The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security
The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security presents an analysis of the post-Cold War dynamics of power balancing between the United States and China, and the role great powers and middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea, Japan, India and Australia play in this process. It makes a persuasive contribution to the on-going debate on the US–China relationship by showing how divergent US–China policies in key areas such as anti-terror and anti-WMD initiatives, democracy and human rights, the US alliance system and the UN system contribute to unstable patterns of power balancing in the Asia-Pacific. The book looks in detail at Southeast, Central, Northeast and South Asia as the main arenas for US–China competition for influence on the regional security architecture. Odgaard provides a theoretical context to the debate by drawing on the frameworks of the English school, expanding on their concepts of powers, balance of power and coexistence to provide a unique understanding of how US–China relations in the Asia-Pacific are evolving. Focus is given to the different US–China perspectives on regional security issues including the North Korean nuclear programme, the Taiwan problem, Japan’s and Russia’s role in Asia-Pacific security, the conflict between India and Pakistan and ASEAN’s approach to peace and stability. The book offers a systematic treatment of the complexities of Asia-Pacific security, mainly through the medium of interviews with policy practitioners and academics in the region. Providing conceptual insight, The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security gives a clear understanding of the mechanisms necessary to maintaining regional stability and the implications of US–China power balancing for global security which will be essential reading for scholars, students and foreign policy specialists in the field of Asia-Pacific security. Liselotte Odgaard is Associate Professor in International Relations at the University of Aarhus.
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To my father
The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security US–China policies on regional order
Liselotte Odgaard
First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”
© 2007 Liselotte Odgaard All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-96496-9 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0–415–41591–8 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 978–0–415–41591–0
Contents
Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Frontispiece 1
Introduction
xi xiii xv 1
Powers, balancing and coexistence in theory and in practice 6 Realism versus the English school 13 Realist assumptions 14 English school assumptions 16 The organization of the book 21 2
Powers, balances of power and coexistence: the views of the first generation of the English school
23
The first generation of the English school: concepts and dynamics 24 The balance of power 25 Rules of coexistence 28 What makes a power great?: structural power vs. relational power in Asia-Pacific security 43 The dominant power: the United States 46 The great powers: China and Japan 50 The middle powers: Russia, South Korea, India and ASEAN 56 3
Sino-US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific US policies on the use of force in Southeast Asia 68 US policies on the use of force in Central Asia 73 US policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia 77 US policies on the use of force in South Asia 83 US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific 88 Chinese policies on the use of force in Southeast Asia 90 Chinese policies on the use of force in Central Asia 95
67
x
Contents Chinese policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia 98 Chinese policies on the use of force in South Asia 103 Chinese policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific 107 Deceitful allies and fluctuating strategic partnerships: Sino-US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific 109
4
Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific
115
US policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia 117 US policies on legitimacy in Central Asia 121 US policies on legitimacy in Northeast Asia 126 US policies on legitimacy in South Asia 134 US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific 138 Chinese policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia 139 Chinese policies on legitimacy in Central Asia 145 Chinese policies on legitimacy in Northeast Asia 149 Chinese policies on legitimacy in South Asia 157 Chinese policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific 160 The virtues and problems of liberal democracy and creeping hierarchies: Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific 163 5
Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific
169
US policies on institutions in Southeast Asia 171 US policies on institutions in Central Asia 177 US policies on institutions in Northeast Asia 180 US policies on institutions in South Asia 185 US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific 189 Chinese policies on institutions in Southeast Asia 191 Chinese policies on institutions in Central Asia 195 Chinese policies on institutions in Northeast Asia 199 Chinese policies on institutions in South Asia 203 Chinese policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific 207 Unstable compromises: Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific 209 6
Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order in the twenty-first century
215
The first generation of the English school revisited 217 Stable instability: Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order 221 The Asia-Pacific and global order 232 Notes Bibliography Index
237 243 265
Acknowledgements
The work presented in this book would not have been possible without the assistance of numerous people who contributed to the substance of the argument. Some of these have since moved to other positions. It is impossible to thank everyone individually, but some people and institutions bear mentioning. In the United States, Michael B. Yahuda, George Washington University and the London School of Economics and Political Science; David L. Shambaugh, George Washington University; Michael O’Hanlon and Charles L. Pritchard, Brookings Institution; State Department; The White House; Bates Gill and Derek Mitchell, Centre for Strategic and International Studies; Victor D. Cha, Georgetown University; Alastair Iain Johnston, Harvard University; Joseph Cirincione, The Carnegie Endowment for Peace; Percaya Desra, the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN; Gerrit W. Gong, UC Berkeley; Ronald K. Frank and Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Pace University; John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago; Royal Danish Embassy, Washington, D.C. Michael B. Yahuda generously answered countless questions; so did Joseph Tse-Hei Lee in addition to commenting on the manuscript. In China, Andrew Watson, the Ford Foundation; the Central Party School of C.P.C.; Jin Canrong, Song Xinning, Daojiong Zha, Shi Yinhong and Miao Miao, Renmin University; Zhu Feng, Fan Shiming, Xiaoming Zhang, Niu Jun and Jia Qingguo, Peking University; Qin Yaqing, Su Hao and Zhu Liqun, China Foreign Affairs University; Yang Wenjing and Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; Chu Shulong, Tsinghua University; Ruan Zongze, China Institute of International Studies; James Miles and Mure Dickey, the Economist; The National Defense University; Tao Wenzhao, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In Indonesia, Landry Haryo Subianto, J. Kusnanto Anggoro and Hadi Soesastro, Centre for Strategic and International Studies; the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia; Hasjim Djalal, Advisor to the Centre for Policy Planning and Development of the Republic of Indonesia; the President’s Office of the Republic of Indonesia; Makmur Keliat, University of Indonesia; S. Yunanto, the Ridep Institute; M. C. Abad and Anti Rita Nurhaida, the ASEAN Secretariat; R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa,
xii Acknowledgements the Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation of the Department of Foreign Affairs; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Management for Social Transformation UNESCO-LIPI and Chairman for UNESCO-MOST; Teuku Faizasyah, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Pretoria. In South Korea, Taeho Kim, Hallym University; National Defense University; Korea Institute for Defense Analysis; Jaewoo Choo, Kyung Hee University; Sukhee Han; Byungki Kim, Korea University; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Bum-Suk Kim, Taehwan Kim, Yonsei University; Hieyeon Keum, University of Seoul. In Russia, Andrey V. Grozin, CIS States Institute; Uyanaev Sergey, Alexander Zhebin, Roald Saveliev, Konstantin V. Asmolov, Tamara Karganova and Vasily V. Mikheev, Institute of Far Eastern Studies; Anatoliy D. Tsyganok, Academy of Military Sciences of Russian Federation; Boris Yulin; Victor A. Sukhotin; Royal Danish Embassy Moscow; Dmitry Verkhoturov, Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation; Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; Shaken Galimbekovich Nadirov and Galina Sergeevna Yaskina, the Institute of Oriental Studies; Alexey G. Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center. In Singapore, Barry Desker, Ralf Emmers, Tan See Seng, Amitav Acharya and Evelyn Goh, Nanyang Technological University; Keith M. Fitzgerald; Lee Lai To, National University of Singapore; Bilahari Kausikan and Peter Ho Hak Ean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the United Kingdom, Yuen Foong Khong, Oxford University; Christopher R. Hughes was my host at the Asia Research Centre, LSE in October–December 2003 and generously allowed me to arrange a workshop on the theme of this book; Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, Jinmin Wang and Masaaki Tonedachi, who shared an office with me at the Asia Research Centre, discussed the themes of the book with me in the early phases of this project. The late Michael Leifer brought to my attention F.S. Northedge, who is central to the arguments in this book. In Denmark, Inge Rasmussen and Preben Holst Mogensen, Aarhus University, both did much more than anyone could ever have asked for to see me through this project. Martin Broe provided input for the theoretical argument in the book, and Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen assisted me with my stay in the United States. Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller wrote a newsletter from the Royal Danish Embassy, Singapore which was a daily inspiration in the process of writing the manuscript. The Danish Social Science Research Council generously funded the project. It goes without saying that I am responsible for any deficiencies in this book.
Abbreviations
APEC ARF ASEAN ASEAN–PMC BMD CACO CCP CFCA CIS CSCE CSIS CSTO DMZ EAEC EAS ETIM G7 G8 GDP GNP IAEA ICT IMU INTERFET KEDO KIDA LDP MTCR NPT NRC OSCE PAP PSI
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN–Post Ministerial Conference Ballistic Missile Defence Central Asian Cooperation Organization Chinese Communist Party Combined Forces Command Afghanistan Commonwealth of Independent States Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe Centre for Strategic and International Studies Collective Security Treaty Organization Demilitarized zone East Asia Economic Caucus East Asia Summit East Turkestan Islamic Movement Group of Seven Group of Eight Gross domestic product Gross national product International Atomic Energy Agency Information communication technology Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan International Force for East Timor Korea Energy Development Organization Korea Institute for Defense Analysis Liberal Democratic Party Missile Technology Control Regime Non-Proliferation Treaty NATO–Russia Council Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe People’s Action Party Proliferation Security Initiative
xiv Abbreviations RMA RMSI SAARC SCO SEATO TAC UNDP UNTAET USCINCPAC USPACOM WMD ZOPFAN
Revolution in Military Affairs Regional Maritime Security Initiative South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Shanghai Cooperation Organization South-East Asian Treaty Organization Treaty of Amity and Cooperation United Nations Development Programme United Nations Transition Authority East Timor Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command United States Pacific Command Weapons of mass destruction Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
Arctic
Ocean
Russia
Kazakhstan Uz
be
Mongolia
ta yzs Kyrg
k
ist Tu an rkm en ista n
n
DPRK
Taji kis
ist an
tan
Af
gh
an
Japan
ROK
China
Pakistan
Ne pal
Bhutan
India
Laos
Taiwan
Bangladesh
India
Pacific Ocean P
Myanmar Vietnam
Philippines
Thailand
Cambodia Brunei Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Maldives
Singapore
Malaysia
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Indian Ocean
East Timor
N Australia
Southeast Asia Central Asia Northeast Asia
New Zealand
South Asia
Figure 1 The four sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific that form the main arenas for Sino-US implementation of policies on regional order.
Introduction
The traditional obligation to defend freedom and the necessity for coexistence with adversaries . . . [is] . . . a clear conflict between two moral imperatives. (Dickson 1978: 129)
The quote expresses the principal dilemma of US foreign policy between imposition and coexistence as experienced by Henry A. Kissinger as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the Nixon Administration 1969– 74. In this political dilemma, Kissinger gave priority to coexistence. Coexistence means that states pursue their national interests as long as they do not jeopardize international stability (Odgaard 2002a: 113–43). In the event that their security interests collide, agreement between the major powers on conflict resolution mechanisms must be established on the basis of a compromise between differing demands for security arrangements to prevent or control conflicts that may lead to mutual use of force. By contrast, the defence of freedom entails missionary activity to impose universally the principles of state conduct that justify the military, economic, political and social systems of one major power. In Kissinger’s view, negotiation and compromise would bring more benefits to Washington than the toughness required to force the spread of liberal democracy to the top of the foreign policy agenda. This consideration lay behind his visit to China in 1971 which initiated a thaw in Sino-US relations. In international relations theory, Kissinger is associated with classical realism. This school of thought is also known for its views on the need to balance the pursuit of national interest with pragmatism. However, when it comes to the political dilemma of imposition and coexistence, the so-called English school has dealt theoretically with the dilemma in its writings on the balance of power in a way that sets it apart from the tradition of classical realism. The English school deals with the question of how states attempt to preserve peace and stability through common habits and practices designed to regulate state conduct. One such practice is the balance of power. This school believes that stable power balancing requires that the states apply raison de système, implying that the common good must not be sacrificed for
2
Introduction
the benefit of national interests (Wight 1991: 31). Stability is therefore not just a question of equilibrium in terms of the relative military and economic capabilities of major powers; it presupposes a balance of power embedded in a consensus as to what constitutes reasonable state conduct. This political framework is legitimate if it is accepted by all major powers. Stable power balancing does not reflect the absence of unsatisfied demands. Instead, redress for grievances is sought through adjustments of the political framework rather than through overturning it. Stability is hence brought about through respect for common principles of coexistence, limiting the means used to sustain the balance of power. Coexistence does not preclude conflict; it entails, rather, that conflicts can be resolved without breaching the consensus as to what constitutes legitimate state conduct. Nor does coexistence presuppose extensive cooperation; coexistence is designed to accommodate the conflicting demands of major powers where their spheres of influence coincide, but it does not entail that common policy initiatives overtake the individual pursuit of national interests. The English school has turned to history to substantiate their arguments on stable power balancing. One of the periods looked at by Adam Watson is the nineteenth century regional order in Europe as an example of stable power balancing (Watson 1992: 238–50). One characteristic of this order was that armed force was used by agreement or acquiescence. Another element of the European order was a consensus on non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states to preserve the principle of dynastic rule and hold back the forces of nationalism that threatened to overthrow the existing regimes. A third element of the European order was the use of regular conferences to accommodate conflicting demands of states that threatened to upset the status quo. Hedley Bull focused on the Cold War balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, arguing that stable power balancing was similarly derived from the management of their relations that focused on limiting or containing wars against each another, on agreeing to respect each other’s spheres of influence that represented the opposing ideologies of liberalism and communism, and on coordinating their policies to defend the existing distribution of power (Bull 1977/1995: 194–222). Irrespective of historical and geographical focus, an international environment of coexistence appears to depend upon some measure of commonality or acceptance between the major powers on the use of force, on the legitimacy of governments, and on the institutions used for policy coordination. The English school is useful for this type of study. If such fundamental agreement does not exist, unstable power balancing that is not underpinned by common principles of state conduct replaces coexistence. In this type of international order, moderation becomes irrelevant (Butterfield 1972: 341). The absence of an agreed political framework for conflict settlement between the major powers leaves them without sufficient security guarantees to exercise self-restraint, encouraging them to pursue an international order that neutralizes any opponents because they would seem
Introduction
3
to lack the qualities of good faith and willingness to come to an agreement that accommodates their demands for security. Redress for grievances is hence sought through the imposition of unilateral demands that does not take into account the views of others on how peace and stability are best preserved. A major power seeking to impose its security interests on other states does not necessarily have schemes for the domestic policies of other states, as suggested by Kissinger’s concerns over the US quest to spread liberal democracy. For example, Chancellor Bismarck’s determination to change the European order in the late nineteenth century did not encompass models for the domestic management of state sovereignty. However, the inclination to lay down the law for other states involves that the boundaries of state sovereignty are no longer protected by a commitment to consider the common interests of states. This security vacuum encourages domestic groups with political agendas that challenge existing political authorities to use an unstable international environment to their own ends. In other words, models for domestic governance that challenge existing state boundaries may enter the international environment through the back door even if none of the major powers deliberately attempts to encourage it. In the case of late nineteenth century Europe, Bismarck’s policy inadvertently fuelled the forces of nationalism in Austria that contributed to the downfall of this multinational empire. There is no easy theoretical or political answer to the persistent dilemma between coexistence and imposition. This book addresses the question whether post-Cold War Sino-US relations in the Asia-Pacific are characterized by balancing underpinned by coexistence, making for a stable order, or whether they rather bear the marks of an unstable order that cannot accommodate grievances, leading to attempts to overturn the existing political settlement. The argument rests on the insight that stable power balancing depends on the political framework rather than the polarity aspect, as the neo-realists would have it. For the political framework to sustain stability, common agreement on mechanisms that advance coexistence is essential to prevent the use of force between powers with conflicting security interests by designating common principles for conflict resolution. This question is central to the ongoing debates on coexistence and balancing among Asia-Pacific security scholars. This debate is dominated by the view that such a pattern is already in place, signifying that as the traditional borders between the sub-regions of Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia dissolve, enhanced interdependence raises the stakes in avoiding violent conflict. One study cautiously concludes that although self-help, alliances, balance of power and hegemony remain central security dynamics in the region, trade, investment and other interactions are likely to be managed by reference to common rules rather than by recourse to war, and that cooperation may eventually succeed coexistence (Alagappa 2003: 571–605). Similarly, another study argues that although East Asia mostly resembles the coexistence model of international
4
Introduction
order, cooperative elements in the economic and financial sectors have developed that restrain the operation of the balance of power and war (Buzan 2004: 238). An important part of the background for these assessments is the change in China’s approach to Washington at the turn of the millennium when Beijing stopped attacking the US alliance system, recognizing not only that it was likely to stay in place for the foreseeable future, but also that it had some advantages for China. First, it had provided a framework that allowed China to concentrate on developing its economy and become a regional great power. Second, the alliance system granted China continued access to its largest export market, the United States. Third, Chinese overtures for policy coordination and cooperation have been well received, particularly in Southeast Asia, as they were no longer required to choose between China and the United States. In addition, the US alliance system provided a sort of insurance that allayed Asian fears of potential Chinese domination. At the same time, the 2001 war on terror changed US priorities and strategic thinking. Before 9/11, China was depicted as a potential ‘peer competitor’, but the war on terror encouraged the United States to see Beijing as a potential strategic partner (Yahuda 1996/2004: 268–69, 284, 306–10). This book argues that the apparent Sino-US strategic rapprochement is merely superficial, and that it conceals fundamental disagreements on the mechanisms necessary to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific. Although China is aware of the advantages of the US alliance system for its own security, it is not willing to abandon its demands for regional order to extract these benefits as long as the United States seems intent on using its alliance system to uphold pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific. US pre-eminence is the principal long-term challenge to Chinese security because it does not leave room for China’s demands for an Asia-Pacific order. These demands include the rise of China as a military great power with legitimate claims to the territory that it defines as the Chinese motherland and the continued authority of the UN Security Council as the principal forum for managing international order. The United States on its part refrains from describing its relations with China as a strategic partnership because the two political systems are based on discordant definitions of legitimacy, and because of strategic uncertainty about the consequences of China’s rise for the security of the United States and its allies (interview with senior US official, 19–10–2004). This book therefore concludes that coexistence between the United States and China is not in place. Instead, an unstable balancing situation persists between the two major Asia-Pacific powers. In the debate on balancing, three different positions stand out. One, advanced by Alastair Iain Johnston, argues that China does not balance the United States. He concludes that China’s efforts to be richer and more powerful have not translated into a concerted effort to supplant the United States as the predominant state regionally or globally (Johnston 2003: 5–56). In contrast, Michael Yahuda argues that the question of Chinese balancing
Introduction
5
has as yet been left unanswered. According to him, China’s concept of cooperative security may be interpreted as a recipe either for reducing US regional influence or for advancing regional stability (Yahuda 2003: 189– 206). Finally, Aaron L. Friedberg emphasizes developments that imply a future Chinese balancing of the United States, such as the fact that there has been very limited convergence of interests between the United States and China and that their mutual perceptions and policies still impede a rapprochement (Friedberg 2002: 33–50). This argument is consistent with his previous argument that Asia lacks stability-enhancing mechanisms such as a high level of economic integration and regional institutions to mitigate and manage conflict (Friedberg 1993/94: 5–33). This book takes Friedberg’s conclusion one step further by arguing that Sino-US balancing already takes place. However, due to considerable power inequalities between the two powers Chinese balancing is not conducted using traditional military means; instead, China uses diplomacy to weaken the US position. Middle powers play a crucial role in this strategy. While the United States has numerous allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific, entities such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),1 Russia, South Korea and India have cooperated with China on maintaining stability, pending Sino-US agreement on the basic pillars of order. These middle powers have vastly different security interests, and their relations with the major powers differ significantly. For example, South Korea’s principal security interest is to prevent violent conflict in Northeast Asia, whereas that of Russia is to preserve sub-regional hegemony in Central Asia. Similar differences are found in their relations with the United States and China, since South Korea remains a US ally that gravitates towards China on particular issues, whereas Russia counterbalances the United States by gravitating towards China. As major powers, the United States and China have a policy for the Asia-Pacific as a whole, as indicated by US efforts to maintain and modernize the alliance system and by Chinese efforts to preserve the Cold War UN system as the moral basis for regional order. In their attempts to implement these policies, they cannot ignore the vastly different security dynamics that they and the sub-regional powers give rise to in the sub-regions of Southeast, Central, Northeast, and South Asia. Instead of seeing the Asia-Pacific as a region that is converging into one security complex,2 the book argues that because of continuously different subregional security dynamics, it is still necessary to consider the regions as separate strategic settings for the implementation of Sino-US policies on the use of force, the legitimacy of governments, and on the institutions used for policy coordination. The argument is made by revisiting the concepts of balancing, coexistence, dominant powers, great powers and middle powers with a view to devising a framework for analysing whether power balancing takes place in the Asia-Pacific on the basis of a consensus on common principles of coexistence.
6
Introduction
Powers, balancing and coexistence in theory and in practice The argument that stable power balancing depends on the political framework rather than the polarity aspect is usually associated with the so-called English school. Hedley Bull’s book The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics from 1977 established the English school as an independent theoretical approach (Bull 1977/1995). He belongs to the first generation of English school proponents.3 Focusing on Bull’s contribution, the theoretical aim of this book is to push the revolutionary implications of this cluster of scholarly thinking about the balance of power and international order into the limelight. In contrast to the second generation of English school scholars, they subscribed to the view that fundamental strategic concerns must be resolved before non-strategic dynamics can translate into cooperative international orders. The subsequent analysis of US and Chinese policies on AsiaPacific security suggests that there is still some merit to their argument. Bull’s principal aim was to substantiate that although realism and the English school share a number of assumptions, their approaches to the study of international relations were fundamentally different. He proceeded by taking on the central concepts of realism to demonstrate that the behavioural patterns described as essential in the international realm did not necessarily follow from the assumptions on which realists based their arguments. In attempting to establish the English school as an independent school of thought, however, Bull failed to adequately explain the differences between these scholars and those categorized as realists. In particular, the boundaries between the first generation of English school scholars and some classical realists are fluent. Indeed, scholars such as E.H. Carr and Henry A. Kissinger have developed arguments on balancing that resemble the English school approach.4 This book accounts for the argument that stable power balancing depends on the political framework based on English school thought. Below, I will demonstrate that there are fundamental differences between their arguments and those of the realists on the question of stable power balancing. The English school focuses on self-imposed constraints on states’ use of power, in particular those decided by the major powers. Major powers use their position of superiority to invest the international realm with some measure of management, for example through the establishment of conflict resolution mechanisms to prevent outbreaks of war between them. The special role of major powers is rarely formalized to any great extent since the international level is fundamentally an anti-hierarchical structure based on the principle of the equal rights and obligations of sovereign entities. Formalizing the special role of major powers would call into question their legitimacy as managers and weaken the elements of coexistence engendered by them (Bull 1977/1995). The argument on major powers allows for an examination of the question if the major powers in the Asia-Pacific contribute to coexistence by ameliorating the effects of power balancing by means of common principles of state
Introduction
7
conduct. The book argues that only two powers qualify for the position of major powers in the Asia-Pacific and both are somewhat atypical. The dominant power in terms of military and economic capabilities, the United States, is external to the region. This is an advantage as well as a drawback. The advantage stems from the fact that the United States only began to play a role in the Asia-Pacific in the twentieth century and that it is therefore not party to the historical conflicts that continue to give rise to animosity between China and Japan. In addition, although the United States is considered an intrusive power with ambitions of controlling security dynamics, it is not suspected of having territorial ambitions because to avoid overextending its resources, it has to rely on local allies such as Japan and South Korea. The drawback stems from its liberal designs for domestic political state conduct that give rise to regional concerns about US interference in the internal governance structures of indigenous states. China has neither the military nor the economic capabilities usually required to achieve status as a major power. However, China’s size, impressive economic growth rates during the last couple of years and continuous differences with the United States over the appropriate basis for state conduct are factors that have encouraged the surroundings to consider China the most likely future opponent to Washington. The perceptions of China as a likely challenger to the United States combined with Beijing’s efforts to implement principles of state conduct in the Asia-Pacific that challenge US designs for regional order have allowed China a level of political influence approximating that of a great power. China bases its version of Asia-Pacific order on diplomacy rather than military power. The indigenous states of the region have welcomed Beijing’s advocacy of the preservation of the UN system as the basis for proper state conduct complementing the US alliance system, and political influence is an effective means of asserting great powerhood because leadership is at least as important as imposing one’s will in this type of system. Although the managerial responsibilities of major powers leave them in a far better position to invest security arrangements with their own interests, no state is so powerful that it can impose its will without a view to the interests of others. Those with a major interest in maintaining an existing order can only hope to preserve it by accepting so many concessions that even powers with few interests in the status quo find it legitimate. Butterfield describes the nineteenth century major powers in this light, pointing out that they acted as responsible leaders when they addressed themselves to problems such as the Barbary Pirates5 and the African slave trade (Butterfield 1972: 340). Similarly, major powers intent on revising existing security arrangements must garner support, especially from powers with sufficient resources to act partially independently of them. These are the so-called middle powers. Middle powers are usually states with less economic and military capabilities than great powers and more capabilities than small powers possess.
8
Introduction
In regions where no single power qualifies as a middle power, several powers may join forces to position themselves as a pooled middle power. Middle powers have not been the subject of much scholarly debate, partly as a reflection of their negligible formal standing in international politics. Three middle power models stand out, however: the functional approach, which sees middle power status as a function of an entity’s contribution to a given international issue (Chapnick 1999: 74–75); the behavioural approach, which focuses on a specific diplomatic approach emphasizing multilateral compromise;6 and finally, the hierarchical approach, which defines middle power status on the basis of relative capabilities (an example is Neack 2000). The English school uses insights from all three models. The principal contribution is Carsten Holbraad’s Middle Powers in International Politics (Holbraad 1984). Like the hierarchical model, the English school defines middle powers on the criterion of relative capabilities. From this starting point, Holbraad uses the English school to investigate the role played by middle powers with medium level capabilities in preserving international order by means of the balance of power, diplomacy and international law. This book will similarly use the hierarchical model to identify the middle powers in the Asia-Pacific and the behavioural model to investigate their role in establishing a regional order of coexistence. In particular, the behavioural approach lends support to the argument that states with medium economic and military capabilities may play an intermediary role in disagreements between the major powers. Holbraad also uses the functional approach to argue that middle powers are not formal entities; their relevance for international politics is derived from the major powers and the character of their relations and their importance vary over time and across regions (Holbraad 1984: 8). This book similarly argues that the influence of middle powers is very much determined by Sino-US relations and by the characteristics of contemporary Asia-Pacific security arrangements. In addition, the functional approach lends itself to the argument that middle powers are not necessarily single states; since middle power status is derived from a certain type of diplomacy, states can pool their diplomatic resources to position themselves as intermediaries between the major powers. In the Asia-Pacific, middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India have gained significance after the Cold War. One explanation for this development is the emergence of a competitive situation between the US and the Chinese versions of regional order. This leaves the middle powers with inordinate possibilities for shaping regional security arrangements. They derive their influence from their attractiveness to both Washington and Beijing as partners in their efforts to implement their particular versions of a prospective security order in the Asia-Pacific combined with their ability to gravitate to either side. The regional middle powers tend to prefer a combination of the military security guarantees provided by the US alliance system and the principles of state conduct inherent in the UN system advocated by China as the moral basis of state conduct. On the one hand, their
Introduction
9
reluctance to choose sides prolongs the competitive situation between the security arrangements promoted by the United States and China. On the other hand, their inclination to recognize advantages in both versions of regional order may suggest ways to combine the two systems to allow a regional order of coexistence to emerge. Whether the strategic choices of the middle powers engender conflict or coexistence depends on balancing dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. Recent English school studies tend to de-emphasize the balance of power, one reason being that it is considered a realist concept, the use of which would blur the school’s distinctness from realism.7 In this book, however, the English school’s understanding of the balance of power is discussed from the point of view that although many of its dynamics and concepts resemble those of realism, the English school distinguishes itself from the majority of realist scholars by the argument that the political framework rather than polarity determines whether power balancing is stable. This contrasts with approaches such as human nature realism, which argues that lust for power leads to hegemonic aspirations, with defensive realism arguing that maintenance of the balance of power is caused by the structure of the system, and with offensive realism which holds that the structure of the system fuels hegemonic aspirations (cf. Mearsheimer 2001: 17–22). The balance of power is not at the centre of the liberal school of thought that focuses on the transformative potential of international political and economic forces for international order. The economically oriented part of liberalism tends to see socioeconomic welfare issues as more important than issues of national security (cf. for example Brands 2001). Insofar as these scholars have a concept of power balancing, they conceive of it as a dynamic between economic actors such as trade unions and management. The politically oriented part of liberalism argues that liberal democracies are natural allies (Doyle 1999: 41–66). The implicit concept of power balancing is non-military and offensive in the sense that the school holds that liberal societies expand through their superior ability to provide individuals with wealth and peace that sets an example for other states and through the spread of market economic structures engendering economic interdependence, thereby raising the costs of the use of force. The balance of power in the constructivist school of thought has been most prominent in the writings of Alexander Wendt. If states find themselves in a self-help system where power balancing is the fundamental dynamic, this is because their practices made it that way. The intersubjective knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is confirmed and reconstructed by processes of social will formation (Wendt 1992: 391–407). The balance of power is hence not a stable feature of international relations and can be overcome through changes in the interplay between agents and social structures. For example, the proliferation in transnational non-state actors impacts on the fundamental structures that constitute the international system. In contrast to the English school, power balancing is hence not a defining feature of international relations. Realism
10
Introduction
is therefore the theoretical approach that comes closest to the English school’s understanding of the balance of power. Like realism, the English school considers the balance of power to be the most essential ingredient of international order under conditions of anarchy. However, numerous realist scholars assume that anarchy leaves little room for cooperation to affect stability, which is rather seen as a by-product of individual states amassing power at the expense of others.8 By contrast, the English school posits that stability is a result of conscious collective efforts, emphasizing that anarchy does not necessarily discourage cooperation. In its view, major powers have managerial responsibilities with respect to international order, encouraging them to cooperate to underpin the balance of power in order to maintain or strengthen stability. Stable periods are therefore characterized by agreement between the major powers on which mechanisms promote coexistence. In periods of transition with changing balancing patterns, on the other hand, major powers that contest the foundations of a new order are often unable to agree on mechanisms of coexistence. The debate on coexistence rarely addresses the issue of balancing. One exception is Andrew Hurrell, who does so by combining the concept of coexistence with the idea of a minimal international society dominated by the dynamics of power politics. He posits that minimalist rules ensure that states can pursue their national interests with a minimum of social obligations, except those required to coexist with other states (Hurrell 1998: 21–22). However, he considers the balance of power a metaphor, not a formal mechanism of power political bargaining. Another author, Barry Buzan, links the English school concepts of coexistence and power balancing in his comparison of the characteristics and prevalence of orders of coexistence and cooperative orders. He concludes that the Asian order can be most adequately described in terms of coexistence (Buzan 2004: 143–46, 191–94, 238). This book, by contrast, concludes that coexistence is not currently in place in the Asia-Pacific. Instead, an unstable order prevails that contains no agreement between the major powers about permissible goals and methods of foreign policy that allow for conflict settlement. The argument is an elaboration of Hedley Bull’s point that although stable power balancing is a precondition for the preservation of international order, states often disregard the requirements of balancing. His analysis concentrates on the means by which the major powers preserve international stability, the most important ones being the preservation of the general balance, and takes argument with those who claim that hardly any policy coordination occurred between the Eastern and the Western bloc during the Cold War by pointing out instances of US–Soviet cooperation aimed at preserving stability (cf. Bull 1977/1995: 107, 201–2, 194–222). In contrast to Bull, I elaborate his concept of coexistence and demonstrate that the major powers must adjust their definitions of permissible state conduct to those of allies and other
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11
powers if stability is to be preserved, and that consequences for international stability will follow if the major powers ignore this. The book argues that the policies of the major powers on the use of force, on the legitimacy of governments and on the institutions used for policy coordination are the principal indicators of the prospects for a regional order based on coexistence. The reason is that these policies are the practical expressions of the fundamental rules on which all fundamental state interaction is based: the rules of war, of jurisdiction and of agreements. Rules of war designate the constraints on the use of force between states and encourage wars to be conducted and ended in an orderly fashion to ensure that peaceful state interaction can be restored. Rules of jurisdiction deal with the question of legitimacy, defined as the collectivity of states’ assessment of the entities that claim sovereign rights over a territory and its population (Wight 1977: 153). These rules define the identity and boundaries of the entities that make up the international realm, thus removing any uncertainty about the entities exercising political authority and the extent of that authority. Rules of agreements involve provisions for institutional platforms and methods of accession to treaties, codes of conduct and other types of interstate agreements that invest the international realm with a measure of predictability, facilitating foreign policy planning and reducing the level of insecurity in the international realm. Agreement between major powers on the use of force, legitimacy and institutional security arrangements pave the way for coexistence. First, constraints on the use of force principally serve to prevent war between the major powers that would be likely to alter the status quo. Second, common definitions of legitimacy prevent conflict between the major powers over issues of domestic state conduct that would blur the identity of the entities that make up the international realm and cloud the international agenda with disagreements over issues such as ideology, religion and ethnicity that do not readily lend themselves to compromise. Third, common institutions for policy coordination prevent that alternative fora for decision-making are introduced into the international realm that might give rise to competitive rules of state conduct and hence threaten the status quo. The book argues that balancing in the Asia-Pacific is not conducive to a regional order of coexistence because the odds are stacked against a compromise between US and Chinese policies on the issues of the use of force, international legitimacy and institutions. Concerning the use of force, the United States conducts a policy of preventive first-use to curb terrorist activities and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India have assisted Washington in these efforts, they are critical of what they see as US demands for compliance with its decisions on the use of force, irrespective of their own security concerns and national interests. Such reservations have permitted China to poach on US alliances and partnerships. This development does not sit well with US plans for strategic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, and
12
Introduction
implies continuous fluctuations in alliance patterns and a continued low level of military transparency. Consequently, the United States and China are unlikely to agree on permanent mechanisms for constraining the use of force anytime in the foreseeable future. Their disagreement on this issue is also manifested in their conflicting policies on legitimacy. On the question of legitimacy, the United States and China appear to agree that a broad interpretation of legitimacy is detrimental to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, at least for the time being. However, the United States is only willing to support a narrow interpretation of legitimacy as long as governments adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are committed to contribute to the war on terror. In addition, Washington maintains a long-term commitment to the spread of liberal democracy. Equally, China has reservations about the narrow interpretation of legitimacy, as indicated by its long-term commitment to the reunification of the Chinese motherland as defined by Beijing and the spread of a Sino-centric system of dominance through economic integration, migration and symbolic recognition of China’s superiority. The United States and China may thus be able to agree that the narrow interpretation of legitimacy is acceptable in the short to medium term. However, fundamental disagreement prevails between the two major powers on the standard by which governments obtain legitimacy in the long term, as indicated by Washington and Beijing’s divergent positions on Taiwan and North Korea. Their mutual commitment to a common understanding of the principle of non-interference is therefore questionable, and this disagreement has far-reaching implications for Sino-US policies on institutions. On the question of institutions, the United States and China both advocate that security agreements should involve some form of common institutional framework. However, this commonality is superficial. US policies on institutions are based on its alliance system that allows it to extend its security umbrella to the region as a whole and to use military means against states that fail to comply with US demands for counter-terrorist and nonproliferation measures and with its policies on legitimacy. Chinese multilateralism, by contrast, involves commitment to binding security agreements that respects Beijing’s demands for maintaining the Cold War interpretation of the UN principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council as the basis of order in the Asia-Pacific. The prospects for a common security framework to facilitate stable balancing patterns in the near future hence remain rather dim. It should be evident from the above outline of the main theoretical and empirical arguments of the book that the English school is useful not only for pointing out that in view of the fact that the international realm is based on anarchy with no authorities above and beyond the states, state conduct is surprisingly rule-bound. The approach also permits an investigation of the consequences for international order when states fail to accommodate their national interests and demands to those of other states. The focus on the
Introduction
13
elements of order in the international realm hence not only facilitates analyses of the possibilities for enhanced peace and stability in the international realm. It also facilitates analyses of underlying conflicts that may jeopardize international peace and stability. In contrast to the conventional view of the English school that presents the approach as a fundamentally optimistic assessment of the state of international affairs, this book demonstrates that a pessimistic assessment focusing on the pitfalls inherent in patterns of state conduct is equally feasible.9 Realism essentially makes the same contribution to the study of international relations. A discussion of the similarities and differences between the English school approach and realism is therefore appropriate.
Realism versus the English school Realism is the oldest and best-known theory in international relations. The qualities and drawbacks of all other approaches therefore tend to be assessed against it. Outside Europe, the English school is by contrast a littleknown approach in the theoretical landscape of international relations. Its roots are at times traced back to Grotius, a seventeenth century international lawyer and founder of modern natural law theory, who also formulated the term the society of states that has become the core concept of the English school (Yost 1994: 263–90; Bull et al. 1990). C. A. W. Manning’s book The Nature of International Society from 1962 is usually considered the first book to explain the English school concepts (Manning 1962). The English school shares fundamental assumptions with realism as both approaches build on the assumption of international anarchy. The first generation of English school writers hence discusses and criticizes aspects of realism. Bull takes issue with the realist argument that international anarchy engenders conflict between states. Instead, he tries to substantiate that this fundamental characteristic of international relations gives rise to cooperation between states because the political authorities recognize that only through foreign policy coordination are the states capable of reducing the element of insecurity about one another’s intentions that would otherwise give rise to conflict (Bull 1977/1995). Another leading English school scholar, Alan James, has questioned the realist argument that international law is a peripheral device in international relations that merely serves as a pretext for pursuing national interests without considering the interests of the collectivity of states. James instead argues that international law has arisen out of a common concern to invest international relations with a measure of regulation that strengthens the element of order, and hence increases the security of states (James 1973: 60). A third English school scholar, R. J. Vincent, takes issue with the realist argument that noninterference in the domestic affairs of others is the safest route to security by arguing that the international realm is first and foremost designed for the benefit of individuals, and as such, breaches of the fundamental rights of
14
Introduction
individuals to livelihood and safety justify external interference in the domestic affairs of other states (Vincent 1986: 151). The following two sections look into realism and the English school. The central assumptions of each approach are examined, leading to a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two schools of thought.
Realist assumptions The realist tradition stresses the element of conflict in international relations, taking a pessimistic view of the prospects for security in international relations and focusing on the occurrence of conflict between states. For example, Carr was at least in part motivated to write The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Carr 1939/1946) by his observation that political decision-makers exhibited a dangerous tendency to include moral considerations in foreign policy decisions and underestimate the importance of issues of power. Another example is the neorealist wave in the 1970s and 1980s, which can be seen as a reaction to arguments from liberal and dependency theorists that it is the lack of morality in international relations that leads to conflict (see for example Doyle 1986: 1151–69; Caporaso 1978: 13–43). In contrast to these theories, realists usually warn against the relentless conflicts that they interpreted as consequences of value-based foreign policies. In their view, an anarchical system encouraging states to amass power at the expense of others and the repeated occurrence of wars is, although not ideal, the most secure system conceivable (see for example Gilpin 1996: 3–26). Realism hence tells the tragic story of international relations. Realism rests on three core assumptions. First, states are fundamentally like units (see for example Waltz 1979: 79–101). This characteristic stems from the condition of international anarchy that offers no protection other than that provided through their own efforts to enhance individual state security by increasing their relative capabilities. Ironically, the efforts states make to protect themselves produce dynamics that jeopardize security. One such dynamic is called the security dilemma. It describes situations where wars and arms races occur between two or more actors although none of the involved parties had wanted these phenomena to occur, because one state perceives the actions of another as aggressive. In abstract terms, the security of one state becomes the insecurity of another (see for example Herz 1958: 231–43). For example, military modernization undertaken by one state, because it has fallen behind developments in military technology due to temporary economic problems, can be interpreted by neighbours as offensive armament efforts directed at them. Realists tend to hold different views of the possibilities of resolving the security dilemma. Most realists see the dilemma as escapable,10 but the escape routes suggested vary. Some refer to characteristics at the structural and interaction levels. For example, Herz suggests that the distribution of power in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe allowed the states to provide for their national security
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15
without creating security dilemmas, and Glaser argues that geographical barriers and the ability of states to distinguish between offensive and defensive defence through mechanisms such as weapons control agreements can ameliorate the security dilemma (Herz 1958; Glaser 1996: 122–63). The last variable, the ability of states to distinguish between military force postures, rests on the argument suggested by Carr, that the willingness of major powers to consider the demands of discontented states through the establishment of rules of state conduct, some of the consequences of power politics, such as war, might be avoided (Carr 1939/1946: 169). The link between Glaser and Carr’s arguments is that they both attach importance to the ability of states to establish some kind of political framework that reduces the risk of war. Second, power is the principal driving force in international relations, either as a goal in its own right or as a means to achieve national security, giving rise to states or alliances with such strong capabilities that they threaten to dominate the entire system or are perceived as engendering threats that must be countered by other states determined to preserve their own security. Behavioural differences are therefore principally caused by the relative position of states in the international system and not, for example, by ideology, regime type, or other forms of value-based phenomena.11 Balancing these powers or threats to prevent one single state or alliance from winning global dominance is the mechanism that preserves the fundamental condition of international anarchy (Morgenthau 1948/1967). The realist understanding of the balance of power rests on a capabilities argument, but scholars in this tradition differ as to which variables determine whether a balance of power is stable. Some realists, such as Waltz, argue that in addition to international anarchy, stability depends not on whether the international system is bipolar or multipolar, but on a constant number of poles in the system. The rise and fall of major powers is hence what initiates changes in the set-up of the international system (Waltz 1979: 129–93). However, the majority of realists have a more nuanced view of stable power balancing. They examine, instead, the unit and interaction levels of states. Some of these explanations focus on the political framework as the key to stability. Morgenthau refers to the importance of statesmanship and diplomacy in forging political compromises to help diminish the negative consequences of power politics such as wars that overthrow the status quo (Morgenthau 1948/1967). Kissinger argues that power balancing must be underpinned by common rules of state conduct if stability is to prevail. In the sense that Morgenthau and Kissinger share a positive view on morality in international politics, it is an international kind of morality based on the observation that rules of the game curtail volatility in the international system, whereas the substance of those rules is not important as long as the states are able to agree on those rules. In practice, however, common rules are not likely to be founded in ideology, religion, or similar normative systems because under international anarchy, states will continue to differ
16
Introduction
on these points. International morality with a positive contribution to stability is hence associated with the procedures rather than the substance of state conduct. Third, the dynamics of domestic and transnational politics are not perceived as essential to the dynamics of international anarchy. Consequently, there is a tendency to regard the state as a unitary actor and to treat internal disagreements on foreign and defence policy issues and the importance of transnational actors as independent actors that impact international security issues as secondary variables in the formation of international politics. It is incorrect to conclude that realists ignore phenomena such as public opinion, infighting between foreign and defence ministries, and Islamic terrorism. However, domestic and transnational phenomena are usually treated from the state point of view. They are part of the process of foreign policy-making and impinge on the foreign policy priorities of states, but they are seen as issues in the foreign policy-making process rather than actors that challenge the primacy of the state in the international realm. Among realists who do not completely ignore the dynamics of domestic and transnational politics, some treat these phenomena as partial explanations of the formation of the foreign policies of states. For example, Kissinger explains that Austria’s foreign policy in the early nineteenth century was in part formulated because Austria wanted to preserve the principle of nonintervention, enabling it to suppress nationalist forces that threatened to bring down dynastic rule and break up the empire (Kissinger 1957). Gilpin argues that the decreasing ability of hegemons to preserve the status quo may in part be explained by the tendency of hegemonic states over time to take their position of superiority for granted, encouraging them to allocate fewer resources for the preservation of the existing system, an explanation that originates from domestic politics (Gilpin 1981). Other realists treat the dynamics of domestic and transnational politics as variables that the states spend resources to control. The phenomena therefore become potentially important items on the security agenda of states. For example, Christensen argues that the ease with which political decision-makers are able to mobilize resources domestically depends on their ability to convince the public that an immediate external threat exists. Consequently, statesmen may divert attention away from what they consider necessary, but unpopular foreign policy priorities by consecutively implementing popular foreign policies (Christensen 1996). Carr investigates the importance of public opinion, focusing on the importance for policy-makers of winning approval in the population for the implementation of major foreign policy decisions such as participation in wars (Carr 1939/1946: 132–45).
English school assumptions The English school emphasizes the element of order in international relations, assuming a positive outlook on the impact of common rules of state
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17
conduct on security and focusing on the prevalence of stability in international relations. For example, part of Bull’s motivation for writing The Anarchical Society (Bull 1977/1995) was his observation that the comparatively stable order that prevailed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was not necessarily best explained by referring to the blessings of bipolarity, but might have more to do with the success with which the two major powers were able to establish rules of state conduct designed to prevent war between them. Another example is Watson, who, by contrast, was concerned about the consequences for global stability of the gap between the formal rule on non-intervention in the UN Charter during the Cold War and the US and Soviet practice of ideologically motivated interventions in their spheres of influence (Watson 1992: 299–309, 317). The English school takes the view that international anarchy encourages the states to underpin the dynamics of power politics with common rules of state conduct to reduce the element of conflict in the international realm. The English school hence tells the story of states’ efforts to maintain coexistence. Like realism, the English school assumes that states are like units because of the prevalence of anarchy in the international realm.12 However, they adopt a more comprehensive view of the consequences of anarchy, arguing that it gives rise to societal dynamics as well as dynamics of power politics that may both jeopardize and enhance international security. The second generation of English school scholars tends to argue that societal dynamics further international security, whereas the dynamics of power politics jeopardize security. Societal dynamics may be defined as states that, through dialogue and consent, have established common rules and institutions for the conduct of mutual relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining such arrangements (Bull and Watson 1984: 1). For example, Vincent argues that states may venture beyond the insecurity-generating implications of international anarchy because of shared values attached to the states system that restrain the use of power beyond and within state territory. It is a normative statement advocating that the states system should take into account the interests of the world society of individuals, since they ultimately exist to provide for the basic needs of human beings (Vincent 1986). The first generation of English school scholars instead took the view that it was the ability of states to reconcile the dynamics of power politics and societal dynamics that determined whether international security would be jeopardized or strengthened. According to Bull, a stable, and hence more secure, system depended on whether the major powers were able to agree on common rules of state conduct that upheld coexistence and prevented war between the major powers (Bull 1977/1995). Butterfield’s view of the possibility that societal dynamics might overrule the dynamics of power politics was more pessimistic. He invented the idea of the security dilemma to illustrate the tragedy of international relations because even if all actors have benevolent intentions, international anarchy prevents states from
18
Introduction
acting on these intentions. Instead, their mistrust of each other leads to repeated conflict and war. Prudence is an advantage for weak powers, but once they become major powers, prudence is abandoned in favour of a bid for dominance of the states system (Butterfield 1951: 9–36). However, even the most pessimistic scholars of this generation started out with the observation that societal and power political dynamics coexist in the international system. The possibility that common interests coincide with the national interests of states is the starting point that makes the international realm fundamentally different from the Hobbesian law of the jungle, even if national interests usually dominate. This argument comes very close to those presented by realist scholars such as Carr, Morgenthau and Kissinger. However, these scholars recommended that states prioritized their national interests in foreign policy-making. Carr’s starting point was a critique of the utopianism of the League of Nations in the interwar years of the early twentieth century. Morgenthau argued that a Hobbesian type of system is the best security mechanism we can hope for, and Kissinger saw common rules of state conduct as a by-product of the power political dynamics that compelled nineteenth century Austria to promote such rules to ensure survival. By contrast, the first generation of English school scholars recommended that states prioritize their common interests in foreign policy-making, even if, at least according to some of them, this almost never happens in practice. A second assumption of the English school is that order and not power is the principal dynamic in international relations. The focus on order implies that security is best facilitated by common regulatory mechanisms, and not by amassing power. Order is thus not an end in itself but a means to security, not only for the individual state, but for the entire collectivity of states. Order denotes stability and regularity in the pattern of assumptions, rules and practices accepted as legitimate and that concerns the mechanisms of and limits to the process of change (Armstrong 1993: 6). Second-generation English school scholars argue that order can be reconciled with justice to promote an international system that provides for the basic needs of individuals for survival. For example, in his later writings Bull argues that to reconcile order and justice, states must respect differences as well as similarities between various understandings of justice instead of enforcing their own individual brand without regard for the existence of alternative worldviews. The first course of action serves to clarify to the surroundings the fundamental moral criteria of a specific state to enter into any sort of cooperation with others. By contrast, the second course of action implies that other entities are not entitled to define their own moral values – an attitude likely to jeopardize rather than enhance security (Bull 1983: 32–33). Following this line of reasoning, scholars such as Wheeler and Dunne have asked if a moral community actually exists as a shared pattern of action among state leaders (Wheeler and Dunne 1998: 48). The first generation of English school scholars instead recommended that
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19
order be prioritized over justice based on the argument that justice in the international realm differs from that which can be achieved domestically, because justice is regulated by law within states, whereas this only applies in principle between states. In practice, justice is regulated by politics. Manning has explained this position. He argues that in the event that states become accustomed to show disrespect for common rules of state conduct, the reason is not that international law is inadequate or that order has become less important. It is rather because the major powers disagree on the fundamental rules that are to provide for security (Manning 1972: 323–24). According to Manning, the first priority of states is to adjust the rules of state conduct to the realities of power politics, that is, the demands and interests of the major powers. The remaining powers will adjust their behaviour accordingly because if they ignore the rules of the game, they jeopardize their own survival (Manning 1975: 328–29). Definitions of justice are hence derived from the realities of power politics, allowing states to solve conflicts according to the rules of state conduct without changing the status quo and thus preserve the existing order (James 1973: 62). By contrast, if justice is allowed to take precedence over order, irreconcilable worldviews will form the basis of state conduct and hence hamper the preservation of a stable international order (Watson 1982: 49–50). Again, the arguments of the first-generation English school scholars come very close to those proposed by realists since the English school arguments on order are similar to realist arguments on stability. The difference is, however, that even for realists who recognize that states may at times establish systems of order, the idea of rule-bound behaviour is not fundamental to stability, except in specific historical circumstances such as the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. And even during that period, the importance attached to the rules of state conduct varies. Manning sees it as detrimental to state survival to ignore common rules of the game. By contrast, Kissinger considered Austria’s ability to manipulate the rules to serve its national interests as the fundamental cause of the long peace in Europe because it was imperative for Austria to avoid another war. Even for realists who recognize that rules of state conduct at times make a difference, such situations emerge because they can be manipulated to serve the national interests of particular states, while seeming to serve the common good. This manoeuvre helped the Austrians to keep the expansionary ambitions of Prussia and Russia in check. In sum, realists consider rules of state conduct to be tools of power political bargaining, whereas the English school sees them as essential to preserve stability. A third assumption of the English school is that theoretical insights are derived from practice.13 Changing historical and societal circumstances are therefore what provoke new theoretical understanding (Jackson 1996: 210–11; Jackson 2003). The second-generation English school scholars have studied historical developments with a view to substantiating that it is transformations at the domestic level within the units of the international system
20
Introduction
that have produced the most significant changes in international relations. For example, Linklater argues that envisaging alternative forms of community and citizenship may be thought to erode important and enduring differences between the study of international relations and the study of domestic society and politics. The distinction between community within and anarchy between states is hence a much too harsh division between domestic and international politics (Linklater 1993: 6–9). Buzan similarly argues that the transnational world society has a transformative effect on the society of states (Buzan 2004). The first generation of English school scholars similarly argued that theoretical criticism and correction must be founded on an understanding of the historical conditions as theory is anchored in and responds to history (Bull 1972: 32). However, their studies instead focused on substantiating the enduring superiority of the states system as a way of organizing the international realm. Wight investigates the late middle ages in an attempt to identify the characteristics that made the states system developed in Europe so attractive that it spread throughout the rest of the world (Wight 1966: 89– 131). Bull compares the states system with other types of international systems and concludes that a cosmopolitan world society is unlikely to become dominant, but that the states system would likely benefit from being reinforced by a cosmopolitan culture at the global popular level because the global diplomatic elite is losing control over the foreign policies of states (Bull 1977/1995: 286–305). Butterfield set out to demonstrate how the balance-of-power dynamics were refined over the centuries due to the development of philosophical and historical insights into the principles that sustains this pattern of state conduct (Butterfield 1972: 336–57). Realist scholars such as Carr, Kissinger and Mearsheimer have conducted similar historical studies. However, they do not usually use them to substantiate the pervasiveness of the states system, since they tend to take this dynamic for granted. Instead, realists tend to use historical studies to achieve a deeper understanding of the intricacies of the workings of the states system. For example, although he also discusses the virtues and drawbacks of realism in relation to liberalism, the principal purpose of Mearsheimer’s historical studies is to argue that states maximize their power rather than balance the power of other states, thus aiming his argument principally at defensive realists (Mearsheimer 2001). Kissinger similarly sets out to refine realist insights by demonstrating how the use of diplomacy can alter the balance of power to the advantage of powers that are comparatively weak in terms of military capabilities (Kissinger 1957). The first generation of English school scholars, by contrast, studied history with a view to demonstrating the continued relevance of the states system. It should be clear by now that although realist and first-generation English school studies of international relations are closely related, there are nevertheless fundamental differences between their understandings of the dynamics of the states system. The aim of this section has been to point out that realism and the English school cannot be conflated into one approach.
Introduction
21
This book takes the English school as a starting point for investigating power balancing in contemporary Asia-Pacific security to answer the question if coexistence between the major powers characterizes regional order.
The organization of the book The rest of the book seeks to answer the question whether China balances US power in the Asia-Pacific in a way that facilitates coexistence. Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of powers, balance of power and coexistence in order to construct an analytical framework for the study of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. I argue that stable power balancing depends on agreement between the major powers on a system of coexistence that allows for conflict resolution on the basis of common principles on the use of force, the legitimacy of governments, and the institutions managing international order. I then go on to define dominant powers and great powers on the basis of structural power in the area of security, production, finance and ideas. Using this definition, the United States qualifies as a dominant power, and China and Japan as great powers with elements of structural power. Beijing has the ideational elements of structural power allowing it to challenge US preeminence in the Asia-Pacific. Subsequently, the concept of a middle power is defined using Holbraad, arguing that where a single power does not qualify as a middle power, several powers may join forces to position themselves as a pooled middle power. On these criteria, ASEAN is a middle power in Southeast Asia, Russia in Central Asia, South Korea in Northeast Asia, and India in South Asia. The Asia-Pacific hence consists of one external dominant power and one indigenous great power challenging the dominant power, and four sub-regions: Southeast, Central, Northeast, and South Asia. The remainder of the book analyses Sino-US security policies in these four sub-regions. Chapter 3 investigates Sino-US policies on the use of force in the AsiaPacific, discussing if these policies contribute to a regional order of coexistence. I argue that the United States conducts a policy of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony to curb terrorist activities and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India have assisted Washington in these efforts, they are critical of what they see as US demands for compliance with its decisions on the use of force, irrespective of their own security concerns and national interests. Such reservations have allowed China to poach on US alliances and partnerships. This development does not sit well with US plans for strategic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific and implies continuous fluctuations in alliance patterns and a continued low level of military transparency. Consequently, the United States and China are not likely to agree on permanent mechanisms for constraining the use of force in the foreseeable future. Chapter 4 discusses if Sino-US policies on the legitimacy of governments contribute to a regional order based on coexistence. I argue that the United
22
Introduction
States and China appear to agree that the broad interpretation of legitimacy, including human rights, is detrimental to peace and stability in the AsiaPacific, at least for the time being. However, with the possible exception of South Asia, fundamental disagreement prevails between the two powers on the standard by which governments obtain legitimacy in the long run. The United States remains committed to defend liberal civil rights and democratic polities. China maintains a long-term commitment to reunifying what it defines as the historical motherland and to promoting a system of hierarchical bandwagoning relying on cultural superiority, economic integration and migration. Middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India prefer US ideas on political authority to Chinese policies on legitimacy, encouraging Beijing to adopt a pragmatic approach to the promotion of the civilizational elements of a Sino-centric order. Nevertheless, mutual Sino-US commitment to a common understanding of the principle of noninterference is called into question, hence lowering the perceived level of protection of existing regimes and increasing the likelihood of preventive warfare. Chapter 5 discusses if Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific contribute to a regional order of coexistence. The United States prefers to rely solely on its alliance system and the involvement of global and regional institutions such as the United Nations and ASEAN is ad hoc and conditional, depending on their contributions to US security priorities. Chinese policies on institutions are by contrast firmly embedded in the Cold War UN system, a system that can be used to ward off US attempts at consolidating its version of regional order in the Asia-Pacific and to persuade regional states that China has no intentions to interfere in the political authority of other states. Seen from the perspective of the middle powers, partial cooperation with the United States and China on consolidating their preferred structural basis for regional order serves their interest in promoting neither a US–centric or a Sino-centric order, but instead an order that combines elements from both in a way that maximizes the influence of Asia-Pacific middle powers. The existence of multiple guidelines of state conduct engenders unstable balancing patterns not underpinned by coexistence because over time, the indigenous powers swing back and forth between gravitating towards the US and the Chinese structural basis of regional order. Chapter 6 concludes by re-examining Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order in the twenty-first century. The chapter summarizes the main conclusions and discusses the theoretical and empirical implications of the book’s findings. I argue that the first generation of the English school have provided the field of Asia-Pacific security with analytical tools allowing for insights into the potential for conflict inherent in contemporary Sino-US policies. I then go on to substantiate that the future global order is determined in the Asia-Pacific region because that is where the spheres of influence of the major global powers intersect. The unstable Sino-US balancing patterns detected in Southeast, Central, Northeast and South Asia are therefore likely to ascend to the global level.
2
Powers, balances of power and coexistence The views of the first generation of the English school
The English school has had continuous difficulties in gaining popularity beyond a scholarly audience in Britain. This may of course be due to US perceptions of superiority, encouraging the domestic audience to concentrate on nationally developed theoretical approaches such as realism and liberalism. Another equally plausible explanation is, however, that the first generation of English school scholars failed to adequately explain how they differed from classical realism. The contemporary generation of English school scholars has a similar problem of setting themselves apart from the constructivist school of thought because of its venturing into the territory of identity politics. From the beginnings in the Cold War era, the English school has therefore occupied an uneasy position in the landscape of international relations because the approach occupies common ground with realism as well as constructivism.1 This chapter builds on the first generation of English school scholars, as indicated in Chapter 1 by the explanation of the differences between these scholars and scholars of classical realism. The principal first-generation scholars, defined as those who contributed to English school arguments on the balance of power and considered strategic issues fundamental to the maintenance of international order, are C.A.W. Manning, Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull and F.S. Northedge.2 The theoretical arguments are illustrated by examples dating from the Congress of Vienna of 1815 to the end of the Cold War in 1989 because during this period the balance of power between states manifested itself as a fundamental dynamic in international relations. The seeds of what came to fruition in 1815, however, had been planted more than two centuries earlier. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia indirectly introduced the concepts of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention by allowing the political authorities of delimited territory to determine domestic policies on religion. In the event of popular dissatisfaction, their option was to vote with their feet, i.e. to leave their home country. The decision to invest incumbents with religious authority heralded the gradual dissolution of horizontal boundaries of group authority such as that between the Catholic Church and dynastic rulers, instead instituting vertical geographical boundaries as fundamental. On
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this occasion, the states system was formalized. Hence, international order became an order between states whose characteristics depended on their choice of allies and adversaries, thereby encompassing power balancing between states based on the management and use of military force. The 1713 Peace at Utrecht transformed the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference into explicit rules of state conduct, hence formalizing the principle of power balancing as part of the European system. Thereby, security was not merely a possible outcome of state interaction; instead, security was obtained through the institutionalization of an equilibrium of power as a fundamental principle underpinning the foreign policies of states. Common security management was thereby introduced as a part of the European order. However, the international order introduced in 1713 was based on tradition, recognizing only the authority of dynasties and not that of republics. It was not until the 1815 Congress of Vienna that international order became purely based on power in the sense that whoever was strongest, dynasty or republic, would have the greatest say in European security affairs. The 1815 Congress was an attempt to remove the issue of legitimate rule from the international agenda by recognizing republics as legitimate international entities with a right to managerial responsibilities provided they had sufficient capabilities to sustain their position. Ironically, only by 1815 did it become possible to employ different understandings of legitimacy in the game of power balancing between states because there was no longer a prior definition of entitlement to political authority. Instead, the task of defining legitimate political authority was left in the hands of the most powerful states in the system. In other words, in 1815 a system of power balancing underpinned by coexistence encompassing principles on the use of force, security management and legitimacy came into being, which is the object of discussion in this book. The chapter outlines the main characteristics of the first generation of English school scholars in order to explain the theoretical concepts and dynamics used to analyse the balance of power in Asia-Pacific security in the remainder of the book. Subsequently, I investigate the understanding of balances of power, coexistence and powers among the first generation of English school scholars with the purpose of devising a framework for the study of balancing and coexistence in Asia-Pacific security.
The first generation of the English school: concepts and dynamics The central concepts of the English school are international order, institutions and states. Its concept of international order defines the way the English school sees the layout of the international realm, and its concept of institutions defines the way the school sees the dynamics that engender
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 25 activity and change in the international realm. The English school considers the states to be the central actors in the international realm. The concept of international order describes how state security is ideally facilitated through regulatory mechanisms in the international realm. Basing its enquiries on order, the English school covers the spectrum from hostility over coexistence to integration in its efforts to understand international relations. Order may be understood as ‘a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values’ (Bull 1977/1995: 3–4). This definition implies that order is an intermediate goal pursued to achieve other, primary goals. Order is hence a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Ultimately, order is a means to preserve the states system and the states themselves, to maintain peace as the normal condition and to maintain coexistence. Efforts to maintain coexistence involve limiting violence, stabilizing possessions through rules of property and keeping promises. Moreover, Bull sees order as a pattern, implying that recurring mechanisms or ways of behaving must prevail if order is to exist. Since no political authorities exist above and beyond the states, they are the only territorial actors who may participate fully and regularly in international relations. Consequently, they are the principal actors in the patterns of order. Institutions make up these patterns of order. Bull defines institutions as ‘a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realization of common goals’ (Bull 1977/1995: 71). Institutions in the English school sense are not merely concrete organizations or formal structures such as the United Nations although these are part of the patterns of order made up by the institutions. Rather, institutions form a kind of superstructure consciously used by the states to further peace and stability (Watson 1992: 311). The balance of power is the most fundamental of these institutions.
The balance of power The balance of power ideally ensures that power is distributed in such a way that no single state or entity is able to dominate the remaining states or entities. Objective characteristics such as relative military power and economic resources determine the distribution of capabilities and hence play a central role in establishing which states occupy the positions of major powers. Major powers prioritize the maintenance of the balance of power above all other security issues, including that of ensuring peace, because it is a precondition of the preservation of the states system. Bull discusses the consequences of the number of poles in the system – the main focus of neorealism – but his main point is that power balances are not the direct outcome of polarity, but are contrived, i.e. based on the conscious actions of states. He furthermore claims that states are motivated by the conscious goal of a stable balance (Bull 1977/1995: 97–107). Butterfield on his part points to the danger
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of focusing solely on relative economic and military capabilities for stability since conflict between the major powers usually arises from complex situations in which the limits of legitimate state conduct are not immediately obvious (Butterfield 1972: 356–57). Wight attributes the maintenance of the balance of power to conscious policies, emphasizing that stability is not obtained by merely taking into account the distribution of power; adherence to common principles of order such as the requirements for legitimate political authority is equally important (Wight 1966: 104). Manning describes the relative stature of the powers as not just another name for relative influence; influence is a function not of a country’s stature only, but of its connections. This complex idea of power implies that the strongest power may not necessarily command the most influence; a weaker power with strong allies may end up more influential (Manning 1975: 190–91). Power balancing is therefore not just determined by relative capabilities, but also by diplomatic skills. Northedge describes the balance of power as an act of political will rather than a mechanical law of the international system. He uses the example of the interwar years in early twentieth century Europe, identifying the rise of idealism caused by the memories of the catastrophic effects of the First World War and the unwillingness of the European powers to enforce the 1919 peace settlement, as central explanations for the disintegration of the balance of power that was to constrain German territorial ambitions (Northedge 1976: 92–94). Although aware of the different consequences for order of simple and complex balances of power, the English school argues that the political framework rather than polarity determines the stability of power balancing. For the political framework to sustain international order, commonly agreed rules of coexistence are required (Odgaard 2002b: 51; 2003: 11–24). Coexistence means that states may pursue their national interests as long as they do not jeopardize international stability (Odgaard 2002a: 113–43). A regional order of coexistence requires that the great powers leave each other alone except in the case of collisions of interests. Under these circumstances, they will cooperate in order to avoid or control conflicts which may otherwise result in mutual use of force. Bull argues that major powers may play a role in the promotion of international order by pursuing policies that work for them. Such policies aim at preserving the general balance of power, seeking to avoid or control crises as well as seeking to limit or contain wars amongst one another. However, major powers also exploit their preeminence by unilateral exploitation of their local preponderance through mutual respect for one another’s spheres of influence and by joint action to promote common policies through the international system as a whole. Exploitation of the special position of major powers presupposes the management of mutual relations with one another to avoid conflict and wars between them. Even so, in practice, major powers frequently behave in such a way as to promote disorder, for example by seeking to upset the general balance rather than to preserve it, to foment crises rather than to control
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 27 them, and to win wars rather than to limit them. Bull investigates the extent to which the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to international order during the Cold War. He concludes that they carried out the six roles mentioned above and as such contributed to an international order that enjoyed a great deal of support among other states (Bull 1977/1995: 194– 222). Butterfield notes that the management of international order through conference diplomacy is likely to be the arena for power politics, and ‘the major powers hold a predominance in them which bears some proportion to their might’. The promotion of international order therefore depends on the coincidence between the national interests of the dominant powers and the common interest in coexistence. Butterfield gives the example of British policies during the interwar years and during the Second World War in the twentieth century. He notes that the virtues of British moderation of and consideration for the demands and interests of others were born out of the fact that the policy which would have been dictated by self-interest happened to be identical with the one demanded by altruism. Real-political considerations encouraged Britain to opt for conference diplomacy rather than a trial of strength with a rival, hence promoting coexistence rather than conflict by taking into account the interests of others (Butterfield 1951: 32–33). Wight points out that most states seek their preservation by pursuing the balance of power as illustrated by Britain’s doctrine of intervention against the Holy Alliance in nineteenth century Europe. Castlereagh is aware of the interests of the community of nations as a whole, and his attention to the common interests of states is tied in with balance of power considerations as against a guarantee of regimes. The repeated interference of the great powers in the affairs of Sweden, Poland, Geneva and Holland was, in the last resort, justified by reference to the balance of power; in other words, international order was upheld through a great-power agreement that the use of force was legitimate insofar as it served to preserve stability (Wight 1966: 117). Manning argues that the states must agree on the rules and goals of the international system, even if their individual goals differ, for coexistence to prevail (Manning 1975: 108). Northedge mentions that during the early phases of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union successfully avoided war with each other as well as with the lesser powers Britain, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan, in part because both disapproved of resorting to armed force in almost any form. At the end of the day, the prevention of violent conflict between major powers is not so much a question of equilibrium in the international balance of forces as of a common agreement between the major powers on the constraints on the use of force (Northedge 1976: 283–85). Coexistence is hence designed to stabilize the balance of power through limited cooperation on the avoidance of conflicts between the major powers that may upset the status quo. Coexistence is not a foregone conclusion. It depends on the willingness and ability of the major powers to establish a set of common rules to be implemented in their management of international order. A common vision of the bases of
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international order and its purpose is the principal requirement for power balancing to be based on coexistence.
