the Governor-General of New Zealand.6 New Zealand's legal rights to the Ross Dependency claim are inextricably linked with its relationship to Britain. The arrangement that New Zealand would “govern” this uninhabited territory meant that it came to be understood by the New Zealand Government and people that the Ross Dependency was a “New Zealand claim”; hence, 1923 is the point from which the New Zealand Government now dates its Antarctic entitlement.7 Yet from a legal point of view, New Zealand's separate legal rights to legislate for the Dependency did not occur until much later, when New Zealand became independent from Britain, both in constitutional and institutional law.8 This was a long and complicated process and there are many dates which mark the stages of this transition. However, the one which most clearly identifies the Ross Dependency as legally a part of the “Realm of New Zealand” is the 1983 “Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of New Zealand”.9 This document defines the territories under the administration of New Zealand's Governor General, the representative of the British Crown. This 1983 document updated a similar “Letters Patent” from 1917 which did not include the Ross Dependency in “the Realm of New Zealand”.10 At 450,000 square kilometres the Ross Dependency is larger than the main islands of New Zealand (North, South and Stewart Island) put together. It is located between latitudes 160 and 170 degrees east to west and ends at latitude 60 degrees south. Most of the claim consists of ice, the Ross Ice Shelf. When the claim was made in 1923 there was little awareness of the actual geography of the Ross Dependency zone. The drawing up of the Ross Dependency's boundaries was based on the theory of “sectors”, similar to that

adopted in the Arctic, and, to a certain extent, similar to how some of the boundaries of Africa were drawn up by colonial powers in an earlier era. The “border lines” of the Dependency slice through mountain ranges and end at the South Pole. The Ross Dependency is around 2,500 kilometres from the New Zealand mainland. It is the second smallest claim of all the Antarctic claimant states, but its actual size does not represent its value. The Ross Ice Shelf forms one of the most convenient access points into Antarctica. This is why many Antarctic explorers launched their expeditions from there and why the USA, long the leading power in Antarctica, initially set up four bases there, now reduced to two. For a long time, successive New Zealand governments were extremely diff-dent about the Ross Dependency claim. Initially they tended to worry about the cost of maintaining it, while in the 1950s and early 1970s internationally minded senior politicians even wanted to give it away, proposing that Antarctica should be managed by the United Nations or run as a world park.11 However, in more recent times, such concerns and lofty altruism have been replaced by a strong awareness of the strategic advantages New Zealand's Antarctic claim offers. Moreover, since the early 1990s, the failure of the Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties (ATCPs) to pass the Convention of the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), the negotiations of which New Zealand led for nearly ten years, resulted in a gradual realisation that collective action in Antarctica would not always be completely sufficient to protect New Zealand's national interests.12 Despite being an original signatory to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, New Zealand continues to maintain its right to sovereignty over the Ross Dependency. It is entitled to do so under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, which states that the treaty is not “a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica”.13 The New Zealand Government is confident that the Antarctic Treaty has maintained New Zealand's interests well in the last fifty years, and that it is likely to continue to do so.14 As part of supporting its claim New Zealand employs an “active permanent presence in the Ross Dependency”.15 This is demonstrated in multiple ways, including: New Zealand's continued commitment to the research station Scott Base, despite tough economic times since the 2008 global economic crisis and the aftermath of major earthquakes in Christchurch from 2010 to 2011; the focusing of New Zealand's scientific

research activities on the territory of the Dependency; New Zealand's assumption of international sectoral responsibility for search and rescue activities, meteorological observations, and hydrographic surveys in the Ross Sea region; New Zealand's bid for the management of nineteen environmentally protected areas within the Ross Dependency; as well as strong government support for Antarctic activities at an international and national level, involving government departments, the business community and ordinary New Zealanders. New Zealand doesn't have the resources to do much more on its own, but it is extremely proactive about working with other national programmes. This is a useful means to reduce costs, meanwhile maintaining New Zealand's interests. New Zealand is cautious about asserting the Ross Dependency claim, carefully trying to avoid overly forceful actions which might cause friction within the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) or among non-Treaty signatory countries,16 especially the USA, whom New Zealand is dependent on for transport to its base. In 2006 New Zealand applied to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to take over control of 1.7 million sq km of seabed (outside the Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ) on the continental shelf around the territory of New Zealand. The application did not include data on New Zealand's Ross Dependency Antarctic claim, but the New Zealand Government stated that it reserved the right to do so in future. The New Zealand position was that this meant that they were respecting the requirements of the Antarctic Treaty, at the same time as protecting their rights in the future to make a claim to the Antarctic seabeds surrounding the Ross Dependency.17

New Zealand's Antarctic organisations New Zealand's Antarctic involvement is coordinated and overseen by a number of bodies who work closely together. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's tiny Antarctic Policy Unit (it has only three personnel) is tasked with: coordinating policy advice to the New Zealand Government on Antarctica and the Southern Ocean including the Ross Dependency; representing New Zealand's interests within the various bodies of the Antarctic Treaty System; conducting New Zealand's Antarctica-related diplomacy; providing the Minister of Foreign Affairs with advice on the implementation of the Antarctica (Environmental Protection) Act 1994, which includes developing clear procedures for all tourists, tour operators and non-governmental visitors to Antarctica who depart from New Zealand; as well as advising the New Zealand Government on the implementation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Act of 1981.18 Other New Zealand government departments with Antarctic interests include the Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Defence, the Treasury, Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Transport; the Department of Conservation, Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; New Zealand Defence Force; Land Information New Zealand; and Maritime New Zealand. New Zealand government policy on Antarctica is coordinated by the Officials Antarctic Committee, which is chaired by the Antarctic Policy Unit. All the above-mentioned government departments with an interest or role in Antarctica, as well as Antarctica New Zealand, are members of this body. The Environmental Assessment and Review Panel, a body of scientific specialists, advises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the environmental impact of any New Zealand-related Antarctic activity. Antarctica New Zealand is a Crown entity in charge of developing, managing and implementing New Zealand government activities in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, “in particular in the Ross Dependency” (my emphasis).19 Antarctica New Zealand has a six-person board of directors and a permanent staff of twenty-five based in Christchurch, New Zealand. It is also in charge of employing the temporary staff who work on New Zealand's Antarctic base each season and managing the base. It coordinates,

approves and provides some of the funding for New Zealand's Antarctic scientific research programme. It kits out researchers and other visitors going down to Antarctica on New Zealand projects in their distinctive stylish black and orange Antarctic gear (Antarctica New Zealand launched the new uniform for all New Zealand personnel in 2008, designed by New Zealand company Earth Sea Sky). Through its arts, media and youth programmes the organisation is also in charge of raising public awareness in New Zealand about the international significance of the continent and its connection and importance to New Zealand.20 These activities have helped to develop a strong awareness of New Zealand's Antarctic heritage among ordinary New Zealanders. Antarctica New Zealand is based in Christchurch, at the International Antarctic Campus next to Christchurch International Airport, which is also the location for the US and Italian Antarctic programme Offices. Over 75 per cent of the world's scientists flying to Antarctica depart from here.21 Christchurch has developed considerable expertise in cold-climate logistics over the many decades of Antarctic exploration and international scientific research there. More than fifty local businesses provide Antarctic support services through the Canterbury Antarctic Business Interest Network (CABIN).22 New Zealand has a number of research centres dedicated to Antarctic studies, as well as smaller groups of researchers working on Antarctic themes at all of New Zealand's eight universities. The University of Canterbury hosts Gateway Antarctica, a multi-disciplinary research centre which coordinates the Antarctic research of specialists in the sciences, law, social sciences, arts and humanities.23 Gateway Antarctica offers undergraduate and graduate courses in Antarctic Studies, including the fourteen-week-long Post-Graduate Certificate in Antarctic Studies (which, uniquely, includes a two-week field trip to Antarctica). Reflecting the strong interest in Antarctica in New Zealand, these courses are usually heavily over-subscribed. The Antarctic Research Centre at Victoria University in Wellington24 focuses on Antarctic science and it is recognised as a world leader of research into Antarctica's past climate, its influence in global climate change, and polar scientific drilling technology and operations. The University of Waikato's Antarctic Research Unit is located within the School of Science

and Engineering. The personnel of this unit have specialist interests in soil mapping and the human impact on the Antarctic environment.25 Auckland, Massey,26 Lincoln and Otago universities and the Auckland University of Technology all have staff engaged in Antarctic research who collaborate with other New Zealand-based and international Antarctic researchers covering a wide range of felds.27 Three Crown Research Institutes: Landcare,28 which engages in environmental research; GNS Science,29 which specialises in earth sciences; and the National Institute of Water and Atmosphere (NIWA)30 all engage in Antarctic-related studies. NIWA's research vessel RV Tangaroa provides logistical support for New Zealand's hydrographic surveys and other scientific research in the Southern Ocean. A number of non-governmental organisations are also involved in supporting (and sometimes critiquing) New Zealand's Antarctic activities and engagement with the ATS. Greenpeace New Zealand, the Forest and Bird Society, and the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition are the most prominent. All three have a strong interest in environmental issues, while Greenpeace and the Southern Ocean Coalition have also been involved in an ongoing effort to stop Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean. The Antarctic Heritage Trust (New Zealand) is an NGO which receives funding from the New Zealand Government for its administrative costs.31 The Trust has been active in promoting the preservation of a number of historic explorers' huts in the Ross Dependency.32 Such activities help to underline New Zealand's Antarctic claim, so it is not surprising that the organisation receives government assistance for its work.

New Zealand's Antarctic presence: Scott Base New Zealand's permanent Antarctic research station, Scott Base, is located on Pram Point, at the end of Hutt Point Peninsular, on Ross Island in the Ross Dependency. It is a short walk from the USA's largest Antarctic research station, McMurdo. Scott Base was built in 1957, initially as a depot for the British Trans-Antarctic Expedition and for science activities associated with the International Geophysical Year. It became a permanent research station in 1959. Every year during the austral summer about 35 New Zealand Antarctic Programme (NZAP) staff are located at Scott Base to help scientific research teams and other groups with their activities. The NZAP staff provide food, administration, communications, operations and field training for all participants in New Zealand's annual Antarctic activities. Since the late 1950s about 20–30 science projects per year are undertaken from Scott Base. Around 350 New Zealanders visit Antarctica as part of the New Zealand Antarctic Programme each year — this is more than the numbers of Chinese personnel currently visiting Antarctica. During the peak summer research period the base can house up to 85 people at any one time. A “winter over” team of about 11 New Zealand personnel carry out scientific research and engage in ongoing base maintenance activities in preparation for the next austral summer. Of the New Zealand personnel who visit Antarctica 46 per cent are scientists, about a third are support personnel, while the rest are nonscientists such as artists, dignitaries and students.33 New Zealand scientists need only spend a minimum of time in Antarctica, as planes depart from Christchurch to the Ross Dependency two to three times a week in the summer season. The USA provides the bulk of the air transport for New Zealand personnel going down to the Antarctic. The USA, New Zealand and Italy34 participate in a joint logistics pool to move staff and goods between Christchurch and the Ross Sea area. The contributions of each country to the pool are proportional to the weight of cargo and personnel they send. Every year the USA sends around 4,000 personnel through Christchurch airport down to its Antarctic programmes in the Ross Dependency area; the New Zealand personnel quota is less than a tenth of that at 350; and the Italian programme sends only

seventy personnel. Accordingly, for example during the 2009–2010 season, the USA contributed sixty-five fights, New Zealand contributed eight fights and the Italian programme contributed four fights. Two US merchant ships (a tanker and a cargo boat) also travel down in January each year to deliver fuel and any items too heavy for the planes to transport. Lacking the USA's massive defence resources to draw on for its Antarctic transport, New Zealand and Italy put in their fair share to the pool through other means. A wind farm near Scott Base that became operational in 2010 feeds power to the two bases and is now recognised as part of New Zealand's contribution to the logistics pool. New Zealand also provides cargo handling and covers the Antarctic planes' landing fees at Christchurch airport. Without the US logistics support it would be extremely difficult for New Zealand to continue its existing Antarctic programme but, at the same time, due to the convenience Christchurch offers the USA as its main extra-Antarctic base for its Antarctic operations, the USA is also dependent on the cooperation and goodwill of New Zealand to maintain its core Antarctic objectives. Scott Base was rebuilt from 1976 to 1977, with further renovations occurring from 2005 to 2007. In its present form it consists of a series of eight modern buildings, built from sheet steel and lined with polyurethane foam. The base is elevated above the ground so that snow can blow underneath. Scott Base buildings are all painted a distinctive “Scott Base green”; adding a hint of New Zealand's greenery to the stark Antarctic landscape. The buildings are joined together by a series of corridors; this allows personnel to move throughout different parts of the base without having to go outdoors, as well as enabling sectors to be closed off if there was a fire. The base is cosy and warm with a relaxed family atmosphere. The interior is decorated in soothing shades of white and green to match the exterior, and there is a similar attention to detail in the nutritious home-style meals served at the base canteen and in the overall base management. The renovations at Scott Base in recent years have included considerable efforts to lower the impact of the human presence on the ice. All rubbish is carefully sorted, and that which can be recycled such as metal, plastics and batteries are returned to New Zealand. All food scraps, paper and untreated timber are burnt in a high temperature incinerator. Windows are now quadruple-glazed, urinals are “waterless” and a new helicopter uses 40 per cent less fuel.35 Sewage and grey water are treated in a waste water plant

before being discharged into the Ross Sea. The new wind farm now provides all the energy needs of Scott Base, ending the dependence on diesel fuel for heating the base and the risk of oil spills in the pristine Antarctic environment. Antarctica New Zealand has a long-term commitment to reduce the carbon footprint of the base.

New Zealand's Antarctic policies New Zealand's Antarctic policies are a combination of the concerns of the various government departments engaged in overseeing New Zealand's Antarctic interests. New Zealand has geostrategic interests in Antarctica, as well as scientific, environmental, economic and political concerns.

New Zealand's Antarctic science In order to maintain its credibility as a leading Antarctic state it is essential that New Zealand engages in high quality science there. Antarctic science, unlike most other areas of scientific discovery in New Zealand, is strategically important in New Zealand's overall foreign policy goals. Accordingly, unlike other scientific activities in New Zealand, Antarctic science is heavily subsidised by the government. If a scientist's project is accepted in the annual Antarctic science plan of Antarctica New Zealand, then their transport, clothing, housing and food costs will be covered by Antarctica New Zealand as part of its annual budget. These are referred to by Antarctica New Zealand as “shadow costs”.36 Scientists make a small contribution to these costs in their research budgets, but it by no means covers the full amount.37 Scientists can apply for the bulk of the funding costs of their research experiments on the ice through the government's Foundation for Research Science and Technology budget for Antarctic science and/or logistics support.38 Approximately NZ$2.4 million per year is available for Antarctic research through this fund.39 An additional NZ$4.5 million was available for Antarctic-related science projects during the 2007– 2009 International Polar Year. New Zealand scientists who receive funding from other sources (such as the Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden Fund) are also entitled to receive the Antarctica New Zealand subsidy for “shadow costs”, as long as their project has been accepted within the annual plan for New Zealand's Antarctic science activities. The total budget for all of New Zealand's Antarctic activities is around NZ$21 million (US$17 million), the budget for ANZ covers NZ$13 million of that total.40 In the 2009 budget New Zealand's Antarctic budget was capped, and it is likely to be kept that way for the next five years due to the difficulties the New Zealand economy

is experiencing as a result of the global economic crisis and major earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. Other government programmes have suffered major cutbacks in spending, so the fact that the Antarctic-related spend has only been “capped” indicates the value that the New Zealand government places on its Antarctic assets. In order to make best use of resources and prioritise the scientific research most relevant to New Zealand, Antarctica New Zealand sets the agenda for scientists as to what are regarded as the key themes worthy of exploration in its five-yearly statement on New Zealand's “Antarctic and Southern Ocean Scientific Strategy”. In 2008 the core government agencies engaged in Antarctic activities identified New Zealand's strategic science interest as: focused on the Ross Sea region; investigating global processes and climate change, biosecurity, as well as bioprospecting and other economic issues; exploring issues of biodiversity in the marine environment and managing Antarctic marine resources; and managing the human impact in Antarctica.41 Other themes were not completely excluded, but scientists who wished to explore such topics had to relate them back to the core research agenda.42 New Zealand is reliant on international collaboration to explore its research activities in Antarctica, so for this reason the core themes of New Zealand's science strategy are closely linked to the international Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research's (SCAR) core science programmes.43 The key New Zealand International Polar Year Antarctic activities were the Antarctic Drilling Project (ANDRILL), the Census of Antarctic Marine Life (CAML), Winter Sea Ice Growth, and Predicting Bio-complexity in Dry Valley Ecosystems. New Zealand is a strong supporter of transparency and access to information in Antarctic research and all the outcomes of New Zealand's Antarctic research to date are available on an online portal.44 New Zealand's Antarctic research is well regarded internationally and has a high rate of citation in international, peer-reviewed journals. In a 2004 survey of the citation rate of Antarctic nations' scientific output, New Zealand ranked seventh, ahead of such countries as Japan, Russia and China.45 Over a sixyear period (2003–2009) the scientific output of Antarctica New Zealandsupported researchers was cited 817 times.46 A 2012 study comparing the Antarctic research of various countries against their GDP rated New Zealand as the top performer. New Zealand also rated second in the top three

countries putting forward policy papers to the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.47 Such papers are the main means to influence policy-making in the Antarctic Treaty System.

New Zealand's economic interests in Antarctica New Zealand has numerous economic interests in Antarctica. These include: tourism; fishing; providing logistics for national and international Antarctic expeditions; the involvement of New Zealand commercial companies in Antarctica; and the potential for economic exploitation of the findings of scientific research done in Antarctica. Antarctic-related economic activities made a direct contribution to the Canterbury economy (the region surrounding the city of Christchurch) of around NZ$88 million (around US$70 million). It is estimated that the New Zealand economy as a whole earns at least NZ$133 million (around US$105 million) per annum from its Antarctic involvement.48 Currently boats from the USA, Italy, Korea, China and Russian Antarctic programmes visit Christchurch's port of Lyttleton on a regular basis and other Antarctic-related vessels also visit. As part of its plan to be a logistics and scientific research hub for Antarctic activities, the Christchurch city council has established Antarctic collaboration with the US, Italian, British, Australian, Korean, Russian, German, Canadian, Chinese, Argentine, South African, Chilean and Indian Antarctic programmes as well as with local body authorities in those countries engaged in Antarctica.49 New Zealand is particularly keen to exploit the potential economic benefits of Antarctic scientific research.50 However, so far, the government is cautious about involving commercial operators on a large scale in the New Zealand Antarctic programme overall. This is further evidence of the strategic importance of Antarctica to New Zealand and the government's desire to maintain political control of New Zealand's activities there. New Zealand's Antarctic tourism includes the sea tours organised by New Zealand-based companies to the sub-Antarctic islands south of New Zealand and to the Ross Dependency. The Antarctic tours of New Zealand-based companies must include a New Zealand government observer, to ensure that the proper environmental protocols are followed. New Zealand is the only Antarctic nation to insist on this.51 This practice serves to reinforce New

Zealand's Antarctic claim as well as ensure its environmental protocols are followed during tourism activities. New Zealand's Antarctic tourism also includes New Zealand-based Antarctic tourism which draws on New Zealand's Antarctic heritage and ongoing connections such as the International Antarctic Attraction in Christ-church and the Antarctic display in the Kelly Tarlton Underwater World in Auckland. The Canterbury and Invercargill museums both have substantial Antarctic displays and there is a wealth of other Antarctic-related sites in Christ-church, Wellington and Invercargill; where many Antarctic expeditions were launched from or famous Antarctic explorers once lived. Ross Sea and Southern Ocean fishing by New Zealand fishing companies brings in approximately NZ$20 million (US$15 million) per annum into the New Zealand economy.52 The depletion of fish in these areas has a flow-on effect on the availability of fish in New Zealand's adjacent EEZ. Hence the level of fish stocks in the Ross Sea and Southern Ocean and the rate of illegal unregulated and unreported fishing there is of direct interest to New Zealand. New Zealand is a strong advocate of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which manages and monitors fish stocks in the Antarctic seas.

New Zealand's political interests in Antarctica New Zealand has a strong political interest in maintaining its claim to the Ross Dependency and its ongoing involvement in international Antarctic governance. New Zealand is an island state, remote from the rest of the world, with a population of only 4.3 million. New Zealand has always been dependent on other states for maintaining its security and access to markets and it is particularly reliant on multilateral alliances to pursue its foreign policy goals. Hence it relies on the Antarctic Treaty and the international collaborations which have stemmed from it to help preserve New Zealand's claim to the Ross Dependency and further New Zealand's wider interests in Antarctica. As part of this, New Zealand puts considerable efforts into gaining leadership positions within the Antarctic Treaty System. Currently New Zealanders head several key leadership positions in the ATS including: the Chair of the Committee on Environmental Protection; the Executive Secretary for and head Office of the Council of Managers of National

Antarctic Programmes, COMNAP (at the campus of the University of Canterbury in Christchurch); a Vice-Chair of the COMNAP Committee; the Secretary of SCAR's Evolution and Biodiversity Group; and Co-deputy Chair of the Standing Committee of Antarctic Data Management (SCADM). Whereas some ATCPs such as China and India are critical of the ATS, New Zealand has a direct political interest in the continuance of the Antarctic Treaty and its various associated bodies of international law. New Zealand does not have the resources to defend its Ross Dependency claim, so it relies heavily on the structures of the Antarctic Treaty and other international regimes to continue to do so. New Zealand has a stronger interest than most Antarctic nations in ensuring that Antarctica continues to be peaceful and free from military conflict. New Zealand is the second closest nation to Antarctica and any conflict there would likely have a spill-on effect in New Zealand.

New Zealand's environmental interests in Antarctica Antarctica has a critical role in global climate change. As a close neighbour of Antarctica, New Zealand has a direct interest in changes in the Antarctic environment and how they might affect us. Climate change in Antarctica will have a direct and immediate effect on New Zealand ecosystems, and overfishing of Antarctic seas fish stocks is likely to affect fishing in its EEZ. At certain times of the year the hole in the Antarctic ozone stretches from the Antarctic continent to completely cover New Zealand. As a consequence New Zealand puts a high priority on the conservation of the “intrinsic and wilderness values” of both the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean and regards maintaining these as a strategic interest of New Zealand.53 Like all nations with an early Antarctic involvement, New Zealand wasn't always conscious of environmental concerns when working in Antarctica. However, currently New Zealand prides itself on being a leader on environmental matters in Antarctica. It was the first country to prepare a comprehensive environmental evaluation under the requirements of the 1999 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Nowadays, maintaining high environmental standards in New Zealand's own Antarctic activities is one way for New Zealand to guarantee its ongoing influence in Antarctic international fora.54 New Zealand currently chairs the Antarctic Treaty's Committee for Environmental Protection, which is an important means to

ensure its views on these issues are heard and understood by other Antarctic nations.

Antarctica in New Zealand foreign policy New Zealand's Antarctic activities give the nation a level of status and international profile which would be impossible to achieve without that connection. New Zealand regards Antarctica as a “national asset” which gives it much needed leverage in its dealings with other nations.55 For example, during the period from 1984 to 2006 when US–New Zealand highlevel defence and security-related bilateral relations were in the doldrums due to New Zealand's declared non-nuclear policy, New Zealand's interactions with the USA over Antarctic matters continued to be relatively constructive. However, they may have been a factor in the negative reaction to the suggestion of New Zealand-Swedish collaborations which Aant Elzinga describes in his chapter in this volume. Nonetheless, overall, the positive relations between the two countries in Antarctica meant that when high-level relations did eventually improve, it was easy to move back to more normal interactions. Regardless of any other problems in the bilateral relationship, it is in the USA's interest to maintain easy access to its facilities at McMurdo and the Scott-Amundsen South Pole Research Station, as much as it is in New Zealand's interest to continue cooperating with the USA on Antarctica. Neither the USA nor New Zealand could afford New Zealand public opinion to turn against the US use of New Zealand facilities to access its key Antarctic stations, all of which are located in the Ross Dependency. However, since 1984 (when New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy was first announced) the USA has punished New Zealand for its anti-nuclear policy by banning visits to the country from US military vessels.56 The stalemate occurred because New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation requires that visiting foreign ships must declare if they are nuclear powered or carry nuclear weapons, with which the USA still refuses to comply. For twenty years the US ban on its naval ships visiting New Zealand had a small, but significant, impact on the logistics support provided by the US military which helps move New Zealand scientists to Antarctica. The US ban included visits to New Zealand of the boats of the US Coast Guard. This meant that after the

ANZUS split,57 when the US Coast Guard icebreakers travelled to Antarctica to break up the ice in advance of the merchant ships which bring supplies to McMurdo, the South Pole Scott–Amundsen Base and New Zealand's Scott Base, they had to avoid the most obvious port of departure, Christchurch's port Lyttleton, and leave from Hobart, in Australia. However, the pettiness of this political gesture from the US defence establishment has now been overridden by financial practicalities and the limitations of US icebreaking capabilities to deal with thick Antarctic sea ice. Since 2007 the USA has hired either a Swedish or a Russian icebreaker to clear a channel into McMurdo Sound. US military planes are excluded from the ban on visiting New Zealand, so the Christchurch–McMurdo fights provided by the US Air Force, US Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve58 have continued, unaffected by the controversy over New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy. New Zealand's passing of its anti-nuclear legislation in 1985 led to the US Government's suspension of ANZUS obligations to New Zealand. Until that date ANZUS had joined the three countries in a military alliance which had lasted thirty-five years. Since 1985 New Zealand has been shut out of many aspects of military cooperation with the USA. Any joint training exercises require a presidential waiver.59 However, despite the end of ANZUS and the pressure it has put on NZ–US military interactions, each year between twenty and sixty New Zealand Defence Force personnel work alongside the US military in facilitating the NZ–US joint logistics pool and other Antarctic activities.60 New Zealand also values its Antarctic connections for the opportunity it affords New Zealand diplomats in finding common points and opportunities for collaboration with other nations. The Antarctic Treaty System governs Antarctica on a consensus basis through the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). However, like many international organisations, much of the deal-broking is done behind the scenes before the meetings among blocs of like-minded countries. New Zealand currently coordinates closely with the USA and Australia, as well as frequently with Chile, on Antarctic policy matters. Oddly, given the strong awareness on the part of both the New Zealand and Australian governments of the need to forge new regional groupings to reflect the changes in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years, neither have yet applied to join the Asian Forum for Polar Science (AFOPS). AFOPS coordinates polar policy

and science among China, India, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea — all Asia-Pacific countries who New Zealand and Australia are linked to in other forums such as APEC. Joining AFOPS would be an opportunity for both New Zealand and Australia to forge closer links with some of the most proactive members of the ATS who have a collective Antarctic budget which exceeds that of Russia. New Zealand has extremely close scientific and logistical collaborations with the US, Australian, British, Chilean, German and Italian Antarctic national programmes and it is exploring opportunities for collaboration with the Korean national programme. New Zealand also helped Malaysia develop an Antarctic research programme by offering beds at Scott Base to Malaysian scientists. In previous decades Malaysia was one of the leading international critics arguing for Antarctica to be governed by the United Nations. New Zealand's initiative in helping Malaysia to take a positive role in Antarctica illustrates how in the current period, New Zealand manages to both uphold the Antarctic Treaty and to maintain its own claimant rights. Separate from these official links, individual Antarctic researchers in New Zealand have established a wide range of research collaborations with their counterparts all over the world. These collaborations also help to strengthen the place of Antarctica in New Zealand's foreign policy while strengthening the perception (one of the desired goals of Antarctica New Zealand), that New Zealand is “an intellectual and logistics gateway to Antarctica”.61

Conclusion In the current era New Zealand clearly has a strong interest and a vital need to maintain its foothold in Antarctica, more so than most Antarctic nations. From New Zealand's perspective the current Antarctic Treaty System is at present the most effective and efficient means to maintain its ongoing interests in Antarctica. Nevertheless, if the ATS were to collapse, New Zealand's continual efforts to establish a wide-ranging pattern of activities, responsibilities and associations in the territories of the Ross Dependency would help to uphold its claim. New Zealand would never challenge the Antarctic status quo, but it is well aware that there are other nations who are not happy with the way Antarctica is governed and seek major systemic change of the ATS. New Zealand's interests in Antarctica are complex and strongly reflect its geographic proximity. Whatever happens in Antarctica and its surrounding oceans will have a direct impact on New Zealand's economic, political and environmental security, and New Zealand is fully committed to maintaining its strategic interests there at almost any cost.

Notes 1

An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the Polar Record (2011), 47, pp. 126–134, under the title “New Zealand's Strategic Interests in Antarctica”. I am grateful to this publication for permission to republish. British Antarctic Survey, “Frozen in Time: Fossils from the Antarctic”, 2009, w​w​w​.a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.a​c​.u​k​/a​b​o​u​t​_​a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/g​e​o​g​r​a​p​h​y​/r​o​c​k​/f​o​s​s​i​l​-c​o​l​l​e​c​t​i​o​n​.p​h​p.​

2

“NZ Summer Marked by Icebergs”, The Age, 6 January 2005, w​w​w​.t​h​e​a​g​e​.c​o​m​.a​u​/n​e​w​s​/W​o​r​l​d​/N​Z​-s​u​m​m​e​r​-m​a​r​k​e​d​-b​y​-i​c​e​b​e​r​g​s​/2​0​0​5​/0​1​/0​6​/1​1​0​4​8​3​2​2​1​8​7​4​2​.h​t​m​l.​

3

“Icebergs Bear Down on New Zealand”, NZ Herald, 14 November 2009, w​w​w​.n​z​h​e​r​a​l​d​.c​o​.n​z​/n​z​/n​e​w​s​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​.c​f​m​?c​_​i​d​=1​o​b​j​e​c​t​i​d​=1​0​6​0​9​3​1​1​.

4

w​w​w​.n​z​h​i​s​t​o​r​y​.n​e​t​.n​z​/p​o​l​i​t​i​c​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​-a​n​d​-n​z​.

5

R. Moroney, “Erebus: 30 Years On”, Hawkes Bay Today, 28 November 2009, w​w​w​.h​a​w​k​e​s​b​a​y​t​o​d​a​y​.c​o​.n​z​/l​o​c​a​l​/n​e​w​s​/e​r​e​b​u​s​-3​0​-y​e​a​r​s​-o​n​/3​9​0​6​9​9​2​/.

6

w​w​w​.l​e​g​i​s​l​a​t​i​o​n​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/r​e​g​u​l​a​t​i​o​n​/i​m​p​e​r​i​a​l​/1​9​2​3​/0​9​7​4​/l​a​t​e​s​t​/D​L​M​1​1​9​5​.h​t​m​l.​

7

w​w​w​.m​f​a​t​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/F​o​r​e​i​g​n​-R​e​l​a​t​i​o​n​s​/A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/1​-N​e​w​A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p.​

8

Dame Alison Quentin-Baxter, email communication, 18 November 2009.

9

http://cabinetmanual.cabinetOffice.govt.nz/appendix-a. My analysis of this point was confirmed in an email communication from Trevor Hughes, Head of the Antarctic Policy Unit, MFAT, NZ, 18 November 2009.

Z​e​a​l​a​n​d​-a​n​d​-

10 Karen Scott, email communication, 18 November 2009. I am extremely grateful to Ms Scott for her legal advice in phrasing this section and other Antarctic international law related aspects within the paper. 11 See Malcolm Templeton, A Wise Adventure: New Zealand and

Antarctica 1920–1960, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000. 12 Stuart Prior, personal communication, 26 November 2009. 13 w​w​w​.s​c​a​r​.o​r​g​/t​r​e​a​t​y​/a​t​_text.html. 14 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, Antarctica New Zealand, 3 July 2008, p. 7. 15 Ibid. 16 Stuart Prior, “Antarctica: View from a Gateway”, Working Paper, 5/97, Center for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, p. 7. 17 w​w​w​.n​z​h​e​r​a​l​d​.c​o​.n​z​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/n​e​w​s​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​.c​f​m​&l_id=2objectid=10470725. 18 w​w​w​.m​f​a​t​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/F​o​r​e​i​g​n​- R​e​l​a​t​i​o​n​s​/A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/i​n​d​e​x​.p​h​p.​ 19 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, part 1. 20 www.antarcticanz.govt.nz/. 21 w​w​w​.c​c​c​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/c​i​t​y​l​e​i​s​u​r​e​/a​r​t​s​c​u​l​t​u​r​e​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​c​o​n​n​e​c​t​i​o​n​s​.a​s​p​x.​ 22 w​w​w​.s​c​o​o​p​.c​o​.n​z​/s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/A​K​0​9​0​9​/S​0​0​4​2​7​.h​t​m.​ 23 www.anta.canterbury.ac.nz/. 24 w​w​w​.v​i​c​t​o​r​i​a​.a​c​.n​z​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​/p​e​o​p​l​e​/i​n​d​e​x​.a​s​p​x​. 25 h​t​t​p​://e​r​t​h​.w​a​i​k​a​t​o​.a​c​.n​z​/r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/u​n​i​t​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​/. 26 www.maths.otago.ac.nz/asog/. 27 See the detailed list of the profiles of New Zealand researchers with Antarctic interests at www.nzuaa.org/. 28 w​w​w​.l​a​n​d​c​a​r​e​r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​.c​o​.n​z​/r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/e​c​o​s​y​s​t​e​m​s​/p​e​n​g​u​i​n​s​/. 29 w​w​w​.g​n​s​.c​r​i​.n​z​/w​h​a​t​/e​a​r​t​h​h​i​s​t​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/c​r​p​.h​t​m​l​. 30 w​w​w​.n​i​w​a​.c​o​.n​z​/o​u​r​- s​c​i​e​n​c​e​/c​o​a​s​t​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a.​ 31 Neville Peat, Antarctic Partners: Fifty Years of New Zealand and United States Cooperation in Antarctica, 1957–2007, Wellington: Phantom House Books, 2007, p. 42. 32 w​w​w​.h​e​r​i​t​a​g​e​-a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​.o​r​g​/A​H​T​/.

33 This section draws on the information in the Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011. 34 The Italian Antarctic programme operates Mario Zuchelli Station, a summer-only base, located at Terra Nova Bay. 35 “Wind Farm to Open at Antarctic Base”, The Press, 16 January 2010, w​w​w​.s​t​u​f​f​.c​o​.n​z​/t​h​e​-p​r​e​s​s​/n​e​w​s​/3​2​3​4​6​0​4​/W​i​n​d​-f​a​r​m​-t​o​-o​p​e​n​-a​t​-A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​-b​a​s​e.​ 36 Antarctica NZ Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, p. 20. 37 Bryan Storey, Head of Gateway Antarctica, University of Canterbury, email communication, 16 November 2009. 38 w​w​w​.f​i​r​s​t​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/f​u​n​d​i​n​g​/r​e​s​e​a​r​c​h​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a.​ 39 w​w​w​.f​i​r​s​t​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/f​l​e​s​/A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​%2​0​R​e​q​u​e​s​t​%2​0​f​o​r​%2​0​P​r​o​p​o​s​a​l​s​.p​d​f​. 40 E. Butler, Antarctica New Zealand, personal communication, 18 November 2009. 41 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”, 2011, p. 4. 42 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”, 2011, p. 1. 43 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”, 2011, pp. 7, 9, 11. 44 h​t​t​p​://g​c​m​d​.n​a​s​a​.g​o​v​/K​e​y​w​o​r​d​S​e​a​r​c​h​/H​o​m​e​.d​o​?P​o​r​t​a​l​=a​m​d​_​n​z​M​e​t​a​d​a​t​a​T​y​p​e​=0​. 45 P. G. Dastidar, and O. Persson, “Mapping the Global Structure of Antarctic Research vis-à-vis Antarctic Treaty System”, Current Science (2004), 89(9), pp. 1552–1554. 46 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 31. 47 John R. Dudeney and David W. H. Walton, “Leadership in Politics and Science within the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Research (2012), 31, 11075, DOI: 10.3402/polar. v31i0.11075. 48 C. Saunders, P. Dalziel and P. Hayes, “The Contribution of Antarctic-

Related Activities to the Canterbury and New Zealand Economies”, Agribusiness and Economic Research Unit, Lincoln University, 2007. 49 S. Johnston, Christchurch City Council, personal communication, 1 December 2009. 50 “New Zealand's Antarctic and Southern Ocean Science Strategy”, 2011, p. 6. 51 Peat, Antarctic Partners, p. 97. 52 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 7. 53 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2012, p. 8. 54 Antarctica New Zealand Statement of Intent, 2009–2011, p. 13. 55 Prior, “Antarctica: View from a Gateway”, p. 1. 56 “Admiral: US Ships Won't Come Until New Zealand Drops Nuke Ban”, New Zealand Herald, 3 September 2009, w​w​w​.n​z​h​e​r​a​l​d​.c​o​.n​z​/n​u​c​l​e​a​r​-s​h​i​p​s​-b​a​n​/n​e​w​s​/a​r​t​i​c​l​e​.c​f​m​?c​_​i​d​=1​5​0​0​9​5​9​o​b​j​e​c​t​i​d​=1​0​5​9​4​8​9​0​. 57 ANZUS: The Australia, New Zealand United States Treaty (1951) which binds Australia and the US and Australia and NZ to defend each other in the event of a military attack. Originally a three-way treaty, NZ– US military relations broke off in 1984 over NZ's anti-nuclear legislation. 58 w​w​w​.u​s​a​p​.g​o​v​/u​s​a​p​g​o​v​/a​b​o​u​t​U​S​A​P​P​a​r​t​i​c​i​p​a​n​t​s​/i​n​d​e​x​.c​f​m​?m​=1​. 59 “Admiral: US Ships Won't Come Until New Zealand Drops Nuke Ban.” 60 Antarctica FAQ, w​w​w​.n​z​d​f​.m​i​l​.n​z​/o​p​e​r​a​t​i​o​n​s​/d​e​p​l​o​y​m​e​n​t​s​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/2​0​0​7​0​2​1​5​-a​f​a​q​.h​t​m.​ 61 w​w​w​.a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​n​z​.g​o​v​t​.n​z​/i​n​t​l​-c​o​n​n​e​c​t​i​o​n​s​/1​0​1​8​.

