The Australia-Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present (Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 4)

The Australia–Japan Political Alignment Routledge Studies in Modern History of Asia 1 THE POLICE IN OCCUPATION JAPAN ...

Author: Alan Rix

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The Australia–Japan Political Alignment

Routledge Studies in Modern History of Asia 1 THE POLICE IN OCCUPATION JAPAN Control, corruption and resistance to reform Christopher Aldous 2 CHINESE WORKERS A new history Jackie Sheehan 3 THE AFTERMATH OF PARTITION IN SOUTH ASIA Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya 4 THE AUSTRALIA-JAPAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENT 1952 to the present Alan Rix

The Australia–Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the Present

Alan Rix

London and New York

First published 1999 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002. © 1999 Australia-Japan Research Centre All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-415-19781-3 (Print Edition) ISBN 0-203-00377-2 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-20111-6 (Glassbook Format)

Contents

Preface

vi

Introduction

1

1

The First Political Links: Resolving Wartime Issues

9

2

Issues and Styles: Prime Ministers and Diplomacy

28

3

Resolving Disputes: Some Key Australia–Japan Negotiations

43

4

The Machinery of Diplomacy: Managing the Relationship

70

5

The Pressure of Public Opinion: The Japanese Presence and the Public Debate

96

6

Australia, Japan and International Cooperation

117

7

Keeping the Region Safe: Defence and Security in the Australia–Japan Relationship

147

Conclusion: Perfect Partners?

176

Bibliography

180

Abbreviations

186

Index

187

Preface

This book had its origins in personal experience of the workings of the AustraliaJapan political relationship and a realisation that no comprehensive work on this important subject was available. A research grant from the Australian Research Council enabled most of the research to be conducted, while the Department of Asian Languages and Studies at the University of Queensland provided the base for that work. I am indebted to many people for their assistance, notably Tony Anderton, Carol Chardon, Sue Collier, Peter Drysdale, Trevor Holloway, Purnendra Jain, Pam Rayner, Maureen Todhunter and Donna Weeks. Several colleagues gave valuable comments on an early manuscript, including Glen Barclay, Warren Reed and Bill Tow, as did two anonymous reviewers. My warm thanks also to Judy, Chris and Mike for their patience and support. Alan Rix Brisbane May 1998

Introduction

The newspaper headlines of December 1992 were insistent: ‘Japan’s perfect partner’, ‘our new best friend’, ‘Australia as sole natural ally’ —a senior Japanese diplomat, in an official Foreign Ministry publication, had singled out Australia as the only hope for a real partner for Japan.1 In Australia, Prime Minister Keating committed the country to future integration with the Asia Pacific region, further strengthening this message when he visited in September 1993. In May 1995 he signed the Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, in which both countries pledged to build ‘an enduring and steadfast partnership which is a strong positive force for cooperation in the Asian Pacific region’. Whether Australia is a natural ally of Japan is a controversial issue. What cannot be denied, however, is that the relationship between Australia and Japan is close, of long standing and very active. Most attention is focussed on the economic aspects of the relationship: commodity trade (notably coal), tourism and investment. The political aspects of the relationship are given little attention, even taken for granted. The fact that Australia and Japan have had strong, collaborative political links and a close interweaving of political interests since the Peace Treaty of 1952, has been largely ignored in debates about ties between the two countries. This book fills that gap. It is about the growth of the political alignment between Australia and Japan in the postwar period. Dominated by the economic and trade ties, and overshadowed by public attention on the rapid expansion of commercial interests and the minerals trade, Australia’s political relationship with Japan goes back well before the Second World War. There is a striking photograph in The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18 of the Japanese cruiser Ibuki escorting the first Anzacs from Australia to Egypt in 1914, from whence they crossed to Gallipoli. The Anglo-Japanese alliance, under which the Ibuki protected Australia’s troops, failed in the 1920s under a growing Japanese desire for independence in the Pacific, but it did introduce Australia and Japan to the idea that they had common interests in the Pacific region.2 These interests naturally diverged as Japan’s imperial ambitions grew, but trading links expanded until the mid–1930s, when Britain’s jealous textile exporters, through their government, forced Australia to restrict Japanese imports.3

2

The Australia–Japan political alignment

The political relationship between Australia and Japan today is of a different order. Founded on robust trade and shared security interests, it pervades all aspects of the bilateral connection between the two countries. It goes beyond the basic formalities and arrangements of diplomatic contact, and is a necessary and formative element of the relationship. The development of extensive political exchange and cooperation between Australia and Japan began early in the postwar period. Political dialogue with Japan runs throughout the postwar relationship. To a degree it reflects the fact that the two nations are part of a greater strategic arrangement, just as they had been in 1914. Since the end of the Second World War, Australia and Japan have cooperated under the Americandominated Pacific security system, and their bilateral relations have been moulded by this overwhelming reality. At the same time, Japan’s international position changed quickly in the 1950s and 1960s with its greater economic strength, its burgeoning defence profile, its part in US-Japan security cooperation, and the emergence of new influences on postCold War regional security. Much has been written about the postwar trade and economic relationship between Australia and Japan, but little about the political structures and processes that guided its growth, or about the people who oversaw the gradual intermingling of interests and political cooperation. There is little doubt that the impetus came from both sides, or that both were basically willing partners in the political rapprochement and forging of today’s strong political alignment between the two countries. THE AUSTRALIA-JAPAN POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP Although the Australia-Japan relationship has been seen by many as a purely economic one, where the central feature has been the growth of trade in the postwar period, trade has not occurred in a vacuum.4 This book details the complementary and indispensable set of government-to-government dealings that underpinned the commercial relationships, the panoply of political and bureaucratic consultations, government policies, public and political perceptions and attitudes, official negotiations and bilateral agreements, arrangements and understandings—all of which constitute the ‘political relationship’. We are not talking about a random set of bilateral ties, dominated by trade and highlighted by the occasional exchange of ministerial visits. The Australia-Japan political connection is a deeply-rooted political commitment in Australia, gaining greater depth more recently as the cooperative regional arrangements under APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) have gained acceptance. It is also an unavoidable responsibility for the Japanese, given their traditional dependence on Australian resources and raw materials, and their recognition since the Occupation period of the commonality of political and strategic interests between the two countries. A long history of political and diplomatic dealings, a complex legal and administrative structure, regional commitments, overlapping security interests, and a public awareness (articulated at least in Australia) have all given form and substance to the Australia-Japan relationship. There are several key themes in this story. The dominant one is that of a strong political alignment arising from shared security interests, and its effect initially in the resolution of wartime issues and later in the development of security and defence

Introduction 3

cooperation. This alignment is linked to concerns about regional security and the development of regional and international cooperation between Australia and Japan. A third theme has to do with the accretion of political, legal and bureaucratic commitments arising from closer consultation, diplomatic dealings and extensive negotiations. A fourth theme concerns the personal linkages between Australian and Japanese leaders, their reflection in a growing ease of communication and, at the wider societal level in Australia, the easing of public opinion and discrimination against the Japanese, despite periods of intense public debate. Let us unravel some of the skeins of this story. It begins in the period after 1945, when a new Japan sprang from defeat. A new and independent Australian attitude about its role in the Pacific region emerged from the wartime realisation that being part of the Empire did not confer automatic benefits of protection; rather, it brought heavy duties and painful costs. The Chifley government, through the insistent and aggressive Minister for External Affairs, H.V.Evatt, sought some of the responsibilities and rights in postwar international relations which its contribution to the war effort demanded. In relation to the Pacific settlement these demands were tolerated by the British, and Australia took part in the armistice with Japan, the Occupation of Japan, the Tokyo war crimes trials and the governance of Japan via the Allied Council for Japan, advisory body to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Allied Commander in Japan.5 A dominating feature of the postwar Australia-Japan link, tenuous, impersonal and suspicious as it was initially, was the antagonism between the Americans and the Russians. This was obvious to Australia’s representative in Tokyo, W.Macmahon Ball, as early as April 1946.6 It was a powerful motivating force for cooperation by both countries with the United States, despite Australia’s lingering fears of a revival of Japanese militarism. The formal military alliances between the United States and both Australia and Japan are thus an important part of our story, as they gave impetus to a congruent and persistent (but not identical) set of Pacific security perceptions held by Australia and Japan. A central focus of the Australia-Japan political relationship is therefore the strategic environment, notably the American hegemonic system, the security connections which held this together, the Cold War and its persistent effects, and the Australian and Japanese perceptions that brought them to recognise their overlapping interests in the Western Pacific region. These attitudes were first apparent in the earliest years of the post–1952 relationship, and came to the fore during the first exchange of prime ministerial visits in 1957. Similarly they were evident in the 1980s and 1990s, during the prime ministerial visits at that time, and remain an important feature of bilateral political discussions. The bilateral context is also a central part of our story. We examine the changes to Australian policy as a part of resolving wartime issues—establishment of relations, diplomatic dealings, sorting out compensation and war criminal cases. By the middle of the 1950s Australia had more or less cleared away such matters and could get on with more constructive dealings with Japan. As a part of this rapprochement, prime ministerial diplomacy in the 1950s is compared with that of more recent times—

4


the consistency of issues across that long span of years is remarkable. This persistence of issues is reflected in both the attitude of the Australian public to Japan, and the network of treaties and agreements that give legal foundation and form to the diverse bilateral relationship. Thus we examine the ways in which Australia’s discrimination and prejudice against the Japanese began to break down, and how public opinion has been influenced by the changes in the economic and political relationship over fifty years. It is clear that relationships do not necessarily rely on a compliant and supportive public. The 1950s experience showed that Australian political leaders were not prepared to test public opinion on the merits of an expanded political relationship with Japan. Time and a new Japan have changed that, but public opinion has not necessarily followed government policy. The development of the relationship has been occasioned by dissension in public opinion, and by tension at the official level, as the interests of each side have been tested over specific issues and policies. These differences have been particularly obvious in the process of bilateral negotiations, in which some of the fundamental principles of dealing between the two countries have been determined, and tested. The cases analysed (negotiations over pearlshell fishing, a commerce agreement, and the Basic Treaty of Friendship) show clearly the dynamics of a developing political relationship. Likewise, the bilateral relationship has required, indeed engendered, complex political, legal and administrative mechanisms. While there is argument about how effective some of these arrangements might be in advancing the interests of either party, they do provide an institutional basis for official-level dealings. In this regard, it is also important to detail the official presence in each country, and the mechanisms in each for managing relations with the other. Management of perennial tensions in ties with Japan usually relates to some of the major economic aspects of relations. The political waves from these issues of trade, immigration, transport, fishing, commodity trade and (more recently) tourism and investment have washed over many a cosy Australian preconception and disturbed a generally disinterested political milieu on both sides. Australia’s federal system has had a particular impact, particularly in the days of more aggressive federal-state relations in the 1970s and the political exercise of states’ rights by conservative premiers. One of the most important features of the postwar Australia-Japan connection has been the extensive regional cooperation between these two industrially advanced countries of the region. While such consultation and cooperation began back in the early 1950s with the Colombo Plan, and has been an ongoing aspect of their bilateral political discussions since then, the advent of the Pacific Cooperation concept in the 1960s led eventually to serious reassessment in both countries of the potential for greater bilateral commitment to regional issues, and some important political commitments by both countries in recent years. Japan and Australia have also been involved in a defence relationship, without a formal defence treaty. Security matters have shaped the bilateral relationship from the beginning, and this influence has stemmed mainly from their respective security treaties with the United States. It has involved the development of common approaches to regional security problems and a consistent but low level of defence exchange, more active in recent years. Defence and security, despite the lack of any formal bilateral

Introduction 5

arrangements, have always been at the foundation of the Australia-Japan relationship, given the context in which their ties grew and prospered, and the interests of both countries in maintaining their security treaties with the United States. AUSTRALIA-JAPAN POLITICAL ALIGNMENT A central feature of international relations in the Asia Pacific region is therefore that both Australia and Japan maintain strong political and security alliances with the United States: this is the classic feature of an ‘alliance’, two unequal nations held together in a formal military relationship, with responsibilities on each side.7 The military rationale for an alliance is usually cited as the prime motivating force, or at least a common aggressor is seen to be necessary, or a ‘fear of other states’.8 Snyder summarises our understanding of alliances to point out that an alliance is a ‘promise, an explicit mutual declaration of future intent,’ and involves military collaboration. He distinguishes formal alliances from the broader phenomenon of ‘alignments’, which refers to the expectations held by policymakers about support relations between nations. Dingman is more particular still, specifically identifying an alliance as ‘a written, formal agreement’.9 Without a formal bilateral alliance treaty involving military cooperation, the AustraliaJapan relationship can be deemed an ‘alignment’ in Walt-Snyder terms. Like Snyder, Ward also looks on this type of relationship more as an ‘alignment’, more extensive than the formal alliance and less focussed on the military dimension.10 However, Walt treats alliances and alignments as interchangeable. He accepts that alliances can be formal or informal but involve a relationship of security cooperation, requiring some level of commitment and exchange for both parties.11 In the wider literature, in the quest to understand how and why states select their partners, it is clear that alliance and alignment are often run together. Martin Wight, for example, takes a comprehensive view of alliances, seeing them as varied in character, purpose, occasion, duration and the relative position of their members. He accepts that alliances are possible beyond the traditional view of their security function: ‘they can also be wartime or peacetime, offensive or defensive, political or economic or cultural, permanent or temporary, bilateral or multilateral’.12 He particularly highlights political alliances which are designed, he says, to enhance the security of the allies or to advance their interests, against the outer world. Political alignment characterises the Australia-Japan relationship. This alignment encompasses a long-standing set of common security perceptions encapsulated in sister security treaties with the United States, concluded separately primarily because in 1951 Australia was not prepared to countenance a broader pact that directly involved an alliance with Japan. The Australian Government’s attitude to dealing with Japan changed relatively quickly in the 1950s, and the relationship led to growing dialogue about regional security, the buildup of strong regional cooperation, and a complex formal treaty relationship (albeit without a specific bilateral defence treaty between Australia and Japan). Indeed, several commentators over the years, particularly from Japan, have argued that Australia and Japan are now indeed ‘allies’ —a loose usage of the term, admittedly, but consistent with the appreciation of the breadth of what can constitute an alliance relationship.

6


More effusive reporting suggests that, ‘politically, Tokyo and Canberra are, at the moment, as snug as two bugs in a rug’. The Brisbane Courier-Mail stated baldly in 1995 that ‘Japan is our chief ally’.13 It is important to understand why this political relationship has come about. It could be argued in terms of the inherent bilateral gains deriving from Australia-Japan trade and economic relations: trade complementarity encouraging political alignment. But there was a wider agenda, notably the system of security treaties in the Pacific formed at the same time as the Japanese Peace Treaty, an American hegemonic system that necessarily involved both Australia and Japan. Walt argues that states ally against states that threaten them (they ‘balance’), or they ally with states that threaten them (they ‘bandwagon’).14 In the postwar Australia-Japan relationship there have been several processes at work. First, the American Pacific security system has been an underlying condition, and was brought about by Western attitudes to communism in the late 1940s and 1950s, fuelled by the Korean War, the Cold War, the rise of communist China and the Vietnam conflict. Australia and Japan both cooperated to strengthen Pacific security as formal allies of the United States. This approach lasted until the 1980s, with Australia and Japan both regarding themselves as active members of the ‘Western alliance’. In this context, as separate treaty partners of the United States, both countries saw their interests as dovetailing. They cooperated as would be expected of geographically proximate and economically linked members of the American hegemonic system. There is also a common perception that Australia and Japan need to cooperate for the Pacific future: strong bilateral interests dictated that Australia and Japan should seek closer alignment of policies, to help lead a dynamic and growing region. Second, there was throughout the 1950s and 1960s, linked to the formation of the American security system in the Pacific, a clear objective of keeping Japan away from the communists, encouraging its economic development and political maturity so as to make it a cooperative member of the American alliance network. This was a dominant theme in the development of Australian policy towards Japan in the 1950s and into the next decade, and was instrumental in helping change Australia’s official attitudes to dealing with Japan. Third, Australia began from the 1960s to regard the growth of Japanese economic strength and political influence as a sign of Japan’s growing status as a political power. Australia recognised the potential impact on Australia of this development and sought ways to accommodate itself to this new Japan. In Walt’s terms, then, how can we analyse the Pacific alliance relationships? The participation by Australia and Japan in their respective security treaties with the United States may represent a clear case of balancing with that power against the perceived and, on occasions, real communist threat in the Asia Pacific region. There was perhaps also, initially, an element of Australian bandwagoning with the United States against a perceived future threat from Japan, although this rationale was not long-lived. Similarly, Australia’s active policy of developing closer political and economic ties with Japan to keep it from the communists may suggest a process of balancing by Australia with the United States to bring Japan into the fold, and complementary balancing with Japan as members of

Introduction 7

the Pacific alliance. In this way, Australia and Japan could be seen as balancing to form the third side of a Pacific security triangle. There may also, however, be a sense in which Australia at times approached the relationship with Japan by ‘bandwagoning’, aligning itself closely with Japan to ensure that Australia remained linked to its more powerful partner and Japan remained aware of the benefits of the bilateral linkage. Japan’s greater economic, political and military strength has been recognised by Australia since the early 1960s, as will be explained below; Australia’s prosperity has been linked to the growth of the Japanese economy, and Australia’s policy has been to cultivate Japan actively at a diplomatic and trade level. Australia’s more recent focus on a ‘special relationship’ and a ‘constructive partnership’, and its efforts to engage Japan in cooperative regional activity over thirty years, point to another process at work, as Australia has strengthened its ties with Japan by implementing a more open and independent Australian diplomacy in the region, into which Japan could be and has been drawn. This was in part a reflection of Australia’s view that it could assist Japan in playing a greater political role in the region. The success of this Australian approach is a tribute to persistent and creative regional diplomacy, and constant engagement of Japan in regional affairs (particularly in APEC). Some see the Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership of May 1995 as an outcome of this process, largely eschewing diplomatic euphemism and stating boldly some frank agreements between Australia and Japan on long-term, ‘steadfast’ partnership, mutuality, friendship and regional cooperation.15 This policy has continued under the Howard government into 1998 with the endorsement of the ‘Partnership Agenda. There have thus been three processes at work in this bilateral alignment between Australia and Japan—first, the formal links between the United States and its separate treaty partners, Australia and Japan, that encouraged closer defence and security alignment; second, attempts by Australia to hitch its future closely to that of Japan; and third, Australian involvement of Japan in its own initiatives and interests, as part of the day-today development of the Australia-Japan political relationship across a wide spectrum of political and bureaucratic activity. The Australia-Japan political relationship tells us much about how Australia sees its place in the region, how it has defined its future and fashioned its diplomacy. Its largest trading partner has also been one of its greatest political challenges, as the two countries moved from the war years into peace and prosperity, and as the international roles of each shifted dramatically. The political substance of the Australia-Japan relationship has itself shaped the economic ties that have so dominated the debate about ties with Japan. NOTES 1 2

The Japanese article was Ogura Kazuo, ‘Chiiki togo to nihon no sentaku’, Gaiko foramu, December 1992, pp. 4–11. Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Athlone Press, London, 1966; Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901–14, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1976.

8 3

4 5 6

7

8

9

10

11 12 13

14

15

The Australia–Japan political alignment D.F.Nicholson, Australia’s Trade Relations, Melbourne, F.W.Cheshire, 1955, p. 122; D.C.S.Sissons, ‘Manchester v. Japan: the imperial background of the Australian trade diversion dispute with Japan, 1936’, Australian Outlook, vol. 30, no. 3, December 1976, pp. 480–502. Alan Rix, Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia’s Trade with Japan 1945–57, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986. Alan Rix, Intermittent Diplomat: The Japan and Batavia Diaries of W.Macmahon Ball, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988. Rix, Intermittent Diplomat, pp. 18–21. These matters, and the future relations of Australia with Japan, were discussed further by Ball in his Japan: Enemy or Ally, Cassell, London, 1948. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Macmillan and Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 268–70. George Liska, in his Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, pp. 3ff, also sees an alliance as a formalisation of alignments. Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 13; Kenneth N.Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Random House, New York, 1979, p. 166. Glenn H.Snyder, ‘Alliances, balance and stability’, International Organization, vol. 45, no. 1, Winter 1991, p. 123; Roger V.Dingman, ‘Theories of, and approaches to, alliance polities’, in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, Free Press, New York, 1979, pp. 245–66. Michael Don Ward, ‘Research gaps in alliance dynamics’, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, vol. 19, no. 1, 1982, pp. 8–9. Stephen M.Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1987, p. 12. Martin Wight, Power Politics, Penguin Books and Royal Institute of International Affairs, Harmondsworth, 1979, p. 122. Recent comments include Humphrey McQueen, ‘Japan: it’s time to accept the ties that bind’, Australian, 17–18 October 1982, p. 24; Australian, 5–6 December 1992; Walter Hamilton, ‘Fear that stifles a friendship’, Australian, 22 June 1992; Greg Sheridan, ‘Our new best friend’, Australian, 13–14 March 1993. A major Japanese statement of the importance of Australia-Japan ties was that referred to above by Ogura Kazuo, ‘Chiiki togo to nihon no sentaku’. The quote is from Greg Sheridan, reporting on an interview with Ogura, Australian, 14 April 1993. Also see Courier-Mail, 20 May 1995. Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Stephen M.Walt, ‘Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia’, International Organization, vol. 42, no. 2, Spring 1988, pp. 275–316; Stephen M.Walt, ‘Alliances, threats and U.S. grand strategy: a reply to Kaufman and Labs’, Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, Spring 1992, pp. 448–82. For the text of the Australia-Japan Declaration, see Embassy of Japan, Canberra, Reports from Japan, Spring 1995.

1 The First Political Links: Resolving Wartime Issues

The Australia-Japan relationship was redefined in the 1950s, becoming attuned to the new realities of the postwar world, as Japan sought and gained greater access to the world trading system and to international organisations. The period saw a fundamental realignment of Australian ties with Japan, with the exchange of prime ministerial visits by Menzies and Kishi in 1957 and the signing of a commerce agreement in the same year. More importantly, it was a time during which Australia, at least officially, wiped the slate clean of war-related problems, and began to allow Japanese to enter Australia once again. This action helped greatly to pave a smooth path for ministerial visits, bilateral talks on trade and a growing bilateral interchange in government and business circles. This chapter discusses how Australia dealt with the political and diplomatic issues of Japan’s wartime legacy, including the sensitive problems of immigration policy as it affected the Japanese. Australia quickly recognised the value in not just resolving the political (and indeed trade) matters that were a strong reminder of wartime animosities, but in beginning the process of moulding Japanese attitudes and policies towards cooperation with Australia. Trade resumption was slow but not impossible, but in the practical human dimension of allowing Japanese entry to Australia, policies proved more difficult to adjust. FRIENDLY OVERTURES Pressure for resolving outstanding issues with Japan had begun well before the Peace Treaty came into effect in April 1952. Australian officials had been cautiously arguing the case for greater acceptance of Japan at a political level. In the economic and trade area this was tempered by concern about import competition from Japan, but Menzies recalled the general approach that we ‘wanted to be on good terms with Japan and bring it into the community of nations’.1 Menzies was even lauded in the Japanese press as a member of the ‘know Japan’ school of thought. Certainly he was a realist, seeing that Japan could not be ignored or kept in isolation. This view was partly a result of his clear recognition, explained during the war years, of Japan’s future as a Pacific power; Australia’s interests required acceptance of Japan in international dealings.2 Australia’s negotiations on

10 The Australia–Japan political alignment

trade with Japan were infused with this pragmatism, and Menzies himself regularly reminded Australians of the sense of such a course: Australia must ‘blot out’ hostility towards Japan, an important industrial power with hard-working people: ‘To have a people like this in the Pacific area unfriendly to us would be a grievous error…. We must nurture every drop of friendship we can.’3 Menzies’ Minister for External Affairs, R.G.Casey, was also realistic, and expressed concern that Japan’s traditionally warlike nature would not disappear in the short term.4 In the parliamentary debate on the Peace Treaty in June-July 1951, Casey spoke of the potential ‘menace’ of Japan. Others were quite sanguine; General Blamey, former commanding officer of Australia’s war against the Japanese, was reported in 1949 as seeing no threat from Japan. He supported the development of Japan as a bulwark against Russia and as an ally of Australia. Japan, said Blamey, ‘will play an influential part in the world again’.5 Obviously, the Allied concern in the 1950s with the threat of communism was central to the need to ensure that Japan remained in the Western camp, and as friendly as possible. The problem for the Australian Government was how political relations should be handled to greatest effect in eliciting a positive and friendly response from Japan, and in a way that minimised the damage from a probably critical Australian public. ‘The wiping of the slate’ on all non-trade issues was, in fact, largely completed by 1954. The Peace Treaty required that parties to it should deal directly with Japan. As we shall see in Chapter 4, this eventually brought about a network of formal agreements and arrangements between Australia and Japan. Initially, however, it encouraged the beginnings of a government-to-government negotiation round; in fact, it assisted the establishment of formal diplomatic and political relations on a broad scale. Friendly relations with Japan were also fostered by Australia in a myriad of minor ways, as recommended by Australian diplomats in both Tokyo and Canberra. A wreath was sent from the Australian Embassy on the occasion of the death of the Speaker of the Lower House (Mr Shidehara Kijuro) in March 1951, and a message was also transmitted to the Imperial Family on the death of the Empress Dowager in May 1951, ‘on grounds of our future relations with Japan’.6 Eucalyptus seeds were presented to the Governor of Tokyo for a ‘Forest of Peace’ in the Meiji Shrine. However, in Canberra sensitivity to public opinion was still high, and the authorities were reluctant to approve the Japanese Ambassador’s laying a wreath at the Anzac Day ceremony in 1953 (a day that commemorates Australia’s war dead). To avoid giving direct offence to the Japanese Ambassador (who was widely respected), it was decided that only Commonwealth diplomats would be allowed to participate in the wreath-laying part of the ceremony.7 The first Japanese Cabinet minister to enter Australia after the war did not come until late in 1955, although he was not an official guest. Welfare Minister Kawasaki Hideji was in fact on a parliamentary ‘fact-finding visit’ to Australia and New Zealand, but he was hosted by Sir John Latham, the first Australian minister appointed to represent his country in Japan in 1940. Policy matters were omitted from any discussions.8 Irrespective of such action at lower levels to improve contacts between Australia and Japan, the Australian Government was anxious to settle the outstanding political issues between the two countries. The Japanese likewise were keen to see a number

The first political links: resolving wartime issues 11

of matters resolved, especially the question of Japanese war criminals still in custody. Economic and trade relations were also advancing steadily, but have been extensively discussed elsewhere.9 There was, in many sectors of the Australian Government, a desire to ‘clear the decks’ of problems left over from the war, and to start afresh in a new relationship with Japan. Already, peacetime contacts had ‘matured’ into a relationship that was taken so seriously that it involved an entrenched bilateral dispute over pearl fisheries and the right of Japanese boats to enter and fish for pearlshell in Australian waters. This is discussed in Chapter 3. Once the first Japanese Ambassador, Nishi Haruhiko, was appointed to Canberra in December 1952 (arriving a month later), pressure began to be exerted by the Japanese Embassy on several issues involving Japan’s international role (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), and bilateral links. Nishi and his staff were assiduous in their discussions with Australian officials, making full use of their new diplomatic presence. The Japanese were not, however, the only source of pressure for a review of Australian attitudes towards Japan. Within Canberra itself, and from London and Washington, came views strongly supportive of a ‘less unyielding’ approach to Japan. We know that, in commercial terms, pressure from the Japanese Government for a change in Australia’s approach was insistent during this period, and eventually Australian trade policy was revised to allow more favourable tariff treatment for Japanese goods. There was a need, therefore, for this relaxation of policy to be reflected on the political side as well. But what of politics? In a later chapter we examine Australian public attitudes and will see that in this early period there was a distinct dichotomy between hard-line antiJapanese feeling based mainly on wartime experience, and a tolerance of Japan based on a practical realisation of Australia’s need for the Japanese market and its regional strength. It was this pragmatism that lay at the base of the Menzies view of Japan’s strength and encouraged the opinion, expressed in his ‘Man to Man radio broadcast of 17 March 1954, that Australia should behave as a ‘grown-up nation which knows that the greatest stumbling block to peace is the perpetuation of enmity’.10 POLITICAL DECISIONS ON JAPAN The turning point in Australia’s political ties with Japan came on 17 August 1954 when Cabinet made decisions on a wide range of matters of Australian policy towards Japan. The wording of the decision itself is indicative of the mood of the time: The Committee inclined to the opinion that, in handling issues involving our relations with Japan, Australia should give special attention to the need to prevent the formation of a close alliance between Japan and Communist China; and that Australia should be guided by the principle of allowing Japan, through cooperation with non-communist nations, to have reasonable facilities for taking a part in her own defence, for meeting her economic difficulties by expanding her export trade, and for developing her political and economic life and institutions in a way that will strengthen Japan’s association with the West. 11


Here we see a government concerned to bring Japan ‘back to the fold’, to encourage her to stay in the Western camp through cooperation. We shall discuss presently what the government’s decisions were, but it is important to appreciate that Australia was under some pressure to review its policy. Even before this time there had been calls to forgive the Japanese, and this from no less than the conservative Sydney Morning Herald: Australia should, it encouraged, send the best available man as Ambassador to Japan, invite Japanese journalists to Australia, set up student exchanges and encourage sporting contests.12 This was perhaps further than the government was then prepared to go, but it was a call that had previously been mooted by liberal Australians who dealt with Japan,13 and eventually taken up as a first step in an official ‘cultural relations policy’ after prime ministerial meetings in 1957. Cultural relations, a central part of Japan’s bilateral relationships, will be discussed further below and in Chapter 5. Such initiatives were important to Japan in helping smooth the path for political discussions. The Japanese were themselves firm in arguing the case for political cooperation: Japan and Australia were now ‘in the same camp in this troubled world’, argued Japan’s first Ambassador, Mr Nishi, when he arrived in Sydney in January 1953.14 With moves in early 1954 to establish Japanese defence forces (and the eventual creation of the Self-Defence Forces in July 1954), comment focussed on how Australia’s interests would be served by giving Japan a proper alternative to ‘going it alone’ in the future.15 After the Menzies government was re-elected on 29 May 1954 (a controversial election held in the midst of the Petrov spy scandal), there was room for Cabinet to act. The US Government hoped for a warmer Australian attitude, and the American Ambassador had written to Mr Casey in these terms on 16 March. They also sought an easing of Australia’s attitude to Japanese war criminals.16 The Americans wanted to strengthen Japan’s defence as a part of regional security.17 Casey’s view was that ‘we have to “live with” Japan for the future and…we should give up our negative attitude towards the Japanese and be more forthcoming and civilised in our relationships with them’.18 Menzies apparently agreed. The United Kingdom argued that Japan was a danger to the Commonwealth and the Western world, because of the potential for a Japan-China nexus and a consequent shift in the world balance of power. Britain wanted to foster Japanese trade to help boost the Japanese economy, and to try to effect a change in British opinion towards Japan. Preventing an association between communist China and Japan was seen as the United Kingdom’s ‘cardinal aim in the Far East’.19 Given domestic political controversy over Soviet spying, the climate of opinion in Australia was also one conducive to an anticommunist policy. The Cabinet debate of 17 August 1954 was, in Casey’s words, ‘a good discussion and went on for over 2 1/2 hours’. Cabinet agreed solidly with the view that Japan had to be treated better and the Japanese economy supported. It was also agreed that endorsing Japan’s membership of the Colombo Plan ‘would be a good move to start off the “new deal” for Australia towards Japan’.20 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 5.


Cabinet wished to avoid both radical left- and right-wing tendencies in Japan, but sought a ‘moderate government’ to keep Japan in the Western camp. The major practical issues at stake were, apart from the Colombo Plan, dealt with in a variety of ways to give effect to the intent of the Cabinet decision. Resolution of trade matters was a longer-term problem, and was handled through the departments of Commerce and Agriculture and Trade and Customs. Trade questions could not be widely canvassed in an External Affairs Cabinet submission. However, other decisions in the second half of 1954 were critical in committing Australia to trade negotiations with Japan that culminated in the Commerce Agreement of June 1957.21 Similarly, Australia’s ongoing dispute with Japan over pearl fishing and Japanese entry to Australian waters was to continue for several years. But other war-related issues were on the agenda. In April 1952 when the Peace Treaty came into force, 241 Japanese war criminals were still serving sentences imposed by Australian war crimes courts. The Australian Embassy in Tokyo was ‘inundated’ with requests for war criminals to be repatriated to spend the remainder of their sentences in Japan. The Japanese Government in August 1952 also requested unconditional release of all war criminals sentenced by Australia.22 Australia was, in fact, the last of the Allies to grant parole or some measure of clemency to Japanese war criminals. Cabinet recognised that its reluctance to do so had placed Australia in an invidious position and open to Japanese criticism. Australia was not prepared in 1952 to release all war criminals, but as their sentences expired, some were returned home from Manus Island, where most of the Class B and C criminals sentenced by Australia were held. The government was ready to accept the application of Japanese Law 103 providing for ‘good time credit’ for early release of those held in Japan (mainly at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo), but Menzies (and others) raised the issue of Japanese compensation payments to Australian prisoners-of-war.23 No progress was made on that issue immediately, but Japan paid over £4.5 million in May 1955 to the Red Cross for distribution to governments concerned. In April 1955 Cabinet agreed to parole or release major war criminals on agreed international terms, and to the parole of minor war criminals after they had served ten years (or one-third of their sentence).24 There were delays due to UK opposition, but after releases and remissions, only 19 war criminals sentenced by Australia remained in custody. To alleviate what was seen as a major irritant in relations, it was decided in March 1957 (because of Menzies’ impending visit to Japan) that these prisoners should receive special consideration and all were released within a few months.25 It was undoubtedly a combination of concern about public opinion in Japan and possible damage to Australia’s policy of strengthening its relations with Japan that pushed Australia to resolve the war criminals question. Favourable Australian responses were also given to Japanese requests to recover their war dead in Papua New Guinea, and to undertake salvage operations in Rabaul. An agreement was signed in 1955 to provide for the maintenance of Australian war graves in Japan at the British Commonwealth Cemetery in Hodogaya, near Yokohama. This arrangement has continued to work well, with use of the land in perpetuity ceded to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. Japanese war graves in Australia numbered


some 526 (prisoners-of-war and internees) and were eventually all relocated to the Japanese cemetery in Cowra in the early 1960s. The cemetery is near the site of the former prisoner of war camp, and casualties from the Japanese outbreak at the camp in August 1944 are buried there. The cemetery is on NSW Crown Land under the trusteeship of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, which has allowed the Japanese Government to use it, on a payment-of-costs basis.26 CEMENTING FRIENDSHIP AND COLLABORATION By January 1957, Australia-Japan relations had developed to the point where the Japanese Embassy was able to express to the Department of External Affairs the view that ‘Australian policy was in fact one of developing genuine friendship with Japan and widening our cooperation…a large number of differences or points of friction that had existed between us were now cleared away, and that (in April 1957) AustraliaJapan relations ‘were now back to normal’.27 Foreign Minister Kishi, in his first formal interview with Australia’s Ambassador, Sir Alan Watt, in January 1957 expressed a desire to maintain friendly relationships. At about the same time the Australian Government began expressing a view not simply about the need to improve relations, but about the mutual interest that existed between the two countries. This represented a major departure for Australian policy—and says a great deal about Canberra’s perceptions of the changing balance in the political relationship, and its direction. A statement prepared by the Australian Embassy in Japan in early 1957 about Japan’s invitation to Mr Menzies to visit (a draft statement that was not distributed in the end) argued as follows: It is perhaps not generally recognised that Australia and Japan have many matters of mutual interest. Both are highly developed nations on the Western edge of the Pacific, and as such are destined to play an ever increasing role in the Pacific area. The stability and well-being of the various countries of S.E. Asia, particularly those which have only recently gained full sovereignty, must be of paramount importance to both. It is therefore only logical that Australia and Japan should cooperate in their efforts for the economic development of the S.E. Asian area. 28 Australia was perhaps able to feel some satisfaction at its support of Japan’s reemergence as an independent nation of the region. By March 1956 most of the issues identified by Cabinet in August 1954 for resolution had been settled. In a ‘personal and secret’ letter to Ambassador Watt in April 1956, Arthur Tange (then Secretary of the Department of External Affairs), was highly optimistic: On the whole I believe that the Japanese have been rather favourably impressed by the efforts which Australia has made to resolve outstanding difficulties. The Japanese come to Australia with some feeling of apprehension arising from their guilty recollections of their war-time excesses. Usually they depart feeling that they have been made more welcome in Australia than in any Asian country. The


Embassy in Canberra has been staffed by competent officials and headed by most competent Ambassadors. We have good working relations with them here and I should think that you should also be able to establish good working relations with the Japanese Government in Tokyo. If you find that this assessment has been over optimistic, please let us know.29 Tange also felt that public opinion had mellowed; indeed by the end of 1957 the Federal Congress of the Returned Servicemen’s League supported the governments move to strengthen friendship with Japan, mainly through the efforts of its national president between 1950 and 1960, Sir George Holland.30 Along with a more constructive Australian policy after 1954, and positive efforts by Australia to resolve the trade issue with Japan, came a broadening of the scope of bilateral ties. The visit of Mr Kishi brought a suggestion from him that expanded cultural relations would be advantageous. Japan saw the enhancement of cultural relations as a part of its diplomacy, a useful way to strengthen friendly ties without controversy or excessive expenditure. Through the latter part of the 1950s there had been sporting contacts, but Kishi proposed donating cultural materials to Australian universities for Oriental studies, and the establishment of a scholarship. Menzies responded by endorsing the value of cultural exchanges, and the joint communique recorded that agreement had been reached on expanding cultural ties, including the exchange of parliamentary visits. Such visits have continued spasmodically since that time, the Japanese Diet having its own JapanAustralia Parliamentarians’ Friendship League. The first exchange took place in 1958, and reciprocal visits have been a feature of the Australia-Japan political relationship since that time. Cultural ties focussed at first on art, film, academic and scientific exchanges, and media visits. When External Affairs Minister Casey visited Japan in March 1959, his Japanese counterpart, Mr Fujiyama, raised cultural relations in their talks, and argued strongly for the expansion of such links.31 These have grown into a central part of at least Australia’s contribution to the bilateral relationship, particularly with the establishment of the Australia-Japan Foundation by the Australian Government in 1975. It was felt in Canberra in the early 1970s that not a great deal had been achieved in the fifteen years or more of cultural exchange, and that a more focussed approach was required to Australia’s policy towards cultural relations with Japan. This was part of an attempt to add some substance to the economic relationship, bringing the relationship more into the wider social framework of ‘people-to-people’ bilateral contacts. CREATING A POSITIVE IMAGE OF AUSTRALIA The period immediately following the initial prime ministerial visits of 1957 and the conclusion of the Commerce Agreement in the same year was one in which government attention was focussed intensively on the progress of the economic relationship in the wake of the Agreement, and more broadly on the development of a closer working relationship between Australia and Japan in the areas of international cooperation. This is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, for it involved both widening governmental consultation on regional affairs in particular, and growing Australian sensitivity to the important


strategic and security position of Japan and its relevance to Australia’s role in this part of the world. As a result, Australia saw a particular need to develop policies to strengthen cultural and information activities, so as to consolidate Australian ties with Japan. The starting point for this approach was the recognition in Canberra in 1961 that ‘Japan will increasingly occupy a position of influence and power in the Pacific and Asian areas because of her economic strength and the ability and drive of her people’. As a result, it was felt that Japan should remain a friend of the West, especially because it could affect Australia’s ‘physical and economic security’. Thus Australia needed to ‘influence the present and potential leaders of Japan on lines favourable to Australia and to secure close political and economic collaboration’.32 In what became the basis for long-term policy towards Japan, a program of political information activities, cultural relations and friendly exchange of information was implemented, aimed at bringing Japan to a position of friendship with Australia and to break down long-held prejudices and misapprehension on the part of the Japanese towards Australia; for example, to counter the widely-accepted view that Australians were racist and anti-Japanese. This same approach has been central to Australia’s policy towards Japan ever since, particularly in defining an activist role for the Australian Embassy in Tokyo. Specifically, what was seen to be necessary was to make Japan feel part of the Western camp, to break down the Japanese view of Australians as uncultured, selfish in not exploiting their vast land, and anti-Japanese, and to encourage Japan to regard Australia as an equal partner in the Pacific. This was to be accomplished by more governmentlevel contacts, more visits by distinguished Australians to Japan, wider educational exchanges through postgraduate scholarships, Australian cultural activities in Japan, closer contacts between trade unions, and expanded information work through the Tokyo Embassy. Furthermore, an exchange of political intelligence was foreshadowed: the building up of an atmosphere of trust by bringing the Japanese more into our confidence as we do our Western allies though passing to them selected political information gathered by Australia in the field. This could also have practical advantages in that it might lead to our receiving information from the Japanese on areas, such as China, of special interest to Australia.33 These proposals were put to the Minister for External Affairs for agreement in principle and for action as and when appropriate. Later reports suggested that there was ‘a good Japanese response’ to the exchange of political information and views.34 Prime Minister Menzies was also positive, although perhaps less well-informed, telling Averell Harriman on a visit to the United States that ‘Australia’s trade policy towards Japan should be recognized as courageous, politically and economically’.35 Australia’s relations with Japan were fundamentally sound, ‘but he did not know what more could be done’ when asked how he thought Japan could be pushed further along the road to democracy and proWestern attitudes.36 He obviously did not have the benefit of the advice that Barwick had received, advice that was spelt out further in September 1962, to the effect that Japan could be encouraged ‘as an impressive example of synthesis between East and West…the idea of Japan as the bridge between East and West is one which tends to appeal to the Japanese themselves’.37


This rather creative thinking from Canberra blossomed into an active agenda of collaboration between the two countries in regional cooperation and on security issues, something that we shall discuss in later chapters. It is important to appreciate, however, that there was deliberate thought given to this process in this early period of diplomatic contact, and the possibility of an intense Australian investment in building bilateral ties, for Australia’s own benefit, was canvassed and accepted, and remained a part of Australian policy thereafter.38 Thus, resolution of many of the issues that had arisen in wartime was a powerful boost to closer bilateral ties. But this action, plus the deliberate Australian effort to foster closer ties through targeted political and cultural programs, was not the totality of the relationship, and serious outstanding problems hung cloud-like over prospects for an expanded and friendlier relationship. Chief amongst these were trade questions, notably Australia’s discriminatory import policies. Yet, by July 1957 a new agreement began the process of achieving non-discriminatory access for Japanese goods, and allowing greatly expanded bilateral trade. In 1963, discrimination under GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) by Australia towards Japan was removed entirely. Another serious impediment in the 1950s was the ongoing dispute over Japan’s access to the Australian pearlshell fishery. This was not resolved until the 1960s when pearlshell itself lost its economic attractiveness and Japan’s access was no longer a matter for concern in Japan. We deal in Chapter 3 with the implications of these difficult negotiations for the later political relationship. Of course, these issues were quickly replaced by others but the swift attention to the political management of irritation in dealings with Japan was a major step forward in placing the relationship on a foundation of reliability and stability—at least as far as the two governments were concerned. As we shall see, this was not always translated in Australia into public acceptance of Japan. Perhaps Menzies’ approach was effective in its subtlety: in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Mr Saito Shizuo, in 1971, Menzies said: I think it is most important that a broad relationship has been able to develop on the basis of our economic ties. But there is one thing that you need to note. That is, in short…that Japan-Australia relations should not be publicised. For example, it is necessary to build our partnership, but if the government states this too loudly, older people will seize on this commitment and it will lead to argument. Quietly letting Australia-Japan relations flow along is the best way for them to grow.39 Of course, the Australian Government has not always been able to, nor has it always wanted to, let relations with Japan go along quietly. Nor has the public always allowed them to; on the contrary, public attitudes have been an important factor in the development of the political relationship with Japan. THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM One of the primary public controversies in Australia’s political relationship with Japan has been that of the entry and stay of Japanese in Australia. In prewar years the number of residing Japanese was moderately high (3,593 in 1901 and still just under 1,000


in 1941).40 These people were largely connected with the pearlshell, pearling and sugar industries and the trade in primary raw materials such as wool that burgeoned in the 1930s. In the prewar period Australia was unbending in its refusal to soften the discrimination applied to Japanese under its immigration laws. An important feature of the postwar relationship has therefore been how Australia has come to grips with the need to open its doors wider to Japanese who wished to live and work in their country. It took nearly three decades after the end of the Second World War for a fully nondiscriminatory policy to emerge, as part of a fundamental reassessment of Australian immigration policy by the new Labor government of the day.41 Understandably, anti-Japanese feeling was strong immediately after the war, particularly during the period of the first postwar Labor government under Chifley, which administered the relationship with Japan in the formative years from the end of hostilities until 1949. Immigration policy under the then Minister, Arthur Calwell, was straightforward: No Japs! Calwell claimed to be representing Australian public opinion and its resentment of Japanese atrocities against Allied soldiers; he denied racist animosity but there is no doubt that the tenor of policy and the attitudes of the day (notably in Calwell’s strong statements) had strong racist overtones.42 Admittedly much of the wartime propaganda had been of the same sort.43 Calwell claimed that while he was Minister no Japanese would be permitted to enter the country.44 On 6 October 1948, in discussing the entry of Japanese war brides, he declared ‘Japanese women should not be allowed to pollute our shores…’.45 This uncompromising stance was a part of a deliberate policy on the problem of the Peace Treaty with Japan. The Australian Government view was that no Japanese should leave Japan until after the peace settlement, and Japanese emigration should certainly not be contemplated. The Department of Immigration stated that ‘no Japanese irrespective of circumstances will be permitted to visit Australia’.46 This strict policy continued until the very end of the Labor government’s term, and only one month before the 1949 General Election Calwell was restating his attitude, which by that stage (given the expanding demand for and opportunities in trade) was not serving Australia’s broader interests at all: We don’t want to see any Japanese on Australian shores in any circumstances or in any capacity…That goes for trade, as well as for sport. I think the feelings of those relatives of the men who were butchered fiendishly are more worthy of consideration by a Minister of State than profits to be made from trade and laurels to be won in sports.47 In referring to sport, Calwell was answering proposals from the Australian Ambassador in Japan, Patrick Shaw, that Australia follow the US lead and allow the development of sporting and philanthropical ties as a means of encouraging more friendly attitudes towards the Japanese. A visit by the president of the Japanese YWCA was refused in October 1948, and the Australian Lawn Tennis Association had blocked the return of Japan to the World Tennis Federation. Requests for business visits were also refused until late in 1951.48


The election of a conservative government in Australia in December 1949, and the appointment of Harold Holt as Minister for Immigration, began a new period in dealing with Japan, and specifically with Japanese entry to Australia. The first Japanese visitor was the Bishop of Kobe, Bishop Yashiro Hinsuke, a renowned Anglican leader in Japan and opponent of Japan’s military past. The Anglican Archbishop of Sydney petitioned the government and the Immigration Department granted a visa to the Bishop to transit Sydney en route to New Zealand and to stay in Australia on his return in June 1950. This was despite External Affairs’ narrow-minded reservations: It seems unreasonable to deny the Bishop a visa. At the same time the attitude of the Australian Government since the war has been consistently opposed to Japanese visiting Australia until the peace treaty has been signed. If the Bishop lands, it will be the thin edge of the wedge. Under the circumstances I would suggest that we ask the Bishop to find another route into New Zealand.49 Despite this excessive and almost vindictive caution by the diplomats, press attitudes were increasingly vocal in their support of greater contacts with Japan. Calwell’s November 1949 statement was roundly criticised by the Sunday Herald of 20 November: …there is no point in trying to bind the future by such declarations as Mr Calwell has made. These may be popular at the moment; they are no substitute for a rationally determined, long-range policy…. Bitter as we still feel towards the Japanese in this country, we cannot and should not wish to keep up our feud with them forever. They are our neighbours in the Pacific, and we will have to find a basis for living with them again. Gestures of unappeasable hatred and suspicion will not help. The same sentiments were reiterated by the Sydney Morning Herald in supporting the visit of Bishop Yashiro. Official policy was to encourage visits by people from Asia (except Japan), and the law made no discrimination on racial grounds. Nonetheless, the application was ‘firmly based on the determination to maintain a homogeneous population—of predominantly British extraction—without racial or minority groups’.50 Even an American citizen of Japanese origin was refused a visa in April 1951, although by August of that year Japanese formerly living in Australia (including former internees) and those en route to other countries, were allowed in. Japanese business visitors gained access from October 1951, and journalists from March 1952.51 War brides (that is the Japanese wives of Australian servicemen and ex-servicemen who had served in Japan during the Occupation and met their future spouses there) were allowed to enter Australia from 1952, and thereafter policy towards Japan began to be eased. Thus the relaxation of the strict policy towards Japanese entry was hastened by humanitarian concerns: sympathy towards servicemen separated from their war brides. This immigration problem was one that had sprung directly from Australia’s involvement in defeating Japan, and which had aroused controversy in the administration of the Occupation.52 Caution about the possible numbers of war brides seeking entry remained, however, and External Affairs attempted to limit the number and range of persons applying.53 The war brides and their arrival in Australia created quite a stir in the press for a time. Even the noted war historian C.E.W.Bean argued in the Argus (20 January 1953) for public forbearance for Japanese brides, saying that


Japanese atrocities were minor compared to those of the past, and that the Japanese ‘had no tendency to brutality’. A flood of applications from servicemen in Japan to marry Japanese girls occasioned some mild panic on the part of the Army and External Affairs people, particularly as BCOF/BCFK54 was waiting to repatriate quite a number of the longer-serving men in Japan who were the most likely to have formed such friendships. To inject some realism and dampen enthusiasm amongst Japanese women, it was even proposed that Mrs Cherry Parker, the first war bride to be allowed into Australia, should broadcast to Japan on Radio Australia a message about the difficulties of mixed marriages and the kindnesses she had encountered in Australia. While this might have deterred some hopefuls, messages about acceptance by Australians of Japanese war brides would not have done so.55 The governments objective here was to avoid a rush of Japanese into Australia, although many of these applicants would already have had lengthy liaisons. Authorities also wanted to limit problems that might arise later in marriages where the couple was mismatched or might encounter hostility in Australia. In April 1953, forty brides arrived in Australia, and the number eventually reached about five or six hundred.56 This policy (which later also included Japanese fiancees of Australian servicemen, although on much stricter conditions) proved to be extremely important in influencing public opinion.57 Calwell was characteristically unpleasant about the migration of war brides, claiming that it was part of a Menzies policy of appeasing Japan.58 But one informed view was that the great success that the very large majority of these women earned in their role as Australian wives, mothers and citizens in their new country was one of the factors that made it relatively easy for the Australian Government in 1956 to lift the ban on the naturalisation of Asians that had been in operation since Federation. In 1956 Asians became eligible for naturalisation upon marriage to an Australian, and other Asians became eligible after 15 years’ residence. This enabled the war brides and the small handful of Japanese who had remained since before the passing of the Immigration Restriction Act [of 1902] to become citizens and ended their disqualification from some social service benefits. 59 As well as war brides, other categories of visitor were allowed entry.60 A visa was granted in May 1952 to a journalist from the Asahi shimbun, and even to two Japanese jockeys and a veterinary surgeon to look after yearlings sold to Japanese interests. Nothing, it seems, would get in the way of the interests of the Australian horse-racing industry! The first Japanese students were admitted in March 1953, and tourists in July 1954, although strict foreign exchange controls in Japan prevented many tourists from coming. The policy appeared rather inconsistent when Japanese radio scientists were strangely dissuaded from coming to an international scientific conference, whereas some sporting contacts had been allowed in 1954. The Lawn Tennis Association, previously strongly opposed to the participation of Japanese players in Australian tennis tournaments, relented, saying that they would welcome a Japanese team visit. The Tokyo Giants baseball team toured in November 1954, although it


excited little public interest.61 It was symbolically important for both Japan and Australian immigration policy that Japan sent a national team to the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, despite some lingering public opposition in Australia. In October 1956 Japanese were placed on the same immigration basis as other Asians, and by 30 September 1958, 1,008 Japanese were in Australia under nineteen different categories of entry. The largest groups were war brides (457), pearlers (274) and businessmen including wool buyers and merchants (149).62 Wider access The 1956 lifting of the ban on naturalisation of Asians also allowed highly qualified Asians to enter and become naturalised after fifteen years. In March 1966 this period was reduced to five years and technical specialists were also allowed to enter for indefinite stay. The main groups of specialists were initially engineers, geologists, prawn fishing and pearling experts and university staff.63 A reciprocal visa agreement between Australia and Japan took effect from 10 February 1969. It abolished visa fees and provided for multiple entry four-year visas for business representatives and visitors. Some controversy with trade unions arose in the 1960s over the employment of Japanese specialists on mining operations in Western Australia, but a 1965 statement by the Western Australian Trades and Labour Council accepted the use of Japanese skilled tradesmen where Australian labour was in short supply.64 The evidence of the Department of Immigration to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in 1972 is a substantial statement on immigration policy towards Japan.65 At that time there were still separate provisions for entry of ‘persons of nonEuropean descent’. The Department of Immigration paper recognised that there were pressures to change the policy—not in the sense of eliminating its racially discriminatory aspects, but in its specific day-to-day operations. It acknowledged pressure from the tourist industry to abolish visas for Japanese and American citizens (see below), but firmly opposed this on the grounds of it interfering with entry procedures through immigration. It also recognised complaints (notably from business organisations) about procedural problems in approving and issuing visas. Similar problems were echoed by other witnesses to the Committee,66 although the Department argued that these difficulties were minimal within the overall system. The wider problem was whether the Immigration Department system of regulation reflected a basically racist approach to dealing with Japan. Former Prime Minister Whitlam has described it as ‘that second-rate, racist department’,67 and there is no doubt that Australia’s image in Japan in these years was one of ‘White Australia’, an image not assisted by the teachings in the Japanese school curriculum about Australia’s racial policies, nor the easily understood term for the White Australia policy, haku-go-shugi. As Palfreeman points out, ‘between 1907 and 1966, the policy was, for all practical purposes and with some rare exceptions, one of exclusion’ [of non-Europeans].68 The government of Harold Holt in 1966 (especially his Minister for Immigration, Hubert Opperman) began the process of dismantling the White Australia Policy.69 The Labor


government of Mr Whitlam after 1972 wished to remove the ‘White Australia’ tag, and did so reasonably successfully. Australian policy since that time has gone a long way towards persuading the Japanese that such a problem no longer exists; the tourist boom and the rapid growth in Japanese business residents in Australia has demonstrated that Australia’s past racial attitudes are not given great prominence in Japan today, although the Japanese press is not slow to report what it sees as racist comments in Australian public debate. The number of Japanese migrating permanently to Australia has never been large, and has never been a target of Australian policy. The Minister, Mr Downer, specifically rejected the idea of encouraging Japanese migration in 1959, saying it was unlikely to be acceptable to public opinion.70 Recent figures indicate that in the year ended June 1996, 676 Japanese arrived as settlers, nearly three times the number in 1982, but below the peak year of 1988 when 820 Japanese arrived as permanent entrants. Japanese-born residents of Australia at 30 June 1995 numbered 25,340.71 VISAS AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT Apart from the early postwar years, immigration and visa matters have not been a significant problem at the political level. They have always been present, however, particularly because of Australia’s image in Japan until recent years as a country unwilling to allow entry of non-whites. Difficulties over visas for businessmen, and conditions attaching to them, have been an ongoing irritant in the economic relationship, and bilateral Business Cooperation Committee meetings have pointed out these deficiencies on a regular basis. In 1964, a senior Japanese businessman complained of inconsistency in approvals for technical staff to work on projects in Western Australia: ‘Mr Doko said it was still difficult for a Japanese businessman to get a visa for anything like a prolonged stay in Australia’.72 The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Aichi, when he visited in June 1979, denied that Japan regarded discrimination as a problem.73 However, reports indicated that many Japanese businessmen had such a strong image of Australia as racist and discriminatory in its dealings with Japan that the improvements which had been made in visa approvals were not fully appreciated: …Australia’s reputation in Japan is much worse than it need be because of the misconceptions which surround our immigration policies—misconceptions which Australia had made little effort to clear up…. An analysis of the situation [regarding temporary entry] indicates that these days at least this type of discrimination is a good deal less common than most Japanese think. But it is difficult to convince Japanese businessmen of this, partly because of actual discrimination in the past, but mainly because many Japanese tend to transfer their anger at Australian discrimination against Japanese immigrants [which the author acknowledged was unambiguous] into this arena. They assume that because there is discrimination in one field there is in the other.74 In May 1956 the Japanese Embassy in Canberra had proposed a draft agreement on ‘Entry, Stay, Travelling and Residence’, seeking ‘most-favoured nation treatment’ in such matters. This followed their raising the issue in the first session of the informal


trade talks and their insistence on some equality of treatment in entry and stay for the businessmen of each country in the other.75 Australia appreciated that, in regard to entry and stay, ‘the Japanese will probably not consider it sufficient to be placed on the same basis as other Asians and may well ask to be treated no less favourably than any other alien, for example, French or American’.76 Australia was not interested in taking up the proposal (see Chapter 3 on the origins of the Basic Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation) and discussions lapsed, not being revived until the early 1970s. When negotiation for the Basic Treaty took place between 1973 and 1976, Japan originally sought standard Friendship Commerce and Navigation (FCN)-type provisions for entry and stay. Woodard notes that the Immigration Department was seen ‘as one of the least helpful’ during the negotiations: A significant factor in the Department of Immigration’s attitude during the Treaty negotiations was its desire to preserve the wide degree of discretion its officers enjoyed in making decisions on a case-by-case basis (it claimed this worked to the advantage of Japanese businessmen). Throughout the negotiations it refused to accept that the Treaty would not be used by Japan to make representations in individual cases.77 The outcome of the Treaty negotiations was Article VIII, which provides for ‘fair and equitable treatment with respect to…entry into, sojourn or residence in, travel within and departure from’ each country. Each party was also required to simplify its procedures relating to entry and stay. It also provided that treatment would not be discriminatory between each party and that accorded to third countries. The Agreed Minutes (Paragraph 1) also make it clear that claims cannot be retrospective: …these provisions in no way require either country to accord the nationals of the other country treatment which has been accorded to nationals of any third country under policies which are then no longer operative. The Exchange of Notes provides a specific guarantee of temporary entry of 180 days and vague assurances of favourable treatment for the entry and stay and renewal for trade and commercial purposes. In all aspects of entry and stay a ‘floor’ of most-favoured nation treatment is provided. However, a protocol to the Treaty specifically excludes Japan from claiming any privilege arising from Australian visa or migration agreements with other countries. The Treaty placed the long-vexed problem of the handling of Japanese entry to Australia into a ‘stable and orderly framework’, which has not been upset by subsequent events. The Prime Minister’s Committee which reported on the Australia-Japan relationship in September 1977 did not even mention immigration and entry/stay issues, nor made any recommendations thereon.78 There have been some improvements introduced, such as the Working Holiday Visa scheme introduced in 1980, an important means for enabling younger people to gain experience in the other country. Discussion of a no-visa agreement was raised in Australia in 1980, but did not get far. It was felt that, since Australia had no other such arrangements (while Japan had forty-five as of late 1980), it would cause concern amongst ethnic communities in Australia if the Japanese alone were given visa-free entry. The visa-free issue arose again in 1986–87 when a Cabinet sub-committee revisited the problem and the broad question of whether Japanese


should gain some form of favourable treatment within Australia’s overall immigration policy. While such a change was not approved, one comment urged the government to agree, on the grounds of the importance of the Australia-Japan relationship and the fact that Japanese tourists and visitors were ‘among the most desirable foreign entrants to Australia’.79 The newspaper decried the efforts of the Returned Servicemen’s League to prevent any changes: …One unforgiving, shamefully primitive, antediluvian political lobby dominates Australian policy in this area. The RSL and its fading cohorts still carry sufficient political heft to block any reform of immigration procedures for Asians in general and Japanese in particular… The call for visa-free entry was taken up both by Japanese and Australian interests: a senior government adviser, Mr Amaya Naohiro, argued that controls on the entry of Japanese businessmen were a source of friction, while the strongly pro-tourism and prodevelopment Premier of Queensland, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, urged visa-free entry as a means of boosting the numbers of Japanese visitors to Australia.80 Conversely, there have been some proposals for Japan to ease restrictions on Australians residing in Japan. Senate Committee evidence in 1972 pointed out that rather strict conditions applied to aliens (such as Australians) residing in Japan, although Australians were not specifically discriminated against. Woodard points out that in the early stages of the Basic Treaty discussions in Canberra it was suggested that a standard of treatment based on reciprocity could be adopted. The idea was not taken further.81 However, entry and stay provisions for Australians into Japan have never been a serious problem in the relationship. The issues of entry and stay for Japanese, and the presence of Japanese in Australia, have always been sensitive matters for the Australian Government. They remain so, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. For governments, however, more immediate problems of diplomacy revolve around the atmosphere of the relationship, the way in which representatives of each country conduct themselves, and the way in which they are treated. The bilateral diplomatic arena in postwar Australia-Japan relations has always been constructive and friendly, albeit a little tentative to begin with in the 1950s. The initial diffidence was eased markedly by the success of reciprocal prime ministerial visits in 1957. The issues discussed then were important in setting a climate for bilateral political and economic cooperation, and in many ways the fundamental objectives of policy have not changed markedly since that time. It will be helpful, therefore, to examine the process of prime ministerial diplomacy early in the relationship’s history, and in more recent times, and it is this topic that we take up next. NOTES 1 2

R.G.Menzies, The Measure of the Years, Cassell, London, 1970, p. 61. Menzies in D.A.S. Campbell, Post-war Reconstruction in Australia, Sydney, Australasian Publishing Company, 1944, p. 30. See also an article by Malcolm Fraser, ‘Britain’s Asian blind spot’, Australian, 5 January 1994.

