The Core of Japanese Democracy: Latent Interparty Politics

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The Core of Japanese Democracy

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The Core of Japanese Democracy Latent Interparty Politics Yasumasa Kuroda

THE CORE OF JAPANESE DEMOCRACY

© Yasumasa Kuroda, 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–6901–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kuroda, Yasumasa, 1931– The core of Japanese democracy : latent interparty politics / Yasumasa Kuroda. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6901–9 1. Japan. Kokkai—Decision making. 2. Legislators—Japan. 3. Japan— Politics and government—1945—Decision making. 4. Negotiation—Japan. 5. Democracy—Japan. 6. Political parties—Japan. I. Title. JQ1654.K87 2005 320.952—dc22

2004061824

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: June 2005 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

For all my former students


Contents

List of Figures

viii

List of Tables

ix

Preface

x

Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Dissimulation, Enigma, Formalist, Prismatic Society to Bilayer Theory

xii

1

2. The Bilayer Theory

27

3. Japanese Politics in Bilayer Perspective

57

4. The History of IPRC Politics: 1890–1993

91

5. The Origin and Nature of the Bilayer Structure

135

6. The Core of Japanese Democracy

143

7. Conclusion: Summary and Implications

185

Appendix

209

Glossary

211

Notes

215

References

237

Index

245

List of Figures

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1

Abridged Scattergram by Language and Nationality Language, Culture, and Government External Pressure and Bilayer Structure in the Diet Latent IPRC in the Legislative Process The First 10 Steps in Bill Drafting and Introduction by Cabinet to the Diet

43 49 54 54 64

List of Tables

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.18 6.19 6.20

Middle Response by Nationality and Language in Use High Loading Variables on the First Dimension High Loading Variables on the Second Dimension Logo-self-centrism versus Rashomonesque-diffuse-self The Ruling LDP IPRC Chairs and the HR HMC Chairs, 1955–1993 Expenditure of the LDP IPRC, 1965 IPRC Expenditure and Events by Duration System Category by Era Democracy: Favorable or Unfavorable Voter Eligibility, Turnout, and Candidate Competition in Historical Perspective Interest in General Election Preference to be Born Woman Next Time by Year Japanese Superiority Complex by Year Leave It up to Outstanding Political Leaders by Year Alienation and Crime by Year Engel’s Coefficient by Year Per Capita GDP by Year Living Standard by Year Your Standard of Living in the Last Decade Welfare Recipient by Year Leveling of Income Distribution by Year Annual Pay of Chief Executives and Entry-Level Employees by Year Average Life Expectancy by Gender and Year Infant Mortality Rate by Year Total Number of Suicide, Suicide Rate, and Suicide Reasons by Year Unemployment Rate by Year Getting Beyond Compulsory Education by Year Summary Findings: The Dynamics of Democracy

41 42 43 47 101 110 119 137 151 153 154 156 156 158 162 167 168 169 170 170 171 172 174 174 176 177 178 179

Preface

I have a confession to make at the outset. I taught Japanese politics since the early 1960s through the early 2000s without discussing what is called “kokutai” politics in Japanese1 or what I refer to here as “Interparty Relations Committee politics” (IPRC politics). I plead guilty for not teaching my students what I now consider the core of the legislative process at the highest level. I offer my sincere apology for my ignorance to my former students. As a way of making amends, I have written this book to redeem myself in the field as I retire from active teaching. I also wish to dedicate this book to all of my former students who were not told of what I have written herein. I taught my students that the Japanese have a way of negotiating behind closed doors like many politicians in most countries, including in international organizations such as NATO, EC, or UN, but more so, comparatively speaking. However, like many of my colleagues, I did not go into the details of what I meant by “nemawashi” or informal prior consultation in a political context until I myself learned of the existence of the IPRC in 1990 when I organized the Centennial Conference on the Japanese Diet at the University of Hawaii and invited the (now late) former prime minister Noboru Takeshita, current prime minister Jun’ichirh Koizumi and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) secretary general Tsuruo Yamaguchi, all veterans of IPRC politics. I also invited Keisuke Hi of the Yomiuri Shimbun, who delivered a paper on IPRC politics, and others. It was then that I began to see the latent power structure of the Japanese Diet that was only dimly lit. In throwing light on a hitherto hidden part of politics, I became interested in how this new finding relates to democracy. The title of the book, thus, is The Core of Japanese Democracy. To organize what I have found in rooms behind closed doors, I have developed a language-based model of bilayer governmental structure from data I gathered from cross-language surveys on mother culture constraints in international understanding sponsored by the Toyota Foundation in the 1980s. After introducing the subject of IPRC and reviewing its literature in chapter 1, I explain my bilayer theory of Japanese politics in chapter 2. I then apply the bilayer theory in chapters 3–5 to examine the nature and scope of IPRC

Preface

xi

politics from the literature and interview data I collected. Then, in chapter 6, I focus on Japanese democracy in view of IPRC politics that politicians have hitherto successfully hidden from the English-speaking world during the Cold War era for reasons you will see. In the words of Tomi’ichi Murayama, an IPRC veteran who became prime minister of a coalition government between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the JSP, he was acting like a Musashi2 using two swords, a lofty socialist ideal manifestly and latently holding hands with archrival LDP counterparts.3 Many outside observers were surprised to see two archrivals who fought like cats and dogs for 38 years from 1955 to 1993 form the coalition government in 1994. They should not have been surprised, if they had had a glimpse of what lay behind the thick fig leaves of the Japanese legislative process at the highest levels. The last substantive chapter is devoted to the question of democracy. After characterizing the communitarian nature of Japanese democracy as compared to individually based American democracy, I conclude the book by discussing the validity and reliability of my findings and their implications in terms of both theory and substance in chapter 7. My objective in writing this book is to reveal and explain the latent dimensions of the legislative process in the Diet—briefly touched upon by a limited number of authors on Japanese politics but never explored in any detail to this date. I do so from a language-based bilayer theory. For this purpose, I reviewed as much literature as possible and interviewed IPRC members of various parties, their officials, and others, mostly journalists, who are knowledgeable about the subject. I also explain how the bilayer nature of the Diet affected the way Japan has developed its parliamentary democracy since 1890, which is different in significant ways when compared with American democracy. I use Japanese words in the book when there is no single suitable equivalent word in English. A glossary of Japanese terms can be found at the end of the book. Most of the Japanese terms used in the book are familiar to students of Japanese culture, with the exception of the parliamentary locution used particularly among IPRC members. I would be delighted if you find answers to some of the questions you have about Japanese politics in this book and raise new questions as a result of knowing some of what takes place on the other side of the closed doors in the Diet building. Yasumasa Kuroda Honolulu and Yokohama

Acknowledgments

When I started to work on this IPRC project, I was still actively teaching at the University of Hawaii in the 1990s. As I retired, I moved to Waseda University in Tokyo as an exchange researcher. I felt strange and yet somewhat nostalgic to return to the University where I started my university education over a half century ago. I am now a research associate at the Institute of Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University in Tokyo as I complete the manuscript. In addition to these institutions where I continued my work on the project, I owe much to foundations, institutions, and individuals who supported my research on this project directly or indirectly to whom I am much obliged. Allow me to list some of them. Institutionally, I am thankful to foundations that made the IPRC project possible. They include Japan Studies Endowment Grants and Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Hawaii, Sagawa Kyibin, Toyota Foundation, Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Political Public Relations, Kansai University, Waseda University, and Center for Global Partnership. I interviewed a number of Diet members, IPRC staff members, journalists, and others on IPRC politics in 1997 and 1998. I am deeply grateful to the following individuals: Diet Members. Hirotaka Akamatsu, Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) IPRC chairman, May 15, 1997 in his HR (House of Representatives) Building 2 office; Khichi Hamada, former LDP HR member, May 14, 1997 in his private office in Nagata-chh; Shichirh Ith, HR president, May 13, 1997 in HR Presidential Building; Jun’ichirh Koizumi, LDP, May 13, 1997 in his Minister of Welfare office; Mayumi Moriyama, LDP, May 14, 1997 in her HR Building 2 office; Naoto Minezaki, DPJ HC member, March 26, 1998 in his HC office; Kanezh Muraoka, LDP IPRC chairman, May 16, 1997, in his HR Building 2 office; Kansei Nakano, Shinshinth IPRC chairman, May 16, 1997, in his Shinshin party IPRC office in the Diet Building; Noboru Takeshita, LDP, May 2, 1994 in his Nagata-chh office; Hajime Tamura, LDP, May 15, 1998 in his Hirakawa-chh office; Iwao Teramae, Japan Communist Party

Acknowledgments

xiii

(JCP) IPRC chairman, May 19, 1997 in his HR office; Tsuruo Yamaguchi, JSP HR, March 27, 1998, in JSP Headquarters. Party Officials. Hiroshi Hoshina, executive director for the LDP IPRC office, May 12, 1997 in the LDP IPRC office in the Diet Building; Shigenobu Tamura, May 12, 1997, the LDP Policy Research Affairs Committee Research Specialist in the LDP Headquarters Building coffee shop; Takanobu Shimizu, LDP International Bureau Executive Director, May 15, 1997 in the LDP Headquarters Building coffee shop; Journalists. Yasuyuki Aoki, May 15, 1997, Asahi Shimbun’s political reporter in the Japan Press Center Restaurant; Yukio Matsuyama, former chief editorial writer for the Asahi Shimbun in the Japan Press Center Restaurant, May 15, 1997; Shhichi Oikawa, Director of Yomiuri Research Division, May 16, 1997 at his Yomiuri Shimbun office; Hisashi Ozaki, former editorial writer for Yomiuri, May 16, 1997 in the same office as above; Keisuke Hi, formally with Yomiuri, over the phone September 9, 2004. I delivered a paper on IPRC co-authored with Yoshie Kobayashi on IPRC politics in 1997 at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (Kuroda and Kobayashi 1997). On the subject of Japanese communitarian democracy, I delivered another paper the following year at the APSA meeting co-authored with Kate Zhou and Naoto Yoshikawa (Kuroda et al. 1998). I incorporated parts of these two papers into this book. Now, I finally have this book completed thanks to so many people who so kindly shared their precious moments with me on the subject. Some such as the late former prime minister Takeshita, the late former MITI minister Keijirh Murata, the late Dr. Chikio Hayashi or the late professor Isao Kitaoka from whom I learned so much are no longer with us. In the process of organizing international conferences that led me to start the current project and to gather data for the IPRC project, I came to be indebted to Neil Abercrombie, George Akita, Nobuo Asai, Lonny Carlile, James A. Dator, Akio Endh, David Fouse, Richard A. Gephart, Richard Halloran, Chikio Hayashi, Michisada Hirose, Yhichi Ishikawa, Sam Jameson, Isao Kitaoka, Takehiko Kiyohara, Jun’ichirh Koizumi, Tetsuo Kondh, Takeshige Kunimasa, Charles Lake, George McGovern, Norman Y. Mineta, Takayoshi Miyagawa, Nobuo Morikawa, Mayumi Moriyama, Keijirh Murata, Kabun Muth, Keisuke Hi, Shhichi Oikawa, Leon Panetta, Fred W. Riggs, William V. Roth, Jr., Patricia Scott Schroeder, Adlai E. Stevenson, Yoshikatsu Takahashi, Noboru Takeshita, Hikaru Takeuchi, Yasumasa Tanaka, Naoki Tanaka, Yoshiaki Watanabe, Tsuruo Yamaguchi, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Junya Yano, and others. I wish to express my gratitude to all those who made it possible for me to see this book in print to be read by those who are interested in knowing the

xiv

Acknowledgments

hitherto hidden but crucial part of Japanese politics at the highest level. In the tradition of Buddhism, I am extending my appreciation to all living beings including plants, trees, weeds, cicadas, microorganisms, and everything else that enabled me to sustain myself on earth to complete the present task. However, I am especially thankful to all those listed above who provided me with information I needed to complete the book. In addition, I wish to thank my daughter Kamilla McClelland and my wife Miyoko who have assisted me in a variety of ways. Editor Anthony Wahl and others along with two anonymous reviewers kindly provided me with suggestions to improve the quality of the present work. They are in no way responsible for any errors or omissions in the present work nor for my interpretation of the data herein.

1 Introduction: Dissimulation, Enigma, Formalist, Prismatic Society to Bilayer Theory

Benjamin Disraeli, British prime minister in the nineteenth century, characterized the practice of politics in the East as “dissimulation”; more recently, a Dutch journalist (van Wolferen 1989) has described the Japanese character, if there is one, as being “enigmatic” and elusive. A few American journalists have made insightful observations. Richard Halloran (1969) writes about Japan in terms of “images and realities.” Likewise, Sam Jameson observes that revolutionary changes in appearance in Japanese politics contrast starkly with the core of Japanese politics, which, remarkably, remains the same (2001). Knowledgeable American political scientist Chitoshi Yanaga makes a penetrating observation when he says Japan’s modernization and democratization efforts were more cosmetic than substantial (1956, 4–5). Jon Woronoff (1986, 384) echoes Yanaga’s analysis. American historian George Akita (2005) cites Aritomo Yamagata to verify that it was the intent of Meiji leaders to modernize in appearance in order to preserve the Japanese way internally. A cross-culturally sensitive political scientist, Fred W. Riggs (1964), proposes a model called “prismatic” society to explain the nature of modernization in developing countries. More recently, leading Japanese politics specialist Gerald L. Curtis (1999, 9) characterizes the Japanese state as “refractive” and includes at least a few pages on kokutai politics. I argue that some of these observers reveal themselves more than or as much as they reveal the nature of the Japanese state. The question is why, and from whose perspective is the Japanese state dissimulative, enigmatic, democratic, prismatic, or refractive? It may be that, to the Japanese, their politics may be logical, clear, straight, rational, and sensible as can be. This is not to deny that the masses prefer to see Japanese politics done the way Prime Minister Koizumi is conducting himself—being more open and understandable to the public, for example. He is trying to portray politics more on the lines of

2


“what you see is what you get.” His popularity soared to over 80 percent in the early summer of 2001 though it is currently in decline because of his position on keeping troops in Iraq, Social Security reform, and other domestic issues. His popularity in relation to his predecessor Yoshirh Mori’s dismal single-digit ratings toward the end of his regime is phenomenal. However, Koizumi, too, is, or at least has been, an integral part of the power structure that is admittedly “what you see is what it is not”—“images and realities” that are different, as Halloran describes Japan.1 I am in total agreement with Curtis (1999, 10) when he says that Japanese politics is not necessarily enigmatic or defiant of systematic inquiry. He correctly claims that the Japanese have a “particular logic.” Once one understands that logic, everything makes sense, he writes.2 Hence, the title of his book is “The Logic of Japanese Politics.” Curtis (1999, 16) went on to say that history and language is a sine qua non to the understanding of a society.3 I could not agree with him more on these two points. However, I find his next point about the role of culture in explaining politics puzzling and in need of further explication (Curtis 1999, 10–11) when he claims that culture cannot explain Japanese politics. He cites the existence of numerous conflicts in Japanese history as proof of his contention. By saying so, he assumes that Japanese culture extols harmony; therefore, there should have been no conflicts in Japan. By citing the example of Tanaka’s decision to recognize China, Curtis claims that the prime minister ignored the giri-ninjh4 Japan held for Taiwan (1999, 13–14). The concept of giri-ninjh also includes Japan’s giri or obligation to a much larger population of mainland China. Decisions involving giri-ninjh often involve dilemmas. I believe in this instance, the late prime minister Tanaka’s predecessor Eisaku Sath was a friend of the Taiwan lobby, which made it impossible for him to recognize the PRC during his tenure. Tanaka also had his giri toward the Japanese people, a large majority of whom have expressed a desire to recognize the regime for many years. I am afraid Curtis’s understanding of giri-ninjh was too narrow to prove the concept useless in explaining politics. Harmony has been emphasized officially ever since Prince Regent Shhtoku promulgated the 17-article “Constitution” in 604.5 It reads among other things: Let harmony be the guiding principle of our country. My understanding is that one of the key reasons for the Japanese to have developed harmony as the “guiding principle” is that there was much conflict in society, such as the religious war between Shinth and Buddhism at the time of Prince Shhtoku. Logic would have it that harmony is a key norm, not a fact, because of the existence of conflict. Since culture seems to constitute an important part of Curtis’s book, it would have been helpful if he explicitly defined what he meant by culture unambiguously. I use the concept of culture as we defined it in our book (Hayashi and Kuroda 1997) following basically an

Introduction

3

anthropological definition offered by Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945, 97–98) who define it as “an historically derived system of explicit and implicit design for living” for a group of people. An implicit design is a key derived from language that must be understood to have an insider view of the world under study.6 Furthermore, I do not know of any social scientists who argue that Japanese culture is a sufficient condition to explain politics. I certainly argue that culture is an important contributory condition if not a necessary one; but it is surely not a sufficient condition to explain Japanese politics. And in some cases, such as in explaining the Diet’s legislative process, culture constitutes a necessary condition. Some parts of a culture are more enduring than others, some more pervasive than others, some more common in other cultures, and some more unique than others. I perceive of culture in probabilistic terms, not in strict Aristotelian logic—at times more in the earlier tradition of Protagoras of Adera. How then do I propose to approach the core of Japanese politics?

The Core of Parliamentary Politics: Interparty Relations Committee Politics Integrative Approach My objective is to approach the understanding of Japanese politics, particularly its core of Diet politics, from an integrative perspective of comparing Japan with other nations, especially the United States and the tradition of humanities and sciences, that is, interpretive and positivistic heritages.7 I do not find an institution in the United States comparable with the politics of Interparty Relations Committees (IPRCs) in Japan. There are no comparable committees in U.S. Congress that maintain offices with large party budgets. Most other countries use the rules committee, management committee, and other openly institutionalized means through which many IPRC functions are performed. However, politics in all countries operates behind closed doors to varying extents. The point, nevertheless, is that no ruling party in any country provides opposition parties with as much campaign funds as Japan. Hence, the present study is comparative in design, since its theory is derived from our comparative language surveys in the United States, Japan and the Arab world. Moreover, the data used is comparative in the sense that it is diachronic within Japan. As such, my presentation, interpretation, and findings of data will be framed within a comparative perspective. As Curtis speaks of the logic of “Nagata-chh” and “inside the beltway,”8 I have used a limited number of Japanese terms on the Diet and introduced some Nagata-chh parlance from which I hope to infer implicit meanings that they carry in generating a particular subculture in my concluding chapter.

4


Who makes the law in Japan? Who constitutes the government? The Japanese constitution in Article 41 clearly stipulates that the Diet is the highest organ of state power and the sole law-making organ of the State. However, the undisputed fact has been that the bureaucracy has played a crucial role in making laws.9 Japanese bureaucrats, as in many parliamentary systems, play a greater role in drafting and guiding bills in the legislative process than elected representatives in the Diet.10 No matter where and by and for whom bills are initiated, proposed, examined, and revised by nonelected officials, bills must be introduced to the Diet and must pass the House of Representatives (HR) and the House of Councilors (HC) before becoming law. The theory developed in this book to shed further light on Japanese politics is based on the work of the authors cited in my opening paragraph. In the existing English-language literature about Japanese politics in general, and Japanese parliamentary politics in particular, most authors remain formalistic, very vague, and general.11 Certainly that was my impression when delivering a paper on IPRC politics at the 1997 American Political Science Association meeting (Kuroda and Kobayashi 1997).

IPRC Politics Defined IPRC politics centers on the role played by kokkai taisaku i’inkai (the IPRC) located in the Diet building. The IPRC in the legislative process at the highest level of policy making in the nation is developed by each party for the enhancement of its objectives in legislation through informal negotiation with other parties and government agencies.12 The IPRC is, however, not a part of the parliamentary standing or ad hoc committee system but it is outside of the Diet, a party committee.

IPRC Politics in Theoretical Perspective Many authors on Japanese politics writing in English present only the official or formal version of Japanese politics. Some, on the other hand, make general statements, such as the need for closed-door consultations in the Diet, the highest organ of the state, without going into detail on how powerful interparty committees with their own Diet budgets and offices operate outside the legal framework. There are some exceptions. For example, the last book by the late Ichirh Murakawa (2000) bifurcates Japanese policy-making process into formal and informal versions. Leading scholars of Japanese politics, such as Gerald L. Curtis (1988, 247)13 and Scott C. Flanagan (Richardson and Flanagan 1984, 189), talk about the importance of nemawashi in Japanese politics, but they fail to spell out how and when nemawashi actually operates. They correctly tell us that the practice of nemawashi plays an important part in politics, which is empirically true. They say that it is important to negotiate and

Introduction

5

consult with proper parties in advance to obtain an understanding before a formal decision is made. For example, Khichirh Agata (1997, 292) says that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wanted to avoid using its majority position in parliament to pass a telecommunication bill under study and offered an amendment to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). His description of the policy-making process implies that the decision-making system does not work the way it does in a liberal democracy, in which the majority has the power to pass bills. He stops there and does not extrapolate. Some authors, such as Gerald L. Curtis (1999, 118–119) and J.A.A. Stockwin (1982, 168), offer partial answers to this discrepancy with the West. Stockwin reports that opposition parties embarrass the LDP by disrupting its agenda and making it look bad as a dictatorial party, not respecting legitimate opposition parties when they boycott a Diet session. In his most recent work, Curtis (1999) explains the covert nature of IPRC politics in relation to the gikai un’ei i’inkai or House Management Committee (HMC) for the first time in his work and spends 2 out of 242 pages on the subject that Kurimoto (1997) says constitutes the core of Japanese politics.14 Curtis (1999, 16) writes that if an observer of Japanese politics fails to understand a language and culture, the subject becomes exotic or enigmatic, as inferred by Disraeli and van Wolferen. He correctly places language as a necessary but not sufficient condition to understand politics. I am in complete agreement with him. It takes language proficiency to be able to see the crucial importance of the IPRC in Japan politics. Perhaps that is why it took someone like him with his language proficiency and cultural sophistication to even mention IPRC politics, however briefly. Diet members who should be in the know, such as LDP leader Khichi Kath (1995, 12–13)15 and scholar-turned-politician Shin’ichirh Kuriomoto (1997, 57–59) tell us that IPRC politics is the core of Japanese Diet politics. After reading and speaking with my informant political leaders, including IPRC members, journalists and scholars, I, too, came to the same conclusion that Kath did if we consider the amount of contributions the IPRC makes to decisional outcomes in the Diet. After introducing how the Japanese Diet committee system is organized, an otherwise well-informed Richardson singles out the HMC in both houses as most influential in the operation of the Diet (1997, 129). He says, “It is here that the schedules of Diet proceedings are decided, including the schedules for debates and votes in both Diet committees and plenary sessions.” What he says is the official version of how the Diet operates.16 Empirically speaking, in his statement, the verb “decided” should be replaced by “announced.” While routine decisions are made by the HMC, the IPRC, behind closed doors, makes most if not all important and controversial decisions in the Diet. The LDP IPRC appoints the LDP members of the IPRC.

6


Fred W. Riggs (1964) proposed the model of the prismatic society, which in some ways resembles our theory but is different in other important perspectives. By using the metaphor of a prism, his model focuses on how a society develops functionally specific “diffracted” organizations from a “fused” pristine society (1964, 27–30). Although there are several important similarities between his prismatic society and my bilayer theory, the latter departs from the former. We shall return to his prismatic model in chapter 2. Japanese politics seems to vary with each author’s viewpoint. It is Rashomonesque.17 Authors on Japanese politics cited above are largely correct in their generalizations, but none provides systematic empirical data to buttress claims nor offers any theory to fully and systematically explain why formal political institutions do not behave the way they do in the West, and why the majority has no right to pass a bill in the highest organ of the state, the Diet. The objective of the book is designed to fill these lacunae.

The Objective What I propose to do in this book is generate a theory and provide as much detailed data as I can to prove the usefulness of the theory in explaining how the IPRC affects the entire legislative process in the Diet, from bill drafting to final voting. In doing so, one will be able to see why the LDP spent as much as $70 million or even more on its dealings with the opposition parties in 1993, the last year of the 1955 system era,18 when it had the ruling party position. The reader of this work will see why the LDP can form a coalition government with Socialists and why it chose Tomi’ichi Murayama, a socialist leader, as its prime minister in 1994. Likewise, the reader will see why Socialists used to speak so vehemently of their lofty idealism so far away removed from reality during the Cold War era under the 1955 system. There was a rational reason for their apparent quixotic behavior. Many actors, but not all, knew why they were saying what they were saying. In a way, socialists were realistic, rational, and pragmatic. To provide a key to make sense out of a seemingly chaotic or Rashomonesque world of politics, I present sufficient data to prove the existence of a bilayer power structure in the Diet and suggest a probability that similar dual structures have existed for centuries. After demonstrating the applicability of bilayer theory to the entire political history of Japan, I present an implication of the prominent role that IPRC politics played especially during the Cold War era on the growth of Japanese democracy.

Bilayer Theory I propose this bilayer theory to explain Japanese politics in a comparative perspective. The term bilayer here is meant to convey the nature of Japanese power

Introduction

7

structure, which consists of at least manifest and latent layers in the sense that what you see in many cases is only visible tatemae19 part of what is going on. Briefly put, Japan has a formal tatemae version of what is happening in accordance with the laws of the nation for public consumption, and a latent reality (hon’ne) that is seldom and only sporadically reported by Japanese scholars. Leading Liberal Democrat Jun’ichirh Koizumi, on May 13, 1997, in his Ministry of Health and Welfare office, replied to my inquiry with the few firm words of “that is something we do that we cannot talk about.” He could not deny his ignorance of the IPRC, since I spoke with him the day before in the LDP IPRC office in the Diet building. We discussed other issues, but he remained silent on the taboo. One well-known political leader refused twice my request for an interview, through two contacts. This leader probably wanted to maintain her public image. Sane Japanese seldom discuss their hon’ne publicly. Americans are more open about their hon’ne. As I point out, I propose that this difference originates from the nature of the language we use. The Japanese public suspects that politicians make decisions behind closed doors, but many accept the practice since they themselves engage in similar compartmentalizing activities themselves. Some citizens however, loudly complain about how their representatives make their real decisions behind closed doors. But both public and IPRC members involved in hidden interparty politics know that the former’s complaint too often is tatemae—a normative behavior. Some readers might ask why political leaders are openly engaged in interparty negotiation in privacy? First, IPRC members only show what they want others to see. This is much like the traditional Chinese dress with the split toward the bottom end showing the lower part of the legs, which also makes walking easier. Second, the IPRC is like kuroko or black figures who inconspicuously assist actors or dancers in traditional Japanese Kabuki or Noh plays on stage. Japanese audiences see them, but suspend belief for the sake of the play; they are focused on the actors. Third, not every Japanese knows of the existence of the IPRC. Only knowledgeable Japanese are aware of the existence of the IPRC. Fourth, some public-spirited citizens ask for more sunshine in the policy-making process, to no avail. To respond to such a cry from the public, the current popular yet controversial Nagano prefectural governor, Yasuo Tanaka, literally installed glass walls around his office to show that he has nothing to hide. Visitors are welcome to see him through clear windows. He is an exceptional figure in Japanese politics. Younger workers cannot openly complain to their superiors unless they are at a drinking party after work. They may pretend that they are drunk and engage in a frank discussion of what they really think with their superiors. As Chie Nakano says, Japan is a vertical society where status counts. This is true even after death, for every deceased receives a name that a Buddhist priest considers appropriate, which indicates a ranking in the next world.

8


This nature of Japanese politics leads Disraeli, van Wolferen, and other Eurocentric observers socialized in Aristotelian literalism to conclude it is enigmatic or inscrutable. In view of the nature of the proposed theory, how then can we gather data to test the validity of the bilayer theory? A few daring politicians and a good number of journalists have spoken out to reveal parts of politics that the Diet members do not wish to discuss. I relied on my own interviews of current and former Diet members, the IPRC staff members and journalists, and written works in Japanese by mostly journalists and politicians for the present research. This book focuses on Diet politics in general, and the role played by political parties in passing bills in particular, from a sustained bilayer theory perspective. In short, how and why does the Diet manage to perform its primary function of passing laws the way it has been, particularly during the 1955 system era? A bill once submitted must pass through an appropriate committee, then the HR session, and then the same process is repeated in the HC. The Diet must also set priorities in passing certain bills over others. How is this process managed? A formal answer to the question is what one finds in most books describing the layers of Diet structure. However, the bilayer theory enables the reader to see layers hitherto undiscussed, like the other side of the Moon. Our focus is on IPRC politics, which constitutes a latent layer of the bilayer system. Officially speaking, the IPRC is not a part of the Diet, but it is a party organ. The press often refers to it as the IPRC for short. It literally means the politics of the Diet Countermeasure Committee, a powerful version of the HMC, whose function is largely ceremonial for public consumption. Hence, I intend to go beyond what most authors cover on the core of Japanese politics, to systematically reveal as much as I can as an outsider looking in, by covering the literature in Japanese and asking questions of people who have been involved in IPRC politics from a sustained bilayer theory perspective. I shall introduce the bilayer theory in full in chapter 2.

Lacuna The selection of the subject is based on a glaring lacuna that exists between the reality of Diet politics and the existing literature in English and, to a lesser degree, in Japanese language materials. This deep gap prevented outsiders, including many in Japan, from seeing the hidden power structure at the highest level of the legislative process in Japan. The existence of the lacuna is clearly demonstrated by reviewing questions by many observers of Japanese politics as reproduced here. Why do such well-known foreign observers of Japanese politics, such as Disraeli of the nineteenth century and van Wolferen of the twentieth century,

Introduction

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label Japanese politics as elusive, and what do they see as deceiving, as Halloran implies in his book? Why does Japan fail to produce charismatic leaders? Why is it that Makiko Tanaka, who was most popular among Japanese politicians in 2001, could not succeed Yoshirh Mori as prime minister? Why do politicians continue to engage in activities behind closed doors? Why is it that a majority cannot pass law in the Japanese Diet unless it receives the nod from minority parties? What does it take to obtain “permission” from opposition parties? Is Japan an undemocratic state where a ruling party with majority seats in the Diet cannot make law? I found bilayer theory to be most useful in answering a number of puzzles about Japanese politics, be it characterized as being dissimulative, elusive, enigmatic, or misleading. The book is useful to the extent that it makes the reader see things not seen openly before and better able to explain why politics operates the way it does in Japan. Therein lies my ultimate objective in writing this work.

The Value of IPRC Politics Another question I wanted to address is the value of IPRC politics to Japanese. Is it beneficial or detrimental? The question of how IPRC affects the growth of democracy in Japan will be discussed in chapter 6.

Beneficial Nature of IPRC Politics What we can learn from the literature thus far if Curtis (1988) and Flanagan (Richardson and Flanagan 1984) cited above were correct, is that extensive prior consultations behind closed doors are necessary for government decision making. This results in a hollowing of the Diet. Indeed, many critical observers have pointed to the hollowing of Japanese political institutions.20 I, for one, agree with their observations although I disagree with their recommendation to have an ideal of a liberal democracy on Japanese soil as it exists in the United States where pros and cons are openly presented on the basis of what each representative articulates as her or his own views or interests. The reason for my departure from the supporters of open democracy by majority stems from my understanding of the nature of Japan that makes such an attempt an impossible task. Here I also depart from Kurimoto, who claims the reason lies in modern legislative systems that allow minorities through such tactics as the filibuster and other methods to delay the process (Kurimoto 1997, 57–58). For this reason, he says that all democratic legislatures in the world make secret dealings between ruling parties and opposition parties behind closed doors like the IPRC does in Japan. Hence, he says IPRC politics is here to stay. I would contend that one could observe some maneuverings behind the eye of public scrutiny on some issues on a more individual

10


basis among Congressional members in the United States for example, but not on a party basis. Even in an international organization, such as NATO or UN, where prior consultation on controversial issues among major partners may be routine, it is nothing like what the Japanese do. It is not the intent of the authors to imply that this type of nemawashi takes place only in Japan, since it certainly does in the West as well. I recall speaking in the early 1970s with the University of Hawaii president who served as U.S. ambassador to NATO prior to his appointment to the University. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland responded to my question of how to pass a resolution or bill at NATO by informing me that he would first check with the British, French, and other key partners in NATO informally in advance. After receiving their unofficial responses, he will decide whether to present his proposal at a formal meeting of all NATO members.21 I also found recently that this type of informal organization exists in the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly. It consists of five representatives from seven political groups organized along parties, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, Leftists, and Independents. They are not organized along nations that contribute to making the Council a cohesive and integrated supernational body. It came into existence about 10 years ago, as President Peter Scheider of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informed me.22 It takes place in the West as well, although not as frequently and extensively as it does in Japan. The Japanese have a system, the IPRC with each party having its own IPRC office in the Diet building where a number of office staff members do nothing but IPRC work. The Japanese have an institution especially designed for this purpose whereas other nations do not.23 I do, however, agree with Kurimoto in that it is likely to be a permanent part of Japanese politics for years to come and that it is not necessarily antidemocratic since all voices are taken into account. In fact, it has had beneficial effects on Japan as a nation-state in virtually eliminating poverty.24 The LDP would not have given in and modified their bills to meet JSP demands had it not been for IPRC politics. I expand on this and other points later to conclude that IPRC politics has had many beneficial effects on Japan, however seemingly undemocratic and unethical its methods may have been. I argue that beneficial payoffs to national interests outweigh negative fallout from the 1955 system. Nevertheless, it is not my intent to leave the reader with an impression that he sees nothing wrong with IPRC politics. I perceive of IPRC politics as the Japanese way to facilitate internationalization of the country. Bilayer theory has been the Japanese way of accommodating the changing nature of the ruling system in Japan, probably from time immemorial, or at least from the seventh century. As such, the dualistic nature of the method generates detrimental elements that are inescapable.

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Detrimental Nature of IPRC Politics First, if we define democracy in terms of majority rule, the Japanese system is undemocratic. It makes it impossible for the majority party to pass bills without obtaining informal approval from all opposition parties, with the possible exception of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). Second, the use of large sums of cash or material gifts by the ruling party is wrong from any rule of ethics. The ruling party should not have given away the equivalent of millions of dollars worth of bribes per annum to pass bills if it has a majority in the Diet as the LDP did during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. Money politics must have no place in democracy. I must, however, not place blame on Diet members alone, for I do not believe they receive sufficient compensation for what they do to represent the people of Japan. Various studies have pointed out that it costs more than a million dollars to maintain a Diet office per year (e.g., Hirose 1989). Diet members receive enough funds to hire no more than three assistants. Legislators need more than three assistants to manage two offices, one in Nagata-chh and another at their home district. Every democratic nation should strive to eliminate money politics. Third, the secretive nature of IPRC politics goes against open decisionmaking rules. With the exception of national security concerns and other limited matters, much of the Diet members’ actions should be in public. Fourth, the use or threat of violence by Diet members or in the Diet, even if staged, is wrong anywhere, anytime.

Summary In summary, the primary objectives of the book are to (1) propose bilayer theory to explain the core of parliamentary politics in Japanese Diet, IPRC politics, and other institutions in Japan in general; (2) provide available data on the subject of IPRC politics from that sustained theoretical perspective; (3) seek answers to the question of the permanent nature of IPRC politics and the implications of findings for the development of democracy in Japan.

Bilayer theory is designed to explain why many Western observers chose to view politics in Japan the way they did because of the nature of Japanese culture and especially the language, which is different from that of the West. I thus take a revisionist position to the extent that there are sufficient differences between Japanese culture, on the one hand, and the Western culture along with China and Korea, on the other, that set apart Japan from other nations in the way it adopts new ideas and institutions from abroad. It is not

12


the same way institutions behave in the West. In this sense, bilayer theory departs from Edwin O. Reischauer’s (1957, 178–208) position on Japan’s modernization. It sides with authors such as Chitoshi Yanaga, George Akita, and Sam Jameson in its view of how political institutions in Japan behave differently from those of the West, even if they appear similar. The hollowing of political institutions, such as the Diet constitutes evidence of the validity of revisionist positions. A caveat is in order, however. This does not mean that political institutions are totally different from the way they look externally, but function differently to the point that we cannot assume that their behavior is the same as in the West. Bilayer theory will show why IPRC politics is here to stay for years to come despite criticism made against it by media and reformers. For example, why did Ichirh Ozawa’s efforts to ban IPRC politics fail after the end of the 1955 system in 1993?25 First, it has aided Japan, making it one of the most egalitarian nations along with Austria and Scandinavia in the last half of the twentieth century. Second, it has also brought the political stability that the Japanese economy needed for decades, particularly during its rapid growth period. I have briefly touched on the existing literature at the outset. Let us review the literature more in detail to find out the nature and scope of the existing literature on the question of IPRC politics.

The Literature “Even Gerald Curtis cannot talk about IPRC politics and he has not . . . ” So declares Shin’ichirh Kurimoto (1997, 59–60), who started his political career in the HR in 1993. He is also professor at several universities. One of his books is entitled Japanese Politics Textbooks Won’t Teach You. He states that most Japanese citizens do not know the role IPRC politics plays in the Japanese Diet. Further, he does not think Japanese scholars have any concept of the intricacy of how IPRC politics works in managing the Diet with the possible exception of Yhichi Masuzoe, a scholar-turned-politician (Kurimoto 1997, 59). He declares that foreign scholars never analyzed the core of Japanese politics, whatever Columbia University’s Gerald Curtis says. Curtis is in no position to talk about IPRC-based Diet politics and he has not, claims Kurimoto. What he means is that Curtis has not gotten to the most important element of the Japanese decision-making system. Kurimoto’s assertion may be hyperbole, but he is essentially correct. NonJapanese observation of Japanese politics has been superficial to a large extent, as manifested in little mention of the existence of IPRC politics in discussing Japanese Diet politics in particular, and Japanese politics in general. Of course, this has been the intention of the Japanese since the Meiji

Introduction

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Restoration days when Meiji leaders moved the feudalistic society into a member of the world community at large. Even some Japanese political scientists fail to see the crucial role IPRC politics plays in the management of the Diet, for example, Abe, Hitoshi, Muneyuki Shindh, and Sadafumi Kawato (1993). I found a near total absence of literature in English on IPRC politics. I also discovered that the literature in Japanese by political scientists remains scant and devoid of systematic treatment. I must confess my ineptness in not paying sufficient attention to this key dimension of Diet politics until I met and spoke with the then prime minister Noboru Takeshita, former JSP Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi, Khmeith’s Junya Yano, and other political leaders in addition to political reporters, such as Keisuke Hi and editorial writers of major newspapers in the early 1990s. After spending several years searching and interviewing politicians, bureaucrats working in IPRC offices, and journalists in the late 1990s, I come to conclude that Kurimoto (1997) is empirically valid. Existing data in Japanese are admittedly sporadic, unsystematic, and practically nonexistent, and even more so when it comes to English-language publications, for several reasons: (1) Politicians involved in decision making behind closed doors never reveal what they did or do in full detail. They do their best to hide their activities and conduct their business in inaccessible places. They seem to have succeeded in not revealing their behind-the-scenes activities, at least to non-Japanese observers. A limited amount of material on IPRC politics is available in Japanese, but not in English. As I mentioned earlier, the LDP bought up all copies of Arima’s book (1984) as soon as it was out. I found only five copies available in college and university libraries in all of Japan when I tried to secure one. I had to have a copy made at one of the university libraries to obtain the book. Furthermore, when veteran IPRC members reveal their experience on rare occasions as was done by Kuno (1988) representing the ruling party and socialist Yamamoto (1988) or “Mr. Compromise” as he was known, they do so by revealing as little as they can without mentioning money. An exception to this may be the former LDP member of the HR, Khichi Hamada (1993, 32–35, 182–192), popularly known as “Hamakh” for short. He mentioned the amount of money involved in IPRC politics in and out of the Diet on occasions to make waves. He has written on his experience (1993, 1994). Politicians involved in IPRC politics do their best to keep what they do to themselves. The late prime minister Takeshita, who was well known for his skill in IPRC work, used to proudly declare before reporters that “I will do my negotiation with opposition parties in a way you will never find out” (Matsuda and Kayamori 1991, 51). A veteran member of IPRC-zoku26 told Mai’nichi reporters as follows (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 68): IPRC-zoku and HMC-zoku consider it their biggest “asset” to maintain silence, not reveal anything to outsiders.

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(2) Although Japanese reporters enjoy their freedom of the press to a large degree, there are limitations such as protecting their sources in such a way that they do not jeopardize their future relationship with individual politicians. In short, they do not and cannot report everything they see and experience. In other words, even political reporters do not tell the public everything they know about IPRC politics. They talk about “ura no ura,” meaning there are unofficial versions behind unofficial versions. In addition, reporters informed me that there are unofficial versions behind unofficial versions, behind unofficial versions. Finding the truth is a painful process that can be likened to peeling an onion one layer at a time. Indeed, it may be like an onion; the truth does not exist—IPRC politics is Rashomonesque. (3) Political scientists in Japan seldom conduct interviews with their subjects in politics. Politicians are often inaccessible to many scholars in Japanese society. NonJapanese scholars specializing in Japanese politics frequently depend upon Japanese scholars for many sources of information, though not exclusively. (4) Foreign scholars specializing in Japanese politics find it difficult to see things that politicians and parties do not wish the public to see. Articles and books that deal with IPRC politics in scholarly literature are small in number and often anecdotal, easily escapable from casual readers who do not pay attention to minute details. (5) The language barrier is a problem, too. IPRC politicians use the Diet lexicon to converse so that it is impossible for the Japanese public to understand. Politicians use the following terms: Okyhyomi:

When bills are introduced, they are read and explained at plenary session. After that, they are referred to relevant standing committees for consideration. This reading of a bill prior to being assigned to a committee in the Diet is called “okyhyomi.” It literally means the reading of a sutra. Tsurushi: It means to keep bills, such as the 1984 revised health insurance bill, “hanging” to prevent passage. They do not get read. Orosu: It means to “pull-down,” to be read and assigned to a committee for deliberation. Makura hhan: This refers to relatively noncontroversial bills. It gets processed quickly, leaving controversial ones “hanging.” Miyage hhan: This means “souvenir bill,” meaning a bill for a special group. It also seems to be a “bacon” bill for opposition parties. Neru: It literally means to sleep. The term refers to opposition parties refusing to take part in deliberations in order to get concessions or a “milk bottle” from the ruling party. Honyibin: This means milk bottle. It refers to cash payments made by the ruling party to opposition parties. If the Socialists sleep, an LDP member has to bring a milk bottle to wake them up.

Introduction

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Mura: A party faction is referred to as a “mura” or village and its leader is “oyaji” or old man. Its officers are referred to as “daigashi” or oyaji’s assistants.

The list goes on and on. One must learn to understand the Diet locution to know what is happening in the parliament. The task of understanding IPRC politics is made challenging because of these factors, not just for nonJapanese observers but also for Japanese themselves. There are several reasons for the use of these terms among Diet members. First, to use terms that are understood by insiders or members only promotes bonding or “togetherness.” Mochizuki may be referring to a similar concept when he used the term viscosity to characterize the Diet. Their sense of community is obviously strengthened by the use of a common parlance. It helps all the members of the Diet to work together to promote national interest. Second, the sense of belonging promotes political stability that is also in the national interest. A well-run economy requires political stability. Third, the sense of community promotes the exchange of hon’ne or true opinions. In other words, it facilitates freer communication among Diet members, regardless of party affiliation. And finally, the use of a common parlance understood only by insiders makes IPRC member tasks easier to do on a moral level. It also creates euphemisms that may make acts easier to undertake. If you are taking a milk bottle to a crying baby, for example, it is much easier than thinking you are bringing a thick envelope or bag containing 1 million dollars to your political opponents.

Contribution by Scholars I start with English-language literature, followed by Japanese literature. Several books, such as Baerwald (1974, 84–86, 93, 1986, 91, 99, 117), Calder (1988, 205), and Curtis (1999, 118–121), make brief references to the IPRC but no one has yet written specifically on IPRC politics in either Japanese or English. None in English, with the possible exception of Yanaga (1956, 267–268), refers to the core of parliamentary politics in detail as Kurimoto (1997, 60) asserts. Kurimoto should know. He is a former economics professor trained in cultural anthropology who serves in the Diet. He was a Liberal Democrat until he was ousted. Some correctly suspect that there is something beyond what observers see in the official version of what goes on in Diet sessions. They include such scholars as Curtis (1988), Flanagan (Richardson and Flanagan 1984), and Woronoff (1986). They know that there are tatemae and hon’ne in things Japanese. Woronoff and others even claim that Japan is not as democratic as its constitution suggests. However, they never touch on the role of IPRC politics in the legislative process in the highest organ of the state.

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In the year Kurimoto (1997) published his book denouncing the ignorance of political scientists, especially those outside of Japan, Kobayashi and I delivered a paper on IPRC politics detailing the nature and examples of IPRC politics in a single-spaced, 40-page-long paper at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association in Washington, DC (Kuroda and Kobayashi 1997). Perhaps, Chitoshi Yanaga (1956, 267–269) was the first author to capture the essence of IPRC politics in his book entitled Japanese People and Politics published in 1956. He is one of the few authors on Japanese politics and history to point to the bilayer nature of Japanese politics as will be brought out later in the book. He says that, theoretically, authority makes all decisions, but in reality, forces outside of the government structure or machinery make decisions away from the watchful eyes of the press. He draws an analogy to the smoke-filled backroom caucuses in the United States. He renders IPRC as the “Diet Policy and Strategy Committee” (Yanaga 1956, 267). Although he did not focus on IPRC politics to the extent that Kurimoto would like to see done, Yanaga’s contribution should be recognized. He has correctly observed that proper authorities are not really making decisions in Japan because they act according to what others had decided in advance. The one responsible for decisions was the IPRC, Yanaga said. First, for the reasons cited above, what Kurimoto (1997) accused scholars of remains largely true, but not entirely. The present study is intended to fill the gap between practicing politicians and that of observers by presenting both sides of the coin, or the other side of the moon that we normally cannot see from Mother Earth. Second, several works deal with IPRC politics, but regrettably not enough to obtain a detailed picture of what is going on behind closed doors in the Diet. Some claim that the Japanese often use nemawashi, hanashiai, and other informal means in discrete ways to settle differences, admittedly lacking details of what was going on behind the thick curtain. Western observers of Japanese politics for centuries called it something that is beyond what they are accustomed to—be it dissimulation or enigma. Some are astute enough to see through the surface or tatemae to develop some ideas of the world beyond the official level of understanding. Chitoshi Yanaga, his compatriot from Hawaii George Akita and Sam Jameson penetrated through the façade of politics from the Meiji period onward to acquire a fairly clear picture that many Western observers with Japanese language proficiency did not see. There is no single book in Japanese devoted to IPRC politics as such by any scholar that I can locate in any language. Some scholarly books on Japanese politics include sections on IPRC politics, or at least parts of a section or a chapter that deals with IPRC politics (Fukumoto 2000; Honda 1995, 75–92; Ishikawa 1995b, 26–27; Ith et al. 2000, 244; Iwai 1988; Murakawa 1989, 162–167, 279–280, 2000; Naka 1991, 1993, 64–73;

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Nakano 1992, 1993, chapter 3, 119–134; Nonaka 1995, 49–57, 173–174; Sath and Matsuzaki 1986; Sone 1994, 164–166; Sone and Iwai 1987; Sone and Kanazashi 1989, 44–54; Takahashi 1995, 135–137). None of them, with the possible exception of Fukumoto (2000), Honda (1995), Murakawa (2000), and Nakano (1993), however, discuss IPRC politics in detail or in a systematic fashion. Many of them are more critical about IPRC politics than analytical in discussing it. Some of them discuss the topic without ever mentioning the term IPRC politics as such (e.g., Naka 1993, 64–73; Sone and Iwai 1987). A research scholar who worked in the ruling LDP Headquarters and in other positions for the party authored a series of books on the policy-making process. His posthumous book comes closest to my bilayer theory proposed here. The late Ichirh Murakawa (2000) was also a researcher at the Waseda University and the Princeton University. He also taught at the Hokuriku University. His writings always reflected his first-hand experience with the policy-making process of the ruling party. In his last book published in 2000 after his unfortunate and untimely demise, he subtitles his book entitled Policymaking Process as “Japan’s formal government and the real government.”27 First, he bifurcates Japanese governments into formal and real government. Second, he focuses on the ruling LDP and subsequent coalition governments. In doing so, he has a section on IPRC politics. Third, referring to Tokugawa Shogunate, he correctly writes that the Tokugawa shogun became a formal structure within which rose others who governed Japan in Tokugawa’s name.28 His writings, no doubt, reflect what he did and observed in the LDP Headquarters located near the Diet building. His goal appears to lie in explaining how policy is formulated without using an explicit theory as such, wherein lies the difference from what is done in this book. The difference is not in substance. On the whole, authors on Japanese politics who mention IPRC politics are most likely to have had experience in the operation of parliament or party as a member, researcher, and/or journalist. Empirically oriented scholars and journalists are likely to have paid more attention to the works of IPRC politics. Shimph’s chapter on Diet management in the book edited by Horie and Kasahara (1995) includes discussion on the Imperial Diet era as well. He is the only author to point out the possible existence of IPRC politics as early as 1890, right after the First General Election was held. Kawato is one of the few scholars who mentions the existence of something similar to IPRC politics in the prewar Imperial Diet (1992, 191–194, 204–205). Naka writes that it is easy to see why some Socialists opposed the LDP only in public for the sake of maintaining the major opposition party image (1993, 73). They do so in order to engage in dangh or informal behind-thescenes trading in practice with the ruling party. Naka calls this a sign of 1955 system fatigue.

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Sone and Iwai in The 1987 Annuals of the Japanese Political Science Association discuss how many obstacles opposition parties place in the legislative process in the Diet and describe that they and the ruling party eventually negotiate informally to remove barriers. They have nothing to say about how it is done in detail and how much it costs the ruling party for the removal operation. They do not even offer an explanation for the failure of the ruling party to use the majority rule available to them under the new constitution. Sone and Kanazashi (1989, 44–54) in their visual introductory textbook on Japanese politics do point out, however, how IPRC politics operates in more detail. They offer explanations for the inability of the ruling party to do what it desires in the Diet despite its numerical superiority. Their presentation of how IPRC politics works is one of the best works on the subject. The late Sath and Matsuzaki (1986), a scholar and an LDP researcher/ staffer, wrote a more detailed and appropriate treatment of IPRC politics than other scholars and presented new findings. One such finding is that IPRC leaders tend to come not from bureaucratic backgrounds, but from political backgrounds; they are party politicians. Only 3 of 27 LDP IPRC chairmen from the Hatoyama to Nakasone eras, or only about 10 percent, were bureaucrat-turned-politicians (Sath and Matsuzaki 1986, 133–134). This finding suggests that requirements for leadership in IPRC politics are not limited to professional knowledge of a particular field of legislative areas as much as human relations skill. It is their ability to make friends and maintain good working relationships with opposition party members. It includes not just skills in verbal communication, but also in nonverbal communication, including the art of haragei,29 the art of give and take. Nakano (1992, 71–74, 113–116) points to the essential nature of IPRC politics as distinct from standing committee work, which requires expertise in a particular area and contacts with relevant officials, experts, and interest groups. IPRC politics is one of the models he proposes of policy-making processes in the Diet. Some scholars include a discussion of IPRC politics in covering the legislative process and the Diet. However, their numbers are limited. More authors on policy-making processes discuss sources of power such as corporate interests or bureaucratic power over individual Diet members; few scholars discuss what happens to interparty politics. There is a fair amount of descriptive work on IPRC politics, but little has been done to theorize IPRC politics beyond viewing it as a way to overcome obstacles. Scholars who do this view the legislative process in terms of meeting various obstacles, as proposed by Iwai (1988, 206–222). Iwai also uses Mochizuki’s concept of “viscosity” (1982) as a reason for the existence of IPRC politics. Kusano (1999, 197–202) presents a brief discussion of what happened to IPRC politics after the fall of the LDP as the ruling party after its 38-year

Introduction

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reign. Japan’s policy-making process remains cloudy in many ways, making it difficult for the public to view it clearly. I found Fukumoto’s book on Japanese parliamentary politics (2000) after the first draft of the current manuscript was completed. I found it to be the most systematic analysis of Japanese parliamentary process I have ever seen. IPRC politics is incorporated in his three models of the Japanese legislative process that he developed: (1) deliberative discussion model, (2) deliberative viscosity model, and (3) normal deliberative model. The last two models are based on the viscosity model proposed by Mochizuki (1982) and the rubber stamp model used by many authors, respectively (e.g., Baerwald 1974), while the first one is Fukumoto’s own model that combines the traditional rubber stamp model with Mochizuki’s viscosity model and focuses on issuesalient bills. Fukumoto’s model calls for legislators to debate and deliberate on the merits and demerits of bills in an open arena while they may be involved in negotiations behind closed doors—IPRC politics. He skillfully analyzes factors that cause parties to confront one another on different issues through quantitative measures. He examines ideological and economic issues that divided the Diet through 1996 by dividing postwar Japan into three periods, including the occupation period (1947–1952), system formation period (1953– 1969), and the system period (1970–1996). He uses observable parts of the legislative data and finds three distinctive clusters representing his three models in his analysis. He finds the Japanese Diet more functionally positive and democratic than many other authors who used to portray the Diet as being largely a rubber stamp. Although he does not focus on IPRC politics, it is very much an important part of his model. What I have done here is to shed light on the hitherto largely invisible part of his model by collecting as much data as possible and proposing the bilayer model. Fukumoto (2000, 2) says that IPRC politics or dual structures may be extended to include other aspects of Japanese life—suggesting that “official” and “unofficial” ways of doing things may be an integral part of Japanese culture. His models and findings recognize the existence of IPRC politics in the Diet and other parts of the country as well. However, I depart from him when he says that IPRC politics has neither existed traditionally nor as a necessary part of Japanese political culture or parliamentary system. IPRC politics is an artifact to him. He also considers the ideological conflict that existed between Conservatives and Socialist Forces during the 1955 system era a myth, which I consider a controversial part of his book.

Contribution by Journalists In comparison, scholars lag behind journalists in writings on IPRC politics, both in quality and quantity, especially the latter. The work of the latter

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is more detailed and rich in context. The literature can be divided into several dimensions of IPRC politics.

Critical Tone This is one of the common threads that one finds in reading IPRC literature. It is written from critical perspectives of liberal and open democracy developed in the West (e.g., Hirose 1989, 47–54; Honzawa 1995, 28–38; Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 53–123, 1990, 220–223; Hi 1990, 72–76). Many scholars’ works fall under this category of literature.

Money and Smoke-Filled Rooms—The Core of Diet Politics? Criticism is based on several grounds. First, the use of large sums of money by the ruling party on opposition parties in IPRC politics is unethical. Second, the secretive ways of IPRC politics go against the grain of open democracy. Third, the existence of IPRC politics results in the hollowing of the Diet (Ishikawa 1995b, 26–27; Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1986, 128–134, 282–284; Hshita 1999, 349–368; Watanabe 1976, 193–196). Satsuki Eda, Social Democratic Alliance president in the Diet, informs us that while he and other directors of a committee are negotiating something, often they would say they need to go back “home” to consult. They need to receive instruction from their IPRC before they can make a commitment (Eda 1985, 155–156). Yet they have the legal right to decide. They never exercise their legal right, instead yielding to their party’s IPRC. Standing committees, in other words, get their orders from IPRC.

Atheoretical Account Because of the nature of the journalism profession as practiced in Japan, reporters tend to be descriptive and measured in their writing of IPRC politics. There are no bylines in their articles, making whatever a particular reporter writes the responsibility of the entire paper. One exception is that they can write more freely once they leave their papers. For example, Masumi Ishikawa, formerly of the Asahi, writes about his encounters with IPRC veterans like Khichi Yamamoto (Ishikawa 1997, 120–129). Matsuda and Kayamori (1991, 43–67) write a comprehensive presentation of IPRC politics outlining the nature and scope of IPRC politics in a chapter entitled “What is IPRC politics?” Kunimasa’s account of IPRC is another episodic presentation of what IPRC does through the eyes of a journalist (1997, 122–125, 168–171).

Facts and Figures Journalists have written much on the amount of money that the LDP IPRC spends or who took how much and when to give to opposition parties

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(Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1986, 284–285, 1990, 220–223). Some of these are not what IPRC leaders would like to see reported in public. Otherwise, they report what IPRC politicians stage for public consumption. Both of these accounts are useful in capturing the larger picture of what IPRC politics is all about.

Reports by Politicians As pointed out, IPRC politics turns out to be a taboo topic to discuss in many ways. Diet members are careful in writing about the subject. There are a number of reasons for the reluctance of the LDP as well as opposition parties to openly talk about the topic. Motoharu Arima wrote a book to document how he struggled to pass the 1983 health insurance revision bill that Prime Minister Nakasone wanted to see become law (Arima 1984). Arima, in cooperation with his colleagues in and out of his own party, the LDP, fought hard as chairman of the Labor Committee in the HR to pass the bill. In the process of doing so, he revealed part of what the shadowy IPRC does. Arima must have thought that as long as he does not touch on the amount of money involved in IPRC work, he could reveal how much IPRC is involved in bill passage. According to Khichirh Ueda, a JCP member of the HC who used to be editor of the Akahata (Red Flag) reports that the LDP collected as many copies as possible shortly after publication of Arima’s book (Ueda 1999, 78–79). The book (Arima 1984) detailed how he as the Labor Committee chairman cooperated with others in the LDP leadership, the IPRC, and opposition parties. They removed barriers one by one to overcome the difficulties and have the bill passed finally, with only the JCP opposing it. He reports how Tatsuo Ozawa of the LDP and Tomi’ichi Murayama of the JSP worked to jointly draft scenarios to get the bill out of the committee. It is a highly dramatized account of what happens to Japanese democracy behind the scenes. It is embarrassing for both the ruling party and its opposition parties to be so exposed, even if it is in the name of the “spirit of compatriots” as a Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader would put it. I should note that the JCP is not always involved in IPRC politics. The health insurance revision bill was labeled in early 1983 as the “Biggest Confrontation Bill between the Ruling Party and Opposition Parties” (Arima 1984, 18). How could the Diet pass the bill by August 7 after 227 days? It took a lot of wheeling and dealing by IPRC committee members, often out of the Diet. The IPRC made it possible to revise the bill and make arrangements for the ruling party to pass the bill against the wishes of the minority parties. Arima does not tell us how much the LDP paid to its opposition parties. IPRC politics makes a mockery of democracy—the reason for the LDP’s decision to pull the book off of the market soon after its publication, even though Arima (1984) did not mention anything about the money involved.

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Kuno (1988) and Yamamoto (1988), veteran IPRC leaders of the ruling LDP and the major opposition party, the JSP, respectively, during the 1955 system era, wrote about their experiences in the Diet. They tell us their observations of the Diet from their respective positions in a more constrained manner than Arima did. Kuno and Yamamoto chaired IPRC committees in their own parties although Arima did not. Yamamoto reveals how he and his counterparts in the ruling party got together to draft a scenario to stage a shibai30 to fool the media. He concludes by saying that to fool your opponents requires you to fool your own people first, requiring him to script a shibai at times in cooperation with the ruling party partner. He ends his presentation by chiding IPRC politics lately of being too serious all the time. He said he used to start his daily morning IPRC session with an off-color story to relax his party members. There are enough anecdotes for the reader to get some idea of what he did as “Mr. Compromise,” as he was called. Kuno (1988), too, tells similar stories from the ruling party side. Like other Diet members who revealed things about IPRC politics, he says nothing about the money involved. Kuno and others do not disclose every detail. For example, he gives hints that IPRC politics is involved in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty crisis of 1960 over the passing of the revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He and others provide us measured exposure to the nature and scope of IPRC politics. Apparently, both parties must have approved their writings. The Yomiuri did the right thing by asking both the ruling party and the JSP to take part in writing these articles. That made these works more acceptable to both parties. Khichi Kath (1995) gives us a concise presentation of the nature of the Diet politics in general, and IPRC politics in particular. He points out the distinctive difference between the ways Japan and the United States make decisions. Japan goes by consensus making while the United States adheres to decision making by majority rule. He cites two exceptional instances to this generalization. He says that the LDP decided on party policy by majority rule on two cases: (1) the resumption of diplomatic normalization with China and (2) the Japan–China Air Agreement. Having once decided within the ruling LDP, then, the task is to convince opposition parties to come along—the task for IPRC politics. A part of this task involves negotiation behind the scenes, Kath reports. He also points out the flexible nature of parties in reaching a consensus. Khichirh Ueda (1995, 130–133, 1999, 78–82, 106–108, 136–137, 188–191) also presents his views on IPRC politics. They are not much different from the rest except that he is freer to talk about it than others since JCP is least involved in IPRC politics, as far as I can ascertain from my data gathering. It is an irony to say that the JCP plays more by open rules of liberal democracy than the rest of the parties in Japan as far as IPRC politics is concerned, but it is true. He points out the secretive and deceptive nature of

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IPRC politics. He correctly says that it requires considerable negotiation skills to be an IPRC member. Others have written on IPRC politics, but one that ought to be included here is a scholar-turned-politician who tells us as much as he can as a member of the Diet. He writes of the JSP in disdain as a party officially opposed to the ruling LDP while accepting lucrative monetary awards from the LDP for their cooperation behind closed doors (Kurimoto 1999, 17–18). In an earlier book, Kurimoto blasts scholars both in and out of Japan for their ignorance of IPRC politics. Secret negotiations take place because Diet members trust each other. In fact, he claims that it is “the essence of parliamentary democracy” everywhere (1997, 57–59)!! He gives no evidence of the existence of IPRC politics anywhere else except Japan. He claims that IPRC politics is a necessary condition for bills to pass in any parliament. He points out the permanent nature of IPRC politics. While that may be true, his other claim about the existence of IPRC politics outside of Japan is in doubt. His book on the LDP also contains a few points on IPRC politics (1999, 17–18). Chinatsu Nakayama, who served in the HC, reports that the final say on bills comes from IPRC committees (1986, 86–87). The late Junzh Iwasaki (1994, 277–284) uses a waka poem31 to tell us how he felt while he was involved in IPRC work. He says he composed numerous poems for 30 years during his political career since his mayoral days. He selected 39 poems out of 500 or 600 to include in his book. I found that 14, or 36 percent of the 39 poems, relate to IPRC politics. A poet is motivated to compose poems whenever something or some events profoundly affect her or him psychologically. We tend to express our inner emotions through poems as a way of alleviating tensions felt within. Iwasaki selected these poems probably on the basis of how strongly he felt about the events and how well he was able to express his feelings at the time he composed them. If so, I must infer that IPRC politics constituted a very important, if not the most important, part of his political career, confirming Kurimoto’s assertion (1997) that IPRC politics is the core of Japanese politics. The late former prime minister Noboru Takeshita insists in writing (Takeshita 1995, 138–139) and in my meetings with him in the 1990s that one party did not dominate the 1955 system. It was a system where permanent ruling and opposition parties worked together to form a system. What he is saying without being explicit is that there was a close working relationship between the LDP and other opposition parties, especially the JSP. In short, the 1955 system was a two-party system officially, but in practice it was IPRC politics that made economic prosperity accompanied by social stability and relatively equal distribution of income and wealth realities in the second half of twentieth century in Japan. As the late former prime minister used to say, “It takes us (the LDP) three years to realize what the Socialists want.”

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Note As the first chapter comes to an end, I wish to explain several items that may assist the reader in understanding the nature of the present study, particularly those who are reading this as a textbook in Japanese or as part of a comparative politics class.

Frequent References to Sources Some of you may be bothered by my frequent references to data sources. I have done so for three reasons. First, many of us who teach Japanese politics may doubt the validity of what I say, since much of what is contained in this book is new in the English language. Those who may not accept what I say should have readily available references to check against what other authors have said about the subject matter under discussion. Scant references on the subject are available in English. I might also add here that much of what I report coincides with what politicians, officials, and journalists have told me. Most informants I spoke with are unwilling to bring up any instances of IPRC politics other than what has already leaked out. They often admit to what is going on in a general way without specifying particular cases. Even when I heard the same or similar report from multiple sources, I find it difficult to assess the extent of collaboration between the LDP and the JSP on such dramatic crises as the 1960 Japan-U.S. Mutual Treaty Revision. There was at least one denial of any IPRC involvement in the Treaty Revision crisis from a senior political leader. Second, many political scientists do not make full use of data provided by journalists who follow key politicians 24 hours a day. When one deals with sensitive matters as IPRC politics, it is difficult to obtain systematic data. While not all available data provided by journalists are valid and reliable, to be sure, it should not prevent us from using them with care. My contention is that political scientists do not make enough use of their data, however unsystematic they may be. Third, given the scant data available on the subject in English, references cited herein should aid those who wish to know more about the subject. I wish that more younger Japan politics specialists will make this silent power structure of Japan their subject and go beyond what I have to shed more light into the darker side of politics. For these reasons, I beg the indulgence of those who find frequent references tedious and bothersome.

Frequent Use of Japanese Words Some of you may find the frequent use of Japanese words disturbing and some of you may even be put off. It is only natural that we seek the familiar.