9

The French Connection

The role of France in the Antarctic Treaty System Chavelli Sulikowski

France an extensive record of positive involvement in the Antarctic region. It is a claimant to continental Antarctic territory, possesses sub-Antarctic islands, and is an original signatory to the 1959 Treaty. France occupies a privileged and well-affirmed position in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region.1 An influential and active member of key Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) institutions, France plays a pivotal role in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) established under the Madrid Protocol.2 As a cooperative, multilateral regime, the Antarctic Treaty has proven to be a successful international instrument for the management of Antarctic affairs for more than five decades.3 It has evolved into a comprehensive system of distinct, but complementary, international institutional arrangements. The Treaty brings together multiple state actors of varying capacities, and involves all the major world powers. A rich school of literature already exists on issues relating to Antarctic law and governance within international environmental law and politics. Numerous studies have focused on issues relating to regime formation, levels of state participation, and problems associated with Treaty compliance and enforcement. However, consideration of how the behaviour of key Treaty member states has helped

shape the evolution of the ATS, has to date, remained a relatively neglected area of analysis. France maintains and pursues significant interests in the Antarctic region. The nature of these interests can be broadly characterised as geopolitical, economic, scientific, and environmental. France's principal Antarctic interests are centred around several key areas: first, preservation of France's Antarctic claim, and enhancement of its regional presence. The political dynamics of Antarctic affairs are changing – international interest in Antarctica is on the rise, with an increasing number of nations either intending to, or already establishing themselves on the continent, on both a temporary and permanent basis. For claimant states in particular, this raises several major concerns – most notably, those relating to sovereignty, resource rights, and environmental management issues. In turn, this has potential implications for how claimant states, such as France, manage, articulate, and undertake their Antarctic interests and agenda. France is therefore especially conscious of the need to strengthen its existing position, in order to remain at the forefront of Antarctic affairs.4 Second, enhancement of Europe's Antarctic presence is of political and strategic importance to France. As a dominant European power, promoting a European Polar dimension significantly strengthens France's regional position, and improves its capacity to remain actively engaged in Antarctic affairs.5 Third, France pursues excellence in Antarctic science, and seeks to remain an international leader in research domains.6 Finally, France places increasing emphasis on addressing environmental issues in the Antarctic region, particularly in the face of climate change – a topic that is being increasingly discussed and debated at the highest political levels internationally.7 It is important to note that these categories of interests are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive but, rather, frequently occur in varying combinations, overlap, and interchange in terms of scale and level of importance. This in turn depends upon both internal or domestic changes and effects occurring within France, as well as external factors, taking place both within the regional and international arenas.

France's behaviour within the ATS can be characterised as influential, committed, and cooperative. Nevertheless, as this chapter points out, France reserves the right to assert its national interests when it perceives these interests to be fundamentally at stake – and has acted accordingly in order to preserve its interests on a number of occasions. It must be noted, however, that France recognises, and strongly upholds, the significant value of the Antarctic Treaty, and on the occasions it has chosen to assert its interests it has done so within and with respect to the framework of the Treaty.8 As the complexity and interdependent nature of issues concerning the Antarctic region widen in scope and magnitude, many Treaty member states (particularly those with long-standing and well-established interests), are increasingly engaging in cooperative efforts at a variety of levels. This rise in cooperative activities has emerged as a growing trend among some Treaty members. Importantly, it suggests that states are now, more than ever, prioritising the wider interests of Antarctica – and, to an extent, implies a general relaxation of the pursuit of purely national interests under some circumstances. In light of France's broad range of Antarctic interests, and in order to accommodate a widening Antarctic agenda, French participation within the ATS is increasingly characterised by multi-level international cooperation. This trend is particularly evident since the overturning of the Antarctic Minerals Regime in the late 1980s, followed by the establishment of the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection in 1991.9 In defining a national Antarctic strategy, France, taking both political and scientific considerations into account, is pursuing several main cooperative strategies, most notably: the negotiation of both formal and informal agreements, and the development of bilateral and multilateral partnerships centred around multi-disciplined scientific collaboration; environmental management; resource pooling and logistics sharing; and the development of a coordinated European Polar strategy.

French Antarctic policy organization Consideration of France's Antarctic interests and agenda can be divided into three key areas of analysis: first, the organisation of its Antarctic policy at the domestic level; second, France's management of its key Antarctic interests within the regional policy framework of the European Union (EU); and third, its behaviour at the international level through engagement with the ATS and its associated instruments. It is important to note that France's national systems of management relating to its Antarctic territory, and the way in which France coordinates foreign policy, shape its behaviour within both multi-level regional and international contexts. At the domestic level, France's Antarctic interests and activities are primarily managed by two key agencies – the l'Institut Polaire Français PaulEmile Victor (the IPEV) and the Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (the TAAF). Established in 1992, the IPEV is a public interest group comprised of nine public, or para-public bodies (of which the Ministry of Research, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TAAF, and le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (the CNRS), have the most instrumental roles).10 The Ministry for Higher Education and Research provides an essential component for the IPEV budget, which has an annual budget of €28 million. Of this budget, 90 per cent is allocated to scientific interests, and includes the provision of technology, logistics, equipment, and infrastructure – this also includes non-Polar affairs, such as the chartering of the Marion du Fresne to other regions. Of the IPEV's budget, 9.5 million euro is dedicated to Antarctic affairs (including the salaries of permanent IPEV personnel, this figure is closer to €10.3 million). The IPEV is responsible for the selection and implementation of France's Polar science programmes, as well as those for the French sub-Antarctic territories.11 Providing financial support for an average of sixty-five scientific programmes annually, the IPEV organises research missions, and is responsible for the provision of logistics and infrastructure, as well as the chartering of the French Polar vessels, the Astrolabe, the Marion du Fresne, and La Curieuse.12 Importantly, collaboration (at both the national and international levels) is now a key component of the assessment criteria for proposals submitted to the IPEV for consideration. This has seen the cooperative role of the IPEV extend further

in recent years, to include support and coordination of more regional and international scientific and technological programmes. The role of the IPEV extends to include support and coordination of regional and international scientific and technological programmes. The IPEV employs around 100 permanent staff, with two-thirds of employees drawn from the CNRS. Additionally, a number of contractual staff and civilian volunteers are recruited by the IPEV for the Summer and Winter Polar campaigns on an annual basis to provide further technological assistance. Since the establishment of the IPEV in 1992, France has increasingly occupied an eminent international position in terms of both the volume, as well as the quality, of scientific research it undertakes on the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions. Internationally, France is ranked fifth in relation to the number of published scientific reports produced on the Antarctic. On average, more than 65 per cent of French research articles are on the subAntarctic and Adélie Land.13 France is an international leader in terms of the number of published international scientific reports relevant to the subAntarctic region, surpassing the number of publications produced by other sub-Antarctic island claimant States such as Australia, the UK, and South Africa.14 In terms of the diversity of the research, more than 30 per cent of French publications are focused on terrestrial ecology, with geophysics comprising 16 per cent, and the atmospheric sciences 11 per cent.15 Established under French statutory law in 1955, the TAAF is an overseas territory16 of France that is independently administered by a Préfet from headquarters on Réunion Island.17 The TAAF is responsible for the administration and management of the French sub-Antarctic island territories of Kerguelen, Crozet, Saint Paul, and Amsterdam18, as well as Adélie Land, and the Îles Éparses.19 Its principal role is to ensure the management of ecosystems – including, or in conjunction with, the management of fisheries.20 Management of maritime issues, such as the fight against illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing within the French exclusive economic zones (EEZs), is also an integral area of responsibility of the TAAF. The implementation of scientific activities and programmes that take place on the French islands remains the responsibility of the IPEV.

It is important to note the unique political and legal nature or status of the TAAF, especially in terms of its relationship to the EU. The TAAF does not belong to the EU. European Community (EC) law does not apply to the TAAF, except for the association regime based on Part IV of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EEC Treaty)21 – “Association of the overseas countries and territories” (Articles 182–188 of the ECC Treaty).22 As a result, in regard to fisheries management, the TAAF maintains an autonomous authority over the waters surrounding France's Antarctic and sub-Antarctic territories, while all other French fisheries are managed under the EU's Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).23 In 2007, the French Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technologic Choice (OPESCT),24 on the instigation of the Senate Commission on Economic Affairs, commissioned a report on France's position concerning international issues surrounding Antarctic research. Undertaken just prior to the International Polar Year (IPY) 2007/2008, by French Senator Christian Gaudin, this report intends to provide clarity and definition to France's current Antarctic programme and priorities, highlighting the importance of developing bilateral and multilateral European and international partnerships.25 From a domestic politics perspective, Senator Gaudin's report draws attention to aspects of France's national Antarctic management arrangements requiring improvement – specifically, the need to develop a clearer articulation of the respective powers and responsibilities of the IPEV and the TAAF. In order to remain a pivotal player in Antarctic science, both France's organisation of research, and its capacity to engage in cooperative activities at multiple levels, is essential. Results from Senator Gaudin's report identify the absence of an “active policy of national cooperation”, regarding the capacity and extent of interagency coordination between the IPEV, the TAAF, research laboratories, scientists, and key funding bodies. Improved coordination processes would promote coherency, direction, and permanency between both agencies, and ultimately improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of French Antarctic policy. In March 2009, French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed former Prime Minister Michel Rocard as French Ambassador for international negotiations relating to the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This role seeks to improve the

coordination of France's national Polar agenda and policies, so it may enhance its capacity to pursue its Antarctic agenda and key interests in the region – most notably, maintaining its regional presence, promoting the French territories via scientific research, and remaining fully active both regionally and internationally in the Antarctic sphere. In October 2010, President Sarkozy appointed Senator Gaudin as the new préfet of the TAAF. This action can certainly be perceived as an endorsement of Senator Gaudin's recommendations, and a precursor to improved coordination. As a member of the EU, France's Antarctic, and especially its subAntarctic policies, must take into consideration regional frameworks and policies established by the European Commission (EC). This is most clear in relation to fisheries issues within CCAMLR – where the distribution of fisheries competencies between the EC and its member states calls for enhanced policy coherency and coordination.26

France and Antarctica – an historical perspective France's historical legacy in the Antarctic region dates back to the 1700s.27 The discoveries and territorial claims made by early French explorers, such as Bouvet de Lozier, Marion du Fresne, Kerguelen de Trémarec, and Bruni d'Entrecasteaux, ensured that France dominated the first phase of eighteenth century Antarctic exploration.28 The nineteenth century witnessed a surge of international Antarctic interest, with many European expeditions undertaking voyages in an attempt to locate the South magnetic pole. In 1837, Jules Sébastien Cesar Dumont d'Urville, commissioned by King Louis Philippe, led France in the international race to locate this pole, seeking also to extend France's sphere of influence in the region. During this voyage, d'Urville charted and claimed several islands in the name of France – Louis Philippe Land, Joinville Land, and Rosamel Island, as well as the Adélie Coast (Terre Adélie), and Pointe Géologie.29 A desire for ce's increasing interest in the Antarctic region and, to a considerable extent, determined the strategic and economic importance of Antarctica to French national interests. Claiming South Pacific territories in the 1800s prompted France to secure naval routes and nearby territory in the Southern Ocean region. It was therefore strategically sound for France to expand its sphere of influence as far south as the Antarctic.30 At this time, voyages of exploration and discovery began to reflect national policies to a greater extent. Following several decades of limited international Antarctic activity, the Sixth International Geographical Congress in 1895 revived interest in the region. French Antarctic interest was rekindled with the 1903–1905 and 1908–1910 expeditions of Jean-Baptise Charcot, whose scientific voyages also sought to reaffirm France's regional presence.31 As states began to realise the potential strategic and economic value of Antarctica – prompted by increasing international competition for declining whale stocks, and a growing interest in Southern Ocean fisheries, several nations set about claiming portions of the continent.32 The partition of

Antarctica commenced in 1908 when the United Kingdom (UK) formally claimed Antarctic territory, followed by New Zealand in 1923, and France in 1924 with the annexation of Adélie Land.33 In 1924, Adélie Land, the Îles Kerguelen, the Îles Crozet, and the Îles St. Paul and Amsterdam, were placed under French Fisheries Regulations, and were managed by the French Government of Madagascar. Antarctic exploration entered a new phase in the late 1940s, as several nations established permanent occupancy on both the continent and subAntarctic islands. France was among the first nations to establish research stations in the Antarctic during the 1950s.34 This followed approval by the French Government of a proposal put forward by explorer and ethnographer Paul Emile Victor in 1945, for the establishment of an official French Antarctic research programme, the Expéditions Polaires Françaises (EPF), which also undertook significant research work in the Arctic.35 Responsible for the organisation of French Polar research expeditions, the EPF established bases on France's sub-Antarctic islands, as well as two continental stations, in preparation for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) scheduled for 1957–1958.36 On 6 August 1955, the TAAF, comprising the Îles Kerguelen, the Îles Crozet, the Îles St. Paul and Amsterdam, and Terre Adélie was established as an overseas territory of France. While demonstrating a strong commitment to science, the establishment of the French national research stations also highlights the increasing development of political interests in Antarctica throughout the post-World War II period. Although stations were established in anticipation of the upcoming IGY, they also lent legitimacy to existing claims by establishing occupancy.37 The IGY demonstrated the value of ongoing international scientific cooperation in the Antarctic, while also providing the opportunity to put aside sensitive geopolitical issues such as territorial sovereignty disputes, and the non-recognition of existing Antarctic claims by nonclaimant nations, such as the United States (US) and the Soviet Union.38 Consequently, the IGY provided the “vital impetus” and “ground work” for the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty.39 Following fifteen months of preparatory meetings, the Antarctic Treaty was signed on 1 December 1959 in Washington, DC, by representatives of the IGY participating states,40 and entered into force on 23 June 1961.

France and CCAMLR The Antarctic Treaty does not deal with the exploitation, ownership, or management of marine living resources. As Antarctica became the site of increasing global commercial interest in marine resources in the 1970s, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) recognised the importance of establishing a separate, but complementary treaty directly relating to Antarctic marine living resource management.41 Internationally negotiated by the ATCPs, this treaty would involve nations with a direct interest in, or an intention to research or exploit Antarctic marine living resources. In drafting a regime, the ATCPs sought to agree upon key principles that ensured the conservation of marine life, while also allowing the rational harvesting of resources,42 in order to limit the detrimental effects of over-exploitation on Antarctic ecosystems, and to reduce the chance of international conflict over resource use.43 With the commencement of formal convention negotiations in Canberra in early 1978, two issues of major contention became apparent. In the first instance, there was an issue regarding the prioritisation of values – due to the refusal of ATCPs to “prohibit” the potential exploitation of a given resource under a negotiated treaty, the capacity to balance environmental and geobiological values with those of a political and economic nature seemed intrinsically difficult.44 Second, there were considerable tensions surrounding the notion of territorial sovereignty. Bounded differently from that of the Antarctic Treaty,45 the proposed Convention Area's zone of application would impinge upon the sovereignty of several islands lying north of 60° South in the southern sectors of the Indian, and South Atlantic Oceans administered, or claimed by Argentina, Australia, France, Norway, South Africa, and the UK.46 Two special consultative meetings held throughout 1978 failed to resolve these issues, and produce a draft convention that satisfied all parties.47 France objected to a draft produced at an informal conference in Washington, DC in September of the same year, based on concerns relating to sovereignty over its undisputed islands located within the area encompassed by the draft convention. Barnes notes that the issue of Antarctic territorial claims and

sovereignty rights generated the most significant pressure on ATCPs in their attempt to establish a convention.48 In spite of the development of revised versions of the “written understanding” requested by France in order to clarify its sovereign rights in the 200 nautical mile zone49 around Kerguelen and Crozet islands at a meeting in Bern in early 1979, a draft acceptable to all parties failed to be produced.50 Negotiations were further delayed as France requested that either the boundary of the Convention Area be redrawn without the inclusion of its islands, or that “explicit language” be used in the text of the Convention to ensure indisputable French jurisdiction over the waters surrounding Kerguelen and Crozet islands.51 Despite the fact that other member states claiming islands within the Convention Area accepted that Article IV of the draft convention sufficiently protected their sovereignty,52 France requested that a clear identification and articulation of its rights as a coastal state over the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Kerguelen and Crozet islands be included as an annex to the Convention. Several revised draft annex versions were developed by eight countries (including France), in the lead up to the 1979 ATCM held in Washington, DC, however, none was totally acceptable to every state. Following this meeting, an agreed annex version was offered to delegates to present to their respective governments for consideration. This Statement was finally agreed upon, and included as the Chairman's Statement in the Final Act at the diplomatic Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.53 CCAMLR was adopted on 20 May 1980 at a formal conference in Canberra, and entered into force on 7 April 1982. As indicated above, France played a decisive and influential role in the negotiation of the Convention, the development of the Chairman's Statement, and its inclusion as an annex to the Treaty. It did so by consistently exercising its bargaining power as a prominent Treaty member and claimant state, over issues relating to sovereignty rights and territorial jurisdiction within its EEZs. The Chairman's Statement specifically relates to the application of the Convention to the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet islands over which France has jurisdiction, as well as “to waters adjacent to other islands within the Convention Area of application, over which the existence of State sovereignty is recognised by all CCAMLR Contracting Parties”.54 States

claiming sub-Antarctic islands reserve the right to opt out of conservation measures that the state finds objectionable, difficult, or impossible with which to comply. The Statement stipulates that measures relating to marine living resources in the EEZs of Kerguelen and Crozet islands developed by France before the Convention enters into force, will remain effective until altered by France acting within the Commission's framework. France can agree that the waters adjacent to these islands should be included in the area of application of any specific conservation measure under consideration, or indicate that they should be excluded for a particular conservation measure.55 France has remained an active CCAMLR Commission member since the Convention's entry into force.56 Most notably, it has played a significant role in attempting to eliminate the problem of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing for Patagonian Toothfish in its EEZs, and pursues collaborative bilateral efforts in this regard.57 Sharing a common interest in protecting fisheries resources from the persistent problem of IUU fishing within their neighbouring EEZs, the French and Australian governments signed the Cooperative Fisheries Surveillance Treaty in November 2003.58 The Treaty enables the joint surveillance of fishing vessels, collaboration regarding patrol missions, and enhances information exchange. Significantly, the Treaty allows for the “hot pursuit” of an illegal vessel to continue from the territorial sea of one state into the other, on the proviso that the other state has been notified.59 The Australian National Interest Analysis (NIA) report on this Treaty highlights that cooperative action between states sharing similar concerns regarding IUU fishing, is an effective method to address the issue.60 Paul Murphy of the Australian Fisheries Management Authority informed the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Treaties that since the signing of the Treaty, patrol vessels had been successful in deterring illegal fishing activity in the French and Australian maritime areas.61 The Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, was signed in January 2007 by the French and Australian governments. This agreement builds on the 2003 Treaty, and enables the apprehension of an illegal vessel by either Australian or French officers by allowing them to board vessels belonging to either nation in the EEZs of both states.62

France also demonstrates a strong commitment to reducing incidental seabird mortality (bycatch) levels within the EEZs surrounding Kerguelen and Crozet islands, by adopting and implementing a subset of CCAMLR mitigating measures.63 France reported that in the 2006/2007 season, albatross bycatch had been reduced to zero, and the level of mortality for other seabird species decreased from 12,000 birds per annum in the early 2000s, to 1,000 birds by 2008.64 Following France's implementation of a National Plan of Action (NPOA) to reduce bycatch in its EEZ fisheries, CCAMLR's Scientific Committee commended France on its efforts to employ mitigation measures, which resulted in bycatch reductions reported in Subarea 58.6, and Division 58.5.1 in the 2008 season.65 Furthermore, at the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee to the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP),66 held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in April 2010, France, in recognition of its responsibilities under the Agreement, announced its intention to develop an NPOA for the critically endangered Amsterdam albatross.67 A decision to develop similar measures for all species identified as critically endangered occurring within French territory has also been adopted.68

France, CRAMRA, and the reorientation of the ATS Prompted by fears of global petroleum resource scarcity, and significant rises in oil prices during the 1970s,69 international interest in potential exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources became increasingly apparent. With this in mind, the ATCPs turned their attention to negotiating a regime for the regulation of these resources.70 There is no reference to either minerals, or the question of mining in the Antarctic Treaty, nor had provision been made under a separate agreement.71 As with the negotiation of both the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR, the question of mining raised numerous geopolitical, economic, and environmental concerns. The minerals negotiations proved especially challenging and contentious, due to questions relating to sovereignty, territorial claims, resource ownership, and management rights. These factors contributed to the increasing tension between claimants, consultative and non-consultative parties, as well as states without Treaty membership. Despite complex debates and discussions concerning Antarctic mineral resources ensuing for seven years, formal negotiations did not commence until 1982. The result of a lengthy and complicated negotiating process, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), was adopted on 2 June 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand, and opened for signature on 25 November that same year.72 Constituting another instrumental ATS element, the Convention enabled consultative parties to develop principles, rules, and institutions for the regulation and management of potential future mineral resource activities in the region.73 Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) such as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), saw the Convention as essentially a “slippery slope” to future Antarctic mining, and incompatible with environmental protection principles.74 A campaign against the signing of CRAMRA gathered strength in both France and Australia. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Michel Rocard, France was the first nation to publicly state its reservations regarding the Convention in April

1989, before refusing to sign CRAMRA in June the same year.75 Following this, the Australian Government under the leadership of Prime Minister Bob Hawke, announced on 22 May 1989 that Australia would not sign the Convention,76 instead, proposing the development of a comprehensive environmental protection regime that would prohibit mining, and classify Antarctica as an international wilderness reserve.77 At this time, international support for CRAMRA began to decline, as other Treaty parties started to question the legitimacy and potential environmental implications of the Convention.78 France and Australia's joint opposition to CRAMRA effectively brought an end to the Convention, as Article 62 requires the signatures of all claimant states in order for it to enter into force.79 There are two, related explanations for France's support of overturning CRAMRA. The first is connected to the unprecedented growth of the environmental movement globally throughout the 1970s and 1980s.80 The 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Union heightened public environmental awareness worldwide, while controversy over French nuclear testing in the Pacific throughout the 1970s and 1980s instigated global antinuclearisation movements, and prompted the development of the green social movement in France.81 Furthermore, both France and Australia were concerned by a series of major oil spills that occurred in Polar waters in 1989.82 These incidents provided a strong case for environmentalists by internationally publicising the significant risks associated with transporting oil across Polar waters.83 In conjunction with ASOC, eminent French explorer and scientist JacquesYves Cousteau assisted in raising environmental awareness and influencing public opinion on CRAMRA, via petition movements and governmental lobbying.84 However, uncertainty surrounds the details pertaining to the extent of Cousteau's role, due to inconsistent accounts of what took place at informal meetings between Rocard, Hawke, Cousteau, and relevant Australian and French government officials throughout 1989. The French Bureau of the National Assembly commissioned the OPESCT to evaluate and report on the economic issues and ecological risks associated with Antarctic mining in 1989. According to Senator Gaudin, the results of this report further cemented President Mitterrand's opposition (on Cousteau's

further recommendation) to CRAMRA, in favour of negotiating a new environmental protection agreement for the Antarctic.85 However, according to Woolcott,86 although Cousteau “endorsed the [nature reserve] idea in principle”, he did not rule out the possibility of environmentally safe mining at some point in the future. This draws into question the extent of Cousteau's influence on the French Government, and does not exclude the possibility that Cousteau was in fact approached by the French Government to stir antimining sentiments, and sway public opinion in the pro-CRAMRA states, due to his widespread international credibility.87 According to Hawke, Cousteau supported the concept of an Antarctic nature reserve, and agreed to an indefinite ban on mining, at an informal meeting in Paris on 18 June 1989. Hawke believed his collaboration with Cousteau fundamentally influenced Rocard's decision to oppose CRAMRA, and that the immense pressure exerted by the Cousteau Foundation on the French Government prompted Rocard to reject the Convention publicly.88 The second explanation relates more directly to French domestic politics. Given the contention surrounding France's environmental credentials throughout the 1970s (due to nuclear testing in the Pacific), and the 1980s (due to the bombing of the Greenpeace vessel, Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland Harbour in July 1985 in an attempt to prevent anti-nuclear protesting), it is possible that in overturning CRAMRA, France sought to improve its environmental image internationally.89 Elliott notes that the new French Socialist Government (formed after the Socialists regained majority in Parliament in June 1988) under President Mitterrand presented solid environmental credentials, with the appointment of Minister for the Environment, Brice Lalonde, a founder of Les Amis de la Terre.90 According to Elliott, as “one of the least conservationist of the Treaty parties”, France's decision to overturn CRAMRA was an attempt on behalf of the French Government to reduce the power of the green vote, and was therefore, couched more in domestic politics rather than environmental goodwill.91 Supporting this theory, McCulloch adds that a desire “to placate a growing environmental lobby” partly contributed to France's decision to refuse signing CRAMRA.92

France and the Madrid Protocol on environmental Protection Following CRAMRA's demise in 1989–1990, France and Australia placed the concept of an Antarctic environmental protection regime on the immediate consultative party agenda, seeking to have their initiative “adopted as an institutional goal” within the Antarctic regime.93 Given the strong ongoing support for the minerals regime demonstrated by many of the powerful contracting parties,94 and considering the hostility both Australia and France faced in their overturning of CRAMRA, the capacity to gain consensus on a new environmental protection treaty that prohibited Antarctic mining seemed a highly ambitious undertaking. The development of an environmental protection agreement signified a major turning point in Antarctic affairs. With demonstrated experience in the development of environmental agreements, it was logical for Australia to adopt a leadership role in Protocol negotiations. As an influential and well respected actor both regionally, as well as on the global scale, France played a pivotal role in encouraging and leading other European nations throughout both the process of moving towards negotiations, and also during the actual development of the Protocol. This complementary approach pursued by France and Australia enabled initial challenges associated with the concept of an environmental agreement to be overcome, and ultimately resulted in the realisation of an optimum outcome – the establishment of comprehensive environmental principles for the Antarctic. Despite significant initial reservations, ATCPs moved away from the prospect of mineral exploitation, in favour of institutionalising environmental protection principles for the Antarctic under a legally binding agreement. After only four negotiating sessions conducted over a twelve-month period, ATCPs accepted the French-Australian proposal, and signed the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection in 1991. Its entry into force in 1998 confirmed the redundancy of CRAMRA for the foreseeable future. Described as “an extraordinary achievement in international diplomacy”, the Protocol (including six annexes)95 constitutes an integral part of the ATS. It provides a comprehensive environmental protection framework,96 by consolidating environmental measures into a single agreement under the

Antarctic Treaty.97 Significantly, the Protocol places “an indefinite ban on all activities relating to [Antarctic] mining with a review after fifty years”.98 The Protocol is established in Article 11, and defined in Article 12, the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP), which provides advice and recommendations to the ATCPs at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings.99 The CEP is comprised of Treaty member states that are also signatories to the Protocol. To date, major issues in the CEP have included: environmental impact assessments; area protection and management (including specially protected areas and historic sites); environmental monitoring and reporting; waste management; prevention of marine pollution; review of Annex II of the Protocol;100 and prevention of the introduction of non-indigenous species. France plays an active role in the CEP, and has made valuable contributions in a variety of issue areas. Most notable has been its work on the development of measures aimed at limiting non-native species introduction and transition between sites. This has been identified as a priority one issue in the CEP five-year work plan, and an area on which France has collaborated extensively with both Australia and New Zealand.101 At the thirty-third ATCM, held in Punta del Este in May 2010, France proposed amendments to the rules of procedure governing the participation of experts in the meetings of ATCM bodies. This would enable wider categories of experts (including those not belonging to international organisations with a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica), to attend and participate in meetings, and to have their comments or recommendations included in the meeting report.102 France's proposal received initial support; however, informal consultations undertaken by France indicated that a consensus text could not be agreed upon between parties at ATCM XXXIII.103 France has also taken a leadership role in developing site guidelines for visitors to Antarctica, particularly in relation to the environmental aspects and impacts of Antarctic tourism. In conjunction with Australia and New Zealand, it initiated an assessment study on this issue in May 2009.104 France also concentrates its efforts on improving the assessment of cumulative environmental impacts in Antarctica – particularly in relation to the activities of tourism operators.105 Based on its work on this issue, France has encouraged the establishment of a method to centralise tourism and

nongovernmental activity authorisation, in order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of potential cumulative environmental impacts.106 France's commitment as a CEP member, and the valuable role France has played in CEP proceedings, was formally recognised with the selection of French scientist Dr Yves Frenot as Vice Chairman of the CEP in 2005 and Dr Frenot's election as CEP Chairman at the ATCM in 2010.107

France, international cooperation, and the ATS Antarctic affairs are fundamentally characterised by a long-standing network of international cooperation.108 Brought to the fore following the success of the 1957/1958 IGY, the principle of international cooperation underpins the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and its related provisions and, importantly, has played a decisive role in shaping the behaviour of Treaty member states. Despite a long-standing legacy of international cooperation in the region, a number of Treaty parties are now, more than ever, engaging in cooperative activities for a number of reasons. Nations involved in Antarctic affairs are increasingly demonstrating a common desire to improve knowledge and understanding of the region. International cooperation is not only an efficient, but indeed a necessary step in addressing issues requiring collective solutions, such as environmental protection, marine resource management, and climate change. Antarctica is at the centre of international climate change research – accounting for the highest percentage of research activities undertaken in the region.109 In addition to the significant environmental concerns associated with climate change, related geopolitical and economic considerations are broadening at the global level. As a shared sense of urgency concerning climate change rises, some member states are increasingly recognising the critical importance of cooperating to identify common research priorities, to concentrate efforts in areas of mutual scientific interest, and to develop effective collaborative programmes.110 As the scale of Polar science programmes and initiatives widens, so too does the financial cost associated with undertaking necessary research activities – with some nations spending up to 80 per cent of their total Antarctic budget on logistics and infrastructure.111 This provides another major incentive for increased cooperation, particularly in relation to the sharing of logistics, infrastructure, and Polar vessels. In France's case, the geographical isolation of its Antarctic bases accentuates the importance of undertaking cooperative efforts. Unlike other Antarctic claimant states (with the exception of Norway and the UK),112 France has maintained a bi-polar agenda – engaging in activities

in both the Antarctic and Arctic regions.113 This necessitates a significant division of both national funding and resources, and requires a higher level of coordination between national, regional, and international agencies. Given Antarctica's geographical distance, and considering it does not claim territory in the Arctic, France places particular emphasis on pursuing cooperative initiatives and policies in relation to the Antarctic region. As a major, and ongoing contributor to Polar research, France is a leader in Antarctic science programmes at both regional and international levels, and places significant emphasis on continuing this trend. At the regional level, France is a driving force in European Polar affairs – demonstrating a high level of participation in key European Polar science agencies, and engaging collaboratively on joint research projects and initiatives at both bilateral and multilateral levels. Internationally, France is a pivotal player in Antarctic science. A major participant in multilateral initiatives such as the IPY, France is also a key contributor to major international Antarctic organisations and instruments, such as CCAMLR and the CEP. Considering the significant position science occupies on the French Antarctic agenda, and given its extensive record of scientific involvement, France perceives the maintenance of a permanent scientific presence in the Antarctic region to be of crucial importance to its overall interests in the region.114 Europe is a powerful actor in Antarctic affairs, with European Polar agencies constituting an “intricate and fertile network”, operating across extensive Polar regions, and encompassing multi-disciplinary research.115 Accordingly, this network encourages and facilitates high-level research via “healthy doses” of both cooperation and competition between European nations.116 The capacity to undertake successful Polar research relies on international cooperation and collaboration.117 As an increasing number of states become involved with, and active in Antarctic affairs, France considers the development of an effective and coordinated Antarctic strategy at the European level to be an essential step in terms of the future direction of Polar affairs and, most importantly, fundamental to the maintenance of France's key interests in the region. France actively encourages the concept of the establishment of a centralised European Polar agency in order to: increase funding

opportunities; assist with the financial costs of research, logistics, and infrastructure; develop regional research networks; and promote the establishment of an organised cooperative Polar program within EU states. In this regard, France is particularly interested in strengthening existing bi-polar cooperation with Germany and Italy, as a means of initiating an overall European collaborative strategy. According to the French Minister of Higher Education and Research, François Goulard, the most effective direction for France to pursue in the future is that of international and, in particular, European cooperation.118 Broadening the scope of the European Antarctic dimension would enable a joint maximisation of resources, and facilitate the development of multinational and coordinated long-term planning between European countries. An enhanced pan European capacity would assist France in remaining at the forefront of Antarctic affairs.119 France's joint venture with Italy in the establishment of Concordia Station (Dome C) – a permanent research station located at the interior of the continent, but within the Australian Antarctic sector,120 provides a pertinent example of France's capacity to develop a highly successful bilateral collaborative partnership. It also serves to highlight the emphasis France places on enhancing the overall European presence in the Antarctic region, and its commitment to pursuing excellence in scientific research. Operated year-round since 2005,121 Concordia is currently the only joint continental station in full operation.122 It intends to provide a platform for international cooperation on which to base and support research programmes with shared objectives, and to ultimately improve the capacity of the international scientific community in undertaking Antarctic research projects in a number of domains.123 Dome C provided one of the two sites selected for deep ice drilling for the European Project for Ice Core Drilling in Antarctica (EPICA), and has undergone initial site testing for the launch of an international astronomy programme. In establishing Concordia, France sought to strengthen collaborative ties with its key European partners, thereby enhancing not only the overall Antarctic presence of the EU, but also reaffirming the French presence. France, Germany, and Italy are all open to the development of a Rome – Berlin – Paris triangle for Polar research. This would mean German involvement at Concordia, and the Italians joining the Franco-German base in

Ny-Ålesund on Spitsbergen, in the Arctic. The French – German – Italian trilateral process was commenced with the signing of an initial agreement for the development of a tripartite research programme at Concordia – albeit limited to specific research on tropospheric aerosols and cloud cover. At the same time, France recognises that this must not be incompatible with other forms of cooperation. Having expressed interest in participating scientifically and operationally at Concordia, and being capable of strengthening the European presence in Antarctica, Spain represents a good example of a potential third party to be included at Concordia.124 France, in conjunction with Italy, recognises the need to develop a two-phase strategy for strengthening their position: first, increasing emphasis must be placed on pursuing programmes of scientific excellence that require limited logistical resources; and, second, the logistical capacity of Concordia must be improved in order to accept larger, multidisciplinary projects in the future.125 This would widen the scope of not only European research ventures, but also provide a gateway to international research activities.126 Regionally, France engages in Antarctic affairs through the European Polar Board (EPB),127 and the European Polar Consortium (EPC).128 While the EPB is a permanent science and advisory committee, the EPC was a fouryear initiative established to essentially consider how to better integrate and share resources among European countries active in the Polar regions.129 The IPEV has been a driving force in both the EPB and EPC, and provides support to the management and operation of the EPC in conjunction with the European Science Foundation (ESF). The EPB aims to identify and prioritise Polar science issues that are of common European interest, and to enhance Europe's capacity to participate at the global level.130 In establishing an integrated network for European Polar activities, the EPB intends to provide a strategic platform upon which to develop a future European Polar entity. The cooperative capacity of European research teams was put to the test during the highly successful EPICA project – a multinational initiative established and supported by the EC's framework programme, the ESF, as well as individual national Polar agencies.131 Commenced in 1995, and concluded in 2006 (after a six-year extension of the project in 2000), EPICA was undertaken in order to complement the

results of the highly successful Greenland Ice Core Project (GRIP). EPICA aimed to obtain the most extensive chronological climate record possible from Antarctica, on which to base studies of climate variability in both the Polar regions. The multilateral project involved obtaining ice cores from two different sites, Concordia Station (Dome C), and Germany's Kohnen Station, with research teams and funding support from ten European countries.132 Drilling at Concordia concluded 21 December 2004, when after reaching a depth of over three thousand metres, scientists extracted what is currently, to date, the world's oldest ice core. This extended the climatic record to over 900,000 years. The IPEV was a partner and major participant in EPICA and, along with their Italian counterparts, Programma Nazionale di Richerche in Antartide (PNRA), significantly contributed to the provision and coordination of logistical support necessary to undertake deep ice drilling at Concordia.133 Internationally, France stresses two main priorities. First, developing international partnerships that demonstrate strong collaborative potential. Second, pursuing a leadership role in research domains in which it excels internationally.134 While actively encouraging and engaging in bilateral and trilateral European partnerships, France also recognises the importance of pursuing and strengthening wider international networks of cooperation. Specifically, it is recognising that cooperation with the four countries whose bases are geographically the most proximal to the French stations (the US, Italy, Australia, and New Zealand) should be favoured, without necessarily maintaining a special approach towards these countries. Particular areas of potential cooperation with Australia are identified: logistics cooperation (especially since Australia and France both share Hobart, Tasmania, as their main Antarctic gateway), and astronomical research at Concordia.135 France continues to work with both Australia and Japan on the Collaborative East Antarctic Marine Census (CEAMARC) in the Dumont d'Urville Sea.136 France also collaborates extensively with Australia and Italy in the area of astronomical research, as part of the “Antarctic Research, a European Network for Astrophysics” (ARENA) project, undertaken at Dome C.137 Following the success of EPICA, interest in establishing ice core drilling sites in the eastern Antarctic is increasingly emerging among the international scientific community. Dome Argus (Dome A) on the Antarctic Plateau

presents significant potential in this area, with a Chinese research team undertaking sample drilling during the IPY 2007/2008. Given its extensive logistical experience in supporting ice core drilling activities at Concordia France has maintained ongoing collaboration with China on this matter, and is eager to participate in potential future drilling activities at Dome A.138 International cooperation is essential for the realisation of large-scale multinational initiatives, such as the International Polar Year (IPY) – a collaborative multinational initiative focused on enhancing research in the Polar regions.139 The most recent IPY, in 2007/2008, witnessed an unprecedented level of international cooperation. According to the EPB Executive Secretary, Paul Egerton, the IPY facilitates the capacity to “launch a wave of science diplomacy”, by enabling nations to network, and develop common strategies and approaches.140 The most recent IPY saw French researchers involved in almost a quarter of the selected programmes – including eight projects either led, or co-led by French scientists. This highlights not only France's capacity to undertake extensive Polar activities, but also confirms its leadership role, and commitment to excellence in scientific research.

