The Chinese In Southeast Asia And Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions

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Ching-Hwang Yen

University of Adelaide, Australia

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

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LONDON

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SINGAPORE

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BEIJING

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SHANGHAI

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HONG KONG

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TA I P E I

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CHENNAI

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Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yan, Qinghuang. The Chinese in Southeast Asia and beyond : socio-economic and political dimensions / by Yen Ching-hwang. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-981-279-047-7 ISBN-10: 981-279-047-0 1. Chinese--Asia, Southeastern. 2. Chinese--Foreign countries. I. Title. DS523.4.C45Y373 2008 305.895'1059--dc22 2007044802

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2008 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected]

Printed in Singapore.

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Contents

Part I: The Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore Introduction

1 3

1. Malaysian Chinese Society in Transition (1903–2003)

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2. A Century of Chinese Business in Malaysia (1904–2004)

37

3. The Roles of Hokkiens in the History of Malaysia and Singapore

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4. Kinship and Organization: The History of the Gan (Yan or Yen) Clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia (1850–1993)

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5. The Development and Future of the Chinese Kinship Associations in Singapore and Malaysia

117

6. Reflections on My Study of Ethic Chinese History in Singapore and Malaysia

137

7. Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya (1900–1911)

149

8. Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya: A Revisit

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9. Lim Lian Geok and His Struggle for the Chinese Education in Malaya (1949–1961)

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The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond

Part II: The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond

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10. Social Change in the Ethnic (Overseas) Chinese Communities: A Historical Perspective

261

11. A Preliminary Study of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia (1842–1941)

285

12. Confucianism and the Ethnic Chinese Business in East and Southeast Asia

321

13. The Overseas Chinese Nationalism: A Historical Study

337

14. Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution

361

15. Hakka Chinese in Southeast Asian History

379

16. Hong Kong, China, and the Overseas Chinese

397

17. Dr Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China

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Index

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PART I: CHINESE IN MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE


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Introduction

The Chinese in Southeast Asia, with their economic clout, have been attracting attention from politicians, scholars, and observers alike. As the rise of China as an economic powerhouse and its influence looms large over Southeast Asia, the role of Southeast Asian Chinese in the region’s economic relations with China receives further attention from the outside world. What made Southeast Asian Chinese an important economic force and their growing importance to China are, to a certain extent, determined by the nature and development of their communities. A multifaceted approach is needed to unravel the forces that propelled the communities ahead. This book places its focus on social, economic and political aspects of the communities with special emphasis on the Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore. It contains 17 papers, the majority of which had not been in the English language, written in a period of 6½ years from January 2000 to April 2006. Some of these papers are based on public lectures and keynote speeches delivered at various international conferences in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. This book is divided into two major parts: Part I focuses on Malaysia and Singapore, while Part II covers others parts of Southeast Asia and beyond. The importance of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia among the Southeast Asian Chinese can be assessed from both historical and current perspectives. Not only were they most numerous, but they also formed the strongest socioeconomic and cultural entity. Numerical strength and their special position enabled them to play a pivotal role in the socioeconomic, political, and cultural developments among Southeast Asian Chinese: setting the scene and standards for other ethnic Chinese to follow, and extending their influence beyond 3


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Southeast Asia. The founding of the Nanyang University in Singapore in 1953 as the highest Chinese educational institution in Southeast Asia, and the hosting of the first convention of Chinese entrepreneurs worldwide by the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in August 1991 are two good examples. The first two chapters, “Malaysian Chinese Society in Transition (1903–2003)” and “A Century of Chinese Business in Malaysia (1904–2004)” provide a survey of Malaysian Chinese society and business between early 20th and early 21st centuries with a developmental perspective. The chapters analyze the socioeconomic forces for change, evaluate success or failure, and point out future directions. The performance of the Ethnic Chinese there was conditioned by their history and the nature of their societies. The Chinese societies in Malaysia and Singapore had been divided by the existence of dialects and geographically based huiguan (dialect association), and kinship-based zongqinhui (clan association). Dialect and kinship connections, though in decline as time goes on, still exert some influence on the performance of the Chinese in the social and economic arenas. Chapter 3, “The Roles of Hokkiens in the History of Malaysia and Singapore” is written from this perspective. The Hokkiens are a major dialect group in Malaysia and Singapore, and they formed into a powerful bang (a combined dialect and geographical entity). They are extremely influential in the Chinese societies and have commanded considerable economic clout; and their economic performance has enormous impact on the economies of Malaysia and Singapore as a whole. With a historical perspective, this chapter assesses especially the roles of the Hokkiens in the Malaysian economy and the development of modern Chinese education in Malaysia. It also examines the patterns of Hokkien entrepreneurship and evaluates the contributions of the Hokkien entrepreneurs in the transformation of modern Malaysian economy. Traditionally, huiguan and zongqinhui formed the two important pillars of Chinese societies in Singapore and Malaya, and the majority of the Chinese lived under their influence. As time passed by and the changes in political and economic environments took place in Southeast Asia and China, their roles in the Chinese societies


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diminished and their influence on the Chinese declined. However, since the 1980s, these two traditional social institutions undertook reforms and went through a process of rejuvenation, and they found new meanings and new roles in the Chinese societies. Chapter 4, “Kinship and Organization: The History of the Gan (Yan or Yen) Clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia (1850–1993)” provides a case study of this transformation process. This study has challenged a popular belief that zongqinhui is becoming less and less relevant as a social institution, and it will fade away in oblivion. This study shows that it can survive and even prosper under the conditions of having an aspiring and far-sighted leadership, a reform in its traditional functions, and a changing role in an ever-changing domestic and international environment. Both Chapters 5 and 6 add to the substance of social dimension of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia. Chapter 5, “The Development and Future of the Chinese Kinship Associations in Singapore and Malaysia” of which the Chinese version was written in 1991, compares separate developments of clan organizations in Singapore and Malaysia. With different political and cultural environments, they appeared to have taken different routes. The clan associations in Singapore were integrated into an umbrella organization under the government’s guidance with new socioeconomic and cultural roles, while their counterparts in Malaysia were left alone by the government to find their own way and new direction. Chapter 6, “Reflections on My Study of Ethnic Chinese History in Singapore and Malaysia” takes a critical look at certain socioeconomic and political issues of the Chinese in history, corrects a Western colonial bias, and provides a more balanced view on these issues. The following three chapters are concerned with some important aspects of Chinese political life in Singapore and Malaysia. Chapter 7, “Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya (1900–1911)” and Chapter 8 “Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya: A Revisit” deal with Dr Sun Yat-sen’s activities in the region. Sun, the founding father of the Chinese Republic, carried out a dynamic revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya


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in an attempt to topple the Manchu government in China. Due to the numbers and wealth of the local Chinese, Singapore and Malaya became the key centers of Sun’s revolutionary party — Tongmenghui (The Alliance), and they were integrated into a global network of Chinese revolutionary movement. Chapter 7 examines Sun Yat-sen’s close and cordial relationship with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya through his frequent visits and his personal bond with the local Chinese revolutionary leaders. With his romantic view on revolution, Sun allocated the financial role to the Overseas Chinese, and expected them to contribute to the utmost to finance the on going revolutionary uprisings. It also assesses the response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to Sun’s calls for donations and other supporting actions. Chapter 8 reaffirms the importance of Singapore and Malaya as key Tongmenghui regional centers in Southeast Asia, and assesses the mutual relationship between Sun Yat-sen and Tongmenghui on the one hand, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya on the other. The Chinese reformist and revolutionary movements in Singapore and Malaya were important in the early political life of the Chinese. The Chinese not only learned the political skill that was helpful in their later political actions, but also brought the communities closer to China in political and economic terms. Many of them at this time looked to China to pay their loyalty and rested their hope on a rich and powerful Chinese Republic to protect their interests overseas. Chapter 9, “Lim Lian Geok and His Struggle for the Chinese Education in Malaysia (1949–1961)” is a unique aspect of Chinese political life in the pre- and post-independent Malaya. Lim Lian Geok (Lin Lianyu) was an ordinary Chinese high school teacher until 1952 when the survival of Chinese education in Malaya became a political issue. With his eloquence, a sharp tongue, a strong combative spirit, and a fearless determination to defend Chinese education at all costs, he was elected as the leader of the United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association of Malaya (UCSTA) in December 1953. Using UCSTA as his power base, he mobilized the support of the entire Chinese community to fight for the legitimate status of Chinese education. Lim’s 8 years at the helm of UCSTA (from December 1953 to December 1961)


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placed this teachers’ union at the forefront of the struggle. Despite setbacks and personal sacrifices, Lim managed to hold the line of Malayan Chinese education. Lim was not a professional politician, nor was he inspired to become one. His political activity was a means to achieve his educational aims. He did not fit into any of the three categories of the Chinese political leadership in Malaya, classified by Professor Wang Gungwu, but belonged to a new type of Chinese leadership — modern trade union leader. Part II of this book focuses on socioeconomic and political aspects of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chapter 10 provides a broad overview of the social change in the Ethnic Chinese (Overseas Chinese) communities worldwide. It examines the factors and stages of the change, elucidates its characteristics and problems, and points out its future directions. This chapter is based on a keynote speech in Chinese delivered at the International Symposium on PostWar Transformation of Ethnic Chinese held in Xiamen (Amoy), China in May 1989. The concerns for the development of Ethnic Chinese communities after World War II and their future relationship with emerging China, underpinned the organizing of this symposium. Chapters 11 and 12 examine the economic life of the Chinese in Southeast and East Asia. Chapter 11, “A Preliminary Study of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia (1842–1941)” is an attempt to search for historical roots of modern-day Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia so as to explain its dynamics and vitality. First, it examines the characteristics of the Chinese capitalism: strong commercial capital, transnationalism, mobility, flexibility, and adaptability. It continues to investigate the process of accumulation of Chinese capital in that long period of time that involved reinvestment, currency reserve, and real estate. It also scrutinizes the efforts of the Chinese capitalists who had invariably contributed to the rise of Chinese capitalism. Then it turns its attention to the role of the Chinese capitalist institutions and the stages of development of Chinese capitalism in that century. Chapter 12, “Confucianism and the Ethnic Chinese Business in East and Southeast Asia” adds a cultural dimension in the economic life of the Chinese in the regions. Is the dynamism of the Chinese business in these regions purely the result of interactions of socioeconomic


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and political forces? or does it have other ingredients such as cultural and religious factors? This chapter emphasizes the importance of unique cultural factors — Confucian values and traditional Chinese social practices — in the rise of Chinese business. It examines the nature of Chinese business such as family ownership, strong business networking, strong cultural input in business organizations, and management practices. It also argues that Confucian basic tenets such as filial piety, loyalty, familism, and respect for age and authority formed the basis of the Chinese business ideology, while Confucian concepts of harmony, reciprocity (mutual obligations), hierarchy and paternalism, innovation and progress have profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese management practices. The last five chapters are related to the political life of the Ethnic Chinese and Chinese in general. Chapter 13, “The Overseas Chinese Nationalism: A Historical Study” takes a broad historical perspective on the Overseas Chinese nationalism, the most important political life of the Overseas Chinese, examining its evolution and development, and assessing its importance in the history of the Overseas Chinese. Chapter 14, “Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution” is a revisit of my early work, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution published in 1976. The 1911 revolutionary movement in Southeast Asia was momentous in the early political life of Southeast Asian Chinese. Their involvement in the revolutionary process and their financial contribution to the revolution were well documented in my book. However, the Revisionist historians in the United States in 1980s attempted to marginalize Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese in the revolution. This chapter, written in 1986, was to refute the views held by the Revisionists, and to reaffirm the important roles of Sun and the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution. It re-examined the response of the Southeast Asian Chinese to Sun Yat-sen’s and Tongmenghui’s calls, and reasserted their important financial contributions. The last two chapters “Hong Kong, China, and the Overseas Chinese” and “Dr Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China” have contemporary relevance. Both were written at the times when uncertainties loomed over Hong Kong and China. The former was written in


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the wake of Tiananmen Crackdown on 4 June 1989, when Hong Kong was shrouded in political mist, and many of the residents of the colony were thinking of migrating overseas. It was presented as the inaugural lecture by the Chair of History of the University of Hong Kong. The latter was written in an uncertain political climate facing China amid growing tension between China and the United States in the aftermath of the Hainan Incident in April 2000 where an American spy aircraft was shot down by the Chinese. It was presented as a keynote speech delivered in Chinese for a major international conference on “Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China” held in Hong Kong in November 2001. The conference was designed to re-evaluate Sun’s legacies and their implications for the new century. I pointed out that Sun Yat-sen’s “unfinished revolution” was partially realized by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping on the mainland, and Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and Jiang Jingguo in Taiwan, and Sun’s vision for a powerful and righteous China has been gradually fulfilled by China’s peaceful rise and its greater role in international affairs.


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Chapter 1

Malaysian Chinese Society in Transition (1903–2003)*

The Forces and Directions of Change In the century between 1903 and 2003, Malaysian Chinese society underwent drastic changes: from slow to rapid change, and from a change of small-scale to large-scale. This century witnessed the change of Malaysian Chinese society from a British colony to a modern global village of an increasingly integrated world. This change was remarkable and has profound impact on the future direction of the Chinese society. It is, therefore, pertinent to observe this change from a historical perspective. The change of the Chinese society was driven by both internal and external forces. The former consisted of the division and integration of the Chinese society, the rivalry and conflict of dialect and regional organizations, the division and competition between Chinese-educated and English-educated, conflict and rapport between Chinese-based political parties, and the conflict between economic and social forces. The latter comprised the rivalry and conflict between the Chinese and Malays, the impact of rapid political changes in Southeast Asia and Malaysia, the impact of Chinese politics in China, the impact of economic globalization, and the impact of the revolution in technology and communication. When the Malaysian Chinese society was shocked and shaken by the May 13th racial riots in 1969, the direction of its change was ambiguous. Many Malaysian Chinese were saddened by the events, * This chapter is based on my Chinese paper presented at the international symposium on “A Century of Malaysian Chinese Society (1903–2003): Retrospect and Prospect” held at the MCA Building, Kuala Lumpur, 22–23 November, 2003.

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and lost confidence in their future and the future of their children in Malaysia. A number of them considered the options of either migrating to Western countries or returning to Hong Kong or Taiwan for the sake of their children. By 1970s, the Chinese society groaned under the pressure of the New Economic Policy (NEP), and again many of them felt their future and the future of their children were bleak. However, under these frustrated and uncertain circumstances, the Chinese society had demonstrated its resilience by emphasizing unity and self-reliance in order to break the dilemma. In addition to political and economic pressures, the Chinese education was also under enormous strain and was fighting for its survival. The resourcefulness and the spirit of self-reliance enabled the Chinese to cope with adversities. At the dawn of 1990s, the Chinese began to see the light of a bright future after having gone through the tunnel of darkness. This new situation was brought about mainly by the interplay between domestic political change and external economic impact. First, the political struggle within United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) favored the political status of the non-Malays, and reduced the government’s pressure on the Chinese society. Second, the rise of the four Asian Little Dragons — Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore — in the 1970s and the growth of China’s economic power in the second half of 1980s provided new economic opportunities for Malaysia. Third, Taiwan’s increased investment in Malaysia and Malaysia’s growing economic contacts with China changed government’s attitude toward Chinese language and education. Chinese language was no longer considered by the government as a tool for political subversion, but rather a commercial language that could be used to advance Malaysia’s economic interests. Fourth, trade and other economic opportunities in China led the government to value the Chinese business, and believed that Chinese Malaysians who have good command of Chinese language and culture could be instrumental for the country’s entry into China’s vast market. Fifth, government’s realization that high-tech knowledge was a key to future prosperity of Malaysia, and many of these high-tech talents in the Chinese society could be fully utilized for the service of the nation.

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Malaysian Chinese Society in Transition (1903–2003)

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Chinese Society in 1903 The Chinese society in 1903 was the continuation of the Chinese society of 19th century Malaya. It was characterized by traditionalism and conservatism as the society adhered closely to Chinese tradition in all aspects. Three factors can be identified for the making of a traditional Chinese society in Malaya. First, the Chinese society was fundamentally an immigrant society, and the ethos and mores of the immigrants were determined by their economic status. Since most Chinese immigrants were concentrated in entrepots and mining centers pursuing their trading and mining activities, they were physically segregated from each other, and as a result, an united and coherent Chinese society failed to emerge. Second, most of the Chinese immigrants were imbued with traditional ideas before they left China, and tended to cling to those ideas and habits when they settled overseas. They continued to celebrate traditional Chinese festivities in Malaya regardless of the change of climate and environment.1 In addition, they held dearly to their hearts the idea of glorifying their ancestors and the practice of ancestral worship. For example, on the day of the Qing Ming festival in March 1897, the Chan (Chen or Tan) clan temple of Kuala Lumpur had mobilized more than 300 clansmen to lay sacrifices at the clan’s cemetery. This act of honoring ancestors earned much praise in the local Chinese community.2 Traditional Chinese customs and practices also received approval of the British colonial authorities which adopted a non-interference policy in dealing with Chinese culture and mores. In 1892, the acting Resident-General of Perak instructed the district officials to recognize the legal status of Chinese customs such as marriage, concubinage, adoption, and inheritance.3 Third, the Chinese society in Malaya was permeated with traditional ideas of loyalty and patriotism due to the efforts of the Chinese Consul-General in Singapore and the Consul in Penang who 1

For the retention of traditional Chinese festivities in Malaya in the 19th century, see Yen Ching-hwang, (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911. pp. 17–20. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 2 See Guangshi Wubao (a Chinese newspaper in Kuala Lumpur), 22nd March 1897, pp. 3–4. 3 See Perak Government Gazette, Taiping, 1892, 5:4, p. 94.

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cultivated the idea of loyalty to the emperor and Qing dynasty.4 All these contributed to the formation of a tradition-ridden conservative Chinese society. The Chinese society in 1903 also possessed the characteristics of an immigrant community — fluidity and instability, as the majority of the Chinese population were immigrants whose transient nature of thought determined their behavior. They were driven out of China in pursuit of economic advancement so as to support their families in China. Most of them were single males without families overseas, and had no intention of settling in the new land permanently. Once they had made enough money, they preferred to go back to China.

Chinese Society in Transition, 1904–1942 In a period of 38 years from 1904 to the Japanese occupation of Malaya and Singapore in 1942, the Chinese society entered a new era, an era of change from a conservative and divided immigrant society to a more united and modern society . This change was the result of several forces at work. First, like many other overseas Chinese communities in the world, the Chinese society in Malaya was deeply impacted by politics in China. At the beginning of the 20th century, the reform and revolutionary movements led by Kang Yuwei and Dr Sun Yat-Sen respectively, shifted their theatre of activity from China to Overseas Chinese communities.5 In the period between 1904 and 1912, both reformists and revolutionaries had established many footholds in Singapore and 4

For the Qing Consul-General’s promotion of idea of loyalty to emperor and to the Qing dynasty, see Yen Ching-Hwang, (1982). Overseas Chinese nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912, In Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16 (Pt. 3), p. 410; see also the same article published in Yen Ching-hwang, (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia p. 208. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 5 See Lo Jung-Pang, (1967). Sequel to the chronological autobiography of K’ang Yu-wei (Kang Youwei). In K’ang Yu-Wei: A Biography and a Symposium, Lo Jung-Pang (ed.), pp. 178–183. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press; Eve Armentrout Ma, L. (1990). Revolutionaries, Monarchists and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. pp. 45–51. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Wickberg E (ed.) (1982). From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada. pp. 74–77, 101–104. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited.

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Malaya, with many front organizations and newspapers to spread their propaganda.6 The spread of radical ideas not only brought the Malayan Chinese closer to China, but also provided them with an idea of a modern and united China that transcended traditional kinship and dialect ties. Their devotion to this new China was reflected in their unreserved support for China’s struggle against Japanese invasions.7 Second, the Chinese economy in this period displayed substantial change in its structure — modernization and diversification. The traditional entrepot trade underwent modernization that helped to stimulate the rise of modern financial institutions and services. Chinese banks and financial services that appeared in ports broke the European monopoly of financial sectors in Malaya and Singapore, and speeded up the transaction of Chinese business.8 At the same time, the traditional Chinese cash-crop plantation such as pepper, gambier, and sago were gradually replaced by rubber which had enornous potential in the international market. Furthermore, this period also witnessed the growth of manufacturing industry, principally in pineapple canning, the making of rubber goods, coconut oil refining, and biscuit making. This manufacturing industry, though in its infant stage, achieved moderate success in both domestic and foreign markets. 6 See Yen Ching-hwang, (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, pp. 88–149. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press; Suryadinata, L (1987). The 1911 Revolution and the Chinese in Java: A preliminary study. In The 1911 Revolution — The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia. Lee Lai To (ed.), pp. 108–124. Singapore: Heinemann Asia. 7 See Yoji Akashi (1969). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and boycott movement, 1908–1928, Journal of South Seas Society, 23 (Pts. 1 & 2), 69–96; Yoji Akashi (1970). The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941. Kansas: Center for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas; Tsui Kuei-Chiang. Haixia zhimindi Huaren dui wushi yundong de fanxiang (The response of the Chinese in the Straits Settlements to the May Fourth Movement). Journal of the South Seas Society, 20 (Pts. 1 & 2), 13–18; Yen ChingHwang (1982). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan incident, 1928. In Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, Yen Ching-Hwang pp. 306–329. 8 For the rise of the Chinese banking and financial institutions in Singapore and Malaya, see Tan Ee-Leong (1953). The Chinese banks incorporated in Singapore and the Federation of Malaya. Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 26 (Pt. 1), 124–138; Lee Sheng-yi (1990). The Monetary and Banking Development of Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 88–89. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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Third, notable progress was made on the fronts of Chinese education and culture. Late Qing educational reform in China had direct impact on the rise of modern Chinese education in Southeast Asia. The Zhong Hua School (Zhong Hua Xue Tang), the first moderntype Chinese school in Southeast Asian region was founded in May 1904 in Penang, and became the forerunner of modern Chinese education in Malaysia and Singapore.9 Following the footsteps of the Zhong Hua school, several modern-type Chinese schools were founded in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in the same decade.10 During the Republican period (1912–1949), due to closer political links between China and its overseas subjects, the educational policies of the Republican government had direct bearing on the development of modern Chinese education in Malaya: from modern-type schools to full-fledged modern Chinese schools; from primary schools to junior and senior high schools, the Malayan Chinese education had developed into a complete and organized educational system.11 All these Chinese schools retained a great deal of Chinese cultural values, lifted the 9

For details of the founding of the Zhong Hua School in Penang, see Penang Sin Pao (Penang), 1st July 1904; Lat Pau (Singapore), 30th December 1904; Tan Yeok-Seong (Chen Yusong) (1983). Malaya huawen jiaoyu farenshi (The history of the commencement of the Chinese education in Malaya). In Ye Yin Guan Wencun (Collections of Literary Works of Ye Yin Hall), Tan Yeok-Seong, Vol. 2 pp. 239–240. Singapore: South Seas Society. 10 The modern Chinese schools founded in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in this period included Yin Sin Primary School (May 1905), the Yang Zheng School, Duan Meng School, and Dao Nan School (all three were founded in 1906) in Singapore; and the Confucian Primary School and Kuen Cheng Girl School (both founded in 1907) in Kuala Lumpur. See Yen Ching-hwang, (2003). Hokkien immigrant society and the modern Chinese education in British Malaya, 1904–1941. In Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, MW. Charney, BSA. Yeoh and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.), p. 116. Singapore: Singapore University Press & World Scientific. See also the same article collected in Yen Ching-hwang, (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 10–181. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 11 See Tay Lian Soo (Zheng Lianshu), (1998) Malaxiya huawen jiaoyu fazhanshi, diyi fenci (A History of the Malaysian Chinese Education), Vol. 1, pp. 161–370. Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of the Chinese Teachers’ Associations; Xu Suwu (1949). Xinjiapo jiaoyu quanmao (The Bird’s-eye View of the Chinese Education in Singapore), pp. 29–31. Singapore: Lian Shu Publishing Company; Tay Lian Soo and Gwee Yee Hian (eds.) (1975). Malaxiya Xinjiapo huawen zhongxue tekan tiyao fu xiaoshi (The Souvenir Magazines of the Chinese High Schools in Malaysia and Singapore, With Appendixes on School Histories), pp. 6–247. Kuala Lumpur: The Chinese Department of the University of Malaya.

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literacy rates, and propelled the Chinese society from a conservative to a modern one. At the same time, the improvement of literacy stimulated the growth of modern Chinese media, and, as a result, Chinese newspapers and magazines increased their circulation, enriching the spiritual life of the Chinese society.12 The Malayan Chinese culture also underwent significant changes during the Republican period. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 that transformed the outlook of modern China animated the development of modern Chinese literature in Malaya and Singapore that was to become an important branch of modern Chinese culture.13 In addition, the movement also brought new ideas to the Malayan Chinese society such as freedom and equality, and the elevation of women’s social status.14 During this period, the dialect and clan associations that constituted the backbone of the Chinese society, had to change their roles and directions. Apart from traditional role of assisting their clansmen and dialect folks, they had invariably tried to keep abreast with changing time and environments by promoting Chinese education and cultural activity. The work of the Hokkien Association in Selangor is a case in point. In 1930s, education was a focus among its overall activities. Apart from financing three affiliated Chinese primary schools, it also founded Zhong Hua high school in July 1939 to meet the needs for higher education among Hokkien children. The school later became a leading Chinese high school in Kuala Lumpur.15

12

For the phenomenal growth of Chinese newspapers in Singapore in this period, see Wong Hong Teng (Wang Kangding) (1995). Xinjiapo huawen rihbao shelun yanjiu, 1945–1959 (A Study of the Editorials of the Chinese Newspapers Published in Singapore, 1945–1959), pp. 24–41. Singapore: The Chinese Studies Centre of the Department of Chinese Studies, National University of Singapore. 13 See Fang Xiu (1962). Ma Hua xin wenxue shigao, shangzhuan (A Preliminary History of the Malayan Chinese Literature), Vol. 1 pp. 3–219. Singapore: The World Book Store of Singapore. 14 See Nanyang Siang Pau (The Nanyang Commercial Press, Singapore), June to November 1934; Yen Ching-Hwang, (2000). Historical background. In The Chinese in Malaysia, Lee Kam Heng and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), pp. 27–28. Shah Alam, Selangor: Oxford University Press. 15 See “Jilongpo Xuelane Fujian huiguan yishi jilu” (Minutes of the Selangor Hokkien Association, Kuala Lumpur) (manuscript, a photo-copy kept by Yen Ching-hwang), the years between 1930 and 1939; Guo Zhuzhen (Quek Choo Teng) et al. (eds.), (1986). Xuelane Fujian huiguan bainian jinian tekan, 1885–1985 (The Souvenir Magazine of Centenary Celebration of the Selangor Hokkien Association, Kuala Lumpur) pp. 56–57, and 72. Kuala Lumpur: Selangor Hokkien Association.

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The rise of alumni associations — a new form of Chinese social organization, was significant during this period. They cut across kinship and dialect boundaries and served as a bridge to unite Chinese society. The first Chinese alumni association, the Nan Lu Alumni Association was founded in Singapore in 1918. By 1930s, there were at least 10 alumni associations in Singapore, and 13 in Penang with substantial membership.16 Apart from meeting members’ recreational needs, they were also involved in educational and cultural activities.

Chinese Society Between 1942 and 1957 Malayan Chinese society underwent most drastic changes during this period. It began with the scourge of Japanese occupation of Malaya, and went through the stages of postwar and pre-independence. The drastic political change in East and Southeast Asia had profound impact on the Chinese society during this period. In a period of 3 years and eight months between February 1942 and August 1945, the Malayan Chinese suffered unprecedented cruelty and misery under the Japanese rule. Tens of thousands of Chinese who were suspected of being anti-Japanese were massacred,17 but some of the prominent antiJapanese leaders such as Tan Kah Kee had a narrow escape.18 During 16

For instance, the 10 alumni associations in Singapore claimed to have 2000 members in 1930s. See Yang Jiancheng (Yang Chien-ch’eng) (1984). Sanshi niandai Nanyang huaqiao tuanti tiaocha baogao shu (A Report on the Overseas Chinese Organisations in Southeast Asia during 1930s. Based on Japanese Intelligence Sources in Taiwan), pp. 99–100. Taipei: Zhonghua xueshu yuan. 17 For the details of Japanese massacres of the Chinese in Singapore, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur, see Ge Fusheng (1984). Jian Zheng(Xinjiapo) zhi huiyi (My recollections of the massacre in Singapore), Fang Nianzu (1984). Bin Cheng dajianzu zhi Rikou duxing (The great massacre in Penang and the Japanese cruelty), and Yang Ye (1984). Jilongpo lunxian qianhou (On the eve and aftermath of the fall of Kuala Lumpur). In Xin Ma Huaren kang Ri shiliao, 1937–1945 (Historical Source Materials relating to the Chinese Resistance to Japanese Occupation in Singapore and Malaya), Hsu Yun-Tsiao (Xu Yunqiao) and Chua Shi Kun (Cai Shi jun) (eds.), pp. 435, 509–512, 559–560. Singapore: Wen Shi Publishing Company. 18 See Tan Kan Kee (1993). Nan Qiao huiyi lu, xiace (Recollections of My Life in Southeast Asia), Vol. 2 —. pp. 419–424. River Edge, USA: Ba Fang wenhua qiye gongsi; Yong, CF (1987). Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, pp. 286–289. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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the Japanese occupation, the Malayan Chinese groaned under the brutal Japanese rule. Economically, the Chinese society suffered capital exhaustion because of huge sums of money extorted from the Chinese by the Japanese conquerors. The decline of business and industry as result of war further plunged Chinese society into crisis. Many of the Chinese lost their jobs and lived in misery.19 In the areas of culture and education, most of the Chinese schools were closed down, while the remaining few were forced to change their medium of instruction from Chinese to Japanese. At the same time, teachers and pupils were forced to bow to the east in honor of the Japanese emperor before school lessons started.20 This period also witnessed the decline of moral values in the Chinese society. Some Chinese betrayed their relatives, kinsmen, friends, and the Chinese community for self-interest, and some Chinese women resorted to prostitution for money. The Malayan Chinese society also underwent drastic change in the period between August 1945 and July 1957 — from Japanese surrender to the eve of independence of Malaya. This radical change can be assessed at three different levels. First, postwar Southeast Asia entered into an era of rapid political change with the rise of indigenous nationalism that had enormous impact on the region. The Western colonial powers — Britain, Holland, France, and the United States had to keep abreast with change of time by slowly adopting a policy of “Decolonisation,”21 that had profound impact on the politics of postwar Malaya. Second, the victory of Chinese Communism in China and the retreat of Chiang Kai Shek’s regime to Taiwan in 1949 had far-reaching influence in the Malayan Chinese society. Third, the change of Chinese political identity and the rise of localism created a new situation in the Chinese society. 19

See Chen Songzhan (C.C. Chin) (1998). Rizhi shiqi de huaren, 1942–1945 (The Chinese under the Japanese Rule, 1942–1945). In Malaxiya huaren shi xinbian, diyice (A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lin Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung and Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 1 pp. 94–100. Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of Chinese Associations, Malaysia. 20 See Hsu Yun-ts’iao and Chua Shi Kun (eds.), op. cit., p. 418. 21 See Turnbull, M (1992). Regionalism and nationalism. In The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. 2, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, N Tarling (ed.), pp. 588–591. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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At the first level, Western powers’ crushing military defeats in the hands of the Japanese — the French in Indo-China, the British in Malaya and Singapore, and the Dutch in Dutch East Indies, dispelled the myth of “White supremacy,” and led to the rise of indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia. As a result, indigenous nationalist movements demanded and fought for their independence. The Vietnamese nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Ming and the Indonesian nationalist movement led by Sukarno resorted to armed struggle to obtain their independence. Under such influence, the British colonial government was prepared to let go its colonies in Burma and Malaya through peaceful negotiations, and the result of which was the granting of independence to the people of these two colonies.22 The independence of Malaya directly affected the Chinese society, and brought with it new challenge to the Chinese. At the second level, the Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong crushed Chiang Kai Shek’s army, and succeeded to found the People’s Republic of China on 1st October 1949, while Chiang retreated to Taiwan — an island off the southeast coast of China — to lick his wounds. This led to the creation of two Chinas and a long-lasting division between mainland China and Taiwan. On the one hand, the new Communist regime in China and its radical political outlook created fears among the Southeast Asian countries that reacted with restrictions and eventually termination of Chinese immigration. On the other hand, the Nationalist regime in Taiwan embarked on an active courting of Southeast Asian Chinese to invest and study in the island that retarded the growth of local political consciousness among the Malayan Chinese. At the third level, the Malayan Chinese encountered serious political challenge. After having recovered its rule in Malaya and Singapore, the British government began to introduce administrative reform for the purpose of consolidating its political control. In January 1946, the British proposed to introduce the Malayan Union to replace the existing administrative units of Federated Malay States and Non-Federated Malay States, and to incorporate Malacca and 22

Ibid.

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Penang into it.23 Under this new political unit, all adult residents regardless of their race will be granted citizenship. This proposal met with strong opposition from the emerging Malay elite that resulted in the replacement of Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya which came into being in January 1948.24 Under this new political framework, the right to citizenship for non-Malays were restricted, and it had serious and long-term implications for the Chinese society in Malaysia. In addition to this political challenge, the Chinese society was burdened with the legacy of the Second World War. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that had collaborated with the British in fighting the Japanese, returned to the jungle to take up armed struggle as a result of failure of negotiations with the British over political settlement in the postwar period. The British outlawed the MCP and imposed an emergency on Malaya.25 To cut off the supply to the insurgents, the British resettled Chinese rural population into government-controlled “New Villages” on the outskirts of cities and towns.26 As many members of the MCP were ethnic Chinese, the government cast suspicious eyes on the loyalty of the Chinese. Furthermore, the outbreak of the civil war in 1946 between the Communists and the Nationalists in China had direct bearing on the Chinese society in Malaya, and it led to intense struggle between pro-Communist leftwingers and pro-Nationalists elements within the community. The 23

For a detailed study of “Malayan Union”, see Allen, J de V (1967). The Malayan Union. New Haven: Yale University Press. 24 See Lee Kam Hing and Heng Pek Koon. The Chinese in the Malaysian political system. In The Chinese in Malaysia, Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), p. 198. 25 For the study of the Emergency in Malaya, see Stubbs, (1989). Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 26 For the origins and implementation of the “New Villages” in Malaya, see Sandhu, KS (1973). Introduction: Emergency resettlement in Malaya. In Chinese New Villages in Malaya: A Community Study, R Nyce and S Gordon (eds.), pp. xxix–1xv. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd.; Short, A (1975). The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960, pp. 231–253. London: Frederick Muller Ltd.; Francis Loh Kok Wah (1988). Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters and New Villages in the Kinta Valley, Malaysia, c. 1880–1980, pp. 106–156. Singapore: Oxford University Press. For case study of the “New Villages,” see Cheng Lim Keak (1976). Mengkuang: A Study of a Chinese New Village in West Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University.

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political split between the left and the right divided the Chinese and blurred their views on their political future in the region. However, there was a small group of the Straits Chinese who began to promote local political consciousness among the Chinese. Most of the members of this group were English-educated and were influenced by Western or Malay culture, and they had little or no link with China. Politically, they pledged loyalty to Britain, and had close connections with the British colonial authorities in Malaya. The rapid and drastic political change in Southeast Asia and Malaya awakened them to the realization that the British would slowly withdraw from the political stage in the region. To safeguard their own interests and that of the wider Chinese community, they quickly organized themselves under the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock, a wealthy businessman from Malacca. They attempted to influence the attitude of the British over the issue of the formation of the Federation of Malaya, but of no avail. But through their efforts, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) — the first Chinese political party in Malaya was formed on 17th February 1949.27 The founding of the MCA reflected the rise of local political consciousness among the Englisheducated Chinese, and through MCA organizational and propaganda networks, local consciousness was fostered and enhanced among entire Chinese population.28 In October of the same year, the founding of the People’s Republic of China on the mainland and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan weakened China-oriented identity among the Malayan Chinese, and reinforced their local political consciousness. In the decade of 1950s, local political consciousness had been heightened among the Malayan Chinese, and many of them were prepared to accept that they will permanently reside in Malaya, and considered it to be the “First Hometown” (Diyi guxiang). The surge of 27

For an excellent study on the formation and development of MCA, see Heng Pek Koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, pp. 54–55. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 28 Ibid, pp. 143–156; Chui Kuei Keong (Chui Guichiang) (1989). Xin Ma Huaren guojia rentong de zhuanxiang, 1945–1959 (The Change of National Identity Among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1959), pp. 231–232. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press.

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this consciousness was the result of at least three factors. First, the Singapore Legislative Council introduced a new legislation in September 1950, requiring all non-British subjects passport holders to apply reentry visas, and the validity of the visas was restricted to a period of 3 months. The new legislation was enforced in October of the same year, and it was also adopted in the Federation of Malaya.29 The new legislation brought a great deal of inconvenience to the Chinese, especially to businessmen, travellers, and students. Despite strong protest from the Chinese communities, it was vigorously enforced. Under this new law, only British subjects and the citizens of the Federation of Malaya were exempted. As a result, more and more Chinese applied for citizenship.30 Second, the Communist regime in China carried out a series of radical reforms in 1950s such as Land Reform, the Three-Antis and Five-Antis, and the Collectivization.31 All these movements directly impacted on the home provinces of Malayan Chinese in Fujian and Guangdong, with many of their relatives badly affected. This weakened their traditional ties and their enthusiasm for investment in China. As a result, their cherished idea of returning to their home villages for retirement faded away, and their decision of making Malaya their first home had been strengthened. Third, the MCA that represented the interests of the Chinese society formed a political alliance with UMNO in 1952,32 and later it was joined by the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). The formation of this powerful Alliance Party was an effective mechanism for arbitrating community interests of the three major races in Malaya, and it minimized potential racial conflicts. Its resounding victory in the first general election in 1955 created a new political situation in which the future of Malayan Chinese communities lies. Many of the Malayan Chinese, regardless of their educational backgrounds, 29

Chui Kuei Keong, Ibid. p. 291. Ibid. pp. 291–292. 31 See Meisner M (1977). Mao’s China: A History of the People’s Republic, pp. 84–112, 140–163. New York: The Free Press; Donnithorne A (1967). China’s Economic System, pp. 31–91. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 32 See Heng Pek Koon (1988), Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, p. 59. 30

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enthusiastically supported the independence movement led by the Alliance, with a hope that an independent Malaya would bring stability and prosperity, and would protect their long-term economic interests.

Chinese Society after the Independence, 1957–1968 The independence of Malaya on 31st August 1957 opened a new chapter in the history of Malaysia. Like the Malays and Indians, the Chinese were overjoyed by the achievement of this new nationhood. They hoped that their life in an independent nation would be better than the life under British colonial rule, with their interests in politics, economics, culture, and education protected. Their expectations were partly fulfilled by the Alliance government’s liberal policies. A lassez faire economic policy was pursued and economic reform was implemented. Under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Chinese economic interests were protected. Chinese were given important economic portfolios such as Finance Minister and Minister of Industry and Commerce in the cabinet. During this period, Chinese industry and commerce achieved remarkable growth due to the government’s encouragement and concessions. However, Chinese language and education in this period were placed under a mounting pressure to change. Before the independence, Chinese communities under the leadership of Lim Lian Geok were prepared to suspend their demand for making Chinese language as an official language of Malaya. This political concession made by the Chinese was intended to show solidarity among different races so as to facilitate the independence movement.33 But after the independence, with the ultimate 33

For details of this important political concession made by the Chinese in the famous “Malacca Meeting” (Maliujia huitan) on 12th January 1955, see Lim Lian Geok (Lin Lianyu), (1988). Fengyu shibanian, shangji (The Stormy Eighteen Years of My Life), Vol. 1, pp. 108–111. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foudation. For analysis of this event, see Tan Liok Ee (1997). The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, pp. 155–160. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; Yen Ching-hwang (2004). Lim Lian Geok and his struggle for the Chinese education in Malaya, 1949–1961. A Paper Presented at the International Conference on National Boundaries and Cultural Configurations, the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 22–25 June 2004, pp. 25–27.

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aim of making Malay as the only national language of Malaya, the Alliance government imposed considerable pressure on the Chinese high schools to change into nation-type secondary schools. As a result, 54 out of 70 Chinese high schools were converted into nationtype which accepted government’s financial package. Only 16 Chinese high schools rejected the offer and were declared as independent schools.34 The Alliance government ended its high-handed approach toward Chinese education with the publication of “Talib Report” on 4th August 1960 in which the government-sponsored public examination for Chinese junior high school graduates was abolished , and only Malay and English were allowed to be used in all public examinations. At the same time, the government also declared that all independent Chinese high schools had to be regulated by the educational rules and regulations.35 Government’s harsh treatment of Chinese education generated a great deal of ill-feeling among the Malayan Chinese, and the Chinese language and education became a sensitive political issue that brought a large number of Chinese-educated Chinese on the collision course with the MCA, and had indirectly caused factional struggle and split within the MCA. This period also witnessed the surge of political consciousness among the Chinese, and the division of their political action. The movement for acquiring Malayan citizenship lifted the level of Chinese political consciousness. They began to realize that they had both privilege and responsibility in a newly independent nation, and their rights as citizens would be protected only when they were involved in political action. Since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Lee Kuan Yew, the premier of Singapore that was a component part of the new nation, began to preach a new idea of “Malaysian Malaysia”. This new slogan emphasized that Malaysia is a multiracial country and it did not belong to a particular racial group. It had influenced the political outlook of many non-Malays, and had heightened Chinese 34

See Tay Lian Soo (Zheng Liangshu) (1998). Dulihou huawen jiaoyu (Chinese education after the independence). In Malaixiya Huaren shi xinbian, dierce (A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung and Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 2 pp. 267–268. 35 Ibid, p. 264.

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political consciousness. As a result, Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP) set up its branches in some parts of Malaysia to gain Chinese support. At the same time, Dr Lim Chong Yew, the former president of MCA who resigned from his post because of his dispute with Tungku Abdul Rahman over the Chinese language and education issue, founded the Gerakan party with sound support from the Chinese communities. The entry of these two Chinese-based political parties undermined the MCA electorate base among the Chinese. Furthermore, the ascendancy of English-educated leadership led by Tan Siew Sin in the MCA and its unsympathetic attitude toward Chinese language and education disappointed many Chinese who turned to support the two new parties.

The Change in the Chinese Society Between 1969 and 1990 The conspicuous features of the Chinese society during this period were the magnetization of Chinese politics, the challenge posted by the government’s NEP, and the continuous pressure on Chinese education and culture. The marginization was the result of interplay of two political forces. First, after the May 13th racial riots in 1969, the moderate Malay political elite represented by Tunku Abdul Rahman was replaced by the radical wing of UMNO led by Tun Abdul Razak who consolidated Malay political power through the function of the National Operations Council (NOC) that ruled the country until February 1971. Tun Razak adopted a new strategy of weakening Chinese political power by forming a multiple racial-mixed party to replace the Alliance. After 1972, with the initiative of Tun Razak, the National Front (Barisan National) was formed to replace the Alliance party. It was a confederation of 11 political parties, absorbing several small opposition parties such as Chinese-based Gerakan.36 The formation of the Front consolidated the supreme power of UMNO in this new coalition, and weakened the position of the MCA in the 36 See Crouch, H (1966). Government and Society in Malaysia, pp. 32–44. Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin Australia.

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government. This was reflected in the allocation of portfolios in the cabinet. Before 1973, MCA leaders were given important economic portfolios such as Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and Commerce , but after 1973, these two important portfolios were in the hands of UMNO appointees, and the MCA leaders had to satisfy with less important positions in the cabinet such as transport and telecommunication. The second factor causing the marginization of Chinese politics was the disenchantment of the Chinese electorate with the MCA performance, especially over Chinese language and education. Their shift of support to the Gerakan and Democratic Action Party (DAP), formerly affiliated with the PAP in Singapore, divided Chinese votes, and led to the marginalization of Chinese politics. The most serious challenge to the Chinese community in Malaysia during this period was the introduction of the NEP in 1971. The radical Malay elite that took over power in 1970 came to the conclusion that the fundamental cause of the May 13th riots was the poverty of the Malays and the unequal distribution of wealth among different races in Malaysia. They championed for a restructuring of Malaysian economy by direct government intervention. A NEP was thus adopted to correct the economic imbalance among the races and to achieve 30% ownership of the economic sector by the Malays and other indigenous groups within 20 years. The new policy had two major goals: to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians regardless of race; and to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function.37 To correct economic imbalance, the government restructured the employment market. It not only allocated most of the public service jobs to the Malays, but also forced private enterprises to take on Malay employees for up to 30% of their staff. With an intention of creating a Malay business class, the government encouraged Malays into business by providing them with cheap loans, easily accessible business premises, and preference in the allocation of licenses, business contracts, and distribution 37

Ibid. pp. 24–25.

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agencies. To speed up the process of achieving 30% ownership goal, the government also set up some large national enterprises that controlled resources, finance, and communications.38 The implementation of the NEP posted the most serious challenge to the Chinese in Malaysia. How would the Chinese protect their economic interests? What role would the Chinese play in the implementation of the NEP? And how would Chinese business survive and grow under the NEP? It would seem that the Chinese had little choice except to emphasize unity and solidarity in order to find a solution to these problems. In analyzing the structure of the Chinese business, it would not be difficult to find that most of the Chinese business and industry belong to small and medium-sized enterprises. The majority of them were family-owned with a traditional mode of management and limited capital, and they were no match for the newly formed large national enterprises. To break through this dilemma, some far-sighted Chinese leaders such as Koh Peng Ting, the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Penang, advocated modernization and corporatization of Chinese business as a solution to the problems. It was to mobilize scattered Chinese capital to form into corporations with modern management techniques.39 The rise of the MCA’s Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPH) in 1970s and the spread of the cooperative movement in the 1980s were the realization of this modernization and corporatization program. Their early success stimulated Chinese business to grow, but their eventual collapse dealt a heavy blow to the Chinese collective selfstrengthening movement during this period.40 Although the Chinese 38

See Gomez ET and Jomo KS (1997). Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, pp. 29–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 39 See Koh Peng Ting (Xu Pingdeng) (1979). Malaixiya Huaren jingji diwei de tantao (An investigation into the economic position of the Chinese in Malaysia). In Ping Yan Ji (Collections of Plain and Humble Words), Koh Peng Ting, pp. 20–28. Penang: Xin Da Printing Ltd. 40 See Searle P (1999). The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists, pp. 178–188. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin; Ho Khai Leong (He Qiliang) (1998). Duli hou xi Ma huaren de zhengzhi yanbian (The political change of Western Malaysia during the postindependent period). In Malaxiya Huaren shi xinbian(A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung and Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 2, p. 99. Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of the Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia.

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cooperative movement failed, some Chinese private enterprises scored notable success. Most of these were family-owned or joint enterprises, and they managed to grow and expand under the NEP framework. At least five factors can be identified for their success. First, the familybased or joint enterprises have the advantage of flexibility in decisionmaking, and they could make quick decisions and grasp the opportunities available to them. Second, since many of the senior staff were connected with the family, they were prepared to work hard for the enterprise. The internal cohesion was stronger than the Chinese collective enterprises. Third, most of these enterprises focused on business and property development rather than manufacturing. Fourth, they preferred to use acquisition and merger as the strategy of expansion rather than setting up their own branches. Fifth, they diversified their growth by extending investment in enterprises abroad.41 During this period, Chinese culture and education also received enormous pressure from the government. With marginalization of the Chinese politics, the UMNO dominated government pushed ahead of its national integration policy in culture and education. In 1971, a “National Culture Policy” was declared to guide the action of the government. It contained three important points: indigenous (Malay) culture be the core of the national culture; relevant elements or programs of other cultures can be incorporated into the national culture; and Islam to be a factor in the making of the national culture.42 Obviously this policy was the reflection of a consistent line of thought pursued by the radical Malay elite that Malay culture and Islam ought to be the core of the national culture, and racial conflicts could be avoided if the non-Malays can accept and identify with Malay culture.43 Under the framework of national culture, the government 41

See Jesudason, JV (1989). Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia, pp. 150–154. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 42 See Ho Khai Leong, op. cit., pp. 86–87. 43 See Hou Kok Chung (He Guozhong) (1998). Duli hou Huaren wenhua sixiang (The cultural thought of the Malaysian Chinese after the independence). In Malaxiya Huaren shi xinbian (A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung and Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 3, p. 53. Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of the Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia.

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ardently promoted Malay culture, including language, literature, arts, dance, and music. On the other hand, it discriminated against nonMalay cultures, and restricted traditional Chinese cultural performance including the popular lion dance.44 For fulfilling the long-cherished policy of one nation and one language, the government steadfastly promoted Malay language and its usage in the national education system. As a result, most of the English schools were converted into Malay schools with Malay as the medium of instruction. At the same time, the government also pushed forward the usage of Malay in the higher education sector, and to replace English as teaching medium in universities and other tertiary institutions. Under this ever mounting pressure, the Chinese community was forced to unite and adopted the policy of “Self-reliance” (Ziqiang Busi, Zhili Gengsheng) in dealing with their culture and education. First, a Chinese independent schools revival movement was launched in Perak in 1973 by the Perak Chinese Schools Management Committee led by Hu Wanduo.45 The movement was aimed at lifting the academic standard of the independent schools by internal reforms. It sought the support of Chinese parents by encouraging them to send their children to the schools. In addition to the use of Chinese language in the school, the students were encouraged to learn English and Malay as well.46 To overcome the problem of further study for graduates, the schools were encouraged to establish links with overseas colleges and universities. The lifting of academic standard together with better prospect for graduates invariably created a positive image in the Chinese community, and more and more 44 Ibid., p. 54; see also Hou Kok Chung (2002). Malaisiya Huaren: shenfen rentong, wenhua yu zuqun zhengzhi (The Chinese in Malaysia: Identity, Culture and Politics of Race), p. 104. Kuala Lumpur: Huashe yanjiu zhongxin. 45 For details, see Hu Wanduo (the president of the Perak Chinese Schools Management Committee) (1976). Fanzhan Bilizhou Huawen duzhong zhanwang (The prospect for the development of the Chinese independent schools in the State of Perak, Malaysia). In Bilizhou Huawen duzhong fuxingshi (A History of the Revival of the Chinese Independent Schools in the State of Perak), Huawen Duli Zhongxue fazhan weiyuanhui, pp. 4–6. Ipoh: Shanghai yinwu shuji. 46 See Zhou Yue (1995). Dongnanya huawen jiaoyu (The Chinese Education in Southeast Asia), pp. 168–169. Guangzhou: Jinan University Press.

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Chinese parents were willing to send their children to the independent schools. This positive momentum was ironically helped by government’s compulsory conversion of English schools into Malay schools. Many Chinese parents were unhappy with this abrupt change, and were prepared to send their children to Chinese schools where their children can learn more languages. Facing an ever-increasing external pressure, the Chinese community embarked on a Chinese cultural revival movement. In 1980s, with the support of Chinese social organizations and Chinese media, the community carried out a series of cultural activities including exhibitions of “searching for Chinese cultural roots” (Xungen Zhanlan Hui), exhibitions of traditional Chinese painting and calligraphy, spring couplets (Chun Lian), Chinese chess competitions, traditional Chinese dances, Chinese martial arts, Chinese regional operas, Chinese music, folk songs and Chinese poetry recitals. At the same time, the Chinese community also organized large-scale celebrations of traditional festivities such as Chinese new year, dragon boat festival, and the moon festival, etc.47 In addition, under the leadership of the 15 leading Chinese shetuan (social organizations), the Chinese community began to organize cultural forums since 1984, and integrated these forums into a Chinese cultural festival (Huaren wenhuajie) to be held annually in each state of Malaysia. In these cultural forums, prominent scholars and personalities were invited to speak on Chinese cultural issues, so as to raise the level of cultural consciousness among the Chinese.48 In order to 47 See Hou Kok Chung (1998), Duli hou Huaren wenhua sixiang (The cultural thought of the Malaysian Chinese after the independence). In Malaxiya Huaren shi xinbian (A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung & Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 3, p. 57. 48 In 1983, a year prior to the formation of Chinese Cultural Festival by the 15 leading Shetuans, a large-scale cultural forum was organized by the Sin Chew Jit Pau (a leading Chinese daily in Malaysia) together with the Federation of Hokkien Associations of Malaysia. The forum was entitled “Issues on the Malaysian Culture” and it took place on March 13 at the Federal Hotel in Kuala Lumpur. Over 1000 people attended the forum, and I had the privilege to be invited as one of the three speakers. The topic of my address was “The Change of Chinese Culture in Malaysia: A Historical Perspective”(Cung lishi jiaodu kan da Ma Huaren wenhua de yanbian). See Sin Chew Jit Pau, 14th March 1983, pp.1 and 3; for the full text of my speech, see Sin Chew Jit Pau, 17th March 1983, p. 10.

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preserve and promote Malaysian Chinese culture, the 15 leading Chinese shetuan entrusted the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall to establish the Center for Malaysian Chinese Studies in 1985 in Kuala Lumpur. Though the center experienced teething problems, it had later carried out reform and employed professional academics to run the show. It began to collect source materials related to the Chinese community,49 and published academic journal — Journal of Malaysian Chinese Studies as well as monographs on the Chinese in Malaysia. It also organized academic forums on Malaysian Chinese issues, and scored excellent results.

Chinese Society after 1990 After having ridden out the two stormy decades, the Chinese society achieved steady development in the first half of 1990s. The Asian Currency Crisis that swept through Southeast and East Asia had profound impact on Malaysian Chinese society. The steady development in the first half of 1990s was brought about by several factors. First, the rapid political change in Malaysia in late the 1980s created a new political environment that favored the Chinese. The internal strife and split within UMNO that resulted in the final victory of the new UMNO led by Prime Minister Mahathir, divided the Malay electorate.50 In order to consolidate its position, the new UMNO had to 49 See Voon Phin Keong (Director, Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies) (2005). Huashe yanjiu zhongxin — dingwei, yanjiu, zhanwang (Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies — roles, research and prospect). In Chengfeng polang ji canghai — Huashe yanjiu zhongxin erhshi zhounian tekan (Riding the Winds and Waves, Bridging the Deep Blue Seas — 20th Anniversary 1985–2005 Commemorative Publication, Voon Phin Keong (ed.), pp. 68–74. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies; Hou Kok Chung (He Guozhong) (1994). Malaixiya Huaren shehui yu wenhua zhuancheng zhong de bianyan xintai (Malaysian Chinese Society and the Marginal Mentality of the Cultural Change). In Dongnanya Huaren yu Zhongguo jingji yu shehui (The Chinese in Southeast Asia and China’s Economy and Society), Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) (ed.), p. 177. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies; Hou Kok Chung (1998), Malaixiya Huaren: shefen rentong, wenhua yu zuqun zhengzhi (The Chinese in Malaysia: Identity, Culture and Politics of Race), p. 126. 50 For the factional struggle within UMNO, see Crouch H (1966), Government and Society in Malaysia, pp. 114–129; Means P. (1991). Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, pp. 199–206. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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adopt a more liberal attitude toward the Chinese, and was prepared to give concessions to Chinese demands. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1991 ended the Cold War and ushered in a new era of peace when economic competition among nations began. Moreover, the economic globalization that began to impact on economic planning and directions of many nations, drove Malaysia to follow the global economic trend with plans for fast economic growth. Third, the rise of Asian Little Dragons — Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore in 1970s and 1980s,51 and the opening of China in 1980s provided excellent opportunities for Malaysia to pursue its economic goal. The commercial value of Chinese language was enhanced. Chinese language and Chinese education became a part of national assets to be utilized for the industrialization of Malaysia. Fourth, on 28th February 1991, Mahathir expounded his famous “Grand Vision of 2020” that would transform Malaysia into an advanced industrialized nation in three decades. To reach this lofty goal, the government had to strife to create an united Malaysia based on a loose idea of “Malaysian Race” that would help mold loyal and dedicated Malaysian citizens.52 Although Mahathir did not clearly spell out the contents and the steps to fulfil the creation of a new “Malaysian Race”, his government had nevertheless adopted a more tolerant attitude towards non-Malays. The focus of the government was no longer rested on the equitable distribution of wealth among different races, rather, it was on the creation of a larger economic cake that all Malaysians would have a share. The new policy received strong support from the Malaysian Chinese who believed the new policy was good for all Malaysians and the nation. At the same time, new Malay leaders such 51

For the rise of Taiwan and Hong Kong and their impact on Chinese business in Southeast Asia, see Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Rise of Ethnic Chinese Business in East and Southeast Asia. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Chinghwang, pp. 3–22. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 52 See Ho Khai Leong (He Qiliang) (1998). Duli hou xi Ma huaren de zhengzhi yanbian (The political change of western Malaysia during the post-independent period). In Malaxiya Huaren shi xinbian(A New History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, Hou Kok Chung & Lai Kuan Fook (eds.), Vol. 2, p. 108. Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of the Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia.

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as Anwar Ibrahim, the Deputy Prime Minister began to use the term of “New Malays” since 1993 to project the new image of Malay leaders who were liberal and tolerant in their outlook. The substantial support given to the government by the Chinese community was demonstrated in the landslide victory of the Barisan National in the 1995 general election.53 The 1990s would have been a golden decade for the Malaysian Chinese society had there been no impact of the Asian Currency Crisis. The crisis started in the middle of 1997 in Thailand with the sharp fall of value of Thai baht, and it quickly swept through Southeast Asia and part of East Asia, with Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea being the worst hit.54 Malaysia was not spared from this catastrophe. The Malaysian ringgit (dollar) slided and the share market plummeted, the result of which was closure of companies, loss of jobs, and the suffering of the ordinary people. The Chinese community bore the brunt of the severe impact. However, with a stern fiscal policy adopted by the Mahathir government to control the movement of capital and to peg the ringgit with the US dollar, the crisis subsided. In tackling this problem, the government also used its reserve to aid those companies that were badly hit by the crisis, and some of these recipients were large Chinese business enterprises. Mahathir’s strategy in dealing with the impact of the Currency Crisis was proven to be an effective one, and it helped the Chinese community to tide over the disaster.

The Prospect One hundred years is a short time in the history of mankind. Having travelled a short journey of 100 years from 1903 to 2003, the Malaysian 53

Ibid., pp. 109–110. For factors contributing to the collapse of the Thai baht, see Warr, P (1998). Thailand. In East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? McLeord RH. & Garnaut R (eds.), pp. 49–65. London and New York: Routledge. For more analysis on the crisis and its implications for the future of Asia, see Delhaise PF (1998). Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd.; Henderson C (1998). Asia Falling: Making Sense of the Asian Currency Crisis and Its Aftermath. Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; Godement F (1999). The Downsizing of Asia. London and New York: Routledge.

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Chinese society has a long journey ahead. If history is like a mirror that would serve as a guide to the future, there is a clear path leading to a bright future. One hundred years ago, the Malayan Chinese community was an appendix to the British colonial society, but now it becomes an important integral part of an independent Malaysia. Although the Chinese community had gone through a rugged road with many twists and turns, they would have to learn from history that only with the unity and adherence to the spirit of Chinese culture can the community tide over crises arising from an uncharted course. Malaysia is a multiracial and multicultural society that is striving toward the goal of building an advanced industrial nation. In this process, Malaysia has to abandon the “Assimilation” theory that was opular in the 1950s, and to embrace a new emerging Multiculturalism” to tackle ethnic issues. Under this broad political and social framework, the Chinese community would see clearly its future direction. It must strive to deepen the political and economic integration into Malaysian society, but to retain Chinese education and the essence of Chinese culture. This culture is different from the Chinese culture found either in Mainland China or Taiwan, and it contains many local elements with distinctive features. In short, this is the alaysianization of Chinese culture. Although Mahathir had raised the concept of creating a “Malaysian Race”, it is still vague and undefined. Racial integration is a slow and peaceful process that cannot be put together by legislations. This process has to be based on tolerance, equity, and mutual understanding between different races. An unified language and education system is only a means to that end, but not the only means. Racial integration and racial harmony can be nurtured by subjective efforts and the creation of favorable environments.

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Chapter 2

A Century of Chinese Business in Malaysia (1904–2004)*

Chinese Business before 1904 The Chinese had been active in business in Southeast Asia long before 1904. They had been trading with Southeast Asia, and within the Southeast Asian region. Before the coming of the Europeans to Southeast Asia in the 16th century, Chinese traders not only had the lion’s share of the China–Southeast Asian trade, but also controlled parts of Southeast Asian trade. But the coming of the Europeans changed the trading landscape in the region, and the position of the Chinese traders were undermined. The second wave of European penetration into Southeast Asia in the 18th century led by the British further weakened the Chinese economic status. The British giant commercial conglomerate — The East India Company established Penang and Singapore in 1786 and 1819, respectively, partly for the consolidation of its monopoly on tea trade,1 and partly for attracting Chinese traders to the ports so as to undermine the Dutch commercial interest in the region. However, the long commercial struggle between the British and the Dutch resulted in mutual losses in trading opportunities that led them to begin to negotiate a treaty. A treaty

* This chapter is based on my Chinese article published in Chen Xuefeng et al. (eds.) (2004), Jilongpo ji Xuelane Zhonghua Gongshang zonghui yibai zhounian jinian tekan, 1904–2004 (The Souvenir Magazine of Centenary Celebration of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, 1904–2004), pp. 84–99. Kuala Lumpur: the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Kuala Lumpur and Selangor. 1 For the reasons of founding Penang as a British port, see Tregonning KG (1965). The British in Malaya: The First Forty Years, 1786–1826, pp. 1–40. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press; for British early tea trade with China, see Greenberg M (1951). British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–42, pp. 1–9. Cambridge: University Press, reprint 1969.

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that would protect long-term mutual benefits in Southeast Asia was signed in 1824. Under this treaty, the British withdrew their advances in Java and Sumatra, while the Dutch gave up their ambition in the Malay Peninsula with the exchange of British possession of Benkulen in the Southwestern part of Sumatra for the Dutch colony of Malacca in the Malay Peninsula.2 The British gradually developed their new commercial system after having entrenched themselves in the Malay Peninsula. Since 1821, a string of trading firms had been established in Singapore and Penang, including the Guthrie Company (1821) and Boustead Company (1828) in Singapore, and John Buttery Company (1830) in Penang.3 Initially acting as managing agents for big companies in London and Europe, these trading firms grew their own business by developing regional trade, and then involving in finance, shipping, mining, and plantations.4 This new commercial system possessed characteristics of the colonial economy, that is, moving surplus industrial products from home countries in Europe and distributing them in the colonies; and at the same time, local products in Southeast Asia had been collected through these trading firms and sold in the international markets. Under this new system, Chinese merchants were no match for the Western merchants, and had to satisfy themselves with the middlemen’s role in the colonial economies. Apart from this middlemen’s role, Chinese merchants were also involved in China–Southeast Asian regional trade, importing Chinese goods and exporting local products to China.5 2 For discussion of the rivalry and conflict of the British and Dutch in Southeast Asia, and the final solution to the conflict, see Tarling N (1962). Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World 1780–1824, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press. 3 See Allen GC and Donnithorne AG (1957). Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study of Economic Development, pp. 53–56. London: George Allen & Unwin Limited. 4 Ibid. 5 See Chiang Hai Ding (1970). Sino–British mercantile relations in Singapore entrepot trade, 1870–1915. In Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell, Jerome Ch’en and Tarling N (eds.), pp. 106–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For more detailed study of the foreign trade in Singapore and the Straits Settlements and the role of Chinese merchants in it, see Wong Lin Ken (1960). The Trade of Singapore, 1819–69, as an independent issue of the Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 33(Part 4) Singapore) and Chiang Hai Ding (1978). A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870–1915. Singapore: National Museum.

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In addition to trading activity, the Chinese businessmen were also active in gold and tin-mining, pepper and gambier planting as well as shipping. The production of gold and tin, pepper and gambier stimulated Chinese business activities, and created wealth and prosperity for the Chinese communities.

The Change in the Patterns of Chinese Business Activities before World War II In the period of 38 years between 1904 and 1942, Singapore and Malaya experienced two world wars and one world depression that devastated the economy of the region. Facing the challenge of these crises, the Chinese businessmen had to strengthen their adaptability and re-arrange their businesses in order to survive and grow. New types of Chinese business arose during this period, including the rise of rubber and pineapple planting and their related industries, the rise of banking and financial services, and the production of consumer goods. In contrast with the period before 1904 that focused on primary production and exchange, this period of business activity centered on secondary and tertiary industries that were characterized by value-added enterprises. The production of rubber and pineapple was not only geared for export, but also provided raw materials for making rubber products such as rubber shoes, rubber raincoats as well as canned pineapple for both domestic and international markets.6 Since 1896 when Tan Chay Yan — a Chinese businessman from Malacca — successfully planted commercial rubber in Buket Lintang in the Northeast of Malacca, rubber emerged as a new type of plantation that would bear enormous profit. It became the hot spot for 6

For the production of rubber goods and pineapple cans, the best example is the commercial activity of Tan Kah-kee. Tan established Rixin and Xinli chuan pineapple canneries in Singapore, and later built a large factory to produce rubber manufacturing goods, including different types of tyres for cars and bicycles, daily necessities, medical equipments and rubber shoes, etc. See Tan Kan-kee (Chen Jiageng) (1993). Nan Qiao huiyi lu, xiace (My Reminiscence of the Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia), Vol. 2, pp. 487–504. Singapore: Tan Kah-kee Association and Tan Kah-kee Foundation; Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, pp. 45–55. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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Chinese investment in Singapore and Malaya. Due to its high commercial value, it soon replaced pepper and gambier to become a mainstay of Chinese business.7 Apart from rubber, banking and financial institutions also emerged to impact on the Chinese communities. Being an effective commercial medium, banking was extremely important for large-scale commercial, agricultural, mining, and manufacturing activities. Prior to 1903, no Chinese banks existed in the Malay Peninsula. Although Chinese businessmen could obtain services from foreign banks, there existed a language barrier between the banks and Chinese businessmen who were not versed in English language. The inconvenience felt by the Chinese-speaking businessmen encouraged some of them to start Chinese banks. Besides, the rapid growth in international trade and the cash crop industry in the Malay Peninsula enhanced the need for Chinese banks. The founding of the Kwong Yik Bank Company Ltd. in Singapore in 1903 marked the beginning of Chinese banking in the region.8 It was followed by the founding of the Sze Hai Tong Banking Company Ltd. in 1907 by a group of rich Teochew businessmen in Singapore.9 The first Chinese bank established in the Peninsula was the Kwong Yik (Selangor) Banking Corporation that was founded in July 1913 by a group of wealthy Cantonese businessmen in Kuala Lumpur led by Cheong Yok Choi. Although the bank carried the same name of “Kwong Yik” as the Kong Yik Bank Company Ltd. in Singapore, it was neither a branch of the Singapore bank, nor was it a close financial partner of the latter. The name “Kwong Yik” literally means 7

For the planting and commercial value of rubber, see Wu Tiren (1951). Redai jingji zhiwu — xiangjiao shu(Rubber — Tropical Cash Crop), pp. 6–8. Singapore: Guanghua yinwu gongsi; Drabble JH (1973). Rubber in Malaya, 1876–1922: The Genesis of the Industry, pp. 22–33. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; Colin B (1978). The Natural Rubber Industry: Its Development, Technology and Economy in Malaya, p. 25. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 8 Kwong Yik Bank Company Ltd. was founded by Wong Ah Fook and other rich Cantonese businessmen in Singapore and Johore for the service of the local Cantonese communities. See Tan Ee-Leong (1953). The Chinese banks incorporated in Singapore and Malaya. Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society 26(1), p. 114. For further details on the founding of the Kwong Yik Bank, see Patricia Lim Pui Huen (2002). Wong Ah Fook: Immigrant, Builder and Entrepreneur, Singapore: Times Editions. 9 See Tan Ee-Leong, ibid, p. 115.

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“the benefits of the Cantonese” and was to provide financial services to the local Cantonese community. The second Chinese bank that appeared in Malaya was the Bank of Malaya, Ltd. Ipoh (Yibao Zhongxing yinhang) founded in 1920, but it was closed down in 1930 under the severe impact of the world depression. Apart from the four banks mentioned above, there were at least eight other Chinese commercial banks established in the region during the period between 1903 and 1941, and the majority of them were located in Singapore.10 Most of these Chinese banks possessed the features of a modern bank — in addition to taking deposits and providing loans, they also settled trade bills and were involved in foreign exchange. Their functions exceeded the functions of the traditional Chinese “Money House” (Qian Zhuang).11 A noted characteristic of the Chinese banks was their close relationship with Chinese dialect groups. The founding of two Kwong Yik banks and Lee Wah bank by the Cantonese group, the founding of the Sze Hai Tong bank by the Teochews, and the founding of the Chinese Commercial bank, the Ho Hong Bank and Oversea Chinese bank and later the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation by the Hokkiens reflected this trend. The dialect community became the main source of capital and business of the bank, and in return, the bank served primarily the interests of the dialect community with dialect-spoken staff and services. As time went on, this dialect demarcation gradually gave way, and the bank’s customer

10 The eight Chinese commercial banks were the Chinese Commercial Bank, Ltd. (Hua Shang Yinhang, 1912), the Ho Hong Bank Ltd. (He Feng Yinhang, 1917), Oversea-Chinese Bank Ltd. (Hua Qiao Yinhang, 1919), Lee Wah Bank, Ltd. (Li Hua Yinhang, 1920), Batu Pahat Bank Ltd. (Badu Baxia Yinhang, 1920), the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd. (Hua Qiao Yinhang, 1932), Ban Hin Lee Bank Ltd. (Wan Xing Li Yinhang, 1935) and the United Chinese Bank Ltd. (Da Hua Yinhang, 1935). Except the Batu Pahat Bank Ltd. and the Ban Hin Lee Bank Ltd., the rest were all located in Singapore. Ibid, pp. 117–132; Lee Sheng-Yi (1990). The Monetary and Banking Development of Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 38–39. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 11 The ‘Money House’ (Qian Zhuang) in the Treaty Ports in late Qing China were also involved in settling trade bills to facilitate foreign trade in addition to its traditional functions of taking deposits and providing loans. For an authoritative study on Qian Zhuang in late Qing China, see Zhang Guohui (1989). Wan Qing qianzhuang he piaohao yanjiu. (A Study of the Money Houses in Late Qing China). Beijing: Zhong Hua shuju.

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pool was expanded to include other dialect speakers. As the Chinese banks during this period were tilted toward communal-centered service, they operated in a different way from Western principles — personal connections became an important principle for getting loans from the bank. Loan mortgages were not based entirely on sound security and repayment ability of the borrowers, but on the good faith arising from personal connections with the bank and social status of the borrowers. Strong dialect tie can be, in one sense, a strength of the bank, but it could also be a major weakness of the bank. The collapse of the Kwong Yik bank in Singapore in 1913 after just a decade’s existence was mainly due to the heavy borrowing of the directors and their failure in repaying the debt.12 In addition, this strong communal connection also restricted the bank’s healthy commercial expansion. However, the common weakness of the Chinese banks during this period was the shortage of capital that did not enable them to compete favorably with foreign banks, and made them vulnerable to withstand any major financial crisis from outside. The amalgamation of the three Hokkien banks — the Chinese Commercial bank, the Ho Hong bank, and the Oversea Chinese bank — into the Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation in 1932 was designed to ride the storm of the World Depression, and made the Hokkien banks viable in a new uncharted world.13 In short, the rise of Chinese banks stimulated the Chinese business activities, smoothed commercial transactions, consolidated the financial position of Chinese businessmen, and promoted export activities of Singapore and Malaysia in general. The manufacturing activity of pre-war Singapore and Malaya was focused on the processing of local raw products such as tin-smelting, pineapple canning, and the making of consumer rubber products. In 1893, there were 37 tin smelters in Perak and 26 in Selangor, and most of them were of small-scale owned by the Chinese. In the first decade of the 20th century, there were at least 10 pineapple canneries 12

See Patricia Lim Pui Huen (2002), Wong Ah Fook: Immigrant, Builder and Entrepreneur. Singapore Times Editions. 13 For discussion of the reasons for this amalgamation of the three Hokkien banks and the birth of the Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation, see Wilson D (1972). Solid As A Rock: The First Forty Years of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, pp. 3–6. Singapore: the OverseaChinese Banking Corporation Ltd.

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in Singapore. The end of the World War I in 1914 witnessed the rise of new markets for export of rubber manufactured products due mainly to the sharp fall of rubber prices. Chinese entrepreneurs such as Tan Kah-kee changed their focus in producing rubber for military use, and converted rubber processing plants into rubber factories. Tan built his largest rubber manufactory in Sumbawan, and produced a variety of rubber goods such as raincoats, tennis balls, rubber umbrellas, sports shoes, rubber toys, tyres and tubes.14 Apart from pineapple canning and rubber manufacturing, there also arose other light industries such as coconut oil refining, biscuit, and soap making. Modern coconut oil refineries were concentrated in Singapore and Penang where the supply of copra was abundant. Coconut oil was produced for the domestic market and for export. In 1925, at least five refineries existed in both islands. The two refineries in Singapore were owned by Lim Peng Siang, a well-known Hokkien businessman, while two refineries in Penang were owned separately by a Hokkien and a Cantonese.15 Traditional Chinese biscuit making was basically a family-type business characterized by small-scale and labor-intensive production, and hygiene control was arbitrary. With rapid social change after World War I, the demand for Western type of biscuits increased. This led to the establishment of modern biscuit-making plants. The three well-known biscuit makers during this period were Ho Ho Biscuit Company, Tan Kah-kee’s Globe Biscuit Company, and Zhong Hua Biscuit Company, all of which were located in Singapore. These biscuit makers adopted modern technology and produced high quality biscuits for both domestic and Southeast Asian markets.

Chinese Business between 1945 and 1971 In the two and a half decades from the end of World War II (August 1945) till the promulgation of the New Economic Policy by the Malaysian government in 1971, Chinese society in Malaysia experienced 14

See Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, p. 52; Tan Kah-kee (1993), Nanqiao huiyi lu, 2, 504. 15 See Li Changfu (1930). Nanyang huaqiao kaikuang (Present Conditions of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia), pp. 95–96. Shanghai: Hua Feng printing.

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unprecedented changes. Political change was most rapid, but the changes in Chinese economic and business activities were also striking. During the period of Japanese occupation (January 1942 to August 1945), Malayan Chinese groaned under the oppression of the Japanese: many innocent Chinese were rounded up and murdered, and the Chinese economy was ruined with high inflation and declining business activity. The surrender of the Japanese in August 1945 saw the return of the British rule and the restoration of political and social order. It revived the Chinese business and manufacturing activities. At the beginning of the post-war period, Chinese economic activities were restored to the pre-war level. In addition to the tin and rubber export, the manufacturing sector showed signs of flourishing. For instance, in 1950, of four rubber manufacturing plants in Selangor, three were owned by Chinese businessmen. They were the Huang Zhong Ji Rubber Manufactory, Feng Qiang Rubber Products Company, and Qin Yeliang Rubber Products Company, and all of them were located in Klang. Their rubber products ranged from tyres, rubber shoes, rubber tubes and rubber spittoons to medical equipment and scientific experiment equipment,16 and they were produced for both domestic and foreign markets. However, the growth of Chinese light industry was restricted because of economic and political factors. Under the economic framework of colonialism, development of light industry in the colonies was circumscribed because it would undermine the import of surplus industrial products from Europe, and would threaten the long-term interest of the colonial countries. At the dawn of 1950s, the Korean War (1950–1953) brought unprecedented prosperity to Malaya because of high demand for rubber which had high military value. But the prosperity was shortlived once the war was ended abruptly. By the middle of 1950s, the economy of Malaya was under the threat of a recession. This was due to the following factors. First, the decline in demand for rubber saw the big slide of rubber prices. Second, the production of synthetic 16

See Yu Shakun (ed.) (1951). Nanyang Nian Jian (The Annal of Southeast Asia), Section 3 on Malaya, p. 267. Singapore: Nanyang Printing Company Ltd.

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rubber as a result of development of new technology reduced the demand for natural rubber in the European and American markets. The price of Malayan rubber tumbled. Third, the price of tin — another pillar of the Malayan economy — was also under threat. It decreased from M$387 per pikul in 1956 to M$373 in 1957 and M$369 in 1958. Further, the tin reserve also declined.17 To arrest the declining Malayan economy and to prepare for the independence of Malaya as a new political entity, the governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Crown Colony of Singapore, and the United Kingdom requested the International Bank (the World Bank) for a commission to investigate and make recommendations. The Commission’s report in 1955 pointed out that the existing Malayan economy could not sustain the population growth after the independence, and recommended restructuring of the Malayan economy. The main thrust of the report was diversification of the economy that included expansion of agricultural products as well as rubber, and the expansion of secondary manufacturing. In the expansion of manufacturing sector, the commission emphasized the role of private enterprise, and stressed that “Industrial development must of course depend primarily on private initiative, enterprise and capital.”18 It also recommended the future Malayan government to improve the climate for private industrial enterprise and to expand overhead facilities such as power, transport, and communications.19 The Alliance Party led by Tungku Abdul Rahman incorporated the basic principles of the industrial policy of the report into its manifesto for the first general election in 1955. With its landslide victory in the election, the Alliance government after the independence in August 1957 appointed an Industrial Development Working Party to streamline the implementation of the report. In 1961, a Tariff Advisory Committee was 17 See Rokiah Alavi R (1966). Industrialisation in Malaya: Import Substitution and Infant Industry Performance, pp. 30–31. New York: Routledge. 18 See The Economic Development of Malaya: Report of a Mission Organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Crown Colony of Singapore and the United Kingdom (1955), p. 22. Singapore: Government Printer for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 19 Ibid.

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established within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to protect the new industries in Malaya.20 In about one and a half decades from August 1957 to the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1971, Chinese business in Malaysia achieved a remarkable growth. The new economic strategy of the Alliance government created many new opportunities in business and industry. Those astute Chinese businessmen grasped these opportunities to transform their family-based businesses into modern transnational conglomerates. The outstanding performance of Chinese business in this period was the result of interplay of the following factors. First, the new economic strategy created a relatively free laissez-faire environment for investment, and the government’s emphasis on the participation of local capital favored Chinese business. Second, Chinese businessmen, in comparison with Indian and Malay businessmen, were positioned to take advantage of these new opportunities because they possessed more capital, business skills, and management experience. Third, as a major political partner of the Umno in the Alliance government, the MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) had substantial influence in the making and execution of economic policies. Men like Tun H.S. Lee and Tan Siew Sin had been holding the Finance portfolio in the government, and they had influence over the implementation of these policies that may contribute to the rapid growth of Chinese business.21 This period of rapid growth of Chinese business witnessed the rise of a group of business conglomerates and powerful Chinese entrepreneurs. They included Kuok Brothers Group led by Robert Kuok Hock Nien, the Genting Group owned by Lim Goh Tong, the Hong Leong Group, Malaysia led by Quek Leng Chan, the See Hoy Chan Group led by Teo Soo Cheng, the Kuala Lumpur Kepong Group owned by Lee Loy Seng, and the Oriental Holdings Berhad owned 20

See Jomo KS (1988). A Question of Class: Capital, the State and Uneven Development in Malaya, p. 221. New York: Monthly Review and Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, Philippines. 21 See Heng Pek Koon and Sieh Lee Mei Ling (2000). The Chinese business community in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–1999, in The Chinese in Malaysia, Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), pp. 129–131. Shah Alam, Selangor: Oxford University Press.

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by Loh Boon Siew. The rise of the Kuok Brothers Group illustrates the process of transformation of family-based Chinese business into a modern commercial conglomerate. Robert Kuok Hock Nien (or Romanized as Guo Henian) was born in Johore Bahru, the capital of the state of Johore, West Malaysia. His father, Kuok Keng Kang (Guo Qinjian in Mandarin) migrated with his brothers from Fuzhou, Fujian to Malaya in 1940s. Like other Chinese immigrants, the Kuok brothers worked as apprentices and shop assistants before they started a grocery shop in Johore Bahru with their hard-earn savings. The shop named “Tong Seng” (Dong Sheng, Eastern Rising) mainly dealt in rice, sugar, and beans. Kuok Keng Kang proved to be an astute businessman with good social skills. By rubbing shoulders with local Malay dignitaries, his business grew in leaps and bounds. In the post-war period, he effectively controlled the sale and distribution of rice, sugar and flour in the state of Johore as a result of his political connections.22 Although the Tong Seng company was a traditional Chinese business, it laid the foundation for the building of a modern commercial empire by Robert Kuok. Family background shaped Robert Kuok’s inspiration and future career. Family business oriented him toward an exciting business world, and stirred his imagination of creating a business empire in which the entrepreneur was the king. His family wealth enabled him to receive good English education that was the important ingredient for his future success. He was first educated at the English College (later renamed Sultan Abu Bakar College), the best English high school in Johore Bahru, and pursued his tertiary education in the Raffles College, the prestigious English institution in Singapore. In the early 1950s, he further proceeded to England to work and study, and observed at first hand the workings of the London Commodities Exchange, and he was especially interested in the sugar transactions in the international market. This provided him with insights into the international trading of commodities that benefited greatly his early business career. While he was in London, he also observed business 22

See Zhou Shaolong (1996). Guo Henian Zhuan (A Biography of Rubert Kuok Hock Nien), pp. 22–32. Hong Kong: Ming Chuang Publishing Company Ltd.

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and management of Western companies that enabled him to run modern Chinese business conglomerates. Robert Kuok’s decision of returning to Malaya in 1955 was momentous in his life history. He would have missed the golden opportunity of creating a business empire if he had decided to remain in England. The year 1955 saw the beginning of emergence of an independent Malayan nation with the installation of an elected Alliance government, and the implementation of the new government’s economic policies opened up many avenues for creating wealth, and greatly benefited those shrewd entrepreneurs such as Robert Kuok. After his return from England, Robert Kuok adopted two important steps to lay the foundation for his business empire. First, he liquidated Tong Seng company, and transferred its most lucrative parts — involving in rice and sugar trade — to a new company named Kuok Brothers Private Ltd. that laid the foundation for the future Kuok Brothers Group.23 Second, he had firmly cast his eyes on the international sugar trade as future direction of his business expansion.24 His basic strategy in the decade after 1957 was to achieve maximum growth in Malaysia by exploiting every opportunity arising. Taking advantage of the government’s generous concessions in tax, he found in 1959 the Malayan Sugar Manufacturing Berhad — the largest sugar refinery in Malaysia — in partnership with government’s agency FELDA, and Japan’s Nissin Sugar Manufacturing. It processed the sugar from Kuok’s mills in Thailand, and then exported much of the refined sugar to Indonesia. Three years later, he established Federal Flour Mills to process wheat imported from North America.25 At the beginning of 1960s, Kuok concentrated his attention and investment on sugar, and succeeded in controlling the entire Malaysian market in 23

See Heng Pek Koon (1997). Robert Kuok and the Chinese business network in Eastern Asia: A study in Sino-capitalism. In Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia, Brook T and Luong HV (eds.), p. 161. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 24 See Lin Wuguang (1995). Malaixiya de huaren qiye jituan (The Chinese business conglomerates in Malaysia). In Dongnanya huaren qiye jituan yanjiu (Studies in the Chinese Business Conglomerates in Southeast Asia), Wang Muhan (ed.), p. 111. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press. 25 See Jesudason JV (1989). Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia, p. 61. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Heng Pek Koon, op.cit., p. 165.

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production, distribution, and export. In 1962, China’s attempt to flood the Malaysian market with its cheap refined sugar was thwarted by Kuok who imported huge quantities of even cheaper refined sugar from India. His victory over China’s attack won him much respect and a nick-name of “Asian King of Sugar” (Yazhou tangwang).26 To consolidate his position on sugar production, he adopted the strategy of backward integration by expanding into sugarcane cultivation. After having acquired 14,490 acres of land from the Perlis state government, he established Perlis Plantation Company in 1968.27 Thus, his control over production, distribution, and export of sugar was complete. Robert Kuok’s great business success in Malaysia provided him with a strong base from which he expanded his business to Southeast and East Asia and beyond. The political and economic climate in Malaysia had changed drastically since the racial riot of 13 May 1969 and the ensuing introduction of pro-Malay New Economic Policy in 1971. At the same time, investment opportunities arose in East and Southeast Asia with the rise of Four Little Dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore). One of the bright spots on the horizon was tourism. At the beginning of 1970s, he founded a chain of luxurious hotels named Shangri-La in Singapore, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Seoul, and Beijing. In the decade of the 1970s, with the strategy of diversification, Robert Kuok succeeded in creating a vast multinational business empire in East and Southeast Asia. By 1990, his group consisted of over 200 companies in a range of enterprises, including sugar production and distribution, hotels, import–export, food-industry, petro-chemical industry, mining, shipping and transport, real estate, media and publication, movie and videos, finance and insurance.28 26

See Zhou Shaolong (1996). Guo Henian Zhuan (A Biography of Rubert Kuok Hock Nien), pp. 67–71. 27 See Gomez ET (1999). Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation, p. 41. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. 28 Ibid, pp. 40–49; Lin Wuguang (2000) Malaixiya de huaren qiye jituan (The Chinese business conglomerates in Malaysia). In Dongnanya huaren qiye jituan yanjiu (Studies in the Chinese Business Conglomerates in Southeast Asia), Wang Muhan (ed.), pp. 111–113; Liang Yingming (2000). Guo Heniang jiazu (Robert Kuok Hock Nien’s Clan). In Huaqiao Huaren baike chuanshu: Jingji juan (The Encyclopedia of Overseas and Ethnic Chinese: Volume on Economy), Zhou Nanjing, et al. (eds.), p. 152. Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi.

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Chinese Business under the New Economic Policy (NEP) The May 13th riots in not only 1969 ended the long-standing racial harmony in Malaysia, it also terminated the Alliance Government’s laissez-faire policy. The ensuing economic policy was the promulgation of the New Economic Policy in 1971. The radical Malay elite that took over the control of the Alliance believed that the poverty of the Malays and the unequal distribution of the fruits of modernization were the root causes of the tragedy. They advocated restructuring of Malaysian economy to correct economic imbalance. The NEP had two long-term aims: employment in all economic sectors should reflect the racial composition of the country by 1990; and ownership of productive wealth should be restructured so that by 1990 the Malays and other indigenous groups own and operate at least 30% of the total.29 To achieve the aims of increased employment for the Malays, the government not only allocated most of the public service jobs to the Malays, but also forced private enterprises to take in Malay employees for up to 30% of their staff. To encourage Malays into business, the government provided them with cheap loans, easily accessible business premises; and special preference to the Malays in the allocation of licenses, business contracts, and distribution agencies. To speed up the process of realising 30% ownership goal, the government set up some huge national enterprises that controlled resources, finance, and communications.30 The introduction of the NEP was a most serious challenge to the Chinese community as a whole. What role will the Chinese play in the Malaysian economy under the new economic policy? How would the Chinese protect their self-interest? These were the crucial questions faced by the Chinese at that time. Having just recovered from the impact of the May 13th riots, the Chinese community was in disarray without a clear and constructive policy to deal with these issues. For example, in its national conference held in Trengganu in June 1972, the 29

See Crouch H (1996). Government and Society in Malaysia, pp. 24–25. Sydney, NSW: Allen & Unwin Pty. Ltd. 30 See Gomez ET and Jomo KS (1997). Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, pp. 29–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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“Federation of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry” (Malaixiya Zhonghua shanghui lianhehui) — the organisation representing the Chinese business and industry — did not have a detailed discussion on these problems, except a warning made by Y.T. Lee, the acting president of the federation. Lee warned the delegates that Malaysia was undergoing an economic revolution, in which the private enterprises had no match with the power of government-owned public enterprises. He called upon them to face up to this serious issue.31 However, a more probing and constructive view was expressed by Koh Peng Ting, the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Penang. In May 1975, in an article on the future of Chinese economic position, he aptly analyzed the current political and economic situations in Malaysia, as well as the traditional structure of Chinese business and industry, and pointed a clear direction that Chinese had to follow in order to survive the extraordinary challenge. He reminded them that the Chinese traditional type of family business was unable to keep abreast with time. Small and dialect-segregated Chinese business had to break with the past, and unite under a larger Chinese community. In the handling of business, the Chinese had to abandon traditional family management style, and learn from the operation of overseas big business enterprises. A new system based on legal and impersonal practices must be constructed. He also pointed out that a bright spot on the horizon was that more and more young Chinese received higher education both domestically or overseas, and their future involvement in business and industry would help rescue Chinese business. Lastly, he warned that Chinese community could only survive the relentless competition by abandoning old ideas and practices, and to absorb talents into their ranks.32 31

See Mahua shanglianhui di nianliujie changnian dahui huiyi jilu, 9/6/1972 (Minutes of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Representatives of Federation of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia, 9th June 1972). In Mahua shanghui shi (A History of the Federation of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia), Huang Kunfu (ed.), p. 188. Kuala Lumpur, Federation of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia. 32 See Koh Peng Ting (Xu Pingdeng) (1979). An investigation into the economic position of the Chinese in Malaysia. In Ping Yan Ji (Collections of Plain and Humble Words), Koh Peng Ting pp. 20–28. Penang: Xin Da Printing Ltd.

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As the custodian of Chinese business interests, the MCA came to realize that the introduction of NEP would have great impact on the economic status of the Chinese, but MCA could do very little politically to stop its implementation. After careful deliberation, the MCA leadership adopted a strategy of self-strengthening of Chinese economy by reform, renovation, modernization, and corporatization. Its first step was to mobilize small and scattered Chinese capital for the founding of modern business corporations. In 1975, the MultiPurpose Holdings Berhad (MPH) was launched by MCA president Lee San Choon to spearhead the reform, with Lee Loy Seng — a reputable business leader as its first chairman.33 After Tan Koon Swan had taken over the running of the corporation in 1977, MPH achieved remarkable growth and expansion. It diversified into finance, real estate, manufacturing, plantations, shipping and trading. In the first decade of its existence, the MPH was a success story worth to be told by many Chinese. It had succeeded in pooling scattered Chinese capital for the building of a modern business conglomerate. By 1985, when MPH was registered in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange as a public company, it had at least 80,000 shareholders with a paid-up capital of M$571,000,000 and 18,000 employees.34 The success of MPH in 1980s gave rise to a movement of corporatization of Chinese business based on dialect and regional associations. Some two dozen small- and medium-sized holding companies appeared in this period, that included the Hok Lian of the Hokkien community, the Kar Yin and Fui Lian of the Hakka community, the United Teochew Holding Berhad of the Teochew community, and Grand Ocean and Mewah cooperatives of the Hainanese community.35 These dialect and regional organizations had traditionally possessed tremendous influence over their members, and they had no 33 See Heng Pek Koon (1992). Chinese business elite of Malaysia. In Southeast Asian Capitalists, Ruth McVey (ed.), p. 135. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asian Program, Cornell University. 34 Ibid, p. 136; Heng Pek Koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, p. 271. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 35 Heng Pek Kook (1992). Chinese business elite of Malaysia. In Southeast Asian apitalists, Ruth McVey (ed.), p. 136; Gomez ET (1999). The Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation, , p. 83.

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hesitation to use their influence to attract investors, and they also invested in the holding companies to set examples for members to follow.36 The Chinese self-strengthening movement posed a threat to the implementation of the NEP whose main aim was the lifting of the economic status of the Malays, and the success of the Chinese corporatization movement was deemed to have undermined NEP programs. This was clearly reflected in the obstruction of MPH expansion into banking and plantation. MPH in 1980s adopted acquisition and merger as key strategy for expansion, but it was thwarted by the government on the instigation of UMNO youth. As a result, the attempt of acquiring the United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC) and Dunlop Holdings Berhad by MPH failed to go through.37 Of course, the failure of the MPH and the corporatization movement could not be just attributed to political intervention, other factors also came into play. Tan Koon Swan’s fall in his speculative financial activity and his imprisonment in Singapore’s jail was an important factor for the collapse of MPH, while mismanagement, corruption, and embezzlement accounted for financial losses of the holding companies and for the loss of confidence among investors. Further, the economic recession that hit Malaysia in the middle of 1980s had its toll on the Chinese enterprises.38 Despite the setbacks of the Chinese corporatization movement, some Chinese private enterprises scored remarkable success. Most of 36

For example, the Hokkien Association of Selangor (Xuelane Fujian huiguan) on 4th November 1981 resolved to purchase M$100,000 value of shares of the Hok Lian Holdings Berhad. See (1986). Xuelane Fujian huiguan bainian dashi zhi, 1885–1985 (The Major Events of Hundred Years’ History of the Hokkien Association of Selangor). In Xuelane Fujian huigua bainian jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of Centenary Celebration of the Hokkien Association of Selangor), Guo Zhuzhen et al. (eds.), pp. 326–328. Kuala Lumpur: Hokkien Association of Selangor. 37 For analysis of the rise and fall of the MPH, see Searle P (1999). The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers or Real Capitalists, pp. 178–188. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 38 See Ho Khai Leong (He Qiliang), Duli hou xi Ma huaren de zhengzhi yanbian (The Political Change of Western Malaysia during the Post Independent Period). In Malaixiya Huaren shi xinbian (A New History of the Chinese in Malaysia), Lim Chooi Kwa (Lin Suihao) et al. (eds.), Vol. 2, p. 99. Kuala Lumpur: the Federation of the Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia.

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them were still family-based or joint enterprises, but adopted modern management and expansion strategy in their operations. Five factors can be identified for their success. First, the family-based or joint enterprises have the advantage of flexibility in decision-making. They could make quick decisions and grasp the opportunities available to them. Second, since many of the senior staff are related to the owner, they are prepared to work harder for the company. The internal coherence was stronger than public listed enterprises. Third, most of these enterprises focused more on property development than manufacturing. Fourth, acquisition and merger were the preferred strategy of expansion rather than setting up branches. Fifth, diversification of capital by extending their investment to enterprises abroad.39 But the most important factor for their success was their ability in using political network for the benefit of their enterprises. Most of these newly emerged Chinese entrepreneurs possessed business acumen, foresight, flexibility, and the courage to take risk. They observed the rapid change of political and economic climates in Malaysia which required changes in attitude and strategy under the framework of the NEP. They actively cultivated political patronage from the Malays, and utilized this political network for the benefit of their enterprises. They were prepared to go into partnership with the Malays, or recruit Malay dignatories onto their boards of directors. The most successful Chinese entrepreneurs under the NEP were Khoo Kay Peng of Malayan United Industries (MUI), Vincent Tan Chee Yioun of Berjaya Corporation Berhad, Lim Thian Kit of Kamunting Corporation Berhad, William Cheng Heng Jen of Lion Corporation Berhad, and Loy Hean Heong of the Malaysian Borneo Finance (MBF) Corporation Berhad. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and the rise of his Berjaya Corporation Berhad is the best example for the illustration of the remarkable growth of some private Chinese enterprises under NEP. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun was born in 1952 in Batu Pahat, Johore. He ranked fourth among six children in a well-to-do business family. He had an ambition of becoming a lawyer, but the failure of his 39 See Jesudason JV (1989). Ethnicity and the Economy: The State, Chinese Business, and Multinationals in Malaysia, pp. 150–154. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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father’s transport business forced him to take up a clerical position in the United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad (UMBC) after completing his secondary education. He also worked part-time as an insurance agent for American International Assurance (AIA). With his burning ambition of becoming rich and famous, he began to venture into small-scale trading business. His business venture did not achieve a break through until 1982 when he was at the age of 30. In that year, he acquired the coveted Malaysian franchise for McDonald’s fast-food chain against financially powerful competitors such as See Hoy Chan group, East Asiatic and Federal Hotels group of companies.40 This victory not only laid down the solid foundation for the building of his future business empire, but also gained him business credentials that enabled him to seek more capital to facilitate his corporate activity. In 1983, with a stroke of luck, he succeeded in acquiring control over Berjaya Kawat Berhad, a small public-listed steel-wire manufacturing company, which he re-named Berjaya Corporation. Since then, the Berjaya Corporation became the flagship of Tan’s business empire. From 1985 onward, Tan step by step fulfilled his dream of building up a vast diversified conglomerate. He adopted an aggressive “takeover” strategy to maximize the growth of his corporation. This included 48% stake in Regnis (M) Sdn Bhd, a company handling Singer Sewing Machines (1985); a leasing company named Prime Credit Leasing Sdn Bhd (1986); a 22% stake in Palmco Holdings Bhd (1986); and a 28% interest in South Pacific Textile Industries Bhd (1987). But the most important acquisition was his 70% stake in Sport Toto Berhad in 1985 through his private holding company, B&B Enterprise Sdn Bhd. The Sport Toto Berhad, the lottery operator, incorporated by the government in 1969 to generate funds for sports budget, was privatized in 1985 as part of government’s new strategy of beating the severe recession in Malaysia.41 Tan’s control of Sport Toto Berhad was significant for the rapid expansion of his business. It not only guaranteed continuous cash-flow 40

See Gomez ET (1999), Chinese Business in Malaysia, pp. 112–113; Searle P (1999), The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism, p. 191. 41 See Gomez ET, ibid, pp. 113–114.

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that supported the on going programs, but had also reaped handsome profit that could be ploughed into his programs of expansion. The share price of the company increased instantly by fivefold soon after it was listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in June 1987.42 In 1993, Vincent Tan was again the beneficiary of the government’s privatization programs. His Berjaya Corporation-led consortium — Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd — was awarded M$6 billion worth of sewerage contract that was to plan and construct new systems in addition to the refurbishing and upgrading of the existing sewerage systems for a period of 28 years.43 By this time, Tan’s building of a diversified business conglomerate was almost completed. The meteoric rise of Vincent Tan during the NEP period should not be attributed just to his personal quality such as business acumen, foresight, flexibility and personal drive, but also his ability to forge a Sino–Malay partnership in business, and his readiness to exploit his political connections. This theme ran through his business career from his first break through in acquiring the McDonald’s franchise, to the control of two government-privatized projects — the Sport Toto lottery and sewerage contract.44 Unlike the Chinese cooperative holding companies that posed a threat to the Malay interests, Tan’s Berjaya Corporation that was prepared to partner with Malay entrepreneurs and benefit Malay dignatories, was seen in a very favorable light in the eyes of the government, and was awarded profitable projects. This unseen factor also accounted partly for the success of similar Chinese private enterprises during the NEP period.

Chinese Business after 1990s Having accomplished its historical mission, the NEP was replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991. The introduction of the new policy had its domestic and international factors. First, Malaysia suffered economic contraction in the middle of 1980s as a 42 43 44

See Searle P, op.cit., pp. 192–193. See Gomez ET, op.cit., p. 115. Ibid, pp. 112–115; Searle P, op.cit., pp. 192–195.

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result of a global recession. The decline in demand for commodities in international markets saw a big slide in prices for Malaysian rubber, palm oil, and tin. For the first time since independence, Malaysia registered a minus one percent growth rate. Partly influenced by the United Kingdom and the United States, Prime Minister Mahathir adopted privatization as a strategy to reduce government debt and to stimulate economic growth. At the same time, the government encouraged foreign and domestic investments by tax concessions and by relaxing employee quota requirements.45 Second, drastic political change in Malaysia led to the change of government’s attitude and policy toward non-Malays. The internal feud and factional struggle in the second half of 1980s split UMNO, ending with the victory of the New UMNO led by Mahathir.46 The split weakened the Malays’ hold on political power in Malaysia, and the New UMNO had, to a certain extent, relied on non-Malays’ votes to keep it in power. In formulating a new economic policy to replace the NEP, the government had to take into consideration the economic interests of the non-Malays. Third, the end the Cold War at the dawn of 1990s ushered in a new era of international politics in which ideological and military rivalry between two super powers ended, and economic competition among nations began. Further, the globalization began to impact on economic planning and directions of many nations, including that of Malaysia. Malaysia must follow the path of rapid economic modernization. Fourth, the rise of the economic power of Asian Four Little Dragons — Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore — in 1970s and 1980s,47 and the opening up of China in 1980s provided 45

See Gomez ET (1999), Chinese Business in Malaysia, pp. 133–134. For internal feud and factional struggle within the UMNO, see Crouch H (1996), Government and Society in Malaysia, pp. 114–129; Means G (1991). Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation, pp. 199–206. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Khoo Kay Jin (1992). The grand vision: Mahathir and modernisation. In Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), pp. 67–71. North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia in Association with Allen & Unwin. 47 For the rise of Taiwan and Hong Kong and their impact on Southeast Asia and the Chinese Business in Southeast Asia, see Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The rise of ethnic Chinese business in East and Southeast Asia, in The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Ching-hwang (ed.), pp. 2–32. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 46

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up excellent opportunities for Malaysia to pursue its economic goals. If the government could take full advantage of the language skill and cultural expertise of the Chinese Malaysians, Malaysia would benefit greatly from trade and investment in its drive for industrialization. Together with the announcement of the new NDP, Mahathir expounded his famous “Grand Vision of 2020” in which he visualized that in a period of 30 years, Malaysia would be transformed into an advanced modernized industrial nation, and his government will dedicate itself to the realization of this grand vision. The new NDP and the “Grand Vision of 2020” brought new hope and new opportunities for Chinese business, and during this period, the government shifted its focus on creating a bigger economic cake for all Malaysians regardless of their racial origins. Under the new policy, the government adopted the strategy of EOI (Export Oriented Industrialization) and encouraged manufacturing and export. Mahathir himself had led two big delegations to China and South America for opening up new markets for Malaysian commodities and industrial products. Under this new political climate, the Chinese business as a whole recovered its vigour, and achieved steady growth in the first half of 1990s. Big Chinese private business continued to enjoy political patronage and grew rapidly. For instance, the Yeoh Tiong Lay (YTL) Corporation Berhad achieved rapid expansion in early 1990s due to its close relationship with Mahathir. In 1990, it was awarded a government contract worth M$800 million to create a nationwide rural healthcare network. In 1992, the corporation rose to prominence because it was the first to be awarded by the government an independent power producer (IPP) licence valued at M$2.5 billion.48 Small- and medium-sized Chinese business also received a boost by the government’s new policy and initiatives, and they expanded into manufacturing and education services industries. The flourishing of Tan You Sin’s Indit Educational Service group in 1990s testified to the rapid growth of Chinese service industry in Malaysia.49 48

See Gomez ET (1999), The Chinese Business in Malaysia, pp. 164–166. See Tay Won Mok (Zheng Yunmu) (1996). Yongchuang tianxia: Malaxiya zhongxiao qiye chenggong zhilu (Challenge the World: The Successful Path of the Small and Medium-sized Industry in Malaysia), p. 178. Kuala Lumpur: Yuan Sheng Foundation. 49

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However, the rapid growth of Chinese business in the 1990s was short-lived due to the Asian Currency Crisis that began with the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997.50 The crisis swept through Southeast and East Asia with Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea being the worst affected.51 The crisis also had its toll on Malaysia. The values of Malaysian ringgit and shares tumbled though they did not crash, resulting in the closure of companies and loss of jobs.52 The Chinese business could hardly escape the onslaught of the currency crisis, and among the worst hit Chinese enterprises were those over-geared corporations, including Vincent Tan’s Berjaya group, Lee Kim Yew’s Country Heights group, Jeffrey Cheah’s Sungei Way Holdings, Tong Kooi Ong’s Phileo Allied, Teong Teck Leng’s Kuala Lumpur Industries, and Ting Pek Khiing’s Ekran group.53 Many of these corporations were under enormous pressure unless they received fresh injection of capital or enter into corporate restructuring with new partners. Surprisingly, none of them collapsed. However, those Chinese corporations that adopted a prudent strategy of expansion by combining borrowing and self-financing were able to ride the storm. They included Rubert Kuok’s Kuok Brothers group, Lim Goh Tong’s Genting group, and Lee Loy Seng’s Kuala Lumpur Kepong group.54 Unlike Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea that accepted International Monetary Fund’s stringent rescue packages, Mahathir controlled the movement of foreign capital, fixed the exchange rate 50

For an analysis of the factors contributing to the collapse of Thai baht, see Warr P (1998). Thailand, in East Asia in Crisis: From Being a Miracle to Needing One? McLeord RH and Garnaut R (eds.), pp. 49–65. London and New York: Routledge. 51 For more analysis on the crisis and its implications for the future of the region, see Delhaise PF (1998). Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems. Singapore: John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd.; Henderson C, Asia Falling: Making Sense of the Asian Currency Crisis and Its Aftermath. Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; and Godement F (1999). The Downsizing of Asia. London and New York: Routledge. 52 For the impact of the currency crisis on Malaysia, see Yong Wai Seng (1999). The currency crisis and its effects on Malaysian society. Unpublished B.A. Honours Thesis, History Department, the University of Adelaide, pp. 20–31. 53 See Heng Pek Koon and Sieh Lee Mei Ling (2000). The Chinese business community in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–1999. In The Chinese in Malaysia, Lee Kan Hing and Tan Cheee-Bing (eds.), p. 161. Shah Alam, Selangor: Oxford University Press. 54 Ibid, p. 162.

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between ringgit and US dollar, and aided those enterprises that were worst hit by the crisis. Although the majority of the beneficiaries belong to the government-owned enterprises, some Chinese private companies also benefited from this strategy. It was claimed that Vincent Tan’s Berjaya Corporation Berhad received M$300 million loan from the government to complete its Kuala Lumpur light rail project; while Ting Pek Khiing’s Ekran group was able to overcome its cash flow problem due mainly to the substantial financial aid granted by the government.55 By 1999, Malaysia had weathered the currency crisis, and the Chinese business began to recover from its severe impact. Nevertheless, some thoughtful Chinese felt that a post-mortem investigation into the crisis would benefit the Chinese community in future. Using media or social organizations as instruments, they promoted public awareness on this crucial issue. The work of the Nanyang University Alumni Association (Malaya) is a case in point. The association is an non-profit and non-secterian organization promoting cultural and educational interests of the Chinese in Malaysia. It organized two international conferences on the currency crisis in Kuala Lumpur. The first was convened on 15 April 1998 when the crisis was still raging, and it attracted a great deal of interest. Renowned scholars such as Nobel laureate (Chemistry) Professor Lee Yen-tse of Taiwan, Professor Li Yining of China — a prominent economist, and Professor Y.K. Ng of Australia — another prominent economist, were key note speakers. Their speeches were inspiring and stimulating.56 The second conference, convened on 21 November 1999 was to examine the future of Chinese business in post-crisis era. It was entitled “Towards 21st Century: International Symposium on Economy.” Three overseas experts were invited to speak at the conference, they were Professor Liew Chong Chin of Canada, a medical expert, and two economists from Singapore and Hong Kong. They emphasized that the “knowledge economy” would dominate the new century, and 55

Ibid; Gomez ET (1999), The Chinese Business in Malaysia, p. 195. For details of this conference, see Lim Chong Keang (ed.) (2000). Huanbao, jinrong fengbao, jingji chengzhang lunwenji (Collection of Articles on Environmental Protection, Currency Crisis and Economic Growth), pp. 65–139. Kuala Lumpur: Nanyang University Enterprise Pty. Ltd. 56

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the Chinese would have to raise their scientific and technical knowledge in order to face keen competition. At the same time, they also pointed out that high tech and knowledge-intensive industry will be the future of economic growth.57

Summary and Conclusion For the century between 1904 and 2004, Chinese business was travelling on a long and rugged road full of twists and turns. Before 1904, Chinese businessmen had found their niche as middlemen under the colonial economic framework, and they prospered under the British rule. From 1904 to 1942, the Chinese business underwent changes in its patterns of operation. In addition to traditional entrepot trade, it developed high-return plantation industries such as rubber and pineapple canning, banking and finance service industry, and consumer-oriented manufacturing. This change of business pattern not only expanded the scope of business activity, but also consolidated the financial position of the Chinese businessmen that enabled them to forge ahead toward modernization. During the Japanese Occupation between 1942 and 1945, the Chinese business experienced severe decline and destruction. It recovered and grew during the post-war period, but experienced a bumpy ride in the early 1950s because of the rise and fall of rubber prices in the international market as a result of the Korean War (1950–1953). In about one and a half decades from 1957 to 1971, the Chinese business grew rapidly and achieved unprecedented prosperity. The new laissez-faire policy and the ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) strategy pursued by the Alliance government after independence of Malaya in 1957 provided excellent opportunity for the Chinese business to expand. Further, the political influence of MCA over Alliance economic policy added to the advantage of the Chinese business that achieved a remarkable growth. However, the growth of the Chinese business was cut short by the introduction of the NEP in 1971, under which it encountered a daunting task of keeping its 57

For the contents of these articles, see ibid, pp. 141–174.

