The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations

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Author: Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo

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The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers A Study in International Relations TUKUMBILUMUMBA-KASONGO

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lumumba-Kasongo, Tukumbi, 1948The dynamics of economic and political relations between Africa and foreign powers : a study in international relations / Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96086-2 (alk. paper) 1. Africa—Foreign economic relations. 2. Liberia—Foreign economic relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign economic relations—Liberia. 4. Congo (Democratic Republic)— Foreign economic relations—Belgium. 5. Belgium—Foreign economic relations—Congo (Democratic Republic) I. Title. HF1611.L85 1999 337.6—dc21 97-33708 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1999 by Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 97-33708 ISBN: 0-275-96086-2 First published in 1999 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

To My Grand Parents, Maman Mana and Maman Wetshi, Papa Tukumbi and Papa L u m u m b a .

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Contents Preface

ix

Abbreviations

xi

1. The Dynamics of Political and Economic Relations

1

2. Liberian-American Economic Relations: Social and Political Implications

33

3. Relations of Political Economy Between Congo-Zaire and Belgium

77

4. A General Conclusion: What Perspectives after the Cold War? 111 Selected Bibliography Selected Bibliography 121 Index

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Preface Relationships among nations and people are not ontologically static. They are always changing to satisfy some specific interests. In the 20th century, international relations have been shaped more by the dynamics of the global system than by local/national imperatives. Africa's international relations tend to respond more to the logic, needs and the demand of the global capitalism than to these of the African people, their conditions, and internal dynamics. That is to say, Africa's international relations can be studied as a set of subsystems of the global system. Why has it been this way? What has Africa collectively gained from the functioning of current international relations? What directions will international relations take in Africa in the 21st century and beyond? What are the dominant trends in relationships between Africa and foreign powers? The politics of frontiers and the significance of geographical morphologies are weakened by marketing and production processes within multinationals, the strength of international cooperation, the movement of capital, and by the power of communication technologies. However, the contradictions of the global capitalism in terms of its processes of surplus accumulation, resource distribution, and re-allocation at the national level in the developing world, have forced some people and their groupings to re-define themselves in various cultural, psychological, and national forms. These forms reflect, for worse or better, the nature of multipolarity of the world system.

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Preface

In terms of foreign investments, Africa as a continent has been marginalized from the dynamics of the global capitalism. At the same time, African states have been recommended to integrate (external integration) further the same world system through the backdoor, namely through the adoption of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and the stability programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The relationships between marginalization and integration processes have created conflicts and confusions among African states in terms of policy formulation and choices. However, they also can create opportunities for developing new development paradigms. In more than fifteen years of teaching international relations, political economy, and theory of politics, I have been intellectually dealing with the above issues, both in class room as well as in research, workshops, and conferences. However, it is only after I was involved in a research project on foreign powers in Africa in 1985 sponsored by the Council for Development of Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA, in Dakar, Senegal) that I became more motivated to pursue my work on this particular topic. This book is a product of many efforts, namely teaching, research, consultancy, and conferences in Africa, Europe, and the USA. Each chapter in this book was presented or discussed in a seminar or a conference. Thus, I received invaluable critical comments and insight from many of my colleagues and students on various aspects of my view of the dynamics of world system and its implications in Africa. As the list can be too long to mention each person, I would like to thank all of them collectively for their input and assistance. I sincerely thank each of my family members (the LumumbaKasongos) for a great support and constructive comments that I have enjoyed from each of them in the process of writing this book. Their patience and understanding gave me enough time to think and write. I thank Mana particularly for finding time to critically read the entire manuscript in April 1997 and make important suggestions, despite her own busy schedule. However, needless to emphasize that any shortcomings in this book and internal weaknesses of the arguments are my own responsibility.

Abbreviations ACS AFDLC Bf CAR CIA CK CSK ECC ECM ECOMOG ECOWAS EEC ESF EU FBCAG FDI GECAMINES GECOMINES GDP

American Colonization Society Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo Belgian francs Central African Republic Central Intelligence Agency Campagnie du Katanga Comite Special du Katanga European Common Currency European Common Market Economic Community Peace Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States European Economic Community Economic Support Fund European Union Fond Belgo-Congolais d'Amortissement et de Gestion Foreign Direct Investment Societe des Carrieres et Mines du Congo Societe Generate Congolaise de Minerals gross domestic product

xii

GNP IMF LAP LPP MIGA MNC/L MOJA MPLA MPR MRU NAFTA NATO NDPL OAU PAL PPP PRC SAPs SG SGM SOZACOM UMHK UNITA UPP WHIG

Abbreviations

gross national product International Monetary Fund Liberian Action Party Liberian People's Party Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba Movement for Justice in Africa Movemento Popular de Libertagao de Angola Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution Mano River Union North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Democratic Party of Liberia Organisation of African Unity Progressive Alliance of Liberia Progressive People's Party The People's Redemption Council Structural Adjustment Programs Societe Generate Societe Generate de Minerals Societe Zairolse du Commerce Union Miniere du Haut Katanga National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United People's Party With Hope in God

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The Dynamics of Political and Economic Relations INTRODUCTION The General Problem What is the role of Africa in the existing orbits of powers? Where does Africa fit in the current dynamics of the world political economy? In terms of societal projects and human progress, what are the policy implications of this location for the majority of Africans and for African states at the national and regional level? After the end of the Cold War, it has become intellectually and philosophically more difficult, using the dominant paradigms in international relations, namely realism and idealism, to predict the behavior of actors and structures of actions in international relations. It is this way because those major paradigms were heavily influenced by the logic of polarity in world affairs. For more than sixty years, ideological and military struggles between the East and the West were the most important contributors to predictability and unpredictability of the behaviour of the actors in international relations. In most cases, the dominant paradigms were philosophically deterministic and tended to be ahistorical. However, it is usually more appropriate to contextualize and historicize the analysis of international relations as this process can help explain how and why the actors in world politics pursue their interests as they do based on the realities of their regions or subregions as reflected in the dynamics of the global puzzle (Mansbach, 1994).

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Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers

This book is a critical analysis of the relations between Africa and the dominant foreign powers in the global puzzle and the impact of those relations on the articulation of national policy. It is an effort to contextualize and historicize the analysis of international relations in Africa. It offers a structural explanation of the nature of Africa's relations with the industrial powers. It deals with two levels of analysis: (1) Continental Africa in the world system with its defined universalistic assumptions and, (2) Particularities of the continent as reflected in case studies. The dynamics between these two levels of analysis can help identify, classify, and illuminate the dominant trends in Africa's political economic relations in the twenty first century and beyond. The major questions that guide the study include: Within the global change that is taking place in most parts of the world, how can we characterize the nature of economic and political relations between Africa and the foreign powers,1 particularly the industrial countries before and after the end of Cold War? What is the significance of the global change at the local and regional levels as it is reflected in these relations? The internal or nationalistic demand for global change in various regions and subregions of the world, including Africa, and the slow processes of global integration and transformation, are taking place simultaneously. This demand and the resulting global change are creating opportunities for some social groups, states, and countries and promoting new values in most parts of the world. However, at the same time, they are precipitating social conflicts elsewhere. The demand for economic accommodation by the states in the South (the developing countries) and for political participation by their people, as well as the state's resistance to democratization and the dynamics of global change is likely to cause a paradigmatic shift in the social sciences. Countries in the South are not culturally, politically, and economically homogeneous. However, a random paradigmatic change without a sociophilosophical base can lead to unwarranted analytical discourse and the formulation and implementation of ahistorical based policies. The failure to ask historical questions and to contextualize the arguments of international relations or the social sciences at large may lead to "scientific-mysticism." The first chapter of this book raises the issues related to the problematic issues related to the economic and political relations between Africa and the foreign powers within the context of global

Dynamics of Political and Economic Relations

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change. The book's theoretical approach, which is essentially structuralist and historical, and its philosophical assumptions, will also be explained. Although each African state has its own particular relations with specific industrial and European states, chapter 1 deals with Africa as both a regional political block and an economic entity. It discusses the major relations that have linked Africa and the world system. It also identifies the major trends that derive from those relations and their characteristics within the dynamic of the general paradigm of the world system. Some intelligent generalizations will also be considered. The second and third chapters of the book examine two case studies: the relations between Liberia-United States and the relations between Congo-Zaire2 and Belgium. The fourth chapter that deals with the prospects of the North-South relations after the end of the Cold War. These relations have had serious impact in Africa, for instance: they have qualitatively transformed lives, the cultures, traditions, values, and economies of African peoples. These relations are those of political economy. What benefits and/or losses (costbenefit analysis) resulted from Africa's interactions with foreign powers? What has been gained or lost individually and collectively throughout the process of contemporary state formation? What are the prospects for the future? Within the framework of global change, the renewal of popular and social movements in Africa, and the search for "sustainable development" 3 at the international and regional levels, the study of economic and political dynamics between African and the foreign powers is justifiable and urgent. The intensity of historical connections and the nature of the world system provide the context for understanding the external and internal constraints in search for new dynamic developmental paradigms. The study of global change, either from the point of view of Immanuel Wallerstein's world system (1979) or from the dynamic subsystems approach,* leads to a cautious examination of the linkages between the elements of "systemness." 5 In general terms, Barrie Axford defines global "systemness" as a single place with its particular own contradictions. As he said: The character of global systemness can be seen most clearly in the development of the world economy over the last few decades, which has seen a transformation from "organized" to disorganized capitalism on a global scale (Lash and Urry,

4


1987) and the emergence of what Carnoy et al. (1993) call "the new global information.^ 1995, 94) The term "systemness" refers to the reproduction and transformation of a system through scions and routine practices. The global system should not be seen as an organic unity (1995). As further articulated in this book, this caution is warranted because the functioning of elements within the global system at the local or regional levels do not necessarily produce "global homogenization." This homogenization was perceived by modernization theorists in the past as an essential process of development. It should be noted however, that the elements of subsystems do have a certain level of autonomy in the way they function and reproduce themselves. The world is presently in a complex and ambiguous transition. In the absence of a hegemonic or monopolistic power that can impose its order on other nations or states and teleologically shape the global events, it has become more difficult to accurately predict the behaviour of actors in the global system than it was forty years ago. The bipolar system of managing world affairs has collapsed. Multipolar discourses are likely to emerge in the twenty first century, especially in the subsystems of the global system. Many actors have started questioning their existing place and role in the global system; many are in the process of searching for themselves in cultural and developmental terms. The most important question therefore becomes: What will the philosophical basis of multipolar discourses be? The effort to understand the dynamics of the transition to multipolarity and where this transition will lead depends on the individual's economic situation, ideology, and geographic location. It requires a critical understanding of the underlying principles embodied in the world system. Some of the general dynamics of this transition are characterized by the rise of primary nationalist movements, fascist and racist sentiments, the search for new cultural identities, the global liberalization of world trade, the globalization of market and productive forces, broad movements towards regional economic organizations, and the expansion of communication technologies. As Castells said: The fact that new information technologies are available at the very moment when the organization of economic activity relies increasingly on the process of a vast amount of information, moreover, contributes to removing the fundamental obstacle to labor-productivity growth as economies evolve from


5

material production to information processing as the source of employment for most workers (1993, 20). In addition to the rapid development of technologies, markets, and science, what is making this transition possible is the attitude and conviction among many people that this is the only planet in which we must and should humanly and socially interact and live together. Some important questions regarding the nature of the new technologies are: Who are owners of these technologies? Who are their consumers? What role do the information technologies play in defining or re-defining the relationship between the South and the North? Are they used for making the world a better place to live for all? One of the most important phenomena that characterize contemporary societies is the nature, level, and complexity of systematic interactions among different peoples, institutions, and states. These interactions, economic, social, political and cultural, affect different social classes, genders, peoples, races, and geographical regions differently. The quality of interactions can be measured nationally or regionally by factors, such as progress, reciprocity, cost-benefits, and levels of understanding and respecting one another's cultural and ideology. The intensity of interactions in the past five hundred years or so has been so great that some idealistic liberal scholars and institutions tend to analyze the world system and its politics mainly from the perspective of the "global village" or global community, a notion that is quite controversial from a realistic and historical perspective. What are the dominant values in this village? What is their philosophical basis? How do they fit in the world system? Finally, what is, or will be, the role of the value system, if any, in the political and economic interactions between African states and industrial Western powers? Some scholars prefer to describe the world system as the global corporate world and not as a global assembly line. From this point of view, corporations are perceived to play more important roles in determining the movements of states, people, and money than any other agencies of change. They determine the nature of these movements based on their own premise, which is maximizing the benefits. They also produce value systems that tend to dominate the nature of international relations. However, in this study, the usefulness of these theories, including Barrie's globalization^ is limited because they do not expand their illustrations to include the current dynamics and struggles for change in the Southern countries such as those in Africa.

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Some scholars and students of Africa, like Claude Ake, Samir Amin, and Ntalaja-Nzongola convincingly and consistently argue that the current African socioeconomic and political crises derive mainly from the nature of historic interactions between Africa and the world system. The history of imperialism has been defined as an agency that has renamed the world in the image and interests of Europe (Amin, 1987). After they became sovereign, with their own flags, constitutions, currencies, bureaucratic administrations, and armed forces, why the African states have failed, in most cases, to improve the quality of their relations with Western powers and forge or dictate new relationships with them? Foreign powers in this context include the former colonial powers, the United States, the former Soviet Union, Japan, multinational and transnational corporations, and international financial institutions. Before analyzing the general case from a global perspective, this chapter briefly examines the reasons for selecting the relations between Liberia and United States and Congo-Zaire and Belgium relations. The case study focuses on Congo-Zaire and Liberia because of their unique histories related to the formation and evolution of state, and the level of cruelty used for their forced entrance into the world system. However, throughout the book, other illustrations have been provided to sufficiently support these points. For various reasons, Congo-Zaire and Liberia illustrate the general patterns of political and social implications of African relations with foreign powers, particularly the industrialized powers. In 1885, at the Berlin Conference, the Congo was declared to be the personal private property (estate) of King Leopold II of Belgium. The African people of this part of the continent were subjected to the draconian rules of being the property of a foreign European king. The atrocities committed by the Belgian ruler and his administration have been well documented by historians and ethnologists, and testimonies can be found in the archives of the League of Nations and the United Nations. The Congo has more than two hundred ethnic groups. It was Belgium's colony from 1909 to 1960. Belgium, which is one of the smallest former colonial powers in Europe, is poor in natural resources. However, it does belong to the European Community and the European Union. It has two ethnic groups: Walloons and Flemings. In contrast, Congo-Zaire is one of the biggest countries in Africa and has the third largest population in sub-Saharan Africa (about forty-five million people in 1996). It is also one of the richest


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countries in the world in natural resources, including minerals such as high grade copper, diamonds, cobalt, zinc, uranium, and has substantial agricultural potential. In 1997, however, it has been classified by many national and international organizations as one of the poorest countries in the world. Liberia, on the contrary, was not formally colonized by the European powers. However, through the process of state formation and power consolidation by the dominant class, the ruling elite in Liberia created an internal colonial situation similar, in some important ways, to the former apartheid politics in South Africa. It became a neocolonial state par excellence. Liberia was founded by the American Colonization Society (ACS) in 1821 with the support of the United States government. It is one of the smallest countries in Africa and is rich in natural resources. It has about sixteen ethnic groups. Its sponsor, the U.S., is one of the largest and richest countries among the industrialized powers. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, it has become de facto the only functioning superpower. Congo-Zaire's ruling elite, especially Mobutu Sese Seko (Joseph) and his clique, kept close relations with Belgium until recently. In Liberia, the ruling elite has not only been close to the U. S. but was also the protector agent of U.S. culture and ideology in Africa. This elite referred to the U.S. in the preamble of their constitution as their "original home." In both cases, the adoption of Marxist or Socialist ideologies into state policies, as attempted in other countries, was absent. Congo-Zaire had a dire constitutional and political crisis in the 1960s, which led to a serious misunderstanding between the president and the prime minister in terms of their functions. This misunderstanding and the constitutional crisis were the most important factors that indirectly led to the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba with the collaboration of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Mobutu, who was then the head of the army in the Congo. For many years, Liberia was considered by many scholars, especially those with a functionalist perspective, to have the least unstable political situation in Africa. This was before the coming to power of the late Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe in April 1980, followed by a violent power struggle that started in about the mid1980s and eventually led to the total collapse of the state and society in 1990. Doe was the first native African to be head of state in Liberia, and he captured state power through excessive violence. In both cases, political pluralism had not been practiced until recent power struggles,

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although in Liberia's case there was always an appearance of democratic constitutionalism. Both Doe and Mobutu vehemently resisted any attempt to fully adopt multipartyism. The political history and national economic needs of relations between Liberia and the United States and between Congo-Zaire and Belgium have been changing. However, until recently, the ideologies of the dominant classes have not changed. The direction, quality, and beneficiaries are important issues in economic relations between an industrial country, either a former colonial power like Belgium or a superpower like the U.S., and a developing country, like Congo-Zaire or Liberia. In both Liberia and Congo-Zaire, the rigidity of the state in power sharing and the fragile confidence in its international relations contributed to the creation of highly centralized state decision making. As stated earlier, this chapter, covers only the major areas that have dominated in African relations with the rest of the world-the trends in direction that those linkages, their political and economic significance for Africa and their potential to promote or to cope with the major changes that are taking place at the present time and will take place in the twenty first century. The approach is both a combination historical-structural paradigms and systems analysis. The chapter focuses conceptually on the dynamics of systems analysis, that is to say, on a system and its elements, and their relationship with political history. Economic and political relations are discussed within the context of North-South interactions after the Cold War. To understand the dynamics of those relations today, it is important to analyze how they were established and determine what actors were involved. LOCATING THE PROBLEM: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The African state, the major actor in the current debates about development and in the actual development processes, is not a product of an internal evolutionary process. It is not a product of the maturity of African political systems, or internal contradictions or struggles among the African political powers either. It was created at the end of ninetieth century by the European powers to serve as an agent of social change within the world system. This social change was dominated by the interests of the metropolitan forces. The expression metropolitan is borrowed from literature of the old dependency school of thought to mean, the center of powers within the global system. It is an economic, cultural and political location where the


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major decisions are made. From the ninetieth century up to the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the African states had special relations with the European powers. Although they were always dominated by the former colonial powers, their relations were not static. They can essentially be characterized as relationships of domination. However, in the world system, the contradictions in the relations between the colonial states and the colonizing powers and the demands of the international political economy can also offer possibilities for national change. African states, the major African actors in international relations, politic, and the world economy, have stronger links with the North through international market mechanisms and former colonial institutions than between themselves. African social and economic problems reflect this important external dimension. While in the other regions in the periphery of the world system, there are some cases of relative success in some aspects of either a classical market economy, a mixed economy or a "socialist market economy," in Africa, especially countries in the south of the Sahara, social, economic, and political problems reflect tendencies to characteristics of global failure. The African economy, the African market of raw materials, and the African consumer market are highly fragmented and parcelized. Many factors have contributed to this situation. For instance, the size of the African domestic economy is too small, the volume of trade among African countries is low; and African relations with the industrial countries often fluctuate and are unidimensional. Almost half of the African countries have a population of less than five million. About 85 percent of the continent's total exports are marketed with industrialized countries of the North (compared to 75 percent for South America and 68 percent for South and East Asia). Only a very small fraction of African exports, ranging from 3 to 6 percent, go to other African countries. About thirty African countries are landlocked; most of them are situated at more than one thousand kilometers from any major seaport. Africa has not been performing well compared to other developing countries with relatively similar conditions. For instance, from 1982 to 1992, the average annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for Africa was 2 percent; for South Asia, the most comparable region, it was a little over 5 percent; while the East Asian rate was 8 percent.7 In addition, according to the classification of many international institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), approximately

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three hundred million Africans are poor, and more than one hundred are extremely poor. In the late 1980s, many African countries were faced with a negative growth syndrome. Most of their national economies have been in near or partial collapse. Economic growth was minimal in many countries in the early 1990: generally, it has been between 1.0 and 3.1 percent, while the population growth has reached an average of between 3.0 to 3.5 percent in the same period. Moreover, drought has often seriously hit more than twenty African countries; and there are no tangible signs, within the international political economy, the systems of accumulation, the marketing mechanisms, foreign loans or national distribution of revenues or saving systems that the situation will soon improve in most of Africa. Since 1993, the gross national product GNP) has increased by up to five percent in some countries like Ghana and Cote dTvoire. In Cote dTvoire, for example, with its newly inspired slogan of Velephant d'Afrlque (the elephant of Africa), the government has predicted that growth will reach double digits before the end of the century. Economic and political relations among states revolve around the management of the interests and powers of the forces involved. One of the issues that has concerned many African and Africanist scholars in studying Africa's international affairs is the philosophical assumption behind African-European relations after most African countries gained nominal political independence. Do those relations reflect a conspiracy theory? Have they been equally beneficial to Africans and Europeans? William Zartman poses the problem in the following manner: During the past three decades, a debate arose over whether Euro-African relations were a case of decolonization or dependency-whether Europe presence and influence were gradually declining, leaving Africa increasingly on its own as a part of a multilateralized interdependent world, or were merely ebbing to a more subtle plateau of dominance, leaving Africa locked and co-opted in a class-society world (1993, 1). In this book, some elements of this debate will be touched on in light of a historical-comparative analysis. Through a historical perspective and concrete case studies a better understanding and appreciation of the dynamics of the Africa and European relations can be reached. Another important dimension worth considering is the nature of changes in the world system and its impact on both Africa and Europe (on industrialized countries in the North).


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Between the fifteenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, despite the impact of large scale-slavery, which significantly altered the fabric of African culture, demographics, and reoriented its political economy, and despite the impact of Islamization,8 relations between African and European rulers were generally based on the concept of different but equal,9 in other words, on some form of basic mutual respect and dignity. However, over the past one hundred years or so, Africa's relations with European industrial powers, especially the former colonial states, have raised serious questions concerning the intentions of the West in Africa and the impact of European policies on African politics, development programs, and institutional building. Because of the major struggles taking place in the 1990s in local and national ideologies and world politics, now is the most appropriate time to critically examine specific relations between Africa and foreign powers. Between the end of the 1880s and the end of the 1980s in Africa, for instance, international or transnational capitalism could not have survived without the support and guidance of strong state apparatuses. Colonial states that were created militarily. For all practical purposes, they were merchant states. These states were assigned duties by the metropolitan administrations to do and be everything with absolute raw power. The assumption here has been that strong states would create strong institutions, which would be conducive to nationbuilding. Thus they became, de facto, the strongest instruments of colonization par excellence in the world system. That is to say, the policies of a police state and its purportedly efficient management of resources have been essential for the development and maintenance of the capitalist world system. They were asked to do everything and be everything as well. Starting in the 1980s, new waves of economic programs from the so-called donors and international financial institutions which were supposed to bring growth and development, continue to systematically weaken many dimensions of the participation of the African state in the world economy. Not only have some states in developing countries become nationally illegitimate, many of them are no longer viable in world politics; as they are committing what Okello Oculi called "sovereignty suicide."10 This is not only happening in the less industrial countries. In Russia, for instance, although the United States is firmly behind the Russian economy, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are also having a serious negative impact on fiscal

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policies, planning and social programs. It should be emphasized that initial social, economic, financial and political conditions, and the quality of infrastructures in the countries before the implementation of those programs had a different impact. Although the state is not dead in developing countries, it is functioning without a clear, strong national agenda as a partner of economic corporations and financial institutions that have hegemonic power. Popular and democratic movements are struggling to push for state reforms. In short, the state no longer determines by itself the mechanisms of its expansion and the policies of its operations. Multinational corporations and foreign capital (the forces or engines of the global economy) have become more powerful than states in determining and recommending what kind of local policies to choose in a given political milieu. Onimode Bade, for instance, discusses the role of those institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as being essentially imperialistic. They were conceived as new masters to contribute to the building of the imperialist empire and the African crisis (1988, 1). Within this context, what kind of input can the economic and political relations between Africa and foreign powers contribute to social progress in Africa, in terms of, for example, capital formation and accumulation, human resources, establishing infrastructures, and institutional capacity building? What was the past nature of those relations? Nearly four decades after most African countries earned nominal political independence, the social and economic conditions of the majority of people have not improved. Regardless of significant efforts by some states to change social and political conditions, and the adoption of the stabilization programs of the IMF and the SAPs of the World Bank by the early 1980s, all statistics from the national, international, and regional organizations indicate that the living conditions of the majority of the African people are worsening. In most instances, the middle class, one of the most historically dynamic agents of change in many countries, has become weaker. In terms of its relationship to the instruments of production, investment, and social class maintenance, some scholars talk about the possible disappearance of such a class in most parts of Africa. The conditions of rural dwellers especially those of women, landless peasant, and poor farmers, are devastating in many countries. It is too soon to evaluate the impact on African development of the end of the Cold War and the drive for democracy in Africa. The politics of the linkages


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between Africa and the industrial powers must be analyzed and evaluated. Economic relations-which include commercial exchanges, grants, investments, financial aid, mechanisms and patterns of production, distribution, and market forces-between the African states and foreign powers are not an intellectual or academic abstraction. They are pragmatic, complex, and dynamic, and can be analyzed as historical and social processes. They are constantly in a state of flux, responding and adapting to the demands and forces of new local, national, and international realities; they are self-centered, interestoriented entities. Both realists and idealists agree that there are no free rides within the interactions among states. Almost all contemporary states satisfy most of their own interests through interactions with others in specific sectors, as defined by the ruling elite and dictated by local or regional conditions. These interactions have various political, diplomatic, strategic, or economic objectives and implications. They are influenced, both nationally and internationally, by a set of factors, that generally determine the nature of their dynamism. What is the nature of economic interactions between African states and industrial foreign powers? Pragmatically and philosophically, who are the real actors involved in those relations? Who are the real beneficiaries? What kind of benefits do these interactions bring about? What are the principles and processes that facilitate these interactions? In a world where the quest for global change is articulated by various social forces and institutions in different regions with unpredictable speed, new political and economic alliances are likely to emerge in all directions and from across all cultures and ideologies. The need to understand the nature of the impact of the past relations and linkages among states is crucial. In the current transitional period,11 the study of economic relations may help determine what kind of developmental, political, and policy options should be envisioned and explored, based on the availability of resources and taking into account the nature of existing power relations and their national policy implications. Although a global restructuring, or perestrolkay has not yet taken place, the African states and people, through popular and nationalistic movements, have generally begun to press for the assessment of the impact of past interactions with foreign powers. As stated by the author elsewhere: World politics is in transition. The effort toward understanding the dynamics of this transition and direction of its action depends on one's economical, ideological, political and geographical location. Generally this transition is

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characterized by the rise of strong nationalist movements, patriotism, fascist/racist sentiments, the slow and gradual process of re-alignment of social forces, the search for new cultural identities, the global liberalization of world trade, the globalization of market and productive forces, the broad movements towards regional economic organizations and the expansion of communication technologies. Contrary to the current popular views among scholars and policymakers that the dynamics of this transition will be mainly shaped by a single ideology of free market economy (or what may also be called a "unipolar") and its social, political and policy ramifications, my reading of the dynamics of the current political events in world affairs leads me to think differently.12 The reasons for the reemergence of the current movements can be found in the nature of the national and international configurations of the power struggle, the international political economy, and the contradictions in local political alliances and policies of resource allocation and distribution. The unequal distribution of world resources (for instance, 20 percent of the world population uses 80 percent of the world resources) which are scarce, indeed, and its impact on the local or regional milieux, are compelling various social forces to search for new alternatives. However, any struggle for change that is not guided by a philosophy or a social project cannot adequately address societal or policy contradictions. As previously mentioned, in the past five hundred years or so, Africa has had, either by the will of its leaders or because of conquest by Western foreign powers, formal and informal economic and political ties with the outside world. Before that period, linkages between Africa and the rest of the world were basically determined by the dynamics of internal conditions and forces. Slavery a VEuropeenne and colonialism have had a more directly devastating impact on contemporary African political economies than informal commercial and diplomatic relations have had. The struggles of African peoples against imperialist powers and their pursuit of social justice have taken different forms. Much has been said and written about the nature of these nationalistic struggles (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991). However, specific relations between a given foreign power and an African state and society reveal more than a generalization about the dynamics of their relations. In policy matters, interests cannot be discussed in general and abstract terms. Because the African state is an expression par excellence of the state system the world over, the study of interactions between a given African state and a foreign power can depict specific


15

interests that those relations promote and protect, and their impact on the people at large. Specifically, this book examines: 1. The dynamics of the economic relations between Africa and foreign, industrial powers (to avoid generalizations, two empirical cases have been selected) 2. The impact of these relations on national policy formulation and implementation, and society at large 3. The ideological and political assumptions behind those relations Since the end of the Cold War between the former Eastern bloc and the Western powers, and the collapse of most Marxist states with the exception of China, North Korea, and Cuba, a global assessment in international relations is gradually being made in many parts of the world. States and regional and international economic and political organizations are searching for new behaviours and codes of interaction; therefore, new forms of bargaining are evolving in the distribution of resources. In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, and its potential full actualization in the European Common Currency (ECC) in January 1999 is one of the examples of the regional approach to development. In addition, in North America, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have re-organized trade agreements and consolidated economic relations through the recent North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA), for which negotiations began in the mid-1980s. Covering a population of about 385 million in 1995 and a combined economic production exceeding $6 trillion per year, NAFTA would represent a greater duty-free market than the European Union, which served as its model (Snow and Brown, 1997, 188). With potential that other South American countries such as Chile to join NAFTA sooner than expected, the United States does not have a strong interest in expanding its market to all of Africa. The late Ron Brown, the former National Chairperson of the Democratic Party and Bill Clinton's Commerce Secretary, who tragically died in a plane crash over Bosnia and left a legacy of civil rights activism, tried to sell "Made-in-the-USA" products in Africa. However, this effort was not going to be effective and productive because in 1992 Bill Clinton did not have, and in 1997 he still did not have, a consistent foreign policy towards Africa upon which to base commercial activities. In addition to NAFTA, the United States counts on the political stability of Russia, to forge new economic relations. The governing