Conclusion France demonstrates a strong commitment to the Antarctic Treaty. It has significantly contributed to the evolution of the ATS, through its integral role in major Treaty instruments and institutional processes. Examination of France's key Antarctic interests and agenda suggests multiple reasons for its engagement in the region, and points to a number of different factors that contribute to France's behaviour and decision making within the ATS. Increasing international interest in the Antarctic, coupled with rising environmental concerns – most notably climate change – are major factors generating pressure on Antarctic Treaty parties. This leads, necessarily, to enhanced and coordinated policy responses from the parties, and reevaluations of their Antarctic agenda and policy priorities. The Antarctic provides a pertinent example of the inextricable nexus between science and politics – the region is vital not only in terms of its capacity to provide a vast, living laboratory in which to undertake multidisciplinary research, but also provides an arena in which Treaty members may exercise foreign policy that directly impacts on how activities – namely scientific research – are undertaken in the region. Although it is widely recognised that science provides a significant “currency of influence” in the Antarctic,141 politics and policy remain very much to the fore, and it is evident that geopolitical interests remain the predominant drivers in terms of shaping the direction of national Antarctic agenda.142 For France, the “culture of cooperation” embodied in the 1959 Treaty provides not only the cornerstone of the entire Treaty system, but also a valuable and efficient method of operation in the Antarctic region. As pointed out by Senator Gaudin, “in the realm of science, cooperation cannot be an objective in itself”.143 France recognises that the extent and direction of its Antarctic involvement in the future will be shaped by its capacity, and intention to continue pursuing coordinated policies aimed at enhancing multilevel cooperation – particularly in relation to scientific research – and by focusing its efforts on establishing partnerships based on the identification of areas of mutual interest and competencies. This must occur regionally, through engagement with France's key European partners, as well as

internationally, under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty. Achievement of this goal will cement France's position as a pivotal player in Antarctic affairs for the foreseeable future.

Notes 1

Christian Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, Report on France's Position with Regard to the International Issues Surrounding Polar Research: The Case of Antarctica, Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technologic Choices, No. 230 (2006–2007), p. 91.

2

The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) are also included under the Antarctic Treaty System.

3

The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated in 1959, and entered into force in 1961.

4

Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 6.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid., p. 1.

7

Christo Pimpirev, “Editorial”, European Polar Board Newsletter, No. 4 (March 2010), p. 1.

8

France and Australia worked together in opposition to the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CRAMRA). While some Treaty parties considered this action to be an attack on the overall integrity of the ATS, France and Australia argued that their decision was in no way intended to undermine the ATS, but rather built upon, and enhanced, the existing institutional capacity of the system to deal with environmental issues. See Richard Herr, Robert Hall, and Marcus Haward, “Introduction – Antarctica's Future: Symbols and Reality”, in Richard Herr, Robert Hall, and Marcus Haward (eds), Antarctica's Future: Continuity and Change, Hobart: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1990, p. 15. See also, “A Joint Australia/French Proposal in the Form of a Paper including a Draft Recommendation for ATCM XV – Comprehensive Measures for the Protection of the Antarctic Environment and its Dependent and Associated Ecosystems”, Working Paper 2, submitted by Australia and France, ATCM XV (Paris, 9–19 October 1989), pp. 3–4.

9

The Madrid Protocol entered into force in 1998.

10 Previously the Institut Français pour la Recherche et la Technologie (the IFRTP), the IPEV was first established in 1992, following the merging of the research missions of the TAAF, and Les Expéditions Polaires Françaises (the EPF). 11 A call for multi-discipline research proposals is extended by the IPEV to the national scientific community annually. Submitted proposals are examined and selected by the Conseil des Programmes Scientifiques et Technologiques (CPST) annually, with proposals selected on the basis of scientific merit and feasibility. 12 The selection of proposals follows a call for the submission of multidiscipline scientific research proposals. Proposals are assessed by the Conseil des Programmes Scientifiques et Technologiques (CPST), on the basis of both scientific merit and feasibility. See w​w​w​.i​n​s​t​i​t​u​t​-p​o​l​a​i​r​e​.f​r​/. 13 Y. Frenot, “Les auteurs francais et les regions polaires dans la presse scientifique”, Rapport d'Activite 2008, G. Jugie. Brest: IPEV, p. 9. 14 Yves Frenot, personal communication, 19 May 2011. 15 Frenot, “Les auteurs francais et les regions polaires dans la presse scientifique”, p. 9. 16 France's overseas Territoires (Territories) and Départements (Departments) are those territories that are administered outside of Europe. From a legal and administrative point of view, Départements and Territoires are significantly different. Currently, the TAAF comprises the only overseas Territoire of France. See Eric Pilloton, “Le statut des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises”, in Christian Cointat (ed.), Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes: Un enjeu pour la planète, une responsabilité pour la France, Rapport d'Information du Sénat No. 132, Commission des Lois Groupe d'études sur l'Arctique, l'Antarctique et les Terres Australes (25 September 2007–2008), pp. 12– 13. 17 Prior to 1955, the territories that now constitute the TAAF were administratively attached to Madagascar. On 6 August 1955, “L'île Saint-Paul, l'Île Amsterdam, l'Archipel Crozet, l'Archipel Kerguelen, la Terre Adélie et les Îles Bassas da India, Europa, Glorieuses, Juan de

Nova et Tromelin” were classified as an overseas Territoire of France (Article 1 of Loi 55–102 of 6 August). Article 2 permits the administration of the territory from Paris, by a chef du territoire (referred to as the administrateur supérieur), assisted by a consultative council (provided for under Article 3). Since 2004, the TAAF has fallen under the administration of a préfet, supported by a consultative council comprising representatives of different ministerial departments. The préfet has a unique role in that the position is not only representative of the French Government, but also of the French Territoire – being represented by a chef de district in each of the French Southern and Antarctic districts. “Le Décret du 21 novembre 1924 rattachant les Îles Saint-Paul et Amsterdam, les archipels Kerguelen et Crozet et la Terre Adélie au gouvernement de Madagascar”, w​w​w​.l​e​g​i​f​r​a​n​c​e​.g​o​u​v​.f​r​/a​f​f​i​c​h​T​e​x​t​e​=J​O​R​F​T​E​X​T​0​0​0​0​0​0​2​9​9​2​9​4​; “Loi nº 55–1052 du 6 Août portant statut des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises et de l'île de Clipperton”, w​w​w​.l​e​g​i​f​r​a​n​c​e​.g​o​u​v​.f​r​/a​f​f​i​c​h​T​e​x​t​e​.d​o​?c​i​d​T​e​x​t​e​=L​E​G​I​T​E​X​T​0​0​0​0​0​6​0​6​8​1​3​6​; “Loi nº 2007–224 du 21 février 2007 portant dispositions statutaires et institutionnelles relatives à l'outre-mer (1), w​w​w​.l​e​g​i​f​r​a​n​c​e​.g​o​u​v​.f​r​/a​f​f​i​c​h​T​e​x​t​e​.d​o​?T​e​x​t​e​=J​O​R​F​T​E​X​T​0​0​0​0​0​0​6​4​1​0​9​9​; Pilloton, “Le statut des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises”, pp. 14–15. 18 Following a recommendation made by le Comité de l'environnement polaire in 1995, the Kerguelen, Crozet, Saint Paul, and Amsterdam archipelagos were classified as a réserve naturelle des Terres australes françaises (a nature reserve), by the Decree No. 2006–1211 of 3 October 2006. See w​w​w​.t​a​a​f​.f​r​/s​p​i​p​/s​p​i​p​.p​h​p​?a​r​t​i​c​l​e​1​1​5​; and “Décret nº 2006– 1211 du 3 octobre 2006 portant création de la réserve naturelle des Terres australes françaises”, Journal Officiel de la République Française (Paris, 4 October 2006). 19 Classified as a nature reserve since 1975, l'Archpiel des Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India, and Europa, are situated in the Mozambique canal; Tromelin is located in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, these islands were transferred by decree to come under the administrative power of the TAAF, under the authority of a préfet. Since 2007, the Îles Éparses have constituted the fifth district of the TAAF. 20 Eric

Pilloton,

“Auditions

du

Groupe

d'études

sur

l'Arctique,

l'Antarctique et les Terres Australes Françaises”, in Cointat, Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes, p. 27. 21 Often referred to as the Treaty of Rome (1957), before it was renamed “The Treaty establishing the European Community”, in 1993. 22 “The Member States agree to associate with the Community the nonEuropean countries and territories which have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom”, Part IV – Association of the overseas countries and territories (Article 182), “Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325 (English Edition), Vol. 45 (24 December 2002), p. 111. Contrary to the outermost regions (ORs), which constitute an integral part of the EU (in France's case, the overseas departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guyana, and Réunion), the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) listed in Annex II of the Treaty are those that are not independent, but linked to a EU member state. OCTs are not part of the EU, even though they are part of their member state, and are therefore exempt from the application of European Community law. 23 Formally established in 1983, the CFP is the EU's instrument for the management of fisheries and aquaculture. The policy underwent significant reform in 2002. Although EU member states have transformed a large measure of their respective fisheries competence to the European Commission (EC), Annex II of the EC Treaty states that this transfer of competence does not apply with respect to certain territories of the member states. See Robin R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987; Robin R. Churchill and Daniel Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010; and Ellen Hey, Developments in International Fisheries Law, Cambridge, MA: Kluwer Law, 1999. 24 OPESCT was established by Act No. 83–609 July 1983, following the unanimous vote of the French Parliament. See w​w​w​.s​e​n​a​t​.f​r​/o​p​e​s​c​t​/e​n​g​l​i​s​h​.h​t​m​l​. 25 A report conducted by Senator Gaudin on the transposition bill for the Madrid Protocol in 2003 prompted the undertaking of this wider report on France's Polar affairs in 2007.

26 Erik Molenaar, “CCAMLR and the Southern Ocean Fisheries”, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16:3 (2001), p. 490. 27 Alan Gurney, The Race to the White Continent, New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 2000, p. 35. See also Alfred Van der Essen, “The Origin of the Antarctic System”, in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), International Law for Antarctica, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 18. 28 Ibid. 29 Maria P. Casarini, “Inception of the IGY”, in Francioni and Scovazzi, International Law for Antarctica, p. 629. 30 Van der Essen, “The Origin of the Antarctic Treaty System”, p. 17. 31 William A. Hoisington, “In the Service of the Third French Republic: Jean Baptiste Charcot (1867–1936) and the Antarctic”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 119:3 (August 1975), p. 315. 32 Robert E. Wilson, “National Interests and Claims in the Antarctic”, Journal of the Arctic Institute of North America 8:16 (Winter 1955), p. 17. 33 France based this claim on d'Urville's first sighting of Adélie Land in 1840, after the British Embassy questioned France's intention to stake a territorial claim. Following France, Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1942 – amended 1946), made claims to Antarctic territory. Following the exclusion of Adélie Land from the British claim of 1933 (under the administration of the Commonwealth of Australia), Franco-British negotiations further defined France's claim, with the decree of 1 April 1938 declaring the islands and territories situated south of 60° S, between 138° and 142° East to be under the sovereignty of France. See J.F. Da Costa, Souveraineté sur l'Antarctique, Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1958, p. 14; and Richard Bilder, “The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica”, in Jonathan Charney (ed.), The New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and the Exploitation of Antarctica, Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun Publishers, 1982, p. 168. 34 Throughout this period, twelve nations established forty-eight research

stations. See Paul-Emile Victor, “Préface”, in Da Costa, Souveraineté sur l'Antarctique. 35 The EPF was founded by Victor in 1947. In 1992, the EPF fused with the research management part of the TAAF to form the Institut Français pour la Recherche et la Technologie Polaires (IFRTP). 36 Two previous International Polar Years (IPYs) took place in 1882–1884 and in 1932–1933. 37 Evan Luard, “Who owns the Antarctic”, Foreign Affairs 62 (Summer 1984), pp. 1175–1194. 38 Davor Vidas, “The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: An Overview,” in Olav Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 37. 39 Christopher Beeby, “The Antarctic Treaty System: Goals, Performance and Impact”, in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds), The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics, London: Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991, p. 8. See also Lorraine Elliott, International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic, Hampshire: Macmillan, p. 30. 40 James Hanessian, “The Antarctic Treaty 1959”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 9 (1960), p. 460. Additional states have acceded to the Treaty since its entry into force in 1962 – currently there are forty-six contracting parties to the Treaty – of these, twenty-eight countries participate as consultative parties, and the remaining eighteen states have non-consultative status. 41 Recognising the need to protect Antarctic seals from potential overexploitation in the future, ATCPs negotiated the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) in 1972. However, as Antarctic sealing failed to commercially develop, the Convention never entered into force. James Barnes, “The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean”, in Charney, The New Nationalism and the Use of Common

Spaces, p. 243. 42 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 248. 43 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 82. 44 Ibid. 45 The Antarctic Treaty zone of application covers the area south of 60° South latitude, including the entire Antarctic continent, ice shelves, and off-lying islands, but excludes the high seas. 46 The French islands of Kerguelen and Crozet geographically fall within the Convention Area. See Mathew Howard, “The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five Year Review”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989), p. 107; and Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 265. 47 This is in spite of eight nations, including France, developing draft agreements for a marine living resources treaty. 48 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 243. 49 Pressure upon ATCPs to develop a marine living resources regime was heightened due to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations that were under way throughout the 1970s. In order to protect the exclusive rights of ATCPs over marine living resource exploitation in the Antarctic, it was imperative to both their individual and collective interests that a Treaty covering Antarctic marine living resources be developed prior to the signing of UNCLOS in 1982. Under UNCLOS (which entered into force in 1994), coastal states have sovereign rights in a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending from the coastline of the territory. This enables coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over natural resources, as well as to undertake scientific research and manage environmental protection in their respective EEZs. See Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, “Illegal Southern Ocean Fishing and Prompt Release: Balancing Coastal and Flag State Rights and Interests”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (2004), p. 171. 50 Barnes, “The Emerging Convention”, p. 262. 51 Ibid.

52 Australia, Norway, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 53 Hereafter referred to as the Chairman's Statement. 54 Although this Statement specifically refers to the sub-Antarctic islands over which France has jurisdiction, it also applies to other islands within the Convention Area – South Georgia Island, the South Orkney Islands, the South Sandwich Islands (all of which are claimed and subjected to international dispute between the UK and Argentina), Bouvet Island (Norway), Prince Edward and Marion Islands (South Africa), and Heard and McDonald Islands (Australia). See “The Statement by the Chairman of the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,” Text of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), p. 23. 55 Ibid. 56 The Commission was established under Article IX of the Convention, giving effect to the objectives and principles of the Convention set out in Article II. See www.ccamlr.org. 57 It is necessary at this point to define what is meant by IUU fishing; which is a term first used by CCAMLR at a 1997 Commission Meeting. This definition is adapted from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Adopted by the 24th session of the Committee of Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 26 February – 2 March 2001. Illegal fishing refers to activities conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations. Illegal fishing also refers to activities conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are Parties to a regional fisheries management organisation but operate in contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organisation, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law. Furthermore, illegal fishing includes the activities of vessels that are in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organisation. Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities which have not been reported (or have been misreported) to the relevant national

authority; as well as fishing activities undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organisation which have not been reported (or have been misreported), and are in contravention of the reporting procedures of that organisation. Unregulated fishing relates to fishing activities conducted in the area of application of a regional fisheries management organisation that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State or fishing entity not party to that organisation. Unregulated fishing also refers to fishing taking place in areas for which there are no applicable conservation or management measures, and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law. 58 Entering into force in February 2005. The full title of this treaty is, “Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French South and Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald Islands.” See “Treaty with France concerning cooperation in maritime areas in the Southern Ocean”, Report 63: Treaties tabled on 7 December 2004, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra: February 2005, p. 6. 59 Under the Law of the Sea Convention, the hot pursuit of a vessel must be broken off if a vessel enters the territorial waters of a third country in the process, unless the consent of the coastal state is received. The French-Australian Treaty provides “an automatic mechanism for such consent to be received to ensure that hot pursuit may be maintained”. Ibid.; Gail Lugten, “Net Gain or Net Loss? Australia and Southern Ocean Fishing”, in Lorne Kriwoken, Julia Jabour, and Alan Hemmings (eds), Looking South: Australia's Antarctic Agenda, Armadale: The Federation Press, 2007, p. 105; and Paul Kimpton, “Current Legal Developments – Australia”, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19 (2004), pp. 541–542. 60 “Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, done at Paris 8

January 2007,” National Interest Analysis: Category I Treaty (February 2010), para 3. 61 Paul Murphy, Transcript of Evidence, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties – Treaties tabled on 4 and 24 February 2010, Official Committee Hansard, Canberra: 15 March 2010, p. 17. 62 “Agreement with France on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws”, Report 111: Review into treaties tabled on 25 November 2009, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Canberra: February 2010, p. 23. See Eric Pilloton, “la lutte contre la pêche illicite”, in Christian Cointat, “Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes”, pp. 22–24. 63 Karine Delord, Nicolas Gasco, Henri Weimerskirch, and Cristophe Barbraud, “Seabird Mortality in the Patagonian Toothfish Longline Fishery around Crozet and Kerguelen Islands 2001–2003”, CCAMLR Science 12 (2005), p. 63. 64 Cleo Small, “Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Their Duties and Performances in Reducing Bycatch of Albatrosses and Other Species”, Birdlife International, Cambridge: Birdlife International, 2005, p. 35. 65 “Report of the Twenty-seventh Meeting of the Scientific Committee – Item 5-Incidental Mortality”, Hobart: Scientific Committee of the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (SC-CCAMLR-XXVII), 2008, p. 1. 66 Entering into force in 2004, ACAP is currently comprised of thirteen member countries. Its key objectives are to coordinate international activities in order to conserve twenty-nine different species of albatross and petrels, and to mitigate known threats to these species. 67 “Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Advisory Committee”, Mar del Plata: Advisory Committee to the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels, 13–17 April 2010, 10.18, p. 124. 68 Ibid., p. 19. 69 Two major international events in the 1970s contributed to the rise of Antarctic mineral resources as an issue of global prominence. First, the

discovery of traces of methane and ethane during the Deep Sea Drilling Project in 1971–1972 heightened speculation regarding the existence of hydrocarbons on the continental shelf. Second, the Arab oil embargo in 1973–1974 caused oil prices to quadruple, and prompted concerns over the future availability of petroleum resources. 70 It was at the sixth ATCM in Tokyo in 1970 that an interest in Antarctic minerals was first formally expressed. See Christopher Joyner, “The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process”, The American Journal of International Law 81:4 (October 1987), p. 888. 71 Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 336. 72 Christopher Beeby, “The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and its Future”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward, Antarctica's Future, p. 47. 73 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 135. 74 ASOC coordinated the anti-CRAMRA campaign in Australia. See Anthony Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The Greening of White Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 26 (1991), p. 224; Christopher Joyner and Ethel Theis, Eagle Over the Ice: The US in the Antarctic, Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997, p. 56; and Rodney McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty – The Antarctic Treaty – Antarctic Minerals Convention – Wellington Convention – Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 22 (1992), p. 214. 75 McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection”, p. 216. 76 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 170. 77 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 216; and Gillian Triggs, “A Comprehensive Environmental Regime for Antarctica: A New Way Forward”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward, Antarctica's Future, p. 103. 78 Richard Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the Antarctic Treaty”, in Julia Jabour-Green and Marcus Haward (eds), The

Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, proceedings of the conference celebrating the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty 22 June 2001, the University of Tasmania, Australia, Hobart: Antarctic Cooperative Research Centre, 2002, p. 22. See also Lee Kimball, “Conservation and Antarctic Policy Making: The Antarctic Conservation Agenda”, in Herr, Hall, and Haward, Antarctica's Future, p. 87. 79 To enter into force the Convention also required the ratification of at least sixteen of the twenty-four ATCPs at the time. In addition to needing the ratification of the seven Antarctic claimant states, the Convention also required the ratification of the US and the Soviet Union to enter into force. See Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, in Stokke and Vidas, Governing the Antarctic, p. 162; and Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the Antarctic Treaty”, p. 22. 80 Riley E. Dunlap, “The Evolution of Environmental Sociology: A Brief History and Assessment of the American Experience”, in Michael Redclift and Graham Woodgate (eds), The International Handbook of Environmental Sociology, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1997, p. 29. 81 Neil Carter, The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy, Second Edition, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 102. 82 Most prominent among these was when the Exxon Valdez tanker hit a reef in Alaska, spilling eleven million US gallons (40,000 m3) of crude oil. A spill from the Argentine ship Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic Peninsula also caused alarm when the ship ran aground and spilled some 600 m3 of light fuel oil. Rocard, “Opening Address”, Paris, 9 October 1989. See also Francisco Vicuna, “The Regime of Antarctic Marine Living Resources”, in Stokke and Vidas, Governing the Antarctic, p. 174; and Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p. 163. 83 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 224. 84 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 227; “Conservation of the Antarctic Environment”, document prepared by the Foundation Cousteau and submitted to Mr François Mitterrand, President of the French Republic (Paris, 10 June 1989). See also Drew Hutton and Libby

Connors, A History of the Australian Environmental Movement, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 196. 85 Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 9. 86 Woolcott, “The Continuing International Importance of the Antarctic Treaty”, p. 23. 87 Interview with Antoine Guichard, Executive Secretary of COMNAP (October 2003–September 2009), Hobart, 20 April 2008. This information is based on an undocumented speech presented by Prime Minister Michel Rocard at “Soirée Polaire à la Tour Eiffel”, an event hosted by le Cercle Polaire/la société d'Exploitation de la Tour Eiffel (Paris: 11 February 2008). 88 Ibid. 89 Bergin, “The Politics of Antarctic Minerals”, p. 226. 90 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 170. 91 Ibid. 92 McCulloch, “Protocol on Environmental Protection”, p. 216. 93 Elliott, International Environmental Politics, p. 172. See “A Joint Australia/French Proposal” and “Franco-Australia Draft Working Paper on Possible Components for a Comprehensive Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Antarctica”, Working Paper 3, submitted by Australia and France, ATCM XV (Paris, 9–19 October 1989). 94 Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p. 153. 95 Including six legally binding Annexes governing: (Annex I) Environmental Impact Assessment procedures, (Annex II) the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora, (Annex III) waste management and disposal, (Annex IV) marine pollution, (Annex V) area protection and management, and (Annex VI) liability arising from environmental emergencies. 96 Article II declares members responsible for the “comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems”, designating the continent a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”.

97 Joyner, “The Effectiveness of CRAMRA”, p. 167. 98 Up until 2048, the Protocol may only be amended by a consensus agreement of all consultative parties. After this time, a conference may be convened in order to review the provisions of the Protocol as well as the mining prohibition. The prohibition on mineral resource activities cannot be removed unless a binding legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities is in force. See Hutton and Connors, A History of the Australian Environmental Movement, p. 196. 99 Richard Rowe, “Antarctic Treaty: Past, Present and Future”, in JabourGreen and Haward, The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future, p. 12. 100Annex II relates to the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. 101Committee on Environmental Protection, “Report of the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP XII)” – Part I Final Report, Item 8: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora – (a) Quarantine and nonnative species, Committee on Environmental Protection (Baltimore, 6–9 April 2009), p. 25; and, “Open-ended Intersessional Contact Group on Non-Native Species (NNS) Report 2009–2010”, Working Paper 9, submitted by France, ATCM XXXIII (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010). 102“Rules Governing the Participation of Experts in Meetings of ATCM Bodies”, Working Paper 45, submitted by France, ATCM XXXIII (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010). 103“Final Report of the Thirty-third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting”, Item 5: Operation of the Antarctic Treaty System: General Matters, Rules governing the participation of experts in meetings of the ATCM bodies (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010), pp. 28–29. 104“Report of the Committee for Environmental Protection” (CEP XIII), Item 6: Environmental Impact Assessment – (b) Other EIA Matters, Committee on Environmental Protection, ATCM XXXIII (Punta del Este, 3–7 May 2010), p. 10. 105A cumulative impact is defined as “the impact of combined past, present and reasonably foreseeable activities [including activities that] may occur over time and space”. See “Cumulative Environmental Impacts in Antarctica, Minimisation and Management”, proceedings of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Workshop

on Cumulative Impacts in Antarctica (Washington DC, 18–21 September 1996), p. 3. See also Kees Bastmeijer, The Antarctic Environmental Protocol and its Domestic Legal Implementation – International Environmental Law and Policy Series, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 183; and J. Timothy Ensminger, Lance N. McCold, and J. Warren Webb, “Environmental Impact Assessment Under the National Environmental Protocol Act and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty”, Environmental Management 24:1 (July 1999), p. 13. 106Committee on Environmental Protection, “Report of the Committee for Environmental Protection” (CEP XI), Item 6: Environmental Impact Assessment – (b) Other EIA matters, Kyiv (2–6 June 2008), p. 19. 107Dr Yves Frenot is the current director of the IPEV. 108Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 103. 109“The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I: An assessment of current strategic management, polar programme definition and processes”, Report by the European Polar Consortium (2007), p. 19, w​w​w​.e​u​r​o​p​o​l​a​r​.o​r​g​/a​s​s​e​t​s​/f​i​l​e​s​/E​S​F​_​p​o​l​a​r​V​1​.p​d​f.​ 110See, “Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes européens”, in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 25; and “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 6. 111“Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes européens”, p. 23. 112Norway claims Dronning Maud Land in the Antarctic, and Bouvet Island and Peter I Island in the sub-Antarctic. The Spitsbergen Treaty of 9 February 1920 recognises the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway over the entire Arctic archipelago of Svalbard (Svalbard was made part of Norway by the Svalbard Act of 1925), although the exercise of sovereignty is subject to certain stipulations. The Treaty allows signatory nations the right to settle on the archipelago. The UK is not considered to be an Arctic state – geographically, politically, or culturally. However, it is a near neighbour, with established political,

commercial, and scientific interests, and is an observer state to the Arctic Council. The UK maintains NERC Ny-Ålesund research station in Svalbard. See Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, pp. 14 and 38. 113Although France has never claimed sovereignty to Arctic territory, it has maintained a regional presence through the establishment of scientific bases (Charles Rabot and Jean Corbel) located on the Svalbard archipelago. The IPEV, and Germany's Alfred Wegner Institute (AWI), merged their existing research stations into a shared facility in 2003 – the AWIPEV Arctic Research base at Ny-Ålesund, Spitsbergen. See “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume II: European Polar capacity – an overview of research infrastructures in the Arctic and Antarctic”, Report by the European Polar Consortium (2007), p. 7. 114Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 9. 115“Pôles d'excellence: les principaux instituts et organismes européens”, p. 23. 116Ibid. 117Comments made by Gérard Jugie at a round table discussion, in Christian Cointat, “Arctique, Antarctique, Terres Australes”, p. 44. 118François Goulard, “Closing Speeches (iv)”, in Christian Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, Report on France's Position with Regard to the International Issues Surrounding Polar Research: the Case of Antarctica, Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technologic Choices, No. 230 (2006–2007), p. 201. 119Ibid. 120The Franco-Italian agreement for Concordia was established on 9 March 1993. 121Concordia opened for routine summer operation in 1997, and commenced year-round operation in early 2005. 122Some Antarctic stations include facilities (for example, a laboratory building) that are funded, or partly operated, by one or more other nations. Currently, Concordia is the only year-round station operated as an integrated joint venture. See Patrice Godon and Nino Cucinotta, “Concordia: A new permanent, international research support facility

high on the Antarctic ice cap”, paper presented at ISCORD 2000 (Hobart, January – February 2000), p. 1. 123Concordia was originally established as a summer camp in order to provide support to the EPICA project. See “Nouvelles initiatives européens” in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 32; and “Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European Perspective”, Report by the European Science Foundation (2007), p. 37. 124Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 109. 125“Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European Perspective”, p. 37. 126“Nouvelles initiatives européens”, p. 32. 127Established in 1995, the EPB is the European Science Foundation's (ESF) strategic advisory committee on science policy to the Polar regions. With twenty-five member organisations from twenty European countries (including two non-EU member states – the Russian Federation and Switzerland), it enables coordinated European engagement in Polar science programmes at both the regional and international levels, and provides advice and recommendations to the European Commission, as well as relevant international bodies. 128The EPC is a Coordinated Action financed by the EC under framework RTD programme 6 EUROPOLAR ERA-NET ERAC 517842. It is comprised of twenty-seven government ministries, national funding agencies, and national Polar RTD authorities, from nineteen European countries, and of the ESF/EPB. See http://europolar.esf.org; and “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 19; www.esf.org/research-areas/polar-sciences/about.html. 129“Investigating Life in Extreme Environments: A European Perspective”, p. 2. 130The European Polar Consortium: Press Release, available at www.essi.org/docs/EPC.pdf. 131Involving ten European nations, the EPICA programme ran from

January 1996 to December 2000. In January 2001, the project was extended for another six years, and concluded in December 2006. See “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 17. 132Kohnen Station, in Dronning Maud Land, was selected as the second site for drilling. Drilling concluded 17 January 2006 at a depth of 2,774.15 metres. See, “Les Pôles: archives climatiques mondiales”, in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 7; and “The Landscape of European Polar Research – Volume I”, p. 10. 133“Plus d'Europe aux hautes latitudes”, in Recherche Polaire – Numéro Spécial, RTD Info – Magazine de la Recherche Européen, Information and Communication Unit of the European Commission's Research DG (May 2005), p. 20. 134Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 122. 135Ibid., p. 111. 136Commenced in 2007 in time for IPY 2007/2008, CEAMARC involved French and Australian scientists working collaboratively onboard the Aurora Australis, in order to collect and sort benthic organisms in the Dumont d'Urville Sea. See “Shedding Light on the Sea Floor”, Australian Antarctic Magazine, Issue 18 (Hobart, 2010), p. 15; and “Sorting the Catch”, Australian Antarctic Magazine, Issue 18 (Hobart, 2010), p. 18. 137Commenced in 2006, the ARENA network is a European project approved by the EC as a Coordination Action of the Research Infrastructure Programme activity (2006–2009). It brings together twenty-two research partners, involving seven European nations as well as Australia. In February 2010, the ARENA network released its “Vision for European Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Antarctic Station Concordia/ Dome C in the next decade”. This document outlines the development of a long-term, future strategic plan for astronomical research, including the establishment of an astronomical observatory at Dome C. See http://arena.unice.fr/; Joseph Cheek, “ARENA: Developing a New European Astronomical Observatory at Dome C”,

SciencePoles – International Polar Foundation (11 May 2010); and “Vision for European Astronomy and Astrophysics at the Antarctic Station Concordia/Dome C in the next decade 2010–2020”, ARENA Network Press Release (February 2010), w​w​w​.a​r​e​n​a​.u​l​g​.a​c​.b​e​/u​p​l​o​a​d​/P​R​ A​R​E​N​A​ V​i​s​i​o​n​_​E​N​.p​d​f.​ 138Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 38. 139The most recent IPY (March 2007–March 2009) was organised through the International Council for Science (ICSU), and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) continues the legacy of the previous IPYs. See Jean Pomereau, “Beyond Oslo: Milestones, Perspectives, and Priorities for International Polar Research”, SciencePoles – International Polar Foundation (13 August 2010); and “Europe and International Polar Year 2007–2008”, European Polar Board/European Science Foundation Report (February 2007), p. 3. 140Paul Egerton, quoted in “Europe and International Polar Year 2007– 2008”, Report by the European Science Foundation/European Polar Board (2007/2008), p. 2. 141Richard A. Herr and H. R. Hall, “Science as Currency and the Currency of Science”, in J. Handmer (ed.), Antarctica: Policies and Policy Development, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Australian National University, 1989, pp. 13–24. 142“The Landscape of European Polar Research – Vol I”, p. 6. 143Gaudin, “French Polar Research”, p. 108.

Part III Burning issues on the Antarctic ice

10

Rallying around a flag?

On the persistent gap in scientific internationalism between word and deed Aant Elzinga

The price tag for participation in Antarctic research is steep in terms of financial and technological investments. Thus there is a basic discrepancy between the ideal of scientific internationalism and traditionally entrenched national interests. The history of the Swedish case is used to highlight early aspects of the gap between word and deed. Recent postcolonial developments provide incentives for nations that have not participated before to now probe modifications in the political and organizational framework of Antarctic research in a new wave of change precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the sweep of economic globalization that has brought new forms of collaboration. A question that arises is to what extent changing conditions associated with the new era may increase the scope of international participation in Antarctic research, and is it possible that in future we may see scientific stations under the banner of a collective supranational framework (such as SCAR or the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat)?

