Terror and territory: the spatial extent of sovereignty

Tt: RROR AND IERRI10RY

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Terror and Territory THE SPATIAL EXTENT OF SOVEREIGNTY

Stuart Elden

Uni1<ersity of Mirmesola Press

Porrions of rhe lnrroducrion ;md chapter 3 were prC'o·iously published .IS .. Terror and Termory," Antipode 39, no. 5 (2007): 821-45; rcpnnred with permission from \'J Rather, the project is to "make the world safe for It is therefore revealing that the conflict was portrayed by Bush as a "global war on tcrror ..- global both in its scope and in its goal. In his analysis of the "long twentieth century," Arrighi argues that there is a .. recurrent contradiction between an "endless'' accumulation of capital and a comparath•cly stable organization of political space":r Centra l to such an under!>t:lnding is rhc: ddinit1on of a nd .. rc:rritonalism .. :J.S opposite: modes of rule: or logics of power. Tc:rritoria list rulers identify power w ith rhc: c:xrc:m and populousness of rhc:ir domams, and concc:i\•c: of wc:althlcapital as a means or a by-product of the pursmt of rc:rritona l expansion. Cap1r.1lisr rulers,, in comrast, idenrif)' power with the: extc:nr of rhc:ir command O\'C:I scarce: resources

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J.nd consider acquisinorts as a J.ccumularion o f capu:al.n

and

::1

by-producr of the

Arrighi notes how discretc logics acrually operate in relation to each othcr "within a givcn spa.tio-tcmporal contcxt,"' and that as a conscqucnce, "actual outcomes have dcparted significant!}', even diametrically, from what is implicit in cach logic conceived abstracdr."n It is this insight that David Harvey has illuminating!)' brought to bear on U.S. practicc in the current moment, drawing om the tensions bctwcen what he calls, following Arrighi, the logic of tcrritory and the logic of capita l.10 The wider economic aspccts of the "war on tcrror" have rcccivcd extensivc analysis,, and this book docs not seck to rcpcat thesc discussions. lnstcad. through a focus on the tcrritorial qucstions, it adds a cruciaJ dement: an insistence on one aspcct of the "'geo'' in the geoeconomic and geopolitical. Deborah Cowcn and Ncil Smith suggest that "whcrc geopolitics can be understood as a means of acquiring tcrritory towards a goal of accumulating wealth, geocconomics re\•crses the proccdurc, aiming dirccdy at the ac.cumulation of weaJth through market control. The acquisition o r control of territory is not at all irrelevant but is a tactical option rather than a strategic ncccssit)'· " 41 While sympathetic to this a rgument, this book seeks to dig a little deeper into the specificaiJy territorial aspects of this change. As Cowen and Smith caution, "thc ris-e of gcocconomic calculation is highly uneven temporally as wcJI as spariaJly, it is episodic, and it can never fully supplant geopolitics. ".u What this requires is an understanding of the territorial in order to recogni:z.e the relation between the ongoing geopolitics in the geocconomic moment. Territor}' itself cannot be assumed to havc remained unchanged as strategies toward it morph into tactics. lndeed, wh ile territorial acquisition may have generally become a tactical rather than a strategic goal, this docs not mean that there is no territorial aspect to state practice, or that territory docs not continue to be an object of nonstate actors. Today's territorial logic is not the same as previous imperial practices. Indeed, a complicated set of territorial and politicaJ divisions and incorporations have oc.curred over the past several ycars, the underlying structures of which bc.comc more evident if the temporal scope: is broadened berond simply the period since 2001. Yet while we should certainly rethink and examine, and be open to analysis of the ncw, we must not forge,t that the war has thus far been fought with a very conventional sense of territory in mindterritory that has bocn targeted, bombed, and invaded. This book, therefore, offers an interrogation of the territorial logic of the present, suggesting that this is a cmcia l ingredient of anr examination of

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the tension betwe-en capitalist accumulation and state-territorial constra ints a round the distribution of resources and the accumulation of wealth. Despite me importance of this ropic, as this book a ims ro demonstrate, there has been little work looking at the question of territory explicit!}'· Indeed, at times the territorial has been distinctly underplayed. AI-Qacda has often been portrayed as a dttcrritorializ.cd nct>vork rather than as operating within, between, and against existing territorial frames; while the challenges to international law have been widd}' discussed, there has been little analysis of the implications for the kgal basis of tl1c relationship between SO\'erdgnt}' and trrritory. This book S«ks to providr such a corrective angle. In addition, while mr trrm "terror" has been widd)• r mployed, mere has been little examination of what it actually is:u The definition a nd scope of terror and territor}·, and their relation to the state, require careful analysis. Terror and the State

In this book, "terror" is understood in a broad sense-from the practices of the nonstate actors traditionall}' labeled as terrorist organizations to the actions of statrs in their international relations: and from the bombs, missiles, and bullets of death and destruction to me imagined geographies of threat and rrsponsc. States drarly operate in ways that tcrrifr-.4.1 The terrorism of nonstate actors is a \'cry small proportion of terrorism taken a.s a whole, with states ha\'ing killed far more than those who oppose This is as true in thc "war on terror" as in countless othcr conflicts. For many writers; thcrdore, thc distinction is one of degree, onc of tactics, rather than a complete disassociation. This lcads to a number of pro\'Ocative formulations, which act as a spur to thought evcn in their glibncss: .. onc man's terrorist is anomer man's freedom fighter'"; "a trrrorist is s.omconc who has a bomb but doesn't ha\'e an air forcc";4" the car bomb is me "poor man's air forcc." 4 ' In his book Luftbeben: A11 den Que/len des Terrors, which litcrallr translates as "Air Tremors: At the Source of Terror," the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk argues for an analysis of terrorism from and of the air, re.cognizing thc power of aerial assault, poison gas attacks in World War I, and thc gassing of Jcws in the Holocaust. 4 ' These arc, of coursc, actions of states. He broadcns thc analysis to look at radioactivity, meteorology, pneuma to logy, and thus provides a series of analyses of how commanding the air can tcrrorizc the carth. To express this idea, he coins tlu: term "'atmotcrrorism"-a broadening of terrorism from the earth to thc atmosphcrc.4 Y Slotcrdijk's point is that many forms of tcrrorism target

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indi,riduals and groups through the air that they breathc, thus targe,ting the air itself. !o> This is what is meant by the term Luftbeben-"air tremors" or "airquake." Thcrc is indeed something different about terror that comc:-s from the a ir. There were particular fears of the bomber airplane in World War U, with the idea that there was no effective defense and that the bomber would "always get through." As Herz purs it, "the roof blew off the territorial state." 11 This brought civilian popuJations into proximity with conflict in a way that they had prc\•iously never cncountcrcd-cspcdally in countries that had not been invaded in that war, such as Britain or Japan . In the Cold War, the fear of nuclear assault and the continuing attempts to create a missile ddensc shidd spc.tk nor simpl}' of the consequences of an attack, but in part of its mode of delivery. Truck and car bombs, and suicide bombers, whose ov.'ll bodies arc the means of delivering destruction, arc undoubtedly terrifying, but barriers and wa lls can be crccred to attempt to protc.ct a state from them. Assault from the air is much harder to prevent. It is not coincidental that tv.•o of the most extreme rcsponsc:-s of the United States and its a llies in the "war on terror" have been to aerial attack: to the airplanc:-s of St:ptrmbc:-r 11, 2001, and to Hezbollah's Katyusha rockC"ts launched against Israel in 2006. And yet those state rrsponses, like most other state-terror actions. also carne from the air. The "Shock and Awe" asS XXX

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as debates certainly we do not need ro rdy on this suspoct etymological basis. More importantly, we can relation in practice, too. Creating a bounded space is already a act of exclumaintaining it as such require-s constant vigilance and sion and the mobilization of thre-at; and challenging it ne.('essarily entails a transgres:sion.U ldebvre dc-scribcs the modem state in these ve-ry terms: Son•rcignr:y implies "spJce," and whar is more ir implies a space against which 'riolence, whether larcnr or overr, is dirccred-a sp:Jce csrabhshed and consriwred b)' violence.... [\'cry smre IS born of violence, and srarc power endures only b)• \'irrue of violence directed towJrds a space.... A violcnc,e , and connnuous ere-arion by violent me-ans (by fire and blood, in B1smarck's phrnsc)-such arc the hallmarks of the sr.ue.i>J

This is, in part, what Etienne Balibar means by the violence of borders and the .,·iolcncc beyond Elsewhere, Lefebvre claims that "viois to political space, not onlr as an expression of (political) will to power, but due to a permanent reign of terror .... ••gs This cannot be seen in isolation from political and the of unification to the state and its States whercb)' social practice is arc territorial, ccrtainl}', but the territorial aspe-ct is not a mere container control of territory is what makrs a pos:siblr. for state action. Thus, control of territory accords a to the and its spatial Those in control of act in ways that those not in control of territory cannot is to exercise terror; to territorial To control a obscurrd b}' the workings is to rxrrcisc terror. Whilr the first is of the system, the is continually reinforced by it, in that sdf-dctermination movements the world over (that is, those that seck control of space currently held by a state) a rc The misnamed United Nations-a le-ague of states coded as or an assembly of gm·crnmrnts would be apt-is appcalro to as the of such ln 1988, for instance, U.N. Sccre,t ary General ja\•ier Perez de Cuellar described the United Nations as an organization of and said that it would be "against our philosophy to be in touch with the rncmics of The continued insistrncc of the Unitrd Nations on the idral of "territorial intcgrit}'"-that states should have their existing borders and have exclusive- sovercignry within this link, The current international s ituation, brought into specific focus in the "war on terror, •• exposes the tensions within this term. For some statc-s, sovereignty, starr violence,

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and state terror is rendered problcmaric, comingent., ycr state tcrrirory is supposed to remain unquestioned. This book therefore interrogates the territorial aspects of rhe "war on terror" twofold, both that it important territorial dimensions, which arc palpable yet underplayed, but a lso that taking territor)' into ac.count provides a scrirs of valuablr insights into t he "war" more generall}'· It rccognius that today, many people arc arguing for an understanding of political-spatial relations that gOC"s beyond territory, but it counters this suggestion by showing that it is still a crucia l component of state-spatial thinking and one that rhe international legal system still privileges. As Brenner narcs, analyses oft·c:n suggest that territory is an either/or problem, with territory either bC"ing prcscnr or absent. "Consequently, the possibilit}• that territoriality is being rC"configurcd and rcscaiC'd rather than eroded cannot be adeq uatcly explored. " 90 This book therefore docs not aim to suggest that a ll configurations of power arc nor that this .is the onl}' spatial scale of ana lysis. Rather, it demonstrates that territory is an important a nd neglected issue that demands intrrrogation. In doing so. it shows how a critical geographical perspective, informed by historical work on plsors ro rry ro localize AI-Qacda m :\fghanisran and decimate a cell by t'r.lSing a landmass.••

Thus Fukuyama concentrates on history, or what he terms " History, " ignoring geographica l Spt".cifidty did Hcgd, a nd, a rguably. Marx, in their broad sweep accounts of human progress), whereas Huntington buys inro a modC'rn variant of geographical determinism, ignoring history, along with much else. The third of these commentato rs is the former National Sccmity AdviZbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinskj had, even sor to President Jimmy in the late 1970s, begun tile strategic proc-ess of pla nning for American supremacy, and his thinking is arguably as importa m as what happened during the Reagan and first Bush administrations in terms of shaping the geopolitical cmrironment:n It was Brzezinski whose actions had helped to fomen t instability in Afghanistan by a rming the enemies. of the pro-Soviet regime. Brzezinski had suggested to Carter that " tilis aid would induce SO\'ict military interYention" a nd t hat when thc:y d id intervene', "we can give the U.S.S.R. its own Vietnam war. Sn·cral years after leaving office, Brzezinski articulated his ideas in the book The Great Chessboard, which offered a series of cartographic representations of the new global security, which thcmsclvC's linked to a much older linC"agC' of gcostrateg)', such as Halford Jt.·t ackinder a nd Nicholas Spykman. Two of Brzezinski's rC'presemarions a rc particularly worth highlightir1g: "the global zone of percolating violencC''' 44 and " tile critical core of Europe's Sccurity. ''41 Yet Brzezinski dis misses ideas that his actions le<J to the contempora ry

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Cartographies of ltle post...Cold War world