Rules of coexistence Rules of coexistence do not exhaust the totality of international legal instruments which, of course, go far beyond those necessary to preserve international stability. Neither rules regulating cooperation among states above and beyond mere coexistence, such as trade rules, nor the constitutive rules of international society, are pertinent to stable power balancing. Rules of coexistence merely define the minimum conditions for maintaining a stable balance. According to Bull, they are the rules of war, of jurisdiction and of agreements (pacta sunt servanda) (Bull 1977/1995: 65–68). Northedge similarly discusses the normative rules of law, of propriety or morality, and of right and wrong or ethics. He argues that such rules are necessary for coexistence simply because states cannot escape their neighbours; after a war, some kind of de facto peace settlement has to be put in place because, in contrast to men, states cannot keep to themselves. Goodwill with other states and, consequently, the status as a worthy business partner is the basis for a state’s successful interaction with other states. Reputation is an asset that states cannot afford to take lightly (Northedge 1976: 112–13, 150–51). Wight describes the preconditions of stable power balancing by which is meant the maintenance of the status quo. The status quo does not preclude peaceful change or even violent conflict. However, change is subject to control. In addition, the maintenance of the balance of power requires flexibility of alliances in the sense that every member of the states system should be prepared to cooperate with any other member of the states system, as circumstances demanded. The balance of power conferred a right of intervention in the domestic affairs of a state that threatened the balance of power (Wight 1973: 100–09). Wight directly ties coexistence in with power balancing, hence stating as the principal rules the right to use force in the event of a revolutionary power threatening to overthrow the existing international order, the principle of rule-governed change, and general acceptance of the principle of stable power balancing overruling alliance obligations. Manning is less specific about the precise nature of the rules. He does, however, argue that the international realm is a quasi-Gemeinschaft. The aspirations of states to coexist are not founded on contractual obligations but on the fact that the organization of the international realm into states makes the existence of social relations between them unavoidable. As a consequence, states will attempt to justify their foreign policy decisions by reference to common rules of state conduct, claiming that their actions do not represent a breach of the international political framework. The prevalence of international anarchy implies that claims of rule-bound behaviour may be contested by other states, which allows for a relatively wide margin of interpretation as to the nature of legitimate conduct. The fact that states
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 29 routinely look to the collectivity of states for approval, however, indicates that they invariably attach importance to the acceptance of the diplomatic community of their foreign policy decisions (Manning 1975: 160–61, 176–77). Butterfield in practice describes the nineteenth century balance-of-power system as one of coexistence by saying that the rules and precepts of the system might not have prescribed the ordinary objectives of foreign policy, but at least they established limitations. This system drew a line which a state could not cross safely whether in promoting its own interests or in pursuing its ideals. He also notes that the qualities of moderation and self-restraint characterizing the nineteenth century balance-of-power system cannot be taken for granted; the First World War and the interwar years in the early twentieth century demonstrated that if a states system is destroyed through the breach of its rules, the rules cannot be reinvented (Butterfield 1972: 341). Hence, the principal virtues of a states system based on coexistence appear to be flexibility rather than rigidity, moderation rather than extremism, and persuasion rather than imposition. Bull argued that the rules of war, of jurisdiction and of agreements (pacta sunt servanda) constitute the rules of coexistence defining the minimum conditions for maintaining a stable balance (Bull 1977/1995: 65–68). The rules of war serve to limit violence, which is a common goal of all social life and as such a goal of the international system as well. The rules of jurisdiction promote the goal of stability of possession which is reflected in the compact of mutual recognition of sovereignty at the international level. The rules of agreements serve to fulfil the goal of the keeping of promises, without which cooperation at the national or international level cannot take place. This list of rules and goals is not exhaustive, according to Bull. He also includes the preservation of the system, the goal of maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, and the goal of peace as the default condition in international relations (Bull 1977/1995: 16– 18). It is, however, difficult to envisage the preservation of international anarchy, the survival of individual states and the maintenance of peace without common agreement to limit the use of force, to respect political authorities governing a designated territory and its people, and to respect agreements, such as treaties. Without limitations on the use of force, peace is unlikely to be the normal condition in a system of states in which the states enjoy a monopoly on violence. Equally, if jurisdiction does not carry any weight as a protective measure, international anarchy is most likely replaced by another type of international order, such as a hierarchy with one political authority that lays down the law for all other entities. Finally, if the sanctity of agreements is not recognized, it becomes meaningless to negotiate treaties, such as peace settlements that restore post-war working relations between states and guarantee the security of entities that survived the war. The rules of life, property and truth are essential. States, as peoples, do not adhere to the rules all the time, but that is a condition of life at the national as
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well as at the international level. The rules pertaining to a particular order will often be nested in actual state behaviour rather than in written agreements since decades or even centuries may pass before legal rules are accepted by all states. In the meantime, rules may be recognized de facto through state conduct. The major powers are those responsible for upholding international order by maintaining stable power balancing. The central question is therefore whether they have worked out an explicit or tacit practice on the basis of the rules of coexistence which is conducive to the preservation of stable power balancing such as that established between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Occasionally, these powers may have broken the rules originally established by mutual agreement, but the breaches happened at random; Washington and Moscow did, however, not consistently fail to adhere to their own rules, and they only broke down when the Soviet Union disintegrated, leaving the United States as the only major power. During the Cold War, violent conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was constrained by the strategic relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states belonging to the opposing alliance, as well as the UN Security Council. Mutual nuclear deterrence was established on the basis of the realization that even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons could not prevent the catastrophic results of a few nuclear weapons hitting the territory of the major powers. President Eisenhower recognized this in a speech to the United Nations as early as in 1953. The way to prevent a war between the two major nuclear powers of the Cold War was to acquire actual operational weapons together with such a credible appearance of determination to use them that even the advisors to the President would not doubt his resolve (Gaddis 1997: 229–34). Mutual US–Soviet nuclear deterrence was supplemented with the gradual development of an arms control system, in part emerging from nuclear conversations begun in the 1950s on the consequences of atomic testing in the atmosphere. These developed into an agreement on the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other treaties which paved the way for strategic arms limitation talks (Dunbabin 1994: 150–88). Although their immediate value in preventing war between the major powers might have been limited, the talks demonstrated the awareness in Washington and Moscow that a nuclear war would be devastating for both parties and that both powers, however hostile their relations might be, were able to embed mutual nuclear deterrence in a diplomatic dialogue that engendered mutual agreement on constraints on the use of nuclear weapons, however limited these constraints were. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states belonging to the opposing alliance was sometimes breached, usually through proxy conflicts such as the Second Indochina War. However, in Europe, which bordered the Soviet Union where the Cold War was coldest, and in Latin America in the immediate vicinity of the United States, the major powers
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 31 refrained from interfering in the opposing alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, even in the event of alleged severe human rights violations such as those committed with the assistance of the Soviet Union in Hungary in 1956 and with the assistance of the United States in Chile in 1973. The principle of non-interference was respected at the core of their spheres of influence because it allowed them the stability required to manage their main allies, in the case of Washington by means of democratization and in the case of Moscow by means of totalitarianism (Gaddis 1997: 189–207). The UN Security Council was the principal forum for great-power management of international peace and security. The permanent members, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China,3 had, and still have, veto powers ensuring the possibilities of either assent or abstention on important questions. By preventing action against a permanent member, the veto saved the organization from wrecking itself in operations against its most powerful members. Enforcement actions could be undertaken only with cooperation from all permanent member states (Weiss et al. 1999/2004: 11–12). The five permanent members were also those states recognized as nuclear powers, which made the veto even more significant. In practice, the UN Security Council largely proved incapacitated in the management of global security, with 13 peacekeeping and military observer operations and the adoption of economic sanctions against South Africa as significant exceptions (Weiss et al. 1999/2004: 29–46). This incapacity left the management task to the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Washington and Moscow mutually accepted that insofar as joint decisions on the management of international peace and security were taken, it happened on the basis of unanimity in the Council. The guidelines for state behaviour listed in the UN Charter, which defined the rules of the game in international politics during the Cold War, were therefore undisputed as the reference point for the legitimacy of state conduct. The basic principle of the UN Charter acting as a benchmark for the United States and the Soviet Union as well as all other states was that of absolute sovereignty, which was committed to Article two, paragraph four stating that all states shall refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations (The United Nations 1945). The US–Soviet agreement on constraints on the use of force as well as common definitions of legitimacy and institutions are examples of rules of coexistence allowing the major powers to maintain stable power balancing despite prevailing ideological differences. The example serves to demonstrate that it is not enmity per se that prevents major powers from establishing common rules of state conduct; instead, it is, as Manning has pointed out, their agreement that the goal of stability is essential to both parties which determines their ability to establish a lasting political framework that preserves the status quo. Also, this framework of common rules of state conduct must be considered amenable to the furthering of their national
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interests and the goal of stability (Manning 1975: 108). The English school has not been very specific about the substance of the rules of coexistence and the dynamics that give rise to them. Below, I attempt to rectify this omission by elaborating on the rules of coexistence and how they promote stable power balancing. The rules of war support coexistence by defining constraints on the use of force. These rules do not prevent wars; indeed, occasional, limited warfare that affects the distribution of power among the major powers may contribute to stable power balancing. However, wars between the major powers are avoided principally by averting or controlling crises and wars between lesser powers that, ultimately, may involve the major powers. This general aim may encompass a lot of additional efforts such as the settlement of political disputes and the control of competition in armaments (Bull 1977/1995: 192, 206–7). One example is the arms control agreements based on mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Dunbabin 1994: 150–88). During the nineteenth century European Concert, wars were started only in the event of consent from all major powers (Wight 1966: 116–18). Hence, the constraints on the use of force vary according to military-technological developments, the views of the major powers on the acceptability of violent conflict, and similar unit and interaction level characteristics. During the interwar years, disagreement prevailed as to whether the restrictive rules of the League of Nations on the use of force were universally applicable, as indicated by the decision of the United States to forgo membership of the organization. The central questions are therefore not the contents of the specific rules, but the existence of agreement on the constraints on using force as well as the system devising the basic principles concerning the use of force. For example, the system defines whether collective security or a self-help system should apply, and the constraints define the limits on using force in defending the collective or national interests of states. The question of constraints on the use of force is not only central to the prevention of war between the major powers but also to the formation of alliance patterns within a specific international order. Major power agreement on constraints on using force does not prevent states from defecting from one alliance to another, but it raises the potential costs for lesser powers of disregarding the common rules on the use of force. For example, de facto nuclear non-aligned powers such as Israel and India that refrained from signing the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also stopped short of publicly claiming nuclear status to minimize the political costs of acquiring a nuclear capability. Both powers traded in formal alliances for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), at least, partly due to the gravity of threats from neighbouring states. After the Cold War, India, by contrast, decided to go public with its nuclear capability in 1998, formally announcing its intention to develop what it called a minimum credible deterrent. The decision allows India to discuss its nuclear capability with external
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 33 interlocutors such as the United States, implying that the Cold War order in the Asia-Pacific has disintegrated with the implosion of the Soviet Union (Tellis 2003: 61–108). This situation has left India with opportunities to carve out a new position for itself, such as opting for acceptance that India belongs to the club of nuclear powers and considering the advantages and drawbacks of a strategic partnership with the United States, its Cold War adversary. Acceptance of the constraints on using force from the allies of the major powers in general and their core allies in particular is crucial because the major powers depend on their assistance and backing. No state is so powerful that it can enforce its own interests without taking the views and demands of its allies and partners into account (Grotius quoted in Wight 1978: 123). Even the most powerful state needs to convince its partners that its policy is responsible and feasible in order to avoid the eclipse of common interests due to intra-alliance divergences (Wight 1978: 130). The states whose combined activities are to bring about a desired outcome must be provided with a plausible justification of the constraints on using force (Manning 1975: 29– 32). The standing of a major power therefore depends on its ability to persuade its allies that power is used in a just and sensible manner because consensus on the constraints on using force is central to alliance solidarity. For example, the Eisenhower administration’s pursuance of multipolarity with Europe as an integrated third pillar in the global balance of power was subsumed under a proposal to adopt the doctrine of flexible response in 1962. As part of the plan to establish a multilateral European force, the European allies were supposed to pay the lion’s share for a middle-range ballistic missile force that remained under US control. Europe was not enthusiastic about the proposal, which left it without control of the nuclear forces, and since the control issue was more important to Washington, the multilateral force proposal was dropped in 1965 (Weber 1993: 262–67). The United States’ insistence on retaining control over the decision to launch nuclear missiles, however, came at the cost of the participation of France, which decided to leave NATO’s strategic command structure in 1966 to preserve an independent nuclear capability. The importance of intra-alliance consensus is derived from the ability of a major power to command an identifiable group of loyal supporters, which will enable it to create a stable sphere of influence for itself. On the other hand, if there is disagreement on the use of force, cooperation is potentially jeopardized, and alliance patterns may become volatile. Volatility is not to be confused with flexibility, which implies the reshuffling of existing alliance patterns to maintain an approximate equilibrium of forces. Instead, volatility implies that existing mechanisms for resolving intra-alliance conflicts including the reshuffling of alliance patterns cannot be relied upon and the major powers cannot take it for granted that support for their decisions on the use of force is forthcoming from their partners and allies. This unstable environment is therefore characterized by a high level of uncertainty concerning the combined forces commanded by opposing major powers, which
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diminishes the transparency of military security issues and increases the risk of violent conflict. France’s departure from its military role in NATO in 1966 is an example of the inherent flexibility in systems where common constraints on the use of force are accepted by allies as well as adversaries. The result of France’s departure was the reshuffling of alliance patterns because it happened under conditions of stable power balancing between the United States and the Soviet Union. Washington and its other allies worried about the precedent France’s withdrawal might set, but the United States made an effort to accommodate France. First, Washington refrained from opposing the French nuclear deterrent; second, the United States supported European currency realignments when the franc weakened in 1968 and President de Gaulle refused to devalue; and third, Washington accepted negotiating cooperation between the United States and France, all of which gradually engendered detailed plans to exchange military information at a more limited level than that between the United States and its other European allies, predominantly using presidential and military channels. Hence, Washington moved quickly to exercise damage limitation to preserve unity in transatlantic relations. Considering the continued threat from the Soviet Union against France, Paris accepted US overtures for continued military cooperation, and after a period of upheaval, US–French relations returned to approximate normality from the mid-1970s, as indicated by the French decision to keep troops in Djibouti after its independence in 1977 (Dunbabin 1994: 398–99). However, US–French alliance relations were never fully repaired, and France has remained the potentially deceitful ally to this day. Hungary’s attempt at leaving the Warzaw Pact in 1956 was more disconcerting to the Soviet alliance system because it was only prevented by the use of force. The US–Soviet tacit agreement to refrain from interference in each other’s spheres of influence, however, withstood the pressure and left Hungary, no longer considered a loyal ally, at the periphery in terms of influence in the Soviet alliance system. It was no coincidence that Hungary was the first state to open the so-called iron curtain on 23 August 1989, allowing people to leave for Austria, an action that proved central to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November that year. During the Cold War, the overall pattern was that of a stable power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Washington and Moscow agreed on mutual constraints on the use of force. Consequently, they were able to manage intraalliance conflicts while maintaining coexistence between the Western and the Eastern bloc. By contrast, during periods of instability with no coexistence between the major powers, allies are able to defect to the opponent if their interests and demands are ignored by their major power sponsor. This happened in late nineteenth century Europe with Bismarck’s rise to power in Prussia in 1862 because he did not accept the Concert system that Austria’s Metternich and Britain’s Castlereagh had been instrumental in creating. Bismarck rejected
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 35 the idea of self-restraint that had encouraged Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia and France to coordinate their foreign policies before making decisions on the use of force against other sovereign entities. Bismarck reasoned that unification of the German principalities was the only route to security. On this basis, Prussia broke its confederate bond with Austria, the secondary German principalities were estranged from their alliance with Austria, and Austria and Prussia undertook a war that separated Schleswig–Holstein from Denmark. In 1866, Austria declared war on Prussia. The war left Vienna completely isolated from Germany and allowed Prussia to establish hegemony in Northern Germany. By means of military power, Bismarck imposed a change in the alliance system that disregarded the principle of the Concert of Europe of maintaining a special equilibrium within Germany in order to create a structure among the German states which was strong enough to resist attacks from both the Eastern and Western bloc, but not powerful enough to disquiet Germany’s neighbours and which was sufficiently unified to be mobilized for defence purposes, but not too centralized to become an offensive threat. Bismarck’s policy of German unification concluded in 1871 after France’s defeat in the Franco–Prussian war had heralded the dissolution of the Concert of Europe with the First World War, upsetting the European equilibrium of power by the creation of a state through the use of force (Kissinger 1968: 888–924). During the second half of the nineteenth century, the European order of coexistence was dissolved by Bismarck’s rejection of the very same principles that ensured its maintenance, hence giving rise to violent conflicts. This allowed Prussia to poach on existing alliances on the basis of Prussia’s demands for regional order in Europe, thus engendering insecurity throughout the system due to swiftly changing allegiances. The rules of jurisdiction support coexistence by defining the principles of legitimate political authority. International legitimacy depends on the collectivity of states’ assessment of the entities that claim sovereign rights over a territory and its population (Wight 1977: 153). The default criterion for this assessment is effective control defined as the presence of an effective and stable regime within a geographically delimited area (Det Sikkerheds-og Nedrustningspolitiske Udvalg 1994: 25). This definition represents a narrow interpretation of state obligations, namely to accept political authorities with a proven record of control over territory and peoples – irrespective of their ideological, religious or ethnic features. The reasoning behind this narrow definition of legitimacy is that if foreign policy is dominated by moral considerations, international stability will be jeopardized (Butterfield 1972: 341), the implication being that stability comes before human rights considerations. The principle of effective control, a fundamental principle in the UN Charter, came to dominate the Cold War period. The principle was, however, vaguely defined, which left it to the states to interpret what the term ‘people’ means and how they are to be effectively controlled (Pellet 1992: 179). One explanation of the unclear definition of the principle of effective
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control during the Cold War is the violent chaos engendered by the attempts at implementing national self-determination in Eastern and Central Europe, in the Balkans and in Asia Minor. Effective control was introduced with a view to avoiding conflicts engendered by competing territorial claims. The major powers of the Cold War were not willing to take responsibility for prospective conflicts emerging in the countries that were about to be decolonized. Since it had proven impossible to delimit borders according to ethnic affinities, the political authorities able to control the peoples located within a delimited territory were left with responsibilities for nation-building on the basis of the ethnic groups that were present within their territories (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 122–23). Another reason for the preference for the principle of effective control during the Cold War was the ideological conflict between the Western and Eastern bloc, which was not compatible with cooperation on questions involving interference in the political authority of existing states. During the Cold War, effective control hence involved the freezing of existing territorial borders unless a state ceased to exist (Koskenniemi 1994: 257). The main problem with the principle of effective control is that states are not obliged to take into account the views of the population. Consequently, fundamental rights rest with states. A state can therefore decide to manage its political authority in a way that does not enjoy legitimacy among its people. Insufficient domestic legitimacy may produce conflict within the international system since dissatisfied domestic groups may challenge existing political authorities and thereby also existing international borders. Mechanisms to resolve such conflicts do not exist at the international level because the international system and its practices are built around states. If one state interferes in another state in support of a subset of the population without approval, the result is international condemnation. For example, India’s invasion of Pakistan in 1971, which led to the establishment of Bangladesh, was condemned and attracted no outside support despite a widespread desire in the East Pakistani population to secede from Pakistan. By contrast, a broad interpretation of state legitimacy may include the internal management of political authority by the units qualifying as states on the argument that the raison d’être of states is ultimately to provide security for individuals.4 In the event of severe human rights violations such as genocide, individual security rather than stability may be prioritized by states. Individuals and not only states have rights and duties within this definition of legitimacy, implying that states do not have a right to discriminate against peoples within their territory on the basis of ethnic, religious, ideological or other forms of loyalty that transcend state borders. Minorities have rights of political participation equivalent to those enjoyed by the majority of the population. According to a broad interpretation of legitimacy, states are not only responsible for the preservation of the states system, but also for the protection of the basic rights of individuals. The broad interpretation of legitimacy was applied in Europe during the
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 37 interwar years of the twentieth century. The interpretation was adopted by the great powers with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After 1918, the dominant political form was the nation-state rather than the multinational empire. This empirical fact was taken to its ultimate conclusion since the practice adopted in Europe was to return territory previously annexed by other states on the basis of ethnicity. For example, Alsace–Lorraine, which had been annexed by Prussia in 1871, was returned to France by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, and the northern part of Schleswig–Holstein, which had been annexed by Prussia in 1864, was returned to Denmark as a result of a plebiscite in the province. The principle of national self-determination also found expression in the League of Nations, designed to facilitate cooperation between the major powers on the preservation of international peace and stability. The organization subscribed to the idea that public opinion was the voice of reason prevailing over governments, which was reflected in the decision to give minor powers permanent preponderance in the Council of the League of Nations (Carr 1939/1946: 28–36). The main problem with the broad interpretation of legitimacy is that, in its respect for justice, it fails to confront the problem of power. Had, for example, the people of Alsace–Lorraine been asked about their preferences in a referendum, they might have opted to remain a part of Germany since one consequence of the Prussian occupation was substantial French emigration from and German immigration to the province (Mayall 1990: 53). The definition of ethnicity used to define jurisdiction over Alsace–Lorraine was hence based on recent history, whereas the definition used to define jurisdiction over Schleswig–Holstein was founded on popular opinion. In reality, of course, France used its power, in its capacity as one of the principal drafters of the Versailles Treaty on account of its victory in the First World War, to interpret the principle of legitimacy to its own advantage. On another note, the frequency of civil wars involving genocide leaves a state with responsibilities for intervening in numerous conflicts provided a broad interpretation of legitimacy obliges a state to protect fundamental individual rights. In practice, a number of other factors are therefore taken into account in the decision-making on so-called humanitarian interventions, such as the possibilities of international approval and status as a result of the intervention, the likelihood of success, the implications for the balance of power of the intervention, etc. Irrespective of the substance of the interpretation of legitimacy, agreement on the limits of political authority is fundamental to prevent domestic politics from creating havoc at the international level since it defines the boundaries of the obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Blurred boundaries concerning political authority lower the perceived level of protection of existing regimes since they can no longer predict which entities may fall victim to outside intervention. The result may be unstable balancing dynamics and the increased likelihood of preventive warfare against likely aggressors.
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For example, the broad interpretation of legitimacy adopted after the First World War, which resulted in the dissolution of the dynastic multinational Ottoman and Austro–Hungarian empires, concealed vastly different views on how the principle was to be implemented, as indicated by the divergent interpretations adopted by France and Denmark. Different notions of how to implement national self-determination meant that significant pockets of minorities ended up outside the borders of their ethnic homeland. Most conspicuously, the victors of the First World War ignored the vote of the Austrian population, who favoured joining Germany. In practice, French foreign policy decisions were made on the basis of the principle of effective control encouraging France to demand security guarantees against a restored Germany, which might challenge the legitimacy of the French government. By contrast, the United States tied in the notion of national self-determination with the idea of democratic peace, arguing that if political authority ultimately rested with the German people, they would remain peaceful and not seek to conquer territories inhabited by German minorities. Democracy rather than national self-determination was hence at the crux of the United States’ understanding of legitimacy. Germany, however, interpreted the idea of national self-determination literally, compelling the Weimar Republic to resist enforcement and work for the revision or overthrow of the Versailles Treaty. Predictably, the United States did not issue security guarantees to France, which was left to fend for itself, while Washington concentrated on the economic recovery of Germany. Germany used its gradual restoration to plan for the reunification of what it defined as the German motherland, plans that were realized with the Second World War (Kagan 1995: 281–436). The boundaries of political authority were blurred since France did not endorse the United States’ idea of democratic peace and hence focused on rearming against a future German threat. Germany similarly did not endorse the United States’ principle and expected France to oppose its prosperity to prevent German hegemony in Europe. The insecurity prevailing between France and Germany and the United States’ neglect of this problem partly explain why Germany decided to preempt the possibility of French opposition towards German influence with the subjugation and occupation of France. Hence, stable power balancing founded on coexistence never came into being after the First World War. For the rules of agreement to support coexistence, consensus is necessary on the institutions used for policy coordination on security issues to ensure stability and peace between the major powers. The English school does not normally consider organizations as fundamental institutions. However, the first generation of these scholars emphasizes the importance of major power management and the ability of these powers to use conference diplomacy as a tool for solving disagreements within common frameworks of decisionmaking on security issues. The existence of common institutions, whether these are informal like the ad hoc conferences used during the nineteenth century European Concert or formal like the series of arms control nego-
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 39 tiations that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is necessary to carry out security management. Greatpower management is not conceivable without some form of physical platform that brings together state leaders. The institutions discussed in this book define the limits of acceptable state conduct and provide a framework of joint decision-making within which contending states may adjust their differences on the rights and responsibilities of states. Common decisionmaking is needed because balances of power are political in the sense that politicians deliberately maintain them (Wight 1978: 180). Since states are the ultimate political authorities in the international realm, the decision to remain within rule-bound limits is not a question of law but of politics (Manning 1972: 301–55). States involved in the maintenance of a stable balancing pattern tend to apply the raison de système which says that the common good must not be sacrificed for the benefit of national interests (Wight 1991: 31). Major power disagreements are consequently resolved with respect for existing rules of coexistence, which means that a state might have to postpone the pursuance of, for example, goals of territorial expansion insofar as such an act is likely to upset the power equilibrium. If states fail to maintain a stable balance, it is not because order in the form of power balancing embedded in common rules of coexistence has become less important to them. Rather, it reflects that these rules are founded on a weak institutional framework that does not facilitate that states sacrifice the pursuance of national interests if these threaten the common interests of states. Ideally, institutions for policy coordination between the great powers provide a coherent set of guidelines for the rights and responsibilities of states in preserving international order that sustains coexistence. For example, the nineteenth century European Concert aimed to preserve peace by concerted diplomatic action which was reinforced by periodic conferences dealing with problems of mutual concern. Such concerns typically arose in cases of disagreement on whether specific foreign policy actions were in line with the existing political framework of coexistence. One incident that caused disagreement was the Greek insurrection in the Ottoman Empire causing Russia to demand an exclusive right of intervention to protect the Greeks against Turkish oppression on the grounds of an obligation to protect co-religionists. A Russian intervention threatened the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and hence, in Austria’s opinion, the dynastic principle and the principle of non-intervention in other states in the event that force was used, which would upset stable power balancing. A Russo-Turkish war would threaten Austria’s safety and the existing order that depended on constraining Russian territorial ambitions in Europe and on preventing nationalism from upsetting the European balance. Humanitarian considerations for the Greeks were thus, in Austria’s opinion, subordinate to maintaining the existing European order. To determine the sense of the allies and to preserve alliance unity, ad hoc ministerial conferences were
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held in Vienna which resulted in an agreement to separate the Greek question of human rights atrocities from the Turkish issue of breaches of Russo-Turkish treaty obligations, thwarting the Russian territorial ambitions. The agreement was confirmed by the European Congress gathering all European powers in Verona to ensure consent from the minor powers (Kissinger 1957: 286–311). The conference diplomacy of the early days of the European Concert did not merely serve the purpose of confirming prior agreement; it was central to demonstrate unity across Europe on a legitimizing principle on which to continue social oppression of nationalist forces such as those forming among Greeks. Nationalism was the major long-term threat against the survival of the multinational empire Austria, which formed one of the indispensable pillars in the European balance. By contrast, disagreement between the great powers on the appropriate institution for policy coordination on security issues results in competing definitions of the limits on state conduct. The resulting existence of multiple guidelines diminishes the possibility of upholding international agreements and security guarantees since, in the event of dissatisfaction with one political framework, states may opt for alternatives presented by other powers. The outcome may be an unstable balance of power with fragile strategic partnerships and fluctuating patterns of cooperation. The twentieth century interwar years were beset with this problem, since the United States never ratified the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which established the League of Nations and was meant to preserve European stability. The US critics that proved sufficiently influential to prevent the Senate’s approval did not approve of Washington’s commitment to safeguard European peace and stability, instead advocating a return to isolationism. Britain also abstained from such a commitment, favouring a policy of appeasement on the grounds that Britain had no interest in involving itself in continental power scrambles and favoured a revision of the treaty in favour of Germany, which was seen to have been unfairly treated in the process of meeting the national interests of the victors in the First World War. The US and British resistance towards the Treaty left the League of Nations with no powers to enforce the Covenant’s provisions of collective security, and, in reality, France was left to protect itself. The British version of the Treaty, which made Britain’s promise to protect France contingent upon US approval, was rejected on 19 November 1919. The German Weimar republic, which had been excluded from the League Assembly and did not form part of the League Council, which was the decision-making body in the event of a threat of war, resisted enforcement and worked for the revision or overthrow of the Versailles Treaty. Not surprisingly, Germany looked with approval upon subsequent US and British efforts to prevent France from rigorously enforcing the Versailles Treaty and revise the treaty’s provisions with the purpose of conciliating Germany. The efforts resulted in Germany’s permanent membership of the League Council, leaving Germany free to violate the Versailles Treaty. The goal of appeasement was, however, not reached as
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 41 evidenced by the beginning of the Second World War in 1939. The decade leading up to the war was marked by fluctuating patterns of cooperation, for example, Germany’s decision to collaborate with the Soviet Union despite British opposition (Kagan 1995: 281–436). The ability of major powers to manage their relations according to an agreed set of principles determines whether cooperation and conflict are patterned or random. In a stable order, conflicts over local or peripheral issues are likely to be resolved within the boundaries of existing security arrangements that preserve coexistence. According to Bull, states often pursue vastly different and conflicting objectives in the international realm, but in so far as their foreign policy is consistent with the common rules of behaviour, the status quo is not challenged (Bull 1977/1995: 64). For example, the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War, did not upset stable power balancing because the communist takeover in South Vietnam only set an example for its immediate neighbours, Laos and Cambodia (Gaddis 1997: 190). Likewise, the war did not upset the structure of coexistence sustaining stability through mutual nuclear deterrence and arms control, non-interference in the affairs of core states in the opposing alliance, and the authority of the UN Security Council; the United States had its alliance stronghold in Southeast Asia in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia was at the periphery of the Soviet sphere of influence. By contrast, conflict resolution in an unstable order is usually imposed due to the abandonment of the existing framework of obligations. In the words of Manning, some of the great powers agreeing on the political framework of the 1919 Versailles Treaty had reservations about the very nature of the game; that is to say, their views on the legitimate use of force, on regime legitimacy and on the institutions useful for policy coordination differed fundamentally from those of US President Woodrow Wilson (Manning 1975: 162). These differences sowed the seeds of subsequent wrangles that engendered the Second World War. In the interwar years, the vast differences between the French, US, British and German views on the preconditions for sustaining coexistence implied that they acted according to conflicting rules of the game. For example, German complaints about the conditions of the peace settlement after the First World War were taken into account because the United States and Britain were supportive and sufficiently strong to impose their will despite French protests. Stability is hence not necessarily associated with the absence of conflict and a high frequency of cooperation. This discussion of coexistence has attempted to demonstrate that periods of transition in patterns of power balancing are accompanied by instability due to disagreements on the just use of force, legitimate political authority and institutional settings. This was the situation during the second half of the nineteenth century with the rise of Bismarck to power in Prussia, and the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars were similarly marked by such fundamental disagreements. Such disagreements typically arise in areas where the
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spheres of influence of the great powers overlap and as a result of the failure of states to adjust the existing order to changes in the identities of the leading powers. Hence, Prussia’s understanding of the instruments necessary for the protection of national security could not be accommodated within the nineteenth century European Concert system. German, French and British interests were not considered to be adequately protected by the League of Nations system. This situation led to conflicting implementations of the provisions of the security arrangements in Europe. Periods of instability do not necessarily engender war, at least not immediately. The twentieth century interwar period in Europe lasted for 20 years, and Prussia and Germany gradually imposed revisions to nineteenth century security arrangements over a period of approximately 50 years. However, unstable power balancing not underpinned by a political framework of coexistence creates a dysfunctional international environment that allows states to pursue hegemonic aspirations at the expense of the common interests of states. The risk of violent conflict, blurred boundaries of political authority and competing institutions of policy coordination promote an inherent sense of insecurity in the international realm which prompts the states to spend undue resources on keeping the peace, because the nature of the game has changed and its rules have been abandoned; instead, states play their own games without adequate information on the games played by others. This unstable situation calls for relatively high expenditure on national defence and on diplomacy, enabling individual states to counter aggression, to withstand crises that may turn into violent conflict, and to constantly adjust to swiftly changing patterns of strategic cooperation. Such an international environment calls for compromise on revised mechanisms for sustaining peace and stability to adjust the existing order to changes in the identity of the leading powers. However, major powers contesting the foundations of order are not necessarily able to forge such compromises because they fear the loss of due influence. For this reason, this type of environment is more prone to war between the major powers. For example, the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century were characterized by repeated instances of wars and interventions engendering swiftly changing alliance patterns, such as Germany’s unexpected decision to break the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia in 1890, siding instead with Britain. In addition, the conference diplomacy bringing together the European powers to manage security issues did not devise a system that would permit the peaceful resolution of disputes. The 1878 congress of Berlin demonstrated that a new balance of power centred on Germany had come into being, but the treaties that had maintained coexistence between the European powers were replaced by a revised alliance system centring on the dual alliance between Germany and Austria, which was to keep the peace in Europe by preventing conflict between Austria and Russia (Kagan 1995: 106–8). This system was based on deterrence with no underlying common rules of state conduct, giving rise to repeated instances
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 43 of alliance defection, threats of war and diplomatic deception to conceal gaps between strategic capacity and political goals. Of course, such dynamics also characterized periods such as the Cold War. However, during the second half of the twentieth century, these dynamics were mainly at play at the fringes of the system rather than at the centre and hence did not significantly threaten the system of coexistence established between the United States and the Soviet Union. The theoretical framework above is based on the argument that stable power balancing is not merely achieved through equilibrium of power but also depends on agreement between the major powers on a system of coexistence that allows for conflict resolution on the basis of common constraints on the use of force, common definitions of regime legitimacy, and agreement on the institutions used for the management of international order. I will now turn to the question of the identity of the entities on which stable power balancing depends.
What makes a power great?: structural power vs. relational power in Asia-Pacific security Bull argues that great powers are at the front rank economically and militarily. Military capabilities that justify great-power status include the possession of strategic nuclear weapons. After this clarification, Bull concentrates on the managerial side of great powerhood (Bull 1977/1995: 194–222). Manning distinguishes between power and influence, arguing that states that are relatively weak in terms of capabilities may be more influential than states with major capabilities. Great powers are the powers deferred to as great by other states that recognize their superior strength (Manning 1975: 190–91). This is in line with Bull’s argument that there is a capabilities element as well as a recognition element in the status of great powerhood (Bull 1977/1995: 99). To Butterfield, great powerhood is a question of capabilities (Butterfield 1966: 132–75). Among the first generation of English school scholars, Wight offers the most detailed definitions of great powerhood, distinguishing between dominant powers and great powers (Wight 1978: 30–67). Dominant powers are states that aspire to gain mastery of the states system. Apart from having the capabilities to aspire for dominance, they must have designs of international unity and solidarity. One example is Henry V, king of England 1413–22, who dreamed of leading a reunited Christendom in the last crusade against the Turks. Coalitions overthrowing the dominant powers, however, rely on the balance of power to maintain what they usually describe as freedom and independence, as well as on treaties to revise international order to match the new realities of power once they have defeated the aspiring hegemon. According to Wight, the 1815 Congress of Vienna introduced the notion of power as the basis of the nineteenth century international order, leaving the strongest party in control of maintaining peace and stability in Europe,
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ignoring the characteristics of domestic political systems. Ironically, only when it was attempted to remove domestic legitimacy as a basis of international legitimacy of states did it become possible to have competing definitions of regime legitimacy. This development interrupted stable power balancing since legitimacy was confined to the domestic political arena in principle but not in practice, as witnessed by the British moral support for Greece’s secession from the Ottoman empire from 1827. Wight argues that the principal feature of the great powers is their propensity to monopolize the right to create international conflict. Furthermore, great powers are those with general interests as opposed to the limited interests of other powers. Responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and stability rest with the great powers, even if, in practice, the principal driving force behind their foreign policies remains the promotion of their national interests. The doctrines of equality and unanimity, built into systems such as the Concert of Europe and the UN Security Council, are designed to ensure that the major powers are not considered above the law, and as such the major powers are obliged to settle conflicts amongst them and consider the interests of the whole even if no one but themselves will test their practical adherence. A major power does not wait for recognition; it reveals itself by being a power that can confidently contemplate war against any other existing single power. Wight’s distinction between dominant powers and great powers is a convincing description of the power structure in contemporary Asia-Pacific security. The United States is beyond doubt a dominant power in the AsiaPacific with economic and military capabilities second to none as well as a functioning alliance system dating from the Cold War. The United States’ capabilities far surpass those of China and Japan, which can lay claim to region-wide interests but are unable to contemplate war against the United States. Wight’s definitions of dominant powers and great powers are not, however, easily applicable in practice since they contain no exactly measurable variables. Susan Strange’s definition of structural power is used to concretize Wight’s definitions. Structural power confers the power to decide how to do things and the power to shape the frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people or relate to corporate enterprises. Structural power can be found in four separate distinguishable but related structures: security, production and credit, as well as knowledge, beliefs and ideas (Strange 1988/1994: 25–32). First, as long as violent conflict threatens personal security, whoever offers protection against this threat can exercise power over other non-security matters. Second, according to Strange, the production facet is just as fundamental as the security facet mentioned above. The production facet is concerned with the issues of who decides what to produce, how to produce it and for whom, how to combine land, labour, capital and technology in the production, as well as how to reward. Third, whoever gains the confidence of others in their ability to create credit will enjoy structural power. Fourth, knowledge is power, and whoever is able to
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 45 develop or acquire and to deny the access of others to generally valued and sought-after knowledge will also exercise structural power; and whoever can control the channels by which this knowledge is communicated to those given access to it, will exercise structural power. This concept of ideational power relies on knowledge in areas such as technology, research and development, since Strange’s understanding of power is based on a realist capabilities argument. In this book, Wight’s English school understanding of ideational power combining a capabilities argument with a value-based argument will be employed instead, defining the concept as designs of international unity and solidarity in the form of a goal based in ideology, religion or historical mythology, as well as the capabilities to implement that goal. Wight’s definition is here understood to encompass the policies on the use of force, legitimacy and institutions making up dominant powers’ version of international order. This definition implies that ideational power consists of an operational element allowing for the implementation of the dominant power’s policies on the use of force that encompasses its strategy to obtain and maintain a dominant position at the international level. Second, Wight’s definition of ideational power implies a civilizational element in the form of beliefs based in ideology, religion or historical mythology investing the dominant power with policies on legitimate political authority. Third, the definition implies a structural element, not to be confused with Strange’s structural power concept, in the form of an institutional network through which the dominant power may spread its ideational power. A dominant power commands a capabilities basis consisting of security, production and credit power that is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of dominant power status. A dominant power also commands the complex element of ideational power allowing it to use its capabilities to implement its version of international order. Strange is preoccupied with the characteristics of dominant powers rather than those of great powers, which are defined as those capable of exercising relational power, i.e. the power of A to get B to do something B would not otherwise do. This is a somewhat inadequate definition for the purposes of this book, which distinguishes between the foreign policies of dominant, great and middle powers. A great power is therefore further defined as a power that commands some of the facets of structural power, investing it with the potential to challenge the dominant power by getting it to do something it would not otherwise do, but with insufficient power to overtake the position of the dominant power in the international realm on its own. For example, if a great power commands structural power in the areas of production and credit, it may be able to challenge the material power basis of the dominant power, but it has to buy into the ideational power of other states to be able to challenge the position of the dominant power. A great power may also command structural ideational power, which enables it to challenge the dominant power’s version of international order. However, it has to cooperate with other powers to challenge the position of the dominant
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power since it has insufficient economic and military capabilities to implement its version of international order on its own. Both dominant powers and great powers are hence sufficiently strong to determine, as pointed out by Wight, if international relations are characterized by conflict or by coexistence, implying that both types of powers have general interests encompassing responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and stability.
The dominant power: the United States On the above-mentioned criteria, the United States qualifies as a dominant power, and China and Japan as great powers with elements of structural power. The United States is beyond doubt a dominant power in the AsiaPacific with economic and military capabilities second to none. The United States’ military power is likely to outmatch the combined military power of China, Japan, Russia and India for the next 20 years. The United States has the security facet of power, principally because of its edge in military technology, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which became a central element in the objectives of US defence strategy from the late 1990s. Technologically advanced systems and concepts such as stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, standoff robotic weapons and advanced sensors allow US military forces to perform at levels of effectiveness many times greater than forces equipped with previous generation gear such as those of China. This, in turn, has enabled US forces to accomplish missions that might otherwise have been regarded as infeasible (IISS 2005a: 19–37). For example, during Operation Northern Watch, a US European Command Combined Task Force charged with enforcing the UN mandated no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq and with monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council directives from 1996 to 2003, improved air-to-ground missile technology aided US combat troops in aiming at 225 targets over a period of one year. An indication of Washington’s power in the area of security is the attention China pays to the asymmetrical military balance resulting from the RMA, which is led by the United States, in part because it can afford to invest substantially in military technology, nuclear arsenals and information warfare (interview with high-ranking Chinese military official 20–11–2004; The State Council Information Office 2004). In terms of manpower, the United States commands 1,473,960 troops, approximately two-thirds of the troops available to China.5 However, the United States outperforms number two on the list, Russia, approximately eight times, with defence expenditures at US$ 490,621 million.6 This leads us to the second aspect of power, that of production. The technology prowess and inventiveness of the United States exceed the rest of the world combined. The US expenditure on research and development as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) was 2.82 per cent, allowing the United States to rank sixth among the OECD countries.7 The
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 47 reason for the leading position of the United States is hence not merely expenditure but also the characteristics of the US capitalist production system. One example is the US lead in biotechnology and genome science, an area that took early root because the government both encouraged capital’s early involvement with biotechnology and technology transfer and, closely attuned to capital’s needs, heightened its support of genome science in a manner fitting to competitive market needs (Loeppky 2005: 264–86). In 2004, the value of US trade was US$ 1,769 billion, exceeding China’s entire GDP of US$ 1,650 billion in the same year.8 The gross national product (GNP) of the United States accounts for 26 per cent of the world’s total.9 Its foreign direct investment outflows in 2004 totalled US$ 229 billion, constituting approximately one-third of the world’s total and leaving the United States at the global front rank in terms of access to foreign markets (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005a). The receiving countries obtain some measure of control over the United States due to the vulnerability of foreign investments to political and economic developments abroad. However, US direct investments are spread all over the world, implying that on balance, the United States derives more power from its foreign direct investments than do the receiving states. Its foreign direct investment inflows in 2004 totalled US$ 96 billion, constituting approximately 15 per cent of the world total. These figures indicate that the United States is the most attractive market in the world (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005a). The costs for states that are subject to US embargoes are therefore high. For example, US President Eisenhower’s initiation of an embargo on publicly produced Cuban sugar, with effect from 1961, left the communist state heavily dependent on subsidies from the Eastern bloc, which by 1984 cost the Soviet Union some US$ 4.6 billion per year (Dunbabin 1994: 200). With the implosion of the Soviet Union, Cuba’s economic hardship became much more pronounced, as implied by Havana’s mounting difficulties in maintaining its pride, the hospitals, at international standards of excellence. Altogether, the structural power exercised by the United States in the area of production is second to none. The system of US monetary hegemony was founded on the Bretton Woods system, which gave control to a series of governmental and regulatory organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, ultimately, the US Federal Reserve. The system was effectively dismantled in 1971 when President Nixon decoupled the dollar from the gold standard. This move made the dollar inconvertible de jure and added a 10 per cent surcharge to all imports from Europe to the United States, effectively pushing the entire US debt onto Europe. What remained was structural US power in the area of credit (Hardt and Negri 2000: 266). Its net imports of goods and services were US$ 624 billion in 2004, implying that since 1991 the United States has yet again run a major deficit that currently amounts to approximately 5 per cent of its GDP.10 The United States may not be able to continuously ignore the burden of external debt service, and it is conceivable
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that at some point, global investors will stop acquiring more US assets, for example in the event that the euro proves competitive with the US dollar as a reserve currency (Mann 2000: 42–45). However, this type of scenario remains speculative, and the recurring ability of the United States to run a trade deficit over sustained periods of time in part reflects the continued world-wide appeal of the US dollar as an international currency (B. Cohen 2002: 307). For example, China cannot pull the plug on the US dollar in practice because the costs for China would be too high, meaning that it would be suicidal to do so. China has adequately demonstrated its eagerness to build up its economic and military resources and is not likely to risk jeopardizing its current position through such action. Hence, US structural power in the area of credit remains unchallenged. One element in US ideational power is the ideas of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony (Gaddis 2004). They are the operational element in the US version of regional order and represent post-Cold War US policies on the use of force. A second element in US ideational power is the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy and market economy. These are the civilizational element in the US version of regional order, representing US policies on legitimacy. A third element in US ideational power is the US alliance system. This is the structural element in the US version of regional order, representing US policies on institutions. In the post-Cold War era, pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony have been the principal US strategies for maintaining its position of dominance. Pre-emption means the prior seizure of entities such as territory, groups or equipment expected to generate insecurity at a future date (Gaddis 2004: 16–22; The White House 2006). The US post-Cold War definition of pre-emption involves a revised definition of imminent threat, weakening the threat that normally justifies pre-emption in standard definitions of international law. For example, suspicions of contributions to terrorist activities are sufficient to justify pre-emption according to Washington. Pre-emption consequently includes preventive war as well as such policies as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the detention without trial of individuals suspected of terrorist activities (Bolton 2004; The White House 2002b). Unilateralism implies that the United States cannot rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety and therefore should be prepared to act on its own (Gaddis 2004: 22–26). The US post-Cold War definition of unilateralism involves the continuation of the missile defence programme, the retention and upgrading of a large nuclear arsenal, and the reorganization of its force posture to increase its rapid power projection capabilities. Hegemony implies the rejection of the idea that the United States could or should exist on equal terms with any other great power on the North American continent. Hegemony hence entails a commitment to maintain a preponderance of power as distinct from a balance of power.11 Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the only dominant power at the international level, which encourages Washington to opt for global hegemony.
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 49 The spread of the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy and market economy is the long-term strategy for preserving the US position of dominance. The liberal idea of civil rights is based on the demand for respect for the autonomy of individuals (Vincent 1986: 17–36). A society based on individual autonomy requires the protection of civil rights by means of law to ensure the right to life and property as well as the obligation to respect agreements. No entity, not even the state, ranks above the law, and as such, the state apparatus itself is also obliged to respect the law. The liberal idea of democracy involves that the people are sovereign and that their will is respected by means of the right to elect representatives for the management of political authority. In essence, the liberal democratic model implies that adult members of society determine what constitutes the good life and how it is realized. The liberal idea of the market entails that economic growth is the road to prosperity. This economic philosophy implies that the state plays a minor role in the economy, which allows the decisions of market agents to engender the most effective use of resources. The US interpretation of the concepts of civil rights, democracy and market economy after the Cold War involves the idea of globalizing these liberal concepts to ensure the strengthening of international peace, security and prosperity. As it has been embraced world-wide by and large, economic globalization is not a fundamentally contested issue. According to some analysts, governments cannot resist the tides of international trade and finance, but instead compete for the benefits of globalization by accommodating themselves as much as possible to the preferences of market agents to enhance their wealth. In trade, this means opening the economy to foreign competition through commercial exchange and direct investment. In finance, it means creating an environment of sound monetary and fiscal policies to sustain the confidence of creditors and portfolio managers (B. Cohen 2002: 302). Economic globalization is a more pervasive feature in terms of trade than in terms of finance, but the trend points consistently towards enhanced financial interpenetration. Consequently, at present the principal US concern is to keep the United States the economic leader of the world by the advancing of proposals for economic freedom through open markets (The White House 2005a, 2006). Liberal democratic and legal globalization has, however, yet to take root. The United States still has a mission to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbours, the advance of freedom will lead to peace (The White House 2005a). The United States believes in the concept of democratic peace meaning that international peace is best engendered by democracies governed by law. Such states are less likely to go to war against each other because they consider each other legitimate entities behaving in accordance with common rules of state conduct (Fukuyama 1991/92: 18). The US goal of spreading democracy may be traded in for stability in the
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short term, but it remains the long-term goal of US governments. Even the second Bush administration, which shows tendencies to prioritize stability rather than democratization, has promised to fight terrorism by military means in the first instance to create the preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy in the long run, arguing that peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom defined as democracy (The White House 2005a, 2006). The third element in Washington’s ideational power is the US alliance system. It originates from the Cold War threat of Sino-Soviet expansion and does not merely encompass the customary understanding of alliances as pacts of mutual military assistance. Rather, the United States developed an extensive system of alignments of which the actual military alliances formed the iron core. Initially, the Soviet Union was surrounded by a virtual power vacuum along its entire periphery, from Scandinavia and the British Isles, along the rimlands of Eurasia, to Japan and Korea. The United States therefore established and maintained a substantial military presence in and close to the chief Eurasian danger areas, projecting US power across the water barriers (Wolfers 1962: 206–9). After the Cold War, the US alliance, or perhaps more precisely, alignment system has remained in place. One of the core strategic objectives of US national defence is to strengthen the country’s security relationships with traditional allies and to develop new international partnerships, working to increase the capabilities of its partners to contend with common challenges (The White House 2006). The US overseas military presence operates in and from four forward regions: Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral and the Middle East– Southwest Asia (Department of Defense of the United States of America March 2005). The United States has embarked on a comprehensive realignment of the US global defence posture to enable US forces to undertake military operations world-wide, reflecting the global nature of US interests. However, the continued prioritization of the Asia-Pacific in the US military force posture testifies to the fact that this region is of primary significance to US interests, and as such it is pivotal for the United States to assure partners, dissuade military competition, deter aggression and coercion, and be able to take prompt military action in this region. The continued ability of the United States to perform in these capacities constitutes the structure that aids the US attempt to implement the other aspects of its ideational power in the Asia-Pacific.
The great powers: China and Japan China is not a dominant power, but it has the ideational element of structural power that allows it to challenge US pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing’s military capabilities are considerable, among them a nuclear capability weaker than that of the United States and Russia, including approximately 30 intercontinental ballistic missiles and approximately 110
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 51 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as a certain space capacity. In 2003, China became the third country after the United States and Russia to achieve a manned space mission. Furthermore, China pursues advanced defensive and power projection capabilities. China’s defence modernization priorities include reforms driven by the American-led Revolution in Military Affairs, having fewer but better troops, and stepping up its military posture across the Taiwan Strait. China’s defence budget is estimated to supersede that of Russia in 2004 with a level of expenditure at US$ 62.5 billion, surpassed only by US defence budgets (IISS 2005d: 270). Substantial amounts of the PLA’s budget allocated to the procurement of weaponry are used to buy arms and defence-related technology from Russia. By 2004, China was expected to have received fighter aircraft, amphibious assault ships, fastattack aircraft, missile destroyers and submarines (IISS 2005d: 260). China also spends heavily on military communication satellites. So far, China’s military pretensions depend on access to Russian arms and know how, but its military modernization programme aims consciously at decreasing its dependency on external sources of military arms and technology (IISS 2004c: 161–62, 170–71). China uses considerable resources on transforming its armed forces from self-sufficiency in manpower to self-sufficiency in military technology to be able to adopt swift and flexible defence responses to geographic and non-geographic threats. In terms of manpower, China ranks number one in the world, commanding 2,255,000 active troops (IISS 2005d: 270). However, due to the Revolution in Military Affairs, manpower is not very significant to the military capacity of a state nowadays. Beijing’s political-strategic reach encompasses Northeast, Southeast, Central and South Asia, in contrast to Moscow, whose reach does not go beyond Central Asia. However, its dependency on Russian arms deliveries leaves China at approximately the level of Russia in terms of security, with the capabilities of a great power. Its arduous efforts to catch up with the Revolution in Military Affairs, however, reveal that China is far from the level of structural power commanded by the United States. In terms of production, China similarly commands no structural power. Despite surging economic growth rates, estimated at 9.1 per cent of GDP in 2004 (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2005), China’s GDP was US$ 1650 billion in 2004, which is only a fraction of the US GDP at US$ 11,734 billion (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 2005b). However, China is still a country struggling with poverty. China’s trade only accounts for 4 per cent of the world’s total, and China’s commodities production only accounts for 9 per cent of the world’s total. Approximately half of China’s labour force is working in the agricultural sector (Royal Danish Embassy, Singapore 2005). Hence, China only qualifies as a great power by the skin of its teeth in terms of production power; indeed, its claim to great powerhood is mainly justified by expectations of becoming a global economic power due to high economic growth rates sustained for more than two decades.
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China’s claim to great powerhood is similarly flawed if considering the question of credit. China’s current account balance was US$ 68,659 million, in 2004 confirming that China is an exporting state that heavily penetrates foreign markets to earn foreign currency (The World Bank 2005b). In 2005, Washington pushed for a revaluation of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, to curb China’s economic growth. China complied, revaluing the renminbi by 2.1 per cent. Although this was far less than the 27.5 per cent adjustment called for by several US senators, the incident indicates the vast differences in credit power between the United States and China (Roach 2005). The fact that China has not yet adopted a financial regime of currency flexibility indicates that in terms of credit China is a vulnerable state, whose economy can easily be adversely affected by fluctuating exchange rates. The United States is not immune to Chinese currency revaluations since these could lead to devaluations of the US dollar and rising interest rates. However, the risks for the Chinese economy are much greater than the risk run by the United States. China has the ideational element of structural power that allows it to challenge US pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific. One element of Chinese ideational power are the ideas of cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity. They are the operational elements of China’s version of regional order and represent Chinese post-Cold War policies on the use of force. A second element of Chinese ideational power are the ideas of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning. They are the civilizational element of China’s version of regional order, representing Chinese policies on legitimacy. A third element in Chinese ideational power is the UN system of the Cold War. This is the structural element of China’s version of regional order, representing Chinese policies on institutions. In the postCold War era, cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity have been the principal Chinese strategies for challenging US pre-eminence. Cooperative security is concerned with the process of building trust and mutual confidence in the expectation that the continuous extension of the practice of multilateral cooperation will make the risk of armed conflict disappear in due course (Yahuda 2003: 192). It involves the use of diplomatic means to test whether the surroundings are willing to take into account Chinese demands and interests. Chinese unilateralism is similar to that of the United States in that it implies that Beijing cannot rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety, and therefore should be prepared to act on its own. However, Chinese unilateralism differs from that of the United States by being a passive military build-up designed to prepare for fighting a future war, since China is in no position to encourage the use of force for foreign policy purposes at the present time. China does not make a secret of its prioritization of reforms driven by the Revolution in Military Affairs with the purpose of allowing China to be self-sufficient in military technology (The State Council Information Office 2004). Multipolarity implies the emergence of new poles in the Third World, Western Europe, North America, Australia, Northeast Asia, South Asia and Eurasia (Hughes 2005: 125). The
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 53 Chinese concept of multipolarity does not imply traditional power balancing through alliances, but through the looser concept of strategic partnerships. In practice, multipolarity involves partial cooperation with powers that are willing to counter US security policies in their sub-regions, hence forming the basis for China’s poaching on US alliances and partnerships. The civilizational elements of Chinese ideational power are historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning. China’s experience of having been deprived of its own fate has instilled in the Chinese mind-set a sense of inalienable right to correct past wrongs. What used to be its property is to remain its property, implying that China is not inclined to forget past assaults on its possessions and begin anew. The result is an inflexible definition of territorial sovereignty, involving a continued commitment to recover its unilaterally defined territorial rights (Tzou 1990: 13). The implication for Chinese foreign policy is that the post-Cold War efforts to negotiate outstanding border issues with neighbouring states centre on interim rather than permanent settlements. Hierarchical bandwagoning derives from the Chinese concept of space. Originally, the Chinese ruler or emperor was located at the centre, protected by his closest liege-lords, and at the periphery were the barbarians who were not really human (translated by Ricket, quoted in Yates 1994: 62). If barbarians accepted Chinese culture as their civilization, they were reclassified as tributary states and left to govern as they saw fit, while the Chinese ruler retained symbolic control (Callahan 1994: 118–24). If the tributary states violated Chinese superiority, military force was used to attempt to maintain Chinese control. This concept of space implies that a hierarchy based on moral superiority or superior power takes shape in the international realm (Odgaard 2002b: 209). The Chinese hierarchical system does not per se involve infringement of the political authority of other states, but may rely on economic integration and migration that cause the weaker powers to bandwagon with the stronger power. Due to insufficient military capabilities, contemporary China must rely on these means to implement a Chinese-style hierarchy. The third element in Beijing’s ideational power is the UN system of the Cold War. China justifies its foreign policy by reference to the UN system’s fundamental principles of absolute sovereignty, effective governmental control and the authority of the UN Security Council. This system corresponds closely to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that have formed the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since 1982 (CongressionalExecutive Commission in China 1982). The UN is the principal platform for China on which to demonstrate its commitment to universal principles of state conduct and to show that China is a responsible power fulfilling its obligations towards the international community. Hence, the UN offers a persuasive means of demonstrating that China’s pursuit of national interests is embedded in globally accepted principles of state conduct centred on absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council in global security management (interview with Associate Research
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Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). The Chinese alternative to the revised US alliance system is a conservative structure designed to postpone the consolidation of a Pax Americana until China is sufficiently economically and militarily strong to attempt the implementation of an Asia-Pacific order based on Chinese interests. At least to some extent, Beijing has been successful in implementing its version of regional order in the Asia-Pacific on the basis of the political power engendered by the ideational element of China’s structural power. The result is a competitive model to the dominant US version of regional order which allows other states to alternately side with the two powers without making a firm commitment. This situation does not represent a plausible threat towards US pre-eminence as long as China does not command structural power in the fields of security, production and finance, but it does sustain a situation of unstable power balancing. China is called a great power because it has elements of structural power that allow it to implement an alternative to the dominant US order in the Asia-Pacific with the assistance of other regional powers without threatening to overthrow US pre-eminence. Japan also possesses this ability and is hence the second great power with elements of structural power in the Asia-Pacific. Japan has the production and credit elements of structural power that allow it to challenge US preeminence in the region, but Tokyo has no desire to do so at present because it relies on the US alliance system to contain China. In the area of security, Japan is constitutionally constrained by its Article nine, which prohibits Japanese use of force for purposes other than self-defence, leaving responsibility for regional security issues to its US ally. However, these constraints have slowly been loosened in the post-Cold War period (Qingguo 2000). A consensus has emerged behind a possible reworking of Article nine that will lift the ban on participation in collective security initiatives. Another indication that Japanese defence autonomy is increasing is Tokyo’s acquisition of weapons that increase the range and independence of the armed forces and redirect their focus from a reactive to an active defence posture. Furthermore, although Japan is not a nuclear power, Tokyo possesses the technology to enable it to acquire nuclear weapons within a few weeks (interview with a researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis 27–1–2005). Japan had 239,900 active armed forces in 2004, which is not an impressive feature, indicating the high technological level of Tokyo’s defence. Its defence spending was US$ 45.1 billion in 2004, leaving Japan with the fourth largest defence budget in the Asia-Pacific (IISS 2005d: 279). Modernization of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces involves pursuance of a defence posture which will allow it to position itself as a significant strategic player in the Asia-Pacific with or without support from Washington. However, Japan remains dependent on the United States to remain at the forefront in terms of military technology, and as such it does not possess structural power in the realm of security.
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 55 Japan does, however, have structural power in the area of production. Japan is clearly an economic giant. It is the second largest economy in the world, with a GDP of US$ 3,788 billion in 2004, only superseded by the United States (OECD 2004b). The value of Japanese trade in goods and services in 2003 was US$ 394.5 billion, which leaves it in a position as the third largest trader in the world after the United States and Germany (OECD 2006). Japanese foreign direct investment outflows in 2004 totalled US$ 31 billion, making it the seventh largest investor in the world (OECD 2004a). Japanese investments are spread across the world’s regions in fairly equal shares, another indicator of Japan’s structural power in the area of production (Ministry of Finance Japan 2004). Japanese products dominate markets in shipbuilding, steel, chemicals, consumer electronics and automobiles because they represent quality and innovation (Hook et al. 2001: 10). Japan spent US$ 133 billion on research and development in 2002, only surpassed by the United States (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005b). Japan has less proficiency in using technology to increase productivity than in applying technological innovations in manufacturing. The structural constraints on the ability of the Japanese labour force to think in terms of structural innovation leave it far behind the US potential for innovation. Nevertheless, Japan’s global power and reach in terms of production have been maintained despite 15 years of excess debt, excess capacity and excess employment in the private sector, and by 2005 Japan’s profitability and global competitiveness were on the rise again. Structural economic reforms, such as reduced cross shareholding, changed accounting standards, and improved infrastructure to allow for better and more transparent capital markets, underscore that Japan is committed to implementing the policies necessary to sustain its global production power. Japan is likely to become a powerful engine of growth in the Asia-Pacific once again (Koll 2005: 11–15). In the area of credit, Japan is similarly a significant power. Japanese net exports of goods and services were US$ 94 million in 2004 (The World Bank Group 2005c). Japan is hence a creditor nation. Indeed, Japan’s external net assets amounted to ¥ 185 trillion in 2005, making it the largest creditor in the world (‘Japan still No. 1 in terms of net external assets’ 2005). The figure emphasizes the global financial power of Japan, but it also points to the fact that Japan is not an attractive market for foreign investors. Nevertheless, Japanese overseas assets encourage the outside world to accommodate Tokyo’s demands to attract Japanese investments. Japanese credit is also a potential basis for selling out assets in large quantities in a particular country such as the United States, which would adversely affect the growth rates in the country targeted. In practice, such a move would, however, be suicidal since those selling out assets would lose significant amounts of capital. Nevertheless, Japanese ownership of a massive amount of assets does allow Japan to exercise leverage because the government can decide to spend or withhold large resources from other states (Lincoln 2003).
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Japan has, however, never made much active use of its structural power in the areas of production and credit, presumably because it does not command ideational power and, in view of persistent Sino-Japanese enmity, has no alternative to the vision of regional order suggested by the United States. Tokyo has therefore remained Washington’s most faithful ally during the post-World War Two period. Japan now pursues its national interests with greater vigour but without presenting a plausible framework for regional order. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1993 partly due to Japanese initiative, might constitute a potential institutional basis of regional order. However, like the United States and China, Japan has not shown interest in promoting preventive diplomacy within this framework, and as a consequence the ARF has remained a failed vision of regional order. Japan instead gravitates towards the US version of regional order based on the Cold War alliance system. Japan has not entered the competition for influence on the principles governing regional security arrangements as an independent power. For the time being, Japan is therefore not making active use of its structural power to propose an alternative to the US version of regional order. Should it attempt to do so, it is likely to be motivated by mistrust in the willingness of the United States to protect Japan against Chinese encroachments on its interests. Japan is capable of translating its structural economic power into military power and using it for purposes of balancing the power of China. The absence of an ideational element of power prevents Tokyo from suggesting an alternative to US preeminence. Should it choose to assert its power at a future date, it is likely to do so purely to promote its national interests without consideration for the demands of other regional powers. As long as Japan remains the core ally of the dominant power the United States, China is forced to rely on other powers that share China’s interest in constraining US pre-eminence and are sufficiently powerful to be able to refrain from choosing sides between the two states. This in-between position allows China to continue to challenge US pre-eminence without promoting the emergence of a Sino-centric order in the Asia-Pacific. Such in-between powers are here called middle powers.
The middle powers: Russia, South Korea, India and ASEAN The role of middle powers in power balancing depends on the degree of stability between the dominant powers and the great powers (Holbraad 1984: 13). Middle powers have little influence on regional order management when great-power balancing is stable. In this case, where international stability is not threatened, the middle powers have little incentive to use their limited resources on regional order; instead, they will concentrate on other priorities such as economic development. By contrast, in periods of transition, when security arrangements have not been revised to accommodate changes in the distribution of power, middle powers may be able to obtain
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 57 influence out of proportion to their resources. Middle powers have a special interest in staying on good terms with all major powers since their strategically advantageous positions in comparison to lesser powers depend on their good-will with all of these. The position of a middle power depends on having sufficient capabilities to convince the major powers that it may make a significant contribution to sub-regional stability. Middle powers must have economic capabilities significantly greater than the regional small powers, but smaller than the regional great powers. Economic capability is the most reliable indicator of power compared with variables such as population, area, location, resources, organization and leadership. Military capability such as the size of the armed forces and military expenditure is equally important for middle power status, as a middle power must be able to discourage military intervention from hostile major powers (Wight 1978: 65). Military capability rests on economic capability, but also on political priority and alliance relations. Consequently, this capability indicates power in the medium rather than the long term (Holbraad 1984: 78–79). Military capability can be obtained by proxy, namely through an alliance with a great power committed to deterring enemies of the middle power. However, should alliance relations become strained the middle power must possess sufficient economic capacity to take over responsibility for its self-defence. The geographic location of a middle power is also important because it affects its ability to influence and to intervene. The range of influence of a middle power does not go beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The most effective method for middle powers to influence security arrangements is, if possible, to avoid choosing sides between the contending powers, since if so positioned, they may be able to influence both. As middle powers do not have the same resources as great powers, they cannot determine or manage security arrangements, but they can contribute to their construction or remodelling. As it is beyond their capability to create permanent balancing patterns with stable management mechanisms, they concentrate on conflict management in their immediate environment, which will allow them to influence sub-regional order in the short to medium term. Concern for stability is not necessarily their driving force. Rather, it may very well be to maximize national interests, such as maintaining a dominant sub-regional position. However, to most unaligned middle powers, the dangers and opportunities presented by a high level of tension between the major powers will seem too great not to respond to if they are in a position to exercise influence (Holbraad 1984: 127). Even states formally aligned with one major power may opt for cooperation with both sides (Holbraad 1984: 144). Middle powers have limited influence because their positions are highly dependent on their attractiveness to the major powers. This role is usually not accompanied by formal recognition and often goes unnoticed due to the lack of publicity on this role. During the Cold war, middle powers had
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limited leeway because conflict resolution was in the hands of the major powers. By contrast, the divergent post-Cold War strategies of regional order pursued by the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific produce a random pattern of rivalry and cooperation. This in-between situation leaves middle powers with considerable leeway to influence sub-regional orders. On the above-mentioned criteria, Russia, South Korea and India qualify as middle powers in the Asia-Pacific. Russia’s military capabilities are greater than those of China, with independent military technology able to produce the whole range of advanced weaponry. In 2004, Russia’s armed forces consisted of 1,037,000 active troops, and its defence budget was US$ 61.9 billion. Russia’s defence expenditures are declining, while those of China are rising. This development implies that without the economic basis to sustain, let alone expand, its capability, Russia cannot make a plausible bid for great-power status. The World Bank classifies Russia, with a GDP of US$ 432,855 million in 2003, as a moderately indebted lower middle income country faring worse than China, which is classified as a less indebted lower middle income country (The World Bank 2005a: table 4.2; World Bank list of economies 2004). Russia has considerable oil and gas resources. Although these have contributed to recent improvements in the Russian economy, they are hardly a viable basis for a great-power economy. Indeed, increasing reliance on earnings from hydrocarbon exports may serve to postpone long overdue structural economic reforms that might bring Russia into the top league of global economies. Its armed forces provide ample indications of a public system that is not economically viable. Thus, Moscow sells arms to almost any state willing to buy them to ameliorate its economic problems; Russia has insufficient resources and manpower to maintain the command networks and early-warning systems of its strategic nuclear forces (Busch 2002: 44–90); the high retirement rate for officers makes it impossible to train sufficient replacements; the average annual flight time for air force pilots is only 20 per cent of the standard requirement, etc. (IISS 2004c: 97–99). The painful military reform process undertaken to address these problems reflects Russia’s transformation from a world power with a vision of global order into an Asia-Pacific middle power reduced to persuading the United States and China to take its demands for regional order into account. The basis of this policy is Russia’s nuclear capability combined with substantial conventional capabilities. Russia is sufficiently strong to avoid subservience to great-power demands and to conduct a foreign policy of alternating gravitation towards the United States and China. Moscow’s decision in December 2004 to postpone the construction of an oil pipeline to China and redirect it towards the Pacific and Japan, and then re-open negotiations in 2005 on a pipeline deal with Beijing indicates its determination to maintain a high level of flexibility in its relations with China. In the Asia-Pacific, Russia’s strategic reach does not go beyond the Central Asian region of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Even in this part of the former Soviet Union, Russia has
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 59 been unable to sustain hegemony and has maximized its national interests since the mid-1990s by alternately gravitating towards the United States and China without choosing sides. Russia has been a part of the six-party talks during the second US–North Korean nuclear standoff that began in 2002 and is potentially able to wield considerable influence. Nevertheless, it has not been willing to do so since the issue is not at the top of its foreign policy agenda. Russia is mainly interested in avoiding the outbreak of violent conflict. With the exception of the question of multilateral dialogue, Russia gravitates towards the Chinese position. Urgent security concerns such as Chechen separatism and Central Asian terrorism have, however, resulted in half-hearted support for Beijing’s policy. During the six-party talks Russia has scored diplomatic victories when it was convenient and did not require much of an effort, but in general it has been unwilling to play a central role in the negotiations due to pressing security concerns closer to home. In Northeast Asia, South Korea relies on US military deterrence. In 2004, South Korea’s armed forces consisted of 687,700 armed troops, and its defence expenditures amounted to US$ 16.3 billion, which makes it the smallest of the Asia-Pacific middle powers (IISS 2005d: 284). However, South Korea has the economic capacity to take over its own defence. In 2004, South Korea’s GDP was US$ 673.7 billion, which positions it as the fifth largest economy in the Asia-Pacific after the United States, Japan, China and India despite a relatively small population of approximately 48 million people (The World Bank Group 2004). South Korea was hit relatively hard by the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 and has since slowly embarked on an economic reform programme, mainly to break the hold of large, multiindustry conglomerates, called chaebol, over the financial sector. South Korea has also experienced continuously low demand for its exports. Despite these shortcomings, South Korea remains a relatively successful developed economy in the Asia-Pacific with a current account balance of US$ 29.6 million and a real GDP growth rate of 4.6 per cent in 2004 (The US Government 2005). Developments confirm that Seoul is also willing to use its economic surplus to assume greater responsibility for its national defence, which is narrowly directed against defending the country against an attack from its principal enemy, North Korea. For example, in an answer to a US proposal in June 2004 to withdraw a third of its troops by December 2005 and to replace them with sophisticated weapons such as anti-missile systems, President Roh stated that South Korea should assume a greater role in its own defence (‘ROK Leader Moots New Security Roadmap’ 2004). According to the South Korean defence community, South Korea now accepts more responsibility for its national security, seeing this as an opportunity to develop a more mature relationship with the United States and to adjust existing asymmetries in the US–South Korean alliance (interview with a professor, National Defense University 12–1–2005; interview with a researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis 24–1–2005). South Korea’s interests are almost exclusively centred on the Korean
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peninsula and do not extend into the wider region. However, the Korean question brings into play both the US and Chinese versions of regional order in the Asia-Pacific because it touches upon the questions of the use of force, regime legitimacy and institutions for the management of security issues. In particular, the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff has tested the commitment of the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea to the two versions of acceptable state conduct. For example, the issue of preemption versus cooperative diplomacy has emerged as different strategies for conflict resolution during the crisis. The question of regime legitimacy has predominantly been on the agenda due to the divergent views on the status of Kim Jong-Il’s government. In addition, the Taiwan issue comes into play because the standoff threatens to break the link between communist North Korea and democratic Taiwan established by Beijing’s unofficial vow to refrain from bringing about reunification with the island by military means if the United States adopts the same policy on the Korean peninsula (interview with Professor Kim, Sung-Han, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28–1–2005). Furthermore, the question of institutions for the management of security issues has emerged with, on one side, the US advocacy of the use of the UN system to denounce North Korea as a pariah state, and, on the other side, China’s advocacy of ad hoc negotiations between legally equal entities on the grounds that military and economic sanctions challenge the sanctity of the UN principles of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. The nuclear standoff also brings South Korea’s siding with the United States as well as China to the fore, predominantly because Seoul’s short- and medium-term security interests dictate a policy of cooperation with China during the second US–North Korean nuclear standoff, whereas its long-term security interests correspond closer to the US version of regional order. Even though it is not the only security issue of importance in Northeast Asia, the Korean issue brings into play the central themes that concern the dynamics of power balancing and stability between the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Mongolia.12 India is the third middle power in the Asia-Pacific. India is a so-called rising power with aspirations to be a power on a par with China, and New Delhi certainly understands itself as such. However, its economic and military capabilities merely justify middle power status. In 2004, India’s GDP was US$ 691.9 billion, which is approximately the same as the much smaller South Korean state. Like that of China, India’s rise is an economic phenomenon. It is founded in New Delhi’s decision in 1985 to change the basis of self-reliance from an autarkic model of development sustaining Indian independence from global market economic structures to an interdependence model of development promoting the international competitiveness of the Indian economy through exposure to external trade and investment flows. India’s economic globalization is reflected in consistent decennial growth rates of 5.6 per cent during the 1980s and 1990s, indicating that the economy has proved robust despite ongoing reforms to liberalize
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 61 state control (Baru 1999). It remains to be seen whether continued expansion and liberalization of its economy will bring India into the club of leading economic world powers (The World Bank Group 2005b). India’s defence capabilities include a nuclear and a ballistic missile programme, but it is a weaker capability than that of Russia and China, principally because of its insufficient holdings of intercontinental ballistic missiles. India’s defence includes 1,325,000 active troops, and its defence expenditures were US$ 19.4 billion in 2004 (IISS 2005d: 236). This leaves India with a defence budget not much larger than that of South Korea. The Indian army is the largest of the three services, but its navy is also a key element in India’s military capabilities since India is a maritime state with a vast coastline. Russia is the biggest supplier of defence products to India, but the United States is also becoming an important source of high-technological equipment. India’s conventional capabilities do not compare to those of the United States, China, Japan and Russia, and India’s long-range deployment capabilities are also limited in comparison. Adding to this disadvantage is the fact that India has active defences towards Pakistan and China (Nayar and Paul 2003: 44). India’s military capabilities are beyond doubt weaker than Russia’s, leaving it in the category of middle powers. In terms of ideational power, India has some claims to great-power status through the policies of maintaining a nuclear deterrent, its status as the thirdworld exemplar of a secular democracy, and as a leader of third-world multilateralism aimed at economic and social equalization at the international level. These positions indicate that a strong element of utopianism has formed an inherent part of the identity of the Indian state since its establishment in 1947, which has also given rise to India’s great-power ambitions. These ambitions, however, have not met with much success. India’s nuclear capability has never won global approval, and the United States has only conceded de facto to India as a nuclear power in 2005. Furthermore, it did not succeed in obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Unlike China, India also failed to establish an independent position in the US– Soviet great-power rivalry and instead became an object of this global pattern. Responding to US–Pakistani military cooperation in 1954, India gravitated towards the Soviet Union, demonstrating the difficulties of opting out of global balancing dynamics. India has also had difficulties convincing the surroundings of the legitimacy of its military interventions on the subcontinent, which has left it with minimal returns on these efforts in terms of status and recognition. In particular, criticism of India’s hegemonic ambitions has surfaced whenever its interventions have risked increasing tension levels on the subcontinent or have aimed at India’s long-standing adversary Pakistan. India has hence never managed to transform its potential for ideational power into a viable framework for regional order. Since the turn of the century, India’s economic transformation has been followed by markedly improved relations with the major external powers on the subcontinent, the United States and China. This development combined
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with India’s capabilities is what justifies calling India a middle power in South Asia that cooperates with both of the major powers in the Asia-Pacific without choosing sides. India continues to expand its ties to Washington. However, anti-American sentiments within the Indian political establishment favouring a balancing approach to the United States constitute a prevailing impediment to a solid strategic partnership between the two states (Ganguly 2003/04: 41–47). Similarly, second thoughts in Washington on the interests of the United States in promoting India’s great-power ambitions are one of the major barriers towards this development. On the other hand, Rahul Sagar notes that US–Indian ties of a more intimate kind may be founded in US fears of a rising China, growing interpenetration of the service economies of both countries, and mutual benefits from enhanced military cooperation (Sagar 2004: 115–36). Similar tendencies can be detected in Sino-Indian relations after the turn of the century. Conflictridden Cold War Sino-Indian relations have been replaced by a more complex relationship involving enhanced possibilities of cooperation and competition. Beijing and New Delhi share incentives to counter a unipolar world order to enhance their relative positions in the international order, both powers are interested in securing the flow of energy resources from Central Asia and the Middle East, and neither of the two states favours the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in international trade agreements. On the other hand, neither country is comfortable with the rise of the other, encouraging competition for influence. In addition, the geographical barriers and similar Chinese and Indian economic development levels imply that they are economic competitors rather than prospective partners (Harding 2004: 342–43). The seemingly cordial relations between Beijing and New Delhi hence conceal asymmetrical threat perceptions. This prompts India to complement the thaw in Sino-Indian relations with enhanced strategic cooperation with the United States. Sino-US policies as well as Indian preferences hence encourage New Delhi to behave like a middle power gravitating towards both Washington and Beijing, which allows India to influence the South Asian region also consisting of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and the Maldives without being able to establish subcontinental hegemony. Australia is in a region of its own, Oceania, which includes New Zealand, Melanisia, Micronesia and Polynesia. Papua New Guinea is considered part of this region since ethnically and politically it is closer to Oceania than to Southeast Asia. Traditionally, Australia is considered a middle power, and estimated on the basis of its economic and military capabilities it undoubtedly fulfils the criteria. Australia has one of the fastest growing economies in the Asia-Pacific, largely thanks to China, which is a major trading partner of Canberra. Overall, the Australian economy has demonstrated considerable flexibility and strength in the face of sharp downturns in export markets such as Japan and South Korea, as indicated by its ability to sustain GDP growth rates of between 2.0 and 3.8 per cent in the period 2000–2004 (The World
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 63 Bank Group 2005a). In terms of military capabilities, the Australian Defence Force is one of the most capable and professional in the AsiaPacific, and Canberra has embarked on a major acquisitions programme including combat aircraft, amphibious transport vessels and air warfare destroyers that will further strengthen its defence and power projection capabilities. Australia’s defence budget of US$ 11.6 billion is about onethird of that of South Korea. Australia’s defence commands relative modest levels of manpower, 52,872 active troops in 2004, reflecting that its armed forces are adjusted to the Revolution in Military Affairs (IISS 2005d: 266). However, in terms of the behavioural aspect of middle power status, Australia is not a middle power in post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. Australia has major interests in China, predominantly due to the importance of China to the Australian economy, and its security interests in the neighbouring sub-region of Southeast Asia are considerable as indicated by Australia’s leadership role in the UN peacekeeping force. This force was deployed in East Timor in 1999 and included troops from countries such as the United States, Britain and Thailand. Despite these interests, Australia plays a peripheral role in Southeast Asian security dynamics, which are dominated by ASEAN’s framework of the non-use of force, political dialogue and consensus decisions. Australia’s claim to middle power status originates from the Cold War and is similar to that of Canada.13 Australia can be called a middle power mainly because it has wielded influence by promoting human rights issues and by advocating better conditions in the international trade system for weaker powers (Cooper et al. 1993). Washington and Beijing have recurring disagreements over the conditions of international trade and finance, but economic globalization is not a fundamentally contested issue between the two powers.14 Australia can hence not lay claim to Asia-Pacific middle power status on the basis of its trade policies. However, Australia firmly supports the United States on the fundamentally contested issues of the use of force, legitimacy and institutions for security management and it does not show any tendency to alternately gravitate between the United States and China. Canberra’s decision in April 2006 to sell uranium for peaceful purposes to China on condition that it will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comes on the heels of the US administration’s decision to ask the US Congress for permission to sell fuel to India for its civilian nuclear plants despite New Delhi’s non-acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Sino-Australian agreement can therefore be interpreted as Australia’s attempt to make use of inconsistencies in US policies on weapons of mass destruction to ensure that Canberra maintains a benevolent relationship with Beijing and cash in on China’s economic potential despite Australia’s overall position as a loyal US ally. Australia has placed its bet on the preservation and strengthening of the US alliance system to protect its security interests in the Cold War era. Disagreements on human rights issues have largely died down with the end of the Cold War. Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States
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is no longer keen on preventing Australia from positioning itself as an arduous supporter of the liberal notion of human rights, as can be seen from the US acceptance of Australian leadership in the 1999 UN intervention in East Timor. At the same time, Australia’s long-term views on legitimacy correspond closely to the liberal world order promoted by the United States. Canberra is also keeping a suspicious eye on tendencies towards the emergence of a Sino-centric order, which would leave Australia at the very periphery of influence in the Asia-Pacific. Rhetorically, Australia may be critical of the US inclination to use the UN system only when it complies with US security interests, but the preservation and strengthening of the US alliance system is a higher priority due to concerns about future Chinese policies in the Asia-Pacific. In regions where single powers do not qualify as middle powers, minor powers may join forces to position themselves as a de facto middle power. But this type of pooled middle power only fulfils the capabilities requirement if they succeed in acting as a unity. A pooled middle power may be established through institutionalized cooperation aiming at furthering the interests of a group of states more effectively than they could have managed on their own. In the economic realm, a group of states may develop a common market to enhance the economic performance of each state. In the military realm, a group of states may develop a common defence identity with the aim of increasing the security of all participating states. Insofar as such attempts at pooling resources are incomplete, intra-organizational diplomacy must compensate for these deficiencies. For example, the states may attempt to negotiate free trade and aid agreements with external powers in unison although their economies remain separate. The group of states may also obtain military capabilities by proxy, through bilateral defence cooperation agreements with the same great power. In other words, considerable investment in diplomacy to ensure political compromises as a compensation for the absence of unified political authority is necessary for a group of states to present themselves as a unity to the outside world. On these criteria, ASEAN qualifies as a middle power. ASEAN’s impact is traditionally founded in its ability to influence issues by speaking with a collective diplomatic voice (Leifer 1989: 86, 150–59). ASEAN is in the process of pooling its economic resources by means of a free-trade area and attempts to negotiate economic and financial cooperation agreements with external powers in unison, as indicated by the 2003 ASEAN–China framework agreement on a free-trade area and the ASEAN+3’s inauguration in 1999 in order to establish financial cooperation between ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea. ASEAN has no defence identity, but the Southeast Asian states except for Indochina and Myanmar rely on US military deterrence to guarantee the preservation of peace and stability (Odgaard 2002b: 131–44). So far, the ASEAN common market is an aspiration, and formal common threat perceptions or interoperability among the militaries of the Southeast
Powers, balances of power and coexistence 65 Asian states do not exist. Nevertheless, ASEAN unity is not fiction, which shows in the ability of the states to forge a large measure of solidarity in their extra-regional interaction. Solidarity has manifested itself in the adoption of common positions towards developments involving external powers and in the members’ agreement on common principles of state conduct. The existence of shared threats against the security of Southeast Asian states has promoted some measure of unity in their external relations, leaning towards the United States as well as China without a firm commitment to either power. Admittedly, within ASEAN there are exceptions, most notably Myanmar, which gravitates towards China but has little influence in ASEAN, as reflected in its decision not to chair ASEAN in 2005. Vietnam is beginning to welcome US military force, and the neighbouring states Laos and Cambodia are so weak that they are not even able to fill out their role as ASEAN member states, for example, they do not have sufficient numbers of staff to participate in ASEAN’s numerous meetings. Hence, ASEAN as a whole comes to rely on US military force for security while cooperating with China to preserve the UN system of the Cold War. Consequently, ASEAN can be termed a middle power in a behavioural sense. This argument is based on the observation that the states with influence within ASEAN are the more wealthy states in terms of economic and military capabilities: Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Brunei is a relatively weak state, but it does not stand in the way of ASEAN unity. It might be argued that ASEAN has elements of ideational power. However, although it provides platforms for other Asia-Pacific powers to meet and exchange views, ASEAN has not succeeded in exporting its model for regional order outside its own sub-region. ASEAN unity mainly emerges in its overall policies on the United States and China, but attention must be paid to the fact that significant differences of opinion over the external policies towards the United States and China remain. For example, Singapore remains more positive towards contemporary US designs for regional order than Indonesia. Such persistent differences call for awareness that these may jeopardize the ability of ASEAN to adequately play the role of a middle power between the United States and China. It should also be noted that since ASEAN is not a middle power per se, a more appropriate denomination may be an association with elements of middle power status. However, for purposes of simplicity ASEAN is termed a middle power throughout this book. The major Asia-Pacific powers, the United States and China, use different instruments to implement their competing models of regional order. The United States gravitates towards using military instruments for purposes of order creation, whereas China tends to prefer the instruments of diplomacy. The US preference is not so surprising since no other state can match it in terms of military and economic capabilities. China’s preference is equally obvious. By far the weaker power in terms of tangible capabilities, China
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uses its diplomacy to defer the establishment of a permanent order in the Asia-Pacific, pending the realization of its development potential. China has come to appreciate the contributions of middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India to regional peace and stability, in contrast to the United States, to whom they are often an impediment. One reason for China’s advocacy of collaboration with these powers is that they do not have the wherewithal to promote permanent patterns of regional order of their own making; instead, they concentrate on maintaining peace and stability in their immediate environment. Such goals match those of China well since they increase the chances of deferring the question of a permanent AsiaPacific order indefinitely until China can match the economic and military capabilities of the United States. By contrast, the efforts of middle powers to side with both the United States and China are at odds with US calls for unconditional commitment to its policies on the use of force, the legitimacy of political authorities and the institutions defining the limits of state conduct. The United States fears that even though middle powers only have limited impact on regional security arrangements, their unwillingness to choose between US and Chinese security policies may pave the way for more permanent security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific that combine elements of a Pax Americana with elements of a Sino-centric order. The remainder of the book investigates Sino-US policies on the use of force, legitimacy and institutions in Southeast, Central, Northeast and South Asia, arguing that a rapprochement between Washington’s and Beijing’s views on a permanent Asia-Pacific security order is not on the cards. Unstable power balancing not underpinned by coexistence is therefore likely to characterize the region for the foreseeable future.
