The Changing Face of European Identity: A Seven-Nation Study of (Supra)National Attachments (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

The Changing Face of European Identity

Drawing upon systematic research using Q methodology in seven countries – Denmark, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden – this volume represents results of the most extensive effort yet at crosscultural, subjective assessment of national and supranational identity. The studies explain how the European Union, as the most visible experiment in mass national identity change in the contemporary world, influences how Europeans think about their political affiliations. The particular strength of Q methodolgy is its capacity to delve deeper into subjective opinion with regard to a political topic than can be done with largescale surveys – a great advantage in dealing with a topic of such complexity as identity. Q offers a unique bridge of qualitative and quantitative approaches and a powerful tool to illuminate identity types that exist in society. Besides the groundbreaking use of subjective methodology, the multinational character of this project is unique as well: providing the first cross-cultural study of national identity in Europe. Finally, this respresents one of the largest surveys ever done on subjective impressions of European political affiliations. The book comes to the conclusion that our view of national identity in general, and European identity in particular, is largely uninformed by systematic and in-depth investigation of subjective impressions. It reveals that rather than the three basic views of European integration that commentators and the public take for granted (nationalist, pluralist and supranationalist), there are potentially several more, adding nuance to discussion of national and European identity, and makes the case that identity is undergoing considerable change in Europe. This is the first book to provide an in-depth, methodologically focused, crosscultural study of subjective notions of national versus supranational identity in Europe. It will be of great interest to students and researchers in politics, sociology, and social pyschology. Richard Robyn is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kent State University, and Director of their Washington Program in National Issues. His research interests include international organization, national identity, and European politics. He has published reviews and articles in European Security, Politique Européenne, and the APSA Law and Politics Review.

Routledge Advances in European Politics 1 Russian Messianism Third Rome, revolution, Communism and after Peter J. S. Duncan 2 European Integration and the Postmodern Condition Governance, democracy, identity Peter van Ham 3 Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini 4 International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies 5 Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg 6 Institutional Challenges in the European Union Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrén 7 Europe Unbound Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Edited by Jan Zielonka 8 Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans Nationalism and the destruction of tradition Cathie Carmichael 9 Democracy and Enlargment in Post-Communist Europe The democratisation of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991–1998 Christian W. Haerpfer 10 Private Sector Involvement in the Euro The power of ideas Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer 11 Europe A Nietzschean perspective Stefan Elbe

12 The European Union and E-voting Addressing the European Parliament’s internet voting challenge Edited by Alexander H. Trechsel and Fernando Mendez 13 European Union Council Presidencies A comparative perspective Edited by Ole Elgström 14 European Governance and Supranational Institutions Making states comply Jonas Tallberg 15 European Union, NATO and Russia Martin Smith and Graham Timmins 16 Business, the State and Economic Policy The case of Italy G. Grant Amyot 17 Europeanization and Transnational States Comparing Nordic central governments Bengt Jacobsson, Per Lægreid and Ole K. Pedersen 18 European Union Enlargement A comparative history Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert 19 Gibraltar British or Spanish Peter Gold 20 Gender Politics and Society in Spain Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente 21 European Union Negotiations Processes, network and negotiations Edited by Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson 22 Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations Stephen C. Calleya 23 The Changing Face of European Identity A seven-nation study of (supra)national attachments Edited by Richard Robyn

The Changing Face of European Identity

Edited by Richard Robyn

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2005 Richard Robyn for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contribution All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-31110-8 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–34815–3 (Print Edition)

Contents

vii

Contents

1

List of tables List of appendices Contributors

ix x xi

Introduction: national versus supranational identity in Europe

1

RICHARD ROBYN

2

Methodology

17

RICHARD ROBYN

3

Beyond duality: Danes’ views on Denmark and the European Union 2001

37

KIM CHRISTIAN SCHRØDER AND SØREN ESBEN HANSEN

4

Being in Europe: pluralism and patriotism in England and Scotland

64

UNA McCORMACK

5

Supranational identity emerging in France: nationalism submergent

91

RICHARD ROBYN

6

Steadfastly European? German (supra)national identity in a rapidly changing Europe

115

DE FOREST W. COLEGROVE

7

Italian multiple identities: the Italian perception of national and European belonging ANDREA PITASI, MICHELA MARCHIONNI AND MARIA FRANCESCA MASSONI

140

viii Contents 8 European identity frames in the Netherlands

159

CHRIST’L DE LANDTSHEER, CRAIG CARROLL AND RALPH HEKSCHER

9 Northern Ireland, identities and Europe

186

JOHN BARRY

10 Being a Swede in a transforming European setting: the structures of an emerging Swedish supranational identity in the twenty-first century

207

DANIEL SILANDER AND CHARLOTTE WALLIN

11 Conclusion

227

RICHARD ROBYN

Index

236

List of illustrations

ix

Tables

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1

Q sample structure for (supra)national identity study P-set structure for (supra)national identity study Referenda results in Denmark The Q study respondents Ranking of statements by the four groupings Eurobarometer survey respondents’ expression of nationality/Europeanness 4.2 British responses to Eurobarometer surveys 4.3 Ranking of statement 12 in four accounts 4.4 Ranking of statements 13 and 22 in two accounts 8.1 Factor matrix with (supra)national identity factors 8.2 Z scores among the four factors 9.1 Respondents’ views on the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union 9.2 Responses to questions on UK union with/independence from the EC 10.1 Factor scores: rotated component matrix

26 31 38 44 57 71 72 84 85 167 173 189 190 219

x List of illustrations

Appendices

3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2

Q sample and factor arrays – European/Danish national identity The Danish Q statements Factor loadings Q sample and factor arrays – European/English and Scottish national identity 5.1 Q sample and factor arrays – European/French national identity 5.2 Q array 5.3 French Q statements 6.1 Q sample and factor arrays – European/German national identity 6.2 German Q statements 7.1 Q sample and factor arrays – European/Italian national identity 7.2 Italian Q statements 8.1 Q sample and factor arrays – European/Dutch national identity 8.2 Dutch Q statements 9.1 Q sample and factor arrays – European/Northern Irish national identity 10.1 Swedish Q statements

59 61 88 89 109 111 111 134 136 154 156 180 182 205 224

Contributors xi

Contributors

John Barry is Reader in the School of Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland. He has a BA and MA in Politics from University College Dublin and a PhD in Political Theory from the University of Glasgow. He has written extensively on environmental politics, political theory and Northern Ireland. Some publications include: Rethinking Green Politics (1999, Sage) – Winner of the UK’s Political Studies Association WJM Mackenzie Prize for best book in political science, 1999; Environment and Social Theory (1999, Routledge); Citizenship, Sustainability and Environmental Research (coauthored with John Proops) (2000, Edward Elgar); Sustaining Liberal Democracy (co-edited with Marcel Wissenburg) (2001, Palgrave); International Encyclopedia of Environmental Politics (co-edited with E. Gene Frankland) (2001, Routledge). Craig Carroll is a PhD candidate at The University of Texas at Austin and a researcher in the Corporate Communication Centre at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. His research focuses on public communication as a forum for the creation and constraint of identity in organizational contexts and has examined such diverse organizational forms as The United Methodist Church, Juan Valdez, 4-H, and the International Coffee Federation in Bogotá, Colombia, and the European Union. He has published in Management Learning, Communication Research, and Corporate Reputation Review. De Forest W. Colegrove is a Collegiate Professor at the University of Maryland University College (European Division). He is retired from the US Navy, has undergraduate degrees in chemistry and mathematics, and graduate degrees in international trade and humanities from Salve Regina University. His teaching assignments with UMUC are split between undergraduate courses in economics and business, and graduate courses in MIS and public administration. Dr. Colegrove has taught classes in Italy, the Netherlands, the UK, and has established and taught an economics course in Russia. For that project, he co-authored an economics textbook. He and his wife, Ann, live near Heidelberg, Germany.

xii

Contributors

Christ’l De Landtsheer is Professor of Communication Sciences at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. She was an Associate Professor at the Amsterdam School of Communications Research ASCoR of the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and a visiting scholar at various universities in Europe and in the US. Her research interests are in the area of psychological and linguistic aspects of political communication. She has written and edited numerous journal articles, special journal issues, book chapters and books in Dutch and in English. She is a co-editor, with Ofer Feldman, of Politically Speaking: A Worldwide Examination of Language Used in the Public Sphere (Praeger, 1998) and Beyond Public Speech and Symbols: Explorations in the Rhetoric of Politicians and the Media (Praeger, 2000). Søren Esben Hansen is a qualitative researcher and interviewer at the market research institute ACNielsen · AIM (Copenhagen, Denmark), where he has specialized in lifestyle segmentation and user evaluation of computer-mediated communication. He has been a research assistant for the project The Danes and the Media: Everyday Life and Democracy, carried out for the Danish Government’s Commission on the Media (1995). He has a Master’s in communication from the Department of Communication, Journalism and Computer Science at Roskilde University, Denmark, where his research has dealt with the ethnography of online communities. Ralph Hekscher is a commercial broadcasting planner in Hilversum, the Netherlands. He studied commercial economy and communication studies at the University of Amsterdam. His interests are in the area of subjective conceptions in intercultural communication and European integration. Michela Marchionni holds a BA with honors in Communication Sciences at the Nottingham Trent University – European School of Economics. She is a specialist in human resources management and strategic marketing. Maria Francesca Massoni holds a BA with honors in Communication Sciences at the Nottingham Trent University – European School of Economics. She is a specialist in music management and major events management. Una McCormack is completing a doctorate in sociology at the University of Surrey, studying the social shaping and social construction of new communications technologies. A graduate of Newnham College, Cambridge, she took an MSc in psychology at the University of Reading, and was subsequently a research associate at the Judge Institute at the University of Cambridge, and publications and PR manager for a British, Westminster-based ‘think-tank’. She has written academic articles on first-time voting in the UK and online communities on the internet, and has been a peer reviewer for Operant Subjectivity, the journal of Q methodology.

Contributors xiii Andrea Pitasi holds a PhD from the University of Bologna and is adjunct university professor of strategic communication at the University of Palermo. He is also a freelance professional trainer, consultant in knowledge and communication management, writer and essayist. Richard Robyn is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kent State University, Kent, OH, where he also received his PhD. His research interests are nationalism, identity issues, European security and European Union. He has published in European Security, Politique Européenne, National Identities and Politics, Groups and the Individual. Kim Christian Schrøder is Professor of Communication at Roskilde University, Denmark. He is co-author of The Language of Advertising (1985) and co-editor of Media Cultures: Reappraising Transnational Media (1992). His research has dealt with discourse analysis and reception analysis of advertising and televised serial fiction. He has published widely on the theoretical and methodological aspects of qualitative audience research. His current research deals with political discourses and the media in a combined text/audience perspective. Daniel Silander is a PhD candidate and lecturer at the Department of Social Science, Political Science at Växjö University, Sweden. His research interests include the processes of globalization, internationalization and democratization and their impact on international relations. His main research topic is the reorganization of European space with the changing political conditions in Eastern and Central Europe since 1989. The main concern is the different paths of political development within postcommunist countries and their impact on the European Community. Charlotte Wallin is a PhD candidate and lecturer at the Department of Social Science, Political Science at Växjö University, Sweden. Her main research interest is in the field of comparative politics, mainly focusing on European integration, political parties and gender issues.

xiv

Contributors

Introduction

1

1

Introduction National versus supranational identity in Europe Richard Robyn

European integration will require a transformation of the way the average European thinks and acts. (Charles Pentland 1973, p. 242)

A remarkable story is unfolding in Europe. It is a story well worth telling not only for the political and economic change that is taking place of an unprecedented scope and type, and which goes against the grain of so much history in Europe: who could have imagined a generation ago, for example, that Europeans would willingly give up their currencies? It is also remarkable for the comparatively slower, and thus more imperceptible, change that is happening in how Europeans feel about their individual nations and how they relate to them. But it is also a story that is often not being told well because its narrative is hard to discern. This is partly because the lenses we use to examine international politics are too often distorted by preconceived notions of how people view their relationship with their nation. The on-going construction of the European Union (EU), now accelerating into a future even more uncertain than before, and the role of that institution as a major agent of change on a massive scale in Europe, raises fundamental questions about the ability of people voluntarily to acquire new forms of identity with new political institutions. That is what this book is all about. The researchers in this book scattered around seven different countries of Europe to carry out these studies: the United Kingdom (England, Scotland and Northern Ireland), Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. We went to “the street” to find out what Europeans of all walks of life think: into homes, garages, businesses, farms, cafés. We went into local, national and European government offices. We talked with elites, from socialist members of the European Parliament to officials of the far-right National Front in France. But we also sought out common folks, from day laborers to the unemployed and the retired. So often what we encountered surprised us: an avowedly nationalist former French Foreign Legionnaire who expressed disdain for the anti-immigrant far-right party in France; a Protestant policeman, member of the Ulster Constabulary, who was comfortable

2 Richard Robyn with an Irish identity, even if it meant separating from a British identity; numerous Europeans who seemed to yearn for international cooperation but strongly held to a nation-state-oriented world. Using a methodology that allowed us unprecedented access into ways of thinking about identities and affiliations, we could reach a level of analysis that previous survey research could rarely approach. Tapping into the extensive opinions of more than 300 Europeans of all walks of life, it became the most extensive effort yet at cross-cultural, subjective assessment of national and supranational identity. The point of this unprecedented effort was to focus in on a key theme: the impact of the process of European integration, as manifested through the work of the European Union.

The contemporary rise of nationalism in Europe There are many who would say that ingrained habits of Europeans, formed by distinct cultural backgrounds, would militate against any significant change in personal affiliation to the nation. These habits will provide a natural brake on the speed and extent of European integration (Smith 1990, 1992, 1995; Allott 1992; Sampson 1971, p. 26; Leonard 1998). Europeans may make some surface changes in order to keep a job or have the convenience of more open borders, but they will keep their separate languages and distinct cultures intact. Despite the undoubted changes that the European Union has brought to the continent, they say that nationalism is just too strong a basic force in the world. Nationalism supposes a strong link of the individual to the nation-state, and these “Europessimists” can point to plenty of evidence that it is still a force to be reckoned with today. Throughout the Cold War, with Europe between the superpowers, it was thought that the kind of nationalism that had brought such destruction to the continent in the first part of the twentieth century had been tamed. Yet daily headlines from places such as the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Israel, Iraq, Northern Ireland and the Basque country of Spain are reminders that even into the new century we still seem to be in an age of ethnic conflict and of extreme forms of nationalist sentiment. Studies have shown that upwards of twothirds of the conflicts in the world today could be of the “identity-based” type that characterizes nationalist motivations (Regehr 1993). Einhorn et al. (1996, p. 2) have speculated that the collapse of the Soviet Union, which some say meant the triumph of democracy over tyranny, actually may only have left in place two ideologies in Europe: nationalism and the market. Nationalism certainly appears to remain one of the most powerful forces in contemporary political life. In surprising places it seems to be coming in from the cold and becoming part of the mainstream political scene (Suter 1998, 5). Across Europe, for example, in rich countries and poor, far right-wing political parties are gaining in strength, parties that seemingly have little in common except for a fear of foreigners (Seward 2000, p. 2A). In France, the extreme right-wing National Front (NF) consistently scored in double digits in national and regional elections throughout the 1990s, enough to broker elections between the mainstream left and right. The NF broke through in

Introduction

3

the spring 2002 presidential elections and shocked the nation when its leader Jean Marie Le Pen beat other mainstream candidates and managed a face-off in the finale with incumbent President Jacques Chirac. While neo-Nazi groups and skinheads in Germany took to the streets and grabbed headlines in recent years, more quietly far-right political parties have been gaining electoral strength. As only one example, the German People’s Union captured 13 per cent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt state elections in 1998. This development forced the governing Christian Social Union in Bavaria to announce a series of “security initiatives” (expelling foreigners guilty of serious crimes, stepped up searches for illegal immigrants, increased spending on crime equipment), all in a state previously known for its low crime rates. For most of the post-war period the far right has been of little consequence in Germany, never managing to the support of more than 5 per cent of the electorate. Yet, as Gerhard Frey, head of the German People’s Union, declared, “In France, Italy, Denmark, everywhere the right wing is entering politics and shifting the mainstream body politic to the right … voting right wing for young people in Germany today is now part of their culture, like techno music and rollerblading” (Drozdiak 1998, p. 5). In Germany this political change has included increased attacks on the EU. Saxony Premier Edmund Stoiber has declared that Germany would no longer tolerate being the “milk cow” that nourishes its neighbors: “We are paying more into the EU budget than all of the other members combined. That is neither fair nor acceptable to the German people” (Drozdiak 1998, p. 5). The resolve of EU and national leaders across Europe in the face of the rise of nationalist parties was tested by the inclusion of the extreme-right Freedom Party in the Austrian government. Led by Jörg Haider, a charismatic politician who in the past has made comments favorable to Hitler and pushed an anti-immigrant stand, the Freedom Party grew from 5 per cent in the early 1990s to 27 per cent of the vote in 1999 elections. On January 31, 2000, António Guterres, the Prime Minister of Portugal, which held the EU presidency at the time, issued an unprecedented warning to a member state when he said that the EU would not “promote or accept any bilateral official contacts at a political level” with a government that included the Freedom Party (McNeil 2000, p. 1). Despite this strong stand, eventually it was the EU that relented and quietly permitted Austria to continue as a member in good standing. It is also worthwhile for purposes of these studies in (supra)national identity to note Haider’s defiant reaction: “no foreigners can tell us what to do.” What does the word “foreigner” mean now for Austrians when they are now citizens of the European Union as well as their own country? The Netherlands is also facing a situation of coalition government with antiimmigrant parties. The assassination of the extreme-right candidate Pim Fortuyn in the weeks leading up to the 2002 elections led to an outpouring of support and the election of representatives of his party to the government. Along with other relatively rich, ex-colonialist European countries, the Netherlands is dealing with immigrant “guest workers” coming into the country from former colonies in increasing numbers. The resulting predicament has been posed as a stark question:

4 Richard Robyn “in a white European country, can these nonwhite newcomers ever truly blend into the national identity?” (Robinson 1998, p. 1). This may be especially important for a sense of national self in Europe where nationality has long been explicitly based on shared ethnicity – “blood ties” – unlike perhaps the USA which views itself as a nation of immigrants. Yet strong nationalist movements that have racial undertones have appeared in the USA in recent years (Tilove 1998, p. 14), showing this country is not immune to the sentiment. Nor are other countries around the world immune, no matter their governments’ professed commitment to multiculturalism. In Australia the racially-based One Nation Party has grown in strength (Warner 1998, p. 5). Israel is going through a painful and protracted debate over immigration and the “exact” meaning of Jewish identity, ostensibly over which religious group is qualified to perform conversions, but with a barely-hidden subtext of power and legitimacy and over who is a “real” Jew (Kraft 1998, p. A12). Debates such as this have engendered even deeper and more far-reaching discussions in Israel over whether it is a Jewish state or a multicultural state (Sontag 1999, p. 1). The causes for the success of these movements may be many and varied, and may differ in each country with the special conditions there. They may gain support due to the perceived failure of the national government to come to grips with social problems such as unemployment, crime, or immigration. In other places it may be from a fear of the pace of life in general and of economic globalization and cultural imperialism, perhaps especially from America. But it seems that one factor may be contributing to the process as a continentwide phenomenon against which nationalist may rally: the increasing presence of the European Union in the daily lives of many people. How did this phenomenon of such obvious non- or even anti-national import rise in the heart of Europe?

The emergence of the “European idea” Although writers, thinkers and poets from Dante to Churchill have conceived of a continent-wide political realm of Europe (de Rougemont 1966), it was only in the last century with the formation of the European Union that it seemed possible that this supranational entity might actually come into existence on a voluntary basis. The last type of long-standing continental political organization, the Christian empire of the Middle Ages, was based on feudal order of subservience and premodern conceptions of religious unity more than political engagement. It is only recently with the EU that so many citizens of Europe in this modern era have been called upon to give up voluntarily at least some of their allegiances to their own political nations. With the formation of the nation-state system in Europe, a gradual process over several centuries but effectively started with the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Wars of Religion in the seventeenth century, Europeans have been drawn into an ever-tightening web of allegiances to central authorities that reside in capital cities of separate and distinct nations with carefully drawn borders. These allegiances were developed and supported through extensive campaigns of mass

Introduction

5

education in these nations that emphasized the learning of national languages and cultures. For the most part, Europeans came to accept the idea of singular attachments to national political institutions. While dreamers might have conceived of a European idea, it took powerful political leaders such as Napoleon and Hitler, backed by military forces of overwhelming strength, to try and force Europeans to overcome their national attachments, with only limited success and the tragic results of which we are all familiar. In the destruction of the last of those attempts, World War II, Europeans seemed to be willing to try again, only this time on a more voluntary basis. The forces of recovery and unity came together following the war to found the forerunner of the EU, the European Coal and Steel Community, Europe’s “first supranational institution” (Gillingham 1991, xi). Created as an attempt to avoid wars such as the one then just fought and to help in economic recovery, the ECSC pooled the production by six European countries of two key resources for building armies, coal and steel. This was a significant departure from the way things had happened before in Europe with its history of economic as well as political nationalism. While the ECSC itself was not a great success (Gillingham says it “did none of the things it was supposed to do” [p. xi]), it nonetheless had an immediate galvanizing effect on the forces for change swirling throughout Europe in the immediate postwar period. It directly led to the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the establishment of the European Community (EC), the precursor to the present European Union. European integration has been an uneven process, proceeding on at least two different fronts: economic and political. The economic integration that started with the ECSC proceeded with some faltering throughout its subsequent metamorphoses through the European Common Market to the European Economic Community, then more simply the European Community and finally the European Union. At each step along the way, institutional structures were added or institutions then in place were granted significantly more powers to oversee new functions. With arguably the lone exceptions of the United Nations and the newly-formed African Union, the EU is the only supranational organization that is overtly charting a course to lay direct claim to the sovereign rights of nations. This has important implications for this project, for the drive to construct the EU calls for the people of Europe to reorient their thinking about how they relate to their national political institutions. As Pentland states, “European integration will require a transformation of the way the average European thinks and acts” (1973, p. 242). But how are Europeans to conceive of this European identity?

The identity literature As we have seen, in Europe especially there has been a coincidence of several fundamental disturbances that seem directly related to nationalism: the upsurge of nationalist sentiment described above, taking place in liberal democracies heretofore committed to multiculturalism; shocking outbreaks of nationalist rhetoric and consequent ethnic cleansing in places such as ex-Yugoslavia; often

6 Richard Robyn less than enthusiastic support for European integration; and German unification in which the former East does not always seem to feel close to its Western counterpart. These developments are raising “almost existential questions” of what it means to be a European in contemporary times (Chryssochoou 1996, p. 297). In light of these developments, the increased presence of the EU in the lives of all Europeans is raising questions about whether this entity can command the allegiance of millions of people across the continent. Support for the EU has at times seemed quite faltering in several of the countries in these studies, some say because national identity is too strong to permit this change. Europeans cannot identify with Europe as a whole, the argument goes: they feel French or German or British, and that is simply all there is to say. Smith has made the case that something that is a part of a “global culture” such as the EU is fundamentally different from something that is part of a national culture. An artefact of global culture is “affectively neutral” (Smith 1990, p. 177), with little of the emotional power of national or ethnic cultures. Elsewhere (1992, p. 78) Smith writes scathingly of the EU as embodying unacceptable historical myths … [and] a patchwork memoryless scientific “culture” held together solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to change. After all, it is often argued, who would want to fight and die for the EU? Allott (1992, p. 2) is typical of this stance: All the talk about creating in the minds of the citizens, a sense of loyalty and attachment to the EC is not worth much now, given that the new total structure will be as obscure as the Holy Roman Empire. … One may be called upon to die for the EC in war, but will not be able to say quite what one is dying for. Not only mainstream commentators but academics from the left have raised this point. In wondering why it is that people would make the ultimate sacrifice for an ideal of nationhood when they “obviously” would not for the “market zones” that comprise capitalist states, Benedict Anderson in his classic Imagined Communities asks for example “who will willingly die for Comecon or the EEC?” (1990, p. 53). There are several objections one could make at this line of argument. One is that it poses a strange and hard-to-verify litmus test for comparing identities. It also ignores the sacrifices of those in current peacekeeping duties on behalf of the EU in Bosnia and elsewhere. But the most telling criticism is that the evidence for this supposed dominating attachment of national identity has been skimpy. The arguments become assertions rather than conclusions based on hard facts. In the debate over European unity, arguments that essentialize national identity are heard frequently. Geert Hofstede, a Dutch academic, questions the future stability of the EU and argues that Europeans remain “inevitably” divided by their history: “countries have remained separated precisely because there existed

Introduction

7

fundamental differences in thinking and feeling between them” (Hofsted quoted in Marshall 1996, p. 24). It is for him a question of “mental programming.” Niels G. Noorderhaven, director of the Institute for Research on Intercultural Cooperation in Maastricht, warns, “… if you try to deny [cultural differences], then the trouble really begins” (Marshall 1996, p. 24). Perhaps not surprisingly, some national leaders might tend to agree. Margaret Thatcher at a seminar of former world leaders in Colorado, in expressing apprehension at a unified Germany in the EU, declared, “Her [Germany’s] natural character is to dominate. There’s something in this I still fear” (quoted in Marshall 1996, p. 24). Some analysts have warned of dire consequences of European unity. Invoking Durkheim’s (1926) fear of social disintegration and Lifton’s (1979) concern for the human need for symbols, Hazani (1999, p. 2) sees the EU as part of a globalization project whose effect is to “desymbolize” human life. The result of this deprivation of familiar symbols, he believes, would be humans “reduced to an agony of ‘lifeless life,’ from which they attempt to extricate themselves in a variety of ways – most of them harmful.” Hudson (2000, p. 4) warns of a borderless Europe “without the certainties of belonging [that] might as easily produce a fractured self and intolerant and violent reactions to difference.” In a similar vein, Sampson (1971, p. 26) argues that attempts to bring unity to Europe have brought “not unity but a fragmentation verging on near-total self-destruction.” Not all analysts are quite as downbeat about how Europeans are faring with greater and greater unity. Some are more or less optimistic about the prospect for citizen support of a fully-formed EU (Bailey 1992; Miall 1996), although often admitting that the contours of an emerging identity are hard to define. Nevertheless, Smith sees Europeans today “groping in some confusion toward a new type of social order, yet are afraid to let go of the old” (1992, p. 56). National cultures are the basic stuff of which new identities are being constructed in Europe, and the process of bypassing them is seen as problematic: “established cultures,” says Smith, “are essentially antithetical to the development of a cosmopolitan culture, which poses problems for a European identity” (1992, p. 55). It is this question of the problem posed by existing cultural forms for a new identity in Europe that the studies in this volume seek to address. The convergence of all these developments provides an urgency to studies of identity formation and change: the effect of global forces that undermine national state authority and divide citizen loyalties, the rise of extreme right- and left-wing groups in the heart of liberal western democracies, and the seeming ease with which political leaders of all stripes, mainstream or not, can manipulate and gain consent of a populace to carry out nationalist agendas. As will be shown in this volume of studies, in particular in Europe, the home of the nation-state and the scene of countless nationalist-based wars, study of the subjective attachments people have to their political institutions is of critical importance. There is a need to explore whether those attachments are primarily and/or exclusively to national, subnational, supranational or other (possibly even previously unarticulated or unimagined) institutional forms. Work of this type might even question the very idea of a dominant national identity.

8 Richard Robyn While the academic literature on the EU has come rather recently to the entire notion of identity change (Smith, 1991), interest in the EU as an institution and in the larger integration movement has come together with social scientific focus on the politics of identity (Connolly 1991; Laffan 1996) to make European identity a “burning political issue” today (Delanty 1995, p. vii). As Shore (1998, p. 48) puts it, questions of “European identity have come to dominate the political agenda in Europe, questions that once were subjects of esoteric interest.” In attempting to answer these questions, however, the EU literature is distinctly unhelpful. The problems we have in this regard are of at least three types, two that are primarily methodological in nature and one that is more philosophical. First, field data in EU research is traditionally of a macro type, broad-based quantitative studies which deal with hundreds and even thousands of people. These surveys can provide much-needed information and can be very useful to understanding how Europeans think about the EU. Indeed, the studies in this volume refer often to the leading survey data in this field, Eurobarometer. But researchers are only beginning to use more individual-level analyses, although these too are few and far between. This new trend will be discussed in a later section on research in social psychology. The second problem is that there seems to be no research on forms of attachment. The inquiry in this case would go beyond whether French people are, or are not, forming attachments to this emergent political institution, and focus more on the particulars of those attachments, and especially on the question of how they may be grouping together in any describable ways. In simple yes/no questions in broadbased polls such as those of Eurobarometer, this is too easily missed. Respondents might for example agree that the EU is a good thing, but only under certain circumstances. They might thus be positively inclined if the evolution towards the EU were to be slower for example, or would include more or less attention to certain aspects of social, economic or security policy. Polling data may miss these nuances, and simply show general agreement or disagreement. And yet these subtle nuances are the gist of thought, and can be critical to how citizens ultimately express their opinion in elections. If that support does not seem deep, as the French referendum of 1992 seemed to suggest, commentators might too easily suppose that this is due to citizen unwillingness to try something new, something that is not “natural” to them. The final problem in the debate on national versus supranational identities is that the national form is usually seen as the norm and a European identity is measured against it. Commentators assume a weakness of a European identity because they assume it should have the same basic characteristics as a national counterpart. Thus, surveys such as Eurobarometer typically ask respondents if they feel more national or European oriented. But the differences between the two forms of identity cannot be lightly dismissed. A European identity, for example, cannot be based on any one language, as most national identities are. A European identity is also not based on any clear borders, a capital, or a preexisting state with long-held symbols and institutions. A European identity is not necessarily created in conflict with a national identity, as we have seen in

Introduction

9

the EU’s careful attempts to acknowledge member state identities, as this comment attests: Europeans have been capable of inventing their own responses to a problem common to the whole world: how to keep one’s cultural identity and at the same time adjust to the modern world, i.e., the technological revolution. In a way, building Europe is being able to find one’s own direction, something, I feel, that is no longer possible at the national level. (Vignon 1997, p. 11) Because of the perceived lack of attention to identity matters, psychologists have issued a challenge (Breakwell and Lyons 1996) to the field to assess how changing identities have influenced monumental changes in Europe and to examine whether existing theories and methodologies are adequate to this task. These researchers and others (MacDonald 1993; Wilson and Smith 1993) have noted that there has been relatively little research on changing European conceptions of identity in the context of the European Union, and have called for more research and multiple methods to study this complex phenomenon. The project reported on in this volume is, in part, a response to that call, offering Q methodology in a cross-cultural context as an underutilized but potentially valuable tool to help in analyses of identity.

Forms of identification with the EU Despite this lack of attention to identity matters, one can still locate some helpful lines of inquiry that can provide new ways of thinking about the problem. One promising avenue is to draw from the theoretical literature on the EU that comments on possible ways to view the integration process itself. Examining the debate over how the integration process works could help to see how allegiances are formed and attitudes toward the process develop. In this regard, one of the more perceptive and influential observers of the EU in its various forms, Charles Pentland (1973), in examining the various theoretical positions on integration in Europe, described two as predominant: the functionalist (a primarily economically-derived term that has later been better labeled as supranationalist in the EU literature) and the pluralist. These two theoretical positions with regards to the EU will be used in these studies (joined with an opposing nationalist view of European integration not analyzed by Pentland, all discussed in more detail in “Methodology” below) as forms of possible attachment to or detachment from the EU. According to Pentland, functionalists, or supranationalists, subscribe to the belief that “the modern technology of communications, industry and warfare, as well as the growth of economic, ecological and social problems on a regional or global scale, present irresistible pressures toward international cooperation and ultimate political unity” (p. 64). Modern pressures will inevitably compel people to bypass the nation-state and form a “new political community” (Haas 1958,

10 Richard Robyn p. 16). Neither Pentland nor Haas speculated on what this new political community might be, although the expectation was that it would happen in Europe and would largely involve people who generally see the practical value of a supranational state and the obsolescence of the nation-state. It would likely happen sooner rather than later because of “real world” pressures primarily from the global economy and technological change. Pluralists, on the other hand, would see European integration as a much more deliberate process. States, if they do come together in greater integration, would do so as a “community of states,” characterized by a high level of interaction among nation-states which essentially maintain their sovereignty. While not necessarily opposed to a supranational government emerging as a result of this interaction, pluralists tend at the same time to be skeptical of the idea of this government acting independently of the will of the constituent states. A pluralist reaffirms the nation-states as the bases of international life and envisages the emergence of an international community through improvement of the ways in which they regulate their relationship with each other. The advocates of this view find valuable many of those characteristics of the international system which, according to other theorists, are the prime candidates for elimination. (Pentland 1973, p. 29) A comment from British Prime Minister Tony Blair might exemplify best how a pluralist would see identity issues: On the question of how we run our education and health systems, welfare state, personal taxation, matters affecting our culture and identity, I say: “be proud of our diversity and let subsidiarity rule.” (Tony Blair quoted in Eurocom 1998b, p. 3) Pluralists would see a natural limiting factor to political integration – namely, “a significant but persistent core of national identity in each state, in whose service governments may feel obliged to act in ways unproductive for integration” (Pentland 1973, p. 47). Pluralists might see the nation-state as a more “natural” fit to human needs, but might be open to considering ways in which it no longer fits those needs. In the chapter on methodology which follows, it will be explained how these two different ways of thinking about the EU – the supranationalist and the pluralist – were used, along with a clearly different nationalist approach, as the bases for the hypothetical forms of attachment in these studies. These forms, thus derived directly from the EU literature, were then carried out into the field to see if they describe adequately the way Europeans are thinking about the issue.

Introduction

11

A multinational study of national identity in Europe: overview of the project and findings This seven-nation study of national and supranational identity in Europe in the context of the European Union was begun in 1998 in France but conducted primarily in all seven during the spring and summer of 2001. The intent was to investigate the nexus of national and supranational identity construction, utilizing the intensive subjective analysis Q methodology. To achieve optimum cross-cultural comparisons, study instruments were all uniformly constructed across the cultural spectrum but translated for each locale. Details about the methodology will be found in the next chapter, and the findings for each country are found in their separate chapters that follow. In this section of the introduction, only general comments will be made on the overall findings of the studies as a group. In general, and as might be expected, reactions to the construction of the EU vary across the different cultures in interesting ways particular to each. German supporters or detractors of European integration do not see it quite the same as their Danish counterparts, and so on. But the reactions vary only within certain parameters and do not shatter into thousands of idiosyncratic forms. Those parameters have been established by the general discourse that surrounds the phenomenon of integration and that emanates primarily from Brussels. In country after country, participants in these studies grouped themselves into surprisingly few clusters of opinion: no fewer than four but no more than five groups in each country, with the predominate number being four groups. It should be noted that in Q studies (the method will be explained in the next chapter), because of the small-n nature of the methodology, more groupings of opinion might be found in different samplings from other parts of a population at large, although it likely would not be many more. Also, no fewer groupings would be found than occurred in the studies. The first finding of significance of this project, therefore, is that these groupings varied at all in these different cultural settings. This departs significantly from the expectations we might have from the literature, as we have just seen in the work of Pentland, in which only the two positions are described: the supranationalist and the pluralist. In each of the studies reported on here, variations on these positions are described; in no study does the exact groupings of thought occur that we might expect from Pentland. Another significant result that emerges from these studies is the difficulty in finding nationalists in Europe whose opinion in depth corresponds even roughly with the coherent philosophy of nationalism described in the literature (see Smith 1983, described in more detail below in the chapter on methodology). While nationalists of varied stripes were certainly found in these different countries, the various components of thought that we expect to see in a coherent nationalist doctrine are rarely exhibited in any particular persons or groups. This difficulty in finding classic nationalists might be because of a phenomenon that several researchers comment upon in their chapters (specifically, the studies

12 Richard Robyn in France, Germany and the Netherlands), that of participants hiding their true feelings from the researchers out of shame of being politically incorrect. For example, in the chapter on the French study, it is speculated that nationalist thought in France has “gone underground.” Or this phenomenon of scarcity of classic nationalists may be because nationalist thought has been undermined by several generations of gradual but steady European integration. This seems at least as plausible an explanation. For example, one of the more nationalist-oriented expressions occurred in only one grouping in England that Una McCormack labels “Besieged Nationalist” – besieged because of the defensive nature of the opinion expressed. This English grouping was the only cluster that even remotely approached the strong nationalist factor that emerged in France, which itself was less a separate factor of opinion as it was defined itself in opposition to supranationalist expression. Perhaps the underpinnings of classical nationalist doctrine is changing in Europe. There is a remarkable reservoir of support within all of these countries for the European Union, at least in the general sense of feeling the need for the organization. There is, on the other hand, much less support for specific contours of a European identity. Many Europeans may be predisposed towards Europe, but may not think of themselves at all as Europeans. It should be noted that these studies did not try to flesh out these contours, and simply left the issue aside in pursuit of more general feelings of affiliation to identities. There is a great deal of national pride in each of the countries, with the possible exception of Germany. Because there is also such significant support for European integration across much of the political spectrum in these countries, this suggests that Europeans are capable of multiple identities, and that there is a good deal of support for the concept – however unconscious – of separating political from cultural identity. In studies of this kind, it is tempting to examine the data with an eye to finding those Europeans who are “most nationalist” or “least supranationalist.” This reading from statistical data would be, however, the typical aim of large-scale survey research that differs in kind, if not in principle, from these smaller-scale intensively subjective studies. Nonetheless, it is argued here that it may be possible to compare across cultures, if the research design is constructed to accommodate this. We argue that it is possible in this multinational project. That is because these studies all start from roughly the same vantage point: i.e., on the one hand, reacting to the same continentwide European discourse that comes from Brussels and on the other to the basic philosophical underpinnings of nationalist thought that in principle all people live with in their daily lives. Here, the general approach would be along the lines pursued by Dryzek and Holmes (2002, p. 21) in which the comparisons across cultures would have to be expressed in words rather than statistics. If such cross-cultural comparison is valid in Q studies, then French and Danish participants who expressed supranationalist affiliation exhibited this in the most purely supranationalist orientation among all participants. By the same token, those in Britain and Germany expressed their affiliation to supranational identity

Introduction

13

in the most mixed form. In other words, these participants seemed less willing to commit to this form of affiliation, and more mixed their expression with aspects of pluralist or even nationalist thought. While this may not be so strange a finding for British participants, coming from a country that is notoriously Euroskeptic, it is rather surprising for Germans. As for comparing nationalist expression across the cultures, it has already been noted that it was hard to find a nationalist as defined in the literature. Nonetheless, those that did express nationalist leanings were more purely defined in England, while those expressing mixed feelings about their national affiliation were more pronounced in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. If the supranationalists and nationalists take up the extreme ends of a continuum of opinion with regards to European and national identity, then the large middle ground represents pluralism. This pluralist sentiment would express some acceptance of the need for European integration, but at the same time would hold affiliation – more or less strongly expressed – to the nation-state system and the need for diversity of cultural expression, at least on the national level. This level of acceptance of European integration differs widely across the countries, from optimistic in France and England, to more pragmatic in Denmark, to the most pessimistic in Germany. In some ways, the large number of “pluralists” in these studies represent the most interesting groupings for those committed to both European and anti-European forces in politics: the vast ground out of which they could draw for their supporters. These pluralists represent those less committed to political stances on either end of the spectrum, but perhaps amenable to change under certain circumstances and with convincing appeals. One last finding should be mentioned which pertains especially to Northern Ireland. Conventional wisdom has it that only two identities of real significance exist in that benighted land: Irish Catholic nationalist and British Protestant unionist. In his study, John Barry found that in fact several distinct identities exist, and that people express a range of opinions about personal affiliations with political and cultural institutions, not simply the bipolar views we have come to expect. And, in a finding of potentially great significance to those pursuing peace across political divides there, one of those groups expresses an emerging Northern Irish identity that is in contradistinction to both the nationalist and unionist. This new identity, which looks to the cultural commonalities among residents of Northern Ireland rather than connections outside the land which characterize the nationalist and unionist perspectives, could be the nucleus of opinion that could transform divisive politics there.

Outline of this book In sum, the studies that will be presented in this volume, through use of a focused methodology, will consider various European perceptions of the EU to examine subjective conceptions of national identity in the context of a rapidly changing European polity. The goal is to uncover the forms and relative intensity of

14 Richard Robyn attachment that Europeans feel toward their evolving national and non-national political institutions. A fundamental research issue that is raised in these analyses is whether the hold of national identity on Europeans’ psyches is so dominant as to hinder significantly any formation of non-national identities. The overall thrust of this analysis can be described as roughly following that recommended by Wintle (1996, p. 18): “The emphasis in any model must be on two things: the reciprocal inter-reaction between the imposition of unity by the state on the one hand, and the acceptance and conditioning of that unity by (increasing) numbers of the state’s subjects on the other.” The “state” in these cases will be either the separate nation-states or the EU. A research design to approach the topic will be presented in some detail in Chapter 2. The general reader, interested more in results and the country studies, will be excused to skip this chapter. But for the more engaged reader, some explanation of the methodology will be in order and may be of real interest. It is argued here that Q methodology, supplemented by in-depth interviews, is a method that can best complement previous research and add to the literature. Results of each country study are presented alphabetically by country in subsequent chapters. It will be noted that Northern Ireland is included as a separate chapter. This is because of the complex and interesting differences it presents for identity questions and because of the research foci of the authors, Una McCormack and John Barry. Finally, a concluding chapter will address the implications of the research for political analyses and the possibilities for future European political configurations. This research project is designed to contribute to several literatures. These would include international relations theory, perhaps especially in recent efforts to bring culture, identity (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996), ideas (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998) and more individual-level analyses into international relations; to the EU literature to add to a growing subliterature on identity matters; to studies of nationalism, introducing a new and yet little-addressed topic of the dominance of national identity in contemporary society; and to social psychology, in response to recent calls for newer methodologies to get at notoriously elusive questions of identity.

References Allot, P. 1992. “How to Cross the EC Pain Barrier,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, pp. 2, 4. Anderson, Benedict. 1990. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edn. London: Verso. Bailey, Joe (ed.) 1992. Social Europe. New York: Longman. Breakwell, Glynis M. and Evanthia Lyons (eds). 1996. Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Chryssochoou, Xenia. 1996. “How Group Membership is Formed: Self Categorization or Group Beliefs? The Construction of a European Identity in France and Greece,” in Glynis M. Breakwell and Evanthia Lyons (eds), Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Connolly, William E. 1991. Identity/Difference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. de Rougement, Dennis. 1966. The Idea of Europe. New York: Macmillan.

Introduction

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Delanty, Gerard. 1995. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. New York: St Martin’s Press. Drozdiak, William. 1998. “German Far Right Captures Mood That Begins to Affect Other Parties,” International Herald Tribune, July 6, p.10. Dryzek, John and Leslie Holmes. 2002. Post-Communist Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Durkheim, Émile. 1926. De la division du travail social. Paris: F. Alcan. Einhorn, Barbara, Mary Kaldor and Zdenek Kavan (eds). 1996. Citizenship and Democratic Control in Contemporary Europe. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. Eurocom. 1998. March, 10(3), p. 2. Gillingham, John. 1991. Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hazani, Moshe. 1999. “A Brave, New Globe?” Presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, July, Amsterdam. Hudson, Ray. 2000. “The Painful Politics of Cultural Difference,” The Independent, January 7, p. 3. Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Thomas Diez and Sabine Jung. 1998. “Which Europe? Conflicting Models of a Legitimate Political Order,” European Journal of International Relations, 4, pp. 409–46. Kraft, Dina. 1998. “American Converts to Judaism Struggle for Citizenship in Israel,” Akron Beacon-Journal, July 30, p. 2. Laffan, Brigid. 1996. “The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), pp. 81–123. Lapid, Yosef, and Friedrich Kratochwil (eds). 1996. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Leonard, Mark. 1998. Making Europe Popular: The Search for European Identity. London: Demos. Lifton, Robert J. 1979. The Broken Connection. New York: Basic Books. Macdonald, Sharon (ed.). 1993. Inside European Identities. Oxford: Berg. Marshall, Tyler. 1996. “The Untied States of Europe,” Los Angeles Times, May 28, p. 25. McNeil, Donald G. 2000. “Europeans Move Against Austrians on Nativist Party,” New York Times, February 1, p. 5. Miall, Hugh. 1996. “Wider Europe, Fortress Europe, Fragmented Europe?,” in Hugh Miall (ed.), Redefining Europe. New York: Pinter. Pentland, Charles. 1973. International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber and Faber. Regehr, Ernie. 1993. War After the Cold War: Shaping a Canadian Response. Project Plowshares Working Paper 93-3. Waterloo, Ontario: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel College. Robinson, Eugene. 1998. “An Immigration Quandry: The Netherlands Grapples With Its Identity,” International Herald Tribune, July 7. Sampson, Anthony. 1971. The New Europeans. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Seward, Deborah. 2000. “Fear of Foreigners Fuels Far Right,” Cleveland Plain-Dealer, February 11, p. 4. Shore, Chris. 1998. “The Myth of a Euro-Indentity,” Eurovisions, 13, pp. 48–50. Smith, Anthony D. 1983. Theories of Nationalism, 2nd edn. New York: Holmes and Meier.

16 Richard Robyn —— 1990. “Towards a Global Culture?,” in Anthony D. Smith (ed.), Theory, Culture and Society. London: Sage. —— 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. —— 1992. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,” International Affairs, 68(2), pp. 55–76. —— 1995. “The Nations of Europe after the Cold War,” in Jack Hayward and Edward C. Page (eds), Governing the New Europe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Sontag, Deborah. 1999. “Debate in Israel: Jewish State or Now a Multicultural State?” New York Times, December 1, p. 9. Suter, Keith D. 1998. “Unconventional Leaders Rise on a Wave of Anger,” International Herald Tribune, July 3, p. 3. Tilove, Jonathan. 1998. “The New America,” Cleveland Plain-Dealer Sunday Magazine, July 12, p. 10. Vignon, Jerome. 1997. Interview in Carrefours, 7, December, pp. 1, 3. Warner, Denis. 1998. “Australians Need to Halt This Party’s Racist Bandwagon,” International Herald Tribune, July 3, p. 14. Wilson, Thomas M. and M. Estelle Smith. 1993. Cultural Change and the New Europe. Oxford: Westview Press. Wintle, Michael. 1996. “Cultural Identity in Europe: Shared Experience,” in Michael Wintle (ed.), Culture and Identity in Europe. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate.

Methodology

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17

Methodology Richard Robyn

In this chapter the design for this multinational research project will be laid out. First, the underlying philosophical stance of the entire work will be briefly considered, a conceptual framework that draws from the literature but that attempts to close gaps in that literature that may pertain to the issues under study. Then the methodology to be employed in the research will be considered.

Conceptual framework Building on the ideas of Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), Giddens (1985) and others, the overarching stance taken in this study is to conceive of nation-states not as entities of objective reality but as “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983). The project thus builds on social constructivist (Onuf 1989, Berger and Luckmann 1966) arguments to see national identity as constructed and never fixed; that it can be meaningful to persons; that it is constantly reworked from a repertoire of traditions, myths, and representations; and that it can be employed when it makes political sense (Breuilly 1985, p. 382). Furthermore, the emphasis will be primarily on Billig’s (1997, p. 6) conception of banal nationalism: “the ideological habits which enable established nations … to be reproduced.” While Billig describes how nations are reproduced coconstituitively – i.e. both by agent (individuals) and structure (the nation) – he focuses more on that part of the process that involved how nations inculcate citizen habits. The emphasis here, however, is on the inverse: the way that ordinary people in their everyday lives respond to (supra)nationalist discourses and formulate their world views based at least partly on this response. A goal will be to examine how the two entities – the nation and the EU – are thus being reproduced by their citizens. This approach shifts the emphasis of study from objective characteristics of the national states or the EU as a supranational entity, and instead focuses on people themselves and how they conceive of their nation’s existence and reality, how and to what extent that nation may be changing in the face of an encroaching European Union, and whether that is, in the view of the citizen, a good thing.

18 Richard Robyn To a certain extent, the national discourse “out there” in society is about national character, what constitutes a nation. As Stephenson (1967, p. 93) has written, “national character is what a nation is prepared to talk to itself and others about … It is what gives a nation a sense of its own identity.” These studies thus begin with discourses about national and European institutions, and touch upon national character matters, but they end with how people perceive those discourses and whether or not they seem attached to one or more of them. Such an approach necessitates, as Giddens has noted (1985), a strong psychological component to the analysis. Thus, subjective understandings people have of their attachments to political institutions are central to the study. An intensive analytic approach (Brown 1980, pp. 112–14) is utilized in an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of participants’ views. An approach based securely on subjective reality would help to ground the analysis in a way that previous theoretical literature on nationalist practices tends not to be (Terhune 1964; Worchel 1997). In that sense, this study joins a growing body of literature on the impact on the self of events of culture-wide significance (Breakwell and Lyons 1996; Wicklund and Oosterwegel 1995; Stryker 1980; Eller 1999). It may be useful to point out that “subjectivity” referred to here is not employed in the sense of an opposition to scientific “objectivity” (or presumed scientific objectivity, [Rosaldo 1994]), but in the sense of individual, “self-referent notions” (Stephenson 1953, p. 248). This has the sense of viewing the world through one’s own mind, of individual opinion as a valid object of study. More about the methodology employed in this study and its basis in the scientific study of subjectivity is presented below in the methodology section. Following Pentland (see earlier discussion in Chapter 1), this project made use of at least two theoretical positions – the supranationalist and the pluralist – as bases for two possible forms of attachment to the EU. In addition, following the nationalist literature, a third and essentially opposing factor – the nationalist – was posited and investigated. Basically, the project then examined whether European participants in this study would connect with these forms of affiliation, or would exhibit different ones. More on these forms of attachment will be discussed below in this chapter. Social psychological theory, and especially social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1971), is naturally helpful to an analysis whose focus is on personal impressions of political discourse. Thus, following social identity theory (SIT), this analysis did not center on proximate group behavior – i.e. behavior within a group where participants can see and hear each other, but on how grand cultural and political forces influence the individual, and how national/supranational issues affect individual structuring of social identity. SIT advances the notion of identity salience, that people will form and reform their social identity from a repertoire of multiple identities, depending on contextual demands. A focus of the study was on those demands that may provide greater or lesser salience for the participant. Similarly both to SIT and some political scientific analyses, nationality here is conceived as resting in large part on an “us vs. them”

Methodology

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basis, and attempts were made to focus on outgroups that the individual believes to be relevant. In contrast to much of the research in SIT, this project eschewed structured experimentation in artificial settings for data collection, instead attempting to gather data in as naturalistic a setting as possible. This meant operating on site, doing fieldwork at various places around Europe and utilizing methodologies such as Q and interviewing techniques to elicit face-to-face, in-depth comments. It is hoped that a project that is focused on subjectivity will contribute to a more nuanced reading of individual differences than is evident in SIT’s concept of the self (Cinnirella 1996, p. 255). Finally, it may be appropriate at this point, after noting what this study attempts to do, to comment as well on what it does not include. In this study there will be no speculation on the psychological need people have for group attachments. This will be accepted as given and will not be explored in any fundamental way. Rather, emphasis will be on the relative strength of those ties and with which entity at the national or supranational levels people feel more comfortable associating. There will also be no philosophical speculation on the ultimate nature of nationalist sentiment, whether that might be situational or primordial (Richmond 1987; Davis 1997), but rather an acceptance that nationalist feelings are very real and present. The sense people have of their national identity, it is assumed, constitutes a force in itself worthy of study. Finally, this project will not attempt to examine “national character” as such, what characteristics of that character might be, or even whether it exists or not in fact. There will be no speculation on whether or not the participants in the study fit a modal personality (Inkeles 1997) that may be associated with a national character. Instead, as noted previously, the focus will be on how people understand their relation to their nation vis-à-vis the European Union.

Methodology Because the focus of this research is on subjective understandings of political discourse, the methodology employed should necessarily be focused on the individual. To avoid as much as possible the pitfalls of methodological individualism and the confusions of infinite variation, however, the methodology should at the same time attempt to seek out and explain patterns of behavior across individual expression. It should thus bridge the chasm between quantitatively and qualitatively based research. And of course it should be rigorous and adhere to all scientific canons. In answer to all these demanding criteria, the primary research tool used in this project is Q methodology (Brown 1980; McKeown and Thomas 1988; Stephenson 1953), an approach that seeks the orderly examination of human subjectivity. Invented by William Stephenson in the 1930s (Stephenson 1935, 1953), Q methodology involves the rank-ordering of a set of statements (Q sample) by a participant in an array that reflects that person’s overall perspective relative to

20 Richard Robyn aspects of discourse expressed in society on a particular topic. As Stephenson (1978) observed, there is a “shared communicability” in society on most topics, and one can locate a “concourse” of statements that approximates this. Then, by a process of “focalizing attention,” a participant will arrange these statements to reflect his/her subjective structure relative to the topic in question (Stephenson 1978, p. 28). Factor analysis of the results from all participants in a study will then bring operant factors to the surface. In this way, Q attempts to bring a structured and statistically relevant analysis to the data. The goal of a Q study is to reveal common groupings of opinion within a given population on a particular topic. These patterns are revealed through factor analysis, a powerful procedure that aids in finding statistically significant groupings in a mass of seemingly highly diverse opinion. This then allows the researcher to investigate the factors in greater depth than otherwise, to help in describing and interpreting shared perspectives. In the process, Q inverts the traditional procedures of statistical analysis. Often referred to as “R” methodology, traditional quantitative analysis is primarily concerned with correlating opinion with traits such as age or gender across populations, while Q methodology is concerned with correlating patterns within persons (McCormack 1998, p. 5).1 Stephenson argued that subjectivity is an actual event that can be measured with great accuracy through subjective behavior analysis (Brown 1999) and that Q methodology could be a powerful tool in this approach. For Stephenson, a person’s opinion is an object worthy of study and forms the basis of his or her subjectivity. Aided by Kantor’s tenets on what constitutes psychological events (1938, 1959) and interbehavioral psychology (1959), Stephenson (1953; 1983, pp. 112–13) attempted to establish the study of subjectivity as a natural science and thus rescue it from a sort of dustbin to which it had been assigned by much of behavioral psychology primarily because of concerns over mentalism (Brown 1999). As Stephenson (1983, p. 122) wrote: Subjectivity is all about us in every branch of human knowledge – in religion, politics, economics, literature, science, education, philosophy. Authorities speak with its tongue, and [yet] deny any theoretical and methodological advances that can put subjectivity in line with the universality of science. Objectivity, everyone believes, belongs to the “world outside.” The denial of a place for science in the “world inside,” our subjectivity, is a matter for the ultimate shame of modern science. Taking Kantor’s (1959, p. 16) definition of interbehavior, the “behavior of specific individuals in relation to concrete objects and events,” Brown posits further (1999, p. 43) a “naturalistic subjectivity” in which a researcher would be drawn to study a person’s “historical relationship to the political information provided and to its meaning when viewed subjectively.”

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21

This does not mean that the approach can reveal the inner workings of the mind, or that a link can be discovered between thought and action. There is a lively debate in the psychological literature over the validity of research into internal causal variables, with the behaviorist view that there are none (Skinner 1953; Wolf 1978). Similarly, Stephenson (1953, pp. 86–100) did not claim that the methodology says anything specific about internal thoughts or internal causal variables (Brown 1999; Febbraro 1995). In any event, this study will steer clear of this debate in simply claiming along with Stephenson that subjectivity is behavior and worthy of study, and that Q methodology is a valid and valuable tool in that effort. Since opinion can be revealed through Q analysis, it can be studied, measured and compared with others’ opinions. As long as this is done with appropriate operations, this can form the basis of a scientific study of subjectivity. Q methodology has been used primarily in psychology (Stephenson 1987) but has had broad application in fields as disparate as mass communication (Stephenson 1967), phenomenology (Brown 1994; Delprato and Knapp 1994), education (Stone 1996), public administration and management (Brown et al.1999) and health care (Stainton Rogers 1991), among others. It has even been used to study music (Maxwell 1999) and humor. The literature of Q methodology is extensive (Brown 1968, 1977) and may now exceed 2500 entries (Brown 2000). The methodology has had a valued place in political scientific research (Brown 1980; Dryzek 1990, 1996, 2002). It has been shown to be especially useful in gauging whether a particular political discourse is resonating within a population, and whether it is resonating in ways that theorists and/or general commentators suppose. Both of these characteristic strengths of Q were especially helpful for this study where the thrust was to learn more about how Europeans attach more with their nation or the European Union, and whether those affiliations might be how analysts and commentators suppose them to be. For a similar example of how Q has been useful in this way, Dryzek (1997) employed it to show that the overarching consensus on liberal democracy traditionally thought to exist in the United States is wrong. Instead, in his study he found that there are other operant patterns of subjectivity that give rise potentially to different resonant discourses on democracy in American society. Noting Q’s power in thus revealing different discourses, DeLeon and Steelman (1999) have called for its use in public policy studies in general to aid especially in fleshing out varieties of opinions on controversial policy issues. While there have been numerous Q studies on identity (see for example Brown 1984; Davis 1997; Goldman and Emke 1991; Marshall 1991; Wong and Sung 1998), and recent work using Q in Eastern Europe to study civic culture (Klicperová 1999), attitudes towards economic liberalism (De Holczer 1989) and democracy (Dryzek 1997; Dryzek and Holmes 2002), the technique has only recently (Haesly 2001) been used to examine identity change in the context of the European Union. These studies thus join with this pioneering effort in this regard. It is hoped that the procedures and results, as noted previously, will demonstrate the usefulness of Q to this important issue area.

22 Richard Robyn The concourse For Q methodology, the concourse represents an important part of the basic phenomenon of interest for study. Taken from all that is spoken or written on a particular topic, the concourse could be a huge number of statements, perhaps on the order of several thousand. Stephenson (1978, p. 25) in fact posits that the number is theoretically infinite and, in what he called the “law of the concourse,” that it is growing all the time (1983, p. 75). The statements are reduced using Fisherian design (Stephenson 1953, pp. 101–13) to a manageable number for a Q sample to be constructed. It is this smaller number of statements of the Q sample that is then administered to participants in the study. More is presented below on the particular Q sample for these studies following these more general comments on the properties of a concourse. A concourse has several empirical properties (Stephenson 1983, pp. 75–6). Since statements are taken from general public discourse, they should all be understood by the participants. But they may be understood differently by each of the participants, even apprehended differently by the same participant at different times of life, an important and telling property. The statements reflect something of the general culture and as such should reflect understandings that people have about an aspect of that culture. In Q methodology, the basic phenomenon worthy of study is the “whole response” (Brown 1980, p. 173), or the viewpoint of a person with respect to the topic in question. The concourse is therefore critical in helping to elicit a person’s response to a topic. The goal in collecting the statements from the concourse for the Q sample is representativeness, to present a fair rendering of a particular discourse on the topic in question. In these studies, the concourse reflects expressions of national and transnational sentiment. The intent was to reveal salient factors within the concourse on national and European Union identity and the degrees of diversity within a community regarding attachment to the nation and/or to a supranational entity. An important distinction thus needs to be drawn on the one hand between what can be described or what has been said by commentators about a nation or a supranational entity, and on the other hand what people think about those descriptions or statements, and whether and to what extent there is agreement with them. An individual’s picking and choosing a way through a sample of statements, finding those that s/he agrees or disagrees with, could be conceived as that individual’s attempt to establish an identity on the particular issue in question. It is a way to work out a positive distinctiveness with regards to a topic, or a viewpoint that would distinguish that person from another, which is a critical part of establishing a person’s social identity (Cinnirella 1996, pp. 253–4). The concourse for this project was first collected in 1998 for dissertation work in France by the editor of this volume. Subsequent fieldwork was carried out in France using this concourse. Following the successful completion and defense of the dissertation (Robyn 2000), a cohort of researchers was gathered to then translate this concourse into the several languages and different cultures for this seven-

Methodology

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nation project. More about this translation process and problems encountered will be addressed below. The concourse for the original French study was collected from a variety of sources: books, journal articles, newspapers, and statements by interviewees. Some statements were located in the theoretical literature on nationalism and the EU, some from mainstream discourse and the popular press, some drawn out of and modified from the social psychological literature concerning aspects of motivation, and some from comments elicited in administering Q sorts to European participants. All statements were thus either derived from the literature or otherwise indigenous to the population, and related to concepts of national and supranational identity formation. The statements for this French study are listed in Appendix 1; in this section of the study, only certain ones are excerpted for illustrative purposes. The Q statements for each of the country studies are appended at the end of the appropriate chapter. It is pertinent to note here that, other than the forms of attachment described below, which themselves were advanced to articulate intellectual positions relative to national and integration theory, there is a dearth of explicit description in the literature on forms of European attachment to national versus supranational identity. This points again to a genuine need in the literature for studies of this kind. Reiterating the EU discussion in the previous chapter, Pentland (1973) described two theoretical positions on European integration as predominant: the supranationalist and the pluralist. Supranationalists, believing that modern technology and social problems on an international scale compel transnational cooperation and perhaps even possible political unity, are skeptical of the ultimate capacity of the nation-state to deal with the complexities of modern life. They may have been profoundly affected by the past performance of the nation-state, particularly its implication in atrocities in European history. Individuals who hold these views would likely agree with the following statements from the concourse: The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. (From the autobiography of Jean Monnet, an architect of the early forms of the European Union) European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. (From a speech by Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission) National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. (From an interview) The nation-state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty … It is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. (From an article by David Mitrany, an early proponent of supranational government)

24 Richard Robyn I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of France. (Derived from the identity literature) I am very attached to Europe as a whole. (Derived from the identity literature) Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities. (Elizabeth Meehan, Citizenship and the European Community, p. 5) In contrast to supranationalists, pluralists might have a greater appreciation for the diversity of national cultures, and the inevitable need for a national state to protect and defend that culture. They might see European integration as a much more deliberate process of interaction, debate and discussion among nations whose sovereignties might be surrendered only under the most critical circumstances. According to pluralists, any emergent supranational government would have to be run at the behest of the member states. Along with nationalists, to be described below, pluralists see a natural limiting factor to political integration: “a significant but persistent core of national identity in each state, in whose service governments may feel obliged to act in ways unproductive for integration” (Pentland 1973, p. 47). Pluralists therefore may have a mix of national and supranational identity tendencies but allied strongly to neither. In the sample of statements, the following are representative of the pluralist viewpoint: I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. (From a speech on the future of Europe by former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher) Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. (From the same speech by Margaret Thatcher) Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe … it is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. (Jean Monnet, from his autobiography, and in his later period of more pluralist leanings) European countries are diverse, but it is possible for a European Union to work. (From an interview) Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. (From an interview)

Methodology

25

Both the supranationalist and the pluralist positions above share an interest in and a certain commitment to political integration in one form or another. The significant differences between the two relate to the speed and inevitability of the process, and the character of the resulting governance structure. What is not investigated in the analysis so far is a view diametrically opposing both. That view would be the nationalist. More than simply skeptical of supranational governance, the nationalist would be opposed to it. Like Bauer (1924, p. 135), the nationalist would have a belief in a nationally shared “community of fate,” a common history of glory and defeat that would tie together a people within a certain bounded territory into a “community of character.” Like Montesquieu and Herder, the nationalist would believe explicitly in the idea of a national culture, and accept that it differs from any other culture. This fundamental incommensurability would inevitably thwart true political union, not simply slow it down or change in some way its character, as a pluralist might argue. Drawing on the nationalist literature from Montesquieu and Herder to Bauer and Kohn, Smith (1983, p. 21) derived seven propositions from the “core nationalist doctrine”: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Humanity is naturally divided into nations. Each nation has its peculiar character. The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity. For freedom and self-realization, men must identify with a nation. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state.