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However, one indispensable characteristic of education is learning about the unfamiliar. The unfamiliar often seems tedious at first, but you will grow accustomed to new terminologies as another way of viewing the world. Expanding our horizons keeps our brains productive as we grow older. Second, another reason for my use of Japanese words is to give the reader a flavor of Japanese politics that is as close as one can get without speaking Japanese. Even if we use the same word like “equality,” it means something different in an American context as opposed to a Japanese context. When we use the word equality in American English, equality of opportunity and social equality in general comes to mind. We promote social equality in the name of democracy, while Japanese are more likely to be thinking about income equality. In fact, the Japanese promote social inequality in the name of better human relations. When two Japanese business people meet, they exchange business cards in order to know what honorific to use. Salaries vary with the size of the employee’s family, among other things, while in modern day United States, one’s pay does not vary with the size of her or his family. The net income gap between a chief executive and a first-year college graduate in Japan remains low, about seven to one. The Japanese also use more implicit meanings of words to express themselves, while Americans attempt to make everything explicit and direct. In short, I would like to see the reader appreciate differences in the nature of language in understanding Japanese politics. Third, some may argue that the bilayer theory is nothing more than a model used by many, such as Murakawa (2000), who separate official politics from what really goes on. Differences between my theory and classification schemes are that the former offers (1) a logical and empirical derivation of the bilayer theory, (2) an explicit definition of each component of the theory, (3) specification of its limitations, (4) clear specification of applicable areas of inquiry, and last and most importantly (5) specification of causal factors. I consciously and explicitly view parliamentary politics from a sustained bilayer theory perspective throughout the book and make serious efforts to be systematic and empirical. I also discuss the validity of the bilayer theory at the end of the book as well in addition to substantive findings, which has not been done by others.

What Is to Follow? The book is designed to construct a telescope to view the other side of the moon hitherto not seen in its entirety. The book is about bilayer theory and IPRC politics. First, I present my bilayer theory of Japanese politics in chapter 2. Second, after the introduction of the theory, Japanese politics from bilayer

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perspective is offered in chapter 3. Third, the nature and role of IPRC politics within the context of the Diet is explained in chapter 4. Fourth, the history of IPRC politics is compiled from available sources in chapter 5. Fifth, I argue that IPRC politics played an indispensable role in promoting the growth of democracy in chapter 6 while Japanese economy grew at an unprecedented rate. Finally, in chapter 7, I summarize and discuss the implications of the book.

2 The Bilayer Theory Almost nothing gets decided in plenary session discussions. —Kaichi Kata, HR Everything is decided behind the scenes. —Koichi Hamada, former HR The PIRC is a committee in which we do things we cannot talk about. —Jun’ichira Koizumi, the then Minister of Health and Welfare When I first entered the world of politics, I thought I could pass a bill if it had genuine merit. I learned otherwise. It is leaders like those with former Prime Minister Takeshita’s human relations skills that make things happen. —Ki’ichi Miyazawa, former prime Minister

The first statement is an excerpt from Khichi Kath (1995, 12), one of the top LDP leaders who attempted vainly to topple the then prime minister Yoshirh Mori in the fall of 2000. He is a diplomat-turned-politician who served as the LDP secretary general. The second remark is taken from “Hamakh,” as he is popularly known, Khichi Hamada (1994, 242). He is known for his outspokenness and outrageous behavior while he served in the Diet as an LDP member. Prime Minister Jun’ichirh Koizumi, the then Minister of Health and Welfare, made the third remark during an interview in his office to my question of why he cannot talk about IPRC politics.1 Each of these speakers represents totally different styles of politics, and yet they agree on one point. Decisions in the Diet are made mostly behind closed doors in practice, not in formal Diet sessions. In other words, here is what Chalmers Johnson (1995) refers to as “omote” or explicit and “ura” or implicit

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in discussing political terms in Japanese. Former prime minister Miyazawa led an elite career starting with a law degree from the University of Tokyo and entered the Ministry of Finance. He assisted Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda in making the economic miracle of the 1960s possible. He won a seat in the HR in 1967 and led a successful political career, becoming prime minister. However, he failed to pass a political reform bill, leading the LDP to eventually lose its ruling party position after 38 years of rule since 1955.2 Former prime minister Miyazawa made the remarks cited above on September 22, 1998 to commemorate Prime Minister Takeshita’s 40 years in the Diet (Hshita 1999, 12). Politics is not based on a rational reasoning process, but on making compromises among competing interests requiring human relations skill. Politics takes place behind the scenes as veteran Diet members Kath and Hamada report as to how decisions are made. Mr. Takeshita was a master IPRC leader, working with the kingpin of IPRC, Shin Kanemaru, who chaired the LDP IPRC under three prime ministers, Sath, Nakasone, and Hhira. Legislative decisions are debated and voted upon in plenary sessions in accordance with the official version of how the Diet operates, but what the first two well-known political leaders are saying is that decisions are made in backstage referred to by Hamada and Johnson—the IPRC. When I questioned the then Minister of Health and Welfare Koizumi, who was elected prime minister in April 2001, on the nature and scope of activities of the IPRC, he chose to remain silent. I asked him why he could not talk about it. His response was what I quoted above, revealing the latent nature of IPRC politics. As we noted in chapter 1, many observers of Japanese politics from the West in particular saw what is explicit, official, or visible to conclude that Japan is democratic in the sense that it has institutions very similar to those of the West. Some had a glimpse beyond the official version of government, “implicit” parts or what is behind the scenes. Western observers, with a few exceptions, failed to clearly capture the politics of “ura” or what is behind closed doors. The Japanese public, to a large degree, shares the Western observers’ understanding of Japanese politics, since Diet members do their best to hide what they do outside of the formal institutions. Given these findings, what should Japanese political scholars do? Seek the truth by going beyond the front door to the extent possible and in ways that are possible? That is what I did in this book by proposing a bilayer theoretical model of Diet politics.

Search for a Theory Shedding Light on Opaque Japanese Politics Indeed, as Socrates declared, knowledge begins with wondering. My wondering led me to look for a key to open the closed door. Rational-choice theorists and their critics dominate theory building in comparative politics in pursuit of a unifying theory. One way to build a

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unifying theory is to develop a number of less-ambitious theories. One way to categorize theories is to identify the level and scope of areas to and in which a theory may be applicable. What I propose is clearly not a unifying theory that may be widely applicable at all levels, as Marxism was intended. It is a more modest one with a narrower application, but powerful within a specified area of the world. The theory proposed here is what Robert K. Merton refers to as a middle-range theory of organization applicable to Japan and possibly to other areas to a limited extent. We learned from the literature reviewed briefly in the last chapter that if we use what one might call theories developed in the West, we would not always get a full understanding of Japanese politics. We need to develop a theory that can be applied to Japan.3 I found a key that should bring order to somewhat chaotic data. We should be able to make reasonable inferences about hitherto opaque parts of Japanese politics.

Western Institutions and Japanese Tradition In searching to answer the question of how Japan makes laws to govern itself from a comparative politics perspective, I found it useful to go back to the question of how government and politics came into existence. In all societies, as some of our ancestors moved out of Africa, they must have come to realize a need to be organized to survive in an often-inhospitable environment. There was a need to communicate with others, resulting in the ubiquitous development of spoken language. Some societies never developed written language, while others did. Next, or about the same time in some areas, came the development of the concept of money and banking along with a written language. This happened in Mesopotamia, and the concept spread to the Levantine and the Aegean seas and to much of the world, constituting today the center of the modern world. China independently developed its own systems that are functionally similar to its Semitic counterparts. Another common human heritage is the development of various types of religion, especially the spread of monotheism that dominates the contemporary world. The Industrial Revolution in England followed an agricultural revolution in many parts of the world. Today, we go beyond industrialization to an information-based revolution characterized by growth in the service industry, represented by information processing. These developments were made possible through an organized effort of people operating under governments to resolve conflicts and making “authoritative allocation of values,” to borrow David Easton’s term (1960, 129–134). Authoritative decisions in the Weberian sense are made within a defined territory, where the government monopoly of threat and the use of physical force are maintained to carry out policy (Gerth and Mills 1946, 180). This unique institution called government in the modern society is often divided

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into three branches. In some nations, they are separate and independent, as in the United States. In others, as in the United Kingdom and Japan, legislative and executive branches are closely intertwined. The Japanese parliament, the oldest modern legislature in Asia, came into existence as a result of Japan’s modernization efforts on its way to become an equal member of the world community.4 Japan had to look like a modern nation-state in its forms and institutions, at least externally, to eliminate its unequal treaties with the West. The Meiji government (1868–1911) promulgated its modern constitution in 1889, conducted the First General Election to elect members of the Imperial Parliament, and opened its first session in 1890. The U.S. Congress makes decisions on the basis of majority rule after an open debate. According to the norm and books on Japanese government, the Japanese Diet does the same.5

Development Theory: More Superficial Than Substantive Industrialization accompanied by modernization started to spread to the rest of the world from Europe. These forces gave Europeans the backing to colonize much of the world. Other nations reacted in a variety of ways, from becoming colonized to maintaining a minimal sense of independence from the industrial powers. Fred W. Riggs, among others, developed concepts and theories to explain what is happening to these parts of the world from the perspective of public administration. Riggs (1964) developed a prismatic society model in which external and internal forces interact to preserve the traditional method of governing while formal and external changes take place. Using the metaphor of a prism, Riggs’s theory focuses on how society develops functionally specific “diffracted” organizations that are modern, industrialized, and secularized from a “fused” pristine society (1964, 27–30). While organizationally and formally new institutions are created, traditional processes survive in new forms. Formalism plays a significant part in this process of change. However, as Riggs says, the only crucial variable in his model is the extent of “functional specificity of structures” (1964, 31). Although his prismatic society is isomorphic to our bilayer theory with respect to external and internal forces interacting to preserve the traditional method of governing while formal changes take place, the latter departs from the former in other ways. First, the bilayer theory separates formal from informal organizations as in the case of the theory of prismatic society, but differs in a key perspective of our position that the basic bilayer system was laid down in or around the seventh century and that the basic system continues to function today.

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The Japanese system was earlier functionally specified between formal and informal institutions. The former has been the source of legitimacy for all rulers who governed Japan for centuries. Functions performed by the ten’nh 6or the emperor and those who played the role of governing the country have not changed since the seventh century. Many functionally specific organizations have been created to deal with problems as they arise, but institutions other than emperors handle them all. Furthermore, the bilayer theory attributes the source of domestic driving forces to the Japanese language, while Riggs does not go beyond tradition. We maintain that what keeps the Japanese society dominated by the bilayer system one generation after another is a language implicitly designed to achieve social harmony.7 Japanese language speakers, irrespective of nationality, tend to hold different concepts of self and reality from American English speakers. We have argued that the Japanese language influences its speakers, regardless of nationality, to have a diffuse view of themselves and to be ambiguous or relative in their understanding of the world in the tradition somewhat akin to sophism, leading them to seek harmony within a particular context. This harmonyseeking behavior leads politics to be conducted at two levels, official and unofficial, with emperor to reign and shogun to rule and the HMC to announce and the IPRC to script how the Diet is to be managed, from appointing ruling party members of the HMC to when and how a bill should be passed by the ruling majority. The theory claims that there have been no changes in the way bilayer politics has operated in Japan since time immemorial and that the Japanese language is the carrier of this pattern from one generation to another. Conflicts are ubiquitous and omnipresent in our history. However, the way we go about resolving them varies from one culture to another. The rational democracy model developed in the West calls for arguments for and against to be presented in an open arena, to which all sane and free adults should have equal access to in the tradition of Aristotelian syllogism. Final outcomes of open debates are decided by majority vote. Similarities between the two theories include a division of driving forces between external and traditional sources. Riggs’s main concern stems from his interest in how traditional administrations change when they are modernized as a consequence of external influences. Second, the two theories are alike in their persistence of traditional practices, despite changes in the formal appearance of institutional structure imported from advanced nations. The internationalization of domestic institutions is observed in various parts of the world. However, the two theories suggest that internationalization and the development of a world community remain superficial and not very substantive. More recently, Riggs (1997b), who continues to be prolific in his creative development of new concepts, hypotheses, and theories, claims that the

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parliamentary system is more likely to encourage the survival of democracy as nations go through modernization. Many of his concepts and theories often center on modernization. This claim is no exception. In his “Coping with Modernity: Constitutional Implications,” he says that modernization has three major components—industrialization, nationalism, and democracy. He finds that the price of ever-spreading modernization has been ethnic conflict and the rise of military authoritarianism, anarchy, and refugees. In many parts of the world, nationalism does not always work to unite the nation, but to divide the nation into smaller units. To combat the disintegration process, a presidential oligarchy may arise. For this and other reasons cited in his work (1997a), Riggs concludes that the parliamentary system can sustain democracy more effectively than the presidential system. What he essentially argues is that while institutional arrangement makes a difference, we place more emphasis on the role of culture in general and language in particular as the source of change or no change in institutional arrangement and policy outcome. Japan chose, during the Meiji Restoration, to modernize its institutions in 1867. What was its intent and consequences? Answers vary, depending upon the source.

Japanese Modernization and Democratization: Image and Reality George Akita reminds us that Meiji leaders tried to realize the goal of modernization and constitutionalism so that Japan could become a strong nation in the family of modern nations (1967, 173–174). However, they never aspired to be democratic in the American sense (Akita 1967, 161). Akita (2005), in his most recent work, points out that their intent, in the words of Aritomo Yamagata, was to borrow the West’s keishiki or legal form while keeping traditional governance. Yanaga (1956, 47) underscores this characteristic of the Imperial Diet under the Meiji Constitution. He says it was a superficial imitation of Western institutions. The Meiji leaders borrowed the structural components of modern government, but nothing beyond that. He implied that the process of what goes on in these Western institutions in Japan remains very Japanese. Here, Yanaga was also discussing the government of postwar Japan and democracy as well. The criticism we see and hear frequently, not just in the Japanese media but also in academic circles, is the cry of those who aspire to democracy in Japan and who complain about hollowing of the Diet structure, with important legislative decisions being made outside of the Diet as the nation’s supreme organ. Impervious to their critics, politicians such as Kath and Hamada tell us that most decisions in the Diet are made outside of the Diet, as cited at the outset in this chapter. If fact, another Diet member who was an LDP member and who also

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happens to be a scholar, says that backroom deal making is the essence of parliamentary democracy (Kurimoto 1997, 57). A good recent example of this type of backroom politics is the selection of former prime minister Yoshirh Mori by six insiders in 2000 following the untimely death of the late prime minister Keizh Obuchi. We learn that Japanese institutions, especially the Diet, are similar in structure but quite different in the way the Japanese put it to use. If Yamagata’s efforts were successful, the process must be dominated by the Japanese tradition. The continuing criticism against opaque politics and public cynicism of politicians constitute a testimonial to the survival of traditional backroom politics, as exemplified in the selection of former prime minister Mori in 2000. Kath, Hamada, and Kurimoto would testify as Diet members that it is still the case, even now that the Japanese tradition of arriving at a consensus prevails in the Diet. Yanaga did not see much change in the process even after the demilitarization and democratization of Japan by the Allied Powers, as far as what goes on inside the Western institutions of the Japanese government is concerned. Prefacing Chie Nakane’s remarks on the paucity of any absolute principles or beliefs among the Japanese, Sam Jameson, longtime resident reporter in Japan, remarks on the nature of changes in Japanese politics. He reports that the surface of politics changes on a near-revolutionary scale. “Yet at the core, politics today remains unchanged” (Jameson 2001, 18). His assessment of Japan is similar to that of Yanaga and Akita in that Japan changes its external and peripheral areas while it leaves the inner core intact. To be sure, more authors on Japanese politics and democracy believe that Japan has gone through not just superficial reform but a basic transformation of political and social institutions in the twentieth century, for example, Reischauer (1957, 178–208), Ishida and Krauss (1989), and Ike (1978).8 Two divergent views of what is happening to Japanese modernization and democratization are presented here. The bilayer theory takes the side of Yanaga over Reischauer. Bilayer theory is not alone in taking the position that claims the preservation of indigenous traditional practice while adopting Western institutions in non-Western societies. If one takes the position of democracy as one in which sunshine should prevail in policy making, then Japan clearly is not democratic. If one focuses on the Diet’s output, I found IPRC politics, however secretive and therefore undemocratic, has made Japan more egalitarian and peace oriented than it would have been had the ruling majority power exercised its legal right to rule the country.9 A number of socialist programs became realities, thanks to backroom deals made between the LDP and the JSP, for example, the three non-nuclear principles and the progressive income tax and inheritance tax (Takeshita 1995, 138–139, 2001, 133–135). The late former prime minister Takeshita’s Socialist partner in IPRC politics, former JSP secretary general

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Tsuruo Yamaguchi, told me several times that Takeshita-san used to promise that the LDP will pass what Socialists propose in three years.10 This is one of the reasons Kurimoto (1999, 161–184) labeled the LDP socialist in his book. He has a chapter so entitled: “The LDP is a Socialist Party.” In our paper on “Japanese communitarianism and the elimination of poverty,” we presented data showing how Japan industrialized and modernized while indicators of alienation and social disorganization, such as the rate of felonies, first offenses, foundlings, single-parent and divorce, went down during the twentieth century in Japan. The Marxist theory that the development of capitalism increases alienation proved to be empirically correct in many parts of the world as we observe the rate of violent crime and divorce. The income gap, both in gross and net incomes, has been on the rise, particularly since 1980 in the United States, while Japan has narrowed the gap during the twentieth century.11 By reviewing history, we learn that modernization and democratization in non-Western nations including Japan proceeded differently. Modernization and democracy are different in reality, even if the image these nations attempt to create may be the same. Non-Western states are not copies of the West, however much they may resemble it in appearance. Witness Japan, with the second largest economy in the world. Why are these non-Western nationstates so modern in appearance, form, and in a limited sense, in results, while at the same time remaining different in substance and even structure?

Indigenous Tradition and the Legislative Process The West colonized much of the non-Western world. As non-Western societies with their own languages and traditions either decided to or were forced to modernize and democratize, their governing bodies and people faced the serious challenge of making decisions they never had to make in the past. My focus is on Japan. The West, especially the United States, forced Japan to open itself in the mid nineteenth century, while some progressive Japanese tried to open the closed door from the inside to initiate the process of modernization. Although Japan managed to maintain nominal independence as a sovereign state, it suffered from unequal treaties with the West until the end of the nineteenth century. It was not until Japan promulgated a modern constitution in 1889, opened the first Imperial Diet in 1890, defeated China in 1895, and built modern military forces, modern institutions, and changed people’s lifestyles, such as in the way they dress and have modern haircuts, that in 1899 Japan managed to free itself from the vestiges of Western colonization. Although some progressive forces speaking for limited democracy did seek democracy in Japan, Meiji leaders, as pointed out by Akita, did not have in mind the need for Japan to be democratic. They just wanted to borrow

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Western institutions and forms to maintain their independence as their ancestors did amid the waves of advanced civilization from China earlier. This certainly was not a revolution. It was never even intended to be. It was a change made in order to survive in the changing and ever-widening world community. The second significant change came in 1945 as the Allied Powers occupied Japan to demilitarize and democratize its former enemy. The occupation succeeded in demilitarizing the country. But the second goal of the occupational policy was more of an apparent success than a real one if the bilayer theory is valid and if Yanaga is correct in his generalization of the superficiality of changes in modern Japan. Leading American specialists on Japanese politics, such as Curtis (1988, 247), Richardson and Flanagan (1984, 333–336), say that consensus is what the Japanese seek. Curtis specifies the concept of nemawashi in Japanese as Japan’s preferred means of government decision making—comprehensive consultation with all relevant individuals to seek consensus before making decisions. They are certainly not alone in making this generalization. As indicated in chapter 1, they fall short of not specifying the way in which and the extent to which nemawashi is used in Diet decision making. Exceptions are Baerwald (1974, 84–86, 93, 1986, 91, 99, 117), Calder (1988, 205), Curtis (1999, 118–121), and Yanaga (1956, 267–268) who spell out the shadowy institution—IPRC as the institution assisting the HMC to manage the Diet. None of them, however, goes into detail to explain how it works and how much it is costing the ruling LDP. Yanaga, writing earlier than anyone else, captured what probably is the best description of the power behind the formal institution of the Diet. Some readers may object to my cultural determinist position. I am not insisting this is uniquely Japanese, for a similar practice of prior consultation among elite members of Western decision-making bodies does exist. Nemawashi in Japanese politics, as Curtis (1988) discusses it, is not limited to Japan alone. It also exists in the West as noted in chapter 1. Caucuses also exist in the U.S. Congress as well, but it is among members of the same party who discuss items informally. There may also be informal negotiations in the U.S. Congress, mostly on an individual basis of trading favors. What distinguishes Japan from other countries is the development of another institution with its own staff and office in the Diet building apart from the Diet, in this case a party organ, to manage legislative functions that range from appointing HMC members to providing members of the opposition parties with large monetary rewards amounting to millions of dollars per year for their cooperation with the ruling party. In summary, I would argue that though backroom dealings in politics is not unique to Japan, the extent to which Japan goes about making such deals and the extent of institutionalization of IPRC politics is so all-embracing in scope

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and degree that we cannot classify NATO, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, and the Diet in the same category in terms of their informal decision-making processes and formal structures. Is this what Yamagata was saying when he spoke of “traditional spirit”? Is this shadowy IPRC politics a manifestation of what Curtis and Richardson and Flanagan suggest without specifying any particular institution in Japanese politics? I believe that is the case. The bilayer theory would posit that culture in general, and language in particular, is largely responsible for this difference between the West and Japan at least. When we focus on the Diet’s legislative function, there are no questions about the impact of bureaucrats over Diet members in comparison with the United States. However, this is true of other parliamentary systems to varying degrees. Many bills originate in the executive branch of the government. Likewise, different electoral systems yield significant differences in outcome as to which party benefits and which others lose out. It is obvious that the small district system adopted by the Japanese Diet in 1994 favors the ruling party while the proportional representation system favors opposition parties. The present research will demonstrate that backroom deals resulting from IPRC politics have benefited working-class Japanese in ways that would have been impossible had Japan followed the Western liberal democratic style of politics in accordance with the majority rule principle. What we can learn from these accounts of the Diet is that there is a formal structure of the supreme legislative organ in Japan, but it is a façade and that real decision making is made as it has been since time immemorial. This suggests that there are two structures, one formal and Western in appearance and origin while the other informal and Japanese in style and origin. The bilayer theory of Japanese politics is thus generated. Before I fully construct the bilayer theory of Japanese politics, we should examine how the theory relates to other theories in the field of comparative legislative politics.

Theories of Comparative Politics: Japan In an earlier work, John C. Wahlke (1962, 3–28) presents a theory on the legislative system. He focuses on legislative roles that actors play within a network of relationships in the system. He looks for individual as well as environmental factors affecting legislative roles. He basically takes a systems approach with a feedback mechanism in laying out his framework, as he calls it. For our purposes, no serious attention is paid to legislative structure or the role of parties in legislation in his framework. In the same book, coeditor Heinz Eulau (1962, 343–376) has a chapter on majority and minority parties—a relevant subject for the current research. His emphasis again is on partisan roles that state legislators play in state legislatures, not on the relationship between majority and minority parties as

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they relate to the process of legislation as such. There is an absence of focus on the kind of majority–minority interparty relations with which the present study is concerned. S.N. Eisenstadt defines institutionalization in terms of functional differentiation in solving social problems (1964b, 12) and moving away from the power of ascriptive leadership—a sign of modernization (1964a, 37). His indicators include regulating norms and maintaining boundaries. Generally speaking, institutionalization is the extent to which patterns of behavior are autonomous, repeated, valued, and stable. Nelson W. Polsby focuses on institutionalization of the U.S. HR without explicitly conceptualizing institutionalization. He does, however, report his findings in terms of institutional autonomy, role differentiation, and universal criteria used in legislative processes—in this case the U.S. HR—similar to the way Eisenstadt and Huntington define and discuss institutionalization. Incorporating some of these elements of definitions but not being satisfied with their conceptualization, Richard Sisson adds a new element to define institutionalization. Sisson (1973, 24) defines it as the persistent existence of stable patterns of behavior that enable “the accommodation of new configurations of political claimants and/or demands within a given organization.” He emphasizes the relationship between legislative institutions and their environments, such as bureaucracy and other entities. Sisson (1973, 24–35) shows more concern for “external environment and the internal order of legislative institutions in terms of three criteria”: the structural, the cultural, and the character of the elite. His major concern under the cultural criteria is legitimacy of legislative institutions with the larger public. Unfortunately, his theoretical net is not as relevant as I would wish for my purpose in this study. David Epstein, Daniel Brady, Sadafumi Kawato, and Sharon O’Halloran (1997) attempt a comparative analysis of legislative orientation in the United States and Japan, but focus only on legislative career patterns. They do not relate their findings of differences between the two countries explicitly to either cultural or structural factors. For years following World War II, critics have characterized the Japanese parliament as a rubber-stamp legislature, since the bureaucrats yielded so much power over elected members of the Diet in the legislative process under LDP rule during the 1955 system. Michael Mochizuki (1982) pointed out the role played by elected Diet members by developing the concept of “viscosity” as an organizing principle of studying the Diet. Opposition parties played their part, resisting the ruling party’s efforts to push through bills. However, there are no references to IPRC politics. Ray Christensen (2000, 128–131) discusses “cooperation” between the ruling LDP and its opposition parties, save the JCP.12 He, however, does not go into much detail on IPRC politics in the legislative process beyond indicating

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that large sums of money changed hands from the LDP to the JSP; also, he does not go beyond citing anonymous sources for the exchange. The intent of the present book is to go beyond this by providing published records and results of my interviews, revealing as much as possible about IPRC politics. Michael Mezey (1979) divides parliamentary activities into policy making, representation, and system maintenance. As stipulated in the Japanese Constitution, the Diet is the highest legislative organ of the state responsible for policy making. Mezey classifies the U.S. Congress, in which individual members actively introduce and pass bills, as being an “active legislature,” and the Japanese Diet, in which bureaucrats cooperate with the ruling party to introduce bills to which Diet members respond, as a “reactive legislature.” Anthony King (1976) proposes to focus on the role played by political parties as the key function played in democratic legislatures. Heinz Eulau and John C. Wahlke (1978) classify legislative studies into three categories: systems, process, and behavior. Does any theory or model more closely resemble what is proposed here?

Corporatism and Bilayer Theory In addition to the dominant model of liberal democracy based on majorityrule practice in the United States, a variety of corporatist models are used in a number of European democracies. Corporatism considers politics to be essentially the process of “interest mediation” (Zahariadis 1997, 142) rather than an open market of ideas where pros and cons are debated and an issue decided by the majority in a pluralistic liberal democracy.13 Unlike rational choice theory, which labels the individual as the salient unit, corporatism considers the group as the basic unit of analysis. Under corporatism, groups representing businesses, labor, government, and others negotiate to develop what they conceive of as the best possible policies for the nation while taking each institution’s interest into account. The difference is that these institutionally constructed units do so not openly in front of public scrutiny but behind closed doors. Mediation among the groups was eventually made legitimate by the government in power. Corporatism prevails in such countries as Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (e.g., Hauss 2000, 158–160; Steiner 1997, 127–128). Members of these institutions are not elected members of their national assemblies or parliaments. They are recruited from leaders of organized businesses, labors, or government. Philippe C. Schmitter in 1974 proposes to bifurcate corporatism into societal and state corporatism (Zahariadis 1997, 146). European states cited above represent the former, while institutional representatives play dominant roles in making decisions. Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Greece are examples of the

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latter case, in which the state acts as the primary source of power, and civil representative corporations play a secondary role. Corporatism is applicable in Japan in the sense that decisions are made by various representatives, not just the ruling party in power, and bureaucracy in a clandestine manner. However, it is neither societal nor state corporatism that we find in Japan. It is “societal” in the sense that a variety of views in substance are represented, but it is “state” in the sense that people who are furtively involved in the mediation process are members of the parliament. Abe, Shindh, and Kawato (1994) speculate that if Rengh14 grows powerful enough, there may be a variant of European style corporatism that may take root in Japan. The authors offer the hypothesis after noting Pempel’s suggestion that Japanese corporatism is “corporatism without labor.”15 Although Rengh was involved in the formation of the Murayama cabinet in 1994, the impact of labor unions had declined since the end of the 1955 system era.16 My position is that labor unions had been very well represented in the bilayer structure of Japanese politics during the 1955 system era through the JSP IPRC committee. This will become clear when how the JSP as an indispensable partner of the LDP helped in maximizing Japan’s national interest during the 1955 system era is explained.17 Corporatism with some modifications is applicable in Japan, perhaps more than any other model in the literature. The bilayer theory proposed here is a modified version of corporatism. Let us begin.

Bilayer Theory Language Theory of Japanese Self and Reality The bilayer theory we propose here may be more appropriately labeled a language or cultural theory rather than an orientation, concept, or model, in the sense that it specifies causal factors.18 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Almond and Verba (1963), Hyman (1959), and others introduced the concept of political culture and political socialization. Both of these concepts focus on the political psychology of culture. I was grateful for the introduction of these new concepts into social science, especially as my doctoral dissertation was based on a political socialization survey of law students in Japan in the late 1950s (Kuroda 1962) that was part of a comparative study involving Japan, Turkey, and the United States. However, I found their assumption of the mind of a person at the time of birth to be tabularasa, unacceptable for three reasons. First, I side with Chomsky over Skinner that our mind is neither blank nor a white sheet of paper that one can color and doodle on as we grow up. Our mind is not a piece of white paper, but it is colored, probably to survive as

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long as we can. The perpetuation of the species is imprinted in our brain or programmed in our DNA and enables all of us, no matter where we are born, to learn a mother tongue during the early years of our life on earth. Second, my assumption is that our mind is genetically programmed to survive, and survive well, in a particular environment. We are endowed innately with a bit of Dale Carnegie in ourselves. Psychologists also inform us that we tend to remember pleasant things and forget experiences that hurt us. As I grow older, I noted that I consciously do that in order reduce stress and have a higher quality of life. The most dramatic demonstration of this human quality was brought to my attention at a dinner table one evening when our daughter blurted out, “My daddy was happy when I was born.” I asked her if she had memory of anything else when she was born. Her answer was negative. I inferred then that she must have been talking about the remarks I made at the time I gave her first bath in the kitchen sink. She and her mother returned home three days after she was born in hospital. It was when I was giving her the bath and I was drying her with a towel that I responded to her mother’s remarks that I was happy that she was a healthy girl and that they were both in good health. I learned two important lessons from my young high school daughter. A four-day-old infant is capable of understanding spoken language and recalling pleasant things more than unpleasant. Since I cannot imagine her, an infant, as being capable of deciphering any language, I assume that she experienced warm feelings of being wanted by her father as a girl. That feeling was transformed into words after she learned the language. Third, infants are capable of understanding their environment as soon as they are born and are equipped to transform their understanding into a language as they grow. There are those who also believe in prenatal learning and have pregnant women listen to Mozart and the like. From what leading scholars propose, my own personal experience, and the result of our cross-cultural surveys, I came to consider language as the most important element of culture that ubiquitously affects the structure and nature of politics. What we propose is language as the most salient dimension of culture to focus in understanding not only its explicit but also its “implicit” design for living, which includes politics.19

Evidence for Language Power A series of cross-language surveys conducted yielded the results presented in table 2.1. It shows how Americans, Arabs, and Japanese in different languages respond to questions that contain a response category such as “it depends on the circumstances” or “undecided.”20 The first column represents the percentage of Japanese respondents responding in Japanese choosing the middle

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Table 2.1 Middle Response by Nationality and Language in Use (in %) Nationality Language

Japanese Americans in Japanese Americans Arabs in Arabs in in Japanese Japanese in English in English English Arabic

Mid-response

58

47

34

33

32

26

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 J in J

Am in J J in E Am in E Ar in E Ar in Ar Mid-res

response. The second column contains Americans answering in Japanese. The third and fourth columns represent the percentage of English speakers of Japanese and American nationality, respectively, selecting the middle response. The last two columns represent the middle-response percentage of Arabs responding in English and in Arabic, respectively. These percentages denote the mean middle response to six questions that contained a middle-response category. Almost 60 percent of the Japanese reading and responding in their native tongue select middle response while only 26 percent of the Arabs (one-fourth) reading and responding in theirs do so. The Japanese, at least in the past, have been accused of being “dissimulative,” “inscrutable,” and the like. Now, our data show it is not their nationality so much as their language that makes them appear so, because Americans, too, become ambiguous and noncommittal while Japanese speaking in English are just as decisive and clear as Americans. Our findings reported thus far are limited to the surface of our attitudes. In order to delve into structural dimensions of this attitudinal finding, we went beyond frequency distribution and used Hayashi’s quantification method, an

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Table 2.2 High Loading Variables on the First Dimension Item L4 What happens own: disagree strongly C3 Science and human feeling: undecided K4 Money solves problems: disagree strongly B3 Teach money important: undecided A2 If had enough money: stop working L3 What happens own: disagree I1 Man: must follow nature N2 People are in general: fair

Value 3.49 2.79 2.63 2.60 1.97 1.42 1.40 1.34

Item

Value

I3 Man: must conquer nature J2 Desirable person: efficient worker H1 Preferred dept. chief: rational chief K1 Money solves problems: agree strongly G2 Follow conviction or: follow custom N1 People are in general: unfair K2 Money solves problems: agree

⫺1.96 ⫺1.96 ⫺1.61 ⫺1.46 ⫺1.20 ⫺1.10 ⫺1.03

equivalent of correspondence analysis designed for uncovering salient patterns in nonmetric data.21 Variables loaded highly on the first pattern or dimension are shown in table 2.2 (Kuroda and Suzuki 1991b). I have reproduced questions and responses used in the quantification III analysis in the appendix. Those of you who are interested in more detail of what we did should find them useful. The first dimension separates an integral view of the whole world that is the middle-of-the-road perspective (L4, C3, K4, B3) from an individualcentric and decisively clear view of the world (I3, J2, H1, K1). Implied here is that the most salient factor that divides the people of the three language groups as a whole is found in their view of the world vis-à-vis the self. In other words, there are those who perceive the world as uncertain but generally friendly and focus on the whole world as opposed to those who are selfcentric, rational, and have little trust in others except as to how they pertain to oneself. As you see in the abridged scattergram shown in figure 2.1, the first pattern (horizontal axis) clearly separates Arabic speakers from Japanese speakers with English speakers of all nationalities in the middle. We shall now examine the second dimension, the vertical axis in the scattergram. The second dimension (shown in table 2.3) places L4 and B3 on the top and L1, H2, I1 on the bottom. An integral view of the world (L4) versus a selfcentric view of the world (L1), rationalism (H1, J2) versus paternalism (H2, C1), and pessimism (C3) versus optimism (O1) characterize the second dimension. The second pattern discriminates the holistic–rational pessimism against self-centric–paternalistic optimism. Allow me to jump to the scattergram by

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Abridged Scattergram by Language and Nationality

1.60 Japanese Jpn

1.20 Arabic Arab .80 Japanese USA .40

.00

English Arab

– .40

– .80

– 1.20

English Jpn English USA

– 1.60

– 2.00

Figure 2.1 Abridged Scattergram by Language and Nationality Table 2.3 High Loading Variables on the Second Dimension Item L4 What happens own: disagree strongly B3 Teach money important: undecided I3 Man: must conquer nature C3Science and human feeling: undecided L3 What happens own: disagree H1Preferred dept. chief: rational G2 Follow conviction or: follow custom J2 Desirable person: efficient worker B1 Teach money important: important

Value

Item

Value

4.28

L1 What happens own: agree

⫺1.28

3.92

H2 Preferred dept. chief: paternalistic I1 Man: must follow nature O1 Most people are: trustworthy C1 Science and human feeling: lost

⫺1.27

3.87 2.92 2.13 1.79 1.78 1.67 1.39

⫺1.15 ⫺1.01 ⫺1.00

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nationality and language by omitting the scattergram by variables shown in our original report (Kuroda and Suzuki 1991b).22 The abridged scattergram in figure 2.1 presents where each language and nationality group is located along the two axes. First, we find Arabic speakers on the top left quadrant, Japanese speakers on the top right quadrant, and English speakers in the bottom right quadrant. What structurally separates the three groups most saliently is language, not nationality. Many authors claimed that the Japanese are ambiguous and that the Americans are open and optimistic, and the like, from their impressionistic observation and applying the knowledge that language is an important key to understanding another culture. Our report was, however, the first to present systematic empirical evidence to prove the comparative importance of language over nationality. Second, English-speaking Arabs, English-speaking Japanese, and Japanesespeaking Americans are constrained by their mother tongue to a varying degree, with the Arabs constrained the most followed by the Americans and the Japanese, who are apparently the least constrained. Some may argue that the difference found depends on the proficiency in foreign language acquired by these three nationalities. We came to conclude that proficiency is not the most influential cause, since we found that Tsukuba University students, who have never studied English in the United States, included in our studies are found about the same location in the quadrant along with Japanese students pursuing their degrees at the University of Hawaii. I am certain that Japanese students in Hawaii are more proficient in English than their compatriots in Japan. Hence, the difference found among the three languages is most likely due to qualitative difference in the three languages. What is it, then? This leads me to my next point. Third, Arabic speakers are clearly separated from Japanese speakers, as they are found, respectively, in the extreme top left quadrant and top right quadrant of the scattergram. They are divided by the horizontal or the first axis representing definitive, binary choice-orientation on the left of the scattergram to ambiguous, holistic adjust-orientation on the right. I found this difference between the two contrasting groups at least in part to be derived from the pervasive nature of religion on language or attitudes for both.23 English speakers, on the other hand, find themselves between the two. Japanese speakers adjust to a given situation while Arabic speakers are unconsciously oriented to either reject or accept a given situation. English, at least in its written form, traces its origins to Semitic languages, which include Arabic rather than Japanese. This coincides with the fact that most Semites are monotheistic. They are Christian, Jew, or Moslem, while Japanese, most of whom are polytheistic, can be Buddhist and Shintoist and possibly more all at the same time, such as those Japanese who wed in Christian churches in Hawaii.24

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Fourth, English speakers are found toward the bottom of the scattergram, particularly American and Japanese English-speaking groups. The second axis suggests that English language is structured to make speakers individualistic and optimistic, while the opposite is true of those who are found toward the top, Arabic and Japanese speakers. Indeed, the United States is known as a land of opportunity where anyone can get to the top, whatever the field might be. The other side of the coin, however, is that if you are poor and unsuccessful, it is considered your own fault, even in a land where the gap between the rich and poor is great and widening, particularly since 1980. Our findings thus indicate that our language latently and unconsciously structures our attitudes in a way that is considered normal in its culture that differs by the language in use. What becomes most significant is the salience of language in shaping the responses of the three nationalities.25 The second significant finding is that the Japanese are not used to perceiving the world in binary terms like the Semites or the Westerners. Japanese speakers, irrespective of nationality, view the world holistically, whereas Arabic speakers perceive the world in binary terms. One is either a member of the ruling or the opposition party. This finding was the key to building the bilayer theory. Third, when one examines the history of Semitic languages compared with Indo-European language groups and Japanese languages, they are centrifugal while Japanese has been centripetal in its history. The Semites also spread not just their written language over much of the Western world, but also their monotheistic religion. The remarkable switch the Japanese make from thinking in Japanese to English may be part of the centripetal nature of their language, whereas the Arabs are least likely to change their responses as they switch languages from their mother tongue to English. This finding coincides with that of Galtung (1996, 213) and Mushakhji (1972) who claim that the nature of Japanese culture is additive or adjustable. The Japanese propensity is not binary in the sense that it either adopts or rejects. The Japanese try to adjust and add parts of new ideas and institutions to their existing civilization while discarding parts of outside ideas and institutions from abroad, from Buddhism to Confucianism.26 One of the first novelists of the world, Lady Murasaki Shikibu, the author of The Tale of Genji (ca. 1010), considers “learning” as the essence of yamatogokoro or the Japanese mind when compared with the Chinese mind.27 I infer that she considers the Chinese mind as centrifugal while the Japanese mind or spirit as centripetal in nature and, never being satisfied, always in need of learning to improve. The Japanese seek neither eternity nor any absolute beliefs. A majority of the Japanese perceives a Rashomonesque world28; a dynamic, forever changing floating diffuse world in which one finds beauty and truths, but not eternal truth, nor perfect beauty.29

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The language we use is to a great extent a reflection of the way our forebears lived. We have determined that the nature of Japanese language causes its speakers—be they Americans or Japanese, to reject binary logic while English speakers of Americans and Japanese alike exclude middle-category responses and accept the Western either/or way of thinking. Two basic units of observation we propose to focus on are the concept of self and reality in comparative perspective, which we assumed to be most salient in comparative analysis.

Self and Worldview An inference drawn from cross-national analysis of cross-language survey data indicate the Japanese concept of self is diffuse and indistinct and that the Japanese live in a world of multiple truths. The Japanese self differs fundamentally from that of Semitic-based Western civilization, as manifested in the fact that even the word “individual” did not exist until the late nineteenth century. The individual, who constitutes the most salient unit of society in the West, did not exist at least in the sense it did and does in the West and the Middle East or West Asia. Translators had to invent a Japanese word, kojin. Percival Lowell (1888), reporting in the late nineteenth century, noted the dearth of self, for which reason he liked the Japanese language.30 The self is diffuse in the Japanese context. An analysis by Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) suggests that this fundamental character of Japanese culture passed on from one generation to another by the Japanese language has not changed much over a millennium. As for the second key concept of reality or worldview, we found that Japanese speakers tend to avoid either/or patterns of logic. English-language and especially Arabic speakers are even more likely to exclude middle-of-theroad responses in favor of either/or logic. Western civilization has its roots in ancient Greek culture. The Greeks, in turn, learned to write and to use money from Syropalestinians and other Semites. Later on, Westerners learned to believe in a monotheistic religion from the same Semites. Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945, 97–98) define culture as “explicit and implicit designs for living.” Kluckhohn (1957, 124) claims that each language contains its own way of constructing the world, including a set of “unconscious assumptions about the world.” Our cross-language surveys of Arabic, English, and Japanese among three nationalities support his definition of language.31 The Japanese find it difficult to accept any absolute belief—be it Christianity or Marxism. Neither one finds popular acceptance in Japan while Christianity has thrived in many other countries, including China and Korea. The Japanese are quite content to live in the ambiguous world of multiple truths, as evidenced in their attitude toward religion—they are Rashomonesque. It is difficult for Christianity

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or Marxism to grow in such soil and they have not. Christians account for less than one percent of the Japanese population.

Language Characteristics and Culture In order to locate American and Japanese cultures in terms of these two dimensions, I placed these two key concepts of culture into a property-space concept in table 2.4 on the basis of our survey findings and others discussed earlier. Americans are known for their strong sense of individualism whereas the Japanese are known for their group mentality. Americans tend to perceive the world in Aristotelian tradition and proceed to act on the basis of their rational perception. The Japanese are closer to the tradition of Protagoras who claims, “Man is the measure of all things” over Aristotelian logic. We found Arabs to be stronger in their sense of family and other groupings than Americans. Americans are logo-centric and self-centric whereas the Japanese represent the exact opposition to individualistic and rational-minded Americans, as classified in table 2.4. Having discussed the relationship between language and culture, we are now ready to move on to the next level: culture and political system.

Culture and Political System Economies typically develop by going from a basically agrarian to an industrial society dominated by manufacturing. This process of development is often accompanied by Westernization because of the origin of industrialization. However, all pristine societies do so by using their own prism that necessarily distorts the original format in transition despite their external resemblance to Western forms and institutions. Riggs’s contention, too, is that many traditional values and processes are preserved despite their Western appearances. If Akita (2005), Jameson (2001), Kurimoto (1997), Yanaga (1956), and my model are correct, the core of Japanese politics remains the same and will so persist for years to come. Why have the Japanese gone so far in making decisions behind closed doors to the point of establishing a special interparty institution outside the framework of parliament with budget and offices that actually manage the entire legislative process? NATO, EU, and the UN have closed discussions, Table 2.4 Logo-self-centrism versus Rashomonesque-diffuse-self Reality/self

Distinct and independent

Diffuse and dependent

Aristotelian logic Rashomonesque

United States

Arab World Japan

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but they do not go so far as to develop institutions designed for the purpose of secret talks. The reason for this somewhat unique institution that Japan started to develop as early as the 1890 before the First Imperial Diet convened is, I believe, derived from the nature of Japanese culture, especially its language and religion. As reported earlier in perceiving a given situation, the Japanese view the whole most saliently. They tend to accept multiple truths or ambiguity more readily. When this principle is applied to the decision-making process, it tends to seek an outcome that represents interests of all parties, even if the majority’s views might account for the largest part. In other words, the ruling party seeks only partial victory over opposition parties.32 As the late prime minister Takeshita used to say, you add one and one and divide by two in politics, and that essentially is what he did by accepting Socialists’ proposals in different forms in three years. Tsuruo Yamaguchi, one the late prime minister’s counterparts in the JSP, confirmed his story in my interview with Yamaguchi.33 Bills that pass the Diet hence represent a large segment of society, not just the interests of the ruling party, which consists of large corporate and business interests. Yet, majority rule is technically the order of modern legislatures. Hence, there was a need for IPRC politics to be established to satisfy both external and internal constraints imposed on Japan since the end of the nineteenth century. A former diplomat-turned-politician who ranks high in the LDP, Khichi Kath, succinctly explains how policy decisions are made in Japanese government (1995). Japan is a country of consensus making, as many claim. Japan does not base its decisions on majority rule, which is used very rarely if ever. He provides two exceptions from the 40-year history of the LDP when the LDP made policy decisions based on majority rule: the normalization of Japan’s relationship with China and the approval of the China–Japan Aviation Treaty. In the United States, where majority rule prevails, the minority grumbles about the issue for a long time after the vote, Kath says.34 In Japan, it takes time to reach a consensus, but once decisions are made based on an “understanding” with all parties, they all “accept” the decisional outcomes. What Kath implies is that it takes give and take among parties with different interests over a period of time, and possibly meetings held in secret to satisfy all parties to the point that dissidents will tolerate decisions made by the majority. It may mean either modification of the original bill or some other deal or both to facilitate making the majority rule operative. After three committees in the LDP35 and concerned bureaucrats reach consensus on a bill, it goes to the cabinet for consideration. If it receives cabinet approval, it is introduced to the Diet, where opposition parties may challenge its merits and demerits and debates may ensue. Normally in the West, pros and cons are debated and then majority rule is used to vote on the issue. In Japan, the ruling party does not impose majority rule on opposition parties if

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they seriously oppose a bill. Kath declares that no decisions in the Diet are made by simply debating and discussing pros and cons of an issue as long as the opposition parties are dissatisfied (1995, 12). The ruling party must negotiate and reach an “understanding” with its opposition parties before it uses its majority position to enact laws. The LDP solves conflicts between the ruling and opposition parties through IPRC politics behind closed doors. He adds that this practice may not be exactly democratic, but the ruling LDP does not practice the “tyranny of the majority” even if it is legally entitled to it. This means that each party will do whatever its IPRC committee has decided. Having obtained a “go ahead” from its opposition parties, the ruling party will then use its majority position to vote on the fate of bills, even if they go through a ritual of vocal and vigorous opposition to the ruling party position on an issue. Kath’s accounts fit with what others like scholar-turned-politician Kurimoto (1997) and many others report Diet politics to be like, for example, Takeshita (2001). These factual accounts revealed by Diet members and the results of my interviews with Diet members give me the data I need to construct the flow chart presented as figure 2.2. First, language and religion, constituting the core of culture, define designs for living in the United States and Japan. The nature of language coincides with the type of religions that prevail in each country. The Japanese language, with its diffuse concept of self and reality, is fertile soil for polytheisms, while a logo-centric and clearly identifiable and definitive sense of self leads Americans to accept monotheism and reject polytheism (table 2.2).36 Second, these two nations, divergent as they are, nevertheless developed political systems that are similar in appearance. However, Japan, with its

United States Congress Majority rule culture

Monolayer structure

Language religion Japanese Parliament Consensus making culture

Bilayer structure: Manifest and Latent

Figure 2.2 Language, Culture, and Government

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adherence to the core of its culture, operates the Western system for public consumption only. Unknown to many voters and most observers of Japanese politics outside of Japan, all controversial decisions are made in advance and in private through a traditional mechanism—IPRC politics. The nature of culture as described in table 2.2 leads the United States to formulate its policy on majority rule in U.S. Congress. In Japan, because of the nature of its culture that is diametrically opposed to the United States on two key dimensions, we find majority rule is used only formally, not in a real sense. Japanese prefer to seek consensus outside the framework of the Diet, an outwardly Western institution. They revert to the traditional mode of consensus making as an alternative to open decision making based on majority rule. Sam Jameson (2001) is correct in that Japan is like an amoeba that changes its shape and outlook along with each wave that reaches the shores of its archipelago, while maintaining its inner core. How does Japan develop a bilayer structure? How did it develop the current system of double tracks in the highest organ of the state?

The Bilayer Model of Japanese Legislative Politics Unlike Arab or Western cultures, Japanese culture is essentially centripetal. When one goes back in time, one finds that Jhmon society changed significantly as a result of the waves of Yayoi culture from the Asian continent that reached the shores of the Japanese archipelago during prehistoric times. After the establishment of the nascent state of Japan in the seventh century, the Taika Reform (645–650) swept the country, a result of the advent of Chinese impact—gaiatsu or external forces. When Japan started to feel the Western impact in the early seventeenth century, the Tokugawa government that came into power in 1600 decided to isolate itself in order to extend control over the entire country, undisturbed by foreign forces. It, however, did not totally isolate itself. It was clever enough to keep a small window open through the island of Deshima in Southern Japan to maintain minimum contact with the Dutch, from whom they learned modern science and technology, including medicine. When the Tokugawa government returned its de facto ruling power to the Meiji government in 1868, the Western powers were allowed an open relationship with the new government that was bent on modernizing its country. Perhaps the third wave of significant foreign influence came in 1945, when Japan was defeated in war for the first time in its history. This wave was marked by the heavy influence of the United States on Japanese demilitarization and democratization. The Allied Powers successfully reconstructed political institutions to ensure demilitarization and democratization. For example, the Supreme

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Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) encouraged Diet members to stop the rise of the military. Standing committees were introduced to strengthen the Diet’s power. When one examines the three major changes that affect the nature of Japanese society in significant ways, one notes that Japan is willing to accept new and advanced ideas and institutions in order to survive as an independent state. However, it never accepted anything in its totality. A good example is Confucianism. Japan adopted Confucian ideas and institutions, with the notable exception of the Mandate of Heaven, for two likely reasons. Japan does not accept an absolute idea—be it the Mandate of Heaven, Christianity, or Marxism. Japan also avoids adopting anything that threatens its imperial system. Fred W. Riggs (1964) is correct in saying that a nation that goes through modernization does so through its own prism. Japan’s prism, a.k.a. its language, does not allow absolutism to come through. Diet members, wearing a new cloth labeled “democracy,” parade through the Diet in accordance with U.S. intent and the Constitution, while the core of give and take between the ruling party and opposition parties, IPRC politics takes place behind closed doors. All issues involving potential conflicts are managed by the IPRC from the time a bill is drafted to its passage. In short, much of the script for the Diet is written by the IPRC. Liberal democracy, as practiced in the West, calls for open debate of pros and cons on an issue at hand and majority rule to settle the issue. This is a difficult proposition for the Japanese to swallow, for it contradicts with their way of decision making. Japanese make decisions through consensus and informal discussions where they can speak their hon’ne or true views prior to making a formal decision (nemawashi). Curtis (1988, 1999), Richardson and Flanagan (1984), and others speak of the Japanese use of nemawashi as the way of making all, including political decisions. Curtis (1999) and Yanaga (1956) go further to briefly reveal how nemawashi is applied in Diet politics. Now, my description of IPRC politics is formally assigned to the HMC. It performs its task formally and officially in the Diet, but the groundwork and preparation are done by IPRC. The LDP IPRC even appoints the members of the HMC to ensure a smooth working relationship. The Japanese prism filters liberal democracy so that majority rule survives in appearance, but not in reality. The internal forces fueled by Japanese culture take over the inside of liberal democracy. That is the core Sam Jameson (2001) is talking about in his amoeba model of Japan. When Japan changes, it takes on a new shell like a hermit crab. Jameson starts his article by citing Chie Nakane, who spoke of Japan as having no fixed principles. She, too, meant that Japan espouses new ideas, even if they seem unfit at the outset. Changes in the form that took place as a result of external pressures have not really affected the bilayer nature of Japanese politics from the impact of

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the T’ang Chinese in seventh century through the U.S. occupational reform in the twentieth century. Let us present an example of the bilayer nature of Japanese politics that has not been discussed at all in detail by outside observers, yet that constitutes the very essence of parliamentary politics in Japan (Kurimoto 1997). What appears to happen in many instances when alien institutions are imported to Japan is that the Japanese somehow turn them into rituals rather than the actual place of decision making when the new institutions do not fit well with the normative core of Japanese culture. As mentioned earlier, Yamagata and other Meiji leaders intended to change the feudal Tokugawa regime, but only externally so as to give the impression of Japan as being modern and sovereign. Wakon-yhsai or “Western Technology and Japanese Spirit” was one of the slogans of the Meiji government. Astute observer Chitoshi Yanaga (1956) saw through the external changes that Japan went through after the Meiji Restoration and the Allied Powers’ democratization efforts. The changes that Japan went through were no more than a “superficial imitation of European and American institutions” consisting mostly of structures and nomenclatures. The emperor or ten’nh today plays a largely ceremonial role as the family has for over a millennium. The bilayer theory attributes this phenomenon to the way the Japanese language is designed. While we would not contend that everything is decided behind closed doors as stated by Hamada (1994), many key decisions are so made, particularly those that involve interparty conflicts in the Diet. It should be made clear that Hamada is correct in his generalization in that every bill that comes to the Diet is explained and discussed in the LDP IPRC to assure passage if the cabinet so decides. This is why all freshmen members of the Diet in the LDP are required to join the LDP IPRC and attend early morning meetings five times a week. It is the best way to teach newcomers about how the Diet really operates and to learn about every single bill that comes to the Diet. The late former prime minister Noboru Takeshita tells us that the IPRC is the place where newcomers learn about legislation in the Diet (Takeshita 2001, 126–127). He himself served six terms as the LDP’s vice chairman of the IPRC. The IPRC must have been a required course for all his protégés in the Takeshita School of Politics he so successfully ran.37 What goes on in formal Diet sessions is a consequence of carefully orchestrated efforts of all parties with the possible exception of the JCP, which is not always included in the decision process.38 The HMC is an official Diet standing committee while the IPRC is an official party organ that resolves issues that cannot be handled by the former. The latter engages in work that is not made public to assure smooth Diet operations. Hence, the Minister of Health and Welfare and now the prime minister, Jun’ichirh Koizumi, who

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once served as the LDP vice chairman of the IPRC, responded to my inquiry by declaring that the committee engages in activities one cannot talk about. Many a model has been proposed to characterize Japanese policy-making processes from a corporate model, Japan Inc., to pluralism. However, there have been no attempts to characterize Japan’s political system from a comparative politics viewpoint in historical perspective,39 although such a loosely defined term as a “1955 system” has been used by journalists and scholars to describe the system that existed from 1955 to 1993. The ruling LDP that dominated the Japanese Diet from its inception in 1955 lost a substantial number of its members who formed a new party after the demise of the Cold War, among other things. The LDP lost its ruling position to a coalition of several parties including its chief former rival party, the JSP. Authors on Japanese politics used words like dual structure to describe the power structure, for example, in reference to the Kaifu or Miyazawa regimes (Tomimori 1993, 17–18). In both cases, an assumption is that the real power lies in the Keiseikai or Takeshita faction. External pressure to modernize or democratize comes from abroad. The Japanese respond by accepting modern and democratic institutions and nomenclatures from abroad while keeping their own way of doing things in ways that are difficult for outsiders to see. In other words, there is tremendous internal pressure consisting of conscious as well as unconscious forces derived largely from the Japanese language to preserve their own tradition. I would argue that is essentially what took place in the Taika Reform when China’s influence was the prominent force changing Japan. The West was the external force in the nineteenth century and the United States was the significant external force in the twentieth century. The Tokugawa period (1600–1868) produced a bilayer system based on ability rather than the ranking systems then in existence. Historian Hishi (1995) in his book on Sobayhnin (close task master/advisor) as an institution provided sources of the dynamic stability the Tokugawa Shognate enjoyed for nearly 300 years. System maintenance anywhere and anytime requires change and reform, characterized by the predominant role technology and invention play in the maintenance of the dynamic equilibrium that makes economic and political development possible. He even speculates that the sobayhnin system provided the basis for Japan’s modernization in the late nineteenth century. Because of the shadowy nature of their positions and the way individual members were recruited for ability rather than traditional family standings made them envious and the target of rumor. If the emperor in Kyoto was the de jure ruler and Tokugawa the de facto ruler, the sobayhnins constituted the third layer of power structure that empirically turned out to be the source of power that ran the Tokugawa system.

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They probably resemble the genrhs or elder statesmen of the Meiji era (1868–1911) who played a decisive role in managing the government. If I may place what has been described so far into a drawing, the bilayer model I propose can be illustrated as shown in figure 2.3. External forces created the Diet, including the HMC and plenary sessions where Diet members act in accordance with Western standards in appearance, debating pros and cons of issues, and deciding them by majority rule with due respect paid to opposition parties. This is called tatemae-level performance or ritual. The substance, however, was to be processed by the IPRC, where members of the Diet can informally negotiate (through hon’ne-level communication) and arrive at a consensus behind closed doors in advance of formal proceedings. The IPRC involves itself at all levels of the legislative

External forces Majority rule

HMC: Manifest layer Formal: Tatemae Plenary session Manifest layer

Domestic forces Consensus making

IPRC: Latent layer Informal: Hon’ne

Figure 2.3 External Pressure and Bilayer Structure in the Diet

Bureaucracy Interest group Ruling party Bill drafting

Ruling party PARC PARDC, EC Cabinet

IPRC Ruling party and opposition parties

Diet committees HMC and other committees

Plenary session

Figure 2.4 Latent IPRC in the Legislative Process PARC ⫽ Policy Affairs Research Council, PARDC ⫽ Policy Affairs Research Deliberation Council, and EC ⫽ Executive Council.

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process from a section in bureaucracy to the ruling party’s Policy Affairs Research Council, the cabinet, and all through the plenary session. After the IPRC provides the HMC with instructions, the HMC carries them out and the same thing happens in plenary sessions. Satsuki Eda (1985, 156) reveals a moment of truth when he says that he observed how the ruling LDP chair of the HMC at its meeting waits for a call before announcing his decisions when the IPRC fails to finish its work on time (figure 2.4). He headed a small party, the Social Democratic Alliance. His observation was based on his experience of being in the HMC.40 The bilayer theory represents the form of adjustment or accommodation that Japan makes when external pressured is exerted. Since it rejects majority rule in favor of consensus making, an implication is that whatever comes out of the Diet in terms of the nature of bills reflects the representative input of a greater segment of the population than majority rule alone would produce. Having presented the bilayer theory, we are now ready to look for relevant data and to test its validity, reliability, and usefulness.


3 Japanese Politics in Bilayer Perspective “IPRC Politics—the Diet Stops” When the Diet spins for nothing as time passes I say “hanashiai” between the ruling party and opposition parties is the real politics —The Late Junza Iwasaki, HC

Junzh Iwasaki, the late HC member of the LDP, composed the above poem defining hanashiai or informal discussions behind closed doors where hon’ne or “frank opinions” can be freely exchanged as real politics (1994, 281). Plenary sessions are void of frank discussions and are filled with the formality of articulating ideological and party lines expected by respective constituents and the public at large.1 He served in the HC and served as LDP IPRC vice-chairman as well as Minister of State.2 He presided over the LDP Presidential Election when Jun’ichirh Koizumi was elected on April 24, 2001. These are the words, expressed in a short 31-syllable poem, of a seasoned Diet member who passed away on July 7, 2004 who honestly portrayed how he felt about politics in the highest organ of the state. Why is it that the plenary session in which pros and cons are debated is not where real decisions are made? What is then the real politics, as a veteran politician defines it? IPRC politics is the answer, as so well expressed in his poem. Since IPRC politics played the greatest role during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993, when the LDP maintained its ruling party position uninterrupted for 38 years, longer than any other ruling party outside of Communist nations, I wish to focus on the “real politics” that took place during the 1955 system era. I estimate the amount the LDP spent close to $70 million per annum on IPRC politics in the early 1990s toward the end of the era. Nihonkeizai Shimbun or the Nikkei on September 8, 1995 reports that the LDP’s IPRC budget was reduced to ¥1,412,000,000 in 1994. Ichirh Ozawa, who bolted

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out of the LDP, causing its collapse as the ruling party, attempted in vain to eliminate IPRC politics. Politics takes place within certain domestic and international contexts. In what context did IPRC politics flourish during the 1955 system era? In answering this question, it is the objective of this chapter to examine the role that IPRC politics played from a sustained perspective of the bilayer theory. A brief description of the Japanese parliament as it is formally instituted is in order, to be followed by how politics operates as described above, in order to appreciate the differences between the two versions.

The National Diet:The Manifest Structure The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State. Article 41

After making clear the highest nature of parliamentary power in the nation, the 1947 Constitution goes on to spell out how it is to be structured and managed to perform its objectives as the highest legislative organ of the state. It consists of two houses, the HR and the HC, with more power given to the former on several grounds.3 The HR consists of 480 members who are elected for four-year terms through a single-member district system and proportional representation system. The HR, however, is subject to dissolution if so deemed by the prime minister or if it passes a vote of nonconfidence (Article 45). Since 1945, opposition parties have succeeded in passing nonconfidence bills five times for a variety of reasons when the ruling party failed to maintain enough party discipline to remain an integral unit. The HC elects its 247 members for sixyear terms and is not subject to dissolution (Article 46), giving the Diet a sense of stability. Each house selects its presiding officer and other officials (Article 58). The presiding officer in each house manages its affairs with the help of its HMC, the equivalent of the House Rules Committee in the U.S. Congress. The Diet is also empowered to elect the prime minister, who is most likely to be a member of the HR, the larger and more powerful of the two houses under the bicameral system. The prime minister, in turn, serves at the pleasure of the Diet. There is no separation of power in Japanese government. It also differs from the United States in its unitary system, and is more the like the French government rather than the federal form of government. Hence, the Japanese refer to their government as the National Diet, not the Federal Diet, although the Diet is a misnomer. Of interest to us here is what the Constitution said about an informal setting where frank and honest views can be exchanged, or hanashiai, cited at

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the outset of the chapter, can take place. Article 57 of the Constitution stipulates: Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution. . .

The Constitution provides a legal basis for Diet members to meet in secrecy to perform their tasks. If one looks for legal justification for IPRC politics, this may constitute grounds upon which IPRC politics may find its raison d’être. The Japanese National Diet is located in the center of Tokyo, where other related government buildings, including the LDP and JSP Headquarters, the prime minister’s residence and key ministries are located within a perimeter of slightly over a square mile. Many of these buildings are connected through underground passages, which is why you do not see too many political leaders walking on the streets. IPRC politics is like the underground passes you normally do not see. Casual observers do not notice the underground passes that connect the ruling and opposition parties. How did this underground passageway come to flourish in the Cold War era or during the 1955 system era? We now move from the formal structure to the latent power structure less visible to the public and casual observers. We will do so from the bilayer theory perspective described in chapter 2.

The Bilayer Structure of the 1955 System: Confrontational and Collaborative Symbiosis The Manifest Structure—Microcosm of the Cold War in the Bipolar World It is customary to characterize the 1955 system as an era when the LDP ruled with the JSP being the main vocal opposition party from 1955 to 1993 (see e.g.,Htake 1999). The beginning was marked by the merger of two socialist parties into the JSP, followed by the merger of the two conservative parties into the LDP toward the end of 1955.4 The formation of a splinter party led by Ichirh Ozawa, who bolted out of the LDP, led the Miyazawa government to lose to a vote of nonconfidence in the summer of 1993. In view of the JSP’s inability to become the ruling party, the system is sometimes referred to as a one-and-a-half party system instead of a two-party system. The 1955 system, particularly in its early period, was filled with violent confrontations between the LDP and the JSP, as evidenced in the 1960 Anpo crisis. The then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi railroaded the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty after a bloody confrontation with protestors in and out of the Diet

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building. Presiding Speaker Ichirh Kiyose had to be carried to and from the podium by security forces. President Eisenhower’s visit to Japan was cancelled. After the crisis in 1960, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda focused the nation’s energy on building an economic miracle while occasional violent confrontations in the Diet continued. All these events took place while the Cold War continued in the bipolar world at large until the end of the 1980s. It was after the 1993 crisis and shortly after the formation of the LDP–JSP coalition government in 1994 that I asked the late Noboru Takeshita the role he played in the formation of the coalition.5 His response was very Japanese.6 “People give me too much credit for what I do,” he said. Then, as we started to talk about the 1955 system era, he told me a similar story on a couple of occasions as he did to Shigeo Abe (Takeshita 1995, 136–155, 2001, 130–153). It was a revealing account of the 1955 system.