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situation. He: suggests that Tali ban arc insignificant compared to ''the collapse of the Union," and that is. no such thing as "'a global Islam," but rather a whole range: of coumric:s that have nothing more in common than "Christian countries. The fina l writer to be: discussed here is Robert Kaplan. In a 1994 article, expanded into a book in 2001, Kaplan spoke of "the coming anarchy. " 4 ' What would characterize the post-Cold War world was neither a settled debate concerning political structures nor vast hegemonic blocs facing off against each other. Rather, there would be sporadic conflict, violence, and disorder dispersed across the world and lacking any significant unifying cause: or focus. Kaplan discussed what would today be called " rogue" and "weak" or "failed'' states, and this hclpcd many to make sense of the "new wars" of the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnja, Rwanda, and elsewhere. Clinton apparently had a copy of Kaplan's 1994 article faxed to U.S. embassies across the world. These ideas gained popular Cltrrenq• through the depiction of wars and U.S. interventions in films like Black Hawk Down and Behirtd E11er1ty LineJ:n Kaplan argued that there was a .. bifurcated world," part of which was occupied b}' Fukuyama's Last Jvlan, and part of which was a disintcgrated zone of Hobbesian chaos :·" \'(13r-m.aking

enrim·s will no longer be resutcred m a specific temmry ... Loose and shadowy org:.misms such as Islamic rerrorisr organisations suggest why borders wi ll men n increasingly lirrle nnd sedjmentttr)' la)·ers of rribalisric idemiry and conuol mean more.... Imagine 3 c3rrography in rhree dimensions, as 1f in a hologram. In rhis hologr3m would be rhe O\'erlappmg sc:dimc:nts of group and orher idenrit1es arop rhe merely two dimensional colour m3rkings of city-smrc:s and rhc: remaining narions, rhemsd\·es confused m places b)' shndowy rent..1cles, hovering 0\'erhead, mdtcaring rhe power of drug C:Jrrds, mafi:Js and privarc: securiry 3gencic:s. lnsre3d of borders., rhere w1ll be mm·ing -cenrers" of power, as in rhe Middle Ages. l'\'bny of rhese la)·c:rs would be in mocion. Replacmg lixed and nbrupr lines on 3 Aat spacc: would be 3 shiftmg pntrc:rn of buffer entitles. ... To rhis prorro n hologram one must add other factors, such as m1g,rarions of populations. explosions of birrh mres. vecrors of d isc:o1se. Henceforward rhc: map of rhe world ,vjJJ ne\•er be s.uric. This future map-in a sense:. rhe -Lasr .lvlap"-will be an e\'er mumring represcnrarion of chaos. 10

It is clear how much contemporary of ai-Qacda trade upon this logic. Like thos-c- readings, Kaplan made usc of a range of racist and imperialist tropes of "primitive: sa\'agc:ry" and animalistic " liberation in violc:ncc." 1 1

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Kaplan's argument works in at least two tc:rritorial registers. There is a challenge to accepted territorial distinctions, where previous, borders no longer hold or prcvcnr danger. Threat spreads, ro it must be contained. In the face of this dctcrritorialization, there must therefore be a rctcrritorialization of the power of the: state. Bordc:rs neal to be protected, rdnforccd, or erected, and the apparatus of the state takes on an even more role. Kaplan has written a number of other smdics,, and has travcled across the globe, especially to "problem" areas, to im•estigatc these stiiJ further. Somc arc presented as travelogues, others as political commentary; mos,t arc a bit of both. These ha\'e included studies of places such as the Balkans, the M.iddle East, West Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus,u and Imperial Gmms, a study of locations whcrc U.S. troops arc dcployed.·u The chapter titles of this book bear the names of U.S. military-gc:og:raphical commands, such as CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM. Even bdorc September 11,2001, Kaplan found his influence on the \Vhitc Houst"'s thinking wouJdl continue with the new administration. Mnfson recounts how Bush read Eastward to Tartar)' at Camp Da,·id in carl}' 2001, and tbcn invited Kaplan to tbc White House to discuss its idcas. 14 In a 2006 piece cntitlc:d "'The Coming Normalcy?" on U.S. occupation in Iraq, Kaplan sees the potential for creating a scmblancc of stability through continued U.S. involvement in the: region, suggesting that "except for the collapse of Turkey's empire, thc creation of the state of and the Iranian revolution, nothing and nobody has so jolted the Middle East as has George \YI. Bush. " fl

"In Search of Monsters to Destroy"

ln the 1990s, during the two Clinton administrations, out-of-office conservatives and otbcrs began to plan for a funtrc Republican administration. Drugs, "'rogue statcs'' with weapons of mass destruction, and the instability caused b)' "failed" and "weak'' states were the llCW enemies thC)' mobilized against in their geographies of fear, alongsidc marc traditional enemies such as a rising China. Although there were a number of think tanks, the IPNAC became particularly influential. This is partly of the figures invoh·ed in its foundation, including Chcney, Rumsfdd, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalma}' Khalilzad, who all took on major roles in the Bush administration, along with Bush's brother Jcb and former Vice President Dan Quayle. In addition, PNAC included figures such as William Kristol and Robcrr Kagan, who werc associated with tbc conscrvati•lc magazine The \Veekly Stat1dard.s• Tbcy arc traditionall}' labeled "ncoconservati,·c,'' wbicb had

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originally largely bc-C"n a term used to describe a particular kind of domestic politics, but now largcl}' indicates an approach to foreign policy.>- There is a dose relation between neoconservatism and neoliberalism, with one content to operate in a political realm and the other in a broadly economic realm. Harvey has suggested that the difference of neoconservatism from nco liberalism is twofold: "'fint. in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overweening moralit>• as the necessary socia l glue to keep the bod}' politic secure in the face of external and internal dangers. " 58 If this sounds like the politics of the New Right under fo rmer British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and Reagan, a program Andrew Gamble memora bly summari:z.cd as '' the this is not coincidentaL Howe.,·er, free economy and the strong state, some commentators have suggested that the term "neoconservative" is misleading, suggesting that it is used to describe a disparate group of largely unconnected thinkers and that "if you ever read a sentence that sta rts with 'Neocons bdic\'c,' there is a 99.44 percent chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue."' 60 Nonetheless, there is a certain unified purpose, par ticular ly in terms of PNAC's initial "Statement of Principles," to which many of them signed up.o• The arguments PNAC would make hark back to July 1996, when Kagan and Kristol wrme an essay for the inAucnriaJ journal Foreign Affairs entitled "Towards a Nro-Reaganite Foreign Policy. ""1 j ohn Quincy Adams had declared that America ..goes not abroad in search of monsters to destrO}', "'fJ but this essay takes the exact opposite line: America sltmlld go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The rcason, according to this argumenr, is that the consequences of inaction arc wors.c: than war: The: alrernati\•c: is ro lc:3ve monsters on rhc: loose. ravaging and pillaging ro their hc:arrs' conrc:m.... Whar may ha,rc: been w1se counsd in I 823 (siC], when America was a small, 1solarro power in a world of Europc:nn giants, IS no longer so, w hen Amc:ric3 is me: giant. Because AmericJ. has the capacit)' to conta in or destroy many of the world's found w1rhom much sc:Jrching, and monsters, mosr of wh1ch rhc: rc:sponsibdiry for the JXace and security of the inrc:rnarional order rc:sts so heavily on America's sho ulders, a policy of sirring arop a hill and lc:3d ing by exampk bc:comc:s in pract1ce a policy of cowardice J.nd dis ho nour.fr.l

We can sec in this essay the germ of subsequent policy, in rhe idea that the United States should actively seck out conflict, dcaJing with issues that emerged as tlJey emerged, or even trying to anticipate future problems.

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The geographical net should be thrown wide, as it is in the follow-up edited \'olume Presmt Danger.s.iD The aim shouJd be to spread "bcne•;olenr global hegemon>'· ''M The arguments were not simp!}' forged in oppmition, however. Thq• bear dose rdation to a text written in the last year of Bush the father's presidency. This was the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance." The first draft of this was written by Wolfowitt and Khalilz.ad, fo.llowing an earlier review of the U.S. military after the first Gulf War, but was deemed to be too controversial.•- It was rewritten, in style if not in substance, b)' I. Lewis ''Scootrr" Libby for Key themes rrmerged in a rrport Khalilzad wrote for the U.S. Air Force.• 9 Among othrr things, the rrport urged the United States to "show the leadership nm:ssary to rstablish and protect a new o rder that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a grcatrr role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interrsts." In this, it was not mcrdy content for thr United States to be in a dominant position, but it needed to ensure that it remained unrivaled. While some of this might be done b)' persuasion that these possible rivals' rational interests would be best served by following the United States, there was a need to "discouragr them from challenging our lrndership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order ... [or) even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."71l PNAC accordingly called for the United States to recognize and embrace its unrivaled position as global leader. It proposed "a Rcaganite policy of military and moral clarit>•;' suggesting that though it "'ma}' not be fashionable today . .. [it) is necessary if the UnitC'd State's is to build on the successes of this past ce-ntury and to ensure our security and our greatness in the ne).'t. , -. PNAC a imed to provide the- intdle.ctua l justification fo r the Unitrd to usc power. both in terms of influence but also potentially its military force. But this not merely be: reactive; rather, it should anticipate and preempt problr-ms before they become fu lly realized. As they suggest in their Sc-ptemlx-r 2000 report Rebuildi11g America's De{e11.ses, .. the history of the 20th century shouJd have taught us that it is important to shape circwnstances before crises emerge, and to meet thre-ats before they becomr dire. •n Smith claimed that Henr}' Luce's famous t 941 editoria l for Life magazine. "The AmC"rican Century," masked its spatial, territorial ambitions through a temporal aspiration.-! Following this, Ha rvey has suggested that PNAC "deliberately repeats. therefore, all the e\'asions that Smith exposes in Luce's presentation. "-4 Yet Luce's piece had explicitly argued that "tyrannies may require a largr amount of li\'ing space. But Freedom requires and w ill require far

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greater lh•ing space than Tyranny. "'.5 So too docs PNAC make explicit its territorial agenda. PNAC sets out to establish four core missions for U.S. miJitary fo rces: • Defend r.hc Homeland; • Fighr and dcclsl\'dy win mulnplc, ma1or • rhc "consTabulary,. durics associarcd with shaping riry t'nvironmcnr in crincal rcgjons; • Tr:1nsform U.S. forces ro cxploir rhe ··re,•olurion in mllimry

wars; se
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United States and the European Un ion in terms of how ro deal with the contemporary global situation. 11 5 The European Union has moved into a "post-historical paradise," insulated from events ar1d llOW existing in a kind of Kantian "perpetual pcaoc." The United States, by contrast, has to operate within a wild Hobbesian world, one of perpetua l war, and remains "mired in history. "''h Kagan suggests that Europe is unable to act and as a consequence sees war as undesirable, but it is at least as likely that the reverse is true: Europeans have reduced their armies bec<Juse of their lack of appetite for conflict. For Kagan, though, the United States and Europe were dfectivcly oc.cupying different worlds, in terms of their perception and response. The United States needs to intervene in the chaotic parts of the world pre.cisdy to secure and ensure the European model of thC' future. Because of its particular role in these areas, the United States is forced to operate outside the law, and the European Union should not impose its unrealistic moral and political standards on it. As he puts it, "among oursch•es, we keep the law, bm when we arc operating in the jungle, we must also usc the laws of the jungle."..- This move is a clear indication of the logic behind U.S. securit}' strategy and practicc. 118 A further anal)•sis is the suggestion of a "'connected" and "disconnected" world under globalization, an imagined geography where reonomic disconnection is ,·iewed as a securit}' issue-a threat. Although the relation between the globalized \'(fest ar1d the noll-integrated rest of the world can be viewed quite differently, such a division has important geopolitical consequences. Take New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, on the one hand: If one rhing srnnds our from 9111, it's fact that the tcrrorm:s onginart"d from the least globali7-Cd, Lr-asr leasr in regrated corners ol the world: in namdy, Saudi Yemen, :\fghanisran, and nonhwesr Palnsran.'"