Along with several of these core propositions, other statements of nationalist character were collected. Thus, the following statements in the concourse are representative of the nationalist position: Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters. (From Smith, above) Globalization means the death of my national culture. (From an interview) I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. (From a speech by Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the rightwing Front National in France) Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. (Smith) The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France. (Slogan of a right-wing political group in France on national origins)

26 Richard Robyn The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. (Constructed by the author from political discourse on European Union matters) European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work. (Interview) The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. (Declaration of the Rights of Man, Article III) France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world. (From the autobiography of Charles de Gaulle) Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. (Constructed by author from political discourse on European Union matters) The nationalist/pluralist/supranationalist sentiment is thus displayed schematically in the Q sample structure in Table 2.1. The Q sample structure is incorporated in the full listing of the Q statements found in the appendix to the French chapter. Following the successful administration of these statements in the French study and once the decision was made to attempt a cross-cultural multinational study, the task was to construct Q samples for each of the countries under study. This was done by the authors of each of the chapters in this book. In most cases, simply translating the statements directly posed no special linguistic problem. But for several of the statements – especially numbers 5, 15, 24 and 27 – the meanings were so directly connected to the French experience that alternative statements needed to be found that would convey the same meaning to persons of that country. Using their intimate knowledge of the cultures in question (for most of them their native cultures), the researchers then found cultural equivalents for these statements. Some may object to the cross-cultural nature of this project, arguing that Q is so finely tuned to the particular culture that it cannot be safely carried out of that context. In their recent study on societies in transition to democracy, for example, Dryzek and Holmes (2002) argue as much, insisting in their multinational studies that their researchers in the field in effect construct culture-specific Q samples.

Table 2.1 Q sample structure for (supra)national identity study Main effect

Levels

N

Identity

Nationalist Pluralist Supranationalist

12 12 12

Methodology

27

However, we feel on safe ground in arguing that, with the few statements especially reconstructed as mentioned above, the rest of our statements can cross the cultures represented in our studies. Our approach can accommodate this because of the subject matter. The intent of the entire European integration project, after all, is to establish some commonalities among Europeans. These commonalities may involve basic principles of federalism or the dynamics of European integration, which can be discussed with the same statements across cultures because a European-wide discourse is taking place on these issues. Or the commonalities may simply be to establish and react to the EU as one common source of governance. At the other end of the spectrum in question, the national, the notion of national identity may have particularities for each nation but has as well universal principles, as Smith has pointed out. In any event, the Q samples in these studies provide less a theoretical construct than a departure point for further exploration of issues of subjective impressions of national and supranational identity. The factors that would eventually emerge from these investigations, as described in each of the country chapters that follow, may or may not reflect the theoretical constructs described above, and might reveal different positions relative to the question under study. Since this did in fact occur, and four or more factors were revealed for most of the countries, rather than the three posited in the literature, the task was then to examine those various factors that did in fact emerge, to gauge whether they had significant strength, to describe them, and finally to speculate about whether people have actually changed with respect to the theoretical issues Pentland laid out. It could well be asked at this point how it is that any other forms of identity could emerge if only the statements from these three forms were utilized in the concourse. Perhaps there is a position that would not be represented by these statements. In response to this question, it should first be remembered that only these three possible identities have been posited in the literature, and thus the study to some extent is limited by the limited discourse that has been theorized on this topic. People are similarly confined in the choices they can make about any topic from the discourses available to them in society. Second, the question misunderstands the potential variety of opinion that Q allows participants. Q principles and procedures permit great variability in individual attitudes. The participant is not making unconnected judgments about a series of statements, but is asked to weigh the response to a statement in conjunction with other statements. In this way the sorted Q sample is a picture of identity in which statements are woven into a larger mosaic. Each person was thus asked implicitly to compare each of the N=36 statements with the other, resulting in (N/2)(N – 1) = 630 different possible judgment evaluations. In addition, in simply separating out three piles of statements (agree, disagree or neutral), the way that a participant normally begins a Q sort, the variety potential is on the order of 3.384731763 × 1015. Putting this into perspective, with 6 billion people in the world, there are 564,122 times as many ways to separate the 36 statements into only three piles as there are people in the world.

28 Richard Robyn This would seem to indicate in itself plenty of opportunity for individual variability in the sorting process. But participants do not stop at sorting into only three piles, and instead continue to place the statements into an array (described below). Here, even more variability is displayed, for there are 36! = 3.719933267 × 1041 different ways that the statements could be rank-ordered from “agree” to “disagree.” It should be noted here that a Q-array is a modified form of rank ordering in which each statement in a column is not ranked in relation to other statements in that column, but instead in relation to the statements in each of the other columns. This has the effect of reducing the potential for variability noted above, although it will still be quite large. Allowing such latitude in subjective interpretation contributes to the credibility of the factors that emerge in the study. When people have this much opportunity to express individuality but nonetheless ultimately group into distinctive factors, it is strong evidence that that form of discourse resonates in the population. In its remarkable capacity for allowing this kind of individual expression, Q is of “almost subatomic nature” (Stephenson 1983, p. 78) in its focus. It thus responds well to Kantor’s (1978) specificity principle in scientific analysis, which alerts researchers to the huge potential for individual variability in natural phenomena. As Kantor wrote on the specificity principle as applied to psychology, “no two individuals are alike nor perform any type of adjustmental action the same way in recurrent situations” (1978, p. 123). Research in psychology must account for such potential variability. In its attention to specificity, Q is particularly strong in this regard. Yet there is another side to Q as well, its attention to communability; that is, what an individual’s response has in common with responses from others. Even with all this potential for variability, in this study (as in all Q studies) participants grouped themselves together onto a relatively small number of factors. These factors will be described in the chapters that follow. This communability of responses has two key advantages for a Q study: it permits the researcher to more easily describe factors that actually exist in the community and it allows a smaller number of participants to make up a valid population set. If, despite such great potential for individual variability, people actually do fall into relatively small numbers of groups of opinion, then a proportionately smaller number of participants may be used in the population sample. This is another important distinction between R and Q methodologies. Adding more participants will likely not add more factors but simply more persons on each factor, displaying similar patterns of identity. The respondent design helps insure diversity in the population sample, and thus a larger “net” to catch the necessary “fish.” A number of studies attests to the fact that repetitious patterns arise as larger numbers of participants are included in the sample (see Coke and Brown 1976; Dryzek et al. 1989). More about the population sample for this study is presented below. What makes people reduce to such groupings? Why are we not as idiosyncratic in our views as some would have us, or as we ourselves might wish to be at times? Speculating in this way on basic human nature would be beyond the scope of this

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study. It may be enough to say simply that factor analysis proves that it is so. But Stephenson did theorize on this (1983, pp. 93–4) and posited a “law of affectability” in which he argued that groupings in the concourse form by way of “confluences of feeling.” Feeling is a common element running through a factor from one end of it to the other, in such a way that the statements of the Q sample arrange themselves in a perfect order, each statement in its appropriate place, like pieces of a jig-saw puzzle fitted neatly into place. (Stephenson 1983, p. 93) With such a powerful tool to reduce variability to manageable proportions for study, it is no wonder that one scholar (Duijker 1979, p. 18) lauded Q in this way: Human situations are to some extent like snowflakes: They are innumerable, they exhibit a multitude of forms, and above all they are highly perishable. Qmethodology, Stephenson’s great contribution to psychology, was designed to deal with this “infinite variety,” to make it accessible to scientific explanation without distorting it. Procedures In these studies, participants were asked to sort 36 statements that make up the Q sample, 12 each from the three theoretical positions described in Table 2.1, from agree (+4) to disagree (–4), following this instruction in the language of the country: “These are statements made by people concerning national identity and the EU. Sort these statements from those you agree with to those you disagree with.” The point of the exercise was to elicit subjective impressions and as such, there was of course no “correct” manner of sorting the statements. The data gathered were then factor analyzed using PQMethod (Schmolck and Atkinson 1998), a computer software program made available specifically for Q-methodological studies, in order to gauge the emergent factors. Participants were first asked to read over the statements to get a broad impression, then to sort them into three piles – agree, disagree and more or less neutral – before more carefully examining the statements to decide finally how they would fit precisely into the array. Thus, Q is a “forced choice” methodology (see discussion of the forced choice aspect of Q methodology in Brown [1980, pp. 201–3, 288–9] and Stephenson [1953, pp. 59–61]) in which participants are required to choose how to characterize their attitudes about a statement and set it into a general descriptive picture about nationality and supranationality. For example, there are only three spots in the array for those statements that the participant would feel were most characteristic of his/her feelings about the topic. This requires the person to make distinctions that otherwise might not be made in the course of thinking about or discussing a topic.

30 Richard Robyn The remainder of the statements are then set into the array, according to a continuum represented in the Appendixes. When the sorting is finally done, it should be structured as in the continuum, with statements “most disagree with” to the left and those “most agree with” to the right, with the statements more or less “neutral” in the middle. The neutral area in the middle part of the Q sort (0, +1, –1) is reserved for those statements that create conflict for the participant, or about which the person feels less certainty. Far from being an area of less interest to the observer, the more neutral statements can be equally as critical to revealing how the participant feels. These statements can be particularly useful in eliciting discussion, clarifying the meanings of statements, or probing the feelings of the participants. When done, this array is a structured representation of the subjectivity of the participant on the topic of nationality and supranationality. Subjectivity emerges from virtually the beginning of the sorting process as a participant decides how to place the statements, and as the participant and the observer discuss how the statements are placed. The underlying dynamic is that of Stephenson’s “psychological significance” (cited in Brown 1972, pp. 81–4), that people react to these statements in terms of the degree of significance they feel the statements have for them. Especially statements at either end of the array are of greatest salience for the individual, whether in a positive or negative sense. It would be in this part of the structure that individuals would be expressing those sentiments that they would be most attracted to or repelled by, in effect creating visibly their social identity. Those statements in the middle part are of lesser significance, although as stated previously, they can be of great interest in establishing more nuance for the person’s social identity. The P-set Because of the intensive nature of Q Method and because, as we have seen, factors within discourses are relatively few in number, the methodology can be administered to a comparatively (i.e. compared to quantitative procedures) small group of persons. In Q Method parlance, the group of participants in a study is called a population set, or P-set for short. The P-set in the original French study, described in more detail in the appropriate chapter, was comprised of 37 French participants. The other country studies ranged from that to a few more than 40 each. In total, then, more than 300 Europeans participated in the entire project. In a study with the objective to examine how nationalist/supranationalist discourse is resonating in the population, participants needed to be selected on a purposive basis and come from a wide variety of backgrounds and from varied settings. The P-set for the project is represented in Table 2.2. The search was for representativeness in the sample. This is not to be confused with random sampling; breadth and diversity are more important in this case, based on how the participants are likely to exhibit “theoretical saturation” (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Theoretical saturation refers to the point beyond which “no additional data are being found whereby [the researcher] can develop properties

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Table 2.2 P-set structure for (supra)national identity study Main effects

Levels

N

A.

Gender

(a) male

(b) female

2

B.

Age

(c) young

(d) older

2

C.

Class

(e) working

(f) middle

2

D.

Setting

(g) urban

(h) rural

2

ABCD = 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 = 16 combinations

of the category” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p. 61). Beyond this point, research is simply adding more participants to the study and nothing to the theory. As a reminder, in Q methodology, representativeness is as much or more in the Q-sample statements as in the P-set. In effect, what is being sampled are statements from the discourse, and not the persons themselves. Thus the concern in constructing the P-set is simply to cast an effective “fishing net” in an attempt to understand perceptions among a group of people. In Q, one is not searching for concreteness in generalizations to the population in its entirety, or findings based specifically on personal characteristics of the participants. The P-set has then been constructed to be as broad as possible, and yet divided along levels in which one might expect to find significant national identity differences. In these studies, the levels were determined to be: age, gender, socioeconomic class and setting. Older Europeans, who are likely to have experienced World War II and/or its aftermath, might have internalized a deeper attachment to national symbols than younger persons. As we have seen, the European Union has often been characterized as an elite construction based largely on considerations of global economic matters. One might then expect differences in attitudes based on class and professional working status. Because global economic matters tend to impact differentially in urban compared to rural settings, it might be expected that greater support for supranationality might be exhibited among city dwellers. At least one analyst (O’Brien 1993) has found just such a noticeable urban/rural dichotomy over questions of national identity. Interviews with a variety of French participants during the lead-up to the original study suggested differences based on gender as well: French males, it is suggested, many of whom take part in military service and also participate more (at least as spectators) than women in sporting events that often take on nationalist character in Europe, might be expected to exhibit more nationalist leanings. In Table 2.2 it will be noted that there are 16 combinations within each sample. Participants for the studies were selected based on a combination of the four effects listed. Thus, one participant was a young working-class male from an urban setting (aceg), another a young working-class male from a rural setting (aceh), and so

32 Richard Robyn forth for the remainder of the 16 combinations. In general, we aimed for two participants of each type, which would yield a P-set size of N = 32. Setting As the following chapters will show, each country offered its own interesting “living laboratory” for analysis of national/supranational identity issues. A particular country’s history and contemporary relationship with the European Union movement would offer hypotheses for prediction on whether its citizens would have generally favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards a European ideal. These hypotheses would then be tested by the research from the field. To fulfill setting requirements for the P-set, we administered roughly half the Q sorts in urban and half in rural settings. The quality of the data gathered was only enhanced by the fact that nearly all of us live on site in the countries under study and so know the conditions well. The briefest time spent in country was for the original French study, and that was a lengthy three months. Interviews In addition to Q, we relied on in-depth interviews to validate and cross-check observations, and to reduce systematic bias in data collection. This can be critical when studying an issue of such complexity as national identity. It helps to avoid the limitations of observation inherent in qualitative approaches (Patton 1990, pp. 244–5). These limitations include how the observer can affect the study situation, the selective perception of the observer, and the possibility of the participants’ observations being subject to bias, anger, emotional feelings of that day, to recall error, to reactivity to observer, or to self-serving responses. Q sorts were set up with various participants who best fit the P-set criteria. During the Q sorts we asked often detailed questions prompted by how the participants were constructing the sort. Finally, in some cases we could return to do more in-depth interviews with certain participants who seemed best to exemplify factors that emerged in the study, to understand better the factors highlighted from the Q sorts.

Second-order analysis The preceding has described the procedures used in the administration of the Q sorts in each of the countries of these studies. From the data that had been gathered and analyzed, arrays were constructed for each factor from each country. These groupings are then described in the chapters that follow. Once this data had been thoroughly examined in its particulars by each author, then another analysis was performed on all of that data together by the editor of this volume. This second-order analysis takes all of the arrays from all of the various factors from each of the countries, re-enters them into the PQMethod program to factor analyze them again, this time in comparison with one another.

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The result of this second-order analysis is a rigorous recheck of all factor arrays, and a valuable overview of the entire project, providing useful comparisons of the relative strength, intensity and position of the factors cross-culturally. The results of the second-order analysis provided the grounding for the narration of overall findings in the introductory chapter.

Note 1 For a more detailed rendering of the differences between Q and R methodologies, see Stephenson (1953, p. 58) and Brown (1980, pp. 327–9). For a critique of R methodology and a robust argument on behalf of Q as a superior approach to use especially in certain applications in political science, see Dryzek (1990).

References Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edn. London: Verso. Bauer, Otto. 1924. Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie, 2nd edn. Vienna: Brand. Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1966. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday. Billig, Michael. 1997. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Breakwell, Glynis M. and Evanthia Lyons (eds). 1996. Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Breuilly, John. 1985. “Reflections on Nationalism,” Philosophy and Social Science, 15(4), pp. 55–78. Brown, Steven. 1968. “Bibliography on Q Technique and Its Methodology,” Perceptual and Motor Skills, 26(2), pp. 587–613. —— 1972. “A Fundamental Incommensurability Between Objectivity and Subjectivity,” in Steven R. Brown and Donald J. Brenner (eds), Science, Psychology and Communication. New York: Teachers College Press. —— 1977. “Q Bibliographic Update: A Continuation of ‘Bibliography on Q Technique and Its Methodology’,” Operant Subjectivity, 1, pp. 17–26. —— 1980. Political Subjectivity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. —— 1984. “Values, Development and Character: Appraising Korean Experience,” Korea Fulbright Forum, 1, pp. 33–66. —— 1994. “Q Methodology and Interbehavioral Phenomenology,” Interbehaviorist, 22(3), pp. 24–6. —— 1999. “Subjective Behavior Analysis.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Behavior Analysis, October, Chicago. —— 2000. Personal email correspondence. January 21. Brown, Steven, Dan Durning and Sally Selden. 1999. “Q Methodology,” in Gerald Miller and Marcia Whicker (eds), Handbook of Research Methods in Public Administration. New York: Marcel Dekker. Cinnirella, Marco. 1996. “A Social Identity Perspective on European Integration,” in Glynis M. Breakwell and Evanthia Lyons (eds), Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

34 Richard Robyn Coke, James and Steven Brown. 1976. “Public Attitudes About Land Use Policy and Their Impact on State Policy-Makers,” Publius, 6(5), pp. 97–134. Davis, Thomas C. 1997. “Patterns of Identity: Basques and the Basque Nation,” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, 3(4), pp. 61–88. De Holczer, Paul. 1989. “Economic Nationalism and Liberalism: A Q Methodological Study of Hungarian Economics Students.” Masters thesis. University of South Carolina. DeLeon, Peter and Toddi A. Steelman. 1999. “The Once and Future Public Policy Program,” Policy Currents, 9(2), pp. 1–9. Delprato, D.J. and J.R. Knapp. 1994. “Q Methodology and Interbehavioral Description,” Interbehaviorist, 22(3), pp. 14–23. Dryzek, John. 1990. Discursive Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times. New York: Oxford University Press. —— 1997. Personal correspondence, October 12. Dryzek, John and Leslie Holmes. 2002. Post-Communist Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dryzek, John, Margaret Clark and Garry McKenzie. 1989. “Subject and System in International Action,” International Organization, 43(2), pp. 476–503. Duijker, Hubert C. 1979. “Mind and Meaning,” Operant Subjectivity, 3(1), pp. 15–31. Eller, Jack David. 1999. From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Febbraro, Angela R. 1995. “On the Epistemology, Metatheory, and Ideology of Q Methodology: A Critical Analysis,” in Ian Lubek, Rene van Hezewijk, Gail Pheterson and Charles W. Tolman (eds), Trends and Issues in Theoretical Psychology. New York: Springer. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. London: Cornell University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 1985. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. Glaser, Barney G. and Anselm L. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago, IL: Aldine. Goldman, Irvin and Ivan Emke. 1991. “Communication and Canadian Identity: A QMethodological Study,” Canadian Journal of Communication, 16(3), pp. 129–38. Haesly, Richard. 2001. “Euroskeptics, Europhiles and Instrumental Europeans: European Attachment in Scotland and Wales,” European Union Politics, 2(1), pp. 81–102. Inkeles, Alex. 1997. National Character. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Kantor, Jacob Robert. 1938. “The Nature of Psychology as a Natural Science,” Acta Psycholgica, 4(1), pp. 1–67. —— 1959. Interbehavioral Psychology, 2nd edn. Granville, OH: Principia. —— 1978. “The Principle of Specificity in Psychology and Science in General,” Revista Mexicana de Análisis de la Conducta, 4, pp. 117–32. Klicperová, Martina. 1999. Ready for Democracy? Civic Culture and Civility with a Focus on Czech Society. Prague: Institute of Psychology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. Marshall, Harriette. 1991. “The Social Identities of Women Lawyers,” Operant Subjectivity, 14(2), pp. 106–21. Maxwell, Jennifer P. 1999. “The Violence of the Night: The Perception of Trauma in a Song,” Operant Subjectivity, 22(1), pp. 12–30. McCormack, Una. 1998. “Playing at Politics: First-Time Voting in the 1997 UK General Election,” Politeia (Social Science Research Series No. 1). Cambridge: Fieldfare. McKeown, Bruce and Dan Thomas. 1988. Q Methodology. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

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Meehan, Elizabeth M. 1993. Citizenship and the European Community. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. O’Brien, Oonaugh. 1993. “Good to be French? Conflicts of Identity in North Catalonia,” in Sharon Macdonald (ed.), Inside European Identities. Oxford: Berg. Onuf, Nicholas G. 1989. World of Our Making. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press. Patton, Michael Q. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. London: Sage. Pentland, Charles. 1973. International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber and Faber. Richmond, Anthony H. 1987. “Ethnic Nationalism: Social Science Paradigm,” International Social Science Journal, 39, pp. 3–18. Robyn, Richard. 2000. “Forms of Attachment to the European Union: A Study of French Conceptions of Identity in the Context of a Changing Europe.” PhD dissertation. Kent State University, Kent, OH. Rosaldo, Renato. 1994. “Subjectivity in Social Analysis,” in S. Seidman (ed.), The Postmodern Turn: New Perspectives on Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmolck, Peter and John Atkinson. 1998. PQMethod (version 2.06). [Computer software]. Available online at http://www.rz.unibw-meunchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod/. Skinner, B.F. 1953. Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. Smith, Anthony D. 1983. Theories of Nationalism, 2nd edn. New York: Holmes and Meier. Stainton Rogers, Wendy. 1991. Explaining Health and Illness: An Exploration of Diversity. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Stephenson, William. 1935. “Technique of Factor Analysis,” Nature, 136(3), p. 297. —— 1953. The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. —— 1967. The Play Theory of Mass Communication. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. —— 1978. “Concourse Theory of Communication,” Communication, 3(2), pp. 21–40. —— 1983. “Against Interpretation,” Operant Subjectivity, 6(1), pp. 73–103. —— 1987. “Q Methodology: Interbehavioral and Quantum Theoretical Connections in Clinical Psychology,” in Douglas H. Ruben and Dennis J. Delprato (eds), New Ideas in Therapy: Introduction to an Interdisciplinary Approach. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Stone, James C. 1996. Teachers for the Disadvantaged. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. Stryker, Sheldon. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Palo Alto, CA: B. Cummings. Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1971. “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in William G. Austen and Stephen Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Terhune, Kenneth. 1964. “Nationalism Among Foreign and American Students: An Exploratory Study,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8(4), pp. 256–70. Wicklund, Robert A. and Annerieke Oosterwegel. 1995. The Self in European and North American Culture: Development and Processes. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishing. Wolf, M.M. 1978. “Social Validity: The Case for Subjective Measurement, or How Applied Behavior Analysis is Finding its Heart,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 11(6), pp. 203–14.

36 Richard Robyn Wong, Timothy and Milan Sung. 1998. “Dissolution and Reconstruction of National Identity: The Experience of Subjectivity in Taiwan,” Nations and Nationalism, 4(2), pp. 247–72. Worchel, Stephen. 1997. “The Tangled Web of Loyalty: Nationalism, Patriotism, and Ethnocentrism,” in Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub (eds), In the Lives of Individuals and Nations. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

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Beyond duality Danes’ views on Denmark and the European Union 2001 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen

The relationship between Denmark and the rest of Europe has enjoyed a permanent prominent presence on the public agenda in Denmark for more than thirty years. The issue has probably been more controversial than in most of the other EU member countries. This controversy can largely be ascribed to the structure of our constitutional system, which requires that all issues to do with the giving up of national sovereignty must be decided by the people through a referendum. This constitutional practice has had the effect of polarizing the issue, as six consecutive referenda since 1972 have required the Danes to submit to the curse of duality that follows from perpetually having to decide for or against, first the question of entry into the then-Common Market, later the successive stages towards the building of an economic and political European Union, with increased integration between the EU member countries (for referendum results, see below). However, all the referenda have had a tendency – in spite of the specific economic and political measures to be voted on (such as the Maastricht Treaty, The Edinburgh Agreement, The Common Currency) – to develop into general votes of confidence for the EU project as a whole: whether we want our membership to continue at all. This perspective has been kept alive as a real possibility for many citizens, because Danish EU resistance, particularly at the right and left ends of the political spectrum, has succeeded in preserving a strong institutional platform, consisting of several well-organized popular movements across party lines (The Popular Movement Against the EU, The June Movement), with an institutional superstructure and the public visibility resulting from having elected members of the European Parliament. The existence of these party-like movements has further had the effect of forcing the yes/no duality on to the agenda of European Parliament elections, with an “opponent block” consisting of these two movements and the extreme right and left parties pitted against an “adherent block” of more centrist political parties. In a sense, Denmark has been the enfant terrible of the EU, both because the perennial referenda have caused a permanent uncertainty in the EU institution as a whole about the advancement of the integration process, and because the sometimes negative/sometimes positive outcomes of the referenda have imposed

38 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen a stop/go effect on the more visionary, increasingly impatient supranationalists in the higher echelons of the EU system. Moreover, the example of Denmark has served as a sometimes unwelcome reminder to the political leaders of other, ostensibly more pro-European countries, that the EU resistance that is manifest in Denmark may well lie dormant in theirs. It therefore remains an urgent political question in several other countries just how much “noise” it takes for this dormant segment of the population to wake up and develop into a not-so-silent majority of the electorate. It is perhaps in this light that one should see recent political developments in a number of European countries after 2000, sometimes labelled a swing to the right, which harbour increasingly nationalist, anti-multicultural voices that are generally concerned about, if not outright against, the consequences of the complex processes of globalization and migration. These developments are often, and not without warrant, equated with the parallel process of Europeanization. The present study was conducted in Denmark just after a parliamentary election in November 2001 that caused a swing of the pendulum from a centre/left coalition government to a moderately rightwing coalition government, whose parliamentary majority depends on the support of a more extreme nationalist, anti-immigration, and anti-EU party.

Previous studies of national and European identity in Denmark The changing Danish attitudes to EU membership and increased economic and political integration have been most conspicuously registered in the six referenda, which have all (except for 1972) showed a division of opinion with only a slight deviation from a complete equilibrium of those in favour and those against (Table 3.1). The Eurobarometer Another monitoring device has been the continuous Eurobarometer polls that have followed EU sentiments in all member states each spring and autumn since 1973, polling the population aged fifteen years and over through national samples of one thousand in most countries. It is the declared aim of Eurobarometer to provide Table 3.1 Referenda results in Denmark Year

Issue

% In favour

% Against

1972 1986 1992 1993 1998 2000

EC membership The EC Package The Maastricht Treaty The Edinburgh Agreement The Amsterdam Treaty The European Currency

63.4 56.2 49.3 56.7 55.1 46.8

36.6 43.8 50.7 43.3 44.9 53.2

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“an overview of how European citizens feel about the European Union, its policies and institutions” (Eurobarometer 56, p. 1). The autumn 2001 poll was conducted in October–November 2001, i.e. one month after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States and one week after the start of the war in Afghanistan. This is deemed to have had a significant effect on the views of European citizens on EU matters, and to “have substantially altered public opinion in many ways” (Eurobarometer 56, p. 1), in the direction of more widespread public support for the EU and its institutions. For instance, in the EU as a whole, 54 per cent of the citizens now regard their country’s membership of the EU as a good thing (up 6 percentage points from the spring poll of the same year), and 53 per cent trust the European Union (up 12 percentage points). This shift is something that should also be borne in mind when we proceed to the results of the Q study below, the data for which were also collected in November 2001 – in other words, the Eurobarometer poll and the Q study have been carried out as snapshots of flux at a non-ordinary historical moment when increased existential anxiety may have led citizens in the direction of more hope and support for the kind of powerful agent that the EU can be perceived to be. From the plethora of findings about Denmark in the Eurobarometer poll we have selected those which are most directly comparable to areas covered in the Q study; in some cases the percentages do not add up to 100 because “Don’t knows” are not shown: European and national identity Forty-one per cent of the Danes see themselves as only Danes, 54 per cent see themselves as first Danes, secondly as Europeans, while a mere 5 per cent see themselves as primarily or only European. National pride Ninety per cent of the Danes feel very or fairly proud to be Danish, while 10 per cent feel not very proud or not proud at all. Pride in being European Seventy-three per cent of the Danes feel very or fairly proud to be European, while 21 per cent do not. Support for EU membership Sixty-two per cent regard Danish EU membership as a good thing, while 15 per cent see it as a bad thing. Compared with the spring 2001 poll, the 62 per cent are up from 49 per cent, one of the probable effects of the events of September 11.

40 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen Benefits from EU membership Similarly, showing an increase of 11 percentage points, 72 per cent believe that Denmark has benefited from its EU membership, while 19 per cent disagree. Speed of European integration Comparing people’s perception of the “current speed” of the integration process with the “desired speed,” Denmark is one of only two EU countries where the current perceived speed is faster than the desired speed. In other words, on average Danes want the integration process to slow down. Support for a European constitution Denmark ranks lowest of the 15 member countries on the issue of whether a common European constitution is desirable or necessary, with a support rate of 50 per cent (as against support rates of 80 per cent for Spain at the top and 76 per cent for Sweden in third place). Support for the euro As on the previous issue Denmark is at the bottom of the list, with 47 per cent for (but 7 points up since the previous poll) and 48 per cent against the adoption of the euro. Apart from the Eurobarometer studies, the Danish contribution to The European Value Survey has explored issues of national and European identity (in a fairly peripheral manner), with results that confirm the tendency of the Eurobarometer findings. On the issue of people’s feeling of attachment to different geographical entities this survey finds that the attachment to one’s local area is up from 47 per cent in 1981 to 77 per cent in 1999, whereas attachment to one’s country is down from 36 per cent to 20 per cent, and EU attachment remains low with a decrease from 3 per cent to 1 per cent in the period (Gundelach 2002a, p. 49). Commenting on these figures, Gundelach concludes that nothing appears to indicate that the project of creating a common European identity has been or will be successful in the foreseeable future. The study finds a considerable increase in national pride, with an increase from 33 per cent of Danish men in 1981 to 49 per cent in 1999 who say they are “very proud” to be Danish, the figures for women being almost identical (Gundelach 2002b). A third kind of EU poll are those carried out at regular intervals by various newspapers and television stations in order to closely monitor developments in Danes’ attitudes to specific EU issues and to questions to do with immigration and multiculturalism. As examples of the former, the Sunday newspaper Søndagsavisen asked people (February 2002) about their attitude to the repeal of the Danish

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“exception” to the common EU defence policy, finding 56 per cent “Yes,” 31 per cent “No,” and 13 per cent “Don’t Know.” On immigration, the daily Berlingske Tidende found 65 per cent agreeing and 29 per cent disagreeing that “If the ‘new Danes’ got employment, the integration problems in Denmark would be insignificant” (March 2002, p. 49). These statistical measurements of opinions and values to do with nation and the EU are valuable indicators of public opinion, especially because they provide comparability when conducted at regular intervals over a long period of time. However, as Gundelach himself observes, “questionnaire-based studies of this kind provide a fairly superficial picture, but their strength lies in their representativeness” (Gundelach 2002b, p. 4). To this we may add the limited explanatory power of the survey approach, which originates in the fact that each question produces a statistical mapping of opinion that remains an isolated fragment, one piece of a giant jigsaw puzzle whose pieces will collectively never be able to produce a meaningful picture, because the relationships between each opinion and concrete individuals, and the relationships between the ensemble of opinions held by different individuals, remains obscure as long as the researcher is constrained by the survey methodology. Qualitative methodologies constitute one way of complementing and providing depth to the “superficial” picture of survey findings.

Qualitative studies of national and European identity The European Commission has itself initiated a qualitative study of European citizens’ views on the EU, publishing the report entitled “Perceptions of the European Union,” a qualitative study of the public’s attitudes to and expectations of the European Union in the 15 member states and in 9 candidate countries in June 2001 (European Commission 2001). The objective of the study was to identify and describe perceptions of the European Union: for what reasons, and to what extent, people embrace the idea of the European Union, and what fears, reservations and objections they may have to the European project. Focus group discussions were carried out in all member and candidate countries: two in small countries, four in larger countries. In the case of Denmark, two interviews were carried out in a major provincial city. Generally the study found, as a background to people’s perceptions of the EU, that many citizens in the European countries are pessimistic about the situation in their country and express concern about the future (ibid., p. 3). On the theme of “belonging” it was found that a stark contrast exists between “the South” and “the North,” with the southern populations (i.e. all countries except the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) being strongly aware of the existence of cultural ties between people who may well be very diverse, but who nevertheless share common roots, and who may be an important oppositional force to the dominance of the USA on the world scene. Conversely, in the “northern” countries, Denmark among them,

42 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen the sense of common historical and cultural ties is much less present in people’s minds … In these countries there is a deep-seated conviction of the superiority or specificity of the model of society that the country has developed with its own values, and a weak propensity to share with others, who tend to be seen as a threat. (ibid., 5) More specifically, on the question of the role of the European Union, these countries (as represented by the four or two focus groups) do not favour the building of a strong, federal Europe, there is rather a strong distrust of the European Union and a desire to contain its scope for action. It can be seen, rationally and pragmatically, that belonging to the European Union is useful for the economic interests of the country, … but in all other fields it appears to be more of a threat … any harmonization tends to be perceived as a downward harmonization, to the lowest common denominator, or as contrary to the interests of the country. It is these countries that have the most widespread caricatures of the Community being only concerned with pointless, absurd, even freedom-infringing measures … a perception of a sprawling, inefficient, spendthrift bureaucracy, and a general suspicion of the existence of illegal benefits and payments, and corruption. (ibid., 8) Interestingly, the study finds that “the citizens of the ‘North’” are “particularly resistant to enlargement … seeing almost exclusively negative effects for themselves; many of them are clearly impervious to considerations of solidarity beyond their own borders” (ibid., p. 15). However, this finding is in strong opposition to the findings of the latest Eurobarometer, where the Danes come out in third place on the question of being in favour of enlargement, 69 per cent supporting the admission of new member states (Eurobarometer 56, p. 72), and 79 per cent holding the view that the EU should be open to countries wishing to join (Eurobarometer 56, p. 73). The strongly negative views about the EU found in this qualitative study can certainly be found in a “northern” country like Denmark. However, it would seem that many nuances are lost when just two focus groups are taken as representatives of “the Danish view,” and when the economy of reporting the findings leads the analyst to generalize not just about each country in turn, but to pool together the wide-ranging views of four countries into one over-arching identity profile. As a Danish reader, who knows better than this mono-dimensional picture, it is tempting to conclude that the picture painted here is itself a caricature. There is therefore a great need for a study in Denmark of national and European identity, which avoids the dual pitfalls of quantitative superficiality and qualitative over-generalization. The Q study reported below makes it possible to probe into the diversity of opinions and perceptions within a country, while holding on to the

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ambition to discern distinct patterns of identity that together characterize the population of a country.

The Q study of national and European identities in Denmark The purpose of the Q study is thus to look beyond the duality of “for or against,” through a hybrid research method that unites the best of the large survey opinion poll and the qualitative in-depth interview. In the following, it is taken for granted that the reader is generally familiar with the foundations and procedures of the Q methodological approach, from previous experience with the method, or from the presentation provided at the beginning of this book. The statements In the interviews, participants were handed 36 cards, one at a time, with statements spanning the continuum from nationalism, through national pluralism, to supranationalist sentiment in a proportional manner. Among the issues raised on the cards were those mentioned above in connection with the Eurobarometer – feeling European and/or Danish, national pride, the perceived benefits of EU membership, the speed of European integration – as well as several other issues relevant for one’s sense of identity: globalization, aspects of Danishness, sovereignty, the role of the Danish language, and so on (see Appendix 3.1). The statements from the French study (see Appendix 5.1) were also used for the Danish study, because of the comparative ambition of the cross-national project. However, the translations were rarely verbatim, as we wanted all wordings to sound unequivocally Danish. In other words, we tried to reach a compromise between on the one hand, comparability across the national studies, and linguistic genuineness and cultural affinity on the other. In some cases the original statements presupposed knowledge of history and historical attitudes that were distinctively French (statements 15 and 30) and had to be replanted in Danish soil. A couple of statements were found in a pilot interview with a less-educated participant to be close to obscure, due to their origin in academic treatises, and had to be colloquialized while preserving their political essence as “nationalist” and “supranationalist,” respectively (statements 33 and 35). We believe that this process of colloquialization of the statements, which was a guiding principle in the translation process, contributes significantly to the validity of the Danish study. The respondents The principle of diversity guided our recruiting of participants, according to the overall project parameters. Aiming at an equal representation of genders, high and low educational backgrounds, young and older adults, and people with metropolitan and more provincial backgrounds, we were reasonably successful with respect to gender and setting, less so with age and education (Table 3.2).

44 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen Table 3.2 The Q study respondents Gender: Setting: Education: Age:

Female Metropolitan High 20–30

16 16 18 8

Male Provincial Low 30–45

14 14 12 15

45+

7

Because of practical considerations we defined “setting” as the distinction between participants living in central Copenhagen and those living in the provincial town of Roskilde, 35 kilometres west of Copenhagen. The more rural areas of Denmark were thus not represented in the study. Contrary to some of the other national studies in this book, we deliberately excluded participants who work for the EU and people working in universities in the arts or social sciences. Our study thus tried to be as realistic as possible, recruiting participants who could all be classified as “ordinary people.” The interviews While we see Q methodology as inherently situated squarely between qualitative and quantitative approaches, our actual implementation of the approach attempted to stretch it as far as possible in the qualitative direction while maintaining its quantitative potential. The interviews were constituted as a conversation, by having the interviewer read aloud each statement before handing it to the participant, who had been directed in the interview instructions to think aloud while considering its meaning and its proper place in the array from “most agree” to “most disagree.” In many cases this consideration lasted a minute or more, and involved a conversation in which the participant tried to consider his/her position and the interviewer tried to assist the process through a facilitating and probing attitude. The initial place assignment of the card was often accompanied by the participant explaining why the card was placed in a specific column, or why it was placed in a cross-column area for later precise placement. The interview tapes thus hold a plethora of brief explanations as well as lengthier reflections about the cultural and political issues articulated on the cards. The taped interviews can therefore be used much in the same way that re-interviews are sometimes used in Q analysis, i.e. to put flesh and blood on the skeleton delivered by the factor analysis, enabling us to offer quantitative generalization as well as a deeper description of the verbalized cultural identities of the participants. On the whole, participants felt that the puzzle-like character of the Q exercise was enjoyable. Some objected, understandably, that the Q array, with its forced distributions of cards in the nine columns, was a strait-jacket that prevented them from representing their true attitudes to the various statements, as they would have liked to disagree or agree more strongly with certain statements, or to disagree or agree with more statements than the grid made possible. While this must be seen as a limitation of the study with respect to capturing the subjective attitudes of the participants, on the other hand we agree with the Swedish study that “this

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forced technique actually shaped the respondents’ arguments and they began to rethink their opinion, which also opened up for more informative reflections” (Silander and Wallin, this volume, p. 203). None of the participants raised further objections when it was explained to them that the factor analysis of the individual national study as well as the requirements of the cross-national comparison made compliance with the grid essential.1 In the following sections of this chapter, we present the findings from the factor analysis of the Danish participants’ card placements, reflecting their own relational mapping of their cultural identities as Danes and Europeans at that point in time. We first proceed by briefly summarizing the four factors that each represents as a group in Danish society on the issue of national and supra-national identity. We then go on to provide a detailed characterization of each grouping in turn, based both on their ranking of the statements, which expresses their cultural-political identity, and on the qualitative data from the taped interviews, enabling us to deepen our understanding of the subjective realities underlying the card placements. In other words, the factor analysis has value in its own right, by producing a patterned representation of a discursive terrain characterized by ambivalences. But just as importantly, it functions also as a starting point and foundation for the deep description made possible by the qualitative reflections produced by the participants during the sorting task.

The four identity groupings in the Danish study The factor analysis of the participants’ card placements resulted in four factors significant at the 0.01 level. This means that the participants we used in our fieldwork divided into four groupings that are statistically significant in reaction to the statements that they were given (Appendix 3.2). This reveals that there are at least four possible groupings in Danish society on these issues of national/ supranational identity. Although we constructed the set of participants to cast as wide a net as possible across Danish society, it is possible that we would have found more factors by enlarging it. As mentioned above, our sample of participants does not fully represent the geographical variation between more and less urbanized areas of Denmark, and to some extent over-represents younger individuals with high education. On the other hand, the factor analysis enables us to say that there are no fewer than four groupings in the Danish population on the issue of national and supranational identity. We have decided to present and characterize further the four groupings under the following labels: • • • •

the whole-hearted European (Factor 1) the Eurosceptical Dane (Factor 2) the pragmatic European (Factor 3) the Danish Dane (Factor 4)

46 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen Although the four types appear at first sight to divide themselves neatly into two superordinate groups of “Europeans” and “Danes,” we wish to stress at the outset that there is no indication in the interviews that there is a simple correlation between the “Europeans” and the “Danes” of this study and those voting “Yes” and those voting “No,” respectively, in the EU referenda of recent years. The 30 participants divide themselves between the groupings in the following manner: 13 whole-hearted Europeans, 11 pragmatic Europeans, 7 Eurosceptical Danes, and 3 Danish Danes. It must be stressed that these proportions are not representative of the likely distribution of the four types among the Danish population at large. With a more representative sample, including more lesseducated and older people, we might have approached a more equal distribution among the four types. We did not systematically ask participants about their voting record in EU referenda, but many volunteered this information, enabling us to say with confidence that while the first and last groupings do seem to correspond to the duality of the referenda, the two middle groupings consist of people who voted either way, and who may already (i.e. approximately one year after the referendum) have regretted the way they voted. With all thirty participants, their cultural identity is the product of an ongoing signifying process full of ambivalences and contradictions, fluctuating along sections of the continuum from strong nationalism to strong globalism. Here is an example of a participant reflecting on her attitude to Denmark adopting the European currency: It’s also to some extent this feeling that Denmark should continue to be Denmark, and then something about, well, I somehow do think we should keep our own money, and I just see a kind of charm about, well, our monar…, well, the royal family and all that, but at the same time I sometimes waver a little bit, because obviously I do realize the advantages of it, but nevertheless I cast a clear no-vote last year, I didn’t hesitate for a second … But things are moving all the time, one has to open the door a little, I would say. (23:040)2 In spite of such ambivalence, however, we believe that it is useful to “freeze the frame” and thereby hold each participant “accountable” for an analytical positioning of their identity at a particular point in time, and also to claim a relative degree of permanence for this position. In the case of the participant just quoted, our analysis of the ensemble of her card placements and her expressed views clearly justifies a categorization of her under our label of “the Danish Dane.” In the following characterization of the four factors we rely especially on the top and bottom six of the respective informants’ ranking of the 36 statements, i.e. those statements with which the informants most agreed and most disagreed. However we also include a consideration of other statements and their relative positionings, because it is obviously the factor landscape as a whole that characterizes the identity of the group in question.

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Factor 1: The whole-hearted European The thirteen informants who belong to this grouping share a very positive attitude to the EU, believing that in today’s world one country cannot control its future on its own, and that on the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership (statements 6 and 32). For instance, as one typical participant expresses it, we will have to join the European currency at some point, because we are so dependent on exports that we cannot afford to remain outside. … This is also related to the fact that if Denmark is to survive in Europe, then we must have a voice and we only get a voice in one way and that’s by participating in it. (27:250) … There is only so much that the Danish government can do, we have to be part of a stronger community in order to have a say. (27:810) They envisage a future in which Danes must be bilingual in Danish and English (statement 33, +3) in order to cope in a Europe characterized by diversity, as reflected in their agreement with the view that you can be a citizen of a united Europe without all Europeans having to be the same (statement 31, +4) – “by God a united Europe would be boring if everybody was the same” (27:357). Similarly they don’t see any problem with supporting both a united Europe and preserving Danishness at the same time (statement 34, +3). Obviously when people start to feel more like Europeans this must work to supersede some of that Danishness. … But I don’t know if our identity will become “blurred,” rather we will get a feeling of “We live in Europe and we live in Denmark,” instead of just “We live in Denmark.” … In some areas we will begin to feel more like Europeans, but in other areas we will begin to feel more Danish. (27:375) An important reason for their unequivocal EU support may be that a more integrated Europe will be able to handle better the subnational problems that are conflictual in some countries (for example, Corsica or the Basque provinces), believing that a united Europe is more capable of handling such differences (statement 36, +3). They distance themselves unequivocally from any vestige of nationalism. For instance, they disagree strongly that one’s sense of belonging to one’s country comes before anything else, and that nations constitute a natural entity (statements 7 and statement 3, at –4 and –3 each): Card number 3 about “dividing the globe’s population naturally into nations each with its special characteristics” – I don’t believe that. And relating this to card number 7 about “your sense of belonging to your country coming before anything else” – I don’t believe that at all. (11:136)

48 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen I don’t feel any of that arch-Danishness, I probably feel more as a European than as a Dane, but I also feel more as a citizen of the world than as a European (27:353). … It is quite true that globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture, but then I don’t have anything against that. (27:107) Similarly, on the personal level they disagree that their parents would object to their not marrying a Dane, and to the claim that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity (statements 9 and 5). Nor would they feel personally insulted if someone said something negative about being Danish (statement 28). They are quite critical of traditional manifestations of Danishness, finding, for instance, that Danes are often too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements (statement 30): One example is Denmark’s phenomenal achievements during the Second World War, strongly exaggerated. … If you consider the means we have at our disposal I think we’re doing alright. But we don’t have any reason to be excessively proud, because we’re accomplishing less than we could … we have the resources to do more than we actually do. (27:184) Along these lines they are hesitant about the view that Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world (statement 27 is a moderately negative 1). They are not prepared to strip themselves completely of their national allegiance and think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes, but on the other hand they agree that they do feel firmly connected to Europe as such (statements 12 and 14). They support further integration between the EU countries (statement 26), although they hold an agnostic position on the view that the integration process ought to proceed at a faster pace than has been the case until now (statement 21). In the longer term I support a fully integrated EU. … Perhaps it would be a bit too radical to say “Abolish the national borders,” but I really wouldn’t mind if that came to be. … I don’t hope that we will become The United States of Europe in my own lifetime because I simply find we’re not ready for that, this would mean moving much too fast, and then we have the situation where Mr. and Mrs. Hansen are left behind, and then we will have frictions of one kind or another. The process must be a slow and deliberate one, finding its own pace. (27:820) Altogether these thirteen informants embrace the prospect of further European integration, and a diminishing role for Danishness, as “whole-hearted Europeans.” Factor 2: The Eurosceptical Dane The seven informants in this category can be characterized through their strong and paradoxical attitudes to the future status of the Danish language in Europe.

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On the one hand the Eurosceptical Danes believe that Danes must open up to the rest of Europe and acquire English as a lingua franca that will enable them to communicate across borders (statement 33). On the other hand, however, they demand respect for our national language by requiring that in the future all EU documents should continue to be translated into Danish (statement 35). The paradox is characteristic of a general ambivalence in the cultural and political identity of this grouping. Most support is expressed for the need to maintain Danish values in an increasingly Americanized world (statement 18), not least with respect to language and the media: I believe we have started to Americanize our language far too much. … In situations when there is absolutely no need for it there is a tendency for us to use more and more English words and that annoys me … they do this even in Parliament, and what the hell’s that supposed to mean! But the Queen hasn’t started, she speaks Danish. (30:378) And I really think that all that shit on TV … there I really agree with statement number 18 that Danish and European values should be an alternative to American ones. Because the American programs have a presence that is not at all justified by its quality. (7:017) The accusation of cultural homogenization is also levelled against the EU, as a strong point of disapproval (statement 20). But on the other hand, as a warning against national self-aggrandizement, while we need to preserve our Danish values, we should not delude ourselves about our historical achievements (statement 30): since we are such a small country we’re so proud of the things we have done, and it’s not until you get things turned around a little that you… For instance, until I read a bit more about the Vikings I thought, “what a bunch of marvellous guys!” But then when I was in England the guide told us how the Vikings besieged the town, raped the women, killed the men, and took the children as slaves! Then I thought, oh is that what they did! That’s not a reason to be proud, is it! (30:189) On the issues that specifically touch on relations between Denmark and the EU, Danish sovereignty should be maintained at all costs (statement 17): Well, I think we have some national values that may easily drown if we’re drawn into … like some northern French province, you know. Then we would just be – and don’t get me wrong politically on this – a second-rate nation under some kind of centralized government from Luxemburg or Brussels and so on and so on. That’s where I think that we do have so many values, which means that we must have a sovereign state. (7:153)

50 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen The sceptical stance to the European project may also have to do with a fundamental lack of clarity about what the “European future” may have in store. Reflecting on her “no” vote in the latest referendum (on the European currency, autumn 2000) one participant said, “For me it was very difficult to distinguish between what a yes and a no vote would entail, and then because on the whole I’ve been against the EU, then I thought that I was just not going to say yes to it when I was in doubt about its implications.” (30:155) One of the typical members of this group prefaces her response to the question whether Denmark on the whole has benefited from its membership of the EU (statement 32) with a fifteen-second silence, ended by the declaration that “this is a difficult one.” She explains her hesitation by referring to the tendency for relations between the EU and member countries to be characterized by inconsistency and double standards: Well, I’ll readily admit that I’ve voted no to the EU all along, especially because later it has turned out that all the talk about everything having to be homogenized, everything having to be the same … but you see I pay three times as much for a car than a German does, where’s the logic in that? But at the same time, in the area of agriculture things must be identical, there they don’t differentiate, it’s as if, you know, everybody has to be equal but some are more equal than others. Interviewer: Then you seem to tend towards disagreeing with this statement 32? Well, yes, I, I, I believe, I don’t, no, no, but at the same time I’m also in doubt, but you want it to be my opinion, don’t you? (30:48) It is clear from everything else she says that she’s not in favour of the EU’s homogenizing efforts. What she’s pointing out here is merely that in an area where she would have benefited from such homogenization, i.e. in the area of car prices, the EU apparently serves other interests, not hers. Along similar lines, the general verdict of another sceptic on Danish benefits from EU membership is a cool lukewarm, characterized linguistically by reverse negatives rather than by (un)conditional positives: If you look at the statistics, then you have to say that Denmark has at least not been the great loser in EU affairs. But you have to graduate what you think are the good things about the EU, but economically and in other ways, then I do think that we have had some benefits from it. (emphasis added) (7:026) The grouping’s emphasis on national sovereignty should not be confused with isolationism and self-sufficiency. Several participants (and some in the other groups) revive the lost prospect of a union between the Nordic countries, which was the subject of serious negotiations between Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1960s:

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It was stupid that we didn’t form a common Scandinavia instead, like if we’d said, we have a little group of countries up here, which could also be a part of Europe, but I think we would have achieved more by forming a common Scandinavia, a sort of Nordic EU or something. … In relation to the EU, I think we’d have had a better deal, with Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroes, we should have strengthened our cooperation there rather than with the EU. We’re so small we just drown, I feel like we’re this little pug dog who’s always biting the big ones in their trousers, and they just go (waves her hand dismissively) “stop that, will you!” (30:59) These participants also think that the European countries are so different that the European Union will never come to function properly (statement 22). At least they do not hope so, since for them what the EU project is all about is the creation of a European superpower (statement 16). Therefore, they disagree strongly with the view that European integration ought to move faster than it already does (statement 21): Well, that’s because you have to think through properly what the consequences are of the different decisions you take. I mean if you suddenly make some Romano Prodi (Chairman of the European Commission) solutions where everything is forced down over people’s heads, then … a lot of dissatisfaction will arise in many places, and that will have a reverse effect in my opinion. (7:084) At the personal level of cultural identity these informants do not automatically identify with all things Danish; for instance they distance themselves clearly from the view that they would feel personally insulted if someone said something negative about being Danish (statement 28). Nor do they feel at all that our national culture is endangered by other cultural species entering the country (statement 5), and they don’t see why parents should have a problem with their offspring marrying non-Danes (statement 9): I think it’s okay to say that you’re proud to be Danish, because it would be a bit pitiful if you couldn’t say that, wouldn’t it, but on the other hand I just won’t be like those who say “Denmark for the Danes,” you see, there is a clear difference there. I am not so afraid of the aliens, I happen to believe that the aliens who have come here have enriched our culture, but I think that some of the fear is due to lack of knowledge, people don’t understand that the Moslem living around the corner he is not dangerous for me just because he prays to whoever he prays to, and I go to church. (30:613) Least support is expressed in this group for the apparently preposterous idea that they should think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes (statement 12). In this respect the Eurosceptical Dane responds just like the pragmatic European. On feeling attached to Europe as such (statement 14) they express

52 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen considerably more distance than this group, but less distance than the next factor grouping, the Danish Danes. Altogether, therefore, they can be described as firmly rooted in Danish national culture, sceptical towards the idea of European integration, but open-minded about the receptiveness of Danish culture towards other cultures. Factor 3: The pragmatic European Eleven of the 30 informants are categorized as pragmatic Europeans, a label chosen because they appear to see Europeanization essentially as an inevitable process, which they regard with caution but not without awareness of its benefits – for Denmark. In the words of a typical member of this grouping, I should think that we have … benefited from being in. I think that when the times are bad, then there will be some support of Denmark. In good times we don’t need any assistance, but in bad times then the other countries would … For instance Sweden, when their economy has been under pressure [i.e. before they joined the EU] they were left to their own devices, their krone are lower than the Danish krone, so I should think that we have benefited. (29:135) They believe that – irrespective of the majority against in the 2000 referendum about the common currency – one day it will “become necessary” for Denmark to join the euro (statement 8). I voted for the euro … I am not one hundred per cent aware of exactly what it entails, but it is more, well, I mean we will get the euro no matter what. In say two years when people come here wanting to pay with euros then we cannot say “sorry, we only accept Danish money.” That’s a joke, so there’s really nothing to discuss here. (29:070) They see increased Europeanization not as the product of a supranationalist vision, but as a consequence of the mere passing of time, whereby national differences will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up (statement 23). They find that integration between the EU countries has not gone as far as it possibly can (statement 26), but on the other hand, as the other three groupings, they resist the idea that the process should be accelerated (statement 21). As we interpret this group’s cultural identity with respect to the EU ideal of “unity in diversity,” they appear to embrace the “diversity” aspect more emphatically than the whole-hearted Europeans, as they agree that Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark, France be France, England be England, each with its customs, traditions and identity (statement 19): Obviously Europe should become as interconnected as … but still in such a way that you have the different countries each by itself, so that for instance in the field of transport Europe should be linked together as much as possible …

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but still [American and Japanese tourists] should come to Denmark in order to experience something Danish, and then Italy, that’s something entirely different. (29:225) They disagree that the European Union has meant a homogenization of the cultures of Europe (statement 20, also statement 31), and in contrast to the Eurosceptical Danes they don’t believe that Europe is headed for superpower status (statement 16): I don’t think so! Of course you never know, but I don’t think that the countries will accept having some kind of president of the EU in the foreseeable future, I don’t think so. … The current leader cannot suddenly say, “Now Europe is going to war!” He doesn’t have the power to do that. … It will continue to be each country to itself in this respect. A superpower would be like the USA, where he can just say, Bush I mean, “Send the troops!” and likewise in a lot of other areas. … And that’s because the countries are so special somehow, each in itself. (29:332) They see this diversity as being compatible with cooperative efficiency, disagreeing with the view that the European countries are so different that the European Union will never be able to function properly (statement 22). The pragmatic Europeans are firmly rooted in their Danish identity, disagreeing emphatically that they could ever think of themselves as first Europeans, then Danes (statement 12): “I definitely think of myself as a Dane” (21:050). But compared with the Eurosceptical Danes, they feel considerably more connected to Europe (statement 14 is 0 for this factor and –2 for the Eurosceptical Danes), and they are more neutral on the view that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity (statement 5), accepting that in an increasingly globalized world some measure of identity change is inevitable: It is clear that Denmark and all other countries will change a little when all these other cultures are coming in. Look at England for example, they’re just ten or twenty years ahead of us and if you’re walking around in London you see all these ethnicities, but then they have also had their problems with it. But I don’t feel that they “dilute” it, but on the other hand we have to hold on to it ourselves, and in the longer term all countries will become more and more international. No, I don’t feel that they dilute our culture, I don’t think they do. (29:402) They show no hesitation in agreeing that Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world (statement 27), and deny that Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements (statement 30). The pragmatic stance of this group towards the EU is also evident in their expressed ambivalence that while overall the EU will serve Denmark as a force for good (statement 10 is +4), on the other hand they are rather neutral on the

54 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen claim that on the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership (statement 32 is scored as +1). Thus they come out as slightly reluctant supporters of increased EU cooperation, on condition that their national identity is not jeopardized. Factor 4: The Danish Dane The staunch Danishness of this grouping, consisting of three participants, is evident in the fact that 4 of the top 6 statements, and 8 of the top 14, have a distinctive nationalist orientation. As one typical participant expresses it, “I do feel very strongly that I am Danish” (23:003) and “I am actually quite proud to be Danish, I really am.” (23:093) Their strong national identity is composed on the one hand of an abstract political conviction that national sovereignty and independence comes before anything else (statement 17). On the other hand they express a personal, deep-felt Danishness in everyday contexts, as seen in their strong agreement that should they choose an intercultural marriage, this would be met with parental disapproval: Well, I don’t think they would stand up for … a Turk or … I do think they could accept, well, a … European or a Frenchman or thereabouts … but not any further out. That’s where this old girl may be getting just a little bit racist. (1:149) They also believe that the Danish language must prevail as a lasting presence in EU proceedings (statements 9 and 35) – “if there’s one thing that really matters to me, that is that we keep our own language.” (23:228) One’s Danishness lies in one’s blood, so to speak (statements 9, 5 and 28), but in spite of this, they do not see belonging to one’s country as coming before anything else (statement 7). The interview transcripts do not enable us to explain this, as these participants are on the whole fairly taciturn;3 drawing on comments made to this statement by the members of the other groupings, the most likely explanation is that attachment to one’s family is rated more highly than attachment to nation. The Danish Danes feel a strong attachment to Denmark’s historical past (statement 15) and believe that our historically inherited values are under threat, not only from the EU, as an almost unstoppable Europeanization process (statement 26), but also from the overall globalization process and from the immigration of increasing numbers of aliens into Denmark (statements 4 and 5). Like the Eurosceptical Danes they express a moderate optimism that Denmark will never have to abandon its age-old national currency (statement 8): I’m against the euro. I am so fond of our little “Danes’ Crown.” It would annoy me if we were to lose it, so therefore I don’t want the euro in, that’s why it had to go. (1:046) But they have no great faith that these plans can be averted, as they appear to view the external encroachments from a position of fatalism and impotence, having

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no great confidence in the ability of the Danish government to deal with the challenges of globalization, and being on the whole pessimistic about Denmark’s ability to assert itself in economic and technological affairs worldwide (statements 11 and 2). Nor do they think that Denmark should assert itself in the world: Participant 23: We are such a small country, and I somehow believe we should mind our own business, so I am a bit ambivalent about all these things. Interviewer: So you don’t think we should stick our nose out more than we already do? Participant 23: No, I’m sure that will only lead to a lot of trouble, if we get involved in too many things. Interviewer: What are you thinking of? Participant 23: Well, all those wars and all that, … I think eventually it will hurt “little us,” and then we’ll simply be … how can you say this, then there won’t be anything called Denmark any more, that’s the kind of thing I’m afraid of. (23:072) Their resistance to Europeanization is due to their belief that its hidden agenda is really about creating a new super-power (statement 16), which will make the EU more likely to interfere, against the principle of subsidiarity, in affairs that should properly be dealt with at the national level (statements 34 and 19). This then undermines Danish democracy: “that’s where I get afraid that in the long run people in our little country will have to ask Brussels for permission to breathe – I know this is a bit exaggerated okay? – and I don’t want it to be like that, you see.” (1:0121) With respect to the explicit expression of cultural allegiance they agree with the Eurosceptical Danes that the very idea of perceiving oneself as first a European then a Dane is preposterous, and they are more dismissive of the suggestion that they should feel closely connected to Europe as such (statements 12 and 14). The Danish Danes have several points in common with the Eurosceptical Danes, both groups expressing strong agreement with statements 17, 19, and 35, and strong disagreement with statement 12, that is on issues that deal explicitly with national sovereignty and identity. Where they differ is especially on the attitudes to cultural “others” and the degree of personal attachment to national values, as expressed in statements 5, 9 and 28, where the Danish Danes are more easily insulted in their national pride and considerably less inclined to accept cultural innovation. This is how one participant comments on the claim that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity: I can only agree strongly on that one … there are so many things in connection with jobs and women’s scarves, and all those traditions, as a matter of fact I believe we have to tolerate too much, actually. I can tell how the old people [i.e. in the old people’s home where she works] when they see someone with a scarf it’s really hard on them, and personally I also think it is a little difficult

56 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen when you’re shopping in Ikea or another store and they sit there [at the cash register] with their scarves, but that’s just my attitude, you see. (23:153) For this participant, her deep-felt, instinctive reaction to Islamic scarves is unaffected by her positive impression of “these women” as colleagues: “Well, those I have worked with have been incredibly good and very nice, there’s nothing with them at all, so it’s only my first impulse, but the old people don’t like it.” Also when compared with the Eurosceptical Danes, the fatalism of the Danish Danes is considerably more pronounced (statements 11 and 2), as they seem to have little confidence that their defensive stance is likely to prevail against the overwhelming external forces in the long run. One could tentatively label this group as “culturally cornered,” as they seem to have no viable alternatives to choose between for the future itinerary of the national cultural values they feel so very attached to.