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position in the Malaysian economy. The cooperative enterprise movement that aimed at revitalizing the Chinese business was proven politically unviable, and the movement collapsed after a short period of trial. However, some private-owned Chinese big enterprises that had adopted flexible strategy of growth by closely allying themselves with the Malays, had achieved notable expansion. But these successful private enterprises belonged to a minority of the Chinese business. The beginning of the 1990s signalled the end of the NEP and its replacement of a more liberal NDP adopted by the government. At the same time, Mahathir’s grand vision of making Malaysia an advanced industrial state in 30 years expounded in the early 1990s added to this new momentum of industrialization and globalization. These twin events provided the Chinese business and industry the best opportunity to grow, but the prosperity was short-lived due to the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997. Thanks to Mahathir’s strategy of controlling the movement of foreign capital and the exchange rates, Malaysia managed to tide over the storm. The post-mortem investigation of the crisis carried out by some social organizations helped the Chinese businessmen in Malaysia to understand the actual reasons behind the crisis, developed their sense of alertness over the unpredictable economic future, and helped them to chart their future course of action.

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Chapter 3

The Roles of Hokkiens in the History of Malaysia and Singapore*

Early Hokkien Immigrants and their Social Structure Hokkiens were the earliest Chinese immigrants in Malaysia and Singapore. Chinese began to immigrate to Malacca since the early 15th century after the founding of the Malacca Sultanate. Being strategically located between China, India, and the Southeast Asian archipelago, Malacca was destined to become the hub of a booming international trade, and it attracted a number of Chinese merchants to its shore. These early Chinese traders appeared to have come from Zhangzhou prefecture in the southern part of Fujian province, China, and they played an important role in the international trade of the Sultanate such that their leader was appointed to the position of one of the four Shabbandars by the Sultan.1 It was a natural flow of events that Zhangzhou Hokkiens should become the Chinese pioneers in Malacca, for the Yue Gang (the Port of Moon) of Zhangzhou emerged as a main trading port in the southeastern part of China in the period between 1465 and 1505, and Zhangzhou traders were active in the coastal China and Southeast Asian region.2 The Chinese community * This chapter is based on my Chinese paper presented as the keynote speech at the International Symposium on the Study of Hokkiens in Southeast Asia, held at Crystal Crown Hotel, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia, 20–21 August 2005. 1 See Kernal Singh Sandhu (1961). Chinese colonization of Malacca: A study in population change, 1500 to 1957 AD. Journal of Tropical Geography, 15, 5; see also Kernal Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (eds.), (1983). Melaka: The Transformation of a Malay Capital, c.1400–1980, Vol. 2, p. 96. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 2 See Chen Zhiqiang (1983). Lun Mingdai Zhangzhou Yuegang (On the Port Moon of Zhangzhou during the Ming period), and Cheng Wuquan (1983). Yue Gang de xingqi yu Minnan huaqiao (The rise of Port Moon and the Overseas Chinese of Southern Fujian). In Yue Gang yanjiu lunwenji (Collections of Essays on the Study of Port Moon), Zhonggong Longxi diwei xuanchuanbu and Fujiansheng lishi xuehui Xiamen fenhui (eds.), pp. 1–7, 200–204. Chuanzhou.

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grew in size in 130 years under the Portuguese rule of Malacca (1511–1641). A Portuguese navigator and explorer, de Eredia, who spent some time in Malacca in the early 17th century, observed that a Chinese village was located in a suburb of Upe, and the residents were the “Chincheows”. The word “Chincheows” must be the romanization of Hokkien word of “Cheangchew” which is the equivalent of Mandarin pronounciation of “Zhangzhou”.3 During the early Qing period (1644 –1670), the southern Chinese who resisted the Manchu conquest and were unwilling to become the Manchu subjects, left their homeland and migrated to Southeast Asia, and a group of them arrived in Malacca to seek refuge. The majority of them came from Xiamen (Amoy), Quanzhou, and Zhangzhou. Their arrival further boosted the number of the Hokkiens among the ethnic Chinese in early Malacca. The fact that the early Chinese Kapitans such as Zheng Fang Yang and Li Wei Jing were of southern Hokkien origins testified to the Hokkiens’ majority and their overriding position in the early Chinese community in Malacca.4 The founding of Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819) were designed to protect British trade route from China to Europe, and to ensure British supremacy in tea trade.5 At the same time, the British developed them as free ports to attract Chinese immigrants to trade, work, and settle.6 Koh Lay Huan, the first Chinese Kapitan in Penang 3

See de Eredia, EG (1930). Eredia’s description of Malacca, meridional India and Cathay (translated by JV Mills). Journal of the Malayan Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, 8(1), 19. 4 “Kapitan” probably has its origins in Dutch word “Kapitein” which is equivalent to English word of “Captain”. The word means a chief or a headman of a community. During the Dutch rule of Malacca, the leader of the Chinese community was appointed by the Dutch authority as Kapitan. For the history of Chinese Kapitans in the Straits Settlements and three Northern Malay States, see Wong, CS (1964). A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans. Singapore: Dewan Bahasa dan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan. For the stone tablets dedicated to Kapitan Zheng Fang Yang and Kapitan Li Wei Jing, see Franke W and Chen Tieh Fan (eds.) (1982). Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Malaysia, Vol. 1, pp. 247–248. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. 5 For a discussion on the motives for the founding of Penang, see Tregonning, KC (1965). The British in Malaya: The First Forty Years 1786–1826, pp. 5–40. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 6 For the development of Singapore as a free port and its attraction of Chinese to the port, see Wong Lin Ken (1978). Singapore: Its growth as an Entrepot port, 1819–1941. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 9(1), 50–56; Lee Poh Ping (1978). Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore, pp. 11–27. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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and a native of Zhangzhou, brought along a big group of relatives and friends to Siam (Thailand), then to Kedah, and eventually settled in Penang. Koh was later appointed by Francis Light, the founder of Penang, to be the first Chinese Kapitan to administer the local Chinese community.7 In addition, all of the five powerful Chinese clans — the Khoo (Qiu), the Yeoh (Yang), the Lim (Lin), the Cheah (Xie), and the Tan (Chen) — that dominated the early Chinese community in Penang also came from Zhangzhou.8 These facts suggest a predominant Hokkien population among the Chinese in early Penang. Like Penang, the development of Singapore as a free port attracted a large number of Chinese to its shore, and among them the Teochews and Hokkiens were predominant. Seah Eu Chin (Siah U Chin), an acknowledged Teochew leader of the Chinese community in early Singapore, estimated 40,000 Chinese on the island in 1848, 30 years after the founding of the settlement. Among the Chinese population, the Teochews accounted for 19,000, the Hokkiens plus the Chinese from Malacca (the majority of them were Hokkien descendants) accounted for 10,000, while the rest were made up of Cantonese (6000), Hakkas (4000), and Hainanese (700).9 This suggests that the Hokkiens also constituted a major part of the Chinese population in early Singapore. They were the second to Teochews in terms of numerical strength, and this helps to explain why Teochew and Hokkien are still the predominant Chinese dialects spoken in Singapore. Similar to other ethnic Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia, the Hokkiens moved to the region through two migration patterns: kinship-based and credit-ticket systems. The former was based on 7

See Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Early Fukienese migration and social organization in Singapore and Malaya before 1900. In Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 75–77. Singapore: Times Academic Press. See also the same article originally published in Ping-tsun Chang and Shih-chi Liu (eds.) (1993). Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji (Essays in Chinese Maritime History), Vol. 5, pp. 685–688. Taipei: Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica. 8 Ibid., pp. 76–77. 9 See Siah U Chin (1848). General sketch of the numbers, tribes and avocations of the Chinese in Singapore. The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, No. 2, p. 290.

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blood and marriage ties, while the latter relied on a signed contract.10 Since the majority of early Hokkien immigrants congregated in ports and cities and were predominantly engaged in business, they favored the kinship-based system to recruit their needed labor. After having established themselves in business and requring more helping hands, the Hokkiens returned to their hometowns in China to recruit their kinsmen and relatives. The new immigrants were given the opportunity to learn the trade as apprentices in shops or other business establishments, and were given financial assistance to start their own business. When they successfully established their own business and needed more hands to help, they also returned to China to do the same recruitment. The process was repeated itself, and was formed into a chain migration based on kinship ties. The type of migration pattern that favored the Hokkiens determined the form of their social structure. As a result of the operation of this kinship-based system, a number of same surname immigrants settled in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. For security and access to assistance, they tended to congregate together, and established clan organizations for the protection of group interests. The best example is the case of five powerful Hokkien clans in early Penang: the Khoo, the Yeoh, the Lim, the Cheah, and the Tan. All of them came from the same Hai Cheng district of Zhangzhou. When their numbers increased steadily, and the needs for religious worship and celebration of traditional Chinese festivities were felt, they quickly organized their respective clan associations and built beautiful clan temples for those purposes. The most powerful among the five in Penang was the Khoo Kongsi which came into existence in 1835. Over 100 Khoo kinsmen on the island felt the need of forming an organization, and a preparatory committee was formed and a fund-raising campaign was launched. After 16 years’ effort (in 1851), a magnificent clan temple

10

For a discussion of the patterns of early Chinese migration to Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 4–8. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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was constructed to house ancestral tablets of Khoos’ progenitors and the protector deity — Da Zhi Ya.11 The majority of the early Hokkien clan associations in Malaya and Singapore belong to the “localized lineage”. This term is referred to a surname group (a clan) that came from the same village with a common dialect in China, and it was an integrated entity of kinship, geography, and dialect.12 The members of these Hokkien clan associations came from the same Hai Cheng district of Zhangzhou and spoke the same dialect. Kinship and dialect ties were strengthened by a sense of solidarity and unity among members as a result of prevalent armed clashes among clans in southern Fujian. Like the clan organizations in China, the early Hokkien clan associations were social and cultural entities whose prime objectives were to perpetuate kinship descent, to promote unity and cooperation among members, and to foster traditional Chinese values. Confucian values of filial piety, loyalty, harmony, respect for the age and talent, and the emphasis on education took root in the minds of the early Hokkien immigrants. They inherited the practice of generation and age hierarchies that reflected the traditional Chinese values.13 Further, the adoption of some keywords such as De (virtue), Shi (generation), Xiao (filial piety), and Wen (culture, civilization)

11 The Khoo progenitors worshipped in the Khoo clan temple in Penang included the founder of the Khoo clan in the Xin Jiang village of the Hai Cheng district, China, Khoo Chiang Eng (Qiu Qian Rong), and his wife, plus other Khoo ancestors of the first to fifth generations and their wives. See Khoo Hock Siew (1974). Binlangyu Qiushi longshantang shilue ji tangwu fazhan kaikuang (A short history of the Leong San Tong Khoo clan and its development). In Xinjiang wufang yudetang wenfugong paixi pudie (Geneological Records of the Goh Pang Khoo Clansmen), Bincheng shendetang Qiugongsi (ed.), Penang. 12 For a detailed discussion of the “localized lineage”, see Maurice Freedman (1958). Lineage Organizations in Southeastern China, pp. 1–8. London: The Athlone Press, University of London. 13 According to this practice, members of a clan were organized into different generation layers and age groups, and status and authority were accorded according to seniority. In the generation hierarchy, each generation was given a code word that would be incorporated into the name of a male member. Thus, a male’s name can be easily identified as belonging to which generation. For a discussion of this issue, see Yen Ching-hwang, op.cit., p. 81.

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in the early Hokkien clan associations,14 indicates the transmission of some Confucian values into the early Chinese communities in Malaya and Singapore. The five key functions of the early Hokkien clan organizations were ancestral worship and worship of protector deities, observation of traditional Chinese festivities, helping destitute members and the new arrivals, arbitration of disputes among members, and legalization of marriage and promotion of education.15 In addition to the clan organizations, the early Hokkien immigrants also founded geographically-based associations known as “Huiguan”. Strong kinship ties led the early Hokkien Chinese overfocus on the founding of clan organizations, but neglected their wider geographical connections. In comparison with other Chinese dialect groups, the Hokkien Chinese were relatively late in founding their huiguans. The earliest Hokkien huiguan in Malaya and Singapore can be traced back to the “Tian Hock Keng Hokkien huiguan” (Tian Fu Gong Fujian Huiguan) that came into existence in Singapore in 1860 with its office located in the Tian Hock Keng temple, and its first president was Tan Kim Cheng, a famous Chinese community leader in Singapore in the second half of the 19th century.16 Of course, the predecessor of the Tian Hock Keng Hokkien huiguan, the Tian Hock Keng temple, was founded 20 years ealier (1840), and it was dedicated to the worship of seafaring goddess — Tian Hou (Ma Zu), and 14

The word De (virtue) appeared in the generation code names of Lim Kongsi and Yeoh Kongsi of Penang, while the word Shi (generation) was adopted by Lim Kongsi, Yeoh Kongsi, and Khoo Kongsi as one of their generation code words. See, Lim Kongsi dunbentang ji Lin shi miamshutang beixi yilanbiao (A list of generation code words of Lin Gongsi dunbentang and miamshutang) (No date). In Malaixiya Bincheng Linshi dunbentang ji miamshutang yibai zhounian jiniankan (Souvenir Magazine for Centenary Celebration of the Lim Kongsi Toon Pun Tong and Lim Sz Bian Soot Tong, P ), Lim Teong Aik (ed.), pp. 25–26. Penang; Bin Yang gongsi beizhi yilanbiao (A list of generation code words of the Yeoh Kongsi of Penang), as appendix to the Binlangyu Yang gongsi zhangcheng (The Constitution of the Yeoh Kongsi of Penang); Longshantang Qiu gongsi huiyuan beizhi yilanbiao (A list of generation code words of the members of the Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi). 15 See Yen Ching-hwang, op. cit., pp. 84–93. 16 For the early history of the Tian Hock Keng Hokkien huiguan, see Wu Hua (1975). Xinjiapo huazu huiguan zhi (Chinese Associations in Singapore), Vol. 1, pp. 57–58. Singapore: South Seas Society.

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it was mainly initiated and supported by the Hokkiens in Singapore.17 About the same time, with the founding of the Tian Hock Keng Hokkien huiguan, was the founding of the Hokkien huiguan of Taiping (1860) in the state of Perak, the Eng Choon huiguan of Singapore (1867), the Eng Choon huiguan of Malacca (1875), the Selangor Hokkien huiguan in Kuala Lumpur (1885), the Selangor Eng Choon gongso in Klang (1892), the Eng Choon huiguan of Muar in the state of Johore (1894), and the Eng Choon huiguan of Negri Sembilan (1898).18 The functions of these early Hokkien huiguan were similar to the Hokkien clan organizations, and their main objective was to protect group interests that included religious worship, celebrating festivities, helping new arrivals from China and destitute fellow district folks, promoting friendship, and mediating disputes among the members.19 In contrast with the clan organization, the huiguan’s functions were more broadly based and had a wider scope. For instance, the religious worship in the huiguan was based on the worship of deities in certain geographical areas in China, rather than that confined to the worship of ancestors or protector deity of a particular clan. As the huiguan included many different surname groups from one particular area, it provided a wider scope for social mixing with an additional layer of social contacts for jobs or businesses.

Economic Pursuits of Early Hokkiens and Their Contributions The migration pattern of early Hokkiens not only determined their social structure, but also affected the types of economic activities they 17

See Jianli Tianfugong beiji (Inscription for the founding of the Tian Fu Gong temple). In Xinjiapo Huawen beiming jilu (A Collection of Chinese Inscriptions in Singapore), Chen Qinhe (Chen Ching-ho) and Chen Yushong (Tan Yeok Seong) (eds.), pp. 57–63. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 18 See Yen Ching-hwang, op. cit., pp. 322–326, Appendix 1; Wu Hua (1980). Malaixiya huazu huiguan shilue (A Short History of Chinese Associations in Malaysia), pp. 4–5. Singapore: Dongnanya yanjiushuo; Malaixiya Yong Chun lianhehui yinxi jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of Silver Jubilee Celebration of the Federation of Eng Choon Associations of Malaysia), pp. 134, 142, 147, 155, Kuala Lumpur. 19 For a detailed discussion of the functions of huiguans, see Yen Ching-hwang, op.cit., pp. 42–48.

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pursued. As the majority of them congregated in trading ports, they pursued trading and other forms of commercial activities. Among them were wealthy entrepot traders and landowners whose number was small, while the majority were small traders and shopkeepers who were involved in local trade and retailing activities. Since the days of the Malacca Sultanate, the Zhangzhou Hokkiens were already active in entrepot and international trade. They imported valuable Chinese commodities such as silk, copper and iron utensils, pottery and textiles in exchange for Southeast Asian produce such as spices and dried seafood.20 From the 17th to the 19th centuries when the second wave of European colonization of Southeast Asia took place, the new European powers represented by the Netherlands, Britain, and France gradually carved up the region into their respective colonies. The advantageous trading position hitherto enjoyed by the Hokkien traders was weakened. They were gradually incorporated into the new colonial economic system and their position was reduced to the status of middlemen. Though restricted by the new order, the Hokkien entrepot traders in the Straits Settlements grasped the new opportunities and developed their business under the colonial framework. They established close commercial relations with Western merchants and set up trading networks in Malay Peninsula and other parts of Southeast Asia. On the one hand, they collected local Southeast Asian produce and sold them to European exporters; on the other, they imported Chinese goods and Western manufactured products, and through their wholesale and retailing networks, distributed to the consumers in Southeast Asia.21 In addition, they established shipping 20

See Wheatley P (1959). A city that was made for merchandise — the geography of fifteenth century Malacca. In Nanyang Yanjiu (Southeast Asian Studies), Vol. 1 J1–J8. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Nanyang University; Wheatley P (1961). The Goldern Khersonese: Studies in the Historical Geography of the Malay Peninsula before AD 1500, pp. 306–320. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. 21 Twang Peck Yang (1992). Chinese maritime trading network and organizations based in Singapore, 1820s–1960s. Paper presented at the Conference on Island Southeast Asia and the World Economy, 1790s–1990s, p. 2. Canberra: Australian National University; Chiang Hai Ding (1970). Sino-British mercantile relations in Singapore entrepot trade, 1870–1915. In Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell, J Chen and N Tarling (eds.), pp. 106–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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companies to facilitate their commercial activities. They made handsome profits from trade, and accumulated huge wealth that enabled them to claim leadership status in the Chinese community, and their trading firms enjoyed enormous prestige in society. Some of these large Hokkien trading firms such as Kim Seng & Company, Lee Cheng Yan & Company, and Kim Cheng & Company were wellknown among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.22 The proprietors of the Kim Seng & Company and Lee Cheng Yan & Company, Tan Kim Seng and Lee Cheng Yan, were Hokkiens of Eng Choon origin, while the owner of Kim Cheng & Company, Tan Kim Cheng was a Zhangzhou Hokkien. All of them were born in Malacca, and were among the list of outstanding Hokkien merchants in the region. Apart from their pivotal role in the entrepot and regional trade of Singapore and Malaya, the Hokkiens also made contributions to mining, plantation, banking, and manufacturing industries. Though they were not actively involved in tin mining in the Malay Peninsula, they nevertheless contributed indirectly to the financing of mining activity. With the enormous wealth they had accumulated from trade and real estate, they were in the position to act as financiers for tin mining. Chee Yam Chuan, a wealthy Malacca-born Hokkien who had been active in plantation industry in Malacca and Singapore, cast his eyes on the tin mining industry in the Malay Peninsula. Being a close friend of Sultan Muhammad of Selangor, he helped finance the opening of tin mines in Lukut, and became the Sultan’s main creditor.23 Another wealthy Hokkien merchant who had indirectly contributed to tin mining was See Boon Tiong. Born in Malacca, he left his hometown for Singapore at the age of 18, and he had made his wealth in business through his contact with a wealthy English merchant. He ventured into tapioca planting in Linggi near Malacca, and developed strong interest in the economic development of the peninsula. In 22

See Chiang Hai Ding, ibid., p. 47; Tregonning, KG (1967). Home Port Singapore: A History of Straits Steamship Company Limited, 1890–1965, pp. 8–9. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 23 See Khoo Kay Kim (1975). The Western Malay States, 1850–1873: The Effects of Commercial Development on Malay Politics, pp. 62–63. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, reprint.

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1837, he had close relations with the development of mining and trade in Pahang, Trengganu, Kelantan, Patani, and Singora.24 The most important contribution of the early Hokkiens to the economic development of Malaya and Singapore was the planting and trading of rubber. Chinese plantation industry in the 19th century was dominated by the Teochews who cultivated pepper and gambir in Singapore and Johore for export; the Hokkiens had little role in it.25 However, the rise of rubber in the early 20th century changed the economic fortune of the Hokkiens, and since then they have dominated this new agricultural enterprise. The forerunner of rubber planting in Malaya was Tan Chay Hian (Chen Jixian), a rich Hokkien businessman from Malacca. Tan was born in Malacca, but his ancestors came from the Hai Cheng district of Zhangzhou, Fujian. His grandfather, Tan Tock Seng, a wealthy merchant and philanthropist, left his mark in history by founding the famous Tan Tock Seng public hospital in Singapore. His father, Tan Teck Guan, was a successful planter in Malacca. Brought up in a business family with commercial acumen, Tan Chay Hian had a foresight for the widespread use of rubber in the growing international market. In 1896, he began to experiment commercial planting of rubber in Bukit Lintang in the northeastern part of Malacca with 40 acres of land, and then he further developed another 2000 acres of rubber plantation in Bukit Asahan of Malacca, and made a huge profit.26 Tan’s successful venture laid the foundation for Hokkien domination of this rising industry, 24

Ibid.; For See Boon Tiong as a wealthy merchant in Malacca and Singapore as well as one of the founders of Keng Teck Hui (Qing De Hui), a well-known Chinese richmen’s social organization in early Singapore, see Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) (1993). Qing De Hui: Xinjiapo huashang fuzu de zuzhi yu yunzhuo (Keng Teck Hui: A mutual help social organization of Chinese merchants in Singapore and its functions). In Ya Zhou Wenhua (Asian Culture), No. 17, pp. 155–156; See also the same article in Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng), (1995). Xinjiapo Huashe yu Huashang (The Chinese Society and Chinese Merchants in Singapore), pp. 105–106. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. 25 See Jackson JC (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921, pp. 7–30. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. 26 Ibid., p. 218; Wu Tiren (1966). Zhi Chan xiangjiao duofang ren (The Pioneers in Rubber Planting), pp. 40–43. Xinjiapo: Shijie shuji youxian gongsi; Wu Tiren (1951). Redai jingji zhiwu — xiangjiao shu (Rubber Tree: The Tropical Commercial Crop), p. 8. Xinjiapo: Zhongnan lianhe chubanshe.

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and his success story motivated many Hokkien merchants to follow suit. Soon, a group of Hokkien merchants undertook rubber planting in Ulu Langat, Selangor, in Kinta of Perak and in Labis of Johore. In Singapore, Tan Kah Kee, the well-known Hokkien businessman and community leader, bought 180,000 rubber seeds from Tan Chay Hian and planted them in his Fu Shan estate that set the beginning of a large-scale rubber planting on the island.27 In addition to Tan Kah Kee, Dr Lim Boon Keng, a well-known medical practitioner and businessman, also followed Tan’s footsteps to become a rubber pioneer in Singapore. The big step taken by the Hokkiens in rubber planting led to their domination in production and marketing of rubber and its associated manufactured products, and rubber emerged as the important economic plank of the Hokkien communities in Malaya and Singapore. Moreover, the fast-growing car-making industry and the military value of rubber created a great demand in the international market for this new commodity, the result of which was the speedy rise of rubber prices and the prosperity of the Hokkien communities. Rubber and tin became the two important economic planks of Malaya in the 20th century. Apart from rubber, the early Hokkiens also made contributions to the banking and manufacturing industries. The rise of Chinese banks in the first decade of the 20th century was a symbol of economic transformation from primary production to manufacturing and service industries. The founding of Chinese banks facilitated Chinese business activities and consolidated the Chinese position in the economies of Malaya and Singapore. Although the Hokkiens were not the early founders of Chinese banks in the region, nevertheless, they realized the importance of this modern institution, and were prepared to catch up. One of the early Hokkien banks that had a profound impact on the Chinese communities was Ho Hong Bank. It was founded by Lim Peng Siang, a wealthy Hokkien businessman, together with Dr Lim Boon Keng and Seow Poh Leng, in Singapore in 1917. Lim Peng 27

See Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng) (1993). Nanqiao huiyi lu,Xia ce (Reminiscence of my Life in the Overseas Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia — Autobiography), Vol. 2, p. 489. New edition, Ba Fang wenhua qiye gongsi.

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Siang was born in the Long Xi district of Zhangzhou, Fujian province in 1872. He was an entrepreneur, manufacturer, banker, and shipowner. His business acumen, foresight, and ambition made him a business empire builder.28 Due to the economic needs of the growing Hokkien community and the need to change with times, Lim partnered with his friends to found the Ho Hong Bank that expanded rapidly, first in the Malay Peninsula, and then to other parts of Southeast Asia and China. The expansion in the peninsula was especially rapid, resulting in the establishment of a score of branches in cities and major towns such as Malacca, Penang, Batu Pahat, and Seremban. The bank also set up branches in Palembang and Batavia in Dutch East Indies and Hong Kong.29 The world depression that decimated the world economy in the late-1920s and early-1930s had profound impact on the economies of Malaya and Singapore. The severe economic situation demanded closer cooperation between the existing Hokkien banks if they were to survive the onslaught. The three major Hokkien banks — the Ho Hong Bank, the Oversea Chinese Bank, and the Chinese Merchants Bank (Hua Shang yinhang) — were amalgamated into a new and financially more solid entity, the Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation, in 1932. The new bank proved its capability not only to weather the storm of the Depression, but also to grow rapidly after the Second World War and in the later periods, and it emerged as a major banking corporation in the Republic of Singapore.30 Although the Hokkiens were not the forerunners in the banking industry in 28 For a short biography of Lim Peng Siang, see Yong Ching Fatt, (1977). Zibenjia Lin Bingxiang de xingqi (The rise of Lim Peng Siang, the capitalist). In Zhanqian Xinghua shehui jiegou yu lingdaochen chutan, pp. 104–105. Singapore: The South Seas Society; For a recent study on Lim Peng Siang and his business empire, see Yong Ching Fatt (2004). Lim Peng Siang and the building of the Ho Hong empire in colonial Singapore. In Asian Culture, No. 28, pp. 1–26. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. 29 Ibid., pp. 104–105. 30 For the analysis of the circumstances leading to the amalgamation of the three Hokkien banks into a new banking entity and its growth in post-war period, see Wilson D (1972). Solid as a Rock: The First Forty Years of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation. Singapore: OCBC Limited. For the contribution of Tan Chin Tuan’s leadership to the development of the Overseas Chinese Corporation in Singapore, see Grace Loh, Goh Chor Boon and Tan Teng Lang (2000). Building Bridges, Carving Niches: An Enduring Legacy, Chapters 6–10. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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Singapore and Malaya, they ran the most successful Chinese banks in the region which proved to be most enduring in the test of time. The early Hokkiens also played a significant role in the manufacturing sectors in Singapore and Malaya. The earliest pineapple-canning factory was founded by Tan Kee Peck (father of the famous Tan Kah Kee) in Singapore in the late 19th century for local and export markets, and he had made a handsome profit for his pioneering work. His move set the example for other Hokkien merchants to follow. As a result, there were at least 10 pineapple-canning factories in the first decade of the 20th century on the island, and the majority of them were owned by the Hokkiens. The First World War (1914–1918) that devastated many parts of Asia, dealt a heavy blow to the pineapplecanning industry as well as to the rubber export. But the war also created new opportunities for those entrepreneurs with foresight and courage. The man who took up the challenge was Tan Kah Kee who converted one of his largest rubber factories into a rubber manufacturing plant producing products such as rubber shoes, rubber hats, rubber umbrellas, tubes, tennis balls, and rubber toys.31 His plant also produced inner tubes and tyres for the growing bicycle and motor car markets in the world. In addition to rubber manufacturing, the Hokkiens were also involved in other industries such as soap-making, biscuit-making, oil-processing, soft-drink, soy sauce, and food-canning etc. The World Biscuit factory owned by Tan Kah Kee, the Zhong Hua Biscuit Factory, the Tai Hong Biscuit Factory, and the Lee Biscuit Factory (Nan Yi), had all adopted Western methods in producing hygienic and fine-quality Western-style biscuits that superseded the traditional Chinese biscuits, and they succeeded in capturing a growing market in Singapore, Malaya, and other parts of Southeast Asia.32 31 See C. F. Yong (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, p. 57. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 32 See Chui Kuei Chiang (1995). Zhanqian Xinjiapo Minren de gongshangye huodong (The industrial and commercial activities of the Hokkiens in pre-war Singapore). In Dongnanya Huaren yu Zhongguo jingji yu shehui, Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) (eds.), pp. 145–148. Xinjiapo: Xinjiapo Yazhou yanjiu xuehui; Yen Ching-hwang (1998). Huaren lishi biange, 1403–1941. In Malaixiya Huaren lishi xinbian (A New History of the Chinese in Malaysia), Lim Chooi Kwa (Lin Shuihao), Ho Khai Leong (He Qiliang), Hou Kok Chung (He Guozhong) and Lai Kuan Fook (Nai Guanfu) (eds.). Vol. 1 p. 44. Jilongpo: Malaixiya Zhonghua dahuitang zonghui chuban.

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Economic Change in Malaysia and the Hokkien Entrepreneurs Like other ethnic Chinese groups, the Hokkiens could not escape the cruel and barbaric Japanese rule of Malaya (including Singapore) that lasted for a period of 3 years and 8 months. They suffered atrocities in the hands of the Japanese, and their economies were ruined. The Hokkiens were worst treated by the Japanese and were targeted for revenge because they were suspected to be the main supporters of a movement for China’s resistance to the Japanese aggression.33 As a result, some of their leaders were executed by the Japanese or they had to flee overseas to escape the scourge. The return of the British after the Second World War stabilized the political situation in Malaya and Singapore, and they undertook political and economic reforms in the colonies. By early 1950s, the economies of Malaya and Singapore had already recovered to the pre-war level, but the end of the Korean War in 1953 devastated the international rubber market and rubber prices plummeted. The collapse of rubber prices dealt a heavy blow to the Hokkien community that had hitherto depended on rubber as its mainstay of economic activities. However, the political reform that ushered in a decade of surge of indigenous nationalism and de-colonization showed positive results. In 1955, the British Colonial government, together with the governments of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore commissioned the International Bank to investigate the economic conditions of Malaya. The main thrust of the commission’s report hinged upon the sustainability of the Malayan economy after independence. The new nation had to adopt a diversified multi faceted approach to economic development so as to cope with its population growth. In addition to tin and rubber, the two main pillars of Malayan 33

For Tan Kah Kee’s role in the combined efforts of the Southeast Asian Chinese in fund-raising movement for the support of China’s resistance to Japanese aggression (1937–1941), see Tan Kah Kee (1993). Nanqiao huiyi lu (Reminiscence of My Life in the Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia), Vol. 1, pp. 63–87. River Edge, NJ: New Edition, Global Publishing Co. Inc; C. F. Yong (1987). Tan Kah-Kee: An Overseas Chinese Legend, pp. 213–216. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Stephen Mun Yoon Leong (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD dissertation, pp. 272–296, University of California, Los Angeles.

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exports, other agricultural products had to be promoted for export. But the gist of the report was industrialization would promise a bright future for Malaya. An “Import Substitution Industrialization” (ISI) was recommended. Under this formula, the new nation had to encourage local investment in manufacturing industry by setting up tariff protection, and to encourage foreign investment by lowering income tax and other tax concessions.34 The recommendations were seriously taken up by the Alliance government which came to power in 1955. It set up “Industrial Development Committee” and “Tariff Consultative Committee” to implement the ISI strategy.35 In the period between August 1957 and 1971, when the New Economic Policy was introduced, the Chinese in Malaysia achieved remarkable economic growth as a result of the excellent opportunities provided by the implementation of ISI. Many of them took up the offer of the government by investing in new manufacturing sector, and those with foresight and courage successfully transformed their traditional family business into modern multinational corporations. The Hokkien entrepreneurs played a leading role in this transformation process, and their business conglomerates occupied prominent positions and were recognized as leaders of the Malaysian entrepreneurs. In 1995, an article on the study of Chinese business conglomerates in Malaysia listed 17 major Chinese enterprises, 12 of which belonged to Hokkien Chinese. On top of the list were Rubert Kuok’s Kuok Brothers group, Lim Goh Tong’s Genting group, and Quek Leng Chan’s Hong Leong (Malaysia) Berhad, Loh Boon Siew’s Oriental group, Lim Ah Tam and his son Lim Thian Kiat’ s Kamunting and MPHB group, and the Low Yaw Chuan’s Low Yat group.36 34

See The Economic Development of Malaya: Report of a Mission Organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the Request of the Governments of the Federation of Malaya, the Crown Colony of Singapore and the United Kingdom, Singapore: Government Printer, September 1955, pp. 18–28. 35 See Jomo KS (1988). A Question of Class: Capital, the State and Uneven Development in Malaya, p. 221. New York: Monthly Review Press and Philippines: Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers. 36 See Lin Wuguang (1995). Malaixiya de huaren jituan (Chinese business conglomerates in Malaysia). In Dongnanya Huaren jituan yanjiu (A Study on the Chinese Business Conglomerates in Southeast Asia), Wang Muheng (ed.), pp. 100–102. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press.

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In 1999, Dr Edmund Terence Gomez, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Malaya, published his book on the Chinese business in Malaysia; he listed 10 leading Chinese entrepreneurs, and 8 of them were identified as Hokkiens. They were Robert Kuok, Lim Goh Tong, Quek Leng Chan, Loh Boon Siew, Khoo Key Peng, Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, Francis Yeoh Sock Ping, and Ting Pek Khiing.37 Robert Kuok was born in Johore Bahru; his father and uncles migrated from Fuzhou, north of the Fujian province, and Robert belongs to the second generation of Chinese immigrant. His personal and family fortune was estimated in 1994–1995 to be US$5 billion. Lim Goh Tong was born in 1918 in An Xi district of Fujian province; he belongs to the first generation of Chinese immigrant. In 1994–1995, his fortune was estimated to be US$3.7 billion. Quek Leng Chan was born in Singapore, while his father and uncles were immigrants from Tong An district of Fujian; he belongs to the second generation of Chinese immigrant, and his personal and family wealth was estimated in 1994–1995 to be US$2 to 2.4 billion. Loh Boon Siew was born in Hui An district of Fujian in 1916, and he belongs to the first generation of Chinese immigrant. His wealth in 1994–1995 was estimated to be US1.8 billion. Lim Ah Tam was born in An Xi district of Fujian in 1928 belonging to the first generation immigrants, while his son Lim Thian Kiat was born in Johore in 1959 and belongs to the second generation immigrants. In 1994–1995, Lim family’s wealth was estimated to be US$1.8 billion. Low Yaw Chuan was born in Kuala Lumpur in 1932, while his father Low Yat was born in Nan An of Fujian province. He belongs to the second generation Chinese immigrants, and his family fortune was estimated to be US$1.2 billion. Khoo Kay Peng was born in Batu Pahat, Johore in 1938; he belongs to the second generation Chinese immigrants, and his fortune was estimated to be US$1 billion. Vincent Tan Chee Yioun was born in Batu Pahat in 1952, while his father was born in Eng Choon district of Fujian, and he belongs to the second generation Chinese immigrants. 37

In addition to these eight Hokkien entrepreneurs, the other two entrepreneurs were William Cheng, a Teochew entrepreneur, and Lee Loy Seng, a Hakka entrepreneur. See Gomez ET (1999). Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accomodation, pp. 40–178. The Qudrant, Richmond: Curzon Press.

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Ting Pek Khiing was born in Sarawak in 1945, while his father was born in Fu Qing district of Fujian province. He was the chairman of the Ekran group, and belongs to the second generation immigrants. In 1996, his wealth was estimated at US$1 billion. Three models of Hokkien entrepreneurs can be identified from the above profiles. The first model relates to a common model found among Chinese or other immigrants, that is, “from rags to riches”. The first Chinese immigrants arrived in Malaysia with nothing; but through their hardwork, thrift, business acumen, and luck, they built a business empire and passed it to their children. Lim Goh Tong and Loh Boon Siew are the examples of this model. The second model relates to how the second generation immigrants expanded their business on the basis of wealth created by their fathers and uncles, and succeeded in building their multinational business empires. Robert Kuok, Quek Leng Chan, Lim Thian Kiat, and Francis Yeoh are the representatives. The third model is a model that a business conglomerate is purely created by the second generation Chinese immigrants with their business acumen, foresight, and luck. Khoo Kay Peng, Vincent Tan, and Ting Pek Khiing belong to this type. Lim Goh Tong is perhaps the best example of the first model of Hokkien entrepreneurs. He was born in 1918 to a poor family in An Xi district of Fujian province, China. Family poverty did not allow him to receive good education, and he had only 5 years of schooling in his home village. In 1937, he left China, at the age of 19, for Kuala Lumpur where his uncle worked. He had been a carpenter, chef, and a construction worker. During the Japanese occupation of Malaya, he changed his job to become a hawker and worked hard to save money to start his small business that involved collecting scrap-metals and selling hardware. The reconstruction of Malaya after the Second World War provided excellent opportunity for Lim to get into the building business as a contractor. With his experience in construction and in the trading of building materials, he established Kien Huat Construction Sdn. Bhd in 1950 when the building industry was booming. The 1950s was a decade when Malaya was forging ahead toward independence, and the government was prepared to pump huge capital into infrastructure. Lim Goh Tong seized the opportunity to

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expand his business, and successfully secured several major projects, including roads, bridges. sewerage, dams, and irrigation schemes. He made huge profit out of these projects, and his construction firm became a leading company in Malaysia. His success in construction laid a solid foundation for the rapid expansion of his business. He thus step-by-step realized his dream of building a vast business empire based in Malaysia. He recruited talents and strengthened his management team, and adopted diversification strategy for fast expansion. He branched out into mining and plantation, and was a pioneer in the gambling and leisure industry, hotel and tourism. With his political connections, he succeeded in getting the first gambling licence and the special right to develop Genting highland as the tourist resort. In 1971, the Genting resort, consisting of a casino, international hotels, restaurants, and other attractions was officiated. It became a famous tourist resort in Southeast Asia and the flagship of Lim Goh Tong’s business empire. In addition, Lim’s business activities also covered plantation, construction, real estate, manufacturing, trade, insurance, and finance. In terms of geographical scope, his business extended far beyond Malaysia into other parts of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, Australia, the United States, and Europe, and successfully built multinational corporations across several continents. With his sustained business activities in Malaysia, he has made a notable contribution to the Malaysian economy, especially in the promotion of leisure and service industry and tourism.38 The rise of Rubert Kuok as a leading Malaysian entrepreneur in the 1960s exemplified the second model of Hokkien Chinese entrepreneurs. His meteoric rise to prominence was to a certain extent based on the success in business of his father and uncles who migrated from Fuzhou, Fujian. Like many other Chinese immigrants, they earned their livelihood as apprentices in Johore Bahru, and began to accumulate savings through hardwork and thrift that prepared them 38 See Lin Wuguang (2000). Lin Wutong jiazu (The family of Lim Goh Tong), and Yunding jituan (The Genting group). In Huaqiao Huaren baike quanshu, jingji juan (The Encyclopedia of the Overseas and Ethnic Chinese, the Book on Their Economies), Zhou Nanjing (ed.), pp. 276–271, 561–562. Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi; Lin Wuguang (1995), op.cit., pp. 100–102 Gomez ET, op.cit., pp. 49–58.

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to plunge into business. They founded a grocery shop named Dong Sheng, dealing in rice, soy beans and sugar, and the daily needs of the average Chinese. The success of Dong Sheng laid the foundation for Kuok family’s business. Rubert Kuok was born in Johore Bahru, and received good English education that opened up a complete new world that his father and uncles had never experienced. With his ambition and business acumen, he pursued his further studies in England where he observed the operation of large Western business enterprises. In 1955, Kuok returned to Malaya and transformed his family business into a modern enterprise as the country was on its road to independence, and that provided ample opportunity for business expansion. He succeeded in controlling the production and distribution of sugar in Malaya and some other Southeast Asian countries that earned him a nickname of “Sugar King of Asia”. From 1962 to 1968, he branched out into manufacturing, banking, and sea transport. In the 1970s, he used Malaysia as his base and rapidly expanded his business overseas, and adopted the diversification strategy to achieve his aim of establishing a multinational business empire. His diversification was centered on hotel and tourism, international trade and transport, real estate and media. The geographical boundary of his empire extended from the neighboring states of Singapore to Thailand, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, and Taiwan. By the 1990s, the Kuok brothers group had become an international reputable conglomerate with over 200 subsidiary companies, and his business covered sugar planting and production, hotel and tourism, import and export, food industry, petrochemical industry, mining, aviation, media and film industry, insurance and finance. Although many of Kuok’s enterprises operated outside of Malaysia, he had contributed significantly to the promotion of tourism, sugar planting, and production and manufacturing industry of Malaysia.39 39

See Gomez ET (1999), Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accomodation, pp. 40–49; Zhou Shaolong (1996). Guo Henian Zhuan (A Biography of Robert Kuok Hock Nian), pp. 22–32, 67–71. Hong Kong: Ming Chuang chubanshe youxian gongsi; Lin Wuguang (1995), op.cit., pp. 111–113; Liang Yingming, Guo Henian jiazu (The family of Rubert Kuok Hock Nian). In Huaqiao Huaren baike quanshu, jingji juan (The Encyclopedia of the Overseas and Ethnic Chinese, the Book on Their Economies), Zhou Nanjing (ed.), p. 152.

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Vincent Tan Chee Yioun’s success story is taken as representative of the third model of Hokkien entrepreneurs. He was born in Batu Pahat in the state of Johore in 1952. His father was a first generation immigrant, born in Eng Choon district, Fujian province, China. Through hard work and struggle, his father managed to become a small businessman who failed to provide for his son a tertiary education. Belonging to the baby boomer generation after the Second World War and having received local English education, Vincent’s perception in life and his world were vastly different from that of his father. He was ambitious and dared to take risk. After having completed his high school education, Vincent worked as a clerk in a local bank, and also worked as a part-time insurance agent for an American company. He accumulated some savings to start a small firm involved in local trade and transport as well as an insurance agency. It was not until 1982 when Vincent reached the age of 30 that he had a breakthrough in his business venture. A rare opportunity arose when McDonald called for tenders for a Malaysian franchisee to undertake this new business in the region. With his political contacts and skill, Vincent beat the other powerful opponents and obtained the franchise that marked his rise in Chinese business circles in Malaysia. In 1983, Vincent’s star shone again. Berjaya Kawat Berhad, a Malayowned listed electrical wires company went bankrupt. Vincent, together with his friends, took over it, and changed its name to Berjaya Corporation that eventually emerged as the flagship of his business empire. Malaysia in 1985 was hit by a recession that lasted for several years. Against the normal business practice of contraction, Vincent took a bold step of expansion by taking over several listed companies. Perhaps, Vincent’s most important acquisition was his purchase of 70% of the government’s gaming entity — Sports Toto Berhad in 1985. This lottery company, incorporated by the government in 1969 to generate funds for the sports budget, became his cash cow that helped solve cash flow problems of his Berjaya group. After more than a decade’s operation, the Berjaya group emerged as a powerful Malaysian conglomerate with 200 subsidiary companies, and its scope covered hotel and leisure business, fast food chains, real estate and housing development, insurance and finance, manufacturing

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industry, trade, gaming, and media.40 Vincent Tan’s business activities were confined mainly to Malaysia, and he had contributed significantly to the revival of Malaysian economy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The Contributions of Hokkiens to the Education of Malaysia and Singapore In 1993, the Federation of the Hokkien Associations in Malaysia published a book entitled Malaixiya Fujianren xingxue banjiao shiliaoji (Collections of Historical Materials of the Founding of Chinese Schools by the Hokkiens in Malaysia). It was the first time that a book of such nature had been published to cover the educational activity of the Hokkiens in Malaysia. The book is a pioneering work that had preserved a great deal of materials for further research in this field, and it is a worthy reference.41 I was honored to be invited by the Federation to write an introduction for the book entitled Zhanqian Xin Ma Minren jiaoyu shishi (The Hokkien Education in Malaysia before the Second World War). It traced the history of Hokkien involvement in the Chinese education in Malaya and Singapore, and provided an appraisal of their contributions.42 I have no intention to duplicate all of my arguments contained in the article, and what is worthy to note here are the three major points relating to the Hokkiens’ contributions to the Chinese education in Malaya and 40

See Gomez ET (1999), Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accomodation, pp. 112–127; Liang Yingming, Chen Zhiyan jiazu (The family of Vincent Tan Chee Yioun), and Liang Yingming, Cheng Gong jituan (The Berjaya group of companies), both articles are published in Huaqiao Huaren baike quanshu, jingji juan (The Encyclopedia of the Overseas and Ethnic Chinese, the Book on Their Economies), Zhou Nanjing (ed.), pp. 66–68. 41 See Zeng Rongsheng (ed.), (1993). Malaixiya Fujianren xingxue banjiao shiliaoji. Kuala Lumpur: Federation of the Hokkien Associations of Malaysia. 42 Ibid., pp. 2–27; See also Yen Ching-hwang (1992). Haiwai Huarenshi yanjiu (Studies of the Ethnic Chinese History), pp. 283–342. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. A slightly different English version of this article entitled “Hokkien immigrant society and modern Chinese education in British Malaya” was published in Charney MW, Yeoh Brenda SA and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.) (2003). Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, pp. 114–144. Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific.

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Singapore. Firstly, the Hokkiens were the harbingers in the founding of bang (dialect group) schools which were solely supported by a dialect group, and it had set an example for the other bangs to follow. In 1849, the Hokkien Association of Singapore, under the leadership of Tan Kim Seng (Chen Jinsheng or known as Chen Juchuang), founded the first bang school named Chong Wen Ge. Tan was born in Malacca, but his ancestors migrated from the Eng Choon district of Fujian province. He was a wealthy merchant in both Singapore and Malacca, and was the acknowledged Hokkien community leader on the island. His understanding of the importance of education to the community led him to take the first step to establish the Chong Wen Ge Chinese school, a free educational institution for Hokkien children at that time.43 In a period of 90 years, the Hokkiens in Singapore and Malaya were active in founding schools to educate their young. This included the Chong Wen Ge school (1849), the Cui Ying school (1854),44 and the Dao Nan modern primary school (1907)45 in Singapore, and the Chong Hwa Girls school, the Guo Min school and the Chong Hwa school in Kuala Lumpur in the 1930s.46 In addition, 43

See, Chen Ching-ho and Tan Yeok Seong (eds.) (1970). Xingjian Chong Wen Ge beiji (Stone Tablet in Memory of the Founding of the Chong Wen Ge), in Xinjiapo huawen beiming jilu (A Collection of Chinese Inscriptions in Singapore), pp. 283–285. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press; Kwa Bak Lim (Ke Muling) (1975), Chong Wen Ge yu Cui Ying shuyuan (The Chong Wen Ge and Cui Ying schools). In Shi Le Guji (The Historical Relics in Singapore), Lim Haw Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) et al. (eds.), pp. 217–220, Singapore: The South Seas Society. 44 The Cui Ying school was also founded by Tan Kim Seng, the leader of the Hokkien bang in Singapore. He received financial support from 12 wealthy Hokkien merchants on the island. See Cui Ying shuyuan beiwen (Inscription of the stone tablet dedicated to the founding of the Cui Ying School). In Xinjiapo huawen beiming jilu (A Collection of Chinese Inscriptions in Singapore), Chen Ching-ho and Tan Yeok Seong (eds.), pp. 291–292; Song Ong Siang (1967). One Hundred Years History of the Chinese in Singapore, p. 46. Singapore: University of Malaya Press. Reprint. 45 Dao Nan School was a modern primary school founded by the Hokkien bang in Singapore. It was initiated by Goh Siew Tin (Wu Shouzhen), Teo Sian Keng (Zhang Shanqing) and Lee Cheng Yan (Li Qingyan) who were leaders of the Hokkien bang at the time. See Lat Pau (The Singapore Daily), 16 and 23 April 1907 and 2 May 1907; Lin Yun et al. (eds.), (1966). Dao Nan xiaoshi (A history of the Dao Nan School). Dao Nan xuexiao chuangxiao liushi zhounian jinian tekan (The 60th Anniversary of the Dao Nan School, Singapore), p. 25. Singapore: Dao Nan School. 46 See, Jilongpo Xuelane Fujian huiguan yishi jilu (Minutes of the Meetings of the Hokkien Association of Selangor in Kuala Lumpur) (photocopy of the original minutes kept by Yen Ching-hwang), p. 149.

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the Hokkiens in Selangor also founded the famous Chong Hwa High school in Kuala Lumpur in 1939.47 Bang schools may not be held up as the most modern and advanced educational institution nowadays, but it was a progressive model at that time. It was superior to the privately funded traditional Chinese schools — si shu or clan school, both of which were smaller in size, and short of financial resources. With bang’s financial backup, the bang school could employ more teachers, provide better facilities, and subsidize poor students, the result of which was the improvement of the academic standard of Chinese education. The Hokkien bang-backed schools set a good example for other bangs to follow. In Singapore, the founding of the Ying Xin school (1905) by the Jia Ying Hakkas, the founding of the Yang Zheng school (1906) by the Cantonese bang, the founding of the Duan Meng school (1907) by the Teochew bang, and the founding of the Shun Ren high school by the Hakkas in Kuala Lumpur were invariably influenced by the concept of bang school initiated by the Hokkiens.48 The second major contribution that the Hokkiens made to Chinese education in Malaysia and Singapore rested with the adoption of Mandarin teaching in schools and removal of bang’s barrier in the enrolment of students. Before the founding of the Chinese Republic in early 1912, the Chinese communities were divided by bangs with their rigid social and educational barriers. The founding of modern Chinese schools in Singapore and Malaya at the end of the Qing dynasty strictly followed the bang line with the clear intention of

47

The Chong Hwa High School in Kuala Lumpur was founded by a group of wealthy Hokkien merchants including Ng Tiong Kiet (Huang Zhongji) and others. See Zhongxuebu kaikuang: yange shilue (The high school section: a historical outline). In Yijiu shiliu nian Xuelane Zhong Hua zhongxue fuxiao tekan (A Souvenir Magazine for the celebration of Resumption of the Chong Hwa High school in Selangor in the year of 1946), a reproduced page printed in Ge Zhuzhen (Kuek Choo Teng) et al (eds.), (1986). Xuelane Fujian huiguan bainian jinian tekan, 1885–1985 (Souvenir Magazine of Centenary Celebration of the Selangor Hokkian Association, 1885–1985), p. 72. Kuala Lumpur: Selangor Hokkien Association. 48 For the founding of modern Chinese primary schools in Singapore, see Yen Ching-hwang, Zhanqian Xin Ma Minren jiaoyu. In Haiwai Huarenshi yanjiu (Studies in Ethnic Chinese History), pp. 285–289; Yen Ching-hwang (2003). op.cit., pp. 116–117.

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enrolling bang’s own children.49 However, the activities of the refomists led by Kang Youwei and the revolutionaries led by Dr Sun Yat-sen spread the seeds of unity and cooperation that led to the weakening of bang consciousness.50 The founding of the Chinese Republic strengthened its political and educational relations with its overseas subjects, and heightened overseas Chinese nationalism and their consciousness of belonging to a newly emerged nation. To follow the new political tide, the Chinese schools in Singapore and Malaya began to remove the bang’s barriers and slowly adopted Mandarin as the medium of instruction. The Hokkien bang in Singapore under the leadership of Tan Kah Kee, took the lead in adopting Mandarin, and its Dao Nan school in 1916 began to use this new teaching medium.51 At the same time, Dao Nan also pioneered in appointing a nonHokkien principal and teachers that broke the tradition of bang-based recruitment of teaching staff.52 This breakthrough resulted in not only the weakening of the bang consciousness, but also the establishment of a new modern principle of meritocracy in education. The third major contribution of the Hokkiens to the Chinese education was in the area of a unified examination of Chinese schools in Singapore and Malaya. For the purpose of vetting the educational standard of Hokkien schools in Singapore, Lim Keng Nian (Lin Qingnian) — the head of the educational section of the Singapore 49

See for instance, when the Ying Xin Primary School was established by the Jia Ying Hakkas in Singapore, its rules had clearly stated that the school was only for the Hakka children in Singapore. See Xia Bing Yan (compiled), (1907). Xinjiapo Ying Xin xuetang zhuo gai jianming zhangcheng (The Modified Rules of the Ying Xin Primary School of Singapore), chapter 1, rule 2. Singapore. 50 For the impact of the reformists and revolutionaries on the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, pp. 287–290. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 51 See Wang Zengbing and Yu Gang (1981). Chen Jiageng xingxueji (Records of Tan Kah Kee’s Educational Efforts), p. 62. Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe. 52 In 1916, Dao Nan appointed Xiong Shangfu as the principal of the school. Xiong was a Hunanese from Hunan province, and this broke the tradition of appointing Hokkiens to such important position in the school. In 1921, Dao Nan also recruited several non-Hokkien teachers who came from Hebei, Jiangsu, Hunan, Hubei, and Guangdong provinces. See Lin Yun et al (eds.), op.cit., pp. 46–48.

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Hokkien Association — proposed to introduce a unified examination for all the Chinese schools on the island. The examination was scheduled to take place in December 1930, and it was mainly participated by the 12 Chinese schools controlled by the Hokkien bang.53 The Hokkien Association continued to sponsor three consecutive unified examinations of Chinese schools in Singapore, and the results were excellent. This new initiative was commended by the Colonial government in Singapore that encouraged government-aided schools to participate. The system was later adopted by the Chinese schools in the Federation of Malaya. A unified examination was thus established in Singapore and Federation of Malaya, which was popularly known as the Qi Zhoufu huaxiao huikao The Unified Examination of Chinese Schools in the Seven States). It was cosponsored by the governments of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya together with the Chinese Consul-General. The introduction of this system helped lift the academic standard of the Chinese schools, and made significant contribution to the development of Chinese education in Malaysia and Singapore. The story of Hokkien contribution to the Chinese education in Malaysia and Singapore would not have been complete if Hokkien leaders’ involvement in the field has not been discussed. These outstanding leaders included Tan Kah Kee, Tan Lark Sye, Lee Kong Chian of Singapore, and Lim Lian Geok, Sim Bok Woo, Hu Wanduo, Li Seng Fong (Li Chengfong), Lim Geok Jing (Lin Yujing), and Soh Bok Woo of Malaysia. Tan Kah Kee was a Hokkien leader with world fame, being a modern education promoter. He was also known as an entrepreneur, a philanthropist, and a Chinese patriot.54 His founding 53

See Xu Suwu (1949). Xinjiapo huaxiao jiaoyu quanmao (The Bird’s-eye view of the Chinese Education in Singapore), pp. 65–66. Singapore: Lian Shu yinwu youxian gongsi. 54 For the best work on the study of Tan Kah Kee, see Yong Ching Fatt (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, Singapore: Oxford University Press; For works on Tan Kah Kee as entrepreneur, see Yen Ching-hwang (1998). Tan Kah Kee and the Overseas Chinese entrepreneurship. Asian Culture, No. 22, pp. 1–13; the same article is also published in Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) (ed.), (1995). Chen Jiageng de jingying linian yu qiye guanli (The entrepreneurial ideas and management of Tan Kah Kee). In Xinjiapo huashe yu huashang (The Chinese Society and the Chinese Merchants in Singapore), pp. 148–182. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies.

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of the Jimei educational complex and the Xiamen University was known throughout the Chinese communities in the world, and his deeds inspired some of them to do the same.55 However, Tan’s efforts in promoting Chinese education in Singapore and Malaya, though less known, is worth mentioning. Since 1911, he had been striving to promote modern Chinese education in Singapore. He had been the chairman of the Dao Nan school for many years, and led the school to carry out reforms. He also donated a large sum of money to aid other Hokkien primary schools. His most memorable deed was the founding of the Overseas Chinese High School in 1918, the first Chinese high school in Singapore and Malaya. With the support of the leaders of other bangs in Singapore, he succeeded in founding a nondiscriminatory high school based on the support of the entire Chinese community that set the model for other Chinese high schools to follow.56 In addition, Tan Kah Kee was credited for having founded the Singapore Marine and Navigation College in 1939 and the Nanyang Teachers’ Training College in 1941.57 Tan Kah Kee’s educational deed in Singapore could hardly be matched by others except Tan Lark Sye who was credited for his founding of the Nanyang University in Singapore in 1953. Lark Sye, a fellow countyman from Tong An, had worked for Tan Kah Kee for some years, and championed the founding of Nanyang University.58 55

It has been claimed that Tan Kah Kee’s deeds inspired Li Ka Shing to found the Swatow (Shantou) University in Chaozhou, Guangdong province, and Sir Yeok Kong Pau of Hong Kong to found the Ningpo University in Chekiang province. 56 For Tan Kah Kee’s ardent and emotional speech for support for the founding of the Overseas Chinese High School, see Guo Min Ri Bao (The Citizen Daily), 18 June 1918 and 20 June 1918. This speech is reproduced in Yong Ching Fatt (1980). Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi (Tan Kah Kee in Pre-war Singapore: Selected Documents and Analysis), pp. 25–28. Singapore: South Seas Society. 57 For the founding of the Singapore Marine and Navigation College, see Yeap Chong Leng (Ye Zhongling), Chen Jiageng ban Nanyang huaqiao shuichan hanghai xuexiao shimo (The Commencement and Ending of the Singapore Marine and Navigation College). Asian Culture, No. 14, A Special Issue on Ethnic Chinese Studies (edited by Yen Ching-hwang), pp. 150–160; Yen Ching-hwang (2003), op.cit., p. 139. 58 For short biographies of Tan Lark Sye, see various articles published in Wang Ruming (ed.) (1997). Chen Liushi bainian dan jinian wenji (A Collection of Papers dedicated to the Centenary Celebration of Birth of Tan Lark Sye), Singapore: Ba Fang wenhua qiye gongsi.

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Inspired by Tan Kah Kee’s educational works in Fujian, Tan Lark Sye saw the founding of a Chinese university on the island as the solution to the problems of the Chinese education and to meet an urgent need of the local Chinese students for a tertiary education. Lark Sye donated S$5 million to set the example, and the Hokkien Association of which he was the president donated 500 acres of land in Jurong as the campus of the new university. With its vicissitudes, the university expanded to become the top Chinese university in Southeast Asia, and had produced more than 8000 graduates at the time of its closure in 1980. Nanyang graduates have served in various sectors in Singapore and Malaysia, especially in Chinese education; some of its graduates also made their academic reputations in foreign universities in Hong Kong, Canada, the United States, and Australia. In this context, Tan Lark Sye had contributed significantly to the Chinese education and he will be remembered as the modern Chinese education promoter in the region.59 Apart from Tan Kah Kee and Tan Lark Sye, Lee Kong Chian — nicknamed “rubber king” — also made generous donations to the Chinese schools, University of Malaya, and Nanyang University. At the same time, he established the Lee Foundation that generously provides financial assistance to Chinese cultural and educational institutions, and it has made notable contribution to the promotion of Chinese culture and education in Singapore and Malaysia. On the other hand, the Hokkien leaders in Malaysia also made substantial contribution to the Chinese education, especially to the defence and revival of Chinese education in the 1960s and 1970s. Lim Lian Yeok (Lin Lianyu) and Sim Bok Woo (Shen Muyu), the two leading defenders of the Chinese education came out to fight for the

59

For important documents of the study of Nanyang University, see Nanyang daxue chuangxiao shi (A History of the Founding of Nanyang University) (1956). Singapore: Xinjiapo Nanyang wenhua chubanshe; Lee Yap Lim (Li Yelin) (ed.), (2004). Nanyang daxue shi lunji (A Collection of Documents on the History of Nanyang University). Kuala Lumpur: Malaiya Nanyang daxue xiaoyou hui; For a research into Tan Lark Sye and his efforts in founding and managing of Nanyang University, see Li Liangshi, (2004). Chen Liushi yu Nanyang daxue: Bilu lanrou de banxue zhilu. Tan Lark Sye and Nanyang University, The Vicissitude of Running an University PhD thesis, Singapore, Centre for Chinese Language and Culture, Nanyang Technological University.

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teaching of Chinese language in Malaysia regardless of the personal interests and safety. They fought relentlessly for the survival of Chinese education and culture in this newly independent Malaya (Malaysia).60 Hu Wanduo, inspired by Lim’s and Sim’s deeds, led a Chinese independent school revival movement that started in Perak and spread to other parts of Malaysia.61 The revival of the Chinese education retained high standard of Chinese in Malaysia when the country was forging close economic and political ties with China — an emerging superpower in Asia, and needs more Chinese expertise. In addition to Lim, Sim, and Hu, Li Cheng Feng donated large sums of money in support of the Chong Hwa High School in Kuala Lumpur that has become a reputable Chinese high school in the region. Lim Geok Jing who came from Klang, Selangor, dedicated himself to the maintenance of the two Chinese independent schools — Xing Hua High School and Chong Hwa High School — in Klang.

60

For the study of Lim Lian Geok and his championing for the Chinese education in Malaysia, see Hou Kok Chung (He Guozhong) (ed.), (2002). Lin Lianyu: wei zuqun zhaofen de gushi (Lim Lian Geok: a story of his defence of the interest of the Chinese community). In Malaixiya Huaren: Shenfeng rentong, wenhua yu zuqun zhengzhi (The Chinese in Malaysia: Identity, Culture and Community Politics), Chapter 3, pp. 49–87. Kuala Lumpur: Centre for Malaysian Chinese Studies; Ho Khai Leong (He Qiliang). Bainian Lianyu: lun Malaixiya huaren zhengzhi shang de Lin Liangyu (Centenary Lian Yu: On the role of Lim Lian Geok in the Chinese political history in Malaysia). In Lim Lian Geok Foundation (sponsored). Jiaoyu Qimeng, Chuangxin: Lin Lianyu baisui mingdan xueshu yantaohui” (Education, Enlightenment, and New Creation: A Symposium for the celebration of Centenary birth of Lim Lian Geok), private printed copy, pp. 8–15; Yen Ching-hwang (2004). Lim Lian Geok and his struggle for the Chinese education in Malaysia, 1949–1961. An unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on National Boundaries and Cultural Configuration, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. For original research materials on Lim Lian Geok, see Lim Lian Geok (1986). Huawen jiaoyu de huyulu (A Collection of Appeals to the Defence of Chinese Education), Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation; Lim Lian Geok (1986, 1988). Feng Yu shiba nian (The 18 Years’ Storm of My Life), Vols. 1 and 2. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation; Tay Lian Soo (Zheng Liangshu) (2003) (compiled). Lin Lianyu xiansheng yanlun ji (A Collection of Speeches and Articles by Lim Lian Geok). Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 61 For the Chinese independent schools revival movement and Hu Wanduo’s contribution, see Huawen duli zhongxue fazhan gongzuo weiyuanhui (ed.) (1976). Bili zhou Huawen duzhong fuxing shi (A History of Revival of the Chinese Independent High Schools in the State of Perak). Ipoh: Bili huaxiao dongshihui lianhehui.

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Soh Bok Woo (Su Muyou) of Johore consistently and tirelessly supported the Chinese High School (Hua Ren Zhong Xue) of Batu Pahat.62 There were also other Hokkien leaders who had made contributions to the maintenance of Chinese independent high schools and the revival of Chinese education in Malaysia.63

62

See Li Cheng Feng: zhenxing Jilongpo Zhonghua zhongxue (Li Cheng Feng: The man who revitalised the Chong Hwa High School of Kuala Lumpur); Lin Yujing: Jiantiao er duzhong, yanhu zhaosheng choukuan (Lim Geok Jing: The man who shouldered two Chinese independent high schools and raised funds house by house); and Su Muyou: jianshou Bazhu Huaren zhongxue (Soh Bok Woo: The man who persisted to support the Chinese High School of Batu Pahat). In Malaixiya Fujianren xingxue banjiao shiliao ji (A Collection of Historical Materials of Hokkien Chinese Involvements in the Founding of Chinese Schools and Maintenance of Chinese Education), Zeng Rongsheng (ed.), pp. 80–89, 205–207. 63 Ibid.

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Chapter 4

Kinship and Organization: The History of the Gan (Yan or Yen) Clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia (1850–1993)*

Migration and Settlement of the Early Gan Clansmen (before 1912) The majority of the Gan (Yan or Yen) clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia came from a few districts in the Southern part of Fujian province such as Zhang Zhou, Jin Jiang, Yong Chun, Tong An, and Nan An; while few of them are from Northern Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan provinces. Shortage of reliable historical records prevents us from identifying the earliest Gan clansmen in the region. However, what is certain is that the early migration of Gan clansmen was closely related to the Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia in general. The opening of China after 1842 following the defeat of China in the infamous Opium War coincided with the scourge of natural calamities in South China. The result of which was the creation in vast rural areas of roaming unemployed peasants who were prepared to emigrate overseas to earn a livelihood. Before the lifting of the ban on emigration in 1893, there witnessed an exodus of Chinese coolie laborers from South China following the opening of the Treaty Ports in the 1840s.1 * This chapter is based on a paper published in Asian Culture, No. 29 (Singapore, Singapore Society of Asian Studies, June 2005). 1 For the study of the shipment of large numbers of Chinese coolies overseas, see Yen Chinghwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911. Singapore: Singapore University Press; Irick RI (1982). Ching Policy Toward the Coolie Trade. San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center; Wang Sing-Wu (1978). The Organization of Chinese Emigration, 1848–1888: With Special Reference to Australia. San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center; Zhuang Guotu (1989). Zhongguo fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao zhengce

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Some of these coolie emigrants were shipped to Southeast Asia. The lifting of the traditional restrictive policy on free movement of Chinese emigrants in 1893 marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of China’s relations with its overseas subjects,2 and the result of the lift was the outflow of a large number of Chinese emigrants to Southeast Asia after this period. At about this time, Western control of Southeast Asia led by the British and the Dutch who had undertaken large-scale development of cash crop and tin-mining industries deepened.3 The creation of new economic opportunities attracted the Chinese emigrants to the region that included the early Gan clansmen. Like many other Chinese emigrants, the Gan clansmen were forced partly by the shortage of land for cultivation to search economic opportunities overseas. They spread widely in British Malaya, Burma, Thailand, French Indochina, the Philippines, and Dutch East Indies. Due to the dearth of reliable records, we are unable to estimate how many Gan clansmen resided in Singapore and Malaya at that time, except that Gan clansmen were relatively small in numbers because Gan was a small surname group in China. The majority of them appeared to have engaged in commerce, and some had become prosperous businessmen. This included Gan Lin (Yan Lin) and Gan Eng Seng (Yan Yongcheng or known as Yan Xikun) in Singapore and Gan (The Overseas Chinese Policies of the Feudal Governments of China). Xiamen: Xiamen University Press. For important sources on Chinese coolies, see Chen Hansheng (ed.) (1984–1985). Huagong chuguo shiliao huibian (The Collections of the Historial Materials on Coolie Emigrant Labourers), Vols. 1–10 Beijing: Zhonghua shuju; Chinese Emigration: The Cuba Commission Report. Shanghai: The Imperial Maritime Customs Press, 1876; reprint, Taipei, Ch’eng Wen Publishing Company, 1970. 2 For the analysis of change of this imperial policy, see Chapter 6 of Yen Ching-hwang Coolies and Mandarins. For the implications of introduction of this new policy for the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Ch’ing protection of the returned overseas Chinese after 1893, with special reference to the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In Review of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 15, pp. 29–42. Singapore: South Seas Society. This article was also reprinted in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History. Singapore: Times Academic Press, pp. 31–46. 3 Cash crops developed during this time included sugarcane, pepper, and gambier, sago and rubber. For the study of cash crop industry and tin mining in British Malaya, see Jackson J-C (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press; Wong Lin Ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

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Kim Swee (Yan Jinsui) and Gan Ngoh Bee (Yan Wumei) in Penang. These successful Gan businessmen were actively involved in domestic and trans-regional trade, in opium and spirit farming, and in real estate and tin mining, etc. Influenced by the Chinese tradition, they were involved in philanthropy by giving generously to temples and hospitals,4 to schools and cemeteries. Their philanthropic works were much appreciated by the local colonial authorities and the government of China.5 The best known Gan clansmen in Singapore in the second half of the 19th century was Gan Eng Seng who was born in a poor family in Malacca in 1844. His struggle for education led him to learn English by self-education. He left Malacca for Singapore in quest of opportunities at the age of 17. He first became a store keeper apprentice with the Guthrie & Company. His diligence and hardwork attracted the attention of Mr. Scott, the manager, who gave him encouragement and opportunity. As a result, Gan Eng Seng was promoted to

4

In 1864, the Chinese in Penang raised money for the construction of Feng Shan temple ( ) for the worship of deity Guangze zunwang ( ), there were 4 Gan clansmen among the donors. They were Gan Kim Swee (Yan Jinsui, ), Gan Gam (Yan Jian, ), Gan Gong Suan (Yan Guang Suan, ) and Gan Song (Yan Shuang, ). In 1882, the Chinese in Penang raised funds to rebuild the Shui Mei temple ( ), Gan Kim Swee donated $60 (Straits?). See 1864 Feng Shan temple Guangze zunwang stone tablet and the stone tablet dedicated to the rebuilding of Shui Mei temple of the 8th year of Guang Xu reign, in Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Malaysia, Wolfgang Franke and Chen Tieh Fan (eds.), Vol. 2, pp. 558–559, 565–567. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. In 1892, Gan Eng Seng generously gave a freehold property at Rochore to the Tan Tock Seng Hospital as a gift. See Song Ong Siang (1967). One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, p. 273, Singapore: University of Malaya Press. 5 It was claimed that Gan Eng Seng had donated a sum of money for the construction of school in China and was rewarded by the Ch’ing (Qing) government. In 1889, Gan Eng Seng received a Ching title “Fujian tong zhi” ( ). This title could be the award given to him. See Su Xiaoxian (ed.), (1948). Zhang Zhou shishu lu Xing tongxiang lu (Directory of the Chinese from the Ten Districts of Zhang Zhou), p. 60. Singapore: Yen Ching-hwang, translated by Chang Ching Chiang, Qingchao yu guan zhidu yu Xing Ma huazu lingdao chen (Ch’ing’s Sale of Honors and the Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya), Appendix 4. In Kua Mak Lim and Ng Chin Keong (eds.), (1972). Xinjiapo huazu shi lunji (Essays on the History of the Chinese in Singapore), p. 78. Singapore: the Alumni Association of the Nanyang University; see also the same article published in Yen Ching-hwang (1992), Haiwai huaren shi lunji (Essays on the History of the Ethnic Chinese), p. 35. Singpore: Singapore Society for Asian Studies.

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the chief comprador, a position he occupied for 25 years. In addition to his primary work as a comprador, he was also involved in private business, becoming a labor contractor for Tanjong Pagar Dock Co. Ltd. Investing in real estate and other business activity, he made a huge fortune for himself. Following Chinese philanthropic tradition, he donated money to hospitals and built the famous Anglo-Chinese Free school in 1893 to educate poor students. The school used both English and Chinese as medium of instruction, and it had contributed significantly in the development of education in early Singapore.6 At about the same time with Gan Eng Seng, another prominent Gan clansman in British Malaya was Gan Ngoh Bee (Yan Wumei) who was born in Penang in 1850. In contrast to Gan Eng Seng, he came from a rich family. His father, Gan Guan Teat was a rice merchant in Rangoon, Burma. His wealthy family background enabled him to receive a good English education in Penang and India. He was first educated at St. Xavier’s Institute in Penang, and furthered his education in the Doventon College in Calcutta, India. After having completed his education, he joined in business with his younger brother, Gan Hong Kee and his uncle, Gan Kim Swee, to establish a trading company, Eng Joo, dealing in pepper and tin. Eng Joo was a large trading company involved in trans-regional trade, and it had branches in Rangoon and Calcutta. Having accumulated a huge profit from domestic and trans-regional trade, Gan Ngoh Bee undertook tax farming, a kind of big business at that time in Southeast Asia. Unable to collect certain taxes in the Chinese communities effectively, the colonial governments in the region sold collection rights to rich Chinese merchants of certain taxes such as opium, spirit, gambling, pawnshop, etc.7 The sale of revenue farms was usually through auction, and the term was restricted to 2 or 3 years. Rental for the farms was determined by supply and demand; more bidders for certain farms would bid up the prices. Those farmers who could best use their power, their management skill, and marketing techniques 6 In recognition of Gan Eng Seng’s contribution, the school later bore his name as the Gan Eng Seng School. See Song Ong Siang (1967), One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, pp. 273–275. 7 See Reid A (1993). The origins of revenue farming in Southeast Asia. In Butcher J and Dick H (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming, pp. 69–79. New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc.

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would yield enormous profit, especially on opium and spirit farms. Due to increasing numbers of Chinese addicts, opium farm was most lucrative that could yield tens of thousands of dollars a year, but the cost of the rent for the opium farm could reach a million dollars or more.8 From 1901 to 1903, Gan Ngoh Bee had obtained the Penang opium and spirit farms with a syndicate formed under his leadership. The profit for the farms amounted to $700,000 (Straits dollars). With a 25% share in the syndicate, his profit amounted to S$175,000 for 3 years, averaging S$58,000 per year. Gan Ngoh Bee also invested other profitable business such as real estate in Penang and tin mining in Perak.9 Indeed, he was one of the wealthiest Chinese businessmen in British Malaya.

The Growth of Gan Clansmen in Singapore and Malaya (1912–1965) The collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912 marked the beginning of a new era in modern Chinese history. It also had profound impact on the migration history of the Chinese to Southeast Asia. The Republic sealed an intimate relationship with the Chinese in Southeast Asia because the Southeast Asian Chinese had contributed significantly to the revolutionary movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen.10 But the early Republican 8

See Godley M, Chinese Revenue Farm Networks: The Penang Connection, ibid., pp. 93–94. See Correspondence regarding the reduction in rent of the Penang opium and spirit farms, in Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings, 1905, Appendix No. 10; Yen Ching-hwang, (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 164. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Lee Kam Hing and Chow Mun Seong (eds.), (1997). Biographical Dictionary of the Chinese in Malaysia, pp. 45–46. Petaling Jaya; Selangor: Pelanduk Publications. 10 For the contribution of the Chinese in British Malaya to the 1911 Revolution, see Yen Chinghwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. For the contribution of the Southeast Asian Chinese to the 1911 Revolution in general, see Lee Lai To (ed.), (1987). The 1911 Revolution — the Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia. Singapore: Heinemann; Ching-hwang (1986). Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji (Collections of Essays on the International Conference on Southeast Asian Chinese and the 1911 Revolution). Taipei: the Center for International Studies, Cheng Chi University; Zhong Shan daxue Sun Zhongshan yanjiuso (ed.), (1996). Sun Zhongshan yu huaqiao — (Sun Zhongshan yu huaqiao) xueshu yantao hui lunwenji (Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese: Collections of Essays presented at the (Dr. Sun Yatsen and the Overseas Chinese) International Conference). Guangzhou: Zhongshan University Press. 9

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period was plagued by political division and military chaos caused by the rapacious warlords. The people of Fujian and Guangdong, like their compatriots in other provinces, were thrown into an abyss of misery. Further, these two provinces were savaged by avaricious taxes and marauding bandits. The result of these was the migration of large numbers of Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong to Southeast Asia in 1920s and 1930s. Gan clansmen were among these new immigrants to the region. Owing to the increase in numbers of Gan clansmen in Singapore and Malaya, many in them had gradually moved from big commercial centers like Singapore, Penang, and Malacca to the towns in the Malay Peninsula such as Muar in Johore, Klang in Selangor, and Mentakab in Pahang. This was the result of kinship migration that characterized the Chinese migration during this period. When the Chinese immigrants settled overseas and prospered in business, they began to recruit their kinsmen or relatives from home districts in China to meet the growing demand for labor. These new recruits were offered jobs as apprentices in shops or laborers in the factories owned by the immigrants. Indeed, this pattern of migration contributed significantly to the growth of the Chinese population in Southeast Asia. The majority of the Gan clansmen in Singapore and Malaya were involved in business: trading in rubber and other commodities, planting rubber and managing rubber estates, running grocery shops and becoming agents for patrol and cigarettes and other imported goods. During this period, the Gan clansmen also adhered to the Chinese philanthropic tradition by donating to temples, hospitals or schools. The founding of a Chinese primary school in Mentakab, Pahang is a case in point. The Mentakab Zhong Hua primary school was founded in 1922 to meet the needs for education by the local Chinese children under the leadership of Gan Sin Hor (Yan Chenhu). He was the proprietor of Chop Kian Joo Hing that dealt in patrol and cigarettes. The school was located near the old township near the river (the football field of the Abu Bakar School), and the first principal was Gan Kang Hor (Yan Jianghu). It was later shifted to no. 1 of the new township, and a management committee

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(dongshihui) was established with Gan Sin Hor being elected the first director of the committee.11 Although the numbers of Gan clansmen in pre-war Singapore and Malaya increased substantially, there was a lack of well-managed organizations looking after the interests of the Gan clansmen and coordinating their activities. Reports suggest that there were in existence two Gan clansmen associations in both Penang and Singapore. The Yanshi Luguo Tang (The Hall of the Gan clansmen of the Lu Kingdom) could have existed in 1923, but it left no written record except an old square wooden table traceable to that date; while the Luguo Tang Yanshi Gonghui (The Association of Gan clansmen from Ancient Lu Kingdom) did exist at least in 1928. The directors of this association were also the trustees of the Gan clansmen cemetery at Linchi Mount responsible for public worship at the cemetery during the Ching Ming festival. The association was poorly managed, and failed to unite the Gan clansmen and to protect their common interests.12 Two reasons may account for weak organization of the Gan clansmen in Singapore and Malaya during this period. First, many of them were new immigrants who had to cope with their problems of earning a living, and their financial positions were weak. Second, the impact of the World Depression in 1930s on Singapore and Malaya was severe. The slide in prices for rubber and tin during the Depression greatly reduced the income of many Chinese that included the Gan clansmen. The Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya revived after the scourge of the Japanese occupation during World War II. Realizing the importance of unity and cooperation, an experience 11 See, (1966) A short history of the school, in Pengheng Wendejia Wendejia guomin xiaoxue xiao sishiwu zhounian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the 45th Anniversary of the Mentakab National Type Chinese Primary School of Mentakab, Pahang). Mentakab, p. 11. 12 See Gan Kok Hwa (Yan Guohua) (1978). Luguo Tang Yanshi gonghui chuangban yange (Evolution of the Association of Gan Clansmen of the Lu Kingdom). In Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui shi zhounian jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the 10th Anniversary of the Gan Association of Singapore), Gan, Kee Leong (Yan Qilong) (ed.), p. 43. Singapore: Singapore Gan Association.

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gained during the occupation, the Gan clansmen, like many other Chinese kinship groups, began to organize or reform their associations. At the same time, the British Colonial government also relaxed its control over the registration of Chinese organizations in an attempt to gain Chinese support.13 As a result, many Chinese dialect and kinship organizations were established during the post-war period. In the two decades from 1945 to 1964, three Gan clansmen associations were either established or revived from the past. They were the Yanshi Luguo Tang in Penang (revived in 1946), the Yanshi Zongci of Yong Chun Taochang (The Gan Clan Temple of Taochang of Yong Chun) in Malacca (founded in 1947), and the Luguo Yanshi Gonghui in Singapore (revived in 1948). The Gan Clan Temple of Taochang of Yong Chun was the most important among them. In 1947, vividly remembering the days of misery under the Japanese occupation and realizing the importance of unity and mutual assistance among the kinsmen, a group of Gan clansmen in Malacca under the leadership of Gan Ee Chong (Yan Yizong), Gan Hong Hor (Yan Honghu), and Gan Kim Lian (Yan Jinlian) founded this organization. Gan Ee Chong was elected the chairman, Gan Hong Hor, treasurer, and Gan Kim Lian, zongwu (general service manager). Since many of the Gan clansmen in Malacca were originated from the Taochang of Yong Chun district in Fujian, regional solidarity formed the basis for their grouping, and it had no difficulty recruiting more than a hundred members. In 1949, the generosity of Gan Hong Hor laid the solid foundation for future development of the clan temple by donating a property as its temple building for the housing of ancestral tablets.14 Gan Hong Hor was a wealthy businessman with financial interests in real estate and rubber plantations. In the same year, the clan temple was restructured into a clan in accordance with the tradition practised in China. A clan management committee was established, and Gan Hong Hor was elected the first clan head (zuzhang) of the Gan clan 13 See Blythe W (1969). The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study, p. 336. London: Oxford University Press. 14 See Yan Zhonghu (1974). Malaixiya rengui Yanshi zongci yange shilue (A historial evolution of the Gan Clan temple of Rengui branch of Malaysia). In Yanshi zongqin shilu (A Historial Record of the Gan Clansmen), Yan, Juizhang (ed.), p. 26. Johore Bahru: Xin Wenxue Publishers.

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of Ren Gui branch, and Gan Kim Lian his deputy. It is interesting to note that this restructured Gan Clan Temple had conformed to the pattern of the traditional clan organizations in Southern China as what Maurice Freeman had termed “localized lineage” that was characterized by its exclusiveness and narrow geographical focus, and these Chinese localized lineages did exist in Singapore and Malaya.15 In April 1951, the Gan Clan Temple was registered with the government as a legal body that further consolidated its status in the Chinese community. The generosity of Gan Hong Hor was extended to include 15 acres of hilly land as the Gan clansmen’s cemetery, a block of land of 6 acres, and a building as assets of the temple. The income derived from these assets supported the operation of the temple that included the worship of Gan ancestors and the dead during the spring and autumn festivals, the organizing of festivities and the collection of information relating to the birth and death of Gan clansmen from Taochang of Yong Chun. As members increased, the door of the clan temple was open to include Gan clansmen of Ren Gui branch not just originating from Taochang of Yong Chun, but also from Da Tian, Quanzhou, and An Xi districts. On 29th July 1964, the Gan Clan temple was officially inaugurated and many Gan clansmen from other parts of Malaysia and Singapore as well as overseas attended the solemn ceremony and a huge interest was created among the Gan clansmen in the region. In 1965, a welfare department was created in the temple to help the clansmen to bury the dead. In September 1970, to meet the changing political situation in the region, the temple changed its name to Malaixiya Ren Gui Yanshi Zongci (The Gan Clan Temple of Ren Gui Branch of Malaysia). In 1972, it established an education department offering scholarships (jiang xuejin) and bursaries (zu xuejin) to promising Gan children. Both were restricted to 15

For the ideas of “localised lineages”, see Freedman M (1958). Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. London: Athlone and Feedman M (1966). Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung. London: Athlone. For a discussion of Chinese localized lineages in early Singapore and Malaya, See Yen Ching-hwang (1981). Early Chinese clan organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), pp. 62–87, 1995; see also Yen Ching-hwang Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 33–71. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

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44 students a year with an amount of M$2020 distributed among them.16 The achievements of the Gan Clan Temple are in three areas. First, it united the Gan clansmen in Malacca and later in other parts of Malaysia for the worship of the common ancestor, Gan Nin Kui (Yan Ren Gui), a founder of a Gan (Yan) branch in Fujian province, as well as promoting common interests among the Gan clansmen. Second, the temple had abandoned its geographical narrow focus on the Taochang of Yong Chun district in China. Instead, it had gradually embraced the other Gan clansmen of Ren Gui branch residing in other parts of Malaysia. The removal of geographical restriction laid the foundation for the establishment of the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia, an organization embracing all Gan clansmen regardless of geographical and dialect differences. Third, the temple was able to modernize its aims and activities by establishing welfare and education departments that were in conformity with the changing political and economic environment in Malaysia.

The Founding and the Development of the Gan Clan Associations in Malaysia and Singapore (1965–1990) 1965 was a memorable year and a landmark in the history of Gan clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia. It witnessed the founding of the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia and the Gan Clan Association of Singapore. The founding of these two organizations was partly the result of the activity of the Gan Clan Temple of Taochang of Yong Chun in Malacca. In 1964, when the preparation for the inauguration of the temple was on its way, a group of Gan clansmen of nonRen Gui branch requested to the temple to relax its restriction on membership, but the request was turned down. This prompted the group from Johore with the support of some of those from Malacca area to found the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia. After two consecutive preparatory meetings in March and April 1965, the association came into being. Gan Kim Lian, a leader of the Gan Clan Temple was elected as chairman, Gan Kim Kao (Yan Jingou) and 16

See Yan Zhonghu op.cit.

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Gan Sheng Yeok (Yan Shengyu) were elected as deputy chairmen, Gan Pui Jee (Yan Peijing) was elected as treasuer, and Gan Kok Giap (Yan Kuoye) as the general affairs manager. In addition to these office-bearers, 73 members were nominated to represent Gan clansmen in various cities and towns in Malaysia and in Singapore. The organization first used the Gan Clan Temple’s building in Malacca as its temporary office, and the expenses of the association in its early period was also borne by the temple. After a delay for more than 2 years, its application for registration as a legal society was approved in July 1967.17 About the same time, the Gan clansmen in Singapore also began to found the Gan Clan Association of Singapore. Under the leadership of Gan Yue Cheng (Yan Yuzheng), they held the first meeting on the second floor of the Guan Chong Bee tea company. Twentyeight people were present in this crucial meeting, they included Gan Yue Cheng, Gan Hui Chong (Yan Huizhong), Gan Song Hock (Yan Songshu), Gan Kong Hwee (Yan Guanghui), Gan Kok Hua (Yan Guohua), Gan Teng Chek (Yan Tingjie), Gan Kee Seng (Yan Qicheng), Gan Jing Poi (Yan Zengpei) and others. The meeting resolved to establish the association as well as to enquire the procedures for registering the association as a legal body. In its fourth preparatory meeting on 29th October 1965, a management committee was born with Gan Yue Cheng elected as the president (huizhang), Gan Kee Cheow (Yan Qichao) as vice-president, Gan Kok Hua as general affairs manager (zongwu), Gan Teng Chek as deputy general affairs manager, Gan Hui Chong as treasurer, and Gan Boon Hean (Yan Wenxian) as deputy treasurer. The Gan Clan Association of Singapore officially came into existence on 6th April 1966 after it was approved by the Registrar of Societies as a legal organization in Singapore. The founder and the inaugural president of the association was Gan Yue Cheng, a wealthy businessman, and the proprietor of the Hong Bee Group of companies. He was born in Kuala 17

See Yan Zhonghu, Malaixiya rengui Yanshi zongci yange shilue (A historial evolution of the Gan Clan temple of Rengui branch of Malaysia). In Yanshi zongqin shilu (A Historical Record of the Gan Clansmen), Yan Juizhang (ed.), p. 25.

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Lumpur in 1922, but his parents came from the Shigu county of Yong Chun district of Fujian province. As a descendant of the Ren Gui branch, he was invited in 1964 by the Gan Clan Temple in Malacca to be involved in its management committee, but due to geographical distance between Singapore and Malacca, he declined the invitation. However, Gan Yue Cheng perceived the need for an all-embracing and non-discriminatory organization in Singapore for all the Gan clansmen. His perception of the need led him to actively canvass for the founding of the Gan Clan Association in Singapore.18 The founding of these two Gan clan associations were of great historical significance in the history of Gan clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia. First, both organizations carried the name of gonghui (association) rather than zongci (clan temple) that signified the adoption of a non-discriminatory name which would be able to cut across geographical and dialect lines to embrace all Gan clansmen. A name symbolized its modernity in ideas and organization. In reality, the name gonghui was a more appealing title than zongci that was seen to have a archaic appearance and tune in the Chinese community. This could mean the organizations would be in a better position to recruit younger and better educated members. Second, the clan associations were to meet the changing political environments in both Singapore and Malaysia. The separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965 as an independent nation aroused certain awareness among the Chinese that they had to play a role in these two new nations, and the clan association was one of the channels through which the Chinese could unite and protect their common interests. Third, the social trend in the Chinese communities in the region in post-war era was convergence rather than divergence. The establishment of these two associations conformed with the social trend. Fourth, the founding of these two associations stimulated the Gan clansmen in other parts of Malaysia to establish their own organizations. This included the 18

See Gan Kok Hua (Yan Guohua), Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui chuangli de guocheng (The process of the founding of the Singapore Gan Clan Association). In Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui shi zhounian jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the 10th Anniversary of the Gan Clan Association of Singapore), Gan Kee Leong (Yan Qilong) (ed.), p. 46.

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formation of the Selangor Gan Clan Association (Xuelane Yanshi gonghui) and the Pahang Gan Clan Temple (Pengheng Yanshi zongci) in 1968, and the Johore Gan Clan Association (Roushu Yanshi gonghui) in Muar in 1970. The development of both Gan Clan Associations of Malaysia and Singapore was steady and impressive, firmly leaning toward modernization in their structure and functions. Since official registration in July 1967, the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia grew by leaps and bounds. The legal recognition improved its image and raised its status in society, and in turn attracted more members to join, the result of which was the strengthening of its financial position. In 1972, the association had 448 members, and the numbers increased to 500 in 1976. The structure of the association was elaborate and democratic. The executive committee was led by a president, a vice-president, a treasurer and a deputy, a general affairs manager and a deputy, a secretary and a deputy, a supervisor and a deputy, and a auditor and a deputy. Under these chief office-bearers were the heads of various departments including organization, welfare, culture and education, sports, recreation, and women. Under the executive committees were 72 representatives of various regions. Comprising the representatives of Johore state (including Muar, Batu Pahat, Kluang, Yong Peng, Kulai, Pontian, and Rengit), the state of Selangor (including Kuala Lumpur and Klang), the state of Negri Sembilan (including Seremban, Pilah, and Bahau), and the state of Pahang (including Mentakab, Temerloh, Triang, Kemayan, and Mengkarak).19 The development of the Gan Clan Association of Singapore was even more rapid. The two prime tasks attracting the attention of the leadership were the recruitment of members and the purchase of a clubhouse. Although the association adopted a modern title of gonghui that was open to all Gan clansmen without discrimination of age, sex, geographical origins, and dialects spoken, there were still clansmen who were suspicious of the motives of the leaders and the aims of the association, and they were either indifferent or hostile. In 19

See Malaixiya Yanshi gonghui shilue (A short history of the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia), ibid., p. 177.

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an attempt to recruit as many clansmen as possible into the association, Gan Kok Hua and Gan Teng Chek were most enthusiastic. They visited clansmen house by house, and managed to persuade many of them to join. The purchase of a property as the association’s permanent home was equally urgent. An organization without a proper clubhouse would be equivalent to a family without its own house drifting from here to there. This was why that the leadership started to look for a property to purchase soon after its legal status was confirmed in April 1966. A sub-committee was established under the leadership of Gan Yue Cheng and Gan Hui Chong, president and vice-president of the association. The proposal for buying a clubhouse received strong support from the members. In December 1966, a three-story building located at 18–20b of the Bukit Pasor Road was acquired.20 With second and third floors reserved for the use of the association, the rest were let out for collecting rental — a stable income for the association. With this fixed income, the association was able to carry out its activities. The centerpieces of the activity were in the areas of welfare, education, and recreation. First, being a kinship organization, the association’s main focus was to unite Gan clansmen and to take care of their welfare as the aims of the association’s constitution specified that “to cultivate good relationship among Gan clansmen and to look after their welfare”. Thus, a welfare department was established and it concentrated its attention on members’ welfare such as helping to arrange weddings and funerals, offering financial assistance to meet medical and funeral expenses, as well as helping members to restart their business. In 1975, the association purchased a set of Chinese funeral dressings for loan to members.21 In addition, the association organized feasts to celebrate Chinese festivities such as the Chinese New Year festival, the Yuan Xiao festival (on the 15th day of the New Year period), Qing Ming festival (the festival for laying sacrifices to the ancestors), Dragon Boat festival (Duan Wu jie), the Mid-Autumn

20

See Benhui huiwu zhaiyao (Outlines of the activity of the association), ibid., pp. 90–91. Gan Boon Siong (Yan Wenxiang), Benhui huiwu gaikuang (Brief account of the activity of the association), Gan Hoon Kian (Yan Fenjian), Fuligu suofu de shiming (The mission of the Welfare Department), ibid., pp. 49 and 56.

21

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festival (Zhong Qiu jie), etc. These feasts were well-attended by members, and promoted close relationship among Gan clansmen. Second, the association established an education department responsible for coordinating educational activities. The awareness of the importance of education for young clansmen in a competitive world led the leaders to take such an action. In 1973, the association offered scholarships to bright Gan students who were good in both study and behavior. The scholarship was granted to 10 university students and 50 high school students, the former received S$2000 each and the latter S$200 per person. In 1976, an “Education Fund” was established to replace the scholarship scheme. Under this new scheme, the scholarship was divided into two categories: “Award” (Jiangli jin) and “Bursary” (Zuxue jin). The former was granted to outstanding students regardless of their family financial status; while the latter was conferred on outstanding students from needy families and they received more money than the former that enabled them to complete their study.22 The “Education Fund” was a better scheme than the scholarship scheme; not only had it widened its scope to include more recipients, but it was also fairer in recognising both academic achievements and needs of the students. Under the old scheme, outstanding students from rich or well-to-do families were excluded because they did not need financial help. The third area that the Gan Clan Association of Singapore had scored a great success was recreation. The Chinese term for recreation, Kang Le, means “healthy entertainment” and that included sports, music, painting, excursion, and cinema viewing. Singapore is an international port hustling and bustling with all kinds of activity, and life was extremely competitive and tense, so healthy recreation was needed by Gan clansmen and their children if they were to maintain a balanced lifestyle. Besides, it would attract the young clansmen 22

University students each received S$300 a year, college students each received S$200 a year, senior high students S$100, junior high school students S$50, and primary school students S$25. While university students each received S$1500 a year, college students received S$800 each, senior high school students S$300 each, junior high school students S$200 each, and primary school students S$50 each. See Gan Kee Leong (Yan Qilong). Report on the Four Years Work of the Education Department, ibid., pp. 73–77.

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and give them a social identity. A department of recreation was established in 1970 to promote and coordinate its activities and its initial focus was on youth table tennis and excursion. In November 1974, the association sponsored the first Gan youth table tennis tournament that was well-supported.23 The Karaoke singing was a popular recreation activity started in August 1988. Karaoke is a form of entertainment invented by the Japanese in the 1970s for nightclubs. It spread to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China in the 1980s, and it had special appeal for young people. It can be turned into a form of “healthy entertainment” if it is performed in social clubs for members. To catch on this new tide of entertainment, the association promoted it as family entertainment for Gan clansmen. Karaoke sessions were regularly held in the association’s hall every Friday and Saturday night. They were well-attended by the members. Besides, karaoke was also used as a medium of social contacts among young people. The association’s karaoke group extended its contacts with karaoke groups of other dialects and clan associations such as Jin Jiang, Tong An, An Xi, Xiamen, Yong Chun, Ling Yang, and Teo (Zhang) Clan associations for performance and interaction. Not only did they improve their singing techniques, but they also forged a closer relationship among members of Chinese social organizations in Singapore. The Gan Clan karaoke group also led the karaoke movement in Singapore by organizing the first large-scale Karaoke performance night held in 1992 with the support of 20 other organizations. The event was very successful, attracting thousands of people and raising S$100,000 for charity.24

23

See Gan Kim Siong (Yan Jinxiang), Kang Le yu rensheng (Healthy recreation and life), and Gan Eng Chong (Yan Rongchong), Diyijie qing shaonian zongqin bingpang sai zeji (The siderecord of the first table tennis tournament for the Gan youth), ibid., pp. 80–81. 24 See Chen Shuying (1996). Yanshi gonghui shi diyijia yongyou Karaoke shebei de huiguan (The Gan Clan Association of Singapore is the first Chinese association that had possessed good karaoke equipments). In Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui sanshi zhounian jinian zhi disanjie shijie Yanshi zongqin lianyihui tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Singapore Gan Clan Association 30th Anniversary and 3rd World Gan Clan Conference) Gan Eng Guan (Yan Rongyuan) et al. (eds.), pp. 92–94. Singapore: The Gan Clan Association of Singapore.

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The Gan Clan Association of Singapore was also successful on its external front. Under the leadership of Gan Yue Cheng, Gan Hui Chong, and Gan Boon Siong, the association became the leader of the Gan clan associations in the region. The leaders had been frequently invited by the Gan clan associations in Malaysia to lay foundation stones or to initiate inauguration ceremonies. In 1972, Gan Yue Cheng, representing the association, donated a sum of money to the building funds of the Gan Clan Association of Johore. In June 1974, he donated another sum of money to the Johore association’s education funds. In July of the same year, he donated on behalf of the association a sum of M$5000 to the building funds of the Gan Clan Temple of Pahang. In October 1979, Gan Yue Cheng was invited to initiate the stone-laying ceremony for the new building of the Yanshi Luguo Tang of Penang and he, on behalf of the Singapore Gan Clan Association , donated a sum of M$20,000, and he himself donated another M$12,000 to the building funds. In addition, Gan Yue Cheng also led delegations to visit Taiwan and China to establish contacts with Gan (Yan or Yen) clansmen there. In 1974, he led a delegation to Taipei to attend the local Gan Association’s convention and concurrently the birthday celebration of Fu Sheng Gong, the firstknown Yan (Gan or Yen) ancestor in Chinese history.25 Gan Yue Cheng was invited to be the chief worshipper to conduct the solemn ceremony, an honor conferred on a prominent clan leader. In November 1986, after having stepped down as the president of the Gan Clan Association of Singapore, he led a group of clansmen to visit Qi Fu city of Shandong province, China, and laid sacrifice to the Fu Sheng Gong as well as erecting a memorial stone tablet.26 At the same time, he extended his contact with the 79th direct descendant of the Fu Sheng Gong, Yan Pinggang (Gan Pin Gang) that helped to lay the foundation for the organization of the first world Gan clansmen convention in Singapore in April 1991. 25

Fu Sheng Gong was Yan Hui, a famous disciple of Confucius in Chinese history. Because of his dedication to Confucius and his moral virtue, he was later conferred the title of “Fu Sheng Gong” by a Chinese emperor. 26 See Gan Yue Cheng, leshan haoshi, chongyu yinzai (Gan Yue Cheng: A Philanthropist and a Man Who Promoted Talents of the Clan), ibid., pp. 85–86.

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The Holding of the First and Second World Gan Clansmen Conventions in Singapore and Malaysia (1991–1993) The holding of the first world Gan clan convention in Singapore on 6th and 7th April 1991 was a landmark in the history of the Gan clansmen in the world. Not only did it mark the beginning of a greater unity among Gan clansmen worldwide, but also it also kept them abreast with the changing times and changing world, and promoted cooperation among Gan clansmen in the areas of cultural and economic activities. The holding of this historical event had its important economic and political background. The 1970s witnessed the rise of the Four Asian Little Dragons: Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and the important role played by ethnic Chinese in this phenomenon.27 The 1980s also witnessed the reform and opening of China that led to the rise of China as a future great economic dragon in East Asia. With this rapid change of economic landscape in East and Southeast Asia, there was a need for economic cooperation among the Chinese for their common good and well-being. Politically, the end of the 1980s saw the end of the Cold War that dominated world politics for more than four decades, and it was followed by intense economic competition among the nations. The ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia, together with the Chinese in mainland China shared the common need of closer cooperation under the impact of economic globalization. Since 1980, farsighted ethnic Chinese leaders began to organize world wide dialect and kinship organizations to facilitate cultural and economic cooperations; this included the formation of the World Hakka Friendship Association (Shijie Kejia Lianyi Hui), the World Federation of Teochew (Chaozhou) Associations (Guoji Chaotuan Lianyi Hui), and the World Hainanese Friendship Association (Shijie Hainan Tongxian Lianyi Hui), etc.28 These organizations served the purpose of promoting Chinese 27

See Yen Ching-hwang (2001). The rise of Ethnic Chinese business in East and Southeast Asia. In Nantah Xueren (The Nantah Scholars), Lee Guan Kin (Li Yuanjin) (ed.), pp. 74–76. Singapore: Centre for Chinese Language & Culture, Nanyang Technological University; see also the same article published in Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia, pp. 4–5. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Vogel EF (1991). The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 28 See Yen Ching-hwang (ed.) (2002), Ethnic Chinese business networks in East and Southeast Asia, in The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia, p. 46.

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traditional culture, friendship and creating business networks, so as to maintain the significant role played by the ethnic Chinese in the economic life in the regions. Some of the far-sighted Gan clan leaders in Singapore and Malaysia observed the trend and were prepared to take the lead to form a worldwide Gan clansmen body. One of these leaders was Gan Boon Siong, then the president of the Gan Clan Association of Singapore, who in December 1988 led a delegation to attend the 20th anniversary celebration of the opening of the building of the Gan Clan Association of Northern Malaya in Penang. He was greatly impressed by the active participation in the event by the representatives of the Gan clan associations world wide, and it prompted him to take the opportunity to raise the issue of forming a world body. The proposal was met by a cold response. But due to Gan Boon Siong’s persistence in pursuing his aims, a provisional preparatory committee was established with a draft for forming a world Gan body drawn. After his return to Singapore, Gan Boon Siong pushed the issue among the executives and obtained their firm support. A resolution for hosting the first world Gan clansmen convention to coincide with the celebration of 25th anniversary of Gan Clan Association of Singapore in April 1991 was adopted by the executive committee.29 The first World Gan Clansmen Convention was inaugurated on the 6th and 7th April 1991 at the hall of the Ambassador Hotel (Guobin jiudian), Orchard Road, Singapore. It was attended by 375 Gan clansmen from all over the world, representing Gan clan associations from Taiwan, the Philippines, Malacca, Selangor, Penang, Johore, Pahang, and Singapore. The representatives of the Yan Zi Yanjiu Hui (The Society for the Study of Yan Zi) from Shandong province, China were also present.30 Yan Pinggang, the 79th direct 29

See an article entitled Xianshen gonghui bushou nianling xianzhi: Yan Wenxiang fangtan (In dedication to the works of association without restriction on age: An interview with Gan Boon Siong) (1996). In Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui sanshi zhounian jinian zhi disanjie shijie Yanshi zongqin lianyihui tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Singapore Gan Clan Association 30th Anniversary and 3rd World Gan Clan Conference), Gan Eng Guan (Yan Rongyuan) et al. (eds.), p. 63. 30 Yan Zi, or translated as Master Yan, was Yan Hui, the first-known ancestor of the Yan (Gan or Yen) clan in China. The members of the Society for the Study of Yan Zi included many nonYan people. On this occasion, the representatives of the society included the mayor of Qi Fu and Professor Lo Chenglie, an expert on the study of Yan Zi.

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descendant of Fu Sheng Gong (Yan Hui), was made the guest of honor of the convention.31 The convention was co-chaired by Professor Yen Ching-hwang of Adelaide University and Dr Gan See Khem of National University of Singapore. Professor Yen chaired the first session that focused on the issue of the clan’s education and culture. In his speech to the convention, Professor Yen pointed out that the convention had its great historical significance. He emphasized that Chinese clans have to face the challenge of time, and to make themselves relevant in a rapid changing world. To face this challenge, Chinese clans must possess sound structure, united and harmonious in looking forward to the future. He stressed Chinese clans must have aspiring and hardworking leaders that would lead the organizations to keep abreast with time. He further emphasized that Chinese clans must pay attention to the modernization of traditional Chinese cultures and values, and to groom talents for the associations. He thus proposed to establish a World Gan Clansmen’s Educational and Cultural Fund that received strong support from the participants. A round of fund-raising for the Fund followed. Enthusiastic response was reflected in the raising of a sum of S$200,000 within an hour. The second session that focused on modernization of Chinese clan associations was chaired by Dr Gan See Khem who pointed out that modernization was crucial for the survival and growth for Chinese clan associations. She listed four major areas for discussion: how to recruit new members and groom clan successors, how to make clan associations relevant to the development of nations, the prerequisites that clan associations need to have in the process of modernization, and the establishment of Gan clansmen networks. Most participants were well aware of the issue, and participated in the discussion fervently. The convention agreed to hold a biennial conference to be held in different parts of the world, and resolved that the second World Gan Clansmen Convention to be hosted by the Zhang

31

See (1996) Diyijie shijie Yanshi zongqin lianyihui dahui jilu (Record of the 1st World Gan Clansmen Convention, in Xinjiapo Yanshi gonghui sanshi zhounian jinian zhi disanjie shijie Yanshi zongqin lianyihui tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Singapore Gan Clan Association 30th Anniversary and 3rd World Gan Clan Conference), Gan Eng Guan (Yan Rongyuan) et al. (eds.), p. 135.

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and Yan Clansmen Association in the Philippines in 1993. The convention was closed with concrete results; a substantial amount of money was raised for the Gan Educational and Cultural Fund, and a resolution for establishing a “World Gan Clansmen Network” to promote closer contacts and cooperation among Gan clansmen throughout the world.32 The second World Gan Clansmen Convention took place 24–26th October 1993 in the Mei Hua Hotel, Malacca, Malaysia. The convention that was originally planned to be held in the Philippines was thwarted by social unrest in that country, and thus the hosting of the convention was taken over by the six Gan clan associations in Malaysia. It was attended by many representatives of Gan clan associations throughout the world. In addition to the representatives from Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, Gan clansmen from China, Quemoy (Jinmen) and the United States of America were also present. The president of the Gan Clan Association of Malaysia, Gan Pui Jee (Yan Peijing) chaired and the convention. He welcomed the delegates and called upon Gan clansmen to unite and cooperate in order to make greater contributions to the countries they resided in. His speech was echoed by the representatives who emphasized unity and cooperation. The convention resolved to set up a secretariat to be located temporarily in Singapore,33 to enhance contacts among Gan clansmen in relation to commercial news and investment opportunity, and to assist Gan clansmen in smaller cities to establish their associations. It officially approved the rules and regulations of the World Gan Clansmen’s Educational and Cultural Fund.34 It also resolved that the third convention was to be hosted again by the Zhang and Yan Clansmen Association in the Philippines in 1995. The achievements of the second convention were: put into practice the resolutions of the first convention, and the setting up of the temporary

32

Ibid., pp. 136–137. Singapore was unanimously chosen as the location for the secretariat, and the Singapore Gan Clan Association was to act as temporary secretariat office for the convention. See the record of the 2nd World Gan Clansmen Convention, ibid., p. 143. 34 Ibid. 33

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secretariat in Singapore that served effectively as a bridge to bring Gan clansmen in different parts of the world closer together. The secretariat was charged to collect and channel information among Gan clan associations, and to reflect views from below. It also played an important role in coordinating the work of various Gan associations in organizing future world Gan clansmen conventions.