3
Sino-US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific
US policies on the use of force consist of three elements: pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony. In the post-Cold War era, these three elements have formed the principal strategies for maintaining the dominant position of the United States in the Asia-Pacific. All three strategies are long-standing elements of US foreign policy, which have been redefined to suit the international security environment of the post-Cold War era. Washington’s understanding of pre-emption hence involves a revised definition of imminent threat that weakens the concept of threat normally justifying preemption in standard definitions of international law. Thus, suspicions that a state or non-state actor has breached US anti-terror and anti-WMD (weapons of mass destruction) policies are enough to justify pre-emption. According to the US definition, pre-emption covers a wide range of policy initiatives and options such as preventive war, the use of punitive military force on suspicions that a state or non-state actor is involved in the spread of WMD or terrorist activities, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) focusing on the interdiction of entities suspected of transferring WMD-related equipment, and the detention without trial of individuals suspected of terrorist activities (US Department of State 2003; Walt 2004; The White House 2001, 2002b, 2006). Washington’s post-Cold War definition of unilateralism encompasses the strengthening of existing alliances and the building of strategic partnerships, allowing the United States to reorganize its force posture to increase its flexibility and its rapid power projection capabilities. To implement these plans, the United States deploys permanently ground-stationed forces, forward operating bases with pre-positioned equipment, and facilities for training, exercise and liaison activities (IISS 2004c: 14–19). The unilateral element in these policies is that Washington remains in control of bilateral asymmetrical relations, which allows it to define order in the Asia-Pacific on its own terms. The US post-Cold War definition of hegemony entails a commitment to maintain a preponderance of power as distinct from a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific. Washington opts for hegemony through a combination of enforcement and persuasion. Chinese policies on the use of force consist of cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity. In the post-Cold War era, these policies
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have been the principal means used to challenge US pre-eminence. Beijing’s concept of cooperative security involves the use of diplomatic means to test whether the surroundings are willing to take Chinese demands and interests into account. Cooperation has centred on consolidating stability through agreements on territorial and maritime disputes and on preventing the use of force as a means of conflict resolution (interview conducted by the author with a Chinese scholar, Renmin University 4–11–2004). Chinese unilateralism is centred on a passive military build-up designed to prepare for the fighting of a future war. China’s military modernization process is driven by the Revolution in Military Affairs, by having fewer but better troops and by stepping up its military posture across the Taiwan Strait. China uses considerable resources in the transformation of its armed forces from being selfsufficient in manpower to being self-sufficient in military technology in order to be able to adopt swift and flexible defence responses to security threats (The State Council Information Office 2004). A major part of Beijing’s military modernization programme is aimed at obtaining a capability to perform military strikes against a potentially US-protected Taiwan, when necessary, as well as to defend the ocean frontier and, even at a later date, to exert control over central regional shipping lanes. These developments may signify a Chinese intention to match the United States in the Asia-Pacific within the next two or three decades (interview with Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11–2004; interview with a former Chinese PLA professor 15–11–2004). The Chinese version of multipolarity implies power balancing through the looser concept of strategic partnerships. It involves partial cooperation with powers that are willing to counter US security policies in their respective sub-regions, hence forming the basis for China’s poaching on US alliances and partnerships. The chapter discusses Sino-US policies on the use of force in the four sub-regions Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia in order to assess the implications of these policies for the prospects of stable power balancing underpinned by coexistence.
US policies on the use of force in Southeast Asia In Southeast Asia, the United States has maintained a network of military alliances and partnerships after the closure of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines in 1992. Two of its five key Asian allies, the Philippines and Thailand, are in Southeast Asia, but there are no permanently stationed troops except for a few technicians in Singapore and Thailand. With the 2001 war on terror, Southeast Asia took centre stage in US counterterrorist efforts, as indicated by the deployment of 660 US troops to the southern Philippines in January 2002, in the wake of the intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001. Since then, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have become significant partners in counterterrorist operations because Southeast Asia is considered a safe haven for
Sino-US policies on the use of force 69 Islamic terrorists due to the difficulties of Southeast Asian governments in policing their territories (Kelly 2004). Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are also the core states of ASEAN. ASEAN was established in 1967 as a response to repeated outbreaks of hostility, especially between Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as communist threats to regime stability. In 1984, Brunei became the sixth member state, and Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar were accepted as members from 1995 to 1999. A common defence identity has never been contemplated in ASEAN since, throughout their history as independent states, they have had to deal with great-power rivalry in their neighbourhood, and they have been determined to maintain a nonprovocative military profile to keep this rivalry out of their immediate environment (Bessho 1999: 41–42). This strategy has remained a common foreign policy goal, and the ASEAN states have therefore assiduously avoided showing the tendency to form an intra-ASEAN defence alliance. The fact that the first meeting of ASEAN’s defence ministers was not scheduled to take place until May 2006 testifies to the association’s reluctance to even discuss the possibility of defence cooperation. Southeast Asia has looked to the United States for military protection since the early 1990s. Until 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia saw the US military presence as a potentially destabilizing factor. However, at the 1992 ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Manila, the then six ASEAN member states called on the United States for the first time to maintain a secure military balance in the region. The United States on its part welcomed the general acceptance among Southeast Asian countries that it maintains a military presence in the region. This acceptance allows the United States to counter the principal, potential challenger to its military superiority, China. Washington is an indispensable power broker in Southeast Asia, which implies that the United States accepts extending de facto military security guarantees to the region to make the indigenous states feel sufficiently confident to cooperate with China (interview with senior US official 19–10–2004). One main motive for Washington to upgrade the US military presence in the region is the 2001 war on terror and the related anti-WMD policies. The permanently stationed troops from the United States are concentrated in Northeast Asia, and as such they are mainly of psychological importance to Southeast Asia. Instead, military-to-military relations have proved valuable to date in the war on terror (Montesano and Hwee 2004: 332–33). The Southeast Asian governments that are central to the war on terror recognize the need to work with the United States to fight Islamic militant groups threatening the coherence of the states (interview with Hadi Soesastro, Centre for Strategic and International Studies 3–12–2004). Hence, Southeast Asia has become what may be described as a ‘second front’ in the war on terror. US policymakers have cooperated most closely with their Singaporean counterparts. Singapore is not a formal but a de facto ally of Washington, as indicated by the fact that Singapore allowed the United States to stay after its departure
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from the Philippine bases (interview with Lee Lai To, National University of Singapore 16–19–2005), although only with a small administrative detachment. Prior to the war on terror, the United States had gained critical facilities access to Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Weeks and Meconis 1999: 97). Together with Malaysia, Singapore accepted measures such as the detention without trial on suspicions of terrorism without complaint. US–Malaysian relations have improved markedly with the 2001 war on terror, as evidenced by then Secretary of State James A. Kelly’s pronouncement of Malaysia as a beacon of stability and his description of then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir as a strong partner in the war on terror (Cotton 2003: 161–62). Malaysia, however, remains critical to US suggestions of activities that imply direct US involvement in Kuala Lumpur’s security policies. The Philippines has also welcomed US assistance in the war on terror because of its decade-long problems with this phenomenon, especially in the southern province of Mindanao. Prior to the US presence, the Philippines had experimented with political solutions such as decentralization measures; however, after the US deployment of troops, Manila has conceded to the military measures employed by Washington. Thailand has proved a more difficult partner despite its alliance relations with the United States which also involved sending 422 troops on humanitarian duty to assist the 2003 US-led reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The difficulties allegedly arose because of links between the Thai military and indigenous militant groups. However, the heavy-handed approach adopted by the United States corresponds well to the violent crackdown on alleged Islamic militants in the south conducted by the Thai military. Despite Philippine concerns about popular anti-US sentiments and Thai wariness about Washington’s direct involvement in its security policies, these two countries have been fairly compliant partners in the war on terror. Their participation in the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, Manila’s decision to take advantage of the US military presence in the Philippines to obtain economic and financial support to fight indigenous insurgents, and Bangkok’s decision to allow access for the United States to arrest people on Thai soil all indicate that Manila and Bangkok are predominantly cooperative in the US war on terror (interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Chairman for UNESCO-MOST 15–12–2004). Indonesia was equally sceptical, mainly because of major internal popular resentment against the United States. However, the Bali bombings in 2002, which killed 202 people and had severe repercussions for tourism, convinced then President Megawati of the necessity to work with Washington to get at the problem of terrorism. The anti-WMD policies of the United States have received similarly diverse responses in Southeast Asia. Treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, which Washington is keen to preserve as it is, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which requires export control measures to avoid the spread of missile technology, do not pose problems for Southeast Asia, which has no nuclear powers. In addition, the Southeast Asian states are signatories to the Treaty on the South East Asia
Sino-US policies on the use of force 71 Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which took effect from 1997. The diversity of opinion has centred on the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is meant to strengthen the NPT-framework by identifying interdiction as the key focus for dialogue, training exercises and seizure operations (Valencia 2005: 25–38). The PSI aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related material (The White House 2006). In practice, the United States has been able to join forces with most Southeast Asian countries, including the most arduous critics, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, their formal stances on the issue differ widely (interview with Barry Desker, Nanyang Technological University 11–8–2005). At one end of the spectrum of opinion is Singapore, which does not consider the initiative to be a concern. In the opinion of Singaporean diplomats, it is not wise to turn a blind eye to proliferation issues (interview with Bilahari Kausikan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15–8–2005). At the other end are Malaysia and Indonesia, which remain arduous critics of the PSI initiative. In particular, Jakarta is not comfortable with this policy, which is an obstacle to progress in military cooperation between the United States and Indonesia, a progress in itself moderate compared with that of other Southeast Asian countries that are central to the war on terror (interview with a senior Indonesian official, the President’s Office 9–12–2004). Washington has refrained from interfering in the numerous territorial and maritime conflicts in the South China Sea involving Southeast Asian states as well as China and Taiwan. However, it prioritizes the freedom of the high seas due to the importance of the area’s sea-lanes for commercial and naval traffic. The United States therefore stages frequent joint US– Southeast Asian naval exercises in the South China Sea, and it has considered using US elite forces to secure US assets and prevent terrorist attacks in the Malacca Strait as part of the now defunct Regional Maritime Security Initiative. On a yearly basis, the strait carries 50,000 vessels per year containing between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world’s sea trade, and a quarter of all naval oil shipments come through the strait. This issue has attracted the same pattern of support as that of the war on terror, with Singapore as the most compliant partner, and Malaysia and Indonesia as the most reluctant participants in US initiatives. Indonesia and Malaysia recognize that Washington has legitimate interests in the maritime part of Southeast Asia, and they welcome help with increasing their indigenous security capacity since the countries need equipment such as radar and patrol boats to manage growing security problems such as piracy; around 40 per cent of the world’s total takes place in the Malacca Strait. However, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have rejected Washington’s suggestion that US troops are deployed in the Malacca Strait to assist enforcement of peace and stability (interview with Hasjim Djalal, Department of Foreign Affairs 1–12–2004). Singapore does not oppose a US presence but opts for a low-key approach to avoid stirring trouble with its two big neighbours (interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Chairman for UNESCO-MOST 15–12–2004). Enhanced US military activities in Southeast Asia are complemented by Australia,
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New Zealand and the United Kingdom. These states have broadened the scope of their joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore under the Five Power Defence Pact1 to include non-conventional security threats, particularly maritime terrorism such as that taking place in the Malacca Strait (IISS Strategic Comments 2006). Indonesia’s size and volatility make it a central player for the United States to have on its side in the war on terror. Indonesia has traditionally played a leading role in ASEAN in the sense that if Indonesia has no desire to move forward, then progress is stalled. On the other hand, if Jakarta is on board, progress on outstanding issues is likely to be made (interview with Hadi Soesastro, Centre for Strategic and International Studies 3–12–2004). Since 1999, Washington has tried to resume full ties with Indonesia’s military banned after Indonesian troops devastated the province of East Timor following a UN-organized independence referendum. To demonstrate Washington’s new-found consideration for Indonesia’s security needs, the US military arrived within days of the 2004 tsunami disaster, distributing life-saving medicines and food and positioning a hospital ship off Indonesia’s shores. Joint military exercises and training have also been established. However, prevailing issues such as Jakarta’s insistence that terrorist suspects should receive a fair trial prevent a complete normalization of US–Indonesian military ties. One reason for the United States to approach Jakarta in order to gradually normalize military cooperation between the two countries is US concerns about China’s growing presence in Southeast Asia. China is currently unable to field the resources needed to project a major conventional force beyond its territory. However, Chinese acquisitions from the 1990s of fighter aircraft, submarines, destroyers and information systems indicate that it is in the process of achieving its goal of becoming a regional maritime power within the next two to three decades with a green-water capability allowing it to project force in the Asia-Pacific. The United States is attempting to close the strategic vacuum after its vacation of the permanent Philippine bases in 1992. To achieve this goal, the United States relies on a combination of frequent naval visits and joint exercises as well as training combined with enhanced flexibility of the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific, which will allow Washington to swiftly increase its presence in Southeast Asia in the event of violent conflict with a direct bearing on US interests. In Indochina, where the United States has no presence, Washington is seeking military ties with Vietnam. Vietnam continues to rely on the Soviet Union’s successor, Russia, for military imports, but the first minor, but significant, steps towards US–Vietnamese defence cooperation have already been taken with joint training and intelligence sharing. Another indication of the thaw in relations between Washington and Hanoi is Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai’s official visit to Washington in 2005, the first to take place since the end of the Second Indochina War from 1954 to 1975. Increased US military activities in Southeast Asia are seen as a double-
Sino-US policies on the use of force 73 edged sword by the receiving states. On the one hand, ASEAN recognized in 1992 that a US military presence is a necessary insurance against fears of potential Chinese domination. On the other hand, there is some concern about the apparent US tendency to see Southeast Asia as part of the problem rather than the solution, that is, the United States does not fully acknowledge the role the regional countries can play in addressing challenges such as terrorism.2 Policies such as the PSI and the demand for detention without trial of terrorist suspects are seen as inimical to the freedom of action of Southeast Asian states, and Washington’s heavy-handed approach to policy implementation may indicate that it considers the countries as legitimate objects of preventive first-use. De facto compliance with the majority of US military initiatives in the region since 2002 has concealed prevailing suspicions, especially in Malaysia and Indonesia, that the growing military role of the United States in Southeast Asia will gradually lead to US de facto control over indigenous security policies. US policies of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era have enhanced Washington’s focus on Southeast Asia as a central region to the United States in which to maintain a credible force posture in the AsiaPacific. Southeast Asian concerns in the early 1990s that the US military would abandon the sub-region have hence been replaced by worries in the dominant US-critical states that Washington’s increased military activities will lead to strategic goals and methods better suited to protect US security interests than to preserve Southeast Asian peace and stability.
US policies on the use of force in Central Asia In Central Asia, the 2001 war on terror heralded the establishment of a US military presence. In this sub-region, concerns about the spread of WMD are limited because Central Asia is a poor region with no nuclear powers. Combined with the continued presence of Russia and the growing importance of China and the United States after the turn of the millennium, the likelihood that these countries will become transit points for WMD-related material is minimal. In 2005, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan planned to sign a treaty that establishes a zone free of nuclear weapons, which confirms the tendency to strengthen the non-proliferation regime (RFE/RL Central Asia Report (5:29) 3–8–2005). Like Southeast Asia, Central Asia has been pinpointed as another safe haven for Islamic terrorists. The number of US forces on Central Asian territory is not large. However, the number of troops is not significant since the indigenous militant guerrilla and terrorist groups are small and are best fought by special forces rather than by large conventional forces. As part of the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan, the United States stationed more than 4,000 troops primarily in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, a number which had decreased to approximately 950 NATO troops stationed in Kyrgyzstan by 2005 (IISS 2005d: 242). Their main role remains to assist the US troops in
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Afghanistan, but the permanency of the US presence, officially announced in 2004, ensures that Washington will be able to revise their role by focusing on indigenous Islamic militant groups in due course. This possibility was made clear in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States that lists Central Asia as a region vital to US interests (The White House 2006). During the 1990s, the United States also had interests in Central Asia predominantly because of the oil and gas reserves in the area. Central Asia’s energy resources are fairly attractive objects of exploration projects for multinational companies. Kazakhstan, which has the closest relations to Moscow and the largest percentage of ethnic Russians outside of Russia, approximately a quarter of the population on its territory, holds most of the sub-region’s oil reserves, estimated at 26 billion barrels. Turkmenistan is the most gas-rich of the Central Asian states, with reserves estimated at 273 million barrels. The pipeline network for transport of oil and gas outside the region is, however, insufficient. This has engendered a competition for pipeline projects between powers that see access to strategic resources as a means of increasing their relative power vis-à-vis neighbouring states in the competition for influence. For example, Washington’s interest in oil and gas reserves is not merely determined by its interest in controlling energy resources, but also by strategic considerations. These interests and considerations have caused the United States to become involved in pipeline projects bypassing Iran and Russia with the purpose of isolating Iran and limiting Russia’s dominance in Central Asia. In 2001, an oil pipeline was opened between Kazakhstan and the Black Sea, which improved Astana’s export options and consolidated Russian control over Central Asia’s energy exports. However, the majority of planned pipelines have yet to be realized, which leaves the problem of export outlets unresolved. Prior to the US war on terror, US military involvement in Central Asia was limited to joint training and exercises on a small scale, since 1997 with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. With the 2001 war on terror, US military-strategic interests took centre stage. Washington focused on establishing defence cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan where the majority of US troops assisting the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan were deployed. Uzbekistan, which was the sub-regional state most critical to Russian hegemony, was targeted as the principal strategic partner of the United States. An example of this partnership is the fact that Uzbekistan became the principal beneficiary of US assistance in Central Asia, receiving US$ 161.8 million in 2002, an increase of 289 per cent from the year before (Rasizade 2003: 54). In addition, Washington obtained access to Tajik military bases, Kazakh air bases and permission to overfly Turkmen airspace. In 2002, the US military presence in Central Asia was hence at a high point. The permanency of the US military presence is not only a result of the drawn-out Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, which still occupied 18,000 US troops by 2004, due to continued Taleban counterinsurgency activities destabilizing
Sino-US policies on the use of force 75 the country. Central Asia hosts militant Islamic terror groups with links to Afghanistan as well as to the transnational terror group al-Qaeda, which was the main target in the 2001 war on terror. The terror groups causing the most concern are the banned groups the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (alias the Party of Islamic Liberation) and Akramiya. However, as long as a vast number of US troops are bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and a future intervention in Iran cannot be ruled out, the United States does not focus on fighting groups on Central Asian soil, but instead provides economic assistance that enables the indigenous regimes to perform this function. The permanency of the US presence, in itself, is significant to the dominant Central Asian power, Russia, which by 2004 had deployed approximately 500 troops in Kyrgyzstan to counter the US military presence, and 22,300 troops in Tajikistan to ensure domestic stability, although domestic stability remains fragile due to continuous unrest after the 1992 civil war in this country. In addition, the Russian troops are used to repel infiltration into Afghanistan (IISS 2005d: 167; interview with Professor Vasily V. Mikheev, Russian Academy of Sciences 9–3–2005). Moscow’s response to the incoming US military presence has been two-sided. Initially, Russia welcomed US counterterrorist measures, assisted Washington in gathering intelligence, and accepted US access to Central Asian bases (Odgaard 2002: 178–91). At a time when Russia had increasing difficulties in maintaining its dominant position in the former Soviet republics, it hoped that Washington would respect Russian economic and political interests in return, such as debt restructuring, full membership of the Group of Eight (G8)3 encompassing the principal global economic powers, and continuous Russian dominance of Central Asia. In 2002, Russia hence decided to strengthen its relations with NATO, agreeing to establish the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) as a forum for continuous political dialogue on current security issues. On the same occasion, Washington and Moscow agreed on a new nuclear arms reduction treaty, attempting to maintain the pattern of arms control agreements left over from the Cold War. The apparent strengthening of the US–Russian strategic partnership did, however, take place with Russian reservations, allowing for a de facto withdrawal at a later date. For example, agreement was never reached on the issue of Moscow’s assistance to the Iranian nuclear programme. Russia’s dominant influence in Central Asia is mainly due to the fact that it has maintained a major military presence in the area, using it to actively pursue peace and stability in cooperation with the existing regimes. Moscow assists in border control, in fighting alleged terror groups that are seen as threats to the survival of existing regimes, and in peacekeeping in Tajikistan due to persistent problems with maintaining domestic peace and stability after the 1992 civil war. Russia’s continued dominance of Central Asia’s oil and gas exports also explains why Moscow has succeeded in wielding considerable political influence.
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Despite the continuous military, economic and political influence of Russia, its power was descending throughout the 1990s, as indicated by the establishment of cooperation agreements between Central Asian states and countries such as China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and the United States, often to the dismay of Moscow. Contrary to initial expectations, the incoming US military presence turned out to be a source of competition rather than a source of assistance to Russia in its efforts to maintain its position in its near abroad. Washington’s prioritization of Uzbekistan threatened to crowd out Russian influence because Tashkent hoped to use US attention to increase its regional autonomy and assert itself as a hegemonic power in Central Asia, a position that had eluded it because of neighbouring Kazakhstan’s oil-based relative economic wealth and Astana’s close links to Moscow. Russia’s response was to refocus attention to Central Asia, which had diminished in the late 1990s due to a domestic economic crisis and the prolonged Chechen War in the Caucasus. Russia agreed with Kyrgyzstan to open a military base (its first since the implosion of the Soviet Union) at Kant in 2003, five minutes’ flying time from the Manas airfield used by the United States (Poroskov 2005: 4). Commenting on the base agreement, Russian President Putin stated that the base would not form part of US-related military activities. In January 2006, Kyrgyz defence minister Isakov stated that the duration of the US presence depends on the course of the US-led operations in Afghanistan, in contrast to the Russian presence, which was said merely to be a long-term key element of Central Asia’s regional security system. In June 2004, Tajik President Rakhmonov discussed the future establishment of a permanent Russian military base in Tajikistan with Russian President Putin. In November 2005, Moscow signed the Treaty on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan with Uzbek President Karimov, which involves a military alliance. According to the treaty’s article two, an act of aggression committed against one of the sides by any state or group of states will be viewed as an act of aggression against both sides and therefore implies provision of assistance, including military aid (President of Russia 2004; RFE/RL Central Asia Report (5:45) 30–11–2005). In October 2005, Russia also restored its ties to Turkmenistan, which had been damaged due to Ashgabat’s unilateral announcement that Turkmenistan would downgrade its role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS is a defunct organization established in 1991 with the purpose of promoting closer political and economic ties. Originally, the CIS was seen as a de facto forum for the preservation of Russian hegemony in Central Asia. In 2003, President Putin hence emphasized that the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) encompassing Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan has no role to play in US military activities. The statement also makes the Russian imperative clear that US activities in Central Asia should be confined to anti-terror operations (Albion 2003a). However, the hegemonic image of the CIS has caused the member states to refrain from implementing common decisions. The CSTO may be a weak coalition on which to base Russian leadership in
Sino-US policies on the use of force 77 the former Soviet republics, but it provides Moscow with some basis for clinging to sub-regional superiority and for countering the US presence (interview with Alexey G. Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center 10–13–2005). Recognizing that the Central Asian states do not accept having their freedom of action circumscribed by submitting to the decisions of a forum that is dominated by Moscow and only encompasses three Central Asian states, Russia joined the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in 2004, which also consists of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and focuses on economic integration. The Russian initiatives to regain strategic, economic and political dominance in the sub-region serve as a warning to Washington that Russia expects to remain the first among equals in Central Asia. The Russian concern about US policies on the use of force is that Washington will force Moscow to trade in Russia’s dominant position in the country’s near abroad in return for economic and political preferential treatment at an unknown future date. The Central Asian states see the competitive situation between the United States and Russia as an opportunity for them to maximize their national interests. This is less so for Turkmenistan, which has adopted a policy of neutrality and has weak links to the United States, and Tajikistan, which has handed over part of its responsibilities as a sovereign state for the protection of its territory and peoples to Moscow, which controls the border towards Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, however, change allegiances over time with a view to maximizing their economic wealth and political influence. In 2002, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had stronger links to Washington than in 2005, when the two countries had moved closer to Russia. Kazakhstan has consistently been a close partner of Russia, but with amicable links to the United States. Although the Central Asian states have not accepted submitting to Russian hegemony, by 2005 Moscow seemed to have regained the upper hand in Central Asia in terms of influence, succeeding in warding off US attempts to implement its policies of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony.
US policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia In Northeast Asia, fighting terrorist networks is not a major concern to the United States. Terrorist acts do take place, but these are dealt with on a purely national basis. Of course, China does not accept US counter-terrorist measures on its territory although terrorism is considered a security threat, principally emerging from militant Islamists in the Xinjiang province. Japan has also been the target of terrorist attacks, the most serious incident being the 1995 sarin gas attack on civilians, killing 12 people. However, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, responsible for the use of chemical weapons in a Tokyo subway, is a Japanese phenomenon similar to the doomsday cults that occasionally make the headlines in countries such as the United States but are not included in the US war on terror.
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Instead, anti-WMD related activities are at the centre of US policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia. In particular, North Korea falls within the US definition of legitimate targets for the use of force on the grounds of its nuclear programme. North Korea was hence declared part of a so-called axis of evil also consisting of Iraq and Iran, by President Bush in his State of the Union address in January 2002 (The White House 2002a). The 2002 US– North Korean nuclear standoff began in October 2002 with North Korea’s declaration that it has a nuclear weapons programme and was followed by North Korea’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. Since then, North Korea has been flexing its muscles. Incidents include firing a short-range, anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan in February 2003, intercepting a US reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace in March 2003, conducting an engine test of the Taepo-dong Two missile in June 2004, declaring in February 2005 that North Korea has manufactured nuclear weapons for purposes of self-defence and launching in July 2006 seven missiles in the direction of Japan, one of which is presumed to have been of the long-range Taepo-dong class. The United States, in turn, has stepped up its plans to relocate its approximately 35,000 troops in South Korea, removing about 12,500 troops and moving 18,000 troops based north of the Han River near the North Korean border to the south of Seoul. These plans, termed the strategic flexibility of the US Forces in Korea, began to take effect from July 2004. The United States considers North Korea a non-recognized nuclear-armed power and has openly questioned its willingness to comply with international agreements on the proliferation of WMD. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have been divided over the question as to whether North Korea would give up its nuclear weapons programme. The Clinton administration opted for the carrot rather than the stick approach after prolonged negotiations and considerations of sanctions and the use of force. The visit to Pyongyang by former president Carter in May 1994 broke the deadlock in the first US–North Korean nuclear standoff, resulting in an agreement in August 1994. Pyongyang agreed to give up its alleged capability to develop nuclear weapons in return for a US commitment to allow for oil supplies to North Korea and for the construction of two light-water reactors and other high-tech products (Yahuda 1996/2004: 254). Pyongyang got its oil supplies and its light-water reactors, but uncertainty concerning the status of its missile programme and the spread of missile-related material prevailed. The Bush administration was also divided as to whether to adopt the carrot or the stick approach. One side argued that negotiations were fruitless. This point of view was based on the experience with the 1994 agreement that Washington’s forthcoming approach to Pyongyang had not been rewarded by North Korean de facto acceptance of fulfilling the requirements of the NPT-framework. Another side argued that negotiation was the only realistic means available because the cost of North Korea’s collapse would be too high and the risk of negative side-effects such as refugee problems,
Sino-US policies on the use of force 79 missile attacks on neighbouring states and the costs of rebuilding the country were potentially disastrous for the whole of Northeast Asia (Yahuda 1996/ 2004: 272–73). On the face of it, Washington opted for negotiations, but in reality the Bush administration opted for a kind of in-between solution allowing Bush to fend off criticism of inaction but without presenting North Korea with proposals that stood a chance of approval in Pyongyang (interview with Charles L. Pritchard, The Brookings Institution 12–10–2004). After the fourth round of negotiations in September 2005, Pyongyang insisted that it will not dismantle its nuclear facilities until it gets light-water reactors from Washington, whereas the United States will not extend aid or security guarantees until North Korea’s nuclear programme has been ended (‘Text of N. Korea talks agreement’ 2005). Pyongyang calls for security guarantees because of Washington’s declared right of pre-emption in states that, according to the United States, have contributed to the spread of WMD or WMD-related material (The White House 2006). As mentioned earlier, the United States has revised the definition of imminent threat, weakening the concept of threat that normally justifies pre-emption in standard definitions in international law. Pre-emption is consequently conflated with preventive war (Bolton 2004; The White House 2002b). The threat of preventive war must be written off if Pyongyang is to enter into a formal agreement that puts an end to the standoff because North Korea is so weak that its survival in the face of threats of intervention is debatable without Washington committing itself in writing not to use force. Washington has kept its options open since, according to its national security strategy, Pyongyang’s nuclear programme justifies pre-emption to remove proven North Korean nuclear facilities. In its pursuit of WMD, North Korea is identified as an immediate threat to US security interests (The White House 2006). Two disagreeing factions continue to prevent decisiveness within the Bush administration. One faction, in the short run, is committed to a negotiated settlement that takes into account the concerns of the other players. A second faction, however, is bent on cracking down on North Korea’s illegal activities and, to this end, on enhancing the capabilities of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (Pritchard 2005). This US position not merely puts pressure on North Korea for compliance, but also tests the support of US Northeast Asian allies Japan and South Korea for US policies on the use of force. On the one hand, the Korean problem is a high priority to Japan, but its freedom of action is constrained on this issue. On the other hand, Japan’s position as Washington’s principal ally in the Asia-Pacific has given Tokyo considerable influence on US policies that touch upon Japanese security interests. Japan sees North Korea and China as the most immediate threats towards its security. Incidents such as North Korea’s firing of missiles in the direction of Japan in July 2006 confirm expectations that in the event of violent conflict, Japan is likely to be a principal target for North Korea’s alleged nuclear weapons. In addition to the nuclear threat, Tokyo has outstanding bilateral security issues with Pyongyang in the form of North
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Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s principal security concern is to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and obtain Pyongyang’s release of the Japanese nationals. These have been the issues pursued by Japan during the six-party talks between the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and Japan initiated in August 2003 with the stated purpose of introducing conflict resolution. During the talks, Japan concentrated on keeping the abduction issue on the agenda, a choice that threatened North Korea’s premature departure from the first round of six-party talks to the potential detriment of the peace process in the autumn of 2003. Subsequently, Pyongyang and Tokyo agreed to negotiate the abduction issue bilaterally from February 2006.Tokyo supports removing nuclear devices from the peninsula with the most effective means available. Japan hence gravitates towards the US view that Pyongyang has a history of maintaining a nuclear capability unless forced to abandon it. Tokyo also agrees with the demand that Pyongyang should halt its nuclear activities immediately, and that sanctions are imposed to meet this goal. Thus, Japanese interests closely coincide with those of the United States on the Korean peninsula, at least insofar as Tokyo remains convinced that Washington advocates the most effective means of denuclearizing North Korea and returns Tokyo’s loyalty by taking into account Japanese interests. The United States is a global power in need of loyal allies capable of assisting in looking after some of its interests at the regional level. It is therefore preparing to transfer parts of its responsibilities for security in the Asia-Pacific to Japan. This development was first set in motion with the 1997 renewal of the US–Japanese defence guidelines, which allowed Japan to provide logistical support in crises in the Far East and surrounding areas. The exact scope of the guidelines has not been defined, but it cannot be ruled out that the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea are covered. The guidelines paved the way for an anti-terrorist law, passed in October 2001, permitting the Japanese self-defence forces to assist in the US war on terror as a non-combat partner. In addition, emergency contingency bills allow the Prime Minister to send military personnel overseas without first consulting Parliament.4 A US–Japanese military pact signed in May 2006 includes a decision to relocate 8,000 US marines from Japanese Okinawa to Guam at Tokyo’s request, the construction of new facilities for Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force, an offer to Japan to keep troops and an aircraft squadron on Guam and to deploy anti-missile defences and advanced radar installations. The pact indicates that Tokyo is increasingly taking over responsibility for the defence of its own territory. For the first time, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) draft constitution, which may be approved within a couple of years, advocates the maintenance of military forces for self-defence with the Prime Minister as the supreme commander. It also seeks to elevate the role of the Japan Defence Agency to cabinet-level rank equivalent to other ministries. According to the drafters, the right to collective self-defence will be explicitly
Sino-US policies on the use of force 81 acknowledged in separate legislation, thereby allowing for a larger Japanese security role, while still precluding the deployment of Japanese combat personnel beyond the nation’s territory. Tokyo hence seems intent upon defining a security role commensurate with great power standing. However, this security role would primarily be geared to the defence of Japan, to contributions to multinational peacekeeping and to specific areas of security collaboration with the United States, most prominently on ballistic missile defence and accelerated efforts to interdict WMD activities under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (IISS 2005b). Modernization of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces involves the pursuance of a defence posture that allows Tokyo, proactively, to partake in US policies on the use of force. During the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff, South Korea has been particularly outspoken in calling for the option of negotiations to be fully explored (interview with Charles L. Pritchard, The Brookings Institution 12–10–2004). This contrasts with Seoul’s attitude during the Cold War, where South Korea saw the right to represent the Korean nation as a zerosum game and as such, North Korea was depicted as illegitimate. However, due to South Korean reliance on US military deterrence, South Korea had few options of responding to this stance in view of US and Soviet agreement that the border between their spheres of influence traversed the Korean peninsula. Instead, South Korea adjusted to the general pattern of competition for relative capabilities between the liberal and communist blocs by focusing on surpassing the economic and social development of North Korea. Under the current South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul has instead opted for a conciliatory approach towards North Korea and is therefore at odds with US policies on the use of force. The non-use of force and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula remain a South Korean priority since Seoul would be a likely first target in case of violent conflict. On occasion, North Korea has directed test firings of missiles towards Japan, but violent encounters principally take place between North and South Korea. For example, in July 2003 South Korean and North Korean soldiers traded fire in the heavily mined demilitarized zone (DMZ) intended to keep the armed forces of the two countries apart. Washington’s confrontational approach towards North Korea does not sit well with South Korea. As stated by South Korean President Roh, Seoul and Washington share the goal of preventing North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons, but they have different views on how to resolve the issue (‘Roh, Bush to Reaffirm Peaceful Resolution on North Korea’ 2003). At an early stage, South Korea dismissed the possibility of Seoul’s participation, should the United States decide to take military action on North Korea to halt its nuclear programme. Seoul made it clear that, on this point, South Korea would be unwilling to compromise. In view of South Korean proximity to North Korea and the expected costs of reunification, South Korea prefers a slow process of gradual rapprochement based on dialogue and limited cooperation. Seoul’s so-called
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comprehensive engagement policy is a continuation of the sunshine policy invented by former President Kim Dae Jung (Noerper 2001: 175–76). The new policy, under President Roh termed peace and prosperity, has a wider perspective than the old one, encompassing initiatives such as the development of tourism, the relinking of inter-Korean railways in the DMZ in June 2003, the establishment of a military hotline to ease tensions along the Korean border in June 2004, and South Korean imports of North Korean ceramics to help sustain progress in North Korea’s limited market economic reforms (interview with Professor Taeho Kim, Hallym University 11–1–2005). South Korea has put pressure on the United States to give up its confrontational stance, pleading that the attitude of the regime can be changed by means of dialogue. For example, South Korea tried to postpone discussions on the repositioning of the US forces until the nuclear crisis had been resolved, stating that the South Korean government preferred the old location of the US Army in Korea. The US plans to reposition its forces away from the DMZ to the centre of the peninsula was interpreted by North Korea as a strengthening of US deterrence capabilities against those of North Korea since the relocation means that the main part of the troops would be out of reach of North Korean artillery. The United States, however, went on with the realignment plans that also involve handing over wartime operational control of South Korean troops to Seoul, replacing manpower with advanced weaponry, South Korea’s participation in the PSI, and US demands for trilateral military cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea directed against North Korea, China and terrorist threats in Asia. Initially, Washington allegedly stopped short of asking South Korea to join the PSI, knowing that Seoul is reluctant to risk taking part in this initiative because its participation is likely to be interpreted by Pyongyang as a provocation that might lead to armed conflict.5 By December 2005, Seoul had agreed to a minor role in the PSI programme as an observer to exercise drills, recognizing that it had to accept some of Washington’s demands to ensure that South Korea maintains its status as a major non-NATO ally in view of their disagreements over current US policies on the Korean peninsula. US pressures for trilateral US–Japanese– South Korean military cooperation will set South Korea firmly against North Korea and require improvements in the strained relations between South Korea and Japan (‘North Korea Missile Threat Growing, UFSK Commander Bell Said’ 2006; ‘Park tells Koizumi to show leadership’ 2006). This initiative emulates trilateral military cooperation between the United States, Japan and Australia, the so-called Trilateral Security Dialogue, which held its first meeting in Sydney in March 2006 focusing on China’s military and economic rise. Such talks may be seen as an attempt at putting a halt to South Korea’s rapprochement with China so as to minimize intra-alliance disagreements on how to deal with the Korean issue and with the wider issue of China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific. Although a US ally, South Korea has deviated markedly from Washing-
Sino-US policies on the use of force 83 ton’s policies during the 2002 US–North Korean standoff. Seoul agrees with the United States that North Korea should give up its nuclear programme, allow IAEA inspections, stop missile exports, and resume its missile-test moratorium as demanded by the United States. However, Seoul differs from US policies by advocating that North Korean demands for oil supplies, regime recognition, economic assistance and normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States should be met. Seoul in itself does not have the capacity to change US policies on the use of force on the Korean peninsula, but Seoul can make it difficult for Washington to implement its policies effectively. For example, sanctions are less effective as long as Seoul maintains economic links to North Korea. South Korea’s partially independent policy on the Korean peninsula thus helps to sustain dialogue rather than confrontation as the principal method of conflict resolution.
US policies on the use of force in South Asia In South Asia, anti-terror and anti-WMD activities are both important. Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan, where Operation Enduring Freedom led by the United States is carried out, makes it a central partner in the war on terror. Terrorism is also a well-known phenomenon in India. However, in most cases it is not related to al-Qaeda and other radical Islamic terrorist networks, but to locally based conflicts such as that in Kashmir between India and Pakistan, to the Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka, or to militant Sikh groups in Punjab. In comparison with India, the effectiveness of Pakistan’s anti-WMD policies is highly questionable, but Islamabad is keen to demonstrate improved implementation of non-proliferation measures. Leakages in Pakistan’s nuclear programme do therefore not cause many problems for its alliance relations with the United States. Concurrently with the enhancement of the strategic relations between Washington and Pakistan, Islamabad has initiated strategic cooperation with New Delhi, a move that encourages de facto acceptance of the Indian nuclear programme. The accommodating attitude of Musharraf’s regime towards the political priorities of the Bush administration and Washington’s concerns about the possibility of Islamic rule in Pakistan add to Islamabad’s importance as a core ally of the United States. Pakistan can be described as a struggling polity that continues to be harried by violence between Sunni and Shi’ite militants with links to al-Qaeda despite President Musharraf’s banning of Islamist terrorist groups and his call for a jihad against extremism. In 2001, India and Pakistan were on the brink of war due to an attack originating from Pakistani terrorists on the Indian parliament in December. The incident demonstrates Pakistan’s problems with controlling the militant parts of its population, which are allegedly also supported by parts of the political establishment in some cases. Despite prevailing control problems, the war on terror encourages the United States to continue to gravitate towards Pakistan as its main South Asian ally. US pressures have prompted Islamabad’s armed forces to
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carry out an offensive on the Pakistani–Afghan border to prevent al-Qaeda from using Pakistan as a basis for counterinsurgency activities into Afghan territory. This operation is likely to remain at the top of the US security agenda until Afghanistan’s political system is stable. As long as the Musharraf government keeps the United States happy with its efforts to fight terrorism, Islamabad is likely to remain the most important South Asian partner in the 2001 war on terror. The fact that the United States and Pakistan have significantly increased bilateral defence cooperation during the reign of Bush, whereas Washington merely has ambitions of a strategic partnership with India, testifies to the relative importance of Pakistan in the interim (interview with senior US official 19–10–2004). US anti-WMD policies also focus on Pakistan itself because the control problem permeates Islamabad’s nuclear programme. The control of Pakistani authorities with its nuclear programme was justifiably criticized with the 2003 nuclear proliferation scandal that revealed clandestine supplies of nuclear technology and equipment by Pakistani nuclear scientists to Iran, Libya and possibly North Korea. It remains to be seen whether governmental initiatives to restore confidence in the control of the military establishment with Islamabad’s nuclear programme will be effective in view of Pakistan’s continuing economic difficulties and political instability (IISS 2004a: 228– 42). Washington would appreciate higher Pakistani success rates on antiWMD measures. However, Islamabad’s swift admission that its nuclear scientists have sold information implies that Pakistan is keen to demonstrate improved implementation of non-proliferation measures. Pakistan’s compliance with US policies on the use of force is partly due to the Musharraf government’s recognition that it cannot handle domestic problems with Islamic terrorism on its own. However, Pakistan also needs a great-power sponsor to sustain its conflict with neighbouring India since it is by far the weaker power of the two. Pakistan and India both have nuclear programmes, which Washington would like to see abolished. The United States is in favour of a denuclearization of the South Asian subcontinent since insufficient control mechanisms, especially with the Pakistani nuclear programme, indicate that Islamabad continues to contribute to unauthorized nuclear proliferation. In addition, Indo-Pakistani enmity implies that there is a risk of nuclear war on the subcontinent. The prospects of denuclearization are, however, unfavourable. The 1999 Indo-Pakistani Kargil war, won by India, enhanced the possibility of escalation to nuclear war and strengthened the advocates of a hawkish policy towards the opponent in both states (S. Cohen 2002: 41). The United States would like to see a resolution to long-standing IndoPakistani hostilities since improved Indo-Pakistani relations would make Washington’s aim to cooperate militarily with both parties much easier to fulfil. The Kashmir dispute is the most serious conflict between the two states, whose relations have been marred by armed confrontation due to religious strife and border disputes since their independence in 1947. In
Sino-US policies on the use of force 85 1949, India and Pakistan accepted the UN’s cease-fire line, with one-third of Jammu and Kashmir under the control of the Pakistani Azad Kashmir government. India, however, continued to regard Kashmir as the guarantee of India’s secularism in contrast to Pakistan, which considered Kashmir a confirmation of the religiously based two-nation theory upon which Pakistan was founded. The conflict has therefore shown rapid changes from instances of happy relations to ones of tension and open hostilities without being resolved (Hardgrave Jr. and Kochanek 1986: 58–111). The 2003 Indo-Pakistani peace process seems to be a continuation of this pattern and is therefore unlikely to produce a settlement. In April 2003, the peace process was initiated by India offering to discuss with Pakistan how to replace hostilities with constructive ties. The peace process has resulted in vows to increase Indo-Pakistani political, cultural, economic and family exchanges, but India maintains that a resolution of the Kashmir dispute is not in sight. A dispute settlement offers obvious advantages to both sides, such as political capital to India in the international arena and economic benefits caused by a reduction in military spending (‘South Asia peace “irreversible”’ 2005; ‘S&P tots up gains from Indo-Pak truce’ 2005). Despite the prospects of valuable gains, the domestic political costs of compromising on territorial claims are considerable. Most conspicuously, New Delhi is concerned that a compromise on Kashmir would encourage Muslim, Sikh, communist and Christian separatism to step up demands for independence. Continued Pakistani support for Muslim insurgents in Kashmir is encouraged by the strength of the Islamic opposition that threatens the survival of the Musharraf government and the coherence of the Pakistani state (Ganguly 2003/04: 41– 47). However, the frailty of the Pakistani regime also implies that its survival is questionable without a great-power sponsor supplying military and economic support. Adversarial Indo-Pakistani relations engage the United States in a difficult balancing act because Washington is strengthening its alliance with Pakistan at the same time as it is building a strategic partnership with India. Nevertheless, although inconvenient, the persistence of IndoPakistani enmity is not a major problem for Washington, and therefore the United States is unlikely to intervene to bring about a solution. Unlike Pakistan, India is not a US dependant, and it is not a central partner in US anti-terror and anti-WMD initiatives. Indeed, in some ways India has attempted to emulate US policies on the use of force, striving for the privileges of global powers. India has been allowed considerable leeway in maintaining stability in South Asia for decades. New Delhi has imitated the US policy on the right to intervene in its sphere of influence. The policy involves that, in its hemisphere, intervention in the internal affairs of other states is justified when governments prove unable to control their territory, thereby threatening international peace and stability. The United States has intervened in other American states on several occasions without prior international approval. India has followed a similar course of action in South Asia. India’s calls for recognition of its entitlement to police the
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subcontinent have partly won US approval. US policy in South Asia, as in other regions outside of the American hemisphere, involves leaving the reduction of local tension levels to indigenous powers if regional conflicts do not have an immediate bearing on US interests. Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Goa, Sikkim and, since 1971, Bangladesh are all traditional Indian dependents as India has set out to confirm by intervening militarily in the domestic politics of these states on occasions of political turmoil.6 Bangladeshi independence was the result of India’s victory in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. India has never intervened in the domestic politics of Bangladesh, most likely because Bangladesh has refrained from challenging New Delhi (S. Cohen 2002: 41). In 1961, India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa, realizing that Portugal remained unwilling to give up the island despite the support of the International Court of Justice for India’s claim (Blinkenberg 1972: 215). In 1973–74, when the Nepali majority within Sikkim began to agitate for political rights, India tightened its hold over Sikkim’s internal affairs, and in 1975 the former Indian protectorate was annexed by New Delhi. In 1989, India deployed troops in the Maldives against insurgents attempting to oust the incumbent government despite the absence of Indian interests in the domestic politics of the island state. In 1987, India deployed approximately 60,000 troops on Sri Lanka to curb the secessionist guerrilla warfare of the Tamil tigers that threatened South Indian stability. Bhutan submitted de facto control of its foreign affairs to India in 1949, and India maintains a military presence in this state called IMTRAT, which provides training for Bhutanese military personnel. The special Indo-Bhutanese relationship is based on their 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which assures India’s noninterference in Bhutan’s internal affairs in exchange for Bhutanese acceptance of guidance from India regarding foreign policy. The special relationship forced Bhutan to launch a military operation against Indian insurgents in 2003 despite the risk of reprisals to ward off continuous Indian pressure to prevent cross-border attacks on Indian security forces (Mazumdar 2005: 566–80). In 1989, India enforced a blockade on the Nepalese border due to a trade and transit dispute causing the deplorable economy of Nepal to deteriorate even more. India has also been involved in peace negotiations with the purpose of putting a halt to the Maoist rebels threatening to overthrow the incumbent government from 2001 and ensuring that the current authoritarian government embarks on a democratization process.7 Indian foreign policy activism reached a peak during the reign of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s when it was manifested that India was willing and able to exercise control over these states, should it wish to do so. US reservations concerning India’s policing of South Asia have emerged when Indian interventions have involved Pakistan or given rise to increased tension levels on the subcontinent. On these occasions, the United States has made clear that the right to intervene is a privilege of the dominant powers, for which only the United States and the Soviet Union qualified during the
Sino-US policies on the use of force 87 Cold War. India’s alignment with the Soviet Union, however, allowed it to ignore US objections to Indian foreign policy activism. For example, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, which ended with India’s victory and led to the creation of Bangladesh, was not endorsed by the Nixon administration as indicated by its decision to send a naval task force against India and its advocacy of the UN Security Council defining India as an aggressor. India’s annexation of its protectorate Sikkim in 1975 was similarly unpopular in Washington. China’s claim to Sikkim and its opposition towards recognition of India’s annexation implied that the Indian action threatened to engender conflict with Beijing to the dissatisfaction of the United States. Washington did not approve of a revival of local disputes that might jeopardize the thaw in Sino-US relations in the 1970s. The end of the Cold War dissolved the Indo-Soviet relationship, removing a major barrier towards closer US–Indian cooperation. Washington opted for an engagement policy that began during the Clinton presidency in 1997 and continued during the 2001 Bush presidency. India is a potentially attractive partner due to its vicinity to the Indian Ocean and its growth potential tied in with economic liberalization measures. India has adopted a more sceptical attitude towards US courtship, as indicated by its continued reliance on Russian arms sales and its agreement with Moscow in March 2006 on Russian supplies of uranium fuel for Indian nuclear plants. India’s scepticism is founded on its suspicions that the United States may use closer US–Indian strategic relations to pressurize New Delhi into succumbing to its strategic interests. India is particularly disinclined to renounce its maritime independence in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi has been concerned about US and Chinese maritime influence in this area for decades. Its naval and air facility on the Andamans and the Nicobars in the Bay of Bengal has allowed India to counter the US military presence on the British island Diego Garcia and to keep Chinese force projection at bay since India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war (Berlin 2004: 59–60; Hardgrave Jr. and Kochanek 1986: 355). Despite these misgivings, India has partially retreated from its opposition to enhanced military cooperation with the United States. India has therefore endorsed US overtures for a defence rapprochement. In its 2002 national security strategy, the United States proposed that Washington and New Delhi have a common interest in protecting the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean (The White House 2002b). The Bush administration has also declared its intention to develop a close strategic partnership with India. These plans indicate that although Pakistan remains Washington’s closest strategic partner in South Asia, it is not the sole basis of US strategic engagement. The United States and India carry out joint army, navy, air and special forces exercises, and India is improving its navy’s interception and warfare capabilities with US assistance. New Delhi also plans to buy 120 fighter aircraft for the Indian air force and upgrade its anti-missile systems with US assistance. US Foreign Minister Condoleeza Rice has stated that
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India is emerging to take on global responsibilities, which encourages the United States to accelerate progress in the New Steps in Strategic Partnership encompassing civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, high technology trade and expanded dialogue on missile defence (‘Secretary Condi Rice meets Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh’ 2005). US nonproliferation and export control laws and policies have blocked full nuclear cooperation with India. In seeking to end restrictions on such cooperation, the United States wants India to be accepted globally as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons even though India will not join the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), arguing that India is now poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power (The White House 2006). In return for this concession, in the July 2005 agreement India accepted to assume the same responsibilities and practices as the acknowledged nuclear weapons states. This includes distinguishing India’s military nuclear facilities from civilian ones and putting all civilian facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. India has also agreed to extend its moratorium on nuclear testing.8 The US–Indian agreement implies that the United States puts a high premium on securing strategic cooperation from New Delhi, even to the point where it compromises on its anti-WMD policy. It is highly attractive to Washington to partner with a sub-regional power that has come out of the Cold War without its original dominant power sponsor, the Soviet Union, since New Delhi is the key to future US influence on the subcontinent’s security architecture. Pakistan may be Washington’s main priority as long as the war on terror is at the top of the US administration’s agenda. However, in the long run the United States will seek to accommodate New Delhi’s demands on the issue of the use of force to ensure that it does not gravitate towards China and emerge as a challenger to the US version of regional order.
US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific Vast differences exist between Washington’s policies on the use of force in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia. Southeast Asia is considered to be dominated by weak states unable to control their territory and population effectively. As such, the sub-region constitutes a security vacuum that Washington attempts to fill by seeking cooperation from the dominant states in the region for anti-terrorist and anti-WMD measures. The security threats against the United States emerging in Southeast Asia are not geographically based but stem from transnational terrorist groups; hence, a flexible presence is called for, and unilateralism predominantly consists of bilateral strategic partnerships and cooperation agreements centred on facilities for training, exercising and liaison activities. Regional concerns of US hegemony stem from the tendency of Washington to adopt measures of enforcement should the efforts of Southeast Asian
Sino-US policies on the use of force 89 states to use force against security threats be found wanting. However, for the most part, the indigenous powers have been able to resist pressure for enforcement when US policy initiatives have been considered incompatible with regional and domestic security considerations. Central Asia is similarly considered to be dominated by weak states unable to effectively control their territory and population. As such, the sub-region constitutes the second security vacuum that Washington attempts to fill by seeking cooperation from Central Asian states. Central Asia is also in the backyard of China. Thus, the sub-region poses transnational as well as geographical threats against the security of the United States. To counter these threats, Washington has opted for a strategy of bilateral strategic partnerships and cooperation agreements with sub-regional states to implement anti-terrorist measures. The number of troops is low, but a variety of measures have been adopted due to the diversity of threats the United States is facing in the region. The US force posture thus involves permanently ground-stationed forces, forward operating bases with pre-positioned equipment, and facilities for training, exercise and liaison activities. The establishment of US hegemony has been attempted by proxy through cooperation with Central Asian states that have the weakest links to the traditionally dominant power in the sub-region, Russia. The United States was betting on Moscow’s continuous preference for cooperation with Washington despite US negligence of central Russian demands and interests. This has resulted in the weakening of Washington’s relative position of power because Moscow has taken steps to regain control by using its military and economic importance to persuade defecting states to strengthen their ties with Russia at the expense of the United States. Northeast Asia has been at the centre of US anti-WMD policies due to continuous dissatisfaction with North Korea’s progress as concerns the dismantlement of its military nuclear programme. Internal disagreement in the Bush administration on how to deal with this issue has left the United States in an in-between position. It has refrained from military intervention, resolving that a combination of sanctions and negotiations without compromising its demand for dismantlement before concessions can be given to North Korea is acceptable. This approach indicates that the United States bides its time, presumably until an opportunity to deal with the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme presents itself. For example, North Korea may disintegrate, the North Korean government might concede to US demands, or an opportunity to intervene presents itself. Unilateralism centres on strengthening the US–Japanese alliance to counter the security threats stemming from North Korea and China. In Northeast Asia, the United States therefore has its permanently ground-stationed main forces in Japan and in South Korea. US hegemony is not a problem for Tokyo as long as its loyalty results in influence on US plans for regional order in the AsiaPacific and in protection against the security threats stemming from China and North Korea. These threats are even more serious to Tokyo than to
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Washington due to Japan’s geographical proximity to these states. South Korea is far more sceptical of US designs for Northeast Asia, disagreeing with the US policies on pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony. Despite the US–South Korean alliance relationship, Seoul has proved a somewhat deceitful ally that is only partially willing to adhere to US policies on the use of force. In South Asia, US policies on pre-emption have focused on Pakistan, a polity which gives rise to terrorism and the spread of WMD. Unilateralism involves the building of a strong alliance with Islamabad to stop terrorist groups from using its territory to destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan. Moreover, Washington has put pressure on Islamabad to strengthen its antiWMD policy to prevent leakages to alleged enemies of the United States such as North Korea. India is not so compliant with US steps to manifest its hegemony and only accepts a limited strategic partnership with the United States. New Delhi is also the key to influence on the subcontinent, and the United States attempts to avoid the same mistake as that made in Central Asia: prioritizing weak states such as Uzbekistan to the neglect of strong states such as Russia, which has an impact on the long-term ability of the United States to sustain hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Washington has therefore compromised on its anti-WMD measures with respect to India, recognizing that India will remain a nuclear-armed state like Russia. The United States recognizes that India is a necessary partner in US efforts to implement a regional order on its terms, even if it means giving concessions to a state that does not wholeheartedly support US hegemonic designs and leaves Washington in a compromised position because its policy implementation is determined by strategic considerations rather than by the compliance of strategic partners with its policies on the use of force.
Chinese policies on the use of force in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia is the sub-region where China has been most successful in implementing its policy of cooperative security. Southeast Asia has been a test case allowing Beijing to estimate the benefits and drawbacks of the policy. This development came about through a process of trial and error based on Chinese and Southeast Asian suggestions for dialogue. The proposals were fostered by China’s entry into the strategic and economic structures of Southeast Asia, making it a de facto Southeast Asian power. Beijing’s growing influence engendered concern over alleged Chinese intentions to establish a sub-regional order on its own terms. Beijing attempted to placate the Southeast Asian states by proposing bilateral negotiations to settle disagreements. The incident that caused matters to come to a head was the 1988 naval battle between China and Vietnam. The battle was won by China and resulted in Beijing’s occupation of features in the maritime heartland of Southeast Asia, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Although at the time, Vietnam was not a part of ASEAN, the physical presence of
Sino-US policies on the use of force 91 China in Southeast Asia’s neighbourhood implied that the Southeast Asian states were no longer safe from Chinese power projection. In 1988, to appease its neighbours, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Wang Ying-fan issued a statement saying that China was willing to shelve the issue of sovereignty over the Spratlys on a provisional basis and solve it through negotiation at an appropriate time (Hurng-yu 1991: 123). In 1991, China went a step further in its proposals for dialogue when it came out in support of coordinating national policies in the disputed areas around the Spratlys, but only if authorities were confined exclusively to arranging or supervising cooperative projects (Daily Report China 9–8–1991). Southeast Asia’s answer was to invite China to join an informal dialogue on preventing violent conflict in the South China Sea in 1991 (Djalal and Townsend-Gault 1999: 123–24). This initiative paved the way for the Sino-Southeast Asian agreement on a de facto freeze of the maritime borders in the South China Sea. The informal non-governmental Sino-Southeast Asian dialogue initially focused on scientific and economic issues, a process that was extended to military and defence issues from the late 1990s. Negotiations were transferred to the intergovernmental level in 1999, which resulted in an agreement on a non-binding code of conduct in November 2002. The code committed the parties to exercise self-restraint and avoid activities which would complicate or escalate territorial and maritime disputes. Thus, China and ASEAN agreed to rely on peaceful means and avoid staking their claims through the establishment of additional outposts, to exchange views between defence and military officials, and to provide advance notice of any pending military exercises in the disputed waters (ASEAN 2002). China accepted Southeast Asia’s offer to shelve the issue of territorial and maritime sovereignty to avoid that steadily improved relations would be jeopardized over a matter that China can afford to postpone to a later date. The principal reason why it took China eight years to accept formal negotiations was its general aversion to multilateral security arrangements where it risks being in the minority. Therefore, its Southeast Asian neighbours first had to convince Beijing that they recognized that it has legitimate interests in the South China Sea (interview with Professor Xiaoming Zhang, Peking University 10–11–2004). The code of conduct on the South China Sea is a good example of the possibilities and limitations inherent in China’s concept of cooperative security. The agreement demonstrates China’s embrace of multilateralism which implies a realization that maintaining freedom from commitment towards multiple parties comes at a high cost, although it bears the advantage of a high level of freedom of action and flexibility allowing for swift foreign policy changes. But at the same time it gives rise to suspicions as to the long-term goals of Chinese foreign policy. To ensure its surroundings of China’s peaceful intentions, Beijing has resolved that it is in its interest to accept explicit commitments which reassure the neighbouring states that China is a status quo power aiming at cooperation rather than conflict.
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On the negative side, Beijing’s commitment is merely superficial since the agreement is not binding. This may indicate several things. It may imply that China has good intentions but awaits proof from the Southeast Asian states that they are indeed willing to take Beijing’s interests and demands into account, for example by implementing the free-trade agreement that is due to have been realized by 2010.9 However, it may also indicate that China has not committed itself to maintaining the status quo in the long run. Several tendencies question China’s commitment to refrain from expanding its physical presence. For example, despite ASEAN’s success in committing China to the non-use of force in their maritime neighbourhood, developments such as the Sino-Philippine agreement in September 2004 to explore for oil and gas in a disputed area of the South China Sea create uncertainty as to whether China chooses to promote its own interests at the expense of maintaining stability and cooperation with the Southeast Asian states (interview with a senior Indonesian official, the President’s Office 9–12–2004). Moreover, Beijing has retained its so-called enigmatic claim in the South China Sea (Djalal quoted in Dzurek 1996: 12). Since 1947, maps of the area have been produced repeatedly, depicting a tongue-shaped line resembling an international boundary, but with no indication as to whether China ever intended or still intends to claim all of the islands, the sea, the airspace, the seabed and all the resources contained therein, or simply the islands contained within the lines. To this day, China’s neighbouring states are unable to get an idea of the precise extent of Beijing’s claim to the maritime heartland of Southeast Asia. Since recognized international boundaries have not yet been drawn in the South China Sea, China continues to have overlapping claims with Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. One motive of China for maintaining unilateralism as a central element in its policy on the use of force is the vast unutilized hydrocarbon and fish resources in the South China Sea. Oil and natural gas are available in large quantities in the South China Sea, but the area has yet to be thoroughly surveyed, and dependable estimates of hydrocarbon resources are therefore not available (Snyder 1995). In 2003, China was the second largest consumer of oil products in the world, only surpassed by the United States. China’s total crude oil production is approximately 3.6 billion barrels per day, but daily consumption in China is more than seven billion barrels (US Energy Information Agency 2005). The Chinese are therefore aggressively pursuing additional oil supplies around the world. The South China Sea is undoubtedly one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, but very little is known about the volume of resources available. Of the littoral states in the South China Sea, China has the highest fish catch: 17.5 million tons in 1993 (Djalal 2000: 9–21). The figure not only testifies to China’s large population but also to the fact that as the Chinese middle class grows, demand for animal protein increases and part of this consumption comes from fish. Beijing hence has ample motives for supplementing its concept of cooperative
Sino-US policies on the use of force 93 security towards ASEAN with a unilateral policy allowing it as large a share as possible of the region’s hydrocarbon and fish resources. The seizure of fishing boats and other commercial vessels by military ships within claimed areas constitutes a potential trigger of violent conflict. Of most concern is perhaps China’s armed enforcement of alleged boundaries towards Taiwan. From 1990–95 there were over 120 incidents of Taiwanese fishing boats being robbed or subjected to inspection by China’s public security police or by unidentified ships termed pirates (Cossa 1998). Beijing’s harassment of the Taiwanese merchant fleet risks bringing the sovereignty conflict between mainland China and Taiwan into Southeast Asia. The ASEAN member states have confirmed their support for the one-China policy, but, nevertheless, this conflict may adversely affect their sub-region. The ASEAN member states do not have identical views on the desirability of Chinese unilateralism. Malaysia does not see China as a threat or as having hegemonic intentions, according to the official view (interview with Noor Aziz Yunan, Ministry of Defence 25–2–1998). Kuala Lumpur tends to advance the view that China, given the chance, wants to be integrated into the international community (interview with Azizah Binti Abod, Ministry of Defence 25–2–1998). Thailand and Singapore are more reserved towards China, but, at the same time, assume an accommodating attitude towards it, as indicated by the fact that they played down the Chinese occupation of Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1995. The US ally Thailand also accepted to take part in a joint search-and-rescue exercise with the Chinese navy in December 2005. China is interested in peace and stability and, consequently, is not willing to risk violent conflict with Southeast Asian countries over entitlement to the resources of the South China Sea (interview with Lee Lai To, National University of Singapore 16–19–2005). Indonesia tends to look upon China with suspicion, considering China’s present policy to be charm diplomacy that calls for caution as to the longterm intentions of Beijing (interview with two senior Indonesian government officials, Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 7–12–2004). Nevertheless, it also has a pragmatic view of China as a great power on the rise whose national interests must be accommodated and from whom there is a lot to be gained, in particular in terms of economic interaction, if benevolent, but cautious, relations are maintained (interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, former Assistant to the Minister State Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Habibie 2–11–1998). Brunei tends to adopt the common ASEAN stance on China since this small state primarily focuses on its relations with Malaysia and Singapore and has no interest in adopting an independent position on China. The Philippines clearly does not see China as a potential but as an actual threat which determines its security and foreign policy. For example, former Presidential Security Advisor Almonte does not seem to question the advisability of containing China but appears to regard it as a necessary precautionary measure against a revival of Chinese
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expansion in Southeast Asia (Almonte 1997/98: 83–84). Vietnam sees ASEAN as the key to avoid facing a potentially hostile China in isolation, and it does not have the means to stand up to China on its own. Vietnam is also considering coming under the security umbrella of the United States by giving it access to the old Soviet naval base, Cam Ranh Bay. By contrast, Laos and Cambodia, with whom China signed a military agreement in 2003 to provide training and equipment for Phnom Penh, gravitate towards China rather than the United States. However, most importantly, Beijing has a close strategic partnership with Myanmar. China has allegedly assisted Pyinmana in building a deep-sea port near Mergui on the Andaman Sea and won permission to operate a naval observation facility in the Cocos Islands at the top of the Andaman chain, which allows China to become a major future naval power in the Indian Ocean (Velloor 2004). Hence, China’s military presence in Southeast Asia mainly consists of some military outposts in the South China Sea. Chinese destroyers, frigates and submarines conduct exercises in contested waters in the disputed part of the South China Sea. However, China does not yet have a green-water naval capability that would allow it to control the area. The different views among ASEAN member states towards Chinese policies on the use of force do not prevent ASEAN from forging a unison attitude towards China on issues that threaten peace and stability in Southeast Asia. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar do not pose much of an obstacle to ASEAN unity because they are too weak and isolated to oppose the majority of member states. China has offered to accede to the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. However, ASEAN rejected the offer, stating that it would prefer all nuclear powers to join at the same time (Economy 2005). This is a good example of the extent of ASEAN unity on security issues. The member states maintain unity on the principle that the basis of cooperation with China is the continued military presence of the United States and the de facto security guarantees derived from it. As a consequence, if a potential conflict between the security interests of the United States and China is on the horizon, ASEAN will attempt to detach itself from this conflict of interest to avoid affecting the Southeast Asian security environment. The United States is not in favour of Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone because it is at odds with its principle of not letting host countries of US naval forces know if nuclear armed vessels visit their harbours. Beijing’s accession to the treaty would therefore drive a wedge between Washington and its allies, potentially at the cost of peace and stability. China’s relations with Southeast Asia are close compared with its relations with states in the other sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific, in part because the US military presence focuses on counter-terrorism and, hence, is not an immediate concern, in part because Southeast Asia has proved comparatively conciliatory towards Chinese interests and demands (interview with Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11–2004; interview with a former Chinese PLA professor 15–11–2004). In Southeast Asia, the United
Sino-US policies on the use of force 95 States is not directly involved in the South China Sea, a fact that also aids Sino-ASEAN cooperation (interview with Professor Xiaoming Zhang, Peking University 10–11–2004). Like the United States, China has also been courting Indonesia, which remains one of the more US-sceptical states in Southeast Asia. Indonesia is an important supplier of energy to China, but it is also the most attractive of the ASEAN member states in a political sense since ASEAN cannot move forward with integration and cooperation without Jakarta’s approval. This is reflected in their 2005 cooperation agreement, which is not only about economics and trade but also touches upon military cooperation, including naval cooperation to ensure peace and stability in the Malacca Strait. The extent of Sino-Indonesian military cooperation remains to be seen. So far, Jakarta has used it to commit the United States, China as well as other countries to supplying equipment intended to help Indonesia patrol its own waters to ward off US pressures for participation in the patrolling of the strait. Neither Indonesia nor ASEAN are, however, considered the most central entities in balancing US power. When considering the Asia-Pacific as a whole, China sees ASEAN as helpful in stabilizing secondary security issues (interview with Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11–2004; interview with a former Chinese PLA professor 15–11–2004). But the Southeast Asian states are also weak states with difficulties in maintaining internal unity except when they face external pressures from major powers that threaten sub-regional peace and stability (interview with Professor Zhu Liqun, China Foreign Affairs University 19–11–2004). And perhaps most importantly, Southeast Asia keeps China at arm’s length when it comes to security cooperation, continuing to rely on US military power. Southeast Asia is China’s favourite example of the genuineness of its cooperative security policy, and it is also an important part of Chinese unilateral strategies for consolidating its position as an AsiaPacific great power. Although China cannot afford to neglect the region, the states of the sub-region are not the most central partners in Chinese efforts to balance US power.