The first political links: resolving wartime issues 25 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Sydney Morning Herald, 23 August 1958. T.B.Millar, Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G.Casey 1951–60, Collins, London, 1972, p. 32. South China Morning Post, 1 April 1949. Response by Harry to note by Jamieson, 21 May 1951, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 1. Sunday Sun, 26 April 1953. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/10/2. Alan Rix, Coming to Terms: The Politics of Australia’s Trade with Japan 1945–57, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986. Age, 18 March 1954. Decision no. 53 (PM), 17 August 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 17. Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 1952. Reverend X.Coaldrake, Herald, 30 January 1950. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 January 1953. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 July 1954. Allen to Plimsoll, 22 July 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 2. Roger Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945–1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, Chapter 3. Casey to Tange, 23 July 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 2. Casey in Cabinet Submission no. 30, 28 July 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 2 (Decision no. 53, 17 August 1954). Casey to Tange, 17 August 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. See Alan Rix, Coming to Terms, Chapter 9. See Cabinet Agendum 347, September 1952, AA, A4905/XM1, vol. 14. R.G.M. handwritten note of January 1953 on an explanatory memorandum about Submission 347 (September 1952). Cabinet decided on 23 January 1953 to defer consideration of the matter. See Decision 637 and Submission 347, AA, A4905/XM1, vol. 14. Cabinet Decision 381, 14 April 1955, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 12. Brief for Menzies’ visit to Japan, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 1. Japan Secretariat Research Paper 19/81, ‘Treaties and Agreements between Australia and Japan’, January 1981. Uyama, 4 January 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4; ‘AHL’ to Cutler, 5 April 1957, 3103/10/1 part 5. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Tange to Watt, 4 and 10 April 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Daily Telegraph, 31 October 1957. I.5354, 26 March 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Submission to Secretary, 1 December 1961, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Forsyth to Minister, 21 May 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Brief for Minister’s visit to United States, September 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/ 10/1 part 9.

26 The Australia–Japan political alignment 35 Notes on discussion with Harriman, 19 June 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. 36 Menzies’ discussions with Harriman, I.15331, 22 June 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/ 10/1 part 9. 37 Minister’s brief, September 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. 38 Alan Rix, ‘Australia and Japan’, in F.A.Mediansky (ed.), Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions, Maxwell Macmillan, Botany, 1992, pp. 194–207. 39 Saito Shizuo, Osutoraria tsushin, Kokusai kaihatsu janarusha, Tokyo, 1971, p. 266. 40 D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Immigration in Australian-Japanese Relations, 1871–1971’, in J.A.A. Stockwin (ed.), Japan and Australia in the Seventies, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p. 202. 41 A.C.Palfreeman, ‘Immigration’, in W.J.Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs 1971– 75, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980. 42 C.Kiernan, Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography, Nelson, Melbourne, 1978, p. 134. 43 On the role of racism in the Pacific War, see John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon, New York, 1986. 44 Current Notes on International Affairs, January 1949, p. 107. 45 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 198, 6 October 1948, p. 1271. 46 22 July 1949, AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 part 1. 47 Canberra Times, 16 November 1949. 48 Alan Rix, Coming to Terms, pp. 181ff. 49 See AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 part 1, for documents relating to this case. 50 19 July 1951, AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 part 1. 51 AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 parts 1 and 3. 52 See Oliver Simmonson, Commonwealth Fraternisation Policy in Occupied Japan, unpublished MA thesis, University of Queensland, 1991. 53 AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 part 2. 54 British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) and British Commonwealth Force Korea (BCFK). 55 For the Minister, 11 December 1952, AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8 part 2. 56 The treatment of Japanese in Australia after the war is dealt with in Yuriko Nagata, Unwanted Aliens: Japanese Internment in Australia, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1996. 57 However, it did not extend in 1962 to the government supporting the welfare of children born of Australian servicemen in Japan, or to allowing them to come to Australia for adoption, see AA, A5819/2, decisions 469 and 484 of 1962. 58 Canberra Times, 1 April 1952. 59 Evidence of D.C.S. Sissons to Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 3 December 1971, Official Hansard Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, p. 70. 60 See AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/8, parts 2 and 3. 61 Daily Telegraph, 22 November 1954. On Japanese visas, see AA, A1838/289, 3103/10/ 8 part 2. 62 AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7.

The first political links: resolving wartime issues 27 63 Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Official Hansard Report, p. 191. 64 Sissons, ‘Immigration in Australian-Japanese relations’, p. 207. Also see Australian Financial Review, 13 October 1967 in relation to its important effect on trade with Japan. 65 Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Official Hansard Report, pp. 189– 205. 66 Notably Messrs Madigan (p. 1087), Biggs (p. 1088–90) and Clark (p. 1033–4). 67 Australian Financial Review, 21 March 1979. 68 Palfreeman, ‘Immigration’, p. 99. 69 Article by Jamie Mackie, Australian, 8 March 1996 and letter by Denis Warner, Australian, 12 March 1996. See also Sean Brawley, ‘The Department of Immigration and abolition of the “White Australia Policy” reflected through the diaries of Sir Peter Heydon’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 41, no. 3, 1995, pp. 420–34. 70 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 October 1959. 71 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. 3404.0, 1996 and 3412, 1994–95. 72 Australian Financial Review, 4 September 1964. 73 Australian Financial Review, 17 June 1970. 74 Australian Financial Review, 5 June 1970. 75 Ministers Brief for Japan, March 1959, in AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7, and Initial Statement, in AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 3. 76 Prime Minister’s Conference data papers, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. 77 Gary Woodard, ‘The Australia-Japan Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation: an Australian perspective’, Pacific Economic Papers, no. 172, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra, 1989, p. 17. 78 Australia-Japan Relations, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978. 79 Australian Financial Review, 27 November 1986. 80 Australian, 7 February 1987; Courier-Mail, 12 January 1987. 81 Woodard, ‘The Australia-Japan Treaty’, p. 15.

2 Issues and Styles: Prime Ministers and Diplomacy

The political relationship between Australia and Japan, founded in the 1950s, was largely overshadowed by the needs of trade development in the 1960s and 1970s, and came to the fore again in the 1980s with renewed efforts by both countries to insert political and security issues into the framework of common interests. In the 1990s regional cooperation and security are again at the centre of bilateral concerns and, with rapid changes in Japanese thinking on the role of their Self-Defence Forces and participation in international peacekeeping operations in 1992, closer bilateral defence and security cooperation are important future considerations for both countries. This chapter focusses on prime ministerial diplomacy, highlighting styles in Australia-Japan leadership contacts in the 1950s, the 1980s and the 1990s. Although the personalities were different, the media approaches were worlds apart and Australian diplomacy became much more independent in its outlook, the differences were not as great as one might imagine: Australian and Japanese leaders were concerned in both eras with the minutiae of relations (notably market access) and the broader questions of regional trade and security. The styles were at variance, but the substance of the visits had much in common, even across a span of thirty years. This fact alone says much about the continuity of the Australia-Japan relationship over this time. For Australians, and especially Australian political leaders, Japan has come to be a high stage for political grandstanding. It was not always so, even though the common interests of both countries were recognised early by officials in Tokyo and Canberra. These interests derived from the Cold War mainly but not exclusively; they also resided in the legacies of war, but not simply the desire by many to overcome enmity and grief. War also disrupted trade and the normal friendly commercial relations that each country had enjoyed with the other prior to the Pacific conflict. Politicians, graziers, builders and workers alike saw the potential for future relations, despite the public reserve and the personal animosity expressed in the press and amongst various public pressure groups. The issues and style of Australia-Japan diplomacy in the 1950s and today typified some of the changes that have occurred in dealings between Australia and Japan over forty years; they also reflected the fact that much had not changed, and that efforts

Issues and styles: prime ministers and diplomacy

29

at the highest levels of government to improve and deepen relations remained a top priority for the Australian Government. The significant new factor in the bilateral equation by the 1980s was that Japan had become a power of world status, for whom Australia was far less of a major policy concern than it was when Japan was finding its way again in the postwar world of the 1950s, and when Australia was, in the public eye at least, a symbol of anti-Japanese sentiment. The focus of the challenge has shifted. In late 1957 as Australia officially greeted the first Japanese prime minister to step onto Australian soil, the media harped on the injustices to Australian citizens under Japanese rule in theatres of war in the 1940s; but the late 1980s also saw the Australian media questioning the relationship with Japan and its motives in proposing the so-called Multi-function Polis, while letters to editors warned of the Japanese real estate takeover and the possibility of Japanese imperialist objectives finally being achieved. Similarly, moves were still being made to gain compensation from the Japanese Government for former prisoners-of-war, and calls for the Japanese Emperor to apologise to Australians for Japan’s war deeds continued in political speeches and letters to newspaper editors in the early 1990s.1 Australia’s links with Japan in the 1950s and the 1990s had much in common. Despite the fact that Japan was the dominant economic power of Asia, the balance of trade still remained in Australia’s favour, with an ongoing healthy surplus in Australia’s trade with Japan of $5,235 million for the year ended June 1997, with exports of coal, beef, gold, iron ore and LNG continuing to dominate the trade.2 Although trade in many commodities was stable and regular, there was still uncertainty in the long-term relationship (and especially in some key commodities such as coal). Australia’s objectives were rather less clear in the 1990s than they were in the 1950s, and it was Australia’s place in Asia that was being pondered, not Japan’s. Trade remained the foremost bilateral issue, but joint Australia-Japan interests in a stable, regional power structure (albeit now devoid of the United Kingdom) were never far from the surface. In 1957, both countries had embarked on a new period of friendship, entered into a new bilateral trade arrangement based on non-discrimination, and espoused common strategic objectives. Over the intervening years, the friendship has strengthened (often for very pragmatic reasons), trade has been reasonably fair, if tough, and under pressure from other competitors, and through the 1980s strategic aims remained locked into the US security system aimed at keeping the Soviet Union out of the Pacific. In 1987 the Japanese Foreign Minister spoke at the bilateral ministerial forum of the Australia-Japan ‘North-South axis’ (not a happy turn of phrase).3 A year later, in commenting on the approach of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Takeshita, to regional affairs, an editorial in the Australian newspaper stated: If Japan and Australia wish to be allies then three things have to happen: we have to be friends; we have to trade fairly with each other; and we have to have common strategic aims. If either of us falls down on any one of these points then we are not allies. 4 In the 1990s the broader concerns centred on regional cooperation, notably APEC.


We shall deal with these matters in other chapters of this book, but at this stage it is important to consider the personal dynamics of prime ministerial contacts in both the 1950s and more recently. These meetings symbolise much of the sentiment underlying the relationship. MENZIES’ VISIT TO JAPAN, 1957 The first visit of an Australian Prime Minister after the Peace Treaty of 1951 was when R.G.Menzies landed at Haneda Airport in Tokyo on 11 April 1957. Menzies had visited Japan during the Occupation, as had his predecessor J.B.Chifley, but on this occasion Menzies’ dealings were to be with the Japanese Government, not General MacArthur. Menzies had intended to go to Japan in August of the previous year, following a Japanese invitation, but was prevented from doing so by his official role in negotiations over the Suez Crisis.5 This postponement was perhaps fortunate, for Menzies in 1956 was not ‘especially looking for serious talks with the Japanese’.6 The Japanese were interested in the possibility of a top-level visit, and some Japanese were becoming quite aggressive in their desire to have an audience with the Australian Prime Minister about trade. To avoid such unseemly buttonholing of the visitor, the Australian Ambassador, for his part, was equally firm: ‘it was only our insistence which eventually secured the assent to a sit-down lunch instead of a buffet lunch’.7 Such was the stuff of effective diplomacy! As explained earlier, Menzies’ 1957 visit came near the end of a period of radical shift towards Japan in Australia’s foreign and trade policy directions. It came well after Australia had moved to settle the major outstanding issues on the Australia-Japan agenda, but it did help finalise the difficult but pathbreaking trade negotiations between the two countries. It was also timed to occur before the Japanese Foreign Minister (and soon to be Prime Minister), Mr Kishi, went to Australia. This was a sort of pre-emptive diplomatic strike by Australia given the expressed interest of Japanese ministers in visiting Australia, which was well known for its anti-Japanese immigration policy and had become famous as the host of the 1956 Olympic Games. ‘Cooperation’ was the Menzies’ watchword on his visit. This time it was not possible for him to avoid serious talks, and as soon as he arrived he flagged discussions about ‘mutual understanding’.8 But much of the discussion with Prime Minister Kishi was concerned with far more practical matters, such as the ongoing trade negotiations and the pearling dispute. Kishi got right down to details from the beginning of the prime ministerial discussions, and covered bilateral issues, Japan’s international role, Japan’s desire for expanded cultural relations and exchange of parliamentary delegations. It was a businesslike presentation, made more formal by Kishi, who was dour at the best of times, reading his notes. Alan Watt described the situation as ‘somewhat oppressive’, which led to a ‘brilliant recovery’ and ‘a friendly atmosphere’ as Menzies took up the discussion.9 Menzies spoke without notes but put forward an already well-known Australian position by stating that it was felt to be a bad thing by himself and his government to perpetuate wartime hatreds, ‘and a good thing to promote better relationships’.


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Menzies’ comments were decidedly schoolmasterish in saying that …we felt that Japan must politically be brought back into the full community of nations, and for that reason we have been one of the great advocates of Japan’s admission to the United Nations. We felt that, because we regard this as a very great country and a proud country which should be existing in terms of friendship with countries that have the same feelings. Anyhow, it is part of the tradition in British countries that when you have had a fight you shake hands and have friendly relations.10 Good prime ministerial personal links were apparently established. According to his Australian interpreter, ‘the Japanese were awed by his stateliness’.11 Menzies publicly recorded his view of Japan as a great and powerful nation—a view he had expressed in early 1944, well before the war had finished—and a nation of the Pacific. The Japanese press gave prominent coverage to the visit, and it was timed well to coincide with announcement of the itinerary for Mr Kishi’s Southeast Asian visit, which was to be the first for a Japanese prime minister following the war. The talks between the Prime Ministers were not really long enough to enable close or detailed attention to issues. The problematic areas were the negotiations over a commerce agreement then nearing their climax, and the long-standing issue of Japanese access to Australian pearlshell fishing grounds.12 Both sides made some attempts at reinforcing negotiating points, and general agreement was reached on overall directions. This was not the forum for detailed negotiation, and Menzies sidestepped some of the particular points alluded to by Kishi. On pearling, Menzies made it clear that he did not want it to be a source of irritation. ‘It is not really big enough for that’, he said, even though pearling had been a divisive and time-consuming source of contention in the relationship since 1953. But he summed up a lot of the complexities of Australia-Japan relations before and since when he added, in reference to the pearlshell issue, ‘…it is a question that is full of history, full of politics, and involving the State Governments in Australia.13 One of the problems of greatest interest at the time was that of anti-Japanese feeling in Australia. Menzies rightly tackled it head-on in his part of the talks.14 It was also referred to in the joint communique and Menzies discussed it in his speech to the press conference, fielding questions on public opinion and immigration. It became the subject of articles in the Japanese press: even there it was recognised that popular feeling in Australia had relaxed somewhat, due to the passage of time admittedly, but also as a result of increasing knowledge about Japan.15 There was, however, still a long way to go, it was felt. In this context it was important that that reliable emollient of diplomacy, cultural relations, had its formal introduction to, and acceptance as part of, the Australia-Japan relationship. It was only a small step, but Japan’s persistent emphasis in the 1950s on expanding its cultural relations with Australia, reflected a firmly-held attitude in Japan about the need to gain acceptance as a people, and not just as a diplomatic or trade partner. Japan was seeking real acceptance as a member of the postwar order, and Australia from the outset was very willing to accommodate cultural relations in its dealings with Japan, as it provided a long-term window on Japanese society.


Of equal interest were Japanese analyses of Australia’s foreign policy stance: its fear of Asia, alongside a sense of leadership in the region. But, as the Japanese newspapers pointed out, Australia could hardly lead with its small population base and while it remained ‘an agricultural country’. The Japanese popular view was yet to recognise Australia as a regional power, as it was still regarded as an outpost of Empire. Nonetheless, the concept of Australia and Japan as Pacific neighbours was publicly cemented on this visit. It was an important public relations exercise for the Menzies policy towards Japan, and for the Japanese a sign of its acceptance as an equal player in regional affairs. Australian newspaper comment focussed on the implications of the successful visit for expanding Australian ties with Asia. As a Western Power on the fringes of the Orient’, commented the Sydney Morning Herald, Australia ‘occupies a special position, politically as well as geographically, in Asian eyes, and the Australian Prime Minister’s visit to Japan will be noted with approval in other Asian capitals besides Tokyo. It will be seen, correctly enough, as an important pointer to Australia’s readiness to forget recent wrongs in the interests of good Asian relations’.16 KISHI IN AUSTRALIA, 1957 While the profile of Menzies in Japan was high when he visited in 1957, the attention given to Australian prime ministers in Japan has certainly diminished over the years, as we shall discuss presently. Japanese prime ministers, on the other hand, still maintain a prominent but quiet profile when visiting Australia. There was good reason for caution when Kishi Nobusuke, the first Japanese Prime Minister to visit Australia, arrived on 28 November 1957 for a week-long stay. He took in Perth, Melbourne, Sydney (and a side trip to New Zealand) and three days of talks in Canberra. The visit was controversial and attracted much public comment and criticism, but at the government level it was seen as highly successful and, together with the inauguration of the Commerce Agreement in the same year, helped set Australia’s political relations with Japan on a new plane. It represented a period during which the major postwar bilateral issues were resolved, new common interests were identified, and a process of bilateral consultation and cooperation in non-trade areas began to take shape. Kishi himself was making the second of two trips to Southeast Asian countries to bolster a Japanese policy of rebuilding ties with Asia and the Pacific. It was an important step for him in gaining support for his concept of an Asian Development Fund, which had not been widely supported amongst developed or developing nations.17 Japanese press comment was somewhat negative, highlighting the opposition in Australia because of continuing wartime enmity.18 It was even claimed that some in the Japanese Government had advised Kishi not to go to Asia and Australia, because of the likelihood of rejection and failure.19 The Nihon keizai shimbun reported on the day Kishi arrived that two threatening phone calls had been made to the visiting party,20 and Australian newspapers highlighted the fact that a heavy police guard was on hand throughout Mr Kishi’s visit to Sydney. The airport had seen ‘the tightest security screen ever placed around a visiting dignitary’.21 Kishi’s first day in Melbourne was called an ‘incident-free day’, while in Sydney there were ‘silent but hostile onlookers’.22


33

The Australian press gave Mr Kishi fair treatment during his visit. Although his past associations with Japan’s imperial policies were prominently featured, so were his credentials as a strong anti-communist and a supporter of American Far East policy.23 Some members of the Returned Servicemen’s League were strongly critical. But there was dissension within the ranks of the ex-servicemen as many, including a former commander at Singapore’s Changi prisoner-of-war camp, strongly supported the visit as marking ‘a gesture towards peaceful association’.24 The official policy of the RSL was that they supported Mr Kishi’s laying a wreath at the National War Memorial in Canberra.25 The decision of the Governor-General, Sir William Slim, himself a former prominent field commander against the Japanese, to have Mr Kishi stay as a guest at Government House in Canberra, was an important gesture of reconciliation.26 Such was the atmosphere surrounding the visit. At the governmental level, however, the situation was even better, with a general perception of Kishi’s receptiveness to discussion of security questions, given his strongly anti-communist views. Kishi himself, in recalling his visit to Australia, noted that ‘after the United States, [Japan’s] next closest relationship is with Australia’.27 As it was, nothing particularly unpleasant occurred during the trip, except for a few minor public protests that had little impact on the schedule, and Melbourne’s refusal to offer a civic reception. Kishi made a strong speech at the Parliamentary luncheon in Canberra, in which he ranged over Australian-Japanese cooperation, their common interests and future goals. This speech has since become famous as apparently marking the first ‘apology’ to Australians by a Japanese Prime Minister for the events of the Second World War. Kishi had put a great deal of thought into the speech, and the Japanese Ambassador had canvassed Australian contacts in Melbourne about whether Kishi should refer to Japan’s ‘profound regret’ or ‘heartfelt sorrow’ at the happenings of the Pacific War.28 Kishi eventually chose the latter, which was, in the circumstances, a remarkably unrepentant statement, and certainly not an apology in the strict sense of the word, even though both Japanese and Australian newspapers referred to it as such. The Japanese report, citing a Reuters-Kyodo news agency source, quoted Mr Kishi as saying in English that he wished to ‘apologise’ to the Australian people for what had happened during the war, although the official text of the speech and the Australian reports only refer to his expression of ‘heartfelt sorrow’.29 The Japanese text of the speech, however, does not contain words equating to ‘heartfelt sorrow’, but more closely translates as ‘profound regret’ (sotchoku naru ikan no i). The official English translation was obviously designed for a more favourable public reception in Australia, since the ‘regret’ formula is a well-worn one in the Japanese language. The Japanese phraseology certainly gives no sense of apology. The Kishi visit and his speech have remained controversial, in the light of the Japanese Government’s apparent reluctance over the years to confront its history. One report in 1987 referred to Kishi’s visit as ‘a mission of reconciliation’. The issue was taken up again after changes within the Japanese Government brought leaders younger and willing to offer more than platitudes: these included Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki, Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Hosokawa. In 1991 Prime Minister Hawke ‘urged Japan


to acknowledge its guilt for war-time horrors’, and in early 1992 his successor, Mr Keating, called for Japan to take more responsibility for its wartime actions during a speech in Darwin to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese bombing of that city. Some commentators suggested that Mr Kishi had already apologised in 1957, but others correctly pointed out that this was not so.30 These controversies came much later, and the reception to the Kishi speech in Australia at the time was very favourable. Both Australians and Japanese were pleased with the outcome of the visit and the very positive air in which the official talks were conducted. The Japanese were especially glad of the invitation to Kishi from the Governor-General, Sir William Slim, to stay at Government House in Canberra, and the prime ministerial talks were themselves interesting in terms of the wide range of international and regional issues covered, something which had continued to be a feature of diplomatic contacts between the two governments since the Peace Treaty. The common link was clearly the anti-communist stance of both. On this there was no real disagreement, although Australia was concerned at Japan’s support of the AfroAsian Group and its potential for anti-colonial destabilisation. But neither side desired to recognise communist China, and were firm about the benefits of economic development in Southeast Asia and the need for both countries to cooperate through the Colombo Plan and in other ways. Each country, they agreed, ‘is a Pacific power involved by geography in common problems’.31 One newspaper regarded the Canberra speeches as marking the ‘first official recognition of a joint role in Pacific affairs by Australia and Japan’;32 this theme was stressed strongly by Menzies (as, we have noted above, he had done for over a decade), and Mr Kishi too in his pre-departure press conference emphasised the value of future political cooperation between the two countries in the region. He especially acknowledged the contribution of Menzies in fostering that relationship. On bilateral issues, advances were made on the long-standing pearling problem, with agreement to set up an expert advisory committee on conservation of stocks, prior to any resort to international legal proceedings. There was solid support for the importance of expanding cultural relations, on monitoring trade development under the Commerce Agreement, and for establishing direct telecommunications links between Australia and Japan to assist trade dealings. The objective of the External Affairs Minister, Casey, had been to create goodwill on Kishi’s part towards Australia: …In achieving this we can build on the very practical demonstration that Australia has given over the last few years of our readiness to make a contribution towards giving Japan a place in the world consistent with its history and capacities…I hope that Kishi…will become further aware of the fact that Australia is a country of some importance to Japan in developing its position in the world…. I stress the desirability of trying to give Kishi some impression of our significance, not out of mere patriotic pride, but as a means of securing that Japan’s leaders, in making decisions, should attach importance to Australia’s wishes no less than those of, for example, the


35

countries of South East Asia. …Australia and Japan are both countries on the fringe of Communist expansion in Asia; both countries have an interest in containing that expansion, and in doing so without war. 33 Casey was aware, however, that Japan needed to see self-interest in the relationship; goodwill of itself could not carry it. Kishi’s requests during the talks clearly reflected Japan’s strategy for economic and trade growth with a return to positive diplomatic activity in the region. Australia obviously felt that it was necessary to remain in close touch with growing Japanese economic and political influence and that, although Australia was currently in a strong position as a nation of some status in the region, Japan’s relative position was likely to strengthen vis-à-vis its own. Kishi’s departing statement that ‘the fundamental interests of Australia and Japan, as neighbouring democracies, are identical’34 was a critical one; that perception has been upheld on both sides of the relationship ever since. At the same time, the underlying reason has changed from Kishi’s concern to combat communism to a strong interest in regional stability and cooperation. HAWKE IN JAPAN, 1987 In contrast to the polite stand-offishness of Mr Menzies’ visit to Japan in 1957, and the rather tense public atmosphere coupled with more confident leaders’ discussions of the Kishi visit several months later, Prime Minister Hawke’s visit to Japan of December 1987 was a whirlwind of forceful prime ministerial diplomacy. Surprisingly, the issues themselves were, in the broad, rather similar—bilateral trade, the Soviet Union, Japan’s regional role, and economic cooperation. Still, the emphases were different and the styles obviously a complete contrast. A great deal had altered in the structure and content of the bilateral relationship in the intervening period, but there was nonetheless a measure of comforting security in that the issues under discussion were consistent. It reflects stability in the fundamentals of the relationship, especially the economic profile, the security framework and the regional situation. Times had greatly changed since the conservative, anti-communist dominion outlook of Australia in the 1950s. Japan was seen then as a bastion of capitalist potential and a buffer against the threat to the Pacific from China and Russia, and trade was about to boom under the new Commerce Agreement. In 1987, Japan was the dominant partner in the relationship, in terms of its trade impact, taking over one-quarter of Australia’s exports and nearly one-fifth of its imports. Australia provided just over 5 per cent of Japan’s imports, and took over 2 per cent of Japan’s exports, although in major minerals and foodstuffs, Australia was a dominant supplier to the Japanese market.35 Japan was soon to become the largest investor in Australia, and Japanese tourist visitors to Australia were already nearly a quarter of a million, and rising rapidly. Hawke’s visit in 1987 was one of pressing business, but it had none of the significance of the pathbreaking visit by Menzies thirty years before. It was just a part of the normal ritual of the rushed prime ministerial diplomacy of the 1980s, a chance to exchange opinions and move on. From Hawke’s point of view it was very


much a defensive measure: stopping in Tokyo for just nine hours on his return to Australia from the Soviet Union, Hawke was keen to meet the new Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Takeshita, and put Australia’s case on several matters. But a mark of the difference in both Japan’s international standing and the Australia-Japan relationship was Mr Hawke’s statement prior to his visit about the need for a more active Japanese leadership role, and Australia’s acceptance of the fact that ‘over time it will no doubt do more for itself’ in the defence area,36 a view since maintained by the Australian Government. He stressed the importance that Australia attached to the ‘habit of consulting with and talking to Japan about international political and security issues’. This had long been a firm plank of Australia’s political relations with Japan: maintaining strong and effective channels of communication at the highest levels has been assiduously pursued by the Australian Government since Menzies’ day. We shall see how this developed as the story unfolds in later chapters. Australia did not rate the press space in Japan in 1987 that it had in 1957. Indeed, it got hardly any, whereas Mr Menzies had featured prominently in front page stories. Prime ministerial lecturing was still in vogue, however, although with much less grace and much more urgency than had been the case with Menzies. While defending Japan’s right to determine its own defence spending, Hawke was even more frank on the matter of trade policy. He accused Japan, the United States and Europe of ‘hypocrisy for their agricultural protectionism, which he dubbed as ‘stupidly irrational policies’.37 This came after several hours of talks with Japanese leaders, which led to renewed Japanese assurances that Australia would not suffer in any Japanese deals with the United States to solve their trade imbalance (such as the suggested Japanese agreement to import more US beef to assuage domestic American criticism of Japan). These promises had been made by previous Japanese prime ministers, and there was nothing new in the stance which the Japanese took, nor anything particularly gratifying for Australia. In his one-hour discussion with Hawke, Takeshita made no promises, although the Australian Prime Minister urged a greater Japanese political role consistent with its economic power. He highlighted the needs of the South Pacific countries for Japanese aid. Immediately before Hawke arrived at the Prime Minister’s official residence across the road from the Diet building in Nagatacho, Takeshita had spoken for fifty minutes with the Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Agricultural Policy Committee and its Agricultural Liberalisation Subcommittee. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Uno, responded to Hawke’s arguments on these trade issues with a plea to consider the difficult constraints on Japanese agriculture such as the scarcity of land38 —a statement that did little to sway Mr Hawke (his ‘hypocrisy’ outburst came after the official discussion), but sent strong messages to Japanese rural voters, whose support still remains critical to conservative political power in Japan. Of course, after thirty years the style of prime ministerial diplomacy had changed, but Hawke made no friends in Japan with his bluntly offensive remarks to his hosts. The relative positions of Australia and Japan within the relationship had also changed, and Hawke no doubt felt it necessary to be outspoken, if only to attract some attention in the Japanese media and amongst the voters back in Australia. No longer was Japan the


37

supplicant, attempting to win back international respect, build its international prestige and maximise its trade opportunities. Mr Hawke’s stopover in Japan highlighted Australia’s need to make sure its views were understood by the Japanese Government, to curry favour with a new Japanese leader, and to ensure that its interests were not ignored by the much more powerful Japan. It was a pattern which, without the rudeness, has been typical of Australian prime ministerial diplomacy to Japan in the 1980s and the 1990s. TAKESHITA IN AUSTRALIA, 1988 As in 1957, the visit to Australia in 1988 of the Japanese Prime Minister was surrounded by an ongoing debate about the Japanese presence in Australia, but the theme of common interests was also strongly to the fore. Just as Mr Casey had sought to do in 1957, Australia in 1988 wanted to make its own point of view appreciated by the Japanese leader. Indeed, it was Australia that had lobbied Japan hard for Takeshita to visit.39 The central bilateral issues were trade access and Japanese investment in Australia, but the wider concerns involved Japan’s potential capacity to assist development in the South Pacific. What worried some commentators was the lack of close personal relations between the two prime ministers, in contrast to the ‘Bob-Yasu’ friendship that had developed between Mr Hawke and Mr Takeshita’s predecessor, Mr Nakasone. The relationship with Japan was still formal: ‘it is kept there by custom, language and history said the Australian.40 In that sense, at the top level, things had advanced very little beyond the meetings between Kishi and Menzies of 1957. They were, however, less structured and less heralded in Australia. The slight and diminutive Mr Takeshita, an appearance that belied his great political influence at home, was not a commanding presence, or a flamboyant personality like his predecessor, Mr Nakasone. Like Mr Hawke’s visit to Japan the previous year, Mr Takeshita’s time in Australia was short. The visit was only for two days, with a tour of the Expo in Brisbane as the first, and major, activity. It was ‘a tepid friendship’, commented the Australian Financial Review.41 The Japanese press in fact devoted far more substantial discussion to the visit than did the Australian newspapers, focussing on problems of Australian attitudes towards Japanese investment, and Japan’s approach to the South Pacific. Takeshita’s report to Cabinet on his return emphasised the need to ensure moderation by investors in Australia.42 He mentioned that an anti-investment rally had been held (on the Gold Coast) while he was in Australia, reflecting attitudes which the Japanese promise of a new international cooperation policy would do little to mollify. The primary Australian objective was to defuse in the minds of the Japanese leader this widely expressed sentiment towards Japanese investment in Australia. Both the Treasurer and the Prime Minister reinforced in public statements their desire to see receptivity towards Japanese investment because of Australia’s long-term interests in dealing with Japan.43 When it came to apologies, it was Australia’s turn to be contrite, as Mr Hawke expressed to Mr Takeshita his regret over the anti-investment protests on the Gold Coast.


The atmosphere of the visit was cool—certainly devoid of the back-slapping friendship of ‘Bob and Yasu’ a few years beforehand. Mr Takeshita did not want a game of golf with Mr Hawke; perhaps he remembered Mr Hawke’s criticism of Japan as ‘hypocrites’ after their meeting in Tokyo only a few months beforehand. Talks produced little of substance, and press comment focussed on the ‘ignorance and arrogance’ of the Australian approach, and the desire of the Japanese to build goodwill rather than talk tough.44 KEATING IN JAPAN Efforts at the highest level of government to improve and deepen relations with Japan were a priority for Australia’s Prime Minister, Paul Keating, as they had been for Menzies. Keating’s prime ministerial diplomacy with Japan was a mixture of high politics and bluster, finessing and lecturing. On his September 1992 visit, Keating stated bluntly that he did not support the American NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) concept and that he would not endorse any multilateral trade agreement that was inimical to Japan’s interests or excluded Japan. His very positive approach continued the fundamental realignment of Australia’s position towards Asia that had been initiated under Prime Minister Hawke. Keating made it clear that Japan could rely on Australia, while arguing to Japan the benefits of the proposed APEC headsof-government meeting. He sought to persuade the Japanese of the ‘new Australia, with its energetic economy and vibrant multicultural society.45 Keating also reaffirmed Australia’s support for Japan’s permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, a reminder of the fact that Australia had been a constant supporter since the late 1980s of the need for Japan to take a more active and constructive role in international affairs. Hawke had likewise supported a wider role for Japan in the United Nations, which later became a call for Japan to take a seat on the UN Security Council. There are sound reasons for this pressure for Japan to do more. The Japanese Constitution limits Japan’s capacity to make an international military contribution. Japan itself wants to be seen to be playing its part in world affairs because of its great economic strength, its lack of military contribution to the Western alliance in the 1980s (except for the provision of military bases for the United States in Japan), the protection it has received from the American military alliance in the postwar period, and constant criticism from the United States about what was seen as a Japanese ‘free ride’. Hawke in 1990 had echoed others in support of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping forces. The law to create Japan’s UN peacekeeping force was passed by the Diet in June 1992 after much domestic debate, and in September Cabinet approved the dispatch of Self-Defence Forces personnel and civilian police to Cambodia to act in a support (but not a combat) role. In 1992 Keating welcomed this contribution. Keating’s visit to Japan in September 1994 was part of his diplomatic push to gain support for an APEC leaders’ commitment to regional free trade at the Summit scheduled for November of that year. The Australian of 8 September commented


39

that this campaign was ‘one of the biggest diplomatic drives conducted by an Australian prime minister, and stands to be one of the most important’. By contrast the May 1995 visit was a more ‘traditional’ mix of diplomatic issues, including the successful signing of the ‘Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership’, joint firm commitment to APEC, launch of an Australian cuisine fair, and receipt of an honorary degree from Keio University. The Joint Declaration (signed on 26 May 1995) was a remarkable document, going beyond the formalities of diplomatic euphemism to state boldly some firmly-held policies. It encapsulated the spirit of commitment and cooperation which marked the bilateral relationship. In the Declaration the Prime Minister declared that the relationship was one of ‘unprecedented quality’, based on goodwill and cooperation over the postwar period. They pledged to ‘build on that foundation an enduring and steadfast partnership’. They recognised the mutual economic contribution of each country to the other, the friendship between their two peoples, and expressed their determination to work together ‘with other countries in the region in promoting prosperity, reducing tensions and enhancing political cooperation’. Japan went out of its way to express its view of Australia’s importance to Japanese diplomacy, with echoes of the 1992 statement by Ogura Kazuo about Australia’s role as Japan’s only real regional partner: the Declaration stated that ‘the Government of Japan welcomes Australia’s decision to create its future in the region and reaffirms that Australia is an indispensable partner in regional affairs’. The Declaration was referred to by one commentator as an ‘update’ of the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.46 Although it was certainly not of that status legally or diplomatically, it does represent a contemporary, and politically frank, definition of the relationship. Accounts are that only two drafts were necessary before the final version was agreed—a far cry from the three years of haggling that brought about the Basic Treaty (see next chapter). The accounts further indicate the strong Japanese desire to include in the declaration some very positive wording, indeed a reference to the relationship being ‘unshakeable’ (a term that was ultimately replaced by the word ‘steadfast’).47 During Keating’s 1995 visit, the triumph of diplomacy reflected in the Joint Declaration and the Japanese Prime Minister’s statement that Japan ‘wished to walk alongside our Australian friends as best mates as we step forward together into the twentyfirst century’, was balanced by Keating’s lecturing Japan on how it should come to terms with its history. Keating spoke frankly of Japan’s need to reflect on its past, in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, and to apologise for its past actions. At a ceremony at the Hodogaya war cemetery (the place in Japan where Australian war dead are buried), he said that ‘we believe that Japan should not allow these events [of the Second World War] to be forgotten. We believe that our friendship will be stronger if the truth about these events is known to the Japanese people—and we are pleased that the Japanese Government has taken steps to make it known’. Keating repeated his message in stronger terms on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, when he urged the Japanese Prime Minister to express regret about the war and make a commitment ‘to tell this generation of Japanese people the full truth, the full history of what happened’.


The 1995 Keating visit to Japan was nonetheless a successful and historically important instance of prime ministerial diplomacy. Australian newspaper reports universally supported the directions mapped out by Keating with Japan, lauded the Joint Declaration and supported Keating’s reinforcement of endorsement of Japanese leadership in the region and a greater Japanese international role and responsibility. The words of the Declaration indicate that the Japanese were not merely tolerant of Keating’s enthusiasm and forthright advice. The document states the pledge ‘to build… an enduring and steadfast partnership’. Japan reaffirmed ‘that Australia is an indispensable partner in regional affairs’. These sentiments are unequivocal in their commitment to the future of the Australia-Japan relationship. HOWARD AND HASHIMOTO Prime ministers Howard and Hashimoto maintained this sense of shared interests, exchanging visits in 1996 and 1997. It was Japan, however, that provided a sense of future agenda, proposing an annual prime ministerial meeting and an 18-point agenda for bilateral and international cooperation (which was formally endorsed as the Partnership Agenda at the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee meeting in August 1997). Hashimoto was maintaining a sense of postwar continuity when he said that the two countries shared ‘common policy objectives and interests in maintaining peace and stability in this region’, sentiments eagerly endorsed by Howard. Commitment to the APEC was repeated and Japan’s efforts in supporting Australia’s aspirations to be included in the ASEM (Asia-Europe) group of countries was acknowledged. Individual trade items were discussed and the steady accretion of defence ties was endorsed. There was, indeed, nothing particularly out of the ordinary. The difficulty for the future is that, while there is obvious personal rapport at the leaders’ level, attempts are necessary to link political cooperation with the demands of the new economic and trading environment facing the two countries. These challenges will be difficult ones, given the problems Hashimoto faces in bringing about reformist liberalisation in Japan, and Howard faces in adjusting Australian policy to the need for a more creative trade and investment environment in dealing with Japan.48 CONCLUSION Prime ministerial diplomacy has been an integral part of the development of AustraliaJapan relations. In earlier years it was highly symbolic of the changes that were taking place in bilateral dealings, but by the 1980s was little more than another opportunity for bilateral negotiation over ongoing issues. The greater ease and frequency of prime ministerial travel made visits shorter, with less fanfare. Looking at these changes in the style and content of prime ministerial diplomacy between the 1950s and the 1990s does not directly explain changes in the relationship, although they do highlight the continuities in the structure and substance of bilateral dealings. One important aspect of those dealings, the process of formal negotiations on several important bilateral treaties and agreements, is taken up in the next chapter.


41

NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

29

See Courier-Mail, 7 October 1992. Australia-Japan Economic Institute Newsletter and Australian Bureau of Statistics data. Australian, 9 January 1987. Australian, 2–3 July 1988. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 May 1956. Bunting to Plimsoll, 29 May 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 1. Memorandum from Alan Watt, no. 668, 8 August 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 1. Nihon keizai shimbun, 12 April 1957. Memorandum 361, 23 April 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 2. Record of discussion, 12 April 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 2. Letter by E.M.Weatherstone to the Australian, 27 December 1994. See Chapter 3 . Record of Discussion, 12 April 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 2. Mainichi shimbun, 12 April 1957. Asahi shimbun, 13 April 1957. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 April 1957. The Asian Development Fund was a concept proposed by Kishi to allow Japan to become involved in development projects in Asia, mainly through the injection of funds from other developed countries, as well as Japan. For details and the Australian reaction, see Alan Rix, Japan’s Foreign Aid Challenge: Policy Reform and Aid Leadership, Routledge, London, 1993, pp. 22 and 184. Asahi shimbun, 15 November 1957. Cable I.17121, 18 November 1957, AA, A1838, 3103/10/1 part 6. Nihon keizai shimbun, 29 November 1957. Sydney Morning Herald, 30 November and 1 December 1957. Nihon keizai shimbun, 29 November 1957. Age, 28 November 1957. Sydney Morning Herald, 29 November 1957. Age, 2 December 1957. Sydney Morning Herald, 19 November 1957. Kishi Nobusuke, Kishi nobusuke kaikoroku: hoshu godo to ampo kaitei, Kozaido Tokyo, 1983, pp. 388–9. Report by A.B.Jamieson, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Kishi—Background and Reactions’, no date but early December 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Also Age, 5 December 1957, Nihon keizai shimbun, 5 December 1957. The Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives contain selected papers relating to the Kishi visit. The official report on the visit by the Asian Affairs Bureau in December 1957 is a matter-of-fact recounting of the events of the visit, but makes no mention of Kishi’s speech at the parliamentary luncheon, even though it records that he attended the event (Microfilm A0151 of Postwar Records at the Diplomatic Records Office, Tokyo). The Ministry Archives are, on the whole for this period, patchy. Being a selection of documents, they do not provide anything like a comprehensive record of government papers, in contrast to the Australian Archives. Report by A.B.Jamieson, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Kishi—Background and Reactions’.

42 The Australia–Japan political alignment 30

31 32 33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

The quote about ‘reconciliation’ is from the Japan Times, 23 September 1987, reporting a statement by an Australian director of Moral Re-Armament. Hawke’s statement was reported in the Australian Financial Review, 20 March 1991, and Keating’s in the Courier-Mail, 20 February 1992. See also the Kishi memoirs referred to above, the Sydney Morning Herald of 5 December 1957, and the Japanese text of the speech itself, for which I am indebted to Richard McGregor, former correspondent in Tokyo for the Australian newspaper. McGregor’s article on the subject in the Australian, 29 September 1992 referred to Mr Kishi’s Japanese phraseology as kibishiku hansei suru, but the actual text reads ‘sensochu ni okotta jittai ni taishi wareware no sotchoku naru ikan no i o hyosuru koto wa konin toshite no watashi no gimu de ari, mata watashi no kojinteki gambo de mo aru no de arimasu’. A literal translation of this would render the key words as ‘profound regret’ rather than ‘heartfelt sorrow’. This would suggest neutral feelings about the war rather than a desire to apologise. Some discussion of the Keating statements appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald of 25 February 1992, especially the article by David Jenkins. For a report on the Japanese Ambassador’s reaction at the time to the speech, see Ian McGregor, ‘Making up is hard to do: the day Japan said “we’re sorry”’, Australian, 2 January 1995. Also see Ian McGregor, Japan Swings: Politics, Culture and Sex in the New Japan, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1996, Chapter 7. Joint communique, in Current Notes on International Affairs, December 1957, pp. 963–4. Sydney Morning Herald, 5 December 1957. Casey to Menzies, 2 December 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1957. Peter Drysdale, Nancy Viviani, Akio Watanabe, Ippei Yamazawa, The Australia-Japan Relationship: Towards the Year 2000, Australia-Japan Research Centre and Japan Center for Economic Research, Canberra and Tokyo, September 1989. Speech in Singapore, 29 November 1987. See Japan Times, 9 December 1987. Australian, 4 December 1987; Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 158, 7 December 1987, p. 2851, where Hawke refers to Japan’s agricultural policies as ‘myopic, irrational and misguided’. Asahi shimbun, 4 December 1987. Australian Financial Review, 30 June 1988. Australian, 2–3 July 1988. Australian Financial Review, 30 June 1988. Asahi Evening News, 5 July 1988. Australian Financial Review, 18 and 19 July 1988. Australian Financial Review, 30 June and 7 July 1988. Sources on the Keating visits are mainly press reports at the time and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade information about Keating’s speeches. Australian Financial Review, 29 May 1995. Australian, 29 May 1995. See speech by Prime Minister Hashimoto at the dinner hosted by Prime Minister Howard, 28 April 1997, the Joint Howard-Hashimoto Press Conference, 29 April 1997, various newspaper accounts of September 1996 and April-May 1997on the two visits, and the report by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s East Asia Analytical Unit, A New Japan? Change in Asia’s Megamarket, Canberra, 1997.

3 Resolving Disputes: Some Key Australia-Japan Negotiations

Bilateral negotiations are a test of relationships. Irrespective of the strategic importance of alignments that shape the policies of nations towards their partners, the business of governments must go on. The test of those strategic linkages is their resilience under the strains of day-to-day governance, when the pressures from business and the public to rectify apparent problems in the relationship become uppermost in the political agenda. The history of US-Japan relations, for example, is a prime case of the difficulties of managing a large and complex bilateral relationship in the context of a close alliance.1 There have been several major bilateral negotiations between Australia and Japan in the postwar period. A great many treaties and agreements have been put in place, and a small number has involved serious political controversy. This chapter will examine three important negotiations and their role in the development of the political relationship. They are important because they stand out as cases of tough and often rancorous bilateral bargaining, amidst what have been generally mild and cooperative postwar political dealings between Australia and Japan. The issues to be examined are the negotiations in the 1950s over pearlshell fisheries, the Commerce Agreement of 1957 and its preceding trade discussions, and the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1976. The first two of these were undertaken during the formative period of the bilateral political relationship; indeed it was the appreciation of the two countries’ common strategic interests that assisted the resolution of the issues at hand. The last, over the Basic Treaty, was difficult, but it was an attempt to encapsulate the common political and economic understandings between the two governments in a legal framework. These negotiations tell us much about the political mood of the times in the bilateral relationship: that serious disagreement at the government-to-government level was able to be managed; that the political relationship was able to underpin a dominant economic relationship; that political leaders were usually able to deal relatively easily with bureaucratic blockages; that the management structures for the relationship (which we shall outline in the next chapter) were effective; that serious political and public concern about the relationship in the first decade of post-Occupation contact was able to be overcome through a sensible and careful process of negotiation; and that ultimately a broad


statement of political and economic alignment was able to be negotiated some twentyfive years into the relationship. THE PEARL FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS The dispute between Australia and Japan over exploitation of the pearlshell resources off the coast of northern Australia was the first major political disagreement between the two countries after the war, and remains the issue that persisted longest, lasting as it did some ten years. It was also the first major bilateral negotiation, and the first test of the real relationship between the two governments. Political and business interests in both countries were closely involved and for neither country was it simply a matter of economics. Important political issues were at stake for each government and neither was prepared to sacrifice immediate interests for longer-term bilateral gains. A common concern for the wider bilateral relationship only became apparent later in the 1950s, as the pearlshell dispute dragged on along an increasingly legalistic path. What was interesting about this dispute is the fact that, despite its intensity and the strength of feeling engendered in both countries at the time, bilateral trade and political affairs continued as usual, apparently untroubled by the ill-feeling surrounding the pearlshell issue which, after an initial flurry of political problems, became more of a legal argument as time elapsed. The question of access Before the Second World War, the pearlshell resources in the Arafura Sea off the northern coast of Australia had been extensively worked by Australian boats using mainly Japanese divers. Many of these men were interned in Australia during the war, and there was a shortage of skilled divers when pearling activities resumed after the war. Australia wanted to redevelop the industry, which had provided good revenue from exports to Japan and the United States, where the mother-of-pearl was used almost exclusively in the manufacture of buttons. Australia’s strict immigration laws prevented the postwar return of Japanese divers to the Australian industry (although some Japanese ‘pearling technicians’ were allowed to enter after 1952, being later replaced by divers from the Ryukyu Islands south of Japan, then under American control).2 The Japanese pearlshell industry was therefore keen to fish for itself off Australia, and there is one suggestion that ‘an American syndicate sponsored and financed the resumption of pearling by Japanese luggers’.3 The 1952 Peace Treaty with Japan stipulated (in Article IX) that ‘Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas’. This article was one that was altered little during the drafting process. Despite Australian concerns that Japanese fishing operations in Australian waters should be limited so as to preserve pearlshell stocks, the Peace Treaty gave no protection to Australia’s interests.

Resolving disputes: some key Australia–Japan negotiations 45

Indeed, Australia had had little part in influencing the Peace Treaty process. The United States and the United Kingdom had agreed in February 1951 that Japan should be asked to enter into negotiations on fishing rights.4 The Japanese Prime Minister accepted this, and agreed voluntarily to restrict fishing operations in those areas where Japan was not fishing in 1940.5 This did not include Australian pearling waters. The UK draft of a peace treaty of April 1951 (Article 34) sought to limit Japanese vessels fishing in conserved areas, but the final Article IX of the Peace Treaty was very close to the original American draft. Australia had temporarily reserved its position on the original US draft of the fisheries article,6 but later input to these deliberations was not possible. It was therefore necessary for Australia and Japan to enter into negotiations to regulate Japanese fishing activity. The government wished to avoid a repetition of the prewar despoiling of the resource by overfishing and so the Minister for External Affairs, Mr Spender, first sought the agreement of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Yoshida, for an interim voluntary prohibition on Japanese fishing on the Northern continental shelf pending the conclusion of an agreement.7 The Japanese were reluctant to accept such an arrangement, partly because they were then negotiating with the United States and Canada over North Pacific fisheries (this agreement eventually came into force in June 1953, but did provide for conservation measures, alongside equality of access to the fishery). Australia wished to seek an agreement that would place restrictions on both Australian and Japanese operators.8 A Fisheries Act and a Pearl Fisheries Act were enacted in March 1952 to prepare the ground for conservation measures. The Japanese held off allowing their boats to move into Australian waters pending further discussion of an agreement.9 External Affairs was also keen for negotiations to get under way, to avoid Japanese impatience and the possibility of loss of Australian initiative.10 The Australian Government decided on 15 October to proclaim the Fisheries Act and Pearl Fisheries Act that had been enacted in March. These laws controlled Australian fishing, and involved proclamation of ‘Australian’ waters beyond territorial limits, opening up complex international legal questions. The laws did not extend to foreigners, with whom mutual agreements were needed. The government also decided to enter into negotiations with Japan, but hoped that some restraint from the Japanese would be forthcoming.11 Here was a complex standoff. Australia wanted to keep Japan out of its waters, very broadly defined under the new Acts, but had at that stage no legal means to do so. They had tried persuasion, but the Japanese wanted access for their boats. It was clear that the Australian hope for a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ would not hold for long. Australian legislation had the potential to cause severe embarrassment, by excluding Australians but not the Japanese from northern pearl fishing. Australia had to reach a firm negotiated agreement with Japan as soon as possible, but had no experience of such discussions with that country. At the same time, temporary access had to be dealt with, pending longerterm arrangements. Australia was in no position to push Japan too hard, as control hinged entirely on reaching a satisfactory agreement.