The Latent Structure—A Collaborative Symbiosis The late prime minister Takeshita’s definition of the 1955 system era was that it was not one party dominating the Diet. It was the LDP as the ruling party, aligned to the United States, and the JSP, friendly to the Eastern bloc, both playing their part in the national interest of Japan. The Cold War in the bipolar world at large made this division of roles in the best interest of all parties concerned. Japan was able to limit its military role, despite the United States urging to the contrary, thanks to the JSP’s continuous vociferous opposition to expansion in national defense. The LDP’s alignment with the United States helped Japan’s economy to grow while maintaining relatively good relations with Eastern bloc nations through the help of socialist forces. In other words, Japan was able to resist U.S. pressure to increase its defense capability by using the JSP as an excuse for not being able to go along with, while the JSP in dealing with the Eastern bloc used LDP dominance as an excuse for Japan’s indifference to Eastern bloc nations. Domestically, the LDP insisted on free enterprise and competition. Meanwhile, the JSP and others insisted on adhering to Article 9 of the Constitution,7 which is a nonalignment foreign policy. The JSP also pushed for an egalitarian distribution of income and wealth, which reduced poverty and helped maintain social stability. Without being explicit, Takeshita was essentially telling me that sometimes violent open confrontation between the LDP and the JSP and other opposition parties was at least in part for public consumption to show their loyalty to their respective constituents and to the United States, but it was not the whole truth. Takeshita served as the LDP’s vice chair of IPRC for six terms under Shin Kanemaru and others. He was known for his wide and close contacts beyond party lines. Although the late Takeshita did not make himself explicit to me, observers may be safe to infer that what could be interpreted as collusive politics


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existed between the LDP, on the one hand, and the JSP, JCP, and other opposition parties, on the other. He essentially said that both the ruling and opposition parties worked together in the national interest of Japan by playing different roles. Although he used the expression of division of labor, he was implying the use of IPRC politics as a means to realize the national interest, which was a higher objective. He was known for his skill in human relations as a veteran member of IPRC politics along with the late Shin Kanemaru.8 Naka has a section entitled “Dual Structure of Power” in referring to the Diet in his book on political reform (1993, 64–73). The scholar says that although in theory, the prime minister may be as powerful as the president, in reality, the Japanese prime minister is often not very powerful. A coalition of powerful factions and cliques in the LDP controls its prime minister, just as the Socialist Association controls the JSP. As the 1955 system approached its demise, it became apparent that “the Socialists are opposed to the ruling conservatives, the LDP in appearance, but in reality they are in collusion with the LDP through informal discussions behind closed doors” (Naka 1993, 73). Here we see a conversion on the assessment of the 1955 system between the political leader and the political observer. Both of them say that unlike what we were led to believe from the appearance of two sides clashing on key issues in the Diet, the ruling and opposition parties enjoyed a symbiotic existence behind the scenes. Scholar-turned-politician Kurimoto views the nature of Japanese politics in a similar perspective. Shin’ichirh Kurimoto (1999, 17–18) defines the JSP as the LDP’s supporting actor, not its main rival as portrayed. Kurimoto correctly identifies the JSP as pretending to act in public as the ruling party LDP’s most powerful rival opposition party. Kurimoto continues that the two major actors of the 1955 system, especially toward its end, enjoyed real buddy–buddy relations. The JSP and others have received ample funds from the LDP. To extend his arguments, I would hypothesize that the JSP spoke so loftily of its quixotic idealisms as an act to represent its supporters’ interests, to make the public believe that it is the archrival to the LDP. This gives the appearance of a democracy where pros and cons are debated openly. It also helps the LDP maintain its relative independence from external pressures. Another benefit may be that the JSP IPRC could request more concessions benefiting working people and material rewards from the LDP if it disagreed vigorously. Hence, the JSP’s vociferous opposition against the ruling LDP was both real and unreal. The LDP veterans were aware of this tactic and reacted accordingly to keep the main opposition party sufficiently satisfied so that they could pass key legislation they felt was important without causing excessive commotion. Many observers in the United States used to view Japan as “Japan, Inc.” The Japan, Inc. model stipulates that all Japanese businesses and governments work together to form a monolithic body to promote trade with the United

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States and other countries, paying little attention to defense. This model became popular in the 1980s as the United States started to experience billions of dollars in trade deficits with Japan, especially after 1980. The late former prime minister Takeshita said that the Japanese Diet was officially composed of the ruling and oppositions parties, similar to Western democracies, although in fact everyone worked together behind the scenes to serve the national interest, with the possible exception of the JCP.9 This resulted in not only economic prosperity for Japan, but it also allowed Japan to become the most egalitarian state in the world on the basis of income, Takeshita claimed. He presented data to buttress his assessment (Takeshita 1995, 42–44).10

The Division of Labor was for the Good of Japan To summarize the 1955 system as described by political leaders and observers, Japanese politics operated on two levels, the manifest and latent levels or image and reality. U.S. occupational reformers, consisting mostly of New Dealers, and subsequent modifications made by the U.S. Cold War strategy in the Cold War era designed the government’s structure. The U.S. objective after the Cold War started was to make Japan a bastion of democracy against the communist threat. The system operated the way it was supposed to, at least in appearance. However, under the apparent Western-style democracy, the ruling party and its opposition parties enjoyed a symbiotic existence—as the late political leader Iwasaki said in the poem cited at the outset. The LDP and the JSP collusively prospered through the division of labor forced on them by the Cold War, as the late prime minister Takeshita would put it. He added that it was good for Japan’s national interest, to which I nodded and responded— “I see. That makes sense.”11 In short, Japanese politics operates on two levels, at manifest or official and latent or unofficial levels. We often see only readily visible parts of what is going on in Nagata-chh and not what remains hidden from the public. This is the bilayer theory. Real politics where hon’ne is exchanged and compromises are made happens outside the Diet, even if participants are elected officials. Statements by leading Diet members cited at the outset of chapter 2 also point to the true nature of politics behind the scenes. Although there is evidence that bilayer politics existed for centuries, it is during the 1955 system era that it came to be more fully developed, at least in the sense that we have documented evidence to prove the validity of the bilayer theory. How does IPRC politics operate then?

Legislative Process: Drafting and Passing Bills Politics is essentially the process of formulating policies to govern a nation through the government’s monopoly of physical forces within a given territory.


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The Diet is empowered to be the “highest organ of the state power, and shall be the sole law making organ of the state” as stipulated in Article 41 of the Constitution. Legislative politics, or law making, is the center of focus here. If the Constitution empowered the Diet to be the sole legislative institution, then how does it carry out its key function of generating and passing laws to govern Japan? Many a model has been proposed to explain how the Diet passes bills. Minoru Nakano presents one of the most comprehensive attempts (1992, 1993). He lists 13 different models in all, one of which is IPRC politics. His categorization of models includes key actors and rules by which actors contribute to legislative decision making. He also supplies examples of what he considers typical of each model in the legislative process. The cabinet in power or the ruling party proposes the great majority of bills that pass the Diet. The cabinet proposed 67 percent of 10,008 bills introduced from 1945 to 1985. HR proposed 25 percent, and the HC, 8 percent.12 Cabinet bills have a much better chance of being passed than bills introduced by individual members that require at least 20 signatures as is demonstrated in the following example: 6,927 bills passed the Diet during the same period. Of the total bills passed, cabinet bills account for 85 percent. Individual HR members only passed 13 percent, and individual legislators in the HC only passed 2 percent. How, then, does the cabinet introduce bills? Various bureaucratic branches often generate bills or proposed policies. The bills often incur a cost, necessitating a consultation with the Ministry of Finance. Bills also must be formulated in accordance within the existing rules and laws with which bureaucrats are familiar. Each Diet member is given only three office staff employees to manage one’s office—hardly enough to have anyone who specializes in drafting of bills. Hence, most bills are generated and formulated with the ruling party working with relevant bureaucracies before they get presented to the Diet for consideration. Some bills originate with ruling party leaders, particularly those within the prime minister’s office, as was the case oftentimes with active prime ministers, such as the Nakasone cabinet. Interest groups, public opinion, and the ruling party all play their parts in a bill’s development. To be considered, an idea must be timely and relevant and must be manageable within financial and legal constraints.13 Sone and Kanazashi (1989, 171) list 10 steps for a bill to reach the cabinet level from which the bill is introduced into the Diet as follows: (1) The achievement of consensus within a ministry. (2) Consultation with the Ministry of Finance. (3) Consultation with consultative group (shingikai) consisting of bureaucrats, scholars, experts, journalists, and other knowledgeable people attached to various bureaucratic units.

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The Core of Japanese Democracy (4) Consultation and consensus making with relevant agencies in the bureaucracy. (5) Refer to the ruling party Policy Affairs Research Council (the PARC). (6) Examination by the ruling party Policy Affairs Research Deliberation Council (the PARDC). (7) Approval by the ruling party Executive Council. (8) Bill finalization at the ministry level. (9) Refer to the conference of administrative vice ministers. (10) Refer to the cabinet meeting for approval.

It should be made clear at the outset that IPRC gets involved from the very beginning of drafting bills, probably in some office in the bureaucracy to the last stage of legislation, plenary session in the HC depending upon the nature of a bill. Hirose (1989, 53) reports that when an elderly statesman of the LDP became responsible for the IPRC committee, he requested each ministry’s person in charge of contacting the LDP IPRC committee to make sure anyone approaching them had contacted the IPRC committee first. If the LDP helps its opposition parties in finding money, he wanted to make sure that they felt obligated to pay it back in the form of concessions in passing bills when the time came. IPRC is everywhere where there is a bill, as shown in figure 3.1. The HMC gets involved in passing a bill after it is introduced in the Diet. IPRC gets involved if necessary at every stage of the bill process before and after introduction, as shown in figure 3.1.

LDP: PARC, PARDC, and EC

Bureaucracy ministries

Bureaucracy finance M. agencies IPRC

Gi’un HMC

Cabinet approval

Bill introduced The Diet standing committees

Figure 3.1 The First 10 Steps in Bill Drafting and Introduction by Cabinet to the Diet


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As a bill passes from one stage to the next, especially powerful is what became known as zoku-gi’in or zoku politicians. Zoku Diet members are specialized leaders in a limited area of policymaking in the Diet as the virtue of the following three assets: (1) veteran member of a standing committee; (2) expertise in one’s area of specialization such as construction, and (3) contacts with relevant bureaucrats and interest groups. For the most comprehensive treatment of the subject, see Takashi Inoguchi and Tomoaki Iwai (1987). They are Diet members who because of their long service in an area of legislation, such as construction, acquired expert knowledge of the subject and developed contacts with relevant interest groups and bureaucrats.14 Relevant knowledge and contacts add up to power in the Diet. Zoku politicians belong to appropriate LDP PARC and PARDC committees, where they play influential roles. Then they play their parts again when a bill comes to a standing committee in the Diet where it is considered for judgment. They get to examine the merits and demerits of a bill several times before they vote in the plenary session, where votes are taken. These 10 steps are not based on the Constitution or laws, but on an informal mechanism that developed over the years. Yet, it is stable and routine enough that it can be referred to as an institution with its own structure and processes. It all takes place before the formal introduction of a bill. This was a typical way by which a bill was finalized for introduction to the Diet under the 1955 system. It is definitely an extra-legal legislative institution. With the advent of the 1993 change in the ruling party, the zoku (the LDP) members lost power as IPRC politics lost influence (Ith et al. 2000, 247). After the fall of the 1955 system in 1993, reform-minded Ichirh Ozawa abolished the IPRC committee and replaced it with a meeting of the chief secretary for policy affairs from each party (Horie and Kasahara 1995, 93–110). It did not work well. The Hosokawa government reintroduced IPRC politics under a different name. The development of coalition governments after the 1993 collapse of the 1955 system requires coordination within the ruling coalition parties before the ruling coalition IPRC starts negotiating with opposition parties.15 IPRC politics continues to work at all levels with probably much less fanfare and a smaller budget.16 Numerous efforts to abolish factional politics have failed just as Ichirh Ozawa attempted to abolish IPRC politics in 1993. Jun’ichirh Koizumi resigned from his faction to run successfully for prime minister in 2001 to demonstrate his intent to reform the LDP. He made a dent in factional politics, but it is still alive and well. Both factional and IPRC politics are so deeply rooted and structured in Japanese tradition that reforms will never eradicate them. It is a deeply rooted part of the Japanese tradition that seems not to change over time.17 Faction members continue to meet regularly for lunch to strengthen friendships for mutual survival and career enhancement. Factional politics is found in many parts of the world at many levels. That is certainly true in the community where I did a

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power structure study in the 1960s.18 Factional politics existed in Hawaii where I lived, voted in elections, and was involved in polling for over three decades. Factional politics also tends to be less visible. Let us see how bills are processed in the Diet after the cabinet submits them. Normally, 100–200 cabinet bills are introduced every year that constitute close to 70 percent of all bills, with individual members submitting their own bills constituting the rest. Approximately 85 percent of the Cabinet’s bills pass the Diet every year. Formally, it calls for the reading of bills in the plenary session.19 Key bills that are considered important are not just read but explained. This is known as okyhyomi or “reading of a sutra” in parliamentary parlance. Opposition parties attempt to consider so-called makura hhan or “pillow bills” in Diet parlance. These are bills the parties approve of that get passed early in session, as though they were lead items in the supermarket.20 The second step sees the bills submitted to an appropriate standing committee for consideration. Some bills are set aside without being assigned to an appropriate committee. This is done by parties that do not want to see these bills become law. This state of affairs is called tsurushi or suspending in the Diet vernacular. Opposition parties use these two tactics to obtain concessions from the ruling LDP through IPRC politics. The “pillow” bills need to be not only read, but also explained in the plenary session. Opposition parties make use of this custom to delay the passage of bills that the ruling party considers crucial in order to get concessions from the ruling party. They would ask for an explanation of the bill ad infinitum. They cannot be given to committees for action until they are finished with the explanation. In order to discourage excessive resistance by opposition parties, the ruling party developed what in parliamentary parlance is called “miyage bills” or “souvenir bills.” These are bills the opposition parties desire to have processed smoothly. They are listed along with the “pillow” bills. If the opposition parties want their bacon for their home districts—the “souvenir”—they have to cooperate with the ruling party and stop their efforts to delay the process. Agenda setting is laboriously worked out through IPRC politics, resulting in the smooth running of legislative process as well as representing not only the interests of the ruling party but also some of the opposition parties as well. To show how hard the ruling party and opposition parties try to represent respective constituents, all parties also stage dramatic debates and other parliamentary theatrics. The script writing for the public legislative process is literally done through IPRC politics, down to the last detail. IPRC politics results in everyone getting a thin slice of the pie, even parties that are not the ruling party. Opposition parties would not get anything under normal majority rule. This also fits with the explanation offered by the late Prime Minister Takeshita as well as the comments made by Shigezh Hayasaka, the late former


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prime minister Kakuei Tanaka’s secretary who said that, in Japan, the prime minister (Tanaka) does not make decisions. Everyone takes part in making decisions. After bills including some “pillow” and “souvenir” bills are read and explained, they are submitted to appropriate committees for consideration. This process of sending bills to an appropriate standing committee is called orosu or “bring down” or “pull down” from the state of “suspension.” Each committee examines the pros and cons of bills with an initial explanation, followed by a question-and-answer session. If acceptable, it will be put to a vote for forwarding to a plenary session for action. If it needs to be revised or called for an amendment, it will be discussed and resolved before it is called to question. These steps are what formally happen as expected in any Western government counterpart. However, each party decides on the position it will take on a given bill. Each party decides how to vote as a group and every member goes by the party decision without any exception. How often do opposition parties reject bills, most of which are proposed by the cabinet? Sath and Matsuzaki (1986) report that, of all bills the LDP and its predecessors proposed, opposition parties, with the exception of the JCP, voted on only a small percentage from 1967 to 1985.21 The main opposition party during the period, the JSP, voted anywhere between 60 and 80 percent of the time with the ruling LDP. The Democratic Socialist Party (the DSP) and the Khmeith (the KP) endorsed LDP bills 80–90 percent of the time. The JCP widely fluctuates from 30 to 70 percent. It went along with the LDP most often in the late 1970s and least often in the 1960s and the 1980s. Sath and Matsuzaki (1986, 141–142) inform us that it is not only each party’s position that determines its policy on a bill, but also interparty relations that determine a party’s stand on a bill. I am in total agreement with former prime minister Ki’ichi Miyazawa, who said that human relations skills constitute the core source of power in legislative politics (Hshita 1999, 12). In relation to other countries, the Diet spends less time formally examining bills in committee, meeting two or three times a week during the session. The reason for the bilayer perspective is that much consensus building is done outside of standing committee. It takes time and money to arrive at an understanding of controversial bills behind closed doors, making it unnecessary to argue over an issue except to satisfy legal requirements. If a bill goes out of committee, it goes to the plenary session for a vote. But setting up the agenda is the work of IPRC politics, formally designated for the HMC. The HMC announces the agenda, which is arranged by “Headquarters” or honbu meaning the ruling party IPRC. Most of the time, the ruling party as well as the opposition parties know in advance of what is going to happen at a plenary session when a bill goes up for a vote.

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The Functional Necessity of IPRC Politics Hans Baerwald (1974, 16) reports that the United States decided not to include the filibuster feature of the U.S. Congress when the United States designed the postwar political system in Japan after the war, for fear of conservative minorities who might stop U.S. reform efforts. Consequently, the U.S. draft of Diet Law gave presiding officers power to control the questioning and debate with opposition parties (Baerwald 1974, 14–15). The Law gave them the power to call for a plenary session, set the agenda, and preside over the Diet as they wished. A simple majority can pass a resolution to limit the time for debate. There is no place for minorities to effectively influence the legislative process. That is why Conservatives wasted no time developing the “cow-walk tactic.” It was a tactic to delay the legislative process in protest against the ruling party’s railroading of the Emergency Coal Mining Management bill on November 22, 1947 in the HR plenary session. The ruling coalition then consisted of the JSP, Democratic Party, and the National Cooperative Party when the Liberal Party tried to delay the passage of the bill. It is interesting that after conservative politician Banboku Hno of the Liberal Party introduced it, the Socialists used the cow-walk tactic almost exclusively to harass the LDP. Since no bills can be automatically reconsidered once a session is over, delaying the passage of a bill amounts to killing it. Japan’s normal session lasts only 150 days. There is also a custom of opposition parties not taking part in committee proceedings unless a relevant minister is present. Furthermore, there is the custom of “hanging” that we noted earlier. Then, there is the custom of debating noncontroversial issues endlessly to postpone the passage of bills. If the cow-walk technique does not work, then opposition parties go to “sleep,” meaning they refuse to take part in parliamentary deliberations. This signals the call for IPRC politics to work behind the scenes to wake up the sleeping opposition parties. The LDP secretary general or IPRC chair withdraws funds from a special account, and knocks on the door of the JSP’s office or wherever the “sleeping beauties” are located. In Diet vernacular, this is called taking a feeding bottle “to wake them up”—okosu. When a rumor starts circulating that money changed hands, parliamentarians call the opposition parties “poisoned” or “dokuga mawatta.” The amount of money used by the LDP may have been literally peanuts in the 1950s, as Chiji Kuno, a veteran LDP IPRC member reports that he used to take peanuts from Chiba to the JSP office and the LDP office and spend about the same amount of time in both parties (Kuno 1988, 185–186). However, by the end of the 1955 system era, the LDP was spending close to $70 million per year to appease the JSP and other opposition parties in the Diet. The price of “milk” went up appreciably over the years. It appears, however, the price has gone down with the end of the era.


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The ruling party responds to these efforts to sabotage parliamentary deliberations by railroading important bills. Sometimes, the formal session would accept an interim report from a committee in order to pass bills. Obviously, the ruling party has the ultimate power to pass bills because of its majority position. Opposition parties do not want the ruling party to do so since they will end up helpless against what the ruling party wants to do. Hence, they do their best to get what they can from the ruling party surreptitiously, making it necessary for IPRC politics to perpetuate itself in the Japanese parliament. Negotiations between the ruling LDP and the JSP used to take place in the HMC until the mid-1960s. However, the advent of other minority opposition parties and the renewed growth of the JCP in the 1970s made negotiation in the HMC difficult. The presence of the JCP in the HMC made it uncomfortable for other parties to talk hon’ne or their real desires, since the JCP insists on rational reasoning. Representatives from all parties must be present in the HMC. Here arises the need for the IPRC politics, since different combinations of party representatives could meet more informally where they can open up and speak how they feel, and negotiate.22 The value of IPRC politics increased in the 1970s for the ruling LDP. After the LDP gained 300 seats in the House, the opposition parties found IPRC politics more important than ever before. The LDP lost its majority position in the HC in 1989, making IPRC politics more valuable than ever before for the LDP. The opposition parties used formal and legal tactics to delay parliamentary proceedings on the public level. On the private level, they forced the ruling party to modify bills to meet their needs. Perhaps this is seen most clearly in the virtual elimination of poverty as Japan prospered in the 1960s and 1970s in particular. The gap between the rich and the poor, however, was on the rise after 1993 and especially by 1997 after several measures passed the Diet.23

Managing the Diet The Diet’s main function is legislative. An important initial task of the Diet after receiving bills from the Cabinet or members of the Diet is to set the agenda for a session, which has a time limit. To assure safe passage of important bills, the agenda must be set to reflect the degree of urgency and importance as viewed by various parties. Although it falls on the president of each house to formally set the agenda, in reality, it falls on the House Steering Committee or the HMC in each house and informally to each party’s IPRC committee. Agendas are set by consensus by these two committees in and out of the Diet.24 Formally speaking, the House president delegates to the HMC the power of deciding which standing committee gets which bills and by what order they should be placed on the agenda in the Diet session and other matters

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that concern Diet management. The tasks delegated are greater than similar committees elsewhere, including the House Rules Committee in the United States, which sets mainly the daily agenda, and does not manage Congress. The HMC is composed of about 20 members in the HR and 10 in the HC, depending upon the number of seats each party received in the election. As is the case with other standing committees, directors of the HMC make most of the decisions. The HMC recruits directors from the top four parties in each house in accordance with HMC rules. Informally, it falls to IPRC committees to decide all personal matters, including seating each member of the Diet. IPRC committees handle all interparty conflicts. The LDP IPRC committee appoints HMC members. When the HMC fails to reach a consensus, IPRC politics takes over. When secret negotiations by IPRC committees fail, top leaders of concerned parties come to negotiate a consensus. If no real consensus is reached, they will come to an understanding of each one’s role in the Diet session. IPRC committees may be called upon to script a scenario of violence in Diet formal sessions. In short, the real power of Diet management falls on IPRC committees along with the top leaders of major parties in the Diet. What is the nature and scope of IPRC politics, which is reputed to posses so much importance in legislation, the Diet’s key function?

The Latent Structure: IPRC Politics The basic function of IPRC is the management of Diet affairs, formally delegated to the work of the HMC and HR Speaker. The LDP rulebook stipulates in Article 20 that IPRC is established to manage Diet activities for the party (Jiyiminshuth, March 5, 1995). The committee consists of a chair, several vice-chairs, and members. The party chief secretary, with approval from the party executive council, appoints the chair. The committee chair, with approval from the executive council, appoints vice-chairs and others. The official document contains only the basic nature of IPRC without going into details. IPRC politics refers to the increased power of a small number of IPRC committee members who yield disproportionate power in the Diet (Hirose 1989, 51–52). An IPRC committee is often thought of as one of the Diet standing committees, but it is not. It is a party organ. Simply put, the key function of each party’s IPRC committee is “to lead Diet operation to the advantage of one’s own party” (Hi 1990b, 101). Each party normally places veteran members of the Diet to fill IPRC committee positions. They must have mastery over the entire Diet to perform tasks such as handling the budget and managing bills. They must not only have a good understanding of where one’s party members stand, but they must also know where everyone else stands. To be


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effective, they must also have friendship circles outside party lines as proven in the passage of the first budget bill in 1891. An IPRC committee consists of its chair and a number of vice-chairs assigned to roughly resemble standing committees. IPRC committee normally decides everything by unanimous decision. This leads us to explain the objective of IPRC politics. The LDP IPRC committee consists of (1) chair, (2) about a dozen vicechairs, a large majority of whom are HR members, and (3) others consisting of freshman members of the party. They meet early every morning from Tuesday to Friday during the session. They start with breakfast. Each party has its IPRC committee and office located in the Diet office. The LDP IPRC office has well over a dozen people working full time to meet the needs of the committee.

The IPRC Objective The objective of IPRC politics as defined by the LDP is short and simple: to manage Diet activities. The stipulated and written nature and scope of IPRC is general and vague. Now, that is the official reason for creating the IPRC. The HMC, a part of the manifest structure, was established to manage the Diet in response to the wave of Westernization, as pointed out. The IPRC was developed simultaneously to satisfy the Japanese cultural requirement, according to the bilayer theory. My search has found an account that claims newspapers of the day reported the spontaneous creation of the nascent form of IPRC politics shortly after the First General Election held in 1890—the very first one in Asia, however restricted the right to vote was.25 The bilayer theory tells us that the Japanese thought process structures its users to adjust to a choice, not to respond by choosing one over the other. That was what some of the first elected representatives did in 1890 prior to the opening of the First Imperial Diet Session to work out rules of how to proceed with their legislative work. The most salient basic unit of American society is the individual, but this is not true in the Japanese context. Here, all situations call for a choice that must be the preference of everyone involved, not just the individual. How do you make a choice if there is a zero-sum game situation? One must restructure a nonzero sum game situation so that everyone wins, even though some may win more than others at a given time, as long as everyone’s interest is represented over a period of time more or less equally to reflect a wide range of interests. In a way, Japanese minds are structured to seek a Pareto optimum where everyone gains something, instead of seeing the winner take all. That is what has happened essentially during the period of rapid economic development in the 1960s through the early 1970s, that is, everyone’s share of income increased, but lower echelons did better percentage-wise than upper echelons. When one applies this to the Diet, the answer lies in generating an

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institutionalized means through which this cultural requirement is met. That institution was a predecessor to IPRC developed shortly after the First General Election to pass the first budget bill. This will be presented in more detail in chapter 5. Hence, the objective of the IPRC is to meet Japanese cultural requirements, while that of the HMC is to meet the requirement of modern parliament that is democratic in that decisions are made by majority. I am reminded of the characterization of policy making in Japan as explained by the late former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s secretary, Shigezh Hayasaka26 who used to say that prime ministers in Japan make no decisions; they are made by everyone. I believe he was referring to the latent bilayer structure of power in the nation. To be more specific, the ruling party’s IPRC objective is to maintain political stability27 while maximizing the chances for government-sponsored bills of passing the Diet with a minimum of resources and concessions. The objective of opposition parties is to maximize their separate interests through secret negotiations with the ruling party, since they cannot hope to gain many of their party objectives under majority rule in the Diet. All parties must also demonstrate that they represent their constituents’ interest. Heated debates are a necessary part of open democracy. It then becomes the task of the IPRC to write a script showing how each party can demonstrate its loyalty to its constituents. Former prime minister and veteran IPRC leader, the late Noboru Takeshita, used to say: “We pass opposition party bills in three years.” Tsuruo Yamaguchi, former secretary general of the JSP, likewise a veteran IPRC leader, informed the author of a good example of the JSP’s success in proposing Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles. The principles declared that Japan would not possess, produce, or bring in any nuclear weapons.28 Iwao Teramae, a veteran JCP IPRC leader, informed the author that IPRC politics in the JSP in cooperation with the JCP during the 1955 system era effectively barred the ruling LDP from even bringing up issues clearly against working-class people.29 He leaned back and told me that three new policies against the working class were put into practice by the ruling coalition that included the JSP in 1997. He said sadly that the JCP was the only party that sided with the working people, voting against the bills for three reasons. They included an increase in the consumption tax from three to five percent, the increase in an individual’s share of payment for medical care through the national health plan, and failing to raise the maximum amount a housewife could earn without paying income tax in 1997. The amount used to increase every year in the past to help low income families, Teramae informed the author. The JSP has shown its real colors by aligning itself with its former archrival, the LDP, as the JCP would view the changing nature of Japanese politics.


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Hence, the objective of IPRC politics includes representing the interest of minority parties, mostly on the left side of the ideological spectrum during the 1955 system era, which is something that would have been impossible under a majoritarian liberal democracy. The price of IPRC politics from the Western liberal democratic perspective is that it is institutionalized corruption in need of more openness. There are, then, several objectives for the ruling party in IPRC politics. First, the ruling party must be able to pass its bills with a minimum of resistance from opposition parties to satisfy its support groups whose long-term interests lie in social and political stability. Second, consensus, at least behind the scenes, is a necessary condition to satisfy the first objective, since majority rule is not operative on Japanese soil. The process of achieving consensus offers opposition parties opportunities to obtain their policy objectives through concessions from the ruling party. Hence, the objective of opposition parties is to achieve as much of their policy objectives as they can extract from the ruling party. This is an impossible proposition if majority rule is applied in reality in Japan. Third, opposition parties do not stop at gaining concessions on bills, particularly if the ruling party is determined to push a particular bill through by majority rule, if necessary. A large sum of money moves from the LDP’s organizational activities fund to opposition parties.30 Fourth, the ruling party must maintain the appearance of political stability for its business and financial sector clients. Political stability is a necessary condition for economic prosperity. To negotiate with opposition parties to soften resistance to bills to ensure nonviolence and to keep up appearances, if not the reality of political stability, require prices to be paid, since majority rule is dysfunctional in Japan. In short, all sectors of society have something to gain under the current system that they would not be able to obtain in a majoritarian democracy. If IPRC does what much of the Management or Rules Committee do in the West, what does the HMC do?

The HMC Diet management is formally entrusted to the HR Speaker, HC President, and the HMC in the two houses. The HMC’s purview includes:31 (1) (2) (3) (4)

Diet management, parliamentary rules, questioning the House Speaker, presiding over the impeachment committee and the committee for supplementary suit against judges, and (5) the Diet library.

Matsuda and Kayamori (1991, 45) report that the central task of the HMC is to prioritize bills and set the time allowed for discussion for each bill. HMC

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directors have a special privilege that distinguishes them from other committee members and directors in other committees in the use of Diet cars. HMC directors are the only ones given the use of Diet cars (Watanabe 1976, 194–519). The HMC’s board of directors is often recruited from vice-chairs of the IPRC committee for all parties, probably to ensure smooth coordination between the two committees: the HMC and IPRC committees. The bilayer theory of Japanese politics calls for the Japanese to develop another layer of structure while keeping their new Western institutions intact, even if in only appearance. Although members of the HMC are often referred to as “HMC-zoku,” many of them are not in reality, since only the board of directors serves long enough to acquire power in the committee (Watanabe 1976, 193–194). If the HMC is the front line, so to speak, since it negotiates agenda setting for each political party, for example, it is possible to call the IPRC committee as bringing up the rear (Matsuda and Kayamori 1991, 45). They add that this is why one often hears unsavory rumors unfit for parliament surrounding IPRC politics. The United States introduced a committee system patterned after its own into the postwar Diet in order to strengthen the power of politicians over the military should it rise again. Japanese political leaders, following tradition, reacted to the U.S. proposed system by trying to adjust to the new system.32 Japan accepted the Western format and appearance, but not its substance.

The Scope of IPRC Activities If IPRC performs the tasks normally given to the HMC in the West, what does it do? What does management of the Diet’s affairs include?

Facilitating Legislation The LDP IPRC committee is involved in all phases of the policy-making process parallel to its party committees from the LDP PARC to its Executive Council and Cabinet meetings before bills are submitted to the Diet, as shown in figure 3.1. The LDP IPRC’s concern is limited to, however, how to deal with points of conflict with opposition parties. Formal presentation of bills to the Diet takes place only after the results of the IPRC’s efforts are informally reported to an appropriate party organ. The ruling IPRC chair is responsible for all cabinet bills presented from various agencies, with the exception of member bills.33 Member bills, too, are subject to a process through each party, which requires the assistance of bureaucrats and the IPRC’s screening process (Eda 1985, 129).34 Negotiation in standing committee sometimes stops and one would say, “I need to go back to the home country to consult before I can


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answer your question.” What is meant by “home country” is his party, more specifically the party’s IPRC (Eda 1985, 155). The LDP IPRC decides the order in which each bill is introduced into the Diet, resulting in bureaucrats coming to the IPRC to have their bills considered first, which is called nemawashi. It sets the agenda for Diet sessions. In doing so, the LDP IPRC committee must negotiate with its own party members as well as those of others.35

Party Embassy with Ambassador and Diplomats for Smooth Interparty Relations When Khichi Hamada, known for his outspokenness, was heckled during his questioning, he accused the JSP and the KP of routinely accepting large sums of money from the ruling LDP at a HR Budget Committee meeting on February 4, 1991 (Hamada 1993, 186). He accused the JSP of accepting nearly ¥500,000 as many as 20 times a year! JSP IPRC Chairman Shun Hide vehemently denied Hamada’s accusation. The KP remained silent. Neither party sued him for defamation nor asked the HR’s Disciplinary Committee to take action against him. What the LDP subsequently did was to send its IPRC chairman, Seiroku Kajiyama, to apologize for Hamada’s outrageous words to the IPRC chairs of the two parties. Such a role is also the task of the IPRC. Then, all parties got together to erase what Hamada had said from the Budget Committee records.36 IPRC is charged with being a party embassy for its members. It makes sure that the latent structure of power remains hidden from the public for the good of all parties concerned. Its task is to maintain a well-oiled machinery latently working together for diverse interests, while each party openly fights with all its might to represent its constituents in public. IPRC does its best to have the media focus on the manifest structure of government power.37 HC member Chi’natsu Nakayama (1986, 87), who served as a member of the Reformist Liberal Alliance, points out the need for IPRC politicians to develop shrewd skills in human relations. What this Diet member suggests is that they must act like party diplomats out on a mission to maximize their party’s interests while minimizing their losses. They must be familiar with parliamentary procedures inside out, be known widely and be persuasive, calm yet quick, flexible, with the ability to be deceptive but not deceive and occupy a unique position in the Diet. She claims no close relationship with any IPRC politicians, however. It is one of the routes through which a politician climbs the party ladder.

Arranging for International Politics Chiji Kuno, who was active in LDP IPRC work since the formation of the LDP in 1955, recalls that he reported daily to the U.S. embassy to keep the

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United States informed of what anti-Anpo (Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty Revision) movements were doing (Kuno 1988, 191). He was then the LDP IPRC’s vice chairman. The LDP secretary general and IPRC chair instructed him to report daily to the U.S. embassy. He even had to climb a wall to enter and leave, since the JCP kept a record of people entering and leaving the embassy through the front entrance. He used to meet with ministerlevel diplomats in making his daily report to the U.S. embassy during the 1960 crisis. It was through Makoto Tanabe, Kanemaru’s Socialist friend and former JSP IPRC chairman, that Kanemaru visited North Korea (Hamada 1993, 195). Likewise, the late Seiroku Kajiyama of the LDP visited Seoul on April 20, 1993 prior to the first visit ever by JSP secretary general to South Korea, Sadao Yamahana ex-IPRC vice-chairman. Hence, nemawashi by IPRC committee is not limited to domestic politics.

Writing Theatrical Scenario for Public Consumption Motoharu Arima (1984), who headed the HR Social and Labor Relations Committee in 1984 and who helped the Nakasone cabinet revise the existing health law to reflect the changing needs of health care especially for the aged, wrote a book on how he helped the bill to pass the Diet. He included the role of IPRC politics in the process, except that he said nothing about the money involved in IPRC politics. A JCP member of the HC and former Akahata editor, Khichirh Ueda (1999, 78) reports that the LDP found the book sufficiently offensive to the party to buy up all the copies, resulting in a relatively small number of copies of Arima’s book available to the public after publication.38 I found only five copies available in college and university libraries nationwide when I tried to secure one. I had to have a copy made at one of the university libraries to obtain the book.39 Just as what was then considered the “most important bill for Nakasone Cabinet’s survival” in 1984, the “Health Insurance Diet Session” came to the last stage of passing the HR toward the end of June 1984. A tense atmosphere filled the ruling LDP and its opposition parties over the bill. A delicate and sensitive balance of hon’ne and tatemae characterized the exchange of views. Arima informs us that behind closed doors, LDP director Tatsuo Ozawa and Tomi’ichi Murayama of the JSP 40 drafted a scenario on how to railroad the bill, step-by-step, that is, when should who move to cut off the debate and call the bill for a question, how should it be presented and who will try to stop the move? Arima (1984, 216–217) warns readers that this is serious business, since if one person forgets the script, it would generate real heat and confusion, resulting in disastrous results for everyone. Scenario writing must be done in detail to ensure that both sides understand each other clearly. Actors must be plausible enough to convince their


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constituents that they are representing their voice to the end even if they fail to stop the “tyranny of the majority.” Arima (1984, 216–217) is honest in saying that one sometimes wonders how much is real and how much is theatrics. Some may, he says, accuse the actors of being dirty dealmakers, but they can only say that because they have never been placed in the kind of situation that he and his colleagues are in. One mistake and the actor or actors responsible for the disaster may be forced to resign. One could also get hurt if an error is made, since violence such as tipping over tables is often involved. I am in total agreement with Arima in that his description fits with much of what I have learned by interviewing former and current IPRC politicians and others in the 1990s, from the late former prime minister Noboru Takeshita to JCP IPRC chairman. The only significant difference lies in the extent of explicitness about IPRC politics.

Bonding Interparty Friendship To negotiate freely and in good faith requires trust. One cannot become an instant friend because an important issue came up. This requires IPRC politics to call for participants to be good friends who understand and trust each other. Nakano (1993, 127) points out an example of this among three trusted friends. Powerful Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita in the LDP and the JSP Secretary General Makoto Tanabe enjoyed a close, friendly relationship. Kanemaru and Tanabe used to chair their respective IPRC committees, while Takeshita was also very active in IPRC politics for many years as vice chairman. Some ruling party funds for IPRC politics are used to pay for a weekend matsutake mushroom gathering at one of the members’ districts.41 The host would invite family members as well to promote better relations among IPRC members across party lines. These events were common when the ruling party had sufficient funds. My understanding is that it is no longer the case. Occasional dinners for relevant members only seem to be the order of the day in recent years. Experienced political reporter Honzawa (1995) reports in detail what he saw and experienced as to how ruling LDP IPRC experts entertained their opposition party friends. Probably because Akasaka is too close to the Diet and the watchful eyes of reporters, such top IPRC leaders as Kanemaru and Takeshita used Mukhjima, which was in downtown Tokyo, yet away from its center. It is an area known for large numbers of geisha. Honzawa (1995, 29–31) says that there used to be about 300 in Mukhjima. He adds that some opposition party members became tired of Japanese entertainers, which is why some IPRC parties were held in such areas as Roppongi and Shinjuku, which are frequented by exotic non-Japanese hostesses. These are costly affairs. A restaurant

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dinner runs anywhere from ¥30,000 to ¥50,000 or about $300 and up. If geisha are called, it costs about ¥100,000 and up per geisha. IPRC members like to drink, eat, and play, reports Honzawa (1995). They do not stop there. They also like gambling, since opposition parties know that they always win big. For them, it was a fun way of raising the money they needed to keep their positions. It costs well over $1 million on average to maintain two offices for each Diet member. One game that is often played is mah-jongg. Shin Kanemaru was a mah-jongg addict. Shigeru Hori in the Sath Cabinet met Kanemaru and helped him become dean of LDP IPRC politics. The JSP counterpart was Makoto Tanabe. These two became good friends and great compromisers between the two major parties. Prime Minister Eisaku Sath selected Noboru Takeshita as his chief cabinet secretary because of his human relations skills (Honzawa 1995, 35–37). Honzawa reveals how the late Takeshita used to expand friendships among Diet members across party lines. He would first give the semi-annual gifts Japanese usually exchange in summer and winter to opposition party members. If they did not refuse the gifts, he went to the next step of giving them envelopes filled with cash. Most opposition party members, particularly newcomers, live in state housing for Diet members located near the Diet building. He would first find out when their wives would be home by sending out scouts. Then, he himself would pay a visit. Wives were often flabbergasted by the presence of the well-known leader at their door. They would open the door and invite him in. He would enter as far as their vestibule, but no further. He would then forcefully hand over a thick envelope and leave, saying he is busy and cannot stay for long. Kanemaru thus became Tanabe’s good friend beyond the ordinary level of “senatorial” courtesy, as did Takeshita with Junya Yano (the KP) and Ichirh Ozawa (of formerly the LDP and now a member of the DPJ) to Yiichi Ichikawa (the KP) (Honzawa 1995, 36–37).

Seating Assignment in the Diet Parliament seating arrangements are decided following the election of the House Speaker and Vice Speaker. The House Speaker sits at the center with the prime minister, cabinet members, and others. Normally, the LDP and other conservative parties are seated on the right while the JCP and progressive parties are on the left. The IPRC committee decides exactly where each member sits by taking into consideration the desire of the individual Diet member (Eda 1985, 120). The more influential and senior the member of the Diet, the more likely he or she will sit in the back. Newcomers sit in the front row, which is the opposite of the seating arrangements made in the British Parliament. There, senior members sit in the front because they are more likely to speak and engage in heated debate.


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Instructing Committees The IPRC committee represents an informal organization as opposed to its formal counterpart, the HMC. Hi (1990b, 101) rightly, however, characterizes the IPRC committee as being the “instructive organ” for all standing committees. It is the organ that instructs all committees, from the HMC to the House Education Committee in the Diet.42 It is also a required orientation program, for the ruling LDP, as I found in my interviews with LDP members and staff.

Orientating Newcomers IPRC is the only committee to which all incoming new LDP Diet members must belong. It is a requirement—an orientation program to Diet activities. There are several reasons for this. First, the LDP believes that all new Diet members should learn about IPRC politics, since it is not widely known. Second, IPRC politics constitutes the core of Diet politics from the bilayer theory perspective. One learns the science and art of compromise, the essence of politics. Third, IPRC meetings are set in the early morning and start with breakfast, five times a week to encourage attendance. Since many new Diet members live in Diet housing, alone, especially the first year they are elected, they often do not have time to prepare themselves breakfast. Most people’s minds work best in the morning hours. The LDP takes advantage of this to most efficiently strengthen its influence by teaching newcomers how to deal with opposition parties. IPRC is not a parliamentary organ, even if its members consist exclusively of Diet members. It is not a part of the Diet even if IPRC office is located within the same Diet building. Each party receives an appropriate space allocation in the Diet building after each election. Each party then decides how to use its office space. Most parties decide to set up their IPRC office in the Diet building, resulting in housing non-Diet organizations in the Diet building.43

Recruiting for Party Leadership As we observe, Shin Kanemaru, Noboru Takeshita, Toshiki Kaifu, and even Jun’ichirh Koizumi all played important roles on their way to top party positions. Hirose (1989, 52) commented in the late 1980s that there were more former IPRC committee members in the JSP, the KP, and the DSP who were quickly promoted to higher positions in their respective parties. Many of their secretary generals are former IPRC committee members. We cannot overlook the advantage of serving in the IPRC committee in advancing to powerful positions.

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Helping Opposition Parties Financially and Legislatively Friendships between politicians of the ruling party and opposition parties through IPRC politics can lead for opposition politicians to call on their friends in the ruling party to help them sell tickets for fundraisers. LDP members may obtain funding from the IPRC account or ask corporations, government ministries, and agencies they know to help solicit funding for opposition party members. As pointed out, the LDP has given out millions of dollars per year to opposition parties through IPRC contacts. The LDP and its archrivals, with the possible exception of the JCP, at least during the 1955 system era, were good friends in disguise.

Other Miscellaneous Tasks for the LDP IPRC The LDP IPRC approves or denies Diet member requests for traveling abroad. It makes committee assignments for standing committees, including the HMC, for the party.44 It works especially close with the LDP PARC in the legislative process. The LDP IPRC chair in 1997 assured me that he no longer holds any meetings in expensive restaurants. Mr. Muraoka said that dinner meetings with other IPRC committees are limited to a few times per session. Evidence abounds to support the assertion that the ruling LDP, through IPRC politics, helped the JSP achieve its party objectives by making changes in tax rules, limiting military forces and increasing worker benefits. As in the words of the late prime minister Takeshita, the LDP passes bills that Socialists want within three years. IPRC then performs these 11 functions discussed above to help the Diet perform its task of legislation. Since there are no handbooks on IPRC activities, I had to review the IPRC literature and inquire in a variety of ways during my interviews with my informants to come up with these functions. Since it is part of IPRC’s task to keep its work veiled, I am certain I missed out on some of its activities. Let us now review the characteristics of IPRC.

The Characteristics of IPRC Politics To manage the Westernized Diet in the context of Japanese tradition requires IPRC to have certain characteristics, some of which are blatantly unsavory from the modern Western perspective.

Mr. Compromise on Diet Management—IPRC Politics One of the best-known IPRC politicians, Khichi Yamamoto, had the reputation of being an excellent compromiser representing the JSP. The media called him “Mr. Compromise” (Yamamoto 1988, 159). In response to the media’s label, Yamamoto spells out his rules of Diet operation or IPRC politics. They are as


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follows (1988, 159–160): (1) Maintain trust between parties. One must keep one’s promises; (2) Delineate those matters on which one can compromise and those on which one cannot; (3) Do not forget the human element. Keep private and public matters separate; (4) One can trick opponents, but one should not fool others unnecessarily. Yamamoto reports that he would go to the ruling party and inform its members that he was finished with informal talk (hon’ne talk). He was warning them that he was about to take his gloves off; (5) One should achieve consensus within one’s party. In attempting to achieve consensus, one may mobilize other parties for a theatrics. What he is saying is that one needs to achieve consensus within a party even if it means asking IPRC members of other parties to stage a show. Although he was criticized openly for compromising with his archrival, the LDP, he brought the bacon home in two ways: by concessions on issues and financial assistance from the ruling LDP—feats that would have been totally impossible had he accepted defeat at the hands of majoritarianism. Only in Japan does the ruling party give the equivalent of millions of dollars per year to its opposition parties to pass bills. The ruling party provided its opposition with sources of financial contributions under the 1955 system. The JSP was a friendly cooperative partner of the 1955 system, as presented below.

The JSP IPRC, the Best Supporting Actor of the 1955 System Former LDP HR member Shin’ichirh Kurimoto views the JSP as the ruling LDP’s best supporting actor in disguise during the 1955 system era, parading as the most vocal opponent of the business-dominated LDP and representative of working class people (1999, 17-18). If one peels the hard outer shell of dogmatic Marxism, one will find the JSP’s true ambition—attempting to get as many concessions as possible from the ruling party while avoiding violent confrontations reminiscent of Fabian tradition. The JSP helped the LDP by enabling the ruling party to resist U.S. pressure to rearm and maintain political stability. Indeed, the JSP was the ruling party’s worst political rival in public and its best supporter in reality. Hence, the more quixotic the JSP’s rhetoric, the greater the chance the LDP might give in to its more moderate demands. Kurimoto’s words completely complement what I learned from the late former prime minister Takeshita. The difference is that the former observed IPRC politics played out and may have played some roles in the politics, whereas the latter was a main actor playing the key role in the politics of IPRC for many years. In return for playing the role of archrival in appearance and a partner under the table, there is no question about the LDP helping the JSP in terms of funding and achieving Socialist policy objectives. Evidence is

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overwhelming, as will be presented. However, IPRC politics has its limits, as will be made obvious to the reader.

The Limit of IPRC Politics The limit of IPRC politics or the JSP’s ability to extract concessions from the ruling LDP was clearly demonstrated in the PKO issue in 1992 in the aftermath of the Gulf War. A veteran of the IPRC politics, Makoto Tanabe, who heads the JSP’s IPRC committee, revealed in public for the first time in a labor union reception when he said (Tomimori 1993, 146):45 Even if I were raising my right fist against the ruling party, I would be shaking my left hand with the ruling LDP. That has been my style of politics. However, I have not been able to shake my right hand well since my left hand has been numb lately.

What made his left hand numb was that the ruling LDP decided to railroad a revised PKO bill by passing it on to a standing committee rather than going through the customary IPRC channels. The ruling party members all knew that the JSP opposed sending Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) abroad. He also lost his close contact with Shin Kanemaru of the LDP, who was long known for his role in IPRC politics. Kanemaru was in trouble with a money scandal then. Ichirh Ozawa and Seiroku Kajiyama, who then controlled the LDP IPRC committee, figured they could get by without negotiating with the JSP. However limited the power of IPRC, it is the most powerful body, as claimed by a number of Diet members, scholars, and journalists. I would suggest three possible reasons for the IPRC veteran’s pessimism on the PKO bill. First, public opinion against sending the SDF abroad shifted during the Gulf war.46 Second, the Cold War was over and the LDP’s need for the JSP was declining rapidly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, Mr. Tanabe lost his LDP partner, Shin Kanemaru, over his money scandal. Ozawa and the late Kajiyama were not close friends of Mr. Tanabe. The other side of the coin is that there is a need for all IPRC members to maintain trusting relationships, particularly between those of the ruling party and the main opposition party.

The Dualistic Nature of Interparty Relationship To generate primary group relationships among members, particularly when new members are brought in, the ruling party IPRC holds dinner parties and the like to promote bonding. This fellowship is like an illicit love affair that cannot be made public, as Tanabe says, since opposition members must maintain a rival public image with the ruling party members. You pound the table with your right hand and argue with your political opponents, while


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you hold left hands under the table like lovers playing footsy. One must play this dualistic game of politics with a poker face. The important difference between IPRC politics and footsy is that the former involves vital national concerns while the latter is a prologue, as I will point out next.

The Most Powerful Body in the Diet Each party’s IPRC committee is its most powerful organ. As long as Japan maintains a parliamentary democracy, Kurimoto (1997, 41) says that we must let each party’s representatives manage the Diet. IPRC committees constitute the core of Diet management. Scholar-politician Kurimoto is not alone in claiming the powerful nature of IPRC politics, whose leaders consist of top party leaders. Chi’natsu Nakayama (1986, 86–87), a member of a small party in the HC writing on the nature of IPRC power as being invisible but firm, places many of her colleagues along party lines. Unlike Kurimoto, who was an LDP member until he was forced out, Nakayama was peripheral to Diet politics as a result of being too small a party for the larger parties to be concerned with. They, however, seem to agree on the strength and nature of the power that reside in an institution outside of the Diet as the highest organ of the state. Officially and legally, it is the task of each chair in the two Houses in the Diet to operate parliament. In reality, however, the responsibility of Diet management is entrusted to the HMC in each House and an informal IPRC committee in each political party, a party organ outside of the Diet. We hypothesize that the sources of the supreme power the LDP IPRC has in the life of bills are attributable to several reasons. First, its members are directly connected to the office of the prime minister and the ruling party’s top leaders such as its secretary general and the PARC chair (Honzawa 1995, 28–29).47 The LDP IPRC moves in close cooperation with its party leaders. Second, the IPRC chair has access to an account from which the chair withdraws large sums of cash as needed for committee activities. As will be spelled out, there is a strong association between the timing of each cash withdrawal and that of a controversial bill being considered. The more controversial the bill, the larger the sum, even if the LDP uses its majority position to pass the bill. Third, the Diet is the highest organ of the Japanese nation-state and its key function lies in legislation. If opposition parties are obstacles to a bill, it falls on the ruling party IPRC to remove them by paying two kinds of prices: (1) revising a bill under consideration and/or introducing new bills to satisfy opposition party demands, and (2) making cash payments to opposition IPRC committees. Other forms of satisfying opposition parties include entertaining them at restaurants.48

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The strength of the ruling party IPRC goes beyond these reasons. The ruling party must select a leader of the best human relations skills to be effective. The success of the ruling party IPRC depends on how good terms its chair has, not just with ruling party leaders, but also with opposition party leaders. The closer the relationship a ruling party IPRC chair has with leaders of all parties, the more powerful the chair is. How does one develop friends across party lines? It takes constant efforts to exchange visits and give semi-annual gifts to a large number of one’s colleagues in and out of one’s own party (Honzawa 1995, 29).

Issue-Oriented Nature of IPRC Politics The focus of IPRC activities for the ruling party is legislation, assuring the safe passage of “pillow” bills in particular, and cabinet bills in general. IPRC is involved with the process that bills go through from beginning to end. Unlike the LDP PARC or any standing committee in the Diet that gets involved at a particular stage in the process of legislation from an idea to a law of the land, the ruling IPRC committee gets informally involved in any stage of the legislative process (Iwai 1988, 142).49 The ruling party’s IPRC leaders and its IPRC office staff get calls from bureaucrats getting ready to draft bills to before the bills pass in the second House. Original ideas are modified and drafted to minimize the resistance of opposition parties to ensure the smooth sailing of bills through their arduous passage through the Diet. It is then a party organ specialized in facilitating a bill’s success. Most government bills pass both houses 70–90 percent of the time with approval from the ruling party and opposition parties with the exception of the JCP. The JCP votes with the ruling party about 40–50 percent of the time (Iwai 1988, 104). Many of the bills, however, are modified in the process to be acceptable to not just opposition parties but also to members of the ruling party. Chi’natsu Nakayama (1986, 86–87) points to the fact that she felt the ubiquitous existence of IPRC whenever there were controversial issues. True, but the objective of IPRC politics is to minimize the probability of any bill becoming controversial in advance. The media too make note of the existence of IPRC politics when opposition parties stop Diet proceedings. The focus of IPRC politics remains issue oriented in the sense that their interests are in minimizing the distance between the ruling party and its opposition parties on issues. To perform this main function effectively, it requires work behind the scenes, or nemawashi.

IPRC as Nemawashi Agent IPRC politics is involved in the art of nemawashi between and among parties in constructing scenarios for parliamentary proceedings in advance (Matsuda


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and Kayamori 1991, 44). Nemawashi heads off opposition by minority parties (Watanabe 1976, 195). The nemawashi or request for the ruling party intervention occurs at any point in the policy-making process, from the time an idea is generated in a section in some bureaucracy to propose a bill to the HC session to when the final decision is made. Hence, people bring bills to the ruling party IPRC office to assure the passage of important bills.50 Authors Sone and Kanazashi (1989) report that the Diet operates legally within existing rules. However, when that becomes difficult or conflicts between the ruling party and opposition parties are likely to erupt and nemawashi become a necessity, it calls for the ruling party’s IPRC committee to handle negotiations with opposition parties to come up with an “agreement.” The IPRC committee’s function may depend on who heads the HMC and the ruling party’s IPRC committee. The two authors site a comment on IPRC politics by Shin Kanemaru of the LDP, a veteran member of the IPRC politics: “The IPRC’s objective is to negotiate with other parties on controversial issues in the Diet to maximize its party interest. It is the work of ‘kuroko’ in Shibai or theatre.” The kuroko refers to a person working in black clothes to assist or support the performance of actors on the stage in a less visible fashion. “The IPRC committee would not exist if the HMC chair was powerful enough to resolve conflicts legally” (Sone and Kanzashi 1989, 45). Khichirh Ueda has been active in JCP, having served as Akahata editor prior to his election to the Diet. He was first elected to the HC in 1974. He correctly defines “IPRC politics” as a dangh51 between the ruling party and opposition parties. He points out that the JSP had a tendency to be involved in “money politics.” The JSP had lost its ambition to become a ruling party, lured into compromise with the powers that be behind closed doors (Ueda 1999, 78–79). Western observers often ask why the Japanese would go the long way to do what they have do, when there is an institution precisely designed to do just what IPRC politics does. Why do they engage in corruptive behaviors behind the scenes when there is a stage for fair and open play to represent constituents’ interests in the Diet?

The Outlet for Hon’ne Japanese workers often do not go home directly from their place of work. They go out to bars for a drink with their coworkers and superiors. A reason for this routine for many working people is that they are not themselves while working, but are allowed to open up in an informal setting. Japanese tradition does not allow them to do that in the workplace. But in bars, they can be themselves and criticize their bosses under the influence of drink. Perhaps, I should make it clear again that I am not treating this type of practice as uniquely Japanese, that is, as a discrete variable but as a continuous

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variable. As is the case with IPRC politics itself, what I am pointing out is that the Japanese engage in these activities more often, regularly and in more institutionalized ways than other nationals, particularly when compared with, for example, Americans at large. I am not therefore saying that IPRC politics or dangh is uniquely Japanese, but rather that the Japanese engage in these activities more regularly with a greater frequency and intensity. The same goes for our findings on cross-language surveys (chapter 2) that demonstrated that language structures the Japanese propensity to choose a middle response category but it does not determine it. It is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for any attitude, but it is a very important contributory condition affecting certain aspects of behavioral patterns in a significant way. As long as they are speaking Japanese, the Japanese find it difficult to state their true feelings and intents in formal situations. They are constrained by their language and tradition from speaking their minds, especially if such an act results in confrontation.52 Instead, they act as they are expected to as members of their party. In other words, what one often sees in the Diet plenary session is a ritual rather than decision making. One cannot hope to reach consensus in a formal setting where pros and cons are debated and voted in accordance with majority rule. IPRC politics provides the time and space for individual politicians to freely say what they have on their minds so they can arrive at an understanding and consensus among all parties. IPRC committee members of all parties, save those of the JCP, maintain close personal contacts with each other. It probably was the objective of the IPRC committee to have an effective way for both the ruling party and opposition parties to freely present their hon’ne positions. Opposition parties must have figured out that they would rather be pragmatic and gain concessions behind closed doors than be totally defeated in an open confrontation by majority rule (Hirose 1989, 52). The drawback is that much of the task originally assigned to standing committees to decide on an outline for the discussion for bills, revision of bills, and agenda setting carried out by IPRC committees can have hollowing effects on the standing committees. What remain are skeletons of the standing committees. In short, Hirose (1989) claims that excessive IPRC politics brings more harm than good.

Complicated IPRC Politics Even realizing the virtues of the present system of IPRC politics makes it difficult for the public and particularly those who are not proficient in Japanese to understand what is happening. Sath and Matsuzaki (1986, 123) report that foreign visitors often ask why the ruling LDP has to be concerned with opposition parties, since it has a majority vote in the Diet. The selection of JSP leader Tomi’ichi Murayama as the coalition prime minister came as a surprise to many in and out of Japan. This was no surprise


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to those familiar with IPRC politics, since Murayama was an active participant. Politics in locked hotel rooms is nearly impossible to see, even for journalists who follow politicians day and night. Cash is impossible to trace when neither the givers nor takers wish to disclose their transactions. IPRC-zoku members do their best to coordinate a script to ensure the safety of the players and the dramatic effects of their actions when they act out. The only way we find out about the story behind it is afterward, when we hear from a few who venture out after so many years as Kuno (1988) did. But even Kuno (1988) and Yamamoto (1988) who disclosed a few isolated events said nothing about the money involved in IPRC politics. Hirose (1989, 47) reports that giving money to opposition parties and other related activities is a secret that one takes to one’s grave. Chi’natsu Nakayama (1986) in her book explaining the nature of the Diet has a section on “IPRC” in a chapter entitled “Diet Organization: Front and Back of the National Stage.” She reports that although she has never affiliated herself with established parties in the Diet, she can still feel the influence of the IPRC. She informs us that one does not feel the powerful existence of IPRC when there are no burning issues that divide parties. The air thickens suddenly as stormy issues appear on the horizon, however. As a relatively powerless member of the Diet, her colleagues tell her that they are sympathetic to her ideas personally, but IPRC feels otherwise. She could not find any of her colleagues willing to fight against their IPRC. Sometimes her standing committee chairman would tell his members to discuss issues with each party’s IPRC committee and come back. Then he would dismiss the meeting. She infers that this type of occurrence has convinced her that each party’s IPRC committee does its nemawashi behind closed doors. Each party’s IPRC chair negotiates secretly. And if they fail to reach an “understanding,” the HMC ceases to operate. She concludes by praying for IPRC to do their work to achieve each party’s and the national interest. She implies that standing committees, especially the HMC, is merely a mouthpiece for IPRC, at least on controversial issues.

Negative Dimensions Following the Recruit Scandals, the focus of political reform was to weaken the Diet as a parliament where issues are freely debated and decided. Too many things are decided behind closed doors through nemawashi, such as the scripted scenarios for passing bills.53 In other words, “IPRC politics” should be the focus of attention (Hi 1990b, 100). The LDP, which considered IPRC politics as a “necessary evil,” openly admitted for the first time in an official document of “General Principles of

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Political Reform” released by the party on May 19, 1989, that IPRC politics contains “harmful effects” (Hi 1990b, 100–101). It contains the following passage under the title of Diet revitalization: “Although informal discussion (hanashiai) between the ruling party and opposition parties is a necessity for party politics, excessive prior informal decision-making for the Diet deliberation deprives the Diet of its function. To make the peoples’ deliberation fruitful and transparent, Diet committees should fully perform their functions.” Hamada (1993, 180–181) does not deny the need for IPRC politics to exist. What he does object to is excessive compromising on the part of the LDP. The problem, he claims also has to do with money politics between the ruling and opposition parties. The Asahi on January 28, 1959 devoted two-thirds of its front page on a debate between JSP Chair Mosaburh Suzuki and the then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi. Likewise, the papers in the 1950s devoted much space on parliamentary debates. Thirty-three years later, in 1992, Tomimori (1993, 136–139) reports the same New Year debate as only one of the top stories on the front page. The news value of parliamentary debates has decreased significantly in the last three decades. The flourishing of IPRC politics has reduced the news value of the annual New Year debate. It became more of an exchange of formalities and not of the substance generated spontaneously, which represents a hollowing of the Diet. However, the outcome of latent interparty politics is not all negative, as a veteran JSP IPRC member Tsuruo Yamaguchi and JCP IPRC Chairman Iwao Teramae informed me when I interviewed them in 1997.

Not the Best, but Better Veteran JSP IPRC leader Tsuruo Yamaguchi in response to Jun’ichirh Koizumi’s comments on the nature of the JSP after the 1989 electoral victory in the HC admitted that the JSP makes compromises in Diet politics. However, he justified the situation, saying that although the outcome is not optimal, it is at least better than would have been the case had no compromises been made with the ruling LDP. Another veteran IPRC leader in the ruling LDP, Noboru Takeshita, who was listening to their exchange, said nothing to contradict the Socialist leader. Having also served as ruling party IPRC vice-chairman, Koizumi did not contradict the Socialist response. In return for cooperating with the ruling LDP, the JSP and others receive three types of benefits: (1) money; (2) amending or otherwise revising bills the ruling party considers important to suit the official stand of the opposition parties, and (3) enjoyment of close relationships with ruling party IPRC members. Ruling party IPRC leaders may invite their opposition counterparts and family members to a weekend stay at a hot spring resort, fishing, golf, and other recreational facilities. This is done to promote warm, close,


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and trusting relationships between IPRC members of the ruling and opposition parties. Since Article 57 of the Constitution allows for the Diet to hold closed meetings if two-thirds of its members agree to hold them, closed meetings have their raison d’être. Every freshman member of the LDP must serve on the LDP IPRC committee in what appears to be an orientation program that starts with breakfast every morning five times a week. This very fact is suggestive of the nature of IPRC work. It is relatively unknown outside of the Diet. There is no published material to explain how it works and information must not be made public. Those who are experienced in IPRC work do not talk and swear to take their secrets with them to their graves. I have viewed the Japanese legislative process in the bilayer theory perspective, the formal structure and the real or latent processes that have survived over centuries in the oldest legislature in Asia. It is interesting to note that the late Ichirh Murakawa (2000), who devoted his life to studying the policy-making process in Japan, entitled his last book posthumously published Policymaking Process: Japan’s Formal Government and Real Government. It was his twenty-seventh work. Having worked on policies in LDP Headquarters and written so many articles and books on policy, he came to entitle his last book using a perspective similar to mine. Of course, he simply structured his book by dividing the government into two categories, which he felt was most practical. But he remained atheoretical. Substantively, there are no differences between our writings. Having described the manifest and latent structure of the Diet, I would like to further present in chapter 4 more evidence of the existence of IPRC politics and cases of the roles that IPRC played in the past century of the Diet’s existence in a historical perspective, using available resources gathered by others and myself in the 1990s.


4 The History of IPRC Politics: 1890–1993 I used to spend a half-day in the LDP IPRC office and the other half in the JSP IPRC office those years [the late 1950s through the 1960 Anpo crisis] —Chbji Kuno, HR1 The JSP’s right wing Seikenkasakai asked me to purchase tickets for a fund-raising party when I was LDP IPRC chair. I gave ¥2 million, but I did not get a ticket —Hikosabura Okonogi, HR2

Attempts to press for the passage of the revision of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty in 1960 caused violent reactions from those who opposed the revision, resulting in the death of a young University of Tokyo student. Union members, students, and members of peace groups and others joined the protest in and out of the Diet. The JSP and JCP bitterly opposed the revision the LDP was pushing for. What was then-LDP IPRC member Kuno doing in the JSP office as demonstrations escalated? He chooses not to disclose the content of his activities in the JSP IPRC office, but he writes enough about his scenario writings and going through scripted “fights” in front of camera for the reader to infer a fairly good picture of what went on behind closed doors at least in part (Kuno 1988).3 Minister Okonogi’s statement cited above must come as a surprise to those who are not familiar with IPRC politics. A ruling LDP leader buys close to 200 tickets, probably at $100 or more per ticket for the opposition party’s fund-raising dinner, an unthinkable event in the United States. Obviously, such activities are carried out through informal channels invisible to the public, just like the underground pathways that connect government buildings in Nagata-chh, the nation’s nerve center of power. I hope to shed light on and

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peak into at least parts of the underground pathways, which the late Murakawa (2000) called the “real government.” The objective of this chapter lies in presenting evidence of IPRC politics and cases of the role IPRC played in the legislative process in historical perspective. Incidents and cases described in this chapter are overwhelming and sufficiently compelling to conclude that no one can pretend that the Diet operates like the U.S. Congress or other Western legislatures, although the Diet on its surface appears modern and Western. How and when did underground politics begin in the history of Japanese parliament, the first modern legislature in Asia that opened in 1890?

IPRC Politics under Meiji Constitution The Diet opened on November 2, 1890 with its first session. Parties were roughly divided into two camps, those inclined to support the government and those opposed to the government. The former consisted of Constitutional Liberal Party, Constitutional Progressive Party and Taisei-kai, the latter Liberal Party and Progressive Party (Mason 1969, 195; Shimph 1995, 99). The first two parties, after the Diet opened, changed their names to Yayoi Club and the Gathering Place for Diet Members [Gi’inshikaijo] (Shigi’in and Sangi’in, eds. 1961, 250). The division was based on the question of how different parties support the government.