Chinese policies on the use of force in Central Asia Central Asia is the region where Beijing’s policy of cooperative security took off. Immediately after the independence of the Central Asian states in 1991, China looked to its north-western backyard to further its economic, political and strategic interests by means of dialogue and cooperation. Central Asian hydrocarbon resources constituted one incentive of China’s sub-regional engagement. Neighbouring Kazakhstan has been targeted as the most attractive partner because of its considerable oil production, which resulted in exclusive Chinese access to the oil fields at Uzen and in Western Kazakhstan. In addition, Beijing is involved in the construction of pipelines. In 2005, this resulted in a Sino-Kazakh agreement to open a pipeline between the two countries, the first oil export route to bypass Russia.
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Sino-Central Asian trade has grown. For example, Beijing’s trade with Kazakhstan is larger than Turkey’s overall trade with Central Asia. Another example is trade between China and Uzbekistan, which has grown by over 100 per cent per year since 1992, making Uzbekistan China’s second-largest Central Asian trade partner. To the Central Asian economies, Beijing is an attractive economic partner. Often, Chinese products are of a higher quality than the Russian alternatives. Other possible trade partners, such as the United States and Japan, manufacture products that are often too advanced and expensive for the Central Asian markets. Chinese trade access has been aided by Beijing’s use of economic aid to increase trade with Central Asia. For example, China has awarded Kazakhstan and Tajikistan loans earmarked for the purchase of Chinese commodities. Central Asia’s importance to the Chinese economy is negligible. Trade with Central Asia constitutes approximately 0.25 per cent of China’s total international trade; however, to the Central Asian states, China is an important economic alternative to other external powers (Rasizade 2003). Like Russia, China has been concerned that the permanent US military presence would jeopardize sub-regional peace and stability. Initially, Beijing considered US force projection into Central Asia to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the US military presence promises to help fight terrorism in China’s backyard. Beijing is equally concerned with transnational terrorism. Therefore, and since Beijing could do practically nothing but to adopt a positive attitude, China initially welcomed US efforts to fight the Taleban in Afghanistan even if it involved the deployment of US troops on Central Asian territory near Chinese borders. On the other hand, the US military presence was seen as a threat to Beijing’s newly established position in Central Asia in view of Washington’s attractions as a relatively well-off economic and strategic partner. However, Beijing’s major concern was that the US military presence threatened to crowd out Russia as the dominant military power and to strengthen the relative position of Uzbekistan, which has been reluctant to accept Sino-Russian sub-regional influence (interview with a Chinese scholar, Renmin University 4–11–2004). China’s best bet is to rely on Moscow’s ability to prevent US strategic predominance while gradually allowing for Chinese military influence. China has formalized its military activities in a statement, which also makes clear the Russian imperative that US activities in Central Asia should be confined to anti-terror operations (Albion 2003a). Chinese military cooperation with Russia and Central Asia was institutionalized by treaty in 2001, legalizing the projection of Chinese troops into the sub-region and the staging of joint military exercises (‘China-Russia Sign Good-Neighborly Friendship, Cooperation Treaty’ 2001; Blank 2003). The Kazakh and Kyrgyz ministries of defence cooperate closely with their Chinese counterpart. Kyrgyzstan, which is also courted by the United States and Russia and has the smallest defence force of the five Central Asian countries, is considered Beijing’s principal military partner. Sino-Central Asian defence cooperation
Sino-US policies on the use of force 97 does not have Russian approval, but China’s military involvement is so insubstantial that it serves the purpose of influence rather than power projection (interview with Danish senior official 4–3–2005). The Kremlin does not view China’s minor military role in Central Asia as an immediate threat, but is inclined to consider it supportive of Russian aims of constraining US sub-regional influence (interview with Andrey V. Grozin, CIS States Institute 25–2–2005). This perspective combined with the fact that Russia is welcome to participate in China’s Central Asian activities is also the reason that Moscow does not consider the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline bypassing Russia a threat against its interests (interview with Andrey V. Grozin, CIS States Institute 25–2–2005). Hence, Sino-Russian efforts to accommodate mutual force projection in Central Asia to maintain unity in the face of US competition for strategic influence have been somewhat successful. China and Russia have developed a close strategic partnership in Central Asia, which has been strengthened after the establishment of the US military presence. Their relationship is not solely based on common concerns about US strategic intentions, but is also founded in a mutual interest in settling their long-standing dispute over their common border. This dispute caused repeated rows between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the most serious being a series of border skirmishes along the Ussuri River in 1969 (Shih 1993: 84–86). Sino-Russian economic relations are limited, but Chinese imports of Russian commodities such as oil and weapons and Russian earnings on exports to China provide both powers with incentives to settle conflicts of interests and cooperate to accommodate each other’s foreign policy demands (interview with Research Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University 4–11–2004). China is thus Russia’s largest arms market. Russia sells weapons to almost any state that will buy them, except for Taiwan to avoid disagreement with Beijing over issues of arms procurement. They also have a common view on terrorism as a transnational menace that is to be fought with all means available in Central Asia and at the domestic level. Both Beijing and Moscow are supportive of a multipolar international system and consider the US presence in Central Asia to be an act of premature interference in their spheres of influence (interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). Sino-Russian relations focus on maintaining stability in Central Asia (interview with Professor Song Xinning, Renmin University 14–11–2005). Moscow sees the strategic partnership with China as a means of defending its interests at a time of Chinese decline in terms of military, economic and political power. Immediately following the end of the Cold war, Russia looked for integration with the West. However, in 1998 when a financial crisis hit the country, Western assistance proved disappointing in the eyes of Moscow (interview with Vice President and Senior Research Fellow Ruan Zongze, the China Institute of International Studies 18–11–2004). In addition, US decisions such as the NATO enlargement, Washington’s withdrawal
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from the 1972 treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missiles and the US prioritization of Asia instead of Russia confirmed US negligence of Russian interests. Since then, Sino-Russian relations have steadily improved, and the relationship was officially consolidated with the 2001 Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, which cemented Sino-Russian border stability and cooperation. Thus, China has successfully poached on an initially close US strategic partnership. Suspicions prevail between China and Russia that may prevent the two neighbouring powers from developing a stable partnership enabling them to counter the US presence. Sino-Russian cooperation is still marred by a certain Sinophobia, not only in Russia, but also in states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which are the closest Central Asian cooperation partners of China. Adding to this problem is the fact that the Kremlin has not developed a policy on how to deal with China’s rise at a time when Russia is in decline (interview with Andrey V. Grozin, CIS States Institute 25–2–2005). Moscow remains concerned about the permanency of the US military presence, but the drawbacks of not having the United States nearby are even more serious (interview with Professor Vasily V. Mikheev, Russian Academy of Sciences 9–3–2005). Russia probably prefers a NATO presence to a US presence because the alliance includes EU member states that are seen as civilian powers not interested in challenging Russia’s military position, as indicated by the fact that Moscow has approached NATO for cooperation on antiterrorist activities (interview with Danish senior official 4–3–2005). Moscow’s action implies that it is not sure whether its alignment with Beijing is in its long-term national interest, but because of China’s proximity to Central Asia it is a sub-regional actor that is bound to stay (interview with Dr Sergey Uyanaev, Russian Academy of Social Sciences 4–3–2005). Kazakh President Nazerbaev takes a similar view, encouraging a US, a Chinese and a Russian presence because, in his point of view, a balance of influence between the three powers is called for to maximize Kazakhstan’s national interests (interview with Shayken Galimbekovich Nadirov, Russian Academy of Sciences 5–3–2005). China puts a high premium on strengthening its policy of cooperative security combined with limited unilateralism in Central Asia to promote multipolarity. For the time being, Russia leans heavily towards China, but it has not abandoned NATO and may revert to the West in the long run if Beijing proves to be too dominant.
Chinese policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia In Northeast Asia, cooperative security is not high on China’s foreign policy agenda because the Taiwan problem and Sino-Japanese enmity prevent Beijing from pursuing this strategy consistently and encourage China to rely on unilateralism instead. The exception to this pattern is Sino-South Korean relations, which have been developed on the basis of the principles inherent in China’s concept of cooperative security. The similarities between Beijing’s
Sino-US policies on the use of force 99 and Seoul’s policies on the use of force have emerged in the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff due to the possibility of a US military intervention to dismantle the North Korean nuclear facilities. On the Korean peninsula, China has reasoned, as has South Korea, that the alleged North Korean threat to peace and stability must be averted by avoiding the use of force and by not coercing the current government into abandoning its alleged nuclear deterrent (Yinhong 2004). North Korea is China’s only formal ally. The alliance relationship was instituted with the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty in 1961. One reason that China continues to side with North Korea is that Beijing will not voluntarily contribute to the disappearance of one of the few regional states which challenges US hegemony. A nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia involving the principal US ally Japan is a major security concern for China. However, the disappearance of North Korea will not prevent this development, as indicated by Tokyo’s official statement that China as well as North Korea are the principal potential threats towards Japanese security (‘Japan, US Sign Defence Pact’ 2004). Beijing is also concerned that, in the event of a US military intervention, reunification between North Korea and South Korea ensues, resulting in the emergence of a strengthened US ally on the border of China. The fall of the Pyongyang government is likely to leave China vulnerable, revealing that despite all the talk about China’s rise, it is not even capable of defending its national interests in its immediate continental neighbourhood. It is therefore pertinent to China to ensure that Pyongyang refrains from provocations that may lead to a US military intervention and to convince the majority of states that Pyongyang is a legitimate government adhering to fundamental rules of state conduct. Left with the choices of accepting negotiations or risking the survival of North Korea, Beijing prefers the former option for the time being. In October 2003, China therefore volunteered to persuade North Korea to resume stalled negotiations. It faced the same arduous task in February 2005 when North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks yet again. The fourth round of six party talks took place in September 2005. On this occasion, the US, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, South Korean and North Korean governments agreed on a joint statement according to which North Korea committed itself to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes and returning, at an early date, to the NPT Treaty and to IAEA safeguards. The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and has no intention of attacking or invading North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons (McCormack 2005). However, the agreement did not suggest which of the two contestants had to give way first; that is to say, the question if the United States is to issue security guarantees to North Korea before it dismantles its nuclear programme, or if Pyongyang is to dismantle its nuclear programme before Washington agrees to issue security guarantees. The agreement was presented as a breakthrough in the six-party talks. However, it was more likely the result of Beijing’s demand
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for some kind of result so that the negotiations were not pronounced a failure (interview with Associate Research Fellow, National Chengchi University 28–10–2005). China prefers to keep the talks going even in the absence of a final settlement as long as the United States insists on a confrontational approach. The most likely outcome of negotiations is a non-settlement, with the US– North Korean standoff left unresolved, due to pressing US security concerns and engagements elsewhere, such as the Middle East (Yinhong 2004). China aims at maintaining a limited patron–client relationship with North Korea, while at the same time avoiding being denounced as obstructing regional peace and stability. Remaining on the sidelines of the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff would have been ideal to promote this goal. However, it is imperative for China that the nuclear standoff should fade out and that negotiations for a political framework resolving the question of the Korean partition should be postponed. In the event of military intervention, China has deployed large contingencies of troops along the border towards North Korea during the standoff. These could be used for the protection of Chinese territory, for military assistance to North Korea in the event of armed conflict, and to put pressure on Pyongyang to moderate its policy on the nuclear issue. However, the troops are most likely intended to be used to occupy the northern part of North Korea’s territory, which ensures that China has a buffer between itself and the US ally, South Korea. China’s North Korea policy implies support for a non-settlement preventing the outbreak of violent conflict, but at the same time Beijing prepares for the worst-case scenario of a military intervention. China’s priority to sustain peace on the Korean peninsula has prompted Beijing to play a proactive role in the conflict resolution process. To this end, it has established a division of labour with South Korea aimed at persuading Washington and Pyongyang to refrain from threats of using force. Beijing and Seoul have much more compatible goals on the Korean peninsula than do Seoul and Washington. In view of South Korea’s proximity to North Korea and the costs of reunification, Seoul prefers a slow process of gradual rapprochement based on cooperation and dialogue. Like China, South Korea is also concerned about the refugee flows likely to follow in the wake of a collapse of political authority in Pyongyang. The majority of South Korea’s population is also not too serious about reunification because of the economic burden. In particular, the younger generation is not keen on reunification (interview with Research Professor, Yonsei University 18–1–2005). Seoul puts a high premium on Sino-South Korean collaboration, not only to obtain support for its critical stance towards US condemnation of Pyongyang, but also to dissuade North Korea from undue military provocations. China is the only country with sufficient influence in North Korea to be able to persuade North Korea to display moderation. Chinese involvement is also of vital importance for Pyongyang to trust that its interests will be taken into
Sino-US policies on the use of force 101 account during negotiations. Seoul has concentrated on putting pressure on the United States, arguing that the attitude of Pyongyang can be changed by dialogue. China, on its part, has focused on North Korea since it is the only country with sufficient influence to promote self-restraint in Pyongyang. By engaging South Korea in this diplomatic effort, China ensures that Seoul is able to keep some measure of independence from Washington and is accepted by North Korea as a legitimate party in negotiations (interview with Professor Kim, Sung-Han, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28–1–2005). China has been keen to convince its surroundings that it has parted company with its past as a major arms proliferator, and that it now abides assiduously to global norms of non-proliferation (Isenberg 2004). The 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff impaired this effort due to allegations of Chinese technological support for the North Korean nuclear programme, which resulted in US proliferation sanctions against Beijing in January 2005 (Bolton 2005). During the six-party talks, China has gone to great lengths to demonstrate its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, as is the case for South Korea, its first priority remains the preservation of North Korea and the prevention of a US military intervention (interview with Charles L. Pritchard, The Brookings Institution 12–10–2004). The Korean problem aside, the unilateral element in China’s foreign policy is the most conspicuous part of Beijing’s policy on the use of force in Northeast Asia due to security concerns over Taiwan and Japan. China’s defence white paper emphasizes that Japanese and Taiwanese military capabilities have been reinforced. Since both Taiwan and Japan are aligned with the United States, the leader in military technology, nuclear arsenals and information warfare, Beijing sees the asymmetrical military balance produced by the revolution in military affairs as a threat towards Chinese security (The State Council Information Office 2004). The Chinese government considers the secessionist activities of the so-called ‘Taiwan independence’ forces to be a grave threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (‘Full text of Anti-Secession Law’ 2005). Since 1971, Taiwan has officially been a province under the jurisdiction of mainland China. The Taiwan independence forces are led by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian. In a referendum held in 2004, the population was asked whether, if China refuses to redeploy missiles currently pointed at Taiwan, the island should bolster its missile defences. The referendum failed because the voter turnout was too low, but Chen Shui-bian was re-elected president and plans to hold a second referendum, the contents of which are as yet unknown. Beijing has made it clear that it is unwilling to compromise on the Taiwan issue with the adoption of the anti-secession law of 14 March 2005, which legitimizes the use of non-peaceful means to stop any incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China (‘Text of China’s Anti-Secession Law’ 2005). Taiwanese separatism is discouraged through a combination of military
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and political measures proportional to Taiwanese moves towards independence from the mainland. For example, the US decision in 2001 to offer Taiwan an arms package of US$ 15 billion, including destroyers, anti-submarine aircraft and submarines, as well as the re-election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan’s president in March 2004, were met by a Chinese buildup of its military force posture across the Taiwan Strait involving an increase in the number of short-range ballistic missiles deployed within range of Taiwan. In addition, missile accuracy and lethality have increased. However, insufficient amphibious capabilities continue to detract from the credibility of the Chinese armed forces’ threat of invasion (IISS 2004c: 161). Politically, the National People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law to deter Taiwan from making constitutional revisions promoted by the Taiwanese president, which may take Taiwan further down the road towards independence. Currently, China cannot afford a war that might involve the United States in the Taiwan Strait. However, Beijing is not willing to compromise on the issue of Taiwanese independence. Chinese military and political initiatives directed towards Taiwan are hence intended to preserve the status quo. Japan is probably the most grave security concern facing China since Tokyo is a potential contender to Beijing’s position as the dominant indigenous power in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese government officials say that poor Sino-Japanese political relations, unresolved historical issues manifested by the repeated visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine in memory of war casualties since the 1868 Meiji Restoration,10 and antiJapanese sentiment in the Chinese population make the prospects of confidence-building between the two states bleak and keep China and Japan as strategic rivals (interview with high-ranking Chinese military official 20–11–2004). Tokyo’s plans to extend its military role in the Asia-Pacific add to China’s concerns about a future threat from Japan (interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). Consequently, Beijing’s military modernization programme is partly aimed at countering a future military threat from Japan (interview with high-ranking Chinese military official 20–11–2004). China’s intermediate-range and medium-range ballistic missiles are hence capable of posing strategic threats to Japan. However, as is the case with Taiwan, China has insufficient amphibious assault ships to occupy Japan in the event of war (Moore 2000). Equally, Tokyo considers China to be the principal long-term threat to Japanese security. Japan does not have faith in China’s dedication to cooperative security and to its willingness to promote regional peace and stability. Rather, Japan expects that support for Beijing’s foreign policy designs will result in a Sino-centric order which will reduce Japanese influence on security arrangements to insignificance. As long as Tokyo remains confident in Washington’s ability to constrain tendencies towards a Sinocentric order in the Asia-Pacific, Sino-Japanese relations are unlikely to
Sino-US policies on the use of force 103 deteriorate into hostilities. However, if the US commitment to contain China’s power appears unconvincing, Japan might replace Washington as the principal balancer of China. In the event that multipolarity replaces US pre-eminence, Tokyo has the potential to emerge as a pole opposing Beijing. China’s military capabilities are no match for those of Japan, and Beijing cannot be certain that it will catch up and become a military power on a par with Tokyo. Consequently, China’s policy on multipolarity may backfire. Northeast Asia constitutes a glaring exception to China’s policy on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific. In this sub-region, Beijing relies on unilateralism. The principal reason is that although China has successfully applied its concept of cooperative security to the Korean peninsula, the security concerns stemming from Taiwan and Japan dominate the Northeast Asian security environment seen from the Chinese perspective and give rise to concern about a prospective multipolar structure that might leave China to face Japan on its own. Hence, South Korea’s role as a middle power partially cooperating with China merely impacts on the security environment on the Korean peninsula; beyond this area, ironically it is the US military presence that prevents China from having to face the security threats from Taiwan and Japan on its own.
Chinese policies on the use of force in South Asia In South Asia, since the 2001 war on terror was initiated, China has experienced the same problem as in Central Asia of US threats to crowd out Chinese influence. On the subcontinent, Washington has upgraded Pakistan to a core ally on a par with South Korea, and attempts to establish a strategic partnership with India. In addition to maintaining close strategic relations with Islamabad, Beijing has embarked on a rapprochement with India with the purpose of avoiding that New Delhi, assisted by the United States, emerges as a challenger to China’s position as a great power in the AsiaPacific. China’s foreign policy is directed towards the two adversaries on the subcontinent, much in the same way as are US policies on the use of force in South Asia. Beijing has enhanced its military cooperation with Islamabad to ensure that Washington does not completely crowd out Beijing’s influence in the country that is traditionally China’s principal link to the Islamic world. By contrast, China’s formal relations with India principally consist of a political dialogue meant to reassure New Delhi that China has peaceful intentions towards its southern neighbour while Beijing maintains the upper hand in Sino-Indian relations. During the Cold War, Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation was based on the countries’ common interest in constraining Indian influence. Pakistan joined the US alliance known as the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 to add insurance to its security against India. This action prompted the United States to depart from its stated desire to foster a ‘non-zero sum relationship’ with India and Pakistan.11 Similarly, the Soviet
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invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought Washington closer to Pakistan, whereas India refrained from condemning the Soviet Union at the UN General Assembly in 1982 (Sagar 2004: 115–36). Despite its alliance with the United States, Pakistan’s relationship with China was consolidated during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, which allowed China to substitute for Washington in terms of military support during the US weapons embargo towards Pakistan. Beijing has supplied military equipment to Pakistan since then, and it has maintained its position as Islamabad’s principal source of arms supplies after the Cold War. The United States granted Pakistan’s armed forces US$ 300 million in military assistance in 2006, but the aid was mainly for anti-terrorist operations. Arms supplies from China include fighter ground attack and transport aircraft, co-developed with Pakistan (IISS 2005d: 253–56). Beijing has seized its policy of assisting Pakistan in developing a nuclear weapons programme, a policy that began in the 1970s. At the same time, China continues to support Pakistan’s construction of nuclear reactor plants, contrary to Indian and US recommendations on the grounds that peaceful and defence-related nuclear programmes cannot be kept separate. India and the United States are concerned that China indirectly contributes to proliferation, and these suspicions were fuelled by the revelations in February 2004 that Pakistani nuclear scientists had been leaking secrets to states with nuclear weapons programmes (‘Pakistan builds new nuclear plant’ 2004). Despite China’s efforts to convince its surroundings that it abides assiduously to global norms of non-proliferation, Beijing remains unmoved by such US–Indian concerns. Thereby, China demonstrates that it is disinclined to adjust its policy to the demands of the other regional powers if these run counter to Chinese efforts to sustain long-standing strategic cooperation and to uphold the Cold War principles of the 1967 NPT framework allowing nonnuclear powers to have civilian nuclear programmes. One beneficiary of these efforts is Pakistan. China’s resolve to court Islamabad as a strategic partner has been enhanced with the US move to designate Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, which allows for increased development assistance and military cooperation. Deepened Sino-Pakistani cooperation indicates that China seeks to prevent prospective US plans to consolidate a strategic presence in Pakistan beyond the war on terror from leading to US strategic dominance in South Asia (interview with a Chinese scholar, Renmin University 4–11–2004). Perhaps the most significant development in Sino-Pakistani relations is the Chinese agreement to fund, construct and develop a deep sea port and naval base in Gwadar in Pakistan, following the US intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001. Both Islamabad and Beijing expect significant strategic and economic gains from the joint project. Pakistan hopes that Gwadar will become a shipping hub in the Arabic Sea, and make the country less vulnerable in the event of an Indian naval blockade. China hopes that Gwadar will aid economic growth in its Xinjiang province to the northeast of
Sino-US policies on the use of force 105 Pakistan, and enable China to secure oil supplies from the Middle East. In addition, US–Indian naval activities in the Arabian Sea can be monitored from Gwadar (Ramachandran 2006). China’s enhanced strategic cooperation with Pakistan has not prevented Beijing from seeking cooperation with India after the Cold War. The thaw in Sino-Indian relations took off in 1996 with Beijing’s announcement that it held an impartial position on the Kashmir issue, hence departing from its Cold War support for Pakistan’s territorial claim.12 China’s decision not to take sides on this issue corresponds to its post-Cold War preference for the acceptance of de facto borders such as the 1972 Line-of-Control between India and Pakistan as international borders in the interim.13 In line with this policy, Beijing has decided to accept negotiations on its border dispute with India over Sikkim, the northern section of India on China’s south-western border and the north-eastern section of India on China’s southern border. In 1962, China and India went to war over the border issue (Nayar and Paul 2003: 149). The war ended in India’s defeat, with the border dispute still pending resolution. At present, Beijing has no desire to resume violent conflict over the Sino-Indian border issue; instead, China pursues a policy of negotiating outstanding border issues with neighbouring states in South Asia as well as in the other sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific. The negotiations with India serve to reassure New Delhi that China does not intend to use force to recover territory controlled by India. Despite declared intentions to reach a settlement, the talks have so far been inconclusive. Likewise, Beijing prefers to maintain its claim to disputed territory (‘Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’ 2005). The SinoIndian dialogue on border delimitation implies that Beijing’s desire for a peaceful neighbourhood promotes commitment to dialogue rather than the use of force to avoid that outstanding border disputes constitute a barrier to political and economic cooperation with neighbouring states. Border talks are not the only element in the Sino-Indian thaw. In 2003, China and India held their first joint naval exercises in Chinese waters, and the two states consider establishing additional confidence-building measures and military exchanges (Shahin 2004). The Sino-Indian rapprochement reflects their mutual concern over the prospects of US strategic dominance in South Asia and India’s resolve not to succumb completely to US geostrategic interests in South Asia. Sino-Indian relations are, however, unlikely to develop beyond the rudimentary level, mainly due to India’s reservations. These stem from New Delhi’s ambitions to occupy a position in the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific equal to that of China combined with India’s concerns about China’s expanding influence on the subcontinent. China is a potential challenge to India’s dominant position in and around the subcontinent. Beijing is strengthening its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, primarily by means of its close strategic cooperation with Myanmar that allows China to advance its ambitions to become a major future naval power in the Indian Ocean (Velloor 2004). In 2002, China
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signed a bilateral defence cooperation agreement with another littoral state and traditional Indian-dependent, Bangladesh, aiming at enhancing cooperation in training, maintenance and defence production (Kapila 2003). These developments show that China aims to enhance its influence in South Asia in order to avoid US policies on the use of force dictating the sub-regional security architecture. In the light of China’s growing strategic influence in South Asia, modest Sino-Indian defence cooperation initiatives such as a defence dialogue and joint naval exercises can be seen as confidence-building measures. These measures are apparently designed to put a damper on India’s concerns about China’s increased cooperation with states that are critical of India’s goal of policing South Asia and welcome a counter-weight to India’s hegemonic ambitions. China’s growing influence in South Asia circumscribes India’s possibilities of pursuing intervention in the internal affairs of neighbouring states without US approval. One indication of the limitations to India’s freedom of action is that in Nepal, India cooperates with the United States on negotiating a truce between the Gyanendra government and the Maoist insurgents that threaten to overthrow the government in Kathmandu. Nepal is listed by Washington as a security challenge due to the Maoist insurgency and the retreat of the government from democracy, developments that are said to require intervention from local powers (The White House 2006). India has accepted to act as an intermediary despite reservations about the conduciveness of the Nepalese incumbent to India’s interests on the subcontinent (Mishra 2004: 627–46). The domestic political crisis in Nepal also threatens peace and stability on the subcontinent since the Nepalese Maoists cooperate with similar opposition groups in India as well as in Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka (Adhikari 2004). The Nepalese conflict seems to invite New Delhi to revive its alleged right to unilateral intervention in the event of threats towards international peace and stability, a policy which it was particularly keen to manifest during the reign of Rajiv Gandhi. However, at present it is hard to imagine India doing so without US support. Sri Lanka’s decision to accept the assistance of 1,500 US troops in the tsunami relief effort without consulting India confirms that New Delhi is unable to sustain hegemony in South Asia. In Nepal, India has instead attempted to exercise political influence with support from Washington and the United Kingdom, which also wields influence in Nepal, trying to persuade the Maoist rebels to challenge the Nepalese government with peaceful political means instead of using force. These efforts appeared to bear fruit in June 2006, when the Nepalese government and the Maoist rebels held their first peace talk. This conflict resolution strategy has been challenged by Beijing. China has offered India assistance in the fight against the Maoist rebels, well aware that New Delhi is keen to circumscribe the Gyanendra regime’s authoritarian rule by allowing for a viable political opposition that refrains from using methods jeopardizing peace and stability. Therefore, Beijing’s offer seems like just another diplomatic move intended to affirm China’s
Sino-US policies on the use of force 107 apparent willingness to accommodate India’s interests and demands on the subcontinent by extending an offer that appears as a legitimate attempt to cooperate with India on conflict resolution. In practice, Beijing, however, knows that the offer is at odds with New Delhi’s Nepalese policy and is most likely intended to legitimize its growing unilateral military assistance to Kathmandu’s counterinsurgency operations. Enhanced US strategic assertiveness is not a great threat to India’s decreasing influence on the subcontinent. The greater challenge is China’s entrance into the competition for political and strategic influence, not only in Pakistan, but also in the small South Asian powers that have traditionally been dominated by New Delhi. India’s position appears to be somewhat similar to that of Russia in Central Asia. Like Moscow, New Delhi’s ability to control its small neighbours is declining as Washington and Beijing assert themselves strategically on the subcontinent. India does not have the economic and military means to keep this development at bay. This encourages it to side with the power that appears to have strategic goals most similar to New Delhi and that is most likely to leave India in the driver’s seat with respect to the use of force on the subcontinent. In South Asia, China’s cooperative security policy is mainly intended to appease its Indian neighbour, while Beijing relies on a unilateral strategy allowing it to enhance its strategic influence in the sub-region to ward off growing US strategic influence and poach on the US alliance with Pakistan. Chinese influence in South Asia is modest, and its policies on the use of force are at odds with India’s aim of remaining the dominant power on the subcontinent. A close strategic partnership between India and China is therefore unlikely, which prompts China to prioritize unilateralism rather than multipolarity since it is not in Beijing’s immediate interest to encourage New Delhi to become a pole in a multipolar order.
Chinese policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific China’s policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific are a complex mixture of cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity that varies across the sub-regions according to Beijing’s strategic goals and security concerns. Southeast Asia has provided China with near ideal conditions for testing whether its cooperative security can offer Beijing returns in the form of acceptance that China has become a Southeast Asian power with legitimate sub-regional interests that must be taken into account to preserve peace and stability. Beijing usually refers to Southeast Asia as the best evidence that China intends to take into account the common interests of states even as its influence continues to expand beyond its immediate neighbourhood. However, even in Southeast Asia, Beijing reserves the right to adopt unilateral measures in the event that ASEAN and its member states prove unwilling to meet Chinese demands for oil, animal protein and strategic and economic influence. So far, Sino-ASEAN cooperation has been a rhetorical rather
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than a practical exercise in diplomacy, confirming that the indigenous powers continue to rely on US security guarantees for their basic safety. China does not see Southeast Asia as a significant part of a multipolar structure circumscribing US pre-eminence. This implies that the sub-region is not at the centre of Chinese efforts at balancing US pre-eminence by means of diplomacy. Instead, Russia occupies this position. Sino-Russian strategic relations are not merely focused on Central Asia, one of the sub-regions where Moscow inherited a position of dominance from the Soviet Union. The extent and purpose of their cooperation has, however, predominantly manifested itself in Central Asia because here their security interests intersect and since 2001, they have been faced with the mutual common security concern of a permanent US military presence in their common backyard. China’s cooperative security policy has allowed China and Russia to reconcile their strategic and economic interests in Central Asia and has encouraged Beijing to leave the main responsibility for circumscribing US influence to Moscow. Chinese unilateralism in Central Asia has been designed to allow Beijing access to hydrocarbon resources and to prepare the ground for the projection of military power without alienating Russia’s concern to remain the dominant power in its near abroad. Russia’s gravitation towards China is the most successful Chinese attempt to poach on US strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, Russia is central to China’s efforts to nurture multipolarity with the purpose of preventing the consolidation of an Asia-Pacific order based on US demands and interests. Northeast Asia is the thorn in the side of Beijing’s policy of cooperative security. China has successfully adopted its policy of cooperative security towards the US ally South Korea to prevent the United States from dictating the terms of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Beijing has used the compatibility of Seoul’s and Beijing’s Korea policy to promote conflict resolution by diplomatic means in order to secure the survival of its North Korean ally. Unfortunately, South Korea’s strategic reach does not go beyond the Korean peninsula. Consequently, there is no spillover effect from the cooperative security policies in this area on Taiwan and Japan, which are the principal long-term security concerns of Beijing. To counter threats from these powers, Beijing relies on unilateral strategies centred on strengthening its military force posture to deter aggression and to prepare for the possibility of violent conflict. In the event of a multipolar structure in the Asia-Pacific, Japan is likely to emerge as one of the major poles capable of overtaking Beijing’s present position as the principal indigenous great power in the Asia-Pacific. The drawbacks of a multipolar structure are so severe that China prefers to keep the present situation of instability characterized by the consecutive attempts of the United States and China to implement competing versions of regional order in the Asia-Pacific. In South Asia, Beijing’s commitment to cooperative security is somewhat half-hearted because the subcontinent is dominated by India that may rise to
Sino-US policies on the use of force 109 become another challenger to China’s position in the Asia-Pacific. A thaw has occurred after the Cold War in Sino-Indian relations, but the political dialogue and modest strategic cooperation seem designed to improve Indian concerns about China’s unilateral policies in South Asia. Allegedly, these policies circumscribe India’s influence through the establishment and strengthening of strategic partnerships and military cooperation with India’s neighbours to further strategic goals which are usually at odds with those of New Delhi. Hence, China’s rapprochement with India seems to serve the purpose of preventing US dominance on the subcontinent while limiting India’s ability to project power in South Asia. The purpose of this strategy is to prevent the emergence of a pole that is unlikely to support China’s efforts to implement a Sino-centric version of regional order in the Asia-Pacific.
Deceitful allies and fluctuating strategic partnerships: Sino-US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific The post-Cold war interaction patterns of Sino-US policies on the use of force vary across the four sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific according to the relative integration of their policies into sub-regional security dynamics, the strategic reach of middle powers and the degree to which Washington’s and Beijing’s strategic interests intersect (Figure 2). In Southeast Asia, de facto US security guarantees provide the basis of Southeast Asia’s willingness to integrate China into its diplomatic and economic structures. US policies on pre-emption concentrate on the elimination of anti-terrorist groups, whereas Beijing’s concept of cooperative security is intended to consolidate China’s position as a Southeast Asian power with legitimate sub-regional demands and interests. US unilateralist policies are conducted with a view to protecting the freedom of the high seas and to confirming the continued commitment of the United States to maintain a military presence in Southeast Asia. In comparison with the United States, Beijing’s unilateralism focuses on allowing China a share of the maritime resources of the sub-region and on manifesting China as a Southeast Asian power by maintaining a minor military presence in the South China Sea. US hegemonic tendencies are modest in this area and are kept at bay by the consecutive presence of China, which sees the Southeast Asian states as secondary elements in Beijing’s attempts at balancing the United States due to their lack of the military, economic and political power required to constitute significant poles in a multipolar structure. The comparative weakness of the Southeast Asian states is, however, also a reason for the indigenous powers to be concerned that China may come to dominate the sub-region in the long term if Sino-Southeast Asian integration proceeds. The strategic reach of Southeast Asian states is limited, as evidenced by the inability of countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia to maintain effective control with the territory and waters within their jurisdiction. The states are therefore inclined to attempt to use US and Chinese offers of defence assistance to
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Figure 2 US active pursuit of policies on the use of force indicates areas where the United States attempts to implement its strategic foreign policy principles of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony. China’s active pursuit of policies on the use of force indicates areas where China attempts to implement its strategic foreign policy principles of cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity.
build up their own strength. One example is the Sino-Indonesian declaration of intent to establish defence cooperation in the Malacca Strait, which can be used by Jakarta to obtain equipment for patrolling its waters from Washington despite prior US reluctance to approve of such assistance. At the same time, developments in the Malacca Strait illustrate the very danger of using
Sino-US policies on the use of force 111 disagreements between Washington and Beijing to maximize Southeast Asia’s influence because it invites Sino-US rivalry into a sub-region of states that are unable to prevent conflicts of interest between the two major external powers. So far, ASEAN has been able to maintain unity on such conflicts of interest affecting all of Southeast Asia. ASEAN is hence committed to fighting terrorism in cooperation with the United States, although the practical side of policy-making and implementation is mainly dealt with at the bilateral level. Similarly, ASEAN agrees not to accept China’s offer to recognize Southeast Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone without prior US approval of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) treaty to prevent China from driving wedges between the United States and ASEAN on the grounds of their disagreements on Washington’s WMD policy. In general, Sino-US policies on the use of force do not intersect in Southeast Asia. However, as the two external powers step up their involvement in the region, conflicts of interest over the use of force may arise which the indigenous powers are unable to assist in solving. In Central Asia, a substantial Russian military, economic and political presence is a major determining factor in Sino-US implementation of their divergent policies on the use of force. The United States presence was established as part of the 2001 Afghanistan campaign that encouraged the US armed forces to use Central Asia as a platform for military operations in adjacent areas. By contrast, the United States does not play a significant role in indigenous anti-terrorist activities. China has directed its cooperative security policy towards Moscow, one purpose being to ensure that Russia remains the dominant military power in Central Asia in the face of the US decision to make its military presence permanent. Russia’s strategic reach encompasses all of Central Asia, and Moscow shares China’s aim of limiting US influence in the sub-region. China is preparing to project its military power into Central Asia, but so far its presence is minimal since Beijing relies on Russia to constrain US influence. As long as Washington remains the focus of Sino-Russian defence cooperation, Russia’s emergence in a multipolar structure is seen as predominantly beneficial to Beijing. However, Russia’s concerns about China’s rise and the growing asymmetry in Chinese and Russian power are likely to stop Moscow from siding whole-heartedly with Beijing, as indicated by its preference for keeping NATO as a strategic partner. In Central Asia, the strategic interests of the United States and China intersect, but Russia’s continued ability to dominate the region fosters a minimal Sino-US military presence, preventing direct conflicts of interest from erupting between Washington and Beijing in this area. In Northeast Asia, the United States and China both have a determining impact on the security dynamics of the sub-region. US policies on preemption have encouraged Washington to keep open the option of a military intervention in North Korea to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme while continuing to participate in negotiations to settle the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff. The US ally South Korea supports the
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implementation of China’s concept of cooperative security on the Korean peninsula with a view to preserve peace and stability and to prevent a North Korean implosion. However, South Korea’s strategic reach does not go beyond the Korean peninsula, which prompts China to rely on unilateral strategies to prepare for the outbreak of violent conflict and to deter aggression from Taiwan and the main US ally in Northeast Asia, Japan. China has successfully poached on the US alliance with South Korea. However, in the event of multipolarity, China’s principal adversary Japan is more likely to emerge as a pole than South Korea. China’s efforts to drive wedges between US allies and strategic partners in order to constrain Washington’s ability to implement its policies on the use of force may hence backfire; insofar as Japan begins to see China’s attempts at implementing its policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific as successful, it may decide to rely increasingly on its own armed forces to protect its regional security interests. Although US policies of unilateralism and hegemony are at odds with Chinese security interests, Beijing prefers the prolonged instability caused by Sino-US disagreement over policies on the use of force to a scenario where China has to face Japan on its own. In South Asia, US policies of pre-emption have encouraged Washington to focus on Pakistan because Islamabad has severe problems controlling Islamic terrorist groups and preventing the spread of WMD-related material. However, US plans to preserve pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific require the United States to concentrate on developing a strategic partnership with New Delhi since India is the key to dominant influence on the subcontinent. US unilateralism is intended to strengthen the US military presence. To this end, Washington has compromised on its anti-WMD policy to accommodate India’s demand to be recognized as a nuclear-armed power. The United States recognizes that India’s strategic reach extends to the whole of the subcontinent, and, therefore, compromise is necessary to foster a partnership that will allow Washington a major foothold on the subcontinent. China’s long-term foreign policy goals involve prioritizing Pakistan with whom China has maintained close cooperative ties that centre on sustaining close military cooperation with Islamabad, the purpose being to complement Washington’s growing influence in South Asia and to prevent New Delhi from becoming a dominant pole in a prospective multipolar structure which challenges China’s position as the principal indigenous great power in the Asia-Pacific. China’s apparent cooperative security policy towards New Delhi is predominantly of a rhetorical nature, as indicated by Beijing’s concern to reassure India that it has peaceful intentions and takes Indian security interests into account despite China’s simultaneous efforts to strengthen strategic relations with India’s neighbours. India and China are both concerned about US hegemonic aspirations, but New Delhi considers China’s growing influence on the subcontinent to be the greater evil. This outlook prevents India from encouraging extensive cooperation with China. So far, Sino-US security interests only intersect to a very limited extent in
Sino-US policies on the use of force 113 South Asia. However, the United States envisages India as a prospective junior partner in maintaining sub-regional stability in contrast to China, which sees India as a prospective competitor. This increased competition encourages Beijing to enhance defence cooperation with states such as Bangladesh and Pakistan that are critical of India’s aspirations for dominance. These divergent strategic perspectives have emerged most clearly in Nepal, where the United States supports Indian attempts at negotiating a peace settlement involving a democratization process, whereas China has supported the Gyanendra government’s crackdown on the Maoist rebels. Sino-US policies on Nepal may be one of the first indications that South Asia may become another arena for Sino-US conflicts of interest over policies on the use of force. Concerning the use of force, the United States conducts a policy of preventive first-use to curb terrorist activities and the spread of WMD. Middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India are predominantly in favour of these efforts. However, they are also critical of what they see as US demands for obedience to its decisions on the use of force irrespective of their security concerns and national interests. Such reservations have allowed China to poach on US alliances and partnerships. This development does not sit well with US plans for strategic superiority in the Asia-Pacific and implies continuous fluctuations in alliance patterns and a low level of military transparency. China has its stronghold in Central Asia because Moscow gravitates towards Beijing, whereas the United States may develop a stronghold in South Asia provided New Delhi decides to gravitate towards Washington. However, this pattern may change over the course of a few years if Russian concerns about future Chinese power projection override its fear of US hegemonic aspirations, or if India’s second thoughts about US hegemonic tendencies cause it to gravitate towards Beijing to prevent the consolidation of a Pax Americana. On the Korean peninsula, a similarly volatile interaction pattern persists because Seoul supports Chinese rather than US policies on the use of force. Again, the Sino-South Korean alignment may, however, break up, for example, in the event of a US military intervention, which might encourage China to occupy the northern part of North Korea, or, more likely, because South Korea complies with US demands for enhanced military cooperation directed against North Korea to preserve its status as a major non-NATO ally. The remainder of Northeast Asia shows no such signs of volatility; here, Taiwan and Japan remain loyal towards the United States. Instead, the problem is that China’s policy of poaching on US alliances and strategic partnerships may backfire if it proves too successful, causing Japan to reassert itself as a military power in its own right. Southeast Asia may prove to be the weak link in the chain because ASEAN is not sufficiently united to prevent a future clash between US and Chinese conflicts of interest over policies on the use of force. However, as long as Southeast Asia remains a secondary security concern of the United States and China, this concern may prove irrelevant. In sum, the
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United States and China seem to be nowhere near an agreement on permanent mechanisms for constraining the use of force in the foreseeable future. Sino-US policies on the use of force are not based on a consensus as to what constitutes reasonable state conduct, and, as such, they are not conducive to stable power balancing underpinned by coexistence. The unstable interaction pattern between the United States and China is reflected in their half-hearted commitment to their own policies on the use of force, which is less pronounced in the case of the United States and more in the case of China. The Bush administration has compromised on its antiWMD policies with regard to India to encourage strategic cooperation with New Delhi. However, in general Washington stays quite consistently within the confines of its principles of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony. By contrast, Beijing’s commitment to its cooperative security policy and multipolarity is found wanting, as can be seen from its policies on the use of force in Northeast Asia. Here, unilateralism dominates beyond the Korean peninsula and in South Asia, where these policies appear only to be applied for purposes of appeasement towards the subcontinental middle power, India. The inherent problem with these two policies is that Japan and India are likely challengers to China’s position as the major Asia-Pacific power, which encourages Beijing to rely on unilateralist measures to stop Tokyo and New Delhi from increasing their influence on Asia-Pacific security. As Washington is likely to conduct a policy that, by contrast, strengthens the role of India and Japan in Asia-Pacific security, China may be forced to concentrate on unilateralism and attempt to strengthen its strategic relations with Russia. The volatile pattern of Sino-US power balancing based solely on the uneasy equilibrium of power hence looks set to be consolidated.
4
Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific
US policies on legitimacy are founded in the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy and market economy. This civilizational element in the US version of order is the long-term strategy for preserving US pre-eminence. Economic globalization is by and large accepted around the world as well as in China, which sees this aspect of liberalism as a strategy to resurrect China’s position as a role model for other states and nations to imitate. The United States considers China’s intentions with its integration into market economic structures to be potentially disturbing; however, Washington’s liberal understanding of international relations encourages it to entertain the hope that China’s economic integration will socialize the Chinese into adopting a favourable view on the political ideas of liberalism. The United States therefore adopts a positive attitude towards the fact that contemporary China is fully integrated into the international economic system (The White House 2006). The element of market economic structures is thus not at the top of the US–China security agenda, although issues of contention remain, such as Beijing’s reluctance to include the Chinese currency, the renminbi, in a system of floating exchange rates. Liberal democratic and legal globalization, by contrast, has yet to take root and hence remains a long-term goal of US governments. The rationale behind this element in US security policy is the idea of democratic peace, meaning that democracies committed to the rule of law are less likely to go to war against each other since democracies are seen as entities that play by the rules. By default, they are considered less legitimate targets of enforcement strategies because it is not merely the government, but the people represented by the government whose decisions and activities are thereby called into question since, in democracies, governments are answerable to their citizens. The US aim to spread democracy across the world is, however, not necessarily pursued by peaceful means. Indeed, as implied by the 2003 US-led military intervention in Iraq, violence may be considered a necessary means of pursuing democracy and the rule of law. The 2001 war on terror is principally conducted by military means, which are considered an element in creating the preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law. As stated in US President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union Address, ultimately,
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the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change. The United States supports democratic reform, and elections are vital. However, democracy also requires the rule of law, the protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a single vote (US Department of State 2006). Stability is a precondition for democratization since it is difficult to bring about lasting changes in governmental and legal practices without some measure of predictability in the basic domestic political and military structures. The eradication of terrorism is one of several ways by which stability at the domestic and international level is promoted. Stability may entail working with authoritarian political establishments in the short run to pave the way for long-term liberal political and legal reforms. Chinese policies on legitimacy are founded in the ideas of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning, ideas that spell vastly different aspirations for the future political set-up of the Asia-Pacific compared with the United States. Beijing’s historical concept of sovereignty implies a continued commitment to recover territory that is seen to have been unjustly acquired by foreign powers, predominantly Japan and Western powers intent on amassing power at the expense of China in the nineteenth and twentieth century. In contrast to Japan, China decided not to succumb to pressures to adapt to the legal, political and economic demands of the West in the second half of the nineteenth century because it would have forced China to recognize that the methods and inventions of states considered barbarians were superior to those of China. This attitude placed China at the receiving end of outside enforcement measures, a test of strength that resulted in China’s loss of territory and political and economic freedom, as well as its status of pre-eminence in Asia. Despite the ability of the West to enforce its demands, China was not completely overtaken, conquered or forced to hand over control of the greater part of Chinese territory. Ironically, belief in Chinese superiority was sustained because the basic structures of society prevailed, even in times of severe hardship and outside pressure to change state–society relations to accommodate Western practices such as property rights, since these demands were only partially met. Foreign encroachments on Chinese sovereignty were hence not seen as a defeat, but rather as a period of challenge designed to test China’s resolve to preserve its territorial, political and social integrity. In addition, foreign enforcement measures taught China to see international relations as a long-term zerosum game where compromise did not pay off, and where at times means of enforcement was a primitive, but necessary method of warding off outside demands for submission. This approach to the outside world was sustained after the Cold War and underpinned foreign policy concepts such as Chairman Mao Zedong’s 1974 ’three worlds’ theory (Mackerras et al. 1998: 213). According to this world view, China belonged to the oppressed third world that firmly opposed the so-called expansionist policies of the first world led
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 117 by the United States and the Soviet Union. The second world consisted of developed countries in between the first and the third world. In the first instance, violent means might be necessary to counter the policies of the first world. However, the purpose was not conquest, but merely to preserve the integrity of the oppressed world. This understanding of international relations implies that China is entitled to preserve and recover what was Chinese territory prior to periods of weakness and loss of status, but it does not entail territorial expansion. Hierarchical bandwagoning, the second element in Chinese policies on legitimacy, corresponds to this understanding in that states ranking below China retain a large measure of political freedom (Kang 2003). Weaker powers tend to bandwagon with stronger powers in a Sino-centric order, according to Chinese arguments, due to the moral and cultural superiority of China. Hence, hierarchical bandwagoning does not merely come into being by a push effect depending on relative strength, but also by a pull effect depending on setting an example persuading other states that it is in everyone’s interest that China is at the top of the international hierarchy. China’s means of persuasion may involve the use of force and interference in the domestic affairs of subordinate states that rebel against Chinese dominance (Johnston 1995). However, contemporary China’s relative position of power does not allow for the use of such means. During periods of relative weakness, China instead relies on economic integration and migration to persuade its surroundings that Chinese ways and means are superior. This chapter discusses Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the four sub-regions Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia with a view to assessing the implications of these policies for stable power balancing underpinned by coexistence.
US policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia In Southeast Asia, US policies on democratization and the rule of law have been a long-standing bone of contention, causing heated debates and disagreements between Washington and indigenous powers that had embraced the market economic philosophy of the United States, but also rejected the political ideas of liberalism as a viable basis for state–society relations in their sub-region. The debate peaked in the 1990s with the so-called Asian values debate, which attracted world-wide attention because it raised the question whether liberal economic practices could be combined with other political practices to make an attractive alternative to the Western model of state and society. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad and former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew were at the centre of this debate. A retired Singaporean senior diplomat, Tommy Koh, and the former permanent head of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani, were also among the most assertive proponents of an Asian model. The debate drew attention to a state–society model emphasizing harmony, order and the collective good as opposed to the liberal concepts of
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individualism and human rights. The model rests on the assumption that the government is benevolent and knows better than individuals what is best for the people, over which it has political authority. Those who beg to differ and, hence, assert their individualism are to be treated harshly because they constitute a threat to the common good of the people. Human rights and democracy are dismissed as Western values that are not necessarily compatible with the basic outlook on life in Asia. The advocacy of human rights and democracy is seen as a form of imperialist arrogance requiring that alternative and allegedly more suitable political concepts are promoted (Buruma 1996: 269, 295). Mahathir Mohammad argued that strong, stable governments are usually prepared to make decisions which may be unpopular, but are in the best interest of the nation and a prerequisite for economic development. Lee Kuan Yew often invoked the Confucian tradition as the basis of an Asian state–society model. According to this Chinese philosophy, education is crucial to advancing the moral renewal and cultural uplift of the people, which remain subject to the ruler either as his servants or as the object of his paternal care. Law is then not a system intended to protect individual rights, but is used to wield governmental power. However, the ruler is obliged to provide for the public welfare, which implies that in the Confucian system of state and society, a kind of covenant existed between the ruler and the people, the fulfilment of which provided the ruler with legitimate political authority. The core Confucian values are harmony and social discipline that puts the collective good before the individual good, providing the criteria for excluding so-called decadent libertarian influences from the West as spiritual pollution that causes social upheaval (de Bary 1991: 90, 94, 107). The so-called Asian Way has become an integral feature of the strategy for regime legitimacy and the projection of national influence and power. Since the Asian Way provides criteria for the exclusion of unwanted foreign ideas that are considered detrimental to the moral constitution of the people, ruling elites have used it to propose who is to be politically excluded by reference to a definition of the nation or region determined by indigenous governments. Based on this logic, Kuala Lumpur argued that the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are not entitled to membership of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), a consultative forum floated in the 1990s for discussion of common economic problems in Asia, because they are not Asians, and Asians should have the right to form their own multilateral institutions and bodies without being dictated to by non-Asians (Dupont 1996: 23). Although the caucus itself did not take off, the idea of Asia-specific fora for foreign policy coordination has been realized. First, in 1997, ASEAN+3 emerged as an institution involving only the East Asian nations in Southeast Asia, China, South Korea and Japan to promote political and economic cooperation at senior official, ministerial and heads-ofgovernment levels (Terada 2003: 252). In addition, the three East Asian states were invited to join the ASEAN summit meetings from 1997.
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 119 By contrast, the East Asia summit, the outcome of the EAEC proposal, convened for the first time in 2005 with the purpose of discussing trade issues, includes Australia and New Zealand as well as India. The United States is not part of the East Asia summit. However, this is less of a concern to Washington as long as US loyal states such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan are part of the Asian groupings, since their involvement signals that China is not allowed to perform in a leading role (interview with senior US official 15–10–2004). The inclusion of westernized states such as Australia and New Zealand in the Asian groupings implies that the ASEAN member states most keen to defend the preservation of Asian values have adopted a more relaxed attitude towards Western demands for human rights and democracy. This may be explained by changes in US and Southeast Asian policies on legitimacy. The Asian values debate largely died out in Southeast Asia with the advent of the 2001 war on terror. One of the main proponents of the Asian Way in the 1990s, Bilahari Kausikan, recognizes that Washington no longer cares so much about human rights issues and clarifies that the exclusive view of the 1990s that Southeast Asia should keep the United States at arm’s length is no longer popular (interview with Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan 15–18–2005). Instead, states such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines now focus on the centrality of continued US military and economic engagement in Southeast Asia to their security. The fairly relaxed attitude towards the United States corresponds to Washington’s changed security agenda. At present, the United States puts a high premium on the assistance of governments in preventing terrorist groups from operating on their territory, irrespective of their human rights policies. The promise of the second Bush administration to fight terrorism by military means to create the preconditions for the spread of liberal democracy in the long run (The White House 2005a) conveys the message that in order to defend the liberal ideas of civil rights, democracy and market economy, the United States is presently less concerned with the adherence of governments to standards of civil and political rights. Washington’s war on terror has involved US armed forces directly in the domestic security problems of Southeast Asia, but no breach of the principle of non-interference has occurred because Washington has obtained governmental approval of its activities. The decreasing importance of human rights disagreements in US– Southeast Asian relations manifested itself even before the war on terror. For example, the United States has shown little interest in using East Timorese independence to promote democracy and human rights. Prior to the 1999 Australian-led UN intervention in East Timor, US policies on Indonesia and East Timor evolved from unrestricted support for Indonesia’s military, as was characteristic of US Cold War policy because the Indonesian regime was anti-Soviet, to political ambivalence and military disengagement. This major shift was arguably a determining factor behind the Habibie
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transitional administration’s decision to facilitate a referendum on the future status of East Timor on 30 August 1999, where 78.5 per cent of voters favoured independence.1 The post-referendum violence instigated by Indonesian armed forces caused Washington to announce a suspension of military ties with Indonesia in 1999, but the United States showed little interest in playing a leading role in the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) which caused the Indonesian militias to leave (Scheiner 2000: 117–32). The intervention took place with approval from the Indonesian government which realized that international pressure for East Timorese independence was sufficiently strong to cause severe repercussions in case of non-acceptance. The other ASEAN member states have by and large followed Jakarta’s East Timor policy since Indonesia took over the area by force in 1976, having no interest in allowing for outside intervention in domestic affairs due to human rights violations (Emmers 2005: 652). INTERFET therefore also encompassed Southeast Asian troops from Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia as well as troops from New Zealand. Despite Indonesian resentment, Canberra decided to lead the intervention starting in September 1999 (Cobb 1999). Although Australia’s efforts in East Timor were widely praised, they caused a rift between the ASEAN member states because Australia demonstrated that it was willing to prioritize human rights issues higher than its close economic and strategic relations with Indonesia. This policy was confirmed by Australia’s decision to grant asylum for 42 refugees from Indonesian Papua. Moreover, Australia has led other humanitarian interventions to restore domestic peace and stability such as that in the Solomon Islands in 2003 and in Fiji in 2006, confirming that the protection of human rights and the rule of law in its near abroad remains an important part of Australian foreign policy. Although only a minor contingency of Australian troops remains in East Timor and both Australia and Indonesia have worked hard to improve relations, Canberra’s decision to lead INTERFET has caused lasting damage to the relationship. The intervention also revealed that Australia depended on US equipment to carry out the operation successfully and that Camberra proved to be a follower of US decisions behind the scenes. Noticeably, Washington decided that command of INTERFET would be handed over to the UN as soon as possible. This handover occurred in February 2000 when the United Nations Transition Authority East Timor (UNTAET) was established to complete East Timor’s transition to independence. The events of East Timorese independence demonstrated US reticence about and consideration for Indonesian concerns about the domestic and political costs of accepting intervention, including considerations for the prevalence of numerous other separatist movements on Indonesian territory and the consequences of their separatist demands for Indonesia’s unity. The same cannot be said about Australia, but Canberra’s strong political and military dependence on Washington after the Cold War was revealed, making it clear that Australia in itself was not a major potential strategic concern for Jakarta
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 121 compared with Washington. Indonesia as well as ASEAN as a whole are hence not worried that Australia’s image as a defender of human rights in Southeast Asia will have practical consequences without US approval. Consequently, ASEAN’s principal focus remains US policies on legitimacy. Ironically, at a time when the United States is less keen to promote the liberal ideas of human rights and democracy, the ASEAN member states have begun to consider the benefits of a broad interpretation of legitimacy. In October 2003, ASEAN adopted a security community framework that includes the member states’ commitment to a democratic environment and to the nurturing of common values through a continual discussion of political issues (ASEAN 2003). Shifting from a mere association to a more integrated organization, ASEAN has developed an incipient community spirit which warrants more concerted action to address those issues in future. Thus, ASEAN has become capable of and more confident about discussing domestic issues such as the political situation of Myanmar (interview with two senior Indonesian government officials 7–12–2004). The principal driving force behind the proposal was Indonesia, which, as a newly democratized state, has refused to accept US demands such as that for detention without trial of terrorist suspects. The increasing openness of ASEAN towards a broad interpretation of legitimacy is compatible with the long-term civilizational element in US foreign policy. However, in the short term, ASEAN’s development puts it at variance with US demands for compromises with democratic principles and with the rule of law to ensure effective control of terrorism.
US policies on legitimacy in Central Asia The 2001 US war on terror has called for cooperation with the indigenous governments to fight political Islam, focusing on Afghanistan. These calls for cooperation have been coupled with support for the existing regimes irrespective of their records on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Thus, Washington has acted on a narrow interpretation of legitimacy in Central Asia, giving priority to effective control of militant opposition groups rather than political liberalization. In parallel with the increased US engagement in Central Asia, the commitment of indigenous governments to democratic reforms has declined, partly because no external power has proved willing to push for changes in the management of domestic political authority. Even Kyrgyzstan, in the early 1990s considered the most politically liberal of the states, stepped up oppression of the opposition as an attempt to preserve the political power of the former incumbent President Akaev (Albion 2003b; Toktogulov 2005: 3). The Central Asian regimes consider political opposition groups, militant Islamic as well as liberal democratic groups, to be a principal security concern. The states differ in their choice of methods for countering these threats. For example, Kyrgyzstan has been relatively prone to dialogue with political
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opposition groups in comparison with Uzbekistan, which gravitates towards using violent means to control its territory and people. However, compared with the other Asia-Pacific regions, the Central Asian incumbents are relatively prone to resorting to totalitarian measures to maintain effective control. These measures tend to backfire, increasing the popularity of indigenous opposition groups. Moreover, governmental resolve to use totalitarian measures encourages such groups to see violence as a necessary way to obtain political power. For example, in principle Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami, the Party of Islamic Liberation, opts for the use of peaceful means to gain political power. However, they compromise on this position insofar as their demands are met with violent oppression. Not surprisingly, the Islamic opposition in Central Asia is not in favour of the US military presence since the 2001 war on terror is directed at their eradication insofar as they are seen as a part of global terrorist networks that seek to replace the liberal elements of international order. By contrast, the democratically oriented part of the political opposition is in favour of the US military presence because it hopes that Washington will encourage political and legal reforms. The democratic opposition bases its hopes on the fact that as an outsider to the region in the 1990s, the United States criticized human rights violations committed by Central Asian regimes focusing on holding on to their power. When the United States established a physical presence in the region, the criticism did not die down completely, mainly because powerful voices in the US Congress ensure that progress on democracy and the rule of law is monitored world-wide and criticized if considered insufficient. This critical element in Washington’s Central Asia policy has been sustained despite the US government’s prioritization of governmental stability rather than the promotion of political liberalism. Criticism of widespread politically motivated arrests from the US embassy in Kazakhstan in March 2002 is just one indication of the fact that the United States has not parted company with its long-term goal to spread democracy and the rule of law, even if, at present, it is not high on its sub-regional security agenda. The United States is unlikely to pursue these elements of its security policy if they are considered a barrier towards its terror-fighting activities and if they jeopardize its possibilities of maintaining a permanent military presence in Central Asia. Consequently, political solutions to domestic turmoil in these countries are unlikely to be the order of the day. On the contrary, at least in the short term the US military presence has encouraged the use of military solutions, which has subsequently intensified conflicts between incumbents and opposition groups. The enhanced popularity of Central Asian governments amongst external powers with interests in the sub-region contrasts with deteriorating popularity ratings at the domestic level. Indeed, the Central Asian countries are caught in a spiral of growing violence. In Kazakhstan, arrest of political opposition members occurs with increasing frequency, and the freedom of the press has been circumscribed by means of sabotage and closure of media
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 123 that are critical of Nazerbaev’s government. The last presidential election in December 2005 was hence routinely described as flawed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which resulted in President Nazerbaev’s re-election after scooping 91 per cent of the popular vote (Thomas 2005). Nevertheless, by 2006 Kazakhstan became the role model among the five Central Asian countries, not because of its democratic progress, but because of its relative prosperity and stability, qualities that are at a premium among external sub-regional powers at present. Turkmenistan is a fairly stable totalitarian state, whose contact with other states is almost solely connected to gas exports. President Niyazov is in complete control of the government apparatus. Use of torture is routine, education is predominantly religious, the media are state controlled, and basic laws for the detention and trial of suspects do not exist. The only party allowed to run for office in the 1999 parliamentary election was the ruling Democratic Party. That same year, parliament elected President Niyazov life-time president. In Tajikistan, President Rakhmonov controls parliament, the court, the media and the bureaucracy. As a consequence, the influence of the Islamic opposition to political decision-making is negligible. The 1997 peace agreement ending five years of civil war promised the opposition extensive influence in an attempt to use political means to solve problems of severe domestic instability. However, Rakhmonov has gradually stepped up the use of totalitarian measures to control the country. In 2005, the head of Tajikistan’s opposition Democratic Party, Iskandarov, was put on trial on terrorism and corruption charges. He is but one of a number of former Rakhmonov allies who have been sidelined by the use of legal means not corresponding to the rule of law (RFE/RL Central Asia Report (5:49) 30–12–2005). In Uzbekistan, oppression of all groups that might pose a threat to the incumbent President Karimov has been stepped up. Uzbekistan’s political authorities are known for their willingness to use any means to eradicate voices criticizing the government. For example, no formal opposition parties exist in Uzbekistan, the media are state-controlled, human rights activists are often arrested and accused of supporting Islamic militant groups, and torture of prisoners is routine. Incidents came to a head in May 2005, when Uzbek armed forces carried out a bloody crackdown on anti-government protesters in the eastern city of Andijon. According to human rights groups, hundreds of unarmed civilians, including women and children, were killed. Uzbek officials said 187 people died, of whom most were foreign-paid Islamist insurgents and Uzbek security forces (RFE/RL Central Asia Report (5:48) 22–12–2005). Karimov refused an independent international investigation of eyewitness accounts according to which a massacre had taken place, arguing that the violence had been conducted by Islamic militants intent on overthrowing the government. Western demands for an investigation concealed disagreements over the desirability of the demand in the US administration. One faction encompassing the US State Department approved, while another dominated by the Pentagon emphasized the risk of
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provoking Uzbekistan to cut off US access to the military air base in the country. Washington’s reaction reflected this internal division in that the NATO communiqué, the outcome of a defence minister’s meeting that included Moscow, merely stated that ‘issues of security and stability in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan’ had been discussed (NATO 2005). US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, however, publicly stated that international involvement in an inquiry into the killings in Andijon was essential and declined an Uzbek invitation for Washington to contribute with observers to a commission of inquiry controlled by the Uzbek parliament (Smith and Kessler 2005). Subsequently, Tashkent decided to demand that the United States should vacate the Uzbek air base. The incident demonstrates that the US commitment to spread the liberal ideas of democracy and the rule of law continues to hover in the background of the first priority of stability, encouraging the authoritarian states in Central Asia to keep Washington at arm’s length. As evidenced by the Andijon incident and the explicit US calls for Russia not to impede democratization in Central Asia (The White House 2006), the United States takes the opportunity to act on its policy on legitimacy when it presents itself even at a time when democratization is a secondary priority. This inclination indicates that, in the long run, the US military presence might be used for purposes of human rights and democracy advocacy. Events in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, leading to the overthrow of President Akaev, confirm that the Central Asian states have become increasingly cautious about involving themselves too closely with the United States because it may come at the cost of regime survival. In Kyrgyzstan, local police fired at political demonstrators in the southern part of the country in March 2002, which resulted in six casualties and 20 injured people. The incident engendered domestic turmoil at a level that the political authorities were unable to control, prompting the Kyrgyz government to step down in May 2002. Since then, political unrest has marked the country. The unsettling domestic situation caused then President Akaev to distance himself somewhat from the United States, instead hoping for Russian assistance to maintain his hold on power. To balance the monitoring of parliamentary elections in February and March 2005 carried out by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), President Akaev welcomed observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), stating that the CIS observers have a better understanding of the Kyrgyz environment than observers from Western countries (Saidazimova 2005a). The elections were won by the incumbent, but subsequent clashes between Kyrgyz political authorities and demonstrators demanding new elections resulted in the overthrow of Akaev in March 2005 and the rise to power of Bakiev. He took office immediately after the revolution and won the July 2005 election with approximately 90 per cent of the vote, referred to as peaceful, but flawed elections by Western observers (Saidazimova 2005b).
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 125 The outcome of the Kyrgyz revolution did not change the basic policy of the previous authoritarian regime involving commitment to Akaev’s policy of enhanced links to Moscow, an increasingly critical stance towards the United States, and disinterest in democratic reforms. US forces allegedly supported the popular unrest behind the scenes that resulted in the overthrow of President Akaev in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (interview with Russian journalist 11–3–2005). The outcome of the Kyrgyz revolution proved disappointing compared with the aim of the revolution to introduce democratic reforms and a more pro-Washington administration. If the allegations of US support for the revolution are correct, it is, nevertheless, another indication that Washington is intent on pursuing its policy of legitimacy in Central Asia when convenient. The United States has also raised doubts about Russia’s democratic inclinations. For example, at a speech in Brussels in February 2005, Bush declared that the Russian government must renew a commitment to democracy and the rule of law for Russia to make progress as a European nation (Holley 2005). Similarly, in its 2006 national security strategy, the United States points to a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions in Russia (The White House 2006). However, the statements have not been followed by action on the part of the United States. Most likely, in Brussels President Bush was saying what his Western audience wanted to hear, to reassure Moscow later on that his administration’s Russia policy is not tied to Putin’s record on democracy. In view of the fact that US relations with Russia are already stretched to breaking point, Washington is likely to continue to emphasize the importance of stability before political liberalization. This is indicated by continued US cooperation with regimes such as the Bakiev government in Kyrgyzstan despite insufficient democratic reforms. Russian President Putin looks favourably upon current US priorities because it gives Moscow a green light to use military force to fight separatist movements that Russia defines as terrorist at home and in its near abroad. Russian troops are deployed for this purpose in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino–Balkaria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestr and Tajikistan without active US opposition. For the time being, the United States is prevented from acting decisively on these concerns. The Russian government is waiting to see if US anti-terrorist goals will remain its principal concern in Central Asia, but it does not trust that Washington will maintain these limited goals (interview with a Russian scholar 4–3–2005). The US reaction to the 2005 unrest in Uzbekistan confirms that the United States may keep a low profile on issues of legitimacy in the short term, but it has not given up pursuing these goals. This realization is a major incentive for Russia to strengthen its ties with the Central Asian countries because it allows Russia to sustain a dominant political influence that helps ward off future attempts at overthrowing existing authoritarian regimes.