The Japanese were well aware of the Australian reluctance to allow Japanese boats back in. Early in the Occupation period, Australia had been opposed to the resumption of Japanese fishing and whaling in waters south of Australia. Before the Peace Treaty, reports appeared in Japanese newspapers about Australian opposition to Japanese fishing off New Guinea,12 and Australia’s intention to prevent Japanese fishing in Australian territory.13 Australian attitudes were referred to as ones of caution and alarm. However, the proclamation of the Acts prior to negotiations with Japan over pearl fisheries was designed to strengthen Australia’s hand in the negotiations, and was not done out of a sense of urgency. Australia was also not greatly concerned about British opposition to its proposals, and was prepared to proceed without the agreement of the United Kingdom.14 Both Australia and Japan had good reason to take an aggressive stance in the negotiations: Australia to establish its rights over what it regarded as its own seabed resources, Japan to set its stamp on its new independent foreign policy status, in order to satisfy Japanese public demand for a reassertion of its prewar fisheries activity. Both countries wished to be seen to be able to conduct their own international negotiations. Japan was later to apply the same positive pressure in its discussions with Australia over trade in the mid–1950s, and Australia had at that time strong reasons for acceding, as it wished to safeguard its wool market in Japan (see discussion below). Fisheries, however, were primarily a one-way argument, for Japan had no basis on which to apply pressure on Australia for reciprocal rights, unless it linked fisheries to other areas of trade (which at that stage it did not). It was a question of whether, and to what extent, Japan could gain access to the fishing grounds that Australia wished to conserve and eventually exploit itself, and in which Japanese divers and fleets had fished and unfortunately overfished. Japan was committed by the Peace Treaty only to negotiate. They wished to preserve their full rights under international law and were unlikely to make concessions; although the Japanese Government had been able to conclude a tripartite agreement with the United States and Canada for access to North Pacific waters, it was criticised in Japan for giving too much away, despite their gains.15 Negotiations Australia was forthright in its initial attitude to bilateral negotiations, which began in April 1953, led by Dr Alan Westerman from the Department of Commerce and Agriculture on the Australian side (who was later to lead the bilateral trade negotiations that commenced in late 1955), and Mr Nishi Haruhiko, the Japanese Ambassador to Australia, on the other. Australia stated quite categorically, almost rudely, that the Japanese had to ensure that no Japanese vessels fished ‘on the Australian continental shelf’ pending conclusion of the negotiations: in the view of the Australian Government the presence of a Japanese pearling fleet in waters adjacent to Australia would so fundamentally prejudice the negotiations that it is not prepared to negotiate under such conditions. 16


The Japanese agreed to withhold the fleet, but it was clearly an additional negotiating point for the Japanese. Indeed the Australians only had a very slender basis on which to negotiate, since a strong legal position for controlling the operation of foreign nations in Australian waters had not yet been accepted. The doctrine of rights over the continental shelf was later to form the basis of the Australian position, but initially the negotiations were conducted on the principle of dividing the available areas of fishery so as to conserve the resource. Australia also wished ‘to protect the Australian pearling industry by allocation of areas favourable to it’.17 It was hoped that the continental shelf doctrine would be available to inject into the negotiations at a later date. Australia was in no doubt about Japan’s firm resolve over these negotiations, nor about the pressures under which the Japanese Government was taking part. The Minister, Mr Casey, was advised pointedly by his department that ‘it is certain that Japan will make no concessions in the negotiations without some quid pro quo’.18 The Japanese initial responses at the talks were forceful and to the point, identifying Japan’s long-standing interest and involvement in the Australian pearlshell fishery, and it’s objectives: equal access to ‘the maximum sustained productivity of pearlshell resources’, on the basis of established international legal principles of access to high seas fishery resources. Japan did not accept that international law yet recognised littoral state jurisdiction over sedentary fisheries.19 The Australians wanted to establish separate areas for fishing by each country, thereby allowing Australia to squeeze the Japanese into manageable and less profitable areas. Cabinet saw this as Australia’s preferred initial bargaining position, being unable to see how they could require Japan to abstain from fishing completely.20 Nonetheless, within a week of the negotiations opening, Japanese resistance to the division of areas was obvious, and the Department reported to Tokyo that ‘the primary Japanese concern is to avoid precedents which could be used by Korea, Indonesia, etc.’.21 The Japanese delegation could accept unpublicised, short-term separations, but Australia could not. The considerable pressures on Japan in trying to establish its post-independence international rights were exemplified by the fisheries problem with Korea, since that country had unilaterally declared its sovereignty over neighbouring seas in January 1952 (the ‘Rhee Line’) and negotiations with Japan were still in progress.22 Even at this early stage of negotiations there were problems developing in the handling of the talks. The Japanese announced within the agreed month of ‘breathing space’ for fishing that the Japanese fleet could wait no longer and would sail for Australian waters. This was a substantial pressure on the Australian side and later was used by Japan as the mechanism to force a breakdown in the negotiations. The very location of the talks in Canberra was itself a problem. The Japanese Embassy had only been established in December 1952, and the Ambassador, Mr Nishi, who had arrived in January the following year as the first Japanese Ambassador to Australia, was still finding his feet. The question of where to hold the talks had been extensively canvassed previously in Canberra, and both External Affairs and advice from the United States after their fisheries talks with Japan, had suggested Tokyo as the best venue for a quicker result—to enable Japanese negotiators to communicate with their ministries. Cabinet felt that the talks should take place in Tokyo, but Prime Minister Menzies, overseas at the time, felt strongly that Australia should be the venue, and so it was.23


The difficulty was that the negotiators, as negotiators on the spot, were unable to settle on a compromise solution. Tokyo was unhappy with Nishi’s role: their fisheries people ‘considered Nishi was too disposed to accept Australian pretensions and he [a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official] personally thought Nishi’s previous experience as negotiator with the Soviets on fisheries inside Soviet territorial waters made him a little too ready to think in terms of obtaining concessions from Australia. He said fresh instructions were being sent to Nishi’.24 Nishi himself was on good terms with his Canberra counterparts. Alan Watt, Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs, tried to talk Nishi round to the two delegations working out a formula, referring to the fact that ‘our current negotiations in fisheries were perhaps not as important in themselves as the successful completion of our first post-war negotiations’.25 This argument would have weighed heavily with Nishi as the first ambassador, but he was not tempted. His own recollections relate his appreciation of Canberra’s conservation argument and Tokyo’s intransigence. He believed that an agreement with Australia would make negotiations with Korea easier, but Tokyo did not agree. As Nishi put it, he had ‘never received such strict instructions’.26 Australia applied pressure in other ways—by proposing to the Japanese that they give some latitude to Nishi on the areas and duration of the agreement, but this was not really possible.27 Australia also argued in Tokyo that other issues hinged on a successful outcome in the fisheries talks, notably trade discussions and the relationship with Japan in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This, however, had little effect either. Indeed, the Department of Commerce and Agriculture felt that unless Japan could agree to a proposal that ensured conservation, ‘it would be better for political and other reasons for the Australian Government to discontinue negotiations and let the blame lie where it may fall’.28 As it turned out, the negotiations were broken off, after the Japanese announced on 10 August 1953 that from the following day the pearlshell fleet would move into areas not acceptable to Australia, close to Darwin and where substantial quantities of shell lay. This followed a ‘final proposal’ by the Japanese on 2 July over the question of areas. The Australian Cabinet could not consider the matter until early August, and External Affairs was preparing to ask Cabinet to use the 2 July proposal as the basis for a final compromise, but this was not to be. Cabinet Committee considered the matter on 12 August, and full Cabinet on 13 August, whereupon a system of licensing was agreed, as well as proclamation of Australian waters and an amendment of the Pearl Fisheries Act so it would apply to foreigners.29 Thus the Australian reaction was swift and uncompromising, and confirmed that the Japanese had, in effect, broken off the negotiations by their declaration. The pressure from their industry to fish, and the actions of the Japanese Government appeared to threaten the overall relationship. It seems that Prime Minister Yoshida may not have been fully briefed prior to the decision, as he had other more important issues claiming his attention.30 Australia was unhappy at the prospect of having to license boats, and appreciated that ‘we cannot expect too much response from our friends’,31 but relations with Japan had sunk to the point where ‘it was accepted that the ultimate sanction must be arrest of an offending boat by an Australian naval or official vessel with the possible


use of force’.32 Cabinet felt so strongly on the matter that it agreed that its decisions would be carried out ‘without any notification at the diplomatic level and without any final offer of an agreement being made to the Japanese negotiators’.33 A formal response was made to the Japanese Delegation on 28 August, in which Australia placed blame for the suspension of talks on the Japanese, and declared that Australia now felt free to take such action as it felt necessary to control, conserve and develop the pearl fishery.34 Japan, however, continued to argue that it was Australia that had broken off the talks.35 Australia’s action against Japan Australia did not resort to the use of force. Its preferred option was to use the developing concept of the continental shelf, recognised by the International Law Commission in its report of 17 August 1953.36 A proclamation to this effect was made on 10 September as legislation was introduced into Parliament. The Japanese refused to accept this concept, but its sudden injection in such a formal way took them by surprise. They reserved the right to adopt necessary measures if Australia used force against their vessels. Australia offered to exclude current Japanese fishing from licensing to avoid any international incidents in the few weeks before the end of the fishing season.37 Japan was keen to avoid any trouble, but its longer-term strategy was to seek resolution in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).38 It was also a means to force opinion on the continental shelf doctrine into the political arena, by making Australia live up to its active support of the United Nations and its agencies such as the ICJ.39 Australia notified Japan on 30 October 1953 that it was prepared to consent to the matter being brought before the ICJ. This action set in train a series of related processes: discussions with Japan over an approach to the ICJ; negotiations with Japan over arrangements for Japanese fishing in the interim period before an ICJ ruling; and lengthy and complex legal processes involved in establishing the continental shelf doctrine within international law. It was not until 1958 that the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea recognised the continental shelf convention and vindicated Australia’s original stand. However, the issue never reached the International Court of Justice, as the legal issue was largely resolved by the 1958 Geneva Conference, and Australia was unable to accept Japan’s drafts of an agreed submission to the ICJ. Australia’s draft was likewise unacceptable to the Japanese. Australia, for wider reasons of political image, agreed to support Japan’s accession to the statutes of the ICJ rather than delay the whole proceedings on such a technical basis. External Affairs Minister Casey’s view was forthright: …Attorney-General and I are still of opinion that Australia should vote in favour of Japanese adherence to international court. It might have been in Australia’s interests for Japanese admission to be postponed until next year so as to help us influence conditions for reference of fishing dispute to court. However, it is now clear that Japan will be admitted this year one way or another by the way we cast our vote. Attorney-General and I feel, therefore, that we should


now approach this question on a wider basis than on narrow considerations attached to our fishing dispute. It is clearly in our interest that Japan should be encouraged to settle its international differences through the court. There is further consideration of Australia’s own relations with Japan. We have to live with these people in the Pacific and our failure to vote in favour of their admission would not contribute to reasonable relations between the two countries. 40 Australia wished to be seen to be respecting and adhering to the accepted principles of international dispute settlement set up under the United Nations’ structure. But it did not want to allow Japan the scope to go to the ICJ unilaterally and avoid being subject to the provisional regime of control over fishing activities. The government’s Legal Adviser on these matters, Professor K.H.Bailey, proposed a means of ensuring this, as his advice was that ‘the Japanese object has been to find a way of bringing the dispute into court without the necessity of reaching a modus vivendi as to the provisional regime’.41 In legal terms, Australia had to be seen to be affording Japan a ‘reasonable’ opportunity to fish. A formal statement was given to the Japanese on 19 February 1954 as to Australian requirements of Japanese fishing under the provisional regime. Licences were required for 25 luggers. After some amendments by Cabinet in March, the Japanese agreed in April to the regime for the 1954 season,42 although some in the Japanese Foreign Ministry felt strongly that Japan should not accept the provisional regime, since acceding to what they saw as an illegal agreement might prejudice their case before the Court.43 The frigate Condamine delivered licences to the Japanese fleet on 8 June, with the stern warning that the Japanese luggers could not come within 10 miles of the Australian coastline, could not make contact with any native people, and could not take undersized shell.44 Thereafter, the heat went out of the issue, although it dragged on as a problem of political management for another eight years. Australia-Japan dealings on fisheries more or less equated with bilateral negotiations over Japanese access to Australian resources under the licensing arrangements. After the provisional regime was signed on 24 May 1954, further adjustments took place in subsequent years, allowing the Japanese wider access to areas. However, market problems were developing, as the supply of shell decreased and plastics began to take a bigger share of the button market.45 External Affairs was mindful of the need to support the Japanese economy for political reasons,46 and Australia also wished to continue to appear ‘reasonable’ in view of the planned ICJ matter, and to offset tensions developing in negotiations on trade issues.47 It was even prepared to respond to an apparent overture by Japan to arrange a political settlement of the problem, on legal advice that an ICJ decision may well not favour Australia. Cabinet went so far as to authorise the Prime Minister to sound out the Japanese on such an agreement when he was due to visit Japan in August 1956 (a trip that was later postponed until April 1957).48 Menzies did discuss the matter briefly with the Japanese Foreign Minister, stating that a political settlement was ‘much better than litigation. If you have any proposals we would be glad to look at them’.49 This opened a year or more of pressure from


the Japanese in trying to get Australia to discuss a political settlement, but the Japanese merely expressed a wish to take up from where the 1953 negotiations had been suspended.50 This was unacceptable to the Australian Government, as was a Japanese draft of an agreement. When he visited Japan in April 1957, Mr Menzies deflected a suggestion from the Japanese Prime Minister for ‘a quick solution in a practical way’, saying that the problem was one that involved the Australian states, and required some caution in fishing to preserve the resource.51 This was where matters stood as the new Law of the Sea Conference reached agreement in 1958 on the validity of the continental shelf doctrine. Declining catches were obvious by this time and the Northern Australian shell deposits had not recovered during the war to the extent previously believed.52 By the 1959 season, the catch limit was 375 tons, compared with just under 1,000 tons in the first year of operation under licensing in 1954,53 and the improved quality of plastic buttons was making severe inroads into the mother-of-pearl market. The Australian Government was even working with Australian pearlers and American importers of shell on a publicity campaign in the United States, emphasising the prestige value of pearlshell dress accessories.54 But such actions were inadequate in the face of changing manufacturing technology and market conditions. By 1962 Japanese pearl fishermen had left northern Australian waters. Australia, Japan and the pearlshell negotiations Pearlshell fishing was an issue of central importance to Australian attitudes concerning exploitation of its natural resources, and illustrated a strongly protective and tough stance that was not often seen in the later management of other resources that were regarded as more plentiful. It was Japan that had played such a large part in developing the resources before the war. Australia’s new-found status in international affairs impelled the government towards a tough stance initially, although pearlshell was soon an industry on the defensive, facing falling demand, aggressive competition and diminishing catches. Neither side displayed any great finesse at negotiation, although the difficulties for Australia in dealing with a newly-established Japanese diplomatic mission were considerable. Japan’s problem was that the Australian pearl fishery was a minor economic activity for them, but the diplomatic and legal implications of exclusion were potentially devastating to their relations with Korea and their access to more important fisheries in other parts of the world. Similarly, there were bigger issues in their relations with Australia, notably access to the Australian import market, but it was imperative that Japan hold firm on fisheries. Eventually, the legal arguments came to dominate the approach of both countries. It could be said that if Australia had not been able to use the continental shelf doctrine as a means of controlling Japanese boats, there would have been no practical means to resolve the dispute in Australia’s favour. The only way to manage Japanese access was by negotiation, which failed because Japan was unwilling to restrict its operations,


and Australia (although compromising to some degree) could not agree to disadvantage its own fishermen. It was fortuitous that international discussion on the continental shelf doctrine had advanced so far by the end of 1953, although this was in no small measure due to the activities of K.H.Bailey in influencing international thinking on this issue. Without such agreement, Australia would have had no legal standing for excluding or controlling Japanese boats and, even as late as 1957, it was by no means certain that the concept would gain widespread international acceptance. There was intense feeling in Australia at the height of the issue. Fortunately, however, the political tension and public anger over Japanese actions dissipated by 1954. There was no outcry in the Japanese press—just matter-of-fact reporting of negotiations that soon tailed off—and in Australia the pearlshell fishing dispute was rapidly replaced by concern at a Japanese presence in US survey teams in the New Guinea islands.55 Fishing remained a political problem during the first prime ministerial contacts in 1957, but did not stand in the way of amicable and constructive discussion on a range of other issues. After the introduction of licensing and a means thereby of controlling the Japanese fleet, it became mainly a technical matter, and the more fundamental political and trade questions were dealt with in separate fora. As the first postwar negotiation between the two countries, however, it was not marked by a great deal of willingness to compromise. In the initial stages, the principles were too important and the players too intent on gaining advantage. After 1954, however, other bilateral matters became more pressing and the issue faded in importance. As a negotiation, therefore, effectively it produced little result for either side: for Japan it brought a strict control of their operations, licensing and eventual legal defeat; for Australia, it forced a licensing system they wished to avoid, and legal justification only after five years of international legal debate, by which time the pearlshell industry was on the downslide. One Japanese commentator, a former Japanese ambassador to Australia, argues that the Australian approach showed no understanding of Japan’s need to reconstruct and rehabilitate its economy, and was too tough, even discriminatory. The Japanese did not understand Australia’s sensitivity to preserving its pearlshell stocks, nor to the issue of a former enemy operating so close to Australia itself. The issue was, concludes Narita, a serious impediment at the time to closer postwar relations.56 It may well have delayed better ‘understanding’ between the people of the two countries, but it certainly allowed the governments of each country much closer contact and a stronger appreciation of how to deal with each other. NEGOTIATING THE AUSTRALIA-JAPAN COMMERCE AGREEMENT The Agreement on Commerce between Australia and Japan of 1957 was a treaty to set certain rules for the conduct of bilateral trade. It marked the Australian decision to offer non-discriminatory access to the Australian market for Japanese goods, and acceptance by Japan of the need to cooperate in maintaining an orderly process of exports to Australia. The concern of this discussion is not with the trade aspects of


the agreement;57 rather, it deals with the negotiation process, and how each side coped politically with the other. Following the pearlshell negotiations, this was the second major set of discussions between the two countries, and was conducted in its early stages in parallel with the pearlshell talks. It was important for developing the political relationship because it helped lay the foundation for a long-term approach to bilateral political dealings, because of the ultimate success of the negotiations and because of the constructive approach adopted by each side. Furthermore, the domestic political interests in Japan and Australia associated with the issues under discussion were far more important in the political context of each country than had been the case with the pearlshell question; the stakes were therefore higher for both sides in this agreement, and the negotiation had to succeed if the longer-term relationship at both economic and political levels was to be forward-looking. Again, as with the pearlshell issue, the political profile of the Australian negotiation was not particularly significant of itself; it was, however, highly symbolic for its flow-on effects to other aspects of Japan’s trade and to the reputation of Japan as being able to deal successfully at a political level with controversial international negotiations, especially those with a Commonwealth country such as Australia which had a reputation for being antiJapanese. Like pearlshell fishing, the trade problem excited public interest in Australia. Japan was the object of much public vilification for its prewar trading practices, seen as unfair by many in Australia. Attempts to re-enter the Australian market were met with concern by Australian manufacturers and British Commonwealth exporters to Australia, despite the fact that Japan had rapidly become one of Australia’s main markets for primary produce exports. The trade talks began as a major political issue at about the same time that the pearlshell talks began in early 1953, when Japan began to apply pressure to ease restrictive licensing of Japanese imports by Australia. It took several years before negotiations were finally entered into and concluded, and the processes of negotiation were very different from those for the pearling problem. Many of the conditions, however, were similar. In both cases the Peace Treaty was a decisive initial factor. In the case of trade, Article XII of the Treaty provided that Japan would award most-favoured nation (mfn) treatment in trade to those Allied powers that gave the same treatment to Japan. It opened the way for Japan to push for reciprocal trading arrangements, just as Article IX opened up fisheries access to bilateral negotiation. The push inevitably came, but the trade issue was bound up with more complex international processes. As we saw above, pearlshell fishing was not a significant item for the Japanese economy, despite its relevance for the clothing industry and the rebuilding of some Japanese exports. Australia’s pearlshell was linked to much more important Japanese fishing-related disputes, notably with Korea and China. Japan therefore wished to fight hard to maintain its fisheries position vis-à-vis Australia in order to protect its wider interests.


Generally, Australia was a minor factor in the serious business of Japan positioning itself in the postwar international power structure. But in trade, Australia was far more relevant, of itself, to Japan being accepted in the international trading regime. Within the overall structure of Japanese trade, Australia was a vital supplier of wool, wheat and other goods. While not a significant export market for Japanese products, Australia nonetheless had potential if access to its market could be achieved. Furthermore, the bilateral trade imbalance led to Japanese requests in May 1953 for Australia to ease its import restrictions in order to provide more sterling currency for Japan for import purchasing. Australia was therefore crucial to this aspect of Japan’s trade policy, and the trade negotiations took on serious political significance in both countries. The political ramifications of the issue were not only domestic, however. Trade problems in the 1950s were linked closely to the question of Japan’s membership of international organisations, especially the GATT. The international context of negotiating the Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement was therefore vital to the outcome. Fundamentally, Japan was seeking to bring about an international climate more favourable to acceptance of Japan as a trader on equal terms with others. This came about in July 1955 when Japan became a member of GATT. Australia accepted this but reserved the right to invoke Article XXXV, which provided for withholding of most-favoured nation treatment. Australia had to be seen to be upholding the international mechanisms (as was the case with accepting Japan’s accession to the International Court of Justice), but required strict bilateral controls to be in place too. Australia also did not wish to be seen as obstinate in dealing with Japan, although the Japanese certainly regarded Australia’s stance as a symbol of resistance to acceptance of Japan. There were, therefore, strong pragmatic reasons, coupled with powerful international trends, at the basis of both negotiating processes. But the trade talks were undoubtedly more significant, and more complex for both countries. After the initial bout of pearlshell talks, breakdown and mutual recriminations, the two governments set about dealing with the practical aspects of getting on with the business of fishing for pearlshell. The matter quickly became a routine administrative task except for the broader issue (unconnected with the processes of fishing or licensing) of the outcome of international debate on the continental shelf concept. In contrast, bilateral trade negotiations were drawn-out and complex, and became a highly-charged domestic political issue in Australia over more than a decade after the end of the war. That the end result was a tough but amicable negotiation with a beneficial outcome for both parties says much for the ability of each side to accommodate each other’s position and overcome political opposition at home. The trade negotiation process had several important features that were vital in shaping Australia’s dealings with Japan over the longer term. There was, for a start, a real legal basis on which Australia could limit Japanese access to the market. Second, and on the other hand, Japan had a legitimate and effective source of pressure on Australia, the threat of withholding purchases of wool. Both sides, therefore, went into the preliminary discussions about trade problems with a firm basis of strength in negotiating. Third, a complex interdepartmental situation existed in Australia, matched by similar rivalries at the Japanese end. Fourth, a lengthy period of preliminary exchanges preceded actual


negotiations, so the difference between positions was greatly narrowed at the outset. Fifth, frequent recourse to political decisions was necessary and important, but officials had ample scope for negotiating a compromise (in contrast to the pearling situation). Sixth, negotiation was done by small teams, over a compressed but lengthy period, in a spirit of genuine cooperation. Let us examine each of these features in more detail: (1) legal basis. Australia’s import licensing regulations were the legal basis on which Japanese imports to Australia were controlled. Coupled with the tariff schedules, they were a powerful barrier to expanding the entry of Japanese goods without formal mechanisms to alter regulations. Important decisions to ease licensing restrictions on Japanese imports were taken in July 1953 and November 1954, but not without some strong pressure from the Japanese. However, these major decisions had to be taken at Cabinet level, given the political sensitivity of the issue and the fact that Japan was the country most discriminated against in Australia’s import policy at the time. Alongside these domestic legal barriers were international legal obligations that, one way or another, led Australia to closer trade ties with Japan. These were the Peace Treaty mentioned above, and the GATT which, despite Australia’s reluctance to give full mfn treatment to Japan when it joined in 1955, nonetheless provided another external legal basis for Japan to further its international acceptance, notably by taking up the bilateral negotiation route as the most likely to achieve the objective of freer trade access. (2) Japanese pressure. While Australian legal constraints were an obstacle that needed to be overcome and required very specific decisions to be taken, another significant feature of trade negotiations was the role of Japanese political pressure in influencing Australia towards a more positive and cooperative position. Japan first proposed to Australia in May 1953 that the two countries enter into discussions about Japan’s sterling balances and Australia’s restrictive import licensing.58 This pressure from Japan to ease licensing to improve the balance in Australia-Japan trade was consistent from the end of 1952 until 1955–56 when informal talks about a trading agreement took place. A memorandum from Japan of 27 March 1953 directly stated that ‘Japan…has no other choice than to cut drastically her imports from sterling area…’.59 This meant reducing purchases of Australian wool. A note verbale of 12 May 1953 again sought relaxation of licensing (without explicit threats) and followed with a stronger note on 5 November, in which Japan stated: …unless measures be expeditiously taken on the part of the Australian Government of arresting the deteriorating tendency, the Japanese Government might find itself unable to continue imports from Australia on the pace and scale as in the past periods.60 Australian officials, and Cabinet, recognised the threat. In April, the Department of Commerce and Agriculture (in charge of exports) identified the real possibility that Japan might not continue to purchase at the same level. By May 1953, specific effects on wool purchasing had become clear, with reductions in sterling area imports in the Foreign Exchange Budget Plan for the first half (April to September) of the Japanese fiscal year 1953–54. Commerce and Agriculture calculated this as representing a cut of about 60,000 bales. The advice within the Department was that there was considerable


apprehension about longer-term prospects for the Japanese wool industry and pressure to diversify purchases of raw wool away from Australia. Demand for the next year from Japan was predicted to be lower, and this would translate into lower prices.61 The difficult situation for Australia was summed up in this way: Japanese buying is now a most important factor in the wool market, and her presence there has been a stimulus which has supported the market when it might otherwise have sagged. In addition, Japan competes with Bradford for the ‘bread and butter’ lines of the Australian clip and this is important in maintaining average prices. Should any withdrawal by Japan from the market coincide with a weakening in the purchases of another wool customer, the consequences could seriously affect our economy.62 These considerations weighed heavily with Cabinet when it met on 2 July to consider Japanese trade. It was important to avoid criticism and Japanese retaliation when Australia’s trade figures were healthy (a trade surplus of £350 million predicted at that stage for the year 1952–53 just completed). Cabinet was presented with a unanimous front by the heads of the two trade departments plus Treasury and External Affairs, arguing for relaxation of restrictions to head off ‘major external economic problems (with some international political implications)’.63 Japan had indeed moved to reduce its sterling purchases. Argentinian wool was targeted (108,000 bales), and there were press reports of imports of South African wool for the second half (October-March) of the Japanese fiscal year 1953–54. Trade expectations were for 240,000 bales to be bought from Australia, about 5 per cent less than in the first half of the period. The value of Australian wool exports to Japan fell to £43.7 million in 1953–54, 35 per cent down on the £66.7 million of 1952–53. This lower level was seen again in the following year and only in 1955–56 was there a revival to £65 million as Japan’s sterling balances improved. Thus, Japanese linkage of trade policy with trade threats was real and effective. The Japanese had to balance their various available currencies with different qualities of commodity, so the situation was not altogether one of their choosing. They did, however, use the opportunity for leverage to great effect, and it helped them achieve a relaxation in Australian import restrictions. Not only that, but it coincided with the development in Canberra of a growing consensus at bureaucratic and political levels that a longerterm resolution of Australian trade problems with Japan was necessary. (3) bureaucratic context. Negotiations with Japan on trade and commerce were primarily a matter for three departments in Canberra: Trade and Customs, Commerce and Agriculture, and Treasury. External Affairs played a minor advisory role. On the pearling questions, External Affairs had a much more central responsibility, because agreements involved international treaty negotiations and brought international legal issues into the forefront of debate. The technical questions were the province of the fisheries division of Commerce and Agriculture, but the channel of communication with the Japanese and the legal problems involved External Affairs closely. Trade had always been beyond the scope of External Affairs interests and responsibilities. Not until External Affairs was given the central coordinating role in relations with Japan in 1972 did trade with that country come within their formal


brief (even then it took some years to gain a legitimate voice). In the 1950s, trade was squarely a matter for the departments of Commerce and Agriculture and Trade and Customs, the former concerned with exporting, the latter with imports, customs and excise. To resolve the trade issues, therefore, the two halves of Australian trade policy— exports and imports—had to be brought together at Cabinet level. Until January 1956 when the new Department of Trade was established, incorporating both of the former departments under the headship of John McEwen as Minister and J.G.Crawford as Permanent Head. Thus Commerce and Agriculture gained ascendancy in the new structure, with a separate Department of Customs and Excise to implement policy as determined by the Department of Trade. Nevertheless, External Affairs found it difficult always to keep in touch with the train of events. The Secretary of External Affairs had to request involvement in a key meeting between the secretaries of Trade and Customs and Commerce and Agriculture in October 1955 with the Japanese Ambassador, a meeting that cleared the way for the informal trade discussions with Japan in late 1955 and early 1956, although External Affairs recognised that ‘at this stage, it is doubtful whether this Department can offer much to them’.64 The trade departments had already decided that their basic approach would be to offer Japan de facto mfn treatment.65 Similarly, External Affairs found that it differed fundamentally from Trade on the question of what to inform the Japanese about the basic position that Cabinet decided to take in relation to trade negotiations. Trade was even unwilling to inform the Australian Embassy in Tokyo, and went to great lengths to keep secret from the Japanese that Australia would give them mfn treatment.66 Late in the negotiations, External Affairs was greatly upset to find Trade communicating separately with the Japanese Embassy, representing its message as from ‘the Australian Delegation’. Some stiff correspondence was exchanged, although Trade was completely unapologetic. The Embassy in Tokyo was also upset at the lack of information it was receiving from Canberra about the conclusion of the agreement; Watt complained that he was getting information from the Japanese press and the Japanese Foreign Ministry, but not from his own government. He even expressed his opposition to the visit by the Minister for Trade for the purposes of signing the agreement.67 The important effect of the new Trade Department structure was to give primacy to export opportunities and, in so far as policy towards Japan was concerned, to align the demands for greater import access with the need to raise Australian exports. In the end this was a difficult question of domestic political management which McEwen and Crawford had to undertake. However, it was linked also to the resolution of the major issue in the eyes of the Japanese, whether the remnants of discrimination against Japan in the 1957 Agreement would be removed by getting rid of the option for Australia to invoke Article XXXV of GATT. Australia felt that its ability to give full and unequivocal access to trade rights under GATT depended on the outcome of the 1957 Agreement and the impact on Australian manufacturers of increased Japanese competition. This outcome was generally regarded as a good one: for example, the Australian Knitting Industries Council ‘thanked Japanese clothing exporters for “exercising restraint” since the Australian and Japanese Trade Agreement


came into force’.68 Other reports spoke of mutual praise ‘for the scrupulous way in which the letter and spirit of the agreement were observed’,69 the Cabinet submission seeking approval to negotiate to revise the Agreement and remove the residual safeguard of GATT Article XXXV acknowledged this directly, and both Crawford and McEwen appreciated the progress that had been made: Progress was rapid and the changes effected in the review of the Treaty announced in 1963 caused very little stir…But by this time Australian manufacturers had moved from their early position of bitter and even hysterical protest to recognising Japan sufficiently to establish with Japanese businessmen a joint Committee for Australian-Japanese Business Cooperation. Some industries still feared Japanese competition but the community as a whole has come to recognise the expanding mutual interests embodied in the Treaty… 70 The new trade treaty proved to be very satisfactory. At the end of three years, we were able to say that our experience had shown that we had nothing to fear from Japanese trading methods or trading strength. 71 (4) lengthy preliminaries. As we have seen, the first rounds in the trade negotiations took place in late 1952 and early 1953, as Japan set out its very firm position on improved entry into the Australian market. It took another four years or more before an agreement was reached, and the major milestones of July 1953 and OctoberNovember 1954 (Australian decisions on easier import licensing) and July 1955 (Japan’s entry to the GATT) enabled both sides to understand in a gradual way the position of the other. Australia by late 1954 had generally accepted the necessity of talks with Japan towards some broader trade arrangement. Japan wanted first to be accepted into GATT. This having been achieved, preliminary discussions began in late 1955, which resolved some of the basic questions such as the type of agreement. Coupled with the benefits of lengthy preliminaries was the stability of the players. On the Australian side, most of the senior officials and bureaucrats were the same over the whole period. Likewise, the key ministers remained the same in the Menzies Cabinet, and were able to follow several years of complex discussions. Casey expressed Cabinets feeling at one critical point that ‘it was almost too good to be true when we were told that Departmental talks with the Japanese had reflected the fact that the Japanese did not take exception to the safeguards proposed by Australia’.72 The ambassadors in each country changed once during the whole period, Suzuki Tadakatsu taking over from Nishi Haruhiko in 1955 and Alan Watt replacing E.R.Walker in Tokyo in 1956. Japanese officials were rather less permanent, consistent with the practice of moving senior officials every two or three years. Ushiba Nobuhiko (the chief Japanese negotiator) was in touch with the problem for much of the time, coming into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1954 from a senior post in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and being appointed Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau after he had successfully completed the negotiations with Australia as leader of the Japanese delegation over the seven months of talks.73


(5) scope for negotiation. While trade rapprochement with Japan was a highly sensitive political issue, the actual negotiation of the Commerce Agreement was left to the teams of specialists who were able to work closely together in Canberra over the period of discussions, 27 October–22 December 1956 and 23 March–19 June 1957. In Australia, Cabinet was kept informed and ratified the key points in the negotiating process, but there was ample opportunity for officials to work on details of the problem. Crawford has spoken with quiet pride of his efforts to discuss matters personally with the Japanese Ambassador in Canberra, necessarily in a way that avoided the public gaze. Indeed, at the Japanese end, it was the officials, Ushiba and his Foreign Ministry staff, who were the key players in persuading politicians of the value of accepting Australian requests (especially on wheat). In Australia, Westerman was the main negotiator, but the negotiating position was one that had evolved over the few preceding years. The record of the first informal meeting between Ushiba and Westerman reveals some of the differences between the starting positions of each side that were able to be bridged by patient negotiating. Japan at that early stage was only contemplating a one-year agreement covering 1957, whereas Westerman (speaking in his private capacity) was considering a four- to five-year arrangement to provide mfn treatment plus a more stable basis to the trade (and to avoid annual political opposition). Westerman rebutted Ushiba’s concern that Australia’s mfn offer was designed only for gradual introduction, saying that it was intended to be across-the-board and immediate.74 (6) cooperative negotiation. The Ushiba-Westerman relationship typified the cooperative spirit in which the trade negotiations were conducted. At the opening session, Ushiba spoke warmly of his welcome to Canberra and of the fact that he had already managed to get in a round of golf. Participants in the two small teams appreciated the way in which the teams worked together, both at the top level and at the working group level between Uyama Atsushi of the Japanese Embassy and G.P. Phillips of the Department of Trade.75 By the time the formal negotiations had begun, the positions of each side were reasonably well known. Exploratory talks via the Japanese Embassy had taken place in Canberra between October 1955 and February 1956. Both governments exchanged requests in August 1956, followed by reactions to those requests in October. This opened the way to formal talks beginning three weeks later on 1 November 1956. Department of Trade officials also informed Ambassador Suzuki privately that Australia wanted to accept fully Japan’s requests for mfn treatment and non-discriminatory licensing. Such acceptance required Japan to fulfil certain conditions, especially covering the treatment of Australian products (for example, wheat) in the Japanese market and adequate controls and safeguards on Japanese exports. Australia’s readiness to adopt a cooperative and conciliatory attitude was apparent. At the end of the negotiations, the feelings expressed by both sides about the outcome of the negotiations reflected the success with which the teams had been able to deal with one another: In negotiation the easiest part is to know precisely what one wants oneself…The more difficult thing is to make up your mind what the other man wants and to bring him to understand your own position. In talking to you, Mr Ushiba, I always had the feeling that you knew the kind of problem that was mine and that you could understand it.


I hope you have always felt that I was anxious to take full account of your particular problems. Given that kind of approach, I think negotiations are a much more pleasant occupation than they otherwise would be.76 The Commerce Agreement resulted from a lengthy period of careful bilateral consultation. Negotiating the final document proved relatively painless compared with the pearl fisheries talks; the groundwork had been laid over a four-year period by officials and politicians who were both experienced and far-sighted. In Japan’s case, their view of Japan’s interests included a world role that was premised on being accepted as a member of the international economic community. In Australia, that view was appreciated, as it matched Australian interests and objectives. The 1963 revision of the Commerce Agreement reinforced the success and the solidity of the trade relationship, and the strength of inter-governmental contacts. The revision, agreed upon after negotiations in Tokyo and Canberra in late 1962, involved removal of the right under Article IV of the 1957 Agreement to invoke Article XXXV of the GATT, deletion of Article V which incorporated arrangements for consulting about possible injury to Australian producers from Japanese imports, and further assurances about Australian access to the Japanese market. The revision was certainly welcomed by Japan as putting bilateral trade on a ‘normal’ basis, but it represented far more than this. It came at a time when Britain was negotiating to enter the European Common Market and the potential for Australia in expanding its ties with Japan was more obvious. Said one newspaper report: …Australia must regard Japan as her new ‘Britain of the East’. Japan at present is by far the brightest spot in our trading firmament… in the face of this mounting dependence on Japan, Australia is in a weak position to dodge recognition of Japan as a full trading partner under GATT.77 The Australian Financial Review (AFR) the following month spoke of ‘an essential trading alliance’ between Japan and Australia. It noted increased Australian spending on maintaining commercial and diplomatic intelligence in Tokyo. The interdependence that was hailed ten years later as the keystone of Australia-Japan ties was foreseen at this point as the logical outcome of a stable and active two-way trade. Australia recognised and appreciated the way in which Japan stepped in to prevent problems arising from their exports. Delays in renegotiating after the first agreement formally expired in 1960 allowed for the trends in trade away from Britain to become more widely appreciated, and made the political problem of acceptance of the trends rather less touchy. The renegotiation proved quite straightforward, assisted by what one commentator called ‘the healthy respect negotiators from each country have for their counterparts on the other side’.78 Japan was very reluctant to accept an Australian request to incorporate assurances on the import of Australian beef, and ministerial talks in Japan could not reach agreement.79 Beef was therefore not included, although exports to Japan of frozen beef did expand from 1964, the year after the new agreement was signed, to a level well above the 20,000 tons requested by Australia.80


In summary, therefore, the negotiation of the Commerce Agreement and its revision cemented the economic base to a growing political relationship, and confirmed in the minds of many in both governments that the two countries could work together effectively at an official and political level. THE BASIC TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION OF 1976 The negotiation of the Basic Treaty took two and a half years after Australia first handed Japan a draft treaty in December 1973. Why this was so has been the subject of other more detailed research, and several sources have already canvassed some of the major issues.81 It was undoubtedly an important treaty, a statement of shared economic and political interests, and of a desire to continue those close relationships. The Japanese had pursued the question of a broad treaty with Australia for a long time. While the Basic Treaty arose from a specific prime ministerial initiative, it was in the context of a series of Japanese requests for a friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaty going back to 1894. The FCN-type of treaty itself has a long history in international society and was generally designed to provide for commitments to ensure ease of intercourse in commerce, navigation, entry, establishment, access to courts and protection of persons and property. Japan had established a network of such treaties, for example the 1962 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, which was an agreement between countries of roughly equal size and strength. An FCN treaty between Australia and Japan would not have started from a basis of equality. The distinctive feature of FCN treaties was the mfn clause, and it was certainly common to all of Japan’s FCN treaties. But there was widespread unease and dissatisfaction about whether an FCN treaty could provide full reciprocal benefits. The previous formal Japanese request for such a treaty had been made as part of the Japanese Initial Statement when the first informal trade talks began in October 1955.82 The Japanese argued that, with Article XII of the Peace Treaty (covering Japan’s obligations in these areas for four years) due to lapse in April 1956, replacement arrangements were necessary. The Japanese rightly pointed out the different treatment accorded business people from Australia entering Japan, as against the discriminatory treatment accorded Japanese business people entering Australia. The Japanese envisaged an FCN treaty as incorporating trade guarantees such as abolition of tariff discrimination and import restrictions, plus matters concerning entry, stay and residence of and establishment of Japanese companies or branches in Australia. The Minister for External Affairs explained Australia’s difficulties to the Japanese Ambassador,83 and the proposal was rejected on the following grounds: They [the Japanese] were informed that difficulties due to the Australian federal system and the diversity of State laws had made it impossible to conclude such a Treaty with the United States. Australia did not, therefore, feel there was any point in attempting to conclude such a Treaty with Japan. Instead, attempts will be made to reach separate understandings with Japan on the more important matters


which would normally be included in a Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation.84 It seems that the Japanese realised the difficulty of gaining an FCN treaty, but were most concerned about issues of commercial contact: establishment of trade and branch offices, entry of businessmen (on which they sought mfn treatment), and the basic issues of trade discrimination and import restrictions, which were the province of Australia’s trade policy. Instead of an FCN treaty, Australia agreed with the Japanese suggestion that discussions could be held on individual items. Japan proposed separating the trade matters from the ‘treaty’ matters and hoped that both could be carried forward; the Japanese Ambassador even provided draft agreements covering entry, stay, travel and residence, business activities and treatment of ships.85 However, the two sides moved towards the negotiation of the Commerce Agreement, focussing only on trade issues. The proposal for resolution of entry and stay and other issues was dropped by the Japanese and the Australians decided not to press it. Reactions of Canberra departments were that the Japanese had ‘picked out what…are some of the most difficult aspects of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation’.86 The Canberra attitude throughout the prime ministerial contacts in 1957 was that ‘these draft agreements are still under study by the various Departments concerned. They raise considerable difficulties which may not be easily overcome’.87 Japanese businessmen also asked in 1969 for an FCN treaty and their Australian counterparts rejected the proposal as not likely to provide sufficient equal benefits.88 Australia was very concerned to ensure that it was not disadvantaged by any such arrangement. In the early 1970s, Australian officials had not changed their views. The Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Japan reported in 1972 that Australia should not sign an FCN-type treaty with Japan. Japan’s superior bargaining position as a nowpowerful nation with a vibrant economy and as the major purchaser of Australian raw materials meant that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. Separate treaties on separate issues were still preferred in 1972 as they had been in 1955. This line was taken at the first meeting of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee in October 1972, when the Japanese raised the matter formally, only to receive the by-then standard Australian response. While the Japanese argued successfully for it to be referred to in the communique, they pressed the issue no further.89 The press was scathing in pointing out the government’s double standards: refusing to contemplate an agreement of any sort while Australian and Japanese political and economic interests were clearly more closely aligned than ever before. They even referred to Japan seeking Australia as a ‘new ally’.90 Fortunately, however, others had a far broader view of what was required. Sir John Crawford, former head of the Department of Trade and a key adviser to the government, saw it this way: So for the moment I am dealing with the proposition that we should have a treaty; I would not call it Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, and I think that is one of the dangers of this discussion. People are trapped by nineteenth century concepts of relationships which I do not believe are necessary. I do not even believe it is necessary in the form of the United Kingdom-Japanese Treaty which is often quoted as a model. It is not a model in my thinking; it is full of positive


statements in the beginning and contradictions in the second half—a typical British document!91 Crawford’s desire was for a treaty that put the specific agreements in a broad framework of principles: The document as a whole would provide for consultation and negotiation while recognising something that the Japanese do understand, the pragmatic interest in specific subjects. But if we try to deal with these specific matters only ad hoc and under the pressure of specific day to day events, I think we will lose sight of the general objective of our relationship with Japan which has to be seen a good way into the future as the relationship of two rather important industrial countries in the Pacific both with a degree of dependence upon each other—a very important safeguard for our relationships—but both bound to face pretty important stresses in future relationships with other parts of the region and with Europe. And I make no bones about it: I would be much happier to see our country conducting our affairs with Japan in the framework of a treaty than simply relying on the fact that it has been pretty good so far and we have nothing to worry about. I think that is the path to disaster at the worst, but certainly to less than full result at the best.92 Crawford’s advice was sought by Prime Minister Whitlam in mid–1973 after the Interdepartmental Committee on Japan again prepared papers on a treaty that argued against an FCN arrangement. Crawford urged consideration of specific questions, and a separate report was requested from Foreign Affairs. This time it proposed a broad treaty and Whitlam gained Japan’s agreement for negotiations when he visited Japan in October 1973. One Japanese view of the reasons for Australia’s new interest in a treaty was that Whitlam wished to counter long-held Australian fears of the ‘threat from the north’, linked in postwar years to Japan to a great degree. Whitlam felt that Australians mistrusted Japan, and even within the Labor government itself was a fear of Japanese rearmament (although this was almost an icon of postwar Labor Party policy, stemming from their strong opposition to the 1952 Peace Treaty). Whitlam’s objective, as seen from Japan, was to cement a friendship treaty with Japan and thereby neutralise the ‘threat from Japan’ argument. The treaty was, according to this view, ‘Australia’s first-ever positive policy towards Asia’.93 Thereafter a first Australian draft of a treaty was given to the Japanese in December 1973 and they produced a counter draft in May 1974. Preliminary negotiations were held in July and September 1974 and formal negotiations between 28 November and 4 December 1974. During much of the following year talks were at a stalemate over the precise meaning of the ‘most-favoured nation’ aspects of the Treaty. After the defeat of the Labor government in December 1975, the new conservative Cabinet under Malcolm Fraser was able to resolve the outstanding issues, and the Treaty was signed on 16 June 1976. As Woodard relates, ‘the Treaty was a political initiative’94 and remains the symbol of an intense period of political interaction between the two countries. Its political significance and practical provisions set guidelines for the longer-term management of


relations. Its purposes reflect the positive objectives of Crawford: to establish, on the basis of strong economic links, political principles for the conduct of bilateral contact. This form of Treaty is unique for Australia, and is more comprehensive than many of Japan’s FCN treaties. While much of the Treaty goes no further than ‘best endeavours’, it lays down for the first time specific standards of treatment for the entry, stay and professional and business activities of Japanese nationals. More importantly, in the context of the Australia-Japan political relationship, the Treaty specifically refers to matters of mutual interest in ‘political…fields’, and requires the two countries to try to strengthen mutual cooperation in such fields. Their common interest in the prosperity and welfare of the Asian and Pacific region is mentioned as well. The Treaty therefore provides for political cooperation; it does not mention defence and security affairs, but then it does not exclude them either. The Treaty’s fourteen articles must be read together with the protocol, two exchanges of notes, agreed minutes and a record of discussion. The most important provisions begin with Article 1.3, which provides the ‘umbrella’ for other future agreements. Areas of mutual interest are spelled out in Article III, including areas which have since become of wider significance, such as political, human rights, legal, scientific, technological and environmental. Article V expresses the mutual interest of each country in ‘being a stable and reliable supplier to and market for the other’, although this is only a statement of intent and carries no binding force. The basis of mutual benefit and trust as enunciated in Article V is linked in Article VI to cooperation in the trade and development of mineral resources, including energy resources. The Agreed Minutes remove ‘specific treatment’ of trade matters from the scope of the Treaty. Articles VIII and IX are the key substantive articles, and taken with the attachments to the Treaty, provide a form of mfn treatment with regard to entry and stay in matters relating to business and professional activities of persons and companies (including investment activities), except for arrangements made under certain ‘special agreements’, or emanating from Australia’s membership of the British Commonwealth, or made ‘under policies which are then no longer operative’. These words reflect the negotiated compromise that allows mfn treatment without the full retrospectivity and prospectivity that the Japanese wanted. The negotiation process was one bound to a great extent by an attitude of what the National Times called ‘keeping Superjap at arms length’.95 That editorial made the pertinent point that ‘Japan brings out the worst in many Australian officials… provincialism, insularity, the chauvinism and lurking racism…The Australian bureaucrat’s attitude towards Japan appears to arise out of a mixture of fear and ignorance’. After the event, Whitlam himself complained that departments had obstructed the concluding of the Treaty: The Public Service is so extraordinarily technical and fearful of the legal consequences of any treaty into which Australia enters.

The Treasury was apprehensive that our freedom of action in matters of appreciation and devaluation of the currency or our relations with the International Monetary Fund or the Asian Development Bank might be restricted.


Trade was apprehensive that our conduct under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade could be affected. Immigration—before we had to abolish that second-rate, racist department—was apprehensive of the immigration aspects, although the Japanese have shown no proclivity to migrate to any other country in the world except Brazil. …I forget what other departments there were, but they were extraordinarily technical. Unless a Government or a minister is constantly vigilant and diligent, departments will protract discussions ad infinitum et nauseam.96 Fortunately, the negotiation process showed a strong degree of forward thinking as well, once the basic principles for the Treaty had been clarified at political level. Stockwin and Woodard show that, while there was great difficulty over the mfn aspects of the treaty, negotiation beyond that presented no major difficulties. As was the case with the Commerce Agreement negotiators, both sides were said to respect the toughness of their counterparts. The commentaries on the treaty-making process point to several key factors in its outcome. The first was the level of prime ministerial influence and interest. This meant that pressure to produce a treaty was strong, but the details were left to the officials. Whitlam in 1975 was far too preoccupied with his government’s political future to focus on the finer legal points of resolving the treaty. At the same time, input from the Prime Minister’s office to deliberations at the official level meant a speedier resolution of bureaucratic differences. Second, reliance on departments to resolve negotiating points created serious interdepartmental disputes, and the perils of the attitude quoted above were high. Woodard argues that the Japanese negotiators were ‘more experienced, compact and tightly-knit’, than the Australian collection of fourteen departments, although MITI and the Foreign Ministry were not in agreement on many points. Third, this was a purely government-to-government negotiation. It did not involve non-government participants in the way that the pearling and commerce agreements did. It was concerned with principles of treatment between countries at a fairly abstract level. The Treaty was well received at the time, on the whole. While the AFR referred to it as ‘but a scrap of paper’, enshrining ‘some self-evident facts and a few fine sentiments’,97 other newspapers spoke of its important principles. The Japanese commentaries were restrained. The effectiveness of the Treaty has depended on political will. Woodard shows that the Treaty has been invoked rarely since 1976 by Australia, and that on occasions when it might have been effectively referred to, it was not.98 At the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee Meeting held after the signing of the Treaty, in Japan in January 1977, issues of beef, minerals and sugar trade were under intense discussion, and comment from Japan questioned the value of the Treaty when, despite provisions about stable and reliable supply, Japan was reducing its beef quota and Australia was pressing to reduce Japan’s tuna catch in Australian waters.99 A MITI official likewise pointed out the central place that the provisions of the Treaty had in the ministerial discussions, but pointed out also the difficult problems that faced the meeting.100


Nonetheless, the Basic Treaty is the pre-eminent formal agreement in the bilateral political relationship. It embodies important sentiments and principles, and provides the longer-term reference point that Crawford saw as essential for sure and stable growth in the relationship. It also points the way forward towards cooperative political discussions and regional cooperation and, in terms of the reasons for its inception, locks both countries into a political relationship as well as providing for the range of commercial, visa and trade arrangements necessary for day-to-day contact. In particular, for Australia, it provides a central point of reference for long-term consultative arrangements with its larger and more powerful partner. Over the course of the post-Occupation period, Australia and Japan have dealt with three major political negotiations that brought their political and administrative systems into close contact and helped lay down an atmosphere of cooperative relations that embraced the wider sphere of their bilateral contacts. While they were not the only agreements, nor the only negotiations (and we shall deal with the other agreements in our next chapter), they were important in being highly controversial and yet ultimately resolved in a very positive fashion. Above all else, however, these negotiations helped bring closer together the governmental systems of both countries into an ongoing process of political and bureaucratic interchange. NOTES 1

2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

There is a voluminous literature on US-Japan alliance relations. Among the first to examine a particular bilateral problem area were I.M.Destler, H.Fukui and H.Sato, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in JapaneseAmerican Relations 1969–71, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1979. Roger Buckley’s US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945–1990, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, is a broad survey with a representative bibliography. The entry of divers is dealt with in AA, A5000/1, Decision 343 of 18 March 1952, when Cabinet approved entry to Australia of a maximum of 35 Japanese divers. In A1838/T180, 3103/10/1/2 part 2, Decision 265, January 1955, Cabinet granted permission for not more than 90 Ryukyuan divers to enter Australia. Also see Regina Ganter, ‘Images of Japanese pearl-shellers in Queensland: an oral history chapter in Australia-Japan relations’, Royal Historical Society of Queensland Journal, vol. XIV, no. 7, May 1991, pp. 265–85. W.Macmahon Ball and H.Wolfsohn, ‘Australia’s relations with Japan since 1945’, in Institute of Pacific Relations, Australia’s Policies Towards Asia, Part 4, 1954, p. 11. Robin Kay (ed.), Documents on New Zealand External Relations Volume III: The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Government Printer, Wellington, 1985, documents 147 and 158. Department of State Bulletin, 25 February 1951, p. 351. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1951, vol. VI, p. 1071. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 1, 6 September 1951. Cable O.17845/46, 9 November 1951, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 1, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. Cable I.9030 from Tokyo, 25 June 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 2. Memorandum 17 October 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 2. Cabinet Committee GA(D)9, 15 October 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 3.

Resolving disputes: some key Australia–Japan negotiations 67 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40

Nihon keizai shimbun, 30 April and 8 August 1951. Nihon keizai shimbun, 15 September 1951. Attachment to Cabinet Committee papers, 15 October 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 3. Memorandum by Pacific Branch, Department of External Affairs, 2 March 1953, AA, A1838/ T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 5. Text of note from Casey to the Japanese Foreign Office, see cables O.2751–53, 11 March 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 4. Note to Minister, 2 March 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 5. Note to Minister, 2 March 1953. Views of the Japanese delegation on the general principles contained in the Australian proposals, 15 April 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 5. For the Minister, 2 March 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 5. Cable 170 to Tokyo, 21 April 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 7. Watanabe Akio (ed.), Sengo nihon no taigai seisaku, Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1985, p. 164. Cabinet Committee GA(D)9, 15 October 1952; Cable I.17054 from London, 11 December 1952, both in AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 3. Cable I.6867 from Tokyo, 21 May 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 6. Record of Conversation, 11 May 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 6. Nishi Haruhiko, Kaiso no nihon gaiko, Iwanami shoten, Tokyo, 1965, p. 153. This is borne out in instructions from the Ministry of April-May 1953. Japanese Foreign Ministry documents on the pearlshell issue are contained in Microfiche B-0054 (11th Document Release) in the Diplomatic Record Office, Tokyo. They are, however, a selective set of materials, including telegrams back and forth from Canberra, and Ministry position papers. Only Foreign Ministry documents are included, and documents from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries are unavailable. For the Secretary, 24 June 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 7. Cable O.6863 to Tokyo, 10 June 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 7. Decision 807, AA, A4933/XM1, Volume 12, and AA, A1838/T184, 3101/10/1/1 part 8. I.12626 from Tokyo, 19 September 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 9. For the Minister, 12 August 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 8. Cabinet Committee 12 August 1953, AA, A4933/XM1, vol. 12. Decision 807 referred to above. Cable O.10113, 28 August 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 8. Nihon keizai shimbun, 3 May 1954. Cable O.10167 to Tokyo, 31 August 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 8. The best analysis of the role of the continental shelf doctrine and this issue is S.V.Scott, ‘The inclusion of sedentary fisheries within the Continental Shelf Doctrine’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 41, October 1992, pp. 788–807. For the Prime Minister, 31 August 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3101/10/1/1 part 8. Sekai shuho, vol. 34, no. 29, July 1953, pp. 16–21. Cable I.13609 from Tokyo, 10 October 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 9. For Spender from Casey, Cable O.13530 to New York, 7 December 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 11.

68 The Australia–Japan political alignment 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73

Document attached to papers for Cabinet Committee Gen 16(d)3, 21 January 1954. Paper by Bailey dated 14 January 1954, AA, A4933/XM1, vol. 12. Cabinet Committee Gen 16(d)4, AA, A4933/XM1, vol. 12. Nihon keizai shimbun, 3 May 1954. Nihon keizai shimbun, 9 June 1954. The text of the agreement on the provisional regime can be found in Current Notes on International Affairs, June 1954, pp. 360–61. Cable I.9815, 1 September 1954 and O.8068, 24 August 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/ 1 part 16. For the Acting Minister, 17 February 1955, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 17. McEwen to McBride, 14 September 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3101/10/1/1 part 18. Decision 210, 21 May 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 19. Note from Prime Minister’s Department, 26 September 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 20. Aide memoire, 3 October 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 20. Record of conversation between Menzies and Kishi, 12 April 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/ 11/2/1 part 2. Note by Plimsoll, 6 November 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 20. Current Notes on International Affairs, June 1959, p. 270. Current Notes on International Affairs, June 1959, pp. 270–71. Sydney Morning Herald, 28 January 1954. Narita Katsushiro, Nichigo tsusho gaikoshi, Shinhyoron, Tokyo, 1971, p. 194. This is dealt with in Alan Rix, Coming to Terms, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986. See Rix, Coming to Terms, pp. 176–80. Note Verbale from Japanese Embassy in Canberra, 27 March 1953, see AA, A609, 555/120/4. Gaimusho keizaikyoku daiyonka, Nichigo tsusho kosho no kei-i oyobi mondaiten, January 1957. AA, A609, 317/20/7. Department of Commerce and Agriculture, Trade Policy Division, ‘Implications for Australian exports of Australian licensing of imports from Japan’, 19 June 1953, AA, A609, 317/20/7. Meere to Brown, 22 June 1953, AA, A4905/Xm1, vol. 19. Shaw to Secretary, 17 October 1955, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 2. AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 2. AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 4. I.7788, 4 June 1957, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 6. Also see Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, pp. 263–5. Sydney Morning Herald, 15 October 1958. For an assessment of McEwen’s role in trade negotiations with Japan, see Peter Golding, Black Jack McEwen, Political Gladiator, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1996, chapters 7 and 8. Australian Financial Review, 8 August 1963. J.G.Crawford, Australian Trade Policy, 1942–1966, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968, p. 354. John McEwen, John McEwen, His Story, privately published, 1982, p. 55. Casey to Tange, 22 May 1956, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 4. Alan Rix, ‘Ushiba Nobuhiko: A Japanese “Economic Diplomat”’, Pacific Economic Papers no. 170, Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, Canberra, April 1989.

Resolving disputes: some key Australia–Japan negotiations 69 74

See Nichigo tsusho kosho no kei-i and documents in AA, A1209/23, 1957/5475, ‘Australia-Japan Trade Negotiations, Sixth Plenary Meeting, Friday, 14 June 1957’. 75 Reflected in comments received in interviews with the main participants in the early 1980s. 76 Westerman at the Sixth Plenary Meeting, 14 June 1957, AA, A1209/23, 1957/5475. 77 Australian Financial Review, 12 April 1962. 78 Australian Financial Review, 8 August 1963. 79 Nihon keizai shimbun, 8 May 1963; Australian Financial Review, 8 August 1963. 80 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Reference: Japan), Official Hansard Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, p. 975. 81 D.C.S. Sissons, ‘Japan’, in W.J.Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs 1971–1975, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 255–60; Gary Woodard, ‘The Australia-Japan Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation: an Australian perspective’, Pacific Economic Papers, no. 172, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra, 1989; J.A.A. Stockwin, ‘Negotiating the Basic Treaty between Australia and Japan, 1973–76’, unpublished paper, Australian National University, 1986. 82 AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 3. 83 27 January 1956, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 3. 84 Briefing Notes for Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference 1956, vol. 3, part 3, paper no. 4, Relations with Japan, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. See also the text of a parliamentary question from E.G.Whitlam about the Japanese request in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 March 1972, p. 871. 85 Conversation with Suzuki, Japanese Ambassador, 28 May 1956, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 4. 86 Heyes to Department of External Affairs and draft reply, 28 March 1957, AA, A1838/2, 759/1/ 7 part 6; also ‘Australia-Japan commercial relations’ (no date), AA, A1838/2, 759/1/7 part 4. 87 Brief for Kishi visit, p.9, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 5. 88 Australian Financial Review, 11 December and 20 May 1970. 89 Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 43, no. 10, 1972, pp. 505–8, and Australian Financial Review, 16 October 1972. The Australian general election had been announced on 10 October, two days before the AJMC began. 90 Australian Financial Review, 16 October 1972. 91 Senate Standing Committee, Official Hansard Report, p. 991; and Alan Rix, ‘The 1971–72 Senate hearings on Japan: Sir John Crawford’s Evidence on the Australia-Japan relationship’, Pacific Economic Papers no. 212, October 1992. 92 Senate Standing Committee, Official Hansard Report, p. 993. 93 Nagasaka Toshihisa, ‘Nichigo yuko kihon joyaku ga tou mono’, Sekai keizai hyoron, July 1976, p. 70. 94 Woodard, The Australia-Japan Treaty, p. 25. 95 National Times, 21 May 1973. 96 Australian Financial Review, 21 March 1979. 97 Australian Financial Review, 17 June 1976. 98 Woodard, The Australia-Japan Treaty, pp. 29–37. 99 Asahi shimbun, 20 January 1977. 100 Kawasaki Hiroshi, ‘Daiyonkai nichigo kakuryo iinkai ni tsuite’, in Tsusan janaru, vol. 9, no. 11, February 1977, pp. 96–102.