The Emergence of Nascent IPRC Politics, 1890 Both groups knew there were conflicts and appeared to have settled their differences, or at least agreed to disagree on certain issues before the formal Diet session was ever held. Shimph (1995, 99) cites an article from Tokyo Nichi’nichi Shimbun dated December 2, 1890 as evidence for this inference. The paper reported that the House Rule Book had its first reading only two hours after the selection of committee members. It consisted of 15 chapters and 213 clauses. It passed the House in fewer than 30 minutes after it was distributed to members. We can make three observations here. First, potential conflicts between parties that support the government and opposition parties were successfully avoided through nemawashi or informal negotiation and consultation with relevant individuals prior to formal decisions. Otherwise, how could a committee draft a lengthy bill and be ready for presentation in two hours? How could it pass the House so quickly when there were so many parties with different ideas? Second, it is safe to infer from this event that the very type of work the IPRC is engaged in today was achieved through the quick formation of an informal group that must have worked to complete the task before the

The History of IPRC Politics: 1890–1993

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opening of the Diet after the First General Election held on July 1, 1890. In other words, what the bilayer theory proposes did indeed take place following the First General Election in July 1890, a Western institution created as a result of external influence. Third, although this informal group did not develop into a new institution with its own name and regular membership until nine years later, we can infer from this reporting of the event that the same organization or one similar must have functioned informally until the establishment of the Association for Consultation among Parties in the Twenty-First Diet Session. The preservation of Japanese tradition in the modernized Meiji government was the intent of Aritomo Yamagata, who said that he wanted to develop a Western-appearing political institution while preserving Japanese traditions. We should make note of two points from a comparative politics perspective. First, it did not take too long for the IPRC’s predecessor to form an informal group after the First General Election on July 1, 1890, even before the opening of the Imperial Diet on November 25, 1890. Here it is safe to infer that there must have been a tradition of settling disputes behind closed doors and eliminating open conflicts wherever and whenever possible. Imperial Diet members needed to generate a mechanism of realizing Yamagata’s program—developing a modern national legislature while preserving Japanese traditions, including time-honored consensus-making mechanisms.4 Second, the rule called for unanimous consent or agreement to make decisions, not majority decision making. Third, these evolved rules are based neither on the Meiji Constitution nor Diet law, and the meetings were closed to the public. This temporary device may be considered a nascent form of IPRC politics. We learn two lessons here. First, Japanese mores call for unanimous decisions or consensus achieved informally behind closed doors, where participants can freely exchange views free from public view. Second, majority rule can be peacefully practiced in a formal setting as long as the script is prepared in advance through an organization such as the predecessor of the IPRC politics described above. Not to do so would be considered “railroading” and therefore undemocratic in Japanese political culture. Consequences of such behaviors on the part of the ruling party without implicit approval from the opposition would include violence and shutdown of the Diet session by opposition parties. In summary, the history of IPRC politics dates back to 1890, shortly after the First General Election was held in the summer, even before the opening of the first Imperial Diet session. This points to the basic nature of Japanese institution-building, characterized by its bilayer structure to meet the everchanging waves of change that wash up on the shores of the Japanese archipelago.5 The following two cases represent the successful passage of the expansion of the military budget through IPRC politics and the failure of the government

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ruling party to pass the second military budget when no IPRC politics was employed.

The First Budget Bill, 1891 Government party members, consisting of only 79 out of 300 members, found it impossible to pass a budget bill as a minority without the help of its opposition parties, the Liberal (N ⫽ 79) and Progressive (N ⫽ 41) parties.6 The government intended to increase naval strength in order to prevent Russian forces coming down to the Korean peninsula while the two major opposition parties, elected on the merit of their efforts to gain civil rights, wanted to reduce the government budget. Farmers then were paying 90 percent of the tax revenue. The support basis of the Liberal and Progressive parties is the farming community. Anticipating this, Aritomo Yamagata, representing Hanbatsu or Southern clan men who overthrew the Tokugawa government to usher in the Meiji government, included Shhjirh Goth and Munemitsu Mutsu, who had close contacts with Liberal Party members. Furthermore, Yamagata used Masayoshi Matsukata, known for his expertise in financial matters, along with Goth and Mutsu to negotiate with Yizh Hayashi, Tsuna Takeuchi (Shigeru Yoshida’s father) who had the trust of Taisuke Itagaki and Kamenosuke Misaki, known for his knowledge of finance along with other Tosa clan members who belonged to the Liberal Party. The first budget bill passed Parliament with the help of these men in the First Imperial Parliament Session. They (N ⫽ 26) and others who went along with the government on the budget against the party line had to resign. Certainly, “they performed functions normally attributed to the IPRC committee” as Kaneko (1999, 35) claims, but they were not the first to do so.

Prime Minister Matsukata Fails to Pass the Budget Bill, 1891: No IPRC, No Pass Shortly after the First budget incident in the Second Imperial Diet Session, Prime Minister Masayoshi Matsukata, who did not have majority support, failed to pass the budget bill. The People Party (Minth) attempted to drastically cut the Navy’s budget for building ships and steel mills. Minister of the Navy Sukenori Kabayama blasted the People Party and other opposition parties by pointing out the urgent need for Japan to develop its naval forces. The heated arguments that ensued caused the Diet session to go out of control. The Prime Minister had to dissolve the Diet for the first time in its short history on Christmas Day in 1891. He called for the Second General Election to be held on February 15, 1892. In response to government suppression, anti-government movements during the election campaign resulted in the deaths of 25 people and injuries sustained by 380 people (Shigi’in and


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Sangi’in, eds. 1960, 263). These tragic events lead us to conclude that there is a functional necessity for Japanese to develop an institution that deals with peaceful resolution of conflicts between parties and elected representatives. Some observers call it structural corruption, but it works to avoid violence and make it possible for the Diet to function as a legislature. There was an obvious need for the creation of an established institution to negotiate among members of different factions or groups in the Diet. However, there was not even a political party then as a result of perhaps the vestige of the Tokugawa era when no one was allowed to form a political group, somewhat like present-day Saudi Arabia. There was, thus, a need for the Diet to wait for the government approval of party formation. Prime Minister Matsukata did not have wisdom to use the Goth and Mutsu as his “IPRC committee” representatives to work with minority parties. These two events surrounding the expansion of military budget clearly demonstrate the validity of two hypotheses, one proposed by George Akita (1967) that the Imperial Diet did have at least some powers to prevent or at least delay the passage of budget bills. Second, although there were organized ad hoc efforts to bring about cooperation and compromise between parties after the first generation election, no permanent institutions were established to perform IPRC committee functions, at least during this period in parliamentary history. Hence, the first experiment with the Western experience under Prime Minister Matsukata resulted in the total failure for the Imperial Diet resulting in the dissolution.

Nascent IPRC (Kakuha Kyagikai), 1905 The Meiji government did not recognize political parties in the Diet until the Thirteenth Diet Session that started on November 7, 1898. Since then, each party was required to register. The first interparty negotiation took place among six political parties in 1900 during the Fifteenth Diet Session. Diet members consulted and negotiated with each other for the purpose of impeaching Prime Minister Hirobumi Ith in the House of Peers (Maeda 1990, 227). The effort, however, did not lead to the formation of institutionalized means to settle interparty disputes. The predecessor to IPRC known then as the Association for Consultation among Parties (kakuha kyhgikai) came into existence during the Twenty-First Diet Session that started on February 27, 1905 (Shimph 1995, 101; Shigi’in and Sangi’in, eds. 1961, 250; Thyama and Adachi 1961, 122). It was primarily designed so that parties could consult with each other to set the agenda, the order of speaking, and other matters under the leadership of the Speaker (Nakano 1992, 114). After the formation of Shingai Club7 in the former HC consisting of 18 members in 1910, the Diet decided that, in order to be part of the Association for

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Consultation among Parties, an organization must have at least 25 members in each house to qualify as a party to keep the Shingai Club out (Maeda 1990, 227). To qualify for membership in the Association for Consultation among Parties from 1912 onward, each party had to have at least 25 members. Then, several years before the Pacific War during the Seventy-Fourth Diet Session that started on December 26, 1938, Association rules as well as its name were revised to read “The Association for Interparty Relations” (AIPR). Several items we should note are: (1) the first clause calls for the Speaker to convene and decide the agenda for discussion, (2) Clause 6 calls for all decisions to be made unanimously, and (3) the newly adopted Clause 8 calls for a member party to have 25 or more members. Parties with fewer than 25 members are allowed to attend Association sessions as observers and may be allowed to speak at the discretion of the Speaker (Thyama and Adachi 1961, 122).8 The rules indicate clearly the power of the Speaker over prewar IPRC. Through the Association for Consultation among Parties, the Imperial Diet arranged meetings among party leaders to plan for formal sessions before the end of World War II (Murakawa 1989, 163–164).

IPRC Politics under the Showa Constitution The AIPR to Diet Agenda Council (Gijikyagikai), 1947–1958 The IPRC came into existence shortly after the Pacific War ended and the occupational reform started as a way of adjusting to the newly imposed American “New Deal” institutions. The United States wanted to strengthen the power of the Diet members among other things by creating standing committees (Yamazaki 1988, 13). The assumption was that by creating standing committees, Diet members would specialize in areas of legislation that would strengthen their power within that area of expertise.9 As one of the standing committees, the HMC came into existence during the First Diet Session. Along with the HMC, the AIPR ironed out the details of quotidian work in the Diet while the former was charged with making basic decisions on Diet management. The former did not allow small minority parties to take part in its meetings, but the latter did. Two out of the three ruling coalition parties, the JSP and the National Cooperative Party, during the Second Normal Session (1947–1948), organized AIPR to work right along with the HMC, similar to what existed before the end of the war, to maximize each party’s interest in dealing with other parties (Hi 1990b, 106). SCAP objected to the AIPR that met behind closed doors to make decisions during the Second Diet Session that started in November 1947. The AIPR came to an end and was replaced by the House Steering Subcommittee Council (Gi’in’unei shhi’inkyhgikai) (Hi 1990b, 107). The speaker continued to use the


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new council to manage Diet affairs. This council, too, had a short life. The task was taken over by the HMC’s board of directors until a series of violent incidents erupted in the Diet. To facilitate smoother operation of the Diet, the Diet Agenda Council (gijikyhgikai) replaced the council during the Twenty-Eighth Normal Session, which opened in November 1957. The Speaker appointed eight members of the new council, which turned out to have the same members as the previous council, resulting in the new council not meeting after December of 1958. The power of tradition is more powerful than formal changes.

The National Democratic Party Appoints the IPRC Committee Chair, 1949 Hamada (1993, 181) traces the history of IPRC politics to the Katayama cabinet, a coalition government in 1947. It was then a period of major changes in politics, from the promulgation of the new Constitution to electoral reform after the war. It was then imperative to move bills through the Diet. IPRC politics made it possible for many bills designed to improve the life of the people to pass the Diet. The power of IPRC increased during the Eisaku Sath cabinet era. It even became a necessity to do nemawashi before passing bills. It quickly became customary to informally talk about bills to reach a compromise or dangh over dinner. This was the beginning of IPRC corruption. It takes two to tango, making all political parties with the exception of the JCP guilty of getting involved in dirty money politics (Hamada 1993). It is possible that nascent forms of postwar IPRC politics existed as early as 1947, as Hamada says. However, it was not until Democratic Party dissidents appointed their IPRC committee members that IPRC politics became a Diet institution.10 Democrats (N ⫽ 41), who chose not to join the coalition government of the JSP set up an IPRC committee during the Fifth Special Session that opened on February 11, 1949 after the 24th General Election in January. Having secured a majority in the election, the Liberal Party, too, decided to form an IPRC committee in July 1950. The secretary general of conservative parties and Socialist parties became so busy with other affairs that he could not pay enough attention to the Association for Consultation among Parties. There was a need to strengthen the Association, which led to the formation of the IPRC as we know it today. High-ranking leaders of each party who have close working relationships with other top party leaders lead the IPRC. IPRC politics became an institution largely because of the chairmen of the Liberal Party (Tadao Kuraishi) and the Democratic Party (Saburh Shi’ikuma) who had known each other for many years since the 1930s. These two friends divided by party affiliation forged a sold foundation for the institutionalization of the IPRC politics in the early 1950s (Murakawa 1989, 164).

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Murakawa (1989, 163) traces the history of IPRC politics from 1949 to 1950, when a need to facilitate the legislative process rose. Progressive and conservative parties respectively developed their own IPRC committees within their parties. Top three leaders of each party conducted interparty negotiations to resolve legislative obstacles prior to the rise of IPRC politics, a tradition carried on since the days of the Imperial Diet. As the power of conservative parties started to center around their secretary generals, they needed their own representatives to negotiate with other parties. This need gave rise to the development of IPRC committees. Hence, Murakawa says the origin of IPRC committee lies in this growing need in the late 1940s. It is true the LDP secretary general withdrew money from the LDP organizational activity account, often along with its IPRC chairperson, whenever a controversy arose. To be more specific, Murakawa writes that anti-mainstream wings of the Democratic Party appointed Saburh Shi’ikuma as their IPRC chairman on March 16, 1949. Subsequently on October 25 of the same year, the coalition wing of Democratic Party chose Nagahiro Nagano as its IPRC chairman. The Liberal Party followed suit by nominating Kikuichirh Yamaguchi on July 14, 1950 as its IPRC committee chairman. All three were active in standing committee work prior to their appointments. They were already veterans of interparty negotiations. Later on, as the Democratic Party reorganized to become the National Democratic Party, Shi’ikuma was appointed again as its IPRC chairman. Opposing him was Tadao Kuraishi of the Liberal Party who was also chosen to represent his party as its IPRC chairman. The parties did not select these individuals at random. Both were elected to the Diet from prewar years and knew each other for many years. Negotiations are most likely to succeed between friends, not enemies. They were able to communicate well without making everything explicit and knew when to stop and how far to go in pushing their agenda—a hon’ne level of communication. Murakawa (1989, 164) attributes the establishment of IPRC politics as an institution at least among conservative parties to Shi’ikuma and Kuraishi. They found themselves in the same LDP when it was formed in 1955. Shi’ikuma became Diet HMC chairman during the Hatoyama cabinet era and subsequently, Kuraishi served as LDP IPRC chairman in the shortlived Ishibashi cabinet. As the 1955 system became firmly established, the LDP as the ruling party and the JSP as its chief opposition party, more issues began to divide them. IPRC committee chairmen of each party became representatives of each in interparty negotiations of all important and controversial issues. The IPRC committee chairmen, as time passed, gained more power in the legislative process. IPRC leaders in conservative parties were elevated directly to the three top party posts of president, chief cabinet secretary, and secretary general.


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The two chairs would do their groundwork and reach a tentative agreement or understanding, not necessarily an agreement in the English sense. Then, they would report to their respective party’s secretary general. If everything went well, an announcement might be made at the joint press conference. The matter could go to the top leaders of the ruling party and the main opposition party before a public announcement is made on rare occasion. Scenario writing is the task of IPRC committees for each party. Unlike in the movies, scenario writers remain anonymous and hidden behind the formal actors of the Diet.

IPRC Expense as a Separate Item in the LDP Budget, 1957 Although IPRC expenses may have been “peanuts” as described by Kuno11 in the 1950s, it became a full-course dinner by the early 1990s, when it reached close to $70 million per annum.12 IPRC expenses were grouped along with other party activity expenses in the early postwar years. This was true prior to the merger of the two conservative parties in 1955 to form the LDP. The DSP and JSP did have a separate item called the “Diet affairs expense account” and “external business expense account” that appeared to be for IPRC use. However, the amount remained miniscule in relation to that of the LDP. The first separate item on IPRC expenses appears in the report of the second half of 1957 from July through December. It reads that the party spent ¥12,650,000 on 20 occasions or $1,757 per event in 1957.13 That was a very large sum of money in Japan then. Takeo Fukuda, who became the LDP IPRC chairman, told reporters that his predecessor, Isamu Murakami and then-party secretary general was responsible for separating IPRC expenses from other line items in the party budget. Fukuda refused to reveal any further details. The Mai’nichi reporters detail that the LDP spent ¥13,170,000 on 20 occasions in the first half of 1958 and ¥17,910,000 in the second half over 28 instances. The amount then escalated to over ¥100,000,000 in the second half of 1965 or the first half of 1966 when IPRC expense accounts became a public issue. A member of the LDP who knew about those years informed reporters that “we used to include everything from all expenses for the party activities including lunch money and clerical supplies and expenses into the IPRC expense account” (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 48–49). Contrary to the party member’s account, the “IPRC expenses account” dwindled to ¥50,000,000 to 60,000,000, then, declined further to ¥20,000,000 or 30,000,000 per biannual report on average after the controversy arose.14 A bill restricting the use of party funds passed the Diet on July 4, 1975. After the passage, IPRC expenses as an item in the party financial report disappeared. Before delving further into the historical development of IPRC politics, I wish to present a table showing who chaired the HR HMC and IPRC

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during the 1955 system era to see if we can observe any traceable systematic trend that may reveal the role of IPRC politics in the Diet. Table 4.1 presents a list of the LDP IPRC committee chairs and the HR HMC chair during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. Entries in table 4.1 indicate several trends and characteristics of IPRC politics. First, the HMC chairs tended to belong to the prime minister’s faction in the early years of the 1955 system era until toward the end of Sath era, suggesting the strong working relationship between the two until then. Starting toward the end of his era, the LDP IPRC chair tended to come from the prime minister’s faction. Perhaps this shift was caused by the rising cost of IPRC politics accompanied by the rising GNP in the 1960s. To move larger sums of the party’s special fund for IPRC activities probably required closer coordination between the prime minister and the LDP IPRC chair. Also, Kakuei Tanaka, who succeeded Eisaku Sath as prime minister, was known as a big spender from the days of his tenure as the minister of finance in the Sath cabinet. Second, by the time Nakasone became prime minister, it is clear that there was a close working relationship between the IPRC office and the office of prime minister, and that this continued through Miyazawa’s time until the end of the 1955 system era. Third, the fact that Takeshita faction members continued to serve after the end of the Takeshita era indicates the enduring power of the late former prime minister throughout the 1955 system era and beyond. Comparatively speaking, Prime Minister Miayazawa exercised more power than either the Uno or Kaifu regimes, but in the final analysis the Takeshita faction controlled the ruling party at least until the end of the era in 1993. Fourth, entries in the table indicate the importance of these two offices in the legislative process, the HMC and IPRC committees. Fifth, the table entries also indicate the importance of factions in the ruling party power structure, and therefore the Japanese governmental power structure. This also explains that efforts to abolish factions have failed to materialize throughout the history of politics after the end of World War II. Factions along with IPRC politics are here to stay, despite efforts to eliminate them. As the reconstruction of Japan progressed, the intensity of conflicts between the ruling and opposition parties increased rapidly. The government party had to pass needed bills for the reconstruction of Japan’s economy within limited formal sessions, necessitating the IPRC committee chairman to work behind the scenes to get key bills passed. For this reason, the ruling party’s IPRC committee chair became the fourth most important position following the three key positions in the party besides the president.15 Following the establishment of the 1955 system, bitter ideological conflicts between the LDP and the JSP merged. The ideological conflicts between them resembled the world at large, the bipolar world of communism versus democracy.

101 Table 4.1 The Ruling LDP IPRC Chairs and the HR HMC Chairs, 1955–1993 Cabinet

LDP IPRC Chair (faction)

HR HMC Chair (faction)

Hatoyama 3 Ishibashi Kishi 1 Kishi 2a Kishi 2b Kishi 3 Ikeda 1 Ikeda 2 Ikeda 3 Ikeda 4 Ikeda 5 Ikeda 6 Sata 1 Sata 2 Sata 3 Sata 4 Sata 5 Sata 6 Sata 7 Sata 8 Tanaka 1 Tanaka 2 Tanaka 3 Tanaka 4 Miki 1 Miki 2 Fukuda 1 Fukuda 2 Ahira 1 Ahira 2 Suzuki 1 Suzuki 2 Nakasone 1 Nakasone 2 Nakasone 3 Nakasone 4 Nakasone 5 Takeshita 1 Takeshita 2 Uno Kaifu 1

Umekichi Nakamura (Kano) Tadao Kuraishi (Ano) Isamu Murakami (Ano) Isamu Murakami (Ano) Kashichi Masuda (Sata) Kenji Fukunaga (Ikeda) Saeki Ozawa (Kishi) Shinjira Yamamura (Shi’ina) Masumi Ezaki (Fujiyama) Ybtara Takeyama (Miki) Sonoda, Sunao (Kano) Hideyo Sasaki (Ikeda) Shira Nakano (Sata) Hideyo Sasaki (Maeo) Hideyo Sasaki (Maeo) Shira Hasegawa (Kawashima) Sunao Sonoda (Mori) Sunao Sonoda (Mori) Toshira Tsukahara (Sata) Shin Kanemaru (Sata) Shin Kanemaru (Tanaka) Ken Harada (Mizuta) Hajime Fukuda (Funada) Masumi Ezaki (Mizuta) Sasuke Uno (Nakasone) Toshiki Kaifu (Miki) Shintara Abe (Fukuda) Asao Mihara [Independent] Shin Kanemaru (Tanaka) Shin Kanemaru (Tanaka) Yoshira Tazawa (Suzuki) Hajime Tamura (Tanaka) Hikosabura Okonogi (Nakasone) Morishita, Eta (Nakasone) Takami Eta (Nakasone) Kasei Fujinami (Nakasone) Kasei Fujinami (Nakasone) Kaza Watanabe (Takeshita) Kaza Watanabe (Takeshita) Keiwa Okuda (Takeshita) Kaneza Muraoka (Takeshita)

Kaifu 2 Miyazawa

Seiroku Kajiyama (Takeshita) Hiroyuki Masuoka (Miyazawa)

Sabura Shi’ikuma (Kishi) Shigeru Hori (Sata) Shinjira Yamamura (Kishi) Masumi Ezaki (Kishi) Masumi Ezaki (Kishi) Seijybra Arafune (Kishi) Hideo Suta (Ikeda) Hisao Kodaira (Ikeda) Hajime Fukuda (Ano) Hideyo Sasaki (Ikeda) Kenji Fukunaga (Ikeda) Shinza Tsubokawa (Sata) Shinza Tsubokawa (Sata) Toshira Tsukahara (Sata) Shinza Tsubokawa (Sata) Shigejira Ina (Sata) Chbji Kuno (Sata) Toshira Tsukahara (Sata) Motosabura Wataumi (Fukuda) Yoshira Tazawa (Ahira) Yoshira Tazawa (Ahira) Toshiki Kaifu (Miki) Hideyo Sasaki (Ahira) Hideyo Sasaki (Ahira) Yoshira Tazawa (Ahira) Yoshira Tazawa (Ahira) Shin Kanemaru (Tanaka) Yoshiza Hosoda (Fukuda) Yoshiza Hosoda (Fukuda) Takao Kameoka (Tanaka) Ganri Yamashita (Tanaka) Hideo Utsumi (Tanaka) Shinjira Yamamura (Tanaka) Ichira Ozawa (Tanaka) Ichira Ozawa (Tanaka) Tamisuke Watanuki (Tanaka) Ihei Ochi (Nakasone) Hiroshi Mitsuka (Abe) Toshio Yamaguchi (Nakasone) Hikosabura Okonogi (Nakasone) Hikosabura Okonogi (Nakasone) Tokuo Yamashita (Kamoto) Yoshiaki Mori (Abe) Keisuke Nakanishi (Takeshita)

Sources: Sata and Matsuzaki (1986, 133) and newspaper sources.

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The importance of the IPRC became greater than ever. The role of the respective chairs was in many cases to reach a tentative agreement and then ask for each party’s secretary general to meet to formalize it. There must be a close working relationship between party secretary generals and IPRC chairs to manage the Diet. Each party is interested in having its new members cultivate relationships with members of other parties. As they advance in their respective parties and meet old friends of other parties in conflicts over controversial issues, they find it easier to sit down to discuss contested points informally (Murakawa 1989, 165–167). Each party’s IPRC committee chair is a veteran Diet member who is likely to have held various formal Diet positions prior to the appointment and also to maintain close working relationships with key party leaders. The task of IPRC committees is to make secret deals. IPRC committee chairs are thus entrusted to often make spot decisions on behalf of their parties. The LDP IPRC chair and secretary general and the JSP’s counterparts managed the Diet largely through the IPRC pipeline after the advent of the 1955 system. However, as new parties—The Khmeith, the Democratic Socialist Party, the New Liberal Club and other minor parties appeared after 1965 to play active roles in IPRC politics, the ruling LDP had to deal with an increased number of opposition parties. The opposition parties competed for power through IPRC politics. This led the ruling LDP to deal with different opposition parties in different ways. Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita in 1988 succeeded in passing the consumption tax attempted by prior regimes. Since the combined force of the KP and the DSP numerically exceeded 100, surpassing the number of the JSP, the LDP secretary general and IPRC committee chair settled their disputes with counterparts of the KP and the DSP to pass the bill, not with those of the JSP, who along with the JCP strongly opposed the bill.

“Mr. Compromise” Stages a Show, 1959 Khichi Yamamoto, labeled “Mr. Compromise” by the press, served as JSP IPRC chairman for six years (Yamamoto 1988, 159).16 He confesses that he did make a lot of compromises, for which his colleagues criticized him in public. However, he reports that many of those same colleagues patted his back and thanked him for his achievements privately. He hastily adds he did always draw a line at some point beyond which he refused to compromise. In late November of 1959, the LDP decided to introduce a bill to discipline Inejirh Asanuma for leading a demonstration around the Diet building gate.17 The demonstrators were beginning a protest against the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty Revision bill. The newly appointed JSP IPRC chairman felt a heavy responsibility, since Asanuma was party secretary general then. This was a serious matter that needed to be diffused. Yamamoto spoke


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with LDP Secretary General Shhjirh Kawashima and its IPRC Chairman Kenji Fukunaga, urging them to be easy on Asanuma and begging them to be flexible at their meeting. They agreed it would take time to process the disciplinary bill. Yamamoto’s hope was that if it took a long time, it would not be seriously considered. Meanwhile, the LDP introduced a bill regarding demonstration control. JSP IPRC Chairman Yamamoto called on his counterpart in the LDP to propose a show to convince Diet members on both sides and the media about how hard they were negotiating over the Asanuma case. Fukunaga asked what he had to do. Yamamoto told Fukunaga: “You and I are going to fight—maybe throw a chair or two to each other if necessary” (Yamamoto 1988, 173). Fukunaga responded affirmatively: “OK, let’s do it.” They ostensibly went to an office for negotiation. Having heard that the two IPRC chairmen entered the office for negotiation, reporters came to listen through the office door. They first started in low voices, exchanging jokes and lewd stories. Then, they started to argue loudly after 30 minutes. They threw ashtrays and hit bookshelves to make noise. Yamamoto reports that since they could not throw chairs at each other, they threw them at the door. Then, they stamped out, still arguing angrily. Yamamoto confesses it was hard to keep his face straight. It was difficult to keep members of each party in line without this kind of performance. He says he was thus able to prolong the issue until it was forgotten and dissipated. IPRC chairs sometimes are required to fool not only the public and media but also their own party members. In doing so, they write their own scenarios and act out a show as these two elected representatives did before the audience of reporters.

Was the 1960 Anpo (Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty Revision) Melee Staged? The passage of Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty Revision in 1960 was a turning point in U.S.-Japan relations. President Eisenhower was forced to cancel his trip to Japan. A University of Tokyo student died in violent demonstrations on the Diet compound and HR Speaker Ichirh Kiyose had to be carried onto the podium by police. My efforts to look for sufficient evidence to conclude that the violence that erupted in and out of the Diet building around the midnight passage of the Anpo on May 19, 1960 was staged or not fell short of what I had hoped. I did find, however, enough evidence provided by IPRC members and reports that the IPRC played a part, at least in some way to some extent.18 Both LDP and JSP IPRC chairmen have written on their activities in a book on the Japanese Diet edited by the Yomiuri Shimbun Research Division (Yomiuri Shimbun Chhsakenkyibu, ed. 1988). I have learned from other

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knowledgeable sources of responses that range from the flat denial of any IPRC involvement to the other extreme that says that much of what took place in the Diet building was arranged by IPRC politics.19 Yamamoto, then the JSP IPRC chairman, writes on his involvement in the Anpo crisis in his article on the struggle of opposition parties in the Diet (Yamamoto 1988, 159–184) but carefully avoids giving the impression that IPRC politics played crucial roles in the way crises erupted, culminating in the midnight passage of the Anpo bill. He does touch on limited aspects of what he did as JSP IPRC chairman. For example, he reports that he spoke with the Speaker on several occasions to ask his intent. He said DSP IPRC Chairman Ikkh Kasuga asked him if he could stage confusion, occupy the Anpo committee meeting room, and engage in other activities. They met repeatedly to plan. Yamamoto carefully chooses the word “just as I predicted” to report that 500 police came into the Diet building after 11 P.M. as ordered by the Speaker. Mosaburh Suzuki, Jhtarh Kawakami, Kanji Kath, Kh’ichi Yamamoto himself, and others were sitting in front of the Speaker’s office to prevent him from going out to preside the session (Yamamoto 1988, 178). Did he predict that, because he was a part of the team, police forces were brought into the Diet building? Was it staged? After removing the obstacles, the Speaker was carried to the podium to open the session and at approximately midnight the treaty bill passed the HR. LDP IPRC Vice Chairman Chiji Kuno too is careful in not touching on crucial points of IPRC involvement in the passage of the treaty bill. He, however, drops a few hints here and there to the extent of what the IPRC can do in writing a chapter on the role of the ruling party in the management of the Diet (Kuno 1988, 185–200). Having been elected first to the HR in 1949, Kuno at the outset says he had been involved continuously in IPRC work since the beginning of the 1955 system era. Much of the time he was involved in IPRC politics, the JSP IPRC was headed by Yamamoto. Kuno was vice chairman of the LDP IPRC when the 1960 crisis started. At the time of the crisis, he reports that he was spending 50 percent of his time in the LDP IPRC office and the other half of his waking hours in the JSP IPRC office (Kuno 1988, 186). He used to buy peanuts produced in Chiba by the bag to take with him while visiting the JSP IPRC office.20 The LDP IPRC chair Kenji Fukunaga did not come to these sessions. Kuno reports that he used to eat peanuts with JSP IPRC Chairman Yamamoto and other members to discuss how to manage the Diet, like “let’s dispense” of this bill in this way rather than that way. As I read the article, a question that came to mind was that if the Anpo incident was not staged, what Kuno was doing during half of his waking hours in the JSP IPRC office, if not eating peanuts and planning the next theatrical script. When JSP and outside protestors demonstrated in and around the Diet building, Kuno was there, along with students and union members, singing


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revolutionary songs and taking pictures, including a top JSP leader Inejirh Asanuma. He used to report every move the demonstrators were making to LDP IPRC Chairman Fukunaga and party Secretary General Shhjirh Kawashima, who needed an accurate picture of what was going on. Kuno was asked also to make daily reports to the U.S. embassy. He could not enter the embassy from the front entrance, since the JCP had a camera taking pictures of everyone who entered and left the embassy. Kuno usually climbed a wall in the back of the U.S. embassy compound to make his report to ministerial-level personnel. After the passage of the treaty, opposition parties were to all appearances so indignant that none of the JSP members Kuno used to see would allow him to talk with them, he reports (Kuno 1988, 191). He says that peanuts no longer did anything to reopen the contacts. While I believe his report is correct, what I am uncertain is whether or not that was something he and the JSP IPRC members agreed upon, scripted in advance. He makes attempts to convince the reader of his being kicked out of the JSP office a number of times after the Anpo crisis. He reports that after a month of daily visits, the JSP finally let him in. After he was allowed in the JSP office, it took him a week or ten days to really start talking. A question that came repeatedly to my mind as I gathered information on the Anpo crisis is that how was it possible that no Diet members were seriously hurt, despite the level of violence and confusion we saw on television news. Some Diet members did faint in the process (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1986, 282). The Diet members include senior and frail members who could be easily hurt in tense melees like what took place in the Diet. In view of daily IPRC contacts between the LDP and opposition parties before and during the crisis, at least some of the events must have been scripted, but perhaps not all.21

Robert Kennedy and Kakuei Tanaka on Rearmament, 1962 Attorney General Robert Kennedy came to Japan and on February 5, 1962 met with Kakuei Tanaka, who was then LDP Political Affairs Research Council Chairman.22 Kennedy took this opportunity to propose that Japan rearm itself by amending the Constitution. Inadvertently, Tanaka agreed!! Tanaka told Kennedy that Japan would consider his proposal seriously if the United States returns Okinawa to Japan. Kennedy taped the session and released what Tanaka said to the press. It was also reported to the U.S. Congress. A copy of the tape was sent back to Tokyo. In Japan, February is the month to work on the following year’s budget, which begins in April. Now, the Diet became concerned with the Kennedy–Tanaka incident. The JSP IPRC chairman was then Masumi Ezaki, who refused to even speak with his LDP counterpart. Kuno went directly to Khichi Yamamoto. Yamamoto halted the budget committee hearings and

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ordered him to bring Tanaka. Then, he said, he might consider talking about the possibility of resuming the budget committee discussion. Kuno went to Tanaka’s residence and told him to go to sleep, pretending that he had a cold. Kuno then proceeded to have someone whose name he refuses to disclose erase the only copy of the Kennedy–Tanaka exchange tape in Japan. After Kuno attempted negotiations with Yamamoto for three days, the JSP IPRC member Yamamoto gave in to say that since they are all good friends, let “Kaku-san” as he was known affectionately, Nikaidh, Kuno, and Yamamoto gather to talk about settling the incident. What should be done? Yamamoto gave Kuno a script. It said that at the outset of the next IPRC committee meeting, Kaku-san (Kakuei Tanaka) would come with a mouth mask and mumble “Yar, yar . . .” meaning nothing and go around the table and go out of the room. Yamamoto would then tell everyone that kaku-san, who had a high fever with flu, was good enough to come out to apologize. Let’s consider the matter settled, then, he said. Kuno so instructed Tanaka and he agreed with the script. Kuno told him to make sure he follows Yamamoto’s script and say nothing. Tanaka nodded and said he would follow the instruction. The day came and he entered the meeting room and greeted everyone. But he could not keep himself in line with Yamamoto’s instructions. He apologized to everyone, saying that he made a terrible mistake. “It’s a big problem,” he told them. He then sincerely begged for their pardon. Kuno told him about the promise he had made to follow the script. Everyone in the room burst into laughter. The deal is made and the Diet started to move again. Kuno concludes that these understandings are possible because he feels that he and Yamamoto got along well and shared similar personality traits. Knowing Tanaka’s lavish habits, my hypothesis is that there must have been a fairly large sum of money distributed to opposition parties prior to this meeting of IPRC committees. I am certain that he did not go there emptyhanded. Kuno as well as Yamamoto in their articles never touch on money aspects of IPRC politics. However, as you will see, statistical data show that money flowed from the LDP to opposition parties every time the ruling party wanted to pass bills.

LDP Operation Rules, 1964 Asakusa has a small red-light district behind Asakusa Kan’non temple. One of them was called “Fujita,” to which the LDP Diet members are attracted. The reason is that most informal discussions take place in exclusive restaurants in Akasaka and other fashionable areas. Sometimes LDP members do not like to be seen befriending opposition party members. Former HR member Tsunehiko Antaku of the JSP was invited to “Fujita” for the first time shortly after he became director of the HMC in 1964.


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A black sedan came to pick him up to take him to the restaurant. The former labor union leader enjoyed the amenities he found in the restaurants. A couple of LDP members were already there playing mahjong. The Mai’nichi reporters quoted Antaku: I won that night. But because of the large sums of money involved, I played mahjong once one night. I went there a number of times afterwards as well, but I stayed with geisha women and did not play mahjong. I am not telling you that I discussed any bills, but . . .23

He continued by adding that what surprised him more was what his senior colleague in JSP informed him the next day. His senior Diet member bragged (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 76–77): I played mahjong last night with the LDP’s Mr. X and I won ¥300,000!!

This type of social gathering is called “mahjong konshinkai” in Japanese or “mahjong get-together.” It is an institutionalized form of bonding among Diet members, but its existence is not well known outside of Nagata-chh. Political reporters (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 77) called it an ura-shikan or “hidden custom.” The reporters write about how the amount the LDP dispensed at mahjong parties increased, particularly during the Tanaka cabinet era (1972–1974) from ¥1 to ¥2 million at each party.

PM Sata Reluctantly Pays to Pass a Treaty Bill, June 1965 A JCP member of the HC for 24 years, Khichirh Ueda (1999) writes about his experience in the Diet. Not too many Diet members write about IPRC politics. He cites one of the few published cases of Prime Minister Sath’s words on IPRC politics reported by Isamu Imaizumi in his article entitled “A Shocking Inside Note—opposition parties tottering in the world of money politics—telling you after reflecting upon 20 years of life in the Diet about the structure of collusive dealings behind closed doors between the ruling and opposition parties.”24 Ueda cites a passage attributable to what the then prime minister Sath said to the then DSP Policy Affairs Research Deliberation Council chairman, Isamu Imaizumi from the article as follows: According to a report from the [LDP] secretary general or chief cabinet secretary, I think we can be sure, since enough steps were taken to move on. If you are in trouble with the Policy Affairs Deliberation Council, use money to solve problems. Contact Tomisaburh Hashimoto located next door. The JSP has been opposed to the establishment of an ad hoc committee, but we settled the matter. I think it will be safe sailing. Railroad the bill even if opposition parties vehemently oppose a call for question. Otherwise, the JSP cannot save face. The scenario calls for the opposition parties to oppose spiritedly the passage of the bill before the chairman calls

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for a vote to pass the bill by a majority. It is no longer a question of debating pros and cons, but money. The Diet needs oil to function. I am saddened that postwar politics has gotten this low. It is indeed regrettable that you play with money to pass a treaty or whatever, but there is no other way. I beg for your cooperation. (As cited by Ueda 1999, 79–80)

This must have been a moment of Sath’s hon’ne. Ueda ends the citation by saying that real parliamentary democracy cannot develop without the growth of real and creditable opposition parties (Ueda 1999, 80). The JCP, despite its party’s ideological commitment, has been attempting to play a greater role in IPRC politics. However, my assessment is that other parties do not always welcome the JCP’s participation because of its orientation toward traditional Japanese values.

Shizue Kata Speaks Out on IPRC Politics, 1965 On a related issue of setting up a Consul General’s Office in Seoul, well-known female Socialist leader Shizue Kath told reporters (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 36–37) about an incident that reveals the work of IPRC politics. No one told her how to vote in the committee. She decided to vote for the establishment of the office of Consul General in Seoul. Her fellow Socialists in the committee blindly followed her lead. She was one of the few who were with the LDP on this issue. Suddenly, the committee chairman stopped the proceedings to ask the Socialist director of the committee, “You are supposed to vote against the bill. What happened?” Kath revealed her concern for the collusion of the LDP–JSP in writing up detailed scenarios for the management of the Diet. She said to the reporters: “Some Socialists speak against the LDP during the day, then they go to drink together with the LDP members when evening comes” (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 36–37). Some socialists such as Kath and Takako Doi appear to personally stay clear of IPRC politics.

Freshman Junya Yano’s Questions to PM Sata on the LDP IPRC Expense Report, March 23, 1967 This is an oft-cited celebrated case of IPRC politics. The KP or the Clean Government Party elected its first representatives to the HR. Yano, a novice to parliamentary politics questioned Prime Minister Sath at the House budget committee meeting. What both Yano asked and how Prime Minister Sath responded were later deleted from the committee’s official records. There are eight different exchanges between the two men that are deleted in the official minutes of the meeting (e.g., Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 29). What happened on March 23, 1967 at 1:30 P.M.? Yano asked the then Minister of Home


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Affairs (1985, 31): Yano: I would like to have a report regarding breakdowns on expenditure under the category of kokkai taisaku hi [IPRC expense account] found in a report compiled by the LDP for 1965 and 1966.

Sensuke Fujieda, Minister of Home Affairs, read figures from the records. According to the documents, the LDP spent ¥25,750,000 ($71,528)25 on 14 occasions in the first half of 1965, ¥119,400,000 ($331,667) on 19 occasions in the second half of the same year and ¥104,200,000 ($289,444) on 18 occasions in the first half of 1966. After hearing Fujieda’s report, Yano asked Prime Minister Sath: “For what purposes are these monies used?” Sath revealed an important point without making his meaning clear as follows: “We have all together 420 Liberal Democrats in the two houses. Even if we give ¥100,000 per member for party activities, it amounts to a huge figure. I would like you to know that we have expenditures on some unlikely purposes as well.”26 Freshman Diet member Yano demanded further: “Isn’t there any relationship between the movement of money and Diet operations?” The Mai’nichi reporters thought Yano hit the nail right on its head (1985, 32). The prime minister had no clear-cut answers. Yano ended up asking for a full record of expenditures and the meeting was moved to executive session. All discussion in eight different sections were later deleted from the record. Hirose continues on this exchange among many authors who cite this case (1989, 48). Yano: According to the LDP fiscal report based on the Rules Regarding Political Fund Law, very large sums of money beyond normally expected expenses are flowing to the LDP’s Chief Secretary and its IPRC committee chair. For what purpose is this huge sum of money used? Sath: I left the management of the party in the hands of the chief secretary. I do not know details. Yano: In December of 1965, when the ruling LDP and the main opposition party, the JSP, agreed to normalize the Diet operation, your chief secretary spent ¥30,000,000 and ¥33,000,000 [$175,000] about the same time. Is it not reasonable to think about what might have taken place by putting these two things together? Sath: You are free to speculate. Thinking back to my Chief Secretary days, I can assure you that nothing like what you are imagining took place. Yano: The Chief Secretary must have reported how the money was spent. I would like to have the committee chair ask the Prime Minister to clear up this question.

The Asahi Shimbun printed its version of what the LDP submitted to the Government in the fiscal report dated October 29, 1966 to which Yano was

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referring. Hirose reproduced the table in his book (1989, 50). The following (table 4.2) is my translation of his table. Entries in table 4.2 display close association between the time and amount of money withdrawn by the LDP IPRC committee chair on the one hand and what happens to the Diet or a Table 4.2 Expenditure of the LDP IPRC, 1965 Date

Amount in ¥1,000/ withdrew by

Diet activities

2/03 2/17

500/Hideyo Sasaki 500/Takeo Miki

HR Budget Com begins Question and Answer (2/1) JSP proposes nonconfidence vote for Foreign Minister Shi’ina. JSP refuses to take part in Budget Com while nonconfidence vote being considered. JSP begins to soften its stand on (2/17) and Budget Com deliberation resumes (2/18)

3/10 3/18 4/02 4/16

5,100/Sasaki 500/Miki 2,400/Miki 1,250/Miki

LDP and JSP agree on the ILO ad hoc Com composition (3/19) LDP in HC railroads Comprehensive Retail Market Bill (4/2)

5/11

1,000/Miki

5/12 5/21 5/22

4,600/Miki 2,600/Miki 100/Sasaki

HR Cabinet Com railroads LDP Farm Land Remuneration Bill (5/13) LDP alone decides to extend Diet session (5/19) Diet ceases to operate (5/20–24) HC President calls to order and starts session (5/26)

5/29 6/01 6/10 7/21 9/14

1,500/Miki 440/Miki 100/Kakuei Tanaka 7,200/Shira Nakano 1,000/Nakano

9/21 10/4 10/6

3,000/Nakano 5,300/Nakano 4,500/Nakano

10/13 11/01

2,000/Nakano 5,700/Nakano

11/05 11/06

3,600/Nakano 600/Nakano

HR’s J–K ad hoc Com railroads J–K Bill (11/06)

11/15 11/15

3,000/Nakano 1,800/Tanaka

HR President calls for question to pass J–K Bill (11/12, Diet ceases to operate until 11/15)

12/01 12/01 12/01

300/Tanaka 3,000/Nakano 4,500/Shunji Shiomi

LDP in HR HMC railroads to call for normal session (12/1). HR Com on J–K tension up between LDP and oppositions (12/1, 12/4 LDP railroads the bill)

12/20

30,000/Tanaka

12/21 12/28 12/28

33,000/Tanaka 74.000/Nakano 600/Nakano

LDP–JSP agree to resume deliberation after HR speaker Funada and vice speaker Tanaka resign (12/19) Normal session opens (12/20) Supplementary budget passes (12/27) LDP–JSP comes to an understanding (12/27), ad hoc fiscal management bill passes HR (12/28)

LDP railroads ILO Bill in HR ILO Com (4/15) Diet deliberation stops (4/16)

HC passes Farm Land Remuneration Bill (5/28) Diet session closes (6/1) Special session called (7/22) Gov’t decides on (9/21) to open Japan–Korea Diet session (10/5) HR voted the duration of 70 days for the session (10/6, but the HR sits still until the opening on 10/11) Prime Minister makes his position statement in HR/HC (10/13) HR Com on Japan–Korea dominated by LDP decides on the hearing from opinion-holders (11/01)


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committee on the other. A certain amount of money is taken out by the LDP HR or HC IPRC committee chair or the LDP secretary general and something happens in the matter of a few days, either before or afterward. I cannot find any exception in the entries in the table. Whenever money is withdrawn, some important action takes place either just before or afterward. The evidence is compelling because of its frequency within a matter of a year. Let us review table 4.2 with care.

HR Budget Committee Starts Discussion, IPRC Chairman Withdraws ¥500,000 Three Days Later, February 1–3, 1965 The HR budget committee began discussing the proposed budget on February 2, 1965 as it does annually about the same time before the fiscal year ends on the last day of March. Three days later, Hideyo Sasaki, the LDP IPRC chair withdraws a half million yen.

Nonconfidence Vote Introduced and Budget Committee Meeting Halts, Miki Takes Out ¥500,000 and Meeting Resumes, February 16–18, 1965 On February 16, JSP introduces a nonconfidence vote on Foreign Minister Eisaburh Shi’ina. Immediately, the JSP boycotts the HR budget committee meeting. LDP Secretary General Takeo Miki takes out ¥500,000 the next day. The JSP softens its stand and the committee meeting resumes on February 18, 1965. This is interesting in view of the fact that Miki has been known for his uprightness. He was elected prime minister in December of 1974 for his integrity, honesty, and honor after the money scandal of the Tanaka cabinet. What this suggests is that it is not because politicians believe in “corruption,” structured or otherwise, that they use money to buy their opponents’ implicit approval to do what they are legally allowed to as the ruling party members, but as the then prime minister Eisaku Sath confesses, there is no other peaceful way in Japan. I am reminded of Max Weber’s aphorism regarding the political profession. Evil creeps in wherever there is power.

IPRC Chairman and Secretary General Withdraw Money and Two Parties Agree on Ad Hoc ILO Committee Composition, March 10–19, 1965 Both LDP IPRC Chairman Hideyo Sasaki and Secretary General Takeo Miki withdraw ¥5.1 million and a half million yen on March 10 and 18, 1965, respectively. An agreement is reached between the LDP and JSP on the composition of an ad hoc committee on the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the next day, March 19, 1965. It appears as though a whopping

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¥5.1 million was not enough, resulting in Miki taking out an additional ¥500,000 from the LDP account. A day later, consensus is achieved and announced. Either the JSP’s appetite must have been greater than the LDP anticipated or the LDP was bent on attempting to save as much as it could to curb an inflationary spiral. No politicians find it a pleasant task to solicit funds.

LDP Railroads Comprehensive Retail Market Bill in HC Committee and Miki Withdraws ¥2.4 Million, All on the Same Day, April 2, 1965 The Party Secretary General Miki withdraws ¥2.4 million on April 2. On the same day, the HC committee voted to pass a comprehensive retail market bill against all opposition parties. These two events took place within a matter of 24 hours on April 2, 1965. Can we dismiss these two events as unrelated and merely coincidental?

LDP Railroads ILO Bill in HR Committee as LDP Shells Out Millions,April 15–16, 1965 The LDP members push the ILO bill out of the HR ad hoc committee against the opposition parties on April 15. The HR session is halted the next day, when the LDP, represented by Secretary General Miki, withdraws ¥2.4 million for unspecified reasons.

Miki Takes Out Millions Before HR Cabinet Committee Pushes Out LDP-Sponsored Farm Compensation Bill, May 11–13, 1965 LDP leader Miki, known for his “cleanness” and integrity27 takes ¥1 million out of the LDP account. He has already taken out millions of yen from the same account within the past few months. Three days later, the HR cabinet committee votes that the Farm Land Compensation Bill be taken out of committee for HR consideration. The postwar SCAP carried out land reforms, converting the overwhelming majority of farmers into owner farmers from tenant farmers. That was a longsought-after goal of socialists from the prewar days. Because of the high rate of inflation that plagued Japan then, the payment former landowners received amounted to very little while new owner farmers got their land for almost nothing. This bill was designed to help former farm landowners who felt they lost their lands for almost nothing during the land reform. Since the largest


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portion of the LDP is farmers, it was important for the LDP to help the rural area in any way it could to keep its constituents satisfied.

LDP Railroads to Extend HR Session, Diet Session Halts; Miki Takes “Milk Bottle” to Opponents and They Wake Up; HC Reopens Session, May 19–26, 1965 The ruling LDP railroads to extend the HR sessions on May 19 while the rest of the parties voted against the move. Diet deliberations came to a halt on the 20th and stayed halted until the 24th—the Diet “slept.” On May 21, again Miki takes out ¥2.5 million to “wake up” the opposition parties. Apparently, they need more milk. IPRC chair Hideyo Sasaki takes out additional ¥100,000 on May 22 from the LDP fund for IPRC activities. Several days later, after they are “fed” enough, the HC formal session reopens and resumes its activities on the 26th as though nothing had happened.

Farm Land Compensation Bill Passes HC and Miki Milks ¥1.5 Million, May 28–29, 1965 The HC passes the bill for the Farm Land Compensation Law on May 28 and the next day the LDP IPRC Chairman Miki withdraws ¥1.5 million. This seems to represent a case where money is given out after a bill passes. Normally, Miki, after taking enough milk bottles repeatedly to sleeping beauties, must trust his recipients to deliver what they promise. Apparently, it was not only former landowners who benefited from the passage of this bill. In a way, the JCP and JSP both lost their primary selling point when the Diet passed the land reform bill, resulting in farmers becoming conservative. Hence, the opposition parties were compensated for the loss of votes.28

Regular Session Ends and Miki Dispenses ¥4.4 Million, June 1, 1965 It is all in a day’s work for the hardworking LDP IPRC Chairman Miki to shell out ¥4.4 million when the Diet closed its session on June 1, 1965. For what purpose did he need ¥4.4 million on the day the session came to an end? Is it to thank the opposition parties for their clandestine cooperation while in public his ruling party and its opponents battle it out in formal sessions and committee meetings? For whatever reason, these two events took place simultaneously in one day.

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Secretary General Tanaka Takes Out ¥1 Million and Nothing Happens: June 10, 1965 Tanaka, for some reason, withdraws ¥1 million and nothing happens in ten days either before or afterward. Tanaka is known for his ability to raise money and also for spreading what he gets not only to his followers but also to his opponents. He also knew that friendship does not grow overnight and it takes time to nurture. He may have been laying the groundwork for what he wanted to do in the future. He was known as a big spender, but not for foolishly wasting money and time.

Nakano Withdraws ¥7.2 Million and Extraordinary Session is Called: July 21–22, 1965 One day before the LDP calls for an extraordinary session for Japan–Korea issues, newly appointed LDP IPRC Chairman Shirh Nakano in the First Cabinet of Sath government goes to the bank to withdraw ¥7.2 Million on July 21, the largest sum so far in 1965 for one occasion. This was probably to urge reluctant opposition parties, particularly the JSP, to take part in the extraordinary session, which opened the next day to consider Japan–Korea Relations bills.

Nakano Takes Out ¥1 Million and Another ¥3 Million Before Setting the Date for J–K Session, September 14–21, 1965 The government on September 21 decides that the Japan–Korea Session would open on October 5 after the IPRC chairman dispenses ¥4 million, probably to opposition parties. The last ¥3 million on the day of announcement seems to have clinched the deal.29 Shirh Nakano already spent ¥7.2 million in July for probably the same cause, bringing the total to ¥11.2 million, just to set the date to open an extraordinary session. The Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu (1985, 40) reports on the same document and adds a few comments on the figures released.

Nakano Withdraws ¥5.3 Million as Japan–Korea Session is Called, October 4–5, 1965 One day before for the Japan–Korea Session is officially called; the LDP IPRC chairman shells out ¥5.3 million for his committee. The extraordinary session is called on October 5 as scheduled. This reminds the author of many Japanese who would bring a gift and say “Yoroshiku onegai itashimasu,” meaning


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“Please, I’m counting on your cooperation” before they start a meeting or project together.

Nakano Takes Out ¥4.5 Million on the Day HR Votes to Hold 70-Day Session, October 6, 1965 The day after the Diet is called, Nakano dispenses ¥4.5 million for his committee. The HR votes for holding a 70-day session—everyone is happy and ready to go to work. As an old Japanese saying goes, one cannot fight with an empty stomach. One must be fed before fighting begins.

Nakano Dispenses ¥2 Million as Prime Minister Speaks to Both Houses, October 13, 1965 The withdrawal of ¥2 million coincides with the day when Prime Minister Sath announces his cabinet’s basic positions in both Houses. It appears as if Prime Minister Eisaku Sath speaks officially to the Diet while his IPRC chairman informally feeds his opponents “milk.” The responses from his opponents on the floor are less acidic after they apparently had their milk of magnesia.

Nakano Dispenses ¥5.7 Million as Ad Hoc Committee on J–K Issues Makes Sudden Move, November 1, 1965 The day an Ad Hoc Committee on the Japan–Korea issue makes an emergency move to call on consultants for their views, Nakano representing the LDP in dealing with opposition parties took out the largest amount of money ever in one day, ¥5.7 million, for this one-day event. The LDP succeeds in its motion since it has a majority of votes. It calls for a good understanding of Japanese values to make sense of how the ruling party could spend so much money on its opposition to pass a bill when it has a majority.

Nakano Withdraws Twice as the HR Ad Hoc Committee Railroads the J–K Bill, November 5–6, 1965 Nakano takes out ¥3.6 million, probably thinking the amount was enough to soothe opposition parties for what the HR ad hoc committee was about to do. Perhaps it was so for the DSP, for it finally decided to support the Japan–Korea Treaty Bill (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 40) which it did not until November 5—possibly after receiving some of what Nakano dispensed that day. The next day, on November 6, Nakano takes out an additional ¥600,000. The HR ad hoc committee railroads the J–K bill against the JSP and opposition parties.

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HR Speaker Forces Vote on J–K Treaty Bill at 0:17 A.M., November 12, 1965, Nakano Takes Out ¥3 Million Three Days Later, November 12–15, 1965 On November 2, shortly after midnight, the HR, dominated by the LDP, successfully pushes for a vote on all J–K Treaty and other related bills. The Diet ceases to operate until November 15, the day Nakano and Tanaka shell out ¥3 million and ¥1.8 million respectively for their IPRC activities. After millions are spent here and there, pretty soon the Diet starts to move again. Soon it amounts to real money, even if it is just yen.

Secretary General, HR IPRC Chair and HC IPRC Chair Shell Out ¥10.5 Million for Passing J–K Bills, December 1, 1965 Secretary General Tanaka and HR IPRC Chairman Nakano each take out ¥3 million and HC IPRC Chairman Shunji Shiomi withdraws the largest amount of cash or ¥4.5 million on December 1. The day coincides with the day the LDP forces HR HMC to schedule the opening of the HC plenary session, against the will of the opposition parties. The HC ad hoc committee on J–K affairs dominated by the LDP pushes the J–K related bills out of committee for the HC’s consideration. The J–K related bills pass the HC session with the support of the LDP and DSP on December 1, 1985 (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 41). The JSP accuses the LDP of the “tyranny of majority” following passage. The Diet came to a halt after the passage of the bills on December 1.

HR Speaker and Vice Speaker Resign,Tanaka Takes Out ¥30 Million Twice in Two Days, December 19–21, 1965 Informal discussions between the LDP and the JSP behind closed doors broke the deadlock in the Diet and resulted in the resignation of HR speaker Naka Funada and Vice Speaker Tadashi Tanaka on December 19, 1965 (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 41). The LDP secretary general, commonly considered second only to the prime minister, takes out an unprecedented ¥30 million, the day after the resignation of the officials on December 20. On the next day he takes out ¥33 million. The normal Diet Session is called on December 20. Is the last ¥33 million the final payment to opposition parties by the ruling party to open the normal session as scheduled every year in December? If it was not, then, for what reason could he have withdrawn such a large sum of money? This is one of the bases from which Yano questioned Sath. Yano (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 32) reportedly asked: “Toward the end of December in 1965, Kakuei Tanaka, then party secretary general, withdrew cash twice that totaled ¥63 million. He did this right after the deal was made


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between the LDP and JSP to approve the passage of the J–K bills and to normalize Diet operations.”

Supplementary Budget and Special Fiscal Handling Bills Pass the HR, Nakano Pays, December 27–28, 1965 Hirose reports that the LDP and JSP came to an understanding during a closed session on December 27 and Nakano paid out the last payment of the year to opposition parties on December 28 (Hirose 1989, 50). Then, two pending money bills passed the HR successively on December 28 as the year came to an end.

Japan–Korea Issues of 1965 and IPRC Politics: Inferences This has been a rather lengthy description of events largely centering on Japan–Korea relations in 1965. What strikes anyone is a sudden rise in the amount of funds dispensed toward the end of 1965 to open the regular Diet session as scheduled. Almost two-thirds of IPRC expense for the year is used by Secretary General Tanaka, who is known for his generosity in bringing the Diet back to a normal state of affairs after the turbulent year of haggling between the ruling party and its opposition parties away from the public (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 41). There must have been very intense negotiations between the ruling LDP IPRC committee and its counterparts in its opposition parties in cooperation with top leaders in the respective ruling and opposition camps. The outcome was that the ruling party paid an unprecedented amount of funds to opposition parties in return for the resumption of normal Diet operations. Was it just coincidence that these two types of events, that is, the withdrawals from the IPRC account and subsequent Diet actions, took place so close to each other? Mai’nichi Shimbun reporters provide us with an answer (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 42). They report that at least one member of the Diet, Yoshikata Ash, a former SDP HR member, admitted the movement of money from the LDP to opposition parties: “In fact, money moved.”

He revealed further as follows (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 42): When I became a member of the HMC, I received ¥500,000. I returned the money, saying I had no reasons to receive it. However, soon after that, as I was about to go abroad for a trip, I received ¥500,000, which I accepted . . . The LDP came on strong in the Diet Session dominated by Japan-Korean relations issues. The reason for the move was that the SDP did not make itself clear on its position until the very end.

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The reason for the SDP’s indecisiveness was a split within the party over the Korea issue. The main faction consisting of Suehiro Nishio and others was for the Japan–Korea Treaty, but its anti-main current faction placed the unification of the two Koreas as its highest priority, declining to go along with the LDP proposal, which called for normalization of diplomatic relations with South Korea. If parliamentary democracy works the way it does in the West as described by most authors in English and some authors in Japanese, then why should the HR speaker have to resign for presiding a house where the majority passes bills? Furthermore, the ruling party’s No. 2 man is forced to hand out huge sums of cash to its opposition parties. Why should he do it when the law is with his party to pass any bill it so decides because of its numerical superiority? After all, that is what a U.S.-style liberal democracy is all about. The majority in the Japanese Diet seldom makes decisions alone, and if it occurs at all without implicit approval from the rest of its members, minorities accuse the majority of the “tyranny of the majority.” Most decisions are indeed made by consensus, away from the public, while a majority officially makes all decisions. While in general, money moves as an event takes places in the Diet, how closely associated are the transfers vis-à-vis the event? I constructed table 4.3 to examine this relationship. A glance at the table is sufficient to allow us to make several inferences. First, there is a close degree of association between the withdrawal of funds by the LDP chief secretary or its IPRC committee chair and what the Diet committee or the Diet as a whole does. Whenever there is a conflict between the ruling party and its opposition parties, large sums of money get withdrawn from the LDP bank account. Second, the more controversial the issue, the more the LDP needs to spend. Third, I left out several items on the last fourth column blank when I could not find any specific events for which money was spent. I was unable to find out anything more than the fact the money was taken out by Tanaka on June 10. Of 20 events from February to December 1965 listed in the table, 15 events and money moved within three days of each other, or 75 percent of the time. One-third of the time, or 6 out of 20 times, the exchange of money and events took place within 24 hours! Only once out of 20 times in 1965 did the LDP, in this case, Tanaka, give out money for a reason we could not directly relate to an event. One cannot blame Junya Yano for raising questions. An irony is that he, too, succumbed to the cultural necessity of IPRC politics and became an ardent player over time. Such is the nature or logic of Japanese politics.

Kuno’s HR HMC Chairman Era, 1968–1969 Kuno reveals what happened to him during his HMC chairman days. He was also active in LDP IPRC politics then. He does not attribute what happened


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Table 4.3 IPRC Expenditure and Events by Duration Day

Date

¥ in 1,000/ name

Events in Diet

1 1 1

4/2 6/1 10/6

2,400/Miki 440/Miki 4,500/Nakano

HC LDP railroads comprehensive retail market bill (4/2). Normal session closes (6/1) HR votes duration of session to be 70 days (10/6), but remains idle until the opening ceremony on 10/11

1 1

10/13 11/1


Prime Minister Sata makes opening remarks 10/13 HR ad hoc com. on J–K votes to invite expert opinions to hear their views, 11/1

1 2

12/1 4/16

3,000/Tanaka 1,250/Miki

HR HMC railroads bill to open Diet session 12/1 LDP railroads ILO bill in HR ILO ad hoc com. 4/15 and Diet deliberation ceases, 4/16

2 2 2 2

5/29 7/21 10/4 12/28

1,500/Miki 7,200/Nakano 5,300/Nakano 7,400/Nakano 600/Nakano

HC passes Farm Land Remuneration Bill, 5/28 Extraordinary session is called, 7/22 Japan–Korea Diet session is called, 10/5 Supplementary budget passes, 12/27. LDP and JSP come to behind-the-scenes agreement to pass bill, 12/27. Ad hoc Fiscal Management bill passes, 12/28

3 3

2/3 2/17

500/Sasaki 500/Miki

HR budget com begins question and answer session JSP proposes nonconfidence vote for Foreign Minister Shi’ina JSP refuses to take part in Budget Com while nonconfidence vote is considered. JSP begins to soften its stand on (2/17) and Com deliberation resumes (2/18). LDP and JSP agree on the composition of the ILO ad hoc com (2/19)

3

5/11 5/12

1,000/Miki 4,600/Miki

HR Cabinet Com railroads LDP Farm Land Remuneration Bill (5/13)

3

12/20 12/21

30,000/Tanaka 33,000/Tanaka

LDP–JSP agree to resume deliberations after HR speaker Funada and vice speaker Tanaka resign (12/19)

4

11/15 11/15

3,000/Nakano 1,800/Tanaka

HR President calls for question to pass J–K Bill (11/12), Diet ceases to operate until (11/15)

8

5/21 5/22

2,500/Miki 100/Sasaki

LDP alone decides to extend Diet session (5/19) Diet ceases to operate (5/20–24) HC President calls to order and starts session (5/26)

8

9/14 9/21


Gov’t decides on (9/21) to open Japan–Korea Diet session (10/5)

9

3/10 3/18

5,100/Sasaki 500/Miki

LDP and JSP agree on the ILO ad hoc com composition (3/19)

?

6/10

1,000/Tanaka

?

to him to IPRC politics, though it is safe to assume that it had a hand in the events as they unfolded.30 Kuno said he used majority rule to solve a number of problem bills. Opposition party members retaliated by literally stripping him many times.

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They would rip off his jacket first, and then his shirt, slacks and everything else except his boxer shorts. He had to prepare about seven copies of the same memo pad with the agenda printed on them to end up with at least one. This was because opposition party members would tear up his memo pads to prevent him from continuing with committee proceedings. Tsunehiko Antaku was head director of the JSP IPRC committee while Kuno was HR HMC chairman. Kuno reports how Antaku used to pass on information to him regarding an upcoming melee: Antaku would try to pull Kuno to his direction by grabbing Kuno’s belt from behind. The LDP members would try to pull Kuno back, away from Antaku and other JSP members. Kuno could have gotten choked. Antaku did not want him to get choked. Antaku promised to warn Kuno the day before to have Kuno come to work with his belt and necktie loose. Antaku used to warn of the impending use of violence against HR HMC Chairman Kuno. When you [Mr. Kuno] announce that you are ready to get the meeting of the HR HMC started, even though there are differences of opinions between the ruling party and its opposition parties, I [Antaku] will grab the table and tip it over. I want you to pull back as soon as you say you are going to start the meeting; otherwise I might break your legs.

Kuno writes how nice it was to have a friend like Antaku (Kuno 1988, 194). Apparently, this is a routine scenario scripted by the IPRC. Kuno writes that he forgot to loosen his necktie once and almost choked himself to death. He shouted that Antaku was going to kill him. Antaku let go immediately. At that precise moment, the LDP members grabbed him to safety. On that occasion, he tells the reader that he was stripped of everything except his briefs (Kuno 1988, 194). Although Kuno has had ghastly and bloody experiences, including the 1960 Anpo crisis when police entered the Diet building, he reports no bad feelings toward his colleagues and friends in opposition parties. A few days following the melees, we would pat each other’s backs and say to each other: “You fought well. You did a good job.” Kuno concludes by saying that he has observed the principle of democracy by respecting minorities while preserving majority rule, even if there were conflicts between the ruling party and its opposition parties (1988, 195). “Even if they exceeded their limits and used violence at times, we tried to remain humble and tried harder the next time to settle the matter peacefully.” He laments IPRC politics of recent times as being too materialistic and rational. Kuno claims to have used no more than peanuts diplomacy to negotiate with opposition parties. Human relations are neglected. Today, he says in the late 1980s, so much money is spent on drinks and meals in restaurants and karaoke bars and “fund-raising” in golf courses.