Reflections The most significant contribution of this study to the ongoing portrayal of the national and European identities of Danish citizens lies in its making more complex the otherwise polarized picture of Danish/EU sentiment. From a radical perspective of diversity emanating from the differently patterned card placements of each participant, we could say that the inner discursive landscapes of these thirty individuals is characterized by ambivalent and fluctuating cultural and political identities, which mirror, in many individual minds, the close to 50–50 situation that has been the outcome of all referenda about Denmark/EU relations over the last 30 years. At the same time, the methodology used also enables us to distinguish meaningfully – amidst the flux and diversity of opinions – four identity groupings, each consisting of individuals whose configurations of identity components have enough in common to distinguish them from the other groupings. But even at this level of the grouping, complexity asserts itself in the middle of orderliness, as the following selected ranking comparisons show (the whole-hearted Europeans on average ranked statement 8 in tenth place out of 36, the pragmatic Europeans ranked it in first place, and so on) (see Table 3.3). We find the expected distribution between the groupings’ rankings of statements 14, 17, and 32, for instance the increasing disagreement that one feels “closely connected to Europe as such” (statement 14), and an increasing insistence that Denmark must keep its independence (statement 17). In some cases, we find a situation of one group against the other three, as when Factor 1 is considerably less adamant that they do not think of themselves first as Europeans, then as Danes (statement 12), and less insistent that Europe should let Denmark be Denmark (statement 19). In other cases we find a neat division between the two more pro- and the two more anti-European groups, as when Factor 1 and Factor 3 tend towards neutrality as regards the possible development of the EU

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Table 3.3 Ranking of statements by the four groupings

Statement

Factor 1 Whole-hearted European

Factor 2 Sceptical Dane

Factor 3 Eurosceptical European

Factor 4 Danish Dane

8 10 12 13 14 16 17 19 21 32

10 20 22 9 8 13 17 15 19 3

25 29 36 16 28 31 6 4 35 17

1 2 36 12 19 8 11 2 31 13

27 22 36 9 33 30 1 3 25 19

into a superpower, whereas Factor 2 and Factor 4 believe that the EU project is a superpower oriented one (statement 16). Complexity also shows itself in some unexpected deviations from the expected pattern, as when Factor 3, against the other three groupings, expresses strong agreement that the EU is the best way to secure peace and stability for Denmark in the future (statement 10). Of equal interest are the issues on which the positions of all four groupings converge. Thus, on statement 13, there is close agreement that the goal should be a Europe with politically and culturally very different countries, and agreement not to support the suggestion that integration between the EU countries ought to move faster (statement 21). On this point the findings of the Q study corroborate the Eurobarometer poll reported above. We believe that the relative orderliness of the findings of this study that the four groupings express makes the analysis potentially useful for the various agents on the Danish EU scene. For instance, campaigns – for or against increased integration – now have concrete groupings of people with complete identity profiles to “aim for,” instead of the representative but superficial “attitudes” to the atomized issues on the EU agenda found by opinion polls. For a moment taking the perspective of Europeanist campaigners and looking at the Eurosceptical Danes, the identity profile of this grouping may be taken to indicate that the advocates of European integration have just not succeeded in answering in a convincing manner the ordinary Dane’s mundane question of “What’s in it for me?” People are generally not aware, for instance, that many aspects of gender equality and safety standards on the labour market, which they cherish, have come out not of our own “unique” welfare ethos, but are products of “homogenizing” EU directives.4 On the contrary, they point out how EU double standards have typically disadvantaged them, as in the example given by a Eurosceptical Dane above, of non-harmonized Danish car prices. The Q methodological study would enable campaigners to address such concrete issues more accurately and efficiently on the Danish public agenda, as food for

58 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen thought for a sizeable group of Danish citizens, and in a manner that did not conflict with other views held by the group. In order to do that, one would need to devise another, similar Q study, which would relate the social groupings discovered more accurately and be more representative the kind of demographic or psychographic parameters that would make the groupings identifiable in the social landscape. Such a study should also fine tune its stimulus statements more towards a purely Danish horizon of experience than has been possible in a cross-national comparative study such as the one reported here. As we have pointed out at various points, our study is not without its shortcomings. However, we believe that it is a promising beginning for the development of an integrated qualitative-quantitative research method with high explanatory power in the area of national and supranational identity.

Notes 1 A possible solution that could have satisfied most participants in this respect would have been to change the polar opposition into one of “most agree” to “least agree,” and to change the numerical scale accordingly to a 1-to-9 continuum. This change would probably have accommodated participants who felt forced by the grid scale to “disagree” with statements they really wanted to agree moderately with. 2 Notations for interviewees refer to participant number:tape number. 3 Of the three interview recordings in this group, one is unusable due to technical deficiency, the other two are brief on the majority of the statements. 4 We are grateful to Mark Ørsten for suggesting this point.

References Eurobarometer 56. April 2002. Public Opinion in the European Union, Luxembourg: The European Commission, Available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion. European Commission. 2001. Perceptions of the European Union. A qualitative study of the public’s attitudes to and expectations of the European Union in the 15 member states and in 9 candidate countries. June 2001. Luxembourg: The European Commission. Available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/quali_en.htm. Gundelach, Peter, (ed.) 2002a. Danskernes Værdier 1981–1999 (The Danes’ Values 1981– 1999). Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag. —— 2002b. “Danskernes værdier,” Universitetsavisen, 4, University of Copenhagen.

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Appendix 3.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/Danish national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–1

–1

–1

1

2 The global development in economy and technology makes me optimistic on Denmark’s behalf (SN)

0

1

2

–3

3 The globe’s population can be naturally divided into nations, each with its special characteristics (N)

–3

–2

1

2

4 Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture (N)

–1

0

–4

2

5 I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity (N)

–4

–3

–1

1

6 One country cannot control its future on its own (SN)

4

–1

1

1

7 Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anything else (N)

–4

0

0

–3

8 One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the euro (the common European currency) (PL)

2

–1

4

–2

9 It would be difficult for my parents if I was not married to/would not marry a Dane (N)

–4

–3

–2

4

10 The European Union is the best way to secure peace and stability for Denmark in the future (PL)

0

–2

4

–1

11 The Danish government and parliament are fully capable of securing our interests in the globalized world (PL)

–2

1

0

–4

12 I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane (SN)

–1

–4

–4

–4

13 I want a Europe with countries that are as politically and culturally different as they are different geographically (PL)

2

0

1

2

1 Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred if Europeanness is promoted (N)

14 I feel closely connected to Europe as such (SN)

2

–2

0

–3

15 Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existed for more than a thousand years (N)

–3

–1

0

3

16 To create European unity through the EU is not a way to create a European super-power. It is merely a way to create change in Europe (PL)

1

–3

2

–2

17 Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in European cooperation (N)

0

3

1

4

18 I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an alternative to American ones (PL)

0

4

2

–1

19 Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark, France be France, England be England, each with its customs, traditions and identity. It would be stupid to try to melt them together (PL)

1

3

4

4

20 The European Union means a homogenization of the cultures of Europe that I dislike (N)

–2

3

–3

1

21 Integration between the EU countries ought to move faster (SN)

0

–4

–3

–1

continued …

60 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen Appendix 3.1 continued Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

22 The European countries are so different that the European Union will never be able to function properly (PL)

–1

2

–3

–2

23 National differences will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up (SN)

–2

1

3

1

24 Denmark should play a more significant role internationally (N)

1

0

–2

–1

25 The efforts to create European unity are made difficult by people who claim that one country can succeed on its own (SN)

1

–1

–1

–1

26 I believe that integration between the EU countries has gone as far as it possibly can (PL)

–3

1

–4

–4

27 Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world (PL)

–1

2

3

1

28 If someone said something negative about being Danish, I would feel that something negative had been said about me personally (N)

–2

–2

0

1

29 I support the Danish democracy, but I don’t feel particularly nationalistic (SN)

1

2

–2

–2

30 I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements (SN)

2

2

–2

1

31 It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe without all Europeans having to be the same (PL)

4

1

3

2

32 On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership (SN)

4

0

1

1

33 In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish and English in order to cope in Europe (SN)

3

4

2

1

34 If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiarity it is possible to both support a united Europe and to preserve Danishness at the same time (PL)

3

0

0

3

35 I believe that also in years to come all EU documents must be translated into Danish (N)

0

4

–1

3

36 There will be better room for national minorities (such as the Danes in Schleswig, the people in Corsica, etc.) in a united Europe, because a united Europe is more capable of handling such differences (SN)

3

–4

–1

1

The parenthetical notations [(N), (SN) and (PL)] after each statement incorporates the Q sample structure discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. nationalist, supranationalist and pluralist.

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Appendix 3.2: Danish Q statements 1 Vores identitet som danskere bliver mere og mere uklar, hvis det europæiske vinder frem. Our identity as Danes will become more and more blurred if Europeanness is promoted. 2 Den globale udvikling i økonomi og teknologi gør mig optimistisk på Danmarks vegne. The global development in economy and technology makes me optimistic on Denmark’s behalf. 3 Jordens befolkning kan naturligt opdeles i nationer med hver deres særpræg. The globe’s population can be naturally divided into nations, each with its special characteristics. 4 Globaliseringen er en trussel imod den danske nationalkultur. Globalization is a threat to the Danish national culture. 5 Jeg føler, at fremmede i Danmark udvander vores nationale identitet. I feel that aliens in Denmark dilute our national identity. 6 Et enkelt land kan ikke alene styre sin egen fremtid. One country cannot control its future on its own. 7 Tilhørsforholdet til éns land går forud for alle andre tilhørsforhold. Your sense of belonging to your country comes before anything else. 8 Det vil være nødvendigt for Danmark en dag at slutte sig til Euroen (den fælles europæiske mønt). One day it will become necessary for Denmark to join the euro (the common European currency). 9 Mine forældre ville have svært ved at acceptere, hvis jeg ikke var gift med/ ville gifte mig med en dansker. It would be difficult for my parents if I was not married to/would not marry a Dane. 10 Den europæiske Union er den bedste måde at sikre fred og stabilitet for Danmark i fremtiden. The European Union is the best way to secure peace and stability for Denmark in the future. 11 Den danske regering og Folketinget er fuldt ud i stand til at sikre vores interesser i den globale verden. The Danish government and parliament are fully capable of securing our interests in the globalized world. 12 Jeg tænker først og fremmest på mig selv som europæer, dernæst som dansker. I think of myself first as a European, then as a Dane. 13 Jeg ønsker mig et Europa med lande, der er lige så politisk og kulturelt forskellige, som de er forskellige geografisk. I want a Europe with countries that are as politically and culturally different as they are different geographically. 14 Jeg føler mig tæt knyttet til Europa som sådan. I feel closely connected to Europe as such.

62 Kim Christian Schrøder and Søren Esben Hansen 15 Det danske er værd at bevare, fordi det har eksisteret i mere end tusind år. Danish culture is worth preserving because it has existed for more than a thousand years. 16 At skabe europæisk enhed gennem EU er ikke det samme som at skabe en europæisk stormagt. Det er en måde at skabe forandring i Europa på. To create European unity through the EU is not a way to create a European super-power. It is merely a way to create change in Europe. 17 Danmark skal bevare sin uafhængighed i det europæiske samarbejde. Denmark must keep its independence while taking part in European cooperation. 18 Jeg vil gerne have, at de danske værdier fortsat skal fungere som et alternativ til de amerikanske. I wish for Danish values to continue to function as an alternative to American ones. 19 Europa vil være stærkere jo mere det lader Danmark være Danmark, Frankrig være Frankrig, England være England, med hver sine skikke, traditioner og identitet. Det ville være dumt at forsøge at smelte dem sammen. Europe will be stronger the more it lets Denmark be Denmark, France be France, England be England, each with its customs, traditions and identity. It would be stupid to try to melt them together. 20 Den europæiske Union betyder en ensretning af Europas kulturer, som jeg ikke bryder mig om. The European Union means a homogenization of the cultures of Europe that I dislike. 21 Integrationen mellem landene i EU burde gå hurtigere. Integration between the EU countries ought to move faster. 22 De europæiske lande er så forskellige, at Den europæiske Union aldrig kommer til at fungere. The European countries are so different that the European Union will never be able to function properly. 23 De nationale forskelle vil forsvinde i takt med, at en ny generation af europæere vokser op. National differences will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. 24 Danmark skal spille en mere fremtrædende rolle internationalt. Denmark should play a more significant role internationally. 25 Bestræbelserne på at skabe europæisk enhed vanskeliggøres af, at der nogen der påstår, at en enkelt land sagtens kan klare sig alene. The efforts to create European unity are made difficult by people who claim that one country can succeed on its own. 26 Jeg mener, at integrationen mellem EU-landene er gået så langt som den overhovedet kan. I believe that integration between the EU countries has gone as far as it possibly can. 27 Danske landbrugsprodukter og dansk design er blandt de bedste i verden.

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29

30

31

32 33

34

35

36

63

Danish agricultural products and Danish design are among the best in the world. Hvis nogen sagde noget grimt om det at være dansk, ville jeg opleve det, som om de havde sagt noget grimt om mig personligt. If someone said something negative about being Danish, I would feel that something negative had been said about me personally. Jeg bakker op om det danske demokrati, men jeg føler mig ikke særlig nationalt indstillet. I support the Danish democracy, but I don’t feel particularly nationalistic. Jeg synes, at danskerne er lidt for tilbøjelige til at være stolte over Danmarks historiske bedrifter. I think Danes are too inclined to be proud of Denmark’s historical achievements. Man kan godt være borger i et forenet Europa, uden at det betyder, at alle europæere skal være ens. It is possible to be a citizen of a united Europe without all Europeans having to be the same. I det store og hele har Danmark nydt godt af medlemskabet af EU. On the whole Denmark has benefited from its EU membership. I fremtiden må danskerne beherske både det danske sprog og det engelske sprog på lige fod for at kunne begå sig i Europa. In the future Danes must be able to command both Danish and English in order to cope in Europe. Hvis EU bygger på nærhedsprincippet, er det muligt både at gå ind for et forenet Europa og at bevare det danske på samme tid. If the EU works according to the principle of subsidiarity it is possible to both support a united Europe and to preserve Danishness at the same time. Jeg synes – også fremover – at alle EU-dokumenter skal oversættes til dansk. I believe that also in years to come all EU documents must be translated into Danish. Der vil blive bedre plads til nationale mindretal (fx danskerne i Sydslesvig, befolkningen på Korsika, osv.) i et forenet Europa, fordi et forenet Europa bedre kan rumme den slags forskelle. There will be better room for national minorities (such as the Danes in Schleswig, the people in Corsica, etc.) in a united Europe, because a united Europe is more capable of handling such differences.

64 Una McCormack

4

Being in Europe Pluralism and patriotism in England and Scotland Una McCormack

Introduction: constructing a nation, devolving a nation Studying “Britishness” poses particular problems. The political constitution of Great Britain has undergone a radical transformation in the past decade, leading to a devolved parliament for Scotland and an assembly for Wales, both of which have given new political expression to national identities which are distinct from “British” and yet intimately connected. “Englishness,” in contrast, seems an indistinct concept, perhaps synonymous with “Britishness,” perhaps on the verge of finding its own characteristic articulation. And as the already complex nature of Britishness reconfigures, the relationship of Great Britain to Europe has been a source of increased and lively public debate. This chapter reports on research conducted in England and Scotland in summer and autumn 2000 to investigate national, pluralist and supranationalist views of Britain and the EU. “Britishness” was forged in the course of the eighteenth century on the basis of an alliance of Protestant interests across the kingdoms of Scotland, England and Wales in response to perceived threats from continental Catholic Europe (Colley 1996). The political union of these different countries and the emergence of a British identity seem almost a prototype of supranationalism; nonetheless, the endurance of distinctive Welsh and Scottish identities throughout the Westminster era demonstrates the extent to which this was a pluralist settlement.1 Devolution was largely prompted by a sense that, in the UK, all nations were equal, but one was more equal than others. British identity cannot be understood from an English perspective alone. As David Cannadine writes, “(E)ven in the post-modern era of decentred discourse, it bears repeating that the creation of a British identity did not entail or require the abandonment of English or Scottish or Welsh or Irish identities, or of more regional loyalties to county, city, or village” (1995, p. 26). Britain could be the paradigm case of Anderson’s (1983) “imagined community.” It was created in 1707 by an Act of Union which linked Scotland to England and Wales (which had been linked since 1536), with one monarch, one legislating body, and a single system of free trade. Scotland retained a distinctive religious and social character, and its own legal and educational systems; political union did not promise a united people.

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Yet a united kingdom did emerge. In her magisterial study of the “forging of the British nation,” Colley (1996) attributes this to three main factors: “(t)he invention of Britishness was … closely bound up with Protestantism, with war with France and with the acquisition of empire” (p. 8). The eighteenth century was marked by a succession of wars between Britain and France; these conflicts were perceived in Britain as the struggle of a Protestant nation against a powerful Catholic opponent: “war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against them” (p. 5). As British imperial activity extended across the globe during the nineteenth century, this newly forged identity was reinforced as Britons defined themselves in opposition to the peoples they conquered. In 1997 ,referenda in both Scotland and Wales gave “yes” votes for devolution.2 As a result, under the Scotland Act of 1998, the Scottish Parliament was restored, devolving legislative powers to this body on matters such as education, health, and prisons. The act also specified certain issues which continue to be legislated in Westminster; these “reserved matters” include foreign affairs, defence and national security. Representation of Scottish constituencies in the Westminster parliament therefore continues, with the “West Lothian Question” remaining unanswered.3 The Government of Wales Act of 1998 created a Welsh Assembly which does not have legislative powers, but has the authority to develop and implement policy, and allocate funds made available to Wales from the Treasury. Nearly 300 years since the Act of Union, the United Kingdom,4 it seems, is on the verge of dissolution.

Contemporary issues and debates surrounding national identity Writing this overview of national identity issues in Britain at the same time as completing the 2001 Census Form proved an illuminating, if confusing, experience. For the first time, the form contained a question on “ethnic group”; under the section labelled “White,” I was offered three alternatives: “British,” “Irish,” or “Other.” I found this question almost unanswerable. “British” is the term that appears on my passport, yet I am descended from Irish immigrants to Britain. However, having lived my whole life in England, self-definition as purely “Irish” seems both inaccurate and presumptuous. Eventually, I chose “Other,” and carefully inked in “Anglo-Irish” under the space provided for explanations. This response was no doubt infuriating for the individual who had to code it and, while it may prove nothing more than that one should not present a Q methodologist with only three options in which to summarize any subjective experience, it does bring home some of the complexities surrounding the use of words such as “British” and “English.” Contemporary academic and public debate has become preoccupied with defining both terms. What is meant or implied by the term “Englishness”? How is

66 Una McCormack this related to “Britishness”? The terms are not interchangeable, yet frequently – to the exasperation of the Scottish and the Welsh – “British” and “English” are equated in everyday (and even in academic) discourse, leading to what Kumar (2000) calls a “fatal ambiguity as to whether the object of analysis is England or Britain as a whole” (p. 595). From a historical perspective, Evans (1995), reviewing use of the terms between 1790 and 1970, argues that “neither ‘Englishness’ nor ‘Britishness’ is a separately identifiable phenomenon. Instead, they are the product of complicated cross-cultural developments” (p. 243). Kumar (2000), drawing heavily on Colley’s account of Britishness, suggests that it has acted as a surrogate for English identity, which could be merged with the larger identity and the cause for which it stood, i.e. Empire: “English nationalism, past and present, is the nationalism of an imperial state – one that carries the stamp of its imperial past even when the empire has gone” (p. 577). By extension, once that empire has gone, English nationalism finds itself in crisis. Condor (1996), in a thoughtful discussion of English national identity, emphasizes above all its elusiveness. “(T)he only significant cultural icons specifically designated as ‘English’ are the national sports teams. The English flag and red rose are seldom used as popular symbols. There is no English national costume and no distinctive English national anthem. In England, public holidays have no national significance, and most English people do not even know the date of St. George’s day” (p. 43). It takes only a moment to think of suitable symbols from a Welsh, or Scottish, or Irish perspective. Condor concludes that the “apparent absence of Englishness itself is a phenomenon worthy of consideration” (p. 43). (It is worth noting that since Condor was writing, the English flag has become commonplace at sporting events.) In a speech in 1993, John Major, prime minister at the time, eulogized a Britain “of long shadows on county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers” (The Guardian, 23 April 1993, p. 14). Billig’s (1995) analysis points out “the lack of county cricket in Scotland merits no mention. His exemplars are masculine: he evokes beer and cricket, not sweet sherry and needlepoint … (He) mentions the suburb, but not the inner city; the cricket ground, but not the football stadium; the dog lover but not the unemployed. This evoked nation is empty of motorways, mine-shafts and mosques” (p. 102). The Blairite adoption of the language and imagery of “Cool Britannia” during the late 1990s involved similar exclusions: focusing on a London scene of fashion, food, and music, cool Britons were young, affluent, and lived not just in the southeast of England, but in the capital itself. Billig’s analysis of Major’s speech works as well for the rhetoric of Cool Britannia: “(a)s with all such metonymic stereotyping, the representation involves exclusion … An artfully partial, and selectively idealized, Britain stands for the whole” (p. 102). Banal as this may seem, such exclusions can play a part in explosions of what Billig calls “hot” nationalism. The term “British” has found a degree of acceptability amongst second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants to Britain from the West Indies, Africa, and the Indian subcontinent. The 2001 Census contained

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the options “Black British” or “Asian British” under the question concerned with ethnic group. However, the report made to the Runnymede Trust by the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000) points out: To be English, as the term is in practice used, is to be white. Britishness is not ideal, but at least it appears acceptable, particularly when suitably qualified – Black British, Indian British, British Muslim and so on … (However) … Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic largely unspoken, racial connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness is racially coded. (Paragraph 3.30, p. 38) This elision of “British” and “English” is of great significance in contemporary Britain. In the 2001 election, following racial unrest in Oldham, a town in the northwest of England, the far-right British National Party (BNP) polled 16.4 per cent of the vote in the constituency of Oldham West and Royton, coming in third place (the BNP polled 11.2 per cent in the neighbouring constituency of Oldham East and Saddleworth): this was the party’s best ever showing in a general election. The unrest in Oldham was followed by riots in several towns across the north of England, and demonstrations in Glasgow, throughout the summer of 2001. Issues surrounding multiculturalism and integration are central to contemporary political debates over asylum seekers and immigration policy, and the reality of pluralism in modern Britain. Having given an account of the complexity of issues surrounding the idea of a British national identity, I shall move on, in the next section, to discuss press, party political and academic accounts of Britain’s relationship to the European Union, and review the results of surveys conducted to investigate these issues. The “awkward partner” George’s (1998) aphorism sums up the common perception of Britain’s relationship to the EU which seems to be, at best, confused and, at worst, antagonistic. Reflecting on how the British identity was historically formed, in part, in opposition to Europe, Colley neatly captures how “the agonies that British politicians and voters of all partisan persuasions so plainly experience in coming to terms with Brussels and its dictates show just how rooted the perception of Continental Europe as the Other still is” (p. 7). Britain seems to be an awkward, even unwilling, member of the EU. Laffan (1996), discussing the enthusiasm of many member states for a supranational, European attachment, suggests their eagerness results from challenges to national identity raised by “the politicization of immigration, the fragmentation of the post-war order, regionalism (and) the rise of the ultra-Right … Official nationalism has embraced and accommodated the ‘European project’ in many states and … integration took the sting out of nationalism in western

68 Una McCormack Europe to a significant extent” (pp. 81–2). She continues: “It is striking that the two long-time Member States whose state identities could not be enhanced by the European projects, the UK and Denmark, are most half-hearted about the political dimension of integration” (p. 87). In the UK’s case, this ambivalence, Laffan suggests, is connected to a sense that “EU membership spelt the end of Empire and the diminution of a world role that contributed so much to how the UK explained itself” with the result that “British political leaders continue to focus on national autonomy and identity: a highly centralized state structure, a pragmatic political culture, and the sovereignty of Parliament all serve in addition to reinforce the fact that the UK sits uneasily into the Union’s governance structures” (p. 87). In this view, then, supranational attachment would signal an unpalatable admission of Britain’s reduced place in world affairs. Party policy As Anderson and Weymouth (1999, p. 1) write: [T]he most articulate expression of “Euroscepticism” is … located in the parliamentary Conservative Party. But it also found expression to the right of it in the Referendum Party, and to the left, among “old” Labour parliamentarians … Euroscepticism … is a phenomenon which straddles the political divide, both inside and outside Westminster, although its most intense manifestation (and most profound consequences) has been mostly apparent on the right of British politics. The issue of the single currency has dominated debate about Britain’s relationship to the EU. Labour has committed to holding a referendum on entry, the date of this dependent on Britain’s readiness according to five “economic tests” set by the Chancellor, Gordon Brown. The Conservative Party has committed to remaining out of the single currency at least for the lifetime of the current parliament and, after more than a decade of internecine warfare over this issue, has elected as leader a Eurosceptic committed to keeping the pound. The Liberal Democrats are in favour of entering into the single currency as soon as possible, subject to approval in a referendum. While the Liberal Democrats maintain a common front on this issue, the two main parties, despite their stated policies, have in the past both been split, although the Conservative Party’s divisions have been considerably more obvious in recent years. The two business pressure groups concerned with this issue, Britain in Europe and Business for Sterling, both draw cross-party support. The case has been made in the right-of-centre press for Britain’s entry into NAFTA in preference to the single currency – another possible source of a non-European supranationalist allegiance, which has drawn on the idea of Britain’s “special relationship” with the US. All three of the national parties support the terms of the Nice Treaty which allow the expansion of the EU eastward. Labour has supported the EU Charter of

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Rights as a declaration of aspirations, but does not support proposals to incorporate it into British law. It has accepted that Britain should give up one of its Commissioners in return for increased voting influence in its main decision-making body. The Labour government has also been a main driving force behind the Rapid Reaction Force. The Conservatives argue that Europe should not go down the route of becoming a superstate. They oppose the introduction of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the grounds that it is the first step towards a European constitution, and will undermine law-making at Westminster. They oppose the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, arguing that is effectively a European Army, and that a European defence identity outside of NATO is not necessary. The Liberal Democrats support the Nice Treaty’s programme for expansion and reform, but argue that it falls far short of a triumph. The party supports a constitution for Europe and closer cooperation between members, with Westminster and European Parliament providing closer scrutiny of the Commission, and also supports the creation of a rapid reaction force. The Scottish National Party seeks equality of status for Scotland within the EU. It supports the idea of a confederal EU that collectively exercises certain sovereign rights pooled by states, and entry into the single currency, which should be decided in a referendum. The national press The European Commission maintains a website which “monitors the British press’s highly distorted coverage of the European Union.”5 From a cursory survey of this site it appears the British press is obsessed with monitoring legislation purportedly concerned with the curvature of bananas, the straightness of cucumbers, or the standard weight of a loaf of bread (inevitably, in metric). A sub-category of this genre reports on attempts to ban such emotive symbols of national pride as the double-decker bus, lollipop ladies, the oak tree, and mushy peas. The banalities of banana directives aside, while the British national press is largely Eurosceptic there is a range of opinion from the enthusiastically Europhile Financial Times to the avowedly Eurosceptic, pro-NAFTA Daily Telegraph. Anderson and Weymouth (1999) conducted an in-depth analysis of the British press, from a pro-Europe perspective, across two periods: the year preceding the general election of 1997, and during the 1998 British EU presidency. They appropriately excoriate parts of the press for xenophobic, particularly anti-German, content. They are also fierce in criticizing the failure of the European Parliament in promoting the EU within the UK, endorsing Leonard’s (1998) description of the EU’s management of the press in the UK as “The Great Public Relations Disaster”: “(w)hat is perhaps the most crucial body in helping to achieve legitimacy for the EU within the UK is almost invisible to the voters whom it represents” (p. 157). Where Weymouth and Anderson’s analysis becomes problematic is in their overview of the left-of-centre press which, they believe, has failed to explain the euro properly: “(t)he advantages of a single currency have never been fully

70 Una McCormack explained to the British public by the press” (p. 93). At the heart of their critique is their belief that there has been a debasement of the debate, a “conversationalization of public discourse” (p. 3) leading to a situation in which “the majority of the reading public is indeed insulted by the quality of the press performance with regard to European issues” (p. 185). Yet Weymouth and Anderson do not seem to take seriously the notion that, perhaps, having had the single currency explained to them, sections of the British public might still choose not to support it. One is left with the thought that Weymouth and Anderson do the British public as much a disservice as the press which they censure. Survey research on British attitudes towards Europe Survey research seems to support strongly the characterization of Britain as a Eurosceptic nation. A poll of 1004 adults in Britain conducted by ICM in January 2001 reported that two out of three respondents said they would describe themselves as British and not European. Just three per cent said they would regard themselves as European first (although a majority [53 per cent] of those surveyed believed that Britain should stay in the European Union). A survey by MORI in March 2001 of 21–35-year-olds in four European countries suggests that a European identity is emerging among this age group in France, Germanyand Italy, with onethird of those surveyed seeing themselves as European first and foremost. In contrast, 75 per cent of those surveyed in the UK preferred to identify themselves as British. The Eurobarometer (EB) opinion surveys, conducted twice a year by the European Commission across all EU member states, collect data on a number of key issues, such as support for EU membership and the euro, perceptions of the benefits of EU membership, and also the development of a shared European identity. Data from this survey refer to the United Kingdom as a whole (and thus including Northern Ireland), and relate to surveys published between July 2001 (EB 55) and November 1997 (EB 47), i.e. covering the period of the last UK parliament. I focus here on reporting data which provide information on attachment to national and European identity. Across this period, respondents were asked to what extent they considered themselves European only, or their nationality only. This information is presented in Table 4.1. The UK has consistently been well above average in terms of percentages who report feeling only their own nationality; since the start of 1999 the UK has reported the highest scores of any member state, even as the European average has decreased. In terms of those expressing solely a European identity, the figure remains very low in comparison, and close to the EU average. As EB 54 (2001a) summarizes: “in the UK … national identity is clearly the prevailing sentiment” (p. 13). This contrasts with the general situation in Europe: “we find that in a number of countries people are more and more likely to have a shared sense of identity with their own nationality on the one hand and Europe on the other hand” (p. 13).

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Table 4.1 Eurobarometer survey respondents’ expression of nationality/Europeanness Eurobarometer

Nationality only (%)

European only (%)

54 53 52 51 50 49 48 47

62 (38) 64 (41) 67 (45) No data 62 (43) 60 (44) No data 57 (45)

3 (4) 2 (4) 3 (6) No data 5 (4) 5 (5) No data 6 (5)

(Sources: Eurobarometer nos 47–54) Notes 1. Bold figures indicate the lowest score across all EU partners for that year. 2. Figures in brackets indicate the EU average for that year.

Measures of attachment to Europe were taken in 1999 (EB 51) and 2001 (EB 54); the UK gave the lowest scores across all EU partners in both years, almost 20 per cent less than the EU average, although a 4 per cent improvement was measured between studies. EB 54 also reported on measures of “pride in being European”; “levels of pride are lowest in the UK (45 per cent) … (i)n the UK, 19 per cent feels not at all proud” (p. 15). A question on whether there is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans was asked in 1999 (EB 50) and again in 2000 (EB 52). The UK scored lowest in terms of agreement (28 per cent), and this figure remained steady, and 10 per cent below the EU average (38 per cent). However, levels of disagreement with this statement dropped 5 per cent in the period, and were not the highest recorded across all 15 EU member states. On issues of identity, then, a national identity appears firmly in place in the UK, and attachment to a European identity weak. More generally, the UK appears to be one of the most sceptical member states. Data from most recent Eurobarometer surveys show that on all key seven questions asked on the survey, the UK consistently scores below the EU average (these questions relate to support for the euro, enlargement, a common foreign policy, a common security policy, and to the benefits of membership, whether membership is a good thing, and trust in the EU). The UK gives the lowest score on five out of seven of the questions asked in each of the three most recent surveys to date. Europhilia in Britain By all indications from surveys, then, Britain seems to be a Eurosceptic nation, one in which attachment to national identity remains strong. Yet it should be noted once again that ICM’s survey in January 2001 showed that a majority (53 per cent) of those surveyed believed that Britain should stay in the European Union. Moreover, the academic literature emphasizes the increased fragmentation of Britishness and the elusive, weak nature of English national

72 Una McCormack Table 4.2 British responses to Eurobarometer surveys EB

Membership good thing (%)

Benefit from membership(%)

Trust in EC (%)

Support for euro (%)

Support common foreign policy (%)

Support common security policy(%)

Support enlargement (%)

53 54 55

25 (49) 28 (50) 29 (48)

25 (47) 30 (47) 29 (45)

24 (45) 24 (46) 25 (45)

22 (58) 21 (55) 25 (59)

40 (64) 36 (65) 38 (65)

49 (73) 51 (73) 51 (73)

26 (27) 31 (44) 35 (43)

(Sources: Eurobarometer 53–5) Notes 1. Bold figures indicate the lowest score across all EU partners for that year. 2. Figures in brackets indicate the EU average for that year.

identity – yet Eurobarometer data argue that one reason a supranational attachment to Europe has not emerged is because of persistent attachment to a national identity. What lies behind these inconsistencies? One possible explanation is that in studies encompassing the whole of Britain or the UK, the more Europhile voices of Scottish and Welsh participants are being lost, i.e. that Euroscepticism is an English phenomenon. Haesly (2001) writes that: “many Scots and Welsh possess positive attitudes towards specific aspects of Europe … a view under-emphasized given the Euroscepticism of the British press and the Conservative Party” (p. 82). Haesly conducted a detailed and extensive Q methodological study of European attachment in Scotland and Wales, in which he extracted factors representing 9 accounts, which divide broadly into two groups: Eurosceptics, and positively inclined European attachments. One of the most important features to come out of his analysis is the instrumental nature of some of the positive European attachments, connected to specifically Welsh or Scottish concerns, e.g. the economic benefits resulting from European integration. In addition, European attachment had a symbolic value; he writes: “many Welsh respondents use positive European attitudes to distinguish themselves from the perceived Eurosceptic English” (p. 82). Europhilia, in this case, is primarily connected to formulating an identity which is differentiated from the perceived essence of another identity; as Haesly summarizes: “not all European attachments may be truly classified as ‘Europhile’ ” (p. 83). In Scotland, Haesly found a similar diversity in positive European attachments, some of which have an instrumental function: [I]n many ways, Scottish Eurosceptics and Scottish Europhiles are polar opposites. Whereas Eurosceptics worry about the sovereign implications of the European Union, Europhiles actually embrace European integration for precisely this reason. (p. 89) In both Wales and Scotland, however, Euroscepticism is connected to a sense of Britishness; there is a “simple, yet powerful, conclusion … that Euroscepticism in Scotland and Wales is primarily a matter of Britishness” (p. 93).

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Haesly emphasizes the need for a more complex understanding beyond the simple binaries which pervade discussion of attitudes: [w]hile a primary cleavage toward the European Union remains between Eurosceptics and Europhiles, such categorization does not adequately describe the range of attitudes that individuals form about this complex political institution. (p. 82) He concludes: “it does disservice to the complexity of European attitudes to rely on the traditional assessment that Britain is a nation of Eurosceptics” (p. 98). Haesly’s conclusions, of course, refer to Wales and Scotland. The questions remaining are: Does Europhilia exist in England? What forms does it take? How does it relate to the Euroscepticism for which Britain is more generally known? The following section describes in detail a study carried out in England and Scotland into national and supranational attachments.

Overview of results • •

Five accounts emerged from four factors (see Appendix 4.1 for factor loadings and Appendix 4.2 for factor arrays). Pluralism was most prominently expressed and it emerged in two forms: •

•

•

•

Supranationalism emerged in two forms: • • •

•

A pluralism which was optimistic about Britain’s involvement in Europe while emphasizing diversity; it was most commonly expressed by those who described themselves as being on the left. A pluralism which was associated with patriotism; respondents described themselves as British and Scottish; they were more ambivalent towards the EU, seeing both pros and cons; this account was expressed by people from a variety of political affiliations. This pluralism questions the simplistic notion that Britain is a Eurosceptic nation. Whilst no specific European supranational identity emerged (see below), both pluralist accounts were positive about an EU which respected diversity.

A supranationalism which was in opposition to nationalism and racism. A supranationalism which was not connected to any national identity, connected instead to attachments such as Christianity or feminism. No explicitly European supranational attachment emerged.

Nationalism was expressed only by English respondents, and it was characterized by a sense of being under threat. This reflects the academic literature which describes English national identity as being in “crisis” (Kumar 2000).

74 Una McCormack Setting The P-set Since this study was taking place within the context of the other, pan-European studies, it was important that the focus remained on the investigation of the dynamic between the national (British) and the supranational (European), and the possible emergence of supranational identity. In the interests of simplicity, this suggested that investigating national identity within Britain should be avoided, and the P-set made up of respondents from only one part of Great Britain, e.g. England. However, this would fail to address Kumar’s challenge to avoid the “fatal ambiguity as to whether the object of analysis is England or Britain as a whole”. It would persist in equating Britain with England, giving no information on the wider spectrum of British national attachment. It was therefore decided that while the bulk of the respondents would be English (and these would be matched according to the model used in the other studies), this would be complemented by a number of responses from Scottish participants, in order to investigate the wider British context.6 The P-set was chosen to follow the sampling model outlined in the original study in France, attempting to capture a sample of people with variations in age, working status, and gender, as well as differences between rural and urban settings. In total 32 interviews were conducted in England, and seven in Scotland. In addition, three more Q sorts were added to provide a representation of how the literature represented a pluralist (sort 40), a supranationalist (sort 41) and a nationalist (sort 42). These three sorts brought the total number to 42. Developing the Q-set Two main principles lay behind the development of the Q-set for the British study (see Appendix 4.2 for the full list of statements that are included in the factor arrays). First, in order to facilitate comparisons across all the studies being conducted, many statements from the French study were translated directly into English. For example, statements 7 and 8 required little in the way of adjustment to work in a British setting: 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties. 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Britain. Second, for those statements which were particular to the French study, translation into a British context was carried out with the principle of “thematic” replication, i.e. to maintain the way in which the statements divided evenly into the three theoretical positions (supranationalist, pluralist, and nationalist), whilst allowing the statements to have local resonance. Examples of this would be: 15 The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France.

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This statement, which had been used as a campaign slogan during a French election and was related to a particular expression of French nationalism, was replaced with: 15 Britain’s relationship to Europe is entirely shaped by the experience of the Second World War. Since the study was primarily concerned with exploring the connection between British identity and the possible emergence of European supranational identity, the words “Britain” and “British” were used throughout. However, a Q-set enables the researcher to catch various nuances of meaning. For example, the following statement from the French study was replaced: 35 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. This statement, taken from the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, was judged not to have similar applicability to the British situation, in which Parliament functions as a symbol of sovereignty. As a result, the following statement was substituted: 35 The reality of the British constitution is that to be part of the United Kingdom is to accept that the sovereignty of the people is vested in Parliament. Most importantly, this statement allowed investigation of different conceptualizations of sovereignty in English and Scottish political discourse. The statement was taken from a remark made by a Scottish Conservative during the devolution debate, and had been subsequently used by supporters of devolution to show how the English conception of sovereignty (as being vested in Parliament) differed from the Scottish idea in which the people remain the source of sovereignty. Whilst giving a representative account of one perspective of sovereignty in the British context, this statement could therefore also operate as a means of exploring competing conceptions of sovereignty in Britain. Context of the study sites Following the parameters set by the French study, interviews in England were conducted in two areas, one urban and one rural. Study sites were chosen, in addition, to reflect an enduring division in English society: the “north–south divide.” Average gross household and personal incomes are higher in London and the southeast than other regions of the UK; house prices and weekly household expenditure are also higher and continue to rise at a faster pace. Differences in health were also noted, with, for example, deaths from heart and circulatory diseases

76 Una McCormack more common in the north than in southern regions (ONS 2000). The two study sites in England were chosen to reflect this national difference between north and south. Interviews in England were carried out in summer 2000, and in Scotland in autumn 2000. The urban study site was Sheffield, situated in the north of England, and the fourth largest city in England. Sheffield is, traditionally, a strong Labour “heartland”; five out of its six constituencies returned Labour members of parliament in the 1997 and 2001 general elections (Butler and Kavanagh 1997; BBC Vote 2001). However, the decline of Sheffield’s manufacturing industries (primarily steel) throughout the 1980s and 1990s has gone hand-in-hand with falling turnout in elections – turnout dropped by 5.7 per cent between the 1992 and 1997 general elections (Butler and Kavanagh 1997), and the constituency of Sheffield Central recorded the fourth lowest turnout in 1997 (53 per cent, dropping to 48.5 per cent in 2001; BBC Vote 2001). Sheffield City Council was taken by the Liberal Democrats in the 1998 local elections and has been subsequently held. Interviews with rural participants took place in Cambridgeshire, one of England’s largest agricultural areas. The parliamentary constituency in which interviews were conducted is Cambridgeshire South-East, a traditionally Conservative region (the Conservatives have lost the seat only once in the last 75 years); in addition, the area is part of the Eastern region which, in the 1999 European elections, returned one of three MEPs from the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP is dedicated to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Recent years have seen the emergence of a “countryside” identity coalesced around various rural and pro-hunting interests under the name of the Countryside Alliance.7 The political situation in Scotland had a distinct composition well before devolution. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged as a significant force in Scottish politics; it is a left-of-centre party committed to Scottish independence, and has a strong commitment to European integration. In the 1997 election the SNP polled 22 per cent of the vote and doubled its number of MPs, holding most of these seats in the 2001 election (winning five). The Liberal Democrats won ten seats. The collapse of the Conservative vote in Britain in 1997 was particularly marked in Scotland, with no Conservative MPs returned for any Scottish constituencies; only one seat was won in 2001. Labour hold by far the greatest number of Westminster seats, 55 in all in 2001. In the devolved Scottish Parliament, Labour holds the largest number of seats; the SNP is the official party of opposition.

Summary of the accounts Four factors of significance were extracted, and five accounts were interpreted: 1 Optimistic pluralism 2 Besieged nationalism

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3 Patriotic pluralism 4 Beyond national identity 5 Anti-nationalism Account 1: Optimistic pluralism This account was made up of 10 pure loadings and two mixed loadings, seven men and five women. Respondents were from a mixture of political backgrounds, with a skewing towards left-of-centre descriptions. Several respondents also selfdescribed in terms of national identity, including British, Scottish, and Irish. This account was the most positive about Britain’s role in the European Union, and showed the first signs of the possible emergence of a new identity: 10 The EU is a means to ensure peace and stability for Britain in the future (+4). 23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up (+4). However, there was a strong emphasis on diversity: 22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for EU to work (+4). 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse (+3). 19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality (+3). 36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities (+2). As a result, this account has to be seen as pluralistic, as the following ratings show: 1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the EU and we are left empty as a result (–3). 12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next; I feel I am more a citizen of Europe (–3). 17 Britain must maintain an independence in European affairs (+1) Negative loadings were associated with what were described in interview as “racist” statements: 5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity (–4).

78 Una McCormack 9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was British (–4). 18 The EU is simply German dominance by the back door (–4). Summary • • • •

Enthusiasm for the EU as a project for peace and stability in Europe. Respect for the diversity of member states seen as part of the strength of this project. Rejection of nationalist sentiments, perceived as “racist.” No European attachment – this is a pluralist account.

Account 2: Besieged nationalism The second account was derived from a factor made up of 10 pure loadings and one mixed loading. Two of these loadings were strongly negative, and are discussed separately as Account 5 (anti-nationalism). All the theoretical sorts loaded significantly on this factor, with the supranationalist sort providing a negative loading. The theoretical nationalist sort loaded strongly on this factor, and this account clearly represents nationalism. Of those who expressed this account, the majority were of an older generation, both men and women, all of whom were well into retirement age. There was a slight skew towards respondents coming from rural areas. Two young men also articulated this account, and all respondents were from England. 3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics (+4). 5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity (+4). 28 If someone said something bad about being British, I would feel they had said something bad about me (+3). 35 The reality of the British constitution is that to be part of the UK is to accept that the sovereignty of the people is vested in Parliament (+3). 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties (+2). 6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future (–4). 33 The nation state is too weak to ensure us equality and too strong to allow us freedom … it is the focus of irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions (–2). 29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic (–2).

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The account is explicitly anti-European: 10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Britain in the future (–4). 12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next; I feel I am more a citizen of Europe (–4). 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Britain (–3). 25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies (–3). 36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities (–3). 14 I feel very attached to Europe as a whole (–2). 32 In general, Britain has profited from its involvement with the EU (–2). But despite its strong nationalism, this is an identity which feels under threat (note in particular the ambivalent rating for statement 23): 1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result (+3). 4 Globalization means the death of national culture (+3). 23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up (0). Summary • •

English nationalism, but a sense of being under threat. Explicitly anti-European.

Account 3: Patriotic pluralism The sense of being under siege contrasts sharply with the more robust patriotism expressed by respondents on Account 3, made up of six pure and two mixed loadings. Of the respondents, half were Scottish and half English, three were women and five men. There was a mixture of political affiliation, including a Liberal Democrat local councillor, and self-descriptions as diverse as “Scottish Socialist” and “British Conservative”. Account 3 can be understood as a more patriotic form of pluralism than that expressed by Account 1. Its pluralism is expressed clearly in these ratings: 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse (+4).

80 Una McCormack 19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity; it would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality (+4). 22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for European Union to work (+2). 36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities (+2). 5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity (–2). 30 British society is united by a delusion of our shared history and by a common hatred of our neighbours (–2). The rating of this final statement also points to a belief in the already pluralist nature of British society. Patriotism is expressed in the following statements (numbers in brackets compare rankings for the other pluralist account, Account 1, showing the main points of difference between these two accounts): 3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics +3 (–1). 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties +3 (–3). 23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up –4 (+4). 14 I feel very attached to Europe as a whole –3 (0). 12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next; I feel I am more a citizen of Europe –3 (–3). Respondents on this account are therefore generally ambivalent towards the EU (and not at all pro-euro): 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Britain (–4). 10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Britain (–1). 21 The pace of European integration is too slow (–1). 11 Our national leaders are capable of maintaining our institutions in a global environment (+1). 17 Britain must maintain an independence in European affairs (+1). 32 In general, Britain has profited from its involvement in the EU (+1).

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One respondent, respondent 32, provided a mixed loading on both this and Account 1; this respondent, whose work was liaising between the EU and local government, was therefore able to articulate a more explicitly positive attitude towards Europe with a strong sense of patriotism (here, towards Scotland). Summary • • •

Emphasis on diversity as being necessary to any European project. Otherwise ambivalent about either pros or cons of European integration. Strong patriotism, described by individual respondents in a variety of ways: British, Scottish, English.

Account 4: Beyond national identity Taking supranationalism to be the belief that “modern pressures will inevitably compel people to bypass the nation state and form a new political community,” it appears that this account (four pure loadings and one mixed loading) expresses some aspects of supranationalism, e.g. a rejection of nationalism: 6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future (+4). 33 The nation state is too weak to ensure us equality and too strong to allow us freedom … it is the focus of irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions (+3). 4 Globalization means the death of national culture (+3). 5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity (–4). 9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also British (–4). 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties (–3). 11 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment (–3). 28 If someone said something bad about being British, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me (–2). Nevertheless, there is no acceptance of a European identity, with respondents, in the main, showing ambivalence towards Europe: 12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next; I feel I am more a citizen of Europe (–3). 14 I feel very attached to Europe as a whole (–2).

82 Una McCormack 10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Britain in the future (–1). 26 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go (–1). 17 Britain must maintain an independence in European affairs (+2). 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Britain (+2). 20 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures (+2). 21 The pace of European integration is too slow (+2). For this group of respondents, loyalties lie elsewhere; based on interview material, these supranational attachments include Christianity and feminism: 29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic (+2). 24 Without the Empire, Britain has been a second-rate power (+2). 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties (–3). Summary • •

A rejection of nationalism. No particular enthusiasm for the EU; other trans-national attachments expressed.

Account 5: Anti-nationalism The two respondents who make up this account loaded negatively on the factor which, in its positive form, expresses Account 2: Besieged nationalism. This account, Anti-nationalism, stands in opposition to nationalism: one of the respondents (respondent 26) also loaded significantly on Account 1 (optimistic pluralism), which is compatible with the strongly anti-racist sentiments expressed by that account. The other respondent (respondent 27), with a strong, pure, negative loading on this factor, described herself as an “anti-nationalist.” However, this person demonstrated no particular emotional attachment to Europe. She expressed a belief that globalization and the shift to greater European integration were inevitable, but felt that this had both positive and negative potential. Reflecting this, she rated statement 12 (“I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am more a citizen of Europe.”) at 0. She did not self-describe with any of the identities offered in the interview, preferring her own descriptions, none of which was related to national or political affiliations. Turning to the respondent (respondent 26) who articulated both this and Account 1, it was considered that this respondent might hold a European supranational attachment, since these accounts combine anti-nationalism with optimism about the EU. Looking closely at this respondent’s individual sort, the case remained

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unclear. He did not describe as European, rating statement 12 at –2, but expressed attachment to Europe, rating statement 14 (“I feel very attached to Europe as a whole”) at +2. Strong agreement was given to the diversity of the EU: 22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for EU to work (+4). In common with the pure response, there was a sense of an inevitability of the globalizing processes leading to closer European attachment: 6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future (+3). 2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for Britain (+3). But there was also a dismissal of patriotism and a strong rejection of emotional descriptions of national sentiment: 29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic (+4). 5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity (–4). 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties (–4). This points to a pragmatic, rather than an emotional, vision of the European Union.

Discussion In May 1945, when the devastation wrought by nationalist ideologies could be seen across the world, George Orwell wrote a penetrating analysis of the delusions of nationalism and the psychological crutch such attachments provide. Merciless in exposing the self-deceptions on which the varieties of nationalism he describes depend, he nonetheless insists on differentiating nationalism and patriotism: Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism … [O]ne must draw a distinction, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By “patriotism” I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality. (Orwell 2000, pp. 300–1)

84 Una McCormack In this study, precisely such a distinction emerged. A patriotism, based in a pluralist conception of both Britain and the EU and associated with a pluralism more optimistic about the EU, could be distinguished from the Europhobia expressed by the nationalist account. This is by no means a denial of the significance of the nationalist identity which emerged in England. This nationalism is indeed, as the literature suggests, connected to a post-imperial sense of reduction of influence, a bitter pill for those who would prefer to see the nation of that attachment acquiring “more power and more prestige.” Most importantly, drawing this distinction does not gloss over the powerful antagonisms and hostilities that nationalist attachments enable. The example of the respondent who expressed suspicion and dislike of the Kosovan refugees housed near him demonstrates clearly that the articulation of “hot” nationalism affects the day-to-day reality of those who come to this country seeking asylum and also, for example, many non-white British citizens. Billig would argue that it is the banalities of patriotism which keep nationalism simmering and ready to boil over. However, the patriotism expressed in this study emphasized the necessity of accepting a plurality of possible identifications; in this respect “patriotic pluralism” was closely related to the more enthusiastically pro-European “optimistic pluralism.” By focusing on the centrality of pluralism in these accounts, the lack of a European supranational identity becomes more explicable. There can be no doubt, based on the findings of this study, of the weakness of such an identity. Supranationalism emerged as anti-nationalism or as an attachment to a religious or feminist identity, but not as an emerging European identity. Indeed, perhaps the most conspicuous message from this study comes from the single consensus statement across factors, statement 12: “I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am more a citizen of Europe.” Its ranking is shown in Table 4.3. Neither of the two respondents who articulated anti-nationalism gave a positive rating to this statement, again suggesting a lack of emotional attachment to a European identity. It is hard to see how the case for an emerging European supranationalist identity in Britain can be made. Indeed, it is possible to argue that European supranationalism sits uneasily with pluralist discourses which see respect for diversity as a necessary aspect of any European union, and such a sentiment is expressed by both pluralist accounts, as shown in the ratings for statement 13 (“I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse”) and statement 22 (“European countries are diverse, but it is possible for European Union to work”), which were ranked across the two accounts as shown in Table 4.4: Table 4.3 Ranking of statement 12 in four accounts Account Statement

1

2

3

4

12

–3

–4

–3

–3

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Table 4.4 Ranking of statements 13 and 22 in two accounts Account Statement

1

3

13 22

+3 +4

+4 +2

Pluralism, even in its patriotic form, is certainly not Europhobia, and neither is it necessarily the same as Euroscepticism, unless Euroscepticism and Europhobia are to be defined as not choosing “European” as one’s primary – even only – political or cultural allegiance. Haesly (2001) describes the problems associated with such overly simplistic binary distinctions: [w]hile a primary cleavage in attitudes towards the European Union remains between Eurosceptics and Europhiles, such categorization does not adequately describe the range of attitudes that individuals form about this complex political institution. (p. 82) The characterization of Britain as a nation of Eurosceptics, as the “awkward partner,” fails to capture this diversity. As Haesly (2001) writes: the “awkward partner” literature emphasizes how British attitudes toward Europe differ from other European Union members’ attitudes rather than investigating how British attitudes towards Europe often reflect trends found in more positively inclined EU member states. (p. 82) He concludes: it does disservice to the complexity of European attitudes to rely on the traditional assessment that Britain is a nation of Eurosceptics. (p. 98) Let us return, once again, to the simple but powerful messages emerging from the poll conducted by ICM in January 2001. Two out of three respondents said they would describe themselves as British and not European; only three per cent said they would regard themselves as European first. But a majority (53 per cent) of those surveyed believed that Britain should stay in the European Union. The study reported in this chapter supports these findings, that many people in Britain – British, Scottish, English – would welcome being in a Europe of diversity and plurality, which eschews single identifications – national or supranational – and where patriotic attachment remains one acceptable option among many.

86 Una McCormack

Notes 1 On this point, it perhaps bears mentioning that the last major anti-Catholic legislation was repealed in 1871, and the monarch can still not be a Catholic. This was a pluralist settlement of Protestant interests. 2 The devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Assembly in December 1999, following the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998, resulted from circumstances particular to the Northern Irish situation. 3 The “West Lothian Question,” an enduring conundrum of the already cryptic British constitution, was posed by Labour MP Tam Dalyell, and asks: “after devolution, why should Scottish MPs at Westminster be allowed to vote on English domestic matters while English MPs would not be allowed to vote on Scottish domestic matters, which would be the sole concern of the Scottish parliament?” 4 “Great Britain” refers to the union of the Scottish and English crowns (1603) and parliaments (1707). Wales had been linked to England since 1536. The “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” was formed in 1921 on the creation of the Irish Free State (the Republic of Ireland). “Britain” and “British,” therefore, do not refer to either the Irish or Northern Ireland – “the British Isles” is used to denote the geographical islands, although the phrase “these islands” is often used. 5 See http://www.cec.org.uk/press/myths/. 6 Studying both Welsh and Scottish national identity was unfortunately beyond the scope of this research. Irish identity is explored in greater detail in another chapter. 7 Interviews in rural areas took place before the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease.

References Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Anderson, P.J. and Weymouth, A. 1999. Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. London: Longman. BBC Vote 2001, Results and Constituencies. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/ english/static/vote2001/results_constituencies/default.stm. Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D. 1997. The British General Election of 1997. London: Macmillan. Cannadine, D. 1995. “British History as a ‘new subject’: politics, perspectives and prospects.” In Grant, A. and Stringer, K.J. (eds), Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History. London: Routledge. Colley, L. 1996. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837. London: Vintage. The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. 2000. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. London: Profile Books. Condor, S. 1996. “ ‘Unimagined Community?’ Some social psychological issues concerning English national identity,” in Breakwell, G.M. and Lyons, E. (eds), Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Eurobarometer 47. 1997a. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 47. 1997b. Young People’s Attitudes to the European Union: A Typology of Public Opinion Among Young Europeans. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

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Eurobarometer 47. 1997c. Women’s Attitudes to the European Union: A Typology of Public Opinion Among Europe’s Women. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 48. 1998a. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 49. 1998b. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 50. 1999a. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 51. 1999b. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 52. 2000a. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 53. 2000b. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 54. 2001a. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 55. 2001b. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Evans, E. 1995. “Englishness and Britishness: national identities, c.1790–1870.” In Grant, A. and Stringer, K.J. (eds), Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History. London: Routledge. George, S. 1998. An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haesly, R. 2001. “Eurosceptics, Europhiles and instrumental Europeans: European attachment in Scotland and Wales,” European Union Politics, 2(1), pp. 81–102. Kumar, K. 2000. “Nation and empire: English and British national identity in comparative perspective,” Theory and Society, 29(5), pp. 575–608. Laffan, B. 1996. “The politics of identity and political order in Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), pp. 81–123. Leonard, M. 1998. Making Europe Popular: The Search for European Identity. London: Demos. ONS (Office of National Statistics). 2000. Regional Trends, 35. London: HMSO. Orwell, G. 2000. “Notes on nationalism,” in Essays. London: Penguin Classics.