4 The Machinery of Diplomacy: Managing the Relationship

The political relationship with Japan is diverse, challenging but bureaucratised; its many facets all require constant management, legally and officially. The day-to-day efforts of civil servants in Canberra and Tokyo allow the dialogue between governments to continue, the minutiae of diplomacy to be monitored, the ceaseless torrent of communications to be despatched, read and filed. Diplomacy is all about words, and diplomacy has to be recorded, endlessly and repeatedly. As we have seen, the development of political contacts between Japan and Australia has been gradual, and government mechanisms have grown over the years to accommodate such growth. These mechanisms are an essential infrastructure for the management of day-to-day relations, and themselves provide a background for the development of a sense of alignment within the relationship. In this chapter we shall examine these mechanisms and their operations, and look also at the legal structure of treaties and agreements that give permanence and order to the relationship. It is the proliferation of such connections between governments, and their permeation through the business of government, that makes them such an important element in the Australia-Japan alignment. They formalise and legitimate the political commitments and bind the daily administrative and political business into a structured, ongoing intergovernmental process. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS Full diplomatic relations between Australia and Japan were re-established in 1952, when the Peace Treaty came into force. Australia had maintained an official representative in Tokyo since 1946, when William Macmahon Ball, the British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council for Japan, was also appointed Australian Minister, and headed the Australian Liaison Mission. He was succeeded by Patrick Shaw in late 1947, and Colonel W.R.Hodgson from 1949 until 1952. The Liaison Mission remained until the establishment of the Australian Embassy in April 1952, and the appointment of Ambassador E.Ronald Walker at that time. Walker was an economist, who had advised the NSW and Tasmanian governments and represented Australia as Economic Counsellor

The machinery of diplomacy: managing the relationship 71

in Paris from 1946 to 1950, and was an executive member of the National Security Resources Board. He published several books on economic theory and the Australian economy. Australia’s representatives in Japan have, on the whole, been senior Australian diplomats and public figures. Tokyo has been a high-profile post requiring diplomatic experience and skill. Of the thirteen Australian ambassadors appointed to the Tokyo post between 1952 and 1998, only one has written at length about his work there.1 Alan Watt, Ambassador to Japan from 1956 to 1959, found the experience somewhat frustrating, but due perhaps more to bureaucratic obstacles in Canberra than to difficulties with the Japanese Government. It took longer for Japan to establish an official presence in Australia. The Japanese Government asked informally in October 1951 if it could open an agency in Australia before the Peace Treaty became effective.2 It became a matter for Cabinet decision, but was ruled against, and Canberra preferred official contacts to proceed slowly ‘in the interests of avoiding possible embarrassing consequences for both sides.’ 3 What these embarrassments would be was not made clear, but they presumably referred to the possibility of public demonstrations against Japanese diplomats. The appointment of Japan’s first ambassador proved to be a tricky political question in Canberra. Japan and Australia agreed in April 1952 to exchange ambassadors after the Peace Treaty came into effect, but the choice and appointment of Japan’s representative took several months. It was a highly important decision, because of anti-Japanese hostility in Australia and the need to have as the first Japanese ambassador someone who had not been associated with the war and who could establish public rapport. Several candidates were mentioned early, including former Prince Tokugawa Iemasa, who had been ConsulGeneral in Sydney from 1925 to 1929, Kase Shunichi, a well-known diplomat, and Nishi Haruhiko, who had been Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs in Prime Minister Tojo’s first Cabinet (including at the time of Pearl Harbour) but who had resigned in September 1942 and held no office for the rest of the war. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Okazaki Katsuo, said that they were trying to ensure the selection of one of the very best men so as to assist friendly relations with Australia, and Nishi was proposed. There was some concern in Australia (notably at Cabinet level) at Nishi’s association with Tojo, and the government sought advice from the French Ambassador in Tokyo. The final assessment was that Nishi had disagreed with Japan’s militaristic policy, that he had resigned in protest over the creation of the Ministry of Greater East Asian Affairs in 1942 and that he was in favour of ‘intelligent and progressive pan-Asianism’.4 In the end, it was felt that it was too serious a step to reject Tokyo’s nomination and that ‘no-one that was likely to be nominated would be less objectionable’.5 So Cabinet accepted the nomination on the strength of this double negative, the Queen assented and Nishi was attested on 21 November 1952, arriving in Sydney on 7 January 1953. Nishi has written of his time in Australia.6 As he expressed it, his first attendance at the Anzac Day memorial service in Canberra was a great trial for him and his wife. But he appreciated the Australian Government’s ready welcome to him; his book shows that he did not always consider his instructions the most appropriate way of


dealing with problems in relations with Australia (see the discussion in Chapter 3 on the pearlshell fisheries negotiations). The Australian side was warm in its praise of Nishi’s contribution and he undoubtedly helped smooth over many of the official uncertainties about how to deal with the Japanese at that time.7 Nishi was frank about his background and press reports about his arrival were supportive.8 His staff were experienced diplomats, and the Counsellor, Kakitsubo Masayoshi, ‘stood by the Ambassador’s side, constantly interjected and answered most of the questions put to the Ambassador’ when he arrived in Canberra.9 More than anything, Nishi stressed that Japan and Australia were ‘in the same camp in this troubled world’.10 Embassies are the focal point for contact between the two governments. Australia has maintained a consulate in Osaka on a sporadic basis (and now has consular and trade offices in several Japanese regional cities), and Japan has consulates-general in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Cairns. Levels of consultation have certainly increased. By the time the Acting Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Keith Shann, gave evidence to the Senate Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence in March 1972, he could say that ‘we probably see more of people from the Japanese Embassy at all levels than any other Mission in Canberra’.11 Shann’s evidence is worth quoting at length, as it shows the depth of consultation and cooperation between the two governments: The [Japanese] Embassy is an active Embassy and we have many things that we want to talk to the Japanese about. We are developing habits of consultation with the Japanese. I do not think the Ambassador would mind me saying that he is in my office frequently—more frequently perhaps than any other Ambassador in Canberra. There are, as you know, many ministerial visits to Japan—parts of these habits of consultation, with seven in the last 12 months. As you know, there has just been a parliamentary visit to the area. The State Governments are interested in Tokyo, and two or three of them have offices or representatives in Tokyo. There is a Joint Consultative Committee, a ministerial level committee, the setting up of which was agreed to last year, and the first meeting of which is likely to be held in Canberra this year. Annually there are trade talks between us and the Japanese. All these things are building up into confident, often confidential, exchanges between the two countries, going beyond the mere formalities of diplomacy into fields of practical relationships. So far as we are concerned in Foreign Affairs, we have meetings of officials annually with the Japanese. The next lot of these will be held in Tokyo early in June. At these meetings a very wide range of subjects indeed is discussed between senior officials of the two governments. During the past few years there have occasionally been messages between the heads of government of the two countries on important matters. And there has been an emerging pattern of political contact with Japan, as opposed to the predominantly economic contact that we had with the country following the last war. We talk to them about China a lot. We have talked to them, for instance, in the Chinese context, of tactics in the United Nations— the last session of the United Nations. There have been considerable


exchanges between us on President Nixon’s visit to China, and for instance in 1970 when the Cambodian Conference in Djakarta was mooted, the consultations between Australia and Japan on what we should expect to come out of the Conference were very close and very intensive, before, during, and after the Conference. The co-ordination of our activities with Japan is partly automatic, partly just the sort of day-to-day consultation which Government departments are accustomed to. But in the case of Japan, the Government has consciously decided to do something which it has not done in relation to any other country, and that is to have a standing committee of Commonwealth departments to consider the co-ordination of Australian policies towards Japan. This stemmed from the interdepartmental committee which met in 1970, and we now have this standing committee which meets from time to time—the last meeting was a couple of days ago—to discuss various matters arising inter-departmentally in our relationship with Japan. This is the clearest recognition of the importance which the Government attaches to this particular relationship.12 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES Shann’s testimony pointed to a range of administrative arrangements for managing relations. Despite the ministerial contacts and a ministerial committee which first met in 1972 (discussed in detail below), bilateral relations were run by officials. In Japan, the responsible office in the Foreign Ministry since 1969 has been the Oceania Division of the European Affairs Bureau, an anomalous location for Japan’s Pacific diplomacy in the 1990s, but logical in the early postwar years when Oceanic affairs were mainly to do with Commonwealth members and former British colonies. Previously, Australia had come within the British Commonwealth Division of the same bureau, along with Ireland. As with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, contacts with Australia span all sections of the Ministry, but the Oceania Division is the main point of contact and advice to the government. There have been calls over the years for Australian affairs to be placed in the Asian Bureau. In 1992, as part of a general ministry reorganisation, the creation of a new Pacific Bureau was announced, to take effect in April 1993 and to include an Oceania Affairs Division, along with North American Affairs Divisions. Unfortunately these proposed changes did not eventuate and as of 1996, Australian affairs remain the responsibility of the European and Oceanian Affairs Bureau.13 The Japanese image of Australia as a white European country remains strong, a ‘semi-advanced’ nation,14 and of relatively minor importance to Japan’s diplomacy. The first foreign policy ‘blue book’ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1957 covered Australia under ‘British Commonwealth relations’. It was not until the seventh issue in 1963 that an ‘Oceania relations’ section was provided to cover Australia and New Zealand.15 Australia enjoys only minor exposure within the Foreign Ministry system, although within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Australian affairs came within the import and market divisions of the International Trade Bureau until 1973, when trade administration was put on a regional basis, Australia becoming part of the Americas and Oceania Division of the International Trade Policy Bureau.


In April 1991, in a reshuffle of the market divisions, responsibility for Australian trade policy moved to a new Southeast Asia-Pacific Division, bringing Australia closer to the orbit of Asian trade policy and leaving American policy on its own.16 At the Australian end, the Japan Section within the North Asia Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade manages direct bilateral dealings with Japan. Earlier, Japan affairs were managed in the East Asian Section and later by the Pacific and Americas Branch of the Department of External Affairs. A separate Asia Division was established in 1970, including a North Asia Branch responsible for Japan, China and the Koreas.17 In 1993 Japan came under the responsibility of the new North Asia Division. As Shann indicates above, however, many parts of the Department are involved with Japan affairs, given the breadth of relations. Likewise, amongst other government departments in Canberra there is wide-ranging and regular contact with the Japanese Embassy. For three decades until the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from the two separate departments in July 1987, ongoing rivalry for influence over the Japan relationship plagued relations between the two departments. In the period until the mid–1960s, the Department of Trade was central to Japan affairs, under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister John McEwen. Increased diplomatic cooperation brought a more important role for the Department of External Affairs, although it was ill-equipped with economic expertise. Similarly Trade was not ready to deal with the political problems of Australia’s wider relations with Japan. Max Suich in 1968 called for greater authority for External Affairs in dealing with Japan, citing the new challenge of developing ‘personal, cultural and political contacts’ as one that the Trade Department could not manage and rightly belonged with External Affairs. He pointed out that ‘the Australian presence in Tokyo is substantial and increasing…but it is not the size of the political staff that concerns some observers. It is their authority back in Canberra’, meaning the weak bureaucratic position of the Department of External Affairs.18 RE-ASSESSING AUSTRALIA’S MANAGEMENT OF JAPAN AFFAIRS The Australian bureaucracy seemed to take these warnings of management inefficiencies and divisions seriously. In late 1968 the Pacific and Americas Branch proposed to their Minister that an inter-departmental committee be established to coordinate policy on Japan. It was not approved, but the Department tried again in April 1970 and by the middle of that year a permanent heads committee was set up, chaired by Foreign Affairs (as it was to be named in November of that year), and including also Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Trade and Industry.19 Meeting first on 8 June 1970, the Japan IDC was an important innovation for the Australian foreign policy system, bringing together the key departments in an attempt at coordination. It reflected not only Japan’s importance to Australia, but attempts to resolve the perennial tension between the departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade over Japan policy.


The IDCJ of 1970 began a train of adjustments through the 1970s in Australia’s capacity for managing Japan affairs. Australia was undoubtedly adventurous in its experimenting with various models, and in attempting to tackle the problem of ‘coordinating’ policy. The need to improve inter-departmental communication and coordination had become apparent as Australia’s contacts with Japan began to accommodate Japan’s greater international activism and Australia’s aim of involving itself with Japan in regional cooperation. These administrative innovations eventually lost their impetus under the weight of bureaucratic inertia and infighting, and structural changes within the public service. There were several steps to this process: the demonstrated ineffectiveness of the IDCJ as a coordinating mechanism, Foreign Affairs’s designated new role as coordinator of Japan policy, continued competition between it and the Trade Department, a further review of the relationship followed by the establishment of new machinery, and the eventual absorption of these structures into Foreign Affairs line management, and the merging of the formerly competing departments of Trade and Foreign Affairs. The brief of the IDCJ was extremely wide. It was asked to report on a series of objectives for Australian policy towards Japan: (a) establish the closest possible relationship with Japan at the political and diplomatic level (b) not unduly encourage the view that the rearmament of Japan should be speeded up or that Japan should play a direct security role in South-East Asia (c) encourage an interdependent role between Japan and the US (d) be involved in regional organisations or initiatives which Japan sponsors or in which it plays an important role (e) be as responsible as possible—while avoiding offence to Japan— to the view sometimes expressed in the region that Australia should act as the counter balance to Japanese influence (f ) examine its aid and commercial policies in South-East Asia to see that they are effective in expanding Australia’s economic and political influence in the region (g) see that Japan’s trading opportunities continue to expand (h) scrutinise periodically immigration policy to as to avoid unnecessary offence to Japan (i) keep in touch with New Zealand and the US in matters relating to Japan. 20 These were, unfortunately, highly conservative objectives couched in reactive language (‘not unduly encourage’, ‘be as responsible as possible—while avoiding offence to’, ‘avoid unnecessary offence’) and obviously designed to suit the intractable and possibly conflicting interests of several Australian government departments. It was a charter aimed at consolidating Australian approaches to its formidable partner, but hardly designed to break new ground.


The IDC reported to Cabinet in July 1971, and as a result a new Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Japan was approved. Establishing a permanent committee was a further mark of the importance to Australia of its relations with Japan, and it meant a new responsibility for the Department of Foreign Affairs, which was given the task of chairing the new IDC. Already, in June 1971, Prime Minister McMahon had announced that Foreign Affairs would be taking ‘the leading administrative role’ in relations with Japan.21 He explained that ‘the coordination of diplomatic relationships between any two countries ought to be the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs’. It was now going to lead in ‘trying to work out sensible and better relationships’ with Japan, although advised by other departments on specific matters. Another major indication of Japan’s significance was the choice of Japan as the reference for the first inquiry of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, which began taking evidence on 22 November 1971. It was a lengthy and thorough inquiry which investigated all areas of Australia-Japan relations and produced in 1973 what was in fact the first published official government report on Japan and the bilateral relationship. Most of the recommendations of the Committee were acted upon (although some took longer than others), an indication of the relevance and perspicacity of its conclusions. Other recommendations helped shape the Australian approaches to relations (especially in trade) with Japan since that time. In particular, the Committee recommended ‘the establishment of a consultative and planning agency, incorporating the present interdepartmental committee on Japan and representatives from industry, to advise the government on all aspects of Australia’s relations with Japan. This organisation should be supported by adequate research facilities’.22 Machinery along these lines was eventually established in 1979 following a further review of the relationship. The early 1970s was a time of rapid exposure of the media and public to the realities of Australia’s dealings with Japan. Simultaneously, a review was being conducted in Japan, as part of the development of a resource diplomacy policy. The reported objective of Japan’s assessment was ‘to examine how far Japan can afford (and avoid) relying on Australian raw materials and what policies should be adopted to produce a close and sympathetic relationship which will ensure the stability of Australian supplies’.23 This was a far cry from the somewhat apologetic objectives laid down for the IDCJ. Japan was making its Australian policy highly instrumentalist, whereas Australia’s objectives said nothing about what Australia wanted to achieve from its bilateral dealings. Nonetheless, relations with Japan were gaining wider attention from the Australian Government. The visit by the Minister for National Development, Mr Swartz, to Japan in August 1970, was seen to reflect a belated recognition by a non-mainstream Canberra department of where their long-term interests lay.24 According to journalists, this was an unusual attitude, citing ingrained prejudice as a serious barrier to dealing with Japan: There is nothing secretive about the key role that suspicion and doubt play in determining official Australia attitudes towards Japan. A wide range of top public servants and businessmen are quite prepared to vocalise their prejudices at the slightest excuse. 25


A later article summed it up as ‘changes on top, bias below’,26 and made several vital points: first, that the attitudes of the key bureaucrats and businessmen were changing quickly, but at the working level this was not the case; second, that Australia did not have the specialist expertise to access Japan properly, and the Department of Foreign Affairs was seriously thin on the ground in this respect; third, ad hoc reactive policies were useless without ‘coherent aspirations—let alone plans—for future relationships in the Pacific’; fourth, there was a danger that the Canberra bureaucracy might ‘confuse recognising the importance of Japan with actually having policies’; fifth, Australia’s lingering racism was a serious impediment to better relations with Japan and the region. The Senate Committee hearings also assisted the educational objective; it could not, however, improve government expertise, although subsequent policies have gone a long way towards rectifying that difficulty. But serious inconsistencies in the government’s approach to Japan were made clear by the struggle between Foreign Affairs and Trade over responsibility for Japan policy. Frequent newspaper reports referred to Mr McEwen’s activist approach to maintaining contacts in Japan, his closeness to Japanese ministers, and the effectiveness of his personal diplomacy compared with the new IDCJ structure chaired by Foreign Affairs.27 It was then revealed that McEwen and his Department were negotiating secretly with Japan on a new trade deal—in fact negotiating with Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs without any consultation with Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs. Such moves were roundly criticised by the Australian Financial Review as symptomatic of Australia’s poorly prepared, even ignorant, and ad hoc approach to Japan. McEwen was trying to expedite an arrangement before his retirement in February 1971. His successor as Leader of the Country Party and Minister for Trade, J.D.Anthony, was soon in Tokyo, and was able to highlight the Department of Trade’s role in Japan policy by tying up agreement on a new ministerial committee, an issue discussed in more detail below.28 Even in February 1972 Anthony was still being said to be campaigning to retain Trade s pre-eminence in dealing with Japan. Trade wanted chairmanship of the Australian ministerial group instead of Foreign Affairs.29 Anthony did not get the responsibility; it went in the end to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Bowen, just as Trade had been unable to stop Foreign Affairs being given the broad coordinating role on Japan just a few months after McEwen left the political stage. What was the outcome of the work of the IDCJ? How did it perform its coordinating role? This subject has been widely canvassed by Matthews in several papers;30 his analysis was also surveyed by the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations set up by the Fraser government in 1977 to report on measures to enhance the relationship and its management. Although the IDCJ had much in common with the well-known shortcomings of interdepartmental committees in general, its institutional weaknesses had a great deal to do with its performance: in particular, its terms of reference, membership, level of representation, meeting style, secretariat support and the like. The evidence of the Working Committee points to:


…the ineffectual nature of the IDC/J. In addition, the IDC/J has been criticised for its tendency to seek refuge in consensus and lowest common denominator solutions, its reluctance to address medium and long term issues, its lack of receptivity to new ideas and, generally, for its failure, not only in its work but in the weight given by Departments, to reflect the importance of the Australia-Japan relationship.31 The IDCJ had its strengths (coordinating administrative arrangements and as an educational mechanism within the Canberra bureaucracy) but overall it contributed little in policy or policy coordination to Australia’s dealings with Japan. For example, Matthews reported that Asking departments to report on policies in their own policy areas simply guaranteed that no policy evaluation occurred. It also limited the search for new policies: when asked for possible initiatives the committee responded by proposing modest incremental changes to existing programs. It is significant that none of the policy innovations of the 1970’s—e.g. the Australia-Japan Economic Relations Project, the Basic Treaty, the Australia-Japan Foundation—were proposed in any of the committee’s policy reviews. On the contrary, the Committee resisted both the Treaty and the Foundation. Even modest incremental changes were treated with caution if at all.32 THE MYER COMMITTEE OF REVIEW The innovations in Japan policy under Whitlam and in Fraser’s early days (such as the conclusion of the Basic Treaty and the establishment of the Australia-Japan Foundation), coupled with the obvious deficiencies in managing Japanese affairs, promoted yet another reassessment of government machinery. The Ad Hoc Working Committee on AustraliaJapan Relations (the Myer Committee) was set up by Prime Minister Fraser in early 1977 to evaluate the state of the relationship with Japan and to propose an effective means of managing it. When it reported in September 1977, it found that while the economic relationship was reasonably firm, there was still a long way to go in developing close contacts with Japan. But the Committee put Australia’s interests first and argued that Australia could be sympathetic to Japan’s perceived vulnerabilities, and could develop close rapport with Japan without being seen as ‘Japan’s surrogate or client state’. The Committee put forward a number of proposals for enhancing the future relationship, particularly in relation to resources security and access for Japan, improved efforts for information exchange, and an expansion of interchange of personnel at all levels of contact. These included better training for business in Japan skills, appointment of labour and agricultural attaches to the Tokyo Embassy, and wider activities in culture, education and science. The measures advocated by the Myer Committee to improve management of the relationship were more controversial, and were something of a revolution in government action in dealing with Japan. They attracted wide international attention, brought a flurry of policy-related research and discussion, but eventually faded in importance within the bureaucratic system as a result of indifference, hostility and jealousy. The ideas


were not exactly new, as they had been proposed in outline by the Senate Committee some five years previously (Recommendation 11 of the Senate Committees report),33 but they were accepted by government on this occasion and acted upon. They included a Standing Committee on Japan (SCJ), to replace the IDCJ and to consist of permanent heads of departments, chaired by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The proposal for a permanent heads committee was designed to ensure continued high-level government attention to the Japan relationship, and the committee had a broad brief for coordinating and identifying issues. A second committee was a Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan (CCRJ), to report to the SCJ and to be chaired by a senior person from the private sector. This committee was to include the permanent heads and a range of other community representatives. It offered its advice to government on the relationship. Most importantly, a permanent secretariat was also to be established, something which the IDCJ lacked and suffered from as a result. The Myer Committee also proposed that attention be given to the machinery for coordinating Commonwealth-State relations as they related to Japan, and that a Premiers’ Conference be held to that end. The new machinery began with a flourish in 1979. The CCRJ was chaired by the chief executive of CSR Ltd, Sir Gordon Jackson, and the Japan Secretariat was headed by an Assistant Secretary-level career diplomat. One press comment suggested that the time taken to implement the recommendations (over one year) would render them largely ineffectual, although this came from a member of the Myer Committee, journalist Peter Robinson, and undoubtedly reflected frustration at the governments delay in dealing with the report.34 The Secretariat had an unusual position within the Department of Foreign Affairs, being outside the normal line management and answerable directly to the permanent head. This meant that it was involved both in work that was the primary responsibility of the line structure of the Department of Foreign Affairs and also in matters that came within the territory of other departments. As a result, many other sections and departments were watchful of the Japan Secretariat’s activities and careful to guard their own policy prerogatives. In the end, of course, the Secretariat was only a small unit servicing two advisory committees, so its formal administrative authority, let alone its influence, was limited. The secretariat model was one widely praised by observers of foreign policy administration. T.B.Millar called it ‘the one real innovation [in foreign policy administration] in recent years’, with ‘a degree of flexibility and capability to chance its arm which is denied to the Department’. His comments also reflected the view of some that it usurped responsibility rather than enhanced policy, but he did suggest that the model could be more widely used in Australia’s approach to its foreign policy.35 The benefits of the secretariat model were also praised as worthy of attention in the United States, for an administration in search of a more effective way of dealing with Japan, which was seen as having a ‘bureaucratic edge’.36 Apart from some broad comments by the first director of the Japan Secretariat on the role of the Japan Secretariat,37 the only detailed study of the workings of this machinery to date is that by Minagawa.38 Overall, he concluded that the system had


provided greater exchange of information, and that improved ‘policy coordination’ had taken place. Although not fully institutionalised as part of the policy system for dealing with Japan, it was an important symbol of the importance Australia placed on dealing with Japan. However, Minagawa identified a number of problems in the operation of the machinery: limited activity by the SCJ, the need for leadership within the machinery (in reality a task for the head of Foreign Affairs), ineffective use of Secretariat staff resources, budget limitations, the excessive confidentiality of Secretariat reports, and the disparate interests of CCRJ members. Stiff bureaucratic and political resistance to the machinery prevented its acceptance into the Canberra policy making system. After changes to personnel in 1983, and eventual consolidation within the line structure of the Department, the machinery became moribund, although the Standing Committee on Japan was still formally in existence in 1991, along with a Standing Committee on Northeast Asia. An analytical unit with a wider brief for Northeast Asia was also set up, and the specific focus on Japan policy disappeared. The experiment in Japan policy coordination was over. THE AUSTRALIA-JAPAN MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE (AJMC) Despite bureaucratic limitations in managing relations with Japan, periodic contact at the political level has been important for the relationship, if only to give officials a continuing focus for involving ministers in talks with their Japanese counterparts. The AJMC has been the most consistent political symbol for Australia in its dealings with Japan. It puts Australia amongst a small group of countries with regular ministerial-level consultations with the Japanese, now a somewhat privileged position for a minor power such as Australia in the 1990s (despite the enlivening issue of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), although symbolic of the continuing relevance of the bilateral political alignment between the two countries. The origins of the Committee relate to a past era in the bilateral relationship, when regional cooperation and political consultation were necessary, even urgent, tasks for a Japan trying to come to grips with the expectations held of it as an economic power, and in a period when the United States was withdrawing from its dominant role in Asia. Regular officials’ talks began with Japan in January 1967, as an annual forum for close consultation on regional affairs, typified by the comment before the second meeting in November 1968 that the two groups of officials will ‘burrow into each other’s minds’.39 Another significant factor was the long-standing business connections established through the joint business cooperation committees (the AJBCC and JABCC). Established in 1962 (and the Japanese committee in 1963), they have been described as important channels of institutionalised communication between the two countries.40 Their success over a decade was a factor in demonstrating to government that such high-level meetings could bring benefits: later the business committees were described as ‘old boy networks’ between Australia and Japan, ensuring a regular forum for discussing trade problems. It also, argued the Australian Financial Review, ‘was mainly effective in developing personal relationships between some of the participants and in giving the two governments concerned a chance to deal with all those involved


in Australian-Japanese trade on a centralised, coherent basis’.41 The ministerial committee, in contrast, was a more formal and manageable way of keeping an eye on developments in the relationship and, according to one Japanese source, in ‘managing’ the ad hoc policies set in train by the business sector.42 Their perceptions were rather different: business saw their committees as a way of enhancing business links, while government saw their ministerial meetings as a way of monitoring the private sector. Initially its role as a forum for political coordination was limited, and economic imperatives had a lot to do with its inauguration. It was Japan that seems to have first proposed a regular ministerial conference. During the visit to Japan by External Affairs Minister Hasluck in March 1967, Foreign Minister Miki made clear his desire to see closer contacts between ministers, and inprinciple agreement was reached for further ad hoc meetings at that level. This was reaffirmed in the joint communique for the visit, being referred to as a valuable means of dialogue on important (but unspecified) problems of common interest.43 The issue became tangled, at the Australian end, in territorial disputes between the departments of Trade and External Affairs, which had disagreed over the carriage of Japan policy since the 1950s, when Trade had monopolised the negotiations over the Commerce Agreement, much to External Affairs’ annoyance. In the final period before his retirement from active politics in February 1971, McEwen moved to strengthen his department’s place in Japan policy by initiating discussions with Japan over trade arrangements and the need for a closer general relationship with Japan. This was seen by McEwen to be necessary in the light of more exclusivist barriers in Europe because of Common Market policies. Cabinet supported his approach and in a private discussion with the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Sato, in June 1970, McEwen put forward what became known to the Japanese as the ‘McEwen Plan’, for ‘increased exchange of information and closer coordination of trade and aid policy’.44 The Australians were hoping for further progress on the issue when MITI Minister Miyazawa was to visit Australia in October 1970. The trip was postponed, but when he did visit Australia in April 1971, he came prepared to discuss the possibility of joint ministerial meetings. Miyazawa felt that relations with Australia should be put on a solid basis, and before he left for Australia it was intimated that a joint ministerial committee would be considered.45 A formal request was indeed made by Trade Minister Anthony for a regular ministerial forum. The Japanese Cabinet approved the proposal on 7 May, although Foreign Minister Aichi suggested that it could be at either ministerial or vice-ministerial (permanent head) level. It was, he hoped, going to be a functional (kino-teki) body.46 Agreement between the two governments was formally reached when Mr Anthony visited Japan at the end of May 1971. The Japanese Foreign Ministry clearly saw the dangers of establishing a precedent, for it was reported as saying that such ministerial committees were suitable for Japan’s dealings with developed countries (such as Australia), but it would not be possible to have them for developing countries.47 Australia was well behind the Canadians, as the sixth of their joint ministerial meetings with Japan had been held in 1971.


The agreement on establishing the AJMC was clearly an important step for both countries at that juncture. It provided the Japanese with the top-level regular access to the Australian Government they had sought for some years, and gave to Australia a focus for their reconsideration of the Japan relationship that was reflected in the other changes being made lower down in the government hierarchy. These were discussed above. Unfortunately, it took another seventeen months before the first AJMC was able to convene. In Japan, the political situation was in disarray as the shock waves from Nixon’s rapprochement with China destabilised the regime of Prime Minister Sato, and a new Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, was installed in July 1972. At the Australian end, internecine bureaucratic disputes over which department would chair the AJMC stalled the Australian side in deciding on the arrangements for the AJMC meeting.48 The first gathering was finally held in October 1972, in Canberra. Japanese newspapers headlined the event with ‘Politics the focus for the new Australia-Japan nexus’, stressing the importance of the new regional situation for the two countries. Five ministers attended from Japan (Foreign Minister Ohira, MITI Minister Nakasone, Agriculture Minister Adachi, Transport Minister Sasaki and Head of the Economic Planning Agency Arita). From the Australian side, Foreign Minister Bowen led the delegation, with Trade Minister Anthony and seven other Australian ministers, and the Chief Minister of Papua New Guinea, Mr Somare. Debate centred on economic issues and the Australian Minister for Immigration was notably absent. The main sour note of the conference was that Australia again rejected the Japanese proposal for a friendship, commerce and navigation treaty, although the communique allowed for further ‘study’ of the issue. On return from the AJMC, Mr Nakasone was more optimistic, saying that the Australians had not rejected the idea, and that a treaty was possible. He felt that there was support for such a treaty within the Australian Government, and also indicated that the Australians had accepted the Japanese suggestion to establish a Pacific economic organisation.49 However, Australian reports of the meeting point to a very negative Australian brief for the talks, and refusals by Australia on both the questions of a treaty and a Pacific organisation. Max Suich accused the Australians of inertia, negativism, adversary psychology, and bureaucratic quarrelling that was ‘at best small-minded and at its worst potentially disastrous’.50 Foreign Affairs had even tried to prevent the PNG ministers, invited to observe the talks, from sitting at the conference table. Meetings of the AJMC have been held regularly since that time, until the fourteenth in August 1997. They have normally lasted two or three days, although Australian officials have frequently been at a loss to decide how to enliven the proceedings (there was even a serious proposal in the early 1980s that the Japanese ministers be asked for several days to a relaxed resort in Australia, allowing closer personal ties to be established with their Australian counterparts). The Japanese ministers have often shown less than great enthusiasm for taking part and it has been at times, quite obviously, a meeting with low priority for them. It has come to have far more relevance for the Australian Government in providing a window into the Japanese Cabinet that would be otherwise unavailable. It is an important forum for the Australian Government that is not likely to be given up easily, and renewed Japanese interest in Australia’s role in Japan’s regional objectives has heightened the meetings’ relevance for Japan.


For that reason, the discussions at the AJMC have broadened from purely bilateral economic issues towards an interchange of ideas on international developments and especially economic and political matters of concern to Australia and Japan. It is also a useful platform for repeating the grand cliches and gestures of friendly relations. Japanese ministers in particular are able to use this rather-less-than-regular opportunity to reaffirm Japan’s good intentions and listen to Australian complaints. The Japanese have also taken the opportunity to make broader statements about their Pacific policy —witness Foreign Minister Kuranari’s policy announcements during and around the AJMC in January 1987. While the Japanese regard the AJMC as helpful but not terribly important, it does provide the high-level point of contact that governments need to ensure that their messages are being received. The relevance of the meeting for the Japanese may be less than its importance for Australia, but the policy discussions are still of value. The first AJMC was undoubtedly a forum for detailed discussion of bilateral economic issues; later meetings were in a similar vein. The fourth AJMC held in Tokyo in January 1977 typified the fairly tough bargaining of economic diplomacy. Both sides appeared to have misgivings about the sincerity of the other. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Hatoyama, set the tone by roundly criticising Australian industrial relations in a speech that was unusual for its bluntness.51 For their part, the Australians pushed for a trade-off between beef and fish: continued port access for Japanese fishing vessels in return for higher Japanese beef import quotas in line with the increases that had been expected. Australian ministers were aggressive in their negotiating at the meeting. The same toughness on beef was seen also on questions of investment, coal prices and tonnages. Some Australian comment was negative, citing the ‘malaise that has settled over AustraliaJapan relations. Squabbling over a few thousand tons of beef is a far cry from the grand plans for joint uranium enrichment, Pilbara development, or the new iron ore and coal mines that used to grab the headlines at the annual ministerial talks only a few years ago’.52 Yet by 1978 Australian and Japanese ministers were referring to the ‘natural partnership’ between the two countries and by the time of the 1989 AJMC, discussions were more routine. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described it as ‘not of course a negotiating forum but an occasion for the regular review of the overall relationship’. In that sense the AJMC is not a meeting that can decisively set directions for the Australia-Japan relationship; it has tended to look back rather than forward. It can and does help to align Japanese and Australian thinking about the broader international context, a feature of the meetings held in 1993, 1995 and 1997, in which alignment of views on international issues was an important outcome of well-attended meetings.53 The AJMC has played a constructive part in assisting communication between the key figures in the Australia-Japan political relationship. It has not changed the course of the relationship, merely served it. TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN The day-to-day practical management of a relationship between governments is structured by political and economic pressures, and by legal precedent and convention. In all diplomatic relationships there are legal obligations and constraints imposed by the framework of treaties and agreements that have been concluded between the two countries


over previous decades. This is particularly so for a relationship where political understandings between governments often require practical and concrete expression. In the Australia-Japan context there are several important agreements that form the prime basis on which behaviour of governments and peoples towards the other have been based. The first of these is the Peace Treaty of 1952, which brought the two countries into formal contact with one another after the hostilities of World War II, and laid down obligations on both sides to regulate their new relationship. On the economic side, the Commerce Agreement of 1957, and its amendment in 1963, have been the fundamental guide to trade and commercial relations, setting standards of trade and tariff treatment between the two countries. At the political level, the Basic Treaty of 1976 has laid down commitments in trade, cooperation, entry and stay and other areas that are intended to flow through into all areas of contact between the two countries. These treaties have affected what could be called the ‘big picture’ in the relationship. Alongside them is a network of agreements on various aspects of bilateral contacts, which we shall examine to see how they influence the way in which the relationship is managed. Overall, it can be said that the agreements give a rational framework to regular contacts; many provide the necessary technical conditions and obligations for smooth relations in a range of areas, but others are referred to very infrequently.54 Fishing One of the first formal agreements with the Japanese was to do with access to Australian waters for fishing (in that case, pearlshell). In January 1955, Mr McEwen stated that he wished to negotiate an agreement with Japan to regulate Japanese fishing access,55 as Japanese boats by that time were operating around New Guinea and as far south as the Tasman Sea. However, it was only in 1967 that Australia legislated to extend the limit of exclusive fishing rights from 3 to 12 miles offshore, and negotiations were held with the Japanese. An agreement was signed in 1968 and came into force in August 1969, excluding Japanese fishing except for tuna. Japanese boats were licensed and paid a fee. An agreement of October 1979 superseded these arrangements, and included a head agreement covering bilateral fisheries arrangements, and a subsidiary agreement covering tuna long-line fishing. The head agreement recognises Australian sovereign rights over resources in the Australian 200-mile fishing zone (AFZ), and provides for Australia to set catch limits, fees, etc. The head agreement was the first of its kind for Australia and sets down principles for the conservation and management of the AFZ, the rights of foreign boats to exploit it and the responsibility of Japan to supervise its vessels. There are therefore responsibilities on both sides. The main difficulties in negotiation and ongoing management relate to tuna fishing, and the subsidiary agreement was renegotiated and renewed in 1980 and usually each year thereafter. Like the pearlshell arrangements, it provides an adjustable mechanism for managing access, and a means of regular negotiation to alter fishing areas and catches to allow for proper conservation. As it has turned out, the balance between the demands of the Australian industry to catch the tuna, and the


Japanese to continue their long-lining, as well as the need to ensure that the tuna are not fished out, has been the most difficult problem for the Australian Government. In the end, it became a technical question that had to be resolved politically. Successive bilateral settlements on continued tuna longline fishing in Australian waters have been renewed since 1979, but have been increasingly complicated by the demands of the domestic industry for its share of declining fish stocks.56 Telecommunications One of the earliest impediments to dealings between Australia and Japan was the lack of an effective telecommunications link. Until 1958, Australian telecommunications with Japan were channelled through the Commonwealth Telecommunications System, and then routed through Singapore and Hong Kong. The Japanese negotiators for the Commerce Agreement, for example, felt greatly frustrated at the slowness and inefficiency of the service,57 and when trade and business expanded after the Commerce Agreement of 1957 the system became quite inadequate. It even became a topic for decision between Prime Ministers Menzies and Kishi when they met in December 1957, Kishi pressing the Australian leader hard to speed up a decision about opening the service, to which Menzies responded positively. A direct telephone and telex service began in 1958. A satellite link opened in 1969. Civil aviation Qantas Empire Airways began flights into Japan via the Philippines in 1947. The route was initially chartered by the RAAF and civilians were able to use it from March 1950, and a twiceweekly service began. A bilateral agreement on civil aviation was signed on 19 January 1956, although Japan Air Lines (JAL) did not begin a reciprocal service into Sydney via Hong Kong until 1969. Negotiations began in 1964 but got tangled up in Japan’s agreement with the United Kingdom, which was vitally interested in controlling the route to Australia from Hong Kong. After the conclusion of the Commerce Agreement in 1957, Japan had been seeking closer civil aviation relations with Australia, and Qantas had indicated a desire to support Australian policy, which was to favour friendship with Japan ‘as one of the few strong influences against the spread of communism in the area’.58 But this did not translate into a direct JAL route immediately. Attached to the agreement are a number of confidential memoranda which update the Agreement when necessary. These relate to more technical details such as route capacities and services, and from the beginning Australia sought to engage Japan in discussions to expand the use of the Australia-Japan route. The agreement contains no definition of what is a ‘reasonable’ tariff and it has been left to the airlines, the IATA machinery and the governments to determine fare levels on the route. Qantas and JAL have been criticised for the high level of fares on the direct AustraliaJapan route, although today there is a highly complex traffic and fare structure given the rapid growth in tourism. Whatever the arguments about fare structures, the civil aviation agreement has provided a firm basis for the development of the route over thirty-five years.


Double taxation An agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income was signed on 20 March 1969 and came into force on 4 July 1970. It closely follows the 1963 OECD model agreement which most Western countries have now adopted. It fixes, between the two revenue authorities, an exclusive or prior right to tax, and provides relief against double taxation. As trade and commercial activity (notably investment) increased in the mid–1960s, the Japanese were anxious to conclude an agreement that would protect their investors in Australia’s natural resources, and their trade services such as shipping, from being taxed on their earnings by both countries. The question of a double tax agreement was raised by the Japanese Embassy in 1959 but without success, as the Australian Treasury did not support of the possible loss of tax revenue. The matter was again taken up by the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Ikeda, when he visited in 1963, but the negotiations that began soon after in April-May 1964 were adjourned. They were not restarted because Australia saw as its first priority the need to renegotiate their tax agreement with the United Kingdom. One newspaper also suggested that Australia did not have enough experts to carry on two sets of negotiations simultaneously.59 There were two sides to the negotiation problem. On the one hand, Australia benefited from the tax taken from Japanese companies (such as shipping companies) operating in Australia. On the other hand, the Japanese Government exercised guidance over the level of Japanese investment in the Australian resources industry, and ‘in recent years the Japanese Government has tended to take a rather tough line toward applications for permission to invest in Australia.60 The benefits accruing from concluding an agreement would be a more relaxed attitude in Japan towards investing in Australia, and a consequent upsurge in Japanese business and trade activity with Australia. Japan had double tax agreements with sixteen nations, including India and New Zealand, but not with Australia, apparently its only major trading partner without the benefit of such an agreement. The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Sato, raised the double tax issue as a matter of urgency during his visit of October 1967. He even hinted at the difficulties that the lack of an agreement might present for the continued health of bilateral trade. Australia agreed to begin negotiations at an early date, as the renegotiation with the United Kingdom had almost finished. Talks with Japan accordingly began in Canberra on 5 February 1968 and an agreement was signed just over a year later. The agreement remains an essential element in the bilateral business environment. International money orders This is a minor agreement that provided for the exchange of international money orders between the postal systems of each country. It came into force in 1961 and was terminated in 1992. An agreement on parcel post was also concluded in 1962.


Visa agreement As discussed in Chapter 1, Japanese were not able to enter Australia after World War II until 1951, when woolbuyers were given ninety-day visas (with a renewal provision) and later were allowed to stay for the duration of the buying season. In October 1955, Japanese businessmen were allowed to stay for an initial period of six months, and woolbuyers gained an indefinite stay. In 1956 all provisions relating only to Japanese nationals were removed, and the period of stay has gradually increased.61 Japan and Australia negotiated an agreement in 1968 to abolish visa fees for nationals of each country entering the other. It also provided for four-year business visas and other matters. The Basic Treaty of 1976 included provisions for temporary entry, and business entry and stay. Agreement on the British Commonwealth War Cemetery in Japan The British Commonwealth War Cemetery in Japan is covered by an agreement involving Japan and seven other countries, which came into force in 1956. The land near Yokohama is granted to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, which arranges for maintenance of the cemetery. Australia pays its share of the costs. The agreement has worked well and without any major complications. There is no specific agreement protecting Japanese war graves in Australia, other than government support for the Japanese cemetery at Cowra, NSW, which includes the graves of all Japanese previously interned in Australia. The graves are maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission with the Japanese Government paying costs, although there is no formal inter-governmental agreement for this arrangement. Migratory Birds Agreement This is an unusual agreement that was often regarded with some mirth amongst officialdom in Canberra, because of its long history of difficulty of ratification and because, at the time, it seemed a matter of minor importance. The agreement protects a number of species of birds which migrate between the two countries and which have in the past been the object of shooters and other dangers to their survival. These birds include some 66 species of shearwaters, petrels, boobys, terns, egrets, sandpipers, skuas, swifts and, among others, the oriental cuckoo. The agreement was first signed in 1974 but, under Federal government policy in order to be ratified by the Australian Government, assurances were required from state and territory governments that they could actually live up to the protection provisions of the agreement. This involved negotiations between the National Parks and Wildlife Service of the Commonwealth and state parks services, and the Attorney-General’s Department, to ensure that adequate state government enabling arrangements could be put in place. A number of amendments were required to state legislation plus other assurances about protective measures.


The humour of the situation to many officials in Canberra was that so much legal and constitutional trouble had to be gone through to protect what some saw as a few unfortunate birds. In the 1970s, however, environmental consciousness was not a major part of government policy. One of the major achievements of the Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan was to push for, and eventually secure, the final ratification of this agreement, which came into force in October 1981. Nuclear Safeguards Agreement Scientific exchanges and cooperation between Australia and Japan have been a regular feature of the relationship since the late 1950s. The Nuclear Safeguards Agreement is not so much a scientific cooperation agreement as a means of ensuring that Japan, as a buyer of Australian uranium, will adhere to the safeguards which Australia lays down for the use and handling of nuclear material. The safeguards agreement was preceded by an Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of 1972, which itself superseded an agreement in the civil uses of atomic energy of 1962. The 1972 agreement provided for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, but in the main was designed to provide international safeguards for the transfer of nuclear material, such as uranium ore. The 1972 agreement was greeted with hopes of Australia-Japan cooperation in uranium enrichment, and the possible establishment of an enrichment plant in Australia,62 but this did not eventuate. The 1982 agreement was the result of a new Australian safeguards policy introduced in May 1977, which required prior conclusion of a bilateral agreement and prior Australian Government consent to the export, enrichment and reprocessing of uranium. This meant that new contracts for uranium export required a new agreement, although shipments under contracts made before December 1972 were able to continue. However, negotiations over the new agreement took longer than had been anticipated and there was some doubt that agreement would be reached before shipments under new contracts were due to take place in March 1982. Japan felt that Australian safeguards were too strict, according to the Japanese Minister for Science and Technology, Mr Nakagawa Ichiro,63 but the Australian Government was firm on its standards, saying quite correctly that they were no greater than those which other countries (including France) had accepted. Negotiations were concluded eventually in January 1982, reports indicating that Australia had conceded a number of major negotiating points to the Japanese, including a waiver on prior approvals in reprocessing of Australian uranium.64 Science and technology agreements The first major agreement in this area is the Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in Science and Technology, which came into effect on 27 November 1980. It is a broad ‘umbrella’ agreement, a joint committee overseeing the activities operating under the auspices of the agreement. Cooperative exchange in science and


technology is continuing in several areas, but the agreement as such only provides overall support for such work, and is not specific in its objectives. One series of agreements between the two countries concerns cooperation on the project for the Geostationary Meteorological Satellite System of 1977. This provides for Australia to establish and operate tracking equipment as part of a global effort to monitor the Japanese satellite positioned over West Irian, and receive meteorological data from the satellite. These data form the basis for the daily weather reports and satellite pictures on Australian television. Cultural Agreement This agreement was signed in November 1974 by Prime Ministers Whitlam and Tanaka, and became effective from February 1976. It is an agreement of ‘intent’ rather than specific provisions. In this it is similar to other cultural agreements that Australia maintains. It provides for Australia and Japan to ‘promote’, ‘encourage’ or ‘facilitate’ exchanges of personnel and information, the establishment of cultural institutions, scholarships, teaching and research, and the understanding of the culture of the other country. It also enables the governments to facilitate tourism. The agreement is still active today, and the Mixed Commission, a committee of representatives from each country to monitor the agreement, meets every two years, and focusses on educational and cultural issues that affect the two governments. The Agreement has been important for the two foreign ministries, as it has given them a reference point for the operation of the cultural relations programs. On a regular day-to-day basis, the Australia-Japan Foundation and the Japan Foundation carry out most of the cultural exchange work, and have become the major cultural exchange foci for relations between Australia and Japan. In Australia, the Australia-Japan Foundation has become part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Cultural Relations Branch, effectively absorbing into line policy areas of the Department a body that was established as an independent statutory authority and is still supposed to operate under its own legislative charter. The Foundation is not designed to be the administrative mechanism of the agreement, although it undoubtedly contributes to the objectives of the agreement. The primary purpose of the Foundation, according to the Australia-Japan Foundation Act, is to encourage closer relations between peoples, but the Cultural Agreement is designed to develop relations between countries. From the Australian angle, this distinction is blurred today, particularly as the Foundation sees itself very much as a reflecting government policy on dealings with Japan, indeed as being the main instrument of that cultural relations policy. COMMONWEALTH-STATE RELATIONS In strict diplomatic terms, the Australian and Japanese governments are the sole channels of formal communication between the two countries. In an age of complex international interdependence, and a myriad of transnational arrangements, the two


national governments are not the only means of communication, nor the most important on some occasions. The bilateral relationship is managed through a mix of official and non-official contacts, which include Australian state governments. Australia’s relations with Japan have been complicated by the Commonwealth-state relationship, and the impact of states on dealings with Japan. Although part of a federal system, states have taken in recent years a much higher profile on the foreign stage. As a means of attracting investment and encouraging trade, state leaders have been active in unofficial ‘diplomacy’ that has become a feature of the foreign relations of most industrial federal systems, such as in Canada, the United States, India, Germany and even at a substate level, in France and Great Britain. The Commonwealth-state relationship can generate problems, as the Myer Report indicated: it was particularly concerned at the possibility of Australian governments speaking with more than one voice, and of Japanese interests benefiting from such differences. Several Australian states have had an official presence in Japan for a number of years. The first were Western Australia and New South Wales in 1968 (although some Australian marketing authorities such as the Wheat Board and the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation had opened some years previously). South Australia was represented by Elders from 1970 until 1990, when a formal state office was established. Similarly, Victoria was represented by Heine Bros from 1974 until 1977, with an office opening in 1978. Queensland has had its own representative office since 1980, while Tasmania uses an Australian firm, and the Northern Territory Tourist Commission has its own premises. In 1998, therefore, all six states had their own presence in Tokyo and maintained a full (if limited in personnel) representative function, although this often came down to meeting and greeting state visitors, assisting businessmen and undertaking minor informationgathering duties for the home government.65 State representation in Tokyo, while on occasions irksome to the Australian Embassy, which can never be fully aware of what the state offices are doing, merely reflects the political situation in Australia. State offices do no more than the offices that most US states and Canadian provinces maintain in Japan, often with more resources. The bigger problem is a political one, identified by the Myer Committee as often typified by political and ideological differences between state and federal governments: concern by states that their interests will not be properly or fully represented by the Australian Government; shortcomings in exchange of information on Japan between the two levels of government; and the fact that the state offices and the Embassy often work from different information bases in undertaking their representational work in Tokyo, and may even be competing in trade promotion. The Myer Committee felt that it was damaging to Australian interests if the two levels of government spoke with more than one voice.66 As has happened in the past, state and federal interests vis-à-vis Japan have often clashed. This can be confusing to Japan, although the Japanese have gained a remarkably good understanding of the Australian system over time, particularly as they have consulates in different states and are aware of the peculiarities of Australian federal politics. In the end the differences will be political ones, even though the Commonwealth has the power over foreign affairs under Section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution.


The most difficult period of Commonwealth-state relations concerning Japan came during the Whitlam and Fraser periods (1972–83) as states such as Western Australia and Queensland attempted to assert rights over trade deals, and stamp their views on overall relations with Japan. Prime examples were the attempts by the then Queensland Premier, Mr Bjelke-Petersen, to pressure the Japanese on imports of agricultural products by suggesting restraints on minerals access or, later, on fishing rights. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not always averse to this sort of outside pressure in helping its own case in Tokyo,67 but it was extremely annoying to the Federal government. A similar major difference of opinion occurred over guidelines for iron ore prices under the Fraser government, when pressure from the Queensland and Western Australian governments in particular meant that Federal guidelines were eventually dropped on iron ore. State interests in resources exports usually centre on the tonnage exported, which increases the state income from rail freights on the carriage of the ore to ports. The Federal interest has usually been on the price gained for the commodity rather than the quantity shipped.68 There is no simple solution to the Commonwealth—state problem in dealings with Japan. Under the post-Myer Committee administrative system, attempts were made to improve Commonwealth-state coordination and exchange of information on Japan, by convening meetings of state and Commonwealth officials, and having Japan affairs discussed at Premiers’ Conferences, but it achieved little in the way of concrete gains. Ultimately, the differences are political, but the state mechanisms of unofficial diplomacy are now so strongly established that state-level diplomacy on Japan is a central feature of the day-to-day management of the bilateral relationship. Indeed, in many ways, there are positive benefits to this process, as it enables contact to be made with Japan on a much broader front than would be possible through the one embassy gateway to Japan. Indeed, the major problem area would seem to be the ability of each of the state governments to manage and coordinate their own policy on Japan, as well as to maintain reasonable contact with Canberra. While some state governments such as Queensland are making a conscious effort to streamline and professionalise their Japan dealings (having established its own Japan Secretariat in 1990), others have little in the way of machinery able to keep track of the contacts between different parts of their government and official Japanese agencies. Of course, at the state level the range of contact becomes even more complicated because individual companies may become involved with Japanese companies and state instrumentalities (such as financing bodies, tourist corporations, regulatory agencies) as intermediaries or partners. If one goes further, to the local level, there is also a vast array of personal and official contacts. The sister city movement, encompassing in 1997 seventy-five cities in Australia and their counterparts in Japan, five sister ports and six state-prefecture tie-ups,69 involves a constant stream of inter-governmental contact at the local level, often involving substantial funds and administrative arrangements. These again are means by which the Australia-Japan relationship has grown and flourished as a ‘people-to-people’ activity over the years. As far back as 1962, the then Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, saw great merit in sister city links and urged the Lord Mayor of Sydney to push ahead to establish a link with the Japanese city of Nara.70 The first relationship formalised was that between Lismore in NSW and Daiwa-takada in Nara Prefecture, in August 1963,


followed by two others in the 1960s, eight in the 1970s and twenty-five in the 1980s. Another thirty-six have been initiated or renewed since 1989. The first state-prefecture relationship was formed in 1980 between Victoria and Aichi. Along with Canada, Australia has the third largest number of sister city relationships with Japan of any country, after the United States and China. Given the move in Japan towards active local economic development, trade promotion and the ‘think globally, act locally movement, there is pressure today for increased contact between Australian and Japanese local areas.71 Minagawa argues that state and federal activities vis-à-vis Japan are complementary, the national authorities working with the Japanese Government and its agencies and state representatives working with the business sector. But he does admit that, despite this, conflicts are common and the practical problems of managing a range of type of official and semi-official representatives in Japan are significant.72 CONCLUSION The bureaucratic, political, legal and constitutional structures in place to manage the Australia-Japan relationship on a daily basis are long-standing, ever more complex, and relatively permanent. They speak of difficult negotiations, careful compromises and always widening contacts between the two national governments. They make the relationship an institutionalised and now routinised set of arrangements, into which the problems of the day fit and are dealt with. They emphasise stability and predictability, where crises can be handled and where channels for communication and argument are easily established. They indicate close confidence in a relatively trouble-free bilateral environment, and reflect also decades of personal contact between officials, politicians and business leaders, to make the arrangements of today ones forged in hard-won trust and confidence. They speak of a comfortable, but not complacent, political relationship. NOTES 1

2 3

Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972. The Australian ambassadors in Tokyo following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1952 were: Dr E.R.Walker (from June 1952), Sir Alan Watt (April 1956), L.R. McIntyre (May 1960), Sir Allen Brown (June 1965), Gordon Freeth (January 1970), Keith Shann (January 1974), John Menadue (March 1977), Sir James Plimsoll (April 1981), Sir Neil Currie (October 1982), Geoffrey Miller (August 1986), Rawdon Dalrymple (1989), Dr Ashton Calvert (1994) and Peter Grey (1998). Japanese ambassadors to Australia were Nishi Haruhiko (January 1953), Suzuki Tadakatsu (July 1955), Narita Katsushiro (April 1959), Ota Saburo (June 1961), Chiba Koh (January 1966), Kai Fumihiko (August 1967), Saito Shizuo (February 1970), Yoshida Kenzo (September 1973), Okawara Yoshio (March 1976), Kuroda Mizuo (April 1980), Yanagiya Kensuke (December 1982), Nagashima Toshijiro (February 1985), Yanagi Kenichi (November 1987), Fukada Tsutomu (March 1991), Hasegawa Kazutoshi (April 1993) and Satoh Yukio (1996). AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/7 part 1, Cable I.17546, 9 October 1951. Cable O.16469, 12 October 1951, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/7 part 1.

The machinery of diplomacy: managing the relationship 93 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14

15 16 17 18 19

20 21 22

23 24 25 26

See file AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/7 part 1. Note by External Affairs Minister Casey of 17 September 1952 on memorandum by R.L. Harry to the Minister of 16 September 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/7 part 1. Nishi Haruhiko, Kaiso no nihon gaiko, Iwanami, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 143–62. Alan Rix, Coming to Terms, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986. Argus, 13 January 1953. Canberra Times, 13 January 1953. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 January 1953. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Official Hansard Report, Canberra, Government Printer, p. 353. Official Hansard Report, pp. 353–4. Daily Yomiuri, 16 June 1992. Administrative units within the Japanese and Australian bureaucracies are given different names. In Japanese government ministries, the highest organisational unit is the kyoku, or bureau, which is made up of bu (departments) and ka (divisions). In Australian government departments, the highest unit is the division, which is divided into branches and sections. The ‘Oceania Division’ in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs roughly corresponds to the ‘Japan Section’ in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Courier-Mail, 4 March 1991; Neville Meaney, Trevor Matthews, and Sol Encel, The Japanese Connection: A Survey of Australian Leaders’ Attitudes Towards Japan and the Australia-Japan Relationship, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988. Gaimusho, Gaiko seisho: waga gaiko no kinkyo, no. 7, August 1963, p. 102. Tsusho sangyosho-hen, Tsusho sangyosho 30 nenshi, Tokyo, Tsusho sangyo chosakai, 1979; Asahi shimbun, 14 April 1991. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 12, December 1970, p. 642. Australian Financial Review, 26 July 1968. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 42, no. 4, 1971, p. 236; reports by Trevor Matthews on the interdepartmental committees on Japan in Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration, Appendix Volume 4, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976; Trevor Matthews, ‘Papering over differences: the Standing Interdepartmental Committee on Japan’, in Sol Encel, Peter Wilenski and Bernard Schaffer (eds), Decisions: Case Studies in Australian Public Policy, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1982, pp. 74–100; Australian Financial Review, 26 June 1970. Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration Appendix Volume 4, pp. 294–5. Speech to Australian Institute of International Affairs Conference, 12 June 1971, in J.A.A.Stockwin (ed.), Japan and Australia in the Seventies, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972. Japan: Report from the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1973, p. 81. Also see Alan Rix, ‘The 1971–72 Senate hearings on Japan: Sir John Crawford’s evidence on the Australia-Japan relationship’, Pacific Economic Papers no. 212, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra, 1992. Australian Financial Review, 19 March 1971. Australian Financial Review, 17 August 1970. Australian Financial Review, 2 November 1970. Australian Financial Review, 16 September 1971.

94 The Australia–Japan political alignment 27 28 29 30

31 32 33 34

35 36 37

38 39 40

41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49

Australian Financial Review, 6 July 1970. Australian Financial Review, 28 May 1971. Australian Financial Review, 1 February 1972. See references above, and also Trevor Matthews, ‘Australian bureaucrats and foreign policy coordination: the case of the Interdepartmental Committee on Japan’, Tokyo daigaku kyoyogakubu kyoyo gakka kiyo, no. 12, 31 March 1980; and Trevor Matthews and G.S.Reid, ‘The Australian bureaucracy and the making of foreign policy’, in Peter Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji (eds), Japan and Australia: Two Societies and their Interaction, Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1981, pp. 304–44, esp. pp. 320–26. Australia-Japan Relations: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978, p. 149. Matthews, ‘Australian bureaucrats and foreign policy coordination’, p. 14. Japan: Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, p. 81. National Times, 17 June 1978. Chairmanship of the SCJ was proposed by the Myer Committee to be held by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, but a minority view (including that of Sir John Crawford) was that it should be a task for the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This latter course was eventually approved by the government. T.B.Millar, ‘Changes in the formal structure of foreign policy consideration’, Australian Outlook, vol. 37, no. 1, April 1983, pp. 26–8. Ronald A.Morse and Edward A.Olsen, ‘Japan’s Bureaucratic Edge’, Foreign Policy, vol. 52, Fall 1983, pp. 167–80. Richard Broinowski, ‘The Japan Secretariat—An innovation in foreign policy co-ordination’, in Paul Dibb (ed.), Australia’s External Relations in the 1980s: The Interaction of Economic, Political and Strategic Factors, Croom Helm Australia, Canberra, 1983, pp. 193–205. Minagawa Shugo, Rempo seifu no tainichi kiko no seidoka, Seikei daigaku ajia taiheiyo kenkyu senta osutoraria kenkyu shirizu 3, January 1987. Australian Financial Review, 14 November 1968. Mayumi Kamada, Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committees: forging channels of communication’, Pacific Economic Papers no. 219, Australia-Japan Research Centre, ANU, Canberra, May 1993. Australian Financial Review, 29 October 1981. Interview with a former Japanese Ambassador to Australia, 8 December 1987. Asahi shimbun, 30 March and 1 April 1967. Australian Financial Review, 6 July 1970 and 9 November 1970; also see Saito Shizuo, Gaiko: watashi no taiken to kyokun, Saimaru shuppankai, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 115–6 and Osutoraria tsushin, Kokusai kaihatsu janarusha, Tokyo, 1971, pp. 149–51. Asahi shimbun, 20 April 1971. Nihon keizai shimbun, 7 May 1971. Nihon keizai shimbun, 27 May 1971. Australian Financial Review, 1 February 1972. Asahi shimbun, 16 October 1972.

The machinery of diplomacy: managing the relationship 95 50

51 52 53

54

55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69

70 71 72

Australian Financial Review, 16 October 1972. The Australian general election at which the McMahon government was defeated by the Labor government under Gough Whitlam had already been announced before the AJMC. National Times, 31 January–5 February 1977. National Times, 24–29 January 1977 and Tsusan janaru, February 1977, pp. 96–102. Minister for Foreign Affairs News Release, 2 November 1993; Embassy of Japan, Reports from Japan, vol. 3, no. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 8–9. On ‘natural partnership’, see remarks by Prime Minister Miyazawa at a dinner hosted by Prime Minister Keating, 30 April 1993, where he refers to a 1978 visit to the AJMC. In this and later parts of this section, I use information from Treaties and Agreements between Australia and Japan, Japan Secretariat Research Paper no. CCRJ/19/81, January 1981 (a paper released publicly); Current Notes on International Affairs, May 1971; and various information articles from Department of Foreign Affairs journals up to the present. Current Notes on International Affairs, January 1955, pp. 32–3. See Australian Fisheries vol. 53, no. 9, September 1994, especially Albert Caton, ‘The NSW SET Fishery resurfaces—but is it back?’, pp. 18–22. See Rix, Coming to Terms, p. 206. John Gunn, High Corridors: Qantas 1954–1970, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1988, p. 181. Australian Financial Review, 12 October 1967. Australian Financial Review, 12 October 1967. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, May 1971, article on Australia’s relations with Japan’. Australian Financial Review, 21 January 1972. Australian Financial Review, 31 July 1981. Australian Financial Review, 20, 22 and 25 January 1982. Information on establishment of state offices based on correspondence with the current directors of those offices. Australia-Japan Relations, pp. 160–61. David Sissons, ‘Japan’, in W.J.Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs 1971–75, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 249–50. Alan Rix, ‘Australia and East Asia: Japan’, in P.J.Boyce and J.R.Angel (eds), Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976–80, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983, pp. 193–200. Kokusai shinzen toshi renmei, Nihon no kokusai shimai toshi ichiran, Tokyo, 1992; Jichisho gyoseikyoku shinkoka, Zenkoku shichoson yoran heisei 7-nenpan, Tokyo, 1995, pp. 472–93; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘A New Japan? Change in Asia’s Megamarket’, Canberra, 1997. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9, 2 March 1952. Warren Reed in Australian Financial Review, 2 February 1990. Minagawa, Rempo seifu no tainichi kiko no seidoka, p. 3.

5 The Pressure of Public Opinion: The Japanese Presence and the Public Debate

The Australian phobia about the threat of Asia is legendary. The experience of some Australians at the hands of the Japanese during the Second World War reinforced in the minds of many the sense of threat that Japan has evoked in the past. In the postwar political relationship between Japan and Australia, the problems of public opinion and their effect on policy have been considerable; politicians have always had an ear tuned to signs of changing public attitudes about Japan, and concern about public opinion has weighed heavily on government decision makers. Nevertheless, a close political alignment between the two countries has been forged regardless of the vagaries of attitudes and short-term political responses. In the areas of immigration and the Japanese presence, Australian policy has sometimes seemed inimical to the cultivation of friendly and cooperative political relations. Ultimately, however, the benefits of close relations with Japan have had to be evident, able to be explained by political leaders and persuasive to the general public. Traditionally, public opinion has been regarded as one of the major sources of domestic restraints on foreign policy makers.1 This is neither straightforward nor direct: ‘neither a clear nor consistent guide to policy making’.2 Public opinion (and the media, through which much public opinion is communicated) is regarded as being at the periphery of the foreign policy process,3 but nonetheless public opinion does have a role. In particular, it is seen as setting broad policy boundaries and directions, on the one hand restraining government actions and at other times stimulating innovation. It is used by decision makers to justify their actions (as Arthur Calwell did with his intransigent opposition to Japanese immigration after the Second World War), and is also a valuable tool for policy makers in international bargaining. The supposed support or lack of support from public opinion can be a powerful element in negotiating. Overall, however, ‘the links between mass attitudes and foreign policy behavior are complex’.4 While public attitudes have been an important factor in AustraliaJapan relations in the postwar period, elite opinion has tended to be seen by analysts as having a greater direct impact on foreign policy.