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University Emergency Management Bill, July–August 1969 Kuno cleverly reports his activities on the University issue (Kuno 1988, 191–195) by mentioning what he had to do as HR HMC chairman, not as LDP IPRC vice chairman. Kakuei Tanaka was secretary general and the IPRC chairman was Sunao Sonoda. Sonoda tells Kuno that opposition members would not come along. Sonoda asks him and the HR HMC to solve the problems with opposition parties. If he does not do anything, the responsibility would go to “Kaku-san” Secretary General Tanaka, who would have to resign from his post. He calls on “Kaku-san” and Susumu Nikaidh to meet with him. The three met and came to a conclusion that Kuno would take the rap. As described above, there have been more than a dozen cases where key bills were railroaded by the ruling LDP in the recent past.31 He knew what he had to do—resign from chairmanship. The passage of the university bill was made very difficult, resulting in the resignation of the speaker and vice speaker of the HR to calm down opposition parties. A few Diet aides were hurt in the scuffling that ensued (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 120), though no Diet members were hurt. Kuno kept a letter of resignation in his pocket at all times. After the passage of the University bill at the end of July and just before a resolution to oust his chairmanship was introduced, he presented his letter of resignation to the Speaker. By then, his letter of resignation was thoroughly wrinkled. To the Speaker’s inquiry of why it was so wrinkled, he told the truth, that he had it all along from the day he assumed his chairmanship. The Speaker thanked him for his decisiveness and hard work to get the bill passed.32 In this instance he became the price the ruling party had to pay to satisfy opposition parties. They in turn were in need of demonstrating to their constituents that they did their best to stop the ruling party from doing what it was entitled to do. The ruling party should not have to pay anyone to do what it does, especially since it has the majority in the Diet. Had the Western concept of majoritarian democracy been practiced in the full sense of the word, the ruling party would have no need to spend millions of yen to pass bills. The Mai’nichi political reporters in their book on power and money report two cases of IPRC politics (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1986) in 1970 and 1971.

Japan–Korea Relations, 1970 The Mai’nichi reporters wrote that in 1970 when Japan–Korea relations dominated the Diet, a large sum of money exchanged hands. A total of ¥223 million was spent by the IPRC committee, as reported by the LDP to the Ministry of Autonomy that year (1986, 284). The figure represents a jump of five or six times of its budget in previous years. When details of the sum are examined, they found that the withdrawal of a large sum of money

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from the LDP accounting department coincided with the slowing down of Diet proceedings by the opposition parties. They then sought an answer to this coincidence to finally find that some Diet members admitted that some members of the opposition parties received a large sum of money to allow Diet deliberations to continue, which meant that the LDP would get what it wanted.

The Okinawa Reversion Bill, November 17, 1971 The Mai’nichi reporters provide us with an event they observed that symbolizes the existence of IPRC politics.33 It took place on November 17, 1971 when LDP members of an ad hoc committee in the HR railroaded the Okinawan Reversion Agreement. Members of opposition parties jumped upon the table at which the committee chairman was sitting and literally pushed and shoved ruling party members over the issue. However, they report that the scuffling lasted as long as TV camera crewmembers were filming the meeting. The committee adjourned itself as soon as the cameras were removed. The reporters write that members of the ruling party and its opposition parties left the meeting chatting with one another as though nothing had happened. They reported that this scuffling was probably an act after differences were settled in secret (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1986, 283).

Fiscal Report of Political Organizations, 1981 to Home Ministry The Mai’nichi reporters cite (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 81) figures from the report found in the Home Ministry Report. Sanrei-kai or Sanrei association headed by Hajime Tamura of Tanaka faction was the man behind the LDP IPRC chairman. The association gave ¥100,000 at Susumu Kobayashi’s fundraising party held on February 19, 1981 at Hotel New Htani in Tokyo. This is significant because Kobayashi is a member of the JSP, Tamura’s archrival opposition party in the Diet. Another organization headed by Shin Kanemaru of the LDP, the dean of IPRC politics, gave another ¥100,000 on the behalf of the party. Approximately 16,000 people attended the fund-raiser. The list included Kakuei Tanaka, who was then indicted for the Lockheed scandal, the then prime minister (LDP) Zenkh Suzuki and many LDP leaders along with the JSP leaders. Tanaka even spoke at the fund-raiser. It would be difficult to imagine a similar scenario in the United States. Imagine President Bush making a large financial contribution and then attending a fund-raiser dinner for a Democratic member of the Congress. But this happens in Japan, where democracy operates differently than it does in the United States.


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The Mai’nichi continues to reveal how the LDP goes out of its way to help Socialists (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 81–82). Kanemaru’s organization gave ¥50,000 to Hyhsuke Niwa, a fellow Liberal Democrat of the party’s Khmoto faction, to celebrate the publication of his book on May 29, 1981. But on November 27, 1981 Kanemaru’s organization gave ¥200,000 at a party to celebrate SDP leader Ikkh Kasuga’s receipt of an honorary degree. Kanemaru gave his political opponents four times more than he did for his own party members. The reporters tell us how important the opposition party members are to IPRC leaders. Members of the JSP and other opposition parties routinely ask LDP if they know members, for a mailing list, for soliciting funds.

LDP IPRC Chair (1982) Admits He Gave Money to Opposition Parties on TV Hamada (1993, 184) reports that on March 13, 1991 TV Asahi had an evening program entitled “The Scoop” that addressed on the topic of IPRC politics. It was probably the first television station to do so. Hajime Tamura, who served as LDP IPRC chairman in 1982 during the Zenkh Suzuki Cabinet era, stated: I gave [money] to individual members of opposition parties. Some even press me to donate. I sometimes do so while passing them on the Diet floor. If and when a committee chairman’s office is open, I hand over cash in offices. During my term, the amount of money involved was in the area of ¥1 million.

Hamada comments that, what Hajime Tamura said is something every politician knows, but it took courage for him to say that in front of TV cameras. Katsumoto Kawamura, who was vice chairman of the DSP IPRC committee, admitted receiving a thick envelope when there was a bill for reforming the JNR. But the DSP IPRC chairman returned it through a secretary. Hamada (1993, 185) says that he does not know whether the DSP actually returned the money. What is certain, he says, is that money was transferred from the ruling to opposition parties. When opposition party members went abroad, it was customary to give them a going-away present in the amount of ¥1 or 2 million. When issues involved were particularly important, ¥100 million or more of money changed hands.

Critical Remarks on IPRC Politics by Veteran Member of the LDP IPRC Members, 1983 Kuno, who served as both HR HMC chairman and IPRC chairman, ends his article by criticizing the nature of IPRC politics. His comments are significant

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as he was involved in IPRC politics for so many years. His criticism focused on the refusal of opposition parties to take part in Diet proceedings, such as committee meetings, when they do not like what is happening. They desired either concession on a bill under discussion and/or money. They usually refuse to return until they get something through IPRC politics. Kuno suggests that the ruling LDP should also come up with some tactics to combat its opposition’s refusal to take part in Diet deliberations without giving into their demands. Although he does not say so directly, I infer from his words that he is against the use of money (“bottle of milk”) to “wake up” opposition parties, in the parlance of the Diet. He used the tactic of continuing the budget committee meeting when he was the chairman, even if members of his opposition parties left the meeting, and refused help from IPRC committees to make the JSP and other parties return to the meeting. The opposition parties came to beg him not to railroad the budget bill. He refused and proceeded in passing the budget bill on April 4, 1984 (Kuno 1988, 199–200). This, if true, suggests that he is forced into playing a role he personally rejects.

Millions of Dollars Flow, 1983 A member of the HC and former editor of the Red Flag Ueda (1995, 132) reports from a roundtable discussion appearing in the Mai’nich Shimbun on September 20, 1983 that “I feel it is true that millions of dollars flow to opposition parties on key occasions as a way to manage them by the ruling party.”

The Case of the Revised 1984 Health Insurance Bill A former HC member for 24 years, Khichirh Ueda says that the equivalent of millions of dollars (¥100,000,000 and more) quietly changed hands in dangh dealings on the 1984 health insurance bill (Ueda 1999, 78–80).34 Perhaps JCP is the least influenced by the way Japanese carry on politics, which insists on sticking to rules and open politics. Its members, too, are forced to go along with the traditional Japanese way if they want to get anything done in the Diet. The party has its own IPRC committee, like every other party, and does its best to be a part of the decision-making body through IPRC politics, even if its members are not always welcomed by the ruling LDP.35 Khichirh Ueda, a JCP member who served as an editor for its popular party paper Akahata and as a member of the HC from 1974 to 1998, wrote a book entitled A Diet Member. In it he says the JSP, the largest opposition party against the ruling LDP, and others tended to become part of the LDP money politics. “That is what is known as IPRC politics” (Ueda 1999, 78). He then cites a book that was withdrawn and collected by the LDP after publication because it contained a detailed description of IPRC politics, on the railroading of the revised health insurance bill of 1984. The book was entitled “Heath Insurance Diet Session Meets Rough Ocean Waves” in 1986.


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Ueda describes what the book says, which I consider significant since it implies that the JSP, which distanced itself from the LDP more than any other party, with the exception of the JCP, has very close informal contacts with the LDP: It is reported that Tatsuo Ozawa, who is the top director of the LDP IPRC committee and Tomichi Murayama, Socialist director of the IPRC committee, jointly drafted a scenario of the passage of the revised Health Insurance bill specifying who would propose to cut off a debate, who would object to it by running to the podium and other actions in detail. The author reports to have seen a dangh note specifying which bill would pass, fail to pass or to be continued marked O, X and e respectively. (Ueda 1999, 79)

Okonogi’s Revelation of IPRC Politics in April 1989 Hirose (1989, 43–54) says you cannot discuss money politics without mentioning the LDP IPRC committee expenses (Hirose 1989, 47). Hikosaburh Okonogi, who belonged to the Nakasone faction and served as Minister of Construction, happened to talk about IPRC politics to reporters at a time when Socialists were critically questioning the LDP government for its leader’s involvement in the Recruit Scandal that brought down the Takeshita regime. He knew IPRC politics talk was taboo, but probably decided to talk about it, because the fact is the Socialists have been accepting LDP bribe money for many years. He perhaps wanted the public to know the Socialists, too, were guilty of accepting bribes from the ruling party. Okonogi knew what had been taking place behind closed doors in IPRC politics since he had served as the LDP IPRC committee chairman during the first Nakasone Cabinet era. Hirose summarizes what Okononogi told reporters as follows (1989, 47–48): There are people who place invitations to fundraisers in Diet mailboxes. Some invitations come from opposition parties. Actually, such Socialist leaders as Mr. Yamaharu Muth, Hideyoshi Hirose and others come visit us with invitations to support their fundraisers. When I was IPRC chairman, a right-wing Socialist group asked me to buy tickets. I gave them ¥2,000,000 but received no tickets.

Okonogi was referring to a fund-raiser held by the Seikenkhshkenkyikai in March of 1983. LDP IPRC members informed Hirose that the real figure involved was probably one digit higher, which comes to 20 million yen or close to $200,000. The receiving end of the money refused to comment on this question (Hirose 1989, 48).

Former JSP Workers on IPRC Politics during the 1955 System Era It is not impossible to infer the nature and extent of IPRC politics from the following statement made by a former employee of the JSP who worked

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in IPRC politics during the 1955 system era (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 37): I know who in the JSP meet with whom in the LDP at which restaurant to decide when the LDP would introduce this and that bill, to which bill the JSP would refuse to take part in the deliberation for how many days to delay its passage. This is all done backstage. I know all about IPRC politics, but these stories I will take to my grave.

Another JSP worker tells reporters of incidents where he and his coworkers were mobilized to form a picket line to prevent either the formal Diet Session from opening or a standing committee meeting. On one of these occasions, JSP IPRC Committee Chairman Khichi Yamamoto came to inform them to dismiss by saying, “We settled the matter” (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 38). He speculated that there must have been some work done behind closed doors.

Consumption Tax and PKO Bills, 1989–1991 Ueda (1995, 132–133) says there are rumors of large sums of money of about ¥100 million changing hands on each national sales tax and PKO bill that passed the Diet.

Hamada at the Budget Committee Meeting on February 4, 1991 Khichi Hamada (1993, 35) writes that he responded to jeers from Socialists while he was questioning Japan’s aid to the Gulf War at the House budget committee meeting on February 4, 1991 by shouting back the following: “What in hell are you talking about when you are receiving ¥500,000 20 times a year?” They then asked him to provide them with evidence and refused to take part in the committee meeting. He confesses in his book that nobody asks for receipts when the LDP IPRC committee gives cash in envelopes to opposition parties. Money is given sometimes at mahjong games or golf, where members of opposition parties always win. There are cases when money changes hands in Diet hallways when IPRC committee members pass each other. He concludes, saying: “This is the reason why we really cannot show what we do in the Diet to outsiders” (Hamada 1993, 35, 185). Shun Hide JSP IPRC chairman denied Hamada’s claims outright. Hamada says that he heard of this practice of giving money from the late Hikosaburh Okonogi (Hamada 1993, 186). He also confesses that he himself has given out money in the past. The difference is that when he did the giving, the amount always far exceeded ¥500,000.


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The LDP IPRC committee’s strength grew between the Sath and Tanaka administrations. The strength of the LDP IPRC chair in some ways surpassed the three highest party positions.36 The LDP IPRC chair is empowered to do all negotiations with opposition parties privately by getting necessary funds from the chief secretary. The LDP IPRC committee gave money to Socialists and other opposition parties, except for the JCP.37 Hamada reports that, part of the IPRC committee’s funding came from the prime minister’s Office of Research. All major political figures in the opposition parties during the 1955 era have been recipients of wedding presents, get-well presents while in the hospital, and other forms of presents (money) in an envelope. Card games, golf tournaments, and other games are often used for the purpose of giving money to opposition party members. Hamada says that a notable exception may be Takako Doi (Hamada 1993, 182).38

PKO Bill:The Limit of the IPRC Politics, 1992 The limit of IPRC politics or the JSP’s ability to extract concessions from the ruling LDP was clearly demonstrated in the PKO issue in 1992 in the aftermath of the Gulf War. IPRC political veteran Makoto Tanabe, who heads the JSP IPRC committee, revealed in public for the first time in a labor union reception (Tomimori 1993, 146):39 Even if I were raising my right fist against the ruling party, I would be shaking my left hand with the ruling LDP. That has been my style of politics. However, I have not been able to shake hands well, since my left hand has been numb lately.

What made his left hand numb was the cooperation of the LDP, the KP, and the DSP in the HMC to railroad a revised PKO bill so that it could pass on to a standing committee rather than going through the customary channel of the IPRC committees. They all knew that the JSP would be opposed to send the Japan SDF abroad. He also lost his close contact with Shin Kanemaru of the LDP. Kanemaru was long known for his role in IPRC politics. Kanemaru was then in hot water with his money scandal then. Ichirh Ozawa and Seiroku Kajiyama, who then controlled the LDP IPRC, figured that they could get by without negotiating with the JSP.

Hamada says Kanemaru gave ¥50,000,000 to Socialist IPRC Committee Chair, 1993 On January 28, 1993 at the House budget committee meeting, Hirotaka Akamatsu, JSP secretary general, stated that it was the responsibility of the prosecutors to find out how Shin Kanemaru disposed of ¥500,000,000.

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Hamada could not control himself during a televised proceeding and blurted out the following in the hope that he would be punished by the budget committee (Hamada 1993, 183): Don’t talk as if you are clean. Your [IPRC] chair, too, received ¥50,000,000!

When Hamada was serving as vice secretary general of the LDP to Secretary General Kanemaru, Hamada heard Kanemaru talking about delivering 50 million yen to Makoto Tanabe, who then headed the JSP IPRC committee. Hamada received no response from anyone.

The IPRC Scenario Played Out, 1994 Ueda (1999, 191) cites another case of the existence of IPRC politics regarding the failure of passing the Small District Electoral System bill on January 21, 1994 when the LDP was an opposition party along with the JCP: The JSP was a part of the ruling coalition government then, even though there was strong opposition to the bill among HC members of the JSP. There were information exchanges indicating a possibility of defeating the bill. Efforts were made to count the number of votes. I have been told that Shhichi Ichikawa, the JCP IPRC committee chairman and LDP counterpart Tomio Yamamoto spoke with each other every morning. Although the papers said that more Socialists voted against the bill than expected, JCP IPRC Committee Chairman Ichikawa predicted the exact number of votes against the bill. After the bill was defeated, Yamamoto came to shake hands with Ichikawa. The world has changed indeed.

So ends Ueda’s comments.

IPRC Money Drying up, 1994 Nihonkeizai Shimbun, the equivalent of the Wall Street Journal in Japan, reports in its September 8, 1995 issue that the LDP lost much of its budget for IPRC expenses from its heydays before 1993. It reports that the 1994 IPRC expenditure was only ¥1,412,000,000 or roughly $14 million. The figure is less than 20 percent of what it was in 1993, implying that it used to be close to $70 million per annum in 1993. The paper reports that Yoshirh Mori, the then LDP secretary general, withdrew over $4 million, or almost one-third of the total sum from the LDP organizational activities account or the IPRC account in 1994. The largest sum withdrawn was about $500,000 on December 15, 1994 while the rest was under $300,000 per withdrawal. He withdrew ¥139,000,000 or one-third of the 1994 expenditure in a couple of months between April 28 and June 22, when the LDP regained its ruling party position with the JSP. On the day the Hata cabinet was formed on April 28;


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Mori took out ¥20,000,000 from the IPRC account. A few days prior to that, the JSP left the coalition government. Mori took out another ¥20,000,000 on the day Tomi’ichi Murayama, who then was the JSP secretary general, met with Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata to tell him that the JSP would not join the coalition government unless Hata resigns from his prime minister position. The paper concludes by saying that IPRC money was dwindling fast.

Party Leadership Council [Kakuhakanjikai], August 13, 1993 A coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa was formed, following the demise of the 1955 system, in the summer of 1993.40 Subsequently, each of the five parties—Japan New Party, New Party, the KP, the JSP, and New Party Sakigake—sent two representatives to the Party Leadership Council. Two committees within the Council were called “Political Affairs Leadership Council” and “Policy Leadership Council.” They are the equivalent of the LDP IPRC committee and “Policy Affairs Research (Deliberation) Council.” They decided to meet twice a week at 11 A.M. on Tuesdays and Thursdays during the session. The JSP, being the largest among the ruling coalition parties, selected the JSP IPRC committee chairman as the presiding officer of this new council. Hatoyama, the vice cabinet secretary, was invited to meetings to represent the Hosokawa cabinet.

The Ruling Coalition Leadership Council, Murayama Cabinet, 1994 Onward In addition to traditional IPRC politics, there arose a council of ruling coalition parties to iron out differences consisting of the Socialists, the Liberal Democrats, and a small number of the New Sakigake party members. Similarly, Hashimoto and his successors followed Murayama’s suit with minor variations. After all, coalition partners other than the LDP are former opposition parties with different political preferences and orientations.

IPRC Politics in Historical Perspective We have learned that IPRC politics in its nascent form in all likelihood played a part even prior to the opening of the First Imperial Diet in 1890 in order to reach a consensus on the operating rules of the Diet. Furthermore, we know the origin of something closely resembling IPRC politics that may have existed from the prehistoric times of myths and legends. Since then, we have observed various forms of a dualistic power structure with the emperor as de jure head of state and the Shogunate as de facto ruler. After several decades of Tokugawa Shogunate rule, sobayhnin advisors and other senior

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advisors seem to have taken on the actual governing power with the Tokugawa Shogunate as the secondary de jure power holder.41 Kaneko (1999) traces the history of IPRC politics back to 1891, when several men negotiated with parties to pass the First Budget bill. Officially, the Meiji government did not recognize the existence of parties until 1898. Then, on February 27, 1905 an interparty organization came into existence, the association for consultation among parties. This, I believe, is the first institutionalized means through which parties negotiated behind closed doors to settle differences prior to the formal Diet session. World War II interrupted the development of political parties because the national war effort overrode partisan differences. After the confusion following the end of the war settled in 1949, the Democratic Party appointed the first IPRC committee chairman. It was to be followed by the Liberal Party. It, too, established the first IPRC in July 1950. As the 1955 system evolved, the LDP and the JSP officially known as archrival parties developed well-paved underground paths to maximize Japan’s national interests during the Cold War years. The heyday of IPRC politics came to an end with the fall of the LDP as the ruling power in 1993. However reduced in influence and resources, it continues to thrive in twentyfirst-century Japan and is likely to continue in various forms, for generations to come. In describing the historical development of IPRC politics, I have attempted to show how money and concessions to opposition parties are used to manage conflict in a bilayer power structure. In doing so, each party maximized its objectives while the nation as a whole maximized its interest by making use of the international environment that made the 1955 system possible. In citing actual instances of IPRC politics, I have shown how closely the withdrawal of funds is related to the time of passing controversial bills. Though admitting that I do not have a full picture of what took place behind closed doors because of the opaque nature of the IPRC politics, I have presented sufficient data, including testimony from top Diet leaders such as Kh’ichi Kath, to prove the ubiquitous existence of IPRC politics in Japanese parliament.42 It is reasonable to expect that IPRC politics did not suddenly appear in 1890 but must have existed prior to 1890 in some way. I reviewed the history of Japan to see whether a bilayer or multiplayer structure of power existed in Japan before the Meiji Restoration in 1868. A brief review of the history of Japanese politics by using the bilayer theory revealed that its origin goes back to kojiki or the Chronicle of Ancient Matters. How, then, does one go about obtaining legitimacy for a new informal institution that performs functions designed for its formal counterpart? Historically speaking, the ultimate source of legitimacy has been in the hands of the emperor. Observe how the Tokugawa shogunate issued a decree to


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govern the conduct of the emperor in 1615, after Iyeyasu Tokugawa succeeded in controlling the entire country, while at the same time the Tokugawa’s own position remained to be appointed by the emperor every time a new shogunate was to be inaugurated. According to Mitsusada Inoue (1976, 36), we may attribute the beginning of this method of power acquisition to the Katsuragi family during the fifth century (413–478), who through the marriage of a daughter to the emperor (gaiseki kankei)43 legitimized its family influence in ruling the country. Officially, it was the emperor who governed the country, but in reality it was a group of his or her relatives who influenced the ruling process. It is interesting to note that filial piety was used to reinforce the power of the parents of a daughter who marries an emperor. Confucianism may have played a part in legitimizing the relationship. The tradition continues to this date, as the nation’s new prime minister is formally appointed by the emperor, even when the Diet members elect the prime minister. When did this tradition begin? Our hypothesis is that the beginning of the bilayer structure goes back to the days of pre-recorded history or myth. Wakamori (1973, 50–52) reports the myth of Izumo giving the power to reign (shirasu) to emperor while maintaining actual power over Izumo, the power of ushihaku or de facto power over a territory. The Yamato government was run by an emperor (Wakamori 1972, 28–32), as found in Kojiki [Record of Ancient Matters] compiled in 712. The imperial family wanted the power to recognize and legitimize the Izumo’s ruling family’s right to govern its territory, as it had in the past. Here we see the separation of power clearly drawn between the right to recognize (shirasu in Kojiki) someone’s legitimacy to rule a territory, and the actual power to govern (ushihaku in Kojiki)—a bilayer system for the first time in Japan. Our hypothesis is that Izumo, whose ruler resisted the expanding Yamato government (Yayoi and others) to place all of Japan under its reign, was Jhmon. This arrangement between the early inhabitants (Jhmon) and newcomers from the Asian continent (Yayoi) represents what Hanihara (1994) calls a bilayer theory. Harmony (wa) between the two groups was achieved through the sharing of power rather than conquest as such. Chapter 5 represents an attempt to apply the bilayer theory to premodern Japanese history. In this chapter, we learned that the latent power structure outlined in the bilayer theory at least in some form may be as old as Japanese history, or from the dawn of Japan as a nation. Attempts to do without it causes government breakdown and efforts to abolish IPRC politics as late as in 1993 have failed miserably, to the reformers’ dismay and chagrin. We may be justified in dividing the history of bilayer structure on the basis of our presentation thus far as follows: (1) National and Local Power Period: Conflict between newcomers and indigenous residents of Japanese archipelago and rivalries among powerful

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families and tribes in prehistoric times may have resulted at times in war as well as the making of arrangements such as what Wakamori suggests from his reading of the Record of Ancient Matters. It is an arrangement whereby the power to rule is divided between rulers in a manner that avoids serious armed conflict. While such an arrangement departs from the bilayer model I proposed, it is a very similar model of conflict avoidance or “harmony” among competing powers through some form of power sharing among parties involved in making decisions. The division was not between the manifest and latent power structure, but between competing powers in different realms. An underlining assumption in the structure was that the supreme need for conflict avoidance and that power should be shared in some form where no one has all the power. This brings—Wa or peace. (2) Emperor and Shogunate Period: As the imperial family continued to expand its power over the archipelagos, a clear form of national power structure emerged. The origin of Shogun dates back to around 720 or even earlier.44 It means “general” in contemporary Japanese, but it originally meant the commander of an army that subjugated resisting indigenous or barbarian forces consisting mostly of probably Jhmon people such as Ainu. Traditionally, it was the emperor who had the right to appoint a person to Shogun. By the twelfth century, the Minamoto family clearly surpassed his role of general and established sufficient power to govern the nation. As you will see in chapter 5, various forms of bilayer and multilayer power arrangements appeared during this period. The last Shogunate family of Tokugawa collapsed and opened the way for modern Japan to emerge in 1867. The first parliament in Asia made its appearance in 1890, following the first general election in July 1890. It was shortly after July that the nascent form of bilayer structure started to function even before the First Imperial Session opened on November 25, 1890. (3) The Manifest HMC and Latent IPRC Period: We found this nascent IPRC in 1890 was not institutionalized, which made it possible to function continuously as evidenced in the dissolution of the Diet on Christmas Day in 1891, only a year after it opened. Matters had to wait until 1905, when the Diet members gained the freedom to form political parties. Political parties had been banned since the days of the Tokugawa period. The IPRC was formed as soon as political parties were allowed to be formed in 1905, and continued to function one way or another through the 1940s. As the 1955 system was formed, the IPRC became more active and powerful, reaching its peak during the 1955 system until 1993 or the fall of the LDP as the ruling party.

I have shown in this chapter how IPRC politics reached preeminence during the 1955 system era and the Cold War period characterized by the bipolar world political power structure. What has been taking place since the 1993 power shift suggests the powerful staying power of IPRC politics


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despite the first ruling coalition government’s move to abolish it. It did not just survive; it continues to thrive, only in different forms and probably with smaller budgets, making legislative politics possible without much violence and disruption. I found people who refuse to talk about it and deny its involvement in the 1960 Anpo crisis, but no one has yet to deny its existence. I found it impossible to find any evidence to deny the existence of IPRC politics in some form since the dawn of Japanese history in fact. What then was left for me to do was to throw as much light as possible on the hitherto latent dimensions of Japanese legislative process at its highest level. The next chapter briefly reviews the history of Japanese government in terms of the bilayer theory to show to what extent the bilayer model may apply to Japanese political history.


5 The Origin and Nature of the Bilayer Structure

We have learned that IPRC politics in its nascent form in all likelihood played a part even prior to the opening of the First Imperial Diet in 1890 in forming consensus on the operating rules of the Diet. Furthermore, I found evidence that suggests the origin of something closely resembling IPRC politics that might have existed from the prehistoric era of myths and legends. Myths separate the power to reign or shirasu from power to govern or ushihaku, generating a bilayer governing process. Since then, we have observed various forms of dualistic or multilayer power structures with the emperor as de jure head of state and the Shognate as de facto ruler. After several decades of Tokugawa Shognate rule, sobayhnin advisors and other senior advisors seem to have taken on actual governing power with the Tokugawa Shognate as the secondary de jure power holder.1 It is reasonable to expect that the bilayer nature of Japanese political structure did not all of a sudden appear in 1890. IPRC politics must have existed prior to 1890 in some way. I decided to review the history of Japan to see if a bilayer or multilayer structure of power existed in Japan before the Meiji Restoration in 1868. A brief review of the history of Japanese politics revealed that its origin goes back to the Chronicle of Ancient Matters of 712. How, then, does one go about seeking legitimacy for a new informal institution that performs functions designed for its formal counterpart? Historically speaking, the ultimate source of legitimacy has been in the hands of the emperor. Observe how the Tokugawa Shognate issued a decree to govern the conduct of emperor in 1615 after Iyeyasu Tokugawa succeeded controlling the entire country. At the same time, Tokugawa was appointed by the emperor. According to Mitsusada Inoue (1976, 36), we may attribute the beginning of this method of power acquisition to the Katsuragi family during the fifth century (413–478), who through the marriage of a daughter to the emperor (gaiseki kankei2) legitimized its family’s rule of the country. Officially,

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the emperor governed the country, but in reality it was a group of his or her relatives who did the ruling. It is interesting to note that filial piety was used to reinforce the power of parents of a daughter who marries an emperor. Confucianism may have played a part in legitimating the relationship. The tradition continues to this day, as the nation’s new prime minister is formally appointed by the emperor, even while Diet members elect the prime minister. When did this tradition begin? Our hypothesis is that the beginning of the bilayer structure goes back to the days of pre-recorded history or myths. Wakamori reports on the myth of Izumo province. The powerful Izumo ruling family resisted the Yamato government’s efforts to unify the country. He says that the imperial family sent an envoy to ask for the symbolic or titular power to reign (shirasu). The power of actually governing Izumo would be had by its ruling family. The family maintained the power of ushihaku or de facto power over a territory (Wakamori 1973, 50–52). The Yamato government was run by an emperor (Wakamori 1974, 28–32), as found in the Record of Ancient Matters. What the imperial family wanted was the power to recognize and legitimize the Izumo’s ruling family’s right to govern its territory, as it had in the past. Here we see the separation of power clearly drawn between the right to recognize (shirasu) someone’s legitimacy to rule a territory, and the actual power to govern (ushihaku), a bilayer system for the first time in Japanese history. Our hypothesis is that Izumo, whose ruler resisted the expanding Yamato government (Yayoi and others) to place all parts of Japan under its reign, was Jhmon. This arrangement between early inhabitants (Jhmon) and newcomers from the Asian continent (Yayoi) represents what Hanihara (1994) calls a bilayer theory. Harmony (wa) between the two groups was achieved through the sharing of power rather than war and conquest. We found in chapter 3 that IPRC politics may have started as soon as the First General Election was held in 1890. This suggests that certainly it was not a new idea but rather something that had existed for centuries. If the language-based bilayer theory has validity, it could have existed as soon as the Japanese language was developed in its present form. If we were to use bilayer theory to review the history of Japan, what do we find in its written history?

Historical Overview of Japanese Politics in Bilayer-Theoretical Perspective To answer this question, we have developed several categories of political systems:3 (1) imperial rule as characterized by the emperor directly exercising power to govern the country; (2) coalition as a system known for its feature of two or more parties or groups forming a team to govern the country;

The Origin and Nature of the Bilayer Structure

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Table 5.1 System Category by Era Era

Period

Asuka Taika-Hakuha Nara Heian Kamakura Kenmu/Nanboku Muromachi Shokuha Tokugawa Meiji Taisha Shawa Total N

587–645 645–710 710–794 794–1192 1192–1333 1333–1338 1338–1573 1573–1603 1603–1868 1868–1912 1912–1926 1926–1989 587–1989

Percent prevailed

Total %

Imperial Coalition Bi/Multilayer Civil war Total years rule

0 33 0 60 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 3 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

58 27 71 338 141 0 235 25 265 44 14 63

0 2 0 0 0 2 0 5 — 0 0 0

58 65 84 398 141 5 235 30 265 44 14 63

96

16

6.8

1.1

1,281

9

1402

91.4

0.7

100

91.4

100 80 60 40 20

6.8

1.1

Imperial

Coalition System type

0.7

0 Bilayer

Civil war

(3) bilayer as characterized by two layers of bodies acting to rule the country while multilayer as a system in which one finds three or more layers of parties, one of which normally plays the dominant role in making decisions; and (4) civil war as a system in which at least no formal de facto institution exists to govern Japan4 or neither de facto nor de jure formal institutions exist, as in the case of the Revolt of Jinshin (A.D. 671–3) (table 5.1). We assume that emperors have always acted as formal heads of Japan, possessing de jure power except when there was no emperor, such as when the Revolt of Jinshin took place for two years following the demise of the powerful emperor Tenchi in 671. The revolt was over the question of who was to succeed. We classified this short period of two years as a warring period. Since we must depend on available documents to render our judgment on classifying historical regimes, including pre-recorded early historical periods, validity and reliability of the data used for classification are subject to further refinement and revision. We consulted several history books in Japanese as

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specified.5 Differences between bilayer, trilayer, and quaternary-layer are often blurred and subject to different interpretations as noted in the reference to the relationship between Prince Regent Shhtoku and Umako Soga in note 5. Another operational note to be made explicit here is that there have been times in history when the extent of civil war or internal strife was difficult to fathom and when the extent of the emperor family’s sphere in the Japanese archipelago was uncertain, leading us to avoid the use of the warring category unless formal imperial institutions themselves collapsed. Hence, while we are aware of the decline of Gotoba jhkh’s insei (former emperor continuing to exercise power over his or her successor emperor) after the death of Kiyomori Taira because of internal strife, the insei as an institution continued to remain despite its weakening power. Others may classify the period from 1181 to 1192 as a warring period, since chaos existed until the rise of Yoritomo Minamoto as Shhgun6 in 1192, when he was finally appointed by Emperor Sutoku. First, we found that as much as 91 percent of Japanese history from 587 through 1989 was characterized by bilayer or multilayer power structures. Japan was ruled for much of its recorded history by nominally superior de jure heads of state and de facto leaders who ruled the country in the name of the emperor. Second, the direct imperial rule by emperor accounts for only about seven percent of the past 14 centuries. Third, the total state of civil war existed for less than one percent of the time when there were no formal de facto ruling institutions. Actual periods of disorder and chaos in parts of the country existed much more than one percent of the time, to be sure. However, if we use our operational definition of the category, chaos constitutes less than one percent of Japanese history. Coalitions of actual ruling parties or groups account for about one percent of Japanese history. Even if we alter our operational definition of the civil war category to include the so-called warring period in Japanese history from 1467 to 1568 in the category of civil wars, the total period of bilayer/multilayer periods is reduced by only about seven percent. In short, Japan was ruled by military or civilian family groups much of the time in the name of emperor, who formally recognized the ruling group, legitimizing its existence. Our bilayer model of Japanese political system fits the findings to a large extent. We found our model applicable to about 80–90 percent of Japanese history. The next question is, did the bilayer or multilayer system prevalent come into existence as a consequence of external and domestic pressures? While we have some idea of how the Soga family rose as a result of the cognate family relationship, it is difficult to draw a firm inference as to the origin of the bilayer system in the sixth century. An overview of the history of external pressures on Japan suggests that it experienced significant pressures from abroad three times in recorded


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history.7 The first wave was the advent of Buddhism, Chinese writing, advanced weapons and products that started to trickle down to Japan starting around the fourth century from China and Korea, culminating in the Taika Reform in the seventh century.8 The second wave of external pressure came toward the end of the Tokugawa shogunate in the middle of the nineteenth century. Tokugawa returned governing power to the imperial family in 1868, after which time serious efforts were made to import Western institutions and ideas in order to build a modern nation-state. The second wave, thus, came largely from the United States and Europe. One might say that it took from 1868 to the end of the nineteenth century for Japan to quickly catch up with the West to the point that Japan was able to eliminate all unequal treaties. The United States wanted to put an end to Japan’s self-imposed isolation while at the same time there were Japanese who wanted to open the door from the inside as well. The third and the latest large wave came as a result of defeat in 1945. The impact this time was almost exclusively from the United States. The Taika Reform (A.D. 645–650) was a result of external forces, although the Japanese sought Chinese ideas and institutions by sending students to China. The pressure was self-induced and not imposed. The reform was based on the system of T’ang China, which was influenced by Confucianism. The Japanese took much of the T’ang Chinese system to develop its new land system to better govern the country. Rikh (1986, 60) reports that the Chinese developed statutory penal codes to maintain order and the Japanese established statutory laws governing bureaucracy. Although the new Japanese system was based on Chinese ideas and institutions, the Japanese ended up with a centralized system different from China in a couple of perspectives (Rikh 1986, 72): (1) new offices were created, but existing leaders were kept to receive new titles. (2) Confucian model of a rational bureaucracy based on meritocracy was not accepted; the new system made elite positions hereditary— a dual system or bilayer system. For these reasons and the Japanese desire to perpetuate the emperor system, the Japanese rejected the Mandate of Heaven. What we can infer from these differences is that the Japanese accept reform with a minimum of change in the existing structure to bring in a new system, but not revolutionary changes that totally reject the past. The Japanese seem to seek harmony with the existing system when they wish to change. In other words, the Japanese in the seventh century probably preferred to avoid open confrontation with existing authority while they were willing to accept reform in order to establish a better administrative system patterned after T’ang China. Likewise, to put an end to the oppression of Buddhism and the continuing war between Buddhism, a new religion from China (A.D. 538) supported by the powerful Soga clan and Shintoism with a close relationship with the imperial family, Prince Regent Shhtoku, whose

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mother hails from the Soga clan, reportedly made serious efforts to promote both Buddhism and Shintoism. The Taika Reforms were based on Confucianism. Here we see the promotion of three religious ideas by government officials in seventh-century Japan. The Japanese did not choose one religion, but wanted to add all of them into their lifestyle by discarding some elements of new religions, however incongruent they may have looked to rational, logic-centered outsiders. In fact, the concept of wa itself is basically a Confucian doctrine, as is the preference for the middle-of-the-road position over a binary position. The difference between Chinese and Japanese may lie in areas and extent of application of the concept of harmony, wa.

Summary Findings: Multilayer Nature of Bilayer Theory Although I began with the idea of a bilayer theory, I have found more than two layers of power in Japanese history. Over the course of my interviews with knowledgeable sources, I have discovered there may be ura no ura. There are rooms behind the backroom where IPRC politics takes place. For instance, Khichi Yamamoto reports that he and his counterpart in the LDP, Kenji Fukunaga, once staged a drama, pretending they argued loudly and threw chairs around and pounded on doors. Reporters were outside the room listening in. They came out after an hour or so, still arguing loudly (Yamamoto 1988, 173–174). He and Fukunaga met prior to that meeting to decide what to do to make reporters write about how hard they fought. Arima (1984, 32) reports the possible existence of “shadow IPRC committee chair” in his book. Likewise, the use of sobayhnin advisors by the Tokugawa Shognate is another example of complicating the governing structure. Hakuseki Arai, who decided to execute the “47 Akao warriors” who successfully revenged their deceased master’s enemy, was one of the sobayhnin advisors. I would infer that actual decision makers consisting of sobayhnin advisors, IPRC members, or whoever tend to be able leaders who did not inherit their position, but earned it through hard work, knowledge, and human relations skills. In contrast, de jure leaders inherit their positions through their ascribed status. Some observers speculate that Keiseikai or Keisei study group headed by former prime minister Takeshita was behind several prime ministers, such as Kaifu and Miyazawa in the 1990s. If true, this certainly constitutes another layer of the governing body. And this group may be also behind LDP IPRC politics. Members of IPRC simply are messengers rather than decision makers in this case. In community power structure studies, generally, we find legmen or messengers as decision-makers if we use Robert Dahl’s decision-making


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approach (1961), while we may find men behind legmen if we use the reputational approach of Floyd Hunter (Kuroda 1974a). Having bilayer or multilayer structures of power is necessitated by the need of a power structure to meet the different needs in a political system. For example, de jure rulers based on hereditary systems such as the emperor can provide the legitimacy and stability needed for the growth of a nation’s economy whereas able de facto rulers are needed to provide policies necessary for economic growth, environmental health and sociocultural enhancement. If our findings are correct, then bilayer or multilayer Japanese power structures may have existed for centuries. IPRC politics developed immediately following the First General Election in 1890 evolved to its height during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. In a way, the rapid economic development and relatively equitable distribution of income in Japan came about as a result of IPRC politics. This leads us to focus on the core of Japanese democracy. Bilayer power structures have existed in Japan from time immemorial. What are the implications of our findings for Japanese democracy?


6 The Core of Japanese Democracy Why the hell don’t you give me my right to vote? Hey, hey democracy . . . You say all government measures are to be decided by public discussion You gave our franchise to those who exploit us We fought wars; regimental colors were stained by our blood . . . —Song for Universal Suffrage, 1920s After all different arguments made and exhausted in the Diet (behind closed doors), comes the final outcome—Democracy —The Late Junz¯o Iwasaki, HC

People often hum or croon a tune to themselves to express their feelings. They also sang to promote causes such as “We shall overcome” in the 1960s. What is quoted above was one of the songs sung by people who were involved in the movement toward democracy in the 1920s in the aftermath of World War I. There was a yearning for peace, humanism, democracy, and equal rights during that period in world history. The NAACP was organized following the Niagara movement in the United States and the Society for Leveling in Japan was organized to bring an end to ethnic discrimination and servitude in both countries. Universal manhood suffrage became a reality in 1928. A few years later, in the year 1931, the era of militarism started with the establishment of a “provisional” regime in Manchuria. The Democracy movement lost strength to rising chauvinism characterized by its preemption strategy until its defeat in 1945. In response to my inclusion of Khalil Gibran’s poem “On Friendship” in the program for the Japan-U.S. Hawaii Conference of legislative leaders and others in 1991, the late Keijirh Murata, former Minister of International Trade and Industry, gave me a signed copy of his book of poems that was

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published when he was minister. He said the excitable nature of his youth led him to start composing poems. He was surprised and pleased to see a poem included in the Conference program. Poems are an outlet for sensitive people, including some Diet members, to express themselves. For Japanese, especially, it is a way of expressing emotions they feel constrained from letting be known otherwise, particularly when one is serving in such sensitive committees as the IPRC. The Late Junzh Iwasaki (1994), a Diet member who was then serving in the LDP IPRC, composed the 31-syllable poem cited above. This was a poem on IPRC politics, the most frequently visited topic among poems that he included in the book. He may have done it unconsciously, but among all his Diet activities, IPRC politics impacted him the most. He passed away as I was completing this book in the summer of 2004. He essentially said that after all of the spurious assertions on IPRC politics comes the final outcome, a democracy. In the same group of poems that he composed, he talks about how difficult and frustrating it is at times to get a bill passed, with the formalities and give-and-take of real politics at IPRC gatherings. The poem cited above represents an example of how IPRC politics can be constructive. It is obvious that IPRC sessions do not always end well, from the rest of his poem. The picture I infer from his poems is that IPRC politics is complex, but it is a form of democracy. It is a form of democracy that is not apparent in formal Diet sessions, where only a skeleton of the democratic process exists. Having shed as much light as I can on IPRC politics with the bilayer theory, the remaining task of the book is to relate IPRC politics to the growth of Japanese democracy. This chapter draws heavily from Kuroda (2004b). Let me begin with the definition of democracy.

Democracy Definition and Constraints The Cold War ended with the last century. Claims are made that democracy won. Dahl (2000, 8) reports that only 6 out of 43 nation-states were democratic in 1900. The number, after the Cold War, reached 43 out of 192 nations by 1990. What is the meaning of democracy? We often confuse our normative and empirical values in the first place. Furthermore, the same or equivalent word may cross-culturally carry different meanings, especially connotations. Democracy can be defined in a variety of ways, depending upon one’s preference, both in terms of substance and measurement methodology. The word is derived from the Ancient Greeks. Demokratia can be broken down to “demos,” meaning for the people, and “kratos,” to rule. Democracy originally meant rule by the people. One could, of course, raise the question of whether the term “people” included slaves. Democracy originally referred to a


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system in which people ruled themselves. What is, however, important now is how we should define democracy so that we can talk about it meaningfully in the context of twenty-first-century Japan in particular and the world at large. Although many authors have defined democracy, I found one salient and common thread. That is the concept of equality (e.g., Dahl 2000; Lasswell and Kaplan 1950). My preference is to define democracy as a political system in which all adults have potentially equal access to power and authority to determine the scope of government activities and they are free to pursue liberty.1 As H. L. Mencken alluded to democracy as Arcadia or Santa Claus, it is a norm, not like an inevitable tax, a cold reality. Assumed in my definition is that everyone knows what is in one’s best interest. Citizens must be forever aggressive in their watch to ensure that the government and mass media do not abuse their power to use democracy as a means of rationalizing their own agenda. The song for universal suffrage sung in the 1920s during the Taishh Democracy era cited above expresses a voice for democracy. The fewer and lower the barriers to effective political participation for all adults, the more democratic the system is. The more evenly the political resources, such as information and financial resources, that enable all adults to meaningfully participate in politics are distributed, the more democratic the system is. The definition above calls for potentially equal and effective access to power and authority, leaving room for those who do not wish to participate in politics to exercise their freedom not to do so. To assure equality of access to authority for everyone, competition for power and authority needs to be maintained through a competitive party system where more than one party competes for a ruling party position. An assumption in the definition is that decisional outcomes under such a democratic system should benefit the largest possible segments of the population, not just privileged sectors of society. However, reasonable differentiation in resource distribution should be maintained in order to keep creative people from leaving for other countries. Constraint is inherent in any institution for democracy to survive. This raises the question of the viability of democracy. Faced with the imminent rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces in Algeria in 1991, the army canceled the election and installed a civilian-led state council to rule while the army kept real power. This resulted in the fundamentalist’s launch of a bloody insurrection against the regime. The question is, should a democracy use undemocratic means to prevent the rise of antidemocratic forces if its survival is at stake? This tragedy has happened, unfortunately in Algeria, where the long and bloody struggle for independence from the French took so long from 1954 to 1962 and resulted in the loss of many lives. Is majority rule, often thought of as part and parcel of American democracy, a necessary condition for democracy? Majority rule is not always practiced in the United States, from the elections of presidents and the Electoral College

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system to the passage of a national health plan shortly after World War II.2 Majority rule is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a democracy to prevail. It is an effective and fair means based upon the principle of benefiting the majority to make decisions. It is not a universal rule observed in all democratic countries. Majority rule does not guarantee democratic results; it only ensures that the strongest views prevail. For example, President Roosevelt’s order supported by the majority to relocate people of Japanese ancestry and confine them to barbed-wire compounds went diametrically against the democratic rule of liberty and justice for all. And yet, it was considered legal and constitutional. Disobeying the order by insisting on one’s rights as done by such Japanese Americans as Gordon Hirabayashi resulted in a guilty verdict.3 Likewise, the majority of Germans supported Hitler. Furthermore, Hitler came to power through democracy. Obviously, majority rule is not a sacred cow. Other constraints of democracy include such questions as democracy from a particular point of view. The United States is a democracy, but do or can indigenous peoples, including Kanaka maol’i or indigenous Hawaiians, view the United States as democratic? Do or can Christian and Moslem Palestinians, whose land has been taken away by Jewish Zionists, view Israel as democratic? There can be no democracy where there is no self-determination or respect for landownership, since indigenous people are denied equal access to power and authority. The American rebellion against the British Empire was taxation without representation. Rebellious indigenous people are referred to as rebels or terrorists by imperialists and colonialists. As I write this book, Bush’s preemptive attack on Iraq to democratize the country faces many seemingly insurmountable barriers. Is he correct in forcibly imposing his American style of democracy in Iraq? The criterion for democracy is whether people are ruling themselves in their own interest, or self-determination. National boundaries for much of the Middle East were drawn by British and French imperialist powers for their own interests, and to create disjointed bastions of power (Kuroda 1994a). The Bush administration claimed that just as the United States made Japan a democratic country, his administration can do it, not only in Iraq, but also in the entire Middle East. The situations faced in democratizing Japan and Iraq are vastly different. Deep and extensive ethnic and religious cleavages found in Iraq are absent in the unitary state of Japan. Unlike Japan, a flexible federal form of government might be the most viable system of governing Iraq, if democracy is possible at all. Some may also question whether any country where foreign troops are stationed to protect the host country can be considered truly self-determining and democratic. We need to know what type of democracy may be best suited to a given country. Factors and conditions required for the growth of democracy may differ in different countries at different times in history. What, then, are the contexts within which we can view democracy in Japan?


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Another question that comes to mind is methodology, for it impacts the outcome of any research, as I pointed out in my earlier community power structure study in Reed Town, Japan (Kuroda 1974a). How do I measure democracy? I use aggregate and survey data plus other indicators to show how democracy grew during the 1955 system era in Japan. I intend to describe data that are considered a result of policy actions taken by the government of Japan over the years, with particular focus on the 1955 system era, 1955–1993. The results may or may not show that IPRC politics is considered a very important contributory condition, if not a necessary condition to the growth of Japanese democracy. This should enable the reader to see why I consider IPRC politics, with all of its undesirable and unethical features or structural corruption, may have made a positive contribution to the growth of Japanese democracy. Corruption, of course, is not unique to Japan, but is universally prevalent.4 Again, it is the matter of degree that separates some countries from others.

Japanese Political Culture and Political Structure Historical Perspective Political culture refers to an individual’s orientation toward politics and government, which is the psychological dimension of the Japanese political system. How does Japanese political culture relate to democracy? Although elements of democracy may have existed in Japan prior to the Meiji era, as Inoguchi points out (2003), there was no specific concept of democracy as such in Japan until it decided to adapt the parliamentary system as a means to achieve the goal of modernization and independence in the late nineteenth century while keeping its traditions as much as possible. The Liberty and Popular Rights Movement had been pushing for a representative government in the form of a constitution and national assembly since 1874. The movement called for popular sovereignty under the guise of “national sovereignty” and insisted that the government should exercise its power for the people. If it abuses its power, the movement insisted that people have the right to resist and oppose the government. The Meiji constitution promulgated in 1889, however, firmly established absolute imperial sovereignty, even if it contained some democratic elements such as the creation of HR, where eligible voters consisting of 1.13 percent of the total population were enfranchised to elect representatives. Many parliaments have been patterned after the British Parliament, which has had perhaps the longest history of parliamentary democracy. In 1832, five percent of adults over 20 years of age in Great Britain were eligible to vote. The British adults had to wait until 1921 for a majority to be eligible to vote. In Japan, gender and tax barriers prevented almost 99 percent of Japanese adults from being eligible to vote when the First General Election

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was held in 1890. They had to wait until 1946 for a majority to be able to participate in elections. Ever since the First General Election in July 1890, the parliament has made progress toward democracy in the sense that the proportion of eligible electorates continues to grow as a consequence of the removal of barriers such as the passage of the universal manhood suffrage law in 1928 during the so-called Taishh democracy era, the second wave of democracy. Despite heroic efforts by Rep. Takao Saith, Kunimatsu Hamada, and others who openly spoke out against the rising military in the 1930s in the Diet, the second wave of democracy collapsed and ushered in the rise of chauvinistic militarism. Democracy was imposed on defeated Japan after the end of World War II by SCAP through the new Constitution, the new government structure, land reform, educational system, and other reforms. All these systems had the definitive mark of the New Deal in a liberal democracy. The two main objectives of U.S. reform efforts were demilitarization and democratization. The United States worked to strengthen the parliament over other forces such as the military. There are several factors we should keep in mind from the American perspective in viewing the third wave of democracy that the Japanese experienced in the last half of the 1940s. We may be justified in inferring from these discussions that Japan is becoming democratic as far as electoral participation is concerned. The question is, can one draw a similar conclusion about elected representatives? The present study shows that nondemocratic procedures are used in the Japanese parliament. The sun should shine in the legislative process in a democracy. It clearly does not, as evidenced in the then minister Koizumi’s words in 1997 that IPRC politics engages in activities that cannot be made public. Is this unique to Japan? My answer is no. All democratic countries have what Robert A. Dahl calls the “dark side” of bargaining among political elites including bureaucrats (2000, 113). In this sense, Kurimoto is correct in that all democratic legislatures in the world have an unseen side (Kurimoto 1997, 57–58). Again, however, the concern has to do with the extent to which the Japanese have institutionalized a clear bilayer structure. Yes, most citizens in democratic countries are cognizant of a “dark side,” but tend to overlook it as a price of representative government. After all, we are all humans with imperfections. Hence, the reality is politicians are ubiquitously distrusted. Perhaps one way to judge how well Japanese representatives secretly make deals between the ruling party and the opposition is to examine Japan’s achievements in human potentials and protecting the interests of its citizens. In short, let us focus on what we can see under the sun.


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The Japanese Context First, under a typical unitary system, the old Japanese government structure was highly centralized.5 Although the unitary system was kept, the government structure was decentralized and women were given the right to vote for the first time. Unlike the United States, Japan operates under a unitary system like Britain and France, even if the present-day government is decentralized to a large extent. Another structural difference between Japan in relation to the United States is that it is a parliamentary system, making the principle of the separation of power inoperative. The prime minister heads the executive branch of the government while serving as chief legislator in Parliament. Furthermore, Japan is a constitutional monarchy, while the United States is a republic. We find many structural differences with Japan. Nevertheless, Japanese political structure is clearly democratic in nature, for it has a multiparty representative system based on “free” competition.6 The salient difference in Japan is its bilayer structure. Second, we often speak of due process in discussing democracy in America. We are concerned with fairness in proving equal opportunity for all without regard to gender, race, or other innate qualities. In other words, a fair process by which individuals are treated is of extreme importance. Consequently, if anyone fails to be successful, it is the fault of the individual, not the country, as played upon as a theme in the old American TV show featuring Archie Bunker (1968–1978). Going from a log cabin to the White House is not a dream to Archie, but reality, as evidenced in the number of people who flock to the United States, he would insist. We place a premium on the process over the consequence of democracy. Furthermore, the stress on equality is focused on political and legal equality and not equality in substance and structure. If we really believe in equal opportunity for all to succeed in America from birth, then we should all start from the same financial starting point and make the inheritance tax 100 percent for everyone, but we do not. Moreover, more than one out of three of us in America today are born to a family where there is no father, for starters. It is a challenge for the government to provide each child with equal access to education so that they may develop to her or his capacity. Unlike Americans, the Japanese pay less attention to the process than the result with respect to financial equality. Second, the individual is not a salient unit of society, as I presented in discussing Japanese culture in chapter 2. “Seken” is the most salient. There is no comparable word in English. It may be best translated as “significant community” in the sense it is omnipresent and most relevant to oneself. When a business executive commits a whitecollar crime and it is discovered, his public statement is most likely to be: “I am sorry for disturbing the peace of ‘seken’.” What is important is not the crime, but the disturbance to society. Individual freedom accounts most

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saliently in the realm of American democracy, whereas peaceful and stable significant community is paramount in Japan, at least on the surface. Third, the Japanese believe in rule by consensus rather than the tyranny of the majority. They consider the majority party passing a law bitterly opposed to by opposition parties as not only unfair, but also undemocratic. The public demands that the ruling party should get an “understanding” from opposition parties before railroading through any bills. There is a need for IPRC politics to satisfy both the requirements for modern parliamentary democracy and Japanese tradition. Now we begin to see how Japanese democracy may be different from American democracy both in terms of apparent procedure as well as end results. Fourth, in addition to the cultural baggage that Japanese carry in their political culture, another tradition that separates Japan from the United States is the prominent role government bureaucrats play in Japanese government, as in many parliamentary systems. The center of legislative politics has been in government bureaucracy since at least the beginning of the Meiji era in 1868.7 Those who became politically active in the Meiji government were largely from the warrior caste. The Higher Institute for Barbarian Studies during the Tokugawa era was developed into the Imperial University of Tokyo, which was established initially to train government bureaucrats. Bureaucrats today continue to play a significant role in initiating bills. Members of Parliament continue to depend on bureaucrats for legislative assistance, since they are given only three staff members each. Fifth, the term “democracy” was almost universally accepted after the end of World War II, but not in Japan.8 Longitudinal Japanese National Character surveys conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics revealed that it was not until the end of 1980s or the end of Cold War era that the majority of Japanese accepted democracy as a good ruling system (Kuroda 2000).9 Inoguchi (2003) points out that all three models proposed by Watanuki on cultural politics, Krauss and Pharr on television politics and his “karaoke” democracy point out that Japanese are distrustful of politicians while they believe in the legitimacy of democracy and its structure. That is true of the United States, where people are distrustful of particular presidents such as Richard Nixon, but they have high regard for the office of the presidency. Also, a great majority of Americans enthusiastically espouse democracy—well over 80 percent. Although it is safe to assume that democracy is considered a legitimate form of government in Japan today, table 6.1 suggests that it has become so only in the late 1980s. Until then, a plurality of the Japanese had a neutral or no opinion on the concept of democracy. Even in the 1990s, we cannot say that the Japanese enthusiastically espoused democracy as such. A majority just accepted it. I find lukewarm support for democracy. As for attitudes toward politicians, I found in my


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Table 6.1 Democracy: Favorable or Unfavorable (#8.2e Would you say that you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of on each of the following ideas? Democracy: (1) Favorable (2) It depends (3) Unfavorable (4) DK.)

80 60 40 20 0

1963 1968 1973 1988 1993

Favorable % 38

38

43

52

59

Depends %

52

46

38

33

49

Favorable %

Depends %

earlier survey of law students at the University of Tokyo and the University of Kyoto plus the Legal Research and Training Institute in the late 1950s that the students were highly cynical and distrusting of politicians while they showed a high sense of civic duty, particularly among the more liberal, which consisted mostly of JSP supporters (Kuroda 1967b). There is no question of whether the Japanese are cynical toward their politicians—possibly even more so than Americans. What I find differently from Inoguchi is the degree of Japanese acceptance of democracy as a legitimate form of government. However, this may become somewhat irrelevant unless we all have the same concept of democracy in mind. Only 38 percent of the people thought democracy was “good” in the 1960s. The percentage rose to 43 percent in 1973. It was not until 1993 that a clear majority thought democracy was “good,” however differently they interpreted democracy. Even after the majority of Japanese accept the concept of democracy, it still depends on how we define democracy as to the question of whether or not Japan is democratic. Before ending this section, we may want to note here that barriers in politics based on race, ethnic origin, gender, and other ascribed status are something we find in common with Japan. Religion as a barrier is practically nonexistent in Japan, however. Japan had two Christian prime ministers, one of whom was a socialist since 1945 in a country where less than one percent of the population is Christian. Despite the abolishment of the caste system in the early Meiji period, its remnants continue to plague present-day Japan.10 For example, Hiromu Nonaka, after serving several top key posts in the LDP, retired from politics in protest against Prime Minister Koizumi. He reports how indignant he was once at fellow LDP Diet member Tarh Asao, former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida’s grandson-in-law who made the following

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statement: “We cannot let former untouchables like Nonaka become prime minister.”11 “Ethnic” barriers die hard. In summary, first, we have pointed out several systemic differences between the United States and Japan in terms of governmental forms and structures. Second, I have focused on the difference in what is considered the salient unit in society. The Japanese consider “significant community” as the key unit of society as opposed to the individual in the United States. Third, Japanese decision making is characterized by consensus, not decisions based on majority vote. Fourth, many authors have pointed out the prominent role bureaucrats play in Japanese politics. Fifth, the word “democracy” as an almost universally well-accepted word finally surfaced in Japan at the end of Cold War. Having defined democracy and the context in which democracy exists, I am now ready to examine how IPRC politics, however corrupt in some perspectives, may have contributed significantly to the development of democracy during the 1955 system era, from 1953 to 1993.

Findings To successfully conclude that whether IPRC politics promoted democracy during the 1955 system era requires one to first develop an association between what happened during that period in the country in terms of indicators for democracy.12 Second, we must prove that IPRC politics most likely caused the growth of democracy and eliminate other alternative hypotheses.

Elections and Democracy First, we will look for indicators of democratic growth from the inception of the Diet. The key concept of democracy calls for equal access to power.

Voter Eligibility What portion of the population is enfranchised to vote? Table 6.2 is constructed to provide a summary view of three indicators of democracy, (1) voter eligibility;13 (2) voter turnout;14 and (3) competition for candidates.15 The First General Election was held in July 1890 with a very high voter turnout, as evidenced in about 94 percent of eligible voters casting votes in the very first election ever held in Asia.16 However, the percentage of eligible voters represented only one percent of the total population. Requirements included age, gender, and tax criteria, barring 99 percent of the people from taking part. The gradual deduction in the tax requirement increased the number of eligible voters from two percent in 1902 and then finally to five percent in 1920. In 1928, all adult males over the age of 25 were allowed to vote, but


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Table 6.2 Voter Eligibility,Turnout, and Candidate Competition in Historical Perspective Year

Eligibility criteria

1890 1902 1920 1928 1946 1955 1960 1969 1980 1990 1993

Age (25⫹) Gender (M) Tax (¥15) Age (25⫹) Gender (M) Tax (¥10) Age (25⫹) Gender (M) Tax (¥3) Universal manhood suffrage Universal suffrage (age 20⫹)

Eligibility %

Voter turnout %

Competition rate

1.13 2.20 5.46 20.12 51.22 56.17 59.01 67.55 74.57 73.31 NA

93.73 88.39 86.73 80.33 72.08 75.84 73.51 68.51 72.94 72.74 67.26

4.14 1.81 1.81 2.01 5.94 2.18 2.01 1.94 1.63 1.86 NA

Note: NA ⫽ Not ascertainable. Sources: Kamei Senkyo Renmei (1967), Nishihara (1972), Office of the Prime Minister (1975), Asahi Shimbun (1975).

not women. Eligible voters then increased to 20 percent of the general population. Shortly after that, the growth of democracy halted as a result of the rise of chauvinistic militarism in the 1930s. With the advent of U.S. occupational reform, democracy resumed its spread in 1946, when every adult was allowed to vote, enabling more than half of the population to take part in the First General Election in postwar Japan. With the passage of the eugenics law in 1947 and its revision in 1948, the birth rate declined significantly, resulting in a gradual decrease in the number of children and a rapid increase in the aged population. Consequently, eligible voters increased to 73 percent of the population by 1990. Despite the increase in the percentage of eligible voters, we cannot consider this as the only sign of the Japanese system becoming democratic, since some of the increase has to do with the aging population.

Voter Turnout Voter turnout is an indicator of interest in politics and “significant community” or seken. As Kyhgoku and Ike argued as well as I did in our earlier works on political participation (Kuroda and Kuroda 1968; Kyhgoku and Ike 1959), rural Japanese voters vote more often than urban voters due to their sense of belonging to their communities, not because they are specifically interested in politics. Urbanization and its resulting rate of social alienation caused voters to lose interest in their traditional significant communities, lowering their rate of political participation. Voter turnout has been on a decline over the past several decades in Japan, as in table 6.2. In table 6.3, voter interest in electoral politics has also been on a decline. I do not consider

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Table 6.3 Interest in General Election (#8.6 What do you do in general elections for the House of Representatives? (1) Let nothing stand in the way of voting, (2) Try to vote as much as possible, (3) Not much interested in voting, (4) Hardly ever vote, (5) Other.)

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003

Shall

Try

Not

62 53 51 41 45 39 34 40 37 35

32 41 44 50 47 48 50 50 47 50

3 4 4 6 5 9 10 7 9 8

Hardly

Other

DK

2 1 1 2 3 3 5 3 6 6

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total N 2,369 2,698 3,033 3,055 1,913 2,173 3,682 1,833 1,339 1,192

Nothing stands in the way of voting

Voting duty? 80 60 40 20 0

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003

% 62

53

51

41

45

39

34

40

37

35

Year

this as an indicator of decline of support for democracy as much as a decline in the traditional sense of significant community. This trend, however, has a limit if democracy is to survive. Only about 50 percent of voters in the United States have voted in presidential elections in recent decades. It is desirable for a viable democracy to have at least a majority of the voters taking part in elections. What we presented in table 6.2 consists of aggregate data indicating voter behavior in elections. We shall now look into voter interest in electoral participation by using longitudinal Japanese National Character Study data.

Voter Interest The first response category includes only those voters who are determined to vote, rain or sunshine. The second response category includes the largest category of voters who try their best to vote. As one can see, determined


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voters in the first category declined over the years from the 1950s to 2000 and beyond. These are probably people who to varying degrees were affected by social pressures to conform to their traditional norm (Kyhgoku and Ike 1959). Many probably do not view voting as individuals exercising free will, but they vote because they are members of a community they rightly consider most salient. As shown in the bottom of table 6.3, the first category of voters is on a decline. Hence, I consider this trend as not a sign of decline in democracy, but rather as an improvement in meaningful voting for democracy. We now move to review another important indicator of viable democracy— free competition in elections.

Candidate Competition In addition to free and regularly held elections as a necessary condition for a viable democracy, it is probably equally important to have competition among different parties and candidates. Japan has always had multiparty elections except during the war years, when parties were abolished in order to maximize the efforts of World War II. We find competition among candidates since the inception of the Diet, as evidenced in the last column in table 6.2. We found more than four candidates competing for each Diet position in the First General Election. In the first election after World War II, almost six candidates vied for each seat won in the HR election. The key concept of democracy is equality. The electoral system has changed over the years to reflect the importance of equal access to power and authority in democracy. Do Japanese believe in equality of gender and race or ethnicity? As I commented on the difference in the concept of equality between Japan and the United States, I found significant differences in Japan on this question relative to the American norm.

Inferiority, Equality, and Superiority Americans have made great strides toward gender equality (table 6.4). So have the Japanese, but not as much as the Americans, from what I can observe from family relations to job opportunities. Can systematic data shed light on the question of gender and racial equality? The longitudinal Japanese National Character Study data provides us with some answers on gender and racial equality issues.17 An assumption here is that if women were not treated well, one would not desire to be born a woman if one could be born again. The percentage of those who desire to be born as women was only 17 percent shortly after the

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Table 6.4 Preference to be Born Woman Next Time by Year If you could be born again, would you rather be a man or a woman? (1) Man, (2) Woman, (3) Other.)