Waves of change regarding Antarctica and limitations on internationalism The current trend of multinational consortia and other forms of partnership in Antarctica may be seen as a third wave of change. Coalitions have formed for cost-sharing and joint use of logistic facilities. This also opens up possibilities for the entry of further countries in Antarctic involvement as well as broader cooperation in research and development (R&D) more generally. As Sanjay Chaturvedi elsewhere in this volume suggests, it comprises a paradigm shift precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the sweep of economic globalization. The present wave of change follows upon two earlier historical waves of change. The first one came after the Second World War and was shaped by conditions of the Cold War. It left its imprint on the design of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS – for details see Marcus Haward's chapter in this volume). The second wave came in the 1980s when external pressures mounted, that challenged the colonial nature of the regime. On the one hand there was the call of Third World nations for a New Economic World Order that strongly influenced geopolitics in the 1980s, on the other there was the issue of environmental protection that gained urgency. As we know the AT regime successfully met the challenge posed by two alternative regime concepts that emerged, one hinging on the notion of the Heritage of Mankind, the other on the idea of a World Wilderness Park.1 The changes introduced under pressure from outside as well as responses within the ATS introduced greater flexibility. Significant were first of all a rethinking of the science criterion as the entry ticket for non-consultative party nations that wished to become full members, and second the taking onboard of the principle of sustainable development in a special form applicable to the icy continent. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) that had all along mantled the role of developing and coordinating international research and increasingly provided independent advice to Treaty Parties on scientific and environmental questions, initially through national government delegations, was now finally, in 1987, granted observer status and the right to attend

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) and to there submit information and working papers; some other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were also granted observer status. Last but not least, remember, by this time Brazil and India (from 1983) and China (from 1985) were also full Consultative Parties. Thus, some of the earlier grounds for critique of the regime being a closed club of predominantly rich nations were weakened. Today, when Malaysia, the most persistent earlier critic of the ATS, has accepted the existence of the system and is a member of SCAR, the global situation has definitely become one characterized by Klaus Dodds as a world where there is not a sufficiently strong “coalition of the willing” to fundamentally challenge a system, and its associated political architecture, that contains most of the G8, the European Union, and major countries in the Third World, such as China, Brazil and India. 2 Chaturvedi in the present volume discusses a further number of issues raised by Dodds (cf. Chapter 3); in a recent paper Shirley Scott, also taking a point of departure in Dodds' analysis presses further to argue that in its very constitution the ATS codifies inequitable relationships historically associated with what she calls a third wave of Antarctic imperialism. She says that it is therefore misleading to speak of a truly postcolonial discourse as long as this fundamental structural inequity engendered in the ATS is not addressed headon; failing to do so will only continue to gloss over residual colonialism.3 In the present situation the only realistic avenue for broadening participation in Antarctica is through incremental steps within the ATS. Since such participation must hinge on the science criterion it is relevant to consider how it was introduced as a political tool to restrict membership in the system. It is also pertinent to note how the original draft statutes of the Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) were watered down to avoid any ambiguity that went against the political interests of countries that had claims to Antarctic territories.

The creation of SCAR and its limited mandate The Special Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR – afterwards called the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research) was created at a constitutional meeting in The Hague, the Netherlands in February 1958. This followed upon an earlier meeting held in Stockholm at the request of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU – afterwards called the International Council for Science) to “examine the merits of further investigations in Antarctica, covering the entire field of science, and to make proposals to the ICSU on the best way to achieve such a programme”.4 Both meetings were convened by Nicolai Herlofsson, a specialist in cosmic physics at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm,5 and in both cases invitations were sent with a call for delegates from all twelve countries expressing a relevant interest by their active involvement within the framework of the International Geophysical Year (IGY). After being constituted the delegates present at The Hague meeting went through the draft of the statutes that had been tabled and revised them. One paragraph in particular caused considerable discussion. It went as follows: “The Executive Committee of SCAR is responsible to ICSU for the administration of the scientific programme defined by SCAR.” The term “administration” was changed to “co-ordination” and the rest of the text was carefully sanitized to avoid anything that might imply reference to “questions of occupancy”. This information appears from the report the Australian delegate Keith Bullen, seismologist at the University of Sydney, left to the Australian Academy of Science.6 The changes made in the text of the draft constitution were significant because the term “administration” might be interpreted to mean that what research was to be done would not be a matter solely for each individual nation to decide upon within the compass of its own national programme. The fear was that the original formulation left the door open for an idea of central planning, a principle associated with Soviet practices, an anathema to advocates of the Free World. References to occupied territory, further, would undoubtedly once again ignite earlier contradictions leading to fruitless debates about “whose territory?” Given that some territorial claims overlapped and that the two superpowers had made no claims for themselves,

denied the legitimacy of all existing claims and reserved their own right to lay claims in the future, the word “occupancy” was apt to undermine the kind of harmony needed for fostering cooperative research ventures. Additionally, to refer to one or another nation as “occupying” territory implies privileging some nations before others, which again goes against the principle that science is international: explicit or implicit denial of sovereign claims on the other hand might at worst lead to the claimant's refusal to allow scientists from other countries to do research in their “sector”, or the demand that they had to be authorized by the claimant nation; whichever way, a mixing of science and politics would generate friction that was bound to spill over into the life of scientific communities concerned with Antarctic research. So it was found best to stick to a neutral language. Bullen was elected vice chairman of the Executive Committee and played an important role in the conscious and careful delineation of the boundary between science and politics motivated by questions of ownership and sovereignty in Antarctica. As he expressed it, “… SCAR needs to be more than usually thoughtful and careful on such questions … they are questions of governments, not for scientific bodies”. It was he who managed to get the clause regarding “administration” struck from the constitution. Like several other delegates he was keen to keep out any language that might later be interpreted as giving SCAR powers that would transcend and impinge on the autonomy of individual countries and their scientists. Probably not much argument was needed because several other delegates from claimant countries were equally dubious when it came to formulations that could imply a dirigisme approach to research cooperation, one that went beyond voluntary consent and against the sovereign interests of their home governments. With respect to the definition of tasks of special committees for research in particular disciplines or fields there was a discussion of the following formulation: “Special Committees may not act as arbiter between the adhering groups. Any bilateral or multilateral negotiations must take place directly between adhering groups (Note by K.E.B.: It was stated that ‘groups includes countries’)”.7 The significance of the pertinent wording and Bullen's comment is that, again, no transnational authority, decision-making processes or organizational arrangements should be allowed that might override the autonomy of national scientific communities or interfere with the fact that

each of these communities when doing research in Antarctica at the behest of their own country (or some institution within it) was mandated as such by none other than its own respective government back home. In diplomatic terms it was a matter of finding the correct language to seal off any possible form of transnational “dirigisme” in both nongovernmental and intergovernmental intercourse; respect for national sovereignty forbids interference from external powers. The existence of political, economic or military control of science by one's own government was of course another matter – the principle of national autonomy prevailed and the principle of full-fledged scientific autonomy did not count here. The common view for a long time has been that the IGY (1957/58) represented scientific internationalism in a pure form. It was held that politics was set to one side and science was in command. The discussion involving SCAR's original draft constitution and how it was sanitized in a conscious effort to manage the boundary between science and politics suggests that far from being kept at bay, politics was sublimated in science. Recent scholarship that makes use of previously secret Cold War archival material, now available after the collapse of the Soviet Union, tends to confirm this interpretation. The earlier picture is gradually being revised.8 It is now found that there was plenty of politics at work in the course of various events during the IGY. Political rivalry between nations during the development of the IGY translated into scientific cooperation and competition. The two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, were at loggerheads with each other and initially the USA wanted to apply the Truman Doctrine of Containment to keep the USSR out of Antarctica. When this failed, scientific internationalism with free trade in research information became the preferred strategy, since it entailed an open-handed approach allowing for each country to have insight into what the others were doing.9 The superpowers were not the only ones to use science, apart from its capacity to advance knowledge, also for power and prestige. For the countries concerned the mounting of stations became the means whereby they not only pursued research but, symbolically, they also manifested their interest in Antarctica at a political level. This is evident in the jockeying that went on in the siting of research bases. From the outset the USA was bent on placing a research base at the geographical South Pole. Symbolically this was a strong political statement since it is where all territorial claims converge. A base at

this location gives its occupant a toehold in every sector. The USSR for its part as part of its plan for the IGY also wanted to locate a base at the South Pole, but was thwarted by the prior move of the USA and, not to be outdone, that country's scientists took on the challenge of establishing a base at the Pole of Inaccessibility furthest away from all continental coastlines. This was another political statement signifying superpower prowess. Australian and some other countries' concern with Soviet activities in East Antarctica also had a bearing on the siting strategy for stations in that region. One of the reasons a Belgian latecomer participating in the Antarctic leg of the IGY in 1958 was welcomed in the West was because it added a “friendly nation” station on that part of the map. Afterwards, in the Netherlands the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, an anti-communist hardliner during the Cold War years (and president of the NATO Council in 1958) argued that his country should encourage and support the Belgian enterprise financially and scientifically after the termination of the IGY in order to prevent the King Baudouin station from being abandoned, which it was feared might lead to “the Russians” taking it over.10 As it turned out Luns was unsuccessful in his bid – but the Soviets did not move in either.11 There are many other examples of the play of politics in the preparations for and subsequent development of the IGY.12 Elsewhere I have argued how, since Antarctica is too cold to colonize by traditional means, the placement of research stations may be seen as a surrogate expression of colonialism.13 The production of scientific knowledge became an important currency in the realm of governance. This is the essence of the science criterion inscribed in the Antarctic Treaty that was shaped in 1959 at the end of a conference attended by the same twelve nations that had been invited to both the Stockholm conference in 1957 and the constitutional meeting of SCAR in February 1958. Further nations that wanted to join the original twelve as full members of the AT had to qualify themselves by displaying substantial research in Antarctica. The interpretation of what this meant was the prerogative of the consultative parties to the Treaty, a circle of nations that grew only slowly during the first twenty years of the treaty's existence. In practice the science criterion defined the dividing line between those to be included, and those excluded. In other words science set the premises for a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion in a unique international management regime established outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations. Legitimacy

derived from a successful collective dedication of Antarctica as a zone of peace and science.

Sweden and the “science question” in the Antarctic Treaty A forgotten example of the constraints politics posed in the Antarctic Treaty is the case of Sweden. Its scientists had considerable involvement in Antarctica prior to the IGY, but since they missed out on the IGY's Antarctic leg, that nation was never considered as a potential candidate to be invited to the Washington negotiations. Although the Swedes largely had themselves to blame for this, in the purported world of “disembodied” science free of politics the situation is difficult to understand. Why were some nations that had a previous record of good Antarctic science but for some reason did not participate in the Antarctic leg of the IGY a priori excluded from the AT? Swedish polar efforts during the IGY were concentrated on Svalbard. Nevertheless it was Swedish scientists who, partly on the basis of an excellent earlier track record of Antarctic research, were asked to convene – in September 1957 at Saltsjöbaden, outside Stockholm – the strategically important meeting where the possible interest in setting up a new international coordinating body for Antarctic research was probed. The secretary who did much of the work of organizing this meeting was the glaciologist Valter Schytt who also had a hand in formulating the draft constitution. He also became the first secretary of SCAR in February 1958.14 Ambassador Bo Johnson Teutenberg, who in the early 1980s dedicated himself to bringing Sweden back onto the road to Antarctica, has in retrospect vented a tone of disappointment when looking back into the past. In his speech at the workshop on the Antarctic Treaty System held at Beardsmore Glacier in the Transatlantic Mountains, 12 January 1985 he indicated that if Swedish politicians had been more alert in 1959 perhaps Sweden might have found itself inside, rather than outside, the ATS from the outset. He noted that Swedish scientific involvement in Antarctica during the years preceding the Antarctic Treaty was such that the international scientific parties decided to meet in Stockholm in 1957 for discussions concerning scientific cooperation in Antarctica.15 Further, perhaps, a more decided Swedish policy in the period preceding the important Washington conference could have brought Sweden, with its long-standing Antarctic and polar scientific interests, displayed by several substantial activities, such as expeditions, into the Treaty System from its very beginning in “some

capacity or another”16; government support in 1959 to scientists to help them promote their specific interests could perhaps have led Swedish scientific activities in another and more positive direction as regards Antarctica and polar research in general. The government position at the time, on the other hand, was obviously that Sweden did not want to become a non-consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty, particularly considering its long-standing traditional activities in Antarctica. So the whole thing was dropped – for twenty-five years.17 When Swedish politicians in the early 1980s awakened to the fact that important minerals negotiations concerning Antarctica were going on they also shared the widely held (false) belief18 that the door to the “club” might close in 1991. Therefore they moved quickly to join in the second wave of change. The experience first encountered, when gearing up to place a station in an area of the Ross Dependency in cooperation with New Zealanders, is also telling for what it says about how the realpolitik, then emanating from Washington, was still out of tune with the principle of scientific internationalism. This story, reflecting the continuation of limits placed on well-conceived plans for research cooperation, is taken up below. First, however, some further words on the Swedish case in 1959 to verify the historical grounds for Teutenberg's critical remarks and to consider what reason his political colleagues of an earlier generation might have had not to press the case for a Swedish presence in the Antarctic Treaty at the very outset. Swedish accomplishments in Antarctic research were widely recognized in the late 1950s. It was not only Otto Nordenkjöld's historic expedition 1901– 03 with two successive overwinterings at Snow Hill Island and the loss of his expedition vessel Antarctic that stood out as a high point, nor the rich cache of results that despite all the dramatic circumstances filled six thick scientific volumes published in German over the years 1904–20. There was also, fresh in mind, the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition of 1949–52, the results of which had already appeared in several internationally renowned publications. Valter Schytt's recovery, analysis and interpretation of a 100metre ice core from the ice shelf by Maudheim station off Dronning Maud Land (DML) was an important first. So was Gordon de Q. Robin's work with dynamite explosives in a long chain of snow pits for seismic soundings on a traverse across part of DML, leading to a classic paper showing the first long

profle of mountainous terrain underneath an Antarctic ice sheet. Several other young researchers also gained invaluable Antarctic experience.19 Schytt's pioneering glaciological studies were well known, for example, to the specialists in the USA who were preparing that country's glaciological programme for the IGY, since they sought out his comments and constructive criticism on a draft of that programme in 1956.20 The driving force behind the Maudheim expedition was the Swedish geographer and leading international glaciologist, Hans Ahlmann, who spent a long time planning and successfully negotiated the political conditions and scientific composition of the tripartite enterprise.21 Fifteen persons, researchers and support staff, collaborated fruitfully in a number of different projects on the basis of a clear division of labour and associated national responsibilities. Afterwards it was cited as the first truly international expedition to the continent and an exemplar with influence on the plans for the IGY.22 Valter Schytt became secretary of SCAR at its constitutional meeting, a function that, at the next meeting, in St Petersburg in the summer of 1958, was taken over by Gordon de Q. Robin since Schytt was absent on an expedition to Spitsbergen. Subsequently Schytt asked to resign from the position due to health problems contracted on that expedition, following this the secretariat was permanently transferred from Stockholm to Cambridge where it was housed at the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI). Teutenberg obviously had reason for his disappointment with what happened in 1959. He indicated that Sweden had itself to blame, given the lack of political will in higher echelons, but he offered no explanation. My thesis is that Prime Minister Tage Erlander, like his labour movement colleague Prime Minister Walter Nash in New Zealand, was a dedicated internationalist with a great deal of faith in the United Nations. Like Nash he probably favoured international control of Antarctica, but unlike Nash, his country was far away from the icy continent and his government did not have a “Ross Dependency” to be concerned about. Therefore he was never confronted with the latter's problem of what Christopher Beeby has referred to as having to give up a position of “purity”.23 In his position as Prime Minister since 1946 (until 1969) Erlander had a powerful influence over the political life of his country. Also, the Secretary

General of the United Nations since 1953 (until 1961) was Dag Hammarskjöld, a Swede who dedicated his life to that organization as a dynamic leader and succeeded in enhancing its authority. Furthermore, Otto Nordensjköld's Antarctic expedition, discoveries and mapping of several areas in the Peninsula never led to a claim, nor did Swedish governments ever present one. Argentina, on the other hand, on the basis of having one of its citizens (José Maria Sobral) on Nordenskjöld's scientific team and moreover sending a rescue vessel to bring them all back to civilization (after the loss of Nordenkjöld's vessel Antarctic), did use these exploits as one argument to boost its territorial claim. Given all the circumstances it is understandable that Swedish politicians were reserved regarding a possible Antarctic management regime outside the UN system. Contrariwise negotiators creating what became the ATS probably, notwithstanding Sweden's exceptional historical scientific record, were not inclined to entertain special treatment regarding a nation that in Antarctic affairs had a record of deferring to the UN. Indicators reflecting Sweden's contrarian stance were strong. In February 1956 the government of India made a proposal to put the “Question of Antarctica” on the agenda of the UN General Assembly later that year.24 This move may have been prompted by New Zealand Prime Minister Walter Nash's suggestion in January of a UN trusteeship for the continent. Although India, after opposition in Chile and Argentina as well as lack of support from the UK and the USA, finally withdrew the proposal, it is interesting to note that prominent among the nations that indicated an interest in it one finds Sweden.25 In a now classical essay appearing shortly after the IGY, the expert on international law, John Hanessian, expressed the following view: India's motive, evidently, was its desire to secure international agreement for the development of Antarctic resources for peaceful purposes, for nonmilitarization of the area, the banning of nuclear weapons testing in Antarctica, and the reference of further disputes in the area to the International Court.26 The perspective summarized here tallied well with that of Sweden's ambassador in India in 1956, Alva Myrdal, a leading social democrat who

actively supported Sweden's foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment and was a member of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). This latter organization – an NGO founded in 1915 and taking its present name in 1919 when it moved its headquarters to Geneva to be near the seat of the League of Nations – had on several occasions in its history petitioned to turn Antarctica into a United Nations trusteeship (or some other mode of political internationalization).27 The negotiators in Washington took on board important elements in the Indian proposal but not the alternative mode of governance associated with it and the thinking of the women's international peace movement.

The second wave of change – the principle of mutual benefit During the 1970s only one country was added to the original twelve signatories as a Consultative Party, Poland. An earlier attempt by Poland to join in 1961 on the basis of research activities prior to IGY was unsuccessful, and Poland was put on hold until 1977 after setting up Arctowski station on easily accessible King George Island. In the decade that followed, from 1980 to 1990, fourteen further countries were added as full members, with Brazil and India (1983) and China (1985) representing an important breakthrough that defused the Third World opposition of non-aligned nations led by Malaysia that challenged the political legitimacy of the ATS. This development led to several changes in the system, with greater transparency and willingness to adapt to the new geopolitical situation while still upholding the constitutional inequity fundamentally inscribed in the system.28 How the Netherlands became a full member in 1990 thanks to a less rigid interpretation of the science criterion is often taken as another turning point in cooperative efforts. What is forgotten in citing this example, however, is that even here it was the principle of mutual benefit that played in, not only in the fact that the ATS could now embrace a small but leading scientific nation excelling in marine research, but also regarding the arrangement between the Netherlands and Poland. It was the economic crisis in Poland culminating in 1989 – before the collapse of the former USSR and the end of the Cold War – that had created a situation where the Poles sorely needed hard (dollar) currency. Renting out part of their Arctowski station to the Dutch was propitious, while for the Dutch in turn it afforded a window of opportunity that helped them into the ATS. Coming back to the Swedish story, earlier policy had changed and by the early 1980s that country too wanted to become a full member of the ATS, fearing that the door might close in 1991. Like many other nations the Swedes had economic motives prompted by the minerals negotiations and in addition they had high quality technology suited for cold climate and polar conditions for which there might be a market (the Hägglund Bandvagn allterrain carrier, for example). A massive expedition in the Arctic in 1980 (Ymer-80) on the occasion of the centennial of A. E. Nordenskiöld's Vega expedition through the North-East Passage had demonstrated that in several

scientific fields there was now a very capable new generation of researchers with strong polar interests. Politically and scientifically Sweden was now ready to rise once more to the Antarctic challenge. When this was decided things happened rapidly. In 1984 Sweden acceded to the AT and joined the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Living Resources (CCAMLR). The same year saw the creation of a Polar Research Secretariat, a public agency headed by Anders Karlqvist as Director General. A general agreement on bilateral scientific cooperation already existed at the highest political level between the Swedish and New Zealand governments and now Karlqvist introduced a creative interpretation of it in terms of exchange also within polar research. His vision was that Sweden would base its presence in Antarctica on access by air, an idea that turned out to be a bit premature at the time – however nowadays it is a fact. Access to the McMurdo base via Christchurch naturally appeared as an attractive option, an analogue to the entry of Italy that went that route in the establishment of its Terra Nova Bay station in 1985. Sweden proposed a cooperative agreement with New Zealand that would enable Swedish scientists to develop a base in the Ross Sea area; Karlqvist had in mind Cap Adare as a suitable site.29 In 1986 for the first time the national Science Bill for 1987 identified polar research as a priority area and earmarked 30 million SEK (about US$5 million). Everything was going smoothly until it turned out that the USA blocked the possibility of Swedes joining their New Zealand colleagues on the Christchurch—McMurdo airroute that had been running since Deep Freeze 1955.30 The Americans apparently saw no benefit for their part. Failing in his first agreement, Karlqvist soon – more or less serendipitously – found another route, one to the opposite end of the continent, namely Dronning Maud Land via the German Neumayer station. This would bring Swedish scientists back to the traditional haunts of the Maudheim expedition. The key collabor ator was Gotthilf Hempel, the head of the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) in Bremerhaven. He saw his chance to get Sweden to ally with Germany in order to strengthen activities on DML where AWI had established a foothold with its Georg Neumayer station. Thus, the first Swedish Antarctic Research Programme (SWEDARP) expedition was made possible in 1987/88. The Germans had invested a lot of money into building a state-of-the art

research vessel, the Polarstern, and were keen to accommodate British, Austrian, New Zealand and other researchers on Polarstern expeditions. Hempel actually managed to reorganize his own expedition so that the Swedes were given a place on board for the aforementioned austral summer. Important too was the promise that in the following year a Swedish expedition vessel would be able to take along equipment AWI researchers needed. Thus even here both parties stood to benefit.31 Hempel could please his political paymasters by cutting costs, and Karlqvist was able to send a reconnaissance team led by Olle Melander to find a suitable place for a summer station. By January 1988 the Swedes had placed two joined fibreglass modules on a small nunatak in the Sharfenbergbotnen (botnen = cirque) valley in the Heimefront Range32 several hundred kilometres from the nearest coast and called it Svea. For the 1988/89 season, leasing a Swedish vessel, Stena Arctica, the biggest Swedish expedition ever to Antarctica took place. Fieldwork concentrated in two geographical areas, Western DML and the Antarctic Peninsula. Roughly two degrees south of the of the Maudheim expedition's landing almost forty years earlier, the Stena Arctica deposited a lot of equipment and materials for transportation inland where construction workers from northern Sweden built a roomy insulated wooden station on stilts, Wasa, as their main base located on Basen nunatak in Vestfjella range (some maps still use the German name, Kraul Mountains); in relation to Svea it is nearer the Riiser-Larsen ice shelf. It was ready in 1989. Thanks to the diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Teutenberg and the Swedish Foreign Ministry a risky plan no one was really sure about actually succeeded: the little Svea base already qualified Sweden for full membership in the ATS at a special ATCM meeting in Paris, September 1988 – in other words well before the completion of Wasa station. The Swedish Government immediately signed CRAMRA to be in on the minerals regime,33 not knowing of course that two important actors, Australia and France, would soon refuse to endorse that agreement. The story of the Dutch experience described above, as well as the Swedish one (both in 1959 and in the 1980s) is instructive because it illustrates how it is not altruism and scientific internationalism that has been a key element in the ATS. Rather national interests remain as both enabling and constraining

factors.34

A third wave of change, driven by economic globalization and new partnerships Economic globalization and the emphasis on entrepreneurship in science are currently significant driving factors. Science policy analysts suggest that with the end of the Cold War and the change from a bipolar world to the more complex multi-centred one associated with globalization we can now speak of a paradigmatic shift in the economics, organization and policy of research from a Cold War period to a “globalized privatization regime”.35 Globalization involves a combination of new patterns of competition and cooperation on the basis of regional geographic affinities and/or common concerns among groupings of nations. For example non-Arctic states like China, Japan, India and South Korea are linking into Arctic research facilities on Svalbard. There exists an Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFoPS) involving China, India, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea, with a secretariat hosted by the Japanese Institute of Polar Research. Its scope also includes the Antarctic.36 Anne-Marie Brady, Kim Seungryeol and Sanjay Chaturvedi in their respective chapters in this volume point out how China, Korea and India have long-term economic interests in what is going on in polar regions and want to mantle leadership roles in Antarctica in particular. The AFoPS is a forum where they together with other Asian nations can mutually harmonize some of these interests and coordinate their Arctic and Antarctic research efforts. Since there is strength in numbers the forum affords the countries involved a means to act in unison in a regional coordination effort within the ATS. It may also benefit each individual nation when it comes to future resource exploitation, in the Antarctic in the long term and in the Arctic more immediately as sea-ice there continues to retreat. In the latter regard, significantly, China for example is (hitherto unsuccessfully) trying to gain observer status in the Arctic Council. The growing trend in joint Antarctic expeditions witnessed during IPY-4 (2007–09) also seems to continue. Australia and Japan may get closer in logistic cooperation in accessing Antarctica, and New Zealand port authorities assisted South Korea's first-ever icebreaking vessel Araon during its stopover for fuel and supplies in Christchurch before its mission to

Antarctica. Australia has offered India to share one of its research stations, but India has refused this bid and opts for construction of a new station in Larseman Hills. China is making its mark as a major player in the construction of a new station at the top of the East Antarctic Plateau with an eye to setting a new ice-coring record by pressing the time horizon back (at Dome A) to one million years BP. China is also in the process of building a new icebreaker with state-of-the-art research facilities that is expected to be operational in 2013. This will help maximize effective expedition time in both the Antarctic and Arctic. Further, a Chinese fixed wing aircraft is planned to be available to Antarctic research teams by 2015 to facilitate rapid transportation between stations and serve as a platform for aerial-based geophysical studies. The country will also step up its efforts to study polar environmental changes and intends to explore oil, gas and biological resources in the two polar regions.37 Pakistan is also projecting the upgrading of its station and the possibility of a new one to qualify for full ATS membership; however not much has happened in the field. In the examples just cited the quest for national power and prestige is unmistakable (see Appendix, below). Malaysia meanwhile is coming forward on behalf of Southeast Asia to develop polar research competence and may one day erect a station in the long-term future. Such declarations, however, must be assessed with caution: one has to distinguish between lofty rhetoric and action on the ground. In some cases scientific entrepreneurs are putting forth visions but the necessary political backing has not materialized. The impact of globalization and, with it, new forms of regionalization, is very evident in Europe. With IPY-4 European countries have got together to coordinate logistic efforts to make access to their Antarctic research stations easier. The most prominent example of a new form of coordination is the European Polar Consortium (EPC). It is a coordinated action financed by the European Commission through its framework programme for research. The consortium is composed of twenty-seven governmental ministries, national funding agencies and national polar R&D authorities from nineteen European countries, and the European Polar Board of the European Science Foundation. The goal has been to facilitate long-term partnerships between countries with large polar research programmes and those with smaller or evolving programmes in Eastern and Central European countries. The longterm goal is to develop what is called a “European Polar Entity”. The focus is

on both the Arctic and Antarctic. In this connection, as a preliminary step, the Consortium has made an inventory of all existing stations, research vessels and research aircraft owned by various European countries.38 Besides providing a comprehensive multinational picture of research capacities and focal points the idea is to rationalize future use of resources in coordination and design of European Scientific Platforms on the basis of scientific needs and demands of the aggregated research community. It will allow operators to plan deployment of resources in more efficient ways, slotting in researchers in places on the basis of information and schedules that might not otherwise be available to the individual scientists. Presently the EPC remains much of a desktop product with little practical impact. Nevertheless, even if much of it is rhetorical it may help move the discourse on Antarctic operations in new directions. The USA too has been stepping up the NSF programme for Antarctic Infrastructure and Logistics, and special provisions are made for improving research-coordinating networks. A recent concern is icebreaker operations. These are critical to the continued existence of the US stations and their associated outlying field sites. The highest-priority need in the south is to support annual re-supply of McMurdo Station, the hub and lifeline of US operations in Antarctica. The basic reason for its existence is to supply the South Pole station, which means that icebreakers and a viable logistical apparatus are vitally important. In this context a temporary solution for improving early season access from sea by a channel into McMurdo Sound during the past five years has been the leasing of the modern Oden II icebreaker from Sweden to much more rapidly do the work that relatively old-fashioned, inefficient and time-consuming US Coast Guard icebreakers with much larger crews were finding problematic and troublesome. Recently a couple of severe Scandinavian winters caused stoppage of commercial shipping in the Gulf of Bothnia between Sweden and Finland. This led to strong opposition to send the icebreaker to Antarctica the next time round. The decision of the Swedish Maritime Administration to keep the Oden home in the coming winter generated protests from Swedish polar researchers who annually used the vessel in the Amundsen Sea to gather data for climatological work on route to McMurdo Sound.39 US State Secretary Hillary Clinton took direct contact with the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt urging his government to extend the leasing arrangement for the next

austral summer. The New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully also sent a similar letter. In the end Sweden did not budge from its position but chose to prioritize its regional business interests at home much to the chagrin of the US authorities. The case provides an interesting example of how the entry of a policy of marketization and outsourcing of infrastructural services in an Antarctic research programme has benefts but also increases uncertainty and vulnerability. The need to provide access to the ice-covered waters of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean by a US ship outfitted to support scientific research is, comparatively speaking, a secondary concern since it does not appear to be the primary driver in justifying new strategic investments in US icebreaker capabilities. This becomes clear from reading the report produced by a panel of evaluators engaged by the Washington-based Academies of Science (NAS) to review US policy and resources regarding the Antarctic commitment. The panel in its report expressed worries about the maintenance of the country's logistics lifeline on which the Antarctic presence as a big power ultimately rests. The following statement in the report makes clear what is at stake. According to a representative of the Department of State assigned to Antarctic issues, if resupply of South Pole Station is not successful and the station were abandoned, this would jeopardize, and probably reduce, the influence of the United States in Antarctic governance. There would be significant consequences because abandonment of that key site would create a vacuum in leadership and likely result in a scramble for control. Abandoning it would be detrimental to the US position as well as to the stability of the treaty system. To preserve the US and hence its influential role in the Antarctic Treaty, it is paramount to maintain the three permanent research stations and their associated active research programs throughout the Antarctic continent.40 Reading between the lines, the statement clarifies how infrastructural capacity and an ability to keep abreast of new logistical developments is politically acute for nations that want to maintain a traditionally dominant position in the current situation in a new era when they find themselves challenged by China and a number of other players that are investing heavily to claim leadership positions. Further, it indicates how rising costs associated

with new technologies in times of economic difficulties raises question marks even in the USA concerning its Antarctic policy, given that the country's supremacy in Antarctic affairs has always depended on demonstrating its exceptional prowess in economic and scientific as well as in diplomatic terms. US interests in Antarctica and its circumpolar oceans when translated into foreign policy in Washington are symbiotically linked to the existence of the ATS and perpetuating its stability.41 Globalization and privatization offer new ways of trying to preserve a hegemonic position based less on individualism and more on suitable partnerships through which new forms of international cooperation may be orchestrated. The new issue that arises for smaller nations that lack resources comparable to those of larger nations or superpowers is similar to the one the Chinese used to criticize as a characteristic feature of colonialism, i.e. the formation of “uneven” or “unequal agreements” where the stronger (imperialist) partner dictated the terms. The question again is the difference between word and deed – to what extent will the gap persist between the language of scientific internationalism and the practice of quasi-nationalism of the richer nations. A boost in transnationalism brings with it a greater degree of integration in cost-sharing, logistical operations and scientific practices. These go beyond what was possible as long as transnational interaction was limited to coordination merely of nationally controlled research programmes. When Australia's representative emphasized the importance of careful wording in the shaping of SCAR's original statutes (see above) he spoke from a position of opposition to possible big power influence from the side of the USSR. Today Australia is the second largest Antarctic actor itself, and like other big actors it can readily endorse internationalism, while smaller nations or potentially large actors like China and India that want to make their mark must carefully weigh the pros and cons of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Integrative efforts to overcome earlier fragmentation is helped by the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP), formed in 1989 following on from several changes within the ATS (see above). It is a nongovernmental organization that originally came out of SCAR's Working Group on Logistics (WGL) whose tasks were taken over by the Standing Group on Logistics and Operations (SCALOP). In 1991, that is, three years after SCAR did, COMNAP gained observer status at the ATCMs and began

to provide its own independent advice to the AT parties. In 2008 SCALOP was in turn abandoned as COMNAP in the context of the new era and challenges at hand was reorganized, and became project oriented with a more integrative focus on a coupling of managerial and logistics tasks. Presently COMNAP serves as an important conduit through which new approaches to logistics may be operationally developed within the ATS. These approaches involve facilitating and promoting international partnerships with a multiplicity of national and private entrepreneurial actors.42 According to a recent count the physical assets of the twenty-eight national Antarctic programmes represented by COMNAP include a range of aircraft, over forty vessels, around thirty Antarctic airfields, over thirty-seven yearround stations, equipment that sustains telecommunications and IT capabilities around the continent, and equipment required in support of deep field operations. Human capacity involves more than 1,000 people in the Antarctic winter and over 4,000 in austral summer time.43 With the help of SCAR, COMNAP has established new systems to bring researchers to East Antarctica by air to give them more rapid access to their research laboratories there. This does away with the earlier more laborious routings via ships and there is a double gain in valuable research time: the austral summer working season on the continent is extended, which is attractive for young researchers while senior scientists can more easily shuttle in and out without being tied down for the entire season. At the same time precious polar research vessels are relieved from logistical obligations; which in turn gives them more cruise time for science. The new systems bring increased transport efficiency comparable to that which Australia and New Zealand, with their respective modes of shuttle traffic to Antarctica, have been enjoying already for many years. A key component in the network is DROMLAN, the Dronning Maud Land Air Network, and an intercontinental link with shared aerial logistics directly from Cape Town to destinations on DML available to all European countries and members of SCAR. There are two main landing sites, blue ice runways close to the Russian Novolazareskaja and the Norwegian Troll stations, and from these extend a configuration of connecting fights by Twin Otters and the like to various stations as needed, including especially Vostok and the South Pole. Eleven countries are included: Belgium, France, Germany, India,

Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, South Africa, Sweden and the UK. DROMLAN is a vital element supporting the polar research system, particularly its European part. Parallel to this there is the shipping network, the Dronning Maud Land Shipment (DROMSHIP) with an ice-strengthened freighter from Cape Town, again relieving polar research vessels that would otherwise have to spend more time on logistical transport operations. Still, there is a relative undercapacity to meet pressing demands for dedicated icebreaking polar research vessels. Envisaged for the future is the need for larger vessels of this kind plus, probably, a system of international consortia to run them. Another example of collaborative action is the recently started effort to coordinate scientific and logistics activities on King George Island, an island that is known for the proliferation of a large number of research stations (fifteen facilities) across its territory. Ten countries are involved in a plan to reduce duplication of activities by introducing new forms of direct information exchange regarding their activities on the island by establishing a database that apart from ongoing projects also includes information on newly proposed projects, locations (with geographic coordinates) of each project and principal investigators to contact. In the longer term this provides a basis for identifying what logistics resources can be pooled and/or shared or scientific tasks that may become linked and modified across national Antarctic programmes.44 The growing practice of cost-sharing and coordination of logistic efforts has a bearing on the internal dynamics of the ATS. The managers of national Antarctic programmes are part of the strategic decision-making process that in their own respective countries determines which projects will actually receive support. The decision-making cultures in which they are embedded differ considerably between countries, as do their national reporting lines in each case across a range of ministries and departments. At the same time, in their interaction with each other within the COMNAP commonly agreed upon problems and issues tend to induce perspectives that transcend national frameworks, as is the case in any epistemic community.45 A priority issue today is to achieve better coordination of vitally important search and rescue operations. Successful coordination in this and other areas affords another layer of the building of mutual trust among various nations within the ATS, comparable to what SCAR does in the realm of science itself. The entry of

consortia on the scene may also be a further indicator of “regionalization” and “alliances” or alignments of convenience involving a variety of state and private actors from various countries. In that respect new cooperative approaches in logistics and cost-sharing may introduce new dynamic twists within the ATS, phenomena social scientists ought to investigate. Another area where coherence of the ATS currently is enhanced, but also differences occur, is of course around the issue of tourism (opportunity and threat). Some parties to the AT have ports that are gateways for tourist carriers and various stakeholders stand to gain from this business while other countries that are members of the AT lack such facilities and may therefore be inclined to take less positive positions with respect to a tourist boom (on the challenges of tourism see further Jane Verbitsky, Chapter 11 in the present volume).