Conclusion: Kinship and Organization Being one of the two pillars of Chinese social structure, kinship was a major principle through which Chinese organized themselves in the 19th and early 20th century Singapore and Malaya.35 As the region underwent rapid political and socio-economic changes in the postWorld War II period, and the termination of migration from China following the victory of Communism in October 1949, it was widely assumed that kinship as a principle for social organization would no longer be able to withstand the test of time, and would fade away into oblivion. However, history has proven this assumption wrong, and kinship is still relevant in the second half of the 20th century and beyond. This study on the history of Gan (Yan or Yen) clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia shows that the Chinese clan organizations can survive and even prosper under the conditions of an aspiring and farsighted leadership, a reform in their traditional functions, and a changing role in an ever-changing domestic and international environment. An aspiring and far-sighted leadership is important because it can observe the trend of change, chart the future direction of the organizations, and dedicate itself to the realization of the lofty goals. A reform was needed because the circumstances change, and their functions have to be changed accordingly. For instance, the welfare function of the kinship organizations before the war was focused on providing accommodation and assistance to new immigrants from China, but the drying up of fresh immigrants from China after 1949 saw a shift of the clan’s focus on the local members, including their 35 Another pillar was dialect and regional affiliation. For detailed discussion, see Yen Chinghwang (1996), A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, Chapters 2 & 3.

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welfare, education, and recreation. The relationship between kinship and organization is not static but dynamic. Although kinship organizations are being perceived by members of younger generation, especially those who are not Chinese-educated, to be archaic and irrelevant in a modern world, they still can be resurrected and reactivated for the purpose of improving the well-being of a social group, and their negative image can be radically altered if they are proven to be pragmatic and useful socio-economic organizations in an economically globalized world.

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Chapter 5

The Development and Future of the Chinese Kinship Associations in Singapore and Malaysia*

The Origins of the Chinese Kinship Associations in Singapore and Malaysia The Chinese had been settling in Singapore and in the Malaysian region earlier than the Malacca Sultanate. At the time when the sultanate was founded in the early 15th century, the Chinese had already formed a Chinese village (Kampong China) in the port.1 At the beginning of the 16th century, Malacca was conquered by the Portuguese, and was transferred to Dutch control in 1641, and eventually it came under British rule in 1824 under an Anglo-Dutch treaty.2 In a long period of more than 300 years from 1511 to 1824, the number of Chinese in Malacca increased slowly,3 and they gradually improved their social organizations. Under the Portuguese and Dutch rules, the leaders of the Chinese community were appointed by the authorities as “Kapitans” to administer the community. Under the Kapitan’s system, the Ethnic * This chapter is based and public lecture delivered in Chinese as a part of celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Gan Clan Association of Singapore, April 1991. 1 For the record of existence of a Chinese village (Campon China), see de Eredia, EG translated by Mills JV (1930). Eredia’s description of Malacca, Meridional India and Cathay. Journal of Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 8 (pt. 1) p. 19. 2 For Anglo-Dutch negotiations over the borders of their colonial empires in Southeast Asia that led to the conclusion of the 1824 treaty, see Tarling, N (1962). Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824. St. Lucia: Queensland University Press. 3 When the Dutch took over the control of the city of Malacca in 1641, the Chinese population was estimated at 300 to 400. See Commissary Justus Schouten’s Report of his Visit to Malacca, translated from Dutch by Hacobian M (1936). Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 14(1), 132.

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Chinese community enjoyed a high degree of self-government, and the Kapitans possessed considerable administrative power.4 There is no evidence to suggest that Chinese kinship associations existed.5 Which was the earliest Chinese kinship association in Singapore and Malaysia? When was it established? These are the questions that interest many scholars as well as laymen. There are three different claims for the honor of being the earliest Chinese kinship association. First, there is a suggestion that the Cao Clan Temple of Singapore (Cao Jia Guan) established in Singapore in 1819 was the earliest Chinese kinship association.6 Its founder was Cao A Zhi — a native of Taishan district of Guangdong — who was a chef of Stamford Raffles and was credited for hoisting the first British flag on the island of Singapore when the British claimed control over the island in 1819. To reward his courage, Raffles granted Cao a block of land on which he built Cao Clan Temple in honor of his ancestors. The second claim came from the Jiang Xia Tang Huang Clan Temple of Malacca (Maliujia Jiang Xia Tang Huang Si Zongci) which was founded in Malacca in 1825 by a group of Hokkien merchants, principally Huang Furong, Huang Wencheng, Huang Longcheng, and Huang Zhucheng. The founders came from the southern part of Fujian province and spoke the Hokkien dialect. The main objective of founding the temple was to worship the ancestor of the Huang (Ng) clans in China — Huang Xiao Shan. The temple was dedicated to 4

For a competent study of Chinese Kapitan system in British Malaya, see Wong CS (1963). A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans. Singapore: Ministry of Culture. 5 The earliest Chinese clan organization that existed in Malacca was the Kang Har Ancestral Temple founded likely in 1825, a year after the British takeover of Malacca. See Yen Ching-hwang (1981). Early Chinese clan organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1) p. 63; see also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, p. 66. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 6 See Wu Hua (1975). Xinjiapo Huazu huiguanzhi (Records of Chinese Associations in Singapore), Vol. 2, p. 1. Singapore: South Seas Society. However, a noted Singapore Chinese historian, Tan Yeok Siong (Chen Yuxiong), suggested the forerunner of the Cao Jia Guan, the Caofu da gongsi, was founded in 1831, while Cao Jia Guan was not founded until 1863. See Tan Yeok Siong (1984). Xinjiapo kaiguo yuanxun Cao A Zhu kao (Notes on Cao A Zhu (Cao A Zhi) — Pioneer in the founding of settlement of Singapore). In Ye Yin Guan wencun, diyijuan (Collections of My Literary Works in Ye Yin Guan), Tan Yeok Siong, Vol. 1, p. 69. Singapore: South Seas Society.

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unite the Huang clansmen in Malacca, and to carry out ancestral worships during the spring and autumn festivals.7 The third claim for the status of earliest Chinese kinship association was the Jiang Xia Tang Huang Clan Temple of Penang (Bingcheng Jiang Xia Tang Huang Si Zongci) that was founded in 1828, and it was located in the Guangdong (Canton) street of the island.8 The founders of the temple were unknown, but what is certain is that it was founded by a group of Huang’s clansmen who spoke the Hokkien dialect. They also wished to worship the Huang clan’s ancestor — Huang Xiao Shan — who served as a rallying figure for the unity of Huang clansmen on the island. If we list them in time sequence, the Cao Clan Temple of Singapore should be regarded as the earliest Chinese kinship organization in Singapore and Malaysia.9 Although the earliest Chinese kinship association was established in Singapore, the Ethnic Chinese clans in Penang achieved their fullscale development. The five powerful clans in Penang — the Khoo (Qiu), the Yeoh (Yang), the Tan (Chen), the Lim (Lin), and the Cheah (Xue) — ranked among the top Chinese kinship organizations in the histories of Singapore and Malaysia.10 With a large number of clansmen, powerful financial position, beautiful clan temples, and relatively good historical records, these clans played an important role in the history of Penang. Because of their strong financial position, they were able to maintain and pay for the upkeep their majestic clan temples which have become tourist attractions, and have contributed to the development of tourism in Malaysia. The main reason for the fullgrown kinship organization in Penang was that all of the five powerful 7

See (1970) Maliujia Jiang Xia Tang Huang Si Zongci shilue (A concise history of the Jiang Xia Tang Huang Clan Temple of Malacca). In Huang Shi Zupu zhi bai sishi zhounian jinian tekan (Genealogy of the Huang Clan and the Souvenir Magazine of its 140th Anniversary), Binglangyu Jiang Xia Tang Huangsi Zongci (ed.) Penang. 8 See Huang Wanxiang Ben Congci shilue (A concise history of the Jiang Xia Tang Huang Clan Temple of Penang), Ibid. 9 See Yen Ching-hwang. Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), 63; see also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang, Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, p. 66. 10 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 75. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press.

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clans originated from the same district of Hai Cheng in Fujian province,11 and their clansmen multiplied rapidly on the island due to the kinship-based migration. The numerical strength provided them with strong cohesion as well as economic and social power. Two types of Chinese kinship organization can be discerned: a lineage-based and a nonlineage-based.12 The former was constructed on the basis of common kinship, geographical, and dialect ties. Its members shared a common not-too-distant ancestor traceable to the early settlement in Fujian or Guangdong, and they came from the same village or district speaking a common dialect. For instance, the members of the famous Khoo Kongsi of Penang came from the San Du village of Hai Cheng district, Fujian, where they spoke the Hokkien dialect, and worshipped Khoo Chian Eng (Qiu Qianrong, or Ch’iu Ch’ienyung) — the founder of the Khoo (Qiu) clan in Fujian province.13 The rest of the five powerful clans also belonged to this lineage-based category. Among the early Chinese kinship organizations in Singapore and Malaysia, these lineage-based clans predominated in numbers with 24 out of 33 kinship associations in the 19th century, accounting for 75% of the total.14 The nonlineage-based organization was constructed on a looser kinship tie or a special historical connection. They carried the same surname and believed that they shared a common distant ancestor in 11

Apart from this, three of the five powerful clans — the Khoo, the Yeoh, and the Chieh — came from the same village of San Du of the Hai Cheng district. See Yen Ching-hwang. Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911, in Yen Ching-hwang, Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, p. 50. 12 For discussion of these lineage-based and nonlineage-based clan organizations, see Yen Chinghwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 75–78. For further discussion of Chinese localized lineage, see Freedman M (1958), Lineage Organization in South-eastern China, pp. 1–8. London, The Athlone Press, University of London. 13 See Khoo Hock Siew (1974). Binglangyu Qiusi Longshantang shilue ji tangwu fazhan kaikuang gouzhi tangzhi shimo. (A short history of the Leong San Tong Khoo Clan and its development). In Xin Jiang wufang Yudetang Wenfugong paixi pudie(Genealogical Record of Goh Pang Khoo Clansmen), Bing Cheng Shengdetang Qiu Gongsi (ed.) Penang: Khoo Kongsi. 14 See Yen Ching-hwang, Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), Appendix Table 1, pp. 88–92; see also Yen Ching-hwang, Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 66–70.

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ancient China. They did not come from the same village or the same district, but they appeared to have spoken the same dialect. They belonged to the minority among the early Chinese kinship organizations, and accounted for 25% of the total, that is 9 out of the 33 kinship associations in the 19th century.15 What is instructive is that eight out of nine nonlineage-based organizations were located in Singapore. Among the eight associations, four spoke Cantonese, two Hokkien, and one each for Teochew and Hainanese. The main reason why Singapore had more nonlineage-based kinship organizations was that it was an international port where Chinese emigrants from Fujian and Guangdong met, and were dispersed to other parts of Southeast Asia.16 When the number from same lineage was insufficient to form an organization, people of the same surname felt the need to form nonlineage associations to promote and protect their common interests. The earliest nonlineage organization in Singapore and Malaysia was the Chan Association of the four districts of Singapore (Xinjiapo Siyi Chen Shi huiguan) which was founded by Chan Nam (Chen Nan). The four districts (Siyi) were Tai Shan (Toi Shan), Kai Ping (Hoi Peng), En Ping (Yan Peng), and Xin Hui (Shan Wei) that were located in the southern part of Guangdong province, and they shared some common customs and historical experience. After the opening of Singapore, Chan clansmen from the four districts migrated and settled in the port, but their numbers were not sufficient to form a lineage-based organization; this was why they were prepared to combine their numbers to form a kinship-based body. Because they did not share a not-too-distant common ancestor in Guangdong, they did not use the term of Tang (hall), Zongci (temple),17 or Gongsi (Kongsi); instead, they adopted the name of Huiguan (association).

15

Ibid. See “Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider and Take Evidence upon the Conditions of Chinese Labourers in the Straits Settlements, 1876, in Colonial Office Records (CO) 275/19, pp. 2–17. 17 The terms of Tang and Zongce were mostly used by lineage-based kinship organizations, and they were used to indicate closer blood ties among the members of the organization. 16

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Another type of nonlineage-based organization is the multi-surname association which shared a common historical origin of sworn brotherhood or split clans. The best example of the multi-surname group in Chinese history was the sworn brotherhood in the Peach Gardens (Tao Yuan Jieyi) among Liu Bei, Guan Gong, Zhang Fei, and later, Zhao Zilong. The four sworn brothers were famous generals known for their faithfulness and righteousness, and their legend was spread widely among Chinese populace by the famous historical novel — The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (San Guo Yanyi). Their legacy left their descendants with a feeling of closeness among themselves though they did not share common blood ties.18 The earliest multi-surname organization was the Liu, Guan, Zhang, and Zhao Association of Singapore (Xinjiapo Liu Guan Zhang Zhao Gucheng huiguan). It was founded in 1866 by Liu Danian, Liu Cizhang, Guan Yale, Zhang Shiyi, and Zhao Yiren, and the majority of its members were Cantonese speakers.19 Because of the dialect barrier, the association did not seem to have non-Cantonese speakers and had effectively excluded the Hokkiens, Teochews, Hakkas, and Hainanese.

The Structure, Functions, and Development of Early Chinese Kinship Association The structure and functions of the early Chinese kinship associations differed, to a certain extent, from the present day associations. The 18

For the history of the sworn brotherhood among Liu Bei, Guan Gong, Zhang Fei, and Zhao Zilong, and the genealogies of the four clans, see several articles in a souvenir magazine published by the Liu, Guan, Zhang Zhao Clans Association of Singapore and Malaysia, entitled Xinjiapo Malaxiya Liu, Guan,Zhang, Zhao taltang gongsuo jiniankan (Souvenir Magazine of the Liu, Guan, Zhang, Zhao Association of Singapore and Malaysia) (Penang, 1968). 19 Early membership lists before 1949 of this organization cannot be obtained, but a scrutiny of the lists after 1949 shows that the association belonged to the Cantonese or sub-Cantonese speakers group. For instance, the 1949 list contains 770 names, all of them came from the districts close to Guangzhou, such as Nanhai, Panyu, Shunde, Taishan, Dongguan, Kaiping, Sanshui, Zengcheng, Xinhui, and Zhongshan. See (1949) Liu, Guan, Zhang, Zhao gucheng huiguan di qishiliu zhounian jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Seventy-sixth Anniversary of the Lau Kwan Cheung Chew Ku Seng Wuikun of Singapore), pp. 47–59. Singapore: The Lau Kwan Cheung Chew Ku Seng Wuikun, 1949.

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early associations had a simpler structure but more complicated functions. This was mainly because the number of Ethnic Chinese at that time was smaller and they enjoyed a higher degree of self-government. As a mainstay of the Chinese communities, the kinship associations had to assume more responsibilities in dealing with routine matters. The structure of the early associations was basically a three-tier pyramid: the lower tier of general membership, the middle rung of members of management committee and subcommittees, and the top layer of executive committee. The executives consisted of Zu Zhang (or known as Jia Zhang, head of the clan),20 deputy Zu Zhang (deputy head of the clan), honorary secretary, honorary cashier, and auditor.21 All of them were elected to their positions by the management committee, whereas the members of the management committee were elected by general membership. The structure of the early kinship associations, though simple, was capable of discharging its duties. The process of electing the members of both committees was in line with the concept of electing the best and able candidates to fill the positions, and this practice conforms with the spirit of modern democracy. Of course, there were deviations from this norm that some rich and powerful were elected to the key positions and were able to manipulate the associations to their advantage, but this seems to be an exception.22 Like traditional Chinese clans in China, the early Chinese kinship associations were the product of combined blood and geographical ties. The main objective was to carry on the descent line based on blood relations, to unite clansmen, and to preserve traditional Chinese culture and values. These objectives were clearly reflected in 20

See for instance, the Thye Guan Tong Ong Gongsi of Penang addressed its clan head as Jia Zhang, and this term was still used in mid-1970s. See Binglangyu Tai Yuan Tang Wangshi zumiao zhangcheng (Rules and Regulations of the Thye Guan Tong Ong Gongsi, Penang) (the copy obtained by the author in July 1974). 21 For instance, the structure of the Lim clan in Penang. See Rules and By-laws of Kew Leong Tong Lim Kongsi (an undated pamphlet in both English and Chinese). 22 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986), A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 82–84.

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the functions of the associations that were to carry out ancestral worship, to unite and offer assistance to clansmen, to celebrate traditional Chinese festivities, to promote education and to settle disputes.23 Ancestral worship was the most important function of the early Chinese kinship associations, especially lineage-based organizations. The five powerful Chinese clans in Penang installed the statues of their clan founders of post-Fujian settlement era in their ancestral temples on the island. The Khoos worshipped Khoo Chian Eng,24 the Yeohs worshipped Yeoh Teck King (Yang De Qing),25 the Tans worshipped Tan Guan Kong (Chen Yuan Guang),26 and the Lims worshipped Lim Leong Kong (Lin Rang Guang).27 Most of the early Chinese kinship associations built their ancestral temples when their financial situations allowed. They conducted two sacrificial ceremonies a year, usually in spring and autumn.28 Because there was no seasonal change in Singapore and Malaysia, the Chun Ji (Spring Sacrifice) usually fell in the period between March and May, whereas Qiu Ji (Autumn Sacrifice) was usually conducted in the months between August and October.29 Apart from worshipping the founders of post-Fujian era, sacrifices were also extended to the protector-gods or protector-goddesses of the kinship associations. These deities were 23

Ibid., p. 84. See Xinjiang Qiushi gepaixi zhaojizu jianpu (Brief Genealogy of Sin Kang Seah Khoo’s Ancestors of Various Branches) (Penang: The Khoo Kongsi, 1967). 25 See Rules and Regulations of the Yeoh Kongsi of Penang, item 4. 26 See Chew Qiyu (ed.). Yunchuantang Chenshi zupu (The Genealogy of the Yunchuantang Chen Clan) (Penang, 1967), p. 5; Chew Rongqing (ed.), MaliujiaYunchuantang Chenshi zongci dasha locheng kaimu dianli ji bai zhounian jinian tekan (Malacca Eng Chuan Tong (She Tan Ancestral Temple) New Building Official Opening and Centenary Anniversary Celebration), p. 12. (Malacca: Malacca Eng Chuan Tong, 1974). 27 See Lim Teong Aik, Centenary Souvenir of Lim Kongsi Toon Pun Tong and Lim Sz Bian Soot Tong. 28 The Spring and Autumn sacrifices seemed to have been strictly observed by the lineage-based kinship organizations. Examples of these can be drawn from the Eng Chuan Tong Tan Kongsi of Penang, the Thye Guan Tong Ong Kongsi of Penang, and the Yap Clan Temple of Selangor. See Bingcheng Yunchuantang Chen gongsi zhangcheng (Rules and Regulations of the Eng Chuan Tong Tan Kongsi, Penang), p. 2, item 8; Binglangyu Taiyuantang Wangshi zumiao zhangcheng (Rules and Regulations of the Thye Guan Tong Ong Kongsi), p. 9, item 35; Xuelange Yeshi zongci zhangcheng (Rules and Regulations of the Yap Clan Temple, Selangor), p. 6, item 31. 29 Ibid. 24

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related either to the history of a particular clan in China or to the process of migration of the clan members overseas.30 To unite and assist members was also a major function of the early Chinese kinship associations. In the traditional peasant society in South China where the modern welfare system was unknown, people had to depend on sons for support upon their retirement. The Chinese old saying that “to bring up sons for the preparation of old age” (yang er fang lao) reflected the feelings of peasant families. However, the inadequacy of the system was partly remedied by the clans which looked after in part the aged paupers, widows, orphans, and the incapacitated.31 In the early Ethnic Chinese society where the majority of its members were predominantly single males, many of those who were compelled to live overseas because of unemployment and poverty had to depend on the charity provided by kinship or dialect organizations. As the number of these paupers increased, it imposed a great deal of pressure on the early kinship associations that pledged to support their destitute clansmen. The constitutions of the early kinship associations had clearly stated that it was the associations’ obligation to provide assistance to the members;32 and they were 30

For example, the Khoo Kongsi’s clan god was Tua Sai Yah (Da Shi Ye in Mandarin), the colloquial name of General Xie Xian of the Jin dynasty who was connected with the early migration of the Khoo clansmen from north to south China, and was worshipped by the Khoos in China and overseas. The protector-goddess of the Lim Kongsi in Penang was the Thean Seong Seng Boe (Tian Shang shengmu in Mandarin, she was also known as Tian Hou or Tian Fei or Ma Zu), the popular sea-goddess widely worshipped by the Chinese in South China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. See Khoo Hock Siew, Malaixiya Binglangyu Qiushi Longshantang zhilue. (A concise history of the Leong Sam Tong Khoo Kongsi of Penang, Malaysia). In Qiushi renwen zhilue (The Concise History of the Literature, History and Philosophy of the Khoo Clansmen), Qiu Xiuqiang and Qiu Shangyao (eds.), p. 33; Rules and By-Laws of Kew Leong Tong Lim Kongsi (Penang), p. 13. 31 For instance, the Yang clan of Jiangyin district, Jiangsu province stipulated that rice and clothing allowance to be distributed to the needy mentioned above. See Hsien Chin Hu (1968). The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions, pp. 184–185, Appendix 58. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation. 32 The Lim Kongsi of Penang had clearly stipulated in its by-laws of this obligation. It states that “the Kongsi may, wherever possible, render pecuniary assistance to any clansman who is unable to earn his living in consequence of decrepitude, destitution, or sickness. Such clansman may, he desires , be repatriated to China at the expense of the Kongsi.” See Rules and By-Laws of the Kew Leong Tong Lim Kongsi, p. 9.

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obligated to provide simple burial for poor deceased members without close kin,33 to assist the cost of passage of poor members who wished to return to their home village in China, and to provide assistance to new clansmen from China with lodging, food, and employment. Most traditional Chinese festivities were associated with Chinese cultural tradition or peasants’ economic life. The Chinese new year (chun jie) and the winter solstice day were linked with peasants’ economic activities, while the Qing Ming festival (visiting ancestral graves) in third moon,34 the Dragon Boat festival (in memory of the patriotic poet Qu Yuan who drowned himself) in fifth moon, the Zhong Yuan Festival (feeding the hungry ghosts) in seventh moon, and the Mid-Autumn Festival in eighth moon were closely related to Chinese cultural tradition. When the early Chinese emigrants settled in Singapore and Malaysia, they brought with them these festivities. In the early immigrant society where Sunday as regular holiday was unknown, festivals became substitutes that the employees could use for rest or to participate in other social activities. From the association’s point of view, celebration of traditional festivals not only helped to perpetuate Chinese tradition and values, but also provided opportunities for members to exchange news about home villages and employment and business opportunities so as to promote clan solidarity.35 Promoting education was another important function of the early Chinese kinship organizations. Chinese education was significant in promoting Chinese culture and values because it served as important linkages between generations and between China and the Ethnic 33

The Khoo Kongsi of Penang provided a simple funeral and a proper burial in the Kongsi’s cemetery in the event of a poor clansman dying without a close kin. See Khoo Phaik Suat (1974). The Clan Kongsis of Penang, with particular reference to Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi. An unpublished B.A. Honours academic exercise, Science University of Malaysia, Penang, p. 18. 34 The Qing Ming festival is popularly known to the West as the “Feast of the Dead”. It was and still is observed by many Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. For the observation of this festival among the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, see Kong See Boo Poe (Guangshi wubao, a local Chinese newspaper), 22 March 1897, pp. 3–4. 35 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986), A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 87–88.

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Chinese communities. If the Chinese culture and tradition failed to continue, the existence of the kinship associations was in doubt. For those financially strong associations, they started their own clan schools to educate the young; for those that could not afford to do so, they tried to help or support the establishment of Chinese schools. The better-known clan school in early Singapore and Malaysia was the Khoo Clan School (Qiu Shi jiazu xuetang) in 1907 in Penang.36 It was located in the Khoo Kongsi’s ancestral temple, and the children of Kongsi’s members received free education. Like other early Chinese schools, the clan schools emphasized Chinese tradition. Students were inculcated with Confucian values of filial piety and loyalty through the study of Confucian Classics such as the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing) and Analects (Lun Yu) etc.37 Another major function of the early kinship associations was the settling of interclan and intraclan disputes. Disputes over money, business, employment, and other matters tended to undermine the solidarity among clan members, and early intervention by clan leaders could help avoid the worsening of conflicts that might lead to violent brawls or killings.38 On the other hand, disputes between two clans could result in armed struggle and the disruption of social stability. In the 19th century Penang, for instance, the five powerful Chinese clans 36

See Report of the Chinese Consul-General of the Straits Settlements, Sun Shiding, about the Founding of Chinese Schools by Chinese Merchants in Southeast Asia. In Zhengzhi guanbao (Qing Government Gazette, 28th day of 9th moon of 33rd year of Guangxu (3 November 1907). 37 See Yen Ching-hwang (1981). Early Chinese clan organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12 (1), p. 86. 38 The Eng Chuan Tong Tan clan, one of the five early Penang Chinese clan organizations that was founded in 1854, claims that arbitration of internal disputes and of inter-clan disputes was its most important work in its early decades. This function of mediating disputes was maintained among some clan organizations founded after the second World War. See Bingcheng Chenshi Yunchuantang jianshi. (A short history of the Eng Chuan Tong Tan Kongsi of Penang). In Yunchuantang Chenshi zupu (The Genealogy of the Eng Chuan Tong Tan Clan), Chen Qiyu (ed.), (Penang, 1967); the Eng Choon Toh Teo Gan Ancestral Temple (Yong Chun Taochang Yanshi zongce) of Malacca which was founded in 1949, has included this function of mediation in its rules and regulations. See Malaixiya Yongchun taochang Yanshi zongci zhangcheng (Rules and Regulations of the Eng Choon Toh Teo Gan Ancestral Temple, Malacca) (Malacca, 1949), Chinese section, p. 2, rule No. 12.

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agreed to cooperate in settling interclan disputes so as to bring peace and stability to the Chinese community. In 1881, the Khoo Kongsi, the Yeoh Kongsi, and the Cheah Kongsi further established a special institution named Sam Kui Tong Kongsi to deal with the disputes between the three clans, and a management committee consisting of four members each from the three kongsis was created.39 In almost one and a half century from 1819 ( the founding of the first Chinese kinship association in Singapore) to 1965 (the separation of Singapore from Malaysia), the development of the Chinese kinship organizations in Singapore and Malaysia can be divided into three major stages: the first stage, from 1819 to 1889, the second stage from 1890 to 1941, and the third stage from 1942 to 1965. The first 70 years were the emergent stage, with slow but steady pace of growth. Due to the non-intervention policy adopted by the governments in the Straits Settlements and in the Malay states, the Chinese communities enjoyed a high degree of self-government, but the communities were inflicted with disturbances caused by the warring secret societies.40 Although the kinship associations had influence over their members, they were subordinated to the secret societies in terms of power and authority. The 50 years of the second stage was the expansion of the kinship associations in terms of numbers and influence. This was due to three major factors. First, British suppression of the secret societies in 1889 and the introduction of Societies Registration Ordinance in the following year crushed the power of the secret societies and drove them underground,41 and all Chinese social organizations came under the 39

See Khoo Phaik Suat (1974). The Clan Kongsis of Penang, with particular reference to Leong San Tong Khoo Kongsi. An unpublished B.A. Honours Academic Exercise, Science University of Malaysia, Penang, p. 21; author’s interview with Yeoh Seng Chan, clan leader of the Yeoh Kongsi in Penang on 17 July 1974. 40 See Comber L (1959). Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Survey of the Triad Society from 1800 to 1900. pp. 77–246. Singapore: Donald Moore; Blythe W (1969). The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, pp. 88–221. London: Oxford University Press; Wynne ML (1941). Triad and Tabut: A Survey of the Origins and Diffusion of Chinese and Mohamedan Secret Societies in the Malay Peninsula, 1800–1935, pp. 245–277. Singapore: Government Printing Office. 41 See Blythe W, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, pp. 224–248.

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supervision of the government. Being the two mainstays of the Chinese social structure, the kinship and dialect associations were recognized as legitimate social institutions that lifted their social status in the Chinese communities and attracted more emigrants to join. Second, the surge of new emigrants from China created favorable conditions for kinship associations to recruit members. Third, the booming economy of the Chinese communities as a result of the development of rubber,42 tin mining, and manufacturing changed the social outlook of the communities, and stimulated the development of the kinship associations. The third stage was marked by the fall of Malaya and Singapore into the hands of the Japanese in 1942 and ended with the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965. This short period of about 24 years can be subdivided into two phases: the period of Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and the postwar and the postindependent period. Under the Japanese rule, the Chinese communities suffered brutality and persecution, and hundreds and thousands of Chinese, especially those who were educated, were rounded up and shot.43 Most of the Chinese social organizations ceased to function and their members were scattered, including the kinship associations. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and the return of the British rule, Chinese social organizations were resurrected but were confronted with extraordinary challenges: ancestral temples and clan club houses that 42

For the rise of rubber as a mainstay of Malayan economy, see Jackson JC (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921, pp. 211–245. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press; Drabble JH (1973). Rubber in Malaya, 1876–1922: The Genesis of the Industry. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; Barlow C (1978). The Natural Rubber: Its Development, Technology and Economy in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 43 For massacres of the Chinese in British Malaya, see several accounts of massacres in Penang, Johore, and Singapore in Hsu Yun-ts’iao and Chua Ser-koon (eds.) (1984). Xin Ma huaren kang Ri shiliao, 1937–1945 (Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1937–1945: Selected Source Materials), pp. 430–438, 504–516, 588–602. Singapore: Cultural and Historical Publishing House Pte. Ltd. For the massacre in Singapore and the estimated number of the victims ranging from 5000 to 50,000, see Chua Ser-koon (1984). Zhanshi Malaiya de Huaren (The Chinese in Malaya under the Japanese Occupation). In Malaixiya Huaren Shi (A History of the Chinese in Malaysia) Lim Chooi Kwa and Loh Cheng Sun (eds.), pp. 73–75. Petaling Jaya: The Federation of Alumni Associations of Taiwan Universities, Malaysia.

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were damaged or left in disrepair under the Japanese occupation required repairs or renovations44; clan members who suffered the scourge of the Japanese rule needed immediate financial relief; and the economic reconstruction of their home land in southern China required substantial financial assistance. These gigantic tasks spurred the clan leaders to work hard during the postwar period. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the rubber boom following the outbreak of the Korean War, together with a liberal economic policy pursued by the independent Malayan government, created unprecedented prosperity that enabled the kinship associations to carry out their activities smoothly.

Present Conditions and Future of the Chinese Kinship Associations in Singapore and Malaysia The independence of Singapore from Malaysia on 9th August 1965 was an important event in the political history of the region, and it was also the watershed in the history of the Ethnic Chinese in both countries. Before the separation, Singapore and Malaya were considered as an integrated whole, while the Ethnic Chinese regarded themselves to be members of the same family. After the independence, both countries pursued separate goals with different policies that had profound impact on the Chinese communities. The Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia had to accept the new reality that they belonged to two sovereign states with different goals and policies. Since August 1965, Malaysia continued to pursue its single language and education policies that focused on the development of Malay language and culture.45 This approach imposed immense pressure on 44 For instance, the Singapore Teochew Lee Clan Association stopped operating during the Japanese occupation, and its clan temple was left in disrepair. After the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Lee clansmen were occupied with raising money to renovate the temple. See Li Xiongqiu (1970). Xinjiapo Chaozhou Longxi gonghui (The Teochew Lee Clan Association of Singapore). In Long Xi Lishi jinian tekan (Long Say Lee Clans Souvenir Magazine), Li Guohan et al. (eds.), Singapore, “Hui Shi” (Section on History of the Association), p. 4. 45 For a discussion of the birth of “National Culture” of Malaysia (based on Malay culture) in 1971 and its implications for Malaysian Chinese culture, see Hou Kok Chung (2002). Malaixiya Huaren: Shenfen rentong, wenhua yu zuqun zhengzhi (Malaysian Chinese: Identity, Culture and Ethnic Conflict, pp. 97–131. Kuala Lumpur: Center for Malaysian Chinese Studies.

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the Chinese community in Malaysia. The government’s attitude in treating Chinese social organizations was to let them take their natural course to oblivion. Although the Chinese community adopted a “self-reliance” strategy (zili gengsheng) to develop Chinese education and culture, including famous “Chinese independent high schools revival movement” (huawen duli zhongxue fuxing yundong) and achieved remarkable results,46 the Chinese social organizations were still confronted with some major problems such as outdated objectives and functions, the decline of membership and the aging of the leadership. These problems were especially serious among the kinship associations. On the other hand, the Chinese social organizations in Singapore seem to have taken a different direction. In the first 10 years after the independence, the Singapore Chinese associations encountered similar problems like their counterparts in Malaysia such as declining membership and aging leadership, plus some of the traditional functions had been taken over by the state. Later, under the encouragement of the slogans of “survival” and “nation-building”, many educated Chinese were prepared to get involved in the social organizations. At the same time, the Singapore government, with realization of great potential of the Chinese social organizations for the prosperity of Singapore if they were properly guided, helped to found the Federation of Chinese Clan Associations of Singapore (Xinjiapo zongxiang zonghui) on 27th January 1986,47 and the majority of the Chinese associations were included into this new umbrella organization. 46

For the birth, development, and prospect of the Independent Chinese High Schools Revival movement in the state of Perak, Malaysia, see Hu Wanduo (1976). Fazhan Pilizhou Huawen duzhong zhanwang (The prospect of the development of the Independent Chinese High Schools in Perak), and Shen Ting (1976). Pilizhou Huawen duzhong fuxing shi (A history of the revival of independent Chinese High Schools in Perak). In Pilizhou Huawen duzhong fuxing shi (AHistory of the Revival of Independent Chinese High Schools in Perak), Shen Ting (ed.), pp. 4–9. Ipoh: Shanghai yinwu shuju. 47 For the inauguration of the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations on 27 January 1986, and the opening speech delivered by Mr Ong Teng Cheong, the Second Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, see Lim Haw Seng, Lim Guan Hock and Kwa Buk Lim (eds.), (1986). History of the Chinese Clan Associations in Singapore, p. 146. Singapore: Singapore News & Publications Ltd.

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The founding of the federation was a landmark in the social history of the Chinese in Singapore, and it was a milestone for great unity and solidarity of the Chinese social organizations. It embraced most of the associations numbering 185 units, and formed a gigantic social force. Two out of the seven objectives of the Federation — Objective 2 and 3 — are especially important. The former was to promote, sponsor, or assist Chinese educational, cultural, and social activities so as to raise public awareness and appreciation of Chinese language, culture and tradition. The latter was to promote, assist, or initiate the research of Chinese language, culture, and tradition. The ultimate aim of the above objectives was to foster and develop Chinese culture and tradition. The preservation and promotion of Chinese culture and tradition were significant in the creation of new culture and society of the Republic of Singapore. In 1982, more than 3 years before the formation of the Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, the Singapore government launched the Confucian education movement which was aimed at incorporating the essence of Confucianism into the curriculum of high schools in Singapore (as an elective subject for religious and moral studies). The government also invited eight renowned scholars to Singapore to spread Confucian ideas through public lectures and seminars.48 In 1983, an institution that devoted its studies of Confucianism — The Institute of Studies of East Asian Philosophies — was established in the campus of the National University of Singapore. The Confucian education movement, in retrospective, was not to revive Confucian teachings, but to critically evaluate the teachings for the purpose of preserving and developing traditional Chinese values. In the process of modernization and the remolding new Singaporean culture, the government saw the downside of Western culture and the positive elements in traditional Chinese culture that can be extracted for the creation of new Singaporean culture. With the backing of enormous human and financial resources, the Federation of Chinese Clan Associations was able to launch large-scale 48

See Wang Mong Lin (Director, Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore) (1984). Foreword. In Confucian Ethics Today: The Singapore Challenge, Tu Wei-Ming, pp. ix–xi. Singapore: Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore & Federal Publications (S) Pte. Ltd.

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cultural activities, and scored notable results. In 1989, when the federation celebrated its third anniversary, it listed several major achievements in the 3 years. This included the sponsoring a large-scale celebration of the Chinese new year — spring festival concert (zong xiang zhi ye), a movement for promotion of speaking Mandarin, publishing a biennial bulletin — Yuan (The Origins) and other publications, and sponsoring exhibitions of Chinese cultural artifacts and relics. In addition, the federation also hosted academic seminars, Chinese computer learning classes, and table tennis tournaments. Most importantly, it set up a history resource center — Singapore Chinese Cultural and Historical Materials Center (Xin Hua wenshi zhiliao zhongxin) — for collecting source materials relating to the Chinese in Singapore. The achievements of the federation inspired and spurred the activities of member associations that strove toward a clear goal of promoting culture and unity so as to contribute to the nation-building of the young republic. Some associations opened their doors for outsiders in order to remove dialect barriers among the Chinese. They also promoted healthy cultural activities such as setting up choirs, hamonica groups, Chinese music groups, and Chinese dance troupes. For strengthening the spread of Chinese culture, they started cultural and academic classes for members, and sponsored poem recitations and writings, publishing of magazines and books, etc. Some kinship organizations also sponsored international clan conventions to promote friendship and economic cooperation. What would be the future of Chinese kinship associations in Singapore and Malaysia? Is there any future at all for the organizations? These are the questions that many people would like to ask, but there are not simple answers. Being a historian, I would like to answer these questions from a historical perspective. They can be considered at two different levels: the problems of function and internal solidarity. With regard to the functions of the kinship associations, we have seen clearly that they were the products of their time to meet certain special needs. The 19th century Chinese society was fundamentally an immigrant society consisting primarily of male immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong. The majority of them had little or no education

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at all, and they needed a great deal of help from clansmen to solve problems of living and employment. The kinship associations were formed to meet these needs. However, the changing times and environment put them to the crucial test as to whether they can alter their functions to suit the changing times and needs. Far-sighted leaders who regarded these changes as a challenge were prepared to change the functions, and to promote healthy cultural activities and education. They carried out reforms and helped to transform the image of the associations as archaic and irrelevant organizations. I am sure these reforms would continue to receive support from younger members and ignite their enthusiasm in getting involved in the associations’ activities. For these associations, I believe their future is bright. However, for those kinship associations with conservative leadership that follow tradition closely, their future is bleak. Because they failed to change their functions to suit the changing times and environment, they would lose support and decline into oblivion. Many organizations in history that failed to keep pace with changing times became historical relics. The problem of internal solidarity is also crucial for the survival of the kinship associations. Kinship association is a social organization that consists of members with diverse backgrounds and motives, and as such, also becomes a target for people with ulterior motives for advancing personal interests. Some people are active in these social organizations to acquire fame and enhance social status, and some even advantage of the organizations to reap financial benefits. One of the common problems of Ethnic Chinese social organizations is the lack of unity and solidarity. A key factor contributing to the problem is Chinese tradition that overemphasized the interests of family and clan. Another key factor is the legacy of an immigrant society that overfocuses on competition and material gains. To a certain extent, the fame and financial interest (ming li) are sometimes the cause for leadership brawls in the social organization that would weaken its strength and tarnish its public image. The kinship associations are of no exception. To overcome internal disunity, the leader of the association must have a spirit of dedication and determination to serve the members and the society, he or she must have broad-mindedness and

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foresight, have the ability to foster internal unity and solidarity and lead the association to a bright future. At present, Singapore and Malaysia are undergoing rapid economic and political developments, and industrialization, modernization and urbanization have profound impact on the society that have indirectly affected the Chinese social organizations. If the kinship associations are able to critically assess these influences and carry out reforms accordingly, I have no reason to doubt that their future would be a bright one.

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Chapter 6

Reflections on My Study of Ethnic Chinese History in Singapore and Malaysia*

The Attitude of Study in Ethnic Chinese Histories in Singapore and Malaysia The totality and organism of history History is the total record of activities of the entire human race, and a good history is a record that faithfully reflects the major themes of human activities. The writing of a good history of the Ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia is of no exception. It has to reflect in entirety the lives and struggles of the Ethnic Chinese in these two countries, and it has to be written in the context of modern Chinese history and the history of Southeast Asia, for the existence and development of the communities were closely related to the development and strife of both China and Southeast Asia. Further, as history is a major part of social science, it cannot be separated from other branches of social science such as politics, economics, sociology, anthropology, culture, and religion. In view of this, a competent historian of Ethnic Chinese studies needs modern history training with broad social science knowledge. Thus, he or she would be able to interpret the history of the Ethnic Chinese in its entirety. Apart from its entirety, history is an organic whole of human records. It is not only a manifestation of objective events, but also a record of interaction between internal and external forces. For * This chapter is based on my speech in Chinese delivered as the inaugural Tan Lark Sye Professor of Nanyang Technological University of Singapore in August 2000 at the Singapore History Museum.

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instance, an economic problem cannot be fully understood from just an economic perspective, otherwise the conclusion would be partial and incomplete. On the contrary, a multi faceted analysis would provide a better and more accurate answer.

Scientific methods for the study of the Ethnic Chinese history of Singapore and Malaysia Since history is an important part of social science, its research has to be conducted in a scientific way. The scientific way of conducting a research is to delve into rich historical records and attempt to integrate theories with source materials. In the 1950s and 1960s, a group of Western scholars — historians, political scientists, and economists — adopted a research method in which fact and evidence were sought to support a preset theoretical framework. This method appears to be unscientific because it does not seek truth from fact, but rather use partial fact to support a pre-conceived idea or theory. On the contrary, a scientific method uses a theory as a premise, and critically evaluates rich historical records, then reaches conclusions on the basis of this process. In the field of Ethnic Chinese history, some historians have adopted the first approach. For instance, in his book Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore published in 1978, Dr Lee Poh Ping of University of Malaya attempted to interpret the causes for the violent clashes in the 19th century Chinese society of Singapore from an economic perspective. He claimed that the prime factor for the disturbances was the existing gambier and pepper society being impinged by a free trade society,1 and his work had at that time been hailed by some scholars as a fresh new interpretation of the social history of the Chinese in 19th century Singapore. However, Lee’s theory was based on a rather shaky ground without strong historical evidence. In their review of Lee’s book, Professor Wong Lin Ken, former Raffles’s Professor and Head of the History Department of the National University of Singapore, and Professor Khoo Kay 1 See Lee Poh Ping (1978). Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore, pp. 11–30. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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Reflections on My Study of Ethnic Chinese History

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Kim, the Professor of History of the University of Malaya, pointed out that Lee lacked strong historical evidence to support the existence of two unrelated economic societies. Therefore, Lee’s theory cannot be fully supported.2 Before Lee published his work, he had a private conversation with me in Kuala Lumpur over his new interpretation. I expressed my doubts on the existence of the two separate and unrelated societies — “pepper and gambier society” and “free trade society” — and his so-called new interpretation was in question. Lee himself was not familiar with the Chinese language, and had to depend on a translator. Further, the Chinese materials that he had consulted were quite limited. But he was keen to quickly publish his thesis as a book. Lee received his training from an American university with strong influence from a famous social historian, Barrington Moore.3 He attempted to apply Moore’s theory to his study of Singapore Chinese society, but unfortunately his approach was too mechanical without the support of rich historical materials, and his conclusions were therefore called to question. Another example of this unscientific approach to the writing of Ethnic Chinese histories of Singapore and Malaysia is the work of a Japanese historian, Sei’ichi Imahori who published a book on the Chinese society in Malaya. One of the focuses of his book is the study of the Chinese commercial guilds. He concluded that the early Chinese temples in Singapore and Malaya were commercial guilds that included the famous Ching Hoon Teng Temple of Malacca, the Tian Fu Gong (Tian Hock Keng) of Singapore, and the Guang Fu Gong of Penang. The main evidence for his assertion was that most of the directors of these temples were rich Chinese merchants.4 Obviously, Professor Imahori failed to grasp the fact that the leadership of the Chinese society was monopolized by the members of the merchant class, and the temples they had controlled were not 2

See Wong Lin Ken’s (1980) review article published in the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 11(1), pp. 152–155; see also Khoo Kay Kim’s (1978) review article in the Journal of Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 51(2), 151–153. 3 See the preface of Lee’s book. 4 See Sei’ichi Imahori (1979). Malaiya Huaqiao Shehui (Overseas Chinese Society in Malaya), translated by Liu Guoyin, pp. 4–5. Penang: Jiaying huiguan.

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equivalent to commercial organizations. Professor Imahori only spent 3 months for his fieldwork in Malaya, and he seemed to have rushed to the conclusion without commanding sufficient source materials, and he had also mechanically applied Western economic theories to the study of the Ethnic Chinese society in Malaya. This approach is unscientific and needs to be corrected.

Some Issues in the Ethnic Chinese Histories of Singapore and Malaysia History of the ruling class or history of the ruled From a broad historical perspective, the Ethnic Chinese community did not belong to the mainstream society of Singapore and Malaya, but was a dependent one. This meant that there were no ruling and the ruled within the Chinese community. In the main stream society, members of the ruling class consisted of Malay aristocrats and British colonial officers who were the holders of power. Within the Chinese community, the society was divided into upper and lower social classes. The former consisted of rich merchants, tin miners, and land owners, while the latter comprised workers (tin mining workers, estate workers, and wharf workers), rickshaw pullers, prostitutes, and beggars. Social stratification and status allocation were not based on the possession of power but on wealth.5 At the same time, the Ethnic Chinese society was not rigidly structured, and it possessed a high degree of social mobility. As wealth was the determining factor for social mobility, a pauper could move up the social ladder with fast speed if he had made a fortune regardless of his previous social status. Similarly a rich merchant would lose his social status and respect if he lost his wealth and would move down to the lower stratum of the Chinese society.6 For this reason, it would be unwise to conduct research into Ethnic Chinese society based on class analysis. 5

See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 141–143. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 6 Ibid., pp. 154–162.

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Of course, there were exceptional cases in the Ethnic Chinese history in Southeast Asia. Some of the Chinese leaders were incorporated into the ruling class of the mainstream society, but they still retained close connections with their Chinese communities. In the 18th and 19th century Southeast Asia, Chinese Kapitans were appointed by Western colonial governments as agents to rule the Chinese communities, and they were incorporated into the colonial power structure. However, these Chinese Kapitans were mostly rich tin miners or wealthy merchants as well as the leaders of their own dialect groups, and they still retained close geographical or kinship relations with the people they ruled.7 Despite these facts, some historians adopted class analysis in their approach. In 1986, Dr James Warren of Murdoch University, Western Australia, published his book on the lower class Chinese in Singapore entitled Richshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore,8 which was followed after a few years by another book entitled Ah Ku and Karayuki-San: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940.9 The former examined the lives and struggle of Chinese coolies, while part of the latter was concerned with the miserable lives of Chinese prostitutes. In his introduction, Dr Warren clearly indicated that he was particularly fond of writing the history of lower class that justified his class analysis approach. He had widely searched government records including the reports of coroners for his works, and attempted to look at the society and social change from a lower-class perspective. I have always held a view that the writing of the history of coolies or prostitutes can only reflect part of the lives of the Ethnic Chinese society, but it was partial and cannot reflect the real lives of the entire Chinese community. This one-sided perspective is not only partial, but it also distorts the image of the whole picture.

7 Ibid., pp. 42–43, 125–126. For a study of the early Chinese Kapitans in Singapore and Malaya, see Wong, CS (1963). A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans. Singapore: Ministry of Culture. 8 See Warren JF (1986). Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore 1880–1940, Singapore: Oxford University Press. 9 Warren JF, Ah Ku and Karayuki-San: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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The centrality of China and the periphery of Ethnic Chinese communities Ethnic Chinese relations with China is a major issue in the study of Ethnic Chinese history of Singapore and Malaysia. Since the 1870s, protection of Ethnic Chinese became a major issue of China’s diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and the Ethnic Chinese also played an increasingly important role in China’s politics and economy. What should be our attitude in assessing their relationship? A common attitude adopted by historians is to look at China as the centrality of this relationship, while the Ethnic Chinese communities were placed at the periphery. This relationship seems to be characterized by a “giving and receiving” dichotomy, especially in diplomatic protection. The protection of Chinese coolies and the Ethnic Chinese in the late Qing period,10 and the activities of the Chinese reformists and the revolutionaries among the Ethnic Chinese in the early 20th century tended to give the impression of China’s “giving” to the Ethnic Chinese communities. At the same time, late Qing and early Republican China’s education reform that had profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese reinforced this impression. Further, the import of books and textbooks from China, and the impact of the May Fourth Movement on the Ethnic Chinese projected an image of continuous “receiving” by the peripheral Ethnic Chinese communities. From another perspective, however, the Ethnic Chinese communities were not just in the position of receiving things from China, but they also served as an important bridge between China and the outside world. Through this bridge, progressive thoughts, advanced economic and commercial organizations, and political influence from the West were effectively transmitted to China. Further, Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs from Southeast Asia such as Zhang Bishi (Chang Pishih, known as Thio Tiauw Siat), Zhang Yinan (Chang Yu-nan) and Hu Zichun (Foo Chee Choon) invested substantially in China in

10

For the protection of coolies and Ethnic Chinese during this period, see Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 204–347. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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building railways, mining, and grape wine production.11 In the same period, the Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs from Australia such as Ma Yingbiao (Ma Ying-piu), Guo Le (Kwok Lock), and Guo Quan (Kwok Chin) brothers, learned the Western practice of doing business in Sydney, and founded the famous Sincere (Xiansi) and Wing On (Yong An) companies in Hong Kong and Shanghai. They inaugurated the modern Chinese departmental stores in China, and were the forerunners of modern Ethnic Chinese enterprise.12 The efforts of the above-mentioned Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs contributed significantly to the economic modernization of China. On the political front, the Ethnic Chinese also impacted on the political development in modern China. After the failure of the 1898 Reform in China, the Reformists and the Revolutionaries fled to Ethnic Chinese communities for refuge. Both of the groups mobilized huge support among the Ethnic Chinese for their political purposes. With a strong support from the Chinese in Southeast Asia and North America, Dr Sun Yat-sen launched several revolts in South and Southwest China, and eventually led to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 11

For Ethnic Chinese capitalists’ involvement in constructing railroads in South China, see Godley, MR (1973). Chang Pi-shih and Nanyang Chinese involvement in South China’s railroads, 1896–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4, pp. 16–30; Godley, MR (1975). The late Ch’ing courship of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Journal of Asian Studies, 34, pp. 361–385; Godley, MR (1981). The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Yen Chinghwang (1982). The Overseas Chinese and the late Ch’ing economic modernization. In Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16 (2), pp. 217–232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Yen Chinghwang (1984). Chang Yu-nan and the Chaochow Railway (1904–1908). Modern Asian Studies, 18(1) 119–135. Yen’s two articles are also published in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Studies in Modern Chinese History, pp. 159–195. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 12 For the histories of Sincere and Wing On Companies, see Chan Wellington KK (1982). The organizational structure of the traditional Chinese firm and its modern reform. East Asian Business History (A Special Issue of the Business History Review), 56(Summer), especially, pp. 219–235; Chan Wellington KK (1998). Personal styles, cultural values and management: The Sincere and Wing On Companies in Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1900–1941. In Asian Department Stores, KL MacPherson (ed.), pp. 66–89; (Richmond; Surrey; Curzon Press), Yen Ching-hwang (1995), The Wing On Company in Hong Kong and Shanghai: A case study of modern overseas Chinese enterprise, 1907–1949. Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, pp. 196–236. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Yen Ching-hwang. Wing On and the Kwok brothers: A case study of pre-war Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. In Asian Department Stores, KL. MacPherson (ed.), pp. 47–65.

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February 1912.13 Further, in the 1930s when China was confronted by a full-scale invasion by the Japanese imperialists, the Ethnic Chinese, especially those in Southeast Asian region, under the leadership of Tan Kah-kee, successfully raised huge sums of money to support China’s resistance against Japanese aggression. Had there been no Ethnic Chinese financial and moral support, China would have had a harder time in its resistance and would have suffered more setbacks.14 All these examples show that the peripheral Ethnic Chinese communities also had an impact on China. Mutual interactions and impacts between the two parties should be given a proper focus in the study of their relations.

Colonial viewpoint or Ethnic Chinese viewpoint Most Southeast Asian newly independent states have a long colonial past that needs to be re-evaluated in a proper historical context. Many European colonial powers — British, Dutch, French, Spanish, and Portuguese — without exception sought maximum economic benefits by using Chinese cheap labor and trading skills to create more wealth, while Chinese traders had to grow their business under the Western colonial system. In other words, the prosperity of the Ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia depended to a large extent on the development and prosperity of the colonies. This mutual dependent relationship though necessary, is in some way conflicting. Because of this, the Southeast Asian government records were sometimes tainted with bias in relation to the Ethnic Chinese and their activities. For instance, the Ethnic Chinese communities in the second half of the 19th and first decade of 20th centuries were plagued by the problems 13

See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. 14 See Stephen Mun Yoon Leong (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles; Yen Ching-hwang (1998). The Overseas Chinese and the second SinoJapanese war, 1937–1945. Journal of South Seas Society 52 (August), pp. 150–159. See also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 369–388. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

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of opium-smoking and gambling. In commenting on these problems, the colonial officers or officer-turned scholars tended to shirk the government’s responsibilities. In 1856, Thomas Braddell, a former British government officer, claimed that the problem of gambling cannot be eradicated because it was a daily need of the Chinese laborers.15 Another British high-ranking officer in Malaya, L. A. Mills in his book, British Malaya, 1824–1826, considered gambling a part of Chinese national character.16 In 1883, the Acting Colonial Secretary of Penang asserted that Chinese were born with a gambling instinct and they were born gamblers.17 Obviously, most of the colonial government officers or scholars blamed the Chinese and their national character for the gambling problem. In fact, the fundamental cause for the widespread gambling in the Ethnic Chinese communities in British Malaya was the government’s “gambling farm” system from which the government derived substantial income. I have in my book, The Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, corrected this viewpoint.18 I believe that a balanced view on the gambling and opiumsmoking issues should take into consideration the nature of the Chinese immigrant society of predominantly male workers, the gambling farm system, and the profit orientation of the gambling farmers who had a vested interest of luring more customers into gambling dens.

The issue of Overseas Chinese nationalism From the end of the 19th century to the 1940s, there was a surge of Overseas Chinese nationalism in Southeast Asia. It not only had a profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese communities, but also had 15

See Braddell T (1856). Gambling and opium smoking in the straits of Malacca. Journal of Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, Ser. 2, (1), pp. 66–67. 16 See Mills LA, (1960). British Malaya 1824–1826, an independent issue re-published in the Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 33 (3) p. 239. 17 See short-hand report of the proceedings of the legislative council, the Straits Settlements dated 6 July 1883. In Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings, 1883, p. 50. 18 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 239–241. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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significant implications for the development of modern Chinese history. The outpouring of Overseas Chinese’s national feeling was first demonstrated in their solid support for China’s reform and revolutionary movements.19 Both Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen obtained substantial support from the Overseas Chinese. After the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912, the Overseas Chinese expressed their patriotic sentiment in support of China’s fight against external aggressions such as the 1915 anti-Japanese movement,20 the fervent response to the May Fourth Movement in 1919,21 the anti-Japanese boycott movement in the period between 1928 and 1931,22 and the full-scale fund-raising movement in support of China’s resistance against the Japanese invasion between 1937 and 1941.23 The surge of the Overseas Chinese nationalism during this period was the product of its time and a historical fact that no one can deny. Several years ago, I had the privilege of being asked to write the historical section for the proposed book, The Chinese in Malaysia. After

19

See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. Armentrout Ma LE (1990), Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 20 See Yoji Akashi (1968). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and boycott movement, 1908–1928: A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. Journal of South Seas Society 23, pp. 71–73. 21 See Tsui Kuei-chiang (1965). Haixia zhimindi Huaren dui wushi yundong de fanxiang (The response of the Chinese in Straits Settlements to the May Fourth Movement). Journal of the South Seas Society 20, pp. 13–18. 22 See Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan Incident, 1928. Journal of the South Seas Society, 43, pp. 1–22; See also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 306–329. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 23 See Yoji Akashi (1970). The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement 1937–1941. Kansas: The University of Kansas Press. Leong Stephen MY (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles; Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Overseas Chinese and the second Sino-Japanese war, 1937–1945. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 369–388. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Ren Guixiang (1989), Huaqiao di erhci aiguo gaochao (The Second High Tide of Patriotism of the Overseas Chinese), pp. 67–98. Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi zhiliao chubanshe; Zeng Ruiyan (1988). Huaqiao yu kang Ri zhanzheng (The Overseas Chinese and the Resistance to Japanese Invasion), pp. 126–147. Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe.

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having completed my draft, I sent it to the editors for their comments. One of the editors felt that my paper was too Chinaoriented especially in dealing with Overseas Chinese nationalism, and he asked me to incorporate more information on the friendly relations between Chinese and Malays. I rejected his request with a note that I could not change historical facts to suit current political requirements, for during the period between the late 19th century and 1940s, China was the mainstream of the Ethnic Chinese political life. I always hold the view that the prime responsibility of a historian is to reflect and evaluate the objective historical facts, and he/she has to take a scientific approach in his/her works, but not to write history to serve politics or other needs.

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Chapter 7

Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya (1900–1911)*

Just as Dr Sun Yat-sen was a great leader of the Chinese people, so was he a great leader of the Overseas Chinese. He lived in the hearts of millions of the Overseas Chinese. Sun had a deep feeling for them too, and was greatly appreciative of their contributions to the revolution he led. This led to him honoring them with the famous remark, that the Overseas Chinese were the mother of the Revolution of 1911. Unlike many Chinese in China, Sun was not scornful of his overseas compatriots. Instead, he had profoundly intimate feelings for them. This was because he spent a great deal of time amongst them, communicated with them, and understood their grievances and hopes. The Overseas Chinese reciprocated this feeling with enormous admiration and respect for Dr Sun. They admired his courage, his integrity and dedication to the cause of making China strong and wealthy. They were also impressed by his demeanor, his charming personality, and his unfading confidence in the revolution and the future of China.

Sun’s Relationship with the Overseas Chinese Since the founding of the Hsing Chung Hui in 1894 to the founding of the Chinese Republic in early 1912, Sun Yat-sen’s political career was closely related to his ability to mobilize support from the Overseas Chinese . In this sense, the Overseas Chinese were an important part of Sun’s political capital. Sun was the only great Chinese leader in modern

* This chapter is based on a paper presented at the Centenial Symposium on Sun Yat-sen’s Founding of the Kuomintang for Revolution, held in Taipei, 19–23 November 1994.

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times who had spent a great deal of time among the Overseas Chinese before the 1911 Revolution. His pre-1911 political activity was almost entirely centered on the Overseas Chinese communities, planning, maneuvering, and trying to capture a revolutionary base in the south and southwestern parts of China. In his overall relationship with the Overseas Chinese, his relationship with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was especially close. During about 16 years of wandering overseas between 1894 and 1911, Sun visited Singapore at least eight times, and Malaya, six times.1 Sun also stayed for a considerable period of time in these two places. In Singapore, his residence was the famous Wan Ching Yuan (Bin Chan House), a revolutionary headquarters in Singapore, while in Penang, his secret residence was a two-storey villa at 400 Dato Kramat Road.2 Sun’s close personal relationship with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya can also be seen from his intimate relations with some local Chinese leaders. He sealed close bonds with Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock in Singapore, Goh Say-eng and Ng Kim-Keng in Penang, Tay Lay-seng in Ipoh, and Teng Tse-ju in Kuala Pilah. He kept in touch with them constantly through correspondence or through a sophisticated ciphering system.3 During the T’ung Meng Hui period from August 1905 to December 1911, Sun wrote at least 96 letters to Overseas Chinese leaders dealing with party affairs or soliciting funds. Sixty-three of these were written to the leaders in Singapore and Malaya, principally to Teo Eng-hock, Tan Chor-nam, and Teng Tse-ju.4 1

See Wang Gungwu (1981). Sun Yat-sen and Singapore. In Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, pp. 128–141. Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books. See also Wang Gungwu (1953). Chinese reformists and revolutionaries in the Straits Settlements 1900–1917. BA Honours thesis, University of Malaya, Singapore. 2 See Teo Eng-hock, (1933). Nan-yang yu chuang-lt Min-kuo (Nanyang and the Founding of the Chinese Republic), pp. 48–49, Shanghai; Tan Kim Hong (ed.), (1987). Ping-ch’eng hua-tsu li-shih t’u-p’ien chi (The Chinese in Penang A Pictorial Documentation), p. 142. Penang. 3 See Teo Eng-hock, one of the front pages. 4 The other 33 letters were written to Overseas Chinese leaders in the Dutch East Indies, Vietnam, Thailand, the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong. See Sun Chung-shan ch’uan-chi (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen) (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 286–586. Beijing: Chung Hua shu-chi; Chen Hsu-lu and He Sheng-ch’ao (eds.) (1990). Sun Chung-san chi wai-chi (Additional Records to Sun Yat sen’s Complete Works), pp. 330–337. Shanghai: Shang-hai jen-min ch’u pan she.

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His personal relationship with Teng Tse-ju was especially cordial. Teng, a successful tin miner and businessman, joined the T’ung Meng Hui in 1906, and became the president of the T’ung Meng Hui branch of Kuala Pilah when it was founded at the end of 1907. Teng soon became Sun’s faithful follower and a confidant, partly because he was a Cantonese speaker who could communicate with Sun well. In the period between 1907 and 1910, Teng was the main figure responsible for helping to raise funds from the local Chinese for several planned uprisings in the south and southwest of China.5 Whenever Sun was in need of money, Teng was one of the first people to be contacted. This was why, out of Sun’s 63 letters to the Overseas Chinese leaders in Singapore and Malaya during the T’ung Meng Hui period, 38 of them were written to Teng Tse-ju alone.6 Teng’s financial contribution to the staging of various uprisings before the 1911 Revolution and his unreserved loyalty to Dr Sun Yat-sen was well recognized by other revolutionary leaders, such as Huang Hsing and Hu Han-min, who spoke highly of him.7 Thus, Teng became one of Sun’s most trusted agents and the main spokesman for the Chinese in the region.

Sun’s Perception of the Overseas Chinese’s Role in the Revolution In a broad historical perspective, Sun Yat-sen stood out from other revolutionary leaders of modern China such as Hung Hsiu-ch’uan and Mao Tse-t’ung. This was because he had a different revolutionary direction and strategy. Having a different socio-economic background, education, and circumstances, Sun differed from Hung and Mao over the aims of the revolution. His ultimate aim was not just to 5.

See Lu Fang-shang (1986). Teng Tse-ju yu Hsin-h’ai ko-ming, 1906–1912 (Teng Tse-ju and the 1911 Revolution, 1906–1912). Hsin-h’ai ko-ming yu Nan-yang hua-jen yen-t’ao-hui, lunwen chi (Essays on the Southeast Asian Chinese and the 1911 Revolution), pp. 341–359. Taipei: Center for International Relations, National Cheng Chi University; T’an Hui-ch’uan (1965), Teng Tse-ju shih-lueh. In Ko-ming hsien-lieh hsien-chin chuan (Biographies of Revolutionary Martyrs and Leaders), p. 811. Taipei. 6. See Sun Chung-shan ch’uan-chi, Vol. 1, pp. 286–586. 7. See Hu Han-min, Kung-chu Tse-ju Teng hsien-sheng wu-shih shou hsu (A preface to the 50th birthday celebration of Teng Tse-ju). In Ko-ming hsien lieh hsien-chin chuan, p. 812.

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remove the Manchu regime, but to modernize China with the introduction of an advanced political system from the West. Unlike Hung Hsiu-ch’uan who attempted to restore a rather archaic but more equitable feudal system, and unlike Mao Tse-t’ung who emphasized the interests of the Chinese working class and proletarian dictatorship, Sun led a nationalistic and democratic revolution. Sun Yat-sen, to a certain extent, shared the peasant background of Hung Hsiu-ch’uan and Mao Tse-t’ung. But his elder brother’s migration to Hawaii and success in business in later years speedily altered the socio-economic status of Sun’s family in China. By the time Sun was actively involved in the revolution, Sun’s family status was more appropriately classified as middle class. More importantly, what made Sun different from Hung and Mao was his education. He received most of his education in English outside China, especially in Hawaii and Hong Kong. In 1878, at the age of 12, Sun arrived in Hawaii to join his brother. His education at the Iolani School, Honolulu, opened up a new world for him, and exposed him to Christian and Western influences.8 Sun’s 5 years of tertiary education at the College of Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong from 1887 to 1892 further reinforced Western influence on him, and shaped him as a liberal democrat. Although Sun was trained as a medical doctor, he did not confine his reading just to medical science subjects, but also studied a wide range of topics such as economics, politics, geography, history, and astronomy, and was especially interested in current affairs.9 His broad reading and keen observation led him to realize how much China was lagging behind the West. He had enormous admiration for the Western material civilization and its democratic systems, and was prepared to borrow these systems to help transform China into a modern state. 8

See Sun Chung-shan nien-pu (1980). (The Chronology of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 10–11. Beijing: Chung-hua shu-chi; Schiffrin, HZ (1968). Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 12–14. Berkeley: University of California Press. 9 See Lo Hsiang-lin (1954). Kuo-fu chih ta-hseuh shih-tai (University Days of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 30–32. Taipei: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan, reprint; Ch’en Hsi-ch’i, (1986). Kuan-yu Sun Chung-shan te ta hsueh shih-tai (Concerning the university days of Dr Sun Yat-sen). In Sun Chung-shan yen-chiu lun-wen chi, 1949–1984 (Essays on Sun Yat-sen Studies, 1949–1984), Vol. 1, pp. 66–67. Ch’eng-tu: Shih-ch’uan jen-min chu-pan she.

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Unlike Hung Hsiu-ch’uan and Mao Tse-t’ung, who were brought up in peasant families and spent their formative years in peasant society, Sun was, to a great extent, alienated from the Chinese peasantry. Because of this, he could not mobilize the peasantry in the way Hung and Mao did for his revolution. Thus, his orientation toward the West and his alienation from the peasant masses helped to determine the direction of his future revolution. Instead of roaming the Chinese countryside seeking support, Sun went to the Overseas Chinese communities to find his strength. He mobilized the support of the Chinese in Honolulu and founded the first Hsing Chung Hui there on 24 November 1894.10 Further, he gained support from the local Chinese in Hong Kong to found the Hsing Chung Hui headquarters there on 21 February 1895.11 Although Sun Yat-sen gained strong support from the Overseas Chinese for his early revolutionary movement, he had no clear perception of the Overseas Chinese’s role in the revolution before 1900. This was partly because of expediency, and partly because he was trying out a revolutionary strategy: romantic adventurism. His strong personal contacts with the Overseas Chinese in Honolulu and Hong Kong led him to seek early supporters among them. On the other hand, his strategy of romantic adventurism led him to try to exhaust all avenues of power, including the use of Chinese secret society members, Japanese agents and Filipino independence fighters.12 All these avenues seemed to offer instant success. But the failure of the Waichow (Hui chou) Revolt in 1900 shattered Sun’s hope of an instant revolution. He needed to chart a new course of action. In retrospect, the failure of the Waichow Revolt in the southern part of Kwangtung was a turning point in Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary 10

See Feng Tzu-yu (1965). Ko-ming i-shih (Reminiscences of the Revolution), pp. 3–4. Taipei: Shang-wu yin-shu kuan; Chang Yu-fa, (1982). Ch’ing-chi te ko-ming t’uan-li (Revolutionaries of the Late Ch’ing Period: An Analysis of Groups in the Revolutionary Movement. 1894–1911), pp. 159–162. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica; Hsueh Chun-tu (1971). Sun Yat-sen, Yang Chu-yun and the Early Revolutionary Movement in China. In Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China, Chun-tu Hsueh (ed), p. 106. New York: Oxford University Press. 11 See Chang Yu-fa, op. cit., pp. 163–166; Feng Tzu-yu (1953). Hua-ch’iao ko-ming k’ai kuo shih (Overseas Chinese and the Founding of the Chinese Republic), pp. 3–4. Taipei: Shang-wu yinshu kuan. 12 See Schiffrin, HZ, op. cit., p. 140.

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career. For the first time, he came to realize his limitations as a revolutionary and a conspirator. He began to realize that a successful revolution required long-term planning and massive popular support. In about 5 years between the Waichow Revolt and the founding of the Tung Meng Hui in August 1905, Sun became more mature as a professional revolutionary. He was no longer hasty and anxious to create a political miracle. He came to gain a long-term view of revolution: it depended very little on luck, but rather on a well-organized and well-executed plan and on broad support. He also came to realize that the revolutionary path was a tortuous one, full of twists and turns. It was this new perspective on revolution that brought Sun to include the Overseas Chinese into his long-term plans, in particular because of his awareness of their great financial potential. A post-mortem examination of the Waichow Revolt led Sun to discover that lack of money was a major factor in the defeat of the uprising. Moreover, he was impressed by the reformists’ success in raising funds among the Overseas Chinese for their abortive revolt in Hankow in 1900.13 He was especially impressed by an alleged donation of S$250,000 by a wealthy Singaporean Chinese named Khoo Seokwan.14 What made Sun even more aware of the importance of Overseas Chinese money was the reformists’ takeover of his old base in Honolulu. To Sun’s great surprise and outrage, his letter of introduction for Liang Ch’i-ch’ao in 1900 facilitated this takeover. Sun’s friendly gesture to Liang was intended to serve as a bridge to a possible alliance with the reformists, but Liang took advantage of Sun’s good faith and converted many local Chinese to the reformist cause, including many of Sun’s old supporters.15 From Honolulu to mainland United States, Liang and other reformist leaders scored further success in recruiting 13

See Ting Wen-chiang (ed.) (1959). Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p’u ch’ang-p’ien ch’u-kao (Preliminary Draft of Sources for a Chronological Biography of Liang Ch’i-ch’ao), p. 134. Taipei: Shih-chjeh shu-chi. 14 See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, p. 56. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. 15 See Feng Tzu-yu (1954). Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo ch’ien ko-ming shih (A Revolutionary History Prior to the Founding of the Chinese Republic), Vol. 1, p. 44. Taipei; Chang P’eng-yuan (1964). Liang Ch’i-ch’ao yu Ch’ing-chi ko-ming (Liang Ch’i-ch’ao and the Revolution during the Ch’ing Period), pp. 128–133. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academic Sinica.

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more Overseas Chinese into the Emperor Protection Association (Pao Huang Hui), and succeeded in tapping Overseas Chinese’s financial resources.16 In envy of the reformists’ financial success and realizing the importance of Overseas Chinese’s money, Sun in 1903 and 1904 undertook a trip to Honolulu and the United States mainland in an attempt to recover lost ground in the region. It was in this process of combating reformist influence that Sun gained new insights into the Overseas Chinese and their role in the revolution. We can safely suggest that by 1904, he must have had a clear perception of this: the Overseas Chinese were to be incorporated into his long-term plan, to serve mainly as the benefactors of the revolution. Sun’s perception of the Overseas Chinese’s role in the revolution was a romantic one. He felt that all Overseas Chinese should share his belief in building a strong and modern China, should fearlessly support the overthrow of the Manchu regime, and should donate generously to fund revolutionary activities. Sun was a nationalist, not a Marxist. Although he was sympathetic with the Marxist theory of fighting for the interests of common people, he rejected the Marxist interpretation of history as being the result of a constant class struggle.17 He felt that Marxist ideology had no room in his approach to the Overseas Chinese. To his thinking, the Overseas Chinese should think and behave like their compatriots in China. Despite their long sojourn overseas, they should be loyal to China, and should be dedicated to the cause of China’s salvation. Thus, despite their class backgrounds, age, and sex differences, they should support his revolution wholeheartedly. He further felt that the Overseas Chinese should have even more hatred for the Manchus 16

For Liang and other reformists leaders’ activities in Honolulu and mainland United States, see Armentrount Ma LE (1990). Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the America’s and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 60–94. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. For Sun’s perception of Liang’s success in tapping Overseas Chinese financial resources in San Francisco, see Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Huang Chung-yang, December 1903, in Sun Chung-shan ch’uan-chi, Vol. 1, pp. 229–230. 17 See Sun Yat-sen (1962). Min-sheng chu-i (The principle of people’s livelihood). In Sun Chung-shan hsuan-chi (Selected Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 2, pp. 776–781. Hong Kong: Ssu Tung ch’u-pan she.

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than their compatriots in China — not only because their ancestors were massacred by the Manchus during the Manchu conquest of China in the mid-17th century,18 but also because they were neglected by the Manchu government, which failed to protect them overseas.19 Thus, Sun had arrived at a clear perception of the role of the Overseas Chinese in the revolution. Because they were generally wealthier than their compatriots in China, the Overseas Chinese were to contribute money and to raise funds for his military programs. This perception of their role partly stemmed from his strong belief in specific roles for specific groups in the revolution. To Sun, each group in Chinese society, both at home and abroad, had a particular role to play in the revolution. Professional revolutionaries like him were to be the organizers and coordinators of the revolution; the intellectuals and students were to spread revolutionary ideas; the Overseas Chinese were to donate and raise money; and the members of secret societies and the new army were to become the attacking forces. The combination of the efforts of these various groups would make a successful revolution. This concept was partly derived from his ideas on the division of labor, and partly from his firm belief that the specific role assigned to each group was most suitable for that particular group. The financial role was given to the overseas Chinese not only because they were generally wealthier than their compatriots in China, but also because they knew very little about revolution, let alone how to fight a war in a revolutionary uprising in China. Sun had even on one occasion bluntly told Tan Chor-nam, a top leader of the Tung Meng Hui in Singapore, that the Overseas Chinese knew very little about 18

Sun’s accusation of Han Chinese massacres by the Manchus was repeated again and again to his Overseas Chinese audience: see the public talks delivered by Sun in Penang in 1907 and 1908, in Yang Han-hsiang (ed.), Ping-ch’eng yeh-shu pao-she nien-ssu chou-nien chi-nien t’e-k’an (Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary of the Penang Philomatic Society), pp. 141–143. Penang: n.d. English translations of these two public talks are found in Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Appendices 2 and 3. 19 See Sun’s public talk delivered at the P’ing Chang Kung Kuan (Chinese Town Hall of Penang) in 1907, ibid., pp. 141–142. For an analysis of the Ching Government’s failure to protect the Overseas Chinese, see Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, especially Chapters 5 and 7. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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the revolution,20 and repeated this view in a public speech to his supporters in Penang in April 1911.21 Sun Yat-sen’s perception of the role of the Singaporean and Malayan Chinese in the revolution was that it was no different from the role of the Overseas Chinese in general. Since the founding of the Tung Meng Hui in Japan in August 1905, he felt more confident about the revolutionary movement, and was preparing to launch a series of uprisings in the south and southwest of China. Sun realized that money was the key to the success of his planned revolts. Money was needed to purchase arms and ammunition, to bribe Ch’ing officials and soldiers, and to resettle revolutionary refugees when any revolt failed. He planned to raise $2,000,000 through sales of military bonds, which were to be sold at $250 per bond with a face value of $1000. The subscribers were to be repaid with the full value of the bonds when the revolution was successful.22 At that time, Sun had a vague idea that Southeast Asian Chinese communities were full of wealthy merchants, and they could become the main patrons of his proposed military scheme. He claimed that certain sons of these wealthy Chinese merchants in Penang and Java were student members of the Tung Meng Hui, and that they would return soon to Southeast Asia to help persuade their fathers and elder brothers to subscribe.23 This was why Sun wrote to Tan Chor-nam soon after the founding of the Tung Meng Hui in Tokyo, to look for rich patrons among the Chinese in Singapore. Sun at this time must also have been 20 In my interview with Tan Chor-nam in August 1966, he recalled that Sun had once told him bluntly that the Overseas Chinese knew very little about politics, and their most effective contribution to the revolution would be to donate money. Interview with Tan Chor-nam on 7 August 1966 at his residence in Singapore. 21 On this occasion, Sun stated that “Whenever I meet you comrades, my only purpose is to ask for donations… Overseas Chinese comrades need only to donate money, whereas comrades in China are to sacrifice their lives for the purpose of saving our country”, See Sun Yat-sen (1966). Tung-chih kung fu ko-ming chiu-kuo chih chih-jen (All Comrades must shoulder the responsibility of saving the nation). In Kuo-fu ch’uan-shu (Collected Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Chang Ch’i-yun (ed.), pp. 482–483. Taipei: Kuo-fang yen-chiu-yuan. 22 See Feng Tzu-yu, Ko-ming i-shih, Vol. 1, pp. 254–256. “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Tan Chor-nam (Ch’en Ch’u-nan) dated 30 September 1905.” In Sun Chung-shan ch’uan-chi. Vol. 1, pp. 286–287. 23 “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Tan Chor-nam”, ibid., p. 287.

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fully aware of the numerical strength and economic potential of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore and Malaya. He must have picked up this information from his early contacts with Dr Lim Boon Keng, Dr Wu Chieh-wu, and Huang Nai-shang in Singapore in 1900, when he arrived for the first time on the island in an attempt to rescue his two Japanese supporters from prison.24 He must also have gained the same information during his visits to Vietnam in 1900 and 1902.25 Later, Sun’s founding of the Tung Meng Hui branches in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in 1906, and his long stay in the region in the following years, led him to understand to the wealth of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In November 1909, in order to get a large loan from an American banker, Sun claimed that a group of wealthy Southeast Asian Chinese were willing to be the guarantors, and that their aggregate wealth was estimated to be around US$20,000,000. This group of wealthy Overseas Chinese included one banker, three proprietors of rice mills in Bangkok, several merchants in Singapore, and three tin miners in Malaya.26 Sun seemed to have been under the impression that among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, those in Singapore and Malaya were the richest. Because of this perception, Sun rested great hopes on them to contribute to the revolution. This led him to perceive that the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya should play a greater financial role than other Overseas Chinese in the revolution. His rather romantic view that all Overseas Chinese, regardless of their class backgrounds, age, and sex, should play an equal part in the revolution led him to believe that if he could persuade some extremely wealthy merchants to support his cause, all the financial problems for the planned uprisings could be resolved. 24

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 40. See Ch’en I-ling (1977). Kuo-fu yu Yueh-nan (Dr Sun Yat-sen and Vietnam). In Hua-ch’iao k’ai-kuo ko-ming shih-liao (Historical Materials relating to the Overseas Chinese and the Founding of the Chinese Republic), Chiang Yung-Ching (ed.), p. 385, Taipei: Cheng Chung shu-chi; Sun Chung-shan nien-p’u, pp. 47, 55. 26 See “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to an American banker, November 1909”. In Sun Chungshan chi-wai chi, Ch’en Hsu-lu, et al. (eds.), pp. 331–332. 25

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One of the merchants singled out by Sun was Loke Yew (romanized in Mandarin as Lu Yu; in Sun’s correspondences, Lu was referred to as Lu Pi-ch’en, as Pi-ch’en was the courtesy name of Lu Yu). Loke, a native of Ho Shan district of Kwangtung province, made his millions in tin mining in Malaya. He possessed scores of tin mines in Perak Selangor, and Pahang, and other cash crop plantations and commercial enterprises. He was one of the richest Chinese in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Southeast Asia.27 Sun had personally approached Loke in Kuala Lumpur in 1906 for a large donation, but was not successful. However, Sun persisted in trying to change Loke’s mind, either by correspondence or through his confidant, Teng Tseju, who was a close friend of Loke’s. Sun persisted in believing that Loke’s wealth was the answer to his financial problem, and that his request for a donation of S$100,000 to finance the Hokow uprising in Yunnan in April 1908 was easily affordable to Loke.28 Although Sun was disappointed with Loke for not patronizing his military programs, his perception of the important financial role of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was nevertheless unaltered, and he repeated this message time and again in the period between 1909 and 1911.29

The Response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya The popular belief that Sun Yat-sen easily gained the support of Overseas Chinese for his revolution is untenable. In fact, Sun appealed strongly to 27

See Tsao Yao-fei (1964). Lu Yu po-shih (Dr Loke Yew). Ma-lai-ya Ku-kang-chou liu-i tsunghui t’e-k’an (Souvenir Magazine of the Federation of the Associations of the Six Districts of Kukang chou in Malaya), Pt. 2, p. 512. 28 See “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Teng Tse-ju dated 7th March, 1908, Letter from Dr Sun Yatsen to Teng Tse-ju dated 1 April 1908”, and “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Teng Tse-ju and Huang Hsin-ch’ih dated 20 May 1908”. In Sun Chung-shan hsien-sheng nien-nien lai shou-cha (Twenty Years Correspondence of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 1, Teng Tse-ju (ed.), (1927). Canton: Double Leaves; Kuo fu ch’uan-shu, pp. 406–407; Sun Chung-shan ch’uan-chi, Vol. 1, pp. 360–366. 29 See Ko-ming hsu-yu yung-ch’i yu fang-fa (The making of a revolution requires courage as well as means, a speech given by Dr Sun to the supporters in Penang at the end of 1910); and Tungchih tang kung-fu ko-ming chiu-kuo chih chih-jen (All comrades must shoulder the responsibility of saving the nation, a speech given by Dr Sun Yat-sen to the supporters in Penang at the end of 1910) in Kuo-fu ch’uan-shu, pp. 482–483. English translations of these two speeches are found in Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Appendices 4 and 5.

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Overseas Chinese for support, and launched battles against the reformists in the Overseas Chinese communities in the period between 1903 and 1909. His decisive victory over his political opponents came some time in 1909, but the fruit of this victory was hard-won. Except for a small number of supporters in Honolulu and Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen, in his early career, was known to Overseas Chinese not as a revolutionary leader, but as a reckless bandit chief. His daring attempt in the first Canton Revolt in October 1895 earned him condemnation among Overseas Chinese, especially the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. A leading Chinese newspaper in Singapore, Sing Po, published a hostile report about his activities in April 1896, about 6 months after the revolt. In this report, Sun was described as an unrepentant bandit chief (fei shou) who had fled overseas after the failure of his rebellion in Canton, and was again trying to hatch another rebellion in the same city.30 The editor of the newspaper added a footnote at the end of the report claiming that Sun had planted opium poppies in the district of Nan Hai of Kwangtung province in 1894, and had brought havoc and misery to the Chinese of that province.31 The report projected a negative image of Sun Yat-sen, fitting him with the traditional image of a bandit chief: red eyebrows and green eyes, crafty and treacherous. The editor’s footnote had further portrayed him as a vicious and immoral man who pursued his selfish gains by poisoning his countrymen. Sing Po persistently condemned Sun and his revolutionary activities throughout the period between 1896 and 1898, with only slight change of term in referring to Sun Yat-sen as a rebel (ni tang) or rebel criminal (ni fan) rather than a bandit chief.32 It may be argued that Sing Po’s reports only reflected the conservative view of a section of the Chinese in Singapore. But given the fact that Sing Po was one of the two major local Chinese newspapers and its influence extended far beyond the island,33 its negative images of Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary activities must have impeded an 30

See Yu ming fan chih (To rebel again). In Sing Po, 18 April 1896. p. 5. Ibid, p. 5. 32 See Ni-tang pi ch’ang (The madness of the rebels). In Sing Po, 23 September 1897, p. 4; Fang lei luan shuo (On the prevention of internal rebellion). In Sing Po, 22 February 1898, pp. 1, 4. 33 See Chen Mong Hock (1967). The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore, 1881–1912, pp. 54–63. Singapore: University of Malaya Press. 31

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early positive response by the Chinese in the region to the revolution. The conservative view held by Sing Po at that time, to a great extent reflected the cultural and political mood of the local Chinese. The last decade of the 19th century saw the rise of a dynamic Confucian revival movement in Singapore, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies,34 which reasserted Confucian values of loyalty, filial piety, and chasity;35 in particular, the concept of loyalty to one’s emperor was obviously incompatible with the revolution preached by Dr Sun Yat-sen. This led the Overseas Chinese to perceive Sun in a negative light, and his activities as great crimes. When Sun made his first visit to Penang in 1907, his arrival on the island appalled local conservative Chinese, who regarded him as a “snake” or “scorpion”.36 Another factor that inhibited the Singaporean and Malayan Chinese’s early response to Sun Yat-sen’s call was the fear of a Ch’ing government reprisal. Like most Overseas Chinese of the time, the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya were sojourners rather than settlers. Even successful settlers could not cut off family ties with their homeland, they had either aged parents or wives and children in China.37 At the same time, the establishment of Ch’ing consulates in Singapore (1877) and Penang (1893) enabled Ch’ing diplomats to spy on emigrants’ political activities.38 Any serious involvement in activities against the dynasty would be detected and reported to the home government for 34

For a study of the movement in Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Confucian revival movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899–1911. Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, 7(1), 33–57. For the movement in the Dutch East Indies, See Coppel CA (1981). The orgins of Confucianism as an organized religion in Java, 1900–1923. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), 179–195; Leo Suryadinata (1978). Confucianism in Indonesia: Past and Present. In The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers, pp. 33–62. Singapore: Chopman Enterprise. 35 See Yen Ching-hwang, ibid, pg no. 36 See Ch’en Hsin-cheng, Hua-ch’iao ko-ming hsio-shih (A concise history of Overseas Chinese involvement in the revolution) (Manuscript kept in the Kuomintang Archives, Taipei, Taiwan). 37 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 10. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 38 For the establishment of the Ch’ing consulate in Singapore and vice-consulate in Penang, see Wen Chung-chi (1964). The nineteenth-century imperial Chinese Consulate in the Straits Settlements. MA thesis University of Singapore; Yen Ching-hwang, Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, pp. 140–144, 168–176.

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punishment.39 This could mean severe punishment for themselves, or for their relatives or kinsmen in China — a deterrent for many Overseas Chinese to respond to the early call of Sun Yat-sen.40 However, the main impediment hindering the response of Malayan and Singaporean Chinese to Sun Yat-sen’s call was the reformist influence. The abortive Hundred Day’s Reform in 1898 forced Kang Yu-wei and Liang Ch’i-ch’iao to flee China and to seek outside support. They regarded the Overseas Chinese as a most valuable asset for the recovery of their political fortunes in China. Through the propaganda networks, they preached reform and modernization as the means of regaining China’s greatness. Their preaching attracted many Overseas Chinese intellectuals and merchants.41 Kang’s claim of having a close relationship with the deposed monarch, Emperor Kuang-hsu, earned him considerable sympathy as well as adding to his credentials of appeal to the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.42 To these Overseas Chinese the 39

In 1907, the Ch’ing Consul in Singapore, Sun Shih-ting, reported to the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi concerning the activities of Sun’s Yat-sen and Teng Tzu-yu in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. See “Telegram from the Viceroy of Kwantung and Kwangsi to the Wai Wu Pu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) dated 24th day of 4th moon of 33rd year of Kuanghsu (4th June, 1907). In Wai Wu Pu shou-fa tien tang (Telegram Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 33rd year of Kuang-hsu (1907) (manuscript). 40 It was claimed that many Overseas Chinese in San Francisco were relucrant to join the Hsing Chung Hui in 1903 because they were fearful for the safety of their families and properties in China. See Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’iao ko-ming kai-ko shih; p. 62. 41 For the success of the reformist appeal to intellectuals and merchants in the Overseas Chinese communities in North America, See Lo Jung-pang (ed.) (1967). Sequel to autobiography. In Kang Yu-wei. A Biography and a Symposium, p. 180. Armentrout Ma LE; Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 48–51 Tucson: University of Arizona Press; Chang Yu-fa (1971). Ch’ing-chi te li-hsien t’uan-ti (Constitutionalists of the Ch’ing period: An Analysis of Groups in the Constitutional Movement, 1895–1911), p. 229–230. Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica; Edgar Wickberg et al. (1982). From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada, p. 74. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd. 42 According to Hu Han-min, a close associate of Dr Sun Yat-sen, K’ang used to boast to the Overseas Chinese that he was a tutor of Emperor Kuang-hsu and had in his possession a secret edict which he had never shown to anyone. As pointed out by Hu, K’ang was using his relationship with the deposed emperor to hoodwink Overseas Chinese into giving financial support. See Hu Han-min, recorded by Chang Chen-chih (1963). Nanyang yu Chung-kuo ko ming (Nanyang and the 1911 Revolution). In Chung-hua min-kuo kai-kuo wu-shin-nien wenhsien (Historical Documents of the Republic China for the Last Fifty Years). 1(pt.11), p. 478.

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reformists offered a practical alternative to the Ch’ing government in their pursuit of power and fame in China. Further, their support for the reformists was still seen in the context of paying loyalty to the emperor, and was acceptable to many tradition-minded Chinese. In contrast, the revolution preached by Sun Yat-sen was seen as a radical departure from this tradition, one which would incur much personal risk and sacrifice. Despite all these impediments, support for Sun Yat-sen among the Overseas Chinese grew with the change of mood of the nation. The year 1900 was a momentous year, dramatically changing the attitude of the Chinese (including the Overseas Chinese) toward the dynasty. The Boxer catastrophe shattered the faith of many Chinese in the dynasty’s ability to cope with foreign encroachment, and some farsighted Chinse started to look for alternatives to save China. More and more Chinese and Overseas Chinese saw Sun and his activities in a different light, and dropped their hostility toward him. As Sun stated in his memoirs, he was no longer looked upon as a snake or beast by his compatriots after the Boxer Uprising, and some of them began to sympathize with his cause.43 The second decisive year in the Overseas Chinese’s response to Sun Yat-sen’s call was 1905. The period between 1901 and 1904 witnessed the slow but steady growth of revolutionary activities overseas. Through the Hsing Chung Hui and its affiliated organizations such as Chung Ho T’ang, the revolutionaries succeeded in spreading their message in the Overseas Chinese communities. Sun Yat-sen’s early visits to Vietnam and Singapore in 1900, and his later activities in Honolulu and continental America in 1903 and 1904, began to establish his credentials among the Overseas Chinese. In the case of Singapore and Malaya, the arrival of Yu Lieh, a leader of Chung Ho T’ang, in Singapore at the beginning of 1901 laid a solid foundation for revolutionary activities in the region. Yu, an experienced organizer, mobilized support among members of the lower class, and succeeded in founding Chung Ho T’ang branches in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Perak, Johore, and Seremban.44 43 See Sun Yat-sen, Yu chih ching-ch’eng (Success for those who are determined) (Autobiography). In Kuo-fu ch’uan-shu, p. 34. 44 See Hsien Chiang (1951). Yu Lieh shih-Lueh (A Concise Biography of Yu Lieh), pp. 15–16. Hong Kong; Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 41–45.

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A merge of strength between Yu and a small group of local Chinese revolutionaries, led by Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock, in Singapore in 1903 further boosted revolutionary activities in the region.45 The year 1905 also turned the tide in favor of the revolutionary movement as a whole. With the support of overseas students as well as various revolutionary groups in Japan, Sun founded the famous T’ung Meng Hui (United League) in August 1905 in Tokyo. It signaled the beginning of a more united revolutionary movement with clear political platforms, organization, and propaganda machinery.46 One of the main directions of the T’ung Meng Hui was the expansion of its branches in the Overseas Chinese communities. From 1905 to 1911, 24 important branches of the T’ung Meng Hui were established outside China, 18 of which were among the Overseas Chinese.47 Thus, 1905 can be taken as a landmark year in the expansion of revolutionary activities in the Overseas Chinese communities, and the beginning of an active response of the Overseas Chinese to Sun Yat-sen’s call. With the spread of T’ung Meng Hui branches overseas after 1905, Sun Yat-sen was in a better position than before to mobilize Overseas Chinese’s support. Through propaganda networks and front organizations, Sun succeeded in indoctrinating tens of thousands of Overseas Chinese with his revolutionary message. However, the entrenched reformist influence in the Overseas Chinese communities proved to be a major stumbling block for Sun Yat-sen, and the struggle with the reformists was crucial for his success or failure in gaining Overseas Chinese support. The fight against the reformists was carried out mainly by Sun’s Overseas Chinese supporters; he acted only as a supervisor. The struggle took place at two levels; wresting control of schools and social organizations from the reformists, and launching an ideological attack aganist them.48 45

Yen Ching-hwang, ibid., pp. 60–61. For a discussion of the significance of the founding of T’ung Meng Hui in the revolutionary movement, see Schiffrin, HZ, Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 344–366. 47 Among these 18 overseas branches, 10 of them were in Southeast Asia, 7 in America and 1 in Australia. See Chang Yu-fa, Ch’ing-chi ko-ming t’uan-t’i, pp. 325–337. 48 For the ideological war between the revolutionaries and the reformists, see Ch’i Ping-feng, (1966). Ch’ing-mo ko-ming yu chun-hsien te lun-chan (The Polemics between the Revolutionaries and the Reformists during the Late Ch’ing Period ), pp. 104–234. Taipei: Ching Hua yin-shu-kuan. 46

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For the political scene in Singapore and Malaya, the response of the Overseas Chinese to Sun Yat-sen’s call was enthusiastic and exuberant. The revolutionary movement in the region was most vigorous among the Chinese in Southeast Asia after 1905. Sun’s stopover in Singapore in July 1905 on his way to Tokyo sealed his bond with Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock, the two most active local revolutionary leaders on the island. Both Tan and Teo were impressed by Sun’s charisma and broad knowledge of the West, and were prepared to accept his leadership. Sun’s encouragement further strengthened their faith in the revolution and stimulated their revolutionary activities.49 With the groundwork laid by Tan and Teo, the T’ung Meng Hui branch in Singapore was founded on 6 April 1906, witnessed by Dr Sun Yat-sen who arrived on the island from Europe en route to Japan. Fourteen founding members, in the presence of Sun, pledged their commitment to overthrow the Manchus and to establish the republic. Both Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock were elected unanimously as the chairman and deputy chairman of the branch.50 The founding of the Singapore T’ung Meng Hui branch, the first of its kind in the Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, enabled Sun Yat-sen and his close associates to plan for immediate expansion into the Malay Peninsula, where large numbers of Chinese were scattered in ports and towns. Sun had to leave for Japan for a short while, and when he returned in July 1906, he immediately undertook the task of setting up new branches in Malaya. Accompanied by some supporters, including Tan Chor-nam and Lim Ngee-soon, Sun’s mission succeeded in establishing a T’ung Meng Hui branch in Kuala Lumpur on 7 August 1906, with 16 founding members. Unfortunately, his mission failed to bear fruit in Seremban and Ipoh,51 but the unfinished task was completed by Sun’s local 49

See Tan Chor-nam, Wan Ch’ing-yuan yu Chung-kuo ko-ming. In Chung-hua min-kuo ka’i-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien, 1(pt. 11), p. 535; Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yu ch’uang-li min-kuo, p. 9. 50 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 92–93; Feng Tzuyu, Hua-ch’iao ko-ming k’ai-kuo shih, p. 79, A list of the members of the Early Period of China’s Tung Meng Hu. In Ko-ming wen-hsien (Documentary Records of the Revolution), Lo Chia-lun (ed.), (1958). Vol. 2, pp. 73–74. Taipei. 51 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 94–98.

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supporters, and within 2 years, T’ung Meng Hui branches were established in Penang, Seremban, Ipoh, Kuala Pilah, Muar, and Kuantan.52 It is worth noting that the majority of the founding members and the leaders of the T’ung Meng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya appear to have derived from the merchant class. Ten out of the 14 founding members in the Singapore branch were rich or well-to-do merchants, while most of the leaders of the T’ung Meng Hui branches in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Ipoh, Kuala Pillah, Kuantan, and Malacca were identified as merchants.53 However, the merchants’ dominance in the T’ung Meng Hui founding membership, leadership should not mislead us into concluding that only members of this class were enthusiastic in responding to Sun Yat-sen’s call. A small minority of the merchant class did support Sun’s revolution fervently, but their actions were far from representative of the class to which they belonged. They responded to Sun’s call because they were primarily concerned with China’s declining power and its inability to cope with 52

See Yen Chiang-hwang, Ibid, pp. 92–100. Among the 14 founding members in Singapore branch, Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock, Li Chuch’ih, Hsu Tzu-lin, Lim Ngee-soon, Lin Ching-ch’iu, Hsiao Pai-ch’uan, Liu Hung-shih, Chiang Yu-t’ien, and Wu Yeh-ch’en, were identified as rich or well-to-do merchants. In Kuala Lumpur branch, Loke Chow-thye was a tin miner, Wang Ching was probably a merchant, Yuen Ying-fong, a merchant, and Too Nam, a teacher. In Penang, both the leaders of the T’ung Meng Hui branch, Goh Say-eng and Ng Kim-keng, were rich merchants. In Ipoh, the leaders of the branch, Tay Layseng and Li Guan-swee, were rich merchants, in Kuala Pilah, the leader of the branch, Teng Tseju was another rich merchant. In Malacca, the leader of the branch, Sim Hung-Pek was a rich merchant. In Kuantan, the branch chairman, Loke Chow-lo, was a tin miner. See Feng Tzu-yu (ed.), Nan-yang ko-ming tang ti-i-jen-Chen Ch’u-nam (Tan Chor nam — The Top Overseas Chinese Revolutionary in Southeast Asia). In Ko-ming i-shih, Vol. 3, pp. 183–189; Anonymous (1950). ‘Chang Yung-fu chuan’ (A biography of Teo Eng-hock). In Malai-ya Ch’ao-ch’iao t’ungchien (The Teochews in Malaya), p. 158 P’an Hsing-nung (ed.), (1950). Singapore: Nantao ch’upan-she; Chan Chan-mooi, (1940). To Nan hsien-sheng shih lueh (A short biography of Mr Too Nam). In To Nan hsien-sheng ai-shu lu (Obituaries of Mr Too Nam), Chan Chan-mooi (ed.), Kuala Lumpur. “Interview with Madam T. M. Too (granddaughter of Too Nam) on 7 October 1966 in Kuala Lumpur”; Wu Tee-jen, “Tao-nien fei-chia shu-nan te Wu Shih-yung lao t’ung-chih” (In Memory of an Old Comrade: Goh Say-eng) (manuscript), p. 3; “Interview with Mrs Goh Say-eng on 14 October 1966 in Penang”, Huang Ching-wan (1933). Cheng Lo-sheng kuang-yung shih (A history of achievements of Tay Lay-seng). In Nan-yang P’i-ll hua-ch’iao ko-ming shih-chi (Historical Records of the Involvement of the Chinese in Perak in the 1911 Revolution), Huang Ching-wan (ed.), p. 1. Shanghai; Teng Tse-ju (1948). Chung-kuo Kuo-min-tang erh-shih nien shihchi (Records of China’s Kuomintang in the Last Twenty Years), pp. 1–2. Taipei: Publisher name. 53

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foreign encroachment. They were also concerned with the worsening status of the Overseas Chinese in foreign lands. These patriotic merchants were relatively young in age, and had no political or economic interests in China. Therefore, they were able to respond more freely to the revolution than many other rich Chinese merchants in Singapore and Malaya.54 All these branches were integrated into an effective network for carrying out revolutionary activities. The main task for Chinese revolutionaries in the region was to raise large sums of money in support of a series of uprisings in the south and southwest of China. But these funds could not be raised unless more and more local Chinese were converted to the revolutionary cause. For this reason, the revolutionaries mounted aggressive propaganda activities in a bid for financial support. Three major propaganda organizations were formed: newspapers, reading clubs, and drama troupes. Newspapers were a powerful medium for transmitting the revolutionary message, as they reached wide sections of the Chinese population. Apart from the Thoe Lam Yit Poh, which was founded in 1904, the revolutionaries founded another four papers in the period between 1907 and 1911. The founding of the Chong Shing Yit Pao (Restoration Daily) in August 1907 led the way, followed by the Sun Poo (The Morning Daily) in August 1909, the Kwong Wah Yit Poh (The Glorious Chinese Daily) in December 1910, and the Nam Kew Poo (The Straits Chinese Morning Post) in October 1911. Except for the Kwong Wah Yit Poh in Penang, all other newspapers were published in Singapore. They made a concerted effort to spread revolutionary message, to attack the Ch’ing government and its policies, and to engage in heated polemics with the reformists.55 To reinforce the effect of the revolutionary media, Sun Yat-sen’s supporters established a score of reading clubs to help disseminate the revolutionary gospel. A reading club, a kind of cultural and social center where newspapers, magazines, and books were made freely available, was deemed by Sun’s supporters to be an effective means of reaching 54

For a detailed discussion of the response of the merchant class to the revolution, see Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 264–276. 55 See Yen Ching-hwang (1975). Chinese revolutionary propaganda organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1906–1911. Journal of the South Seas Society, 29(Pts. 1 and 2), 50–52.

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out to wider audiences, especially among the poorer section of the Chinese population who could not afford to buy reading materials. At least 58 revolutionary reading clubs were set up in Singapore and Malaya. Prominent among these were the Singapore Reading Club, the T’ung Teh Reading Club, the K’ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club in Singapore, and the Penang Reading Club (or known as Penang Philomatic Society) in Penang. All of these reading clubs helped to expose their members to the influence of revolutionary ideas and messages, and enabled many members of the middle and lower classes in the Chinese community to respond to Sun Yat-sen’s call.56 Revolutionary media and reading clubs had their limitations. They could only reach those who were literate, while the illiterate were beyond the reach of written propaganda. This shortcoming was overcome by the founding of drama troupes. Drama was one of the oldest forms of popular entertainment in rural Chinese villages, and found wide acceptance among the illiterate masses in China. The visit of a revolutionary drama troupe, Chen T’ien Sheng, from Hong Kong at the end of 1908 activated revolutionary drama activities in the region. Its successful performances served as a trigger for large-scale revolutionary drama activities in Singapore and Malaya, and at least five local drama troupes were founded.57 All these troupes performed popular revolutionary plays which praised martyrdom and dedication to the revolution, exposed the corruption and nepotism of the Manchu government, 56

See Teo Eng-hock, Nan-yang yu ch’uang-li min-kuo, pp. 91–92; Feng Tzu-yu, Hua-ch’lao koming ka’i-kuo shih, p. 85; Chong Shing Yit Pao, 7 November 1907, p. 5; Anonymous, Min-kuo ch’ien Sing-chou chih ko-ming yun-tung (Revolutionary movement in Singapore before the founding of the Chinese Republic). Manuscript kept in the Kuomintang Archives, Taipei, Taiwan; Yang Han-hsing (ed.), Chung-hua min-kuo K’ai-kuo ch’ien-hou chih pen-she ko-ming shih (The revolutionary history of the Penang Philomatic Society before and after the creation of the Chinese Republic). In Ping-ch’eng Yeh-shu pao-she nien-ssu chou-nien chi-nien t’e-k’an (Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary of the Penang Philomatic Society), Yang Han-shing (ed.), p. 8. Penang; Chen Hsin-cheng, “Hua-ch’lao ko-ming hsiao shih,” manuscript, p. 10. 57 These troupes were Fan Ai Pan (Universal Love Troupe) and Min To She (People’s Bell Troupe) in Singapore; The Perak Welfare Troupe in Ipoh; the Chen Wu She (The Anti-Opium Drama Troupe) in Kuala Lumpur, and the Ching Shih Pan (Warning to the Age Troupe) in Penang. See Yen Ching-hwang, Chinese revolutionary propaganda organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1906–1911, Journal of South Seas Society, 29(1 and 2), pp. 57–59.

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and effectively brought the revolutionary message to the illiterate masses.58 Like other major Overseas Chinese communities throughout the world, the reformist influence proved to be a major obstacle to obtaining Singaporean and Malayan Chinese support for Sun Yat-sen’s call. As the reformists had arrived earlier and were wellentrenched in some social and educational institutions in the region, Sun Yat-sen’s supporters found it difficult to infiltrate existing urban schools. They were compelled to start night schools and schools in suburban areas, and they took some drastic measures to try to unseat reformist hold on educational institutions. This led to rivalry and confrontation with Kang Yu-wei’s supporters, and sometimes led to violent clashes.59 As an integral part of the global ideological war, Sun’s supporters in Singapore and Malaya launched a vehement attack on the reformists. The Chong Shing Yit Pao, the main propaganda organ of the revolutionaries in Singapore, took on the Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao (The Union Times), the reformist mouthpiece. The Chong Shing Yit Pao was under the control of a prominent journalist, T’ien Tung, and was reinforced by the Min Pao’s team from Tokyo, including two prominent revolutionary leaders, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. Sun Yat-sen supervised the ideological war and contributed two articles to the polemic.60 Meanwhile, reformist literary heavyweights such as Ou Ch’u-chia and Wu Hsien-tzu, two disciples of Kang Yu-wei who had considerable experience in journalism in North America, came to Singapore to assist the team. The polemic focused on the issues of a racial revolution, a constitutional monarchy, the practicability of a racial revolution, and the introduction of a parliament in 58

See Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid, pp. 59–61. See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 154–170. 60 Under the pen name of “Nanyang hsiao hsueh-sheng” (A primary school student), Dr Sun Yat-sen contributed two articles to the Chong Shing Yit Pao. The first one was entitled “Lun chu ko-ming chao kua-fen che nai pu shih shih-wu che yeh” (Those who fear that revolution would lead to partition are ignorant of world affairs) in Chong Shing Yit Pao, 12 September 1908, p. 2. The second, which appeared 3 days later in the same newspaper, was entitled “P’ing Shih shang pu jen-ts’o” (P’ing Shih still does not admit his mistakes). 59

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China.61 The reformists were placed in a disadvantageous position in this controversy because they constantly had to defend the actions of the Ch’ing government which were beyond their control. Ch’ing suppression of a reformist-affiliated group in China, the Cheng Wen She (Political Information Society) in July 1908, exposed the government’s lack of sincerity in promoting reform, while its proclamation of the outline of a proposed constitution in September 1908 made the proposed constitutional monarchy a mockery.62 All these fastmoving events in China caught the reformists unprepared, and made them defenseless against the revolutionaries. As more and more Chinese in Singapore and Malaya were subject to the intensive influence of revolutionary propaganda, and understood the limitations of the reformists, many of them shifted their position to support Sun Yat-sen. The loss of the ideological war to the revolutionaries worldwide was not the worst problem for the reformists. Their political fortunes took a sharp turn for the worse after 1908. The suppression of the Cheng Wen She crippled their clandestine activities in China, and the proclamation of the outline of the proposed constitution discredited them as power brokers between the Manchus and the Overseas Chinese. More importantly, the untimely death of Emperor Kuang-hsu on 14 November 1908, a day before the death of Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi, deprived them of the main justification for existence, and crushed their hopes of restoring the emperor’s power. Many reformist supporters, including those in Singapore and Malaya, felt depressed and switched sides to support Sun Yat-sen. Thus, by 1909, the victory of the revolutionaries over the reformists in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya was almost complete. The removal of this major stumbling block led to a more active response of Singaporean and Malayan Chinese to Sun Yat-sen’s call. 61

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 186–201; Chui Kuei-chiang, “Chong Shing Yit Poh: Hsin-chia-po-T’ung meng-hui te hou-she, 1907–1910” (Chong Shing Yit Poh: The Mouthpiece of the Singapore T’ung Meng Hui, 1907–1910). In Hsin-hai ko-ming yu Nan yang hua-jen yen-tao hui lun-wen chi, pp. 139–148. 62 See Yen Ching-hwang, ibid, p. 202.

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Although the revolutionaries had won the battle over the reformists, their strength was weakened by internal strife. T’ung Meng Hui in its original form was not a united and well-integrated political organization, but a confederation of three major revolutionary groups with distinctive geographical origins. The different educational backgrounds and attitudes toward the West of the leaders further polarized the component groups within the T’ung Meng Hui. This division was clearly reflected in the power structure of the party, where the leaders of the three groups maintained a tenuous balance of power in the executive committee, and recruitment of members tended to have a strong provincial bias, wrecking the unity of the party.63 As early as 1907, internal discord led to several attempts to unseat Sun Yat-sen’s leadership in the T’ung Meng Hui headquarters in Tokyo. These were led by the leaders of the Chekiang-Kiangsu and Hunanese groups.64 Dissatisfied with Sun’s style of leadership and dismayed by the defeat of a series of revolts in south and southwest China after the end of 1908, leaders of the Chekiang-Kiangsu group, Chang Ping-lin and T’ao Ch’eng-chang, launched an intensive anti-Sun movement. Tao and close associates were particularly active among the Chinese in Southeast Asia attempting to undermine Sun’s support. Tao made some headway in the Dutch East Indies and also acquired some support from the Chinese in Singapore, headed by Koh Soh-chew and Ch’en Yun-sheng, two Teochew leaders who were deeply involved in the first and second Teochew uprisings in 1907. They began to compete with Sun in the bid for financial support among Southeast Asian Chinese.65 63

See Cheng, SH (1962). The Tung Meng Hui: Its organization, leadership and finances, 1905–1912. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Washington, p. 118; Liew KS (1972). Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution, pp. 68–72. Canberra: Australian National University Press; “The list of the executive members of the T’ung Meng Hui headquaters in Tokyo,” in Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien, Vol. 1, Pt. 11, pp. 233–234. 64 Cheng, SH, ibid., pp. 119–121; Liew KS ibid., pp. 72–84. 65 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 215; Koh Han-hui (ed.) (1962). Ko-ming lieh-shih Hsu Hsueh Ch’iu chuan (The Biography of a Revolutionary Martyr: Koh Soh-chew), p. 6. Singapore; Feng Tzu-yu, Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo ch’ien koming shih, Vol. 2, p. 31; Anonymous, “Tao Ch’eng-chang tsai Nan-yang ts’ou-k’uan chih chang ch’eng” (Tao Ch’eng-chang’s fundraising regulations in Southeast Asia). Original copy kept in the Kuomintang Archives in Taipei, Taiwan.