The pressure of public opinion: the Japanese presence and the public debate

97

One detailed study of Australian leaders’ attitudes to Japan and the Australia-Japan relationship shows that Japan figured strongly in leaders’ views, but that a ‘sense of unease’ about the relationship characterised their attitudes.5 We shall return to the findings of this study later in the chapter. At the same time, Hugh Smith’s conclusions about public opinion and Australian policy, ‘that public opinion sets outer limits beyond which no party will go if it wishes to gain or retain office’,6 have been open to challenge in the Australia-Japan relationship. The interplay of public opinion and foreign policy is a changing one; although the public has traditionally been less interested in foreign than domestic policy, the intense scrutiny by the media today of government forays on the international stage and the ever-more-obvious domestic impact of global issues have given public opinion new significance for foreign policy makers. Since the Second World War, popular sentiment has always been claimed by Australian governments to be a necessary element of their decision making on Japan. In the 1950s, as in the 1980s, the media reflected often hostile popular attitudes about Japan, although there has never been any major upswelling of opinion representing unified positions. As we saw in Chapter 2, even the Returned Servicemen’s League was divided on the issue of the visit of Mr Kishi in 1957, and a similar diversity of opinion surfaced in the late 1980s in relation to Japanese investment in Australia, as we shall see below. The polls One of the most sensitive areas in the bilateral relationship has been that of Australian popular attitudes towards Japan. We will recall from Chapter 1 that Calwell based his fervent opposition to any Japanese visiting Australia on what he argued was popular Australian opinion about the Japanese: angry rejection of Japanese behaviour in the war and hatred towards all Japanese for what a few had done. But were Australians hostile to Japan and, if so, for how long after the war were they hostile? Public opinion surveys do not provide a clear-cut answer on this issue. The Gallup Poll results from 1945 did not specifically address general Australian attitudes towards Japan, but sampled opinion on particular issues.7 Predictably, therefore, in August 1945, 50 per cent wanted to punish Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal, and in July 1947, over 80 per cent supported a long occupation of Japan. A poll in May 1949, however, argued that Australians did not trust the Japanese—‘doubtless a reflection of wartime atrocities’, commented the Gallup analyses. In testing of popular Australian attitudes to international affairs in the 1950s and the 1960s, it was clear that Australians saw the United States and Britain as their allies, and remained cautious about Japan. The Japanese Peace Treaty was opposed by 63 per cent in August-September 1951, and a year later 60 per cent believed that Japan would threaten Australia again within twenty years. Even in 1971, over two-thirds of respondents thought that Japan was likely to become a ‘great menacing power’ although, when compared to other likely threats, Japan (at 7.8 per cent in February 1970), was ranked well below China, Russia and Indonesia.

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These poll results suggest a wary Australian populace, still mindful of wartime experiences. On wider social issues, however, responses were less hard line. In late 1949, 43 per cent favoured Japan playing again in Davis Cup tennis, but 44 per cent opposed this, on the grounds of ‘Japan’s treatment of war prisoners’, ‘too soon after the war; not for a few years yet’. Likewise, only the following year, 56 per cent opposed Japan taking part in the Melbourne Olympics of 1956. Women were especially hostile in their views, mainly because of Japanese treatment of war prisoners and the fear of Japan again menacing world peace. On the other hand, 60 per cent of respondents accepted in early 1952 that Japanese war brides should be allowed to come to Australia. Support increased the following year for war brides, but opinion was divided in early 1955 on whether Japanese divers should be allowed in to work on Australian pearling luggers. Reasons given for opposing entry still included such sentiments as ‘they can’t be trusted’ and ‘our soldiers suffered too much’. By 1965, six out often people approved the temporary employment of Japanese experts in the iron ore industry in Western Australia, and half of these were prepared for those Japanese to settle permanently. It was claimed that ‘they’re clever people’, ‘we should learn from them’, and ‘they trade with us’. Such views indicated a marked change in Australian attitudes towards the Japanese. Overall, however, these results reinforce the argument that resentment against the Japanese lingered long after the war, and influenced attitudes to many aspects of Australian dealings with Japan. The most active part of those dealings, however, was in trade, and here opinions were much more diverse. Just after the end of the war, in February 1946, polls showed 47 per cent of people were against resuming trade (against 45 per cent in favour, with farm owners 55 per cent in favour). By September of the same year, opinions had changed, with 57 per cent supporting trade (48 per cent opposed). This change was mainly due to an increase in support from men, and professional and business people. Most supporters recognised the importance of markets in Japan for Australian exports. Support for trade continued to grow thereafter. In September 1947 it was up to 65 per cent (27 per cent opposed). Although only a bare majority favoured the import of Japanese toys in November 1951, by August 1953 six out often people were happy with increased imports from Japan. On the other hand, there was some caution in agreeing to accept Japanese equipment on the Snowy Mountains Scheme in mid–1953. This attitude had changed by mid–1964, when nearly two-thirds of respondents agreed that Australia should buy Japanese trainer aircraft. Gallup Polls are only one indication of changing Australian sentiment towards Japan. They nevertheless provide consistent longitudinal evidence of public attitudes, apart from letters to the newspapers (which are, in any case, a strongly biased sample of opinion). The Gallup Poll results confirm that resentment against Japan continued for many years after the war and affected some people s attitudes on matters of everyday relations. But the results were also reasonably predictable. Strong feelings were likely to dissipate over time as the practical benefits of dealing with Japan became more apparent to ordinary Australians. Yet the pragmatism was balanced by recalcitrant opinion as well —while trade was firmly supported soon after the end of hostilities, fears of a future Japan threat persisted through into the 1970s.


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Japanese Embassy surveys Another important piece of evidence about popular attitudes comes from ANOP polls conducted on behalf of the Japanese Embassy in Canberra over the period 1973 to 1994.8 These surveys tested Australian popular opinion on the image of Japan held in Australia, the economic, political and international aspects of Japan, and Japan-Australia relations. In the 1976 poll, the single most commonly held impression of Japan was of the Second World War (‘enemies, militarism, POW camps’). This accounted for 16 per cent of replies. However, industry and trade taken together totalled 26 per cent and cars featured for 10 per cent of people. By the time of the 1988 survey, the Second World War was still the main ‘top of the mind’ impression, but held by a slightly lower 12 per cent of people. These views were held more by older people. Knowledge of the war was claimed by only 8 per cent of respondents in 1994, with culture and tradition the main areas of knowledge. The surveys revealed interest in economic relations with Japan to be high; Japan’s economic importance to Australia was clearly recognised, although this view declined slightly over the period 1976–85. Nearly two-thirds of people polled regarded Japan as Australia’s most important economic partner in 1994. Images of Japanese people were favourable—hardworking, inventive, efficient and polite (but also secretive, arrogant and ready to copy others). Interestingly, Japan as a threat did not rate highly for Australians. Japan was rather seen as a ‘steadying’ influence in the Asia Pacific region, and consistently until 1985 two-thirds of respondents felt that Australia should be ‘friendly’ towards Japan. That number fell away in 1988 to 54 per cent following widespread debate in Australia about the Japanese presence and Japanese investment (see discussion below). In that survey, too, 75 per cent of people preferred no more Japanese investment; the figure fell to only 72 per cent in 1994.9 Likewise, attitudes about Japanese immigration have become more polarised since 1976. By 1988, 49 per cent of those polled wanted less or no immigration, compared to only 34 per cent in both 1976 and 1994. Newspapers came up with the headlines ‘Japan finds fewer mates’, ‘Japanese find fewer friends’, and quoted Japanese officials as planning new information and public relations programs in Australia to boost its image and argue the benefits of foreign investment.10 Where the fault for this change in Australian attitudes lay was not altogether clear, although one Japanese official was quoted as saying that The Australia-Japan relationship has entered a new phase but this survey indicates the level of information and knowledge in Australia is clearly not keeping up with those changes…The Australian public does not seem to be prepared for the changes that are taking place.11 To a great extent, the political issues of the day affected the ANOP surveys on Australian attitudes. Nevertheless, as a barometer of public opinion, they have certainly been seen by the Japanese Government as a mark of the effect of their policies and the impact of greater contact between the two countries. The importance of the surveys is that the Japanese Government likes to watch closely trends in Australian public opinion on Japan, especially the image of Japan and its role in the region. Conversely, the Australian Government has also commissioned public opinion surveys in Japan, one

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recent poll indicating that three out of four Japanese saw Australia’s immigration policy as non-discriminatory. Earlier surveys portrayed Australia in a more negative light as ‘rich, white and British’.12 Government and business in both countries, however, tend to be more directly influenced by elite opinion as expressed in the newspapers and other media. Only one serious analysis of Australian and Japanese elite attitudes has been undertaken, and it showed that generally Australian leaders had a favourable view of the relationship with Japan, slightly more so than the public at large. The leaders were more inclined to think of Japan in terms of its distinctive society and admired attributes, rather than in terms of militarism and the threat of expansionism. Leaders also exhibited greater warmth towards the Japanese than the general public, 85.5 per cent of people believed that Australia’s attitude to Japan should be friendly. A substantial majority felt there was a good basis for a ‘special relationship’, but there was also considerable reserve about Japan’s regional political and defence role, and many were reluctant to give the relationship with Japan any further formal diplomatic or strategic character. There was even, amidst the strongly receptive view of Australia’s dealings with Japan, ‘a sense of unease about the nature of the relationship and the changes that were taking place in it’. They had to do with ‘mutual incomprehension and mutual ignorance…the gap of culture…complementarity and vulnerability’.13 THE PUBLIC DEBATE ABOUT JAPAN IN AUSTRALIA The nature of the public debate on Japan in Australia has, in some ways, changed remarkably little over forty years. Just as there have been continuities in the issues discussed and debated between the political leaders, there were close parallels between the topics of public debate in the 1950s and the 1990s. This debate is a touchstone of the social relationship that underpins political and economic ties. It has been a debate carried out largely in Australia, given Japan’s dominance of its economy, compared with Australia’s small (but nonetheless important) impact on Japan’s economic structure. As Creighton Burns put it, ‘the attitude of the average informed Australian on relations with contemporary Japan may best be summed up in three words: awe, apprehension and anticipation’.14 Apprehension has stood out as the main element in the debate, an apprehension born of fears about change to the Australian way of life brought about by dealings with Japan, or closer links with Japan. Political argument in the 1950s about rebuilding ties with Japan was couched in crude and bitter terms. Menzies’ attempts to rebuild relations with Japan and persuade Australians to see the benefits of dealing with Japan on a friendly basis, were met with what one newspaper called the ALP’s ‘racial policy’.15 Arthur Calwell wrote that ‘the Menzies Government is pro-Japanese, although the majority of Australians are antiJapanese and are appalled at Mr Menzies’ attitude’. Truth argued that ‘in his attempts to bend over backwards in order not to appear beastly to the Japanese, Mr Menzies appears to have completely lost contact with the realities of Australian thought’.16 The Leader of the Opposition, Dr H.V.Evatt, was more restrained in his criticism, acknowledging the good sense of casting off enmity towards the Japanese and once again trading with Japan,


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but concentrating on the foreseen threats to Australia from a rebuilt Japan. Yet Evatt could not resist what had become for him a favourite racist argument: In conclusion, I quote the stern warning recently issued by the President of the Queensland returned soldiers’ organisation, Sir Raymond Huish, who said: ‘The Japanese can never be trusted…they are planning to march south again. Like the leopard, the Japanese will never change their spots—aggression is born in them’. I commend that warning to Mr Menzies.17 These statements were made during a critical election period, when the Labor party was under strong attack from the government on the Petrov spy issue, but newspapers reacted sharply to Calwell’s argument. The News-Weekly of 17 February 1954 declared categorically that ‘we hold Mr Calwell’s policy towards the Japanese in complete reprobation, as anti-Christian, anti-Australian and anti-Labor’. A more measured rebuttal came from the Herald on 18 March, which pointed out that Calwell’s ‘one-man war…offers no realistic alternative to the idea of accepting Japan as a nation which will go on existing and with which it is necessary for us to have trade relations’. The Menzies government won the controversial election of May 1954 and went on to develop links with Japan even more actively and in a businesslike manner. That did not ease feelings of resentment towards the Japanese (public expressions of protest were made when Prime Minister Kishi visited in 1957), something of which the Japanese themselves were only too aware. A series of articles in the major daily newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, in April 1957 on the occasion of the Menzies visit to Japan, had as its lead article an analysis of Australian anti-Japanese feeling: It is said that the anti-Japanese feelings of Australians are the worst in the world. Japanese who go there cannot avoid gloomy, if not tragic, feelings. During a year or a year and a half one often comes across this problem and gets depressed by it…. It is all right in the big cities like Sydney or Melbourne, but if one gets out past the suburbs a bit, the Australians’ idea of a Japanese is simply a buck-toothed, short-sighted, violent barbarian.18 The Asahi’s former Australian correspondent, Mr Matsuoka, who wrote these articles, acknowledged that the situation had improved in recent years but, when it came to foreign policy, he claimed that Australia still had a long way to go in getting closer to Asia: Australians generally have a fear of being surrounded by different races and different cultures—it is a fear that will not go away’.19 Matsuoka was more prescient than he probably anticipated. This fear of Asia has not dissipated in the 1990s. The ‘apprehension’ that Burns identified has been reinforced by the effects of a strong economic relationship and the outcome of an Australian policy of encouraging foreign investment. During the height of the resources boom and the rapid expansion in Australia’s minerals trade with Japan, there was a constant concern about attitudes. The Australian Financial Review (AFR) was at the forefront in arguing for a new attitude to the Japanese, in particular because of the reporting of well-known journalists and Australia-Japan observers such as Peter Robinson and Max Suich, who sought to persuade Australians to learn much more about the country with which Australia’s economy was so closely intertwined.

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By the end of the 1960s, ‘understanding’ was of major concern to commentators. It was an upbeat, optimistic message about the need for effective ‘communication’: …it is true that Australian and Japanese businessmen are continually in communication with one another…similarly, the two countries have been able to communicate diplomatically…But this bread-and-butter, tradesmen’s entrance type of communication does not represent the kind of empathy which will have to develop between the two countries if they are ever to co-operate effectively in promoting regional stability and prosperity…human communication between the two countries is still really on a very primitive level…20 The AFR saw the link between political cooperation and some degree of popular communication, although it had no particular answers for the gaps it identified. But it did give vent to the by-then obvious conclusion that it was Australia which was the junior partner in the relationship, an outcome that the fierce debates of the 1950s had not predicted. Of course, in the intervening years the Japanese economy had grown rapidly and Japan had achieved a balance of payments surplus. The AFR put it bluntly: …very few Japanese feel that any special attention should be paid to Australia as a society and Australians as a distinctive people rather than Australia as an impersonal source of raw materials and revenue from exports. Moreover, as Japan grows rapidly into the ‘super-power’ class this attitude is likely to grow stronger, since the Japanese sense of hierarchy and fascination with quantification would tend to place Australia fairly low on any list of ‘important’ nations.21 There was talk of ‘the same psychological and emotional wavelength’ as a basis for political cooperation: ‘a fundamental feeling of partnership between the two West Pacific powers is the essential answer to the threat of [psychological] crisis. And the logical partnership is one aimed at the promotion of regional development and security’.22 The writer was concerned that this ‘psychological crisis’ in the relationship might develop as Japan treated Australia in a rather off-hand way, which ‘will seem to Australians like unbridled and frightening arrogance’. There is every indication that this ‘psychological crisis’ is a part of the AustraliaJapan relationship in the 1990s, as Australians seek a way of understanding the impact of Japanese economic and investment strength in their country. Not that Australia is the only one of Japan’s economic partners in this predicament, but the hierarchical nature of the relationship is all too obvious. According to Peter Robinson, however, some basic Australian attitudes on race also had to be addressed: There is a quite fundamental decision which will have to be made here: Do we adjust and adapt the barriers of what I will broadly call white Australia to the realities of our relationship with Japan, or do we begin to erect a white investment policy, a white tariff barrier, a white share market and a white resources development plan? It seems to be that we have no alternative but to recognise the facts of life…and accord Japan exactly the same rights as we accord any other big, powerful, friendly foreign country…At present, our discriminatory attitudes hit the Japanese most severely at the personal level—I would point out that this is the level where the deepest


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bitterness can be ingrained and where emotional memories can colour attitudes for years into the future…We cannot even pretend to operate as respected people on the international scene—let alone develop our relationship with Japan—while it is accepted practice for the most senior of businessmen, public servants and even politicians to refer in normal conversation to the people of our most important trading partner as ‘Japs’ …so long as it is in common usage it will be like a tiny piece of grit in the Australia-Japanese relationship—almost too tiny to be significant, yet irritating enough to inflame the whole organism. 23 The racist issue was taken up also by Max Suich, when he claimed that ‘it is rarely acknowledged in Canberra or Tokyo but the most sensitive and potentially the most troublesome issue between Australia and Japan is Australia’s immigration policy and its alien entry regulations’.24 He claimed Australian inertia, misconceptions and sheer humbug made the issue very sensitive. It ‘arouses feelings of anger and defensiveness on both sides and which make rational or factual discussion of the issue uncommon’. The Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, Mr Miyazawa, was quoted as saying that Japanese should not become too conspicuous in Australia, ‘particularly because of your immigration laws’.25 The point about this concern for Australian racist attitudes to Japan was that observers foresaw dangers to the smooth development of a new and closer economic connection between the two countries. One writer saw it as ‘some psychological, political and emotional readjustment problems of gut-wrenching magnitude’. At the time, Australia’s likely drift towards dependence on Japan within the Asia Pacific region, and Japan’s desire to extend its resources reliance on Australia, were seen as inevitable; less likely was the capacity of Australia, in particular, to adjust to the social demands arising from such levels of interaction.26 THE PLACE OF CULTURAL RELATIONS The Australian Government attempted to address these broader concerns of attitudes and communication. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence took evidence in 1973 on the extent of cultural contact between Australia and Japan, especially on the teaching of Asian languages in Australia. Such contacts were seen as a means of ameliorating possible tensions arising from public attitudes; Japan, in particular, had seen the benefits of cultural exchange from the outset of the relationship in the 1950s. In its report the Committee endorsed the idea of a cultural agreement between Australia and Japan, and the establishment of a foundation to foster cultural relations with other countries. Both of these were achieved within the next three years. The Cultural Agreement was signed on 1 November 1974, and the Australia-Japan Foundation was established by an Act of Parliament on 7 April 1976.27 Cultural relations as an aspect of policy had its beginnings in the 1950s. Prime ministers Kishi and Menzies discussed the expansion of cultural relations when Menzies visited Japan in April 1957. Japan had hoped to send an exhibition of

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Japanese art to Australia, to exchange students and professors and establish a ‘JapaneseAustralian Cultural Society’. Menzies in December of that year indicated that ‘the general idea of cultural contact was a very good one and on our respective sides we should encourage it’.28 Governments indeed supported the development of bilateral cultural relations from then on. Non-government cultural exchanges had also begun in 1955, and were to continue actively.29 The extent of such people-to-people contacts was, however, extremely limited. They enabled a base for tertiary-level teaching to be established, the fostering of some sister city connections, and the expansion of parliamentary and media exchanges. The business cooperation committees took strong initiatives, however, with government adding its broad support and some special visitor funds. Other special links were established, such as the development of the Japanese cemetery and memorial garden in NSW at Cowra, on the site of the former prisoner-of-war camp, through the enthusiasm of the local council and townspeople, and Japanese organisations.30 The creation of the Australia-Japan Foundation, however, was based on a recognition in 1974 that not a great deal had been achieved in altering either popular attitudes in Australia about Japan, or Japanese recognition of Australian cultural achievement. In the early 1970s, too, as outlined above, a substantial impediment to improved Australia-Japan relations was that a major irritant to the Japanese is the belief that we consider them inferior and that they are convinced they are discriminated against in international trade, in migration and in political contacts. 31 Thus, commentators such as Max Suich urged an entirely new approach to dealing with Japan, ‘to improve understanding and exchange of information’. The Australia-Japan Foundation was a part of this attempt by Australia to widen its ties beyond what was seen as just economics. Even though a broadly-based set of political contacts already existed, cultural relations were seen as a non-controversial and apolitical means of fostering goodwill across the barriers of language and custom. Prime Minister Whitlam saw the need for ‘a framework within which well motivated and competent Australians and Japanese who wish to build understanding and goodwill between our two countries can operate more effectively’. He envisaged a foundation to provide a base for building a range of contacts with Japan, so as to ‘establish a genuine and deep understanding of each other’s attitudes and cultures’.32 The committee established to consider the matter agreed with the Prime Minister, although it did not widely canvass the alternatives. The Japanese Government was not prepared at that stage to reciprocate other than by sending a cultural mission to Australia to assess the opportunities for implementing the Cultural Agreement. The Australian decision reflected the view that closer economic relations with Japan necessitated ‘elucidating the character, culture and outlook of the two peoples’, especially as the committee accepted that the economic interdependence of the two countries will become even greater. Of particular significance for the committee was the sponsoring of intensive language study as a basis for promoting


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contacts with Japan. Australia recognised that its interests lay in learning more about its major trading partner. The Australia-Japan Foundation, despite some difficulties in its relations with its ‘home’ department, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the eventual bringing together of the cultural exchange work of the Foundation and the Department into a common organisational structure, has maintained a high profile since its inception, and has indeed fostered ‘people-to-people’ contacts. Whitlam’s original objectives of creating a framework for building understanding and goodwill have been vigorously pursued, and undoubtedly attained in good measure: at the same time, success in reaching every corner of Australian society to advance these objectives could not be expected. Indeed, the bilateral foundation model of cultural relations begun by the AustraliaJapan Foundation has proved resilient and has been a key factor in using cultural relations as part of Australia’s strategic marketing of its image in Asia.33 THE JAPANESE PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA: THE DEBATE OF THE LATE 1980s Apprehension about the Japanese presence in Australia reached frantic levels in the years 1986–89, spurred by concerns at the speed of expansion in Japanese tourism, Japanese investment and specific development proposals such as the Multi-Function Polis (MFP). The political relationship was severely tested by the public expressions of feeling about the role of the Japanese in Australia: a prime ministerial apology was even proffered to soften the media impact of outspoken local criticism of the Japanese presence. The debate was a prime example of how popular feeling and media frenzy can threaten the longer-term constructive impacts of public policy. What became known at the time as ‘Australia’s racist debate’ had several origins. One was linked to the broader issue of Australia’s immigration policies, arising from a report to the government in June 1988. By far the major problem was the wide publicity given to the rapid increase of Japanese investment in Australia, especially in property and tourist facilities. Linked to this was an attempt by pressure groups on the Gold Coast in Queensland to form an anti-Japanese investment campaign. The death of Emperor Hirohito in January 1989 sparked a short burst of anti-Japanese feeling. Finally, a plan to establish Japanese retirement settlements in Australia (the ‘Silver Columbia’ project) was met with hostile suspicion, and the Japanese Government’s MFP proposal became a subject of acrimonious public debate when it was pulled into the Federal election campaign by the Leader of the Opposition, Andrew Peacock, in early 1990. Immigration The immigration debate did not have much to do with Japan; it was more about the balance of Asian and European populations within the overall immigration intake and its eventual effect on the Australian population profile, although it had an effect

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on the concurrent arguments about Asian investment in Australia. As the AFR of 12 October 1988 noted, however, it did indicate that Australia was now in the stage of practical contact and personal interaction with Asia, coping with the problem of ‘dealing with individuals and vastly different social structures on a tolerant, understanding and flexible basis’. The episode showed that Australians were not really ready for that quantum leap as a society, despite the efforts of some sectors of society. The Emperor Anti-Japanese feeling erupted in the media when Emperor Hirohito died on 7 January 1989. Such outpourings were not confined to Australia and much of the argument focussed on whether Australia should be represented at the funeral for the late Emperor. The spectre of wartime atrocities gave heat to the debate, as embittered writers to newspaper letter columns urged readers not to forget Japan’s war crimes. Some letters were highly personal and obviously deeply felt. However, a high degree of invective was unusual; indeed, alongside the many letters criticising the betrayal of the honour of Australia’s war dead by official attendance at the funeral, were numerous pleas for looking ahead rather than backward. Many, however, also pointed to Japan’s failure to acknowledge its past and express regret for its wartime actions. This point has been made forcefully by contemporary historians of Japan’s foreign relations: Japan’s unwillingness to confront its imperial past has hampered its capacity to define a creative role in international relations today. One newspaper quoted Harvard professor and former US ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer: ‘To put it bluntly, Japan must show a greater readiness to join the human race. They must identify themselves with the rest of the world and feel a part of it.’34 Other responses spoke of the facts of history: the public responsibility of an emperor subject to enormous political constraints within a military-controlled government. What stood out in the debate was the need to look to the future rather than the past: ‘we cannot build a new world on old graveyards’.35 Another writer on the same day urged: ‘Let us look forward, not backward, as we move toward the 21st century in a global community which geographically places Japan as a strategic ally for the future’. The death of the Emperor gave cause for reassessment most pointedly to the Japanese. An avalanche of reflective and argumentative comment accompanied the Emperor’s final illness and death, and continued through the inauguration and later formal enthronement of the new Emperor, Akihito. The Japanese debate was mainly concerned with the nature and future role of the imperial system itself, although much comment was also made about Emperor Hirohito’s personal responsibility for the war and the actions of the Japanese armed forces. The level of historical debate about these matters in Australia was limited, with a few exceptions. Some material was taken from overseas newspapers. More attention in Australia was paid to the official Australian attitude towards the funeral; for the government a matter of protocol. A careful weighing of the question of Australia’s broader trade and political relations was achieved reasonably well by the eventual accumulation of


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correspondence in the newspapers. By the end of the burst of letter writing, arguments supporting the moral basis for attending the Emperor’s funeral were being made: acceptance of the ‘special relationship’ based on trade, the need to forgive if not to forget, but most importantly, the imperative of the future relationship with a new and different Japan. As one, admittedly conservative, writer put it: ‘For us, the duty is vigilance and active co-operation in the maintenance of peace.’36 Investment This was the most divisive issue in the public debate about Japan in the 1980s. It turned on the problem of foreign investment in real estate, in particular the purchase of freehold title by foreign investors, and the very rapid rise in Japanese investment generally, and the property sector especially, after 1982. The share of Japan in total investment in Australia jumped from 8.7 per cent in 1981 to 17.9 per cent in 1991, overtaking the United Kingdom as the second largest source of investment after the United States. This partly reflected a general flow of direct investment abroad by the Japanese, which also saw Japan’s share in the level of direct investment in Australia more than triple between 1981 and 1991, to 16.2 per cent. The inflow of direct investment from Japan peaked in 1989 at US$2,258 million and has generally been falling since then, despite some increase in 1994–95 and 1995–96. In the Australian real estate sector, the rise in direct investment from Japan was even more spectacular, from a base of zero in 1980–81 to a share of 49.2 per cent in 1991–92, and a level of US$1,255 million. More recently, there has been a shift towards Japanese investment in manufacturing in Australia and investment in real estate had fallen to only 4 per cent of the total in Japanese fiscal year 1994. Investment in foodstuffs accounted for 47 per cent of all Japanese investment in 1994. The issue of Japanese investment in Australia has been coupled with the related issue of the Japanese presence in Australia, itself mainly an outcome of investment infrastructure and the growth of inbound tourism from Japan. Total visitors from Japan increased nearly fourfold from 1984 to 1988, while tourist visitors increased fivefold, to 294,000 in 1988. Japanese visitor arrivals have continued to increase substantially, reaching 813,100 in 1996.37 An early intervention by government in the investment issue after successive decisions to relax foreign investment guidelines (such as the freeing up of real estate investment in July 1986) was the decision in September 1987 to prevent the purchase of residential homes by foreigners, to alleviate a price spiral in the higher reaches of the Sydney property market said to be caused by Asian purchases of large residences. This was a major intervention by the government in its liberalised investment environment. The limits were later eased to allow purchases ‘off the plan’ and by companies rather than individuals.38 Some investors felt that Australian ‘anti-Japanese’ sentiment was behind the issue, especially as the end of the immigration and multiculturalism debate overlapped that on investment. One letter to the editor of the Australian was prophetic when it predicted that

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If the Opposition has any brains at all it could easily win the next election by promising to change the present pro-Asian immigration policy. ‘White Australia’ was the policy of Labor for many years. Then without consulting their supporters or the public they changed it. By adopting a head-in-the-sand attitude they are ignoring the overwhelming opposition, and overwhelming it certainly is. They could lose the election unless they change their policy or at least allow the public to have its say on a referendum.39 By the middle of 1988, the investment debate had reached full swing. Letters to newspapers objected to the ‘alienation’ of land. Many criticised the sale of a koala sanctuary in Brisbane to Japanese interests (despite the fact that it was to be upgraded and maintained as a wildlife park). The term ‘Japanese takeover’ became common parlance, while ‘Australia for Australians’, ‘Wake up Australia’, ‘Lest we forget’, ‘Japanvader’, ‘the polite invasion’ peppered the public contributions. Many referred to the Japanese as having finally taken over Australia, prompting one elderly gentleman to plead ‘In the name of God, I beg you, save my country’.40 The sense of alarm, and ‘spirit of jingoism’ mentioned by one writer,41 developed into a more serious anti-Japanese racism with the convening of a meeting called ‘Heart of a Nation’ on the Gold Coast on 24 May 1988. About 1,500 people turned up in an atmosphere of ‘yellow peril mania’ (likened by a Japanese reporter present to ‘an antiJapanese rally in a country at war with Japan’42). The investment problem was said to be likely to affect local elections, and led to pressure for the Queensland state government to establish a register of foreign land ownership. More outspoken politicians wanted some form of aliens legislation, while public opinion in the press mainly sought limits on, or a stop to, Japanese buying up of freehold title.43 As Bruce Whiteside, the organiser of the anti-investment meeting, put it, reinforcing the feeling of apprehension noted above: It is an emotive issue, but the fundamental basis is still, regardless, a case of money crushing little people. The overriding thing which came out of that meeting is that people are concerned, confused and some are fearful for the future. Whether we like to admit it or not, the Japanese were our enemies in World War II, and people have a natural suspicion.44 ‘Cultural imperialism’ by the Japanese was also spotlighted as a concern. It seemed that mere xenophobia was an inadequate explanation. Investment was not just a trigger setting off a deep held racist antipathy, but was itself apparently a major worry for many citizens. The actual level of Japanese investment on the Gold Coast and elsewhere figured little in the debate. It was pointed out that Japanese were not the main investors overall, and that ‘Japanese economic penetration of Australia is a minefield of myths and misinformation fuelled by lack of data’.45 The speed of increase of Japanese investment and its concentration in the tourism sector (such as on the Gold Coast) was obvious, but what it meant for the economy and the future was less certain. The investment debate nonetheless provoked a political response. A Japanese real estate industry leader called for restraint in speculation and more caution by small and medium Japanese investors.46 The AFR of 14 June 1988 was forthright in its rejection of a ‘growing anti-Japanese campaign’:


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The chief reasons for the wave of anti-Japanese sentiment, washing through backwaters traditionally prone to xenophobia are: the Japanese, present in rapidly increasing numbers, are physically identifiable, as different racially and culturally from most Australians, and therefore feared and mistrusted by the ignorant; a material envy often misplaced if lifestyles, as opposed merely to incomes, are accurately compared; and anxiety that a substantial Japanese presence, especially among employers, might require increased productivity. That such a sentiment is most strongly felt on the Gold Coast is no coincidence. For that is the city of opportunity, built for and by opportunists. Its neon world is arguably that of Australia’s future, rooted not in Australian tradition, but in a ‘world culture’, reflected in its ‘international’ modernist architecture and takeaway cuisine. No wonder it intrigues, indeed appears to welcome, young Japanese who might well feel more alienated in a Dubbo or a Mildura or an Albany. Racism has almost invariably emerged historically, in the under-class that has frequent contact with the foreign group that is simply stereotyped, that is currently offering the most visible reproach in its frustrated ambitions…it is important for Australians who uphold the values of civilisation, to speak out—in their holes and elsewhere—against this anti-Japanese surge, which is the stuff of which wars are ultimately made. The broader reaction was twofold. On the one hand, there were arguments about the benefits of foreign investment; on the other came firm reminders that Australia was placed geographically, and economically, in the Asia Pacific region. More colourfully came ridicule, one columnist putting it down to the ‘de facto alliance between loony Left and loony Right’, those who resent any economic relationship with a powerful partner, and those still fighting World War II.47 The main pro-investment statements came from the Treasurer, Mr Keating, who ruled out any tightening of controls over tourism-related investment. The Prime Minister took advantage of the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Takeshita (admittedly a case of unfortunate but unavoidable timing) to state forcefully that opposition to Japanese investment did not reflect Australian attitudes: Our friendship is reflected in the very large numbers of Japanese families who are visiting our country as tourists, and enjoying our hospitality and the grandeur of our landscape. Let me say, Mr Prime Minister, that your fellow countrymen and women are very welcome guests to Australia.48 Mr Hawke also put the case for the great benefits he saw flowing to Australia from Japanese investment: ‘…there is no future for an Australia which deludes itself it can be a fortress island with barriers put up around and say we’re not part of this Asian region’.49 The part-of-Asia argument was taken up by others with alacrity. ‘Will we become the poor White trash of Asia?’ was one headline in a Sunday tabloid. ‘That’s no Japanese invasion, it’s our salvation’ also hit the mark, while ‘Tokyo or the bush’ declared another.50 Collectively, these comments urged Australians to wake up to where they lived and how dependent their country was on economic growth in Asia. They needed to capitalise on positive Japanese attitudes towards Australia:

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Why did Harold Holt bury the White Australia policy? Because he had nothing else to do on a Tuesday afternoon? Not so. It was because, unlike R.G.Menzies and A.Calwell, he had a sense of geography. The economies of the Pacific Rim and Southeast Asian countries are the fastestgrowing in the world. They hold the key to our future. Let them grasp the idea that Australia is retreating to an anti-Asian stance…and our trading position will sink world-wide, our diplomatic influence will diminish.51 Even in 1992, however, a poll suggested that there were still strong reservations about closer ties with Asia; far fewer people welcoming investment from Asia than from Europe. This was especially so, it seemed, from young people. Strong anti-Asian bias was also seen in a Brisbane poll in January 1993,52 although a study by a major Australian law firm highlighted the oversimplification of the media portrait of Australian attitudes to Japanese business. ‘It is a very small minority who are strongly antagonistic’, argued the report, which further suggested that ignorance in Australia of the facts of the situation and of Japanese people and culture led to some prejudice.53 Similarly, the Japanese Embassy’s ANOP survey of 1994 indicated a slight increase in those favouring more Japanese investment in Australia, a slight decrease in those seeking the same or less. The results certainly did not suggest a public unified against Japanese investment.54 The Silver Columbia proposal One of the early signs of anti-Japanese feeling came in late 1986 when Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry floated a proposal to establish ‘silver city’ communities overseas; settlements where older Japanese could retire for part or all of their latter years. It was not a proposal designed specifically for Australia, although much interest from potential investors in Australia was immediately forthcoming. Criticism in Japan was quick to emerge, because of the idea that old people would be sent abroad to alleviate the burden on Japanese social services.55 Predictably, the response in Australia was aggressive, on both sides of the argument. Some saw the proposal as a means of ‘exporting pensioners’, although the main policy issues were to do with the establishment of foreign enclaves within the Australian community. The Australian Government moved quickly to head off concern about that aspect, stressing that retired people could be admitted as immigrants if they were at least 55, intended to retire permanently in Australia, had no intention to seek employment and had enough assets to support themselves. The government did not support retirement in enclaves.56 Japan’s rapidly ageing population and relative prosperity have brought about demands in Japan to improve the lot of elderly retirees. Some Japanese were already retiring to Australia and had adequate financial support, but the Japanese Government itself was wary of the MITI proposal, and saw no value in pushing it in the face of public opposition in Australia.57 The proposal was laid to rest, as far as Australia was concerned. It was a trial policy balloon and elicited the response needed for MITI planners to adjust their plans. There was perhaps never any real chance that it would be supported in


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Australia, as the notion of enclave development had never been acceptable to Australian policy. Neither was the concept clearly explained or defended. It was left to readers’ letters and a few in-depth newspaper articles to debate the issue. If nothing else, it showed a predictably biased response by some Australians, and an insensitive attempt by MITI to gauge popular reaction. The Multi-Function Polis Much the same can be said about the initial proposal for the MFP, made in January 1987 by the Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, Mr Tamura Hajime. The MFP became over the next few years the biggest source of debate on the Australia-Japan relationship, and the most serious political irritant. It coincided with the arguments about Japanese investment and the Japanese presence, but did not spill over into widespread public comment until it was raised in the Federal election battle in early 1990. Until then it was the preserve of bureaucratic planners, consultants and academics. Its name meant nothing, it had no shape or detail, it was simply an idea in the making. However, despite its lack of form, it had all the elements to attract, and to threaten, popular opinion. This is not the place for a lengthy analysis of MFP decision making. Several books have already been published on that subject.58 Essentially, the idea was for a new city development, incorporating elements of high-technology industry, education and tourism. It originated in the Leisure Development Section of MITI, as a way of providing some Japanese initiative in directing the future of the Australia-Japan relationship. Japanese spokesmen saw it as a future-oriented means for Australian and Japanese governments to work together. It reflected aspects of Japan’s technopolis strategy, a futuristic, Utopian view of social development, and a very heavy component of tourism-related investment for improving the lifestyle opportunities of ordinary Japanese. The choice of Australia was not surprising when considering the fundamental nature of the project—to provide additional facilities for new lifestyles, work and education to Japanese citizens in an offshore location. It was necessary, therefore, that this location be accessible to Japan and be possessed of good climate and political stability. It needed to have available land and be amenable to Japanese investment. As the Japanese Minister for Transport, Mr Hashimoto, was quoted as saying: Japan wanted to build a high-technology super city in Australia because of the availability of land…if it were at all possible, it would be built in Japan but Japan does not have the space.59 Australia fitted these guidelines well. However, when proposed, the MFP was still only an idea. There was no clear blueprint. The Japanese concept paper spoke in generalities and was highly ambiguous. What was generated, however, was an active program of analysis at federal, state (even local) government levels, and in the private and academic sectors. A lengthy process of feasibility studies was undertaken from the beginning of 1988 to determine the details of the MFP concept, its economic and commercial viability, and economic and social impacts. If nothing else, the concept set a myriad of challenges to policy makers in federalism, immigration, taxation, legal, urban planning

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and other areas. The Federal government took the lead role in guiding this process, through the Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce. Federal and state governments agreed on a set of principles for Australian participation in the MFP that stressed its internationalism, its reach outside Australia-Japan relations and outside any economic or cultural enclave development, and other principles stressing the central role of the private sector. After the concept paper was presented to the Federal government in January 1990 by the consultants, a process began to determine an appropriate site for the MFP in Australia. Here most states were competing to attract the project, seeing it as a boost to their technology and tourism development policies. A recommendation was initially made that a southeast Queensland site receive support, but the Queensland government was in the end unwilling to go against vocal local opinion against land resumption, which would have been necessary to secure a large enough site to meet the requirements of the MFP brief. The Queensland government declined the offer, admittedly put to it under severe time and budgetary constraints. The recommended site thereby was named as one on the edge of Adelaide, and a feasibility study began to assess the preferred form of the MFP on the particular site. From early 1991, therefore, the heat went out of the political and public debate; it became a problem for Federal and South Australian planners to develop the MFP idea to a satisfactory conclusion. Whether this will meet the original Japanese objectives for new leisure—lifestyle—tourism options is difficult to gauge. As of 1996, it would appear that the MFP has little future, at least as an Australia-Japan project. The public debate on the polis was largely non-existent before January 1990. Reservations were expressed in newspapers and academic writings. ‘Trojan horse or friendly gesture?’ asked a columnist in the Sydney Morning Herald in mid–1988.60 We want genuine bilateral cooperation in this project, stressed the author, not a Japanese enclave geared to Japanese objectives only. Many commentators doubted the viability of such Utopian schemes. Much time was spent on competing ideas about exactly what the MFP could contribute. The idealism of the Japanese proposal and its potential were aimed at far more practical Japanese objectives for Japanese interests under ‘the dynamic expansionist thrust of Japanese capital and its drive to incorporate what are seen to be desirable Australian material and human resources’.61 The MFP gained most public exposure when the Leader of the Federal Opposition, Mr Peacock, stated on 16 March 1990 that, if his coalition were elected to government, he would not go ahead with the MFP. He said he was opposed to enclaves and that the MFP would achieve nothing that current means and policies would not do.62 Allowing for the heat of an election campaign that was not going well for Mr Peacock, he was badly briefed on the MFP. He revived the anti-Japanese and anti-investment debate, and rejected the ongoing process of collaborative assessment with the Japanese. Peacock was at odds with the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke, and with members of his own party. One political columnist roundly criticised Mr Peacock for bad judgement and ignorance, saying he would be a ‘danger as Prime Minister’.63 Plenty of public support for Mr Peacock appeared in newspapers, but he did not win the election. The risks of the Peacock approach


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were not so much his questioning of the concept, but the bad timing, his argument and his poor understanding of what it was all about. CONCLUSION The MFP issue touched some raw feelings surrounding the Australia-Japan relationship: …when the dogs of trade war, racism, xenophobia, protectionism, regulation and repudiation of cooperation with our principal trading partners and suppliers have been let loose, then indeed we can Cry Havoc.64 In early 1990, the political effects of the MFP were bound up with a tense federal election campaign, but it still posed questions about the ability of the Australia-Japan relationship, and the political and bureaucratic mechanisms that managed it, to deal with deep-seated antagonism of Japanese contact with Australia, albeit from an outspoken minority. Some would argue that there really has not been a debate yet, and that Australia has a long way to go before it can adequately reconcile the competing attitudes towards Japan. Certainly, the public debate in the late 1980s indicated the fragility of widespread public acceptance of our relationship with Japan and its direct and obvious impact on the domestic economy. Goot showed that polls clearly reflected public concern about foreign investment,65 although such opinions are inconsistent and undoubtedly volatile, as the evidence from the Gallup Polls indicates. A solid groundswell of opinion can mobilise around specific issues, fanned by the media but with political impact, as was so vividly demonstrated in the debates discussed above. While these were relatively shortlived and largely media-driven, they indicate clearly that social acceptance of Japan in Australia cannot assumed to be permanent or universal. The 1988 events are reflected in some of the elements of the Pauline Hanson/One Nation debate from 1996 through 1998 about Asian immigration and multiculturalism, the implications of which were not lost on Japanese officials and other observers.66 Why was this so? Was there a ‘psychological crisis’ in the relationship, an inability by Australians to accept the dominance of a once-scorned nation? There were undoubtedly serious racial overtones in a lot of Australian public comment on Japan. The MFP was a sideshow to the main game of foreign investment, about which the outcry was loudest. Fuelled partly by the media and inflammatory headlines, the vehemence of citizens’ comments was testament to a deep sense of frustration echoed by the anti-investment campaigner, Bruce Whiteside: the little people were ‘concerned, confused and…fearful for the future’. In Burns’s terms, Australians were apprehensive and in awe of the Japanese. The debate was also based on ignorance of the state of foreign investment. No reasoned, accurate and up-to-date analysis of the investment trends was available until well after the tumult had passed. The debate was aimed at ‘Japan’, not ‘the Japanese’; indeed, arguments were cast in terms of the conflicts of the past, not the developmentversus-heritage conflicts of the present. The issue of ‘selling off the farm’ became an issue when Japan was the buyer, but the already extensive ownership of Australia by British and American interests was not mentioned.

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There was certainly an element of ‘psychological crisis’ in Australians’ approach to Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as they sought ways of understanding the impact on this society of Japan’s economic strength. It was born of uncertainty, and an unwillingness to accept the implications of a more open system of international economic and political relationships. The debates in the late 1980s marked the emotional awakening of Australians to what was happening; they signalled that public feeling remained a powerful factor in the political management of Australia-Japan relations. Anxious public opinion was shown to be more concerned with immediate sensationalist issues than the sweep of the postwar political relationship with Japan, and the enormous growth in the political and economic structures that give permanence and stability to bilateral relations. NOTES 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16

Joseph Frankel, International Politics: Conflict and Harmony, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1969, p. 125. Charles W.Kegley, Jr and Eugene R.Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Progress, fourth edition, St Martins Press, New York, 1991, p. 299. John Spanier and Eric M.Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made, second edition, Robert E.Kreigler Publishing Co., Huntington, 1978, p. 91. Kegley and Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, pp. 302–3. Neville Meaney, Trevor Matthews and Sol Encel, The Japanese Connection: A Survey of Australian Leaders’ Attitudes Towards Japan and the Australia-Japan Relationship, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988. Hugh Smith, ‘Internal Politics and Foreign Policy’, in F.A.Mediansky (ed.), Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions, Maxwell Macmillan, Botany, 1992, p. 36. Australian Gallup Polls, from August 1945. ANOP, Australians View Japan: A National Attitude Study, prepared for the Embassy of Japan, May 1976, September 1977, March 1985, April 1988, March 1994. Attitudes towards investment from particular countries were not polled in Australia until 1971 by ASRB, and the results showed strong support for investment from Japan, although less than that from Britain and the United States. See Murray Goot, ‘How much? By whom? In what? Polled opinion on foreign investment, 1958–1990’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 3, December 1990, pp. 253–4. Australian, 25 August 1988; Courier-Mail, 24 August 1988. Newspapers surveyed included the national daily, the national financial daily and the daily from Brisbane, a major centre of Japanese investment and tourist activity. Courier-Mail, 24 August 1988. Courier-Mail, 4 March 1991; Sydney Morning Herald, 8 March 1982. Meaney et al., The Japanese Connection, p. 93ff. Creighton Burns, ‘Australian attitudes on relations with Japan’, Speeches on Japan, vol. 9, no. 92, 1988, pp. 12–17. News-Weekly, 17 February 1954. Truth, 14 February and 7 March 1954.

The pressure of public opinion: the Japanese presence and the public debate 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41

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Press Statement, 18 March 1954, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 2. Asahi shimbun, 13 April 1957. Asahi shimbun, 17 April 1957. Australian Financial Review, 30 October 1969. Australian Financial Review, 30 October 1969. Australian Financial Review, 23 October 1968. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Reference: Japan), Official Hansard Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, p. 44. Australian Financial Review, 5 June 1970. Australian Financial Review, 16 April 1971. Australian Financial Review, 30 October 1969 and 2 November 1970. D.C.S.Sissons, ‘Japan, in W.J.Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs 1971–75, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 231–70. Record of Conversation, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/11/2/1 part 2; Record of Discussion, 5 December 1957, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. See details in Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (Reference: Japan), Official Hansard Report, pp. 1073–7. Australian, 23 September 1989, and Mainichi shimbun, 14 October 1973. National Times, 28 May 1973. Report of the Committee on the Proposed Australia-Japan Foundation, Canberra, February 1975, extracts from annexure. Rosaleen Smyth, ‘Managing Australia’s image in Asia’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 49, no. 2, November 1995, pp. 223–36. Courier-Mail, 31 January 1989. Australian, 14 January 1989. This point has been forcefully made by contemporary historians of Japan’s foreign relations: Japan’s unwillingness to confront its imperial past has hampered its capacity to define a creative role in international relations today. See Barry Buzan, ‘Japan’s future: old history versus new roles’, International Affairs, vol. 64, no. 4, Autumn 1988, pp. 557–73. Also see David Jenkins, ‘Japanese “sorrow” is no apology’, Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1992, p. 9. Sir John Carrick, former Liberal Party minister, Australian, 20 January 1989. Peter Drysdale, ‘Japanese direct foreign investment in Australia in comparative perspective’, Pacific Economic Papers no. 223, September 1993, Canberra, Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1993. For other information on Japanese investment in Australia, see Access Economics, Japanese Investment in Australia: A Report prepared for the Australia-Japan Foundation, January 1991; Australia-Japan Economic Institute, Economic Bulletin, June 1995; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 5306.0, International Investment Position of Australia, December Quarter 1996. On tourism, see ABS, 3401, Overseas Arrivals and Departures, November 1997 and previous issues. See annual reports by the Foreign Investment Review Board, and Drysdale, ‘Japanese direct foreign investment in Australia in comparative perspective’. Australian, 18 November 1987. Australian, 5 April 1988; Courier-Mail, 15 February 1988. Courier-Mail, 25 February 1988.

116 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

The Australia–Japan political alignment Courier-Mail, 14 June 1988. A second meeting attracted only about 300 people. Courier-Mail, 27 and 28 May 1988. Courier-Mail, 7 June 1988. See also a chapter by Whiteside in Ross E.Mouer and Yoshio Sugimoto (eds), The MFP Debate: A Background Reader, La Trobe University Press, Melbourne, 1990, pp. 153–9. Sun-Herald, 21 August 1988. Courier-Mail, 14 June 1988. P.P.McGuinness in Australian Financial Review, 5 July 1988. Courier-Mail, 5 June 1988 and Australian, 9 July 1988. Australian Financial Review, 19 July 1988. Sunday Mail, 14 August 1988; Sydney Morning Herald, 22 June 1988; Australian, 27 January 1988. Courier-Mail, 7 August 1988. Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1992; Courier-Mail, 13 January 1993. Mallesons, Stephen Jaques, Attitudes Towards Japanese Business Activity in Australia, 1991. ANOP, Australians View Japan: November 6, 1994: A National Attitude Survey, Sydney, 1994. See the comments by a Foreign Ministry official quoted in Walter Hamilton, Serendipity City: Australia, Japan and the Multifunction Polis, ABC Books, Sydney, 1991, pp. 7–8. Japanese reactions are also referred to in Courier-Mail, 1 September 1986 and Australian, 9 October 1986. Courier-Mail, 2 February 1987; Australian Financial Review, 3 February 1987. Courier-Mail and Australian, 7 February 1987. For detailed coverage of MFP decision making, see Mouer and Sugimoto, The MFP Debate; Hamilton, Serendipity City, Gavan McCormack (ed.), Bonsai Australia Banzai: Multifunctionpolis and the Making of a Special Relationship with Japan, Pluto Press, Sydney, 1991; Ian Inkster, The Clever City: Japan, Australia and the Multifunction Polis, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1991; Allan Patience, ‘Confronting a terrible legacy: Australia’s Japan problem and the MFP’, Policy Organisation and Society, no. 4, Summer 1991, pp. 25–32. See also Glen St J.Barclay, ‘The oyabun does not dance on stage: The Queensland government and the Multi-Function Polis’, Meanjin vol. 49, no. 4, 1990, pp. 689–703. Courier-Mail, 13 January 1987. 10 June 1988. McCormack, Bonsai Australia Banzai, p. 42. Australian, 20 March 1990. Australian, 19 March 1990. See also Paul Kelly, The End of Certainty: The Story of the 1980s, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1992, pp. 579–83. P.P. McGuinness in Australian, 20 March 1990. Goot, ‘How much? By whom? In what?’. See references to Japanese views in Sydney Morning Herald and Australian Financial Review in early June 1997. The Japanese Ambassador refuted the papers’ claims (see AFR, 18 June 1997). Also see Weekend Australian, 5–6 July 1997.