In contrast, the: official 9/11 Commission concluded: Amt"rica stood out as an objt"Ct for adm1ranon, l"rt V>', :md blame. Th1s created a kind of cultura l aS)'IJlmerry. To us, Afghanistan sc:cmt"d very far away, To mc:mbt"rs of al Qaeda, Amc:rica sc:emed ver)' dose. In a sense, rhey more globalized than we wcrc.llJI

Although they differ on this point, both arc intent on inscribing a particular geopolitics of division. one that functions tC'rritorially. Friedman, especially in his best-selling book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, ' 21 offers an account of the globalizrd world where everyone desires a Lcxus, compared to people fighting over olive trees . The world of tradition is

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as backward to globalization.•ll olive arc a but they particular symbol of the Palcstinianllsracli conAict, of arc a lso about territory, who controls the resources of sc.arc,e and ferti le land, and the division which the Israeli wall or has marked more clcarly. m A similar logic is found in Friedman's 2005 The World Is Flat,' 2• which suggots not that the world is not round as much as it is not vertically stratified. This ideal of world as flat or kvc:l is both description and prcs Haass dC'clar ed in 2.002., anticipating an argument made by Barnett: Is :1 successor idea lo I dunk there IS. Iris the of mrc:gr.uion. The I of U.S. foreign policy should be ro persuade the omer major powers to sign on to cenain !key ideas as ro how rhe world should oppos:inon ro terrorism and pons of mass destruction, supporr for Ire therefore clear that on the e\'ening of Septcm bcr l l, 2001. the Bush administration had a number of geographical ana lyses of the threats and opportunities of the post-Cold War SinOC" then, they have had many more. The continuities between the prc•·ious U.S. administrations should not be underestimated. T hc complcx topographies and the notw-complex diagnoses of them ha\'C continually shaped U.S. policy. This a number of the states that have found themselves targets, depicted either as "weak'' or "failed" sta tes that arc breeding grounds for terrorists, or "rogue"' states like Iraq or Iran. In addition, it raises the question of just what is the relation of lslamism to thc understanding of territory? It is to these questions that the following chapter!> turn.

CHAPTER TWO

Territorial Strategies of lslamism

AI-Qacda is often portrayed as a deterritorialized network or association. Yet C\'cn networks have connections, and examining tbe materialit}' of its nodes demonstrates that it is a much more groundeJ organization. If we think through bow ai-Qacda actually functions, it is clear that it operates in a profound[}' territorial way. both within and against conventional understandings of tbc rdation bct>vccn sovereignty and territOr)'. In tem1s of a di.,·ision of labor within ai-Qacda, the gmcrallr accepted \'iew is cltat Osama bin Laden is the orator and Ayman ai-Zawahiri is more the strategic planncr and recruiter. AI-Zan•at. for example, suggests that al-Zawahiri is the key person behind the September 11, 200l , attacks.• \Xfhilc ai-Zawahiri is often described as bin Laden's lieutenant, his role is as more of a coorganizer and leader. They have each influence() the other, rather than the older ai-Zawahiri shaping bin Laden. One of the key issues that bin Laden is credited with has been ai-Zali\rahiri's move from targeting the "ncar enemy" of Egypt, as a means to challenge Israel, to a direct targeting of the "far enemy" of the United States. A key 1995 writing of ai-Zawahiri was "The Road to Jerusalem Passes Through Cairo''i yet in 1998, he was a partner to bin Laden's wider strategy of iihad against Jews and Crusaders, a move cllat drew criticism from his colleagucs.2 The influence of ai-Zawahiri on bin Laden was to persuade him to embark on jilmd himself, rather than funding operations and working as an Islamic relief worker and pre.acheL3 Taking account of this shift of priorities demonstrates a crucial geopolitical strategy. The proximity of "ncar" and "far" enemies and the spatial politics of jihad indicate the geographicaJ and territoriaJ aspects of al-Qaeda's The argument here is thus in opposition to Ro}'s claims that bin Laden "has no strategy in the true sense of the word,. and that " there is no geostratcgy of Islam use Islam is not a territorial Indeed, despite his claims about "dctcrritoria lization," Roy's

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analysis continually invokes a series of sites, countries, and strategies that demonstrate a significant territorial sense. As Balibar has a rgued, the idea of a network as simply a "dctcrritoria lization'' is "the constitution of a network is also of course a rctcrritoria lization.".i A!!. Mustafa puts it: The canogrophy of terromm will al.so h.t\'e co move bc:yond traditional compartmenulisro gcograph)• of nation smrc:s.... The: sovereign sp-.1cc:s of nation smres a nd the nodal nttworks of mrc:rnauonal terrorism offer a fundamcmal ch:1llmge to rhe moo:krn srarc-cenrered g.lobal geopolitics. 6

Similarly, Ehtcshami has suggested that the stratcgks of Islamism act as a challenge to the "basis of the existing internationa l S)'Stcnt-thc system of territorially-based states."' But approciating these insights requires more than a simple ar gument that we have gone beyond state territory or straightforward geography. Rather, it requires a fundamental rethinking of the geographies of territory. Eslamism acts as a challenge to the relation between state, sovereignty, and territory. Nonstatc actors can control territory; many states cannot. A range of issues arc often used as justifications for terrorist attacks. These go beyond the widespread condemnation of Israel and extend to a range of issues with direct U.S. involvement and those with a more indiroct linkage. These territorial aspects would include, but arc dearly not limited to, Russia in Chcchnya, India and Pakistan in Kashmjr, inaction in Bosnia, conAict in the Philippines with ethnic Muslims, support fo r the Indone-sian government in the Cold War, and the stationing of U.S. troops on the Arabian Peninsula, as well a& the long-running sanctions and air strikes against Iraq. They have now been joine-d by events in Afghanistan, Lebanon (already a repeat of events from 1978, 1982, and long after}, and the Horn of Africa, as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At the very least, these issues arc indicati\rc of the ongoing widespread nature of territorial problcms in thc \Vorld that have been maskcd by the end of the Cold War and the supposed triumph of globalizarion. 8 The 9111 Commis.sio11 Report rocognizes that many of these territorial issues arc, in part. the answer to the question "Why do 'they' hate a lthough the report tdlingl)' docs not mention the stationing of U.S. troops. On this last point. it is worth noting that opposition is not simply to the presence of U.S. troops in the "land of the two Holy but also bc.cause bin Laden, Hush with success in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, had offered to rid Saudi Arabia of the Iraqi threat himself w hen Iraq invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s, only to have- this offer spurned by the royal family.''

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As former CIA l'r'1ichad S.Cheuer notes. the United States is " hated across the Isla mic world beca use of spcrific U.S. government policies and actions .. . arc at war with an ai-Qaeda-led, be-cause of a nd to defend those policies, and not, as lsla mist President Bush mista kenly has said, 'to defend freedom and a ll that is good and just in wo rld .'"' 2 He notes six reasons: • • • •

U.S. support for Israel th:n keeps Palc:sunians in the Israelis' thra ll U.S. and o ther Western trOOP'S o n the Arabian l'eninsui J. U.S. occupation o f Iraq and Afgha ni.s.ro n U.S. support for Russia, lnd1a, and Gina aga inst rhc:i r 1\·tushm mihunrs • U.S. pressure: on Arab energy producers ro keep oil pnces low • U.S. support for aposr:1re, corrupt, a nd t)'rann ic:J l governments13

All bm the last two arc obvious!}· territoria l; all can

understood geopolitica lly. M any other things that couJd be added to this charge sheet actions against Libya a nd Sudan a nd a whole range of events in Central America and South America.' 4 Yet where such issues a rc acknowledged, this is generall)' done in such a Wa)r as to o bscure and erase differences, such as in the fo llowing speech by President George Wl. Bush: Q,•er the years these: extremists have used a lirany of exc uses. for violence- t he Israeli presence on rhe West Bank, or the U.S. military of me Tali ban, or the Crusades presence in SJ.udi Arabia, or t he of a tho usand >'ears ago. In fact, we're not facing a set of that c:J n be soothed and add ressr'· The hatrro of rhe radicals before Iraq W:JS an issue. and it will exist after Iraq is no longer an excuse. The g,ovc:mment o f Russia d1d nor support Opcrarion Iraqi Freedom, :Jnd yet t he: mihunrs killed more rha n I SO Russia n schoolchild ren in Bcslan."

O f the man}' things that co uld be sa id of this, two will ment of the United States in Iraq reaches back to over a

invol\•c-

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Scptcomber 11, 2001, with the enforcement of the no-Ay zones, the U.N.sponsorcd scanctions regime, and the bombardments of Operation Desert Fox in Docember 1998; and the a.trocity in Beslan is linked to Russia's involvement in Chcchnya, a different, albeit re lated, war. Given the fog surrounding the "war on terror," some understanding may be appropriate. It is equally important to rocogni:z.c that the ma jority of territorial claims arc £O rocovcr lost land rather rhan conqucr, 1" although the notion of what "Muslim lands" arc can be rather vague, sometimes extending to lands lost to Islam in the fifteenth century. Thus, this chapter looks at a i-Qaeda and militant Islam more genera lly through the territorial aspects of its operations and the particular territorial imaginary of its leaders. In doing so, it explicitly retcrritoria liz.cs the analysis, looking both at specific territoria l grievances across the world and rhetorical ideas of a new Caliphate. Reading Bin Laden

Despite the portrayal of bin Laden as livi ng in a cave, he is generally acknowledged to be an expert at using the media to communicate his messages. In re.ccnt his organization's media tactics have changed, with an extensive usc of the Internet. 1- Yet while he is able to reach a widesprccad audience, he is much less effective in terms of getting Western audiences to actually listen to what he says. Part of the reason for this is, of course, the role of the media in acting as a conduit for his messages. In the late autumn of 2001, for instance, major U.S. media outlets agreed to limit the public release of bin Laden's messages on the instructions of then- National Security Advisor Condole.czza Rice. 18 One of the claims was that the messages might include coded messages to terrorists, something bin Laden himself has d ismissed as "hilarious ... it's as if we were living in the time of mail by carrier pigeon, when there arc no phones, no tra\•dcrs, no Internet, no regular mail, 110 express mail, and no electronic mail. " 19 Clearly the point was more to deny him a \'Oice/0 in much the same wa}' that the British govemmcnt used to overdub Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams in media interviews with the words of an actor during the 1980s and early 1990s. A similar outcry ac.companicd the September 2007 visit of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to speak a t the Un ited Nations and Columbia University in New York. Yet as the speeches and writings of Stalin and Hirler bccar both historical and political importance. so too do the words of a ll participants in tbis current war. The historical and political significance of his speeches require examination. Understanding docs not, of course. mean empathizing. As Fisk

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suggests, '' bin Laden might lx crud, wicked, ruthless, or c:viJ personified, but he is intelligent. " 1 1 In these terms, Tariq Ali's view of Sayyid Qutb's 1964 work Milestones, alrcrnari\'c:Jy translated as Sig11pos1s, is instructive: ''From a materialist viewpoint the book is rcpc:titive, banal, uninspiring., and intdkctuall}' offensive. Yet it has had a massive impact on two generations of Muslims, and that alone necessitates an cngagc:mcnt with its idc.as. "'11 Yet bin Laden docs nm ncc,cssariJy sec a distinction bc:twc:cn speech and acts. His speech preceding the 2004 U.S. presidential election was as powerful as an attack, and as Faisal [)c,rji notes, he "describes the C\'Cnts of September the dc\•cnth not as hostile: or vc:ngcful actions so much as a set of communicatiom. " .U In his own words, his encmics "only understand thc language of attacks and killings. '' 14 Even if his \'iews arc controversial and at times abhorrent, bin Laden is a dcepl)' impressh·c orator. The comments of Octavia Nasr, CNN's senior editor for Arab affairs and one of the main intc:rprctcrs of bin Ladcn, arc instructive: He is doquem, doquem. He usc:s cbsstcal ..\rabtc, which makes h1m one of the roughest people ro rr:mslare. He also has an exrraordmary knowledge of rhe Koran. He has memoriz.ed the Koran. He choosc:s ltis quores. He also 1mpro\'1ses h1s speeches. This is someone who does nor re-ad spC'C'chcs. In a ll of rhe videotapes [har I have seen and translated, he dOC's nm even look at a script, and he can go on for hours nonsrop, staying dC':lr and on message. He doesn't get nred. You can say he's ollC' of thOSC' top public spcakers.ll

has claimed that bin laden is " not an original thinker" and not "an outsunding Qur'anic scholar: hC' lacks the command of ttxrual subdc:tics that mark Wahhabi C'xcgctes in Arabia, or their Azhari coumerparts in Cairo." Instead, Lawrence suggests that his strength is his "'literary gifts," suggesting that "what actually distinguishes him ... is that he is first and forcmo"St a pokmi£ist. " 24 Thc usc of the Koran is, of course, a major part of his rhetoric, even if his interpretations of it arc disputcd. Whilc the theological aspects of his will not be discusSl'd here, a fcv.• aspects arc worth underlining. One is that bin Laden and Zawahiri do not generally preach or practice antiShi'a politicsl attempting to hold to the: line that the divisions within Islam arc less important than those between Islam and the West. An internal war wrthin Islam will, he suggests, gi\·c victory to their common cncn1ics. As Dc\ii puts it, "bin Laden is not averse to claiming the support not only of herc:tics for the jihad, but of apostates as wdl. '" 1- Gunar atna has described this as a "goal-orientated rather than rule-orientated doctrine. Differmccs between types of Islam arc important, certainly, but the blankct assumptions