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At the end of 1909, anti-Sun movement shifted into top gear. A concerted effort by Chang Ping-lin and T’ao Ch’eng-chang to discredit Sun’s leadership came to the surface. An open letter, written sometime in November 1909 by T’ao Ch’eng-chang to the T’ung Meng Hui headquarters in Tokyo, accused Sun of ill-treating his comrades and practising favoratism and corruption, and called for Sun’s removal from office.66 At about the same time, Chang Ping-lin in Tokyo also issued a statement vehemently attacking Sun for refusing to help the ailing Min Pao (People’s Tribune) which was under Chang’s editorship, accusing Sun of embezzling public funds, and urging the Overseas Chinese not to donate money to Sun and his supporters.67 Tao’s and Chang’s combined attack thwarted Sun Yat-sen’s fundraising activities among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and a large number of the Chinese in the United States also lost faith in Sun’s leadership. The damage to Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary movement was so serious that it prompted Sun to write a letter to defend his integrity and reputation.68 During this crisis of confidence in Sun Yatsen, the majority of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya stood firmly behind him. A group of Sun’s faithful supporters from Seremban, Kuala Pilah, Malacca, and Muar, under the leadership of Teng Tse-ju, came out openly to defend him. They issued two public statements in November and December 1909 refuting Tao’s and Chang’s charges, and attacked Chang and other dissidents. Chang was described as a 66

The original letter was lost. Fortunately it was reproduced in the Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao, the main reformist organ in Singapore. However, the title of the letter was slightly changed to “A circular declaring the crimes of Sun Yat-sen by the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia.” See Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao, 11 November 1909, p. 2; 27 November 1909, p. 2; 29 November 1909, p. 2. 67 Chang’s statement was widely circulated in Japan and overseas, and it was also widely reproduced in reformist newspapers in Japan and Southeast Asia, including the Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao. See Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao, 6 November 1909, p. 2; Young-tsu Wong (1989). Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936, p. 76. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 68 Sun’s letter was written to Wu Ch’ih-hui (Wu Ching-heng), a revolutionary leader in France, and the principal adherents of the Hsin Shih Chi magazine in Paris. The letter was to defend Sun against accusations of his embezzlement of revolutionary funds. See “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Wu Ch’ih-hui of second half of October 1909,” in Sun Ch’ung-shan ch’uan-chi, Vol. 1, pp. 419–422; Chang Ch’i-yun (ed.), Ko-fu ch’uan-shu, pp. 418–419.

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selfish, partial, narrow-minded, immoral, and disgraceful to revolutionary intellectuals.69 At the same time, the main revolutionary organ in Singapore, Chong Shing Yit Pao, showed its support for Sun. Two editorials were published in the paper attacking both Chang and Tao for their vicious slander of Sun, and praised Sun for his dedication and integrity.70 The editorials were written by Ho Teh-ju, the chief editor of the paper and a founder of the famous K’ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club. Ho was one of the few revolutionary leaders in Singapore who came out in strong support of Sun. He also reproduced some articles in the Chong Shing Yit Pao from the Chung Kuo Yit Pao and Kung I Pao in Hong Kong, and the Jih Hua Hsin Pao in Japan. These articles were even more critical of the anti-Sun elements, and Chang was accused of betraying the party.71 Despite some damage done to the T’ung Meng Hui in Singapore, the majority of Chinese in the region stood firmly on the side of Sun Yat-sen in this internal struggle. They trusted his integrity and continued to give him moral and material support. This was why Sun, after a successful trip to America between 1909 and 1910, decided to use Singapore and Malaya as the first step in reorganizing the party. He transferred the T’ung Meng Hui Southeast Asian headquarters from Singapore to Penang in July 1910, and undertook the restructuring of the branch in an attempt to rejuvenate the party.72 At the same time, Sun persisted in his plans to stage revolts in south or southwest China, and planned another large-scale uprising in 69 These two published statements appeared in the Chong Shing Yit Pao in Singapore. The first statement, entitled “Tse Yen” (To reprimand), was published in the paper on 22 November 1909, p. 1. The Second statement, entitled “Fu Ssu-li wai-yeh tsai chi ni-ming pang-shu tse” (A reply to those slanderers who sent the anonymous letters in Surahbaya), appeared in the Chong Shing Yit Pao, 8 December 1909, p. 1. 70 See Teh-ju, “Tse Chang Ping-lin yu fa ni-ming shu-tse” (Condemn Chang Ping-lin and those who sent anonymous letters). In Chong Shing Yit Pao, 6 December 1909, p. 1 and 7 December 1909, p. 1; Teh-ju, “Wuhu, t’iao-liang chih hsiao-ch’ou” (Alas! The pitiful clown). In Chong Shing Yit Pao, 3 January 1910, p. 1. 71 See Chong Shing Yit Pao, 30 November 1909, p. 1, 2 December 1909, p. 1, 18 January 1910, p. 7. 72 See Yang Han-hsiang, “Chung-hua min-kuo k’ai-kuo ch’ien-hou, Chih-pen she ko-ming shih.” In Ping-ch’eng yeh-shu pao-she, nien-ssu chou-nien chi-nien t’e-k’an, Yang Han-hsiang (ed.), pp. 21–22.

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Canton. On 13 November 1910, he convened a crucial meeting in Penang, known in modern Chinese history as the Penang Conference. Most of the participants were either his loyal followers like Hu Han-min and Huang Hsing, or his faithful local supporters such as Goh Say-ying (Penang), Ng Kim-keng (Penang), Teng Tse-ju (Kuala Pilah), and Li Hau-cheong (Ipoh).73 The choice of the participants, and the manner in which the Penang Conference was called, reflect Sun Yat-sen’s determination to organize and stage another major revolt in his own way. The conference was called without the approval of the T’ung Meng Hui headquarters in Tokyo, and the branches in Southeast Asia, which were influenced by his opponents, were not invited to send representatives. Sun was confident and determined that with the support of the majority of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya he would be able to stage another major revolt. The fervent response and generous donations to the Canton 29th March Uprising by the Chinese in the region vindicated Sun’s trust in local Chinese support.74

Conclusion Sun Yat-sen had a close personal relationship with the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, especially with some revolutionary leaders such as Tan Chor-nam, Teo Eng-hock, and Teng Tse-ju. His perception of the Overseas Chinese role as the main benefactor of the revolution was well applied to the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. Numerical strength and wealth of Singaporean and Malayan Chinese led Sun to expect them to play a greater financial role than other Overseas Chinese. Negative images of Sun, fear of reprisal, conservatism, and the influence of the reformists were the factors which thwarted the early response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to Sun Yatsen’s call. However, support for Sun in the region grew with the change of tide from 1900 to 1905. From 1905 to 1911, support for 73

See Yang Han-hsiang, Ibid, pp. 32–33; Tsou Lu (1939). Kuang-chou san-yeh nien-chiu ko-ming shih (A History of the Canton March 29th Revolution), p. 2. Hong Kong; Yen Ching-hwang (1986). Penang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Journal of South Seas Society, 41(Pts. 1 and 2), 69. 74 See Yen Ching-hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 234–238.

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Sun by the Singaporean and Malayan Chinese was substantial and firm. With the establishment of various T’ung Meng Hui branches in Singapore and Malaya, Sun’s faithful supporters were able to eliminate the reformist influence and effectively mobilize tens of thousands of local Chinese to support Sun’s ongoing revolutionary uprisings staged in the south and southwest of China. During a split within revolutionary ranks, the majority of the revolutionaries in Singapore and Malaya stood on Sun’s side, trusted his integrity, and continued to give him moral and financial support. With their solid support, Sun was able to counter the influence of Chang Ping-lin and T’ao Ch’engchang, and to stage an important revolt in Canton in April 1911 which indirectly led to the successful Wuchang Revolt in October of the same year.

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Chapter 8

Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya: A Revisit*

When Wan Qing Yuan (Wan Ch’ing Yuan or known as Bin Chan House) celebrates its centenary on 6 April 2006 as the Southeast Asian center for Dr Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary movement, a reevaluation of the relationship between the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya and Sun’s movement is timely. Thirty years have lapsed since I first published my major work in this field, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya,1 and a minor work in 1994 entitled “Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1900–1911,”2 it is fitting to revisit the subject and reassess some of my findings. This chapter is not intended to focus on the nature of the 1911 Revolution, nor would I enter into debate over the role of the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution; it is rather, to concentrate on the interactions and the meaning of the relationship between the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya on the one hand, and Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary party — Tongmenghui (Tung Meng Hui) — on the other. * This chapter is based on a paper presented at the international seminar on ‘Tong Meng Hui, Sun Yat Sen and the Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Revisit’, co-sponsored by Chinese Heritage Center and Sun Yat Sen Nanyang Memorial Hall, Singapore, held at Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 12 June 2006. 1 See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur & New York: Oxford University Press. 2 See Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1900–1911. In Guofu jiandang geming yibai zhounian xueshu taolunji (Proceedings of Centennial Symposium on Sun Yat-sen’s Founding of the Kuomintang for Revolution), Vol. 1, English Section, pp. 29–55. Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe; see also the same article reproduced in Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 339–367. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

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Singapore as the Center of Tongmenghui Activities in Southeast Asia (1906–1909) It was not a historical accident that Singapore was selected as the location for a key Tongmenghui branch in Southeast Asia, but rather, it was a calculated move on the part of Tongmenghui leadership. When the Tongmenghui was inaugurated in August 1905 in Tokyo, its leaders shared a common desire of expanding its branches as rapidly as possible. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of this newly established confederation of Chinese revolutionary parties and the man who had best knowledge of the Overseas Chinese, championed to set up branches in the Overseas Chinese communities, especially those in Southeast Asia. Sun’s selection of Singapore as the location for a key Tongmenghui branch was determined mainly by his knowledge of the port and his connections with the local Chinese revolutionaries. Having been to the port twice in 1900 and 1905 respectively, he must have been aware of Singapore’s superior geographical position in Southeast Asia with a predominant Chinese population that owned an estimated four-fifth of the local real estate3; he must also have been aware of the growing revolutionary activities among the local Chinese.4 Being an international entrepot, Singapore was equipped with modern transport and telecommunications that were crucial to 3

Sun Yat-sen might not be personally aware of this fact, but he must have been impressed by the affluence of the Chinese in Singapore in his two short visits to the port. The estimated Chinese ownership of the local real estate was offered by two emissaries, Wang Ronghe and Yu Jun who were sent by the Qing government to investigate the conditions of the Chinese in Southeast Asia in 1887, see “Memorial of Zhang Zhidong to the Court dated 8 December 1887.” In Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (The Complete Works of Zhang Zhidong), Wang Jinqing (ed.), Vol. 1, pp. 471–472. (Taipei, 1963). 4 In 1904 when Sun was in the United States to organize his activities, he was surprised to find the publication of Thoe Lam Jit Poh — a revolutionary newspaper in Singapore. He contacted the expatriate revolutionary You Lie in Kuala Lumpur to find out detail information of the paper. See Tan Chor-nam, “Wan Qing Yuan yu Zhongguo geming shilue” (Wan Qing Yuan and the Chinese Revolution). In Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian (The Compiled Documents of Fifty Years’ History of the Republic of China, thereafter referred as ZMKWW), Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian bianzhuan weiyuanhui (ed.), (Taipei, 1965–1966), Vol. 1, Pt. 11, p. 535; see also the same article published in Jiang Yongxing J (ed.) (1997). Huaqiao kaiguo geming shiliao (Historical Materials relating to the Overseas Chinese and their Relations with the 1911 Revolution), p. 333. (Taipei: Zheng Zhong shuju.)

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revolutionary activities.5 More importantly, Sun’s personal relationship with the leaders of the local Chinese revolutionaries was the decisive factor for the choice. Tan Chor-nam (Chen Chunan) and Teo Eng-hock (Zhang Yongfu), the twin leaders of the local revolutionaries were instrumental in the founding of the Singapore Tongmenghui branch. Sun in his brief visit to Singapore in 1900 had not heard of Tan’s and Teo’s names, and his indirect contact with them in 1904 was through his reading of the Thoe Lam Jit Poh (Tu Nan Ribao) in the United States. But his brief stop at the Singapore port in June 1905 en route to Tokyo provided him with an opportunity to meet both Tan and Teo who came on board Sun’s ship . The meeting was crucial for both parties. Both Tan and Teo were deeply impressed by Sun’s warm personality, powerful intellect, and superior knowledge of the world, and they believed that they had found the saviour of the Chinese revolution. On the other hand, Sun was impressed by their burning enthusiasm for revolution, and was greatly interested in the information they had provided on the burgeoning local revolutionary activity. Sun informed them that he had received considerable support of Chinese students in Europe and was on his way to Tokyo in an attempt to form a grand revolutionary alliance that would serve as an umbrella organization for all revolutionary parties, and he urged them to get ready to join this proposed alliance. Later, he sent a letter to Tan Chor-nam to reaffirm his intention.6 Additional factors that led Sun Yat-sen to choose Singapore over Hanoi or Saigon as the key Tongmenghui branch in Southeast Asia 5

Telecommunication facility was very important for the communication between the headquarters and the branches of Tongmenghui in China and overseas, and between Sun and his supporters. Sun had devised a secret code combining Roman alphabets and Chinese characters for communicating with his supporters. See Teo Eng-hock (Zhang Yongfu), Nanyang yu chuangli minguo (Nanyang and the Founding of the Republic of China), (Shanghai, 1933), an unnumbered front page entitled “Tongmenghui Minguo qian sinian suoyong mima dianbu” (The Secret Code used by the Tongmenghui branch in 1908). 6 In his letter, Sun assured Tan that when the proposed revolutionary alliance was consummated, he would personally come to Singapore to enlist the support of the local revolutionaries. See “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Tan Chor-nam dated 7 July 1905, in Guofu quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Zhang Qiyun (ed.), pp. 362–363. Taipei. Guofang chubanshe, 1960; see also Feng Ziyou, Zhonghua minguo kaiguoqian gemingshi (A Revolutionary History Prior to the Founding of the Chinese Republic ), Vo. 2, p. 115. Taipei, 1954.

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was probably the consideration on both geographical and linguistic grounds. Hanoi or Saigon, though close to China’s border of southwestern provinces that would facilitate revolutionary uprisings,7 would be disadvantaged by its closeness to China that would be easier for the Chinese authorities to detect and suppress the revolutionary activities. Due to linguistic grounds, Sun being an Englisheducated medical doctor, was far more comfortable dealing with British colonial authorities than the French colonial government in Indochina. After having chosen Singapore as the location for the establishment of the key Tongmenghui branch in Southeast Asia, Sun felt the necessity of having a personal touch; instead of sending other Tongmenghui leaders for the work, he had to do it himself. This seems to have been based on two important considerations. First, being closely affiliated with an Overseas Chinese family and having been active in cultivating support among the Overseas Chinese in America, he considered himself most suitable for the job, and would bear excellent results. Second, as his romantic view of the role of different social classes in the Chinese revolution, he regarded Overseas Chinese as a major financial source for the revolution8; his personal touch on this event would consolidate his bond with the Chinese in Southeast Asia that was later prove crucial for his power within the Tongmenghui structure. To execute his plan to tap their enormous 7 Hanoi was the only competing location for Sun to establish his key Tongmenghui branch in Southeast Asia. Before 1905, Sun had been to Saigon and Hanoi, and had established the Xing Zhong Hui (The Revive China Society) in Hanoi in 1903. See Chen Yiling, Guofu yu Yuenan (Dr Sun Yat-sen and Vietnam), in Jiang Yongjing (ed.), Huaqiao kaiguo geming shiliao, pp. 384–85; Feng Ziyou (1965). Yuenan Henei Xing Zhong Hui (The Xiang Zhong Hui branch in Hanoi, Vietnam), in Geming Yishi (Anecdotal History of the 1911 Revolution), Feng Ziyou (ed.), Vol. 4 p. 18. Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan. 8 For Sun Yat-sen’s romantic view of the roles of various social classes in the 1911 Revolution, see Yen Ching-hwang (1995), Sun Yat-sen and the Overseas Chinese, 1894–1911. In Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, Yen Ching-hwang), pp. 77–78. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Lu Fangshang (1986). Deng Zeru yu Xin Hai geming, 1906–1912. In Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji (Collected Essays of the International Conference on the Southeast Asian Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, thereafter referred as XGNHYL) Xinhai geming yu Nanyang huaren yantaohui lunwenji bianji weiyuanhui (ed.), p. 346. Taipei: The Center for the Studies of International Relations, National Cheng Chi University.

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financial resource, Sun arrived in Singapore in early April 1906 to establish the Tongmenghui branch. With the groundwork laid by Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock, a small group of supporters were gathered at the Wan Qing Yuan — Teo Eng-hock’s villa — on 6 April (13 days of third moon of the Bing Wu year), and 15 founding members were required to take an oath and sign it in the presence of Sun. Office bearers were elected on the spot with Tan Chor-nam as its first president, and Teo Eng-hock his deputy.9 The founding date of the Singapore Tongmenghui on 6 April 1906 has given rise to confusion and controversy, and this is mainly due to the majority of revolutionary records that placed the founding date either in the middle or the end of 1905. These records included the authoritative works of Feng Ziyou and the memoirs of Tan Chornam and Teo Eng-hock. Feng, a Tongmenghui leader in Japan and a faithful follower of Dr Sun Yat-sen, spent half of his later life in collecting and writing the history of the 1911 Revolution, and placed the founding date sometime in the winter of the Yi Si year (October to December of 1905); while Teo Eng-hock’s memoir claimed the founding date was in the middle of July of the Yi Si year (middle of August of 1905), and Tan Chor-nam’s memoir accepted the founding date sometime at the end of 1905. Obviously, Teo’s claim is an error, because founding of the Singapore branch could not be earlier than the inauguration of the Tongmenghui headquarters in Tokyo (20 August 1905). Tan Chor-nam’s record of the event which was his speech given on 1 January 1941 entitled “Wan Qing Yuan and the Chinese Revolution” was his recollection of the revolutionary activities in Singapore, approximately about 35 years after the event. The accuracy of the founding date of the Tongmenghui branch is in question. While Feng Ziyou who had interviewed Tan and Teo, and

9 For more details of the founding of the Singapore Tongmenghui branch, see Yen Chinghwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 92–94.; for identifying the 15 founding members on 6 April, see “Zhongguo Tongmenghui chengli chuqi (Yi Si Bing Wu liang nian) zhi huiyuan mingce” (A List of Early Members of the Tongmenghui in 1905 and 1906 years), in Lo Jialun (Chief Editor), Geming wenxian (Documents on the 1911 Revolution), Vol. 2, pp. 73–74. Taipei: Guo Guang Publishers, 1958.

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had based his writings on their recollections naturally made the same mistake.10 Being the key Tongmenghui branch in Southeast Asia, Singapore was destined to carry the responsibility of expanding revolutionary influence throughout the region. First, new branches needed to be established to form an effective network that could spread the revolutionary message and to raise funds. Second, propaganda media such as newspapers needed to be published to convert more Overseas Chinese to the revolutionary cause. In August 1906, after having returned from Japan to Singapore, Dr Sun made a roving visit to the Malay Peninsula for the purpose of establishing Tongmenghui branches. Accompanied by his close associates, he visited Seremban, Kuala Lumpur, and Ipoh in an attempt to raise revolutionary profile among the Chinese audiences, but he had mixed results. In Kuala Lumpur — the capital city of Malaya — he succeeded in founding a Tongmenghui branch, but his visit to Ipoh was a complete failure mainly due to the obstruction of the local Reformist supporters led by tin-mining tycoon Foo Chee Choon (Hu Zichun).11 Having suffered the setback in Ipoh, Dr Sun returned to Singapore to plan out his next move. He sent Tan Chor-nam and Lim Ngeesoon (Lin Yishun) — two key leaders of the Singapore branch — to Penang to set up a Tongmenghui branch. A letter of introduction from Dr Sun served as the link between Sun’s emissaries and the local Chinese revolutionaries led by Goh Say-eng (Wu Shirong), a rich and respected community leader. Local revolutionary supporters were

10

See Teo Eng-Hock, Nanyang yu chuangli Minguo (Nanyang and the Founding of the Republic of China), p. 10.; Tan Chor-nam, “Wan Qing Yuan yu Zhongguo geming shilue” (Wan Qing Yuan and the Chinese Revolution). In ZMKWW, Vol. 1, Pt. 11, p. 537, this article is also published in Jiang Yongjing (ed.), Huaqiao kaiguo geming shiliao, p. 336.; Feng Ziyou (1953). Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi (A History of the Overseas Chinese Involvement in the 1911 Revolution), p. 79. Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, reprint, Feng Ziyou, “Haiwai gedi Zhongguo Tongmenghui shilue” (A concise history of the Tongmenghui overseas branches). In Feng Zhiyou, Geming Yishi (Anecdotal History of the 1911 Revolution), Vol. 4, p. 161. 11 For Sun Yat-sen’s mission to Malay Peninusula to establish Tongmenghui branches, see Yen Ching Hwang, Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 95–98.

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mobilized and a Tongmenghui branch was established at the end of 1906 with Goh as its first president, and Ng Kim-keng (Huang Jinqing) his deputy.12 The influence of the Singapore Tongmenghui branch was not just confined to British Malaya, but it also radiated its influence to neighboring regions such as Dutch East Indies. In the period between the end of 1906 and the end of 1907, it had sent out several members to Dutch East Indies in an attempt to set up Tongmenghui branches there. These revolutionary emissaries included Xie Liangmu, Li Zhuzhong, Li Tianlin, Chen Fangdu, Zeng Lianqing, and Liang Moan.13 In the spring of 1907, it sent Zhang Yuren and Wu Wenbo to Java to recruit the Indies Chinese, and they organized a meeting in Pintu Kecil (in Chinatown) and established the Tongmenghui of the Dutch East Indies (Heshu Tongmenghui).14 The position of Singapore as the center of Tongmenghui in Southeast Asia was consolidated in 1908 when it was officially upgraded to the status of regional headquaters in Southeast Asia (Nanyang Zhibu). In view of the growing number of branches in British and Dutch colonies that came under the influence or control of the Singapore Tongmenghui, Sun saw the time was ripe to uplift its status to a regional headquater and he appointed Hu Hanmin as its director (Zhibuzhang). To facilitate communication among the branches and to tighten the party’s control over the members, Sun drafted three items of communication modus operandi and a 16-point constitution for all Southeast Asian branches. Among the methods of communication, all branches were provided with addresses and were required to correspond once every 2 months, any change

12

See Feng Ziyou, Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi (A History of the Overseas Chinese Involvement in the 1911 Revolution), p. 87; Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 98–99. 13 Feng Ziyou, ibid, p. 93. 14 See Suryadinata, L (1987). The 1911 Revolution and the Chinese in Java: A preliminary study. In The 1911 Revolution — the Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia, Lee Lai To (ed.), p. 109. Singapore: Heinemann Asia; see also the Chinese version of this article under Liao Jianyu (Leo Suryadinata), “Xin Hai geming yu Zhao Wa huaren: chutanxing yanjiu,” in XGNHYL, pp. 388–389.

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of address must be reported to the regional headquarters, and all of the branches were required to despatch congratulatory message to the new branches so as to seal a closer relationship. On the constitution of Tongmenghui branches, the document stated clearly the aims of the party, the obligations and rights of the members, the structure, and office-bearers of the branch. To enable the branchs to function efficiently under secret cover and to cope with growing membership, the document proposed to organize the members along a military line.15 The lifting of the Singapore branch to the status of Tongmenghui regional headquarters in Southeast Asia, in retrospect, was important, but it did not really stimulate or improve the performance of the Singapore branch. This was because the anti-Sun movement that started in 1907 in Tokyo began to undermine the activities of the Tongmenghui branches in Southeast Asia, and affected the morale of the revolutionary supporters in the region.

Penang as the Center of Tongmenghui Activities in Southeast Asia (1910–1912) Penang was not destined to become the center of Tongmenghui activities in Southeast Asia. It was the result of circumstances rather than natural progression. Its rise should be understood in the context of the global revolutionary situation and Dr Sun’s determination of going his own way. 1909 was the year when Dr Sun faced the greatest challenge in his early revolutionary career, and his leadership was put to the test. More threatening to his leadership was that his opponents were more well organized than before, and their activities posed a threat that undermined his credibility among the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. He suffered several setbacks consecutively. First, his several organized uprisings — four in 1907 and two

15

Sun’s plan was to organize members into pai, lie, dui, and ying. eight members in one pai, every three pai into one lie, every four lie into one dui, and every four dui into one ying. Each level of the organization was to have a head in charge. See Feng Ziyou, Huaqiao geming kaiguo shi (A History of the Overseas Chinese Involvement in the 1911 Revolution), pp. 81–84.

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in 1908 — failed miserably one after another.16 These abortive revolts seemed to have ended his revolutionary adventures, at least for the time being, and had shaken his belief in revolutionary adventurism. Second, problems related to the aftermath of these abortive revolts, especially the rehabilitation of a group of more than 400 revolutionary refugees from Indo-China bothered him a great deal.17 Third, a sense of gloom and doom developed among his supporters in Southeast Asia as a result of these continuous defeats, and Sun’s judgment and his strategy of staging revolts in South and South-west China were questioned. Fourth, the depressed state of revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya due to the depressed economic conditions, and the possible collapse of Chong Shing Jit Poh (Zhong Xing Ri Bao, the Restoration Daily) — the main revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia, loomed large in Sun’s mind. Fifth, the anti-Sun movement that aimed at his removal from leadership of the Tongmenghui shifted into top gear. It started in Tokyo in 1907,18 and became more organized and more threatening to Sun’s position in 1908 when one of its leaders, Tao Chengzhang toured Southeast Asia 16

These included the Chaozhou Huang Gang uprising from May 22nd to 27th 1907, the Huizhou (Waichow) Qinuhu Uprising from June 2nd to 13th 1907, the Fangcheng Uprising from September 1st to 17th 1907, the Zhen Nan Guan Uprising from December 1st to 8th 1907. In 1908, there were the Qin Lian Uprising of 27th March to 3rd May, and the Hekou Uprising of 29th April to 26th May. See Chen Shuqiang, “Xin Hai geming shiqi Nanyang huaren zhiyuan qiyi jinghui zhi yanjiu”(A Study on the Southeast Asian Chinese Support for the Revolutionary Uprisings during the 1911 Revolutionary Period), in XGNHYL, pp. 243–244.; Guangdong sheng zhexue shehui kexue yanjiuso lishi yanjiushe (The History Section of the Philosophical and Social Science Institute of the Guangdong Province) et al. (eds.), (1980). Sun Zhongshan nianpu (The Chronology of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 87–93. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. 17 After the defeat of the Hekou uprising in May 1908, revolutionary refugees led by Huang Mingtang retreated to Vietnam, but they were disarmed by the French colonial authorities, and were banished to Singapore. Sun had settled most of them in a quarry. Some of them were accused of being involved in robberies, and 21 of them were detained for trial by the authorities. Sun alleged that they were framed by the local Reformists. See “Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Wang Fu dated 2nd March 1909,” in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Guofu quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), p. 413. 18 For leadership tussles in Tokyo, see Liew KS (1971). Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-Jen and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 68–84. Canberra: Australian National University Press; Young-Tsu Wong (1989). Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936, pp. 67–83. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

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and succeeded in driving a wedge among the Chinese in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.19 Among these setbacks, most threatening to Sun’s leadership was Tao’s activity. Not only did it directly undermined the support of the Overseas Chinese in the region, it but also raised doubts and suspicions of Sun’s integrity and his revolutionary credentials. Tao, together with Zhang Binglin, another anti-Sun leader, publicly denounced Sun in newspapers for his self-serving and profiteering motives.20 Sun, while in Europe on his tour for foreign financial support, saw it fit to make public about the finance of the Tongmenghui, a direct rebuttal to the accusations of his adversaries.21 Instead of bowing to the pressure of his opponents to resign, Sun, a man of destiny and with supreme confidence in his own leadership, decided to go his own way and to overhaul the Tongmenghui for the sake of the Chinese revolution and for his self-interest. He realized that key to the success of any future revolts still lay in the supply of money, and the overseas Chinese still remained the main source of finance. He held the upper hand over his adversaries because of his closeness to the Overseas Chinese and his ability to 19

For Tao Cheng-zhang’s activities in Southeast Asia, see Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 214–217. For Tao’s correspondence with his supporters in Dutch East Indies such as Li Xiehe (Li Zhuzhong) and Wang Ruoyu, See Tang Zhijun (ed.), (1986). Tao Chengzhang ji (The Collection of Tao Chengzhang’s Works), pp. 147–169. Beijing: Zhonghui shuju. 20 The attack on Sun Yat-sen took the form of an open letter and leaflet. The open letter was written by Zhang Binglin, and the leaflet was distributed under the title of “Nanyang geming dang ren xuanbu Sun Wen zuizhuang shu” (A Declaration of Sun Yat-sen’s Criminal Acts by the Revolutionaries in Southeast Asia). The original letter and the leaflet were lost, but they were reproduced in various Reformist newspapers, including one in Singapore, the Nanyang Zonghui Bao (The Union Times). See Nanyang Zonghui Bao, 6, 11 November 1909, p. 2. 21 Sun in his letter to Wu Jingheng (Wu Zhihui) in late October 1909 on his way to America, defended himself on the charges of making himself famous and profiteering from revolutionary activities. He claimed that before the Chinese revolution was an acceptable cause of action by Chinese students studying overseas, he risked his life and reputation by involving in antiManchu revolts, and was accused to be a traitor. He had nothing to gain to enhance his reputation. On the profiteering charge, he defended himself by saying that he had good income by practising as a Western trained medical doctor, and had no need of making profit out of revolutionary activities. See “Letter from Sun Yat-sen to Wu Jingheng in London on the eve of his departure for the United States,” in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Guofu quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 418–419.

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cultivate their financial support. A bright spot on the horizon was the Chinese communities in the United States where the Reformists (Bao Huang Hui) declined following the death of the Emperor Guangxu at the end of 1908 and the internal power struggle within the Reformist ranks.22 In the next 7 months from November 1909 to May 1910, Sun spent all his time in the United States where he established Tongmenghui branches in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Honolulu. Although he did not obtain a substantial amount of money for his new ventures, he nevertheless laid the solid foundation in North America for tapping Overseas Chinese financial resources.23 Boosted by his success among the American Chinese, Dr Sun left Hawaii for Japan and arrived at the port Yokohama on 10th June 1910. His decision of going his own way had polarized the revolutionaries in Japan into pro-Sun and anti-Sun camps, and he was blunt in expressing his displeasure over the acts of the dissidents and his intention of organizing another party. Nevertheless, he was persuaded to drop the idea and agreed to call a meeting for all the provincial heads of the Tongmenghui to thrash out their differences.24 Unfortunately, the meeting did not eventuate because Sun was forced to leave Japan in view of a 5-year ban on him that was still in force. On 11 July 1910, Sun Yat-sen arrived in Singapore after more than a year’s absence. To his dismay the revolutionary activity in his old base was at its lowest ebb. The anti-Sun movement undertaken by Tao Chengzhang and others had done more damage than he had anticipated. The Tongmenghui regional headquaters was disorganized and inactive, and some of the old comrades had lost enthusiasm for the revolution, and several of them appeared to have exhausted their financial resources. This did not dishearten him; instead, he was more determined to reorganize and rejuvenate the party for his future 22

See L Eve Armentrout Ma (1990), Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 128–131. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 23 See L Eve Armentrout Ma Ibid, pp. 131–135; Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 221–224. 24 See Liew KS, Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution, p. 80.

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move in China. After consulting his close supporters from the Ipoh and Penang branches of Tongmenghui, Sun decided to transfer the Tongmenghui regional headquaters from Singapore to Penang. On 19th July 1910, Sun arrived in Penang, and he instructed the secretary of the regional headquarters, Zhou Hua, to move all documents to Penang, and Zhou was to retain his same job in the new regional headquarters.25 Dr Sun Yat-sen’s choice of Penang rather than Kuala Lumpur, Malacca, Ipoh, Kuala Pilah, or Seremban as the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian regional headquarters was based on at least three important considerations. First, the Penang Tongmenghui branch was less influenced and affected by the anti-Sun movement, and it had demonstrated its enthusiasm and vitality in carrying out revolutionary activities. It had established an important front organization — the Penang Philomatic Society (Bincheng yeshu baoshe) — that became the model of revolutionary reading clubs in Singapore and Malaya. Second, Penang was a major port on the north-west of the Malay Peninsula with modern banking and telecommunication facilities. As a regional headquarters, it had to help coordinate revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia, and the speed of transmitting and distributing secret messages and funds was crucial for the proper working of the headquarters. Third, Penang, as part of the Straits Settlements, was under the same administration as Singapore, and the revolutionary activities did not need to readjust to a new political environment.26 Having shifted the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian regional headquarters from Singapore to Penang, the uppermost issue in Sun Yatsen’s mind was how to revitalize the party so as to respond to any new opportunities arising in China. He appointed two trusted supporters, Goh Say-eng and Ng Kim-keng to head the organization

25

See Yang Hanxiang, “Zhonghua minguo kaiguoqian zhi benshe geming shi” (The revolutionary history of the Penang Philomatic Society before the Founding of the Chinese Republic). In Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), Yang Hanxiang (ed.), p. 21. Penang. 26 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 228–229.

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which was placed on a sound pyramid structure. At the top of the pyramid was the standing committee under which were seven departments: the Executive (Shuwu ke), Finance (Caizheng ke), Secretariat (Wenan ke), External Affairs (Waijiao ke), Education (Jiaoyu ke), Investigation (Tiaocha ke), and Reception (Zhaodai ke). Each department consisted of 5–13 members with a head in charge. A 20-point constitution clearly defined the jurisdiction and responsibilities of each department, and interdepartmental relations such as holding a meeting at least once a month among all departmental heads.27 A tight and well-structured party machinery enabled the regional headquarters to function more efficiently and flexibly. The second step taken by Dr Sun to rejuvenate the party was to reorganize the rank and file members along a military line. Members were organized into pai and lie, with eight members forming into one pai, and four pais into one lie. The pai and lie were under the control of a head who was to keep close touch with rank and file members on the one hand, and the standing committee on the other.28 The idea of organizing rank and file members along a military line was contained in Sun’s draft constitution for Southeast Asian Tongmenghui branches in 1908 when he uplifted Singapore’s status to the regional headquarters in Southeast Asia, but obviously this idea was not put into practice by many of the branches. This military system strengthened the control of the party over members, and broadened the basis of low-level leadership. The third step taken by Sun to reform the party was to reregister the members. Struck by the deep influence of the anti-Sun movement in Southeast Asia, he was determined to seal a closer relationship with members. He intended to weed out any sympathisers of his opponents from the party and only retained those who were prepared to devote to the revolution and himself, and required the reregistered members to swear and sign a new oath in his presence. His intention of gaining absolute control

27

See Yang Hanxiang, op. cit., p. 22; Chen Xinzheng, Huaqiao geming xiaoshi (A concise history of the overseas Chinese involvement in the revolution) (manuscript., copied by Wu Tie-jen, and this copy is held by Yen Ching-hwang), pp. 33–35. 28 Yang Hanxiang, op. cit.; Chen Xinzheng, ibid., pp. 21–22.

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over the rejuvenated party was clear, that was to clear the path for a new military venture in south China.29 The preparation for the Second Canton Uprising in April 191130 in Penang was the major event undertaken by the Penang Southeast Asian regional headquarters. The preparation took the form of a crucial conference held in Penang which was known in the history of the 1911 Revolution as the Penang Conference (Bineng huiyi). The conference was directly responsible for the planning, preparation, and starting of a revolt in Canton city — a major revolt that surpassed all previous revolts and indirectly led to the Wuchang Uprising on 10 October 1911. The planning and preparation of such important uprising placed Malaya in the limelight of the Chinese revolutionary movement. The idea of organizing a major revolt in South China in the early 1911 was conceived before Sun’s arrival in Singapore in July 1910. In defiance of his opponents’ support for a revolt in central or northern China, Sun still believed his strategy of staging uprisings in South or South-west China to effect a national revolution was a correct one, and he was prepared to test it out again with the strong support of Overseas Chinese. His success in establishing Tongmenghui new branches in the United States and his reorganization of the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian regional headquarters reinforced his confidence to undertake a large-scale revolt in Canton, the heart of Southern China. In October 1910, he began contacting his loyal followers and invited them to Penang for 29

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 231; Yen Chinghwang (1995). “Penang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution.” In Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, p. 294, Yen Ching-hwang. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 30 This Second Canton Uprising was popularly known in Chinese as “Guangzhou sanye erhshijiu qiyi,” and it should be literally translated as “Canton third moon 29th Uprising”. But third moon 29th was in Chinese lunar calendar which in fact fell on 27th April 1911. Some English books conveniently used the term the “Canton March 29 Uprising” or “The Revolution of March Twenty-ninth,” see for instance, Chun-tu Hsueh (1961). Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 78–93. Stanford: Stanford University Press, and my own work, Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 231–238, perhaps a better term should be “The Second Canton Uprising” of April 27, 1911 which is differentiated from “The First Canton Uprising” of 1895.

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a meeting. On 13th November 1910 (12th day of 10th moon in the lunar calendar), the crucial meeting was held at Dr Sun’s residence — 400, Dato Kramat. The participants included his faithful followers such as Huang Xing, Hu Hanmin, Zhao Sheng, Sun Mei (the elder brother of Dr Sun); the representatives of the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian headquarters, Goh Say-eng, Ng Kim-keng, Xiong Yushan, Lin Shian; and the representatives of the Tongmenghui branches of Ipoh, Seremban and Pontianak (Borneo), Li Xiaozhang, Deng Zeru, and Li Yixia.31 The result of the Penang Conference was a foregone conclusion. With the participants carefully selected by Dr Sun Yat-sen himself, no strong objection against his proposal of staging a major revolt was raised. With maximum optimism and analytical ability, Sun succeeded in persuading the participants to go his way. Several important decisions were taken at the conference: Canton was to be the target of the new revolt, an amount of at least $100,000 to be raised among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the new army of Guangdong was to become the main force of the revolt, and 500 revolutionary cadres were to be recruited as members of a suicide squad.32 The success or failure of the revolt seemed to rest on the funds to be raised among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, with the target of $50,000 each to be raised in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and $30,000 each to be raised among the Chinese in Vietnam and Thailand. Sun realized that he had a gigantic task of raising such huge funds, he needed to get whole-hearted support from the comrades in Penang, and to get every ounce of their effort if the fund-raising movement was to succeed. This was why he called a meeting at the

31

See Zhou Nu (1939). Guangzhou sanye erhshijiu geming shi (A History of the Canton 3rd Moon 29th Uprising), p. 3. Hong Kong; Yang Hanxiang, Zhonghua minguo kaiguoqian zhi benshe geming shi (The revolutionary history of the Penang Philomatic Society before the Founding of the Chinese Republic). In Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), Yang Hanxiang Y (ed.), pp. 32–33. 32 See Yang Hanxiang, ibid., p. 35; Deng Zeru (1948). Zhongguo Guomindang erhshinian shiji (Twenty Years’ Historical Records of the Nationalist Party of China), part reproduced in ZMKWW., Vol. 1, Pt.14, p. 41. Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju.

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Penang Philomatic Society 2 days after the conference. At the meeting, Sun made an emotional appeal for support. He adjured them to share the responsibility of saving China, and again he invoked his famous theme of revolution that Overseas Chinese sacrificed their money by donating to revolutionary funds, while the comrades in China sacrificed their lives by being directly involved in the revolution. He even staked his future on the planned revolt, and pledged that he would rather die or retire and would not trouble them again should the revolt fail.33 Most of the participants were touched by Sun’s emotional appeal, and his charisma carried the day with more than $8,000 donations promised on the spot.34 Unfortunately, Sun Yat-sen was unable to guide the fund-raising campaign himself because he was ordered by the British colonial authorities to leave Penang as a result of his public criticism on the British colonial rule. With extreme reluctance and uncertainty about the fund-raising campaign in Southeast Asia, he left Penang for North America, and entrusted the work to Huang Xing and Hu Hanmin. With dedication and hard work of the leaders of the Penang Tongmenghui and the support of Sun’s other faithful followers in key Malayan branches of Ipoh, Kuala Pilah and Seremban Teh Lay-seng (Zheng Luosheng), Li Guan-sui (Li Yuanshui) and Deng Zeru, the fund-raising movement in Malaya was a success, and it raised an amount close to $50,000.35 Being the center of the revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia during the late Tongmenghui period (1910–1912), Penang played an important role in the support by Southeast Asian Chinese in response to the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911. The news of the outbreak 33

See Dr Sun’s speech entitled “Tongzhi dang gongfu geming jiuguo zhi zeren” (Comrades must share the responsibility of saving China), dated 1910 in Penang, in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Guofu quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 482–483; The English translation of this speech is found in Yen Ching-hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Appendix 5, pp. 337–338. 34 See Yang Hanxiang, Zhonghua minguo kaiguoqian zhi benshe geming shi (The revolutionary history of the Penang Philomatic Society before the Founding of the Chinese Republic). In Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), Yang Hanxiang (ed.), p. 35; Chen Xinzheng C, Huaqiao geming xiaoshi (manuscript kept by Yen Ching-hwang), p. 23. 35 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 234–238.

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of the uprising came as a great surprise and excitement to the Penang regional headquarters and pulled them out of the depressed state following the defeat of the Second Canton Uprising in April 1911. As soon as the telegrams of the uprising and the request for financial support were received on 11 October, 1 day after the outbreak, a sum of $20,000 was immediately sent to Shanghai Tongmenghui regional headquarters to meet the urgent needs. Although the Wuchang Uprising was planned and executed by Sun Yat-sen’s opponents in the party and took place in central China rather than the south or southwest of China, the prospect of success aroused huge enthusiasm among the Penang revolutionaries. Regardless of who should claim the credit for the uprising, all the members of the regional center worked very hard for the common goal. Some leaders at the headquarters were said to have neglected their own business and devoted most of their time to the cause of the revolution.36 The center effectively discharged its coordinating role: cables and telegrams received from China were immediately transmitted to the Tongmenghui branches throughout Southeast Asia, reports on the victories of revolutionary armies were made public by circulars and in newspapers, and fund-raising activities to support the on going revolution were aunched by the center and other important branches. In comparison with the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian regional headquarters in Singapore, the Penang headquarters played an equally important role in the support of the Chinese revolution. The former radiated its influence to neighboring areas, helping to start Tongmenghui branches in the Malay Peninsular and Dutch East Indies, and integrating them into an effective network. At the same time, the Singapore regional center also initiated the establishment of many types of front organizations such as night schools, reading clubs, drama troupes, etc., and coordinated revolutionary propaganda machines to mount an ideological war against the Reformists. In contrast, the Penang regional center devoted most of its time in coordinating and 36 See Yang Hanxiang, op. cit., in Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), Yang Hanxiang (ed.), p. 62.

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raising funds in support of two major revolts — the Second Canton Uprising and the Wuchang Uprising. Although the roles of the two regional centers varied, their contributions to the Chinese revolution were equally significant. Without the existence of these two regional centers in Singapore and Penang, the Chinese revolutionary activities in Southeast Asia could not have been smoothly carried out, and the 1911 Revolution — viewed as a process of continuous revolutionary actions — could not have been completed.

How did the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya Respond to Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s Appeals Thirty years ago, I was right to adopt an approach that combined nationalism and class analysis to assess the response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the 1911 Revolution.37 This response was mainly determined by the nature of the 1911 Revolution and the nature of the Overseas Chinese communities. Unlike the Taiping Revolution in mid-19th century or the Communist Revolution in 1949 that aimed at socio-economic transformation of the Chinese society, the 1911 Revolution was a democratic revolution with a strong racist overtone. It did not aim at mobilizing the poor and oppressed peasants to violently overthrow the rapacious landlord class, nor did it target to effect a fierce class struggle between Chinese working class and the capitalists. What it aimed at was to mobilize the support of members of all Chinese classes to overthrow a decadent Manchu regime in order to save China from foreign imperialists, with an ultimate objective of successfully modernizing China. At the same time, as the 1911 Revolutionary movement was led by Dr Sun Yat-sen and other foreign-educated Chinese intellectuals, it was to operate outside China instead of working among the members of various classes within China. Furthermore, the 1911 Revolution aimed at the overthrow of a regime that was ruled by the minority Manchus who were ethnically different from the majority of the Han Chinese. The Manchus were highly 37

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 264–286.

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conscious of this difference and jealously guarded their power with institutionalized discrimination against the Han Chinese. This, together with the cruelty in treating Han Chinese in the early history of their conquest in China, provided fertile ground for the revolutionaries to whip up anti-Manchu sentiment among the Overseas Chinese. In addition to the nature of the 1911 Revolution, the response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s appeals was conditioned by the nature of the Overseas Chinese communities. Like other Overseas Chinese communities at the turn of the 20th century, the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya can be described as immigrant and urban communities characterized by predominantly single male population, instability, and a high-degree of social mobility.38 The transient nature of the immigrant community, the loneliness, and boredom endured by male workers had implications for their response to Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s appeals. Furthermore, the fluidity of social mobility and the fluctuation of fortunes that determined one’s socio-economic status in the community also affected the attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in responding to the appeals. In terms of statistics, the number of Chinese in Singapore and Malaya responding to the calls of the Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen was relatively small. The figure I compiled from various sources suggested a number of 630 members of Tongmenghui and another 600 keen supporters among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya in the period between April 1906 and October 1911, making up a figure of 1230. This figure is slightly lower than a figure of about 2000 given by a revolutionary leader of the time, Deng Muhan, and an estimate of 3500 by a Japanese observer. Even if we accept the figures by Deng and the Japanese observer, this figure still represents only about 0.3% to 0.5% of the Chinese population over the age of 15 in Singapore

38

For discussion of the nature of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya during the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, see Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 141–143. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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and Malaya at the time.39 This number seems to be very small, but bear in mind that there were Chinese who responded to the appeals of Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen but wished to remain anonymous for the fear of safety or other personal reasons. What should be remembered is that involvement in revolution was not like attending a dinner party — as what Mao Zedong had aptly put it — nor was it the same as getting involved in a modern business enterprise that anyone could cash in for quick profit; it was a dangerous undertaking that would invite reprisal from the Qing government. So the small number of the Chinese population in Singapore and Malaya actively involved in the revolutionary movement was understandable. However, in a period of slightly over 4 months from the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising on 10th October 1911 to the abdication of the Qing emperor on 12th February 1912, the number of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya responding to the 1911 Revolution dramatically increased. The total number was estimated to be between 30,000 and 41,000, a figure representing 4.4% to 5.9% of the Chinese population over the age of 15. This phenomenal increase was mainly due to the prospect of success of the 1911 Revolution and the opportunistic attitude of many Chinese in the region. The prospect of success of the revolution produced a strong band-wagon effect. Those who opposed the revolution and those who supported the Reformists saw the need of changing horses, and those who were sitting on the fence saw a bright future for the Chinese revolution, and were prepared to support it.40 The focus of Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s appeal was nationalism and revolution. In order to get more donations for the on going 39

See Deng Mu-han (1965). Sun Zhongshan xiansheng zhuan (A Biography of Dr Sun Yat-sen) quoted in Zhonghua minguo gejie jinian guofu painian danchen chouban weiyuanhui (ed.), Geming xianlie xianjin shiwen xuanji (Selections of Poems and Writings of the Revolutionary Martyrs and Forerunners) (Taipei), Vol. 3, p. 38. For Japanese estimate, see Anonymous, “Qingguo gemingdang zhi shili tongji zai waiguo ze” (An Estimate of the Strength of the Chinese Revolutionary Party Overseas) (manuscript kept in the Kuomintang Archives, Taibei, Taiwan), pp. 1–3. For my own estimate, see Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 262–263. 40 See my analysis of this change of attitude in Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 263–264.

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revolutionary uprisings in south and south-west China, Sun and other Tongmenghui leaders emphasized nationalism and its relationship with revolution. Wang Jingwei ( Wang Ching-wei), a top leader of the Tongmenghui and a faithful follower of Dr Sun, had made at least 11 public speeches in Singapore and Malaya in the year of 1908, and 8 out of the 11 which are identifiable, were on nationalism.41 Among four public speeches delivered by Dr Sun to his supporters in Penang in the period between 1907 and 1910, all of them were related to nationalism and revolution.42 The content of these public speeches were well structured around nationalism and revolution: from the threat of foreign imperialism, crisis of China under a corrupt and inept Manchu regime, the removal of Manchus as the stumbling block in the way of China’s salvation, devotion of all Chinese to the well-being of China (patriotism), and the responsibility of the Overseas Chinese in donating and raising funds for revolution. These contents were carefully crafted by the speakers in order to get the maximum result from the audiences. At the same time, the themes of nationalism and revolution plus democracy — another 41

Out of 11 public speeches delivered by Wang Jingwei, 7 were made in Singapore, 2 in Kuala Lumpur, and 1 each in Seremban and Penang. In time sequence, 3 were made in January 1908, 2 each in March and May, and 1 each in June, August and October, and 1 cannot be identified. See Table 2 “Speeches Delivered by Wang Ching-Wei (Wang Jingwei) in Singapore and Malaya (1908–1909), in Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 121. 42 The first public speech made by Sun Yat-sen in Penang in 1907 was at the Penang Chinese Town Hall (Ping Zhang Huiguan or P’ing Chang Hui Kuan), the topic was entitled “The Overthrow of the Manchus is the Prerequisite for China’s Salvation.” The second public talk was delivered by Sun in 1908 at the Xiao Lan Ting Club, Penang, entitled “China will be Conquered again if the Manchus are not Overthrown.” His third talk was delivered in Penang at the end of 1910 entitled “The Making of a Revolution requires Courage as well as Means,” while the last talk in Penang at the end of 1910 entitled “All Comrades must Shoulder the Responsibility of Saving the Nation.” The last 2 were delivered after the Penang Conference in his effort to raising funds for the planned The Second Canton Uprising. See Yang Hanxiang (ed.), Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), pp. 142–143; Chen Xinzheng, “Huaqiao geming xiaoshi” (A Concise History of the Overseas Chinese Involvement in the Revolution) (manuscript kept by Yen Ching-hwang), p. 1; Zhang Qiyun (ed.) (1960). Guofu quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 482–483. Taibei: Guofang chubanshe. English translations of these talks can be found in Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Appendixes 2 to 5, pp. 330–338.

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principle of Sun’s Three Peoples’ Principles — were expounded by the leaders of the Tongmenghui, both national and local, in the Chong Shing Yit Pao, the Tongmenghui’s main revolutionary organ in Southeast Asia, in Singapore. The articles elucidating these themes in the Chong Shing formed the main body of barrage mounted against the Reformists’ appeals of constitutional monarchy and the salvation of China through the restoration of the deposed emperor Guangxu (Emperor Kuangshu). The ideological war launched by the leaders of the Tongmenghui not only targeted at diminishing the Reformist support in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya, but also aimed at clarifying the confusion between reform and revolution in the minds of many Overseas Chinese.43 In examining the response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the 1911 Revolution, I was correct to divide them into three different social groups: upper social group, middle, and lower social groups, and observed their behavior in relation to the revolution. The upper social group consisting of commercial magnates, wealthy shopkeepers, property and land owners, wealthy tin-miners and planters, big contractors, and financiers. Their value to the revolution was their possession of immense wealth that could finance the revolutionary uprisings easily, and some of them became the target of personal appeals by Dr Sun Yat-sen and Tongmenghui leaders.44 However, these men of wealth and high social status had many things to ponder in relation to the appeals of Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen: their personal and family 43 For heated debates between the Chong Shing Yit Pao and the Reformist Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao (The Union Times). See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 186–211; Chui Kwei-Chiang, “Zhong Xing Ribao: Xinjiapo Tongmenghui de houshe, 1907–1910” (Chong Shing Yit Pao: The Revolutionary Organ of the Singapore Tongmenghui, 1907–1910), in XGNHYL, pp. 139–151. 44 Loke Yew (or Lu You), a tin-mining magnate and a wealthy developer was the target of Sun Yat-sen personal approach. In 1906 when Sun led a mission to Malaya to found the Tongmenghui branch there, he personally approached Loke asking him to donate a large sum of money to the revolution, but of no avail. See Chen Qiyuan, “Xinhai qianhou Peng Zemin xiansheng he Jilongpo huaqiao de geming huodong” (Mr Peng Zemin and the Revolutionary Activities of the Overseas Chinese in Kuala Lumpur before and after the 1911 Revolution), in Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xiashang huiyi chuanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiuhui (ed.), Xinhai geming huiyilu (Recollections on the 1911 Revolution) (Beijing, 1961), Vol. 1, p. 396.

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safety, the safety of their relatives in China, and the safety of their wealth. Because of their wealth and high social status, they developed certain contacts with the British colonial authorities and Qing government in China, and they were under the watchful eyes of the Qing diplomats in Singapore and Penang where the Qing government had its Consulate-General and Vice-Consulate establishments.45 For those wealthy merchants who had Qing official titles,46 they naturally leaned toward supporting the Qing government and rejected the revolution. Those rich merchants who received traditional education with conservative thinking rejected Sun’s revolutionary message as “no respect for emperor and no respect for father” (wujun wufu) and considered Sun a rebel chief.47 I had in my book listed 20 rich merchants: 10 of them were conservatives supporting the Qing government or the Reformists, while the other 10 were keen supporters of the revolution.48 Despite 45

For the establishment of the Chinese Consulate (later changed into Consulate-General) in Singapore in 1877, and the Vice-Consulate in Penang in 1893, See Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 140–144, 171. Singapore: Singapore University Press; “Memorial of Guo Songtao to the Court Urging for the Establishment of a Consulate in Singapore dated 27th day of 8th moon of 3rd year of Guangxu (3 October 1877),” in Qingji waijiao shiliao:Guangxu chao (Historical Materials on Foreign Relations in the Late Qing Period for the Guangxu Reign), Vol. 11, pp. 13b–15a. (Taibei, Wen Hai chubanshe, reprint, 1964); Xie Fucheng, “Despatch to the Zongli Yamen relating to the Appointment of the Vice-Consul in Penang dated 20th day of 1st moon of 19th year of Guangxu Reign (8 March 1893), in Xie Fucheng, Chushi gongdu:zoushu (Correspondence of my Diplomatic Mission to England and my Memorials to the Court) (Taipei), Vol. 2, pp. 25a–25b. 46 For wealthy Chinese merchants in Singapore and Malaya who purchased Qing official titles during the late Qing period, see Yen Ching-hwang (1970). Ch’ing’s Sale of Honours and the Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(2) 20–32. See also the same article reprinted in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 177–198. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 47 When Sun first visited Penang in 1907, he was rejected outright by some wealthy merchants with such a view. See Chen Xinzheng, Huaqiao geming xiaoshi (A Brief History of the Overseas Chinese Involvement in the Chinese Revolutions) (manuscript kept by Yen Ching-hwang), p. 2. 48 See Table 3 entitled “The Origins of Ten Rich Merchants Who were Revolutionary Leaders in Singapore and Malaya, 1903–1912” and Table 4 “The Origins of Ten Rich Merchants Who were Either Reformist Leaders or Pro-Ch’ing Conservatives in Singapore and Malaya, 1898–1911.” In Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 267–275.

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their common class background of having possessed considerable wealth and the fear of losing that wealth and personal safety, they responded differently to the revolution. This was because there were other factors at work such as economic and political connections with the Qing government, age and the type of education received, and personal contacts with Sun Yat-sen or other leaders of the Tongmenghui.49 These other factors helped to determine why some were more exposed to the calls of Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen, and were more responsive to the emotional appeals of nationalism and revolution. Thus, what can be summed up is that the class analysis is necessary but not sufficient; it has to combine with nationalism and other social and personal factors. The members of the middle social group that included shopkeepers, petty traders, school teachers, clerks, and shop assistants appeared to have responded to the calls of Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s more enthusiastically than the members of the upper social group. Many members of this group had received some form of education, and they were in a better position than the members of the lower social group to receive the influence of revolutionary publications. Because of their literacy or semi-literacy, they were aware of the declining power and status of China in the world that had important implications for their own position overseas. A dawning idea of nationalism, together with a desire for a strong China that could protect their interests overseas, motivated many of them to support the revolution. They joined the Tongmenghui and other revolutionary front organizations and were actively involved in carrying out revolutionary activities. They formed the backbone of these organizations and staffed the lower echelon leadership of the party, and the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s appeals could not have borne fruit without their participation. In short, the members of the middle social group were very enthusiastic in response to the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s calls, and their contribution to the success of Chinese revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya was substantial.50 49 50

See Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid, p. 276. See Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid, pp. 277–282.

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The members of the lower social group that comprised wharfies (water-front workers), tin-mining and plantation workers, gardeners, hawkers, rickshaw-pullers, and prostitutes were numerous in the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya, and their response to the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s calls appeared to be most enthusiastic. Their enthusiasm and generosity earned high praise from prominent Tongmenghui leaders like Hu Hanmin. Hu, together with Deng Zeru were entrusted by Sun Yat-sen to coordinate the fundraising movement in Malaya and Singapore for the Second Canton Uprising and had personal experience with members of various social groups. He considered the workers most enthusiastic and generous in making donations to the revolution, and stated that “they often generously donated $20 to $30, and many donated 1 or 2 months, wages to the revolution. Some of them even wrote down their names first and tried to pay up later.”51 Class analysis would lead us to conclude that because they possessed no wealth and without family burden, they were more free than members of the two other social groups to respond to revolutionary appeals. In comparison, the members of the lower social group were less educated and less sophisticated in hiding their emotions. They were also most receptive to the revolutionary appeals through the functions of night schools, reading clubs, public talks, mass rallies, and drama troupes. They, therefore, responded spontaneously and fervently to the calls of Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen. This comparison may mislead us to conclude that the members of the lower social group were most responsive to the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s appeals and had contributed the most to the revolution. The first statement is correct that the members of the lower social group were most enthusiastic and generous in responding to the appeals, and they were followed by the members of the middle social group and the upper social group. But, if we judge the contribution to the revolution in terms of the amount of money raised, therefore, we have to reverse the order of ranking and place the members of the 51 See Hu Han-min (recorded by Zhang Zhenzhi), “Nanyang yu Zhongguo geming” (Southeast Asia and the Chinese Revolution), in ZMKWW, Vol. 1, Pt. 11, p. 482.

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upper social group first, this was because they contributed most of the money to the revolution. For instance, it was claimed that the tinmining workers in Perak had raised $10,000 for supporting the revolution following the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911,52 but this figure was relatively insignificant compared with an amount of $1,000,000 raised among merchants and tin-miners in Perak in the same period.53

What did Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen Mean to the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen meant a great deal to the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, and their activities during this period had a profound and lasting impact on the local Chinese communities. The name of Tongmenghui which was replaced by Kuomintang (or Guomindang, the Nationalist Party) faded away in the minds of many Chinese in these two territories, but Sun Yat-sen’s name (in Chinese, Sun was popularly known as Sun Zhongshan) is still well-remembered and respected in the Chinese communities.54 To the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya during the post-1911 Revolution period, Sun was their national hero and the savior of the Chinese people. Due to Sun’s frequent visits to the region and his bond with the local Chinese, he was regarded as one of them and was to receive their unreserved support. When Sun was inaugurated as the first provisional president of the Chinese Republic in early 1912, the Overseas Chinese, including those in Singapore and Malaya, had linked their future destiny with

52 See the reports in the Singapore Free Press, 9 November 1911, p. 6; Nam Kew Poo, 14 November 1911, p. 9. 53 Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 285. 54 In June 1966, I was in Singapore and Malaysia collecting materials for my PhD thesis on the Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. To my great surprise, many Chinese in huiguans and zongqinhui knew very little about the 1911 Revolution, but Sun Yat-sen’s name was well remembered and respected. Some of my interviewees felt honored to be associated in some way with Dr Sun. See my preface in the Chinese translation of my book, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution entitled “Xing Ma Huaren yu Xinhai geming” (translated by Professor En-han Lee) (Taipei: Lian Jing chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1982), p. 9.

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Dr Sun, and warmly congratulated his election to that prestigious position. Among 156 congratulatory cables for his inauguration, 56 of them came from Overseas Chinese.55 Viewed from a broad historical perspective, the profound and lasting impact of the Tongmenghui’s and Sun Yat-sen’s activities on the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya can be discussed at three different levels: political, social, and cultural.

Increased Politicization of the Chinese and the Rise of Overseas Chinese Nationalism Before the coming of the Reformists and Revolutionaries to the shores of Singapore and Malaya in 1900, the Overseas Chinese were mostly apolitical with a traditional idea that politics was exclusively for the educated elite. But the activities of these Chinese political refugees changed substantially their political outlook, especially by the works of the Revolutionaries led by Dr Sun Yat-sen. Compared with the Reformists’ “Emperor Protection Society”, Tongmenghui was a relatively well-organized political party with a clearly defined platform and a web of branches and front organizations as well as a well-developed propaganda network. Through the functioning of these networks, Sun Yat-sen and Tongmenghui leaders were able to mobilize support and effectively indoctrinate the Chinese with progressive ideas of nationalism and revolution that had struck a chord of response.56 As a result of the activities of the Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya became more

55 See Qiu Jie (1996). Xinhai geming houqi geming dangren yu Huaqiao de guanxi (The Relationship between the Revolutionaries and Overseas Chinese during the later period of the 1911 Revolution). In Sun Zhongshan yu Huaqiao — “Sun Zhongshan yu Huaqiao” xueshu yantiaohui lunwenji (Sun Yat-sen and Overseas Chinese — Collection of Essays of the Conference on ‘Sun Yat-sen and Overseas Chinese), Zhong Shan daxue Sun Zhongshan yanjiusuo (ed.), pp. 157–158. Guangzhou: Zhongshan daxue chubanshe. 56 See Yen Ching-hwang (1982). Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. In Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16, Pt. 3, pp. 416–424. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; see also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaya, pp. 212–218. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

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politicized. Not only they were more aware of what was going on in China and the world, they were also more prepared to participate in the movements that would change their own destinies, and the wellbeing of the society and the nation. This more open and participatory process set into motion by the Revolutionaries and the Reformists led to the rise of Overseas Chinese nationalism. As I had pointed out before, Overseas Chinese nationalism was not a component of the local indigenous nationalist movements, but an integral part of modern Chinese nationalism aimed at the salvation of China.57 If we view the rise of Overseas Chinese nationalism in Singpore and Malaya as a chain of historical events starting from the arrival of the Revolutionaries and the Reformists in 1900, and going through the stages of the 1911 Revolution, the drastic response to the Japanese 21 Demands in 1915, the response to the Japanese aggression in China in 1919 and 1928,58 and culminating in a largescale mobilization of support for the resistance against all-out Japanese invasion of China between 1937 and 1945,59 therefore, in this perspective, the activities of the Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen during the 1911 Revolution period was an important first step in the political development of the Overseas Chinese, without which the early Chinese political life would have lost some of its luster or not happened at all.

57

See Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid, Modern Asian Studies, pp. 397–398; Community and Politics, p. 200. See Yoji Akashi (1968). The Nanyang Chinese Anti-Japanese and Boycott Movement, 1908–1928: A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. Journal of the South Seas Society, 23(1&2) 70–74; Tsui Kuei-chiang (1965). Haixia zhimindi Huaren dui wusi yundong de fanying (The Response of the Straits Chinese to the May Fourth Movement). Journal of South Seas Society, 20(1&2) 13–18; Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan incident, 1928. Journal of the South Seas Society, 43(1&2), pp. 5–8. 59 For a detailed study of the involvement of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya in support of China’s resistance against Japanese invasion, See Stephen M-Y. Leong (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of overseas Chinese nationalism in Malaya, 1937–41. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, pp. 249–238. For the mobilization of all Overseas Chinese in support of China’s resistance against Japanese during this period, see Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The overseas Chinese and the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1945. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 369–388. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 58

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Breakdown of Social Barriers and Increased Social Cohesion in the Chinese Communities in Singapore and Malaya Before the coming of the Reformists and the Revolutionaries, the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were segregated by dialect and kinship associations. The former emphasized common geographical origins and dialect affiliation, while the latter underscored the importance of shared blood and kinship ties.60 This segregation was reinforced by the dialect and geographically based secret societies that tended to lead to constant social conflict.61 As a result of this segregation, social barriers were created between different dialect groups expressed in social contacts, marriage, and education. For instance, the modern primary Chinese schools that were established by different dialect groups in Singapore in the first decade of the 20th century,62 still erected barriers in the enrolment of students.63 Both the Reformists and the Revolutionaries contributed significantly to the break-down of social barriers and increase of social cohesion of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya. Through propaganda networks, they projected China as an integrated political entity comprising all different provinces in China, and the salvation of China was directed to the whole country rather than an individual province or region. This new notion of China had broadened the 60

For the functions of dialect and kinship associations, see Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, pp. 35–93. 61 See Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid, pp. 198–202.; Lee Poh Ping (1978). Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore, pp. 64–81. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; Blythe W (1969). The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya: A Historical Study, pp. 101–148. London: Oxford University Press. 62 For the founding of various dialect-based modern primary Chinese schools in Singapore such as the Ying Sin primary school (1905), and Yang Zheng, Duan Meng, and Dao Nan primary schools in 1906, see Yen Ching-hwang, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya,” In Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, Michael W. Charney, Brenda S.A. Yeoh & Tong Chee Kiong (eds.), p. 116. Singapore: Singapore University Press & World Scientific); see also the same article in Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, 180–181. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 63 See for instance, in January 1908 a public notice put out by the Dao Nan primary school run by the Hokkien pang (dialect and geographical entity) in Singapore clearly stated that children of the Hokkien pang aged between 7 and 14 or 15 should enrol for the new term starting 20th January 1908. See Lat Pau (The Singapore Daily), 2 January 1908, p. 6.

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political outlook of the Overseas Chinese. In the course of their activities, Sun Yat-sen and the Tongmenghui leaders realized that disunity among the Chinese was a major obstacle in their appeals for support. Sun, at least in one public speech delivered in Kuala Lumpur in 1906, warned that disunity would ruin the Chinese community as a whole.64 The leaders of the Tongmenghui branch in Kuala Lumpur ingeniously promoted the concept of unity among students and general public through songs of unity and patriotism.65 At the same time, as the Tongmenghui and other revolutionary front organizations — reading clubs, night schools, and drama troupes — that were aimed at appealing to all members of the Chinese communities regardless of their dialect or kinship backgrounds, provided excellent opportunities for them to work together for a common goal, and indirectly promoted inter-bang (or pang, a dialect and geographical entity) contacts and understanding. This helped break down social barriers and enhance social cohesion.

The Emergence of New Ideas and the Spread of Modern Chinese Education The pre-revolutionary Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya were primarily a traditional Chinese society ridden with old Confucian values of loyalty to emperor, filial piety, chastity, and inequality between sexes. As a result of the efforts of the revolutionaries in projecting China as a “nation-state” rather than a “dynasty”, as well as in promoting some democratic ideas, traditional concepts were gradually replaced by new ideas of nationalism and patriotism (based on devotion to a nation-state), altruism, martyrdom, equality, and freedom.66 64

See Deng Muhan, “Dr Sun Yat-sen’s Visit to Kuala Lumpur in 1906” (original manuscript kept in the Guomindang Archives in Taipei, Taiwan). 65 In the Too Nam School that was controlled by the revolutionaries, the students were taught the importance of unity. Examples such as “ants and bees are small and weak, but they can survive because they are united…” were given to preach the message of unity. This simple analogy was incorporated into songs sung by students in school and on public occasions. See Chong Shing Yit Pao, 26 June 1909, p. 1. 66 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 290.

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In expression of altruism and martyrdom, the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya donated tens of thousands of dollars to support the 1911 Revolution, and they continued to contribute millions to support China’s fight against Japanese aggressors in the next three decades. As a part of the expression of equality and freedom, Chinese women were given better treatment in the post-1911 Revolution society, and more girls schools were opened and women began to take part in social activities. Together with the emergence of new ideas was the spread of modern Chinese education. Certainly the spread of modern Chinese education cannot be entirely credited to the Chinese revolutionaries, but their activities had stimulated and speeded up that process. The introduction of modern Chinese education in Singapore and Malaya was started by the Qing officials in the first decade of the 20th century,67 but its speed of development would have remained slow without the activities of the Reformists and the Revolutionaries. Because of the emphasis on nationalism and new statehood for a republic spread by the Revolutionaries, the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya increasingly realized the importance of literacy and modern education for the Chinese people. It was with this awareness that some of the local Chinese leaders such as Tan Kah Kee were prepared to devote themselves to promote modern Chinese education. Tan, a member of the Tongmenghui in Singapore, and a leader of the Hokkien community,68 was credited with modernizing Hokkien schools in Singapore by removing dialect barriers and introduction of Mandarin as medium of instruction, and he was further credited with founding the first modern Chinese secondary school — the Chinese High School (Huaqiao Zhong Xue) — in Singapore in March 1919.69 67 The first modern Chinese school in Singapore and Malaya — Zhong Hua Xuetang — was founded in Penang in 1904 by Zhang Bishi (Chang Pi-shih, also known in Chinese official records as Zhang Zhenxun, he was also popularly known in the Western literature as Thio Thiau Siat), a Penang Chinese community leader and concurrently a Qing high-ranking officer. See Penang Sin Poe, 1 July 1904; Lat Pau 30 December 1904. 68 For an excellent study of Tan Kah Kee’s life and career, See Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 69 See Yen Ching-hwang, “Hokkien Immigrant Society in British Malaya”. In Chinese Migrants Abroad: Cultural, Educational, and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, MW Charney, BSA Yeoh and Tong Chee Kiong (eds.), p. 134; see also Yen Ching-hwang, The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 204–205.

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The school was based on cross-pang participation and it was later held as a model for the founding of other non-pang high schools in Singapore and Malaya. Due to the stimulus provided by the Chinese revolutionary activities, the spread of Chinese education was speeded up and it underpinned the molding of an unique Chinese character of the Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya.

Conclusion From a broad historical perspective, the 1911 Revolution was the result of the interaction of several important forces at work both inside and outside China. The most important force in toppling the Manchu regime and the founding of the Republic of China in 1912 — the first democratically oriented republic in Asia — was represented by Tongmenghui (The Alliance) led by Dr Sun Yat-sen. The Wuchang Uprising on 10 October 1911 that led to the political sea change in China was a culmination of a historical process that was preceded by 10 abortive revolutionary uprisings organized directly or indirectly by Dr Sun. Out of the 10 revolts, 8 were organized by Tongmenghui between 1906 and 1911 in south and southwest China. These abortive revolts could not have been staged without the involvement, support, and financial contribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya played a pivotal role. The relationship between the Tongmenghui, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya was extremely close and cordial. Tongmenghui could not have carried out successfully its activities in Southeast Asia without the key centers in Singapore (1906–1909) and Penang (1910–1912); and the Tongmenghui Southeast Asian center during this period surpassed in importance the headquarters in Tokyo, and became the nerve center of the entire revolutionary operation during this period. Sun Yat-sen, on the other hand, had used Singapore and Malaya as his most important base for his pursuit of revolutionary ventures in China. In his early revolutionary career between 1894 and 1911, Sun visited Singapore at least eight times and Malaya six times, and also stayed for a considerable period of time in these two places. He had developed close personal relationships

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with some local Chinese revolutionary leaders such as Tan Chor-nam and Teo Eng-hock in Singapore, Goh Say-eng and Ng Kim-keng in Penang, and Deng Zeru in Kuala Pilah. Some of them gave him unreserved support even beyond the 1911 Revolution era. Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen meant a lot to the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. Sun Yat-sen was held up by many Chinese in these two territories as a national hero and the savior of China. He was a constant source of inspiration for their dedication and devotion to the founding of a rich and powerful China. Tongmenghui, on the other hand, provided a structure for the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to participate in political activities, and an opportunity to have their political skills. It was an important politicization process of the Singaporean and Malayan Chinese in their early political life. Furthermore, the activities of Tongmenghui and Sun Yat-sen helped to break down social barriers and enhance social cohesion of the hitherto divided Chinese communities. Their activities also contributed to the spread of new ideas and the rise of modern Chinese education in the region.

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Chapter 9

Lim Lian Geok and His Struggle for the Chinese Education in Malaya (1949–1961)*

Lim Lian Geok: The Man and His Career Lim Lian Geok (Lin Lianyu in Mandarin), or Lin Caiju, was born on 19 August 1901 in Xi Chang village, Yongchun (Eng Choon in Hokkien) prefecture, Fujian province, China.1 Born to a large family with four brothers and three sisters, he was ranked second among the male children. As his elder brother died young, he thus filled the shoes of the oldest son in the family that comes with heavy responsibility.2 At the age of six, Lim Lian Geok was enrolled in a local traditional private school — sishu. At the age of seven, he also learned from his grandfather popular Confucian works such as Trimetrical Classics (San Zijing,) and the Four Books, including The Great Learning (Daxue), The Mean (Zhongyong) and Analects (Lunyu).3 In 1916 at the age of 15, he left home for port Xiamen (Amoy) where he worked * This chapter is based on a paper presented at the international conference on National Boundaries and Cultural Configuration held at The Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 22–25 June, 2004. 1 Yongchun was a prefecture (zhou) during the late Qing period. During the Republican period, Yongchun was reduced to the position of a district (xian). 2 See Lin Duo-cai (son of Lim Lian Geok) (1995). Wei huawen jiaoyu, tuo qi jizi liu danxin — Lin Lianyu bufen jiashu zhengli (For the Chinese Education, Lim Lian Geok had to relocate his family: Collections of Lim Lian Geok’s family letters), in Jiuwu nian Huajiao Jie Teji: Lin Lianyu xiansheng shishi shizhou nian jinian (The Souvenir Magazine of the 1995 Festival of Chinese Education: 10th Anniversary of the Passing of Lim Lian Geok, thereafter, Huajiao Jie teji), Jiaozong Mishuchu (Secretariat of FCSTA) (ed.), p. 43. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 3 See Lim Lian-geok (2002). Lin Lianyu xiansheng lianbiao (The Chronology of Lim Lian Geok) p. iv, in Jiang Gui ji. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation; Lu Feng (Compiled), Lin Lianyu xiansheng nianbiao (The Chronology of Lim Lian Geok), in Huajiao Jie teji, ibid., p. 86.

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as an apprentice. Combining work with self-learning, he managed to by pass normal modern schooling and got into Jimei (Chi Mei) Normal College, a renowned modern educational institution founded by Tan Kah Kee, in Jimei village, Tong An prefecture near Xiamen. He was trained to be a teacher specializing in history and Chinese language. After 4 years of study, he graduated with distinction.4 Lim Lian Geok’s personality and career bore the imprint of his family’s influence. Lim came from a declining scholar family in Southern Fujian. His grandfather, Lin Yiren and his father Lin Gengyang were both known local scholars in Yongchun prefecture, and were known for their expertise in mathematics. His grandfather, holder of a Qing title of sui gongsheng (sui kung-sheng)5 that qualified him for a membership of gentry class in traditional Chinese society, was a celebrated sishu teacher. He was noble and upright, earning respect from local residents, including the prefectural officials of Yongchun.6 His father, through his own effort, excelled in mathematics and astrology, and was admitted as a member of China’s Astrological Society. His father also helped to compile the Yongchun Gazette (Yongchun xianzhi), an honor reserved for eminent local scholars.7 Presumably Lim Lian Geok’s grandfather had passed the first stage of Qing imperial examinations, but not high enough to hold any official position. Being the holder of first imperial degree, xiucai, he was qualified to become a teacher of sishu. Lim Lian Geok’s father, who might or might not have held an imperial degree, followed his father’s footsteps and also earned a living as a teacher. The attributes of traditional Chinese scholars — dedication to learning, immaterialistic, and uncompromising attitude toward principles — that Lim’s grandfather and father had possessed seem to have helped mold Lim’s personality.

4

Ibid. This title was conferred on the scholar who was selected by virtue of seniority and achievement. Normally, one sui gongsheng was selected every year from a prefectural school. See Chung-li Chang (1995). The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society, p. 28. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 6 See Lim Lian Geok (2001). Lin Lianyu xiaoshi (My Short History), in Fengyu shibanian (My Storming Eigtheenth Years), Vol. 2, p. 190, 2nd printing. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 7 See Lim Lian Geok (1986). Concerning the Yongchun Gazette, in Za Jin Ji (Miscellaneous Writings), pp. 1–2. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 5

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Lim Lian Geok and His Struggle for the Chinese Education in Malaysia

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Lim Lian Geok’s father must have struggled hard at the idea of letting his son to go to Xiamen for an appreticeship that may lead young Lian Geok to get into business. This was a departure from the family’s scholarly tradition. But the rapid political and social change following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the founding of the Chinese Republic in early 1912 diminished the chance of scholarly pursuit for a living. Fortunately, in 1917, the second year after Lim Lian Geok’s arrival in the port Xiamen, the Jimei College (High School), including Normal College and other professional colleges, was founded.8 The combination of an apprenticeship and study proved to be satisfactory for Lim whose inclination leaned toward study and scholarship. Free tuition plus free boarding and food provided by the college made possible for Lim to pursue his study without worrying much about the money. It was on the campus of Jimei that helped mold Lim Lian Geok’s character and nurtured his unquenchable love for Chinese culture and education. Jimei was one of the most reputable modern colleges in China. Its reputation was built not only on the quality of staff and students and modern equipment, but also on strict discipline and fine school tradition. Best teachers were recruited throughout China, and students were also selected on the basis of merit. The college upheld the Confucian tradition of honesty, sincerity and perseverance, which became the school motto of cheng (honesty and sincerity) and yi (perseverance).9 These values were also incorporated into the school song which was sung by students every Monday morning at the school ceremony.10 In explaining the school motto, cheng (honesty and sincerity) was expanded to include pragmatism and justice, and yi (perseverance) was further expanded into self-motivated struggle for excellance (zi qiang bu xi).11 Like many other students, Lim Lian Geok

8

For the founding of the Jimei College in 1917, see Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng) (1993). Nanqiao huiyi lu (My Autobiography), Vol. 1, p. 13. (New Edition) River Edge, USA: Global Publishing Co. Inc. 9 See the plaque of the college motto, the two characters were written by Tan Kah Kee, founder of the college, and his brother, Tan Keng Hian dated 4th moon of 7th year of the Republic (May 1918), in Lin Lide (ed.) (1998). Xiamen shi Jimei zhongxue (The Jimei High School of Xiamen), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, photograph pages at the front of the book. 10 For the school song of Jimei, see the same photograph page of Xiamen shi Jimei zhongxue. 11 See Lin Li-de, ibid, p. 8.

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must have been influenced by these values and desired to uphold them in his future career. Like many modern schools in China during the Republican period, Jimei was also influenced by the new values introduced by Cai Yuanpei, a well-known educationist and the first Minister of Education of the new Republic in 1912. The “morality of citizens” military nationalism, utilitarianism, globalism, and aestheticism — that formed the core of the new values left their mark on a modern school like Jimei.12 Jimei was especially concerned with “morality of citizens”, the type of citizens created for the new China. If education was the means of strengthening China as a nation and Chinese as a race, as what the founder of Jimei, Tan Kah Kee had upheld,13 Jimei was obviously imbued with this spirit, emphasizing the importance of moral education and the nurturing of students’ correct behaviour. It stressed that “the moral conduct (caoxing) is more important than academic work for a student…” and the student’s moral conduct had to be monitored regularly by teachers.14 Lim Lian Geok, like many other students of his time, could not escape the moral influence of Jimei which helped to mold his character as a fighter for Ethnic Chinese education in Malaysia. In 1924 at the age of 23, Lian Geok graduated with distinction from the college after 5 years of study. His excellent command of Chinese language and history persuaded the college to retain him as a language teacher. 1927 was the turning point in Lim Lian Geok’s life. He left China for British Malaya and Dutch East Indies to pursue his teaching 12

For Cai Yuanpei’s educational reform in early Republican China, see Li Guilin (ed.), (1989). Zhongguo jiaoyu shi (A History of Chinese Education), pp. 354–355. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe. 13 See Yen Ching-hwang (2002). Hokkien immigrant society and modern Chinese education in British Malaya, 1904–1941, in The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, p. 206. Singapore: Times Academic Press. See also the same article published in Charney MW, Yeoh BSA and Tong CK (eds.), Chinese Migrants Abroad: Culture, Education and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Diaspora, p. 135. Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd; Yang Jin-fa (Yong Ching Fatt) (1980). Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi (Tan Kah Kee in Pre-war Singapore: Selected Documents and Analysis), pp. 26–27. Singapore: South Seas Society. 14 See Liu Lide (ed.) Coaxing Kaocha (the monitoring of moral conduct), selected from Jimei Weekly Nos. 56 and 57, in Xiamen shi Jimei zhongxue, pp. 24–25.

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career.15 He might not have originally planned to settle in Southeast Asia, but changing circumstances both in China and Southeast Asia made him stay, and that decision determined his future direction in life. What prompted Lim Lian Geok to make such an important decision was the temporary closure of Jimei College in November 1926 as a result of the students’ strike against the principal who refused administrative reform of the college. The students petitioned with the founder of the college, Tan Kah Kee, for intervention, but the petition was rejected.16 Further, the collapse of rubber price and the downturn of Tan’s personal fortune in the second half of 1926 probably also contributed to the temporary closure of Jimei.17 Temporary loss of job at Jimei was not the only reason to prompt Lim to make such a momentous decision in life. It is claimed that he was also motivated by his intention of personally persuading Tan Kah Kee to restart the college. He claimed that he carried an introduction letter from the principal, Ye Caizhen, and in Singapore he managed to persuade Tan Kah Kee to reconsider his decision that led to the re-opening of the college.18 Strangely, Lim did not go back to Jimei to resume his duty as a Chinese language teacher after he had succeeded in persuading

15

The chronology of Lim Lian Geok at the front of various Lim Lian Geok’s publications lists 1925 as the year that Lim left China for Southeast Asia. Both Lu Feng and Tay Lian Soo (Zheng Liangshu) list 1927 as the year Lim left China. Cross checking with other references, it seems Lu’s and Tay’s claims are closer to historical events. For Lu’s claim, see Lu Feng (compiled), “Lin Lianyu nianbiao”, for Tay Lian Soo’s claim, see Tay’s article entitled Lun Lin xiansheng de renge he qinghuai — du Lianyu shichun hou (On the temperament and disposition of Lim Lian Geok — comments on the collection of poetries of Lim Lian Geok), see Huajiao jie teji, pp. 47 and 86. 16 See Lu Feng (compiled), Lin Lianyu nianbiao, in Huajiao jie teji, p. 86.; Wang Zengbing and Yu Gang, Chen Jiageng Xingxue Ji (The Story of Tan Kah Kee’s Promotion of Modern Chinese Education), Appendix, Chen Jiageng xingban jiaoyu dashi nianbiao (The Chronology of Major Events of Tan Kah Kee’s Promotion of Modern Chinese Education), pp. 110–111. Lim Lian Geok’s own short autobiography claimed that the pro-Guomindang (Nationalist Party) students riding on the wave of rising nationalism made excessive demands and attacks on the College that led to the strike and closure of the institution, See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Lin Lianyu xiaoshi (Mr Short History), in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 2., p. 194. 17 Yong Ching-fatt (1987). Tan Kah Kee: The Making of An Overseas Chinese Legend, p. 64. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 18 Lim Lian Geok (ed.), My Short History, in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 2, pp. 170, 194.

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Tan Kah Kee to restart the college. Instead, he took up a temporary job in a Chinese primary school named Guomin School in Ayer Tawar, Perak. After a month, he set sail for Surabaya, Java, with a friend of his father’s former student, and he later settled with a teaching job in Eastern Java.19 Another consideration for Lim to leave China for Southeast Asia was probably the worsening of the political situation in Southern Fujian where minor warlords controlled the province since 1917. Political turmoil and social instability in Southern Fujian cast a dark shadow over the future of educational development in the province.20 Lim probably saw that there was not much future in a teaching career in Xiamen under a warlord’s rule, while Southeast Asian Chinese communities appeared to be a safe haven to pursue his teaching career and to bring up a family. Whatever the reasons for this decision, his life was changed forever. The loss of China of a good teacher was the gain of the Chinese community in Malaysia of a future fighter for education and culture. In a period of about 8 years from 1927 to 1935, Lim Lian Geok’s teaching career in Southeast Asia and China was determined by ad hoc decisions arising from opportunities and circumstances. He became a relief teacher in Perak for 1 month in 1927 and spent several years teaching in Eastern Java, 6 months in Klang and 2 years in Kayang, Selangor; then he returned to his home district, Yongchun in early 1930s for his mother’s funeral, and took up a teaching job for a year at a local primary school; he spent 6 months at Da Tong school, Xiamen before taking up a job in Confucian Middle School in Kuala Lumpur in October 1935.21 From October 1935 to August 1961 when Lim’s job as a teacher was terminated by the Malayan government, Lim stuck to one job in the Confucian Middle School, a remarkable stability in his 19

See Lim Lian-geok, Ibid, p. 194. For the political and social instability in Southern Fujian, see Chau Chi-Fung (2003). Jindai tongshang kouan yanjiu: yi Xiamen chengshi fazhan wei gean zhi kaocha (1900–1937) (Treaty ports in modern China: Xiamen’s urban development as a case study (1900–1937). (PhD thesis, Hong Kong Baptist University), pp. 205–315. 21 Lim Lian Geok, My Short History, in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 2, pp. 194–195; Lu Feng (compiled) Lin Lianyu xiansheng nianpu (The chronology of Mr. Lim Lian Geok), in Huajiao jie teji, pp. 86–87. 20

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teaching career. His initial appointment at the Confucian Middle School was accidental rather than planned; his own short biography recorded his move from Xiamen to Kuala Lumpur was due to repeated requests by his friend, Huang Guangrao who was appointed the principal of the school in autumn, 1934.22 Huang was eager to enhance its reputation by recruiting good teachers and expanding teaching facilities. The recruitment of Lim Lian Geok was one of his early aims. With or without Lim’s help, Huang managed to expand teaching and other facilities such as improving the library, building the science laboratory and construction of students’ hostel, and made a name in the school history though he had a short tenure as headmaster.23 In 22 years of his teaching career in the Confucian Middle School (deducting 3 years and 8 months for the period of Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945), Lim was known for his devotion to teaching and his profound knowledge in Chinese history and culture. He twice declined the appointment of headmastership of the school. After the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, Lim was urged to take over the helm of the school, but he declined, and instead, he took up the chairmanship of the school management committee (xiaowu weiyuanhui) to restore the school. After the school was restarted on 20 December 1945, he was again invited by the school’s management board to fill the position of headmaster, but he declined.24 As a teacher, he was inspiring and stimulating.25 He was probably influenced by Confucius as a teacher expounding knowledge to students rather than seeking power as a school administrator. Lim, throughout his life, sought neither power, glory nor wealth for himself. In fact, he despised those rich but stingy Chinese businessmen 22 See (1975). Zun Kong zhongxue xiaoshi (A history of the Confucian middle school). In Malaixiya, Xinjiapo huawen zhongxue tekan tiyao fu xiaoshi (Chinese High School Souvenir Magazines of Malaysia and Singapore with School Histories), Tay Lian Soo & Gwee Yee Hean (eds.), p. 97. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Chinese, the University of Malaya. 23 Huang resigned in summer 1936. Ibid. 24 See letter of the school management board of the Confucian Middle School to Lim Lian Geok signed by the chairman of the board, Zhang Kunling dated 18th March 1946, reproduced in Fengyu shibanian, Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Vol. 2, p. 193. 25 See Yen Ching-hwang, East Meets West: Memoirs of An Ethnic Chinese Scholar and Social Activist in Australia and Asia (manuscript), pp. 31–32.

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and those unprincipled Chinese politicians and high-ranking officials, and felt shameful to be associated with them as community leaders.26 He was comfortable with the position of an ordinary teacher. It was perhaps in this capacity that allowed him to express views on Chinese education more freely and to fight for Chinese education without damaging the institution he worked for.

Lim Lian Geok’s Struggle for the Chinese Education Chinese writers like to use the dichotomy of “historical situation and heroes” (shishi zao yingxiong, yingxiong zao shishi) as a conceptual tool to analyze the relationship between history and personality. They hold that heroes are the product of a specially given historical circumstance in which they operate, but the acts and deeds of heroes also affect the course of history.27 This interdependent and interactive relationship can also be applied to the study of Lim Lian Geok as a resilient fighter for Ethnic Chinese education and culture, and ultimately a hero of Malaysian Chinese society. Lim Lian Geok’s active involvement in the founding of the Chinese Teachers’ Association of Kuala Lumpur was not realized until 1949. But his idea of organizing a teachers’ association for the welfare of Chinese teachers began in June 1946, less than a year after the end of Japanese occupation of Malaya.28 What led him to the idea of organizing a teachers’ association was the miserable death of two Chinese school teachers. Lim in his autobiography listed at least two incidents that prompted him to organize the Kuala Lumpur Chinese School Teachers Association (KLCSTA). One of these incidents was the death of Zheng Jianshan, a colleague in the Confucian Middle School, and the holder of a Bachelor of Arts degree from prestigious Beijing University. Zheng died in poverty and his family was 26 See Lim Lian Geok’s letter to his younger sister named Lin Zizhen dated 7 November 1973, reproduced in Huajiao jie teji, p. 82. 27 For instance, Huang Runyue, a Chinese high school teacher and a leader of the United Chinese School Teachers Association used this concept to comment on Lim Lian Geok. See Huang Lunye’s preface (1963). In Huiyi pianpian lu (Extracts of my Reminiscences), Lim Lian Geok, Kuala Lumpur: UCSTA front pages. 28 See Lu Feng (compiled), Lin Lianyu nianbiao, in Huajiao jie teji, p. 88.

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only compensated with extra 2 months” salary by the school management board for his 5 years of service. Lim was further appalled by another incident of a Chinese primary school teacher from Anson, Perak, who committed suicide because of poverty and sickness with a large family to support.29 This idea of organizing a teachers’ association was inspired more by the welfare of the Chinese school teachers; and would probably fit in the idea of modern unionism. At the time of the founding of the KLCSTA in October 1949 of which Lim was its secretary, the political situation in post-war British Malaya changed rapidly. The emerging Malay nationalists asserted tremendous pressure on the British Colonial government for constitutional change and the protection of Malay interests. They demanded a major say in the formulation of new education policy of post-war Malaya.30 The establishment of a Central Advisory Committee in September to examine the education policy for the newly formed Federation of Malaya was the first signal of the government’s interventionist policy. Its recommendation of expanding English education as a solution to the problem of inter-racial education in May 1950 changed the pre-war laissez-faire policy in treating Chinese education.31 About the same time, the failure of political arrangement between the British Colonial government and its former ally — the Communist Party of Malaya — erupted into violence, and as a result the emergency was declared in Malaya in 1948. Large numbers of suspected rural Chinese population were moved to the new villages, and the Chinese’s loyalty to Malaya was called into question.32 Many 29 See Lim Lian Geok, Wo zuzhi jiaosi gonghui (I Organise the Teachers’ Association), in Fengyu shibanian, Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Vol. 2, pp. 175–176. 30 See Tan Liok Ee (1997). The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, pp. 46–48. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 31 See Tan Liok Ee, Ibid, pp. 48–49. 32 For the study of the Malayan Emergency, see Stubbs R (1989). Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960. Singapore: Oxford University Press; for the introduction of the new village to control rural Chinese population, see Nyee R (1973). In Chinese New Villages in Malaya: A Community Study, Gordon S (ed.), Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute Ltd; Francis Loh Kok Wah, (1988). Beyond the Tin Mines: Coolies, Squatters and New Villages in the Kinta Valley, Malaysia,c.1800–1980, pp. 106–156. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Cheng Lim Keak (1976). Mengkuang: A Study of a Chinese New Village in West Malaysia, Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University.

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Chinese school teachers were suspected of being Communist supporters or sympathizers, and the Chinese schools were targeted for raids or closure.33 Confronted by increasing political pressure and declining status, the Chinese education called for fighters who could defend fearlessly its interests. Lim Lian Geok, together with a few associates, responded to the call and were prepared to sacrifice themselves for the survival of Chinese education. Like missionaries responding to “God’s call”, Lim responded fervently to the call of his time to be the defender of Chinese education and culture. Strong influence of principle and uncompromising attitude from his father and grandfather, high morality from Jimei, together with a sense of mission made Lim Lian Geok a formidable and combative fighter who was prepared to sacrifice himself for the cause as a martyr. In November 1950, Lim Lian Geok was elected as the president of the KLCSTA. His election was timely to fight the first crucial battle for the Chinese education — the Barnes Report of Education in July 1951. The Barnes Committee appointed in July 1950 arose from the dissatisfaction of the Malay nationalists, represented by Dato Onn, over the future of Malay education in the Federation of Malaya. Its terms of reference were to examine the existing conditions of Malay education and the ways to lift its standards.34 About the same time, on the recommendation of the new British High Commissioner for Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, a separate Fen–Wu Committee was set up to study the problems relating to Chinese education. Ironically, both committees brought out their reports in the middle of 1951 (in June and July), only one month apart. The Barnes Committee consisting of 9 Malay members out of 14, echoed the view of the Malay nationalists that the Malay language must play a crucial role in the new nation. In fact, it had surpassed its terms of reference by recommending the ending of the 33 In December 1952, police carried out raids at the Confucian Middle School for suspected Communist supporters among teachers and students. See Lim Lian Geok, Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 1., pp. 24–29. 34 See Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, pp. 49–50. There is a typing error on page 50 of Tan’s book which placed the appointment of Barnes Committee on 25 July 1951 instead of 25 July 1950.

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existing separate vernacular schools system based on different racial communities, and their replacement by a single type of primary school; and this new type of primary school should only use Malay and English to produce bilingual students who would eventually proceed to English secondary and tertiary education.35 For the first time, the concept of a “national school” was introduced by the Barnes Report to describe this new type of primary schools that were to serve as a tool for future nation-building. The report also recommended that all public funds to be channelled into the proposed “national schools”, which would attract students away from existing vernacular schools. The report gave no role for the Chinese and Indian languages in the new educational system, and believed that those non-Malays who regarded Malaya as their permanent home should “set aside their vernacular attachment in the interests of a new social unity.”36 On the other hand, the Fenn–Wu Committee consisted of two foreign scholars, Dr William Fenn and Dr Wu The-yao with no representation from the local Chinese society, came to a different conclusion. Its report in July 1951, warned of the danger of imposing one or two languages on a multi-racial society like Malaya. It supported the idea of teaching both Malay and English languages in all schools, but recommended retention of vernacular languages and cultures in non-Malay schools. Both William Fenn and Wu Theyao appeared to have believed in unity in diversity in a multi racial society. Although Chinese schools, like English and Indian schools, still lacked a Malayan orientation, they should be helped by the government to develop that local orientation. Their report recommended that the government should help Chinese schools to evolve into “truly Malayan schools” as “equal partners with other schools” in the future educational system by immediately increasing 200 percent in aid to the Chinese schools.37 These two different educational reports perhaps reflect two different schools of thought toward immigrants and their education. 35

See Tan Liok-ee, ibid, pp. 56–58. See Tan Liok-ee, ibid, p. 58. 37 See Tan Liok-ee, ibid. 36

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The Barnes report reflects the dominant view of the time that immigrants in Southeast Asia should be assimilated into host countries, and give up their cultural baggage and traditions. This “assimilationist” view met the inspiration of the Malay nationalists. However, the Fenn–Wu report echoes the minority view of the time that immigrants should have the right to retain their culture and tradition, but they should slowly integrate into the mainstream society. This “multiculturalist” view certainly won the support of the Chinese community in Malaya. The release of both Barnes and Fenn–Wu reports in the middle of 1951 set off a heated public debate on the education policy of Malaya. The former had the strong support of Malay organizations and media, while the latter earned the praise of the Chinese press and shetuan (social organizations). Facing these two conflicting reports, the High Commissioner took no firm view but was inclined to accept the former. He tried behind the scene to put the pressure on William Fenn to change their recommendations, but to no avail.38 It was at this crucial juncture that Lim Lian Geok stood out to fight against the Barnes Report. The implementation of the report would mean the elimination of Chinese education, and the withering of Chinese culture and tradition. Lim realized the need of a strong base from which he could launch his attack. His Kuala Lumpur Chinese Teachers’ Association, though important, was not sufficient to mobilize the support of all Chinese teachers, let alone all Chinese in Malaya. With the support of his close supporters, Sim Bok Woo (Shen Muyu in Mandarin) of Malacca and Wu Taishan of Negri Sembilan, he called for a pan-Malayan Chinese teachers meeting in August 1951 to air their opposition to the Barnes Report. The event of formulating new education policy moved very rapidly after the release of both reports. Sir Henry Curney, who favored the Barnes Report, moved to set up a Special Committee on Education to draft a legislation to be presented to the Legislative Council for approval. The Committee headed by the Attorney-General, consisted of representatives from three major political parties, two of whom were Malay parties, the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) led by Dato Onn, 38

See Tan Liok-ee, ibid, pp. 58–59.

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and the UMNO led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, while two representatives of Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), H.S. Lee and Leung Cheung Ling were included.39 On 24th and 25th August 1951, 30 representatives from 12 Chinese Teachers’ Associations of the nine states of Malaya met in Kuala Lumpur to discuss their collective response to the release of both Barnes and Fenn–Wu reports. A resolution was passed to condemn the Barnes report and its proposal of abrogating vernacular schools. The meeting also agreed to set up a pan-Malayan organization to coordinate the activities of all Chinese Teachers’ Associations of the Federation of Malaya and a preparatory committee was established with David Chen as chairman, Lim Lian Geok and Sim Bok Woo as members.40 The United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association of Malaya (UCSTA) was inaugurated on 24th and 25th December of the same year at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting adopted the draft constitution and the inaugural manifesto of UCSTA. The manifesto summed up the common aspiration and objectives of Chinese school teachers in defending Chinese education, in promoting Chinese culture, and in safeguarding the interests of Chinese school teachers. The constitution, on the other hand, provided a flexible structure of the organization by annual rotating leadership among its constituents based on organizational unit rather than individual members. The president of the presiding unit would automatically become the president of the UCSTA.41 The formation of UCSTA was of crucial importance in the movement of Chinese education in Malaysia, and it also became the power base from which Lim Lian Geok launched attacks on the Colonial government for its 39

See Tan Liok-Ee, ibid, pp. 60–61. See Zheng Liangshu (Tay Lian Soo) (2001). Malaixiya huawen jiaoyu fazhanshi (A history of the development of Chinese education in Malaysia), Vol. 3, pp. 93–94. Kuala Lumpur: Malaixiya huaxiao jiaoshihui zonghui; Lu Tingyu (1987). Jiaozong sanshisan nian, in Jiaozong sanshisan bianjishe (compiled), Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian (Thirty Three Years History of the United Chinese School Teachers’ Association), pp. 7–8. Kuala Lumpur: Malaixiya huaxiao jiaoshihui zonghui. 41 Tan Liok Ee (1992). The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, p. 92; Tan Liok Ee (1992). Dongjiaozong and the challenge to cultural hegemony 1951–1987, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Kahn JS and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), p. 186. North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia , Allen & Unwin. 40

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suppressive educational policy. Although Lim Lian Geok made important contributions to the formation of this organization, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that Lim was solely responsible for its founding. Lim Lian Geok claimed that in July 1951, the KLCSTA of which he was the president, invited the representatives of 16 Chinese teachers associations of various states of Malaya to meet in Kuala Lumpur to oppose the Barnes Report which led to the founding of the UCSTA in December 1951; while his close associate, Sim Bok Woo claimed that in 1950, he met Lim in Kuala Lumpur and suggested to him for the formation of a pan-Malayan Chinese school teachers’ association. With Lim’s agreement, Sim used his Malacca Chinese Teachers’ Association to invite representatives from other Chinese teachers to a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, which led to the formation of the UCSTA. Sim also claimed that he was responsible for the drafting of the constitution.42 What actual role that Lim Lian Geok played in the founding of the UCSTA is no longer significant since at that time he had already emerged as leading voice of the Chinese teachers on education issues, and his formal leadership of the UCSTA was not confirmed until December 1953, 2 years after the founding of that organization. The battle to oppose the Barnes report had been turned into the battle for combating the unfair treatment of Chinese education in the proposed Education Ordinance of 1952. In the period about 1 year from the formation of the UCSTA (December 1951) to the adoption of Education Ordinance in November 1952, Lim Lian Geok was active in opposing the Barnes report as well as trying to influence the Special Committee on Education on its recommendations to the Legislative Council. On 24 November 1951, 1 month before the founding of the UCSTA, Lim presented a memorandum to the Special Committee on behalf of the KLCSTA to oppose the concept of a national school contained in the Barnes Report, and to request for 42 See Lim Lian Geok’s speech delivered at Shanghai Restaurant in Kuala Lumpur dated 15 April 1965, and Sim Bok Woo (Shen Muyu), Bingcheng Lin xiansheng de yizhi (Carry on the Legacy of Lim Lian Geok), both articles were published in The Federation of the Chinese Schools Management Boards of Perak(ed.), Lin Lianyu (Mr. Lim Lian Geok), Ipoh, The Federation of the Chinese Schools Management Boards of Perak, 1986, pp. 38–39, 55.

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the incorporation of Chinese education into the national educational system. He listed several important reasons for such a request: the natural need of Chinese children for mother-tongue training, Chinese civilization as one of the oldest and outstanding civilizations of the world, the harmonious and non-aggressive spirit of Chinese education, potential contribution of Chinese education and the Chinese in the nation-building of Malaya, the spirit of the language as the basis for the promotion of loyalty to Malaya, and the government’s obligation to promote ethnic cultures under the UN charter.43 As the UCSTA was still in a stage of shock due to the murder of its first president, David Chen of the Chung Ling High School in February 1952, Lim with the help of Ting Ping Sung, redrafted and resubmitted the memorandum to the Special Committee on Education in the name of UCSTA on 2 September 1952. The memorandum, though convincing from the Chinese point of view, fell on deaf ears of the Special Committee that basically endorsed the Barnes report concept of multi racial national schools with some variations. The report of the Special Committee, however, allowed Mandarin or Tamil to be taught in the schools where there were at least 15 pupils who wished to take advantage of the facility. The Legislative Council unanimously passed the Educational Ordinance in first reading with some reservations by a Chinese member, Wong Pak Choy, who was concerned with the future extinction of the nonEnglish and non-Malay schools.44 Before Lim Lian Geok’s ascent to the presidency of the UCSTA in December 1953, he had already emerged as the de facto leader of the Chinese education movement. The failure of the memoranda of the KLCSTA and UCSTA to the Special Committee taught Lim that the petitions of Chinese teachers without broader Chinese community support and political backing would be futile. The opposition to the implementation of the 1952 Education Ordinance

43

See Lim Lian Geok (1986). Cheng jiaoyu linxuan weiyuanhui yijianshu (Memorandum to the special committee on education), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu (The Appeals for Chinese Education), pp. 1–2. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 44 Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya 1945–1961, pp. 62–63.

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needed a broader support base in the Chinese community. On the eve of the passing of the 1952 Education Ordinance, Lim Lian Geok was instrumental in the calling for a national conference of the representatives of Chinese school teachers and Chinese school boards, together with the representatives of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), ostensibly for the discussion of the government’s subsidy to Chinese teachers announced in July 1952. In fact, the hidden agenda of the conference was to discuss ways and means to oppose the impending Education Ordinance to be adopted on 21 November of the same year. Over 70 representatives, of whom the majority were teachers, attended the conference, which took place on 9th and 10th November in Kuala Lumpur. The issue of the Report of the Special Committee on Education dominated the 2-day meeting; outraged teachers who aired their strong opposition to the impending Education Ordinance hijacked the original agenda on government’s subsidy.45 The conference bore concrete results. Apart from electing a nine-men committee responsible for the negotiations with the government on education subsidy, it passed three important resolutions: to write to the new British High Commissioner, General Templer, for the objection of the impending Ordinance; to solicit support of all Chinese shetuans (social organizations) for the opposition to the Ordinance by collecting signatures; and to call another special national conference to oppose the Ordinance if it was adopted by the Legislative Council in less than 2-weeks’ time. The conference also entrusted Lim Lian Geok to draft the manifesto of the conference46 that opposed the introduction of national schools, and defended the use of mother tongue in Chinese schools. It listed four major reasons for teaching Chinese: as the most effective way of learning for Chinese children according to educational theory, as the right of Chinese as a race, as the need of local environment in Malaya, and

45

See Lim Lian Geok, Quanguo huaxiao dongjiao daibiao diyi ci dahui (The inaugural meeting of the representatives of Chinese teachers and Chinese school management boards), in Fengyu shibanian , Vol. 1, pp. 45–49. 46 See Lim Lian Geok, ibid, p. 54.

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as the common aspiration of Chinese who wish to retain their great cultural heritage.47 It is not surprising to see that the manifesto had repeated most of the reasons for teaching Chinese language contained in the memorandum of the UCSTA submitted to the Special Committee on Education on 24 November 1951. As the manifesto was aimed at appealing to the entire Chinese community for support, Lim, on behalf of the conference, emphasized the important linkage between Chinese education, Chinese culture, and Chinese race by introducing a motto that “culture is the spirit of a race”. He warned that the preservation of Chinese culture rested with the continuation of Chinese education, and implied that the identity of Chinese race would be lost when Chinese education was terminated.48 Lim Lian Geok’s accession to the formal leadership of UCSTA and the leadership status of the Chinese education movement in December 1953 was the result of circumstances and his personal quality. As the KLCSTA presided over the third annual general meeting in December 1953, he automatically assumed the presidency of UCSTA for a year in accordance with the constitution of UCSTA. But his outstanding performance prompted the organization to change its constitution to allow him to be elected continuously for another 7 years until 1961 when he was banned as a teacher, which disqualified him from holding the position. Lim’s rise was partly due to changes in circumstances. The mounting crisis facing the Chinese education after the passing of the 1952 Education Ordinance in first reading, together with the dearth of leadership in the UCSTA called for a leader who had the courage to stand up to the pressure imposed by the government. Since the murder of David Chen in February 1952, the organization lacked a

47 See Lim Lian Geok. Malaiya lianhebang huaxiao dongjiao ji Mahua gonghui daibiao lianxi huiyi xuanyan (The manisfesto of the conference of the representatives of Chinese school teachers and Chinese school management boards together with the representatives of the Malayan Chinese Association dated 16 November 1952), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, pp. 7–12; see also the same document in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, pp. 318–319. 48 Ibid.

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dynamic and articulate leader.49 Though disadvantaged by his lack of command of English, Lim Lian Geok was eloquent and sharp, and more importantly he possessed strong combative spirit with the determination to sacrifice himself for the cause of Chinese education. Lim was known for his sharp tongue and fearless rebuttal, his lashing-out at the Deputy High Commissioner, Donald MacGillivary at a meeting on 8 November 1952 between the representatives of UCSTA and Sir Donald on the issue of the future of Chinese education was well known.50 In the period of 8 years (December 1953 to December 1961) under the presidency of Lim Lian Geok, the UCSTA was placed under the spotlight of the Chinese education movement, and Lim was its acknowledged leader. The period can be divided into two important stages of development: the first stage from 1954 to 1957; and the second stage from 1958 to 1961. The former was dominated by the struggle against the 1954 Education White Paper and for the existence of Chinese primary education; while the latter was fighting for the survival of Chinese secondary education. The period witnessed the rapid political change in Malaya and in Malayan Chinese society. Post-war Malaya was ushered into an era of decolonization and the emergence of local political parties, and the preparation for the independence of Malaya in 1957. The post-independence period saw the predominance of Malay power and its pressure on the Chinese community. At the same time, the political change within the Chinese community was also rapid. The installation of a Communist regime in mainland China cut off the continued supply of fresh Chinese immigrants, and speeded up the process of local orientation of the Chinese.