16


elite in Washington continues to support economic and political reforms undertaken in Moscow in order to make Russia a partner in a troubled world politics. The notion of self-determination has returned in international political discourses among several U.S. allies and the emerging nation-states in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The debate on self-reliance is slowly emerging in political forums, though it has not been translated into policy formulation in many parts of the world, including Africa. Self-reliance in countries in the South can be a feasible policy only when there is a social movement with a committed ideology that mobilizes states and people, and transforms them into progressive social agencies. A THEORETICAL POSITION ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS The analysis of political and economic relations is not a technical inquiry. It deals with power configurations and their social impact at a given time in a given society. Political and economic relations can be strategic and instrumental in promoting various objectives; they can also be developmental and intended to essentially pursue social objectives. Thus, economic and political relations must be analyzed in historical context. The degree and nature of the impact of these relations in a given milieu depend on specific local conditions, the actors involved, and the historical configurations in which the relations have evolved. Despite the dynamism that these relations are capable of engendering and their underlying ideologies and policy implications, they cannot be approached as autonomous phenomena. The "non-objective" factors (non-economic or so-called nonrational characteristics such as culture and political personality of the leadership) influence the relations of exchange, production, management and consumption. It is necessary to distinguish between primary, or dominant, relations in a given social and political context (for example, those associated with class or state) and those which are predominantly peripheral to production, reproduction and the maintenance of a given social system. To better understand any social system of interactions, its major actors, and the structures in which they function, it is necessary to identify how those actors have historically and socially produced and reproduced themselves. Mechanisms they use locally, regionally, and internationally to enter the world system and consolidate their


17

power must also be analyzed. There is always a dynamic relationship between the national, regional, and international environments in which actors live and function and the actions they take to do things. Dependency theorists have generally characterized political and economic relations between former colonial powers and developing countries as those which produce economic inequality (dependence on capital flows, technological input and labor exploitation) in the peripheral countries and development in the metropolitan countries (Rodney, 1981). The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, recently supported the above position by saying: "They (states in the North) look for a scandalous situation if one looks at it closely since, in the final analysis, it is the poor who are financing the rich." 13 The dependency paradigm labels countries with less industrialized societies as satellites and peripheries to international markets, while centers of major decision processes are located in the metropolis (the center of power). The argument continues that due to lack of capital, technology, and human resources for social, economic, and industrial projects, most countries in the South have not formed appropriate economic and social bases either for national liberation or capital/resource mobilization. As indicated earlier, the relations of the political economy are more complex than just the mechanisms of capital inflow or outflow, technological dependencies or transfers, and the distribution of surplus accumulation, which are all regulated and monopolized by the dominant classes. Social and cultural class interests also contribute to the shaping of center-periphery relations. Relations in the periphery are not always passive, even in the most reactionary political situation. A peripheral state can manipulate international economic relations or resources for its own political survival. This was the case with many regimes in Africa until the emergence of the recent popular and democratic movements. That is to say, international relations can also shape and/or determine national policies in a given context. Those relations can also take different forms and expressions. Within the dominant paradigms (realist and positivist typologies in Western scholarship), studies of the interactions or linkages in political economy include state-state agendas, state policies, economic ideas or ideals embodied in those policies, the availability of the necessary resources to implement policies, and the political climate of the social milieu. Within this state-centric approach, many scholars tend to neglect the energy of the so-called informal sector in economic terms

18


or primordial or social attachment and its impact on relations between state-states. Though it is difficult to quantify, for example, the personality of a given leader and the dynamism of the local or national culture, these factors also influence political and economic relations among nation-states. Assumptions in conventional international relations stipulate that all sovereign states can have, in principle and legally, equal access to the same international resources regardless of their past political history: their location, national resources, and identities, are Utopian and a historical.14 However, the view that these states can exercise their rights equally in the international political economy and collective security systems if they respect existing agreements, conventions, laws, and norms of international forums and institutions is realistically and politically unfounded. Can the concept of plus ga change, plus c'est la meme chose (the more things change the more they remain the same) accurately depict the nature of postcolonial relations of political economy between, for instance, Liberia and the United States, CongoZaire and Belgium, Cote dTvoire and France, Nigeria and Great Britain, and Angola and Portugal? This concept can be misleading and cynical if used in a political and social analysis because it treats political forces and society as essentially static entities. Some relations may change in physical and historical terms but not necessarily in ideological terms. The relations between France and Africa, for example, demonstrate the lack of structural change. According to Naomi Chazan et al.: Time and again, observers have been struck by the extraordinary continuity of French policy in Africa. The reasons for this continuity are quite straightforward. The African empire was one of the great exploits of French history. Especially since 1830, when an expeditionary force set foot in Algeria, Africa has loomed very large in the French imagination and worldview. By the end of the nineteenth century, France claimed control of vast expanses of Sahara, the Sahel, and posts along the Atlantic coast stretching to the Congo in the south (1988, 379). The heavy influence of France in its former colonies in Africa is still a determining factor in how these countries behave internationally in the postcolonial era. In Cote dTvoire for instance, despite the efforts at Ivorianization of the economy that was initiated by Felix Houphouet-Boigny and finalized with the depart of many so-called French technicians in the 1990s, the French presence as advisors in decision making is still a reality. Even at the end of the Cold War when the recent global liberalization is the major dogma of the global


19

system and global change, the major investor in a country like Cote dTvoire is France. As Howard W. French eloquently reported: "So far, French companies have won out in all of the biggest privatization programs, and although diplomats say the bidding process appears fair, rival bidders say that in key industries, they suspect that French political influence plays a major role in determining who wins the contract."15 However, to be able to understand how local agents, state apparatuses, and societies interact globally with France as an agent of the global system, it is necessary to study the specific conditions both in France and in the former French colonies in Africa that facilitated the consolidation of this continuity. What kind of inputs and demands does this relationship satisfy? A case-by-case approach may reveal why the African political elite in the former French colonies (with the exception of Guinea-Conakry, which voted no to the referendum of 1958 and Algeria, which won independence from France through an armed national liberation movement) opted for the status quo at the time of their nominal political independence, even though the relations with France were politically, economically, and intellectually static. However, GuineaConakry under President (General) Lansana Conte, has joined the rest of the former French colonies under the umbrella of the Francophone association. In Algeria, the contradictions of nationalistic policies have produced internal war, making the consolidation of the French relations with the petty bourgeois nationalists extremely difficult. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN AFRICAN AND FOREIGN POWERS Despite massive nationalist movements that occurred after the World War II, some of which were led by Marxists, Socialists, or progressives, many African countries gained independence through negotiations with the colonial powers. The African elites preferred to replace the colonial powers without making structural administrative changes. Many political reforms were introduced to fit the aspirations of the new political rulers. The most important characteristic of the postcolonial politics in Africa was the inheritance of parliamentary democracy. By retaining this status quo, Africa was supposed to maintain relations with the European powers through a liberal democracy or a similar

20


constitutional government. However, the colonial powers were not democratic; therefore, the colonial situation could not be democratic. It is logically improbable for a non democratic situation to create a democracy of any kind elsewhere. Moreover, liberal democracy was never seriously practiced. Limited democracies and selective democratic practices were introduced in most parts of Africa after World War II. These state reforms were due to the internal pressures in the colonies: for instance, the continuation of nationalist movements and the power struggles in the metropolitan countries. The change in the balance of power in world politics, especially the emergence of the former Soviet Union and its expansionist tendency, forced the colonial powers to start making some political reforms. Some of the major objectives of these reforms were: (1) to save the world system from being destabilized; (2) to make some seleaive institutional changes that would lead to the claimed immortality" of the European powers in Africa; (3) to create "permanent" allies in the world that was divided ideologically, politically, and economically between West and East and North and South. It was believed that liberal democracy and its practices in international forums were going to consolidate the relations between African and European powers. Although there were systematic efforts by the African elites to make it work, this liberal democracy quickly became dysfunctional. It was essentially alien to the majority of the people, and it was philosophically imposed on the society by the new elites. Another area which contributed to the maintenance of political and economic relations between Africa and European powers is formal education. After many countries gained their nominal political independence, in most cases, the need for human resources was massive. With financial assistance from the West and its foundations and institutions, African states sent many of their students to study in Europe or North America for graduate degrees. Each state sent its students to study in its former colonial metropolitan country. Many countries spent more than 30 percent of their expenditures in education at large. More than 50 percent of these expenditures were few spent in higher education. Despite claimed reforms in the curriculum of the schools, with few exceptions, the educational structure did not qualitatively change much from the European


21

model. Among the exceptions was in Tanzania, where the leaders decided to use African socialism as the path to development. Each former Portuguese country that gained independence in the 1970s through armed struggles produced a somewhat different educational curriculum which balanced nationalistic and socialistic elements. Since the 1960s, the percentage of the formally educated Africans has increased in all countries. However, the national market economy has not absorbed them into the society, causing a brain drain, a movement that forced very qualified African intellectuals to migrate to North America and Europe. The lumpen-proletarianization of the intellectuals has also become a serious problem in African society. African states and elites are still strongly linked to the European powers through phenomena such as Francophonie and the Commonwealth. These two institutions play the role of cultural control. While Francophonie and the Commonwealth do not promote economic relations, they regulate the behaviour of members states and continue to be used as instruments of promoting consumer culture. In the case of France, for instance, Richard Sandbrook said: France has maintained an unusual pervasive influence in its former colonies of West and Central Africa and in other francophone countries, including CongoZaire. French governments until 1990 showed no compunction in supporting autocrats who upheld French commercial and strategic interests. France exerted its influence through cultural, economic, and military channels. It has devoted substantial resources to maintain educational systems in the former colonies modelled on the French system, including the secondment of French secondary and university teachers under aid agreements (1993, 100). Although this situation has started to change, France is still using cultural imperialism and political arrogance in its relationship with its former colonies. In most national conflicts in Africa between 1960 and 1997, the European powers intervened to support their client leaders. For instance, the United States has supported Jonas Savimbi in Angola and through Congo-Zaire Reslstencla Naclonal Mogamblcana (RENAMO) of Mozambique, the late Mobutu of Congo-Zaire, the late Emperor Haile Salassie of Ethiopia, all the presidents of Liberia, and until recently, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya to cite only a few. France firmly supported Mobutu, who was infamous for being one of the most brutal African dictators. France supported a one-party state in Cote dTvoire, Benin, Burundi, the Congo, the Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Niger, Togo, Rwanda, and Congo-Zaire, to

22


cite only a few countries. For instance, in 1996, the president of France, Jacques Chirac, sent troops to rescue President Ange Pattasse of CAR, who was seriously challenged by a significant portion of the armed forces. Until very recently, Belgium has militarily and politically supported Mobutu. Within the context of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union also supported its allies in Africa: Haile Mariam Mengistu of Ethiopia, the Movemento Popular de Llbertagao de Angola (MPLA) and Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Each of the governments model was inspired and supported by the then dominant players in world politics in the West and East. At the economic level, since 1960 African political leaders have chosen of three economic models: a market-led economy (liberal economy), African socialism based on self-reliance and sufficiency (a combination of socialism and nationalism) or Marxism-Leninism. By 1997, none of these models had produced sustainable development schemes as defined in this book. African economies are still the most vulnerable economies. Most of the African states depend mainly on the export sector. The cash crop economy is very dependent on European market and consumption. In most countries, more than 50 percent of national revenues derive from exports primarily to Western countries. This dependency creates difficulties in planning appropriate national policies. With the decline in prices of African commodities which started at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s in some countries, many African states decided to borrow money as a quick and easy way to support state apparatuses. As of 1996, the total debt in Africa had reached almost $300 billion. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the debt service consumed between 40 and 60 percent of national revenues. Directly or indirectly, all African people are working to pay off these debts. Loans to Africa are given within the framework of the conditionalities of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank and stabilization requirements of the International Monetary Fund. One of the requirements is privatization of the state. More than thirty five African states have adopted, these programs, at least in part. It is expected that the programs will help the states balance their national budgets in an efficient and rational manner. However, so far, participation of Africans in the privatization sector of their national economy has been less than 40 percent of total shares in most cases. Structural adjustments generally have not fulfilled their expected promises either on a sectorial or national basis. There are only a few


23

success stories, for instance, in tax collection, payment of the salaries of public employees, and a small growth in countries such as Cote dTvoire and Uganda. The social consequences of most of these programs on society at large are, for all practical purposes, disastrous. States have limited their involvement in supporting small schemes of agricultural programs in rural areas. Most people have lost purchasing power. Salaries have been reduced in many countries up to 25 percent for some social groups. Salary delays have become national chronic problems in some countries. Health services have been reduced and have also become extremely costly. Poor people cannot afford to go to private clinics as recommended by the programs. From the views of the advocates of the current revised SAPs within the World Bank, the new programs should deal directly with poverty. The results of privatization and austerity programs would be positive only in the long run, after Africa had her own entrepreneurs, innovators, and investors (capitalist class). However, these programs do not articulate the poverty elimination scheme. Consequently, they are further undermining the governments' popular support. The unpopularity of those programs all over the continent has intensified with the rise of political consciousness. In 1993, for instance, the national assembly in Cote dTvoire made a decision that all the SAPs must be discussed in the parliament before any further implementation, and that the processes of privatization should stop for a while. C6te dTvoire is known as one of the few success stories within the capitalist development model in Africa until the middle of the 1980s. Its privatization schemes will be finalized at the end of the 1997. Cote dTvoire could also get in 1998 a financial assistance from the complicated relief package known as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to deal with its structural indebtedness. Will this action be able to positively change the trends of marginalization that are affecting Africa, including Cote dTvoire? Two concomitant phenomena that help define Africa's current international relations are the further integration of Africa in the world system through market mechanisms and the marginalization of Africa. These two tendencies dialectically relate to each other. Integration can be defined in terms of the classical role of Africa: producing raw materials and consuming what it does not produce. As stated previously, African markets and economies have been very open, but international financial institutions and developed countries have not sufficiently transferred capital to Africa, as wished by

24


integrationists even in countries such as Ghana where SAPs have been almost fully adopted. The magic of the market has not worked in Africa. Integrationists support the view expressed by John Ruggie in which he has characterized the current international political economy as one of embedded liberalism in which the major Western countries intervene in their domestic economies to buffer the costs of adjusting to shifts in the world economy.16 More openness is the prescription of the neo-orthodox adjustment advocates. Marginalization is another characteristic of the current African economy. From the point of view of marginalization, one of the manifestations of African problems is its weak participation in the world economy, the global processes of production and market mechanisms. The emerging dominant trend in industrial investments in Africa began in the 1970s, with the Western firms, which were predominantly British and French, and also Japanese firms, gradually withdrawing from the continent. Capital flights intensified towards the end of the 1980s. According to Persephone Economou et al. using the data from the IMF and those published by the Organization of Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD): Although there are limitations on reliable statistics, data published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations (based on the IMF data) appear to indicate some firm trends of foreign investment in Africa. Total world inflow of the FDI reached a record high of $152 million in 1988. Some fourth-fifths of this inflow went to developed countries. FDI in developing countries continued to decline in the last two decades. Developing countries' share dropped from 32 percent in 1975 to 18 percent in 1988. Developing countries' share of FDI may further decline in the 1990s if the efforts of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries to attract foreign investment prove successful.17 Africa's share of the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) declined from about 6.6 percent in 1960 to 2.8 percent in 1980 with a slight increase to 3.5 percent in 1985.18 New investments have been almost absent in many countries with, a few exceptions in oil-producing countries and countries regarded as highly strategic such as Egypt during the Cold War. According to Paul Bennett's study of fifteen English-speaking African countries, British industrial FDI inflow to Africa had declined from 4 percent of total overseas industrial investment in the mid-1970s to 0.5 percent in 1986.19 The French Transnational are also disengaging from Africa. In some countries like Burkina Faso and the Congo-Brazzaville, France has only disinvested. In other countries such as Cote dTvoire, the average


25

annual inflow of FDIC declined from $63.5 million in 1975 to 1980 to $41.3 million in 1981 to 1987; in Senegal the average annual inflow dropped from $17.5 million in 1975 to 1980 to $8.4 million in 1981 to 1987. Currently France is more actively involved in restructuring its position in Europe, including Eastern Europe, than in firmly engaging in economic movements in Africa. However, the official development assistance (DOA) to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has proportionally increased and expanded in real terms. In the 1980s, for instance, the real increase in DOA to SSA averaged 3 to 4 percent a year. This situation can be summarised in what Christina Katsouris stated: Despite the known dependence of many African countries on development aid, net official flows to Africa plunged by 48 percent in 1996 to $ 3.2bn, the lowest level for a decade, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports in its latest World Economic Outlook. These flows are made up of all lending official bilateral and multilateral sources, minus repayments. There was also a 43 per cent fall in the IMF's soft loan approval to Africa through its enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF). Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa saw a 38 per cent drop in its primary source of World Bank lending«soft loans from the International Development Association....While the total decline in net capital flows to Africa was a somewhat less dramatic 17 percent (to $13.9 bn) in 1996, this was still the second decline in a row. (1,4) What are the general trends in the relationship between the European Community (EC) and sixty-nine African, Caribbean, and Pacific (CAP) countries, which started with the signing of the first convention in 1975 in Lome, Togo? There was a high level of enthusiasm from both the members of the community and the African states to set up new mechanisms that would transcend the colonial basis for the promotion of new cooperation. The EC received high profile attention in terms of international relations in Africa. However, it did not produce the Marshall Plan a VAmerlcalne that some African heads of state such as Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Abdou Diouf of Senegal have advocated. One of the consequences of the SAPs for Africans has been an increase in the cost of imported goods. Where the purchasing power is decreased, Africans, especially the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie, are forced to make a selective choice in what they consume. Choice is limited. De facto, African consumers are marginalized in the world market. Another dimension of marginalization is that international investors are gradually moving

26


out of Africa. Political malaise associated with political instability and the rise of military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a panic situation to which international financial institutions have reacted by moving out of the continent. The majority of European states, not only Britain and France, are moving out of Africa. They are moving, while the structures of the African economies they created and that are maintained by the African elites have not changed. The following classical reasons are given for the movement of the industrial powers out of Africa: 1. Inefficient and ineffective public administration 2. Poor infrastructures in areas such as transport, communication, and research 3. The existence of competitive markets elsewhere 4. Civil wars From the marginalization point of view, Africa does not offer enough inputs to the world economy. This is why it is being marginalized. Africa's marginalization results from the continent's absence from the major discussions that may lead to a reorganization of the world economy. Africa was absent from most of the negotiations on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT). Regionalism has led to more protectionism and regulations, contradicting the free market approach that is behind GATT. What will the impact of NAFTA be on the African economy in the long run? Although there is no data to support this position, it appears that the United States is likely to continue its meager investment policies in Africa, which are included on moving slowly because of political uncertainty, with perhaps the possible exception of South Africa, where President Bill Clinton promised, in his first presidential term, to provide $900 million to the new government of Nelson Mandela. Despite the Republican-dominated debate on the issue of drug trafficking linked to the Mexican government, Mexico will continue to offer a large market for "Made-in-the-USA" goods. Until 1996, United States investments in Africa made up less than 7 percent of its total investments in the world. The recent decision of the United States to cut off its assistance programs (the U.S.A.I.D. programs) in many parts of Africa is also an example of marginalization. In Congo-Zaire, for example, the U.S.A.I.D. offices were closed in 1990. In general, concerning Africa, with the exception of Egypt and to a certain extent South Africa,


27

United States has been even working contrary to its own doctrines: "All good things go together" and "Economic development will lead to political stability." United States has supported democratic movements in Africa through a human rights approach. However, the right to free speech (autonomy of logos) without economic rights is only likely to produce more violence as people continue to search for means of surviving. It is clear that multiparty democracy without an economic base will not create "sustainable development." There are continual debates in many high-power business executive offices in the West and Japan about what should be done about Africa. For the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, the decision has been made that, despite internal political problems and a difficult roads to reform, Western capitalists and states should assist Russia and the Eastern Europe in rebuilding their economies. The reelection of Boris Yeltsin in June 1996 as president of Russia has accelerated the process of this country's "integration" in the world economy. His deteriorating health conditions before a major surgical operation did not precipitate new presidential elections that could have led once again to violent political claims and power struggles. Finally, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited, in December 1997, seven African countries, including Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Her mission was to reassert American interests in a continent that was, during the Cold War era, segmented by Washington and Moscow in their military and ideological struggles and their support of dictators. U.S. officials identified three aims for her trip: to advance U.S. interests in the Great Lakes area, establish ties with a new generation of African leaders, and reach out directly to ordinary Africans in meetthe-people events (Reuters, December 7, 1997). Bill Clinton visited Africa in 1998 (especially Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Senegal, and South Africa). The visit was spectacular in terms of image it created, the symbolism of understanding Africa that it projected, and for the enthusiasm it is likely to mobilize. He mentioned Africa twice in his state of union address in January 1998 as part of his agenda to make new free trade arrangements between the United States and Africa. Is this new move based on a new U.S. commitment to promote real democracy and economic development in Africa? In the past, the U.S. did not produce a history of supporting democracy in developing countries. Is it committing itself to support

28


democracy after the Cold War era that is characterized by a generalized crisis of capitalism in Africa? Within the general logic of the arguments advanced in this book, Bill Clinton's foreign policy towards Africa is a reflection of a new strategy to expand the U.S. merchandises, rather than this of articulating a coherent philosophical perspective in the manner in which Washington perceives Africa. The U.S. has been trying to replace or challenge former colonial powers in Africa in terms of political influence. For instance, the U.S. is determined to make sure that the French influence is decreased in the countries of Great lakes, especially the DRC. The new political change, especially in Uganda and the DRC, has opened new possibility for the United States. However, this possibility is not likely to last for a long time without making the US interests clash with those of people as Africans continue to struggle against the state's interests in order to establish democracy. IMPLICATIONS OF RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN POWERS ON THE AFRICAN SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Industrial powers, like France and the United States, are morally and financially supporting multiparty democracy in Africa. Those states and several others have financed national conferences or democratic processes in several countries. However, the implementation of the SAPs is vastly weakening the basis for the functioning of democracy. Where to go from here and what should be done? Many African states are frustrated and confused as they try to cope with external and internal demands and the pressures of the global economy. In the an absence of a grand plan from the state, the majority of African people are living without any clear direction in terms of personal and collective growth. They are disappointed by the total incapacity of most African states to make tangible changes. The message from industrial powers is that Africa should further link themselves with international, financial, and multilateral institutions. These institutions are advocating domestic policy reforms. In the 1980s, no African state officially refused the implementation of reforms. However, the concern of many of them has been basically about the social implications of reforms in a fragile political and economic situation. International institutions lack sensitivity to those social and political issues. Recently, the World Bank has been trying to revise its agenda in order to deal with rural and poverty issues. In


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April 1997, it announced that development programs should move away from the classically dominated economistic approach. Within the global economy, foreign powers still have an important role to play in Africa. However, this role has to be shaped by the new world and local realities, the demands of the African people, and international changes; and it should not necessarily focus on the state. If foreign powers want to have a positive impact, their assistance and development programs should be reoriented toward the use of local resources and institutions both in material and human resource terms. Their developmental agenda should focus on the African people and their building institutions, rather than on creating new behaviour. The first approach is based on the dialogical relations between Africans and representatives of foreign powers and the dynamics of the milieu, while the latter is based on technical institutional building as the only way to advance efficiency. If foreign powers are serious about Africa, their targets should not be the states or elites, although they are important, but poor people and their institutions. While the dynamics of economic and political relations between Africa and foreign powers seems to be static, or tends to create a static atmosphere at the state level, at the societal level, people's energies are prevailing. What people do at the grassroots level seems to be dynamic and real for the African societies at large. Epistemologically and realistically this is the place where an important portion of knowledge about development should come from. Marginalization is providing opportunities for various African social groupings to invent new options. In Cote dTvoire and to a lesser degree in Senegal, for instance, after the devaluation of the Franc CFA (a currency used by all the former French colonies in West and Central Africa) in January 1994, some people, particularly those from the middle class, started to make an effort to consume local products. In short, autocentric development can be sustained by making an appropriate environment in which peoples' values are coherently articulated, and people's living conditions are also comprehensively transformed. Can the foreign powers support such a development model? Within the framework of the multipolar concept of the world in the twenty first century, do foreign powers have any choice of not supporting this model? At the present period, the industrial countries' relations with Africa are at best slippery, fragile, and unpredictable because on the one hand they support multipartyism, which is not likely to succeed given the economic conditions produced by the austerity programs and the massive demands of people that the state is

30


incapable of converting into output while on the other hand they are forcing Africa to be out of the world map. One of the areas in which the interactions between Africa and the industrial powers could be consolidated in the twenty first century is technology. In this era of microchips and computers, Africa can improve its productive forces by using its creativity in technological industry. The approach for this technological innovation and exchange should be a selective. This technology has to be culturally sensitive, economically productive, and politically manageable by the Africans. Access to it must be based on solid democratic learning processes. Technology allows the emergence of new relations and new intimate communities which are quite responsive, and possess a great richness of communications that would not otherwise happen.20 These relations must be based on a new concept of partnership between Africa and the industrial powers. NOTES 1. In this context foreign powers refers to the former colonial powers, more specifically to the industrial powers, and Japan and the United States. They constitute most powerful countries in the world system (global capitalism). 2. In the transitional constitution produced and approved by the Sovereign National Conference of 1992, the country of Zaire was referred to as Zaire (Congo). In April 1997, Kabila, the leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Kinshasa announced that the name Zaire had been changed back to the Congo. Thus this book uses either Zaire (Congo), Congo-Zaire, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Zaire, according to appropriate historical context. 3. This is a controversial concept that has become en vogue among policymakers and development scholars in both developing and industrial countries; it means a development that should be economically productive, socially manageable, environmentally safe, and relatively self-reliant, and it also denotes possibilities for articulating new policies and strategies that can lead to such a development. 4. Various dependency theorists have defined third world phenomena as subsystems of the world system. See, for instance, T. Dos Santos, 'The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60 (May 1970). 5. For further information on the usage of "systemness," see Barrie Axford, The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), especially chapter 1 on "Conceptualizing the Global Conditions" 6. Ibid. 7. Thomas M. Callaghy, "Africa: Falling off the Map," Current History 93 (January 1994): 31.


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8. For further information on this topic, see Cheikh Anta Diop, Pre-Colonial Black Africa, trans, by Harold J. Salemson (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1987). 9. Basil Davidson develops the view that "different but equal" is a historical perspective that has been lost in the brutal way Africa entered the world system. Cheikh Anta Diop is the most-known scholar who fully analyzed this historical concept; see, for instance, his book entitled: LAfrique noire precoloniale (Paris: Presence Africaine, 1960). 10. See Okello Oculi, "Union Government for Africa: Putting the Case, What Time Is It? National Time," African Association of Political Science Newsletter (June 1993): 3. 11. Since the end of the Cold War, no institution, or state, or scholar has been able to predict exactly where the world system is heading. It seems to be historically correct to study the causes and symptoms of the movements of change nationally and regionally. The direction of the world system is unpredictable because people and the states do not control enough dimensions of the causative variables to make accurate forecast. 12. Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, "Nationalism and Regional Economic Integration in Africa," Ithaca, New York, The Department of City and Regional Planning, Cornell University, Working Paper No. 135 (February 1993): 1. 13. "UN General-Secretary Urges Fresh Approaches for African Development," Africa Recovery 6 (December 1992 and February 1993): 12. 14. For further discussions of these assumptions, see Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). See also Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). 15. Howard W. French, "Ivory Coast Sells Itself as West African Powerhouse," New York Times (July 9, 1996). 16. Callaghy, 'Africa: Falling off the Map" 36. 17. Persephone Economou et al., "Europe 1992 and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa," in Europe and Africa: The New Phasey ed. Williams Zartman (Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 96. 18. Ibid., 99. 19. For further information on marginalization, see Paul Bennell, "British Industrial Investments in sub-Saharan Africa: Corporate Responses to Economic Crisis in the 1980s," Development Policy Review 8 (1990): 155-177. 20. Public Perspective, "Technological Change and America's Future: An interview with George Gilder," The Public Perspective 5:2 (January/February 1994): 25.


2

Liberian-American Economic Relations: Social and Political Implications INTRODUCTION: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES This chapter examines past economic relations between Liberia and the United States and their impact on, and implications for, Liberian society before the civil war that started in December 1989 and the collapse of the state in 1990. The dynamics of these relations at the national level illustrate the nature of domestic policies and class relations, especially as they have related to various processes of capitalist economy. The hypothesis developed is that the ruling class in Liberia has always had an eclectic position vis-a-vis their own politics and culture. Additionally, Liberia was not forced (as Ghana, Nigeria, and the Congo were), through the process of selfdetermination and incorporation in the world system, by the Western powers to be part of the United States and its economic system, which the black settlers in Liberia hated and admired at the same time. These settlers were associated themselves with the United States values of individualism, protestantism, and capitalism without liberal democracy. In the settlers' politics, arts, and religion, there are efforts to be emancipated from American ways and, at the same time, that there is a systematic effort to maintain strong identification with American values as a way to diffuse tensions or conflict. Identification with the political philosophy and social values that the settlers hated is one of the characteristics of Liberian uniqueness. The decision of the ruling class in Liberia to have closer economic interactions with the United States was neither absolutely fixed in

34


history nor philosophically random. The settlers had possibilities and options to delink themselves from the cultural and economic domination of the United States and look for other development options. Why were other options not explored? What implications did the dynamics of the interactions the United States have on sociopolitical and economic condition in Liberia? Since 1944, many important political and social changes did occur in the state formation process in Liberia and in Liberia's relations with the United States. The coming-to-power of William V. S. Tubman (1944-1971) as an imperial president, with his "integrationist" and open-door policies, consolidated the incorporation of Liberia into the peripheral capitalist world. The 1980s military coup d'etat in Liberia, though it did not seem to seriously question the sense and direction of political history of the ruling elite, brought a new social category into the power system. The brutal collapse of the state and society in Liberia is likely to raise new social consciousness among different social groups. In this peripheral capitalist state, the local allies (mostly members of the True Whig party and their families) of the United States have consolidated their power and disassociated themselves from the masses. As Wallerstein stated: In peripheral areas of the world economy, however, the primary contradiction is not between two groups within a state each trying to gain control of that statestructure, or to bend it. The primary contradiction is between the interests organized and located in the core countries and their local allies on the one hand, and the majority of the population on the other. In point of fact, then, an "imperialist" national struggle is in fact a mode of expression of class interest.1 This contradiction in Liberia took the form of ethnic, class, and power struggles. Before 1944 the Liberian state was in transition toward a "complete" neocolonial state where the interests of foreign powers became well-articulated and clearly protected by the legal system of a client state. As foreign powers began to consolidate their powers and interests through investments and financial assistance schemes, Liberia gradually became a peripheral state. Its mode of production reflected, at the beginning, a combination of slavery and "primitive" capitalism. The role of the state was mainly to ensure that the elements of the dominant mode of production survived by forcing high taxes on natives, slave-like labor and wages, and financial support from large corporations.