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US policies on legitimacy in Northeast Asia In Northeast Asia, US policies on legitimacy both enjoy the most support and meet with the largest challenges. Northeast Asia encompasses the democracies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, which are also core allies and strategic partners of the United States. In addition, Mongolia, a buffer state between northern China and southern Russia, has embarked on a democratization process. However, the sub-region is also home to China and North Korea, two of the strongest detractors of US policies on legitimacy. On the one hand, the democratic states of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan do not pose significant challenges to US policies on legitimacy, but on the other hand they are not of much assistance in promoting US goals of spreading democracy and the rule of law when this issue is on Washington’s security agenda in the Asia-Pacific. Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state, and as such it is irrelevant to US efforts to enforce democracy and the rule of law in foreign countries. Japan and South Korea, however, supported US efforts to reconstruct Iraq after the ousting of former President Saddam Hussein in 2003, a process that involves restoring peace and stability as well as instituting democracy and the rule of law. South Korea agreed to send approximately 3000 troops in 2003, including combat-ready special troops and marines. In 2003, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s cabinet agreed to send 550 non-combat troops. In the Asia-Pacific, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces have also sent troops to the Indian Ocean to assist the 2001 US operation to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan by providing logistical support. Japan formed part of the 1993 peace-keeping operation in Cambodia with approximately 1,330 peacekeeping personnel, and it also decided to dispatch 690 peacekeeping troops to the East Timor operation in 2002. Both Cambodia and East Timor were occupied by imperial Japan in 1941–45 and in 1942–45, respectively, so the missions were sea-changes in the sense that the Japanese armed forces were accepted as contributors to the restoration of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. However, in contrast to the 2003 intervention in Iraq, these operations and that undertaken in Afghanistan were missions approved by the UN. Support from Washington’s Northeast Asian allies was somewhat muted concerning the Iraq intervention compared with another ally, Australia, which is also a parliamentary democracy. Australia participated with approximately 2,000 combat troops in the war proper in Iraq, and supplied about 800 non-combat troops for the subsequent reconstruction operation. Canberra showed no signs of wavering, demonstrating enduring and consistent commitment to the US intervention. Japanese and South Korean participation in the Iraq operation is instead comparable to that of Thailand and the Philippines in that domestic opposition towards supporting US policies on legitimacy abroad is a barrier for governments that consider support for Washington’s policies necessary to ensure continued US commitment to extend security guarantees to these countries. In terms of issues
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 127 of support for US policies on legitimacy, the assessment of Tokyo and Seoul hence differ vastly from that of Australia. An important element in Canberra’s foreign policy profile is to promote democracy and the rule of law at the international level in contrast to Tokyo and Seoul. Indeed, Japan’s and South Korea’s democratic political set-ups prevent the governments of Tokyo and Seoul from extending as much support for US initiatives to spread democracy and the rule of law as they would otherwise have done. In addition, the incentives for the Japanese and South Korean governments to extend support for US policies of legitimacy is not their commitment to the spread of democracy and the rule of law as in the case of Australia, but instead to their own safety. Like Iraq, Japan was forced to adopt a democratic constitution following its defeat in the Second World War. Nominally, Tokyo became Washington’s ally with the 1951 US–Japanese security treaty, but, in practice, Japan was subject to foreign occupation. US efforts to democratize and demilitarize the country to prevent a recurrence of Japanese military expansion in Asia were, by and large, successful, although elements of authoritarianism such as the continuous dominance of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remains. US efforts involved sweeping reforms of Japan’s political, economic, social, and cultural institutions and practices. Most importantly, in 1947, the autocratic and militaristic constitution from 1889 was replaced by a new constitution worked out by the United States. It included the socalled peace clause in Article nine that prohibited Tokyo from possessing a military force for purposes of fighting a war, confining Japan’s armed forces to the defence of Japan’s own territory (Fukui 2007, forthcoming). The gradual relaxation of the constitutional constraints on Japanese armed forces is supported by the United States. This relaxation is indicated by Washington’s demands for revision of the US–Japanese Defence Guidelines to upgrade the alliance’s ability to respond to Article-six-type regional contingencies by filling in gaps in military operability within its geographical scope that now extends to the Asia-Pacific. Article six of the US–Japanese alliance treaty provides for US use of Japanese facilities and areas for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East (‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America’ 1960). The revisions to the guidelines in 1996 and 1997 reflect that the United States finds it difficult to accept that Japan can provide non-combat support in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and Cambodia, but not in its own sub-region. Indeed, the 1994 US–North Korean nuclear standoff catalysed the revision process. At that time, Tokyo turned down US requests for assistance in applying military pressure on Pyongyang, referring to the legal constraints on the activities of Japan’s armed forces (Hughes 2004: 42– 43, 99–100, 135–36). Although concerned about North Korea’s reaction, Tokyo has participated in pre-emption initiatives during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff, agreeing to participate with the United States and
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Australia in Proliferation Security Initiative drills and to intercept merchant vessels carrying WMD-related equipment. Japan has hence inspected all North Korean vessels at ports in Japan (GlobalSecurity.Org. 2003). It remains to be seen how far Japan is willing to go in its support for future US military operations in Northeast Asia. With regard to the PSI initiative, Tokyo lobbied for Chinese participation to alleviate North Korea’s concerns about Japan’s role in these efforts, albeit to no avail. Public opinion in Japan still demonstrates high levels of caution on security matters, preferring the Japanese Self-Defence Forces to make international contributions via the UN (Hughes 2004: 58–59). Similarly, Japan has not explicitly supported a regime change in North Korea due to concerns for its own security, which may be jeopardized in the event that Tokyo supports the view that Pyongyang is an illegitimate regime. Since Washington’s official policy does not encompass a North Korean regime change, this issue is not much of a problem for Japan. Japanese wariness of supporting US-led military operations, particularly in Northeast Asia, is, at least partly, caused by the disapproval such activities are met with in Japan’s neighbourhood. Neighbouring states such as China, South Korea and North Korea are concerned that relaxation of the constitutional and treaty-based constraints on Japan’s Self-Defence Forces is a step to remilitarize Japan. Such concerns are not entirely unfounded. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi appeared oblivious to strong protests from Beijing, Seoul and Pyongyang against his repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine memorial for Japanese war casualties since 1868. These visits meet public demands for a display of sympathy with Japanese war heroes, including 14 Class A war criminals from World War Two.2 The continued demand for reverence for Japan’s militaristic past suggests that the country’s militaristic tradition can easily be resurrected, particularly since US calls for a greater Japanese security role in the Asia-Pacific unintentionally might support such a development. This scenario is unlikely to threaten the US–Japanese alliance or the Japanese commitment to a democratic constitution, for which support in the Japanese population is high (Hughes 2004: 42–43). However, it does not bode well for the prospects of stable power balancing underpinned by coexistence that Japan’s enhanced role in military operations meets with such resistance in its neighbourhood. South Korea does not have constitutional constraints preventing it from supporting US policies on legitimacy. South Korea is a newly democratized state whose democratization process took off in 1987 when amendments to the constitution were adopted, resulting in a substantial increase in popular democratic rights. Then President Chun Doo-hwan was instrumental in this development, expecting his preferred successor former general Roh Taewoo to increase his legitimacy in the upcoming election which he won as expected. The democratization process, however, had unforeseen long-term consequences since Kim Young-sam, South Korean president from 1992 to 1998, ensured civilian control with the military, thus removing its privileged
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 129 position in politics and society (Moon 1998: 280). The current president Roh Moo-hyun, elected in 2002, represents the US-critical part of the South Korean population, questioning to what extent Seoul should remain loyal towards Washington. To many people, continued loyalty towards Washington seems to involve measures that are detrimental to South Korea’s security. Such measures include the US decision to remove troops from South Korea, the reorganization of the US force posture away from Seoul, thus increasing the vulnerability of the capital city in the event of North Korean aggression, the PSI Initiative, which is likely to further aggravate relations between North and South Korea, US demands for trilateral military cooperation involving Japan, which risks putting a halt to the rapprochement process between North Korea and South Korea, the hand over of wartime operational control of South Korean troops to Seoul and the confrontational stance of the United States towards North Korea during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff. These initiatives and demands are but some of the developments that have caused Seoul to question whether the alliance is useful to its security. South Korea has no intention of abandoning the alliance. Nevertheless, the current administration is intent on accepting more responsibility for its own security, not only because Washington encourages Seoul to do so, but also because it allows South Korea to adopt a partially independent stance in the event that US policies are considered detrimental to the stability and welfare of South Korea. At the popular level, the young generation is particularly receptive to enhanced South Korean security independence, indicating that the critical stance towards the United States is likely to grow stronger in future. In a sense, Washington’s policies on legitimacy, which involved support for the South Korean democratization process in the 1980s and 1990s come at the cost of allowing Seoul to embark on a rapprochement with China and to support regime preservation in North Korea, policies that run counter to US aims to spread democracy and the rule of law. However, South Korea is not nearly as important for the US security strategy in the Asia-Pacific as is Japan, as implied by the changes in the US force posture that reduce Washington’s commitment to the defence of South Korean territory. At the end of the day, South Korea is almost certain to maintain its alliance relations with the United States, at least for as long as North Korea remains a threat to South Korea’s security (interview with a professor 12–1– 2005; interview with a researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) 24–1–2005). Washington has therefore not shown too much concern about Seoul’s increasing political independence from Washington and its growing criticism of US policies on the Korean peninsula. Despite South Korean protests, the United States has proceeded with its military reorganization plans and refused major compromises to its original policy during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff, realizing that South Korea cannot at present afford to abandon the alliance. Mongolia is a newly democratized state in Northeast Asia that has built
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increasingly close relations with the United States in the post-Cold War era. However, geopolitically it has more in common with the Central Asian countries since economically and militarily, it is a weak state squeezed in between southern Russia and northern China.3 From 1924 to 1990, Mongolia was a communist, nominally independent Soviet client state (Frank and Lee 2005: 146–47). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia established a democratic constitution in 1992. In contrast to the Central Asian states, Mongolia has made genuine progress in implementing liberal democracy and the rule of law, although severe flaws and irregularities exist. Peaceful transfers of power between parties and presidents demonstrate that procedural democracy has been established. In addition, freedom of association, speech and religion are generally well protected and practised, and civilians have formal control over the military and the police. Persisting problems include arbitrary arrests and detention, torture of people in custody, rigged elections, unlimited allowance for campaign donations, vague definitions of responsibilities in connection with the organization of elections, and a law enforcement system marked by red tape, delays, bribery, corruption and tribalism. Noticeably, the downfall of Mongolia’s coalition government in January 2006 marked a relapse for the democratization process since it involved an unlawful reshuffling of the cabinet. Mongolia is hence not a democracy on a par with Japan and South Korea. However, in contrast to the Central Asian regimes, Mongolia is making a reasonable attempt at consolidating democracy and the rule of law (Lee 2005), emulating the example of neighbouring Russia. Due to its geographic location, Mongolia cannot easily escape dependency on China and Russia, countries that are not keen to promote liberal democracy in neighbouring states. The United States has sought ties with Ulan Bator; however, these ties are comparable to those established with Central Asian states in that they focus on assistance for the 2001 war on terror in return for economic assistance. Mongolia has deployed 21 troops in Afghanistan and 130 in Iraq. Support for the US-led 2003 intervention in Iraq was particularly welcome since it happened in the wake of the Philippine troop withdrawal from the operation in 2004, an action that threatened to be followed up by additional Asian troop withdrawals. In return, Washington has recognized Mongolia’s democratic progress by putting it on its Millennium Challenge Account aid stream as the only continental Asian country. This type of aid is awarded to countries that are seen as making progress within the areas of democratization and market economy. Apart from this step, Washington has, however, not been a very active supporter of democratization in Mongolia (Noerper 2005). Several reasons might explain US reluctance to step up cooperation with Ulan Bator. Due to Mongolia’s geographic location, Ulan Bator cannot escape Sino-Russian influence. In view of considerable dissatisfaction in countries such as China and Russia with the US presence in Iraq, the United States is not interested in worsening relations with these countries by stirring up
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 131 disagreement over political developments in a weak country to whom Washington does not have easy access and which has not been held back by its two large neighbours in its efforts to implement democracy and the rule of law. In particular, the current US priority of stable government implies that while Mongolia’s democratization process is welcomed by Washington, it does not encourage the United States to take supportive steps that might anger Beijing and Moscow. Ulan Bator is aware that reliance on US support on a larger scale is unrealistic and has hence pursued a variety of ties with states in the Asia-Pacific. For example, Mongolia has close diplomatic relations with North Korea and Japan. Apparently, North Korean–Mongolian relations have not given rise to criticism from the United States. However, absence of criticism only emphasizes the negligible importance of Mongolia to the United States. It may also indicate that Washington recognizes that it is important for Ulan Bator to stay on good terms with China, and perhaps even US awareness that North Korea might attempt to emulate at least some of the market economic reforms implemented by Mongolia such as its privatization of 80 per cent of originally state-held assets. Taiwan is yet another newly democratized country in Northeast Asia with close strategic relations with the United States, but also with the potential to obstruct US implementation of its policies on legitimacy through separatist activities that destabilize Sino-US relations in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s democratization process began in earnest in 1986. It was initiated by the then ruling Kuomintang party and intended to strengthen the ability of the government to meet international challenges such as mainland China’s demand for reunification, the negligible number of states recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state, and its dependency on the United States for military assistance to protect the island against the threat of mainland China’s use of force. In addition, in the 1980s the domestic opposition to the ruling party was weak, which gave rise to the expectation that regime change would not result in the incumbent’s loss of power (Nielsen 1995: 313–14). The only opposition party that was subsequently to win significant electoral support was the Democratic Progressive Party, the party of Chen Shui-bian, who was elected president in 2000 and re-elected in 2005. Taiwanese democracy is comparable to that of South Korea. It has its flaws such as insufficient civilian control over the military, but is functioning well enough for external observers not to seriously question whether democracy has already been consolidated on the island. Undoubtedly, the United States approves of Taiwan’s democratization process since it eases Washington’s ability to justify its military support for Taipei and strengthens the prospects of spreading democracy in the Asia-Pacific. However, Taiwanese democracy also poses challenges to the United States in view of its current prioritization of stability, which also applies to the Taiwan Strait. The slowness with which Taiwan is implementing defence reform plans is one example of the problems posed by Taiwanese democracy. The reforms are intended not only to consolidate civilian control with and nationalization
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of the armed forces, but also to streamline the armed forces. Washington is not happy with Taiwan’s timetable for weapons procurement, encouraging Taipei to speed up in view of the swift pace by which China’s armed forces undertake military modernization partially aimed at threatening Taiwanese security. Taipei, on the other hand, accuses Washington of cashing in on Taiwan’s security problems by overstating the need for weapons acquisitions and has made clear that Taiwan will not buy every weapons system that the United States wants to sell to it. The increasing powers of Taiwan’s parliament, the legislative Yuan, over Taiwan’s defence partly explains the reservations of many of its members concerning the weapons procurement plans, which stem from worry about the costs and effectiveness of planned arms deliveries from the United States. Taiwanese democracy thus makes it more difficult for Washington to deal with Taiwan when it comes to security issues, even though it also motivates the United States to extend enhanced support for Taiwan and to maintain its de facto commitment to Taiwan’s security (Chase 2005: 362–82). Chen Shui-bian’s election victory raised the potential for conflict between the United States and mainland China in the Taiwan Strait because his victory constituted a setback for Beijing’s policy of peaceful unification under the ‘one country, two systems’ formula since Chen refused to accept the ‘one China’ principle (Hughes 2001: 124–37). Chen Shui-bian’s election victory, which ousted the traditional ruling party of Kuomintang, was widely praised as a significant step towards consolidation of democracy in Taiwan, making a return to authoritarian rule unlikely. But his victory also decreased the prospects of reunification with the mainland. The strengthening of separatist forces with the election victory of the Democratic Progressive Party thus brought the issue of unification by the use of force high on the security agenda of mainland China, which resulted in the adoption of China’s AntiSecession Law in March 2005. The law legitimizes the use of non-peaceful means to stop any incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China (‘Text of China’s Anti-Secession Law’ 2005). Chen Shui-bian’s comparatively rigid policy on the reunification issue has strengthened Sino-US resolve to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict in the Taiwan Strait. As early as 1995, following the crisis of that year where Washington sent aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait in response to Chinese missile tests and military manoeuvres in the area, the United States declared that it intended to continue to safeguard Taiwanese security. However, Washington would not protect Taiwan if it provoked mainland China by declaring independence. Since then, Washington has unsuccessfully pushed for Taipei to restart the cross-strait dialogue with mainland China that came to a halt with the 1995 crisis. The United States has subsequently sharpened its 1995 statement. For example, following Chen Shui-bian’s 2000 election victory, US President Bush publicly announced that the United States is against any unilateral decision to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, warning Taipei that moves towards independence would be seen as pro-
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 133 vocative actions that would not prompt Washington to help Taiwan in the event of a military crisis. Allegedly, Bush informed mainland China in private that the United States will come to the defence of Taiwan in the event of military aggression from mainland China. Nevertheless, the sharpened US tone towards Taiwan implies that Washington is compelled to move away from its traditional policy of strategic ambiguity (Dickson 2001: 84–103). This gradual shift in policy clarifies under which circumstances the United States is willing to defend Taiwan. Furthermore, it is directed towards Taipei to discourage separatist tendencies to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and keep the dialogue between Taipei and Beijing on track. The Taiwanese democratization process strengthens the case for the spread of liberal democracy despite mainland China’s insistence on the freedom of individual states to choose their form of government because it can be used to argue that the Chinese people opt for political influence if given the choice. However, Taiwanese democracy also poses grave threats to US policies on legitimacy because it endangers peace and stability between the two major Asia-Pacific powers, the United States and China. The drawbacks of the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law in Northeast Asia should not alter the fact that the United States generally enjoys considerable benefits from this development. Since the 1980s, the main opponent of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, mainland China, and its ally North Korea have become increasingly hard pressed by the growing number of countries in their near abroad committed to a liberal domestic political order. The consolidation of democracy in Northeast Asia strengthens US resolve to maintain its criticism of China’s negligible democratic progress and Washington’s reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the communist regime in Pyongyang. Indeed, Washington’s insistence that North Korea should be denuclearized is not likely merely to be motivated by the prospect of removing an impending threat towards the security of the United States and its allies. A denuclearized North Korea would also break the link between communist North Korea and democratic Taiwan established by Beijing’s unofficial vow to refrain from bringing about reunification with the island by military means if the United States adopts the same policy on the Korean peninsula (interview with Professor Kim, Sung-Han, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28–1–2005). Since the North Korean regime is unlikely to survive without its nuclear weapons programme, its dismantlement involves the overthrow of the Kim Jong-Il government (interview with a researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) 27–1–2005). Beijing does not yet have the military means to take over Taiwan. Therefore, the disappearance of the Taiwan–North Korea link would further strengthen the de facto independence of the Taiwanese democracy. US policies in Northeast Asia indicate that its commitment to a broad interpretation of legitimacy founded in liberal democracy and the rule of law is maintained in the long term, even if this priority is secondary to that of governmental stability in the short term.
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US policies on legitimacy in South Asia In South Asia, the short-term priorities of US policies on legitimacy are similar to those in the other sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific. Hence, US policy is based on the following reasoning: to defend the ideas of democracy and civil rights in the long term, the legitimacy of governments in the short term is determined by their commitment to US anti-terror and anti-WMD policies and not to their adherence to liberal civil and political rights ideals. Therefore, the 2001 war on terror does not a priori allow India to advance its influence in Washington despite the fact that India is often seen as the exemplar of a third-world democracy, being a secular democratic republic with a parliamentary form of government (Hardgrave Jr. and Kochanek 1986: 58–111). Indeed, a principal reason for the United States to prioritize relations with Pakistan in the short term despite its authoritarian political system is the 2001 US intervention in Afghanistan, which was undertaken to fight the terror threat stemming from the Taliban government’s links with al Qaeda. The Afghanistan intervention undertaken in October 2001 was the first major US response to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001. The incentive to undertake the intervention was to target al-Qaeda, the transnational terrorist grouping responsible for the terrorist attacks, which had taken shelter in Afghanistan, using the Taliban-run country as a base for training militant Islamists to strike at the United States and its allies. The Taliban movement emerged in 1994, consisting of disgruntled former mujahedin and students of Islam from schools located in Pakistan along the Afghan border. In August 1998, the Taliban gained control over the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, effectively taking political control of the country. Ironically, the United States had itself laid the foundation for the Taliban’s rise to power in the 1980s when Washington supported the Afghan mujahedin, the Muslim guerrillas opposing the Soviet occupation undertaken in 1979. These mujahedin became the core of the Taliban after the Soviet Union and the United States had left the country (Khalilzad and Byman 2000: 65–67). Pakistan was another keen supporter of the Taliban. After the departure of Moscow and Washington, Islamabad continued to assist the Taliban. In the 1990s, Islamabad aimed at establishing a client government, providing Pakistan with strategic depth. At the time, war with India over Kashmir appeared to be a distinct possibility with the Pakistan-supported insurgency escalating in the Kashmir valley. Until then, Pakistani support for the Taliban had been motivated by the Islamization of the Pakistani polity, which was encouraged by Pakistani military dictator Zia ul-Haq’s policy to use Islam to legitimize his regime during his reign from 1977–88. During the anti-Soviet insurgency, Pakistan became a safe haven for approximately two million Afghan refugees, primarily Pashtun, whose ethnic kin inhabits the north-western part of Pakistan. Islamabad’s arduous support for the Pashtun Taliban in Afghanistan reduced Pashtun irredentism in Pakistan and was
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 135 also looked upon favourably by Islamic militants in the country (Ayoob 2002: 55–57). Even before the US war on terror it became clear to Islamabad that the Taliban was out of control and that Pakistan’s attempts at influencing the regime were failing. As early as May 2000, Pakistan and the United States collaborated to try to persuade the Afghan regime to extradite Osama bin Laden. If the Taliban refused, Afghanistan risked being designated a terrorist state and as such, a potential target of a US military operation. During the course of 2000, the United States continued its policy of threats of armed hostility if Osama bin Laden was allowed to continue to operate on Afghan territory. The UN approved a sanctions policy, and Pakistan attempted a policy of constructive engagement to persuade the Taliban to adopt a moderate stand on the issue of terrorist camps (Judah 2002: 69–80). The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 and on the Indian parliament in December 2001, both allegedly conducted by terrorists trained in Afghanistan, meant that the US hard-line policy won the day, exposing Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy as a complete failure. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 from 28 September 2001 mandated anti-terror initiatives, and hence formed the basis for the US-led intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 (United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1373’ 2001). Islamabad was forced into a policy reversal, opting to contribute to US anti-terrorist activities, concentrating on diverting extremism from Pakistan. Indeed, the US-led forces in Afghanistan have assisted Pakistani troops with surveillance and communication. The war itself in Afghanistan was won principally by means of a combination of strategic US bombings to the north of the Hindu Kush. These paved the way for an offensive in northern Afghanistan by the Massoud-led Northern alliance armed with Russian weapons, when the Taliban lines began to disintegrate as a result of the US bombings. The Bonn conference held from 27 November to 5 December 2001 subsequently brought together four Afghan factions to form a transitional regime led by Hamid Karzai, which was elected president in the largely peaceful October 2004 election. Since then, the US-led coalition in Afghanistan has been busy attempting to transform the country into a stable democratic polity. Parliamentary elections were held in September 2005 with the population not appearing to fear retaliation from Taliban militias. This election was also conducted in a relatively peaceful and orderly manner, resulting in the assembly of an Afghan parliament in December 2005 for the first time in thirty years. Hence, significant developments have been made in constructing a sustainable national political infrastructure and political society in Afghanistan, although the peacekeeping operation is far from over (The White House 2006). The so-called Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFCA) continues to focus on remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in remote areas bordering Pakistan, with some assistance from Pakistan’s armed forces, since the Taliban continue to fight to oust the Karzai government. About 20,000 US-led coalition forces are hunting the Taliban on the Afghan side of the
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border, and thousands of Pakistani troops are fighting Islamic militants in the Waziristan region on the Pakistani side of the border. Thus, the positive trends of relative political stability remain contingent on the accommodation of powerful regional and ethnic interests (IISS 2005c: 333–40; ‘Taleban reject Karzai talks offer’ 2006; ‘Pakistan’s undeclared war’ 2004; ‘Protests at Afghan border deaths’ 2006). As noted by US President Bush, in Afghanistan, the United States remains on the offensive, assisting a President and a National Assembly that are fighting terror while building the institutions of a new democracy (US Department of State 2006). Washington’s decision to establish a strategic partnership with Kabul in 2005 signifies continued US support for the Afghan government’s commitment to promote a stable democracy (The White House 2005b). US operations in Afghanistan imply that comparatively few rewards can be expected from attempts to create the preconditions for establishing liberal democracy and the rule of law, compared with the costs involved in making such an attempt. Much the same lesson can be drawn from the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq, where the successful conduct of the war itself subsequently drowned in criticism of the reconstruction efforts which have been wrecked by continued violence between opposing factions.4 For this reason, the United States is unlikely to undertake this type of operation unless justified by other aims, such as the ousting of the Taliban and al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, control over a significant oil exporting country such as Iraq, the dismantlement of nuclear programmes such as those in North Korea and Iran, or the prevention of WMD proliferation by enemy regimes such as that in Pyongyang. Support for democratization processes set in motion by domestic forces, as has been the case in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, is a much more economically and politically cost-effective means of promoting US policies on legitimacy. For example, US support for the Indian strategy of negotiating with the authoritarian Gyanendra administration in Nepal, with the purpose of introducing elements of democracy into the political system, does not place the US administration at the centre of criticism. However, simultaneous Chinese military support for the authoritarian Nepalese government also implies that the United States might have to opt for more heavy-handed strategies in countries where opponents of US policies on legitimacy, such as China and the Taliban, use force to obstruct Washington’s attempts at implementing democracy and the rule of law. In the long run, US policies on legitimacy encourage Washington to see New Delhi as the more desirable partner of the two major South Asian states, Pakistan and India. US pleas for the spread of democracy and the rule of law fall on much more fertile ground in New Delhi since India has been a secular democratic republic with a parliamentary form of government since its independence in 1947 (Hardgrave Jr. and Kochanek 1986: 58–111). The Bush administration has declared its intention to develop a close strategic partnership with India based on their mutual commitment to democracy. For example, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice notes that Indian
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 137 democracy is a positive element in New Delhi’s increasing global responsibilities (‘Secretary Condi Rice meets Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh’ 2005). The 2001 war on terror does not a priori guarantee Pakistan a favourable position compared with India vis-à-vis the United States. Indeed, Islamabad’s participation in the war on terror reveals that it is a US dependant unable to control its own territory in the face of the growing domestic popularity of Islamism. The United States is supportive of Musharraf, because the likely alternative to his authoritarian regime is to be found among the Islamic sectors of the opposition, implying that Musharraf is the lesser of two evils. Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was intended as a means of strengthening the regime in Islamabad vis-à-vis India. Contrary to expectations in Islamabad, it manifested Pakistan as a fragile polity that needs assistance to prevent Pakistan from becoming another Afghanistan. India is a stable democracy capable of exercising influence beyond its own territory (Ayoob 2002: 61). As such, it is by far the more attractive partner, but it is also the one that is more difficult to get on board. On the one hand, the 2001 war on terror has encouraged Washington to upgrade Pakistan to the status of a core non-NATO ally, a decision that has strained US–Indian relations. On the other hand, the combined US–Pakistani military operations in South Asia do not merely contribute to stability in Afghanistan; they also help to preventing Pakistani terror groups from operating on Indian territory, a security threat that ties up Indian military and economic resources in counterinsurgency operations across the ‘Line of Control’ in Kashmir and contributes to recurring disruptions in the Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, such as New Delhi’s accusations that Pakistan is responsible for the terrorist attack in Mumbai in July 2006 that killed approximately 200 people.5 US–Pakistani cooperation in the war on terror may help to ameliorate tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi, making it less difficult for Washington to cooperate with both Pakistan and India. The potential for cooperation inherent in the similarities between the political systems of the United States and India should not be exaggerated. Democracy is consolidated in both polities, and the historical background of the two systems is similar, in that they are both founded on British thinking on liberal democracy, emphasizing representative government, legal equality and civil rights underpinned by a judiciary that is at least partially independent from the executive.6 However, Washington and New Delhi have never cashed in on this potential because India was aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moreover, India is likely to conclude that US post-Cold War focus on Pakistan and Afghanistan implies that Washington puts a higher premium on stability than on democracy. Furthermore, although India fulfils the civilizational criteria of a Pax Americana, it does not fully approve of the operational and structural aspects of US ideational power that Washington uses to implement its version of regional order, such as its anti-WMD policy and its reliance on the alliance system rather than the UN system to maintain US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, Indian
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aspirations for multipolarity, subcontinental dominance and the preservation of the Cold War UN system are at odds with US strategies for preserving its position of pre-eminence. US–Indian differences over the principles of Asia-Pacific order are likely to continue to constitute serious impediments to the possibilities for cooperation on the basis of their common commitment to democracy.
US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific The similarities between Washington’s policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia are greater than the differences. The United States is committed to a narrow interpretation of legitimacy, emphasizing the need for political stability to take root before democratization and the rule of law is established. On the other hand, the United States continues to pursue its long-term goal of a broad interpretation of legitimacy involving the spread of liberal democracy and civil rights, insofar as it is reconcilable with the goal of political stability. In Southeast Asia, Washington has reversed its course, replacing its advocacy of democratization and respect for human rights in the 1990s with demands for effective governmental control with population and territory. At the same time, ASEAN has taken preliminary steps to establish a dialogue on democracy, calling into question US instruments for the promotion of stability, since these encourage breaches of fundamental principles of the rule of law. Spurred on by the Indonesian democratization process, Southeast Asia as a whole is considering a wider interpretation of legitimacy, which corresponds to long-term US policies, but which is somewhat at odds with Washington’s short-term policies. The United States does not have a long history of involvement in Central Asia, and its limited engagement in this sub-region dominated by the external powers of Russia and China has been based on a prioritization of political stability rather than democratization. In principle, this prioritization suits the authoritarian regimes of the sub-region well. However, suspicions that Washington supports indigenous political opposition groups advocating democratization have grown, especially following the 2005 revolution in Kyrgyzstan and US demands for an investigation of the 2005 Andijon incident in Uzbekistan, which involved hundreds of civilian casualties. Despite Washington’s focus on political stability, the Central Asian regimes have therefore retreated somewhat from cooperating with the United States, relying on Russian security guarantees to preserve political power. Northeast Asia is the stronghold of US policies on legitimacy, since Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are democratic polities which are also aligned with the United States. Mongolia has also embarked on a democratization process, but its geographic location encourages Ulan Bator to emulate the Russian example of democracy with totalitarian features. Democratic partners do not always make the most compliant partners, as indicated by South
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 139 Korea’s opposition to Washington’s policies on the Korean peninsula and Taiwan’s separatist inclinations that threaten to upset peace and stability with mainland China. Although Washington supports the maintenance of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, it is unlikely to abandon democratic Taiwan in the event of violent conflict. This sets US policies on legitimacy off against Chinese demands for reunification on mainland Chinese terms. Japan is a consolidated democracy, and as such, the United States encourages Tokyo to undertake constitutional revisions allowing it to play a military role in Asia-Pacific security. The potential drawback to these plans is the possibility of a remilitarized Japan taking over the balancing of its principal adversaries, North Korea and China, a development that may hold the most serious potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific. In addition to China itself, the gravest short-term challenge to US policies on legitimacy is North Korea, since neither of these regimes is legitimate in the eyes of Washington. Arguably, the US would like to see the disintegration of the communist regime in Pyongyang, a development that would break the link between mainland China’s tacit acceptance of Taiwanese democracy and tacit US acceptance of North Korea’s communist regime, leaving China completely isolated in its home region as the only authoritarian government. South Asia presents the United States with the most immediate challenges to its policies on legitimacy, producing a somewhat blurred picture of its priorities. In Afghanistan, the United States is leading the coalition attempting to create political stability with a view to establishing a functioning democracy and the rule of law. Despite substantial progress in this direction, Washington has not been given much praise for its efforts, considering the costs. For this reason, the United States is unlikely to engage in such operations in the future, unless they are considered necessary for implementing core policies on US regional order, such as fighting terrorist bases and governments that sponsor WMD. Pakistan, which is a weak authoritarian regime threatened by the Islamic opposition, has assisted Washington in combating militant Islamism in South Asia. Washington’s concern to avoid a Talibanization of Kabul and Islamabad encourages the United States to prioritize a narrow interpretation of legitimacy in South Asia, despite the location of the world’s largest democracy, India, on the subcontinent. In spite of the political affinities between Washington and New Delhi, India is reluctant to support the operational and structural elements intended to preserve US pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific. US policies on legitimacy do not, therefore, assist Washington much in persuading the major South Asian power to become a reliable US strategic partner.
Chinese policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia In Southeast Asia, China has combined an inflexible definition of territorial sovereignty, involving a continued commitment to recover its historically defined territorial rights in the South China Sea with a short-term pragmatic
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attitude towards an interim settlement of the territorial disputes. In November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a non-binding code of conduct committing the parties to resolving their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, through consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law (ASEAN 2002; Kazmin 2002). Despite this commitment, the Chinese claim to the South China Sea is not founded in plausible interpretations of international law. However, Beijing formulates its arguments in the language of international law.7 The tongue-shaped, dashed boundary line that generally follows the 200 metre isobath is considered a traditional sea boundary line by the Chinese. Dzurek suggests that the traditional sea boundary line determines the sovereignty of islands, but not the limits of maritime jurisdiction (Dzurek 1996: 12). The dotted line cannot therefore be considered to be a representation of the Chinese claim to maritime space. It covers around 80 per cent of the South China Sea. China has never indicated the exact course of the dotted line. Hence, its claim to maritime space in the South China Sea remains unclear. Hasjim Djalal, then Director of Legal and Treaty Affairs of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, expressed the lack of clarity about the Chinese claim in 1979, when he stated that the nature of the Chinese claim was enigmatic (Djalal quoted in Dzurek 1996: 12). China bases its claim on three arguments: discovery, effective occupation and recognition (Roque and Harry 1997: 197–98). The following official statement illustrates the Chinese view: More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese people were already sailing on the turbulent waves of the South China Sea, as recorded in ancient Chinese literature. By the time of the Western and Eastern Han dynasties (206 BC–220 AD), the South China Sea had become an important navigation route for China. As navigation steadily developed, long years of sailing the seas enabled the Chinese people to become the first discoverers and the masters of the South China Sea Islands. Surveyed and named time and again and worked and administered without a break, these valuable islands became an inalienable part of our beautiful motherland. (Ti-tsu 1975: 10–15) China’s discovery of the South China Sea dates back to ancient times. Archaeological finds and references in ancient Chinese books to Nanhai, or South Sea, are used to substantiate the claim that the Chinese controlled the islands of the South China Sea between 770 and 221 BC (Shen 1997: 19–23). From 206 BC to AD 220, when the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties ruled China, Chinese temples, graves and obsolete cannons are mentioned, as are descriptions of the geographical features, but again the evidence remains circumstantial. Chinese arguments about effective occupation are based on events in the twentieth century. For example, Beijing claims that the Chinese government
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 141 took every opportunity to reiterate China’s sovereignty throughout the 1930s and 1940s (Shen 1997: 55–61). The Chinese also present arguments of public recognition of China’s title to the islands. For example, Chinese sources claim that North Vietnam stated in 1958 that it recognized and supported China’s declaration on its territorial waters (‘Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian’s Talks With Premier Pham Van Dong’ 1977). The 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea stated that a territorial sea boundary of twelve nautical miles applies to all Chinese territories, including all islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas (Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea 1958). In 1992, China passed a law stipulating that foreign military vessels may only pass through China’s territorial waters if given Chinese approval (Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 55 1992). This legislation drove the point home that relying on Beijing to respect international law was not feasible, given its intention to assert, at least in principle, its alleged historical territorial rights. China is unrelenting in its demand that its sovereignty over the South China Sea be recognized. This demand may be interpreted in the light of its tradition of hierarchical bandwagoning. China applies this concept to the South China Sea by demanding that the neighbouring states recognize its special rights to the area in principle, even if it refrains from taking advantage of these rights in practice. China appears to be prepared to make concessions that imply the sharing of the resources of the area with the other claimant states only if its claim is accepted in principle. Beijing’s agreement to shelve the sovereignty issue allows China to maintain its inflexible definition of sovereignty in the South China Sea, while simultaneously allowing Beijing to offer the other claimant states concessions. From the Chinese point of view, this is a generous gesture of resource sharing with states that do not have any a priori rights to the area. If the other claimant states accept this formula, such an arrangement would symbolically recognize Chinese superiority, meeting its demand to be accepted as a power with special rights and obligations. Beijing’s demands resemble the Chinese tributary states system in which the bandwagoning states were left to govern as they saw fit, while China retained symbolic control (Odgaard 2002b: 224–25). These civilizational elements of Chinese ideational power come to light when China expounds what it sees as the basis for its sovereignty claim. According to China, although some of the islands in the South China Sea have been illegally occupied by other countries in modern and contemporary history, the islands’ legal status as part of China should not be affected. Beijing argues that, according to international law, it does not matter that it has not exercised effective control over the islands for sustained periods of time. Even if another claimant occupies the territory, acquiescence from the former sovereign is necessary for the new occupant to proclaim sovereignty (Chenyuan 1991: 249). Thus, Beijing manages to leave the other claimant states in no doubt that it is only China’s generosity towards the neighbouring
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states that allows other states to occupy sovereign Chinese territory without having asked for permission from China. The Chinese ideas of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning hold some attractions for the Southeast Asian states, in that they encourage states to live and let live, allowing for heterogeneous political systems. Hence, the civilizational elements of Chinese ideational power are conducive to a diversity of political systems that insulates regional states from US demands to implement the liberal concepts of democracy and the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian states are not persuaded that they stand to benefit from supporting this aspect of Chinese designs for regional order, because it is a system based on mercy rather than on merit. US civilizational goals are based on a system of individual competition, which means that all states willing to adopt the liberal concept of state– society relations have the opportunity to gain recognition as equal and trusted members of the club of democracies contributing to peace and stability by means of their sheer identity. Thus, they can also perform responsibilities as partners, rather than as subordinates of the United States. This type of relationship is not conceivable in a Sino-centric type of order, where states are, by definition, unequal. Chinese confidence in its attractiveness to the rest of the world remains intact, despite its relative military and economic weakness. It sees itself as unique and great, as an entity you can learn from but never become (Shih 1993: 126–27). This sense of superiority originates in the belief that China is historically entitled to play a leading role in the world. When Chinese superiority is ignored, China interprets it as an unjust rejection of its rightful political status. Since China retains superior moral and cultural qualities, it is entitled to special rights and obligations, leaving it as the first among equals. China is the natural leader, and should be recognized as such (Odgaard 2002b: 208–9). A Sino-centric regional order would therefore always place other powers in a position of inferiority; their freedom of action can always be withdrawn by reference to insufficient consideration for Chinese interests and demands on the part of neighbouring states, because it is not achieved by adopting procedures for state–society relations whose conduciveness to specified standards can be measured, but by the Chinese ruler delegating responsibilities on the basis of his discretionary powers. Hence, a Sino-centric system ultimately leaves other states in permanently inferior positions in terms of political power. China’s ideas of historical sovereignty and moral superiority are not conducive to Southeast Asian expectations of retaining complete sovereignty, or of possessing equally valid entitlements to territorial and maritime jurisdiction, or of being treated as politically equal entities, irrespective of the characteristics of their political systems. Part of the Southeast Asian reluctance towards a Sino-centric order stems from its historical experience of subservience to China. For example, the historical state of Annam, a resented term meaning Pacified South, was a product of Chinese occupation from 111 BC until AD 939, when the Annamese drove out the Chinese. The
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 143 area was later to become known as North and Central Vietnam. Since the colonial era, ethnic Chinese have also traditionally dominated the economic sectors of Southeast Asian states such as Malaysia and Indonesia, giving rise to resentment and anti-Chinese attitudes, especially among Muslims in these countries. Indeed, the Indonesian uprisings in the late 1990s, which were catalysed by the Asian financial crisis during the same period, and which brought about the ousting of Suharto’s government in 1998 and set off democratization of the Indonesia polity, were wrought by popular violence against ethnic Chinese communities that were seen as part and parcel of the government’s oppression of the Muslim population, due to their relative economic prosperity. Post-colonial communist insurgencies, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, were seen as major security threats, alerting these countries to their vulnerability to Chinese attempts at their independence since its ethnic kin often formed a central part of Southeast Asia’s communist movements. In Singapore, the popularity of the communists was effectively weakened by the economic success of the city-state, although some clandestine communist activity remained. The crushing of the Indonesian communist party in 1965 curtailed the strength of the communists, but the Indonesian political authorities remained fearful that guerrilla warfare would break out anew, and that communists would penetrate the bureaucracy. The Indonesian occupation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975 may be seen as an example of Indonesian determination to suppress communism. The fact that the occupation took place immediately after the ultra-leftist Fretilin party had gained control of the colony and proclaimed East Timorese independence in November 1975 reinforces this interpretation. The activities of the Malaysian communist movement reached their apex in the years 1948–60, a time of primarily left-wing anticolonial unrest. After independence in 1957, communism lost popularity, but remained a threat to state survival, largely due to the ethnic Chinese minority. The connection to the ethnic Chinese minority also characterized the communist movement in Thailand, where the communists remained popular throughout the 1970s, peaking in 1977–78. As of 1978, the communists lost popularity due to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and internal challenges to communism from the political and popular levels of society. In the Philippines, the communist movement was also linked partially, but not predominantly, to the ethnic Chinese. The communist movement, particularly the New People’s Army, emerged in 1975 as a significant force in Philippine politics, and came to be seen as a serious threat to regime stability (Feske 1991: 44–54; Kuntjoro-Jakti 1984: 3–28; Weatherbee 1984: 29–45; Ahmad and Hamid 1984: 51–65; Nemenzo 1984: 71–101; Hui 1984: 109–27; Wongtrangan 1984: 133–68; SarDesai 1989/1994: 248). Chinese support for local communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia indicated that China felt entitled to exercise special rights and obligations in the region. Southeast Asia had to spend considerable resources on containing such
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insurgencies while at the same time maintaining a friendly attitude towards China, in order to avoid provoking Beijing to use force (Vatikiotis 1996: 182–83). Its experience with Chinese economic integration and migration into its homelands has reminded Southeast Asia to keep Chinese influence in the sub-region at modest levels. A Sino-centric order based on historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning is not desirable, because of the costs in terms of political freedom. Southeast Asia is interested in assisting China in balancing US power so as to preserve the political heterogeneity of the region, but the aim is only to ward off US attempts at dominance, without causing Washington to abandon Southeast Asia, because the prospect of a Sino-centric order is even more disturbing for the political freedom of the indigenous powers. Most of the ASEAN member states share this position on setting limits for their relations with China. Since the South China Sea constitutes the first line of defence for the littoral states of Southeast Asia, they cannot afford to ignore a worst-case scenario in which China attempts to restore what it defines as its territorial and maritime space in the maritime heartland of Southeast Asia at some future date (interview with Dr Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies 29–10–1998). In authoritarian Singapore, the political establishment has taken note of the velocity with which China has become widely engaged in Southeast Asia. Beijing is seen to have successfully utilized the widespread perception that China is already a major global power to surpass the standing of established ASEAN dialogue partners such as Japan. China interprets its current position of economic, political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia as a kind of hierarchical bandwagoning with the ASEAN member states paying tribute and recognizing the superiority of China by allowing Beijing to assume an inordinate position in Southeast Asian diplomacy. The remarkable rise in Chinese activities involving ASEAN during the past five to seven years does not necessarily translate into dominance, but it does give Beijing the option of presenting itself as an attractive alternative partner to the United States. This type of development implies that ASEAN’s interests are best served by encouraging a balance of power that includes the United States (interview with Permanent Secretary Peter Ho Hak Ean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17–18–2005). This cautious view on China’s exercise of influence in Southeast Asia is mirrored in Indonesia’s political establishment, where senior diplomats state that China’s charm diplomacy represents no immediate danger, but they are less certain of ASEAN’s ability to maintain manageable relations with China over a time span of two decades (interview with two senior Indonesian government officials, Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 7–12–2004). Such reflections on the nature of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia reveal that decision-makers in the sub-region are aware of the seductive quality of China’s hierarchical bandwagoning model, which in the long term may translate into submission of Southeast Asian interests to those of Beijing. The prospects of China utilizing its grow-
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 145 ing foothold in the sub-region to establish a Sino-centric order encourage the ASEAN member states to pursue strengthened ties with Washington as well as Beijing.
Chinese policies on legitimacy in Central Asia In Central Asia, the theme of barbarian threats against the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation colours Beijing’s security agenda. Xinjiang province in the north-western part of China is inhabited by a mixture of Chinese and Turks. It borders the Central Asian countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Hence, Xinjiang constitutes one of the outposts of Chinese civilization, where a policy of assimilation has so far been pursued, but in the post-Soviet era transnational Turkish identity politics are seen to have put a halt to this process, giving rise to opposition against China that necessitates the use of violent measures to defeat what appears to be considered a barbarian threat. The domain of Chinese rulers traditionally included the barbarian tribes defined, not so much by race, religion or national origin, as by cultural achievement. People who did not accept Chinese civilization, and who did not know the refinement of ceremony, music and culture, were defined as barbarians. Barbarians were not foreigners in a strict sense, but instead uncivilized, and as such, awaiting assimilation into the Chinese orbit by means of a cultural transformation. Indeed, it was the duty of the Chinese ruler to effect such a transformation and confer the boon of civilization upon those who had been born barbarian. Often, barbarian submission to Chinese rule was achieved by military conquest. However, the tributary system also prompted the Chinese ruler to win the admiration of barbarians through virtue, and in return the barbarians expressed their gratitude by offering their local products to him. Since barbarity was defined according to cultural standards, barbarians could become Chinese when they advanced to the Chinese level of civilization, and conformed to the higher Chinese standards of living. Until the barbarians became civilized, they were subject to a policy of segregation. However, if the barbarians refused to accept the benefits of civilization, and continued to disturb China, then a policy of chastisement was to be followed (Hsü 1960: 6–12). China’s approach to barbarity implies that, traditionally, it was a multinational state. Maintaining national unity has therefore been a major task, especially in remote areas such as Xinjiang. National sovereignty is conceived of as requiring the protection of Chinese territory against foreign invasions, occupation and exploitation, and is the first priority of the Chinese government. Xinjiang is an area where national sovereignty is considered to be threatened at present. Consequently, it is a main priority of the Chinese government to solve the problem of transnational separatism. Uyghurs constitute the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, making up 45 per cent of the population. Only when the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and other Turkish minorities in
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the province are added to their numbers can Xinjiang province be said to have an Islamic, Turkish-speaking majority of 60 per cent, with the Han Chinese in the minority. This is, however, the most relevant categorization seen from Beijing’s point of view, because the principal threat against Chinese unity from this area is defined as transnational Islamic militancy. China uses its historical definition of sovereignty to ward off demands for Xinjiang’s independence. Xinjiang is thus said to have been a part of China for thousands of years, since the days of the Han dynasty from 206 BC to AD 220 (Shulong 2003: 186–87). Xinjiang was first ruled by China in the first century BC. Since then, Xinjiang’s relations with China have been marked by long periods of separation and political unrest due to the unwillingness of the indigenous population to accept the adoption of Chinese standards of civilization. Furthermore, China only conquered the whole of Xinjiang in the middle of the eighteenth century, and this was actually the achievement of the Manchu Qing Empire (Bovingdon 2004: 65–66). Nevertheless, China only emphasizes modern non-Chinese rulers, or barbarians, as sources of political unrest. This argument serves to sustain the myth that the communist party is the latest in China’s history of dynasties personifying Chinese civilization, and that only foreign barbarians encroaching on Chinese territorial integrity have been able to cause open rejection of the benefits of Chinese civilization. Thus, the decision of local Uyghurs to proclaim the independence of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan in 1933, and again, to no avail, in 1944, when the now Taiwan-based Kuomintang ruled China, is cited as a period of threats against Xinjiang’s unity with China, as is the post-Soviet period in Central Asia. After the end of the Cold War, separatists in Central Asia and in Xinjiang have become active again, reviving the goal of establishing an Eastern Turkestan on the basis of Turkish ethnicity. Beijing sees the newly won independence of the former Soviet republics as the principal cause of the recent rise of nationalist sentiment among the Uyghurs (Shulong 2003: 187). Uyghur resistance to Chinese rule justifies a policy of chastisement, encouraging Beijing to cooperate with Central Asia and Turkey in using violent means to crack down on the activities of Uyghur exiles and indigenous Uyghur militants who are held responsible for terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, Beijing and other parts of China.8 Central Asia was the first sub-region in which Beijing pursued a pragmatic policy of settling outstanding border issues in order to promote China’s options of defeating Uyghur separatism by means of a policy of cooperation with the Central Asian regimes. In July 1998, China and Kazakhstan signed a border agreement resolving the dispute over their shared border, granting China approximately 22 per cent of the total territory claimed as Chinese. In June 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan signed an Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness that formally ended a border dispute between the two states. Under a 1996 border accord, Bishkek transferred 30,000 hectares to Beijing. At the end of May 1999, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament ratified a border agreement
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 147 ceding some 95,000 hectares of land to China. Tajikistan and Beijing signed a treaty in May 2002 handing over some 100,000 hectares of land to China. In Kyrgyzstan, China invests in energy, transportation, mining and agriculture, hence importing natural resources from the country. The 2001 Sino-Kyrgyz agreement also involved a Chinese aid grant to Bishkek of US$ 2 million (Blua 2002; ‘Kazakhstan, China Sign Border Agreement’ 1998). China’s relationship with the Central Asian countries can be seen as a kind of modern tributary system that is based on the historical links between China and the Turkish people of Central Asia (interview with Dr Galina Sergeevna Yaskina, the Russian Academy of Science, and the Diplomatic Academy of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11–3–2005). China was not granted all of the territory originally claimed (Fravel 2005: 79). Nevertheless, it was on the receiving end of large chunks of territory, and this testifies to the asymmetrical relationship between Beijing and the Central Asian countries. Chinese territorial claims are, in principle, inflexible, which means that China maintains an inalienable right to correct past encroachments on its territory. However, the actual extent of Chinese claims is, in contrast, highly flexible, as evidenced by China’s enigmatic claim to territory and maritime space in the South China Sea. This way of defining territorial jurisdiction allows Beijing to adjust its territorial claims to changing political circumstances. China’s contemporary relations with neighbouring Central Asian states allow China direct access to the natural resources of these countries, providing China with influence on their production systems. This policy of access is rewarded by China’s concern for the welfare of these countries, as exemplified by the granting of aid. Sino-Central Asian border agreements recognize the fact that China had legitimate outstanding claims to territory in the sub-region. Since the nature of cooperation between the countries confirms the superiority of China over these countries, China is less concerned to recover all of the territory that is claimed to be historically Chinese. Instead, a system resembling hierarchical bandwagoning has been established. China has also resolved its century-old border dispute with Russia, the major power in Central Asia. As early as 1991 and 1994, Russia and China signed agreements delimiting the eastern and western parts of their common border, but disputes over several minor sections remained to be solved. In June 2005, however, Beijing and Moscow signed an agreement that puts an end to these remaining bones of contention (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in India 2005). China shares Russian concerns about the spread of militant Islam within their territories. One of the common interests shared by China and Russia is to obtain US support for the political authority of existing regimes in Central Asia, and their right to cooperate with China and Russia on fighting secessionist movements by any means. As long as the survival of Central Asian governments is threatened by internal opposition groups and external pressures, the returns on Sino-Russian efforts to combat Islamic militants with the assistance of incumbents remain uncertain. Hence,
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in January 2002 China and Russia argued that the US-led intervention in Afghanistan implied Washington’s acceptance of their continued fight against terrorism on their own territory without external interference (interview with a Chinese government official, National Defense University 20–11– 2004). Subsequently, the United States listed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, as demanded by China. This gesture, combined with US acceptance that separatist groups in areas such as Chechnya, Xinjiang and the Ferghana Valley be fought by military means, converges with Chinese, Russian and Central Asian ideas about how to deal with terrorist threats against existing regimes. US support for Central Asian cooperation on fighting terrorism by any means is a redeeming feature of the US military presence for the other powers, and allows the local powers to implement a narrow interpretation of legitimacy in the short-term, focusing on maintaining effective control over territory and peoples. Russia not only entertains second thoughts about the long-term implications of US policies on legitimacy; like the ASEAN member states, Chinese long-term policies on legitimacy are of equal concern. The Chinese concept of historical sovereignty has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. Russia is a descending power in contrast to China, which is an ascending power. Hence, Russia is concerned that, at some point in the future, it might become feasible for China to try and establish a system of hierarchical bandwagoning, and consider its border agreement with Moscow null and void. This concern is founded on the growing number of illegal Chinese immigrants that inhabit Russia’s thinly populated far eastern provinces (interview with Shayken Galimbekovich Nadirov, Russian Academy of Sciences 5–3–2005). The immigrants currently assume an inferior position, usually working as unskilled labour in sectors of production such as manufacturing or farming. Russia fears that this development is a classical example of how China conquers territory. Russian Sinophobia may be fuelled by the need for a convenient explanation as to why the economy of Eastern Siberia is faring so badly (interview with Professor Vasily V. Mikheev, Russian Academy of Sciences 9–3–2005). However, it is an explanation that finds resonance in Russian images of China’s political thinking and, as such, it gives rise to psychological barriers to stable Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. Traditionally, China does not use force unless attacked; instead, the Chinese inhabit borderlands and focus on integration into the economic structures of society, bringing with them their culture of daily life and their attitude of moral superiority that encourages them to avoid assimilation through interaction with the local population. Russia is a much stronger power than the Central Asian countries, and as such, growing Chinese influence is seen to take place in a far more subdued and discreet manner. Nevertheless, Chinese immigration in some parts of the Russian political establishment is seen as an example of creeping annexation, comparable to China’s gradual occupation of territory in the South China Sea over the past three decades. In the eyes of Moscow, China’s thousand-year old strategy for
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 149 obtaining political influence is to strengthen its position step by step, or, as implied in a Chinese proverb, to cross the river while feeling the stones under your feet. China employs a slow, but unstoppable, process of colonization, but they will not admit to using this strategy, since it is not accepted as legitimate in the sub-region. Nevertheless, parts of the Russian political establishment suspect that China aims to move Chinese people to Russia and Central Asia, starting with economic integration (interview with Dr Galina Sergeevna Yaskina, the Russian Academy of Science, and the Diplomatic Academy of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11–3–2005). As Russian power is waning, the long-term prospects of becoming a supplier of natural resources to a China with sufficient capabilities to cause Russia to bandwagon with China are discomforting. Russia will only align with China on an equal footing; Moscow is not willing to accept a junior partnership as is conceivable if Chinese economic and military power continues to grow (interview with Alexey G. Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center 10–3–2005). Thus, Chinese policies on legitimacy constitute a barrier to a stable SinoRussian alliance.
Chinese policies on legitimacy in Northeast Asia Northeast Asia is the sub-region in which China’s historical understanding of sovereignty, and its model of hierarchical bandwagoning meets the most immediate resistance, since Northeast Asia encompasses Taiwan, which in China’s view has been estranged from the mainland due to foreign encroachments on Chinese territory, including the territorial expansions in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The Korean peninsula is subject to a subtle policy of hierarchical bandwagoning. Since the onset of the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff that caused fears in Beijing of US military intervention, China has begun airing arguments of Chinese historical sovereignty over the Korean peninsula. This development has given rise to concern in South Korea as to the long-term consequences of Seoul’s economic and political rapprochement with Beijing. Mongolia is also subject to the Chinese policy of hierarchical bandwagoning, but only to a very minor extent, because Moscow and the United States also influence Mongolia. Due to long-standing pressures to succumb to foreign ideas of legitimacy, Northeast Asia is the sub-region in which the theme of humiliation of China appears most forcefully in China’s policy on legitimacy. This theme of foreign humiliation dates back to the late Qing dynasty in the nineteenth century. At this time, Western and Japanese influences began to encroach on Chinese authority by using force in the event of attempts to circumscribe foreign interests such as opium imports. The trade war between Britain and China of 1839–42 was ended with the treaty of Nanjing, which forced China to cede Hong Kong to Britain and to pay war reparations. Furthermore, the unequal treaty system that placed British citizens under British jurisdiction was
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introduced. This weakening of China’s central government paved the way for internal uprisings that undermined the control of the Qing dynasty over Chinese territory. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Sino-Japanese hostilities broke out. The 1894–95 war over Korea, which was won by Japan and forced China to cede Taiwan, revealed China’s weakness when confronted with a rising power. The 1911 revolution resulted in the overthrow of the Qing emperor, bringing Sun Yat-Sen to power in 1912, in what was now a republic. In the early twentieth century, the rivalry between Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the communists emerged. Japan’s attack on Chinese troops in Manchuria in 1931 resulted in the creation of the Japanese state of Manchukuo and Japan’s invasion of northern China in 1937. Manchurian soldiers, armed civilians and Chinese communists formed the core of Chinese resistance, allowing Mao Zedong to consolidate his leadership of the communists. Japan’s defeat in 1945 was followed by civil war in China. Kuomintang fled to Taiwan in 1949, and the communists proclaimed the birth of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Mao Zedong’s rise to power brought the foreign encroachments on Chinese territory to an end (Odgaard 2007, forthcoming). Beijing’s Taiwan policy constitutes the most rigid application of China’s sovereignty concept, since Taiwan performs all the functions of a normal state, but it has failed to obtain the international recognition necessary to be recognized as a state conducting a normal foreign policy. Thus, Taiwan is formally a province under the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan constitutes the principal remaining stain on China’s national honour. The costs of compromise in terms of political capital, at a time when China is struggling to acquire the economic and military resources enabling it to assert its greatpower status, are far too high. Even if this was not the case, Taiwan constitutes a denial of Beijing’s representation of Chinese civilization from its own ethnic kin, and its separation from mainland China must be revoked in order to allow the People’s Republic of China to make a convincing claim to personify the Chinese nation. For this reason, mainland China’s claim to hold jurisdiction over Taiwan contains no room for compromise. This attitude emerges in China’s tracing of the ancient history of Taiwan. The official newspaper, the China Daily, argues that Taiwan was part of the mainland land mass 20,000–30,000 years ago, when the primitive people of Taiwan, mainland Zuozhen Man, were already living there. When the sea level rose during the Ice Age, 15,000 years ago, the land linking Taiwan and the mainland was submerged. The paper also emphasizes that Taiwan’s connection with the Chinese mainland has been traced back to primeval history by modern archaeology (‘Zouzhen Man – as Ancient as Peking Man’ 2003). This carefully crafted argument ties Taiwan’s geographic and human history together with that of mainland China back to the origins of mankind, which is further back than any other area claimed to form part of the Chinese motherland. The argument manifests that the links between mainland China and Taiwan are as intertwined and enduring as human life, and that the ties
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 151 between them are even more unbreakable than the Teutonic plates of the earth. Chinese President Hu Jintao states that Taiwanese authorities are pursuing ‘creeping independence’ by means of ‘rectification of Taiwan’s name’ and ‘desinification’ (‘President sets forth guidelines on Taiwan’ 2005). Beijing is communicating the view that separatism in Taiwan does not form part of Chinese civilization. The importance attached to the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan is also reflected in the priorities of the Chinese government, which lists the vicious rise of the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces as the most important item on the Chinese security agenda (The State Council Information Office 2004). This hard-line attitude falls on fertile ground amongst the Chinese public, which feels that Beijing can afford to be more proactive and assertive, calling for reunification even if it involves war with the United States (interview with Professor Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11–2004). China’s long-term commitment to reunification is supplemented with a pragmatic short-term policy, as is usual for China’s application of its historical concept of sovereignty. For example, in 1972, China de facto accepted a continued US diplomatic and military presence in Taiwan, in return for US agreement to the principle of ‘one China but not now’ (Yahuda 1996/2004: 174). By 2006, Beijing’s Taiwan policy also involved a combination of shortterm pragmatism combined with an unrelenting unwillingness to compromise in principle. For example, President Hu Jintao’s four-point guideline on cross-Straits relations combines unrelenting adherence to the one-China principle, and uncompromising opposition to Taiwanese moves towards independence, with a clear preference for peaceful reunification and enhanced interaction at the people-to-people level (‘President Sets Forth Guidelines on Taiwan’ 2005). This policy may preserve stability in the Taiwan Strait, and at the same time discourage a strengthening of Taiwanese separatism in the short term. The pragmatic part of China’s Taiwan policy does not, however, solve the problem that Taiwanese President Chen Shuibian is committed to further Taiwanese separatism, and Beijing is committed to countering such moves with a proportional response. The anti-secession law passed in March 2005, which allows Beijing to use non-peaceful means to meet Taiwanese moves towards independence can, for example, be seen as a response to Chen Shui-bian’s 2004 referendum asking the population whether, if China refuses to redeploy missiles currently pointed at Taiwan, the island should bolster its missile defences. The referendum failed because the voter turnout was too low, but Chen Shui-bian was re-elected president in 2005, and he plans to hold a second referendum, the contents of which, as yet, are unknown. The result of the referendum reflects concerns among the Taiwanese population that further moves towards independence may result in a war with China (interview with Associate Research Fellow, National Chengchi University 28–10–2005). However, Taiwan is a democracy, and as such, moderation on the independence issue cannot be counted on for certain. The United States is committed to protecting Taiwan against
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aggression, unless provoked by Taiwan itself. This policy stance leaves some uncertainty as to the extent of US security guarantees towards Taiwan. However, should Beijing resort to the use of force against Taiwan, the United States is unlikely to abandon a loyal de facto ally that represents a democratic China, as opposed to the authoritarian political system of mainland China. The United States recognizes that mainland China has taken steps towards political freedom, for example by conducting village-level elections. The general assessment of the political system of the People’s Republic of China is, however, that China’s leaders have not yet made the fundamental choices about the nature of their state that are necessary for China to prosper. Mainland China is seen to be following an outdated path, as implied by the lack of social and political freedom, and by its pursuit of advanced military capabilities that can threaten its Asia-Pacific neighbours. In the opinion of the United States, China cannot let its population experience the freedoms of buying, selling and producing, while denying them the rights of assembly, speech and worship (The White House 2002b, 2006). The long-term US commitment to liberal democracy is not least directed towards China, because a democratic China is expected to be much more conducive to the consolidation of a Pax Americana. Unfortunately, China is equally committed to defending its own version of legitimacy, in particular with regard to Taiwan, which, like Hong Kong and Macao, is seen to be a territory that must be returned to the so-called Chinese motherland, under the jurisdiction of Beijing. Beijing cannot conceive of Taiwan as a kind of tributary state of China, but only as an integral part of mainland China’s political, economic, social and military structures. Thus, Taiwan is the issue that highlights the differences between Sino-US policies on legitimacy, and leaves the two countries with no real room for a compromise that will settle their differences permanently. For this reason, the Taiwan issue will continue to be a source of instability between the two major powers of the Asia-Pacific that holds the potential to start a war. China’s relations with Japan hold the same potential. The Japanese are seen to belong to the same racial group, and have a similar culture. The Chinese sense of superiority vis-à-vis the Japanese, who were traditionally seen as dwarf pirates, was dealt a blow with Japan’s rise to world-power status after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, and Japan’s economic success since World War Two has evoked similar emotions. China has been unable to fit Japan into its scheme of legitimacy. Chinese efforts to organize the Asia-Pacific according to its version of regional order therefore appear flawed, resulting in China’s use of Japan as a target for demonstrating its moral superiority and the dangers of Japanese mentality (Shih 1993: 133–34). Japan is depicted as a nation that thinks in terms of national interest before thinking in terms of the common interests of states, to the detriment of the international community (interview with Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University 9–11–2004). Thus, improved Chinese relations with neighbouring states since the end
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 153 of the Cold War do not encompass Japan. Despite growing economic interdependence and cultural exchange, Sino-Japanese relations continue to be marred by animosity. China considers the ball to be in the Japanese court if Sino-Japanese relations are to be improved. For China, such an improvement is conditional on Japan submitting to China’s model of hierarchical bandwagoning by recognizing that Beijing, and not Tokyo, is the major AsiaPacific power whose superiority requires symbolic recognition. Hence, in China’s view, Japan has to face the reality that it is a declining power, whereas China is a rising power. As such, it is in Tokyo’s interest to recognize China’s integration into the international community as a responsible great power. Unfortunately, during Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s reign, Tokyo has instead increasingly concentrated on national goals such as obtaining global recognition of Japanese great-power status, by insisting on permanent membership on the UN Security Council, and on extending its military role in the Asia-Pacific by placing the demands following from its US alliance relations before all other security concerns (interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). The Taiwan issue is another area that has set off China against Japan. During the Koizumi administration, Japanese relations with Taiwan have become much closer, as indicated by Japan’s decision in 2005 to allow Taiwanese citizens entry without a visa. So long as Japan is seen to deny Chinese superiority, for example by the repeated visits of the Japanese Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine in memory of war casualties since 1868, China and Japan are likely to continue to be strategic rivals (interview with high ranking Chinese military official 20–11–2004). One indication of the bleak prospects of improved SinoJapanese relations is China’s continued attempts to portray Japan as hostile towards common Asian interests by referring to its militaristic past as an issue that jeopardizes regional peace and stability, and demonstrates Japanese inferiority, as can be seen from repeated Chinese protests against the Yasukuni Shrine visits. The Sino-Japanese dispute over sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands also brings this attitude to the fore. The Senkakus consist of five uninhabited islets in the East China Sea that are claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan. In 1953, the United States assumed administrative control of the islets. In 1971, China declared ownership of the Senkakus. The following year, the United States returned control of the islets to Japan, together with Okinawa, located 200 nautical miles east of the Senkakus (Austin 1998: 162–76). The dispute did not become serious until 1996 (Suganuma 2000: 134). At that time, right-wing militants from the Japan Youth League began consolidating Japan’s effective occupation of the Senkakus by means of activities such as hoisting the Japanese flag and building a shrine with support from Tokyo. This development fuelled Chinese suspicions that Japanese militarism is on the rise. For example, a Chinese newspaper comment on this issue argues that Japanese Prime Ministers’ obeisance at shrines of war criminals, omissions in history textbooks of Japanese aggression
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against China and Korea in the early twentieth century, movies extolling militarism, and tolerance of right-wingers landing on the Senkakus are all indications of growing Japanese militarism (Chong 1999). China sees Japanese behaviour as a disguise for Japan’s aspirations to dominate Asia, challenging China’s right to restore the motherland. The Senkakus are a tangible object of dispute that brings the navies of the two states into dangerous proximity. Ongoing Chinese research activities and naval operations in the area claimed by Japan as its exclusive economic zone testify to the danger of confrontation. In March 2005, Japan decided to spend US$ 3.08 million on installing weather radar on islands at the centre of Japan’s territorial dispute with China, enabling Tokyo to monitor ships in Japanese territorial waters. In April 2005, Japan began processing applications to let companies explore the disputed area in the East China Sea for natural gas. Because the context of the dispute is two powers with incompatible policies on legitimacy, and sharing no willingness to compromise, the dispute is a potentially volatile hot spot (Odgaard 2002a: 130–31). The Koreans have traditionally been subject to Chinese suzerainty. In fact, the history of Sino-Korean relations is complex, alternating between Chinese conquests and tributary relations and Korean repellence of Chinese invasions since 194 BC. During the Cold War, China did not make much active use of its historical concept of sovereignty in its relations with the two Koreas, satisfied with the establishment of the permanent armistice line in 1953 that ensured the consolidation of communist North Korea following the end of the Korean War. However, in 2002, China initiated a research project to review the history of China’s Northeast. One outcome of the project was the inclusion of the kingdom of Koguryo in the annals of Chinese rather than Korean history. The kingdom encompassed most of what is now North Korea in the south, and stretched well into Manchuria in the north. The Chinese government has not commented on the move, but Chinese academics have said that the map change is merely part of a major historical project, and malign intentions should not be read into it. China has not made any claims to the territory or called for a boundary change, despite the cartographic revisions of ancient kingdoms. However, approximately 60 years ago the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) changed its view of China’s territorial borders with regard to Taiwan, altering its status from that of a regional national minority into a province. By 1943, it was politically expedient for China to alter the status of Taiwan, which was subsequently declared an integral part of China (Scofield 2004). This incident sets a precedent for China to alter its territorial claims in the face of changing political circumstances. Koreans fear that the redefinition of the history of Koguryo has been caused by the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff involving the possibility of US military intervention. China’s remapping equips Beijing with an allegedly legitimate basis for undertaking military intervention in North Korea, incorporating the state under Chinese jurisdiction in order to maintain a geographical buffer against US armed
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 155 forces and its allies, and to ensure that North Korea remains communist (interview with a Senior Research Fellow, affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) 27–1–2005). China has also established very close economic links with North Korea. The volume of trade between China and North Korea in 2005 was approximately US$ 1.5 billion, making China North Korea’s largest trade partner. Chinese investments in North Korea constitute approximately 85 per cent of all direct foreign investments in North Korea. In practice, China is subsidizing North Korea, whose survival would be severely threatened without China’s efforts to keep the North Korean economy afloat (Lankov 2005). In return, Beijing exercises considerable political influence in Pyongyang, making their relations resemble traditional tributary relations between the Chinese ruler and neighbouring states recognizing the superiority of Chinese civilization. This incident has caused sectors of the South Korean political establishment to warn against the growing economic, political and cultural links between mainland China and South Korea, which are seen to drive wedges between South Korea and its US ally. As is often the case, Chinese attempts at enhancing links with neighbouring states focuses on strengthening bilateral trade. Thus, in 2004, China surpassed the United States as the largest export market for South Korean products for the second year running – a position the United States has otherwise held since 1965. While South Korean exports to the United States grew at 2.7 per cent, those to China grew by 48 per cent in 2003 and 51 per cent in the first quarter of 2004. According to polls in 2004, 63 per cent of ruling party legislators in South Korea identify China as South Korea’s most important economic partner, compared with 28 per cent who identify the United States (Cha 2005: 35). Significant sectors of Seoul’s political establishment tend to see Chinese policies as another attempt at establishing a relationship of hierarchical bandwagoning that may cause the United States to abandon Seoul, leaving South Korea under the Chinese sphere of influence. In particular, the conservative wing of South Korea’s political establishment points to Seoul’s position as a secondary ally compared with Japan, which, if it causes too much trouble for the United States, Washington can afford to abandon, leaving it up to Seoul to protect itself. China is seen to want to create an antiUS condominium. Sino-South Korean collaboration during the 2002 US– North Korean nuclear standoff is seen as a successful initial step towards including South Korea in such a condominium, because the United States has come to the conclusion that it cannot rely on Seoul’s support, even in vital security issues (interview with Professor Kim, Sung-Han, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28–1–2005). This assessment of Sino-US intentions as regards South Korea may be exaggerated, but these concerns among the upper echelons of South Korean decision-makers imply that there are limits as to how far President Roh Moo-hyun can conduct a policy of partial independence from its US ally. The cautious attitude towards fundamental change in South Korea’s external relations with the United States and China
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is reflected in the continuously pivotal role of the US political establishment in the formation of South Korea’s foreign policy (Byungki 2006: 14), and in the growing support among the South Korean population for the US alliance. While only 42.3 per cent of the so-called three-eight-six generation, referring to the younger generation, saw a need for the US alliance in May 2002, this increased to 63.5 per cent in May 2003, after the US troop reorganization plans were announced. Nationwide figures reflected a similar shift, increasing from 56.4 per cent to 76.3 per cent respectively, and to 91 per cent among those of 50 years or older, with calls for the maintenance and strengthening of the US alliance (Cha 2005: 36–37). The remapping incident drives the point home that although enhanced cooperation with China may maximize the national interests of South Korea in the short term, China’s enigmatic long-term intentions may not be conducive to South Korea’s security interests. The Mongolians and the Chinese have complex historical relations, since the Chinese have been subject to Mongolian rule. The Mongol Kublai Chan became the first emperor of the Yuan dynasty in 1279. Mongol control of China lasted until 1367. The Mongols are considered state-of-the-art barbarians, to be chastised when out of control, and to be civilized to accept Chinese superiority when appeased. From the middle of the first century AD, a series of Chinese dynasties controlled Mongolia. At the end of the seventeenth century, the Manchu dynasty ruling China took control over Mongolia. Inner Mongolia came under Chinese sovereignty, while Outer Mongolia became an independent state in 1911, at the insistence of Russia, which wanted a geographical buffer against China. Due to Russian, and later Soviet, support, China did not manage to reassert its rule, and recognized Mongolian independence in 1946, in return for Soviet acceptance that Xinjiang was under Chinese sovereignty. Mongolians are adherents of Tibetan Buddhism, a fact which is handled with great caution by the leadership to avoid arousing the anger of China. Both Russia and China exercise major influence on Mongolia, so China is not the only major power with a say in Ulan Bator. Chinese attempts to establish some kind of hierarchical bandwagoning system based on trade with Ulan Bator must take Russian interests into account, as is the case in Central Asia. Both Russia and China have expressed an interest in mineral and energy resources within Mongolia. The copper mines in southern Mongolia potentially feed the needs of 80 per cent of the Chinese copper market. Mongolia is concerned about Chinese migration, but it has no serious territorial disputes with China (Noerper 2005). Mongolian President Enkhbayar reached an agreement with Beijing in November 2005 on delimiting their common border. In view of Ulan Bator’s geographic location, it is unlikely to escape its position as a Russo-Chinese dependent. On the other hand, if Mongolia avoids provoking its two large neighbours, the modest interest of other countries in the country implies that it will be allowed to pursue democratic political reforms without external interference. Official Chinese
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 157 histories state that Mongolia was unjustly separated from China by traitorous monks and by foreign interference at the end of the Qing Empire. Nevertheless, China manifested its self-restraint when it comes to Mongolia in 1991, when it refrained from taking advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union by reoccupying Mongolia, instead reaffirming its recognition of Mongolian independence and territorial integrity (Yahuda 1996/2004: 287). Beijing’s behaviour on this occasion yet again demonstrates that its seemingly inflexible understanding of sovereignty is adjusted to changing political circumstances. Beijing’s current efforts to build a close strategic partnership with Moscow call for Chinese self-restraint in its relations with Ulan Bator. For this reason, Beijing refrains from exerting much influence on Mongolia.
Chinese policies on legitimacy in South Asia South Asia is also subject to Chinese attempts at implementing its concepts of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning, albeit to a lesser extent than the other sub-regions. China has unresolved territorial disputes with India. These have been the topic of ongoing negotiation since 1993. They concern Sikkim, the northern section of India on China’s south-western border in Kashmir and the north-eastern section of India on China’s southern border in Arunachal Pradesh. The talks have so far been inconclusive (‘Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China’ 2005). The failure to produce an outcome implies that China’s long-term historical interpretation of legitimacy makes it difficult to reach a final settlement. Hence, Beijing maintains that the current borders were a colonial inheritance and therefore unacceptable. China is, however, committed to continuous dialogue, in order to avoid border disputes preventing enhanced Sino-Indian political and economic cooperation. Beijing sees India as a potential competitor to its position in the Asia-Pacific, unlike the United States, which envisages India as a prospective junior partner. China does not necessarily have major incentives to solve the border dispute. On the one hand, it adds to Indian security concerns about China, and prompts New Delhi to allocate considerable resources for the purpose of defence against aggression from China, as well as against Pakistani aggression. This weakens India’s possibilities of exercising influence beyond its sub-region, and hence also its prospects of competing for influence with China. Persistent uncertainty as regards Chinese intentions towards India strengthens Beijing’s ability to maintain the upper hand in its relations with India. On the other hand, an interim settlement of the border dispute would enhance Beijing’s image as a benevolent great power that takes into account key demands and interests of neighbouring states in the Asia-Pacific, such as those of India. An interim settlement, such as that agreed in the South China Sea, would improve China’s possibilities of increasing its influence on the subcontinent, by allowing Beijing to demonstrate that it compromises with India on seemingly vital issues, while quietly continuing to block India’s rise to
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great-power status. India is a much stronger power than China’s neighbours in sub-regions such as Central Asia, and is therefore much less likely to compromise on its territorial demands with a state that is likely to be more of a competitor than a partner for India. For this reason, New Delhi rejected Beijing’s proposal that it renounce territory in the eastern sector, in return for keeping control of the strategically important Aksai Chin on the western sector of the border (Ramachandran 2003). India expects an approximately equal division of disputed areas, not only geographically, but also in terms of the significance of contested areas. Beijing is not keen to accommodate this demand. Thus, the border talks are not moving forward at any great speed. However, the gains to be derived from at least a temporary border settlement are sufficiently great that Beijing is likely to accept such an agreement with India in the not too distant future. China pursues trade relations with India. Bilateral trade between India and China grew at 79 per cent in 2004, the fastest rate in the world, and has reached a volume of US$ 13.6 billion. However, China has no intentions of establishing a relationship resembling hierarchical bandwagoning. SinoIndian relations remain too marked by distrust and competition for that purpose, and India is too powerful for China to contemplate such a relationship. Instead, the two countries are attempting to ameliorate persistent tensions by means of border trade agreements in disputed areas. With the June 2003 Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Co-operation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India, Beijing and New Delhi agreed to establish border trade markets in Sikkim and in Tibet, with the purpose of confidence-building.9 Tibet is another outstanding issue that continues to sour Sino-Indian relations. Prior to the 2003 agreement, India had already officially recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China, and pledged not to allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India (cf. for instance ‘Full text of joint statement of China, India’ 2005). Tibet is high on China’s security agenda, because it has become an internationally politicized issue due to the alleged violations of the human, cultural and religious rights of indigenous Tibetans. China claims that Tibet has formed part of China for at least the past 400 years, and that it does not crack down on human rights, religious freedom or cultural heritage. According to Beijing, these accusations arise from insufficient knowledge of the coincidence between religious activists and separatists. According to China, Beijing only targets separatists, but this may be publicized as crackdowns on religious rights (Shulong 2003: 185–86). In fact, the historical relations between China and Tibet are complex. For example, the fifth Dalai Lama ruling Tibet visited the Chinese emperor in 1652 without kowtowing.10 However, he received a seal, the meaning of which remains a contested issue in relation to Tibetan sovereignty. China, needless to say, insists that the handover of the seal testifies to China’s long-standing sovereignty over Tibet. Beijing’s argument that Tibet is an integral part of China serves to
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 159 keep Lhasa under Beijing’s political authority, so as to retain a geographical buffer between China and India. The fourteenth Dalai Lama is currently heading the exiled Tibetan government that has taken up residence in India since 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled after an unsuccessful uprising against the Chinese rulers. The exiled Tibetan government is not recognized by other states as the legitimate political authority of Tibet. However, India has agreed to host the exiled Tibetan government (Garver 2003: 122–24). By doing so, New Delhi has provided the Dalai Lama with a stable platform from which to agitate for Tibetan independence. India’s new-found accommodating attitude towards China’s Tibet policy is based on the recognition that the major Chinese military presence in Tibet constitutes a threat towards Indian security that is best ameliorated by accepting Chinese jurisdiction over Tibet. The SinoIndian rapprochement on the Tibet issue holds the potential for China to apply its policy of using trade to enhance its control over neighbouring states, by establishing Tibet as a trade hub for the Himalayas. However, the prospects of such a development are bleak, since Tibet’s infrastructure remains far from sufficient to allow it the status of a trade hub. Moreover, the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan are still heavily influenced by India, and, in the case of Nepal, increasingly by the United States (Mathou 2005: 513–18). China has also courted another Indian dependency in the northeastern part of South Asia, democratic Bangladesh, with the purpose of enhancing cooperation. However, Dhaka’s economic foreign policy focus encourages it to attempt cooperation with all states willing to contribute to the country’s economy, as demonstrated by its increasingly accommodating attitude towards Taiwan (Riaz 2005: 117). Hence, Dhaka also looks to India and the United States as attractive partners. Although China is building container port facilities in Bangladesh, and is seeking more extensive naval and commercial access, Dhaka is not one of Beijing’s close partners. Since Sino-Indian cooperation appears to continue to be circumscribed by their focus on one another as prospective competitor states, Beijing is unable to establish a system of hierarchical bandwagoning in the north-eastern part of South Asia. Instead, Pakistan is arguably at the centre of Chinese efforts to implement a system of hierarchical bandwagoning in South Asia. One example is the Karakoram Highway, which links China and Pakistan. It was opened in 1982 with the official purpose of fostering trade, popular interaction and military assistance to Pakistan. The highway has caused problems, due to unsolicited trade in arms and drugs and enhanced links between Islamists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang, encouraging China to repeatedly close the road. However, it remains useful for trade and popular links. Furthermore, Pakistan has adopted a strict counter-terrorist policy vis-à-vis the Uyghurs, despite traditionally close Pakistani–Uyghur trade links, in order to demonstrate that Islamabad is on China’s side as concerns anti-terrorist issues. Thus, Sino-Pakistani relations continue to evolve, despite the expiry of the
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Sino-Pakistani land-based trade agreement in 2000 (Haider 2005: 522–45). As indicated by China’s occasional closure of the highway to Pakistan, and by Pakistani concessions on the Uyghur issue, China largely dictates the substance and form of Sino-Pakistani relations. Seventy per cent of Pakistani exports to China consist of cotton. In addition, leather products, minerals and seafood are exported from Pakistan to China. This makes it a supplier of raw materials to China. In return, China sells more advanced manufactured goods to Pakistan, such as electronics, chemicals, machinery and footwear. Around 60 Chinese companies operate in Pakistan, out of a total of 500 foreign companies, making China a significant investor in Pakistan. China’s trade volume with Pakistan accounts for approximately 20 per cent of China’s total trade with South Asia (‘Pakistan, China to set up free trade area’ 2004). Hence, Pakistan does not dominate China’s South Asian trade. However, the combination of continuously close economic and military–strategic ties, and China’s inclination to make use of asymmetrical Sino-Pakistani relations in order to place demands on Pakistan’s foreign relations and decisions hold the seeds of relations marked by hierarchical bandwagoning. Current US cooperation with Pakistan does not do much to circumscribe Beijing’s ability to use its upper hand in relations with Islamabad in order to promote its national interests. One reason for this is that the United States increasingly prioritizes a strategic partnership with India, whereas Washington’s relations with Pakistan are concentrated on implementing US anti-terror and anti-WMD policies. Therefore, Islamabad cannot afford to ignore Beijing’s demands and interests, as it is Pakistan’s most likely long-term economic and strategic partner, and shares Islamabad’s aim to curb Indian influence in South Asia. In view of Pakistan’s severe economic, strategic and political weakness, Sino-Pakistani relations could well develop along the lines of a modern type of hierarchical bandwagoning system.