88 Una McCormack

Appendix 4.1: Factor loadings Q sort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

1 –.32

Factors 2 3 –.23 .55 .10 .07 –.10 .21 .19 .43 .16 .42 –.27 .09 .15 .03 .15 .29 –.18 .17 .28 .46 .20 .12 .14 .51 .27 –.03 –.09 .05 –.21 .27 .16 .23 .14 .75 –.01 –.02 –.12 .40 –.12 .26 –.16 .41 –.07 .46 –.21 .29 .06 –.01 –.33 .57 –.51 .03 .24 –.70 –.14 .09 .24 .66 –.16 .43 .02 –.06 –.34 .50 .05 .20 .16 .68 –.28 .20 –.32 .47 –.12 .47 .47 –.12 .05 .10 .36 .55 –.10 –.84 –.02 .75

4 .12 .23 –.18 .02 .06 .79 –.08 .02 .35 .16 .00 .63 .73 .15 –.02 .74 .11 .30 .17 –.03 .10 .38 .28 –.14 .24 .15 .20 .15 .10 .16 .29 .01 .26 .17 .54 .27 –.19 .11 –.01 –.08 –.17 –.09

Gender Age Class Setting M O W R .40 F O MC R .41 M O MC R –.07 F Y W R .11 F O W R .01 M O MC U .05 F Y W U .22 M O MC U .40 F O MC U –.02 F O MC U –.05 M O W U .16 F N/A N/A S .23 F Y W U .72 M Y MC U .75 F Y MC U .07 F O W U .07 M O W U .55 F O W U .66 M Y MC U .70 F Y MC U .40 F Y MC R .15 M Y MC R .51 M Y W R .78 M O MC R .27 M Y MC R .63 M N/A N/A S .39 F Y MC R .53 F O MC R –.04 M O W R .12 F O W R .46 F Y W R .47 M N/A N/A S .61 M N/A N/A S .27 F N/A N/A S .03 F N/A N/A S .25 M N/A N/A S .27 M Y W R .03 M Y W U .10 M Y W U .34 N/A N/A N/A N/A .21 N/A N/A N/A N/A –.17 N/A N/A N/A N/A M = male; F = female; Y = young; O = older; MC = middle class; W = working class; U = rural; R = rural; S = Scotland

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Appendix 4.2: Q sample and factor arrays – European/English and Scottish national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–3

4

–1

1

2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for Britain.

0

–1

0

–2

3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics.

–1

4

3

4

4 Globalization means the death of national culture.

–2

3

0

3

5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity.

–4

4

–2

–4

0

–4

0

4

1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result.

6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties.

–3

2

3

–3

2

–3

–4

2

–4

0

–4

–4

10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Britain in the future.

4

–4

–1

–1

11 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment.

0

0

1

–3

–3

–4

–3

–3

3

1

4

0

8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Britain. 9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also British.

12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am more a citizen of Europe. 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. 14 I feel very attached to Europe as a whole.

0

–2

–3

–2

–2

2

3

0

16 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe … It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances.

3

–1

4

0

17 Britain must maintain an independence in European affairs.

1

1

1

2

–4

0

–2

0

3

1

4

1

–1

2

0

1

15 Britain’s relationship to Europe is entirely shaped by the experience of the Second World War.

18 The European Union is simply German dominance by the back door. 19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. 20 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures.

continued …

90 Una McCormack Appendix 4.2 continued Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

21 The pace of European integration is too slow.

1

0

–2

1

22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for European Union to work.

4

0

2

0

23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up.

4

0

–4

–2

24 Without the Empire, Britain has been a second-rate power.

2

1

–1

2

25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies.

–1

–3

1

–1

26 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go.

–2

2

2

–1

27 The Royal Family is a symbol of our national unity.

–1

1

–3

–4

0

3

–1

–2

28 If someone said something bad about being British, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. 29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic.

2

–2

0

2

30 British society is united by a delusion of our shared history and by a common hatred of our neighbours.

–1

–1

–2

4

31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity.

0

–1

2

1

32 In general, Britain has profited from its involvement in the EU.

1

–2

1

0

33 The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us freedom … it is the focus of irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions

–2

–2

–1

3

34 Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time.

1

–1

1

–1

35 The reality of the British constitution is that to be part of the United Kingdom is to accept that the sovereignty of the people is vested in Parliament.

1

3

0

3

36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities.

2

–3

2

–1

The parenthetical notations [(N), (SN) and (PL)] after each statement incorporates the Q sample structure discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. nationalist, supranationalist and pluralist.

Supranational identity emerging in France

5

91

Supranational identity emerging in France Nationalism submergent Richard Robyn

This chapter will describe the results of part of the overall multinational project, an attempt to examine French perceptions of the European Union. French involvement with all the key issues raised by this project – nationalism, the nation state and the European Union – will be discussed briefly in the first section of this chapter as background information. Then a lengthier discussion of the study and its results will be presented, followed by a concluding section that attempts to draw out some of the findings and their implications for the overall study.

France, nationalism and the EU Perhaps more than the other countries in this multinational project, France offers an interesting and telling “living laboratory” for analysis of national/supranational identity issues. Its history with the European Union movement would lead us to predict generally favorable attitudes among French people towards a European ideal. But that history also suggests potentially ambivalent feelings about the EU itself, and perhaps significant divisions as to its direction and fundamental makeup (for example, whether it should be primarily a supranational or intergovernmental institution). The intimate involvement of the country through its history in the establishment of arguably the first nation state and nationalism in its Revolution suggest a potentially compelling mix of beliefs on the part of its citizens. We think of France as the home of the nation state. This was the country where Cardinal Richelieu and the kings he served built that unique combination of the absolutist bureaucratic state wedded powerfully to a nation of people with a sense (either volunteristic or compelled by that state) of its unitary culture. Not only through building of the nation state, the French also contributed hugely to nationalism with their Revolution, so important for the key concept of popular sovereignty, that the ultimate authority in a nation is the will of all of the people of that nation. This concept later yields to the idea of self-determination of government based on national and/or ethnic background, a key building-block for nations throughout the twentieth century. When it comes to France, we also think of Napoleon and the spread of the ideals of national unity to other countries, of Charles de Gaulle and the grandeur

92 Richard Robyn of French culture. To this day, support for the nation state and state intervention in society is deeply embedded in all French political parties across the ideological spectrum (Jachtenfuchs et al. 1998, p. 431). And yet, France has shown a commitment to the European ideal that has been characterized as “changing yet steadfast” (Tiersky 1994, p. 174). Perhaps because of the long, and too often disastrous, experience the country has had with nationalism, key French figures were early and strong supporters of the EU, although with sometimes different views of how the institution should look and behave. French leaders were instrumental in establishing the first institutions of the European movement. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded by Frenchman Jean Monnet who, together with his compatriot foreign minister Robert Schumann, envisioned this institution of economic and productive cooperation as a way primarily for France and Germany to sit firmly, if not always comfortably, together as the twin driving forces of European integration. This bilateral approach to the development of the EU has continued largely to the present. French leaders played out on the public stage the different kinds of attitudes towards European integration noted previously in the introductory chapter. Monnet and Schuman exemplified the supranationalist side of the argument, standing for strong European institutions. They worked in tandem, although more often at crosspurposes, with their own prominent national leader, Charles de Gaulle, who represented the different pluralist point of view. It was de Gaulle who forcefully argued for a “Europe of the Nations,” in which the member states would jealously guard their sovereignty while still working cooperatively for the good of Europe. De Gaulle, for example, forced voting procedures stipulating unanimous consensus in the European Council as an early condition for French continued involvement in the EC, what became known as the “Luxembourg Compromise.” This meant effectively that any one member country could block legislation if that country felt it compromised its sovereignty. While de Gaulle often appeared to the public as an advocate for French national interests above all others, he nonetheless remained a committed Europeanist (Beloff 1963), a position not inconsistent with that of the pluralist, as previously noted. Finally, at least two other French leaders have played important roles in EU construction. During the critical period of the early 1980s in which there was widespread questioning of the EEC and its purpose, French President François Mitterand felt the need to raise the stakes in the integration process. Through his influence, France decided not to utilize the Luxembourg Compromise, thereby unblocking logjams and leading to a more effective Council. Mitterand also backed the committed supranationalist Jacques Delors as Commission President in 1985, and supported his mandate to revive the community, with remarkable results, including the introduction of the single market and the single currency. While French leaders have been important advocates of European unity, what about the French people? Eurobarometer data have consistently placed France among the most supportive of the EU and the European movement in general since polling began in 1974. Perhaps because of the lengthy postwar involvement with the EU, the French have been generally supportive of European institutions.

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Yet, this has not been unadulterated support. In 1992, the French nearly voted down the Maastricht Treaty; and the 2002 spring elections, as we have noted in Chapter 1, brought the anti-EU National Front leader Jean-Marie Le Pen as far as the final runoff for president. Although Le Pen was soundly defeated in that election, the experience left a distinct impression that more is going on in French attitudes towards their affiliation with national and supranational identity than a simple reading of the country’s history might suggest.

The study The study was initially carried out in France and with French employees of the EU in Brussels during a nearly three-month period in the spring and summer of 1998, with follow-up work done during the summer of 2001. In France, study sites included Paris and the eastern province of Franche-Comté. The inclusion of Belgium in this study was primarily to elicit attitudes and histories of French Eurocrats working in the European Union itself, at its headquarters in Brussels. The Q sample of statements for this study has already been discussed in the methodology chapter. As a reminder, all statements were either derived from the literature or were otherwise indigenous to the population, and related to concepts of national and supranational identity formation. The statements for the French study, translated into English, are listed in Appendix 5.3. Participants were asked to sort 36 statements on individual cards, 12 each from the three theoretical positions described above. The sorting was done on an array from agree (+4) to disagree (–4), following this instruction in French: “These are statements made by people concerning national identity and the EU. Sort these statements from those you agree with to those you disagree with.” The P-set The population set (P-set) for this study were 37 French participants, 29 living in France and the remaining 8 being French employees of the EU in Brussels, Belgium. In addition to the 37 Q sorts, I added three more myself when I sorted the statements according to how I felt the literature represented a supranationalist (sort 34), a nationalist (sort 3) and a pluralist (sort 32). This additional sorting allowed easier and more graphic comparison of the factors that actually emerged from the data. These three sorts brought the total number of Q sorts to 40. The basic parameters for the P-set for the French study have already been described in the chapter on methodology. In practice, to fulfill the requirements for the P-set it was necessary to meet and engage a great variety of French people. This meant not only working with participants in the city of Besançon, but venturing out into the Jura countryside in the environs of the city. There I met with farmers, teachers, mayors of small villages, housewives, day laborers and others. The inclusion of Belgium in this study was primarily to elicit attitudes and histories of French Eurocrats working in the European Union itself, at its headquarters in Brussels. EU elites, as potential exemplars of supranationalist sentiment, were

94 Richard Robyn thought to exhibit the strongest commitment to a European ideal. It was important to tease out personal stories of commitment and change, of subjective assessments of a changing reality in the European polity. It was instructive as well to reveal differences and similarities in factors compared to those exhibited by French nonelites, such as those participants in provincial France.

Results: factors and French/European identity types Once the sorting for all participants was done, data was loaded into the PQMethod software program, which extracted the factors. This section of the paper provides a discussion of the identity types that were actually uncovered in that process. The empirical question to be addressed is whether the types theorized in the literature – the supranationalist, the nationalist and the pluralist – actually exist among French people. In contrast to the literature that presented three factors of significance, four factors were revealed. Factor 1 is labeled “supranationalist”; Factor 3 an “optimistic pluralist”; and Factor 4 a “disaffected populist.” Furthermore, an oppositional Factor 2 emerged as well, labeled a “nationalist”. This factor emerged as bipolar to Factor 1, thus forming a distinguishing grouping in itself in opposition to the supranationalist identity. All of these factors will now be discussed in some detail. The factor matrix used to interpret the identity types is found in Appendix 5.2. The factor loadings marked with asterisks are above 0.43 and are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.1 As the appendix illustrates, 10 persons are associated exclusively with Factor 1, while 2 are loaded on Factor 2, 13 on Factor 3 and 3 on Factor 4. In addition to these pure types (i.e. those loading exclusively on these factors) there were five mixed cases where Q sorts were significantly correlated with Factors 1 and 3 (3), Factors 2 and 3 (1) and 3 and 4 (1). As a reminder, the totals include my own sortings (sort 3 as Factor 2, sort 32 as Factor 3 and sort 34 as Factor 1). Factor arrays were created to analyze the identity types. These are found in Appendix 5.1, with the associated statements to which the factors reacted. The types that were revealed through these procedures will be described in the remainder of this section. Factor 1: The supranationalist Those labeled “supranationalist” have the most positive association with the EU of all the participants in the study. Supranationalists no longer see the nation state as commanding their primary allegiance. Statements that supranationalists related to most positively reflect this orientation: 12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of France (+4).

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6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future (+4). These statements received the highest positive scores by those that identified themselves with the supranationalist group, thus showing the greatest significant degree of salience on the question of (supra)national identity. The supranationalist identifies the EU as an international organization that has brought peaceful change to Europe, as the wave of a future in which it holds the promise of the end of nationalist divisions in Europe. But more than simply an organization, the EU is seen by supranationalists as the embodiment of ideals that they hold dear: peace, prosperity, solidarity, and social inclusion. Concerning the recent and ongoing introduction of the euro, which brings with it the remarkable loss of a key part of French identity, the franc, the supranationalist reacted positively (+3): “Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for France.” In a further key difference from all others in this study, supranationalists saw the EU as a potential avenue of redress for minorities mistreated by nationalism or otherwise left out of the benefits of national societies in Europe. Supranationalists rated as highest (+4) their agreement with statement 36: “Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities,” a sentiment that was for the most part simply not on the radar screen for all others in the study. It should be noted in this regard that ethnicity was not a targeted characteristic for the P-set, and only one participant, a Breton who scored as a strong supranationalist, made her ethnic background clear during interviews. The comments made by these participants could be interpreted in a number of different ways if heard randomly, but because they are combined with Q sorts in a focused interview with follow-up questions, what is revealed is the significance of the statements as a coherent discourse. This coherence is true even with certain dissimilarities of opinion on specific statements. For example, participant 17, the Breton, differed markedly with other supranationalists on the question of whether humanity is naturally divided into different cultural groupings. Where the group as a whole reacted mildly negatively to this statement (–1), this participant scored it the highest (+4), undoubtedly reflecting the salience to her of issues of multiculturalism and cultural diversity. Responses to statement 7 (“Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties”) were especially revealing on this latter point. One Eurocrat, participant 24, stated simply, “I am afraid of this kind of loyalty,” and then mentioned caustically the symbol of France, the rooster. Participant 29, also an EU bureaucrat, working in a position of authority in the Forward Studies Unit and a specialist on gender issues, articulated this point more clearly. She distinguished the idea of the nation as opposed to the nation state, arguing that the idea of the latter was of the nineteenth century especially. While for her the nation state was not disappearing, its hegemony in Europe was definitely on the wane. The nation state for her was a masculine,

96 Richard Robyn singular entity, linked more to territory and ultimately to a nationalism that is an emotional response to the little-understood forces of globalization. So conceived, the nation state is a far different political representation than a feminist perspective on politics in which people themselves mattered more. For her the EU represents a way to link people more directly across national boundaries. Participant 27, a French lawyer working in the legal services unit of the EU, had a unique perspective on the issue. In her job, she often must argue against her own country in court. “Because I know France best,” she said with a grin, “I can easily find the faults …” “The French government,” she added emphatically, “is not capable … you can’t leave these bureaucrats alone in a room together, they are at times so incompetent … technocrats govern now, not leaders … we have to explain things to them very simply.” But it was not only the EU bureaucrats who expressed supranationalist skepticism about the efficacy of the nation state. Participant 6, the elderly mayor of a village in the Jura, declared, “It is not the nation that is foundational, but the individual.” A young female college student (participant 11), while not very sure on most statements, seemed to agree on this point. She felt strongly that while France was a great nation with attractive ideals, it had been badly let down by the state that represented it: “We should have intervened earlier and more certainly in Rwanda,” she gave as an example. Participant 22, a pig farmer in the Franche-Comté whose scores placed him close to the supranationalist camp, was equally critical. “The worker has been mistreated by the system,” he said bitterly. “It’s always the small one who gets nothing and the big who have it all.” But what about the French nation? “Rien,” he said simply: “nothing.” Expressing sentiments that sounded strikingly similar to those of the disaffected populist which will be described below, the farmer nonetheless sorted the Q statements differently and was more closely allied with the supranationalists. This is perhaps at least in part in resignation to what he saw as inevitable: “we are all a part of Europe now, even a part of America … one can get in a plane and be there tonight.” This level of criticism naturally raised the issue of patriotism. These supranationalists could make a distinction between patriotism for the nation and for the nation state. Our pig farmer said about patriotism, with a sly wink, that one should have “just enough … but not too much.” Several felt that extreme patriotism was more characteristic of America than of France: “You see flags everywhere in America,” said participant 33 who had spent a summer working in Chicago. But most were wary in general of adopting an attitude that could be seen as too chauvinistic. Participant 38 commented, “Oh, yes, sure. You hear that all the time: ‘France is the most beautiful country in the world, with the most intelligent people.’ And,” he added sardonically, “the most modest!” The criticism of the nation state was likely allied to another distinguishing characteristic of the supranationalists their feeling of solidarity with minorities who are seen as excluded from the benefits of the nation (statement 36). For the supranationalists, the EU had a clearly positive role to play in this regard, while for the other factors this simply did not register as a personal interest or they felt

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actively opposed to the idea. While the Breton in the study was the most detailed in her discussion of this point, other supranationalists mentioned that constructing a European Union above and beyond the reach of the French nation could add a channel of aid for minorities. Within this factor, composed almost entirely of white French, there seemed to be a strong sense of solidarity with ethnic others. Another characteristic of the supranationalists was their unabashed attachment to Europe. More than any of the other factors, the supranationalists thought of themselves as European before French (statement 12) and felt very attached to Europe as a whole (14). But this attachment to Europe and their skepticism about the nation state, it should be said, did not automatically translate into a clear conception of a European identity. For participant 17, the Breton, it was not easy to give specific characteristics to this new form of identity. When pressed, she said, “It is that one has a choice in where you can live; it is not a closed society.” This shift in allegiance to another level does not for her mean a loss of personal identity. “On the contrary, I do not feel I am losing an identity, but gaining my own real personality, that which is made on personal experience.” A European identification could arise from negative feelings toward French identity as well. Participant 33, a young woman of Besançon, described herself as repelled by what she feels is the prevalent attitude in France of superiority towards other cultures: “The French always think they are the best.” But she also had difficulty describing a European identity, as did almost all in the study: “For me, it is cultural. Even with all the battles in our history … I am perhaps an idealist for an idea of Europe … I just have a hope … but I am not very confident for the reality of politics to forge a new European identity.” Did this identity include religion? She answered emphatically, “No, no!” Participant 6, the mayor of a small village in the Franche-Comté, described himself as a strong regionalist, an advocate both for his village and the Jura. He felt he was more European in previous years when he had worked closely with associations that sent and received young Europeans. “Am I very attached to Europe?” he muttered to himself as he did the Q sort, holding statement 14 (“I am very attached to Europe as a whole”) aside until the very end. “Europe has a richness of diversity that should be protected,” he explained finally, perhaps as much for his own benefit as mine, to argue through the problem. “This is a part of our geography, which has contributed to this … the beautiful Switzerland is an example, and our own Franche-Comté. I don’t want homogeneity.” But then abruptly he decided: “It bothers me that there are borders … . France will not stay alone and independent completely … Europe is necessary, it will grow in people’s lives.” He then placed the statement in the most positive category (+4). Was this a contradiction with his strong support for regional identity? No, he did not see it that way. For him, the identities did not necessarily conflict. Among the Eurocrats in the study, an interesting sidenote in this regard was whether any of them felt particularly “French,” living as they do in Belgium and working in an environment that stresses internationalism. Did they miss something, sometimes feel nostalgia for France? Undoubtedly because Belgium is such a

98 Richard Robyn close neighbor of France and Brussels a relatively cosmopolitan city, none of the EU bureaucrats spoke of especially feeling culture shock or nostalgia for France. But interestingly, several of them spoke of their personal political persuasion as helping in their keeping their French identity. As most are part of the European Socialist Party and they met regularly as a group to talk French politics, they spoke of feeling close because of that solidarity. The fourth and final distinguishing characteristic of the supranationalists was their stance towards the EU as preventing war in Europe. Most saw this as such an important and self-evident part of the EU that they did not speak of it much. The statement referring to it (statement 10) was simply and automatically placed in the higher part of the array. In general, the intensity of feeling on this issue was a function of age. Older people saw this as a reality while younger not so much, although even with the young it was an important part of the EU’s raison d’être. An interesting sidenote arose when those who grew up in homes in which the talk was of war seemed to share especially strong feelings about this issue. Participant 26, for example, a Eurocrat who oversees the translation services expressed concern during the interview for the loss of languages and cultures in the integration process, and spoke emphatically of the need to save national languages (“I am working here in part to defend the French language”). Yet on the point of the EU as saving Europe from war, she was immediately and assuredly positive about its role. As she explained, her parents grew up in Alsace-Lorraine during the First World War, and told her many stories of the war. Her family experienced first-hand the divisions of competing nationalisms: her aunt was proGerman, but her uncle pro-French, for example. For her, the EU represented a countervailing construction, a vision that undercuts nationalist ones. It may be interesting to note that her son was at that time a UN peacekeeper in Bosnia and was writing a book about what the French need to preserve in European integration. When broken down by characteristics of gender, age, socioeconomic background and education, there are some telling indicators for the supranationalists. They were all, with the exception of the pig farmer, exclusively well-educated professionals. Perhaps not surprisingly, those supranationalists who worked for the EU were especially well educated, several having gone to private international schools that demanded competence in more than one foreign language. But even those who did not work for the EU were well educated (two of the non-EU group were university professors and one a university student) and from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (or with high future expectations, as with the student). It may be a criticism of this study that so many of those who worked with the EU were included, but it should be noted that, in terms of Q methodology itself, the number of participants scoring on any one factor is of little importance. It should also be noted that, while the persons scoring the highest six in this category work at the EU, one was significantly weaker in supranational commitment, scoring lower than seven non-EU people, and one EU person did not come out supranationalist at all but pluralist (significantly, this was the linguistic coordinator of the translation section). The supranationalists were predominately older (nine older

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participant supranationalists compared with four younger), but almost evenly divided by gender (seven males to six females). Identity is also partly determined by what a person feels s/he is not. The supranationalists as a group seemed not to be worried about questions of national identity, and clearly set themselves off from those who did. They responded negatively towards Le Pen’s statement (statement 5) about immigrants as polluting the national identity, did not feel their French identity was migrating to Europe and leaving them empty in any way (statement 1), or that the globalization process spelled the end of French culture (statement 4). Even with their marked skepticism towards the nation state (statement 35) and with their work in remaking European governance, these Eurocrats felt a significant part of their identity was still French, and they thought it was possible to retain it even as they supported the drive toward greater Europeanness. They came from parents who, it seems, raised them in open and tolerant ways (statement 9). They said they did not feel personally insulted if they heard someone criticizing France (statement 28). There was, however, a certain ambivalence within this group about identity that is worth mentioning. Older members especially, such as participant 30 who was one of the founding fathers of the EEC and worked with Jean Monnet, see the EU as almost exclusively an economic entity with little deep influence on people’s personal or cultural identity. “When you go to Spain or to Italy, there are obviously differences … . What is this European identity? … we are all multitypes.” Younger supranationalists tend to see the EU more in terms of its impact on identities in a deeper sense. But all members see cultural identity as a separate issue and feel that one can support the EU and still be French. The striking similarity of thought on critical matters among the supranationalists indicates a general sense of shared concerns. In sum, these concerns include issues of war and peace in Europe and of the EU as a force for responsible change, a need to help those minorities who are seen as excluded from the benefits of the nation state, attachment to Europe as a whole and a definite skepticism with regards to the efficacy of the nation state. Factor 2: The nationalist One of the more remarkable findings of this study may be how hard it was to find a French nationalist as defined in the literature. This is striking in large part because of our expectations based both on survey data and on popular conceptions of the French as strong nationalists. We expect that French nationalism will be dominant. Eurobarometer data (1998) show strong support in France for a French as opposed to a European identity. When asked which of various combinations of identities they feel most describes them, the responses were: European only: 6% European and French: 9% French and European: 49% French only: 31%

100 Richard Robyn Thus, according to this large, short-response survey, roughly one-third of the respondents should be fairly committed nationalists. Yet it became apparent, approximately mid-way through the study as data was being entered in the computer and results analyzed, that none of the French people being interviewed was displaying a coherent nationalist discourse. While many would declare themselves, going into the Q sorting, strongly French with a strong national identity, and might respond positively to some of the nationalist statements, below the surface their responses to the nationalist discourse lacked coherence. They did not agree with several key tenets of nationalism, and came out favoring a number of important points from either the supranationalist or pluralist discourse. Participant 35, for example, seemed during the interview phase to express strong nationalist sentiments but during the Q sorting came out strongly skeptical of the national state to guide the country into an uncertain future. He was rather surprisingly open to Europe, putting him clearly in the pluralist camp. This is a tribute to the strength of Q methodology, which allows the researcher to dig below surface opinion and examine root coherence of discourse. Ultimately, only one participant in the study was found to be a nationalist, participant 36. This person, perhaps not surprisingly, was an official with the party headquarters of the National Front in St Cloud, just outside Paris. This individual’s Q sort revealed that the important distinguishing characteristics of the nationalist are the uncritical acceptance of the centrality of the nation in social life, the proximate nature of cultural and political identity, the exaltation of France, and a suspicion of the European Union and other similar culturally invasive forces that originate from outside the country. Distinguishing statements for the nationalist are listed below. 3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters (+4). 4 Globalization means the death of French national culture (+3). 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse (+4). 19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality (+4). 24 France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world (+3). The nationalist sees a closer tie of cultural and political identities than any other group in this study. For the nationalist, politics is overtly a part of a larger cultural picture, and might even be thought to provide the tools to fight the cultural war. This close tie is so, despite the nationalist participant saying outright that he could easily separate the two identities, and then giving as an example how the Bretons have done so. For him, this seemed the case because Brittany had been for

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so long out of the news as a site of violent opposition to the French government. But there was more than a little irony in his example, when the radical Breton (participant 17) who declared in her interview that, in spite of the relative lack of violence and media attention recently to minority issues, still feels put upon by the central government. The close interweaving of the cultural with the political is best articulated in the fear (statement 4, +3) of the effect that powerful forces in the world will have on France: “Globalization means the death of French national culture,” as well as his agreement with the NF motto, “The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France” (+3). Asked what this latter joining of Catholicism and state government could mean for him personally (as the son of immigrants, a selfdeclared practicing Greek Orthodox), he had an answer which showed how far he had to rationalize to stave off dissonance: “But it’s the fact that he was Christian that’s important,” a statement that might equally serve to stake off for him the parameters of Europe itself. His concern to find a place of inclusion in France for himself – a non-Catholic son of Greek immigrant parents – in a time of significant change in France towards more integration with other European countries within the EU could perhaps be considered manifestations of “status anxiety,” which Bell (1960, pp. 22, 98, 117–18) has noted is prevalent in times of social turbulence. Our nationalist’s turn to radical politics may then be seen in part as his attempt to relieve the effects of this anxiety. Our nationalist somewhat surprisingly closely agreed (0 and +1) with the supranationalists on neutrality towards the issue of the greatness of French wine and cheese, one of the statements meant to elicit responses of a cultural nature. This seemed a rather too lukewarm response for a true nationalist but, he explained, as a Greek immigrant he has been well aware of other great wines in Europe. The more telling difference between the two factors on the issue of cultural and political identity is that the nationalist sees a definite loss of identity to the EU (statement 1, +2 versus –4 for the supranationalists). Another clear difference between the two factors, so much so it is one of the defining characteristics of the nationalist, was in a certain regard for French grandeur. Clearly for the nationalist an important part of his identity is seeing France recognized as a great nation, shown in his very positive response to de Gaulle’s famous saying, “France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world” (statement 24, +3). This is closely allied with the question of patriotism, a concept which made him far less uncomfortable than any others in the study. He declared his strong aversion (–3) to statement 29: “I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic.” Yet this exaltation for the French nation, he emphasized, extended neither to the French state historically (“they have for 30 years been socialist!”) nor especially to the current occupant of the Elysées Palace, despite the fact that the party of President Chirac declares itself to be neogaullist. Our participant was scornful: “They are not standing strong enough against immigration, and besides, de Gaulle lost us Algeria.” A final characteristic of the nationalist is the clear suspicion of the EU as a cultural contaminant. The National Front, as has been mentioned earlier, is the only major party that has consistently declared its opposition to European

102 Richard Robyn integration for France. He articulated his party loyalty through his very negative responses (both –4) to the two statements (15 and 10), “In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU” and “The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for France in the future.” Yet at the same time he was somewhat less radical than the party in his neutrality (0) on the question of attachment (statement 14, “I am very attached to Europe as a whole”), saying that again as a Greek immigrant he could feel a larger attachment than only the narrower national one, “but only so far as we not lose our identity,” he hastened to add. “I feel an attachment,” he went on to say, “but it depends on what issue,” and felt supportive of the euro in as much as for him it could play a role in counteracting American influence. It should be noted that when I learned of his Greek heritage and asked with surprise, “Your parents were not French?” he replied proudly, “Yes, I have Greek blood, but I am French through and through.” A final surprising finding was his departure, however small, from his party boss’s stand on race and ethnicity. He felt neutral (0) on Le Pen’s famous expression (statement 5), “I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity.” This was a defining term for all other respondents, something that united them in opposition to the nationalist rhetoric then current in France. Our nationalist, perhaps feeling the heated reaction from across the political spectrum to Le Pen’s statement, was clearly not comfortable with it. But for him it was simply that “polluting” was “too strong a word”; he wondered aloud about replacing “polluting” with “altering.” Thus rather than dispense with the statement altogether and risk modifying what for him was a strong stand on national identity, he suggested a cosmetic remedy. For him, as likely with all nationalists, immigrants to the country should become French; France should not change for them. Factor 3: The optimistic pluralist As mentioned previously, the traditional pluralist for this overall project is defined largely by Pentland (1973, pp. 29–63). What this study could add to the literature on European integration is a more nuanced updating of this view, for the findings here differ in several important ways from this traditional notion of pluralism in the literature. The largest group in this study (17 persons), contemporary French pluralists seem more optimistic about the integration process than their traditional pluralist ancestors, less fearful of the change it is bringing to France, especially on the question of loss of national culture. These pluralists are more positive towards the EU, in particular as they see it has contributed to the prevention of war in Europe. They are noticeably less Gaullist than previous generations of French, for example reacting negatively (–2) to de Gaulle’s famous saying, “France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world.” And yet they clearly emerged from traditional pluralism, and share fundamental assumptions with them about how the world operates. These modern pluralists agree with their predecessors, for example, that national identity is a natural part

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of human life. For example, pluralists give the highest rating (+4) to statement 3, “Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters.” Participant 6, an older mayor of a small village in the Franche-Comté, articulated this for the group: “Our identity as French comes from our wars, the suffering these have caused, and our geography; it is a natural part of us as our mountains, rivers and forests.” They are proud of France and its products: “French wine, cheese and perfume are the best in the world” (+3). They also converge with traditional pluralists in statements with which they both disagree. They do not feel themselves to be European; for example, they adamantly disagreed (–4) with the statement, “I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of France.” They felt themselves patriotic, although several drew a sharp distinction between patriotism to the country and allegiance to the particular government in power. They nonetheless differed significantly from traditional pluralists, largely in the optimism they showed towards life in general and towards European integration as a particular political development. Rather than seeing the passing of the nation state as a matter of grave concern, they seemed to see an evolution away from it as an exclusive source of governance, an evolution that they felt was both positive and necessary. Partly this seems to come from a pragmatism that may be characteristic of many of the pluralists. As power seems to be shifting to another level in Europe, they seem eager to take advantage of that for themselves and their families. Or their constituencies: several of the participants in this study were mayors of small villages, and often the discussions in the interviews centered on the administrative changes they have seen in recent years that showed this power shift. For example, they had to ensure that their villages complied with regulations, everything from water quality to trash disposal, many of which were now emanating from Brussels rather than Paris. But it was not simply regulations. The mayors also saw France more as a part of a larger Europe. “Anyone who produces now,” said one, meaning his constituent farmers, merchants and factory workers, “has to think of Europe.” But at a deeper level than this pragmatism was a more basic faith in the European Union that appeared to be motivated in large part by their seeing it as a force for peaceful change in Europe. As a group they responded most positively (+4) to the two statements, “The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for France in the future,” and “Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for France.” This integration may in fact now be even a little too slow for them, a remarkable departure from the traditional pluralist who favored much more gradual change. As a group, they felt somewhat negative (–2) towards the statement, “The pace of European integration is too slow.” Perhaps in answer to the pluralists of the past who were unsure of embarking on the road to a European community, these modern pluralists felt that in sum “France has profited from its involvement in the EU” (+2).

104 Richard Robyn Factor 4: The disaffected populist Three young working class participants – two females and one male – formed a group that seemed distinctly more alienated from all forms of government than the others in the study. While more or less obedient to the laws of the land, whether those laws are French or European, they felt markedly unpatriotic (statement 29, +4) as French, distant from their political institutions, and uncertain of both their national leaders (statement 11, –1; statement 33, +1) and the European Union (statement 10, 0; statement 22, +2; statement 32, –2). They were, however, able to separate their feelings for France as a nation from those for the French government, showing a marked affinity for French culture (statement 17, +2; statement 27, +2) as opposed to European culture (statements 12 and 14 both –4) and the most supportive of all the factors for the idea that for themselves personally, political and cultural identity can be separated (statement 31, +3). Their fear, however, is that the political domination of France by the EU (statement 17, +2; statement 19, +4) would mean the death of French culture (statement 4, +3). They strongly accept the idea that people are naturally divided into different national cultures (statement 3, +4), and that they like it that way for Europe (statement 13, +2). This diversity, however, convinces them that the EU cannot work effectively (statement 22, +2). “We cannot agree on anything as French,” said one with a snort. “Imagine what it is like with all those others!” As a group, they fear globalization as a force that can destroy French culture (statement 4, +3), and resent the intrusion into French life of powerful tools they see as part of this globalization such as the euro (statement 8, +1). The type of populism exhibited by these participants – what I call Disaffected Populism – has not been identified in the theoretical literature on European integration. It has been named after the category identified by Dryzek (1996, pp. 133–6, 139–40) in his work on democratic discourse. While there are some significant differences from the findings here and the populist segment of American responses to democratic discourse that Dryzek found, there are definitely similarities. For both these groups, there is a strong belief that politics is in the hands of a government that does not listen to the people and what they want and need, and may in fact repress them; that people are left to rely on elites to govern and all one can do is hope they are honest, even when experience shows this is rare; and that society is inherently unequal and class-divided. But where Dryzek identified a populism that advocated a form of activism to confront the government, the disaffected populist in this study represents a distinctly less active and involved populist, someone less confident in grass-roots democracy to solve society’s problems or in their own capacity as individuals to effect change. For them, politics has been a disillusioning and disheartening experience. As disaffected as this is, however, it is a coherent discourse, to be distinguished from the kind of populism that Kaldor (1996, p. 13) describes as the “appeal to irrational prejudices in order to win votes.” For these disaffected populists, their approach to politics is perfectly rational, however skeptical and disillusioned it is. They may have believed in a politician or an ideology in the past, but they saw the

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resultant government and how it did not measure up to their standard of performance. This does not necessarily mean that they have given up entirely on the political process, however. The two women in particular, for example, vote with some regularity in national elections (for socialist candidates), and they both voted in the 1992 referendum on Maastricht. Significantly for voting patterns that assume basic differences based on voting behavior, however, they came out differently on that referendum on the EU treaty: participant 16 voting “yes” because she felt the staying on a general European track was overall positive for France and its peaceful relations with other countries, but her compatriot (participant 23) voting “no” because the treaty seemed far too intrusive in French life. The third, the male from Paris (participant 37), was so distant from political life that he completely ignored the referendum and does not vote in general (“the right or the left? … I put them all in the same sack”). For all three Disaffected Populists, they seemed to respond more to family and community concerns, with little loyalty to either national (statement 7) or supranational (statement 14) institutions. Talking freely as they sorted the statements, two of these participants (the female factory worker and the male clerk) admitted to a certain nonconformism towards life in general. They both mentioned this as part of their character and that this independent streak would likely impact their political views. Why was participant 23 opposed to the EU? Partly she felt it simply did not fit the French character. “The French are always critical of others and of each other,” she said. “How can we get along with others?” More than this, she was pessimistic that France would be strong enough for the kind of intensive push and pull of national interest that the EU seemed to demand. Specifically Germany, she felt, will “eat” the French because they are always so much stronger. French politicians would not be able enough to defend their interests. And America is the strongest of all. She connected the EU to the generally undesirable influences in society that many French identify chiefly as American. Unlike the nationalist who would get fighting mad about these pernicious cultural influences and draw racial inferences from them, however, this participant was distinctly less angry and more general in her criticism: the undesirable influences were things such as huge department stores that have displaced small boutiques and regulations on products such as wines and that tend to produce homogenized types (“the European Union will bring all that,” she said with conviction). This was echoed by the other woman populist, participant 16, who expressed the fears of a young mother: “There is too much of America on TV, with its violence and drugs.” Nonetheless each of the populists was open to other cultures in a general way and stated their appreciation of other ways of life. This seemed to be for them little connected to the EU in any significant way. One participant, participant 16, the female cleaner, also seemed to show some bruised feelings over French interactions with others. She related a story about one of her cousins who went to England and overheard on the boat crossing the channel the French being described as “frogs” by some of the British.

106 Richard Robyn The disaffected populists were in consensus with Factors 1 and 2 – but not with the nationalist – in several ways. All of the participants except the nationalist reacted negatively to Le Pen’s statement (statement 5) on immigrants polluting the national culture. “That’s pretty extreme,” said the male populist, “besides, they do the work that French people don’t want to do.” His fellow populist, participant 23, described Le Pen as a “mean little Hitler,” and worried that his influence was gaining among those she worked with in her factory. They all also reacted negatively to the National Front slogan (statement 15) on Clovis and French Catholicism. In the case of the populists, this could be due to the lack of religious conviction (which they all claimed), where for the supranationalists it seemed to proceed out of a more direct concern for the attempt by the right wing in France to define narrowly French identity. None of the three factors felt restricted by their parents concerning meeting foreign people (statement 9) or were impressed with de Gaulle’s comment (statement 24) on France needing to be among the first rank of countries (“ridiculous,” sniffed participant 23). They differed so markedly amongst each other on the question of how the younger generation would feel about the EU in the future that their overall scores came out neutral. The Parisian male felt his generation did not much care about the issue while both of the women worried about the young but for different reasons: one feeling youth today did not care enough to maintain their French identity and the other feeling that national identity was so strong it could lead to another war in the future. On the surface, it seems surprising that the populists disagreed even more strongly than the others that European integration had gone as far as it could go (statement 26). On closer questioning, this seemed to be simply an expression of resignation on their part that such integration is inevitable, however undesirable for them personally. The populists distinguished themselves from the optimistic pluralists in interesting ways that made them seem to be the true descendants of traditional pluralists. Similarly to the traditional pluralists, the disaffected populists saw national cultures as natural divisions (statement 3), felt more French than European (statements 12, 14, and 19) and wanted to see France represent an independent point of view in Europe (statement 17), criticized the EU as ineffective based on its diversity (statements 22 and 27), felt that it was not particularly beneficial for France (statement 32) – except as a possible counter to American influence (statement 18) – does not prevent conflict (statement 10), and was proceeding altogether too quickly (statement 21). This point of view differs significantly from the optimistic pluralists in this study chiefly in its harsh criticism of the EU. The optimistic pluralists seem to have now a more positive assessment of the EU as working effectively on behalf of France. Also significantly unlike pluralists, the populists were not patriotic (statement 29) and were alienated both from French leaders (statement 11) and from the nation state they represent (statement 33). From this analysis, the argument could be made that as French pluralists have seen the EU develop over the years, those that were disillusioned with it and politics

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in general became disaffected populists while those that have been generally pleased with it have become optimistic pluralists. Distant from national and continental political institutions, skeptical of political leaders, but able to separate feelings for France as a nation from the French government and showing an appreciation for French culture as opposed to European culture, for disaffected populists, political and cultural identity can be separated. They feared the political and cultural domination of France by the EU, which would mean the death of French culture. Disaffected populists strongly accept the idea that people are naturally divided into different national cultures, and they like it that way for Europe. Their belief in, and appreciation of, this national diversity convinces them that the EU cannot work effectively (“We cannot agree on anything as French,” said one. “Imagine what it is like with all those others!”). They fear globalization as a force that can destroy French culture. Fundamentally, politics is in the hands of a government that does not listen to the people – especially working people and the disenfranchised – and what they want and need. People are then left to rely on elites to govern. All one can do is hope they are honest, but experience has shown that those kinds of politicians are rare. The populists may have believed in a politician or an ideology in the past, but they saw the resultant government and how it did not measure up to their standards of performance. Why should European politicians be any different, if it is only national politics writ large?

Conclusion This part of the overall project focused on the ways French people conceive of their relationship to their nation and to the European Union. The approach, utilizing Q methodology, constituted a potentially useful avenue of research on a complex topic. It could offer the field a fresh perspective that could contribute to our growing knowledge of national identity. It is argued here that this new approach in the French study rendered a more nuanced reading of attachments to the European Union than has been noted before in the literature and that could be useful to the field. By adding an optimistic pluralist and a disaffected populist to the panoply of possible attachments, the study may help us to see that people react differently to their national and emerging supranational institutions. Eurocrats in Brussels may take heart that pluralists in France seem to be more disposed than in the past to EU construction, but may wish to take note of a possibly growing number of French who are dissaffected from both institutions. As the search for a French nationalist seems to confirm, few French people in the postmodern era may be adopting wholly the kind of near-exclusive attachments to the nation that have been described as “core nationalist doctrine” (Smith 1991, p. 74). This is not to claim that there are not many in France who do adhere to it – after all, Q methodology does not claim to say anything about percentages of the general population that follow the factors of opinion uncovered in a study. It does, however, suggest that French people express a variety of opinions about their

108 Richard Robyn attachments. This is significant in a country whose image suggests a strong national identity as central for its citizens. If this is not the case for French people in this study, that could cast doubt on notions that national identity is the dominant identity for all people in contemporary times. We may need to rethink the concept of nationalism and in particular, our conception of the dominance of national identity in the contemporary world.

Note 1 The formula for standard error is SEr = 1/÷ N where N is equal to the number of statements (N = 36). For this study, SEr = 0.16 and coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level if they exceed 2.58(SEr) = 0.43.

References Bell, Daniel. 1960. The End of Ideology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. Beloff, Nora. 1963. The General Says No: Britain’s Exclusion from Europe. Baltimore, MD: Penguin. Dryzek, John. 1996. Democracy in Capitalist Times. New York: Oxford University Press. Eurobarometer 49. 1998. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Thomas Diez and Sabine Jung. 1998. “Which Europe? Conflicting Models of a Legitimate Political Order,” European Journal of International Relations, 4, pp. 409–46. Kaldor, Mary. 1996. “Nation states, European Institutions and Citizenship,” in Barbara Einhorn, Mary Kaldor and Zdenek Kavan (eds), Citizenship and Democratic Control in Contemporary Europe. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar. Pentland, Charles. 1973. International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber and Faber. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press. Tiersky, Ronald. 1994. France in the New Europe: Changing Yet Steadfast. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

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Appendix 5.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/French national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–4

2

–2

–1

2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy has contributed to my optimistic mood for France. (SN)

0

0

2

–1

3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters. (N)

–1

4

4

4

4 Globalization means the death of French national culture. (N)

–3

3

–3

3

5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. (N)

–4

0

–3

–2

6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. (SN)

4

–2

1

0

7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties. (N)

–2

2

0

–1

3

–1

4

1

–3

0

–3

–4

10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for France in the future. (PL)

3

–4

4

0

11 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. (PL)

0

–1

1

–1

12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of France. (SN)

4

–2

–4

–4

13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. (PL)

–1

4

–1

2

1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. (N)

8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for France. (PL) 9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also French. (N)

14 I am very attached to Europe as a whole. (SN)

2

0

3

–4

–2

3

–2

–2

2

1

–1

0

–1

2

3

2

18 I want France to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs. (PL)

0

0

2

3

19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. (PL)

0

4

3

4

–3

1

–1

1

1

–1

–2

–2

15 The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France. (N) 16 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. (PL) 17 France must maintain an independence in European affairs. (N)

20 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. (N) 21 The pace of European integration is too slow. (SN)

continued …

110 Richard Robyn Appendix 5.1 continued Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–1

1

–1

2

0

–4

0

–1

24 France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world. (N)

–2

3

–2

–3

25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. (SN)

2

–3

0

0

26 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go. (PL)

–1

–1

–1

–3

27 French wine, cheese and perfume are the best in the world. (PL)

0

1

2

2

–2

2

0

–3

29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. (SN)

1

–3

–4

4

30 Our society is united by a delusion about our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors. (SN)

1

–2

–4

1

31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity. (PL)

1

0

1

3

32 In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU. (SN)

3

–4

2

–2

33 The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty … It is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. (SN)

1

–2

0

1

34 Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time. (PL)

–3

–3

1

1

35 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. (N)

–4

1

1

0

36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities. (SN)

4

–1

0

0

22 European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work. (PL) 23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. (SN)

28 If someone said something bad about being French, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. (N)

The parenthetical notations [(N), (SN) and (PL)] after each statement incorporates the Q sample structure discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. nationalist, supranationalist and pluralist.

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Appendix 5.2: Q array (with statements indicated for composite Factor 1 of French study) –4

–3

–2

–1

0

1

2

3

4

1

4

7

3

2

21

14

8

6

5

9

15

13

11

29

16

10

12

35

20

24

17

18

30

25

32

36

28

22

19

31

34

26

23

33

27

Appendix 5.3: French Q statements 1 Notre identité en temps que nation converge vers l’Union Européenne et nous nous retrouvons démunis. Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. 2 Les innovations rapides technologiques et l’économie globale ont contribué à mes sentiments d’optimisme envers mon pays. Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for my country. 3 L’humanité est divisée en nations ayant leur caractère particulier. Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters. 4 La globalisation veut dire la mort de la culture nationale française. Globalization means the death of French national culture. 5 Je ne hais pas les étrangers dans mon pays, mais je trouve qu’ils polluent notre identité nationale. I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. 6 Les nations souveraines du passé ne peuvent plus résoudre les problèmes du présent; elles ne peuvent pas assurer leur propre progrès ou controler leur propre futur. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 La loyauté envers l’état-nation a la priorité sur les autres loyautés. Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties. 8 Adopter une unité monétaire européenne unique sera difficile mais nécessaire pour mon pays. Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for my country. 9 Mes parents seraient mécontents si j’étais marié avec quelqu’un qui n’est pas français. My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also French.

112 Richard Robyn 10 L’Union Européenne est un moyen d’assurer la paix et la stabilité pour mon pays. The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for my country in the future. 11 Les chefs de nos gouvernements sont capables de diriger nos institutions dans un environement global. Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. 12 Je me sens d’abord européen, puis ma nationalité après. Je me sens citoyen d’Europe plus que de France. I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of France. 13 Je veux une Europe des états-nations qui soient aussi différents politiquement et culturellement qu’ils sont différents géographiquement I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. 14 Je me sens très attaché à l’Europe dans son ensemble. I am very attached to Europe as a whole. 15 Le baptème de Clovis est le baptème de la France. The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France. 16 L’unité en Europe ne crée pas une nouvelle sorte de grande puissance; c’est une méthode pour introduire le changement en Europe … ce n’est pas un plan détaillé, ce n’est pas une théorie, c’est un procédé ayant déja commencé à amener les gens et les nations à s’adapter ensemble au changement des circonstances. Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe … it is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. 17 Mon pays doit maintenir son indépendance dans les affaires européennes. France must maintain an independence in European affairs. 18 Je veux que la France représente une alternative à l’influence américaine, une autre voix dans les affaires internationales. I want France to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs. 19 L’Europe sera plus forte parce qu’elle a la France comme France, l’Espagne comme Espagne, la Grande Bretagne comme Grande Bretagne, avec chacune ses propres coutumes, traditions et identités. Il serait ridicule d’essayer de les emboîter comme des pièces en une sorte d’identikit de personalité européenne. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. 20 L’Union Européenne représente une homogenisation peu attrayante des cultures européennes.

Supranational identity emerging in France

21 22 23

24

25

26

27 28

29 30

31 32 33

34

113

The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. La vitesse de l’intégration européenne est trop lente. The pace of European integration is too slow. Les pays européens sont trop divers pour qu’une union marche bien. European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work. Les différences culturelles entre Européens disparaîtront avec une nouvelle genération d’Européens arrivant à maturité. National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. La France n’est réellement elle-même qu’au premier rang. France is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world. La désunité européenne est le résultat d’une fiction délibérément encouragée d’une pleine sovereignté nationale et d’une efficacité absolue des politiques nationales. European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. Je pense que l’intégration européenne est plus ou moins allée aussi loin qu’elle le peut. I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go. Les vins, les fromages et les parfums de France sont les meilleurs du monde. French wine, cheese and perfume are the best in the world. Si quelqu’un disait quelque chose de négatif sur la France, je le prendrais comme si cela était dit à mon sujet. If someone said something bad about being French, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. J’obéis peut-être les lois, mais je ne me sens pas spécialement patriotique. I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. Notre société est unie par une illusion au sujet de nos antécédents et par une haine collective de nos voisins. Our society is united by a delusion about our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors. Il est possible de séparer l’identité politique de l’identité culturelle. It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity. En général, mon pays a bénéficié énormément de sa participation à l’UE. In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU. L’état-nation est trop faible pour nous assurer l’égalité et trop puissant pour nous permettre la liberté … c’est au coeur même des émotions irrationelles, affaiblies, et souvent déstructrices de l’homme. The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty … it is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. Le fédéralisme avec la subsidiarité est un moyen de réconcilier ce qui paraît irréconciliable: encourager l’émergence d’une Europe unifiée tout en maintenant fidelité à son propre pays.

114 Richard Robyn Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time. 35 La Nation est essentiellement la source de toute souveraineté; ni un individu ni un groupe d’individus ne peut se voir attribuer aucune autorité qui ne vienne pas de cette souveraineté. The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. 36 Une plus grande intégration européenne peut apporter aux minorités nationales un plus grand sense de leur propre identité. Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities.

Steadfastly European?

6

115

Steadfastly European? German (supra)national identity in a rapidly changing Europe De Forest W. Colegrove

As the largest and richest country in Europe, Germany has had an outsized impact on the course of European integration and in the actual workings of the institutions of the European Union. Along with France, Germany makes up the other “twin engine” powering an overall generally positive approach to European integration (Clingaert 1996, pp. 106–8). Starting with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer following the Second World War, through a succession of leaders, the German government has seen European cooperation as central not only to its own survival as a fledgling democracy, but to Europe as a whole. This generally steadfast support for the integration project has been crucial to its overall success into the present. But what do average Germans on the street think about the integration project? Does the “permissive consensus” hold and they see it as favorably as their leadership? Are they as steadfastly European? A sampling of Eurobarometer surveys both before and after the fieldwork for this German study reveals a generally skeptical German public with regards to European integration. Eurobarometer 55 (October 2001), the issue prior to this research project, describes results of the then-current survey data on the opinions of citizens of the fifteen EU nations. According to the surveys, the vast majority of Germans (81 per cent) feels that life has improved or stayed the same during the previous five years, but that it may get worse with the continued growth of the EU. This may be understandable in light of the fact that Germany shoulders the greatest burden of all the EU member states in financing the organization. Satisfaction with EU ranks fifteenth out of the fifteen EU nations, and Germany ranks as well last of the fifteen in optimism for the next five years. It is perhaps therefore not surprising that Germans rank last in the EU in interest in EU news. The result of all this skepticism is not that Germans feel the EU should be scrapped (the rank here is eighth of the fifteen), but there is low trust in the EU generally (twelfth) and in EU institutions in particular (fourteenth) and great concerns over enlargement, where Germany ranked thirteenth out of the fifteen in support of expansion. Germans were also notoriously fond of their deutsche Mark

116 De Forest W. Colegrove before it disappeared, which explains why support for the introduction of the euro at that time was also not particularly high, where Germany ranked tenth out of the fifteen. Eurobarometer 56 (April 2002) contains results of surveys done from fieldwork in October/November 2001, or following the research of this project. Coincidentally, this report focused in part on questions of national and supranational identity, which Eurobarometer surveys do from time to time and which naturally proved useful as a kind of large-survey counterpoint to this project. When asked directly about their attitude toward identification with Germany or Europe, Germans ranked rather high in comparison with other Europeans (p. 14). Germans scored fifth out of the fifteen nations in generally feeling more European than their own nationality. Significantly, this European orientation was held in the face of a general trend for all Europeans since 2000 in feeling more their own nationality than European. On questions of national versus European pride, however, the data show a definitely mixed picture. Germans scored among the lowest of their European counterparts on either dimension. They were lowest in national pride, scoring 66 per cent positive compared with Ireland at the highest level, 97 per cent; and at the opposite end of the scale, highest in “not very proud” at 25 per cent compared with only 2 per cent of the Irish. Yet their pride in being European is even lower: along with British nationals, typically the most Eurosceptic of all Europeans, Germans were the least proud of being Europeans at only 47 per cent. However, it should be said that at the opposite end of that particular scale Germans who called themselves “not at all proud” of being European was not quite as high, at 11 per cent in Germany compared with 17 per cent in Britain. In terms of support for EU membership, Germany ranked tenth out of the fifteen nations, but the actual percentage of the population that expressed this was slightly above the average for all EU nations (p. 19), with positive outweighing negative responses 55 per cent to 11 per cent. The surveyors note that this has risen 10 per cent since the last survey in 2000. In terms of satisfaction with democracy in the EU, Germany ranked eleventh out of the fifteen nations. By 44 per cent to 34 per cent, more Germans felt the country had benefited from its EU membership than not. Part of the intent of this study is to determine to what extent descriptions of German feelings concerning national identity described in the Eurobarometer surveys were consistent with the findings of this Q methodology research, and with other current writings about the subject. In the next section, this will be explored.

Overview Using only the Eurobarometer as a source, one could readily conclude that Germans are generally rather skeptical of the entire EU integration process. They would seem to have little trust in EU institutions, want it to get no larger, and have little or no interest in hearing any more about it. However, especially in comparison with their fellow Europeans, Germans seem more willing to think of themselves

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as Europeans, and generally slightly more supportive of the EU. Thus, at the outset of this research project, it would be easy to conclude that Germans by and large were generally skeptical of the continued formation of a European Union. Counter to these attitudes, however, were my own observations of the German population. As a university professor and researcher living near Heidelberg, I have met and become quite close personally to many German citizens of all ages, and have found them to be generally more mixed in their feelings for integration. Few seemed negative to the extent shown by the results of the Eurobarometer survey. I was thus open to whatever findings were to be noted by my administration of the Q sorts and interviews. Q methodology findings, however, generally revealed a more nuanced and complex reaction among Germans toward European integration in general and the EU institutions in particular. Four clearly delineated groupings of Germans emerged from the application of Q methodology. These groups will be described below.

Setting Fieldwork for the German study was conducted in two parts: 34 participants were assessed by way of mailings throughout Germany done between November and December 2000 by Andreas Rambow and an additional 15 participants in face-toface administration of Q sorts by myself in the summer of 2001. The latter part of the study was conducted in and around the area of Heidelberg. Conducting Q studies through the mail, while valid (Olins and Van Tubingen 1978), does not allow intensive questioning during the process. Face-to-face interviews for the latter part of the study were conducted in person usually at the participant’s home or place of work. The average period of time for the examination was 75 minutes. The researcher often shared coffee and kuchen with the respondents after the interview, allowing ample time to question the interviewee regarding responses to the statements that were being sorted. The P-set for the study followed that of the overall project, with participants coming from diverse backgrounds based on age, gender, setting and socioeconomic status. Statements were translated from the English and adjusted for cultural bias; these are presented in Appendix 6.1.

Factors The ultimate objective of this research was to determine the extent of feelings of German nationals regarding the integration of the German nation into a larger unit, the European Union. Volunteer participants were asked to respond to statements by showing that they either agree or disagree with the statements. Additionally, through factor analysis of the choices made, relative intensity of feeling is shown. The data were factor analyzed by Richard Robyn (project director), with the assistance of Steven Brown, using PQMethod 2.09 (Schmolck and Atkinson 1978). Q analysis seeks to join together groups among the 49 German respondents who

118 De Forest W. Colegrove feel similarly regarding integration of the 15 European states, in particular, the integration of Germany into a bigger “whole,” the EU. Four factors were found to be significant at the 0.01 level. Factor 1 was determined to be predominantly supranationalist; Factor 2 pluralist; Factor 3 nationalist; and Factor 4, pessimistic pluralist. The following sections of this chapter are descriptions of, and responses to, the factors, with reference to the factor arrays in Appendix 6.2. Factor 1: Supranationalist This factor, with the most numerous participants loaded on it at 25, has the most positive association with the EU of all participating in the study. Germans who loaded on this factor feel integration has been important for Germany as a country, that it has generally profited from its involvement with the EU, in particular to ensure peace and stability in Europe as a whole. For them, European integration should continue and could even proceed at a faster pace. According to the surveys overseen by Eurobarometer, statement 26 (“I think European integration has attained its final stage: it can go no further”) should resonate well with the German population. Supranationalists in this study, however, strongly disagree with it (–4). They seem to believe that the EU represents an attractive blending of European cultures (statement 20). Supranationalists have “turned the corner” in terms of debate over where their loyalties lie and no longer see Germany as commanding their primary allegiance. Statements that this group related to most positively reflect this orientation. They feel personally quite attached to Europe. This is strongly indicated in their responses to statements 14, 31, and 12, as well as their overall very positive feelings towards the EU as a political entity. As a group, they are nearly the most negative towards statement 5 (only Factor 4 scored it lower): “I have nothing against foreigners in my country, but I think they have a significant impact on our national identity.” This statement is the “meanest” nationalist statement in the study, i.e. aggressive towards immigrants to the country. In other words, they feel strongly that foreigners in Germany are not a threat to national identity and they might be supportive of further immigration into the country. This orientation is important as a gauge for feelings towards the EU, which encourages the idea of freer movement across borders, especially within Europe. This may have particular resonance in Germany, where especially some disenchanted young people have joined radical anti-immigrant groups as a means to express their anger with the system. When we repress our history and thereby our self-hate, the result is what we experience today: youths in both parts of Germany attempt to awaken “Hitler,” and everything he stands for, in order to achieve new life, to transform selfhate into a hate of foreigners. Silently, a large number of Germans support them. (Wyden 2001, p. 198)

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Not only among the young, but there seems to be a persistent annoyance among all parts of German society with “out” groups, particularly the Turkish minority. These “guestworkers” have been brought into German society over several generations to fuel the miracle economy of the German postwar renaissance, but often seem to fit uneasily into its social fabric. In the cities there is a wealth of cultural diversity, especially in Frankfurt and Berlin. More Turks now live in Berlin than in Turkish cities. And in Frankfurt approximately 30 percent of the population is not ethnically German. (Nees 2000, p. 32) Yet despite this aspect of globalization that many seem to find uncomfortable, supranationalists did not react positively (–2) to statement 4: “Globalization means that German culture will cease to exist,” instead believing that “it’s possible to separate the political from the cultural identity of a nation” (statement 31, +3). This also seems significant, especially in the context of the cultural, political and economic change that has roiled German society since East/West unification. If the difficult process of integration of East and West Germany is an example, optimism may be hard-won because of the opportunity costs involved. For the most part East and West Germany had a very hard time making the transition. East Germany, for example, has become Germany’s equivalent of Italy’s Mezzogiorno, a permanently depressed region that is a continual source of social and fiscal concern. (Krugman 1999, p. 4) According to its own figures, East Germany’s per capita income was about 80 percent that of West Germany – higher, indeed, than that of some West German Lander. What was revealed on reunification was an economy that looked, well, Third World. (Krugman 1999, p. 25) Despite their generally positive feeling towards the EU as a supranational entity, however, supranationalists also feel that Germany and other European countries can and should maintain their own identities within the EU. For example, statement 19 received a +4: Europe will be stronger for the very reason that in the European context, Germany remains Germany, Austria remains Austria, France remains France, and Spain remains Spain. Each land keeps its own culture, traditions and identity. It is not a good idea to attempt to force European Union countries into a European culture, tradition and identity. This statement and another of the “most agree” statements are pluralist in nature, significant for a factor that is loading so strongly overall in the supranationalist

120 De Forest W. Colegrove direction (the rest of the top ten statements are supranationalist in nature). This seems to mark this group of German supranationalists as significantly pluralist in nature as well – certainly so in comparison with French supranationalists. This may perhaps be explained by a certain skepticism supranationalists seem to express about how important this question of national identity really is. This group for instance also scored statement 3 (“Men are by their very nature linked to nations, each of which has its own unique characteristics”) in the middle range, i.e., not very important for them one way or another. Nonetheless, this attitude could be significant, if only as a way to say that they do not see European integration as a threat to German culture or identity. For example, statement 31 (“It’s possible to separate the political from the cultural identity of a nation”) gets a quite positive rating (+3). This feeling of the need for European nations to maintain their cultural independence within the EU for this supranationally-oriented group contrasts with the French group, where Factor 1 (also labeled “supranationalists”) scored this statement a zero (Robyn 2000). This may be a very significant difference in attitudes between the two countries, to say that Germans, even when they are very supportive of an EU, still maintain a strong sense of nationhood where French supranationalists do not. This general orientation seems to be borne out by the other factors, described below. It may be instructive to continue this exploration, and more closely compare the French supranationalists with their German counterparts. The French seem more theoretical in their approach (for example, scoring statements 6, 25, and 34 higher, the more theoretically-oriented expressions). As mentioned above, the French factor also seems more purely supranationalist in their orientation, with no mix of pluralist statements in their “most agree” categories, whereas the German supranationalists had a definite mix of supranationalist and pluralist statements. While both groups are neutral with respect to the pace of European integration (both scoring this a +1 only), German supranationalists seem to prefer deeper integration (scoring statement 26 as –4, while their French counterparts score it as –1). French supranationalists seem more reluctant to leave it to the next generation (0 compared with +3) to accomplish. The potential pluralism of the German supranationalists, however, seems to be tempered by hesitancy when it comes to considering the German national government as an effective alternative to the EU for governance. Respondents were unimpressed with their leaders, if scoring 0 as a group to statement 11 is any indication: “Our elected officials will be capable of providing leadership to our national institutions (governmental agencies) in a global environment.” They were particularly strong (+3) in agreeing with statement 33: “Equity for all Europe can only be achieved if European integration moves forward.” Certainly these, if not most of the German respondents, could be thinking about German history of the twentieth century in this regard. Destructive behavior was exhibited on a number of occasions by the German government. Two of the respondents were very vocal (and somewhat heated) in their discussions of World War II and, in particular, the Holocaust.