Percentage for preferring woman

#6.2

60 40 20 0

1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 17 23 28 30 31 34 35 37 39 39 Year

Table 6.5 Japanese Superiority Complex by Year

Percentage believing in Japanese superiority

#9.6 Generally speaking, would you say that the Japanese people are superior to or inferior to Western peoples? (1) Japanese superior, (2) Japanese inferior, (3) The same, (4) Undecided, (5) Other (Specify).)

60 40 20 0

1953 1963 1968 1973 1983 1993 1998 2003 20 33 47 39 53 41 33 31 Year

advent of the 1955 system era. The percentage grew gradually to almost 40 percent by 2003—more than doubling the original figure. This trend was more pronounced among women. In my 1963 study of community power structure, I noted increased feelings of gender equality among women and concluded that there has been greater progress toward gender equality than class egalitarianism (Kuroda and Kuroda 1968). To measure the racial equality question in the United States requires us to use such methods as the social distance scale, since we cannot ask direct questions and hope to get valid responses. We find that those who were formerly considered “untouchables” and non-Japanese are discriminated against on the basis of their ascribed status in Japan, as I reported earlier. Furthermore, non-Japanese and non-citizens are not allowed to participate in national elections. However, some localities allow non-citizens to vote. The best indicator of prejudiced or biased attitudes I can find concerns Japanese attitudes toward Westerners (table 6.5).


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Abraham Lincoln called for government by the people to be one of the characteristics of democracy. As I briefly mentioned in chapter 1, we promote equality in the name of democracy and the fundamental principle on which the United States stands while we also advocate free enterprise. Japan also promotes equality, but not in the social arena. In fact, the Japanese norm calls for social inequality in many ways, as can be seen in the ubiquitous use of honorifics. This is one reason why authors such as Chie Nakane call Japan a vertical society. This may be a remnant of the caste system that continues to haunt the Japanese archipelagos despite efforts made to end it. Therefore, the Japanese are not constrained to say that they feel superior to Westerners if indeed they feel so. I found a plurality consisting of 28 percent of respondents choosing the category of Japanese inferiority over superiority in 1953 shortly before the start of the 1955 system era. The percentage of those who believe in Japanese superiority started to increase with the rise of the GNP until 1983, when a majority of the Japanese believed in their superiority over Westerners. Since then, the proportion started to decline to the one-third it is today. The largest cause of change over time is derived from the periodic effect over cohort and aging effects (Kuroda 2000).18 The rise in racial/nationality bigotry coincided with the rapid economic development from the 1950s through the 1960s, followed by a drop in 1973, probably as a result of the first energy crisis. Although not shown in table 6.5, it is encouraging to note that those who choose the third response of the “same” increased from 14 percent in 1953 to more than 30 percent in recent surveys. In sum, we can say that gender equality has improved over the years. Social equality, however, is another question. The Japanese superiority complex appears to fluctuate with the economy. My reading of the data for the effects of education is not clear. In the 1973 survey, 43 percent of elementary school graduates as opposed to 30 percent of college and university graduates felt that the Japanese are superior to Westerners (Hayashi et al. 1975, 575). The association is weak. However, the effects of education on this item in earlier surveys of 1963 and 1968 showed a somewhat reversed tendency compared to the 1953 survey results, which showed no association at all on this question (Aoyama 1970, 163). There are some problems with this item to begin with, since the word “Westerners” is a broad concept. The Japanese consider some Westerners superior over other Westerners, for example. Americans and Germans are considered superior over the French, English, or Russians (Hayashi et al. 1970, 568–569). Moreover, this item may be contaminated by elements of nationalism to some extent, since the question is not directly racial or ethnic in nature. Accordingly, I must conclude that Japanese have a national superiority complex, even if it has declined in recent decades, while gender equality has improved clearly and significantly in the past half century.19

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Participatory Democracy Universal Suffrage from above to Citizen Movements from the Bottom Representative democracy demands voter participation. The longitudinal Japanese National Character Survey includes a question on whether voters should take part in politics if they already have ideal leaders for the people. In other words, if the results would be for the people, should people still take part in politics? Entries in table 6.6 clearly show that people still believe in discussing issues among themselves and not leaving everything to their leaders. An increasingly large segment of the population finds a healthy distrust of political leaders, a good sign for the growth of healthy democracy. We find only 38 percent of the adult respondents disagreeing with the statement in 1953. Forty years later, in 1993, we find exactly 68 percent disagreeing. This represents a definite increase in people who believe in government by the people and not just for the people. Occupational reform brought about legal and structural improvements to democracy in Japan, but it was democratic reform from above, not from the grassroots level of the late 1940s. It took over two decades for the Japanese to bring about democracy from the bottom in the late 1960s to the early 1970s through environmental, anti-Vietnam War, and other humanitarian movements. I reported the rise of a new politics in 1972 (Kuroda 1972b, 1974b). I noted the so-called citizen movement springing up everywhere in Japan. I then called the movement “an incipient growth of grassroots-level

Table 6.6 Leave It up to Outstanding Political Leaders by Year (#8.1b Some people say that if we get outstanding political leaders, the best way to improve the country is for the people to leave everything to them, rather than discussing things among themselves. Do you agree with this, or disagree? (1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) Depends on situation (4) Other (5) DK.)

Disagree percentage

80 60 40 20 0 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 %

38

44

47

51

51 Year

58

60

61

68

67

69


159

democracy.” The movement was basically non-partisan, yet one cannot deny the major role of Socialists and Communists. It was also antiestablishment in its basic orientation, since the movement associated polluters with industrial complexes that supported the LDP. The first energy crisis heightened the need for energy savings. Mass media joined the movement and convinced bureaucrats of the need to improve the country’s quality of life. Some urban schools had to close at noon because of pollution levels. These were times when bags of oxygen were sold in vending machines. I have no data to show what role the IPRC played during this period, but in 1973 and 1974, several key bills passed the Diet to improve the environment. New industries sprung up to save energy and restore a clean environment. Japan was able to increase its GNP in a matter of a few years while reducing energy consumption. One of the factors that led the LDP to change its nonchalant attitude was that Socialist and Communist candidates and an increasingly large number of governors and major metropolitan mayors, including those from Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Yokosuka, Kamakura, Fuji, and Kyoto won elections over LDP candidates. This would have been impossible in prewar Japan, since governors were appointed by the national government. Gubernatorial positions were made elective positions by postwar reform. We learned here that structural reform from above was a necessary condition for grassroots democracy to develop. The citizens’ movement was a manifestation of the people’s belief in the need to take action in order to move the government to act on behalf of the people. Has there been an attitudinal change on the importance of political participation?

Belief in Government by the People The National Character Survey data clearly demonstrates the definitive trend toward people’s belief from 1953 to 2003 in the importance of government by the people idea, as shown in table 6.6 (Kuroda 2000; Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character 2004, 111; Sakamoto et al. 2000, 112–113). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was clear that about half of the voters believed in not leaving everything to leaders to decide. They wanted government by the people. That is when citizen movements sprung up like mushrooms all over the country. A majority of Japanese thought that they should take direct part in politics to affect the scope of government activities, be it keeping pollution out of their environment or keeping Japan out of war.20 Japan by the early 1970s was attitudinally ready for active grassrootslevel politics. However, it was not until the 1980s before a majority of the Japanese began to accept the concept of democracy. As for the public’s preference for

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having the people discuss political issues among themselves, entries in table 6.6 indicate that the largest change in five years occurred from 1973 to 1978 in the past 50 years of the longitudinal survey, the time when grassrootslevel politics became popular. I also found that this was largely a consequence of cohort effects and not that of the aging population or periodic effects. Government by the people is not sufficient to assure that political leaders serve the interests of as large a segment of the people as possible in a democracy. As the two key reforms of postwar Japan were to disarm and democratize, the Allied Powers successfully carried out what they could, using the existing government bureaucracy and structure. Reforms included farmland reform that made farmers, then constituting more than 50 percent of the population, conservative. Two basic policies of the Yoshida government, which concluded the Peace Treaty with the United States and other countries in 1951, were to leave national defense to the United States while Japan concentrated on economic recovery. For these two policies to succeed, the Yoshida government and successive LDP governments developed various policies to achieve these two policy objectives during the Cold War era. Their task was to decide how to balance free enterprise with their traditional norm of social harmony. The concept of equality, a key element of democracy, was part of the answer. To develop an economy requires political stability, while democracy calls for free discussion and open debate. There are Communists and Socialists as well as conservatives and nationalists. How do you allow freefor-all debate while maintaining political stability? Traditionally, the Japanese have successfully avoided the importation of absolutism of any sort throughout history. Most JSP and JCP members are Marxists (absolutists) of various persuasions. How do you make them accept what conservative LDP want to pass in the Diet? The LDP cannot afford to have the kind of political instability and violence witnessed on such occasions as the 1960 Anpo crisis and develop the economy at the same time. How does the government maintain law and order? There are basically two answers. One is to assume as Hobbs did that people are basically nasty and to develop a powerful dictatorial government to suppress violence and maintain law and order. The other is to provide people with adequate goods and services they need to make a decent living so that they will not use violence to get what they desire. Even if goods and services are scarce, violence is less likely if they are distributed more or less equally. The prewar government of Japan chose the former to develop the strong government while the postwar government chose the latter to solve this basic problem. In a way there was no choice under the Allied occupation. In the 1990s, Robert D. Putnam (1996) started to re-emphasize the importance of civic organizations de Tocqueville (1955) cited as an important sign of democracy in America in the 1830s. For economy and democracy to grow, social capital was needed. Our pursuit of individual freedom and IT revolution


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has led us to “bowl alone” or “pachinko alone”21 in Japan. Industrialization and urbanization have uprooted many of us from our birthplaces to lose contact with local groups of various sorts that had played important roles in the past. Mom-and-pop stores disappeared, replaced by convenience stores that are open 24 hours a day. Japan faced the same challenge of social alienation. What happened in Japan with regard to this challenge of the modern era? De Tocqueville also points out that great strength lies in the American ability to commit mistakes that they may correct afterward. His was right with respect to what the U.S. government did in the case of Japanese Americans who were unjustly interned during World War II.

Alienation and Democracy Table 6.7 demonstrates how Japan maintained social order and minimized social alienation since the Meiji period. Meiji Japan was a violent and disorderly society in relation to what became of Japan in the twentieth century. Marx predicted that social alienation grows with capitalism. This Marxian hypothesis came true in the United States, in China today, and other parts of the world, where crime rates rise and the gap between the rich and the poor widens as industries develop and towns urbanize, resulting in social disengagement and geographic dislocation. That may be a reason for neoTocquevilleans such as Robert Putnam to call for the need of social capital if American democracy is to grow and economy to prosper. I used the number of children born into single-parent families or foundlings, the number of homicides, first-time offenders, and the percentage of divorce as indicators of alienation and social disorganization in the past 120 years of Japanese history.

Foundlings and Single-Parent Children I found a better record for foundlings than for children born into singleparent homes. I would speculate that there could have been more abandoned children than the figures indicate. My hypothesis is that there must have been more children who are born out of wedlock than the figures that were made public. I was not able to find public records for the postwar period. My speculation is that not more than one percent of children belong to this category in the postwar period, with the exception of 1945, 1946, and 1947. There were obviously many children who were abandoned following the war, particularly in China, Korea, and other Japan-occupied areas. Some died or were killed while others were picked up by kind people in the formerly occupied areas. No reliable statistics are available on them. Some are still trying to return to their ancestral lands. Since abortion was legalized for medical as well as social reasons shortly after the war under the guise of eugenic law, the birthrate also sharply declined.

162 Table 6.7 Alienation and Crime by Year Year

1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926

Foundling/natural children 5,081/ 4,941/ 4,968/ 5,467/ 5,746/ 5,777/ 5,576/ 5,349/ 5,431/ 5,325/ 4,958/ 4,858/ 4,775/ 4,550/ 4,188/ 3,740/ 3,257/ 2,942/813 2,642/ 2,550/ 2,437/ 2,338/ 2,276 2,074/ 2,083/ 1,900/ 1,832/ 1,736/ 1,664/ 1,567/ 1,587/916 1,616/ 1,729/ 1,812/ 1,733/ 1,608/ 1,472/ 1,392/ 1,128/ NA 755/ 666/ 682/ 679/ 677/

Homicides

First-time Offenders

Divorces per 1,000 population

7,577 9,405 7,554 5,968 4,152 4,432 4,962 6,016 1,082 1,253 1,410 1,458 1,527 1,578 1,741 1,848 1,827 1,399 1,511 1,582 1,652 1,524 1,571 1,511 1,625 1,717 1,690 1,412 1,389 1,538 1,603 1,962 2,021 1,333 1,886 1,943 1,874 1,935 1,869 1,873 1,889 2,502 2,330 2,391 2,620

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 151,386 160,235 170,187 180,579 181,134 158,789 63,503 66,129 62,422 57,931 60,626 56,811 36,504 40,504 44,735 48,108 48,867 49,772 46,872 48,715 46,760 45,988 42,023 44,919 49,677 54,194 63,779 66,421

NA NA NA 2.98 3.06 2.84 2.76 2.68 2.70 2.76 2.76 2.82 2.74 2.62 2.71 2.87 2.27 NA NA NA NA 1.41 NA 1.30 1.30 1.20 1.00 1.18 1.18 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.00 1.01 NA NA 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.83 (Continued)

163 Table 6.7 Continued Year

Foundling/natural children

Homicides

First-time Offenders


1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1043 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

653/ 604/ 611/ 617/ 534/ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

2,447 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 1,433 1,139 1,059 861 926 1,953 2,098 2,895 2,969 3,076 3,109 3,061 3,090 3,356 3,269 2,862 2,652 2,906 2,965 2,844 2,921 2,503 2,452 2,501 2,379 2,273 2,225 2,297 2,351 2,146 2,134

70,592 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 26,689 26,795 32,347 40,138 33,745 65,766 65,450 69,899 58,427 60,040 53,988 55,373 51,045 48,044 54,035 51,103 47,770 46,392 45,392 41,008 37,285 35,996 34,603 32,757 33,935 34,591 30,617 29,402 26,871 25,890 27,197

0.82 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.68 NA NA NA 1.02 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.99 (Continued)

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Table 6.7 Continued Year

Foundling/natural children

Homicides

First-time offenders


1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

2,188 2,113 1,870 2,179 2,113 1,988 1,843 1,841 1,560 1,712 1,768 1,789 1,788 1,833 1,678 1,584 1,441 1,308 1,238 1,215 1,227 1,233 1,225 1,236 1,257 1,323 1,466 1,338 1,462 1,436 1,405 NA

28,423 26,266 25,728 26,175 27,408 27,684 29,096 29,087 28,374 30,336 31,397 30,725 32,060 31,656 30,651 29,726 28,242 24,605 22,745 NA 20,864 21,242 21,266 21,838 22,433 22,667 23,101 24,496 27,498 28,500 30,277 NA

1.02 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.11 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.22 1.32 1.39 1.51 1.50 1.39 1.37 1.30 1.26 1.29 1.28 1.37 1.45 1.52 1.57 1.60 1.66 1.78 1.94 2.00 2.00 2.10 2.27 2.30

Sources: Kuroda (1985), Kuroda et al. (1998), Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Government of Japan, ed. (1987, 41, 164, 386–388, 446–448; 1992, 51; 1998, 59, 765, 777), Gifu Prefectural Government: http://www.pref.gifu.jp/s11229/jinkou/siryou5.htm;Alpha Net, Japan: http://www.alpha-net.ne.jp/ users2/knight9/toukei.htm#.

Homicide The Meiji era (1868–1911) was a violent period, characterized by a high rate of crime until the establishment of the modern government based upon the Constitution in 1890. Entries in table 6.7 shows homicide numbers plummet at that time. The First General Election was also held to elect members of


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the HR in 1890. When one considers the fact that the Japanese population nearly quadrupled from the early Meiji era to the present, the number of homicides as well as first-time offenders should have increased accordingly, but this did not happen. The Taishh democracy era (1912–1925) brought about a slight increase in the number of homicide cases of about 2000 in 1914. A bit of freedom could have meant more violence or homicide cases. The World War II years brought the number of homicides down, but the number began rising as the war ended in 1945. In the year 1954, homicide numbers reached a peak of 3,356. The figure slightly declined in 1955 when the 1955 system started in the fall of 1955. Since then, the number of homicides never exceeded 3,000 and it started to decline after the 1960 Anpo crisis. It is difficult to maintain that there is no relationship between the government of Japan and the number of homicides in the past 120 years. Significant shifts in the number of homicide cases took place in 1890, 1942–1945, and 1955–1956, which correspond with the First General Election, World War II and the establishment of the 1955 system. If we leave World War II out, the first and third changes in government suggest that whenever the people felt their government represented more of what they wanted, there was a decline in the number of homicides. Another important finding is that industrialization and urbanization did not bring about higher rates of homicide in Japan. In fact, the number declined sharply in view of the fact that the population has more than tripled during the past 120 years. The Marxian hypothesis proves wrong, at least in Japan.

First-Time Offenders A sharp decline in the number of first-time offenders occurred in 1905. Firsttime offenders declined from 158,789 in 1904 to 63,503 in 1905. The RussoJapanese War that started in 1904 and ended in 1905 is likely a major cause of this decline. It marked the first time an Asian power defeated a European power in modern history. Although Japan won nominally over Czarist Russia, Japan paid a high price in casualties. As a rule, nationalism is heightened during any war, which keeps many from committing serious crimes. People are united or bonded to maximize war efforts. The Sino-Japanese War that started in 1937 also brought crime statistics down. The Pacific War started while the Sino-Japanese War was still going on and had little impact on the crime rate. However, the end of World War II unleashed a new wave of crimes, doubling the number of first-time offenders in 1946. There was not enough to eat then. A judge by the name of Yoshitada Yamaguchi starved to death in 1946 as a result of trying to live on rationed rice alone.

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The figure for 1955 stood at 54,035 for first-time offenders. The number decreased to 51,103 in 1956 and continued to decline. This trend continued until the late 1970s. It increased slightly in the 1980s. It started to decrease again in the late 1980s and continued to decline as the economic bubble burst. It reached its lowest figure of 20,864 in 1992, only to start rising again. The rise in the number of first-time offenders in the 1990s is characterized by the surge of crimes committed by foreign residents. This coincided with recession. In the year 2002, we note the highest number of 30,277 who are so classified, which is about the same level recorded in 1967. These crime figures compare favorably against Europe and the United States. England has one of the lowest rates of crime in Europe, but the figure is still about twice that of Japan. The United States has five times the crime rate of Japan. It is interesting to note that these two countries are the only modern nation-states with capital punishment and which have not joined the International Criminal Court. As with homicides, crime has gone down despite the increase in population and industrialization accompanied by the rise in geographic movements of the people, resulting in urbanization in the past 120 years. The number of first-time offenders rose following the end of World War II and then started to decline after 1955, only to rise again after 1992. The increment in the number is over 1,000 per year after 1998, coinciding with lamenting on the sad state of affairs for the people at large by the JCP IPRC chairman I referred to earlier. We, thus, find some degree of association between the number of first-time offenders and IPRC activities in the 1955 system.

Divorce Rates Divorce rates, too, are an indicator of social alienation and disorganization. I found it interesting that Japan’s divorce rate in the late nineteenth century was higher than that of the United States. Japan’s divorce rate along with crime rate went down to about half of what it was in the late last nineteenth century while that of the United States skyrocketed during the same period. As table 6.7 shows, the rate of divorce was close to 3 per 1,000 population in late-nineteenth-century Japan. It started to dip in the late 1890s and the trend continued until the Pacific War. The rate was about 1 per 1,000 immediately following the war. It started to descend again after 1951, reaching the lowest postwar record of 0.73 in 1963 during the rapid economic development period in Japan’s history. Since, then, however, it has been slowly but steadily rising. I found that Japan successfully managed to avoid the danger Marx predicted of the tendency for social alienation to grow with capitalism. Industrialization accompanied by urbanization brought about more social bonding based upon the nation-state or place of employment in the past


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century, lowering crime and divorce rates. We also noted that changes in government are associated with these indicators of social disorganization and alienation. However, the way Japanese regimes went about in achieving these government objectives was different before and after World War II, as we shall discover. Authors such as Seymour M. Lipset called for the importance of developing a large middle class for democracy to grow. If a democratic government is doing well, the people should be content. Now we shall look for indicators of key contributory conditions for democracy and results of democracy in Japan.

Large Middle Class and Democracy There are two general methods of measuring social class: (1) self-identification by using the survey research method and (2) aggregate assessment. We shall use both of them here. Social class has no meaning when practically no one had enough to eat following the end of World War II. Let us start with a view on Engel’s coefficient and welfare recipient figures.

Living Standards Engel’s coefficient represents how much food costs as part of an average household budget. We assume that the lower the standard of living, the higher proportion of food expenditure, since we all have to eat to maintain ourselves. Entries in table 6.8 indicate over 60 percent of household expenditures went to pay for food, leaving little for the rest of household expenses. The percentage went down appreciably by the beginning of the 1955 system

Food expenditure/total expenditure (%)

Table 6.8 Engel’s Coefficient by Year

100

50

0

1947 1955 1965 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003

% 63

46.9 38.1

32

29

27

25.4 23.7 23.3 23.2

Sources: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination, Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: http://www.maff.go.jp/abst/from2/8ab/84b.html, http://www. stat.go.jp/ data/kakei/2003np/ zuhyou/2nh0001.xls

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era to about 47 percent. The rapid economic development of the 1960s helped Japan raise its standard of living. By the end of the 1955 system era in 1993, the coefficient was down to 24 percent. The coefficient is still going down, but very slowly. Other aggregate data we can use to examine the standard of living is per capita GDP. Table 6.9 again confirms the improvement the postwar government made in raising the standard of living. We find significant differences between tables 6.9 and 6.10. We find the per capita GDP declining from 1995 to 2000, confirming the contribution 1955 system or IPRC politics made toward improving the economy. This also coincides with the JCP IPRC chairman’s comments. We now move from aggregate data to survey data. How have people felt about their standard of living in recent years? This is extracted from the Japanese National Character Study. When we count those who thought living standards were either “Very” or “Fairly” high, we find, in table 6.10, that the percentage increased from 51 percent in 1973 to 74 percent by 1993, the year the 1955 system collapsed. The percentage plummeted sharply from 74 to 53 percent in 1998 and appears to continue to decline. The perception of high living standards apparently went down with the breakdown of the 1955 system. Let us look at another survey data from the Japanese National Character Study to show how people feel about their living standard now compared to 10 years ago, as shown in table 6.11. If we divide the five responses into “better” or “worse” groups by eliminating the middle category, we find a definite trend toward the standard of

Table 6.9 Per Capita GDP by Year (US$)

Per capita GDP (US$)

45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0 Per capita GDP

1960

1965

1975

1980

477

932

4,481

9,280

1985

1990

1995

2000

11,502 24,935 42,341 37,549

Sources: Takeshita (1995, 34), Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/h15-nenpou/chart/chart/chart3.html/


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Table 6.10 Living Standard by Year (#9.12d What about the standard of living? How would you rate Japan? (1) Very high, (2) Fairly high, (3) Fairly low, (4) Very low, (5) Other, (6) DK.)

F. high

F. low

V. low

Other

9 11 NA 17 16 5 5

42 52 NA 56 58 48 45

32 25 NA 19 20 38 41

10 7 NA 3 2 6 6

1 1 NA 1 0 – 0

High percentage

1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003

V. high

80 60 40

51

73

63

DK 5 4 NA 4 3 2 3

Total N 1,539 1,913 NA 1,824 1,905 1,341 1,158

74 53

50

1998

2003

20 0 1973

1978

1983

1988

1993

Year

living getting better as we move from the 1980s to 1993, when the 1955 system collapsed. The trend, however, is reversed by 2003, as shown in table 6.11. Here, again, we see evidence of the validity of what the JCP IPRC chairman said. The fact that both objective aggregate data and subjective survey data produce very similar results suggests strongly the validity and reliability of our hypothesis of the 1955 system being the leveling factor, perhaps slightly in favor of equality over freedom and liberty from the American perspective of democracy and free enterprise. If the government works for entire sectors of the country, the poverty rate should fall, reducing the number of welfare recipients. Did this happen during the 1955 system era?

Welfare Recipients I found the percentage of people on welfare to be close to four percent of total households in table 6.12 as of the year 1952 when Japan became independent. It went down to about 3.5 percent in 1955 and with the rapid economic development in the 1960s, it went down to about 2 percent for the 1970s through the 1980s. It started to decline further after the Plaza Accord in 1988 and the yen appreciated in value. The figure reached 1.4 in 1992 and started to increase slightly after 1995. This indicator, too, roughly corresponds

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Table 6.11 Your Standard of Living in the Last Decade (#7.30a Compared with 10 years ago, do you think your standard of living is . . . (1) Better, (2) Slightly better, (3) About the same, (4) Slightly worse, (5) Worse, (6) Other, (7) DK.)

Year Better Slightly better Same Slightly worse Worse Other/DK Total N 17 10 9 4 4

32 31 31 24 16

Percentage

1983 1988 1993 1998 2003

35 43 46 42 40

10 10 10 22 28

4 4 3 7 11

1 1 1 1 0

2,173 1,824 1,905 1,341 1,158

60 40 20 0

Better Worse

1983 49 14

1988 41 14

1993 40 13

1998 28 29

2003 16 39

Year Sources: Sakamoto et al. (2000, 107); Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character (2004, 107).

Percentage of welfare recipient

Table 6.12 Welfare Recipient by Year 5 4 3 2 1 0

1952 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1995 2000 Recipient % 3.96 3.49 2.72 2.48 2.2 2.15 2.11 2.1 1.55 1.4 1.48 1.65

Year Source: The National Research Institute for Social Security and Population Problems, http://www. ipss.go.jp/ Japanese/seiho/seiho.html

to the establishment and downfall of the 1955 system. To be more precise, the number of welfare recipients has been going down since Japan’s independence in 1952 and the trend continued during the 1955 system of 1955–1993. However, the figures for 1995 and 2000 suggest that the number of recipients is on a gradual rise. One gets the impression that something changed after 1992.


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Income Leveling Even if the economy grows, income needs to be more or less evenly distributed for the middle class to grow sufficiently to support a democracy. There are homeless and destitute people in urban Japan, but the numbers are smaller in relation to the United States. Slums are rarely found, even in urban areas. There are thieves, shoplifters, and swindlers, to be sure, in Japan. As can be seen from homicide statistics shown in table 6.7, crime rates are lower, however. Streets are narrower and sometimes there are no sidewalks, but they are safer from mugging. My daughter spent her junior year at International Christian University in Tokyo. When I took her there, she was surprised to see unlocked bicycles parked on campus. She went there from UC Berkeley, where even locked bicycles are stolen. Foreign visitors are often surprised to find unattended vegetable stores in towns and along roadsides. A head of cabbage may cost a dollar. Customers put a dollar into a box, and if one needs change, one can take it from coins in the box. My understanding is that storeowners sometimes find less money than they expect, but most of the time they find it all there. These are signs of a people and government that have successfully eliminated poverty as much as humanly possible under the Japanese free-enterprise system. One factor contributing to these remarkable phenomena is the income leveling in Japan through fiscal and tax policies and other financial measures. One way of measuring the leveling of income distribution is to divide the total amount received by the top quintile by the bottom quintile, as done in table 6.13. In 1951, when Japan concluded its Peace Treaty with the United States and other world powers, the top one-fifth of households were making close to six times the income of the bottom fifth of households. By 1993, the top fifth was making only 2.75 times as much as the very bottom. Table 6.13 Leveling of Income Distribution by Year

Year Top quintile/bottom quintile

1951 1955 1965 1975 1985 1993 5.76 4.78 2.90 2.73 2.86 2.75

TQ/BQ

6 4 2 0 1951 1955 1965 1975 1985 1993 Year Source: Takeshita (1995, 46). Former prime minister Takeshita derived his figures from a study of family budgets by the Office of General Affairs, the Government of Japan.

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Table 6.14 Annual Pay of Chief Executives and Entry-Level Employees by Year (in yen) Yearly income

1927 Gross 1927 Net 1963 Gross 1963 Net 1973 Gross 1973 Net 1980 Gross 1980 Net 1996 Gross 1997 Gross

Chief executive comp.

Male college grad. comp.

165,000 151,000 6,082,000 3,013,000 15,676,700 7,181,400 23,593,000 11,543,000 NA 33,700,000

1,500 1,500 257,900 252,500 825,500 797,400 1,623,000 1,546,000 NA NA

Difference

110.0⫻ 100.6⫻ 23.6⫻ 11.9⫻ 19.0⫻ 9.0⫻ 14.5⫻ 7.5⫻ 10.5⫻ 11.2⫻

Sources: Abegglen and Stalk, Jr. (1985, 192); their figures are extracted from the Japan Federation of Japanese Managers Associations [Nikkeiren]’s report published in 1982; Kyada News Service of Seikei Kenkybjo published in 1998 derives the latest figures for 1996 and 1997 from a newspaper report;The Hawaii Hachi, February 14, 1998, 2.

A comparable multiple for the United States in 1991 is 12. The gap has been widening in the United States since 1980 with the Reagan administration. In contrast to the United States, there has been a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor in Japan during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. A similar trend is seen in the average annual pay of chief executive officers and entry-level college graduate employees by year, as shown in table 6.14. The prewar difference between a CEO’s salary and that of an entry-level worker was about 100 to 1, in contrast to about 10 to 1 in the 1990s. Another important difference between the two periods is that there was hardly any difference in ratio between gross and net compensation difference before the war, while there are significant differences between postwar gross and net income, suggesting the introduction of a progressive income tax system after the war. Although the differences between figures for 1996 and 1997 are slight, they do suggest a possible reverse trend of increased difference in compensation between CEO and the entry-level worker. Japan may have reached a point of leveling in compensation that may work against innovative entrepreneurs who may leave for greener pastures in foreign country to start their businesses. Nevertheless, if this is the trend, what the JCP IPRC chairman said about the JCP being alone speaking out for the masses is true—the gap is widening. One of the indicators of an open democratic society is its social mobility. Is there any difference in the extent of social mobility over the past 50 years?

Social Stratification and Social Mobility Toshiki Sath (2000) uses a longitudinal survey of social stratification and mobility from 1955 through 1995 conducted every 10 years to present his


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case. He argues that while it is true that for the period through the mid-1980s, equalization of classes took place in Japan, particularly among those who were born before the end of World War II, that is, however, not true of postwar generations who have inherited much of what they have. He admits that Japan has become more egalitarian if one uses the gini index and even if one uses survey data. Japan also became an open society. However, that is not true of all cohort groups. He points to the pre–World War II generation that rebuilt Japan after the war as being highly socially mobile. Postwar generations, particularly those who were born during the baby boom years, did not show much social mobility. Schooling certainly has been used in many countries to help increase the level of upper mobility everywhere. Japan is no exception. It uses a competitive entrance examination system as a way to allow those who have achieved sufficiently high scores to enter the university or college of their choice. Private universities may use other criteria to allow entrance. That is not true of national universities. I, however, found that a disproportionately large percentage of law students at the University of Tokyo, the University of Kyoto and trainees at the Legal Training and Research Institute (the only graduate school of law in Japan then) hail from fathers who are bureaucrats and graduates of the University of Tokyo in my elite law student survey conducted in the late 1950s. Sath makes a similar point in his chapter 2 (2000). He rightly points out that we should focus on those who are about 40 years old in measuring one’s social class status in Japan. Young people enter employment first as a clerk, but they may advance themselves to management positions by the time they are 40. Sath’s study indicates that social equalization started to decline after the mid-1980s, a bit earlier than my data analysis indicates.

Representation and Democracy What do people everywhere desire? Health, happiness, peace, and the like are popular answers. If the government is serving the needs of people at large well, people should lead long, happy lives. While it is difficult to measure happiness, it is easier to measure life expectancy, since aggregate figures are readily available today. Did life expectancy improve during the 1955 system era?

Average Life Expectancy Entries in table 6.15 definitely indicate the lengthening of the average life expectancy in Japan from 1947 to 2002. In fact, the average Japanese today lives longer than any other people on earth. The trend continues even after 1995. While we cannot say anything about the quality of life for the Japanese, it is clear that the government of Japan is doing a relatively good job of providing health care for its people through a national health insurance

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Table 6.15 Average Life Expectancy by Gender and Year

Life expectancy

100 80 60 40 20 0

1947 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002

Male 50.06 63.6 65.32 67.74 69.31 71.73 73.35 74.78 75.92 76.38 77.72 78.32 Fem 53.96 67.75 70.19 72.92 74.66 76.89 78.76 80.48 81.9 82.85 84.6 85.23 Year Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Government of Japan, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/ life/life02/life-1.html

Infant mortality rate

Table 6.16 Infant Mortality Rate by Year (Death/1,000 Live Births)

100 50 0

I M Rate

1947 76.7

1980 7.5

1985 5.5

1990 4.6

1995 4.3

2000 3.2

Source: The World Fact Book, 2004 by CIA, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

program. Entries in table 6.15 do not contradict with our hypothesis about democracy and the 1955 system, although evidence does not say that the 1955 system had a better impact on life expectancy than other systems. A related indicator of public health is the infant mortality rate. The more developed the country, the lower the infant mortality rate. Japan has one of the lowest rates along with Sweden and a few other European countries. Table 6.16 shows a dramatic decrease in the infant mortality rate from 1947 to 1980, 76.7 per 1,000 live births to 7.5, one-tenth of what it was in 20 years before. The trend continues to this date. Hence, our inference from table 6.16 is the same as that of table 6.15; it does not contradict with our hypothesis about democracy and the 1955 system.


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Suicide and Unemployment People commit suicide for various reasons. Three major reasons for committing suicide in Japan are health, financial, and human relations–related problems, some of which are attributable to government policies. Some Japanese obviously commit suicide for purely health reasons, but there are human relations components that often accompany health problems. Financial reasons lead people to commit suicide, but if there are family members or friends with whom they can discuss their problems with, their chance of killing themselves may be reduced. One sad phenomenon one hears about in Japan is that suicide is not always an individual act, but rather a family act in which the entire family, including children, die along with their parents. How would government policies affect the suicide rate? Certain fiscal policies, tax policies, regulatory policies, and economic measures can adversely affect sectors of society to the point of bankruptcy or job loss that may lead individuals to commit suicide. The JCP IPRC chairman claimed that the masses, particularly the poor, were no longer represented in the Diet in 1997 when I interviewed him. He said it was because Socialists, who used to represent them, are no longer there. He added that the JCP is the sole friend of the masses left and pointed to three measures that the Diet passed in 1997 that would adversely affect the public. Was he telling the truth? We shall see. Entries in table 6.17 from 1950 through 1975 show some fluctuation in the number of suicide cases, but no real trend can be traced. Neither do we find much variation from 1978 through 1997. The figures have not come down through 2003. This is not all. Although I have not shown here, figures in the National Police Agency data indicate that suicide committed by the selfemployed jumped from 3,028 in 1997 to 4,355 in 1998, a whopping increase of 1,327 in one year!! Likewise, the number of unemployed, including senior citizens, who committed suicide, soared from 11,590 in 1997 to 15,266 in 1998. Such sudden rises were unprecedented in postwar history. It is difficult to deny the correlation that exists among the three measures plus other bills the Diet passed in 1997 and these statistics. I found another indicator of the same trend in the rate of unemployment for the same two years as shown in table 6.18. “Infoseek” website reports that as of April 13, 2004, there is no single year when the rate of unemployment changed more than 0.7 percent, as noted in 1998. It also notes that there was a sharp rise in suicides. Suicides in 1998 increased 34.7 percent from 1997. The degree of association between these two indicators is greater than that of suicide and the price of stock. It suggests financial constraints imposed as a result of policy changes that could have produced these adverse effects. The surge in unemployment rate accompanied by the increase in suicides in 1998 is unprecedented.

176 Table 6.17 Total Number of Suicide, Suicide Rate, and Suicide Reasons by Year Year

Suicide

Suicides per 100,000

Health

Financial

Alienation

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

16,311 22,477 20,143 14,444 15,728 19,975 20,788 21,503 21,048 20,434 21,228 25,202 24,596 23,599 25,524 24,460 23,742 22,436 21,346 21,084 22,104 21,851 21,679 22,445 23,104 24,391 32,863 33,048 31,957 31,042 32,143 34,427

NA NA NA NA NA NA 18.0 18.5 18.0 17.3 17.9 21.1 20.5 19.5 21.0 20.0 19.3 18.2 17.3 17.0 17.8 17.5 17.3 17.9 18.4 19.3 26.0 26.1 25.2 24.4 25.2 27.0

NA NA NA NA NA NA 12,506 13,307 12,818 12,288 12,488 14,256 14,091 14,100 15,375 15,264 15,327 14,838 14,269 13,666 13,912 13,006 12,543 12,798 13,044 13,659 16,769 16,330 15,539 15,131 14,815 15,416

NA NA NA NA NA NA 1,703 1,577 1,820 2,019 2,377 3,651 3,458 2,684 2,759 2,283 1,842 1,396 1,272 1,660 2,062 2,484 2,418 2,793 3,025 3,556 6,058 6,758 6,838 6,845 7,940 8,897

NA NA NA NA NA NA 2,466 2,412 2,206 2,024 2,110 2,134 2,343 2,218 2,454 2,258 2,147 1,975 1,857 1,734 1,874 1,807 2,007 2,008 1,971 2,064 2,952 2,880 7,767 2,726 2,698 2,858

Note: The three legislative measures on national health insurance, consumption tax, and income tax against the JCP passed in the Diet in 1997 that resulted in a heavier burden on less affluent sectors of the country as noted in pp. 72–73 and p. 182. My hypothesis is that these changes resulted in a significant rise in the number of suicide in 1998 as can be so inferred from the figures in bold. Sources: Data from 1950 to 1977 were taken from the following website: http://www.niph.go.jp/wadai/ boushi/statistics/pdf/list/pdf. Data from 1978 through 2003 were derived from National Police Agency data found on the following website: http://www6.plala.or.jp/fynet/5tokei-keisatu-jisatu.htm


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Table 6.18 Unemployment Rate by Year

Unemployment rate (%)

1950

1965

1985

1990

1997

1998

1999

2000

2003

1.2

1.2

2.6

2.1

3.4

4.1

4.7

4.7

5.3

Source: Derived from “Infoseek,” which is the trademark for Rakuten, Inc. Its website is http://members. at.infoseek.co.jp/J_Coffee/toukei.html#jisatsu

Schooling and Democracy What is popular and supported by the majority is not always politically or morally correct. This is one reason why some theorists denigrate the merits of democracy. A viable democracy requires people to be informed and exercise their freedom to critically evaluate the performance of government. That requires more than mere literacy; it requires critical thinking. Each citizen must have equal and effective access to learn about policy alternatives and their consequences if democracy is to grow. Everything else being equal, the higher the level of schooling, the greater the voter turnout is in most countries. Earlier in table 6.4, I presented the results of a question on whether the people should leave everything to outstanding leaders or people should “discuss things among themselves.” Those who chose the latter are the kind of people who make democracy viable. The National Character Study results show that the higher the level of education, the more likely they choose the latter. Higher education makes people critical about everything, including themselves. Hence the question is: Did the 1955 system help the Japanese gain better education? I constructed table 6.19 to show how the percentage of young people going beyond compulsory education of nine years to high school, college, and university changed from 1955 through 2003. I was not able to locate figures for 1960. Setting aside the quality of education, it appears as if the 1955 system has done well in having an increasingly large percentage of young people obtain higher education. I might note here that more women go to two-year colleges than men and more men go to four-year universities than women. These figures do not include those who get educated through correspondence or online. The fact that highly educated voters are more likely to discuss issues among themselves than the less educated suggests that many are getting the kind of education needed for citizens in democracy. I also wish to add that those who are better educated are more likely to choose the second answer of “try to vote as much as possible” instead of “let nothing stand in the way of voting” in the item I presented in table 6.3. This, too, suggests that the higher the level of schooling, the more likely they are to vote as a way of exercising their free will and not as a matter of conformity or

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High school/college, university

Table 6.19 Getting Beyond Compulsory Education by Year 150 100 50 0

1955 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003

High school

51.5

70.7

82.1

91.9

94.2

93.8 94.4

95.8

95.9

97.1

Col/univ.

10.1

16.9

23.6

38.4

37.4

37.6 37.4

45.2

49.1

46.3

Year Source: Government of Japan, White Paper http://www.gender.go.jp/whitepaper/h15/danjyo/html/honpen/ chap04_08.html

compulsion. These findings tend to indicate that the 1955 system so far has done well in educating people as citizens of democracy, at least with regard to the dimensions examined here. And in turn they must be contributing toward the development of democracy.

Conclusion Summary I have cited a song and a poem to illustrate a few ways of looking at Japanese democracy through the eyes of those who were involved in making democracy possible. I have selected equal access to power and authority as the key concept in democracy among many definitions for our purposes here and pointed out constraints of democracy as well. Then, we reviewed Japanese contexts within which democracy may take root. I gathered aggregate and survey data to examine the extent to which government policies have positively or adversely affected the welfare of the people over the years, especially during the 1955 system era. How well does the government represent the interest of the masses instead of a privileged few? Do people have equal and effective access to power and authority? Is there freedom and liberty for all? Are people socially connected? Are people free from crime? Do people feel safe? Is there a large middle class? Are people healthy and do they enjoy long, healthy lives? Do many fall through the public safety net of public assistance or who are otherwise adversely affected by government policies? A democratic government is assumed to represent the interest of all people at large.


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Table 6.20 Summary Findings: The Dynamics of Democracy Item

Negative relations

Voter eligibility Voter turnout

Valid at face value

Voter interest

Valid at face value

Candidate competition Democracy initiator Gov’t by people Single-parent child Crime Divorce Living standard: aggregate data Livings standard: aggregate data Living standard: survey data Living standard: survey data Welfare recipient

Income leveling Life expectancy Infant mortality Suicide Unemployment rate Schooling

Positive relations

No relationships

1890–1945 Quality of voter turnout Quality of voter interest No significant change Grassroots 1970s 1953–2003 (1973–1978) Decreased Decreased Decreased Engel’s coefficient down Per capita GDP up until 1995, down after 1995 Up until 1993, down after 1993 Up until 1993, down after 1993 Declined till the early 1990s, increased in 1995, 2000 Improved in postwar years Continues to improve Continues to improve Drastic increase 1997 to 1998 Increase from 1998 on Continues to increase

I constructed table 6.20 to summarize major findings. Our null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between the type of government Japan has had in the past 120 years in general and from 1955 to 1993 during the 1955 system era in particular and items listed in the first column. An assumption is that the government has become democratic with time from 1890 to 2004. The null hypothesis is accepted in one case on candidate competition. There have always been more candidates than there are for available seats in the HR. Competition seems keener in the year following significant political

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changes, such as the First General Election in 1890 and the first postwar election, but otherwise there are no trends extractable from the data. We find voter turnout and interest in elections to be inversely related to time, that is, the percentage of eligible voters voting in election and interest in voting has decreased over the years. In other words, they voted less often and showed less interest in voting with time, at least that is the case at face value with the figures we found. My explanation is that voter turnout is not always the best indicator of a democracy. The Soviet Union used to have close to 100 percent voter turnout. The U.S. voter turnout for presidential election has been only about 50 percent in recent decades. As for voter interest, rural voters in particular have been showing interest in voting as a matter of conformity, not of exercising their right to choose their representatives. Voters have been better educated in recent years to perceive of voting as an act separate from social duty or obligation. I found the remainder of the 17 items to show positive relationships between time and democratic indicators. The postwar government has become more and more democratic with time in general. At least in six cases, consisting of per capita GDP, two survey data on living standards, the number of welfare recipients, the suicide rate and unemployment figures, we find negative signs after the fall of the 1955 system in 1993. On the whole, I may be justified in generalizing that Japan is becoming more and more democratic with time, especially after World War II. We find, however, some signs of a reversal on such items as standard of living, the number of welfare recipients, suicide cases, and unemployment figures after the collapse of the 1955 system. In short, an increasingly large number of people were having financial problems in the past decade. Some may argue that this is an economic downturn for which the government cannot be held responsible. However, no one can deny that government actions have adversely affected lower sectors of the country, especially since 1997. These include three measures that passed the Diet: the increases in sales tax and health insurance cost, and less tax deduction for part-time workers.

Discussion and Implication Oligarchy, Nascent Democracy to Military Chauvinism The Japanese used oligarchy followed by military chauvinism to maintain law and order and to develop strong bonding between people before World War II. Prewar Japanese regimes used strong-arm tactics to bring stability and strengthen the social fabric while developing the economy. Crime, divorce, and social disorganization started to decrease after the establishment of a parliamentary system, but the gap between the rich and the poor did not narrow before the war.


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Democracy from the Top to Democracy from the Bottom and Egalitarianism The postwar Japanese government found no alternative but to govern the country through democracy. Yoshida doctrine called for leaving national defense to the United States and concentrate on economic recovery. The leaders could not use nationalism to build social capital. People abhorred anything that reminded them of wartime Japan, including the national anthem and nationalism. The occupational policy called for the dissolution of the Zaibatsu or large financial combines, resulting in the development of many smaller companies. To raise productivity, they started to treat their employees well by developing a lifetime employment system and paying entry-level workers well. In short, by 1960, many larger companies started to raise morale with company songs and incentives to offer new ideas. Military and chauvinistic songs of the war era were replaced by the company song to regenerate a sense of belonging. The narrowing of pay gaps between CEO and entry-level workers to a minimum also helped cultivate “in-group” feelings and lower the sense of alienation that Marx predicted. These leveling trends by industries were also accompanied by the government’s progressive income tax and other measures to eliminate poverty while recovering from the war. Also, the Yoshida doctrine enabled the government to focus its attention on economic development. The era of industrialization followed by the IT age creates an environment where we tend to withdraw to ourselves in the form of “bowling alone,” or as Putnam calls it, “pachinko alone” in Japan. We have become couch potatoes, browsing the world of the Internet and other forms of atomized patterns of human behavior. The challenge in the era of IT is how to develop bonding between people through the civic associations that de Tocqueville talked about? These bonds include a healthy nationalism, family relations, neighborhood organizations, citizen movements, and the like for the development of democracy in industrialized countries.

Contribution of IPRC to Democratic Ends I found much evidence to prove that Japan is becoming democratic in the past half century, particularly during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. There are a few signs that suggest at least in some areas, the democratic trend we found during the 1955 system era eroded in the past decade after its collapse. These findings, however, constitute only an association between the two sets of variables. To establish a causal relationship between IPRC politics and democracy, let us listen to what political leaders who went through the 1955 system have to say about IPRC’s contribution.

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Rep. Iwao Teramae, JCP IPRC chairman The six sets of aggregate and survey data presented in the chapter validate what Rep. Iwao Teramae, chairman of the JCP IPRC in 1997 claimed in my interview with him.22 My original intent of interviewing Rep. Iwao Teramae in 1997 was to inquire about his IPRC activities, not about the past or the IPRC’s contribution to democracy. While we were discussing the IPRC, he started to complain about the decline in the power of the opposition parties to get concessions from the LDP. Primary among his party’s priorities were keeping taxes low for low-income families and not raising the patient’s share of medical costs.

Rep. Hirotaka Akamatsu, DPJ IPRC chair Rep. Hirotaka Akamatsu, DPJ IPRC chairman, a former JSP member, informed me about IPRC’s contribution to the welfare of people at large.23 I found that these two IPRC members from the JCP and JSP are sufficiently similar to verify my point of the IPRC’s contribution to the growth of Japanese democracy. IPRC politics along with the U.S. occupational land and other reforms made it possible for those who were exploited as in the song for universal suffrage to have an effective voice in the Diet despite its minority status in the parliament.

The late prime minister Noboru Takeshita, LDP IPRC vice chairman Following his answer to my question on his contribution to the formation of the LDP–JSP coalition government in 1994, he informed me about the roles the LDP and JSP played during the Cold War era. I have mentioned the late prime minister’s comments about what I would call the “collaborative symbiosis” between the LDP and JSP through IPRC politics in chapter 3.24 It was in the national interest for the JSP to play the anti-American role, and for the LDP to play the pro-American role, and the IPRC made that possible. Among the consequences were that Japan was able to stay away from war and rearmament, narrowing the gap between the rich and poor among other objectives that Socialists wanted, and maintaining political stability the LDP wanted that enabled the economy to grow during the 1955 system era.

Epilogue Three Diet members from three different parties are essentially saying IPRC politics made it possible to pursue egalitarian democracy and promote a market economy while maintaining a Pareto optimum simultaneously, thanks to the Cold War. Hence, I would conclude that the IPRC, especially during the 1955 system era, contributed significantly toward democracy. If there were no powerful IPRC, political unrest or upheaval that characterized the 1960


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crisis could have occurred continuously to make economic recovery and rapid economic development impossible. This would have resulted in neither the LDP nor the JSP achieving their party objectives and the country would have been far from becoming democratic. Having said that, I do not deny that IPRC politics not only helped to promote democratic ends, but also led Diet members to the unethical and undemocratic ends of corruption. Furthermore, what we find is far from the ideal of democracy as defined at the outset. For example, the Diet membership recruitment process leaves much to be desired. There are just too many second- and third-generation Diet members, providing hardly equal and effective access for every adult to be recruited into the Diet. There are also too many male members and not enough women, especially in the LDP. Only a fraction of political aspirants gather enough funds to become candidates. The Japanese perceive of democracy like everything else. The choice is not between the best and the worst, but rather a happy medium. Their perspective is derived from a culture that predisposes them to adjust rather than to choose. It may be more appropriate to say that I found them adjusting to the wave of democracy relatively well through the bilayer structure. I must point out that the contribution of the IPRC to democracy was made possible only after U.S. enforcement of democratic government structure and reforms, such as land reform on the defeated Japan against resistance from Japanese leaders. Without external pressure, there would have been no friendly structure for democracy to rise from the bottom. Unlike what the Bush administration has done in Iraq, the United States wisely used the existing bureaucracy to bring about democratic reforms. Now, the end of the Cold War made the collaborative symbiosis impossible, resulting in the fall of both the LDP and JSP in 1993. Consequently, the power of IPRC has declined. Where will Japanese democracy go next with a weakened IPRC in the post–Cold War world era still in search for a new world order with Bush’s version in difficulty as of this writing?


7 Conclusion: Summary and Implications

The objective of the book was to propose the bilayer theory to explain the existence of the dual nature of Japanese political structure with special focus on the Diet, the highest organ of the state. Another objective was to assess the nature and scope of Japanese democracy from the bilayer theory perspective. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, it examines whether or not I have achieved what I set out to do at the outset. Finally, I shall discuss implications of my findings for comparative politics study and democracy in Japan. How valid and reliable are my findings of IPRC politics as viewed from the perspective of the bilayer theory, the core of politics as labeled by some Diet members? How useful was the bilayer theory to many who hitherto saw only official versions of Japanese politics, resulting in them labeling the Japanese state, dissimulative, enigmatic, refractive, or at least different from the West? How effective is the bilayer theory for people who demand open and transparent politics in Japan? How viable is the theory for applying it beyond the realm of politics into other aspects of Japanese society? What are the limitations of my findings? What are the consequences of my findings for democracy in Japan? Is democracy in Japan different from that of liberal democracy, as it exists in the United States? If so, how different is it for what reasons? Was U.S. occupational reform to democratize Japan a failure or success? What choice does Japan has for its future if it is to achieve the goal of transparent democracy as its people aspire?1 Finally, what are the implications of my findings for comparative politics theories in general and Japanese politics studies in particular? Where do we go from here?

The Bilayer Theory and IPRC Politics Validity I have shown how the nature of Japanese language seems to make its speakers shy away from making their intents explicit and clear from the Western

186


perspective. Their predisposed propensity is to adjust to the existing situation without taking sides rather than making a choice. This has more to do with the intrinsic nature of the language, not nationality, for Americans too tend to be Japanese-like when they think in Japanese (Hayashi and Kuroda 1997 and the references therein; Kuroda et al. 1986; Kuroda and Suzuki 1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). Politics requires one to make a choice. How then are Japanese politicians to make choices while making successful adjustments? A time-honored method developed from the time of mythological age or the Kojiki is to develop a dual structure whereby one satisfies the functionary necessity of making decisions away from the public. That is what Ray Christensen (2000, 129–130) refers to as hon’ne is exchanged and give-and-take occurs. Then, they act officially and formally in accordance with the prescribed legislative process of presenting the pros and cons first, followed by a decision by the ruling majority in plenary session—tatemae. The story of Izumo in the Kojiki described in chapter 4 also represents an attempt to develop a win–win situation where no one loses—a nonzero sum game. This may have led Prince Shhtoku (574–622) to develop the concept of “wa” or peace that was written into the 17-article Constitution. It has been pointed out by many authors on Japanese politics that plenary sessions are much shorter and less frequent in Japan than any other modern legislatures. It is shorter since everything is scripted behind the scenes, which in turn provides construct validity of the existence of bilayer structure. I described how I derived the bilayer theory by way of cross-language surveys. I am not saying that the bilayer structure exists only in Japan. It exists probably ubiquitously, but it does so more systematically and in an institutionalized fashion in Japan than in most other countries.2 In chapter 2, I have also demonstrated how this propensity to refuse to respond to binary-oriented questions affects the way the Japanese make decisions by attempting to derive a consensus instead of making a decision based on majoritarian principles.3 This tendency calls for the development of dual structures to accommodate both domestic and external pressures for Japan to become an integral part of the world community. There are rational-choice scholars and others who deny culture as an independent variable affecting Japanese politics as represented by Gerald Curtis (e.g., 1999) who claims that culture does not explain politics. Then there are area-focused scholars who use such terms as political culture. Such scholars include Ray Christensen (2000, 128–131) who recognizes the influence of culture on politics. The former does not give sufficient reasons for denying the powerful impact that culture has on politics, as I pointed earlier by citing Curtis. What I have presented from cross-language surveys constitutes reasonable grounds for the systematic empirical evidence that culture constitutes an important ingredient of politics everywhere. At least, I would contend that

Conclusion: Summary and Implications

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nationality is not important as language for the proposition that Japanese culture avoids open confrontation unless it is for public consumption. Setting aside the controversy over Japanese culture as a key independent variable affecting the Japanese, both scholars cited above do recognize cooperation between opposition parties and the ruling LDP. They do not, however, go into the details of politics as the key institution in the Diet as was the case with Mochizuki (1982). We found that politics, as an invisible part of Japanese politics, indeed exists. All major parties maintain offices in the Diet building with staff as if it were a part of the Diet. It, of course, is a party office since it is not funded by the public sector. I found sufficient evidence to infer that some form of IPRC politics appeared as early as shortly after the First General Election in 1890, even before the opening of the First Imperial Diet Session. The Diet started to institutionalize IPRC politics as soon as political parties were given proper recognition for the purpose of the smooth functioning of the Diet. After World War II, the Diet wasted no time in reintroducing IPRC politics in 1947. IPRC politics developed itself to perhaps its highest level during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993. It continues to function as the key committee to operate the Diet today though there is reduction in the amount of money involved. I cannot find evidence to deny the existence of IPRC politics in the Diet today.4 My efforts to interview Takako Doi on IPRC politics failed twice. I cannot interpret that to mean that there is no IPRC politics or that the JSP has never taken any part in IPRC politics, although she may not personally have. Even political leaders such as the current Prime Minister Koizumi, former Minister of Welfare in 1997, said that he cannot talk about IPRC politics although he did not deny its existence. Their refusal to discuss IPRC politics cannot be construed to mean that they deny its existence. Probably, it is the nature and scope of IPRC politics that constrains them from speaking about it. Furthermore, a short reference is made in the LDP party rulebook on IPRC politics. Though lacking in details specifically with reference to the amount of money involved in IPRC politics, there is sufficient evidence to prove the validity of the bilayer theory as it applies to the Japanese Diet from its very beginnings in 1890. We found ample evidence to prove the validity of the bilayer theory especially after 1947—the continuous existence of IPRC politics as an institution. IPRC politics does not only exist, but I also found evidence that it is the essence of real working politics in the Diet, as revealed by leaders such as Khichi Kath (1995, 12) and Junzh Iwasaki (1994, 282) or as I inferred from my interview with Iwao Termae of the IPRC JCP chair. Furthermore, some sources suggested the existence of politics behind IPRC politics. Perhaps, Arima’s use of such terms as the “shadow IPRC committee

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chair” verifies the existence of politics behind IPRC politics as we know it. What actually exists may be more than a bilayer structure; it may be multilayer. An example of statements in The Honolulu Advertiser, on March 2, 2002, as revealed from the Nixon tapes involving Rev. Billy Graham suggests the nature of truth to be difficult to prove and not wise to publicize, as it exists ubiquitously in the world of politics.5 The tape uncovered that Nixon and Graham believed that Jews controlled the news media in the United States; the two resented their dominance and wanted to do something after Nixon was reelected. Subsequently, Rev. Graham said that he does not remember the incident, but apologized profusely for his remarks (Graham 2002). The nature of truth or validity is sometimes such that it cannot be uncovered in its complete form. There are always politically correct and incorrect things to say. Such is the nature of validity testing in social science. Hamada writes that he referred to the KP’s involvement in IPRC politics in his remarks cited in chapter 3 on the occasion of the Budget Committee meeting on February 4, 1991 (Hamada 1993, 185–186). He challenges the KP, the JSP, and other opposition parties to sue him for defamation. What the IPRC of each party did was to agree to strike off Hamada’s statement from the official record. The fact that both the JSP and KP failed to take action against Hamada is indicative of the validity of his challenging statement. He also informed me that no one challenged him on the contents of his book entitled Nine Politicians Who Ruined Japan. He accuses Yasuhiro Nakasone, Shin Kanemaru, Noboru Takeshita, Hiroshi Mitsuzuka, Ichirh Ozawa, Kenji Miyamoto, Makoto Tanabe, and two others of ruining Japan with money politics. We find two sources of evidence for the undeniable existence of IPRC politics in this affair. First, despite the challenge, none of the disparaged parties attempted to sue Hamada for slander. Second, the unanimous decision by IPRCs from each party to delete Hamada’s remarks from the official record is a powerful indicator of the conspiratorial nature of IPRC politics. Although I was able to discover actual samples of IPRC politics such as the three principles of nuclear weapons or taxation issues in terms of policy outcomes,6 I cannot find direct evidence for the exchange of money. What I did find is limited to what appeared in papers and books about when and how either the LDP IPRC chair or its secretary general withdrew money. Timing is usually associated closely with the passage of important bills that divide parties. To summarize the validity of the bilayer model of the Diet, I took several steps: First, my attempts to look for evidence to deny the existence of IPRC politics failed. There was not sufficient evidence to deny its existence. I visited several IPRC offices in the Diet building to assure myself of the physical existence of the IPRC. As I mentioned, the current Prime Minister Koizumi refused to discuss IPRC politics, but he did not deny the existence or usefulness of it. I then found the Minister of Health and Welfare Koizumi coming


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in to see the LDP IPRC office manager while I was speaking with the manager. Minister Koizumi apparently needed the services of the IPRC. Second, I found what I would consider sufficient evidence to prove the association between the timing of the withdrawal of money by the LDP IPRC members or LDP leaders and the passage of controversial bills. I also found evidence for a causal relationship between what the JSP wanted and what the LDP decided to do, for example, the three nuclear weapons principle. I found individuals who were involved inform me to that effect. Third, I have heard a considerable amount of testimony from Diet leaders in the LDP, JSP, JCP, and other parties that verifies the role of IPRC politics in the legislative process. In the words of the late former prime minister Takeshita, the way bills are passed in the Diet is that you add one and one together and then divide by two. His statement was echoed by his JSP counterpart, Tsuruo Yamaguchi, in his remarks during my interview with him. Furthermore, I heard no remarks that contradict those statements from Khichi Hamada, Kansei Nakano, Iwao Teramae, and others. Likewise, the journalists I interviewed never directly contradicted what I reported herein. Hence, I would conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove a causal link between IPRC politics and legislative outcomes in the Diet for most controversial bills, verifying the validity of the bilayer theory. The nature of the IPRC makes it impossible to systematically detail its processes. I have presented as much evidence as possible on IPRC activities as an observer, but there are many areas that remain clouded for others to explore and expose.

Reliability I have found similar findings from (1) newspaper reporters (2) scholars (3) politicians both who had direct experience in politics and those who did not (4) party staff members including ones in the LDP office, and (5) my own interview results with IPRC members from the ruling LDP to the JCP. Particular facts such as whether IPRC politics played a part in the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty Revision crisis or how often and how deeply or extensively the JCP gets involved in politics may differ from one source to another. However, the basic fact of the existence of IPRC politics remains the same from all knowledgeable sources. The nature of some evidence as presented by different Diet members varied from some who refused to be interviewed to retired IPRC veterans who were willing to share information. There are also some honest and ruling abiding politicians such as Minister Jun’ichirh Koizumi. Even his answer is useful in the sense that everything IPRC politics does involves activities that are politically incorrect to release to the public. For this reason, official party documents on IPRC politics remain scant and brief. This nature of IPRC politics is probably the major reason why the LDP requires its freshman members to

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belong to its IPRC committee and attend daily morning meetings during the weekdays. Although there are discrepancies among different data sources in details, I found no evidence contrary to the superior power enjoyed by IPRC committees in the operation of the Diet, from dispute resolutions between parties to the power they enjoy over the HMC officially in charge of the management of the Diet. The LDP IPRC committee even appoints the LDP members of the HMC. In other words, there are no basic discrepancies among different data sources on the nature of IPRC politics, proving the highly reliable nature of the data collection used to validate the bilayer theory as applied to the Diet. Another serious limitation has to do with the use of money in IPRC politics. Of course, this was brought to the public’s attention in a big way when Junya Yano, then a new member of the Diet who questioned Prime Minister Sath for his party use of money for IPRC politics. Outspoken Khichi Hamada is another person who revealed some of what he saw and spoke out beyond what was expected by his ruling party. Obviously, many disagree with what Diet members such as Hamada say or write. Such is the nature of truth in politics as revealed on the Nixon tape. After discovering the latent power structure of IPRC politics and learning the role it played in shaping Japan, especially during the 1955 system era from 1955 to 1993, I came to conclude that what the late prime minister Takeshita, a master of IPRC politics, told me was true and fits with what I learned from Tsuruo Yamaguchi, a JSP IPRC veteran, Teramae Iwao, the JCP IPRC chairman, and Hirotaka Akamatsu, the DPJ IPRC chairman. The former essentially said that during the 1955 system era, officially, the LDP took a pro-U.S. position and the JSP took its antithesis, an anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet position, but unofficially at the latent structural level, they were all nationalists united to maximize Japan’s national interest within the bipolar world of the Cold War era. Thanks to vocal dissent against Japan’s rearmament from the JSP, the JCP, and other left-wing forces, the LDP was able to resist U.S. pressure to rearm Japan. This made it possible for Japan to concentrate more on economic development. Teramae and Akamatsu informed me that the JCP and JSP were able to receive concessions from the LDP in order to benefit the working people. A veteran member of the JSP and former director general of the JSP IPRC, Tsuruo Yamaguchi, also informed me that he used to be criticized publicly by union leaders and media for compromising excessively with the LDP. Meanwhile, the same union leaders patted his back and praised his IPRC work, saying “well done” and thanking him whenever he met them in union offices. His remarks also fit with Takeshita’s “you add one and one and divide by two.” Progressive tax bills, environmental bills, defense bills, consumer bills, health insurance bills, and the like passed the Diet during the 1955 system era to virtually eliminate poverty, keep defense costs to a minimum, lower the crime rate, and develop a large middle class to enable the


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economy to grow. All of these outcomes certainly are not all classifiable as being the work of the conservative business-supported LDP. Political leaders who ought to know because of their Diet experience more or less agreed with generalizations I came up with that Japan uses its distinct cultural tradition to employ a silent layer of power and authority to build a democracy that withstands external and domestic pressures. I found no significant discrepancies in my primary sources of the data. These included political leaders from the ruling LDP to the radical JCP, leading me to conclude that my data sources proved to be not only valid, but also highly reliable despite the sensitive nature of the data. Hence, I must conclude that our findings are limited and unreliable in some ways on certain aspects of IPRC politics, but on the whole the basic nature of IPRC politics as presented remains firm and unshaken.

The Limitation The intrinsic nature of IPRC politics makes it impervious to inquiry. First, IPRC politics has been kept out of the attention of many political scientists or outsiders. Why so? The reader is familiar with the then minister Jun’ichirh Koizumi’s comments on IPRC politics. As a former employee of the JSP’s IPRC committee put it, what IPRC politics does is “something one takes to one’s grave” (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 1985, 37). Those who have been involved in IPRC politics since 1890 have successfully kept much of what took place in secret to themselves. However, some leaks have been presented in the preceding chapters herein to provide at least a partial picture of what goes on behind the closed doors of hotel rooms, offices, and restaurants. As for data presented in the manuscript, I have accumulated as much as I can from other observers, consisting mostly of journalists, including notes I took from interviews. However, I must report that I am unable to report everything I learned because of the nature of IPRC politics. For example, I interviewed a former top leader of a party official who is now retired. He asked the party officials present at Party Headquarters to have some printed materials sent to me. The party refused to send me any of the materials he requested. I also checked some reports with some veteran IPRC leaders such as the late former prime minister Noboru Takeshita, who is always nebulous in responding. He was a master human relations man. When I asked him about a report that detailed the key role he played in the formation of the LDP–JSP coalition government in 1994, he said “people give me too much credit for what I do.” I must mention that only one political leader denied the role that IPRC played in the 1960 crisis. He was emphatic in his denial whereas the other reports I have contradict with his claim. In any case, political leaders who were willing to meet me were much more open than a well-known political leader who refused to meet me twice on the subject.