Chinese policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific A pattern of politically determined use of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning can be found in Beijing’s policies on legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia. In the short term, China is committed to a narrow interpretation of legitimacy, prioritizing stability rather than territorial claims to restore the motherland and the re-establishment of Chinese dominance of neighbouring states. However, at the same time, China is pursuing its long-term goal of a broad interpretation of legitimacy, by maintaining claims for restoring the motherland in principle and by pursuing hierarchical bandwagoning by means of trade, immigration and asymmetrical political relations, provided that this policy does not conflict with the short-term goal of stability. In Southeast Asia, the idea of a tributary system impacts on Beijing’s policies on legitimacy. Beijing pursues stability and the shelving of sovereignty claims while
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 161 maintaining an enigmatic claim to the South China Sea that leaves room for adjustment according to changing political circumstances. Sino-Southeast Asian policy coordination, and cooperation on maintaining stability in the South China Sea, is seen as an act of generosity on the part of China, rather than as a compromise of territorial claims. This perception of the status of the South China Sea, combined with the depiction of the maritime heartland of Southeast Asia as a Chinese lake, indicates that Beijing’s allowance of Southeast Asian resource exploration and exploitation may be withdrawn at a later date when it proves to be politically convenient. Thus, Sino-Southeast Asian relations in the South China Sea can be conceived of as a modern tributary system in which China retains symbolic control, leaving the bandwagoning states to govern as they please. China’s policy on sovereignty disputes may spell a long-term aim to reassert its superiority through the gradual implementation of a Sino-centric order based on Beijing’s exercise of discretionary powers in Southeast Asia. The seductive quality of China’s model of hierarchical bandwagoning prompts the Southeast Asian states to pursue a balancing of Chinese power with US assistance. Central Asia is traditionally seen as a barbarian homeland which is to be civilized or, in the event that such attempts fail, to be met with repercussions eradicating threats against China’s integrity. The Turkish-speaking part of the population in the Chinese province Xinjiang is subject to a policy that combines Han-Chinese immigration with the use of violence to fight separatist Islamism that is seeking to deny China sovereignty over Xinjiang. Neighbouring Central Asian states comply with Chinese anti-terrorist policies. Asymmetrical trade relations and border settlements have also been established between China and neighbouring Central Asian countries, involving Chinese influence on indigenous production systems and Central Asian territorial concessions. Hence, a rudimentary kind of hierarchical bandwagoning system is emerging between China and the neighbouring states to its northwest. However, Sino-Central Asian relations also resemble those usually established between major powers and smaller states in its own hemisphere in modern times, so one should not make too much of the idea of hierarchical bandwagoning in this sub-region. The characteristics of the Chinese method of establishing superiority, however, by means of trade relations and immigration without assimilating with the local population, justify its labelling as a modern variety of hierarchical bandwagoning. China and Russia have solved territorial disputes along their common border. However, Chinese immigration and integration into the economic structures of Russia’s Far East have given rise to emerging fears that Beijing is slowly, but surely, attempting to establish a similar system across its northern border. The prospects of the waning Russian power becoming a junior partner in a Sino-centric bandwagoning system constitute a barrier to the development of a stable Sino-Russian alliance. In Northeast Asia, the theme of shame impacts heavily on Chinese policies on legitimacy. In the case of Taiwan, China’s concept of historical sovereignty
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is taken to the extreme, with the mainland and Taiwan described as inseparable geographic and human units, and with no room for compromise on the principle of jurisdiction. In practice, however, China adjusts its policy according to what is politically expedient. Japan does not fit into China’s policies on legitimacy, encouraging Beijing to attempt to isolate Japan as a state whose behaviour is destructive to Asia-Pacific peace and stability. For this reason, competing Sino-Japanese territorial claims also tend to become irresolvable, with a continuous potential for violent conflict. On the Korean peninsula, China’s decision to redefine an ancient Korean empire as Chinese gives cause for concern as to the prospects of Beijing’s establishment of a buffer between itself and South Korea in the event of a US military intervention. Moreover, Seoul fears that China’s recent remapping of ancient Korea, and its surging economic integration with China constitutes the beginning of a system of hierarchical bandwagoning in the event that South Korea continues to drift away from its alliance with the United States. This has caused an increase in the popularity of the US alliance. Sino-Mongolian relations hold the potential for the development of hierarchical bandwagoning relations. However, limited Chinese interests in Mongolia, combined with Ulan Bator’s position as a traditional Russian dependency make it unlikely that China will make use of this option in the foreseeable future. In South Asia, Sino-Indian negotiations on the issue of delimitation of their common border continue. The two states are prospective competitors rather than prospective partners, especially due to the rapprochement between the United States and India. Nevertheless, China does have some incentives to agree on an interim settlement, because a border agreement would allow Beijing to strengthen its image as a benevolent great power, making concessions to its Indian neighbour while retaining the upper hand in Sino-Indian relations. In the same way, Chinese relations with the states that are traditionally dependent on India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, show limited potential for the development of a system of hierarchical bandwagoning, since these countries continue to gravitate partly towards New Delhi, and Chinese economic interests in them remain limited. Instead, China looks to Pakistan. However, Sino-Pakistani relations focus on sustaining a strategic partnership rather than on expanding trade relations, although these do follow the typical pattern of hierarchical bandwagoning, with China as a supplier of advanced manufactured products and Islamabad as a supplier of raw materials. Moreover, migration tends to be into rather than out of China, which is a cause for concern on the part of Beijing, because of the alleged links between Islamists in Xinjiang province, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan differs from the majority of Central Asian states in that the political establishment in Islamabad attempts to accommodate the Islamist opposition, leaving Beijing with concerns about the Pakistani government’s contribution to preventing the spread of militant Islamism. Sino-Pakistani relations hold the potential for developing a system of hierarchical bandwagoning. However, due to Chinese reservations against
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 163 further integration and Islamabad’s accommodating attitude towards political Islam, their relations predominantly resemble the traditional relationship of a major power dominating a minor neighbouring power with the purpose of balancing third powers, in this case India and, on the part of China, also the United States. Hence, China’s application of its model of a Sino-centric order is somewhat uneven, and appears to depend on the level at which balancing takes place. For this reason, sub-regional balancing, as can be seen in Chinese relations with India, Taiwan and Japan, seems to discourage hierarchical bandwagoning, and encourage an inflexible application of the historical understanding of sovereignty. In contrast, regional balancing of the United States seems to encourage hierarchical bandwagoning and a flexible application of the historical understanding of sovereignty.
The virtues and problems of liberal democracy and creeping hierarchies: Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific The patterns of interaction for Sino-US policies on legitimacy after the Cold War vary across the four sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific, according to patterns of sub-regional and regional balancing, the correspondence between long-term and short-term goals of legitimacy, and the preferences of middle powers for alternative models of legitimacy (Figure 3). In Southeast Asia, the short-term priority of the United States and China is political stability. Hence, they are both committed to a narrow interpretation of legitimacy, implying that effective control with a territory and its population takes priority over the implementation of their models of democracy and hierarchical bandwagoning. For the United States, this means that the ability of governments to fight terrorism and control the spread of weapons of mass destruction is the principal criterion for assessing the legitimacy of governments. For China, this means adopting a pragmatic attitude with respect to its historically based territorial demands, adjusting them to the current political conditions. Thus, Sino-US short-term policies on legitimacy do not produce any immediate conflict, implying that Sino-US relations in Southeast Asia are characterized by coexistence rather than by balancing behaviour. The ASEAN member states gravitate towards the US model of legitimacy, giving rise to concern about the long-term implications of China’s insistence on its jurisdictional rights in the South China Sea de jure, and its hierarchical understanding of the status of Southeast Asian activities in the area as an act of generosity on the part of Beijing that may be withdrawn at a later date. One of the principal motives for the ASEAN member states to encourage a continued US presence is therefore concern for a future Sino-centric order involving hierarchical bandwagoning. The United States may use a heavy hand in its anti-terrorist policies in Southeast Asia, but this only takes place with the explicit consent of the indigenous powers. Chinese policies, on the other hand, give rise to blurred boundaries
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Figure 3 US democracy indicates areas where the United States attempts to implement its civilizational foreign policy principles of liberal democracy and civil rights or where this political model is already in place. China hierarchical bandwagoning indicates areas where China attempts to implement its civilizational foreign policy principles of historical sovereignty, economic integration, migration and symbolic political superiority.
on the principles of non-interference and effective governmental control, since Beijing combines the interim shelving of sovereignty demands with continued insistence that the South China Sea is, in principle, under the jurisdiction of the Chinese motherland. In Central Asia, Sino-US policies on legitimacy are equally centred on
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 165 domestic stability. Hence, the United States keeps a generally low profile on issues of democracy and the rule of law. On the other hand, US reactions to the Andijon incident in Uzbekistan, and its subdued criticism of Russia’s democratic credentials, indicate that the US goal of spreading liberal democracy is an underlying theme of Washington’s Central Asian presence that may be acted upon when this is seen to be convenient. Chinese policies on legitimacy are more pronounced, but of less immediate concern. Chinese migration to Central Asian and Russian borderlands, and Chinese integration into the economic structures of these countries, may be the precursor of a sub-regional system of hierarchical bandwagoning. Since Russia remains the dominant Central Asian power and the Chinese presence is so far limited, the principal concern of the Central Asian countries has been the possibility that US support for the spread of liberal democracy may lead to the overthrow of existing regimes. The perceived need to balance US power has caused them to draw closer to Russia. Russia entertains the same immediate concerns about US policies on legitimacy, hence encouraging the balancing of Washington by siding with China. However, the Russian Far East is seen as subject to the same subtle patterns that may engender a system of hierarchical bandwagoning to the northeast of China. The prospects of a position as junior partner in relation to China constitute a barrier to a stable Sino-Russian alliance. Although both the United States and China prioritize a narrow interpretation of legitimacy, they both supplement their policies with elements of a broad interpretation of legitimacy, giving rise to blurred boundaries of political authority and unstable balancing patterns, since SinoRussian balancing of the United States is constrained by Russia’s fear of the development of a Sino-centric system of hierarchical bandwagoning. In Northeast Asia, Sino-US policies on legitimacy come into direct conflict over the Taiwan issue, since Washington is unlikely to abandon a democratic Taiwan, and China is equally unlikely to compromise on its demand for sovereignty over Taiwan. Current Sino-US pragmatism on the Taiwan issue may prevent conflict in the short term, but it does not solve the underlying problem of incompatible Sino-US understandings of legitimacy. In the same way, Japan sets off Sino-US policies on legitimacy against one another. The democratic Japanese polity is to some extent a US creation, and the close affinity between Washington and Tokyo encourages the United States to demand that Japan takes on more responsibility for Asia-Pacific security. These plans conflict directly with China’s schemes for Asia-Pacific security, in which there is no room for Japan, because it does not fit into the Chinese version of regional order. Hence, Tokyo is pictured as an inherent liability to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. On the Korean peninsula, Washington’s unruly ally, South Korea, is entertaining second thoughts about the prospects of its inclusion in a Sino-centric system of hierarchical bandwagoning, insofar as enhanced economic and political links with Beijing alienate Seoul from its US ally. South Korean opposition to this development, combined with suspicions that China is using its historical understanding of
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sovereignty to justify creating a North Korean buffer between itself and the US alliance, is preventing the emergence of a strategic partnership between China and South Korea, and limits the possibilities of Sino-South Korean collaboration to momentarily overlapping interests such as that of preventing regime change by means of military intervention on the Korean peninsula. Mongolia is undergoing a democratization process. Its geo-strategic location between Russia and China makes it a potential part of a Sino-centric hierarchical bandwagoning system. However, Chinese efforts to build close relations with Russia encourage Beijing to limit its influence in Mongolia. Nevertheless, Mongolia is an exception to the general pattern in Northeast Asia where a Sino-centric system of hierarchical bandwagoning is actively discouraged by means of balancing behaviour on the part of states subscribing to the US policy of the spread of liberal democracy. China’s response to this balancing behaviour is a combination of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning adjusted to the political circumstances, resulting in a system of concentric circles as regards political influence, with Japan left as a pariah state subject to a priori exclusion from a Sino-centric order, South Korea on the periphery in between the Chinese and the United States’ spheres of influence, Mongolia as a Sino-Russian co-dependent gravitating towards Russia, North Korea as a tributary state, and Taiwan as an indispensable part of Chinese civilization. The majority of democracies in this system do not accept their status in a Sino-centric order. The disparate Sino-US policies on legitimacy give rise to unstable balancing patterns, because the creeping emergence of a Sino-centric system of legitimacy is countered by support from the majority of Northeast Asian states for US policies on legitimacy. These policies leave Japan at the centre of influence, South Korea and Taiwan as junior partners, Mongolia on the periphery, and North Korea as a pariah state that cannot form a legitimate part of a Pax Americana with its current type of regime. In South Asia, by way of contrast, both the United States and China tend to favour a narrow definition of legitimacy, being less concerned to establish partnerships on the basis of political affinity, and more interested in promoting political stability so as to constrain the influence of another alternative to Sino-US ideas of legitimacy, that of political Islam. This external challenge to Sino-US understandings of political authority, which has its stronghold in Afghanistan and Pakistan, weakens their incentives to balance one another. For this reason, with assistance from Pakistan, Washington has focused on eradicating the Islamic political system in Afghanistan, with the purpose of paving the way for democratization and the rule of law. Ironically, New Delhi’s democratic political system has not encouraged a stable US–Indian strategic partnership, since India is opposed to the operational and structural elements of a Pax Americana. India is even more concerned about the emergence of a Sino-centric order, however, encouraging Beijing to focus on enhancing relations with Pakistan, which, in contrast to the Indian rim states, also sees New Delhi as a barrier to exerting its influence on the South Asian
Sino-US policies on legitimacy 167 subcontinent. Moreover, enhanced Sino-Pakistani relations reduce US influence in Islamabad. However, Pakistan is a channel for political Islam that is seen as a barbarian kind of threat against the Chinese civilization, hence discouraging the emergence of a system of hierarchical bandwagoning. Instead, a traditional relationship of asymmetrical influence has been established between Beijing and Islamabad, centred on strategic cooperation, while attempting to prevent migration from Pakistan and Afghanistan into China. Sino-US policies on legitimacy in South Asia are reasonably compatible, because they both focus on preventing the spread of Islamic polities rather than advocating competing models of political authority. Their policies on legitimacy do not, therefore, contribute significantly to instability in South Asia. With regard to legitimacy, the United States conducts a policy based on a narrow interpretation of legitimacy focusing on political stability in the short term. However, the United States remains committed to defending liberal democratic polities that also support the preservation of the US alliance system and US policies on the use of force. Middle powers such as ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India prefer US ideas on political authority to China’s historical understanding of sovereignty and what is perceived as Beijing’s creeping promotion of a system of hierarchical bandwagoning. These reservations against Chinese policies on legitimacy encourage China to focus on employing its understanding of political authority in the weak parts of the sub-regions in which Chinese policies on legitimacy are either irreconcilable with those of the United States, or where the United States concentrates on furthering political stability. Central Asia and Northeast Asia provide the first type of incentive, whereas Southeast Asia provides the second type of incentive. Beijing’s subtle advocacy of a Sino-centric type of political authority in Taiwan, North Korea, Central Asia, the Russian Far East and the South China Sea, however, further alienates China from its Asia-Pacific neighbours. For this reason, China adopts a pragmatic approach to the promotion of the civilizational elements of a Sino-centric order, favouring stability rather than reunification of the motherland and hierarchical bandwagoning systems, at least in the short term. The exception to this pattern is Japan, which is negatively defined as an enemy of Chinese civilization, and as such it is depicted as a threat towards peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The targeting of the great power Japan as the principal problem state of the Asia-Pacific has additional potential appeal. One reason is that a remilitarized Japan with enhanced freedom of action commands the capabilities to replace China as the dominant indigenous power in the Asia-Pacific, and there continues to be widespread resentment against Japanese attempts to exercise great powerhood in large parts of the Asia-Pacific. However, Japan’s position as the principal ally of the United States looks set to continue, and makes China’s case for focusing on Japan as a threat to regional peace and stability less convincing. Northeast Asia is an arena for the most dangerous clashes between US and Chinese policies on
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legitimacy, because in the Chinese view Japan constitutes a pariah state and North Korea a tributary state, and Taiwan forms part of Chinese civilization. In contrast, Washington sees Japan and Taiwan as model democracies and North Korea as a pariah state. South Korea is not well-positioned to mediate on this issue, since it supports the liberal ideals of the United States. The differences between Sino-US understandings of political authority emerging in Northeast Asia reveal that, in the long term, they do not agree on the criteria justifying political authority and interference in the domestic affairs of other states. As such, their policies are not conducive to stable power balancing underpinned by coexistence, but instead lower the perceived level of protection of existing regimes and blur the boundaries of political authority. The principal exception to this pattern is South Asia, where a third understanding of legitimacy, that of political Islam, causes both Washington and Beijing to prioritize a narrow interpretation of legitimacy, focusing on the common goal of effective control over territory and citizens within existing states, rather than the promotion of divergent ideas of political authority.
5
Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific
US policies on institutions are based on the Cold War US alliance system that rests on the principle of military security guarantees in the event of aggression that threatens the survival of alliance members. This structural element in the US national security strategy assists Washington in implementing the other aspects of its ideational power in the Asia-Pacific. The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) is geographically the largest unified command in the US defence structure. It stretches from the west coast of the Americas to the east coast of Africa, and from the Arctic to the Antarctic. USPACOM’s area of responsibility includes the Pacific, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and encompasses 43 countries. The Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (USCINCPAC), commands approximately 300,000 personnel from all US services, about one-fifth of the total US armed forces. Approximately 100,000 of USCINCPAC’s military personnel are forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific region (United States Department of Defense 1998). The US alliance system in this region is more like an alignment system. Washington’s only real allies with whom the United States has pacts of mutual military assistance are South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The Japanese Self-Defence Forces are, however, not allowed to come to the defence of the United States due to constitutional constraints. In addition, the United States has defence responsibilities for the Pacific Islands of Guam, American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, which are US territories, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, which have signed Compacts of Free Association. Singapore has no formal alliance with the United States, but the fact that Singapore hosts a contingency of the US Pacific Command, or the Unified Combatant Command, testifies to its importance in the US alliance system. Taiwan is not a state de jure, but considerable military assistance from the United States and Taipei’s participation in the theatre missile defence programme indicate that it occupies a central position in the US alliance system. Outside of this core, the United States has strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and India. Russia is a strategic partner of the NATO alliance. On the very periphery, the United States has military
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cooperation agreements with Indonesia, Malaysia and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the US alliance system covers all the four sub–regions of the Asia-Pacific: Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia. Washington uses it to assure partners that they form part of the US security umbrella, to deter arms races, aggression and coercion, and to enable the United States and its allies to take military action in this region. The structural element in US ideational power is hence founded in an institutional setting over which it has extensive control, reflecting Washington’s reluctance to rely on multilateral security institutions, which usually function on the basis of the principle of approximate equality between sovereign states. The involvement of global and regional organizations such as the United Nations and ASEAN is ad hoc and conditional, depending on their contributions to US security priorities. If their contribution does not compare with the cost of their involvement, the United States prefers to rely solely on its region-wide alliance system. Washington is concerned about the emergence of pan-Asian regional structures that may tackle security problems without the United States. Washington is anxious that new ‘Asia-only’ institutions might duplicate the work of existing trans-Pacific structures, since US interests would be greatly challenged by the evolution of the region into an exclusionary bloc (interview with US government official, US Department of State 6–10–2004). Examples that fall within this category are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the ASEAN+3, which includes the majority of Southeast Asian states, China, Japan and South Korea. Despite this concern, the United States remains the dominant regional power with the most extensive network of alliances and strategic partnerships, and has therefore opted to establish a Pax Americana outside of recognized multilateral institutions. No single international security framework where other states exercise determining influence is accepted as an authority on just state conduct. Instead, Washington activates the forum that is most likely to accommodate US national interests. Unlike NATO, which covers the Atlantic, the US alliance system is not based on US civilizational goals or on any global definitions of moral state conduct, and hence does not have a moral basis beyond that of commitment to preserve US pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific, as can be seen from the fact that it is not founded on one pact, but on a variety of bilateral agreements that are adjusted to changing regional circumstances. Commonality of interests and values at the bilateral level form the basis for joint action, which implies a flexible, but somewhat unpredictable, basis for implementing US policies in the Asia-Pacific. Chinese policies on institutions are based on the UN system of the Cold War. As is the case with the US alliance system, this structural element in China’s national security strategy assists Beijing in implementing the other aspects of its ideational power in the Asia-Pacific. In contrast to the United States, Beijing attaches importance to having a moral basis for the imple-
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mentation of its version of regional order. This is partly because Beijing, as the weaker power in relation to the United States, cannot use military, economic and political benefits as means of persuasion to the same extent that Washington can. Moreover, the civilizational element of Beijing’s ideational power holds far fewer attractions for the Asia-Pacific states than that of the United States, implying that its ability to implement its version of regional order is strengthened by referring to an external source of political authority that is recognized by the majority of powers as legitimate. The UN has this quality because it is a relic from the Cold War that continues to be recognized as the principal forum for the management of security issues of global importance by the majority of states. Since the UN was founded in the wake of the Cold War, it reflects the common principles of state conduct upon which the Western and the Eastern bloc were able to agree, namely those of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council as a platform for the management of international peace and security by the major powers. The UN system is well-suited to the Chinese hierarchical bandwagoning model, which does not devise specific domestic political structures. It is also a useful means for countering US advocacy of military intervention and active measures to spread liberal democracy, due to the requirement of consent from the target state to undertake such measures. Furthermore, China occupies permanent membership of the UN Security Council, in effect meaning that it can veto US attempts to use this forum to consolidate a Pax Americana. Hence, the UN system is predominantly useful as a defensive structure that can be used to ward off US attempts at consolidating its version of regional order in the Asia-Pacific, and to persuade regional states that China has no intention of interfering in the political authority of other states. Beijing therefore makes sure that the permanent and ad hoc security institutions to which it subscribes explicitly acknowledge the fundamental principles of the UN system. China’s efforts to embed its Asia-Pacific policy in globally accepted principles of state conduct provide it with a platform for developing and implementing its own version of regional order. This chapter discusses Sino-US policies on institutions in the four sub-regions Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia, with a view to assessing the implications of these policies for a stable balance of power underpinned by coexistence.
US policies on institutions in Southeast Asia In Southeast Asia, the United States shuns treaty-based arrangements, preferring instead bilateral agreements. The 2002 US–ASEAN joint declaration promising greater cooperation in intelligence exchange and other joint action to deal with international terrorism was an indication of intent rather than a recipe for action (interview with a senior government official, the ASEAN Secretariat 7–12–2004). The divide-and-rule policy adopted by Washington towards the ASEAN member states is partly caused by
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Washington’s preference for structuring its policy around its principal allies. The US allies in Southeast Asia are Thailand and the Philippines, and Singapore is a de facto ally, and in reality Washington’s main cooperation partner in Southeast Asia, as can be seen from Singapore’s hosting of a contingency from the US Pacific Command. Australia is considered the most loyal US ally, and New Zealand is of growing importance for Washington. Australia and New Zealand have major economic and security interests in Southeast Asia, but they do not form part of ASEAN and are not accepted as proper Asian states by the ASEAN member states. Washington’s Southeast Asia policy encompasses cooperation with ASEAN. Thus, the United States notes that enhanced relations with ASEAN are of vital importance to Washington, because ASEAN serves as a force by which to promote stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN provides a forum joining together diverse countries with deep-seated disagreements, with the common aim of achieving peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region. The United States is critical of ASEAN’s policy towards states intent on preventing processes of democratization, calling for more assertiveness internally among the member states, instead of prioritizing consensus and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The example of Myanmar is emphasized, noting that ASEAN has not done all it could, or should, to promote democracy, although ASEAN’s decision to ask Myanmar to relinquish its turn to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006–7 was seen as a step in the right direction (John 2005). Official US policies on ASEAN reveal that the United States recognizes that ASEAN provides Southeast Asia with stability. As such, it supports Washington’s Asia-Pacific interests by creating a sub-regional environment conducive to US intentions of strengthening strategic bilateral ties with Southeast Asian states, while avoiding involvement in sub-regional disputes that do not have a direct bearing on US interests. On the other hand, Washington is not interested in placing ASEAN at the centre of its Southeast Asia policy, because the association remains committed to the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference, promoting an inclusive approach towards regimes that are aligned with China, such as Myanmar. US overtures for strategic cooperation with communist Vietnam and Washington’s condemnation of the domestic policies of the Pyinmana regime imply that Washington’s principal concern is not to promote democracy in Southeast Asia, but to consolidate its alliance system to prevent China from crowding out US sub-regional influence. Myanmar’s alignment with China encourages the United States to demand a more forceful hand in relations with Pyinmana, in order to reduce its value as a strategic partner. Pressure from ASEAN to undertake a democratization process would do just that, because such a development is likely to either sever the ties to communist China or to force Myanmar out of ASEAN, hence removing its principal source of protection from Western pressures for regime change and giving it a status of illegitimate pariah state.
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ASEAN is not willing to accede to such demands, and is therefore of limited use to the United States; Washington cannot use ASEAN as an active force in its efforts to consolidate its alliance system. The member states of the association would never agree to support this aim, due to vast intra-ASEAN differences on the virtues of the US alliance system. Cooperation on common security problems is a rare phenomenon, since the member states usually disagree on both the nature of, and the methods for dealing with, security threats. Such differences prevent ASEAN from taking positive action, as can be seen from the diverse policies towards the United States of member states such as Singapore and Myanmar. ASEAN’s reservations in relation to US policies also stem from the fact that the association adheres to a policy of inclusion, based on the belief that inclusion promotes socialization into ASEAN’s form of institutionalism, which involves a conciliatory, non-confrontational, process-oriented approach to interstate conflicts and dialogue-based, consensus-seeking methods of conflict resolution. This inclusive, dialogue-oriented approach is not conducive to US policies of exclusion and conflict resolution by means of imposition. For example, US sanction policies towards and its demands for democratization in Myanmar contrast with ASEAN’s policy of inclusion and domestic political transformation by means of dialogue, policy coordination and cooperation. Due to these differing approaches, US–ASEAN cooperation is likely to remain limited, despite the fact that the United States cannot afford to elude involvement with the association, in view of China’s steadily growing involvement with ASEAN. US–ASEAN ties have formally been strengthened by Washington’s endorsement of ASEAN’s proposal in 2005 for an enhanced partnership that places US–ASEAN relations on a level with those the association has established with China, Japan, South Korea and India. ASEAN is not interested in US abandonment of the association. Southeast Asia prioritizes maintaining US involvement with the association at the same level as that of China, in order to prevent the emergence of a Sino-centric order. However, ASEAN is not willing to change the basic principles of the association to accommodate US interests, since such steps would imperil ASEAN’s policy of establishing cooperation with external powers on the basis of Southeast Asian principles of state conduct. The limitations on the possibilities for expanding US–ASEAN ties mean that US–Southeast Asian relations are primarily rooted in bilateral cooperation agreements to the satisfaction of both sides. Reliance on bilateral ties is compatible with Washington’s tendency to look at the sub-region in terms of relations with individual countries, and with Southeast Asia’s preference for allowing for a diversity of security policies towards the United States (interview with Permanent Secretary Peter Ho Hak Ean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17–8–2005). The intra–ASEAN diversity of opinion on security relations with Washington comes to the fore on issues such as maritime security. For example, the United States put forward the so-called Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in March 2004, in order to enlist support
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for implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the Malacca Straits Initiative, which was intended to fight illicit activities at sea that threaten the freedom of the high seas, such as piracy. The proposal included the deployment of US troops to conduct interdiction at sea. Singapore supported the US proposal, whereas Malaysia and Indonesia rejected it on the grounds that it might encourage US infringement on their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. To ward off US pressures for approval, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta instead formulated a coordinated patrol initiative that went into effect in 2004 with the participation of Singapore. In 2005, the initiative was extended to include air patrols (Keyuan 2005: 127). This incident testifies to the determination of the Southeast Asian countries to maintain a diversity of defence and security policies towards the United States, at the same time as the countries strive to maintain Southeast Asian control of sub-regional defence and security matters. This policy is designed to keep Washington militarily involved, without compromising ASEAN’s resolve to uphold the principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference as the bases for subregional cooperation. Singapore is at the centre of Washington’s network of agreements, due to its arduous support for a continuous US military presence in Southeast Asia, which it sees as a prerequisite for continued regional stability. In the eyes of Singapore, ASEAN’s interests are best served by having a balance of power that includes the United States (interview with Permanent Secretary Peter Ho Hak Ean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17–8–2005). In 2005, Singapore and Washington signed a bilateral strategic framework agreement that addresses terrorism and anti-WMD measures such as Singapore’s involvement in the Proliferation Security Initiative. Singapore contributed with military forces to the 2003 US intervention in Iraq, and a US–Singaporean free-trade agreement took effect from January 2004, reflecting Singapore’s commitment to sustain balanced relations with the United States and China, and to take an active part in Washington’s war on terror. The Philippines and Thailand, which are US allies, also form a central part of US efforts to consolidate the alliance system. Both allies have sent troops to participate in US efforts at restoring stability in Iraq, and both countries have subsequently been designated major non-NATO allies on a par with South Korea. The United States is sponsoring a Philippine defence reform programme designed to enhance the capabilities of the country’s armed forces, and Thailand hosts the largest multinational military exercise with US participation in Asia, Cobra Gold. On the periphery of US–Southeast Asian relations is Brunei, which contributed to the international monitoring team following the US crack-down on terrorism in Mindanao in the southern part of the Philippines. Brunei also participates in joint military exercises. Vietnam has concluded an International Military Education and Training agreement with the United States, reflecting Hanoi’s inclination to establish defence ties with the United States. Finally, Indonesia and Malaysia have
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cooperated closely with the United States in the war on terror, and also allow the US Pacific Command access to their harbours. The US involvement with ASEAN does not merely pertain to the US presence in Southeast Asia, but to its institutional preferences in the AsiaPacific as a whole, because ASEAN provides region-wide arenas for security dialogue. Of these, the most significant one is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).1 The United States, however, prefers the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) formed in 1989,2 which came into being at the initiative of Japan (Wan 2003: 284–85). Washington’s preference for APEC is partly determined by its reliance on the US alliance system for the management of Asia-Pacific security issues, while promoting the use of multilateral institutions for the spread of economic liberalization. Economic globalization is not a fundamentally contested issue in the Asia-Pacific. The United States can safely be promoted through multilateral institutions without risking a competing economic philosophy being brought to the table that might challenge the very idea that economic liberalization is a good thing. This is not the case with the other core elements of the US version of regional order concerning non-economic security issues. On the other hand, Washington recognizes that the exclusion of security issues from multilateral Asia-Pacific fora is not acceptable to indigenous powers. As a consequence, the United States has attempted to include them on the APEC agenda, pursuing security initiatives such as counter-terrorist and non-proliferation policies. Washington’s preference for expanding APEC’s agenda rather than accepting dialogue on security issues in genuine regional security institutions is further encouraged by APEC’s membership, which includes major countries from the US sphere of interest in Latin America and all its major allies and strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific, including Taiwan. As a result of its purpose and its membership basis, APEC is not a forum conducive to the promotion of a Sino-centric order. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which held its inaugural meeting in 1994, was moulded on ASEAN’s institutionalism, which, in the view of the association’s members, has prevented intramural war. The ARF is still far short of reaching its initial declared objective of developing a stable and predictable pattern of relations in the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, the assessment that the ARF is unlikely to see the full realization of its three-step agenda of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution as outlined in the ARF Concept Paper in the foreseeable future still holds true. Initially, the United States rejected Asia-Pacific multilateralism as a solution in search of a problem, because Washington was concerned that multilateral security institutions would erode the rationale for its bilateral system of alliances and strategic partnerships in the region. China was equally reluctant to participate in the ARF, being aware that the very raison d’être of the institution was to rein-in China. However, as China began to recognize that the institution was a useful means of influencing regional thinking about its position and role in the regional security architecture, the United States
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began to use the ARF as a mechanism for discussing contentious Sino-US issues such as the South China Sea disputes (Acharya 2003: 229–31). Despite some progress in Sino-US perceptions of the usefulness of the ARF, the institution is unlikely to become the principal forum for the management of Asia-Pacific security issues, insofar as the United States does not approve of this development. The decision by the US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, not to show up for the 2005 ARF meeting in Laos, allegedly as a protest against the domestic politics of Myanmar, and the subsequent decision by China to follow suit and not send its foreign minister, indicates that Washington remains fairly indifferent to the ARF’s usefulness for engendering regional stability. The United States is sufficiently strong to use the ARF as an instrument for promoting its own security agenda, which involves maintaining the US alliance system as the principal regional security structure, rather than as a forum for multilateral decision-making on common security issues. The absence of the United States from the 2005 ARF meeting had an important demonstrative effect that upset a lot of Southeast Asian countries, because it signalled that Washington was unwilling to take the ARF beyond the initial stage of confidence-building, shattering ASEAN’s hopes of exporting its model of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (interview with Lee Lai To, National University of Singapore 16–8–2005). The East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN+33 give cause for concern on the grounds that Washington is excluded from participation, so they constitute a possible platform for the establishment of a Sino-centric order. The idea of an East Asian grouping that excluded Washington was first conceived by Malaysia in the early 1990s, as a way of countering US influence in the area. The ASEAN+3 primarily deals with financial issues, having been established in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which swiftly spread from Thailand to Indonesia and South Korea, prompting Southeast and Northeast Asia to try to deal with the negative consequences of economic interdependence (Terada 2003: 266). The East Asia Summit has both trade and security issues on the agenda. The inaugural summit of the EAS in December 2005 was inconclusive, merely reiterating prior commitments and agreements, and resolving to continue the dialogue process (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2005). The United States is not terribly worried about these institutions, even if it is excluded from participation, principally because continuously hostile relations between China and Japan constitute a major barrier to the development of a security collaboration that challenges US pre-eminence. Moreover, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand ensures that the EAS is unlikely to challenge the primacy of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific security architecture. Thus, the United States is quite comfortable with the institutional structure that has developed from ASEAN. Even if ASEAN contains member states that are aligned with China, dominant member states such as Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand will not allow Southeast Asia to part company with the US security umbrella. For example, Singapore insisted that the EAS
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be based on inclusive rather than exclusive regionalism, implying the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand, on the grounds that China might otherwise come to dominate the grouping (interview with Permanent Secretary Peter Ho Hak Ean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 17–8–2005). Since one of ASEAN’s achievements is its ability to maintain unity when confronted with external powers, the EAS could only be realized insofar as such countries were accepted into the grouping. Hence, the majority of ASEAN member states and the United States agree to expand formal security ties, but to base a continued US presence in Southeast Asia, and in the Asia-Pacific as a whole, on the US alliance system.
US policies on institutions in Central Asia In Central Asia, the United States defies indigenous multilateral institutions for the reason that it does not form part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which encompasses China, Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. At the same time, Central Asia is the sub-region where the US alliance system is at its weakest. Washington has no allies in the area, and its two strategic partners, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, are more closely aligned with Russia and China. Washington’s sub-regional agenda intersects with conflicting indigenous security interests and the policies of other powers, leaving the United States with a strategic vacuum in Central Asia that Washington will find it difficult to make up for (interview with Shayken Galimbekovich Nadirov, Russian Academy of Sciences 5–3–2005). The comparatively weak position of the US alliance system in Central Asia was demonstrated with the 2003 US intervention in Iraq. Despite their urgent need for economic assistance from any state willing to provide it, the Central Asian governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan did not support the US-led 2003 intervention in Iraq, and Kazakhstan’s decision to send troops to Iraq came belatedly. Washington’s dissatisfaction with the Central Asian governments’ attitude towards anti-terrorist operations outside of their own territory has not, however, caused it to abandon the subregion. The impending reorganization of the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific will scale down the concentration of troops in Northeast Asia, and allow for the spread of troops over a wider area to close existing gaps in the United States network of military cooperation agreements (interview with senior US official, US Department of State 15–10–2004). Since these gaps have predominantly emerged in Southeast and Central Asia, the US military presence in these sub-regions is likely to remain permanent, as announced in 2004 with regard to Central Asia. However, in doing so, Washington has to take into account Moscow’s strategic interests and demands, since Russia was already the dominant military power when the United States deployed troops in the sub-region as part of the 2001 war on terror. For example, former Kyrgyz President Akaev’s rejection of
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Washington’s request to deploy reconnaissance aircraft at the US Ganci air base following a trip to Moscow in February 2005 indicates that Russia wields influence on the extent of US–Central Asian cooperation (Saidazimova 2005a). The best option for the United States is to settle for forming part of a NATO presence, which is currently the case, with the US military presence constituting approximately 950 NATO troops stationed in Kyrgyzstan, assisting the US troops in neighbouring Afghanistan (IISS 2005d: 242). The principal US challenge is that by 2006 Moscow is closely aligned with China, threatening to crowd out the US presence in Central Asia due to concerns about Washington’s commitment to spread democracy in the subregion. The United States therefore needs to take advantage of Russian fears of the gradual emergence of a Sino-centric order, in order to win Moscow over to its side. To this end, the transatlantic alliance is useful, because it involves European countries on which Moscow is more inclined to rely for the protection of its interests than is the case with Washington. Nevertheless, Russia remains suspicious of both the US and European military presence in Central Asia, and has also been highly critical of US and UK military action in Iraq, siding with France in the UN Security Council against the 2003 Iraq intervention. Russia shares the concerns of some continental European countries such as France and Germany that the United States is defying international agreements on the limitations of state conduct, by deciding to intervene without the approval of the UN Security Council. However, although some European countries disapprove of current US methods for pursuing their goals, they share Washington’s long-term aims of spreading liberal democracy. Indeed, the NATO alliance is founded on the civilizational principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (NATO Basic Texts 1949). As of late, Washington’s pursuit of democracy in the Middle East has been seen to destabilize Central Asia, and US–European efforts to become involved in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the three South Caucasus states are seen as initiatives to transform Russia’s near abroad into the near abroad of NATO (IISS 2004b: 117–18). Russia sees the expansion of NATO as an indicator that the transatlantic alliance has retained its original goal of containing Russia. Moreover, the rules for the acceptance of new members, combined with NATO’s expanding influence in Russia’s near abroad, is seen as de facto European support for the US goal of the spread of democracy, since respect for the rule of law and human rights, as well as democratic control with the armed forces, are membership requirements. Moscow’s understanding of NATO is that it is a traditional military alliance, and as such its expansion interferes in Russia’s sphere of interest, thereby changing the balance of power between Russia and the West in favour of the latter (Atlantsammenslutningen 2004: 120–23). Thus, Russia parts company with European de facto support for the US goals of spreading liberal democracy in its vicinity. A NATO presence in
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Central Asia is not particularly welcome at present, where the civilizational goals of the United States are seen as an immediate threat towards Russian interests in manifesting its dominance in those parts of the former Soviet Union that do not yet form part of NATO. The long-term concerns about China’s intentions in Central Asia combined with China’s growing economic and military capabilities, however, encourage Russia to accept a continued NATO presence in the sub-region, in order to balance the emerging strategic influence of China. Formal NATO–Russian relations were first established in 1991 as a practice of consultation to foster a cooperative relationship between Central and Eastern European countries and NATO member states. In 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace programme that is to establish practical security and defence cooperation between NATO and individual member states. The NATO–Russia Council (NRC), which was established in 2002, is the most important venue for advancing relations between Russia and NATO. It is a mechanism for consultation, consensusbuilding, cooperation, joint decision and joint action in which the individual NATO member states and Russia work on security issues of common interest. In 2005, Russia signed an agreement with NATO that allows for joint military exercises, and eventually a joint military capability. Russian Defence Minister Ivanov has argued that Moscow attaches importance to holding joint exercises, harmonizing communication devices and sharing data in the face of the common threat of terrorism. Russia and NATO will carry out a joint airlift training exercise later this year, and are expected to conduct full-scale exercises in 2007 and 2008 (Russian News and Information Agency Novosti 2006). Russia and NATO have a common interest in fighting terrorism, which is the current focus. However, even if combating terror is stated as the principal purpose of current joint NATO–Russian activities, the initiation of joint defence activities also signals that Russia is interested in strengthening the strategic links to NATO in order to balance China’s growing influence in its near abroad. Russia would, of course, prefer to preserve control with NATO policies through the NRC, rather than watching NATO gradually expanding its influence in Central Asia and the other former Soviet republics in the Russian hemisphere. Russia is not, however, able to prevent this development. Part of the argument between the United States and Russia on the issue of democracy is therefore caused by President Putin’s need to persuade a domestic Russian audience that submission to US foreign policy demands is not on the cards (interview with Professor Vasily V. Mikheev, Russian Academy of Sciences 9–3–2005). In practice, Moscow is trying to maintain a dominant influence in Central Asia by keeping cooperation with both the United States/NATO and China on an even keel, thus positioning itself as the power that holds the balance between Chinese and US/NATO influence. Sino-Russian foreign policy coordination can therefore be expected to be stepped up at the same time as US/NATO– Russian relations are enhanced, with the purpose of maximizing Russia’s national interests.
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US policies on institutions in Northeast Asia Northeast Asia is the hub of the US alliance system, since Japan and South Korea are allies proper, and Taiwan is a de facto ally. At the same time, it is the sub-region with the lowest level of regional institutionalization. The difficulties involved in bringing together the states of the sub-region around a process of security dialogue stems from the consistently adversarial relations between China and Japan, China and Taiwan, North Korea and Japan, South Korea and Japan, and North and South Korea. At the same time, the United States is not keen to promote the institutionalization of security issues in Northeast Asia, where its alliance system is at its strongest. Ironically, Washington is best positioned to promote its version of AsiaPacific order in Northeast Asia. Japan, the main US ally in the Asia-Pacific, however, has gone to great lengths to promote institutionalization. Japan did not envisage a pure Northeast Asian security dialogue, but instead pleaded that the process be nested in a region-wide security dialogue. Hence, Tokyo was a major driving force behind the establishment of the ARF, building on Australia’s and Canada’s proposals in 1990 for an Asia-Pacific conference on security and cooperation moulded on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At the ASEAN–Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN–PMC) in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991, then Japanese foreign minister, Taro Nakayama, aired the idea that the ASEAN–PMC should be used to create a sense of mutual reassurance in the Asia-Pacific. Then US Secretary of State, James Baker, was not prepared to think beyond a ‘hubs and spokes’ model of regional security, seeing security multilateralism as a mechanism with the potential to undermine Washington’s alliance system. Japan’s initiative, however, indicated its reluctance at the time to assume a conventional regional security role. A multilateral security dialogue that did not jeopardize Japan’s special security relationship with the United States fitted well into its long-standing approach to the region, which precluded a forward military role. In 1989, APEC was created on the initiative of Australia, and the ASEAN and its PMC dialogue partners were intent on creating a regional security structure analogous to APEC that was expected to promote stable relations between the United States, China and Japan. In 1993, the decision was taken to establish the ARF on the grounds that the ASEAN model of incrementally shoring up stability was suitable for a regional environment with tensions not manifested in tangible imminent threats. Moreover, placing ASEAN in a leading role as the chair of the ARF was a convenient solution in a region where none of the major powers, the United States, China and Japan, was seen as being sufficiently responsible to take up this position (Leifer 1996: 23–26). The ARF, however, turned out to be of marginal importance for the Northeast Asian security environment, never reaching beyond the stage of confidence-building. One reason for the failure of the ARF to go beyond the level of a talking-shop is that, unlike Southeast Asia, no outside threat from major external powers has encouraged
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the states to forge unity to prevent intra-mural security threats from developing in their sub-region due to rivalries between the major powers. The Northeast Asian member states turned out to be at the very centre of post-Cold War rivalries, with fundamental differences on the use of force, legitimacy and security institutions that the ASEAN member states or their methods of multilateralism were in no position to resolve. Insofar as the United States, China and Japan prove unwilling to make a genuine effort to utilize the forum for purposes of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, the ARF is unable to ameliorate conflicts in the field of security. Japan’s departure from its reluctance to assume a conventional regional security role implies that Tokyo recognizes that the ARF model is, in practice, a defunct model for Asia-Pacific security, and is placing its bets on consolidation of the US alliance system as the structural basis for Asia-Pacific order. The disinclination of Northeast Asian powers to use permanent multilateral institutions for purposes of conflict resolution implies that when a conflict involving them erupts, there are no mechanisms to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict. Low-intensity conflicts over maritime jurisdiction between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkakus Islands in the East China Sea, between South Korea and North Korea, between Russia and Japan over the Kuriles/Northern Territories in the Pacific Ocean, and between South Korea and Japan over the Tok-Do/Takeshima islets in the Sea of Japan give cause for concern, because there are no conflict resolution mechanisms to prevent the states from pursuing their national interests, even at the risk of threatening peace and stability. Furthermore, the United States has indicated no interest in becoming involved in these disputes, which are seen as purely bilateral conflicts with no direct bearing on US national interests. The risk of an outbreak of violent conflict is highest between China and Japan, due to their persistently adversarial relations. In the Taiwan Strait, the problem also came to the fore in the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when China displayed a dramatic show of force consisting of military exercises and missile tests targeted close to Taiwan. The United States responded with an equally dramatic deployment of two carrier battle groups, an incident that caused concern about the possibility of the outbreak of war between the two major Asia-Pacific powers (Ross 2000: 87). The 2001 EP-3 incident demonstrated that minor accidents easily engender instability, because Washington and Beijing have no script for how to respond to a challenge from the other party, or how to restore stability. The EP-3 incident involved a collision between a Chinese fighter aircraft and a US reconnaissance aircraft in the airspace over the South China Sea, which led to the US aircraft having to force a landing on the Chinese island of Hainan, to the southwest of Hong Kong. Beijing refused to release the 24 US crew members for one and a half weeks, until Washington decided to apologize. The US apology came after a representative from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced that the collision did not occur over Chinese territory, but over its exclusive economic zone. The statement indicates that
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China lays claim to the fish and energy resources of the area, but does not intend to infringe on the freedom of overflight, which the United States officially considers to be a core national interest. Thus, China intimated that Beijing has no plans to prevent US armed forces from passing through the South China Sea. The EP-3 incident involved Washington and Beijing sounding each other out with the purpose of gradually reaching a compromise that preserved the status quo. The incident was resolved by China’s de facto recognition of Washington’s overflight rights, in return for an official apology from Washington, in effect confirming the great-power status of China. The crisis was successfully resolved, but the course of event demonstrates that power balancing without common rules of state conduct involves the risk of violent conflict, and complicates processes of conflict resolution. The United States has no incentives to promote the institutionalization of security issues in Northeast Asia, despite the risk of violent conflict. As the strongest Asia-Pacific power, it is much easier for the United States to consolidate its alliance system as the structural basis of the region’s security architecture without entering into dialogue with neighbouring states on the merits of its security agenda. The occasional outbreak of crises, especially with China, is a risk worth running, since China is not sufficiently strong to force Washington to succumb to its demands, should the United States estimate that it is not worth doing so. Only in the rare event that US allies insist on a multilateral response to a crisis situation where Washington is in a minority, might the United States be pushed towards acceptance of an institutional response. In conflicts where the United States accepts the use of multilateral security institutions, the United States tends to use multilateralization to exclude states that refuse to comply with Washington’s version of AsiaPacific order, before verifying the existence of interstate agreement that a breach of universal rules of state conduct has taken place. This exclusive approach came to the fore on the Korean peninsula during the 2002 US– North Korean nuclear standoff in the wake of North Korea’s refusal to adhere to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States called on a number of international institutions to exclude North Korea as a pariah state on the grounds of noncompliance with Washington’s policy on WMD, before establishing that a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had taken place. The IAEA referred the problem to the UN Security Council in February 2003, as requested by the United States. In April 2003, the UN Security Council put the nuclear crisis on its agenda for the first time, after weeks of intense US lobbying, although to little avail, since the other parties involved in the conflict did not approve of the UN’s involvement. The Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) decided to halt fuel donations to North Korea on November 2002, and, complying with pressure from the United States, KEDO suspended the construction of two light-water reactors as of December 2003.4 US efforts to obtain multilateral approval of sanctions
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before all diplomatic means were exhausted have contributed to North Korea’s exclusion from the conflict settlement process. For example, North Korea was not invited to a meeting on the nuclear standoff on the margins of the UN General Assembly’s meeting in October 2003. The six-party talks established in August 2003 to satisfy US demands for a multilateral approach to North Korea seem to be used by Washington to demonstrate North Korea’s imperviousness to the carrot-and-stick approach. The United States reasons that, having fore-stalled the imposition of sanctions by promising to dismantle its nuclear programme, North Korea has a history of maintaining a nuclear capability. Washington consequently demands that Pyongyang halt its nuclear activities immediately, knowing full well that North Korean compliance would most likely result in the fall of Kim Jong-Il’s government, and is therefore out of the question. Washington argues that North Korea will continue to pose a threat to international stability if not coerced into abolishing its nuclear weapons programme. To implement its coercion strategy, the United States enlists the institutions amenable to its demands, instead of redefining Washington’s policy according to standards that have been approved by the other powers of the Asia-Pacific. South Korea has been instrumental in persuading the United States to test the usefulness of dialogue in the form of ad hoc six-party talks involving Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Tokyo, Seoul and Pyongyang, as a means of conflict resolution during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff. South Korea places a high premium on multilateral talks, with a view to reaching a settlement. Domestic pressures to avoid subservience to the United States encourage this policy. One of the reasons why the current President, Roh, was elected in December 2002, was his promise to secure an active role for South Korea in building a security framework on the peninsula that involves a partial departure from its position as a loyal subscriber to US policy. The South Korean government has prioritized the resumption of dialogue higher than direct involvement, as witnessed by its support for US– North Korean talks in Beijing in April 2003, despite domestic criticism. However, South Korea also has an obvious interest in direct participation, in order to influence the outcome of negotiations. In the first instance, South Korea’s principal partner in promoting multilateral dialogue was Japan, which was also concerned that it would be sidelined in negotiations, therefore agreeing to advocate ad hoc multilateral talks. Together with the United States, Japan and South Korea also started discussions on the contents of a prospective agreement settling the nuclear standoff. The talks resulted in a joint proposal for its resolution, including the establishment of an international inspection system that allows verification that Pyongyang is dismantling its nuclear weapons programme. Following multilateral talks in August 2003, North Korea demanded a non-aggression treaty and additional economic assistance in return for resuming dialogue. The United States has ruled out the treaty option, since it would involve extending a binding commitment to the status quo if North Korea was to accept the discontinuation
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of its missile test programme and allow IAEA inspections. As a compromise, South Korea suggested that the United States offer non-binding security guarantees, a proposal that was immediately supported by China and Russia, which offered to issue additional guarantees. In October 2003, the United States agreed to make such an offer to North Korea, provided that it first dismantles its nuclear weapons facilities and allows the resumption of inspections. South Korea’s policy during the nuclear standoff may be said to aim for peaceful coexistence, since it involves insistence on the non-use of force, adherence to the principle of effective control by recognizing the legitimacy of the current Pyongyang regime, and multilateral dialogue outside the UN framework for decision-making on how to ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. South Korea gravitates towards China’s demands for constraints on the use of force, regime recognition and the institutional setting appropriate for solving the immediate conflict. South Korean views on permanent mechanisms promoting peaceful coexistence in the long run are, however, principally compatible with US requirements. The results of South Korea’s efforts to try to forge a compromise solution to the US–North Korean nuclear standoff have so far been few. Sanctions have been enhanced, and it remains to be seen whether multilateral dialogue will be sustained, let alone result in an interim arrangement resolving the nuclear standoff. By 2006, the United States maintained that Pyongyang must completely dismantle its nuclear programme before security guarantees and economic aid will be granted. North Korea, on the other hand, insisted that security guarantees be issued before dismantlement can take place. In July 2006, North Korea conducted another round of missile tests directed towards Japan. Despite Chinese and Russian condemnation of a Japan-sponsored UN resolution to slap sanctions on North Korea, the UN Security Council issued a unanimous resolution condemning North Korea’s missile launches and requiring all member states to prevent transferral of and procurement from North Korea of missile and WMD-related material, thereby imposing sanctions without allowing for the initiation of military action against North Korea (United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1695’ 2006). China and Russia reluctantly agreed to issue a toned down resolution after Beijing had failed to obtain Pyongyang’s acceptance of resuming the six-party talks. By August 2006, only Japan and the United States had proceeded to specify sanctions to be adopted, whereas South Korea recommended refraining from such activities, instead urging Washington to focus on how to revive the stalled six-party talks. The resolution thus appeared to further split the countries involved in the conflict settlement process, as announced by China. The question of a permanent settlement seems to be off the table, since the US and Chinese positions differ sufficiently for a compromise not to be in sight. On the positive side, after five rounds and seven sessions in more than two years, violent conflict has so far been avoided. Moreover, US recognition of the legitimacy of the North Korean regime and US commitment to dialogue
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no longer appear to be in question. China has accepted a multilateral approach to conflict settlement, and has persuaded Pyongyang to comply. The six-party talks demonstrate that South Korea may be able to push the United States to continue participating in multilateral negotiations, but if the major powers are not willing to compromise, South Korea cannot do much in the way of ensuring conflict settlement. Middle powers such as South Korea are not promoting permanent patterns of security management in the AsiaPacific, since that is beyond their capacity; instead, they are concentrating on preventing violent conflict in their immediate vicinity, allowing them to contribute to peace and stability in the interim. Washington’s allies in Northeast Asia are not, however, seeking to challenge the pre-eminence of the US alliance system, as indicated by their acceptance of the use of sanctions whilst carrying on with the six-party talks.
US policies on institutions in South Asia In South Asia, Pakistan is the main ally of the United States, and was designated a major non-NATO ally on a par with South Korea in 2004. In addition, Washington formed strategic partnerships with India in 2004 and with Afghanistan in 2005. The level of institutionalization in this sub-region is low, allowing the United States to establish bilateral cooperation agreements without the constraints engendered by treaty-based regional security arrangements. South Asia does have an institution for security cooperation, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985 and consisting of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Since its establishment, however, SAARC has suffered from inherent weaknesses. It was founded at the initiative of former Bangladeshi President, Ziaur Rahman, who, together with smaller countries such as the Maldives, sought consensus from India and Pakistan (Yahya 2004: 351). Thus, SAARC was never masterminded by one of the major subcontinental powers, which accepted its establishment but were never keen for the institution to play a leading role in the South Asian security architecture. Therefore, it produces no immediate concern on Washington’s part that it is excluded from influence. Indo-Pakistani enmity and Indian dominance of SAARC has stifled institutionalized security cooperation. India is the most powerful member state, allowing it to dominate the setting. For example, on three occasions India has either forced a postponement of SAARC’s annual meeting, or refused to attend due to New Delhi’s displeasure with developments in Pakistan. The postponement of the SAARC Heads of State Summit in 1999 followed renewed tensions between India and Pakistan, resulting in the Kargil conflict in 1999, whilst the postponement of the SAARC Heads of State Summit in 2002 followed the armed militant attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 (S. Cohen 2002: 44). Finally, India refused to
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attend the 2005 SAARC summit in Dhaka for reasons of security, which was interpreted by observers as a refusal to meet the Nepalese king following his suspension of democracy (Croft 2005: 1052). India has bilateral free-trade agreements with Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and pursues similar agreements with Bangladesh and the Maldives. New Delhi’s policy marginalizes Pakistan’s role in emerging subcontinental trade structures (Yahya 2004: 348). This asymmetry in India’s and Pakistan’s economic positions is likely to be enhanced by the South Asian Free Trade Area which came into effect on 1 July 2006 for SAARC member states. The agreement is expected to benefit India’s economy rather than that of Pakistan. For the most part, SAARC is used to announce decisions on security issues that have been reached outside of the framework, such as the 2004 Indo-Pakistani commitment to a composite dialogue on their long-standing conflicts (‘Pakistan, India Joint Statement’ 2004). This composite dialogue has produced hopes of a resolution to the IndoPakistani conflict, which would encourage a revival of multilateral security dialogue on the subcontinent, because Indo-Pakistani enmity is the principal barrier to the feasibility of institutionalized security cooperation. According to the joint statement, Pakistan promised that Islamabad will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any way, eroding at least some notion of the support that Kashmiri activists had been getting in the past. India, in turn, accepted to include negotiations on Jammu and Kashmir in the composite dialogue, despite the risk of growing pressures for border change. The agreement created a loose framework for negotiations between Pakistan and India, without stipulating the means by which they were to move ahead with a bilateral peace process. Although it demonstrated the willingness on both sides to accept concessions in the interest of peace, as demanded by the United States, the agreement was more a declaration of intent than a road map for the Indo-Pakistani peace process. The divide-and-rule politics pursued by India on the subcontinent prevent SAARC from having any authority on the principles of state conduct. It also impacts on Pakistan’s relations with ASEAN’s institutional framework. Pakistan’s plea for admission to the ARF was thus turned down until 2004, because some members were concerned that the ARF would be held hostage to the Kashmir dispute, and because of India’s blocking of Pakistani membership (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2004). Similarly, despite Pakistan’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2004, Islamabad only enjoys the status of a sectoral partner of ASEAN, in contrast to New Delhi, which is a full ASEAN dialogue partner. India obtained full ASEAN dialogue partnership in 1995, ARF membership in 1996, and India–ASEAN summit status in 2002. The Indian approach to regional stability contrasts with that of Indonesia, which in the mid-1960s recognized that foreign policy coordination with Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines in the face of external pressures to accommodate the demands of the major powers served
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Indonesian security interests better than any attempts to establish Southeast Asian hegemony. This policy engendered curtailment of intra-regional tensions (Leifer 1999: 33). In contrast, continuous Indo-Pakistani conflict has left no room for coordination of South Asian foreign policy, thus increasing India’s determination to sustain a divide-and-rule policy and maintain hegemonic aspirations towards its immediate neighbourhood. The lack of foreign policy coordination in South Asia, however, also allows Washington to adopt the same divide-and-rule policy following the Cold War, leaving India with few options to counter US efforts to strengthen alliance relations with Pakistan. One example of the US post-Cold war enforcement of its will on South Asia is the Indo-Pakistani arms control dialogue. This process began after the May 1998 nuclear tests, and was the result of pressure from the United States for New Delhi and Islamabad to take action to stabilize the relationship between the two nuclear powers. Pakistan and India are under constant scrutiny from the United States, which demands that they behave responsibly and demonstrate a genuine search for a peace process. Washington has been particularly concerned that Kashmir would be a potential nuclear flashpoint between India and Pakistan (Croft 2005: 1042–44, 1054). The growing dependency of both Pakistan and India on Washington’s military cooperation indicates that US demands have a considerable impact on the willingness of Islamabad and New Delhi to at least prove willing to negotiate, even if the prospects of conflict settlement are still not on the cards. In view of Washington’s long-term prioritization of India, and the comparative weakness of the Pakistani polity, the United States is likely to use its leverage to push for Islamabad rather than New Delhi to compromise in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. India’s preference for a low level of South Asian institutionalization contrasts with its support for a high level of institutionalization globally, which increases its chances of realizing its ambitions to obtain great-power status. India has aspired to this position through the policies of maintaining a nuclear deterrent, a status as the third-world exemplar of a secular democracy, and as a leader of third-world calls for international economic and social equalization. India’s ambitions have not, however, met with much success. Its status as a global power never won approval, as illustrated by its failure to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, India would like to see the Council maintained as the main forum for great-power management of international order. This preference is not surprising, since India’s great-power aspirations stand the best chance of fulfilment if the UN framework is not replaced by a Pax Americana involving the use of multilateral institutions as and when they serve US interests. India’s calls for permanent membership are more persistent than ever because the end of the Cold War has encouraged increasing demands for a revision of the UN Security Council. In 2004 and 2005, Brazil, Germany, Japan and India promoted their admission as permanent members by means of a joint bid for permanent seats, arguing that an African country should have a similar
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status on the grounds that the Council should reflect the relative weight of the world’s regions. So far, these efforts have been to no avail. One major obstacle shattering India’s hopes for permanent membership status is US resistance. First, allowing India permanent membership would leave Pakistan in a weaker position in South Asia, increasing the prospects of a resolution to the Indo-Pakistani conflict on India’s terms. Since Pakistan is currently Washington’s principal South Asian ally, India’s membership of the UN Security Council would alter the Indo-Pakistani balance sufficiently in New Delhi’s favour that the United States would no longer have any credibility as a reliable partner in Islamabad. The United States made an implicit bargain with Pakistan to obtain assistance for the US-led 2001 intervention in Afghanistan and the subsequent coalition occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan was asked to cut its ties with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, to assist US and coalition plans to attack and occupy Afghanistan, to counter anti-American extremists within Pakistan, to reduce domestic sectarian violence and to curb alleged state support for jihadi and/ or terrorist activities related to the Kashmir issue. In exchange, the United States would support Pakistani attempts at improving its international standing, and not push for democratization. In addition, Washington claimed that it would at least look with fresh eyes at Pakistani claims in the Kashmir issue. Finally, the United States promised not to target Pakistan as a facilitator or harbour for international terror, as long as it complied with the US global war on terror (Kennedy 2005: 109–11). The US–Pakistani deal encourages Islamabad to adopt an accommodating attitude towards India in the bilateral peace talks, but it also strengthens the resolve of the United States to oppose New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council in the interim, whilst Islamabad plays a significant part in the US war on terror. Second, Washington opposes expanding the permanent membership per se, because agreement will be harder to reach, and the US options of using the Council as a blueprint for future decisions on military interventions and sanctions are likely to be even more limited than at present. Although Washington has opted out of the UN Security Council’s claim to be the legitimate, legal and pre-eminent guardian of international peace and security, it still attempts to obtain approval for its foreign policy activities such as the 2003 intervention in Iraq. Arguably, what the United States is hoping for is to gradually reform the existing UN system, as indicated in its 2006 national security strategy, where it called upon the UN to reflect current geopolitical realities, not to be shackled by obsolete structures, and to reinvigorate the UN Charter’s commitment to the promotion of democracy and human rights (The White House 2006). Alternatively, the United States might seek to replace the UN system with an alternative forum for coordination between the major powers of global security issues based on the US interpretation of right and wrong state conduct. Washington does not intend to abandon or ignore the UN so long as this process is still underway. Instead, the United States is running a parallel process of trying to justify its foreign policy by
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legal means, such as its revised definition of imminent threat to ease approval of preventive war, whilst at the same time lobbying for the use of the UN for its own purposes, when Washington estimates that it has a good case, such as its recommendation that the UN Security Council adopt sanctions against North Korea during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff (Bolton 2004; The White House 2002b). The United States remains opposed to an expansion of the UN Security Council at a time when it is still making active use of it. India is currently trying to present itself as a responsible great power. For example, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, in 2006 made an effort to persuade the Indian parliament to approve a civilian nuclear deal with the United States that involves placing the country’s thermal nuclear power capacity under IAEA safeguards, in return for US acceptance that India is not a signatory state to the NPT framework (‘Indian PM Defends Civilian Nuclear Deal with US’ 2006). One reason for taking such steps is to demonstrate that India is recognized as a global great power by the world’s dominant power, the United States. Washington can be expected to prioritize New Delhi over Islamabad in the long run, but India is unlikely to become an entrusted ally on a par with states such as Britain and Japan. Opposition to the accommodation of US demands will remain widespread in the Indian political establishment for the foreseeable future. For example, it remains unclear to India’s strategic elite why its core interests should serve as fodder for a belated US effort to stabilize the Pakistani polity (Sagar 2004: 121). India’s continuing reservations on strategic cooperation with the United States further detract from Washington’s inclination to support India’s aspirations for full-scale global great-power status, as would apply in the event that India became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Should the United States come to accept India’s bid for membership, it would most likely imply that this institution has had its day as the core political framework for major power management of international order, leaving India as empty-handed as before in terms of international status.
US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific The US alliance system is used in different ways in the sub-regions of Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia. Southeast Asia contains a cluster of US allies and strategic partners, but the United States has no permanent bases in Southeast Asia other than a minor administrative unit in Singapore. Formally, Washington is strengthening its ties to ASEAN, recognizing that the association has a major role to play in maintaining intramural peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and in providing platforms for security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific. However, internal ASEAN differences with regard to relations with external powers, differences with the United States over ASEAN’s inclusive approach to member states that do not pay heed to liberal democratic goals and ASEAN’s support for the establishment of multilateral fora that exclude the
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United States constitute barriers to strong US affiliations with ASEAN. At the same time, the majority of Southeast Asian states place a high premium on the security guarantees offered by the US alliance system, engendering de facto acceptance that the structural basis for US–Southeast Asian security cooperation is the US alliance system rather than ASEAN. In Central Asia, the US alliance system is in a weak position. As Washington’s relations with Moscow have worsened, Washington’s strategic partnerships with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are hanging in the balance, because the principal strategic partner of these states is Russia. The US military presence in Central Asia has been pronounced permanent, but currently it consists of less than 1,000 troops under NATO command. NATO constitutes the best option for Washington to maintain a presence in Central Asia that is acceptable to Moscow, because the alliance involves European powers. NATO provides a credible alternative sub-regional partner to the close strategic partnership Russia currently has with Beijing, which allows Moscow the opportunity to revert to prioritizing its strategic partnership with NATO, should China prove a deceitful partner. In contrast, the US alliance system has its stronghold in Northeast Asia, which encompasses the main allies Japan and South Korea, which host permanent US bases, as well as Taiwan, which is a de facto strategic partner of the United States. The level of multilateralization in the field of security is comparatively low, producing considerable volatility in areas of temporary and permanent interstate conflict not covered by US security guarantees or directly involving the major powers of the Asia-Pacific, the United States and China, such as the Sino-US 2001 EP-3 incident, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and the maritime conflicts in the East China Sea, the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In Northeast Asia, the US inclination to use multilateral institutions to promote its individual strategic goals came to the fore in the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff. During this conflict, the United States has made use of the UN, the IAEA, KEDO and the ad hoc six-party talks in an attempt to isolate North Korea as an illegitimate state that has breached international agreements on proper state conduct. South Korea helped to prevent a break-down in sub-regional peace and stability by pushing for a continuation of multilateral negotiations between Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow, Seoul and Pyongyang, where US positions on North Korea are in a minority. However, Seoul is not sufficiently influential to bring about conflict settlement in the face of US unwillingness to compromise. The strength of the US alliance system in Northeast Asia increases the risk of violent conflict. It is not accepted as the structural basis of subregional order across the board, and as such it gives rise to fierce resistance, because its stronghold is in the neighbourhood of its main Asia-Pacific opponents, China and North Korea. In South Asia, the US alliance system is mainly used to juggle conflicting security interests in Pakistan and India, which are both prioritized as central to the US alliance system. Indo-Pakistani enmity and Indian dominance of
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SAARC has stifled security cooperation in this context, which is thus, at most, used for announcing previously negotiated bilateral agreements. The paralysis of SAARC is not untoward for Washington, which can attempt to conduct its divide-and-rule policy without having to answer to the decisions of South Asian multilateral security institutions. For this reason, the United States has called upon Islamabad to pursue an Indo-Pakistani peace process with a view to conflict resolution, in return for assistance with US operations in Afghanistan. New Delhi tries to present itself as a responsible great power with a view to obtaining US support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, consideration for the security demands of its Pakistani ally, persistent constraints on Indo-US security cooperation and US preferences for keeping the identity and numbers of current permanent members intact imply that India’s aspirations for permanent membership are not on the cards.