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Respondent F1, for example, has a Jewish relative and feels keenly the pain of that part of German history. She emphasized that she is not a patriot, and does not want to be considered in any way part of the Nazi project. “The Holocaust is part of my family,” she said passionately. Respondent M1 was particularly incensed during the interview regarding the grouping of Germany and Austria in the same sentence, which was an attempt to encompass “Germanness” as a regional affiliation. He expressed strong feelings toward Austria, partly because it was Adolf Hitler’s birthplace and partly because of the success of the right-wing anti-immigrant party in the elections that had just taken place. M1 was upset that the two countries were even mentioned together, as they are in statements 2, 8, 10, 17, 18, 24, 28, and 30. Respondent M2 agreed: “Austria is nothing and should not be compared with Germany. I respect the people but not the government.” There was considerable difference of opinion regarding one premise, which served to distinguish the different factors. This was statement 32: “In general, my country has profited from its involvement in the EU”. Supranationalists supported this notion moderately (+2). Pluralists (Factor 2), conversely, tend to believe that this is untrue (–3). And nationalists (Factor 3) rank this statement as one of their “strongly-disagree” statements (–4). The converse for the supranationalists (strongly disagree) includes the following statement: “Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties.” Respondent F2 elaborated on this in terms of identity and national security: “You need to be true to yourself – I don’t know if I can be true to Germany if another war comes. I would not necessarily be patriotic.” Respondent F3 had a similar reaction but for a different reason: “I am a Christian more than a German.” The issue of affiliations other than national or supranational may be particularly relevant in Germany. Since the Second World War, the German government has instituted strong protections for religious and minority group rights and a viable federalism that encourages subnational governance. Respondent F3 expressed this sentiment in terms of religious affiliation that transcends national borders, yet does not have special relevance to the European Union either. Nees has explored potential affiliations in terms of local and regional identities: Germans are intensely loyal to their Heimat, the local area where they were born and raised. Unlike Americans, who are known for their willingness to pick up and move when an economic opportunity presents itself, Germans have traditionally been far less willing to leave their local region. They place more importance on their regional than their national identity. (Nees 2000, p. 27) German participants of any grouping were not especially distinguished by statements that sought to explore personal and family impact on national identity formation. Most participants disagreed with these sentiments, making it clear that they formed independent judgments on matters of European and national affiliation.

122 De Forest W. Colegrove To statement 9, for example (“It would be distressful to my parents to know that my spouse was a foreigner”), all the respondents in the study reacted negatively. Many Germans, particularly the young, seem to care little about the ethnic or national origin of their spouse. Bloodlines so important during the time of the Third Reich seem irrelevant now. Parental influence is as important in Germany as it is anywhere else. But the sins of the parents in Germany are a concern of the Kinder and are far more intense than in most countries, in or out of the EU. In the course of openly discussing their country’s recent past, students are confronting the older generations with their questions and accusations. This set off wave after wave of self-examination and self-criticism in the FRG. No other example comes to mind that compares with Germany’s willingness to look so closely at the mistakes of its past in such an open and objective way. Much of the credit for this remarkable feat goes to the younger generation of Germans. (Nees 2000, p. 20) Statement 28 (“If someone makes a negative comment about Germany or Austria, I feel personally as if someone had said something negative about me.”) received a similarly negative reaction from all participants. Respondent F4 was typical: “I do not identify myself with ‘Germany.’ I’m not responsible for the political or cultural picture of ‘Germany.’ I live here in Germany, but I’m just a small part of this state. So why should I feel accused if someone thinks or says something bad about Germany?” Factor 2: Pluralists Ten of the participants came out on this factor, which seems to be significantly more nationalist-oriented than the first group, feeling that Germany must maintain a certain independence in European affairs. They do not feel attached to Europe, and they feel German identity is migrating to the EU, leaving German identity empty as a result. They feel the “naturalness” of the division of the world into separate nations (statement 3, +4), and like the idea of Europe as a continent of separate nations (statements 19 and 13, at +4 and +2 respectively). Nonetheless, they feel the EU can work, and that these very distinct nations can cooperate enough for them to get business done in this institution (statement 22, +3). Yet, they are quite negative in thinking that Germany has profited from its involvement with the EU (statement 32 received a –3 rating), so they likely would be skeptical of greater European integration, or at least of greater German participation in (and thus paying more for) the EU. At a personal level, they feel quite unattached to Europe (statement 12, –4, statement 14, –2). Their attitude towards foreigners is distinctly less tolerant than the first group: the “mean” statement 5 is +2 here, while Factor 1 supranationalists

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scored it a –4, although pluralists are not as intolerant of foreigners as Factor 3 below, which is considered to be more truly nationalist. In comparing this group with Factor 3 on other levels, Factor 2 has such significant nationalist loading that it might be labeled “instrumental nationalist,” where Factor 3 might be “emotional nationalist.” These labels were actually considered during early stages of data analysis. Factor 2s are “instrumental” in the sense that they might feel more nationalist, and believe the world is “naturally” divided into nations, but they nonetheless still think that something like an EU can work, i.e. that a nationalist can still be instrumental, or more pragmatic and less ideological, in approaching international politics. Nonetheless, the label “pluralist” would seem to fit better, for various reasons. Members of this group seem more optimistic about the integration process and less fearful of the change it is bringing to Germany, especially when it comes to the notion of drowning or dissolving the German culture. This would tend to run counter to traditional notions of international cooperation that nationalists might be willing to contemplate. In addition, the generally more favorable view that the pluralists took with regards to pluralist statements 10, 19, 22, and 31 seemed to argue for categorizing them in this way, as did the lack of concern that this group exhibited, unlike Factor 3s, with regards to loss of identity within the European Union. Respondent F5 expresses this pluralist sentiment well: I strongly believe in Europe as a “State” and each state of Europe will take advantage of the multi-cultures (without abuse!). More people work together, so you’ve got more viewpoints on all things and this only can be good – in cultural questions as much as political or human questions. I strongly believe in the positive effects of a peaceful “with each other” in a “multicultural society.” The pluralist believes in national divisions as natural, separating nations with their own unique characteristics (+4 to statement 3). While the pluralist is optimistic about how Germany fits into the global economy (+3 to statement 2), and feels that, overall, the European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Germany in the future (+2 to statement 10), he may at the time feel that European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work (+3 to statement 22). Pluralists as a group believe strongly that Germany must maintain an independence in European affairs, and in this sentiment many agree wholeheartedly with Nees (2000, p. 7): Germany must make an effort to avoid being swallowed up by a larger “union” or group of nations or being assuaged by more powerful Europeans. Although small by American standards – its total area is less than that of Montana – the diversity and complexity of this country are not to be underestimated. Understanding this complexity is a key to working, living, and communicating successfully with the Germans.

124 De Forest W. Colegrove Pluralists have a moderately positive (+2) response to statement 13: “I would like to see a Europe that consists of individual states whose political and cultural differences should be equally reflected by their geographical situation.” This is perfectly in line with their notion of the naturalness of cultural difference. These pluralists would likely agree with the kind of cooperation between Germany and France that has guided much of the work of the EU. A case in point is described by Friedman (1999, p. 239): Southern France is preserved as Southern France, in part, because Germany, through the EU, subsidizes French agriculture so that small French farmers, and therefore small shopkeepers and small villages, can survive intact – despite global pressures for consolidation of farms and the malling of villages. In other words, what we like about southern France is based on a common Euroagriculture policy and transfer payments to support small-plot farming to keep the villages there intact, in part because they are seen as a source of cultural richness. Despite this, pluralists seem to want to put the brakes on further European integration, at least to the extent of slowing it down. They believe the pace of integration is not too slow (statement 21) and are strongly opposed to the idea of the euro (statement 8). An intensive comparison of the German pluralist with the French pluralist (Factor 3 in the French study) is instructive. The two groups are similar in their beliefs in the “naturalness” of nations. The cluster of statements that allows this expression (statements 3, 10, 17, 19, and 30), some of which might be construed as nationalist in nature, are mixed with other statements of greater optimism towards international cooperation. This would seem to make them more pluralist. Both German and French pluralist groups are relatively optimistic about globalization (statement 2) and feel it does not necessarily mean the death of their national cultures (statement 4). Yet both emphatically state they are not citizens of Europe more than their own countries: statement 12 gets –4 for both. But the two groups diverge from each other in significant ways. French pluralists seem more optimistic about what European integration can do for their country. They believe their country has profited from being involved with the EU (+2 to statement 32 while German pluralists score it –3), less concerned about identity loss to the EU (statement 1 is –2 for the French and +1 for the German) and are more supportive of the euro: +4 to statement 8 while their German counterparts are emphatically against the idea with –4. French pluralists are also personally more attached to the idea of Europe (statement 14 is +3 for the French but –2 for the Germans). They are less patriotic than their German counterparts (statement 29 is –4 for the French and +3 for the Germans). This may serve to continue the theme raised earlier of greater overall German commitment to the nation. In sum, German pluralists think of themselves primarily as citizens of Germany. They are definitely less optimistic than their French counterparts regarding the EU on a range of matters, and relatively less attached to the idea of Europe. They

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are shading into nationalist sentiment, but of a sort that is significantly instrumental in its approach to the EU, i.e. as an organization that this group feels it can work with to benefit personally. As mentioned earlier, even with the temptation to group them into a kind of nationalist camp, ultimately the decision seemed more justified to make them pluralist. Factor 3: Nationalist Of all the factors revealed among the German participants, this was the most negative, perhaps even hostile, towards the EU, the most xenophobic towards foreigners in Germany, and the most unattached personally to Europe. The six participants who came out on this factor seem to be approaching European politics with a very strong sense of German identity and with a very great concern that European integration means a loss of German identity. For these reasons in particular, they would seem naturally to fall into the nationalist category. With all the discussion concerning emergent nationalism in Europe, it may be asked whether this study can shed light on numbers of believers in nationalism there may be. As a reminder concerning Q methodology, it may or may not be significant that this relatively low number (12 per cent) of German participants in this study came out on this factor. In the French study, only one person was found who responded in a way that the literature would say a nationalist would. Yet, one cannot claim from a Q method study exactly how many people in the larger society would respond the same way as this factor. The thrust of a Q study is to identify possible groupings in that larger society; in other words, some people in German society will believe this same way, we simply do not know from a Q study exactly how many. That is for a larger statistical survey. This nationalist group is devoted to Germany and subscribes to the doctrine that national interest and security are more important than international (EU) considerations. Participants included in this group believe people naturally divide into nations with their own peculiar characteristics, that globalization means the death of German national culture and that German identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and they are left empty as a result. The statements placed into the “most disagree” part of the array were also consistent with a nationalist stance. Nationalists were found to disagree in the strongest terms with the following statements, from the different philosophical stances: 14 I feel strongly attracted to Europe in its entirety. 16 Unity in Europe will not result in a European political entity. Instead, unity will serve to promote change in Europe. 32 In general, my country has profited from membership in European Union. Nationalists disagree strongly with statement 11: “Our elected officials will be capable of providing leadership to our national institutions (governmental agencies)

126 De Forest W. Colegrove in a global environment.” It might on the surface seem an anomaly for nationalist expression to be so critical of national leaders, but this coincides with sentiment expressed by French nationalists. Nationalists in a number of European countries have become vocal critics of their national leaders who have been more or less committed to supranationalist policies in recent years. In addition, in Germany this sentiment might be particularly strong due to history. Current strong criticism of the present government, however, lends little support to the notion that this level of dissent will soon relent. A comparison of German nationalists with French is revealing. On the surface, the two groups seem to have little in common, perhaps indicative of those who hold “contrarian” positions within their respective societies. German nationalists are significantly more “mean” with regards to foreigners than their French counterparts (statement 5 is +3 for Germans and 0 for French); and express a theoretical position on national divisions that admits of hatred towards neighboring countries (statement 30 is +2 for Germans and –2 for French). German nationalists seem much more concerned about the EU becoming a superstate that will dominate Germany than their French counterparts for their nation (statement 16 is –4 for Germans and +1 for French). The Germans view their youth as more disposed to European integration than the French (statement 23 is +2 for Germans and –4 for French). The French seem more concerned that France maintain an independence in European affairs than Germans (+2 compared with –2 on statement 17), but that could be explained by a persistent French public debate over this as compared with Germany. Germans seem less patriotic than their French brethren (+1 compared with –3 on statement 29). But the similarities are there and point tellingly towards nationalist political orientation. They are committed to the concept of national divisions as a part of human nature (statement 3 is +4 for both groups). They are both concerned about loss of identity to the EU (statement 1 is +2 for Germans and +1 for French) and the adverse effects of globalization on German identity (statement 4 is +4 for Germans and +3 for French). They both think that European integration is not too slow, suggesting it could be even slower and they would be happy (statement 21 is –3 for Germans and –1 for French). Perhaps the most significant finding of this study is to confirm, along with the French study, that the nationalist sentiment expressed on the street is not very consistent with the “core nationalist doctrine” that is generally thought to constitute nationalist thought in the literature (Smith 1991, p. 74). The statements that make up the nationalist approach (especially statements 3, 7, 27, 28, and 35 and the converse to statements 29, 30, and 31) had little consistent resonance with anyone in the study. Only those labeled here “nationalist” had even remotely favorable responses to these statements in their entirety, and several of the statements received a fairly negative response. The following lists these statements with their responses in descending order from the nationalist group: 3 Men are by their very nature linked to nations, each of which has its own unique characteristics (+4).

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30 Our society is held together by events of history and common hatred toward our neighbors (+2). 27 German wine, cheese and other products are the best of their kind in the world (+1). 28 If someone makes a negative comment about Germany or Austria, I feel personally as if someone had said something negative about me (+1). 29 I obey the law but I am not particularly patriotic (+1). 31 It’s possible to separate the political from the cultural identity of a nation (–2). 7 Loyalty toward one’s own country is more important than any other form of loyalty (0). 20 The European Union represents an unattractive blending (homogenization) of diverse European culture (0). 35 A nation by itself is the source of sovereignty. No one can claim or carry out certain rights that do not originate with this sovereignty (–2). In other words, although this group is clearly nationalist in its overall responses, the kind of core doctrine that we have traditionally thought makes up nationalist thought does not resonate with them in any consistent way. As with the French study, we may need to rethink what constitutes modern nationalist thought in Europe now that the European Union is having a major impact through several generations of Europeans. Reactions to two different statements might seem anomalous and need some explanation. On the surface, because of the generally positive orientation towards the nation as opposed to supranational institutions that German nationalists seem to hold, it may seem contradictory that they placed a high value (+3) on statement 33 (“Equity for all Europe can only be achieved if European integration moves forward”). But that may be explained by the fact that they feel with such European integration as has already happened, the nation has become weakened. Again, this could be a mark of their concern about the direction of European integration. The other possibly anomalous reaction pertains to German nationalist sentiment concerning the euro and is more difficult to explain. Participants rated statement 8 a +4: “The introduction of a European common currency will not be easy, but will be an important step for Germany and Austria.” This would seem to run contrary to nationalist sentiment, which would see a distinctive currency as a significant marker of nationalism. Perhaps it may be even more important for Germans: In this century alone Germans have twice lost all their personal savings because of inflation and economic collapse brought about by war. This loss may explain the current German pride in their currency, the beloved deutsche Mark (DM), and their resistance to adopting to the euro. (Nees 2000, p. 41)

128 De Forest W. Colegrove Since the participants who scored nationalist were all of the group that participated by mailing, none could be interviewed later. Perhaps there was a misunderstanding of the statement, perhaps there is another sentiment not being given voice here. Further study of German nationalists would seem to be warranted. In sum, German nationalists are well within the parameters of what we traditionally think of as nationalists (Smith 1991), although their sentiment seems markedly more sharply defined, less tolerant, and less patriotic than French nationalists. They seem more concerned about the EU as a potential superstate that will rob Germany of its identity and dominate it politically. Factor 4: Pessimistic pluralist Seven of the participants in the study fall into a group that shares a range of similarities with Factor 2 pluralists, but differ in ways significant enough to constitute a separate category. This group seems to believe that there can be two equal entities (Germany and the EU) operating independently but in concert, yet as a group is reserved, even pessimistic, about its impact on German culture and its probability of success. They do not see themselves as patriotic, yet they seem to have a strong sense of national identity. As a factor dominated by pluralist sentiments, they might naturally want Europeans to retain their identities in the EU, and seem to feel the “naturalness” of national divisions. Similarly to Factor 2 pluralists, the pessimistic pluralist strongly believes in a Europe of politically and culturally different nation states that may cooperate in a union to produce potentially positive change, but a union that at the same time should not essentially alter the character of those states. Thus, both groups score most positively (+4) statement 3 and both have strongly positive responses to statements 13 and 19. Characteristic of the group, respondent F7 expressed this sentiment: “People in Spain or Italy live differently than us because of climate and history … I am losing something with this EU tradition. We all blend in – we lose our uniqueness.” Respondent F8 agrees, expressing it in terms that show the nationalist roots of pluralist sentiment: I believe that nations develop their own specific “trademarks” due to their history, their environment, and their educational systems. All these factors can change slowly, but generally stay the same over a longer period of time. Those and other factors like geographical location and weather conditions “imprint” people and create typical “trademarks.” The pluralists and their pessimistic counterparts are equally uneasy with the adoption of the euro (both scoring statement 8 a –4) and not feeling strongly attracted to Europe (both –2 to statement 14). They both feel that the EU is too diverse for it to work effectively (statement 22). In responses that mirror Eurobarometer findings, these two groups also react negatively to overt expressions of patriotism, even as they are elsewhere expressing

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positive sentiments toward their nation and national culture. They both placed statement 29 (“I obey the law but I am not particularly patriotic”) in the +3 category, and they both reacted negatively to the statement that marks pride in their nation’s products (statement 27): “German wine, cheese and other products are the best of their kind in the world.” These may seem on the surface to be anomalies, but may be explained as responses to current national debates in Germany about unwanted by-products of German production, especially pollution. Interestingly for this study, this debate is to a certain extent being expressed in a European context: Is Germany keeping up with new EU environmental protocols? Would negative responses to this question have something to do with this lack of pride? Coal subsidies are especially discordant in Germany, which has made a highprofile commitment to bring its greenhouse gas emissions to 25 percent below the 1990 level by 2005. (Roodman 1998, p. 74) Yet with all their similarities, there are differences between the two groups of German pluralists. The key difference seems to be that Factor 4 pluralists seem more “pessimistic” than their Factor 2 counterparts. They are distinctly less hopeful (–1 compared with +3 on statement 2) concerning technological change and the global economy, the key indicator among the statements on gauging attitudes of optimism and pessimism. They are less sanguine that national divisions will disappear with a new generation of Europeans (–3 compared with 0 on statement 23). They feel more keenly that the EU is an unattractive blending of cultures (+3 to 0 on statement 20). Yet it would be a mistake to assume that this group is xenophobic and closed to other cultures. Along with supranationalists, the pessimistic pluralists rated statement 5 the lowest in the entire study, the “meanest” expression toward foreigners in one’s country. This also distinguished them from their pluralist brethren, who scored this statement collectively as +2. Respondent F6 helps us to understand how participants on this factor view this: “Foreigners help to keep our minds open in many aspects. By being ‘different’ [culturally, religiously, …] they probably make us become more aware of our national identity.” Thus, pessimistic pluralists see interaction with others positively, if only as a kind of affirmation of their own cultural identity as Germans. This relative openness to foreigners may help to explain the marginally positive feelings they do have towards the EU in other statements in the study. They reacted with some enthusiasm (+2) to the idea of equity within the EU (statement 33) and with equally moderate enthusiasm for the concept of subsidiarity, and a little less enthusiasm (+1) for the idea that Germany has profited from its EU membership. The pessimistic pluralists, then, constitute a different grouping with a distinct viewpoint in the study, although it was a viewpoint shared in some ways by Factor 2 pluralists. The German pessimists also differed in more ways than not with Factor 4 French participants, in that study labeled “disaffected populists.” The

130 De Forest W. Colegrove French populists gained that distinction by viewing with equal disdain their national and EU leaders, a kind of a “pox on both your houses” apolitical stand that was not really shared by the German Factor 4s. The pessimistic pluralists, even with their skepticism towards the EU, were nonetheless more disposed towards the supranational institution in other statements they ranked higher. They came out expressing more faith in the possibility of the EU (statement 16 at +4 for the Germans and 0 for the French) and saw it as more beneficial than not for their country (+1 versus –2 for French on statement 32). Yet similarly to the French populists, German pessimists rejected a mean attitude towards foreigners (–4 for the Germans and –2 for the French). This could perhaps be explained as both groups expressing their affiliation with foreigners as “outsiders” in the country as much or more than the insiders who govern, although that may be more true of the French group. As mentioned earlier, for the German group this may not be so much feelings of affiliation as instead affirmation of their own national identities.

Conclusion: steadfastly European? This study started with the assumption, gained from an historical perspective, that Germany is steadfastly European. A democratically elected leadership that has been so resolutely supportive of European integration and has so consistently stressed the importance of Germany fitting into that new Europe, would likely communicate that support to and in many ways derive its positions from its people. Would “the street” be significantly different from the government it elects? Eurobarometer was the instrument used initially to obtain a snapshot of the feelings of the average citizen regarding Germany’s participation in the European Union. As described here, these surveys showed that Germans were by and large less than enthusiastic about the process. It seemed “the street” was distinctly less enthusiastic than its leaders. In addition, with regards to German participation in the EU, two consistently negative themes seem to emerge in popular commentaries: German citizens do not like losing the beloved deutsche Mark, and they do not like paying for so much of the EU budget. Q methodology and the interviews of German citizens may have, in the main, confirmed this overall impression. But by providing a closer examination of these views, this Q study has shown significantly mixed feelings below the surface of German opinion, with significant parts of the population much more enthusiastic than the Eurobarometer data would suggest. As mentioned regularly in this chapter, the findings regarding Germany align in several respects with findings from the French study (Robyn 2000), although revealing differences of opinion across the different cultures, as would be expected. This would seem to confirm the efficacy of Q method as a cross-cultural research tool, revealing fine distinctions and connections across so-called cultural borders. In general, especially in comparison with their French neighbors, Germans seem to maintain a fundamentally strong sense of national identity. This is broadly spread among the participants in this study, and is even quite strong among those

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labeled here “supranationalists.” This national identity is expressed even in the face of a weak expression of overt national pride, an interesting combination that corresponds with Eurobarometer findings: Germans are among the least overtly expressive of national (or European) pride among all Europeans. It also exists among those Germans who express strong feelings of non-national affiliation: regional ties or religious affiliations that are extra-German. In other words, Germans seem to have little problem maintaining multiple identities. In comparison to the French, Germans seem less optimistic about the EU in general. Even the supranationalists had a pronounced mix of pluralist tendencies and the pluralists nearly as pessimistic as their pessimistic pluralist cousins. This also seems to mirror Eurobarometer data that found definite lack of enthusiasm among Germans for EU institutions. But unlike the Eurobarometer surveys, in this study there is definite enthusiasm among all the factors (except the nationalists) about certain aspects of supranational connections, and especially about some of the underlying logical connections to supranational identity. Perhaps the most significant finding of this study is confirmation, along with the French study, that nationalist identity does not seem to correspond well with how we have traditionally conceived it in the literature. In Germany, Q methodology respondents who fell into the nationalist camp responded with little consistency to the various components of what has been described as “core nationalist doctrine” (Smith 1991, 74). The findings of this study would confirm, along with the French study, that we need to rethink what constitutes modern European nationalist thought. It could be, now that we have had several generations of experience with the European Union, that the underlying logic that constitutes primary allegiance to the nation, which has been the hallmark of European history, has been undermined. As stated earlier, it may or may not be significant that German nationalists constituted only 12 per cent of this particular study population. Q methodology does not claim to generalize to the larger population in one-to-one fashion. However, along with the French study in which locating a French nationalist was not easy to do, it may be that German nationalism has gone underground, and is not easy to locate. In this study, as mentioned earlier, participants who expressed nationalist sentiment were those who did the mail-in Q sorts and none expressed this in the face-to-face sessions. It may be that participants feel uncomfortable expressing their true feelings openly, which is likely the case. Otherwise, it would be sheer coincidence that only those who express a certain sentiment would do so by the relatively anonymous method of mailing. This has been reinforced by the May 2004 accessions to the 15-member European Union of ten new members: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Germany as the economic powerhouse was at the forefront in welcoming the new members, perhaps particularly in the case of Poland. This enthusiasm may be explained by a certain sense of guilt that Germans likely still retain for Nazi atrocities committed to Poles on Polish soil. Soon to be considered for membership is Turkey, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder will be pushing for approval of that move although perhaps for a different reason: Germany has a large Turkish population

132 De Forest W. Colegrove (2.5 million of the EU’s 3.8 million people of Turkish origin live in Germany) so it becomes an important political factor, particularly as approximately 550,000 of the ethnic Turks are German citizens with voting rights. While government policy may have been supportive of new EU members, the people themselves seem by and large to be unenthusiastic, and it remains to be seen whether they will become more enthusiastic over time. As mentioned earlier, because of the costs involved in admitting new members, costs borne substantially more by Germans than by other EU members, it is often hard to find positive German feeling here for either Poles or Turks. By law, the government pays immigrants a generous stipend, which Germans in general seem to resent. While these ethnic groups often take the lowest-paid jobs (cab drivers, sweepers, cleaners, etc.), and by doing so provide services that many Germans prefer to avoid, nonetheless many Germans seem to exhibit mere toleration rather than affection for them. This does not bode well for any further EU expansion, which might result in a greater intake of foreign workers. Finally, it seems that the significance of this study for the EU movement is that, even with all the complaining that may be aired in polls and studies, the German population will probably go along with further European integration. There seems at the moment to be little significant political opposition to the process. No real obstacles seem on the horizon to further union movement from the perspective of how people in Germany identify their nation with Europe. The process that has been ongoing since the 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty of Rome, has seen Germany a willing participant. Collectively, the German population has endured conflict and consternation for centuries, and it appears likely that they will endure what hardships the integration process may entail and may grow even stronger with it. In their own way, they remain steadfastly European.

References Clingaert, Michael. 1996. European Integration: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Eurobarometer 55. 2001. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Eurobarometer 56. 2002. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Friedman, Thomas L. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. Krugman, Paul. 1999. The Return of Depression Economics. New York: WW Norton. Nees, Greg. 2000. Germany: Unraveling an Enigma. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, Inc. Olins, R.A. and Van Tubingen, G.N. (1979). “Mail vs Personal Interview Administration for Q Sorts: A Comparative Study,” Operant Subjectivity, 2, pp. 51–9. Robyn, Richard. 2000. “A Methodological Approach to National Identity in Europe,” Politique Européenne, 1(1), pp. 84–107.

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Roodman, David Marlin. 1998. The Natural Wealth of Nations: Harnessing the Market for the Environment. New York: WW Norton. Schmolck, Peter and John Atkinson. 1998. PQMethod (version 2.06). [Computer software]. Available online at http://www.rz.unibw-meunchen.de/~p41bsmk/qmethod/. Smith, Anthony. 1991. National Identity. Las Vegas, NV: University of Nevada Press. Wyden, Peter. 2001. The Hitler Virus: The Insidious Legacy of Adolf Hitler. New York: Arcade Publishing.

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Appendix 6.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/German national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

1 We are losing more and more of our national identity to the European Union. Over the long term our national identity will cease to exist. (N)

–1

1

3

0

2 Constant technological change and the global economic system have a positive impact on my attitude toward Germany and Austria. (SN)

1

3

2

–1

3 Men are by their very nature linked to nations, each of which has its own unique characteristics. (N)

0

4

4

4

4 Globalization means that German culture will cease to exist. (N)

–2

–1

4

–1

5 I have nothing against foreigners in my country, but I think they have a significant impact on our national identity. (N)

2

3

–4

–4

6 Classical sovereign states can no longer solve the problems of today: they cannot guarantee their own progress, nor can they control their own destiny. (SN)

0

–1

–1

1

–4

–1

0

–1

8 The introduction of a European common currency will not be easy, but will be an important step for Germany and Austria. (PL)

2

–4

4

–4

9 It would be distressful to my parents to know that my spouse was a foreigner. (N)

–3

–1

–3

–3

10 The European Union is one source of peace and stability for Germany and Austria. (PL)

4

2

–1

0

11 Our elected officials will be capable of providing leadership to our national institutions (governmental agencies) in a global environment. (PL)

0

–2

–3

0

12 I believe I am first and foremost a European and, second, a citizen of my country. (SN)

2

–4

0

1

13 I would like to see a Europe that consists of individual states whose political and cultural differences should be equally reflected by their geographical situation. (PL)

0

2

1

4

14 I feel strongly attracted to Europe in its entirety. (SN)

4

–2

–4

–2

15 The division of the church represented by Martin Luther was simultaneously the division of German Christianity. (N)

1

0

1

–2

16 Unity in Europe will not result in a European political entity. Instead, unity will serve to promote change in Europe. (PL)

1

0

–4

4

17 Germany and Austria must maintain their independence in European issues. (N)

–1

4

–2

1

18 I would like to see Germany and Austria represent a counterweight to US influence. (PL)

–1

2

–1

–2

7 Loyalty toward one's own country is more important than any other form of loyalty. (N)

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135

Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

19 Europe will be stronger for the very reason that in the European context, Germany remains Germany, Austria remains Austria, France remains France, and Spain remains Spain. Each land keeps its own culture, traditions and identity.It is not a good idea to attempt to force European Union countries into a European culture, tradition and identity. (PL)

4

4

–2

3

20 The European Union represents an unattractive blending (homogenization) of diverse European culture. (N)

–3

0

0

3

21 European integration is moving too slowly. (SN)

1

–3

–3

0

22 European countries are too diverse to be easily integrated into a European Union. (PL)

–2

3

0

1

23 National divisions will disappear, making way for a new and growing European generation. (SN)

3

0

2

–3

24 Germany and Austria can remain Germany and Austria only if they play a leading role in the world as a unit. (N)

–2

1

–1

–2

25 European disunity is the result of a conscious drive to place national sovereignty and absolute national advantage at the forefront. (SN)

0

–3

–1

2

26 I think that the process of European integration has attained its final stage: it can go no further. (PL)

–4

–2

0

–1

27 German wine, cheese and other products are the best of their kind in the world. (PL)

–3

–2

1

–4

28 If someone makes a negative comment about Germany or Austria I feel personally as if someone had said something negative about me. (N)

–2

–1

1

–1

29 I obey the law but I am not particularly patriotic. (SN)

1

3

1

3

–1

–4

2

0

31 It’s possible to separate the political from the cultural identity of a nation. (PL)

3

1

–2

0

32 In general, my country has profited from membership in the European Union. (SN)

2

–3

–4

1

33 Equity for all Europe can only be achieved if European integration moves forward. (SN)

3

1

3

2

34 European federalism and political responsibility at the national level attempt to bring together what can be brought together: a unified Europe and a sense of loyalty to one’s own homeland. (PL)

–1

0

2

2

35 A nation by itself is the source of sovereignty. No one can claim or carry out certain rights that do not originate with this sovereignty. (N)

0

1

–2

2

36 A greater degree of European integration can give minorities, such as the Sinti and Roma ethnic groups, a greater sense of their own nationality. (SN)

2

0

0

–3

30 Our society is held together by events of history and our common hatred toward our neighbors. (SN)

The parenthetical notations [(N), (SN) and (PL)] after each statement incorporates the Q sample structure discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. nationalist, supranationalist and pluralist.

136 De Forest W. Colegrove

Appendix 6.2: German Q statements 1 Wir verlieren mehr und mehr unserer nationalen Identität an die Europäische Union. Die eigene nationale Identität wird es eines Tages – auf lange Sicht – nicht mehr geben. We are losing more and more of our national identity to the European Union. Over the long term our national identity will cease to exist. 2 Ständige Erneuerungen im technologischen Bereich und die internationale Wirtschaft tragen zu meiner optimistischen Einstellung zu Deutschland/ Österreich bei. Constant technological change and the global economic system have a positive impact on my attitude toward Germany and Austria. 3 Die Menschheit ist von Natur aus in Nationen aufgeteilt und jede hat ihre eigenen besonderen Merkmale. Men are by their very nature linked to nations, each of which has its own unique characteristics. 4 Globalisierung bedeutet, dass die deutsche Kultur aufhören wird zu existieren. Globalization means that German culture will cease to exist. 5 Ich habe nichts gegen Ausländer in meinem Land, aber ich finde, dass sie unsere nationale Identität empfindlich stören. I have nothing against foreigners in my country, but I think they have a significant impact on our national identity. 6 Die souveränen Staaten von einst können die Probleme der Gegenwart nicht mehr lösen; sie können weder ihren eigenen Fortschritt sicherstellen noch ihre eigene Zukunft kontrollieren. Classical sovereign states can no longer solve the problems of today: they cannot guarantee their own progress, nor can they control their own destiny. 7 Treue gegenüber dem eigenen Land steht über jeder anderen Art von Treue. Loyalty toward one’s own country is more important than any other form of loyalty. 8 Die Einführung einer europäischen Einheitswährung wird schwer werden, aber für Deutschland/Österreich notwendig sein. The introduction of a European common currency will not be easy, but will be an important step for Germany and Austria. 9 Meine Eltern wären sehr unglucklich darüber, wenn ich mit einem Ausländer/ einer Ausländerin verheiratet wäre. It would be distressful to my parents to know that my spouse was a foreigner. 10 Die Europäische Union ist ein Mittel zur Erhaltung des Friedens und der Stabilität für Deutschland/Österreich. The European Union is one source of peace and stability for Germany and Austria. 11 Unsere gewählten Politiker sind fähig, unsere nationalen Institutionen (Ministerien) in einem globalen Umfeld zu führen. Our elected officials will be capable of providing leadership to our national institutions (governmental agencies) in a global environment.

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12 Ich denke, dass ich in erster Linie ein europäischer Bürger bin, und erst in zweiter Linie ein Bürger meines Landes. I believe I am first and foremost a European and, second, a citizen of my country. 13 Ich möchte ein Europa, welches aus einzelnen Staaten besteht. Diese Staaten sollten in gleichem Masse kulturell und politisch so unterschiedlich sein, wie es sich auch in ihrer geographischen Situation widerspiegelt. I would like to see a Europe that consists of individual states whose political and cultural differences should be equally reflected by their geographical situation. 14 Ich fühle mich sehr zu Europa als Ganzes hingezogen. I feel strongly attracted to Europe in its entirety. 15 Die Spaltung der Kirche durch Martin Luther war gleichzeitig die religiöse Spaltung des deutschen Christentums. The division of the church represented by Martin Luther was simultaneously the division of German Christianity. 16 Einigkeit in Europa schafft keine neue politische Macht. Sie dient vielmehr dann, einen Wandel in Europa einzuleiten. The division of the church represented by Martin Luther was simultaneously the division of German Christianity. 17 Deutschland/Österreich muss in europäischen Angelegenheiten Unabhängigkeit bewahren. Germany and Austria must maintain their independence in European issues. 18 Ich möchte dass Deutschland/Österreich ein Gegengewicht zum amerikanischen Einfluss darstellt. I would like to see Germany and Austria represent a counterweight to US influence. 19 Europa wird stärker sein, und zwar genau deswegen, weil es Deutschland als Deutschland hat, Österreich als Österreich, Frankreich als Frankreich, Spanien als Spanien. Jedes behält dabei seine eigene Kultur, Traditionen, und Identität. Es wäre schlecht, wenn mann versuchte, alle EU-Länder in eine Art europäische Kultur, Tradition, und Identität zu zwingen. Europe will be stronger for the very reason that in the European context, Germany remains Germany, Austria remains Austria, France remains France, and Spain remains Spain. Each land keeps its own culture, traditions and identity. It is not a good idea to attempt to force European Union countries into a European culture, tradition and identity. 20 Die Europäische Union verkörpert eine unangenehme Vereinheitlichung (Homogenisierung) unterschiedlicher europäischer Kulturen. The European Union represents an unattractive blending (homogenization) of diverse European culture. 21 Die europäische Integrierung schreitet zu langsam voran. European integration is moving too slowly. 22. Die europäischen Länder sind zu unterschiedlich als dass sie in einer Europäischen Union zusammenpassen würden.

138 De Forest W. Colegrove

23

24

25

26

27

28

29 30

31 32 33

34

European countries are too diverse to be easily integrated into a European Union. Nationale Teilungen werden verschwinden, um für eine neue wachsende europäische Generation Platz zu machen. National divisions will disappear, making way for a new and growing European generation. Deutschland/Österreich kann nur dann Deutschland/Österreich sein, wenn es als eigenes Land einen führenden Platz in der Welt einnimmt. Germany and Austria can remain Germany and Austria only if they play a leading role in the world as a unit. Europäische Uneinigkeit ist das Resultat einer bewusst vorangetriebenen Vorstellung, die volle nationale Souveränität und die absoluten Vorteile nationaler Politik in den Vordergrund stellt. European disunity is the result of a conscious drive to place national sovereignty and absolute national advantage at the forefront. Ich glaube, dass der Prozess der europäischen Integration sein Endstadium erreicht hat: weiter geht es nicht. I think that the process of European integration has attained its final stage: it can go no further. Deutscher Wein, Käse, und andere Produkte sind die besten der Welt. German wine, cheese and other products are the best of their kind in the world. Wenn jemand etwas schlechtes über Deutschland/Österreich sagt, dann fühle ich mich davon persönlich betroffen. Es wäre als hätte er etwas negatives über mich persönlich gesagt. If someone makes a negative comment about Germany or Austria, I feel personally as if someone had said something negative about me. Ich füge mich dem Gesetz, aber ich bin nicht besonders patriotisch. I obey the law but I am not particularly patriotic. Unsere Gesellschaft wird zusammengehalten durch den Lauf der Geschichte und durch den gemeinsamen Hass unserer Nachbarn. Our society is held together by events of history and our common hatred toward our neighbors. Es ist möglich, politische und kulturelle Indentität voneinander zu trennen. It’s possible to separate the political from the cultural identity of a nation. Im allgemeinen hat mein Land durch die EU-Mitgliedschaft profitiert. In general, my country has profited from membership in the European Union. Gleichheit für ganz Europa lässt sich nur dann erzielen, wenn die europäische Integrierung weiter voranschreitet. Equity for all Europe can only be achieved if European integration moves forward. Europäischer Förderalismus und nationale Zuständigkeit versuchen zusammenzubringen, was unzusammenbringbar ist: ein vereintes Europa und anhaltende Treue zum eigenen Vaterland.

Steadfastly European?

139

European federalism and political responsibility at the national level attempt to bring together what can be brought together: a unified Europe and a sense of loyalty to one’s own homeland. 35 Das Land als solches ist die Quelle aller Souveränität. Niemand kann sich Rechte aneignen oder ausführen, die nicht ausdrücklich von dieser Souveränität abstammen. A nation by itself is the source of sovereignty. No one can claim or carry out certain rights that do not originate with this sovereignty. 36 Grössere europäische Integrierung kann nationalen Minderheiten, wie z.B. den Sinti und Roma, einen grössere Empfindung für ihre eigene Nationalität geben. A greater degree of European integration can give minorities, such as the Sinti and Roma ethnic groups, a greater sense of their own nationality.

140 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni

7

Italian multiple identities The Italian perception of national and European belonging Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni

Introduction This chapter examines how Italian national identity is perceived among Italians in the context of the European Union, using Q methodology. In later sections, results of our study, carried out in the summer of 2001, will be presented. In the introduction to the chapter, we will discuss the birth of the national Italian identity and European identity in Italy from an historical point of view. A brief history of Italian national identity It could be argued that the roots of Italian culture and tradition go back to the Roman period and even beyond, although in fact the actual construction of the modern Italian national identity is relatively recent, arguably since 1861 and the unification of Italy. We will certainly look at the modern period, but we will also argue here that a better understanding of how Italians perceive their national identity in a modern European context can be gained from examining earlier history. In fact an historical overview allows us to understand step by step the strengths and weaknesses of the Italians’ perception and construction of national identity. This historical overview starts with the foundation of the first republics and their constitutions at the end of the eighteenth century. The Italian regions were under differing foreign dominations during much of their history. When Napoleon came to Italy to fight Austria, which then controlled the northern region, Italian politics changed deeply. In Lombardy in 1796, once it was plain that the Austrians had been removed, great patriotic parades took place. The Transpadana Republic was proclaimed, which was legally similar to the French form of government. Other republics with their own constitutions were created in almost all of central Italy. By the end of 1796, the Cispadana Republic, established by towns of the region now known as “Emilia,” joined the Transpadana, founding the Cisalpine Republics. In southern Italy the Partenopea Republic was proclaimed. Thus the ideals of the Enlightenment were introduced from France, greatly stimulating Italian revolutionary ideas and helping to bring Italy into the modern age. A short period of repression followed this early period of revolutionary fervor when deposed monarchs and nobles formed an anti-French coalition and revoked

Italian multiple identities 141 the constitutions. But Napoleon returned to Italy to finally remove the monarchies in 1801, and he renamed the Cisalpine Republic the “Italian Republic.” A representative of Italy was called by Napoleon to meet together with Talleyrand, the French foreign minister. Installing Napoleon as President of Italy meant that the Italians were still under foreign control and with their freedom limited, even though an Italian politician was the vice president. The Sicilian Constitution, promulgated in 1812, constituted the first formal break with this foreign control following the fall of Napoleon and his first exile. This Sicilian Constitution ultimately formed the basis of the constitution for the Italian Republic. At the time, there was a strong English army in the Kingdom of Sicily, permitted by King Ferdinando di Borbone so as to avoid occupation by Napoleon. Later, when the relationship between the king and the English was broken, a liberal constitution was established based on governance models in Great Britain, which allowed Ferdinando to remain king. In Sicily, equality under the law and freedom of the press were proclaimed and torture and feudal rights were abolished. When Napoleon was finally defeated and exiled in 1815, the deposed monarchs were restored and the constitution revoked, decided at the Congress of Vienna by the victors over Napoleon. In Italy this started a period of great upheaval and change known as the “Risorgimento,” during which secret societies were formed to fight officially restored power and ultimately to re-obtain the recently suppressed liberal gains. Those societies had in common three main goals: independence from Austria; the unification of Italy; and parliamentary government once unity was proclaimed. Those involved and interested in such issues came from the upper middle classes, largely because the general population was essentially uneducated. Sometimes the leaders associated with this overall movement sided with Austria, sometimes with the Pope or the monarchs, at other times with the patriots, depending on the material advantages they felt they might gain. There were three main revolts during the Risorgimento: in 1820, 1831 and 1848. The first was led by nobles who aimed to become part of the government and to limit the king’s power; but when the middle class expressed the same objective, the nobles took cause with the king, afraid of sharing their privileges. At about the same time, Carlo Alberto, the vice-king of Sardinia, granted a Spanishstyle constitution, based on a unicameral parliament, while the king was away from the country. This constitution, however, was revoked on the king’s return. The most important faction which took part in the revolts of 1820 and 1831 was known by the name of Carboneria (“charcoal factory”), because its followers used slang used by charcoal-burners. The three main revolts were carried out principally by Neapolitan, Sicilian and Piedmontese Carbonari, although insurrections also occurred throughout Italy. The revolts actually took place late in Italy, part of a much larger movement of revolution that had already broken out all over Europe. The revolts in Italy were all finally suppressed by Austria, but a new reality, even more radical then the Carboneria, was then born. The great Italian nationalist

142 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni leader Giuseppe Mazzini aimed at abolishing the monarchy and claimed that every person should have their own land and follow the mission given them by God. In order to do this, the people had to have national sovereignty and not be under a foreign power. According to Mazzini, the people should be free, equal and brothers under a divine law. He also believed that Italians’ first duty was to carry out unification and establish the independence of their homeland. His ideals were not well understood or valued by the illiterate masses. Only later did Mazzini attend to the interests of other democratic movements in Italy: in Rome, Veneto, Sicily, Naples, the Papal state, in the Kingdom of Tuscany, in Parma, Piacenza, Modena and in the Kingdom of Sardinia. Mazzini founded “Giovine Italia” (Young Italy) in 1831, during the revolts, and in 1834 “Giovine Europa” (Young Europe). In fact he believed that Italy could be the origin of a process of liberation from monarchy and prevention of foreign intervention in the sovereignty of nations for all the European peoples. In 1849 the liberal constitutions granted after the third revolt were revoked with the exception of that of Carlo Alberto, known then as the “Albertino Statute”. This was very important, because it extended to other Italian regions when they were annexed as part of the Kingdom of Sardinia during the unification process. The statute sanctioned freedom of the press, prosperity, personal freedom and the sanctity of the home. In Piedmont, part of the Kingdom of Sardinia and center of Italian political power, the leader of the government was the Count of Cavour, a strategist who aimed to establish an alliance of the French against the Austrians. For this purpose, he helped the English and French armies during the Crimean War so as to have the right to join them at the peace conference in Paris and discuss the Italian problem as regards Austrian rule. Soon after that conference anti-monarchic revolts erupted in Milan and Naples, and Cavour took advantage of them to press the urgency of the Italian problem on Napoleon III, the king of France. They signed the military agreement of Plombières in 1858, according to which Lombardy and Veneto would no longer be part of Austria, but part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, while Savoy and Nice would pas to France. Austria, provoked by this, moved against Piedmont but it was defeated. Then the two parties signed the agreement of Villafranca and Napoleon III kept his promise. Moreover, Emilia and Tuscany voluntarily also became part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. The unification process was thus completed partly by Cavour’s diplomacy and partly by the force of troops raised directly from the people by the republican patriot Giuseppe Garibaldi. Finally in 1861 the first Italian Parliament met in Turin and declared the Kingdom of Italy. According to Ernesto Galli, one cannot really locate an Italian identity throughout history. In fact Italian unification was basically the result of diplomatic agreements allied with several different ideals and objectives. Moreover, the interests of the Italian society did not agree with those of the state in most cases. This implies that the mass of people tended to side with those who promised them a job, land, lower taxes, and a reduction of the price of staple goods.

Italian multiple identities 143 Galli argues that in Italy there was more contested politics rather than a strong liberal state, even as this weak state tried to import modern ideologies and renew the economy and laws, as in the case of Cavour. In the unification process, there was a lack of broad cultural support for a bureaucratic state and a real administrative and bureaucratic elite were absent. This resulted in a series of states that did not follow the rights and the interests of the overall society and often perpetrated arbitrary acts of political power (Galli Delle Loggia, 1995). The origin of the Italian state is thus indeed very young, mostly because there was not a strong national elite that could emerge from the bourgeois class, neither from professionals nor from academic or bureaucratic institutions who could represent the Italian tradition (D’Amico, 1987). This, as Galli argues, caused a weak feeling of national identity.

The perception of European identity in Italy The word “Europe” has had different meanings over time: it has been identified with Greece and its continental lands, later with the Roman Empire, then with the Christian Empire. At times it has corresponded with a military agreement, such as the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of Napoleon. Or it has had a religious connotation, as some may argue that Europe is a Catholic Christian continent, in contrast to Protestant Europe and certainly an Islamic Europe. But the modern concept of Europe as a voluntary organization of people with no boundaries was born at the end of the eighteenth century in the Enlightenment. Its ideals have had a synergistic impact in Italy; that is, as its influence has been felt within Italy certain Italian thinkers and politicians have in turn contributed to its movement, although from their own particular and sometimes seemingly contradictory ways. Enlightenment thought of the eighteenth century conceived a Europe as a cosmopolitan and patriotic entity, without a sense of superiority towards other people. This idea comes from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, which is far from the concept of nationalism. These ideals were brought to Italy largely by Giuseppe Mazzini and Carlo Cattaneo more then a century later (Spadolini, 1979). Mazzini, as we said earlier, believed that every nation has a mission. In particular, he felt, Italians should stimulate other Europeans to carry on their process of liberation from the “chains” of domination by foreign governments. For this purpose he founded “Giovine Europa” in order to support his idea of encouraging people to cooperate and act like brothers. Mazzini’s followers acted according to the formula “thinking and moving,” which meant moral commitment and action at the same time. They viewed Europeans in general as a people to educate with programs and objectives to follow in order to make each of them worthy of their own mission to win freedom. Mazzini conceived of a Europe as a democratic republic with no social divisions in which the poor could be rescued from their fate. Carlo Cattaneo followed the Milanese Enlightenment and elaborated a rational approach to the problems of his time. He was interested in socio-economic issues

144 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni and he tried to spread a modern techno-scientific culture throughout Italy and beyond the Italian boundaries. He tried to export his point of view beyond Italy, because he had in mind the idea of a capitalistic Europe. He was aware of the importance of the industrial revolution that occurred in Europe thanks to the bourgeoisie and he supported it (Camera and Fabietti, 1987). Thus was laid the philosophical groundwork in Italy for the concepts that would cultivate Italian support for the first stages of the European Union. With the Treaty of Paris in 1951, which brought the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) into existence, Italy along with Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed to share these key resources and to exploit them within a common market. Chief of the ECSC Assembly in 1954 was the Italian politician Alcide De Gasperi, who was followed by another Italian, Giuseppe Pella. In the 1950s the Italian economy was developing rapidly, as the government and business elites put into practice modern economic theories and innovation that came from Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) was founded in 1957 with the Treaty of Rome, which brought into effect the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which was the third European Community derived from international treaties. The EEC worked to create a legal structure with no customs barriers, to maintain the economic relationship among members and to regulate a common external tariff on goods entering the market. EURATOM, however, had the objective of making members cooperate in scientific research. In this context Italians felt part of a progressive community which favored exporting beyond its boundaries the image of a modern country, according to Camera and Fabietti (1997, Chapter 57). At this time Altiero Spinelli, together with Ernesto Rossi, wrote the “Manifesto per una Europa libera e unita” in Ventoténe (a program for a united and free Europe), the basis of the European Federalist Movement. Spinelli, in his project in which he designed the main topics for establishing a European Union (1950), encouraged the creation and the meeting of a European Parliament over a long period. Many Italians seemed oriented towards Europe in these years and even perhaps felt like pioneers at its birth (D’Amico 1987, Chapter 6). In the 1970s Italian enthusiasm was “reorganized” because the Spinelli project seemed too daring for that time, rejected by the governments of the other member states. Nevertheless, some points of the project were approved and included in the “Single European Act” in 1986. This “refusal” of the Spinelli project and the difficulties of carrying out a European Community with common rules provoked a sort of suspicion and distrust towards the EC among Italians (D’Amico, 1987). Later, at the beginning of the 1990s, Italy started to benefit from the EC structural funds, decided by the Regional Policy for each member. The EC gained some trust back for Italians again (Arts and Lee 1997, chapter 7). Europe was perceived as a benefactor which could help the Italian state and to whom people could apply in case of need. “Europinion,” a continuous tracking survey published on the Internet in 1997 and managed by the INTRA Demoskopea Statistical Institute, illustrated this

Italian multiple identities 145 attitude at the time. The survey focused on the perception of Europe among the EU members. As regarding Italy, 996 Italians were chosen in a random non-probabilistic sample method. It found that the opportunity to receive benefits from the European Community made Italians feel confident, but that they were reticent about extending that possibility to other countries wishing to become members of the EU, such as the states of Eastern Europe. Eurobarometer data compiled from fieldwork done in 2001 (Eurobarometer 56, 2002), in surveying EU perception among members managed by the European Commission, revealed fairly strong support among Italians for the EU. The surveys involved 16,154 interviewees from the 15 countries of the EU, chosen in a random non-probabilistic method. It showed that 64 per cent of Italians consider European membership a good thing, fifth among all member countries. Fifty-seven per cent think that they benefit from the EU policy and 79 per cent that the degree of security in general will rise. Seventy-nine per cent support the euro, even if only 49 per cent is convinced that the European currency will bring them benefits personally. By a huge percentage, 90 per cent, Italians express pride in their nation; they are also first, 75 per cent among the European members in their expression of pride in being European. On the other hand, only 23 per cent consider positively their own political institutions, 37 per cent critically, and 40 per cent negatively. Italians seem to view the EU as an entity that could help solve the inefficiencies of the Italian state under a wider, multi-ethnic point of view (Arts and Lee 1997). They seem rather afraid of the consequences of a new currency and they are worried about the “interference” of EU political structures and rules. This could come, however, from a feeling of distrust towards politics and politicians in general. Finally, only 21 per cent are favorable towards an integration of groups of people coming from different European cultures, while 10 per cent believe that assimilation could be better. Importantly, from what we have considered in these two introductory of introduction, the surveys reveal that Italians could feel threatened by what they see as people who have a strong, differently-oriented cultural identity, in opposition to the traditional, more familiar Italian identity. Thirty-five per cent claim not to be racist, 35 per cent a little and 62 per cent agree that Italy has reached its limits about new people belonging to a European minority willing to come and live in Italy. Italians indeed tend to consider their homeland a safe shelter that they are not glad to share with people of different cultures (Greca 1960). Thus, with the mass immigration of Muslims to the country, especially in the 1990s, many Italians began to fear for their traditions, culture and stability (Magli 2001). This happened at the same time that the EU was becoming a new “nation” beside Italy, but Italians seemed not to be ready to feel European, in part because many felt they had no sound feeling of their own identity yet. With the double blows to their identity of the EU establishing itself as a “supranation” taking the place of their homeland and of Muslims bringing in a different identity, Italians may be seen as more than a little worried about losing what many

146 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni see as their widely recognized features: an Italian style in cooking and fashion, a typical Italian way of using gestures to better express ideas, an Italian way of communicating with cheerfulness (Magli 2001). Some Italians may be afraid to see their entire cultural heritage cancelled through a cultural “leveling” process. Putting together several countries of great diversity is a hard operation that could diminish the value of each. Added to this is the risk deriving from what some may see as restrictive international legal obligations. Many Italians see Italian sovereignty limited by Article 117 of the Constitution, which declares the supremacy of EU laws by the Italian government and single regions legislative power (Magli 2001). Nostalgic for a unified national identity, hemmed in on the one hand by a European Union that is imposing non-national regulations and perhaps bringing in a new sense of European identity, and on the other hand by minority subcultures that are bringing a different sense of cultural identity, Italians face a contemporary scene that is complex and potentially stressful. A look at how Italians “on the street” see national and supranational identity may help to verify the ways that Italians see their identity evolving.

Contemporary perceptions of the link between national and EU identity in Italy Fieldwork for our Italian study of (supra)national identity was carried out during the summer of 2001 in and around the Bologna metropolitan area. A total of 32 participants from diverse backgrounds (described below) were included. Q statements were developed from the original French study (Robyn 2000), translated into Italian both in terms of language and culture. The statements are found in Appendix 7.1. Analysis of the Q interviews was divided into four major steps, described below: 1 Creation of data matrix: the values attributed to the 36 Q statements by the 32 participants were gathered in a table and then processed through calculation of standard variance;1 2 Factor analysis: four major factors were identified, and each of them given a set of representative statements. The four factors identified were then labeled as follows: 1 2 3 4

Vague anti-nationalist Nationalist United States of Europe (USE) supporter European Italianist;

3 Grouping according to factors: Q sorts were grouped according to greater loadings relating to one of the four factors. Only loadings greater than +40 were considered and discussed. This left out three Q sorts, with very low loadings on each factor. These will be discussed at the end of this section of the chapter (as “outsiders”).

Italian multiple identities 147 4 Discussion of Q sorts: Q sorts were analyzed and classified. The intent was to look for specific traits that would characterize each factor. Participants were selected as part of the population set according to the following criteria: • • • •

age: participants were defined as “young” (less than 35 years old) or “old” (over 35); sex: “male” or “female”; social status: “working class” or “middle class” (according to income and level of education); geographical origin: “urban” (from the city of Bologna) or “rural” (from the outskirts of Bologna).

Factor 1: Vague anti-nationalist The first factor, defined as “vague anti-nationalist,” is made up of eight loadings, which represent 25 per cent of the total variance. These loadings are characterized by being mostly men (seven out of eight), from the working class (seven out of eight). The only female participant present in this group (participant 28) is the wife of one of the interviewees belonging to the same group (participant 11). This apparently reflects a common view on political issues that is shared within the family. This couple represents the milder fraction of Factor 1, as their loadings range from +0.4 to +0.6, while Q sorts 3, 4 and 13 exceed +0.8 (strongest relation to the factor). The eight participants are equally divided in age (four young and four old) and geographical origin (four from rural and four from urban areas). Only one of the interviewed has a university degree (sort 13). Participants belonging to this group show strong feelings against any attempt to identify them as plain “Italians”. In general, while being part of Europe leaves them indifferent (statement 14 receives a 0 score), they completely disagree with an identification of themselves as belonging to a given nation. This factor is outspokenly open towards foreigners in general, and specifically towards economic integration. There is an inclination to downplay Italy as a leader and to diminish its role on a world scale. This factor fully acknowledges the need for a greater entity to solve present problems (statement 6 is a very positive +4), and globalization is in this case seen as a useful tool that does not imply the death of Italian culture (statement 4). It is interesting to note how the anti-nationalist stance derives from a strong disagreement with nationalistic statements (placed in –4 as most disagree) while apparently similar statements were placed in +3 and +4 as agree and most agree. Simply put, people belonging to this group show a definite idea of what they do not want and do not like, but may be skeptical of how it can be accomplished in a system of nation states that jealously guard their sovereignty. They may thus be uncertain to propose suitable solutions about European integration. Their view of Italian politics and identity as a nation is not clear, as is shown by the statements placed on +3 and +4:

148 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni 6 Nations can no longer solve the problems of the present. (+4) 35 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. (+3) Factor 1 participants apparently agree that something has to be done about social problems, and national governments cannot solve the problems alone, but that this is the current system and it may be difficult to do anything differently. This group might strongly connect European integration to the issue of efficiency and thus may support handing over of powers through bureaucratic mechanisms that have the potential to solve difficult social problems, many of which may be exacerbated by transnational forces. Also interesting was their response to statement 9 concerning family influence, meant also to gauge potential familial impact on political ideas with regards to the nation. The “vague anti-nationalists” responded positively (+3) to this statement, admitting to strong family influence. Interestingly enough, Factor 2 nationalists (discussed below), had the same response, although obviously with quite the opposite results in terms of outlook on the nation. Considering the discussion earlier on minorities in Italy, it should be noted that all factors are rather skeptical of the EU providing any boost to minorities: statement 36 generally across the board received rather negative scores. As discussed, perhaps Italians attempt to put aside any thought of this aspect of the EU as possibly a hindrance more than a help for Italy with a situation that is perceived as more a curse than a blessing. Factor 2: Nationalist The second factor, which represents 25 per cent of the total variance, contains eight loadings that are characterized by a strong connection to Italy as a sovereign nation, and a slightly negative view of Europe as a whole. Out of the eight loadings, five are females and three are males. Five are from the middle class, one of them is a lawyer, while again they are equally divided by age and geographical origin (four are old and four are young, four of them are from rural areas while four of them come from the city). Five of them present loadings ranging from +0.6 to +0.7 (sorts 14, 15, 16, 23 and 27), which indicates a strong bond to the factor. Nationalists emphasize a strong defense of loyalty to the nation-state and patriotism, and a general aversion towards the European Union. There is a quite high degree of national pride and a corresponding fear of losing Italian national identity. The European Union is not considered a suitable solution for political and social problems. The idea of Europe is discounted, in the sense that there is a strong disagreement even on a version of Europe composed of different, independent nations. Political and cultural aspects defining a nation are considered dependent on one another. From these emphases emerge an idea of Italy that, to a great degree, should be isolated from the rest of the world. Although the idea of Europe is not utterly

Italian multiple identities 149 disavowed (statements 8, 22 and 23 are generally positive), still predominance is given to Italian belonging, and to a general disinterest towards foreign affairs. This is more evident considering the following statements placed positively: 7 Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. (+4) 28 If someone said something bad about being Italian, I would feel bad. (+2) And certain statements placed less positively: 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are different. (–4) 31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural… (–2) 16 Europe is a method for introducing change in Europe… (–2) By no means is this factor as strongly or consistently positive towards all aspects of nationalist thought. Nor are Italian nationalists entirely negative towards the EU. As seems evident in France, the finding in this study of Italians is less consistent nationalist thought than what we might expect from the literature. Factor 3: United States of Europe (USE) supporter Factor 3 is shared by nine loadings, accounting for 28.1 per cent of the total variance. Participants comprising this factor were: five females and fouer males; six working class and three middle class; and balanced division between young and old, rural and urban. Participant 9 had a quite negative loading on this factor. All the other Q sorts range from +0.4 to +0.6. There are no very strong loadings as in the first two factors. Here again, as in Factor 1 anti-nationalists, the predominance of the working class over the middle class produces a result of a positive inclination towards European integration. These Q sorts have a common idea of European Union as an alternative to the United States of America. The label given by some participants was “United States of Europe,” to indicate a supranational entity with a common policy but local governments concerning daily affairs. Factor 3 is in favor of technology and globalization as a means to improve the current situation. Italy has from this point of view benefited from its involvement in the EU. There is a quest for a faster integration, but always keeping in mind that all nation states are basically different (as mentioned above, what is expressed here is the idea of a federal union of single states, as in the American case). According to the interviewees, the Italian situation does not depend on its past history, let alone a feeling of general discontent. Foreigners are welcome and supported. No racial comments were made with respect to Europeans, although it has to be mentioned that participant 9 pointed out his general acceptance of Europeans as opposed to a distaste with respect to foreigners coming from nonEC and non-Western countries.