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Second, political scientists in Japan have little contact with politicians, with the exception of a few as scholar-turned-politician Kurimoto (1997) says. Their empirical works are largely limited to election-related studies and others that involve little interactions with politicians. Foreign scholars do not expose themselves to works by journalists, where much of the publicized work on IPRC politics is done. Much of their language proficiency is insufficient to delve into the inner workings of Diet members, who do their best to hide what they do not wish outsiders to know.7 Everyone likes to tell stories about the sunny side of what goes on, not the shadowy side. The present study constitutes a new lens called the bilayer theory that enables the reader to see the other side of the moon never shown to the inhabitants of earth. Third, journalists do much of the work on IPRC politics, but their work tends to be unsystematic and incomplete at best, since it is impossible, if not very difficult, to learn the full story behind any IPRC politics at work. This is not meant to be a criticism of journalists. The nature of IPRC politics makes it so. Their advantage is that they get to know what politicians do by staying with major political figures on a daily basis over a long period of time. They also talk with and befriend them. Their work is empirical. Scholars tend to stand aloof from unsystematic, seamy stories. They seem to be more interested in criticizing IPRC politics than really trying to understand it. Also, access to busy politicians is not always easy. Many scholars simply do not try hard enough to have much access. In this regard, I must credit reporters for providing their readers with as much truth as they can reveal. Their sources are the richest in terms of the volumes of reporting on the subject. We political scientists are guilty of not making full use of their reports. Hence, IPRC politics outside of Japan is hardly known. For the same reasons, I found it challenging to present sufficient evidence to prove the scope and nature of IPRC politics in full. However, I have sufficiently compelling evidence from many journalistic and few scholarly written sources, including those written by politicians plus the results of my own interviews with political leaders from all major political parties, their aids, party workers, and journalists. They can explain the nature of Japanese Diet politics more realistically than any existing work in English. Kuno (1988) reports on the old days when he took peanuts to his socialist colleagues who opposed the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960. As is the case with all other LDP IPRC veterans, he says nothing about the money that changes hands from the LDP to the JSP and other opposition parties. Journalists report how lavishly the LDP deals with its opponents. This is another reason why it is a taboo topic for politicians to discuss. It is impossible to think that either the Democratic or the Republican party would give a sizable amount of money to its opposition party to push legislation through Congress, particularly if a party already has a majority vote. Congressional members scratch each other’s backs from time to time to push their pet projects,


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but not millions of dollars every year every time for key legislation. Evidence for the existence of IPRC politics is overwhelming, despite limitations due to its very nature. This limitation has to do with the IPRC’s power in the Diet. I do not wish to leave the impression that the IPRC is the most powerful body in the Diet, for it most certainly is not. Party leaders decide who is to be appointed to the IPRC. The LDP IPRC is very closely tied to the prime minister’s office, for instance. Party leaders control their respective IPRCs. It is the most powerful organ in the sense that IPRC politics is what makes compromises between and among parties possible for the Diet to function and maintain political stability. In this sense, IPRC members are not general leaders, but specialized leaders. They lead whenever there are controversial bills. How does the bilayer theory fit with existing theories of comparative politics in general?

Placing Bilayer Theory and IPRC Politics in the Literature Latent Politics: Viscosity, Corporatism to Bilayer Theory By far the most often cited book on the Japanese Diet in English by Japanese authors is Mike Masato Mochizuki’s unpublished dissertation (1982).8 His contribution lies in Blondel’s concept of viscosity as the key variable in explaining the functional nature of Japanese parliamentary politics in opposition to those who argue that the Japanese Diet does not play a significant role in the legislative process, concluding that it is a rubber stamp. However, it functions differently from open liberal democracy in the West, where a majority makes decisions. Michael L. Mezey (1979) focuses more on the extent of contributions made by participants in the legislative process in terms of its outcome. Mochizuki credits opposition parties for their disproportionate strength that allows them to affect the legislative process despite their minority status. Mochizuki attributes this to the viscosity of the Diet without specifying the role played by IPRC politics. He does, however, refer to what Giovani calls “invisible” politics. I do not believe that Mezey means to exclude such “invisible” forces as IPRC politics to contribute to the legislative process because of his empirical orientation. Furthermore, Riggs earlier proposed a prismatic society model and most recently, Curtis characterizes Japanese politics in terms of a refractive model. Many theorists of legislative process or Japanese politics have pointed out the existence of Giovani’s “invisible” parts of politics in many parts of the world. They used different expressions, models, labels, both implicit and explicit, but they insist that politics is more than what is publicly observable in

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plenary sessions and committee hearings. What the bilayer theory does is to make explicit the nature of the prismatic or refractive lens as it exists in the Japanese governing process as to its “invisible” structure and processes. The present work’s contribution lies in making the hitherto suspected invisible structure in Japan less invisible. The present study does not deal with the question of the national power structure as such. There is literature on the question of who is most powerful in Japan. Some claim bureaucratic superiority over politicians (Inoguchi 2003; Johnson 1982) while other authors in Japan claim a triumvirate power structure of business, bureaucracy, and the LDP. It is fair to say that there is no monolithic power structure.9 The question of who is most powerful varies with issue areas be it at the local (Kuroda 1974a) or national level. Another dimension of power besides the area of decision making that this book points to is that power may vary at each stage of the policy-making process in Japan. The group most omnipresent in all stages of the policy-making process is IPRC politics (figure 3.1). Although general directions for making policies may come from each party’s top leaders to its IPRC committee members, it is up to them to negotiate with other IPRC committees to come to an agreement. No matter who initiates a bill, it eventually must be guided through IPRC politics to pass the Diet. In this sense, evidence presented here tends to give more support to Christensen (2000) and others who claim politicians to be the primary source of power, and that power is shared fairly widely, depending upon the area and stage of the decision-making process. He uses the term “cooperation” to suggest the cohesive nature of the Japanese parliament, which comes close to the viscosity theory proposed by Mochizuki (1982). Ample evidence is presented here to prove the institutionalized nature of IPRC politics, which may very well constitute the core of Japanese legislative politics, particularly in view of its omnipresence. My claim here is not that I have revealed anything radically new that has not been said before in a variety of ways such as Mochizuki’s “viscosity” (1982), Curtis’s Japanese “logic” (1999) or Christensen’s “cooperation” (2000). In fact, Yanaga (1956) most accurately detailed the exact nature of IPRC politics earlier than anyone else in the English language literature. What I have done here is reveal as much details as possible to suggest that the nature of IPRC politics is something that goes beyond legislative politics to include national power structure as well. It, indeed, may constitute the core of Japanese politics. In doing so, I have presented data necessary to prove the utility and viability of bilayer theory in understanding Japanese democracy and possibly beyond. In characterizing Japanese politics, many have used different theories or models such as “cultural politics” (Watanuki 1967, 1976), Pempel– Tsunekawa’s corporatism without labor model (1979), Inoguchi’s “bureaucraticinclusionary-pluralism” (1983), “patterned pluralism” by Muramatsu and


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Krauss (1987, 517), “compartmentalized pluralism” by Sath and Matsuzaki (1986), van Wolferen’s “enigmatic state” (1989), Inoguchi’s “iridescent” or “opalescent” model (1991) and “karaoke democracy” (Jain and Inoguchi 1997), and Murakawa’s dichotomy of formal and real governments (2000). The present study comes closest to perhaps Inoguchi’s opalescent model or Pempel–Tsunekawa’s model. In the latter case, it is close and yet the exact opposite of theirs in that what I found is the model of corporatism with powerful labor fits the most in explaining Japanese politics during the Cold War era.

Bilayer Theory: Corporatism with Labor A variation of corporatism in many parts of continental European democracies is what prevails in Japan. Labor union interests represented by the JSP during the 1955 system era were disproportionately effective in reality, but the bilayer nature of their representation made it too “dark” to see or invisible. The fact that it was invisible led T.J. Pempel and Kei’ichi Tsunekawa (1979) to conclude that Japanese corporatism is one without labor. The effectiveness of labor unions is apparent for several reasons. First, the virtual elimination of poverty as known in prewar and early postwar days was achieved largely during the 1955 system era when IPRC politics probably reached its most active phase. As I have pointed out, this is at least in part due to disproportionate impacts the JSP, JCP, and other leftists had on the legislative process. For obvious reasons, they do not publicly claim credit for their achievements. Second, labor unions were very much an integral part of corporatism in Japan represented through the JSP IPRC committee during the 1955 system era and even beyond to some extent or at least until the time of the Murayama cabinet’s formation. Mr. Murayama was officially an ineffective quixotic leftwing member of the JSP, but he was unofficially an effective partner of the LDP’s legislative process through his latent activities on the JSP IPRC committee. Rengo, the largest federation of the Japanese unions and the LDP leadership, must have played “invisible” parts in selecting him to form the LDP–JSP coalition government less than a year after the collapse of the 1955 system era in 1994. The formation of the Murayama cabinet was a surprise to only those who knew visible parts of Japanese politics. To them, it was an impossible coalition of two archrival political parties. It came as no surprise to those who knew that Murayama was a veteran of IPRC politics well connected to the LDP leadership structure. Labor union cadres knew his latent activities, but not the rank and file members for whom he was a spokesman of left-wing lofty Socialist causes. As soon as he became prime minister, he decided to accept the SDF as legitimate. He was, however, different from the LDP prime ministers of the past in that he apologized more deeply and

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profusely to Chinese and other Asian victims of the wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese military than his predecessors. Corporatism views legislative politics essentially as the process of mediation among competing interest groups. It is in this sense a form of pluralistic democracy. The key difference with liberal democracy is that the process is not subject to public inspection in corporatism as it should be in a liberal democracy. Parties or groups negotiate to arrive at a consensus that is acceptable to all parties concerned to the extent that they are reasonably satisfied. To do that might require give-and-take behind close doors that may involve money flowing from the ruling party to the opposition, on the average of $1 million per bill and concessions on issues toward the end of the 1955 system era. Certainly, bribery is illegal in Japan as much as elsewhere. Since the secret transactions were conducted mainly using cash, they are not traceable except for the evidence of withdrawal records from the ruling party’s special account used largely by the party secretary general. Japanese corporatism takes place among members of IPRC committees from political parties representing various interest groups. Key actors are members of IPRC committees especially those of the ruling party. All those including bureaucrats who are interested in affecting decisional outcomes do so through IPRC politics. The scope of IPRC politics includes all aspects of Diet management including the question of what to do with individual Diet members who are in trouble for a variety of reasons. For example, the resignation of popular Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka in the spring of 2002 caused a controversy and a sharp decline in the public acceptance of the Koizumi cabinet. It falls on the responsibility of IPRC committees to deal with the question of a series of individual Diet members in difficulty, such as Muneo Suzuki and Khichi Kath. They work behind the scenes to settle differences between parties. The Japanese public demands more transparent politics. The public liked Prime Minister Koizumi because of his apparent transparency in speaking out on issues, resulting in the high degree of popularity he enjoyed as he came into power in April 2001. Unlike many other conservative politicians, he has a strong sense of individualism, probably as a result of having studied abroad. That may have led the public to perceive him as someone whom they can trust. Perhaps, he is more transparent than many other political leaders, but my experience tells me that he is a dedicated party man, as I indicated earlier. His popularity started to decline in 2002 as the public became aware of who he really was. How important is transparency in politics in a democracy? An informed citizen knows that it costs over a million dollars a year on the average to serve as a Diet member. The public pays only a fraction of one million dollars to keep its Diet members in office. The public provides only three secretaries or aids per Diet member and an office—hardly enough to perform


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all the responsibilities given to a Diet member. We all know that everyone, including politicians, work for people who pay them to perform tasks. If we do not, we should know that we couldn’t expect our representatives to work for us. Japanese representatives are forced to raise about a million dollars per year to stay in office; it is inevitable that some will be forced to engage in activities to survive that are on “dark” side of the street in Nagata-chh where the Diet is located. The literature, thus, can be divided into (1) those who focused on visible politics represented by Pempel and Tsunekawa (1979) and Richardson (1997) and (2) those who included latent, dark, or invisible politics as well represented Curtis (1999) and Christensen (2000). The present work sides with the latter but goes beyond it in systematically unveiling latent politics to the extent never done in the literature on Japanese politics in either English or Japanese. The present study has done so while proving the viability of bilayer theory.

Democracy in Bilayer Theory Perspective My intent is also to discern the characteristic of Japanese democracy from the bilayer theory perspective by focusing on the role that IPRC politics played in the development of democracy. What did we find?

Functional Need for IPRC in Democracy We learned in chapter 4 that Yamagata successfully passed the budget bill by making use of a prototype IPRC, consisting of Matsukata and Ghth representing the government and their ally, the Liberal Party in 1891. These two men knew several leaders of the Liberal Party, which constituted a plurality in the First Imperial Diet Session. The Liberal Party’s ad hoc IPRC members had to resign from the party to take responsibility for collaborating with the government afterward, however. Prime Minister Matsukata failed to pass the budget bill in the Second Session in December of 1891. He did not use IPRC politics, resulting in the dissolution of the Diet before the end of 1891. The use of the IPRC, in other words, made passage of the budget bill possible even though it meant the resignation of 23 members of the Liberal Party from the Tosa clan. Well-known left-wing liberal Chhmin Nakae from the same party and clan background resigned from the HR. Some critics said these men set the foundation for money politics through compromise while others argued that without their compromise, the Diet could not have passed the first budget bill. Without their sacrifices, parliamentary democracy would have collapsed in the first year of its existence. This incident certainly suggests a functional need of IPRC for Japanese parliamentary democracy to run smoothly. The choice is between a dysfunctional

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Diet where everyone exercises her or his freedom of speech and the right to vote their conscience, with many ceaselessly interrupting sessions, generating instability and chaos as opposed to a functioning Diet with a bit of corruption, ending in the resignation of 23 men from the party and the resignation of one of its members from the Diet. Is there any alternative for Japan? As Matsukata and other Meiji leaders found to their dismay early on in parliamentary history, the only alternative was resolving the Diet. The germane question is: Is a functioning Diet with a bit of corruption more democratic than a dysfunctional or violent Diet? More specifically, which would better represent the public’s desires? Which would benefit the public more in the long run? Democracy is not perfect. Nevertheless, it is the most preferred way of governing, even if it is only the least evil way of governing. Although the U.S. model of liberal democracy was imposed on Japan following the end of World War II in violation of the principle of selfdetermination, the U.N. Charter and international law, Japan definitely developed a democratic structure and institution. The Diet structure was hollowed out as the Japanese used their traditional means of IPRC politics to manage the Diet. Official structure and process of Japanese democracy is maintained, but the culture called for an additional branch of IPRC politics. The international environment within which postwar Japanese government found itself after the advent of Cold War, when the United States changed its original occupation policy to meet the challenge of the Soviet threat, provided political leaders with a viable arena for latent IPRC politics to prosper.

IPRC and Democracy: Legislative Process and Consequence Let us review Japanese democracy from the point of view of the legislative process and consequences. First, our focus is on the latent legislative process. We found IPRC politics a necessary tool for a well-functioning Diet on many occasions, particularly for controversial bills. The consequence of attempting to eliminate the IPRC could result in the dissolution of the Diet as it did in 1891 or ceaseless delays and dysfunction, as reformer Ichirh Ozawa, who caused the fall of the 1955 system, discovered to his dismay in 1993. A wellfunctioning Diet requires the IPRC to play its latent role, even if it involves undemocratic elements. If the bilayer theory is correct, latent IPRC politics as well as trouble-ridden factional politics in the Diet will continue to exist for years to come as long as the Japanese speak Japanese. Under IPRC politics, minority parties yield more power than under strictly majority rule, just as smaller states do over states with larger populations, from the point of view of one man-one vote in electing members of the U.S. Senate. IPRC politics, however, represents a departure from democracy, which calls for equal access to all.


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Nevertheless, in the tradition of Max Weber’s concept of government, in order to function, it has to be legitimate and effective, as Seymour M. Lipset would say (1960). IPRC serves the need for the Diet to be effective, although it lacks rational or legal legitimacy. It has, however, legitimacy derived from tradition in Weberian sense.10 Second, we will focus on consequences of the legislative process. We found democratic elements in the legislative outcome of IPRC politics that are largely democratic in several respects. First, it materially or financially benefited large sector of the society, similar to Nobutaka Ike’s model of patronclient democracy (1972, 1978). It created a large middle class, which in turn generated increased demand for consumption, benefiting corporative sectors as well. Second, it lowered social disorganization (Kuroda et al. 1998) and developed social capital (Putnam 1996), contributing to a favorable environment for economic growth.11 Third, it managed to maintain the political stability needed for the economy to grow. At the same time, it made it possible for the voice of the otherwise powerless masses to be effectively heard in the Diet through the JSP and JCP, which are minority parties. Fourth, it contributed toward what the largest sectors of the country wanted during the 1955 system era, that is, to keep Japan out of war.12 While Japan did successfully keep itself out of war during the Cold War era, it is regrettable it did not go beyond that to develop an active peace policy, first by apologizing to its neighbors for its war crimes in such a manner that victims are satisfied, thereby establishing sound neighborly relations with China and Korea. Then, the government should have developed sound friendly relations with its neighbors as Germany has done. In these regards, IPRC served as a mix of what Miller and Stokes (1963) call as the “instructed-delegate and responsible party models” for the public at large—a democracy at work, indeed. From the bilayer theory perspective, a formal government structure provides the legal and rational source of legitimacy for the Japanese government, while a hidden layer of authority consisting of IPRC politics derives its legitimacy from tradition. IPRC politics also makes the legislative process effective and provides political stability and security needed for economic growth, which in turn nourishes the growth of democracy.

IPRC, International Politics, and Democracy I found IPRC activities to include not just interparty relations, but also international relations. Veteran member of the LDP IPRC Chiji Kuno daily reported happenings of the 1960 Anpo crisis to the U.S. Embassy during the turmoil. In the summer of 2004, LDP IPRC Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa

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visited the United States over the question of how to deal with Charles Robert Jenkins, who defected to North Korea during the Korean War and married a Japanese national who is one of many abducted by North Koreans. He came to Japan from North Korea, in August 2004, with his Japanese wife and their children. It is safe to infer that the U.S. government maintains close and direct contact with the LDP IPRC while much of the content of those communications remains unreported to the public. Furthermore, a highranking diplomat came into to see the LDP IPRC office manager while I was interviewing him, indicating that IPRC politics goes beyond national boundaries. There are other areas where the IPRC is involved, such as approving funding for Diet members traveling abroad. The question for us is whether the IPRC contributed to the development of democracy through its role in international relations. My assessment is that it is providing an alternative channel of communication for international relations work for the government. It strengthens the effectiveness of government in carrying out foreign policy. Its roles are often invisible to the people at large. Whether that contributes to democracy depends on how democratic the government is. The IPRC is a tool for the Diet members. What it does depends upon what the Diet leaders want it to do. I have successfully shown hitherto undisclosed dimensions of Japanese politics at the highest legislative politics level from the sustained perspective of bilayer theory. Needless to say, I do not claim to have exposed all dimensions of what goes on in the Diet. What I can say is that I have spelled out what I could at this time and this is the first book devoted exclusively to IPRC politics. What are the implications of what we have found? There are two major theoretical and substantive implications, especially for democracy.

Theoretical and Methodological Implications Theory and Its Usefulness Having an explicit theory to guide the study helped me generate relevant questions to ask political leaders and classify what I found in the literature in a systematic fashion in accordance with the theory. It also helps us properly place our findings within the frame of the existing literature. Language plays an important role in bonding people. Yamagata knew in 1891 when he used a prototype IPRC to get the first budget passed by the Diet that IPRC members of the ruling group and opposition party must know each other well in order for them to work out a compromise. Twenty-nine Liberal Party members of the Tosa clan origin who spoke the same Tosa dialect defected from the Liberal Party line to side with the government. Common parlance among IPRC members helps them promote insider feelings as a group. Since IPRC


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members engage in activities that may be unethical and perhaps illegal at times, they use their own parlance that sounds benign and innocuous. One example is that IPRC members do not bribe opposition party members who refuse to negotiate; rather, they “take a milk bottle” to crying babies. These words may make unpleasant work easier for both sides. The theory proved useful in looking for relevant data for the purpose of analysis.

Theoretical Utility: Japan had a Two-Party System An implication of our findings that the politics of the ruling LDP and its opposition parties, especially the JSP, in the latent legislative process was based on a “two party system” or the ruling party versus opposition parties led by the JSP. Many have characterized Japanese parliamentary politics during the 1955 system era as being “one-party dominant” or a “one-and-ahalf party system.” While that may have been true in official dimensions of the parliament, it was certainly not true in the latent legislative process, as we discovered here. Parliament leaders were all Musashis with two swords. Here again we find the useful nature of the bilayer theory that enables us to see at least parts of the other side of the moon not heretofore seen.

The Usefulness of Journalist Data and the Need for Mutual Respect of Journalists and Scholars I found scant literature on IPRC politics by scholars. No one has ever focused on the subject in any systematic manner. Neither has any systematic data been collected on the subject. They have not treated IPRC politics as the central subject of their inquiry. Many treat IPRC politics normatively, not empirically. Their energies were spent criticizing the money aspect of IPRC politics. Some journalist-turned-scholars on IPRC politics were discussed by Ishikawa (1995a), but not as the central subject. Moreover, I have not found many Japanese scholars who base their work on interviews with Diet members. For example, Shin’ichi Kitaoka (1995) wrote an award-winning book on the history of the LDP without interviewing a single LDP Diet member, or at least mentioning that he did. Journalists have presented profuse and rich interview data, many of which are admittedly unsystematic and anecdotal. The nature of IPRC politics makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to collect any systematic and full data of IPRC activities, particularly with respect to the flow of cash. Their data are often derived from their being with politicians, sometimes 24 hours a day. Journalists typically follow particular political leaders or faction or group of politicians as assigned by their papers. They often know more than what they report. They are often constrained by the fact in Japan that their articles carry no by-lines, making the entire paper responsible for what a single reporter writes. To learn what they know, we must befriend

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them and inquire casually for more information. Their data often are such that we cannot disclose them. Such is the dilemma of studying sensitive dimensions of politics. What the present study implies is that we scholars are not making enough use of the rich data that journalists have accumulated over the years. Their data are simply underutilized by political scientists for a number of reasons. Scholars often look down on journalism for being anecdotal. Journalists, on the other hand, do not believe scholars know much about what is going on in the Diet, since they do not come down to talk with Diet members. This mutual disrespect for both professions is not healthy for the professional advancement of both. The current work demonstrates the huge contribution that journalists make for us to understand the nature of quotidian politics as it unfolds from the 7 A.M. breakfast meetings all new LDP members attend to LDP IPRC meetings late at night. The current study has taught us to respect each other’s professions and to communicate more often to deepen our understanding of the inner politics that politicians do their best to keep away from the public.

The Usefulness of Interview Data I have always found interviews or surveys to be useful, from my dissertation research on law students for a political socialization study of future leaders in the 1950s to the current work. Interviewing the public presents all sorts of problems, but is not as difficult as interviewing busy elites whose access is often very limited. My efforts to interview Diet leaders obviously presented me with some difficulties. I was, however, to my surprise, able to obtain more information from them than I had anticipated on the sensitive subject of latent IPRC politics. I did not always succeed, however, as noted earlier. Likewise, my interviews with IPRC office and party office members also proved to be useful. I was able to report with confidence on some IPRC activities, having heard about them directly from Diet members involved in IPRC projects. I have also seen political leaders enter and exit the LDP IPRC office. That would have been impossible without the interview data I gathered had I relied solely on my reading of the literature. Interviewing also affords us with opportunities to gain new and original information that would have been impossible otherwise. Data is also in the emotions, feelings, and body language I sensed while interviewing that I would not have gotten otherwise.

Using Multiple Sources to Increase Data Reliability and Validity To increase reliability and validity once the data is gathered, we need to have multiple sources of the same data. I interviewed LDP IPRC members and those of opposition parties in an attempt to triangulate what each member said. I also checked what I found in the literature against what I learned in


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my interviews. I found this practice to be a sine qua non in creating an internally consistent data presentation, particularly in dealing with Rashomonesque politics, which can be viewed in so many different ways. I found poems composed by Diet members useful in understanding the nature of IPRC politics, as exemplified in the late Junzh Iwasaki’s 31-syllable poems. How frustrating it is to sit through long sessions without hearing anyone express themselves honestly. This is what happens in many meetings of any group in Japan. Then, there are times when IPRC meetings are successful in achieving consensus after all arguments are made and exhausted. He expresses such feelings so well. Poems are a vehicle of communication. One feels less constrained in expressing one’s raw feelings in poems, for their purpose is to express truth. We can then compare poems written by Diet members with their interview data as well as what they have written, thereby increasing the reliability and validity of our findings.

Bilayer Theory’s Applicability to Other Areas The successful application of bilayer theory to the Diet implies that we can use the same theory to explain such sectors of Japan as the business arena. With the wave of globalization, the pressure to adapt a market-centric U.S. system is certainly felt in Japan, but it is not likely that this nation will accept the U.S. system in its totality, just as the so-called Japanese management system was not totally replicated by the Americans in the heyday of the Japanese economy. The so-called dangh or bid rigging in Japan is difficult to eliminate in its totality. Japan’s prism is likely to yield iridescent color in the process of riding the current wave of globalization when viewed from abroad as long as the Japanese continue to use their language, if the bilayer theory is applicable to business sectors in Japan.

Substantive Implications Rashomonesque Nature of Democracy The concept of so-called demokratia has survived since being coined by Athenians two and a half millennia ago. Romans called theirs a “republic” or public affairs. Alexis de Tocqueville entitled his masterpiece book Democracy in America. Abraham Lincoln offered his famous definition of democracy. More recently, Mao Zedong called his government “democratic.” Are they all talking about the same “thing”?13 The times, places, and languages are so far apart. So it is with democracy in Japan. Moreover, however great its popularity in much of the world, the word “democracy” was not considered favorably by the majority of Japanese as late as the 1980s. Industrialization accompanied by urbanization in Japan brought about reduced crime and divorce and a narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor, among other

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things that contrast with what took place in the United States. An implication is that we should not always expect democracy to mean the American style of democracy, with separation of power and majority rule. More specifically, my findings imply that Japanese democracy is neither strictly based on Aristotelian logic nor accompanied by monotheism, as in the case of American democracy. Rather, it is a reflection of its culture, as we found the proposed bilayer model of legislative process to be valid and reliable.

Democracy without Individualism and Majority Rule Americans tend to associate individual freedom and pursuit of happiness to be part and parcel of American democracy. In contrast to this American concept of democracy, Japanese democracy seems to be void of individualism, for consensus making is paramount, not majority rule. The majority has the legal right to pass bills, but the ruling majority rarely does so without prior arrangement with opposition parties. Moreover, party discipline in voting is strictly enforced in the Diet. Is this Japanese practice a democracy in light of our definition of democracy? Our answer is affirmative. Neither majority rule nor individualism is a necessary condition for democracy to prevail, for the salient concern of democracy is equality of access to power and authority. Under the bilayer nature of Japanese government, particularly during the 1955 system, minority party rights are not only protected, but also, numerically speaking, overrepresented in the latent legislative process, resulting in wider sharing of benefits for a greater segment of the country, particularly for lower income groups than minority parties could have under the strict majority rule.

Viable Democracy Through Illegitimate Introduction of Democracy Our study has shown that the U.S. introduction of democracy to Japan in violation of the concept of self-determination in U.N. Charter and international law turns out to have yielded a healthy democracy, even though it may include unethical and illegitimate elements and is not exactly what New Dealers had in mind when the new constitution and other democratic structures were imposed on occupied Japan.14 Japan could have rejected the U.S. imposition, as Germany did, but its leaders were obsessed with their efforts to preserve the emperor system.15 Does this mean that the Bush doctrine of a preemption strategy to topple Hussein’s regime and install democracy in Iraq is legitimate? No. First, ends do not justify means if we believe in rationalitybased democracy. Second, I have serious doubt about the primary objective of unilateral U.S. aggression in Iraq being solely the need for another democracy, since there are so many other countries nearby so badly in need of democracy. Could it have been a fig leaf for less noble objectives, as Michael Moore


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would suggest? Third, is it worth the lives of so many Americans and Iraqi children? Setting legal and ethical questions aside, what Japan’s experience implies is that it is possible for democracy to grow even if it was illegitimately introduced through an undemocratic manner. Am I saying that the ends justify the means here? No, I am not approving the manner by which the United States forced the defeated Japan to accept what New Dealers thought was good for Japan just as I do not think the way a former American oil company official is appointed to be president, Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan or Ayad Allawi who was affiliated with CIA being appointed to the interim prime minister of Iraq. The reporting of my findings that illegitimately installed democracy can be viable is in no way indicating my approval of such actions since they contradict with my understanding of democracy.

The Choice Is Not Black or White Our conclusion is that Japan is a legitimate democracy in the sense of its formal legislative process, and legitimate in its latent legislative process and substantive consequences for its traditional (cultural) legitimacy. Unlike the binary and rational choice model that tends to dominate the contemporary world, the Japanese model is an additive and adjustable one that accommodates both black and white in the manner its culture had nourished for centuries. Just as an effective medication may have some side effects, latent IPRC politics has side effects that must be kept to a minimum. However, it may help prevent the cohesiveness of a nation from falling ill to political instability and chaos. An implication of our study is that our concern should be generating constructive alternatives to improve Japanese democracy, given that its political culture is not likely to change much. We should not be focused on the malefic aspects of IPRC alone.

Problematic Nature of Japanese Democracy in International Relations Our findings thus far suggest that power at the highest level of legislative politics is dispersed and not concentrated in the ruling party or even the office of the prime minister, leading some observers to infer that no one is in charge of the country. It may be democratic in the sense that power is dispersed, but it presents serious problems as well for Japanese diplomacy in world politics. For example, Japan sends several representatives from several ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to international conferences such as the WTO. If they speak in unison, it would strengthen Japan’s voice in international negotiations. However, they all sing their own songs viewing a particular trade problem from respectively different

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areas, creating a discordant tune. It gives outsiders an impression that Japanese policy is ambiguous and inconsistent, weakening its position in world politics. Some Japanese leaders are aware of this problem and yet are powerless to act, weakening Japan’s position in world politics. In contrast, the U.S. Trade Representative represents a single voice, enabling the United States to make its policy clear. What can Japan do to eliminate this perennial problem and remain democratic at the same time? My findings of IPRC politics in the legislative process imply that the Japanese government needs to extend IPRC politics into dispute resolution among different ministries in the executive branch of government before sending any representative to international meetings so that Japan can present a coherent and cogent argument at the international conference.

IPRC Democracy with All Its Problems Is here to Stay I have presented enough evidence to call the Japanese bilayer system democratic, but one might raise the issue of structural corruption that seems to accompany the latent legislative process. An implication is that corruption is inevitable in such a democracy. My response is that corruption is inevitable in politics, be it American democracy or Japanese democracy, as history shows. Fortunately for Japan, the amount of money spent on IPRC activities seemed to have gone down after the fall of the 1955 system. There are neither rational nor ethical justifications for corruption anywhere. The Japanese “nemawashi” or making prior arrangements through informal contacts with relevant individuals involved in decision making is a well-accepted practice in Japanese society. The latent legislative process by IPRC is a form of “nemawashi” practiced at the highest organ of the state. If Diet members found the IPRC useful, and apparently they do, then it follows that legislation represents decisions reached through democracy. No one desires alternatives, and the reform-minded Ozawa’s attempt to abolish the IPRC failed in 1993. Hence, an implication is that IPRC politics will live and if the bilayer theory is correct, it will last as long as the Japanese culture and language. In summary, we found IPRC politics to have unethical dimensions that need to be corrected and yet it has not only served the national interest of Japan and promoted democracy, but it has also the potential to extend its scope of activities to include the executive branch of government as well.

The Decline of IPRC Politics and Harbinger of Open Democracy We have found that the collapse of the 1955 system signaled the decline of IPRC politics. We also found that it is impossible to eliminate IPRC politics, just as it is impossible to do away with factional politics. There are also signs


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of a widening gap between the rich and the poor, and the shrinking of the middle class in the past decade. What are implications of these findings for the development of democracy in Japan? First, a procedural democracy, akin to American democracy that emphasizes the importance of openness in the legislative process, seems to be starting to take place as a result of the decline of IPRC politics and money politics. It is becoming more open. There are no longer ideologues who shout uncompromising slogans that used to divide the Diet. There are no ideologies that divide the parties any longer as there was when the LDP and JSP dueled during the Cold War era. Keisuke Hi, whom I spoke with as I was completing the current work, pointed out that generation divides the Diet more than anything else.16 The LDP and the DPJ, currently the two largest parties each have members of various persuasions, and party lines indeed are blurred. The late prime minister Tanaka used to say that the LDP resembled a general hospital. Today’s main opposition party (DPJ) is made up of former LDP, JSP, and other members representing a variety of views. Second, despite these changes, IPRC is most likely to survive in one form or another to facilitate the legislative process at its highest level. It has already survived despite efforts to abolish it in 1993, over a decade ago. What seems in store for the future of Japanese democracy? Japanese democracy will continue to grow, but its direction has shifted since 1993, and that direction is toward a more open and American-styled democracy without ever actually becoming an American democracy. One of the reasons for this prediction that is based upon the bilayer theory lies in the role played by religion in American politics. Observe how important a role it has played in the reelection of President Bush in 2004. Japanese voters may not be as enlightened as Europeans in developing democracy, but adjusting the deep cultural predisposition of Yamato gokoro or Japanese mind, as Lady Murasaki said in the eleventh century, is likely to overcome the wave of globalization as it did in the past.


Appendix

A. #2.8

If you were to have enough money to live as comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work or would you stop working? (1) Continue to work (2) Stop working B. #4.5 In raising children of elementary school age, some people think that one should teach that money is the most important thing. Do you agree with this or not? (1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) Undecided C. #7.1 Some people say that with the development of science and technology, life becomes more convenient, but at the same time a lot of human feeling is lost. Do you agree with this opinion or do you disagree? (1) Agree (2) Disagree (3) Undecided G. #2.1 If you think a thing is right, do you think you should go ahead and do it even if it is contrary to usual custom, or do you think you are less apt to make a mistake if you follow custom? (1) Go ahead even if contrary (2) Follow custom (3) Depends on circumstances/situation H. #5.6 Suppose you are working in a firm. Which of the following department chiefs would you prefer to work under? (1) A man who always sticks to the work rules and never demands any unreasonable work, but who, on the other hand, never does anything for you personally in matters not connected with the work (2) A man who sometimes demands extra work in spite of rules against it, but who, on the other hand, looks after you personally in matters not connected with the work I. #2.5 Here are three opinions about man and nature. Which one of these do you think is closest to the truth? (1) In order to be happy, man must follow nature (2) In order to be happy, man must make use of nature (3) In order to be happy, man must conquer nature J. #5.6h Who would you like more? (1) Mr. S who is friendly and can be counted on to help others but is not an efficient worker (2) Mr. T who is an efficient worker but is indifferent to the worries and affairs of others

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Appendix

Money can solve most problems. (1) Agree (2) Agree somewhat (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree L. What happens to me, success or failure, is my own doing. (1) Agree (2) Agree somewhat (3) Disagree somewhat (4) Disagree N. #2.12b Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? (1) Try to take advantage of you if they got the chance (2) Try to be fair O. 2.12c Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (1) Most people can be trusted (2) You can’t be too careful in dealing with people

Glossary

Ainu: Previously thought as indigenous proto-Caucasoid who lived in Northern Japan, the Ainu are now considered part of the Jhmon people, along with Okinawans and others on the main archipelagos in Japan. Akahata: The official party newspaper of the JCP. Bakufu refers to de facto military ruling regime, for example, Tokugawa bakufu. Cow-walk tactic: This is a tactic devised initially by conservatives in 1947 to slowdown the legislative process. For example, they would walk like cows as slowly as they could from their seats to caste their votes. They may chat with someone on the way or stop and look around. Later, the tactic was used by Socialists and other progressive opposition party members to delay the legislative process. DSP: Democratic Socialist Party, a right-wing Socialist party. Dangh: The term refers to going into a huddle to negotiate a deal. It is often applied to refer to “bid rigging” in public works from the Western perspective. To Japanese people, it is their way of helping everyone involved in such a manner that all get a fair share of contracts over a period of time. Genrhs: They are elder statesmen of the Meiji era (1868–1911) who played a decisive role in managing the government. Giri: Proper conduct of obligation and duty deriving from formal relationships. The term is often used in conjunction with another traditional value of ninjh or emotional feelings of attachment. Gi’un: House Management Committee. HMC: House Management Committee, a formal equivalent of the House Rules Committee in the United States. Unlike the U.S. Congressional counterpart, the HMC is more like a mouthpiece for the IPRC. Its members are even appointed by the IPRC. Hanashiai refers to discussing subjects under dispute behind closed doors to reach a mutually agreeable settlement. The objective is to find a win–win solution to avoid confrontation and open conflict. Haragei refers to a traditional Japanese means of nonverbal communication without the exchange of explicit indication of one’s intent. Hon’ne refers to real intention as opposed to “tatemae” or outward pattern of behavior.

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Glossary

JCP: Japan Communist Party. JSP: Japan Socialist Party, the main opposition party from 1955 to 1993. Jhmon: The first wave of people who reached the Japanese archipelago left earthenware characterized by its rope-shaped design. These ancient people were thought to have hailed from the South by way of island hopping. Ainu and Okinawans, who had been relatively isolated in north and south, respectively, for centuries, are thought to be of this origin while the majority of the Japanese is a mixture of the Jhmon and Yayoi people. Kakuha kyhgikai: (Association for Inter-Party Relations [AIPR]) came into existence during the Twenty-First Diet Session that started on February 27, 1905. It is a predecessor of the IPRC. Keigaika: It refers to the hollowing of institutions such as the Diet. Kokutai: Kokutai is an abbreviation for Kokkaitaisaku i-inkai. It literally means Diet Countermeasure Committee, which I found to be not very descriptive of what it does. I have opted to translate the Committee as the IPRC. For this book, the term kokutai will be used to refer to the IPRC. It is a party organ whose primary function is to negotiate with other parties to maximize its policy objectives and power. Kuroko: People who work in black clothes to assist or support the performance of actors on the stage in a less-visible fashion. LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party from 1955 to 1993. Mah-jongg is a traditional Chinese game played by four people. Mandate of Heaven: This Chinese concept refers to the right through which the Chinese emperor held his imperial throne. The Mandate provides the emperor with absolute power as long as the people are satisfied with his governing. However, the concept allowed revolutions to occur if there were good reasons for people to rebel. If a rebel receives the support of more people than the old emperor, the rebel has the Mandate of Heaven to rule the country. Nagata-chh refers to an area in Tokyo where all key political institutions are located. Nemawashi: It literally means root binding in Japanese; one digs around the root of a plant before transplanting. When applied in a social context, it means informally consulting with people who are involved in a decision prior to the formal decision-making process. Ninjh: Human feelings one develops as a result of bonding with others that may be void of rationality. It is often in conjunction with another traditional concept of giri that is traditionally prescribed conduct derived from formal relationships—rational and proper values. Omote refers to front or formal as opposed to ura meaning back, the other side or reverse, as in the proverb, “Every medal has its reverse.” Rengh: This is the large labor union in Japan that came into existence when the largest and progressive Federation of Japan Labor Union and three others formed a coalition to maintain power after a decline in membership. http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/new/index.html Shibai refers to an act put on for the purpose of public consumption. Shhgun: general or tycoon. Sobayhnin: It refers to a close taskmaster/advisor to a shogun during the Tokugawa period in Japanese history. The Tokugawa recruited these advisors from the people at large for their ability rather than their family status from the warrior caste.

Glossary

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Tatemae: An expected or normative pattern of behavior in human interaction as opposed to one’s real intention or feelings. Ten’nh: Ten’nh is translated into English as emperor for many years just as in the case of the Diet. The term normally refers to the male ruler of an empire. While the term may have been somewhat applicable in prewar Japan, it certainly is not the proper translation of the term now, since the ten’no is considered the symbol of the nation. His roles are limited to ceremonial and are more limited in power than the power wielded by the Queen of England today. I use the term as a matter of convention, but I want to make sure that you do not take the emperor to mean ruler as such. The emperor of Japan hardly ever ruled, if at all. He entrusted the power to rule to others, which is in a way a bilayer structure. Ura means the underside, informal side or the backroom of a situation. Yayoi: The second wave of people who most likely came from the Asian continent over two millennia ago. They brought advanced cultures of the continent to Japan.


Notes

Preface 1. “Kokutai” is an abbreviation for “Kokkaitaisaku-i’inkai,” which literally means Diet Countermeasure Committee. Each party in the Diet establishes one to enhance its position in the legislative process. It is not a formal organization of the Diet like a standing committee. 2. He (1584?–1645) is a well-known swordsman. Much of his biography remains unknown and does not go beyond legend; however, he left behind his paintings and the books he authored. He developed his own school of swordsmanship using two swords, for which he became well known. He wrote that he engaged in 60 duels, including some with famed swordsmen of the time such as Sasaki Kojirh, without losing even once. Later in his life, he painted and wrote books. His book, The Book of Five Rings, completed in the last year of his life, became very popular among American businessmen interested in how the Japanese mind worked in the 1980s. 3. As told by the late Noboru Takeshita (2001, 24).

1

Introduction

1. I would characterize him so on the basis of my knowledge of him ever since I met him in 1990, when he attended a conference that we organized at the University of Hawaii to commemorate the Centennial of the Japanese Diet in 1990. Since then, I have also met him and interviewed him on IPRC politics on May 13, 1997 in his Ministry of Welfare Office. Although an eccentric, he is eccentric within the Nagata-chh culture. Nagata-chh is where the Diet buildings are located in Tokyo. He is also witty and knows what pleases the public. In this sense, he resembles former prime minister Nakasone. Both of them are not very well trusted by LDP members, but are much better accepted by the public. It is common practice in democracies to appeal to the public when a leader lacks sufficient support within the ruling party. Koizumi seems to know how far he can go being an independent member of the ruling party, but he remains within party guidelines, an inference I draw based on my personal contacts with him and my observations of the media. 2. Curtis desires to “leave the reader with a sense of the culture of Japanese politics. It is not a book that argues that culture explains Japanese politics” (1999, 11). He writes that once one immerses himself or herself in Japanese society, he or she finds a “particular logic” in operation that enables him or her to make “sense of Japanese politics” (1999, 10).

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Notes

3. I would add religion to the list on the basis of our findings of Japanese culture. For more detail on this inclusion, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) and the references therein. 4. See glossary for definition of Japanese terms. 5. Controversies surround the Prince as to the extent of his real contribution to the development of the state. Although history books refer to the 17-article “Constitution,” it falls short of what we normally consider a constitution. It probably should be thought of as the first written “noble rule” for the country. 6. An implicit design for living can be understood only in cross-language perspectives. In our cross-language surveys of Arabic, American English and Japanese, we discovered that language could be a more powerful force in structuring one’s attitudes than nationality. In other words, humans change the way we see the world, depending upon the language in use, not because of our nationality—at least in few respects as far as Arabic, English, and Japanese speakers are concerned (Kuroda et al. 1986; Kuroda and Suzuki 1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). 7. For the most elaborate and persuasive of such an effort by political scientist, see Hayward R. Alker (1996). 8. He used the word “logic,” including it in the title of his book. I would classify such terms as the logic of Nagata-chh as a subculture within a larger culture of Japan, for we are discussing different designs for living for a limited group of people in a nation. 9. Although the Constitution specifies that legislative functions belong to the National Diet, not the bureaucracy, bureaucrats draft many bills. In reality, however, bureaucrats consider their duty to be making policies, as exemplified in a remark made by a bureaucrat who served for seven prime ministers in the 1980s and early 1990s, and they often do, indeed (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu-Shakaibu 1995, 160). Furthermore, this is in part attributable to the fact that many bureaucrats in the early years of modernization hailed from warrior families, the highest caste in the Tokugawa period prior to 1868. Inoguchi reports that the former warrior caste supplied about 50 percent of the bureaucrats as late as the 1920s (2003, 203). 10. This is a widely accepted generalization in discussing the Japanese policy-making process. For examples, see Muramatsu (1997, 13) and Kaneko (1999). Kaneko traces the history of power struggle between bureaucrats and politicians since the beginning of the Meiji period in the late nineteenth century through the 1990s. 11. An exception might be Curtis (1999, 18–19), who devotes at least a couple of pages to the existence of IPRC politics and writes (1999, 16) that ignorance of Japanese social structure and language makes Japanese politics an “enigma.” 12. For example, the LDP rule says simply that IPRC’s objective is to enhance its party objectives in the Diet. 13. He defends the Japanese way of politics by saying that Japanese proclivity for detailed prior arrangement before reaching a decision, namely nemawashi, does not necessarily take much time. 14. Sam Jameson (2001) may also be thinking about IPRC politics as “the core” of Japanese politics when he says changes are only superficial and not substantive. 15. Kath tells us how important IPRC politics is in passing controversial bills in the Diet. Bills are debated and decided by IPRC politics and the LDP does not use majority rule to push legislation through. Actually, it is an important function of the IPRC to help make draft bills to be kosher to the point there would be no serious objections from major opposition parties. All government agencies are requested to consult with the ruling LDP IPRC before drafting bills.

Notes

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16. He is not alone in his description of the Diet. In fact, all articles and books written in English on Diet operations without exception describe more or less what Richardson says. A few writings, such as Baerwald (1974, 84–86, 93) and Calder (1988, 205), make brief references to the Diet interparty committee. 17. For the concept of Rashomonesque in detail, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997). The concept is derived from Akira Kurosawa’s version of the classic film entitled Rashhmon, which won first prize at the Venice Movie Festival in 1950. 18. The 1955 system refers to the political system that existed from 1955 and 1993, during which time the LDP maintained the ruling party position for 38 long years while its main opposition party was the JSP. It also coincides more or less with the Cold War era. Two socialist parties merged into one in the fall of 1955, followed by two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party, which did the same thing. They came together to form a conservative party called the Liberal Democratic Party, supported by the nation’s most powerful business organizations. Labor unions backed the JSP. 19. It refers to an expected or normative pattern of behavior in human interaction as opposed to one’s real intentions or feelings. 20. For example, see Hi 1990a, 73–76. 21. Ambassador Cleveland was the University of Hawaii’s president in the 1970s. I used to see him regularly at a monthly meeting of a forum on world affairs in town. My question on NATO politics took place when I was asked to introduce him and the topic of his presentation at one such meeting in the early 1970s. 22. He gave a lecture at the Waseda University on February 14, 2003. Following his presentation, he made a brief reference to the existence of this informal body. It was only when I asked him for more information on this informal body did he explain in detail. 23. First, the majority party in the U.S. Congress does not give millions of dollars a year to a minority party to bribe it to pass bills. Second, voting in the U.S. Congress is not always along party lines. The House Rules Committee does what it says it does and no more. Third, there is no IPRC acting as an informal committee on behalf of the Rules Committee to perform tasks that cannot be made public in the United States. 24. See our unpublished paper delivered at the 1998 APSA meeting (Kuroda et al. 1998). 25. Japan New Party and Sakigake Party called for political reform on July 23, 1993. Among other things, it called for the abolishment of IPRC politics to make the Diet more readily understandable to the public. For more detail, see http://www.geocities.jp/ tanaka_kunitaka/election93/2political_reform.html. Ozawa and his party had to reintroduce IPRC politics under a different name. But it functions in much the same way that IPRC politics used to work, although perhaps it operates on a much smaller budget than what the LDP used to spend prior to 1993. 26. Zoku literally means “tribe” or family. IPRC-zoku represents those who are members of the IPRC of any party. Likewise, education-zoku refers to those who belong to the education committee in the Diet. 27. He died in 1998 in a flood while he was writing at his country house. His wife from his graduate student days at Waseda University completed the manuscript on his behalf. 28. I realize that the Tokugawa shogun itself governed the country in the name of emperor in turn. The Tokugawa era after Ieyasu’s regime started to transfer its titular power to those who actually governed, such as sobayhnin and others who sided with the Tokugawa forces in the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600. 29. Haragei refers to a traditional Japanese means of nonverbal communication without the exchange of explicit indication of one’s intent.

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Notes

30. Shibai refers to an act put on for the purpose of public consumption. 31. Waka refers to a traditional Japanese poem consisting of 31 syllables in contrast to a Chinese poem.

2

The Bilayer Theory

1. I interviewed him on May 13, 1997 in his office in the Ministry of Health and Welfare. I met him first in 1990 at the Centennial Conference on the Japanese Diet we organized at the University of Hawaii and knew first hand that he is a nonconformist. Nonconformity is rarely seen among Diet members, which led me to hope that he might be willing to talk about IPRC politics that others were reluctant to discuss. I was wrong. We talked about other things, but when I started to ask him about IPRC politics, he decided to be a loyal party man. 2. He may have been thinking about such bills as the introduction of the consumption tax bill that Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita managed to pass after his two predecessors failed. It is a real test of leadership to pass bills that are considered needed by the nation but unpopular, not among the public but within the ruling party. 3. A Ford Motor company executive team once visited a Nissan motor company assembly plant to look for ways to increase productivity, which is something Japanese automakers have become known for. They discovered that the factory they visited had far more restrooms for the size of its workforce compared to U.S. standards. They inquired as to why this was so. The visiting executives told the Japanese that they can save money by scheduling rest periods in such a manner that not everyone has to use the restroom at the same time. The Japanese answer to that was, it was important for their workers to develop a sense of unity. Rest periods and lunch breaks were an important time for their workers to interact freely, to bond and to develop friendships. This is a clear example of the difference between the American sense of rationality and that of the Japanese. 4. Japan was still suffering from the extraterritoriality enjoyed by the Western powers. It was not until 1899 that Japan succeeded in eliminating the semi-colonial vestiges. 5. For example, authors include Japanese political scientists as well: Abe et al. (1990, 14–26), Stockwin (1982, 88–97), and Ishida and Krauss (1989). 6. See glossary for my translation of the term ten’nh. 7. This is based upon a series of cross-national language studies conducted among American, Arab, and Japanese students (Kuroda et al. 1986; Kuroda and Suzuki 1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). The results of the surveys will be summarized in detail later in the chapter. 8. Of course, Japanese politics has many parts. Some aspects of Japanese politics have indeed gone through fundamental transformations toward democracy after the war. If one sees political participation as part of the political system, e.g., that too has changed. The scale of grassroots environmentalist movements in the late 1960s and the 1970s, and the way the government reacted by initially disregarding their cries and then responding positively after the bureaucrats and media sided with the movements, represent a significant departure from the traditional governing practices of prewar years (Kuroda 1972b). 9. There is another level of secret politics taking place in Japan. It relates to the politics of the M-fund, reportedly involving $500 billion as of 1990. It is a fund largely generated by SCAP from monies collected from the Japanese military and other sources. The fund

Notes

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

18.

19.

219

was turned over to Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and eventually to Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and other individuals. The fund, along with CIA money, is used to help Japan fight progressive forces in Japan and the Soviet threat. Yakuza and rightwing elements have been involved in this type of politics. Involvement in underworld politics by legitimate government is not limited to Japan but exists elsewhere as well. In fact, it is difficult to find a modern nation-state in which there are no underworld activities. IPRC politics is totally different. For a more detailed report on the M-fund, see Johnson et al. (2001). The late prime minister Takeshita echoes his Socialist colleague’s story in his posthumous book (2001, 135). He also informed me of his collaboration with the JSP in my conversations with him on several occasions in the 1990s. For more detail on theory and data regarding this point, see Kuroda et al. (1998). His concept of cooperation includes electoral cooperation, not just legislative cooperation among parties. This, I would suggest, is the kind of democracy embedded in the type of “social engineering” the U.S. Occupational Forces had in mind to make Japan democratic (Ishida and Krauss 1989, 3). Reformers were imbued with the ideal of New Dealers. They have succeeded in totally demilitarizing and institutionally democratizing Japan. Basic democratic institutions made it possible for democracy to grow from the bottom-up over time. For more detail on this point, see Kuroda (1972b, 2001). Large labor unions came into existence when the largest and progressive Federation of Japan Labor Union and three others formed a coalition to maintain dwindling power as a result of a decline in membership. http://www. jtuc-rengo.or.jp/new/index.html For more detail, see Abe, Shindh, and Kawato, translated by James W. White (Abe et al. 1994, 51) and the references therein. First of all, the proportion of organized labor has declined from over three-fifths in the late 1940s to one-fifth by the beginning of the new millennium. Second, the number of JSP seats in the parliament had declined sharply as well after the end of the 1955 system era. In the words of JCP IPRC committee chairman, “We are the only party who places a premium on working people and low-income families after the JSP joined the LDP in the formation of the coalition government in 1994 . . .” The DPJ, supported by Rengh, the largest federation of private sector labor unions and others, is no longer as powerful as the JSP was during the 1955 system era. JCP IPRC Chairman Iwao Teramae lamentably made this observation on May 19, 1997 in his Diet office during my interview with him. I owe much to the late former prime minister Noboru Takeshita for reaching this conclusion; most notably during a meeting I had with him on May 2, 1994 in his Nagata-chh office following the formation of the Murayama Cabinet. Our theory contradicts the rational-choice theory in that all world cultures do not define what constitutes rational action using the Western paradigm based on Aristotelian logic. This is not to deny that there may be universal elements in human society, but there are many cultures with radically different implicit definitions of rationalism. For example, see Kuroda and Suzuki (1989a, 1989b) on rationalism found among Arabic, English, and Japanese speakers. Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) make use of this orientation and examine the basic nature of Japanese culture since the Japanese developed their written language around the seventh century in comparative perspective. The basic set of survey data is from a longitudinal survey of Japanese adults conducted every five years since 1953 and that includes some comparable data gathered in Europe, Latin America, and the United States.

220

20.

21.

22.

23.

Notes The salient nature of language over nationality was demonstrated in a cross–cultural study of American, Arab, and Japanese students in Egypt, Japan, Jordan, and the United States (Kuroda and Suzuki 1991b). Data for this table are derived from the same surveys as in Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) and the references therein. Hayashi started to doubt the validity of some of his Japanese questions that were translated into English and used in surveys in Hawaii. He felt that somehow he was not getting his expected results. He started to use crosslanguage surveys using university students and foreign residents in Japan. I joined his efforts in expanding the survey to include Arabic to make a three-way comparison with the financial support of Toyota Foundation in the 1980s. The conventional translation of the questionnaire was as follows: First, we translated the original questions into the second language. Second, we had someone else re-translate the questions back into the original language. Third, we compared the results of the original with the one that was translated and translated back to see if there were any significant difference between the two versions. If there were no significant differences, we concluded that we have valid and functionally equivalents sets of the questionnaire. We found otherwise. We could not get functionally equivalent responses from the conventionally translated questions in some cases. A case in point is an item that forces a respondent to choose from two sets of polarized answers such as “Yes” and “No.” This type of question is biased in favor of Aristotelian logic, not necessarily shared by every culture. Not everyone is monotheistic. Cultures such as that of Japan allow multiple and sometimes contradicting truths to coexist. Language conditions the structure of thoughts in such a manner that propels its speakers and listeners to frame their concerns in a culturally prescribed fashion (Galtung and Nishimura 1983; Kluckhohn 1957; Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945). Hence, not all questions can be translated into other languages in such a manner that we can obtain functionally equivalent results. If one forces people to choose between two responses, they may choose one. However, that is not likely to be a functionally equivalent response. Our analysis revealed that middle responses couldn’t be placed on a continuum of attitude between “Agree” and “Disagree.” Those who chose the middle response do not structure response patterns in the same way English speakers do, be they American or Japanese. Hayashi developed his proto model of quantification for nonmetric data in 1952, long before correspondence was introduced in France. For more detail, see Hayashi (1952) and Hayashi et al. (1992). Comments made about the findings in this book contain more than what was reported in the original report. I focused more on what is relevant for the purpose of developing the bilayer theory by using what I learned from focus group studies in addition to survey findings. Japanese speakers think of nature as consisting of mountains, rivers, and the like, while Arabic speakers think of basic human instincts as well. That is why they see a need for religion as a means of controlling themselves. Written Arabic is derived from the Koran while written Japanese was developed largely through the effort of Buddhist priests, as manifested in such words as arigath meaning thank you, derived from Buddhist beliefs. It literally means an act or event that cannot possibly take place. Expressing gratitude for everything constitutes a key element of Buddhism. Arabs and Japanese are similar in that religion is an all-embracing part of their life, consciously and unconsciously. The Japanese, however, are not very conscious or serious about religion.

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24. One of the frequent comments made by Arab students on Japanese, who enjoy a good image in the Arab world in relation to Americans in our surveys, was that unlike the United States, Japan has deep roots in its culture. Some go on to say that Japan would be a perfect country if only it believed in God. I would imagine that if we included the same question in our survey instrument used in Japan, Japanese respondents might be equally puzzled by the Arabs, who take religion so seriously. 25. I am assuming Arabs from various countries in the Arab world, who were included in our survey because they happened to be at the University of Jordan in Amman and the American University in Cairo, to constitute one nationality, the Arab. Also, included in the Arab section of the survey were Arab students from a number of Arab nations who were studying in the United States. 26. For example, the concept of Mandate of Heaven was rejected while the Japanese adopted other aspects of Confucianism. 27. For a more detailed discussion on this and other related matters concerning the nature of Japanese culture, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) and Kuroda (2004a). 28. Rashomon is a title of the first Kurosawa movie to win international recognition. It presents several different versions of what happened to a case of murder and rape during the sixteenth century in Japanese feudal history. There is no absolute truth as such in this world. One often, though not always, finds many truths frequently contradicting one another, not just one. On this ontological question and other methodological issues, see Alker (1996). He argues for reformulation of humanistic and scientific methodologies. 29. The Japanese tea ceremony is often thought of as a typical Japanese art, seeking beauty, truth, and joy of life. Observe the shape and color of teacups used in the tea ceremony. They are most likely to be imperfect in shape and dull and subdued in color when observed from the Western perspective. Participants in the tea ceremony are expected to appreciate their beauty. Are the Japanese tea ceremony participants being dissimilative? No, unless one does not speak Japanese. 30. He was a diplomat sent to Japan by the United States, who learned to speak Japanese. He loved the Japanese language for not requiring the use of the word “I” as the subject in sentence construction. He probably was socialized in a language-sensitive family. His sister, Amy Lawrence Lowell, was a well-known poet (1874–1925) in the United States. 31. When one learns a language, one also learns a set of assumptions about the world. Through language, everyone becomes familiar with the world in a certain way, meaning others may not share one’s familiar assumption, not because of one’s individual preference as such but because of one’s own language, creating cultural blind spots here and there. For example, Japanese has no “l” sound while Arabic does not have a “p” sound. To the Japanese ear, “light” becomes “right,” and “park” becomes “bark” to the Arabs. If they cannot hear the differences, it sounds the same to them. What we found in our survey is that a similar situation prevails when a sound is replaced by ways of thinking. Americans are brought up to respond in “Yes” or “No” to a question. Japanese are not. The Japanese make much more use of the implicit meaning of a few words whereas the Americans tend to use more explicit words to communicate. In President Nixon’s words, “I want to make it perfectly clear . . .” It is Nixon’s thought pattern and Prime Minister Sath’s response that led to a misunderstanding.

222

32.

33.

34.

35. 36.

Notes To the former’s request to curtail the export of textiles to the United States from Japan, the latter’s response was “I will do my best.” The interpreter translated the words literally. Nixon took it mean that it would be done. Sath probably meant “I cannot do it,” for such a response normally implies a negative response. Nixon took the interpreter’s words to mean that it would be done. Subsequently, he felt betrayed by Sath. Sath did not wish to hurt his friend Nixon’s feelings by telling him the straight facts of life in Japan. He wanted to be polite and maintain good harmonious relations. As stated earlier, Japanese language speakers, irrespective of nationality, have a proclivity to respond to a statement with their prime concern being how to harmonize with the situation at hand, not necessarily being very sensitive to the content of the statement. Most Japanese know that what the prime minister said was a code word for negative response. It probably should have been translated so. Of course, euphemisms are present in many languages. Our cross-language surveys have shown that Japanese language, when compared with Arabic and English, places far greater value on human relations than the subject of conversation. This generalization is found in other aspects of Japan. The Japanese government issues a lottery, but no one wins millions of dollars, as is the case in the United States. The lottery provides many winners with smaller values to spread its fortunes widely. Even at such events as a company annual picnic, the company is likely to give consolation prizes to all participants with the winner of course getting the lion’s share, to be sure. The Japanese, in other words, play games in such a manner so that no one is a total loser in the many realms of social activity. A somewhat similar phenomenon is observed in the U.S. Congress: when an opposition party proposes a bill that may benefit, e.g., by lowering the price of spiraling drug prices for seniors, especially those who are economically deprived. The ruling party may propose and pass an alternative that at least in appearance helps indigent seniors, but in reality not go to the extent the original bill intended. However, the point is that in the case of the LDP, it went much farther to acquiesce JSP’s demands and developed its economy while narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, lowering crime rate etc., unlike what is taking place in such countries as China today. My understanding differs from Kath’s on this point. In the first place, parties in the United States cannot always control member votes, while party discipline is strictly enforced in Japan. Second, opposition parties by and large accepts the ruling party’s decision once it is made. The then House minority floor leader Richard A. Gephardt told me at the Japan–U.S. Hawaii Conference on national security in 1991 that he supported the Gulf War once the decision was made even though he opposed Bush’s war plan. The three LDP committees are (1) Policy Affairs Research Council, (2) Policy Affairs Deliberation Council, and (3) Executive Council. A person is basically a lonesome creature who needs to have someone or something to be with to make one feel comfortable and at ease—be it one God or other people. Cultures that place the self as the most salient unit in society are likely to produce highly autonomous selves to the point that the walls among them are too high for close bonding. Japanese culture, on the other hand, places supreme value on human bonding and relations over individuals. The Japanese spend a greater amount of their income on social intercourse, such as semi-annual gift exchanges to maintain close bonding within one’s significant group. By doing so, one acquires a strong sense of belonging to one’s group—a diffuse sense of self without boundaries within one’s group. I would submit this sense of diffuse self as likely to lead the Japanese to be communitarian in their

Notes

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psychological make-up, always taking members of the community into account in making decisions. Such a mentality is likely to reduce crime and decrease the level of social disorganization, particularly if a large segment of people have enough to eat and have no serious problems maintaining a minimum standard of living. Economic prosperity brought a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor in postwar Japan, creating a society with a minimum sense of alienation and disproving Marxism. For more detail, see Kuroda et al. (1998). 37. As former prime minister Ki’ichi Miyazawa praised Takeshita san’s superior skill in human relations as the key element in his success as the Takeshita School principal in training future prime ministers like Hashimoto and Obuchi (Hshita 1999, 12–13). Miyazawa confessed that he initially thought in his youth that what it takes to pass a bill in the Diet is that it must be a good bill for the country—a reflection of a rational model. His initial understanding of the Diet proved wrong. Being effective and powerful in politics requires human relations skills possessed by leaders such as the late Noboru Takeshita. It takes great human relations skill to pass an unpopular bill such as the one that raised the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent. Successive prime ministers from Nakasone and Hhira failed in their attempts. How can one pass a bill that is unpopular within the ruling party as well as the public at large? Reasoning will not do, since everyone wants to get reelected. 38. When I spoke with JCP representatives, they claimed that they are involved in IPRC politics and indeed they are, but not always. The JCP gets involved with IPRC politics even today. You can see a number of items reported regarding the JCP IPRC chairman and his activities on its website. However, when I spoke with the LDP IPRC members, their response was that the JCP is not always invited. Why not? First, the reason is based upon an ideology that allows little room for compromise. The JCP takes stands similar to the type of position President Bush took when he said that you are either with us or against us in his fight against terrorism. He said those who aid terrorists are terrorists, the target of our preemptive action. There is no room for negotiation. JCP does not accept money. Its members will return any gift they receive and let the press know what has happened. Basically, IPRC politics is a place of give and take. Those who do not want to play the game by its rules cannot play. A second reason for the limitation of the JCP’s role in IPRC politics is that although JCP members speak Japanese, their minds operate more like English speakers. They reveal their real intent openly and directly, which other Japanese often cannot and do not do in public as long as they are sober. The reason why JCP’s IPRC activities are limited is the same reason why we do not find an elaborate institutionalized interparty negotiating organization in the West. The JCP is fundamentally a Western institution in more ways than other parties that are Western in appearance and Japanese in reality. The JCP and the JSP are similar in their Marxist beliefs. The JSP was good at acting like an ideology-driven doctrine upholding socialist and pacifist idealism in public. Unlike the JCP, the JSP was very much Japanese, however. The LDP wanted the JSP to act like a record, playing the same music over and over regardless of how things changed during the Cold War era. I will explain the reason for this seemingly erratic relationship between the JSP and the LDP in the early part of chapter 3 in the section entitled “The Reality—A Collaborative Symbiosis.” 39. Obviously an assumption here is that the better the theory, the more widely applicable it is. What we intend to propose here is that the bilayer theory is applicable to much of Japanese history, at least since written records became available.

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Notes

40. One might add here that his father was a well-known JSP leader, Saburh Eda. The son, Satsuki, has been an observer of IPRC politics from the outside, since his party is a very small one with little power, even in IPRC politics.