6 Australia, Japan and International Cooperation

In a remarkable article published in December 1992 in the official journal of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Director-General of the Economic Affairs Bureau and one of the most senior figures in the Ministry, Ogura Kazuo, wrote in an analysis of Japan’s diplomacy that only Australia could fill the role of Japan’s real partner in an Asia Pacific regional alliance: their similar democratic values, market economies and approach to free trade, and common interests in security and political matters, gave the two countries a firm basis for continuing and closer partnership.1 This view was warmly endorsed by Australia’s Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, as echoing his own remarks about Australia being a natural ally of Japan, and was enthusiastically taken up by the Australian press in terms of the opportunity and challenge presented to Australia.2 Yet this natural link between Australia and Japan, their common interests in political and security affairs, is nothing new. This chapter shows that it is the outgrowth of a long history of cooperation between the two countries in the international, and more particularly the regional, arena. Indeed, as the two major developed nations of the Asia Pacific region, and as separate security partners of the United States, Australia and Japan have cooperated closely on international issues since diplomats were first exchanged in 1952–53. Naturally enough, their concerns were mainly those of the immediate region; the Pacific and Southeast Asia. But from the outset their official contacts were broadranging; they worked as members of a Pacific alliance system with a close eye to their long-term interests of regional stability and prosperity. Much of the early cooperative activity involved Japan’s admission to membership of international organisations. However, just as the bilateral economic relationship grew and prospered, so the political cooperation between the two countries developed steadily, if cautiously. By the late 1980s there was good ministerial-level rapport and exchanges on political questions, even though Japan had outstripped the supplicant role it initially had, and Australia was far less important in Japan’s world than had been the case in the 1950s. Latterly, it has been in Australia’s interests to ensure it retained a place in Japan’s

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world view.3 The evolution of the political relationship and the close association of views between the two countries on many regional and global issues was dependent on bilateral cooperation on the wider international front over a long period. At the same time, a sense of threat has pervaded Australia’s view of Japan. In the 1950s the dominant fear was that of Japan going communist, and later it was the fear of Japan’s rising economic and eventually political influence. Australia’s approach to Japan has been somewhat defensive, encouraging a wide spectrum of cooperative international activities with Japan as a means of protecting and advancing Australian policy interests. These were defined in 1961 by Australian officials as follows: Japan will increasingly occupy a position of influence and power in the Pacific and Asian areas because of her economic strength and the ability and drive of her people. Her continuing friendship with the West is a matter of vital importance to Australia. What happens to Japan may determine Australia’s physical and economic security. Further efforts should be made to influence the present and potential leaders of Japan on lines favourable to Australia and to secure close political and economic cooperation. 4 The policy prescription for this dilemma was ‘encouraging Japan to regard Australia as an equal partner in the Pacific with common interests, both political and economic’. This was put to the External Affairs Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, as a need for Australia to ‘play a more useful part’ in developing closer Japanese ties with the free world, where ‘opportunities exist for genuine consultation and collaboration’.5 In light of the approach taken by Japanese officials in the 1990s to the relationship with Australia, one of emphasising the possibilities of regional partnership, the policies of 1962 appear to have been highly successful. In many ways, the persistent myth about the economic one-sidedness of Australia’s ties with Japan has harmed Australia’s ability to define a constructive role for itself as the balance of influence in the relationship has changed. But the myth has been reiterated constantly, since trade and economic matters have somehow monopolised the attentions of the managers of Australia-Japan relations, and of most commentators. Lack of public awareness of the extensive political and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries has obscured the importance of that aspect of the relationship, whereas in fact Australia-Japanese cooperation and consultation has been decisive in maintaining the reach of Pax Americana in the Asia Pacific region and in cementing a sound political understanding in Australia, at least about regional political and security priorities. JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE After defeat and Occupation, Japan was keen to re-enter international society as an independent participant. The United States saw this course as necessary for Japanese rehabilitation—a form of control over Japanese behaviour and policy, a means to force Japan to accept international obligations and to work in cooperation with other countries. Australia had the same intentions, but was more suspicious of Japan’s

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capacity for change. Access to international bodies did not take long: membership of ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) and the Colombo Plan came in 1954. the Asia-Africa Group in 1954, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1955. the United Nations in 1956 and a seat on the Security Council of the UN in 1957. Apart from trade agreements, Australia was concerned mainly with Japanese entry to the United Nations and Japan’s membership of the Colombo Plan. Initially, in view of public opinion in Australia (at least as expressed by the media and some politicians), Australia did not want to move too quickly in bringing Japan back into the international community, nor did it want to appear too generous to Japan. At an early stage, however, Australia was supportive of a Japanese return to international economic bodies. It decided to raise no objections to Japan’s application for membership of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It had already supported Japan’s entry to the International Labour Organisation and UNESCO since mid–1951, and favoured Japan’s entry to the United Nations and its specialised agencies. In late 1953 there was no desire in Canberra to see Japan in the Colombo Plan;6 Australia was having difficulty with Japan over pearling and was greatly surprised when Japan had asked for support on Colombo Plan membership at the same time as it had said that it could not conform with new Australian legislation on pearl fishing. It seemed neither tactful nor well-planned to seek favours while in the midst of a serious bilateral dispute. The Colombo Plan proposal was different from Japan’s application to be a party to the International Court of Justice, on which it had also sought Australia’s support at this time. It needed this court standing so proceedings could begin for settlement of the pearl fisheries dispute, and Australia was happy to support Japan’s application in view of the gravity of the dispute and the desire to be seen as working cooperatively to settle it. By August of the following year Australia had decided to support Japan’s membership of the Colombo Plan if a majority of members (including the United Kingdom and the United States) were in favour and if Asian countries did not oppose. The government in Canberra saw some possible spin-offs in resolving other outstanding issues, such as compensation for prisoners-of-war, but there were fundamental strategic reasons.7 These were also behind Australia’s major change of policy direction in August 1954 designed to deal finally with lingering Japan issues (a policy change referred to in Chapter 1). Japan wanted Colombo Plan membership for prestige and for the further advancement of its commercial interests. Australia, however, maintained its cooperative approach to Japan in the organisation, although there were few points of contact in the early years. Australia’s basic policy was to adopt a more liberal attitude towards Japan to avoid it becoming aligned with communist China. While Cabinet adopted this stance ‘reluctantly’, the conclusion was inescapable that Japan needed assistance in its rehabilitation, to prevent being isolated and to counteract any trend to dependence on China.8 Cabinet was hard-headed about where Australia stood vis-à-vis Japan. It

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accepted in 1954 the rather overblown advice that any Australian gestures ‘would have a significant psychological impact on the Japanese people and would influence them towards association with the Western powers’. At the same time this advice was tempered by the sobering (and accurate) realisation that ‘in liberalising her policy in the near future, Australia would be likely to receive considerable cooperation from Japan which would not be so forthcoming in a few years’ time’. A Japan involved actively with other countries ‘particularly in Southeast Asia’ would help stabilise Japanese power between ‘tendencies to go communist on the one hand and tendencies to become nationalistic on the other’. These political objectives had been uppermost in Cabinet’s mind when agreeing that Japan could be accepted as a donor nation to the Colombo Plan. Japan’s likely intention of maximising its trade as a result was not ignored, and the impact on Australia was also weighed: The trade which Japan would develop in South-East Asia through her membership of the Colombo Plan would… deprive Australia of an incipient trade… in such items, for example, as Diesel Locomotives and Tractors. But this loss in Australian exports was far outweighed by the necessity of ensuring that Japan was a strong bidder for our wool. 9 The Prime Minister explained Australia’s support in terms of the importance of the economic development of South and Southeast Asia, Japan’s technical assistance capabilities, and the need to give Japan opportunities to cooperate with noncommunist countries.10 The Minister for External Affairs, Mr Casey, spoke to the Indonesians about their opposition, noting that they were the only ones opposing Japan’s entry.11 In a New Year message to Japan in December 1954, he referred to Australia’s ‘strong support’ for Japan’s entry to the Colombo Plan.12 In late 1954, Australia also expressed willingness to assist Japan’s candidature as an observer to the Economic Community for Europe,13 although it was reluctant to give support to a Japanese nomination for a vacancy on the International Court of Justice.14 In fact, it withheld support, and the issue of whether Australia would back Japan’s candidature remained on the agenda into the 1960s, Australia generally refusing to support Japan, even though the Japanese were able to back Australia’s nomination of Sir Percy Spender to the Court in 1957.15 In 1960 a Japanese judge was again a candidate, and Australia also indicated that it could not endorse him, as it felt obliged to support a Commonwealth candidate, and not to upset other interests within the United Nations.16 Japan’s membership of the United Nations was one of the most coveted prizes for Japanese diplomacy of the period. Japan had stormed out of the League of Nations in 1933 over the question of Japanese policy towards Manchuria and a great deal of Japan’s diplomatic negotiations in the early 1950s were aimed at securing permanent membership of the United Nations. Japan became an observer at the General Assembly in September 1951. Australia decided in 1951 to give ‘all support in its power to Japan’s application’, but Japan’s efforts were blocked by a Soviet veto. Japan expressed its gratitude for Australia’s continuing support, and asked the Prime Minister to push its case at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, and to seek other


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ways of finding an appropriate formula for Japan to be accepted into the United Nations.17 Mr Casey urged Menzies accordingly, warning of the need to allow Japan to regain some of its lost national pride, and prevent its drifting into neutralism or communism. Casey was quite clear about the Australian position: Australia has consistently supported Japan’s admission to the United Nations and will continue to do so. During my speech to the last General Assembly, I went out of my way to stress that Australia wholeheartedly supported Japan’s candidature and would do everything possible to ensure Japan gained early admission. Dr Walker spoke similarly before the Security Council last February. I understand that both statements were very well received in Japan and given most favourable publicity. 18 While no formal statement on Japan’s admission was made at the Prime Ministers’ Conference, ‘all Prime Ministers have spoken in support of Japanese admission’.19 The matter of Japanese membership was in fact caught up with political manoeuvring over Japan’s talks with the Soviet Union on a postwar political settlement. Australia indicated its willingness to take the initiative in sponsoring in July in the Security Council a motion for Japanese admission.20 As it turned out, agreement was not reached in Japan’s talks with the Soviet Union until October 1956, and diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were not formally renewed until December of that year. In that month, at the Eleventh United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council unanimously agreed to admit Japan, and the General Assembly (with two abstentions) did likewise.21 Australia’s active support was at that stage therefore unnecessary, but Australia’s statement of support in the Security Council stressed the relevance of the issue for the immediate region: …the admission of Japan is an essential step in the interests of the United Nations and it is also necessary in the interests of the maintenance of security in the Far East and the promotion of economic development in the countries of Asia. We believe that Japan has an extremely important role to play in the United Nations as a leading industrial power in Asia. Its admission will undoubtedly make the voice of Asia more effective in our councils. 22 Clearly, Australia saw a potential regional leadership role for Japan in the United Nations and was looking, as it had been in relation to the Colombo Plan, for a contribution by Japan to regional economic development. Subsequent events brought Australia and Japan into fairly close cooperation in the United Nations (including cooperation in scientific affairs) and, although the government was considering pressuring Japan to accept Australia’s views more readily (especially on West New Guinea, on which see below), the Australian representative at the United Nations, Dr Walker (previously Ambassador to Tokyo), said he had always found Japan ‘extremely ready to give Australia’s views a hearing and whenever they can to meet our position… it would be appropriate to express appreciation of the co-operation existing between the Japanese and Australian delegations and the excellent personal

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relations we enjoy’.23 Australia supported Japan’s candidature for (successful) election to the Security Council in 1957. A WIDER CONSULTATIVE PROCESS: SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS Acceptance of Japan into the United Nations gave Australia and Japan a common set of international issues with which to deal. Quite apart from urgent regional questions and their common status as regional powers, they were now both concerned with matters of international moment. Ministerial and official level discussions became important for their exchanges on more than just the minutiae of bilateral trade matters. Exchange of views on political issues was part of the normal diplomatic process of information gathering that gained pace from 1952 between Australia and Japan in both Tokyo and Canberra. Increasingly, as evidenced by Cabinet’s forthright reassessment in 1954 of Australia’s Japan policy, the Australian Government saw Japan in very practical, political terms. As correspondent Richard Hughes put it colourfully, ‘Japan menaces us only if she goes Red’.24 This consultation on international affairs became rapidly established as covering a broad range of issues that involved both strictly bilateral negotiations as well as international concerns such as Japan’s efforts to become more involved in international organisations. Thus, Australia supported Japan’s successful bid to preside over the third conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1959,25 and was pressed strongly by Japan to endorse its election to ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Commission of the United Nations), so Japan could retain membership of one of the three major organs of the United Nations.26 Regular diplomatic consultations on international affairs quickly flowed through to ministerial consultations, as seen in the prime ministerial exchanges of 1957, and in External Affairs Minister Casey’s visit to Japan in 1959. Casey had previously met Foreign Minister Fujiyama at the United Nations in New York in September 1958, and talks covered bilateral issues, plus Japan’s relations with the United States, China and the Soviet Union, Japan’s attitude to Korea and nuclear testing.27 In his 1959 visit to Japan, Casey reported that ‘my talk with Fujiyama ranged over the main political questions in North Asia and Southeast Asia. I think progress was made in these discussions in encouraging the Japanese to reveal their thoughts to us on political matters of common concern’.28 Casey’s own statement had declared that ‘in international organisations close and cordial relations exist. Each of our countries has appreciated that we can do a lot to support and help the other’.29 The talks were described by both foreign ministers as ‘intimate’, and agreement was reached on a continuing exchange of political and economic assessments of China, Formosa and Southeast Asia.30 This was an important stage in the development of bilateral ties, for it marked explicit agreement between Japan and Australia that they had interests in common which were independent of their links with the United States. Casey in fact admitted that ‘Australia did not always agree with the United States and was able to bring persuasion to bear privately’, and that both countries should cooperate closely in enhancing their joint political interests.31 Casey’s visit to Japan in 1962 was similarly effective in enhancing bilateral consultation:


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my talks with the Foreign Minister ranged over the international situation in general, with particular attention to developments in South-East Asia. The survey disclosed a substantial identity of views on trends and problems in the area… Kosaka expressed particular appreciation of the effective cooperation between Japan and Australia at the last General Assembly [of the United Nations] in getting through a satisfactory resolution on Chinese representation.32 Australian interests became synonymous with enhancing Japan’s regional contribution, particularly as a stabilising force in Southeast Asia through assistance to economic development (one of the major reasons for Australia’s support for Japan’s entry to the Colombo Plan). Recognising Japan’s potential contribution here was, argued Hughes, being neither ‘pro-Japanese’ or ‘anti-Japanese’, but simply ‘pro-Australian’.33 From the outset, bilateral discussions between Australia and Japan were extensive in their international coverage, but focussed particularly on Southeast and East Asian affairs. At the end of 1952, the Department of External Affairs was aware that the new Yoshida Cabinet would probably be looking towards Southeast Asia ‘for the solution of her economic problems… The future of Japan is inextricably linked with the rest of the Asian problem’.34 Japan was clearly of the same mind, and moved quickly to reaffirm its ties with Southeast Asian countries through trade and reparations, and through participation in the Afro-Asian Group meeting at Bandung in Indonesia in April 1954. Australia was keen to engage Japan in discussion of regional affairs, especially issues of communism in Asia and matters close to home such as Dutch New Guinea, the western half of the New Guinea island disputed by Indonesia and the former colonial power, the Netherlands. Australia supported the Dutch position and was concerned about Indonesian intentions and the possible threat from Indonesian communists. There were regular exchanges on this issue, Japan’s initial position being that ‘we could take it as certain that Japan would not support Indonesia’35 although later developments in Japan’s policy towards Southeast Asia required Japan to work closely with Indonesia on aid and trade matters, culminating in a reparations agreement in 1958, in which the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Kishi, had a personal financial involvement through one of the Japanese suppliers. Japan’s role in the Afro-Asian Group was also a constraining influence, and on several occasions Australia urged Japan to take an independent line within the Group. When Kishi visited in December 1957, he made it clear that Japan had to maintain its links with the Group, but did acknowledge the need to moderate its more extreme anti-colonial attitudes, which both sides saw as benefiting communist interests.36 Australia made strong requests to the Japanese Embassy in Canberra and to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to support the Australian position on West New Guinea. The Japanese Minister’s response was not encouraging: ‘[Fujiyama] asked no questions, gave no reactions and made no statement of policy throughout [the meeting with the Australian Ambassador]’.37 Canberra then decided that ‘we will have to play tough with the Japanese’, by linking the New Guinea question with the threat of adverse public reaction prior to Kishi’s visit scheduled for late 1957 (just as the Japanese had used similar threats about Japanese favourable publicity on clemency for Japanese war criminals prior to

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the Menzies visit to Japan in April 1957). External Affairs proposed not only making this argument to the Japanese Ambassador, but also providing press leaks on lack of Japanese support (‘this is a powerful potential weapon which will bother Suzuki’ [the Japanese Ambassador]), and giving direct warnings to Suzuki about the sensitivity of Australian public opinion to ‘New Guinea’ where Japan was concerned. The last was a particularly brutal reminder of Japan’s past behaviour. The minister, Casey, did make these points to the Ambassador on 27 August and again in November 1957 just prior to the Kishi visit.38 It did not seem to sway the Japanese Prime Minister himself, as very little was said about West New Guinea during the official discussions. Japan maintained a policy that the dispute should be settled by peaceful means, but its alignment with the developing nations within the Afro-Asian Group overrode any desire to cooperate with Australia on these matters. An offshoot of this problem was the recognition by Australia and the United States of the difficulties for Japan in balancing its links with the Afro-Asian countries and those of the West. It was suggested that the latter might try and develop an image of Japan as a country that could span both East and West, acting as ‘bridge’.39 At a bilateral level, the differences over West New Guinea prompted some discussion in Canberra between Japanese and Australian officials over the importance to both countries in exchanging information and views on Indonesia.40 The Kishi visit to Australia of 1957 was really the beginning of closer foreign policy consultation at the topmost level. The Menzies visit to Japan in April 1957 had been a polite, rather restrained affair; by contrast, Kishi’s visit took in several Australian centres, came at the end of an extensive Southeast Asian visit, with a detailed proposal for a major development initiative in the region, and involved lengthy discussions between the Japanese and Australian leaders on regional and world affairs. Casey suggested to Menzies that, as well as encouraging goodwill on Japan’s part towards Australia, policies favourable to Australia and to ‘the free world’ were needed. Moreover, Japan’s attempt to acquire influence by courting the Afro-Asian Group ‘to find markets or raw materials’, had to be thwarted in order to maintain the strength of the great powers.41 Casey’s hopes were met to some extent. On one thing at least Japan and Australia were resolutely in agreement: communism in Asia had to be thwarted. Mr Casey asked for Japanese cooperation to combat it; Mr Kishi said that ‘Japan is antiCommunist and that the policy of the Japanese Government on this question was one hundred per cent with that of the West’.42 But he added that Japan was a member of the Afro-Asian Group: ‘he believed it was Japan’s mission to try to harmonise policy as between the Afro-Asian Group and the West. In particular he wished to see that anti-colonialism in Afro-Asian countries is not taken to extremes’. Here was serious dialogue. Australia and Japan differed over such issues as West New Guinea but their political strategies for the region were aligned. Kishi’s plan for an Asian Development Fund was born of the notion that (as Kishi himself expressed it) ‘the checking of Communism was facilitated in proportion to the degree of economic development’. Kishi did not refer at length to his proposal, but spoke of its complementarity with Australia’s intentions in helping establish the Colombo


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Plan— ‘evidence of this country’s awareness of its geographical link with Asia— evidence, it might be said, of Australia’s awakened Asia-mindedness’.43 It was this ‘complementarity’, indeed, that Australia was most concerned about. While it supported the anti-communist origins of the plan, it had reservations about other aspects. The Asian Development Fund was in fact Japan’s first regional economic cooperation initiative, and proposed combining American capital, Japanese goods and skills and Southeast Asian labour and resources. The Asian reaction was generally hostile, fearing Japanese export growth on the back of American aid channelled through a Japanese fund. Colombo Plan members, in particular, feared competition with or duplication of their nascent scheme. The United States opposed the notion of another multilateral body and advocated a bilateral, project-based approach. Japan persisted, with the then Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Fujiyama, proposing to Washington a multilateral committee in Tokyo ‘to consider projects in Southeast Asia for which Japan would provide “know-how” and materials and the United States would provide finance’. This proposal involved a reduction of American influence over its funds and projects and it was also refused. Japanese control over project selection was not wanted. Faced with such suspicions, and internal conflicts about how the scheme would be managed, the concept did not proceed. Australia was also suspicious, especially in the face of Asian opposition. It feared conflict with the Colombo Plan, but also feared Japanese influence: There is something to be said for the encouragement of an honest, non-discriminatory attempt by Japan to improve relations with Asia, from the points of view of ensuring a stable Japan, economically and politically; of assisting the economic development of Asian countries generally; and of countering communist attempts at economic penetration. However, proposals likely to result in placing Japan in an economically exclusive or dominant position in South East Asia would need to be carefully watched. 44 Kishi was nonetheless serious in his intentions to strengthen relations with Australia. In that he set a precedent for later political-level contacts. One of the prime anti-communist alliances of the 1950s was the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the existence of which raised a question of where Japan might fit in regional defence and security arrangements. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, but there was active discussion about Japan’s future regional defence role, although not as a member of SEATO. Australia was opposed to Japanese membership of SEATO, largely because of Asian reactions, although it recognised that ‘there might be some merit in tying Japan into a tight military alliance’. Japan did not wish to join in any case, because of the limitations of its constitution and strong public opinion against regional defence cooperation.45 The ease with which cooperative diplomacy was able to proceed continued with Casey’s visit to Japan in March 1959, during which the Australian Minister reinforced many of the points made during the Kishi trip, notably on West New Guinea and Korea. Casey offered to pass on a message from Kishi to the Korean president in

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respect of their dispute over fishing rights.46 By 1962 Canberra was fully aware of the need, ‘in our own interest, to develop and consolidate our relations with Japan in view of her increasing importance as a Pacific power’. The extensive set of policy initiatives designed to bring Japan closer to Australia and the West included the following: …the building up of an atmosphere of trust by bringing the Japanese more into our confidence as we do our Western allies through passing to them selected political information gathered by Australia in the field. This could also have practical advantages in that it might lead to our receiving information from the Japanese on areas, such as China, of special interest to Australia. 47 The importance of this emphasis on bilateral consultations was even more apparent during the visit to Australia of Prime Minister Ikeda in September 1963. The visit was businesslike, and was especially important because it coincided with the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Ikeda had made considerable efforts to mediate in the dispute, and talks between President Sukarno of Indonesia and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia had taken place in Tokyo in June.48 It was Japan’s first major effort at international mediation and was a mark of Japan’s greater confidence in regional affairs, and its growing economic aid role in Southeast Asia. Indonesia especially, and Malaysia, were vitally important to Japan’s economic strategies in Asia: trade growth and the combating of communist tendencies through encouraging economic growth. Menzies and Ikeda differed over the confrontation issue: Ikeda sought Australian support for a tripartite conference, but Menzies wanted an end to Indonesian threats before negotiations. The Japanese press noted the heavy responsibility on Ikeda now that he had become involved, and highlighted the differences between the Japanese and Australian positions. But this was not the only topic of discussion. Much time was spent on the issues of trade and aid to Southeast Asia and problems of communist influence in Indochina. Press reports, however, highlighted the Malaysian issue as the major item of the talks, noting in passing the general agreement on bilateral economic matters. There was, nonetheless, agreement between Ikeda and Menzies on the importance of economic assistance to the region: Ikeda was quoted as saying it was the responsibility of both nations to give aid to Western Pacific countries.49 The Menzies-Ikeda talks were important as much as anything for their disagreement. In the 1957 prime ministerial contacts there was no major dispute over the interpretation of international affairs, except Japan’s lack of support for the Australian position on West New Guinea. But this subject was not broached formally in any case; in 1963, Menzies firmly opposed Ikeda’s proposed solution to the Malaysian issue, although he indicated that he would not interfere if tripartite talks actually went ahead. If the Kishi visit had set a tone of cordial and frank cooperation for common regional purposes, the Ikeda visit put concrete substance to that earlier potential. In the official speeches, Menzies urged a new role on Japan, coming back to one of his old themes about Japan’s strength:


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…Japan is one of the great industrial powers…You have, for us, a special significance in the South-West Pacific, in which your influence, a great and growing one, can do much to assist political and economic stability and the elimination of old and new animosities…in this new political and social world, a world which is in the making, Japan has a new historic function and destiny.50 Prime ministerial hyperbole aside, Menzies was urging a positive contribution from Japan. More than half his speech dealt with international affairs. Mr Ikeda responded likewise, stressing the similarities between the countries—both freedom-loving democracies, industrially advanced and politically stable, and with common interests in peace and prosperity in the region—and the responsibilities of each towards economic and technical assistance to the region. The rationale for Ikeda was clear enough: ‘to assist developing countries in the region…is both an insurance policy and a neighbourly duty…but neighbourly help begets neighbourly appreciation…’.51 This move to recognise the roles of Australia and Japan in Asian development, putting the rather crude 1957 anti-communist association into a more sophisticated regional cooperation package, on a political level in mediation and an economic level in aid proposals, marked a new level of bilateral political cooperation and agreement. It was also to bear results in more specific Pacific cooperation mechanisms in the years ahead. Overall, as J.D.B.Miller has observed, with the Ikeda visit Australia continued to draw closer to Japan. He even went so far as to suggest the possibility of a future AustraliaJapan alliance, assuming Australia continued to impress upon Japan the common interests between the two countries.52 This was precisely what Australia did. CONTINUING DIALOGUE The emphasis on bilateral discussion of regional issues did not abate. Indeed in July 1964 Australia proposed to Japan that they have regular official consultations. Japan already had such contacts with the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France, and saw value in discussions with Australian officials.53 The first of these meetings did not take place until January 1967, in Canberra, with the Director-General of the European Affairs Bureau (where responsibility for Australia was placed) attending. The talks were conducted in an amiable atmosphere and were broad-ranging, covering Vietnam, China, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC, of which Japan was a member), the United Nations and Southeast Asian development issues. Both sides agreed on the need for more regional cooperation. Similar themes were taken up in the second round of talks held in Tokyo in November 1968.54 The pace of discussions was quickening by the late 1960s. The increased escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the active ministerial discussions in the ASPAC forum, and various initiatives on the economic front, such as the creation of the Asian Development Bank, the Ministerial Conference on the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and the formation of the group to assist Indonesia’s economic development, the InterGovernmental Group on Indonesia, all involved Australia and Japan directly. A series of important ministerial visits further reinforced the importance that both placed on regional cooperation.

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The Minister for External Affairs, Mr Hasluck, visited Japan in March-April 1967 and clearly got on well with his counterpart, Mr Miki. In their joint statement they explicitly acknowledged the importance of ministerial consultations, and ‘agreed that the two Governments should keep closely in touch with each other on all matters of mutual interest’. As Hasluck explained to Parliament: ‘…I am sure that the personal relationship we have established will mean that each of us will feel free at any time to open further discussions with the other’.55 The well-established principle of Australia-Japan cooperation to assist development in Asia was also reaffirmed (indeed, reinforced by reference to ‘active’ cooperation), and a visit to Australia in October 1967 by the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Sato, brought this home. Already there were questions being raised in the Australian Parliament about where this cooperation might lead. On 28 September 1967 Mr McIvor asked Mr Hasluck about a press report that Japan would be Australia’s ally in future events on Southeast Asia, with Japan’s an economic role and Australia’s a military one. Mr Hasluck’s reply was close to being affirmative. He warned that if by ‘alliance’ was meant ‘a military commitment’, the word was wrongly used, but he stated that relations with Japan were very close and very friendly, that Australia had associations with Japan in a number of international organisations and that ‘we have found a very close correspondence of view on many important matters affecting the region and the world generally. He concluded: We are not in any form of military alliance with Japan but in many aspects of foreign affairs we are happy to work in very close and cordial relationship with Japan, serving common objectives.56 The AFR pronounced loudly on the end of the Australian identity of interests with the United Kingdom and the United States, and the need for future defence and foreign policy planning to take Japan much more into account. The withdrawal of British forces from Asia was a catalyst for a major reappraisal of Australian policy. As Hasluck’s talks in Japan indicated, mutual security arrangements in which Japan was unable to participate because of constitutional restrictions on deployment of defence forces outside its territory, were being replaced by efforts to promote regional cooperation.57 ‘We have have an identity of interests with Japan’, said the newspaper, ‘based on contemporary needs rather than historic ties’. The most effective long-term security of all, of course, will be based on the peaceful economic development of the potentially rich but currently poor countries of Asia…current foreign policy must therefore be directed towards more effective regional arrangements aimed at security from sound economic and political development based on more viable ties that those which formed the impotent SEATO alliance…What we must do is learn to live on our own in this area of the world forming links with those who have a genuine long-term identity of interests based on geography and trade.58 This meant Japan, and Prime Minister Sato’s visit to Australia in late 1967 confirmed the strength of this recognition of interests. By that stage, Japan had become Australia’s main export market, and the longer-term prospects for a close alignment of economic interests were obvious. Australia was also committed to the


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war in Vietnam and Japan was indirectly involved as host to American military bases. Japanese press reporting of the Sato visit was upbeat, suggesting ‘endless possibilities’ for the relationship and emphasising that there had been an air of cooperation in discussing political and economic issues.59 The talks certainly reflected this desire for joint cooperation in Asia. The joint communique and the speeches were all in this vein. Mr Holt in his public statement expounded at length on the common approach each country had to the problems of Asia, and the task of assisting development in that region, in particular through multilateral aid forums. Sato’s comments were even more to the point: without mentioning Australia-Japan bilateral issues, he spoke of the ways in which Australia and Japan were cooperating in Asia. ‘The foreign policies of our two countries have the same goals’, he declared. ‘Japan and Australia stand on the common basis of securing peace and prosperity in Asia and must, therefore, cooperate closely and devote ceaseless efforts towards this end.’60 The trend to a more active regional role for Japan gathered pace as the possibility of an American withdrawal from the region seemed more likely once settlement was reached in Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine of 1969 made this a virtual certainty, and it made Australia a more attractive partner for Japan in furthering Japan’s peaceful contribution to the region, mainly in the aid area. Japan’s foreign aid program was only beginning to expand by that stage, as the achievement of balance of payments surpluses allowed some leeway in Japanese Government commitments to official aid programs. A key step in the practical achievement of Australia-Japan cooperation was the 1968 visit by Foreign Minister Miki Takeo to attend an ASPAC meeting. In a significant endorsement of a process of Pacific economic cooperation, Mr Miki laid out new scenarios for a constructive Japanese contribution to the region since Japan’s lack of military capacity and its restrictive constitutional provisions meant that its efforts had to be directed towards social and economic stability. Again he highlighted the Australia-Japan partnership as important primarily to the area of aid. Expounding Japan’s role, he spoke of it as ‘a bridge to link the advanced countries of the Pacific area with Asia, a comment that harked back to the dilemma Japan faced a decade before in balancing its Asian and Western diplomacy.61 The ‘honest broker’ image of Japan is one that has been evoked by a series of Japanese representatives since that time. It deftly places Japan between East and West, it removes it from a sticky political role on one side or another and leaves considerable scope for action within that framework. Joint Australian-Japanese interests in ‘regional political stability and economic prosperity’ were also a recurring theme in the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual statement on foreign policy. In the 1971 edition Australia (and New Zealand) were referred to for the first time as ‘important partners in the Asian Pacific region’.62 In practical terms, the scope of cooperation between Australia and Japan was mainly at the level of an expressed commonality of interests, coordination of policy directions, and an increasingly cooperative process of exchange of views. In terms of joint activities in aid or similar regional programs there was very little, except for consultation over Japan’s policy towards Papua New Guinea (which gained

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independence in 1973). Indeed, ‘cooperation meant mainly a process of policy alignment and consultation, except for one significant example of political collaboration—the enhancement of the idea of Pacific economic cooperation. The last few years of the Liberal-Country Party government prior to the election of Labor to office in 1972 saw rapid progress in government consultations. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi expressed the hope that Australia would continue to assist Southeast Asian development. There was something of a relaxed atmosphere, certainly as far as bilateral trade issues were concerned.63 The Nihon keizai shimbun spoke of Australia-Japan relations as being in a new stage of development, with Japan increasingly central to Australia’s Asian policy. Australian officials were quoted as explaining the reasons for the Asian shift: one third export dependence on Japan, increased Japanese investment since 1970 and the need to counter Southeast Asian instability brought about by Chinese and Soviet intervention.64 When in Japan in May 1970 Prime Minister Gorton reached firm agreement in principle with Mr Sato for an enhanced program of assistance to Southeast Asia. Australia wanted to assist a positive Japanese role, and one that did not infringe Japan’s non-military foreign policy. A new outlook on Japan’s diplomacy, the so-called ‘resources diplomacy’ approach, also placed Australia in a central position to influence Japanese actions. This approach meant that Japan would look beyond Asia for raw materials and food supplies but, as a key stable supplier, gave Australia a special position.65 Australia’s desire to work with Japan also involved trying to influence Japan’s regional activities. The Prime Minister, Mr McMahon, foresaw Australia working with Japan to ensure ‘that Japanese political activity is directed towards the political and physical field of countries in South-East Asia’.66 He developed this theme further in a major policy statement on Australia-Japan relations in June 1971, when he announced that the Department of Foreign Affairs would take over the carriage of Japan policy. McMahon came down squarely on the side of political cooperation with Japan: …I emphasised that in the immediate future and as far ahead as we could see, Japan was the country that in material, and I believe in political terms, offered the greatest advantages of co-operation with us.67 McMahon was effectively aligning Australia with a Japan future, a relationship with ‘some political overtones stronger than we have heard up until now’. He outlined the political cooperation, especially in the aid field, in which Japan and Australia were involved. Although comment from Japan was favourable, some Australian observers disputed the wisdom of this approach. In an influential book published in 1972, Bruce Grant argued that Australia’s ‘interest in the Asia Pacific region is not to align ourself with a powerful Japan but to use whatever influence we have to encourage a peaceful and prosperous Japan’.68 Australia’s prime objective, he said, was to keep Japan a non-military power and an ally of the United States. It was in this context that the first Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee (AJMC) meeting was held in October 1972 (see Chapter 4), only two months before a change of government in Australia. It was a first for Australia in having so many ministers assemble, and a significant statement of recognition by Japan of the need for close policy discussion with Australia. Japan already conducted similar meetings with the United States, Canada, and South Korea, so Australia was amongst only a


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few countries to gain such access to Japanese ministers. Close discussion was achieved, although the enthusiasm of Japanese ministers has perhaps thinned over the years since. The talks came after sudden and dramatic moves in normalisation of relations between China and Japan, and with the then Australian Government still opposed to diplomatic dealings with China, it was an important opportunity for an exchange of views. It also allowed Japan to press the case for a friendship, commerce and navigation treaty, something which Australia at that stage still rejected. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Ohira, was not too surprised, but it did reveal a serious difference in approaches to consolidating the bilateral relationship, as contrasted with their cooperative regional approach. Journalists pointed to Australian suspicions of Japan’s intentions and its potential economic influence. But the Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, Mr Nakasone, was fairly optimistic about the possibility of gaining a treaty and, furthermore, that Australia supported the notion. He also added that Australia basically agreed with the establishment of a Pacific economic cooperation organisation.69 PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION One of the major specific outcomes of Australia-Japan political cooperation has been the achievement of a process of Pacific economic cooperation and its associated policy discussions. The first AJMC, timed as it was just before a significant shift in Australian domestic political affairs, marked an end to the process of gradual consolidation of bilateral political cooperation. Gone too was the emphasis on joint efforts to assist Asian development and the Australian concern to help mould Japanese political behaviour in Asia. In their place came an abrupt change to Australian economic policies as they affected Japan, moves to cement political understandings in treaty form, and attention to global rather than just regional issues. Those concerns have continued to the present day, as Japan has become more than just a regional power and Australia is no longer seen as rather isolated from global events. The proposal for Australia-Japan cooperation in a Pacific regional organisation was not new even in 1972. The notion of Pacific economic cooperation is an old one. The proposal had its roots in the Japanese vision of a more coordinated future for the Pacific Basin, a future linked to Japan’s economic strength and its guidance to the developing nations of the region. Mr Kishi’s Asian Development Fund was the initial step, but without support from the United States the plan had got no further. Japan proceeded instead with reparations (tied to purchasing from Japan) and an aid program based on technical assistance and yen loans. Mr Ikeda, who succeeded Mr Kishi, also saw the benefits of an Asian economic grouping. His suggestions for an Asian common market arose out of his desire to strengthen US-Japan economic ties, and to engage their partner in economic cooperation in the region. While the Americans were initially non-committal, Japanese business people proposed the creation of a Pacific economic community (to include Australia), an idea also endorsed by a Congressional sub-committee in

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November 1961.70 The group was to include Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific countries. Ikeda also raised the matter with Prime Minister Nehru of India, putting it in terms of the need for Asian countries to consider an Asian common market (Ajia kyodotai). Nehru was interested in principle, but also cautious and Ikeda had to admit the difficulties.71 The groundwork was therefore laid for airing in the bilateral context with Australia. The idea of a ‘Pacific community’ (taiheiyo kyodotai) comprising Australia, Japan and the United States was first mentioned formally when External Affairs Minister Barwick talked with Japanese Foreign Minister Kosaka in June 1962.72 Barwick dismissed it as premature and too abstract, a cautious response that marked most official Australian attitudes until 1980, and even beyond. The US Government was not entirely cold on the proposal, however, and at the ANZUS Council in May 1962 broached the idea of developing some form of Pacific economic collaboration: ‘Mr Rusk had in mind the need to draw Japan into closer partnership in the Pacific’. The Americans followed this up with discussions with Menzies in Washington in June 1962, stressing the need to keep Japan close to the West, and to get closer to it, and proposing periodic meetings ‘of a trade character’ between the five main Pacific countries. Menzies was generally supportive, saying that ‘…on first glance he felt it appeared to have much merit’.73 As Menzies was in Washington, External Affairs Minister Barwick was in Tokyo, where the Japanese also raised the idea and ‘expressed interest in an American suggestions of closer cooperation in economic and commercial matters among Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States and Canada. Barwick was not dismissive, and said that there might be room for thinking about rationalising trade and industrial development among those countries.74 In essence, the concept that was to develop into a formal process of multilateral cooperation over twenty years later was already laid out, and apparently regarded as desirable by many of the parties involved, although discussions had never proceeded as far as details of how the arrangement might work. Indeed, the rationale of the time, to involve Japan more closely in regional trade affairs, partly for political reasons, was not too dissimilar from the arguments put forward much later for the establishment of the Pacific cooperation process. The issue could not progress very far because of ongoing negotiations between Britain and the EEC (European Economic Community), but it did come up again when Ikeda toured Australia in October 1963. He accepted that it had been discussed by the bilateral Business Cooperation Committees, but felt himself that the idea was still ‘under discussion’ and it was too early to consider its realisation.75 In fact, it was the business leaders who pushed it further, making detailed proposals in their September 1964 meeting on how regional economic cooperation should be implemented. They were to continue this strong support for the idea of Pacific economic cooperation, using the bilateral business committee as the basis for a wider grouping of business leaders, the Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Committee (PBECC), formed in 1967 and which first met in Canberra in May 1968.


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At the government level, the pace was slower. In 1966, a senior Japanese politician, Miki Takeo, presented a proposal for Asia Pacific regional cooperation and carried this through into his term as Foreign Minister.76 He was to have a major impact, for his proposal linked up with the more active Japanese diplomacy of the middle of the 1960s. Miki reiterated the theme of stability and prosperity in Asia, but associated this with stability and prosperity in the Pacific. He wanted to mobilise funds in the developed nations (Japan, Australia and New Zealand) to assist the regions developing countries. Miki still spoke of Japan’s position as a ‘bridge’ between the developed and developing nations and the communist and non-communist nations of Asia. The idea was not widely supported, least of all by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. But Mr Hasluck’s visit in March 1967 brought cautious endorsement from the Australian Foreign Minister. Japanese newspapers reported in-principle backing for the Miki concept and agreement that the two countries would continue to strengthen their views on cooperation and solidarity in the region. This was reflected in their communique.77 Miki made a major speech on the subject in May 1967, and again spoke of the need for Australia and Japan to cooperate regionally when he visited Australia for the third ASPAC meeting in July 1968.78 His successor, Miyazawa Kiichi, also proposed an Organisation for AsianPacific States in 1969, suggesting a cooperative arrangement between both developed and developing countries.79 Alongside this official activity, the academic study of Pacific cooperation was gathering pace, with a proposal for a Pacific Free Trade Area by Kojima Kiyoshi the basis for an extensive series of debates on the economic and trade aspects of regional integration.80 It was nearly a decade before the Pacific concept was readdressed in a formal foreign policy context, when in November 1978 Mr Ohira, the would-be Japanese Prime Minister, spoke of the importance of Pacific cooperation in the run-up to the election of the president of Japan’s ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. Discussions at the business and academic level had continued through the 1970s, some prophesying that Australia’s future lay in membership with Japan and the United States of a Pacific Basin Community.81 Much of this comment emanated from the Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee; certainly at government level during the Whitlam and Tanaka years there was little attention paid to regional cooperation initiatives. At the bilateral level most efforts went into negotiating the Basic Treaty and dealing with common problems such as China. Mr Ohira’s seminal statement of 1978 was not made merely for party or LDP factional purposes, or from pressure for a distinctive electoral policy. He had expressed views on the Pacific concept nearly a decade earlier, in 1970. In an interview with the AFR on 2 November 1970 Mr Ohira revealed a keen awareness of Japan’s Pacific future. His statement went well beyond the accepted Japanese policy of the day when he said: The survival and development of Japan will depend on good relations in the Pacific Basin, and the security of the Pacific Ocean. Therefore the primary aim of Japan’s diplomacy should be to maintain the peace, security and prosperity of the Pacific. Therefore the problem of the Asian continent should be secondary in Japanese diplomacy.

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Mr Ohira linked the Pacific question to the problem of natural resources, noting that ‘since Japan must import raw materials the balance of power will tend to the raw materials exporting nations’. He reiterated his desire for Japan to avoid involvement in Asia or attempt anything ‘beyond its capacity’ there. In another interview in November 1971, Ohira put more firmly still Japan’s reliance on the Pacific: Japan is an oceanic nation. Markets and resources she needs must be acquired from every corner of the globe, especially from the friendly countries around the Pacific Ocean—the US, Canada, your country [Australia], New Zealand. Our existence and prosperity depend on the free exchange of commodities, technologies, resources and agricultural products across the Pacific Ocean. So peace and order of the Pacific Ocean must be maintained at any cost…82 While Mr Ohira’s support of the Pacific concept has a long history, two other versions of it immediately preceded his November 1978 policy announcement and may have influenced his views.83 The National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA), a government think-tank in Japan, had proposed the concept of a Pacific Community in the context of US-Japan relations and Japan’s ‘overall security’. NIRA did not itself take the idea very far, but commissioned the Nomura Research Institute in February 1977 to report on the subject, which it did in September 1978. At about the same time the wellknown commentator Tokuyama Jiro published a book on The Pacific Century. These provided the background to thinking about the concept in late 1978. The Nomura concept is based on the notion of an unstable international economic order, a need for comprehensive Japanese security policies based on assured energy supplies, a more open Japan, cooperation with the United States in Japan’s self-defence, an expanded aid program, and regional solutions to economic issues. The Pacific and Atlantic regions would be the mainstays of the new order. The Nomura report considered the Pacific region as essential to Japan’s future but not exclusively. Relations with Europe were important too. Recommendations included ideas on membership, the integral role of ASEAN, cooperation with Europe and discussion of medium- to long-term issues such as energy, resources, food and industrialisation. Importantly, it was seen that Japan’s initiative, rather than leadership, was required, a significant declaration of Japan’s preference for a low profile on the issue. The Tokuyama concept, on the other hand, was based on the long-standing idea that the Pacific is replacing the Atlantic as the leading economic region. New regional arrangements were needed for this and other problems such as finance, trade and aid. He saw an important role for Japan, as initiator of the concept. In spite of these detailed reports, Mr Ohira’s 1978 policy statement did not spell out a concrete proposal.84 His advisers felt he should present a policy which moved beyond the Fukuda Doctrine of his predecessor and political rival. Conceptually, Mr Ohira’s idea was couched in terms of the Pacific being a natural area to which Japan should direct specific attention, indeed, a natural sphere of influence. The statement went on to speak of a loose form of cooperation, and emphasised that Japan could not choose countries to be included but would ‘consult major countries’ and ‘sound out other countries on an individual basis’. In addition to economic and technological cooperation, the policy


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document spoke of Japan providing stable markets for agricultural products, raw materials and processed products; reducing tariffs on products from the countries involved; encouraging the use of the yen in the region; reducing air fares in the region to facilitate personnel exchanges; and furthering aid to Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia. Following his election as Prime Minister in December 1978, Mr Ohira established a study group on Pacific Basin cooperation. Events moved swiftly thereafter. The interim report of November 1979 proposed ‘open regionalism’, noting that ‘Pacific Basin cooperation should aim at a regional community composed of internationally open countries, but it is premised upon their cultural independence and political selfdetermination’.85 Here we see again Ohira’s determination that the idea not be a vehicle for Japanese domination or a ‘rich man’s club’. The report proposed a range of specific policy tasks for Pacific economic cooperation, tasks which in fact reflected Mr Ohira’s basic policy document, and have themselves become central to the policy discussion in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) ministerial meetings of 1989 and 1990. These included industrial adjustment, marine development and resource exploitation, financial and monetary issues and international understanding through personnel exchange and human resource development. Initially, the Japanese bureaucracy was unsure about the proposal and how to handle it. However, the appointment of Dr Okita Saburo, a former bureaucrat, a respected economist and a good friend of Australia, as Foreign Minister in November 1979 gave new impetus to the initiative. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs nonetheless preferred a gradualist approach to the concept. They regarded US participation as vital in order to avoid Japan being seen as the leading nation, and to redirect US attention back to Asia and the Pacific. Australian involvement at this point included both academic analyses by Peter Drysdale of the Australian National University, and the political input of Sir John Crawford. Crawford, like Okita a former bureaucrat and economist of note, had held views on the value to Australia of Pacific cooperation since before the Second World War, and he played an important advisory role in the decision during Ohira’s visit to Australia in January 1980, for the Japanese and Australian governments to support the convening of a Pacific Community seminar by the Australian National University in September 1980.86 This was duly held, but not until three months after Ohira had died during a torrid election campaign brought on by internal party disputes. Crawford and Okita were both highly influential in transforming the initiatives of Ohira and Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, into a more permanent institution in the form of APEC. They helped the Australian National University seminar become a series of Pacific Economic Cooperation Conferences, which eventually led to the proposal for ministerial-level meetings made by Prime Minister Bob Hawke in January 1989. There is, however, continuing argument about the genesis of the Hawke initiative, one source claiming that Australia put forward the idea at the behest of the Japanese Government, which itself was fearful of negative reaction to the concept.87 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, process is one in which Australia has undoubtedly had a formative role, and around which the Australian Government has been urging continued cooperation between Australia and Japan,

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notably in Prime Minister Keating’s proposal for a process of periodic heads-ofgovernment meetings based on APEC membership.88 This suggestion accorded with Japanese ideas for an Asian-Pacific Summit of heads of government.89 The first headsof-government meeting was convened in Seattle in November 1993, after the APECV ministerial meeting, with a second in Bogor, Indonesia, in late 1994 and another in Osaka, Japan, in late 1995.90 Keating urged Japan (as the host country for the 1995 heads-of-government gathering, to take more of a leading role in APEC, and during his visit to Japan in May 1995 both countries endorsed APEC as ‘the primary vehicle of regional economic cooperation’. Keating’s successor, Mr Howard, in April 1997 stated that he and Mr Hashimoto agreed that ‘the APEC association should remain the primary, dominant expression of our shared destiny as partners in the Asia Pacific region’.91 Although there is still some way to go in the development of the APEC process towards regional consensus-building and economic community, the achievement of a formal ministerial conference on Pacific economic cooperation owes perhaps most to non-government support and initiative. Individuals in both Japan and Australia were the key figures over thirty years of bilateral discussion. They included Ikeda, Miki, Ohira and others in Japan; Hasluck, Fraser, Hawke and Keating in Australia; business leaders such as Nagano and Anderson; and scholars such as Kojima, Okita, Crawford and Drysdale. While many bureaucrats in both countries scoffed at what they saw as idealistic thinking devoid of policy realism, the notion was (quite apart from its economic rationale) entirely consistent with Japanese foreign policy from Kishi onwards, completely in tune with the tenor of Australia-Japan discussions on bilateral cooperation in the region, and a cooperative idea that was endorsed in principle (if not in fact until Fraser in 1980) by successive Australian governments. The Pacific cooperation initiative—if it can still be called an ‘initiative’ so long after it was first proposed—is largely the product of Australia-Japan cooperation at government and private levels. It is one of the lasting products of a long period of quiet bilateral diplomacy and the forging of strong political bonds between governments on both sides and business communities. It was neither accidental nor forced, but the result of an evolutionary process of cooperative consultation. COOPERATING WITH JAPAN, THE GLOBAL POWER Japan’s status as a great economic power, regional presence and ‘leader from behind’ on many international issues has altered the process of political cooperation with Australia. This was something foreseen by officials in the early 1960s, as the potential for Japanese regional influence became obvious. With the growth in the Japanese aid program, it became difficult for Australia to work with Japan as an equal partner in, for example, regional development. This is not a new phenomenon. Max Suich, Tokyo correspondent for the AFR in the late 1960s, wrote on 25 July 1968: The key issue which Australia faces in its association with Japan over the next 10 to 15 years can be summed up in a single word: growth.


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Japan’s continued economic growth must in turn produce a growth in power, both economic and political. And it is this power which Japan is increasingly inclined to wield. Out of this simple fact of economic growth comes a host of problems for Australia. Perhaps the most thorny will be the economic dependence of Australia on Japan…Japanese capital penetration in Australia is going to be another issue. In a subsequent article, Suich argued that ‘as Japan becomes concerned with its political power, it is the personal, cultural and political contacts that must be fostered. These interests need, at this early stage, an imaginative initiative similar to John McEwen’s efforts in the mid-fifties on behalf of trade’.92 Australia sought first to gain ready access to Japanese ministers through the joint ministerial committee. The Australian Senate undertook a lengthy and detailed Committee inquiry into relations with Japan in 1971–72, while the McMahon government moved to rearrange bureaucratic responsibilities for Japan policy away from Trade to Foreign Affairs (a suggestion previously made by Suich in 1968). The Whitlam government began to negotiate a treaty with Japan in 1972 and made great strides in cementing a solid cultural relationship. At the same time, Whitlam’s experience with Japan was not particularly happy. His policies of economic nationalism did not meet with approval in Tokyo, and the succeeding conservative government under Malcolm Fraser emphasised constancy, predictability and cooperation (although they still retained tight controls over export prices).93 Since the Whitlam era, Australian policy has had to accept the reality of Australia’s lesser role in the relationship and build a set of commitments and activities that can satisfy Japan’s interests and extend Australia’s points of leverage. This was recognised by the Japanese themselves as early as 1973, reportedly with approval.94 Broadening the relationship involves finding new areas for trade growth. It also includes a conscious policy of engaging Japan in more intimate political ties and attempting to influence Japanese policy towards more constructive activity in the Asia Pacific region. A third area is Australia’s use of Japan’s status as an international power with global responsibilities to pursue its own ends. And, of course, there is the support of ‘cultural relations’ which has continued apace since the signing of the Cultural Agreement with Japan in 1974. Australia’s commitment to this as essential to the relationship is perhaps less than in previous years, but official support for cultural programs has been offset by the rapid growth in the inflow of tourists, especially young people and students, and the growing commitment of Japanese Government funding to cultural programs in which Japanese language learning is involved. Australia moved quickly in the 1970s to expand its range of political and diplomatic activities with Japan. Recognition of the possible extent came most powerfully in 1988 when Japan became far more explicit about its Pacific leadership role. However, Australian efforts to widen contacts with Japan had been evident as far back as 1966, when the government attempted to interest the Japanese in using the Woomera Rocket Range for scientific satellite launching.95 While the Japanese

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went ahead to develop their own launching site in Kyushu, it marked a creative initiative in technological cooperation with Japan, which had begun in the 1950s after Japan joined the United Nations and is now reflected in a range of agreements on scientific matters. In the recent period, the Australian Foreign Minister Mr Peacock was the first to spell out the Australian view of the bilateral power situation, where he spoke of the difficulties in managing ties with Japan, ‘the barriers of language, culture, tradition— and the differences in size, geography and population—are very formidable’. Peacock stated that Japan is one of the great powers; and in strength and potential, by no means the least of them…The importance of Japan is reflected in the attention which the other great powers increasingly give to her; in the influence which Japan can bring to bear on their policies and the extraordinary resilience Japan has shown in dealings with them; in the acknowledgment by the United States that Japan is an equal partner and in the independent role which Japanese diplomacy is developing for itself on international questions of a political character…The stature of Japan is apparent in its unquestioned membership of virtually all the major bodies of international consultation…Japan is and sees itself as a great power. Let there be no doubt about that.96 While Mr Peacock’s prescription for the difficulties Australia faced were mainly to do with the benefits of the Basic Treaty and the Australia-Japan Foundation (both have since become less relevant to the government’s objectives) the problem he identified was one with which Australians are still familiar: …our present relationship with Japan is not yet adequate to serve the interests which Australia and every Australian has at stake…Vast dissimilarities in outlook, national preoccupation, social, intellectual and cultural traditions, economic strength and interests must be overcome in our dealings with Japan…The economic interdependence between Australia and Japan, substantial as it is now, will not be sufficient to bridge or even mask those dissimilarities. This was a bold statement, and one of the frankest ever made by an Australian minister about Australia’s position relative to Japan. The political traffic had not been all one way, however: during the Whitlam years Australia’s brief flirtation with North Korea was watched carefully by the Japanese and they were interested in Australian information on the North.97 Japan was also reported in 1974 as seeking Mr Whitlam’s help in approaching the Chinese Government to allay Chinese fears about Japanese political developments.98 These occasions were few, however, although Japan later asked for Australian advice on managing aid to the South Pacific. One of the major efforts of joint cooperation was Australia’s attempts to get closer to the G7 Summit meetings that began in 1977.99 One commentator reports that Prime Minister Fraser did not take up the offer from Japanese Prime Minister Mr Miki in 1976, when he asked if Australia wished to join the Summit; apparently, Australia did not wish to commit itself to the greater economic openness that Summit membership would imply.100 However, Fraser was reasonably active in personal diplomacy with the Japanese leadership, meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda in an attempt to


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resolve commodity trade issues, specifically beef and sugar. He made a quick visit to talk with Fukuda in April 1978 at his own initiative, but discussed only international issues of trade and growth.101 Yet Fraser indicated that the talks had a positive purpose, when he stated to Parliament: I believe there is a remarkable identity of view and identity of concern between Japan and Australia…[We] have agreed to co-operate to the maximum extent in international forums. Where our officials are attending common meetings of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations or meetings of sub-groups of the MTN, there will be close liaison and close consultation. It was a Japanese suggestion that when the joint ministerial discussions take place next month in Australia a continuation of discussions and co-operation on the broader international issues should be high on the agenda so that the agenda will deal not only with bilateral issues which have broadly filled it on past occasions.102 While Fraser was seen as trying to make his own mark on international diplomacy, especially on North-South issues, the question of the economic summit meeting was also raised.103 Fraser had made it clear before he left that Australia is taking every opportunity to promote her own views responsibly and constructively in these major international forums’.104 Australia saw Japan as the main vehicle for having Australian views represented at the Summit. This suited Japan as it would help to move the centre of gravity of the Summit from Europe to Asia. After seeking Fraser’s agreement, Fukuda sounded out other countries on whether Australia might be invited to the 1979 Summit in Tokyo, but the United States objected, claiming Australia was not an industrial nation.105 Japan apologised quietly to Canberra, but another meeting between Fraser and the Japanese Prime Minister (by then Mr Ohira) was held in Manila on 11 August 1979, just prior to the Tokyo Summit. Fraser wanted Ohira to represent Australian views at the Tokyo meeting, especially on the question of the responsibilities of advanced nations to assist LDC development. Ohira was happy to ‘have Australia with us’ at the Summit; it would support Japan’s recognition as the representative of the Pacific at the Summit.106 On reporting to Parliament, Mr Fraser did not discuss the fact that Japan would be using Australian views in its comments at the Summit, but he did stress the commonality of views held by Australia and Japan on international issues and the value of prime ministerial interchanges.107 Australia and Japan held talks before G7 meetings and Japan reported back to Australia on the outcome, usually (according to Fraser) in greater detail than did the United States or the United Kingdom.108 Similar approaches existed towards Southeast Asian issues. Certainly, policies towards ASEAN were consistent: support for ASEAN at all costs was sometimes a restraint on Australia’s Pacific policy, but Japan too regarded ASEAN as the centrepiece of its Asia Pacific strategy for prosperity and stability. Both Australia and Japan sought ways to resolve the problems in Indochina after 1975, particularly the Cambodian crisis. Australia’s efforts were initiated by Bill Hayden as Foreign Minister, while Japan’s role grew out of its fundamental support of the ASEAN position on Cambodia but desirous of an end to Vietnamese isolation. Japan saw Vietnam as an important potential source of new economic growth in the region. Prince Sihanouk had requested Japan play a mediating

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role, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry responded. Australia-Japan joint activity on Cambodia has been limited but constructive; the main linking element is the joint concern for ASEAN and the desire to see a Cambodian resolution. The Australian Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Bowen, proposed in 1983 a joint peacekeeping role in Cambodia for Australia and Japan, but this suggestion came to nothing, especially as it had not been previously discussed with Japan, and because Japan had constitutional and policy restrictions on peacekeeping activities using Japanese defence forces. Australia and Japan jointly chaired one of the committees at the Paris Conference on Cambodia of August 1989 (and have maintained close contact and cooperation on the Cambodian issue throughout the 1990s).109 Mr Hawke said later that Australia would welcome Japanese participation in a peacekeeping effort in Cambodia,110 which eventually came to pass in 1992 after intensive debate in Japan and the passing of special legislation to approve Japanese contributions to UN peacekeeping activities. Hawke’s statement was part of an assessment, not unlike Mr Peacocks of 1976, of Australia’s relations with Japan, in terms of Japan seeking to define its world leadership position. Hawke was, however, far more positive than Peacock, for he stressed above all the positive benefits from bilateral cooperation on international issues such as Cambodia, the environment, APEC and the United Nations. He also ‘sincerely welcomed Prime Minister Kaifu’s work in ensuring that regional issues were given proper attention at the Houston Summit Meeting of the G7’, a reference to Japan’s continuing representation of Australian views at that forum.111 Japanese representation of Australia’s interests has continued with their support for Australian participation in the second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM II), efforts still without success in 1998. Australia is now a staunch supporter of an enhanced Japanese political role in the region, a position that has developed through the period of the Labor government from 1983–96, and grew out of an initial reaction to the problem of Japan’s growing defence profile. In September 1990 Mr Hawke proposed that Japan was entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as a mark of the greater world leadership that was Japan’s ‘as of right’.112 Mr Keating reaffirmed that support, and stated that ‘Japan’s position as the leading country in the Western Pacific region is beyond challenge’.113 The continuing discussions over Pacific political issues will ensure that the process of regional cooperation between Australia and Japan continues. It is, however, linked now to the question of security and defence, which will be taken up in Chapter 7. JAPAN AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC One prime area of Australia-Japan political and economic cooperation (and an area for potential differences over Japan’s leadership role) is the South Pacific, a region influenced by both countries since before the Second World War. With a higher regional profile, greater aid commitments to the area, and growing concern in the United States and Tokyo about the level of former Soviet activity in the Pacific, particularly its fishing cooperation arrangements with Tuvalu and Vanuatu, Japan


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became a significant player in regional politics. The so-called ‘Kuranari Doctrine’ announced by the Japanese Foreign Minister in Fiji in January 1987, pledged expanded aid programs, support for regional initiatives and efforts to preserve regional peace and stability.114 As well as aiming to forestall the Soviet presence, Japan wanted a higher profile in the resource-rich region, and foresaw a greater aid role for themselves as assistance from Australia, Britain and other donors waned. There were powerful political and economic reasons for the initiative. While it was not a major policy change, the Kuranari statement did mark a Japanese commitment to regional development, which has continued in a less dramatic way, notably through foreign aid. It also gave further scope for bilateral consultation, and Prime Ministers Hawke and Takeshita agreed in July 1988 to step up aid to the South Pacific in the face of regional instability and a growing Soviet presence. This was reminiscent of the recurring anti-communist themes of the 1960s in bilateral political discussions. Australia and Japan both accept the need for coordination of aid policies in the region. Japan wishes to discuss its approaches with Australia and has sought Australia’s ‘understanding’, ‘knowledge and experiences’ but not, it is significant, Australia’s support. Both governments were at pains in January 1987 to dismiss the idea that their aid programs would be ‘coordinated’. Mr Kuranari said that each country had its own policy, and it was more a matter of ‘exchange of information’. It is, indeed, not really clear whether Japan in fact needs Australia or its advice in the pursuit of a South Pacific policy. One Japanese commentator has said that ‘Japan seems to find from time to time Australia’s deep-rooted presence in the South Pacific [an] irritant or obstacle to Japan’s commitment’.115 Japan has entered into discussions with Australia and New Zealand over its Pacific aid initiatives, but Japanese objectives may be independent of other donor interests. A semi-official proposal outlining an aid program for the South Pacific points to declining Australian and New Zealand influence over former Pacific colonies. It also highlights the cultural affinities between Japan and the Pacific countries: Because of Japan’s distinctive cultural background, it is understandable that the Pacific Island nations expect more from Japan than any other developed nations in asserting their independence from the Western culture brought by their former rulers. This can be called the Pacific version of the Malaysian ‘Look East Policy’.116 The importance of cooperation with ‘former colonial power partners’ is frankly acknowledged, including the involvement of Australian and New Zealand consultants. Nonetheless, Japan’s responsibilities to its near neighbours is highlighted, and the bottom line for Japan is ‘to assume a leadership role in extending aid to Pacific island nations’.117 For Japan, South Pacific aid presents a significant challenge in the longer term: the increase in its aid to the region will be much less important than the scope and impact of Japan’s broader policy role in the region. Donor cooperation is one way of smoothing the edges of a growing Japanese regional profile. With reduced USSoviet tensions, Japan’s activities in Pacific aid, investment, trade, fishing and minerals

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exploration take on a new significance. Japan signalled its differences from Australia and Pacific island nations in 1987 by abstaining from the UN vote on independence for the French colony of New Caledonia. Instead it lined up with the big Western nations under pressure from France in particular.118 Nonetheless, bilateral aid talks take place regularly. Australia was involved in a joint team assessing Japanese aid projects, and bilateral aid collaboration began in March 1994 with agreement on a series of joint projects. The first of these joint projects was a health promotion project in Fiji, which began in January 1996.119 Joint aid cooperation is an area that has not yet been widely developed, but it has the scope to extend across the whole Asia Pacific region. CONCLUSION The active bilateral diplomacy of the 1990s on regional issues reflects the Australian approach of forty years in engaging Japan in discussion on the problems of international affairs. There is no doubt that the good rapport established between governments in the early years of official relations demonstrated a strong sense of mutual benefit to be gained from continuing consultation. This was strengthened by Australia’s willingness to support Japan’s return to international society, and by the need for both countries to discuss events in Asia. Australia recognised that its best interests lay in working with, and not against, Japan because of the regional issues that affected both countries; it recognised also the potential for Japan to grow into a formidable regional power. The fact that Australia began to adopt policies in 1962 that prepared for this eventuality shows the long-standing process of getting close to Japan that has marked Australia’s approach to dealing with Japan in a regional context. Australia’s desire to ‘get with the strength’ has not prevented it adopting some creativity in its policies—as in the first reactions to US and Japanese proposals for a regional trade arrangement—but the approach to regional cooperation with Japan came to be for bilateral purposes, to bolster Australia’s standing in the bilateral relationship as the balance of economic power shifted in favour of the more powerful Japan. ‘Widening the relationship’ was the political tag given to this policy, even though the relationship had always been wide, and open to active collaboration on regional issues. The Pacific economic cooperation process is perhaps the main example of cooperation where strictly bilateral objectives have not been foremost. International cooperation between Australia and Japan has served the objectives of both countries well over the postwar period, and the ease of contacts today on such issues is testament to the intensive development of diplomatic contacts in decades past. Certainly the claims by Ogura and others for the ‘natural partners’ tag to describe Australia-Japan relations are strongly supported by their postwar cooperation in international affairs.


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NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34

Gaiko foramu, December 1992, p. 11. Australian, 13–14 March 1993. Alan Rix, ‘Australia and Japan’ in F.A.Mediansky (ed.), Australia in a Changing World: New Foreign Policy Directions, Maxwell Macmillan, Sydney, 1992, pp. 194–207. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9, 1 December 1961. To Minister, 21 May 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Plimsoll note, 15 October 1953, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 9. Cabinet Decision 79, 27 August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 1. Cabinet Minute No.2 (PM), 17 August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 1. Cabinet Minute No.2 (PM), 17 August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol.1. Canberra Times, 23 September 1954. T.B.Millar (ed.), Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G.Casey 1951–60, Collins, London, 1972, p. 190. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 3. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 3. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1/1 part 15. Conversation with Japanese Ambassador, 27 August 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 5. Departmental conversations with Japanee Ambassador Narita, 15 June 1960 and 3 August 1960, and with Yoshida, 11 March and 2 June 1960, AA, A1838/T184, 3101/10/1 part 8. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. On Japan and the UN, see Gaimusho, Gaimusho no hyakunen, vol.2, Gaimusho hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, Tokyo, 1969, p. 834. Casey to Menzies, 24 May 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. I.8991, 5 July 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. O.7742, 5 June 1956, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Gaimusho sengo gaikoshi kenkyukai-hen, Nihon gaiko 30 nen—sengo no kiseki to tembo 1952–1982, Sekai no ugokisha, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 53ff. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 28, January 1957, p. 54. Cable I.17690/1 from Walker, 25 November 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Herald, 10 June 1955. Note 16 September 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 8. Narita discussion with Tange, 8 May 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Cable O.11659, 15 August 1958, AA, A18348/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Casey to McEwen, 16 April 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Press statement, 23 March 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Record of Talks, 25 March 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Record of Talks, 25 March 1959. Another report of the discussions, in Cable I.5352/53, 25 March 1959, said that Casey told Fujiyama that ‘we frequently disagreed with the United States but we did so in private and frequently got them to amend their attitude’. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Cabinet Submission 347 (for noting by Cabinet), 9 August 1962, AA, A5819/2, vol. 9. Herald, 10 June 1955. For Secretary, 12 November 1952, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 1.