49

After the assassination of David Chen, Chou Man Sha (Zhou Mansha) from Penang took over as a care taker leader, and Lee Po Wen (Li Bowen) was elected by the Penang Chinese School Teachers’ Association as its leader and therefore becoming the president of UCSTA; in the second annual general meeting held in December 1952, Tsai Jen Ping(Cai Renping), headmaster of the Yok Choi High School, Ipoh, and the president of Perak Chinese School Teachers Association was elected as the president of UCSTA. See Tan Liok-ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, p. 94. 50 For details of this confrontation, see Lim Lian Geok, Fu chincai tachen ye jian ji (On the meeting with the Deputy Commissioner), in Huiyi pianpian lu, pp. 8–14.

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More and more Chinese identified themselves as Malayan citizens rather than citizens of China or Taiwan, and they were prepared to give their loyalty to this new nation.51 When Lim Lian Geok formally assumed the leadership of the UCSTA in December 1953, the 1952 Education Ordinance was about to be passed in the Legislative Council in third reading and to become law in 1954. A sense of urgency in the fight against the Education Ordinance prevailed. The crunch came in October 1954 when the Education White Paper, which was to implement the 1952 Education Ordinance, passed through the Legislative Council in third reading. Just before the passing of the White Paper, its content had been leaked to the Chinese media in late September, the seriousness of this challenge prompted Lim Lian Geok into action. He called an emergency meeting of the executives of UCSTA, and drafted a solemn declaration opposing the White Paper which was approved by the Legislative Council on 7 October, but due to the difficulty in communication, the declaration did not come out in the Chinese newspapers until two days after the White Paper became law. The risk for Lim to take such an action was imprisonment for his open defiance of a law. Lim was determined to oppose the White Paper at all cost, and was prepared to go to jail by arranging for his close friend, Mr Qiu Tengfang — the secretary of the Hokkien Association — to take care of his wife and his adopted daughter.52 Upon the implementation of the 1954 Education White Paper, the Colonial Government adopted a strategy of encroachment by introducing government-paid English classes in the Chinese schools. The Education Department instructed the Chinese primary schools to apply for these English classes for the beginning of the first term in 51

For this change of Chinese political identity, see Chui Kuei Chiang (1989). Xin Ma huaren guojia rentong de zhuanxiang (The Change of National Identity of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1959), Xiamen: Xiamen University Press; Yen Ching-hwang, Yibai nianlai Malaixiya huashe suo zouguo de daolu (A century of Malaysian Chinese society). Unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on “One Hundred Years of Malaysian Chinese Society: Retrospect and Prospect” held in Kuala Lumpur, 22–23 November 2003, pp. 7–8. 52 See Lim Lian Geok. Fenshui jiaoyu baipishu (To crush the Education White Paper), in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 1, p. 96.

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1955. Those Chinese schools that complied with the demand would be rewarded. If the government-sponsored English classes grew within the Chinese primary education system, it will marginalize the Chinese language as the medium of instruction, and eventually turn the Chinese primary schools into English medium schools. For the Chinese school principals and the directors of the school management boards, this instruction thus presented dilemma. The compliance with the government demand meant a slow death of Chinese primary schools, but the defiance of the instruction would challenge the law. Lim, realizing the seriousness of the government strategy, sought the help of Tan Cheng Lock, the president of the MCA who made a public statement calling on Chinese schools authorities not to comply with the government’s demand pending further investigation. The public statement bore excellent results; none of the Chinese primary school principals applied for the classes, and the deadline for the application lapsed.53 After the failure of its first round of combat, the government adopted the tactic of putting the pressure on the selected schools. The Chinese school inspectors (Shixue guan) of the education Department were instructed to pressurize the school headmasters and the chairmen of school boards to comply. A tactic of “stick and carrot” was adopted to bear quick results. To counter the government’s new measure, Lim Lian Geok encouraged the schools to adopt a “delaying tactic” to fend off the pressure.54 Lim succeeded in frustrating the government’s moves to implement the White Paper. However, this delaying tactic was fundamentally reactive; it was reacting to the strategy and tactics taken by the government, and it would not have a long-term effect in saving Chinese primary

53

See Lim Lian-geok, Ibid, pp. 97–98. For instance, the San Yu primary school of Rawang was pressurized by senior government officials from the Selangor state Education Bureau to start English classes. Both the headmaster and the chairman of the school board were summoned to meet three senior officials together with local district official and police inspector. They were threatened to have financial subsidy removed if they did not comply, but would be rewarded if they decided to go government’s way. The headmaster, Lin Longyan who happened to be a former student of Lim Lian Geok, sought help from Lim who taught him the use of delaying tactic to fend off government’s pressure. Ibid, pp. 99–104.

54

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education. In the meantime, drastic political change in Malaya set in, and the days of British colonial rule were numbered. The new political parties, especially the Alliance, which consisted of UMNO and MCA, would be in power soon. In fact, the first election leading to the self-government was to be held in July 1955, and it would decide the political future of Malaya. The survival of the Chinese primary education in Malaya therefore rested more on Alliance politicians rather than colonial educational bureaucrats. The fight had to be shifted from the education to the political arena. The new situation forced Lim to become a communal politician allying himself with the Chinese politicians in MCA in order to achieve his goal of protecting Chinese education. Lim was impressed by the manner and sincerity of Tan Cheng Lock (Chen Zhenlu in Mandarin) that he was prepared to trust Tan on certain important issues.55 Lim, together with some of 55 Lim was very impressed by Tan’s attitude toward Chinese education in one of the meetings leading to the calling of the second national conference of the representatives of Chinese school teachers, Chinese school management committees and the MCA in April 1953. According to Lim Lian Geok, in answering to his question about MCA’s attitude toward Chinese education, Tan emotionally declared that “…if Chinese do not love their own culture, they would neither be recognised as English nor Malay by the Englishmen and the Malays, and they will become people without ancestry. Only animals such as pigs, cattle, ducks and chicken do not care about their ancestry. The Chinese would be like animals if they do not love or care for their own culture…”. See Lim Lian Geok, Ma Hua jiaoyu zhongyang weiyuanhui de zhenxiang (The truth about the Central Committee on Education of MCA), in Fengyu shibanian Vol. 1, p. 67; see also a different translation of this passage by Tan Liok Ee, in Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, p. 142. However, checking through the minutes of the second meeting of the MCACECC (Malayan Chinese Association Chinese Education Central Committee) held on 19–20 April 1953, it appears that Tan’s statement was made at the meeting in answering the questions of the representatives raised on the future commitment of MCA presidents on Chinese education. The original statement in English is as follows: “Now you say, perhaps another President of MCA may be antagonistic to the spread, development and growth of Chinese education in this country. To me, such a situation is unthinkable and impossible, because the constitution of MCA is such that it must protect the interest of the Chinese not only politically but economically, culturally and educationally and in every other respect. Because if the Chinese don’t know Chinese, they cannot be Chinese (without knowing Chinese culture); they cannot be Chinese if they do not practise Chinese customs and traditions, and if they are not Chinese, they cannot be Malays or Englishmen or Indians. They will be described as pariahs (Hear, Hear)” See Quan Ma huaxiao dongjiao ji Mahua daibiao dierhci lianxi huiyi jilu dated 19–20 April 1953 and part of the English minutes reproduced in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, p. 333. This record is a more genuine statement made by Tan than what Lim Lian Geok had recollected the event years later.

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his close associates, came to realize that the struggle for Chinese education not only had to be waged in the political arena, but also at the higher plane, that meant a higher goal had to be set for the struggle under which the status of Chinese education would be permanently assured. The bid for making Chinese language as one of the four official languages (Chinese, Malay, English, and Tamil) of the new nation was upheld as the goal and was to be popularized in the wider Chinese community. To achieve this lofty aim of the movement, Lim was prepared to compromise with the MCA politicians, even to the criticism of some of his close supporters. In April 1954, Lim was maneuvered into accepting the proposal from the MCA politicians that the supreme decision-making body of Chinese education, the Central Committee on Education (zhongyang jiaoyu weiyuanhui) to be a part of MCA rather than an independent entity.56 This compromising spirit led Lim and his close associates to attend a pre-election bargain session with the Alliance representatives at the residence of Tan Cheng Lock on 12 January 1955, which was later known as the Malacca Meeting (Maliujia huitan). In the meeting, Lim compromised by promising not to raise the official language issue before the election in exchange for a verbal guarantee from Tunku Abdul Rahman, the chairman of the Alliance, that the 1952 Education Ordinance will be abolished and a sum of 2 million dollars will be provided for the aid of Chinese primary and secondary schools.57 The Malacca Meeting, which was severely criticized by the Chinese media for giving away the fundamental demand of the Chinese community,58 helped the Alliance greatly by defusing any opposition from the 56

See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), ibid, pp. 63–65. See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Maliujia huitan, in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 1, pp. 108–118. This issue is to be discussed in greater detail in next section on Lim Lian Geok and the Chinese Politics in Malaysia. 58 In the press release by the Alliance, it was stated that Chinese teachers represented by Lim Lian Geok and others, listened to the advice of their leader, Sir Cheng-lock (Tan Cheng Lock), who had urged that the question of official language be shelved. This was also in the Alliance official record of the meeting. But Lim in his memoirs defended himself that his view was slightly distorted. What he promised was not to raise the issue in seven months before the scheduled general election in July 1955. See the Straits Times Report reproduced in Lim Lian Geok’s article as well as Lim’ article itself. Ibid, pp. 110–113. 57

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Chinese community, and the Alliance scored a landslide victory by capturing 51 out of 52 seats in the general election. The installation of the elected Alliance government in August 1955 raised Lim’s high expectation for a breakthrough for Chinese education. In the aura of post-election victory for the Alliance, he did not hide his jubilation over the event and expressed confidence in the government’s fairness in treating vernacular schools. In reception in honor of the new Education Minister, Dato Abdul Razak Hussein and his deputy, Too Joon Hing, Lim expressed the hope that the education policy of the new government would be in accord with the desire and aspiration of the people, but warned that any policy made blindly without proper consultation with the people concerned would face opposition, and suggested that a consultative committee consisting of the representatives of the Malay, Chinese, and Indian education sectors to be formed for that purpose.59 Perceiving the importance of education in politics, the Alliance government in August 1955 appointed an education review committee consisting of 14 members selected from the component parties of the Alliance.60 The committee headed by Dato Abdul Razak was to examine the existing education policy, and to recommend, changes if any, to the government.61 The Razak committee, though dominated by Malay voices, took a pragmatic and conciliatory stand in dealing with vernacular education. As a token of concession to the vocal demand of Chinese community, it accepted the proposal of Lim Chong Eu (Lin Cangyou in Mandarin) the new MCA president, of incorporating all four existing streams of primary schools into the national education system. The committee in its report emphasized the common content rather than uniformity in teaching medium in the primary schools. The Razak report also stated clearly that the ultimate aim of the educational policy was the creation of a national education system under which all children of different races in the country will be taught in 59 See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), fanying xinren zhengfu jiaoyu buzhang (Dun Lasha, Zhu yunxing) zhici (A speech delivered for welcoming the new Education Minister and Deputy Education Minister, Dato Abdul Razak & Too Joon Hing), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, pp. 58–59. 60 The committee had 8 members from UMNO, 5 from MCA and 1 from MIC. 61 See Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961, pp. 165–166.

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the same national language — the Malay; but the report did not provide a time frame for the fulfillment of the ultimate aim of the education policy.62 From one perspective, the Razak report represents a victory for the Chinese education movement led by Lim Lian Geok, though it was not a total victory. Lim Lian Geok and his co-associates did put the pressure on the Alliance government to fulfill its pre-election pledges. At the end of July 1955, Lim, together with his deputy Ms Sha Yuanru, sent a letter to the Chief Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman congratulating him on the Alliance victory, and reminded him of his pledge for reviewing the existing education policy.63 In October of the same year, Lim led a delegation to see Tunku to press on the same issue; and he, through the Malayan Chinese Association Chinese Education Central Committee (MCACECC) of which he was a member, asserted his influence over the making of the new education policy.64 Although Lim had put the pressure on the Alliance government to fulfill its pre-election pledges to the Chinese education, he did not push the issue of making Chinese as an official language. He could have pushed the issue, had he not been influenced by the larger political issue of independence of Malaya to be negotiated between the Alliance and the British government. He seemed to have been convinced that the independence issue was more important and urgent than the official language issue, and a push for the latter would have cracked the façade of racial unity and harmony in Malaya, which was desperately needed by the Alliance as a bargaining chip with the British. It was in this good faith that Lim postponed the bid for making Chinese as an official language of Malaya. In the second stage of his fight for Chinese education from 1958 to 1961, Lim Lian Geok was preoccupied with the struggle for the survival of Chinese secondary education. He must have been greatly shocked by a series of hostile moves by the government against

62

See Tan Liok Ee, Ibid, pp. 170–172. See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Zhi Lianmeng zhuxi Donggu Yaduraman han (A letter to the Chairman of the Alliance, Tunku Abdul Rahman), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, p. 55. 64 See Lu Feng (compiled), Lin Lianyu nianbiao, in Huajiao jie teji, p. 89; Tan Liok Ee, ibid, pp. 167–170. 63

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Chinese education after the independence. The adverse moves, in an escalating manner, culminated in the 1961 Education Act that required all secondary schools within the national system to teach in one of the two official languages — English or Malay; and to prepare their students for two public examinations — LCE and MCE — in the same language.65 The thrust of the Act on the Chinese secondary education hinged on two issues: the language for public examinations, and the age limit for secondary students. Both were crucial for the survival of Chinese secondary schools. Since most Chinese secondary schools received partial aid from the government, their conversion to national-type secondary schools required them to comply with the conditions set by the government. A concession to the languages in public examinations will force Chinese schools to increase their teaching hours in English at the expense of Chinese, or even to change the medium of instruction from Chinese into English or Malay, which will destroy the character of the Chinese schools. On the second issue, Chinese secondary schools traditionally retained a large number of over-aged students within their system partly because of socio-economic factors, and partly because of the retention system practised by Chinese education.66 The compliance of this condition would mean a decrease of student numbers, and depletion of student recruitment source. Lim Lian Geok was fully aware of the seriousness of these problems, and was determined to fight against the Act. His strategy was to apply pressure on the MCA leadership, and to mobilize Chinese community support behind Dongjiaozong — the alliance between Chinese school teachers and directors of Chinese school committees.67 Soon after the independence, Lim Lian Geok, as a member of MCACECC, attempted to influence the new Education Minister, 65

See Tan Liok Ee (2000). Chinese schools in Malaysia. In The Chinese in Malaysia, Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), p. 243. Shah Alam, Selangor: Oxford University Press. 66 See Tay Lian Soo (1998). Duli hou Huawen jiaoyu (Chinese Education after the independence of Malaya), in Malaixiya Huaren shi xinbian (The New History of the Chinese in Malaysia), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong et al. (eds.), Vol. 2, p. 259 Kuala Lumpur: The Federation of Chinese Associations, Malaysia. 67 This is the abbreviation of Dongzong (United Chinese School Committees’ Association) and Jiaozong (United Chinese School Teachers’ Association).

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Khir Johari, for concessions on these two crucial issues, but to no avail.68 Chinese Education, which increasingly became a sensitive political issue, split the MCA leadership into two major factions; Lim Lian Geok appeared to have allied with the faction led by Dr Lim Chong Eu and Too Joon Hing who was sympathetic to the views of the Dongjiaozong, and against the faction led by Tan Siew Sin (Chen Xiuxin in Mandarin) and H.S. Lee who had an different attitude toward the Chinese education. With the capture of the MCA top leadership by the Lim Chong Eu’s group in March 1958, the chance for Lim to obtain concessions from the government appeared to be good. However, the sudden fall of Lim Chong Eu’s leadership in MCA on the eve of 1959 election dashed all the hope of Dongjiaozong for acquiring concessions from the Alliance government,69 and shattered Lim Lian Geok’s strategy of political alliance with MCA. From then onward, Lim harbored no illusion of working within the existing political framework to achieve his goals. Before the failure of his main strategy of political alliance with MCA, Lim Lian Geok used the mass as supplementary strategy. He wanted to demonstrate to MCA leaders that his views on Chinese education were not just the views of those Chinese school teachers and school management committees which might be criticized as selfserving, but also the views of the broader Chinese community. This was why he was behind the move of organizing a mass meeting of representatives of Malayan Chinese shetuans (Social organization). On 26th April 1959, 1200 delegates representing 747 Chinese registered 68

Lim blamed the failure of the meeting with the new minister partly on the ignorance of education issues of Y.T. Lee, the head of the Cultural Section of MCA, and partly on the manipulation by Philip Egerton, the Superintendent of Chinese Schools in the Education Department. See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Yu Donggu zhijie jlaoxie (Direct negotiations with Tunku Abdul Rahman), in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 2, pp. 36–37; Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education, 1945–1961, pp. 245–246. 69 It was claimed that the demands that Lim Chong Eu made to Tunku on the eve of 1959 election consisted of two major isssues: first, that the Chinese be accorded with equal treatment in their language, schools, and economic activities; and second, that the MCA be apportioned 40 parliamentary seats out of tht total of 104 in the forthcoming election. See Heng Pek Koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, p. 256. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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organizations met at the Chinwoo Stadium in Kuala Lumpur to express a collective view on the urgent issues of Chinese education. A resolution entitled “The General Demands of the Malayan Chinese Community on Chinese Education” was adopted. It contained four important demands. First, the mother tongue should be used both as the medium of instruction and examination. Second, there should be equal treatment for all ethnic schools, including financial subsidies, teachers’ salary, and training. Third, the Chinese community’s representatives be appointed to an advisory committee to assist the government in solving problems of Chinese education. Fourth, there should be a 100% increase in aid to Chinese secondary schools.70 The successful convention of this panMalayan Chinese association strengthened Lim Lian Geok’s leadership in Chinese education movement, and increased his political capital in dealing with the MCA leaders. But unfortunately, the Alliance government did not seem to appreciate his influence, rather, taking this as a dangerous sign of trouble-making that could unseat the government. In the meantime, Lim Lian Geok had to fight against the enemies from within. These enemies were the principals and chairmen of the management boards of Chinese secondary schools who believed that the interest of the schools would be better served by accepting the government’s conditions for conversion. They were prepared to break the rank of solidarity of Chinese secondary schools, and succumbed to the government’s pressure. It must be a great shock to Lim Lian Geok that the first Chinese secondary school to break the rank was the Chung Ling High School in Penang, which was considered to be one of the most prestigious Chinese secondary schools in Malaya. Chung Ling was not known for its excellence in Chinese language, but for its bilingualism. After its inception in January 1923, it began putting emphasis on English learning;71 since David Chen (Chen Chung En) 70 See Penbang huaren dui jiaoyu zong yaoqiu, 1959.4.26 (The general demands on education of the Chinese community in Malaya dated 26 April 1959), in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, p. 430; Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education, 1945–1961, p. 258. 71 Tay Lian Soo has argued that Chung Ling’s tradition of emphasizing English learning was initiated by Gu Xianglin (or known as Gu Yinming), the director of Teaching Affairs of Chung Ling. Gu was versed in both Chinese and English, and was the translator of an English book, A History of Penang into Chinese language. See Tay Lian Soo, Malaixiya huawen jiaoyu fazhanshi, Vol. 3, p. 393.

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was appointed as headmaster in 1931, Chung Ling had been building up a fine reputation for its excellent English standard, that could match some of the good English schools in the Peninsula. The assasination of David Chen in February 1952 as a result of his close affiliation with Guomindang (Kuomintang) activity in Malaya shocked the community and deprived the school of its brilliant administrator. Chen was succeeded by Waung Yoong Nien (Wang Yongnian in Mandarin) who continued the path started by Chen.72 Regardless of warning from MCACECC, the highest Chinese education coordinating body, and the protests from students and teaching staff, Waung continued to pursue negotiations with the government on full financial aid to Chung Ling, and in June 1956, to the shock of all his colleagues, announced Chung Ling’s acceptance of government’s full assistance and conversion to nation-type high school.73 What prompted Waung to break the rank was probably the combination of circumstances, school tradition, personal ambition and selfinterest. In an interview with Tan Liok Ee in 1980, Waung justified his action by claiming his ambition for making Chung Ling the equal of the Penang Free School, one of the the oldest and best-known English secondary schools in the country.74 Lim Lian Geok condemned Waung’a action, and named him as a traitor by selling out on Chinese education for his personal benefit. According to Lim, Waung’s action got him a permanent headship of the school, a status equivalent to an officer of the Education Department enjoying the benefit of an attractive pension and housing allowance, and an increase of his salary by 50% from $800 per month to $1200 per month.75 One would 72

For Chen’s appointment to the headship of Chung Ling in 1931, see a short history of Chung Ling (1979). In Malaixiya Xinjiapo Huawen zhongxue tekan tiyao fu xiaoshi (Chinese High School Souvenir Magazines of Malaysia and Singapore with School Histories), Tay Lian Soo and Gwee Yee Hean (eds.) (1975), p. 164. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Chinese Studies, University of Malaya; for Chen’s work in building up Chung Ling, see Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education In Malaya, 1945–1961, pp. 214–218. 73 For a good analysis of the events leading to Chung Ling’s conversion, See Tan Liok Ee, ibid, pp. 219–224. 74 Ibid, p. 218. 75 See Lim Lian Geok (ed.). Chumai Huawen jiaoyu chuikuei — Wang Yongnian (Waung Yoong Nien — The Leader of crime for selling out Chinese education), in Fengyu shibannian, Vol. 1, p. 180.

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question the real motive of Waung’s action. Undoubtedly, he had a school tradition to uphold, but at the time when he took over from David Chen in February 1952, Chung Ling was already a leading Chinese secondary school in Malaya attracting large numbers of students outside Penang. Why should he try to compete with the bestknown English school in Penang while he was running a Chinese secondary school with a different tradition? The acceptance of the government’s full financial aid would reduce his workload and those of his teaching staff by not having to help raise funds from the Chinese community, but the school had been doing that type of work for many years, plus the fact that students had promised to pay more fees to help the school’s finance. Waung must have realized that the break with the rank would set a bad example for other Chinese secondary schools to follow, and may lead Chinese education to a total collapse. It would be very difficult for people to believe that Waung’s action was purely altruistic, and had no personal gain in this exercise. Perhaps Waung was an opportunist who saw the changing political circumstances were against Chinese education, and would require a great deal of sacrifice, both at the school and personal level, to defend the Chinese education. He probably felt that it would be futile to fight a losing battle against the government. Waung was not Lim Lian Geok, he was not prepared to die as a martyr for Chinese education. When he took over the job of David Chen, Waung was only in an acting capacity, so a permanent headship plus the status of an education officer with a fat salary was certainly tempting. Following the example of Chung Ling, two other Chinese secondary schools — the Chan Wa High School in Seremban, Negri Sembilan, and the Chinese High School in Segamat, Johore — accepted the government’s offer to convert into nation-type high schools at the end of 1956.76 More threatening to the survival of Chinese secondary education was the government’s hardening attitude toward Chinese secondary schools. Perceiving Chinese education as a major obstacle toward nation building, the Alliance government toughened its stand on the conversion issue. Riding on the election victory at the end of 76

See Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education, 1945–1961, p. 245.

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1959, the new Education Minister, Abdul Rahman Talib, appointed a committee headed by him to review the education policy in February 1960. The committee, though consisting of three appointed members from the MCA,77 had little or no input of views from the Chinese education sector. The Talib Report released in August 1960 represented a departure from a more conciliatory attitude adopted by the government in the Razak report. The government was determined to get what it believed to be the ultimate good for national unification and integration, and was prepared to crush any resistance from the Chinese community. This change of attitude was probably brought about by the political change of the time. During the process of producing the Razak Report in early 1956, the Razak Committee had good input from MCACECC views, which had sympathetic support of the Lim Chong Eu and Too Joon Hing faction within the MCA power structure, but by the middle of 1959, the rise of the Tan Siew Sin faction to power deprived the Chinese education of any valuable backing. At the same time, the setback of MCA in the 1959 election reduced any bargaining power that MCA still had. The Talib Report re-affirmed the government’s stand on crucial issues of over-aged students and the languages for public examinations. With the support of the new MCA leadership, the government saw no problems in implementing its policy on the reform of Chinese secondary schools. For about a year after the release of the Talib Report, the government mounted an all-out campaign to win over Chinese secondary schools to accept conversion. Backed by state educational bureaucracy and the influence of MCA branch leaders, the government put the pressure on the directors of school management committees to comply. At the same time, two MCA leaders, Leong Yew Koh (Liang Yugao in Mandarin) and Ong Yoke Lin (Weng Yulin in Mandarin) who were members of the Talib Committee, came out openly to defend the Talib Report, and declared that the government had no intention to eliminate Chinese education, but on the contrary, to protect it. This rather misleading message was repeated and 77 The appointees were Leong Yew Koh, Wong Pow Nee, and Koh Kim Leng who were neither knowledgeable about Chinese education, nor sympathetic toward it.

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repeated in government pamphlets and speeches of the MCA leaders.78 To the headmasters of Chinese secondary schools, the package offered by the government was extremely tempting: lower fees and better employment and higher study prospects for students, better salary and employment security for teachers, and an end to constant worries over school finance.79 Lim Lian Geok’s task of countering the government’s offensive on conversion was daunting. Despite a smear campaign launched by Minister Leong against him, and a threat of cancelling his teaching license and revoking of his Malayan citizenship over his head, Lim fought vehemently against the report and its implementation. He declared that the Talib Report was not a review of the old education policies, but a new policy that was designed to destroy Chinese education, and it was worse than the 1952 Education Ordinance under the British Colonial government.80 He pointed out that the report controvened some of the gains made by Chinese education in the Razak Report. He emphasized that the crux of the problem of Chinese education hinged on the issue of official languages which was used by the government to force Chinese secondary schools to convert. The ultimate solution to this problem and for the defence of Chinese culture, he argued, was the realization of the demand of making Chinese language one of the official languages of Malaya.81 Using Chinese media as his forum to reach the vast number of Chinese-educated readers, he took the government’s offensive head-on. His combative spirit and a strong sense of justice propelled him to take 78

See Tay Lian Soo, Duli hou Huawen jiaoyu (Chinese Education after the independence of Malaya), in Malaixiya Huaren shi xinbian (The New Edition of the History of Malaysian Chinese), Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong, et al. (eds.), Vol. 2, p. 265. 79 See Tan Liok Ee (1992). Dongjiaozong and the Challenge to Cultural Hegemony 1951–1987, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Kahn JS and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), pp. 191–192. North Sydney: Asian Studies Association of Australia with Allen & Unwin. 80 See Lim Lian Geok, Lin Lianyu shumian tanhua (A written statement on Talib Report by Lim Lian Geok dated 20 August 1960), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, p. 90. 81 Ibid, pp. 92–93; Lim Lian Geok, Wo wei shenmo feichang shiwang (Why do I feel very disappointed? — Lim’s speech to the working committee of UCSTA dated 12 August 1960), in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, p. 438.

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on the government regardless of personal interests. In an inverview in Kuala Lumpur with the Tunku’s assistant, Mohamed Sopiee Sheik Ibrahim, he stated that he was prepared to go to jail for his cause.82 By exposing the government’s real intention of phasing out Chinese education, he called upon his Chinese compatriots to stand firm on the issue of conversion and to reject the government’s offer.83 Standing on moral high ground, he called upon all Chinese to defend Chinese education and Chinese culture at all cost, even taking the option of running independent Chinese secondary schools. Invoking the spirit of self-reliance (zili gensheng) of Chinese pioneers in Malayan history who helped to establish and develop Chinese schools, he stressed that the spirit should be continued to overcome the hardship suffered by Chinese secondary schools.84 In the battle for hearts and minds of the Chinese public, the Alliance government led by Leong Yew Koh, attempted to explain its “good intention” toward Chinese education on every possible occasion,85 but its efforts were thwarted by Lim Lian Geok who continued

82 Lim had a private meeting with Sophiee in a Chinese restaurant in Kuala Lumpur on 2 August 1960, two days before the release of the Talib Report. Sophiee might have tried to persuade Lim to change his tough stand on conversion, but was refuted by Lim who expressed his determination to defend Chinese education. See Lim Lian Geok. Bu shou konghe (Not taking the threat), in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 2, pp. 70–73. 83 See Lim’s speech to the national convention of Dongjiaozong in Kuala Lumpur on 5 November 1960, in Zheng Liang Shu (Tay Lian Soo) (compiled) (2003), Lin Lianyu xiansheng yanlunji (Collections of Speeches of Lim Lian Geok), pp. 483–488. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 84 See Lim Lian Geok, Jintieh jin keyi bei poduo, duli zhongxue buke buban (Government’s financial aid can be taken away, but the independent Chinese secondary schools cannot be not established), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, pp. 94–98. 85 Leong on 3 October 1960 spoke at the 4th anniversary celebration of the MCA Shi Wei (Lion’s Tail) new village branch of Ipoh, on 17 October 1960, he spoke at a welcoming dinner in his honor hosted by the Five District (Wu Yi huiguan) of Selangor; on 3 November 1960, he spoke at the dinner in honor of him hosted by the Hokkien Association of Trengganu. Again, on 12 May 1961, he spoke on the same subject at the mass meeting organized by Alliance party in Telor Anson, on 23 July 1961, he spoke at the welcoming dinner hosted by the Federation of Leong Clan Associations in Selangor, on 11 August 1961, he again spoke at the seminar for citizens in Kuala Kangsa. All these occasions, he tried to explain the contents of the Talib Report, and the government’s policy in protecting Chinese education. See Lim Lian Geok Foundation (ed.), (1988). Lin Liang Gongan (Collections on the Controversy between Lim Lian Geok and Leong Yew Koh), pp. 57–123. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation.

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to expose the government’s real intention behind its sweet talk. The polemic between Leong and Lim turned ugly when both exchanged personal insults. Leong described Lim as a charlatan (zou jianghu) and accused his efforts in opposing the Talib Report were not for the interests of people of Malaya, but for his own bread and butter.86 In return, Lim Lian Geok accused Leong as a traitor to the Chinese who sold out on Chinese interests for his own gain.87 In the period leading up to the promulgation of the Education Act (based on the Talib Report) in October 1961, the government, represented by Leong Yew Koh, seemed to have lost ground in the battle for the conversion of Chinese secondary schools; this was why it had to resort to silence Lim Lian Geok by revoking his registration as a teacher and his Malayan citizenship. On 12 August 1961, Lim was served a notice of intention his citizenship signed by the RegistrarGeneral of Citizens of the Federation of Malaya. A week later, on 19 August 1961, the Registrar of Teachers of Selangor officially revoked his registration as teacher.88 This high-handed approach by the government produced concrete results; many secondary school chairmen of management committees succumbed to the pressure, and decided to accept conversion in the last two months of 1961. Thus, the government was able to claim victory in January 1962 that 54 out of 70 Chinese secondary schools had accepted conversion into nation-type high schools, while 16 Chinese secondary schools became independent.89 86

See the report on Leong Yew Koh’s address in Parliament in Zhong Guo Bao (The China Press), dated 13 August 1960, reproduced in Lin Liang Gongan, Ibid., pp. 42–43. 87 See Lim Lian Geok, Liang Yugao shi Huaren liyi de chumai zhe — Lian Lianyu shumian tanhua, 20,8,1960 (Leong Yew Koh is the Traitor to the Chinese selling out Chinese Interests — a written statement of Lim Lian Geok dated 20 August 1960), Ibid., pp. 45–47; this document is also found in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, pp. 439–440. 88 These two notices were reproduced in Lim Lian Geok Foundation (ed.), Lin Lianyu gongmin quan an (The Case of Revocation of Lim Lian Geok’s Citizenship), pp. 11–15. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 89 The breakdown of the Chinese secondary schools was, 54 national-type and 16 independent, making a total of 70. See Tan Liok Ee, The Politics of Chinese Education, 1945–1961, pp. 274–275 table 7.1 and table 7.2; Tay Lian Soo, Duli hou Huawen jiaoyu, table 1 and table 2, in Malaixiya huaren shi xinbian, Lim Chooi Kwa, Ho Khai Leong et al. (eds.), Vol. 2, pp. 267–268.

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Lim Lian Geok and Chinese Politics in Malaysia Lim Lian Geok was not a politician. He did not carry a membership card of any political party, nor did he aspire to become a politician himself. Even when he was the assistant secretary of the MCACECC under the wing of MCA in 1950s, it was political expediency rather than a fulfilled desire. Ironically, Lim Lian Geok was a political activist and an ardent Malayan nationalist. His political activity was a means to achieve his educational aims. Lim possessed some political ideas, that were the mixture of ideas of a Confucian moralist, a Western democrat, and a left-wing political activist. Having been deeply influenced by Confucian Classics, he invariably spoke with a strong Confucian moral tone, and perceived the matters in a moral lens of right and wrong, or black and white. He saw the fight for Chinese education as a righteous act, and the fight of the Chinese community for justice and equal rights were justified. Having been nurtured by modern education at Jimei College, Xiamen, he was imbued with Western democratic ideas of liberty, equality, and citizen’s rights. He even declared the equality of rights was more important than life, and death would be preferred over inequality.90 There is no evidence to suggest that Lim Lian Geok had read Marxist–Leninist works, but as a political activist, he believed the power of the masses, and the mobilization of their support for educational aims. Although Lim Lian Geok did not aspire to become a politician, and had no high opinion for some Chinese politicians in MCA, he was increasingly driven to become a politician as the Chinese education issue became a hot political topic. In this sense, he can be labeled as an amateur or reluctant politician. His amateurism was perhaps the Achilles heel of his political action. In addition, Lim Lian Geok lacked experience of party politics which required a high degree of alertness. He also lacked the craftiness of a shrewd politician who could not be easily maneuvered into a situation that would compromise 90

See Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Gaobie Jiaozong tongren, 7,12, 1961 (My farewell speech to the colleagues in the Federation of Chinese School Teachers Associations dated 7 December 1961), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, p. 112.; see also the same speech collected in Lim Lian Geok Foundation (ed.), Lin Lianyu gongmin quan an, p. 60.

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fundamental demands. The Malacca Meeting in January 1955 is a case in point. On 12 January 1955, a crucial meeting was held at Tan Cheng Lock’s residence between the representatives of Alliance Party and MCACECC. The meeting was significant because it was a historical bargain between the Alliance party and the Chinese community over the issue of Chinese education. The loss or gain in that meeting would impact profoundly the education policies pursued by the Alliance government in a later period. Tunku Abdul Rahman led the Alliance delegates, while Lim Lian Geok was the spokesman for the MCACECC. The position of Tan Cheng Lock was ambiguous because he was the man wearing two hats: being the leader of a major component party of the Alliance, and the chairman of MCACECC. Presenting from a written statement, Lim Lian Geok, on behalf of UCSTA, portrayed the Colonial government as the main enemy of the Chinese education, and couched the demand in a relatively mild language that the Chinese should be allowed to preserve their language and culture. On specific terms, UCSTA asked for extra $2 million aid to Chinese schools, and Chinese to be the second language in an independent Malaya.91 Undoubtedly, Tunku and Lim were the protagonists of the meeting. Tunku, an experienced politician, gave concessions on some minor issues such as the $2 million grant to the Chinese schools, but insisted that Chinese language cannot be accepted as the second language (official language) of the independent Malaya. His main justification was that the Malays had not yet reached the stage that they could accept Chinese as an official language, and this sensitive issue had been used by his opponents, led by Dato Onn who attacked him for selling out on Malay interests to the Chinese, and this could mean an election disaster for the Alliance.92 On the other hand, Lim Lian Geok 91 For a good analysis of this event, see Tan Liok Ee, The politics of Chinese Education, 1945–1961, pp. 155–160; for details of the meeting, see Tay Lian Soo, Malaixiya huawen jiaoyu fazhanshi, Vol. 3, pp. 273–293. 92 See Maliujia huitan jilu (Records of the Malacca Meeting), in Lim Lian Geok Foundation (ed.), Lin Liang gongan, pp. 132–133, the same document is also found in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, pp. 361–362; Lim Lian Geok (ed.), Maliujia huitan (The Malacca Meeting), in Fengyu shibanian, Vol. 1, p. 109.

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was inexperienced and easily maneuvered into the position that he was prepared to compromise on the major official language issue. Lim seemed to have been impressed by the demeanor and sincerity of Tunku who asked him for help to win the forthcoming election by not raising the official language issue within next 7 months (the election was to be held in July 1955). Without much deliberation or discussion with other representatives of the UCSTA and UCSCA, Lim was prepared to help Tunku by giving the final say on the issue to Tan Cheng Lock who was the chairman of MCACECC. According to Lim, he thought the official language issue could not be resolved promptly and hastily, and he gave the final decision to Tan as a token of good will. As a person wearing two hats, Tan Cheng Lock was delighted to take the soft option by giving the guarantee to Tunku for not raising the official language issue before the election.93 Despite Lim Lian Geok’s pushing, Tunku only promised to review the 1952 Education Ordinance without a firm guarantee. The results of the crucial Malacca Meeting was a victory for UMNO and Tunku’s leadership, and the guarantee of Chinese for not raising the sensitive issue of official language contributed directly to the landslide victory in the 1955 election. But Lim’s concession to the UMNO demands was considered by Chinese community as a failure, and he was even accused by a major Chinese newspaper for selling out the demands of the UCSTA.94 Had he planned out the correct strategy and clearly identified what was the fundamental demand of the Chinese community — Chinese as an official language, and had he insisted on the fundamental demands at the historical meeting, the result of negotiations would have been different. With the benefit of hindsight, Lim Lian Geok’s concession on the official language issue proved to be a major tactical mistake. Tan Liok Ee has aptly commented that “the UCSTA’s agreement to temporarily shelve the official language issue proved to be a costly concession. UMNO leaders regarded the issue as henceforth closed and UCSTA leaders never again found themselves in a comparable position of 93 94

See Lim Lian Geok, Maliujia huitan, ibid, pp. 109–110. Ibid, p. 111.

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strength to press the issue….”.95 However, what should be pointed out is that Lim was also a Malayan nationalist believing independence of Malaya was of paramount importance for all Malayans regardless of their ethnic origins, class, and gender. As he explained to his fellow Chinese teachers in December 1956 of why UCSTA had not yet achieved its goal of making Chinese as an official language was “At this point, the most important principle we uphold is the attainment of independence. Everything must be decided on the basis that it does not harm independence. This means that if some things we are fighting for may disadvantage the independence struggle, then we must cope with it in the spirit of tolerance. You must remember, our tolerance is for the sake of the realisation of independence, but not a submission…”.96 Nobody can doubt the sincerity of Lim’s belief that independence for Malaya outweighed the importance of the official language issue, and on this issue, he obviously had put the national interests ahead of the Chinese community’s interests. Unlike Tan Kah Kee in Singapore whose political loyalty was directed to China and fit into the mold of “Overseas Chinese leader”,97 Lim Lian Geok was a Malaya-oriented Chinese leader fighting for the local Chinese community. Since becoming a Malayan citizen in 1951, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of Malaya to the Chinese, and urged the Chinese to regard Malaya as their first homeland (Diyi guxiang) rather than second homeland (Dier guxiang), a traditional view held by the majority of the Chinese of his time.98 Before the independence 95

See Tan Liok Ee, Dongjiaozong and the challenge to cultural hegemony 1951–1987, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, Kahn JS and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds.), p. 189. 96 See Lim’s speech at UCSTA annual general meeting held on 12 December 1956, reprinted in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, p. 181; this translation is partly Tan Liok Ee’s and partly mine, see also Tan Liok Ee, ibid, p. 190. 97 Dr. Yong Ching Fatt of Flinders University, South Australia, described Tan Kah Kee as an legendary Overseas Chinese leader, see Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-Kee:The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 98 See Tan Liok Ee (2001). Cung lishi guandian kan Malaixiya huawen jiaoyu yu huajiao renshi (A historical perspective on the Chinese education and Chinese educationists in Malaya), in Jiaoyu, Qimong, Chengxin: Academic Conference on the Posthumous Centenary Birthday of Lim Lian Geok on 16 September 2001, p. 37. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation.

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of Malaya in August 1957, many of the Chinese leaders, especially the Chinese educated, were uncertain about their political identities, and were confused by the appeals of the Communists in mainland China and the Nationalists on Taiwan island, but Lim was clear and firm in his political loyalty. He was uninterested in China’s politics on both sides of the Taiwan Straits; instead, he cast his eyes clearly on the future of Malaya which he considered to be the land that Malayan Chinese will continue to prosper for generations to come. Lim Lian Geok was not a professional politician, but he had the instinct of a politician. He was knowledgeable about local politics, an ability to detect changing political climate, and the ability to identify fundamental political problems. Strictly speaking, he did not fit into any of the three categories of Chinese political leadership in Malaya classified by Professor Wang Gungwu,99 but belonged to a fourth type of Chinese leadership, that is, modern trade union leaders. He was born in China, Chinese-educated, but unlike the China-oriented leaders, he developed a strong local identity and fought for the interests of the Chinese community rather than that of China or Taiwan. The UCSTA, of which he was the president for 8 years, was a modern trade union protecting the professional interests of Chinese teachers. Lim’s influence on the Chinese politics in Malaya was based on the organization he represented, and partly on the personal reputation he had built up in the Chinese community. The experience in the Malacca Meeting and the Alliance government’s reluctance in fulfilling its promises after the 1955 election, provided him with insight into the UMNO–MCA alliance and the Sino–Malay political relationship. The Chinese population in Malaya at the time could almost match the number of the Malays, but the majority of them had no voting rights. They were either indifferent to the issue of citizenship, or were deterred by law to become one, including those local-born 99 A type leaders were born in China, Chinese-educated and China-oriented, B type leaders based their claim of leadership on wealth and position in the community organizations, C type leaders were local-born, English-educated and Malayan-oriented For a detailed discussion, see Wang Gungwu (1981). Chinese politics in Malaya, in Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and The Chinese, pp. 173–200. North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia Pty. Ltd.

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Chinese. The lack of voting rights became the crux of the problem of Chinese politics in Malaya. According to his calculation based on the July 1955 election, out of the 1.3 million electors, Chinese only had 140,000, while the Malays held more than a million votes. The ratio was one to eight.100 With so much difference in votes, the Chinese would be greatly disadvantaged vis-à-vis the challenge of the Malays in a new democratic Malaya. Lim also realized the permanent solution to the Chinese education problem rested much on the political power of the Chinese, and the increase of Chinese voters would enhance the chance of gaining justice for Chinese education and culture. Apart from these considerations, Lim Lian Geok was aware that the Alliance government had started a process of formulating the constitution for the new nation. A collective expression of Chinese community on this crucial issue of citizenship needed to be made known to the Alliance government as well as the British Colonial authorities in London. Undoubtedly, Lim Lian Geok was the prime mover behind the convention of all Chinese registered shetuans in Malaya held in Kuala Lumpur on 27 April 1956. With his behind-the-scene activity, Lim received the support of the Chinese Assembly Hall of Selangor, The Federation of the Selangor Chinese Guilds and Associations or at that time was known as Sanshiliu Hangtuan zonghui, the Chinese Assembly Hall of Perak and the Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Together with his own UCSTA, he succeeded in mobilizing the majority of the shetuans with 1200 delegates to attend the convention.101 With highly charged emotions arguing from the issue of citizenship, the convention passed four main resolutions: those who were born in Malaya should be automatically accepted as citizens; those who remained in Malaya for 5 years should be eligible to apply for citizenship; equal rights and obligations for all races; and equal treatment to education and culture of all races, plus the demand of making Chinese an official

100

See Lim Lian Geok, Zengchu gongmin quan dahui (The General Meeting of Chinese for the Citizenship of Malaya), in Fengyu shibanian , Vol. 2, p. 2. 101 Each organization was asked to send two delegates which meant the Chinese organizations that supported the idea of seeking for citizenship must have exceeded 550. Ibid, p. 8.

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language.102 The convention was a great success. It produced a working committee of 15 members to see through the issue: one hundred thousand copies of a declaration on the bid for citizenship (incorporating the major resolution of the convention) were printed in Chinese and English to be widely distributed in the Chinese community; signatures of the 1200 representatives were collected; and copies of a memorandum in Chinese and English were produced and were to be dispatched to the United Nations, British Colonial Office, and the Alliance Government.103 The timing for calling the Citizenship Convention on 27 April 1956 was a deliberate move on the part of the Chinese community, for the Reid Constitutional Commission appointed by the British Government was touring Malaya from March to May 1956. The Commission, headed by Lord Reid, was to collect views from institutions and individuals on the drafting of the future constitution of independent Malaya.104 Lim Lian Geok and other Convention leaders obviously saw that as a golden opportunity to express the collective view of the Chinese to the Commission. Lim’s role in the Citizenship Convention was undoubtedly most significant. He was the initiator and a key member of the working committee in organizing the convention. He drafted the convention manifesto and scrutinized the memorandum.105 The Reid Commission report, which was published in February 1957, appears to have taken a sympathetic stand on the claims of Chinese and Indians on the issue of official languages. Having recognized the multi-ethnic nature of Malayan society, the Commission recommended that in addition to Malay as the national language, Chinese, English, and Tamil were to be accepted as official

102

Ibid, p. 5. See Quan Ma huaren zhuce shetuan daibiao dahui zhengqu gongminquan xuanyan (Manifesto of the bid for citizenship of the convention of representatives of the pan Malayan Chinese registered shetuans dated 27 April 1956), reproduced in Jiaozong Sanshisan Nian, pp. 373–374; Lim Lian Geok, Lundun zhi xing (Trip to London for Petition to the British Government on Citizen Issue), in Fengyu shiba nian, Vol. 2, pp. 11–12. 104 Apart from Lord Reid, other members included McKell WJ from Australia, Malik B from India, Abdul Hamid From Pakistan, and Jennings I from Great Britain. 105 See Lim Lian Geok, Fengyu shiba nian, Vol. 2, pp. 2–12. 103

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languages of Malaya for a period of 10 years or more as determined by the Malayan Parliament.106 Although there is no evidence to show that the Commission’s view on official languages was directly influenced by the resolutions of the Chinese Citizenship Convention, nevertheless, the Commission touring Malaya at that time must have noticed the collective views expressed by the Chinese community on this issue. On the citizenship issue, Lim Lian Geok played politics as a union leader. He had no hesitation about use his influence to mobilize support for his fight for Chinese education and culture. But he was deeply commited to a democratic process. He did not advocate violence to achieve his objectives; rather, he used the Chinese social organizations as pressure groups to bear on political party and government. Through his established network among Chinese journalists, he used the Chinese media to express his views and to lash out at his opponents.107 But all these conformed to the democratic process, and they were directed at the ultimate well-being of Malaya. Unlike many Laukeh (China-born) Chinese of his time, he had forseen an independent multi-ethnic and multi cultural Malaya. Since taking up Malayan citizenship in 1951, he was no longer loyal to China or Taiwan unlike many of the Laukeh Chinese were struggling to come to grips with the choice between the two.108 With his readiness to place his future on the new nation, he had a vision for an independent and multi cultural Malaya where different races would enjoy equal treatments in rights and responsibilities, and where they would share the economic fruits. His multi cultural Malaya was a nation built on 106 See Heng Pek Koon, Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association, pp. 228–229. 107 See for instance, Lim greatly praised a journalist named Song Zhexiang, a reporter of the Zhong Guo Bao (The China Press) in Kuala Lumpur, for his fearless and unbiased reports on the fight for Chiense education. Lim called Song as “The friend of the Chinese Teachers”. See Lim Lian Geok, Jiaoshi zhi you — Song Zhexiang, in Fengyu shiba nian, Vol. 1, pp. 222–226. 108 For a discussion of this topic, see Chui Kuei-chiang (1959). Xin Ma Huaren guojia rentong de zhuanbian, 1945–1959 (Change of Indentities among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1959), Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe, especially Chapters 4, 8 and 9; Yong CF and McKenna RB, The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya 1912–1949, pp. 199–222. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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the best of the four civilizations: Western, Chinese, Malay–Arabic, and Indian. In his article entitled Malaiya de jingshen (The Spirit of Malaya), he visualized the mixture of the gist of these four great civilizations — Western democratic tradition, Chinese spirit of hardworking, the optimistic view of life of the Malays, and the Indians’ kindliness and good-nature — would create a Malayan culture, one of the richest cultures in the world in future.109 His idea of creating a democratic and wealthy multi cultural Malaya was ahead of his time.

The Impact of Lim Lian Geok on the Chinese Community in Malaysia Lim Lian Geok passed away on 18 December 1985 at the age of 85. On the same day, a funeral committee consisting of 15 leading Chinese shetuans — UCSTA, UCSCA, together with state Chinese Assembly Halls — was set up, and Lim’s coffin was placed at the Chinese Assembly Hall of Selangor in Kuala Lumpur for the general public to pay their last respect. On 21 December, his coffin was escorted to the Hokkien cemetery by tens of thousands of mourners who lined the streets for five kilometres.110 The massive turn-out of mourners affirmed Lim as the most popular leader the Chinese community had ever seen. He possessed neither wealth nor political power, but was revered by hundreds of thousands of the Chinese after his death. He was adored because of his dedication to the fight for the Chinese education, of his unwavering stand and of his fearless struggle for the equality and justice for the Chinese in Malaysia. Because of this, he was honored as Zu Hun (The Spirit of the Race) of the Chinese in Malaysia. This spirit of the race was further transformed into the “Spirit of Lim Lian Geok” (Lin Lianyu jingshen) which is to guide the Chinese community in future. According to one explanation, the “Spirit of Lim Lian Geok” can be understood at five different levels.

109

See Kang Ruye (penname of Lim Lian Geok) (1986). Tan Malaiya de jingshen (On the spirit of Malaya), in Zha Jin Ji (Miscellaneous Writings), pp. 37–40. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation. 110 See Lu Feng (comp.), Lin Lianyu nianbiao, in Huajiao Jie teji, p. 94.

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The first is at the national level that entails advocacy of national independence, racial harmony, unity and compassion, mutual tolerance and mutual assistance, co-existence and co-prosperity. The second level is from the perspective of ethnic interests that involve protection of the legitimate rights of the ethnic groups on their education and culture, fearless struggle and the spirit of sacrifice. The third level is from the perspective of construction of ethnic culture that involves dedication to profession and to the construction of Chinese culture without consideration for personal gains, and setting an example for others to follow. The fourth level is from an organizational perspective that emphasizes the dependence on the strength of organizations, utilizing talents, collective spirit and self-reliance. The final level is from the perspective of the individual that involves self-education and self-development and the attention for current affairs. One should not be selfish and self-centered, but show concern for the welfare of the society, uphold justice and set good examples for other people to follow.111 Obviously, the spirit of Lim Lian Geok, to a large extent, is derived from the “Chinese Spirit”, and an enriched “Chinese Spirit” in the context of a new multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Malaysia. In retrospect, the Alliance government’s action in silencing Lim Lian Geok by depriving him his teaching permit and citizenship was a historical mistake. Although it did silence some critics on the government’s education policy, it did not cow the Chinese community for its fight for rights and justice. In fact, the action taken against Lim made him the martyr of Chinese education and culture, and uplifted him to the status of a saint to be worshipped by the Chinese. The enormous respect and sympathy for Lim Lian Geok for his fearless struggle led to the canonization of Lim Lian Geok after his death. The Chinese community found an effective weapon — the spirit of Lim Lian Geok to continue the fight for Chinese education and

111

See Lin Lianyu jingshen (The Spirit of Lim Lian Geok), in Gengyun yu Shouhu: Lin Lianyu jingshen jiang teji(Cultivation and Protection: Special Souvenir Magazine of the Lim Lian Geok Spirit Awards from 1988 to 2000), Lim Lian Geok Foundation (ed.), p. 8. Kuala Lumpur: Lim Lian Geok Foundation and The Federation of the Eng Choon Associations of Malaysia, December 2001.

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culture in Malaysia, and his example inspired more and more Chinese to come forward to join the rank for the struggle. Led by the 15 major Chinese shetuans, the canonization of Lim Lian Geok took place soon after his funeral. A provisional committee for the proposed Lim Lian Geok Foundation was immediately established. Taking advantage of the memorial services for Lim Lian Geok staged by different states in Malaysia,112 over one million ringgit (Malaysian dollar) were raised for the foundation within a year. With strong financial backing, the foundation was able to carry out a series of activities to canonize Lim Lian Geok. Since 1987, the anniversary of the death of Lim Lian Geok was named as the “Festival of Chinese Education” (Huajiao Jie). On that day, representatives of Chinese shetuans were to conduct a public sacrifice in a solemn ceremony at Lim’s tomb at the Hokkien cemetery. Since 1988, to coincide with the commemoration of the “Festival of Chinese Education”, Lim Lian Geok Spirit Award was established to reward those individuals and schools that had demonstrated dedication and had engaged in fearless struggle for Chinese education and culture. The award was taken as a great honor for the individuals and institutions and would encourage others to follow suit. Since 1991, the foundation also established the Lim Lian Geok Lecture to promote knowledge on Chinese education, culture, politics, and economics, and prominent scholars were invited to present the lecture; this included a Nobel Price winner in Chemistry, Professor Li Yuan Che of Taiwan, who delivered a paper on 18 December 1994 entitled “Welcoming the Educational Reform of the 21st Century”.113 But the most important activity of the Foundation was the publication of Lim Lian Geok’s works. Before the death of Lim, his works on Chinese education were not published because of legal implications; the foundation felt it was time to publish all of Lim’s works after his demise. From 1986 to 1994, at least 17 books and pamphlets were published. Lim Lian Geok’s major works on his 112

It was recorded that within 7 months of Lim Lian Geok’s death, 27 memorial services were held in Malaysia from January 8 to July 12 1986. See a list of memorial services for Lim Lian Geok. In Lin Lian-yu jijin: Shinian huodong huigu (Lim Lian Geok Foundation: A Retrospect of the Last Ten Years of Activity) in Huajiao jie teji, p. 98. 113 See Lin Lian-yu, ibid, pp. 102–103.

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struggle for Chinese education: The Appeal for Chinese Education (Huawen jiaoyu huyu lu, published in 1986), The Stormy Eighteen Years, Part 1 (Fengyu shiba nian, shangji, published in 1988), and The Stormy Eighteen Years, Part 2 (Fengyu shiba nian, xiaji, published in 1990) formed the corpus of his story. They preserved valuable records of the Chinese education movement, and enhanced Lim’s reputation. The publication of The Controversy Between Lim Lian Geok and Leong Yew Koh (Lin Liang Gongan) and The Issue on Lim Lian Geok’s Citizenship (Lin Lianyu Gongminquan an) published in 1988 and 1989, respectively, affirmed Lim Lian Geok as a fearless fighter and a martyr for the Chinese Education, and guaranteed his sainthood in the Chinese community. These publications were widely distributed and enthusiastically read among educated Chinese, and continued to inspire more people to the cause of Chinese education in Malaysia. Lim Lian Geok’s deeds inspire his colleagues, students and those who believed Chinese education should be given a rightful place in Malaysia, to follow his footsteps. Chinese education experienced enormous obstacles in 1960s and 1970s, but it stood firmly and continued to fight for its survival. Since 1973, with the emergence of new leadership among the ranks of Dongjiaozong, it was resurrected like a phoenix from fire with the movement of restoration of Chinese education in Malaysia. In responding to the declining number of students for Chinese independent secondary schools, the movement started in the state of Perak led by Hu Wan Duo, the leader of the Perak Chinese School Committees Association. The movement focused on the strengthening of the independent Chinese schools both financially and structurally. With popular support in the Chinese community, the movement succeeded in raising substantial funds, and in lifting the academic and linguistic standard of students.114 The success of this self-strengthening movement made Chinese education again 114

For detailed records of the Restoration Movement, see Huawen Duli Zhongxue fazhan gongzuo weiyuanhui (ed.), (1976). Bilizhou Huawen Duzhong Fuxingshi(History of the Restoration of the Chinese Independent Schools in Perak). Ipoh: Federation of the Chinese School Committees Associations of Perak; Zhou Yue (1996). Dongnanya Huawen Jiaoyu (Chinese Education in Southeast Asia), pp. 168–174. Guangzhou: Jinan University Press.

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an alternative education for the Chinese in Malaysia. It is significant to note the idea of developing independent Chinese school system as an alternative education to the government schools appears to have come from Lim Lian Geok as early as 16 March 1961. Facing tremendous pressure from the government to convert to national-type secondary schools, Lim urged the Chinese to forgo the government’s subsidy and opted for running independent Chinese high schools. He emphasized that the cooperation between teachers, directors of school committees (dongshi), parents and general Chinese public would make independent Chinese schools viable.115 Further, the leader of the Restoration Movement, Hu Wan Duo frankly admits that his action in students boycott while he was a student at Chung Ling High School in 1955 was directly influenced by Lim Lian Geok, and his later initiating the movement in Perak was inspired by Lim Lian Geok’s spirit.116

Conclusion Lim Lian Geok is a great Chinese educationist, a social activist, and a Malaysian nationalist whose story deserves to be told and recorded in Malaysian history. His struggle for the survival of Chinese education in Malaysia underpins the important principle of equality and rights for different ethnic groups in a multi racial and multi cultural nation. The government’s oppressive action in depriving him of his teaching job and his citizenship unwittingly made him a martyr and a hero of the Chinese community, and his spirit of fearless struggle for ethnic equality and rights and self-reliance sustained the community’s fight

115

See Lim Lian Geok, Jintieh jin keyi bei poduo, duli zhongxue buke buban (Government’s financial aid can be taken away, but the independent Chinese secondary schools cannot be established), in Huawen jiaoyu huyi lu, pp. 94–96. 116 In this context, Lim Lian Geok’s spirit refers to his spirit of self-reliance and his fearless fight for the equality and rights of the Chinese in Malaysia. See the preface written by Hu Wan Duo as the Chairman for the Federation of Chinese School Committee Associtions of Perak for the book entitled “Lim Lianyu”(Lim Lian Geok) in January 1986, in Bili Huaxiao Dongshihui lianhehui bishuchu, Lin Lianyu (Lim Lian Geok), p. i, Ipoh: Bili Huaxiao Dongshihui lianhehui, March, 1986.

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for justice for Chinese education. His impact on the Chinese community in Malaysia is profound and lasting. Lim Lian Geok’s contribution exceeds the bounds of the Chinese community. He has directly and indirectly contributed to the building of Malaysia as a modern, democratic, and industrialized state. He set an example for many Chinese to follow by diverting his loyalty from China to Malaya through taking out Malayan citizenship as early as September 1951, 6 years before the independence of Malaya. Lim’s struggle, in a historical context, has preserved the Chinese education, and made it the best Chinese education system outside Mainland China and Taiwan. Without the contribution made by Lim and his spirit, Chinese education in Malaysia would have been decimated, and Chinese standard of the Chinese Malaysians would have been very elementary. As Chinese language emerges as the most important business language in Asia only second to English, Chinese education becomes more relevant in Malaysia’s strive for fast economic development. As China emerges as a world great economic power and its influence looms large in Southeast Asia, and as Malaysia moves closer to China in its economic future, those Chinese Malaysians who have a good command of Chinese language and culture would be able to make a significant contribution in developing such close relations. They will serve as an important link in the Sino–Malaysian business, and in the future ASEAN–China Free Trade Zone to be established in less than a decade.

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PART II THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND BEYOND

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Chapter 10

Social Change in the Ethnic (Overseas) Chinese Communities: A Historical Perspective*

Human societies undergo constant and continuous changes: from small to big, from old to new, from new to newer, and from numerical change to the change in character. These changes appear to have followed certain paths that are governed by a natural order, and the development of the Ethnic Chinese communities are no exception. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the source, the process, and the direction of change in the post-war Ethnic Chinese communities, so as to chart the course of their future development. The source of change of the Ethnic Chinese communities came from two directions: internal and external. The former includes the division and conflict among Chinese dialect groups, the conflict between local-born and China-born Chinese, and the polarization of the rich and the poor, and the class conflict. The latter comprises the rivalry and conflict of China politics, the policies of the local governments, the impact of the economic and cultural policies, and the impact of global and regional politics and economics. Ethnic Chinese communities in the past have been weakened by division, rivalry, and conflict among various dialect groups. This occurred more often than not in the communities where various *This chapter is based on my keynote speech in Chinese delivered at the International Conference on the “Social Change in the Ethnic Chinese Communities during the Post-war Period,” held in Kulongsoo, Xiamen, China in May 1989. The Chinese paper was first published in Guo Liang (ed.) (1990). Zhanhou Haiwai Huaren bianhua: guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Social Change in the Post-war Ethnic Chinese Society: Selected Essays for an International Conference), pp. 1–7. Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao chuban gongsi.

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dialect groups have achieved similar numerical strength, such as Singapore and Malaysia.1 However, when a particular dialect group occupies a predominant position, the rivalry and conflict are decreased. This happens in the Ethnic Chinese communities in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where Cantonese speakers appear to have outnumbered other dialect groups.2 Generally speaking, the class relations in the Ethnic Chinese (Overseas Chinese) communities were better than that which existed in the olden days of China. There were no rapacious landlords and powerful bullies that ruthlessly exploited the peasants who rose in massive revolts, nor were there large-scale strikes mounted by organized labor that tended to paralyze the function of the communities. Before the First World War, class division in the Ethnic Chinese communities was not clear-cut, and the class conflict was mild.3 This was because the Ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie was in its infant stage. But the rise of new classes during the two world wars deepened the class division and accelerated the conflict between the capitalists and workers.4 The division 1

For the discussion of numerical strength of various Chinese dialect groups in early and more recent day Singapore, see Siah U Chin (1848). General sketch of the numbers, tribes and avocations of the Chinese in Singapore. In Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, 2, pp. 283–289; Cheng Lim-keak (1985). Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore: A SocioEconomic Geography with Special Reference to Bang Structure, pp. 13–23. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 2 For discussion of this population profile in Canada, see Edgar Wickber, Harry Con, Con RJ, Graham Johnson and Willmott WE (1982). From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada, pp. 7–9. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. For predominant Cantonese migration to America in early period, see Coolidge, MR (1968). Chinese Immigration. Taipei, reprint, Gunther Barth (1964). Bitter Strength: A History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850–1870, especially pp. 50–71. Cambridge: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. Lyman, SM (1974). Chinese Americans, pp. 4–7. New York: Random House. For predominant Cantonese immigrants from See Yap (the Four Counties) of Guangdong province to Australia in the 19th century, see C. F. Yong (1977). The New Gold Mountain: The Chinese in Australia, 1901–1921, pp. 1–8. Adelaide: Raphael Arts Pty. Ltd. 3 For discussion of class relations and class conflict in the 19th and early 20th century Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 149–154. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 4 For organized strikes of Chinese workers in British Malaya in the 1930s, see Stenson MR (1970). Industrial Conflict in Malaya: Prelude to the Communist Revolt of 1948, pp. 15–19. London: Oxford University Press.

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between local-born and China-born Chinese was the natural result of the growth of Ethnic Chinese communities. As time passed and the Chinese communities expanded, the number of local-born Chinese increased substantially, and they were subjected to strong influence of local environment, culture, and education. Many of them lost the feeling for their ancestral homeland in China, and were indifferent to China’s politics and its future, and they had even lost respect for Chinese culture and education. On the contrary, the China-born Chinese still possessed a strong love for their homeland and tended to be identified with the Chinese cultural values and tradition. As a result, political and cultural divisions between the two groups became a major source of social conflict in the Ethnic Chinese communities. The division between the Babas (Straits-born Chinese) and the Chinaborn in Singapore and Malaysia,5 the division between the Peranakans and Totoks in Indonesia,6 and the division between the Mestizos and the China-born in the Philippines7 are some of these examples. These divisions, contradiction and conflict formed the internal forces that propelled the Ethnic Chinese communities to move forward. Together with the external forces, they drove the communities toward reform and change. Among the external forces, the impact of China politics was significant and it had important implications for the Ethnic Chinese communities. Since the rise of national consciousness in 1880s, Ethnic Chinese communities had been closely linked with the fate of 5

For a study on Straits Chinese (Baba) Society in Singapore and Malaysia, see Clammer, JR (1980). Straits Chinese Society: Studies in the Sociology of the Baba Communities of Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore: Singapore University Press. For studies of Baba culture and values, see Tan Chee-beng (1988). The Baba of Melaka: Culture and Identity of a Chinese Peranakan Community in Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publication; Png Poh-seng (1969). The Straits Chinese in Singapore: A case of local identity and socio-cultural accommodation. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 10(1), pp. 95–114. 6 For the division between the Peranakans and Totoks in the Indonesia in late 19th and early 20th century Indonesia, see Williams, LE (1960). Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916, pp. 10–16. Glencoe: Illinois, The Free Press. 7 For the study of the Chinese Mestizos in the Phillippines, see Edgar, Wickberg (1964). The Chinese Mestizo in Phillipine history. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 5(March), pp. 62–100.

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modern China. The abortive Reform movement led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, the Revolutionary movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen, the fall of the Qing dynasty and the founding of the Republic in early 1912, the dictatorship of Yuan Shikai, and the degeneration of China into warlord politics in the 1920s and 1930s, all had profound and lasting impact on the Ethnic Chinese communities.8 At the same time, the rise of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and a series of patriotic anti-Japanese Movements had also aroused unprecedented nationalist response from the Ethnic Chinese.9 Apart from China’s influence, the local governments’ attitude and policies toward Ethnic Chinese had even greater impact on the communities. In the 1930s, the restrictions on Chinese immigration imposed by the government of the Straits Settlements had profound impact on the local Chinese communities, while similar restrictive policies on Chinese immigration and education pursued by Thai, Dutch, and Spanish governments posed great challenges to the local Chinese communities. They forced the communities to change, adjust, and adapt to the new political, economic, and cultural environments. In addition, the Ethnic Chinese communities were also affected by global trends. The founding of the first Chinese girls’ school in Singapore in the late 19th century was influenced by the world trend 8

For the impact of Reformist and Revolutionary activities led by Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen, respectively in the United States and Canada, see Armentrout Ma LE (1990). Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatown: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. For the impact of Chinese Reformist and Revolutionary activities in Singapore and Malaya in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, see Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. 9 For the studies of anti-Japanese movements among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially those in Singapore and Malaya, see Yoji Akashi (1968). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and Boycott movement, 1908–1928 — A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. Journal of South Seas Society, 23(1&2), pp. 69–96; Yoji Akashi (1970). The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941. The University of Kansas Press; Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese to the Tsinan incident, 1928. Journal of South Seas Society, 43(1&2), pp. 1–22; Pang Wing Seng (1973). The double-seventh incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese response to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), 4(2), pp. 278–279.

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that gave women equal rights and opportunities. At the same time, the spread of the idea of human rights and later its incorporation into the United Nations’ charter in the post-war era encouraged many Ethnic Chinese to fight for their basic rights in their residing countries, and this had direct implications for the change of immigration policies in the United States and Canada. The process of social change in the Ethnic Chinese communities can be divided into three major periods: the period of Ming and Qing dynasties, the period between two world wars, and the period after World War II. This periodization is based on the changes in China and global politics and economics, as well as the fundamental changes within the Ethnic Chinese communities. The Ming and Qing period saw the formation and initial development of the Ethnic Chinese communities; the period between the two world wars saw economic and social changes resulting from intense impact of external forces; while the post-war period was a stage when the Ethnic Chinese communities received widespread and profound impact that led to rapid changes and growth.

Social Change during the Ming Qing Period During the Ming Qing period, the Ethnic Chinese began to form viable communities with continuous supply of new immigrants from China. Although the majority of them were illegal immigrants, they continued to spread to Southeast Asia, North America, Central and South Americas, and Australia. This wave of Chinese emigration was the result of the breaking up of the Chinese feudal system, increasing pressure on China by the Western and Japanese imperialists, and the collapse of the rural economy in the southern part of China. Millions of unemployed peasants from Fujian and Guangdong sought economic opportunities overseas.10 At the same time, economic developments

10

See Ta Chen (1967). Chinese Migrations, With Special Reference to Labor Conditions, pp. 5–11. Taipei: Ch’eng Wen Publishing Company, reprint; Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 32–36. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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in Southeast Asia and Americas required cheap labor that helped to sustain the boom,11 and the hardworking Chinese laborers met the needs of the time. Most of the Chinese immigrants during this time were indentured laborers, and many of them were lured by attractive economic gains, and were prepared to work overseas for a short period. The majority of them were young and unmarried with a desire to return to their homeland with wealth. Their stay overseas was temporary and short-term, and thus led to the instability and high degree of fluidity in the Chinese communities. The Ming Qing Ethnic Chinese communities were plagued by social division and social conflict. After having settled in foreign lands, Chinese immigrants tended to organize themselves into associations along dialect and kinship lines, and they formed the dialect-based huiquans (associations) and kinship-based clan associations (zong qin hui), and trade-based bodies (hang hui). All of these organizations carried strong dialect and regional characters, and their prime objective was to protect the interests of their members. As a result, many of these organizations were in a constant state of rivalry and conflict.12 In Southeast Asia where the numerical strength of various Chinese dialect and kinship groups was more evenly spread, they were more often placed on a collision course. In the United States, Canada, and Australia where one dialect group achieved dominant position, the rivalry and conflict appeared to be less obvious. The lack of solidarity and cohesion affected the development and growth of the Ethnic Chinese communities, and weakened their ability to cope with challenges from external forces. The rise of large-scale anti-Chinese movements and the governments’ restrictive immigration policies against 11 For economic changes in Southeast Asia between 1830 and 1920, see Brown, I (1997). Economic Change in Southeast Asia, c.1830–1980, pp. 15–45. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press. For tin mining and plantation development in the 19th century and early 20th century Malaya, see Wong Lin-ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press; Jackson JC (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. 12 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press; Lee Poh-ping (1978). Chinese Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore. Kuala Lumpur and New York: Oxford University Press.

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the Chinese in the United States, Canada, and Australia at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries crippled the local Chinese communities,13 and this victimization of the Chinese was partly due to their inability to band together so as to organize an effective response. The Ethnic Chinese during the Ming Qing period were conservative, with a strong feudalistic outlook. The newspapers and magazines they had published were mainly aimed at spreading Confucian ideas and values. The Confucian revival movement that arose at the end of the 19th century in Southeast Asia, though had some progressive ideas, was a conservative force in the communities.14 The social change in the Ethnic Chinese communities during the Ming Qing period was slow but had some positive aspects. In the later phase of this period, the Reformist movement led by Kang Youwei and the Revolutionary movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen had a profound impact on the communities. The Reformists, with their published newspapers and magazines, spread reform ideas, while Sun Yat-sen and his supporters disseminated ideas of freedom, equality, and democracy through their propaganda networks.15 As a result of the impact of these China-oriented political activities, the Ethnic Chinese communities became more united and democratized, and their relationship with China was strengthened. Toward the end of the Ming Qing period, the Ethnic Chinese communities experienced a major shock as a result of the 1911 Revolution and the overthrow of the Qing government in February 13

For anti-Chinese movements in the United States, see Saxton, A (1971). The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press. For Western governments’ restrictive immigration policies against the Chinese in North America and Australia, see Price, CA (1974). The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australia, 1836–1888. Canberra: The Australian Institute of International Affairs & Australian National University Press; McKee, DL (1977). Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906: Clashes Over China Policy in the Roosevelt Era. Detroit: Wayne State University Press; and Peter S Li (1988). The Chinese in Canada, pp. 23–40. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 14 See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Confucian revival movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7(1) 35–57. Singapore. 15 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 145–291.

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1912. The founding of the Chinese Republic marked the beginning of a new chapter in modern Chinese history, and it was also a landmark of social change in the Ethnic Chinese communities. Obviously, the fall of the Qing dynasty weakened the conservative force in the communities, and it was replaced by a new political force revolving around Guomindang (Kuomintang, The Nationalist Party) and their supporters. This new force was to change the political and social outlooks of the Ethnic Chinese.16 Since the 1911 Revolution, many of the Ethnic Chinese cut off their queues that were a symbol of Manchu enslavement of the Han Chinese. Further, the cutting of the queue was also taken as a determination of the Ethnic Chinese to move toward a more civilized society. During the late Qing period, the queue grown by the Ethnic Chinese became an object of derision by Westerners who regarded it unhygienic and ugly. The removal of the queue showed that the Ethnic Chinese were prepared to adopt Western standards of hygiene and desired to be treated as civilized people. In the United States, Canada, and Australia where the Whites predominated, the speed of Westernization among the Ethnic Chinese was even faster.

Social Change in the Period Between the Two World Wars The Ethnic Chinese communities were in a state of rapid social change resulting from both global and China’s political situations. The economic recovery of post-World War I, the world economic Depression between 1929 and 1934, together with the spread of new ideas, had a profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese communities worldwide. At the same time, the communities were also affected by China’s political instability, economic decline, rural poverty, imported new ideas, and the all-out aggression by the Japanese imperialists. 16

For Guomindant (Kuomintang) activities in Singapore and Malaya and their impact on the Chinese communities, see Yong Ching-fatt and McKenn, RB (1990). The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949. Singapore: Singapore University Press; Png Poh-seng (1961). The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912–1949. Journal of Southeast Asian History, 2(1) 1–32. (Singapore),

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Under the impact of these forces, the Ethnic Chinese communities, especially those in Southeast Asia, showed signs of rapid social change. Although the two world wars had resolved the internal contradictions within the global capitalist system, the solution was shortterm and temporary. The cycles of economic crisis in the capitalist system continued to surface. Several important changes were experienced by the Ethnic Chinese, particularly those who resided in Southeast Asia.

The emergence of Ethnic Chinese industry and the rise of Ethnic Chinese capitalists The global economy recovered rapidly after the first World War. The short-term recovery between 1919 and 1920, together with longterm recovery between 1925 and 1927 provided excellent economic opportunities for the Ethnic Chinese. The large-scale demand for commodities enabled the Southeast Asian Chinese to participate in the production and supply of these commodities, such as rice from Thailand, Vietnam and Burma, rubber and pineapple from British Malaya, and rubber and sugar from Dutch East Indies.17 Some of the far-sighted Ethnic Chinese capitalists grasped this opportunity to effect the control of production and supply of these commodities that brought them huge profit. At the same time, modern Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs also took advantage of this golden opportunity to produce value-added manufacturing products for regional and overseas markets. The famous Ethnic Chinese entrepreneur from Singapore, Tan Kah-kee, was known for his rubber manufacturing and pineapple canning products.18 These new entrepreneurs were different from their counterparts in the late 19th century. Most of 17

For the expansion of Chinese economic activities in the 1920s and 1930s in Southeast Asia, see Guo Liang (1998). Dongnanya Huaqiao Huaren jingji jianshi (A Concise Economic History of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 101–111. Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe. 18 See Tan Kah-kee (Chen Jiageng) (1993). Nanqiao huiyi lu (The Reminiscence of My Days in Southeast Asia) (Autobiography), Vol. 2, p. 504. Singapore: Tan Kah Kee International Society and Tan Kah Kee Foundation, reprint; Yong Ching-fatt (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, pp. 56–58. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press.

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them possessed modern knowledge of doing business, with targeted world markets for their products. Their business outlook differed from that of traditional Chinese who over-emphasized kinship and dialect ties, and they were prepared to integrate Western practice into their recruitment and promotion systems. The rubber magnate of Singapore and Malaysia, Lee Kong Chian (Li Guanqian) and the famous sugar king of Southeast Asia, Oei Tiong Ham (Huang Zhonghan) are two good examples of these modern Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs.19

Economic volatility Economic volatility of the Ethnic Chinese communities was connected with the ebb and flow of the global economy and the nature of the colonial economic system. Ethnic Chinese economy was part of the global capitalist economy, especially in Southeast Asia where the Chinese economy was a crucial part of the Western colonial economic structure. During this period, the main characteristic of the colonial economy was “export orientation” whereby the colonial governments encouraged export of commodities to meet the growing demand in the international markets. For geographical and climatic reasons, most Southeast Asian colonies depended solely on one or two export commodities, such as rice from Thailand, Vietnam and Burma, rubber and tin from British Malaya, and rubber and sugar 19

For the study of Lee Kong Chian’s modern method of management, see Lim How Seng (Lin Xiaosheng) (1995). Li Guangqian de qiye wangguo (The Business Empire of Lee Kong Chian). In Xinjiapo huashe yu huashang (Singapore Chinese Community and Entrepreneurs), pp. 205–217. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. For studies of Oei Tiong Ham’s building of a diversified business empire and his new management style, see Panglaykim J and Palmer I (1970). Study of entrepreneurship in developing countries: The development of one Chinese concern in Indonesia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(1) (Singapore), 85–95; Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), (1989). Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia. Kyoto: The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University. Zhou Nanjing (1995). Lun Huang Zhonghan caituan de xingshuai. (On the rise and fall of the Oei Tiong Ham concern). In Fengyu tongzhou: Dongnanya yu huaren wenti (In the Same Boat through the Storm: Southeast Asia and Overseas Chinese), pp. 525–538. Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao chuban gongsi.

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from Dutch East Indies. As these colonies had no control over the price of their products, frequent fluctuation of prices in the international markets had a profound impact on their economies. Being an integral part of the Southeast Asian economy, the Ethnic Chinese economy displayed a high degree of volatility. For instance, the short-term prosperity during the post-World War I period produced a roller-coaster effect in prices. At the beginning of 1920, a pound of rubber sold in British Malaya was $1.15, but the price tumbled to $0.30 a pound. This violent fluctuation of rubber prices had serious implications for the Ethnic Chinese capitalists. In 1925 when the world economy boomed, the famous Chinese capitalist Tan Kah-kee had made $8,000,000 for that year, most of which came from the sale of rubber and rubber-manufactured products. But his fortune took a sharp turn in 1934 when his business empire collapsed and he went into bankruptcy.20

The struggle between the Left and the Right in the Ethnic Chinese communities During this period, the political life in the Ethnic Chinese communities partly reflected the fluctuation of political struggle in China. The years before and after the Communist–Nationalist split (1926–1927) saw a small group of leftists taking refuge in the Ethnic Chinese communities in British Malaya, and they infiltrated educational and cultural and institutions such as schools, newspapers, and trade unions. Their arrival led to an increased struggle between pro-Communist leftists and pro-Nationalist conservatives.21 Further, economic crises as a result of fluctuation of commodity prices and the impact of the World Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s intensified this struggle. Many workers under the influence of the left carried out strikes to maintain their living standards.22

20

See Tan Kah-kee (Chen Jiageng). op.cit., pp. 505–511; Yong Ching-fatt, op.cit., pp. 64–70. See Yong and McKenna (1990). op. cit, pp. 85–98; Yong Ching-fatt (1997). The Origins of Malayan Communism. pp. 65–78. Singapore: South Seas Society. 22 See Stenson, op.cit., pp. 13–19. 21

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The development of Ethnic Chinese (Overseas Chinese) nationalism Ethnic Chinese nationalism originated in the 19th century, but peaked in the decade leading to the 1911 Revolution. It developed rapidly during the period between the two world wars, and reached its zenith between 1937 and 1941. The onset of this climax was the Japanese all-out aggression in China. Facing the serious prospect of the fall of China as a nation and subjugation of Han Chinese as a race, the Ethnic Chinese with their traditional concerns for the welfare of their compatriots in their homeland organized large-scale antiJapanese and pro-China movements worldwide.23 From the onset of the First World War in 1914 to the closure of the Second World War in 1945, the patriotic actions of the Ethnic Chinese were closely tied with modern Chinese politics. A series of anti-Japanese movements in response to Japanese encroachments in China in 1915, 1919, 1928, and 1931 were carried out in the Ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, and they aroused strong anti-Japanese sentiment displayed in mass meetings, demonstrations, boycotting and burning of Japanese goods.24 Anti-Japanese activity climaxed in 1937 as the Japanese imperialists launched their all-out attack on China at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7. The Southeast Asian Chinese under the leadership of Tan Kah-kee, raised huge sums of money in support of China’s war of resistance against the Japanese. Similar patriotic actions were also taken by the Ethnic Chinese in North America and Europe.25 23

See Stephen Leong Mun-yoon (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD dissertation, pp. 249–338. University of California, Los Angeles; Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Overseas Chinese and the second Sino-Japanese war, 1937–1945. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 371–387. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 24 See Yoji Akashi (1968). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and boycott movement, 1908–1928 — A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. Journal of South Seas Society, 23(1 and 2), 69–96; Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan incident, 1928. Journal of the South Seas Society, .43(1 and 2), 1–22. 25 See Yen Ching-hwang (2002), The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 373–374, 380–381; Pang Wing Seng (1973). The Double-Seventh Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese response to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), 4(2), pp. 278–279.

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The development of education and culture Chinese education was the backbone of the Ethnic Chinese communities. Without it, Chinese culture would not have taken root overseas and the communities would have lost their Chinese identity. The establishment of modern primary schools overseas during the late Qing period laid a solid foundation for the development of modern Chinese education in the communities.26 During the period of the two world wars, Chinese education achieved notable development in Southeast Asia. Although Chinese education suffered setbacks in Thailand and Philippines, it had remarkable gains in British Malaya. Most of the secondary Chinese schools in the region, such as the Overseas Chinese High School, the Chong Cheng High School and the Nanyang Girls High School in Singapore, the Confucian High School, and the Kuen Cheng Girls’ High School in Kuala Lumpur, and the Chung Ling High School and Han Jiang High School in Penang, were established during this period. This meant that Chinese education in British Malaya had already successfully developed into a viable educational system in the region.27 This development paved the way for the founding of the Nanyang University in Singapore in the early 1950s that completed the Chinese education system from the primary to the university level.28 The main reason for the rapid development of the modern Chinese education was the growing awareness of the importance of modern knowledge and education. Far-sighted Ethnic Chinese leaders such as Tan Kah-kee appealed strongly to the community for sup26

See Yen Ching-hwang (2003). Hokkien immigrant society and modern Chinese education in British Malaya, 1904–1941. In Migrant Abroad: Cultural, Educational and Social Dimensions of the Chinese Dispora, Charney MW, Yeoh BSA and Tong Chee-kiong (eds.), pp. 114–118. Singapore: Singapore University Press and World Scientific. 27 See Tay Lian Soo and Gwee Yee Hean (1975). Malaixiya Xinjiapo huawen zhongxue tekan tiyao fu xiaoshi (Chinese High School Souvenir Magazines of Malaysia and Singapore, With School Histories), pp. 9–10. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Chinese Studies, University of Malaya. 28 For a recent work on the founding of Nanyang University and its early struggle for development, see Lee Leong Sze’s (2004) work in Chinese entitled Tan Lark Sye and Nanyang University: The hardship in establishing Chinese education, 1950–1964. Unpublished PhD thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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port for establishing Chinese high schools29; at the same time, the Chinese government also realized the importance of Chinese education for the development of Ethnic Chinese communities, and it provided assistance in teacher-training and textbooks. With the development of modern Chinese education, Chinese culture spread rapidly and widely. As a result of the proliferation of literacy among the Chinese, the number of Chinese newspapers and magazines increased, and the literary works reflecting the lives of Ethnic Chinese also appeared in Chinese newspapers and magazines. Other Chinese cultural forms such as drama, dance, and music also received boosta. Community cultural activities such as concerts and fund-raising drama performances had popularly been promoted by schools and recreational bodies.

The spread of new ideas During this period, the Ethnic Chinese communities were exposed to the new ideas imported both from China and the West. The May Fourth Movement of 1919 that marked the beginning of a mighty intellectual and cultural movement in China had a profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese communities.30 Its anti-imperialist and anti-feudal undercurrent greatly influenced the outlook of the Ethnic Chinese intellectuals. The rise of women movements in China in the 1920s and 1930s pounded the Ethnic Chinese communities and made the Ethnic Chinese more susceptible to the new idea of gender equality. At the 29

In a speech at the fund-raising meeting in Singpore in June 1918, Tan Kah Kee appealed strongly to his compatriots for support. His speech was full of patriotic and moralistic sentiment. For full text of the speech, see Guomin ribao (Citizens’ Daily), 18 and 20 June 1918; the text is reproduced in Yong Ching-fatt (ed.), (1980). Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun: shiliao yu fenxi (Tan Kah Kee in pre-war Singapore: Selected Documents and Analysis), pp. 25–28. Singapore: South Seas Society. 30 For the immediate impact of the May Fourth on the Chinese in British Malaya, see Chui Kueichiang, “Haixia zhimindi huaren dui wushi yundong de fanying (The response of the Straits Chinese to the May Fourth Movement). Journal of the South Seas Society, 20(1 and 2), 13–18. For the impact of the May Fourth movement on Malayan Chinese literature, see Fang Xiu (1962). Mahua xinwenxue shigao (A History of New Literature of the Chinese in Malaya), Vol. 1, p. 2. Singapore: Shijie shuju.

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same time, books and magazines propagating new ideas had been imported from China and circulated among Ethnic Chinese intellectuals and high school students. The impact of new ideas can be detected from the change of community attitude toward women and youth. In traditional Chinese society, women had the lowest social status, and were mostly confined to the family home in which they lived. This traditional attitude toward women was transferred from China to the Ethnic Chinese communities through immigration. However, there was a breakthrough in women education in the late 19th century. The first Chinese girls’ school was established in Singapore in 1899, which signified the initial recognition of the importance of women education.31 During the period of the two world wars, as a result of the May Fourth and the women movements, many primary and secondary girls’ schools were established in the communities. This increased the opportunity for girls to receive modern education, but their career prospect was still restricted. The only respectable career open to women was teaching, but the number was limited. With the rise of women education and the lifting of women’s social status, the relationship between the male and female was no longer mysterious, and it even received public discussion in the media. Ethnic Chinese newspapers had set up special columns for discourse on the issues of marriage, male–female relationships, and women’s status in society.32 These discourses influenced the outlook of the Ethnic Chinese and changed their attitude toward women’s role in the family and society. The youth and the women were the two most oppressed groups in traditional Chinese society. This was of no exception in the Ethnic 31 The Singapore Chinese Girls School was founded by Dr Lim Boon Keng and Mr. Khoo Seok Wan as a part of a reform movement among the Chinese in the colony. See Lee Guan-kin (1990), Lin Wenqing de sixiang: zhongxi wenhua de huiliu yu maodun (The Thought of Lim Boon Keng: Convergency and Contradiction between Chinese and Western Cultures), p. 66. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies; Song Ong-siang (1967). One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, pp. 101 and 197. Singapore: University of Malaya Press. 32 Topics on women such as “ Cultivation of a modern female”, “the dilemma of a modern woman: between career and family”, “the posture of a modern woman”, “how to be a modern woman”, “how to get rid of the yoke of marriage imposed on women”, “a career guide for women,” and “advice to women on health” were discussed in a leading Chinese newspaper. See Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), June to November 1934.

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Chinese communities, but the May Fourth movement inspired the Ethnic Chinese youth to be proactive. Further, they were aroused by the burgeoning nationalism that led them to participate fervently in anti-Japanese demonstrations, boycotts, and fund-raising activities.33 Their active participation in the political and cultural movements not only improved their image, but also enhanced their social status, and altered their image and role in the society.

Rapid Social Change during the Post-World War II Era The Ethnic Chinese communities in the post-World War II era experienced the most rapid social change. This was brought about by the following factors. First, post-war Southeast Asia was in a state of drastic transformation. The pre-war colonial political system was destroyed during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945). The indigenous nationalism that emerged as a new political force was unleashed during the Occupation, and it was partly nurtured by the Japanese for political purpose.34 Second, the Ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia suffered the scourge of the repressive Japanese who cruelly punished the Chinese for their anti-Japanese stance and their staunch support for China’s resistance to the Japanese aggression. Many of the educated Ethnic Chinese were murdered by the Japanese, and the Chinese communities suffered an unprecedented loss of talents.35 Third, 33

For instance, many students of Chinese schools and alumni in Singapore and Malaya responded fervently to the boycotting of Japanese goods as part of Chinese response to the Tsinan Incident, 1928 during which a massacre of Chinese took place in Tsinan city, Shandong province by the Japanese army. See Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese to the Tsinan Incident, 1928. Journal of South Seas Society, 43 (1, 2), p. 6. 34 See Cheah Boon-keng (1983). Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941–1946, pp. 41–45, 101–123. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 35 For the Japanese policy toward the Malayan Chinese during the Japanese occupation, see Yoji Akashi (1970). Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941–1945. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(2), 61–89. For the massacres of the Chinese in British Malaya, see several accounts of the massacres in Penang, Johore and Singapore in Hsu Yun-ts’iao and Chua Serkoon (eds.) (1984). Xin Ma huaren kang Ri shiliao, 1937–1945 (Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1937–1945: Selected Source Materials), pp. 430–438. 504–516, 588–602. Singapore: Cultural and Historical Publishing House Pte. Ltd.

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the sudden retreat of Western colonial power from Southeast Asia caught the Ethnic Chinese communities unprepared, and they needed more time to adjust and adapt to the new political and economic environments. Fourth, the surge of Ethnic Chinese nationalism during the period of two world wars blurred their identity and many of them were confused about their loyalty and belonging. Moreover, the deepening struggle between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist forces split the Ethnic Chinese communities,36 the result of which was their inability to cope with rapid political and economic changes. Fifth, the victory of Communism on the mainland, and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan had profound impact on the Ethnic Chinese. The combination of the above factors led to the rapid social change in the Ethnic Chinese communities.

The relationship between Ethnic Chinese and China was weakened Ethnic Chinese communities developed a very close relationship with China since the late 19th century, and the cordial relationship reached its peak prior to the Second World War. At that time, most Ethnic Chinese considered themselves as Huaqiao (Overseas Chinese) and regarded their residence overseas as temporary, and their loyalty to China was natural and unquestionable. Post-war Southeast Asia saw the surge of indigenous nationalism and the emergence of newly independent states that created a dilemma for the Ethnic Chinese who had to make a choice between China and the new nations they resided in. When the majority of them chose to be the citizens of Southeast Asian countries and pledged their loyalty to these new nations,37 their relationship with China was naturally weakened. Further, the establishment of the Communist regime in Beijing in October 1949 caused a hostile response from some Southeast Asian countries that still retained 36

For the impact of the split between the pro-Communist and pro-Kuomintang elements in the Chinese society in British Malaya, see Chui Kuei-chiang (1989). Xin Ma huaren guojia rentong de zhuanbian, 1945–1959 (The Change of National Identity of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1959), pp. 98–152. Xiamen: Xiamen University Press. 37 For the change of this identity among the Malayan Chinese, see ibid, pp. 328–362.

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their diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government in Taiwan, and the emigration from mainland was abruptly stopped. Those Ethnic Chinese from Southest Asia who wished to visit their hometowns or wished to study in China were forbidden to do so.

The deepening political struggle between pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist elements The political struggle between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) in China was intensified soon after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, and their continuous military clashes led to the all-out civil war in the late 1946.38 The political turmoil in China unfortunately divided the Ethnic Chinese communities into pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist camps. The KMT overseas branches, together with their front organizations, supported the Western colonial governments in suppressing the local Communists. However, the popularity of the Nationalist government among the Ethnic Chinese declined due to its high-handed approach in dealing with the CCP in China; while the pro-communist elements among the Ethnic Chinese including workers, intellectuals, merchants as well as the supporters of the Democratic Party of China, were mobilized to oppose the KMT government’s suppression of the left and advocated the formation of an alliance government in China. Both pro-Communist and pro-Nationalist camps confronted each other in heated debates in the media, in the movements in collecting signatures for public appeals, and in violent demonstrations. The victory of Communism in China further deepened the division between these two camps in the Ethnic Chinese communities.

Lifting the political consciousness among Ethnic Chinese Political consciousness among Ethnic Chinese was generally heightened after the Second World War. In Southeast Asia, many of the 38

For an excellent study of the political conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists during China’s civil war, see Suzanne Pepper (1980). Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–1949. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University Press, paperback.

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local-born Chinese became proactive in local politics as a result of their awareness of the retreat of the colonial powers, the surge of indigenous nationalism, and the planning of their own future in the region. In February 1949, under the leadership of Tan Cheng Lock — a prominent Malacca Chinese leader — the Straits Chinese found the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).39 It was instrumental in getting the Malayan Chinese to participate in local politics that made significant contribution in promoting political consciousness among Southeast Asian Chinese. Ethnic Chinese participation in local politics also occurred in Indonesia and the Philippines. In North America, the increase of Chinese population and the lifting of education standards led the Chinese to realize the importance of their rights. The promulgation of the United Nation’s charter in December 1948 that contained human rights clause stimulated the Chinese in the United States and Canada to fight for their rights.

Development of Ethnic Chinese local identity The development of Ethnic Chinese local identity was mainly stimulated by external factors. The surge of indigenous nationalism and the birth of the newly independent states in Southeast Asia brought immense pressure on the Ethnic Chinese who were confronted with problems such as: What should be their correct attitude in dealing with indigenous nationalism; what would be their role in the newly independent states; and how would they safeguard Chinese education and Chinese culture? All of these problems could only be resolved when they become citizens of these nations. In addition to the drastic political change taking place in Southeast Asia, the monumental change in China politics also created problems for many of them who were prepared to defy local bans in visiting their relatives in China. This helped them to change their future direction and to be identified more with the resident countries. 39

For an excellent study of MCA, see Heng Pek-koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press.

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The trend of Ethnic Chinese economy toward diversification and corporatization Although the Ethnic Chinese economy underwent substantial changes in the period between the two world wars, its fragility and vulnerability were apparent. Some of the far-sighted Chinese capitalists had called upon the Chinese to change their traditional business practice that was based on small-scale family ownership and management.40 The Ethnic Chinese were urged to follow the global trend of organizing large-scale modern enterprises and adopted the strategy of diversification. They were to abandon traditional family business practice, to break the dialect and regional barriers, and to organize themselves into large corporations. But, there were problems that needed to be resolved: problems of how to combine Ethnic Chinese capital to achieve a common economic goal, how to effectively utilize Ethnic Chinese talents, and how to apply Western management knowledge to Chinese business. However, the convergence of dialect and kinship organizations during the post-war period provided favorable conditions to help resolve these problems.

The trend toward localization of Ethnic Chinese education and culture The involvement in local politics and the development of local identity led to the trend of localization of Ethnic Chinese education and culture. Before the Second World War, the Ethnic Chinese education was an integral part of China’s education system, and the Ethnic Chinese schools were the replicas of China’s educational institutions. All the textbooks and teaching materials were imported directly from China, and the knowledge transmitted was predominantly Chinaoriented. Following the birth of the newly independent nations in 40

See for instance, the analysis of this problem made by the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Penang, Mr Koh Peng Deng (Xu Pingdeng) in May 1975. See Koh Pengdeng (1979). Malaixiya huaren jingji diwei de tantao (An investigation into the economic position of the Malaysian Chinese). In Ping Yan Ji, pp. 20–28. Penang: Xinda yinwu youxian gongsi.

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Southeast Asia, Ethnic Chinese education had slowly been localized. Textbooks were published locally with local content that focused on Southeast Asia. Loyalty and love were no longer directed toward China but to the new nations. In addition, newspapers and magazines also reflected this trend: more coverage were given to local events, and the news and reports on China gradually dwindled. Chinese literature, drama, poetry, and music were also localized, reflecting the lives and problems of the Ethnic Chinese communities.41 The localization enabled Chinese education and culture to form an important part of the education system and culture of the new states.

The Future Trends Having examined the historical process that the Ethnic Chinese communities had gone through, it is fitting to list several future trends as follows: (a) Ethnic Chinese communities have already been transformed into an integral part of local societies, and they are subjected more to the influence of the political, economic, cultural, and educational policies of the countries they adopted. (b) The weakening of the relationship between Ethnic Chinese communities and China or Taiwan. As the number of Overseas Chinese (those who identified with China or Taiwan) declined, the number of Ethnic Chinese (those who identified with the countries they adopted) increased; the communities underwent a process of transformation from the identity of “Overseas Chinese” (huaqiao) to the identity of “Ethnic Chinese” (haiwai huaren).42 However, the Ethnic Chinese will still strengthen their 41

See for instance, various articles on Malaysian Chinese culture presented at the forum on “Development and Prospect of Malaysian Chinese Culture” held on 20–21 March 1993 in Kuala Lumpur, in Wenhua shinian (Ten Years of Malaysian Chinese Culture), Fu Sunzhong and Nai Guanfu (eds.), Kuala Lumpur: Malaixiya Zhonghua dahuitang lianhehui chuban. 42 For a discussion of the concept of Ethnic Chinese and their new identities in Southeast Asian independent countries, see Suryadinata, L (ed.), (1997). Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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economic relations with China and Taiwan where they will play an important middlemen’s role, and will contribute to the success of China’s economic modernization. (c) The trend toward modernization of Ethnic Chinese communities. For the purpose of survival and development, the Ethnic Chinese communities will have to modernize themselves so as to strengthen their competitive capacity. This included the modernization of the economy, social structure, thinking, education, and culture. This modernization will enhance the influence of the Ethnic Chinese communities and enable them to play a significant role in the economic system of the new nations. In some Southeast Asian countries the economic power of the Ethnic Chinese have been restrained and shown signs of contraction, but this phenomenon is temporary. Many of the Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs in these countries have been striving to adapt to the new economic environment with their skills and flexible strategies. (d) The trend toward active participation of Ethnic Chinese in local politics will become more conspicuous. Apart from forming and joining political parties, Ethnic Chinese will also use other measures to fight for their rights, and will better use their economic and political resources for the survival and development of the Ethnic Chinese communities. (e) The weakening of traditional Chinese culture and values. As a result of modernization, many traditional Chinese values have been questioned and abandoned. Traditional social organizations such as clan associations and huiguans have to change their functions to suit the new social environment and needs.43 At the same time, traditional values such as xiao (filial piety) and kinship ties have been weakened.

43

For instance, the Gan Clan Association of Singapore had changed its functions to suit the new social environment and needs. See Yen Ching-hwang (2005). Kinship and organization: The history of the Gan (Yan or Yen) clansmen in Singapore and Malaysia (1850–1993). Asian Culture, No. 29, pp. 56–60, Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies.

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(f) Trend toward re-migration. As a result of growing pressure on the Ethnic Chinese communities in some Southeast Asian countries, there arose a trend toward re-migration from these countries to the Western developed countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that have achieved higher living standards. More and more Ethnic Chinese students have studied and settled in these countries. This trend will undermine the existing Ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, it will broaden the influence of Ethnic Chinese in economic and cultural arenas, and will help promote cultural interchange between the East and the West.

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Chapter 11

A Preliminary Study of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia (1842–1941)*

The Nature of Chinese Capitalism Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia was developed during unique historical stage when China’s doors were forced open by the West in 1842, a greater penetration of the West into Southeastern China, the loosening of China’s restrictive immigration policy and the emergence of Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific regions. It was more than a historical coincidence that substantial Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia took place after the mid-19th century and the Western economic penetration into the region deepened in the same period. In fact, it was the latter that created enormous economic opportunities that attracted the increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants to the region. China under the ailing Manchu regime reluctantly opened its doors after the infamous Opium War in 1842. The opening of five treaty ports along coastal China facilitated population movement to Southeast Asian region. Treaty agreements in 1860 obligated China to allow its nationals to work in the British and French colonies.1 Qing government’s reform of its immigration policy in 1893 created

*This chapter is based on an unpublished paper in English written in 2006. 1 See article V of the British Convention of Peking signed on 24 October 1860 (known as Treaty of Peking) between Prince Gong and Lord Elgin, and article IX of the French Convention signed in Peking on 25 October 1860, in Zhongwai tiaoyue huibian (A Collection of Treaties signed between China and Foreign Powers), pp. 12 and 88. (Taipei, Wen Hai chubanshe, 1964); William Frederick Mayers (ed.) (1966). Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, pp. 9, 74. London: Trubner & Co. Reprint, Ch’eng-wen Publishing Company, Taipei.

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a favorable environment under which a large-scale Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia was made possible.2 The lifting of the ban would have been less meaningful for our study if there had been no rapid economic development in Southeast Asia that served as a strong pulling force. The injection of Western capital into cash crop industry and tin mining generated enormous economic activities that demanded huge numbers of manual laborers.3 Chinese response to this new economic opportunity combined with the impact of removal of the immigration ban resulted in the first wave of Chinese immigrants to Southeast Asia. The creation of modern Chinese communities in Southeast Asia as result of the above development laid the foundation for the growth of Chinese capitalism in the region. Southeast Asian Chinese capitalism during this period under study was characterized mainly by a strong commercial capital. Chinese merchants had been active in major Southeast Asian ports since the 14th century.4 Western colonalization of the region after the 2

For analysis of factors leading to the change of Qing traditional restrictive immigration policy, see Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch’ing Period (1851–1911), pp. 249–266. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 3 For a study of involvement of Western capital in the plantation development in Malaya, see Jackson, J (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. For Western mining activities in Malaya, see Wong Lin-ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914: With Special Reference to the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 4 For general trading activities of the Chinese in Southeast Asia during and after the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), see Li Jinming (1990). Mingdai haiwai maoyi shi (A History of China’s Foreign Trade during the Ming Dynasty). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe; Chen Xiyu (1991), Zhongguo huanchuan yu haiwai maoyi (Chinese Junks and China’s Foreign Trade). Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe; Ng Chin-keong (1983). Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast, 1683–1735. Singapore: Singapore University Press; Reid A (1993). Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680, Vol. 2, Expansion and Crisis. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Cushman JW (1993). Fields From the Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam During the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University; Sarasin Viraphol (1977). Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652–1853. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Chuan Han-sheng (1981). Trade between China, the Philippines and the Americas during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Proceedings of the International Conference of Sinology: Section on History and Archaeology. Taipei: Academia Sinica; Tien Ju-k’ang (1982). Causes of the decline in China’s overseas trade between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. In Papers on Far Eastern History, No. 25, pp. 31–44. Canberra: Department of Far Eastern History, Australian National University.

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16th century subjugated them to a new economic system under which they were allocated the role of “commercial middlemen”. Without political and military backing of the home government, the Chinese was no match for the power of Western merchants, and had to satisfy themselves with the new role.5 It was under this colonial economic system that the Chinese commercial capital grew. The Chinese commercial capital was accumulated mainly through entrepot trade. The Chinese merchants, though subordinated to Western merchants, managed to grow their business in this profitable form of trade. With their internal supporting mechanism such as clan and dialect organizations, and regional business networks,6 they were able to carve out niches in trade. In competition with Western merchants for regional entrepot trade in Southeast and East Asia, they had For trading activities in Southeast Asia of a special ethnic Chinese group such as Hokkiens, see Wang Gungwu (1991). Merchants without Empire: The Hokkiens Sojourning Communities. In China and the Chinese Overseas Wang Gungwu pp. 79–101. Singapore: Times Academic Press. Ng Chin-keong, The Fukienese Maritime Trade in the Second Half of the Ming Period. In Nanyang University Journal, No. 5, p. 81–99. Singapore: Nanyang University; James Chin Kong (1998), Merchants and other Sojourners: The Hokkiens Overseas, 1570–1760. An unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hong Kong. 5 For the slow subjugation of the Chinese merchants in Java to the Dutch East India Company, see Meilink-Roelofsz MAP (1962). Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, especially chapter 10 “The United Company Monopoly and the Foreign Asian Merchants in Indonesia at the Beginning of the 17th Century” pp. 239–268; Blusse L (1986). Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia. Dordrecht, Holland: Foris Publications. Chap. 6 “The VOC and the Junk Trade to Batavia: A Problem in Administrative Control,” pp. 97–155; Chao Yung-ho(Cao Yonghe) (1986). Mingmo Huaren zai Zhaowa Wandan de huodong (The activities of the Chinese in Bantan, Java during the Late Ming period). In Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji (A Collection of Papers on Chinese Maritime History), Vol. 2 pp. 219–248. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan sanmin zhuyi yanjiusuo. 6 For business networks in Southeast and East Asia, see Yen Ching-hwang (2002). Ethnic Chinese business networks in East and Southeast Asia. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 23–50. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Hamilton G (ed.) (1991). Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong; Hamilton G (ed.) (1996). Asian Business Networks. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter; Chan Kwok Bun (ed.) (2000). Chinese Business Networks: State, Economy and Culture. Singapore: Prentice Hall, Pearson Education Asia Pte. Ltd; Menkhoff T and Solvay Gerke (eds.) (2002). Chinese Entrepreneurship and Asian Business Networks. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.

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certain advantages. First, China was the main producer of commodities such as silk and porcelain, which were in high demand in the region. Second, a widespread business network was well established among entrepots in Southeast and East Asia. Third, Chinese constituted the major part of the urban population in Southeast Asia that formed sizable consumer markets for both Chinese and Western goods. Without the protection of the Chinese home government and encountering ever-growing competition from Western merchants, the Chinese merchants moved from one place to another in Southeast Asia seeking the best advantage for their business, and they were adaptable and resilient in the quest for commercial profit. They sought the best possible business arrangements with the authorities of the new lands, and had to live by their wits, cultivate the fine art of risk-taking, and at times of crisis, they could only rely on the support of their relatives, clansmen, and fellow district folks.7 Some successful Chinese merchants built their business empires in the region, and tended to monopolize certain lines of business. The pool of Chinese merchants was continuously enlarged by absorbing newcomers who succeeded in breaking into old businesses, or starting new ones. The continuous infusion of merchants came mainly from new immigrants who were inspired to succeed in the new lands. Having experienced poverty as a result of overpopulation in China, and possessing a strong desire for fast economic advancement, most of the new immigrants were potential capitalists who were ever searching for commercial opportunity to fulfill their dreams of becoming wealthy. Trans-nationalism was another major characteristic of the Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia. Some scholars have taken modern Chinese transnationalism as “a recent global phenomenon with historical roots in premodern trade systems, European colonialism, and more recent American geopolitical domination of the Pacific”,8 but

7

See Wang Gungwu “Merchants without Empire: The Hokkiens Sojourning Communities. In China and the Chinese Overseas, p. 98. 8 See Nonini DM and Ong A (1997). Introduction: Chinese Transnationalism as an Alternative Modernity. In Ungrounded Empire: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, Aihwa Ong and Donald M. Nonini (eds.), p. 12. New York and London: Routledge.

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this “recent global phenomenon” has its long historical roots in the transnationalistic nature of the Chinese migration to Southeast Asia. Coming from different parts of Fujian and Guangdong, the Chinese immigrants spread throughout Southeast Asia. But geographical breadth did not greatly weaken the immigrants’ bonds, which were kept alive by resilient kinship and dialect ties. Business activities followed the footsteps of Chinese immigrants who set up business establishments first in the places where kinsmen and country folks abound. From this perspective, transnationalism was the basis for complex business networking for Chinese immigrants. Transnationalism was also made possible in the age of imperialism when the boundaries of Western empires were not clearly drawn. The movement of Chinese from one British colony such as British Malaya to another British colony such as Burma or Hong Kong was relatively easier than moving around among the independent states in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. Since the 17th century, European powers, principally the Netherlands, Britain, and France, were embroiled in rivalry and conflict as a result of their attempts to build their vast maritime empires in Southeast Asia. It was not until 1824 that Britain, and the Netherlands settled the spoils of the colonies in maritime Southeast Asia with a treaty. They drew a demarcation line along the Malacca Straits, and a British colony of Benkulen in the southwest of Sumatra exchanged for the Dutch colony of Malacca, which sealed the deal of the two confronting colonial empires.9 But the imperial boundaries did not deter the development of social and business relationships among the Chinese in the British and the Dutch colonies. Other characteristics of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia were its mobility, flexibility, and adaptability. Transnational trade in the region required a high degree of mobility as goods from China were shipped to Southeast Asia and distributed swiftly through regional business networks, and the Southeast Asian products were partly collected through the same networks in order to feed the lucrative 9 For Anglo-Dutch rivalry and confrontation and their final solution to the partition of political and economic interests in maritime Southeast Asia, see Tarling, N (1962). Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824. St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press.