150 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni Statements placed in “most agree” and “agree” (+4 and +3) describe this idea of a United States of Europe, as defined above: 18 I want Italy to be an alternative to American influence. 2 Technology and global economy contribute to my optimism for Italy. 32 In general, Italy has profited from its involvement in the European Union. The statements placed in the “most disagree” area show a strong defense of Italian pride, as well as a “declaration of intents” that do not derive from a negative attitude towards Italy, nor from a sense of inferiority towards other European countries: 30 Italian society is united by a delusion of our ancestry and … 5 Foreign persons pollute our national identity. 15 Italy’s relationship to Europe is shaped by the Second World War. Similarly to French optimistic pluralists, USE supporters also are rather optimistic (statement 2 is a +4), believing the EU can help maintain peace and stability in Europe (+3 to statement 10) and are supportive of the introduction of the euro (+3 to statement 8). Factor 4: European Italianists Factor 4 is made up of four participants, all from the middle class, three are from the urban area. This group is equally balanced between males and females, and three of them are under the age of 35. The strongest loading (at +0.8) belongs to a graduate in law, working for the Italian postal system, in a management position. There is one strong negative loading at –0.5 (not better identified). This group is characterized by an emphasis on attachment to the idea of Europe, but without any concrete description of what idea of Europe this might be. The generally higher level in education of the participants belonging to this group reflects a strong defense of Italian culture, considered in some ways superior to other cultures, especially with respect to literature and the arts. However, this does not imply a closure towards other civilizations. On the contrary, European Italianists are well disposed towards foreigners coming to Italy. There is a certain level of distrust in globalization and technology, and a quite high level of affection for traditional systems. In general, this group displays an old-fashioned vision of progress. This group seems to say “Yes” to Europe then, but to a lighter version of Europe, that could rely on solid agreements but should not lead to total integration. Trust is given to European institutions as long as they operate at a level of great tolerance for differences, or deeply rooted in values that this form of “Italianism” could accept. This is especially evident when considering that while all respondents belonging to this group “feel very attached to Europe as a whole” (as in statement 14, placed into

Italian multiple identities 151 the “most agree” with a +4), they at the same time strongly support (+4) statement 13: “I want a Europe of nation states that are different.” Clearly they correspond well to the pluralism that was found in the French study (Robyn 2000). However, unlike the French pluralists, these European Italianists are not optimistic at all about the economic and political directions that the world, and by implication the EU, are taking. Of all the groups in this study, they are the most pessimistic when thinking about globalization and technology (statement 2 placed in “most disagree” with a –4). Their independence of thought is shown in their total disagreement with statement 9 that relates to family impact on values in this regard, the most negative of all the groups: “My parents would be unhappy if I were married to a non-Italian.” The outsiders Three Italian Q sorts had very low loadings under all factors. Participants 24, 30 and 31 displayed very contrasting ideas while sorting the statements. They all are women from the middle class, two of them quite old ladies, and two of them come from the outskirts of Bologna. It would have been interesting to investigate the reasons for these low loadings. As will be mentioned below in the methodological remarks and in the conclusion, the use of a quite formal language and difficult vocabulary in the statements created some concern. This might partly explain why these three outsiders rated so low on their loadings. Considering then that all these outsiders are women from the middle class might lead one to think that persons of these backgrounds are generally not very interested or not very informed of European matters. But asserting something of this kind should be based on further observation that was not possible in this research.

Methodological remarks Q methodology is almost unknown in Italy, absent from the most widely distributed handbooks in research techniques (Pellicciari and Tinti 1990 and Guidicini 1991). Nevertheless, its use in this research project focusing on the question of different types of identity was extremely useful to delve deeply into a complex area of political psychology and to understand and clarify complex conceptual matters both about identity and method. We heartily recommend its consideration to our Italian colleagues. The purpose of this section of the chapter is not to introduce and to explain Q method. The principal investigator of the overall research project has already devoted attention to this topic in the introduction to this volume. The aim of this section is simply to offer some key insights into the theoretical and empirical work developed by the Italian team. In more concrete terms, the goal is to balance theory (developed by Michela Marchionni) and empirical fieldwork (developed and managed by Maria Francesca Massoni) offering a second level methodological observation (Forester 1987) of the whole Italian research project.

152 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni Some methodological remarks can facilitate an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of this method. In a kind of methodological form, this is written and shaped as a checklist to assess the proceedings of our research project. The links among European, national, regional and local identities are complex and rich in contradictions. Nevertheless this fragmentation is coherent enough in a cultural context, considering the Italian historical and cultural scenario described in the introductory section (written by Michela Marchionni) and it would be simplistic to criticize the methodology for the emerging socio-cultural contradictions that make up complex national identity. What should be kept in mind about this study is that its statements were created through a dichotomy between European and national identity which could be potentially misleading in several cases. A meaningful example, from this point of view, is represented by the fourth factor, which is composed of people who believe in the EU as institutional–political structure but which should be rooted in profound Italian cultural traditions. Thus, the loadings belonging to the fourth factor could not be explained and interpreted by an identity dichotomization between Italian and European profiles. To solve this observation problem, it would be strategic to integrate Q method with the in-depth interview technique to better integrate qualitative and quantitative aspects of the collected data and information (Ibanez 1985). Otherwise the risk of loss of crucial facets would be rather high.

Conclusions From this study, we can conclude that a sizable number of Italians are rather optimistic and proud of their new European identity, even if they are uncertain what that identity entails precisely. Approximately three-quarters of the factors had a positive idea of the EU, although they may have had different interpretations of the organization. Furthermore, it has to be said that very few interviewees (only one, in fact) expressed comments speaking from a finely-articulated Italian political point of view. Whatever the opinion about Europe was, it was not immediately connected with a definite political party, but more with a personal attribution of value (to freedom, in the case of Factor 1, to the mother country in Factor 2, to world economy in Factor 3, and to culture in Factor 4). Overall, the research suggests that Italians are attached to the idea of Europe, and positively inclined towards becoming Europeans, but this is shown through a variety of possible European integrations. What is lacking in the Italian vision of Europe is a definite idea of how this should be performed, and of why it should be performed.

Note 1 Analysis of the Q data courtesy of Craig Carroll, University of Texas.

Italian multiple identities 153

References Artis, M.J. and Norman Lee. 1997. The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Camera, C. and M. Fabietti 1997. Elementi di Storia: L’Età contemporanea. Bologna: Zanichelli. D’Amico, Nicola and Cristina D’Amico. 1997. Persona e Società. Bologna: Zanichelli. Eurobarometer 56. 2002. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Galli Della Loggia, Ernesto. 1995. L’Identità Italiana. Bologna: Il Mulino. Greca, Carlo. 1960. La Repubblica Italiana e i suoi problemi sociali e politici. Palermo: Tumminelli . Guidicini, Paolo. 1991. Nuovo manuale della ricerca sociale. Milan: Angeli. Ibanez, Jesus. 1985. Del Alogoritmo al sujeto. Madrid: Siglo Ventiuno deEspana Editores. Magli, Ida. 2001. Contro l’Europa. Milan: Bompiani. Pellicciari, Gianni and Giancarlo Tinti. 1990. Tecniche di ricerca sociale. Milan: Angeli. Robyn, Richard. 2000. “A Methodological Approach to National Identity in Europe,” Politique Européenne, 1(1), pp. 84–107. von Forester, Heinz. 1987. Sistemi che osservano. Rome: Astrolabio.

154 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni

Appendix 7.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/Italian national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–4

–4

–4

–1

2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for Italy.

0

1

4

–4

3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics.

2

0

2

2

4 Globalization means the death of Italian national culture.

–4

–3

–2

–1

5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity.

–3

0

–3

–1

4

1

2

0

–4

4

0

0

8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Italy.

1

3

3

2

9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also Italian.

3

3

–1

–4

1

2

3

1

11 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment.

–2

0

0

–2

12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of Italy.

–3

–3

1

1

13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse.

4

–4

1

4

14 I feel very attached to Europe as a whole.

0

–1

1

4

–1

0

–3

–1

16 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe ... It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances.

1

–2

2

3

17 Italy must maintain independence in European affairs.

3

2

–2

3

18 I want Italy to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs.

1

1

4

1

19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Britain as Britain, Italy as Italy, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of European personality.

4

4

1

4

1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result.

6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties.

10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Italy in the future.

15 Italy’s relationship to Europe is entirely shaped by the experience of the Second World War.

Italian multiple identities 155

Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

20 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures.

–3

–3

–2

–4

21 The pace of European integration is too slow.

–2

–1

2

–3

22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for European Union to work.

2

4

4

3

23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up.

0

3

0

2

24 Italy is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world.

0

–2

–1

0

25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies.

–1

1

0

–1

26 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go.

–1

–4

–4

–2

27 The contribution of the Italian language to world literature is unmatched.

–1

–1

–2

2

28 If someone said something bad about being Italian, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me.

–2

2

–1

0

29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic.

0

0

0

1

30 Italian society is united by a delusion of our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors.

2

1

–4

0

31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity.

0

–2

0

1

32 In general, Italy has profited from its involvement in the EU.

–1

–2

3

0

33 The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty ... it is the focus of irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions.

1

2

–3

–3

34 Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time.

2

–1

–1

–3

35 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of man, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it.

3

0

1

–2

36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities.

–2

–1

–1

–2

156 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni

Appendix 7.2: Italian Q statements 1 La nostra identità di nazione sta migrando verso l’Unione Europea e come risultato noi rimaniamo svuotati. Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. 2 Le rapide innovazioni tecnologiche e l’economia globale hanno contribuito al mio umore ottimista per l’Italia. Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for Italy. 3 L’umanità è per natura divisa in nazioni ognuna con le proprie caratteristiche distintive. Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics. 4 La globalizzazione significa la morte della cultura nazionale italiana. Globalization means the death of Italian national culture. 5 Non odio gli stranieri nel mio paese, ma sento che stanno inquinando la nostra identità nazionale. I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. 6 Le nazioni sovrane del passato non possono più risolvere i problemi del presente; non possono assicurare il loro stesso progresso o controllare il loro stesso futuro. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 La lealtà verso la madrepatria supera altre lealtà. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. 8 Adottare la moneta unica Europea sarà difficile ma necessario per l’Italia. Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Italy. 9 I miei genitori sarebbero infelici se non sposassi un italiano/a. My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also Italian. 10 L’Unione Europea è un mezzo per assicurare pace e stabilità per l’Italia in futuro. The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Italy in the future. 11 I nostri leader nazionali sono capaci di gestire le nostre istituzioni in un ambiente globale. Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. 12 Mi considero innanzitutto un Europeo, poi penso alla mia nazionalità. Mi sento cittadino d’Europa più che italiano. I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of Italy.

Italian multiple identities 157 13 Voglio un’Europa di nazioni politicamente e culturalmente diverse, come sono diverse geograficamente. I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. 14 Tutto sommato mi sento molto legato all’Europa. I feel very attached to Europe as a whole. 15 La relazione dell’Italia nei confronti dell’Europa è disegnata interamente dall’esperienza della seconda guerra mondiale. Italy’s relationship to Europe is entirely shaped by the experience of the Second World War. 16 L’unità in Europa non crea un nuovo tipo di grande potere; è un metodo per apportare un cambiamento in Europa … Non è un progetto, non è una teoria, è un processo che è già iniziato, di riunire popoli e nazioni per adattarsi assieme al cambiamento di circostanze. Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe … It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. 17 L’Italia deve mantenere l’indipendenza negli affari europei. Italy must maintain independence in European affairs. 18 Voglio che l’Italia rappresenti un’alternativa all’influenza americana, un’altra voce negli affari internazionali. I want Italy to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs. 19 L’Europa sarà più forte proprio perché ha la Francia come Francia, l’Inghilterra come Inghilterra, l’Italia come Italia, ognuna con i propri costumi, tradizioni ed identità. Sarebbe una follia provare a forzarle in un qualche tipo di personalità europea. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Britain as Britain, Italy as Italy, each with its own customs, traditions, and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of European personality. 20 L’Unione Europea rappresenta un’omogeneizzazione poco attraente delle culture europee. The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. 21 Il passo dell’integrazione europea è troppo lento. The pace of European integration is too slow. 22 I paesi europei sono diversi, ma l’Unione Europea può funzionare. European countries are diverse, but it is possible for European Union to work. 23 Le divisioni nazionali scompariranno al crescere di una nuova generazione di europei. National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. 24 L’Italia non è davvero lei tranne che tra i primi posti dei paesi al mondo. Italy is not really herself except in the first rank of the countries of the world.

158 Andrea Pitasi, Michela Marchionni and Maria Francesca Massoni 25 La disunione europea è il risultato di una finzione di sovranità nazionale e di assoluta efficacia delle politiche nazionali promossa deliberatamente. European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. 26 Penso che l’integrazione europea sia giunta quasi al limite delle sue possibilità. I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go. 27 Il contributo della lingua italiana alla letteratura mondiale non ha rivali. The contribution of the Italian language to world literature is unmatched. 28 Se qualcuno dicesse qualcosa di cattivo sull’essere italiani, mi sentirei come se avesse detto qualcosa di cattivo su di me. If someone said something bad about being Italian, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. 29 Obbedisco alle leggi, ma non mi sento particolarmente patriottico. I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. 30 La società italiana è unita dalla delusione dei nostri avi e da un odio comune verso i nostri vicini. Italian society is united by a delusion of our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors. 31 E’ possibile separare l’identità politica dall’identità culturale. It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity. 32 In generale, l’Italia ha guadagnato dal suo coinvolgimento nell’UE. In general, Italy has profited from its involvement in the EU. 33 Lo stato è troppo debole per assicurarci uguaglianza e troppo forte per permetterci di essere liberi … E’ il centro di emozioni irrazionali, non funzionali e spesso distruttive. The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty … it is the focus of irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. 34 Il federalismo con sussidiarietà è un modo di riconciliare ciò che sembra irriconciliabile: incoraggiare l’emergenza per un’Europa unita e allo stesso tempo rimanere leali alla madrepatria. Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time. 35 La Nazione è essenzialmente la fonte della sovranità; né può alcun individuo, o gruppo di uomini, avere titolo per qualunque autorità che non derivi espressamente da essa. The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of man, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. 36 Una maggiore integrità europea può dare alle minoranze nazionali un maggior senso delle loro identità. Greater European integration can give national minorities more of a sense of their own identities.

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European identity frames in the Netherlands Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher

A country is more than a combination of economic and political elements, it is in the first place and at the higher level a convergence of spiritual values, from which comes its selfness, its outspoken personality, its identity, its “soul.” Without identity, there is no community, no country, no language, no culture. This is what I would like to call the synchronic character at the short term, that is inherent to each national identity. (Lens 1996)

This chapter investigates Dutch citizens’ perceptions of national and supranational (European) identities. National identities are historically important in Europe, thanks to the variety of cultures with their own language, religion, style of living, and national characteristics. Since the mid-twentieth century, however, important changes have taken place in the European economic, cultural and political landscape due to the construction of the European Union. The experiences during World War II, especially, empowered the process of political integration within Europe, as this integration was thought to prevent conflict and a new world war, and as it was expected to further economic and social prosperity. Studies of rhetoric in the European Parliament indicate that besides the institutional process, political integration is similarily taking place at the collective mental level. Indeed, rhetorical distinctions were found to be far more important among the political groups than the nations (de Landtsheer 1998; de Landtsheer and Van Oortmerssen 2000). As many countries are involved, this complex mental integration process is taking place gradually. The Netherlands is one of the countries that right from the start took a leading position in the integration process of the European Union because it wanted to connect with French–German cooperation and because it expected that integration would provide the country with some financial and economic gain (Kapteyn and Schijf 1996). At the same time, political dependency frightened the Dutch so that they came up with their own plan for a “federal” state concept consisting of integration based upon existing alliances as well as US supervision (Kapteyn and Schijf 1996). The European federal state was considered a compromise between

160 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher national advantages and international facts. The solution, besides, was in line with the Dutch tradition of free trade and order through international law, a way for the civil trade republic to compete with states with an aristocratic-military background. Studies nevertheless indicate that there is considerable distance between the Dutch political elites’ support for the European integration process and Dutch public opinion (Kapteyn and Schijf 1996). Dutch political elites are in favor of this European federal state, while Dutch citizens tend to take an opposing tack: Dutch autonomy with reduced international integration. Some have their doubts about the sincerity of Dutch elites, among whom is the Dutch politician Hans van Mierlo, who stated that the best way to stop Europe might be to strive for the most ideal form for Europe (Brill and Roelofs 1995, p. 9). A 1996 Eurobarometer survey among 2000 Dutch citizens showed that Dutch participation in the European Union itself is not opposed by the Dutch (72 per cent is in favor) but that a large majority does oppose a European federal state (76 per cent) (Kapteyn and Schijf 1996). According to the survey, Dutch citizens knew very little about the euro; more than 40 per cent were ignorant of its value (Kapteyn and Schijf 1996). It was a Dutch European officer whose accusations of nepotism and corruption caused the fall of the European Commission presided over by Jacques Santer. News sources are very important to mass media; these shape the media agenda and indirectly influence public opinion (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 1993; Reese and Shoemaker 1996). One could wonder whether the negative media attention affected the Dutch turnout at the 1999 European parliamentary elections, which hardly reached 39 per cent, much lower than the European average of 47 per cent. The EC scandal was widely noted in Dutch news media reporting about the European Union during 1998. According to agenda-setting theory, news sources are very important to mass media; these determine the media agenda and indirectly influence public opinion (Gans 1979). The negative media reporting may have strengthened the impression among the Dutch that the European Union is a bureaucratic machine that lacks democratic control and openness in policymaking. The perception of European integration as a threat to identity would generate conscious protection of national identity and national solidarity (Wecke 2000). According to Priming (Iyengar and Kinder 1997), a recent work in agenda-setting theory, the media affect citizens’ opinions about politicians, policy and the government. The main issues they report on are those on which citizens judge their politicians. Framing (Iyengar and Kinder 1997), yet another effort in agendasetting theory, deals with how news media place subjects in a particular context (“news frames”) and with how this may affect public opinion. Based on the findings of these theories, we suppose that public opinion in the Netherlands may have been influenced by negative media reporting about the Union. Because the available opinion polls suggest that the Dutch population is hardly in favor of European integration, one could suppose that the supranational identity of the Dutch is only weakly developed and that national identity is strong. Since then, however, major publicity campaigns were launched by the government in 2001 and 2002 to inform citizens about the euro and to encourage enthusiasm

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for this common European currency. These information and publicity campaigns for the introduction of the euro formed important news sources for the Dutch mass media. By frequently and positively reporting on the euro and the European Union, Dutch mass media may have placed Europe on the public “agenda.” Thus the Dutch mass media may have caused the Dutch to start thinking and speaking about the European Union and may have contributed to a more positive “European” attitude among Dutch citizens, according to “agenda-setting” theory. We expect a more positive (less “national” and more “supranational”) outcome from our investigation of Dutch national and supranational identities than former opinion polls lead us to expect. We should add, however, that our survey took place in spring 2001, one year before the Dutch voters removed the “liberal” Dutch “purple” coalition Kok II that consisted of social democrats, social liberals and conservative liberals. Halfway through 2002, a populist and nationalist intellectual Pim Fortuyn started his own party. Fortuyn focused attention on himself with statements regarding the inferiority of Islam, the inefficacy of the “purple” policy, and the lack of need for European integration. His nationalistic, anti-immigrant rhetoric was highly successful among some of the Dutch population as was shown by opinion polls that gave him up to 37 per cent of the vote only weeks before the Dutch parliamentary elections. Fortuyn was assasinated in unclear circumstances during the lead-up to the election, but his campaign was succesfully carried on by a party under his own name, List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The LPF won the elections and formed a conservative government with the Christian democrats (CDA) and the conservative liberals (VVD). We will next detail Pentland’s identity theory on which this study is based, and how we put it into effect for our Dutch case by using Q methodology. But before doing so we will explore Dutch publications in search of a “Dutch national identity” so as to be able to understand the Dutch cultural transitions and changes in the process of European integration.

In search of a “Dutch identity” Dutch identity was apparently so evident for such a long time that it was hardly ever discussed in the literature. According to Manheim (1962), the most important values upon which a society is based are those that are not discussed. In times of transition and significant changes of society, this silent self-evidency disappears (Brill and Roelofs 1995). Identity is based upon culture, the values that a community of people accepts sharing, transmitting and expressing among each other and with others (Lens 1996). A common identity generates a “we” feeling against “others” and an appreciation of “others” that is based upon “stereotypes,” stereotypes being based upon incomplete, biased or even fictive information (Hollander 1968). Hofstede (2000), who considers national identity of major importance (“essential”), defines “identity” as a mental programming or predisposition of attitudes that are transmitted and conserved by education and by social interaction.

162 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher In his “typology of identities” Hofstede distinguished between five essential “dimensions,” aspects in which cultures differ from each other and that can be measured by way of interviews. Hofstede came to these dimensions as a result of an international comparative empirical survey among IBM managers in fifty countries. He distinguished “power distance” (small or large; appreciation of hierachy); “individualism” versus “collectivism”; “masculinity” (appreciation of competition and assertivity) versus “femininity” (solidarity and modesty); insecurity avoidance (high or low appreciation of rules and formal procedures) and long-term versus short-term disposition. Based upon his typology, Hofstede was able to describe significantly different tendencies among different national cultures. These were especially evident in dimensions of “power distance” and “insecurity avoidance” between Latin countries (countries that are predominately Catholic, such as France and Italy) that score high on these dimensions, and northern countries (predominantly Protestant, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries) that score low on these dimensions. Again, it is important to emphasize that these differences may be evidence of tendencies that might serve to differentiate among cultures, and should not be construed as deterministic or essential differences. The characteristics pointed out can be imporant indicators of difference that can point the way to further study. Through his work, Hofstede found that the Netherlands is “feminine”: i.e., that modest behavior is desired, being average is the norm, excellence is not appreciated, it is more important to be socially accepted. Solidarity and compromise, negotiation instead of fighting and winning are crucial. These elements are represented in the political-economic consensus policy that is known as the “Poldermodel” (a term untranslatable in English). The Netherlands have the “feminine” characteristic in common with the Scandinavian countries (including Denmark and Sweden) and with France. They differ in this respect from the “male” countries that are included in this study, Italy, Germany, Britain and Ireland. Dominance, assertivity, winners and losers, the aim for excellence, promotion, and earning lots of money are seen as important in these “male” cultures. The protection of the environment is seen as less important than the growth of the economy. Hofstede’s conclusion that the Netherlands is low on “power distance” can be found in the commonly used untranslatable Dutch proverb “Als je gewoon doet doe je al gek genoeg” (“if you behave average you behave more than silly enough”). The style of interaction in most contexts (school, family, work) can be seen as “democratic” and based upon equality. The Dutch have this characteristic in common with the Scandinavian countries Denmark and Sweden as well as with Germany, Britain and Ireland. They differ in this respect from France and Italy, countries in which the “power distance” is considerable. Authority, hierarchy, and centralism are central values; inequality and status-symbols are accepted. The image of the Netherlands as a tolerant country in which yet another untranslatable Dutch phenomenon, “gedoogbeleid” (“things that are formally prohibited are allowed”) is the common practice represents the characteristic of low “insecurity avoidance.” Lack of clarity is seen as normal and is hardly

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reduced, the Dutch are not very expressive or direct and hardly show their emotions. Rules are interpreted in a flexible way. The Dutch again share this characteristic with the Danish, the Swedish, the British and the Irish. “Insecurity avoidance” is high in France, Italy and Germany. People are allowed to show their emotions at times, even aggressive ones. Activity and hard work is valued, rules are needed emotionally, lack of clarity is seen as stressful and is reduced as much as possible. The Netherlands is only moderately disposed toward the long term; it shares this characteristic with Sweden, Germany and Britain (Italy, Ireland, Denmark and France were not included in this part of Hofstede’s study). The only characteristic that the Netherlands shares with all other countries in the group is “individualism.” This concept includes the right for everybody to have their own opinion and privacy. The economic system is based upon individual profits that are considered more important than collective profits. A Dutch scholar who takes an opposite point of view from Hofstede is Leerssen (1993) who gives less importance in his “imagological approach” to (Dutch) national culture. Leerssen considers the self-image of the Dutch as a stereotypical and ideological product that has no objective basis. National identity is just an issue of mentality, of thinking and feeling in a different way, that expresses itself through stereotyping. Small and weak countries like the Netherlands have most often a picturesque exotic image while images of large powerful nations tend to be more reserved and negative (Leerssen 1993). From this hypothesis, it is logical to conclude that the image of the European Union is rather negative compared to the images of smaller European countries and especially in those small countries. Also Lens (1996) conceptualizes the mere existence of a Dutch national identity: everybody uses e-mail, watches the same television programs, uses airplanes, trains and cars. He reduces Dutch identity to economic motives: it only exists when Ajax, the national football team, wins the world championship or when a profitable exhibition of a seventeenth-century Dutch painter is organized, because then exports flourish. According to many authors, the characteristics of Dutch identity may include: the struggle against water, a consensus society, conformity, phlegmatism, the sense of freedom, love for the home, cleanliness, and a “hoarding orientation” or a certain “avarice” (Heerikhuizen 1980). The Dutch are sometimes accused of neglecting their language and thus of disregarding their culture (Stroop 1993) but some consider this a sign of their confidence in the strength of Dutch culture (Jong 1996). From a European comparative study among 277 European young people it can be learned that the Dutch are seen as helpful, friendly, ambitious, rational (purposeful), emotional, and honest. Only the Belgians differed from this average European picture of the Dutch as they found them arrogant and selfish (Hagendoorn and Linssen 1991). There was a considerable consensus between the Dutch and other Europeans’ views on “Dutch” characteristics. The self-image of Dutch young people consisted of helpfulness and emotionality; they are seen as only slightly ambitious, but also as rational and friendly, but not as being honest.

164 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher

In search of a “European identity” How Dutch identity is affected by the European integration process will be investigated later by testing supranational European identity of the Dutch. Meanwhile, the description of such a European identity seems a difficult issue because studies and surveys contradict each other. Some emphasize the values of the French Enlightenment, others see a combination of Greek–Latin, Jewish– Christian, and Byzantine components (Wilterdink 1991; Bakker et al. 1994). Pinxten (1994, pp. 71–2) considers the following components as crucial to European identity: belief in the sovereignty of the individual, a political state construction which maintains a division between state and church, a mechanistic Newtonian conception of the world, a Christian or semi-Christian vision of life and a materialistic attitude. In literature and philosophy, one can notice an attitude that is characterized by doubt, criticism and relativism in relation to self (Soetaert 1992). Whatever could be understood as a European identity, identities always change and adapt to the context of the group. Identity is a continuing process of self-realization and each attempt at definition of a particular identity is only a moment in this process (Verstraete and Pinxten 1998, p. 37). Verburgh (1990) considers the following elements that can affect the creation of identities: family ties, religion, language, cultural differences and economic profit. Elements that may contribute to the mixture of cultures are increased mobility, the attraction of prosperity, certain religious systems and rational Enlightenment. The development of a mixed culture is facilitated by the Internet and by the ease of traveling around the world. In the Netherlands an increasing use of the English language in all areas of society is noticeable, which is perceived by the youth as “trendy” and a medicine against Dutch conformity. Together with the Americanization and commercialization of popular culture through television and advertising, this trend may influence the growth of a mixed culture in the Netherlands. Another factor that may encourage such a culture is economic immigration; people from Turkey and Morocco especially came to the Netherlands to build a better way of life and now form large groups in the population of the Netherlands. In countries other than the Netherlands religion may form a uniting factor between nations, as in the case of Islam. The Arabic language from the Koran is a binding factor, so are the habits and style of living in Mecca and Medina. Some immigrants prefer the uniformity of the Islam culture over cultural diversity. This is reminiscent of medieval Christendom with the role of the Bible, with Latin as a common language and Rome as a center of culture. Yet another factor that may encourage a mixed European identity are the rational ideas of the Enlightenment which inspired the American and French revolutions and ideas of which were influential not only in the Netherlands but in most European countries. These ideas emphasized freedom for ordinary citizens, who should be released from the domination of governments and churches. In contrast to these revolutionary ideas of the Enlightenment are the principles of the reactionary Enlightenment that until the present – but less than during the reign of Napoleon,

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Disraeli, and Bismarck – are influential in Germany, Italy, France and Britain, but not the Netherlands (Verburgh 1990). Some people, like the Dutch (former) politician Enneüs Heerma (1996, p. 37), consider the coexistence and mutual support of a common European identity possible. In his speech about the Dutch identity in a United Europe, well-known in the Netherlands, he declared that the European Union is not there to make Dutch identity disappear. The European Union is necessary to create the conditions in which a colorful culture and identity within the nation states can develop. According to others, such a mix of national and European identity is problematic. Established cultures are essentially different from the development of one international or one European culture, according to Smith (1992). If one aims at maintaining national identity, it will hardly be possible to realize the formation of a supranational identity. The opposition of a global culture is included in the idea of a national culture. Global culture is nothing more than an artificial construction that has not the emotional power of national or ethnic cultures (Smith 1990).

The “supranational” European identity of the Dutch The theoretical frame of this study – similar to the case studies for the other countries in the entire cross-cultural project – is mainly based upon theoretical insights of Pentland (1973) and Smith (1983). It characterizes attitudes toward European identity as “supranationalist,” “pluralist,” and “nationalist.” Based upon our review of earlier research we expect the majority of the Dutch respondents to prefer a pluralistic identity, which means that European integration would be seen as a purposeful, gradual and limited process in which the Dutch national culture should remain unchanged. In addition, we might expect to find a small minority of “supranationalists,” especially among the Dutch respondents working in the European Parliament. Supranationalists consider European integration as a necessary process in which the nation state should be marginalized in favor of a new European community. We further hypothesize that “nationalists” will form another small minority among the respondents. Nationalists would be against European integration because they believe in the supremacy of their own national culture (Pentland 1973; Smith 1983; Haas 1958, p. 6). Q methodology, used here as it is in the other cases in the book, aims to investigate human subjectivity in relation to diverse situations (Stephenson 1953, 1967; Brown 1980; Brouwer and Binnendijk 2000). Three series of twelve (numbered) statements were used to represent the three concepts (“supranationalists,” “pluralists,” and “nationalists”). Except for statements 15 and 27, these are the statements that Robyn (2000) used in the original study. The original statement number 15, “The baptism of Clovis is the baptism of France,” was changed into a more appropriate version, “The relation of the Netherlands with Europe is entirely determined by the experiences during World War II.” The original statement 27, “French wine, cheese and perfume are the best in the world,” was transformed into the more appropriate statement that “The contribution of the Dutch language to world literature is extraordinary.”

166 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher We interviewed 47 respondents at three locations in the Netherlands, including 29 in Amsterdam, 4 each in Maastricht and Groningen, and 10 in Brussels, Belgium. The respondents in Brussels are Dutch members of the European Parliament or their Dutch assistants. Respondents were contacted by telephone or e-mail. The entire data collection took place during three months in spring and summer 2001. We aimed a balanced division of the respondents’ background and gender, acording to the P-set parameters of the French study (Robyn 2000). We asked respondents to read the statements first and then to sort them into three categories (agree, neutral, disagree). We then asked the respondents to examine their choice more closely and to place the statements in a matrix according to values ranging from “most agree with” (value +4) to “most disagree with” (value –4). We used the time while doing the sorting, about 30 minutes, to get a deeper insight into the feelings of the respondents toward the subject. After having collected the Q sort data, we performed a correlation and a factor analysis on these. These analyses generated some factors that allow us to identify the subjective conceptions of each of the respondents (Robyn 2000).

Results The Q sorts were elaborated by way of factor analysis using the program PQMethod 2.09 (Schmolck and Atkinson 1997). As a result of the calculation of a weighted average we were able to determine that both the “supranationalist” identity (entitled Factor 1) and the “pluralist” identity (entitled Factor 2) were represented in our sample of respondents. Besides a small “nationalist” identity, we found a fourth type of identity represented, a mixture of the “pluralist” and the “supranationalist” identities and which we call the “semi-supranationalist” identity (Factor 3). Table 8.1 shows the factor matrix used to illustrate the identity types. The factor loadings are statistically significant at the 0.01 level as they load higher than or equal to 0.43 or lower than –0.43. The table shows a number of respondents that exclusively load on Factor 1 (21 respondents), on Factor 2 (7 respondents) or on Factor 3 (3 respondents). Besides these, there were respondents who loaded negatively on Factor 3 and Factor 4 (two respondents). In addition to these “pure types” we found mixed types (7 respondents) and respondents who did not load on any of the factors (5 respondents). Q sorts of the mixed types significantly correlate with Factor 1 and Factor 4 (3 respondents), with Factors 1 and 2 (3 respondents) and with all Factors 1, 2 and 3 (1 respondent). We also calculated the factor arrays which indicate the scores for factors on statements separately (Appendix 8.2). In this way, the differences and similarities between the factors become clearer. For instance, Factor 1 gave statement 5 the value –4, statement 1 the value –3, statement 3 the value –2, statement 12 the value –1, statement 2 the value 0, and so forth. Except for statements 2, 16, 20, 25 and 33 the original statements used by Robyn (2000) worked well cross-culturally. Those did not need to be translated both linguistically and culturally.

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Table 8.1 Factor matrix with (supra)national identity factors Q sort

1

2

3

4

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

0.07 0.58* 0.43 0.03 –0.20 –0.38 0.09 0.32 0.01 0.27 0.67* 0.51* 0.62* 0.39 0.73* 0.67* 0.53 0.46* 0.54* 0.31 –0.04 0.59 0.29 0.59* –0.04 0.47* 0.65* 0.12 0.63* 0.75* 0.80* 0.71* 0.14 0.83* 0.77* 0.18 0.72* 0.80* 0.76* 0.46 0.45* 0.29 0.59* 0.69* 0.27 –0.07 0.36

0.09 0.12 0.55 0.39 0.64* 0.43 0.44* 0.14 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.08 –0.13 0.46* 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.35 –0.17 0.40* 0.34 0.61 0.35 0.07 0.12 0.14 –0.04 –0.02 0.34 0.42 0.24 0.25 0.36 0.25 0.34 0.72* 0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.02 –0.42 0.57* 0.38 0.11 0.44 0.37 0.26

0.65* 0.34 0.25 –0.12 –0.06 –0.27 0.10 0.65* –0.22 0.69* –0.16 0.04 0.03 0.11 –0.08 0.17 0.45 –0.05 0.25 0.09 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.41* 0.30 0.16 –0.26 –0.14 0.06 0.01 0.28 –0.70* 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.27 0.15 0.03 –0.10 0.11 0.13 0.27 –0.01 0.36 –0.06 0.06

0.02 0.39 0.23 0.45* –0.10 0.40 0.33 0.18 0.37* 0.12 0.26 0.02 0.44 0.12 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.43 0.23 0.59* 0.18 0.18 –0.03 –0.27 0.10 0.05 –0.81* –0.32 0.13 –0.11 0.09 0.19 –0.16 0.01 0.01 0.23 –0.20 –0.17 0.63* 0.05 0.40 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.70* 0.36

VE

26%

11%

8%

9%

Gender

Age

Class Background

F F F F F F F F F F F F F F M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M F F F F F F F M M M M F M F M F M F

O O Y O O O O O O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y O O Y Y Y O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y O O Y Y O O Y O Y Y Y O O O

MC MC MC MC WC WC WC MC MC MC MC WC MC MC MC TC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC WK MC MC MC TC TC MC MC TC TC MC MC TC TC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC

City City Prov Rur Rur City Prov Prov Prov Prov Rur City City City Prov City Prov City Rur Rur City City Prov Prov City City Prov City City City City City Rur City City City Prov City City City Prov Prov Prov Prov Prov Prov Rur

Notes VE: variance explained; F female; M male; O olde; Y young; MC middle class; WC working class; City city background; Prov provincial background; Rur rural background.

168 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher Factor 1: Supranational identity Even more than expected, a supranational European identity was evidenced by a large number of our Dutch respondents, in fact it was the largest among all groups in the study. In general, the Q sort results corresponded to the image of the supranationalist as described in the literature (Pentland 1973). No less then 26 respondents enthusiastically support a supranational government for Europe and a gradual decrease of national political power. Obviously, the attitude of the Dutch has changed, even more then we expected, in favor of European political integration. The governmental (“priming”) publicity campaigns during 1999–2001 surrounding the introduction of the euro and the Dutch press reporting about European matters are very likely responsible for this positive attitude change compared to the rather negative (more or less nationalistic) Dutch attitude that appeared from previous studies and opinion polls. The Dutch “media agenda” which consisted of intensive and positive reporting about the European Union (on the euro, expansion of the EU to Eastern Europe, and so on) has obviously created more interest for Europe among the Dutch and has accordingly significantly influenced the Dutch “public agenda.” The most popular supranationalist statements for the Dutch are those referring to the advantages the EU has had for the Netherlands (statement 32, +4), to the importance of the EU for the guaranteeing of peace and stability for the Netherlands (statement 10, +4), and to the conviction that the EU will function adequately regardless of the diversity of the countries in Europe (statement 22, +4). Respondents think that European integration has not yet reached its limit (statement 26, –3). The high loadings for these outspoken pro-European statements indicate that some Dutch have great confidence in Europe and that they consider a strong Europe important for the Netherlands. The changed attitude of the Dutch toward European political integration is in accordance with the low estimation they seem to have in the ability of Dutch politicians to govern them well in a global environment (statement 11, only +1). Not surprisingly, the supranationalist group includes eight members or workers for the European Parliament, who think that, in the long run, a European supranational culture will replace the national culture. They think that, especially for younger people, living in a Europe without boundaries is self-evident. Participants 30 and 31 listed the characteristics: the younger generation all have English as their second language, went on holiday with their parents to France, studied with a European grant in the UK (and fell in love there with someone from Spain), because they went by Interrail through Eastern Europe, and so on. For these respondents, a return to the Europe of nation states, with border controls, with protectionist national rules, and with strong prejudices, is not an option. Dutch respondents working in the European Parliament differ on this issue with the other Dutch respondents of the supranationalist group, who do not believe that one European culture is realistic or desirable. They think their own national culture is too important. This group of respondents thinks that it is possible to

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distinguish political integration from European integration (statement 31, +2). For them, a supranational European government does not necessarily imply a supranational European culture. European integration is not seen by these respondents as being a threat to their own national culture. This can be concluded from the opinion by these respondents that globalization is not the end of the Dutch culture (statement 4, –3) and from their disagreement with the statement that national identity is migrating to European identity and finally will disappear (statement 1, –3). In this respect these respondents differ from the picture of the supranationalist as it is described in literature. Two young students with Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds (respondents 12 and 26) form an exception within the group as they do think, although perhaps moderately so, that globalization will be the end of Dutch culture (value + 1 and value –1). Their fear for the threat to their own subculture could be explained by their own background in which religion takes a prominent place. Two statements that were earlier described as supranationalist received unexpected scores. Statement 6, that the existing countries from the past are no longer able to organize their own future, received only a moderate score (+2). Another statement (33, 0) was characterized by almost every respondent as unclear and too difficult. Factor 2: Pluralist A second group that can be distinguished from our factor analysis with certainty is the “pluralist.” The profile that appeared resembles almost exactly the pluralist identity as described by Pentland (1973). European integration is seen as a purposeful enterprise in which nation states may cooperate but can keep their own sovereignty, culture, and identity. National culture and its protection are considered of great importance. The factor array (Appendix 8.2) of this group perfectly fits the theory. Statements with the highest positive scores include the following: 19 Europe will be stronger because France, Britain and the Netherlands are as they are, each of them with their own traditions and identity (+4). 3 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment (+4). 32 Participation in the EU has provided the Netherlands in general with advantages (+4). 13 I prefer a Europe of nations that are politically and culturally as different as geographically (+3). The first and the last statements, especially, are considered to be typical pluralist statements according to Pentland (1973). The image of one federal European state with its own identity is clearly not valued. According to the high loading on

170 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher statement 32, European integration is nevertheless seen as desirable, as it provides the Netherlands with opportunities. There were high scores for the statement that this should never go to the cost of national policy and the conservation of Dutch culture (statement 3). The majority in this group feels that the main decisions should be taken by the national government. This group has the highest confidence in national politicians (statement 11, +4). The far from convincing scores on the statements that the integration process is going too slowly (statement 21) and that the process has reached its end (statement 26) suggests that the group has no clear idea of the future of the integration process. Respondents often described European policy as “not transparent” and “inaccessible.” The pluralist group seems to have nothing against foreign cultures, because it has assigned high negative scores to statement 30 (–4). The group, however, does not look forward to a common European culture. Some respondents within this group, mainly the older ones (among which participants 2 and 6, with scores as high as +4) seem to perceive globalization as a threat to Dutch culture, and as a group they are indifferent (0) to statement 4, that globalization means the end of Dutch culture. Factor 3: The semi-supranationalist The third group that resulted from our factor analysis is difficult to describe. The image of what we will call the “semi-supranationalist” consists of high enthusiasm for European integration combined with an awareness of the natural differences in identity between the various European nations and their consequences for the future of Europe. They feel very much related to Europe as a whole (statement 14, +4), and optimistic about technology and the global economy (statement 2, +4). They believe that the Netherlands in general has profited from participation in the EU (statement 32, +3), and support the introduction of the euro (statement 8, +3). However, even with these strong supranationalist tendencies, they at the same time believe in the “naturalness” of national divisions (statement 3, +4). They may reconcile this with a conviction that it is possible to distinguish political identity from cultural identity (statement 31, +3). Even as this group has a very positive attitude toward the intensification of the European integration process, it sees no contradiction with the continued existence of national culture (statement 4, –4). According to the semi-supranationalists, the supranational and the national cultures can co-exist in harmony. The majority of respondents in this group are young people of 24 to 39 years of age, that merely see positive aspects in a deeper European integration. One female respondent (participant 10), a mother of four young children, thought it fun that because of the Schengen treaty, one can easily cross national borders. She thought that the disappearance of borders would only provide for advantages. There was one respondent (participant 33) who exclusively loaded negatively on this semi-supranationalist factor. She showed some kind of scepticism or

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pessimism regarding the advantages of the EU for the Netherlands (negative score on statement 32). She worked for the European Parliament in Brussels and declared herself to be a Communist. Factor 4: The nationalist One of the more interesting results of the factor analysis is the presence of a small nationalist group. The fact that this group appeared at all defies the literature on Dutch identity, as discussed above, which suggests a very weak, even nonexistent, Dutch nationalism. Its presence during our fieldwork in the summer of 2001 might also have foretold a swing in Dutch sentiment that would result one year later in the startling results of the presidential elections. This nationalist group is also interesting for the noticeably mixed nature of its sentiment. As in the French (Robyn 2000) study, this group did not express itself as purely nationalistic as the literature on nationalism would suggest, but had notably pluralist sentiment as well. Nonetheless, in comparison with the other groups, the nationalists reacted positively on a significant number of the essential nationalist statements. Along with Factors 2 and 3, they believe that humanity is naturally divided into nations each with its own characteristics (values for factors 1, 2 , 3 and 4 for this statement were –2, +3, +4 and +4 respectively). However, they distinguished themselves from the others in believing that foreigners are polluting Dutch national identity (statement 5, Factors 1, 2 , 3 and 4 being –4, –2, –1, and +3 respectively); to the prominence of national loyalty (statement 7, Factors 1, 2 , 3 and 4 being –4, -4, 0, and +1 respectively); and to the capabilities of the nation state to solve problems (statement 6, Factors 1, 2 , 3 and 4 being +2, +3, 0, and +3 respectively). As a consequence, the small nationalistic group that we expected could indeed be identified in our analysis. Three respondents exclusively scored on Factor 4, while seven more participants significantly scored on this factor. The most popular statements among this group include the following. 3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own characteristics (+4). 19 Europe will be even stronger because France, Britain and The Netherlands are as they are, with their own traditions and identities. It would be stupid to try to fit these countries into one European identity (+4). 5 Even though foreigners in the Netherlands should not be hated, they nevertheless pollute our national identity (+3). 13 A Europe which is a collection of nations that are politically and culturally as much different as geographically has our preference (+3). 18 The Netherlands should represent an alternative to the US influence and should express a different opinion in international affairs (+3). 8 The introduction of one European currency will be difficult, but necessary for the Netherlands (+4).

172 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher This group certainly does not see itself in the first place as European (statement 12, –4), it feels patriotic (statement 9, –3), and it thinks that the nations of the past are perfectly capable of resolving the present problems (statement 6, –3). There was one person who loaded exclusively negative on the nationalist factor (respondent 28). As mentioned earlier, the presence of the nationalist factor in our analysis does not square with the image of the Dutch as being tolerant and with the absence until recently of right-wing extremist parties in the Netherlands. Dutch scholars (Wilterdink and Zwaan 1991; Eppink 1996) have argued that the Netherlands hardly knows cultural nationalism because the formation of the Dutch nation was completed a long time ago, because it does not suffer from significant external (territorial) and internal (social) tensions, and because “nationalism” sounds suspect after the experiences of World War II. Nevertheless, it is clear from the literature that nationalism is of all contemporary cultures in a world of nation states. Nationalism is certainly not dead on the continent, nor in the Netherlands (Malcolm 1995, p. 66; Snyder 1984). Further proof of this was the 2002 electoral success of the populist and nationalistic politician Pim Fortuyn and the party that carries his name. Our impression indeed is that the nationalist group in the Netherlands may be even more considerable than appears from the Q results. We concluded from our interviews with the respondents during Q sorting that some Dutch respondents did not want to be seen as nationalist but nevertheless made nationalist remarks. In reference to statement 5 that mentioned foreigners “polluting” Dutch national identity, some respondents said that the term “polluting” carried negative associations and kept them from giving the positive score they would have given to a more neutral term. Some respondents made remarks against foreigners and against Europe, but because of how they filled in their Q sort were categorized in the pluralist group. We suppose that the fear of giving politically incorrect answers played some role because people sometimes changed their opinion during the survey or did not always fill in the Q sort in an honest way because they were ashamed to be seen as nationalists or racists. The presence of a considerable nationalist factor was supported by the findings of a small survey we undertook immediately after the distribution of the Q sorts. Respondents were asked which nationality they would most ascribe to themselves. The four possible answers scored as follows: only 4 per cent considered themselves “only as European”; 8 per cent saw themselves as “European and Dutch”; 57 per cent felt “Dutch and European”; while 10 per cent felt “only Dutch.” This may also give an indication of the size of the nationalist group. The 57 per cent of Dutch who also feel European support the hypothesis that the Dutch have recently started feeling more positive about the EU. As perspective on how far the Dutch have come, the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research (NIPO)/Eurobarometer survey from March 1990 found that 60 per cent of the Dutch never thought about being European, while 29 per cent thought of this “sometimes,” 8 per cent “often,” and 3 per cent had no opinion (Verburgh 1990).

10 34 21 36 6 18 9 7 12 14 5 2 1 3

8 12 14 25 21 30 23 10 34 18 1 11 13 20 4 19 5 26 17 3

1.44 1.39 1.37 1.26 1.24 1.18 1.14 1.12 1.04 1.02 –1.04 –1.24 –1.29 –1.34 –1.34 –1.57 –1.61 –1.74 –1.83 –2.31

1 and 3 Statement

Factors 1 and 2 Statement Z–Score

3.24 1.45 1.45 1.29 1.24 1.20 –1.01 –1.25 –1.39 –1.42 –1.43 –1.68 –1.90 –2.86

Z–Score

Table 8.2 Z scores among the four factors

6 31 36 12 27 29 14 25 20 13 19 4 7 3 5

1 and 4 Statement 2.18 1.77 1.60 1.50 1.49 1.48 1.06 1.01 –1.02 –1.35 –1.40 –1.44 –2.38 –3.10 –3.13

Z–Score 19 10 4 20 13 6 36 2 30 33 25 7 8 12 14

2 and 3 Statement 2.31 2.12 2.11 1.94 1.26 1.23 1.22 –1.17 –1.21 –1.31 –1.67 –1.71 –1.97 –2.78 –2.79

Z–Score 6 17 11 36 29 31 27 26 23 35 5 18 8 7

2 and 4 Statement 2.18 1.64 1.55 1.53 1.30 1.30 1.22 1.22 –1.06 –1.19 –1.52 –1.71 –1.86 –2.83

Z–Score 12 14 31 27 9 25 1 34 13 20 5 18 19 4 10

3 and 4 Statement 2.89 2.48 2.00 1.46 1.43 1.42 1.06 –1.30 –1.32 –1.63 –1.70 –1.90 –2.15 –2.21 –2.36

Z–Score

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174 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher

Differences between the four factors There were no consensus statements among our four factors. The differences among the scores of the factors are more interesting to look at; these are presented in Table 8.2. The Z scores in the table indicate the highest positive and negative differences for the statements. One significant difference was between the pluralist group, which supported statement 3 that humanity is naturally divided into nations, and the supranationalist group, which strongly denied this. The pluralist group strongly rejected statement 23 that national boundaries will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up, while the supranationalist group had some doubts about this question. Neither of the two groups loaded positively on statement 12 about feeling more an inhabitant of Europe than of the Netherlands, but the pluralists scored much more negatively this statement than did the supranationalists. One may conclude that the supranationalists are in favor of a far-reaching European integration, while the pluralists are against this. The difference between Factors 1 and 3 is much harder to identify than the difference between Factors 1 and 2. The supranationalists firmly denied that humanity is naturally divided into nations (statement 3), something the semisupranational group strongly believed in. The first group (Factor 1) supported a far-going European integration but did not believe in the growth of a European culture, feeling that Dutch national culture and identity were too strong. The third group (Factor 3) did believe in the growth of a European culture, and expected it to coexist with the Dutch national culture. The supranational (Factor 1) group considerably differed from the nationalist (Factor 4) group in the scores on the typical nationalist statements. In contrast to the nationalist group the supranationalists indeed strongly felt that humanity is not naturally divided into nations, that foreigners do not pollute national identity, that loyalty to the nation state should not go for other loyalties, and that the nations of the past are no longer capable of resolving the present problems. The largest difference between the pluralist (Factor 2) group and the semisupranationists (Factor 3) lay in the attitude toward European integration, which the first group wanted to limit but which the Factor 3 group wanted to expand. In addition, while the first group wanted to protect Dutch culture, the other group wanted all kind of borders to disappear (statements 13, 19, and 23). The pluralists have also opposite scores to the semi-supranationalists in that they see globalization as a threat to national culture (statement 4), Europe as a way to give the Netherlands a stable future (statement 10), that they do not feel related to Europe as whole (statement 14) and that they do not feel European in the first place (statement 12). Besides the typical nationalist statements, these are also the statements in which the semi-supranationalist group (Factor 3) differs from the nationalist group (Factor 4). The pluralist group however mainly differs from the nationalists in significant disagreement over several of the nationalist statements. In the entire study, we found a group of five persons who did not load significantly on any of the factors, and whose Q sorts did not show a common pattern.

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What united these respondents was at most a kind of scepticism or pessimism regarding the advantages of the EU for the Netherlands (negative scores on statement 32). Respondents from this group came from the northern and the southern part of the Netherlands, regions (Limburg, Friesland) described as “cultures within cultures” which seem to value their own regional culture more than the Dutch national culture. These respondents see the utility of European cooperation (statement 0, +4), but they fear the mixture of cultures (statement 20, +4). Even though this group sees the protection of the national or the regional identity as a priority, it cannot be considered nationalist, because it generally gave typical nationalist statements (statements 5, 7, and 9) negative scores.

Conclusion From our study, we can conclude that supranational versus national identity among these Dutch participants is represented by four groups that can clearly be distinguished from each other: supranationalists, pluralists, semi-supranationalists, and nationalists. Among the Dutch population at large, we can confidently conclude that at least these four groupings would be found, although there may be more, depending on how sample populations are drawn. Prior to the study, we had foreseen that, because of publicity campaigns for the EU and the euro, results would show a more pro-European Dutch attitude compared to surveys undertaken two to three years earlier. The results are even more positive than we expected. A supplementary factor that may have affected this development is the increasing distrust in Dutch political institutions revealed by our study. This distrust later showed up in the May 2002 election results that favored the new populist nationalistic party List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). The fact that this Q study tested European identity and not feelings toward Muslims may further have affected the positive results regarding supranational identity. In contrast to our expectations, it was not the pluralist but the supranationalist group that was the largest (21 respondents). Although this is not very significant in Q studies since they do not predict sizes in the general population, we were nonetheless surprised that so many of our participants grouped according to the purer supranationalist sentiment. Many Dutch nowadays seem to approve of a strong supranationally governed Europe. For these respondents, however, this political supranationalism does not necessarily imply the growth of a European culture. Due to the perceived power and value of national culture, the development of such a supranational culture – if any – may be a slow process. The Dutch culture will be increasingly enriched by elements from other cultures, most of these respondents seem to agree, but a real unification of cultures was seen as neither desirable nor realistic. The second largest grouping, the pluralists (seven respondents), emphasized the natural differences between national cultures and identities within Europe and thought these differences should be protected. Some respondents felt threatened by a supranational European culture that might result from a European integration that went too far. European cooperation is necessary and profitable, they felt, but

176 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher this should not lead to the formation of a European government, and major decisions should always be made at the national level. The Q analysis resulted in a small third group that we did not expect. The third group, consisting of three persons who exclusively scored on this type of identity, we called the semi-supranationalists because they were clearly a unique mixture of elements from both the pluralist and the supranationalist camp. This semisupranationalist identity is open to a supranational Europe and to the continued existence of many cultures. This type of identity sees a supranational Europe as an enrichment of their own culture rather than as a threat to it. This Q study further allowed us to distinguish a nationalist group of the same size as the semi-supranationalist group (three respondents). We assumed the presence of a more considerable nationalist group among the population at large, based upon several remarks by our respondents during the interviews. We believe people did not always fill in their Q array honestly as they were ashamed to be seen as racists or nationalists. Recent political developments in the Netherlands also testify of the presence of a considerable nationalist group. We should not exclude however, that some of those who voted for the LPF were protest voters instead of nationalists. In conclusion, our spring–summer 2001 study indicates that potentially many Dutch people think that European integration has not yet reached its conclusion and that a far-going European cooperation can only generate positive effects for the Netherlands. From our study we can further conclude that the Dutch consider their culture and identity of great importance. Further, the majority of the respondents from all the identity types think that Dutch culture should be protected as much as possible. Some believe that Dutch culture will not undergo significant changes during the advancement of the European integration, although others are not so sanguine. The majority of respondents are convinced of the existence of natural differences between the distinct European countries that have their own cultural characteristics. Some considered Dutch national culture too strong to disappear, and thought the culture would likely be influenced by elements from other cultures, but generally saw this as an enriching process. Thus, while political integration through the EU was seen as desirable and possible by most respondents, few of these participants saw cultural assimilation as possible or desirable. At the cultural level, the conclusions from this study provide some empirical confirmation of the theoretical value of the “essentialist” approach by Hofstede (1993), who discovered striking differences in style between various nationalities around the world. Political and business elites might take this into account in cross-border interactions. Only a minority – mostly older respondents within the pluralist group – saw European integration as a threat to Dutch culture. These people opposed a supranationally-governed Europe and wanted to restrict European integration to simple cooperation. They wanted to protect their national culture and to halt the development of a supranational culture. Recent events suggest that such a group may not be limited to mostly older voters. Most respondents thought that a European culture would certainly not become a reality in the short term. Only the semi-supranationalist group really believed

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that such a European identity would become a reality for the coming generation. Even the possibility of a borderless Europe, in this view, would not threaten the continued health of national cultures. How exactly the Dutch see a possible supranational culture, and which political elements count for them, are questions that could be the subjects of qualitative follow-up enquiry through in-depth interviews or focus groups.

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Appendix 8.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/Dutch national identity Factors 1

2

3

4

–3

0

2

–1

2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for the Netherlands.

0

2

4

2

3 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters.

–2

3

3

4

4 Globalization means the death of the Dutch national culture.

–3

0

–4

0

5 I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity.

–4

–1

–2

3

2

2

0

–3

–4

–4

0

1

2

–1

3

4

–4

–2

–1

–4

10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for the Netherlands in the future.

4

1

–4

1

11 Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment.

1

4

1

–1

12 I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of the Netherlands.

–1

–4

2

–4

13 I want a Europe of nation-states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse.

–1

2

0

3

2

–1

4

0

–1

0

–1

–2

3

1

1

1

–2

2

0

–2

18 I want the Netherlands to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs.

1

–2

–2

3

19 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has the Netherlands as the Netherlands, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

0

4

–2

4

Statement 1 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result.

6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 Loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties. 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for the Netherlands. 9 My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also Dutch.

14 I am very attached to Europe as a whole. 15 The relation of the Netherlands with Europe is entirely determined by the experiences during World War II. 16 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begin of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. 17 The Netherlands must maintain independence in European affairs.

European identity frames in the Netherlands

181

Factors 1

2

3

4

–2

1

–4

1

21 The pace of European integration is too slow.

1

–1

–2

0

22 European countries are diverse, but it is possible for a European Union to work.

4

3

2

2

23 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up.

1

–2

1

1

–1

–3

–3

–1

25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies.

1

–3

2

–2

26 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go.

–3

1

–1

–1

27 The contribution of the Dutch language to world literature is extraordinary.

0

–1

0

–4

28 If someone said something bad about being Dutch, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me.

0

0

–3

0

Statement 20 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures.

24 The Netherlands is not really itself except in the first rank of the countries of the world.

29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic.

0

0

–3

–3

30 Our society is united by a delusion about our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors.

–1

–4

–1

–3

31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity.

2

1

3

–2

32 In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU.

4

4

3

2

33 The nation-state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty. ... It is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions.

0

–2

1

0

34 Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time.

3

0

0

2

35 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it.

–2

–3

–1

0

36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities

3

3

1

–1

182 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher

Appendix 8.2: Dutch Q statements 1 Onze identiteit als natie verschuift naar de Europese Unie en we houden uiteindelijk geen eigen identiteit meer over. Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. 2 Snelle technologische vernieuwingen en de “global economy” hebben bijgedragen aan mijn optimisme voor Nederland. Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for the Netherlands. 3 De mensheid is op natuurlijk wijze opgedeeld in naties met hun eigen typische eigenschappen. Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters. 4 Globalisatie betekent het einde van de Nederlandse cultuur. Globalization means the death of the Dutch national culture. 5 Ik haat de buitenlanders in mijn land niet, maar ik vind dat zij onze nationale identiteit vervuilen. I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. 6 De soevereine naties uit het verleden kunnen niet langer de problemen oplossen van het heden; ze kunnen hun eigen vooruitgang niet garanderen en hun eigen toekomst niet bepalen. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 Trouw aan de natiestaat gaat vóór andere loyaliteiten. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. 8 Het invoeren van één Europese munt zal moeilijk zijn, maar wel noodzakelijk voor Nederland. Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for the Netherlands. 9 Mijn ouders zouden niet blij zijn als ik niet zou trouwen met iemand die ook Nederlands is. My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also Dutch. 10 De Europese Unie is een manier om voor Nederland vrede en stabiliteit in de toekomst te garanderen. The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for the Netherlands in the future. 11 Onze nationale leiders zijn goed in staat om in een mondiale omgeving onze instellingen te leiden. Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. 12 Ik zie mezelf in de eerste plaats als Europeaan, daarna komt mijn eigen nationaliteit pas. Ik voel me meer inwoner van Europa dan inwoner van Nederland.