144 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63

The Australia–Japan political alignment Kakitsubo discussion with Plimsoll, 1 April 1955, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Subjects discussed by Mr Casey and Mr McEwen with the Japanese Prime Minister, 4 December 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. I.11832, 22 August 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 5. Secretary of External Affairs to Plimsoll, 26 August 1957; Conversation between the Minister and Japanese Ambassador, 27 August 1957 and Ministers discussion with Japanese Ambassador Suzuki, 13 November 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 5. Brief for Ministers visit to the US, September 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. 20 July 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Casey letter to Menzies, no date but probably November 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Record of Talks (draft) with Mr Kishi, 4 December 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Speech by Kishi to Parliamentary Luncheon, 4 December 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Kishi Brief, ‘South East Asian Development Fund’, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 6. Conversation of Plimsoll with Uyama, 4 January 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4; also see Submission No.30, ‘Australian policy towards Japan’, Appendix L, ‘Inclusion of Japan in S.E.A.T.O.’ and Decision 79, 27 August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 1. Millar, Australian Foreign Minister, p. 317. To the Minister, ‘Australian Policy Towards Japan’, 21 May 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Australian Financial Review, 27 June 1963. See Asahi shimbun, 30 September and 1 and 6 October 1963. Current Notes on International Affairs, September 1963, p. 50; J.D.B.Miller, ‘Problems of Australian foreign policy: July-December 1963’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. X, no. 1, April 1964, pp. 1–15. Current Notes on International Affairs, September 1963, p. 51. Miller, ‘Problems of Australian Foreign Policy’, p. 7. Nihon keizai shimbun, 12 July 1964. Gaimusho, Gaiko seisho: waga gaiko no kinkyo, no. 13, 1968, p. 45. Current Notes on International Affairs, July 1967, pp. 146ff. At the same time, some criticism of Australia’s Asian diplomacy was appearing in Japan, questioning whether Australia could really be regarded as part of Asia, or could effectively coordinate its policies with its Asian partners: see Takahashi Akira, ‘Ajia gaiko ni torikumu goshu’, Sekai shuho, 16 May 1967, pp. 54–7. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 56, 28 September 1967, p. 1441. Australian Financial Review, 6 June 1967. Australian Financial Review, 20 July 1967. Nihon keizai shimbun, 18 October 1967. Current Notes on International Affairs, December 1967, p. 431. Also see Australian Financial Review, 13 October 1967, and Kai Fumihiko, Kokkyo o koeta yujo: waga gaiko hitsuwa, Tokyo shimbun shuppankyoku, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 149–54. Australian Financial Review, 29 July 1968. Gaimusho, Gaiko seisho: waga gaiko no kinkyo, no. 15, 1971 edition, p. 144. Nihon keizai shimbun, 16 June and 12 September 1970.

Australia, Japan and international cooperation 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80

81 82 83 84 85 86 87

88 89

145

Nihon keizai shimbun, 8 March 1971. Australian Financial Review, 8 May 1970. See also Saito, Osutoraria tsushin, pp. 73–6, for some discussion of the background to the Gorton visit. Australian Financial Review, 7 May 1971. Current Notes on International Affairs, July 1971, p. 334. Bruce Grant, The Crisis of Loyalty: A Study of Australian Foreign Policy, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, p. 95; Sekai shuho, 14 July 1970. Asahi shimbun, 16 October 1972. Frank Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1973, pp. 56–63. Nihon keizai shimbun, 23, 26 and 27 November 1961. Australian Financial Review, 19 June 1962; Nihon keizai shimbun, 15 June 1962. Ministers Brief for visit to US, September 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. Cabinet Submission 347, 9 August 1962, AA, A5819/2 vol. 9. Nihon keizai shimbun, 2 October 1963. See Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, p. 189; Asahi shimbun, 23 May 1967. Current Notes on International Affairs, March 1967, pp. 105–6, and Asashi shimbun, 29–31 March and 1 April 1967. There was a further report in the April issue, pp. 146–9, the text of Hasluck’s report to Parliament on his visit. Similar understandings were also reflected in the communique following the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sato to Australia in October 1967: see Current Notes, November 1967. Asahi shimbun, 23 May 1967; Australian Financial Review, 6 June 1867 and 29 July 1968. Nihon keizai shimbun, 23 and 28 May 1969. Kojima Kiyoshi, Taiheiyo keizaiken to nihon, Kunimoto shobo, Tokyo, 1969. Also see Australian Financial Review, 24 May 1968, and Peter Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988. Ariga of Mitsui and Co in Australian Financial Review, 12 August 1969; Australian Financial Review, 5 April 1972. Australian Financial Review, 18 November 1971. Yamashiro Goro, ‘Taihei-kantaiheiyo koso to wa nani ka’, Bunka hyoron, no. 215, March 1979, pp. 56–64. Asahi shimbun, 29 November 1978; also see ‘Zoku: nihon no kake: 80-nendai o mezasu kantaiheiyo koso’, Bungei shunju, vol. 57, 2, February 1979, pp. 330–57. See report in Asahi shimbun, 7 January 1980, and Donowaki Mitsuo, ‘Kantaiheiyo rentai koso’, Keizai to gaiko, no. 690, November 1979. See chapters by Drysdale and Okita in L.T.Evans and J.D.B.Miller (eds), Policy and Practice: Essays in Honour of Sir John Crawford, Australian National University Press, Sydney, 1987. See reports in Australian, 4, 5 and 6–7 January 1996. The Japanese version of events was published in Funabashi Yoichi, APEC, Asia-Pacific Fusion, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1995. See Joint Press Statement, 21 September 1992. Yomiuri shimbun, 19 September 1992.

146 90


Martin Rudner, ‘APEC: The challenges of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, 1995, pp. 403–37. A rash of books has appeared in Japan on APEC and its origins, for example: Aoki Takeshi and Umada Keiichi, Kensho: ajia taiheiyo no atamshii chiikishugi, Nihon hyoronsha, Tokyo, 1995; Kikuchi Tsutomu, APEC: ajia taiheiyo shinchitsujo no mosaku, Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyujo, Tokyo, 1995; Yamazawa Ippei, Suzuki Toshiro, Yasunobe Shin, APEC nyumon: hikareta chiiki kyoryoku o mezashite, Toyo keizai shinposha, Tokyo, 1995. 91 See newspaper reports on Keating visit, May 1995, for example Courier-Mail, 26 and 30 May 1995; Joint press conference by Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister Howard, 29 April 1997. 92 Australian Financial Review, 26 July 1968. 93 See Rix in Boyce and Angel, Independence and Alliance. 94 AIS, ‘Nichigo seiji kankei no jittai’, Jiyu, vol. 15, no. 10, October 1973, pp. 144–6. 95 Australian Financial Review, 8 March 1966. 96 Australian Foreign Affairs Record, August 1976, pp. 437–9. 97 Australian Financial Review, 26 June 1975. 98 Australian Financial Review, 15 March 1974. 99 Australian Financial Review, 9 August 1977. 100 Gregory Clark in Australian, 6 July 1990. 101 Australian Financial Review, 5 April 1978. 102 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 109, 2 May 1978, p. 1586. 103 Australian Financial Review, 24 April 1978. 104 Australian Foreign Affairs Record, April 1978, pp. 170–72. 105 Australian Financial Review, 18 October 1978 and 19 June 1979. 106 Nihon keizai shimbun, 8 May 1978 and 11 May 1979. 107 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 22 May 1979, p. 2190. 108 Interview with Malcolm Fraser, ABC Radio, 21 October 1993. Fraser added that there was an ‘extraordinarily warm’ relationship with Japan during the term of his government. 109 Australian Financial Review, 16 May 1983. 110 Australian Financial Review, 19 September 1990. 111 Australian Foreign Affairs and Trade Monthly Record, September 1990, pp. 621–5; Seki Tomoda, ‘Japan’s search for a political role in Asia: The Cambodian Peace Settlement’, Japan Review of International Affairs, vol. 6, 1, Spring 1992, pp. 43–60. 112 Sydney Morning Herald and Australian Financial Review, 20 September 1990, and Foreign Affairs and Trade, Monthly Record, September 1990, pp. 621–5. 113 Speech to Japan National Press Club, 22 September 1992. 114 This issue was fully reported in Australian newspapers of January 1987. 115 Isami Takeda, ‘New factors in Japan’s ODA policy: implications for Australia-Japan relations’, mimeographed paper, August 1986. 116 Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Pacific Aid Initiative: A Proposal for Japanese Assistance to Pacific Island Nations, Tokyo, April 1988, p. 10. 117 FAIR, Pacific Aid Initiative, p. 48. 118 Courier-Mail, 29 October 1987. 119 Kokusai kaihatsu janaru, September 1997, p. 89.

7 Keeping the Region Safe: Defence and Security in the Australia-Japan Relationship

The question of defence and security has been a constant concern in Australia’s approach to Japan since the end of the nineteenth century.1 In the postwar period, it has been a consistent and often strident theme in Australian attitudes and policy. Australia and Japan have never had a bilateral military cooperation agreement as the formal basis of their relationship but, in terms of defence and security, the two countries have been closely interrelated in their approach to Pacific security in the post-Peace Treaty era, notably through their separate security treaty arrangements with the United States. This chapter examines the scope of defence contacts and discussions between Australia and Japan, in particular the Australian approach to Japanese rearmament and defence policy. This debate in Australia has turned half-circle since the end of the Second World War, such that in the 1990s Australia-Japan defence cooperation is entering areas of activity that have not been seen before. Humphrey McQueen has gone as far as to proclaim Australia’s ‘backdoor alliance’ with Japan, and the term ‘ally’ is rather loosely used in press discussion of the Australia-Japan relationship.2 THE PEACE TREATY, THE ANZUS AGREEMENT AND JAPAN An observer of postwar relations between the two countries in 1949 could not have foreseen the security collaboration that burgeoned later. Australia’s prime objective after the Second World War was to secure itself against future aggression, notably from Japan. This was the unswerving approach taken by the Chifley Labor government (and, initially, by its successor Liberal-Country Party government) in deliberations on a Peace Treaty with Japan, but the Treaty concluded in 1951 was founded on a new set of international conditions. By that time the threat of communism, represented most starkly by the Korean War, loomed largest in the minds of American and Australian (and, indeed, Japanese) policy makers alike. Accordingly, the Peace Treaty with Japan provided no guarantees against Japanese rearmament. Yet as Norman Harper wrote in 1947, ‘Australia’s basic interest in the post-war as in the pre-war Pacific is in security’. Harper noted, however, that as the United States moved to rebuild the Japanese economy and strengthen

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Japan from within, as a means of combating political unrest and the influence of communism, ‘Australian policy has been steadily moving toward closer collaboration with and an acceptance of the American point of view with regard to the Japanese peace settlement’.3 The negotiation of the Peace Treaty brought with it the conclusion of the so-called ‘Pacific Pact’, or ANZUS, the defence cooperation agreement between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. It was designed to provide security protection both from a potential communist threat and from a possible future Japanese threat, and was part of the price the Americans had to pay to secure Australian and New Zealand acquiescence to the Peace Treaty. The ANZUS Pact was signed in September 1951, at the same time as the Mutual Security Agreement between Japan and the United States. As stated in the Australian Parliament at the time, the long-term problem for Australia was the security of Japan from communism, not just security from Japan itself. The Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr Spender, had expressed in February 1950 his desire for a Pacific military alliance to resist communist aggression. He also sought a formal connection with the United States, which he hoped would join the proposed pact. He linked Australia’s acceptance of a Japanese Peace Treaty with a means of assuring Australia’s security in the Pacific, and argued for US guarantees in the form of a regional arrangement. He also suggested that a Pacific security shield would enable Australia to send forces to assist in the global security effort such as in the Middle East.4 The Americans regarded the Australian proposal for a pact as useful but fraught with problems of membership.5 New Zealand and the Philippines also wanted protection from any future Japanese threat. In January 1951 the US foresaw a Pacific Pact ‘strictly confined to the island nations of the Pacific (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States, and possibly Indonesia)’ but not the United Kingdom or other former colonial powers.6 The idea was to include Japan so as to bind it into a collective security net rather than to leave it isolated. It was also a significant bargaining tool: In view of the inter-dependence of the Pact and the proposed Japanese peace, the United States should not become committed to the Pact unless it is assured that the other Parties will agree to the kind of a Japanese peace that the United States feels is necessary. This does not technically preclude a separate negotiation on the Pact, but practically there would be danger in dealing first with the Pact as public opinion in Australia and New Zealand might then treat the Pact as so assured that they would feel that they could, without jeopardising it, revive a strong position against Japanese rearmament.7 As it turned out, the United Kingdom strongly opposed the arrangement on the grounds that if island nations (especially Japan) were to be involved, it may endanger British possessions on mainland Asia (Hong Kong and Malaya). It felt that other measures should be considered to satisfy Australia and New Zealand;8 indeed, US options endorsed by the President and his senior advisers included ‘U.S. unilateral declaration, series of bilateral agreements (U.S. with Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Japan, respectively) or tripartite agreement (U.S., Australia, New Zealand)’, although it was recognised that ‘these latter [would], of course, not provide the desired collective security

Keeping the region safe: defence and security in the Australia–Japan relationship 149

arrangement for Japan’s participation nor [would] they remove very real problem of effect on Asian states and danger that drawing a line [would] invite Commie aggression’.9 The outcome of talks in Canberra in February 1951 between John Foster Dulles, the US emissary, Percy Spender, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, and his New Zealand counterpart, Mr Doidge, was agreement on what was essentially a tripartite pact.10 Spender emphasised that acceptance of a lenient peace treaty without some form of security assurance for Australia ‘would mean political oblivion’ for his party. They saw dangers from communist influence in Japan, Japanese economic strength and the possibility that ‘Japan and China might find it easier to get together than Japan and the Western world’.11 Both Australia and New Zealand were similarly concerned at hostile public reaction to a formal ‘alliance’ with Japan, and Spender argued that ‘inclusion of Japan at this stage would be unacceptable to Australia. Yet he could look to the future: he also appreciated that ‘Australia would find it difficult to reject out of hand an offer of an American guarantee which looked towards the ultimate inclusion of Japan in a Pacific security arrangement’.12 The draft of the Pact hammered out in February 1951 in Canberra left questions of membership open. Dulles did not see the proposed Treaty as ‘the final word for the security of the Pacific area’ and foresaw the involvement of Japan and other countries at a future date in collective security arrangements. The desire to bring Japan into the fold was a strong motivating factor in American and Australian decisions on the draft treaty. Spender felt even as he was debating the draft of the treaty in February 1951 that ‘it was essential that Japan eventually be brought in on our side of the fence and that we should begin to look to that day’.13 Indeed, the formula that Dulles laid out has guided Australian policy on Japanese defence—and political relations with Japan—ever since. Dulles recognised that Japan’s actions fifty years on could not be controlled by these treaties: All that will help at that time will be for us to have started now to bring Japan to a mood in which it will not want to adopt aggressive policies. While in Japan I emphasised that the Japanese should look to the creation not of national forces but of collective security forces. Sooner or later, I said, Japan must pull its weight in the boat. What the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and other countries must try to do is to ensure that the development of armed forces in Japan will be for purposes of collective security. The environment we create in and about Japan will largely determine this.14 Spender envisaged a stronger commitment from Japan and proposed recommending to Cabinet, amongst other things, that if the pact was acceptable to the United States, Australia should propose that Japan later of its own accord enter into an agreement with Australia and possibly other countries under which it would agree not to revive militaristic policies or accumulate dangerous military might. Mr Spender said that it was true, as Ambassador Dulles had pointed out, that restrictions or supervision provided in a treaty tend to break down. Post-treaty covenants, however, would be more likely to be performed, particularly if Japan wishes to win its way into the Western world. Australia, therefore, desired both a pact or security treaty and voluntary Japanese assurances of the type just described. The present pacifist tendency of the Japanese people might well

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incline them toward the desired assurances. It will probably not be in Japan’s power to develop atomic weapons, long-range missiles or an appreciable navy or air force in any event, and therefore its renunciation of the right to build up such weapons and forces would not involve particular sacrifice. 15 This was a rather unrealistic approach, and Dulles said so, emphasising that the greatest short-term worry was that Japan would not recreate adequate armed forces. Australia did not, of course, seek such assurances, but did begin to work towards cooperative regional involvement with Japan. The ANZUS Treaty was signed on 1 September 1951 and came into force at the same time as the Japanese Peace Treaty, on 29 April 1952. Humphrey McQueen argues that Dulles, the ‘Wall Street lawyer’, was able to achieve his broader Pacific pact by roundabout means, adjusting the wording of the tripartite ANZUS agreement to include other nations, notably Japan and the Philippines.16 As Dulles explained to the British Ambassador in Japan, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, ‘he did not contemplate the forging of any instrument of a formal nature like the North Atlantic pact. What he did contemplate was a declaration that there was in fact sufficient interdependence between the islands making up the chain so that an attack upon one link would be a matter of serious threat to the other links’.17 Gascoigne argued in turn that this type of arrangement would equate an attack on Japan with an attack on Australia or New Zealand and would therefore involve a commitment by Australia and New Zealand to provide forces for the defence of Japan.18 This was exactly the situation which the Australian (or New Zealand) Government wished to avoid, despite the fact that Australia accepted the strategic concept of the island chain put forward by Dulles.19 Dulles, however, remained convinced of the need for a more inclusive Pacific arrangement of collective security, to include not just Japan and the Philippines but Malaya and the nations of the Asian mainland. The preamble to the ANZUS Treaty includes an expression of intent about a more comprehensive system of regional security, and Article V of the Treaty refers to an armed attack on one of the Parties as being deemed to include an attack on the ‘armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific’ of any of the Parties. This precise wording was itself proposed by Dulles when the initial draft of the Treaty (prepared by officials) was being discussed in Canberra on 17 February 1951: Dulles suggested that the words ‘armed forces, public’ be added to the draft, thereby specifically bringing US forces in the Pacific within the scope of the Treaty.20 It is this wording which concerns McQueen, and indeed which concerned the Australian and New Zealand Governments in April 1951 when Dulles was reported to have said that support for America if she were attacked in the Pacific would include a commitment to defend Japan if US forces were stationed there.21 Dulles response to this was as follows: It would mean that if there were an attack upon the US forces that were stationed in Japan, Okinawa or the Philippines that that would be deemed to be an attack upon the US in the Pacific for the purposes of that pact, assuming that is made clear in the final drafting. There is


no final agreement but that is my interpretation of the situation as expressed by the President. 22 This interpretation, according to McQueen, has remained part of Australia’s strategic approach ever since, given its continued commitment to the ANZUS process. Japan, in fact, inquired of Australia in 1960 whether it was their view that Article V of ANZUS included US forces in Japan. The advice within the Department of External Affairs, admittedly an unofficial view (as no record of its being transmitted to the Japanese is available), was that it did represent their view.23 The provision for other states to become involved was also included in the draft of Article VIII, which provided for consultation with states in the Pacific area. Dulles’ objective was to ‘permit coordination in planning between the Pacific Pact and a US-Japan Bilateral Pact until Japan can become a member of the former’.24 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed such a provision. They objected in particular to the idea of ‘planning’ as it would mean Australia and New Zealand being party to US military planning, allowing them the opportunity to become involved in NATO military affairs. The offending final sentence of the draft of Article VIII was removed in discussions between Dulles and Australian and New Zealand representatives on 25 June 1951. The Joint Chiefs were opposed to any reference to military plans in any of the Pacific security arrangements, except that with Japan.25 The Peace Treaty and the ANZUS Pact met with a mixed reception in Australia. The Labor Party was strongly opposed to the possibility of Japanese rearmament, and did not view the ANZUS agreement as a viable security guarantee. It was, said Evatt, the Leader of the Opposition, ‘a fraud’.26 Parliamentary debate was torrid, focussing primarily on the possibility of a Japanese threat. The conservative side rebutted Labor attacks by arguing that a stable region required a stable Japan and that Japan should ‘share with us’ in arming a protective circle to defend the Pacific area. That is, Australia’s interests lay in allying with Japan, economically and militarily. Les Haylen, one of the more outspoken anti-Japanese members of the Labor Party, was not impressed: At its miserable best, the decision to rearm Japan is an act of expediency. We do not want the Japanese as allies, but they are to be forced upon us willy-nilly in that capacity. 27 Parliamentary debate on the Treaty revealed a strong divergence between Labor and conservatives over the question of an alliance with Japan. No-one really spelled out the meaning of such a term, but it was closely associated with friendship, economic relations and common security interests, possibly linked through common security arrangements, and premised on Japan remaining anti-communist. However, Les Haylen’s remarks typified the Labor stance, suspicious of Japanese motives, of its economic aggression and its history of territorial expansion: One must return again and again to the problem of Japan—the brooding ‘bad boy’ of the Pacific, locked in the barren islands of the Japanese mainland, teeming with 85,000,000 people, armed to the teeth for somebody else’s war, bereft of trade with China, stripped of empire and expansion, and living in an economy that must have

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overseas trade to enable it to survive. Japan has all the tensions that lead to war rather than those that lead to peace…The idea of Japan as an ally in any over-all security plan is repugnant to Australia. We should be allowed time to test the genuineness, or otherwise, of the Japanese aspirations.28 ‘A commendable, if not convincing, effort to comfort the fearful and credulous’ was how W.Macmahon Ball described the Pact.29 D.C.S. Sissons ridiculed the notion that Japan might come in later to a Pacific security council, drawing a picture of American staff making plans with Australia to resist Japan and at the same time working in close and intimate contact with the Japanese Army. He found equally ridiculous the idea of Japan and Australia exchanging the valuable information about the strength of their own force necessary for them to cooperate effectively in a powerful regional alliance.30 This scenario of Japanese-Australian defence cooperation is now not so unthinkable or, indeed, ridiculous. Indeed, it was envisaged by Dulles and accepted by Spender from the outset. However, the ANZUS Treaty was being seen as separate from a ‘Pacific Pact’, which would involve other Pacific and Asian countries. The Korean Ambassador to Washington referred to ANZUS as a ‘white alliance’; the State Department suggested to him in August 1952 that the Asian nations themselves should initiate a Pacific Pact, as an indication of their willingness to cooperate.31 THE 1950S AND THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL DEFENCE A broader regional security arrangement came together under the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) of September 1954, but it was largely intended to safeguard Southeast Asian security. It was mainly a ‘white power’ agreement, with only the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan joining from the region. This did not include Japan, and Washington continued to aim for ‘formation of…a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS’.32 The Americans rightly saw obstacles to this objective. Indeed, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted to the National Security Council ‘the virtual impossibility of developing a regional defence organisation which would include all the non-Communist nations of Asia’.33 As the US saw it in April 1954, ‘the Australians were likewise opposed to too rapid and strong a revival of Japanese military power. They wished to see a Japan strong enough to participate in joint action for the defense of Asia, but not strong enough to permit unilateral action against an Asian country’.34 Australian policy on Japanese rearmament did not change as Japan’s commitment to acquiring self-defence forces strengthened in the 1950s. The basic stance was that ‘the rearmament of Japan to defend itself against aggression offered no threat to Australia, provided the rearmament was limited’,35 and was undertaken with US ‘supervision’ and endorsement. The Minister for External Afairs, Richard Casey, explained what this meant in the following way: That Japan should be able to defend herself against Communist aggression offers no threat to Australia, provided that the arms and trained manpower are not of a size and nature that would make possible an aggressive expedition outside


Japan. Australia has given particular attention to this point about the size and nature of Japanese armament, and has constantly kept this before the Americans.36 The ‘particular attention’ given by Australia referred to the Australian Defence Committee’s view of 25 March 1953 that the level of Japanese armed forces should be as follows: (a) Navy—sufficient ships, not including aircraft carriers and submarines, of cruiser size and below, to counter the threat of Russia’s naval forces in the Far East; (b) Army—sufficient forces to ensure the security of Japan against land invasion; (c) Air Force—sufficient short-range maritime attack, reconnaissance, fighter and anti-submarine aircraft to ensure the security of Japan. The Defence Committee went on to state that the level of Japanese armaments should enable the proper equipping of these forces, but there was no means of ensuring that these levels were not exceeded. These views were slightly modified in June 1954 when it was decided to raise no objection to Japan receiving a submarine on loan from the United States for training in anti-submarine operations.37 Editorial comment was less sanguine, pointing to the lack of a Pacific security framework into which Japanese rearmament could be fitted, and urging that one be created.38 The Sydney Morning Herald had supported the government approach—avoid a power vacuum in Japan and Japanese pacifism, enable Japan to stand on its own two feet, and recognise Japanese rearmament as an essential factor in Pacific security.39 However, the newspaper warned that we must prepare for the day when Japan became more independent, and work towards convincing the Japanese ‘that Japan’s future lies with the free nations’, including by implication its defence aspects. The paper accepted that this would demand a revolution in national thinking.40 Some domestic Australian opposition to Japanese rearmament was being modified. After the Japanese Government announced that a self-defence force would be formed, the NSW President of the Returned Servicemen’s League said only that the League was opposed to permitting Japan to rearm to the point where it could again threaten aggression, while the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Evatt, could only respond that Australia had to watch ‘the form and content of Japanese rearmament’.41 The former commander of British Commonwealth Forces in Japan, General Sir Horace Robertson, considered that ‘Japan might be an ally in the future if the menace of Communism threatened war’. Joint alliances provided the key, in his view.42 The Government’s position was reiterated in Parliament in 1955 after discussion of Japan’s Five Year Defence Build-Up Program: …the Australian Government considers it reasonable that the Japanese should bear the main responsibility for the defence of their own country and that they should not expect to be protected indefinitely by the United States forces. At the same time, we believe that the armed forces of Japan should be for defence only and should not be of a size or type which could be used for aggressive purposes. We have no misgivings over the developments proposed so far.43

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The Australian stance was clear enough: support the alliance system with the United States, support (while not directly encouraging) a steady Japanese defence expansion as part of that system, alongside establishment of close political relations with Japan in the regional context.44 This also involved encouraging Japan in economic collaboration in the region, something which embraced Australia-Japan bilateral trade interests. So much so that one commentator, political scientist Brian Beddie, was able to argue that the conclusion of the Commerce Agreement with Japan in 1957 was due in part to the fact that ‘…Australia, however reluctantly, has come to rely on a defensive system in which Japan is a key factor’.45 While these two issues were not as directly linked as Beddie’s comment would suggest, Australia’s fundamental policy on Japan, as set out in a Cabinet decision of 17 August 1954, was to prevent Japan becoming aligned with communist China: Fundamental Policy… (4)

Politically Australia’s interest was not served by a situation where Japan was completely dependent on communist China.

(5)

There was a parallel between the position of Germany after 1918 and Japa today; the isolation imposed upon Germany in 1920 had contributed to the rise of Hitler; and there was a danger of cause and effect operating in the next few years to put a Communist government in power in Japan.

(6)

In the long term defence view there was more than a possibility of bringing Japan into close association with the Western Powers and that was a desirable object…

Inclusion of Japan in SEATO The Minister reported that Mr. Dulles had accepted the Australian proposition that Australia could not undertake to guarantee countries in the North Pacific area against aggression. On the other hand, in accordance with the views set out in the first section of this minute, there would be some merit in tying Japan into a tight military alliance.46 This basic policy remained firm throughout the 1950s and was reaffirmed in the exchange of prime ministerial visits in 1957, when Menzies suggested to Prime Minister Kishi ‘a situation in which we, the British Commonwealth, the United States and Japan would consider problems in full consultation with each other and with sympathetic understanding while each maintains its own freedom of action’.47 There was no discussion then of defence cooperation, but ample references to a common front against communism in the region. The issue of Japan’s membership of SEATO came up at an official level, but neither Australia nor Japan wished to push it very far. Japan could make no military commitment, for there would be public opposition in Japan;


Australia was concerned about the effect on the membership status of other countries, notably China.48 The question of a regional security system in Asia did not get very far. In April 1954 the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed support for the idea, but his Prime Minister disagreed. The idea of Japan as an observer at SEATO was also rejected, and Japan in any case was not prepared to consider joining if it meant deployment of Japanese forces. The United States began thinking tentatively again about bringing Japan, South Korea and Taiwan into a form of regional defence alliance, perhaps even a North Pacific one: ‘it was argued that Japanese rearmament could be developed more satisfactorily and effectively in the wider context of a multilateral regional defence organisation than bilaterally’.49 Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand opposed Japan’s entry to SEATO; it was seen as doubtful whether public opinion would allow the governments of those states to enter a mutual defence arrangement with the Japanese.50 The US National Security Council had as its objective the broadly-based Western Pacific collective defence arrangement discussed above.51 Australian policy eventually settled on the formula expressed by James Plimsoll to an inquiry from the Japanese Embassy in 1957, as follows: Australia felt that the present pattern of military arrangements in the Pacific was satisfactory: the United States had bilateral defence treaties with Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Formosa, a trilateral pact with Australia and New Zealand, and a multilateral pact with the SEATO countries. The United States, as a common member of all these agreements was in a position to co-ordinate defence arrangements. Consequently, though Australia and Japan did not have a defence agreement between them, nevertheless our defence arrangements did dovetail through the United States. 52 This expressed desire for cooperation in approaches to regional security issues was seen also at the direct bilateral level, for as early as 1957 the Japanese Embassy in Canberra was pressing the Australian Government to appoint military attaches to the Embassy in Tokyo. It was argued that there were strong advantages in contacts with Japanese defence authorities, and the availability of intelligence about communist countries.53 These requests met with a receptive hearing, since the whole question of Australian military representation in Japan had first been raised in 1950 by the BCOF Commander in Japan, General Robertson, who sought advice on whether a military attache should be kept on in Japan after the withdrawal of BCOF. The Head of the Australian Mission also requested an attache, but Defence Committee in July of that year approved only the appointment of a liaison officer (which BCOF supplied anyway). A more permanent arrangement was considered premature prior to the withdrawal of BCOF or the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and the matter was left in abeyance.54 The first Service attache post was approved by early 1959 by the Defence Committee,55 but was not established in Tokyo until 1961 (partly due to lack of accommodation):

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…It was seen then to be highly desirable to appoint an attache in Japan during the organisation phase of Japan’s Self Defence Forces, to establish and to maintain contact with these forces and to be in a position to assess their present and future capabilities. The growth of Japan as an important Pacific and world nation led to a need to increase Australia’s defence representation. In 1970 a naval attache was appointed and in 1972 an army attache has been appointed.56 THE 1960S: ACCEPTING JAPAN’S REGIONAL ROLE In the 1960s Japan became one of the major power players in Asia. While not a combatant in the Vietnam conflict, it was an important source of economic aid to South Vietnam, a staging point for US forces, a prime R&R and medical evacuation destination, and a source of procurement for goods and services including some arms and military technology.57 During the 1960s the US-Japan Security Treaty continued to be, and was reaffirmed as, the foundation of Japanese defence policy. Strategically, Japan continued to rely on ‘a combination of passive defence, semi-active defence and strategic accommodation, together with a complete dependence upon the United States for both strategic and tactical nuclear deterrence’.58 Japan’s defence capabilities and budget certainly grew over the period: the gross defence expenditure quadrupled from 1960 to 1970, although as a percentage of Gross National Product it fell from 1 per cent to 0.78 per cent and its share in the budget also declined. Nonetheless the 1967–71 Third Defence Build-Up Plan brought about a major increase in personnel, weaponry and equipment.59 Defence planning remained geared to strengthening conventional forces capable of defending Japanese mainland territory and its island perimeter. A policy of ‘minimum defence’ prevailed, however, until the new American policy, enunciated by President Nixon in 1969, of relinquishing its ‘Asian policeman’s’ role and throwing a greater burden of defence onto its Asian allies. The Japanese began to plan for ‘self-reliant defence’, again based on conventional defence forces. Australians continued to be wary of Japan and its military potential, but the official line remained that Japan was a friendly nation, with whom Australia consulted about important regional policy issues such as the stance towards communist China, and an important economic partner.60 Some enthusiasts saw Japan’s anti-communist alliance responsibilities going much further, and supported the inevitability of an expansion of Japanese defence beyond being a ‘home guard’. The Sydney Morning Herald, in its typical support of a tough conservative position, argued in 1958 that Japan, as a Vital anchor of the Pacific security system’, could not make an effective Pacific defence contribution ‘without a widening of the military responsibilities she is prepared to shoulder’.61 This view was not reflected in government policy, nor in general public attitudes and was certainly a radical statement at the time, even for the press. Indeed, it was not until a decade later that the Australian Government echoed such sentiments and even then, despite the international climate of great power withdrawal, it was highly controversial. Australia’s basic attitude on Japanese defence at the beginning of the 1960s was guided by the point made to Dulles in March 1951, that Japanese rearmament should be restricted. Japan in isolation was not considered a military threat, but could become so


if joining with others. The Defence Committee had expressed in 1953 a view on the level of Japanese armed forces (see above) and Cabinet in 1954, in its important decision to deal with Japan on the basis of friendly relations, accepted that ‘Australia should be guided by the principle of allowing Japan, through cooperation with non-Communist nations, to have reasonable facilities for taking part in her own defence…’.62 In response to inquiries from the Japanese Embassy in Canberra about Australian defence policy, the External Affairs view expressed was that Australia was anxious to see Japan with a stronger capacity for self-defence’.63 Further Japanese inquiries followed, and the Minister was told that ‘we are by no means averse to supplying this kind of information, subject to defence security requirements, and in the belief that this might lead to useful exchanges on a continuing basis’.64 Likewise, there was strong interest in finding out more about Japanese defence objectives,65 and broadly, Australia was content for Japan to proceed cautiously in defining its relations with the United States and other Western countries, particularly in the area of defence and security. Australia recognised in May 1962 the need to adjust its approach to Japan in the light of its increasing importance as a Pacific power, and to respond to Japan’s expressed desire to be closely associated with the West. Australia thus acknowledged that Japan should be treated ‘as a full partner’. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, this involved on Australia’s part much closer political cooperation, the exchange of political and intelligence information, and a more active information and cultural program. Australia’s security interests were seen as vitally affected by developments in Japan.66 Regular defence contacts with Japan were maintained. In July 1962 the first Maritime Self Defence Force squadron to visit Australia in peacetime since 1935 arrived for a goodwill visit. Australian ships had already been to Japan, but this training group was the first of many to develop naval contacts with Australia. These contacts emphasised the need for a realistic Australian policy on Japanese defence and bilateral defence relations. It was appreciated that future US and Australian policies would seek to make Japan an ally, but equally there was no indication that Japan would be prepared to commit itself to a formal anti-Chinese coalition.67 Japan’s regional role certainly grew in the 1960s, but it remained primarily one of trade, aid and investment. It joined the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) in June 1966 but was unhappy with the Council’s image of being an anti-communist alliance, notably in the context of the Vietnam War and the policy of containment. Foreign Minister Miki attempted unsuccessfully to inject some counterbalancing elements, by calling at the July 1967 meeting, for example, for peaceful coexistence with China. Miki was never enthusiastic about the Council’s contribution.68 It highlighted, amongst other things, different Australian and Japanese outlooks on relations with China. Japan preferred to give greater attention to the region’s economic councils and it was these matters that mainly influenced the development of Australia-Japan relations. The Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Shane Paltridge, visited Japan in February 1965, as part of an extensive tour of Southeast Asian nations and the United States. His journey was undertaken against a background of a heightening of tension between Indonesia and Malaysia and an Australian decision to commit troops to Borneo, as well as more serious developments in the fighting in South Vietnam (to

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which Australia was to commit a combat battalion in April 1965). Paltridge said that he was in Japan to sound out the Japanese on whether they might be able to contribute more to a Southeast Asia defence arrangement even, according to the AFR, ‘as a possible forerunner to eventually entering some firm alliance with the other Pacific powers’.69 This was reminiscent of the broad Pacific pact advocated by Dulles and rejected by Australia, but reflected the still-accepted notion, expressed in 1959 by the US Ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur, of Japan being ‘part of the island chain anchored at its Southern extremity by “our [the US’s] staunch allies” in SEATO. Japan lay abreast of the Communist world from Siberia down’.70 Paltridge had already said that a conflict involving Australia in Borneo might also bring in the ANZUS partners, and he wanted to find out for himself the attitude of the Japanese to a greater regional security role. Although he was the first Australian Defence Minister to visit Japan since the end of the Occupation, and was scheduled to meet Prime Minister Sato and senior ministers, he could not have made much progress in the talks there, for in his report to Parliament on 23 March 1965, he made no mention of his time in Japan at all, speaking only of his visit to Southeast Asia and the United States.71 Admittedly, visiting Southeast Asia and the United States was the main purpose of his tour, and in Tokyo he pledged that Australia would send more troops to Borneo if necessary, and even suggested that America could become involved in the Malaysia-Indonesia confrontation dispute if the ANZUS Pact were invoked.72 The problems of instability in Southeast Asia led to press speculation about Japan becoming an ally in future. Responding to a parliamentary question along these lines in September 1967, the Australian External Affairs Minister, Mr Hasluck, stated firmly that Australia was not in any form of military alliance with Japan, although he did stress the importance of the existing friendly relations.73 The Hasluck view is of interest, because he chose his words carefully and did not actually reject the concept of alliance, except in so far as it referred to some ‘military commitment’. He affirmed that Australia and Japan ‘have found a very close correspondence of view on many important matters affecting the region and the world generally’. The Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Japanese Armed Forces, General Amano Yoshifusa, however, was not obviously looking to the future when he had visited Australia only a few months previously for meetings of Australian and Japanese Chiefs of Staff. Amano was careful to say little about Australia-Japan defence relations, but did say that Japan was interested in the equipment standardisation program between Australia, the United States and its other allies: We are going to see how your standardisation is going on…In the case of Japan we are thinking about this. If necessary in the case of emergency we could exchange and supply each other with military equipment. Amano would not be drawn further on defence liaison or a defence treaty, other than to say ‘it is a matter for the future’.74


Despite Amano’s reluctance to commit himself, force standardisation was a significant aspect of bilateral defence relations, and it suggested that Japan was concerned about the whole question of future capabilities in the light of possible Chinese threats. Amano rejected any notion of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons in the near future,75 but the question still lingered about what an appropriate defence level should be for Japan, and how neighbours like Australia should respond. Certainly, Japan’s economic and industrial strength led to the development of arms and arms export industries, and Australia began to feel some competition in sales to Asia.76 But by the early 1970s there were even suggestions that Australia might purchase defence equipment (notably tanks and training aircraft) from Japan.77 This did not occur but it pointed to the potential for Japanese influence in the security area, even in spite of Japan’s rigid controls over arms exports (they could not go to communist nations, areas to which arms exports were banned by the United Nations, or to countries engaged in, or on the verge of, hostilities).78 In the late 1960s, however, the problems for Japan in the region were still ones of economic diplomacy and, as the influential Australian journalist Max Suich pointed out, the Japanese preferred it that way. ‘On regional policies’, Suich added, ‘Japan is most wary of occasional Australian suggestions that they should become some kind of joint policemen of South-East Asia’.79 Yet that is precisely what the Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr Gordon Freeth, proposed in a major speech in September 1969. Addressing an American-Australian Association luncheon in New York on 18 September, Mr Freeth explained that Japan’s growing importance in Asia carried with it expectations of a commensurate role in other areas: indeed, he said, we should expect ‘greater political responsibilities in regard to the affairs of the region’ [from Japan]. Specifically on defence, Mr Freeth stated that I would hope that the time will come when Japan could play a greater part in stabilising the region in a way which would make effective use of undoubted Japanese strength without appearing to present a danger to any of the countries in the region.80 By the standards of the day—an era of the new Nixon Doctrine, the impending withdrawal of British forces from Asia in 1971, a bitter conflict in Vietnam—this was reasonably consistent with previous statements about Japan’s defence, as we have seen above. But perhaps because of the great changes taking place in the region, it was a provocative statement. It came soon after a speech by Mr Fairhall, the Minister for Defence, on 7 July 1969 in which he had also urged greater Japanese regional defence commitments: The growing industrial power of Japan needs little comment. Meantime, she is restricted to military forces for home defence. But these, too, are growing and there is room for confidence that, within measurable time, Japan might be prepared to throw her considerable weight and influence into joint machinery for the preservation of peace and security in the South-East Asian region generally.81 This was, in fact, a far stronger statement than Freeth’s although it received less publicity. Fairhall was more specific about the time frame (‘within measurable time’) and spoke of a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia that Freeth did not.

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Fairhall was roundly and rightly, criticised by the AFR for ignoring the realities of Japanese domestic politics and Japan’s defence capacity let alone regional sensibilities about the reappearance of Japanese forces in Asia. Freeth was likewise criticised for ignoring the practicalities of an enhanced Japanese military presence.82 The Japanese themselves were committed to a greater diplomatic and aid effort in Asia, and a growing defence budget to offset in a small way the withdrawal of American conventional military presence. This was to some extent a response to US pressure for Tokyo to do more in defence in the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine. But Japanese public and political opinion was still well behind that of Freeth and Fairhall on the question of a military role in Asia. Freeth added that he thought it inevitable that Japan would seek to exercise a greater influence over the defence and security of the region. However, he said, ‘I don’t suggest that Japan take a dominant role in the region’.83 While that may have been Freeth’s intention, having Japan as a regional military power would not be in Australia’s best interests, as Peter Robinson in the AFR pointed out: …if, through circumstances totally unconnected with Australian desires, Japan ever did become a military power, Australia would not be an ally of equal rank but would barely rate as a subaltern—slightly above the private soldiers of the region represented by the less developed countries.84 The Japanese response to the Fairhall/Freeth proposals was that Japan had clear constitutional limits to its defence policy. The Japanese Ambassador to Australia, Mr Saito Shizuo, declared unequivocally that Japan not only should not, but could not, engage in any overseas military role. Former Japanese Prime Minister Mr Kishi indicated that a peacekeeping role was an option, but the essential message was that Japan’s role in Southeast Asia was one of contributing to security through economic growth.85 The problem remained, however, that Japan was heading towards a regional leadership status, in which the peace, security and prosperity of the Pacific were to be paramount. The return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 was a landmark in US-Japan relations, and part of Japan’s drive to restore its sovereignty over Japanese territory. But with the continuing presence of US military bases on Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, the US-Japan security alliance remained tight, and no wider discussion about regional security arrangements was taken up. Official Australian policy, despite the urgings of Fairhall and Freeth, remained that ‘Japanese rearmament should be within a framework of international co-operation’.86 REAFFIRMING CAUTION The relatively aggressive stance on the need for a Japanese regional security role, adopted by Ministers Fairhall and Freeth, did not endure for long. Only a few months later (on 19 March 1970 in a statement to Parliament) the new Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr William McMahon, set out a more considered policy, declaring that Australia understood and respected Japan’s reluctance to assume a military role beyond self-defence. He saw Japan’s ‘decisive contribution’ coming from its promotion of industrial and commercial growth in the region.87 This statement


removed Australia from any position of pressuring Japanese policy; of placing expectations from within the region upon Japan. McMahon was able to discuss these matters with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr Aichi, who visited in June 1970.88 The governments approach seemed to be to support Japan’s growing defence program by explaining the reasons for it, while making no public demands on the Japanese. Thus McMahon, by then Australia’s Prime Minister, in a widely-reported speech to a conference on Australia-Japan relations in June 1971, spent time explaining Japan’s defence policy and budget, and indicating that Japan was in a vulnerable position adjacent to China. He also repeated that Australia understood Japan’s desire to retain a purely self-defence profile.89 If this sounded like Australian support for Japan’s new defence expansion plans, it clearly was; for a prime minister to go out of his way to explain and justify the defence policy of another country was something of an extraordinary event. While it reaffirmed Australia’s policy of not forcing the Japanese into new defence activities, it marked a new stage for Australia in its acceptance of the direction of Japanese defence build-up. The Minister for Defence, Mr Malcolm Fraser, also took a softer line in discussing Japanese defence in a statement to Parliament in March 1970. While hinting that Japan would soon be playing a ‘progressive and constructive part in Asia, he went no further —certainly not as far as his predecessor Mr Fairhall—except to admit that ‘some kind of break with the postwar era is developing…she has a substantial interest in the stability of the area, primarily because of trade activities. While the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam, claimed that Fraser was proposing some sort of interventionist military role for Japan and pointed out the contradiction between Fraser and the stance of the External Affairs Minister, Fraser pointed out expanded Australia-Japan links and indicated that Australia ‘understands and respects’ the Japanese policy of self-defence only.90 But Fraser certainly did not repeat what Fairhall had said only nine months previously. There was a slight hitch to this stand-off policy when Mr Freeth, appointed as the new Australian Ambassador to Japan, was misquoted as urging Japan to rearm. While McMahon defended his Ambassador in Parliament, 91 the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Whitlam, in effect supported the government’s position on the importance of encouraging Japan’s non-military contribution to the region, although the left wing of the Labor Party spoke out vehemently in 1971 of the dangers to Australia of a remilitarised Japan. Tom Uren, a former prisoner-of-war of the Japanese, declared he was ‘shocked and ashamed’ that there had been no public outcry over Japan’s new Fourth Defence Build-Up Plan. Uren went on to say that Australians ‘will rue the day when Japan rearms’: Australia can benefit and develop only from peaceful co-operation with Japan. But I feel that the remilitarisation of Japan is a danger to Australia because within Japan and within Germany still remain the roots of Fascism. 92 This was bitter comment and possibly reflected the view of many Australians. Uren accused the government of seeking a new ally in a ‘remilitarised Japan’. This challenge in Uren’s statement was not taken up by the government; McMahon fending

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off a question from Dr Cairns on the same subject in May 1971. The then Foreign Minister, Mr Bury, in his major policy statement on 6 April, concerned himself with Japan’s ‘positive and co-operative political role’ in Asia, citing Japanese initiatives for the Jakarta Conference on Cambodia in May 1970. When asked about the Uren/ Cairns arguments, Bury repeated the standard line about Japan’s defensive policy and pacifist sentiment. Bury was quite gushing when asked if Japan could again become an imperialist power in Asia: …they are sensible, friendly and interested in assisting life generally in that part of the world in which we live. In fact their attitude is beneficent. 93 That comment more or less summed up the uncritical attitude of the McMahon government’s approach to Japanese defence. The advent of the Labor government in December 1972 brought little change in stated policy, although it was based on a rather more careful assessment of Japan’s options, especially as regards China. While Whitlam had to contend with left-wing antagonism towards Japan, he himself took an optimistic approach. As Sissons has noted, ‘in office Mr Whitlam reiterated on numerous occasions his conviction that the intentions of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people were, and would continue to be, peaceful’.94 He offered Australia’s support in gaining access to necessary raw materials to avoid any tendency to militarism. In his address to the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee meeting in Tokyo on October 1973 he used the words which his Labor Party successors under Prime Minister Hawke also adopted as a philosophical buttress in their policy on Japanese defence: ‘I believe that Japan is determined—the Japanese Government and the Japanese people—are determined to be the first great industrial power to break the nexus between economic strength and military strength’.95 How (or indeed whether) to match defence capacity to its economic, industrial and political strength has been the perennial difficulty for Japanese defence planners and politicians. The standard approach has been to stick fairly rigidly to a restricted view of self-defence, and not exceed constitutional limits on the exercise of self-defence despite a growing imbalance between economic/political and defence power. Not until the 1980s were there serious attempts by the Japanese Government to extend the meaning of ‘defence’, and that was under consistent American pressure to ‘pull their weight’. The nexus argument was a powerful one and suited Whitlam’s respect for historical precedent. The times were also different from those of fifteen years later, when Hawke could on the one hand urge Japan to break the nexus, and on the other support a growing Japanese defence program and an enhanced Japanese military role in world affairs. Pressure from both the United States and its allies like Australia began to mount from the middle of the 1970s for Japan to accept greater responsibility for its own defence. This grew from the time of the Nixon Doctrine but gained momentum from the argument that Japan was growing prosperous on American defence guarantees, while the US economy began to recede after Vietnam and the oil crisis. The ‘free ride’ thesis became a popular stick with which to push for a greater Japanese effort,


and it appeared in Australia as well. The new Leader of the Opposition in Canberra, Mr Billy Snedden, said that Japan should pay a greater share of the cost of regional security. He added that Japan’s build-up ‘should be confined to within Japan’: …Japan has enjoyed the luxury of not devoting resources to defence, or at least only a very small proportion of its resources. At present, it doesn’t bear anything like its share of the world security burden…they can’t throw a moat around themselves without picking up some of the tab for the region’s peace and security. 96 The press labelled this as ‘militaristic didacticism’ and ‘crassly inappropriate’,97 and so it was, but there was no denying that increased public attention in Australia was focussed on Japan’s growing defence program, which gained greater overseas attention by the active encouragement of defence expansion under the Fourth Defence Build-up Plan by the Director-General of the Defence Agency (in effect, the Defence Minister) between 1970 and 1971, Mr Nakasone. Sissons has discussed the greater attention given to the possibility that Japan would be a likely threat to Australia; these scenarios were not connected with any policy shift towards Japan on the part of the government, but had to do with a reshaping of Australian defence policy. Japan as a threat was given no such credence in a parliamentary assessment of threats, published in 1981.98 The Fraser years saw a changing climate internationally about Japan’s role. Fraser was concerned most with Soviet expansionism and wanted to see Japan play its part in the Western alliance.99 The way Fraser approached this was to stress the common interests of Australia and Japan, which included most importantly, their alliances with the United States and ‘an active American interest in the pursuit of peace’, as well as interests in peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and freedom of Southeast Asia from domination by any great power.100 Fraser also acknowledged that Japan was fundamental to Australia’s ‘security’ interests alongside its political and economic interests: this was because of its relationship with the great powers. It reflected advice that the Myer Committee on Australia-Japan relations had put forward in late 1977, to the effect that Australia should ‘support Japan’s maintenance of a credible selfdefence capacity, but make clear Australia’s view that any expansion of the existing capacity should not weaken Japan’s defence alliance with the United States’.101 As a consequence of the difficulties in Western relations with the Soviet Union, Japan came to gain admittance to the club of ‘Western democracies’, referred to as the ‘Western alliance’, especially after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. With the visit of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko to Washington in May 1981, a new division of labour in regional defence and security became clear, including a Japanese commitment to defence of the sea lanes of communication adjacent to Japan: …in ensuring peace and stability in the region and the defence of Japan (the two nations) acknowledge the desirability of an appropriate division of roles between Japan and the United States.

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The Prime Minister stated that Japan on its own initiative and in accordance with its constitution and basic defence policy will seek to make even greater efforts for improving its defence capabilities in Japanese territories and in its surrounding sea and air space, and for further alleviating the financial burdens of United States forces in Japan. 102 Prime Minister Suzuki also used for the first time the term ‘alliance’ (domei) to describe Japan’s relations with the United States. However, this accord came after sustained pressure from the US administration for Japan to take a greater share of the joint defence burden. The Japanese Government was worried by the rapid pace of Japan’s acquiescence to US demands, and Suzuki in fact indicated that he was unhappy with the communique that he and President Reagan had issued. The confusion led to the Japanese Foreign Minister’s resignation, but the basic problem of interpretation of the communique remained. The United States necessarily saw the document as part of its public stance (and that of its allies) towards the Soviet Union. It was also linked to American pressure on Japan to rearm more quickly. The Japanese differed on how far they had committed themselves to a Western alliance position. The Chief Cabinet Secretary called the American demands ‘unreasonable’ and a variance of views remained about fundamental issues of defence strategy and defence cooperation, at least until the replacement of Suzuki as Prime Minister by Nakasone Yasuhiro in October 1982. It would seem that Australia was also involved in pressuring Japan to do more in defence, at least to the level agreed on by Suzuki, including sea-lane defence. The Australian response was, in fact, to support this US push, although not openly or bluntly. Official statements stressed the need for maintaining links with Japan ‘in a trilateral framework, with the U.S. playing the major part’.103 Australia played down Suzuki’s regional security push, preferring to argue for Japan to restrict its security role to its own waters, with the United States as the strategic power in the wider Pacific. The Foreign Minister, Mr Street, stated in October 1982 that Australia and Japan should develop views in consultation as Western powers in the Pacific, and indicated that they had ‘sought better understanding of each other’s approaches to security, especially when government statements in Japan were suggesting that self-defence may involve protection of foreign-flag ships carrying commodities to Japan’.104 At a practical level, Japan became involved in the RIMPAC naval exercises in early 1980, a joint effort involving the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. This brought Japan directly into Western alliance military coordination, although within the framework of the US-Japan relationship.105 The Australian Government changed in March 1983 with the election of a Labor government under Mr Bob Hawke, but not before an important change took place in Japan’s approach to its defence commitments. Under Mr Nakasone, a much closer alignment of views with the United States was initiated, notably during Nakasone’s visit to Washington in January 1983. At his first meeting with President Reagan, Mr Nakasone confirmed the military nature of the alliance with the United States


and deemed their ties ‘a fateful destiny’. He confirmed Japan’s role in Western efforts to counter the apparent Soviet threat and characterised Japan as ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier’ (fuchin kubo). Nakasone also likened Japan to a ‘shield’ against the Soviet Union in front of America’s ‘spear’. Many in Japan were concerned at this overt anti-Soviet stance, and especially Nakasone’s declaration that, in an emergency, Japan would want to control the straits around Japan to prevent the passage of Soviet vessels. Despite the controversy, Nakasone’s statements registered Japan firmly as a member of the Western camp. Under Nakasone, Japan’s defence policy became much more outward-looking. Specifically and firstly, stronger US-Japan defence cooperation got under way, including tactical command and manoeuvres, defence technology exchange, a commitment to stronger anti-Soviet cooperation, and a Japanese commitment to become involved in Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative. Second, Japan accepted a commitment for a limited regional defence and security role, based on the agreement to patrol the sea-lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. This is interpreted by the Defence Agency as involving ‘not the defence of a restricted area of ocean by Japan, but assurance of the safety of maritime passage by the broad cumulative effect of joint activities by the Maritime Self-Defence Force and the US Navy’. Third, budgetary action to improve Japan’s maritime and air defence capability eventually pushed defence spending over the politically determined limit of 1 per cent of GNP. Increases of 6–7 per cent annually in defence allocation from the General Account budget occurred from 1980. The 1 per cent of GNP barrier to defence expenditure laid down by the government in 1976 was broken in the fiscal 1987 budget under Prime Minister Nakasone, although there is ongoing debate over the actual level of Japanese defence expenditure. Arguments that Japan should be playing a wider regional collective security role have been developed by some American and Japanese analysts. Thus William Tow advocated ‘a revived ANZUS with Japanese ties’, and Yatsuhiro Nakagawa went further to suggest a ‘West Pacific Treaty Organisation’, Japan’s integration with NATO and a US-JapanKorea alliance. Tow also saw scope for a wider range of defence cooperation than had been contemplated by Australia and Japan, notably technology development, antisubmarine techniques, hydrography, lasers, sonar and the like. This was put in terms of the ‘replenishment of ANZUS’. Likewise, the concept of comprehensive security has attractions for the Japanese, involving as it does a mix of policies covering several aspects of Japan’s security.106 While official Japanese policy eschews a collective security function on the basis of current constitutional interpretation, the Peace Problems Research Council reached a position in its 1985 report to Nakasone which could allow for such a collective defence role. It argued that the force of habit in defence policy needs to be broken, that Japan should adopt a more positive world role commensurate with its national power, and should consider, amongst other things, ‘the most effective method for the defense of the sealanes’. Mr Nakasone, judging by a 1978 article of his, was also prepared to approach the definition of ‘self-defence’ in a highly flexible manner, for ‘as long as we restrict ourselves to defense we will have to conduct ourselves in keeping with the circumstances’.