Sharing of stations – and under what flag? In an information paper provided as NGO input to the XXIX ATCM in Edinburgh in 2006 the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) reviewed the question of station sharing. The table below summarizes some of the findings. A conclusion offered is that there is a continued prevalence of the idea that in order to become a full Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party (ATCP), one has to build a station to show seriousness of scientific purpose, although formally the ATCPs have clarified that this is not essential. As ASOC states: The scientific mission and international scientific cooperation is nominally at the heart of the ATS, and through SCAR the region has a longestablished scientific coordination body. It therefore seems surprising that half a century after the adoption of this remarkable Antarctic regime, we still see no truly international stations. The “national sovereign approach” continues to be the principal driver of new stations.46 Indeed it is striking that even though there are many examples of nations sharing scientific equipment, modes of transportation and the housing of researchers, one seldom finds a sharing of national emblems. Individual states continue to prefer building and operating their own facilities under their own fags. This is also apparent if one considers the new generation of state-of-the art stations (some being necessary replacements of older stations that have been covered and pressed down by snow) that have been built during the last fifteen years and future ones currently projected or in process (see the list in the Appendix table below). One important exception is the very modern South African SANAE-IV station already put in place in 1995. It has an overcapacity of berths and therefore cost-sharing is a driving factor behind endeavours to get other nations' scientists to use the facility.47 Another exception is the Concordia station operated jointly by France and Italy. It is the third permanent all-year station on the Antarctic Plateau, besides the Russian Vostok and American Amundsen-Scott bases. It is sometimes referred to as an international station and in France initially, there was some discussion of involving many more countries. Originally the site developed because it was the optimal place for the first phase of deep ice core

drilling under the auspices of the European Science Foundation's European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA – 1996–2006).48 Now that this is completed the focus has shifted to astronomy in order to legitimate continuing investments in terms of cutting-edge science (platforms for astronomical observation in Antarctica have in recent years become highly relevant). Table 10.1 Current examples of sharing stations The following current examples of sharing stations show some of the various modalities employed by Antarctic Treaty States as alternatives to building a new, single-state station: •

No station – The Netherlands has been the most consistent about following a “shared facilities” approach during the past fifteen years. Recently it began construction of a marine laboratory to be opened January 2013 on the site of the UK's Rothera station. The name of the facility will probably be the Gerritsz laboratory in honour of Captain Dirck Gerritsz Pomp who discovered the South Shetland Islands in 1598.

•

Joint station – Since signing a cooperation agreement in 1993 to build a station at Dome C, France and Italy have jointly built and are now operating the Concordia station along with the European Space Agency.

•

Joint logistics – Finland's Aboa station is located near Sweden's Wasa station, with the two stations sharing some logistics facilities.

•

New partnership – The Law-Racovita station of Australia and Romania (formerly Australia's Law station) provides another positive example, which was noted in the Final Report from ATCM.

•

Annexes – Germany has set up two annexes at another country's station: Dallman Laboratory at Argentina's Jubany, and a Geodetic Observatory at Chile's O'Higgins.

•

Station transfers – There have been four instances in which British stations that were no longer in use were transferred to other states: These include Chile's Carvajal (transferred 1984; formerly Station T, Adelaide); Ukraine's Verdansky (transferred 1996 – formerly Station F, Faraday); Chile's Canas Montalva (transferred 1986; formerly Station V,

View Point); and Uruguay's Elichiribehety (transferred 1997 – formerly Station D, Hope Bay). Source: ASOC (2006) ‘Station sharing in the Antarctic’, IPO94 submitted to XXIX ATCM held in Edinburgh, 12–23 June 2006.

The shift to an astronomical focus at Concordia is interesting and significant as a response to the more general problem faced by nations when stations in the long run become obsolete or need somehow to be given a new start or revitalized to justify the great expense incurred in maintaining them. It is sometimes diffcult to generate long-term sustainable scientific interests around stations of a kind that will keep leading scientists involved in the effort; failing this a station may end up becoming a hollow shell maintained for political reasons, which for a nation with self-esteem would mean a loss of face. However, even though scientific motives are certainly strong in the case of Concordia, as Chavelli Sulikowski also argues in her chapter in this volume, one cannot exclude aspects of economics and politics. With its own limited budget France has been keen to find partners and bring in a sharing of costs and generate new scientific agendas. Politically the involvement of Italy – a non-claimant country – as a partner may also be interpreted as important because Concordia lies a fair distance outside the narrow French sector – it is located in the Australian sector about 550 km from the Russian Vostok base. Even more telling perhaps is that on the entire continental territory France is the only claimant country that has a station outside its own sector. Ultimately, because of the character of the ATS, national interests are still the drivers when it comes to the operation of research facilities. Otherwise what is perhaps new on the scene is that there are a number of entrepreneurs that in some countries for various reasons seek the limelight and appeal to their political leaders in order to promote particular agendas. There are examples of this in Estonia and to some extent Malaysia. In the former case an unconventional scientific entrepreneur has been pushing the idea of setting up a research station in his country's name, but he seems to lack the necessary political backing. In the latter case individual lobbying has been important in developing plans for Malaysian scientific participation in the research programmes of other countries as an alternative model of involvement in Antarctica.

The only truly international scientific station was the one Greenpeace ran for a while as a watchdog operation in the Ross Sea region. It existed as an all-year base in Antarctica for a total of five years from 1987 to 1991. Behind it lay an ambitious campaign started in 1985 to promote Antarctica as a “World Park”, an idea that came up in 1979. No non-governmental organization had ever set up a base in Antarctica and there were many practical as well as political obstacles to overcome. Countries that had bases in the region were unanimously hostile to the idea of being Greenpeace's neighbour on the ice. Officially they made it known that they didn't want to mount rescue missions should something go wrong, but their antagonism also masked their reluctance to encourage outside scrutiny. Although the Greenpeace international base existed only temporarily it probably did have some positive impact on public opinion in terms of awareness of the need for good ecological practice in Antarctica. One of the tasks of the over-winterers during their year on the ice included monitoring pollution from the neighbouring bases, the US McMurdo base and New Zealand's Scott base, which in some respects was an eye-opener. A new ship was purchased in 1987, a former icebreaker christened Gondwana replacing an older Greenpeace ship as the supply vessel. On its annual trips to the ice the Gondwana also toured bases in the region to monitor how closely they adhered to Antarctic Treaty regulations concerning the environmental impact of such facilities. One of the scandals that came to light was the way discarded equipment at the McMurdo base had traditionally been placed on the sea-ice where as the ice melted away in the austral summer it sank to the bottom of the bay. Another practice found at some stations was that fluid used to develop photographs in darkrooms was routinely dumped in the snow. Focusing attention on such practices and the lack of appropriate forms for dealing with waste disposal helped force the treaty nations to take these matters more seriously and, as it were, clean up their act. In the 1987/88 season Greenpeace made headlines around the world when fifteen protesters blocked the building site for a French airstrip at Dumont D'Urville and ultimately led to a change of French plans. Over the years not only ASOC but also Greenpeace activists gained informal access to ACTM meetings where they acted as environmental lobbyists in the corridors. In other realms one can find research facilities that are funded and operated

by a large number of nations for a common purpose and on the basis of an agreed upon cost-sharing formulae and rules for use and time allocation to scientists from participating countries. Examples are the European Southern Observatory with its network of telescopes in Chile, or the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESFR) at Grenoble in France.49 Allan Hemmings has recently pointed out how a number of nations active in the Antarctic are able to resolve strategic and national security interests in space and successfully collaborate on an International Space Station but are unable to reach the same level of internationalism in Antarctica. Although international scientific cooperation in the region is well developed in other ways it does not as a rule involve joint facilities. Counting 110 current main facilities in the Antarctic treaty area he notes how only two of these are joint stations, and both involve only two states. Given all the official talk about the potential advantages of scientific cooperation, shared logistics and the need to diminish the environmental footprint the situation is a glaring anomaly that underlines the great gap between word and deed. Hemmings' conclusion confirms the argument of the present paper, namely that the critical factor appears to be the unresolved situation around territorial sovereignty and consequential jurisdiction in Antarctica. As far as it relates to stations, scientific cooperation appears secondary to national autonomy in the selection of locations for other reasons.50 Generally one may distinguish at least five institutional motives for a sharing of facilities: (1) economic (cost-sharing); (2) political (increased legitimacy); (3) logistical (cost-sharing and efficiency); (4) scientific (increased volume and quality of research, a matter that counts very much these days in our Audit Society when bibliometric measures are used to assess performance as a basis for further funding); (5) environmental (minimizing the anthropocentric footprint). All of these considerations are relevant in Antarctic science and they interplay.51 In spite of rhetoric to the contrary it would appear that in practice the first three motives for the sharing of facilities weigh more heavily than the last two. The predominant aspects in sharing of facilities still appear to be economic and political. These two, as part of a formula for mutual benefit and pragmatism, could realistically form the basis for “internationalization”

of a more far-reaching kind in a longer-term future; given science's dimension as a continuation of politics by other means. However, as already noted above with regard to the question of unused capacity in certain parts of the austral summer season, limitations in the possibility of recruiting a sufficient number of highly qualified researchers in one's own country also plays in, especially when it comes to smaller nations. Thus there is also a good scientific reason for national programmes to try to attract scientists from other nations to utilize available space and facilities, i.e. to proactively internationalize. Moreover, from the point of view of strict scientific criteria the proliferation of research stations – each with its own national flagpole – on easily accessible King George Island is not warranted; rather, it makes better sense to reduce duplication and reconfigure activities in, for example, three multinationally shared stations. In principle, once the Antarctic Treaty was in place there is no reason why, theoretically, nations might not get together to create an international research station, one, not with a national fag, but flying the fag of SCAR, the ATS, or say Unesco. In practice such an international station would of course probably once again open up the issue of sovereignty, both between and within the nations involved.52 For future research in history and social studies of polar science it is interesting to clearly identify the factors that made possible far-reaching collaboration in nuclear physics and astronomy but not yet found in Antarctic science. Comparisons with the peaceful uses of atomic energy and collaboration in astronomy are particularly instructive if one is interested in teasing out the limits of internationalism and the institutional motives at play behind scientific efforts. Looking into the future, since increased participation will still have to go through the ATS, it appears evident that in organizational terms the application of the science criterion requires further reinterpretation in what some scholars call a postcolonial take on the issue. The challenge is to find ways and means of broadening participation of further countries in Antarctic research and policy-making in line with a more robust form of internationalism.

Notes 1

For comparative characterization of the three different regimes see Aant Elzinga, “Antarctica, the construction of a continent by and for science”, in Elisabeth Crawford, Terry Shinn and Sverker Sörlin (eds), Denationalizing Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993; Suter has reviewed the role of Malaysia and highlights the concept of the Common Heritage of Humankind – cf. Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage?, London: Zed Books, 1991.

2

Klaus Dodds, “Amongst palm trees: ruminitions on the 1957 Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Record 46(236), 2006, pp. 1–2; Malaysian scientists have been gaining a foothold in Antarctic research through cooperation with scientists in the national programmes of Argentina, Australia, India, South Korea, New Zealand, South Africa and the UK. For SCAR's role and history in relationship to the ATCMs see David W.H. Walton, “The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the Antarctic Treaty”, in Paul Arthur Berkman, Michael Long, David W. H. Walton and Oran R. Young (eds), Science Diplomacy: Antarctica and the Governance of International Spaces, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Insitution Scholarly Press, 2011, pp. 59–68.

3

Shirley V. Scott, “Ingenious or innocuous? Article IV of the Antarctic treaty is im perialism”, The Polar Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 51–62.

4

ICSU, Stockholm Promemorium (1957), in the Valter Schytt archive at the Swedish Royal Academy of Science, Stockholm. See further Aant Elzinga, “Swedish non-participation in the Antarctic leg of the IGY 1957/58”, Berichter zur Polar-und Meerforschung 560, 2007, pp. 142– 162.

5

Originally Lloyd Berkner on behalf of ICSU's Bureau of the Comité Speciale de l'Année Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) had contacted Hans Ahlmann, Sweden's nestor in polar research, but he declined, probably because he had been away from active academic life between 1950 and 1956 when he was Swedish ambassador in Norway. Ahlmann passed the request on to his colleague at Stockholm University, Professor Carl-Gustaf Rossby the famous meteorologist who headed the

Swedish national IGY committee. When Rossby suddenly died (19 August 1957) the task fell on the shoulders of the same committee's vice chairman, Herlofsson. 6

Keith E. Bullen, Meetings of the Special Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) at the Hague, February 2–6, 1958, Archive of Australian Academy of Science. Series MS53, Box 2, Folder 11. G/5 (1958). I am grateful to Rip Bulkeley for bringing this document to my attention and, furthermore, sending me a copy.

7

Ibid. The note appears as such in Bullen's report.

8

See for example some chapters in Susan Barr and Cornelia Lüdecke (eds), The History of the International Polar Years (IPYs): From Pole to Pole, Vol. I., Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2010.

9

The argument that the USA opted for scientific cooperation and coordination as a realpolitik in the national interest for managing the threat posed by the possibility of Soviet bases in Antarctica is succinctly outlined by Simone Turchetti, Simon Naylor, Karin Dean and Martin Siegert, “On thick ice: scientific internationalism and Antarctic affairs 1957–1980”, History and Technology 24(4), 2008, pp. 351–376. For the Chinese case see Anne-Marie Brady in the present volume (Chapter 2). US State Department manipulations to bring Taiwan into the IGY led to the exclusion of People's Republic of China scientists who for their part had well-documented plans to participate. This historical fact has for a long time been suppressed in the (politically) sanitized account of the IGY found in the annals of science; recently what was going on behind the unpolitical (scientific) facade has been incisively analysed on the basis of newly accessible archival sources – for more detail see Zuoyue Wang and Jiuchen Zhang, “China and the International Geophysical Year”, in Roger D. Launius, James Rodger Fleming and David H. DeVorkin (eds), Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering the International Polar and Geophysical Years, Houndmills, Basing-stoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 143–155.

10 Peter Abbink, “Antarctic policymaking and science in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany (1957–1990)”, Circumpolar Studies (Groningen: University of Groningen Arctic Centre) 6, 2009, pp. 61, 77.

11 A few years later, after many difficulties, a series of joint Belgian— Dutch expeditions (1963–66) did for a while manage to continue some research in Antarctica but thereafter fizzled out. Between 1968 and 1970 the Belgians conducted three summer campaigns using the South African SANAE base as a platform. 12 Christopher Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty, Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1972; M. J. Peterson, Managing the Frozen South: The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008; Rip Bulkeley, “Aspects of the Soviet IGY”, Russian Journal of Earth Sciences, 10, 2008, pp. 1–17; Irina Gan, “The Soviet preparation for the IGY Antarctic program and the Australian response: politics and science”, 2nd SCAR Workshop on History of Antarctic Research, Santiago, Chile 21–22 September 2006, Boletín Antártico Chileno: The Chilean Antarctic Science Magazine, Punta Arenas: INACH, 2009, pp. 60–70; Simon Naylor, Katrina Dean, Martin Siegert and Simon Turicetti, “Science, geopolitics and the governance of Antarctica”, Nature Geoscience 1, 2008, pp. 143–145; and Rip Bulkeley, “The political origins of the Antarctic Treaty”, Polar Record 46(236), 2006, pp. 9–11. 13 Aant Elzinga, “The interplay of science and politics: the case of Antarctica”, in Uno Svedin and Britt Hägerhäll Aniasson (eds), Society and the Environment: A Swedish Perspective, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992, pp. 257–283; Aant Elzinga, “Science as the continuation of politics by other means”, in Thomas Brante, Steve Fuller and William Lynch (eds), Controversial Science: From Content to Contention, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 127–152; Aant Elzinga, “Antarctica, the construction of a continent by and for science”, in Elisabeth Crawford, Terry Shinn and Sverker Sorlin (eds), Denationalizing Science, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993; Aant Elzinga, “Geopolitics, science and internationalism during and after IGY”, 2nd SCAR Workshop on History of Antarctic Research, Santiago, Chile 21–22 September 2006, Boletín Antártico Chileno: The Chilean Antarctic Science Magazine, Punta Arenas: INACH, 2009, pp. 71–81; for the interesting case of how disagreements led to a failed European attempt to realize a feasible plan 1970–74 for ice core drilling in Antarctica (a precursor to the successful EPICA programme of 1995–

2005), see Bernhard Stauffer, “Early attempts for an European Antarctic science programme”, Polarforschung 78(3), 2009, pp. 113–118. 14 Schytt was the IGU delegate to SCAR. 15 Bo Johnson Teutenberg “Some Swedish viewpoints on the Antarctic Treaty System”, in Anders Karlqvist (ed.), Sweden and Antarctica, Stockholm: Swedish Polar Research Secretariat, 1985, pp. 69–77. 16 Ibid., p. 70. 17 Ibid., p. 71. 18 Peter J. Beck, “Fifty years on: putting the Antarctic treaty into historical books”, Polar Record 46(236), 2010, pp. 4–7. 19 Charles Swithenbank, Foothold on Antarctica: The First International Expedition (1949–52) Through the Eyes of its Youngest Member, Lewis, Sussex: The Book Guild Ltd, 1999; for the historical and political significance of Otto Nordenskjöld's expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula at the very beginning of the twentieth century see Aant Elzinga, Torgny Nordin, David Turner and Urban Wråkberg (eds), Historical and Current Perspectives on Otto Nordenskjöld's Antarctic Expedition 1901–1903, Gothenburg: Royal Society of Arts and Sciences in Göteborg, 2004, pp. 262–290. The history of the early Norwegian influence is sketched in Noel D. Barrett, “Norway and the ‘winning’ of Australian Antarctica”, Polar Record 45(235), 2009, pp. 360–367. 20 Valter Schytt, Letter 28 February 1956 to Richard Hubley, found in the Valter Schytt archive at Professor Per Holmlund's Office, Department of Physical Geography, Stockholm University. 21 For Ahlmann's glaciological paradigm but also a critical appraisal of real existing political and other motives that tend to be ignored but were actually intertwined with scientific ones in the Swedish partnership in NBSX, see Lisbeth Lewander, “Swedish polar policies from the first International Polar Year to the present”, in Launius, Fleming and DeVorkin, Globalizing Polar Science, pp. 107–122. 22 An example is A. P. Crary who was in charge of the overland traverse programme and the second in command of the US scientific effort in Antarctica – Albert P. Crary, “The Antarctic”, Scientific American

207(3), 1962, pp. 60–73. 23 Beeby, The Antarctic Treaty, p. 11; cf. F. M. Auburn, The Ross Dependency, The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1972; for a review of changes in New Zealand's interest in Antarctica in historical perspective from past to present, see Anne-Marie Brady in Chapter 8 in this volume. 24 Adrian Howkins, “Defending polar empire: opposition to India's proposal to raise the ‘Antarctic Question’ at the United Nations in 1956”, Polar Record 44(228), 2010, pp. 35–44. 25 John Hanessian, “The Antarctic Treaty 1959”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 9, 1960, pp. 436–480. 26 Ibid., p. 451. 27 Ibid.; Bulkeley, “The political origins of the Antarctic Treaty”. For her tireless work in the UN system towards disarmament and world peace, later, Alva Myrdal was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. 28 See Scott, op. cit. in note 3 above. 29 Anders Karlqvist, personal communication. 30 On the history of the Christchurch—McMurdo airlink and its importance for both New Zealand and the USA see Tony Phillips, Gateway to the Ice: Christchurch International Airport – Antarctic Link from 1955, Christchurch: Christchurch International Airport Ltd, 2001. 31 It was a kind of gentlemen's agreement – no monetary transactions were involved, it was purely a matter of an exchange in terms of services rendered. Dutch researchers later participated in several Scandinavian expeditions (early 1990s) in an exchange whereby they bought a trackvehicle (BV) from Hägglunds and put it at their hosts' disposal. Olle Melander, personal communication. 32 The politics of naming in this part of DML is interesting. After the Maudheim expedition Norwegian cartographers in certain cases replaced names that had been introduced by the German Schwabenland expedition of 1939; new names put on nunataks and passes in some cases also associated with those of heroes in the Norwegian wartime resistance movement (Heimefront) against the Nazi-German occupation of Norway.

33 Together with eight other nations Sweden was among the first batch of nine signatories that came in on 25 November 1988. In 1989 another ten signatories joined, with Japan as the last one on 22 November 1989. 34 On the discriminatory gatekeeping character of the science criterion discussed in the CRAMRA context see Francesco Francioni, “Resource sharing in Antarctic: for what benefit?”, European Journal of International Law 1(1), 1990, pp. 258–268. 35 Philipp Mirowski and Esther Mirjam Sent, “The commercialization of science and the response of STS”, in Edward Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch et al. (eds), The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, Third Edn, 2007, pp. 635–689; also see Aant Elzinga and Andrew Jamison, “Changing policy agendas in science and technology”, in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds), The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, London: Sage, Revised Edn, 1995; for a games theory approach invoking the “theory of coalitions” to explain emergent cooperative arrangements in the face of external threats (outsiders/insiders problem) to a “commons” see Urs Luterbacher, “International cooperation: the problem of the commons and the special case of the Antarctic region”, Synthese 100, 1994, pp. 413–440. 36 For an account of the AFoPS and the activities of its members during IPY-4 see Igor Krupnik, Ian Allison, Robin Bell et al. (eds), Understanding Polar Challenges: International Polar Year 2007–2008. Summary of the IPY Joint Committee, Canadian Circumpolar Institute, University of Alberta: CCI Press, 2011, Part V, Chapter 5.3: “Engaging Asian Nations in IPY: Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFoPS)”, pp. 553–574. 37 Nature.com Newsblog, 27 June 2011, h​t​t​p​://b​l​o​g​s​.n​a​t​u​r​e​.c​o​m​/n​e​w​s​/2​0​1​1​/0​6​/c​h​i​n​a​_​p​l​a​n​s​_​n​e​w​_​i​c​e​b​r​e​a​k​e​r​.h​t​m​l,​ accessed 7 July 2011. 38 An extensive inventory and European strategy discussion may be found in European Polar Consortium, The Landscape of European Polar Research, Vol. II, European Polar Capacity – An Overview of Research Infrastructures in the Arctic and Antarctic (EPC Report, 2007). This is a review of European research infrastructures in the Arctic and Antarctic

with details regarding ninety-eight stations, seventy-one airstrips, thirtytwo icegoing vessels, twenty-six aircraft and nine databases, as well as the landscape of cooperation including that with non-European nations. The new European Space Agency's Earth Explorer CryoSat-2 satellite is also an important resource in this context. 39 Göran Björck, Elisabeth Abrahamsson et al., 11 July 2011, “Låt Oden vara!” (Let Oden be!), Göteborgs-Posten, p. 27 (debate article signed by ten scientists), w​w​w​.g​p​.s​e​/n​y​h​e​t​e​r​/d​e​b​a​t​t​/1​.6​7​2​5​1​8​-l​a​t​-o​d​e​n​-v​a​r​a​-, accessed 16 July 2012. 40 National Academies of Science (NAS), Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World; An Assessment of the US Needs, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007, p. 23. 41 Christopher C. Joyner, “United States foreign policy interests in the Antarctic”, The Polar Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 17–35. 42 For COMNAP and its present role of “facilitating and promoting international partnerships” see José Retamales and Michelle RoganFinnmore, “The role of the Council of Antarctic Managers of National Antarctic Programs”, in Berkman, Long, Walton and Young, Science Diplomacy, pp. 231–240. Also in that same volume see John Thiede, “Modern research in the polar regions”, pp. 161–164. 43 Retamales and Rogan-Finnmore (cited in note 42 above), pp. 234–235. 44 Ibid., p. 236; Allan D. Hemmings, “Why did we get an International Space Station before an International Antarctic Station?”, The Polar Journal 1(1), 2011, pp. 5–16. 45 The notion of “epistemic community” is defined by Peter M. Haas as a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. In other words it is a transnational network of knowledge-based experts who help decisionmakers define the problems they face, and hence influence both concepts and perspectives among policy-makers, all the more so since the experts are also the ones who define appropriate policy solutions and evaluate their outcomes. The classical reference is Peter Haas, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy

coordination”, International Organization 41(6), 1992, pp. 1–35. 46 ASOC – Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, Station Sharing in Antarctica. Information Paper 94 (2006), submitted to XXIX ATCM (Edinburgh 12–13 June 2006). 47 A certain degree of overcapacity is not uncommon at most stations (with the exception of the South Pole station and a small number of others) if one considers the entire austral summer season as a whole, while on the other hand within this timeframe there tends to be a peak with many visits, a pattern that has to do with time constraints often imposed, say, in the normal course of an academic year. 48 The other, the second leg of EPICA was located at the German Kohnen station on Amundsenisen, Dronning Maud Land. For the lead role of France in EPICA at the Dome C site see Chavelli Sulikowski (Chapter 9) in this volume who also discusses the signifcance of partnerships formed. 49 The European Synchrotron Radiation Facility (ESRF) is an international research institution for cutting-edge research with photons to study the complex structure and dynamics of matter. It involves nineteen countries. As a research cooperative regime it is based on a convention to which are appended four annexes. Located in Grenoble (France), the ESRF was the first of the third-generation hard x-ray sources to operate, coming on line for experiments by users with a 6-GeV storage ring and a partial complement of commissioned beamlines in 1994. 50 Hemmings, “Why did we get an International Space Station before an International Antarctic Station?,” pp. 5–16. 51 For the concept “institutional motives” see Aant Elzinga, Changing Trends in Antarctic Research, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, Chapter 1. 52 The politics surrounding the creation of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat and its powers is perhaps symptomatic of some of the difficulties. Jan Huber, after finishing his term of office as secretary, has described some of the legal sticky points, among others the one of jurisdiction and the fact that the Secretariat has in a sense hung in limbo in periods between the ATCMs because Consultative Parties wish to prevent it from gaining

a form of permanency or autonomy that might interfere with the sovereign powers of individual governments. See Johannes Huber, “Notes on the past, present and future of the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat”, Diplomacia (Santiago de Chile), 120, 2009, pp. 35–43. The need for the Secretariat to operate in all member states rather than just the host state was emphasized by some scholars all along, e.g. Karen Scott, “Institutional developments within the Antarctic Treaty System”, International Comparative Law Quarterly 52, 2003, pp. 473–487.

11

Titanic Part II?

Tourism, uncertainty, and insecurity in Antarctica Verbitsky Jane

On 14 April 1912 the SS Titanic, pride of the White Star Line, struck an iceberg on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York. The ‘unsinkable’ ship sank rapidly beneath the icy waters off the Newfoundland coast with the loss of 1,522 passengers and crew.1 Today, the Titanic is remembered not just as one of the most luxurious ships ever built, but as a symbol of human folly and arrogance, of mistaken belief in mastery of the natural environment, and of the tragic consequences of negligence and disregard for safety procedures and security protocols. Despite this, nearly one hundred years after the Titanic sinking, the lessons learned from the disaster have yet to be properly applied to Antarctic tourism. Given the exponential growth of tourism in the fifth largest continent, perhaps the most pertinent question that can be asked is not “Could there be a disaster of Titanic proportions in the Antarctic?”, but “When will there be a disaster of Titanic proportions in the Antarctic?”. This chapter argues that the extraordinary growth of Antarctic tourism since the 1980s, coupled with insufficient planning for, and regulation of, tourism by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) over the last two decades has created a situation whereby tourism has become a time bomb issue for the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Antarctica's nonsovereign status, the lack of authoritative governance institutions under the

ATS, ATCPs emphasis on consensus decision-making, differing views among the Consultative Parties about tourism issues, and the position of Antarctica in the international system as a commons area mean that achieving a set of conclusive and binding outcomes in relation to tourism is extremely difficult. However, without legal intervention and rigorous assessment, management, and monitoring, tourism is likely not only to become a source of increasing harm to the Antarctic environment, but itself to become an ever more hazardous undertaking in the Antarctic and its environs. The most appropriate response to these threats is the establishment of a multilateral Antarctic tourist convention, sponsored by the ATCPs and intended to become an integral part of the ATS, that lays out a clear framework of prescriptions and proscriptions for both public and private operators involved in the tourist industry and applies to as wide a range of actors as possible in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.

Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty Sustained human contact with the world's fifth largest continent began only recently. While Antarctica had long fascinated the imagination of adventurers, the difficulties of travelling to the southern polar regions, the extreme nature of the environment, and the sheer difficulty of maintaining human life on the continent limited interaction until the nineteenth century to sporadic voyages by explorers, and irregular visitations by sealers and whalers. In the mid-nineteenth century, though, the first national expeditions were arranged and the ‘heroic’ age of Antarctic exploration was ushered in.2 Roald Amundsen's feat in successfully reaching the South Pole in December 1911 was matched by later explorers, but it was not until the 1940s that the first permanent research bases were set up in the continent. These bases were visible manifestations of the rash of sovereign territorial claims which had been made in twentieth century Antarctica by seven states: Argentina (1943), Australia (1933), Chile (1940), France (1924), New Zealand (1923), Norway (1939), and the United Kingdom (1908 and 1917).3 Increasingly, political and scientific attention began to be paid to the continent. This intensified during the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year (IGY) when, over a period of eighteen months, twelve states cooperated on a series of scientific research projects. The success of these collaborative projects under the aegis of the IGY helped motivate the creation of the Antarctic Treaty,4 a multilateral treaty whose original signatories were the seven Antarctic claimant states, plus five others who had also participated in Antarctic projects during the IGY. The Treaty is an extraordinary document in many respects, not least because it was created during the Cold War, at a time of great tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiation of the Treaty took place in 1959, the same year in which Fidel Castro successfully led an armed revolt to take power in Cuba, and the Treaty came into force in the year in which the Berlin Wall was erected. Despite this background, the twelve original signatories established a treaty that became the first arms control agreement of the nuclear age, and a landmark instrument in denoting a former ‘terra nullius’ as an area to be used for the common benefit of humankind. Its other remarkable feature is that the assertions of sovereignty

over Antarctica made by the seven claimant states are placed in abeyance for the duration of the Treaty. Additionally, under the terms of Article IV(2), no new claims to sovereignty or enlargement of an existing claim may be made while the Treaty is in force. To all intents and purposes, the Treaty ‘freezes’ existing claims and prevents new claims being made in Antarctica. That tourism was not anticipated to become a core industry in the continent is evident from the text of the Antarctic Treaty. Building on the success of the IGY, the Treaty prioritized the importance of scientific research, and dissemination of the results of that research for the benefit of humanity. The preamble to the Treaty thus emphasizes “the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica”.5 The primacy of scientific research in Antarctica is confirmed in Article II which notes that the scientific investigation and cooperation that occurred during the International Geophysical Year should continue within the parameters of the Treaty, while Article III lays out the practical framework for achievement of these objectives. Underscoring the common importance of scientific research in the territory, the Treaty specifies that Antarctica is to “be used for peaceful purposes only”.6 Consequently, military installations, manoeuvres, and weapons testing are absolutely prohibited in Antarctica, as are nuclear explosions and disposal in the continent (defined in Article VI as the “area south of 60 ° South Latitude”7) of radioactive waste material.8 To ensure transparency, accountability, and adherence among signatories to the terms of the Treaty, Article VII provides that Contracting Parties who are also eligible to attend Consultative Meetings have the right to designate observers to carry out inspections and “have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica”.9 Additionally, stations, equipment and installations in Antarctica, and ships and aircraft at embarkation and disembarkation points are also required to be “open at all times to inspection”10 by such observers. Aerial observation is also permitted to be carried out at any time over any part of Antarctica by designated observers.11 Supplementing the inspection rights are the information-sharing provisions of Article VII. These require that Contracting Parties give advance notice to each other of “all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding

from its territory”,12 as well as details of Antarctic stations occupied by its own nationals, and any military personnel or equipment that parties wish to bring to Antarctica. The Treaty, then, is grounded in the assumption that scientific research will henceforth be the focus of Contracting Parties' attention and investment in the Antarctic, and that observers, scientists, and ancillary service and support staff (occasionally supplemented by military personnel seconded to duties at the national scientific research bases), will form the core workforce in the Antarctic. Large-scale Antarctic tourism was not a foreseeable phenomenon at that time; hence the words “tourism” or “tourist” do not appear anywhere in the Treaty.