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of some Western politicians and dements within the media arc tending to erase differences. As bin Laden himself has phrascti it, "this battle is not bctwcm ai-Qactia and the United Stares. This is a battle of Muslims against the global Crusaders. " 29 Indeed, and potentiall)' more so even than Bush. bin Laden is strategically interested in drawing dividing lines. Chapter 1 argued that Bush's usc of the term "with" was sophisticarcd and that undemanding this point was important in cha llenging the idea that the "'war on terror" was predicated on binary thinking. For bin Laden, such divisions-intentional or consequential-arc strategically powerful. As chapter 3 shows, many states found themselves in an awkward position as a result of Bush's imposed choice. For bin Laden, this was a form of terrorism itself: The e\'enrs pro\·ed the of terrorism that America exercises in the world. Bush Slated that [he world has to lx: dn•ided 111 two: Bush and his supporters, and any country that doesn't get inro the global crusade is wnh the terrorists. Wh:u rerronsm is dearer rh:m rhis? Many go\·ernterrorism." They had to go menrs were forced to suppon rhis along with this although rhey knew that we arc defend ing our brothers and defending our sacred \'alues.JO

Bush has described the terrorists as "barbaric criminals who profane a great religion by committing murder in its name. " 11 He has returned to this theme continually: Some call thts e\•il hlamic rad1cahsm; orhers, mdir.ant J iha still others, lslamo-fasctsm. \Vhate11er it's called, rh1s ideology is ver)' differcm from [he rchgion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to sen·e a violent, political \'ision: the establishment, b)· terrorism and sub\·ers1on and msurgency, of a rotalitarian emptre mat all polit1caland religious freedom. These cllcremists d istort rhe 1dea of iihad into a ca ll for terrortst murder ogamsr Christians and Jews and Hindus-and also again5l from orher traditions, who rney regard as hcrcrics.ll

Thus, while Bush continually attempted to drive wedges bctv.•e,cn factions and to insist that this is not a war against Islam, he has not succeeded. Indeed, this attempt has resonances that he may not have intended. As Chemus puts it, "he took it upon himself to define categorically what docs and what docs nor constirute aurhcntic [slam, or authenticity in any religion .... This enabled him to depict the war as a battle against sin waged not just b)' the U.S. but b}' every imaginable form of genuine religion and morality. "JJ

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Bin ladcn is also skilled in taking specific words that have bocn used and exploiting their full resonances : Bush s:ud n in his own words: ..crusade." When Bush says rhat, thq rry to co\•er up for him., then he s.·ud he d idn't mean it. He sa1d Bush divided the world imo rwo: With us or wirh terrorism." Bush IS the leader; he carries t he big cross and walks. I sweor rhot e\•ery one who follows Bush in his scheme has gi,·en up Islam and the word of the prophet. This is very clear. The prophet hos said, don'r follow Jews o r Cllrisnans.,. Our wise people ha\•e s.11d thor those who follow the unfaithful have become unfa ithful rhemselves. Those who follow Bush in his crusade against Mushms have denounced

Bin Laden is thus able to cxploit the full potcntial ramifications of Bush's intrnrional and unintrntional rhetoric. Thr usr ofthr word "crusade" was indeed a gift to his cause, allowing him to claim " this is a recurring war. The original crusade brought Richard from Britain, Louis from France, and Barbarus from Germany. Today the crusading countries rushed as soon as Bush raised the cross. They accepted the rule of the cross. " 11 Turning the "with us or against us" formula against the United States enables him to paint those who support thr United Statrs as enemies of Islam, even if those who oppose it would not ordinarii)' side with bin Laden or his particular interpretation of lslam . In this sense. the usc of the term "crusade" was a spectacular, and casil}•cxploitablc, blunder. More generupon support because many of those ally, he is able to who disagree with his tactics can find common purpose with his causes. As a report for the Ccnmry Foundation declared; "'If the criteria for iihadist support were the belief that the U.S. militar}' should depart Iraq or the Israeli military should depart the West Bank or Gaza, the majority of Muslims would probabl}' agree. " 36 It is worth adding, though it should be obvious, tha t many non-Muslims would also agree. In one of the most insightful analyses of the spatial pracrioes and representations of the jihad, Devji has argued that "the rhetorical sophistication with which bin Laden links the American president's usc of the word crusade to the globe's division into two enemy camps is quite remarkable, allowing him to define the war as onc of rcligion in the most logical of ways. "J" Dcvji is able: to demonstrate the thcological aspects of the war in a number of compelling ways, but he is on less certain ground when he suggests that this is more broad!)' interpreted as being a battle at the level of ideas rather than material practice. As he phrases it, "after all. hO\v else can the division of the globe into opposing camps be intrrprrtcd

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otherwise than as a metaphysical one?'"J-1 Elsewhere, the claim is made that the global aspirations of Islam arc mctaphyskal rather than geopolitiThere arc undoubtedly a series of representations at play here, but thcrc arc a lso concrete matcrial practices. Rathcr than a simple metaphysics or a crude unthcorctical geopolitics of practice, there is a continually intertwined and productive relation between them, a rc AJ-Za wahiri has suggested that "armies achieve victor}' onlr when the infantry takes hold of land." 18 This is related to the idea of taking "the battle to the enemy's own soil. After long centuries of his taking the battle to our soil and after his hordes and armed forces occupied our lands in Chcchnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, and after centuries of his occupying our land while enjoying

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sccurit}' at home:." 59 The: second is the linkage: of diffC'rc:nt struggles. In his important text Knights tmder the Bmmer of the Prophet, he explicit!)' links Chechnya to the Caucuses more generally, and describes the region of the Caspian Sea through to Afghanistan as "a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia,"' which will hdp opposc: the perceived RussianU.S. alliance against Islam in that area, which thc:n can bring in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmc:nistan, and Tajikistan.00 This thc:mc: has a much longer lineage. One exponent is Abdallah Azza m, whosc: 1984 text Defending tbc Land of the Muslims Is Each Man's Overriding Duty is widcl)' citc:d. Azzam dc:.clares that: Th1s dur)' sh3 1l not bpsc wid1 \'lcrory in .-\fgh3nist3n, and the iilmd \vlll obligarion umil all ocher l:!nds which former!)' rem3in 3n were Muslim come back ro us a nd reigns w1rhin rhern o nce lkforc us lie Bukham, U:banon, Chad, £rirrea, Som:Jh3, Philippines, Burm:1, South Yemm, Tashkenr, Andalusia ...61

And once again, the concentration on particular sites does not mean a neglect of the long-running issuc: of Palestinc:: "Our presence in Afghanistan toda}' ... docs not mean that wc: have forgottc:n Palestinc:. Palcstinc: is our beating hcarr."'bl. The sc.cond key theorist is Hassan ai-Turabi: a Sudanese religious leader who played an important role in the political system in the: 1990s before bdng imprisoned by President Omar ai-Bashir. Hc: has been described as "the region's most prolific theoretician" "} and has combined his theories with his political activitics. 64 As de \Vaa l and Abdcl Salam put it, '•if there is to be an Islamist Lenin, then it is Hassan al Turabi .''•s One of the most significant aspects of his work is that the analysis of the Caliphate puts some conceptual flesh onto the rhetorica l bonc:s. Like bin Laden, who was gready influenocd by Turabi in his time in Sudan, and the Hczbollah leadcr Sayyc:d Hassan Kasrallah, al-Turabi is an accomplished orator, able to speak to different audiences in different registers: When wriring in fng,lish, Turabi presents 3 liberal face:. This not just because he is wnring for a non-Muslim audience:, but also bcc3usc h1s umqu11ecn us and our neighbors, nor docs color, race, or language separate us. How can we give any legirimacy or sancriry m rhese borders whiCh they rhemseh•es do not

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The argument that Western models of division have been imposed o-.,·er more traditional understandings of the relationship political rule: and land in the Arab world is not uncommon. more zonal, accounts note that there were ping, nomadic, or fluid understandings ..... Yet much the same could made for the relation between place and politics in Europe and Norrh America in a not-dissimilar period, A shift from earlier understandings to a more rigid divis ion is a historical as wdl as geographical distinction. What is significant is the wa)' in which the Ottoma n Empire was divided. The borders were not drawn along the lines of interna l divisions, as were the Spanish colonies in South America, larer parts of the British a nd French possessions in Africa, or the Soviet Union. Rather, the: dh•isions and the newly created countries were products of another round of grea t-power politics and a renewed colonization. This-as w ith any drawing and redrawing of boundaries-brought together thost' who wished to remain apart a nd fragmen ted existing bonds. Issues concerning Syria and Lebanon, Iraq, and, of co urse, Israel/ Pa lestine, all date from this time. Dnji has a rgued that the indctc:rminacy of the concept of the Caliphate is more than simply rhetorical obfuscation. He contends: The cahphare is nOf a political \'ISion as much as a metaphysical caregor}'. Ir remains only an 1o:kal, With neither a dcscripnon or any concrete pl.m ro set ir up. And in fuct rhe caliphate's rule rhus far is to abandon rhc polrrical geogras.imply conceptual, allow1ng rhe phy of rhe Cold \Var. mack up o f national scares grouped into \'a rio us a llia nces, for a complerdy ck-cerrirona lized and e\·en anri-g.c=ogrophical space. smce the= calipharc= imagined by rhe jihad possesses ncirher center nor penphery ... After na\•ing been a dc:ad lener for well over half a as a living careg.ory. in cemury, rhe caliphate has suddenly no matrcr how meraph)'Sic:al an incarnorion.1•rgyzstan. Pottenger has described its vision as a n "Islamic caliphate that extends from the Muslim region of Wcstem China on the east to the Black Sea on the wcst." ' 02 In southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiah organization has expressed an a im of a pan-Islamic state, bringing together the: world's most populous Islamic nation, lndonesia, with the neighboring states of Malaysia and the Philippines. There is dispute about the relationship betv.•ecn Jemaah lsla miah and a l-Qaeda, with some c.-tling it a subsidiary and o thers an affiliate. Undoubted ly responsible for the: 2002 Bali bombing. this organization certainly finds common purpose with ai-Qaeda in crucial respects.' 03 For Dcvji, the iibaJ is thus "located on the peripheries of the Muslim world geographica lly, politically, and rdigiously." 104 He suggests then that the: jihad i.s nor mm•ing from the: center to the periphery, but rather the: reverse. The Middle East therefore docs not function as a center in any obvious sense:, with ai-Zawah iri relocating from Egypt and bin Laden fmm Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan, via Sudan, and now probab1}' to Pakista n. Zawahiri noted that it was in Afghanistan that the muiahidin became acquainted with a global struggle that transcended their own national backgrounds. 105 Once again, Devji suggests that this means that the specificities arc unimportant: By moving bc(wecn Bosma nnd Afghanistan, Chcchn)'a and lrnq, tho= ;ihad displ.tys i[s fundamcmal mdiffcrcnce ro (hesc rermorics r.uho=r

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than consolidating into a single= Mushm gc=ogrnphy. h ends by dc=-tc=rrirorializ.ing Islam alcogerhec,. since ic is nor one= country o r another rhat 1s impon:anr, bm insread Islam itsdf as a globa l emiry.'00

But this is once more overdrawn. Each of these sites had a significance, both at tht' time and as a catalyst and inspiration for future: struggb. As Kohlmann has suggested, part of the point of working in Bosnia was to t'Stablish a fonvard base for ocher actions, including those against the United States. 10- After the Dayton Agrct'mt'nt, which ended that conflict, most jihadists ldt, but some remained because they had married local rcsidmts. •OJ In addition, Dcvj i's claim falls into the trap of assuming that global movemt'nts arc by their nature dctcrritoria lizcd. This is not necessarily the case. Rather, they open up possibilities within ex isting territorial configurations, challenge straightforward understandings of territory, and excet'd the static limits of nation-state boundaries. It is entirely possible for Abu Musab to declare, as he d id in 2004, that " I am global, and no land is my countr(' at the same time' that he was leading the struggle of in Mesopotamia. A letter sent by al-Qacda to ai-Zarqawi made this strategy clear: The first stage: expel rhc= Americans fro m Iraq. T he= second stage: establish a n Islamic aurho ri ry or amirarc=, rhc=n d c=.,·dop it and suppon it until it the le"el o f a ca li phare-
of d.:anger, is now given :.1 permanent spatial such nevenhdess outside rhe normal