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markets in China.10 To deal with various indigenous populations and to survive the fierce competition with Western merchants in Southeast Asia, early Chinese traders had to develop their flexible attitude and to adapt the changing political and economic environments in the region. A lack of this attitude would have proven to be fatal in their endeavors to build businesses in Southeast Asia.

Accumulation of the Chinese Capital Accumulation of capital by the Chinese traders was relatively easy and uncomplicated. They did not have to break the feudal yoke in society to accumulate wealth, and wealth in the form of liquid currency or property can be acquired unfettered when huge profit was extracted from lucrative business activities. Unlike Europe and Japan, this process was carried out smoothly without agonizing pain. In Europe, there was a close link between the disintegration of feudalism and the rise of capitalism . As pointed out by Maurice Dobb, “Capitalism as a mode of production did not grow to any stature unless the disintegration of feudalism reached an advanced stage.”11 In Japan, the capitalist mode of production grew out of agrarian change such as growth of rural markets, the development of agricultural technology, the transformation of labor, and the decline of cooperative agriculture.12 In the case of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, there was no clear link between indigenous feudalism and Chinese capitalism. Chinese mining activities in British Malaya and Dutch East Indies had some impact on the production of agricultural products that were 10

See Wang Gungwu (1958). The Nanhai trade: A study of the early history of Chinese trade in the South China Sea. An independent issue of Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 31, Pt. 2, Singapore; Wickberg E (1965). The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; Wong L K (1960). The trade of Singapore, 1819–69, An independent issue of Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 33, Pt. 4. Singapore; Chiang HD (1978). A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870–1915. Singapore: National Museum of Singapore. 11 See Dobb M (1963). Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p. 181, revised edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 12 See Smith TC (1965). The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan, pp. 67–156, reprint. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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mainly supplied to feed the growing Chinese mining population, but this kind of relationship had a marginal effect on the accumulation of Chinese capital. In other words, Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia grew not from the embryo of the indigenous feudal system, but from the Chinese communities which were reconstructed overseas by the Chinese immigrants, and the Chinese capital was accumulated in a slow process out of the domestic and the transnational trade in Southeast Asia. Capital, taken in a broadest sense of the word, includes a substantial sum of money, ownership of means of production, and stocks and shares in companies. Chinese capital accumulation in the period under study took three major forms: reinvestment, currency reserve, and real estate. The surplus capital earned can be reinvested into business operation for expansion, and it can be used as reserve with financial institutions for earning interest, or it can be used to acquire real estate (such as warehouses, go-downs, shops, and lands) to gain rentals and capital appreciation. Reinvestment was an effective way of capital accumulation favored by the Chinese capitalists. Since many Chinese capitalists were involved in domestic and transnational trade, the surplus capital can be ploughed back into trading activities by establishing more branches that would in return widen the networks of distribution and the reduction of the cost of purchase. The widening of market and the reduction of cost would improve company’s competitive edge and increase its market share. The reinvestment could also be used to diversify business operations. For a trading company, this surplus capital could be used to set up factories, shipping companies, and financial institutions such as banks. The story of Oei Tiong Ham Concern is a case in point. Oei Tiong Ham Concern was founded in Semarang, Java on 1st March 1863 by Oei Tjie Sien, a Chinese immigrant from Fujian province, China. It was first known as Kian Gwan (meaning the source of all welfare), a family-based trading company. It traded in Chinese goods and exported island products such as sugar and tobacco. When Oei Tiong Ham took over the running of the company from his father, he had a vision of making Kian Gwan a great modern transnational company. Using substantial surplus capital to finance his expansion

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programs and diversification, he built sugar mills to produce refined sugar for export and controlled substantial sugar markets in Southeast Asia. He expanded trading activities outside Southeast Asia by establishing branches in Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. He also set up Heap Eng Moh Steamship Company to ensure smooth movement of goods, and established his own bank named N.V. Bankvereniging Oei Tiong Ham to finance his business operation. His expansion and diversification strategies proved to be successful, and helped to establish a vast business empire in Southeast Asia, and Oei Tiong Ham was widely known among Chinese as the “Sugar King”.13 The reinvestment form of accumulation, though effective and favored by many Chinese capitalists as a strategy, could also be risky. The expansion of branches could lead to over-staffing and reduction of profit. At the time of economic contraction, this reinvestment strategy could lead to cash flow problem, and be fatal to the survival of the company. The second form of capital accumulation favored by the Chinese capitalists was the investment in real estate. The purchase of warehouses and go-downs was partly for the use of storing goods and partly for capital appreciation. When Chinese capitalists were involved in entrepot and transnational trade in East and Southeast Asia, the value of owning warehouses and go-downs was enormous. It freed the company from exorbitant rent demand, and reduced the cost of storage that would have a direct implication for goods to be sold. The acquisition of shops and land, particularly in the center of business district (CBD), was invaluable. The shops could be let out for collecting rentals, and land would appreciate over time. As most of the Chinese capitalists conducted their business in major ports and cities in Southeast Asia, the increase of population almost guaranteed 13 For a good analysis of the rise of Oei Tiong Ham Concern, see Panglaykim, J and Palmer, I (1970). Study of Entrepreneurialship in Developing Countries: The Development of One Chinese Concern in Indonesia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(1) 85–95. For more detailed history of Oei Tiong Ham Concern, see Yoshihara Kunio (1989). Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia. Kyoto: The Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University.

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a long-term growth of value and their investment became a productive form of capital accumulation. Of course, the surplus capital invested in real estate was less mobile, and would reap profit slower than reinvestment in expansion and diversification. However, this form of investment was less risky, and would place the company in a safer position in times of business contraction and economic crisis. The reserve fund as a form of capital accumulation was considered by many Chinese capitalists as conservative as the earning of interest might not cover the inflation. But it was a safety net for the capitalists who did not aim at rapid increase in wealth. It would help the company to tide over financial problems in times of turbulent political and economic change.

Structure of the Chinese Capital The Chinese capitalists The Chinese capital in Southeast Asia could not have been effectively accumulated without the Chinese capitalists and the use of institutions for their operations. Who were the Chinese capitalists? How were they transformed into capitalists? When did the Chinese capitalists as a class emerge? These are some of the important questions to be answered in this section. The Chinese capitalists had their agrarian origins in Southeast China, but no connections with the landlord-gentry class. Most of them were derived from poor peasant stock with little or no formal education, and they belonged to firstgeneration immigrants leaving China for economic advancement overseas. They made their millions in the new land primarily through their business acumen, hard work and entrepreneurship. A selection of six prominent Chinese capitalists during this period illustrates certain themes in the study of Chinese capitalism. These capitalists are Zhang Bishi (Chang Pi-shih) of Java and Penang, Loke Yew of Malaya, Khaw Soo Cheang of Thailand and Penang, Oei Tiong Ham of Java, Li Qingquan of the Philippines, and Tan Kah Kee of Singapore. Among the six, Zhang Bishi, Oei Tiong Ham, and Tan Kah Kee had their business empires built throughout Southeast Asia

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and Southeastern China, and they were widely known throughout Overseas Chinese communities in the world. Zhang Bishi was the best-known Chinese capitalist from Southeast Asia during the late Qing period. Michael R. Godley’s The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911 remains the best work in the study of Zhang’s career and his contribution to the modernization of late Qing China.14 Born in 1840 in a Hakka family in Dapu district, Guangdong province, Zhang migrated to Java in 1857 at the age of 18 as a free immigrant. Like many other free immigrants, he worked as an apprentice in a rice shop. Probably with the help of his father-in-law, he started his own business in Batavia by becoming a provisioner for the Dutch army and navy. After accumulating sufficient capital, he then founded the Yu He Company (Prosperity and Harmony), involving in the production of rice and copra. Taking advantage of Dutch expansion of plantations to northeastern Sumatra, Zhang, together with another Hakka businessman, Zhang Yunan (Zhang Yaoxian) founded the Li Wang Company in 1877 in Deli (modern Medan). The company was actively involved in the planting of coconuts, rubber, and coffee.15 Continuing acting as a supplier of provision to Dutch military and casting his eyes on the growing regional trade, Zhang in 1879 set up a steamship company. His first steamer, Rajah Kongsee Atjeh, flew the Dutch flag and made a good sum of profit, which convinced him to add another two steamers to his fleet. Then Zhang became keenly interested in the business potential on the other side of the Malacca Straits. He moved his base of business operation to Penang in 1886 by establishing Chop Ban Joo Hin (The Wan Yuxing Company, the name means ever prosperous and rising). Zhang, in 1886, obtained the pawn-broking monopoly in Penang, and in 1889, he went into a 14 See Godley, M (1981). The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 15 See Kuang Guoxiang (1958). Bing Cheng shanji (An Anedotal History of Penang), p. 104. Singapore: The World Book Store; Godley MR (1993). Thio Thiau Siat’s (Zhang Bishi) network. In The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia Butcher J and Dick H (eds.), p. 263. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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lucrative opium and spirits farming by joining the syndicates formed by Gan Ngoh Bee. Surprisingly he did not involve himself in tin mining in Malaya as many of the Chinese capitalists did at the time. However, Zhang used Penang as his Southeast Asian launching-pad for his business activities in south China by getting involved in construction of railways in Guangdong and wine making in Qingdao of Shandong province.16 The expansion of his business empire continued in the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya and he saw the need of modern financial institutions such as banks to smooth his operation. In 1907, in the same year as the founding of the Sze Hai Tong Banking (the second Chinese bank in Singapore), Zhang founded the Deli Bank by pooling the resources of well-known tax farmers on both sides of the Malacca Straits.17 Loke Yew was a well-known capitalist of Malaya in the seond half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Born in October 1846 in a poor Cantonese peasant family in He Shan district of Guangdong province, Loke, like many of his district folks, left China on the quest of wealth overseas at the age of 13 (1858). He arrived in Singapore and worked as an apprentice in a Cantonese-owned tobacco company, Lo Qisheng. With hard work and keen observation, he learned how to do business and saved some capital for starting his own business in 1862 in Market Street, Singapore. His shop was named Hing Loong Xing Long (which means prosperity and abundance) dealing with sundry goods. Although Singapore as an entrepot provided business opportunities for new immigrants, it was more competitive and harder to make money. Young and ambitious, Loke cast his eyes on lucrative tin mining in the Malay Peninsula. In 1869, he left Singapore for Larut, Perak which emerged as the center of the mining industry. He worked initially for a mining company and learned how to run a tin mine. After having accumulated sufficient amount of capital, he started his own mining company in Kamunting in early 1870s. 16

See Godley, MR (1973). Chang Pi-shih and Nanyang Chinese involvement in South China’s railroads, 1896–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, IV, 16–30; Godley MR (1975). The late Ch’ing Courtship of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Journal of Asian Studies, XXXIV, 361–385. 17 See Godley, MR, Thio Thiau Siat’s Network. op.cit., pp. 262–263.

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Throughout 1870s, Loke struggled against all odds because of the impact of the Second Larut War in 1872 that involved continued fighting between rival Chinese secret societies, as well as the impact of the downturn of tin prices. Loke’s tin-mining venture in Perak was not as successful as he hoped, but he had better luck in his tin mining and tax-farming activities in Selangor. Having recovered from the 1885 fire, Kuala Lumpur provided various opportunities for making money. Loke wisely allied with powerful local Chinese Kapitans such as Chiew Yoke (Chao Yu) and Yap Kwan Seng (Ye Guansheng) to advance his business. He bid and obtained several types of tax farms such as gambling, spirit, and pawnbroking in Klang and Selangor. In the 1890s, he acquired many mining lots in Ampang, Sungei Besi, Rasa, Rawang, and Serendah. At the peak of his mining activity in Selangor, he had 12,000 mining laborers under his control, and had extended his mining empire to Kuala Pilah (in Negri Sembilan), Muar (in Johore), and Sungei Siput. In addition to his mining and tax-farming activities, he was also involved in construction of roads and shops, and in plantations. In short, by the 1890s, Loke Yew already emerged as a well-respected business tycoon, and his transformation from a businessman to a wealthy capitalist was completed.18 Khaw Soo Cheang (Xu Shichang) of Penang and Southern Thailand was a Hokkien (Fujianese) born in the village of Xia Xia She, Long Xi district of Zhangzhou prefecture of Fujian Province in November 1797. With a humble family background, Soo Cheang and his older brother could have been members of a secret society, Small Dagger Society (Xiao Dao Hui), and fled to Penang after it was suppressed by the Qing authority in 1822. His rise from poverty to 18

See Song Ong-siang (1967). One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore, p. 540. Singapore: University of Malaya Press; Lee Kam Hing and Chow Mun Seong (1997). Biographical Dictionary of the Chinese in Malaysia, pp. 123–125. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications; Cao Yaofei (narrated) recorded by Liu Hunglue and Mei Yuchan, “Dr. Loke Yew” (Lu Yu boshi), in Malaiya Gugangzhou liuyi zonghui tekan (Souvenir Magazine of Pan-Malayan Gugangzhou Six Districts Associations) (Penang, Gugangzhou Liuyi Zonghui tekan weiyuanhui, 1964), Column of “Renwu” (Distinguished Persons) pp. 51–52; Mei Yuchan, “Gugangzhou Liuyi xianqiao zai Ma huodong shi” (A history of activities of the pioneers of the Gugangzhou six districts of Guangdong), in Malaiya Gugangzhou liuyi zonghui tekan, pp. 73–79.

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wealth and power typified the “rags to riches” story of struggling Chinese immigrants. Starting as a pedlar of fruits and vegetables, he became a fruit trader in his own right. With diligence and thrift, he accumulated some capital and invested in land, and then extended his business activities to Southern Thailand. In the early 1830s, Soo Cheang moved to settle in southern Thailand, probably in Takuapa, where he established a close relationship with Thao Thepsunthorn — the wife of a Thai high-ranking officer Noi Na Nakhon, and daughter of Koh Lay Huan, the first Chinese Kapitan of Penang — that marked the turning point of his future career. His political connections with Noi Na Nakhon and the Kapitan’s family opened up considerable economic opportunities that he aimed to acquire the monopoly of tax farming and tin mining, two pillars of big business of the time. In 1844, he succeeded in acquiring the tax farms and later the tin monopoly rights in Ranong. His growing economic power and political influence were recognized by the Thai court and he was admitted into the Thai bureaucracy. In 1854, he was appointed governor of Ranong with a title of “Phra Rattanasetthi”, which was followed in 1862 with another more elevated title of “Phraya”, the second highest rank of the nobility. Remarkably, Khaw Soo Cheang, a poor Chinese immigrant, built up a business empire in Southern Thailand and Penang in a period of slightly more than 3 decades. It was centered in Ranong, and was built on revenue farming, tin mining, shipping, and regional trade. By the middle of 1850s, he had emerged as a wealthy and politically powerful Chinese capitalist in Southeast Asia.19

19

For studies of Khaw Soo Cheang’s life and career and the building of the Khaw business empire, see Hsu Yun-ts’iao (Xu Yunqiao) compiled (1963). Taiguo Linlang Xu Shi zongpu (The genealogy of Khaw clan of Ranong, Thailand). In Xu Shi Zongpu (The Genealogy of Xu (Khaw or Koh) Clan), p. B161. Xu Jiaozheng, et al. (eds.), Singapore: Xu Clan of Singapore; Cushman, JW (1991). Family and State: The Formation of a Sino-Thai Tin-Mining Dynasty, 1797–1932, pp. 9–26. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Cushman JW (1986). The Khaw group: Chinese business in early twentieth-century Penang. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 17(1), 64; Cushman JW (1990), Chinese enterprise in early twentieth-century Penang. In Asian Culture No.14: A Special Issue on Ethnic Chinese Abroad, Yen Ching-hwang (ed.), pp. 77–87. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies; Wong CS (1963). A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans, Singapore: Ministry of Culture.

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Born in Semarang in 1866, Oei Tiong Ham was the second son of Oei Tjie Sien, the founder of the Kian Gwan Company which was transformed into Oei Tiong Ham Concern in the 1890s. He received a traditional Chinese education through private tuition, and was fascinated by Chinese classical novels such as The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Sanguo yanyi). He was fluent in the Indonesian language and very sociable. Though fond of gambling and rebellious against his father’s severity and frugality, young Tiong Ham showed his capacity and acumen in business, and this was why his father was determined to groom him as a successor. In 1890, when Tjie Sien reached 55 years of age, he decided to retire and hand over the responsibility of managing the Kian Gwan company to Tiong Ham who had just turned 24 years of age. After taking over the running of Kian Gwan, Tiong Ham gradually transformed it into a modern family conglomerate. In 1893, Kian Gwan changed its name to Oei Tiong Ham Concern that signalled the arrival of a new era for the company; and under his leadership, it grew stronger and diversified into sugar plantation, sugar refinery, shipping, international trade, banking, and finance. He adopted modern management methods, widely recruited talents into his management team, and sent students overseas for training. Undoubtedly, Oei Tiong Ham was one of the wealthiest Chinese capitalists of his time, and he had succeeded in building up a vast business empire in Southeast Asia.20 Li Qingquan of the Philippines was born in 1889 in an overseas Chinese family in Quanzhou, a well-known international port of southern Fujian province, China. Both his father and grandfather were successful merchants in the Philippines. In 1906 at the age of 17, he arrived in the islands to assist his father in timber business. With business acumen and foresight, he was able to expand his family business 20 See Oei Hui-lan (daughter of Oei Tiong Ham), “Reminiscences,” in Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia, pp. 22–27; Cai Renrong (1989). Huang Zonghan (Oei Tiong Ham) 1866–1924. In Dongnanya zhuming huaqiao huaren zhuan, Vol. 1 (Biographies of Famous Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia), Cai Renrong et al. (eds.), pp. 99–115. Beijing: Haiyang chubanshe; Panglaykim and Palmer, I Study of entrepreneurship in developing countries: The development of one Chinese concern in Indonesia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(1), pp. 85–95.

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into a vast modern enterprise. He adopted a modern strategy of vertical integration by integrating his saw-mill operation with planting, timber logging, and marketing of timber products in both domestic and international markets. He had a substantial share in the emerging timber industry in the Philippines, and his important contribution to the industry was recognized by the Chinese community with a nickname of “ King of Timber”. His leadership in the Chinese business community was confirmed by his election to the powerful position of the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines in his early 30s. His emergence as a wealthy and influential Chinese capitalist in early 1920s enabled him to plunge into another important area of business — modern banking and finance. With the support of wealthy business friend Huang Yizhu from Dutch East Indies, he founded the China Bank Corporation (Zhong Xing Yinhang) in Manila on 20 July 1920, the first Chinese bank and the first commercial bank in the Philippines. The investors of the bank were drawn not just from ethnic Chinese capitalists, but also from Filipinos, Americans, and British. With his wealth and knowledge of modern business, Li Qingquan was elected general manager of the bank as well as the chairman of board of directors. In addition to his business activities in the islands, Li since 1927 had also invested a large sum of money in the construction of Xiamen (Amoy) city — building roads, constructing shop houses, and other public utilities. Li’s substantial investment in his home province gained him a reputation of being a “patriotic overseas Chinese capitalist” from the Philippines.21 21

For studies of Li Qingquan’s career and his contribution to Fujian province, see Xu Guodong (1988). Aiguo qiaoling Li Qingquan zhuan (A short biography of the patriotic overseas Chinese Leader — Li Qingquan). In Aiguo qiaoling Li Qingquan he tade guxiang Shi Zhen (Patriotic Overseas Chinese Leader Li Qingquan and His Home Village- Shi Zhen), Xu Guodong et al. (eds.), pp. 1–3. Xiamen: Xiamen daxue lishixi and Jinjiang Shizhen cunweihui; Yang Jiancheng (ed.) and translated by Su Wenlang (1984). Sanshi niandai Feilibin huaqiao shangren (The Chinese Businessmen in the Philippines), pp. 77–78. Taipei: Zhonghua xuesuyuan Nanyang yanjiusuo; “Li Qingquan, 1889–1940”. In Cai Renlong et al. (eds.), Dongnanya zhuming huaqiao huaren zhuan, vol. 1, pp. 58–70; Lin Jinzi and Zhuang Weiji (eds.), Jindai Huaqiao touzi guonei qiyeshi zhiliao zhuanji, Fujian zuan (Source Materials for the Modern History of Business Enterprise invested by the Overseas Chinese, Section on the Overseas Chinese of Fujian Origins), p. 479. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe.

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Tan Kah Kee of Singapore was one of the best-known Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia in the first half of 20th century. He was also known as a Chinese patriot, an education-promoter, and a philanthropist, and his influence looms large in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and South China even today. He was born in 1874 in Chi Mei village of the Tong An district in the southern part of Fujian province. Although his grandfather and father were overseas Chinese who did business in Singapore, he was brought up in China by his mother in Tong An, receiving traditional education in Confucian Classics. Arriving in Singapore in 1890 at the age of 16, he worked in his father’s rice shop as an apprentice, and gained experience in running a business that laid the foundation for his future career. The collapse of his father’s business in 1903 was a blessing in disguise, and he was left without alternatives but to venture into business himself. His familiarity with rice business and pineapple canning provided him with considerable confidence and a fresh start in business. In 1904, he founded his own rice shop named Khiam Aik (Chian Yi) (meaning Modesty and Benefits) involving wholesale distribution of rice from Indo-China. He then founded rice mills in Thailand to ensure the supply. In the same year, he also built two pineapple-canning factories and developed a pineapple plantation. Tan Kah Kee was aware of the importance of the supply side of his business, and he used vertical integration strategy to ensure undisrupted supply for domestic and international markets. At the beginning of the 20th century, he invested heavily in Singapore in rubber plantations pioneered by Tan Chay Yan of Malacca at the end of the 19th century. The First World War (1914–1918) presented him with both a crisis and opportunities. His lucrative pineapple canning business was ruined because of the disruption over export, but the war also created huge demand for strategic materials such as rubber. With his foresight, courage, and luck, Tan grasped the opportunity to establish a shipping line and converted some of his pineapple canneries into rubber mills. He also produced tin plates to meet the war needs. This diversification strategy worked well, and earned him huge profits. In the 4 years from 1915 to 1918, he claimed that he had made a net profit of $4.5 million. In less than 15 years from the start

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of his business, Tan Kah Kee was transformed into a wealthy capitalist casting enormous influence over the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and South China. The end of the First World War dramatically changed the political situation and economic needs in Southeast Asia and the world. Tan Kah Kee accordingly had to change his strategy for expansion and growth. He restructured his business empire, incorporating all of his business enterprises into the Tan Kah Kee Company in 1919. The new company possessed a new structure of management and carried a limited liability, that enabled him to chart the new course of action in a more competitive business world. The main thrust of his business strategy during the postwar period (1919–1925) was his venture into rubber manufacturing. The slump of the price of rubber following the end of the war did not lead Tan to sell off his rubber plantations and rubber mills, but instead, he started manufacturing rubber products to feed a growing consumer market. In 1920, he turned his Sumbawa rubber mill into a factory producing rubber products such as raincoats, rubber sheets, umbrellas, sleepers, sports shoes, boots, tennis balls, and a variety of rubber toys. Two years later, he further acquired several rubber mills in the Malay Peninsula at a cheap price. His strategy of vertical integration in order to control rubber production and manufacturing worked well. By 1925 when his business reached its peak, he proudly claimed that he had made a net profit of $7.8 million.22 22

For Tan Kah Kee’s family background, business career, and his active participation in promoting modern Chinese education in Fujian province, see Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-kee: The Making of An Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Yen Ching-hwang (1998). Tan Kah Kee and Overseas Chinese entrepreneurship. In Asian Culture, No. 22 pp. 1–13. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, see also the same article republished in Yen Ching-hwang, The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, pp. 123–144; Tan Kah Kee, Nanqiao huiyi lu (Reminiscence of my Life and Activities in the Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia, or translated as Tan Kah Kee: An Autobiography) (Singapore, Nanyang Printing Company, 1946, two volumes, reprinted by Global Publishing Company, River Edge, USA for the Tan Kah Kee International Society, 1993, two volumes); Wang Zeng-bing and Yu Gang (1981). Chen Jiageng xingxue ji (Records of Tan Kah Kee’s Educational Activities). Fuzhou: Fujian jiaoyu chubanshe; Chen Pisheng and Yang Guozhen (1983). Chen Jiageng zhuan (A Biography of Tan Kah Kee). Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe; Ward AHC, Chu RW and Salaff J (translators and editors) (1994). The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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Some common features among these wealthy Chinese capitalists can be identified. First, the majority of them belonged to the first generation immigrants. Second, kinship and regional connections played an important role in their success. Third, personal attributes such as business acumen, dedication and determination, flexibility, and entrepreneurship were essential ingredients for their success. Fourth, luck and the ability to make use of political connections were also important. Except for Oei Tiong Ham, the rest of the capitalists were born in China. Most of them spent their formative years in rural China in a harsh environment, and experienced the hardship of peasant’s life. They had a different outlook from those second-generation Chinese who were brought up overseas in a more comfortable urban setting. They also possessed fine qualities of migrants such as a strong desire for material gain, the will to succeed and the capacity to work hard. Kinship and regional connections played an important role in the success of the capitalists because these two social ties were of paramount importance in the operation of Chinese business. Those immigrants with close kinship and dialect ties tended to have easier access to business knowledge and practice. Not only did they learn practical knowledge of how to do business, but they also received financial and social assistance from kinsmen or district folks. Oei Tiong Ham, Tan Kah Kee, and Li Qingquan learned how to do business through their fathers, and they worked as apprentices in their fathers’ business. Zhang Bishi and Loke Yew benefited greatly from working as apprentices in the shops of their district folks. Personal attributes and entrepreneurship were essential ingredients for success because they endowed the Chinese capitalists with a flair for doing business, and gave them competitive advantage over their business opponents. They stood a better chance to succeed in a complicated and volatile business world. Luck and the ability to use political connections were also important because timing determined the ebb and flow of business, and good fortune (right timing) could help business to flourish, but a bad fortune could destroy chance of success. In the colonial world of Southeast Asia (except Thailand), the ability to use political connections for business was crucial to the

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success of the Chinese capitalists. Zhang Bishi, Oei Tiong Ham, and Khaw Soo Cheang had mastered this skill, and the political influence they wielded lubricated their business activities and helped to speed up the building of their business empires. I have discussed elsewhere the class structure in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, especially in Singapore and Malaysia. I argued that the capitalists formed the upper echelon of the Shang (merchant) class, and comprised exporters and importers, big plantation owners, tin mining proprietors, big contractors, property owners, and financiers.23 For the study of the whole Southeast Asian region, perhaps this list of Chinese capitalists should be added to entrepot traders, shipping owners, opium and tax farmers, developers, and bankers. Unlike the scholar-gentry class in traditional Chinese society where by membership was confined to those who had obtained imperial degrees either through competitive imperial examinations or purchase,24 the membership of overseas Chinese capitalist class was ill-defined, and it was not restricted to any particular social group in the society. The main qualification for that membership was the possession of substantial wealth recognized in the Chinese society. It did not carry any social and legal privileges as the scholar-gentry had.25 The ill-defined and fluid nature of overseas Chinese class system did not meet the social and psychological needs of the Chinese capitalists. After having acquired immense wealth and having cherished the desire of making a difference in the society and glorifying 23

See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 142. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, p. 10. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 24 For excellent studies of traditional Chinese scholar-gentry class, see Chung-li Chang (1955). The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Chung-li Chang (1962). The Income of the Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Hsiao-tung Fei (1953). China’s Gentry: Essays on Rural-Urban Relations. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press; and Ping-Ti Ho (1964). The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368–1911. New York. 25 In imperial China, scholar-gentry were exempted from corvee labor, and were also exempted from kneeling to the judge in the court proceedings.

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their ancestors,26 the Chinese capitalists were generally fond of showing their wealth to enhance their social standing. One of the best ways of showing off was the construction of mansions. These mansions were not only huge in size and well-designed in the traditional Chinese style, they were also constructed with the best building materials by most experienced builders from China. They were designed to accommodate large households and for entertaining. In Singapore and Malaya, many of the wealthiest Chinese capitalists built grandiose mansions, including Zhang Bishi’s mansion in Penang and four Teochew capitalists’ mansions in Singapore. One of the Teochew mansions built by Tan Hiok Nee was known as the mansion of Zhizheng (Zhizheng di) which survived the time and became the head office of the Salvation Army in Singapore in 1970s.27 In Dutch East Indies, Tjong A Fie (alias Tjong Yiauw Hiang and Zhang Hongnan) a wealthy and influential Chinese capitalist from Medan (Deli) Sumatra, built his new magnificent mansion which was elegantly furnished.28 Another rich Chinese capitalist in the Indies, Oei Tjie Sien, the founder of the Kian Gwan company and later the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, had his mansion built in Semarang. It was huge but gloomy, and “it was built in the Chinese style with a series of 26 For psychological needs of the Chinese immigrants for Qing official titles and social prestige, see Yen Ching-hwang (1970). Ching’s sale of honours and the Chinese leadership in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(2), 20–32; see the same article republished in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 177–198. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 27 Zhizheng was an official title conferred on Tan Hiok Nee by the Qing government. Therefore, his mansion was popularly known as “Zhicheng di” (the mansion of the Zhicheng). It was built in 1885 at Tang Road, located at the cross between Clemenceau Avenue and Penang Road in Singapore in 1970s. Another wealthy Teochew capitalist Seah Eu Chin had his mansion built in Boat Quay, Singapore in 1872. See Chang Ching Chiang (1975). Chen Shunian yu Zhizheng di (Tan Hiok Nee and his Zhizheng Mansion). In Shile Guji (Historical Relics of Singapore), Lim How Seng et al. (eds.), pp. 225–230. Singapore: the South Seas Society. 28 According to Queeny Chang, daughter of Tjong A Fie, the mansion was equipped with many black wood furniture encrusted with mother-of-pearl, and huge chandeliers were hung from the high-painted ceiling of the big hall, spreading their radiance over the walls which held candelabra designed in the shape of flower buds. See Queeny Chang (1981). Memories of a Nonya, pp. 19–20. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press Sdn. Bhd.

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separate pavilions linked together with what seemed like interminable miles of corridors. The corridors were lined with fat-bellied earthenware vats filled with rice and tobacco, a rather obvious sign of prosperity which delighted old Tjie Sien ….”29 Undoubtedly, Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia would not have existed as a class without a class-consciousness which meant that they had at least vaguely shared a common idea of belonging to a special group of people in the society. Therefore, Chinese capitalists as a group existed in their own minds and in the society as well as their self-identification. The term capitalist (zibenjia) is a modern term that denotes not just the person who possess huge capital, but also owns the means of production. However, capitalist as a term was rarely used to describe those who possessed huge fortune, but a more general term wealthy merchant (fu shang) was used and selfidentified by those Chinese capitalists. They were conscious of themselves as wealthy merchant belonging to a special social group. Not only did they built gorgeous mansions, they also built beautiful villas and gardens for private leisure,30 and some of these gardens became public resorts. The best example is the case of Nam Sang Garden which was built by a wealthy merchant, Hoo Ah Kay (Whampoa) who served as the first Qing Imperial Consul in Singapore. Specially designed by horticulturists from China, it was richly decorated with miniature rockeries, artificial ponds, aquariums, curious dwarf bamboos, and plants trimmed to resemble animals. It became a famous resort for all Chinese in Singapore and foreign visitors.31 The Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia were not only conscious of their wealth and to display it, but also were aware

29

This was the impression of the mansion gained by Oei Hui Lan, daughter of Oei Tiong Ham and the grand-daughter of Oei Tjie Sien, see Oei Hui Lan “Reminiscences”, in Oei Tiong Ham Concern: The First Business Empire of Southeast Asia, Yoshihara Kunio (ed.), pp. 27–28. 30 In Singapore at the end of the 19th century, wealthy merchants such as Wu Yiding (alias Wu Jinqing) and Cheang Hong Lim (Zhang Fanglin, alias Zhang Mingyun) had their famous villas and gardens built for private use. Wu’s villa was named “De Yan Garden” and Cheang’s villa was named “Ming Yun Villa”. See Lat Pau, 5 June 1888, p. 1, and Sing Po, 3 May 1892, p. 1. 31 See Song Ong-siang (1967). One Hundred Year’s History of the Chinese in Singapore, reprint edition, pp. 52–53. Singapore.

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of belonging to an exclusive social group. They socialized together, spent leisure together, and their children intermarried. They organized social clubs restricting membership to those of their kind. In Singapore, there were at least eight social clubs founded by rich Chinese merchants in the second half of the 19th century.32 Perhaps the best-known rich men’s club in Singpore was the Ee Hoe Hean Club founded in 1895. At least five rich Hokkien merchants, including Lee Cheng Yan, Tan Jiak Kim, and Gan Eng Seng were listed as founders. Aiming at bringing together both Chinese and Englisheducated Hokkien businessmen for recreational and social purposes, the club restricted its membership in the early period from 1895 to 1922 to wealthy merchants.33 In short, by the end of the 19th century, Chinese capitalists in the known term of fu shang (wealthy merchants) emerged as a subclass among the shang (merchant) class in the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Equipped with a sense of class-consciousness, its members were fond of displaying their wealth and created a social chasm by socializing in exclusive clubs.

Chinese Capitalist Institutions Chinese capitalist institutions primarily consisted of business firms (hao) and companies (kongsi ), revenue farms, and Chinese banks. Numerous Chinese business firms existed in Southeast Asia in this 32

These clubs included Ban Chye Ho Club, Cheng Kee Hean Club, Choon Guan Hock Club and Kim Ban Choon Club, the Chui Huai Lim Club, the Shulin Yuan Club, the Xiao Tao Yuan Club and the Ee Hoe Hean Club. See Song Song Siang, ibid., pp. 98, 259, 291, 476, and 552; Lat Pau, 15 April 1890,p.5; Pan Xingnong (ed.), Malaiya Chaoqiao tongjian (The Teochews in Malaya), pp. 343-44; Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, p. 55. 33 See Yong Ching-fatt 1977. Yi He Xuan jilobu yu zhanqian Xinghua shehui (The Ee Hoe Hean Club and the Pre-war Chinese Society in Singapore). In Zhanqian Xinghua shehui jiegou yu lingdaochen chutan (Chinese Community Structure and Leadership in Pre-War Singapore), Yong Ching-fatt, pp. 30–32. Singapore: South Sea Society; Lim How Seng (1985). Yi he Xuan jilobu shilie (A short history of the Ee Hoe Hean Club). In Yi He Xuan jiushi zhounian jinan tekan(Souvenir Magazine of the Celebration of 90th Anniversary of the Ee Hoe Hean Club, Singapore), Huang Yihua et al. (eds.), p. 37. Singapore: Ee Hoe Hean Club.

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period, principally in major maritime ports, cities and towns, and mining centers. They were mostly privately owned, and were probably founded by those ambitious Chinese immigrants who had accumulated a small amount of capital to start their firms. As a usual practice, the name of a business firm comprised of two Chinese characters that made auspicious meaning, words such as xing (rise), fa (get rich), long (prosperous), guang (vast, extensive), zhen (invigorate, animate), an (peace), and he (harmony) were popularly used. Most Chinese business firms at this time appear to have not carried any special suffix, but some had the suffix of hao, zhan, or ji. zhan literally means a store house, a warehouse or a shop, and was mostly adopted by those trading firms or shipping firms that required warehouse or storehouse. Ji means a shop which was less commonly used. Among these suffixed names, hao was most important. hao is literally meant a business house which was commonly used by large family firms, and it carried certain prestige in the community. In an identification of 17 large family firms in Singapore in the period of eight years from 1890 to 1898, 11 of them carried the suffix of hao, two with the suffix of zhan, one with the suffix of ji, and three without any suffixes. These 17 large family firms were owned by wealthy Chinese merchants (capitalists), among them were big names such as Lee Cheng Yan (Li Qingyan), Wu Yiding (Wu I-ting, known as Wu Jinqing, Wu Chinch’ing), and Goh Siew Tin (Wu Siew-chen, Wu Shouzhen).34 kongsi is a Chinese term for Western word “company”, but it was a much loosely used term in the history of the Chinese communities in Southeast and East Asia. Apart from being a business institution, it also broadly embraced some social, political, and even

34

The business firms carried the suffix of hao including Guangheng hao, Yixing hao, Taiyuan hao, Zhenan hao (owned by Lee Cheng Yan), Zhenyu hao, Anhe hao (owned by Goh Siew Tin), Guangwen jinzhenmei hao, Juichun hao, Zhenan hao, Deyuan hao (owned by Wu Yiding), and Caisheng hao. Two firms with the suffix of zhan were Shanyang zhan (involved in shipping) and Fusheng zhan. The one firm with the suffix of “ji” was Guangfeng changsheng ji. The three firms without any suffixes were Zhu Guanglan (famous of its import of tea and tobacco, had more than 40 years of history at the time of 1897), Yong Chuansheng (grocery and textile trade), and Guanghecheng qianyuan (gambier and pepper trade). See Sing Po (in Singapore), 1890–1898.

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criminal organizations. Names such as Yan-who kongsi (or Romanized as Ren He gongsi, the earliest Hakka dialect organization in Penang, founded in 1801), Ngee Ann kongsi (a dialect organization for Teochews in early Singapore), Khoo kongsi and Lim kongsi (two of the five early clan organizations in Penang), Ghee Hin kongsi and Ghee Hock kongsi (early Chinese secret societies), and Lan Fang kongsi (a political and economic organization in Borneo in the 18th century) are just a few of these examples.35 The word kong or gong means public, fair, and open, while the word “si” means manage, attend to, or to take charge of. The combination of these two words is meant a public institution managed openly and fairly. It is worthy to note that this term was used mainly by the Chinese clan, dialect, secret society, and semipolitical organizations before 20th century. The reason is clear that these organizations did not belong to an individual or a family, but were owned and managed by a number of people whether they were members of a clan, a dialect group, a secret society, or a semipolitical organization. In the 19th century Singapore and Malaya, for instance, it could hardly find a few cases that the term kongsi was used for a business entity. For example, in the construction of famous Tian Fu Kong Temple (Tianfu gong) in Singapore in 1850, only 10 out of 315 donors carried the name of a kongsi which can be identified as

35 For the name of Yan-who kongsi and other Hakka organizations carrying the term of kongsi, see Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Early Hakka Dialect organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1801–1900. In Community and Politics: the Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaya, Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 105–108. Singapore: Times Academic Press; for the name of Ngee Ann kongsi and its founding in 1830 in Singapore, see Yen Ching-hwang (2002). The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, p. 276. Singpore: Times Academic Press; for the names of the early Chinese clan kongsis, such as the Khoo, the Yeoh, and the Lim, the Tan, the Cheah in Penang, see Yen Ching-hwang (1981). Early Chinese clan organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911. The Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), appendix 1, pp. 88–92. For Ghee Hin kongsi and Ghee Hock kongsi, see Mak Lau-fong (1981). The Sociology of Secret Societies: A Study of Chinese Secret Societies in Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia, pp. 21–25, 35–45, 51–66. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. For Lan Fang kongsi as both economic and political entity, see Wang Tai Peng (1994). The Origins of Chinese Kongsi, pp. 67–83. Petaling Jaya. Selangor: Pelanduk Publications.

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business firms or companies, and the rest were with individual names or names of their business such as ships.36 The turn of 20th century witnessed increased popularity of the use of kongsi as a business entity and as a capitalist institution. By 1920s and 1930s, the use of kongsi as a modern company was popular in Southeast Asia.37 The popularity was due to two factors: the arrival of new type of Chinese business and the impact of the founding of the new republic in early 1912. The founding of the Kwang Yik Bank in Singapore in 1903 signalled the arrival of this new business. Handicapped by the language barrier, the Chinese businessmen in Southeast Asia were aware of the weakness in the Chinese financial system, and needed Chinese banks to lubricate the operation of Chinese business. To compete successfully with foreign capital, principally the British, Dutch, and Japanese in the region, Chinese businessmen had to adopt modern form of business organization such as liability company which restricted its legal resposibility, and was capable of mobilizing large amount of capital and reaching wider range of investors. For example, Tan Kah Kee, the renowned Chinese entrepreneur and business tycoon in Singapore, turned his various enterprises into a limited liability company named Tan Kah Kee and Company Limited (Chen Jiageng gufen youxian gongsi) in 1931 after he had experienced the liquidity problem of his business. He saw the advantage of this new form of organization which would not 36

These ten kongsis were Xiehengfa kongsi, Zhentai yapian kongsi, Guo zhengnan kongsi, Meixiang kongsi, Yongyuan kongsi, Zhenguangyu jiu kongsi, Jinmei kongsi, Lianzhen kongsi, Zhenyong kongsi, and Hengshun kongsi. See “Jianli Tian Fu Gong beiji” (1970). (The Inscription for the Erection of the Tian Fu Kong Temple dated 30th year of Emperor Dao Guang (1850), in Xinjiapo huawen beiming jilu (A Collection of Chinese Stone Tablet Inscriptions in Singapore), Tan Yeok Siong and Chen Ching-ho (eds.), pp. 57–63. Shatin, Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press. 37 For example, 13 out of 26 Chinese money-shops (Qian Zhuang) and trading companies that were involved in remittance business with China in Jakarta in the 1930s carried the name of Kongsi. In Heshu dongyindu huaqiao shangren (The Chinese Merchants in the Netherlands Indies During 1930s), Yang Jiancheng (ed.), pp. 97–98. Taipei: Zhonghua xueshuyuan Nanyang yanjiusuo; 35 out of 53 major Chinese companies in Manila in the 1930s carried the name of Kongsi. See Yang Jiancheng (ed.) (1984). Sanshi niandai Feilibin huaqiao shangren (The Chinese Merchants in the Philippines During 1930s), pp. 85–92. Taipei: Zhonghua xueshuyuan Nanyang yanjiusuo.

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undermine the operation of his educational establishments in Xiamen when his business faltered.38 The founding of the new republic in China ushered in an era of intense nationalism and the threat of foreign imperialism in China. The new republic injected new vigor of national pride and consciousness of competition with foreign powers in the field of business. Ethnic Chinese business leaders such as Tan Kah Kee began to discuss new business and the concepts of “war of commerce” (shangzhan) and “commerce to rescue the nation” (shangye jiuguo) which were disseminated in the Chinese media in the region. In the declaration of the founding of Nanyang Siang Pau (The Nanyang Commercial Daily) in Singapore on 6 September 1923, Tan lamented the inferior position of the Chinese in commerce vis-à-vis the foreigners because they were ignorant of the principles and general knowledge of business. He also emphasized the important linkage between modern education and modern business enterprises, and implied that the exposure of Chinese businessmen to modern education and media would enhance their competitiveness in the “war of commerce”.39 Revenue farm as a major Chinese capitalist institution in Southeast Asia emerged in the second half of the 19th century when the region achieved remarkable economic growth under Western hegemony. The deepening of Western penetration required compatible financial institution that would facilitate the collection of revenue at the minimum cost to the Western colonial governments. Under the revenuefarming system, Western colonial governments delegated the right of collecting certain taxes to private companies or individuals and it was a monopoly right that ensured no infringement to that right but did not guarantee the profit to the farmers. On the other hand, the farmers were obligated to pay the government on an agreed sum of money 38

See Tan Kah Kee, Nanqiao huiyi lu (Reminiscence of my Life and Activities in the Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia), Vol. 2, pp. 508–509; Yong Ching-fatt Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, pp. 68–69. 39 See Nanyang Siang Pau, 6 and 7 September 1923. This declaration is also reproduced in Yang Jinfa (Yong Ching Fatt) (1980). Zhanqian de Chen Jiageng yanlun shiliao yu fenxi (Tan Kah Kee in Pre-war Singapore: Selected Documents and Analysis), pp. 34–38. Singapore: South Seas Society.

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(rent) in advance each year. As pointed out by Howard Dick, revenue farm as a capitalist institution has three characteristics: it was a monopolistic right, it was a part of the patrimony of the state, and it was transnational.40 The common types of revenue farm in Southeast Asia in the second half of 19th and first decade of 20th centuries were opium (chandu) farm, spirit (arak) farm, gambling farm, tin and pork farms, etc. It is not coincidental that these farms were related closely to the Chinese communities, because the Chinese were the main consumers for these commodities and services, and were targeted by the government. Partly due to the small bureaucracy and the inability to collect the revenue effectively, and partly due the desire of the emerging centralized government to tap the rich new resources, the revenue farming system worked well for both the states and farmers during this period. Due to their financial resources, organizations, and knowledge of the Chinese communities, Chinese capitalists were predominant among the revenue farmers.41 Among several common types of revenue farms, the opium farm was the most important. Not only was it the largest, involving millions of dollars, it was also most profitable. However, the government did not guarantee the level of profit for the farmers, and the profit level was very much connected with the ability of the farmers to maximize the sale of opium among prospective consumers.42 Opium farm as a capitalist institution was an effective mechanism in mobilizing Chinese capital for a potentially profitable investment. As the opium farm was too large for an individual capitalist to handle, it was usually undertaken by a group of Chinese capitalists who formed a syndicate to prepare and distribute the product. An opium syndicate was a temporary business entity organized for that particular purpose covering the period of the opium farm lease lasting 1–3 years. Of course, the 40 See Dick, H. A Fresh Approach to Southeast Asian History, in The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming , John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds.), pp. 8–9. 41 See Butcher John, Revenue farming and the changing state in Southeast Asia. In The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming, John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds.), pp. 23–35. 42 For a discussion of the maximisation of profits by Chinese opium farmers, see Yen Chinghwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, pp. 226–277. Singapore: Oxford University Press.

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syndicate could continue if the lease was renewed, or the syndicate could operate to cover another opium farm. Members of an opium syndicate were usually wealthy Chinese capitalists who grouped together for the venture, and they were held together by traditional kinship and dialect ties,43 or sometimes by friendship and mutual trust that transcended traditional social affiliations.44 This may imply that on some occasions class interests and commercial profit could cross the kin and dialect boundaries. Regardless of the moral questions of whether opium-smoking was good or bad, opium farm as a capitalist institution was effective not only for the pooling together the capital of several Chinese farmers, but also for the mobilization of small amounts of capital in the Chinese communities. It extracted money from hundred of thousands of Chinese opium smokers who were mostly the members of lower social classes. The amassing of the capital from ordinary Chinese could not have happened without the mechanism such as opium-smoking and gambling farms that scourged most of the workingmen in late 19th and early 20th centuries. The capital pooled together for opium farms was huge, and it sometimes exceeded a couple of million dollars. For instance, the Penang opium and spirit farms (1904–1906) headed by Gan Ngoh Bee had pooled together a capital of two million dollars (Straits dollars?), and its monthly rent was S$190,000.45 However, the profit from the sale of opium was also huge. It was claimed that the net profit for the 1901–1903 opium and spirit farms of Penang headed by 43

See for example, in 1860s, the lucrative opium and spirit farms in Singapore were bones of contention between the Hokkien syndicate headed by Cheang Hong Lim, a well-known leader of the Hokkien community and the Teochew syndicate headed by Tan Seng Poh, a leader of the Teochew community in Singapore. See Trocki, CA (1990). Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910, p. 118. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,. 44 For examples, the syndicate which took over the Penang and Province Wellesley opium and spirit farms for 1904 to 1906 was headed by Gan Ngoh Bee, a Hokkien capitalist, but his main partner in the syndicate was Foo Choo Choon, a Hakka wealthy tin miner. See “Translation of an agreement made between Mr Gan Ngoh Bee and Mr Foo Choo Choon in the event of their securing the Penang opium and spirit farms for 1904–1906,” in Report of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Opium Commission, 1908, Proceedings, Vol. 3, p. 127. 45 Ibid.

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Gan Ngoh Bee was approximately S$700,000.46 If the profit derived from revenue farms was squandered by the capitalists in luxurious life styles, the revenue farms as capitalist institution would have been less meaningful. But there are strong evidence to suggest that profit plowed through this channel was reinvested in commodity production or trade. The reason for the close connection between revenue farming and commodity production was because the same financiers supported both forms of venture. In Singapore and the neighboring areas, the opium farmers were also engaged in pepper and gambier production. In Penang, the opium farmers generally invested capital in tin mining in the Malay states.47 The close relationship between revenue farming and commodity production ensured the productivity of Chinese capital. Thus, the revenue farm as a capitalist institution not only served as a mechanism for mobilizing capital, but also as a means of circulating and enhancing the capital. The modern Chinese bank as an effective capitalist institution was beyond doubt, and it was most effective in tapping savings of the Chinese communities. With its sound reputation and strong reserve, Chinese banks attracted different types of savings, ranging from large sums of personal savings of wealthy capitalists, small amounts of savings from individuals, and savings of businesses and industries. Unlike traditional Chinese money houses — qian zhuang — that specialized in depositing and short-term loans,48 modern Chinese banks possessed the features of modern Western banks. In addition to deposits and loans, they were also involved in settling trade bills,

46

See “Gan Ngoh Bee, opium farmer of Penang to Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements dated 10 October, 1904,” in Straits Settlements Legislative Council Proceedings, 1905, Appendix No. 10. 47 See Trocki CA (1997). Boundaries and transgressions: Chinese enterprise in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. In Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism, Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (eds.), p. 71. New York: Routledge. Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (1994), Capital and Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia, p. 146. Houndmills and London, MacMillan Press Ltd. 48 For the functions of the Qian Zhuang in China’s treaty ports in late Qing and early Republican periods, see Zhang Guohui (1989). Wan Qing Qianzhuang he Piaohao yanjiu (A Study of the Qiang Zhuang and Piaohao during the Late Qing China), pp. 164–170. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

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foreign exchange, and remittance business.49 In the first 3 decades of the 20th century, there were at least 15 modern Chinese banks in Singapore and Malaya, 13 in Thailand, and 5 in Dutch East Indies. As founders of these modern Chinese banks were wealthy Chinese capitalists as well as community leaders, their involvement in the founding of these institutions assured the early success of the banks. But the lack of strong governmental supervision on capital requirements and banking practices led to the unrestricted entry of banks. The result was keener competition among Chinese banks. The combination of nepotism, bad management, and restricted social base resulted in the collapse of some Chinese banks. A case in point is Kwong Yik Bank that lasted only about 10 years. Kwong Yik Bank (Guang Yi yinhang) was the earliest Chinese bank in Singapore founded in 1903 by a group of wealthy Cantonese capitalists in Singapore and Johore led by Wong Ah Fook. Wong, a native of Toishan district (Taishan xian) of Guangdong province, migrated to Singapore in 1851. A carpenter by trade and with entrepreneurial spirit and business acumen, he became a building contractor, gambier planter, opium, and spirit farmer. He succeeded in accumulating a considerable amount of wealth, and emerged as one of the richest Cantonese merchants in the late 19th and early 20th century Singapore and Johore. In 1903, he founded the Kwong Yik Bank that was to meet the financial needs of the Cantonese merchants. The name “Kwong Yik” which literally meant “Cantonese interests” or “to benefit the Cantonese” which implied the bank was established for the benefits of the Cantonese, and it had to depend heavily on Cantonese customers for its survival. This restricted social base was not unlike the other Chinese banks founded at this time in Southeast Asia. Its initial advantage of having strong support from a particular dialect group became its Achilles heel and was partly responsible for its fall in 1913. But the bank’s worst problem was mismanagement arising from lack of modern knowledge of managing a bank, and overborrowing by the 49 See Tan Ee-leong (1969). “The Chinese banks incorporsted in Singapore and Malaya. Journal of Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 42(1), 264–265; Da Ye Hua Nian: History of the United Overseas Bank Limited, Singapore (Singapore, the United Overseas Bank Group, December 1985, in Chinese), p.13; Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, Capital and Entrepreneurship in Southeast Asia, p. 161.

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directors of the board, including Wong Ah Fook himself. The high default rate led to liquidity problem, which a caused a run on the bank and ended in its voluntary liquidation on 18 December 1913.50

The Development of Chinese Capitalism Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia prior to the Second World War can be roughly divided into three periods: the period before 1850, the period between 1851 and 1911, and the period between 1912 and 1942. The periodization is based on the political and economic changes in Southeast Asia and China, and sometimes an arbitrary date is chosen for convenience. In the first period before 1851, Chinese capitalisam was in its embryonic stage. It contained capitalist elements, but it had not yet taken a definite form. Carl A Trocki is partially right in pointing out that “before the 19th century, capitalism did not exist in Southeast Asia. Capitalism came with European colonialism and with the connection with Southeast Asian economics to the global capitalist system.”51 Although Chinese traders had been active in Southeast Asia before 1850, and Chinese communities did exist in the region before that time, their activities did not lead directly to the rise of Chinese capitalism. Chinese traders began to be active in Southeast Asia since the Song dynasty (960–1279), and continued to expand their trade in the region throughout the Yuan (1280–1368), Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) periods.52

50

A good detailed account of the crisis and final liquidation of the bank is found in P Lim Puihuen (2002). Wong Ah Fook: Immigrant, Builder and Entrepreneur, pp. 116–125. Singapore: Times Media Private Limited. P. Lim Pui Huen is a great grand-daughter of Wong Ah Fook. 51 See Trocki, CA (2002). Opium and the beginnings of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 33(2), pp. 298–299. 52 For China’s trade with Southeast Asia and other parts of the world during the Song and Yuan dynasties, see Chen Gaohua, Song Yuan shiqi de haiwai maoyi (China’s Overseas Trade during the Song and Yuan Dynasties) (Tianjin, 1981); Li Donghua (1984). Song Yuan shidai Quanzhou haiwai jiaotong de shengkuang (Quanzhou’s Overseas Communication and Trade during the Song and Yuan Periods). In Zhongguo haiyang fazhanshi lunwenji (Essays of the Maritime History of China), pp. 1–40. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Sanmin zhuyi yanjiusuo. For China’s expansion of its foreign trade, including Southeast Asia during the Ming dynasty, see Li Jinming, Mingdai haiwai maoyishi (A History of Foreign Trade of the Ming Dynasty). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1990.

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The active trading activities of the Chinese merchants in the region did not directly contribute to the formation of Chinese capitalists as a class. Although some of the wealthy merchants did stay back in Southeast Asia, the majority of them returned to China with their accumulated wealth, and their trading activities in Southeast Asia and coastal China created ample opportunities for accumulating capital. In this sense, the active operation of the Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia contributed directly to the rise of Chinese capitalism in China, particularly in the coastal regions like Fujian and Guangdong, rather than to Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia.53 The existence of Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia can be traced back to the 10th century when a Arab visitor recorded Chinese settlements in Palembang and neighboring areas in the year 943. The number of Chinese community increased over the centuries up to 1850, but the Chinese population in these early settlements remained small. The small Chinese population had difficulty supporting a capitalist class, and this restricted the rise of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia.54 The year 1850 was chosen as the commencement of the second period partly as a demarcation line of the second half of the 19th century, while the year 1911 is the ending point mainly because of the drastic political change taking place in China, and its profound impact on the Southeast Asian Chinese communities. The second half of the 19th century witnessed deepening of Western economic and political penetration into Southeast Asia. The advancement of the British into Burma and the Malay states, the growing French economic and political control of Indo-China, the increased Western economic influence on the independent Thai kingdom, and the tightening of the Dutch 53

For the Hokkien merchants’ active trading activities in the Philippines and Dutch East Indies during the period of 1570 to 1760, see James Chin Kong (1998). Merchants and other Sojourners: The Hokkiens overseas, 1570–1760. PhD dissertation, Department of History, the University of Hong Kong; for the response of the Hokkiens to the offshore trading opportunities in South China, see Ng Chin-keong (1973). Gentry-merchants and peasant-peddlers: The responses of the South Fukienese (Hokkiens) to the offshore trading opportunities 1522–1566. In The Nanyang University Journal, No. 7, pp. 161–175. 54 For the early Chinese settlements in Palembang and neighboring areas in the 10th century, see Hsu Yun-ts’iao (1951). Hua Qiao (On overseas Chinese). In Nanyang Nianjian (The Nanyang Annals), Yu Shukun (ed.), p. 12. Singapore: Nanyang baoshe youxian gongsi.

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economic grip over the East Indies, all these set a new political and economic environment within which Chinese capitalism grew and developed. At the same time, large numbers of Chinese immigrants flooded into Southeast Asian countries and formed many sizable Chinese communities in which the Chinese capitalists operated. Furthermore, the rise of tin mining, cash-crop plantations, and revenue farming made the large-scale accumulation of capital possible. Opium farming, for instance, was a multimillion dollar industry and the profit also amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars in one concession.55 As appropriately observed by Carl A. Trocki that the development of Chinese capitalism in the 19th century Southeast Asia was intimately connected with the participation of Chinese merchants in the financing and operation of opium revenue farming.56 The development of Chinese capitalism during this period was primarily determined by the new economic policies pursued by Western colonial governments. Clear political division of colonies in Southeast Asia enabled the Western colonial governments to effectively execute their economic policies, to deepen their exploitation of natural resources of the colonies, and to create markets for the consumption of Western manufactured goods. Active participation of Western capital in the tin mining and cash crop industry was made possible under colonial protection. The competition of Western capital in Southeast Asia greatly impacted on the development of the Chinese capitalism. On the one hand, the Western capital posed a serious threat to the Chinese capital, while on the other, it stimulated Chinese capitalists to change their thinking and the way of doing business, and made them more competitive in the domestic and international markets. However, when Chinese capital was unable to compete 55

The Penang opium and spirit farms for the period between 1904 and 1906 had a capital of two million Straits dollars, and the profit of the same farm during the period of 3 years from 1901 to 1903 amounted to S$700,000. See Report of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Opium Commission, 1908, Proceedings, Vol. 3m, p. 127; “Letter of Gan Ngoh Bee, opium farmer of Penang to Colonial Secretary, the Straits Settlements dated 10 October 1904,” in Straits Settements Legislative Council Proceedings, 1905, Appendix No. 10. 56 See Trocki CA, Opium and the beginings of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 33(2), pp. 299–312.

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with Western capital in certain businesses, it would restructure and make itself complementary to Western capital. The growth of Chinese population in Southeast Asia since the second half of the 19th century resulted directly from both new economic opportunities arising in Southeast Asia and the increasing economic hardship of Chinese peasantry in South China. The growth of the size of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia underpinned the rise of large-scale of Chinese capital, without which the large-scale capital would have been harder to accumulate. The growth of the Chinese population not only produced economic opportunities, but also introduced a clear sense of competition among the immigrants from which a new group of Chinese entrepreneurs emerged. Many of these entrepreneurs became wealthy capitalists, and the awareness of their new found wealth and social status qualified them for the membership of the Chinese capitalist class which formed the top layer of the traditional Shang (merchant) class in the Overseas Chinese societies in Southeast Asia. The period between 1912 and 1942 witnessed the development of the Chinese capitalism to a higher stage of maturity. The founding of the new Republic of China not only ended the ailing Qing dynasty, but also ushered in a new era of a Republican regime. The new Republic provided all Chinese, including Overseas Chinese, a new sense of pride and new nationhood, which became a rallying focus of allegiance among the Overseas Chinese. Chinese capitalists like Tan Kah Kee was a good example: he repeatedly emphasized the use of Overseas Chinese capital for the development of modern education in China, and the use of Overseas Chinese capital for the service of China’s interests.57 The development of Chinese capitalism in this period was related to the rise of a new type of big business in the 57 For Tan Kah Kee’s emphasis on the use of Overseas Chinese capital for the development of modern Chinese education, see Wang Zengbing and Yu Gang, Chen Jiageng xingxue ji (Records of Tan Kah Kee’s Educational Activities). For Tan Kah Kee’s emphasis on the use of Overseas Chines capital for the service of China’s interests such as saving China through commerce, see Yen Ching-hwang, Tan Kah-kee and Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship, in The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Ching-hwang (ed.), pp. 140–141.

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Overseas Chinese communities. The rise of modern Chinese banks, the emergence of the manufacturing industry, and the rise of rubber characterized these new businesses. In the 3 decades from 1903 to 1932, there were at least 33 modern Chinese banks found in Singapore and Malaya, Thailand, and Dutch East Indies. Regardless of the ebb and flow of their fortunes, they nevertheless opened up a new type of business with which large-scale capital can be mobilized and channelled for a better use. The emergence of manufacturing, primarily value-added light industry such as rubber goods manufacturing, pineapple canning, coconut oil milling, biscuits making, and manufacturing of Chinese herbal products, opened up a new field of economic activity that benefited from the financing of modern Chinese banks. The commercial planting of rubber on a large scale in plantation estates, and the export of rubber to international markets to feed an ever-growing automobile industry, plus the manufacturing of rubber consumer goods marked an important beginning of rubber as a mainstay of economies in Malaya, Singapore, and Dutch East Indies.

Summary and Conclusion Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia during the period under study was characterized by strong commercial capital, transnationalism, mobility, flexibility, and adaptability. The process of accumulation of Chinese capital was relatively easy and uncomplicated. Unlike Japan and Europe, Chinese capital did not have a feudal yoke to break before it can be effectively accumulated. Chinese capital accumulation took three major forms: reinvestment, currency reserve, and real estate. Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia during the period under study were mainly derived from poor peasant stock in Fujian and Guangdong, and were mostly the first-generation immigrants who made their millions in the new lands through their business acumen, hard work, and entrepreneurship. These Chinese capitalists were well aware of their wealth and social status, and had vaguely shared a common idea that they belonged to a special social group, which can be qualified as a class-consciousness. It is safe to suggest that by the end

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of the 19th century, Chinese capitalists emerged as a subclass at the top of the traditional shang (merchant) class in the Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. Three types of Chinese capitalist institutions existed during this period, they were business firms (hao) and companies (kongsi ), revenue farms, and modern banks. These institutions were shrewdly used by Chinese capitalists to mobilize capital and they made enormous profits out of them. The development of Chinese capitalism under study can roughly be divided into three periods: the period before 1850, the period between 1850 and 1911, and the period between 1912 and 1942. Each period was characterized by different types of business activities, and they were interrelated sequentially in developmental stages.

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Chapter 12

Confucianism and the Ethnic Chinese Business in East and Southeast Asia*

The Rise of Ethnic Chinese Economic Power in East and Southeast Asia In the rise of East and Southeast Asia as an economic powerhouse of the world since 1970s, the emergence of Ethnic Chinese economic power was the most striking and enigmatic. The economic power of the Ethnic Chinese can be assessed in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and their influence in the countries they resided. If the 50 million Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia were grouped together as a single economy, their annual GDP could match any medium-sized Western economic power like Australia. According to Professor Gordon Redding of University of Hong Kong, the Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia produced an aggregate GDP of US$200 billion in 1988 which was almost equivalent to Australia’s GDP of US$239 billion of the same year.1 The Economist, an authoritative magazine, estimated the GNP of 51 million of the Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia in 1990 at US$450 billion, a quarter more than China’s GNP of the same year.2 China at that time had a population of more than 20 times of that of the Ethnic Chinese population. The economic power of the Ethnic Chinese can also be assessed by their relative importance in the * This chapter is based on a public lecture delivered in Chinese as the Inaugural Tan Lark Sye professor of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, August 2000. 1 See S. Gordon Redding (1990). The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, p. 3. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter; Chng David CL (1993). The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in East Asia: Background, Business Practices and International Networks, p. 27. Melbourne: The Committee for Economic Development of Australia. 2 See (1992). The overseas Chinese: A driving force. The Economist, 324 (7768), p. 21.

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economies in East and Southeast Asia. In Taiwan, the economy is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese, while in Hong Kong and Singapore, Chinese control a substantial part of the economy ranging from manufacturing and service industries to real estate, wholesale and retail. In Southeast Asian countries, the economic influence of the Ethnic Chinese is also strong. In Indonesia, for instance, the Chinese who accounted for only 3–4% of the population, owned about 70% of private domestic capital and ran more than 160 of the 200 largest businesses of the country. Liem Sioe Liong’s Salim group alone was estimated to account for 5% of the country’s GDP. In 1995, every reported Indonesian billionaire was an Ethnic Chinese.3 In the Philippines, Ethnic Chinese accounted for less than 2% of the population, but controlled over one-third of their 1000 largest corporations.4

Confucianism and the East and Southeast Asian Economic Miracle The explanation of fast economic growth in East and Southeast Asia would never be complete if the role of Confucianism is not examined. The mainstream scholars or neo-classical economists who are associated with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank explain the rise of economic power of the Four Little Dragons (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore) in terms of rapid economic development of world economy. They take a broad global view and postulate that regional economic development is part and parcel of the global whole, and the success of the Four Little Dragons is the natural result of the development of world economy. Using the hypotheses of “Comparative Advantage” and “Technological Ladder”, the neo-classical economists interpret the economic miracle of the Four Little Dragons in terms of universalistic and institutional factors. They focus on the correct economic policies adopted by the governments of these countries, including market-oriented policy, export-driven 3

Weidenbaum, M and Hughes, S (1996). The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia, p. 25. New York: The Free Press. 4 Ibid.

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strategy, wise use of foreign investment, and macroeconomic stability policies.5 These neo-classical economists tend to ignore and deny non-economic factors such as cultural, religious, and social factors. They would be the least able to accept that Confucianism has anything to do with the fast economic growth of the Four Little Dragons, but they cannot deny the fact that three out of the Four East and Southeast Asian Little Dragons — Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore — have predominant Ethnic Chinese populations. In Taiwan and Hong Kong 98% of the population is Ethnic Chinese, while Ethnic Chinese constitute 77% of the Singapore population. These vast Ethnic Chinese populations shared a common cultural root — Confucianism. Principal Confucian values such as group orientation, respect for authority, reciprocity and sense of obligation, and loyalty to the institutions, permeated the Ethnic Chinese communities in these countries.6 These are the cultural ingredients that bond the East and Southeast Asian societies together and give them strength like cement and mortar to a brick house. This also provides the countries in East and Southeast Asia in their economic performance a competitive edge — Eastasia Edge — the term appropriately coined by Professors Roy Hofheinz, Jr., and Kent E. Calder in their influential book, The Eastasia Edge.7 The fallacy of the interpretation of the miracle of the Four Little Dragons by the neo-classical economists lies in their mechanical view of human societies and economic modernization. They tend to compartmentalize human society into many different segments which are mechanically linked together, and each segment acts quite independently and has little to do with other segments. This is why they view 5

See Gerald Tan (1995). The Newly Industrializing Countries of Asia, 2nd Ed., pp. 41–70. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 6 See S Gordon Redding (1991). Weak organizations and strong links: Managerial ideology and Chinese family business networks. In Business Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia, Hamilton G (ed.), p. 33. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong; Eddie C Y Kuo (1987). Confucianism and the Chinese Family in Singapore: Continuities and Changes, Working Papers, No. 83 pp. 10–25. Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. 7 See Hofheinz, R Jr, and Calder, KE (1982). The Eastasia Edge. New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers.

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economic success purely as the result of effective economic policies and strategies, and ignore sociocultural and religious factors. Conversely, a more acceptable interpretation of the East and Southeast Asian miracle should take a broad overall view of the society which is an integrated organic whole. This interpretation should take into account economic and political factors as well as cultural, religious, and social factors. Max Weber’s famous work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,8 has cast so much influence in the West on the interpretation of the rise of modern Western capitalism. Whether you agree with Weber’s interpretation or not is unimportant, what is important is that he has drawn our attention to the intangible factors which have a profound impact on economic process. Many Western scholars including some economists who disagreed with the neo-classical economists’ view would support Weber’s view that culture and values have an important role to play in the process of industrialization. Similarly, Confucianism which served as a common cultural root of some of the East and Southeast Asian countries would also have a role to play in the rapid economic development of the region. What precise aspects of Confucianism contributed directly to the rapid economic growth are still under intensive study by scholars, and there is no need to go deep into the issue now. But what is relevant here is the relationship between the Ethnic Chinese communities and Confucianism. The Ethnic Chinese communities, especially in Taiwan and Hong Kong, accumulated a great deal of Confucian values, and they are detectable in social practices. For instance, when I was attached to the Hong Kong University 10 years ago, I was struck by a practice of Xieshi yan (dinner for thanking teacher) which is still found in Hong Kong and Taiwan, but is seldom or not found in the Ethnic Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaysia. The students, toward the end of their study or graduation, would host a dinner to thank teachers for their effort, a token of appreciation and respect. This practice is obviously consistent with Confucian values of respect for knowledge and the 8 See Max, Weber, translated by Talcott, Parsons (1958). The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

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concept of reciprocity. In traditional China, teacher–students relationship was a key social relation outside the Confucian Five Cardinal relationships (between emperor and ministers, between father and son, between husband and wife, between brothers, and between friends). Teacher–students relationship did not just hinge on monetary remuneration — students paid fees while the teacher made a living out of it — but also on moral ground. The teacher did not just take teaching to be a job to impart knowledge to students, but it is also to guide them morally and discipline them to become useful citizens of society. He was morally obligated to set a good example for students to follow. On the other hand, the students received knowledge as well as moral guidance from the teacher, and were grateful for what they had been taught. They were to be obedient and respectful of the teacher. A sense of mutual responsibility prevailed.

The Nature of Ethnic Chinese Business in East and Southeast Asia Family ownership, strong business networking, strong cultural elements (Confucian values) in business organization and management are the three main characteristics of Ethnic Chinese business in East and Southeast Asia. Small-and medium-sized family companies constitute the bulk of the Ethnic Chinese business, and family becomes the focus of their business activities. The family provides capital, labor, and management. With the expansion of business activity, it remains in control of management, recruitment policy and bears the profit and loss of the business. The strength of the family business lies in its flexibility in operation and decision-making, and the dedication and loyalty of its labor force. However, limited managerial talent, nepotism, and internal feud, tend to weaken the family business, and restrict its expansion and corporatization.9 But when family business has developed to become a public company, the family or a group of 9

See Wong Siu-Lan. The Chinese family firm: A model. British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 36, pp. 65–68; Redding, S Gordon (1990). The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, pp. 176–181. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

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related families maintains the control of the majority of stocks and management.10 Strong business networking is an important characteristic of the Ethnic Chinese business. As Ethnic Chinese communities grew and developed in East and Southeast Asia under the Western colonial rules, Chinese traders had to develop elaborate networks for survival and growth.11 These networks provided facilities for capital accumulation, marketing information, and distribution of goods and services. What underpinned the Ethnic Chinese business networks were the ideas of Guanxi (Kuan-hsi, personal connections) and Xinyong (Hsinyung, personal trust). “Guanxi” is not an analytical concept, rather, it indicates a personal relationship loaded with affection and mutual obligations.12 It is defined by a scholar as peronalistic, particularistic and non-ideological ties between persons — based on a commonality of shared identification.13 In the context of the Ethnic Chinese society, this shared identification is based on kinship, geographical ties, dialect ties, and education. The early pattern of Chinese migration and the nature of the Ethnic Chinese communities strengthened the kinship and geographical–dialect ties. The lack of the home government protection before 1893 further convinced the Ethnic Chinese 10

See Tong Chee Keong (1996). Centripetal authority, differentiated networks: The social organization of Chinese firms in Singapore. In Asian Business Networks, Gary Hamilton (ed.), pp. 140–153. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter; Lim Mah Hui (1981). Ownership and Control of the One Hundred Largest Corporations in Malaysia, pp. 91–96. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press; Wilson D (1972). Solid As a Rock: The First Forty Years of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation, pp. 107–115. Singapore: Overseas-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd. 11 See Yen Ching-hwang (1998). Ethnic Chinese business networks in East and Southeast Asia. A paper presented at the Chinese Business History Seminar, Department of History, University of Queensland, 30th May 1998. 12 See Ambrose Yeo-chi King (1994). Kuan-hsi and network building: A sociological interpretation, in The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today, Tu Wei-ming (ed.), pp. 109–126. Stanford: Stanford University Press, See also Ambrose Yeo-chi King’s Chinese version of the same article entitled Guanxi yu wangluo jiangou, in (1992). Zhongguo shehui yu wenhua (Chinese Society and Culture), Jin Yaoji, (Ambrose Yeo-chi King) pp. 64–85. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 13

See Jacobs, JB (1973). Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, pp. 80–81. Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University.

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businessmen that they needed to rely on these traditional Chinese social ties if they wanted to survive and prosper.14 Right from the very beginning of the existence of the Ethnic Chinese communities in East and Southeast Asia, the founding of clan organizations (based on kinship ties) and dialect associations (based on geographical and dialect ties) demonstrated the importance of the kinship and dialect bonds among the early Chinese immigrants. These associations had a tight grip over their members, including jobs, social and cultural lives as well as business activities.15 The modernization of the Ethnic Chinese communities have weakened these traditional ties which have nevertheless survived and still formed an important basis for business grouping. On the other hand, the idea of Xinyong is based on honesty and reliability between two parties. It is to a certain extent like modern day credit-rating. But the Xinyong is more than credit-rating: it applies to both parties and involves two individuals, and then between two companies and later between two groups of companies. Although Xinyong has no legal basis, it has serious social and economic implications. A Chinese who lost Xinyong in business would undermine his social status as well as ruining his business.16 Strong cultural input (Confucianism) in organization and management is another important feature of the Ethnic Chinese business. Confucian values of hierarchy, harmony, loyalty, and reciprocity are reflected in the hierarchical structure and paternalistic management in the Ethnic Chinese business. Most Ethnic Chinese business are organized in the pyramid structure with top-down command, power and authority are concentrated at the top. At the same time, the management and ownership are intertwined, with the owner–manager 14

For Qing China’s non-protection policy towards Overseas (Ethnic) Chinese before 1893, see Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 19–31, 72–84. Singapore: Singapore University Press; Zhuang Guotu (1989). Zhongguo fengjian zhengfu de huaqiao zhengce (China’s Overseas Chinese Policy under the Feudal Governments), pp. 61–125. Xiamen: Xiamen daxue chubanshe. 15 See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 45–51, 87–93. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 16 See Barton C (1983). Trust and credit: Some observations regarding business strategies of overseas Chinese traders in South Vietnam, in The Chinese in Southeast Asia , Vol. 1, Lim LYC and Gosling PLA (eds.), pp. 46–64. Singapore: Maruzen Asia.

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enjoying greater power than the salary managers in Anglo-American companies.17 Although the owner-manager has a great deal of power, his power is constrained by the Confucian concept of paternalism and reciprocity. He would have the welfare of his employees at heart and treat them in a fair manner; in return, he and his company receive loyalty and dedication from his employees.18 Of course, there are cases that Chinese employers exploit their employees, but they are an exceptions rather than the norm.

Confucianism and the Business Ideology of the Ethnic Chinese The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia are the descendants of the Chinese immigrants in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Despite changes in political and economic environment and the adjustments they have to make to adapt to new situations the Ethnic Chinese in the region have invariably kept many of the Confucian values and Chinese tradition. Obviously, the Ethnic Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao tend to preserve more of these values than the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Confucian values were transmitted to the Ethnic Chinese communities through education, customs, and social practices. The China-born Ethnic Chinese invariably picked up some Confucian values either through family or village schools in the communities in South China;19 while the local-born Ethnic Chinese were exposed to the influence of Confucianism through Chinese 17

See S Gordon Redding, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, pp. 158–159; Yen Ching-hwang (ed.), Modern overseas Chinese business enterprise: A preliminary study, in Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, pp. 245–246. 18 For the case of Liem Sioe Liong of the Salim Group in Indonesia, see Sung Chek Mei (Song Zhemei) (1988). Lin Shaoliang zhuan (A Biography of Liem Sioe Liong), pp. 69–70. Hong Kong: Southeast Asia Research Institute; for the case of Chang Yung-fa (Zhang Rongfa), see Zhang Rongfa (1997), Zhang Rongfa huiyi lu (The Memoirs of Chang Yung-fa, the founder and CEO of the Evergreen Group of Companies in Taiwan), pp. 306–324. Taipei: Yuan Liou Publishing Co. Ltd. 19 For a study of the spread of Confucian values through family system in imperial China, see Ebrey P (1991). The Chinese family and the spread of Confucian values, in East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation, G Rozman (ed.), pp. 45–83. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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schools, Chinese customs or social practices.20 Confucian values of filial piety, loyalty, familism, reciprocity, and respect for age and authority filtered to all sections of the Ethnic Chinese communities through family teachings, ancestral worship, functions of clan and dialect organizations, and traditional festivities such as Qing Ming (offering sacrifices to the deceased ancestors).21 These values set mental frameworks for the Ethnic Chinese, and provided them with guidance in their behavior. Thus, Confucian values laid the foundation of business ideology in the Ethnic Chinese communities. Several important concepts in modern Ethnic Chinese business ideology are “harmony”, “reciprocity”, “hierarchy and paternalism”, “innovation”, and “progress”. The concept of “harmony” (he) is perhaps most important, and it is derived from Confucian concepts of benevolence (ren) and propriety (li ). Most modern Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs regard their enterprises as an extended family, and the employees and employers only assume different status and role within that large family. It is on the basis of this harmony that members of the company cooperate and the company prospers. But to achieve greater success for the company, members of this large family should understand their positions and roles in the enterprise, and develop their own potential within the organization. The Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs are not unaware of the potential conflict of interests between employers and employees. The gains for the employees could mean the loss of the employers. Unlike the Marxists who see industrial relations in a strict class terms and tend to regard the class relationship as antagonistic and irreconcilable, the Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs perceive the employer–employee relationship as a senior–junior partnership in a common endeavor, and their relationship is harmonious, cooperative, and complimentary.22 20

See Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 298. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 21 Ibid., pp. 84–88; Eddie C Y Kuo (1987). Confucianism and the Chinese family in Singapore: Continuities and changes. Working Papers, No. 83. Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, pp. 10–25. 22 See Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Modern overseas Chinese business enterprise: A preliminary study, in Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, p. 241. Singapore, Times Academic Press.

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Another major concept in the business ideology of the Ethnic Chinese is reciprocity. Again, this concept seems to have been grown out of Confucian concepts of benevolence (ren ) and loyalty (zhong) which govern the bonds between superior and subordinate. Benevolence is not just the right attitude for superior in treating his subordinate, but also his moral duty. On the other hand, the subordinate has to reciprocate with loyalty. From the perspective of the subordinate, he has the right to be treated benevolently by his superior, but also he has the moral duty to pay his superior absolute loyalty. A similar perspective is taken by the superior who is morally obliged to be benevolent, and at the same time, he has the right to demand absolute loyalty. The Chinese tradition seems to have imposed the duty on the superior to initiate such a reciprocal relationship. In applying this concept of reciprocity to the business enterprise, modern Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs aptly use this concept to cultivate good relationships with their employees, and appear to have sealed a strong bond with them. This helps to smooth the industrial relations in Ethnic Chinese enterprises.23 Concepts of hierarchy and paternalism form other important elements of the modern Ethnic Chinese business ideology. The Confucian society was structured hierarchically by class and status, and was further organized into hierarchies of age, gender, and generation within family and clan.24 The Confucian concept of social hierarchy, in contrast to the Western concept of equality, is based on the assumption that individuals are inherently unequal in ability and morality, and they should be given different status and roles in society. Inequality is therefore considered to be natural and justified. Being brought up in a Chinese family and community which are 23 See Guo Quan (Kwok Chin) (1961). Yongan jingshen zhi fazhan ji qi zhangcheng shilue (The Origins of Wing On Spirit and Its Development), pp. 27–28. Hong Kong: Win On Company Ltd. Yen Ching-hwang (1991). The Wing On company in Hong Kong and Shanghai: A case study of modern ethnic Chinese enterprise, 1907–1949, in Proceedings of Conference on Eighty Years History of the Republic of China, 1912–1991, Vol. 4, pp. 91–92. Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo chubanshe. 24 See Baker HDR (1979). Chinese Family and Kinship, pp. 49–70. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd; Hsien Chin Hu (1968). The Common Descent Group in China and Its Fuctions, pp. 18–20. New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.

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hierarchically stratified, modern Ethnic Chinese businessmen tend to perceive others from that perspective. They tend to see the business world in two separate hierarchies: external and internal. In the external hierarchy, business enterprises, large and small are competing among themselves, and they are far from equal. Those large and financially powerful enterprises are at the top, followed by the medium-sized enterprises, and the small and financially weak ones are at the bottom of the hierarchy. The competition in the business world is fierce: successful enterprises expand and move up to the top, while the less successful ones move downward and even disappear all together. In the internal hierarchy, all members of the enterprise are also structured hierarchically according to position and role, and have to contribute their utmost to the enterprise. Within this internal structure, those who occupy leadership positions are expected to lead and to be good examples for their subordinates to follow. At the same time, they have to treat their subordinates with benevolence. This internal hierarchy and its relations give rise to the concept of paternalism.25 The leaders feel morally obligated to lead and to discipline the subordinates for the common good of the enterprise.26 Undoubtedly, the concepts of hierarchy and paternalism generate a strong sense of competitiveness and self-motivation which helps to motivate and discipline the work force, and serves as a driving force behind modern Ethnic Chinese business enterprises.

Impact of Confucianism on Ethnic Chinese Business Management The impact of Confucianism on Ethnic Chinese business organization and management can be best illustrated by the management style of Tan Kah Kee. Tan Kah Kee is a big name in Ethnic Chinese history. A top Ethnic Chinese capitalist, an Ethnic Chinese entrepreneur, a

25

See Redding, SG (1990). The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, pp. 127–135. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 26 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Wing On company of Hong Kong and Shanghai, in Studies in Modern Ethnic Chinese History, p. 210.

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Chinese patriot and a well-known Chinese education-promoter in the 1920s and 1930s, he has became a legend in Ethnic Chinese history.27 His impact on Chinese politics and Chinese education in China is still being felt, and his words and deeds still inspire millions of Ethnic Chinese and Chinese in China alike. Like many other Ethnic Chinese business enterprises, Tan Kah Kee’s management style was characterized by a centripetal authority, known as ‘‘paternalistic style of management”. Power and authority are concentrated at the top, and the decision-making process was top-down rather than bottom-up.28 The Confucian elitist concept of responsibility drove many Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs to over-burden themselves with executive and administrative duties. The foundation of Chinese “paternalism” is based not on Western concept of “power” but on “responsibility”. A Chinese owner-manager tends to make many decisions not because he enjoys making them, but because he feels obligated to run the business properly. Leadership and centripetal authority accounted for much of the success of the Ruifuxiang company of Peking (Beijing), and they were also the key factors for the success of Tan Kah Kee’s business. However, Tan Kah Kee was not as dedicated to business as Meng Luoquan of Ruifuxiang, whose hobby was to read account books.29 Nevertheless, Tan devoted much of his time to building up his business empire. Him rising early in the morning to inspect his factories and branches became his daily routine, and his regular meetings with staff and subordinates qualified him as a workaholic.30 His dedication to business not only injected dynamism into the organization, but also became a model for emulation among his staff and subordinates. 27 See Yong CF (1986). Tan Kah -kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 28 See Yen Ching-hwang (1998). Tan Kah Kee and the Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship, in Asian Culture, No. 22, p. 5. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies. 29 See Wellington K K Chan (1982). The organization structure of the traditional Chinese firm and its modern reform. Business History Review: Special Issue on East Asian Business History , 56(2), 222–226. 30 See Lim How Seng (1995). Chen Jiageng de jingying linian yu qiye guanli (The entrepreneurial ideas and management of Tan Kah Kee), in Xinjiapo huashe yu huashang (Chinese Society and Chinese Merchants in Singapore), pp. 159–160. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies.

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Tan Kah Kee’s paternalistic style of management was inherently Confucian. Being influenced by the Confucian Classics when he was young, he seemed to have absorbed much of the Confucian values and unconsciously incorporated them into his management thought.31 The domination of ownership over management has been an important feature of modern and contemporary Ethnic Chinese business, and it was conspicuously shown in Tan Kah Kee’s style of management. Tan was a firm believer of Confucian elitism — a strong and dedicated leadership would lead to the success of any task. He did not believe in the Western style of democratic process which he reckoned to be inefficient and time-consuming. The traditional Chinese ownermanager style suited his aspiration and personality. He believed that a strong leadership was predicated on the control of ownership, and this was why he safeguarded the control by placing his family members in key management positions. When his Khiam Aik Company was registered as a liability company in 1916, he ensured his permanent control over the company by making himself and his brother Tan Keng Hean two out of the three permanent directors whose approval were to be sought before any new directors could be added. The collapse of his father’s business taught him that control over management was the key to success in business. He thus exercised strict control over his business operation: he was the owner-manger of most of his enterprises, and was the managing director when his enterprises came under the umbrella organization of Tan Kah Kee Company in 1919. Even when he was away in China, busy with his non-profitmaking educational activities, he had his brother Tan Keng Hean at the helm of his business.32 He also appointed his sons to some major management positions, and his son-in-law, Lee Kong Chian, was in a key position in his management hierarchy.33 In all probability, the domination of ownership over management suits Chinese behavior and values. First, it gives the management more weight in running the business, and facilitates the enterprise’s smooth 31

See Yen Ching-hwang, Tan Kah Kee and the Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship. op.cit., p. 5. See Tan Kah-kee (1993). Nanqiao huiyi lu (Autobiography), Vo. 2. p. 500. New Edition, River Edge: Global Publishing Co.Inc. 33 See Yong CF, Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, p. 60. 32

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operation. In a status and power conscious society like the Ethnic Chinese community, a salaried manager carries less weight than the owner-manager, because, in the eyes of staff and workers, he is just one of them, and his power is limited. Second, the owner-manager is able to make decisions move quickly because he is not only just responsible for the short-term profit and loss of the company, but also the destiny of the entire enterprise. He alone will ultimately take the responsibility for the success or failure of the company. Third, unlike the salaried manager of some Western companies who has little risk to his own financial position and may make reckless decisions, the owner-manager has to be more cautious because his personal finance is at stake. He would probably work harder for the success of the company as well. Fourth, the owner-manager would be easier for staff and workers to identify and to invest their goodwill with. In a web of complex human relationships like the Ethnic Chinese community, the investment of goodwill in an owner-manager produces better and quicker results.34 Like other modern and contemporary Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, Tan Kah Kee’s main strength of management lay in his ability to integrate traditional Chinese values with Western business practices. The western principle of meritocracy was intertwined with the Chinese value of personal connections which was expressed in the emphasis of kinship, dialect, and geographical ties. The deficiency of the Western meritocratic principle will be expressed in a strong spirit of individualism and lack of loyalty; while traditional Chinese value of personal connections tends to generate complacency and nepotism. But the combination of these two strengthened and complemented each other. A manager recruited under this formula feels indebted to the employer and has a strong bond with the company. His link to the company is not just hinged on financial rewards, but also on personal and moral grounds; and his loyalty to the company cannot easily be swayed by a higher financial reward from another company.35 Tan Kah

34

See Yen Ching-hwang, Tan Kah Kee and the Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship, op.cit., pp. 5–6. See Yen Ching-hwang (ed.), (1995). Modern overseas Chinese enterprise: A preliminary study. in Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, p. 246. Singapore: Times Academic Press.

35

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Kee was keenly aware of this advantage. He strove to strike the balance between meritocracy and personal connections. In the selection of his managers and senior staff, Tan obviously favored his relatives, kinsmen and fellow Tong An folks. But his pool of talent was not just confined to that; it was extended to cover most Southern Hokkien speakers and graduates of the Chi Mei and Xiamen Universities. For instance, in his Sambawang factory which employed more than 6000 workers, he had six superintendents under the manager of the factory, and five of them were southern Hokkien speakers, and only one came from Anhui province.36 The managers and senior staff recruited on this formula worked hard for Tan Kah Kee, and they were bound to him through dialect and geographical ties, and were not easily poached by Tan’s business competitors. John Lorriman and Takashi Kenjo in their work draw a contrast between Western and Japanese management styles. Western management emphasizes technical competence and strategies, while Japanese management focuses on training of staff and the unleashing of human energy.37 Tan Kah Kee’s approach to management was similar to that of the Japanese. He emphasized a great deal on moral power and the cultivation of correct attitude of staff and workers. His exalted aim of using commerce to save China was inspiring and generated a strong sense of patriotism among his staff and workers who had a clearer purpose to work hard for the success of the company.38

36

See Lim How Seng. Chen Jiageng de jingying linian yu qiye guanli, op.cit., p. 158. See Lorriman, J and Kenjo, T (1996). Japan’s Winning Margins: The Secrets of Japan’s Success, pp. 82–83. Tokyo: Oxford University Press. 38 See Chen Jiageng gongsi fenhang zhangcheng (The Rules and Regulations of the Tan Kah Kee Company Pty. Ltd.) ‘preface’ and pp. 1–8. (Singapore, 1929). 37

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Chapter 13

The Overseas Chinese Nationalism: A Historical Study*

Introduction The term “nationalism” derived from a phenomenon in European history, denotes a process of change of ideas and outlooks. Hans Kohn has succinctly defined that “Nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due to a nation state”.1 The keywords of Hans Kohn’s definition are “supreme loyalty” and “the nation state”. What is implicit in his statement is that there are other loyalties of an individual such as loyalty to a culture, to a tradition, to an institution or a company, or to persons. But Kohn has greatly emphasized the political loyalty of an individual to a nation state and elevated that loyalty to the “supreme” status. This definition is perhaps valid to be applied to the study of the European countries after the end of the 18th century. “Nationalism” as a concept underwent changes when it is applied to the study of similar political processes in Asia, Africa, and other developing countries. Apart from cultural differences with the European countries, most of these countries went through different political processes from the Europeans. Most of them were either colonies or semi-colonies of the European powers in their recent past. Their nationalist movements were very much connected with their struggles against the colonial rules, and their aspirations for * This chapter is based on a paper presented at the International conference on Chinese studies, Kuala Lumpur, 20–21, November 1993. 1 See Kohn, H (1965). Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, p. 9. New Jersey: Van Nostrand Company Inc.

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becoming independent modern states. In this context, perhaps John Kautsky’s definition of “nationalism” as “an ideology and movement in opposition to alien rule, and in hoping to create a new modern state”, is more appropriate for the study of Asian nationalism.2 It is also relevant for the study of Overseas Chinese nationalism. Unlike many countries in the developing world, China was never colonized, and it did not have the experience of direct alien rule. But China in its modern time was reduced to the status of a semi-colony, and experienced similar oppression and economic exploitation in the hands of foreign powers. Thus, modern Chinese nationalism still possesses a strong anti-foreign sentiment expressed occasionally in its outbursts against foreigners.3 At the same time, modern Chinese national leaders such as Dr Sun Yat-sen and Mao Zedong had expressed a strong desire for the establishment of a powerful modern Chinese state.4 The negative element of anti-foreignism and the positive element of the desire for creating a modern state formed the two important parts of the modern Chinese nationalism. Overseas Chinese communities had never been independent communities. They were effectively the outgrowth of the Chinese society in China before the Second World War. Although economic roots of the pre-war Overseas Chinese communities grew deeper and deeper in the host countries, they invariably forged strong political,

2

See Kautsky, J (1962). Political Change in Under-developed Countries: Nationalism and Communism, pp. 33–41. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 3 For a general study of anti-foreignism in China, see Liao Kuang-sheng (1986). Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860–1980. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. For more specific anti-foreign activities, see Cohen, PA (1963). The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 4 For Sun Yat-sen’s view on this issue, see Sun’s famous principle of “Nationalism”, in Sun Yatsen, (1962). Sun Zhongshan xuanji, Vol. 2, pp. 588–660. Hong Kong: Sitong Publisher; See also Sun Yat-sen’s speech to the students of the Lingnan University in Canton delivered on 21 December 1923, in Sun Yat-sen (1986). Sun Zhongshan chuanji (Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 8, pp. 533–542. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store. For Mao Zedong’s view on this issue, see Schram SR (1969). The Political Thought of Mao TseTung, pp. 167–168. Penguin Books.

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educational, cultural, and emotional ties with China.5 But the rapid political change both in China and abroad weakened these ties during the post-war era, and many of the Overseas Chinese communities had transformed their political allegiance and developed their new identity in the host countries.6 In this context, the Overseas Chinese nationalism was an ideology and a movement which expressed a deep concern for China’s welfare and China’s survival as a nation state. It opposed the threat of foreign imperialism in China. It also strove to unite the Overseas Chinese communities in a particular region, and to provide the Overseas Chinese a sense of pride and dignity. But there was a lack of a pan-Overseas Chinese nationalist movement due to distance and political barriers. Although there existed indigenous nationalist movements in the host countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, there were no attempts by Overseas Chinese nationalists to ally themselves with the indigenous nationalists, and their prime focus was still on China. In short, the Overseas Chinese nationalism was an outgrowth of modern Chinese nationalism, but not a branch of the indigenous nationalism in the host countries.

The Origins of the Overseas Chinese Nationalism Both internal and external forces combined to bring forth the Overseas Chinese nationalism. Despite regional and dialect 5

For close political and emotional ties with China during the pre-war period in Southeast Asia, see Akashi Y (1970). The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas; Stephen MY Leong (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of overseas Chinese nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles; Yong CF and RB McKenna (1990), The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949. Singapore: Singapore University Press. For the development of the ties with China among the Chinese in North America, see Wickberg E (ed.) (1982). From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada, pp. 188–203. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd; Lai HM (1922). Cong Huaqiao dao Huaren (From Overseas Chinese to Ethnic Chinese Americans), pp. 204–251. Hong Kong: San Lian Book Store. 6 See Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds.) (1988). Changing Identities of the Southeast Asia Chinese Since World War II. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press; Guo Liang et al. (ed.), (1990). Zhanhou haiwai huaren bianhua (The Post-war Transformation of Overseas Chinese). Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi.

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differences,7 the Overseas Chinese came from the same racial stock and shared a common cultural outlook. The common written language, similar social customs and festivities provided a further bond among them, and the Confucian values permeated the Overseas Chinese communities regardless of age and class differences.8 Further, most Overseas Chinese were Buddhist in their religious outlook with some mixture of Taoism. These latent elements: the common racial stock, the common written language, similar social customs and festivities, the Confucian value system, and a common religious outlook, formed the basis of Overseas Chinese nationalism. External pressure galvanized the rise of the Overseas Chinese nationalism. This pressure came mainly from Western powers and Japan through two channels: the pressure on China, and the pressure placed on the Overseas Chinese communities. The threat of the Western powers to China at the end of the 19th century, and the blatant Japanese aggression in the 1930s, aroused intense nationalistic response from the Overseas Chinese communities.9 Anti-imperialism also characterized the Overseas Chinese nationalism. The anti-American boycotts in the Chinese communities in the United States and Southeast Asia in 1905,10 and the anti-Japanese 7 For a study of regional and dialect differences of the Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya in the period between 1800 and 1911, see Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, Chapters 2 and 6. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 8 For the spread of Confucian ideas in Singapore and Malaya before 1912, see Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Confucian revival movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899–1911. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7(1), 33–57; For the spread of Confucian ideas in the Dutch East Indies, see Suryadinata L (1978). Confucianism in Indonesia: Past and Present. The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers, pp. 33–62. Singapore: Chopmen Enterprise; Coppel CA (1981). The origins of Confucianism as an organized religion in Java, 1900–1923. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1). A special issue on Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia edited by Yong CF, pp. 179–196. 9 For instance, the intense anti-Japanese feeling was aroused in Singapore and Malaya after the outbreak of large-scale Japanese invasion of China in July 1937; see Pang Wing-seng (1973). The double-seventh incident, 1937. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4(2), pp. 269–299. 10 See Tsai Shih-shan Henry (1983). China and the Overseas Chinese in the United States, 18681911, Chapter 6. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press; McKee DL (1977). Chinese Exclusion Versus the Open Door Policy, 1900–1906, Chapter 7. Detroit: Wayne State University Press; Chang Ts’un-wu (Zhang Cunwu) (1965). Guanxi sayi nian Zhong Mei Gongyue fengchao (The 1905 Sino-American Dispute over the Exclusion Law). Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan.

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movements among Southeast Asian Chinese in 1908, 1928, 1931, and 1936–194111 invariably expressed a clear anti-imperialist stance of the Overseas Chinese. This was because they shared a strong feeling of injustice with their compatriots in China who were oppressed by foreign imperialists. Many of them suffered racial discrimination, illtreatment, and cruelties in the hands of foreigners during their migration or sojourn overseas;12 and feared that their compatriots would suffer the same fate if China was to be reduced to the status of a colony. But this anti-imperialist sentiment was basically reactive and defensive. These movements did not target their attacks on imperialism as a system or as an ideology, but rather to resist the imperialism for its aggressions in China and its oppression of the Overseas Chinese. Started in San Francisco as a protest against American discrimination of Chinese immigrants in the United States, the 1905 antiAmerican boycotts spread widely across the Pacific to many Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and in the coastal provinces in China, and it developed into a strong mighty anti-imperialist movement. This was because the issue involved had struck the chord of the hearts of many Overseas Chinese outside the United States who wished that the imperialist discrimination against the American Chinese be resisted and stopped, and they had to take a firm stand on the issue.13

Development of the Overseas Chinese Nationalism Professor Wang Gungwu is right to point out that “No national leader arose independently from the Nanyang Chinese before the visit 11

See Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan Incident, 1928. Journal of the South Seas Society (Singapore), Vol. 43, pp. 1–22; Akashi Y (1981). Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and Boycott movement, 1908–1928: A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. In Journal of South Seas Society, 12(1), pp. 207–223; Akashi Y (1970). The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement 1937–1941. The University of Kansas Press. 12 Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese in Late Ch’ing Period, Chapters 5 and 7. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 13 For the anti-American boycott movement among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, see Lat Pau (Le Bao), 21/6/1905, 29/6/1905, 1/7/1905, 3/7/1905, 19/7/1905; see also Yen Ching-hwang (1976), The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, pp. 64–65. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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of Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen in 1900”.14 This was also true for most of the Overseas Chinese communities throughout the world. In fact, there were no national leaders arising independently from among Overseas Chinese, nor were there any organized nationalist movements emerging from the Overseas Chinese communities before 1900. However, there was a rise of national consciousness stemming from the loyalty to traditional Chinese culture. The Le Shan She Lecture movement and the Confucian Revival movement which arose in the last two decades of the 19th century in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia provided two best examples of this kind. Started in Singapore in 1881 and spreading to Malacca, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur in 1895,15 the Le Shan She Lecture movement attempted to reassert traditional Chinese values among the Southeast Asian Chinese. Conducting regular lectures on the first and fifteenth day of every lunar month, it expounded the Sixteen Sacred Maxims of the Emperor Kangxi,16 which contained much of the Confucian values relating to filial piety, loyalty to the clan, propriety and thrift, obedience to the laws, emphasis on agricultural works, appeasing neighbors and fellow-villagers, rejection of false doctrines, and exaltation of the right learning.17 Emerging in Singapore in 1899 and then spreading to the Malay states and the Dutch East Indies in the early years of the 20th century,18 14

See Wang Gungwu (1981). The limits of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism, 1912–1927. In Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, p. 143. Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books. 15 See Yen Ching-hwang (1982). Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. In Modern Asian Studies, 16(3), 401–402. 16 See Sing Po (Xing Bao), 15/2/1895, pp. 5 and 8. 17 An English translation of the Maxims is found in Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 187–188. A Chinese version of the Maxims which was probably used as a text for the Lo Shan She lectures in Singapore and Malaya, is found in Hare GT (1894). A Test Book of Documentary Chinese, Pt. 1, Vol. 2, Chapters 3 and 4, pp. 92–93. Singapore: Government Printing Office. 18 For the Confucian Revival movement in Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Confucian revival movement in Singapore and Malaya, 1899–1912. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 7(1), 33–57; For the Confucian Revival movement in the Dutch East Indies, see Coppel CA (1981). The origins of Confucianism as an organized religion in Java, 1900–1923. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 12(1), pp. 179–195; Leo Suryadinata, ‘Confucianism in Indonesia’, in The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven papers, pp. 33–62.

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the Confucian revival movement provided a sharper focus and more effective mechanism for the reassertion of the Confucian values in the Overseas Chinese communities. Public celebration of Confucis’ birthday, together with the establishment of Confucian schools and Confucian temples became instrumental for the realization of the objectives of this movement.19 But, these movements could not be equated to Overseas Chinese nationalist movements, for their supreme loyalty was not directed toward a nation state, but to the Confucian culture. In this sense, they could only be regarded as the important part of Overseas Chinese national consciousness, the forerunner of the Overseas Chinese nationalism. The rise of the Overseas Chinese national consciousness at the end of the 19th century was the result of two forces at work: spontaneous reaction of Overseas Chinese culturalists to the decline of traditional Chinese values in the communities; and the Ch’ing policy of cultivating Overseas Chinese loyalty. Overseas Chinese culturalists, consisting of Confucian scholars and merchants saw themselves playing the role of scholar-gentry in the Chinese society in China and as guardians of the Confucian value system and the Chinese way of life.20 They abhorred the decline of the traditional Chinese values and the trend toward Westernization and Babaization in the younger generation of the Overseas Chinese. They believed that they could halt or even reverse the trend by restoring traditional Chinese values, and rekindling the love for Chinese culture, and that the Overseas Chinese communities could withstand the impact of the changing environment.21 Coinciding with the concern of the Overseas Chinese culturalists was the introduction of a new policy toward Overseas Chinese. The traditional hostile policy toward immigrants came to an end in

19

Yen Ching-hwang, Ibid., pp. 44–45. For the composition and role of the gentry in Chinese society in 19th century, see Chang Chung-li (1955). The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 21 See Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 284–295. 20

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1893,22 and the Ch’ing government installed a new policy in courting Overseas Chinese for the support of its economic modernization.23 Brevet titles and official ranks were offered as rewards to woo Overseas Chinese capitalists to invest in China, and this policy was implemented through Qing diplomatic networks or roving emissaries.24 Qing diplomats’ involvement in cultivating Overseas Chinese loyalty predated the change in the traditional policy. The founding of the Chinese consulate in Singapore in 1877, the first of its kind in Overseas Chinese communities in the world,25 marked the commencement of such an effort. Despite their personal inclinations, Consul Zuo Binglong and Consul-General Huang Zunxian consciously carried out this policy of courting the Overseas Chinese. Their effort in founding literary societies and the promotion of cultural activities were the premium for acquiring Overseas Chinese loyalty.26 This invariably helped to kindle national consciousness among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. Overseas Chinese nationalism might not have occurred if the reformists and the revolutionaries were not present in the Overseas Chinese communities at the end of the 19th century. The failure of 22

For the study of circumstances leading to the abolishment of the Ch’ing restrictive immigration policy in 1893, see Yen Ching-hwang, Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of the Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 249–261. 23 For Ch’ing government’s courting of Overseas Chinese for its economic modernization, see Godley M (1975). The late Ch’ing courtship of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. In Journal of Asian Studies, 34(2), 361–385; Godley M (1981). The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang : Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911, Chapters 4–7. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 24 For a study on this subject, see Yen Ching-hwang (1970). Ch’ing’s sale of honours and the Chinese leadership in Singapore and Malaya (1877–1912). In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(2), 20–32; Chui Kuei-chiang (1976). Late Ch’ing’s modern enterprises and the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1904–1911, Occasional paper No. 17, Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang University, Singapore, pp. 1–15. 25 See Wen Chung-chi (1964). The Nineteenth century Imperial Chinese consulate in the Straits Settlements. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Singapore. 26 For the cultural activities of Zuo Binglong and Huang Zunxian in Singapore and Malaya, see Chen Mong Hock (1967). The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore 1881–1912, pp. 115–120. Singapore: University of Malaya Press.

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the Hundred Days’ Reform in China in 1898 forced the top reformist leaders to take refuge abroad. The presence of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in the Overseas Chinese communities first in Japan, and then in North America and Southeast Asia was the consequence of a combination of accidental factors rather than the result of a welldeliberated plan.27 Their presence among the Overseas Chinese made them realize the importance of the immigrants’ money and the potential of them becoming an important political asset. The revolutionaries led by Dr Sun Yat-sen suffered the same fate like the reformists in China. Their abortive revolts in south Kwangtung in 1895 and 1900 forced their leaders to flee overseas. Their presence in the Overseas Chinese communities also made them keenly aware of the importance of the immigrants as political assets.28 The presence of the revolutionaries abroad was again due to circumstances rather than plan. Both the reformists and revolutionaries shared the common objectives of mobilizing the support of the Overseas Chinese to enhance their political fortune in China. They published newspapers, magazines, and leaflets to spread the ideas of reform and revolution; they established schools and reading clubs to disseminate reformist and revolutionary messages; and they also organized public talks and rallies and drama performances to indoctrinate their audience.29 It was during this process of intensive propaganda that they had politicized the Overseas Chinese, and created an 27 See Jung-pang Lo. K’ang Yu-wei: A Biography and A Symposium, pp. 178–196. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press; Ding W (1959). Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changpian chugao (The Draft of the Chronological Biography of Liang Qichao), pp. 80–192. Taipei: Shijie Bookstore. 28 For a discussion of Dr Sun Yat-sen’s perception of Overseas Chinese role in the 1911 Revolution, see Yen Ching-hwang (1988). Sun Yat-sen and Overseas Chinese, 1894–1911. Paper presented at the 7th National Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra, pp. 1–7. 29 For the reformist and revolutionary propaganda activities in Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, pp. 100–211. For reformist and revolutionary activities in North America, see L Eve Armentrout Ma (1990). Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 45–124. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; Wickberg E et al., From China to Canada: A History of the Chinese Communities in Canada, pp. 73–89.

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extremely favorable condition for the rise of Overseas Chinese nationalism. They had invariably promoted China as a nation state which was different from a Confucian cultural empire, and had successfully portrayed China as a political and economic entity of which the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, where the majority of the immigrants came from, were integral parts. It was this China in its entirety that deserved Overseas Chinese’s prime loyalty. At the same time, their activities had, to some extent, united the Overseas Chinese communities. Dialect and regional boundaries had been blurred, and inter-dialect and inter-regional cooperation was made possible under the banner of a projected new China.30 More importantly, the process of politicization had changed the inner outlook of many Overseas Chinese who became more interested in politics, more concerned about the affairs taking place in China, and more confident in themselves and their ability to decide their own destiny. It was the change of this mental outlook of many Overseas Chinese that had injected immense energy into the Overseas Chinese nationalist movements. The development of Overseas Chinese nationalism was closely connected with modern Chinese nationalism in China. In fact, the scope and direction of the Overseas Chinese nationalism were determined by the development and intensity of modern Chinese nationalism. In other words, the Overseas Chinese nationalism reflected the pulse of modern Chinese nationalism. Modern Chinese nationalism arose at the end of the 19th century and went through different stages of development. It began with the anti-Manchu movement led by Dr Sun Yat-sen in the last decade of the 19th century, to the stage of intense anti-warlordism and anti-imperialism in the 1920s, to the highest stage of anti-Japanese imperialism in the 1930s.31 Underlying 30

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 287–290; L Eve Armentrout Ma, Revolutionaries, Monarchists and Chinatowns, pp. 43–51. 31 For the study of rise of modern Chinese nationalism, see Wright MC (ed.) (1968). China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913. New Haven: Yale University Press; Gasster M (1969). Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Chow Tse-tsung (1960). The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Liao Kuangsheng Antiforeignism and Modernization in China, 1860–1980.