The growth of Antarctic tourism However, although tourism is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Antarctic Treaty, it rapidly became one of the two activities most commonly associated with the continent, and from 1966 it appeared regularly on the agenda of the ATCMs as an issue requiring both attention and action.13 Organized tourist activities in the Antarctic were, in fact, occurring before the signing of the Antarctic Treaty. The first commercial fight to visit Antarctica occurred in 1956 when a Linea Aerea Nacional plane overflew the South Shetland Islands and Trinity Peninsula, and was followed a year later by a Pan American Airways cruiser which landed at McMurdo Sound.14 By 1966 cruises had become a regular feature of the Antarctic tourist industry.15 Combining both elements, Fly-Sail or Fly/Cruise operations (where tourists arrive in the Antarctic by aircraft, then undertake excursions by yacht or cruiser) began during the 2004 season.16 Tourist numbers from the 1950s through the 1970s were very limited with fewer than 1,000 tourists per year visiting Antarctica.17 From the mid-1980s onward, though, annual tourist numbers began to climb and by 1992–93 had risen to 6,704. The figures progressed upward, reaching 12,248 sea- and landbased tourists in 2000–01, 19,771 landed tourists in 2003–04, and 40,069 during the 2007–08 season. However, the last three austral summer seasons have coincided with a global recession and, as with tourism in other destinations, Antarctic tourist numbers declined over this period. The number of landed tourists in Antarctic dropped from 37,568 in 2008–09 to 36,875 in 2009–10. The numbers reduced again in the most recent season (2010–11) to 33,824.18 However, despite the recent drop in Antarctic tourism, numbers are likely to rise again as the tourism consumer market increases in emerging economies and as the global tourism market recovers from the recession.19 The general trend, as the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) noted in 2008, has been continuing “increase of tourism resulting in tourist numbers doubling every few years – currently about five years”.20 Over the last three decades, globalization has been a major driver of tourism in the Antarctic. This has combined with greater global consciousness of environmental degradation, particularly of the dwindling number of wilderness and ‘untouched’ areas in the world. As more traditional

destinations have become mass market holiday spots, appetites have been fuelled among tourism consumers both for unorthodox or unusual tourism locations, and for eco-tourism experiences. These factors coincided with technological advances enabling more ice-strengthened ships to be built, and with the post-Cold War release of former Soviet ice-breakers and icestrengthened vessels on to the free market.21 Not only are there now more ships that can cope with Antarctic conditions, but the number of ships with capacity to carry a large number of tourist passengers into Antarctic waters has increased significantly. The largest ships to visit Antarctica, the Princess Cruise Line's 109,000-ton Golden Princess and Star Princess, each carried more than 3,500 passengers and crew.22 Global warming has also played a part in the rise of Antarctic tourism, lengthening the tourist season in the continent. In 2000 the Lonely Planet: Antarctica guidebook advised would-be tourists that the “Antarctic tour season is short – about four months”, from November to February.23 However, by 2008 the guidebook was advising that the tourist season covered a five-month period from November to March.24 In addition to cruise ships being able to carry more tourists to the Antarctic, climate change has enabled ships to navigate the waters of the Southern Ocean for an extended period of time, pushing up the total number of landed sea-borne tourists in Antarctica each year.25 Tourism has not only expanded vertically, however. Horizontal expansion has been facilitated by the increased range of activities in which Antarctic tourists are now engaged. These include mountaineering, kayaking, trekking, skiing, ballooning, skydiving,26 marathons, and long-distance swimming,27 as well as more traditional activities such as photography, guided tours of selected sites, visits to scientific research stations, and observation of indigenous wildlife, fora, and fauna. The growth in tourism has also triggered a concomitant increase in the number of non-governmental or private operators engaged in Antarctic tourism. In 1991 seven Antarctic tour operators formed the International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO). By 2010 more than 100 companies from 14 different countries had joined the industry group,28 and IAATO operators were responsible for landing 26,933 passengers from 53 vessels during the 2008–09 Antarctic tourist season.29

While little research has been done on determining the contemporary value of tourism to the Antarctic economy, some idea of its current worth can be gauged from a study of the market value of the Antarctic tourism industry, estimated to be US$44–55 million for the 1996–97 season when there were 7,322 landed cruise passengers.30 In the 2008–09 season the number of landed cruise passengers was close to 27,000, an increase of more than 350 per cent. This growth in demand for Antarctic experiences is expected to continue long-term. Lamers, Haase, and Amelung note that there is anticipated to be an increase not only in the main Antarctic tourist markets of North America, Europe, and Australia, but also in Russia, China, India and other developing and transitional economy states.31 Tourism is, thus, not only a significant contributor to the Antarctic economy, but is likely to become greater as the years pass. Economic benefits, though, are not the only ones engendered by tourism. Indeed, the way in which tourism can be used as a tool for conservation and support of protected areas has received attention from a number of authors.32 Bushell and McCool note that, among other things, tourism can: provide support for protected areas; support sustainable use of the natural heritage; link practice to conventions and guideline; foster attachment to heritage; encourage a stewardship ethic among the public; work with local stakeholders and industry; work to support local community development; and contribute to civil society, respect for others, and for heritage.33 Antarctic tourism has also been credited with providing assistance for various scientific research stations by transporting people and materials down to the continent on commercial cruise ships, and with motivating the cleanup of notoriously polluted research stations.34

Antarctic tourism: problems and issues Unfortunately, not all tourism in Antarctica provides such positive results. Concern has been increasingly voiced about the negative impacts of tourism on the Antarctic environment. So, too, have concerns about the problems that can be caused by tourist vessels in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. The potential threats include: contamination by tourists of sites not yet investigated by scientists; introduction of non-indigenous animals, plants, or microorganisms; disruption of wildlife breeding cycles; pollution from tourist vessels; degradation of sites caused by repeated tourist visits; increased likelihood of maritime and aviation emergencies in the region due to increased traffic; environmental hazards arising from accidents on land, sea, or air in the Antarctic region; and pressures to establish permanent land-based tourist facilities.35 One of the key issues for tourism in Antarctica is the cumulative impacts of human contact with the environment, also known as the “nibbling effect” or “destruction by insignificant increments”.36 The overwhelming majority (approximately 85 per cent) of tourists visit Antarctica's top twenty landing sites, all of them situated along the Antarctic Peninsula.37 This raises obvious questions about how much contact and carrying capacity the sites can sustain before they become subject to unacceptable deterioration. On a continent dedicated to scientific research for the benefit of humankind, the deleterious impacts of tourism represent a significant challenge to realization of this Treaty objective. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is the founding document and hub of a series of legal instruments which collectively make up the Antarctic Treaty System. These include the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972,38 the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 (CCAMLR),39 the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 1988 (CRAMRA),40 and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (PEPAT).41 Antarctic tourism, therefore, does not take place in a vacuum. According to the provisions of PEPAT, “activities in the Antarctic Treaty area shall be planned and conducted so as to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment and

dependent and associated ecosystems”.42 To reinforce this, the Protocol requires that a system of prior assessment of the impacts of activities on the environment (Environmental Impact Assessment) be conducted according to whether the impacts are identified as having “less than a minor or transitory impact”, “a minor or transitory impact”, or “more than a minor or transitory impact”.43 If an activity is deemed to have less than a minor or transitory impact then it “may proceed forthwith”.44 Otherwise, an Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) must be prepared. If an IEE indicates that the activity will have more than a minor or transitory impact, then a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) is required to be prepared. Comprehensive Environmental Evaluations trigger a process whereby their drafts are circulated to all Parties and made publicly available for comment during a 90-day period. Simultaneously, they are also sent to the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) with a strict time criterion of ensuring that this is done within a minimum of 120 days before the next ATCM meeting.45 The ATCM considers together the draft CEE and advice from the CEP. If approved, a final CEE is prepared, circulated to the Parties, and made publicly available a minimum of 60 days before the activity takes place.46 In addition to the annex dealing with environmental impact assessments, PEPAT also contains annexes covering waste disposal and waste management, area protection and management, and liability for environmental emergencies. Annex V (Area Protection and Management), for instance, enables the designation of specific parts of Antarctica as Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest, while Annex VI (Liability Arising From Environmental Emergencies) requires operators to take preventative measures to reduce the risk of environmental emergencies and to put in place contingency plans “for responses to incidents with potential adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment or dependent and associated ecosystems”.47 The ATCPs, via the ATCMs, have also created their own regulations and guidelines for tourists and expedition organizers to supplement PEPAT. According to the ATS Secretariat, two key sets of provisions are contained in the Environment Protocol and Tourism Guidelines attached to Recommendation XVIII-1 (1994)… supplemented in 2004 with guidelines

on contingency planning, insurance and other matters…. The ATCM also issues specific guidelines for the sites most visited by tourists. They include practical guidance for tour operators and guides on how they should conduct visits in those sites, taking into account their environmental values.48 IAATO, too, has constructed by-laws49 regulating tourism for their own members, and affirms its commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and ATS, including PEPAT. Its website displays the ATCM guidelines referred to above for tourists and tour operators, and templates for reporting procedures. Members are required to adhere to these instruments, and to follow the procedures laid down by the Protocol and the ATCMs. However, while there exists a basic framework of regulation for Antarctic tourism, that framework is skeletal at best, and many aspects of tourism are simply not addressed and managed, or are not legally binding and enforceable. Nor are some of the central parts of that framework implemented evenly and rigorously. For instance, significant critiques of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process have been made, suggesting that the procedures are not sufficiently robust in design or implementation.50 Criticism has also focused on the lack of investigation within the EIA process of cumulative impacts. And, as Joyner has stated, “… the ultimate arbiter of what will be done on the continent belongs to individual national governments. A government can proceed as it wishes, and this procedure contradicts what should be a comprehensive approach.”51 The incompleteness of the framework means that there are gaps in Antarctic tourist regulation which leave the current state of operations vulnerable and open to abuse or mishap.

Enduring difficulties in Antarctic tourism policy and regulation There are a number of factors that contribute to this situation, but the key one is sovereignty. Because the Treaty prevents sovereign claims upon the territory being pursued, no state signatory has been able to have its claim recognized in international law. Consequently, there is no sovereign government in Antarctica. What exists, instead, is a system of governance based upon the Antarctic Treaty and the other instruments making up the Antarctic Treaty System. While there is no authoritative set of governmental institutions able to make and implement legislation for Antarctica, the governance structures and procedures that have evolved under the ATS have, through a process of consensus decision-making and voluntary agreement among the signatories, been able to create a set of policy regimes52 covering various aspects of Antarctic life. Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty established a system of regular information sharing and consultative meetings among signatories, and these meetings form the core decision-making infrastructure for Antarctica. The consultative meetings provide an opportunity for participants to formulate, consider, and recommend to their governments “measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty”.53 To be able to participate and vote at the consultative meetings, though, signatory states must fall into one of two categories. They must be either an original Contracting Party (i.e. one of the twelve states that signed the Treaty in 1959), or a state that acceded subsequently to the Treaty and has demonstrated interest in Antarctica. For this latter group of states interest has, according to Article IX(2), to be demonstrated by “conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition”. Absent this demonstration of interest, states which have acceded to the Treaty are only able to attend the consultative meetings as observers, and have no voting rights. The importance of the Consultative Meetings lies not just in the information-sharing exercises but, especially, in the ability for states to be able to contribute to formulation of a Measure that will be recommended to all signatory governments. It is through the Measures mechanism that much of the day to day, practical governance of Antarctica is worked out. Signatory

states that implement the Measures agreed upon at consultative meetings introduce legislation or regulations in their own countries that are binding upon their nationals. Thus, when nationals of a signatory state travel to Antarctica they are captured by a Measure that was initiated in an ATCM but which is given legal effect by their own state. However, the effectiveness of the Measures is limited by the fact that signatory states are not required to implement the Measures, but merely recommended to do so. It is up to a state to decide whether to follow the recommendation. Political will thus becomes an important feature in consideration of whether a state will implement a Measure. Similarly, enforcement of the Measures is dependent upon the actions of each signatory state. Some states are more vigilant than others in requiring adherence of their nationals to the Measures; some interpret the Measures selectively or in a manner that coincides with their national interests. Furthermore, even if all signatory states decided to follow an ATCM recommended Measure, it would still leave most countries outside the policy framework as only 50 of the approximately 19554 states in the world are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. Another factor that limits the effectiveness of the tourism policy framework is that the tourists who visit Antarctica cannot be guaranteed to be nationals of signatory states. Neither can the tourism operations staff or the company owners. As well, the companies organizing Antarctic tourism may not be registered in the state of an Antarctic Treaty signatory, and the vessels that they operate may be fagged to a non-signatory state. Potentially, then, a significant number of the tourists, industry personnel, companies, and vessels involved in Antarctic tourism may fall outside the ATS extant policy framework, particularly as the tourism industry becomes larger. Industry self-regulation as established by IAATO, though helpful, cannot close the gaps in the policy framework. While IAATO maintains it is “an industry group that has resolved to set the highest possible tourism operating standards in its effort to protect Antarctica”,55 and its by-laws are compliant with the Treaty and ATS instruments, members who breach the by-laws can only be “subject to reprimand or change in membership status, e.g. probation or expulsion, after review by the Membership and Executive Committees”.56 Additionally, membership of IAATO is not compulsory, and so not all tourist

operators belong to IAATO. This has created a difficulty in recent times as the Antarctic tourism industry has grown. The problem of free-riders who use common-pool resources and benefit from the efforts of responsible others to manage and maintain the resources, but do not themselves abide by those management and maintenance rules, is well known in environmental politics.57 The freerider problem is one that is now plaguing Antarctic tourism. According to Monteath, “Some companies refuse to join IAATO. So, they do whatever they want. They are the potential rogues.”58 Adding to the difficulties is the lack in the Antarctic policy-making context of policy entrepreneurs59 and imaginaries who could initiate and take a leading role in debates about tourism and the construction of policy at ATCMs. These factors are significant ones, but they are not insurmountable. What seems to prevent a coherent Antarctic tourism policy being established is the differing perspectives of the signatory states and other interested parties towards tourism. Enzenbacher has commented on the “spectrum of views on Antarctic tourism policy and management and the direction it should take”,60 including two dichotomous views presented at the Twenty-Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting that took place in Edinburgh in 2006. One view focused on the ability of the industry, through IAATO, to self-regulate; the other queried the appropriateness of the tourism industry influencing the tourism policy agenda, “the absence of objective tourism management expertise within Treaty delegations and the lack of a coordinated ATS approach to oversee Antarctic tourism”.61 Without a clear vision and direction for tourism, it is likely that only piecemeal actions will be taken by the ATCPs.

Antarctic tourism: the need for intervention This leaves a dangerous void. Tourism in Antarctica is growing at an unprecedented rate. If tourist numbers continue to increase then at a conservative estimate (and even taking into account the recent drop in numbers), more than 60,000 tourists annually will visit Antarctic by 2020. Cumulative impacts upon Antarctic fora, fauna, and wildlife are likely to grow exponentially. This presents some very difficult issues that the ATCPs need to resolve urgently before disaster strikes and serious harm is done to the Antarctic environment. The invidious effects of human/nature interaction in Antarctic tourism will not spontaneously resolve themselves, and the impacts cannot be rectified. Antarctica is the most pristine of the wilderness areas on earth, but it will not long remain so if the current set of issues hindering development of a comprehensive tourism policy framework is not addressed by the ATCPs. Without carefully considered assessment, intervention, regulation, management, and monitoring of tourism in the immediate future, the ATCPs will be guilty of negligence in their Article IX(1) (f)62 duty to preserve and conserve the living resources of Antarctica.

Maritime concerns The need for intervention is made more urgent by maritime incidents in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters. The sinking and discharge of 600,000 litres of diesel fuel by the Bahia Paraiso at Anvers Island in 1989, the precursor to a spate of sinkings, groundings, and other maritime accidents in the Antarctic region over the following decade,63 should sound as a warning bell to the ATCPs that time is running out to be able to implement policy that can, as far as possible, prevent future incidents of this nature. The disastrous effect of an oil spill in polar waters by a marine vessel was vividly demonstrated when the Exxon Valdez discharged eleven million gallons of oil in the Arctic in 1989. A similar incident in Antarctica would be a disaster of unimaginable scale given Antarctica's unique place in the global ecosystem and its importance as an irreplaceable site for scientific experimentation. Indeed, it is the significant risk of maritime disaster in ship-borne tourism that should focus the minds of the ATCPs and provide impetus for reform in

Antarctic tourism regulation. The Chair's Report from the Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the Management of Ship-borne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area held in Wellington in December 2009 traverses a plethora of problems: the uncertainty of operating in the Antarctic Treaty area for vessels because “many areas have not been surveyed to modern standards”;64 lack of clarity about the formal relationship between ATCMs and the International Maritime Organization (IMO); lack of legally required standards of navigational training in Antarctic waters for crew of Antarcticbound vessels; uneven implementation among Consultative Parties of Measure 4 (2004) on Insurance and Contingency Planning for Tourism and Non-governmental Activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area; an absence of guidelines for responding to large-scale marine spills in the Antarctic Treaty area; lack of coordination between parties on contingency planning for “incidents with potential adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment”;65 lack of participation by some Antarctic-going vessels in current vesselmonitoring schemes in the region; the need for greater coordination between the five parties with Search and Rescue responsibilities, national programmes, and IAATO; and the need for a mandatory Polar Code for ships that would include requirements and measures specific to the Antarctic waters. Antarctic ship-borne tourism, in short, is operating in an increasingly dangerous situation. More and more vessels are negotiating the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters, but they do so at their peril as the majority of the Antarctic sea remains un-surveyed or requires a modern re-survey and less than 1 percent of the sea area within the 200 m contour has been adequately surveyed to meet the needs of contemporary shipping entering Antarctic waters.66 Many of these vessels (approximately 50 per cent) are fagged to non-parties, and do not participate in the existing vessel-monitoring programmes in Antarctica. Sea ice changes continue to make navigation hazardous to ships in the Antarctic region. However, tracking, tracing, and reaching vessels requiring emergency assistance in Antarctic waters is difficult because of the large size of the region, and will become more problematic as the funding for Polar View (an instrument that has proven very effective for improving navigation safety, routing efficiency, and assisting in emergency situations)

ran out in June 2010. Although funding for Polar View was acquired for the 2011–12 austral summer season, it should be noted that the funding basis is not permanent, and depends upon the willingness of institutions such as the European Space Agency to continue their financial support.67 The potential for a serious maritime incident in the Antarctic region involving loss of human life and significant damage to the environment is, therefore, very high. The track record of four tourist vessels grounding and one sinking in the Antarctic Treaty area in just three years is not one that inspires confidence, and without a comprehensive plan for Antarctic tourism generated by the Consultative Parties the future is only too likely to produce a disaster in the region. Commentators have noted that the Consultative Parties are on “borrowed time”68 with ship-borne tourism, that there “is increasing concern about the potential for a maritime disaster involving a cruise ship in Antarctic waters”,69 that “a disaster is waiting to happen unless urgent action is taken”,70 and that another fatal accident, “a new Titanic”,71 will occur. In the words of one journal headline, “How long before the next Titanic?”.72

The IMO and Antarctic-bound ships It is, in fact, a United Nations agency, the International Maritime Organization, rather than the ATCPs via the ATCM framework, which has made efforts to engage with and address some of these problems. Three recent initiatives undertaken by the IMO are aimed at mitigating potential pollution and safety problems. The first initiative was an amendment to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL). The amendment bans, from 1 August 2011, the use and carriage of heavy and intermediate fuel oils for ships operating in the Antarctic Treaty area, and is expected to affect larger cruise ships carrying more than 500 passengers.73 Although it cannot prevent an oil spill, the MARPOL amendment should decrease the chances in an Antarctic spill incident of the denser, harder to disperse, and more environmentally damaging oils being involved. The second initiative involved the re-drafting and updating of the IMO's Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters to cover Antarctic waters. The Guidelines, adopted by the IMO in late 2009, are “intended to be applied

to ships constructed on or after 1 January 2011, although Governments are invited to apply the guidelines, as far as possible, before that date”.74 Although the Guidelines apply to newly constructed ships and are not retroactive, they represent an important step forward in the construction of international baseline safety and protection standards for vessels that will in future journey to the Antarctic. The IMO also began work in “February 2010 on a mandatory International Code of safety for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code)”,75 covering “vessel design, safety equipment, ship operations and crew training for ice navigation” and intended to take effect in 2013.76 Although this latter initiative is still a long way from being finished, its successful completion and implementation would help allay many of the fears currently held about tourism vessel safety in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters.

The need for an Antarctic tourism convention Despite these advances, many outstanding problems remain and these cannot simply be deferred indefinitely or delegated to another organization for resolution.77 As Aant Elzinga notes, there has been little institutional dynamism within the ATS since the adoption of PEPAT in 1991.78 Additionally, there is a real sense in which, as Sanjay Chaturvedi puts it, the ATS “today finds itself at a crossroads”.79 What this means for the long-term future of the ATS is a critical need to deal with issues – not just tourism, but also bio-prospecting and extended continental shelf claims under Article 76 of UNCLOS – that have become increasingly urgent and in need of clear, unambiguous direction and regulation by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. Without such direction and regulation the ATS and the ATCPs risk losing legitimacy, authenticity, and respect as the core multilateral governance system and actors within Antarctica. Put simply, in the context of tourism, the time for the ATCPs to deal with the issue by incremental Measures is long past. For two decades the ATCPs have been cognizant of the growth of tourism in the continent. For almost as long, research and advice has been presented at ATCMs to indicate the need to the ATCPs to plan for and manage tourism in the Antarctic in a manner that is consistent with the stewardship ethic that has evolved under the ATS. The discussions that have taken place at the Consultative Meetings demonstrate a clear awareness on the part of the ATCPs that tourism does need to be controlled and that, without regulation, there will be negative impacts on the environment.80 However, the Measures that have been introduced through Consultative Meetings are essentially reactive ones that have been implemented in the wake of tourist number increases. They are not proactive initiatives Measures introduced as part of a long-term, comprehensive plan for tourism in the area. Effectively, the ATCPs have been playing a lagging game of catch-up as Antarctic tourism booms. But trying to play catch-up as tourism races ahead in a unique, fragile environment is a plan doomed to failure. What is needed is for the ATCPs to create a comprehensive tourist policy with a clear and unambiguous framework for all actors in the industry, and to implement this via a multilateral convention that covers all aspects of tourism

in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Such a convention, once it came into force, would become an ATS instrument and an integral part of ATCPs' governance in the region. Introducing and negotiating a hard international law instrument, such as a convention, is a difficult and time-consuming process. As Palmer has noted, “nations tend to shy away from the specificity they often involve”,81 and Rayfuse asserts that “effective international agreements are easier to reach before vested interests become entrenched”.82 Downie has also identified the “lowest common denominator” problem where states who have the most interest in addressing an environmental problem must try to get the cooperation of countries with little or no interest in the problem, leading to a situation where the outcome “often represents, at least at the start, the lowest common denominator measures that the relevant countries are willing to accept”.83 However, where hard law changes are presaged by soft law, such as a hortatory declaration, a positive outcome appears easier to achieve. The value of initiating change toward an environmental hard law instrument via soft law processes is that soft law solutions change the political thinking on an issue. They alter the circumstances in which an issue is considered; they cause opinion to coalesce. These changes can be a very important catalyst in securing an agreement with a harder edge later…. Soft law is where international law and international politics combine to build new norms.84 Saying is easier than doing in international law, and there is no doubt that introducing a tourist convention for Antarctica would be a diplomatically challenging task, and one that would likely require a harder-edged interaction between the states than the ‘softly softly’ diplomacy that has been such a characteristic of ATCPs governance. The ATS has been praised for the cooperative interactions of the ATCPs which have enabled the system to endure, to evolve over time, and to achieve condominium governance.85 That form of consensus decision-making comes at a price, though, and the price appears to have been deference to the differing views held by various ATCPs and the placing of some issues on the back-burner in order to avoid confrontation and overt splits between the parties. Tourism policy has been one of those back-burner issues.

A background of that nature would seem to negate the possibility of achieving agreement on a tourist convention, but that need not be the case. Prior to the adoption of PEPAT with its prohibition on mining, a diversity of views among parties was also held about what the proper vision and policy for Antarctic mineral resources should be and, given the commercial interests involved, there was widespread pessimism that a mining ban would ever be achieved. It is possible, therefore, to envisage agreement between the parties on tourism policy that is enshrined in a convention, particularly if preceded by a declaration and, especially, if accompanied by civil society activism and public pressure on national governments to engage in good faith with the tourism issue. The recent campaigns to ban landmines and cluster bombs, both of which engendered international conventions that are now in force, demonstrated powerfully the effectiveness of focused civil society action on recalcitrant governments. Another motivational factor is the response from non-signatory states, particularly those in the Global South, that would undoubtedly be forthcoming should a major, tourism-derived disaster occur in Antarctica in the near future.86 That response would certainly focus on the exclusive nature of the ATCPs ‘club’ and the overwhelmingly western, Global North orientation of the Consultative Parties. This was an issue that was debated fiercely at the United Nations General Assembly during the 1980s when the Group of 77, led by Malaysia, questioned vigorously the governance arrangements for Antarctica and what they perceived as the rich states' preserve in Antarctica. The debate engendered questions about the status of Antarctica such as whether it really was a global commons and common heritage of mankind territory, or whether it had, de facto, become a continent ring-fenced by the Antarctic Treaty states, and whose future would be determined by them. The subsequent opening up of ATCPs membership to states such as China and India helped subdue the debate, as did the establishment of PEPAT with its mining prohibition and the assurance that, for fifty years at least, there would not be a scramble for lucrative mining rights in Antarctica. Additionally, the perception that the ATCPs were acting carefully in Antarctic governance and in evolving a stewardship ethic towards the continent provided another reason to take Antarctica off the General Assembly agenda.87 However, a tourism disaster in Antarctica would be only too likely to

reawaken debates about Antarctica among developing states, and to put the Antarctica issue back on to the General Assembly agenda. Non-signatory states could not be expected to be forgiving of such a disaster occurring under the ATCPs watch, especially given the history of warnings about a foreseeable occurrence of this nature. The bypassing of opportunities to act, relegation of a number of issues to another organization altogether, and inability to achieve consensus on tourism even after two decades may provide, in the event of a disaster, the evidence that non-signatory states need to advocate for future governance of Antarctica by a more representative and responsible organization that is not bound by ATS protocols. It is, in fact, a potential tourism disaster that might give birth to a new type of tourism in Antarctica – literally disaster tourism. Disaster tourism can be defined as “a type of tourism that is associated with death, tragedy and suffering”.88 According to CNN, disaster tourism is a growing niche market in the travel industry, evidenced in the wake of natural disasters such as the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami that devastated much of South East Asia, and the wreckage of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005.89 Ironically, the Irish Independent has reported that “the 100th anniversary of the Titanic disaster is set to trigger a tourism bonanza with ‘disaster cruises’ to the spot where the great ship sank”.90

Advantages of an Antarctic tourism convention An ATS-sponsored multilateral tourist convention would have a number of advantages for future governance in the region, particularly as it would be able to plug a variety of gaps in the existing Antarctic tourism framework. Crucially, it would require the parties to agree on at least a basic philosophy for Antarctic tourism that accords with Treaty principles and objectives. That alone would be a major step forward in Antarctic tourism policy as there is neither an overarching plan nor a clear direction determined by the Consultative Parties for tourism in the region. Consequently, there is a current risk that tourism will develop in a fashion that is antithetical to the Antarctic Treaty. Having an agreed philosophy as the foundation of Antarctic tourism would enable the parties to move ahead and create a comprehensive tourism policy, using Treaty-consistent philosophy as the generator of policy parameters. A comprehensive tourism policy that reaffirms commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and also to another ATS instrument, PEPAT, would reduce the risk of future conflict around the issue of sovereignty-centred tourism. Although the Antarctic Treaty freezes sovereign claims upon the continent, there has been concern raised that tourism is being used to reinforce and further these claims. Scott, for instance, asserts that “Australia is using tourism, and control of tourist activity, to support its claim to sovereignty. Similarly, the primary reason for Argentina and Chile promoting tourist activity on the Antarctic Peninsula is that it provides support for their territorial claims.”91 The issue of land-based tourism facilities has become linked to these concerns as the possibility of these facilities raises issues about property rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction. A very real division among the Consultative Parties is apparent on these matters.92 Nevertheless, a tourist convention that reinforces a central feature of the Antarctic Treaty – the non-sovereign status of Antarctica – would provide a decisive response to any Consultative Party with aspirations to gain claims leverage through sovereignty-centred tourism. Accreditation would be a most appropriate issue for the ATCPs to address via a convention. Currently, IAATO is the group which provides accreditation for Antarctic tour operators. IAATO, though, has grown out of

the tourist industry and has vested interests in that industry. It is not a neutral, independent group. Some ATCPs have, de facto, made IAATO the monopoly provider for parts of the Antarctic region under their control.93 This privileging in Antarctic tourism of IAATO by some states means that there are different rules pertaining to the industry being applied in the Antarctic region. Yet achieving a coherent and coordinated tourism policy requires transparent application of universal rules, standards, and policy across the region. And, as mentioned earlier, not all tourist operators are members of IAATO. Moving the locus of accreditation to the ATCPs would enhance capture of operators, and eliminate or significantly reduce the free-rider problem, particularly if the ATCPs refused to cooperate with tourist operators not accredited by them, for instance, by refusing to allow them access to port facilities in ATCP coastal states, refusing to allow tours of their research stations in Antarctica, and refusing any application by a non-accredited operator for an EIA licence. It would be beneficial both to perceived industry integrity and to universal coverage of the tourist industry, therefore, if the ATCPs were to take control of tourist operator accreditation and to do it through the vehicle of a convention. Ideally, a convention would establish an official body charged with Antarctic tourism coordination funded from taxes and charges on the tourism industry.94 Such a body would be able to promulgate regulations in accordance with existing ATS instruments, work with tourism operators to achieve optimum outcomes consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, and require tourism operators to undertake actions in response to tourism-related environmental concerns. It could be responsible for some of the core tasks vital to future tourism in the continent such as controlling the geographical scale of tourism in Antarctica, and confining tourism to certain areas of the territory to ensure that as-yet-scientifically unexamined areas are off-limits to tourists. In this context, it could restrict tourism numbers in areas prone to stress, and declare seasonal limits to commercial tourism in order to retain the integrity of sites. Coordination of site visits with tourist operators to prevent undue traffic in particular areas, and maintaining communications with all tourist operators to ensure orderly and coherent patterns of visitations to the continent would also be vital undertakings. Tasks such as maintaining lists of accredited operators, managing advance notification and post-visit reporting, and providing information and visitor guidelines on Antarctica to intending

tourists would also form part of its workload. An Antarctic tourism coordination entity would, thus, manage overall tourist numbers and activities so that Treaty principles and objectives are not compromised, and tourist operations are occurring effectively and efficiently, yet in a manner that is still consistent with the Treaty itself. The expert scientific community would, necessarily, have an important role to play in such a tourism entity. Given the criticisms mentioned earlier of the cumbersome decision-making process at ATCMs, lack of rigour in the EIA process, and sovereignty-centred tourism issues, it would be preferable to remove, as far as possible, the ATCPs from decision-making in this area, and delegate authority for tourism decisions to Antarctic scientific groups such as the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the CEP which are already an integral part of the ATS infrastructure. It is expert scientific groups like these that are in the best position to know and understand the impacts of tourism on the white continent and the environmental implications for the future of continuing tourist visitations. Their expert opinions should be central to deciding, for instance, what are the appropriate numbers of visitors at the most popular tourist sites and which types of tourist activities should be permitted or suspended in any austral summer season. An important accompaniment to the tasks undertaken by an Antarctic tourism coordination body would be the creation of an official tourist database, and an information repository that would act as a clearinghouse for research on Antarctic tourism. In this context, it should be noted that essential tourism information, such as total annual tourist numbers, is not collated or archived in one database, making it difficult for researchers and policymakers to access verifiable statistical evidence on Antarctic tourism. It is vital for holistic monitoring, management, and evaluation of tourism in Antarctica that the Consultative Parties have access to a variety of independent, objective, up-to-date information and advice streams about Antarctic tourism, so that tourism policy can evolve on a considered and careful basis.

Conclusion Whether the ATCPs will seek the opportunity to redress problems in tourism policy through the vehicle of a multilateral convention, or continue to delay making critical decisions through the ATCMs is a moot question. Creation of a multilateral tourist convention by the ATCPs would not provide a guarantee of an incident-free future in Antarctic tourism, but without it the continent will inevitably be witness to preventable tragedies. In this unique continent, an exceptional commons, that would be a tragedy for all of humankind. A multilateral tourist convention offers an opportunity for the ATCPs to rectify the problems caused by lack of a comprehensive tourist policy, and put in place the safety and security Measures that both tourists and the Antarctic environment need to be protected from each other.

Notes 1

Eyewitness to History, “The Sinking of the Titanic, 1912” [accessed 26 March 2010], www.eyewitnesstohistory.com.

2

According to Thomas Bauer the ‘heroic age’ ended “with the death of Sir Ernest Shackleton aboard the Quest on January 5, 1922”, Thomas Bauer, Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and Future Prospects, New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2001, p. 51.

3

Kevin Hillstrom and Laurie Collier Hillstrom, Australia, Oceania and Antarctica: A Continental Overview of Environmental Issues, Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2003, pp. 233–234; Paul Berkman, Science Into Policy: Global Lessons from Antarctica, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, pp. 34–49.

4

The Antarctic Treaty, Washington 1959 402 UNTS 1961 72. Hereafter, Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

5

Preamble, Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

6

Article VII (4), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

7

Article VII (5)(a), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

8

Article I, Article V, Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

9

Article VII (2), Antarctic Treaty, 1959.

10 Article VII (3), Antarctic Treaty, 1959. 11 Article VII (4), Antarctic Treaty, 1959. 12 Article VII (5)(a), Antarctic Treaty, 1959. 13 Richard Herr, “The Regulation of Antarctic Tourism: A Study in Regime Effectiveness”, in Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 205. 14 Thomas Bauer, Tourism in the Antarctic: Opportunities, Constraints, and Future Prospects, p. 80.

15 Shirley Scott, “How Cautious is Precautious?: Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary Principle”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50:4 (2001), p. 967. 16 Kees Bastmeijer, “Managing Human Activities in Antarctica: Should Wilderness Protection Count?”, New Zealand Yearbook of International Law (2005) [accessed 18 January 2010], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969388. 17 TVNZ, “Slow Down in Antarctic Tourism”, TVNZ Travel News, 13 February 2009 [accessed 14 June 2009], http://tvnz.co.nz/travelnews/slow-down-in-antarctic-tourism-2486138. 18 IAATO, “Tourism Statistics: 1992–2001 Antarctic Tourist Trends”, “2000–2001 Tourists By Nationality (Landed)”, “2007–2008 Tourists By Nationality (Landed)”, “2008–2009 Summary of Seaborne, Airborne, and Land-Based Antarctic Tourism”, “2009–2010 Tourism Summary” [accessed 12 May 2010 and 7 August 2010], w​w​w​.i​a​a​t​o​.o​r​g​/t​o​u​r​i​s​m​_​s​t​a​t​s​.h​t​m​l​; Kraig Becker, “Antarctic Tourism Drops in 2010”, 15 June 2011, w​w​w​.g​a​d​l​i​n​g​.c​o​m​/2​0​1​1​/0​6​/1​5​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​-t​o​u​r​i​s​m​d​r​o​p​s​-i​n​-2​0​1​0​/. 19 See UNWTO Tourism Highlights, 2011 edition, pp. 2–5, World Tourism Organisation, 2011 [accessed 13 November 2011], h​t​t​p​://m​k​t​.u​n​w​t​o​.o​r​g​/s​i​t​e​s​/a​l​l​/f​l​e​s​/d​o​c​p​d​f​/u​n​w​t​o​h​i​g​h​l​i​g​h​t​s​1​1​e​n​l​r​_​1​.p​d​f.​ 20 ASOC, “A Decade of Antarctic Tourism: Status, Change, and Actions Needed”, IP 41, Information Paper Submitted by ASOC to the XXXI ATCM, Kiev, 2–14 June 2008, ATCM Agenda Item 11 and CEP Agenda Item 6(b), p. 4. 21 Daniela Haase, “Tourism in the Antarctic: Modi Operandi and Regulatory Effectiveness”, University of Canterbury: Unpublished PhD Thesis, 2008, p. 9. 22 Colin Woodward, “Why Did an Antarctic Cruise Ship Sink?,” Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 2009 [accessed 25 July 2010], w​w​w​.c​s​m​o​n​i​t​o​r​.c​o​m​/2​0​0​9​/0​4​2​0​/p​o​6​s​0​8​-w​o​g​n​.h​t​m​l​. 23 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, 2nd edn, Melbourne: Lonely Planet Publications, 2000, p. 64.

24 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, 4th edn, Melbourne: Lonely Planet Publications, 2008, p. 16. 25 Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, New Zealand Listener, 11–17 April 2009, p. 28. 26 Jeff Rubin, Lonely Planet: Antarctica, pp. 75–82. 27 Kees Bastmeijer, “Tourism in Antarctica: Increasing Diversity and Legal Criteria for Authorization”, New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 7 (2003), p. 90. 28 IAATO, “About IAATO” and “About IAATO: Objectives” [accessed 18 February 2010], w​w​w​.i​a​a​t​o​.o​r​g​/o​b​j​e​c​t​i​v​e​s​.h​t​m​l​. 29 Report of the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators 2008–2009 Under Article III(2) of the Antarctic Treaty (2009) IP 33 rev.2, p. 8. 30 This was a study undertaken for a doctoral dissertation at the University of Tasmania by P. J. Tracey, “Managing Antarctic Tourism”, quoted in Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-making: Current Challenges and Future Prospects”, in G. Triggs and A. Riddell (eds), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the Future, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007, pp. 172. 31 Machiel Lamers, Daniela Haase, and Bas Amelung, “Facing the Elements: Analysing Trends in Antarctic Tourism”, Tourism Review 63:1 (2008), p. 19. 32 See G. Cessford, “Antarctic Tourism – A Frontier for Wilderness Management”, in P. Dingwell (ed.), Antarctica in the Environmental Age, Wellington: Department of Conservation, 1988, pp. 23–30, and Robert Powell, Stephen Kellert, and Sam Ham, “Antarctic Tourists: Ambassadors or Consumers?”, Polar Record 44:230 (2008), pp. 233– 241. 33 Robyn Bushell and Stephen McCool, “Tourism as a Tool for Conservation and Support of Protected Areas: Setting the Agenda”, in R. Bushell and P. Eagles (eds), Tourism and Protected Areas: Benefits Beyond Boundaries, Wallingford: CAB International, 2007, pp. 13–23.