Liberian-American Economic Relations

35

Only by the processes of gradual internal change, power alliances between the ruling class and the Congoes (and assimilated natives; the Congoes are originally Africans from the Central African region who were being brought to slavery but did not make their journey through as slaves to the United States because slavery became illegal in the United States. Thus, they landed to Liberia as free Africans), power struggles and the conflicts between families did the interests of this government become well-defined and its role of appropriating surplus labor and products for its own benefit and those of the metropolis become clearly articulated. The emergence of Liberia between 1944 and the end of the 1980s as a peripheral capitalist state with state apparatuses, the development of an export-import oriented economy, the development of a bureaucratic and commercial bourgeoisie in commerce, trade, agriculture, and the public sectors, and the rise of an educated elite, created infrastructures for the development of peripheral capitalism. By and large, although objective conditions may be manipulated and promoted by ruling classes and their allies for specific interests and ends, they are important for determining the nature of the actions and policies of the state. Objective conditions are defined in this context as factors or forces that motivate and allow relationships to occur and to be maintained. These conditions can change if the nature of the state or the regime changes. Individuals, social classes, or states relate to each other according to their objective conditions, which include where they are, who they are, and what they have. Those conditions affect actors in their efforts to effectively interact for the benefits of the whole. Could the state of Liberia produce an "internal capitalism," as expected by other Africans, comparable to the development of Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, (the newly industrializing countries known during the Cold War era as the mini-dragons) despite their current economic and financial crises? The existence of too many internal contradictions and the lack of a common vision of society, among other factors, should be carefully studied before any conclusions can be reached on the Liberian modes of production and the characteristics of its "internal capitalism." The objective conditions of the environment and the development of world capitalism, along with ethnic and ruling-class interests, have determined and influenced the nature of state formation and state policies. In the long run, the nature of the Liberian relationship with the United States in diplomatic, economic, and military areas

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contradicts the black settlers' philosophical base, which is: "The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here." Since the mid-1990s, with the collapse of both state and society as a result of a bloody neocolonial war, Liberia has entered into a "dark" period, unprecedented in its history. How the state and people will be able to rebuild their political community depends very much on their understanding of the nature of the forces that were involved in the foundation of Liberia as a contemporary state and country, and the economic and social interactions between Liberia and the United States that shaped that foundation. Since its foundation in 1821 by the American Colonization Society(ACS),2 Liberia was considered by many to be as an "abnormal political entity," or a strange political arrangement, since it was not formally colonized by the Western powers. However, this perception of abnormality did not help the Liberian people and their state avoid colonization in their effort to construct a relatively cohesive political community. With the political and economic consequences of the dynamics of the world system, it became a neocolonial state par excellence. Its history has been the object of much criticism among many scholars on the basis of the behavior of both the state founders and their sponsor. Liberia did not completely fit into the paradigms or orbits that helped conventional Western scholars define Africa. Liberia has often been harshly judged. In political terms, that is to say, from the perspective of state formation and the control of resources, which includes the process of its incorporation into the world system and the internal consolidation of power in the post-colonial era, Liberia is a land of the land of political extremism. At the beginning of Liberia's state formation, the elite had a high dosage of cultural exclusivity in its political formation, discourses, and policy choices. Although it shared many characteristics with neocolonial African politics, it also had its own unique history. "The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here," a slogan in the preamble of the Liberian constitution, shaped the behavior of the state and its relations with other states. But the "Love of Liberty" was applied mainly to protect the interests and the common cultural elements of the Americo-Liberian settlers.3 The Liberian political class has always been in search of itself. At the beginning, like most emigrant political formations, the Liberian state had expansionist tendencies with an assimilationist policy. That is to say, the relationship between the black emigrants and the local Africans was that of conquest and rivalry rather than dialogue and


37

compromise. For many years, Liberia has had difficulties functioning as a state. The government's relationship with local powers and the people have been characterized by permanent struggle and distrust until Tubman came to power with a strong assimilationist and integrationist policy. Earlier, the French and British colonial powers challenged Liberia's existence militarily, commercially, and diplomatically. During its formation, the Liberian state and its politics did not completely follow the rules usually applied to a colonial situation. Yet the logic of its political economy was not much different from that of other colonial situations. The study of economic relations between Liberia and the United States is important because it deepens the understanding of how the Liberian state and society collapsed simultaneously in the early 1990s, how the state has been ambiguous toward self-redefinition, and the United States' "passive" attitude toward the Liberian vicious power struggle. The process of the collapse of the state in Liberia is not unique to Liberia. It has to be understood in a broader context. From a behavioral point of view, nothing tells us that what happened in Liberia between 1990 and 1997 will not happen again in other forms if a constructive critique of its past political history is not systematically undertaken and incorporated into the process of reconstruction. As concerned Liberians are struggling to reconstruct their collapsed society and state, a political analysis of the past is a sine qua non toward understanding the forces that have shaped Liberia. The philosophical basis of the past should help us understand the present and construct a vision for the future. What were the roots of this political violence? What went wrong in Liberia? Is the collapse of Liberian society the result or a product of its so-called abnormality? Some ways to look at these questions are to analyze the nature of Liberia's political economy, the dynamics of the state and its culture, and the nature of relations among civil society, the state, and different classes. An un(*^standing of the nature of economic relations between Liberia and the United states will give important information and the insight needed to analyze the nature of this state, its policies, and the impact of these policies on the Liberian people. As Byron Tarr said: "The Liberian civil war suggests the failure of a grand illusion, the idea of Liberia as an African outpost of Western civilization. Unsolved cleavages between settlers and indigenes, and among indigenes, ensure poor governance that sustains failed policies."4 Since the formation of the League of Nations, Liberia has maintained a high level of international visibility in defending the

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political interests of Africa, especially its right of independence. For instance, Liberia and Ethiopia took South Africa to the International Court of Justice at the Hague over its control of Namibia. It aggressively searched for political alliances in Africa based on the notion of mutual respect of liberty and self-determination. The day of the celebration of the Ghana's independence in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah stated in his inaugural speech that "Once upon a time one could look around the world but not find a free black country. Marcus Garvey sought to create one, but he did not succeed." He cited the efforts of others who tried but did not succeed. Then he went on to say that "Today the spirit of all those who fought to found a free black state has became a reality in this day with the independence of Ghana" as the "first" country in sub-Saharan Africa to earn its independence from the colonial powers. He did not mention Liberia as a free black state that had won its independence from the American Colonization Society in 1847. I can imagine the reactions of any Liberian delegates who were present at this ceremony. This omission is an important reflection of the ambiguity of the Liberian state represented for the people in Africa. Some of the questions raised have been: Is Liberia in Africa? Is it part of the United States? What has been the basis of the loyalty of the state or ruling class in Liberia? Geography does not seem to matter much in coining to a final answer to some of the above questions. Economic conditions in Liberia have been almost permanently unstable from the Commonwealth (1821-1847) to the proclamation of the Republic in 1847. The desire to survive in a harsh social and physical environment without sufficient human and natural resources caused the Liberians to welcome foreign investments from the United States and other Western countries even if this meant, the virtual colonization of Liberia. Who benefited from this decision? What kind of benefits did they derive? At what cost? The premises and principles that motivated the Americo-Liberians to rule Liberia absolutely for more than 120 years and to engage themselves in contradictory relations with the United States should be viewed within the context of the international division of labor, the world economy, and world politics. What role has Liberia played in the structures of world politics and economy? What benefits did the state and people of Liberia gain from the United States? Which social forces have been positively or negatively most affected by the interactions between these two countries? How was social formation (state, class, and party) produced? These are some questions that can


39

help us understand the nature of the Liberian state in terms of its economic interests, its political ideology, its reproduction system, its performance, and its current internal crisis. Reproduction is used in this context as a combination of means that the state uses to maintain its equilibrium through socialization and recruitment processes.

AN OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA To better understand the economic relations between Liberia and the United States, it is important to analyze them within the framework of general American-African relationships. Behind any relations, including an economic one, there is a world view, an ideology, and a vision of the human being and society. This assumption is often rejected or challenged by social scientists because it is difficult to evaluate and test. However, in international relations, especially those between less industrial states and industrial states, the assumption is relevant. The United States is now the leading capitalist country in the world. It behaves accordingly. Before the two World Wars, the American attitude toward Africa had generally been marked by disinterest. No substantial interests or investments similar to those in Asia and South America were made in Africa. The latter was considered mainly as an "appendage of Europe," and African problems were associated with European colonial concerns. As Michael Clough stated: One of the major reasons that shifting geopolitical currents so affect American policy toward Africa is the fact that United States has few tangible interests there. The existence of significant, widely recognized economic and strategic interests-such as those the United States has in Western Europe, Japan, and the Persian Gulf states-directs and to a certain extent stabilizes policy. Clearly identifiable interests reduce the need for constant debate and reassessment and foster continuity from administration to administration. Where interests aie limited or ambiguous, as in the case of Africa, policy is much more sensitive to the changing moods of U.S. domestic constituencies and the reaction of midlevel officials in Washington (1992, 14). As previously indicated, to fully understand the significance of the above statement, U.S. foreign policy toward Africa must be contextualized and historicized. The policy has never been constantly and permanently static.

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The American ruling class in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was facing many internal socioeconomic problems due to the social and economic structures of colonialism and slavery, including North-South conflicts. Its political economy was still relatively weak in technology and management. Some scholars believe that it could not afford to take the risk of expanding its power at that time in history. It was known for its isolationism. As capitalist technology and productive forces developed, however, along with social organizations, the effort to reach Africa became a necessity, especially with the Algerian war and the defeat of France in Asia after 1955. Before 1945, Africa was known in the United States mainly by the presence of black people in America and Europeans in Africa. The United States had participated in the transatlantic slave trade and in the 1884-85 Berlin Conference, where the Western ruling elite divided up Africa for its own economic interests. In the early twentieth century, American pronouncements on freedom and anticolonialism were somewhat romantic, even during the colonization of Africa. When William E.B. Du Bois sought to convene a conference in Paris (France) to bring the plight of the "man of color" (sic) before the world, the United States government declined to issue passports to American blacks to attend (Nkrumah, 1971, 60). The United States did not support any nationalist movements, either in the Congo crisis, in Angola, or in North Africa. Jonas Savimbi of the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), who was supported by the United States, tried to stop the establishment of a socialist government in Angola. The Cold War politics was the determining factor in this support. Before 1945, the economic history between Africa and the United States was characterized not by strong linkages between them. However, the expansion of world economy,5 decolonization, and the expansion of communist ideology brought the United States into the action in Africa. After 1945, with the development of capitalist economies, a new international economic relationship was promoted, in which goods and capital could move with relative speed and freedom. Although the world system had already reached or altered all essential African social relations, direct American investments, trade, and economic assistance were still minimal. Before 1945, only 3 percent of the United States' investments were in Africa and less than 5 percent of Africa's trade was with the United States.


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After the Second World War, central decision makers in the United States began to project American power to almost all the areas outside of the communist bloc. This was mainly due to two reasons: economics and strategy. After the emergence of Communist China, the world became clearly divided into blocs, making the search for alliances a necessity. Starting with John F. Kennedy, to Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Bill Clinton, American presidents recognized that Africa has become a reality in the political scene of the United States' foreign policy. However, although George Bush went to Somalia on December 30, 1992 and organized the operation to "save" lives, the level of knowledge of Africa, its cultures and peoples in the United States is still low. Africa is still perceived very much as "the dark continent." However, this continent is not isolated from the dynamics of the world politics and economics. It has a role to play in the international division of labor and in modern market systems. The question is how was this role formed and what have been its dynamics? American relations with Africa started to take a visibly different shape when John F. Kennedy became the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As Schlesinger said: In this capacity, he [Kennedy] warned his colleagues about the new energy bursting forth in the dark continent. "Call it nationalism, call it anticolonialism, call it what you will," he said in 1959. "Africa is going through revolution." The word is out and spreading like wildfire in nearly a thousand languages and dialects-that it is no longer necessary to remain forever in bondage. He advocated sympathy with independence movements, programs of economic and education assistance, and as a goal of American policy, a strong Africa (1967, 511). The United States Senate in 1959 concluded that the dynamic character of the African people's drive towards self-government indicated that the colonial system in Africa, as elsewhere, was fast running its course and that United States policy should be guided by the expectation of the primacy of Africans in all of sub-Saharan Africa. Movement of the United States toward Africa was not based on any form of decolonization effort. The purpose of its "good will" was to disintegrate the legacy of the colonial empires and replace it by a new legacy of "modern capitalism." From the Congo crisis to Namibia's nationalism, Somalia's crisis, and South African issues, the United

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States has been very much involved in various kinds of economic, strategic, and political activities in Africa. In the early 1960s, for example, the United States was involved in joint actions in politico-military blocs to support its new client regimes, and in multinational financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It supported actions of local political parties. In the early 1980s, the United States strongly supported its client regimes, such as Congo-Zaire and the Sudan. As Donald Snow and Eugene Brown stated: "In Africa, for example, a disproportionate share of U.S. assistance has gone to five states which at various times figured prominently in Washington's strategic objectives. Those five countries-Zaire, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Somalia-actually posted lower economic growth rates than the rest of Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s"(1997, 170). It should be emphasized that the relationship between the U.S. and Africa has not only been economic but political and military as well, as indicated by Stewart Smith: Although not as large in absolute terms as in other continents U.S. investments, aid and trade in Africa is of particularly high economic and political leverage in a continent which, except for South Africa, is economically underdeveloped. In the present decade, these have increased (although not uniformly) more rapidly more in amount~and in importance-than during any comparable previous period (1974, 46). Most African countries, after earning their political independence, had tremendous economic problems. This situation permitted some significant American economic inroads. Classical relations between the United States and Africa ensure the supply of certain minerals and raw materials and their profitability to the United States. The patterns of relations are those buyer and seller (patron-client). By and large, there has been a steady increase in direct as well as private American investments in Africa. In fact, beginning in 1945, as indicated by Kwame Nkrumah, the United States has gradually and aggressively become one of the largest investors in the African and world economies: In 1900, American private foreign investments were small by comparison with Europe's-$500 m. to Britain's $ 12,000 m. and France's $600 m. By 1930, the growth rate of America's foreign investments had already over-leaped those of Britain, standing at $17,000 m. against the later's $19,000 m. and way ahead of France's $7,000 m. America's foreign investment position was supreme by 1949~$19,000 m. against Britain's $12,000 m., the level at which it had opened


43

the century. France's level had sunk to $2,000 m. The first World War eliminated Germany's foreign investments and reduced those of France; the second World War eliminated Germany, Italy and Japan. The American government, moreover, had added $14,000 m. to its monopolists' $19,000 m. of private foreign investments (1965, 57). Although American private capital in Africa was not as large as that of the ex-colonial powers (in 1957, for example, it constituted only 2 percent of total U.S. investment abroad), direct private investment from United States has been increasing yearly. For instance, the cumulative value of investments in 1957 was about $664 million; in 1964, it was about $1,769 million; in 1967, it was about $2,227 million; and in 1970, it rose to $3,476 million6 In 1960, total British, French, and American direct investments in Africa soared, respectively, to $6,500, $7,000, and $1,100 million (Nkrumah, 52). Direct private American investment increased between 1945 and 1958 from $110 million to $789 million. The United States is a major source of private capital for less developed countries (including African countries). As of June 30, 1984, outstanding U.S. commercial bank loans to borrowers in LDCs (including those made by foreign branches of U.S. banks) were about $185 billion.7 African countries produce materials critical to the functioning of the U.S. economy. Many minerals are imported yearly to feed U.S. industries. For instance, in 1968, the United States imported from Africa a significant proportion of its iron and ferro-alloy ores, 56 percent of its manganese, 27 percent of its cobalt, 39 percent of its chromite, and 79 percent of its iron ore, 29 percent of its non-ferrous metals such as antimony, and 9 percent of its copper were all imported from Africa. In the same year, it imported many other commodities: 15 percent of its rubber, about 10 percent of its fiber, and 9 percent of its oil (Smith, 51). This brief picture of African-U.S. relations provides a perspective for analysis. During the Cold War era, American policy in Africa had three main components: 1. a priority for global political alliances; 2. opposition to any political radicalism, especially communism or socialism; 3. and expansion of capitalist commodities, ideology, andmaikets. To achieve its goals, the United States acted directly through economic and military assistance or indirectly through its alliances.

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African-U.S. relations have become much more complex than they were the case before the Second World War. They cover a wide range of sectors: economic, cultural, political, security, and strategic. Until recently, the general American relationship with Africa has been concentrated in seven main areas: liberalization of trade; encouragement of increased use of private capital and multinational corporations; stimulation of American private investment to meet the needs of client states; increasing support for the American non-profit sector in international fields; increased security of the world's food system; improvement of the effectiveness of development assistance from the United States; and opposition to revolutions of any kind, especially communist revolutions. One of the crucial questions here is what have the assumptions been behind American policy for developing the above areas? The premises of U.S. foreign policy and aid can be summarized in the work of Robert A. Packenham, who suggested four premises: change and development are easy; all good things go together; radicalism and revolution are bad; and distributing power is more important than accumulating power (1976, 11-160). American relations, including economic ones, have been guided by the above premises and supported by an economic approach that is reflected in these terms: There is a positive correlation between the level of economic development and the chances of democracy. More precisely, the higher the per capita G.N.P., the more frequent the competitive political systems and polyarchies. Often, in the approach, economic development was seen as the main requisite or cause of political democracy (Packenham, 1976, 210). The United States believes that economic assistance will lead to "political stability." Stability in this case can be referred to as the capacity of the state apparatus to function without a major disruption. It does not include the quality of performance and distributive mechanisms. This premise is embodied in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy. Ronald Reagan believed in a policy of positive engagement; for instance, that pulling foreign investments out of South Africa was going to hurt more black workers. It was assumed that if blacks become well off, they would either be assimilated into the dominant system or they would search for more peaceful means of solving their political conflicts. In short, the United States conceived its relations with Africa within the logic of


45

the international power struggle and the development of world capitalism. The manifestations and organization of this struggle, and the development of this world system at a local level vary from one country to another, but the general premises embodied in the policies to advance the struggle are not unique. To determine the nature and the dynamics of these relations in a specific case, economic and noneconomic factors must be considered. In short, however, during the Cold War era, U.S. imports from and exports to Africa have generally been minimal as Michael Clough stated: Exports to Africa have never accounted for a substantial proportion of total U.S. exports. U.S. imports from Africa did rise substantially in the 1970s, but this was almost entirely the result of a rise in oil prices and an increase in the volume of oil exported from Africa. By the late 1980s, U.S. imports from Africa had returned to their previously low levels. The impact of economic considerations on American policy toward the continent as whole is further limited because U.S. economic interests there are concentrated in a very few countries (1992, 15-16). Systematic budget cuts have been intensified during Bill Clinton's administration. This situation does not seem to promote an actionoriented relationship between Africa and the U.S., which would have positive impact on the conditions of people in Africa. Since 1994, the average overall cuts to the foreign operations budget have been 1011%. Africa has been the most vulnerable among the foreign recipients. It is doubtful that any positive change in budget allocations will be made soon, especially in aid to Africa, unless the U.S. budget is balanced and a new progressive Congress is elected. In contrast to other regions of the world, for instance the Middle East, where the U.S. has a solidly permanent relationship with the state of Israel, African countries, with possible exception of Egypt and South Africa, do not have solid relationship with the U.S. Rather, the U.S. only has some strategic and economic interests to pursue and protect. LIBERIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS A General Perspective Liberia is a product of peculiar relations with, and efforts by the United States. As a product of the movement (the expansionism of Europe in Africa) of the epoch, its progress and the laws that

46


dominated its history have depended on the development of American society and the global capitalist world. George Plekhanov said: "Human history is a process conforming to laws, but does not proceed independently of humankind; history is made by men (sic) who set the problems of progress and solve them in conformity with historical conditions of the epoch" (1940, 7). Liberia was not founded as even a strong semimodern state or a peripheral state, but through the world mechanisms of capital formation and accumulation, and the expansion of capitalism and its production processes, which directly affected the Liberian settlers' condition. However, this small community was gradually incorporated into the backyard of international capitalism, where it has played the classical role of mainly securing the development of the metropolitan capitalist economy (the center). The ruling class in Liberia, in conformity with the historical conditions of the epoch, opted for capitalist ways of solving its socioeconomic difficulties. The impact of this choice on social formation and the Liberian economy, especially beginning in the 1920s, is one of the most important causes of the Liberian malady. Compared with other African countries, Liberia was never formally colonized by the West, though it experienced an internal colonial situation. This occurred as a result of interactions between immigrants (mostly free black people who came to settle in this part of West Africa), the native Africans (previous inhabitants of this land), and the United States. As a "modern" political community with some territorial boundaries, Liberia was founded in 1821 by the American Colonization society and the U.S. government following the passage of the March 3, 1819 anti-slave trade law (Dunn, 1979). Three philosophical tendencies seem to have motivated this Society to found Liberia: (1) A humanitarian, charitable, and missionary philosophy based on the "civilizing" and "Christianizing" mission. (2) A commercial motivation-the possibility of establishing a colony in the West coast of Africa. As with any colony, trade was intended to promote change in the colony for the benefit of the metropolis. (3) Social and psychological pressures among the ruling class and old slave masters to get rid of second-class citizens (Lowenkopf, 1976, 13). Stephen


47

Hlophe also shows that free blacks and manumitted slaves saw no future within the United States (1979,81). Although a humanitarian or philanthropic mission seems to have apparently dominated the decision to set up a country for free blacks, Liberia is, in reality, a result of the combination of many philosophical tendencies and purposes. It was historically and economically difficult for capitalist modes of production to actively reproduce themselves in Liberia at the beginning. As a colleague of mine (a Liberian sociology professor) jokingly told me: "How can you expect anyone who has not had any vision of freedom, a vision of a true Christianity, or a vision of sovereignty to come and reproduce the true visions of these phenomena in this different social context?" What did the new immigrants reproduce? One can assume that free blacks would only have reproduced the social formation mostly experienced by their ancestors. If the spirit of the epoch means anything, the motive of the establishment of Liberia as a commercial alliance would have been in perfect accordance with the movements in Europe. Liberia behaved as a formal colony of the United States for more than one hundred years, as a result of the movement of capitalism. This behavior is due partly to the impact of American economic relations on Liberia. Historically the United States has been the principal source of foreign economic assistance to Liberia and has continued to hold this paramount position despite a great expansion of the flow of aid from other governments and United Nations agencies (McLaughlin, 1966) until the collapse of the state in 1990. But, as already stated, the relations between the U.S. and Africa have not only been economic. Ernst-Otto Czempiel indicates that relations between states are established at three levels: the individual level; the state level (foreign policy); and the international level (ties within the international system). Almost all of these levels interact with each other, but by and large, each level has its own goals, its own operational zones and principles, and its own boundaries.8 From a general view, it is important to consider interactions among all three levels as significant, though state-state relations are the main focus in this book. Between 1839 and 1847, this commonwealth had some expansionist objectives and behavior despite a high death rate and decreasing population. "The American Colonization Society census records of 1843 showed fever was the cause of death in 45.7 percent of all

48


reported deaths of 1,918, in the colony from 1821 to 1843" (Hlophe,1979, 84). In this period, two hundred settlers established themselves at Harper in Liberia. In 1833, a Quaker group from the United States under the name of Youngman's Colonization Society of Pennsylvania founded another colony at Bassa Cove in Liberia. By 1838, there were four major settlements within the Commonwealth of Liberia: Montserrado, Bassa Cove, "Mississippi in Africa," and Maryland. Although they had the same culture and heritage in common, the people in each settlement behaved independently. They perceived themselves as "Virginians," "Alabamians," or "Georgians," according to the American state from which they had emigrated. Liberia was governed by the representatives of the society. The first governor of the Commonwealth of Liberia was Thomas Buchanan, the cousin of the president of the United States, James Buchanan. The constitution of the Commonwealth was drawn up with the help and guidance of Simon Greenleaf, professor of law at Harvard College. On July 26, 1847, Liberia was granted its political independence from the society. The constitution resembled that of the United States, though Liberia was not a federal republic like the U.S. The behavior and organization of the various counties resembled those of the United States. The flag and individualist philosophy that shaped the behavior of the political community reflected many political dimensions of the United States. Although Liberia became an independent nation, the society continued to work as an agency through which aid, donations, and grants could be channeled to Liberia. The society also continued to play the role of persuading other blacks in the United States to join the Liberian settlers (Lowenkopf, 1976, 18) and represented Liberia's interests in the United States. Although the legal status of their relations after the "liberation" of Liberia are not known, the society behaved as an advisory bureau for Liberia's affairs in the United States. The U.S. attitude toward Liberia after the declaration of its independence was philosophically contradictory. The U.S. government did not legally or diplomatically recognize the independence of the newly established Republic until 1862, after England and France had done so. The U. S. reaction would be understandable if Liberia had won its through with violence and classstruggle, or had rejected the primitive capitalist culture.


49

Some hypotheses can be made for America's slow and reluctant recognition of the new Republic. The U.S. government had its own internal problems inherited from colonialism and slavery; and therefore, domestic policies were probably considered more important than foreign relations at that time. Recognition would also imply the acceptance that free black people could have political success; former slave masters were not likely to envision that. They may have had the attitude of "Let a new Republic struggle for its own bread and wine." And, at the time, Liberia did not represent important market for either its own raw materials, labor, and ideologies or for foreign commodities. Lowenkopfs view on this question is: In any case, the U.S. demonstrated little interest in securing closer ties with Liberia. In spite of lively commerce between the two countries, the American government did not seek to develop Liberia as a raw-material producer for its factories, nor as a consumer for its manufacturers. This lack of interest had its most notable effect on the financial circumstances of the settlers; they received little outside aid and virtually no investment. The U.S. did assist the settlers in their efforts to put down the international trade. These actions, directed mostly against the tribal Liberian [who] engaged in trade, and also served to replace coastal European trading posts with those managed by the colonists. But, the United States was beset with its own slavery problems in the 1850s and was unwilling to intervene in Liberian affairs (1976, 20). Some aspects of Lowenkopfs interpretation do not seem to reflect reality. The interval of time from Liberia's independence to U.S. intervention was not a century. When the United States began to contribute through aid, private investments, and military assistance, however, internal sociopolitical problems related to the status of blacks were not qualitatively improved. The economic situation in the United States and in Liberia was worsening as well. The argument that the United States was not interested in exploiting raw material in Liberia and in making it a consumer society does not appear to be consistent with the general trends of Liberian-American economic relations, especially during the Tubman era up to Sergeant Dr. Doe. Another explanation that can be given is that the United States government may have adopted a wait-and-see attitude because it did not have, at that time, enough capital and other resources to throw in the "bush." The U.S. wanted to wait until the social and political situation became relatively stable before bringing foreign investments into Liberia. This argument can be supported by the assumption that U.S. capitalism was not strong enough yet to create and sustain the

50


outside market. The competitive elements of the capitalist economy were not well enough developed at that time to accommodate adventurism and a high level of risk taking. From the Commonwealth to the Republic of Liberia, the infrastructures of dependency9 were created: schools, churches, a bureaucratic structure, and the formal and informal economic sectors, most of which had financial and cultural support from the United States. The first period of political and cultural dependency was when political power was in the hands of the American Colonization society; the second phase was after independence, when the Republic was proclaimed with a virtually American constitution. However, Liberal democracy, an American model, was not instituted as a political machine of integration and unification in state formation. The ideal of "Love of Liberty Brought Us Here" was restricted to the AmericoLiberian ethnic group and ruling class. Even in the Americo-Liberian community there was a serious internal power struggle. The third phase of dependency within the development of the peripheral Liberian capitalist state coincides with the "Liberian economic takeoff." The meaning of this phrase is that most instruments of the so-called economic transformation were controlled by about forty major foreign concerns. Though the average GNP per capita then was one of the highest in the world, the domestic economy was highly fragile due to the dominance of foreign investments and one rubber commodity. The later development of the mining sector contributed to an increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) and fostered an export economy. The last phase of dependency coincided with socioeconomic problems engendered by the decline in commodity prices, including those for rubber and iron ore, and competition among producers and consumers. The United States government and its agencies have taken responsibility for economic assistance without changing the structure of the economy or altering power relations. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with the guarantee of the United States, assisted Liberia with some specific projects as well as fiscal stabilization for a short period of time between 1983 and 1985. Another element that played an important role in determining the nature of Liberian-American economic relations is the choice made by the Liberian state in January 1944 to change its currency from the pound sterling to the U.S. dollar.