3


1. It is unfortunate that the government completed the Diet building in 1936, reflecting the superior position of the executive branch of the government over the legislative branch. The plenary session is held in the same Diet building completed during the Imperial Diet period. The podium on which the Speaker is seated is the highest platform, below which lies the platform for cabinet member seating. The Speaker and cabinet members sit on higher platforms, resembling a tiered stand for Japanese dolls on Boys Day or Girls Day holidays. Their galleries are higher than the members of the Diet. This type of room arrangement may be suited for questions and answers or speechmaking, but is not conducive for discussion and debate. The postwar constitution designates the Diet as “the highest organ of the state.” As such, its members should be on the same standing as the executive branch of the government. 2. I wish to thank the former Minister of Education and Minister of Justice, Mayumi Moriyama, who gave me a copy of the book. Her conversation with the late Junzh Iwasaki appears in the book. They hail from the same prefecture, Tochigi-ken. 3. There are four major ways by which the HR is more powerful than the HC: (1) The Diet is empowered to designate the prime minister, except when the two houses select two different candidates. In that case, the HR’s selection shall prevail, making the HR more powerful of the two (Article 67); (2) A bill becomes a law when both houses pass it. However, the HR has the power to pass the same bill for a second time with a majority of two-thirds or more members present if the HC differs from the HR. If it passes a second time in this way, it becomes law. A bill may also become law if the HC fails to take action in 60 days (Article 59); (3) Budget bills must be introduced to the HR. If the HR passes it and the HC fails to take action in 30 days, the HR’s decision stands (Article 60), and (4) The same power is given to the HR in passing treaty bills (Article 61). 4. The 1955 system also coincided with the Cold War era from the late 1940s to the 1980s. In a way, the 1955 system represents a microcosm of world politics in appearance in that the LDP represents the U.S. side while the JSP and USSR represent the left side. 5. My interview was conducted on May 2, 1994 in his Nagata-chh office. 6. Htake (1999, 14–15) compares Kakuei Tanaka with Noboru Takeshita by pointing out the difference between them. He says that the former makes his answers clear while the latter responds at length and suggests a direction without ever coming to a conclusion. I must say he was vintage Mr. Takeshita when I questioned him. 7. Article 9 of the Constitution renounces war as follows: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” 8. My experience with Takeshita leads me to agree strongly with the general characterizations of his personality ever since I first met him in the restricted area of Honolulu

Notes

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

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International Airport to welcome him in 1990. While we had to wait for the others to come through the regular checkpoints, the two of us sat on a wooden bench to talk for a short period of time. He was smooth and quick to establish rapport with me and we engaged in a substantive conversation in a short time. In one of my subsequent meetings with him in his Nagata-chh office, I presented him with a picturesque Hawaiian calendar. He reached for a set of memorial coins amounting to ¥1,000 or less than $10, signed his name, and gave it to me, saying, “It may sound bad (after the Recruit scandal) to receive any money from me, but I guess this should be OK.” He knows how to make person feel at ease. At one point in the evening, at another conference in Maui, he and Rep. Richard Gephardt got involved in a conversation over taxation issues just before a buffet dinner. The two of them must have become so interested in the discussion that they were oblivious to the rest of us, who were hungrily waiting for them to start dinner. I as presiding officer had to go to them to ask if they could start eating while they continued their discussion so that the others could follow. While he may not be the best orator, he certainly is a master conversationalist who can cite detailed facts and figures at a one-to-one level or in small groups. My interviews with Diet members and reporters led me to infer that the JCP does take part in IPRC politics, but not always, and not to the extent and in the way the JSP did, at least in the past. The JCP is more clean and open about what it does than any other party. It adheres to Western parliamentary practices more than any other party on this point. In a way, the JCP is more Western than the other parties who in reality are more traditional. Available aggregate data on income distribution often lack reliability because different operational definitions are used to measure income gaps, depending upon the particular author and/or government agency collecting the data. Income distribution figures are a form of aggregate data in which it is difficult to achieve uniformity. The figures in our paper led us to the same conclusion as that of the late former prime minister, but others come to different conclusions. See, e.g., Tachibanaki (1998). For our conclusion, see Kuroda et al. (1998). May 2, 1994 in his Nagata-chh office. The data for this is derived from figures from Sath and Matsuzaki (1986, 277–279). Of course, some political leaders like Kakuei Tanaka would even change existing legal constraints if necessary to get what he wants to propose. These Diet members are knowledgeable and have contacts with interest groups and bureaucrats, making them powerful politicians within their specialized areas of legislation. Originally, it was the U.S. occupational policy to encourage politicians to become specialists so that elected politicians would become powerful. Leaders like Kakuei Tanaka encouraged LDP members to learn to draft bills. A result has been the development of zoku Diet members. These powerful leaders are specialized leaders powerful within a given area of legislation. For the most comprehensive study of zoku Diet members, see Inoguchi and Iwai (1987). For the management of policy and legislation including IPRC politics after the formation of Hosokawa’s government, see Murakawa (2000, 90–109). The then LDP IPRC Chairman Kanezh Muraoka informed me on May 16, 1997 in his HR office that he organizes only a couple of dinner meetings at the beginning and end of the year. My impression is that the LDP has smaller amounts of funds available for use in IPRC politics. However, the LDP IPRC committee has a breakfast meeting every weekday. All first-term members of the LDP are required to attend. See also, Hyama (2003, 41–42).

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Notes

17. To abolish party factions is like asking the Japanese to stop speaking Japanese and start learning to speak English. As I stated, the nature of Japanese traditions, if one traces history, is that the Japanese do not choose a new idea or old tradition. They adjust to new ideas, as they did with Buddhism, Confucianism, and things Western. English language speakers tend to choose one or the other alternative while Japanese speakers try to adjust to a situation by refusing to take either the tradition or new idea irrespective of nationality, as we found in our cross-language surveys. 18. For local level in Japanese context, see my earlier study of community power structure, such as Kuroda (1972a, 1974a). 19. The HMC designates important bills to be read and explained in the plenary session. 20. They usually, about 70 percent of the time, vote for cabinet proposed bills. They choose those bills that they decided on passing anyway and designate them as “pillow-bills.” 21. Iwai (1988) reports a similar finding, which includes data through 1987. 22. The JCP alone operates on Aristotelian logic. What it says in public is what it is behind closed doors. But other parties maintain two levels of human interaction, one formal and public, or tatemae, and the other informal and private, or hon’ne. For more on this point, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997). 23. See p. 72 for more detail. 24. On the division of labor between the two committees, see such sources as Iwai (1988, 133–138), Sath and Matsuzaki (1986, 130–135), Ishikawa (1995b, 24–27), Kath (1995, 12–13), and Hi (1990b, 100–125). 25. For a detailed account of this, see chapter 4 on the history of IPRC. 26. He passed away recently in June 2004. 27. Political stability is a necessary condition for economic welfare of a nation from employment rate to effective social security programs for seniors. 28. I interviewed him on March 27, 1998 in an office at JSP Headquarters. 29. May 15, 1997 in his HR office. 30. Although some political leaders are willing to discuss some aspects of IPRC politics, understandably, no politician, with the exception of Khichi Hamada, is willing to discuss money. 31. Matsuda and Kayamori (1991, 45) list the five items as HR rules. Watanabe (1976, 194–195) mentions others that I consider can come under the management of the Diet as follows: managing problems concerning the composition of each committee, compensation and other related matters of the Diet members, and coordinating the activities of the Speaker and parties. Watanabe adds that it is one of the channels through which Diet members can climb to higher positions. The tasks of the HMC members require making wise decisions, necessitating not just knowledge of Diet management, but also the right contacts. For this reason, Watanabe says that they are referred to as HMC-zoku. 32. Aritomo Yamagata revealed the Meiji government’s true intent when he said his plan was to use the Western format, but he was not about to reject Japanese traditional practices. For more on this point of Japan’s modernization, see George Akita (2005). 33. Murakawa (1989, 162–163) reports that the ruling LDP IPRC committee on December 7, 1974 decided “all ministries and bureaus anticipating to propose legislation are hereby required to consult with the IPRC committee and an appropriate standing committee in advance and obtain approval from the committees. Also with respect to the manner of presentation and handling of proposed bills, they are requested to report to the IPRC and appropriate standing committee.”

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34. Eda represented the Social Democratic Alliance when he wrote the book. He first entered politics in 1977 by successfully running for the HC. Subsequently, he was elected to the HR in 1983 and continues to serve in the HC as a Democrat after being re-elected in July 2004. 35. Kanezh Muraoka, LDP IPRC chairman, in his own HR Building 2 office on May 16, 1997. 36. The media labeled Hamada as a man who made improper remarks (Hamada 1993, 187). But, Hamada asks: “Is there any freedom of speech?” 37. The fact that there has been no detailed report of IPRC ever made in an English publication suggests that IPRC has succeeded in performing its task well for over a hundred years of Japanese parliamentary history. 38. Akahata, published by the JCP, means “Red Flag.” It is a party paper whose Sunday edition circulation is said to be 1.64 million. It is a main source of income for the party. Its circulation stands at 350,000 for its daily edition. This compares with LDP’s paper circulation of 680,000 and KP’s paper circulation of 80,000 copies. Three national papers dominate the Japanese market. The Yomiuri has a circulation 10,160,000, the Asahi 8,260,000, and the Mai’nichi, 3,940,000. The largest circulation paper in the United States is USA Today with a circulation of 1,670,000 followed by the New York Times, which has 1,070,000. Data source: http://www.japan-tsushin.co.jp/ list/g08.html. For an English paper published by the JCP, see http://www.japanpress. co.jp/. 39. I wish to thank Professor Yasumasa Tanaka for having a copy of the book made and sent to me. 40. Here is a concrete example of how good a friend of the LDP this JSP member in reality was before becoming the first Socialist prime minister of the coalition government between the LDP and its archrival JSP during the 1955 system era. 41. “Matsutake” is an expensive mushroom that can cost anywhere from $10 to $100 apiece. It grows in mountains in the fall. The Pacific Northwest exports matsutake to Japan. 42. All major political parties maintain IPRC offices in the Diet building. The LDP has more than a dozen fulltime people working in the office to facilitate the operation of the LDP IPRC committee. Each party is given only a limited space in the Diet building, depending upon the number of elected members. Each party is free to allocate its own space. All major parties find it to their advantage to maintain offices in the Diet building, signifying the importance that each party attaches to IPRC politics. 43. I interviewed Hiroshi Hoshina, executive director for the LDP IPRC office, on May 12, 1997 in the LDP IPRC office in the Diet Building. 44. This section draws heavily from my interviews with Mr. Kanezh Muraoka, who was then serving as the LDP IPRC committee chairman. I interviewed him in his office on May 16, 1997. 45. I attempted to interview him on the role he played in the JSP IPRC committee for many years. In my efforts to learn from him (in 1998), I failed to obtain the information I wanted. However, he talked for about a half hour discussing his personal life and other things of mutual interest. He claimed that he was planning on writing a book on his experience. 46. For more detail on this point, see Kuroda (1994b, 2001). 47. Nobuo Ishihara, who served under seven prime ministers during the period 1987–1995 as the top bureaucrat in successive cabinets, makes carefully worded references to activities of the LDP IPRC Chairman Seiroku Kajiyama on political reforms.

228

48.

49. 50.

51.

52. 53.

4

Notes There seems to be no doubt that IPRC gets involved in LDP politics itself as well as in its relationship with other parties and executive branches of government. The LDP IPRC chair can be involved at the highest level of decision-making processes at the cabinet level as well. For details of how it is used to do so during the 1955 system era, see sources such as veteran reporter Honzawa (1995, 28–38). The LDP IPRC used to entertain members of opposition parties at geisha parties. This section draws heavily from the results of my interviews with IPRC office staff and IPRC leaders of all parties from the LDP to the JCP. While I was in the LDP IPRC office, I met and chatted with a minister-level foreign ministry official to a cabinet member. I was told assistance is extended to help the LDP causes at any point in its attempt to pass legislation if there is a request. The term refers to going into a huddle to negotiate a deal. It refers to many situations, including one that involves bid rigging in acquiring government contracts. The usual outcome of open bidding designed to produce a clear victory for one bidder is turned into a nonzero sum game in which every bidder is a winner, at least in the long run. For empirical evidence, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997) and the references therein. Hi probably meant all controversial bills likely to cause disagreement among parties.


1. Kuno (1988, 185–186). He is a veteran member of the LDP IPRC. 2. The statement is attributed to Hikosaburh Okonogi, then Minister of Construction in April 1989 at his press conference. (Tomimori 1993, 11). 3. Many Diet members would rather not talk about IPRC politics, much less write about their experiences. 4. The elimination of unequal treaties with the West must have been foremost in the minds of Meiji leaders. To achieve the goal without losing Japan’s identity, they decided to conceal what was not proper in the Western tradition. Creating a dual structure was the answer. 5. Taika reform (644) was a response to the wave of new ideas and institutions from Buddhism, kanji or Chinese characters, to the legal system from the T’ang dynasty in China as well as to bring about national unity and order. The first “doctor of state” or kuni no hakase came into existence and two persons were appointed to institute the national legal and administrative systems. They acted as advisor/consultants to the government. 6. This paragraph draws heavily from a section entitled “The First IPRC Committee” in Jinyh Kaneko (1999, 34–44). 7. Shingai refers to one of the 12 zodiac signs in Chinese astrology. 8. For the entire rule, see Maeda (1990, 228). 9. The intent was to make sure that freely elected representatives with specialized areas of expertise are less likely to lead the nation to another war. An assumption was that a strong legislature can stop rising militarism if it ever recurs. Kakuei Tanaka took the U.S. suggestion to strengthen the Diet’s position by trying to draft bills on his own with little help from bureaucrats. 10. It is possible that Hamada assumed the AIPR to be the origin of IPRC politics. 11. Kuno (1988) claims that he used to take a sack of peanuts and spend half of his working hours in the JSP IPRC office in the late 1950s. He is careful not to reveal any money dealings involved in IPRC politics.

Notes

229

12. This section draws heavily from the Mai’nichi political reporters’ accounts, especially a section entitled “The Reality of IPRC Expense” (Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu ed. 1985, 47–63). 13. The exchange rate was fixed at ¥360 to $1 until the summer of 1971, when Nixon “shocked” Japan by floating the exchange rate. The amount came to $35,138.89 in U.S. dollars at the time when the size of the U.S. economy was 25 times larger than Japan’s. The LDP IPRC leaders must have spent $1,757 per occasion in IPRC expenses, a sizable sum of money then. 14. This appears to be caused by a change in accounting procedures that deleted meal and clerical expenses from IPRC accounts. 15. The three executives are the secretary general, the chair of the Executive Council, and the chair of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). 16. This section draws heavily from Khichi Yamamoto (1988, 159–184). Yamamoto served in the HR from 1947 to 1983 as a member of the JSP. He held such positions as JSP secretary general and IPRC chairman. He was not serving in the HR at the time of this writing. 17. Yamamoto reports that Asanuma was trying to calm down the 20,000 demonstrators, since some of them had already managed to enter the Diet compound. Looking him from above in the Diet building, the LDP started to accuse him of agitating the demonstrators. Yamamoto was there watching Asanuma. He (1988, 172) reports that Asanuma was doing his best to persuade the demonstrators to stay nonviolent to be effective. 18. One of the former chairs of the LDP IPRC committee specifically denied that IPRC politics played any role in the Anpo crisis of 1960. It was of interest to me that he singled out the Anpo crisis as one case in which IPRC politics did not play any role without my specifically asking for his answer. 19. Some unexpected events happened in the night of May 19, 1960 when the Speaker Ichirh Kiyose was carried to the podium to preside the session long enough to pass the Revision Bill at midnight; some male members of the Diet took advantage of the confusion—pushing and shoving to touch breasts of women members. Newsreels of those days show utter confusion and a chaotic crowd, behavior not expected of any respectable representatives of the people of Japan. 20. This was before Japanese economy experienced its rapid growth in the 1960s. Perhaps he was trying to impress the reader that no serious money then was involved in the LDP IPRC operation. They were all so poor that peanuts were about the type of things they could afford in dealing with opposition parties. He says that Kuno’s peanut souvenirs were well known. 21. I am not alone in making this inference. Initially, this hypothesis was suggested to me by one of the people I interviewed over the years in the 1990s. 22. This section draws heavily from (Kuno 1988, 186–188). 23. Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu (1985, 76). 24. As cited by Ueda (1999, 80) as follows: Isamu Imaizumi, “Shhgekino uchimakunikki— Jiminth no kaneshibarini yoromekuyath—Gi’inseikatsu20nen o kaerimitei’u yoyathno nare’aino khzh.”Gendai, September 1976. 25. $1 ⫽ ¥360. 26. He might have had in mind that IPRC activities are an “unlikely” item since only insiders know about what goes on behind closed doors, with the exception of those others involved and reporters. This, I believe, is why the LDP requires all new Diet members to serve on the LDP IPRC committee during her or his first term. Sath’s response is cited from Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu (1985, 31).

230

Notes

27. Takeo Miki, a USC graduate who headed the Miki faction, which is known for its abstinence from dirty money politics, later elected in December 1974 as prime minister following the Lockheed scandal and the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet. The LDP as well as the rest of Japan wanted to have a prime minister who is “clean,” not tainted by money politics. 28. Farmers constituted a large majority of Japanese voters after the war. About 50% of the employed were farmers as late as 1955 when Japan regained its prewar level economic strength. 29. Mai’nichi Shimbun political reporters make a similar observation. See Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu (1985, 40). 30. This section draws heavily from a section of Kuno’s chapter (Kuno 1988, 193–195). 31. He must have been involved in many occasions when the LDP railroaded bills as a member of the LDP IPRC. 32. The passage of the health insurance bill was made difficult by stiff resistance from opposition parties. Although the Vice Speaker announced his intent to have a written open vote, he was unable to do it in the plenary session on July 11. He ended up asking those who were for the bill to stand up by using his prerogative. The opposition parties accused him of violating the Constitution and he was unable to control the situation, resulting in the resignation of the Speaker and Vice Speaker. Takechiyo Matsuda was appointed as new Speaker and managed to reopen the session on July 25 to debate and pass the University bill. It took five days to complete the process, making it the longest deliberation on the postwar record. The opposition parties kept proposing nonconfidence resolutions and other objections to successfully delay the process. 33. The Mai’nichi is the third largest nationwide newspaper in Japan following the Yomiuri and the Asahi. 34. He is also a former editor of the JCP paper, “Red Flag.” 35. This is an assessment based on my experience interviewing IPRC committee members of major parties, including the JCP and the LDP as I acknowledged their contribution at the outset. 36. The three key posts in the LDP consist of chief secretary, executive council chair, and political affairs research council chair. 37. My understanding after interviewing IPRC committee chair or its members of most major parties, including the JCP, is that the JCP IPRC committee is not always part of IPRC politics. If any Diet members can claim to be free from money politics, they are most likely to be Communist. 38. I made two attempts through two different sources to interview Takako Doi and failed both times. She is the only Diet member whom I failed to interview. Since she knew what I was interested in asking her and my sources for contacts were excellent, I must conclude that she did not wish to talk about it at all. One realizes that no representative wishes to talk much about IPRC politics and most were reluctant to talk about it in detail. I happened to see the then Minister Jun’ichirh Koizumi in the LDP IPRC office while talking with its director. I greeted him and he remembered me. I asked him if I could see him during my stay in Tokyo. I was asked to call his secretary and fix an appointment, which I did and was able to see him the next afternoon. He was then the Minister of Welfare. Although he was friendly and willing to talk about anything, he refused to talk about his experience with IPRC politics other than pointing out that IPRC politics is politics that politicians cannot talk about. 39. I attempted to interview Makoto Tanabe on the role he played in the JSP IPRC committee for many years. In my efforts to learn from him in 1998, I failed to obtain his

Notes

40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

231

cooperation in getting the information I wanted. However, he spoke for about half hour on the phone, discussing his personal life and other things of mutual interest. He claimed that he plans to write a book on his experience. This section draws heavily from Murakawa (2000). For more detail on the role of sobayhnin and Shognate, see Shin’ichirh Hishi’s book entitled The Politics of Shognate and Sobayhnin (1995). As I drafted this chapter, I learned that he resigned from his Diet position over the money scandal in April 2002. He ran successfully and was elected in the subsequent election in 2003. Gaiseki kankei refers to relationships acquired as a result of marriage of a family’s daughter to ten’nh. For a more detailed definition of shogun see my article on shogun (Kuroda 1967e).

5


1. For more detail on the role of sobayhnin and Shognate, see Shin’ichirh Hishi’s book entitled The Politics of Shognate and Sobayhnin (1995). 2. Gaiseki kankei refers to the relationship acquired as a result of marriage of a family’s daughter to an emperor. 3. This section draws heavily from a section in the following unpublished paper: Kuroda and Kobayashi (1997). 4. For example, Takauji Ashikaga in 1336 set up Khmyh as the nation’s emperor in Kyoto while Emperor Go-Daigo fled to establish a rival imperial court in Yoshino, creating two rival imperial courts known as the period of the Northern and Southern courts. Emperor Khmyh representing the Northern court established a formal de facto regime Muromachi Bakufu (military regime under Shhgn who rules the nation in the name of the emperor) in 1338 although the confrontation lasted until 1392. This two-year period when the absence of the direct imperial rule and shhgun with his de facto ruling power prevailed is classified as belonging to the civil war category. 5. Kobayashi read and made notes of the available sources first. Kuroda read some of the source materials, after which time the two discussed the results as to validity and reliability of the data gathered and passed final judgment in classifying each period in history. We are aware, e.g., that Wakamori infers that Prince Regent Shhtoku and Empress Suiko officially governed Japan, while Umako Soga, who worked as Empress Suiko’s Hkami, was the real power behind both of them, at least until he left Asuka to settle in Ikaruga, most likely between 601 and 605 (Wakamori 1974, 90–91). Another authority on Japanese history reports that Umako Soga, who was working for Empress Suiko, then as a minister, had no significant impact on Prince Regent Shhtoku (Sakamoto 1962, 403). However, this is not to deny the influence of the Soga family on imperial family members, since Prince Regent Shhtoku’s mother hails from the Soga family. We have classified Prince Regent Shhtoku’s period not as a trilayer but as a bilayer system with the Soga family ruling Japan in the name of the emperor, an integral part of Asuka period from 587 to 645. 6. Shogunate in Japanese history refers to an abbreviation for Sei-i-taishhgun, a title originally given around 720 to the commander in charge of conquering Ainu, an indigenous Jhmon people who resisted the expansion of the imperial family’s influence (Kuroda 1967e). Yoritomo Minamoto was given the title of shhgun by Emperor Sutoku. The

232

Notes

title by then referred to the hereditary commander-in-chief of military forces or class to rule the nation. 7. Since all Japanese originally came from the Asian continent and the Pacific, and anthropologists inform us that Jhmon people, composed of Ainu, Okinawans, and others, settled in the Japanese archipelago first, followed by Yayoi people, the question is where do you start calling some natives and some new settlers. By the time Japan came to form something of a country, an organized community of people, both ethnic groups were already there. The problem of finding an answer to the question of how the bilayer system started in Japan is that, by the time the Japanese found a way of recording history, the system was already in existence. We have no way of discovering how the system began by looking at the available documents. 8. There may be some who would argue that the advent of the Yayoi culture from the Northeast Asian continent constituted the first wave of external pressure. Our position would be that Japan as we know it today is based on both Jhmon and Yayoi to the extent that the two cultures cannot be separated in discussing Japanese people as a distinctive identity.

6


1. For the definition of Weber’s concept of authority, see chapter 2. On the concept of power and participation in the Japanese context, see my earlier works: Kuroda (1965a, 1965b, 1965c, 1965d, 1967a and references therein, 1967b, 1967c, 1967d, 1974a). 2. Many presidents have been elected by fewer than 50 percent of the total popular votes cast for candidates, including Lincoln, Wilson, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, and Bush. The public at large was for a national health plan in the late 1940s and yet Congress failed to pass the bill due to powerful opposition from organized interest groups. 3. American democracy prevailed in the final analysis since Professor Gordon Hirabayashi and others were pardoned and Japanese American internees were partially compensated for their loss of property, but only decades later and after many years of ceaseless efforts by fair-minded Americans of all races. 4. See e.g., recent books on political corruption (Caiden et al. 2001; Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002). Styles and extent of corruption vary in different parts of the world, but the fact remains that corruption is built into governing process. 5. Modern Japanese government was developed after 1868, when power was transferred from the Tokugawa shogun to Mutsuhito, the Meiji emperor. After having promulgated the Meiji Constitution in 1889, the First General Election was held to start Parliament in 1890. Eligible voters constituted only 1.24% of the total population as a result of restrictions based on gender, income, and other factors (Mitsuka 1988, 101). The intent was largely for Japan to be a self-determining independent state. The Meiji leaders perhaps wanted to use the development of a modern parliament with a new constitution as proof to the world that it deserves to be treated equally by Western powers since it continued to suffer from humiliating, unequal treaties with the West until 1899. The prewar Japanese government in the nineteenth century was democratic only in the sense that it wanted to fully establish the right of self-determination, not in the sense that it provided equal opportunity for the people of Japan to take part in politics as a participatory democracy. 6. It costs over a million dollars a year to maintain a Diet seat when Diet members receive an annual salary of just $150,000. One has to raise the remaining sum to keep one’s seat

Notes

7.

8. 9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

233

in the Diet. To wage an effective campaign is also costly. Many would-be Diet members shy away from politics because of lack of resources. Japanese elections are “free” in the sense that elections are competitive. Even in the proportional representation system, it requires considerable resources to be listed high enough on the list prepared by a party. The party lists its candidates on the basis of their contributions, which may include monetary donations. People everywhere work for those who compensate them for their work. That is the reason why we have such books as Best Congress Money Can Buy by Phillip M. Stem (1992) or Greg Palast’s The Best Democracy Money Can Buy (2003). Ideal democracy calls for more adequate pay for Diet members as well as for Congressional members even if the minority of them abuse them when one considers such scandals as “Greenpia” in Japan or Savings and Loan scandals in the United States. Inoguchi (2003) traces the bureaucratic contribution to the development of democracy to the latter half of the sixteenth century. The very fact that it was the Tokugawa shogunate that enabled the caste system to control all of Japan contrasts diametrically to my concept of democracy, with equality of access to power as the central criterion for democracy to prevail. Mao-tsetung called his Maoism a new democracy, e.g., The word “democracy” is accepted as a norm by many peoples of the world, however differently they may define it. The Japanese National Character Study is based on an ongoing nationwide survey conducted every five years since 1953 by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. For more details on the nature and scope of the longitudinal survey, see Hayashi and Kuroda (1997). The caste system, consisting of four castes and the untouchables was established by the Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868): warrior, farmer, artisan and merchant, and several classes of untouchables. Farmers composed the largest sector of Tokugawa society, with probably 80% or more. Untouchables were just a few percent and were engaged in menial jobs and undesirable positions like executioners, garbage collectors, and those who handled the dead. The only caste engaged in governing was exclusively the warrior caste. Consequently, even after the Meiji Reform, those who entered government bureaucracy were of the top caste, as were government officials. The caste system was abolished shortly after the Meiji Reform in the 1870s. However, there are traces of discrimination against former untouchables in employment, marriage and other areas of social activities, even to this date. Unfortunately, this discriminatory practice continues to find its way even among Japanese Americans as late as the last half of the twentieth century. However, some former untouchables have been active in Diet politics. For more detail, see his recent book (Nonaka 2004) entitled Discrimination and Power. The data presented here are derived from those I gathered for a book-length manuscript when preparing for “Towards Japanese Democracy: The Social Backgrounds of House of Representative Members, 1890–1990” (Kuroda 1985, 2000 and references therein; Kuroda et al. 1998). Eligible voter’s percentage was determined by dividing the number of enfranchised voters by the general population. Voter turnout is calculated by the number of votes cast divided by the number of eligible voters. Competition among candidates is measured by the number of candidates divided by the number of available seats. For the most comprehensive treatment of the First General Election, see Mason (1969).

234

Notes

17. Derived from Kuroda (2000) and the references therein plus The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, April 2004. 18. Changes in public opinion over time have three possible causes: cohort, aging, or periodic effects. For more detail, see Kuroda (2000) and the references therein. 19. Since 9/11, the Bush administration has advanced unilateralism in world politics. Neoconservatives in the administration have taken over his administration, with few realists remaining. The Bush doctrine clearly boosts the military superiority of the United States, which no one would dispute. Its unilateralism and preemption policy have alienated much of Europe and the rest of the world. The Bush doctrine called for democratizing Iraq by force in violation of international law and the democratic principle of self-determination. Likewise, the U.S. imposition of Japan’s new constitution in the occupied Japan was in violation of both international law and the democratic principle of self-determination. However, a sad fact of the matter is that the Japanese would not have drawn up as democratic constitution as what SCAP imposed. Sadly, the Japanese leaders’ overriding concern then was how to maintain the emperor system, not democracy. The new Japanese constitution even specifies the concept of academic freedom not found in the U.S. constitution. 20. The socialist governor of Tokyo ordered U.S. air bases in Tokyo not be used for the purpose of the Vietnam War. 21. “Pachinko” is a sort of pinball machine that the Japanese enjoy as their favorite pastime. If you are successful, you can earn prizes. Pachinko parlors are so ubiquitous that there is said to be one “pachinko” machine for every 50 adults in the country. 22. I interviewed Rep. Iwao Teramae in his Diet office on May 19, 1997. 23. I interviewed Rep. Hirotaka Akamatsu in his Diet office on May 15, 1957. 24. I interviewed the former prime minister on May 2, 1994 in his Nagata-chh office.

7

Conclusion

1. Voters in general seem to be fed up with the established parties as well as politicians as manifested in their electing nonprofessional political aspirants into their elected positions. Approximately 50% of the voters in recent years express no support for any particular party, “muthha” as they are referred to by the press. Practitioners of transparent politics, such as Makiko Tanaka, enjoy tremendous popularity today. 2. The United States is no exception. A case in point may be actions taken by Eleanor Roosevelt, the State Department and Truman administration joined by Zionist groups to push through the majority plan for partitioning Palestine into two states over the 1947 Thanksgiving Day weekend after tabling the motion just before the Thanksgiving Holiday began at the United Nations. Alfred Lillenthal describes how the promise of foreign aid and other means are used to convince Latin American and Asian countries to vote for the Partition Plan. General Carlos Romulo, representing the Philippines, who spoke eloquently of the need to uphold Palestinian self-determination and anticolonialism at the session before the recess was nowhere to be found, replaced by a new Philippine delegate when the UN reconvened after the holiday. If Lillenthal is correct and I believe he is, politicking must have taken place behind closed doors over the holiday weekend to change the position of many third-world countries. (For more detail on this account, see Lillenthal 1953, 55–73.) Having met him and spoke with him at the Kahala Mandarin Hotel in Honolulu, I trust his reports and inferences. I am certain that similar incidents are found on many other cases in the United States as

Notes

3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

235

well. The point, however, is that backroom politics involving large sums of money takes place with much less frequency and is less institutionalized in relation to Japan. Numerous authors who write on Japan have made this point. What is new is that I have attributed a major cause of this propensity to the language in use, not to the Japanese nationality or ethnicity, for Americans too behave in similar ways when they learn to speak Japanese fluently. Japanese start to behave like Americans in making choices as they learn to speak English. This is not to deny that many authors of Japanese politics particularly outside of Japan make reference to IPRC politics in discussing Japanese parliamentary politics. However, the absence of IPRC politics in their discussion of parliamentary politics is derived from their limited perspectives of viewing only visible parts of its formal structure. Karel van Wolferen (1989) calls the Japanese state an “enigma.” Some authors suggest the existence of politics beyond formalities by generalizing that such practices as nemawashi dominate Japanese decision-making process without mentioning IPRC politics. All these point to the very nature of IPRC politics that is beyond what one can talk about, in the utterance of the then Minister of Welfare in 1997, Jun’ichirh Koizumi. An article in The Honolulu Advertiser, March 2, 2002, A4 report on this incident. For Rev. Graham’s apology, see www.billygraham.org Motoharu Arima (1984) details the passage of the health insurance revision bill in 1984 as he guided its course in his book that was reportedly banned immediately after publication. His party purchased all copies. The late Michio Watanabe, a LDP leader of the Diet confesses that he did not know such words as tsurushi until he became a member of the HMC and started to get involved in IPRC politics. For example, see such standard work on the Japanese Diet as Iwai (1988, 24–25). I have seen bureaucrats coming in and out of the LDP IPRC office in the Diet building. Each party’s IPRC office is responsible for maximizing its interests in the legislative process. Bureaucrats who may originate bills need the help of IPRC politicians’ assistance in drafting bills in such a manner that maximizes its probability for passage. This necessity of maximizing requires that they consult with the ruling IPRC committee members. The third source of legitimacy for authority that Weber presents is charisma. Japanese political culture makes it well nigh impossible for any charismatic leaders to rise to prominence. For more detail, see Kuroda (1988). Putnam refers to voluntary association, church and other similar groups that build bonds between and among people as social capital. My reading of functionally equivalent organizations in Japan is not limited to so-called voluntary associations such as citizen movements such as people active in the areas of environment or the anti-war movement, but include villages, communities, workplaces, various types of cliques such as schools, neighborhood organizations and the like that are bound together through frequent contacts. The place of work occupies a large space in people’s lives, most notably those of men in Japan. It is like another family where workingmen and women spend much of their waking hours. Most employees refer to the place of their work as “uchi,” meaning my house in Japanese. Even diplomats and others who work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refer to the Ministry as “uchi.” In other words, these employees use the same expression to refer to the place of their work and their own family. The militant chauvinism that bonded the people together during the war was gradually replaced by company-ism in postwar years. The shortage of labor in the

236

12. 13.

14.

15.

16.

Notes 1960s caused employers to develop worker friendly environments by paying higher wages to entry-level workers and building company housing or developing housing loan programs. Large corporations started the lifetime employment system. This was made possible as a result of political stability after 1960, among other factors. Prime Minister Koizumi’s decision to send the SDF to Iraq in 2003 departs from the past policy of the use of the SDF for the first time. Robert A. Dahl informs us that Viking freemen developed an assembly called ting. The word “thing” in English is derived from the same word meaning assembly and thing (2000, 18). If we apply the concept of self-determination to its full extent, it raises the serious question of how Japan can consider itself a self-determining democracy as long as a large foreign military force is stationed in Japan that enjoys what could be considered an extraterritoriality outside of its military bases, as happened in Okinawa on August 13, 2004, as I complete this manuscript. A U.S. military helicopter crashed and burned on the Okinawa International University campus. It is located next to the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Fortunately, the physical damage was limited to buildings. The Japanese police was disallowed access to the crash site. The U.S. military has the right to the wreck, but Japanese authority has no right to even enter the wreckage site. Is Japan a fully self-determining democracy? It clearly is a challenging question for those of us concerned with the question of democracy and independence as we move into the age of globalization. The emperor system is inherently undemocratic, for it contradicts with the equality of access to power and authority principle in democracy. A tenable argument is that the largest possible segment of the Japanese population believes in the need for the emperor system as their symbol as so defined in the Japanese constitution. For this reason, I would consider the popular acceptance of emperor system to be a necessary condition for Japanese democracy to remain viable. He is a journalist who used to be with Yomiuri Shimbun, the largest circulation paper in Japan, when he presented a paper on IPRC politics in 1990 at the Hawaii conference. I found that he is currently working in the Diet as an aide to Representative Masahiro Morioka. I spoke with him over the phone for several minutes on September 9, 2004.

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Index

Abe, Hitoshi 13, 39, 218–19 Abegglen, James C. 172 Adachi, Toshiko 95–6 Agata, Khichirh 5 Akamatsu, Hirotaka xii, 127, 182, 190, 234 Akita, George xiii, 1, 12, 16, 32–4, 47, 95, 226 alienation 34, 153, 161–2, 166–7, 176, 181, 223 Alker, Hayward 216, 221 Almond, Gabriel A. 39 ambiguity 2, 31, 41, 44, 46, 206 Anpo crisis 59, 76, 91, 103–5, 120, 133, 160, 165, 199, 229 Antaku, Tsunehiko 106–7, 120 Aoyama, Hirojirh 157 Arima, Motoharu 21–2, 76–7, 140, 235 Aristotelian 3, 8, 31, 47, 204, 219, 220, 226 Asahi Shimbun xiii, 109, 153, 216 Asanuma, Inejirh 102–3, 105, 229 Asao, Tarh 151 Baerwald, Hans 15, 19, 35, 68, 217 bilayer theory x–xi, 1, 6–12, 17, 25, 27, 30–1, 33, 35–6, 38–9, 45, 52, 55, 58–9, 62, 71, 74, 136, 140, 144, 185–7, 189–90, 192–5, 197–201, 203, 206–7, 218, 220, 223 definition of 6–8, 40–55 legislative process and 50–5 limitation of 191–3

literature 195–7 multilayer nature of 132, 135, 137–8, 140–1 reliability of 189–91 usefulness of 201 validity of 185–9 bonding 15, 77, 82, 107, 166, 180–1, 200, 212, 222 “bowling alone” 161, 181 Brady, Daniel 37 Buddhism xiv, 2, 45, 139, 220, 226, 228 bureaucracy (bureaucrat) 4, 13, 18, 36–9, 48, 54–5, 63–5, 74–5, 84–5, 139, 148, 150, 152, 159–60, 173, 183, 194, 196, 216, 218, 225, 227–8, 233, 235 Bush, George W. 122, 146, 183, 204, 207, 223, 232, 234 Caiden, Gerald E. 232 Calder, Kent E. 15, 35, 217 caste, discrimination 150–1, 157, 212, 216, 233 Nonaka and 151–2 Christensen, Ray 37, 186, 194, 197 Christianity 46, 51 Chomsky, Noam 39 Cold War 53, 59–60, 62, 82, 130, 144, 152, 182–3, 198 Cold War era xi, 6, 59, 62, 132, 150, 160, 182, 190, 195, 199, 207, 217, 223–4 Communitarian (ism) xi, xiii, 34, 222

246

Index

compromise 28, 62, 78–81, 85, 88, 95, 102 Confucianism 45, 51, 131, 136, 139–40, 221, 226 consensus 22–3, 33, 35, 48–51, 54–5, 63–4, 67, 69–70, 73, 81, 86, 93, 112, 118, 129, 135, 150, 152, 186, 196, 203, 204 conservative 10, 19, 59, 61, 68, 78, 97–9, 113, 160, 191, 196, 211, 217 constitution 2, 4, 15, 18, 30, 32, 34, 38, 51, 58–60, 63, 89, 92–3, 96–7, 105, 146–9, 164, 186, 216, 224, 230, 232, 234 Constitutional Liberal Party 92 corporatism 38–9, 193–6 bilayer theory and 38–9 with labor 195–7 without labor 39, 194 corruption 73, 95, 97, 111, 147, 183, 198, 206, 232 “cow-walk” 68, 211 culture 2–3, 5, 31–2, 36, 40, 44–5, 47, 49–50, 183, 186, 198, 204, 213, 219–20, 232 definition of 2–3, 46 Greek 46, 144 Japanese xi–xii, 2–3, 11, 19, 46–8, 50–2, 149, 187, 205–6, 215–16, 219, 221–2, 232 mother culture x Nagata-chh 3, 14–15, 216 political 19, 39, 93, 147, 150, 186, 205, 235 political system and 47–50 Semitic 44–6 Syropalestinian 46 Western 11 Curtis, Gerald L. 5, 9, 12, 15, 35–6, 51, 186, 193–4, 197, 215–16 Dahl, Robert A. 140, 144–5, 148, 236 dangh 17, 85–6, 97, 124–5, 203, 211

democracy x–xi, xiii, 5–6, 9, 11, 20–3, 25–6, 31–4, 51, 61–2, 72–3, 81, 83, 100, 108, 118, 120, 122, 141, 143–55, 157–61, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173–4, 177–83, 185, 191, 193–200, 203–7, 218–19, 232–4, 236 alienation and 161–7 American xi, 145, 150, 155, 161, 169, 204–7, 232 bilayer theory and 197–207 definition of 11, 144–5 disorganization and 34, 161–7, 180–1, 199, 222–3 egalitarianism and 12, 33, 60, 62, 156, 173, 181–2 equality and 25, 145, 149, 155–7, 160, 169, 204, 233, 236 first-time offender and 161, 165–6 healthy 158, 204 income distribution and 171, 225 IPRC and 182–3, 197–200, 206–7 Japanese x–xi, 2, 6, 11, 21, 141, 144, 147, 150, 165, 178, 182–3, 185, 194, 197–8, 203–7, 232–3, 236 “karaoke” 150, 195 large middle class and 167, 171, 178, 190, 199 liberal 5, 9, 22, 36, 38, 51, 73, 118, 148, 185–6, 193, 196, 198 living standard and 167–70, 179–80, 223 majoritarian 73, 121 open 9, 20, 72, 206–7 origin of 144–5 parliamentary xi, 23, 33, 83, 108, 118, 147, 150, 197 political culture and 39–40, 93, 147–52, 205 representation and 158, 173–7, 195 schooling and 173, 177–9 self-determination and 146, 204, 232, 234, 236

Index Taishh 145–6, 148, 165 voting and 158–61 welfare recipient 167, 169–70, 179–80 Democratic Party xii, 68, 97–8, 138, 217 de Tocqueville, Alexis 160–1, 181, 203 diffuse 31, 45, 46–7, 49, 102, 222 discrimination 156, 233 ethnic 143 Disraeli, Benjamin 1, 5, 8 divorce 34, 161, 163, 166–7, 179–80, 203 Doi, Takako 108, 127, 187, 230 DSP 67, 79, 99, 102, 104, 107, 115–16, 123, 127, 211 Easton, David 29 Eda, Saburh 224 Eda, Satsuki 20, 55, 74–5, 78, 227 Eisenhower, Dwight 60, 103 Eisenstadt, S.N. 37 Engel’s coefficient 167, 179 Epstein, David 37 Eulau, Heinz 36, 38 Executive Council 54, 64, 70, 74, 222, 229–30 explicit 2–3, 17, 23, 25, 27–8, 37, 40, 46, 60, 77, 96, 138, 185, 193–4, 200, 211, 217, 221 external pressure (Gaiatsu) 50–1, 53–5, 61, 81, 138–9, 183, 186, 232 Ezaki, Masumi 101, 105 faction 65–6, 95, 100–1, 118, 122–3, 125, 198, 201, 206, 226, 230 fight (fighting) 75, 87, 91, 103, 115, 219, 223 First Imperial Diet 34, 48, 71, 93, 128, 135, 187, 197 Flanagan, Scott C. 4, 9, 15, 35–6, 51 foundlings 34, 161–4

247

Fukuda, Hajime 101 Fukuda, Takeo 99, 101 Fukumoto, Kentarh 16–17, 19 Fukunaga, Kenji 101, 103–5, 140 Funada, Naka 101, 110, 116, 119 Galtung, Johan 45, 220 Galtung and Nishimura 220 genrh 54, 211 Gerth 29 giri 2, 211–12 globalization 203, 207, 236 GNP 100, 157, 159 Goth, Shhjirh 94–5 government x–xi, 4, 6, 9, 16–17, 28–30, 62–3, 200, 203–4, 206, 211, 216, 218–19, 222, 224–6, 227–8, 232–3 defined (politics) 29–30, 62–3 Graham, Billy 188 Gulf War 82, 126–7, 222 Halloran, Richard xiii, 1–2, 9 Hamada, Khichi xii, 13, 27–8, 33, 52, 75–6, 97, 123, 126–8, 148, 188–90, 226–8 “Hamakh” see Hamada, Khichi hanashiai 16, 57–8, 88, 212 Hanihara, Kazurh 131, 136 haragei 18, 211, 217 harmony 2, 31, 131–2, 136, 139–40, 160 Hashimoto, Ryitarh 129, 223 Hashimoto, Tomisaburh 107 Hata, Tsutomu 128–9 Hatoyama, Ichirh (Cabinet) 18, 98, 101 Hatoyama, Kunio 129 Hauss, Charles 38 Hayashi, Chikio xiii, 2, 46, 157, 186, 216, 217, 219–21, 226, 228, 233 Hayashi, Yizh 94 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 232 Hirabayashi, Gordon 146, 232

248

Index

Hirose, Hideyoshi 125 Hirose, Michisada xiii, 11, 20, 64, 70, 79, 86–7, 109–10, 117, 125 HMC defined 73–4 homicide 161, 163–6, 171 Honda, Masatoshi 16–17 hon’ne 7, 15, 54, 57, 62, 69, 76, 81, 85–6, 98, 108, 186, 211, 226 Honzawa, Jirh 20, 77–8, 83–4, 228 Horie, Fukashi 17, 65 Hosokawa, Morihiro 65, 129, 225 human relations 18, 25–6, 28, 61, 67, 75, 78, 84, 120, 140, 175, 191, 222–3 Hyman, Herbert H. 39 Ichikawa, Shhichi 128 Ichikawa, Yiichi 78 Ike, Nobutaka 33, 153, 155, 199 Ikeda, Hayato 28, 60, 101 illegitimate 205, 219 Imperial Diet 17, 32, 93, 95–6, 98, 224 implicit 3, 25, 27–8, 31, 40, 46, 93, 111, 118, 193, 216, 219, 221 individual(s), individualism xi–xii, 9, 14, 18, 35–6, 38, 45–7, 53, 63, 66, 71–2, 78, 86, 92, 98, 123, 147, 149, 152, 155, 160, 175, 189, 196, 204, 206, 219, 221–2 salient unit 38, 42 industrialization 29–30, 32, 47, 161, 165–6, 181, 203 inferiority 155, 157 Inoguchi, Takashi 65, 147, 150–1, 194–5, 216, 225, 233 Inoue, Mitsusada 131, 135 integrative approach 3–4 IPRC Interparty Relations Committee (kokutai politics) Association for Consultation among Parties 93, 95–7

Association for Interparty Association (AIPR) 96, 212, 228 characteristics of, 9–11, 80–9, 194 decline of, 182–3, 206–7 defined 4 democracy and 181–3, 197–200 Diet Agenda Council 96–7 expense 99, 108, 117, 128–9 functions (activities) of 69–70, 74–80 international relations and 75, 199–200, 205 Kennedy and Tanaka 105–6 legislative process and 62–7 literature 12–23, 193–7 Meiji era 92–6 nascent 92–4 necessity of 68–9 objectives of 71–3 organization of 70–1 politics x–xiii, 4–6, 8–28, 33, 35–8, 48, 50–1, 57–9, 61–3, 65–74, 76–89, 91–4, 96–100, 102, 104, 106–8, 117–33, 135–6, 140–1, 144, 147–8, 150, 152, 168, 181–3, 185, 187–203, 205–7, 215–19, 223–30, 235–6 poverty and 10, 60, 69, 171, 190 pre-1955 system era 96–9 scenario/script and 21–2, 31, 51, 66, 70, 72, 76, 84, 87, 91, 93, 99, 103–8, 120, 122, 125, 128, 186 Takeshita on 62, 182, 190 Yano and Sath on 108–11 Iraq 2, 146, 183, 204–5, 234, 236 Ishida, Takeshi 33, 218, 219 Ishikawa, Masumi 16, 20, 201, 226 Ishikawa, Yhichi xiii Islam 145 Itagaki, Taisuke 94 Ith, Hirobumi, 95 Ith, Mitsutoshi 16, 65, 95, 235

Index Iwai, Tomoaki 16–18, 65, 84, 225, 226, 235 Iwasaki, Junzh 2–3, 57, 62, 143–4, 187, 203, 224 Izumo 131, 136, 186 Jain, Purnendra 195 Jameson, Sam xiii, 1, 12, 16, 33, 47, 50, 51, 216 Japan Inc. model 61 Japan–U.S. Mutual Security Treaty 76, 91, 102–3 JCP (Japan Communist Party) xii, 11, 21–2, 37, 52, 61–2, 67, 69, 72, 76–8, 80, 84–6, 88, 91, 97, 102, 105, 107–8, 113, 124–5, 127–8, 160, 166, 168–9, 172, 175–6, 182, 187, 189–91, 195, 199, 211–12, 219, 223, 225–8, 230 JCP IPRC xii, 72, 77, 88, 128, 166, 168–9, 172, 175, 182, 190, 219, 223, 230 Jiyiminshuth 70 Johnson, Chalmers 27–8, 194, 219 Johnston, Michael 232 Jhmon 50, 131–2, 136, 211–12, 231–2 JSP (Japan Socialist Party) x–xiii, 5, 10, 13, 21–4, 33, 38–9, 48, 53, 59–62, 67–9, 72, 76–82, 85–6, 88, 91, 96–100, 102, 104–17, 119–20, 122–30, 151, 160, 182–3, 187–92, 195, 199, 201, 207, 212, 217, 219, 222–7, 229 JSP IPRC 39, 61, 75–6, 81, 88, 96, 102–6, 120, 126–9, 190, 195, 227, 228, 230 Kaifu, Toshiki 53, 79, 100–1, 140 Kajimayama, Seiroku 75–6, 82, 101, 127, 227 Kanazashi, Masao 17, 18, 63, 85

249

Kaneko, Jinyh 94, 130, 216, 228 Kanemaru, Shin 28, 60–1, 76–9, 82, 85, 101, 122–3, 127–8, 188 Kaplan, Abraham 145 Kasahara, Hidehiko 17, 65 Kasuga, Ikkh 104, 123 Katayama cabinet 97 Kath, Kanji 104 Kath, Khichi 5, 22, 27–8, 32–3, 48–9, 104, 108, 130, 187, 196, 216, 222, 226 Kath, Shizue 108 Katsuragi family 131, 135 Kawamura, Katsumoto 123 Kawato, Sadafumi 13, 17, 37, 39, 218–19 Kayamori, Tetsuya 13, 20, 73–4, 85, 226 Kelly, W.H. 3, 46, 220 Kennedy, Robert 105–6, 232 Kennedy–Tanaka incident 105–6 King, Anthony 38 Kishi, Nobusuke 33, 153, 155 Kitaoka, Shin’ichi 201 Kluckhohn, Clyde 3, 46, 220 Kobayashi, Susumu 122 Kobayashi, Yoshie xiii, 4, 16, 231 Koizumi, Jun’ichirh x, xi, xiii, 1, 7, 27–8, 52, 57, 65, 79, 88, 148, 151, 187–9, 191, 196 Kojiki (Record of Ancient Matters) 131–2, 136, 186 Khmei Senkyo Renmei 153 KP (Khmeith) 67, 75, 78–9, 85, 102, 108, 127, 129, 188, 227 Krauss, Ellis S. 33, 150, 195, 218–19 Kunimasa, Takeshige xiii, 20 Kuno, Chiji 13, 22, 68, 75–6, 87, 91, 101, 104–6, 118–21, 123–4, 199, 228–30 Kuraishi, Tadao, 97–8, 101

250

Index

Kurimoto, Shin’ichirh 16, 23, 33–4, 47, 49, 52, 61, 81, 83, 148, 192 Kuroda, Alice 153, 156 Kuroda, Yasumasa xiii, 2, 4, 16, 39, 42, 44, 46, 141, 144, 146–7, 150–1, 153, 156–60, 164, 186, 194, 199, 216–21, 223, 225–8, 231–5 (2001) 219, 227 (2004a) 221 (2004b) 144 Kusano, Atsushi 18 Kyogoku, Jun-ichi 153, 155 language x–xi, 2–5, 7, 11, 14, 16, 25, 31–2, 34, 36, 39–49, 51, 86, 136, 186–7, 200, 202–3, 216, 218, 220–1, 226, 235 Arabic 3, 41–6, 50, 216, 219–22 English 4, 11, 15, 24, 45–6, 194, 226 Japanese 8, 16, 31, 46, 52–3, 136, 185, 192, 203, 206, 216, 221–2 Semitic 44–5 Spoken 29, 40 written 29, 45, 219 Lasswell, Harold D. 145 latent xi, 7, 28, 45, 75, 133, 193, 195, 197, 198, 202 IPRC 54, 88, 132, 198, 205 layer, level 7, 8, 54, 60–2 legislative process 89, 198, 201, 204–6 structure x, 49, 59–60, 70–89, 131–2, 190 LDP, see ruling: LDP LDP IPRC xii, xiii, 5, 7, 18, 20, 28, 51–2, 57, 64, 68, 70–1, 74–8, 80, 82–3, 89, 91, 98–102, 104–5, 108, 110–11, 113–14, 117–18, 121–3, 125–7, 129, 140, 144, 182, 188–90, 192–3,

199–200, 202, 216, 223, 225–30, 235 legislative process 62–8 legitimacy (legitimate) 5, 31, 37, 38, 130–1, 135–6, 141, 150–1, 195, 199, 204–5, 235 Liberal Party 92, 94, 197, 200 Liberal Party (Post-war) 68, 97–8, 130, 217 Lillenthal, Alfred M. 234 Lipset, Seymour M. 167, 199 logic, logical 1–2, 25, 46, 140 Aristotelian 3, 47, 204, 215–16, 219–20, 226 binary 44–6, 140, 186, 205 Japanese 118, 194 Nagata-chh 3, 216 Lowell, Percival 46, 221 Maeda, Hideaki 95–6, 228 Mai’nichi Shimbun Seijibu 13, 20–1, 92, 99, 105, 107–8, 114–17, 121–3, 126, 191, 229–30 majoritarian 73, 81–1, 121, 186 majority (rule), 146–8, 150–2, 154, 159, 177, 186, 192–3, 198, 203–4, 212, 216–17, 224, 230, 234 manifest xi, 7, 36, 46, 49, 132, 159, 220, 234 layer 54, 62 structure 58–9, 71, 75, 89, 132 Marx, Karl 29, 34, 46–7, 51, 160–1, 165–6, 181, 223 Mason, R.H.P. 92, 233 Matsuda, Takechiyo 13, 20, 73–4, 84, 226 Matsukata, Masayoshi 94–5, 197–8 Matsuzaki, Tetsuhisa 17–18, 67, 86, 101, 195, 225–6 Mencken, H.L. 145 Mezey, Michael 38, 193 middle class 171, 207 large 167, 178, 190, 199 Miki, Takeo 101, 110–13, 119, 230

Index

251

“milk bottle” 14–15, 68, 113, 115, 124, 201 Miller, Warren E. 199 Mills, C. Wright 29 Misaki, Kamenosuke 94 Mitsuka, Hiroshi 101, 232 Miyazawa, Ki’ichi 27–8, 53, 59, 67, 101, 140, 223 Mochizuki, Mike 15, 37, 187, 193–4 Modernization 1, 12, 30, 32–4, 37, 51, 53, 147, 216, 226 money 11, 13, 20–2, 29, 38, 42–3, 46, 64, 67–8, 73, 75–6, 78, 82, 85, 87–8, 97–9, 106–11, 113–18, 120–30, 171, 187–90, 192, 196–7, 201, 206–7, 209–10, 218–19, 223, 225–6, 228–31, 233, 235 monotheistic 44–6, 220 Mori, Yoshirh 2, 9, 27, 33, 101, 128–9 Moriyama, Mayumi xii–xiii, 224 Mr. Compromise, see Yamamoto, Khichi Munematsu 94–5 Murakami, Isamu 99, 101 Murakawa, Ichirh 4, 16–17, 25, 89, 92, 96–8, 102, 225, 231 Muramatsu, Michio 194, 216 Muraoka, Kanezh xii, 80, 101, 225, 227 Murasaki Shikibu 45, 207 Murata, Keijirh xiii, 143 Murayama, Tomi’cihi xi, 6, 39, 76, 86, 125, 129, 195, 219 Mushakhji, Kinhide 45 Mutsu, Minemitsu 94–5

Nakano, Shirh 101, 110, 114–17, 119 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 18, 21, 28, 63, 76, 100–1, 125, 188, 215, 219, 223 Nakayama, Chi’natsu 23, 75, 83–4, 87 National Democratic Party 97 nemawashi x, 4, 10, 16, 35, 51, 75–6, 84–5, 87, 92, 97, 206, 212, 216, 235 newcomers 52, 78–9, 131, 136 New Party (Shinth) 53, 129, 217 Nikaidh, Susumu 106, 121 ninjh 2, 211–12 1955 system 6, 10, 12, 17, 23, 37, 53, 59–62, 65, 81, 98, 100, 102, 130, 132, 165–6, 167–9, 170, 174, 177–8, 180–1 collapsed 168–9, 198, 201, 206, 224 defined 57, 217 era 6, 8, 11, 19, 22, 39, 57–6, 59–60, 62, 65, 72–3, 80, 100, 104, 125–6, 129, 132, 141, 147, 152, 156–7, 167, 169, 172–3, 179, 181–2, 187, 190, 195–6, 199, 201, 219, 227–8 Takeshita on 62, 182, 190 Nishihara, Shigeki 153 Nishimura, Fumiko 220 Nixon, Richard M 150, 221–2, 229, 232, Billy Graham and 188, 190 Nonaka, Hiromu 17, 151–2, 233 Nonaka, Naoto 17 nonconfidence 58–9, 110–11, 119, 230

Nagano, Nagahiro, 98 Naka, Mamoru 16–17, 61 Nakagawa, Hidenao 199 Nakano, Kansei xii, 189 Nakano, Minoru 17–18, 63, 77, 95

Obuchi, Keizh 33, 223 Office of the Prime Minister 83, 153, 205 O’Halloran, Sharon 37 Hi, Keisuke x, xiii, 13, 207 Hishi, Shinzaburh 53

252

Index

Okinawa 105, 236 Okinawa Reversion 122 Okonogi, Hikosaburh 91, 101, 125–6, 228 Hno, Banboku 68 Hshita, Eiji 20, 26, 67, 223 Htake, Hideo 59, 224 Hyama, Reiko 225 Ozawa, Ichirh 57, 59, 65, 76, 78, 82, 101, 127, 188, 198, 217 Ozawa, Saeki 101 Ozawa, Tatsuo 21, 76, 125 “pachinko alone” 161, 181, 234 Palast, Greg 233 PARC (Policy Affairs Research Council) 54, 64–5, 74, 80, 83–4, 229 PARDC (Policy Affairs Research Deliberation Council) 54, 64–5 Pareto optimum 71, 182 peace, peaceful 33, 91, 93, 95, 111, 120, 132, 143, 149–50, 160, 171, 173, 186, 199, 224 Pempel, T.J. 39, 194–5, 197 PKO bill 82, 126–7 politics defined 29–30, 62–3 polytheism 44, 49 poverty 10, 34, 60, 69, 169, 171, 181, 190, 195 prismatic (society) vii, 1, 6, 30, 193–4 Prince Shhtoku 2, 186 Protagoras 3, 47 Putnam, Robert D. 160–1, 181, 199, 235 railroad 59, 68–9, 76, 82, 93, 107, 110, 112–13, 115, 119, 121–2, 124, 127, 150, 230 Rashomonesque 6, 14, 45–7, 203, 217 rationalism, rational-choice 1, 6, 28, 31, 38, 42–3, 47, 69, 120, 139–40, 186

real government 17, 89, 92, 195 Reischauer, Edwin O. 33 reliability xi, 55, 137, 169, 189, 202–3, 225, 231 religion 29, 44–6, 48–9, 139–40, 151, 207, 216, 220–1 Research Committee on the Study of the Japanese National Character 159, 170 rich and (the) poor 45, 69, 161, 172, 180, 182, 203, 207, 222–3 Richardson, Bradley M. 4, 5, 9, 15, 35–6, 51, 197, 217 Riggs, Fred W. 1, 6, 30–2, 51, 193 Rikh, Mitsushi 139 ruling 10, 50, 53, 61, 130–1, 136, 138, 146, 150, 189, 200, 211, 231 LDP 17, 22–3, 35, 37, 49, 53, 55, 61, 66–7, 69, 72, 75–7, 79–82, 86, 88, 91, 102, 108, 113, 117, 121, 124, 127, 187, 189, 191, 201, 216, 226 coalition 65, 68, 72, 96, 128–9, 133 family 131, 136 majority 31, 33, 186, 204 party 3, 6, 9, 11, 13–14, 17–18, 20–3, 28, 31, 35–9, 45, 48–9, 51, 54–5, 57–69, 72–4, 77, 80–6, 88, 93–4, 98–100, 102, 106–7, 111, 113, 115–18, 120–5, 127, 132, 138, 145, 146, 150, 190, 196, 201, 205, 212, 215, 217–18, 222–3, 235 Sakamoto, Tarh 231 Sakamoto, Yoshiyuki 159, 170 Sakigake 129, 217 Sangi’in 92, 95 Sasaki, Hideyo 101, 111, 113, 119 Sath, Eisaku 2, 28, 78, 97, 100, 107–9, 111, 114–16, 127, 190, 221–2, 225, 229 Sath, Seizaburh 17–18, 67, 86, 225–6

Index Sath, Toshiki 172–3 Schmitter, Phlippe C. 38 Second Imperial Diet 94–5 seken 149, 153 self 31, 42, 46–7, 222 American 42, 47, 49 Japanese 39, 46–7, 222 reality and 31, 39–47, 49 worldview and 46–7 Self Defense Forces (SDF) 82, 127, 195, 236 separation of power 58, 131, 136, 149, 204 shibai 22, 85, 212, 218 Shi’ikuma, Saburh 97–8, 101 Shimph, Tetsuo 17, 92, 95 Shindh, Muneyuki 13, 39, 218–19 Shintoism, Shintoist 44, 139–40 Shiomi, Shunji 110, 116 shirasu 131, 135–6 Shigi’in and Sangi’in eds. 92, 94–5 Sisson, Richard 37 Skinner, B. F. 39 “sleep” “sleeping” technique 14, 68, 106, 113 Sobayhnin 53, 129, 135, 140, 212, 217, 231 social disorganization 34, 161, 166–7, 180, 199, 223 social mobility 172–3 socialists 6, 14, 17, 23, 34, 48, 61, 68, 80, 108, 112, 123, 125–9, 159, 175, 182, 211 Sone, Yasunori 17–18, 63, 85 Sonoda, Sunao 101, 121 standing committee(s) 18, 52, 65–7, 69, 74, 82, 84, 87, 98, 126–7, 215, 226 Steiner, Jürg 38 Stem, Philip M. 233 Stockwin, J.A.A. 5, 218 Stokes, Donald E. 199 suicide 175–6, 179–80 superiority bureaucratic 234

253

Japanese 155–7 military 234 numerical 18, 118 Suzuki, Mosaburh 88, 104 Suzuki, Muneo 196 Suzuki, Tatsuzh 42, 44, 186, 216, 218–20 Suzuki, Zenkh 101, 122–3, 186 symbiosis (symbiotic) 59–62, 182–3, 223 Syropalestinian 46 Tachibanaki, Toshiaki 225 Takahashi, Yoshikatsu xiii, 17 Takeshita, Noboru x, xii–xiii, 13, 23, 27–8, 33–4, 48–9, 52–3, 60, 62, 66, 72, 77–81, 88, 100–2, 125, 140, 168, 171, 182, 188–91, 215, 218–19, 223–4 Tamura, Hajime xii, 101, 122–3 Tamura, Shigenobu xii Tanabe, Makoto 76–8, 82, 127–8, 188, 230 Tanaka, Kakuei 2, 67, 100–1, 105–7, 110–11, 114, 116–19, 121–2, 127, 196, 207, 224–5, 228, 230 Tanaka, Makiko 9, 196, 234 Tanaka, Naoki xiii Tanaka, Yasumasa xiii, 227 Tanaka, Yasuo 7 tatemae 7, 15–16, 54, 76, 186, 211, 213, 226 Ten’nh 52, 213, 218, 231 Teramae, Iwao xii, 72, 88, 182, 189–90, 219, 234 Three non-nuclear principles 33 Tomimori, Eiji 53, 82, 88, 127, 228 Tosa clan 94, 197, 200 Thyama, Shigeki 95–6 Tsunekawa, Kei’ichi 194–5, 197 tyranny of the majority 49, 77, 116, 118, 150

254

Index

Ueda, Khichirh 21–2, 76, 85, 107–8, 124–6, 128–9 United States 3, 9–10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 34, 36–9, 44–5, 47–50, 53, 58, 60–2, 68, 70, 74, 76, 91, 96, 105, 122, 139, 143, 145–6, 148–50, 152, 154, 156–7, 160–1, 166, 171–2, 181, 183, 185, 188, 198, 200, 204–6, 211, 217, 221–2, 227, 233–4 University bill 121, 230 urbanization 153, 161, 165–6, 203 ushihaku 131, 135–6 validity xi, 8, 12, 24–5, 55, 62, 95, 136–7, 169, 185–9, 202–3, 220, 231 Van Wolferen, Karel 1, 5, 8, 195, 235 Verba, Sidney 39 violence, violent 11, 34, 59–60, 70, 77, 91, 93, 95, 97, 103, 105, 120, 133, 160–1, 164–5, 198, 229 viscosity 15, 18, 19, 37, 193–4 Wahlke, John C. 36, 38 waka 23, 57, 143, 218 Wakamori, Tarh 131, 136, 231 “wake up” 68, 113, 124 Watanabe, Michio 235 Watanabe, Tsuneo 20, 74, 85, 226

Watanabe, Yoshiaki xiii Watanuki, Jhji 150, 194 Westerner 45–6, 156–7 Woronoff, Jon 1, 15 Yamagata, Aritomo 1, 32–3, 36, 52, 93–4, 197, 200 Yamaguchi, Kikuichirh 98 Yamaguchi, Tsuruo x, xiii, 13, 34, 48, 72, 88, 98, 189–90 Yamaguchi, Yoshitaka 165 Yamamoto, Khichi 13, 20, 22, 80–1, 87, 102–6, 126, 128, 140, 229 Yamatogokokoro 45 Yanaga, Chitoshi 1, 12, 15–16, 32–3, 35, 47, 51–2, 194 Yano, Junya and Prime Minister Sath 108–11 Yano, Junya xiii, 13, 78, 108–11, 116, 118, 190 Yayoi 50, 131, 136, 212–13, 232 Yayoi Club 92 Yomiuri Shimbun x, xiii, 103, 236 Yoshikawa, Naoto xiii Zahariadis, Nikolaos 38 Zhou, Kate xiii zoku Diet members 13, 65, 74, 87, 217, 225–6

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