34 B. Deutsch, “Sinking Raises Questions About Antarctic Tourism”, Dallas Morning News, 31 December 2007, p. 2 [accessed 5 October 2009], w​w​w​.d​a​l​l​a​s​n​e​w​s​.c​o​m​/s​h​a​r​e​d​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/d​w​s​/f​e​a​/t​r​a​v​e​l​/t​h​i​s​w​e​e​k​/s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/D​N​-a​n​t​a​r​c​_​1​2​3​0​t​r​a​.S​t​a​t​e​.E​d​i​t​i​o​n​1​.d​9​2​5​d​e​.h​t​m​l.​ 35 Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Continent: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection, Carolina: University of South Carolina, 1998, pp. 208–212; Yves Frenot, Steven Chown, Jennie Whinam et al., “Biological Invasions in the Antarctic: Extent, Impacts and Implications”, Biological Review 80 (2005), pp. 45–72; Ivana Zovko, “Vessel-Sourced Pollution in the Southern Ocean: Benefits and Shortcomings of Regional Regulation”, in Gillian Triggs and Anna Riddell (eds), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the Future, London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007, pp. 194–195; T. Tin, Z. Fleming, K. A. Hughes et al., “Impacts of Local Human Activities on the Antarctic Environment”, Antarctic Science 21:1 (2009), pp. 5–26. 36 J. Dalziell and M. De Poorter, “Managing Cumulative Environmental Impacts: Antarctica's Challenge for the 21st Century”, in P. Dingwell, Antarctica in the Environmental Age, p. 16. 37 Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-Making”, p. 155. 38 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 29 UST 44 1, TIAS no. 8826. 39 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 1980 19 ILM 841. 40 This Convention is not in force and has, effectively, been superseded by PEPAT. 41 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991 30 ILM 1461. Hereafter, PEPAT. 42 PEPAT, Article 3(2)(a). 43 PEPAT, Article 8(1). 44 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 1(2). 45 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 3(3) and (4).

46 PEPAT, Annex I, Article 3(5) and (6). 47 PEPAT, Annex VI, Article 4(1)(a). 48 Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, “Tourism and Non-Governmental Activities” [accessed 28 May 2010], w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/e​/a​t​s​_​o​t​h​e​r​_​t​o​u​r​i​s​m​.h​t​m​. 49 IAATO, “By-Laws”, Article 10, Operational Procedures [accessed 21 April 2010], www.iaato.org/bylaws.html. 50 Alan Hemmings and Ricardo Roura, “A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Fitting Impact Assessment Under the Antarctic Environmental Protocol to Antarctic Tourism”, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 21:1 (2003), pp. 13–24; Kees Bastmeijer and Ricardo Roura, “Environmental Impact Assessment in Antarctica”, in Kees Bastmeijer and Timo Koivurova (eds), Theory and Practice of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, Leiden/Boston: Brill/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008 [accessed 8 January 2010], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1297285. 51 Christopher Joyner, Governing the Frozen Continent: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental Protection, p. 156. 52 An international regime is “a set of integrated principles, norms, rules, procedures and institutions that actors create or accept to regulate and coordinate action in a particular issue area of international relations”, David Downie, “Global Environmental Policy: Governance Through Regimes”, in Regina Axelrod, David Downie, and Norman Vig, The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, Washington: CQ Press, 2005, p. 64. 53 Article IX(1), Antarctic Treaty, 1959. 54 According to CIA The World Factbook, Southern Sudan became the world's 195th state on 9 July 2011 [accessed 10 July 2011], w​w​w​.c​i​a​.g​o​v​/l​i​b​r​a​r​y​/p​u​b​l​i​c​a​t​i​o​n​s​/t​h​e​-w​o​r​l​d​-f​a​c​t​b​o​o​k​/i​n​d​e​x​.h​t​m​l.​ 55 IAATO, “About IAATO” [accessed 20 April 2010], w​w​w​.i​a​a​t​o​.o​r​g​/a​b​o​u​t​.h​t​m​l​. 56 IAATO, “About IAATO: By-laws, Article 3: Membership, Section F” [accessed 21 April 2010], w​w​w​.i​a​a​t​o​.o​r​g​/b​y​l​a​w​s​.h​t​m​l.​

57 For example, Lorraine Elliot, “Global Environmental Governance”, in Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes (eds), Global Governance: Critical Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2002, pp. 60–61, and Daniela Haase, Machiel Lamers, and Bas Amelung, “Heading Into Uncharted Territory? Exploring the Institutional Robustness of Self-Regulation in the Antarctic Tourism Sector”, Journal of Sustainable Tourism 17:4 (2009), pp. 412–413. 58 Quoted in Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, p. 28. See also ATCM, Chairman's Report from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Tourism and Non-governmental Activities in Antarctica, XXVII ATCM Working Paper WP004, Topic iiia, para.30, p. 11. 59 Nancy Roberts and Paula King, “Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 1:2 (1991), pp. 147–175. 60 Debra Enzenbacher, “Antarctic Tourism Policy-Making”, p. 163. 61 Ibid. 62 Antarctic Treaty, 1959. 63 A Norwegian vessel, MS Nordkapp, hit rocks near Deception Island in January 2007. The MS Explorer hit an iceberg and sank in November 2007. A Panamanian-registered vessel, MV Cuidad de Ushuaia, ran aground in December of the same year. In January 2008 the MS Fram collided with ice. 64 Chair's Report, Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the Management of Shipborne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area, Wellington, New Zealand, 9–11 December 2009, Recommendation 4, p. 4. 65 Idem, Recommendation 13, p. 5. The recommendations traversed in this paragraph are taken from the Chair's Report and also include recommendations 3, 7–9, and 14 from pp. 3–5. 66 Idem, para. 41, p. 13. 67 Andrew Fleming, email communication, 20 July 2011. 68 Chair's Report, Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on the Management of Shipborne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area, Wellington, New

Zealand, 9–11 December 2009, Annex 4, “Remarks by New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Murray McCully”, p. 40. 69 Trevor Hughes quoted in Nancy Cawley, “Feeling the Heat”, p. 31. 70 Paul Bignell, “The Sinking of the Explorer”, Independent, 12 April 2009 [accessed 18 August 2010], w​w​w​.i​n​d​e​p​e​n​d​e​n​t​.c​o​.u​k​/t​r​a​v​e​l​/n​e​w​s​-a​n​d​-a​d​v​i​c​e​/t​h​e​-s​i​n​k​i​n​g​-o​f​-t​h​e​-e​x​p​l​o​r​e​r​-1​6​6​7​5​3​2​.h​t​m​l.​ 71 The Economist, “Waiting for Another Titanic”, 12 February 2009 [accessed 19 September 2010], w​w​w​.e​c​o​n​o​m​i​s​t​.c​o​m​/w​o​r​l​d​/a​m​e​r​i​c​a​s​/P​r​i​n​t​e​r​F​r​i​e​n​d​l​y​.c​f​m​?s​t​o​r​y​_​i​d​=1​3​1​1​0​4​1​2.​ 72 Stephen Talty, “How Long Before the Next Titanic?”, 29 January 2009 [accessed 29 January 2009], w​w​w​.m​e​n​s​j​o​u​r​n​a​l​.c​o​m​/n​e​x​t​-t​i​t​a​n​i​c.​ 73 TTN: Travel and Tourism News Middle East “Ecotourism: New Rules for Antarctic Tourism”, 28:8 August 2010 [accessed 17 September 2010], w​w​w​.t​t​n​w​o​r​l​d​w​i​d​e​.c​o​m​/a​r​c​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​.a​s​p​x​?id=1386artid=9860; WWF, “Ships Banned From Carrying Heavy Oil in Antarctic Waters”, 31 March 2010 [accessed 27 August 2010], w​w​w​.w​w​f​.o​r​g​.n​z​/?4​0​4​0​/S​h​i​p​s​-b​a​n​n​e​d​-f​r​o​m​-c​a​r​r​y​i​n​g​-h​e​a​v​y​-o​i​l​-i​n​-A​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​-w​a​t​e​r​s​; IMO Newsroom, MEPC-Briefng 10, “IMO Environment Committee Makes Progress”, 26 March 2010 [accessed 30 August 2010], w​w​w​.i​m​o​.o​r​g​/N​e​w​s​r​o​o​m​/m​a​i​n​f​r​a​m​e​.a​s​p​?t​o​p​i​c​_​i​d​=1​8​5​9​d​o​c​_​i​d​=1​2​7​2​4​. 74 IMO Newsroom, “Assembly–26th session: 23 November to 2 December 2009”, Press Briefings [accessed 30 August 2010], w​w​w​.i​m​o​.o​r​g​/N​e​w​s​r​o​o​m​/m​a​i​n​f​r​a​m​e​.a​s​p​?t​o​p​i​c​_​i​d​=1​7​7​3​d​o​c​_​i​d​=1​2​1​6​5.​ 75 Antarctic Treaty Database, “Resolution 7 (2010) – ATCM XXXIII – CEP XIII, Punta del Este” [accessed 7 August 2010], w​w​w​.a​t​s​.a​q​/d​e​v​A​S​/i​n​f​o​_​M​e​a​s​u​r​e​s​_​l​i​s​t​i​t​e​m​.a​s​p​x​?l​a​n​g​=e​i​d​=4​7​7.​ 76 Nautical Log, “Polar Code”, 2009 [accessed 7 August 2010], http://nauticallog.blogs-pot.com/2009/12/polar-code.html. 77 On this point see also Aant Elzinga, Chapter 10 in this volume. 78 Idem. 79 Sanjay Chaturvedi, Chapter 3 in this volume. 80 See, for instance, Final Report of the Thirty-second Antarctic Treaty

Consultative Meeting, XXXII ATCM, Baltimore, USA, Washington Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty, Appendix 1, pp. 161–162 and Measure 15 (2009), pp. 199–200. 81 Geoffrey Palmer, Environment: The International Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1995, p. 61.

Challenge,

82 Rosemary Rayfuse, “Warm Waters and Cold Shoulders: Jostling for Jurisdiction in Polar Oceans”, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, UNSWFLRS 56, 2008, p. 7 [accessed 25 September 2010], w​w​w​.a​u​s​t​l​i​i​.e​d​u​.a​u​/a​u​/j​o​u​r​n​a​l​s​/U​N​S​W​L​R​S​/2​0​0​8​/5​6​.h​t​m​l​. 83 David Downie, “Global Environmental Policy: Governance Through Regimes”, p. 72. 84 Geoffrey Palmer, Environment: The International Challenge, p. 63. 85 Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 153–154. 86 Peter Beck, “Twenty Years On: the UN and the ‘Question of Antarctica’, 1983–2003”, Polar Record 40:214 (2004), p. 211. 87 K. Baslar, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 244–248. 88 Zoe Graham, “Is Disaster Tourism Acceptable?,” BBC World Have Your Say, 25 February 2010 [accessed 18 September 2010], http://worldhaveyoursay.wordpress.com/2010/02/25/is-disaster-tourismacceptable/. 89 Dean Irvine, “Trend Watch: Disaster Tourism”, CNN World Weekly, 28 September 2007 [accessed 20 October 2010], h​t​t​p​://e​d​i​t​i​o​n​.c​n​n​.c​o​m​/2​0​0​7​/W​O​R​L​D​/e​u​r​o​p​e​/0​9​/2​7​/w​w​.t​r​e​n​d​s​.d​i​s​a​s​t​e​r​t​o​u​r​i​s​m​/. 90 Ralph Riegel, “‘Disaster’ Cruises to Mark Titanic's Centenary”, Independent.IE, 7 August 2010 [accessed 18 September 2010], w​w​w​.i​n​d​e​p​e​n​d​e​n​t​.i​e​/n​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​-n​e​w​s​/d​i​s​a​s​t​e​r​-c​r​u​i​s​e​s​-t​o​-m​a​r​k​-t​i​t​a​n​i​c​s​-c​e​n​t​e​n​a​r​y​-2​2​8​8​0​8​4​.h​t​m​l​.

91 Shirley Scott, “How Cautious is Precautious?: Antarctic Tourism and the Precautionary Principle”, p. 970. See also Kees Bastmeijer, Machiel Lamers, and Juan Harcha, “Permanent Land-Based Facilities for Tourism in Antarctica: The Need for Regulation”, RECEIL 17:1 (2008), pp. 84–85. 92 See, for instance, the differing positions taken by, on the one hand, New Zealand, Norway, Germany, the Netherlands, and the USA and, on the other hand, Chile, at the XXVII ATCM in Chairman's Report from Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Tourism and Non-governmental Activities in Antarctica, XXVII ATCM Working Paper WP004, Topic iiib, paras. 34–39, pp. 12–13. The Chilean statement would seem to confirm ASOC's assertion that Some claimant states appear unwilling or unable to foreclose on the potential freedom of their citizens and instrumentalities to establish property rights in that state's claimed territory…. Some states are even actively encouraging tourism and have built new, or converted existing, infrastructure to service tourism. ASOC, “Strategic Issues Posed by Commercial Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area”, Information Paper IP 120, 2006, Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 2006, Agenda Item ATCM 12, p. 6 93 Carl Murray and Julia Jabour, “Independent Expeditions and Antarctic Tourism Policy”, Polar Record 40:215 (2004), p. 309. 94 For instance, an Antarctic tourism coordination body could be funded from monies derived from a variety of sources: accreditation charges paid by Antarctic tourism operators; annual Antarctic tourism licence charges; a ‘pax’ tax that varies for each tourism operator depending on the number of tourists they transport to the continent; ‘green’ taxes that are designed to minimize human contact with Antarctica and rise proportionally for each landed tourist an operator transports; charges imposed on tourism operators for guided tours of research stations; and insurance charges or levies for high-risk tourist activities. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all possible taxes and charges. For discussion of the variety of environmental taxes and charges see Jeffrey McNeely, “Sustainable Finance for Protected Areas”, Paper presented to

Protected Areas in the 21st Century: From Islands to Networks, Albany, Western Australia, 24–28 November 1997, pp. 1–14; Paul Elkins, “European Environmental Taxes and Charges: Recent Experience, Issues and Trends”, Ecological Economics 31 (1999), pp. 39–62; Neil Hawke and Pamela Hargreaves, “Environmental Compensation Schemes: Experience and Prospects”, Environmental Law Review 5 (2003), pp. 9–22; Stig Sollund, “Environment Taxes”, Introductory Presentation on Agenda 2 of IFAD Meeting of United Nations Group of Experts on Domestic Resource Mobilisation – A Discussion of Enduring and Emerging Issues, Rome, 4–5 September 2007, pp. 1–5 [accessed 11 October 2011], w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/e​s​a​/f​f​d​/t​a​x​/2​0​0​7​D​R​M​.../0​5​E​n​v​i​r​o​n​m​e​n​t​a​l​T​a​x​e​s​.d​o​c.​

12

Biological prospecting in the Antarctic

Fair game? Julia Jabour

The collection of samples of biological material (bioprospecting) is being undertaken in the Antarctic (that is, the continent of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean surrounding it south of 60° South) on an increasing scale and for a range of potential applications.1 The Antarctic is a perfect target for this activity for a number of reasons. First, it is subject to an extreme climate, meaning that its fauna and fora, which have been relatively undisturbed and isolated for millennia, have made novel functional adaptations to enhance their chances of survival; and second, scientific knowledge about many Antarctic organisms is still comparatively naïve. Consequently there is potentially a good chance of novelty being present, especially in marine organisms. For example, krill oil was discovered to be high in polyunsaturated omega-3 fatty acids that have nutraceutical applications, and the antifreeze polypeptides or glycopeptides found in some polar fish species have important uses in medical technology.2 To scientists and investors, the Antarctic presents an exciting resource. However, bioprospecting as it is currently being undertaken is raising interesting issues — the answers to which are not, so far at least, wholly satisfactory from an egalitarian point of view. For example, bioprospecting in

the Antarctic does not have clarity about jurisdictional scope, regulatory status, access arrangements, environmental implications, commercial use of material and information or benefit sharing.3 Yet in common with many other areas of the world, bio-prospecting is already happening, patents are being filed and products developed — all inside a relative legal and administrative vacuum. Scientists from different countries, including many from Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs), are undertaking bioprospecting activities (e.g. collecting samples of soil, water and organisms) as part of governmentfunded scientific research in the Antarctic. However the ATCPs have been reluctant to extend regulation over their biological prospecting activities beyond what is already required for any authorised activity in the Antarctic (i.e. scientific research, operational support or tourism). Current regulation involves an environmental evaluation of the activity prior to it being conducted and monitoring for unforeseen impacts during and after. Bioprospecting does not attract special legal attention in the Antarctic. The subject has been on Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) agendas since around 20024 and in 2009 the Parties decided that bioprospecting was adequately regulated for the time being by existing laws within the Antarctic Treaty System.5 This was reaffirmed in 2011, and the Final Report noted: ‘the Antarctic Treaty system was the appropriate forum for dealing with Antarctic bioprospecting’.6 The 2011 ATCM was informed about current developments in the international realm, specifically the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity and a report from the United Nations General Assembly Ad hoc Informal Working Group on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdic-tion.7 These developments — the addition to the CBD of a protocol on access and benefit sharing (adopted 30 October 20108) and the report from a specialist group from Oceans and Law of the Sea at the UN (June 2011) — might have spurred the ATCPs into action; in any case it was agreed to establish an intersessional contact group on bioprospecting. Previously, a research project followed the trend in applications for patents in the US and European Patent Databases relating to krill-derived material and the results showed a significant increase in the number of patents being

filed.9 Another useful resource, the Bioprospector database, was established in a joint United Nations University/United Nations Environment Program initiative.10 It contains information on Antarctic bioprospecting activities, although the data can only give a rough indication of scale because of intellectual property and confidentiality restrictions. In 2005, the ATCM recommended that governments continue to review and report on biological prospecting activities in Antarctica. At the ATCM in 2011, only two parties — Argentina and the Netherlands — made such a report.11 Nevertheless it is in this context of actual, rather than hypothetical, activity that bioprospecting in the Antarctic is examined here. The unique physical attributes of the region, including the temperature, light and ice regimes, attract the attention of bioprospectors looking for novelty. However, the place is also unique from the perspective of its political and legal status, which is sui generis — one of a kind. Claims to sovereignty over parts of Antarctica that have not been proven in international law have generated a multilateral treaty regime, implemented domestically and dedicated to managing all human uses of the Antarctic and its resources. This chapter explores whether Antarctica's uniqueness excuses the ATCPs from access and benefit-sharing obligations that they might otherwise owe to the international community from resources removed from an unowned ‘international’ place beyond national jurisdiction. Examining the sui generis status of Antarctica will give insight into the differences, if any, between bioprospecting and high seas fishing. The purpose of this approach is to explore governance arrangements for Antarctic bioprospecting and in the process examine the fundamental question of whether the Antarctic is global commons and its resources, the common heritage of mankind. Connected to this is a query about whether limitations should be put on who has the right to exploit, use and benefit from Antarctic biodiversity above and beyond what exists in law now, and what the broader ethical implications might be.

Sui generis Antarctica Matters such as jurisdiction, access and benefit sharing in the Antarctic context are not unambiguous because of the unperfected claims to sovereignty in Antarctica. With no single sovereign ‘owner’ of Antarctic biological resources, and no explicit regulation by the ATCPs, the onus remains on individual Treaty signatories to provide rules and guidelines for their nationals undertaking bio-prospecting anywhere in the Antarctic. This is consistent with Article 4 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, which states: Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in relation to each Contracting Party: (a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction; and (b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This chapter takes the view that the whole of the Antarctic is ‘beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. This is the practical approach to sovereignty: the area is, until proven otherwise, beyond national jurisdiction in a territorial sense. However, every government whose citizens are in the Antarctic has jurisdiction over its people, in a nationality sense. This might not be the popular view of the claimants but it is how the Antarctic legal system works in situ.

Where is ‘the Antarctic’? The Antarctic itself is defined in a number of creative ways, depending on who is doing the defining and for what purpose (legal, practical, fisheries management, environmental). One definition that could be used in regulating bio-prospecting (and hence would help to clarify other issues such as

jurisdiction) is that used in the Antarctic Treaty. The Treaty's area of application is defined in Article VI as the area south of 60° South, including all ice shelves. (The status of the seabed will be discussed later.) If the ATCPs choose to regulate bioprospect-ing substantively with a Measure from an ATCM or even a freestanding convention or protocol, their mandate to do so will be derived from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. It would be a simple matter to adopt the Article VI area of application in a new regime. However, this kind of simplicity has hardly ever been the case — the other components of the Treaty System all have different areas of application. The 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), for example, has an area of application appropriate to seals: the seas south of 60° South (Article 1). However, no account is taken of the terrestrial environment on which seals haul out to moult and breed. The 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) goes some way towards correcting this, with a different area of application based on a biogeo-graphically distinct zone known as the Antarctic Convergence. In some places, this area is further north than the Treaty's 60° South (CCAMLR, Article 1) and includes some sub-Antarctic island territories. Because CCAMLR applies to marine living resources (Article 1; but not including seals or whales), it is also a potential source of substantive regulation for bioprospecting, particularly if harvesting is involved, as is the case with krill now. Finally, 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), even though it is read in conjunction with its parent Treaty, has its own area of application, described as the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems (Madrid Protocol, Articles 2 and 3 and elsewhere). The first part is the same as Article VI of the Treaty; ‘dependent and associated ecosystems’ do not have coordinates but would extend the Antarctic boundary north of 60°S if the words dependent and associated were taken literally. For example, the phrase could be applied to the foraging range of marine mammals such as Southern elephant seals that migrate between the sub-Antarctic (north of the border) and the continent. The four Antarctic Treaty legal instruments each have different areas of application, which is unhelpful in trying to clarify terms and concepts in bioprospecting. It is essential, therefore, to have a clear understanding of

where the Antarctic is located so that if the Parties are contemplating substantive regulation of bio-prospecting, as opposed to simply considering sample collection as scientific research, and regulation is to include limitations on who has the right to exploit, use and benefit from Antarctic biodiversity, relevant and representative boundaries must be drawn up.

Who owns the Antarctic and its resources? In 1959 when the Antarctic Treaty was adopted, seven states (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand, United Kingdom) laid claim to parts of the continent (three claims overlapped: Argentina, Chile and the UK). Two other states (the United States of America and the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation)) reserved their rights to make claims. One section of the Antarctic continent remains unclaimed to this day and is the largest single piece of unclaimed territory on earth. None of these positions has altered since December 1959 when Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty acknowledged the acquisition of territory then put aside all discussion of it as a creative means of solving the problem, without actually solving it. Article IV acknowledges and preserves the positions of all Parties (claimant or otherwise) indefinitely and nothing any state party does will affect this. Therefore there is no single ‘owner’ of Antarctic resources.

The Antarctic as global commons? Given the variety of definitions derived from Antarctic law, and with no sovereign/s because of Article IV of the Treaty, is it possible to make a case that the Antarctic is global commons instead? Global commons are traditionally described as areas beyond national jurisdiction which are terra nullius, owned by no-one and therefore capable of appropriation, or terra communis, owned by everyone and over which ‘no single decision-making unit holds exclusive title’.12 Using these descriptions it is possible to make the provisional case that the high seas are global commons and perhaps even the continent might be as well because it doesn't actually have one exclusive sovereign. Deciding who owns Antarctica is not as straightforward as this, however. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty preserves the claims to territory as they

were in 1959, thus the claims have been acknowledged and protected but not legally perfected. States parties can (and do) exert their authority but only over their nationals, ships and aircraft while in the Antarctic (Antarctic Treaty Article VIII). The Antarctic Treaty also preserves the position of states parties in relation to high seas rights and duties under other international law (Article VI). This international law contains numerous constraints on Antarctic Treaty parties, but also opportunities to exercise rights in the Antarctic. For example, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) has zero quotas to prohibit commercial whaling for any species anywhere, and there is a whale sanctuary established under the Convention's schedule to give whales in the Southern Ocean extra protection. Notwithstanding, its Article VIII permits the taking of whales in the Southern Ocean through a scientific research permit provision and a rule that permits reservations to decisions made in the International Whaling Commission. Similarly, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) Article 87 permits freedom to fish but this is constrained through, among other things, the duty to cooperate with fisheries management agencies in Article 117 (LOSC). In addition, the Antarctic — as defined in CCAMLR — contains undisputed sovereign territory wherein States parties can exercise jurisdiction exclusive of other states, as established in the Chairman's Statement appended to the Final Act of the conference adopting CCAMLR. In a different context, it could also be argued that south of 60° South is no longer strictly beyond national jurisdiction since the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ratified the coordinates of Australia's extended continental shelf off Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, and Macquarie Island, both of which extend south into the Antarctic Treaty area.13 The Australian government was thus granted the right to extend its exclusive jurisdiction over the area of the seabed and subsoil within this extended continental shelf zone.14 However, Australia also has a corresponding duty to share benefits from minerals extraction from the seabed of the extended zone, as set out in LOSC Article 82, from the 200 nm exclusive economic zone boundary seawards. This is because the LOSC codifies the common heritage of mankind (CHM) designation for the sea bed beyond national jurisdiction.

Are Antarctic resources common heritage of mankind?

The CHM concept originated during the third UN Law of the Sea conference in 1967, when Ambassador Pardo from Malta successfully appealed for the sea bed, beyond national jurisdiction, to be considered the common heritage of mankind.15 In this context, Ambassador Pardo is interpreted to have meant that the sea bed beyond national jurisdiction should not be owned by anyone; management and benefits should be shared; it should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes; and should be conserved for mankind, including future generations.16 Like other buzzwords and phrases, common heritage of mankind tends to be used indiscriminately and inappropriately. However, interpretive guidance can be had from the international law instruments that formally encode it, e.g. the LOSC in which common heritage applies to the area of the sea-bed and ocean foor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States.17 LOSC came into force on 16 November 1994, thus giving legal effect to common heritage of mankind. In addition outer space, the moon and other celestial bodies are also locations where the common heritage designation has the force of law. In the Outer Space Treaty, for example, the following guiding principles were outlined as the first three articles: 1

The exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind.

2

Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.

3

Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) expresses a common heritagelike concept with regard to global biodiversity (e.g. ‘common

concern of humankind’ in the CBD Preamble). It can also be argued that global climate is of significant global concern. Despite these examples, common heritage of mankind, per se, does not have an unambiguous legal definition and may not stand independently of these treaties that invoke it.18 Persistent usage and common interpretation may alter this perception in time but there are few, if any, actual instances of the concept becoming a reality, almost as if it had no legal substance. Certainly it would be difficult to argue that CHM is customary international law. Recent work by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), for example, concluded that the common heritage privileges availabel through LOSC Article 82 (‘payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’) are dormant because of difficulties of implementation.19 Common heritage and global commons may be noble ideals but they do not find support among the ATCPs, most of which are highly developed countries that do not, themselves, stand to benefit from access or benefitsharing arrangements from current bioprospecting activities.

The commons concepts and Antarctic governance None of the international conventions mentioned that expressly allocate benefits to the international community has, as yet, paid out (e.g. invoking either LOSC Article 82 or Article 140, ‘Benefit of mankind’ for sea bed mining). This is primarily because there is no current minerals exploitation on the sea bed and no attempts by a sovereign state to annex outer space or the moon. No express legal provisions allocating benefits have appeared in current Antarctic instruments either, nor are they likely to.20 The Antarctic Treaty, while expressly acknowledging ‘all mankind’ (Preamble) and the benefits of peace and science, does not provide a mechanism in it, or in any of its active subsequent legal instruments, for sharing the benefits of Antarctic resources. Assuming, arguendo, that the sub-text of global commons and common heritage is about access and benefit sharing, the ATCP position can be exemplifed by their response to the actions of the Group of 77 developing countries (G77) in the United Nations during the 1980s.21 During this time, Malaysia — speaking on behalf of the Group — noted, among other things, that the ATCPs were negotiating a minerals convention but that the Antarctic should be considered the common heritage of mankind with all states, particularly developing states, able to gain access and share the benefits from any regime to exploit minerals. Their arguments rested on Malaysia's perception that Antarctic resources were common property, unable to be appropriated by any single state. Counter arguments from the Treaty Parties were minimalist: Ignoring questions about benefit-sharing from Antarctic resources, they simply pointed out that accession to the Antarctic Treaty was open to any state Member of the United Nations22 as if accession to the Treaty was the only barrier between developing countries and Antarctic resources. When the minerals regime dissolved in 1989 in favour of an environmental protocol to the Treaty that prohibited mining, G77 interest in Antarctica began to dissolve as well. Only Malaysia has remained involved. Each year since 2002 it has been invited to observe at the ATCM and each year it is encouraged to accede to the Antarctic Treaty. Until October 2011, Malaysia considered but rejected this encouragement, preferring instead to continue

accepting invitations to attend ATCMs, which the ATCPs continued to issue, and securing places for Malaysian scientists with ATCP scientific programmes heading south (e.g. Australian and New Zealand Antarctic programmes). Malaysia acceded to the Antarctic Treaty on 31 October 2011, and expressed its desire to quickly become a Consultative Party. Ironically, the concepts of access and benefit sharing were formally adopted in the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), to which the G77 was so strongly opposed and which eventually failed. CRAMRA contained provisions acknowledging that participation should be open to all states, particularly developing ones (Preamble) and that the interests of the international community as a whole should be taken into account in decisions about mineral resource activities (Article 2.3(g)). Within CRAMRA there were also provisions for the exchange of money earned from fees payable for various activities but there were no instructions for disbursement of money in excess of budgetary requirements. This function was to be the responsibility of a Commission, established under Article 21. CRAMRA never entered into force, for a host of political reasons, and formal access and benefit-sharing arrangements have not reappeared in the Antarctic Treaty System. Today the ATS regulates all human uses of the Antarctic. The international community is rewarded for its faith in the system by receiving a relatively healthy Antarctic environment and having free access to some scientific information such as climate change forecasting and the status of biodiversity. Whether this is what the international community would prefer is a moot point.

The Antarctic approach to biological resources Putting aside the questions of whether the Antarctic is or is not global commons and its resources (including its environment) the common heritage of mankind, limitations already exist on who can access resources and benefit from its biological diversity or its clean environment. Note, however, that all states parties are prohibited from extracting non-living resources, under the provisions of Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol, though they may conduct scientific research.

Limits on access to Antarctic biological resources The ATS has a range of legal instruments regulating access to biological resources. Essentially, all living things are given broad-ranging protection under the Madrid Protocol (especially Annex II — the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora), with an emphasis on permitting access for purposes of scientific research. Even specially protected species can be taken (within the specific meanings attributed to that term under Article 1, Annex II) in accordance with a permit, for essential science. Some species also have more specific protection. Seals, for example, are not covered under CCAMLR despite them being ‘Antarctic marine living resources’. Rather, they can be harvested in accordance with the regulatory regime established by CCAS, but only by the nationals of signatory states. CCAMLR Commission Members can harvest other marine living resources such as fin-fish and squid in accordance with the CCAMLR Convention and in compliance with conservation measures designed using ecosystem-based management principles. Whales are also not covered under CCAMLR, even though they too ft the category. As described, they are given special protection under a separate legal instrument, outside the ATS. There is no consistency of approach to Antarctic biological resources. Some species are considered purely utilitarian (e.g. Patagonian toothfish); others are both iconic and utilitarian (e.g. krill and whales). Krill – the keystone zooplankton species in the Antarctic food web – is also harvested and increasingly being used in bioprospecting industries, despite concerns

about total krill biomass.23 Whales, on the other hand, are so iconic to some that all species are specially protected – irrespective of their conservation status, while to others whales are simply sea-food. Species such as phytoplankton attract relatively low interest in terms of bioprospecting but have a central place in the Antarctic ecosystem (e.g. krill eat phytoplankton). Fur seals, the stocks of which were decimated in the 1800s, had their Specially Protected Species status under the Madrid Protocol revoked because of a dramatic recovery in population numbers, but without future management plans in place to ensure a downgrading in protection does not compromise populations.24 Finally, while the ATCPs have consistently acknowledged obligations to protect Antarctic species from the introduction of alien species that could decimate naïve native populations, even more so in a warming climate, they have hitherto been unable to agree on basic first steps such as minimum biosecurity and quarantine protocols in place at the gateway ports. The lack of a consistent approach to Antarctic biodiversity confuses discussion about access to biological resources.

Benefit-sharing arrangements in the Antarctic There are a number of phases of bioprospecting, given different titles by different authors. Essentially they all relate to the activities of collecting sample material, isolating ‘novelty’, screening for bioactivity and developing a product. The process is not always linear and may require many loops, for example the collection of more samples before novelty is isolated or the screening process goes ahead. Developing a product may occur as many as 15 years after initial sample collection, if it occurs at all. The first phase of sample collection may be quite straightforward, with no major environmental implications and no further regulation required other than what is already provided for in the ATS (especially the environmental Madrid Protocol). Sample collection is scientific research and as such it will be given only cursory attention as all ATS instruments give priority to scientific research. The subsequent phases are carried out ex situ in laboratories around the world; however, in some cases it might be necessary to undertake in situ resampling. The processes can become very expensive if there are problems with synthetic replication, for example, and might not even result in a

marketable product. This raises two immediate problems for developers: one is guaranteed continued access to the resource in an area that might be, on the one hand claimed but also beyond national jurisdiction; and the second is whether or not a developer would be asked to share benefits for sourcing material from the Antarctic, where there is no sovereign owner. At some point the ATCPs might be forced to arbitrate on these matters and put in place some legal mechanism for implementing their decisions. Decisions that are complex like this will involve the ATCPs making value judgements based on the values of individual states (and infuential individuals within bureaucracies), adequate examination of the facts, consideration of all perspectives, consequences of alternatives and, ultimately, what is most beneficial to the state. Traditional approaches to common good become more tenuous when recipients of personal and/or commercial rewards (e.g. peer respect, profits from end-product sales or licensing) are obliged to share with others who have made no contribution to the process. This forced munifcence takes the stakes well beyond a simple appeal to altruism; money is involved, and the objective of bio-prospecting is, first and foremost, a commercial one. Notwithstanding, altruistic obligations such as access and benefit sharing have been translated into legal norms and given expression in modern international environmental law, most notably in relation to the sea bed beyond national jurisdiction25 but also the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD. Precedent does exist in the LOSC, even though actual benefits have not yet begun to fow, and a better structure will exist through the Nagoya Protocol, once it enters into force.

Discussion A 2007 high level think-tank on future challenges and possibilities for the polar regions in a changing climate reported that a ‘business as usual’ approach to polar governance may not be sustainable in the long term and that it was vital that the ATCM regained its previous proactivity by dealing with issues before they became reality or contentious. Proactivity would enable negotiations to proceed in the absence of vested interests.26 The thinktank regarded the issue of bioprospecting as important and noted that it was under the consideration of the UN; furthermore, they pinpointed both governance and economics as issues specifically for the attention of the ATCPs in the future.27 Bioprospecting has all the hallmarks of a troublesome issue for the ATCPs: it already exists, there are vested interests and there is no specific regulation. To show the scale of the problem, it is informative to look at just one aspect of bioprospecting: the fling of patents. Using information on patents registered in the European and US Patent Offices since the 1970s, Foster et al.28 constructed a database to detect trends in the krill fishery of the Southern Ocean. The research, originally published in 2003 and updated in 2009 (published in 2011), aimed to test whether the increase in notifications required by CCAMLR for new and exploratory fisheries for krill matched patent registrations. In an attempt to understand the discrepancies between notifications of intent to harvest krill and actual reported catches, the CCAMLR Scientific Committee had previously asked Members to supply krill market information (prices, economics of the fishery, products)29 and in 2008 it again asked Members for information specifically on product types to be derived from catches.30 Of all the potential bioprospecting activity in the Southern Ocean, it was thought that the harvesting of marine species such as krill was the leastproblematic scenario because of the existence of the CCAMLR regulations and their remit to conserve and use rationally ‘the populations of fin-fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, including birds’ (CCAMLR Article 1).31 Krill fishing has been carried out in the Southern Ocean since the 1970s, with a variety of end uses for the harvest.

The patent database shows continuing global interest in the development of patents for krill products (Figure 12.1), and how expectations about the potential uses of krill have changed from krill for human food to krill for human use, particularly medicines(Figure 12.2).32 The Foster et al. database confirms existing knowledge that krill are being harvested for human use (pharmaceutical applications) and as an aquaculture food stock rather than for human consumption — which was their original use. Japan and Poland are two fishing states that originally dominated the patent activity, but lately they have been overshadowed by the progressive increase in patents being lodged by US and Canadian entities. This leads to the conclusion that it is too late for the ATCPs to consider bioprospecting as a hypothetical activity. The patent and Bioprospector databases clearly show that activity has gone far beyond this point. Accordingly, it is also too late to develop a commons conscience. While it is certainly not too late to invent a new system to manage bioprospecting, it is highly unlikely in the near future given the current frame of

Figure 12.1 Cumulative number of krill-related patents lodged from 1976 to 2008 (source, and to be viewed in conjunction with, Foster et al. 2011, Figure 2. Used with permission).