This is an analysis that he particularly applies to the concentration and extermination camps of Nazi Germany, and paradigmatically Auschwitz. uo German Weimar Constitution was dfoctivcly suspended in 1934 with the passing of the Enabling Act- a law to deal with the "'Emergency of the People and the ReiciJ"-allowing Hitler not onlr to pass laws directly, but also to break with the constitution. The argument is then made that the Nazi camps were the spatia l extension of this legal usurpaused extensively tion. Yer Article 48 of rhe \'(fdmar Constitution had before Hider, so in some respects, Hider was continuing and extending previous state practice rather than radically breaking with it.' s1 Indeed, Neoclcous notes that "'exception" is perhaps a misleading term, because the declaration of states of emergency is often, paradoxicallr. rather commonplace. Instead, he makes a compelling argument for stressing the notion of "emergency," noting that the extraordinary powers claimed arc strategically inherent in the operations of political power, only to emerge when tacticall>• useful. m

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One thing that is crucial in the Nazi camps is their conccrn with thc management of life and death itself, which Agambcn, fo.llowing Michel Foucault, c.alls "biopolitics." Agambcn thcrcforc claims that rhc camp is "the ptuc, absolutc, and impassable biopolitkal space (insofar as it is founded solely on thc state of exception).'' It thus appt".ars "as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity. "•U The question of biopolitics and its rdation ro politic.al space is a crucial issue, While biopolitics is essemial in the anal ysis of the "war on terror," there can sometimes be a tendency to follow Foucault in seeing too straightforward a shift from a supposcdlr earlier "territorial politics" to a contemporary The analysis herr, while focusing on the territorial politics of thr "war on trrror" sees rhis as part of a more complementary anal>•sis. m The question of "humanitarian intervention" and the management of life and death in camps-cdugcc, internmrnt, or training-have sign ificant territorial clements. Other questions analyzed in this book-the spatial izcd issue of contagion and contamination, for inst.ancc-havc significant biopolitical dements. The territorial and thc biopolitical exist, and must therefore be analyzed, together. More specifically, we should ask if Ag.ambc:n's failure to provide a coherent account of the state demonstrates a more signifi'Cant weakness in accounting for the relation of sovereignty to territory. •.10 This is because while the camp may be his fundamental cxamplc, as Agambcn himself notes, it is not the only possible "'space of excoeption, '' •rThe issues he raises about the relationship bct>vcen sovereign power and space can potentially be used more broad ly in an anal)•sis of territorial so\•ereignty and issues, particularly in terms of the relationship trrritorr. What is crucial to rcmcmbc-r is that Agambcn's point is both historically focused and geograph ically bounded. His important claim concerning the relation of sovereign power to its location can be broadened, as he suggests, but this is only possible if we introduoc both historical and geographical spccificit)' into any extension to othrr spaces. Al:so, it is crucial to interrogate the particular configuration of soverC"ign power in each casr. In addition, we must remember that Agambcn's argumrnts arc about a particular kind of camp that he finds significant, and that there is a risk that hr m·ercmpha:siz.es the exceptional nature of it.•ls It is essential to rcxogniu that the Nazis appropriated an earlier model of the c.amp from colonial practice and used it in at least two distinct ways: thC' concentration camps, which were used as administrative tools to deal with domestic opponents and those deemed medically degenerate, and the later eA"terminarion C'amps. It is the first of these that provides a modd for contemporarr analrses, not the second. The crucial thing, as Mcz:zandra points out, is that these camps drny the "right to mobility.

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Edkins, for has. shown how Agambcn 's. can be usdul in understanding faminc-rclid camps and the camps set up by the North Atfamic Organization (NATO) during the Kosovo conflict in Nlaccdonia.• .o "Humanitarian spaces" such as these, and those deployed in conflicts in Iraq, Rwa nda, and Bosnia an interesting to throrists of political Humanitarian spacesvariously coded as "safe havens," "areas,'' or "zones''-are set up as a response to events such as genocide, refugees, famine, or war, and attempt to institutionalize a state of protection in more than a merely transitory way. Although they arc unlikely to be permanent, their temporary nature can be quite long-term, because they a rc designed to be in place until the situation is and the suspension of the nom1 be ended. Agamben contends that the camp appears when the balance between the ordering of the state and its loca lization-that is, between soverdgnty and tcrritory- "enters a period of permanent crisis and the state decides to undertake the management of the biological life of the nation directly as its own \Vhat we have in humanitarian spaces of exception is an intervention from beyond, where the international communit}' take-s the role of the sta te away from it while prescn'ing its territorial extent. When a state is exercising the ''monopoly of legitimate physical within its territory, grave human rights abuses may result. Sim ilarly, when a state is unable to do this because of the existence of other dements, such as under a civil war or in the case of a "failed state,"' protection of the people may be equally impossible. Genocide and refugees thus produce rather different situations. One is due to particular state practices., the other to the collapse of state structures.t6J In the first case of human rights abuses, the state's territorial intcgrit}' is sustained and indeed makes the repression possible, while in the second case of inabilit)• to rule, the state is clearl}' not in effective control of its territory. In this way, then, Agam ben's description of the logic of the camp as a particular instance of a "space of exception" is productive in the way humanitarian spaces operate both within the existing state (thus allowing territorial preservation) and as a limit to the sovereign power of the state (thus limiting the extent of its power and its territorial soverdgnty). \Vhat is important to underline is that the humanitarian establishment of a particular space is itsdf a so\·ereign act. The United Nations or NATO makes a sovereign decision concerning the spatial extent of the monopoly of legitimate violence. It decides the "spac,e of exception,"' and manage-s the biological lives of the people it seeks to enclose. Indeed, as Agambcn has noted, the way humanitarian organizations conoci\•e of life

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means that they ''maimain a secret solidarity with the: \•ery powers thc:r ought to fight." IM par::Jdo:\ical srams of camp as 3 space o f muS£ be considered. camp is a piece o f (errimry placed ourside no rma l jund1cal bur it IS ne\•err.hclcss nor simply :m exrem31space. Whar is excluded in camp is, according ro rhc etymological of the term (ex-capereJ, take11 for capruredl outside, through irs own exdus10n. 1r.l

Terrorist training camps, o r more broadly, the spaces in which the)' operate, demonstrate a rather different problem. Whereas Aga mbcn's paradigma tic example: demonstrates an intens ifkation of sovereign power and humanitarian safe a reas impose an international presence as a putativcl)' neutral sovereign, these camps operate in nominally sovereign space, due to either the tacit consent or ineffective control of the sovereign power. The absence of sovC'rcigmy in particular places can therefore a lso been sccn as an exception. In fac t, given that there is no longer anrthing ver}' .. with the generalization of the exceptional about "states of phmomC'na to the point where thC' standard operation of law is conCC'rnc:d with C'mergenq•, it is perhaps the absC'nce of soverdgnty over territory itself that is thC' break w ith the norm. YC'•t rnthC'r than being cx-rraterritoria l spaces like Guantanamo, these: arC' inrraterritorial spaces. These places therefore demonstrate the suspension of sovereign control through absence rather than its intensification through exC'cutive decision. ThC' obvious example' of this is, of course, AfgJ1anistan, but it can be extended to a number of in Africa and the greater J\•liddle East. What these spaces illustrate is that the sovereig nt)•/tcrritory relationship has broken down. At times, this is created through the ume• few areas in Afghanistan where the Taliban were concentrated: Some= of the= uwol\'c=d arc= hone)'Comlxd wid1 undc=rground irriganon runnds-not mapped, no t visible= ro but known ro provide= shdrc=r and rransir ro Tali ban forcc=s rh.1.t pc:opk. arc=, in an)' case=, widdy dispc:rsc=d. These= linc=s.. :Jrc= fluid intermingled with farms and \'lllagc=s, .s,o that any kind of bombing is likd)' to cause= ci111lian casu:J inesY

In addition, the operations of a l-Qaeda did not map conveniently onto territorial boundaries. The borde-r with Pakistan, in pa rticular, was porous.

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Legally, the United States was fairly well covered; politically, it was surrounded by allies in deed or in principle. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 was initiated by the French on September 12, 2001. The resolution declared that the Sccurit)• Council was prepared "to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks. "n While this fell short of an explicit authorization for war, both this resolution and subsequent ones reaffirmed "'the inherent right of indi\'idual or collc:cri..·c sclf-ddense." Resolution B73, invoking Chapter VU of the requires all states to police their own territories and ensure that they do not function as "safe ha\•ens," a nd to .. prevent the commission of terrorist acts. '' 4Y Byers argues this "adopted language that C{)Uid be argued to constitute and almost unlimited mandate to usc forcc.'' 1D Rcsolurion 1377, passed six weeks later, noted that many states would require assistance to live up to their requirements under 1373.5 1 All of the abovenoted resolutions were phrased in general terms rather than relating to explicit states. Resolution 13 78, by contrast, was a reflection ofthe s ituarion in Afghanistan and madc clear how the Se Among the benefits it re.('ei\re,d in retum was a dramatic incrcasc in a id. Musharraf therefore effectively abandoned the Taliban but sought to endear himself to his country more generally by attempting to rdocus attention on Kashmir and threatening to usc his nuclear against India if ne.cessary. In part, he justificd his actions br appcaling lO Pakistan's s.clf-prcsenration: "Pakistan is regarded as a fort of Islam. If this fort is damagcd, Islam will be damaged." 81 He thcrcfore had w play a careful ba lancing act bctwccn appeasing the United States and bowing to Indian pressure

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by appearing and cracking down on militants, but at thC' time offering some concessions. Various militants were freed. some jihadist.s WC'TC' nm pursuC'd. and the madrassas largely allowed m operU.S. pressure was kss visible. In what Ron Susk1nd as bdorr.J1 has c'· As 3 result of the

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Sudan's culrural hererogmcuy and dte arnbiguoll!> namre o f a poslOrroman policy, iris a connngenr stare. rhm is, a stare char was created in error_ Ill

U.S. obstruction of international intervention in the Darfur genocide for so long is in part the benefit Sudan has gained for its support. Also, the United States worries about the state collapse that it fears couJd follow such inter\'ention, so it has. reason to wish to avoid this. Thus, there arc other sites that could rcoei.,·e more rxtcnsivc attention, such as the Philippines, where the United States srnt counter-terrorism advisors in late 2001 thr to help in figlu with Abu Sa)•)•af, 1ZA Colombia, and Nrpal. ln United States. has been extcnsi..,·cly invoh•ed in support to governments in central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzs.tan. 125 The United States has madr somr oprrarions public: In Norrh Africa, we are wor&::mg with our parrners ro counrer in rho:- emergence ai-Qaeda's expansion inro the of "al-Qacda in rhe Islamic Maghreb,. llus g.roup has claimed responsibiliry for recenr lerrorisr bombmgs in Algeria, including rhe Aprilll and July I I anacks ag.:tinsr ci\• ilia ns in i\Jg.iers.' 16

The Struggle over Lebanon

In many ways, it is unsurprising that Lebanon is included as a site in the "war on trrror" because the struggle for external influence in the countr)' is longstanding. 12" It has long been usc:d as a base or location for surrogate forc·es-Syrian, Israeli, Pa lestinian, Iran ian, U.S ., and others. Once again, it is, difficult to provide a simple beginning to the events, but the Valrntine's Day massacre of former prime ministc:r Rafik Hariri in 2005 shifted the constellation of forces.m: Lebanon was not doemed able to invrstigate the murder of Hariri itself, a nd the U.N. Securit)' Council has passed se.,·eral r'Csolutions concerning this (esprdally 1595 and 1757). 129 Initially, the crimes were sc:cn as "acts of terrorism." Next, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter was deemed app licable:, and now an internationa l court is bdng set up, an action usually reserved for ethnic cleansing and genocide. This bombing was swiftly blamrd on S)'ria, and as a resuJt the diplomatic pressure it was alread)' under increased. It is notable that this assassination brought a condemnation of Syria that generally has not accompanied Israel's exrcutions.U 0 And this contrasts st arkly with the lack of interrogation of the crimes committed by both sides in the "summer war" of 2006. u'