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the development of the modern Chinese nationalism was the undercurrent of anti-traditionalism and anti-Confucianism which expressed the desire to transform the tradition-ridden society into a modern one so as to make China viable in the modern world.32 Reflecting the spirit and pulse of the modern Chinese nationalism, the Overseas Chinese nationalism also went through the early stage of anti-Manchuism to the stage of anti-warlordism, and climaxed in the stage of intense antiJapanism in the 1930s. In the early stage of the development of Overseas Chinese nationalism, anti-Manchuism became the focal point of mobilization of the immigrants’ support. Manchurians were portrayed by the Chinese revolutionaries as an inferior race, and the Manchu government as inept and corrupt, and incapable of saving China from the aggressive imperialism.33 The Manchu government was further depicted by the revolutionaries as the oppressor of its overseas subjects, and that it had neglected its responsibility to protect them overseas.34 In this political mobilization of the Overseas Chinese, there is no evidence to suggest that those Chinese who suffered more acute discrimination in the host countries, responded more fervently to the call of the revolutionaries.35 However, regional differences marked the early development of Overseas Chinese nationalism. These differences were determined by the size of the Chinese community, the degree of 32

See Chow Tse-tsung (1960). The anti-Confucian movement in early Republic China. In The Confucian Persuasion, Wright AF (ed.), pp. 288–312. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Chow Tse-tsung, In The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, pp. 300–313. 33 See for instance, the article written by Le Sheng entitled, Manren zhi wu chi (The shamelessness of the Manchus) published as an editorial of the Chong Shing Yit Pao, a revolutionary newspaper in Singapore, in Chong Shing Yit Pao (Zhong Xing ribao), 23 January 1908, p. 2. 34 See Chong Shing Yit Pao, 5 September 1907, p. 2, 23 January 1908, p. 2, 5 May 1908, p. 2. 35 Lea Williams’s study of the Overseas Chinese nationalism in Indonesia has found that acute discrimination of the Chinese by the Dutch Colonial government has contributed to the early rise of national consciousness of the local Chinese resulting partly in the founding of the famous Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (Zhonghua huiguan) in Batavia on 17 March 1900. But there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese in Dutch East Indies had responded more fervently than other Overseas Chinese to the 1911 Revolution. See Williams LE (1960). Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916. Glencoe: The Free Press.

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Chinese-ness, and the policy of the host government toward Chinese revolutionaries. Larger Overseas Chinese communities with greater retention of Chinese identity and a friendly host government tended to be more responsive toward the revolution, and the idea of nationalism was more pervasive throughout all classes in the communities. The reasons for this difference are obvious, for a larger Chinese community would have more Chinese schools and newspapers which would have generated immense interest in all things Chinese and the politics in China. Greater retention of the Chinese identity naturally led to more concern for China’s future, and a friendly host government would not have frustrated the activities of the local Chinese revolutionaries. The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya is the case in point. The Chinese communities in Singapore and Malaya was probably the largest at that time, and had stronger Chinese identity. The relatively friendly and sympathetic British Colonial government provided a good opportunity for the local Chinese revolutionary activity to grow.36 Class status and political ties with the Manchu government were two other dimensions of the Overseas Chinese’s response to the antiManchu call. Within the same geographical boundary, the Overseas Chinese responded to the Chinese revolution differently in accordance with their different socio-economic status and their political relations with the Manchu government. For the members of the upper class (including wealthy merchants and traders, wealthy shopkeepers, big tin-miners, big plantation owners, and big property owners), the revolution was not entirely a welcome prospect. Although a successful revolution may lead to a strong modern China which in turn may benefit them in some ways overseas, an unsuccessful revolution would involve high risks. Because of their wealth and vested interests in maintaining the status quo, they were reluctant to antagonize the Manchu government, let alone to support the movement in overthrowing it. This was why their attitude toward the revolution 36

For a discussion of the British Colonial government’s policy toward the Chinese revolution, see Lee Lai To (ed.) (1987). The Attitude of the Straits Government towards Sun Yat-sen, 1900–1911. In The 1911 Revolution — The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia, pp. 35–47. Singapore: Heinemann Asia.

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was ambiguous and opportunistic. For those who had strong political ties with the Manchu government, their attitude toward the revolution was naturally hostile. Only a small number of them who had no political ties with the Manchus and who were relatively young in age, were able to respond fervently to the revolution.37 The members of the middle class (including small shopkeepers, petty traders, school teachers, journalists, clerks, and shop-assistants) appeared to have responded more fervently to the call for the overthrow of the Manchus. Many of them had received some form of Chinese education and were literate, and they were more exposed than the members of the lower class to the influence of the revolutionary publications. They were also more aware of China’s declining status in the world, and of the ineptitude of the Manchu government in defending China’s sovereignty vis-a-vis the aggressive imperialist powers. A dawning concept of nationalism, together with a desire for a strong mother country to protect them overseas, motivated them to respond fervently to the call of the revolutionaries. Many of them joined the revolutionary party, the Tongmenghui, and were actively involved in propaganda activities and in raising funds to support uprisings in China.38 In the United States, for instance, many members of the Youth Study Society (Shaonian xueshe) and later the Young China (Shaonian Zhongguo chenbao) which were active in the revolutionary activities in San Francisco in the period between 1908 and 1911, were of this class ranging from journalists, school teachers, and petty shopkeepers.39 The members of the lower class (including the mining and plantation estate workers, wharfies, rickshaw coolies, workers in Chinese laundry shops and Chinese restaurants, construction and transport workers) also responded as fervently as the members of the middle class did. Although the majority of them were illiterate, they were 37

See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 264–277. For the response of this group in Singapore and Malaya, see Ibid., pp. 277–281. 39 See Feng Ziyou (1965). Geming Yishi (Anecdotal History of the Chinese Revolution of 1911), reprint, Vol. 2, pp. 272–275, Vol. 4, pp. 172–176, Taipei: Shangwu Printing House; Armentrout Ma L. Eve, Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 131–133, 144–155. 38

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nevertheless subject to the intensive propaganda mounted by the revolutionaries. As the majority of them were more recent and poorer immigrants, they had no economic roots in the Overseas Chinese communities, and wished to return to their homeland in China. This would enable them to link their destiny more closely to China than those old Chinese immigrants who had already settled overseas for generations. Further, many of them had first-hand experience of the corrupt and oppressive Ch’ing officials during their course of immigration. More importantly, the majority of them were single and did not have to consider the safety of their families. This would enable them to respond more freely to the revolution without the fear of reprisal by the Manchu government. Many of them not only donated as much as they could afford, but also actively participated in the revolutionary uprisings.40 In the later stage of the development of Overseas Chinese nationalism, the pattern of the nationalism was still similar to that of the early stage. It was not a movement connected with the struggle for survival of the Overseas Chinese abroad, but a reactive movement in responding to the threat of Japanese imperialism to their motherland. In comparison with the earlier movement, it was spontaneous, assertive, better organized, and regionally integrated. Unlike the antiManchu movement which was basically orchestrated by the Chinese revolutionaries in the Overseas Chinese communities, the anti-Japanese movement was a spontaneous response against an imperialist encroachment and aggression against China. The spontaneity and assertiveness of the Overseas Chinese nationalism were the result of decades of politicization of the immigrants. The reformists and revolutionaries had invariably sharpened the idea of China as a modern nation state, and the mechanisms they used had been developed into effective political instruments of the communities. For instance, the reading Clubs which were one of the most effective mechanisms used

40

See Yen Ching-hwang, op.cit., pp. 281–286; Hu Han-min (1963). (recorded by Zhang Zhenzhi). Nanyang yu Zhongguo geming (Southeast Asia and the 1911 Revolution). Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian (Historical Documents related to the Founding of the Republic of China), 1 (11), pp. 482.

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widely by the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia, became the training grounds for political activists and agents for political change in the Overseas Chinese communities.41 Invaluable political experience was gained by the Overseas Chinese in their intimate relationship with the exiled political activists such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Dr Sun Yat-sen, and Wang Jingwei. Not only were they inspired by the new ideas expounded by these prominent national leaders, but also learned the techniques of doing propaganda and mass mobilization.42 This political apprenticeship led to better organization and coordination of their activities in the mass mobilization against the Japanese. What distinguished the anti-Japanese mobilization from the antiManchu movement in the Overseas Chinese communities was its high degree of inter-regional cooperation. This was particularly important in Southeast Asia which had been traditionally regarded by Chinese as a coherent geographical unit. Relatively more mature political experience of the Overseas Chinese in this region partly explained this phenomenon. Further, the growth of modern Chinese education and newspapers in the 1920s and 1930s in the Overseas Chinese communities made this closer regional cooperation possible.43 But most importantly, the anti-Japanese mobilization was in response to an unprecedented crisis that China had ever faced — an all-out Japanese invasion which could result in the loss of China as a nation state and the enslavement of Chinese as a race. This had generated a strong sense of urgency in the minds of the Southeast Asian Chinese and prompted them to unite for a common purpose. 41

For the function of the Reading clubs (Shu Bao She), see Yen Ching-hwang, op.cit., pp. 111–122; Feng Zi-you (1953). Huaqiao geming Kaiguo shi (Overseas Chinese Revolutionary Activities and the Founding of the Chinese Republic), pp. 89–91. Taipei; Suryadinata L, The 1911 Revolution and the Chinese in Java: A preliminary study, in The 1911 Revolution — The Chinese in British and Dutch Southeast Asia, Lee Lai To (ed.), pp. 109–110. 42 See Yen Ching-hwang (1974). Chinese Revolutionary Propaganda Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1906–1911. In Journal of the South Seas Society, 29(Parts 1 and 2), pp. 47–67. 43 For instance, there were estimated 237 items of Chinese newspapers and magazines published in Singapore in the period between 1927 and 1941. See Wong HT (Wang Kangding) (1989). Xinjiapo huawen ribao shelun yanjiu (A study of the editorials of Chinese dailies in Singapore, 1945–1949. Unpublished PhD thesis, National University of Singapore, p. 23.

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The anti-Japanese mobilization among the Overseas Chinese began in 1908 over the Incident of Tatsu Maru, a Japanese ship carrying contraband arms and ammunition which was seized by the Chinese authorities off the coast of Canton in February of that year.44 Anti-Japanese sentiment grew rapidly in the Overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia after the founding of the Chinese Republic. The retreat of Western influence in China during the First World War enabled Japan to emerge as the main imperialist power putting immense pressure on the young and divided Republic. Its notorious Twenty-One Demands in 1915 and its claim for control over former German concessions in Shantung in 1919, infuriated millions of Chinese both in China and abroad. Japan thus became the main target for attack by the militant Chinese nationalists, and the Japanese became the most hated foreigners in the eyes of the Chinese. Reflecting the nationalist pulse in China, the Overseas Chinese reacted strongly to the Tatsu Maru Incident, the Twenty-One Demands, and the May Fourth Incident in 1919.45 By the 1920s, the Overseas Chinese nationalism in the form of anti-Japanism became a mighty force in Chinese politics in Southeast Asia. It was entrenched, militant, well-organized, and well-coordinated. Stimulated by the Tsinan Incident in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the anti-Japanese movement reached its climax in the period between 1937 and 1942 as a result of Japanese all-out invasion of China. The Double Seven Incident of 1937 and its ensuing offensives were the desperate moves on the part of the Japanese to halt mounting 44

Using a high-handed approach toward the Incident, the Japanese government demanded an apology, indemnity, and punishment of the responsible Chinese officials from the Ch’ing government. For details, see Remer, CF (1933). Chinese Boycotts: A Study of Economic Effectiveness, pp. 40–45. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations; For the response of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Akashi Y (1968). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and Boycott movement, 1908–1928: A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. In Journal of South Seas Society, Vol. 23, pp. 70–71. 45 For the response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the May Fourth Incident, see Tsui Kuei-chiang (1965). Haixia zhimindi huaren dui wusi yundong di fanxiang (The response of the Straits Chinese to the May Fourth Movement). In Journal of the South Seas Society, 20 (Pts. 1 and 2), pp. 13–18.

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nationalism of the Chinese and the growing Communist power in China. With in the Japanese aggression full swing, China was fighting for its survival. In response to this unprecedented crisis, Overseas Chinese throughout the world were mobilized to support the fight against the Japanese aggressors. Instrumental in this mobilization were various organizations such as the Chouzhen hui (Relief Fund Association), Jiuzai hui (Disaster Relief Association), and Yijuan jiuguo hui (Chinese War Relief Association). Within 2 months of the outbreak of the war, several Relief Fund Associations sprang up in Burma, Honolulu, San Francisco, Singapore, and Batavia.46 Similar organizations were also formed in France, New Zealand, New York, Canada, Philippines, and Thailand.47 All of them focused on the raising of a large sum of money in support of the war against the Japanese aggressors in China. As the war of resistance dragged on, the mobilization of Overseas Chinese support had to be sustained and on a long-term basis. The need for a closer regional cooperation was keenly felt, the result of which was the formation of the Federation of China Relief Fund Associations of Southeast Asia (Nanyang chouzhen zonghui) under the leadership of Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng), a legendary leader of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.48 The FCRFA was the umbrella body channeling the efforts of more than 45 organizations throughout Southeast Asia, a region with the majority of the Overseas Chinese population with huge economic resources.49 Greater regional cooperation resulted in greater success of the fund-raising movement and the total contribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia to the War of Resistance in China 46

See Ren Gueixiang (1989). Huaqiao zhiyuan zuguo kangzhan dashiji (The chronology of Overseas Chinese support for China’s resistance against Japanese aggression). In Huaqiao dierci aiguo gaochao, (The Second High Tide of Overseas Chinese Patriotism) pp. 350–352. Beijing. 47 Ibid., pp. 352–355. 48 For an authoritative study of Tan Kah Kee, see Yong CF (1987). Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore: Oxford University Press. For Tan’s involvement in the FCRFA, see Tan Kah-kee (1946), Nanqiao huiyi lu (Autobiography), Vol. 1, pp. 47–49. Singapore. 49 Tan Kah-kee, Ibid., Stephen M Y Leong (1976). Sources, agencies and manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, pp. 272–276.

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between July 1937 and February 1942 was estimated to be a remarkable $400 million dollars (Chinese currency).50 Although the main thrust of this mobilization was fund-raising, the most militant expression of this later stage of Overseas Chinese nationalism was boycott. As a powerful economic and political weapon, boycott was frequently used by Chinese nationalists both in China and abroad. The Overseas Chinese nationalists had repeatedly used this weapon against the Americans in 1905, and against the Japanese in 1908, 1915, and 1919.51 By the time of the Tsinan Incident in 1928, boycott was already well integrated into Overseas Chinese nationalist movement, and became an important hallmark of the Overseas Chinese nationalism.52 With the advent of the tidal wave of Overseas Chinese nationalism following the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, boycott was again used as an effective weapon to retaliate against the Japanese for their aggression in China. The boycott movement took various forms: refusal to buy Japanese goods (including manufactured goods and foodstuff), banning the sale of Japanese goods by Chinese wholesalers and retailers, withdrawal of labor from Japanese companies,53 denial of services to Japanese nationals, and rejection of services from Japanese nationals.54 The ban on the selling of Japanese goods was most vigorously enforced by “Patriotic Elements” which were the radical arms of the anti-Japanese mobilization. Under the ban imposed by the Western Colonial governments in Southeast Asia, these “Patriotic Elements” formed into 50

See Dazhan yu nanqiao. (The Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Second World War), p. 47. Singapore: Federation of China Relief Fund Association of Southeast Asia (1947). This estimate is close to an estimate based on Japanese sources which placed the contributions of Southeast Asian Chinese from July 1937 to December 1940 at 312.5 million dollars (Chinese currency); see Akashi Y, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937–1941, pp. 122–123. 51 Akashi Y (1968). The Nanyang Chinese anti-Japanese and boycott movement, 1908–1928: A study of Nanyang Chinese Nationalism. In Journal of South Seas Society, 23(1 and 2), pp. 70–74. 52 See Yen Ching-hwang (1988). The response of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to the Tsinan Incident, 1928. In Journal of South Seas Society, 43(1&2), pp. 5–8. 53 For instance, couple of thousand Chinese mining workers withdrew their labor and resigned from Japanese owned iron ore mines in Johore in January and March 1938. See Nanyang Shang Pau (Nanyang Shang Bao), 14 January 1938; 6 March 1938. 54 See Stephen M Y Leong, op. cit., pp. 262–263.

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clandestine societies with extraordinary names such as “Red Blood Brigade”, and executed the bans by coercive measures. Shops selling Japanese goods were tarred black, and merchants suspected of dealing in Japanese goods or using Japanese materials for their manufacturing products were invariably warned with intimidating letters.55 At the height of anti-Japanese boycott movement, some incidents led to violence and riots. For instance, on 4 July 1938, a group of self-styled Chinese patriots in Penang ransacked a consignment of soy beans alleged to be of Japanese origin. It went out of control and the ensuing unrest lasted for a few days.56 The hostile policies toward Chinese boycotts adopted by various colonial governments in Southeast Asia, together with the internal problems of the Overseas Chinese communities, reduced the boycott movement in the region to a modest success.57

Decline of the Overseas Chinese Nationalism From a broad historical perspective, the decline of the Overseas Chinese nationalism was an inevitable process of assimilation and integration of the Chinese communities into host countries. This was particularly obvious in the countries in Southeast Asia. The rise of indigenous nationalism in some Southeast Asian countries is, to a certain extent, a reaction to the rise of Overseas Chinese nationalism in those countries. The Overseas Chinese nationalism had either inspired or provoked the development of the indigenous movement.58 But both the indigenous and Overseas Chinese nationalisms coexisted before the Second World War because there was no direct conflict of interests. 55

Akashi Y, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, p. 18. Stephen M Y Leong, op. cit., p.265. 57 This was particularly true in the case of the boycott movement in Dutch East Indies. The hostile Dutch colonial government, the self-interest of Chinese businessmen, and the division of the Chinese communities into different dialect groups and between the Peranakans and the Totoks, all contributed to the modest success of the movement. See Akashi Y The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, pp. 35–42. 58 See Williams LE, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 187–188. 56

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The Second World War had disrupted and altered the profile of power structure in Southeast Asia. First, the defeat of the European colonial governments in the hands of the Japanese greatly undermined the power and prestige of the colonial regimes. Second, the Japanese rule in some Southeast Asian countries nurtured the growth of indigenous nationalism. Third, the Japanese rule greatly weakened the Overseas Chinese nationalist movement. Tens of thousands of innocent Chinese in Southeast Asia were massacred by the Japanese, and those who were suspected of supporting the anti-Japanese movement were rounded up and murdered.59 The post-war era saw dramatic growth of indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia. Having mastered organizational skills and being more confident in themselves, the indigenous nationalists began on the road leading to independence. In French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies, the indigenous nationalists launched armed struggles against their colonial masters who attempted to reimpose the rule over these territories.60 In British Malaya and Burma, and the American Philippines, the indigenous nationalist movements took a milder form of political struggle. As fighting for independence was on, the indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia became more assertive and militant. It demanded a clear political stance from the Overseas Chinese communities. As many Overseas Chinese communities were devastated and decimated during the Second World War, and they had been trying to recover from the unprecedented disaster, they were caught unprepared by the new political situation. In other words, Overseas Chinese nationalism was caught in a dilemma as the 59 For instance, the Liquidation campaign launched by the Japanese against the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya in 1942 was estimated to have massacred about 100,000 Chinese. See Hsu Yun-ts’iao (Xu Yunqiao) and Chua Ser-koon (Cai Shijun) (eds.) (1984). Xin Ma Huaren kang Ri shiliao, 1937–1945 (Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan, 1937–1945 — Selected Source Materials), p. 919. Singapore: Wen Shi chuban gongsi; Lee En Han (1986). 1942 nian chu Jibenjun zhanling Xingzhou jianzheng zhiyi kaoshi (Japanese army “Sooh Ching” (Liquidation) campaign in Syonan in 1942). In Journal of the South Seas Society, 41(1 and 2), p. 8. 60 For the post-war Indo-Chinese armed struggle against the French Colonial master, see Hammer EJ (1955), The Struggle for Indochina, 1940–1955, pp. 148–202. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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indigenous nationalism had put pressure on the local Chinese communities. Apart from the drastic change in the host countries, post-war China also went through a process of rapid political change. Following the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, China was plunged into a period of civil war wrestled between the Nationalists and the Communists. Although the Overseas Chinese communities did respond to the civil war as a result of the appeal by the Nationalist government, the response was not as enthusiastic as the response to the Japanese aggression, for the immediate threat to the survival of China as a nation state was removed, and the country was mainly in the hands of the Chinese. Rapid revival of the Kuomintang’s activities in the Overseas Chinese communities did not whip up great support for the civil war among the Overseas Chinese.61 There were many Overseas Chinese leaders who disagreed with the government’s push for civil war, and who would like to see political compromise and rapprochement between the two contesting parties prevail.62 Furthermore, many Overseas Chinese nationalists who had run for their lives during the Japanese scourge in Southeast Asia needed time to rehabilitate themselves, and had to sit back to chart the new course of future action. Some of them had become disillusioned with the corruption and ineptitude of the Nationalist government, and had even changed sides to support the Communists. This was most dramatically exemplified by Tan Kah Kee who changed his support from the Nationalists to the Communists.63 The Chinese civil war had undoubtedly weakened the Overseas Chinese nationalism. The end of the civil war and the victory of Chinese Communism in China in 61

For the rapid revival of the Kuomintang activities during the post-war Singapore and Malaya, see Yong CF and McKenna RB (1990), The Kuomintang Movement in British Malaya, 1912–1949, pp. 199–220. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 62 For instance, the Hongmen Zhigongtang (The Triad) leaders of America who were powerful in the local Chinese communities, took this political line during the postwar era. See Ye Hanming, “Huaqiao huidang yu guogong tongzhan — Meizhou Hongmen de lizhi” (Overseas Chinese Secret Societies and the Chinese Civil War — Example of the Hungmen of America). In Zhanhou haiwai huaren bianhua, pp. 254–255. 63 For an analysis of the background leading to this change, see Yong CF, Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend, Chapters 7 and 8.

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1949 came as a heavy blow to the Overseas Chinese nationalism. It effectively cut off the relationship between China and many Overseas Chinese communities. The Communist victory, though acquired some support in the Overseas Chinese communities, had nevertheless cast doubts in the minds of many Overseas Chinese who had in the past pledged their loyalty to China. Due to the interaction of the drastic political changes in China and the host countries, the Overseas Chinese communities had to adjust to this new environment. The political pressure and economic reality brought home to many Chinese in Southeast Asia that their immediate and long-term interests lay not in China, but in the host countries. They had to change their perception of local politics and their attitude toward the indigenous movements, and be prepared to participate in molding the destiny of the host nations. This realization led some Chinese in Southeast Asia to get involved in the armed struggles against the French in Indo-China and the Dutch in East Indies, and to organize local-oriented political parties. The founding of the Malayan Chinese Association in February 1949 as a political party to safeguard local Chinese interests was one of these examples.64 In North America, the decade of 1940s also saw dramatic changes in the Chinese communities. The abolishment of the Chinese Exclusion Act in December 1943 by the United States, and the repeal of the 1923 Immigration Law against the Chinese on 1 May 1947 by the Canadian government65 opened the way for integration of local Chinese communities into the host societies at large. This process of local orientation and integration, once set into motion, developed with a fast pace in the Overseas Chinese communities in the post-war era. The local identity, i.e., to identify themselves as citizens of the host countries rather than China, also emerged. This signalled the end of the Overseas Chinese nationalism.

64

For the formation of the MCA, see Heng Pek-koon (1988). Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malayan Chinese Association, pp. 46–59. Singapore: Oxford University Press. 65 See Lai Him-mark, Cong Huaqiao dao Huaren, pp. 329–331; Wickberg E (ed.), From China to Canada, pp. 204–208.

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Conclusion Overseas Chinese nationalism was a historical phenomenon arising at the beginning of the previous century and developed during the period between the two world wars. It was primarily a reactive and defensive movement responding to the pressure on the Overseas Chinese communities and the political situation in China. It was an outgrowth of modern Chinese nationalism, and emerged as the result of the reassertion of traditional values, the politicization of the Overseas Chinese, and stimulation of drastic political change in China. Its development was largely determined by the pace of modern Chinese nationalist movements in China. It declined and disappeared into oblivion due to the drastic political change in China, and due to the process of integration of the Overseas Chinese communities into the host societies.

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Chapter 14

Nanyang Chinese and the 1911 Revolution*

It has been almost 3 decades since I published my book. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya (Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976). It is time to reassess some of its conclusions, in the light of many works published since 1976 on the 1911 Revolution. This chapter reviews some of the controversies surrounding the 1911 Revolution and reaffirms some of my conclusions which I believe are still valid.

Causes of the Revolution I was right to say that “The 1911 revolutionary movement arose basically as a result of a reaction to the government’s inability to meet the challenge of world imperialism.”1 What I meant was that the Ch’ing government’s repeated failure to cope with growing foreign aggression at the end of the 19th century was the main cause of the revolution. Of course, foreign pressure on the Ch’ing government began much earlier; it began with the defeat of China in the infamous Opium War between 1839 and 1842. But from 1842 to the end of the 19th century, the main thrust of foreign pressure on China was economic, not territorial. The rise of world imperialism in the last decade of the 19th century threatened the survival of China as a nation and Han Chinese as a race. It was this crisis that gave rise to the revolutionary movement. From a broad historical perspective, the long-term aim of the 1911 Revolution was to save China from foreign imperialism. The * This chapter is based on a paper presented at the International conference on “The 1911 Revolution and the Nanyang Chinese” held in Taipei, Taiwan, 17–19, February, 1986. 1 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 36.

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best way of achieving this aim was to modernize China and make it viable in the modern world. The Ch’ing government, which was reluctant to modernize for fear of losing the Manchus’ privileges, became a stumbling block in the way of China’s salvation. This was why the revolution was aimed at driving out the Manchus as the first step toward China’s salvation. In this context, anti-Manchuism was not an end in itself but a means to an end. China would have been more capable of coping with foreign aggression had the Ch’ing dynasty not been in a state of decline in the 19th century. This decay was caused by socio-economic and political factors. After more than a century of peace and stability under the rule of the K’ang-hsi, Yung-cheng, and Ch’ien-lung emperors, the Chinese population at least doubled from 150 million around 1700 to 313 million in 1794.2 Combined with natural calamities, this enormous population pressure created severe agrarian problems; acute land shortage, a surplus labor force, and exorbitant rent. The wretched and the uprooted population in vast rural China became the main source of social unrest and a force for change. Traditional Chinese historians held the Ch’ien-lung emperor responsible for the economic decline of the Ch’ing dynasty because he had exhausted the treasury by his military campaigns, luxurious life style, and rampant corruption. The financial problems of the Ch’ing government during the post-Ch’ien-lung period was best revealed in the continuous sale of honors and offices. Emperor Chia-ch’ing, Ch’ien-lung’s successor, held three sales and raised 25,000 taels. His son, emperor Tao-kuang floated 6,000,000 taels by a sale of civil and military offices in order to finance the Turkestan War.3 The sale of honors and offices was later institutionalized, and even extended to overseas Chinese who traditionally were considered unsuitable to hold honors.4 The serious consequence of the institutionalization of 2

See Ho Ping-ti (1959). Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953, p. 270. MA: Harvard University Press. 3 See Hsieh, PC (1966). The Government of China, 1614–1911, pp. 105–106, New York. 4 For the sale of Ch’ing honors in the overseas Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya, see Yen Ching-hwang (1970). Ch’ing’s sale of honors and the Chinese leadership in Singapore and Malaya, 1877–1912. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1(2), pp. 20–32.

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the sale of honors and offices was the corruption of the bureaucracy, and its rising inefficiency and maladministration. The decay of the Ch’ing government also had its political dimension. The autocratic system, which required a superman to rule the vast empire, faltered after the disappearance of emperor Ch’ien-lung. Successive emperors failed to measure up to the requirement of an effective autocracy. They lost their grip on the bureaucracy. This situation was aggravated by the emergence of Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi after 1873. Her high-handed rule gave rise to eunuch politics, and her taste for luxury exacerbated the ever-worsening corruption. The decay of the autocratic system at the top affected the entire administration of the empire. This reduced its ability to cope with foreign invasion and internal rebellions.

The Problem of the Main Stream The emergence of a Revisionist School in the United States in the 1970s has aroused controversy over the 1911 revolutionary movement, in particular, concerning the main stream of the revolution and the role of Dr Sun Yat-sen. Led by Joseph W Esherick, the proponents of this school believe that the 1911 Revolution was mainly made in China, not overseas; the T’ung Meng Hui did not constitute the main stream of the revolution, and Dr Sun Yat-sen played little part in the revolution.5 Many scholars would probably accept the Revisionists’ argument that the revolution was mainly made in China. But this would not necessarily deny the fact that the revolutionaries carried out much of their activities overseas. These points are not mutually exclusive. On the question of the main stream of the revolution, the Revisionist scholars have not succeeded, in proving that there was a single revolutionary party within China which was consistently responsible for guiding the national revolution up to the Wuchang Uprising. 5

See Esherick, JW (1976). Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei, pp. 1–2, 143–144. Berkeley: University of California Press; Esherick, JW (1976). 1911: A Review. In Modern China, 2(2), pp. 141–148; Hsieh, W (1975). Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911, pp. 15–40. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

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Esherick claims that the Literature Society, which was founded a year before the Wuchang Uprising in Hupei, was the direct descendant of the Science Tutoring Institute of 1904.6 But he failed to prove that the Literature Society had actually constituted the main stream of the revolutionary movement. Part of Esherick’s rejection of the T’ung Meng Hui as the main stream of the revolution is based on his argument that the Forward Together Society (Kung Chin Hui), one of the two revolutionary societies in Hupei, was independent from the T’ung Meng Hui in Tokyo.7 But he has also failed to convince us that the Forward Together Society was completely independent in its revolutionary actions. He even admitted that it was due to the effort of a T’ung Meng Hui leader, T’an Jen-feng, that the Forward Together Society and the Literature Society were brought together, and were organized to support the uprising in Canton in April 1911.8 Among other proponents of the Revisionist School on the 1911 Revolution, Marry B Rankin and Edward J M Rhoads deserve some attention. Rankin’s book Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971) examines the activities of the members of the Kuang Fu Hui such as Hsu His-lin, Ch’iu Chin, T’ao Ch’eng-chang, and Chang Ping-lin. Rankin has provided a useful regional perspective on the 1911 Revolution. Edward J M Rhoads’ China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung 1895–1913 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1975) examines in some detail the activities of the Reformists and the Revolutionaries in Kwangtung area. However, neither Rankin nor Rhoads have produced any convincing arguments that a single revolutionary party within these regions has guided the national revolution. In all fairness, no single Chinese revolutionary party, except the T’ung Meng Hui, could have guided the national revolution. In other words, the T’ung Meng Hui was indeed the main stream of the 1911 6 7 8

See Esherick, JW, Reform and Revolution in China, p. 153. See Esherick, JW, pp. 153–156. ibid., pp. 156–157.

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Revolution. It would be biased to claim all credits goes to the T’ung Meng Hui, but it would be equally prejudiced to deny the principal role played by the T’ung Meng Hui in the revolution. A more balanced view is as follows: before the founding of the T’ung Meng Hui in 1905 in Tokyo, there was no main stream of the revolution. Revolutionary organizations sprang up in some parts of China and overseas, principally the Hsing Chung Hui in Honolulu and Hong Kong led by Dr Sun Yat-sen; the Kuang Fu Hui in the Kiangsu and Chekiang area, and the Hua Hsing Hui in Hunan and Hupei led by Huang Hsing. In the period before 1905, the Hsing Chung Hui could not be regarded as the main stream of the revolution because the other two groups played an equally important role in arousing revolutionary feeling and in organizing uprisings. The orthodox view of accepting first the Hsing Chung Hui as the main stream, and then the T’ung Meng Hui, should be corrected. The founding of the T’ung Meng Hui in 1905 was momentous in the history of the 1911 Revolution, for it was the only organization guiding the course of the national revolution. It possessed a political platform, an ideology — the Three Peoples’ Principles, an effective propaganda organ — the People’s Tribune, and an organization. T’ung Meng Hui branches sprang up in many overseas Chinese communities and coastal provinces of China. It was a loose confederation of the major revolutionary organizations existing before 1905, including the Hsing Chung Hui, the Kuang Fu Hui, and the Hua Hsing Hui.9 It was responsible for the spread of revolutionary message among the overseas Chinese and Chinese in coastal provinces, and it was also responsible for organizing several abortive uprisings in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan before October 1911. It must be pointed our here that although the T’ung Meng Hui headquarters in Tokyo split in 1907, it had retained its name and framework for the purpose of unity. 9

See Hsueh Chun-tu (1961). Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 45–46. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Liew KS (1971). Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution, pp. 68–70. ANU Press.

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The Role of Dr Sun Yat-sen The Revisionist historians not only rejected the T’ung Meng Hui as representing the main stream of the revolution, but also rejected the principal role played by Dr Sun Yat-sen. It is easy to dismiss Sun’s contribution by simply stating that he and other conspirators played little part in the revolution,10 but it is difficult to prove the point with sufficient historical evidence. Those scholars who attempted to belittle him based their arguments on the facts that Sun was not in Wuchang when the uprising broke out, and that the Wuchang Uprising was independent from the movement led by Sun. However, there are some questions which these scholars have yet to answer: if Sun Yat-sen was not the principal leader of the revolution, then who was? If he had little to do with the 1911 Revolution, why was he accepted as the leader of the revolutionary camp after the Wuchang Uprising? There are two factors underlying the Revisionists’ obsession with Sun’s leadership: a mechanical view of the 1911 Revolution, and a confusion of a revolutionary situation with a revolution. The Revisionists tend to view the Wuchang Uprising in isolation, equating it with the totality of the 1911 Revolution. To my understanding, the 1911 Revolution was a historical process starting with the founding of the Hsing Chung Hui in Honolulu in 1894, and ended with the overthrow of the Manchus and the imperial system in February 1912. In this context, the Wuchang Uprising was only a breaking point, a culmination of the revolutionary actions started in 1894. Without military, ideological, propaganda, and financial preparations, the Wuchang Uprising could not have happened and the 1911 Revolution could not have been successful in toppling the Manchus. Most Revisionist historians have overemphasized the importance of socio-economic factors. Social unrest stemming from socio-economic problems had long existed in China throughout the 19th century. None of the Revisionists can produce sufficient evidence to prove that socio-economic problems in China prior to the Wuchang Uprising were 10

See Esherick, JW, Reform and Revolution in China, p. 143.

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much more severe than the middle or the end of the 19th century. Even though there was a deepening socio-economic crisis, this factor alone would not make a revolution. At the most, socio-economic conditions only created a revolutionary situation. The Revisionists seem to have confused this revolutionary situation with the revolution itself. Revolutionary situation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a revolution. A revolution takes place only when revolutionaries are determined to take advantage of revolutionary situations. The principal role of Dr Sun Yat-sen in the 1911 Revolution cannot be denied. He was the first leader who organized a group of revolutionaries to take advantage of a revolutionary situation created in China during the last decade of the 19th century. He provided the ideological leadership for the revolutionary movement by expounding the Three Peoples’ Principles.11 Sun coordinated revolutionary activities in Overseas Chinese communities and in coastal China after 1905. He also organized, or helped to organize, several major uprisings before the Wuchang incident. His centrality does not diminish the roles of other leaders such as Huang Hsing, Sung Ch’iao-jen, Chang Ping-lin, T’ao Ch’eng-chang, Hsu Hsi-lin, Ch’iu Chin, Ch’iao Ta-feng, Chiang I-wu, and others. What should be borne in mind is that the success of the 1911 Revolution was due to a collective effort, not the result of any single person.

The Role of the Overseas Chinese When the 1911 Revolution is viewed in its totality, the Overseas Chinese did play an important role in the movement leading up to the overthrow of the Manchus. They became the main source of finance for funding various revolts in China and they contributed part of the manpower to the revolution. Overseas Chinese communities became the centers for publishing and spreading of the revolutionary 11 On reassessment of Sun Yat-sen’s contribution to the 1911 Revolution. See Liu Da-nian (1983). Sun Yat-sen — A great patriot and democrat. In The 1911 Revolution: A Retrospective After 70 Years, Hu Sheng, Liu Da-nian et al., pp. 26–66, Beijing, China: New World Press; Ch’en Hsi-ch’i (1980). Sun Chung-shan h’e Hsin-h’ai ke-ming (Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Revolution). In Hsin-h’ai ke-ming lun-wen chi (Essays on the 1911 Revolution), pp. 1–36, Canton.

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message; they also became the bases for planning and staging revolts, and the sanctuaries for revolutionary refugees. The important contribution of the Overseas Chinese to the revolution was made possible by certain historical circumstances: the creation of modern Overseas Chinese communities, the nature of the 1911 Revolution, the Ch’ing policy toward the Overseas Chinese, and the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism. Although the Chinese had been living overseas to trade or settle for centuries,12 the creation of modern Overseas Chinese communities was relatively recent and was closely connected with the modern economic development and advancement of western colonial powers in the East. The discovery of gold in California and the construction of the Trans-Continental railway in North America in the second half of the 19th century resulted in the creation of modern Chinese communities in North America13; the Portguese, the Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and the French advancements in Southeast Asia gave birth to modern Chinese communities in that region too. Although the Overseas Chinese lived in the new lands, their ultimate aims were to make as much money as possible and return home with wealth. All Overseas Chinese communities were closely connected with China through economic and emotional ties. Their relationship with China was further strengthened after the establishment of Ch’ing consulates in Overseas Chinese communities in the last two decades of the 19th century and the party of the 20th century.14 The existence of these modern Overseas Chinese communities provided sanctuaries and bases for revolutionary activities. 12

On early Chinese traders and settlers in Southeast Asia, see Wang Gung-wu, The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South Seas, an independent issue of the Journal of the Malayan Branch of Royal Asiatic Society; Wang Gung-wu (1959). A Short History of the Nanyang Chinese, Singapore. 13 On the formation of modern Chinese communities in the United States and Canada, see Barth G (1964). Bitter Strength: A History of the Chinese in the United States, 1850–1870. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Wickberg E; (ed.), (1982). From China to Canada: A History of Chinese Communities in Canada. Toronto: McClelland & Steward Ltd. 14 For the establishment of Ch’ing consulates in overseas Chinese communities, see Yen Chinghwang (1985). Diplomatic Representation and Consular Expansion in Overseas Chinese Communities. Coolies and Mendarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911. Chap. 4. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

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I have argued in my published works that the nature of the 1911 Revolution helped to determine the role of the Overseas Chinese in this movement.15 The fact that the 1911 Revolution was a political revolution rather than a social one, had already determined its direction. Its immediate aims of overthrowing the Manchus and introducing Western democracy led the revolutionaries to look to new intellectuals and the Overseas Chinese for support. The new intellectuals who had been exposed to foreign influence understood the danger that China was facing; the Overseas Chinese who had lived in foreign lands were also more likely to respond to the call for revolution. I also suggested that the revolution had a strong racial element which the revolutionaries had capitalized on when appealing to the Overseas Chinese. I still hold the view that “if the home government in China had been formed by the Han Chinese instead of the Manchus, the large-scale involvement of the Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution might not have taken place.”16

Response of the Nanyang Chinese to the Revolution The Nanyang Chinese can be grouped together in their response to the 1911 Revolution. Nanyang, a geographical term for the Southeast Asian region today, had been known to Chinese maritime traders for more than a thousand years. Its geographical proximity enabled the Chinese in the coastal provinces of Fukien and Kwang-tung to establish close economic relation with the countries in the region.17 The Nanyang Chinese during the late Ch’ing period formed a distinctive group sharing similar political and economic experiences. Except for the Chinese in Thailand,

15

Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, Introduction, Yen Ching-hwang, (1978). The role of overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution. Southeast Asian Research Paper No. 3, pp. 5–7, Singapore, Nanyang University. 16 Ibid. 17 For the background leading to Fukienese trade with Southeast Asia, see Ng Chin-keong (1983). Trade and Society: The Amoy Network on the China Coast. Singapore: Singapore University Press; For China’s trade with Thailand during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, see Cushman JW (1975). Fields from Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam during the Late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries. PhD Dissertation, Cornell University.

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the Nanyang Chinese lived under the control of Western colonial governments. This was different from the Chinese in North America and Oceania where they came under the direct rule of White men. In Southeast Asia, the Chinese communities coexisted with the indigenous people, and Chinese traders served as middlemen between European merchants and native peasants. There was a larger scope of economic activities in Southeast Asia for the Chinese than those in North America and Oceania where the Chinese economy became subordinate. In Southeast Asia, there was also ample opportunity for the Chinese to share or even to control some branches of the economy such as tin mining and cash-crop plantations in Malaya and Dutch East Indies, and the export and import trade in the Straits Settlements, Thailand, and Burma. The result of this contrast was that the Chinese in Southeast Asia were financially stronger than the Chinese in North America and Oceania. This was why the Chinese Reformists and Revolutionaries were interested in the Nanyang Chinese because of their financial power. China’s geographical proximity to Nanyang also accounted for her close political and migrational relations with the region. The fact that the first Ch’ing consulate was established in Singapore in 1877,18 implies that the Chinese in Southeast Asia had attracted the significant attention of Ch’ing officialdom. The frequent visits of Ch’ing emissaries to Southeast Asia during the late Ch’ing period was indicative of how important the Nanyang Chinese were in the eyes of the Ch’ing government.19 This close political and economic relationship with China facilitated the response of the Nanyang Chinese to the revolution. The anti-Chinese movements in the United States and Australia since the 1880s had a strong racist connotation.20 Chinese living in 18 On the establishment of the first Ch’ing consulate in Singapore, see Wen Chung-chi (1964). The Nineteenth-century imperial Chinese Consulate in the Straits Settlements. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Singapore, pp. 78–84. 19 For reasons leading to the founding of the Singapore Chinese consulate, see Yen Chinghwang, Collies and Mendarins, pp. 141–143. 20 For the visit of Ch’ing emissaries to Singapore, see Chui Kwei-chiang (1967). Wan Ch’ing kuanli fang-wen Hsin-chio-po (The Visits of Chinese Emissaries to Singapore during the Late Ch’ing Period). In Nanyang Hsuch-pao, (Journal of the South Seas Society), Vol. 29, Pts. 1 & 2, pp. 15–29; for visits to Dutch East Indies, see Willaim, LE (1960). Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1906, pp. 150–159. Glencoe: The Free Press.

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White countries suffered persecution as well as discrimination. But, the Nanyang Chinese were better treated than the Chinese in the United States and Australia; although they still suffered some form of discrimination and ill-treatment. The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were the worst treated among the Nanyang Chinese by the Dutch colonial government. They suffered overtaxation, discrimination in legal matters, movement and trade activities, and some of them even suffered physical cruelty.21 The Chinese in the Straits Settlements and the Malay states received relatively better treatment from the British colonial government, but they, too, suffered discrimination from officialdom.22 Whatever treatment they received from the European colonial officials, the Nanyang Chinese as a group came painfully to realize that they were treated not as equals, but as persons belonging to an inferior race. In the presence of the foreign authority, the Nanyang Chinese invariably suffered an inferiority complex. The cause of this inferior feeling was because China was weak and the Ch’ing government was incapable of protecting its overseas subjects. The desire for a strong China which could protect them overseas and bring them pride became the main catalyst of the Overseas Chinese response to the revolution. Apart from this seemingly selfish motive, the Nanyang Chinese as a whole had some patriotic feelings toward China. Although the concept of “China” was still vague in their minds at this time,23 nevertheless, they were concerned with the well-being of the people from the same district or province in China. This was most clearly reflected in their involvement in founding schools, and other types of economic 21

See the petition of Ch’en Shih-lin, a leader of the Chinese in Dutch East Indies, to Chang Chih-tung between 1887 and 1890, in Liu Hsi-hung, et al., Chu Teh Shih-kuan tang-an ch’ao (Records of Chinese Embassy in Germany) (reprint, Taipei, 1966), pp. 1099–1115. For a discussion of the grievances of the Dutch Indies Chinese in late 19th century, see Williams, LE, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, pp. 27–36. 22 In 1890, the Chinese in Singapore felt offended by the police disrespect for Chinese, because policemen arrested Chinese suspects by pulling their queues. This resentment toward the British was expressed in an editorial in the Lat Pau. See Lat Pau, 3rd December 1890, p. 1. 23 Most Overseas Chinese at that time referred to China as “T’ang Shan” (the land of T’ang Dynasty) and called themselves as “T’ang Jen” (the people of T’ang Dynasty). “T’ang Shan” vaguely referred to the districts or provinces that they came from.

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development in their districts.24 And for those Nanyang Chinese who had received better education and knew the poor position of China in the world, they wished to see China becoming strong and wealthy. It was this idealism that inspired many Nanyang Chinese intellectuals and merchants to support the revolution. I was right to draw a distinction between the responses of different classes in the Chinese community in Singapore and Malaya to the revolution.25 Indeed, the Nanyang Chinese, had different perceptions of Ch’ing China and its need for a revolution because of their socioeconomic backgrounds. Their responses to the revolution varied also in accordance with their class interest and their connections with the Manchu government. Except for a few, wealthy Chinese merchants were generally reluctant to support the revolution. Their wealth and political connections with the Ch’ing government led them to favor the status quo, and inhibited them from responding to the revolution. Those few wealthy merchants who actively supported the revolution had no political connections with the Ch’ing government; their concern for the fate of their motherland seemed to have outweighed their self-interests.26 The members of the middle class which consisted of shop-keepers, petty traders, school teachers, clerks, and shop assistants, responded more enthusiastically than wealthy merchants to the revolution. As most of them had no wealth and political connection with the Ch’ing government, they acted more freely without consideration of selfinterests. At the same time, most of them received some form of education; they were better informed than the members of the lower class about the decay of China and the danger of it being partitioned by 24 For Nanyang Chinese economic involvement in their home districts and provinces in the late Ch’ing period, see Godley, M (1973). Chang Pi-Shih and Nanyang Chinese involvement in South China’s railroads, 1896–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4(1), pp. 16–30; Godley, M (1981). The Mandarien-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911, pp. 149–172. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Yen Ching-hwang (1984). Chang Yu-nam and the Chao Chow railway (1904–1908): A case study of Overseas Chinese involvement in China’s modern enterprise. In Modern Asian Studies, 18(1), pp. 119–135. 25 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, pp. 264–286. 26 Ibid., pp. 264–277.

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the foreign powers, and they were more receptive to the revolutionary message. Many of them joined the revolutionary party, the T’ung Meng Hui, and formed its lower echelon of leadership. Their role in the revolutionary movement in Singapore and Malaya in support of the revolution was a significant one. They were the fervent activists: manning the revolutionary reading clubs; becoming teachers of the night schools; the organizers of mass meetings and performers of revolutionary drama troupes. They also became active fund-raisers in support of the revolts in coastal China.27 The members of the lower class, which included tin mining and plantation estate coolies, rickshaw pullers, hawkers, gardeners, beggars, and prostitutes, were the most numerous among the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya. Being less educated and less aware of the danger that China was facing, they were slower than the members of the middle class to respond to the revolution. But after the founding of the T’ung Meng Hui branches in 1906 throughout Singapore and Malaya, and after the success of the revolutionary propaganda activities, many of them were recruited into the revolutionary ranks. Despite their financial limitations, they responded as fervently as the members of the middle class to the revolution. Some of them sacrificed their lives for the cause by assassinating high-ranking Manchu officials28; many of them returned to China to fight against the Manchus after the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising.29 The dynamic response of the members of the lower class can be better understood with these underlying factors: they had no political and economic interests in the Ch’ing government; they were recent immigrants who had close emotional ties with China; most of them had had bitter experience with corrupt Ch’ing officials and ruthless Kheh-taus in the 27

Ibid., pp. 277–281. The best example was Wen Sheng-ts’ai’s assassination of the Manchu General of Canton, Fu Ch’i, in March 1911. Wen was a tin-mining worker in Ipoh, Perak. Wen joined the T’ung Meng Hui, and was deeply influenced by revolutionary publications. In February 1911, Wen returned to Canton and succeeded in assassinating the Manchu General, but he was caught and executed. For Wen’s biography, see “A Biography of Wen Sheng-ts’ai’s in Ke-ming hsien-lieh hsien-chin chuan (Biographies of the Revolutionary Martyrs and Pioneers, pp. 189–192. Taipei, 1965. 29 See Yan Ching-hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 285. 28

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course of their migration to Southeast Asia. But most importantly, they bore the brunt of discrimination, ill-treatment, and humiliation from European colonial officials, and they deeply felt the need of protection from a strong and powerful China which the revolutionaries promised to create.30

The Contribution of the Nanyang Chinese to the Revolution Revisionist historians belittle the role of the T’ung Meng Hui by rejecting its status as the main stream of the revolution, and they also deny the contribution of the Overseas Chinese by claiming that the revolution was not made outside China. But this has contradicted historical facts. The following are the important aspects of Nanyang Chinese contribution to the revolution.

Nanyang Chinese Communities as the Center of Revolutionary Activities Between 1908 and 1911 With the arrival of Dr Sun Yat-sen and his close associates in Southeast Asia in March 1907, the center of gravity of revolutionary activities had been shifted gradually from Tokyo to Southeast Asia and Hong Kong. With the founding of the Southeast Asian headquarters of the T’ung Meng Hui Singapore in the following year, the position of the Nanyang Chinese in the entire revolutionary movement had been lifted. From March 1907 to the autumn of 1908, five major uprisings were staged by the revolutionaries in the coastal provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. They were the Huang Kang Uprising in May 1907, the Waichow Ch’i-nu-hu Uprising in June 1907, the Ch’in-lien Uprising in September 1907, the Chen Nan Kuan Uprising in December 1907, and the Hok’ow Uprising in April 1908. These Uprisings were organized and directed from Hanoi, Singapore, and Hong Kong.31 30 31

Ibid., pp. 282–283. See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 revolution, p. 305.

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Apart from being the center for directing revolts in coastal China, the Nanyang Chinese communities became most active in carrying our revolutionary activities: propaganda, recruitment, and fund-raising.32

Nanyang Chinese Communities Became a Rendezvous for Revolutionary Refugees Being geographically closer to China, the Nanyang Chinese communities were ideally suited as a sanctuary for revolutionary refugees. Those who were involved in abortive revolts and who managed to flee China used Southeast Asian Chinese communities as a place for retreat. Easily merging into the local Chinese population, the revolutionary refugees recuperated and regrouped themselves for further action. Since the failure of the Waichow Uprising in 1900, revolutionary refugees began to arrive in Southeast Asia. This included famous leaders such as Yu Lieh, Teng Tzu-yu, and Huang Yaot’ing.33 From then onwards, Southeast Asia (principally Singapore, Malaya, and French Indo-China) together with Hong Kong became the two major sanctuaries for revolutionary refugees. Following the defeat of the Huang Kang and Waichow Ch’i-nu-hu Uprisings in mid-1907, more than a hundred revolutionary refugees sought sanctuary in Singapore and Malaya.34 Several hundreds revolutionaries who failed in the Chen Nan Kuan Uprising in December 1907, sought refuge in French Indo-China (particularly in Hanoi and Haiphong area) in mid-1908. Due to their involvement in the “Poison Case” Indo-China, they were deported from the territory

32

Ibid., pp. 100–261. See Feng Tzu-yu, “Yu Lieh shih-lueh” (A Short Biography of Yu Lieh), and “Hui-chou keming chun shou-ling Teng Tzu-yu” (The Revolutionary Leader of the Waichow Uprising — Teng Tzu-yu). In Feng Tzu-yu (1965). Ke-ming i-shih (Reminiscences of the Revolution), Vol. 1, 40–44; Vol. 4, pp. 182–185, Taipei: 34 See Lin Feng-wen (1950). Hsin-chia-po Ch’ao-ch’iao yu k’ai-kuo ke-ming lueh-shih. A Brief History of the Singapore Teochews and the Chinese Revolution. In Ma-lai-ya Ch’ao-ch’iao t’ungchien (A Directory of the Teochews in Malaya), P’an H-n (ed.), p. 238, Singapore. 33

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and eventually settled in Singapore and Malaya. They numbered more than 400.35

Nanyang Chinese’s Financial Contributions Finance was the most important contribution of the Nanyang Chinese to the 1911 Revolution. Their financial contribution to stage revolts in the coastal provinces of China was significant. In the years between May 1907 and April 1908, the T’ung Meng Hui staged five uprisings in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan. According to Dr Sun Yat-sen, the expenditure of these uprisings amounted to HK$200,000, about half of which was raised by the Nanyang Chinese. Of this HK$100,000, $60,000 came from French IndoChina and Thailand, $30,000 from Dutch East Indies, and $10,000 from British Malaya.36 In addition to Sun’s record, at least S$50,000 was raised in Singapore and Malaya for the uprising during this period. About S$30,000 was spent on the Huang Kang Uprising (or known as the First Teochew Uprising), and another S$20,000 was spent on the Second Teochew Uprising through the private channel. Thus, we can claim that one of the five major uprisings in the period between May 1907 and April 1908 (The Huang Kang Uprising or the First Teochew Uprising) and a minor uprising (the Second Teochew Uprising) were entirely funded by the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya.37 The financial contribution of the Nanyang Chinese to the revolution lapsed in the period between 1909 and 1910, but it assumed its importance again in 1911. Planned by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his close associates in Penang with the support of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, the Canton March 29th Uprising (27 April 1911) was the 35 See Yen Ching-hwang. The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 307; Teo Eng-hock (1933). Nanyang yu ch’uang-li min-kuo (Nanyang and the Founding of the Chinese Republic), p. 65, Shanghai: 36 See Chang C-y (ed.), (1966) Letter from Dr Sun Yat-sen to Wu Ching-heng in 1909. In Kuo-fu ch’uan-shu (The Complete Correspondence of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 418–419, Taipei: 37 See Yen Ching-hwang, The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution, p. 310.

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most important revolt organized by the T’ung Meng Hui before the Wuchang Uprising. A sun of at least S$187,637 was spent on organizing and implementing the revolt. Out of this amount, the Nanyang Chinese contribution was S$110,636, while the rest was raised in Canada (S$63,000) and the United States (S$14,000). Of S$110,636 raised among the Nanyang Chinese, S$47,663 came from British Malaya (Singapore and Malaya), S$32,550 from Dutch East Indies, and S$30,423 from French Indo-China and Thailand.38 The outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising and its ensuing military action by the revolutionaries brought new hope for the success of the revolution. In the post-Wuchang period between 11 October 1911 and 12 February 1912, an estimated sum of S$870,000 was donated by the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya alone.39 The Chinese in other parts of Southeast Asia also contributed generously to support the post-Wuchang revolutionary action in China. The significance of financial contribution of the Nanyang Chinese to the overthrow of the Manchus can be better understood in terms of the need for money by the revolutionaries and how the money was used in the revolution. After the outbreak of the Wuchang Uprising, the revolutionaries successfully captured several key cities along the Yangtze river and coastal provinces, and set up their military governments. These governments would have fallen without financial support. The money donated by the Nanyang Chinese, therefore, helped to stabilize and consolidate these governments. In November 1911, the revolutionary government in Shanghai under the leadership of Ch’en Ch’i-mei would have collapsed if a sum of S$55,400 from Nanyang had not arrived. In the recovery of Kwangtung and Fukien provinces, the money donated by the Nanyang Chinese was even more important. An estimated sum of S$234,000 was raised in Singapore and Malaya for the support of the revolutionary government in Canton headed by Hu Han-min; another huge sum of S$270,000 from Singapore and Malaya effectively rescued the feeble revolutionary government in Foochow from collapsing.40 38 39 40

Ibid., p. 311. Ibid., p. 313. Ibid., pp. 314–316.

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Chapter 15

Hakka Chinese in Southeast Asian History*

Hakka Chinese are a minority among the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. As a minority among the ethnic Chinese, they possess minority psychology which is characterized by a sense of insecurity and fear. Although the blurring of dialect differences in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia helps diminish the insecure feeling, they nevertheless feel disadvantaged vis-a-vis other dominant dialect groups in the Chinese communities. However, Southeast Asian Hakka Chinese are invariably proud of their achievements in producing some distinguished historical figures in modern Overseas Chinese history, notably, Luo Fangbo in 18th century Borneo,1 Zhang Bishi (Chang Pi-shih or Thio Thiau Siat) in the late 19th and early 20th century Southeast Asia,2 and of course most notably Lee Kuan Yew, * This chapter is based on a key-note speech delivered in Chinese at the 3rd International conference on Hakka studies, 9–11, November, 1996 in Singapore. 1 Luo Fangbo was a Jiaying Hakka from Guangdong province, he was a most famous Chinese pioneer in the 18th century Southeast Asia. He led the Hakka miners in Pontianak, Borneo and founded a large and prosperous Chinese settlement. He developed an unique political system which has been hailed by some scholars as the forerunner of the modern republican system. For the studies of Luo Fangbo’s mining activities and his founding of a new form of political structure in Borneo, see Luo Xianglin (1941). Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo). Chongqing: Shangwu yinshuguan; Wang TP (1994). The Origins of Chinese Kongsi. Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pelanduk Publications. 2 Zhang Bishi (Chang Pi-shih, also known in Chinese official records as Zhang Zhenxun) was a Tapu Hakka from Guangdong province. He first migrated to Dutch East Indies, and built up his vast business empire in the Dutch colony and British Malaya. He was later recruited into the Qing government service, and became the most senior Qing officer among the Overseas Chinese in the 19th century. For an excellent study of Zhang Bishi’s life and deeds, see Godley MR (1981). The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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the former prime minister of Singapore.3 The Hakka Chinese are keenly aware of their minority position in the region, their numbers are smaller than Hokkiens, Teochews, and Cantonese, and probably smaller or larger than Hainanese,4 but their importance in socioeconomic, cultural, and political arenas far exceeds their numerical strength. The unfolding of the enigma of Hakka Chinese success attracts the attention of journalists, observers, and historians alike.

Hakka Chinese Settlement Patterns and Their Economic Pursuits Hakka Chinese were not the earliest Chinese settlers in Southeast Asia, but their mining settlements constituted a major pattern of Chinese setttlements in the region. The Hakkas began to found their early mining settlements in Pontianak, West Borneo in 1776, and then in Bau in Sarawak, and in Banka and Bellitong in Dutch East Indies, and then their mining settlements flourished in Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Perak on the West coast of the Malay Peninsula.5 This mining settlement was most distinctive among three major Chinese settlements in the region. In contrast with the urban port settlements and rural agricultural settlements that other ethnic Chinese had founded throughout the region, the mining settlement displayed a more close-knit and united grouping where self-government of 3 For Lee Kuan Yew’s life story and his works in building up Singapore as a country of First World, see Lee Kuan Yew’s two-volume autobiography, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 1: The Singapore Story. Singapore: Singapore Press Holding & Times Editions Pte. Ltd, 1998 and Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 2: From Third World to First. Singapore: Singapore Press Holding & Times Editions Pte. Ltd, 2000. 4 In Singapore, the 1970 figure shows Hokkiens ranked top with 42.2%, and in descending order were Teochews 22.4%, Cantonese 17%, Hainanese 7.3%, and Hakkas 7%. But the 1980 figure changed slightly with Hokkiens still on top of 43.1%, Teochews 22 %, Cantonese 16.5%, Hakkas 7.4%, and Hainanese 7.1%. See Cheng Lim-keak (1985). Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore, p. 14. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 5 See Luo Xianglin (1941), Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo), p. 19; Daniel Chew (1990). Chinese Pioneers on the Sarawak Frantiers, 1841–1941, pp. 18–24. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press; Wong Lin-ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, pp. 17–43. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.

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varying degrees was achieved. The unity and solidarity that the Hakka Chinese had developed in Guangdong and Fujian laid the foundation for the tight and effective organization of their settlements overseas.6 Since they were better organized and regulated, they were able to achieve social and political stability in the mining centers. Mining of different kinds of metal was the major economic pursuit of Hakka immigrants in early Southeast Asia. They monopolized the mining of gold and tin in Southeast Asia for more than a century until the late 19th century when their dominant position was challenged by European rivals who possessed stronger economic and political power. During more than a century of their dominance, Hakka Chinese produced some well-known miners prominent in the Southeast Asian history. Men like Luo Fangbo of Pontianak,7 Foo Chee Choon,8 and Yau Tat Shin9 of Perak, Yap Ah 6 For the settlements and development of Hakkas in Fujian and Guangdong provinces, see Xie Zuozhi (ed.), (1991). Kejia yuanyuan (The Origins of the Hakkas), pp. 15–50, 119–143. Singapore: Chong Wen chubanshe; Chang Chak-yan and Hsieh Jian (eds.) (1994). Guoji Kejiaxue yantaohui lunwenji (The Proceedings of the International Conference on Hakkaology, pp. 1–22. Overseas Chinese Studies Center, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong; Lau Yee-cheung (ed.) (1996). Kejia zongzu yu minjian wenhua(Lineage and Popular Culture among the Hakkas), pp. 3–68. Shatin: Hong Kong, Overseas Chinese Studies Center, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 7 See Luo Xianglin Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo). 8 Foo Chee Choon (romanized in Ping Yin as Hu Zichun, or known in Qing official records as Hu Guolian) was a Yongding Hakka. Born in Yong Ding district of Fujian province, China in 1859. He came to Malaya with his father at the age of 13. He was educated in Penang, and later ventured into tin-mining. He was one of the most successful tin miners in Perak, and was dubbed “king of tin-mining.” See a short biography of him in Ke Jia: Pili Keshu gonghui kaimu jinian tekan (The Hakka: Souvenir Magazine for the Commemoration of the Opening of the Hakka Association of Perak), p. 570. Penang 1951. 9 Yau Tat Shin (romanized in Ping Yin as Yao Desheng) was a Jia Ying Hakka. He was born in a poor peasant family in Ping Yan district of Jia Ying prefecture of Guangdong province, China. He received some basic traditional Chinese education and had to leave school at a young age because of poverty. He worked as a transport coolie on the border of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. Like many aspiring Chinese, he left his hometown for Malaya in quest of economic opportunity. He arrived in Sungei Ujong and worked in a tin mine as a coolie. He successfully accumulated some capital and started his own mining company, and emerged as a wealthy mining capitalist. For a short biography of him, see “Yao gong desheng” (Mr Yau Tat Shin) (1974). Pili Jiaying huiguan qishi zhounian jinian, xinxia luocheng kaimu tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Seventieth Anniversary and the Opening of the New Building of the Perak Ka Yin Association), pp. 512–514. Ipoh.

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Loy of Selangor,10 made their mark in the local and Overseas Chinese history. Hakka immigrants also settled in rural areas and pursued the cultivation of rice and vegetables.11 They did not seem to have been actively involved in the planting of cash crops such as pepper and gambier in the early 19th century and later in sugar and rubber in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The main reason for this lack of involvement in cash crop plantation was probably because Hakka Chinese had no substational control over the entrepot trade and cash crop industry which were in the hands of the Hokkien and Teochew Chinese.12 10

Yap Ah Loy (romanized in Ping Yin as Ye Yalai, or known as Ye Delai) was a Huizhou Hakka. He was born in Huiyang district of Huizhou prefecture, Guangdong province in March 1837 in a poor tenant peasant family. Poverty deprived him of a basic education, and he had to spend his childhood as a “cowboy” (muniutong). He left China for Malaya for economic advancement, and arrived in Malacca in 1854. He worked as an apprentice and worked his way up in tin mining, and succeeded to become a wealthy mining capitalist and one of the richest men in Selangor owning many tin mines, plantations, factories, shops, and land. He was actively involved in politics and was appointed as the Chinese Kapitan of Kuala Lumpur. He was also involved in the civil war in the state of Selangor, and became a de facto ruler of Kuala Lumpur from 1873 to 1880. He was dubbed “the founder of modern Kuala Lumpur.” For works on Yap Ah Loy, see Middlebrook SM and Gullick JM (1951), Yap Ah Loy, published as an independent issue of The Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 24(2); Wang Zhiyuan (1958). Ye Delai zhuan (A Biography of Yap Ah Loy). Kuala Lumpur: Yi Hua Publishing Company. A more recent work on Yap Ah Loy is Lee Yeap-lim (Li Yelin) (ed.) (1997). Jilongpo kaiduoze de zuoji: Jiapidan Ye Yalai de yisheng (The Footprints of the Pioneer of Kuala Lumpur: The Life and Works of Yap Ah Loy). Kuala Lumpur: Huazi Resource & Research Centre Bhd. 11 See Han Sin-fong (1975). Chinese in Sabah, East Malaysia, Asian Folklore and Social Life Monographs, Vol. 67, pp. 33–34. Taipei: The Oriental Cultural Service; Tregonning KG (1959). Under Chartered Company Rule: North Borneo, 1881–1946, reprint, p. 132. Singapore: University of Malaya Press. 12 Hokkien control of entrepot trade in Singapore was exemplified by the emergence of large Hokkien trading companies such as Kim Seng & Company, Lee Cheng Yan & Company, and Kim Cheng & Company. See Tregonning KG (1967). Home Port Singapore: A History of Straits Steamship Company Limited, 1890–1965, p. 9. Singapore: Oxford University Press; Wong Linken (1978). Singapore: Its growth as an entrepot port. 1819–1941. In Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies, 9(1), p. 46; Chiang Hai-ding (1970). Sino-British mercantile relations in Singapore’s entrepot trade, 1870–1915. In Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia: Essays in Memory of Victor Purcell, Chen J & Tarling N (eds.), p. 258. Cambridge: At the University Press. For Teochew control of cash crop plantations in early Singapore and Johore, see Chin SU (1848). General sketch of the numbers, tribes and avocations of the Chinese in Singapore. In Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, Vol. 2, p. 290;

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Instead, Hakka agriculturalists were involved in planting rice, vegetables, and fruit mainly for the markets in the mining centers where their fellow dialect speakers predominated. As rice was the stable diet of ethnic Chinese, the uninterrupted supply of rice and vegetable to the mining centers ensured the self-sufficiency and independence of Hakka settlements in Southeast Asia. However, some of the early Hakka immigrants did get involved in entrepot trade, cash crop plantation, and modern transport. Attempting to cut into the networks of entrepot trade primarily controlled by Hokkien Chinese was an uphill battle, but some Hakka businessmen managed to do it with special effort and skill. Facing keen competition from both Hokkien and Teochew entrepot merchants, the Hakka merchants grasped the opportunity to develop modern transport and snatched a share in shipping and railways. Zhang Bishi, the famous Hakka entrepreneur in the late 19th century, founded shipping lines based in Java and Penang, and his ships carried goods from port to port in Southeast Asia, and from the Southeast Asian ports to the China coast.13 He was also the main figure behind the railway construction projects in South China during the late Qing period.14 Another prominent Hakka merchant, Zhang Yunan (Chang Yu-nan), who together with his brother Zhang Hongnan (Chang Hung-nan), carved out a share in the entrepot trade of Sumatra and made enormous profit from the cash crop plantation in

Yen Ching-hwang (2002). Power structure and power relations in the Teochew community in Singapore, 1819–1930. In The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics, Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 285–286. Singapore: Times Academic Press; Trocki CA. Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784–1885, pp. 88–91. Singapore: Singapore University Press; Jackson JC (1968). Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya, 1786–1921, pp. 12–30. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. A recent major study of Teochew agricultural enterprises in Johore in the 19th century is Tay Lian Soo (Zheng Liangshu) (2004). Roufu zhou Chaoren tuozhi yu fazhan shigao (A Preliminary Study of Teochew Pioneering Settlements and Development in Johore), Johore Bahru: Nanfang xueyuan chubanshe. 13 See Godley MR, The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911, pp. 11–12. 14 See Godley MR (1973). Chang P-s and Nanyang Chinese Involvement in South China’s Railroads, 1896–1911. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4(1), pp. 16–30.

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Deli in northeast Sumatra. Zhang Yunan, with the influence of Zhang Bishi and having successfully mobilized the support of other Hakka merchants, undertook the construction of a railway linking Chaozhou to Shantou (Swatow), a project which had made a mark in the history of civilian Chinese railway construction.15 What accounted for the success of these Hakka merchants vis-a-vis keen competition from Hokkiens and Teochews was their ability to use political influence for their economic advancement. Zhang Bishi’s early connections with the Dutch authorities and later, his close liaison with the Qing government assured smooth operation of his business and enabled him to build a vast commercial empire in Southeast Asia and the China coast.16 On the other hand, Zhang Yunan also made full use of his political connections with the Manchus for the construction of the Chaozhou Railway.

Hakka Chinese Social Organizations It was more than a historical accident that Hakka Chinese had contributed substantially to the establishment of social organizations of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. One of the important patterns of Overseas Chinese social organizations — geographically based dialect association — appeared to be initiated by the Hakka immigrants, and 15

See Yen Ching-hwang (1984). Chang Yu-nan and the Chaochow Railway (1904–1908): A case study of overseas Chinese involvement in China’s modern enterprise. In Modern Asian Studies, 18(1), pp. 119–135; see also the same article reproduced in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, pp. 159–176. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 16 For Zhang Bishi’s close political connections with the Qing government, first as Qing Vice Consul in Penang, then as the acting Consul-General in Singapore, and the Qing Imperial Commissioner for Promoting Commercial Affairs, see Godley MR, The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 1893–1911, pp. 79–93; Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of Overseas Chinese During the Late Ch’ing Period (1851–1911), pp. 171, 183 & 190. Singapore: Singapore University Press. A more recent work on factors contributing to the establishment of the Qing Vice-Consulate in Penang and the appointment of Zhang Bishi as the first ViceConsul, see Zhang Xiao-wei (2005). Wan Qing zhu Binglangyu fu lingshi zhi jiaoshe fenxi (1893–1911) (Analyses of the roles of Chinese Vice-Consuls in Penang during the late Qing period, 1893–1911). An unpublished PhD thesis, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, Taiwan.

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they had set the example for the other Chinese immigrants to follow. Although the Hokkiens preceded Hakka immigrants to settle in Malacca, they did not seem to have established any social organization which can be classified as dialect-based.17 The Hakka miners who spread widely in the gold mines in Pontianak (West Borneo) and Sarawak in the middle of the 18th century had organized their famous gongsi (kongsi) which was a mix of political-economic and social organizations, and it had set a pattern of its own,18 but did not last long in the history of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. Ironically, this pattern of dialect-based social organization was not established in the Hakka-dominated mining centers, but rather started in the urban ports where Hakka Chinese were a minority. Many scholars agreed that the Hakka dialect association which came into being in 1801 in Penang under the name of Yan Woh Gongsi was the first Chinese dialect association in Singapore and Malaysia,19 and it is also likely the earliest Chinese dialect organization in Southeast Asia. The Yan Woh Gongsi which had changed its name to Ka Aing Koan (Jiaying guan or Jiaying huiguan, or translated as the Association for Jiaying people) in 1891 following the suppression of Chinese secret societies in the Straits Settlements, was founded by the Jiaying Hakkas who came from the five districts of the eastern part of Guangdong province. Closely following the foot steps of the Yan Woh Gongsi was the founding of Huizhou Association of Malacca which came into being in 1805. The Huizhou Hakkas came from the ten districts of the Hui Zhou (Huichew) prefecture in the southeastern part of Guangdong. The Huizhou Hakkas spoke a slightly different 17

Checking through the epigraphic records of the Chinese in early Malacca, no record of dialect-based organizations can be found. See Franke W and Chen Tieh-fan (1982). Chinese Epigraphic Materials in Malaysia, pp. 223–276. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press. 18 See Wang Tai-peng, The Origins of Chinese Kongsi, pp. 67–83; Luo X, Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo), pp. 33–64. 19 See Wu Hua, Malaixiya huazu huiguan shilue (A short history of the Chinese Associations in Malaysia) p. 15, Singapore: Tongnanya yanjiusuo; Yen Ching-hwang (1986). A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 37–38. Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press.

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dialect from the Jiaying Hakkas, but it was intelligible to Jiaying and other Hakkas. The decade of the 1820s saw the emergence of another four Hakka dialect associations in Singapore and the Malaysian region: the Ying He Association of Malacca in 1821, the Huizhou Association of Penang in 1822, the Ying He Association of Singapore in 1823, and the Chayang Association of Malacca in the 1820s.20 Undoubtedly, Hakka Chinese were the creators and harbingers of the dialect organizations in Singapore and the Malaysian region, and their creation of the dialect organization (huiguan) was to meet their needs in a urban port setting where they were the minority among the ethnic Chinese. What made them most active in founding these dialect associations was the combination of factors such as minority insecurity, the nature of Chinese Kapitan system, group cohesion, and the organizational experience in Borneo. Early Hakka immigrants in Penang, Malacca, and Singapore were aware of their being a minority group among the local Chinese communities. The dialects spoken in these ports were either Hokkien or Teochew which were unintelligible to them. They were sometimes confronted with hostility and derision from the members of the dominant groups that gave rise to a minority psychology of fear and insecurity. This sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the nature of the Chinese Kapitan system prevailing in Singapore and Malaya at that time.21 The Chinese Kapitans who were appointed by the British Colonial government or native Malay authorities tended to represent and protect sectarian interests of the Chinese communities.22 The interests of the Chinese minority groups were either ignored or neglected. To organize a geographically based huiguan was a way to protect the interests of the Hakka minority in the region. Being the late-comers on 20

See Yen Ching-hwang (1993). Early Hakka Dialect Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1801–1900. In Asian Culture, No. 17, pp. 108–110. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies; also in Yen Ching-hwang (1995). Community and Politics: The Chinese in Colonial Singapore and Malaysia, pp. 105–109. Singapore: Times Academic Press. 21 For a study of Malayan Chinese Kapitan system, see Wong CS (1963). A Gallery of Chinese Kapitans. Singapore: Ministry of Culture. 22 See Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, p. 125.

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the scene of South China, Hakka Chinese in China had always felt being discriminated aganist by the dominant groups such as Cantonese (Puntai) who occupied the fertile land in Guangdong earlier.23 The Hakkas had to unite to defend their common interests in order to survive in a hostile environment, and developed strong group consciousness and cohesion that served as a strong bond among them. This strong ethnic bond was carried by them to Southeast Asia. Moreover, the unique organizational experience that Hakka immigrants had obtained under the Lan Fang Gongsi in Borneo generally benefited all Hakkas. The Jiaying Hakkas who had migrated from Borneo to Malaya and Sumatra transmitted their experience to the Hakka communities in the region.24 The combination of all these factors accounted for the active founding of huiquan in the region.25 Huiguan as a social institution was not just used as a symbol of unity and solidarity of the Hakka immigrants, it also served the practical purpose of organizing fellow Hakka people together. It organized social and cultural programs, religious worship; provided welfare and material assistance, and regulated the behavior of the members. It was an important vehicle of social control. The Hakka communities in Southeast Asia would have lost their focus and identity without the huiguans. In short, the Hakka communities would not have the strength and mechanism to achieve their social and economic goals had they not successfully founded their dialect organizations. 23

For the theory of late arrivals of the Hakkas in Guangdong and Fujian, see Luo Xianglin (1989). Kejia yuanliu kao (An Investigations into the Origins of the Hakkas). Beijing: Huaqiao chuban gongsi. For a new interpretation of the Hakka late-arrival theory, see Lin Jiashu, Dui Kejia chilai suo de zai yanjiu (On the late arrival of the Hakka: a revisit). In Guoji Kejiaxue yantaohui lunwenji (The Proceedings of the International Conference on Hakkaology), Chang Chakyan and Hsieh Jian (eds.), pp. 1–23. 24 Luo Xianglin claims that after the demise of the Lang Fang Gongsi in Pontianak in 1884, the deputy leader of the Gongsi, Li Yuchang, led some of his followers to Kuala Lumpur. Some of the Lang Fang refugees also sought refuge in Medan and Deli of Sumatra. See Luo Xianglin, Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo), pp. 95–107. 25 See Yen Ching-hwang, A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, pp. 37–43.

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Like other Chinese dialect groups in the region, the Hakka social organizations, principally huiguans, underwent drastic changes in different historical stages since the conclusion of the Second World War in August 1945. The rise of indigenous nationalism in Southeast Asia in the postwar era and the victory of Chinese Communism in China in October 1949 changed the direction and functions of the Chinese social organizations. In their quest for strength in the building of the new states, the Southeast Asian indigenous nationalists demanded loyalty and commitment from the local Chinese communities that helped to speed up the process of local orientation. As a result, Chinese social organizations, including those of the Hakkas, had to restructure their priorities. At the same time, the victory of Chinese Communism in Mainland China severed Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia. The ceasing of emigration made some of the functions of huiguan and clan associations redundant. They were no longer needed to cater to the needs of the new arrivals whose demands for material assistance partly justified the founding and existence of those organizations.26 Like other Chinese dialect groups, the termination of Chinese emigration forced Hakka huiguans to refocus their activities on the existing Overseas Chinese communities; and the absence of new arrivals from China relieved them from their traditional obligations to look after their new fellow dialect speakers that gave them the opportunity to chart a new course of action. They emphasized unity and solidarity of the Hakka communities, especially those distinctive Hakka groups. For instance, a major distinctive Hakka group — the Jiaying Hakkas — founded the Federation of the Jiaying Hakkas of Malaya on 31st December 1950 in Ipoh, and this umbrella organization brought under its wings all Jiaying Hakka associations in Malaya and Singapore.27 The refocusing on local communities led most of the Hakka huiguans in Southeast Asia to concentrate on educational, cultural, and 26

Ibid., pp. 44–51. See “Ma Xin Jialianhui shilue” (A concise history of the Federation of the Jiaying Hakkas of Malaysia and Singapore), in Malaxiya Jiashu huiguan lianhehui yinxi jinian tekan (Souvenir Magazine of the Silver Jubilee Celebration of the Federation of the Jiaying Associations of Malaysia), Kuala Lumpur, the Federation of the Jiaying Associations of Malaysia, 1976), p. 97. 27

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recreational activities. Education was especially important because it was the key to future success for the young Hakkas. Academic success not only brought honor and prestige to the community, but also assured young Hakkas of good-income jobs and professions. This was why many Hakka huiguans undertook to set up university scholarships and loans to encourage of academic excellence.28 In addition, the Hakka huiguans also supported the worthwhile project of founding the Nanyang University in Singapore, the highest Chinese educational institution in Southeast Asia, that would absorb thousands of Chinese school graduates who hitherto had to go to China to receive any form of tertiary education. In the 1970s when Chinese education in Malaysia faced an unprecedented crisis, some Hakka huiguans, such as the Federation of the Jiaying Hakka Associations of Malaysia, came out to support the independent Chinese schools and urged the government to ensure the preservation of the Chinese primary education up to standard six level. It also appealed to the government for permission to establish an independent Chinese university in Malaysia.29 The birth of the new states in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s and the rapid political changes within them invariably involved the Hakka communities in politics. Hakka social organizations such as huiguans acted as pressure groups. Like all other pressure groups, the Hakka huiguans identified and fought for the interests of the Hakka communities as well as the interests of the wider Chinese communities of which they constituted a part. They used direct petitions or appeals, and indirect methods of exercising influence through dialect ties or personal connections. The Federation of the Singapore Hakka Associations is a case in point. The Federation of the Hakka Associations in Singapore was founded in 1928 by a group of wealthy Hakka merchants, including famous Tiger Balm king Aw Boon Ho (Hu Wenhu). The Federation was well-entrenched in the Chinese communities and wielded considerable influence. In late 1957 when Malaya just gained its independence and Singapore was on the way to self-government, 28 29

Ibid., pp. 97–98. Ibid., p. 100.

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the Federation fought for the Chinese language as an official language in Singapore, and pressed the Singapore government to soften the citizenship requirements. In the following year, it was actively involved in helping local Hakka Chinese to apply for citizenship, and more than 3000 citizenship forms were filled and lodged. In 1959, in reacting to the Singapore government’s proposal of cancelling Hakka dialect broadcast on Radio Singapore, the Federation, together with Teochew, Hainanese, and Hokchiu Associations in Singapore petitioned the government for reconsideration. Several months of negotiation with the government resulted in the retention of Hakka together with the other three Chinese minority dialect broadcasts in Singapore.30 Like other Chinese dialect groups, the Hakka huiguans in Southeast Asia attempted to cultivate good will with politicians of Hakka descent in the hope of gaining favor or influence. This was especially common in Singapore and Malaysia where the majority of the Hakka Chinese resided. Politicians were either invited to be advisors or were invited to be guest speakers at some important functions. Certainly, the Hakka huiguans, like many other Chinese dialect huiguans or clan organizations are extremely proud of what their fellow dialect speakers have achieved in politics. But, whether their cultivation of political good will had any influence on decision-making or not is open to question. What should be understood is the delicate relationship between politicians and Chinese social organizations. On the one hand, politicians have, to certain extent, relied on kinship or dialect ties to get elected, and they have to be attuned to their electorates. At the same time, Chinese politicians of Hakka descent also enjoy status and prestige as they are being well-treated, especially since the honor is readily recognized by fellow dialect speakers. On the other hand, the Hakka huiguans also gained special status and prestige in the Chinese communities because some of their own had

30

See “Nanyang Keshu zonghui shilue” (A concise history of the Federation of Hakka Association in Southeast Asia), in Nanyang Keshu zonhui di sanshi wuliu zhounian jinian kan (Souvenir Magazine of 35th and 36th Anniversary Celebrations of the Federation of Hakka Associations of Southeast Asia), p. A.2. Singapore: Nanyang Keshu zonghui.

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achieved national prominence. But how far this good will was translated into influence is difficult to ascertain. It would be unrealistic to believe that Chinese politicians of Hakka descent would bend their political belief or violate the party guidelines and against self-interests in order to meet the demands of the fellow dialect speakers. Perhaps the influence the Hakka huiguans could exercise depends very much on how influential they are in terms of political mobilization in times of election.

Hakka Chinese and Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship The term “entrepreneur” finds its origins back to the 17th century French word “entrepredre” which referred to some individuals who undertook the risk of running a new enterprise. They were primarily contractors and merchants who bore the risks of profit or loss. Risk was therefore the centerpiece of the concept of “entrepreneurship.” In 1776, British economist, Adam Smith in his monumental work, The Wealth of Nations, spoke of the entrepreneur as a person who undertook to form an organization for commercial purposes. His concept of an entrepreneur is more connected to a modern industrialist who has the foresight to recognize potential demand for new goods and services, and creates an enterprise to meet that economic change.31 The crucial role of the entrepreneur in economic activity was greatly advanced by the publication of an Austrian economist, Carl Menger, who in 1871 published his famous work entitled Principles of Economics. Menger agues that economic change does not arise from circumstances but from the individuals’ awareness and understanding of those circumstances. These individuals are entrepreneurs who are the agents for economic change, and they transform resources into consumable goods and services. Menger ranks the entrepreneur on top of all the production elements (including land, labor, and capital), and argues that the existence of land, labor, and capital would not automatically serve human needs unless the entrepreneur is prepared to take risk and organize them together to 31

See Holt, DH (1993). Entrepreneurship, p. 3. Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

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produce goods and services. He not only gives an important role to the entrepreneur in economic activities, but also broadens the concept of an entrepreneur from a risk-taker and the captain of industry to a person who has intense love for wealth and a creator of new enterprise.32 The concept of entrepreneur and entrepreneurship remained fundamentally unchanged until 1934 by another Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) who published a series of influential economic treatises. Schumpeter, a professor of Harvard University, described entrepreneurship as “a force of creative destruction” and a process of change. He also described an entrepreneur as an innovator who used the process to shatter the status quo and to induce change. The key elements of the Schumpeterian concept of entrepreneurship involves innovation, the ability to exploit new invention or untried technology to create new products, and to create new markets. Therefore, a general concept of entrepreneurship can be borrowed from a simplified version of Robert Ronstadt’s definition, that entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of creating incremental wealth. This wealth is created by entrepreneurs who assume the major risks of providing value for some products or services. The entrepreneurs created these values by bringing necessary skills and resources together.33 In the past years, I have defined an Overseas Chinese entrepreneur as a man who brings capital, labor, and management together and creates an enterprise. He possesses a capitalist attitude — the love for money and pursuit of profit, courage to take initiatives and risks, and the determination to implement new ideas, and a strong will to succeed. He must also possess foresight, business acumen, and imagination that would contribute to the success of an enterprise. Apart from these qualities, he must also be innovative and be able to lead, to communicate, and to manage a successful enterprise. He is not just a creator, but also the perpetuator of an enterprise.34 By applying this 32

See Holt, DC, ibid., pp. 5–6. Quoted in Halt, Ibid., p. 7. 34 See Yen Ching-hwang, “The Wing On company in Hong Kong and Shanghai: A case study of modern overseas Chinese enterprise, 1907–1949”, and “Modern Overseas Chinese business enterprise: A preliminary study”, in Studies in Modern Overseas Chinese History, Yen Chinghwang, pp. 224–227, 247–249. 33

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concept of the Overseas Chinese entrepreneur to the study of Hakka Chinese, we can easily identify some of the Hakka entrepreneurs that stood out in the history of Southeast Asia. Men like Kapitan Yap Ah Loy of Kuala Lumpur, Zhang Bishi of Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, and Zhang Yunan of Sumatra enjoyed enormous reputation not just among the Chinese in Southeast Asia and southern China, but also among the Europeans in the region. However, we have difficulty deciding whether Luo Fangbo, the first known Hakka leader in Southeast Asia in the second half of the 18th century was an entrepreneur. Luo was credited for pioneering gold mining in Pontianak and his creation of the gongsi government which has been hailed by some scholars as the pioneer of the modern Republican system.35 The lack of information on how Luo Fangbo organized his mining enterprise and pursued his economic advancement does not allow us to conclude that he was an Overseas Chinese entrepreneur. What was remarkable in the Southeast Asian history is the rise of a group of Hakka Chinese mining entrepreneurs who dominated the scene of tin-mining enterprise in Malaya in the second half of the 19th century. This group included legendary Kapitan Yap Ah Loy of Kuala Lumpur, Foo Chee Choon and Yau Tuck Seng of Perak, and Kapitan Chang Keng Kuei (Zheng Jinggui) of Perak and Penang. Although they came from different regions in China (Yap Ah Loy was from Huiyang district of Guangdong province; Foo Chee Choon from Yongding district of Fujian province; Yau Tuck Seng from Pingyuan district of Guangdong, while Chang Keng Kuei was from Zengcheng district of Guangdong), they all shared a common background of being poor immigrants and a near commonly intelligible Hakka dialect. Like most of the Chinese immigrants of the time, they possessed a strong desire for rapid economic advancement and returning to China with wealth and honor. But unlike the majority of the poor Chinese immigrants, they possessed business acumen and foresight which enabled them to see a bright 35

See for instance, Luo Xianglin, Luo Fangbo suojian Poluozhou Kun Mian Lanfang dazongzhi kao (A Study of the Establishment of Lanfang Presidential System in Borneo by Luo Fangbo), pp. 109–110.

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future for the Malayan tin industry. All of them were endowed with an extraordinary ability in social and political skills that enabled them to succeed in organizing capital, labor, and management to found their respective mining enterprises. Some of them were also innovative in their management style, departing from traditional Chinese methods of running business enterprises. Perceiving the inevitability of a cut-throat competition with European rivals as Malaya was slowly incorporated into the British colonial empire, they began to modify their management style and were prepared to use the modern method of mining exploration by adopting Western steam engines. Yap Ah Loy, for instance, installed in his Ampang tin mine a steam engine pump in 1881, the first of its kind in Selangor, and by 1885, he owned several steam engine pumps of the 11 in the same state.36 Apart from his tin-mining enterprise, Yap Ah Loy was involved in pioneering the plantation of tapioca in Selangor, and he also diversified his business into construction, real estate, and brick kiln, forming a vast business empire in the early Kuala Lumpur.37 All of these Hakka entrepreneurs were not only the creators of their mining enterprises, but also the perpetuators of the enterprises during their lifetime. Zhang Bishi and Zhang Yunan were Hakka entrepreneurs of a different cut. They represented a new type of Hakka entrepreneur who departed from the Hakka-dominated tin mining and competed successfully in coastal trade, shipping, revenue farms, and plantations. In 1981, Dr Michael R. Godley of Monash University, Melbourne, Australia published a book entitled The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise and the Modernization of China, 1893–1911 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), the first full-length study of Zhang Bishi in any language. Godley’s work is excellent and has thrown much light on Zhang’s remarkable career and his contributions to the late Qing economic modernization.

36

See Middlebrook, SM and Gullick, JM (1951). Yap Ah Loy, published as an independent issue of The Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 24(2), 97; Wong Lin-ken (1965). The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, p. 57. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 37 See Middlebrook, SM and Gullick, JM, ibid., pp. 97–98.

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Although Chinese scholar Kuang Guoxiang of Penang had written a piece on Zhang Bishi earlier than Godley’s, Kuang’s work is more anecdotal than serious academic research.38 What emerged from Godley’s and Kuang’s works is a picture of Zhang Bishi who was undoubtedly top Overseas Chinese entrepreneur of his time, and his reputation as a merchant traveled widely in Southeast Asia and China. He was not very different from many other Chinese immigrants in Southeast Asia at the time: strong desire for economic advancement, thrifty and hard-working, ambitious, and with some assistance from kinsmen abroad. But what made Zhang different from them was his business acumen, judgment, and social and political skills. His perception of the important role played by modern transport led him to found his shipping lines plying between northern Sumatra and Penang. His connections with the Dutch and Qing governments facilitated the success of his enterprises. Like other Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, his ability to bring capital, labor, and management together to create his business empire was the key to his success. Beginning as a provision provider for the Dutch in Java, he steadily extended his business activities to cover shipping, coastal trade, revenue farms, mining, banking, and plantation in Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. Between 1895 and 1910, he further extended his business activities in China into the areas of manufacturing and infrastructure industry. He founded the famous Chang Yu Pioneer Wine Company at Chefoo, Shantung, and was involved in textile manufacturing, brick, and glass making39; he also undertook and coordinated the construction of railroads in South China.40 His business empire, in terms of scope and scale, had far surpassed other Overseas Chinese businessmen before him. Zhang Bishi’s business success and his 38

See Kuang Guo-xiang (1958). Zhang Bishi qiren (A portrait of Zhang Bishi). In Bingcheng sanji (An Anecdotal History of Penang), Kuang Guo-xiang (ed.), pp. 97–107. Hong Kong: Shijie Book Store. 39 See Godley, MR (1976). Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs as reformers: The case of Chang Pishih. In Reform in Nineteenth-Century China, Cohen, PA and Schrecker, JE (eds.), p. 51. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 40 See Godley, MR (1973). Chang Pi-shih and Nanyang Chinese involvement in South China’s railroads, 1896–1911. In Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 4, pp. 16–30.

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knowledge and experience in modern business management led him to be successfully recruited into the Qing bureaucracy, and he was given one of the most coveted positions of imperial commissioner for investigating commerce in Southeast Asia. He was also to play a leading role in charting a new course for China’s struggle for economic modernization during the late Qing era.

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Chapter 16

Hong Kong, China, and the Overseas Chinese*

The Past With the return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China on 1 July 1997, the history of Hong Kong will take a new turn. Hong Kong will become an integral part of China, and the ambiguous status of Hong Kong Chinese in the past will end. Historians have difficulties in classifying Hong Kong Chinese as to whether they are Chinese from China or Overseas Chinese living under foreign rule. Strictly speaking, Hong Kong and Macau Chinese should be classified as Overseas Chinese because they were under British and Portuguese rules.1 Because of geographical proximity and for historical reasons, Hong Kong and Macau have been inseparable parts of China, at least in the eyes of many Chinese. Consequently, the Chinese in Hong * This chapter is based on my inaugural lecture from the Chair of History of the University of Hong Kong, delivered on 7 October 1990. 1 Hong Kong island was permanently ceded to Britain in 1842 in the Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing) after the defeat of China in the infamous Opium War. The Kowloon Peninsula was further ceded to Britain in 1860 in the Treaty of Peking, while the New Territory was leased to Britain in 1898 for 99 years. See Article 3 of the Nanking Treaty and Article 6 of the Treaty of Peking. See William Frederick Mayers (ed.). Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers (first published in London in 1877, republished by Ch’eng-wen Publishing Company, Taipei, Taiwan, 1966), pp. 2 and 9. For British leasing of the New Territories in the 1898 Peking Convention, see Peter Westley-Smith (1980). Unequal Treaty, 1898–1997: China, Great Britain and Hong Kong’s New Territories, p. 1, Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press. In relation to the Portuguese rule of Macau (Macao), Portuguese traders illegally occupied Macau since 1542 during the late Ming period, and the Portuguese rule was not officially recognized by China until 1887 when a treaty was signed by the Portuguese and Qing governments in Lisbon. See the Sino-Portuguese treaty signed in Lisbon on 26 March 1887 (1964). In Zhong Wai tiaoyue huibian (Collections of Treaties signed between China and Foreign Powers), p. 410. Taipei: Wen Hai chubanshe.

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Kong and Macau have held in the past an ambiguous status in relation to China. It was in the mid-1980s when China was eager to industrialize, and for political and economic reasons, that a special term “the compatriots of Hong Kong and Macau” (Gang Ao tongbao) was coined for the Chinese in these two territories. They received different treatment from the other Overseas Chinese, and enjoyed certain privileges such as traveling within China. The use of this new term further confused the identities of the Hong Kong and Macau Chinese. The ambiguity of the Hong Kong Chinese’s identity will end after 1 July 1997. By whatever name the Hong Kong Chinese would like to call themselves, such as “Hongkongese” (Hongkongers, Xianggang ren in Mandarin, Gong yan in Cantonese),2 they will be identified by outsiders as the Chinese from China. Then the fate of the Hong Kong Chinese will be closely linked to the future of China. Hong Kong was the center of trade and cultural exchange between the East and the West in the past. Since its acquisition by Britain after the Opium War, Hong Kong emerged gradually as a center of British trade in the Far East. It was a center of opium and entrepot trade, and the gateway into China for Western merchants who were involved in a variety of commercial activities.3 Using Hong Kong as a base, British and Western merchants extended their business activities to coastal and inner treaty ports, and then into the vast rural China. They collected raw materials from China and sold them in the international markets, and they distributed opium and Western manufacturing goods to the vast China market.4 Western companies, headed by Jardine, Matheson and Company, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Group, 2

In a survey conducted by two Hong Kong Chinese academics in 1985 of Hong Kong Chinese identity, surprisingly, 59.5% of the respondents identified themselves as “Hongkongese” when they were asked to choose between it and “Chinese”. See Lau Su-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi (1988). The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, p. 2. Shatin, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. 3 For early opium and entrepot trade in Hong Kong in its early decades, see Costin WC (1968). Great Britain and China, 1833–1860, pp. 107–110. Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint; Endacott GB (1974). A History of Hong Kong, pp. 60–61, 74–75. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, reprint. 4 Chinese compradors were instrumental in Western economic penetration of China. For an excellent study of Western merchants and Chinese compradors in the 19th century, see Hao Ping-yen (1970). The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

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established complex trading and financial networks in China from which they prospered.5 Being the gateway into China, Hong Kong also served as the center of cultural exchange between the East and the West. The colony attracted a large number of Western missionaries, Chinese intellectuals, and compradors. Soon after its inception, Hong Kong became the center of Protestant missionary activities.6 The London Missionary Society, the first of the modern missionary societies that was founded in 1792, made Hong Kong its headquarters in the East, and used it to spearhead its spread to various treaty ports on the China coast. Western missionaries started founding educational institutions in Hong Kong and the treaty ports, and recruited a number of Chinese students. Missionary colleges blended Western and Chinese cultures together in their curricula,7 and produced a number of Chinese intellectuals and compradors who were immersed in both Western and Chinese civilizations. Some big names in modern Chinese history such as Dr Sun Yat-sen, Yung Wing, Tong King Sing, and Wu Tingfang bear the evidence of the important cultural impact of Western missionaries on China.8 5

For a good study of Jardine, Matheson and Company, see Cheung WE (1978). Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine Matheson and Company: A China Agency of the Early Nineteenth Century. London: Curzon Press. 6 See Latourette KS (1966). A History of Christian Missions in China, pp. 245–246. Taipei: Ch’eng-Wen Publishing Company, reprint. 7 See for instance, the Morrison Education Society, an educational arm of the London Missionary Society, moved from Canton (Guangzhou) to Hong Kong after the colony was opened. It recruited a number of Chinese students and trained them in both Western and Chinese cultures. See Smith CT (1985). Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong, pp. 13–33. Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press. 8 For Sun Yat-sen’s connections with British and American missionaries in Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese communities in America and coastal China, see Sharman L (1968). Sun Yat-Sen: His Life and Its Meaning, pp. 19–27. Stanford: Stanford University Press, reissued; Smith CT, op.cit., pp. 87–96. For Yung Wing’s connection with American missionaries, see Yung Wing (1909). My Life in China and America. New York. For Tong King Sing’s connections with British Protestant missionaries in Hong Kong, see Smith CT, op.cit., pp. 34–51; Hao YP, op.cit., p. 196. For Wu T early connections with the missionaries in Hong Kong, see Smith CT, op.cit., p. 132; For Wu’s life, career, and his connections with Christian missionaries, see Linda P Shin (1970). China in transition: The role of Wu T’ing-fang (1842–1922). Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles; For a short biography of Wu Tingfang in Chinese, see Wu Tingfang boshi (Dr Wu Tingfang), in Malaiya Gugangzhou liuyi zonghui tekan (Souvenir Magazine of Pan Malayan Guangzhou Six Districts’ Association) (Penang, 1964), “Renwu zhi” (Prominent Personalities) Section, pp. 37–38.

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At the same time, Western missionaries also translated the Bible into Chinese and widely distributed it among the Chinese population. Chinese converts who had been imbued with Western values also played their part in transmitting Western culture to China. Wang Tao, a famous Chinese intellectual and reformer in late Qing China, published a modern Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, the Xunhuan ribao, and had written widely on the West. His contribution to the Reform movement by introducing Western ideas has been well recognized by historians.9 On the other hand, Western missionaries in Hong Kong also served as transmitters of Chinese culture to the West. Motivated by the future gain of converts among the vast Chinese population in China, Western missionaries were involved in compiling and publishing Western–Chinese dictionaries in an attempt to teach Westerners the Chinese language. They also published works in Western languages on Chinese grammar. But the most important contribution of Western missionaries in transmitting Chinese culture to the West was the translation of the Confucian Classics by James Legge. James Legge, a Scottish missionary who had extensive missionary experience in the East and a profound knowledge of Chinese language and Classics, undertook this translation project with the support of Hong Kong’s merchant prince, Robert Jardine. With the help of Wang Tao, he completed the translation of most of the Four Books and Five Classics.10 His English translations of the Chinese Classics for the first time introduced the essence of Chinese civilization to the West. In addition to commercial and cultural contacts between the East and the West, Hong Kong also served as a source of diaspora of Chinese emigrants to the outside world. Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia and Japan began long before the opening of Hong Kong. Chinese emigration to Southeast Asia after the founding of Hong Kong 9 See Cohen, PA (1987). Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T’ao and Reform in Late Ch’ing China. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University. 10 James Legge’s translation of the Four Books and Five Classics was entitled The Chinese Classics which consisted of seven volumes. First and second volumes of which were translations of the Four Books came out in 1861, while the translation of the Five Classics was completed and published intermittently from 1865 to 1882. See Fok KC (1990). Lectures on Hong Kong History: Hong Kong’s Role in Modern Chinese History, p. 7. Hong Kong: The Commercial Press.

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forged a close link between this new British colony and the Southeast Asian Chinese communities. As Hong Kong became an integral part of the British empire, the economic and administrative links between Hong Kong and British possessions in Southeast Asia such as the Straits Settlements and the Malay States were strengthened. British and Western companies that specialized in acquiring Chinese immigrants were established in Hong Kong,11 and used the colony as a source of cheap labor for British colonies worldwide.12 Although Hong Kong did not become the center of the notorious coolie trade in the mid-19th century,13 it nevertheless emerged as a center of diaspora of Chinese emigrants. Many Cantonese emigrants came from Guangdong to Hong Kong and then headed for Southeast Asia, the United States, Canada, and Australia.14 With the existence of immigrant recruitment companies in Hong Kong, there arose in the colony groups of immigrant brokers who used all means to acquire immigrants from interior Guangdong.15 The networks of the immigrant 11

A number of British emigration agents set up their offices in Hong Kong. They were John Gardiner Austin, Dent & Company, Thomas Gerard, Jardine, Matheson & Company, Lyall, Still & Company, Tait & Company, and James T. White. In addition, other European and American emigration agencies also set up offices in Hong Kong. They were Baak (Dutch), Comstock (Spanish ?), Jorge (French), Rev. William Lobscheid (German), Paul Ehlers & Company (German), Pustau & Company (German), Russell & Company (American), and Sierussen & Company (German). See Appendix III, List of important emigration agents, in Wang Sing-wu (1978). The Organization of Chinese Emigration, 1848–1888: With Special Reference to Chinese Emigration to Australia, pp. 355–360. San Francisco:Chinese Materials Center, Inc. 12 British emigration companies such as John Gardiner Austin, Dent & Company sent Chinese emigrants to the British colony of West Indies, while Thomas Gerard sent Chinese emigrants to British Guiana and Trinidad, and Tait & Company sent emigrants to Australia. Ibid. 13 After the suppression of the infamous coolie trade in Amoy in 1852, Hong Kong was likely to be chosen as the coolie trade center. Due to British government’s stringent measures in controlling the coolie trade, the notorious center was moved to Macau, a Portuguese colony. See Yen Ching-hwang (1985). Coolies and Mandarins: China’s Protection of the Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch’ing Period, 1851–1911, pp. 54–55. Singapore: Singapore University Press. 14 For the majority of credit-ticket Chinese emigrants moving from Hong Kong to San Francisco, California, see Gunther Barth (1964). Bitter Strength: A History of Chinese in the United States, 1850–1870, p. 67. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 15 These immigrant brokers were popularly known in Chinese as “Kheh-taus” (head of immigrant), and most of the immigrant brokers in Hong Kong were Chinese nationals, speaking Cantonese. They were also divided into “principal” and “subordinate” brokers with different roles in the recruitment of immigrants. See Yen Ching-hwang, op.cit., pp. 37–38.

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trade and coolie trade linked Hong Kong, Singapore, and San Francisco together. The Cantonese-speaking immigrants were shipped to Singapore or San Francisco first, and then from there were dispersed to other neighboring countries. The Singapore link in the network dispersed the immigrants to the Malay States, Dutch East Indies, British Burma, and sometimes to Australia and the Pacific, while the San Francisco link dispersed the immigrants to Canada, the United States, and the Central and South Americas.

The Present With the signing of the Sino-British joint declaration on 19 December 1984, optimism about the future of Hong Kong generally prevailed among the Hong Kong Chinese and overseas observers. There were grounds for such optimism. China, throughout its negotiations with Britain over the future of Hong Kong, had demonstrated restraint and willingness to cooperate with the British to deal with this historical problem.16 China was at that time in the mood of opening and modernization, and the Chinese reformers led by Deng Xiaoping, had shown a remarkable grip on power and had undertaken vigorous economic and political reforms.17 Deng Xiaoping’s new political formula of “one country, two systems” (yiguo liangzhi) for the solution of the 16

For Sino-British negotiations for the settlement of Hong Kong and the respective positions on the issue, see Ian Scott (1989). Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong, pp. 171–219. London: Hurst & Company; Roger Buckley (1977). Hong Kong: The Road to 1997, pp. 104–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Joseph YS Cheng (ed.) (1984). Hong Kong: In Search of a Future, pp. 28–74. Hong Kong & New York: Oxford University Press. For China’s basic position on Hong Kong, see Deng Xiaoping’s statement when talking to British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher on 24 September 1982. See Deng Xiaoping (1994). Our basic position on the question of Hong Kong. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 (1982–1992), pp. 23–25. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. 17 For the rise of the reformers and their economic and political reforms, see Harry Harding (1989). China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, pp. 40–236. Sydney & Wellington: Allen & Unwin; Bill Brugger and Stephen Reglar (1994), Politics, Economy and Society in Contemporary China, pp. 48–88. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd; Colin Mackerras, Pradeep Taneja and Graham Young (1994). China since 1978: Reform, Modernization and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire Pty. Ltd.

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problems of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan,18 seemed to have gained increasing support. Furthermore, there was a general assumption among the observers that China’s success on the Four Modernizations would depend greatly on the prosperity of Hong Kong, and it would be in China’s self-interests to continue to allow Hong Kong to flourish because China received one-third of its foreign exchange via Hong Kong. It was also generally assumed that Hong Kong would serve as a test case for Deng’s new political formula; if China did not set a good example in Hong Kong, it would never have the chance to recover Taiwan peacefully. Despite this general optimism, there were a small minority of Hong Kong Chinese who saw the fate of the colony sealed and their hope of continuous prosperity under British rule dashed. This small minority of the Hong Kong Chinese consisted of those who had vested interests in the colonial system, those who had strong cultural and emotional attachments to the British colonial rule, and those who had bad personal experience under the Chinese Communist rule on the mainland. They saw their future and the future of their children in Hong Kong finished, and they started emigrating to Western countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Britain. What should be emphasized here is that the emigration of the Hong Kong Chinese to the Western countries at that time was a slow but escalating process, and most of the emigrants had no strong sense of urgency. The events leading to the Tiananmen crackdown took a sharp turn for the future of the Hong Kong Chinese. Undoubtedly, there were people in Hong Kong who were genuinely concerned with the future of democracy in China, but the majority of the Hong Kong Chinese were more concerned with the implications for their own future in the territory after 1997. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that had there been no 1997 issue, the response of the Hong Kong Chinese to the student movement in China would not have been so 18

For an explanation of the concepts and contents of “one country, two systems”, see Ian Kelly (1986). Hong Kong: A Political–Geographic Analysis, pp. 114–116. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

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overwhelming. The collection of over 10 million Hong Kong dollars in one pro-democracy concert at the Hong Kong race course and the mobilization of over one million people marching in the streets in late May 1989, clearly demonstrated the sentiment of the Hong Kong residents for democracy in post-1997 Hong Kong.19 The Tiananmen crackdown at the dawn of 4 June 1989 sent a shock wave throughout the world. Most of the Hong Kong Chinese had followed the events closely on television, and were shocked to have seen the ugly scenes of the crackdown. Many of them were saddened and had a strong sense of horror and outrage. This prompted a run on the Bank of China in Hong Kong. The impact of Tiananmen crackdown on the territory was profound and lasting. The positive image of Chinese Communism as a compromising and reforming regime which had been projected to the outside world had been tarnished. The crackdown had shown to the Hong Kong Chinese the ugliest face of Chinese Communism, and reminded them of the harsh and cruel treatment that people received during the days of the Cultural Revolution. It had given rise to an unprecedented crisis of confidence among Hong Kong Chinese. Those who had made up their minds to emigrate speeded up the process of application; for those who were wavering about migrating, the crackdown helped them to make up their minds to leave the territory; and those who had no means of migrating, became more desperate, and tried to grab as much money as they could in order to increase their chance of leaving. The mood of exodus from Hong Kong had been created, and the actual number of emigrants leaving Hong Kong jumped from 30,000 in 1987 to 62,000 in 1990. Most of the emigrants left for countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Britain. 19 I was in Hong Kong, at that time witnessing the unfolding of the pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong. See Yen Ching-hwang, East Meets West: An Ethnic Chinese Scholar and Social Activist in Australia (Yen Ching-hwang’s autobiography). Unpublished manuscript, Chapter 8, “Hong Kong interlude: Chair of History and Head of the History Department of the University of Hong Kong”). For a million people marching in Hong Kong streets on 21 and 28 May 1989, see Robert Cottrell (1997). The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat, p. 190. London: John Murray (Publishers) Ltd., reprint.

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The emigration of a large number of Hong Kong Chinese to the West had a great impact on the existing Overseas Chinese communities. First, the size of these communities had grown larger. Reports about the increase of Chinese population in Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco, New York, Sydney, and Melbourne are frequent. Second, the migration of Hong Kong Chinese has strengthened the economic foundation of these communities. Since many of them are business migrants, they have brought their wealth from Hong Kong to the new land, and have injected millions of dollars into the local economies. The strengthening of the economic foundation allows the Overseas Chinese communities to diversify and compete favorably with the locals. The Chinese communities are no longer dominated by an economy based on the catering industry. Many of the Chinese invest in banking, finance, real estate, import and export, supermarkets, and other businesses. The diversification of the Overseas Chinese economy lifts the status of the Chinese communities, and helps to project a more positive and respectable image of the Chinese in the wider societies. The Hong Kong immigrants have also brought experience and skill to the Overseas Chinese communities. Many of them are experienced businessmen, experts in finance, banking, and management.20 They have accumulated useful experience in trade and manufacturing in Hong Kong and China and other countries of AsiaPacific region. With the fast economic growth in the Pacific rim, they could become important assets for countries like Canada, the United States, and Australia in forging closer economic relations with Asian partners such as China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. In addition to the economic benefits, the Overseas Chinese communities could also gain the contribution of the Hong Kong immigrants in the cultural arena. As most of the Hong Kong immigrants have retained more Chinese culture and values than the Chinese from Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, their arrival has created more 20

I was actively involved in the Chinese community in South Australia for a period of 17 years from the end of 1971 to the end of 1988 holding the positions of President and Vice President of the Chinese Association of South Australia for 14 years. This was my observation of the Chinese community in Adelaide, and I read about the Chinese communities in Sydney and Melbourne.