Figure 12.2 Comparison of krill-related patents for food and medicinal use. Note that krill for aquaculture food stock surged in the hiatus period of the 1990s (source, and to be viewed in conjunction with, Foster et al. 2011, Figure 6. Used with permission). mind of the ATCPs who, in 2011, confirmed that the current ATS had appropriate regulation in place. On the face of it, the taking of biological specimens from the Southern Ocean or the Antarctic continent in the quest for potential novelty and bioactivity should not be seen as activities that have an ethical or moral contradiction to them. Rather, bioprospecting is a commercial venture balanced on a substrate of legitimate scientific research, not unlike Southern Ocean high seas fishing. In the case of bio-prospecting, as with fishing, ownership of the resources (e.g. krill) will be conferred on the proponent (the bioprospector or the fisher) by the laws of his sovereign state (which may have been guided by relevant Antarctic regulation) but with no consideration whatsoever for the whole of mankind as a beneficiary.

Even if it could be argued that the Southern Ocean is a global commons where resources belong to everyone, exclusive rewards are being derived from those resources now. Southern Ocean fishers harvest fish for their own benefit, even though yield is based on an allowable catch for the whole fishery calculated through scientific research and regulated through legal and administrative frameworks. Fishers do not fish for purely egalitarian reasons — to feed masses of starving people — even though the World Health Organization lists malnutrition, especially in developing countries, as a major health problem that moral imperatives dictate every capable human should help to address.33 High seas fishers are rewarded for their effort by selling their fish in the marketplace. The market makes the product of the fishers' labours accessible to anyone who has purchasing power, having first established a margin of profit for itself. Reward is not guaranteed, however. The fishers might not catch enough fish to make their voyage economically viable; the market might be saturated with fish, bringing the price down; they might strike bad weather or heavy ice conditions, or have a fire onboard that would render them in grave danger; or fag states might impose excessively large licence fees to try to reduce overcapacity in the fishing feet. Both the burden and the risks lie squarely with the fishers, so why should Antarctic bioprospecting be treated differently to fishing? In the case of bioprospecting, the investor is the risk-taker. Access to resources in an unusual, unowned place like the Antarctic may not be guaranteed as the investor is not able to deal directly with one sovereign government to negotiate current industry standard conditions such as prior informed consent or the means of fair and equitable sharing. Even at sovereign state level these conditions are problematic and developing countries argue that more needs to be done to secure their so-called rights in relation to bioprospecting.34 In the Antarctic, however, the investor may need to do little more than source original material from the region, perhaps accomplished through a small scientific project, and may never need to resample or even harvest. The bulk of the work occurs in a laboratory outside the Antarctic Treaty area and thus outside the control of the ATCPs. One drawback in trying to apply commons concepts to Antarctic bioprospecting is actually a structural one: there is no institution to undertake the functions of a surrogate sovereign. The ATCPs have carte blanche to discuss matters of relevance to the Antarctic, make decisions by consensus at

each annual ATCM and take recommendations to their governments for action. Yet the ATCM itself ceases to exist, per se, at the end of each meeting, only to be resurrected again the following year. In the interim, the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat — the administrative servant of the ATCM — has no autonomy and no power beyond what is necessary to carry out its functions. Considering the disparate groups of state parties (claimants, nonclaimants and others) and the long and complex history leading to the adoption of the Secretariat, granting the organisation institutional autonomy outside the ATCM would be unlikely (unthinkable, even).

Conclusion Bioprospecting is an activity that lives up to all the very high egalitarian expectations laid out in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, including those of peace and the free exchange of scientific information.35 Moreover, exclusive reward from bio-prospecting is as legitimate as exclusive reward from fishing for the states parties to the relevant instruments of the ATS. The Southern Ocean under CCAMLR is not a global commons in relation to all Antarctic marine living resources (CCAMLR Article 1) as access is both controlled and competency-based. The marine species most likely to be bioactive are also ostensibly covered under CCAMLR's rules about harvesting and conservation (although this is yet to be fully tested). If non-living or sedentary resources from the sea bed become the object of bioprospecting activity, they will be freely accessible while the only activity involves sample collection — euphemistically called marine scientific research — promoted specifically by the ATS and protected generally by the LOSC. If living terrestrial resources are bioprospecting targets (e.g. microbes in soil), nationals of states parties to the Antarctic Treaty/Madrid Protocol can freely access them, in accordance with legal obligations which include environmental evaluation and respect of special provisions that may apply (e.g. permits to enter specially protected areas). If sample collection is all that actually occurs in the Antarctic, then reporting the findings, even as simply as describing taxa in the academic literature, will suffice in terms of obligations owed to all mankind under the provisions that require scientific results and observations from Antarctica be shared (Treaty Preamble and Article III). Notwithstanding, the ATCPs can choose to make new regulations about bio-prospecting that do incorporate equitable access or at least benefitsharing schemes. This could not cover the activities of third party states because their consent would be required, and in any case the ATCPs would be confident that while representing less than 25 per cent of the world's states the 50 Treaty parties realistically embody the sum total of global interest in and capacity to undertake Antarctic bioprospecting. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the ATCPs would hand over regulation of Antarctic bioprospecting to a third party such as the United Nations.

It might be possible for the ATCPs to reach consensus on such schemes as the payment of fees by commercial bioprospectors into a common fund to support Antarctic science; royalty payments into the same fund for commercially successful products; and an open-access sample receptacle for common usage.36 Each one is a means of sharing benefits that does not involve the direct transfer of money and in each case does not leave the Antarctic environment open to a resources rush with potentially negative consequences. The prospect of a challenge by developing countries based on commons arguments is remote, to say the least, and the supremacy of the ATCPs goes unchallenged today, 50 years into their governance. This is confirmed, in some measure, by the accession of Malaysia to the Antarctic Treaty in 2011. It is plain from their behaviour that the ATCPs do not embrace commons arguments except insofar as the individual legal instruments promote peace, cooperation and science, and environmental safeguards to help retain environmental integrity. Developing countries are naturally limited in their ability to access Antarctic resources, due in part to a lack of capacity, and the argument the ATCPs would run if challenged on how Antarctic activities benefit all mankind, is to offer peace, scientific results and a pristine environment as alternatives, thereby satisfying any possible contradiction over ethics.

Notes 1 Bioprospector, United Nations University, availabel at w​w​w​.b​i​o​p​r​o​s​p​e​c​t​o​r​.o​r​g​/b​i​o​-p​r​o​s​p​e​c​t​o​r​/a​n​t​a​r​c​t​i​c​a​/h​o​m​e​.a​c​t​i​o​n;​ Foster, J., Nicol, S., Kawguchi, S. (2011) The use of patent databases to detect trends in the krill fishery. CCAMLR Science, 18, pp. 135–144. 2 Bioprospector, ibid. 3 Netherlands (2008) ‘Report of the ATCM Intersessional Contact Group to examine the issue of biological prospecting in the Antarctic Treaty Area’, Working Paper 4 to ATCM XXXI, at p. 7. 4 Jabour-Green, J., Nicol, D. (2003) Bioprospecting in areas outside national jurisdiction: Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Melbourne Journal of International Law 4:1, pp. 76–111. For another perspective see Vigni, P. (2006) Antarctic bioprospecting: Is it compatible with the value of Antarctica as a natural reserve? In: Francioni, F. and Scovazzi, T. (eds) Biotechnology and International Law (Oxford: Hart), pp. 111– 145. 5 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, Resolution 9 (2009) ATCM XXXII, Baltimore, availabel at www.ats.aq; Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden (2009) ‘The Antarctic Biological Prospecting Database’, Working Paper 1 to ATCM XXXII, availabel at www.ats.aq1. 6 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, Final Report, ATCM XXXIV, Buenos Aires, paras 422–428, availabel at www.ats.aq. 7 Ibid. See also Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya Protocol on Access and benefit-Sharing, availabel at www.cbd.int/abs/; United Nations, Ad hoc Openended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, information availabel at w​w​w​.u​n​.o​r​g​/d​e​p​t​s​/l​o​s​/b​i​o​d​i​v​e​r​s​i​t​y​w​o​r​k​i​n​g​g​r​o​u​p​/b​i​o​d​i​-v​e​r​s​i​t​y​w​o​r​k​i​n​g​g​r​o​u​p​.h​t​m.​ 8 For general information see Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Access and benefit-sharing in practice: Trends in partnerships

across sectors. Technical Series No. 38, availabel at www.cbd.int. 9 Foster et al., note 1. 10 Bioprospector, note 1. 11 Argentina, ‘Report on the recent bioprospecting activities carried out by Argentina during the period 2010–2011’, Information Paper 16 to ATCM XXXIV, Buenos Aires; and Netherlands, ‘A case of biological prospecting’, Information Paper 62 to ATCM XXXIV, Buenos Aires, availabel at www.ats.aq. 12 Wijkman, P.M. (1982) Managing the global commons. International Organisation 36:3, pp. 511–536. 13 Jabour, J. (2008) The Australian continental shelf: Has Australia's high latitude diplomacy paid off? Marine Policy 33: pp. 429–431. 14 14 Ibid. 15 UN Doc. A/6695, 1967. 16 Joyner, C. C. (1986) Legal implications of the concept of the common heritage of mankind. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35: pp. 190–199; Larschan, B., Brennan, B. C. (1982) The common heritage of mankind principle in international law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 21:2, pp. 305–337; Weiss, E. B. (1989) In Fairness to Future Generations: International law, common patrimony and intergenerational equity (New York, The United Nations University, Transnational Publishers Inc.); and Zou, K. (1991) The common heritage of mankind and the Antarctic Treaty System. Netherlands International Law Review 38:2, pp. 173–198. 17 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) Preamble. 18 Triggs, G. (1986) International Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica (Sydney: Legal Books). 19 International Seabed Authority (2009) Issues associated with the implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. ISA Technical Study No. 4, availabel at http:www.isa.org.jm. 20 Jabour, J., Weber, M. (2008) Is it time to cut the Gordian knot of polar

sovereignty? RECIEL 17:1, pp. 27–40. 21 Beck, P. (1986) Antarctica at the United Nations, 1985: The end of consensus? Polar Record 23:143, pp. 159–166; Tepper, R., Haward, M. (2005) The development of Malaysia's position on Antarctica: 1982 to 2004. Polar Record 41:217, pp. 113–124. 22 For example see UN Doc A/C.1/38/PV.42 (1983). 23 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR XXX, Advance Copy, Report of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Commission, Hobart, Australia, 24 October–4 November 2011, paras 8.8–8.10. 24 Jabour, J. (2008) Successful conservation — then what? The de-listing of Arctocepha-lus fur seal species in Antarctica. Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy 11:1, pp. 1–29. 25 Brunnée, J. (2007) Common areas, common heritage, and common concern. In Bodansky, D., Brunnée, J. and Hey, E. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 550–573. 26 Polar Regions Unit, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Offce (2007) Polar regions: Challenges and possibilities. Report of the Chair of the Meeting held at Wilton Park, UK, 1–4 October, 2007, p. 7. 27 Ibid. 28 Foster et al., note 1. 29 Nicol, S., Foster, J. (2003) Perspective — recent trends in the fishery for Antarctic krill. Aquatic Living Resources 16: pp. 42–45. 30 Foster et al., note 1. 31 Jabour-Green and Nicol, note 4. 32 Foster et al., note 1. 33 WHO World Health Organization. www.who.int/nutrition/en.

Nutrition,

availabel

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34 Straus, J. (2008) How to break the deadlock preventing a fair and rational use of biodiversity. The Journal of World Intellectual Property

11:4, pp. 229–295. 35 Guyomard, A.E. (2006), Bioprospecting in Antarctica: A new challenge for the Antarctic Treaty System. In: Francioni, F. and Scovazzi, T. (eds) Biotechnology and International Law, Oxford: Hart, pp. 147–169. 36 Jabour-Green and Nicol, note 4.

Index

Abdullah Badawi 99 Adelie Land 166, 167, 168 Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels 171 Agreement on the Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws 171 Ahlmann, Hans 199, 217n21 albatrosses 23, 171 Alexander I Land 137 Alfred Wegener Institute of Polar and Marine Research (AWI) of Germany 104, 202 Aliyev, Heydar 140 Aliyev, Ilham 140 Amelung, Bas 224 Amundsen, Roald 221 Amundsen Scott base 135 Antarctic governance 197, 206

Antarctic imperialism 194 Antarctic mineral resources 7, 9, 41–3, 76, 115, 140–1, 171, 172, 199, 201, 203, 217n34; see also Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA); mining 171, 172, 173, 174 Antarctic Peninsula 14, 225 Antarctic Problem 14, 17 Antarctic regime 173 Antarctic Research, A European Network for Astrophysics 178 Antarctic research stations 223–4; Akademik Vernadsky138; Amundsen– Scott (South Pole) 116, 206, 208, 209, 218n47; Arctowski 201; Bharati68–9; Byrd 116; Changcheng33; Concordia 177, 178, 209; Faraday (renamed Akademik Vernadsky) 137–8; Jang Bogo 79–80; on King George Island 208, 210, 212; Kunlun 34; Leningradskaia133, 136; in Laserman Hills 204; McMurdo 100, 152, 202, 205, 211; Maitri 61; Mirny 136, 140, 143n2; Molodezhnaya133, 136, 139, 141; Novolazarevskaia136–7, 208; Palmer 116; Progress136–7; Russkaia133, 136; SANAE 209; Scott Base 98, 100, 211; Sejong76, 79; Siple 116; Svea203; Troll 208; Wasa203; Willard 116; Vostok133, 136, 208, 209, 210; Zhongshan 33–4; see also further lists appearing on 210 and 214 (Appendix) Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 172, 209–10, 211, 218n46, 223, 240–1n92 Antarctic sovereignty 8–9, 14, 195–6, 197, 209, 220–1, 225–6, 234; extended continental shelf claims 231; sovereign territorial claims 18, 19, 24, 25, 135–7, 141–2, 163, 171, 176, 221, 234 Antarctic tourism 8, 122, 175, 208–9; activities 223; carrying capacity 225; commercial cruises 222–4; see also Princess Cruise Line; cumulative impacts 225, 228; differing ATCP views of 220, 228, 234, 240–1n92; disaster tourism 233; eco-tourism 223; and environment 220, 224–225; Europe and Antarctica, tourism market 224; free-riders 228; hazardous nature 220, 224, 230; lack of comprehensive policy 228–9, 234; lack of regulation 220, 226, 229; markets 224; negative impacts 224; numbers 223, 228; policy entrepreneurs and imaginaries 228; positive benefts 224;

possible multilateral convention 220, 232, 234–6; predictions of disaster 234; sovereignty-centred tourism 234–5; tourism charges and taxes 235, 241n94; tourism measures 231–2; tourist season 223; value of industry 224 Antarctic Treaty: Article I 16; Article II 16, 221; Article III 222; Article IV 17, 18, 20, 24, 245–6; Article VII 222; Article IX 227, 229; challenges faced 8; claimant states 7; Cold War era 1, 221; consensus decisionmaking 220, 232; critiques of 2, 8; governance 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 111–13, 117–22, 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 179, 180; politics of 3, 9, 76; postCold War era 1, 2, 3, 6; research outputs 2 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) 14, 15, 17, 21, 163, 170, 174, 175, 194, 203, 209, 211, 242–3, 251, 254 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) 7, 8, 9, 38, 41, 115, 148, 17, 18, 19, 24, 97, 99, 100, 107, 169, 171, 173, 174, 179, 193, 194, 197, 201, 209, 220, 226, 228–36, 242, 251, 255 Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 193, 219n52 Antarctic Treaty System 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 24, 163, 164, 165, 172, 174, 179; claimant states 136; Belarus 139; Estonia 141; as an institution 1, 13, 19, 21, 22, 24, 41, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 105, 107, 194, 200, 206, 208, 212, 220, 225, 231; Russia 132–7, 141–2; science criterion as entry ticket 194, 197, 200, 213, 217n34; Soviet Union 130; stability of 206; Ukraine 137–8, 142 Antarctica: as commons 220, 233, 236; globalization 223; heroic age of exploration 221; scientifc research 15, 18, 221–2, 225, 227; stewardship ethic 224, 231, 233; sui generis 243, 252, 256; terra nullius 221; wilderness 229 Antarctica New Zealand 104 Antarctica sectors 136 Arctic 133–5, 176, 177; ice cover shrinkage 101; see also North Polar region; Russia: ‘polar state’ Arctic and Antarctic 176, 204, 205 Area Protection 174

Argentina and Antarctica 97, 104, 106, 107, 169, 200 Arturo Parodi Antarctic station 140 Arvid Pardo 97 Asian Forum for Polar Sciences (AFoPS) 6, 100, 203, 218n36 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 100, 106, 107 astronomy in Antarctica 209 Australia and Antarctica 1, 8, 15, 20, 21, 98, 104, 106, 107, 119, 136, 166, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 197, 204, 207; Australian Academy of Science 195; Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) 104; Australian Antarctic Territory 2, 136, 143n2; sovereign territorial claim 221, 234; tourism market 224 Azerbaijan and Antarctica 6, 139–40, 142; funding 140; publications 140 Azizan Abu Samah 104 Bagirov, Huseyn 140 Bahia Paraiso229 Beardsmore Glacier, conference at 198 Beck, Peter 57, 59, 105 Bedritsky, Alexandr 135, 144n18 Beeby, Christopher 200 Bektursunov, Kadyrbek 141 Belarus and Antarctica 6, 132, 138–9, 142; Belarus Antarctic Expedition (BAE) 139; Belarus Government 139; funding 139; Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), Belarus input 138; Union of Russia and Belarus 139; see also Antarctic Treaty System: Belarus; Customs Union; Gora Vechernyaya feld base; Antarctic research station: Molodezhnaya Belgium and Antarctica 197, 208, 216n10 Bellingshausen, Faddei see Russia and Antarctica: Russian Antarctic

Expedition under Bellingshausen and Lazarev Berlin Wall 221 Bifocalism 18 Bildt, Carl 205 bioprospecting 8–9, 68, 231, 242, 248; and the Antarctic Treaty System 243, 251, 255; and CCAMLR 245, 252; and the commons 254; and the Convention on Biological Diversity 244; industries 250; investor 254; phases 250; objective 251, 253; objects 255; patents 251 Bioprospector database 243, 252, 256 Brady, Anne-Marie 105, 203, 215n9 Brazil and Antarctica 194, 201 British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 104, 137–8 Bullen, Keith 195–6, 215n6 Bushell, Robyn 224 bycatch 171 Canada and Antarctica: scientifc links with China 33 Castro, Fidel 221 Centre National de la Recherche Scientifque 165 Chaturvedi, Sanjay 193, 203, 231 Chen Lianzeng 37 Chernobyl 172 Chernomydrin, Victor 134 Chile and Antarctica 33, 200; Institute Antarctico Chileno (INACH) 104; sovereign territorial claim 221, 234 Chilingarov, Artur 134, 144n18 China and Antarctica 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 67, 98, 100, 105, 106, 179, 194, 201, 203, 204, 207; accession to Antarctic Treaty 35; Antarctic organizations 32; as

ATCP 233; budgets 31, 36–7; CCAMLR 40; “China threat” 44, 45; Cold War era 34, 39; China and Antarctica — cont. critique of ATS 40–3; diplomacy 33; fishing 45; foreign policy 43–4, 45–6; governance 44–6; leadership roles in ATS 37–8; mineral resources 41–3; polar exploration 35; propaganda 38–9; research stations 33–4; science 38; sovereignty claims 43; Taiwan 39; tourism market 224 China Arctic and Antarctic Administration 33–4 Chirkov, Anton 141 Christchurch-McMurdo air-route 202, 217n30 Chun Doo-hwan 80 claims see Antarctic sovereignty climate change and Antarctica 64, 164, 175 Clinton, Hilary 205 Cold War 193, 196, 197; end of 193, 201 Collaborative East Antarctic Marine Census 178 colonialism 193, 194, 197, 206 Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 20, 22, 23, 169–71, 202, 225 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 21 Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) 163, 174, 175, 225, 235 Common Economic Space 132, 142 Common Fisheries Policy 166 common heritage of mankind 50, 57, 61, 65, 243; and access and beneftsharing 248; and Antarctic resources 247, 249; and the Convention on Biological Diversity 247; defnition 247; and LOSC 246–7 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 131–2, 141–2 Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) 225

Concert of Asia 64 consortia 204, 208; see also Dronning Maud Land Air Network (DROMLAN); Dronning Maud Land Shipping (DROMSHIP) Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 243; Article 4, 244; and common heritage of mankind 247; and Nagoya Protocol 243, 251 Convention for Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972 (CCAS) 120, 225, 244, 249 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 40, 120, 156, 245, 249–52, 255 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) 19, 76, 97, 105, 119, 148, 164, 171, 172, 173, 174, 203, 217n34, 223 Cooperative Fisheries Surveillance Treaty 170 cost-sharing (in Antarctic logistics) 193, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212 Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programmes (COMNAP) 207, 208, 218n42 Cousteau, Jacques 172 Cousteau Foundation 173 Crick, Bernard 14 Crozet Island 166, 168, 169, 170, 171 Cuba 221 Customs Union 132, 142, 146n64 Dastidar, Prabir G. 2, 38 demilitarisation 13, 24 Deng Xiaoping 43–4 Dodds, Klaus 52–4, 194 Dome A 31, 34, 179

Dome C 177, 178 Downie, David 232 Dronning Maud Land (DML) 199, 202–3, 217n32 Dronning Maud Land Air Network (DROMLAN) 207–8 Dronning Maud Land Shipping (DROMSHIP) 208 Dudeney, John R. 2, 38, 41 ecosystem-based approach 23 Ecuador and Antarctica 104, 106, 107 Eden, Sally 56 Elzinga, Aant 231 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 174, 225–6, 231–2, 235 Environmental Law 163 Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations 172 Environmental Protection 173, 174, 175 Enzenbacher, Debra 228 Erebus crash 148 Erlander, Tage 200 Estonia and Antarctica 6, 131, 137, 141–2, 211; Club of Estonian Members of Polar Expeditions 141; Estonian government 141; funding 141; Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), Estonia input 131, 141; see also Antarctic Treaty System: Estonia; Kaupp, Enn; Saarso, Mart; Tammiksaar, Erki European Commission 167 European Community 166 European Polar Board 177, 178, 179, 204 European Polar Consortium 204, 205, 218n38 European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA) 177, 178, 209,

219n48 European Science Foundation 178, 204, 209 European Synchrotron Radiation facility (ESFR) 212, 219n49 European Union and Antarctica 165, 166, 176 Exclusive Economic Zone 166, 169, 170, 171 Expéditions Polaires Françaises 168 Exxon Valdez 229 Fedchuk, Andriy 138 Fidler, David P. 69 fishing 45, 120–1 Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) 98 Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) 23 France and Antarctica 7, 119, 209, 210; Antarctic agencies 165–8; budget 165; CCAMLR 169–71; CRAMRA 171–3; foreign policy 165, 179; history 167–8; international collaborations 33, 175–9; Madrid Protocol 173–5; national interests 164, 167; National Plan of Action 171; policy 167, 179, 180 politics 163, 167, 176, 179; science 165, 166, 168, 176, 177, 179, 180; sovereign territorial claim 163, 168, 169, 221; tourism 175 Gaudin, Christian 166, 167 Gaidashev, Aleksei 139 Galindez Island 137 Georgia 131 Germany and Antarctica 33, 176, 177, 178, 202 globalization 193, 203, 206 Gora Vechernyaya feld base 139 Greenland Ice Core Project 178 Greenpeace 211

Group of 77, 233 Guidelines for Ships Operating in Antarctic Waters 231 Guo Peiqing 38, 41, 42 Haase (Liggett), Daniela 224 Hammarskjöld, Dag 200 Hanessian, John 200 Haward, Marcus 103, 105 Hawke, Bob 172 Heard Island and McDonald Islands 171 Hempel, Gotthilf 202 Hemmings, Allan 212 Heritage of Mankind, as Antarctic regime concept 194 Herlofsson, Nicolai 195 Heroic Era 18 Hong Kong and Antarctica 39, 40 hot pursuit 170 Hu Lingtai 41 Huber, Jan 219n52 ice core drilling 178 illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 24, 166, 170 Ilolov, Mamadsho 140 India and Antarctica 1, 2, 3, 4–5, 6, 98, 105, 106, 107, 194, 200, 201, 203, 207; Arctic presence 62; ATCP 233; budget 62; CRAMRA 59; foreign policy dimension 50; Indian Ocean dimension 62–4; intervention in the UN 54–6; scientific interest 62; tourism market 224

Indonesia and Antarctica 8 Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) 225 Institut Polaire Française Paul Emile Victor 165, 166, 167, 178 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 17 International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) 224, 226, 228–9, 234 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL) 230–1 International Cooperation 164, 175, 176, 177, 179 International Council of Scientifc Unions (ICSU) 15, 195 International Geophysical Year (IGY) 14–15, 34, 130, 143n2, 144n28, 168, 195, 196, 197, 199, 215n5, 221–2 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 98, 229–31 International Polar Year(s) (IPY) 8, 14–15, 84, 134–5, 144n18, 166, 176, 179, 204, 215n8 international research station 211, 213 International Seabed Authority 248 International Space Station 212 internationalisation 212 Italy 33, 176, 177, 178 Italy and Antarctica 38, 202, 209, 210 Japan and Antarctica 6, 33, 105, 106, 203, 204 Joyner, Christopher C. 3, 5, 226 Kaplan, Robert 64 Karlqvist, Anders 202

Kaupp, Enn 141 Kayumov, Abdulhamid 140 Kazakhstan and Antarctica 6, 132, 141–2; see also Customs Union Kerguelen Islands 166, 168, 169, 170, 171 Kim Dae-jung 81 Kim Young-sam 80–1 King George Island 135 Korea and Antarctica 1, 3, 5, 6, 33, 203, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105; accession to Antarctic Treaty 76; Antarctic organizations 75–9, 104; biotechnology 87; budget 75, 78; corporate involvement 78; diplomacy 76, 83; economic interests 85–9; fishing 76, 85; governance 86; icebreaker 88–9; mineral resources 86; politics 80–2; research stations 76, 79–80; science 83–5 krill 242; and bioprospecting 252; fishing 245, 251–2; iconic status 250; and market information 251; and patents 243, 251–3 Kudekov, Tursynbek 141 Laiba, Anatoly 136–7 Lamers, Machiel 224 Latvia 131 Lasswell, Harold 1, 14 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 19, 20, 21, 22; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Lee Myung-bak 81–2 Li Ming-juinn 39 Li Shenggui 36 Linea Area Nacional 222 Ling Xiaoliang 42

Lithuania and Antarctica 131 Litvinov, Valery 137–8 Livingstone, David 54 Lonely Planet: Antarctica 223 Lukashenko, Alexander 139 Lukin, Valery 132, 136 Luns, Joseph 197 McCool, Stephen 224 McCully, Murray 205 McMurdo Sound 222 Madrid Protocol 86, 97, 105, 134, 163, 173–5 Mahathir bin Mohamad 5, 96, 97, 98, 99 Malaysia and Antarctica 3, 5, 6, 8, 19, 21, 35, 66, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 194, 201, 203, 204, 211; Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM) 100, 101, 102, 103, 106; Little Napoleons 98; Malaysian Antarctic Research Programme (MARP) 101, 102, 104; Malaysian International Seminar on Antarctica (MISA) 105, 105; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia 99, 100, 102; Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) 101, 102; Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) 101, 102; National Antarctic Research Centre (NARC) 101, 102; National Polar Science Agency 101, 102, 106; National Task Force on Antarctic Research 101, 102, 233; and New Zealand 159; in the UN 248–9; Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM) 103; University of Malaya (UM) 101, 104 Maximus Ongkili 101 Melander, Olle 200, 217n31 Ministry of Land and Natural Resources (China) 32 Mitigation Measures 171

Mitterand, François 173 Modelling and Observation Studies of Antarctic Katabatics (MOSAK) Monteath, C. 228 Moon Treaty 23 Mount Vinson 140 Myrdal, Alva 201 Najib Razak 99 Nash, Walter 53, 200 National Academies of Science (NAS, Washington, DC) 206 national interests 193, 202 National Science Foundation (NSF, in USA) 205 Netherlands and Antarctica 201, 210, 216n10, 216n11 New Economic World Order 193 New Zealand and Antarctica 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21, 33, 53, 97, 98, 100, 172, 175, 178, 198, 200, 202, 204, 205; Antarctic governance 157; Antarctic NGOs 152; Antarctic organizations 150–2; Antarctica New Zealand 104; claimant state 148–50; economic interests 155–6; environmental interests 157–8; Erebus crash 148; and foreign policy 158–9; geography 147; history 147–8; international collaboration 159; leadership roles in ATS; Malaysia 159; political interests 156–7; science 154–5; Scott Base 152–4, 158; sovereign territorial claim 149, 221; strategic interests 160; UNCLOS 150; United States 158–9 Niyazov, Saparmurat 131 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 98, 100 Non-Native Species 174 Nordenskjöld, Otto 199, 200 North Polar region 132; see also Arctic

Norway and Antarctica 21, 33, 169; sovereign territorial claim 221 Norwegian–British–Swedish Antarctic Expedition 199, 216n19 Nuclear Free Zone 25 Offce Parlementaire D'Évaluation des Choix Scientifques et Technologique 166, 172 Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) 99 outsourcing 205 Pacifc Andes 40 Pakistan and Antarctica 3, 204 Palmer, Geoffrey 232 Pan American Airways 222 Pan Min 36 Park Chung-hee 80 patents: US and European Databases 243; krill-related 252–3 Patriot Hills 135, 140 Patrushev, Nikolai 135 Poland and Antarctica 201 Polar Code 229, 231 Polar Research Institute of China 33 Polar View 230 Pole of Inaccessibility 197 politics as a concept 3, 9, 13, 14; definitions 3, 13, 4, 25 post-colonial 50, 51, 5–54 Princess Cruise Line 223 privatization 206

Programma Nazionale di Richerde in Antartide 178 Pronichev, Vladimir 135 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991 (PEPAT); see also Madrid Protocol Punta Arenas 135 Putin, Vladimir 134 “Question of Antarctica” 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 106, 107 Ramachandran, S. 2, 38 Rayfuse, Rosemary 232 regionalisation 204, 208 Robin, Gordon de Q 199 Rocard, Michel 167, 172, 173 Roh Moo-hyun 81 Romania and Antarctica; scientifc links with China 33 Ross Dependency 149 Russia (Russian Federation) and Antarctica 1, 3, 6, 33, 131–7, 141–2, 208; Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) 131–2, 137, 143n7; budget 6, 136; decree regarding Antarctica 133–5; failings 135; funding 131, 133, 135; icebreaker 6; Leningradskaia Antarctic station 133, 136; logistics 130, 133–4, 142; ‘minimum allowable’ operations in Antarctica 134; Mirny Antarctic station 136, 140, 143n2; Molodezhnaya Antarctic station 133, 136, 139, 141; Novolazarevskaia Antarctic station 136–7; ‘optimal’ operations in Antarctica 134; ‘polar state’ 132–3, 135; Progress Antarctic station 136–7; research outputs 2; resupply 136; Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) 132–4, 139–42; Russian Antarctic Expedition under Bellingshausen and Lazarev 130, 137, 141; Russian Association of Members of Polar Expeditions 134; Russian Government 132–5; Russian Polar Marine Geological Prospecting Expedition 136; Russkaia Antarctic station 133, 136; salary 133; strike 133; tourism market 224; Union of Russia and Belarus 139; vessels 130, 134, 136–7,

139; Vostok Antarctic station 133, 136; see also Antarctic Treaty System: Russia; Antarctic Treaty System: Soviet Union; Arctic; Customs Union; South Pole; South Polar region; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Russia–Georgia confict in South Ossetia 131 Russian Federal Security Service 135 Saarso, Mart 141 Saint Paul and Amsterdam Islands 166, 168 Sarkozy, Nicolas 167 Savatyugin, Lev 131 Schytt, Valter 198, 199 science as politics 196–7 science/politics boundary 196 scientifc autonomy, principle of 196 Scientifc Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) 14, 35, 100, 106, 117, 193, 194, 195–6, 197, 207, 209, 212, 235 scientifc internationalism, principle of 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 206 Scott, Karen 219n52 Scott, Shirley 194, 234 Scott Base 98, 100 Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) 200 Scottish Association for Marine Science 104 sealers and whalers 221 search and Rescue 229 Seungryeol, Kim 203 ships: Araon204; Gondwana 211; Laurence M. Gould 116; Nathaniel B. Palmer 116; Oden II 205; Polarstern 202; Stena Arctica 203; Xue Long

32 Siti Aisyah Alias, Dr 102 Sobral, José Maria 200 South Africa and Antarctica 21, 38, 166, 169, 208, 209; South Africa National Antarctic Programme (SANAP) 104 South Polar region 130–1, 133–4, 142 South Pole 134–5, 140, 142, 197 South Shetland Islands 222 Southern Ocean 163 South-South Countries 97 Soviet Union see Russia; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) Spain 177 Spitsbergen 177 Standing Group on Logistics and Operations (SCALOP) 207 State Oceanic Administration (China) 32 station sharing 209, 210, 218n46 Stockholm conference 197, 198, 215n4 Stokke, Olav Schramm 3 Striha, Maksim 138 Strugatsky, Vladimir 135 Sub-Antarctic 165, 166, 170 sui generis 243–4 Sulikowski, Chavelli 210 superpowers 195, 196–7, 206 Sweden and Antarctica 198–201, 202, 203, 205; Swedish Antarctic Research Programme (SWEDARP) 202

Taiwan and Antarctica 39–40 Tajikistan and Antarctica 6, 131, 140, 142, 146n64; funding 140; Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE), Tajikistan input 131, 140 Tammiksaar, Erki 141 Terres australes et antarctiques françaises 165, 166, 167, 168 Teutenberg, Bo Johnson 198, 199, 200, 202 Titanic, SS 220 transnationalism 206 Trinity Peninsula 222 Truman Doctrine 196–7 Turkmenistan 131 Ukraine and Antarctica 6, 137–8, 142, 146n64; Akademik Vernadsky Antarctic station (former Faraday) 138; XXXI Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), Kiev 138; budget 138; funding 138, 142; logistics 138; Ukraine and Russia 137; Ukrainian Antarctic Centre (UAC) 137–8, 142; Ukrainian Antarctic Expedition (UAE) 137; Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers 138; vessels 130, 137 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 6, 7, 15, 168, 172; Antarctic Treaty, Cold War era 1, 197, 207, 221; Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 130; Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE) 130–3, 136–8, 140–1, 143n2, 196; Soviet government 130–3; see also Russia United Kingdom and Antarctica 21, 104, 105, 106, 107, 166, 169, 200; British Antarctic Survey (BAS) 137–8; sovereign territorial claim 221 United Nations and Antarctica 19, 21, 198, 200–1 United Nations Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf 43, 114–15, 150 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 57, 58, 97, 114, 231, 246; common heritage of mankind 246–7; International Seabed

Authority 248, 251; marine scientifc research 255 United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) 98 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 22 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 106 United States and Antarctica 5, 7, 14, 15, 33, 100, 106, 178, 197, 200, 206; Antarctic interests 111; Antarctic organizations 110–11; Antarctic sovereignty 113–14; Antarctic Treaty, Cold War era 1, 111–12, 221; biological prospecting 117–18; budgets 6; climate change 116–17; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 120; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 120; Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) 119; environmental protection 118–19; fishing 120–1; foreign policy 110–28; icebreaker 6, 158; mineral resources in Antarctica 115; New Zealand 158–9; Operation Deep Freeze 14; Operation High Jump 14; research outputs 2; scientifc interests 115–16, 117; tourism 121–2, 224; United Nations Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf 114–15; whaling 121 Verbitsky, Jane 209 Vidas, Davor 3 Vidas, Davor 3 Von Bismark, Otto 13 Walton, David W.H. 2, 38, 41 Washington conference 198 Wei Wenliang 36 whaling 22, 121 Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 201 World Heritage Convention 23 World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 15

World Wilderness Park, as Antarctic regime concept 194, 211 Yan Qide 41, 42 Zhang Zhanhai 36 Zhu Jiangang 42