51

ECONOMIC RELATIONS: THE POINT OF VIEW OF PRIVATE SECTOR The role of American private investments in Liberian politics and political economy has been quite complex in the sense that it has incorporated Liberia into the capitalist world the hard way, and at the sametime,it has pacified the Liberian people by creating unrealizable expectations. The motto was that everyone could have his or her own business to make money and succeed. Although this chapter does not discuss in detail the nature of American private investments, it includes a brief and constructive analysis, which is helpful for understanding Liberian-American economic relations. In general, Liberia has a rich resource base: ore deposits, and large portions of land suitable for the cultivation of rice, cassava, maize, and a variety of other food crops which could also provide a basis for agricultural expansion. One of the important multinational corporations that monopolized economic activities in Liberia is the U.S.-based corporation, Firestone Rubber and Tire Company. In 1926 the Firestone Corporation introduced the rubber industry to Liberia. For the government, this was going to increase its national income through taxes and royalties; from the people, both unskilled and skilled labor were needed. In this year, the firm leased one million acres of land for $5 million.10 Starting in 1934 (when it opened its first trees for tapping), in every year until 1958, rubber accounted for an average of well over 50 percent of the total dollar volume of Liberian exports (Clower et al., 1966, 145). The rubber industry is an example of an enclave enterprise that produced primary products essentially for exports. It only had a limited link, if any, with other sectors of the economy. From the time of its establishment up to the 1970s, the Liberian government, the people of Liberia, and the company's owner considered the Firestone Corporation to be as the best hope for development. Robertsfield International Airport was constructed outside of Monrovia to transport rubber to the United States. Firestone expanded its rubber plantations from 34,000 to 56,000, increasing its production two and a half times. The export of rubber from Liberia in 1945, for example, was 10.3 thousand tons.11 Rubber exports were increasing yearly: 66.7 million pounds in 1950, 95.4 million pounds in 1960, and 182.9 million pounds in 1972. Wage employment also increased from about 30,000 workers in 1950 (who were practically all engaged in rubber estates,

52


principally the Firestone plantations) to an estimated 125,000 workers in 1970 (Mehmet, 1978, 127-129). In 1960, for example, Firestone employed about 35,000 Liberiansmore than 40 percent of the total income receipts of Liberians in the same year (Clower, 145). To promote an economic efficiency, the company developed a relatively stable system of benefits for the workers. Housing, medical services, and schooling facilities were provided free. It provided an impressive welfare system compared to what the Liberian government was able to give. In addition, roads leading to the plantations were paved as a necessity for evacuation of the commodity, although the total percentage of paved roads in Liberia as of 1985 was less than 10 percent. Before the war and the vicious power struggle of the 1990s, Firestone, as the largest private concession in the country, had a monopoly on wage labor. The daily wage rate (minimum wage) was $25 in 1950, $30 in 1955, and about $2.00 in 1984.12 Liberian employees, especially those who were working for Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, were the lowest paid in the world rubber Industry.13 Although their conditions seemed to be better compared to the poverty-stricken people and lumpen-proletarians in Monrovia, they far from reflected the development of society at large. To understand Firestone's relationship with the state, the political and economic machinery of the ruling class, one must discuss general characteristics of the concessionary agreements. The company was granted extensive "reserve areas" within which it selected its development area; the concession covered one million acres; and the land rental fee of six cents per acre per year (for ninety-nine years). Firestone's original agreement called for royalties on gross production (with a stipulation for workers' compensation, which included medical, educational and other fringe benefits to employees); concessions to import, duty free, all equipment and supplies required for the development of the enterprise; and assistance from the government to secure an adequate labor force (recruitment). This agreement gave a high degree of operational autonomy to the corporation, which did not depend on governmental resources and rules. The relations with between the company and the Liberian state was that of partners. As many members of the ruling class had their own private rubber companies, their relationship to Firestone was businesslike. Firestone provided technology and financial support to the ruling classes firms, and the state helped the enterprise to


53

maximize its profits. As Mehmet noted: "Foreign firms are not only able to transform profits, dividends and other remittances abroad freely; they are also assured of government help in keeping wages down and trade unions in check (1978, 129)." Although the situation of concessions started to be threatened by political instability, until recently Firestone has been the most significant source of state revenue. The Tubman Era (1944-1971) Tubman was an imperial president who believed that the personal building up of power and the establishment of a strong state were prerequisites for the construction of a contemporary nation. On February 28, 1951, President Tubman declared: Since the incipiency of this nation, first as a Colony and later as an Independent State, relationships between the United States of America and her have been cordial. As a matter of fact and history, the founding of the Republic of Liberia was sponsored by the most eminent of the U.S. statesmen and citizens; men such as Judge Bushrod Washington, Henry Clay, Judge Simon Greenleaf and scores of others. After one hundred and twenty-eight years of the establishment of this Republic on the western shores of the African homeland as a colony by the pioneers with the moral sponsorship and benevolent assistance of the U.S. government, concrete spiritual and material evidence of the growing intensity of friendly intercourse, cooperation and assistance between our Great Best Friend of the Western Hemisphere, the United States of America and our Republic have become manifest by signing in Washington, D.C. an agreement of assistance and co-operation (Richardson, 1959, 229-230). This statement speaks for itself. Tubman chose closer economic relations with the United States, and this was reflected in his domestic and foreign policies. Compared to the Monrovian group of politicians, he came to power as an outsider politician. But his policies made him popular and spiritually "immortal." In Liberia, political leaders are also perceived as having spiritual authority. His foreign policy was aimed at maintaining international sovereignty, preserving Liberia's independence, and developing national human resources (Dunn, 1979,51). The objective conditions were that Liberia had serious economic problems due to the consequences of the Second World War (the European war) and the disturbances of its trading by that war. Thus, Tubman committed himself to "save the liberal democratic

54


ideology." To do this, he formulated and enforced some policy affinities with democracy's torchbearers (Townsend, 955, 168). In principle, this political choice had an impact on state behavior and internal power consolidation. To maintain his political position, he promoted a unification and integration policy. The country was divided into nine counties, five coastal counties and four interior counties (Dunn, 1979, 51). He opted for an open-door policy. The open-door policy as an instrument of economic policy was designed to encourage foreign investments, grants, loans, and trade. The government's goal was to collect money for the expenses of the state in the absence of any strong productive industry. Although foreign investments were not totally unfamiliar to Liberia's foreign policy, during the Tubman leadership, they were intensified. As a result, Liberia's growth became higher than that of any other new states. Robert Clower describes this situation in these terms: Gross in domestic money income more than quadrupled Government receipts increased more than eightfold, tonnage of goods imported nearly quadrupled, rubber exports increased from nothing to nearly three million long tons per year, the money sector labor force nearly tripled, net money income of tribal households more than quadrupled, and mileage of all-weather roads quadrupled (1966, 23). If growth means development, Liberia would have been considered then to be a developed economy. However, the sector of the economy that provided jobs and created infrastructures was an enclave within the country's economy, and it was mainly controlled by foreign corporations. American economic assistance contributed to the socalled economic stability that was well-known in Liberia during Tubman's era. With a high gross national product (GNP) and various forms of assistance, the government was confident about implementing its integration policy. During the period of 1946 and to 1980 (including William Tolbert's era), the United States provided more than $450 million to Liberia14 to help the poor majority find work and to develop projects in various areas. In this period, many projects were funded and sponsored by the United States: to cite only a few, J.F. Kennedy Hospital ($16.8 million); public utilities ($41.5 million); the Monrovia sewer system ($7.0 million); rural roads ($25 million); Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam ($25 million); the White Plains water supply ($7.2 million); telecommunications ($10.3 million); agriculture and rural


55

development ($30 million); and agriculture projects in Lofa and Bong counties ($11 million).15 In a comparative basis the figures on the table below reflect a general trend that characterized the Liberian economy between the late 1950s and the 1960s. The important question is: How was this growth reflected in real social class conditions in the country? Table 1 Indices of Growth of Real Gross National Product in Selected Countries Real Gross National Product Real Gross National Product Per Capita Liberia United Kingdom United States Japan West Germany Ireland Switzerland Congo Nigeria Ghana Uganda

(I960)

(I960)

175 116 121 180 150 104 131 110 150 160 125

170 112 109 150 140 108 122 105 140 155 120

Source: Robert W. Clower et al., Growth without Development, (Evanston, Dl.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 24.

What should be emphasized is that one cannot fully understand the nature of the Liberian growth without examining the trends of economic assistance from the United States even at the time of higher economic growth in Liberia. In addition to funds provided for specific projects, in general, the U.S. economic assistance increased yearly: from 1946 to 48 it was $7.5 million, and from 1949 and 1952 there was an increase to $2.3 million, from 1953 and 1961 it rose to about $29.2 million, from 1962 to 1979, it shot up to approximately $259.3 million. Loans and grants for economic assistance also show the same trends: loans between 1946 and 48 were about $7.5 million, between 1948 and 1952 they were $2 million, between 1953 and 1961, there were about $3.2 million, and between 1962 and 1979 the Liberian government received loans of $102.4 million.

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Relations Between Africa and Foreign I owers

Tolbert's Era (1971-1980) Tolbert attempted to move toward the so-called modernization of Liberia. Although an open-door policy was still the foundatioi for foreign policy and relations, he also came to be known fcr his "nonalignment" statements. From 1971 to 1980, he ruled as a centralist ruler, with a monopoly on the domestic economy, using the state to promote his own economic interests. Liberia became a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and of the Mano River Union (MRU). The forces and elements of social struggle became more visible thai ever and political protests began to appear among various social clas ses in Liberia. In Liberia, ruling class interests have been strongly mixed with those of the state. The private interests of this class have been promoted by the state apparatus and its bureaucratic organizations. Althougi the bureaucratic bourgeoisie has enlarged itself within the machine ~y of the state, its power to qualitatively change things through normal bureaucratic channels has been minimal and inefficient because it has no autonomy. It has historically played the role of securing the interests of the ruling class, on which it depended economi :ally. Though not unique to this period, this situation became even vorse during Tolbert's presidency. Tolbert was not an "imperial president" like Tubman, although he wanted to become one. The project of transforming himself into an imperial president characterized his political behavior and the rature of his policies during his tenure. During his first four-year teim in office he made some efforts to align the government with "politics of efficiency and total commitment" for the advancement of public service and economic development.16 In an interview concerning African development, his position toward modernization cai be summarized in his own words: Efforts are being made to fully mobilize our domestic resources. We aie initiating programmes for reducing illiteracy and increasing knowledge tl rough quality education for our people. Development of human resources is an essential component of our self-reliance policy. My administration's pri 3iities for this year include development of agriculture, increased rice production, development of all-weather roads and communications, development of education.17


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During the Cold War, Tolbert's determination to modernize Liberia forced him to diversify his relationships. He maintained diplomatic relations with East Germany, the Soviet Union, and China. He was committed to improving relations with international and multinational financing institutions in order to secure grants, loans, and other types of economic assistance. His relations with the group of countries characterized as "friends" of Liberia (such as United States, Japan, Saudi Arabia, West Germany) were cordial. As Tubman's vice-president for nineteen years, Tolbert was well acquainted with the open-door policy. He inherited it and promoted it as a means of maintaining himself in office and expanding his power. Though he seemed to believe in nonalignment as a means of diversifying sources of economic support, his main concern was to maintain a free enterprise system as an economic approach to development. As a prominent businessman himself, he used free enterprise to advance his own economic interests, those of his family, and his cronies. American economic interests were not threatened by Tolbert's domestic policies. However, his monopoly on the domestic economy and his diversification orientation did not seem to be fully supported by the United States by the end of the 1970s. American behavior vis-a-vis Liberia was to continue to maintain the status quo. In this regard the relations between them were not to be unique. The United States was also interested in "discovering" other parts of Africa. Liberia could have been used as a bridge for that purpose. President Carter's journey to Lagos, stopping only at Robertsfield International Airport, was not a good sign of friendly relations between the United States and Liberia. Carter was convinced by Tolbert's government, however, that it would be to visit Monrovia. By and large, Tolbert's nine years as president were marked by deteriorating economic conditions caused partly by falling world prices for Liberian exports and diminishing interest on the part of donors. The international market for rubber and iron ore was no longer promising. Synthetic rubber was starting to compete with natural rubber. While Liberia maintained a yearly growth rate of 4 percent between 1967 and 1976, per capita income in the same period averaged a paltry $500. The income distribution was badly skewed, while illiteracy still afflicted three-fourths of the citizenry (the Liberian population).18 In short, the disparities between the ruling class, who mostly lived in urban settings, the workers living in semiurban areas, and the so-called aborigines (natives or indigenes),

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who lived mostly in isolated villages, reached an explosive stage v nder Tolbert. Direct economic assistance from the United States was still firm during Tolbert's tenure. In the 1970s, the United States gave Liberia approximately $300 million in aid. U.S. investment in Liberia had soared sixfold from the previous decade.19 From 1962 and 197S, the United States provided Liberia with about $259.3 million in econ 3mic assistance without counting specific supportive projects; in the same period, the U.S. gave Liberia $102 million in loans and $156.9 million in grants. After the Second World War, specifically from 1946 to 1980, the United States provided more than $450 million to Liberia for development. Although government revenue increased from $3.9 million in 1950 to $32.4 million in 1960 and $78.1 million in 1972 (Mehmet, 1978, 127), in each decade, U.S. assistance surpassed far government revenue. In that regard, U.S. economic assistance was a very important source of support for the domestic policies of the ruling class. The question is: What are the social and political implications of this assistance on Liberian society and the Liberian people? Doe's Regime (1980-1990) On April 12, 1980, Africa's oldest Republic began a new regime: army rule. This regime was led by the former Master Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe (known as both The General and Doctor Doe), who was assassinated on September 9, 1990 by elements of Prince Johnson's militia. Although Liberia did not practice democracy a VAmerlcalne under the previous ruling class (members of the True Whig Party), its political system was known for its apparent institutional stability, like that of Cote dTvoire under Felix Houphouet-Boigny, or Kenya under Mze Jomo Kenyatta. Mze in Kiswali means an old person. It is usually astitlefor wiser old people. However, the social conditions created by the previous governments and the domestic policies of the True Whig Party precipitated the violent removal of Tolbert from power along with his collaborators. He was killed, and most of his team, including his relatives, were executed eleven days after the coup by a firing squad. This tyf e of violence finds its explanation in the nature of Liberian politics. The People's Redemption Council (PRC), an organization that was created


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by Doe and his allies, took power with enthusiasm to change history, though this does not seem to have happened. The coming to power of the military regime was greatly welcomed in Liberia. It came at the right time, when Liberians were fed up with the social conditions created by the True Whig (With Hope in God) Party. They were looking for a hero, a new leader, someone who could make a difference. For many, this was a symbol for change. And for others, this regime could be used as an instrument toward reaching higher societal objectives in the future. It was conceived as the symbol of a break from the past. The new regime was actively supported by the most progressive forces, such as the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), and the Progressive People's Party (PPP). Thus, within Doe's government a strong team of Liberian progressive intelligentsia, such as Togba Nah Tipoteh, Fannbuleh and Bacchus Matthew, accepted various cabinet posts. Some later resigned from their posts, however, because of the reactionary tendencies of the regime. Why capture power? In the early hours of April 12, 1980, when Doe announced the formation of the People's Redemption Council, he said: "Mr. Tolbert and his collaborators were guilty of rampant corruption...conflict of interest, misuse of power, and total disregard to the civil, human, and constitutional rights of the Liberians."20 In another speech, Doe repeated that soldiers came to power to find answers to the sufferings, oppression, and exploitation of the poor farmers, yanna boys, school children, and all citizens whose rights were being overlooked.21 The classic position, or claim, made by most military regimes in Africa has been that the military came to power to restore discipline. Discipline was needed for an effective and efficient functioning of the state apparatus. For many, the Doe takeover was the beginning of the struggle for the cause of the people, and for others, it was the end of the tyranny of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Toward this goal, Doe appointed a constitutional commission chaired by Dr. Amos Sawyer. Between 1984 and 1985, as Doe planned to become the first native civilian president, he made the democratic process to return the power to civilian rule unpredictable and dangerous. Ruling by decrees, Doe terrorized the leaders of the opposition parties and manipulated the democratic process by not allowing political competition. According to Mr. William Swing, the former United States ambassador to Liberia (in 1984), Doe's government was satisfied by

60


the state of relations between the two countries. The aim of the United States then was to avoid shortages and political instability.22 After the coup d'etat, U.S. economic assistance increased tremendously, <md it was projected to increase still more after 1995. For the U.S. government, assistance programs were an integral part of a carefully balanced approach aimed at promoting economic recovery and political stability. The United States has been consistent in its assistance to Liberia, especially during the military regime, though this assistance hardly produced any political stability in the country. Liberia's foreign policy under Doe was also based on open door and laissez-faire principles. This is reflected in a statement made by Ernest Eastman, the Liberian Foreign Minister, in Washington, D. 2.: Moreover, if Liberia is to be expected to play a significant role at all in Mrican and World affairs, the economic well-being of the Liberian people must be assured. With its traditional enthusiasm for the free enterprise system based on its heroic love of liberty, Liberia possesses incalculable potential for beconing a model nation for private enterprise in Africa. Indeed, Liberia is one of tie few countries in the World with the least non-economic controls and 3olicy constraints which make it an ideal place for the embrace of the private investor.23 This statement characterizes Doe's objectives in internal ional relations. Although Liberia had diplomatic relations with some Eastern bloc countries, its basic foreign policy principles and behavior were antisocialist and anti-communist. Socialist and comnunist dogmas were considered threats to the development and stability of Liberia. They were considered foreign ideologies, in comparison to capitalism, which was considered "indigenous or local ideology." The general picture of Liberia's economy in the 1980s was not bright. The growth in its export-import economy was seriously constrained by the weak world market for its iron ore, rubber and timber. As a result, 1980 and 1981, the value of Liberian imports fell 6.1 and 5.2 percent respectively. The situation worsened win the internal instability caused by the struggle for power. In 1982, Head of State Samuel K. Doe made an official visit to the United States and was received by President Ronald Reagan. As a result of this trip, for the next two years the United States provided Liberia with the highest per capita level of U.S. economic and security assistance ever extended to any sub-Saharan African country.24


61

Table 2 Key Economic Indicators of Liberia (In Millions) with the Exception of Debt as % of Revenues

Exports to the U.S. U.S. Share of Exports Imports for the U.S. Budget Revenue Recurrent Expenditures Development Budget (Govt.) Debt Service Payment Debt as % of Revenues Balance of Payments Population

1980

1981

125.6 20.9 121.8 222.4 196.8 57.9 47.5 21.7 104.4 1.80

123.5 23.3 142.1 223.7 241.0 57.01 25.1 11.2 65.4 1.98

Source: Figures were compiled from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Economic Survey of Liberia, (Monrovia, Liberia: 1981), pp. 11, 25, 27, and 33.

Total economic assistance excluding such items as food, food for peace, aid, the Peace Corps, and narcotics increased from $55.1 million in 1981 to $62.8 million in 1983. Loans given under economic assistance also increased from about $15.0 million in 1981 to $16.7 in 1983. Grants in 1981 were $40.1 and in 1983 they rose to million $50.5 million. Of the over $78 million in U.S. assistance in 1984, $13 million was for development grants, and $15.8 million was for military assistance.25 The Economic Support Fund (ESF), also known as security support, astronomically increased. In 1980, the U.S. provided $5.2 million in security support, the same amount that was provided over previous years. In 1981 U.S. security support rose to $32.0 million, and by fiscal year 1984, the security support fund had increased to $34.2 million. The overall proposed aid for 1986 was $93 million, of which $48 million was for economic support and $13 million for military aid.26 The United States Congress stated that the $93 million would only be given if the elections were considered fair. Although the elections were far from being without fraud, the $93 million was delivered. Additionally, the United States has had various programs for Liberia, such as PL-480, which supplied funds for the import of essential foodstuffs, mostly rice. Another program, called DA, provided some infrastructure assistance in "key development" areas, such as education, health, sanitation, medical care, agriculture, and

62

Relations Between Africa and Foreign P )wers

training; ESF was disbursed in close cooperation with the IMF. I; was used for debt service and to help the government meet tough IMF performance criteria and conditionalities. Some programs were used to improve military conditions, such as housing and equipment, and to train Liberian soldiers. In 1979, military aid was $1.5 million. By 1983, it was $12.7 million, an increase of 846 percent. Between 1980 and 1985, the U.S. economic assistance was directed toward one main objective: to allow the Liberian military govern ment to make good progress toward its goal of returning the country to a civilian constitutional government by January 1986. The U.S. government had contributed at various stages of the government's effort to respect its promise. Yet the military regime did not idlow free elections to occur, though two other parties were symbolically allowed to compete with the Doe Party (the National Democratic Party of Liberia). Liberia has had an outstanding debt, which was estimated in 19JI5 at approximately $850 million.27 The IMF, with the support of the United States, committed itself to provide loans on a yearly basis. The United States served as the guarantor for Liberian loans Tom commercial banks as well. In short, the role of the United States as a donor to Liberia has been one of the most important sources of capital in the Liberian economy. It reflects similar trends that have been identified and discussed in other sectors. Table 3 Foreign Grants by Donors, 1980-1981 (in $ Millions) Donor

1980

1981

United States United Nations European Economic Community Japan Netherlands Egypt France Other

13.8 4.6 2.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.3

5i~; 49 2.) 6.L (U 0.4 0.? (U

Source: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Economic Survey of Liberia, (Moi irovia, Liberia: 1981), p. 37.


63

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERIAN SOCIETY The most important question is: Where did the U.S. dollars go and who benefited from them? Liberia did not become a peripheral capitalist state until the forces of capitalism in the United States became sufficiently developed to cultivate new interests and expand new markets abroad. Before the formation of an oligarchic state based on slavery and "primitive" capitalism, Liberian-American relations were basically maintained at cultural and historical levels. That is to say, cultural domination in Liberia did not go along with economic or financial domination as was the case in most parts of Africa. Liberian settlements served as a kind of American cultural reservoir, to be used as a means of "civilizing" Africa. It is debatable whether this "civilizing mission" was based on humanitarian principles, or if it had a hidden economic agenda. As previously indicated, economic motivations began to surface with the formation of the Liberian state, especially between the 1920s and 1940s up to the collapse of the state and society in 1990. Pressures from the French and British colonial powers, internal power struggles between dark and light skinned Americo-Liberians, and hostilities from the hinterland, are among the factors that contributed to the development of different forms of fragmented or fragile nationalist unifying sentiments. The threats to the survival of black settlers played a vital role in their solidarity and awareness, which were reflected in some aspects of the formation of the state and its policies. Tubman understood this situation well when he pursued "unity," solidarity, assimilation, and open-door policies as prerequisites for nation-building. Though there were short periods (1920s and 1940s) of power struggle among various political parties in Liberia, the True Whig Party was the dominant political organization until 1980. However, until recently, Liberia was never constitutionally a one-party state like Congo-Zaire or Tanzania. The behaviour of the Liberian state under the True Whig party in many ways fits Kostas Axelos's definition of the state: It is nothing more than the form of organization which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of [the] property and interests....The State exists only for the sake of private property....Since the State is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole society of an epoch is

64


epitomized, it follows that the State mediates in the formation of all coi imon institutions and that the institutions receive a political form (1976, 119). It should also be added that Liberia, as an oligarchic state, conducted its business like "family affairs." This tradition was maintained by the ruling party and the caste-like web of familylodge-church cliques. As Elliot Berg, quoted by Mehmet, said: For more than 100 years the Liberian government operated like a kind of private club-without budgets, records, accounts, filing systems and procedures for making public decisions and executing them once made. It was a system in which expenditure control resided in the presidential power to sign all checks over $25, and in which formal budgeting was unknown, it was something dealt with in conversation with the president. That things worked this way didn't matter much before the 1950s, since governments had only a few million dollars to spend anyway, most of it for salaries (1978, 125). The state meant the ruling class, and national interests represented those of this class. Economic assistance was used to help the ruling class to strengthen its power. American economic assistance began its consolidation in Liberia when Liberia was near to becoming a B itish colony by default as a result of its numerous loans with British b< nks. The intent of U.S. Firestone's rubber venture was to rescue Liberia from its financial difficulties and shift the dependence of the Liberian state from the European-centered capitalist world economy tc the American economy. The first thing that occurred in terms of the impact of U.S. rela ions was state privatization and the development of both the bureaucratic and the commercial bourgeoisie. Firestone encouraged the development of the commercial bourgeoisie, which could then depend on its technology and its capital. In the areas of trade and exploitation of rubber, this commercial bourgeoisie would not threaten or seriously challenge the interest of the United States or Firestone. At the national level, the descendants of the Americo-Libe ians dominated Firestone for many years. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie is composed mainly of those members of society who want to secure social mobility through no*mal socialization processes: having university diplomas or having a jood connection within the state apparatus or with prominent famlies. Most of the members of this class have been associated with the dominant values of the Americo-Liberian elite. One important feature of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie is its nationalistic outlook. Being in


65

possession of the state, this elite saw itself as the savior of the nation and identified what were objectively its own interests or the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, or even the interests of other classes, as the interests of the whole nation. Privatization of state operations meant the control of the state's affairs by very few members of the ruling class. Most of the members of this class were involved in joint ventures with multinational firms. Their own firms were often financed out of government subsidies. One example of this is the late Stephen Tolbert's Mesurado group of companies. Tolbert was the former minister of finance, and brother of the late President Tolbert. President Tolbert himself was one of the largest private rubber producers in the country. The state, in reality, was a private committee for managing the common affairs of the Liberian peripheral bourgeoisie. Its interests were sponsored and promoted by both multinational corporations and U.S. economic assistance. The ruling class interests and those of foreign corporations have not been in contradiction. This class has used its power to gain more wealth by exploiting natural resources with the managerial skills and technology of giant multinational corporations like U.S. Firestone. The multinational corporations had also been assured by the government that it would keep wages down, control potential labor disputes, and allow the transfer of profits and dividends outside the country without much difficulty. American economic assistance and private companies intensified Liberia's integration into the capitalist orbit. Without a strong national bourgeoisie, Liberia developed a peripheral capitalist economy, which was characterized by a low developmental production and articulation inside the country, and also by a weak domestic policy for the distribution and the deliver of public services and goods. The economy created was not "autocentric." In this peripheral social formation, production was mainly for profit and not for the development of productive forces or the national economy. Profit was obtained through the creation of surplus value consequent to the exploitation of labor in capitalist production and international trade. The result of this process divided Liberian society as described by Kenneth Adelman: The disparity between the urbanized settlers and the rural natives once resembled that described by a Medieval priest: First, there's the king, then nobility, then the gentry, then the merchants and laborers. Then there's nothing, and again nothing, and once more nothing. Then there's the peasants.28

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Relations Between Africa and Foreign PDwers

U.S. economic assistance supported existing political instituions, and in that regard, it was used to maintain and perpetuate the power of the ruling class, meaning that the U.S. dollar was also utilized for political purposes. With U.S. dollars, Tubman, Tolbert, and Doe succeeded in reproducing themselves and maintaining their powe \ American support became even more visible Doe's military regime as the United States financially sponsored the democratic processes, which were totally destroyed by Doe. In October 1985, Samuel Doe "won" the presidential election with 50.9 percent, while his party (the National Democratic Party) garnered twenty of twenty six Senate seats and fifty one of sixty four positions in the House of Represents ives. The Liberian election was considered by the majority of Libeiians, foreign observers, and journalists in Monrovia to be a fiasco di e to massive fraud and political manipulations organized by Doe's party. Though the United States considered using penalties against Doe if the elections were not fair and just, $86 million in fund allocated by the Congress for fiscal year 1986 were delivered in their entirety. For many years the descendants of the Americo-Liberians received over 60 percent of the national income. In 1970, for instance the average income of Liberians was $70 per annum, while for the top income group (mostly Americo-Liberians) it was about $3,272.29 The U.S. dollar helped pay off loans, alleviate deficits, and for finance political campaign funds. It is difficult to conceive of the existence of the state at this point without the U.S. dollar. It was even usec for monthly payments to government employees. At the societal level, the impact of American economic intervention in domestic policies accelerated the development of internal contradictions. Three main social phenomena were engendered as a result of this economic assistance: consolidation of the ruling class's power as a compradorlal ("collaborator") class, manifestation of social and political movements, and development of the culture of poverty, or underdevelopment. The dependent bourgeoisie that controlled the business of the state owed its position to the patronage of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and multinational corporations. Though the Liberian ruling class had its interests in the national and private economic sectors, it was not capable of competing with United States or other large foreign corporations. The metropolis the U.S. continued to provide economic and military aid, which was used by the ruling class to maintain the siatus quo until Charles Taylor's invasion in December 1989. Econcmic


67

assistance increased during the military regime even as Doe and his regime constantly violated human rights and democratic principles. Constitutionally, Liberia had never been a one-party state. However, the ruling class utilized its political resources to function as a oneparty state. Even with very little internal support, the military regime managed to change its uniforms to civilian dress. In this process, a level of terror and economic and political instability was reached that was much worse than that of previous Liberian regimes. Militarily and economically, American assistance was greater by the 1980s than in the previous decade. Yet Liberia became less developed than in the preceding ten years. The ruling class was too pacified by the illusion of capitalist success to introduce real innovations in production and appropriate social policy reforms. Economic assistance supported the domestic policies of the ruling class, which appropriated surpluses, exploited labor, lived in comfort, exercised power and enjoyed an inflated social status. As a result of the extremely unequal distribution of resources and access to power, conflicts, contradictions, and underdevelopment became part of Liberian society and culture. Starting in the 1970s, Liberia experienced serious economic problems and political pressures from the progressive intellectuals, who advocated more power sharing and equal distribution of resources. There were a series of strikes in the private and public sectors in the 1970s and a Rice Riot in 1979 and Amos Sawyer, who, in the early 1990s, was the first president of the interim government and one of the founding fathers of the Movement for Justice in Africa, MOJA ran for the Monrovian mayor's office against the True Whig party's candidate. This led Liberia to a piece of history sans retour (history of no return). The origin of most social movements in Liberia can be found in the monopoly of power structures by the U.S. sponsored ruling class, including the military regime. Most of the opposition movements, like the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), believed in "sharing the pie in equitable ways and more political participation for all Liberians." All opposition movements were bora to challenge the ruling class. Operating in Liberia since 1973, five years longer than PAL, MOJA has focused on grassroots work in rural development projects. Its support comes from a wide range of social classes: rural peasants, students, the Liberian intelligentsia and businesspeople, to name a few. During the time of political struggle between the late President Doe

68


and progressive forces, Doe characterized the University of Liberia as being "all MOJA people." After July 1984, following the lift on political bans as a step toward a return to civilian rule intendec for January 1986, Liberia was a theatre of about ten political parties. Some of the most important include Doe's National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), the United People's Party (UPP) led by Bacchus Matthew, the Liberian People's Party (LPP) with Amos Sawyer as its leader, and the Liberian Action Party (LAP) led by Jackson F. Doe. The United States encouraged and sponsored the processes that engendered multipartyism in 1985, but despite the rough road it ook, Doe did not lose his U.S. financial support. The United States could not trust and support any other party for fear of not being ab e to predict the political ideology and behavior of "an outsider." It feared the emergence of progressive movements among the youth and their leaders at the universities. The development of events forced the U.S. to support the compromised outsiders in the Philippines and Haiti, but why not in Liberia? Though the democratic process had not worked in Liberia ii the past, it seemed very difficult to destroy its moral basis among the progressive forces in Liberian society. The University of Liberia was slowly producing anti-American sentiments among its student body. All this did not mean the complete rejection of the American culture, it was a spirit of protest against the United States because of its policy vis-a-vis South Africa and its almost unconditional support oJ the Liberian ruling class. As internal contradictions continued to be rooted in Liberian social formation, the role students played for the advancement of history was more important than the expected role of the relatively small class of urban, working people (proletariat) and their potential allies, the peasants. Although they were not armed and did not have the means to take over state power, students in Liberia had a greater influence over the direction of political events thai the organized labor movement or any trade union. Historically, the culture of poverty fostered the psychology of dependency. Making use of this dependency, the ruling dass distributed money and other commodities on the streets dvring carnivals and other occasions of festivity (much like Francois Du\alier in Haiti). At the individual level, many people, especially those u the lower social strata, lost confidence in working or any other activities of self-reproduction. Theoretically, people reproduce themselves socially in participating consciously (with their labor) in social activities. In Liberia, people from lower strata were virtually waiting