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demands for Chinese newspapers, magazines, and books, and has also created demands for different types of Chinese foodstuffs. The result of this is the increase in the Chinese cultural activities and contributed to the maturity and sophistication of the Chinese communities. More Chinese newspapers and magazines are published, more video-tapes and books are imported, and more Chinese foodstuffs are made available in the communities unknown before. In short, the coming of Hong Kong immigrants has enriched the cultural lives of the Overseas Chinese communities, and has strengthened the Chineseness of the communities. The coming of Hong Kong immigrants to the West has its own problems. First, the Hong Kong immigrants have further divided the existing fragmented Overseas Chinese communities.21 They group together socially and economically, and have polarized the communities. They live close by and socialize together, yam-cha and play majong together. Their children go to the same private schools and they play games and watch video programs together. They speak Cantonese instead of English or Mandarin, and have founded clubs and social organizations to advance their mutual interests. By doing so, they have created new enclaves and a separate identity. Second, the arrival of Hong Kong immigrants has increased racial tension between the Chinese communities and the wider communities at large. They have brought with them their values and lifestyles from Hong Kong. They are materialistic and status-conscious, and do not hesitate to display their wealth in the new land. They live in expensive houses and travel in luxurious cars. Their show of wealth is not in tune with the customs and habits of many people in countries such as Canada and Australia. This tends to generate envy and jealousy among the White population. Further, many Hong Kong immigrants are involved in speculation in local property markets, which helps in 21 As a keynote speaker (together with the prominent Australian historian Professor Manning Clark) at the First National Conference of the Australian Chinese Community held in Sydney 28–30 November 1986, I made the warning of the harm of having a fragmented Chinese community in Australia; see Yen Ching-hwang (1988), Chinese Australians: Past, present and future. In the Proceedings of the First National Conference of the Australian Chinese Community, p. 8. Sydney.

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some ways to raise property prices beyond the reach of ordinary families in these countries. Also, many of the Hong Kong immigrants are insensitive toward local customs, acting as if they were living in Hong Kong. The chopping down of some old trees in an established Vancouver’s suburb in the practice of Chinese fengshui (geomancy) has created racial tension with the local residents. All these practices have contributed in part to the growing anti-Asian sentiment among the White population in Canada, Australia, and the United States. Third, the coming of some members of the triad from Hong Kong helps to tarnish the image of the Overseas Chinese communities. The triad members, particularly those who posed as rich businessmen, arrived in the West through business migration programs, and they have brought along their clandestine organizations to the new land. They are involved in drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, and protection rackets. The struggle for territorial control in Asian communities in Canada, the United States, and Australia has led to murders, arsons, and gang wars. In 1988, an Australian current affairs program entitled “The Triad in Australia” closely examined triad activities in Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, and pointed a finger at their origins in Hong Kong. The presence of an increasing number of triad members in these countries has projected a bad image of the Overseas Chinese communities.

The Future To predict the future relationship between Hong Kong, China, and the Overseas Chinese communities in the West is not an easy task. It depends on several variables: the stability of Chinese politics, the mood and attitude of the Hong Kong Chinese, and the changing immigration policies of the Western countries. The details of the future relationship between Hong Kong and China requires a separate study. What can be observed are the broad trends leading to the future relationship. Out of my expectation, China during the postTiananmen crackdown has toughened its stand on Hong Kong. The dramatic fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe made Chinese leaders in Beijing nervous, and generated a strong sense of

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insecurity. Political survival of the Chinese Communist Party outweighs any economic benefits which may be derived from the prosperity of Hong Kong. This is why the regime in Beijing has adopted a rather inflexible policy toward Hong Kong. China’s uncompromising attitude toward British initiatives for stabilizing Hong Kong by granting rights of abode to 250,000 Hong Kong Chinese, testified to such intransigence. What should be pointed out here is that China’s fear of Hong Kong being used as a base for subversive activities against Socialist China is genuine, and how to alleviate such fear depends very much on the mood and attitude of Hong Kong Chinese. But at the moment, it seems that Hong Kong and China are on a collision course. The Hong Kong Chinese have been active in preparing for self-government, and they have been trying to create a mechanism for the guarantee of their basic rights of which they value so much. Some of them still actively support the pro-democracy movement outside Hong Kong in defiance of China’s warnings. Of course, Hong Kong Chinese can justify their actions by claiming entitlement to democracy and human rights. Whether this will have any effect on the Chinese government after 1997 is in doubt. The attempt to create a separate identity of “Hongkongese” (or Hongkongers)22 will not be in tune with Chinese nationalism and will not be relevant after 1997. Unless Hong Kong Chinese tone down their political ambitions and their all-out quest for democracy, and devote more of their energy to the economic arena, the clash between Hong Kong and China will be inevitable. Whatever the future relationship between Hong Kong and China might be, the process of exodus of Hong Kong emigrants will continue, and will likely be accelerated toward 1997. In the next 6½ years, another 400,000 Hong Kong Chinese are expected to migrate to countries in the West and perhaps some to Southeast Asian and Pacific countries. The coming of these 400,000 Hong Kong emigrants will

22

See Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, op.cit., p. 2; Kuan Hsin-chi and Lau Siu-kai (1987). Hong Kong’s search for a consensus: Barriers and prospects. In The Future of Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond, Hungdah Chiu, Y. C. Yao, Wu Yuan-li (eds.), p. 108. New York: Quorum Books.

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increase the size of the Overseas Chinese communities, will further strengthen their economic foundation, and will increase the influence of Hong Kong Chinese in the Overseas Chinese communities. Perhaps there will be a more important role for the Hong Kong immigrants to play in the defense of the long-term interests of the Overseas Chinese communities. There has been conjecture in Australia that with the help of Hong Kong Chinese money and financial expertise, Sydney may emerge to become the financial center of South Pacific rim. Certainly there is scope for the Hong Kong immigrants to operate as their numbers increased. With the coming of the political refugees to the West from China, and the large number of Chinese students studying in the West, the Overseas Chinese communities in Canada, the United States, Australia, and Europe will take on a new political dimension. Some Hong Kong immigrants would support these pro-democracy activists and form pressure groups that could exert pressure on the Chinese government. Although these political groups would not be able to form an alternative government in China, they would use the international media and other means to lash out at and embarrass Beijing. Due to the new political situation in the Overseas Chinese communities, the Chinese government will certainly pay more attention to them in an attempt to gain support of the Overseas Chinese. From Beijing’s perspective, there are old foes (the supporters of Guomindang) and new foes (the pro-democracy activists) in the midst of the Overseas Chinese population. The worst would be the joining of hands of these two adverse forces in the communities. This new development would require changes in China’s policy and strategy toward the Overseas Chinese. It would use its diplomatic establishments worldwide and the Overseas Chinese Bureaus (Qiaoban) and the Overseas Chinese Associations (Qiaolian) to realize its objectives. Chinese diplomats would try to cultivate cordial relationships with the leaders of the Overseas Chinese communities and try to forge closer links between China and the communities. The Overseas Chinese Bureaus and the Overseas Chinese Associations would also use their contacts to influence the attitude of the Overseas Chinese toward China.

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The struggle between pro-China elements on the one hand and the pro-Taiwan and pro-democracy activists on the other will intensify. It will further split the Overseas Chinese communities. How long this struggle will last is difficult to predict. What can be sure is that this political struggle will serve as a new stumbling block for the cooperation and unity of the Overseas Chinese communities which are badly needed in those countries.

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Chapter 17

Dr Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China*

Dr Sun Yat-sen and Modern China International environment and China’s position in the world in the 19th and early 20th centuries Dr Sun Yat-sen was a great Chinese revolutionary, and his deeds had changed the destiny of modern China. Sun was born in an era of rapid political and social changes. The second half of the 19th century was a turbulent world where the powerful swallowed the weak under the influence of Social-Darwinism. The period also witnessed the rise of world imperialism under which the globe was partitioned by Western powers, with many parts of Asia and Africa being carved up and turned into Western colonies. In the age of imperialism, China was under the inept Manchu government which was corroded by corruption and nepotism. China faced an unprecedented crisis of being partitioned by Western powers and Japan. Since the opening of China in the wake of the Opium War (1839–1842), Western powers, led by Britain, had controlled China’s international trade. Western merchants, armed with extraterritorial rights and backed by modern financial institutions, penetrated into the vast interior China, and subjugated Chinese people for relentless exploitation. In the face of the imperialistic challenge, the Manchu government showed its ineptness. The Manchu government was eroded by both ageold feudalism and autocracy which proved to be incapable of coping with drastic political change. The result of this was the weakening of * This chapter is based on a keynote speech presented in Chinese at the International Conference on The 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China, Hong Kong, 12–14 November 2001 at the Hong Kong Baptist University.

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China and the decline of its international standing. China in the second half of the 19th century was nicknamed “the sickman of East Asia”.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and Chinese consciousness Dr Sun Yat-sen was born in 1866 after China was defeated by Britain and France in their joint expedition against China in the second Opium War (1856–1860). In Sun’s formative years, China was further pressured by the expansionism of France which ended with China’s defeat in the Sino-French war over the protection of Vietnam — a Chinese protectorate — in 1885.1 Sun Yat-sen was at the time 19 years of age, and he was devastated by the event. Sun’s awareness of China’s crisis was also partly due to his family and educational background. His family belonged to the middle peasantry, owning a small plot of farming land. His elder brother was a successful Overseas Chinese in Hawaii where he had made a mark in the local Chinese community.2 Overseas Chinese were men living in two worlds. On the one hand, they carried the baggage of old China with traditional Chinese customs and values, while on the other, they were exposed to progressive ideas of the West. Sun was in such environment that he received both Chinese and Western education. Having received basic English education in Hawaii, Sun was sent home to China, and enrolled in a Chinese medical college in Guangzhou named Boya as a trainee student. In 1887, he was admitted into the Hong Kong Medical College for Chinese as a medical student. In cosmopolitan Hong Kong, Sun had access to various types of books and magazines on social sciences and current affairs.3 He was well aware of the decay of China and its declining power, and the danger it faced. In contrast with the old Chinese intellectuals such as scholar-officials, Sun possessed a 1

For China’s mishandling of diplomatic and military affairs leading to the Sino-French war, see Eastman LE (1967). Throne and Mandarins: China’s Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversay, 1880–1885. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2 See Schiffrin, HZ (1968). Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, p. 12. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 3 See Luo Xianglin (1954). Guofu zhi daxue shidai (The University Days of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 28–29. Taipei: The Commercial Press of Taiwan.

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profound knowledge of the West, and had a sense of urgency in rescuing China from the encroachment of Western and Japanese imperialists. Of course, Chinese consciousness of imperialistic threat did not start with Dr Sun Yat-sen. The leaders of the Self-Strengthening movement such as Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Zhang Zidong were well aware of the danger that China was in during the second half of the 19th century, and they had been attempting to reform China in order to check the foreign encroachment.4 But their understanding of the West was partial and superficial, and their solution to China’s problem was piecemeal and impractical. Their famous formula “Chinese learning as the base, and Western learning as the function” (Tiyong principle) was proven ineffective.5 The modernization programs they undertook appeared to be cosmetic. Further, most of them were from bureaucratic-landlord families. Hence, their reform could not have been thorough, for some of the reform programs contravened their self-interests. Sun Yat-sen’s understanding of the West was not only more profound than the Self-Strengthening reformers, but also his prescription for the cure of China was more practical and thorough. Since the defeat of the Manchu government in the SinoFrench war in 1885, Sun realized that the Manchu government was beyond salvation. It had to go before China could be saved. This was why he had decided to dedicate himself to overthrowing the Manchus.6 Although Dr Sun’s revolutionary ideas were conceived directly in reaction to the Manchu ineptness, more importantly, he 4

For the study of the Self-Strengthening movement, see Wright, MC (1962). The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The Tung Chih Restoration, Chapters 9 and 10. Stanford: Stanford University Press; “Biographies of Three Leaders of the Self-Strengthening Movement: Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hungchang and Chang Chih-tung”, in Readings in Modern Chinese History, Hsu, Immanuel CY (ed.), pp. 183–203. New York: Oxford University Press; Liu Kwang-ching, Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870–1875. In Approaches to Modern Chinese History, Feuerwerker A, Murphey R and Wright, MC (eds.), pp. 68–104. Berkeley: University of California Press. 5 See Teng Ssu-yu and Fairbank JK (1966). China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839–1923. (Athenneum paperback), Chapters 5–14. 6 See Sun Yat-sen (1966). Sun Wen xuehsuo’ (The Theory of Sun Yats-sen), Chapter 8, ‘Yuzie jingzheng’, in Guofu Quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Zhang Qiyun (ed.), p. 32. Taipei: Guofang Yanjiuyan.

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was strongly influenced by the republican ideas of the West. He had observed the political systems in the West, and realized the autocratic system was on the way out in Europe, and the emerging republican system was most democratic and progressive, and it was also keeping abreast with the times. This was why he advocated the establishment of a democratic system based on the American or French model.7 He believed overthrowing the Manchu regime was only the first step toward China’s salvation; the eventual objective was to build a democratic, rich, and powerful China. Dr Sun Yat-sen was a charismatic leader. His noble character, demeanor, and persuasive power attracted many people to support his revolutionary undertaking. The famous Chinese revolutionary leader in Singapore, Tan Chor-nam (Chen Chunan) recalled that he was deeply impressed by Sun’s warm personality and broad knowledge during his first encounter with Sun, and was soon converted to support Sun’s cause.8 With his charisma, knowledge, and the profound understanding of the West, Sun had attracted many people to his revolutionary undertaking. His revolutionary enthusiasm and his idealism for a democratic and powerful China encouraged his supporters to strive for the revolution. Apart from his personal contacts, Sun also aroused the new political consciousness of the Chinese people through his eloquent speeches delivered in seminars or public rallies. In the one and a half decades prior to the 1911 Revolution, Sun Yat-sen targeted two social groups — Overseas Chinese and overseas students — as his core supporters. With his broad knowledge, powerful intellect, international reputation, and social skills, Sun had no difficulty in winning their support. His analytical ability and his profound knowledge of history and current affairs always aroused tremendous enthusiasm for 7

See Sun’s detailed discussion on American and French type of democracy, in Sun Yat-sen (1986). Minquan zhuyi (The principle of peoples’ rights or the principle of democracy), in Sun Zhongshan quanji (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 9, pp. 264–266, 289–294, 300–306 and 311–314. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. 8 See Tan Chor-nam (1963). Wan Qingyuan yu Zhongguo geming shilue. (A brief history of the Been Ching Villa and the Chinese Revolution), in Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian (Documents relating to the Founding of the Republic of China for the Last Fifty Years), Vol. 1, no. 11, p. 535; see also, Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, p. 92. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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revolution.9 Sun Yat-sen’s selection of Overseas Chinese and overseas students as his core supporters was partly the result of the nature of the 1911 Revolution, and partly because these two groups were more receptive to his revolutionary message. Having lived in foreign lands and having been exposed to foreign influence, the members of these two groups would have appreciated his revolutionary deeds. Further, most of them were young, energetic, and idealistic, and they could be used as effective agents for spreading the revolutionary message among the vast Chinese masses.

Dr Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary deeds Dr Sun Yat-sen was a great revolutionary leader with ambition, foresight, courage, and perseverance. He came from a middle class background with good education. He was a trained Western medical practitioner who could have lived a comfortable life with a good income, but he chose to risk his life to dedicate himself to the salvation of China. In the 17 years between the founding of the Xing Zhong Hui (November 1894) to the overthrow of the Manchu government (February 1912), he had gone through a rugged revolutionary path. The Xing Zhong Hui (Revive China Society) and later the Tong Meng Hui (The Peoples’ Alliance) were both the core organizations of the Sun’s revolutionary movement. In addition, there were other revolutionary organizations springing up in other parts of China in different stages, but undoubtedly, both the Xing Zhong Hui and Tong Meng Hui constituted the main stream of the 1911 Revolution. During the era of Xing Zhong Hui (1894–1904), Sun was not yet able to claim the leadership of the entire Chinese revolutionary movement.10 His kidnapping in London by the Chinese 9

See his speeches delivered to students in Tokyo in August 1905 and his speech delivered in Penang to a group of Overseas Chinese, in Bingcheng yeshu baoshe niansi zhounian jinian tekan. Yang Hanxiang (ed.), (The Souvenir Magazine of the 24th Anniversary Celebration of the Penang Philomatic Society), pp. 141–143, (Penang, undated); Zhang Chiyun (ed.), Guofu quanshu, pp. 479, 482–483; Yen Ching-hwang, pp. 330–338. 10 For the best work on revolutionary organizations before 1911, see Zhang Yufa (1982). Qingji de geming tuanti (The Revolutionary Organizations during the Qing Period), 2nd Ed., Taipei: Zhangyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiuso.

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embassy staff in 1896 proved to be a blessing in disguise. He skilfully used the international media to publicise his name and to claim his leadership status.11 But when the Tong Meng Hui was founded in Tokyo in August 1905, Sun was accepted by different revolutionary groups as their paramount leader.12 With the overseas students united under the banner of the new revolutionary party, Sun expanded its activities to incorporate the Overseas Chinese who spread widely over the globe. With the solid support of these two groups, he launched several armed uprisings in South and Southwest China in the period between 1906 and 1911.13 The repeated failures of these uprisings did not crush Sun’s revolutionary spirit, and he persevered. Eventually, the armed uprising in Wuchang, central China, triggered off large scale revolts throughout central and south China, and led to the overthrow of the Manchu regime in February 1912. Throughout his anti-Manchu revolutionary undertaking, Sun had demonstrated his total dedication to the revolution, and his unyielding spirit to accomplish a lofty task. First, he demonstrated his vast knowledge and intellect by formulating the “Three Peoples’ Principles” (Nationalism, Democracy, and Socialism) which became the guiding principles of the revolutionary movement.14 Second, Sun possessed the leadership quality and obtained vast support of Chinese people, especially the overseas students and Overseas Chinese. Third, Sun’s courage, determination, and perseverance inspired many young Chinese revolutionaries to follow him, and to sacrifice even their lives for the revolution. Sun’s ability to turn defeat into strength and his

11

See Wong JY (1986). The Origins of An Heroic Image: Sun Yat-sen in London, 1896–1897. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 12 See Liew Kit-siong (1972). The Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Revolution, pp. xx. Canberra: ANU Press. 13 See Luo Jialun (1965). Guofu nianpu (The Chronological History of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 1. Taipei; Guangdong zhexue shehui kexue yanjiusuo lishi yanjiushi et al. (eds.), (1980). Sun Zhongshan Nianpu (The Chronology of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 78–132. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju; Hsueh Chun-tu (1961), In Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 56–93. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 14 See Chang SH and Gordon LHD (1991). All Under Heaven: Sun Yat-sen and His Revolutionary Thought, pp. 93–122. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press; Bergere M-C, translated by Lloyd J (1998). Sun Yat-sen, pp. 352–394. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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unshakeable faith in the revolution set an excellent example for millions of Chinese to follow.

The Legacy of Dr Sun Yat-sen The unfinished revolution Looking back on his 40 years of revolutionary career from 1885, Sun in March 1925 before his death regretted that the revolution had not yet been accomplished. This feeling of regret was expressed clearly in his will on national matters.15 Sun’s disappointment was not referred to the overthrow of the Manchu regime and the founding of a republic, but rather to the ultimate goal of the revolution — a rich, powerful, and democratic China. In Sun’s eyes, the overthrow of the Manchus was only the first step toward such a exalted goal. On his death bed, Sun could not help but regret that the fruit of the revolution was stolen by Yuan Shikai, Tuan Qijui, and other warlords who had caused China to descend into political turmoil and military chaos. This was why in his will Sun appealed to his supporters to continue the struggle in accordance with his “Three Peoples’ Principles” and his “National Reconstruction Strategy” (Jianguo fanglue) and “National Reconstruction Outlines” (Jianguo dagang). He also advised them to awaken vast Chinese masses to the revolutionary cause and to ally China with those countries which treated China as equal to fulfill such a goal.16 Undoubtedly, this unfinished revolution was accomplished by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in mainland China, and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and Jiang Jingguo in Taiwan. In 1949, Mao Zedong and his revolutionary colleagues founded the People’s Republic of China, and declared to the world that the Chinese people have stood up. Following Mao’s footsteps, Deng Xiaoping carried out China’s modernization, helping to transform China into a modern power. On the other hand, Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo had also carried out transformation of Taiwan in accordance with 15

See Sun Yat-sen (1986). Guoshi yizu (My will on national matters), in Sun Zhongshan quanji (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 11. Beijing: Zhong Hua shuju. 16 Ibid.

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Sun’s teachings and blueprints, and succeeded in raising Taiwan to the status of a small economic dragon in East Asia.

Rich and powerful China Rich and powerful China was the new China that Sun Yat-sen had envisaged and would like to create. But bulding this rich and powerful China on a feudal and overpopulated land was a daunting task for anyone to undertake. How would China reach this seemingly unattainable goal? Sun had read widely and was well aware of the history of the Western nations. He was especially impressed by the Meiji Restoration of 1868 under which Japan was transformed from a backward kingdom into a rich and powerful modern state within three decades. Japanese culture was derived mainly from China, and had been deeply influenced by Neo-Confucianism of Wang Yangming of Ming dynasty. Since 1868, Japan undertook drastic reform under the Meiji Emperor, and succeeded in modernizing itself on the Western model. Japan also succeed in integrating Confucian values with Western systems, and strode on the road to wealth and power. Inspired by the Japanese success, Sun Yat-sen believed that China could achieve similar result through rapid modernization.17 China had vast territory and huge material and human resources. If China could undertake modernization, wealth and power could be obtained within one or two generations. In 1917, Sun Yat-sen announced his elevated plan of China’s modernization with the publication of his famous ‘National Construction Strategy’ (jianguo fanglue). The book comprised three major parts: psychological reconstruction, material reconstruction, and social reconstruction. The material reconstruction was the core of his strategy.18 In this material reconstruction section, Sun 17 See Jansen MB (1967). The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univerity Press; also Jansen MB (1980). Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911, in The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing 1800–1911, Fairbank, JK and Liu Kwang-ching (eds.), Vol. 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 18 See Sun Yat-sen (1962). Jianguo fanglue, in Sun Zhongshan xuanji (Selected Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 1, pp. 104–419. Hong Kong: Shitong chubanshe; Zhang Qiyun, Guofu quanshu, pp. 1–154.

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presented his blueprint for modernization of agriculture, industry, and the transport system. He emphasized the construction of three major modern ports in the North, East, and South China, and the building of a network of railways and roads covering most of China.19 Sun also emphasized the importance of using foreign capital and technology for the development of China. Sun’s modernization blueprint was partly realized by Deng Xiaoping in his Socialist Four Modernizations implemented after 1978. Although Sun’s plan could not compare with Deng’s in terms of scope and intensity, his blueprint was formulated 60 years earlier than Deng’s. It was ahead of his time.20 Outside mainland China, Sun’s blueprint was experimented in Taiwan, and had achieved remarkable results. Since the retreat from the mainland to Taiwan in 1948, Jiang Jieshi and his successors had carried out modernization of the island in accordance with Sun’s “Three Peoples’ Principles”, “National Reconstruction Strategy” and “National Reconstruction Outlines”. They carried out land reform, and undertook modernization of agriculture and industry. They also utilized foreign capital to develop education and technology, and Taiwan emerged as one of the Four Little Dragons of East Asia.21

A democratic China Democracy was one of the three mainstays of Sun’s “Three Peoples’ Principle”. Sun held firmly that democracy was the essential ingredient for the building of a new China. But the concept of democracy, though found in Confucianism in the form of min ben (People as the base of a nation), never belonged to the main stream of Confucian thoughts. It was primarily a Western concept, and was imported into China to 19

Ibid., Sun, pp. 186–338; Zhang, pp. 39–117. See Bergere M-C (1998). Translated by Lloyd, J Sun Yat-sen, pp. 285–286. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 21 For the application of Sun’s Three Peoples’ Principle to Taiwan, see Cheng Chu-yuan (1989). The doctrine of people’s welfare: The Taiwan experiment and its implications for the third world, in Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine in the Modern World, Cheng Chu-yuan (ed.), pp. 244–275. Boulder and London: Westview Press; for Taiwan’s rise to the status of Four Little Dragons, see Vogel EF (1991). The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia, pp. 13–41. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20

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counter the oppressive autocracy. To encourage Chinese people to get familiar with this concept, Sun in his “National Reconstruction Strategy” included detailed descriptions of democratic procedures and practices. This section was entitled “Social Reconstruction” with a sub-title of “the initial steps of people’s right” (minquan chubu).22 In his eyes, the importation of Western democracy was not just to give China’s political system a face-lift, but democracy should take root in China’s soil. He believed that democracy was not just to express the sovereignty of people through its institutions, but also to serve as the source of national strength of the new nation. Under the autocratic rule, the emperor was sovereign and his words were laws, but his intelligence could not match the combined wisdom of all Chinese people. He deeply believed the new China would have been better off by drawing its strength from the collective intelligence of the people. Although Sun Yat-sen valued Western democracy, nevertheless, he felt the Western democratic system was inadequate because people had no power to scrutinise and impeach their elected representatives and government officials if they failed in their duties. This was why he proposed and extra two powers — the censorial power and examination power — to compliment the three powers (legislative, administrative, and judiciary) of the Western model. This was his famous Five Powers Constitution (Wuquan xianfa). These two new powers were derived from traditional Chinese political system — the censorial system and the examination system, but Sun had evaluated these systems and integrated them into his new “Five Power” system.23 In Sun’s mind, the ideal type of democracy was the democracy whereby people are the sovereign, and the government was controlled by the people and for the benefit of the people. This was similar to President Lincoln’s famous dictum, “Government of the people, by the people and for the people”. Dr Sun Yat-sen’s democratic China has been partially fulfilled in the mainland China and Taiwan. Although the participation of multiple

22

See Sun Yat-sen. Jianguo fanglue (The strategy of reconstruction of China), in Sun Zhongshan xuanji (Selected Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen),Vol. 1, pp. 339–419; Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Guofu Quanshu (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), pp. 118–151. 23 See Sun Yat-sen. Wuquan xianfa, (The Five Powers Constitution), in ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 572–587.

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parties in the discussion of national politics and policies through the institution of the Peoples’ Political Consultative Congress (Zhengzhi xueshang huiyi or abbreviated as Zhengxue) exists on the mainland, their participation in a national election is denied. This risks the criticism of being a “One party state”. However, the concept of the rule of law which is a cornerstone of modern democracy has been nurtured. More laws passed by the People’s Congress of China are positive signs of democratic steps taken toward democracy. In Taiwan, President Jiang Jingguo had liberalized the authoritarian rule of the Guomindang, and his successor, President Li Denghui further democratized the political system of Taiwan. The 23 million Chinese on the island are involved in the direct election of the President, and the representatives of the parliament. However, overemphasis on the Western type of democracy may bring division and chaos, for democracy requires historical roots and a proper process. The origins of Western democratic system was rooted in the Enlightenment era of European history in the late 17th and 18th centuries. The great thinkers of the time such as John Locke of England, Voltaire, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Motesquier of France, and Thomas Jefferson of United States of America had contributed significantly to the concept of the sovereignty of people and people’s rights, and the first democratic nation was established in North America in 1776. Later, democratic regimes also appeared in France and other parts of Europe with variation. But the democratic ideas and systems were born in Europe and America with different cultures and circumstances. China is a country with a long tradition and a huge population. To what extent a Western type — either American republic system or British parliamentary system — of democracy would be most suitable for China is a matter for further discussion.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and 21st Century China International situation and China’s position in the 21st century The arrival of — 1st January 2000 as the commencement of the 21st century has brought new hope for mankind. The emergent China

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requires a peaceful and stable environment under which rapid modernization can be accomplished. But the reality is far from peace and tranquillity. The beginning of the new century was marked by growing tension in the Asia-Pacific region. In March 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (Min Jin Dang) which advocated the independence of Taiwan, captured the political power of the island. Its presidential candidate, Chen Shuibian, was elected the president of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Electoral success boosted the morale of the Taiwanese independent movement, and created tension across the Taiwan Strait. In November of the same year, the Republican presidential candidate, George W. Bush, was elected the president of the United States after some electoral wrangling. After the inauguration on 20 January 2001, the Bush administration signalled a major shift in its defence and foreign policies. On the pretext of defence against so-called rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, the United States proposed to build a national missile defence (NMD) system, and to abrogate the antiballistic missile treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. The proposed NMD system which is implicitly aimed at China would tip the nuclear balance between the East and the West, and create tension and instability in Asia Pacific region. Further, the new Bush administration has altered its China policy, and reversed the Clinton administration’s constructive engagement policy into a containment one. The dictum of “strategic partner” of the Clinton era has been changed to “strategic competitor” as some commentators have put it. Since the end of World War II, the United States of America has emerged as a dominant world power replacing the position of Britain. During the Cold War era (1945–1991), the United States headed the capitalist camp of the West, and confronted head-on the Soviet Union which became the captain of the Socialist camp. It was one of the two super-powers controlling the so-called bipolar world.24

24

For the origins of the Cold War, see Joyce and Gabriel Kolko (1972). The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers; Cumings B (1990). The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947–1950. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War ended and the world was dominated by only one super-power, the United States. The superior position of the United States not only boosted its prestige, but also increased its arrogance. The rise of China’s economic and military power posed a challenge to the supremacy of the United States in Asia Pacific. In pursuit of its hegemony, the United States has taken China as the future adversary in the region. Taiwan’s security issue is one of several cards — including Tibet issue, Falun Gong, and human rights — that United States can play against China. The crash of an American spy plane over Hainan island on 1st April 2001 demonstrated the arrogance of the United States and its bullyboy tactics. The rise of political power of the “Taiwan Independence” (Tai Du) and the pursuit of hegemony of the United States created new tension and instability in Asia Pacific.

United to strengthen China and Chinese race Sun’s ideal China is also a China that is unified and united. China could only be strengthened by the unity among its five major races who live harmoniously and strive for a common goal. In his early revolutionary career, Sun had already realized the dilemma that China would face during the post-revolutionary period after the Manchu regime was removed. The core of the 1911 Revolution was antiManchuism which to a large extent was based on racial hatred. To whip up the support of Han Chinese for the overthrowing of the Manchu regime, Sun Yat-sen and his followers maximized the race factor. They recounted the cruelty of the Manchus in their conquest of China proper by massacring hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese in Yangzhou city (in northern Jiangsu province) and Jiading (in southern Guangdong province). Both massacres were used as effective weapons for inciting hatred against the Manchus.25 But what 25

See for instance, the impact of these anti-Manchu pamphlets on revolutionary martyr, Wen Shengcai (Wen Sheng-tsai) who attempted to assassinate a Manchu general in Canton in 1911. Wen was an Overseas Chinese from Perak, Malaya. See Yen Ching-hwang (1976). The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, p. 284. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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should be the attitude of the Han Chinese in treating the Manchus after the Manchu regime was overthrown? What would be the attitude of the non-Han Chinese in treating the new republic which was dominated by the Han Chinese? Dr Sun and other far-sighted revolutionary leaders shared the view that a new concept of a Zhong Hua (Chinese) race which would embrace the five main races in China: Hans, Manchus, Mogolians, Muslims, and Tibetans, and the new republic was the creation of this new Chinese race. The territory of the new republic was to be based on the territory established by the Manchus during the Qing Dynasty. No part of the Qing territory could be separated from the territory of the new republic. Within the new republic, the five core races enjoy equal status and live harmoniously. Therefore, the new wealthy and powerful China envisaged by Sun is an unified and united one. If Dr Sun were to live today, he would certainly be against the independence of Taiwan, and would not tolerate the separation of the island from Chinese territory. Although Sun witnessed the defeat of China by a powerful Japan in the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895, and the cessation of Taiwan and Penghu islands to Japan as the result of China’s defeat, he did not live to witness the return of Taiwan and Penghu islands back to China in 1945. The civil war in the wake of World War II split the Nationalist and Communist alliance, and ended with the victory of the Communists and the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan under Jiang Jieshi. This created the continuous rivalry and tension between the two contending regimes across the Taiwan Strait. Sun Yat-sen would have been greatly distressed if he were to live to witness such a situation. However, the long rivalry did not result in the separation of Taiwan from China because both claimed to be the sole representative of entire China. It is only in the last two decades that the “Taiwan Independence” movement has clamored to separate Taiwan from China.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and China’s “Open Door” policy In developing a blueprint of modernization for China, Sun Yat-sen emphasized that China had to depend on foreign capital for its material

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reconstruction. This was mainly due to the fact that China was a poor country, and had lagged behind the West in the fields of science and technology for more than a hundred years. If China wished to depend on its own efforts, it would take decades to accumulate sufficient capital and to train needed talent. He believed the use of foreign capital and talent in the service of China was the short-cut to China’s modernization. He once said: “If we wish to modernize, we have to adhere to the open door policy. To utilize foreign capital and talent was a short-cut to modernize our nation. This is unavoidable”.26 Of course, Sun realized that the open door policy had negative aspects. For instance, unbridled use of foreign capital and talent could lead to foreign control of China’s economy. This was why he emphasized that China must maintain its sovereignty in relation to foreign investment. China could exercise control over the scope and intensity of foreign investment, the movement, and distribution of foreign capital and talent. When Sun proposed the open door policy, China was divided into many political entities controlled by different warlords, and the foreigners still enjoyed their extraterritoriality in China, an unprincipled open door policy would have a profound negative effect. Thus, Sun championed for the revision of the unequal treaties signed between China and the foreign powers, and to abolish the extraterritorial rights of the foreigners. It was only after China had recovered its sovereignty that an open door policy could work well, and China could borrow any amount of foreign loans without restraining foreign investment in China.27 Clearly, Sun’s open door policy included the use of foreign capital, foreign personnel, technical know-how and technology, and management knowledge. He also insisted that foreign capital must be used in the fields of production and transportation, while unproductive arenas should be ruled out.28 26

See Sun Yat-sen, Sun Zhongshan quanji (The Complete Works of Dr Sun Yat-sen), Vol. 2, pp. 480–481; Huang Yan (1996). On the open-door thought of Dr Sun Yat-sen, in Sun Zhongshan yanjiu he shiliao (The Study and Historical Materials on Dr Sun Yat-sen), p. 141. Guangzhou: Renmin chubanshe. 27 See Sun Zhongshan quanji, Vol. 2, p. 340. 28 See Huang Yan, p. 144.

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Since Deng Xiaoping ascended to supreme power in 1978, China had abandoned the ideology-driven policies of the Cultural Revolution, and concentrated its energy and effort on China’s modernization. In the economic arena, China also abandoned the “self-reliance” policy (duli zizhu, zili gensheng), and replaced it with the open door one. The new policy was to utilize foreign capital to speed up China’s modernization. The utilization of foreign capital went through three channels: the borrowing of foreign loans, the acceptance of foreign aid, and direct foreign investment. In December 1978, China’s first foreign loan of US$175 million was borrowed from a consortium consisting of British, Canadian, and Australian banks. Then, China further borrowed loans from Japanese, French, Canadian, Australian, Italian, Norwegian, Swedish, and German banks. In 1984, a large loan of US$1.88 billion was borrowed from Japan in a period of 7 years. In foreign aid, China accepted aid from the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the form of low interest loans. Until 1983, more than US$1.2 billion had been received by China. In direct foreign investments, the main bulk of the capital came from Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, the Ethnic Chinese (mainly from Southeast Asia), and Taiwan. The main form of foreign direct investment was the joint enterprise.29 The best way of reaping the benefits of the open door policy was through the establishment of the “Special Economic Zone” (jingji tequ). In 1980, China established four special economic zones in both Guangdong and Fujian provinces, namely Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. And then another 14 special economic zones were established along the south and east coast of China. In 1986, the largest special economic zone, the Hainan island, was inaugurated. All these special economic zones were to house foreign joint enterprises which were export-oriented. Apart from manufacturing huge volume of consumer products for export, the special economic zones also developed agriculture, fishery, and

29

See Bucknall K (1989). China and Open Door Policy. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

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tourism. These special economic zones generated tremendous economic activities, and radiated their influence to neighboring regions.30 There are many similarities between Deng Xiaoping’s and Sun Yat-sen’s open door policies. First, the fundamental aims of both were the same, i.e., to use foreign capital and talent to speed up China’s modernization, so as to narrow the gap between China and Western developed countries. Second, the main strategies of both were similar. It was to encourage foreign investment in China’s coastal cities and ports, and to lead China’s rapid economic development. In the last 2 years, China has adopted the new development strategy of “Great Development of the West” (xipu dakaifa). The development of northwest and southwest of China have been handicapped by plateaus, mountains, and gorges, but these regions are rich in mineral and natural resources. The development of the west of China would lift the living standards of the local population and correct the imbalance of economic development between the East and the West of China. Further, the development of the West would consolidate China’s borders and defence. If Dr Sun were to be alive today, he would have supported this strategy wholeheartedly.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and the future of China Dr Sun Yat-sen was a nationalist, a patriot, and an internationalist. Throughout his revolutionary career, he not only strove to rescue China from the eminent danger of being partitioned by the powers, but also wanted to help other Asian nationalists in their struggle for independence from Western colonialism. He realized that China had a similar fate as many Southeast Asian countries, and had been oppressed and exploited by the West. The future destiny of China was connected with the struggle against Western imperialism of which other Southeast Asian nationalists shared. Therefore, he sympathized with the Vietnamese struggle against the French imperialists 30

Ibid; Harding H (1989). China’s Second Revolution: Reform After Mao, pp. 163–171. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

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in Indo-China, and Filipino nationalists’ struggle for independence from the United States. When Sun was in exile in Tokyo in early 1905–1908, he met Vietnamese reformer, Phan Boi Chau, and influenced Phan’s attitude toward democracy and republicanism. He assisted Phan in having Vietnamese students continue their education in Japan. He also helped the Filipino nationalists in purchasing arms and ammunition for a revolt against the American colonial government in the Philippines.31 Sun Yat-sen’s internationalist outlook helped guide China’s future direction. Sun had always declared that China is a great nation with a long unbroken civilization, it has to make greater contributions to human kind, and has to play a significant role in international events. What Sun meant by the greater contributions and significant role were not for the quest of hegemony, but to help those weak and poor countries. Sun’s political thoughts were partly derived from traditional Confucianism of which the ultimate aim was to achieve “great harmony of the world” (shijie datong) or so-called the utopia. He supported the traditional Chinese “king’s way” (wang dao) instead of “hegemonist’s way” (ba dao) in conducting China’s foreign policy. China’s development and nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missiles appeared to be for defensive purposes. Chinese leaders have repeatedly assured the world that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons to resolve disputes with other countries, and they have also repeatedly declared that China will never seek hegemonic status in the world. I believe that Dr Sun Yat-sen’s internationalism and humanity have shown the way for China to follow in its international relations, and Chinese leaders will continue to adhere to this principle.

Conclusion Perceiving the unprecedented crisis that China faced in the second half of the 19th century, the continuous slide of China’s power and 31

See Chen Yan (1989). Sun Zhongshan dui Dongnanya minzu jiefang yundong de yingxiang he gongxian (The impact and contribution of Dr Sun Yat-sen to the National Liberation Movement in Southeast Asia), in Sun Zhongshan he ta de Shidai (Dr Sun Yat-sen and His Age), Vol. 1, pp. 292–295. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.

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its international standing, and the continuous foreign encroachment on China, Dr Sun Yat-sen dedicated his life to the salvation of China as a nation and the Chinese as a race. His task of overthrowing the corrupt Manchu regime and building a rich, powerful and democratic China was daunting. With the support of overseas students and Overseas Chinese, together with other social classes in China, he succeeded in removing the autocratic Manchu regime and establish a republic in 1912. The post-1911 Revolution China was far from what Sun had envisaged. The republic was reduced to shambles first by the monarchistic Yuan Shikai and later by regional warlords, and China was plunged into political turmoil and military chaos. Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925 a frustrated patriot, as what Professor Martin C. Wilbur has put it. Sun had not seen the ultimate goal of the revolution been fulfilled. However, Sun left an important legacy for the Chinese people. His unfinished revolution was partly accomplished by Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping on the mainland and Jiang Jieshi and Jiang Jingguo in Taiwan. His vision of building a rich, powerful, and democratic China, again was realized on the mainland and Taiwan with the democracy still to be desired. Sun’s vision and teachings are not outdated, and they still serve as useful guides for politicians across the Taiwan Strait. The new political situation in Asia Pacific in the new century — the rise of political power of the Taiwanese independent movement, and the antagonistic and hegemonic policies pursued by the new American administration — posed a threat to the peace and stability in the region. China’s restrained response to this new challenge is commendable. Had Sun been alive now, he would pursue a similar cautious policy. But certainly he would have opposed the separation of Taiwan from China. China’s present policy of strengthening Chinese race (chenxing zhonghua) instead of emphasizing ideological supremacy would have received Sun’s strong support. China’s pursuit of open door policy and the recent strategy of “great development of the West” are in line with Sun’s fundamental strategy of utilizing foreign capital, talent and technology for the modernization of China. Sun’s internationalism and humanity also helped to set guidelines for China’s conduct in international affairs.

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Index

anti-Confucianism, 347 anti-imperialist sentiment, 341 anti-Japanese boycott movement, 355 anti-Japanese demonstrations, 276 anti-Japanese mobilization, 352 anti-Japanese movement, 146 anti-Manchu revolutionary undertaking, 416 anti-Manchuism, 347 Anwar Ibrahim, 34 ASEAN–China Free Trade Zone, 257 Asia Pacific, 423 Asian Currency Crisis, 34, 59, 62 Asian King of Sugar, 49 Asian Little Dragons, 12 Australia, 60, 80, 89, 262, 265–268, 283, 370, 371, 401–403, 405–407 Australian, 426 autocratic system, 363 Ayer Tawar, 216

1898 Reform, 143 1911 Revolution, 150, 194, 198, 207, 268, 361, 363, 365, 366, 376, 414, 415, 423 1952 Education Ordinance, 225, 226 1954 Education White Paper, 229 21 Demands in 1915, 204 Abdul Rahman Talib, 240 accumulation of capital, 290 accumulation of the Chinese capital, 290 Adam Smith, 391 adaptability, 289 aestheticism, 214 agricultural products, 290 Ah Ku and Karayuki-San: Prostitution in Singapore 1870–1940, 141 alliance, 232–234 alliance government, 25, 46, 77, 233, 250 altruism, 206 alumni associations, 18 America, 163, 262 American Philippines, 356 American spy plane, 423 Ampang, 296 an (peace), 307 An Xi, 108 An Xi district, 78, 79 Analects (Lun Yu), 127, 211 analytical ability, 414 Anglo-American companies, 328 anti-Chinese movements, 370

B&B Enterprise Sdn Bhd, 55 bang (dialect group), 84–86 Bangkok, 49 Bank of China, 404 Banka, 380 banking, 71 banking and manufacturing industries, 73 Barisan National, 34 Barnes, 223 Barnes Committee, 220 431

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Barnes Report, 221 Batavia, 74, 353 Batu Pahat, 54, 74, 91, 105 beggars, 373 Beijing, 49, 277, 409 Beijing University, 218 Bellitong, 380 benevolence (ren), 329, 330 Benkulen, 289 Berjaya Corporation, 56, 60 Berjaya Corporation Berhad, 54 Berjaya group, 59 Berjaya Kawat Berhad, 55, 82 bilingual students, 221 Bin Chan House, 177 Bombay, 292 Boustead Company, 38 Britain, 70, 289, 412 British, 368 British Colonial government, 100, 241, 371 British Colonial Office, 250 British High Commissioner, 226 British Malaya, 186, 191, 214, 219, 270, 271, 273, 290, 295, 356 British Malaya, 1824–1826, 145 Buket Lintang, 39 Bukit Asahan, 72 Burma, 269, 270, 316, 353, 356 business acumen, 74, 302 business acumen and foresight, 298 business firms (hao), 306, 320 business ideology, 328 business institution, 307 business networking, 326 Cai Yuanpei, 214 Calcutta, 96, 292 Canada, 60, 89, 262, 266–268, 279, 283, 353, 401–403, 405–407 Canadian, 426 Canton, 190, 352

Canton 29th March Uprising, 174, 376 Canton Revolt in October 1895, 160 Cantonese, 41, 43, 121, 314, 380, 406 Cantonese (Puntai), 387 Cantonese bang, 85 Cantonese emigrants, 401 Cantonese speakers, 262 Cantonese-speaking immigrants, 402 Cao Clan Temple of Singapore, 118 capital accumulation, 293 capitalism, 315 capitalist (zibenjia), 305 capitalist institution, 311, 313 Carl A Trocki, 315 Carl Menger, 391 cash crop plantation, 383, 383 Center for Malaysian Chinese Studies, 32 Central and South Americas, 402 centripetal authority, 332 Ch’en Ch’i-mei, 377 Ch’en Yun-sheng, 171 Ch’iao Ta-feng, 367 Ch’ien-lung, 362 Ch’ing China, 372 Ch’ing consulate, 161, 368, 370 Ch’ing diplomats, 161 Ch’ing dynasty, 362 Ch’ing government, 170, 344, 361–363, 371–373 Ch’ing officials, 373 Ch’ing period, 369, 370 Ch’in-lien Uprising, 374 Ch’iu Chin, 364, 367 Chan (Chen or Tan) clan temple, 13 Chan Wa High School, 239 Chang Hung-nan, 383 Chang Keng Kuei (Zheng Jinggui), 393 Chang Ping-lin, 171, 175, 364, 367 Chang Pi-shih, 379

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Index Chang Yu Pioneer Wine Company at Chefoo, Shantung, 395 Chang Yu-nan, 383 Chaozhou Railway, 384 chasity, 161 chastity, 206 Chayang Association of Malacca, 386 Cheah (Xie), 65 Cheah Kongsi, 128 Chee Yam Chuan, 71 Chekiang area, 365 Chekiang-Kiangsu group, 171 Chen Fangdu, 183 Chen Nan Kuan, 375 Chen Nan Kuan Uprising, 374 Chen T’ien Sheng, 168 cheng (honesty and sincerity), 213 Cheng Wen She, 170 Cheong Yok Choi, 40 Chi Mei village, 300 Chian Yi, 300 Chiang I-wu, 367 Chiang Kai-shek, 417 Chiang Kai Shek’s regime, 19 Chicago, 187 Chiew Yoke (Chao Yu), 296 China, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 81, 142, 192, 199, 211, 215, 229, 263, 277, 278, 281, 282, 288, 291, 298, 318, 332, 338, 359, 373, 374, 397, 398, 405, 407 China Bank Corporation (Zhong Xing Yinhang), 299 China politics, 261 China proper, 423 China’s economy, 425 China’s future, 348 China’s GNP, 321 China’s politics, 263 China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwangtung 1895–1913, 364

433

China’s resistance to the Japanese aggression, 276 China’s restrictive immigration policy, 285 China’s self-interests, 403 China’s sovereignty, 349 China-born Chinese, 263 China-oriented leaders, 248 Chincheows, 64 Chinese “Money House” (Qian Zhuang), 41 Chinese authorities, 352 Chinese bank, 40–42, 73, 306 Chinese big enterprises, 62 Chinese biscuit making, 43 Chinese biscuits, 75 Chinese business activities, 39, 42 Chinese business and industry, 28 Chinese business, 8, 28, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 46, 51, 52, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 280, 309 Chinese businessmen, 39, 44, 46, 61, 62, 217, 310 Chinese capital accumulation, 319 Chinese capital, 52, 291, 318, 319 Chinese capitalism, 7, 285, 288, 290, 315–318, 320 Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia, 291 Chinese capitalist, 7, 291–295, 299, 302–306, 311, 312, 318, 320 Chinese capitalist institution, 310 Chinese cash-crop plantation, 15 Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Penang, 28, 51 Chinese Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, 299 Chinese cheap labor, 144 Chinese chess competitions, 31 Chinese children, 225 Chinese Citizenship Convention, 251 Chinese civilization, 225, 400

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Chinese clan, 127, 308 Chinese classics, 400 Chinese collective enterprises, 29 Chinese commercial bank, 41, 42 Chinese commercial capital, 287 Chinese Communism, 388, 404 Chinese Communism in China, 19, 357 Chinese Communist, 403 Chinese Communist Party, 408 Chinese communities, 39, 40, 68, 99, 123, 127–130, 141, 205, 209, 291, 311, 318, 348, 370, 405 Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, 379 Chinese community, 30, 31, 34, 35, 51, 60, 65, 128, 131, 140, 141, 216, 228, 232, 233, 240, 247, 253, 256, 257, 316, 347 Chinese consciousness, 412 Chinese Consul-General, 13, 87 Chinese converts, 400 Chinese corporatization movement, 53 Chinese cultural activities, 406 Chinese cultural performance, 30 Chinese cultural revival movement, 31 Chinese cultural roots, 31 Chinese cultural values and tradition, 263 Chinese culture, 29, 32, 35, 126, 133, 227, 273, 274, 399, 400 Chinese culture and tradition, 127 Chinese culture and values, 282 Chinese currency, 354 Chinese customs, 329 Chinese dance troupes, 133 Chinese dialect groups, 41, 261 Chinese dialect huiguans, 390 Chinese dialects, 65 Chinese economic status, 37 Chinese economy, 44, 52, 370

Chinese education, 33, 35, 87, 88, 90, 91, 131, 207, 218, 220, 225, 227, 232, 234–242, 244, 249, 251, 253, 255, 256, 273, 274, 279, 332, 349 Chinese educational, 132 Chinese education-promoter, 332 Chinese emigrants, 94, 121 Chinese emigration, 265, 388 Chinese enterprises, 53 Chinese entrepreneur, 43, 54, 309 Chinese family, 330 Chinese farmers, 312 Chinese fengshui, 407 Chinese festivities, 126 Chinese foodstuffs, 406 Chinese funeral dressings, 106 Chinese girls’ school, 275 Chinese goods, 38, 70 Chinese herbal products, 319 Chinese High School, 91, 274 Chinese High School in Segamat, 239 Chinese identity, 273, 348 Chinese immigrants, 63–65, 78, 79, 266, 289, 291, 297, 350, 385, 393 Chinese immigration, 93, 264, 285, 286 Chinese in Malaysia, 32, 90 Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore, 3 Chinese in Singapore, 3 Chinese in Southeast Asia, 3, 165, 353, 356, 358 Chinese independent, 30 Chinese independent high schools revival movement, 131 Chinese independent secondary schools, 255 Chinese investment, 40 Chinese journalists, 251 Chinese Kapitan, 64, 65, 141, 386 Chinese Kapitan of Penang, 297 Chinese Kapitan system, 386

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Index Chinese kinship association, 117–119, 123, 124, 133 Chinese kinship organization, 120, 126, 128 Chinese language, 30, 33, 90, 132, 227, 245, 257, 390 Chinese leaders, 28, 248 Chinese leaders in Beijing, 407 Chinese literature, 281 Chinese Malaysians, 58, 257 Chinese martial arts, 31 Chinese media, 31, 310 Chinese merchants, 38, 157, 286–288, 316, 372 Chinese Merchants Bank (Hua Shang yinhang), 74 Chinese migration, 98, 326 Chinese mining activities, 290 Chinese mining population, 291 Chinese minorities, 379 Chinese minority groups, 386 Chinese money houses, 313 Chinese music, 31 Chinese music groups, 133 Chinese national character, 145 Chinese national leaders, 338 Chinese nationalism, 359 Chinese nationalist movement, 354 Chinese nationalist movements in China, 359 Chinese nationalists, 354 Chinese New Year, 31 Chinese New Year festival, 106 Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, 400 Chinese newspapers, 274, 406 Chinese opium smokers, 312 Chinese parents, 30, 31 Chinese patriot, 300, 332, 355 Chinese pioneers, 63, 242 Chinese plantation industry, 72 Chinese poetry recitals, 31

435

Chinese politicians of Hakka descent, 390, 391 Chinese politicians, 218, 231, 244 Chinese politics, 29, 332 Chinese population, 195, 279, 316, 318, 318, 362, 375, 400 Chinese population in Malaya, 248 Chinese primary education system, 230 Chinese private business, 58 Chinese private companies, 60 Chinese private enterprises, 29, 53 Chinese prostitutes, 141 Chinese race, 227, 423 Chinese railway construction, 384 Chinese reformers, 402 Chinese regional operas, 31 Chinese Republic, 6, 146, 149, 202, 268 Chinese restaurants, 349 Chinese revolution, 186, 196, 348 Chinese revolutionaries, 416 Chinese revolutionary, 411 Chinese revolutionary activity, 348 Chinese revolutionary movement, 190 Chinese school inspectors (Shixue guan), 230 Chinese schools, 87, 221, 230, 235, 242, 273, 348 Chinese secondary education, 239 Chinese secondary school, 237, 241, 242 Chinese self-strengthening movement, 53 Chinese Settlement Patterns, 380 Chinese settlements, 380 Chinese settlers, 380 Chinese shetuan, 32, 226 Chinese social organizations, 31, 128, 129, 131, 390 Chinese social structure, 129 Chinese society, 14, 32, 34, 35, 43, 140, 303

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Chinese Spirit, 253 Chinese teachers, 247 Chinese temples, 139 Chinese traders, 37, 144, 290, 326, 370 Chinese tradition, 95, 127, 134, 330 Chinese tradition and values, 126 Chinese War Relief Association, 353 Chinese wholesalers and retailers, 354 Chineseness, 348, 406 Ching Ming festival, 99 Chinwoo Stadium, 237 Chong Cheng High School, 273 Chong Hwa Girls School, 84 Chong Hwa High School, 85, 90 Chong Hwa High School in Kuala Lumpur, 90 Chong Hwa School, 84 Chong Shing Jit Poh (Zhong Xing Ri Bao), 185 Chong Shing Yit Pao, 167, 169, 173, 198 Chong Wen Ge, 84 Chop Ban Joo Hin, 294 Chop Kian Joo Hing, 98 Chouzhen hui, 353 Christian and Western influences, 152 Chun Ji (Spring Sacrifice), 124 Chung Ho T’ang, 163 Chung Ling, 238, 239 Chung Ling High School, 225, 237, 273 citizenship, 390 clan associations, 282, 388 clan organizations, 68, 390 Class status, 348 Classic of Filial Piety (Xiao Jing), 127 coastal China, 373 coconut oil refining, 43 co-existence, 253 Cold War, 57, 110, 423 Cold War era (1945–1991), 422 Collectivization, 23

Colonial government, 223, 229 Colonial government in Singapore, 87 Colonial viewpoint, 144 colonialism, 44 colonies, 44 Communism, 277 Communist Revolution in 1949, 194 Communists, 248, 357, 424 companies (kongsi), 306, 320 company, 307 Comparative Advantage, 322 comprador, 96 Confucian basic tenets, 8 Confucian Classics, 127, 244, 300, 333, 400 Confucian concept, 328, 330 Confucian cultural empire, 346 Confucian elitism, 333 Confucian Five Cardinal relationships, 325 Confucian High School, 273 Confucian ideas, 132 Confucian Middle School, 216, 217 Confucian moral tone, 244 Confucian revival movement, 161, 267, 343 Confucian temples, 343 Confucian values, 8, 67, 161, 324, 327–329, 340, 342, 418 Confucianism, 7, 132, 321–324, 328, 331, 428 construction, 349 Consul in Penang, 13 Consulate-General, 199 Consul-General, 344 co-prosperity, 253 credit-ticket systems, 65 Cui Ying school, 84 culture is the spirit of a race, 227 Da Tong school, 216 Dao Nan modern primary school, 84

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Index Dao Nan school, 86, 88 Dapu district, 294 Dato Abdul Razak Hussein, 233 Dato Kramat, 191 Dato Onn, 220, 222 David Chen, 223, 225, 227, 238, 239 De (virtue), 67 de-colonization, 76 Deli, 384 Deli (modern Medan), 294 Deli Bank, 295 democracy, 416, 419–421 Democratic Action Party (DAP), 27 democratic China, 429 Democratic Progressive Party (Min Jin Dang), 422 Deng Xiaoping, 9, 402, 417, 426, 427, 429 Deng Zeru, 191, 192, 201, 209 Deputy High Commissioner, 228 Development of the West, 427 dialect, 67, 206, 386 dialect affiliation, 205 dialect and regional boundaries, 346 dialect association, 384 dialect community, 41 dialect groups, 262 dialect organizations, 387 Dier guxiang, 247 directors of school committees (dongshi), 256 Disaster Relief Association, 353 Diyi guxiang, 247 Donald MacGillivary, 228 Dong Sheng, 81 Dongjiaozong, 235, 236 Double Seven Incident of 1937, 352 Dr Lim Chong Eu, 236 Dr Sun, 184, 187 Dr Sun Yat-sen, 208 Dr William Fenn, 221 Dr Wu The-yao, 221

437

Dragon Boat festival, 106, 126 Dragons, 57 drama, 281 drama troupes, 168 Duan Meng school, 85 Dunlop Holdings Berhad, 53 Dutch, 38, 264, 368 Dutch authorities, 384 Dutch colonies, 289 Dutch colony of Malacca, 289 Dutch East Indies, 74, 186, 191, 193, 214, 271, 290, 295, 319, 342, 370, 371, 380, 393 dynasty, 206 Early Chinese Revolutionaries: Radical Intellectuals in Shanghai and Chekiang, 1902–1911, 364 East Indies, 317 economic globalization, 33 Economic Pursuits, 69, 380 Edmund Terence Gomez, 78 education, 205, 389 Education (Jiaoyu ke), 189 Education Department, 229 Education Ordinance, 229 Edward J M Rhoads, 364 Ee Hoe Hean Club, 306 emigration, 405 Emperor Chia-ch’ing, 362 Emperor Guangxu, 198 Emperor Kangxi, 342 Emperor Kuang-hsu, 162, 170 Emperor Kuangshu, 198 Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi, 363 En Ping (Yan Peng), 121 Eng Choon, 71, 211 Eng Choon district, 78 Eng Choon huiguan of Malacca, 69 Eng Choon huiguan of Muar, 69 Eng Choon huiguan of Negri Sembilan, 69

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Eng Choon huiguan of Singapore, 69 England, 421 English classes, 229 entrepot trade, 383 entrepreneur, 391 EOI (Export Oriented Industrialization), 58 equality, 206, 207 Esherick, 364 Ethnic Chinese, 123, 130, 137, 142–144, 268, 269, 272, 277–281, 321, 322, 328, 329, 379 Ethnic Chinese (haiwai huaren), 281 Ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie, 262 Ethnic Chinese business enterprises, 331 Ethnic Chinese business ideology, 330 Ethnic Chinese business leaders, 310 Ethnic Chinese Business Management, 331 Ethnic Chinese business networks, 326 Ethnic Chinese Business, 7, 321, 325, 327 Ethnic Chinese businessmen, 331 Ethnic Chinese capital, 280 Ethnic Chinese capitalist, 269, 299, 331 Ethnic Chinese communities, 142, 144, 145, 261–272, 274, 275, 277, 281–283, 324, 326–328 Ethnic Chinese community, 140, 334 Ethnic Chinese economic power, 321 Ethnic Chinese economy, 270, 271, 280 Ethnic Chinese education, 280, 281 Ethnic Chinese enterprises, 330 Ethnic Chinese entrepreneur, 142, 143, 269, 282, 329, 330, 331 Ethnic Chinese history, 138, 331 Ethnic Chinese intellectuals, 274, 275 Ethnic Chinese local identity, 279 Ethnic Chinese nationalism, 272, 277 Ethnic Chinese political life, 147 Ethnic Chinese population, 321 Ethnic Chinese schools, 280

Ethnic Chinese social organizations, 134 Ethnic Chinese society, 125, 141 Ethnic Chinese students, 283 Ethnic Chinese talents, 280 Ethnic Chinese viewpoint, 144 Ethnic Chinese youth, 276 Europe, 64, 186, 272, 290 European history, 337 European powers, 289 Executive (Shuwu ke), 189 External Affairs (Waijiao ke), 189 fa (get rich), 307 Falun Gong, 423 familism, 8 family business, 325 family conglomerate, 298 Far East, 398 Federal Flour Mills, 48 Federated Malay States, 20 Federation of China Relief Fund Associations of Southeast Asia (Nanyang chouzhen zonghui), 353 Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, 132 Federation of Chinese Clan Associations of Singapore, 131 Federation of Malaya, 23, 45, 220, 243 Federation of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 51 Federation of the Hokkien Associations in Malaysia, 83 Federation of the Singapore Hakka Associations, 389 Feng Qiang Rubber Products Company, 44 Fenn–Wu Committee, 221 Fenn–Wu reports, 223 Fen–Wu Committee, 220 Festival of Chinese Education, 254 filial piety, 8, 67, 161, 206 Filipino nationalists, 428

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Index Finance, 376 Finance (Caizheng ke), 189 financial contribution, 376 financial expertise, 409 First Hometown (Diyi guxiang), 22 First Teochew Uprising, 376 First World War (1914–1918), 269, 300, 352 Five Powers Constitution (Wuquan xianfa), 420 “Five Power” system, 420 flexibility, 289 Foo Chee Choon (Hu Zichun), 182, 381, 393 Foochow, 377 foreign encroachment, 413 Forward Together Society (Kung Chin Hui), 364 Four Asian Little Dragons, 110 Four Books, 211 four civilizations, 252 Four Little, 57 Four Little Dragons, 49, 322, 323 France, 70, 289, 412 Francis Yeoh, 79 freedom, 206, 207 French, 368, 426 French imperialists, 427 French Indo-China, 375 from rags to riches, 79 Fu Qing, 79 Fu Shan, 73 Fu Sheng Gong, 109, 112 Fui Lian, 52 Fujian, 23, 47, 78, 82, 93, 98, 120, 265, 289, 316 Fujian province, 63, 74, 78, 79, 84, 104, 120, 291, 298, 300 Fukien, 369 fund-raising movement in Malaya, 192 future of China, 427 Fuzhou, 47

439

gambier, 15, 138, 139, 382 gambling, 145 Gan, 93 Gan (Yan or Yen), 114 Gan ancestors, 101 Gan Boon Siong, 109, 111 Gan businessmen, 95 Gan Clan Association, 104, 105 Gan Clan Association of Johore, 109 Gan Clan Association of Northern Malaya in Penang, 111 Gan Clan Association of Singapore, 103, 107, 109, 111 Gan Clan Associations in Malaysia, 102 Gan Clan Temple, 101–103 Gan Clan Temple of Taochang, 100 Gan clansmen, 94, 95, 97–103, 107, 114 Gan clansmen’s cemetery, 101 Gan Ee Chong, 100 Gan Eng Seng, 94, 96, 306 Gan Guan Teat, 96 Gan Hong Hor, 100, 101 Gan Hui Chong, 103, 106, 109 Gan Jing Poi, 103 Gan Kang Hor, 98 Gan Kee Seng, 103 Gan Kim Kao, 102 Gan Kim Lian, 100–102 Gan Kim Swee, 94, 96 Gan Kok Hua, 103, 106 Gan Kong Hwee, 103 Gan Lin, 94 Gan Ngoh Bee, 95, 97, 295, 312, 313 Gan Nin Kui, 102 Gan Pui Jee, 103, 113 Gan See Khem, 112 Gan Sheng Yeok, 103 Gan Sin Hor, 98, 99 Gan Song Hock, 103 Gan students, 107 Gan Teng Chek, 103, 106

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Gan Yue Cheng, 103, 104, 106, 109 gardeners, 201, 373 GDP, 321 General Templer, 226 Genting Group, 46, 77 Genting resort, 80 geographical origins, 205 geographical–dialect ties, 326 George W. Bush, 422 Gerakan party, 26 German banks, 426 Ghee Hin kongsi, 308 Ghee Hock kongsi, 308 globalism, 214 Globe Biscuit Company, 43 GNP, 321 God’s call, 220 Goh Say-eng, 150, 188, 191 Goh Say-eng (Wu Shirong), 182 Goh Say-ying, 174 Goh Siew Tin, 307 Gong yan in Cantonese, 398 gonghui (association), 104 gongsheng (sui kung-sheng), 212 Gongsi (Kongsi), 121 gongsi government, 393 good fortune, 302 Gordon Redding, 321 Grand Ocean and Mewah cooperatives, 52 Grand Vision of 2020, 58 Guan Gong, 122 guang (vast), 307 Guang Fu Gong, 139 Guangdong, 23, 93, 98, 120, 265, 289, 295, 316, 393 Guangdong province, 295, 314, 423 Guangxu, 187 Guanxi (Kuan-his), 326 Guo Henian, 47 Guo Le (Kwok Lock), 143 Guo Min school, 84

Guo Quan (Kwok Chin), 143 Guomindang, 202, 268 Guomindang (Kuomintang), 238 Guthrie Company, 38, 95 H.S. Lee, 223 Hai Cheng, 120 Hai Cheng district, 72 Hainan, 93 Hainan island, 423 Hainanese community, 52 Hainanese, 121, 122, 380, 390 Hakka agriculturalists, 383 Hakka Chinese mining entrepreneurs, 393 Hakka Chinese, 379–381, 384–387, 390, 391 Hakka communities, 388, 389 Hakka community, 52 Hakka descent, 390 Hakka dialect, 390, 393 Hakka entrepreneur, 383, 393, 394 Hakka family, 294 Hakka huiguans, 388–391 Hakka immigrants, 381, 382, 384–387 Hakka leader, 393 Hakka merchants, 383 Hakka miners, 385 Hakka people, 387 Hakka settlements, 383 Hakka social organizations, 388, 389 Hakkas, 85, 122 Han Chinese, 194, 195, 361, 369, 423, 424 Han Jiang High School, 273 Hanoi, 179, 374, 375 Hans, 424 Hans Kohn, 337 hao, 307 harmony, 8, 67, 327, 329 Harvard University, 392 Hawaii, 152

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Index hawkers, 201, 373 he (harmony), 307 He Shan district, 295 Heap Eng Moh Steamship Company, 292 Henry Gurney, 220 hierarchy, 8, 327, 329, 330 High Commissioner, 222 high-ranking officials, 218 Hing Loong, 295 Ho Ho Biscuit Company, 43 Ho Hong Bank, 41, 42, 73, 74 Ho Teh-ju, 173 Hok Lian, 52 Hok’ow Uprising, 374 Hokchiu Associations, 390 Hokkien (Fujianese), 296 Hokkien Association, 84, 87, 229 Hokkien Association in Selangor, 17 Hokkien bang, 86, 87 Hokkien banks, 42, 74 Hokkien businessman, 43, 73, 306 Hokkien Chinese, 77, 383 Hokkien Chinese entrepreneurs, 80 Hokkien clan, 66, 67 Hokkien clan associations, 67, 68 Hokkien clan organizations, 69 Hokkien communities, 73 Hokkien community, 52, 76, 207 Hokkien dialect, 119, 120 Hokkien entrepreneurs, 79, 82 Hokkien huiguan, 68 Hokkien Immigrants, 63, 66–68 Hokkien leaders, 89 Hokkien merchants, 73, 75 Hokkien population, 65 Hokkien schools, 86 Hokkien speakers, 335 Hokkien trading firms, 71 Hokkiens, 41, 63, 65, 66, 69, 71–76, 84, 85, 121, 122, 380, 382, 384 Hokkiens’ contributions, 83

441

Hokow, 159 Hong Kong, 12, 33, 49, 57, 60, 80, 81, 89, 108, 110, 143, 152, 168, 292, 322, 323, 374, 397–399, 401–408 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Group, 398 Hong Kong Chinese, 397, 398, 402–405, 407–409 Hong Kong Chinese money, 409 Hong Kong emigrants, 408 Hong Kong immigrants, 405–407, 409 Hong Kong Medical College, 412 Hong Kong race course, 404 Hong Leong Berhad, 77 Hong Leong Group, Malaysia, 46 Hongkongers, 398 Hongkongese, 398 Honolulu, 152, 154, 155, 187, 353, 366 honors, 362 Hoo Ah Kay (Whampoa), 305 Howard Dick, 311 Hsing Chung Hui, 149, 153, 365, 366 Hsu His-lin, 364, 367 Hu Han-min, 151, 169, 174, 191, 192, 377 Hu Wan Duo, 255, 256 Hu Wanduo, 30, 87, 90 Hu Zichun (Foo Chee Choon), 142 Hua Hsing Hui, 365 Huajiao Jie, 254 Huang Clan Temple of Penang, 119 Huang clansmen, 119 Huang Guangrao, 217 Huang Hsing, 151, 174, 367 Huang Kang Uprising, 374, 376 Huang Kang, 375 Huang Xiao Shan, 118, 119 Huang Xing, 191, 192 Huang Yaot’ing, 375 Huang Zhong Ji Rubber Manufactory, 44

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Huang Zunxian, 344 Huaqiao (Overseas Chinese), 277 Huawen jiaoyu huyu lu, published in 1986, 255 Hui An district, 78 Hui Zhou (Huichew), 385 huiguan, 68, 282, 386–388 huiguan (association), 121 huiguan (dialect association), 4 Huizhou Association of Malacca, 385 Huizhou Hakkas, 385 humanity, 429 Hunan, 365 Hundred Days’ Reform, 345 Hundred Day’s Reform in 1898, 162 Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, 151–153 Hupei, 365 Imahori, 140 imperialism, 289, 341 imperialistic threat, 413 Import Substitution Industrialization, 77 Indah Water Konsortium Sdn Bhd, 56 Independence of Malaya Party, 222 independent Chinese university, 389 India, 63 indigenous nationalism, 76, 276, 356 indigenous nationalists, 356 indigenous populations, 290 individualism, 334 Indo-China, 316, 428 Indonesia, 59 Industrial Development Committee, 77 industrial relations, 329 inequality between sexes, 206 innovation, 8, 329 International Bank, 45, 76 International Monetary Fund, 426 internationalism, 429 internationalist, 428 Investigation (Tiaocha ke), 189

Ipoh, 165, 166, 188, 192 Iran, 422 Iraq, 422 Italian, 426 James Legge, 400 James Warren, 141 Japan, 187, 290 Japanese, 426 Japanese aggression, 76, 204, 357 Japanese aggressors, 207 Japanese companies, 354 Japanese goods, 272, 354, 355 Japanese imperialism, 350 Japanese imperialists, 144, 272 Japanese invasion, 204 Japanese management styles, 335 Japanese materials, 355 Japanese occupation, 44, 61, 79, 99, 129 Japanese rule, 18, 19, 76, 356 Japanese surrender, 19 Jardine, Matheson and Company, 398 Java, 216, 291, 293, 294, 383 Jean Jacques Rousseau, 421 Jeffrey Cheah’s Sungei Way Holdings, 59 ji, 307 Jia Ying Hakkas, 85 Jiading, 423 Jiang Jieshi, 417, 424 Jiang Jingguo, 417 Jiang Xia Tang Huang Clan Temple of Malacca, 118 Jiaying Hakka Associations of Malaysia, 389 Jiaying Hakkas, 385-388 Jimei, 214 Jimei (Chi Mei) Normal College, 212 Jimei College, 213, 215, 244 Jimei educational complex, 88 Jimei village, 212

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Index Jin Jiang, 93, 108 Jiuzai hui, 353 John Buttery Company, 38 John Kautsky, 338 John Lorriman, 335 Johore, 54, 98, 111 Johore Bahru, 47, 80 Johore Gan Clan Association, 105 Johore state, 105 Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950), 392 Joseph W Esherick, 363 Journal of Malaysian Chinese Studies, 32 K’ai Ming Public Speaking and Reading Club, 168, 173 K’ang-hsi, 362 Ka Aing Koan, 385 Kai Ping (Hoi Peng), 121 Kampong China, 117 Kamunting and MPHB group, 77 Kamunting Corporation Berhad, 54 Kamunting, 295 Kang Youwei, 146, 264, 267, 342, 345, 351 Kang Yuwei, 14, 162 Kapitans, 117 Kar Yin, 52 Karachi, 292 Karaoke singing, 108 Kelantan, 72 Kemayan, 105 Kent E. Calder, 323 Khaw Soo Cheang, 293, 296, 297, 303 Kheh-taus, 373 Khiam Aik, 300 Khiam Aik Company, 333 Khir Johari, 236 Khoo, 66 Khoo (Qiu), 65, 119, 120 Khoo Chian Eng, 120, 124 Khoo Clan School, 127 Khoo Kay Kim, 138

443

Khoo Kay Peng, 54, 78, 79 Khoo Key Peng, 78 Khoo Kongsi, 66, 120, 128, 308 Khoo Seokwan, 154 Khoos’ progenitors, 67 Kian Gwan, 291 Kian Gwan Company, 298, 304 Kiangsu, 365 kidnapping in London, 415 Kien Huat Construction Sdn. Bhd, 79 Kim Cheng & Company, 71 Kim Seng & Company, 71 King of Timber, 299 king’s way, 428 kinship and dialect associations, 129 Kinship and Organization, 5 kinship associations, 134, 135 kinship migration, 98 kinship organizations, 115 kinship ties, 68, 205, 282 kinship, 114, 206, 302 kinship-based, 65 kinsmen, 19, 66 Kinta of Perak, 73 Klang, 90, 216 Kluang, 105 knowledge economy, 60 Koh Lay Huan, 64, 297 Koh Peng Ting, 28, 51 Koh Soh-chew, 171 kong, 308 kongsi, 307–309 Korean War (1950–1953), 44, 76, 130 Kuala Lumpur, 16, 17, 40, 60, 69, 78, 84, 85, 158, 165, 182, 188, 206, 217, 223, 226, 237, 242, 273, 296, 342, 393 Kuala Lumpur Chinese School Teachers Association (KLCSTA), 218, 219, 220, 224, 225, 227 Kuala Lumpur Kepong Group, 46 Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 52, 56

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Kuala Pilah, 151, 166, 172, 188, 192, 209, 296 Kuang Fu Hui, 364, 365 Kuang Guoxiang, 395 Kuantan, 166 Kuen Cheng Girls’ High School, 273 Kulai, 105 Kuok, 79 Kuok Brothers Group, 46, 47, 77 Kuok Brothers Private Ltd, 48 Kuok Keng Kang, 47 Kuomintang, 202, 268, 357 Kwang Yik Bank, 309 Kwangsi, 374, 376 Kwangtung, 365, 369, 374, 376 Kwong Wah Yit Poh, 167 Kwong Yik, 42 Kwong Yik (Selangor) Banking Corporation, 40 Kwong Yik Bank Company Ltd., 40 Kwong Yik Bank, 41, 314 L. A. Mills, 145 Labis of Johore, 73 Lan Fang Gongsi, 387 Lan Fang kongsi, 308 late Qing, 16, 142 late Qing period, 268 Laukeh (China-born), 251 LCE, 235 Le Shan She Lecture movement, 342 Leadership, 332 Lee Biscuit Factory (Nan Yi), 75 Lee Cheng Yan, 71, 306, 307 Lee Cheng Yan & Company, 71 Lee Foundation, 89 Lee Kim Yew’s Country Heights group, 59 Lee Kong Chian, 87, 89, 270, 333 Lee Kuan Yew, 25, 26, 379 Lee Loy Seng, 46 Lee Poh Ping, 138

Lee San Choon, 52 Lee Wah bank, 41 Lee Yen-tse, 60 Legislative Council, 222, 224, 229 Leong Yew Koh, 240, 242, 243 Leung Cheung Ling, 223 Li Guan-sui (Li Yuanshui), 192 Li Hau-cheong, 174 Li Hongzhang, 413 Li Qingquan, 293, 298, 299, 302 Li Seng Fong, 87 Li Tianlin, 183 Li Wang Company, 294 Li Wei Jing, 64 Li Xiaozhang, 191 Li Yining, 60 Li Yixia, 191 Li Yuan Che, 254 Li Zhuzhong, 183 Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, 154 Liang Ch’i-ch’iao, 162 Liang Moan, 183 Liang Qichao, 264, 342, 345, 351 lie, 189 Liem Sioe Liong’s Salim group, 322 Liew Chong Chin, 60 light industry, 44 Lim (Lin), 65, 119 Lim Ah Tam, 77, 78 Lim Boon Keng, 73, 158 Lim Chong Eu (Lin Cangyou), 233 Lim Chong Eu, 240 Lim Chong Yew, 26 Lim Geok Jing, 87, 90 Lim Goh Tong, 46, 77–80 Lim Keng Nian, 86 Lim kongsi, 308 Lim Leong Kong, 124 Lim Lian Geok, 6, 24, 87, 211–218, 220, 223–230, 234–236, 238, 241–246, 248–254, 256 Lim Lian Geok Foundation, 254

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Index Lim Lian Geok Lecture, 254 Lim Lian Yeok, 89 Lim Ngeesoon (Lin Yishun), 165, 182 Lim Peng Siang, 43 Lim Thian Kiat, 77–79 Lim Thian Kit, 54 Lin Caiju, 211 Lin Gengyang, 212 Lin Lianyu, 211 Lin Shian, 191 Lin Yiren, 212 Ling Yang, 108 lion dance, 30 Literature Society, 364 Liu Bei, 122 Lo Qisheng, 295 Loan mortgages, 42 Loh Boon Siew, 47, 77, 78 Loke Yew, 159, 293, 295, 296, 302 London, 38, 47 London Commodities Exchange, 47 London Missionary Society, 399 long (prosperous), 307 Long Xi district, 74, 296 Lord Reid, 250 Low Yat, 78 Low Yat group, 77 Low Yaw Chuan, 77, 78 Loy, 393 Loy Hean Heong, 54 loyalty (zhong), 330 loyalty to emperor, 206 loyalty, 8, 67, 161, 327 Luguo Tang Yanshi Gonghui, 99 Luo Fangbo, 379, 381, 393 Ma Yingbiao (Ma Ying-piu), 143 Macau Chinese, 397 Macau, 398, 403 Mahathir, 32, 33, 35, 57–59 mainland China, 228, 388, 417, 419

445

Malacca, 39, 63, 64, 66, 71, 72, 74, 84, 95, 98, 100, 111, 166, 172, 188, 386 Malacca Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 249 Malacca Meeting, 245 Malacca Meeting (Maliujia huitan), 232 Malacca Sultanate, 63, 70, 117 Malacca-born Hokkien, 71 Malaixiya Ren Gui Yanshi Zongci, 101 Malay aristocrats, 140 Malay business class, 27 Malay businessmen, 46 Malay culture, 29, 30 Malay education, 220 Malay electorate, 32 Malay elite, 27, 29 Malay employees, 50 Malay leaders, 33, 34 Malay nationalists, 220, 222 Malay Peninsula, 38, 70, 71, 98, 165, 295, 301 Malay Peninsular, 193 Malay schools, 30 Malay states, 316, 342, 371, 401, 402 Malaya, 67, 68, 158, 196, 200, 203, 207, 228, 293, 295, 304, 314, 319, 370, 387 Malayan Chinese, 18, 44, 169, 170, 174, 209 Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 22, 25–27, 46, 52, 61, 223, 226, 230–232, 236, 240, 244, 248, 279, 358 Malayan Chinese Association Chinese Education Central Committee (MCACECC), 234, 235, 238, 240, 245, 246 Malayan Chinese Community, 35, 237 Malayan Chinese education, 16 Malayan Chinese society, 18, 19, 228 Malayan citizen, 229, 247

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Malayan citizenship, 25, 243, 257 Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 21 Malayan economy, 45 Malayan government, 45 Malayan Parliament, 251 Malayan schools, 221 Malayan Sugar Manufacturing Berhad, 48 Malayan Union, 20, 21 Malayan United Industries (MUI), 54 Malays, 27, 50, 53 Malaysia, 27, 33, 51, 54, 56–58, 60, 62, 63, 81, 130, 257, 385 Malaysian Borneo Finance (MBF) Corporation Berhad, 54 Malaysian Chinese, 33 Malaysian Chinese society, 11 Malaysian economy, 62 Malaysian franchise, 55 Malaysian Malaysia, 25 Malaysian market, 48, 49 Malaysian Race, 33, 35 Malaysian ringgit, 59 Malaysian ringgit (dollar), 34 Malaysian rubber, 57 Manchu, 414 Manchu government, 6, 156, 168, 347, 349, 350, 411 Manchu regime, 152, 155, 416, 429 Manchurian Incident in 1931, 352 Manchus, 194, 349, 362, 366, 367, 369, 373, 413, 423, 424 Mandarin, 133, 406 Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise and the Modernization of China, 1893–1911, 394 Manila, 299 manufacturing, 129 manufacturing industry, 15, 71 Mao Tse-t’ung, 151–153 Mao Zedong, 9, 20, 196, 338, 417, 429

marriage, 205 Marry B Rankin, 364 martyr, 255 martyrdom, 206 Marxist, 155, 329 Marxist ideology, 155 Marxist–Leninist works, 244 Maurice Dobb, 290 Max Weber, 324 May 13th racial riots, 11 May 13th riots, 50 May Fourth, 275 May Fourth Movement, 17, 146, 276 May Fourth Movement in 1919, 264 McDonald, 55, 56, 82 MCE, 235 means a store house, 307 Melbourne, 405 Meng Luoquan, 332 Mengkarak, 105 Mentakab, 105 Mentakab Zhong Hua primary school, 98 meritocratic principle, 334 Michael R. Godley, 294, 394 Mid-Autumn festival, 106 middle class, 372 migration, 93 migration pattern, 65, 66, 69 military nationalism, 214 min ben (People as the base of a nation), 419 Min Pao, 169 Min Pao (People’s Tribune), 172 Ming, 265, 315 Ming Qing period, 267 mining, 349, 381 mining centers, 385 mining settlements, 380 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 46 mobility, 289 modern China, 348, 411

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Index modern Chinese bank, 313, 314, 319 modern Chinese education, 209 modern Chinese literature, 17 modern Chinese nationalism, 204, 338, 346, 347 modern Chinese schools, 16 modern enterprise, 299 modern Western capitalism, 324 modernization blueprint, 419 modernization of agriculture, industry, and the transport system, 419 Modesty and Benefits, 300 Mogolians, 424 Mohamed Sopiee Sheik Ibrahim, 242 moral conduct (caoxing), 214 morality of citizens, 214 Motesquier of France, 421 MPH, 53 Muar, 98, 105, 166, 172 Multi-Purpose Holdings Berhad (MPH), 28 Murdoch University, 141 music, 281 Muslims, 424 mutual assistance, 253 mutual tolerance, 253 N.V. Bankvereniging Oei Tiong Ham, 292 Nam Kew Poo, 167 Nam Sang Garden, 305 Nan An, 93 Nan Lu Alumni Association, 18 Nanyang, 369 Nanyang Chinese, 341, 369–372, 376 Nanyang Chinese communities, 375 Nanyang Chinese contribution, 377 Nanyang Chinese intellectuals, 372 Nanyang Girls High School, 273 Nanyang Siang Pau, 310 Nanyang Teachers’ Training College, 88

447

Nanyang Tsung Hui Pao (The Union Times), 169 Nanyang University, 4, 88 National Construction Strategy (jianguo fanglue), 418 National Culture Policy, 29 national missile defence (NMD) system, 422 National Operations Council (NOC), 26 National Reconstruction Outlines, 419 National Reconstruction Outlines (Jianguo dagang), 417 National Reconstruction Strategy, 419, 420 National Reconstruction Strategy (Jianguo fanglue), 417 National University of Singapore, 132, 138 nationalism, 206, 337, 416 nationalist government in Taiwan, 278 nationalist movements, 337 Nationalist Party, 202 nationalists, 248, 357, 424 Nationalists to Taiwan, 277 nation-state, 206 NDP, 62 Negri Sembilan, 105, 239, 380 neo-classical economists, 323 Neo-Confucianism, 418 Netherlands, 70, 289 networks of the immigrant, 401 New Economic Policy (NEP), 12, 26, 28, 46, 50, 53, 54, 56, 61, 62 new economic system, 287 New Malays, 34 New UMNO, 57 New Villages, 21 New York, 187, 353, 405 New Zealand, 262, 283, 353 Ng Kim-Keng, 150, 174, 188, 191 Ng Kim-keng (Huang Jinqing), 183 Ngee Ann kongsi, 308

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Nissin Sugar Manufacturing, 48 Noi Na Nakhon, 297 Non-Federated Malay States, 20 non-Han Chinese, 424 nonlineage-based organization, 122 North America, 192, 265, 272, 358, 370 North Korea, 422 northeastern Sumatra, 294 northern China, 190 Norwegian, 426 Oceania, 370 Oei Tiong Ham, 270, 292, 293, 298, 302, 303 Oei Tiong Ham Concern, 291, 298 Oei Tjie Sien, 291, 304 one country, two systems (yiguo liangzhi), 402 Ong Yoke Lin, 240 Open Door, 424 open door policy, 425 opium, 312 opium (chandu), 311 opium and spirit farms, 97 Opium farm, 311 Opium War (1839–1842), 411, 361, 398, 93 Opium War in 1842, 285 opium-smoking, 145 Oriental group, 77 Oriental Holdings Berhad, 46 Ou Ch’u-chia, 169 Overseas, 340 Overseas Chinese, 149, 150, 153–155, 158–165, 167, 178, 186, 192, 195, 197, 198, 202–204, 206, 247, 318, 340, 341, 343–345, 347, 351–353, 357, 359, 367–369, 374, 397, 398, 409, 412, 416 Oversea Chinese bank, 41, 42

Oversea Chinese Banking Corporation, 42, 74 Overseas Chinese (huaqiao), 281 Overseas Chinese abroad, 350 Overseas Chinese Associations (Qiaolian), 409 Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, 41 Overseas Chinese Bureaus (Qiaoban), 409 Overseas Chinese capital, 318 Overseas Chinese capitalists, 344 overseas Chinese class system, 303 Overseas Chinese communities, 150, 153, 160, 163, 164, 169, 178, 195, 294, 303, 306, 316, 339, 341–344, 346, 350, 351, 355–359, 367, 368, 405–407, 409, 410 Overseas Chinese culturalists, 343 Overseas Chinese economy, 405 Overseas Chinese entrepreneur, 392, 393, 395 Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurship, 391 Overseas Chinese High School, 88 Overseas Chinese history, 382 Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, 162 Overseas Chinese leaders, 357 Overseas Chinese loyalty, 344 Overseas Chinese national consciousness, 343 Overseas Chinese nationalism, 8, 145–147, 204, 337–339, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347, 350, 354–359, 368 Overseas Chinese nationalist movement, 356 Overseas Chinese nationalists, 339, 354, 357 Overseas Chinese population, 353, 409 Overseas Chinese’s national feeling, 146 owner-manager, 328

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Index Pacific, 402 Pacific rim, 409 Pahang Gan Clan Temple, 105 Pahang, 72, 98, 105, 111 pai, 189 Palembang, 74 Palmco Holdings Bhd, 55 pang, 206, 208 pan-Overseas Chinese nationalist movement, 339 PAP, 26 Patani, 72 paternalism, 8, 329–332 paternalistic style of management, 333 Patriotic Elements, 354 patriotic overseas Chinese capitalist, 299 patriotism, 197, 206 pattern of the nationalism, 350 Peach Gardens (Tao Yuan Jieyi), 122 Penang Conference, 174, 190, 191 Penang Free School, 238 Penang Philomatic Society, 168, 192 Penang Reading Club, 168 Penang Tongmenghui, 188 Penang, 21, 64–66, 74, 95, 98, 111, 127, 157, 166, 184, 190, 192–194, 209, 237, 273, 293, 296, 297, 304, 312, 355, 376, 385, 386 Penghu islands, 424 People’s Republic of China, 397 people’s right (minquan chubu), 420 people’s rights, 421 People’s Tribune, 365 pepper, 15, 138, 139, 382 Perak, 42, 69, 202, 216, 380, 381 Perak Chinese Schools Management Committee, 30 Perlis Plantation Company, 49 Phan Boi Chau, 428 philanthropic tradition, 96

449

philanthropic works, 95 Philippines, 111, 298, 322, 353 Phraya, 297 pineapple canneries, 42 Pingyuan district, 393 Pintu Kecil, 183 plantation, 71 plantation estate workers, 349 plantation workers, 201 poetry, 281 Political Consultative Congress, 421 Political Information Society, 170 political outlook, 206 political revolution, 369 political ties, 348 Polo Bridge, 272 Pontian, 105 Pontianak, 380, 381 Portuguese rule, 64 Prime Credit Leasing Sdn Bhd, 55 Principles of Economics, 391 pro-China elements, 410 pro-Communist leftwingers, 21 progress, 329 pro-Nationalists elements, 21 propaganda networks, 205 propriety (li), 329 Prosperity and Harmony, 294 prostitutes, 373 qian zhuang, 313 Qin Yeliang Rubber Products Company, 44 Qing authority, 296 Qing bureaucracy, 396 Qing diplomatic networks, 344 Qing dynasty, 14, 143, 264, 268 Qing economic modernization, 394 Qing era, 396 Qing government, 196, 199, 267, 285, 395

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Qing Imperial Consul, 305 Qing Ming festival, 13, 106, 126 Qing period, 64, 383 Qing, 265, 315 Qing title, 212 Qingdao, 295 Qiu Ji (Autumn Sacrifice), 124 Qiu Tengfang, 229 Qu Yuan, 126 Quanzhou, 64, 298 Quek Leng Chan, 46, 77–79 racial harmony, 253 Raffles College, 47 rags to riches, 297 Rajah Kongsee Atjeh, 294 Rangoon, 96 Ranong, 297 Rasa, 296 Rawang, 296 Razak report, 234, 240 reading Clubs, 350 Reception (Zhaodai ke), 189 reciprocity, 8, 327–330 Red Blood Brigade, 355 Reformists, 143, 163, 170, 193, 199, 204, 205, 207, 267, 350, 370 Reformists (Bao Huang Hui), 187 regional connections, 302 Regnis (M) Sdn Bhd, 55 Reid Constitutional Commission, 250 Relief Fund Association, 353 re-migration, 283 Ren He gongsi, 308 Rengit, 105 Republic of China, 208, 422 respect for age and authority, 8 respect for the age and talent, 67 responsibility, 332 Restoration Daily, 167, 185 revenue farm, 311, 313, 306 Revisionist historians, 8, 366

Revisionists, 367 Revolutionaries, 143, 171, 204, 205, 207, 350, 369, 370 revolutionary enthusiasm, 414 revolutionary message, 415 rich merchants, 199 Richshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore, 141 rickshaw pullers, 140, 201, 373 Robert Jardine, 400 Robert Kuok, 48, 49, 78 Robert Kuok Hock Nien, 46, 47 Roy Hofheinz, 323 rubber, 45, 76, 270 rubber goods, 43 rubber king, 89 rubber mills, 301 rubber planting, 73 rubber products, 44, 301 rubber shoes, 44 rubber spittoons, 44 rubber tubes, 44 Rubert Kuok, 77, 80, 81 Ruifuxiang, 332 rural China, 362 sale of honors, 363 Sam Kui Tong Kongsi, 128 San Francisco, 187, 353, 402 Sanguo yanyi, 298 Sarawak, 79, 385 scholar-gentry, 343 scholarship, 107 Schumpeterian concept of entrepreneurship, 392 Second Canton Uprising, 190, 194, 201 Second Canton Uprising in April 1911, 193 Second Larut War, 296 Second Teochew Uprising, 376 second World Gan Clansmen Convention, 113

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Index Second World War, 76, 272, 277, 278, 315, 338, 356 secret society, 128, 308 Secretariat (Wenan ke), 189 See Boon Tiong, 71 See Hoy Chan Group, 46 Sei’ichi Imahori, 139 Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall, 32 Selangor Chinese Guilds and Associations, 249 Selangor Eng Choon gongso in Klang, 69 Selangor Gan Clan Association, 105 Selangor Hokkien huiguan, 69 Selangor, 42, 85, 90, 111, 380, 382 self-motivation, 331 self-reliance, 30, 426 Semarang, 291, 304 Seoul, 49 Seremban, 74, 166, 182, 188, 239 Serendah, 296 Shabbandars, 63 Shang (merchant), 318, 320 Shanghai, 143, 193, 292, 377 Shangri-La, 49 Shantou, 384, 426 Shaonian Zhongguo chenbao, 349 Shenzhen, 426 shetuan, 222, 236, 249, 254 Shi (generation, 67) Shigu county, 104 Shun Ren high school, 85 si shu, 85 Siam (Thailand), 65 Sim Bok Woo, 87, 89 Sim Bok Woo (Shen Muyu), 222 Sincere (Xiansi), 143 Sing Po, 160, 161 Singapore, 33, 40, 45, 49, 57, 60, 63, 66–69, 71, 76, 98, 110, 111, 178, 182, 184, 187, 194, 195, 200, 203, 205, 207, 273, 293,

451

300, 304, 314, 319, 322, 323, 342, 353, 374, 385, 386, 390, 402 Singapore government, 390 Singapore link, 402 Singapore Reading Club, 168 Singaporean and Malayan Chinese, 175 Singer Sewing Machines, 55 Singora, 72 Sir Henry Curney, 222 sishu, 211 Sixteen Sacred Maxims, 342 Small Dagger Society, 296 soap making, 43 social barriers, 206 social cohesion, 205, 206 social contacts, 205 social factors, 324 social group, 306 social mobility, 140 social organizations, 384 social reconstruction, 420 social skills, 414 social stratification, 140 Social-Darwinism, 411 Socialism, 416 Socialist Four Modernizations, 419 Soh Bok Woo, 87, 91 source of all welfare, 291 South America, 58 south China, 190, 387 South Korea, 12, 33, 49, 57, 59, 110, 322, 405 South Pacific Textile Industries Bhd, 55 Southeast Asia, 182, 183, 191, 194, 215, 216, 266, 270, 278, 281, 283, 285, 288–290, 292, 302, 315, 321, 325, 340, 341, 355, 356, 374, 381, 401 Southeast Asian archipelago, 63 Southeast Asian Chinese, 3, 158, 171, 341, 351 Southeast Asian Chinese capitalism, 286

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Southeast Asian Chinese communities, 316, 375 Southeast Asian economy, 271 Southeast Asian Hakka Chinese, 379 Southeast Asian ports, 286 Southeast Asian produce, 70 Southeastern China, 294 Southern Fujian, 216 Southern Thailand, 296, 297 South-west China, 190 Soviet Union, 33 Spanish, 368 Special Committee on Education, 222, 224, 225 Special Economic Zone, 426 spirit (arak), 311 spirit farms, 312 Spirit of Lim Lian Geok, 252 Sports Toto, 82 Sport Toto Berhad, 55 spring couplets (Chun Lian), 31 Straits Chinese, 279 Straits Settlements, 70, 371 strategic partner, 422 strengthening Chinese race (chenxing zhonghua), 429 structure of the association, 105 student movement in China, 403 students, 325 Sugar King of Asia, 81 Sumatra, 383, 384, 387, 393 Sumbawan, 43 Sun, 188 Sun Mei (the elder brother of Dr Sun), 191 Sun Poo, 167 Sun Yat-Sen, 5, 8, 9, 14, 97, 143, 146, 149, 151–153, 160–164, 170, 174, 177, 178, 192–196, 198, 200–203, 206, 209, 267, 338, 342, 345, 351, 363, 365–367, 374, 399, 411–415, 417, 418, 420, 424, 427, 429

Sung Ch’iao-jen, 367 Sungei Besi, 296 Sungei Siput, 296 Surabaya, 216 Swatow, 384 Sydney, 405 Sze Hai Tong Banking (the second Chinese bank in Singapore), 295 T’ao Ch’eng-chang, 171, 172, 175, 364, 367 T’ien Tung, 169 T’ung Meng Hui, 150, 151, 164, 166, 171, 172, 174, 363–365, 373, 374, 376, 377 T’ung Teh Reading Club, 168 Tai Hong Biscuit Factory, 75 Tai Shan (Toi Shan), 121 Taiping, 69 Taiping Revolution, 194 Taishan xian, 314 Taiwan, 12, 33, 35, 49, 57, 60, 81, 108, 110, 111, 229, 254, 281, 282, 322, 323, 403, 405, 424, 429 Taiwan Independence, 423, 424 Taiwan Strait, 429 Takashi Kenjo, 335 Talib Report, 240, 241 Tan (Chen) , 65, 119 Tan Chay Hian, 72 Tan Chay Yan, 39, 300 Tan Cheng Lock, 22, 230, 231, 245, 279 Tan Chor-nam, 150, 156, 157, 164, 165, 174, 179, 209, 414 Tan Guan Kong, 124 Tan Hiok Nee, 304 Tan Jiak Kim, 306 Tan Kah Kee, 18, 75, 86–89, 207, 212, 214–216, 293, 300–302, 309, 310, 318, 331–335, 357 Tan Kah Kee and Company Limited, 309

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Index Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan Tan

Kah Kee Company, 333 Kah Kee Company in 1919, 301 Kah-kee, 43, 144, 269, 271–273 Kee Peck, 75 Keng Hean, 333 Kim Seng, 71, 84 Koon Swan, 53 Lark Sye, 87–89 Liok Ee, 238 Siew Sin, 236 Teck Guan, 72 Tock Seng, 72 You Sin’s Indit Educational Service group, 58 Tang (hall), 121 Tanjong Pagar Dock Co. Ltd., 96 Tao Chengzhang, 185 Taochang of Yong Chun, 101, 102 Tao-kuang, 362 Tariff Advisory Committee, 45 Tay Lay-seng, 150 teacher, 325 teacher–students relationship, 325 Technological Ladder, 322 Teh Lay-seng (Zheng Luosheng), 192 Temerloh, 105 Teng Tse-ju, 150, 151, 172, 174 Teng Tzu-yu, 375 Teo Eng-hock, 150, 164, 174, 179, 209 Teo Soo Cheng, 46 Teochew, 65, 121, 122, 380, 383, 384, 390 Teochew bang, 85 Teochew Chinese, 382 Teochew community, 52 Teong Teck Leng’s Kuala Lumpur Industries, 59 textile manufacturing, 395 Thai, 264 Thai high-ranking officer, 297 Thai kingdom, 316 Thailand, 34, 48, 59, 59, 81, 269, 270, 293, 297, 319, 353, 369

453

The anti-Sun movement, 187 The Appeal for Chinese Education, 255 The Barnes report, 222 the Chinese High School (Huaqiao Zhong Xue), 207 The Chinese, 371 The Controversy Between Lim Lian Geok and Leong Yew Koh (Lin Liang Gongan), 255 The Eastasia Edge, 323 The Ethnic Chinese communities, 276 The four districts (Siyi), 121 The Great Learning (Daxue), 211 The Issue on Lim Lian Geok’s Citizenship, 255 The Mandarin-capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernization of China, 294 The Mean (Zhongyong), 211 The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, 177 The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya, 361 the Philippines, 81, 293, 299 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 324 The Romance of the Three Kingdoms (San Guo Yanyi), 122, 298 the sickman of East Asia, 412 The Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800–1911, 145 The Stormy Eighteen Years, Part 1, 255 The Stormy Eighteen Years, Part 2, 255 the T’ung Meng Hui, 165 The Triad in Australia, 407 The United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association of Malaya (UCSTA), 223 The Wealth of Nations, 391

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Thio Thiau Siat, 379 Thio Tiauw Siat, 142 Thoe Lam Jit Poh, 179 Thoe Lam Yit Poh, 167 Thomas Jefferson, 421 Three Peoples’ Principles, 198, 365, 367, 416, 417, 419 three powers, 420 Three-Antis and Five-Antis, 23 Tian Fu Gong, 139 Tian Fu Kong Temple, 308 Tian Hock Keng Hokkien huiguan, 68, 69 Tian Hock Keng temple, 68 Tian Hou (Ma Zu), 68 Tiananmen crackdown, 9, 404, 407 Tibet, 423 Tibetans, 424 Tiger Balm, 389 tin industry, 394 tin mining, 129, 317 tin, 45, 76, 270 Ting Pek Khiing, 78, 79 Ting Pek Khiing’s Ekran group, 59, 60 Ting Ping Sung, 225 tin-miners, 202 Tiyong principle, 413 Tjong A Fie, 304 Toishan district, 314 Tokyo, 179, 185, 365, 428 Tong An, 93, 108 Tong An district, 300 Tong An folks, 335 Tong An prefecture, 212 Tong King Sing, 399 Tong Kooi Ong’s Phileo Allied, 59 Tong Meng Hui, 416 Tong Meng Hui (The Peoples’ Alliance), 415 Tong Seng, 47

Tongmenghui, 6, 178, 179, 182–184, 187, 188, 191–195, 200, 201–203, 206, 208, 209, 349 Tongmenghui (Tung Meng Hui), 177 Too Joon Hing, 233, 236, 240 trading company, 291 traditional China, 325 traditional Chinese culture, 132 traditional Chinese customs and values, 412 traditional Chinese dances, 31 traditional Chinese education, 298 traditional Chinese festivities, 68 traditional Chinese schools, 85 traditional Chinese social practices, 8 traditional Chinese social ties, 327 traditional Chinese society, 275, 303 traditional Chinese style, 304 traditional Chinese values, 67, 132, 343 Traditional social organizations, 282 Transnational trade, 289 Trans-nationalism, 288 transport workers, 349 Trengganu, 50, 72 Triang, 105 Trimetrical Classics (San Zijing), 211 Tsinan Incident in 1928, 352 Tuan Qijui, 417 Tun Abdul Razak, 26 Tung Meng Hui, 154, 156–158 Tungku Abdul Rahman, 26, 45 Tunku Abdul Rahman, 24, 223, 232, 234, 245 Turkestan War, 362 Twenty-One Demands in 1915, 352 UCSCA, 252 UCSTA, 224, 225, 227–229, 245–249, 252 Ulu Langat, 73 UMNO, 23, 29, 32, 223, 231, 246

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Index UMNO youth, 53 United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association of Malaya (UCSTA), 6 United Kingdom, 45 United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC), 53, 55 United Malays National Organisation, 12 United Nations, 250, 426 United Nations’ charter, 265 United States of America, 421 United States, 80, 89, 187, 266–268, 279, 283, 370, 371, 401–403, 405, 407 United Teochew Holding Berhad, 52 University of Hong Kong, 321 University of Malaya, 78, 138 utilitarianism, 214 Vice-Consulate, 199 Vietnam, 269, 270 Vincent Tan, 56, 79, 83 Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, 54, 78, 82 Voltaire, 421 Waichow Ch’i-nu-hu Uprising, 374, 375 Waichow Revolt, 153, 154 Waichow Uprising, 375 Wan Ching Yuan (Bin Chan House), 150 Wan Qing Yuan, 177 Wang Ching-wei, 197 wang dao, 428 Wang Gungwu, 7, 248 Wang Jingwei, 197 Wang Yangming, 418 Wang Yongnian, 238 warlords, 417 water-front workers, 201 Waung Yoong Nien, 238 Waung, 239

455

wealthy merchant (fu shang), 305 Wen (culture, civilization), 67 West, 414 West Borneo, 380 West coast of the Malay Peninsula, 380 Western capital, 286, 317 Western Colonial governments, 354 Western colonial power, 277 Western colonialism, 427 Western companies, 334, 398 Western countries, 407 Western culture, 400 Western democracy, 420 Western democratic system, 421 Western education, 412 Western empires, 289 Western imperialism, 427 Western manufacturing goods, 398 Western merchants, 287, 411 Western missionaries, 400 Western model, 420 Western values, 400 White Paper, 230 White supremacy, 20 William Cheng Heng Jen of Lion Corporation Berhad, 54 Wing On (Yong An), 143 Wong Ah Fook, 314 Wong Lin Ken, 138 Wong Pak Choy, 225 World Bank, 45, 426 World Depression, 271 World Depression in 1930s, 99 World Federation of Teochew, 110 World Gan Clansmen Convention, 111 World Gan Clansmen’s Educational and Cultural Fund, 113 World Hainanese Friendship Association, 110 World Hakka Friendship Association, 110

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Xi Chang village, 211 Xiamen (Amoy) , 64, 211, 299 Xiamen University, 88 Xiamen, 7, 108, 212, 213, 216, 217, 244, 426 Xianggang ren, 398 xiao (filial piety), 67, 282 Xiao Dao Hui, 296 Xieshi yan (dinner for thanking teacher), 324 Xin Hui (Shan Wei), 121 xing (rise), 307 Xing Hua High School, 90 Xing Long, 295 Xing Zhong Hui, 415 Xing Zhong Hui (Revive China Society), 415 Xinyong (Hsinyung), 326, 327 Xiong Yushan, 191 xipu dakaifa, 427 Xunhuan ribao, 400

Yangzhou city, 423 Yanshi Luguo Tang, 99 Yanshi Zongci of Yong Chun Taochang, 100 Yan-who kongsi, 308 Yap Ah Loy, 381, 382, 393, 394 Yap Kwan Seng (Ye Guansheng), 296 Yat-sen, 264 Yau Tat Shin, 381 Yau Tuck Seng, 393 Yeoh (Yang), 65, 119 Yeoh Kongsi, 128 Yeoh Sock Ping, 78 Yeoh Teck King, 124 Yeoh Tiong Lay (YTL) Corporation Berhad, 58 yi (perseverance), 213 Yijuan jiuguo hui, 353 Ying He Association of Malacca, 386 Ying He Association of Singapore, 386 Ying Xin school, 85 Yong Chun, 93, 100, 108 Yong Chun district, 104 Yong Peng, 105 Yongchun Gazette, 212 Yongchun, 211, 212 Young China, 349 Youth Study Society, 349 Yu He Company, 294 Yu Lieh, 163, 375 Yuan Shikai, 417, 429 Yuan Xiao festival, 106 Yung Wing, 399 Yung-cheng, 362 Yunnan, 159, 374, 376

Y.K. Ng, 60 Y.T. Lee, 51 Yan Pinggang, 109, 111 Yan Woh Gongsi, 385 yang er fang lao, 125 Yang Zheng school, 85

Zeng Guofan, 413 Zeng Lianqing, 183 Zengcheng district, 393 zhan, 307, 307 Zhang Bishi, 294, 302, 303, 379, 384, 393–395

World War I, 43 World War II, 265, 422 worship of the common ancestor, 102 Wu Chieh-wu, 158 Wu Hsien-tzu, 169 Wu Shouzhen, 307 Wu Siew-chen, 307 Wu Tingfang, 399 Wu Yiding, 307 Wuchang Revolt in October, 175 Wuchang Uprising in October 1911, 192, 202 Wuchang Uprising, 194, 363, 366, 377

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Index Zhang Bishi (Chang Pishih), 142, 293 Zhang Bishi’s mansion, 304 Zhang Fei, 122 Zhang Hongnan, 383 Zhang Yinan (Chang Yu-nan), 142 Zhang Yunan, 383, 384, 393, 394 Zhang Yunan (Zhang Yaoxian), 294 Zhang Zhou, 93 Zhang Zidong, 413 Zhangzhou, 63–65, 67, 72, 74 Zhangzhou Hokkien, 63, 70, 71 Zhangzhou prefecture, 63, 296 Zhangzhou traders, 63 Zhao Sheng, 191 Zhao Zilong, 122 zhen (invigorate), 307

457

Zheng Fang Yang, 64 Zheng Jianshan, 218 Zhizheng (Zhizheng di), 304 Zhong Hua, 424 Zhong Hua Biscuit Company, 43 Zhong Hua Biscuit Factory, 75 Zhong Hua high school, 17 Zhong Hua School, 16 Zhong Yuan Festival, 126 Zhou Hua, 188 Zhuhai, 426 zongci (clan temple), 104 Zongci (temple), 121 zongqinhui (clan association), 4 Zu Hun (The Spirit of the Race), 252 Zu Zhang, 123

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