European identity frames in the Netherlands

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

183

I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of the Netherlands. Ik wil een Europa als een verzameling van naties die in politiek en cultureel opzicht net zo verschillend zijn als in geografisch opzicht. I want a Europe of nation-states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. Ik voel me erg verbonden met Europa als geheel. I am very attached to Europe as a whole. De relatie van Nederland met Europa is geheel gevormd door de ervaringen tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. The relation of the Netherlands with Europe is entirely determined by the experiences during World War II. Eenheid in Europa creëert geen nieuw soort supermacht; het is een manier om veranderingen door te voeren in Europa. Het is geen blauwdruk, het is geen theorie, het is een proces dat al is begonnen, en dat volkeren en naties bij elkaar brengt om zich gezamenlijk aan te passen aan veranderende omstandigheden. Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. Nederland moet onafhankelijk blijven op het gebied van Europese aangelegenheden. The Netherlands must maintain independence in European affairs. Ik wil dat Nederland een alternatief vertegenwoordigt voor de Amerikaanse invloed, een ander geluid in internationale kwesties. I want the Netherlands to represent an alternative to American influence, another voice in international affairs. Europa zal juist sterker zijn, omdat Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië en Nederland zijn zoals ze zijn, ieder met zijn eigen gebruiken, tradities en identiteit. Het zou dom zijn om te proberen deze landen een soort Europese persoonlijkheid toe te meten. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has the Netherlands as the Netherlands, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. De Europese Unie betekent een onaantrekkelijke homogenisatie van Europese culturen. The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. Het tempo van Europese integratie is te langzaam. The pace of European integration is too slow. Europese landen zijn wel divers, maar het is mogelijk dat de Europese Unie goed zal functioneren. European countries are diverse, but it is possible for a European Union to work.

184 Christ’l De Landtsheer, Craig Carroll and Ralph Hekscher 23 Nationale scheidslijnen zullen verdwijnen wanneer er een nieuwe generatie Europeanen opgroeit. National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. 24 Nederland kan alleen maar zichzelf zijn op de eerste plaats van alle landen ter wereld. The Netherlands is not really itself except in the first rank of the countries of the world. 25 De verdeeldheid van Europa is het resultaat van een doelbewust gekoesterd verzinsel over volledige nationale zelfbeschikking en over de absolute effectiviteit van de nationale politiek. European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. 26 Ik denk dat de Europese integratie zijn limiet heeft bereikt. I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go. 27 De bijdrage van Nederlandse taal aan de wereldliteratuur is ongeëvenaard. The contribution of the Dutch language to world literature is extraordinary. 28 Als iemand iets negatiefs zou zeggen over Nederlanders, zou ik dat voelen alsof iemand iets negatiefs zegt over mezelf. If someone said something bad about being Dutch, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. 29 Ik gehoorzaam dan wel de wetten, maar ik voel me niet erg vaderlandsgezind. I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. 30 De Nederlandse samenleving is verenigd door een waanidee over ons voorgeslacht en door een gemeenschappelijk haatgevoel jegens onze buren. Our society is united by a delusion about our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors. 31 Het is mogelijk om politieke identiteit te scheiden van culturele identiteit. It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity. 32 Nederland heeft in het algemeen baat gehad bij haar betrokkenheid bij de EU. In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU. 33 De natiestaat is te zwak om te zorgen voor gelijkheid en te sterk om ons vrijheid toe te staan … het is het focus van irrationele, disfunctionele en vaak destructieve emoties. The nation-state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty. … It is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. 34 Federalisme met deelstaten is een manier om datgene te verzoenen wat onverzoenbaar lijkt te zijn: het ontstaan van een verenigd Europa bevorderen terwijl men tegelijkertijd trouw blijft aan zijn vaderland. Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time. 35 De natie is in wezen de bron van alle heerschappij; geen individu of groep heeft recht op een macht die niet uitdrukkelijk hiervan afkomstig is.

European identity frames in the Netherlands

185

The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it. 36 Grotere Europese integratie kan nationale minderheden meer een besef geven van hun eigen identiteit. Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities.

186 John Barry

9

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe John Barry

Focusing on Northern Ireland for a study of attitudes to national identity is to choose an extreme political environment in which to research. The experience of Northern Ireland and its 35 years of “troubles” represents a textbook case study of what can happen when competing conceptions of national identity, and opposing claims of sovereignty over the same territory, clash. Although constitutionally a part of the “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” (to give the United Kingdom its full title), with a majority of its inhabitants professing a desire to keep it that way (the unionist position and community), the status of Northern Ireland has, both since its creation by the partition of Ireland in 1921 and more recently since the beginning of the “troubles” in 1968, has been contested (both peacefully through democratic politics and violently through terrorist campaigns such as the Provisional IRA) by those supporting the reunification of the island of Ireland (the nationalist position and community). It is a place where these two different senses of national identity – allegiance and loyalty – run deep, with both communities being able to draw upon long-established historical narratives, events and politicised cultural traditions with which to defend, celebrate and articulate their competing and oppositional identities (Barry 2003). Given the often insularity of this clash of national identities and competing claims of sovereignty, studying attitudes to Europe, the European Union and associated senses of European identity within Northern Ireland is to examine a novel and much under-researched dimension of Northern Ireland politics. The main findings of the limited literature and research on this topic are that European issues are “domesticated” by local politics: both opinion poll evidence and examination of the ideology and manifestos and statements of the major political parties in Northern Ireland support the view of their being distinctive and oppositional views on Europe and the politics and policies of the European Union depending on whether one looks at “nationalist” or “unionist” positions (Smith 2000; Ruane and Todd 1996). As Smith puts it, Attitudes to Europe in Northern Ireland do correlate strongly to political identities which, in the particular circumstances of the province, are constructed around competing views of sovereignty … Attitudes towards

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 187 Europe have remained clearly divided along the lines of the two main political communities. (Smith 2000, pp. 190, 195) Unionist attitudes to Europe are generally thought to be “Eurosceptical.” As Keating puts it, “unionists have tended to be anti-European, seeing the European project as a threat to their precarious British identity and, in many cases, expressing suspicions about the weight of Catholic countries within the European Union” (2001, p. 68). The main unionist political party for example, the Ulster Unionist Party is, or was until recently, close to the “Eurosceptical” wing of the British Conservative Party, though since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 and the setting up of the devolved power-sharing assembly, there are signs of a more positive attitude to the European Union. The other main unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), and its powerful and charismatic leader, Ian Paisley, have tended to be even more antiEuropean. Paisley’s view often comes close to depicting the European Union as a modern incarnation of “the Holy Roman Empire,” a pan-Catholic organization of which he and the political–religious ideology he articulates is, to say the least, extremely sceptical and critical. For Keating, “Extreme unionists, such as the Democratic Party and Ian Paisley, which regards Europe as a Catholic plot and a surreptitious way of uniting Ireland … remain stridently anti-European” (2001, p. 68). Equally, some commentators have pointed out that the DUP and the unionist identity it represents, also adopts a political-religious perspective not just about the European Union but also dominant European political traditions. According to Tonge, “Elements within the DUP are also hostile to the perceived influence of the Church of Rome within the Christian Democratic traditions of the Community, a problem seemingly undetected by all the other European political parties” (Tonge 1998, p.70). Yet, equally, Ian Paisley has been a member of the European Parliament since 1979 and indeed receives the highest number of votes in Northern Ireland European elections (which as an aside are the only elections in Northern Ireland conducted using the proportional representation system) and has worked alongside nationalist MEPs, notably John Hume, in promoting Northern Ireland and defending specific Northern Ireland interests and concerns (Meehan 2000). In Northern Ireland, what is known as “nationalist” sentiment opposes unionist demands to stay within the United Kingdom, and instead favors the union of Northern Ireland with the Republic, the larger southern part of the island. Nationalist enthusiasm for the European Union and greater European Union involvement in Northern Ireland is most clearly expressed by the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and especially its former leader and Nobel Prize winner John Hume. Under Hume’s leadership the SDLP has consistently sought to promote a “European” institutional model for solving the territorial dispute in the province, ranging from its 1973 policy of “a United Ireland in an EC context” (Hainsworth 1985, p. 123), to the more recent “Europe of the Regions” proposed framework (Meehan 2001, p. 203), including a commitment to greater European Union involvement in the

188 John Barry governance of Northern Ireland, much to the disquiet of unionists who viewed this as a clear intention to dilute the union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom (Bew and Meehan 1994). Equally, a large part of the explanation for the decisively more favorable attitude amongst nationalists towards the European Union lies in the idea that greater integration of Northern Ireland within the European Union would undermine the union between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom and help the process of reunifying Ireland. As Kennedy points out, Irish nationalist attitudes towards European union have always included a vague idea that the inclusion of both parts of the island of Ireland within a European Community destined for “ever closer union” must, inevitably, provide a favourable context for their own aspiration towards a united Ireland. (Kennedy 2000, p. 163) While doubtless true, there is also the argument that nationalist support for the European Union and greater European involvement in the governance of Northern Ireland is not necessarily associated with this being a step on the road to a united Ireland. Nationalist positive attitudes to Europe and its institutions are also related to the positive role these external bodies and processes have played in both highlighting and redressing nationalist complaints and claims of injustice. Here bodies as diverse as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Parliament have been used by nationalists to publicize and embarrass the British government. This has involved particularly the controversies arising from “security and policing” in Northern Ireland in terms of uneven and biased policing, the British Army presence and alleged collusion between elements with the British Army, the former Royal Ulster Constabulary and loyalist terrorists in targeting and killing Catholics. At the same time, it is also the case that recent nationalist attitudes to the European Union have been formed by the extremely positive role played by the European Union in supporting the emergence of the “celtic tiger” economy in the Republic of Ireland, and relatedly, the benefits greater European integration and enthusiasm for the European project can bring to peripheral regions such as the Republic. Equally, Northern Irish public opinion has in the past tended to be hostile or ambivalent about membership of the European Union. For example, in the 1975 referendum on British membership of the then European Economic Community, “24% of the entire electorate endorsed EC membership, compared with 44% in England and Wales, and 36% in Scotland” (Keating 2001, p.71). However, from this negative starting point in 1975, more recent survey evidence seems to indicate that Northern Ireland as a whole is more “pro-European” than the rest of Great Britain as a whole. Using the British Social Attitudes Survey (1991–5) and the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1991–5), Smith (2000, p. 178) points out that there is discernibly a more positive attitude to the European Union in terms of the response to whether the United Kingdom relationship with the European Union should be closer (see Table 9.1).

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 189 Table 9.1 Respondents saying, as a member state, the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union should be (%)

Closer Less close About right Don’t know

1991 NI

GB

1993 NI

GB

1994 NI

GB

1995 NI

GB

41 7 41 11

39 11 41 9

40 14 34 12

30 24 36 10

45 10 37 7

37 23 34 7

39 13 38 11

29 26 39 6

From Smith (2000, p. 178).

Smith draws two main conclusions from his analysis of the survey data from the British and Northern Irish Social Attitudes Surveys. According to him, Firstly, from a general European perspective, attitudes in Northern Ireland to relations with the EU are closer to their pattern in the UK as a whole than they are to those in continental states. Secondly, and by contrast, the decline in approval of the benefits for closer EU links which is so marked in the GB responses after 1991 is not shared by their Northern Irish counterparts … Northern Ireland opinion through the 1990s has remained both remarkably even and noticeably more enthusiastic about the relation with the EU than it has among fellow citizens across the water. (Smith 2000, p. 179) It is clear that the more pro-European attitudes of nationalists account for this more positive outcome for Northern Ireland taken as a whole in comparison with the rest of the United Kingdom, yet curiously this is not explored or stressed in any great depth by Smith. This is all the more curious since he is aware that the main reason for the variation between Northern Ireland and Great Britain as a whole in its attitude to the European Union has to do with the “internal division” within Northern Ireland between “nationalism” and “unionism.” The unionist position is more Eurosceptical and the nationalist more pro-European. In response to the question “Should the United Kingdom do all it can to unite with the EC, or should the United Kingdom do all it can to protect its independence from the EC?,” the responses shown in Table 9.2 were found according to party affiliation.

Description of the study Twenty-seven participants and Q sorts were used in this Northern Ireland study. This is less than the 36 or so participants found in the other studies in this volume, and is due to a combination of time constraints and also that the bulk of the Q sorts were conducted during the summer of 2002. This is the “marching season” in Northern Ireland when tensions are high between the two communities, making individuals less amenable to participating in politically focused research; in

190 John Barry Table 9.2 Responses to “Should the United Kingdom do all it can to unite with the EC, or should the United Kingdom do all it can to protect its independence from the EC?” (%) Unite with EC 1995 Unionist DUP/OUP* Nationalist SDLP/SF**

24 69

Independence 62 19

Don’t know 14 13

Notes * Unionist parties: the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Official Unionist Party. ** Nationalist parties: Social Democratic Labour Party and Sinn Fein.

addition, many individuals go on holiday during this troubled period, which resulted in people cancelling their participation in the study. Despite this, however, the 27 participants come from a wide range of backgrounds, in terms of age, gender and occupation, as well as most importantly in the context of Northern Ireland, covering an adequate range of opinion from within and between “nationalist” and “unionist” communities as well as those that do not fall into either “camp.” The participants ranged in ages from 80 plus to early 20s, and from retired people, students and local councillors to members of the police force. There were 37 statements used, one more than the 36 used in other chapters. This was to accommodate having two statements concerning “British” and “Irish” national identities (statements 1 and 2). Five factors were found, including one that was bipolar (Factor 2), which are discussed below. The following should be read in conjunction with the factor arrays listed in Appendix 9.1.

Discussion of factors Factor 1: Supranationalist This factor is strongly defined by a pro-European, state-sceptical, liberal (and in the context of Northern Ireland, anti-sectarian) character. The defining statements of this factor (in terms of most strongly agree +4, disagree –4) are the following: 9 Loyalty to the nation state overrides all other loyalities (–4). 7 I do not hate foreign persons in Northern Ireland but I feel they are polluting our national identity (–4). 32 It is possible to separate political from cultural identity (+4). 33 The European Union can further contribute to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland (+4). This supranationalist discourse disagrees with the “my country right or wrong”, strongly nationalistic view that “Loyalty to the nation state overrides all other loyalities” (statement 9, –4) entails, and is also anti-patriotic: “I would not describe

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 191 myself as especially patriotic” (statement 30, +3). This factor is also distinguished in that unlike all the other factors, it sees that unalloyed state sovereignty and the ability of nation states to solve current problems and control their own futures is all but past. For example this factor strongly agrees with the statement, “The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present, they cannot ensure their own progress, or control their own future” (statement 8, +3). This scepticism regarding the state is matched by a sceptical attitude towards the nation, or at least a narrowly “nationalistic” view of the nation. This can be seen in the anti-xenophobia that characterizes this factor in disagreeing strongly with statement 7: “I do not hate foreign persons in Northern Ireland but I feel they are polluting our national identity” (–4). However, Factors 3 and 4 also express this anti-xenophobia (–3 and –4 respectively), with only Factor 2 being indifferent about it in placing it in the 0 column. Equally significant, this factor is the only one which disagrees with the following statement, “The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it” (statement 36, –2). The degree to which this factor evidences disagreement with this statement, taken together with its strong disagreement with the claim that loyalty to the nation state overrides other loyalties, confirms this factor as sceptical towards the nation state as the only or most important focus of political identity. The relative lack of support for either Irish or British identification (unlike the other factors) is consistent with this factor’s support for a supranationalist “European” identity. Indeed, one could say that this factor is not simply supranationalist, but arguably anti-nationalist, perhaps as a result of the negative experience of Northern Ireland in terms of the clash between competing nationalist claims of “Britishness” and “Irishness.” In the context of Northern Ireland, what is striking about this factor is the relative indifference it exhibits towards either being “British” or “Irish”. While this factor does show very weak support for being “Irish” (statement 2, +1) and not “British” (statement 1, –1), unlike all the other factors, it is not characterized by being strongly nationalistically inclined one way or the other. All the other factors are clearly identifiable as either strongly “Irish” (Factors 3 and 4) or “British” (Factor 2). At the same time this factor expresses a “liberal” non-sectarian view in being most in disagreement with the statement “My parents would be unhappy if I did not marry someone from the same community in Northern Ireland” (statement 11, –3). This “liberal”, non-traditional view is of course in line with the cosmopolitan values one would expect of a supranationalist, European perspective. Attitude to Europe This factor is clearly pro-European. For example, it disagrees with the statement that 3 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result (–3).

192 John Barry Participants in this group are particularly positive about the European Union’s contribution to the improvement and normalization of Northern Ireland society. Of all the factors, it loads most strongly and positively on the following statements concerning the relationship between Northern Ireland and the European Union: 12 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Northern Ireland in the future (+3). 33 The European Union has and can further contribute to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland (+4). Equally, the pro-European sentiment of this factor is also independent of the European Union–Northern Ireland relationship, as can be seen in the distinctiveness of this factor in relation to its loading on the following statements: 17 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances (+2). 23 European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work (–3). Yet, curiously, this factor rejects (albeit weakly) a distinctively “European” identity over and above other, more local identities in loading –1 and +1 respectively on statements 14 and 16. It is as if this factor is more interested in the “institutional” dimension of the European Union rather than any identity constitutive aspects. There is also some evidence that this group could be described as articulating a “Europe of the regions” view, in that while it disagrees with the statement that “The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures” (statement 21, –2), it agrees with statements 19 and 20 which express a pluralistic, anti-centralized, federal conception of the European Union (statement 35, +2), as well as disagreeing with the statement that “National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up” (statement 24, –1). Equally significant in this respect is this factor’s positive support for separating political from cultural identity (statement 32, +4), though it may be that this is in relation to identities in a Northern Ireland rather than the European context. Factor 2: Northern Ireland traditional unionist Euroscepticism This factor is bipolar and defined by a number of characteristics in terms of how strongly it agrees or disagrees with the following defining statements: 1 28 14 16

I would describe my national identity as British (+4). I am proud to say I am from Northern Ireland (+4). I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next (–4). I am very attached to Europe as a whole (–4).

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 193 This is the most obvious traditional “unionist” political factor in both its loading on statement 1, but also its negative attitude towards an Irish national identity (statement 2, –3), pride in being from Northern Ireland and also in articulating a traditional unionist “Eurosceptical” attitude as outlined above. Attitude to Europe This factor exhibits a strongly anti-European perspective, both by itself and especially in relation to the attitude to Europe and the European Union in the other three factors. For example, of all the factors it expresses most agreement or disagreement with the following statements: 14 16 22 23

I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next (–4). I am very attached to Europe as a whole (–4). The pace of European integration is too slow (–3). European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work (+3).

30 I would not describe myself as especially patriotic (–3). 36 The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it (+3). It is the only factor which agrees or disagrees with the following statements: 3 Our identity as a nation is migrating to Europe and we are left empty as a result (+2). 18 Northern Ireland must maintain an independence in European affairs (+1). 25 It should be an honour to be known as a Northern Irish nationalist or Northern Irish unionist, because both are of the people, from the people, and for the people (+1). 26 European disunity is the result of a deliberately fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies (–2). 33 The European Union has and can further contribute to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland (–2). In this sense this factor is strongly “British nationalist” (read “unionist”) as opposed to supranationalist or European (statements 1, 36, 25), is patriotic (statement 30), and proud of Northern Ireland (statements 28 and 29) and of being a Northern Irish unionist (statement 25). In this, Factor 2 expresses a traditional unionist scepticism or hostility to the European Union as discussed below, and the one factor which is most dismissive of a European dimension to political identity (–4 for both statements 14 and 16) and perceives the European Union as a threat to national identity (statement 3). Equally, but consistent with this “Eurosceptical”

194 John Barry perspective, this factor does not think that the European Union has or can contribute to improving Northern Ireland (statements 12 and 33). It is also the only factor that does not disagree with the xenophobic sentiments of the following statement: 7 I do not hate foreign persons in Northern Ireland but feel they are polluting our national identity (0). While this should not necessarily be taken as evidence of xenophobia, it is clear that in comparison to the other factors which all expressed strong disagreement with this statement, Factor 2 is perhaps more narrowly focused on the concerns of traditional unionism: namely, the relationship between nationalism and unionism and the constitutional status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom or part of a united Ireland, rather than more “modern” or recent multicultural issues relating to the migration and immigration of non-Irish and non-British ethnic and national groups to Northern Ireland. However, it is noticeable that while all the other factors are constituted by a strong negative ranking of this statement (–4 for Factors 1 and 4, –3 for Factor 3), this factor is indifferent about it. Factor 2B: Bipolar Factor – pro-European Irishness However, Factor 2 is bipolar (Factor 2B); that is, there is an additional discourse or factor here which is the polar opposite to that outlined above. It articulates an “Irish”, pro-European perspective and in this sense is very close to Factor 1 above. Its defining statements are the same as for Factor 2, but with the values reversed: 1 28 14 16

I would describe my national identity as British (–4). I am proud to say I am from Northern Ireland (–4). I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next (+4). I am very attached to Europe as a whole (+4).

Thus Factor 2B represents an “Irish nationalist” perspective which is extremely positive about Europe in terms of identity formation and attachment. What also distinguishes this factor is that it is the only one which agrees or disagrees with the following statements: 13 Our local political leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment (+2). 20 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, Ireland as Ireland, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them together into some sort of common European personality (–2).

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 195 This factor’s ranking of the latter, together with its defining statements (1, 28, 14, 16), confirm its effusive European character and scepticism of existing nation states and national identity. Though strongly “Irish” in terms of national identity (statement 2, +3), and “non-British” (statement 1), this putative “Irish nationalist” sense of identity needs to be placed in the context of its strong negative reaction to statement 28, and its strong support for a European sense of identity. It might be that what this statement represents is an attempt to articulate a “cultural” rather than strictly political sense of “Irish” identity alongside a “European” political identity (statement 32). For example, Factor 2B is also the one factor which has the highest ranking for statement 14, thinking of oneself as European first rather than, in this case, a Northern Irish nationalist, and also the factor which most strongly supports the idea that national divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up (statement 24). Thus, while an Irish sense of identity is expressed, it is ranked lower than a European one. Not only does this factor seem comfortable with overlapping Irish and European identities, there is a sense that it ranks them, perhaps along the lines above, that is, a European political identity and an Irish cultural one. This would be consistent with its support for statement 37: 37 Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities (+1). in which “Irishness” in Factor 2B is a “minority” identity (in a double sense, both within Northern Ireland and within the European Union as a whole), but one the articulation of which is dependent upon a larger European political context (institutions and identity). Here it is important to point out that Factor 2B (together with Factors 1 and 4) agrees with statement 19 that the European Union is based on cherishing distinctive cultural and national identities. This extremely European sense of identity and identification is consistent with Factor 2B’s rejection (along with Factors 3 and 4) of the statement that Northern Ireland should maintain an independence in European affairs (18), and its strong rejection of the claim that European integration is too slow (statement 22) and also its support for the view that Northern Ireland should adopt the single European currency. At the same time, while this factor articulates an “Irish” national identity, it also expresses, in a manner akin to what we found in Factor 1, a scepticism or negative view of the “nation” and “state”. For example, Factor 2B is more strongly opposed to statement 36 than Factor 1, which concerns the claim that the nation is the source of all sovereignty, and like Factors 1 and 3, this factor expresses a “postnational” perspective in agreeing with the view that the sovereign nations of the past are inadequate for the problems of the present and the future (statement 8). A rather curious aspect of Factor 2B is that while it is extremely negative about Northern Ireland in many respects (ashamed of being from Northern Ireland, statement 28, or being a Northern Irish unionist or nationalist, statement 25; and there is no value placed on distinctively Northern Irish food, drink and culture,

196 John Barry statement 29), at the same time it is the only factor to positively endorse the capabilities of local political leaders in managing Northern Irish institutions in a global environment (statement 13, +2). One interpretation of this apparent contradiction or inconsistency is that from the viewpoint of this factor, what is being conveyed is that local political leaders, supported by and firmly within a European Union political context, are capable of managing local institutional mechanisms in a global environment. At the same time it might be that this factor views the European Union as the main “institutional” level for dealing with global dynamics which then “filters down” specific global issues for more local levels to deal with, which is consistent with this factor’s rejection (albeit weak) of the claim that globalization means the death of national cultures (statement 6), since the possible negative effects of globalization are filtered out at the European Union level first, thus protecting national and minority cultures and identities which exist in member states. Factor 3: Northern Ireland nationalism – pro-European Irishness The defining statements of this factor are the following: 1 I would describe my national identity as British (–4). 25 It should be an honour to be known as a Northern Irish nationalist or Northern Irish unionist, because both are of the people, from the people, and for the people (–4). 31 The two main traditions in Northern Ireland are united by a common delusion about their past and a common and misplaced fear and mistrust of one another (+4). 16 I am very attached to Europe as a whole (+4). This factor expresses a Northern Ireland “Irish nationalist” perspective, but a rather curious one, given its extremely negative reaction to statement 25 above and positive endorsement of statement 31. It is an “Irish” national identity insofar as it ranks statements 1 and 2. This factor seems to offer a mirror image of Factor 2, the Northern Ireland unionist perspective, in that not only does it disagree strongly with statement 1 (British/unionist identity), it also agrees (+3) with statement 2 (Irish/ nationalist identity). It thus shares much with the bipolar Factor 2B discussed above. Unlike all the other groups, Factor 3 agrees with statement 11, “My parents would be unhappy if I did not marry someone from the same community in Northern Ireland” (+2). All the other groups either disagreed with this statement (Factors 1 and 4) or were indifferent about it (Factor 2). In the context of Northern Ireland this seems indicative of a strong “traditional” Irish nationalist view, in that not only is it strongly “anti-” or “non-” British, but also perhaps concerned about limiting contact between the two communities. As such this Irish nationalist view may exhibit a sectarian political attitude towards the non-nationalist community in Northern Ireland (i.e. the unionist one).

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 197 However, against this must be set the sense in which this factor may represent what one could call a distinctly Europeanized “Irish”/“nationalist” identity, in that it is the only factor to agree with statement 14, “I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next” (+2), while also expressing the strongest disagreement with statement 3, “Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result” (–4). Equally this factor registers the strongest agreement with statement 6 that, “Globalization means the death of our national culture” (+3), which seems to imply that while it is pro-European, this factor is against or sceptical about “globalization” (at least in terms of its perceived negative impact on distinctive national identities). This factor is also distinguished from the others by its ranking of statements 25 and 31. On the one hand this group seems to be anti-nationalist: it is anti- or nonpatriotic (statement 30, +2), disagrees very strongly with the “nationalistic” or “communitarian” overtones of statement 25; is the only factor to disagree with the statement that “Northern Ireland has the finest food, drink, culture and landscape in the world” (statement 29, –2). Attitude to Europe This factor was the only one which agreed with statement 14, “I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next” (+2), expresses most agreement of all the other factors in terms of attachment to Europe as a whole (statement 16, +4), strongly believes that European integration should and can go further (statement 27, –3), and is the only factor which thinks European integration is too slow (statement 22, +1), which together with its negative loading on statement 3, that is disagreeing that identity is migrating to Europe and we are left empty as a result, reinforces its “pro-European” character. While expressing a pro-European perspective, this factor is also generally negative about “globalization”, in both being the only factor to register disagreement with statement 4 that, “Rapid technological innovations and the global economy has contributed to my optimistic mood for Northern Ireland” (–1), and also its strong support for the view that “Globalization means the death of our national culture” (statement 6, +3). Europe seems more firmly its focus in that against the dynamics of the global economy, Factor 3 (unlike all the other factors found), agrees with statement 10 that, “Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Northern Ireland” (+2). Yet balanced against this effusive support and attachment to Europe and the European Union, Factor 3 also expresses an awareness of the limits of the European Union’s contribution to Northern Ireland. Thus we find this factor is the only one to (albeit weakly) disagree with statement 12 that “The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Northern Ireland in the future” (–1), but more strikingly, it is the only statement to disagree and to a much stronger degree than to statement 12, with statement 33, “The European Union has and can further contribute to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland” (–2). And it is also indifferent to statement 37, concerning the protection of minority

198 John Barry identities by greater European integration. How are we to explain this? One interpretation is that for this factor, the solution to Northern Ireland’s problems (while helped by European Union involvement) must ultimately be found in an “internal settlement” within Northern Ireland itself. It is perhaps in this context that we should view this factor strongly endorsing statement 31, concerning the common delusion the two main communities in Northern Ireland have of one another, and equally its rejection of the claim that it should be an honor to be a Northern Irish nationalist or unionist (statement 25). In this way, Factor 3 might be said to see the resolution of the problems of Northern Ireland as one which is primarily to be located within the Northern Ireland context, and only subsequently one for which the European Union can help. That is, perhaps Factor 3 articulates a view of “Northern Ireland solutions to Northern Ireland problems”, but within a wider pro-European context. Factor 4: Northern Irish multiculturalism Defining statements for this factor: 2 I would describe my national identity as Irish (+4). 3 Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result (–4). 5 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics (+4). 7 I do not hate foreign persons in Northern Ireland but feel they are polluting our national identity (–4). From a Northern Irish perspective, this factor is extremely interesting and indeed politically significant, if held by a significant number of citizens in Northern Ireland. What is exciting about this factor is that while it seems to be strongly “Irish” in that it places statement 2 “I would describe my national identity as Irish” on +4, this is modified by it also agreeing (albeit weakly, +1) with the opposite view as expressed in statement 1, “I would describe my national identity as British”. Thus what we seem to have here is a “Northern Irish” sense of national identity in which there is an overlapping of both Irishness and Britishness, in which there is a significant modification of both Irishness and Britishness and the emergence of a hybrid “Irish-British”/“Northern Irish” identity. Or to put it another way, although it seems that this identity is heavily weighted towards an “Irish” sense of national identity (and thus on the face of it, sharing this Irish national identity with Factor 3), it is perhaps closer to the mark to say that what we find in this factor is a discourse of modified or altered “Irishness” and “Britishness”. What this modified “Irish” sense of national identity involves, in marked contrast to Factor 3, is a less antagonistic or zero-sum attitude to “Britishness”, in the sense that Irishness is defined in large part by not being British. Thus in Factor 3 we can observe a “traditional” discourse of Irish

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 199 nationalism in that not only is statement 2 “I would describe my national identity as Irish”, ranked +3, but equally importantly, statement 1, “I would describe my national identity as British” is ranked –4. This traditional account of Irish nationalism as constituted and defined by “non-” or “anti-” Britishness has been a strong feature of Northern Irish history (and equally the history of the Republic of Ireland). It is still prevalent today as expressed in both the ideologies of the two main nationalist parties in Northern Ireland, the Social Democratic Labour Party and especially the “Irish republicanism” of Sinn Fein. By contrast, Factor 4 is not so narrowly “non-” or “anti-” British and does represent a novel hybrid “Irish-British” identity. Equally, in terms of “Britishness”, while this factor has a positive British aspect, unlike Factor 2, this factor does not define this British dimension in terms of anti- or non-Irishness. Hence in Factor 2 we find a “traditional” unionist sense of British identity (statement 1, +4), and –3 for statement 2 (“I would describe my national identity as Irish”). In this respect Factors 2, 2B and 3 are mirror images of one another, each defining Irishness or Britishness in opposition to the other, thus creating or expressing mutually exclusive senses of Irish or British national identity. However, Factor 4 does not regard Irishness and Britishness as mutually exclusive, instead representing an overlapping “Northern Irish” sense of identity which has elements of both Irishness and Britishness. This Northern Irishness can be seen in this factor’s +3 ranking of statement 28, “I am proud to say I am from Northern Ireland”, and its positive ranking of statement 36, “The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty …” (+2); its disagreement with placing a European sense of identity before a national one (statement 14, – 3); and its disagreement with statement 30, “I would not describe myself as especially patriotic” (–1). Factor 4’s positive endorsement of pride in being from and associated with Northern Ireland, and its support for the claim that the nation is the source of all sovereignty, and lack of support for the priority of a European sense of identity, is something it shares with Factor 2, the traditional unionist discourse. However, unlike Factor 2, Factor 4 is more pro-European in general (in terms of supporting more integration, statements 22, 23, 27) and also in terms of the positive contribution the European Union can make to Northern Ireland in particular (statements 12, 33). At the same time, this factor is the only one to positively endorse (and most strongly) the claim that “Humanity is naturally divided into nations each with their own peculiar characteristics” (statement 5, +4), which, given the interpretation above, could be said to further support the “Northern Irish” complexion of this factor, in the sense of Northern Ireland being construed as a distinct nation separate from (but also overlapping with) the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Attitude to Europe Interesting features of this factor are the similarities it shares with the supranationalist discourse in Factor 1. On a majority of statements the two factors either

200 John Barry agree/disagree to the same degree or are distinguished only by the degree to which they agree/disagree on particular statements. For example, the consensus statements for both factors are: 7 I do not hate foreign persons in Northern Ireland but feel they are polluting our national identity (–4). 21 The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures (–2). 22 The pace of European integration is too slow (–1). 27 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go (–2). Not only does this give this factor a similar “pro-European” complexion to Factor 1 (indeed, here this factor is more positive about statement 16, “I am very attached to Europe as a whole” – which it ranks at +2 as against the +1 for Factor 1), but also a distinct “multicultural” character as against both Factors 2 and 3. This multicultural character can perhaps be seen in this factor’s rejection of the idea that the European Union is a threat to national identities (statement 3), or that foreigners are a threat (statement 7), but significantly that globalization is not a threat either (statement 6). On this latter globalization issue, Factor 4 is the only factor (apart from the minority bipolar Factor 2B) which does not have a negative view of globalization. This might be explained by the fact that Factor 4 is the factor most in agreement with statement 4, “Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for Northern Ireland” (+2). This factor seems to be confident that various non-national forces, changes and dynamics (from globalization, the European Union and immigration) do not threaten either a secure but altered sense of local/national “Northern Irish” sense of identity or one’s pride and attachment to Northern Ireland as a “nation” and its people. Indeed, what this factor seems to be articulating is that this outward-looking but secure Northern Irish sense of identity is fostered and helped by the European Union context. Thus, alongside Factor 2B, Factor 4 is the only factor to (weakly) support the idea that the European Union can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities (statement 37). And for Factor 4, the “national minority” in question seems to be one which includes both “Irish nationalist” and “British unionist” perspectives.

Conclusion Attitudes to Europe and the European Union in Northern Ireland are diverse, as this study has shown. The majority of factors found can be described as broadly pro-European, with the notable exception of Factor 2, although there are important and interesting qualifications to other pro-European factors, such as Factor 4. There is no doubt that the European Union has had a positive effect on attempts to find solutions to the Northern Ireland problem, whether it be offering new institutional arrangements as possible models of governance or the European

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 201 Parliament and other European Union institutions as important fora for Northern Irish politicians to meet and discuss, to more practical financial support, for example, through its Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. As Meehan puts it, while direct effects may not be obvious, European Union initiatives have contributed to the conditions under which it has become possible for people from different communities to negotiate with one another. There is evidence of new ways of thinking facilitated by the EU. (Meehan 2000, p. 207) And with the exception of Factor 2, the discourses found in this Q study support Meehan’s view of the positive contribution the European Union has and can make to solving or dealing with Northern Ireland’s problems. However, while most commentators would agree with Meehan’s sentiments, some are less convinced of the contribution of the European Union to the Northern Ireland problem. According to Ruane and Todd, The formation of the European Union has improved relations between member states, including between Britain and Ireland. It has also made available new strategic resources for the parties to the conflict in Northern Ireland – the two states and the two communities. It has not, however, provided a dramatically new context for resolving the conflict. (1996, p. 280) They go on to state that Thus far at least, European integration has not removed or even noticeably weakened the conditions of communal conflict in Northern Ireland. Its main effect has been to introduce a new arena for conflict. European elections are fought on local issues and the results interpreted for their local significance. The European Union is integrated into party ideology and political debate. (1996, p. 287) Another sceptical voice is Porter who, again while recognizing the positive contribution the “Europeanization of Northern Ireland” has made (particularly in terms of improving relations between Britain and the Republic of Ireland), dismisses the claims of those who advance a “Europe of the Regions” solution to Northern Ireland in terms of bypassing or transcending the competing claims of nation state based sovereignty. He notes that it is far from evident that increased regionalisation would imply the transcending of nation states; it seems more the case that regionalisation would occur within their ambit. Accordingly, sovereignty is not easily disposed of, borders are not so magically spirited away, and political identities are not

202 John Barry effortlessly relocated. Indeed, the notion that those attachments that distinguish unionists from nationalists can be transcended by the sheer appropriation of a common “Europeanism” appears to underestimate the nature and depth of the attachments at issue: they are not cast aside so lightly. (Porter 1996, p. 39) This scepticism about the “Europeanization” of Northern Ireland as on the one hand both a reality and something that ought to be actively promoted (for example along the lines of a “Europe of the regions”) is invariably and identifiably closer to “unionist” than “nationalist” views (Anderson 1998; Porter 1996; Kennedy 2000), thus confirming one of the main propositions of this sceptical view at the academic level, that of the “domestication” or “translation” of Europe and the European Union into the enduring and all pervasive binary oppositions of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Thus, this academic perspective is identifiably close to the “traditional unionist” perspective articulated in Factor 2. Yet this needs to be placed against the background of the European Union as a political level and context within which innovative and progressive thinking and action about Northern Ireland can and has taken place. For example, as Kearney points out, while unionists were outraged about the dilution and sharing of sovereignty in Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland as outlined in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 (between the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland governments), there was no unionist objection to the sharing or pooling of sovereignty between the then-ten member states of the European Union – and thus between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland – as contained in the Single European Act (1997, p. 16). However, this study offers some support for Kennedy’s hope that, “In time, the exaggerated concepts of national identity which inflame the problem may be softened by a common European sense of identity, and offer a helpful background for the development of the fragile agreement of 1998 [The Good Friday Agreement]” (Kennedy 2000, p. 167). Certainly, the senses of identity found in Factors 1 and 4, in particular, do offer some, albeit tentative, support for the emergence of a “European” sense of identity which overlaps with and offers a context within which “unionist” and “nationalist” political identities can be rethought outside of a binary opposition to one another. While most conventional thinking and writing on the positive contribution of the European Union and notions of “European identity” and “citizenship” to Northern Ireland is associated with conventional “nationalist” party positions (especially the moderate Social Democratic Labour Party), it is a view also shared by other parties in Northern Ireland such as the Alliance Party and the Women’s Coalition. At the same time, this study shows that a positive regard for Europe is not an exclusively “nationalist” position, but one which cuts across (but does not, as yet, fundamentally displace or undermine) the enduring “local and tribal” political identities that exist in Northern Ireland. On the one hand, one can agree with Anderson’s pointed remark, that “Glib notions of a ‘borderless world’, an ‘end to territorial sovereignty’, or a European

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 203 identity replacing national ones, are actively misleading” (1998, p. 132). Yet, on the other, one can take issue with his equally glib dismissal of “actually existing” European identities co-existing and overlapping with “national” ones. To say that national identities are still the most important foci for the formation of the political identity and loyalty of citizens of Northern Ireland does not mean than European dimensions to identity are either non-existent, “actively misleading” or ought to be actively discouraged. Of particular note is the support from this study (indicative though it may be as is true of all Q studies) within the “nationalist” community and sense of identity, of definite signs of transcending the absolutes of British and Irish sovereignty (Keating 2001, p. 71); a greater willingness to explore solutions and expressions of “Irishness” which fall short of Irish unity; are less exclusionary of “Britishness”; and more accommodating of a Europeanized and commonly shared “Northern Irish” identity. However, my own view of the limits of the positive potential of this greater European identity in Northern Ireland means it falls well short of the rather effusive and perhaps idealistic claims of Kearney and Wilson who hold that “a European identity for Northern Ireland could help kickstart it out of its position, the product of so many decades of unionist conservatism, as a continental backwater into the mainstream of European debate” (1997, p.88). It is hard to see whether Northern Ireland can and indeed should take such a leap, and perhaps more realistic advice might be for Northern Ireland to concentrate on stilling its troubled backwaters first. The European Union has and can play a important role in Northern Ireland in terms of providing a larger context within which “traditional” expressions of national identity in Northern Ireland, namely “Irishness” and “Britishness” can be redefined and reworked, as well as supporting the (re)emergence of a hybrid “Northern Irish” identity which combines elements of “Irish” and “British” identities, as found in Factor 4. For this putative “regional” Northern Irish identity to develop however, it probably requires, as Ruane and Todd indicate, “a process of mutual distancing – by the states from their ‘client’ communities and by the communities from ‘their’ states – and a common commitment by the people of Northern Ireland to the region they share” (1996, p. 303), a process which will be both difficult and demand a more secure and transformed sense of the identities of the two communities in which “Britain” and “Republic of Ireland” (as reference points for the articulation of “Irishness” and “Britishness”) play a diminished and diminishing role. It might be that the experience of devolved government since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, has helped to foster this perhaps fragile sense of Northern Irishness in which both “Britishness” and “Irishness” are constituent elements, but it is equally the case that the European Union and a sense of European identity is also an important, if albeit of secondary importance, component in rethinking identities in Northern Ireland.

204 John Barry

References Anderson, James. 1998. “Rethinking National Problems in a Transnational Context”, in David Miller (ed.), Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism. London: Longman. Barry, John. 2003. “Patron States, Loyalty and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland,” in Linklater, A. and Waller, M. (eds), Loyalty and the Postnationalist State. London: Routledge. Bew, Paul and Meehan, Elizabeth. 1994. “Regions and Borders: Controversies in Northern Ireland about the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, 1(1), pp. 95– 111. Hainsworth, Paul. 1985. “Northern Ireland and the European Community,” in Michael Keating and Barry Jones (eds), Regions in the European Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kearney, Richard. 1997. Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy. London: Routledge. Kearney, Richard and Wilson, Robin. 1997. “Northern Ireland’s Future as a European Region” (Submission to the Opsahl Commission 1993), in Kearney, Richard (ed.), Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, Philosophy. London: Routledge. Keating, Michael. 2001. Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kennedy, Dennis. 2000. “Europe and the Northern Ireland Problem,” in Kennedy, Dennis (ed), Living with the European Union: The Northern Ireland Experience. London: Macmillan. Meehan, Elizabeth. 2000. “Europe and the Europeanisation of the Irish Question,” in Cox, Michael, Guelke, Adrian and Stephen, Fiona (eds), A Farewell to Arms?: From “Long War” to Long Peace in Northern Ireland. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Porter, Norman. 1996. Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland. Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Ruane, Joseph and Todd, Jennifer. 1996. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Mike. 2000. “The European Connection and Public Opinion,” in Kennedy, Dennis (ed.), Living with the European Union: The Northern Ireland Experience. London: Macmillan. Tonge, Jonathan. 1998. Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change. London: Prentice Hall.

Northern Ireland, identities and Europe 205

Appendix 9.1: Q sample and factor arrays – European/ Northern Irish national identity Factors Statement

1

2

3

4

–1

4

4

1

1

3

3

4

3 Our identity as a nation is migrating to European Union and we are left empty as a result.

–3

2

2

4

4 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy have contributed to my optimistic mood for NI.

0

1

1

2

5 Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characteristics.

–2

0

0

4

1 I would describe my national identity as British. 2 I would describe my national identity as Irish.

6 Globalization means the death of our national culture.

0

1

3

3

7 I do not hate foreign persons in NI but I feel they are polluting our national identity.

–4

0

3

4

3

1

1

0

9 Loyalty to the nation state overrides all other loyalties.

–4

0

1

2

10 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for NI.

0

2

2

0

11 My parents would be unhappy if I did not marry someone from the same community in NI.

–3

0

2

1

12 The EU is a means to ensure peace and stability for NI in the future.

3

0

1

2

13 Our local political leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment.

0

2

3

3

–1

4

2

3

15 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse.

1

2

1

0

16 I am very attached to Europe as a whole.

1

4

4

2

17 Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances.

2

0

0

1

18 NI must maintain an independence in European affairs.

0

1

2

2

19 While the EU is a new type of political institution, it is still based on the cherishing of distinctive cultural and national identities.

2

1

1

3

20 Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, NI as NI, Italy as Italy, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them together into some sort of common European personality.

2

2

0

1

8 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present, they cannot ensure their own progress, or control their own future.

14 I think of myself as a European first then my own nationality next.

continued …

206 John Barry Appendix 9.1 continued Factors 1

2

3

4

21 The EU represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures.

Statement

–2

2

0

2

22 The pace of European integration is too slow.

–1

3

1

1

23 European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work.

3

–3

1

1

24 National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows.

–1

2

1

0

25 It should be an honour to be known as an NI nationalist or an NI unionist, because both are of the people, from the people, and for the people.

–1

1

4

0

26 European disunity is the result of a deliberately fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies.

1

2

1

0

27 I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go.

–2

1

3

2

28 I am proud to say I am from Northern Ireland.

0

4

0

3

29 Northern Ireland has the finest food, drink, culture and landscape in the world.

0

3

2

0

30 I would not describe myself as especially patriotic.

3

3

2

1

31 The two main traditions in NI are united by a common delusion about their past and a common and misplaced fear of one another.

1

0

4

0

32 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity.

4

1

3

0

33 The EU has and can further contribute to the creation of a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland.

4

0

2

3

34 The nation state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty. It is the focus of our irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions.

0

1

0

1

35 Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be the irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time.

2

0

0

1

36 The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or body of men, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it.

–2

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37 Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities.

0

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1

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 207

10 Being a Swede in a transforming European setting The structures of an emerging Swedish supranational identity in the twenty-first century Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin There are few empirical studies on Swedish national identity and most of those have had methodological weaknesses (Goldmann 1998, p. 19). From an ethnological perspective, the question of identity has often been posed negatively as part of reactions to opinions about immigration and refugees (Mårald 1997). The Swedish ethnologist Åke Daun has attempted to analyze the cultural codes, personal characteristics and operational morale of the Swedes. He emphasizes Swedish pertinence, objectivity, striving for independence and tendency to avoid conflict as general Swedish behavioral characteristics. Other characteristics include integrity and a yearning for privacy. The typical Swede is also said to be silent and to have a puritanical working morale (Daun 1994). From another perspective, viewing Swedes as a national group, Swedish national sentiments are often considered to be few and low-key, although their numbers and salience have increased in recent time (Gidlund and Sörlin 1993, p. 195; Klingemann 1999, p. 43). To mention one example, the Swedish national day (Svenska Flaggans Dag) was hardly ever celebrated before the 1980s. According to the Swedish political scientist Kjell Goldmann, the Swedes look upon their nation as only moderately unique compared to other nations. Nevertheless, if we look at the support for the political community in Sweden, expressed as stated opinions about willingness to fight for the country, combined with national pride, Sweden is ranked number one of the Western European countries (Klingemann 1999, pp. 38–9). Goldmann argues further that Swedish identity is predominantly civic in practice though often expressed as ethnic in principle. The Swedish self-image appears to be based on national identity in cultural terms, and in terms of content it emphasizes the value of national history and cultural heritage (Goldmann 2001, pp. 59–62). Recent research has shown, however, that Swedish identity is changing under the impact of the transforming European context, a pattern which shows a decline of rigidity in national self-conception and the emergence of something more diffuse and flexible (Mårald 1997). Therefore it seems possible to say that when the physical and institutional surroundings of Sweden are changing towards a new European order, this also affects how the Swedes perceive themselves. In this

208 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin chapter we wish to illustrate what we, from empirical data, can see as viable future shapes of a new political identity in its making.

Sweden and Europe in the recent past Sweden, as part of the latest wave of European Community enlargement, is among the youngest members of the European Union (EU).1 In the consultative referendum of 1994, the Swedes voted yes to the EU with a small margin: 52.3 per cent in favor and 46.8 per cent against (0.9 per cent non-valid votes). The voting turnout was 83 per cent and it was the highest ever in the history of Swedish referenda. Following a parliamentary decision, in January 1995, Sweden achieved full membership status within the Union. The Swedish electorate was, however, divided into different factions. As with the other Scandinavian countries, EU membership was more approved among the political elite, the business community and the media than within the rest of the Swedish population. Within the political sphere several parties were internally divided and the traditional left–right spectrum could only to a limited degree explain the opinion differences. Geographically, the northern part of Sweden voted “no” while the southern part of the country was more favorable to membership. Those voting “yes” were mainly concentrated in the densely populated areas around Stockholm and to the urban areas of southern Sweden, while the northern cities and the more rural areas showed a propensity to vote “no”. The referendum also seemed to be determined by education and gender with the more educated and the men voting “yes” and the less educated and the women voting “no” to membership (Widfeldt 1996, p. 114). In general, the “yes” faction stressed that Sweden would be better off if participating in the collaborative framework of the EU, particularly when setting the European political and economic agenda. The “no” faction, on the other hand, emphasized the loss of sovereignty if Sweden was to become a Union member. Many no-voters also described the EU as a rich man’s club in conflict with other regions of Europe and the poor countries of the world. The issue of national identity was briefly raised by the “yes” faction in their more internationalist approach to politics, whereas the “no” faction maintained a more nationalistic stance. This division of opinions was also stressed in September 1995 when Swedish voters were supposed to elect 22 members to the European Parliament. With a voting turnout as low as 41.3 per cent – half the number in any modern Swedish referendum or parliamentary election – the result indicated stronger representation from the Greens and the Left (former Communist) party, both of which were negative to Union membership. As a consequence, more than half of Sweden’s first delegation to the European Parliament consisted of those who were against Union membership (Hadenius et al .1993, pp. 339–40). The election turnout of 1999 showed even lower percentage of voters: 38.8 per cent. However, in this election the Liberal Party received a much higher level of votes than in 1995 (an increase from 4.9 per cent to 13.9 per cent), while the Greens lost many votes (a decline from 17.2 per cent to 9.5 per cent). At the same

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 209 time the Conservative party (Moderaterna) lost almost 3 per cent, while the left party gained almost the same. The complexity of the elections reflects the hesitations and worries which existed at the time of the referendum and these hesitations and worries are still evident in the debate on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The referendum on Swedish participation in the EMU in September 2003 resulted in a turnout where 55.9 per cent voted “no” against 42 per cent of “yes” voters. The referendum of September 2003 had some features resembling the EU referendum of 1995 in terms of more women than men voting “no”, less educated voting “no” and an urban/rural difference. The party orientation had also similar patterns as in 1995. However, due to the strong majority of “no” voters, 55.9 per cent, this group was more widely spread over all dimensions. The political parties in favor of EU membership in 1995 were divided into factions of “no” voters. This was especially the case for the government party. The prime minister and the foreign minister, who were in favor of the euro, were opposed by those against the euro in the Ministry of Commerce, Cultural Affairs and Environment. Additionally, the parties supporting the government, the Green and Left parties, were the leading forces behind the “no” campaign. In the aftermath of the euro referendum, Sweden faces severe problems. We can see a Social Democratic government that failed to lead its country into the euro and that is deeply divided at its highest levels. It is also dependent on support from the leading “no” parties, the Green Party and Left Party, to retain a majority in parliament. From a European Union perspective, Sweden has been regarded as an EU sceptic country in the north (Michalski and Tallberg 1999), avoiding regional solutions and preferring active membership of the United Nations.2 In this sense, Sweden is a traditional state, stressing national sovereignty and national identity, and Swedish spokesmen often refer to the region as Sweden and Europe rather than Sweden in Europe. However, in January 2001, Sweden had, for six months, the Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers.3 The preparation for the Presidency of the European Council intensified the debate about how to relate to a growing and important European Union. Throughout the 1990s, issues of economic integration, political cooperation and military collaboration were intensified, contrasting the traditional Swedish model of “non-participation in alliances during peacetime, aimed at neutrality in the event of war” (Hadenius et al. 1993, pp. 326–40). With the Swedish non-alignment model in mind, developed and consolidated primarily in a Cold War context, those major changes that appeared in the European political landscape in autumn 1989 and after, had great impact on Sweden and the Swedes. Perestroika and glasnost starting with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the subsequent Eastern European transformations in 1989, not to forget the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, undermined the traditional axis of conflict in the bi-polar international system. These events indicated a disruption of historical continuity where old structures had to be replaced with new ones (Gaddis 1992/1993; Lundestad 1991).

210 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin As the European states have come closer to each other and their relations have intensified over the last decade, the willingness to extend the European Union has significantly symbolized a growing shared vision and ambition to unify Europe. The Iron Curtain divided one Europe from the other – defined “us” from “them” – and self-identification emerged out of the different normative ideals underpinning the two camps. However, when one camp suddenly collapsed, the idea of one unified Europe could no longer be resisted. From a Swedish perspective, these changes of the political order in Europe fundamentally changed the Swedish international context. In the late 1990s, the question of Sweden in Europe was suddenly elevated to the status of utmost importance. From having been essentially a small state at the northern, Baltic periphery of Europe, Sweden was now to become more involved in European affairs, politically, economically, socially, but also culturally. Despite the impressions of Swedish citizens that Sweden is different from most European countries, similarities are now gaining more and more significance. This may have great impact on the Swedes’ perception of the European Union in the future (Daun 1997, pp. 89–95). Some changes in perceptions were identifiable already in the 1980s. A comparative study of 13 European countries showed how Sweden had a lot in common with other European countries (Daun 1997, p. 130). Linz and Stepan (1997, p. 27) have shown how political identities are not fixed, “rather they are highly changeable and socially constructed.” For Sweden this raises the question about how the Swedes are relating to changes in their surroundings – particularly in Europe, that is – if they are becoming less Swedish and more European, or if they develop overlapping identities. The traditional Swedish perspective on Europe and the European Union seemed to be based on the idea of national sovereignty and national statehood. However, after the membership of the European Union was achieved, the supranational characteristics of the European project have become more visible. Today it is no exaggeration to say that the European dimension has a great impact on Swedish institutions, politicians and public sector representatives. This impact also spills over into non-governmental organizations and the public at large. In this sense Sweden and the Swedes are integrating Europe and the Europeans step by step (Jacobsson 1999, p. 103–24; Johansson 1999, pp. 9–20, 292–4). This integration process at both the social and individual level underlines the importance of studying identification processes empirically. Some preliminary evidence Among the available sources, statistics from Eurobarometer show contrasting findings for Sweden (Eurobarometer May 2001). A high proportion of the Swedish population is attached to Europe: 74 per cent feel very or fairly attached to Europe. The only country scoring higher is Luxembourg (82 per cent compared to EU average at 58 per cent). However, when the respondents are asked to grade their European identity compared to their national identity, national identity clearly is the prevailing sentiment. Swedes who only identify with their nationality are in a majority, with

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 211 54 per cent compared to the average EU figure of 38 per cent. Only in the UK is nationality more important. The Swedes are, according to Eurobarometer, moderately proud of their nationality (88 per cent), which is in the middle of the scale for the 15 EU member states. The pride in being European is lower (70 per cent), which is in the middle of the scale for the 15 countries. In 1997, the Democratic Audit of Sweden conducted a study on feelings of allegiance and presented the results in a report, “Democracy Across Borders.” People were asked whether they felt fairly strong or very strong allegiance with people living in their own municipality, county, province, country (Sweden), continent (Europe) and the world beyond Europe. Fifty-nine per cent had a fairly or very strong feeling for their own municipality, 50 per cent for Sweden as a nation, 34 per cent for the Nordic countries and 19 per cent for Europe (Petersson 1997, p. 104). This study shows how Swedish feelings of allegiance were stronger at the domestic than at the international level. One unexpected finding was that the strongest community sentiments were not to be found at the national level. Despite the fact that most symbols of a common identity – language, culture, history – are primarily national in character and that national alignment far exceeds municipal, the most intense expression of allegiance is found at the local level (Petersson 1997, p. 104). Overall, research shows that the Swedes feel very attached to Europe as a whole but their nationality is clearly Swedish although this national pride is only moderate. Trust in national Swedish democracy is fairly high and there is mistrust about the EU democracy.

Q methodological considerations Respondents The P-set in the study of Swedish identity was selected from 30 Swedish citizens and the interviews were carried out in May to July 2001. The study took place in Växjö, which is a typical medium-sized town in the southeast of Sweden. Most of the respondents live and/or work in Växjö. According to the parameters of the overall project, the respondents were selected in order to represent gender, age, educational background and setting. When the coding of the material took place, lines were drawn between sexes, those younger than 35 years old and those older than 35 years, a group who had a university degree and a group without a degree. Finally, the setting in rural and urban areas was dealt with using Växjö as a typical Swedish town representing by its medium size both rural as well as urban realities of Sweden. The chosen respondents living and/or working in Växjö are therefore likely to reflect the perceptions of a broader population, even if statistical sampling is of less importance when using Q methodology. As an additional criterion, PhD candidates from social sciences were also participating in the study. These respondents were PhD candidates in social sciences from the Departments of Social Science, Economics and Humanities at Växjö University. Six disciplines (political science, sociology, economics, media and

212 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin communication studies, history, cultural studies) were represented by two persons each of both sexes. This additional criterion was picked to reflect the academic disciplines that are most concerned over issues such as identity, legitimacy, demos, power and organizational constructions in an era of globalization, internationalization and Europeanization. A final comment on the sample of this study concerns background variables – socioeconomic class as well as religious affiliation – which have not been used in this study. Political cleavages on the basis of class and religion have been factors structuring the political discourse in Western democracies and election turnouts in the past. When partisan divisions sprang out of socioeconomic cleavage in an era of industrialization, socioeconomic stratification status influenced political competition. As a consequence, the political patterns of the twentieth century were very much based on and decided by the socioeconomic patterns of the end of the nineteenth century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1977). Western democracies have, however, developed to such an extent that today they are more postmodern than traditionally modern societies. With this transformation, new values and issues of concern have emerged which are less traditional in character and more postmodern reflecting issues of life satisfaction, environment, equality and welfare, and so on. These new postmodern issues have been added to the political agenda and as a consequence erased much of the traditional class spectrum and the clear class categories (Dalton 1996, pp. 319–20; Inglehart 1999). As Dalton stresses, it is not that cleavages have become entirely irrelevant. They still shape the partisan loyalties of many voters. Yet many other voters now find themselves without a clear location in the class, religious, or other social groupings. (Dalton 1996, p. 331) Sweden, as a highly postmodern/postindustrial society, is one of the Western democracies that has shown an ongoing decline in class voting. “Present levels of class voting in Sweden, for instance, are a shadow of prior class polarization” (Dalton 1996, p. 324). The decline of the class cleavage has inspired new research on the class concept. Issues such as gender, level of education or educational cleavages have been some new dimensions of class voting. The religious cleavage has come to show the same decline in significance as the class cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For Sweden, as a traditional homogenous and strongly Protestant country, religious cleavage has only had a minor impact on political affairs. Sweden is, as the other Scandinavian countries, characterized by cultural homogeneity. Religious cleavage has therefore had no impact on our research in the choice of respondents. Statements The Q statements from the study on France (Robyn 1999) were translated into Swedish in a way that also captured the intention of the French statements. However, four statements – 15, 18, 24 and 27 (see Appendix 10.1) – were revised to reflect

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 213 Swedish conditions. The four revised statements, which in the French study were more specifically French in character, related to what we found were more typically Swedish characteristics: nature, environment, the welfare state and Swedish neutrality. Swedes as well as foreigners most often use these areas of concern to describe typical Swedish traits and the Swedish way of living. Interviews Q methodologists often complain about the lack of sophistication in listening to and interpreting answers from respondents. Traditional social research with prestructured answers has shown pitfalls in understanding replies elicited by the respondents. The classical defense for traditional research has been that the answer will reflect the question with no certainty what the answer really means or what the respondents really want to say. As proponents of Q methodology, we want to avoid the pitfall of putting words into the respondent’s mouth. In our use of Q methodology, we have made several reflections that help us to interview the respondents and identify a model of the respondents’ own thought patterns rather than those of a model derived from the researchers’ preconceived ideas. A few observations were made when the respondents faced the statements of the study. First, many of the respondents were eager to place more statements on the negative (disagree) spectrum. This can be explained by the fact that most people find it easier to take a stand against something than actively take a stand for something. Some of the respondents also questioned the principle of forced Q distributions. However, for us it seemed necessary to make the respondents take a stand between the statements by prioritizing their agreed from their disagreed statements. We wanted to record the direction of the respondents’ attitudes. This forced technique actually shaped the respondents’ arguments and they began to rethink their opinion, which also opened up more informative reflections. Second, some respondents shed light on variations in the construction of the statements, as some of these were easier to understand than others. The higher the level of complexity of the statement, the harder it was to understand and use. One woman stressed that “the statements and some words within the statements are very hard to understand, which makes me just want to place them anywhere.” On closer inspection, some statements seemed to have such a high level of complexity and consisted of difficult words and concepts that only relatively well-educated people could grasp. PhD candidates also raised this concern. For natural reasons they had fewer difficulties understanding the statements. But some respondents from this group did point out core concepts of statements as unknown to them. As a consequence, the role as an interviewer also included answering and asking questions during the interviews in order to clarify the statements and how to relate to them. Third, a few respondents made us aware of the difference between a reflection based on how things should be and how things really are – in other words the relation between the empirically perceived reality and the normative ideal-type. Some respondents asked if they were supposed to reflect on the statements as if

214 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin they evaluated reality as of today or as they hoped the future would look like. In other words they asked for the operant conditions to be more specific. They stressed that they agreed with some statements if evaluating them in a long-term perspective as development trends, but if interpreted as taking place right now, they were more sceptical. One PhD candidate argued that many statements varied from being theoretical in nature to being normative, and therefore they were hard to relate to. He stressed, “there is a difference between what I wish for, and what I really believe in”. Finally, and very interestingly from a Swedish perspective, many respondents questioned why the statements did not cover the democratic aspect of the EU. One woman among the academics argued, “the debate on democracy, which is typical for Sweden, is not represented in the statements.” A PhD candidate also stressed the absence of “statements about transparency and openness, and power within the EU.” Almost unanimously all respondents stressed that the most intensely discussed issue in the Swedish debate on the European Union has been the democratic deficit and the related issues of power distribution, participation, openness and transparency within the EU institutions. The problem of accountability has been one of the most frequently used arguments for the Swedish “No to the EU” movement before and after the EU membership of 1995. Their argument has been that the European Union is suffering from a democratic deficit and lacks the possibility of accountability, which is unacceptable for a democratic decision-making organization. As Sweden has a very high support for democratic governance as an ideal type of governance (93 per cent), compared to other Western European countries, democracy is the focus when it comes to debates regarding reorganizing political affairs and institutional structures (Klingemann 1999, pp. 42–4).