69

for "manna" to come from heaven. In this country, social capital was incapable of inducing structural change (Clower, 91). The effects of the culture of poverty on Liberian society were numerous: laziness, corruption, speculation, and the loss of nationalist sentiments. As a direct product of the peripheralization of Liberia, in the 1980s the culture of poverty was an inherited dominant political culture in which the ruling class was perceived as godlike and therefore could not be challenged. Democracy from the top was not a political model that could be used to find solutions to this social crisis. In short, U.S. economic assistance tended to divide society by supporting a compradorial bourgeoisie that was incapable of controlling the labor force, efficiently collecting and allocating surpluses, and controlling the market and technology. This book has discussed the impact of U.S. relations with Liberia in terms of the Liberian state in crisis: the crisis of legitimacy, the crisis of mobilizing scarce resources for the development of the Liberian nation, and the cultural crisis. For many years the Liberian state was in a serious crisis of legitimacy. The personification of the state was one of the symptoms of this crisis. In Liberia, from the viewpoint of the state, the capitalist mode of production was considered a "natural," not a foreign, ideology. However, the state was not capable of effectively and efficiently promoting the laissez-faire principle. The crisis of world capitalism was felt more seriously here than in Angola or Mozambique. In Liberia, the state gave the impression that every one could make it. Yet in reality only a few people participated in, and benefited from, the activities of the formal sector of the economy. The crisis of legitimacy was reflected in the incapacity of the ruling class to deliver services and satisfy the majority of people's needs. Being unable to influence the behavior and norms of the international market for the export and marketing of its commodities, the state counted mainly on donations, charity, the IMF, the World Bank, the United States, and from its citizens taxes for its survival. Because the Liberian state did not have any legitimacy from either Liberian history and culture or its performance, the only tools it had to manipulate were the legal system, the security of the state argument, and co-optation. A common national culture, vision, belief and world view, was almost absent in Liberia. Christianity, Islam, and African religions did not provide the ground for the legitimacy of the state as they did in Northern Africa, where Islam plays the role of a unifying force. Nationalism is an option as an ideology and a set of guidelines for profound policies and political reforms for all sectors of Liberian

70


society. This is what the future government in Liberia and its titzens will need to start debating. Many people in Africa, including Liberians, could not understand why the United States stood by and watched Liberia being torn clown by an internal neocolonialist civil war. It is only through a historical analysis that relevant comments can be made about U.S. behavior and its implications for the Liberian-American relations at the end o: the war. There is no simple way to perform this analysis. The Uiited States watched the development of events in Liberia carefully afte - the assassination of Doe. What happened was not terribly strange. Ii was predictable, although the magnitude of what took place was unpredictable. I told my political science students at the Universi y of Liberia that Liberia was about to enter a dark and tragic period. Doe was too rigid to consider debates and compromises. The distributive mechanisms of the Liberian state were fundamentally biased against the majority of the population because they were rooted in the dominant political philosophy of the ruling class. Historically and sociologically, Liberia is a land of political extremism. The U.S. embassy in Mamba Point in Monrovia was still functioning at the beginning of the carnage (1990). The emtassy sent the marines to evacuate U.S. citizens. Many foreigners and Liberians who could afford it were evacuated as well. Not necessarily supporting the scape-goat argument, the United States cannoi be viewed as innocent in what happened in Liberia. It strongly supported all of the last four Liberian presidents. With the strong and consistent intervention of the Economic Community Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and considerable efforts from the neighboring states and people, the civil war has, in theory, ended and the processes of reconstruction have started with election of Charles Taylor as president. CONCLUSION For many years the Liberian social formation was articulated and reproduced through the complex mechanisms of a combinatior of slavery and "primitive" capitalism. Ethnocultural elements were ised by the state as a basis for legitimacy and maintenance of the statusquo. The origin of the crisis of the Liberian state is historically and structurally associated with the transformation (qualitative struc ural change) of primordial elements (ethnicity, family, race, and religion)


71

into a state/class power relationship, which was linked to the development of capitalism. The emergence of the modern Liberian state did not completely dismantle all aspects of slave mentality among the ruling class or "primitive" modes of accumulation. The process of class consolidation or class-consciousness among the social strata has been slow in Liberia. Since the Liberian state was not formed as a result of an internal evolution, popular demand, national power struggle, or class struggle, its incorporation into world capitalism was relatively smoother than was the case in Ghana or Zimbabwe. The compradorial class of the Americo-Liberians and the American metropolitan ruling elite had many things in common: language, religion and formal education systems. These elements formed die basis and the supportive forces for creating and promoting the peripheral state, its ideology and its values. In addition to these common factors, objective conditions in Liberia played a vital role in determining the types of relations that have developed between Liberia and the United States over many years. Between 1944 and 1990, the development of a peripheral state was in conflict with the social and economic aspirations of the Liberian people. The privatization of the state was, in part, an effort by the ruling class to create alliances with commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisies, which conceive of the state as either a medium for accumulating wealth or for acquiring access to power. The ruling class monopolized state businesses and those of foreign corporations for its own interests. The hegemony that the ruling class established in the total control of politics and the domestic economy was firmly sponsored and supported by American economic assistance and private investments. It succeeded because of the type of political community that was created in which the Americo-Liberians shared the same beliefs and political ideology and also controlled the economy as a client state. The natives were excluded from political participation. As the leaders of the client regimes of the United States, Tubman, Tolbert, and Doe believed that they could acquire all the necessary economic inputs for the development of Liberia. The result has been quite different. Liberia was incorporated into the backyard of capitalism, where it had no power to change the mechanisms of its intercourse in international relations. These client regimes reproduced themselves with the blessing of American assistance, but they were too

72

Relations Between Africa and Foreign P< >wers

weak to foster any qualitative internal change for providing more jobs, allowing any real political participation to occur, or allocating surpluses. American economic assistance and private investments increased before the civil war. Total American investment in 1985 (the year that the level of political crisis intensified) was $450 million, down from over $500 million a few years before. Since the 1970s, the national economy has been very slow. This was shown in budget deficits, a decline in national revenues, and in the international price of rubber, iron, and timber. The American dollar has had a strong economic and political role to play in Liberia, as it went to pay salaries and debts and sponsored political campaigns. However, American direct economic assistance, either through grants or loans, was not invested on a long-term tasis. It was used mainly to support the then existing political institut ons. This tended to create a social disequilibrium between the political leaders and the people rather than creating "socio-political stabil ty." The state's performance did not build legitimacy. The structure of Liberian social formation consisted of: a peripheral capitalist state with client regimes organized by the compradorial dass (the ruling class and its bureaucratic bourgeoisie). This structure tended to be authoritarian rather than of liberal (the U.S. model). The Americo-Liberians, it was argued, from the point of view of heir history, resources, and geographical location, were incapable of forming an internal capitalist state. The hegemonic political position of the previous regimes, inclu ling Doe's ambitions to be like Tubman, and the Americo-Liberian elite and its U.S. support, accelerated the power struggle in Liberia As social and political conditions deteriorated daily, the progressive forces voiced their claims, supported by the poor masses. The ideological battle between Doe's regime and certain groups among the progressive forces could be predicted. The privatization of the slate's businesses increased the unemployment rate and also promoted ligh taxation policies, which provoked social dislocation in both urban and rural sectors. For many years, the United States' interests in Liberia covered a wide range of areas: economic, geopolitical, military, and strategic. The actualization of these interests and their maintenance were the undertakings of an extremely dependent state, which did not ha /e a clear vision of national interests. This weak state's domestic policy could not survive without the direct intervention of the United States.


73

That is to say, the United States' economic relations with Liberia have been more than economic. The United States identified priorities for Liberia and provided services and human resources in many sectors. Between 1946 and 1980, more than fifteen obligations, loan authorizations, and projects were undertaken by the United States.30 The previous trends of U.S. foreign policy show that it continued to intensify its economic assistance to Liberia in order to impede the struggle of leftist groups, even after the collapse of Marxism. This assistance was likely to be small compared to the real need of eliminating the crisis Liberia has experienced. Despite the elections that Liberians had in 1997, Liberia is not in a real transitional period toward any kind of democratic society. It has to be reconstructed first. Although the direction in which the forces of change will lead the country may be hard to predict, antiAmericanism is likely to emerge sooner or later among suffering Liberians. The humiliation many Liberians have been experiencing from American embassies in West African capital cities will contribute to the emergence of a nationalist consciousness. At the end of the Cold War, the political equation has changed. Liberia's geopolitical role is dead at this point. Iron ore and rubber are not as attractive as they used to be in international markets. Ideologically, Liberia did not present any threat to the stability of West Africa. Doe did not have any strong relations with America's potential or real enemies in the world. He was in the process of transforming himself into becoming either a Mobutu of Congo-Zaire or an Eyadema of Togo. For some reason, the United States has always had ambiguous attitudes toward Liberia. The United States only recognized the sovereignty of Liberia fifteen years after it earned its independence in 1847 from the American Colonization Society, after France and Great Britain did so. The reasons for this were not clear then, and they are not clear now. Many questions are still unanswered, especially those regarding the alleged escape of Charles Taylor in 1989 from the Boston Jail in Massachusetts after he was indicted for embezzling money from the Liberian general service office when he was its general manager (with the privileges of a ministerial position). The United States did not officially support Taylor. It also did not strongly support the first interim government of Amos Sawyer. It did not substantially support Ms. Ruth Perry, the head of the Liberian state before the presidential elections of June 1997.

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Relations Between Africa and Foreign F 3wers

Until recently, the neo-colonial war in Liberia has continued to destroy lives, and the country's culture, resources, and values. A most every Liberian has lost a relative or a friend in the war. The trauma of this war will last for many years among the Liberian people. What is the likely result after this tragic episode is completely over? The process of reconstruction will be difficult and slow because of the lack of initial capital, material resources, and philosophical guidance. This war is likely to produce several phenomena. For example, loyalty to ethnicity and the spirit of class struggle may emerge simultanec usly. The Americo-Liberians/Congoes and other ethnic groups have suffered equally from the war. However, the non-AmericoLiberians/Congoes tend to consider themselves as victims ol the system created and supported by the United States. Thus, reconstruction is being shaped by feelings of nationalism. This nationalism is likely be generally antiAmerican. Even Charles T lylor has once used nationalist slogans against what he calls the "imper talist intervention of the ECOMOG operation" initiated by Ibratiima Babangida, the Nigerian President. The new Liberia will attempt to diversify their economic relations. Will the Democratic president and the Republican Congress in the United States change the basis of U.S. policy? The answer is no. But the interpretations may be different in some dimensions of U.S. foreign policy. Those who expect considerable economic assistance from the Republican dominated Congress will be disappointed. Since Americans are demanding more attention for domestic needs, aid may be more symbolic than substantial.31 President Bill Clinton has not made any commitment to Africa, especially in his final term in the office. First Lady Hillary Clinton's visits in March 1997 to many African countries and also the possible Bill Clinton's visit before the end of his term, will not change the U.S. foreign policy toward Africa much. This policy is based on \ague elements of changing interests, human rights, and humanitarian principles. Clinton will continue to use the respect for human rights as his basis for foreign policy in Africa without looking a the economic implications of this basis. However, the political changes in the Congo-Zaire may force the U.S. to concentrate more on this country, especially if nationalists control the state. The U.S. interest in Liberia may not be clearly articulated until the state is stabilized. However, to determine the nature of economic relations between Liberia and the United States, economic and noneconomic variables must be considered.


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NOTES 1. See I. Wallerstein, "Class and Class Conflict in Contemporary Africa," Canadian Journal of African Studies 7:3 (1973): 380. 2. This was a philanthropic organization established in the United States in 1816 for the purpose of repatriating slaves and free blacks from the United States. Many abolitionists, both black and white supported it. 3. The Americo-Liberians, known also as settlers, are here to a small ethnic group of the descendants of the free black people who came from the United State and settled in the West Coast of Africa starting in 1821. Today, though the expression is not popularly used in Liberia, it includes both assimilated natives and the Congoes. 4. Byron Tarr, 'The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 21:1-2 (1993): 74 5. For further information about the different phases of the development of capitalism, see Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). 6. Survey of Current Business, (August 1963, October 1968 and January 1971). 7. U.S. Department of State, "A Quick Reference Aid on U.S. Foreign Relations," (January 1985). 8. Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "America-Germany: A Particular Relations," German Foreign Affairs Review 34 (March 1983): 212. 9. For further information about dependency paradigms, see F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Underdevelopment in Latin America (Beikeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1979); and see also Ronald H. Chilcote, ed., Dependency and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982). 10. "Liberia: Which Side Were You On?' Africa News (April 21, 1980): 23. 11. World Trade Information Service 1:58 (1951): 1-5. 12. The author's interview with some workers in Harber, Liberia in June 1984. 13. "Liberia: Which Side Were You On?": 2-3. 14. Monrovia A-17 is the name of a Document (not a Journal) that the author obtained from the United States Embassy in Monrovia, "Decline in Economic Growth, U.S. Trade Opportunity,". 15. Ibid 16. Kenneth L. Adelman, "Liberia: Hosting the O.A.U.," Africa Report 24:4 (July-August 1979): 9-12. 17. Jeff Mutada, "Interview with President Tolbert," Africa Development (July 8, 1973): 5. 18. Adelman, "Liberia: Hosting the O.A.U." 19. Ibid. For further information, see also Ozay Mehmet, Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).

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20. "Liberia: Five Years of the Army," West Africa 3529 (April 15, 1985):731. 21. Ibid. 22. From a private conversation of the author in early 1984 wit I Mr. William Swing, then U.S. Ambassador to Liberia. 23. Ernest Eastman, "Liberia's new role in Africa," Speech deliveed at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., November 29, 1983. Mr. Ernest Eastman was the Foreign Minister at the time of this speech. 24. Unclassified document that the author obtained from the United States Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia in 1984. 25. Undated and unclassified document from the United States Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia on the United States Department of Commerce: International Trade Administration, Washington, D.C. 20230. 26. Patrick Seyon, "Liberia: Threats to Democracy," West Africa nc .3528 (April 8, 1985): 656. 27. Ibid. 28. Adelman, "Liberia: Hosting the O.A.U.": 11. 29. A document that was obtained in the U.S. A.I.D. office in Monrovia on "MPEA, Indicative Manpower Plan of Liberia for the Period 1972-1982," Monrovia, June 1973, p. 53. 30. "U.S. A.I.D. Report on a brief history of development assistarce to Liberia by the United States government (1946-1980)," Washington, D. C.; the author used this document in the office of the U.S. A.I.D. in Monrovia, Liberia in June 1984. 31. For further information on the perception of Clinton's foreign x)licy toward Africa, see Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, "Clinton and Africa," Africa Notes (December 1992): 1-2.

3

Relations of Political Economy Between Congo-Zaire and Belgium OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES Congo-Zaire is in the middle of a "popular revolution," a serious political re-construction, and unprecedented social and economic malaise. It is in a difficult transition toward de-Mobutusizing (deconstructing the society from Mobutu's mode of ruling and political culture) the state and the society at large. Mobutu's regime was challenged by popular movements which were demanding the dismantling of what they considered an "irrelevant," kleptocratic regime, and ruthless dictatorship, and the establishment of some form of democracy. Between April 1993 and May 17, 1997, Congo-Zaire was at an impasse with two governments-both dysfunctional, each claiming legitimacy, and both sending their delegates to international fora. In October 1996 the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo, led by Laurent-Desire Kabila, captured the country and liberated most of it from Mobutu's tyranny. It is clearly expected that this will change the equation of power relations in Congo-Zaire. As I predicted, by the time this book is out, Mobutu was out of the political scene in the country. After Kabila captured Kinshasa on May 17,1997, Mobutu was forced into exile in Morocco, where he died with prostate cancer on September 7, 1997. The Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo

78


(AFDLC), now the ruling political party, has enjoyed massive support in the country as well as outside to overthrow Mobutu. His victor}r is a result cumulative struggles and sacrifices from various people's political organizations since 1961. With or without Mobutu and the Mobutuists in power in Kinshasa (the capital city), the arguments in this book are valid because they are at the same time structurally historical, philosophically global, and politically futuristic. The relationship between Congo-Zaire and the industrial countries, especially that between the post-Mobutu regime and Belgium, wll be generally determined by the ability of the new regime and the political and economic elites in Kinshasa to get good prices for Zairean raw materials, to persuade industrial countries to continie to provide financial assistance and invest in the country, and to foster a new role within the world system. The nature of these relations and the likelihood for a change in the economic and political relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium will depend on the stability of Congo-Zaire's social and political institutions and whether or not the current popular movements succeed in establishing a democratic system of governance or any form of nationalist government. Given the level of the struggle and the anger in the country, it can be predicted that people's input and participation may force the new government to be more nationalistic in terms of articulating people's interests in the formulation and implementation of public and foieign policies. Belgium's interests in Congo-Zaire's raw materials are still vital. After the death of Mobutu, can those interests continue to be veilarticulated without Mobutuists in state power? As discussed further in this chapter, the end of Mobutu does not necessarily mean the end of Mobutuism. But between 1980 and 1997, anti-Belgium and mtiAmerican sentiments grew strong among various populist movements and some political parties, especially in the segments of the population that have been hardest hit the country's social and economic problems. For the first time, in March 1997, the American flag was burned down by protesters in front of the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa as people became more frustrated with the behaviour of the U.S. in continuously and almost unconditionally supporting Mobutu. 1Vhat are the implications of those sentiments in economic and political relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium? The momentum of current popular movements and civil society, as expressed since 1992 in the agenda of the sovereign national conference and that of most political groupings, was toward Mobutu leaving office through a democratic process. The arguments of tiiose

Congo-Zaire and Belgium

79

movements became more radicalized as Mobutu continued to resist fundamental political reforms and to zigzag with the intention of hijacking the agenda of multiparty politics in order to remain in power. He lost his legacy and legitimacy toward the end of the 1980s despite the massive support he enjoyed in the past from his traditional masters: Belgium, France, and the United States. On April 6 and 10, 1997, the governments in these three countries declared that they had persuaded Mobutu to step down from power because he had lost his people's support. The Belgian government went even further in condemning Mobutu's declaration of the state of emergency as illegal and naming General Likulia Bolongo (former minister of defense) as the prime Minister to replace Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the opposition, who was in the office (for the third time in five years) for less than a week in March 1997. In the earlier period of the emergence of popular movements in Congo-Zaire, especially after in April 1990 when Mobutu reluctandy announced the legalization of multipartyism, the Belgian state was still firmly supporting his regime in Kinshasa. The military intervention of Belgium and France in September 1991, after mutinies and uprisings in almost all the country, was not only intended to protect Belgian and French citizens, but also to see if the regime could still be saved. Brussels, Paris, and Washington perceived the situation in Congo-Zaire at the time in symptomatic terms: mismanagement and corruption. To them the possibility of having a union government or power sharing between Mobutu and the opposition parties was considered a better alternative than the one people seemed to have been articulating through their struggle-the establishment of some form of democracy. Until recently, Belgium's policy in Zaire has focused on personality politics. In 1993, as the political struggle became stronger and the social situation worsened, Belgium became the first and only European state to openly and publicly support democratic efforts and try to isolate Mobutu by recognizing Tshisekedi's government. Etienne Tshisekedi is the President of the Union Sacree, who was elected Prime Minister by the "Sovereign" National Conference in 1992 and March 1997 and was nominated by his party as prime minister to replace Kengo wa Ndondo. Belgium also refused to invite Mobutu to the funeral of King Baudouin, who died of a heart attack on July 30, 1993, although Mobutu announced a two-day holiday in Congo-Zaire to mourn his death. King Baudouin was a personal friend of Mobutu's. This decision was not just symbolic. It reflected a new turnure ("turn") in

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the relations between Mobutu and the old colonial masters. Belgium has understood that in order to maintain and protect its long term interests in Zaire, it has to support efforts toward political reform in the country. But an important question is: Can a former colony and former colonizer have equal economic and political relations based on the principle of state sovereignty and the law of reciprocity? Why is it that the Belgian government was the first government in Europe to recognize the government of Etienne Tshisekedi? Between 1965 and 1975, for example, the relations between the Zairean state and foreign capital were concentrated in six industrial countries: Belgium, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. These countries represented 85 percent of total foreign investments and 100 percent of the loans in the Zairean industrial sector (Bezy, et al. 1981, 101). This chapter discusses the general objectives of political and economic relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium and their policy implications in the Congo-Zaire from 1960 to the early 1990s. The focus is on the relations between Belgian capital, investnents, trade, and loans, and the Zairean state. The analysis deals with the dynamism of those relations in state building and policies. Since the mid-1990s, Zaireans have engaged in serious political struggles against the policies of the state and its dictatorial behavior. Though it will take a while to fully determine the nature of the outcome ol this process, politically the situation will not be the same again, especially with a strong interventionist military and ideological elements associated with Kabila and other popular movements. This chapter is divided into five parts. In the first part, the main objectives and arguments of this section are introduced. The second part is a brief historical background of general relations betweer the Congo and Belgium. The third part discusses the relations between Zaire and Belgium from 1960 to 1971. The fourth part deals with the evolution of those relations from authenticity2 to the rise of multipartyism. The last part is a summary of the main arguments and policy implications of those relations on Congo-Zairean social and political conditions. Some questions worth including in this analysis are: Why did the Belgian state separate the political decolonization process from economic decolonization? What kind of relations were derived from the logic of economic paternalism? How have the Zairean state an I its leaders, especially Mobutu, been perceived by the Belgian ruling class?


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An important point, to be explicidy taken into account in this inquiry, is that the Mobutu regime was the creation of both the Belgian state and of the CIA and the American government (Callaghy, 1984, 159; and Stockwell, 1978). These two institutions had different agendas for Zaire. Belgium wanted to remain the godfather in Zaire's affairs as long as possible. That is to say, through the Zairean economic institutions that have been firmly tied to, and controlled by, Belgian and international financial institutions, Belgium desired to maintain the dominant role in the "reorganization" of the Zairean economy and its policies. The United States however, preferred to see Zaire operating in the free trade environment of world capitalism. Both Belgium and the United States also created a special role for Mobutu as a watchdog against any development of socialism in Central and Southern Africa during the Cold War period. However, Mobutu was incapable of stopping the spread of socialist movements and influence in Southern Africa. Will the relationships between these two countries qualitatively change in the post-Mobutu period? Although historical and cultural factors are important in the way these two states and their ruling classes interact, both economically and politically, the roles that Zaire and Belgium play in the world political economy are vital in understanding the present and future trends of their political and economic relations. The composition of the ruling elite may change in the Congo-Zaire, as it has already been the case since May 1997 when Laurent Kabila declared himself president in the country but as long as Congo-Zaire's national economic structures do not fundamentally change, the nature of its relations with Belgium are not likely to change either. Relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium will be affected by the current consolidation of economic and political relations within the European Economic Community (EEC). The question is: In what way and towards what direction? A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON THE COLONIAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CONGO Many studies have been published on the relationship between King Leopold II, his Congo Free State, the Belgian government, and the Belgian Congo (Depelchin, 1992). Thus, the discussion on these topics will be limited here to only a brief historical account for a better understanding of the dynamics of postcolonial relations. The

82

Relations Between Africa and Foreign P< wers

Congo became a personal property (a piece of real estate)3 of King Leopold II between 1885 and 1908 as a result of the partition of Africa at the Berlin conference that was convened by Otto Von Bismarck of Germany. The nature of the Congo Free State can be summarized in the role and objectives of the king. As Jean-Philippe Peemans said: His role was crucial if only because he built a state apparatus in the colony which had features of the mercantilist epoch (monopoly of exploitation of the natural resources, extreme harshness of the methods used to mobilize man]j>ower resources, confusion between private and public uses of state money) while at the same time, he largely utilized resources provided by that policy of "prinitive accumulation" to lay down the infrastructures which prepared the ground for profitable investment. After 20 years of rather painful efforts, he hadfinancednot only the external economies required by further investment, i.e. the constn ction of railways and use of water-ways, but he had also largely financed the expeditions which led to the discovery of rich deposits of non-ferrous me al in Katanga.4 Although Jean-Philippe Peemans appears to believe that colonization of the Congo was purely a political adventure because colonial affairs did not operate according to the classical economic logic, his description of the role of the king is relevant. The king's political ambition was strongly linked to his capitalist adventuiism. According to Peemans, the Congo as a private property was not well managed with clear political and institutional rules. However, massive labor exploitation and heavy taxation provided huge benefits tc the king and private companies in Belgium. Congo Free State (part of the king Leopold IPs empire) and the Campagnle du Katanga (CK) created the Comlte Special du Katanga (CSK) to manage heir common enterprises. Two-thirds of the benefits from the CSK we it to the state and one third to the CK. Starting in 1910, the Congo was ruled by a complex trinity of church, state, and private companies. The Catholic church provided limited formal education based on the concept of "pas d*ellte, pas de probleme" ("no elite, no problem"). It created a new basis for Western Christian morality and its value system (or what George Nzongola-Ntalaja called cultural oppression) through which Africans were expected to be "pacified" and were also forced to respect the newly established authority, law, and power. The state was to establish the so-called peace and order through military and administrative means. This state was absolutely powerful and arbitrary in its pclicy implementation and in its behavior. With these two attribute;, it


83

attempted to create one of the largest reservoirs of labor in colonial Africa. The private companies were expected to invest, expropriate properties, develop industries, and control resources. Despite the potential competition among Belgian financial groups who had interests in the colonial economy through the founding of the Union Mlnlere du Haut Katanga (UMHK) in 1906 by the CSK, the state used its full powers, through different kinds of constraints and pressures, to undertake large public works, mobilize a large volume of cheap human labor for mines and large plantations, and foster exports. It used unlimited coercive forces to appropriate resources. Belgian financial groups dominated investments and control over the colonial economy. Societe Generate (SG), the largest financial institution in Belgium, and one of the holding companies in the UMHK, held almost two-thirds of its investments. In the UMHK, voting rights were allocated as follows: the CSK 35 percent; Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. maintained 20 percent; the SG 7 percent; and the CK only 1 percent.5 As documented elsewhere,6 this monopoly of finances by Belgian private companies created social and ideological conflicts between colonialists and colonists based on their specific relations to the colonial political economy at large. Liberals believed in opening up the Congo for international trade and foreign investments. Socialists believed in forming and implementing policies that were intended to improve African social conditions. For them, the emancipation of the Congolese was possible through the improvement of their social conditions, the rise of social consciousness through the establishment of trade unions, and the support of working class movements. After World War II, though the Belgian state firmly believed in its policy of maintaining a "special" status for the Congo within the world system, the internal ideological social class conflicts in the metropolis, the defeat of the French in Indochina in the mid-1950s, the emergence of new social movements, and the intensification of various forms of struggles in the colonies in Africa, including the Congo, forced the ruling elite (the Belgian bourgeoisie) to reformulate an economic policy in an attempt to: (1) improve the living conditions of at least those workers in the main urban areas and the most important industries; (2) develop a petty bourgeoisie of clerks, low ranking civil servants, and teachers in the primary schools;

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(3) increase state involvement in the maintenance and development o : the colonial system. At the same time, the economic situation in the metropo itan countries demanded more raw materials to feed their industries, especially after the imperialist wars of 1914 to 1915 and 1940 to 1945, and it also required the promotion of some freedom in trade relations and more incorporation of the Congolese economy intc the Belgian economy. Taxes and borrowing were increased to ensure the financial and military stability of the colonial empire. By the time of independence, the colonial state had accumulated 9 billion Bf (Belgian francs) in loans, for the most part in the form of bonds, which were owned by private subscribers in Belgium. This capitalintensive economy building based on exports provided some United benefits to the newly emerging African petty bourgeoisie. However, this class was not incorporated as property owners or investors in the economy's productive sector. The question of the African peasantry was neither systematically nor consistently well articulated in this economy. The rural economy was generally neglected during several per ods of colonization. There was a development of an agricultural surolus for export before 1890, again between 1910 and 1915, and yet a>ain around 1945. This was possible because of the unlimited supply of labor (forced labor) at subsistence wages and the low prices paid to peasants for their agricultural commodities.7 This situation was also due to the colonial economic policy in the Congo, which favored the establishment of giant industrial mining companies at the expense of local food production and local trade based on agricultural production. In short, the political economy of the Congo was characterized by the extensive proletarianization of the adult riale labor force, marginalization of females, the accumulation mechani sms associated with compulsory cultivation of export crops, and economic inequality.8 By the end of the 1950s, the Belgian state had created a strong peripheral capitalist economy in the Congo. The Belgian bourgeoisie, which represented only 1 percent of the population, controlled 95 percent of stock capital, 82 percent of producion enterprises, and 70 percent of production materials (Bezy et al.,1981, 10). To be more efficient in exploiting human and natural resources, and based on the ideology of their "civilizing mission," the Belgian < tate produced a colonial system of education that was focused primarily on primary, vocational, technical, and religious education, which were