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In 2004, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1559, demanding a withdrawal of Syrian troops from the region. Perceiving that getting the: S}rrians out of Lebanon would deal a substantial blow to the Bashar a !-Assad regime in Damascus, the United States were determined to work on a number of fronts.' ' 1 In his 2005 State of the Union address, Bush noted that "Syria still allows its territory and parts of Lebanon to be used by terrorists who seck to destroy every chance: of in the: rcgion." 111 Tactics included inciremem and encouragement within Lebanon, particularly in the naming of the anti-S)rrian opposition "the Cedar Revolurion"'l-l to link it to movements elsewhere, as wel l as the covert support of Kurdish rkments in Syria itself. Syrian inAurncr was portrayed as the: key dement prevc:nting Lebanese unity, political ami territorial, with the pro-Western "Gucci"' prorcsts receiving much more Western attention than pro-Syrian drmonstrations. Syrian troops lxgan to withdraw in spring 2005, whi.ch Bush and Blair both hailed as part of wider change within tbe region. It was also notable that actions of "forcig11'' actors in Lebanon drew widesprrad criticism at the time, in spite of the fact that the history a nd current practice of the United States is filled with both covert and overt interference. Indeed, the United States criticiz.cs Iran for interfering in Iraq, which they themselves occup)'· As Glass noted in relation to tbis strategy, "whether American SU"J.rri:wn critcna. 1"

As he suggests, Hczbollah thus contrasts starkly with the Lebanese government's tre-atment of the PaJestini ans in their refugee: camps, something that compares unfavorably even to their treatment in other countries of the PaJcstinian diaspora. Yet Lebanon refuses to grant the estimated 400,000 Pale-stinians citizenship bcc<Jusc they arc largely Sunni and this would destabiliz.c the demographics of the country and the sectarian basis upon which its democratic distribution is esr.abJished. The refugee raise a complicated set of territorial and sovereignty issues, which came to a head in 2007. Since the 1948-49 exodus, and espc.cialtr since the expulsion of PaJcstinian leadership from Jordan in the late t 960s and carl)' 1970s, Le-banon has hosted a number of Palestinian rcfugcc:s. Disperse-d across the coumry to prevent coordination of activity, the refugee camps had fixed borders, so population increases from the 100,000 that originally fled in 1948-49 have led to more and more overcrowding. Verticality became a solution, turning the area into a larger volume. Unemployment was extensive, travel was restricted, and conditions frequently were appalling. In 1982, Phalangist Christian fo rces allied to the Israelis our a massacre in the Shatila camp and the neighboring area of Sabra in West Beirut while the IDF were surrounding the area.

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For the Lcbancril' gO\•crnmcnt, these camps have long been a problem because they arc effective!)' out of their territorial control. lnitially this of the was by the terms of a 1969 compromise in the Cairo Arab League saring that Lebanese forces were not permitted to enter the camps, although this has long been abrogated. n They arc therefore pockets of what is perceived as an ex'ternal problem within their state. This was initially the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with the "Fakhani Republic," until lsracl invaded in 1982; now it is ln 2007, these longstanding problems erupted. The spark for this fighting was the army trying to arrest people suspected of a bank robbery in Tripoli. Lebanese forces attempted to enter the outskirts of the Nahr ai-Bared refugee camp in the north of the coumry, and ended up fighting with the Fatah a l Isla m group. There were rumors that 150 to 200 armed men were im·olvcd, Jed by Shaker a l Abssi in the camps. Initiall}' unable to enter the camp proper. they launched an aeria l bombardmcm that resulted in a number of military, militia, and civilian casualties. Fatah ails lam responded with attacks on Lebanese army positions. The fighting, which began on M.a)' 20, 2007, and lasted until early September, was the '''orst internal violence since the end of the civil war. For the Lebanese government, the existence of armed mj litias in these camps puts the camps in breach of the Taif Accords and U.N. Sccurit}' Council resolurions. The Lebanese government required that people lca\'e the camps or face destructive consequences: further guilt by geography. The internal tcmporar}' cease-fires were quickly broken, allowing few to escape and preventing much aid from reaching the camps. The PLO eventually allowed the Lebanese armr to take up positions within the camps, lcading to their fina l m·crthrow. Yet this produced sympathy for the group across the camps in Lebanon and the linkage of other struggles to this one, particularly in the revulsion against the mode of assault. One c}'ewitncss said, "We have never experienced violence like this. Not even the Israelis behaved like thi.s .... Lebanese military was perceived to be struggling, given that of their 4-0,000 men, 15,000 arc required to secure the border with Israel and 8,000 to secure the border with Syria from arms smuggling, and this. is unlikely to be the end of tensions. Bush continually lent his support to the Lcbancst" government: "Extremists that arc uying to topple that young democracy need to be reined in. '' 1"'9 The United States also sent planeloads of arms and ordered the freezing of assets of any group undermining the Lebanese government. Indee-d, it likely that the Lebanese government was operating in this W3}' at least partly to prevent either Israel or, less like l}', the United States intervening instead. The U.S. State Department suggested that "it woltld appear

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that the Lebanese security forces are working in a legitimate manner to prO\ride a secure, stable environment for the Lebanese people in the ....rake of provocations and attacks b>• violent extremists." 110 Simi larly. the U.N. SccUI'it)• Council, at the time under US. leadership, interpreted these incidents as "an unacceptable attack on Lebanon's stabilit}', secur ity, and sovercignt)•.'' They "reaffirmed their strong support for the sm•ercignty, territorial integrity, unity, a nd political independence of Lebanon within its imernationall}' rccogniz.e
126

IRAQ

Concerns were raised about the lack of rccognirion of Iraq's "Arab identity," and yet the constitution works c-autiously round this, declaring that Iraq is ''parr of the Islamic world and its Arab people arc part of the Arab nation."&! It thus recognizes the separation and lack of a wholesale identit}' of tht' country. The question of scalt' thus works both ways: dm'>'11 to subnational art'• for currentlr known resources, meaning that future fidds be the prcscnrc of regional governments and foreign oil companies. 116 On resources more generallr, Article H 0 tries to ensure "fair distribution" of water as part of an overall deal. While the assertion of thc " sovereignty and territorial intcgrity" of states i:s a commonplace of U.N. rcsolurion:s-induding a reaffirmation of "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity ofiraq, Kuwait, and the neighboring States" in Resolution H4 1 in November 2002-therc has been a telling shift in the reso lutions pertaining to Ir aq since the invasion. In May 2003, rhe U.K. and U.S. ambassadors to the United Nations stated that: Th( Uni ted States, rh( United Kingdom :md Co:1linon partners, working through rhc Coalirion P·r o,•ision3l .o\mhoriry,shall mtcr nli:1, for sccuriry in .:md for the prO\"ISIOnaladminisuation of Iraq, including by: deterring hosrilities; mainta ining the territorial imegriry of Iraq and securing Iraq's oorders, sccunn g. :1nd removing, diS3bling, rendcnng h:1rmless, ebmmating or dc-srroying (a) a ll of Iraq's wc-;tpons of mass desuucrion.'1 7

In these crucial clements, im•oking the Jaw of occupation, theirs was the sm·erdgn position, rather than Iraq's. But their position was endorsed b}' the United Nations on l\•1 ar 22, after the forma lity of the invocation of the SO\•ereignty and territoria l integrity of Iraq," with the United Nations "rc""ognizing the specific authorities, rcsponsibiJities, and obligations under applicable internationa l law of these states as occup)•ing powers under unified command. " 118 Resolution 1500 again pays lip service through the: usual though Iraq had been invaded, it was not sovereign, a nd its territorial integrity had been violarc:d. 119 Resolution 1511 docs the same, but there is a notable shift in the attenda nt register: 4

Underscoring that of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, riglu o f rhe Iraqi peopk free-l y co their own reaffirmmg polirical future :1nd control their own narurnl resources, re1terar.ing irs resolve thar rhe day whe-n Iraqis go\'ern themsd\•es must come quick ly. J.nd r('Cognizmg importance of inrern:1r.ional suppon, panicubrly thar of counrries in re-gion, lrn q 's neighbors, and regional orgamzanons, m t.'lking forward this process expediriousJy ... Reaffirms t he sovereignt)' and territorial mregrit)• o f Iraq, and underscores, in rh:1t conrext, the- temporary namre o f the exercise b)'

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the= Coalition Provistonal Aurhorir>' (Authority) of rhe specific responstbiliric=s, o bligations under inrc=mauonallaw recognizc:d and sc:t forth m resolurion 1483 (1003), which will cc=aS•

Yet wha t Bush failed to realize, or to acOC"pt., is that the d isputcs arc not merely those that take place within any democratic polity; they go to the

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root of rhC' very constitution of that polity itself. This is constimtion nor as a document o r a process of making, but constitution as composition, rhc very makeup of land and people. One of the key concerns shouJd be that clements both sec themscl\•es as having more in common with neighboring states and communities than with other Iraqi populations, and perceive that of those others as well. Indeed, for many Sunnis, the Shi'as arc " Islamic fanatics in league with Iran," and the Kurds "traitors working with the Americans." 111 What is labeled " insurgency" has been made possible through the erearion of a "faile-d" state in place of a "rogue" one, and the United Statts has rhercforc ere-a re-d the very rh ing that ir claimed threatened stabiliry in the firsr place. The one group in Iraq that most \cvanrs the existing territorial settlement to be preserved consists of those most hostiJe to the political process, and the United States is in part trying to protect that settlement for them in the face of rheir opposition. It is likely rhat a new balance of power needs to emerge in Iraq before it can begin to stabilize. The ongoing debates about the prcsenc.c of the troops and timetables for withdrawal hinge on this question: whether the invasion precipitated a division that the oc,cupation postpones. As British journalist Simon Jenkins put it in 2005: Neocon5erv:uivcs might fantasise O\'er Iraq a democr.u1c Garden of a land ro stablliry :md prospemy. Harder noses were comem ro dump t he place m Ah mad Chalabi'slap and let ir go to hell. H.J.d that I suspect there wou ld ha\·e been :.1 bloody of scores bur by now a tnpartrre republic hauling rtsclf back to peace and reconstrucrion. Iraq is., after all, one of lhe richesr narions on eartb.'J£

Other writers suggested that the situation was likely to gcr worse if premature withdrawal takes place, following Colin Powell's prewar warning to Bush that if "you break it, you own it'' Getting rid of Sa.ddam created a duty to resoh·c the problems that his overthrow produced. Yet the internal tensions bcrwccn Shi'as and Sunnis in Iraq cannot be confined to thar counrry--othcr regional powers ha•·c a srakC' in the outcome of the conflict. In the north, fighting has a lready spi lled over the border with Turkc)', with incursions &om both sides. Those who sec a morvar on terror" in a much context. U.N. Charter. In "Territorial integrity'' is a term that is mshrined in Chapter 1: Purposes and Principles, Article 2, Paragraph 4, it decla res: AJJ Jt.·lcmlx=rs shall refrain in their mtcrmttlonal rd:nions from t he rhrca1 or usc of forc·c against 1hc: termorial intc:griry or pollric::tl indc:pc:ndc:ncc of ::tny stJrc, or in ::tny other ma nner inconsistcm with 1hc Purposes of rhc: Unttcd 1'\arions .4

Taken with Article 2, Paragrnph 7, which U.N. in domestic jurisdiction of an}' which arc essenriaiJy within state," a nd Article 2, Paragraph 1, which notes that "the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Jvlcmbcrs," this a clear orientation of international law a round ke)' principle's: equalit}' of all states, competence for of existing boundaries. This tic jurisdiction, and territorial is, in a sense, the necessary fiction inherent in the concept of the Nations: that states arc in control of. and sovereignty over:, their entire territory. 'lllis ddinition and this reinforcement is not to foundU.N. resolutions, ing charter, it also c claim that there i!> no hierarchy docs not seem to lx- the Gl!>e, asterritorial integrity continuall}' out in struggles with other principles of international law. In part, this is bccaUS(' of its fundamental importance to any commonl}' concdvcd notion of statehood and its role in the international system. This is the ncccssar)' myth of territorial integrity and absolute sovereignty. A recent example would lx- the Council for Europe's negotiations around the rights of minorities, such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mj noritics, fommlatcd in Strnsbonrg in 199 The notion of territorial integrity is stressed three times in the Framework, notably in Article 21: "Noth ing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental prinCth·c jurisdiction, and this in turn requires a clearl)' bounded territory that is recognized to lx- the domain of an idemified political authority .. . territorial integrity faciJirates the functioning of a legal order. " 6.2. Without territorial integrity, he claims, states arc not onl}' not able to sun•ive, but they arc also unable to d ischarge their responsibilities to thc "most basic morally lcgitimate interests of the indi\·iduals and groups that states arc empowered to serve, their imerest in the prcserva6on of their rights, the security of their persons, and the stability of their expectations." States therefore do not merely have a "morally legitimate interest in maintain ing the principle of territorial integrity," but an "obligatory• intcrcst. ' 'h} Buchanan similarly wants to challenge the absolutist interpretation of territorial integrity, where it is applied to all statcs, and proposes a more circumscribed \'crsion that is applied to legitimate states only. nlis is what he calls "the morally progressive interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity. " 64 Statcs arc illegitimate if they "threaten the lives of significant portions of their populations by a policy of ethnic or religious persecution" or if they deprive "a substantial proportion of the population of basic economic and political rights. " b.l The &econd case is cxemplified by South Africa; the first is shown by the infringement of "Ir aq's territorial integrity in order to cstablish a 'safe zone' in the North fo r Kurds. '" 66 What we have here is the basis for the a rgument for humanitarian intcn·cntion, where a state that docs not discharge its responsibilities to its popu lations can legitimate international intcnrention, a theme discussed in the next section. In the current dimatc, therefore, sceessionist movC'mems (that is, those who want to challenge an)• nOlions of territorial integrit}' in the sense of existing borders) arc increasingly being redefined as terrorists, or, at the ver)' least, as dangers to local, regional, and global stabiJity. The line benvecn secessionist and terrorist is increasingly blurred. Dcspitc their condemnation of many states in thcir prosccmion of independence mo"ements, it is worth noting that almost all the groups on the U.S. Department of State's list of terrorist o rganizations arc self-determination movements. 6- The U.N. General Assembly, in Rcsolution 49/60 from 1994, a lso made this link, stating that "thc Statcs Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their condemnation of a ll acts, methods, and practices