Results of the Q sorts The analysis of the Q sorts followed four steps: 1 Transposition of the data matrix so that the Q sorts become variables, and the Q statements, 36 in all, become “cases.” 2 A factor analysis of the Q sorts to find strong factor loadings related to the identity variables contained in the 36 statements. 3 A grouping of the 30 Q sorts with strong loadings on the same factors, for closer scrutiny in order to find out about eventual relationships with education, age and gender. 4 A discussion of Q sorts, which have no strong loadings on the extracted identity factors. Factor 1: Supranationalist The first factor, comprising 30.8 per cent of the total variance, turns out to have 10 factor loadings exceeding +0.6; that is, there are 10 Q sorts which have this in

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 215 common that they are strongly related to Factor 1. These Q sorts can be ordered and we see that Q sort 28 has the strongest loading on this factor, closely followed by Q sort 29. One Q sort (number 2) has a strong negative loading on Factor 1. Of the ten Q sorts which are aligned with Factor 1, five are males and four are females, seven have a high educational level (three are PhD candidates), two have a low educational level, four are in the category “older” whereas five are in the category “younger” subjects. The majority of the respondents in this group have a higher education. The result of the Q-analysis reflects supranationalist statements on +3 and +4 as “agree” and “most agree.” There were no nationalist statements placed on “most agree.” The respondents are clearly anti-nationalistic and believe in further European integration, which is perceived as necessary for Sweden. Pluralist statements stressing the nation state as the core unit (statements 13 and 26), were placed on –4 as “most disagree,” which is reflecting the idea of supranational structures (statement 6). The supranationalists are convinced that Sweden is better off if integrated into Europe economically (statement 8) and for security (statement 10) and they feel they belong to Europe (statement 14). As one respondent expressed, “No single state is independent of others. The borders have disappeared due to technology and economy.” Another respondent stressed something similar: “We have to join (EMU) considering our economy.” Beside this economic perspective on Sweden and Europe, a third respondent stressed that “The Union is a means for securing the position of all of Europe and since Sweden is part of Europe it is also a means to secure Sweden’s position.” The supranationalist patterns are detected in the way respondents see how Sweden gradually is being integrated in Europe and how this on-going process today is good for Sweden. The respondents are thinking in nation state terms with focus on Sweden, but are convinced that nation states differences will vanish in the longer run of further European integration (statements 16 and 23). This development of Sweden, in becoming part of something bigger and more supranational, is benefiting Sweden and the Swedes overall. This group can therefore be characterized as supranationalist, stressing that Sweden will be better off if further integrated in a supranational Europe. Characteristic statements for this group are statements such as: 6 The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 21 The pace of European integration is too slow. 25 European disunity is the result of a deliberately fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. But also some pluralist statements stressing the need for Sweden to integrate into Europe ARE:

216 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin 8 Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Sweden. 10 The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Sweden in the future. Factor 2: Pluralist The second component among the Q sorts, explaining 15.1 per cent of the total variance, has five factor loadings above +0.6. These Q sorts have also been ordered so that Q sort number 23 has the highest loading (0.672) and Q sort number 4 has the lowest loading (0.611). Of the five Q sorts which are aligned with Factor 2, three are males and two females, three are related to high education (three PhD candidates), two are related to low levels of education, two are related to the “older” Q sorters whereas three are related to “younger” Q sorters. This group of respondents had a much weaker supranational pattern than group one and place several supranational statements on “most disagree.” The nationalistic statements are almost as many as the supranationalistic on +3 and +4. However, overall, this group consists of pluralists who perceive an interstate order where Sweden is a sovereign nation state. Sweden is representing something politically unique (statement 24) in the world and should therefore continue to be a third voice in world politics (statement 18). As one respondent stressed, “We are more or less non-aligned, it is part of our self-identity.” Another respondent also stressed, “Sweden has had a good reputation as a neutral country.” Sweden as a single nation state is therefore representing something that is typically Swedish in the world. These respondents also stress the competitive strength of Sweden in a global order. As one respondent argued, “Sweden has received a lot of attention and is labeled as a high technology country.” As a consequence, according to this pattern of thought, Sweden should not develop into being simply a part of a supranational structure, but rather only participate internationally when there are good reasons for doing so on an ad hoc basis. In a European context, two respondents expressed a lack of faith in the EU as a multilevel organization, but agreed about its necessity. The idea that the EU should solve the big issues, and Sweden the rest, was prevalent. Characteristic statements for this group are a mix of supranationalist and nationalist sentiments, but with an emphasis on pluralism. Such statements are: 2 Rapid technological innovations and the global economy has contributed to my optimistic opinion about Sweden. 24 Sweden is not really itself except in the first rank of the countries of the world. 34 Federalism with subsidarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time.

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 217 In sum, the Swedish pluralist generally fits well into the definition of “pluralist” according to the theoretical framework. But, as has been discussed about other types in the introduction to this volume, the fit is not precise and does not exactly correspond with pluralists from at least two of the other countries in these studies. The Swedish pluralist differs from, for instance, the French and British optimistic pluralists. Compared with these optimistic pluralists, the Swedish Pluralist seems more sceptical of the EU, while at the same time more European-oriented. The EU has pros and cons for this pluralist, who seems to feel an affinity with a panEuropean model of cultural diversity. The Swedish pluralist does not seem to stress, as in the French study, “national identity as natural part of human life.” Finally, compared to the British patriotic pluralist, the Swedish pluralist is also ambivalent towards, even sceptical of, the EU depending on how the Union develops. The fear of “Fortress Europe” exists, and the Swedish pluralist will support the idea of European integration, as long as it is based securely on interstate cooperation. Factor 3: Internationalist The third component, explaining 6.2 per cent of the total variance, yields four factor loadings above +0.6. Of the four Q sorts aligned with Factor 3, one is positively related to male Q sorts three to female Q sorts, four are related to high education (two PhD candidates), none are related to low levels of education, two are related to the “older” Q sorters, whereas two are related to “younger” Q sorters. One Q sort, that is sort number 11, had a strong negative loading on Factor 3. The internationalists stress the difference between nation states and how Sweden is representing something typically Swedish in international affairs (statement 18). These respondents argue that nation states are based on cultural identity (statement 31) and how nation state leaders actually have authority to represent the national trait. For them, Europe therefore consists of different nation states with different traits, which is good for Europe (statement 13). However, these respondents are convinced that Sweden must engage in international and European affairs and has something valuable to contribute: a distinctive Swedish life style. The supranational patterns are strong, while the “pure” nationalist ones ARE almost non-existent. This group believes in the idea of Sweden participating in European affairs (statement 14) and how European integration can benefit Sweden in A variety of ways, among them being supportive of minorities (statement 36), but also for “peace and stability” (statement 10). The nationalist perspective is very weak and the respondents do not see themselves as particularly patriotic (statement 29). Characteristic statements of this internationalist group of mixed patterns of pluralism and supranationalist are: 31 It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity.

218 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin 13 I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. 29 I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. 36 Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities. Remaining factors and outliers The fourth factor, explaining 5.6 per cent of the variance, only yields one factor loading above +0.6, namely Q sort number 5, which has the strong loading of 0.835. This Q sort was done by a male with low education who belonged to the young group. As a result, this fourth component showed a mixed result. The only factor loading above +0.6 was nationalistic/pluralistic, but on the other hand nationalistic/pluralistic statements were placed on the extreme negative scale. Therefore, no significant pattern was identifiable. Overall, Q sorts 6, 10, 12, 13, 14, 26, 27, and 30 did not yield any strong loadings on the four patterns of Q sorts singled out for our analysis. Since the Psample is small, it is not surprising from a statistical point of view that these eight Q sorts yielded low loadings on the four extracted factors. It is not that they yielded no loadings, only that the loadings are below the +0.6 threshold we have decided to use here. Also, there is no systematic pattern among the loadings on the four factors, which could justify an attempt to extract additional factors.

Reflections on the Q analysis We have identified three groups in our study of Swedish (supra)national identity: supranationalist, internationalist and pluralist. All these three groups are located from the center towards the supranationalist extreme on a scale between nationalist– supranationalist. Overall, there are strong patterns of supranationalism and pluralism in all three groups. The supranationalist group clearly chooses supranational statements with no patterns of nationalism. This group of respondents perceives Sweden as part of a transformation that will lead to supranational structures in Europe and they believe this is good for Sweden. There are patterns of pluralism, but the overall picture is clearly supranationalist. The pluralist camp differs from the supranationalist group in its significant number of nationalist statements with which there is strong agreement (+3 and +4), coupled with almost as many supranationalist statements at the same level of agreement. This group is against supranational structures and is more concerned with what will happen to Sweden when Europe is undergoing change. The majority of statements chosen as +3 and +4 are pluralist in nature and the respondents believe that Sweden is unique and should only integrate with others when necessary. However, they do perceive needs of integration and cooperation among European states in certain areas.

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 219 Table 10.1 Factor scores: rotated component matrix Component 1 Sort 1 Sort 2 Sort 3 Sort 4 Sort 5 Sort 6 Sort 7 Sort 8 Sort 9 Sort 10 Sort 11 Sort 12 Sort 13 Sort 14 Sort 15 Sort 16 Sort 17 Sort 18 Sort 19 Sort 20 Sort 21 Sort 22 Sort 23 Sort 24 Sort 25 Sort 26 Sort 27 Sort 28 Sort 29 Sort 30

–0.213 –0.642 0.637 0.408 –0.081 0.062 0.729 0.659 0.629 0.529 –0.227 0.593 0.383 0.574 –0.040 0.729 0.777 –0.263 0.636 0.212 0.212 –0.183 0.148 0.277 –0.100 0.292 0.311 0.807 0.788 –0.068

2 0.617 –0.029 0.343 0.611 –0.126 0.190 0.027 0.232 –0.244 –0.178 0.366 0.012 0.173 0.563 0.298 0.310 –0.021 0.172 0.464 0.118 0.358 0.668 0.672 0.613 0.301 0.287 0.557 0.142 0.215 0.493

3 0.086 0.056 0.258 0.224 0.091 0.315 –0.045 0.178 –0.106 –0.057 –0.674 0.037 0.486 0.311 0.622 0.128 0.094 0.690 0.238 0.686 0.281 0.429 0.101 0.104 0.791 0.566 0.463 0.292 0.209 0.199

4 0.451 0.025 –0.058 0.183 0.835 0.406 –0.012 0.123 –0.087 0.390 –0.074 0.171 0.101 0.127 0.043 –0.081 –0.235 0.305 0.091 0.189 0.550 0.062 –0.115 0.095 0.017 0.079 –0.165 –0.132 0.162 0.462

Factor loading order for each component 3:II 1:negative 6:I 5:II 1:IV 4:I 5:I 8:I 3:negative

5:III 4:I 3:I 2:III 7:I 4:III 2:IV 2:II 1:II 4:II 1:III

1:I 2:I

Notes Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: orthogonal (varimax with Kaiser normalization). Rotation converged in 7 iterations. We extracted four components explaining 57.68 % of the variance. Using eigenvalues ³ 1 as a criterion, which is suggested as a default by the SPSS program, would have resulted in 8 components, and the resulting explained variance would have been increased to 74.81%. As can be seen from the table above, it is even a doubtful criterion to use a four component solution, since the fourth component only has one strong loading, that is a loading ³+0.6, which comes from Q sort number 5. Q sort number 2 has a strong negative factor loading on component 1, and Q sort 11 has a strong negative loading on component 3. In both cases, however, there are not other strong positive or negative loadings on the other factors.

220 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin The internationalists are also characterized by pluralism, but with a high number of chosen supranationalist statements (+3 and +4) and with very few nationalist statements. There is a similarity in groups two and three in that both agree with a majority of the pluralist statements, but a major difference arises in the low number of nationalist statements in group three compared to group two. Along with the high number of supranationalist statements group three agrees with, this clearly distinguishes group three from group two. The internationalists favor European cooperation and integration more and question the theoretical basis of the nation, but still believe that this international cooperation can and should occur on a nation state basis. Summarizing all this, the Swedes in this study tend to have overlapping identities and perceive themselves as parts of various European communities. The supranationalist group consists of Swedes stressing favorable transformations in bringing Sweden into supranational structures; the internationalist respondents perceive themselves as Swedes in an international context where Sweden, with its good qualities, must contribute to the international arena by active participation in European affairs. The pluralists are stressing national traits and the national heritage, but are also reflecting on how Sweden in some areas has to join the European arena, but then with hesitation and based on the Swedish way of doing things. Sweden is politically and culturally unique and cooperating internationally should only occur when there are strong reasons for it. The pluralists are not as internationally-oriented as the internationalists, but rather flexible in their views on the relations between Sweden and Europe. In the context of the relatively scattered recent research on Swedish identity, our study also supports the notion of Swedes being proud of Sweden. However, it is also obvious that Swedes perceive themselves as part of something bigger than Sweden and how they think Sweden can participate and contribute to a better world. These perceptions among Swedes have also been confirmed by recent comparative research showing how Sweden is unusual compared to other states. In the supranationalist group, such development will, we conjecture, favorably lead to the integration of Sweden into supranational structures, while the internationalists support enhanced interstate relations and European integration based on nation state structures. In our sample there are more supranationalists than nationalists, with overall overlapping identities in being both Swede and European in terms of international commitments. There is a strong belief that Sweden is part of European affairs. Thinking about Sweden after joining the European Union has led to a shift in emphasis so that people seem to no longer think so strongly of Sweden and Europe, as they think of Sweden in Europe. Considering the variables age, gender and education, the findings of this study show strong agreement with Inglehart’s post-materialist studies, revealing a strong relationship between higher education and more favorable attitudes to a supranational European Union. Out of the nine respondents scoring higher than +0.6, seven represented the higher education group. This result has affinity with the statistics from the EU referendum of 1995 where the more highly educated

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 221 were more inclined to vote yes to EU membership. However, no further patterns considering gender and age can be found in the study.

Final remarks The transformation of Europe and the Union over the last decades has raised the issue of how to reorganize Europe in a new millennium, but also of how to build a European identity in support of the European project. As the richest single group of states in the world and a global political actor, the EU has had increasing impact as a “civilian power” (Hill 1992, p. 122). Since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991, the EU has also stressed new pillars including defense and security concerns. These concerns have traditionally been outside the orbit of Swedish political debates, since the official doctrine in foreign policy matters has stressed non-alignment and neutrality. The issue of economic integration has primarily concerned the Swedish/EU agenda and the debate about participation in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Swedish decision makers have decided to wait and see, but have nonetheless adapted to the convergence criteria of EMU. With the adaptation to European social and economic patterns, Swedes have also come to compare taxes and structures of ownership, where Swedish tradition has given high priority to low levels of privatization and favored a centralized public sector and high taxes. The political vision of the Social Democratic Party, has included the idea of socioeconomic equalization in the Swedish society (“Folkhemmet”). However, in the 1970s, Sweden faced economic deficit and in the 1990s, economic hardship continued which triggered increased distrust in politicians and parties. This new situation of Sweden opened up a political and civil debate on the EU and the potential benefits of becoming a member of the European economic market. The issue of security has centered on the question of how to maintain security for Sweden in a new post-Cold War European military context. After the dramatic changes in Eastern and Central Europe, the Swedish debate has mainly concerned the status of strict neutrality in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and the increased Europeanization of NATO. The traditional Swedish self-image, of being a “mediator,” “bridge-builder” or “critical voice” and “model” in international politics, still exists, but Sweden strives to play an active part in the new European security system as well (Goldmann 2001, p. 77). The transformation of Europe has therefore come to have impact on how the Swedes view themselves in a new world order and in a changing European context. Traditionally, Sweden has been a peripheral northern and Scandinavian country more outside than inside Europe. In our study we found that much of this is still prevalent in Swedish attitudes to nationhood and the European community, but that there is a new tendency to think about Sweden in Europe, rather than Sweden and Europe. This is reflected by the fact that nationalist statements were overall placed in the extreme negative scale. All three groups, singled out by the factor analysis, are responding very negatively towards statement 5 in the Q sample, that is the idea that foreigners would pollute Swedish identity.

222 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin Sweden is unique and has typically Swedish traits, so the respondents seem to argue, and they also believe in the idea that Sweden as a nation state can benefit from and contribute to a better world. One group of respondents, the supranationalist camp, believes in a transformation of Sweden into something supranational; another group, the internationalists, stress how important it is for Sweden to be internationally active; the third group, the pluralists, stress Swedish independence when possible, but integration when necessary – based on the specific Swedish way and Swedish life-style traits.

Notes 1 The widening of the Union began in the 1970s with a first wave of new countries (UK, Denmark and Ireland) and continued in the 1980s with a second wave (Greece, Spain and Portugal). In the 1990s, a third wave was accepted including Austria, Finland and Sweden increasing the number of member-states to 15. In May 2004, the EU enlarged significantly with 10 more countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus). This great enlargement was a result of a strongly emphasized policy by Romano Prodi, Chairman of the Commission since 1999. 2 For further information regarding Sweden’s sceptical position to the EU, see the Eurobarometer 1996, published in January 1997. In this survey, only 6 per cent of the Swedish population answered that they most of all felt like citizens of the European Union. In the same survey, 49 per cent said they wanted to leave the Union. 3 The EU Member-states take turns presiding over the European Council of Ministers. The Presidency means leading and administering the political work of the Union for six months.

References Dalton, Russell J. 1996. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Daun, Åke. 1994. Svensk mentalitet: ett jämförande perspektiv. Stockholm: Rabèn Prisma. Daun, Åke. 1997. Den europeiska identiteten: Sverige och Italien, EU och framtiden. Stockholm: Rabèn Prisma. Eurobarometer 45. 1996. Luxemburg: European Commission Eurobarometer 54. 2001. Luxemburg: European Commission. Gaddis, John L. 1992/1993. “International RelationsTheory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, 17(3), pp 5–58. Gidlund, Janerik and Sverker Sörlin. 1993. Det europeiska kalejdoskopet. Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Goldmann, Kjell. 1998. Skilda identiteten – gemensam demokrati in EU ett demokratiprojekt?, SOU 1998:145. Stockholm: Fritzes. —— 2001. “In Lieu of the Swedish Model,” in Kjell Goldmann and Karin Gilland (eds), Nationality Versus Europeanisation: The National View of the Nation in Four EU Countries. Stockholm: Department of Political Science. Goldthorpe, John H., Catriona Llewellyn and Clive Payne. 1980. Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain. Oxford: Clarendon. Hadenius, Stig. 1997. Swedish Politics During the 20th Century – Conflict and Consensus. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute.

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 223 Hadenius, Stig, Björn Molin and Hans Wieslander. 1993. Sverige efter 1900 – En modern politisk historia. Stockholm: Bonnier Alba. Hill, Richard. 1992. We Europeans. Brussels: Europublication. Inglehart, Ronald. 1999. “Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy,” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. Jacobsson, Kerstin. 1997. Så gott som demokrati. Umeå: Boréa. Johansson, Karl-Magnus (ed.). 1999. Sverige i EU:s institutioner och beslutsprocesser. Stockholm: SNS. Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis,” in Pippa Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1997. “Towards Consolidated Democracies,” in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien (eds), Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore, MD and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (eds). 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press. Lundestad, Geir. 1991. East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics 1945–1990. Oslo: Norwegian University Press/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mårald, Bert. 1997. Svensk identitet. Lund: Historilärarnas förening. Michalski, Anna and Jonas Tallberg. 1999. “Project on European Integration Indicators People’s Europe.” Working paper, European Commission forward studies unit. Petersson, Olof. 1997. Demokrati över gränser. Stockholm: SNS förlag. Widfeldt, Anders. 1996. The European Union and the Nordic Countries. London: Routledge.

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Appendix 10.1: Swedish Q statements 1 Vår nationella identitet håller på att överflyttas till den Europeiska Unionen och konsekvensen av detta är att vi förlorar vår “svenskhet”. Our identity as a nation is migrating to the European Union and we are left empty as a result. 2 Snabb teknologisk utveckling och den globala ekonomin har bidragit till en positiv inställning till Sverige. Rapid technological innovations and the global economy has contributed to my optimistic mood for Sweden. 3 Mänskligheten är naturligt indelad i nationer med sina säregna karaktärsdrag. Humanity is naturally divided into nations with their own peculiar characters. 4 Globaliseringen innebär en bortvittring av svensk kultur. Globalization means the death of Swedish national culture. 5 Jag hatar inte utländska personer i mitt land, men jag känner att de utarmar den svenska identiteten. I do not hate foreign persons in my country, but I feel they are polluting our national identity. 6 De traditionellt suveräna nationerna kan inte längre lösa dagens problem; de kan inte längre säkra sin egen utveckling och kontrollera sin egen framtid. The sovereign nations of the past can no longer solve the problems of the present; they cannot ensure their own progress or control their own future. 7 Lojaliteten till nationalstaten är starkare än andra lojaliteter. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties. 8 Att införliva en europeisk valutaenhet kommer att bli svårt, men är nödvändigt för Sverige. Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for Sweden. 9 Mina föräldrar skulle vara olyckliga om jag inte var gift med en svensk(a). My parents would be unhappy if I were not married to someone who was also Swedish. 10 Den Europeiska Unionen är ett medel att säkra fred och stabilitet för Sverige i framtiden. The European Union is a means to ensure peace and stability for Sweden in the future. 11 Våra nationella ledare har förmågan att styra våra institutioner i en global miljö. Our national leaders are capable of managing our institutions in a global environment. 12 Jag ser mig först och främst som en europé, sedan som en svensk. Jag är mer en europeisk medborgare än en svensk medborgare. I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of Sweden.

Being a Swede in a transforming European setting 225 13 Jag vill se ett Europa av nationalstater som är lika politiskt och kulturellt differentierat som det är geografiskt. I want a Europe of nation-states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. 14 Jag har mycket starka band till (känner mycket för) Europa som helhet. I am very attached to Europe as a whole. 15 Den svenska modellen i den harmoniska välfärdsstaten är unik. The Swedish model in the well-functioning welfare state is unique. 16 Europeisk enighet innebär inte en ny form av stormakt; det är ett medel att introducera en europeisk förändring. Det är inte satt på pränt och inte heller en teori, utan en påbörjad process i att föra medborgare och nationer samman för att tillsammans anpassa sig till förändrade omständigheter. Unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe. It is not a blueprint, it is not a theory, it is a process that has already begun of bringing peoples and nations together to adapt themselves jointly to changing circumstances. 17 Sverige måste behålla sitt oberoende i europeisk politik. Sweden must maintain an independence in European affairs. 18 Jag vill att Sverige skall representera ett neutralt alternativ till den globala stormaktspolitiken och verka som ytterligare en röst i världspolitiken. I want Sweden to represent a neutral alternative to the superpowers as an additional voice in world politics. 19 Europa kommer att växa starkare just p.g.a. att Sverige är Sverige, Spanien är Spanien och Storbritannien är Storbritannien, varje land med sina vanor, traditioner och identiteter. Det vore löjligt att försöka forma detta in i en gemensam europeisk identitet. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has Sweden as Sweden, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality. 20 Den Europeiska Unionen representerar en oattraktiv homogenisering av Europeiska kulturer. The European Union represents an unattractive homogenization of European cultures. 21 Utvecklingstakten i den europeiska integrationen är för långsam. The pace of European integration is too slow. 22 Europas länder är för olika för att en europeisk union skall fungera. European countries are too diverse for a European Union to work. 23 Nationella olikheter kommer att försvinna med att en ny generation av européer växer upp. National divisions will disappear as a new generation of Europeans grows up. 24 Sverige är sig inte likt utan sin specifika roll som alliansfri och neutral medlare i världen. Sweden is not really herself without her specific role as non-aligned and neutral mediator in the world.

226 Daniel Silander and Charlotte Wallin 25 Europeisk oenighet är ett resultat av en medveten proklamerad fantasi om nationernas fulla suveränitet och deras absoluta effektivitet i utformandet av nationell politik. European disunity is the result of a deliberately-fostered fiction of full national sovereignty and of the absolute effectiveness of national policies. 26 Den europeiska integrationen kan inte utvecklas ytterligare. I think European integration has gone about as far as it can go. 27 Svensk natur, miljö och välfärd är bäst i världen. Swedish nature, environment and welfare are the best in the world. 28 Om någon sa något nedsättande om att vara svensk, skulle jag ta det som en negativ inställning till mig som person. If someone said something bad about being Swedish, I would feel as if they had said something bad about me. 29 Jag följer lagar, men jag känner mig inte särskilt patriotisk. I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. 30 Vårt samhälle är förenat av en föreställning om våra förfäders arv samt av en gemensam fientlig inställning till andra samhällen. Our society is united by a delusion about our ancestry and by a common hatred of our neighbors. 31 Det är möjligt att urskilja politisk identitet från kulturell identitet. It is possible to separate political identity from cultural identity. 32 Generellt sett har Sverige definitivt tjänat på medlemskapet i Europeiska Unionen. In general my country has definitely profited from its involvement in the EU. 33 Nationalstaten är för svag för att garantera oss jämlikhet och för stark för att tillåta oss frihet. Nationalstaten är skapad ur människans irrationalitet och osäkerhet. The nation-state is too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty. It is the focus of man’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. 34 Federalism med subsidaritets-principen är en väg att förena vad som ser ut att vara oförenligt, nämligen uppmuntran att utveckla ett förenat Europa samtidigt som lojaliteten till sin nation bevaras. Federalism with subsidiarity is a way to reconcile what appears to be irreconcilable: encouraging the emergence of a united Europe while keeping loyal to one’s homeland at the same time. 35 Nationen är källan till all suveränitet; ingen individ eller annan aktör kan få någon auktoritet som inte uttryckligen härstammar från nationen. The nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual or any body of men, be entitled to an authority which is not expressly derived from it. 36 Mer utvecklad europeisk integration kan ge nationella minoriteter mer utrymme för deras egen identitet. Greater European integration can give national minorities more a sense of their own identities.

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11 Conclusion Richard Robyn

Drawing upon systematic research using Q methodology in seven countries in Europe, this volume presents results of the most extensive effort yet at crosscultural, subjective assessment of national and supranational identity in Europe. The studies attempt to explain how the European Union, as the most visible experiment in mass national identity change in the contemporary world, influences how Europeans think about their political affiliations. The personal viewpoints of the participants in these studies are playing out, as are all Western Europeans, against a backdrop of change that may be gradual and subtle, but is every bit as profound as we have witnessed in these times of rapid and massive change elsewhere around the world. For the first time in more than three hundred years the post-World War II generations of Europeans are seriously confronted with the possibility of a genuinely new and higher level of political affiliation than the national. Their responses to this impetus for change are many and varied, and thus not easy to gauge. We present in these studies, we believe, one approach to focusing in on and thus beginning to understanding these responses. It is further argued here, however, that our view of this unfolding story has been distorted and to a great extent blinded by the way we conceive of the depth and lasting power of national identity. While there has been a solid tradition in political scientific inquiry into the theoretical bases of nationalism, and in social psychology with social identity theory an avenue of inquiry into how people construct their identities, there has been a significant lack of attention in either of these fields to subjective assessments regarding the challenges to the supposed autonomy of the nation state, and to the possible subsequent changes in forms of national/supranational identity this may engender among the peoples of Europe in a time of massive social change. It is one contention of this multinational project that this inattention has left academic inquiry largely disconnected from the way people as individuals conceive of these changes in their lives. This has often led researchers to come to conclusions based on potentially inaccurate notions of the impact of past history or abstract logic. The research procedures outlined in this volume, and the products that resulted from applying those procedures in the field, consciously set out on a different

228 Richard Robyn track. While not completely setting history and logic aside, the focus is nonetheless different, on the ways people actually conceive of their national identities and whether the hold of that identity on their psyches is so dominant as to hinder significantly non-national identity formation. The project, involving as it did an innovative core in Q methodology, constituted one possible attack on the problem in question, and may offer the field a fresh perspective that could contribute to the growing knowledge of nationalistic practices. The attempt here was to add concreteness that may be missing from traditional analyses. As analysts observe the European scene, it is all too easy to miss the profound changes occurring at the individual level, focusing as so many do on glacial changes at the macro-level, or on the intricate and often inconclusive battles amongst institutions over sovereign turf. Fitted with the lenses of traditional conceptions of national identity, it is all too easy to assume that Europeans with their bitter history of warring national allegiances will not accept real change. As most academics have argued, in a world of nation states it is difficult if not impossible for people to act on a radically different notion of identity. Elites may do this for reasons of their own, but surely not the common folk. From mainstream academic discourse, across a range of essentialist and constructivist positions, this view has a remarkable tenacity. Instead, what may be happening is that, in part under the influence of the EU, Europeans are considering the advantages of a variety of affiliations and constructing new ways of identifying themselves politically. The findings of these studies seem to suggest this strongly. In summary, the findings of these studies are: 1 Reactions to the construction of the EU vary across the different cultures in ways particular to each. But those reactions fall within certain parameters, more or less according to the general discourse that emanates primarily from Brussels. 2 Thus, there are surprisingly few clusters of opinion: no fewer than four but no more than five significantly different groupings of opinion exist in each country. The predominate number of groupings is four, which emerged in all of the countries except England and Scotland in the UK. This differs from how we might have surmised reactions from the literature, which theorized three only: supranationalist, nationalist and pluralist. There are variations on these three positions – and new ones – described in these studies. 3 We had difficulty finding nationalists in Europe whose opinion in depth corresponds even roughly with the coherent philosophy of nationalism described in the literature. This might be because participants are hiding their true feelings from researchers out of shame or concern for political correctness. Or it might be because nationalist thought has been undermined by several generations of gradual but steady European integration. 4 This latter explanation could be plausible. Our evidence for this is compelling: the more purely nationalist-oriented expression occurred in only one grouping

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in England that Una McCormick labels “besieged nationalist.” This viewpoint, as she describes it, is quite defensive in nature. In addition, the French nationalist is itself less a separate factor of opinion as it was defined in opposition to supranationalist expression. Perhaps the underpinnings of classical nationalist doctrine is changing under the more pervasive influence of the European Union. There seems to be a remarkable reservoir of support in all countries for the European Union, at least in a general feeling of need for the organization. There seems to be much less support for any specifically defined contours of a European identity. There is a great deal of national pride in each of the countries, with the possible exception of Germany. This, together with significant support for European integration, suggests that Europeans are capable of multiple identities, and of separating political from cultural identity. French and Danish supranationalists expressed this affiliation in the purest form compared with other supranationalists. British and German participants expressed their affiliation to supranational identity in the most mixed form, rather surprising for Germans. Nationalist leanings were more purely defined in England. Mixed feelings about national affiliation were more pronounced in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. There is a large middle ground of pluralists in these studies and, we surmise, across Europe. Pluralist expression differs widely across the countries: from optimistic in France and England to more pragmatic in Denmark to the most pessimistic in Germany. Pluralists might represent the most interesting groupings for those committed to both European and anti-European forces, making up a large mass of opinion decidedly uncommitted to well-defined goals of European integration.

In the academic debate over the influence of the EU, these findings suggest that the institution has been surprisingly successful in its efforts to establish an identity that competes with time-honored national ones. This, however, does not necessarily mean that a “Chinese box” of ready-formed identities are winning the day with Europeans, that the new Europe will in any way be defined narrowly by religious, linguistic or cultural affiliation. These studies instead amply demonstrate that identity change at the micro-level is not neat but gloriously messy. There was little agreement among these participants about what a European identity is. With the help of Q methodology, however, one can see certain orderly patterns emerging. Looking with extremely fine lenses at individual expressions of identity, one could easily become frustrated by the remarkable variety of differences expressed, which could total in the millions. But with the lens of Q methodology, even with the “almost subatomic nature” (Stephenson 1983, p. 78) of its analytical power, one sees instead responses that have some commonalities. It is hoped that this multinational project will enhance understanding of how people form and then reform their political attachments, and whether those

230 Richard Robyn attachments are primarily singular (as traditional political analyses generally have it) or potentially multiple. As the search for a French nationalist described in Chapter 5 seems to confirm, echoed by the findings in several of these other countries, it seems that most Europeans in contemporary times no longer adopt wholly the kind of singular, exclusive attachment to the nation that traditional IR theoretical notions of nationalism have defined as “core nationalist doctrine” (Smith 1991, p. 74). This is not to claim that in other countries people have not adopted this doctrine, or that there are not many in Europe who do adhere to it but were not discovered in these studies. After all, as pointed out often in this volume, Q methodology does not claim to say anything about percentages of the general population that follow the factors of opinion uncovered in a study. It does nonetheless suggest that by and large Europeans express a variety of opinions about their attachments, and that is significant. This is, after all, a continent whose image suggests strong national identities as central for its citizens. If the case is not strong for so many Europeans in these studies, that could cast doubt on notions that national identity is the dominant identity for all people everywhere. We may need to rethink the concept of nationalism and, in particular, our conception of the dominance of national identity in the contemporary world. At the very least, this project suggests that more directed analytical work needs to be done on the issue. Questions could understandably be raised at this point. Can people really change? Can they (re)construct their identities? This enters an arena of grand philosophical questions that call for more attention than this project can give, but the findings here could contribute to a growing literature on the capacity of people to alter their politics (Schattschneider 1975) and their selves (Ludwig 1997). As Ludwig argues, it is possible to “write your own story” as opposed to being obliged to live out the lives others have created for you – in this case, abject obedience to the nation state. The possibility of rewriting one’s place in the polity suggests that what is happening in Europe is part of a process of “social learning” (Deutsch 1966). Key to his concept of political change, social learning for Deutsch was an evolutionary process which in some instances produces fully-formed societies and communities. Admittedly the bulk of Deutsch’s work was on the emergence of modern nations, but by extension the process could apply to international integration. We see this in his description of the process of community building through social learning, which sounds similar to that outlined at various places in this study for the European Union. One begins with the proposition that both society and community are developed by social learning, and that a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services … Experience and complementarity may … continue to reproduce each other, like the proverbial chicken and the egg, in a syndrome of ethnic learning, that is, a historical process of social learning in which individuals, usually over several generations, learn to become a people. (Deutsch 1966, pp. 91, 174)

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The logic of social learning thus does not preclude the creation of broader political communities than the national. As Deutsch wrote so long ago, “the same process which made nationalism probable may soon come to turn against it” (Deutsch 1966, p. 190). It could be that the concept of other levels of governance in Europe has reached an important level of acceptance, not the “soon” that Deutsch foreshadowed in the 1960s, but towards the end of that century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Following Dawkins (1989), it may be that the idea of non-national governance has achieved the status of a “meme,” a concept of cultural change that may be usefully introduced here. As defined by Dawkins, a meme is a unit of cultural transmission that has the capacity to catch on and replicate itself until it transforms that culture in powerful ways. The idea of supranational governance, originating in the modern context following a destructive war, may have gathered enough steam through more than 40 years of endeavor to be self-replicative now, to inhabit people’s lives in roughly the same way that the concept of the nation state did for past generations. Through a process of imitation, a meme leaps from brain to brain in roughly similar fashion that a gene (after which it is named) jumps from body to body by way of sperm and egg. For Dawkins, memes can be any number of concepts: “tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches” (Dawkins 1989, p. 192). A successful meme is one of great survival value, that starts a new kind of evolutionary path on its own. It succeeds to the extent it meets his criteria for “longevity, fecundity and copying-fidelity” (ibid., p. 194). The latter point – copying fidelity – refers to how well the meme fares in competing with its “alleles,” or “rivals for the same chromosomal slot” (ibid., p. 196). In our case here, the allele in competition could be considered that of singular attachment to the nation state. If this is true, it could have far-reaching implications for the future of the nation state and the system in which it is embedded. If people no longer accept a national identity as dominant in their lives, they may be less inclined to support uncritically their national leaders when they claim that solutions to social problems should not be found at supranational or subnational levels, on the grounds that it may encroach on national sovereignty. This could help explain how it is that devolution of authority in Britain, a truly revolutionary concept that has changed the face of authority relations on that island, has not met with the kind of widespread resistance there that a revolutionary idea of its kind might under different circumstances. This could also help to explain how it is possible for the international community to intervene militarily within sovereign countries on humanitarian grounds, as was done for the first time in 1994 with NATO in Kosovo. Public opinion, in the past perhaps held in thrall by the web of logic that supports national sovereignty, may have long contributed to holding international organizations such as the UN and NATO in check when confronting civil wars and the criminal activities of some national leaders. If, as these studies suggest, that web of support for nationalism is breaking apart to some degree, that may have implications for support for interventions by the international community. This might then cast doubt on some elites, national or otherwise, who might claim that “people just wouldn’t

232 Richard Robyn accept” that kind of supranational action. The implications for international law and the more or less solid postwar support for UN actions – purely as arbiter of interstate disputes, and not of civil wars – are also suggestive. This is not to say that this study has found that people are ready to scrap the nation. This point should be strongly emphasized because it could be lost in the overall thrust of this project, which points out how many Europeans seem open to ways to bypass the national state. When offered the opportunity to select statements that would show complete disfavor toward national identity, none of the participants in this study went in that direction. Even the supranationalists harbored some fond attachments to their nation, although those ties are perhaps more cultural than political in nature. It does suggest, however, that people may be more willing to relegate the nation state to a lesser place in their pantheon of affiliations, to turn away from national identity as a singular attachment. This may then translate into a greater willingness to add other levels of governance to join the national, whether at supranational or subnational levels. This would then seem logically to point to ever-greater acceleration towards integration in Europe in the future. The pace of acceleration would of course be dependent upon the perceived success of national and EU leaders at instituting reforms that are seen to be ultimately in the best interests of the greater number of their citizens. Thus it may more precisely be said that from the results of this study, greater integration may not necessarily be held back by a populace that feels uncomfortable with the loss of national sovereignty. Political positions argued in those terms – of irretrievable loss of national sovereignty – could simply be the expression of national politicians more concerned for their own loss of power in the process. This suggests that one should be wary of politicians who claim to speak for a constituency that expresses rock-solid support for the nation state. That support may be less rock-solid than supposed, and may have formed instead over more substantive economic or social concerns and transposed to easily identifiable national symbols or past patterns of affiliation that have been primarily national. As events in the Balkans seem to show, these studies also seem to support the idea that citizen support coalescing around national symbols is more a reaction to context than anything to do with innate motivation towards nationality; that is, that hypernationalism is motivated by any number of reactions to outside events, from fear of social disintegration in the former Yugoslavia to concern over loss of control in the globalization process in almost any country around the world to celebration over a World Cup victory in the streets of Paris. Insights gained in this research could also support initiatives for alternative forms of democratic governance. This could include efforts at non-traditional coalition building that might cross regional, ethnic, class and national boundaries in Europe and elsewhere. If, for example, the EU offers minorities an effective avenue for redress of grievances, as several in this study pointed out, then minorities from regions that cross national borders could find common issues of concern and thereby discover ways to work together and with the EU to address these grievances with their respective national governments.

Conclusion

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This project might also enhance data collection strategies of quantitative measures such as Eurobarometer. This is a particular strength of Q methodology (Stephenson 1964a, 1964b, 1953, pp. 190–218; Brown 1986, pp. 66–7), which can help reveal the thinking behind proportional responses and thus add depth and nuance to large-scale surveys. Q studies can reveal new and different categories of responses that may be missed in surveys, as these studies have done with adding to the possible discourses on issues of European integration an optimistic pluralist and disaffected populist (France), a besieged nationalist and a patriotic pluralist (England and Scotland), and a pragmatic European (Denmark), among others. Thus for example, as Stephenson has shown (1953, pp. 205–6), one can suggest possible new items that could be added to questionnaires to help sharpen an analytical tool. Respondents to Eurobarometer questionnaires could rank order the statements that were most distinguishing of the four factors revealed in this study. Thus, they could be confronted with the following: Instructions Rank the following statements in order from the one (1) MOST characteristic of you, to that (4) LEAST characteristic of you: A I think of myself as a European first, then my own nationality next. I feel I am a citizen of Europe more than of my own country. B I want a Europe of nation states that are as politically and culturally different as they are geographically diverse. C Adopting a single European currency will be difficult but necessary for my country. D I may obey laws, but I don’t feel especially patriotic. How the respondents rank these statements could then be revealing of how proportionally each viewpoint is reflected in the population as a whole, a strength of large-scale surveying. More work should be done in this application of Q methodology to the European political scene. These studies could strengthen social identity theory by adding to its conception of the self certain elements of subjective motivation often missing in descriptions of identity formation. Breakwell and Lyons (1996, p. 4) point out that different methodological approaches need to be tried in order to add nuance to social identity theory and to get a better fix on a topic of such breadth and depth as European identity change and construction. This approach using Q methodology represents one alternative in that effort. As DeLeon and Steelman (1999, p. 4) argue, we need to enrich our toolkits to include more contextual methods of analysis, such as interviewing skills, cognitive mapping, ethnography and participant observation, participatory policy analysis, content analysis, narrative analysis, q-methodology [sic] and cluster analysis.

234 Richard Robyn The implications raised in this project might also offer some space to speculate on the hypothesis that multiple loyalties of individuals can have a pacifying effect on intergroup relations (LeVine 1965, p. 54). This study did not examine how pacific people are in their thoughts toward others. If most people no longer accept a singular identity that is nationally-based, as this study suggests, however, it may be more difficult for national leaders to marshal armies to threaten an “other” on purely national grounds; in other words, through simple appeals to national identity. The example of Kosovo may seem on the surface to present an exception to this, but on closer examination it may in fact prove the point. Certainly in Serbia and Kosovo, appeals to ethnicity were prime motivators for citizen mobilization, but the fact that the appeals did not ignite a more general European-wide conflagration, as many feared might happen as it did in World War I when different ethnic and national groups picked sides and supported one Balkans group over another, could show that ethnic and national loyalties are now in Europe much reduced compared with a few generations ago. In the introduction to this volume, the proposition was advanced from a variety of sources that, in order to show that Europeans are not affiliating with the European Union, it only need be asked: who would die for Brussels? It seems self-evident that people are not willing to die for Brussels as they have been (and perhaps still are) willing to die for their countries. These studies, however, suggest that Europeans may be less willing than in the past to die for their countries in the future. They may not be willing to die for Brussels either, however. They may instead be willing to die for principles that either of these symbolic places are seen to stand for: democracy, rule of law, multiethnic states and protection for minority rights, freedom of movement and trade, and peaceful cooperation among nations, among others. European contributions of troops to peacekeeping efforts, put in harm’s way in the Balkans for example, may show that degree of willingness. While the prospect of giving up life is never easy to contemplate, and perhaps should not even be broached to prove anything in a study of national identity, the defense of these aforementioned values could offer citizens of Europe the fundamental grounding for transition to a new identity.

References Breakwell, Glynis M. and Lyons, Evanthia (eds). 1996. Changing European Identities. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Brown, Steven. 1986. “Q Technique and Method: Principles and Procedures,” in William D. Berry and Michael S. Lewis-Beckn (eds), New Tools for Social Scientists. London: Sage. Dawkins, Richard. 1989 [1976]. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DeLeon, Peter and Toddi A. Steelman. 1999. “The Once and Future Public Policy Program,” Policy Currents, 9(2), pp. 1–9. Deutsch, Karl. 1966. Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. LeVine, Robert A. 1965. “Socialization, Social Structure, and Intersocietal Images,” in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

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Ludwig, Arnold. 1997. How Do We Know Who We Are? A Biography of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1975. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press. Stephenson, William. 1953. The Study of Behavior: Q-technique and Its Methodology. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. —— 1964a. “Application of Q-Method to the Measurement of Public Opinion,” The Psychological Record, 14, pp. 265–73. —— 1964b. “Application of the Thompson Schema to the Current Controversy Over Cuba,” The Psychological Record, 14, pp. 275–90. —— 1983. “Against Interpretation,” Operant Subjectivity, 6, pp. 73–103.

236 Index

Index

Allott, P. 2, 6 Anderson, B. 17, 64 Anderson, J. 202 Anderson, P.J. and Weymouth, A. 68, 69 anti-nationalism 82–3, 147–8 Arts, M.J. and Lee, N. 144, 145 Australia 4 Austria 3 Bailey, J. 7 Bakker, S. et al. 164 Balkans 232 Barry, J. 13, 186 Bauer, O. 25 Bell, D. 101 Beloff, N. 92 Bew, P. and Meehan, E. 188 Billig, M. 17, 66 Breakwell, G.M. and Lyons, E. 18, 233 Breuilly, J. 17 Brill, P. and Roelofs, A. 160, 161 Britain: anti-nationalism 82–3; as awkward partner 67–8; British/English elision 67; confusions over identity 65–6; constructing/devolving a nation 64–5; contemporary issues/debates 65–73; context of study sites 75–6; and devolution 65, 231; discussion of findings 83–5; and Englishness 65–6, 67; Europhilia in 71–3; and identity 81–2, 85; language/imagery of 66; and national press 69–70; and nationalism 73, 78–9; P-set 74; party policy 68–9; and pluralism 73, 77–8; and problems of Britishness 64–5; Q-set 74–5; summary of accounts 76–83; and supranationalism 73, 79–81; survey results 70–1, 73–6 British National Party (BNP) 67

British Social Attitudes Survey (1991–5) 188–9 Brouwer, M. and Binnendijk, N. 165 Brown, S. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 233; et al. 21 Brown, S.R. 165 Butler, D. and Kavanagh, D. 76 Camera, C. and Fabietti, M. 144 Cannadine, D. 64 Carlo Alberto 141, 142 Cattaneo, Carlo 143–4 Cavour, Count Camillo 142, 143 Christian Social Union 3 Cinnirella, M 19, 22 Clingaert, M. 115 Coke, J. and Brown, S. 28 Colley, L. 65 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 221 concourse: and commitment 25; concept 22; and French study 22–3; and nationalists 25–6; and pluralists 24; and positive distinctiveness 22; properties 22; and representativeness 22; and suprnationalists 23–4 Connolly, W.E. 8 constitution, support for 40 culture 12–13, 26–7, 49, 50, 51–3, 55, 95, 170, 176–7 Dalton, R.J. 212 D’Amico, N. and D’Amico, C. 143, 144 Danish Dane: and cultural allegiance 55; and currency 54; fatalistic view 54–5; and identity 55–6; and language 54; resistance to Europeanization 55; sense of identity 54

Index 237 Daun, Å. 207, 210 Davis, T.C. 19, 21 Dawkins, R. 231 De Holczer, P. 21 De Landtsheer, C. 159; and Van Oortmerssen, L. 159 de Rougemont, D. 4 Delanty, G. 8 DeLeon, P. and Steelman, T.A. 21, 233 Delprato, D.J. and Knapp, J.R. 21 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 187 Denmark: ambivalence/contradictions in 46; benefits of EU membership 40; complexity of views 56; Danish Dane 54–6; as enfant terrible 37–8; and the euro 40; Eurobarometer findings 38–9; The European Value Survey 40; Euroscepticals 48–52; identity groupings in 45–6, 56; interviewees 44–5; media findings 40–1; national/ European identity in 38–41; pragmatic European 52–4; and pride 39; Q study 43–5, 59–63; qualitative studies 41–3; reflections on findings 56–8; relationship with Europe 37; respondents 43–4; and speed of European integration 40; support for EU membership 39; and support for European constitution 40; wholehearted European 47–8 Deutsch, K. 230, 231 Drozdiak, W. 3 Dryzek, J. 21, 104; et al. 28; and Holmes, L. 12, 21, 26 Duijker, H.C. 29 Durkheim, E. 7 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 221 Einhorn, B. et al. 2 Eller, J.D. 18 England see Britain euro 40, 95, 116, 127, 160–1 Eurobarometer 8, 38–9, 70–1, 99, 128, 130, 145, 160, 172, 210, 233 European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 144 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 5, 132, 144 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 188 European Economic Community (EEC) 144 European Parliament (EP) 159, 187, 188

European Union (EU) 1; distrust of 42; emergence of European idea 4–5; enlargement of 210; future stability of 6–7; and identity 7, 8–10; macro-type research on 8; and political attachments 7, 8; support for 6; as supranational organization 5 The European Value Survey 40 Europeanization 55, 201–2 Europessimists 2 Eurosceptical Dane 48–9; and benefits of membership 50; and cultural homogenization 49, 50; and cultural identity 51–2; and European integration 51; lack of clarity on European future 50; and language 49; and Scandinavian link 51; and sovereignty 49, 50 foreigners 118–19, 122–3, 131–2, 150, 172, 221 Forester, H. von 151 France 2–3; ambivalence in 99; and Americanisation 105; and attachment to Europe 97; compared with Germany 124, 126, 130–1; and cultural groupings 95; disaffected populists 104–7; and the euro 95; as a great nation 101; and identity 97–8, 99, 100–1; and integration 102, 106; and law/bureaucracy 96; and loyalty 95–6; and minorities 96–7; nationalists 91–3, 99–102; optimistic pluralists 102–3; P-set 93–4; and patriotism 96; positive associations with EU 94–5; pragmatism in 103; Q studies 109–14; results of study 94–107; scepticism in 107; study on 93–4; supranationalists 94–9; and war 98 Freedom Party 3 Friedman, T.L. 124 functionalists 9–10 Gaddis, J.L. 209 Galli Delle Loggia, E. 143 Gans, 160 Garibaldi, Giuseppe 142 Gellner, E. 17 German People’s Union 3 Germany 3, 6, 12–13; compared with France 124, 126, 130–1; core doctrine 126–7; data analysis 117–18; and the euro 116, 127; fieldwork 117; and foreigners 118–19, 122–3, 131–2; and

238 Index globalization 119; and the government 120; history 120–1; and identity 116, 119–20, 121–2, 130–1; and integration 123, 132; loyalties 118, 121; and national divisions 123–4; nationalists 125–8; negative attitudes 125–6; optimism in 131; overview 116–17; pessimism in 128–30; pluralists 122–5, 128–30; and pride 116; Q study 134–9; scepticism in 115–16, 120, 122; as steadfastly European 130–2; and support for EU membership 116; supranationalists 118–22 Giddens, A. 17, 18 Gillingham, J. 5 Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L. 31 globalization 119, 174, 197 Goldman, I. and Emke, I. 21 Goldman, K. 207, 221 government, governance 120, 232–3 Greca, C. 145 Gundelach, P. 40, 41 Haas, E.B. 9, 165 Hadenius, S. et al. 208, 209 Haesly, R. 21, 72, 85 Hagendoorn, L. and Linssen, H. 163 Hainsworth, P. 187 Hill, R. 221 Hofstede, G. 6–7, 161–3, 176 Hollander, A.N.J. 161 Hudson, R. 7 Hume, John 187 identity 231, 233–4; analysis 13–14; British 81–2, 85; Danish 38–41, 45–6, 56; French 97–8, 99, 100–1; German 116, 119–20, 121–2, 130–1; importance of national 159; Italian 143–51; literature on 5–9; multinational study 11–13; national vs supranational debate 8–9; North/South divide 41–2; Northern Ireland 191; research into 1–2; salience 18–19; Swedish 217–18, 220 imagined communities 17 imitation 231 immigration 40–1, 145, 161, 164 Ingelhart, R. 212 Inkeles, A. 19 integration 159, 174, 176; Danish 40; Dutch 159–60, 168–9, 174, 176; French 102, 106; German 123, 132;

Northern Ireland 188; pace of 232; support for 40; Swedish 215 internationalists (Sweden) 217–18, 220 Italy, attachment to Europe 150–1; European Italianists 150–1; and family influence 148; and foreigners 150; historical background 140–3; and identity 145–6; and immigration 145; and integration 145, 148; link between national/EU identity 146–51; and loyalty 148–9; Napoleon Bonaparte 140, 141; nationalists 148–9; outsiders 151; perception of European identity in 143–6; political institutions 145; Q methodology in 151–2; revolts in 141–2; scepticism in 147; and sovereignty 146, 147; and United States of Europe 149–50; vague antinationalists 147–8 Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D.R. 160 Jachtenfuchs, M. et al. 14, 92 Jacobsson, K. 210 Jong, M.J.G. de 163 Kaldor, M. 104 Kantor, J.R. 20, 28 Kapteyn, P. and Schijf, B. 159, 160 Kearney, R. and Wilson, R. 203 Keating, M. 188, 203 Kennedy, D. 188, 202 Klicperová, M. 21 Klingemann, H.-D. 207, 214 Kraft, D. 4 Krugman, P. 119 Kumar, K. 66, 73, 74 Laffan, B. 67–8 Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. 14 Leerssen, J. 163 Lens, N.G. 159, 161, 163 Leonard, M. 69 LeVine, R.A. 234 Lijphart, A. 212 Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, S. 212 loyalty 95–6, 148–9, 190–1, 199, 234 Ludwig, A. 230 Lundestad, G. 209 McCombs, M.E. and Shaw, D.L. 160 McCormack, U. 12, 20 McKeown, B. and Thomas, D. 19 McNeil, D. 3 Magli, I. 145, 146

Index 239 Malcolm, N. 172 Mårald, B. 207 Marshall, T. 7, 21 Maxwell, J.P. 21 Mazzini, Giuseppe 142, 143 Meehan, E. 24, 187, 201 membership, support for 40 Miall, H. 7 Michalski, A. and Tallberg, J. 209 Mitrany, D. 23 Napoleon III 142 nation state 4–5, 121, 231 nation states 217, 220 national character 19 National Front (NF) 2–3 nationalism: attachments 19; banal 17; beseiged 78–9; British 73, 78–9; changing nature of 12; and conflict 2; contemporary rise of 2–4; crosscultural comparisons 12–13; and cultural commonalities 13; Danish 47–8; delusions concerning 83; Ducth 171–2, 176; European 12; French 99–102; fundamental disturbances related to 5–6; German 123–4, 125–8; hiding true feelings 11–12; Italian 148–9; and national pride 12; Northern Ireland 196–8; and patriotism 83–4; pluralist sentiments 13; racial undertones 3–4; and rightwing political parties 2–3; strength of 2; subjective views 17–18 Nees, G. 119, 121, 122, 123, 127 Netherlands 3–4; background 159–61; and culture 170, 176–7; differences between factors 174–5; and Dutch identity 161–3; elite/public opinion difference 160; and Enlightenment ideas 164–5; and the euro 160–1; and European identity 164–5; and federal state concept 159–60; feminine characteristics 162; and foreigners 172; and globalization 174; and immigration 161, 164; individualism of 163; and integration process 159– 60, 168–9, 174, 176; and language 163, 164; and the media 160, 168; and national divisions 171–2, 176; nationalists 171–2; non-emotional 163; pluralists 169–70, 175–6; positive attitude 170; Q studies 165, 166–73, 180–5; results of study 166–73; semisupranationalists 170–1, 176;

scepticism in 170–1; supranationalists 165–6, 168–9, 175; as tolerant 162–3, 172 Nice Treaty 67–8 Northern Ireland 13; ambivalence in 188; attitudes 191–2, 193–4, 197–8, 199–200; background 186–9; bipolar factor 194–6; effect of EU on 200–1, 203; and Europeanization 201–2; favourable attitude 188; and globalization 197; and identity 191, 195, 202–3; and integration 188; and loyalty/patriotism 190–1, 199; multiculturalism 198–200; nationalism 187, 188, 196–8; negativity in 195–6; political differences 186–7; proEuropean Irishness 194–6, 196–8; Q study 189–90, 189–200, 205–6; and sovereignty 202; supranationalists 190–2; troubles in 186; and union with Republic 187; unionist Euroscepticism 187, 192–4 Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1991) 188–9 O’Brien, O. 31 One Nation Party 4 Orwell, G. 83 P-set (population) 30–2, 93–4 Paisley, Ian 187 patriotism 79–81, 83–4, 96, 190–1, 199 Patton, M.Q. 32 Pellicciari, G. and Tinti, G. 151 Pentland, C. 1, 9, 10, 23, 24, 102, 165, 169 Petersson, O. 211 Pinxten, R. 164 pluralism, British 73, 77–8, 79–81, 84–5; French 102–3; optimistic 77–8, 102–3; patriotic 79–81; Sweden 216– 17, 218 pluralists 13, 18; German 122–5, 128–30; Netherlands 175–6; pessimistic 128–30 populists, French 104–7 Porter, N. 201–2 PQMethod 29, 32 pragmatic European (Denmark), ambivalence of 53–4; and cultural identity 52–3; and Danish identity 53; and homogenisation of cultures 53; inevitability of euro 52; and integration 52

240 Index Q methodology, Italy 151–2 Q studies 11, 19; Britain 74–5, 88–90; and communability 28–9; and the concourse 22–9; cross-cultural nature of project 26–7; Denmark 43–5, 59–63; development of 19–20; and factor analysis 20; France 109–14; Germany 134–9; and identity 21; interviews 32; Italy 151–2, 154–8; and latitude in interpretation 28; methodology 26–9; Netherlands 165, 166–73, 180–5; overall findings 227–9; patterns emerging 229; and political scientific research 21; procedures 29–32; and psychology 21; questions raised by 230; and R methodology 20; and second-order analysis 32–3; setting 32; subjective impressions 27; and subjectivity 20–1; and understanding of attachments 229–30; and variety of opinions 27–8 Q study, Northern Ireland 189–200, 205–6; Sweden 211–14, 224–6 Reese, S.D. and Shoemaker, P.J. 160 Regehr, E. 2 Richmond, A.H. 19 Robinson, E. 4 Robyn, R. 130, 146, 151, 165–6, 212 Roodman, D.M. 129 Rosaldo, R. 18 Rossi, Ernesto 144 Ruane, J. and Todd, J. 186 Runnymede Trust 67 Sampson, A. 2, 7 Schattschneider, E.E. 230 Schmolck, P. and Atkinson, J. 29, 166 Scotland see Britain Seward, D. 2 Silander, D. and Wallin, C. 45 Skinner, B.F. 21 Smith, A. 126, 128, 131 Smith, A.D. 2, 6, 8, 25, 165 Smith, M. 186–7, 188–9 Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) 187–8 social identity theory (SIT) 18–19 social learning 230–1 Sontag, D. 4 sovereignty 49, 50, 146, 147, 202, 231–2 Spadolini, 143 Spinelli, Altiero 144

Stainton Rogers, W. 21 Stephenson, W. 18, 19, 21, 22, 28, 29, 165, 229, 233 Stroop, J. 163 Stryker, S. 18 supranationalism 9–10, 18, 231–2; British 73, 81–2, 84; Dutch 165–6, 168–9, 175; French 94–9; German 118–22; Northern Ireland 190–2; Sweden 214–16, 218 Suter, K.D. 2 Sweden: background 207–8; complexity of elections in 209; division of opinions in 208; and economic integration 221; and foreigners 221; and identity 207–8, 210–11, 217–18, 220; and integration 210, 215; internationalists 217–18, 220; interviews 213–14; neutrality of 216; non-alignment model 209; perspectives of 210; pluralists 216–17, 218; Q study 211–14, 224–6; recent EU relationship 208–11; reflections on analysis 218, 220–1; respondents 211–12; results of study 214–18; scepticism of 209; statements 212–13; supranationalists 214–16, 218 Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. 18 Tilove, J. 4 Tonge, J. 187 Treaty of Paris (1951) 144 United States of Europe (USE) 149–50 van Heerikhuizen, B. 163 Verburgh, A.J. 164, 165, 172 Verstraete, G. and Pinxten, R. 164 Vignon, J. 9 Wecke, L. 160 whole-hearted Europeans (Denmark), and Danishness 47, 48; and further integration 48; marriage and aliens 48; and nationalism 47–8; positive attitude 47; reasons for unequivocal support 47 Wicklund, R.A. and Oosterwegel, A. 18 Widfeldt, A. 208 Wilterdink, N. 164 Wintle, 14 Wolf, M.M. 21 Wong, T. and Sung, M. 21 Wyden, P. 118