85

intended to provide needed human resources for the mining companies and the lower ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. This education system, mainly managed by the churches, created the largest middle class in sub-Saharan Africa and a stable working class by African standards.9 This class played the role of intermediary between the masses and the colonial administration. However, it did not develop any of the characteristics of an autonomous working class with a clear sociological. It was well politicized and thus did not have any common political vision or objectives (Lumumba-Kasongo, 1991, 47). In addition, there was a small class of evolues ("evolved ones"), known also as the black bourgeoisie which was created in 1948 by Buisseret, the new general governor of the colony at the time. This class had special privileges and services within the colonial administration but did not have equal rights or the same treatment as the ruling class. The intent was to separate and dissociate this class from the masses so it would become the local advocate of the existing power structure. Its relationship with the ruling class was that of client-patron. The struggle for independence was also partially the result of antagonistic relations between this class, the Belgian administration, and the governing elite. When the Congo became independent, a new spirit of political liberalism and the continuing monopoly of private Belgian financial groups represented two conflicting ideological tendencies in the political economy. Political and economic relations between Zaire and Belgium in the postcolonial era were very much influenced by the process of building a fragile state at the time of independence without a strong national economic base (not even a National Bank), the imperatives of the world economy, and the claims and objectives of the Belgian state, which decided to maintain its "immortality" in Congolese affairs. Because the commercialized agricultural sector in the early postcolonial period was neglected,10 more examples have been drawn from the political economy of the mining sector in this chapter. In 1958, commercialized agriculture represented 22.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP), but in 1966, it was only 8.3 percent. Immediately after independence, especially between 1960 and 65, foreign investments in agriculture were extremely low. That is to say, the contribution of the agricultural sector to national revenue was almost nil. Thanks to the Shaba copper mines, the economic pulse of Zaire still beats.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND BELGIAN ECONOMIC PATERNALISM The colonial state in the Congo was a relatively powerful political machine. It functioned like a semikingdom and partially as a sec ular political entity. In the 1950s, its participation in all businesses in the Congo was estimated at about 70 percent of the Congolese port! olio of 34.9 billion francs. By the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, because of the fear of nationalization, Belgian private and semiprivate companies made massive withdrawals of capital (capital flight) from the Congo and pushed maximum exports with reduced import; in anticipation of a new government's restrictive policies after independence (Nkrumah, 1965, 219). Within the above context, the major question is: Did decolonization succeed in destroying the structures of both the coknial administration and of large private financial enterprises and in weakening the power of the Catholic church? The Catholic churc h is an important factor in understanding the nature of the Congo-Bel *ian relations because first, it was part of the colonial power structure, and second, Belgium is a Catholic nation. If the answer is yes, vhat replaced the church? How did a newly sovereign Congo react to, or attempt to deal with, Belgian economic paternalism? Since the June 30, 1960 celebration of independence, poliical relations between the Congo and Belgium have not always been smooth. However, the objectives of the emerging African elite in the Congo and the dominant class in Belgium have generally been consistent. The African elite wanted to pursue various forms of decolonization policies to fit its political consolidation effort and agenda, and the dominant class in Belgium wanted to retard such a process. On the celebration day of the independence of the Co igo, Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Congo, who was more ideologically nationalistic than many other members of the emerging petty bourgeoisie, made a political statement in which he depicted how the colonial administration perceived and treited Africans, and how its policies based on racism and ignorance. As Lumumba stated, Africans were considered to be savages: I ask my friends, all of you who have fought unceasingly at our side, to make this thirtieth of June, 1960, an illustrious date that will be indelibly engiaved upon your hearts, a date whose meaning you will teach your children with Dride so that they in turn will tell their children's children the glorious story of our struggle for freedom...We are proud of this struggle amid tears,fire,and blood, down to our very heart of hearts, for it was a noble and just struggle, an


87

indispensable struggle if we were to put an end to the humiliating slavery that had been forced upon us. We have been the victims of ironic taunts, of insults, of blows that we were forced to endure morning, noon, and night because we were blacks. Who will forget that a black was addressed in familiar form, not because he was a friend, certainly, but because the polite form of address was to be used only for whites. We cannot forget the burst of rifle fire in which so many of our brothers perished, the cells into which the authorities threw those who no longer were willing to submit to a rule where justice meant oppression and exploitation (lierde, 1972, 220-222). The philosophical assumptions of the so-called mission clvlllsatrlce ("civilizing mission") and the method of gradual change were questioned that day, not by a peasants' movement revolt, but by a member of the evolue class. This historical account of the past was not understood and appreciated by the former colonial ruling class. The Belgian delegates, including the late King Baudouin, were embarrassed. Some wanted to immediately return to Belgium. For many, this incident was a reflection of a bad beginning (or un acte de mauvalse fol ["an act of bad faith"] by the new Congolese leader) for the new era of political and economic relations between the newly proclaimed republic and its colonial power. How did Lumumba's critical public statement affect new political and economic relations after the ceremonies held June 30,1960? This statement by itself did not have a direct impact on Congo-Belgiun relations. However, it created an atmosphere, or mindset, which could provoke more questioning about the nature of the relations between a former colonial power and a newly independent African country. As briefly mentioned, in the political roundtable conference, which was held in Brussels between January 20 and February 20, 1960, both Congolese and Belgian leaders adopted resolution 14, which provided for a separate economic roundtable conference to discuss economic problems in the Congo. 11 With the exception of Jason Sendwe and Moi'se Tshombe, many other major Congolese leaders, like Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Kasavubu, refused to attend the economic conference, which was held between April 26 and May 16, 1960 in Brussels. They were not pleased with the approach of separating economic discussions from political discussions. The meeting was dominated by Katangan interest groups. Their argument can be summarized in these terms: A Katangan common front emerged, demanding that the CSK portfolio be split into equal parts, one for the province of Katanga, one for the Congo state, and

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Relations Between Africa and Foreign Pc wers

one for the Compagnie du Katanga. The Province would undertake itself to adapt the statutes of the CSK to the new situation. The CSK would administer the lands of the new province and retain all personnel without distinction and with their rights. In this case, the private partners, the Companie du Katanga, would receive one third of the shares in the UMHK, thus, acquiring together with those already held, 248,403 out of a total of 414,000 voting shares thereby avoicing a take-over by Congolese state control. Obviously, the Katangan plan coircided with interests of private foreign investors.12 As indicated elsewhere, it is this kind of position, and not a cul tural argument advanced by the African elite, that was used as the gromds for the promotion of the spirit of the politics of secession in Kat mga in the 1960s. The Katanga secession was strongly defended by Belgian interests as much as possible. Their logic was tha: an independent Congo would be a dependent partner with the pr.vate companies that were actually running the national economy. The decision of the Belgian government to ratify the resolution made in June 1960 is an indication of a common attitude of the Belgian state vis-^-vis the Congo. As Wolf Radmann stated: On June 27, 1960, three days before Congolese independence, the Convention was ratified by decree of the Belgian Government without any provision for the division of the CSK assets other than the shares of the Compagnie du Kat inga. The remaining two-thirds of the portfolio were to be in trust by the Belgian government pending expiration of concessions in 1990. This trust account amounted to about 23.8% of the voting shares of the UMHK, a minority cc ntrol faced with a coalition of Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., Compagnie du Kaanga and Societe Generate de Belgique. The convention did, however, deprhe an independent Congo of possibility of controlling the powerful CSK organic ation and private control-at least for the time being-of UMHK.13 The first Congolese government either did not have enough time, or the needed domestic or international political support, to pursue its nationalistic approach in dealing with the economic situation. The secessionist movements, the political struggle among the new leaders, and the effect of the Cold War and Western interests, all contributed to weakening the state's power of taking any serious look at economic relations (or foreign capital and its management) between the Congo and Belgium. The new Congolese government operated under the old economic and administrative structures. Belgian private interest groups feared that Lumumba would nationalize foreign compaiies, including the giant UMHK. He was considered a political threat to western economic and political interests. After his assassination on January 17, 1961 in Katanga, with the collaboration of the CIA and


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Mobutu, neither Cyrille Adoula, the prime minister between 1961 and 64 (popular in Washington and Brussels), nor other governments after him (like Evariste Kimba's government, nominated by Prime Minister Kasavubu between October and November 1965) felt seriously committed and obligated to deal comprehensively and aggressively with the question of the role of the UMHK in the national economy. Adoula tried but was unsuccessful because of his lack of strong political commitment. Prime ministers were mainly concerned with state building. This was considered to be the prerequisite for building an independent nation. The majority of government members who succeeded Patrice Lumumba were from the first generation of the Congolese educated elite (like Cyrille Adoula), most of whom had studied in Belgium and had many personal friends in the influential and powerful Belgian milieux. Most members of the Binza group,14 for example, were proWestern and desired to become a new class of "albinocracy" (a social class that lacks a clear social and political base and, thus, has a fragile and ambiguous social and economic identification that generally is associated with the nouveau rlche) in the Congo. Thus, despite the political turmoil in the Congo between 1961 and 1965, known as the Congo crisis, with the support of this group, the number of Belgians who wanted to do business in the Congo increased considerably. Despite the increasing desire for national political autonomy, the importance of foreign capital continued to rise. The first step toward establishing new economic relations between the Congo and Belgium was the decision made by the Congolese government on November 29, 1964 to expropriate by decree, without compensation, all the holdings of the CSK and dissolve it under Congolese laws. Though this decision was at first rejected by PaulHenri Spaak, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (a former Secretary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and a leading member of the Socialist Party) on February 6, 1965 an agreement was reached and signed. The portfolio was then released to the Congo, and Tshombe, the prime minister, received a check of 92.420.000 million Bf from the UMHK in dividends and interest accrued to the Congo since 1960. The new state, as part of the same deal, had to assume liabilities for other obligations of the colonial state. The public debt of the colonial state was about 9 billion Bf or $536 million U.S. dollars. Le Fond Belgo-Congolais dAmorttssement et de Gestlon (FBCAG) was established for the purpose of servicing this debt, including payments of interest and redemption of principal.

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The Congolese government was to pay a monthly installment of 25 million Bf or $6 million U.S. dollars annually, and the Belgian government was to pay 17.5 million Bf monthly or $4.2 million U.S. dollars annually. According to the accord signed in March 1965. the Fond would take care of $ 246.5 million U.S. dollars to be pai 1 in forty years with 3.5 percent annual interest. How was this deal perceived by both states? The Belgian state and the Belgian business class15 considered the above deal to be the first solid treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two states. Paul-Henri Spaak believed in Belgium's international responsibility to ensure security and stability in the Congo. Stable relationships between the two countries would also give credence to the Belgian government's paternalistic role in the Ccngo in the eyes of international institutions. A stable Congo woulo be beneficial to the members of NATO as well. Moise Tshombe, whc did not have a strong conviction about the unity and independence of the Congo, seemed to have believed that this treaty was the first step toward "economic decolonization," and would lead to certain changes in the nature of cooperation between the two counties. However, why should a newly independent country pay colonial debts, and what would the impact be of paying this debt in a fragile nati )nal economy? What was Tshombe's political agenda for accepting such a deal? It is not clear why Tshombe decided to make this deal. Three factors should be taken into account here. He came from the family of the old traditional African Kingdom of Lunda; he was a member of the emerging African capitalist class; and he also had political ambiti 3ns. After being the leader of a secessionist movement, Tshombe probably had to change his image to become more acceptable as a national political leader. He wanted to consolidate his power at home through the support of international institutions. Moise Tshombe was al;o a businessman in Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) who opted to work in close cooperation with Western capitalists. He believed in capita ism and its laissez-faire principle as an economic model that could stop establish a radical leftist nationalism (such as that of Lumumba) by some members of the Congolese elite. However, he did not do much to change the structure of the Congolese political economy. Joseph Desire Mobutu came to power on November 24, 1965 by a military coup d'&at. He was not new to the milieu d'affaires belies. He had spent some time in Belgium getting training in journalism. He was the personal secretary of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. By relationship or association, he was then a member of the ruling ptirty,


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the Mouvement National Congolais Lumumba(MNC/L). He was also the head of the new army (the Congolese National Army, formerly La Force Publlque). While in Belgium, he was associated with the Belgian intelligence unit (La Surety Beige). The Belgian state and business sector were convinced that though he could become a nationalist, he would never be a communist. They shared this belief with the CIA, which also fully supported Mobutu. As a member of the Binza group (nouveau rlche), he was ideologically predictable. Could political and economic relations between Belgium and the Congo qualitatively change with this group? What direction did they take? Who benefited from them? Whatever the real political motives were, Mobutu decided in 1966 to give a new image to the political economy of the Congo. At the time, the Congolese state was receiving about 75 percent of its foreign exchange earnings and about 60 percent of its exports from the mining sector. He decided to do this, not through conventional bilateral diplomatic channels, but rather through a national political argument concerning the role of the UMHK in an independent Congo. Before Mobutu, this company was a relatively autonomous institution with its own agenda, rules, and structures, which were strongly linked to Belgium and its international financial basis. It was referred to as un ttat dans un Etat (a state within a state). In his speech on June 30, 1966, Mobutu declared that political independence meant nothing as long as it did not include economic independence. Earlier in the same year, he imposed new taxes on copper and marketing policies, as indicated by Radmann: By decree-law of June 7, 1966 the Congolese government made it compulsory for all foreign based companies whose main activities were in the Congo to establish their head office there by the end of the year. Under the same date, the so-called Bakajika law provided full employment by the state of all land, forest and mining rights conceded or granted before June 30, 1960, without any mention of compensation.16 After many attempts to renegotiate with the Belgian elite about the status of the UMHK, on December 31, 1966, the Congolese government officially announced its decision to expropriate the UMHK and transfer its assets to a new company effective January 2, 1967. The newly created company was called the Societe Generate Congolaise de Minerals (GECOMINES). The Republic of Congo then increased its participation to 60 percent of the shares. The remaining 40 percent were to be offered to the public. Politically, the

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GECOMINES became, de facto, a state-owned company. The state would control all investments in or any projects associated with, the company, and it would control the decision making process for the growth of the company and the direction of its operations. This political decision affected several aspects of the relations between the Congo and Belgium in the social, economic, and political domains, but it did not displace or fundamentally alter Belgium's ole in the international economic system or its role in the Congo. Despite the expropriation of the UMHK, the Belgian government provided Mobutu with $70 million in economic aid between 1966 and 1? 67. One of the most important questions was, Who should manage the GECOMINES and who could invest in it? After negotiations with the Societe Generate de Minerals (SGM), another subsidiary of the powerful Societe Generate de Belglque, the SGM accepted managerial, marketing, and commercial duties in the new company It would receive a commission of 4.5 percent of the value of all sales In 1969, another agreement was reached whereby the government extended the managerial role and marketing power of the SGM for twenty-five years. In 1970, the name of the company was changed to the Soci£t£ des Carrieres et Mines du Congo (GECAMINES). In 1M72, a structure of more political control was introduced in which the administrative board was abolished, and the GECAMINES was brought under the direct control of the head of state (the president). The director general and the assistant director general were still both Belgians. In 1974, the compensation agreement in favor of the S 3M changed from 6 percent of annual sales for fifteen years to a fixed sum of $100 million, regardless of fluctuations in the production and marketing mechanisms of minerals. ZAIRE-BELGIUM POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS FROM AUTHENTICITY TO THE EARLY 1990s In October 1971, Mobutu announced his politics of "authentic ty" with much fanfare, national and international publicity, and personal pride. Authenticity was one of the most publicized forms of nationalism in Africa. As articulated in official government documents and speeches delivered by Zairean authorities, it w: is a political ideology of the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR). It was a state ideology. It was also referred to as Zairean authentic nationalism, which was an instrument of state action and policy. What were the objectives of the MPR?


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The most important objectives can be summarized as follows: (1) to increase agricultural and industrial production; (2) to advance the politics of large-scale projects;17 (3) to improve conditions for individual well-being; (4) to unite the Zairean people; (5) To promote democratic liberties, and exalt national intellectual and cultural values and with respea to promoting the effective freedom of Congolese women and youth. All this could be possibly achieved only in the union of all Zaireans for dynamics (national energies) and the Grandeur de la Repubtlque ("Power of the Republic") (Mouvement Populatre de La Revolution, 1967). The Grandeur de la Repubtlque was Mobutu's slogan to sell his philosophy of authenticy. With this slogan, he projected his ideas that by 1980, Zaire would be the number one in economic development. As an ideology of the MPR, authenticity also served as a cultural and a philosophical basis for the state's actions and policies. When the advocates of this movement had some difficulties defining it, however, it was argued that authenticity was not a literal effort to revive the African past in a modern society; instead, it served as a cultural and historical reference to the past. Mobutu described how "Congolese society was," and his own role in this new political activity, when he captured power, stating: We, unfortunately, have found our Congolese train in a bad shape. But for us, it was even worse than that. It was not because of the bad state of the railroad system, or machinist (operator) was drunk or the wagons were not fixed, but in our 1965's train, everything was broken into pieces, we had to put these different parts together to be able to ride this train again (1971, 10; Kambembo, et al. 1979, 3). The classical argument that Mobutu always advanced to try to win international support for his dictatorial practices is that ever since 1965, when he came to power, he promised to achieve two important goals: building the nation and state, and peace and stability. Through cultural nationalism he planned to achieve his task of creating new

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institutions that would lead to a strong state and a peaceful and united nation. What is authentic Zairean nationalism? It can be defined at se/eral levels. At the administrative level, it meant symbolic reforms within the structures of regional administration. Reforms that were nade included changing the names of colonial units and restructuring the number of existing administrative units. At the time of independc nee, the number of provinces was 6. Before 1965, it they were increased to twenty-one, including the City of Kinshasa, which has a special autonomous status. It is both a region and the capital city of Zaire. Mobutu decided to restructure the provinces in order to coitrol national politics through a highly centralized power. The country's name was changed from the Congo to Zaire. Province became region, district became sub-region, territorial unit became zone, and the village became locality. While these reforms gave an impressioi of decentralization of power, in practice and reality, within the logic and structure of the military regime, all nominations, promotions, and allocations of resources were directly made in Kinshasa. These administrative reforms were strongly supported by slogan of this cultural nationalism. Mobutu himself defined authenticity in these terms: We are now embarking on our cultural liberation, the re-conquest of our African, Zairean soul. We people of black skin (race) have had imposed on us the mentality of quite a different species. We must become once again authentic Africans, authentic Blacks, authentic Zaireans.18 At the cultural level, authenticity was conceived of as an intellectual decolonization process and a search for African cultural identity. Does it literally mean a return to African culture and traditions? An attempt to answer this question clearly has never been easy, even for Mobutu himself. In his speech before the 28th General Assembly of the United Nations in New York on October 4,1973, he said: The Zairean experience has been forged on the anvil of a political philosophy which we call authenticity. This is an awareness on the part of the people of Zaire leading them to look to their origins, to delve deeply into values of their ancestors in order to determine those which make for their own harmonious and natural development.19 When Mobutu promoted his authentic Zairean nationalism in October 1971, he announced his new cultural nationalist program as the "return to authenticity." Because of the confusion of defining the


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concept and the difficulty of actualizing this concept of returning to the past into policy, he had to explain before the MPR Congress of May 21-24, 1972 what authenticity meant again, as he said: "Authenticity consists of becoming aware of our character, our own value, of basing our action on the fruits of the nation, in order to make our action be truly ours and truly effective" (Kambembo, 36). Here, the word "return" was deleted from the vocabulary of the state power. What it probably meant was that in becoming whatever Zaireans could be, the people would have to first regain the lost elements of African culture. Culturally, authentic nationalism meant self-discovery, or discovery of African culture within one's social context. It was defined by several well-known Zairean philosophers of authenticity as "the search of self, re-definition and the selfrecovery for the need of self-realization" (Kambembo, 40). To promote the idea of self-discovery, Christian-European names were dropped by a presidential decree, starting with Mobutu himself, who changed his name from Joseph-D6sir6 to Sese Seko. All the names of cities, towns, streets, boats, newspapers, and schools were replaced by African names. Belgian names on monuments and historical sites were all changed. In the school system, civic and political education centered on the Mantfeste de la N'sele20 (Manifesto of N'sele), which replaced the Christian religion. Thus, a war was waged against Christianity, especially Catholicism which was perceived by the state as representative of imperialism par excellence. The Catholic church, as one of the powers that had ruled the Congo, was offended by the new political approach and program undertaken by Mobutu. The closing down of some seminaries and schools of theology was a step toward openly combating Christianity, as well as an attempt to decrease its cultural and philosophical influence throughout the country. Whether or not this combat was taken seriously by Mobutu and the Catholic church, it appeared to be more of a power struggle than an ideological and cultural movement. Mobutu feared that his power and authority could be undermined or challenged by the influences, structure, and hierarchy of the Catholic church at home and abroad. At the political level, it is difficult to define authenticity because, in the beginning, it did not seem to have any clear political objectives or vision for the whole society. Nevertheless, some elements of this nationalism can be identified. First, this nationalism claimed to reject both capitalism and communism as foreign ideologies. Zaire's political elite then opted neither for the left nor for the right, and their

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position was called "positive neutrality." Second, this nationalism was theoretically intended to guarantee fundamental liberties and to operate and advance revolution within the state in the economy, finances, the workplace, social sectors, culture, and the arts as well ss in African politics and at the international level.21 Whether or not these nationalist elements were genuinely incorporated into public policy formulation and implementation is a different story. Never were fundamental or partial liberties guaranteed for ordinary people ur der Mobutu's regime. At the economic level, what did authenticity mean? As previously indicated in the first part of chapter 3, the economy of Congo-Zaire is structured for the export of raw materials, mainly copper, cobalt, industrial diamonds, uranium, and to a lesser degree, rubber, timber, coffee, palm products, cocoa, and tea. Copper alone counted for (nehalf of government revenues and nearly two-thirds of its foreign exchange earnings. The economic boom at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s created a wrong impression, advanced by the miliiary government, the economy would continue to improve in terms of increasing the production of raw materials and their marketing, f it was under the control of the nationals through Zaireanization. By this logic, the control of the economy by Zaireans, based on African serial relations, which are dominated by the philosophy of the extended family system, would make the process of social distribution of wealth among the people much easier. How was economic policy interpreted through the politics of authenticity? Strong propaganda was orchestrated by the state to promote the idea of self-sufficiency in both economic production and consumpt on. Thus, on November 30, 1973, amid rising mineral prices, Mobutu announced a program aimed at transferring a great deal of Zaiiean wealth in foreign hands to the Zaireans. The Zaireanization of the economy is a policy that shaped the national economy and made relations between Zaire and Belgium more critical. Most foreign companies were turned over to Zaireans as the lew managers, by presidential decree. The deiegue(e)s ("representatives") and acquereurs ("new property owners") were chosen by the government. The most important criterion for acquiring properties or managerial position was an active membership in the MPR. Thus, the sector concerned with the distribution of small enterprises sucl as plantations, farms, and fisheries, which had been predominantly ui der the control of Belgians, was given to Zaireans. Many previous owners did not get any compensation. The major political objective behind Zaireanization was to enlarge the size of the African middle class, or


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petty bourgeoisie, that would strongly support the regime. This was an attempt to create a new political base for the regime. In principle, according to the state, Zaireanization was also supposed to ensure the economic independence of the country. It meant the control of the economy by Africans. But it took less than two years before Zaireanization collapsed. By 1974, after an assessment of the impact of this policy on the performance of the national economy, and after pressure from foreign donors, the state decided to undertake another "radical alternative," known as nationalization. This new approach meant the transfer of Zaireanized properties to the state, as indicated by Scott F. Bobb: On December 30, 1974, in the face of falling production figures and criticism from the international financial community, the Zairean government granted a partial retrocession, allowing up to 40 percent of the ownership of the Zaireanized properties to be returned to the foreign owners. The proportion was increased to 60 percent nine months later. However, the government did retain ownership of what were considered vital industries, namely in the energy, timber, and large-scale transportation sectors (1988, 230-231). As already indicated, according to Kambembo, Kazadi, and Mpinga, who were then all members of the Political Bureau (the senior policymaking body of both the MPR and the government), and according to philosophers of authenticity, nationalization meant a state policy intended to liberate the national economy from all external and internal constraints. What does this mean in terms of Zaire-Belgium relations? How were the politics of authenticity reflected in the economic and political structures of, and relations between, these two countries? The basis for consolidating economic and political relations is culture. Education, as a powerful agent which promotes culture, was the domain most affected by this new policy. In 1974, an educational reform agenda was established, following the sweeping nationalization of higher education in 1971. Mobutu called for a total reexamination of the school's monopoly on education, advocating even a "de-schooled" society. The Belgian principle of pas d'elite pas de probleme("no elite, no problem"), which shaped the colonial political economy until 1960, was challenged in its entirety. The main objectives of the new educational reform can be summarized in five main goals, as described by Galen Hull22:

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(1) to achieve universal basic education of six years by 1980; (2) to increase the professional emphasis of secondary and higher education so that they can provide the nation with trained personnel necessary for development; (3) to act so that the school is no longer the sole means of advancement in society; (4) to establish the government control over the entire education system, including schools run by churches, replacing religious instruction with political and civic education; (5) to introduce a year of mandatory national service before entrance to the university. This attempt to "Africanize" the curricula at all levels of the school system not only displaced the inherited Belgian programs but also removed the Western philosophy of education from the learning process. With the introduction of four national African languages (Kikongo, Kiswahili, Lingala, and Tshiluba), French, the official and administrative language, was also affected. However, until the end of the 1970s, the Belgian government continued to provide the largest share of foreign assistance for recurrent expenditures in the education system.23 Its aid primarily provided for the salaries of Belgian teachers and administrators. School, especially the university, became the ideological apparatus of the state.24 Though de-Zaireanization occurred quickly after 1974, the Belgians did not regain control over culture or education. It is true that there are still some inherited Belgian influences in the Zairean systeri of education. However, Mobutu succeeded in creating a Mobutuist educational system, in terms of both its underlined ideology and its political objectives. There are still more Zaireans studying in Belgium than in all ether industrial countries combined. However, generally, the curricula and research objectives in Zairean institutions do not reflect the agenda and philosophy of Belgian universities and research centers. In short, the emphasis on the search for "indigenous African valies" threatened the values that were articulated by church dogmas and the Belgian education system. In 1972, diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Zaire were broken. This escalated the level of tensions between Zaire and Belgium because Belgium is a Catholic country. The expulsior of


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Belgians, especially priests, and the disputes between the former Monsignor (later Cardinal) Malula and Mobutu, created an atmosphere of instability in the political relationship between Zaire and Belgium. In principle, according to the ideology of the state, Zaireans were supposed to stop looking at Belgium as the source of their cultural system and social values. That is to say, the Belgian world view and its ethos should no longer generate the ideas and ideals of the society to be built in Africa. Postauthenticity, in other areas of the political and economic relations between these two countries, has been characterized by the failures of both Zaireanization and nationalization to reach the intended state objectives, the most important of which was claimed to be the building of an independent Zaire. The oil crisis of 1973, mismanagement of state enterprises (parastatals), corruption at all levels of social and state structures, political nepotism, the fluctuation in the prices of primary Zairean product exports, such as copper, diamonds, and coffee, and the lack of political will of the state to foster change characterize the general situation in Zaire between 1973 and 1990. Between 1965 and 1969, for instance, the rise in the prices of copper was 39,000 to 85,000 Bf a ton; in 1972 it fell to 47,000 Bf a ton. Between 1975 and 1979, there was a relative improvement in the export market for copper, cobalt, diamonds, and coffee. However, the debt service took over 20 percent of Zairean exports. Furthermore, It should be added that Zaire lacks processing facilities for copper, so much of it was refined in Belgium. As indicated earlier, despite authenticity, the GECAMINES, a newly state-owned company, depended very much on the management and marketing of the SGM. The contract for the recruitment of expatriates was made between the SGM and the recruiting agent. Despite nationalization, until 1974, the materials from the GECAMINES were all delivered directly to the SGM, which was responsible for marketing and delivering them to clients. The financial price of this kind of linkage was high. The SGM was financing the GECAMINES operations by giving provisional advances to the company. In principle, the SGM was supposed to assist the GECAMINES in becoming more self-sufficient in marketing and refinery. Its daily operations and the outcome of this responsibility reflected a different story, however. In the early 1980s, the managing director of the GECAMINES was still a Belgian named Robert Crem. He also became the head of a newly state-owned company: the National Trading Company, or the

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Societe ZaXroise du Commerce (SOZACOM). The objectives o1 the new company were to harmonize and supervise commercial transactions by the state or parastatal businesses. It was also intended to oversee the purchasing of equipment and construction of goods and to ensure that the most competitive conditions in terms of quality, price, and transport were achieved.25 It was a state marketing agency for minerals and had contracts with La Societe Generate de Minerals. About 80 percent of the contractual engagements of the SOZACOM were treated or transformed at the Belgian-owned M&allurgh d' Hoboken-Overpelt (Bezy, 1981, 89). When Robert Crem wasfirei, he was replaced by another Belgian with close ties to the SG. To illustrate further how the Zairean economy still depended heavily on Belgian financial capital, and technological and technical input, an example from the oil business will illustrate the point. Sixty percent of Zaire Fina (the national oil company) is owned by the Belgian Oil Company, Petrofina, while the Zairean state owned 40 percent. Petrofina has recently invested in the new oil wells near lakes Mobutu and Tanganyika as well. As of 1987 there were about ninety Zairean wells with an annual production of around 1.7 metric tons.26 Petrofina also controls Zaire-Sep, which is an oil product storage and transport company. This situation has been described by Katw«la in these terms: Such a picture reveals to some degree the nature of the open-ended interest 1 >y the core societies, Belgium in particular. Indeed, since the colonial periol, the economic structure established by the Belgians in Zaire was centrally desig led to establish in the Zairean industries extracting minerals needed by the Belgian industries first and then by other countries of the Western bloc.27 Until 1990, in the area of textiles, for instance, the Utexafrica Group, which has been Zaire's main textile producer, was comprised of five companies of a group under the Belgian Company, Texaf SA. Other Belgian textile companies, like the UCO Engineering SA-NV, have provided funds to modernize the thirty-year-old Utexafrica Group. A Belgian group, Alcatel, has invested in the rehabilitation of Kinsiiasa's telecommunication network since the 1980s. Although the nature and costs of the contracts set up between individual Belgian companies and the Zairean government need to be carefully examined, it I; safe to say that the influence of Belgians in the operations of large Ziirean enterprises has been dominant. Despite Zaireanization and nationalization, the Zairean ecoiomy was still, until recently, a heavily unbalanced export-import tyoe of economy whereby more than 80 percent of the Zairean bilateral and