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of terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wberever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among Stares and jX'Oples and thrcvas thus part of the traditional rhcmric of the United Nations, but this action dearly challenged those ideals. Indeed, the violation of its territorial intcgrit}' was one of the key points of the Yugoslavian goverfUllent's protest to the United Nations following the NATO action.114 Resolution 1.244 did not justify action in Kosovo, which was taken without Security Council support, but as former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook points o ut, intervention was backed by NATO, the European Union, a nd all of Serbia's neighbors, t hroe tests that the 2003 invasion of Iraq did not While Cook said this after the event, at the time he was Jess sure, with international lawyers wa rning that the war could be illegal. U.S. Secretary of State l\.'[adclcinc Albright notes in her memoirs, "I told him he should get himself new Iaw}•crs. If a U.N. resolution passed, we would have set a precedent that NATO required Securit}' Council authorizatio n before it could act. Th is would give Russia, not to mention China, a veto m•er NATO. Such concerns resurfaced during the Iraq war:. While Resolution 1244 saw Kosovo's funtre as ..substantia l autonomy within the Federal Republic of it did not quite, pace Fink Yoshira,.- expressly rule out independence for Kosovo because this wa:s the basis under "interim administration." Albright reca lls that "we agreed among ourselves that Kosovo would have to become an international protectorate aher the war, with Yugos lav sm•crcignt}' retained in name only. "n As \'(Tilliarns suggests, the actua l substance of 1244 "sigl1ificantly, and likely irreversibl)', altered sovereign control over Kosovo. Indeed, problcn1s concerning a final scttlement-oJ:, in the words of Ahtisaari's 100 - for the disputed plan, ·' independence with international territory stalled on the dua l issues of recogl1itiol1 a nd precedent. A unilateral declaration of independence, while m:ognized by ma ny states, did not resolve the issue. Claims that Koso\'O is a su; gePieris case that demanded recognition but docs not create precedent arc politically expedient but legally dubiotts.' 0 ' They arc in the same category as denials that the initial

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for intc:rvcnrions without U.N. mandate-a claim made by former French prime: minister Dominique de Villc:pin, among For Ignaricff. the intervention did establish principle that statc:s can lose sovereignty over a portion of their tc:rritor}' if thc:y so opprc:ss the majority population there that they rise in and successfully intcmationa l support for their rc bdlion."' ' (11 But cautions that this is not a universal bwluse it would not appl)' in Chochnya or East Turkistan. It docs nor work as a principle as much as a product of great-power politics. For the American ncoconsen•ativc: Char les Krauthammrr, these: intrrvrntions a nd the U.S. opc:ration in Ha iti had supporr from U.S. Jibrra l and world opinio n-as o pposed to their reaction to the Iraq war- for a simple reason: Hai1i, Bosni:., and Kosovo were hum:.nitarian \'C'ntufC's-fights for right and good, det'Oid of ,-aw 11ational intC'resJ. And only humanim ria n imer\·enriomsm-' B-efore and :\fter t he 2003 Im.-asion o f Iraq: Cluster Sample Sun·ey," Tilt! 364, no. 9448 (2004 1: 1857-64; a nd Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh l a fra, Shannon Dooq, and Les :1fter the 20()3 lm•asion of lr.1q: A CrossSecrional Cluster S."1mple Stuve)', .. TIM Lancet 368, no. 9545 (2006): 142 1-28 . For discu.s.sions, see John Sloboda and Ha mit D:.1 rd agan, Iraq Body Coum Proje of colonial nccropohrics,.; also sec: Derek Gregory, ·•Palestine: undCT Siege, .. Antipode 36, no. 4 60 1-6. 10 . See Derek Gregory, TIJe Colonial Presmt: .4.{ghatJistatJ, Palestine, fr,zq (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 19. I I . A s1m1lar cla im could be m:.1de for the bombings m London on Ju ly 7,1005, which have similarly reduced to 7f7, or rhOS(: m o n March II , 1004, which have been designa ted 3/11. O f other events on September II, the coup agamsr Salvador :\Jlende m Ch1le m 1973 ls. most often noted, l>ut this was also the: date in 1912 thar rhc: Bnris h M:mdare of Palestine began. See Stuarr Croft, Culture, Crisis, a11d O JJ Ter-,or (C:.1 mbridgc:: Cambrtdge Uni\'c:rsity Press, 1006), 15-17; Angelo Rasanayaga m, l l{gJmmstan: A Modem H1story• (l ondon: t B. Tauns, 2003), 144. 11. Indeed, one book on the consequ ences has [he sim ple ride "'Afrer, .. wrth the: subtitle speaking of the 11 Era ... Sec: SteYen Brill, The Rebuildmg atJd Dcfendmg of .-\merica in the September 12 &11 (New York: Simon and Schusrc:r, 2003) . 13. On the: spatial aspects of the World Trade Center c:\•c:nrs a nd consequences for rhe site a nd the city, see After the W!orld Trade Center. Rethinkmg New York Cit)', ed. !vlichael Sorkin and Sharo n Zukm (Roud edge: New York, 2001). 14. 1'-:eil Smith, "Sca les of The !t.1:mufactunng o f 1\'ationa ltsm and [he War for U.S. G loba lis m, " in l ifter the \.l lorld Trade Center, 98-99; see also Arundhati Roy, 71u Algcbm of Infinite Justice (London: Flamingo, 2002). 15. Achcar; The Cfash of B.zrbarism s, 27. On t he role: of popuJa r culture in producing the wa r menra lity, see Cynthia Weber, Jm.zgiwng Am er1m ' Prc:ss, 2006); Dc:bnx, Tabloid Culture, and Geopolitics tLondon: Roudroge, 2008). 16. Grorge W. Bush, spt>c:ch o f October II , 2.001> Set" also Rush, spt>c:ch of Octobc:r 29,200 I ; Rudolph Gi ul uni, York Ciry after 11,2001," Septembc:r 10,2003, hnp:l/fpc.starc:.gov/fpd2397 1.htm; D1mirri K. Simc:s, .. What War Means," Natwnal i!Jterest, Tha nksg1\'ing Specia l Issue, 200 I, hnp:/1 www. nixoncenter.org/pu blican on sfaniclesffNl spc 10 I dks.pdf. 17. j t":l.n-Marie Colombam, sommes tous Amencams," u Monde, Septembc:r 12,200 1. 18. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, m Collision," m Worlds itJ Colliston: Te"or atJd tilt' Future of Global Order, c:d. Booth and Tim Dunne (london: 2.0021, I. 19. Gregory, The Colonial Present, 19. 20. George Vi". Bush, spc:och of Scprembc:r 27, 200 I. Bush equally said its terrams will be rha n the battlefields and beachheads of the past"i see also spc:c:ch of &ptember 2.9, 200 I. Cohn Powdl remarke-d t hat m his previous t rai rting as a soldier, .. t here is the roc:my occupying a p1ccc: o f ground. We .:.m define: it in sp:Ke, and other dimensions., and you c.m :.u.scmble forces :.1 nd go afte-r lt. T his is. The: c:nemy is in nu ny ploces. The is not looki ng to be found . T he rnemy is hidden. The cnem)' is very oftrn right here: within our own country. .-\nd SO you ll3\'e tO design a campoign plan mat goc:s after that kind o f enemy"> SCC Cohn Powdl, to !Press," September 14, 100 I, http://www.yak.edu/ lawweb.la\'alon/sept_ ll/powell_bncf05.htm. Earli er, ClLnton roo had djscussro the changing geographies: foes haYe ex'tended t he: fi elds of battle from physico ! space to .:ybcrspace; from world's \'ast bodiCS of wa ter to the complex workings of our own human bodies, .. William J. Clinton, .. Prcsidc:m BLII Clin ton SjX:Jks to the Na\':J l Academy a t Annapolis,.. Ma)' 22, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ ,-\LLPOLITICS/19981U5/Wdinton.academy/transc ript.h.tml. 2L Smith, ..Scales o f Terror," 105. 22. Set" Wills, Tl1e First \V'ar 011 Tefforism. 23. Colin Flint, cd., of Geograpbies of Discrimi1zation and Intolerance m the (New York: Routledge, 10041; Colin Flint, cd., The Geography of War and From DealfJ Camps lo Diplomats lOxfo rd: Oxford Prcs.s, 20051. 24. The Geographical Dimmsions ofTarorism, Susan L Cutter, Douglas B. Richa rdson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks (New York, Roudedgc:, 2003 ). The: presem book can be seen as parr of a challenge wid1in the disciphne of geography to rh.at book. Vwfcnt Geographies: Frur, Te"or; and Pol1timl cd. Dere k Gregory ond Alla n Prc:d (New York: Routledge, 20061 arose our of precise-ly such a challenge, man)' of the papers bemg first presented ot the 2004 meeti ng of the AAG in Philadelphia.

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2.5. 1\.i.:trburg.c:r, m Cunc:r c:t a l..,

Geographical Dimt!mio11s of Terrortsm,

X\'11.

2.6. Ibid. 2.7. Ira Ch.:-rnus, Monstos to Dt!stro)': TIJe Nroco nsentative \ll,1r 011 Terror and Si11 tBouJdc:r, Colo.: Parad1gm, 1006), 144. 2.8. Hc:nri Lc:feb\·rc:, Espan! d poJittqltt!: L£ drott a Ia 11il/e 11, C:du-ion (Pans: Amhropos, 1000 ( 1972]), 59; Henri Ldc:bnc:, State, Space, \Vorld, ec:L Ne1l Brc:nnc:r and Stuan Eldc:n Uni vc:rsity o f 1\·tinnesoro Prc:ss.., 2008): p. 174. A of Lefebvre's work is provided in EJd.:-n , Undt•rstanding He11ri Theory• and Possible (London: Continu um, 2004 1. For the contexT of this ci:J im, see d uprc:rs 5 and 6 of thar book. 2.9. 1\.bnh.:-w Sparke, In Space o(T1Jeory: Postfoundational Geographies o f (M mnropolis : Universit)' o f Minnesota Press, 1005), 244-45. 30. SuS:J n Robens, Anna Secor, a nd Man h.:-w Sparke, G.:-opolitics, .. ,-\ntipode 35, no. 5 (2003). 31 . Sec: Da\•id H arvey, T11e !mpemlism (Oxford: Oxford Um\•ersit)' Pr.:-ss, 2003); ,-\ Brief Htst oi' Press, 2005); Bob Jessop, Neil Bn:nner, and Mamn Jones, orizing Sociosparial Rebtions, .. En111r-cmment and Planning D: Society tJnd Space 26, no. J (2008) 389-401. 92. The phrases in marks are from Neil Brenner (New State Spaces, 70), tradmg on Agnew's criuquc: of the "terrironal rrap"; see john Agnew, ·'The: Territoria l Trap: The Geographic:Jl Assumptions of International RelAtions T heory, .. Rev1ew of lniematicma! Poi1ticdl Economy I, no. I ( 1994) 5.3-80. 93. Cited m Roben Fisk, "The Dou Die Standards, Dubious Moralir)' and Duplicit)' of rhe Faght Agamsr The l11depmdenl, J:muary 4, 2003. 94. Gregory, Tlu: Colonial Presellt, 143 .