Chinese policies on institutions in Southeast Asia In Southeast Asia, China has embraced the sub-regional institutions that have proliferated from the core institution of ASEAN, rather than attempting to establish competitive institutions. Beijing’s embrace of existing institutions serves to demonstrate its intention to cooperate with the Southeast Asian member states on the basis of existing security frameworks, and to recognize the importance of ASEAN for Asia-Pacific peace and stability. Beijing acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in October 2003 as the first non-ASEAN member state to sign, thus departing from its reluctance to sign ASEAN’s security treaty (Whiting 1975: 307). The TAC contains rules of state conduct designed to preserve intra-Southeast Asian stability. In the 1990s, China feared that accession to the TAC would imply Beijing’s recognition of ASEAN as the principal forum for producing order and stability in the region. Such a symbolic recognition of Southeast Asia’s managerial superiority was not, at the time, considered to be in accordance with the Chinese understanding of its destiny as regional leader and its reluctance to formal commitments to multilateral security fora, because it did not trust its demands and interests to be taken into account. Thus, China would not make itself subservient to the TAC (interview with Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Institute of Strategic and International Studies 25–2–1998). China’s decision to accede to the TAC implies that it now recognizes ASEAN as the principal forum for order and stability in the sub-region. Beijing’s recognition of the TAC also demonstrates China’s resolve to pursue peace and stability by diplomatic rather than by military means (interview with Vice President and Senior Research Fellow Ruan Zongze, the China Institute of International Studies 18–11–2004). Like China’s Five Principles of Coexistence, the TAC is a product of the Cold War, and closely resembles the UN’s principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and
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the authority of the UN Security Council as a principal forum for major power management of international peace and security. The treaty reveals the express commitment of the ASEAN member states to secure peace. It states that the signatory states must display mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations. States are entitled to lead their national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion, and they are not to interfere in the internal affairs of others. Differences or disputes are to be settled by peaceful means, and the states relinquish the right to use force or threaten to use force. Finally, the states commit themselves to effective cooperation (Article 2 a–f 1976). The TAC reflects the fact that the ASEAN member states are committed to the Cold War principles of international order, and that international cooperation is to be established by peaceful means. Thus, ASEAN’s security framework broadly resembles the fundamental rules of international order agreed at the global level. The ASEAN member states see the TAC as a tenable basis for the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific as a whole, because it has proved its worth as a frame of reference for acceptable behaviour in maritime Southeast Asia and Thailand. Southeast Asian security thinking leaves no room for highminded idealism based on a vision of greatness restored. Instead, ASEAN aims for limited, but unison cooperation intended to preserve peace and stability between states exhibiting great variety, especially in terms of political systems and economic and social development (Odgaard 2002b: 235– 36). The equivalent of the TAC in China is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence from 1954, which remain part of the constitution of the People’s Republic of China. These principles include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries (‘Preamble’ 1982). Hence, peaceful coexistence does not entail international relations being dominated by cooperation. Instead, Beijing advocates that the pursuance of national interests should be a combination of individual foreign policy choices and extensive multilateral dialogue, in order to prevent clashes between states over national interests that may produce violent conflict. Thus, multilateral diplomacy is a means of allowing states to concentrate on fulfilling their individual goals, rather than an end in itself. A comparison of the TAC with China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence shows that both are conservative security frameworks that closely resemble the Cold War interpretation of the UN’s principles of international order. The commonality between the security treaties of ASEAN and China and the UN Charter was made clear back in 1997, when the two parties ‘affirmed that the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and universally recognized international law should serve as basic norms governing their relations’. This statement emphasizes their
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respect for one another’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states (‘Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the People’s Republic of China’ 1997). Hence, six years before China and ASEAN officially established a strategic partnership with Beijing’s accession to the TAC, the only remaining reservation in Beijing was the consequences of formally committing to ASEAN’s security treaty rather than agreeing on a separate ASEAN–China security treaty. China since gave up on this reservation, because Beijing decided that demonstrating its acceptance of the fundamental security interests of other Asia-Pacific states would assist it in promoting its aim to stall Washington’s efforts at consolidating its version of regional order. Compatibility between the formal security frameworks of China and Southeast Asia is not, however, the principal reason that Beijing has committed itself to ASEAN’s security treaty. The institutional framework of ASEAN and its methods of conflict management, policy coordination and cooperation suit China’s multilateral strategy for at least four reasons. First, ASEAN’s form of diplomacy principally involves obliging states not to encroach upon the right of individual states to control its internal affairs and be externally independent, whatever disagreements otherwise exist between the parties. Thus, as a general rule, the states can look after their national interests, provided these interests do not threaten the security of other states. The recent tendency of ASEAN to allow a dialogue on the domestic politics of member states does not impact on the general principles of absolute sovereignty and non-interference, since no initiatives can be taken with regard to the domestic politics of other states without their explicit consent. Instead, member states may lose de facto influence within ASEAN, as in the example of Myanmar’s acceptance in 2005 not to take up the chairmanship of ASEAN from 2006. However, such consequences do not represent a problem for China, whose major concern is to uphold the Cold War principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council subscribed to by both ASEAN and China in order to ward off US attempts at revising these rules of state conduct. Second, ASEAN’s continuous commitment to the Cold War principles of state conduct, combined with ASEAN’s cautious attitude towards controversial issues, imply that cooperation is confined to areas where there are no serious prior disagreements. If controversial issues potentially jeopardize peace and stability, the most ASEAN can do is to attempt to establish a dialogue process aiming at confidence-building. Respect for the independence and integrity of other states is thus a precondition for establishing joint activities between states that share no tradition of cooperation. Third, ASEAN has a history of constructive engagement with external powers by means of dialogue rather than the use of force. As such, ASEAN is well-suited to China’s diplomatic efforts at promoting a peaceful neighbourhood, and its
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reservations on the US tendency to use military means. Fourth, ASEAN’s inclusive, process-oriented style of diplomacy, with a preference for shelving disagreements and concentrating on areas where agreement is possible, means that ASEAN, as yet, has no permanent security mechanisms for conflict resolution; instead, they are established ad hoc when a common approach to a dispute is needed. The inherent flexibility of ASEAN is compatible with China’s preference for maintaining the UN’s principles of international order in place without having to negotiate permanent conflict resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, ASEAN’s commitment to consensus among states partaking in a dialogue process means that outcomes in the form of legal documents are not a priority (interview with Qin Yaqing, China Foreign Affairs University 9–11–2004). This preference suits China’s inclination for a high level of flexibility in its foreign policy well, since institutional pressures for legalized cooperation are not applied. For these reasons, ASEAN is seen as crucial for providing leadership and foreign policy coordination in the Asia-Pacific. The United States cannot be leader, since it is attempting to establish a regional order on US terms that is not acceptable to the main indigenous great power, China (interview with high-ranking Chinese military official 20–11–2004). Nor can China, since it has a similarly contested regional security agenda. Moreover, China is on bad terms with the other regional great power, Japan (interview with Vice President and Senior Research Fellow Ruan Zongze, the China Institute of International Studies 18–11–2004). Beijing cannot therefore implement its multilateral strategy without assistance from other states that share China’s commitment to the Cold War interpretation of the UN Charter. ASEAN is accepted as a reasonably neutral entity, because of its extensive system of dialogue partners that encompasses the United States, Russia, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan, India, China, Canada and Australia, as well as the EU and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and its efforts to engage in economic and security cooperation with all the major powers of the Asia-Pacific. Furthermore, ASEAN has demonstrated its viability as a security institution despite vast historical, cultural, political and economic differences among the member states (interview with Chinese military official 20–11–2004). The same characteristics apply to the Asia-Pacific as a whole, which is one reason why Beijing considers ASEAN’s model for security management to be useful for promoting dialogue. Most importantly, using ASEAN to establish a network of dialogue, foreign policy coordination and cooperation ensures that the moral foundation for the state conduct advocated by China constitutes the basis for all major multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific. China is aware of the limitations as to what ASEAN is able to achieve in terms of providing structures that promote peace and stability by diplomatic means. First of all, ASEAN is able to assist China in preventing the United States from consolidating a Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific, but it is neither willing nor able to promote the establishment of a Sino-centric order.
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Second, precisely because ASEAN only uses diplomatic means, it has no bearing on the development of the US alliance system that forms the structural basis of the US version of regional order (interview with Chu Shulong, Tsinghua University 17–11–2004). Third, ASEAN cannot contribute to improving relations between contending states such as China and Japan or Japan and South Korea (interview with Professor and Associate Dean Jia Qingguo, Peking University 16–11–2004). ASEAN can merely bring the powers together by forming regional multilateral dialogue mechanisms on security issues. However, it cannot ensure that constructive dialogue takes place if the states involved are not inclined to improve their relations, because ASEAN itself is not a major player in Asia-Pacific security (interview with Professor of International Studies, Peking University 10–11–2004). ASEAN can do nothing about the fact that military power still plays a major role in security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific, since there is no permanent security framework that has succeeded in promoting peace and stability (interview with Professor Song Xinning, Renmin University 14–11–2005). Hence, institutions such as the ARF and ASEAN+3 are important for maintaining peace and promoting continued dialogue among the major AsiaPacific powers. However, ASEAN’s institutional network does not have much to offer in terms of suggesting the central tenets and methods of establishing a new Asia-Pacific order (interview with Research Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University 4–11–2004).
Chinese policies on institutions in Central Asia In Central Asia, China has been the driving force in maintaining a viable forum for security coordination between itself, Russia and the Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. China’s efforts have centred on preserving an edge on these powers in defining the principles of sub-regional order, and on pre-empting US attempts to challenge it, and its partners have complied. The original purpose of China’s proposal to create a Central Asian security institution was somewhat different. The Shanghai Five, built on an arrangement first formed in 1994 at Beijing’s initiative, held its first summit in 1996, and included Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as China. The institution came out of the post-Soviet process of border settlement agreements between Beijing and Moscow. Both China and Russia saw it as convenient to expand the negotiation process to encompass the three Central Asian states to settle outstanding border issues on a bilateral basis, considering that the political leaders of these countries were remnants of the leadership in the former Soviet republics. Annual meetings accompanied these negotiations between the Chinese and Russian leaders, in which they established understandings about their mutual security interests in Central Asia and developed what they called a strategic partnership. In addition to these elements of cooperative security in the form of confidence-building,
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cooperation, consultation and coordination, the Shanghai Five also included a joint pledge to oppose the three forces of separatism, terrorism and Islamic extremism, hence linking Chinese security interests in Xinjiang with similar security interests in Russia and the three Central Asian states (Yahuda 2003: 191–92). The 1996 Shanghai Five framework was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001, and Uzbekistan became a member that same year, leaving only neutral Turkmenistan out of the institution. According to the founding document of the SCO, the institution is intended to promote regional security and economic cooperation, and to combat terrorism, separatism and religious extremism (‘Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ 2001). At the outset, the multilateral institution was designed to counter sub-regional security threats and to stabilize China’s northwestern backyard following the turmoil produced by the implosion of the Soviet Union. The entire undertaking that evolved out of Sino-Soviet efforts to put decade-long hostilities behind them became China’s first attempt at addressing security threats by means of institutionalized multilateral cooperation, involving the formation of a tangible platform for dialogue, coordination and cooperation that did not encompass the United States. Shortly after the formation of the SCO, additional Chinese security concerns arose with the 2001 war on terror, the first part of which was the intervention in neighbouring Afghanistan in October 2001. This intervention involved the establishment of a US military presence in Central Asia, concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The incoming US presence was seen as a threat to the SCO’s viability as a platform for consolidating China’s sub-regional influence. To counter the concern about Washington’s future intentions in Central Asia, the SCO held its first meeting of Foreign Ministers since its establishment. At the meeting, then Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, highlighted the fact that the SCO’s member states agreed that China’s efforts to fight the Muslim separatism threatening Chinese security and unity and Russia’s effort to combat Chechen terrorism were part and parcel of the international fight against terrorism. Moreover, the SCO Foreign Ministers agreed that the UN and the UN Security Council should play a leading role in the anti-terrorism campaign, expressing their commitment to embed anti-terrorist efforts in the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and their opposition to an arbitrary expansion of anti-terrorism efforts outside of the UN political framework. Finally, the SCO member states decided to set up an anti-terrorist organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.5 Beijing, Moscow and the four Central Asian member states thereby expressed a thinly veiled concern that Washington might use the 2001 war on terror as a pretext for pursuing US national interests without concern for global rules of state conduct. The decision to establish a Central Asian terrorist centre indicates the resolve of the SCO member states to prevent the United States from conducting policies disregarding the Cold War UN framework on their territory.
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In addition to the decisions and statements of the SCO meeting, China suggested that the SCO is formally recognized as an organization under international law. This step intended to underline the legality of Chinese foreign policy initiatives involving multilateral activities to counter accusations that the SCO was merely an excuse for the promotion of a military alliance opposing NATO. The SCO obtained formal legal status in June 2002, when the Saint Petersburg Declaration was signed at the second SCO summit, transforming the SCO into a treaty-based institution subscribing officially to the Cold War interpretation of the UN principles of international order (‘Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’ 2002). At this same conference, Russian President Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin confirmed that separatists in Chechnya and Xinjiang constitute a serious threat to Russian and Chinese security respectively, and that Sino-Russian efforts to counter this threat form part of the war on terror. In addition, Russia and China stressed that they consider the SCO to be of central importance in ensuring that a multipolar world replaces global US dominance. Thus, the SCO is clearly conceived as an institution firmly grounded on global principles of state conduct opposed to US attempts at consolidating US pre-eminence without regard for the UN system of the Cold War. Since the SCO is open to new members, China has succeeded in consolidating a political framework for the governance of Central Asia which the United States finds it hard to reject as a basis for order. The SCO institutionalizes and implements policy coordination and military and economic cooperation. Although formally subscribing to the non-use of force, in the St Petersburg Declaration the member states commit themselves to backing up the political framework with defence cooperation against attempts at unilateral military dominance. Moreover, in order to strengthen Sino-Russian security relations, Beijing agreed to create a bilateral mechanism of national security consultations in February 2005, for the first time. With the institutionalization of the SCO and Sino-Russian relations, China has demonstrated its willingness to trade in flexibility for determining influence on the principles of sub-regional order. In contrast to Beijing’s preference for the SCO as the principal security institution in Central Asia, Moscow prefers to prioritize the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which excludes both China and the United States, and hence allows Russia the greatest influence. However, apart from the membership basis, the CSTO and the SCO have similar security goals (interview with Professor Vasily V. Mikheev, Russian Academy of Sciences 9–3–2005). The Central Asian states prefer the SCO, because Russian influence is balanced by another external great power. Moscow cannot therefore afford to ignore the significance of the SCO, in which it forms the main component, together with China. At the unofficial level, Russia recognizes that the institution is an informal military and economic bloc of equal Sino-Russian influence in Central Asia, which is well-positioned
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to prevent the US military presence from transforming into enhanced political-strategic influence on the part of Washington (interview with Andrey V. Grozin, Director of the Department of Kazakhstan and Middle Asia 25–2–2005). So far, the SCO has been of limited practical value because the treaty is not effective, as indicated by China’s reliance on Russia’s military presence to ward off US influence, and the fact that the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan has not been sealed, despite the SCO’s commitment to do so. The SCO is, however, of considerable political value to Moscow, since it gives Russia a chance to present itself as a co-leader of a sub-regional coalition, thereby adding to its international political standing (interview with Alexey G. Arbatov, Carnegie Moscow Center 10–3–2005). The main difference between Beijing’s and Moscow’s views on the SCO is the importance they attach to its moral basis, which is central to China, but not to Moscow. For Beijing, the legality of the SCO is crucial, because it allows Beijing to demonstrate that its commitment to the UN system is not merely symbolic. This priority can be seen by the fact that China has initiated a multilateral security institution that attempts to demonstrate its respect for the principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council at a time when the United States is parting company with the fundamental rules of the UN system. For example, the SCO’s demand that the United States accepts the crackdown of member states on domestic Muslim separatists is seen as a demand for US respect for absolute sovereignty. The SCO’s commitment to existing Central Asian regimes is portrayed as a commitment to the principle of effective control, in contrast to Washington, which is accused of supporting illegitimate opposition groups planning to overthrow incumbents. Finally, the SCO’s demand that the United States only maintains troops in Central Asia for purposes of UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan constitutes an attempt at demonstrating commitment to the UN Security Council’s authority on issues of importance for international peace and stability. Incidents such as the US demands for investigations of the 2005 Andijon killings in Uzbekistan, where the government allegedly shot civilians at random on the pretext of fighting terror, is seen as illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of Uzbekistan, and is not accepted as a legitimate defence of universal human rights. Hence, the SCO advocates the Cold War interpretation of the UN system, according to which absolute sovereignty cannot be compromised, in contrast to US post-Cold War attempts at modifying the system to accept peace-making in the event of grave human rights violations such as genocide (Lukin 2004: 34–38; RFE/RL Central Asia Report (5:41) 27–10–2005). The SCO’s policy on the UN corresponds to that of China, which is equally intent on preserving the old version of the UN system, both to avoid unwittingly legitimizing unilateral US attempts at revising the UN system, and to ensure that the United States cannot use human rights clauses to interfere in the domestic politics of China and neighbouring authoritarian states aligned with China. China continuously emphasizes that respect for state sover-
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eignty should be the basic principle the international community continues to follow, and that the UN system should continue to safeguard international peace and stability as long as there is no viable alternative to the present institutional global order. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which, according to Beijing, did not have a clear UN mandate, is often cited as an example of the dangers of relaxing the conditions justifying humanitarian interventions without having presented the international community with a coherent moral basis that has obtained prior global approval (Xiaocheng 2003: 170–71). Russia is an arduous supporter of China’s preference for preserving the Cold War interpretation of the UN system. However, Moscow does not share Beijing’s interest in presenting itself as a power with a universally accepted moral basis for its foreign policy, because it is not a great power with an Asia-Pacific policy, but merely a middle power with a political– strategic reach extending no further than its immediate neighbourhood. Russia is therefore purely motivated by national interests that centre on avoiding US interference in its domestic affairs and Russia’s near abroad, over which Moscow still hopes to preserve dominant influence. Russia’s narrow focus on avoiding further decline means that its commitment to the SCO depends on its continued preference for siding with China to meet this goal. The continued presence of the CSTO and NATO implies that Russia can change institutional preferences insofar as it sees China’s support for consolidating the SCO as a pretext for implementing a Sino-centric order in the Asia-Pacific.
Chinese policies on institutions in Northeast Asia Northeast Asia has the lowest level of institutionalization of all the four sub-regions in the Asia-Pacific. This state of affairs is not merely caused by Washington’s preference for consolidating its alliance system as the structural basis for regional order, but also by persistent enmity between China and Japan, Japan and South Korea, North Korea and Japan, North Korea and South Korea, and Taiwan’s separation from the Chinese mainland. Multilateral security institutions in Northeast Asia are difficult to create because the basic precondition for a security dialogue, recognition that the parties involved are legitimate political authorities, is not fulfilled, since China does not recognize Taiwanese sovereignty, and there are no signs that China is likely to do so in the future. South Korea and North Korea pursue limited communication. Seoul’s reliance on the United States and Pyongyang’s reliance on China for military security guarantees against aggression from the neighbouring Korean state leaves the two Koreas with limited prospects for cooperation. Japan has established a bilateral dialogue with North Korea on outstanding security issues such as North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. However, Tokyo’s commitment to the survival of Kim Jong Il’s regime is debatable, since Japan
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proved to be a loyal supporter of Washington’s uncompromising stance towards North Korea during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff, and has pronounced North Korea an enemy of Japan on a par with China. Although not enemies, historical animosity and territorial disputes continue to mar relations between Japan and South Korea. Such a conflict-ridden environment does not leave much hope for the establishment of UN-based sub-regional multilateral security institutions. This is not to say that Beijing is pleased with the lack of institutionalization in Northeast Asia. Ideally, China would like to see the emergence of multilateral security institutions promoting peace and stability in its immediate neighbourhood (interview with official at Central Party School of CPC 2–11–2004). On the other hand, China is not willing to compromise on the question of Taiwanese sovereignty. Furthermore, the survival of North Korea’s communist regime continues to be Beijing’s main priority on the Korean peninsula, in contrast to the long-term priorities of the United States and Japan. On the issue of Sino-Japanese relations, China considers the ball to be in Japan’s court. Seen from China’s perspective, it is in Tokyo’s interest to recognize China’s integration into the international community as a responsible great power. Unfortunately, during Prime Minister Koizumi’s reign, Japan has instead increasingly concentrated on individual goals such as obtaining global recognition of Japanese great-power status, by insisting on permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and on extending its military role in the Asia-Pacific by placing the demands following from its US alliance relations before all other security concerns (interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). China is a major trading partner for Japan, but enhanced economic relations have not impacted on bilateral security relations (interview with Professor Zhu Feng, Peking University 7–11–2004). Without a Sino-Japanese rapprochement there will be no Northeast Asian security institution promoting coexistence (interview with Research Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University of China 4–11–2004). The 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff is one of the few instances where a multilateral security dialogue has been established. During the conflict, China insisted that negotiations take place outside of the UN framework, so as to avoid North Korea being singled out as a rogue state in violation of recognized principles of state conduct. Thus, China’s policy on the UN does not seem to fit the general pattern of Chinese advocacy of the UN as the principal forum for the management of security issues of global significance. However, Beijing’s commitment to the UN system does not entail the active involvement of the UN in conflict settlement; instead, China advocates adherence to the Cold War interpretation of the UN’s rules of state conduct when states undertake conflict settlement. Beijing does not consider the UN’s involvement in the US–North Korean nuclear standoff to be legitimate; instead, it argues that the United States attempted to use the UN to further its unilateral interests without respect for the fundamental rules of
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the UN system. Beijing points out that North Korea has no proven nuclear capability, in contrast to Washington’s close strategic partners such as Israel. Consequently, there is no basis in international law for international condemnation of North Korea in this matter. According to Beijing, North Korea’s claims to possess nuclear weapons have been brought about by US threats of military intervention. Beijing is careful to point out that Pyongyang should allow IAEA inspections and restate its commitment to the NPT. To maintain a convincing argument that Beijing acts in accordance with the Cold War UN system, China reluctantly had to accept the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution in July 2006 that condemned North Korean missile tests and imposed sanctions without approving of military action, following a failed Chinese attempt to persuade Pyongyang to resume sixparty talks immediately after North Korean missile tests had taken place on 5 July 2006. However, North Korea’s demands for security guarantees from Washington before conflict settlement can be reached are considered understandable, due to the risk of a US military intervention that, in Beijing’s view, cannot be justified in international law, since North Korea does not constitute a threat to international peace and stability. There are no legitimate arguments for the involvement of the UN Security Council, except in the event that the United States carries out a military intervention or if North Korea refuses to proceed with the six-party talks while continuing to launch missiles (interview with Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11– 2004; interview with a former Chinese PLA professor 15–11–2004). This is the argument presented by China in public, to convince other states that Beijing’s policy on the Korean peninsula is indeed in line with its general commitment to the UN system. By relying on these arguments throughout the six-party talks, China has succeeded in presenting itself as the convenor which accommodates the interests of other states, in contrast to the United States, which is perceived as a power that puts its own interests first (interview with Professor Kim, Sung-Han, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 28–1– 2005; interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). To some extent, China has been playing to the gallery with its conduct during the sixparty talks. In practice, Beijing prefers a partial settlement without IAEA inspections, due to the long-term strategic value of maintaining the SinoNorth Korean alliance intact, with North Korea dependent on China without international involvement (interview with Shi Yinhong, Renmin University of China 15–11–2004; interview with a former Chinese PLA professor 15– 11–2004). The 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff revealed flaws in China’s claim that it subscribes to the UN system as a universal moral basis for its Asia-Pacific policy. Seoul supports the Chinese position, partly to avoid undue provocation of Pyongyang, and partly because South Korea is not itself a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In fact, both Seoul and Beijing initially hoped that Washington’s calls for a multilateral dialogue could be warded off by
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insistence on a bilateral US–North Korean dialogue convened by Beijing. Sino-South Korean agreement to support the so-called Beijing talks rested on their mutual interest in non-involvement to avoid becoming entangled in a conflict that might compromise their security interests. Seoul was interested in avoiding further rifts in the US–South Korean alliance, and Beijing was keen to avoid being confronted with its military alliance obligations towards North Korea (interview with Professor Su Hao, China Foreign Affairs University 10–11–2004). The Sino-North Korean alliance has been in place since 1961, and has been maintained with the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Chinese Communism Subject Archive 2006). Beijing’s alliance obligations towards North Korea are interpreted in a similar way to Washington’s approach to the defence of Taiwan. Hence, Beijing adopts the policy not to fight on behalf of North Korea if Pyongyang instigates conflict by means of provocation. However, in the event that North Korea is attacked without displaying prior aggression towards other states, China is obliged to provide North Korea with military assistance (interview with Professor and Associate Dean Jia Qingguo, Peking University 16–11–2004). North Korea depends sufficiently on China for its compliance to multilateral talks to be unlikely without pressure from Beijing. North Korea is aware that Washington prefers multilateral talks to bilateral dialogue because it can transfer responsibility for the outcome of a negotiation to the other parties, thus avoiding compromise (interview with Professor Zhu Feng, Peking University 7–11– 2004). This was also the reason why Beijing and Seoul initially supported bilateral talks. China only dropped its insistence on bilateral dialogue after the Beijing talks had proved futile in April 2003, and after North Korea had conducted a short-range missile test and issued a warning that it would be followed by a long-range missile test (interview with Professor Taeho Kim, Hallym University 11–1–2005 and 17–1–2005; interview with Research Professor Jin Canrong, Renmin University of China 4–11–2004). The six-party talks provide a rare opportunity to try to establish a more permanent security institution in Northeast Asia. In principle, Beijing supports such a development, seeing the talks as part of the broader tendency in China’s political establishment to part company with its Cold War reliance on bilateralism and unilateralism. The six-party talks, together with China’s engagement in ASEAN and the SCO, testify to Beijing’s increasing focus on multilateral security institutions to improve its relations with neighbouring states and to increase its regional influence (interview with Associate Research Professor Yuan Peng, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations 12–11–2004). However, with conditions such as the exclusion of the Taiwan issue from the agenda and the strengthening of Washington’s alliance with Japan, such a development is not on the cards (interview with Professor Su Hao, China Foreign Affairs University 10–11–2004). Moreover, a permanent Northeast Asian security institution would require some kind of a settlement of the wider Korean problem. At a minimum, such a settle-
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ment requires reconciliation between North and South Korea to an extent that allows the two states to cease mutual military deterrence, by means of a peace treaty that puts an end to the state of war in which North Korea and South Korea still find themselves (Quinones 2001). Beijing has agreed to convene multilateral negotiations on the Korean nuclear problem, because it is imperative for China that the nuclear crisis does not end in violent conflict, and also that negotiation of a political solution to the question of the Korean partition be postponed. In view of China’s modest economic and military capabilities, Beijing prefers interim arrangements to remain in place, pending clarification of US military-strategic plans such as those for a ballistic missile defence (BMD) covering the Asia-Pacific and the consequences of increased US military activity in the region. For China, the drawback to the multilateral approach is that the United States and Japan are likely to see interim arrangements as a precursor to negotiations on a permanent solution to the Korean problem (interview with a researcher affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) 27–1–2005; The White House 2006). Since China prefers to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula, Beijing’s acceptance of the role as a convenor of multilateral negotiations is potentially counterproductive, as indicated by the fact that China only accepted this role because it was the only available alternative that might defuse the conflict between Washington and Pyongyang. The challenges of the six-party talks to Chinese security interests and to its image as a responsible great power with a globally acceptable moral basis for its Asia-Pacific policy encourages China to attempt to present itself as a convenor or an intermediate power carrying the conditions of peace from one camp to the other, and not a mediator playing an active role in forging conflict settlement. This strategy permits Beijing to give the impression that China is pursuing a democratization of international politics, allowing all powers, dominant, great, middle and small, a say on security issues on an equal basis, and not a multilateral strategy with the purpose of furthering a Sino-centric order (interview with Niu Jun, Peking University 13–11–2004). This is particularly important for China in Northeast Asia, because it is in this sub-region that China is under most pressure to succumb to US demands for an Asia-Pacific order. The best means of warding off this development is to persuade its surroundings that Beijing has peaceful, legitimate intentions, performs strictly in accordance with the Cold War UN system and takes into account the interests of all powers concerned.
Chinese policies on institutions in South Asia Despite China’s growing embrace of multilateral institutions since the turn of the century, China has no major incentives to promote the authority of multilateral security institutions in South Asia. The current environment leaves China in a favourable position to pursue its interests, because it has
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the upper hand in relations with both India and Pakistan. Moreover, the United States forms no part of South Asian security institutions. Thus, China is not terribly concerned about its exclusion from institutional frameworks on the subcontinent. Nevertheless, Beijing has adopted a proactive attitude towards institutional frameworks on the subcontinent as of late, focusing on SAARC. In November 2005, China was to be given observer status in SAARC (‘China accorded SAARC observer status’ 2005). Under the SAARC charter, new admissions to the regional grouping require consensus from the member states Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (‘Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’ 1985). At the summit in Dhaka, Afghanistan was granted entry as a new member of the institution, and Japan was to obtain observer status on a par with China. The decision to allow Afghanistan entry into SAARC is a tribute to President Karzai’s efforts at establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan, rather than a strengthening of SAARC. Pakistan welcomes the approval of Kabul, because of the economic, ethnic and security links between the two governments that helps sustain US engagement in Pakistan (‘Welcome new blood to anaemic SAARC’ 2005). However, Afghanistan is an excessively weak polity, with an incumbent whose survival depends on continued US-led military operations to maintain the regime, and is therefore likely to be a peripheral member of SAARC with no significant impact on the effectiveness or agenda of the institution. By contrast, Chinese membership of SAARC could imply a boost to the institution’s impact, because it is a major power with a proactive South Asia policy. The SAARC Charter demands adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, particularly respect for sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and the peaceful settlement of all disputes (‘Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation’ 1985). Thus, the treaty forming the basis for SAARC is in accordance with China’s commitment to the Cold War interpretation of the UN system and Beijing’s five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries (‘Preamble’ 1982). Attachment to SAARC therefore advances China’s general policy of preserving the Cold War variety of the UN system as the structural basis of Asia-Pacific order, and manifests Beijing’s commitment to multilateral sub-regional security institutions, allowing all powers, large and small, a say in the management of South Asian security issues. Observer status is the first step towards membership of SAARC, and allows China to follow the institution’s development at close hand. Should SAARC continue to be a defunct institution, no harm will be caused by China’s affiliation. However, if SAARC, contrary to expectations,
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takes off as an institution of importance for security and/or economic relations, China will be well-positioned to apply for membership. Indeed, China’s very membership may boost the significance of SAARC. Arguably out of fear of the prospects of Chinese dominance of the institution, India opposed acceptance of Beijing’s request to be included as a dialogue partner of the seven-nation regional grouping at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in November 2005 (Akhlaque 2005). The proposal was mooted by Pakistan at China’s request, as Pakistan, not surprisingly, would like to see its close strategic partner play an active part in SAARC, thereby hoping to change the balance of power in the institution in Islamabad’s favour (‘China may play effective role in SAARC: Mushahid’ 2005). India is allegedly concerned that the inclusion of China will harm New Delhi’s economic interests in South Asia, and eclipse India’s importance and standing as the major power in the grouping. New Delhi is worried that it might lose its ability to control SAARC, stifling cooperation to enhance Indian influence on the subcontinent. The small South Asian states welcome China’s attachment to SAARC, because it increases their options of leaning towards an alternative major power whose interests differ from those of India on quite a large number of issues. Subcontinental states such as Bangladesh and Nepal are already trying to balance Indian power by means of strategic cooperation with China, and they hope to further redress the balance in Beijing’s favour in order to avoid having to succumb to Indian economic and strategic demands and interests. Such states emphasize the shift from a ‘China threat’ to a ‘China opportunity’ theory, opening up the alternative to explore the benefits that can be drawn from China due to its economic development. They attempt to emulate ASEAN’s accommodating outlook on Beijing in order to placate New Delhi’s reservations towards enhanced Sino-SAARC relations (Gautam 2006). The risk of accepting Chinese participation in SAARC’s activities is that yet another bilateral conflict further circumscribes the institution’s ability to play a role in subcontinental security, if Beijing and New Delhi prove to be competitors rather than partners (Pandey 2003). Ultimately, India did not veto Beijing’s request for observer status, probably because China will not be able to participate in SAARC decisions as a dialogue partner, but merely to follow negotiations. New Delhi might consider Chinese membership of SAARC as a principally symbolic act, undertaken to demonstrate its commitment to its general policy on AsiaPacific security institutions in view of SAARC’s negligible significance. Moreover, the acceptance of Japan as an observer at the same time as China’s request was met implies that India intends to include other major powers simultaneously with China, in order to preclude Chinese dominance. The inclusion of China as a dialogue partner is a first step towards full membership. However, for the foreseeable future, SAARC’s decision may at best promote economic integration between China and the subcontinent, but it will most likely merely constitute a symbolic confirmation of Chinese
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support for sub-regional multilateral security institutions based on the Cold War interpretation of the UN’s principles of state conduct. India’s calls for membership of the UN Security Council have publicly been given a favourable reception by China. In reality, however, China is not keen to see India’s inclusion as a permanent member with veto rights, despite the fact that Beijing places a high premium on institutionalized security cooperation at the global level, out of concern for US attempts to create a Pax Americana to replace great-power management in the UN Security Council. China needs all the support it can get to sustain the UN system as the principal forum for great-power management. Disregarding Pakistan’s objections, Chinese State Councillor Tang Jiaxuan has hence recognized the need for India to play a greater, more constructive role in this setting (Bagchi 2004). This statement has some substance to it, in that both Beijing and New Delhi are suspicious that US efforts to establish an alternative order departing from the principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council are not only motivated by US demands for non-proliferation and counter-terrorist measures, but also by a resolve to prevent states that might challenge US pre-eminence from exercising a determining influence on the formation of the global security architecture after the Cold War (interview with official at Central Party School of CPC 2–11–2004). Moreover, Beijing has emulated New Delhi’s long-standing contributions to UN peacekeeping activities, aiming to convince the international community that China and India are nonaggressive, responsible powers acting in accordance with global standards of state conduct. As of January 2006, China contributed a total number of 1,060 military observers, civilian police and troops out of a grand total of 71,811 peacekeeping personnel to UN peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan, Timor-Leste6 and the Middle East. At the same time, India contributed a total of 7,313 military observers, civilian police and troops to UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Golan Heights, Cyprus, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Sudan and Georgia. Thus, both powers are contributors to human security operations that have been authorized by the UN Security Council, and that have been accepted by the receiving governments (United Nations 2005b, 2006; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations 2002). Hence, both Beijing and New Delhi are keen to demonstrate their commitment to preventing gross human rights violations, so long as the principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council are not compromised. Common Sino-Indian concerns, their support for allowing developing countries to have more influence in the UN system and their keenness to manifest their support for the managerial role of the UN Security Council in the preservation of international peace and stability demonstrate the potential for Sino-Indian collaboration on sustaining the
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UN system as the structural basis for international order (interview with Professor and Associate Dean Jia Qingguo, Peking University 16–11–2004). Nevertheless, Chinese misgivings about contributing to Indian aspirations for great-power status outweigh the benefits of supporting New Delhi’s bid for permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Beijing is keeping a close eye on New Delhi’s ambitions to become a great power on a par with China (interview with Chu Shulong, Tsinghua University 17–11–2004). China is not interested in advancing these ambitions, thus contributing to the rise of a challenger to its current status as a global political power. Furthermore, India’s decision to make a joint bid for permanent membership with Japan, Germany and Brazil further adds to China’s opposition to endorsing changes to the membership of the UN Security Council. Tokyo poses the most immediate threat to Chinese security so long as its role in Asia-Pacific security arrangements is enhanced with assistance from the United States, while relations with China remain dominated by enmity. Hence, New Delhi’s joint bid with Japan rules out Chinese support for India’s permanent membership. Although the so-called Group of Four ended up dropping their demand for veto rights in an expanded UN Security Council, China maintained its opposition to the reform proposal, which subsequently failed to obtain approval at the September 2005 UN Millennium Review Summit. After the meeting, Indian Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh, declared that India plans to work tirelessly towards the goal of obtaining permanent seats for the Group of Four (Black 2005). Beijing’s seemingly positive attitude towards Indian demands for playing a larger role in the UN system allows China to demonstrate its willingness to accommodate Indian interests, and advocate the continuing importance of the UN Security Council, without being held to its support, insofar as the United States remains opposed to an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council. In reality, however, China provides India with little support for obtaining an institutional position allowing it the formal rights and responsibilities of a global great power.
Chinese policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific China has embraced UN-based multilateral security institutions to varying degrees in the sub-regions of Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Northeast Asia and South Asia since the turn of the century. Examples of China’s efforts to embed its Asia-Pacific policy in globally accepted principles of state conduct include China’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003, its efforts to consolidate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a treaty-based security framework in Central Asia in 2002, its endorsement of the six-party talks on the US–North Korean nuclear standoff in 2003, and China’s status as an observer in SAARC. In Southeast Asia, China’s endorsement of ASEAN’s security framework allowed Beijing to put a damper on the voices that were concerned about China’s emergence as
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a de facto Southeast Asian power. China’s accession to the TAC manifests Beijing’s commitment to actively promoting the Cold War interpretation of the UN system in cooperation with neighbouring states, with the purpose of promoting peace and stability, not just in Southeast Asia, but in the Asia-Pacific as a whole, through ASEAN’s region-wide institutional network. ASEAN does not, however, provide China with a platform for the spread of a Sino-centric order, since the majority of Southeast Asian states consider their framework to be a supplement, and not an alternative, to the US alliance system. In reality, therefore, China does not envisage ASEAN as a role model for how to engender peaceful coexistence in the Asia-Pacific, but merely as a provider of a structure that can be used to enhance China’s image as a responsible great power promoting regional peace and stability. Beijing’s active participation in ASEAN’s institutional network also assists Beijing in spreading a structural basis for regional order that might prepare the ground for an alternative to the US alliance system, insofar as China’s growing economic and military power allows it a future position as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. In Central Asia, cooperation with Russia on institutionalizing a security framework that takes Chinese interests into account became a high priority with the arrival of a US military presence in 2001. China’s efforts to construct a structural basis for an Asia-Pacific order are at their strongest in this subregion, where the US alliance system was introduced too late to become dominant. The SCO is based on the Cold War interpretation of the UN system, and the member states use the institution as a tool for revealing the immorality of US policies on Central Asia, and for demonstrating the commitment of the member states to global principles of state conduct. However, Beijing must attempt to accommodate Russian reservations about accepting the SCO as the dominant sub-regional security institution. Moscow is concerned that the SCO might be used to promote a Sino-centric order which is at odds with Russia’s attempt to maximize its national interests by means of cooperation with NATO and the CSTO, as well as the SCO, without allowing either of those institutions to dominate Central Asia. Russia’s concern about China’s future intentions explains why the SCO is strong on rhetoric and weak on implementation of its decisions for multilateral security cooperation. In Northeast Asia, by way of contrast, China’s pursuit of the establishment of sub-regional institutions based on the UN system is thwarted by the absence of fundamental preconditions for security cooperation, such as mutual recognition of all political authorities as legitimate entities that form part of the international community. The 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff is therefore one of the few conflicts that has engendered multilateral security dialogue. China was not left with much choice but to accept six-party talks on the Korean peninsula, due to its preference for maintaining peace and stability without risking a North Korean regime change. In Beijing’s view, China’s commitment to the UN system is not compromised by its
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reluctance to involve permanent multilateral security institutions, since Pyongyang has no proven nuclear capability. China’s position on the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff has encouraged it to play the role of a convenor of negotiations, presenting itself as an intermediate power carrying conditions of peace from one camp to the other. The purpose of this strategy is to convey the impression that Beijing promotes a democratization of international politics that allows all powers an equal say on security issues whilst preserving China’s interest in the status quo, in warding off a transformation of the six-party talks into a permanent Northeast Asian security institution, and in keeping the Sino-North Korean alliance intact without outside interference. Hence, China’s policy on the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff reveals flaws in China’s claim that it subscribes to the UN system as a basis for Asia-Pacific order. In South Asia, China has been granted observer status in the paralysed SAARC, which is based on the Cold War interpretation of the UN system, at the same time as the subcontinental institution accepted Japan as an observer and Afghanistan as a full member. Beijing’s peripheral affiliation with SAARC confirms China’s commitment to the Cold War variety of the UN system as the structural basis for Asia-Pacific order. The practical importance of China’s inclusion as a dialogue partner is likely to be negligible, however, because SAARC is paralysed by Indian opposition to allowing multilateral institutions influence on subcontinental security issues. China looks favourably upon India’s support for its efforts to maintain the UN Security Council as the principal forum for the global management of international peace and stability. However, India’s potential future challenge to Beijing’s position in the Asia-Pacific, and India’s joint bid with Japan, rules out Chinese support for New Delhi’s demand to become a permanent member of this institution.
Unstable compromises: Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific The patterns of interaction of Sino-US policies on institutions after the Cold War vary across the four sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific, depending on the compatibility of Sino-US policies on institutions and the other ideational elements of Sino-US models of Asia-Pacific order, and the correspondence between Sino-US policies on institutions and those of the middle powers (Figure 4). In Southeast Asia, both the United States and China recognize ASEAN as the principal provider of policy coordination on security issues in the sub-region. Washington has demonstrated its recognition of ASEAN’s importance by enhancing its formal links with the association, but beyond the status of a dialogue partner and decisions on cooperation on common security issues such as terrorism, US–ASEAN links have limited practical importance apart from the fact that they allow the United States to partake
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Figure 4 US alliance system indicates areas where the United States attempts to implement its structural foreign policy principles of consolidating and expanding its Cold War system of allies and strategic partnerships. China institutions indicates areas where China attempts to implement its structural foreign policy principles of expanding its participation in multilateral security institutions based on the Cold War UN system
in the activities of the association. Both sides accept the consolidation of the US alliance system, but in the case of ASEAN, only as a structural basis for US–Southeast Asian security cooperation, and not for Asia-Pacific order. Instead, ASEAN envisages its own cluster of Asia-wide institutions as the structural basis for regional order, aspiring to export the so-called ASEAN
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way of maintaining peace and stability to the whole region. To this end, ASEAN has instead enlisted the support of China, which is not merely one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners, but which has also acceded to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which contains the principles of regional order advocated by Southeast Asia. Beijing, however, sees ASEAN’s regionwide institutional network as a potential platform for the implementation of a Sino-centric order in the long run, as evidenced by the description of ASEAN as an initiator of institutional frameworks, rather than a prototype for how to bring about a balance of power embedded in coexistence. In the meantime, ASEAN is useful for demonstrating Beijing’s commitment to actively promoting the Cold War interpretation of the UN system in cooperation with neighbouring states. ASEAN supports the preservation of the UN system as the basis for Asia-Pacific order, but not the use of its institutions for Sino-centric purposes, encouraging the Southeast Asian states to rely on the consolidation of the US alliance system in their own sub-region. For this reason, ASEAN deliberately supports competing definitions of the principles of state conduct to advance its diverse goals of sub-regional security and its leadership ambitions in the Asia-Pacific as a whole. This twopronged strategy contributes to an unstable balance of power, since ASEAN goes some way towards supporting China’s advocacy of the principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council. However, in the event that the security of member states is considered to be threatened by China’s growing influence, the majority of Southeast Asian states are likely to invoke US security guarantees. In Central Asia, the United States relies on NATO’s principles of state conduct, in contrast to China, which has been the driving force behind the creation of the SCO, propagating the Cold War interpretation of the UN principles of state conduct to pre-empt US attempts at dominating the subregion. Russia supports this policy, but, like ASEAN, Moscow is concerned that China intends to use the SCO as a structural basis for establishing a Sino-centric order in Central Asia. Ideally, Moscow would like to see the CSTO as the dominant institution in Central Asia. However, in the absence of sufficient power to enforce an order based on Russia’s national interests, Moscow instead maintains links with NATO, in order to be able to revert to siding with the United States in the event that China starts using the SCO as a vehicle for determining a sub-regional order on its own terms. On the one hand, Russia prefers a NATO presence to a unilateral US presence, because NATO encompasses European powers that are critical of US attempts at promoting a Pax Americana. On the other hand, NATO rests on liberal democratic values which Moscow is less than keen to introduce as a basis for order in Central Asia. Thus, Russia contributes to the preservation of the SCO as well as NATO, but stops short of supporting the implementation of Central Asian security policies through these institutions. Moscow’s halfhearted preference for competing guidelines of state conduct contributes to unstable power balancing with shifting patterns of Sino-US influence. Russia
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is a strong supporter of China’s ambition to preserve the Cold War UN system as the structural basis for regional order. However, out of fear of the emergence of a Sino-centric order in its backyard, Russia maintains links with NATO as a reserve. In Northeast Asia, the US alliance system constitutes a well-consolidated structural basis of order that is not countered by an UN-based institutional framework, but merely by the defunct Sino-North Korean alliance. A permanent institutional framework would therefore almost certainly be heavily influenced by the US alliance system, which is the principal reason that China does not promote permanent Northeast Asian security institutions. Beijing accepted an ad hoc multilateral security institution negotiating conflict settlement in the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff. Beijing proposed that North Korea had no proven nuclear capability, arguing instead that US threats of military intervention challenged the authority of the UN to define the limits of state conduct. South Korea supports Beijing’s policy on institutions on the Korean peninsula, which testify to Seoul’s simultaneous support for the consolidation of the US alliance system and an UN-based sub-regional order. Seoul relies on the US alliance system for security guarantees. However, Seoul’s support for Chinese positions during the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff has confirmed that South Korea does not agree with US attempts to part company with the Cold War UN system. Hence, South Korea contributes to unstable power balancing by supporting competing guidelines for state conduct. In South Asia, the US alliance system is in principle based on mutual security guarantees between the United States and Pakistan, but the United States courts India as a core, long-term, strategic partner that is indispensable to the establishment of a US-centric order on the subcontinent. China’s policies on institutions have a much weaker foothold, as evidenced by the fact that China has merely obtained observer status in SAARC, together with Japan. The defunct South Asian security institution is principally useful for propagating Beijing’s commitment to the Cold War UN system. China has not been conducive to India’s overtures for support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Like Washington, Beijing is not willing to promote Indian aspirations for the status of a global great power. India is inclined to opt for closer links to the US alliance system, in order to ward off Chinese attempts at establishing a Sino-centric order on the subcontinent. However, at the same time, Beijing’s inclusion as a SAARC dialogue partner allows for the possibility of using the institution to promote the preservation of the Cold War UN system. Thus, New Delhi is positioned in between the United States and China, in a way that contributes to unstable power balancing, by supporting competing definitions of principles of state conduct. The US alliance system is a well-consolidated structural basis of regional order that is by and large accepted by all the Asia-Pacific middle powers. In contrast to the NATO alliance, which requires alliance members to commit
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themselves to liberal democracy and the rule of law, the only unifying principle of state conduct of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific is mutual security guarantees in the event of external aggression. This system is in harmony with the right of individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack, as listed in article 51 of the UN Charter (The United Nations 1945). However, the middle powers of ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India do not approve of Washington’s efforts to use the US alliance system as a basis for establishing a Pax Americana, because they are critical of some of the operational and civilizational aspects of the US vision of regional order. China has been able to cash in on these reservations by invoking the Cold War interpretation of the UN system, which is based on the principles of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council. The Asia-Pacific middle powers agree with Beijing that the UN system should be preserved, in order to prevent the United States from using the alliance system as a basis for introducing its definitions of pre-emption, unilateralism, hegemony, liberal democracy and the rule of law as the main elements of regional order. China has actively pursued the preservation of the UN system, by buying into existing sub-regional institutions committed to the old UN principles of state conduct, such as ASEAN’s institutional network in Southeast Asia and SAARC in South Asia, and by establishing this kind of institution in cooperation with middle powers, such as the Sino-Russian-dominated SCO in Central Asia. Seen from the perspective of the middle powers, partial cooperation with the United States and China on consolidating both the alliance system and the UN system serves their interest in promoting neither a US-centric nor a Sino-centric order, but instead an order that combines elements from both, in a way that maximizes their influence on Asia-Pacific security. The middle powers are sufficiently attractive to be courted by both the United States and China, because their support is needed in order to dominate the sub-regions. Since both Washington and Beijing have only succeeded in winning partial support for their policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific, their structural bases of regional order are maintained side by side, contributing to unstable power balancing without a common, coherent code of state conduct. The uneasy partnership is ameliorated by the fact that the US alliance system is encompassed by article 51 of the UN Charter. Nevertheless, SinoUS policies on institutions are not compatible insofar as they are used to promote the operational and civilizational aspects of Washington’s and Beijing’s versions of regional order. This is most evident in Northeast Asia, where the United States has attempted to persuade the other parties involved to invoke the UN in order to have North Korea pronounced an illegitimate international entity that is not likely to act in accordance with recognized principles of state conduct, thus confirming its tendency to use the alliance system to implement its version of regional order. South Korea instead supported China’s argument that the existence of North Korean nuclear facilities had not been proven, and that US threats of military
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intervention challenged the UN’s principles of state conduct, thus allowing Beijing to ward off US attempts to obtain a UN mandate for military action against North Korea. However, the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff also reveals flaws in China’s general policy of preserving the UN system. Beijing is not interested in a permanent UN-based security institution in Northeast Asia, due to the strategic value of maintaining the Sino-North Korean alliance intact, thus implying that China’s commitment to a UNbased regional order might have come about out of necessity, and that it might be replaced with a Chinese alliance system, should Beijing come to possess the economic and military capabilities to do so. The dominant power, the United States, is currently in the process of parting company with the Cold War UN system, by pursuing pre-emption, unilateralism, hegemony, liberal democracy and the rule of law through its alliance system. Being the weaker power, Beijing has presented its UN-based alternative as a democratization of Asia-Pacific politics that is not intended to enhance China’s regional influence, but instead to allow small and great powers an equal say on regional security issues. However, insofar as China starts using the network of institutional affiliations that it has built up all over the Asia-Pacific to promote a Sino-centric order, the middle powers are likely to retreat from their current cooperative policies with regard to China, relying on US security guarantees to prevent the realization of this scenario. Thus, the existence of multiple guidelines of state conduct engenders unstable balancing patterns not underpinned by coexistence, because over time the indigenous powers swing back and forth, gravitating between the US and the Chinese versions of regional order.
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Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order in the twenty-first century
The United States likes to box, whereas China likes shadow boxing. (Interview with official at Central Party School of CPC, Beijing, 2–11–2004)
The quote pinpoints the fundamental difference between US and Chinese security policies. Washington conducts a relatively straightforward policy of implementing measures of pre-emption, unilateralism and hegemony assisted by its alliance system with the purpose of spreading liberal democracy and the rule of law. The policy is dominated by the belief that US economic and military superiority gives Washington the necessary means to impose its will upon other states. The advantage of US policies is that its means and purpose are clear. Washington makes no secret of its intention to discard the old principles and practices of the Cold War based on a belief in the moral superiority of its own ideals of state conduct. In the 1990s, the United States experimented with a policy of persuasion at a time when it was hoped that the mere attractions of the liberal model of state and society were sufficient to convince the surroundings that the US version of international order was the only attractive alternative left following the discrediting of communism with the implosion of the Soviet Union. The returns on this accommodating policy proved to be low because beyond the Western hemisphere, numerous states refused to buy into Washington’s ideas of how states are to manage political authority to produce the greatest benefits for the largest number of people. In particular, the widespread authoritarianstyle governments were less than thrilled with the prospects of being subjected to popular demands that might not only bring down the incumbent, but also engender the disintegration of states still struggling to create coherent nations whose loyalty was firmly directed towards the state apparatus. Washington did not conclude that it might be a good idea to adjust its policies so as to take into account that the majority of states face conditions vastly different from the United States and have other ideas of civilization and the common good of the people that cannot easily be accommodated by the liberal model of state and society. Instead, spurred on by the terrorist
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attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the United States saw a historic chance to set its mark on the structures and principles of global order. The United States opted for a policy of imposition with the purpose of revising the existing international order in correspondence with US interests and values. Of course, Washington cannot completely ignore the demands and interests of other states; mostly it only takes them into account insofar as it is necessary to achieve the long-term goal of sustaining US pre-eminence and of establishing an international order based on US definitions of right and wrong state conduct. For example, it may involve strengthening ties with certain allies such as Pakistan, which do not fulfil US criteria for proper state conduct in the interim, even if Washington does not plan to rely on these allies in the long term. The downside to Washington’s policy is the opposition it raises by the inherent arrogance of a strategy of imposition. Nevertheless, most states find that the devil they know is the safest bet even if it means that they have to accept measures that, at times, are at odds with their interests. The principal advantage of supporting Washington’s policy is the security guarantees offered by the United States, which protect them against what they perceive as the greater evil, namely an order dominated by China. China is the shadow boxer, implying that its strategies and intentions are never quite obvious to its surroundings. That is perhaps the principal reason for the aversion to the emergence of a Sino-centric order, the fear of the great unknown. Beijing conducts an unpredictable policy that involves the implementation of cooperative security, unilateralism and multipolarity assisted by its adherence to the Cold War UN system. The purpose is apparently to gradually spread its model of historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning. Or is it? That question remains unanswered and is the cause of the uncertainty as to what goals and intentions lie behind Chinese foreign policy conduct. At the same time, China’s advantage is precisely the indeterminable character of its policies since it gives Beijing a high level of flexibility, allowing China to swiftly adjust its goals and intentions with changing circumstances. This constant in Chinese foreign policy has been supplemented by a policy shift whereby, in addition to unilateral policy measures, there is an activist policy in multilateral institutions. In the 1990s, China began experimenting with multilateral security dialogue and institutionalization of security cooperation in Southeast and Central Asia. International cooperation that goes beyond the stage of dialogue requires willingness to compromise, such as the shelving of the sovereignty question in the South China Sea in return for the opportunity to develop economic and security ties with ASEAN. The main payoff for this new policy was that China established links with US allies and strategic partners, making inroads into the US alliance system by offering alternative benefits. In a sense, China overtook the US policy of persuasion of the 1990s, presumably out of necessity, since China’s economic and military capabilities remain far too modest to pursue a policy of imposition. China makes considerable efforts to convince the surroundings of its peaceful intentions,
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embedding its foreign policy in the Cold War principles of the UN system of absolute sovereignty, effective control and the authority of the UN Security Council. An additional benefit of this policy is that the alleged immorality of US state conduct is exposed. To some extent it works. In very few years, China has obtained numerous strategic partners except in its immediate Northeast Asian neighbourhood where the US alliance system also has its strongest foothold. The flaws in China’s foreign policy concept also emerge most clearly in this sub-region because it insists that Taiwan remains under the jurisdiction of mainland China and because it has failed to fit Japan into its version of international order. Despite all the progress China has made in presenting itself as a responsible great power, it continues to rely on unilateralism, although mainly in the form of a passive military build-up. However, by doing so, Beijing reveals that its cooperative foreign policy and advocacy of the UN system remains experimental and may be withdrawn at a later date when China has sufficient economic and military capabilities to impose a Sino-centric order founded in historical sovereignty and hierarchical bandwagoning. The drawback to Beijing’s policy is its preferred two-pronged strategy, which fails to convince neighbouring states that China’s rise will remain peaceful. Support for the Chinese version of international order is hence likely to involve continued reservations. The majority of Asia-Pacific states are likely to carry on relying on the United States for security guarantees, predominantly serving to protect them against China’s growing power. Shadow boxing may allow China political influence beyond that justified by its capabilities. However, it does not produce the loyal allies and partners that could help China win the contest for influence on international order.
The first generation of the English school revisited The book has examined post-Cold War balancing patterns in the AsiaPacific, focusing on the contribution of dominant powers, great powers and middle powers to regional stability through power balancing embedded in rules of coexistence. To address this problem, the book has revisited studies from the first generation of English school scholars on international order. They subscribed to the view that fundamental strategic concerns must be resolved before non-strategic dynamics may translate into cooperative international orders. The preceding analysis of US and Chinese policies on AsiaPacific security suggests that there is still some merit to their argument. In the debate on the consequences of China’s so-called rise to great-power status, three different positions stand out. One group of scholars argues that China’s rise will be accompanied by an aggressive foreign policy similar to that implemented by the United States at present. This argument is based on the observation that the United States is promoting an order based on its alliance system. This system cannot accommodate China’s rise as a military great power with legitimate claims to Taiwan and its exercise of a
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determining influence on global security arrangements. China is therefore pushed to develop a Sino-centric alternative to Washington’s designs for a future world order.1 A second position argues that China’s rise will be peaceful. This assessment is based on the notion that China’s regional rise is conducive to peaceful coexistence or even enhanced cooperation since the principal concern of the Beijing government is to prevent social upheaval threatening to bring down communist party rule and dismember the country. China has no interest in conducting an assertive foreign policy that requires allocating undue resources for imposing an order based on Chinese interests rather than the common interests of states (see for example Shambaugh 2004: 64–99; Johnston 2003: 5–56). A third position proposes that the means China is going to use to fulfil its long-term foreign policy goals are as yet unknown. Beijing’s concept of a cooperative foreign policy may be seen as an attempt at assessing whether the international environment is able to accommodate vital Chinese interests such as its claim to jurisdiction over Taiwan and its demands for safe energy supplies. If the returns on this foreign policy concept prove unsatisfactory, China may revert to an assertive foreign policy involving the use of force, provided its economic and military capabilities allow it to hold the position as a global great power (see for example Berg 2003: 17–22; Yahuda 2003: 189–206; Hughes 2006: 151–56). The first generation of English school scholars would most likely subscribe to the last point of view. They shared a tendency to see international relations as a never-ending contest between the dynamics of power politics, the forces of legitimacy and the need for common rules of state conduct to maintain international order. In their assessment of international politics, they shared the realist conclusion that power politics is fundamental, but went on to argue that the self-help system promoted by this dynamic is at times ameliorated by the need for acceptance from and coordination with the international environment, encouraging states to consider their common interest in embedding power balancing in rules of coexistence. Central to the concept of coexistence is thus that it does not involve the cancellation of balancing between states, but merely that it is embedded in common rules of state conduct allowing great powers to solve disagreements within the confines of the existing international order. The minimum requirement for this type of order is that the major powers act on the basis of common constraints on the use of force, common definitions of regime legitimacy, and agreement on the institutions used for the management of international order, since such common foundations prevent strategic problems from getting out of hand so as to avoid violent conflict between the great powers. Some scholars question if approaches such as that of the first generation of English school scholars, which considers power balancing to be a central variable in international politics, fully correspond to contemporary security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. For example, Johnston argues that China’s efforts to be richer and more powerful have not translated into a concerted military effort to replace the United States as the predominant state region-
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ally or globally (Johnston 2003: 5–56). Johnston’s analysis implies a need for a broader view on security issues going beyond the argument that power balancing of some kind is central to international security dynamics. Undoubtedly, there is more to international security than mere power balancing between states. However, it can be argued that phenomena such as information communication technology (ICT) globalization, the increasing transnationalization of domestic security problems such as diseases, and growing economic interdependence and people-to-people interaction do not challenge the centrality of power balancing, but instead impact on its characteristics. For example, the globalization of information and communication technologies affects the means by which states respond to traditional security issues. The waves of hacking attacks launched against sites in the United States after a US reconnaissance aircraft was forced to land on Hainan Island by Chinese jet fighters in April 2001 demonstrates that states are becoming increasingly skilled at information warfare (Hughes 2002: 205–24). Another example is the SARS disease, which became an international security concern in 2003. To address the threat, it proved imperative to take multilateral initiatives as well as to improve policy coordination between local, regional and central levels of government. However, the secrecy of Chinese authorities and an insufficient communication infrastructure proved to be one factor impeding progress in dealing with SARS (deLisle 2003: 587–604). Thus, the SARS problem allowed states and international agencies to put pressures on the Chinese government to comply with international demands for the decentralization of decisionmaking authority and calls for increased transparency in China’s political system. Such demands play into the issue of power balancing by calling for Beijing to conform to liberal standards of governmental accountability and to discard the tendency of the Chinese Communist Party to retain central control. The SARS case thereby, intentionally or unintentionally, discredits China’s efforts at warding off US attempts at using its superior relative power to spread its own model of state–society relations and question the legitimacy of Chinese communist party rule. Growing economic interdependence characterizes Sino-Japanese relations, leading to more dense and frequent interaction between the two states. During the 1990s, Japan became China’s most important trade partner, and China ranked as Japan’s second trade partner. However, growing economic interdependency has not led to a corresponding improvement of relations in other spheres (Yahuda 1996/2004: 326–27). Despite steadily growing levels of economic interdependence, their relationship remains marred by strategic threats and persistent enmity that stifles cooperation beyond the level of dialogue. Economic interdependence impacts on power balancing between China and Japan by bringing the two states into closer contact, but insofar as any spill-over effect has occurred from the economic level to the strategic and political levels, arguably it has jeopardized rather than improved relations between Beijing and Tokyo. For example, growing
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economic interdependence may have brought into focus their conflict over the Senkaku Islands and maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, enhancing their resolve to take effective control over claimed areas at the expense of the other party with the purpose of exploiting oil, gas and fish resources in the area. Even when examining a seemingly state-of-the-art strategic issue such as the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff, it may be called for to look at non-strategic collaboration such as tourism and railway construction between North and South Korea. Such efforts may have a positive effect on the level of trust and willingness to compromise that can pave the way for the settlement of security problems pertaining to the military–strategic level of international politics. However, ultimately, given the prevalence of US opposition towards North Korea’s nuclear programme and the Pyongyang regime, the strategic side of the Korean problem remains the most urgent security issue for the states involved. In addition, non-strategic cooperation between South and North Korea plays into the dynamics of power balancing between the United States and China by encouraging Seoul’s partial departure from the confrontational US stance during the 2002 nuclear standoff, thus driving wedges into the US–South Korean alliance relationship. ICT globalization, the SARS case, economic interdependence and enhanced people-to-people contacts thus, at least to some extent, link up with traditional power-balancing dynamics in a way that calls for attention to alternative understandings of the concept of power and how the game of power balancing between states is played out. Although relying on traditional theories of international relations, this book has attempted to address such concerns by arguing that China balances the United States by other means, not only by focusing on diplomacy, but also through mechanisms such as economic integration and migration. The above examples illustrate that whether state-centred or transnational security issues are on the agenda, power balancing continues to play a part in the course of events. The question remains if power balancing is the appropriate concept for capturing the essence of contemporary Sino-US security relations. One answer might be that it depends on the concept of power balancing that is applied. It should be noted that in this book power balancing does not merely imply the use of relative power to further national interests since this simple understanding of power balancing is considered inadequate to capture the complexities of Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific security. For example, China’s prioritization of stability in its near abroad is fairly certain, whether Beijing’s motive is a quest for building up its economic and military capabilities to be able to balance the United States by traditional means, or if the search for stability reflects a genuine willingness to ensure that China’s rise will be peaceful. The book takes such observations into account since power balancing is combined with the concept of coexistence. Thereby, power balancing is seen as a potential vehicle for regulating state conduct with the purpose of preserving stability. Power balancing hence becomes an integral
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part of international order that may contribute to constraining great-power conflict if it is conducted in an orderly and predictable manner. In addition, the combination of the concepts of power balancing and coexistence results in a much broader understanding of power balancing than is traditionally applied since coexistence is not merely about the use of force, but also addresses issues of regime legitimacy and how states cooperate on managing international security. The combination of the concepts of power balancing and coexistence also allows for analysis of economic integration, but as defined in this book economic integration is considered a means of power balancing rather than a variable that might ameliorate the consequences of power balancing. This raises another question, namely if this is a reasonable way of dealing with the impact of economic globalization on Sino-US relations. The book has addressed the issue of economic globalization, arguing that it is not a contested concept. As such, it does not give rise to fundamental disagreements between the United States and China. It may be argued that this redeeming feature in Sino-US relations is likely to make all the difference as to what kind of order is in the making in the Asia-Pacific. The postCold War era is less than two decades old, and it takes much longer to change political-historical structures than economic structures (Dahrendorf 1990). Consequently, we may not yet have seen the impact of economic interdependency on the strategic and political structures in the Asia-Pacific. However, historical evidence suggests that in the international realm, the core of new political structures is often determined within a decade. It took approximately ten years, from 1812 to 1822, to establish the central tenets of the Concert of Europe. It took around nine years to construct the foundations of the Cold War order, although, over the years, minor revisions were made to make the existing order compatible with a changing international environment. These historical examples imply that it is more likely that the current characteristics of the contemporary order in the Asia-Pacific remain in place. The remainder of this chapter discusses the implications of this conclusion for the characteristics of regional and global order in the twentyfirst century.
Stable instability: Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order The book has argued that stable power balancing is not merely achieved through an equilibrium of power, but depends on great-power agreement on a system of coexistence that allows for conflict resolution based on common constraints on the use of force, common definitions of regime legitimacy and agreement on the institutions used for the management of international order. The last decade has seen very little progress in the direction of stable Sino-US power balancing underpinned by coexistence. Sino-US policies on these issues demonstrate that instead of focusing on areas of compromise, the United States and China adhere to competing concepts of regional order.