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multilateral economic relations were with the industrial countries, especially Belgium and Luxemburg. Belgium and Luxemburg have occupied a vital role in this economy. For instance, Zaire's total exports to Belgium and Luxemburg have increased yearly from $385 million in 1982, $420 million in 1983, $463.5 million in 1984, $500 million in 1985, $582.3 million in 1986, and $768.5 million in 1987 and 1988, while Zaire's exports to other European countries between 1982 and 1987 were about $80 to $85 million annually (International Monetary Fund, 1989, 6). In the same period, Zaire's imports from Belgium and Luxemburg have been constantly increasing from $156.6 million in 1982 to $338.5 million in 1988. It is clear that trends in export-import have not been very much affected by political nationalization. In short, Belgium and Luxemburg's trade with Zaire equals more than 50 percent of all trades between Zaire and all other African countries combined until recently. Zaire is also one of the largest producers of industrial diamonds: until recently, about 6 million carats were produced annually. During the dispute between Zaire and De Beers Central Selling Organization, which controlled more than 80 percent of the world's rough diamond outputs in the 1980s, Belgians were prepared to intervene and try to win the marketing contract. Another important factor in the political economy of postcolonial relations between Zaire and Belgium is the foreign debt crisis. In 1997, Congo-Zaire has accumulated about $14 billion in foreign debt. Since the middle of the 1970s, Zaire has spent over 25 percent (or $700 million yearly) of its revenues on external debt-servicing. Until 1985, Zaire was the third country in sub-Saharan Africa, after Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria, to accrue such a high interest rate on its loans. As a result, in addition to other budgetary problems, Zaire started to experience enormous balance of payment deficits. Belgium is a member of the Paris Club, a group of creditors in Europe that provides loans and grants to developing countries. It is part of the European Community. In the 1980s, the debt crisis began to be evaluated by investors and donors as an alarming problem, both in terms of the inability of the government to pay interest on its loans, respect for the debt schedule payment, and potential internal social consequences. In 1987, the Paris Club accepted a rescheduling of Zaire's loan repayment of $884 million and extended it for fifteen years, with a six-year grace period. Following the usual problems between Mobutu and the Belgian media, in 1988 the Belgian government announced that Belgium was willing to reduce Zaire's

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payment obligations with respect to the estimated 43 billioa Bf ($1,171 million) in bilateral debt. The plan involved cutting the repayments on a 4 billion Bf ($109 million) governme lt-togovernment loan by one-third, and rescheduling repayment ova" 14 years on about 17 billion Bf ($463.2 million) in governmentguaranteed commercial debt. In the 1980s, the nature of Zaire-Belgium relations is reflected in the following statement: Relations took a further turn for the worse in mid-January [1989] with Zaire renouncing its aid agreements with Brussels and stopping payments on Belgian loans. Belgiumrespondedby halting all new development plans in Zaire. After a meeting on January 14th... Mr. Wilfried Martens, the Belgian Prime Mi lister, warned Zaire that its moves would not contribute to its international cred bility, and the measures such as its debt repayment moratorium and the limits on landing in Zaire by Sabina, the Belgian carrier, will frighten off other j partner countries and would-be investors.28 Belgium was among the first donors in the industrial countries to ease the debt problems of Zaire by forgiving repayment of 1 billion Bf in direct state loans and by rescheduling payment terms for a further 15 billion Bf in loans as of 1988. As was illustrated in the introduction, political and ecoromic relations are also shaped by non-objective factors. The most important of these factors in this chapter are Mobutu's personal relations with the Belgian social milieu. He invested more in Bel gium than in any other industrial country. He owned several chateau.* and large properties in Belgium, including his presidential palace in Rhode-Saint-Genese (George, 1988). Someone in Belgium benefited from these Mobutu's personal investments. It is also estimated, as of 1990, that there were about f fteen thousand Zaireans residing in Belgium, of whom three to four thousand were students with Belgian grants. Before September 1991, when the military mutinied against the Mobutu regime and were joined by the popular uprising, there were also about four thousand Belgians working in Zaire, especially in the aid programs and state agencies. In April 1997, despite a high level of social instability and political uncertainty in the country, the number of Belgians in CongoZaire was estimated to be two thousand. The opposition against Mobutu before the emergence of multiparty politics was strong among those Zaireans who were living in Belgium. Despite the rhetoric of Zaireanization and nationalization of private industries in the 1970s, Belgian interests have succeeded in


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maintaining their historical footing in Zaire's economy. These interests were secured militarily, as was shown in Belgium's operation in Stanleyville in 1965 and 1966, in its two interventions in Shaba in 1978 and 1979. They were also secured through the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The latter offered insurance for new investments against the foreign exchange risk until the emergence of multiparty politics and popular movements. Will Belgian interests continue to be secured in the post-Mobutu era or in a democratic Congo-Zaire? CONCLUDING REMARKS Congo-Zafre's dependency on primary product exports not only makes it vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices but it also shapes its interactions with the creditors of capital and providers of new technologies and military assistance. Despite an apparent permanently diplomatic crisis, which tended to reflect a certain level of suspicion and lack of trust between Congo-Zaire and Belgium, Belgium has always been the first among industrial countries to be involved in drawing plans to revive Congo-Zaire's economy and its "financial credibilities." Despite an effort to diversify the sources of foreign capital, Belgian financial groups maintained afinancialmonopoly and an economic protectorate over Zaire until 1991. Congo-Zaire's outstanding debt, which was estimated to be $7.6 billion in 1991 (excluding loans from the IMF), was mosdy owed to bilateral government creditors (government owned financial institutions and corporations), while multinational institutions accounted for 20 percent of this debt, and commercial banks accounted for 6 percent. This debt was an important factor, which shaped Zairean state behavior and actions. The Congo-Zairean state bourgeoisie, which was strongly associated with Mobutu, could not implement detente with Belgium despite its political rhetoric. Why would the Belgian government, after the disputes of 1988 through 1990, suggest reducing by 33 percent the repayment on a $108 million loan to Congo-Zaire and the suspension of CongoZaire's $467 million commercial bank loan guaranteed by Brussels? Without the debt rescheduling in which the Belgian government has played a leading role, Congo-Zaire would have a 50 to 60 percent debt-service ratio. Payment of external debt services amounted for 13 percent of total government expenditures in fiscal year 1989-1990.

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During Mobutu's regime, the country had two major guarantors for its loans and investments: (1) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and (2) the Belgian government. The IMF and the World Bank stopped providing loans and any type of other financial assistance to Congo-Zaire in 1990. Whether through the Paris Club or the European Bureau of the World Bank, the Belgian government has always tried to make sure that the deficit in the balance of payments in Congo-Zaire did not become explosive. As a historical guarantor, it also has to make sure that the Zairean government respects the contracted commitments and economic reforms. As a leading investor, Belgium has tried to promote a favorable climate for investments by the foreign and national private sectors. It has played the role of the gendarmeCpolicc officer") of the industrial countries and the protector of the interests of international capitalism until the 1990s. Postcolonial relations between Mobutu, the Belgian government, and Belgian businesspeople were those of client-patron. Belgium provided capital and technologies in the mining sector and, until recently, Mobutu used them to consolidate his power. Thus, the Zairean state has been a client-renter state. For many years the Belgian state did not develop a clear and strong opposition to Mobutu's regime. As Callaghy indicated: "He [Mobutu] adopted the Belgian state structure and patrimonialized it by creating an administrative structure monarchy which was used to recentralize power."29 His nationalist agenda, through the promotion of authenticity, enabled him, to a large extent, to control the political management of foreign capital. This political management allowed him to have access to the financial and economic input of foreign industries. It also gave him legitimacy to control information in order to prevent la futte du pouvolr (the flight of power) that could originate from, and be fabricated by, political intrigues of foreigners, especially Europeans and their national partners. In fact, this political management meant that the state could use capital from foreign corporations as it wished to consolidate its power. The basis of the conflict between the Mobutu Zairean state and the Belgian government has not been with the structure of dependency and the patron-client nature of their relations, but rather with the perception of the right of the donor-investor (Belgium) to know what has been going on inside Mobutu's regime in order to protect its interests and to maintain the democratic nature of the Belgium media. Mobutu tried to dispute the nature of that right The Belgian media, as part of their democratic practices, insisted on the rights of the press. Mobutu was an unscrupulous dictator who hated any form of


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democracy and democratic media. By and large, he and members of the Belgian elite have had common economic interests. This elite, as any other elite in the world, tried to maintain the status quo. The losers in these complex relations have always been the poor Zairean people. Will the recent rise of multiparty politics, popular revolutionary movements, and the coming to power of Kabila in Congo-Zaire qualitatively affect these political and economic relations? Current multiparty politics and power struggles embody four dominant ideological tendencies: Mobutuism, accommodationism, Lumumbaism, and secessionism. That is say, the leaders of the existing multitude of political parties, in their strategies of power struggle, see themselves as Mobutuists, accommodationists, Lumumbaists, and secessionists. At this moment, it is not very clear which ideological tendency will be dominant in the transition toward democratic process. However, if multipartyism creates a momentum of nationalism or social movements capable of demanding and forging changes in power relations in the country, these relations could change. Political pluralism a la Mobutu could not but fail because it was only intended to create and promote a limited and controlled democracy. Mobutu used his traditional means-state power, military power, and corruption-to remain in power. He was always incapable of making acceptable political reforms. He did not know the language of consensus. After he was forced out of power by Kabila with massive people's support, Mobutu died in Morocco on September 7, 1997. Values of the system that he established for thirty-two years may continue to function, unless the people's quest for democracy becomes a global social movement capable of threatening the interests of the bureaucratic and state bourgeoisie. The 1992 economic and political consolidation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Union is likely to affect certain dimensions of the economic and political relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium because by January 1999, Belgium is likely to join the European Common Currency (ECC) grouping, if it will be able to satisfy the tough membership's requirements of Union. Even in relative terms, Belgian businesspeople will still be more involved in acquiring international contracts for developmental projects in Congo-Zaire as so-called advisors and technicians. They claim to know the CongoZairean social conditions and people better than anyone else in industrialised world. Apart from its former colonies in Africa,

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Belgium does not have any client-states elsewhere. Consequently, it will try to support and work with any new regime in Congo-Zaire. To change the postcolonial relations of the political economy between these two states for the benefit of the majority of the people in Congo-Zaire, Congolese have to struggle to restructure their national economy, to identify its local priorities, to diversify its economic relations, and to shape its domestic and foreign policies by some type of Pan-Africanism or regional ideologies of development. The current movement of the European states, which are gradually shifting their investments and transferring their technologies to Eastern Europe (to be a regional peripheral market in Europe), is providing possibilities for the Congo-Zairean people and the state to restructure their relations with Belgium. Authenticity could not help because it was a political ideology of diversion to camouflage the social, political, and economic problems, which were created by Mobutu's regime through the process of accumulating and maintaining an authoritarian and totalitarian power system. Through authenticity, the Zairean state bourgeoisie became tnterlocuteur ("spokesperson") for, and manager of, foreign capital, which was used as an instrument of control, oppression, and consolidation of state power. The challenge of future Congo-Zairean political leadership and nationalism is how to get rid of the Mobutuist mentality, structure, and dependency syndrome and create national political and economic institutions that will permit Congo-Zaire to directly enter international financial and economic systems without the blessing of Belgium—by its own efforts, rights, and priorities. After all, Congo-Zaire is one of the richest countries in the world, with all its minerals, agricultural potential, and human resources. To change the relationships of production and consumption, and the investment codes with Belgian state and private companies, the postMobutuist state and people must redefine their economic priorities based on the objective conditions of their social environment. This can be done first through the process of establishing a popular and social democracy. The power struggle after Mobutu is between Mobutuists, secessionists, and Lumumbaists. Kabilaism is likely to emerge with a distinctive ideological position among the Lumumbaists because of his Maoist, Marxist, nationalist and populist background and also because of the nature of the alliance that was formed to overthrow Mobutu. In the past, Kabila has defined himself as Marxist and Lumumbaist. If these two ideological dimensions become the basis


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for foreign policy and international relations, he may challenge the existing economic and political relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium in a new way. In international relations, Lumumbaism is very much an African nationalism, while marxism is very much a structural globalism. An empirical policy study of the impact of the relations between Congo-Zaire and Belgium on social conditions in CongoZaire after the complete unification of Europe with a common currency, and within the context of the current struggles for democracy in Congo-Zaire, is needed to fully understand the dynamics of this relationship.

NOTES 1. Most of the data in this chapter have been drawn from myresearchin the article, "Zaire Ties to Belgium: Persistence and Future Prospects," Africa Today 39: 3 (1992): 23-48. 2. Authenticity is a political philosophy, which was articulated by Mobutu of Zaire in 1972 and which became the basis of his regime's policies and general guidelines for the state's behavior. For Mobutu and his associates, it meant to discover, use, and appreciate African values. See also John Stockwell, In Search Of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978). 3. For further information on King Leopold n as a great capitalist who possessed the Congo as Rockefeller possessed Standard Oil, see George Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in Contemporary Politics (London: Institute for African Alternatives, and Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1987). 4. Jean-Philippe Peemans, "Imperial Hangovers: Belgium-The Economics cf Decolonization " Journal of Contemporary History 15:2 (January 1980): 277. 5. On the question of secessionism in the Congo, see Tukumbi LumumbaKasongo, "Katanga Secession: Creation of the West or Manifestation of Congolese Internal Power Struggle?"/*?!*™**/ of African Studies, 15: 3-4 (Fall/Winter 1988): 101-109. 6. Ibid 7. Jean-Philippe Peemans, "The Social and Economic Development of Zaire since Independence," African Affairs, Journal of Royal African Society 74: 295 (April 1975): 150-151. 8. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution In Africa, 96-97. 9. For further information on this subject, see Nzongola-Ntalaja's article "Class Struggle and National Liberation in Zaire," Contemporary Marxist 6 (Spring 1983): 57-94 where he indicates that the Congo had 1,083 African wage earners (1954-57), more than in Algeria (1,035), Morocco (928), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) (610), Kenya (555), Tanganyika (431), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) (263) or Ghana (262).

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10. For further information on this topic see Lumpungu Kamanda, "Les probfemes aauels de T^conomie agricole zairoise," Cahlers economiques et sociaux 12-2 (1974): 13-29. 11. Wolf Radmann, 'The Nationalization of Zairefs Copper From Union Minifcre to GECAMINES," Africa Today 25:4 (October-December 1978): .29. 12. Ibid., 30. 13. Ibid., 31; see also Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-politiques (CRISP), Courtier Africain 40 (December 24, 1964): 1-19. 14. Binza is one of the luxurious suburbs of Kinshasa where members of the first generation of the ruling elite used to live. This group was composed of the few Congolese who studied in Belgium and France in the early 1960s, and who joined the government led by Cyrille Adoula after Mobutu made his first military coup d'etat in 1961. Since November 24, 1965, when Mobutu took power through a second military coup d'&at, he ruled the country in close collaboration with this group until the emergence of the recent struggle for multiparty politics and popular movements in the 1990s. 15. The Belgian business class was composed mainly of people working in agriculture, transportation, construction, and those who were involved in trade, mining, and finances. The Congo was for many a new opportunity to invest. The colonists were also part of this class. 16. Radmann, "The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper," 35. 17. Grands projets (large-scale projects) were part of Mobutu's speeches in the 1970s. They referred to the establishment of large scale public infrastructures and development projects in Zaire, such as Inga-Shaba's hydraulic power, and the building of a worid trade center in Kinshasa Although none of these prestigious projects worked effectively, they were initially intended to be showcases of Mobutu's agenda Mobutu used these showcases to mobilize his support nationally and internationally. For further information about the politics behind these projects see Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution, Manlfeste de la N'Sele (Avant Propos, Kinshasa: Bureau Politique, 1967). 18. "Zaire: MPR Congress," Africa Research Bulletin 9:5 (May 31, 1972): 2473. 19. President Mobutu's speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 4, 1973. 20. It was a booklet or an official document in which the doctrine or political philosophy of authenticity was explained. Nsele was the presidential domain near the city of Kinshasa It is here that Mobutu and his associates met to announce the birth of authenticity for thefirsttime. 21. "Zaire: MPR Congress," 2473. 22. For general information on the educational reform see a well-written article by Galen Hull, "Education in Zaire: Instrument of Underdevelopment," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, ed Guy Gran (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979). 23. Ibid., p. 149/ 24. Ibid 25. Africa Research Bulletin 22:3 (April 30, 1980): 768.


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26. Africa Research Bulletin 24: 8 (September 30, 1987): 8838. 27. J. Ghifem Katwala, "Export-Led Growth: The Copper Sector," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, ed. Guy Gran (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 124. 28. "Zaire-Belgium," Africa Research Bulletin 25-11 (January 31, 1989): 9390; for further information on the debt of Zaire and how it was dealt with in Belgium, see "Zaire-Belgium: Debt Relief Rift," Africa Research Bulletin 25:11 (December 1988): 9354. 29. Thomas Callaghy, "The International Community and Zaire's Debt Crisis," in The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities, ed. George NzongolaNtalaja (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa Worid Press, 1986), p.221.


4

A General Conclusion: What Perspectives after the Cold War? The major issue of concern in this final and concluding chapter is to identify the consequences of the end of bipolarism in the relationship between the North and the South. The North and the South have different perceptions of themselves and of their roles in world politics. These perceptions and the dynamics of location of the North and the South have been shaped by their power relations in the global system. The radical division of labor and unequal distribution of resources, as promoted and supported by the dominant political ideology and militarism in the North and their supportive local institutions and agencies in the South, continue to contribute to the increasing gap between the North and the South. As Claude Ake said: The disparity of means and power is stunning by any conventional measure of economic and technological distance and military capability. For instance, on a rough estimate, 75 percent of the world's population in the South accounts for less than 25 percent of the world's productive output and less than 15 percent of global trade. By all indications, the poor world's share of the world's population is still increasing, while its share of the world's output is diminishing. The ratio will approach 80 percent of world's population having less than 20 percent of its resources by year 2,000 (1992, 14). Despite some common colonial heritage and similar economic, demographic, political, and technological characteristics among the countries in the South, it is intellectually and historically misleading to examine the South as a monolithic entity. While some countries like

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China, Brazil, India, and Indonesia (before the current economic, financial, and political crises) in the South are managing to become productive parts of the global economy, others are fragmented along the forces, definitions, and parameters of the old political geography and colonial political economy. Cardoso characterizes the relationship between the South and the North in a newly defined global economy as integrationist or marginalist in nature as he said: Therefore, we are no longer talking about the South that was on the periphery of the capitalist core and was tied to it in a classical relationship of dependence. Nor are we speaking of the phenomenon, described some twenty-five years ago by Enzo Faletto and myself in our book Dependency and Development in Latin America, whereby multinational companies transfer parts of the productive system and the local producers are ties to foreign capital in the "dependentassociated" development model. We are dealing, in truth, with a cruder phenomenon: either the South (or a portion of it) enters the democratictechnological-scientific race, invests heavily in R & D, and endures the "informational economy" metamorphosis or it becomes unimportant, unexploited, and unexploitable (1993, 156). An important point here is to emphasize that this integration has not produced universalism, liberal democracy, and social progress in many parts of the South. In fact, many "areas of the earth are of greatly diminished importance to the world economy (even considering their exploited and dependent conditions)"(Cardoso, 1993, 156). What does characterize the relationship between the North and the South after the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and when antagonisms between East and West also ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991? A generalized common sense assumption that derives from the logic of the end of the Cold War is that the new era may stimulate and encourage more understanding among states and peoples, creating a new comprehensive basis for the worldwide cooperation that is needed for global change. This idealistic view has to be critically analyzed and understood in light of specific historical and political configurations. Can this idealistic assumption be applicable to the asymmetric relations between Liberia and America, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Belgium? Realist scholarship, based on the centricity of the state, may suggest a different perspective, that is, that potential confrontations about

What Perspectives after the Cold War?

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security and state interests of the state have not been altered by the end of visible ideological and militaristic conflicts between East and West It cannot be said precisely what direction political and economic relations between Liberia and America and the DRC and Belgium will take in the twenty first century: how they will be operationalized, what forms they may take, and what kind of packaging they might be wrapped in. This is not necessarily pathological. This lack of precision should not be always perceived as being ontologically destructive in search for newness. It is due mainly to the fact that the world is in a major transition of uncertainty and ambiguity, especially as the twenty first century approaches without a solid collective philosophy. Every major transition may embody elements of uncertainty and ambiguity. This does not mean that we, the actors and actresses in world politics, are completely lost. It means only that there are many factors or variables in local and regional environments that are still unknown and may cause anxiety. People generally feel better when they can plan their short-and long-term future activities based on facts that can be controlled. People around the world are in the process of redefining themselves in order to articulate, for better or for worse, what they consider to be their interests. However, certain patterns or characteristics in these relations can be generalized for policy and scholarship purposes. One of the most important characteristics of world politics today is the search for new realignments in power relationships. Every state is looking for ways of building a new identity, be it cultural or political. This identity is perceived to be important in the developmental processes. Another characteristic, which is specific to Africa, is further marginalization of the continent within the world economy. As Africa is being marginalized, states will tend to alienate themselves further from their citizens. This alienation will intensify the level of poverty. Thus, the dynamics of poverty among the majority of people, and the existence of cheap weaponry in the formal and informal market, are very likely to produce a high degree of national political violence in various forms. The assumption that the end of East-West confrontational policies and politics will engender more dialogical relationships between the North and South is misleading. One of the consequences of the end of the Cold War is that, through regional or sub-regional movements, states seem to be prepared to collectively promote their interests. Africa came out of a political,

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ideological, and military battle extremely weak in economic and social progress, institutional building, and political stability. Europe was relatively better organized than the United States, whose Republican presidents were mainly pursuing military and confrontational politics. At the end of the Cold War, capitalist America has had more internal pressures to readjust itself to the demands and forces of a polycentric world than the smaller country of Belgium. However, the United States is a more dynamic center, or metropolis, than Belgium. Despite the fact that it did not formally have colonies in Africa, today the United States has a wider political leverage there than Belgium~a larger political space to operate from. Additionally, the United States is attempting to resume its postwar (World War II) position, using a coalition approach: the U.S. as police officer of the world in the truncated world capitalism of which it is the primary creator. What can it offer to Liberia or gain from it in the twenty first century, and what can Liberia offer to, or gain from, the United States? Despite many internal contradictions, corruption, racism, sexism, and various other forms of power struggles within the world system in the North, Northern states, and their politics, have reflected a relatively continuous political stability for more than two hundred years. During this period, France and Italy, for instance, did not even produce a series of military coup d'etats a VAfricatne. It was always questioned if Spain were part of this pax europa, especially during Franco's dictatorship. Portugal was peripheral to the British political economy. However, this stability in Europe did not stop world politics from exploding or undergoing major changes starting in the latter part of the 1980s. The crisis of distribution and consumerism in developing countries was combined with the inability of the world market and its agents in the government and business sectors to satisfy the demands of the producers and protect their interests. The merchant state became the bouc emtssatre ("scapegoat") for most problems caused by the market economy in the South. The South's political stability succeeded in containing and weakening leftist movements in Europe and the expansion of communist regimes. This stability cannot be explained as an outcome of internal evolutionary political processes in the North. The South made an essential contribution to its establishment and maintenance, militarily and economically. It is only now, strangely, that France, for example, officially recognized that historical fact in October 1993 by honoring


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African anctens combattants" ("former soldiers") who died to save imperialist France. The claims embodied in the current movements of change are reflected by the rise of national and popular movements in most parts of the world, the intensive degradation of the ecosystem by overuse of chemical products and technology in the systems of production and manufacturing, the improvement in long-distance communication technologies and computer science, rapid mechanisms in the transfer of capital, the globalization of capital, and the internationalization of poverty. Although the Cold War unexpectedly ended without the incidence of a major war between the United States and the former Soviet Union on their own soil, the legacy they created between 1917 and 1989 still lingers. The current situation in Liberia and CongoZaire strongly support these assertions. That is to say, the world remains dangerously militarized. The access to sophisticated weaponry, including nuclear weapons, is much easier today than it was yesterday. Worldwide poverty and polarization between the North and South will be intensified as we move toward the twenty first century, which will be a century of intensive competition. Obviously, material resources will be more scarce and population growth may increase even more. The struggle between the North and the South will be more open and acute as the politics in the North becomes increasingly more conservative. The effects of the Cold War have been obviously more devastating in the South than in the North because, for more than three decades, the South, especially the weakest countries (majority of them are located in Africa), were transformed into the battle zones between communist Russia and capitalist America. Regimes in the South picked sides without creating their own national economic and political base, and the processes of super-exploitation that started in the 1920s was intensified. From Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo to the DRC, to cite only a few, the regimes and systems they established or sponsored suppressed, oppressed, and killed millions of people, but not in the name of modernization or industrialization or any form of a nationalist ideology as was the case of Russia under Stalin. In the South, the "hot war" was inherited with all its implications. Ad hoc United Nations peace arrangements in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan will not produce stable conditions for implementing liberal democracy.

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Peace is not a technical phenomenon, rather it is a developmental process. The United States tried to maintain its hegemonic power between 1945 and 1970. During this period, its visibility in world affairs, including Africa, was intensified. Strategically, it needed Liberia to be a preparatory information center (as in the role of the Voice of America in Liberia) for other parts of Africa and for Asia. Suddenly, the equation changed. A different ball game with different rules has replaced the old one. After much destruction in Liberia, which is one of the consequences of the policies of U.S.-supported dictators and the Americo-Liberian elite, the United States does not have the political will, the moral commitment, and the financial strength to reconstruct Liberia. It does not have a grand plan for Liberia. The United States is working through its dominant institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to impose its dominant ideology and economic programs throughout the world. After peace is restored and political and social institutions are established in Liberia, the United States may intervene through those institutions to give loans to Liberians. It may do so in order to ensure that imports of U.S.-manufactured goods are revitalized in Liberia, although this country constitutes a minuscule market indeed. However, this is not likely to be the major objective of U.S. policy. The U.S. private sector may come back again to make speculations. The United States will not, however, play the role of guarantor of Liberia's foreign loans and grants as it did in the past. African states in general are deeply weakened by multinationals and multilateral financial institutions, which are attempting to replace, financially and at the policy advising level, the roles of the states in the North. There is the impression that the Northern based-multinationals have become the ambassadors of the Northern states in global affairs. If a liberal approach is what Liberians opt to use in order to reorganize their system of production and social relations, their chance to have access to foreign capital, investments, and technologies in the North does not depend on the United States but rather on the multilateral financial and economic institutions and multinationals. Liberians would have to be able to compete with others. LiberianAmerican economic relations may improve in the area of trade, but this will not occur at the specific level of U.S. bilateral economic relations with Liberia but within a framework of sub-Saharan Africa in general. Hope for Liberia lies not with the United States, but with


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Africa and with other subregional organizations and countries in the South. The case of the DRC and Belgium will not follow similar patterns to those of the United States and Liberia. The strong European community in which Belgium functions poses a challenge to the United States. Once the monetary union of January 1999 occurs, there will be a selective "strategic de-linking" from the world system as it was recreated since 1944. The process of redefining European interests collectively will weaken, in some regions of the world system, the relations between Europe and U.S. Despite the major instability that characterizes its political system, and the predictable postMobutuist power struggle, in terms of economic potential, the Congo has not yet been out of the picture for the European states, especially Belgium and France. It should be noted that the Democratic Republic of Congo is the second largest French speaking country after France. The decision of the Congolese government for not sending any delegation to the meeting of the Francophonie association in Hanoi in November 1997 is a sign of new challenge to the imperialist France. The French speaking Belgians are indirectly concerned with this decision. However, the national interests of Belgium are ranked higher in the Belgian international relations than those of any ethnic group in the country. The fact that the meeting (that I characterized as a public relation meeting) of the so-called friends of the Congo was held on December 4-6, 1997 in Brussels, is a sign that the Belgium is politically willing to rethink its relationship with Kabila and the Congolese state. This is a reflection of a new foreign policy approach to be considered both in the DRC and Belgium. The first Kabila's visit outside of Africa was not in Belgium but in China. This is another statement that is related to the new Congolese government foreign policy approach. The economic-social development model that Kabila's government has considered to adopt is not the Belgian model; rather, it is a "social market" one. China is the first socialist country after the end of Cold War to have articulated many elements of this model. The European Union (E.U.) is highly interested in developing a new basis for cooperation with the DRC. In August 1997, Hans Van Mierlo, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, and Tony Lloyd, the British Foreign Office Minister of State, visited Kinshasa where they met the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bizima Karaha. They discussed, among others, issues

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related to the process of democratization in the DRC, the humanitarian assistance that the E.U. could offer to the country, and the DRC's future relations with the E.U. This first meeting, which was planned in a meeting of E.U. foreign ministers in June 1997 in Luxembourg, is a sign of how members of the Union are willing to collectively work to promote their interests in the DRC. Not only does the DRC offer a large potential market for their goods, but it also has large deposits of diverse crucial minerals that are still vital to the industrial development in the North. The European community is likely to use Belgium in order to reach the Congolese market. However, the Belgian business community may use protectionist mechanisms to continue to look at the DRC as their domain or zone of influence. This may cause tension between the community and private Belgian interests. The Belgian state cannot maintain the living standards of its people, expand its economy, and be competitive without the European community and the DRC. If popular movements succeed in establishing genuine democracy or some form of legitimate, accountable government in the country, Belgium will move quickly to invest in major areas in the DRC, including infrastructures, higher education, and mining. Even in the middle of the war between Laurent-Desire Kabila and Mobutu's military, after Kabila captured Mbujimayi, Kolwezi, and Lubumbashi (important mining areas in the country), in April 1997 De Beer of South Africa and some Belgian businesspeople started negotiating with Kabila to establish their credibility in mining and protect their market interests. Although Belgian decisions and movements may be shaped by policies of the European Union, they will find room through historical connections, and specific arrangements of cooperation, to be involved in Congolese affairs. Unlike the United States, which has not been flexible enough to look holistically at Liberia with new glasses at the end of an era, Belgium shifted its imperialistic position (before Mobutu was forced out of power in May 17, 1997) from fully supporting Mobutu's regime for more than twenty five years to supporting democratic movements in Congo-Zaire. Belgium has an important socialist party that influences its foreign policies. The United States does not. Congo-Zaire was economically, politically, and culturally crippled under the Mobutu dictatorship. The end of the Cold War brings opportunities not only for diversifying its economic relations but also for choosing partners based on mutual respect.