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THE LABOR RESPONSE The Australian Government under Mr Hawke was the first Australian administration since the mid–1950s to have a clear, articulated and reasonably unequivocal policy on Japanese defence. The problems of the previous government’s lack of a firm policy were demonstrated by the new Australian Ambassador’s response to a question about Japanese defence when taking up his post in December 1982, before the election of the Hawke Labor government. Sir Neil Currie declined to comment, saying that ‘since no Australian Minister had enunciated a clear policy on the issue, he felt it beyond his duty to suggest what Canberra’s attitude might be’.107 Yet at the same time the calls for Japan to join ANZUS were continuing, one writer suggesting that it was a logical step for Japan to take, despite resistance to the idea in Japan.108 Initially, statements by the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, were cautious, warning against rapid or sudden changes or movements in force structure that might suggest ‘a regional security role’. This cautious approach was adjusted during visits to Japan by Mr Hawke in February 1984 and to Australia by Mr Nakasone in January 1985. Mr Hawke admitted that both countries have ‘similar perceptions of the security and strategic interests of our region’. He supported Japan’s ‘contribution to Western strategic interests through its self-defence forces and the provision of bases for the United States in Japan’.109 Like its predecessors, the Hawke Government’s attitude towards Japan’s defence buildup was based on the notion that Australia and Japan share a common treaty partner in the United States. But the practical implications for Australia were not clearly delineated. In 1983 Mr Hawke said that, despite the free ride argument, the domestic constraints on Japan’s policy could not be ignored and that Australia was sensitive to these.110 The Hawke Government accepted a strategic scenario in September 1983 that opposed ‘the extension of Japanese defence activity into our region’,111 but there was little expansion of the argument about common security interests (for example, in relation to security for Pacific resource shipping routes), except Mr Hayden’s statement that Australia had sympathy for the Japanese position (on re-equipment of its forces) ‘in the face of Soviet provocation, including the continued occupation of and a military build-up on the Northern Territories Islands and its deployment of large numbers of SS20 intermediate range missiles in the Soviet Far East’.112 Despite acceptance of Japan taking on a greater share of its own defence burden, and a steady development of Japan’s regional presence, the Hawke government maintained opposition to a Japanese regional defence role or a change in the structure of the Japanese defence forces. As Mr Hayden expressed it in 1984, they would be concerned if the structure were ‘to clearly establish a capacity for a long distance projection in an attack mode’.113 The government certainly recognised the pressures that might fall on Japan from political sensitivities on trade and defence in the United States, including calls for Japan to share more of the cost of the Western security umbrella, to replace some of the American regional military presence, extending beyond the present 1,000 miles defence zone concept, or to carry out more of the West’s defence research and development. Mr


Hayden urged maintenance of the status quo, and for Japan to take a non-military route to its Asia Pacific leadership role: [Japan’s] role, regionally and globally, is now rapidly evolving in ways that challenge traditional assumptions. It challenges historical experience which has suggested hitherto that, in order to be a major power and recognised by others as such, a country needs to be a major military power. Japan is proving that this is no longer the case. It is thereby pointing the world in a new and more positive direction. Japan, in fact, is now playing an increasingly vital role in maintaining the security of the Asia-Pacific region through its growing trade, aid and investment activities in the region.114 Thus the government, in addition to the press and other commentators, was roundly critical of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Howard, when he called for Australian support for a Japanese defence build-up. In Tokyo in March 1988, Mr Howard proposed a more cooperative defence relationship between Japan, Australia and the United States, ‘a triangular political-security relationship’.115 As newspapers pointed out, Mr Howard went further than any previous Australian political leader in seeking to promote closer security links with Japan. Indeed, he went further than any leader in the region.116 Peter Robinson declared that Howard was ‘totally out of his depth’. Mr Hayden said ‘it was extraordinarily indiscreet and certainly thoroughly insensitive’.117 The Howard initiative came to nought. As it was, he was at odds with the Chairman of the Opposition’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Senator Robert Hill, who viewed ‘with reservation’ a significant military build-up by Japan.118 The official government line was restated by Senator Gareth Evans (who became Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade in September 1988) as follows: …We believe that the most effective way in which Japan can enhance regional security and stability is through its capacity as an economic power to act as an engine of growth for the region through trade, investment and aid programs. We believe that it would be far more in the national and international interest for that particular line of approach to be adopted rather than for us to see the kind of excursion into the military area and defence cooperation that the Leader of the Opposition embarked upon.119 The Australian position was that the role for Japan described by Evans was the preferred path, but that any enlarged Japanese defence role should be ‘in the context of a tight integration with the Western alliance and in the context of collective perceptions about what serves the security interests of this region’.120 In September 1990 Mr Hawke proposed that Japan was entitled to a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations as a mark of the greater world leadership that was Japan’s ‘as of right’. However, said Mr Hawke, Japanese leadership should not extend to a greater military role in the Pacific.121 MOVING TOWARDS GREATER DEFENCE COOPERATION The Labor approach to defence relations with Japan was one of close consultation but advocacy of a cautious Japanese expansion of defence strength and reach. The notion of the Western alliance was still strongly held in Canberra, despite the changes in the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trades submission to the Senate inquiry on Japanese defence policy in November 1992, where Australia and Japan

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were described as the ‘southern and northern “anchors” of the Western alliance in the Western Pacific’,122 an image that harked back to the original Dulles concept of a Pacific island chain of collective defence stretching from Japan to Australia and New Zealand. There was greater bilateral dialogue on defence matters, the Department acknowledged, but ‘there is no crushing imperative to rush into formal practical defence cooperation with Japan’.123 Nonetheless, partly as a result of the perception that Australia could assist Japan in playing a stronger global leadership role, the two countries were in 1996 closely involved in defence cooperation at both policy and practical levels. Prime Minister Keating’s visit to Japan in September 1992 saw a reaffirmation of the Australia-Japan-United States linkage through their respective security treaties, and their contribution to regional security, including Japan’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping activities.124 The same message was put by Keating in his May 1995 visit, adding that the security links with Japan did not have to be treated with any great sensitivity in Australia, a response to opposition from the Returned Servicemen’s League to the idea of expanded defence cooperation with Japan. ‘Fifty years is a long time’, he added. A separate message he put to the Japanese Government consistently was about the need to apologise and be honest about the mistakes of the past.125 These were the formalities, and the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, had put a franker Australian view the previous year. In explaining away Japan’s excesses of its imperialist period as simply Japan’s copying the actions of the European powers, Senator Evans rationalised the past in a way no Japanese minister had been able to do. He went further in arguing that Japan needed ‘to be encouraged to develop politically and militarily according to newer concepts of security—like “common security” and “collective security” —that are likely to determine the shape of the 21st century, rather than according to those that shaped this century or the last’.126 Evans acknowledged that Australia was now ‘well and truly engaged’ in dialogue on security matters in general and regional security issues in particular. Australia strongly supported Japan’s efforts in the Gulf War and Japan’s decision to take part in UN peacekeeping operations. It also supported Japanese proposals to upgrade the ASEAN post-ministerial talks to include political and security dialogue.127 These approaches were in line with Australia’s strategic planning for the 1990s, as spelled out in a government paper of 1989 released in September 1992. That document suggested that Australia’s strategic interests required, amongst other things, the need to ‘initiate consultations with Japan to explore possible avenues for defence cooperation in order to engage Japan constructively on regional strategic issues’. It was also noted that Australia was unlikely to support other general security agreements apart from those it already had, but that ‘less formal cooperative arrangements may…emerge in specific areas of shared security concern’, including the relationship with Japan.128 A 1993 strategic review also stressed the need for some substantial defence contacts with the major Asian powers, based on shared strategic interests.129 The most public statement of Australia’s interest in closer defence relations with Japan came with the visit of Senator Robert Ray, Australian Minister for Defence, to Japan in September 1992. During that visit (widely and incorrectly touted as the first visit of an Australian defence minister to Japan), and a return visit following that of the Japanese


Defence Minister to Australia in May 1990, agreement was reached to increase defence contacts between the two countries, possibly even instituting annual defence talks. Discussions also focussed on the possibility of regional collective security arrangements, although Senator Ray acknowledged that these might take time to implement. The press reported the possibility of joint exercises between Australia and Japan, which could be held in Australia. While the Minister did not rule this out at the time, it was clearly not on a current agenda (and was later denied as a possibility by Senator Ray), even though there is some limited bilateral naval cooperation taking place.130 The way was therefore opened for expanded bilateral defence cooperation, and Ray made it clear that Japan would become a regular stopping-off point for Australian defence ministers. Australian and Japanese defence officials had already increased their cooperative contacts since the 1980s. There had been ongoing meetings, such as the visit of the Australian RAAF Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Evans, in July 1984.131 But in May 1990 came the first visit to Australia by a Japanese defence minister, when Mr Ishikawa Yozo spent two days in Canberra. This followed travel to Tokyo by Chiefs of the Air Staff and Royal Australian Navy in 1989 and April 1990, respectively. There were also staff college placements and policy planning discussions between foreign ministries, which have been in place for many years. Australian strategic intelligence experts and the Chief of the Defence Force Staff also went to Tokyo in early 1990 and the Chairman of Japan’s Joint Staff Council, General Terashima Taizo, reciprocated in October 1990, the first visitor at that military level since 1982. The growing level of bilateral cooperation was highlighted by a report in February 1993 confirming a Defence Department offer to Japan of testing areas for Japanese weapons in South Australia and Victoria. A Japanese team visited the sites. In a separate but related development, in July 1994 Cabinet approved the use of Woomera Rocket Range as a testing site for space vehicles developed by Japan for scientific purposes. Testing of an umanned space re-entry vehicle (ALFLEX) took place at Woomera in 1996.132 These activities were consistent with the Australian Government’s message about cooperation, consultation and ‘a tighter integration with the Western alliance’, a message reaffirmed by the Howard government in 1996.133 The annual meetings of defence officials and annual ‘high level’ defence consultations agreed on (previously held every two years) during Senator Ray’s visit to Japan in September 1992 helped to institutionalise the mechanisms of closer defence relations, and consolidate the strategic agreement and defence cooperation between the ‘southern and northern anchors’ of the Western Pacific alliance. In February 1996 the first annual official-level talks on politico-military matters were held in Tokyo, following an Australian suggestion. They involved two sets of talks, politico-military and military-military, and raised bilateral discussions to a new level in policy alignment. This policy approach to closer Asian defence ties was reflected in Australia’s 1994 Defence White Paper, and statements by senior defence officials.134 The report on Japan’s defence and security by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was also supportive of expanded defence ties: ‘the Committee believes that long term policies should be developed to enhance bilateral defence links in a practical way’. Further, the Committee specifically said it did not reject the notion of joint military

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exercises.135 This inquiry was the first such dedicated hearing into Japanese defence and security by the Australian Parliament, and the report echoed the government’s approach of engaging Japan in a more constructive leadership role in the region as the best way to encourage Japan to maximise its security interests. Under the Howard government, defence and security cooperation has been increasingly emphasised. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, received wide attention for his remarks on a visit to Tokyo in June 1996 urging closer Australia-Japan defence ties and a stronger security role for Japan in the Asian region.136 This theme was taken up by Mr Howard when he and Mr Hashimoto met in Canberra in April 1997. Howard said that ‘increasingly, both the Japanese Prime Minister and I see the defence relationship as becoming part of the bilateral association, although he was careful enough of public opinion to stress that it should be allowed to evolve; he did not see it ‘dramatically accelerating’.137 A further exchange of defence ministers took place in late 1997 and early 1998, with annual meetings foreshadowed.138 The clear recognition of shared regional security interests that involve not just Southeast Asia but the whole Asia Pacific region, has encouraged deliberate and careful construction of strategic and defence collaboration, indeed since 1990 ‘an increasing pattern of intimacy and regularity and substance in our contact and dialogue’.139 CONCLUSION Defence relations between Australia and Japan have clearly advanced well beyond the limits originally envisaged in initial prime ministerial contacts between the two countries, even though there is no formal security relationship, as proposed by the United States for the Pacific defence pact, an ‘alliance’ with Japan that Australia did not want. Yet the objectives of current cooperation remain essentially the same as the tentative discussions in 1957: to keep the region stable and safe (from communism then, but from other threats today), to represent the close identity of interests in regional policy between Australia and Japan, and as a mark at that time of growing friendship and now of retaining firm friendship. The difference today, of course, is that Japan is now a nation of considerable military strength and with great potential for a security impact in the region; it is therefore in Australia’s interests to retain its strong relationship with Japan. Given the history of Australia’s relations with Japan, military cooperation is the form of policy coordination most symbolic of a fundamental change in Australia’s approach. It was always thus, a policy hard to sell publicly, but necessary to prove friendship. NOTES 1 2

Some of these issues are covered in Henry P.Frei, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1991. Australian, 17–18 October 1992. For a helpful survey of Asia Pacific security arrangements, see William T.Tow, ‘Contending security approaches in the Asia-Pacific region’, Security Studies, vol. 3, no. 1, Autumn 1993, pp. 75–116.

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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Norman Harper, ‘Australian policy towards Japan’, Australian Outlook, December 1947, pp. 14–24. For details of the origins and negotiation of the ANZUS Treaty, see Robin Kay (ed.), Documents on New Zealand External Relations Volume III, The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Government Printer, Wellington, 1985 (hereafter Kay, Anzus Pact), documents 191 and 202. Also see P.C.Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1969, and Philip Dorling, The Origins of the ANZUS Treaty: A Reconsideration, Flinders Politics Monograph no. 4, Flinders University, Bedford Park, 1989. Dorling’s book discusses in detail the link between the Treaty and the wider security issue of the Middle East. Two other good studies, although with a New Zealand emphasis, are Ann Trotter, New Zealand and Japan 1945–1952: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty, Athlone Press, London, 1990; and W.David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-making, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945–55, Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 1995. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951, vol. VI, p. 140. FRUS, 1951, VI, pp. 132–3. FRUS, 1951, VI, p. 137. FRUS, 1951, VI, pp. 154–5. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 230; FRUS, 1951, VI, p. 150. Kay, ANZUS Pact, documents 226 and 231. FRUS, 1951, VI, p. 158. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 231, p. 632. FRUS, 1951, VI, p.165; Kay, ANZUS Pact, pp. 606–7 (Document 226). US Pact, pp. 606–7 (Document 226). FRUS, 1951, VI, pp. 170–71. Australian, 17–18 October 1992. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 215. For an analysis of some aspects of the background to this thinking, see Lester J.Foltos, ‘The new Pacific barrier: America’s search for security in the Pacific, 1945–47’, Diplomatic History, vol. 13, no. 3, Summer 1989, pp. 317–42. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 216. Kay, ANZUS Pact, p. 609. FRUS, 1951, vol. VI, p. 166. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 263. Kay, ANZUS Pact, Document 264. AA, A1838/1, 3103/10/4 part 1, 3 March 1960 and 7 March 1960. FRUS, 1951, VI, p. 178. FRUS, 1951, VI, p. 207 and pp. 219–20. Sydney Morning Herald, 25 July 1951. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 212, 14 March 1951, p. 468. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 213, 10 July 1951, p. 1190. W.Macmahon Ball, ‘The Peace Treaty with Japan’, Australian Outlook, vol. 5, no. 3, September 1951, pp. 129–39. D.C.S. Sissons, ‘The Pacific Pact’, Australian Outlook, vol. 6, no. 1, March 1952, p. 25.

172 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57

58

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The Australia–Japan political alignment FRUS, 1952–54, XII, p. 212. FRUS, 1952–54, XII, p. 962. FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, p. 408. FRUS, 1952–54, XIV, p. 409. Sydney Morning Herald, 10 March 1954. Current Notes on International Affairs, March 1954, p. 189. AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 5. Sydney Morning Herald, 13 March 1954. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 May 1953 and 1 September 1953. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 July 1954. Sydney Morning Herald, 29 September 1953. Melbourne Herald, 8 April 1953. Current Notes on International Affairs, September 1955, p. 629. Norman Harper, ‘Australia and Regional Pacts, 1950–57’, Australian Outlook, vol. 12, no. 1, March 1958, pp. 3–22. Brian Beddie, ‘Problems of Australian foreign policy, July-December 1957’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 3, no. 2, May 1958, p. 149. Cabinet Minute NO.2 (PM), 17 August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 1. Ministers Brief, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7, referring to Menzies’ discussion in December 1957 with Prime Minister Kishi. Plimsolls discussion with Uyama, 4 January 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Appendix L, ‘Inclusion of Japan in S.E.A.T.O.’ part of Submission 30 on Australian policy towards Japan’, August 1954, AA, A4906/XM1, vol. 1. AA, A1838/277, 3103/9/3/8. National Security Council 5429/5, FRUS, 1952–54, XII, p. 1066. 4 January 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. Uyama conversation with Plimsoll, 7 January 1957, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 4. AA, A816/1, 19/304/454. Minister’s Brief, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Reference: Japan, Official Hansard Report, Government Printer, Canberra, 1972, p. 428. No mention of a Japanese defence attache was included in the Japanese Government’s Shokuinroku (staff list), until the 1977 edition, which referred to positions as at July 1976. A military attache at the Japanese Embassy in Canberra (Mr Terai) was listed. See Thomas Havens, Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan 1965–1975, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987; Masayo Shiraishi, Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951– 1987, Southeast Asia Papers, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990. Makoto Momoi, ‘Japan’s defence policies: some background concepts in the 1970s’, in J.A.A.Stockwin (ed.), Japan and Australia in the Seventies, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972, pp. 107–8. Frank Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1973, pp. 116–19. Garfield Barwick, Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, in Current Notes on International Affairs, July 1962, p. 37.

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72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93

Sydney Morning Herald, 31 March 1958. Australian Attitude towards Japanese Security Arrangements, 12 September 1958, AA, A1838/ T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Quinn, 22 July 1958, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Minister’s Brief, March 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Watt to Secretary, no. 803, 31 July 1958, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Australian Policy Towards Japan, 21 May 1962, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 9. J.D.B.Miller, ‘Future Australian security’, Australian Outlook, vol. 18, no. 2, 1964, pp. 182– 3. Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, pp. 188–9. Australian Financial Review, 5 February 1965. MacArthur to Casey, March 1959, AA, A1838/T184, 3103/10/1 part 7. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, vol. S28, 1965, pp. 41–4. The Paltridge visit to Japan was poorly reported in the press as well, and one suspects that it was played down to avoid public criticism. Australian, 6 February 1965; Courier-Mail, 6 February 1965. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 28 September 1967, p. 1441. Australian Financial Review, 28 June 1967. Australian Financial Review, 10 August 1967. Australian Financial Review, 5 March and 29 July 1968, 7 October 1969. Australian Financial Review, 6 January 1972. Australian Financial Review, 29 July 1968. Australian Financial Review, 18 April 1968. Current Notes on International Affairs, April 1969, p. 527. Australian Financial Review, 4 August 1969. Australian Financial Review, 26 September 1969. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 40, no. 9, September 1969, p. 533. Australian Financial Review, 26 September 1969. Australian Financial Review, 2 and 16 October 1969. Australian Financial Review, 12 December 1969. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 41, no. 3, March 1970. The Japanese Ambassador of the period, Mr Saito Shizuo, discusses the visit of Mr Aichi, placing it in the context of greater expectations arising from the region on Japan to play a more constructive role, and a desire by Australia to see a more solid relationship with Japan. Saito claims the visit was important in consolidating closer relations between the two countries. See his Osutoraria tsushin, Tokyo, Kokusai kaihatsu janarusha, pp. 98–101. The speech is printed in Stockwin, Japan and Australia in the Seventies, pp. 1–9. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 66, 10 March 1970, pp. 233, 678 and 752–3. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 66, 8 April 1970, p. 812. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, vol. 72, 3 May 1971, pp. 2399– 400. Current Notes on International Affairs, vol. 42, no. 5, reporting TV interview on 17 May 1971.

174 94 95 96 97 98

99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106

107 108

109

110 111 112 113 114 115 116

The Australia–Japan political alignment ‘Japan in W.J.Hudson (ed.), Australia in World Affairs 1971–1975, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 260–65. Keynote address to the Second Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee Meeting, 29 October 1973, Australian Foreign Affairs Record, vol. 44, no. 11, November 1973, p. 756. Australian Financial Review, 13 July 1973. Australian Financial Review, 17 July 1973. Sissons, in Australia in World Affairs 1971–1975; Australian Financial Review, 13 February 1974; Canberra Times, 15 February 1975; Parliamentary Paper, Threats to Australia’s Security: their nature and probability, 1981, pp. 37–8. Hugh Smith, ‘Defence policy’ in P.J.Boyce and J.R.Angel (eds), Independence and Alliance: Australia in World Affairs 1976–80, pp. 41–57. Age, 3 July 1976. Australia-Japan Relations: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978, p. 88. Australian Financial Review, 11 May 1981. Fedor Mediansky, ‘Problems in Australian foreign policy, January-June 1981’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 27, no. 3, December 1981, pp. 300. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, October 1982, pp. 613–8, reporting speech to Asia Society in New York, 5 October 1982; Australian Financial Review, 19 April 1983. National Times, 12 January 1980. The above paragraphs are based on Alan Rix, ‘Japan’s Comprehensive Security and Australia,’ Australian Outlook, vol. 41, no. 2, August 1987, pp. 79–86. Tow’s article is ‘Australian and Japanese Security Cooperation: Present Barriers and Future Prospects’, Australian Outlook, vol. 38, no. 3, December 1984, pp. 200–6. Nakagawa’s is ‘The WEPTO Option: Japan’s New Role in Asia/Pacific Collective Security’, Asian Survey, Vol. XXIV, no. 8, August 1984, pp. 828–39. Courier-Mail, 12 December 1982. Omar Martinez Lagorreta, ‘The balance of power and tensions in Asia and the Pacific Basin: The role of the intermediate Powers’, Australian Outlook, vol. 36, no. 3, December 1982, p. 41. See the following: Minister for Foreign Affairs News Release M79, 27 July 1983; Speech by Mr Hawke, 15 January 1985, recorded in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, January 1985, p. 8; speech by Mr Hawke, 2 February 1984, in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, February 1984, p. 62. Speech to Washington Press Club, 15 June 1983, in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, June 1983, pp. 267–73. National Times, 30 March-5 April 1984, p. 28. Speech in Sydney, 16 October 1984 (Press Release M146), 16 October 1984. Speech at Joint Services Staff College, 10 April 1984, in Australian Foreign Affairs Record, April 1984, p. 311. Speech ‘Leadership in the Asian-Pacific Region’, 6 June 1988, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade News Release M93. Australian, 26–27 March 1988. Australian Financial Review, 29 March 1988.

Keeping the region safe: defence and security in the Australia–Japan relationship 175 117 118 119 120 121 122

123 124

125 126 127 128 129 130

131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139

Australian Financial Review, 31 March 1988. Australian, 2–3 April 1988. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, vol. 126, 14 April 1988, p. 1532. Hawke lecture in Singapore, 29 November 1987, Japan Times, 9 December 1987. Sydney Morning Herald, 20 September 1990; Australian Foreign Affairs Record, September 1990, pp. 621–5. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, (Reference: Japan’s defence policy and current defence development and debates in Japan and the region), Official Hansard Report, 7 December 1992, p. 22. Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Official Hansard Report, 7 December 1992, p. 30. Prime Ministerial Press Release 1548/2, Speech by the Prime Minister to the Japan National Press Club, 22 September 1992; Joint Press Statement by Prime Ministers Miyazawa and Keating, 21 September 1992. Courier-Mail, 28 April 1995, 23 May 1995, 15 August 1995; Australian, 15 August 1995. ‘Australia and Japan: An evolving relationship’, Opening Address to Canberra Colloquium, 10 July 1991, p. 5. Australian, 25 July 1991. Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990s, Endorsed by Government 27 November 1989, Department of Defence, 1989, pp. 44–5. Australian, 23 February 1994. Japan Times, 30 September 1992; Transcript of Press Conference by Senator Ray, 29 September 1992. Ray’s ruling out of joint exercises was reported in Weekend Independent (Brisbane), 16 October 1992. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, July 1984, p. 730. Courier-Mail, 26 February 1993; Australian, 13 July 1994; Advertiser, 26 February 1993. Australian, 24 September 1990; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1989 and 3 September 1990; Australian Financial Review, 6 April 1990; Courier-Mail, 7 June 1996. Australian, 24–25 August 1994. Japan’s Defence and Security in the 1990s: Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Canberra, Senate Printing Unit, June 1993, p. 197. See speech by Mr Downer at Japan’s National Press Club, 6 June 1996, and reports in a range of Australian newspapers referring to this speech and other comments made by Downer. Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister Howard, 29 April 1997. Australian, 2 January 1998. Statement by Hugh White, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence; see AustraliaJapan Research Centre, Developments in Australia-Japan Defence Ties, Australian National University, Canberra, December 1997. For a Japanese view, see Yukio Satoh, ‘From Distant Countries to Partners: the Australia-Japan relationship’, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper no. 312, Australian National University, Canberra, November 1997.

Conclusion: Perfect Partners?

The political rhetoric and the vocabulary of the Australia-Japan relationship is repetitive and rather tired, but it reflects nonetheless the underlying political reality of a strong alignment of interests. References to cooperation, friendship, neighbours, partners, even ‘constructive partnership’, the latest official terminology, serve as verbal expressions of a complex web of administrative, political and some personal connections that have their roots in the early postwar years. The Australia-Japan political relationship is more than mere words, however, as this book has shown. It represents a strong bilateral linkage of close identity of interests and perceptions, and an Australian policy that has at times tied itself to the political and economic power of Japan in the Asia Pacific region, but has also sought to involve Japan in a more active political role alongside Australian regional initiatives. In trade Australia and Japan have long recognised their economic complementarity; on the political side, ‘perfect partners’ is an exaggeration, but the postwar political relationship has been important and beneficial to both countries. The bilateral political alignment has several facets. On the Australian domestic front, it is institutionalised in the array of administrative arrangements and processes that link the two governments. These overlay fickle public sentiment and, if anything, rather racist attitudes expressed over such issues as immigration and investment, as it is clear that many Australians have been unsure of how to deal with the Japanese phenomenon and its local manifestation. Chapter 5 referred to the ‘psychological crisis’ faced in the public arena; certainly the public acceptance of a close link with Japan has not been wholehearted. But the history of postwar immigration, and of trends in public attitudes, show a basic acceptance of the inevitability of close relations. Similarly, the high points of political negotiations between Australia and Japan have tended to cement the commonality of interests. While tension and political conflict have been a part of these issues, conflicts have been managed, the management structures for such processes have been effective and negotiations have helped set broad understandings. In addition, the intensity of ongoing negotiations has assisted the two governmental systems to operate effectively with each other. Negotiations have helped bring the two governments together, not separate them over transient negotiating difficulties. In

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particular, negotiations have enabled some relationships between key government officials to develop in a way that would otherwise have been unlikely. Those negotiations were made possible by the array of administrative mechanisms in place to manage day-to-day bilateral relations. These mechanisms, including the many treaties and agreements that form a legal foundation to the relationship, were largely the product of ad hoc responses to a growing need for administrative arrangements and processes to manage commercial activities. The formal agreements incorporate the normal bureaucratic conflicts and rivalries on both sides, as well as some complacency and hostility; the Australia-Japan political relationship has not been immune from the normal obstructive processes of bureaucracy. We have not seen a great deal of creative management, although the hub of the relationship was to be found in the bureaucratic systems in each country and their diplomatic representation in the other. The Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee was the most adventurous example of bilateral political management, although it has not been a contentious forum or one used by either side in anything other than a reactive way. It exemplifies the comfortable alignment, a well-worn but conscientious habit of consultation in which the premises, rhetoric and outcomes are known and rehearsed. At the same time, beyond mere symbolism, the AJMC has provided a consistent, high-level ‘umbrella’ for government-to-government contacts for over twenty years. This should not be underestimated. The Australia-Japan political relationship has been given a high public profile in Australia but understandably much less so in Japan. Extensive political consultation over forty years by leaders from both countries has reaffirmed shared values and interests and articulated the steady accretion of commitments to the political and commercial relationship. The initial prime ministerial contacts, and Australian decisions in 1954 to deal with remaining wartime issues, led to an early acceptance by Australia of Japan as an equal player in the region, as a nation of great potential influence and power, and a country to be reckoned with in the Pacific region. The policy reforms of the period were based on a determination to keep Japan within the Western camp and away from the influence of communism. This same approach guided Australia’s dealings with Japan on regional and international issues, and also set the parameters for the security relationship that gradually developed between the two countries. Based on this initial inspiration for regional cooperation and a set of treaty obligations that locked both countries into a common approach to regional security, we have seen since the 1950s a steady growth of bilateral cooperation on security issues and international affairs. This has occurred despite the fact that Japan, mainly because of constitutional limitations, did not participate quite as actively as Australia in regional arrangements. This has spanned both multilateral political cooperation (such as with the Pacific economic cooperation process) and bilateral activities (such as the growing defence relationships between the two countries). The Australia-Japan political relationship is firmly rooted in the growth throughout the postwar period of an identity of interests, political and bureaucratic dialogue, exchange of information and intelligence, and active diplomatic and defence cooperation.

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What has been the motivation for the development of this political alignment? Obviously, the necessity for reinforcing strong economic ties has been a powerful factor: Japan has sought stable and reliable sources of raw materials and minerals, and Australia has needed a large and steady market for its exports. Yet economic forces can themselves provide some certainty in these arrangements without the need for the development of such an extensive array of political cooperation and shared interests. The shared US connection has therefore been paramount, and we have seen how that led to the incorporation in Australia’s approach to Japan of the concept of the ‘island chain of security’. The common threat has always been seen as that of communism, and bilateral discussions of the security environment in the region have, until only 1991, been centred on that problem. The Pacific security ‘triangle’ has been a distinctive feature of the approach by Australia and Japan to regional security, despite the lack of a formal bilateral security treaty. Australia’s commitment under ANZUS involved Japan in any case, through reference in the treaty itself to American armed forces in the Pacific (including Japan). So Australia and Japan have both been linked to the American security framework, once Japan had been brought into the fold through the security treaty system and the adoption from the 1950s of positive policies by Australia to deal with Japan in a constructive and cooperative way. At the same time, there has undoubtedly been a tendency by Australia to seek to accommodate itself to Japan, once the potential for Japan’s massive regional influence was recognised. It was recognised in Australia at an early stage in the postwar period. The policy was set by 1962, with Australia concerned to ensure that its relations with the powerful Japan accorded with Australian interests, and that we did what we could to persuade Japan of the benefits of close relations with Australia. This was apparent in our style of negotiating, our leaders’ diplomacy of later years, our attempts to gain a forum for ministerial discussions, our international cooperation and the deliberate attempts to broaden the scope of the political discussions between the two countries, and the expansion of bilateral defence cooperation. In addition, Australia’s own active regional diplomacy has affected the relationship, helping to draw Japan into a more positive political role in the Asia Pacific and giving substance to the ‘partnership’ aspects of the relationship. The two countries enjoy in 1998 a relationship that is, quite literally, close, cooperative and constructive, as the 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership and the 1997 Partnership Agenda between Australia and Japan attest in a very public fashion. While not limiting its own diplomatic initiatives, Australia has accepted its relatively minor status in the Japanese world view and attempted to create a useful role for itself alongside Japan in, on the one hand, the American security environment and, on the other, in a bilateral framework of shared political and security perceptions of the region, where Australian interests are not threatened by an unpredictable Japan. The systems for managing the bilateral relationship ensure that predictability is a central feature of the political relationship. The political alignment with Japan is therefore built on a shared desire to accommodate with the United States for common security purposes, and to gain from bilateral cooperation and regional collaboration. If Australian interests benefit more from that arrangement, both countries still achieve net gains. Their interests are advanced, the relationship is

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strengthened, and it adds to the further certainty of greater economic returns through trade and investment. The Australia-Japan political alignment has been one of the major influences in the creation of the postwar Asia Pacific political and economic environment. It was the sharing of political and security interests that ensured smooth cooperation in trade and a readier acceptance of Japan into international and regional fora. It provided a structure of friendly diplomacy and an assured reception for Japan as part of the broader Western diplomatic and security effort in the region. This was of significance for Japan in its efforts to return to a recognised political role in Asia in particular. The alignment has also been of enormous significance for Australia in gaining greater political standing in the affairs of the region, and achieving a sympathetic hearing in the capital of one of the world s major powers. If not a ‘perfect’ partnership, this is most certainly a productive and positive one.

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NOTES 1 The letters ‘AA’ in the notes refer to the Australian Archives, and are followed by the appropriate number for the file series used. 2 Throughout the book Japanese names are given in the Japanese order, with family name first, except where Japanese authors may be cited in references to books published in English. ARCHIVAL SOURCES Records held in the Australian Archives in Canberra were an important source for some parts of this book, in particular the Department of External Affairs general correspondence series (CRS A1838), such as its files on political relations with Japan (CRS A1838/T184, 3103/10/1). Other relevant series were papers from successive Cabinets in the Chifley and Menzies governments, files on the pearlshell negotiations with Japan (A1838 3103/ 10/1/1), Department of Trade files on the Commerce Agreement negotiations (A1209/ 23), and files on prime ministerial visits in the 1950s (part of the A1838 series). Files from the Japanese Diplomatic Record Office were also used, in particular material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Postwar 11 th Document Release on relations with Australia. Unfortunately these materials are very selective and cannot be considered a proper archival record. BOOKS AND ARTICLES Access Economics Japanese Investment in Australia: A Report prepared for the Australia-Japan Foundation, January 1989. AIS ‘Nichigo seiji kankei no jittai’, Jiyu, vol. 15, no. 10, October 1973, pp. 144–6. ANOP Australians View Japan: A National Attitude Study, Embassy of Japan, Canberra, May 1976, September 1977, March 1985, April 1988, March 1994. Australia-Japan Relations: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978.

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Abbreviations

AA AFR AJBCC AJMC ANU ANZUS APEC ASEAN ASPAC BCFK BCOF CCRJ ECAFE EEC FCN FRUS GATT GNP ICJ IDC IDCJ (IDC/J) mfn MFP MITI NATO PBECC RAAF RIMPAC SCJ SEATO UK UN UNESCO US

Australian Archives Australian Financial Review Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee Australian National University Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations Asian and Pacific Council British Commonwealth Force Korea British Commonwealth Occupation Force Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East European Economic Commission Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaty Foreign Relations of the United States General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade gross national product International Court of Justice Inter-departmental Committee Inter-departmental Committee on Japan most-favoured nation treatment Multi-Function Polis Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan) North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Committee Royal Australian Air Force Pacific Rim nations’ naval exercises Standing Committee on Japan South East Asian Treaty Organisation United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organisation United States

Index

Adachi Tokuro 82 Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations (Myer Committee) 77, 78–80, 90, 91, 163 administrative structures, Australia-Japan 73–84 Afghanistan 163 Afro-Asian Group 34, 119, 123, 124–5 Agreements, Australia-Japan 84–89 Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 1992 88 Agreement on Cooperation in Research andDevelopment in Science and Technology 89 agreement on civil uses of Atomic Energy, 1962 88 civil aviation agreement 85 Commerce Agreement, Australia-Japan 4, 9, 13, 15, 30, 32, 34, 35, 43, 52–61, 62, 65, 84, 85 Cultural Agreement 89, 91, 104, 137 Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) agreement 23, 61, 62, 63, 64, 82 International money orders, agreement on 87 Migratory Birds Agreement 87 nuclear safeguards agreement 88 pearlshell fishing agreement 84, 85 science and technology agreements 88, 138 taxation agreement 86 visa agreements, Australia-Japan 24, 87 Agricultural Liberalisation Subcommittee (Liberal Democratic Party) 36 Agricultural Policy Committee (Liberal Democratic Party) 36 agricultural protectionism 36, 37, 81 agriculture, constraints on Japanese 37 Aichi Kiichi 22, 81, 130, 161, 173n aid 81, 129, 131

Japanese 75, 127, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 167 Japanese role in Asian development 41n, 75, 124, 127, 128, 129, 134, 141, 142, 160, 167 Australian role in Asian development 127, 128, 129, 133 South Pacific 36, 37, 135, 140, 141, 142 United Kingdom 141 United States 125 Akihito, Emperor 34, 106 alignment, nature of security 5 alliance, nature of security 5, 128, 164 Allied Council for Japan 3, 70 Amano Yoshifusa 158–9 Amaya Naohiro 24 America see United States Anderson, R.W.C. (Robert) 136 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, 1962 61, 63 Anthony, J.D. 77, 81, 82 anti-communist sentiment 12, 33, 34, 35, 124, 141, 151, 157 anti-Japanese sentiment, Australian 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 22–3, 28, 29, 30, 31, 52, 71, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 124, 151 Anzac 1 Anzac Day 10, 71 ANZUS (Australia-US security alliance) 148, 150, 151, 152, 158, 165, 166, 171n, 178 Council 132 APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 2, 7, 29, 40, 80, 82, 132, 135, 140 heads-of-government meetings 38, 39, 136

188


apology for Japanese war deeds 29, 33–4, 39, 41–2n, 106 Argentina 56 Arita Kiichi 82 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 134, 140, 168 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 40, 140 Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) 127, 129, 133, 157 Asian common market 132 see also Asia Pacific economic cooperation Asian Development Bank 127 Asian Development Fund 32, 41n, 124, 125, 130 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2, 7, 29, 40, 80, 82, 132, 135, 140 heads-of-government meetings 38, 39, 136 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 134, 140, 168 Atomic Energy, 1992 Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 88 civil uses of, 1962 agreement 88 Attorney-General’s Department, Australian 87 Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee (AJBCC) 58, 80–1, 133 see also Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee; business cooperation committees Australia-Japan Economic Relations Project 78 Australia-Japan Foundation 15, 78, 89, 103–5, 138 Australia-Japan military cooperation 2–3, 4, 6, 29–30, 33, 40, 63, 128, 150–2, 154, 158 Australia-Japan political relationship 1, 2–8, 63, 70–95 continuity of 28, 29, 35 declining importance of Australia 29, 73, 102, 137, 142, 177, 178 Australian Constitution 92 Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) 84 Australian Knitting Industries Council 58 Australian Lawn Tennis Association 19, 21 Australian Liaison Mission 70 Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation 90 Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee (AJMC) 40, 62, 65, 80–3, 162, 177 Australia, role in Asia 7, 34, 39, 109–10, 125, 144n Bailey, K.H. 50, 52 balance of payments, Australia-Japan 29, 102, 129 Ball, W. Macmahan 70, 72, 155 Barwick, Garfield 17, 92, 118, 132 Basic Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, 1976 4, 23, 24, 39, 43, 61–6, 78, 84, 87, 133, 138 BCFK (British Commonwealth Force Korea) 20

BCOF (British Commonwealth Occupation Force) 20, 153, 155 Bean, C.E.W. 20 Beddie, Brian 154 beef exports to Japan 29, 36, 60–61, 66, 83, 139 Bjelke-Petersen, Joh 24, 91 Blamey, Thomas 10 Borneo 158 Bowen, Lionel F. 77, 140 Britain see United Kingdom British Commonwealth 53, 73, 154 British Commonwealth War Cemetery see Hodagaya British Empire 3, 32 Burns, Creighton 100, 101, 113 Bury, Leslie 162 business cooperation committees 22, 80–1, 104, 132 see also Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee; Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee Cairns, Jim 162 Calwell, Arthur 18, 19, 20, 97, 100, 101 Cambodia 39, 75, 139, 140, 162 Canada 45, 46, 81, 90, 92, 131, 132, 134, 164 Casey, R.G. 10, 12, 15, 34, 35, 37, 47, 49, 58, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 152 Chifley, J.B. 3, 18, 30, 147 China 16, 73, 74, 92, 122, 123, 126, 127, 130, 133, 138, 149, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162 fear of Japanese alliance with 11, 12, 119, 154 fishing disputes with 53 recognition of 34, 82, 131 threat of 6, 35, 97, 159, 161 civil aviation 85–6 agreement 86 clothing industry 53 coal exports to Japan 1, 29, 83 Cold War 2, 3, 6, 28 Colombo Plan 4, 13, 34, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125 Commerce Agreement, Australia-Japan 4, 9, 16, 31, 32, 34, 35, 43, 52–61, 62, 65, 81, 84, 85, 154 Commerce and Agriculture, Australian Department of 13, 46, 48, 55, 56, 57 Common Market see European Common Market Commonwealth, British 53, 73, 154 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference 121 Commonwealth-state relations, Australian see federal system, Australian Commonwealth War Cemetery, Hodagaya see Hodagaya Commonwealth War Graves Commission 14, 87 communism, 149

Index 189 in Asia 35, 85, 123, 124, 125, 126, 147 in Japan 6, 118, 120, 121, 148, 177 threat of 7, 10, 35, 147, 148, 149, 153, 170, 177 see also anti-communist sentiment Condamine 50 Constitution, Australian 92 Constitution, Japanese 38 limits to defence spending 38, 125, 128, 129, 160, 162 Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan (CCRJ) 79, 80, 88 Continental Shelf Doctrine 47, 49, 51, 52, 54 Cowra Japanese cemetery 14, 104 Cowra Japanese Internment Camp 14, 104 Japanese prisoners’ outbreak from 14 Crawford, John 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 135 CSR 79 Cultural Agreement 89, 104, 137 cultural relations, Australia-Japan 12, 15, 16, 30, 31, 34, 78, 89, 103–5, 137 Currie, Neil 166 Customs and Excise, AustralianDepartment of 57

EEC (European Economic Community) 120, 132 see also European Common Market Elders 90 elite attitudes, Australian and Japanese 101 Empire, British 3, 32 Empress Dowager, death of Japanese 10 entry to Australia, Japanese 9, 18–24, 62, 87, 110 see also immigration European agricultural protectionism 36, 81 European Common Market 60, 81 European Economic Community (EEC) 120, 132 see also European Common Market Europe, Australian and Japanese relations with 63, 134 Evans, Gareth 83, 117, 167, 168 Evans, Selwyn 169 Evatt, H.V. 3, 100, 101, 151, 153 Expo, Brisbane, 37 External Affairs, Australian Department of 14, 19, 20, 45, 47, 50, 56, 57, 74, 81, 82, 123, 124, 151, 157 see also Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

defence, Japanese 11, 12, 36, 100, 130, 134, 140, 145–70 Constitutional limits to 38, 125, 128, 129, 160, 162 spending on 39, 153, 156, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166 defence relationship Australia-Japan 3, 4, 5, 6, 28–29, 33, 40, 64, 128, 145, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159 development projects see aid Dingman, Roger V. 5 discrimination, racial see racism, Australian Doidge, Frederick 149 Downer, Alexander 170 Downer, Alexander (Senior) 22 Drysdale, Peter 135, 136 Dulles, John Foster 149, 150, 152, 154, 156, 158, 168 Dutch New Guinea see New Guinea, West

Fairhall, Allen 160, 161 FCN (Friendship Commerce and Navigation agreement) 23, 61, 62, 63, 64, 82 federal system, Australian 4, 31, 61, 90–1, 112 problems resulting from 90–1 Fiji 141, 142 First World War 1 Fisheries Act 45, 46 fishing 4, 44–54, 84–5, 142 conservation of resources 44, 45, 46, 47, 84 international negotiations on 45, 46, 47, 141 Japanese entry into Australian waters 44, 45, 50, 53, 84 licensing of Japanese ships 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 84 North Pacific 45, 46 territorial limits to 45, 46, 48, 84 tuna 66, 84 Foreign Affairs and Defence, Senate Standing Committee on 21, 72, 103, 170 Foreign Affairs (and Trade), Australian Department of 48, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 89, 93n, 105, 129, 137, 171 see also External Affairs, Australian Department of Formosa 122, 155 see also Taiwan France 88, 90, 127, 142 Fraser, Malcolm 63, 78, 91, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 161, 163 free riding on defence spending, Japanese 39, 163, 166

ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) 119 Economic and Social Commission of theUnited Nations (ECOSOC) 122 economic growth, Japanese 6, 7, 35, 36, 38, 62, 102, 114, 137 educational exchange, Australia-Japan 16 educational relations, Australia-Japan 78, 89, 104, 111, 137 education, Australian on Japan 15

190


Freeth, Gordon 159, 160, 161 free trade 38, 117 Friendship Commerce and Navigation agreement (FCN) 23, 61, 62, 63, 64, 82 Fujiyama Aiichiro 15, 122, 123, 125 Fukuda Takeo 139 Doctrine 134 G7 (Group of 7) 139, 140 Gascoigne, Alvary 150 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 17, 48, 65 agreement to invoke Article XXXV 55, 58, 60 Japanese acceptance into 54, 58, 119 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea see Law of the Sea Conference Geostationary Meteorological Satellite System 89 Germany 90, 127, 154, 161 gold exports to Japan 29 Goot, Murray 113 Gorton, John Grey 130 Grant, Bruce 130 Great Britain see United Kingdom Greater East Asian Affairs, Japanese Ministry of 71 Gulf War 168 Hanson, Pauline 113 Harper, Norman 147 Harriman, Averell 17 Hashimoto Ryutaro 40–1, 42n, 111, 136, 170 Hasluck, Paul 81, 128, 133, 136, 158 Hatoyama Iichiro 83 Hawke, Robert Lee 34, 35–7, 38, 109, 112, 136, 140, 141, 164, 166, 167 Hayden, Bill 139, 166, 167 Haylen, Les 151 Heine Bros 90 Hill, Robert 167 Hirohito, Emperor 97, 105, 106–7 Hitler, Adolf 154 Hodgson, W.R. 70 Hodogaya, Commonwealth War Cemetery 14, 39, 87 Holland, George 15 Holt, Harold 19, 22, 110, 129 Hong Kong 148 Hosokawa Morihiro 34 Howard, John 7, 40–1, 42n, 136, 167, 170 Hughes, Richard 122, 123 Huish, Raymond 101 human rights 64 Ibuki 1 Ikeda Hayato 86, 126, 127, 131, 132, 136

immigration 4, 17–24, 31, 96, 99, 107, 112, 176 agreements, Australian 24, 87 Asian 107, 113 debate 105–6, 109 policy, Australian 9, 18, 44, 75, 100, 103, 105, 107–8, 110, 176 discriminatory 18, 21, 30, 61, 104 on Japanese entry 9, 18–25, 61, 87, 103, 110 Immigration, Australian Department of 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 65, 82 Immigration Restriction Act 21 see also White Australia Policy Imperial Family, Japanese 10 see also Hirohito, Akihito, Empress Dowager imperialism, Japanese 1, 29, 33 cultural 108 import competition from Japan 9 policies, discriminatory 1, 17, 52, 59 India 90, 132 Indochina 126, 139 Indonesia 47, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 136, 148, 158 threat of 97 Industry, Technology and Commerce, Australian Department of 112 see also Trade and Industry, Australian Department of Interdepartmental Committee on Japan, Australian Standing 62, 76 Interdepartmental Committee on Japan (IDCJ) 63, 73, 74–8 Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia 127 International Air Transport Association (IATA) 86 International Atomic Energy Agency 122 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 119 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 49–50, 54, 119, 120 International Labour Organisation 119 International Law Commission 49 International Monetary Fund 65, 119 International money orders, agreement on see Agreements, Australia-Japan investment foreign 101, 107, 113 Japanese 142, 167 in Australia 1, 4, 36, 37, 38, 41, 97, 102, 105, 107–110, 111, 114n, 130 in foodstuffs 107 in manufacturing 107 in real estate 105, 107, 109

Index 191 in resources 86 in tourism 36, 105, 107, 109, 114 on the Gold Coast 38, 108, 109 opposition to 38, 105, 113, 114 iron ore exports to Japan 29, 83, 91 industry, entry of Japanese experts in 98 Ishikawa Yozo 172 Jackson, Gordon 79 Japan as Pacific power 6, 9, 29, 34, 126, 170, as world power 29, 63, 135, 140–4 economic growth 6, 7, 35, 36, 38, 62, 102, 114, 137 fear of 97, 98, 100, 118 international role 30, 35, 38, 40, 55, 77, 106, 121–4, 124, 146 resurgence of nationalism in 120 role in the Pacific 6, 9, 34, 35, 40, 124, 132–3, 162, 180 role in the Western camp 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 74, 121, 129, 156, 160, 168, 180 threat of 97, 98, 99, 100, 148, 151 Japan Air Lines (JAL) 85, 86 Japan-Australia Business Cooperation Committee (JABCC) 80–1 see also Australia-Japan Business Cooperation Committee; business cooperation committees Japan-Australia Parliamentarians’ Friendship League 15 Japan Foundation 89 Japan Secretariat 79, 80 Joint Consultative Committee on Japan, Australian 72 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, 1995 1, 7, 39–40, 178 Kaifu Toshiki 34, 140 Kakitsubo Masayoshi 72 Kase Shunichi 71 Kawasaki Hideji 10 Keating, P.J. 1, 34, 38–40, 109, 136, 140, 168 Kishi Nobusuke 9, 14, 15, 30, 31, 32–5, 40n, 85, 97, 101, 103, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 136, 154, 160 Kojima Kiyoshi 133, 136 Korea 47, 122, 126, 131, 152, 155, 165 fishing rights with Japan 47, 48, 51, 53, 126 Korea, North 138

Korean War 6, 147 Kosaka Zentaro 123, 132 Kuranari Tadashi 83, 141 doctrine 141 languages teaching of Asian languages in Australia 103 teaching of Japanese in Australia 104, 137 Latham, John 10 Law of the Sea Conference 49, 51 Lawn Tennis Association, Australian 19, 21 League of Nations 120 Liberal-Democratic Party, Japanese 133 LNG (liquid natural gas) exports to Japan 29 MacArthur, Douglas 3, 30, 158 McEwen, John 57, 58, 74, 77, 81, 84, 137 ‘McEwen Plan’ 81 McIvor, Hector 128 McMahon, William 76, 130, 137, 160, 162 McQueen, Humphrey 147, 150, 151 Malaya 148, 150 Malaysia 126, 158 ‘Look East Policy’ 141 Manchuria 120 Manus Island 13 Matthews, Trevor 77, 78 media commentary on Japan, Australian see press, Australian commentary on Japan media exchanges, Australia-Japan 15, 104 Meiji Shrine 10 Menzies, Robert G. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 30–2, 34, 35, 36, 48, 51, 58, 85, 100, 101, 103, 104, 110, 120, 121, 124, 126, 127, 132 Middle East 148 Migratory Birds Agreement 87–8 Miki Takeo 81, 128, 129, 133, 136, 157 militarism, Japanese 3, 99, 101, 151–52, 156–7, 161, 162 threat of 7, 99, 101 acknowledgment of past 115n see also rearmament, Japanese Millar, T.B. 79 Miller, J.D.B. 127 Minagawa, Shugo 80, 92 minerals exploration, Japanese in Pacific 142 mining industry entry of Japanese specialists to Australia 21 Ministerial Conference, Australia-Japan 130–31 see also Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee (AJMC) Ministerial Conference on the Economic Development of Southeast Asia 127

192


Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japanese 1, 41n, 48, 50, 57, 58, 65, 73, 77, 82, 91, 93n, 117, 129, 135, 140 Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 58, 65, 73, 81, 82, 110, 111 Mixed Commission (committee monitoring the Cultural Agreement) 89 Miyazawa Kiichi 81, 103, 133 most-favoured nation (mfn) treatment 23, 24, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65 multiculturalism 38, 109, 113 Multi-function Polis (MFP) 29, 105, 111–3 Multilateral Trade Negotiations 139 Mutual Security Agreement, Japan-US see United States-Japan alliance relations Myer Committee (Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia-Japan Relations) 77, 78–80, 90, 91, 163 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) 38 Nagano Shigeo 136 Nakagawa Ichiro 88 Nakagawa Yatsuhiro 168 Nakasone Yasuhiro 37, 82, 131, 163, 164, 165 Narita Katsushiro 52 National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) 134 National Parks and Wildlife Service 87 National Security Council, US 152, 155 National Security Resources Board 71 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 151, 165 Nehru, Jawaharlal 132 Netherlands, the 123 New Caledonia 142 New Guinea 14, 46, 52, 82, 84, 123–4, 126, 130 West 89, 121, 123, 124, 126 New Zealand 10, 19, 32, 73, 75, 86, 129, 132, 133, 134, 141, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 164, 168 Nishi Haruhiko 11, 12, 46, 47, 48, 58, 71, 72 Nixon Doctrine 129, 159, 160, 164 Nixon, Richard 82, 156 Nomura Research Institute 134 North Asia 122 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 151, 165 North-South issues 139 Nuclear safeguards agreement 88 nuclear testing 122 Occupation period 2, 19, 30, 46, 66, 97 children born to Australian servicemen during 26n

OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) 86 Ogura Kazuo 39, 117, 142 Ohira Masayoshi 82, 131, 134, 135, 136, 139 oil crisis 163 Oazaki Katsuo 71 Okinawa 150, 160 Okita Saburo 135, 136 Olympic Games, 1956 21, 30, 98 open regionalism 135 Opperman, Hubert 22 Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Committee (PBECC) 133, 135 Pacific community 82, 132, 134, 135, 177 see also Pacific Cooperation; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Pacific cooperation 4, 82, 130–36, 177 see also Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; Pacific community Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) 133 Pacific security system 2, 3, 6, 7, 117, 134, 149, 150, 152, 156, 178 Pakistan 152 Palfreeman, A.C. 22 Paltridge, Shane 157–8 Papua New Guinea see New Guinea Parker, Cherry 20 parliamentary exchanges, Australia-Japan 15, 30, 72, 104 Partnership Agenda, Australia-Japan 7, 40, 178 Pax Americana 118 see also United States, Far East policy peacekeeping operations, Japanese participation in see UN peacekeeping forces Peace Problems Research Council 165 Peace Treaty, Japanese, 1952 1, 6, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 30, 34, 44, 45, 46, 53, 61, 63, 70, 71, 84, 97, 147–55 Peacock, Andrew 105, 112, 113, 138, 140 Pearl Fisheries Act 45, 48, 119 pearling 18 pearlshell fishing agreement 84, 85 Australian employment of Japanese divers 44, 98 conservation of stocks 34, 44 dispute 11, 13, 30, 34, 119 entry of Japanese divers and fishermen 18, 21 Japanese access to Australian waters 11, 13, 17, 31, 44, 45 negotiations on 4, 43, 44–52, 53, 54, 73 Petrov affair 12, 101 Philippines 148, 150, 152, 155

Index 193 Phillips, G.P. 59 Plimsoll, James 155 polls, public opinion 97–100, 114n Australian polling on Japan 97–8, 113 Japanese Embassy surveys of Australian views 99–100, 110 press Australian commentary on Japan 6, 12, 19, 28, 29, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 60, 62, 64, 65, 72, 76, 77, 80, 96–115, 119, 128, 137, 153, 156, 158, 163, 167 Japanese commentary on Australia 9, 22, 28, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 46, 52, 57, 86, 101, 126, 130, 145n Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Department of 74 prisoners-of-war Australian 33, 161 Japanese compensation to 3, 13, 29, 119 Japanese treatment of 99 camps 98 protectionism 36, 37, 81 public opinion on Australia, Japanese 16, 22–3, 124 see also press, Japanese commentary on Australia; polls, public opinion public opinion on Japan, Australian 3, 4, 11, 13, 17, 18, 31, 96–114, 124, 156, 176 continuity of 100 see also press, Australian commentary on Japan; polls, public opinion Qantas 85, 86 racism, Australian 16, 18, 22, 65, 77, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 113, 176 Radford, Arthur 152 Rahman, Tunku Abdul 126 Ray, Robert 169 Reagan, Ronald 164, 165 real estate, Japanese investment in Australian 29, 105, 107, 108 opposition to 29 rearmament, Japanese 63, 75, 147, 152–3, 156–7, 160, 161, 162 see also militarism, Japanese regional security 1, 3, 6, 7, 12, 14, 28, 29, 35, 152, 155, 163, 169 Australia’s role in 7, 35, 171 Japan’s role in 7, 35, 102, 125, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160 Reischauer, Edwin 106 resource diplomacy policy 76, 78, 130 resources, Japanese dependence on Australian 2, 76, 78, 102

Returned Servicemen’s League (RSL) 15, 24, 33, 97, 101, 153, 168 RIMPAC 164 Robertson, Horace 153, 155 Robinson, Peter 79, 101–2, 160, 167 Rusk, Dean 132 Russia see Soviet Union Saito Shizuo 17, 160, 173n Sasaki Hideyo 82 Sato Eisaku 81, 82, 86, 128, 129, 130, 158 science and technology agreements 88–9, 138 scientific relations, Australia-Japan 78, 88 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) 125, 128, 152, 154, 155, 158 Second World War 28, 33, 39, 84, 96, 97, 99, 108, 109 security, regional see regional security Self-Defence Forces, Japanese 12, 28, 38, 152, 153, 156, 157, 165, 166 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (and Trade), Australian 21, 76, 103, 170 Shann, Keith 72, 73, 74 Shaw, Patrick 18, 70 Shidehara Kijuro 10 Sihanouk, Prince 140 Silver Columbia project 105, 110–1 Sissons, DCS 152, 162, 163 sister city links 91, 105 Slim, William 33, 34 Smith, Hugh 97 Snedden, Billy 163 Snowy Mountains Scheme 98 Snyder, Glenn H. 5 Somare, Michael 82 South Africa 56 Southeast Asia 31, 32, 35, 110, 117, 120, 122–7, 139, 140, 158, 170 Australian policies on 139 development aid to 123, 126, 127, 130, 167 economic development 14, 34, 110, 127 regional stability 14, 120, 127, 133, 158, 163 South Korea see Korea South Pacific 38, 140–2 Japanese aid to 36, 37, 126, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 167 South Vietnam see Vietnam Soviet Union 3, 10, 29, 35, 36, 121, 122, 130, 141, 163, 168 fisheries negotiations with Japan 48 spying (see Petrov affair)

194


threat of 35, 97, 141, 153, 163, 164, 165, 166, Spender, Percy 45, 120, 148, 149 sporting links, Australia-Japan 12, 15, 18–19, 21, 98 Standing Committee on Japan (SCJ) 79, 80 state-prefecture relationships 91 states’ rights, Australian 4 see also federal system, Australian sterling import reductions, Japanese 56 Stockwin, J.A.A. 65 Strategic Defence Initiative 165 Street, Anthony (Tony) 164 students, Japanese in Australia 12, 21 Suez Crisis 30 Sugamo Prison 13 sugar exports to Japan 18, 65, 139 Suich, Max 74, 82, 101, 103, 104, 136, 137, 162 Sukarno 126 Suzuki Tadakatsu 58, 59, 124, 164 Swartz, Reginald 76 Taiwan 155 see also Formosa Takeshita Noboru 29, 36, 37–8, 109, 141 Tamura Hajime 111 Tanaka Kakuei 82, 89, 133 Tange, Arthur 14, 15 tariff schedules 11, 55, 84, 135 restrictive 55, 61, 84, 102 see also trade, restrictions; trade, Japanese access to Australian taxation 86–8, 112 agreement 86–8 double 86–8 telecommunications 34, 85 Terashima Taizo 169 textiles industry 1 Thailand 152 Tojo Hideki 71 Tokugawa Iemasa 71 Tokuyama Jiro 134 Tokyo War Crimes Trials 3 tourism 1, 4, 21, 86, 89, 91, 112 Japanese investment in Australia 36, 108, 109, 111–12 Japanese to Australia 21, 24, 36, 105, 107, 109, 137 Tow, William 165 toys, Japanese exports to Australia 98 trade 4 Australian dependence on Japanese 36, 102–3, 103, 105, 106–7, 109–10

beef 29, 36, 60, 61, 65, 66, 83, 139 coal 1, 29, 82 commodity 1, 4, 139 complementarity, Australia-Japan 6, 104, 176 discrimination 17, 52, 57, 61, 62, 104 see also tariff schedules; trade, Japanese access to Australian foodstuffs 35 gold 29 in raw materials, Japanese reliance on 134, 135 iron ore 29, 91 Japanese access to Australian 1, 17, 37, 52, 54, 56, 59, 63, 80 see also tariff schedules; trade, restrictions LNG 29 minerals 1, 35, 65, 91, 101 primary raw materials, Australia-Japan 18, 54, 63, 101 regional 145 relations, Australia-Japan 18–19, 28, 30, 44, 45, 54–62, 74, 78, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94, 101, 104, 105, 110, 125, 133, 157, 182 restrictions 1, 61 see also tariff schedules; trade, Japanese access to Australian sugar 18, 65, 139 wheat 54, 59 wool 18, 46, 54, 55, 56, 87, 120 Trade and Customs, Australian Department of 13, 56, 57 see also Trade, Australian Department of Trade and Industry, Australian Department of 74 Trade, Australian Department of 57, 59, 62, 65, 74, 75, 77, 81, 137 see also Trade and Customs, Australian Department of Trades and Labour Council, Western Australian 21 trade unions, Australia-Japan contacts 16 transport 4 Treasury, Australian Department of 56, 65, 74, 86 Tuvalu 141 UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) 119 United Kingdom 1, 3, 12, 13, 29, 45, 46, 60, 91, 119, 127, 139, 141, 148, 155 aid 141

Index 195 Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation, 1962 61, 62 Australian alliance with 97, 128 investment 107, 114n Japanese agreements with 62, 85 tax agreement with 86 United Nations 38, 49, 50, 73, 120–21, 127, 140, 142, 159 Economic and Social Commission of (ECOSOC), Japanese membership of 122 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 119 General Assembly 121, 123 Japanese observer status on 120 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 49– 50, 51, 54, 119, 120 Japanese membership of 31, 119, 120, 139 peacekeeping forces, Japanese participation in 26, 38, 140, 160, 168 Security Council 121 Japanese membership of 38, 119, 121 Japanese permanent seat on 38, 140, 166 United States 12, 61, 77, 82, 90, 92, 118, 119, 122, 124, 125, 134, 135, 137, 141, 143, 144, 151–2, 156, 161, 162, 168, 170, 178 agricultural protectionism 36 aid 125 —Australia alliance 3, 5, 6, 7, 97, 128, 133, 167, 168, 178, 179 Far East policy 33, 148, 155 investment 107, 114n —Japan alliance relations 5, 6, 7, 33, 39, 43, 67, 77, 122, 127, 130, 133, 138, 141, 148, 151, 154, 157, 159, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 178, 179 military bases in Japan 38, 129, 160, 166 National Security Council 152, 155 security treaties with 5, 7, 117, 148 —Soviet tensions 3, 141, 142 withdrawal from dominant role in Asia 80, 129, 135 see also Nixon Doctrine Uno Sosuke 36 uranium 83, 88 Uren, Tom 161, 162 Ushiba Nobuhiko 58, 59 USSR see Soviet Union

Uyama Atsushi 59 Vanuatu 141 Vietnam 127, 140, 156 War 6, 129, 132, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163 visa agreements, Australia-Japan 21, 23, 24, 87 Walker, E.R. 58, 70–71, 121 Walt, Stephen M. 5, 6 war brides, entry to Australia of Japanese 18, 20, 21, 98 war crimes, Japanese 106 see also apology for Japanese war deeds War Crimes Trials, Tokyo 3 war criminals, Japanese 3, 11, 12, 13, 97, 124 Ward, Michael Don 5 Watt, Alan 14, 30, 48, 57, 58, 72 Westerman, Alan 46, 59 Western Alliance 6, 38, 163, 164, 167, 168 West Irian see New Guinea, West Wheat Board 90 wheat exports to Japan 54, 59 ‘White Australia Policy’ 22, 102, 107, 110 Whiteside, Bruce 108, 113 Whitlam, E.G. 22, 63, 64, 65, 78, 89, 91, 104, 105, 133, 137, 138, 161, 162 Wight, Martin 5 Woodard, Gary 23, 24, 64, 65 wool Argentinian 56 South African 56 trade with Japan 18, 46, 54, 55, 56, 87, 120 entry of Japanese industry representatives 21, 87 Woomera Rocket Range 137, 169 World Tennis Federation 19 World War I see First World War World War II see Second World War Yashiro Hinsuke 19 Yoshida Shigeru 45, 48, 123 YWCA, Japanese 19

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