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Washington advocates an order predominantly based on military instruments in contrast to Beijing, which promotes an order founded in the instruments of diplomacy. This difference means that the United States concentrates on activities such as the reorganization of its military presence to increase the credibility of flexible response and preventive first-use, the involvement of US armed forces in the domestic security policies of other states, and the maintenance of its Cold War alliance system as the basis of permanent security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific. For its part, China increasingly focuses on the forging of compromises with states that are at least partially supportive of Chinese interim demands for respect for the absolute sovereignty of states, acceptance of political authorities with a proven record of control over geographically delimited territories and people, and institutionalized security arrangements founded in the UN system of the Cold War. These demands reflect the weaker power’s resolution to postpone permanent revisions of security arrangements in the AsiaPacific until Beijing is sufficiently strong to exercise influence on a par with Washington. With such conflicting views on regional order, the United States and China leave considerable responsibility for the maintenance of stability to middle powers with sufficient economic and military capacity to remain partially independent of great-power policies. Sino-US policies in Southeast Asia during the last decade illustrate that uncritically optimistic assessments of Asia-Pacific order are inherently problematic. The Sino-ASEAN rapprochement of the 1990s took place against the backdrop of a continuous US military presence in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN member states promoted coexistence with China by establishing dialogue and coordination on scientific and economic issues, a process that was repeated with respect to military and defence issues from the late 1990s. The United States encouraged ASEAN to seek dialogue with China on mechanisms of coexistence in order to avoid entanglement in disputes with no immediate bearing on US interests. This development seems to imply that non-strategic conflict settlement impacts on coexistence at the strategic level. However, one reason accommodating this conclusion is that the United States remained detached from the process. The Southeast Asian case is not an example of Sino-US coexistence but of a sub-regional environment where Washington’s and Beijing’s security concerns remained sufficiently separate, allowing for the pursuit of competing versions of order without much disagreement. ASEAN’s apparent success in positioning itself as an intermediary between Washington and Beijing has occurred in the absence of serious great-power conflict. Its duration has therefore yet to be put to the test. If Sino-US security concerns come into conflict, for example over sea-lanes such as the Malacca Strait where their strategic interests intersect, this is likely to have a dampening effect on the efforts of indigenous powers to maintain coexistence. The Sino-Russian rapprochement in Central Asia during the last decade has been encouraged by US challenges to sub-regional balancing patterns
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since 2001. Here, China has been proactive in institutionalizing a new security order to pre-empt US attempts at altering existing security arrangements in its backyard. Russian determination to maintain a dominant influence in Central Asia encourages Moscow’s partial collaboration with Washington and Beijing. Russia has gravitated towards China due to concerns about US plans to encourage democratization. However, Russia may swing back to gravitating towards Washington if its fears of Chinese dominance are confirmed. Moscow tacitly accepts that the United States pursues its strategic interests through NATO while it assists China in consolidating a sub-regional order constraining US influence in Central Asia and maximizing Russia’s own influence. This case demonstrates that a middle power dominating its sub-regional environment can be a major impediment to the ability of great powers to implement their versions of international order. The Sino-South Korean rapprochement in Northeast Asia is founded in compatible short-term goals on the desirability of a slow gradual integration of North Korea into international economic and political structures. China has looked for collaboration with a power that supports the preservation of North Korea, and which, at the same time, is willing to part company with the confrontational US approach to conflict resolution. China cannot itself play the part as the only state supporting North Korean demands and interests without losing all credibility in Pyongyang, and South Korea is the only possible partner that fulfils China’s requirements. Beijing has accepted multilateral talks, but China is satisfied with the status quo, and the United States is arguably neither willing to intervene nor to compromise on its demands for denuclearization before accepting concessions. Consequently, the outcome of negotiations is likely to be that the US–North Korean nuclear standoff slowly fades into insignificance without formal agreement on mechanisms of conflict resolution. The Korean case demonstrates that a middle power may prove instrumental in defusing a disagreement that threatens to produce violent conflict between the United States and China. However, middle powers are not able to promote permanent mechanisms of coexistence if the major regional powers remain unwilling to compromise. The Sino-Indian rapprochement in South Asia in the post-Cold War era is predominantly rhetorical. Dialogue on the Sino-Indian territorial disputes, border trade and China’s support for India to play a larger role in the United Nations does not alter the fact that, at the end of the day, China sees India as a prospective competitor to its position in the Asia-Pacific. This leaves little room for compromise. By contrast, the United States envisages India as a prospective junior partner in maintaining sub-regional stability. The difference in outlook reflects that the United States is predominantly a dominant global power in need of regional allies contributing to its continued strategic preponderance without challenging its interests. Despite India’s opposition towards US plans to consolidate Pax Americana, India best fits the bill since New Delhi is able to control the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean with US
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backing. China is predominantly a regional great power in need of partners willing to counter US demands for a revised regional order without challenging China’s position in the Asia-Pacific. Since India’s great-power ambitions beyond the subcontinent potentially challenge Beijing’s position, Beijing is less inclined to establish extensive strategic cooperation with New Delhi. Instead, Pakistan is China’s most likely main strategic partner in South Asia in future. On the other hand, India supports China’s efforts to preserve the Cold War UN system and is unlikely to emerge as a loyal partner of the United States that can be trusted to assist implementation of US AsiaPacific policies. Nevertheless, the Indian case demonstrates that a middle power aspiring to dominate its sub-regional environment may be left with few choices but to gravitate towards one of the major powers if the other major power sees the middle power as more of an opponent than as a collaborator. Despite several points of agreement, Sino-US Asia-Pacific policies do not facilitate stable power balancing based on coexistence. Two characteristics bear mentioning. First, the sub-region furthest from coexistence is China’s near abroad, namely Northeast Asia. It also hosts the weakest of all the AsiaPacific middle powers, South Korea, whose strategic reach does not go beyond the Korean peninsula, and which depends heavily on the United States for its defence. The US alliance system is here at its strongest, and China’s UN-based institutional network is at its weakest. As a consequence, China has not established an effective counter-weight to US attempts at consolidating its version of regional order in Northeast Asia, and the pattern of Sino-US rivalry is less consistent. China cannot afford to opt out of the game of power balancing this close to home. However, at the same time it cannot adopt its preferred foreign policy principles as convincingly as is the case in the other sub-regions because the United States has such a strong foothold here at the same time as the local middle power, South Korea, is comparatively weak. Northeast Asia is therefore the most volatile subregion in the Asia-Pacific and the risk of violent conflict directly involving the United States and China is the greatest. The parts of Northeast Asia lying beyond the Korean peninsula are not characterized by the simultaneous presence of Sino-US structures of order to the same extent as is the case in Southeast, Central and South Asia. In the three sub-regions where such structures have emerged, there is a tacit kind of rivalry involving Chinese poaching on US alliances and strategic partnerships, US advocacy of liberal democracy and the rule of law, and the promotion of competing Sino-US guidelines of state conduct. At the same time, China quietly pursues implementation of a system of hierarchical bandwagoning and maintains its historical understanding of sovereignty. This uneasy kind of simultaneous presence does not promote stability, but it ensures that states act on the basis of certain rules and structures of state conduct. Even if these are not compatible because the indigenous powers tend to pick and choose between competing versions of order, it ensures that
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China and the United States are engaged in a simultaneous contest for influence. This contest may form the precursor of an order based on coexistence provided China and the United States, at some point in the future, manage to establish common rules of state conduct transcending their differences on issues such as human rights, the UN system, etc. In Northeast Asia, a competing set of rules and structures is not available for the quadrangle consisting of China, Japan, Taiwan and the United States. Here, China is alone in defending its version of international order towards Washington and its core Japanese ally and close Taiwanese strategic partner. Japan and Taiwan accept the full packet of regional order offered by the United States, hoping that Beijing will have to succumb to Washington’s demands in the future. Therefore, China cannot respond by promoting its own version of regional order by means of shadow boxing, leaving its strategies and intentions unclear; instead, China is forced to reject the terms of order directly because Japan and Taiwan are central to the kind of order implemented in the AsiaPacific in their capacity as fairly strong powers at the core of the US alliance system. In the case of Taiwan, China does not use its preferred contemporary strategy of shelving sovereignty disputes, leaving the question of formal jurisdiction to be solved at a later date. Instead, China accepts no compromises as regards the ‘one China’ principle and mainland China’s sovereignty over Taiwan (Hughes 2006: 139–46). This policy ensures that Taiwan remains excluded from the majority of international institutions and networks, especially in the area of security. Taiwan is predominantly a member of APEC, which deals with economic issues, but it remains excluded from central regional and global security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the United Nations. Similarly, in the case of Japan, China cannot use its preferred contemporary strategy of establishing strategic partnerships with major regional powers that also cooperate with the United States on strategic issues. Instead, China attempts to single out Japan as a morally deficient state whose foreign policy is solely based on the pursuit of its national interests, and which ignores the common interests of states. Chinese references to Japan’s historical pursuit of territorial imperialism evoke a response in the region because, like China, numerous states also experienced the costs of Japan’s so-called co-prosperity sphere in the first half of the twentieth century. They are worried that a remilitarization of Japan and enhanced responsibilities for maintaining peace and stability in the region by military means might revive Japanese aspirations for regional dominance. Tokyo’s continuous pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is seen as an act of selfishness motivated by Japan’s aspirations to implement its nationalistic designs for world order. By contrast, India’s bid for a permanent seat is perceived positively as an attempt at redressing the imbalance between the developing and the developed countries in the UN, even if China’s support to India is only at the rhetorical level. China’s efforts do not
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stop Japan from pursuing regional free-trade agreements, embarking on a military modernization process, and enhancing alliance relations with the United States. China has been able to accommodate South Korea’s demand for support for a strategy to gradually integrate North Korea into international society rather than a strategy of regime change and swift reform as recommended by the United States. Nonetheless, the 2002 US–North Korean nuclear standoff has also shown that there are flaws in China’s version of Asia-Pacific order. China has succeeded in presenting itself as the convenor accommodating the interests of other states, in contrast to the United States, which is perceived as a power putting its own interests first. However, in practice Beijing arguably prefers a partial settlement without IAEA inspection due to the long-term strategic value of maintaining the Sino-North Korean alliance intact with North Korea as a China dependant without independent international involvement. The standoff has hence revealed flaws in China’s claim that it subscribes to the UN system as a universal moral basis for its AsiaPacific policy. Altogether, these flaws are quite serious because they rule out the emergence of power balancing based on coexistence. The security dynamics of Northeast Asia are substantially different from those of the Asia-Pacific as a whole in that they are dominated by raw power politics without being ameliorated by rules of state conduct. China is the dominant state in the subregion, but it does not behave according to its ordinary scheme of state conduct. This is unfortunate because Northeast Asia is the key to AsiaPacific order since it is home to China, the principal opponent of the United States. Moreover, Chinese foreign policy in Northeast Asia calls into question Beijing’s long-term intentions with its current foreign policy in the AsiaPacific as a whole. Northeast Asia is so central to Asia-Pacific security that it makes Beijing’s claim that it intends to sustain a cooperative foreign policy appear unconvincing. And Beijing cannot single out Northeast Asia as a special region where other rules apply because Beijing attempts to build the foundations of an order for the Asia-Pacific as a whole. A second characteristic of Sino-US Asia-Pacific policies preventing stable power balancing based on coexistence is that in the other sub-regions Southeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia, Washington’s influence is weaker and here, the flaws in the US version of regional order are revealed. In Southeast and Central Asia, Washington tends to prioritize stability before the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law. This means that the United States supports authoritarian regimes systematically violating the civil rights instituted in the UN Charter although Washington claims to promote an order that puts these same rules on a par with those of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention. The United States defends this position by arguing that domestic stability is a precondition for the spread of democracy and the rule of law if these changes in domestic political structures are to constitute lasting, consolidated features of state and society and not just
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be a rhetorical device concealing that authoritarian political structures have been maintained. The problem with this argument is that in South Asia, the United States prioritizes authoritarian Pakistan rather than democratic India. In Southeast Asia, Washington prioritizes authoritarian Singapore while remaining fairly critical of Indonesia despite Jakarta’s efforts to establish democracy and the rule of law.2 In Central Asia, the United States prioritized Uzbekistan as its main strategic partner until recently despite the fact that it is one of the most totalitarian states in the sub-region. Therefore, the real reason for US priorities is apparently not the argument that stability must come before democracy, considering that Singapore has been a stable authoritarian regime for decades and India a consolidated secular democracy for even longer. Instead, US policies are most likely influenced by its concern to preserve US pre-eminence in the Asia-Pacific. As a consequence of the change in US policies on India, another flaw has emerged involving US acceptance of India’s refusal to commit to the Non-Proliferation Treaty despite the centrality of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the US scheme for Asia-Pacific order. This endorsement represents a long-term change in US policies on the subcontinent. In the short term, Pakistan has become a core US ally because Washington needs Islamabad’s assistance in its efforts to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the current authoritarian regime in Pakistan is threatened by the Islamic domestic opposition, that in the eyes of Washington, constitutes an undesirable alternative to the Musharraf administration. In the long term, the United States intends to prioritize New Delhi because if India becomes a strategic partner of Washington the US version of Asia-Pacific order is likely to dominate South Asia. The United States has taken the risk of compromising its own principles of state conduct with regard to India because it wants to avoid that India, which is very critical of US policies on regional order, ends up siding with China as did Russia. Such flaws in US designs on the Asia-Pacific encourage indigenous powers to enlist at least partial support for China’s version of regional order to avoid the consolidation of a Pax Americana in the Asia-Pacific. Even if the majority of states partially siding with China prefer the US designs for regional order, they are also aware that if the United States comes to dominate regional policies in the Asia-Pacific, Washington is likely to be much less tolerant and accommodating towards the demands and interests of indigenous powers than is the case at present. These states are particularly keen to support the parts of China’s regional policy encompassing the ideas of cooperative security, multipolarity and preservation of the UN system of the Cold War because these policy elements prevent the United States from becoming too dominant. Some of them, such as Malaysia and Russia, are particularly opposed to the US commitment to spread liberal democracy and the rule of law. Others, like India and South Korea, are concerned about the US departure from the Cold War principles invested in the UN system and its tendency to resort to unilateralism and military solutions to security
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problems. On the other hand, they will not buy the whole package on offer from Beijing because a Sino-centric order is not a desirable alternative. The United States and China appear to continue to work at cross-purposes in the Asia-Pacific. However, the present interim type of order, marked by a low level of predictability, a high level of freedom of action and fluctuating patterns of conflict and cooperation, would seem to be the prevailing pattern of state conduct for the region in the twenty-first century. The Asia-Pacific middle powers ASEAN, Russia, South Korea and India are not of equal strength. Their influence on sub-regional security structures have been inordinately large in the post-Cold War era because they are sufficiently influential that neither the United States nor China can afford to ignore them. It is not desirable for them that neither of the two major powers come to dominate regional order. First, because neither of them provides an altogether attractive alternative, but second and perhaps even more importantly, the middle powers have much more influence when two powers compete for dominance by offering diverse versions of regional order than if there was merely one coherent type of order, as was the case during the Cold War.3 In the current environment, the middle powers are left with extraordinary responsibilities for preserving the balance. However, it remains to be seen whether their efforts result in Sino-US agreement on permanent security arrangements for the Asia-Pacific. The proliferation in strategic partnerships and ad hoc collaboration with numerous powers reflect China’s success in postponing the settlement of a stable order for the Asia-Pacific as a whole. But it also reflects that the middle powers have proved unwilling to choose between the two, nor do they have to, due to the inability of the United States and China to agree on fundamental rules of state conduct. For Washington, there seems to be two alternative ways of preserving US pre-eminence. One solution would be to accommodate Chinese demands for regional order and renounce on some of the principles of the US version of regional order. Washington’s prioritization of building up the force postures of its Northeast Asian ally Japan and its strategic partner Taiwan provokes Beijing, since mainland China maintains its claim to jurisdiction over Taiwan and Sino-Japanese enmity prevails. A Sino-US agreement based on an order of coexistence requires that the United States limits its aggressive pursuit of consolidating its alliance system. The strengthening of US military cooperation with Chinese adversaries encourages China to respond by raising defence expenditures. It may well be because of this US policy that Beijing continues to rely on a passive form of unilateralism instead of making a whole-hearted commitment to a cooperative foreign policy with a permanent focus on policy coordination and cooperation based on the common interests of states. Perhaps more importantly, Washington’s pursuit of the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law is not acceptable to China. Even if Washington tends to prioritize stability before democracy and human rights, it does pursue the latter goals when a convenient occasion appears. This was the
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case with the 2005 Andijon killings in Uzbekistan, or when US national security interests are considered threatened, as was the case with the 2001 intervention in Afghanistan. At the end of the day, the United States is awaiting a democratization of mainland China itself because that would imply the defeat of Beijing’s version of regional order. These plans constitute the main long-term threat in the eyes of Beijing that prevents reconciliation between the US and Chinese demands for regional order, because the communist regime cannot risk buying into a US scheme of regional order that involves its own fall. If China had an alternative model of domestic political authority appealing to neighbouring states, Sino-US disagreement on the issue of legitimacy might ironically have been minimized. Washington would then have realized the infeasibility of trying to spread liberal democracy and the rule of law in the Chinese part of the world, just as the United States learned to accommodate the communist regime in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The political philosophy of Kungfutsianism, which is based on collective and hierarchical principles, has occasionally been suggested as a possible basis for constructing an alternative model of state–society relations if translated into workable political arrangements. However, it remains to be seen if such a process is set in motion. So far, Kungfutsianism has predominantly been used as a pretext to fend off demands for liberal political reform rather than as a basis for constructing a viable model of domestic legitimacy. And, as accounted for in Chapter 4, the majority of China’s neighbours perceive the Chinese ideas of historical sovereignty hierarchical bandwagoning as a major drawback to a Sino-centric order. Since China cannot come up with a viable alternative to the US version of domestic order, its best bet is to advocate the preservation of the Cold War UN system. It allows for the prevalence of heterogeneous political systems due to its principles of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. This is a negative solution in that it serves to prevent the United States from enforcing its own principles of domestic conduct without suggesting viable alternatives. This is a weakness in China’s proposal which provides Washington with an outstanding chance to invest Asia-Pacific order with its own values of state–society relations. The prospects of a compromise between the United States and China that might allow for power balancing founded in coexistence hence look bleak. Will this type of unstable order will stay with us for so long that this is the kind of order we will have in the twenty-first century? If so, its principal characteristics are already known: the absence of binding alliance commitments, a highly unpredictable international environment but also a considerable freedom of action allowing for swift foreign policy adjustments. This kind of prolonged interim order has advantages as well as drawbacks. For the United States, the advantage of the current order is that it allows Washington to pursue its economic interests almost wherever it wants. China’s embrace of market economic structures that are so central to US demands for regional order is hence a vast improvement compared with the
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communist alternative adopted by the Eastern bloc during the Cold War order. Moreover, the United States has an outstanding chance of promoting its version of domestic political order, not only because China has not suggested an alternative, but also because the strengthening of the US alliance system serves to enhance the democracies forming the core of the system. The costs of the current order are of course higher than if the United States dominated Asia-Pacific order. In particular, the critical voice of the secondary powers carries much weight in Washington because China provides them with an alternative offer of partnership. Russia’s change of policy in the 1990s has been most remarkable. In the early 1990s, Moscow sided with the United States. However, disappointment as to the returns from this partnership and concern about the consequences of US policies on legitimacy caused Russia to align with China from the late 1990s. Arguably, Moscow’s change in priorities has encouraged the United States to compromise its anti-WMD principles to accommodate the equally US-critical Indian political establishment with the purpose of ensuring that India gravitates towards the United States rather than China. Similarly, ASEAN’s rapprochement with China implies that the United States has to conduct a relatively conciliatory policy towards the Southeast Asian states. For example, one reason that Washington had to retreat from its demand to send troops to assist patrolling the Malacca Strait is arguably that the Chinese supported a request from Indonesia and Malaysia to remain in control of the strait. Nevertheless, ultimately the United States benefits substantially from the current order since it remains the only dominant power in the Asia-Pacific. For example, it could afford to stay away from the ASEAN Regional Forum’s summit in 2005, making Beijing subsequently follow suit. This demonstrated that Washington remains the first among equals. And as much as Beijing attempts to poach on US alliances and strategic partnerships, the majority of Asia-Pacific states continue to rely on Washington for the most vital means of survival, namely security guarantees, which Beijing cannot provide. The majority of Asia-Pacific states would not want to rely on Beijing even if China had the military capabilities to do so since, if forced to choose, they would opt for a Pax Americana rather than a Sino-centric order. This characterizes the priorities of the majority of ASEAN member states, South Korea and India and of course states such as Taiwan, Japan, Australia and New Zealand that are at the core of the US alliance system. Russia relies on its own extensive military capabilities instead. Ideally, Washington would prefer to be able to implement its version of regional order in its totality, and its efforts to contain China point to the fact that it continues to work towards the goal of regional hegemony. Current conditions are, nevertheless, sufficiently satisfactory for the United States to profit substantially from the present regional order, and since Washington has to take into account the views of the secondary powers, US policies will most likely contribute to its maintenance. Chinese foreign policy also seems to sit well with a high level of unpredict-
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ability and a low level of commitment, which allows Beijing to give an enigmatic impression of its strategies and goals. To some extent, this has been a deliberate Chinese strategy since the late 1970s, designed to safeguard it against pressures from superior powers at odds with Chinese interests. Although, after Secretary of State Kissinger visited Beijing in 1971, the AsiaPacific was often described as tripolar, the Chinese did not in any serious way challenge the status which the dominant powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, enjoyed during the Cold War. It seems more reasonable to describe China during the later years of the Cold War as a middle power sufficiently strong to avoid subservience to great-power demands and capable of conducting a foreign policy founded in alternating gravitation towards the United States and the Soviet Union. First, China’s nuclear capability combined with substantial low-technological conventional capabilities allowed this policy. In addition, China’s willingness to use force against foreign encroachment of the territorial integrity of what was defined as the Chinese motherland was well proven. Second, a significant pragmatic element pervaded Chinese foreign policy thinking, as implied by its willingness to side with the liberal as well as the communist bloc. Third, China based its foreign policy decisions firmly on an estimate of which partnership would result in the highest returns for China’s national interests. Its foreign policy profile points to the existence of an alternative programme for international order to that of the United States and the Soviet Union. China was presented as a developing state aiming for peaceful coexistence, a new economic world order and defiance of alliances. In contrast to the great powers, China did not occupy a position allowing it to export its development model to other countries to any significant extent. In the main, the alternative political framework remained a rhetorical device designed to highlight China’s foreign policy independence since Beijing did not command sufficient influence to have an impact on the fundamental principles of international order. China’s principal gain was the considerable strategic, economic and political benefits it was able to extract by its foreign policy. It did, however, not contribute to or alter the political framework used by the United States and the Soviet Union for the management of international order. China’s influence in the international realm has been out of proportion to its actual economic and military capabilities since then. One explanation is its skilful manoeuvring between the United States and the Soviet Union. They were not at ease with a state that refused to take sides, and opted for a high level of freedom of action that enabled it to adjust quickly to changes in the bipolar balancing pattern. If interpreted in this way, the present order is not intermediate, but has already been adjusted to serve Chinese interests. The difference between the present order and that of the Cold War is, however, that China no longer acts as a middle power alternating between alliances. Instead, the pattern of Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific resembles that of a dominant power in spe. It is difficult to utilize this potential under conditions of high unpredictability, as indicated by its calls for a
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stable international environment allowing it to concentrate on economic development. The costs of constant foreign policy adjustments are high in a situation where China prefers to direct the majority of resources towards the economic sector. But if the United States remains determined to establish a Pax Americana, China is left with few choices but to continue its present foreign policy.
The Asia-Pacific and global order What are the consequences for global order of the prolonged interim order consolidated in the Asia-Pacific? Compared with the Cold War order, the region where competing versions of order promoted by the major powers intersect has moved from Europe to the Asia-Pacific.4 The dominant and great powers in contemporary international politics, the United States, China and Japan, are in the Asia-Pacific, making it likely that developments in patterns of state conduct in that region will determine global order. The American continent is dominated by the United States and is hence unlikely to form part of any rivalry, at least for as long as China’s strategic reach does not extend beyond Asia proper. China has made inroads into Latin America, cashing in on Washington’s neglect of this region. China’s role is here predominantly motivated by its interest in Latin America’s agricultural products and natural resources such as oil. It remains to be seen whether Chinese commercial interests in the region translate into strategic interests. The Latin American countries are no doubt interested in a counterweight to the United States, implying that at some point in the future we might see Sino-US strategic interaction patterns similar to those found in the Asia-Pacific. The EU is the only power outside the Asia-Pacific that might aspire to the status of a global great power. The EU is of course not a member of the UN Security Council, but two of its most important member states, the United Kingdom and France, are permanent members, thus allowing major European powers to influence the global management of international peace and stability. The EU does not have a common army either, and the popularity of the proponents of an integrated European defence policy has been greatly reduced. The majority of EU member states do, however, form part of the NATO alliance as US allies. Both the EU and the United States are committed to the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law. The EU remains far from being a unitary state, as confirmed by the failure to obtain popular approval for a common European Constitution in 2005. Without the fundamental capabilities of a great power, it is perhaps more appropriate to call the EU a kind of anomalous secondary power like ASEAN. The EU has a well-functioning common market, a parliament, a European Court of Justice and other state-like characteristics that make the EU a much more integrated unity than that of ASEAN. The EU’s advanced integration and
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the fact that it consists of more powerful states than the ASEAN member states gives it much more weight at the global level of international politics. Even more than ASEAN, the EU is able to forge a large measure of solidarity in extra-regional affairs, manifested in agreement on common principles of state conduct. The European Security Strategy lists physical security or ‘freedom from fear’, political participation, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, an open and inclusive economic order that provides for the wealth of everyone or ‘freedom from want’, and social well-being in all of its aspects such as access to health services, to education, to a clean and hazard-free environment, etc. (Biscop 2005). However, the EU does not have much influence in the Asia-Pacific. One reason is that the EU’s weakest point is the issue of a common foreign and defence policy, and another that the United States has no great desire to enlist the EU’s involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs. It is therefore unable to command much influence in the region. Both the EU and China have vowed for enhanced cooperation based on a strategic partnership. The EU does support parts of China’s version of international order, namely the elements of a cooperative foreign policy and multipolarity. The EU also supports the preservation of the UN Security Council as the principal forum for the management of global security issues. But it also agrees with the United States that the UN principles of state conduct should be revised so as to list democracy and civic rights as fundamental on a par with absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states. The EU and China have not been able to translate their aspirations for a strategic partnership into systematic cooperation and regular joint initiatives. The EU and China have not been able to move beyond the stage of dialogue, and the prospects of that happening are not too encouraging. A major limitation to the feasibility of EU–China cooperation is that Beijing’s cooperative security strategy and its prioritization of diplomacy remain experimental. By contrast, the EU is predominantly a civilian power relying heavily on economic and diplomatic means for international influence. Beijing sees a strong national defence and continued authoritarian rule as a necessity to maintain domestic stability and to protect China against future aggression from foreign powers such as the United States and Japan, should they prove unwilling to accommodate Chinese demands and interests in a future global order. EU diplomacy and a cooperative foreign policy constitute some of its defining characteristics, which allows it to present itself as the prototype of how economic and political power can be used to claim global influence without relying on military capabilities. This idea of power may appeal to contemporary China because it helps Beijing to convince the surrounding countries that China has no interest in promoting a Sino-centric order, but that China’s rise will be accompanied by a continued focus on the common interest of states in international peace and stability. However, in view of US efforts to strengthen its alliance system, China’s commitment
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to cooperation and diplomacy remains experimental and is therefore not, as yet, a reliable basis for long-term EU policy planning towards China (Odgaard and Biscop 2006). The EU is aware of the uncertainty as regards China’s future foreign policy priorities and therefore continues to gravitate towards support for the United States and its version of international order. Africa and the Middle East do not host any great powers. Nigeria and South Africa are the most likely states in the African region to aspire to great-power status. However, both states share the characteristics of the majority of the region’s states, which have been bogged down in considerable economic and social problems for decades, preventing them from aspiring to global influence. China does have an Africa policy that centres on the need for hydrocarbon resources, but its strategic engagement in the region is limited, focusing on participation in UN-mandated operations to strengthen its image as a responsible power supporting the Cold War UN system. By and large, the same characteristics apply to China’s relations with the Middle East, although here China’s political engagement is on the rise in states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Middle East may therefore become an arena for rivalry between the United States and China on a par with the Central Asian sub-region. For example, the conflict over Iran’s nuclear programme illustrates what might happen. Together with North Korea and Iraq, Iran was pronounced part of the axis of evil in President George Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002 (The White House 2002a). Since then Washington has argued that Iran does not need a nuclear programme due to its abundant oil resources. The United States, together with the EU, is afraid that Iran might start a war with Israel on the grounds that Iran does not recognize the state of Israel, and that the Iranian authorities have called for Israel’s destruction. The United States also accuses Teheran of supporting terrorist groups, and Washington is concerned that these groups might gain access to nuclear weapons from Iran. Iran is entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has concluded that Iran has enriched uranium and carried out related activities and is likely to have used non-declared plutonium, but Iran has no proven nuclear weapons capabilities. Iran has been under tremendous pressure from the United States, Japan and the EU to reveal all aspects of its nuclear programme. Iran has cooperated with the IAEA, but in June 2005, when the United States spent less time and attention on North Korea and Iraq, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme rose to the top of the global security agenda. US Secretary of State Rice demanded that the IAEA either toughened its stance on Iran or that its head, Mohamed ElBaradei, was replaced by another person. Since 2005, there has been talk of the possibility of a US intervention in Iran. In 2006, Russia offered to resolve the crisis by agreeing to enrich Iranian uranium on Russian soil, but Teheran refused the proposal. Russia and China prefer to accommodate
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Iranian demands by allowing the IAEA to manage the Iranian nuclear crisis, as accepted by Teheran. However, the United States and the EU insist that the issue is handled by the UN Security Council, which has the power to impose sanctions and authorize military interventions. On 31 July 2006, shortly after condemning North Korean missile launches and imposing sanctions, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and imposing santions should Iran fail to shut down these activities (United National Security Council, ‘Resolution 1696’ 2006). As has so far been the case with the resolution on North Korea, by September 2006 Iran has ignored the demands of the UN Security Council, and China and Russia have refrained from imposing sanctions, agreeing to pass a Security Council resolution to demonstrate their commitment to IAEA inspections and the NPT as is necessary to make a convincing claim to support the preservation of the Cold War UN system (Lynch 2006: A16). The Iranian case confirms the main point of the book, that the United States and China are opponents on fundamental security issues and propose divergent principles of international order. Their differences cause serious rifts between them when a vital security issue is on the agenda and makes conflict resolution exceedingly difficult. As concerns the Iranian nuclear crisis, China argues that Iran is entitled to have a peaceful nuclear programme which calls for the involvement of the IAEA on the grounds that Iran is a signatory state to the NPT. The United States calls for the involvement of the UN Security Council because it hopes for approval of sanctions and possibly a military intervention against Iran on the basis of breaches of the NPT. Beijing’s arguments are closest to the Cold War principles of the UN system. By contrast, Washington’s behaviour testifies to its desire for reform of the UN system. It has not accepted the IAEA’s handling of the crisis despite ElBaradei’s assessment that Teheran’s cooperation has often called for praise rather than criticism. Instead, the United States has argued in favour of a confrontational approach or a change in the IAEA’s management. Being an Islamic republic, Teheran sides with China and Russia, which refer to the Cold War principles of the UN system, but Iran is a weak power without the means to determine the methods of conflict management. By contrast, the United States sees the Islamic republic as a threat to international peace and stability due to its domestic political set-up. The case also illustrates the US preference for using its alliance system to impose its version of order through sanctions and threats of pre-emption, whereas China enlists support from the middle power Russia for preserving the rules of the old order by relying on the IAEA. But most of all, the Iranian nuclear crisis confirms that when a conflict on security issues between Washington and Beijing breaks out, their fundamental differences on principles of international order are sustained rather than resolved. At the global level, the same kind of unstable Sino-US power balancing as is found in the Asia-Pacific, not embedded in a
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framework of coexistence, appears to be consolidated as the international order for the twenty-first century. If so, it is not likely to give rise to a greatpower war, but this kind of order is likely to impede conflict resolution on security issues involving the United States and China and complicate efforts at establishing global structures of policy coordination and cooperation.
Notes
1 Introduction 1 ASEAN is considered a pooled middle power. Chapter 2 provides additional arguments to substantiate that ASEAN constitutes a middle power. 2 The argument contrasts with the one made by Buzan and Wæver (2003), which is that Northeast and Southeast Asia already constitute one security complex. 3 I use the terminology first- and second-generation English school scholars. This may seem misleading to some since it may be argued that Bull was the secondgeneration English school, building on the work of Wight and Manning. A subsequent third generation would then be scholars such as Watson, and Dunne a fourth generation. This is a valid description, but it is less useful for my purposes since it focuses on age and teacher/apprentice relations rather than significant conceptual change, which is the distinction I wish to make here. Another option would be to distinguish between pluralists and solidarists. Pluralists stress the rational dynamics behind the establishment and workings of international order, whereas solidarists stress the importance of the dynamics of values for international order. Cf. Dunne 1995: 125–54. However, this distinction does not adequately cover what is meant here by second-generation English school scholars, which also cover those that argue that the barrier between domestic and international politics is fragile due to transnational dynamics such as, for example, economic interdependence and nationalism. See for example Buzan (2004); Mayall (1990). Furthermore, in contrast to first-generation English school scholars, the approximate equivalent pluralists covers contemporary scholars that have not dealt extensively with balance of power issues. See for example Jackson (2003). 4 Carr is categorized as a realist by some authors and as an English school scholar by others. For example, compare Haslam (2002) with Dunne (1998): 23–46. 5 The Barbary Pirates were a group of fighters who attacked US ships along the Barbary Coast of northern Africa in the beginning of the nineteenth century. They came from a handful of African states that at first signed treaties with the United States in which they promised to stop attacking US ships. However, they broke those treaties and the United States responded successfully with the use of force. 6 One example is Cooper et al. (1993). Another example is Cox (1996: 241–75). The study also contains elements of the hierarchical approach. 7 Recent English school studies usually emphasize concepts such as international society, institutions, and international law. Cf. for example Jones (2003: 371–87); Little (2000: 395–422); Reus-Smit (1997: 555–89). Suganami (2003: 259) is one exception. Suganami points out that one type of English school study focuses on the relationship between the evolution of the states system and balances of power.
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8 This is admittedly a very crude generalization of realism, to which there are many exceptions. For example, Mearsheimer (2001: 44, 76–79), the principal contemporary offensive realist, points to variables such as the stopping power of water and the costs of additional military force as impediments to states’ tendency to maximize their share of world power. 9 The argument that the English school has a fundamentally optimistic assessment of international relations does not mean that they resemble idealists such as the late US President Wilson, criticized by Carr for believing that international cooperation would lead to a more benevolent international realm (cf. Carr 1939/1946). The argument of the English school scholars is instead that the international realm is not merely a self-help system as argued by realists; international anarchy may also give rise to international policy coordination and cooperation. 10 Significant exceptions are for example Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (2001). 11 This is the conclusion reached by for example Walt (1987). 12 The term like units is a neorealist concept (cf. Waltz 1979). It may be argued that the argument of like units in the English school sense is based on international law because states become states through the act of recognition that they form part of the collectivity of states (cf. James 1993: 269–88). The realist argument is instead that the competition for relative power released by international anarchy encourages states to become like units. However, the act of recognition is essentially a derivative of international anarchy since the reason that recognition becomes significant is because no ultimate political authorities exist above and beyond the states. 13 The English school has also argued that theoretical insights are derived from philosophy (cf. for example Bull 1969: 20–38). However, the argument of practice seems to have had more influence in the English school.
2 Powers, balances of power and coexistence: the views of the first generation of the English school 1 The overlap between the English school and these neighbouring ideas is most clearly revealed in Wight’s exposition of what he calls realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Rationalism equals the English school, and revolutionism shares some features of constructivism. 2 According to some of his colleagues, F.S. Northedge considered himself to be a realist scholar. However, significant parts of Northedge’s work contribute to the English school debate on balancing and coexistence. His employment at the London School of Economics and Political Science and his affiliation with many first-generation English school scholars are likely explanations of these contributions. 3 The People’s Republic of China became a member of the UN Security Council in 1971, replacing the Nationalist representative from Taiwan. 4 Vincent (1986: 151). The broad interpretation of legitimacy belongs to the second generation of English school scholars, sometimes called the solidarist strain of English School thought. If phrased according to Bull’s theory of international relations, it involves rules regulating cooperation among states above and beyond what is necessary for mere coexistence, such as trade rules. 5 Size of the armed forces (active/2004) (IISS 2005d: 20). 6 Total national defence expenditure 2004, including US$ 66.1 billion emergency and non-emergency supplementals (IISS 2005d: 37). 7 In contrast to Japan, whose third rank can be explained by a stagnating GDP, the US rank is based on high levels of expenditure in research and development (OECD 2004c). 8 US Census Bureau (2004); Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the
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United States of America (2005). GDP measures output generated through production based on labour and property physically located within the confines of a country. It excludes such factors as income earned by US citizens working overseas. GNP is the total dollar value of all final goods and services produced for consumption in society during a particular time period, whether within or outside the confines of a country. The GNP of the United States was US$ 11788 billion in 2004 (cf. Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 2005a). The main element in the current account balance that indicates if a country runs a deficit is trade in goods and services. The other two elements, net investment income and net unilateral transfers, have little effect on the overall balance (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 2005a). Gaddis (2004: 26–30). The vast literature on the concept of hegemony is not addressed here since the concept is not applied in a theoretical, but in an empirical sense. Therefore, it merely refers to a preponderance of power in this book. Mongolia is not involved in the Korean issue. However, the general question of different Sino-US policies on regime legitimacy raised during the second US– North Korean nuclear standoff is related to the democratization process that is taking place in Mongolia. Cf. Chapter 4. Although it has no fundamental bearing on Asia-Pacific order, this concept of middle powerhood is still viable in international politics, for example in the United Nations General Assembly where Canada, as well as Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Samoa and South Korea are part of the so-called Middle Powers Initiative, which encompasses 28 UN member states working on examining the legal, technical and political requirements for a nuclear weapons-free world (cf. United Nations 2005a). Some analysts argue that the United States has a hyperglobalist inclination to break down state barriers, as a result of growing interdependence in the areas of trade and finance. By contrast, China sees economic globalization as a kind of developmental techno-nationalism that offers the prospect of ‘leap-frogging’ the advanced industrial economies and balancing the danger that the United States might use its economic power to gain political control over the world (cf. Hughes 2005: 131). However, in practice the US political establishment is using economic globalization to preserve global dominance and has not handed over power to transnational corporations and similar non-state actors, as indicated by the ultimate predominance of the interests of government over the interests of transnational corporations. The ban on weapons exports and defence-related technology towards China and US willingness to adopt sanctions towards the EU, should it choose to lift its arms embargo on China, are obvious cases in point.
3 Sino-US policies on the use of force in the Asia-Pacific 1 The 1971 Five Power Defence Pact is based on the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. 2 Interview with Dr R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, the Directorate-General for ASEAN Cooperation (10–12–2004). Singapore and Malaysia accepted the detention without trial of terrorist suspects, and Singapore looked favourably upon the US offer of assistance in the Malacca Strait, but remains wary of becoming a US dependant. 3 The name was changed from Group of Seven (G7) to Group of Eight (G8) in 1997, reflecting Russia’s membership. In December 2005, the member states Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States decided that Russia should host the 2006 G8 summit as an indication of Russia’s importance to the informal dialogue on global economic issues.
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However, Russia has not yet obtained permission to participate in the meetings of finance ministers and is hence not yet a full member of the informal group. For a short presentation of the Diet debate on the emergency contingency bills, see Takahara (2002). Interview with a Senior Research Fellow, affiliated with the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) (27–1–2005). The assessment may also be due to the desire of the conservative part of South Korea’s political establishment to present a positive image of South Korea’s US ally to counter growing anti-Americanism. According to official sources, South Korea has been reluctant to participate in PSI operations despite US demands for support (cf. Jin 2005). India is the principal military power in South Asia (cf. IISS 2005d). Size of the armed forces (active/2004) and defence expenditure (US$/2004): India – 1,325,000 and 19.6 billion; Pakistan – 619,000 and 3.33 billion; Bangladesh – 125,500 and 777 million; Sri Lanka – 111,000 and 510 million; Nepal – 69,000 and 132 million; Bhutan – n.a. and 22 million; Maldives – n.a. and 40 million. Indian support for the Nepalese government has been modest, arguably due to covert Indian support for the Maoist rebels to circumscribe Nepal’s ability to resist Indian hegemony in South Asia by gravitating towards external powers (cf. Mishra 2004: 627–46). However, a more likely explanation to India’s stance on the Nepalese domestic crisis is that New Delhi has long-standing malevolent relations with the Nepalese government and therefore opts for a democratization process rather than to assist the government in fighting the insurgents. Perkovich (2005). As of August 2006, the proposal is awaiting approval from the US Senate. Even if the agreement fails to obtain approval, it indicates the longterm principles of US policies towards India. If the free-trade agreement between ASEAN and China is implemented, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are to be incorporated no later than 2015. The 1868 Meiji Restoration marks the replacement of the Tohugawa shogunate with an oligarchy adopting Western-style practices of industrialization. This change in Japan’s political, economic and social structures resulted in the emergence of Japan as a military power in 1868. SEATO existed from 1954 to 1977 as an alliance between Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The benefits of the South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty were extended to the protocol states Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. SEATO was created with a view to stabilize Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular. Some analysts argue that the rapprochement began when the Indian Prime Minister visited Beijing for the first time in 34 years in December 1988, followed by the establishment of confidence-building measures on the Sino-Indian border in 1989 (see, for example, Jain 2004: 253–69). However, China’s changed policy on the Kashmir dispute is a precondition for the development of substantial SinoIndian cooperation. Therefore, this article refers to 1996 as the turning point. The former ceasefire line was transformed into the Line-of-Control with the 1972 Indo-Pakistani Simla agreement that committed the two countries to a bilateral settlement of all outstanding disputes (S. Cohen 2002: 41).
4 Sino-US policies on legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific 1 East Timor gained full independence in 2002, and is not yet an ASEAN member state. It remains to be seen whether East Timor obtains full membership, in view of ASEAN’s history of support for Jakarta’s policy on East Timor since it was annexed in 1976. East Timor has observer status in ASEAN, and in July 2005, it became a member of the ARF (cf. Madjiah 2002).
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2 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has announced that he will step down in September 2006. His most likely successor, due to his position as chief government spokesman, is also from the Liberal Democratic Party: the current Chief Cabinet Secretary, Shinzo Abe. Abe is considered even more hawkish than Koizumi on foreign policy issues such as Sino-Japanese relations. 3 Mongolia’s GDP was US$ 1.23 billion in 2004. Its defence budget was US$ 1.84 million in 2004, and its armed forces commanded 8,600 active troops (cf. IISS 2005d: 290). 4 The lack of a UN mandate justifying the US-led 2003 intervention in Iraq has naturally contributed to the widespread criticism of Washington’s operations. 5 In 1949, India and Pakistan accepted the UN’s ceasefire line, with one-third of Jammu and Kashmir under the control of the Pakistani Azad Kashmir government. The former ceasefire line was transformed into the Line-of-Control by the 1972 Indo-Pakistani Simla agreement, which committed the two countries to a bilateral settlement of all outstanding disputes (cf. S. Cohen 2002: 41). 6 For an analysis of the historical underpinnings of Indian democracy, see for example Sarkar (2001: 23–46). 7 A detailed analysis of this issue can be found in Odgaard (2002b). 8 For a critical assessment of Beijing’s claims of terrorist activities by Uyghur militant groups, see for example Millward (2004). 9 ‘Full text: India-China agreement’ (2005). In the long run, the opening of a trading post on the Sikkim–Tibet border could be expected to boost Chinese exports to South Asia, since the distance of transportation between the western part of China and South Asia can be shortened by more than 5,600 miles (cf. Mathou 2005: 511–12). 10 To kowtow means to kneel and touch the ground with one’s forehead, in expression of symbolic submission to the Chinese ruler. 5 Sino-US policies on institutions in the Asia-Pacific 1 The ARF encompasses Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor, the United States and Vietnam. 2 APEC encompasses Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. 3 The EAS encompasses the ASEAN member states, China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India. ASEAN+3 encompasses the same member states, with the exception of Australia, New Zealand and India. 4 The United States, South Korea and Japan are founding members of KEDO. The organization was established in 1995 to assist implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which involved North Korean acceptance to freeze, and ultimately dismantle, its nuclear programme. Subsequently, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Poland, the European Union, the Czech Republic and Uzbekistan became members (cf. KEDO 2002). 5 The Regional Anti-Terrorism Agency ended up being located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Hua 2002). 6 The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is the official name of East Timor. 6 Sino-US policies on Asia-Pacific order in the twenty-first century 1 Some scholars see this development as inevitable, whereas others see it as a
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reversible outcome of US foreign policy (cf. Mearsheimer 2001: 360–402; Bernier 2003: 629–43; Casetti 2003: 661–75; Christensen 2001: 5–36). 2 In principle, Singapore has a parliamentary form of government. In reality, however, no viable opposition exists to the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) due to insufficient resources, manipulation with the geography of the constituencies, prosecution of government-critical voices, etc. 3 See Chapter 2 of this book for the argument that there was a coherent type of global order during the Cold War. 4 On the basis of the neorealist approach, Waltz has made a similar empirical argument (cf. Waltz 2000).
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Index
Abe, Shinzo (Prime Minister of Japan) 241n2 absolute sovereignty 12, 23–4, 31, 53–4, 60, 171–2, 174, 191, 193, 198, 206, 211–13, 217, 222, 227 Afghanistan: democracy in 135; and Russia 75; and SAARC 203–4; and United States 134–6, 187–8, 196 Africa, and China 234 agreements, rules of 11, 29, 38 Akaev, Askar (former President of Kyrgyzstan) 121, 124–5, 177 alliance systems: between China and North Korea 201, 208, 211–12, 214; of Soviet Union 34; of United States 4, 5, 12, 34, 48, 50, 54, 68, 103, 113, 169–70, 173, 175–7, 180, 184–5, 189–91, 194, 199, 201, 208–9, 211–13, 216, 224, 231; see also Pax Americana Alsace-Lorraine 37 anarchy: and balance of power 10, 12; international 13–15, 17 Annam 142 anti-Chinese attitudes, in Southeast Asia 142 Anti-Secession Law (China) 102, 132, 151 anti-terrorist law (Japan) 80 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) 175, 180, 225, 241n2 ASEAN 173, 193–4, 237n1; and China 64–6, 91–4, 107, 139, 144, 175–6, 191, 193–4, 207–8, 209–11, 222, 230; defence cooperation by 69, 94, 110, 173–4, 193; East Timorese membership 240n1; ideational power of 65; inclusion policy of 173, 193; and India 186; and Japan 65, 180–1; on legitimacy issues 121, 138, 163; as middle power 64–5; and non-provocative military strategy 69; and Pakistan 186; Regional Forum 56, 175–6, 180–1, 186; and regional order 65, 194; and South Korea 65; TAC 186, 191–2, 207; and United States 65, 66, 73, 113, 169, 170–4, 175, 189, 194, 209, 211, 213, 222–3 ASEAN+3 64, 118, 170, 176, 195, 241n3 Asian values debate 117–19 assimilation policies, Chinese 145 Australia: and China 63–4; and East Asia Summit 176; economic capabilities of 63; humanitarian interventions by 120; as
middle power 62–3; military capabilities of 63; peacekeeping by 63; and regional order 64; and United States 63, 82, 126, 171–2 Austria 16, 19, 35, 39–40, 42 authoritarian regimes 121–5, 136, 215; US support for 227 Baker, James 180 Bakiev, Kurmanbek (President of Kyrgyzstan) 124–5 balance of power 24–6, 29, 39; and anarchy 10, 12; in Asia-Pacific region 3–4; and coexistence 24, 221–2; in English school 1–2, 9–10, 23, 220–1; and realism 9, 10, 238n8; see also stable power balancing; unstable power balancing Bangladesh: and China 105, 112, 159, 205; and India 86, 205 barbarians, Chinese definitions of 145 Barbary Pirates 237n5 behaviouralism 8 Beijing talks 201 Bhutan, and India 86 bilateralism, of China 197, 202 Bin Laden, Osama 135 Bismarck, Otto Edward Leopold von 3, 34–5, 41 border disputes of China: with Central Asian states 146–7, 161; with India 157–8, 162 boundaries, sea 140, 141 Brazil 206 Bretton Woods system 47 Brunei 69; and China 93; and United States 174 Bull, Hedley 2, 6, 10, 17, 41, 237n3; on balance of power 25–6; criticism of realism 13; on great powers 43; on institutions 25; on international order 25, 27; on order and justice 18; on rules of coexistence 29; on states system 20 Bush, George W. (President of United States) 78–9, 87, 125, 132, 136, 234 Butterfield, Herbert 7, 17, 20, 26–7, 29, 43 Buzan, Barry 10, 20, 237n2 Cambodia 41, 65, 69, 94, 126–7, 143, 240n9, 241n1
266
Index
Carr, E.H. 6, 14–16, 18, 20, 237n4, 238n9 Carter, Jimmy (former President of the United States) 78 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount 27, 34 Central Asia: economic integration of 77; institutional policies of China in 195–9, 208, 211; institutional policies of United States in 177–9, 189–90, 211; legitimacy policies of China in 145–9, 161, 165–6; legitimacy policies of United States in 121–5, 138, 165, 227; and Russia 5, 59, 75–7, 177–8, 197; unstable power balancing in 211; use of force policies of China in 95–8, 108, 113; use of force policies of United States in 73–7, 89, 111, 208; and war on terror 73, 74, 75, 177, 196 Chen Shui-bian (President of Taiwan) 101–2, 131–2, 151 China: and Afghanistan 196; and Africa 234; Anti-Secession Law 102, 132, 151; and ASEAN 64–6, 91–4, 107, 139, 144, 175–6, 191, 193–4, 207–8, 209–11, 222, 230; and Australia 63–4; and Bangladesh 105, 112, 159, 205; bilateralism of 197, 202; and Brunei 93; and Cambodia 94; and Central Asia 95–8, 108, 113, 145–9, 161, 165–6, 195–9, 208, 211; cooperative security strategy of 52, 68, 90–1, 95, 98, 107–9, 111–12, 114, 218; democracy in 152, 219, 229; diplomacy emphasis of 5, 66, 222; economic capabilities of 51–2, 54, 115; and European Union 233–4; force used by 117, 148; foreign policy of 53, 116, 151, 191–2, 207, 216–18, 229–32; great power status of 50–2, 54, 214, 217–24; hegemony of 93, 205; hierarchical bandwagoning concept of 53, 117, 141–2, 144, 147, 161–2, 164, 171; ideational power of 50, 52–3; and India 62, 103, 105, 107, 108–9, 120–1, 157–8, 162, 204–6, 224; and Indonesia 93, 95, 109, 144; institutional policies of 12, 170–1, 191–214; and Iran 235; and Japan 99, 101–2, 108, 111, 152–4, 162, 165, 167–8, 181, 200, 206, 219–20, 225–6; and Kazakhstan 95–6, 146; and Kyrgyzstan 146–7; and Laos 94; and Latin America 232; legitimacy policies of 12, 22, 116–17, 138–68, 171; and Malaysia 93; and Middle East 234; military capabilities of 46, 51, 68, 103; and Mongolia 149, 156–7, 162, 166; multilateralism of 12, 91, 191–2, 199, 202–3, 207–8, 211, 216; multipolarity strategy of 52–3, 68, 97–8, 102–3, 107–8, 112, 114, 197; and Myanmar 94, 105; and Nepal 205; and North Korea 99–101, 154–5, 184, 201–2, 207–8, 211–12, 214, 223, 226; and Northeast Asia 98–103, 108, 111–12, 149–57, 161–2, 168, 199–203, 208, 211–12, 224–7; and Pakistan 103–4, 112, 159–60, 162–3, 167, 204, 224; and Philippines 92–3; and regional order 54, 64, 66, 194, 209, 211, 213; and Russia 51, 58, 96–8, 108, 111, 147–9, 161, 165, 178–9, 223, 230; and SAARC 203–5, 209, 212; and SCO 195–9, 207–8, 211; and Sikkim 105; and Singapore
93, 144; and South Asia 103–7, 108–9, 112, 157–60, 162–3, 166–7, 168, 203–7, 208–9, 212, 224; and South Korea 100–1, 108, 149, 155, 156, 162, 165–6, 201, 212, 223, 226; and Southeast Asia 90–5, 107, 109–11, 139–44, 161, 191–5, 207–11; sovereignty concepts of 52–3, 116, 139, 141, 145, 150; and Taiwan 93, 101–2, 108, 132, 149–52, 162, 165, 181, 200, 225; and Tajikistan 96, 146–7; territorial claims by 90–1, 94, 139–41, 144, 147, 154, 161; and Thailand 93; and Tibet 158–9; trade by 92, 95, 155, 158, 160; and UN system of Cold War 53, 170–1, 191, 200, 204, 207–13, 231–2; unilateralism of 52–3, 68, 92–3, 98, 101, 103, 107–8, 114, 217; use of force policies of 67–8, 90–113; and Uzbekistan 95–6, 196; and Vietnam 93; and war on terror 196 Chinese ethnic minorities, resentment against 142–3 Christensen, Thomas J. 16 Chun Doo-hwan (President of South Korea) 128 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 76, 197 civil rights, in United States 48, 49 Clinton, Bill (former President of United States) 78, 87 coexistence emphasis in foreign policy 1, 2, 10, 24, 27, 29, 214, 218; in Asia-Pacific 3, 10–11, 21, 163, 225; in China 53, 191–2, 207; and power balancing 24, 221–2; rules of 26, 28–31; and stable power balancing 31, 38; and unstable power balancing 42 Cold War 27, 30; and effective control 35–6; policy coordination in 10, 17; see also UN system of Cold War communism, in Southeast Asia 143 Concert of Europe 19, 34–5, 39–40, 221 conflicts between states: potential 168, 224–7; realism on 14; resolution of 2, 181, 203; in Taiwan Strait 132; see also war Confucian traditions 118, 229 Congress of Vienna (1815) 24 constitution, in Japan 127 constructivism 9, 23 cooperation between states 13, 121 cooperative security strategy, of China 52, 68, 90–1, 95, 98, 107–9, 111–12, 114, 218 credit: in China 52; in Japan 55–6; and structural power 45; in United States 47 CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) 76–7, 197, 211 Cuba 47 Dalai Lama (14th) 159 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea (1958) 141 defensive realism 9 democracy: in Afghanistan 135; in China 152, 219, 229; in Japan 127, 165; in Mongolia 129–30; in Northeast Asia 133; and peace 49–50, 115; in Russia 125; in South Korea
Index
267
128; and stability 116; in Taiwan 131–2; US goal of spreading of 1, 49–50, 115–16, 124, 136, 139, 152, 164–5, 214–16, 229; as Western phenomenon 118 democratic opposition, in Central Asia 122, 138 Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan) 131–2 development aid, Chinese 147 diplomacy, Chinese use of 5, 66, 222 divide-and-rule policy: in India 186; in United States 171, 186 Djalal, Hasjim 140 domestic governance, models for 3 domestic politics, and international politics 16, 20 dominant powers see hegemony Dunne, Timothy 18, 237n3
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (China) 53, 191–2 force see use of force foreign humiliation theme, in Chinese policies 149–50 foreign policy: of China 53, 116, 151, 191–2, 207, 216–18, 229–32; coexistence emphasis in 1, 2, 10, 24, 27, 29, 214, 218; trade as instrument of 50, 159, 161; of United States 1, 215–16, 229 France: legitimacy policies of 37; and NATO 33–4; and Treaty of Versailles 40; and United States 34 Franco-Prussian war 35 Friedberg, Aaron L. 5 functional approaches, to middle powers 8
East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) 118–19 East Asia summit 119, 176–7 East Timor: independence of 119–20; Indonesian occupation of 143; Japanese participation in peace-keeping operation 126 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 148 economic capabilities: of Australia 63; of China 51–2, 54, 115; of India 60–1; of Japan 55–6; of middle powers 57; of Russia 58; of South Korea 59; and structural power 44; of United States 46–9 economic interdependency 9, 219–21, 153, 176, 237n3 economic liberalization, in Southeast Asia 175 effective control 12, 35–6, 38, 53–4, 109, 121–2, 141, 148, 163, 168, 171, 192–3, 198, 205–6, 211–13, 217, 220 Eisenhower, Dwight D. (President of United States) 30, 33, 47 ElBaradei, Mohamed 235 English school in international relations theory 1, 6, 12–13, 16–21, 25, 237n3, 238n13; and Asia–Pacific balancing patterns 217–22; and balance of power concept 1–2, 9–10, 23, 220–1; and constructivism 23; first generation 23–5, 38, 43, 217–18, 220; on middle powers 8; and realism 9, 13–14, 18– 20, 238n9, n12; and rules of coexistence 32; second generation 23 Enkhbayar, Nambaryn (President of Mongolia) 156 EP-3 incident 181–2 ethnic minorities: Chinese 142–3; Turkish 145–6 Europe: balance of power in 2; legitimacy policies of 36–7; state system in 20; transatlantic alliance 178 European order 19, 24, 34–5, 39–40, 221 European Security Strategy 233 European Union 233–4
Germany: and Austria 42; League Council 40; and national self-determination 38; and Reinsurance Treaty with Russia 42; and Treaty of Versailles 39–40; and UN Security Council 206; unification of 35 Gilpin, Robert 16 Glaser, Charles 15 global order 22, 232–6 globalization 49, 219, 221 Goa, and India 86 Great Britain 72; moderation 27; and Treaty of Versailles 40 great powers 21, 43–4, 45; China 50–2, 54, 214, 217–24; European Union 233; and ideational power 45; India 188–9, 206, 224; and institutions 40; Japan 54, 200; legitimacy policies of 37; management by 39; United States 7, 44; see also hegemony; major powers Greece, and Ottoman Empire 39 Grotius, Hugo 13 Group of Four 207 Gwadar naval base (Pakistan) 104
First World War 38, 40 Five Power Defence Pact 72, 239n1
hegemony 16, 21, 43–4; of China 93, 205; and ideational power 45; of India 106, 186; of Indonesia 186; of Prussia 35; of Russia 5, 75, 77; of United States 46–9, 67, 88–90, 99, 112–14, 214, 230–1; see also pre-eminence of United States in Asia-Pacific Herz, John H. 14–15 hierarchical approaches, to middle powers 8 hierarchical bandwagoning model, in Chinese foreign policy 53, 117, 141–2, 144, 147, 161–2, 164, 171 history, English school theories founded on 19–20 Holbraad, Carsten 8, 21 Hu Jintao (President of China) 151 human nature realism 9 human rights: US policies on 119, 122–4, 229; violations in Central Asia 122–4; violations in Mongolia 130; as Western values 118 humanitarian interventions 120 Hungary, and Soviet Union 34 Hurrell, Andrew 10
268
Index
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) 182, 235 ICT globalization 219 ideational power 45; of ASEAN 65; of China 50, 52–3; of India 61; of Japan 56; of United States 48, 50, 169–70 independence: of East Timor 119–20; of Taiwan 132 India: and ASEAN 186; and Bangladesh 86, 205; and Bhutan 86; and China 62, 103, 105, 107–9, 120–1, 157–8, 162, 204–6, 224; economic capabilities of 60–1; and Goa 86; as great power 157–8, 188–9, 206, 224; hegemony of 106, 186; ideational power of 61; institutional policies of 187; and Maldives 86; as middle power 60; military capabilities 61, 87; and Nepal 86, 106, 113, 205; nuclear capabilities of 32–3, 88; and Pakistan 84–6, 104, 137, 185–7; and regional order 62; and SAARC 185–6; and Sikkim 86, 105; and Soviet Union 87; and Sri Lanka 86; trade by 158, 185; and UN Security Council 187, 205–6, 212; unilateralism of 106; and United States 62, 85–8, 103, 112–13, 134, 136–7, 139, 166–7, 212–13, 224, 227, 230 Indochina War, second (Vietnam War) 41 Indonesia: and China 93, 95, 109, 144; hegemony of 186; and Malacca Strait 71; political turmoil in 142–3; and Proliferation Security Initiative 71; and United States 70, 72, 119–21, 174; and war on terror 70, 72 information warfare 219 institutional policies 25, 38–9; of China 12, 170–1, 191–214; of India 187; in Japan 180; in Soviet Union 31; of United States 12, 31, 169–79, 180–91, 209, 211–14 institutions: common 38–9; and great powers 40; for policy coordination 11–12, 22 INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) 120 intermediate powers 203 international law 8, 13, 19, 48, 68, 79, 139–41, 192, 196, 200, 237n7, 238n12, international order: English school on 24–5, 27; political framework 26; and power politics 15, 218; and states system 25 international politics, and domestic politics 16, 20 international relations theory: balance of power concept in 1–2, 9–10, 23, 220–1; English school 1, 6, 8, 12–13, 16–21, 25, 217–22, 237n3, 238n9; morality in 14–16, 18; realism 1, 6, 14–16 investments: by Japan 55; by United States 47 Iran: and China 235; and United States 234–6 Iraq, US-led intervention in 126, 136, 174, 177–8 Iskandarov, Makhmadruzi (Tajik opposition leader) 123 Islam, political 166, 168 Islamic opposition: in Central Asia 75, 122; in China 148 Islamization, in Pakistan 134
Ivanov, Sergei (Defence Minister of Russia) 179 James, Alan 13 Japan: and ASEAN 65, 180–1; and China 99, 101–2, 108, 111, 152–4, 162, 165, 167–8, 181, 200, 206, 219–20, 225–6; democracy in 127, 165; economic capabilities of 55–6; as great power 54, 200; ideational power of 56; institutional policies of 180; military capabilities of 54–5, 128; and North Korea 79–81, 199; and regional order 56, 181; and SAARC 203, 205, 212; and South Korea 65, 183; structural power of 54–6; and Taiwan 153; and UN Security Council 200, 206; and United States 54, 80, 82, 90, 113, 126–8, 165, 200, 225; and war on terror 80 Jiang Zemin (President of China) 197 Johnston, Alastair Iain 4, 218–19 jurisdiction, rules of 11, 29, 35 justice, and order 18–19 Karakoram Highway (Pakistan–China) 159 Karimov, Islam (President of Uzbekistan) 123 Karzai, Hamid (President of Afghanistan) 135, 203 Kashmir dispute 84–5, 241n5 Kausikan, Bilahari 119 Kazakhstan: and China 95–6, 146; human rights violations in 122–3; oil reserves of 74–5 Kim Dae-jung (President of South Korea) 81 Kim Young-sam (President of South Korea) 128 Kissinger, Henry A. 1, 15–16, 18–20 knowledge, and structural power 45 Koh, Tommy 117 Koizumi, Junichiro (Prime Minister of Japan) 126, 128, 153, 200 Korea Energy Development Organization 182 Korean peninsula see North Korea; South Korea Kublai Chan (Mongol Emperor) 156 Kyrgyzstan: authoritarian regime in 121–2, 124–5; and China 146–7; and Russia 75–6; and United States 73–4, 177–8, 196 Laos, and China 94 Latin America, and China 232 League of Nations 37, 40 Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister of Singapore) 117–18 legitimacy policies 11, 24, 31, 35–8, 163, 165–7; of China 12, 22, 116–17, 138–68, 171; of United States 12, 22, 38, 48, 115–39, 163–8 liberalism 9, 115 liberalization, economic 175 Linklater, Andrew 20 Mahatir bin Mohamad, Datuk Seri (Prime Minister of Malaysia) 117–18 Mahbubani, Kishore 117 major powers 33, 44; in Asia-Pacific 6–7, 21; and balance of power 25; and common
Index constraints on use of force 218; and effective control 36; role of 6–7, 10–11, 26; and rules of war 32; see also great powers Malacca Strait 71–2, 109, 174 Malaysia: and China 93; communism in 143; and United States 70, 174, 176 Maldives, and India 86 Manchuria 150 Manning, C.A.W. 13, 19, 26–8, 31, 41, 43 Mao Zedong 150 Maoists, Nepal 106 maritime terrorism 71–2 market economy, of United States 48–9 Mearsheimer, John J. 20, 238n8 Metternich, Klemens Wenzel von 34 Middle East, and China 234 middle powers 7–8, 56–8, 212–13, 223–4; ASEAN 64–5; in Asia-Pacific 5, 8–9, 11, 21, 167, 222, 228; Australia 62–3; China 231–2; India 60; Russia 58; South Korea 59, 103, 224; in Southeast Asia 142 migration, Chinese 148, 161–2, 165 military capabilities: of Australia 63; of China 46, 51, 68, 103; of India 61, 87; of Japan 54–5, 128; of middle powers 57; of Russia 58, 75; of South Korea 59; of United States 46, 66 military presence: of China in North Korea 100; of China in Southeast Asia 94; of India in South Asia 86; of Russia in Central Asia 75–6; of United States in Asia 69, 73–6, 78, 82, 87, 98, 106, 122, 177–8, 189–90, 196, 208 military technology, and structural power 46 Millennium Challenge Account aid 130 minorities see ethnic minorities Missile Technology Control Regime 70 monetary hegemony, of United States 47 Mongolia: and China 149, 156–7, 162, 166; democracy in 129–30; and North Korea 131; Russian interests in 156; and United States 130 moral superiority, Chinese ideas of 142 morality, in international relations 14–16, 18 Morgenthau, Hans J. 15, 18 multilateral security institutions, in Northeast Asia 181, 212 multilateralism: in Asia-Pacific 175; of China 12, 91, 191–2, 199, 202–3, 207–8, 211, 216; and SCO 196; of United States 175, 182, 202, 212 multipolarity strategies: of China 52–3, 68, 97–8, 102–3, 107–8, 112, 114, 197; of Russia 97, 197 Musharraf, Pervez (President of Pakistan) 83–5, 137, 228 Myanmar: and China 94, 105; and United States 172–3, 176 Nakayama, Taro 180 national self-determination 38 NATO 169, 211–12; and France 33–4; and Russia 75, 98, 169, 178–9, 211; and United States 178, 189–90, 211
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Nazarbaev, Nursultan (President of Kazakhstan) 123 neorealism 14 Nepal 159; authoritarian regime in 136; and China 205; and India 86, 106, 113, 205 New Steps in Strategic Partnership 87 New Zealand: and East Asia Summit 176; security 72; and United States 172 Nigeria 234 Nixon, Richard (former President of United States) 47, 87 Niyazov, Saparmurad (Turkmenbashi, President of Turkmenistan) 123 non-interference principle 2, 12, 22, 24, 30–1, 37, 41, 119, 164–5, 168, 172, 174, 184, 192–3, 196 non-intervention principle 23–4 Non-Proliferation Treaty 12, 30, 32, 71, 104, 182, 200; India’s attitudes towards 88, 189, 227; Iran’s adherence to 235; North Korea’s withdrawal from 78, 99 North Korea: and China 99–101, 154–5, 184, 201–2, 207–8, 211–12, 214, 223, 226; and Japan 79–81, 199; and Mongolia 131; nuclear programme of 127–8, 133; nuclear standoff with United States 60, 78, 81–2, 98, 100–1, 111, 127–8, 182, 199, 200–1, 207–8, 212, 214, 223, 226; and Russia 184; and South Korea 81–3, 99, 100–1, 202, 220; and Taiwan 133; and United States 60, 78– 80, 89, 111, 139, 182–4, 200–1, 208, 212–14, 223 Northeast Asia: institutional policies of China in 199–203, 208, 211–12; institutional policies of United States in 180–5, 190, 211–12; legitimacy policies of China in 149–57, 161–2, 165–6; legitimacy policies of United States in 125–33, 138–9, 165; multilateralism of 199; potential conflict area between US and China 168, 181, 224–7; unstable power balancing in 212; use of force policies of China in 98–103, 108, 111–12; use of force policies of United States in 77–83, 89–90, 111–12; weapons of mass destruction in 77–80, 89 Northedge, F.S. 26–8, 238n2 nuclear capabilities: of India 32–3, 88; of Iran 235–6; of North Korea 127–8, 133 nuclear deterrence between United States and Soviet Union 30, 32 nuclear standoff between US–North Korea 60, 78, 81–2, 98, 100–1, 111, 127–8, 182, 199–201, 207–8, 212, 214, 223, 226 nuclear weapons free zone, Southeast Asia as a 71, 94, 111 offensive realism 9, 238n8 oil and gas reserves, in Central Asia 74–5 Operation Northern Watch 46 opposition groups: in Central Asia 75, 121–3, 138; in China 148 order: European 19, 24, 34–5, 39–40, 221; global 22, 232–6; international 24–7, 218; and justice 18–19; regional 54, 56–8, 60, 62, 64–6,
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176, 194, 209, 211–13, 222–32; subregional 5, 57 Ottoman Empire, and Greece 39 Pakistan: and ASEAN Regional Framework 186; and China 103–4, 112, 159–60, 162–3, 167, 204, 224; and India 84–6, 104, 137, 185–7; Islamization in 134; and SAARC 185; support for Taliban 134–5; and United States 83–5, 87, 103–4, 134–5, 137, 139, 185, 187–8, 204, 212, 227 Partnership for Peace programme 179 Pax Americana 54, 66, 113, 170–1, 184, 187, 194, 205, 213; see also alliance systems, of United States peace, and democracy 49–50, 115 Peace of Utrecht (1713) 24 Peace of Westphalia (1648) 23 peacekeeping 63, 206 Phan Van Khai (Prime Minister of Vietnam) 72 Philippines: and China 92–3; communism in 143; and United States 70, 172, 174 pipeline projects, in Central Asia 74 pluralists 237n3 political framework, and stability 3, 6, 9, 15, 26 political Islam, concerns about 166, 168 political turmoil, in Central Asia 123–4 power balancing see balance of power power politics: and international order 15, 218; and societal dynamics 17–18 pragmatism, in Chinese foreign policy 151 pre-eminence of United States in Asia-Pacific 50, 54, 56, 67, 79, 102, 107, 112, 170, 206; see also hegemony of United States pre-emption strategy of United States 48, 60, 67, 109, 111, 112, 114, 188, 214 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (2003) 48, 67, 71, 73, 79, 81–2, 128–9, 173, 240n5 Prussia, and Austria 35 Putin, Vladimir (President of Russia) 76, 125, 179, 197 Al-Qaeda 134 Rahman, Ziaur (former President of Bangladesh) 185 Rakhmonov, Imomali (President of Tajikistan) 123 realism 1, 6, 14–16; and balance of power concept 9, 10, 238n8; and English school 9, 13–14, 18, 19, 20, 238n9, n12 regional institutionalization 180 Regional Maritime Security Initiative 71, 173 regional order 222; and ASEAN 65, 194; in Asia-Pacific 222–32; and Australia 64; and China 54, 64, 66, 194, 209, 211, 213; and India 62; and Japan 56; and middle powers 57; and Russia 58; and South Korea 60; and United States 54, 56, 66, 176, 212, 213 research and development: in Japan 55; in United States 46–7 Revolution in Military Affairs (China) 46, 51, 68
Rice, Condoleezza (US Secretary of State) 87–8, 124, 136, 176, 235 Roh Moo-hyun (President of South Korea) 81, 128, 183 Roh Tae-woo (President of South Korea) 128 rulers: Chinese 145; in Confucian tradition 118 rules: of agreements 11, 29, 38; of coexistence 26, 28–31; of jurisdiction 11, 29, 35; of state conduct 17, 19, 31, 191, 218, 225; on use of force 11, 218; of war 11, 29, 32 Russia: and Afghanistan 75; and Central Asia 5, 59, 75–7, 177–8, 197; and China 51, 58, 96–8, 108, 111, 147–9, 161, 165, 178–9, 223, 230; Chinese illegal immigrants in 148; democracy in 125; economic capabilities of 58; and Germany 42; hegemony of 5, 75, 77; and Iran 235; and Iraq 178; and Kyrgyzstan 75–6; as middle power 58; military capabilities of 58, 75; and Mongolia 156; multipolarity strategy of 97, 197; and NATO 75, 98, 169, 178–9, 211; and North Korea 184; and Ottoman Empire 39; and regional order 58; and SCO 198–9, 208; and Tajikistan 75–6; and United States 58, 75–7, 98, 111, 113, 125, 165, 177–9, 213, 223, 230; and Uzbekistan 76; and war on terror 197 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 185–6, 203–5, 209, 211 Saint Petersburg Declaration 196, 197 SARS epidemic 219 Schleswig-Holstein 37 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 170, 177, 195–9, 207–8, 211 sea boundaries 140–1 Second Indochina War (Vietnam War), and stable power balancing 41 Second World War 41 security dilemma 14–15, 17 security guarantees, by United States 231 Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) 181, 153–4, 220 Shanghai Five 195 Sikkim: and China 105; and India 86, 105 Singapore: and China 93, 144; communism in 143; and East Asia Summit 176–7; and Malacca Strait 71; and Proliferation Security Initiative 71; and United States 69–70, 172, 174, 227 Singh, Manmohan (Prime Minister of India) 188 six-party talks 59, 80, 99, 101, 183–4, 201–3, 207–8 societal dynamics, and power politics 17–18 society of states 20 solidarists 237n3, 238n4 South Africa 234 South Asia: and bilateral cooperation 185; institutional policies of China in 203–9, 212; institutional policies of United States in 185–9, 190–1, 212; legitimacy policies of China in 157–60, 162, 164, 166–8; legitimacy policies of United States in 133–7, 139,
Index 166–8; unstable power balancing in 212; use of force policies of China in 103–7, 108–9, 112; use of force policies of United States in 83–8, 90, 112; and war on terror 83–4, 90, 134, 137 South China Sea 176, 181; Chinese claims to 91–2, 94, 139–41, 144, 161 South Korea: and ASEAN 65; and China 100–1, 108, 149, 155–6, 162, 165–6, 201, 212, 223, 226; democracy in 128; economic capabilities of 59; and Japan 183; as middle power 59, 103, 224; military capabilities of 59; and North Korea 81–3, 99, 100–1, 202, 220; and regional order 60; security interests of 5, 59–60; and United States 78, 81–3, 90, 103, 111, 113, 126–9, 155–6, 183, 201, 213; and US–North Korean nuclear standoff 81–2, 183–4 South-East Asian Treaty Organization 103 Southeast Asia: Chinese military presence in 94; communism in 143; economic liberalization in 175; institutional policies of China in 191–5, 207–11; institutional policies of United States in 171–7, 189, 209–11; legitimacy policies of China in 139–44, 161, 163; legitimacy policies of United States in 117–21, 138; nuclear weapons free zone 71, 94, 111; and United States 222, 227, 230; unstable power balancing in 211; US military presence in 163–4, 222; use of force policies of China in 90–5, 107, 109–11; use of force policies of United States in 68–73, 88, 109–11; and war on terror 68–70, 72, 88, 174–5 sovereignty see state sovereignty Soviet Union: alliance system of 34; and Hungary 34; and India 87; and UN Security Council 30; and United States 2, 17, 27, 29, 31, 183; see also Russia Spratly Islands 90–1 Sri Lanka: and India 86; US military presence in 106 stability: and democracy 116; goals for legitimacy policies 163; and political framework 3, 6, 9, 15, 26 stable power balancing 2–3, 21, 28, 31, 34, 41, 43, 222; and coexistence 31, 38; English school’s focus on 17; and political framework 3, 6, 9, 15, 26; and raison de système 39; realism on 15 state conduct, rules of 17, 19, 31, 191, 218, 225 state sovereignty: absolute 23–4, 31; boundaries of 3; Chinese conceptions of 52–3, 116, 139, 141, 145, 150 state–society models, Asian 117–18 states: concept of 25; hegemonic see hegemony; rules of conduct of 17, 19, 31, 191, 218, 225; society of 20; as unitary actors 16, 17, 238n12 states system: and coexistence 29; in Europe 20; formalization of 24; and international order 25 Strange, Susan 44–5
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structural power 44–6, 170; of China 50–1, 54; of Japan 54–6; of United States 46–7 subregional order, and middle powers 5, 57 Suganami, Hidemi 237n7 TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) 186, 191–2, 207 Taiwan 60, 126; and China 93, 101–2, 108, 132, 149–52, 162, 165, 181, 200, 225; democracy in 131–2; independence of 132; and Japan 153; and North Korea 133; and United States 113, 126, 131–3, 151–2, 165, 181, 225 Taiwan Strait, conflicts in 132 Tajikistan: authoritarian regime in 123; and China 96, 146–7; and Russia 75–6; and United States 177 Taliban 134–5 Tang Jiaxuan 205 territorial claims, Chinese 90–2, 94, 139–41, 144, 147, 154, 161 terrorism: fight against 75, 147–8, 159; maritime 71–2; see also war on terror Test Ban Treaty (1963) 30 Thailand: and China 93; communism in 143; and United States 70, 172, 174 Tibet, and China 158–9 trade: by China 92, 95, 155, 158, 160; by India 158, 185; as instrument of foreign policy 50, 159, 161 Treaty of Good Neigbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation (2001) 98 Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone 71 Treaty on Strategic Partnership 76 Treaty of Versailles (1919) 37–8, 40 tributary systems, modern 161 Trilateral Security Dialogue 82 Turkish ethnic minority, in China 145–6 Turkmenistan: authoritarian regime in 123; gas reserves of 74; and Russia 76; and United States 177 UN Security Council 31; and Brazil 206; and Germany 206; and Group of Four 207; and India 187, 205–6, 212; and Japan 200, 206; and Soviet Union 30; and United States 30, 187–8, 205–6; and US–North Korean nuclear standoff 182, 200–1, 208 UN system of Cold War 192, 196, 206; and China 53, 170–1, 191, 200, 204, 207–13, 231–2; and Russia 198–9; and SCO 198; and United States 198, 214 Unified Combatant Command 169 unilateralism: in Chinese foreign policy 52–3, 68, 92–3, 98, 101, 103, 107–8, 114, 217; of India 106; of United States 48, 67, 88–90, 109, 112, 114, 214 United States 175–6; and Afghanistan 134–6, 187–8, 196; alliance system of 4–5, 12, 34, 48, 50, 54, 68, 103, 113, 169–70, 173, 175–7, 180, 184–5, 189–91, 194, 199, 201, 208–9, 211–13, 216, 224, 231; see also Pax Americana; and ASEAN 65–6, 73, 113, 169–5, 189, 194, 209,
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211, 213, 222–3; and Australia 63, 82, 126, 172; and Brunei 174; and Central Asia 73–7, 89, 111, 121–5, 138, 165, 177, 189–90, 211, 227; and China 4, 12, 21–2; civil rights in 48–9, 68; democracy promotion goal of 1, 49–50, 115–16, 124, 136, 139, 152, 164–5, 214–16, 229; economic capabilities of 46–8, 49; force used by 115–16, 222; foreign policy of 1, 215–16, 229; and France 34; as great power 7, 44; hegemony of 46–9, 67, 88–90, 99, 112–14, 214, 230–1; human rights policies of 119, 122–4; ideational power of 48, 50, 169, 170; and India 62, 85–8, 90, 103, 112–13, 134, 136–7, 139, 166–7, 212–13, 224, 227, 230; and Indonesia 70, 72, 119–20, 121, 174; institutional policies of 12, 31, 169–91, 209, 211–14; and Iran 234–6; and Iraq 126, 136, 174, 177–8; and Japan 54, 80, 82, 90, 113, 126–8, 165, 225; and Kyrgyzstan 73–4, 177–8; legitimacy policies of 12, 22, 38, 115–39, 163–8; and Malaysia 70–2, 174, 176; military capabilities of 46, 66; military presence in Asia 69, 73–4, 75, 76, 82, 87, 98, 106, 177, 189–90, 196, 208; and Mongolia 130; multilateralism of 175, 182, 202, 212; and Myanmar 172–3, 176; and NATO 178, 189–90, 211; and Nepal 113; and New Zealand 172; and North Korea 60, 78–80, 89, 111, 139, 182–4, 200–1, 208, 212–14, 223; and Northeast Asia 77–81, 89–90, 111–12, 125–33, 138–9, 165, 168, 180–5, 190, 211–12, 224; nuclear standoff with North Korea 60, 78, 81–2, 98, 100–1, 111, 127–8, 182, 199–201, 207–8, 212, 214, 223, 226; and Pakistan 83–5, 87, 103–4, 134–5, 137, 139, 185, 187–8, 204, 212, 227; and Philippines 70, 172, 174; preeminence in Asia-Pacific 50, 54, 56, 67, 79, 102, 107, 112, 170, 206; see also hegemony, of United States; pre-emption strategy of 48, 60, 67, 109, 111–12, 114, 188, 214; and regional order 54, 56, 66, 176, 212–13; and Russia 58, 75–7, 98, 111, 113, 125, 165, 177–9, 213, 223, 230; and Singapore 69–70, 172, 174, 227; and South Asia 80–8, 90, 112, 133–7, 139, 160, 166–8, 185–91, 212, 227; and South Korea 78, 81–3, 90, 103, 111, 113, 126–9, 155–6, 183, 201, 213; and Southeast Asia 68–73, 88, 109–11, 117–21, 138, 163–4, 171–7, 189, 209–11, 222, 227, 230; and Soviet Union 2, 17, 27, 29, 31, 183; and Taiwan 113, 126, 131–3, 151–2, 165, 181, 225; and Tajikistan 177; and Thailand 70, 172, 174; and Treaty of Versailles 40; and Turkmenistan 177; and UN Security Council 30, 187–8, 205–6; and UN system of Cold War 198, 214; unilateralism of 48, 67, 88–90, 109, 112, 114, 214; use of force policies of 11, 31, 67–90, 111; and Uzbekistan 73–4, 177, 198, 227; and Vietnam 72, 172, 174; and war on terror 4, 75, 84, 119; and weapons of mass destruction 69, 70–1, 77–80, 84, 88–90, 114
United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) 169 unstable power balancing 2–3, 40–1, 54, 214; in Asia-Pacific 10, 22, 166; and Central Asia 211; and coexistence 42; on global level 236; in Northeast Asia 212; in South Asia 212; in Southeast Asia 211; between United States and China 4–5 UNTAET (United Nations Transition Authority East Timor) 120 use of force 29, 32–3; by China 117, 148; policies of China 67–8, 90–113; policies of United States 11, 31, 67–90, 111; rules on 11, 218; by United States 115–16, 222 Uyghurs 145–6, 159–60, 241n8 Uzbekistan: authoritarian regime in 123–4; and China 95–6, 196; and Russia 76; and United States 73–4, 177, 198, 227 Vietnam: and China 93; and United States 72, 172, 174 Vietnam War see Second Indochina War Vincent, R.J. 13, 17 violence see use of force Waever, Ole 237n2 Waltz, Kenneth N. 15 war: information 219; reducing risk of 15; rules of 11, 29, 32; see also conflicts between states war on terror 4, 74, 115–16, 119; Central Asia and 73–5, 177, 196; China and 196; and cooperation 121; Indonesia and 70, 72; Japan and 80; Russia and 197; SCO and 196; South Asia and 83–4, 90, 134, 137; Southeast Asia and 68–70, 72, 88, 174–5; United States and 4, 75, 84, 119 Warzaw Pact 34 Watson, Adam 2, 17 weapons of mass destruction 11, 21, 32, 69–71, 73, 77–81, 83–5, 88–90, 111–14, 127, 134, 136–7, 139, 160, 174, 182, 230 Wendt, Alexander 9 Western values 118 Wheeler, Nicholas J. 18 Wight, Martin 20, 26–8, 43–6 Wilson, Woodrow (former President of United States) 41, 238n9 WMD see weapons of mass destruction Xinjiang province (China) 77, 104, 145–6, 148, 156, 159, 161–3, 195–7 Yahuda, Michael 4–5 Yasukuni Shrine (Japan) 1023, 128, 153 Zia ul-Haq, Mohammed (former President of Pakistan) 134 ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) treaty 111