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Belgium will lessen the level of its colonial arrogance vis-a-vis the Congo, but mutual respect is not likely to come soon. Everything will depend on how the DRC will economically and politically reorganize itself after Mobutu. In terms of economic relations, the DRC might benefit more from the dynamic of an intermediate South than from a peripheral North. Liberia and the DRC must reorganize their priorities to prepare themselves to enter the century of tough competition (or comparative competition) with a relatively high level of confidence. Their policies must be autocentric and pan-African. The end of the Cold War gives them a chance to be agents of change instead of continuing to be forced to the level of passive actors in world politics. Their policies need to be more nationalistic and democratic within the framework of strong cooperation among states, countries, and people in the South. Policies inspired by popular and national movements may provide the ground for changes in economic and political relations between Africa and foreign powers. It is only when the criteria and conditions of relations are set up in Africa, and by Africans, for their own interests, that economic and political relations between Africa and foreign powers will be productive and beneficial for Africans. This requires a structural change in the African political economy and its systems of production and marketing, and a new leadership that is linked to the people's interests, and which derives its power and legitimacy from the people. Only that can make a difference. Hopefully, popular and national movements will create such a leadership. I agree with Cardoso's perception of the dynamic South as he said, A future with dignity for countries of the South will be achieved only with more education, a better state, enhanced productivity from its "human resources," and a great technological leap forward (information technology, new materials, environmental sense, and new modes of organization). Alsorequiredare a democratized society and state (necessary conditions, as noted above, for the marriage of production, university, and society in an atmosphere of freedom which is conducive to organizational and technological innovation) (157). The social progress embodied in the above picture will not take place in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo within the existing paradigms of incompetence, excessive dependence, marginalization, and truncated liberal democracy. A selective de-

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linking from the domination of the North and its old paradigms of development has to be explored as a new approach for Liberia and the DRC. Their economic and political relations and foreign relations at large with the countries in the North must be re-invented on the principles of mutuality and reciprocity. These relationships should be shaped by positive feelings and policies of nationalism and the contradictions of the global system as reflected in the African objective conditions.

Selected Bibliography Adams, Nassau A. World Apart: The North/South Divide and the International System. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1993. Adelman, Kenneth L. "Liberia: Hosting the O.A.U," Africa Report 24, no. 4 (July-August, 1979): 9-12. Ake, Claude. The New World Order: A View From the South. Lagos, Nigeria: Malthouse Press, 1992. Amin, Samir. Eurocentrism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987. . Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1990. .Unequal Development. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972. Anta Diop, Cheikh. Pre-Colonial Black Africa. Trans, by Harold J. Salemson. Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1987. Archer, Clive, and Fiona Buttler. European Community: Structures and Process. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. Aron, Raymond. The Imperial Republic. Trans, by Frank Jellinek. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Axelos, Kostas, and Ronald Bruzina. Alienation, Praxis, and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1976. Bade, Onimode. A Political Economy of the African Crisis. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1988. Barrie, Axford. The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. Bennell, Paul. "British Industrial Investments in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corporate Responses to Economic Crisis in the 1980s." Development Policy Review 8, no. 2 (June 1990): 155-177.

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Selected Bibliography

Bezy, Ferdinand, Jean-Philippe Peemans, and Jean-Marie Wautelet Accumulation et sous-developpement au Zaire 1960-80. Louvain La-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 1981. Bobb, Scott F. Historical Dictionary of Zaire. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1988. Boulding, Elise, ed New Agendas for Peace Research: Conflict and Security Reexamtned. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. Byron, Tarr. "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective," Issue: A Journal of Opinion 21, nos. 1-2 (1993): 74-83. Callaghy, Thomas M. "Africa: Falling off the Map." Current History 93, no. 579 (January, 1994): 31-36. . The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984. Cardoso, F. "North-South Relations in Present Context: A New Dependency? In The Global Economy in Information Age: Reflections on Our Changing World, Martin Carnoy, et al.: 149-159. University Park, PA: Pennylvania State University Press, 1993. . and E. Faletto. Dependency and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979. Carnoy, Martin, Stephen S. Cohen, Manuel Castells, and F. Cardoso. The Global Economy In Information Age: Reflections on Our Changing World, University Park, PA: Pennylvania State University Press, 1993. Castells, Manuel, "The Informational Economy and the New International Division of Labor." In The Global Economy in Information Age: Reflections on Our Changing World, Martin Carnoy, et al.: 15-43. University Park, PA: Pennylvania State University Press, 1993. Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques (CRISP), "Le Gouvernement de Tshombe et la fin des compagnies h la chme"Courrier Africain no. 40 (December 24, 1964): 1-19. Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill, and Donald Rothchild. Politics and Society In Contemporary Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. Chilcote, Ronald H. ed Dependency and Marxism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982. Clough, Michael. Free At Last?:U.S. Policy Toward Africa and End of the Cold War. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. Clower, Robert, George Dalton, Michell Harwitz, and A. A. Walters. Growth Without Development: An Economic Survey of Liberia. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966. "Continental Developments," Africa Research Bulletin 22, no. 3 (April 30, 1985): 7667-7672. "Continental Developments," Africa Research Bulletin 25, no. 11 (December, 1988): 9347-9354.


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Czempiel, Ernst-Otto. "America-Germany: A Particular Relations," German Foreign Affairs Review 34, no. 3 (1983): 221-223. Depelchin, Jacques. From the Congo Free State to Zaire (1885-1974): Toward a Demystification of Economic and Political History. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series, 1992. Dunn, D. El wood. The Foreign Policy of Liberia During Tubman Era: 19441971. London: Hutchinson Benham, 1979. Easton, Emest. "Liberia's new role in Africa," Speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. November 29, 1983. "Economic Aid," Africa Research Bulletin 24, no. 8 (September 30, 1988): 9275-9276. "Economic Co-operation," Africa Research Bulletin 9, no. 5 (June 30, 1972): 2375-2376. Europa Yearbook for 1985. London: Europa, 1985. Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969. George, Susan. A Fate Worse Than Debt: the World Financial Crisis and the Poor. New York: Grove Press, 1988. Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Hlophe, Stephen S. Class, Ethnicity and Politics in Liberia. Washington, D . C : University Press of America, 1979. Hull, Galen. "Education in Zaire: Instrument of Underdevelopment," in Gran, Guy ed Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979. International Monetary Fund. Balance of Payments Statistics. Yearbook. Washington, D.C: International Monetary Fund, 1989. Kamanda, Lumpungu. "Les problemes actuels de l'economie agricole zairoise." Cahiers economiques et sociaux 12, no. 2 (1974): 13-19. Kambembo, Jacques wa Dile Kazadi, and Mpinga-Kasenda. Le Nationalisme Zairois Authentique. Kinshasa: Institut Makanda Kabobi, 1979. Katsouris, Christina. "Sharp Fall in Resource Flows to Africa: Concessional Loans from IMF and World Bank also Plunge." Africa Report 11, no. 2 (October 1997): 1-4. Kegley, Charles Jr. Controversies in International Relational Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. Klitgaard, Kent T, and Valerie D. Ellis. "Accumulation and Crisis." In Economic Processes and Political Conflicts: Contributions to Modern Political Economy, edited by Richard W. England, 89-108. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987. "Laissez-Faire on Trial," Africa News 13, no.15 (October 12, 1979): 3-4. Lash, Scott, and John Urry. The End of Capitalism. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.

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"Liberia: 5 Years of Army," West Africa no. 3529 (April 15, 1985): 731-733. Lierde, Jean Van. Patrice Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches and Writing of Patrice Lumumba, 1958-1961. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1972. Lowenkopf, Gus. Politics in Liberia: The Conservative Road to Development, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1976. Lumumba-Kasongo, T. "Clinton and Africa," Africa Notes. December 1992): 12. . "Katanga Secession: Creation of the West or Manifestation of Congolese Internal Power Struggle?" Journal of African Studies 15, nos. 3, 4 (Fall/Winter 1988): 101-109. . Nationalistic Ideologies, Their Policy Implications and Struggle for Democracy in African Politics. New York and London: The Edwin Mell Press, 1991. . "Social Movements and the Quest for Democracy in Liberia: MOJA and Its Transformation into a Political Party." In African Studies in Social Movements and Democracy, edited by Mahmood Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, 409-461. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series, 1995. . "Zaire Ties to Belgium: Persistence and Future Prospects," Africa Today 39, no. 3 (1992): 23-48. Mansbach, W. Richard. The Global Puzzle: Issues and Actors in World Politics. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994. McLaughlin, Russel V. Foreign Investment and Development in Liberia. New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966. Mehmet, Ozay. Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. Mobutu, Sese Seko. Message du President de la Republique au Parti Frere du Senegal, le 14fevrierl971. Kinshasa: Ministere de l'lnformation, 1971. Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution. Manifeste de la N'Sele. Avant Propos, Kinshasa: Bureau Politique, 1967. MPEA. Indicative Manpower Plan of Liberia for the Period 1972-1982, Monrovia, June 1972. Mutada, Jeff. "Interview with President Tolbert," African Development (July 8, 1973): 5-7. Nkrumah, Kwame. Neo-Colonlallsm, Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1965. • Neo-Colonlallsm, Last Stage of Imperialism. New York: International Publishers, 1971. Nzongola-Ntalaja, George. "Class Struggle and National Liberation in Zaire." Contemporary Marxist 6 (Spring 1983): 57-94. . The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1986.


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-Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays In Contemporary Politics. London: Institute for African Alternatives and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1987. Oculi, Okello. "Union Government for Africa: Putting the Case, What Time Is It? National Time." African Association of Political Science Newsletter (June 1993). Ojo, Olantunde C B., Orwa, D.K., and Utete, CM. African International Relations. London, New York, and Lagos: Longman, 1985. Packenham, Robert A. The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Dependency Studies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. . Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Peemans, Jean-Philippe. Accumulation et Sous Developpement au Zaire: 19601980. Louvain-La Neuve: Presse Universitaire, 1981. . "Imperial Hangovers: Belgium-the Economics of Decolonization." Journal of Contemporary History 15, no. 2 (January 1980): 257-286. . 'The Social and Economic Development of Zaire since Independence." African Affairs, Journal of Royal African Society 14, no. 295 (April 1975): 148-179. Plekhanov, George. The Materialist Conception of History. New York: International Publishers, 1940. Radmann, Wolf. 'The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper From Union Miniere to GECAMINES," Africa Today 25, no. 4 (October-December 1978): 2547. Raymond, Bron, ed Ecological Resistance Movements: The Global Emergence of Radical and Power Environmentalism. New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. Richardson, R. Nathaniel. Liberia's Past and Present. London: The Diplomatic Press and Publishing Co., 1959. Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington, D.C: Howard University Press, 1981. Sandbrook, Richard The Politics of Africa's Recovery. London and New YorkCambridge University Press, 1993. Sawyer, Amos. Effective Immediately, Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986: A Personal Perspective. Rijksweg, The Netherlands: Africa Center, 1988. Schatzerberg, G. Michael, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988. Schlesinger, A. A Thousand Days. New York: Fawcett World Library, 1967 Seyon, Patrick. "Liberia: Threats to Democracy," West Africa no. 3528 (April 8, 1985): 656-657. Smith, Stewart. U.S. Neo-Colonlallsm In Africa. New York: International Publishers, 1974.

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Snow, M. Donald, and Eugene Brown. Beyond the Water's Edge: An Introduction to U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997. Spero, Joan Edelman. The Politics of International Relations. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. "Statesman or Dictator," West Africa no. 3529 (April 15, 1985): 733-735. Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. New York: Norton, 1978. Survey of Current Business, August 1963, October 1968 and 1971. Washington, D.C. Townsend, R.E., ed President Tubman of Liberia. London: Consolidated Publications, 1955. U. S. A.I.D. Report on a brief history of development assistance to Liberia by the United States government (1946-1980); this is an unclassified Document the author obtained from the United States Embassy in Monrovia, 1984. United States Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C: International Trade Administration, Several short articles on Trade between U.S. and liberia (1920-1970), Washington, D C U.S. Department of State. "A Quick Reference Aid on U.S. Foreign Relations," (January 1985), Washington, D C United States Embassy in Monrovia, "Decline in Economic Growth, U.S. Tiade Opportunity," Liberia, Monrovia A-17; this is an unclassified Document the author obtained from the United States Embassy in Monrovia, 1984. Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Class and Class Conflict in Contemporary Africa" Canadian Journal of African Studies 7 no. 3 (1973): 375-380. . The Modern World System, Volume I, New York: Academy Press, 1979. Waltz, Kenneth. "The Stability of a Bipolar World" Daedalus 9 no. 3, (Summer, 1964): 881-909. "Which Side Were You On?," Africa News 14, no. 16 (April 21, 1980): 2-4. World Trade Information Service Part 1, no. 58, 1951. Zartman, I. William. Europe and Africa: The New Phase. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.

Index Adelman, Kenneth, 65 Adoula, Cyrille, 88-89 Africa-foreign powers relations: cultural imperialism and, 21; education and, 20-21; equal rights and, 18; France and, 18-19, 21-22; historical analysis of, 13-14, 16-19; ideology and, 11, 19-20; imperialism and, 6-7; liberal democracy and, 19-20; multiparty democracy and, 28, 29-30; popular/nationalist movements and, 119; postindependence ideology and, 19-20; resource distribution and, 14, 15; self-reliance and, 16; social approach and, 28-29; social change and, 8-9, 12; social justice and, 14; technology and, 30; U.S. political interests and, 27-28. See also Congo-Zaire and Belgium relations; economic relations; Liberia-U.S. relations Ake, Claude, 6, 111 albinocracy, 89 Albright, Madeleine, 27

Alcatel, 100 Algeria, 18, 19 Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDLC), 77-78 American Colonization Society (ACS), 7, 36, 38, 46, 4 7 ^ 8 , 50, 73 Amin, Samir, 6 Angola, 18,21,40 Axelos, Kostas, 63-64 Axford, Barrie, 3-4, 5 Babangida, Ibrahima, 74 Bade, Onimode, 12 Bakajika law, 91 Bassa Cove, Liberia, 48 Baudouin, King, 79, 87 Belgium. See Congo-Zaire and Belgium relations Bennell, Paul, 24 Berg, Elliot, 64 Berlin Conference, 6, 40, 82 Binza group, 89, 91 Bobb, Scott F., 97 Bolongo, Likulia, 79

128 Boston Jail, 73 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 17 Brown, Eugene, 42 Brown, Ron, 15 Buchanan, Thomas, 48 Burkina Faso, 24 Bush, George, 41 Callaghy, M. Thomas, 104 Campagnie du Katanga (CK), 82, 83, 88 Canada, 15 capitalism: Congo-Zaire and, 81; internal, 35; modern, 41; peripheral, 34-35, 65, 71-72; primitive, 63, 70; Tshombe and, 90 Cardoso, F., 112, 119 Carnoy, Martin, 3-4 Carter, Jimmy, 57 Castells, Manuel, 4-5 Catholic church, 82, 86, 95, 98-99 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 7, 88-89, 91 Chazan, Naomi, 18 China, 57, 117 Chirac, Jacques, 22 Clinton, Bill, 15, 26, 27-28, 45, 74 Clinton, Hillary, 74 Clough, Michael, 39, 45 Clower, Robert, 54 Cold War, 1, 40, 4 3 ^ 5 , 57, 81. See also North-South relations Comite Special du Katanga (CSK), 82, 83, 87-88, 89 Commonwealth, 21 communism, 60 Congo Free State, 81,82 Congo-Brazzaville, 24 Congo-Zaire, 6-7, 21, 42, 77, 79, 117-18 Congo-Zaire and Belgium relations, 6; black bourgeoisie and, 85; church's power and, 82, 86, 95; civilizing mission and, 84-85, 87; colonial rule and, 82-85; Congo

Index crisis and, 89; culture and, 94-95, 98-99; democracy and, 105-6, 118; determinants of future, 78; economic independence and, 99-101; economic restructuring and, 106; economic treaty and, 90; economic-political separation and, 87-88; education and, 84-85; European collective interests and, 118; exports and, 100-101; ideological change and, 18; independence transition and, 85-89; Kabila and, 106-7, 117; Katanga secession and, 87-88; Lumumba and, 86-87, 88-89; mutual respect and, 118-19; nationalism and, 92-94, 107; nationalization and, 97, 99, 101; political reform and, 79-80; popular movements and, 78-79; post-Mobutu period and, 81; private companies' power and, 83; raw materials and, 78; ruling elite and, 83-84; rural economy and, 84-85; social consciousness and, 83; state's power and, 82-83; United States and, 81; working class and, 84-85; world political economy and, 81; worldwide cooperation and, 112-13. See also Mobutu, Joseph Desire Conte Lansana, 19 Cote d'lvoire, 10, 18-19, 23, 24-25, 29 Crem, Robert, 99-100 Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 47 De Beers Central Selling Organization, 101, 118 democracy: Congo-Zaire and, 77, 104-6, 118; liberal, 19-20; multiparty, 28, 29-30; parliamentary, 19-20 Dependency and Development in Latin America, 112 Diouf, Abdou, 25

Index Doe, Jackson E, 68 Doe, Samuel Kanyon, 7-8, 58-62, 66, 67-68,70,71,72,73 Du Bois, William E.B., 40 Eastern European countries, 27 Eastman, Ernest, 60 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 56 Economic Community Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 70 economic relations: African consumer market and, 9; economic models and, 22; export sector and, 22; foreign investment and, 24-26; growth and, 9-10, 22; imports and, 25; integration and, 23-24; international financial institutions and, 11-12; international institutions and, 28-29; marginalization and, 23, 24, 25-26, 29; national debt and, 22; negative impact of, 11-12; privatization and, 22, 23; regional development and, 15; structural adjustments and, 22-23 Economic Support Fund (ESF), 61, 62 education, 20-21, 84-85, 97-98 Egypt, 26-27, 45 Ethiopia, 21, 22, 38,42 European Bureau, 104 European Common Currency (ECC), 15, 105 European Community (EC), 25, 101 European Economic Community (EEC), 81, 105 European Union (EU), 6, 15, 105, 117-18 export sector, 22 Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 25 Faletto, Enzo, 112 Faso, Burkina, 24 Firestone Corporation, 51-53, 64, 65 Flemings, 6

129 foreign powers defined, 6 France: African investment by, 24-25, 80; Congo and, 117; Cote d'lvoire and, 18-19; foreign investment by, 42^43; post-colonial influence, 18-19, 21-22; Liberia and, 37, 48, 73; Mobutu and, 79; multiparty democracy in Africa and, 28; political stability of, 114-15 Francophone association, 19 Francophonie association, 21, 117 French, Howard W., 19 French Transnationals, 24 Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), 22 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 26 Germany, 43, 50, 57 Ghana, 10, 24, 38 global change, 3-5 global village, 5 Grandeur de la Republique, 93 Great Britain: foreign investment by, 24, 42-43, 80; Liberia and, 37, 48, 64, 73; post-colonial influence by, 18; Zaire and, 80 Greenleaf, Simon, 48 Guinea-Conakry, 19 Harper, Liberia, 48 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), 23 Hlophe, Stephen, 4 6 ^ 7 Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 18, 58 Hull, Galen, 97-98 human rights, 74 idealism, 1 imperialism, 6 internal capitalism, 35 International Court of Justice, 38 International Development Association, 25

130 International Monetary Fund (IMF): African economy and, 9-10; Congo-Zaire loans and, 104; foreign investment and, 24, 25; imperialism by, 12; Liberia and, 50, 62, 69; loans to Africa by, 22; Structural Adjustment Programs by, 11-12, 22-23, 28; U.S. interests and, 116; U.S. support of, 42 international relations: Cold War and, 1; dependency and, 17; European integration and, 27; peripheral states and, 17; world changes and, 2-5. See also Africa-foreign powers relations; North-South relations Islamization, 11 Israel, 45 Italy, 43, 80 Ivorianization, 18 Japan, 27, 43 J.E Kennedy Hospital, 54 Kabila, Laurent-Desire, 77, 80, 81, 105, 106-7, 117, 118 Karaha, Bizima, 117 Kasavubu, Joseph, 87 Katanga, Congo-Zaire, 82, 87-88 Katsouris, Christina, 25 Katwala, J. Ghifem, 100 Kennedy, John E, 41 Kenya, 21,58 Kenyatta, Jomo, 58 Kinshasa, Congo-Zaire, 78, 79, 94, 117, 100 Lagos, 57 League of Nations, 6, 37 Le Fond Belgo-Congolais dAmortissement et de Gestion (FBCAG), 89-90 Leopold II, King, 6, 81-82 liberal democracy, 19-20 liberal economy, 22 Liberia, 7, 38

Index Liberian Action Party (LAP), 68 Liberian People's Party (LPP), 68 Liberia-U.S. relations, 6; abnormality of Liberia and, 36; African-U.S. relations and, 39-45; black settlers and, 33-34, 35-36, 48; collapse of, 37; commercial bourgeoisie and, 64; culture and, 63; democratic process and, 66, 68; dependency and, 50; Doe's regime and, 58-62, 70; economic decline and, 60; economic growth and, 50, 54-55; expansion of capitalist movement and, 45-47; historical analysis of, 37; ideological change and, 18; independence and, 48-49; internal capitalism and, 35; legitimacy crisis and, 69, 70, 72; modernization and, 56-57; motives for founding Liberia and, 4 6 ^ 7 ; multilateral institutions/multinationals and, 116-17; nationalism and, 69-70, 73, 74; neo-colonial war and, 74; peripheral capitalism and, 34-35, 65, 71-72; political ideology and, 60; poverty/underdevelopment and, 67, 68-69, 72; power struggles and, 7-8; private investments and, 51-53; privatization and, 64-65, 71, 72; reconstruction and, 74, 116; resource distribution and, 66, 67; ruling class interests and, 7, 33-34, 56-58, 63-67, 71, 72; social movements and, 67-68; Tolbert era and, 56-58; Tubman era and, 53-55; twenty-first century and, 114; U.S. economic assistance and, 54-55, 58, 60-62; worldwide cooperation and, 112-13 Lloyd, Tony, 117 Lome, Togo, 25 Lowenkopf, Gus, 49 Lumumba, Patrice, 7, 86-87, 88, 90 Lumumbaism, 107

131

Index Luxemburg, 101 Maastricht Treaty, 15 Malula, Monsignor, 99 Mandela, Nelson, 26 Manifeste de la N'sele, 95 Mano River Union (MRU), 56 Marshall Plan, 25 Martens, Wilfried, 102 Marxism-Leninism, 22 Maryland, 48 Matthew, Bacchus, 59, 68 Mehmet, Ozay, 53 Mengistu, Haile Mariam, 22 Mesurado group, 65 Metallurgie d'Hoboken-Overpelt, 100 Mexico, 15, 26 Middle East, 45 Mierlo, Hans Van, 117 "Mississippi in Africa," 48 Mobutu, Joseph Desire: Africaforeign powers relations and, 22; ascension to power by, 90-91; Belgium rulers and, 79; Catholic church and, 98-99; democracy and, 8, 104-5; economic independence and, 91-92, 97; education and, 97-98; exports and, 96; foreign debt and, 101-2, 103-4; Lumumba and, 7; negative effects of rule by, 118; opposition to, 102, 105, 77-79; personal relations and, 102; politics of authenticity by, 92-96, 104, 106; socialist expansion and, 81; wealth distribution and, 96-97 Mobutuism, 78 modern capitalism, 41 Moi, Daniel arap, 21 Monrovia, Liberia, 57, 70 Montserrado, Liberia, 48 Mount Coffee Hydroelectric Dam, 54 Mouvement National Congolais Lumumba (MNC/L), 90-91

Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), 92-93, 95, 96 Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), 59, 67-68 Movemento Popular de Libertagao de Angola (MPLA), 22 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), 103 multinational corporations, 12, 65, 112 Namibia, 38 National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), 68 National Trading Company, 99-100 National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 40 nationalism, 69-70, 92-96, 107 nationalization, 97, 99, 101 Ndondo, Kengo wa, 79 Nigeria, 18 Nkrumah, Kwame, 38, 42 North American Free Trade Agreements (NAFTA), 15, 26 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 90 North-South relations: Cold War effects and, 115; Congo-Zaire and Belgium relations and, 119; economy and, 9; European collective interests and, 117-18; global economy and, 112; labor and, division of, 111; multinationals and, 116; political stability and, 114-15; post-Cold War transition and, 113-14; resource distribution and, 111; social progress requirements and, 119-20 Ntalaja-Nzongola, George, 6 Oculi, Okello, 11 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 24 Packenham, Robert A., 44

132 Paris Club, 101,104 parliamentary democracy, 19-20 Pattasse, Ange, 22 Peace Corps, 61 Peemans, Jean-Philippe, 82 People's Redemption Council (PRC), 58-59 Perry, Ruth, 73 Persephone Economou, 24 Petrofina, 100 Plekhanov, George, 46 Political Bureau, 97 Poos, Jacques, 117 Portugal, 18 primitive capitalism, 63, 70 Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL), 67 Progressive People's Party (PPP), 59 Radmann, Wolf, 88,91 Reagan, Ronald, 44, 60 realism, 1 Resistencia Nacional Mogambicana (RENAMO), 21 Rice Riot, 67 Robertsfield International Airport, 51, 57 Ruggie, John, 24 Russia, 11-12, 15-16,27 Sandbrook, Richard, 21 Savimbi, Jonas, 21, 40 Sawyer, Amos, 59, 67, 68, 73 Schlesinger, Arthur, 41 scientific mysticism, 2 Seko, Sese. See Mobutu, Joseph Desire Sendwe, Jason, 87 Senegal, 25, 29 Shaba copper mines, 85 slavery, 11, 14, 35 Smith, Stewart, 42 Snow, Donald, 42 social change and imperialism, 8-9 socialism, 22, 60

Index socialist expansion, 81 socialist market economy, 9 Societe des Carrieres et Mines du Congo (GECAMINES), 92, 99 Societe Generate (SG), 83 Societe Generate Congolaise de Minerals (GECOMINES), 91-92 Societe Generate de Belgique, 88, 92 Societe Generate de Minerals (SGM), 92, 99, 100 Societe Zairoise du Commerce (SOZACOM), 99-100 Somalia, 41,42 South Africa, 26-27, 38, 45, 68 sovereignty suicide, 11-12 Soviet Union, 22, 27, 57 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 89, 90 Stalin, Joseph, 115 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS), 11-12,22-23,28 Sudan, 42 sustainable development, 3 Swing, William, 59-60 systemness, 3-4 systems analysis, 8 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., 83, 88 Taylor, Charles, 66, 70, 73, 74 Texaf S A, 100 Tipoteh, Togba Nah, 59 Togo, 25 Tolbert, Stephen, 56-58, 65, 66, 71 True Whig Party, 58, 59, 63, 67 Tshisekedi, Etienne, 79, 80 Tshombe, Moise, 87, 89, 90 Tubman, William V. S., 34, 37, 53-55,63,66,71 UCO Engineering SA-NV, 100 Uganda, 23, 28 Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (UMHK), 83, 88, 91-92 Union Sacree, 79 United Nations, 6, 115 United People's Party (UPP), 68

Index United States: aid to Africa by, 26-27; Congo-Zaire and, intersts in, 81; European collective interests and, 117; foreign investment in Zaire by, 80; hegamonic power of, 116; investment in Africa by, 26; Mobutu and, 79; multiparty democracy in Africa and, 28; NAFTA and, 15, 26; political interests in Africa by, 27-28; political leverage in Africa by, 114; postCold War transition and, 113—14; Russia and, 15-16. See also Liberia-U.S. relations U.S.A.I.D. programs, 26 U.S. Congress, 61 U.S. Embassy (Congo-Zaire), 78 U.S. Embassy (Monrovia), 70 University of Liberia, 68, 70 Utexafrica Group, 100 Vatican, 98 Von Bismarck, Otto, 82

133 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 3, 34 Walloons, 6 World Bank: African economy and, 9-10; Congo-Zaire and, 103, 104; imperialism and, 12; Liberia and, 50, 69; loans to Africa by, 22; rural/poverty issues and, 28-29; Structural Adjustment Programs by, 11-12, 22-23, 28; sub-Saharan Africa and, 25; U.S. interests and, 116; U.S. support of, 42 World Economic Outlook, 25 World War II, 53 Yeltsin, Boris, 27 Youngman's Colonization Society of Pennsylvania, 48 Zaireanization, 96-97, 99 Zaire Fina, 100 Zaire-Sep, 100 Zartman, William, 10

About the Author TUKUMBI LUMUMBA-KASONGO is Herbert J. Charles and Florence Charles Faegre Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of International Studies at Wells College, Senior Fellow at the Institute for African Development at Cornell University, Visiting Scholar in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University, and Director of CEPARRED. He has taught throughout Africa and the United States and has published extensively on international relations, social movements, and structural adjustment programs in Africa. He is author of The Rise ofMultipartyism and Democracy in the Context of Global Change: The Case of Africa (Praeger, 1998).

ISBN 0-275-96086-2

HARDCOVER BAR CODE

The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations

Political Theory and International Relations

Political Theory and International Relations

The State and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

The Environment and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

Security and International Relations

Religion and International Relations

Technology and international relations

Ideology and International relations

Meaning and international relations

Culture and International Relations

Realism and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 65)

The state and international relations

Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa, A

International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory?

The Foreign Encounter in Myth and Religion: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy, Volume 2

Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Warlords in International Relations

Issues In International Relations

Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Moralizing International Relations: Called to Account (Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy)

Automorphisms and Equivalence Relations in Topological Dynamics

International Relations

Refugees in International Relations

The Economic Factor in International Relations: A Brief Introduction

The history and nature of international relations

International Relations and the Philosophy of History

Japan-Africa Relations

Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's Foreign Relations 1972-1989

The Dynamics of Economic and Political Relations Between Africa and Foreign Powers: A Study in International Relations

Political Theory and International Relations

Political Theory and International Relations

The State and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

The Environment and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

Security and International Relations

Religion and International Relations

Technology and international relations

Ideology and International relations

Meaning and international relations

Culture and International Relations

Realism and International Relations (Themes in International Relations)

The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 65)

The state and international relations

Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa, A

International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory?

The Foreign Encounter in Myth and Religion: Modes of Foreign Relations and Political Economy, Volume 2

Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Ideas, Interests and Foreign Aid (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Warlords in International Relations

Issues In International Relations

Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Moralizing International Relations: Called to Account (Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy)

Automorphisms and Equivalence Relations in Topological Dynamics

International Relations

Refugees in International Relations

The Economic Factor in International Relations: A Brief Introduction

The history and nature of international relations

International Relations and the Philosophy of History

Japan-Africa Relations

Between Self-Determination and Dependency: Jamaica's Foreign Relations 1972-1989

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