1. Geographies of Fear, Threat, and Division I. Richard A. Clarke. i\gairrst All Enemil's: IMide i\merica's \V.1r on Terror (london: The Free Press, 24. 2. Henry Kissinger, "'Destroy rhc Network. • The Washington Post, Scprembc:r 12,200 I, A31. 3. lbad.• see Dimatri K. Sames. •'Whar \'\lar Mc:ms.ft Tl1c National lntt!'rest. Thanksgiving Special Issue. 200 L, hrrp:l/www.nixoncenrer.org/publicarions/artidesffNlspclO I dks.pdf. 4. Anthony Seldon, Blair (london: Free Press, 2004), 490; John Kampfner. Blmr's Wars (london: Fr« Press, 2004), 116. 5. Ou-is Johnson and Jo lyon uslie • •.1t.{gltanistan: Tin! of (london: Zed Bcoks. 2004), 10. Books,200.H. 38. 6. Bob Woodward. Bus1J 111 \Var (london: 7. Howard Fineman, "A Prc:sidcm Finds His True Voace," Newsrt!t!ek, S.:-ptember 24, 200 L. 50. cited an Roy, Tl1e Algebra of l11finiu justice. 22 9. 8. Ron Suskand, The One Percl'nt Doctri11e: Dl't!p Irrsidl! Aml!t'ica's Pttrsuit of Its f.nemies sinu 911 1 t::-.l'ew York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 19. 9. Rumsfeld, an Ira Chernus, Morrsters to Destroy: Tht! Neocomerr.mth•l! \Var 011 Tl!rror tmd Sm (Boulder: Paradigm, 2006), 139. E.xccpr when quonng, I will rend to usc the phrase "'war on terror" rhroughout. 10. Samuel Weber, Targets of Opportunity: On the of Thirrking (New York: Fordltam Press, 94.

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I I. Bush apparently rc:movc:d a line from this said, "This is not an act of rc:rrorism, rhis is an act of war"; sec: Con Coughlin, 1\meri Debbie Lisle: and Andrew Pepper, Xew Face of Global 1-!oll)•wood: Black 1-l11wk Down and r:he Politics of Mcta-Soverelgrlt)'," Cttftural Politics I. no. 1 (1005): 165-92; Geamid 0 Tuatlud, of Gc:opolincs and r:he Pleasures of W.u: Behind Enemy Lines and Amc=rican Gcopolincal Ge-opolitics 10, no. 2 (10051: 356-77; and C. Weber. lmagmmg America at \Var: Mordllt)'. .\.fore generally, scc= Franc;o1s Dcbrix, Tabloid Terror: War, Cui/lire, 1md Goopol1tics (london: Routledge, 2008 1. 49. Kaplan, ·'The Coming ,'\narcby," 70. 50. Ibid., 70-71. 51. Simon Dalb)', ·'The Envtronment a.s Geopolitical T hreat: Reading Robert Kaplan·s 'Coming :\narchy,'., Ecumc-ne 3, no. 4 ( 1996): 472-96, Simon Dalby, E1wironmentai Security (.\·finneapohs: Uni\·ermy of 1\•hnncsota Press, 10021. 51. Robert D. Kaplan, Ba/ka11 Ghosts: A]ollrnC')' tl1ro1tgiJ History· York: Sr. l\·(artin·s Press, 1993); The Ends of the Eart/J: A journey at the Dawn o f the 11 st Century• (New York: Ra ndom House, 1996); Eastward tc Tartar)•: Travels 111 BalkatJs, Tile Middle East, tmd the- Caucasus lXew York: Random House, 2000). 53. Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: Americ' Prc:ss, 2006j . I S. David Domke, God \Villitlg?, 149. His Own Words," 204_ 19. Bin Ladc:n, 20. Ibid ., 196_ 21 . Robc:rt Frslc, Tiu Grt!at Wl1r for Cwill.ztltiotl: TJ1e Conqrtcst of the Middle East, rc:\'- c:d_ (london: Harper Pc:rc:nmal, l006j, 1059_ 21. Ta riq Ah, TIJe Clash of Fundamentalisms; Cr-usades, )lhads, and Moderm ty (london: Vc:rso, 10021, 108; sec: .'\bdel wah:.J b EI-Affcndi, Trtrabi s Revolution; Islam and Power in Sudan (l ondon: Grc:)' Seal, 1991), 14-16. Sayyid Qutb, Mtfestones (Beirut and Damascus: T he: Holy Kora n Publishm;g 1980 lorig_ 196411. 23. Faisa l Oc:vji, Landscapes of the j ibad: MilildllC}', .111ortlfll)\ Modermty (Ithaca: Corn ell Universny Press, 2005), 14_ 24. Bin laden, ·' In H i5 Own Words," 197. O n rhe symbolic of terrorPerformance:, Ism, see also jdfre)' C . .'\lc:xander, ·' f rom t he Depths o f Coumerpc:rformance, and 'September 11 ,"' Sociological Theory 11, no . I (2004 ): 88- 105. 25. Karen j . Green bc:rg, AI Q11edtJ Now: Uuderstmtding Today's Tefforls"ts (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\'ermy Press, 2005), 118-24, 132. 26. Bruce lawrmce, "Introduction," in Osama bin L1.dcn, to the 'X'orld: Tl1c Statemmls of Osama bm Ladm, tr3115. Howarth (london: Verso, 2005 ), X\'i. 27. De,•ji, LandscafJt:s of tbc j i1Jad, 53. 28. Roha n Gunara tna, lt1side .-H Qaeda, 146 . H is O w n Words," 193. 29. Bin Laden, 30. Ibid., 196-97. 31 . George W. Bush, spc:cch of Octolx r 7, 100 I. 32. George W. Bush, spc:cch of October 6, 1005. 33. Ira Chem us, Monsters to Dt•slroy, 126. 34. Bin l aden, H is O w n Words," 202. 35. Ibid. 36. The Century Foundario n, Defmting tiJt! j ibadists; A Blueprmt for i lction (New York: The Century Foundation Prc:ss, 2004 1, 18 . 37. De\'ji, Landscapes of tbc ji1Jad, 77. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., 125. 40. The a rgument here in part builds on thar o f l deb\'re, Tbe Production o f Space.

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4 1. Ban Ltckn, tc the W'orid, 239-40. 42. Ban Ltckn, "'In H is Own Words," 185. 43. lb1d., 204. 44. Ban Ltckn, tc the \florid, 153, 162-63. 45. m Gerges, The Fllr Enemy, 179. The video is J.llailablc=, along with commentary, at http://www.claoner.orr)cbr/cbrOO/IIIdeolexcerprs/c:xcc:rpts_index. html. York: Doubleday, 46. Raymond Ibrahim, ed., The A I Qaeda Reader 20071,27. 4 7. bin laden, A·fessages to the World, 153. 48. Ibid., 183; scc: aoo Jvlariam :\bou Zahab and Olivier Roy, lslanust Networks: 71Je ,.J,fghan-Pakistan Comwction, trans. john Kmg (London: H um and Co, 2002), 65. 49. Src=vc: Coil, Gbosi Wars: T1u Secret Histcry of the C l.-1., :\{ghanisian, and Bin Laden, from the So.vtct lnmmon to Sept ember 10, 1001 (New York: Pengui n, 20041, 270; Ron SLW< ind, Tf1e One Pcw:lll Doctritlt', 147, see J oshua Teitelbaum, Holler Thm1 Thoh: Sat4di Ar• in Arabic, would bear o ut the first pan of this analysis; the d iscuuion in 1992. shows tha t e.,·en when the West to a Western audience, he was to prc-smt things in a calm and moderate way. 67. T11rabi's Velllttr:co, 9 1. 68. H 1s 1964 doctoral degree from the Sorbonne was o n emergenq• powers employed by liberal de-mocracies" ; S(:e Burr and Collins, Revolrtflolllll'Y Sudan , 5. 69. Abdel Salam and de WaaJ, ..On the fJ iIu re and Persistence o f }1had," 22. 70. de W.1al, ·•(ntrodumon," S. 7 1. The- conrributors ro Ya na.gihashi H iroyub, ed., The Co11cept of Territol'y 111 Islamic Luv tmd Thougbt (London: Keg an Paul, 2000) see the term terntory" as synonymous w ith dar al-lslam, but lcrritory is used much more broadl>· m their srudic:s. A more useful genera l study is Mohammed R= Dialili, roires et fro ntihcs dans l'1deologie islamisre contemporaine,., Rdaltons mtemationals, no. 63 (1990): 305-12. 72. J ohn L Esposito, UniJo/y W'ar: Terror in the Name of Islam Oxford Unl\'c:rsiry Press, 2002.), 2 1. 73. Ibid., 35. 74. Bin Laden, His Own Words, " 230. 75. Reu\·en Firestone:, Jihad: The Origin of Holy \Var iu islam (Ox.ford: Oxford are widespread m the: Univen>ity Press, 1999), 16-1 7. DiscusSions of the te-rm lite-rature. Aside: from the references gi\'C'n here, S(:e !\•b 1KI Khadduri, and Pmcc in the LaJt' of lsiam (Balnmon::, Md.: Johns Hopkms P.n::ss, 19551; Firestone, j ihad, 18; Aoou Zahab and Roy,ls/,unisl Nctworks, I; Qasim Zaman, TIM in Co11temporary Islam: Custodians ofCfhmgco (Princeton, N .J.: Princeton Umversit>' Space dtld Holy War: TiM Politics, Cttltme, Press, 2002.), 47-48; Junn Cok, and HIStory of Shi'tte islam (London: I. It Tauris, 2.002), chapter 9; Ruthvrn,

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A Fury for God: The IslmnisJ Attack on America, rc:v. c:d. (l ondon: Granta, 20041, 54-55: and from the: perspc:cti.ve of rhe U.5. milimry, see Ll rry Knapp, "The Concc:pr and PraClice of Jihad in klam," Parameters: U.S. i\nny War Colfl!ge Qtwrterly JJ, no. l {2003): 82- 94. 76. Ibra him, TJJe A I- Qaeda Rcadt!r, 10. 77. Rmh\'en, A Fury for God, 56. 78. Dtlip H iro, \Val' without End, 2 15. 79. Ruth\'en, A Fury for God, 56. 80. Jonath::m Freedland, " ]r's Not Only about Iraq,.. Jul)' 20, 2005, hnp:// www.gw.rdlan.eo.uk/commc:ntfsrory/O, l 5J 1997,00. hrml. 8 1. Akbar; The Shade of Swords, 33. 82. Hiro, War witho¥41 End, ch.aptc:r I. 83. .'\bdel Sa lam and de \Vaal, "'On me Failure and Persistence of j ihad," 49. 84. de Waal and Abdel Salam, "ls.Lamism, State: Power; and j1had in Suvc:lop t hese: claims more: broodly, sc:c: Jenn)' Edki ns, VCromquc Pin-Fat, a nd Mid1ael j. Shapiro, eds., Sovereign Lu.les: Power in Glob.ll Politics (london: Routkdgc, 2.0041, and also tmd U!Jendtng War. Gor,t•rmng tire World Duffield, Dettelopmellt, of Peoples (Ca mbridge:, UK: Polity, 2007). On rhc: topic generally, Robc:rro EsposUniito, Bios: Biopolitics and Pltilosopb')•, trans. Timothy Campbell \'erstt}" of Mmnesota is helpful. 156. Sec: Paul A. PaMJ.\'OIU, ··The Contradictory State of Gtorgio ,'\g;;unbcn," Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 147-74. In a powerful anJ.lysis, William E.. Connolly, "The: Ethos o f So\'c:rc:tgnry," in Law 1111d the Sacred, ro. Austin Sarat, Lawrence: Douglas, and !\'[arrha Merrill Umphrey (Sta nford: Stanford Press, 1007), 135-54, clatms rhat we need to rhc: figure: '"So\•ereignry ts tiMt which devdop t hese: claims more: broadly, sc:c: Jenn)' Edki ns, VCromque Pin-Fat, a nd Mid1ael j. Shapiro, eds., Sovereign Lu.les: Power in Glob.ll Politics (london: Routkdgc, 2.0041, and also tmd U1Jend1ng War. Gor,t•rmng tire World Duffield, Dettelopmellt, of Peoples (Ca mbridge:, UK: Polity, 2007). On rhc: topic generally, Robc:rro EsposUniito, Bios: Biopolitics and Pl1ilosopb·y, trans. Timothy Campbell \'erstt}" of Mmnesota is helpful. 156. Sec: Paul A. P:.ls.s:J.\'Ont, ··The Contradictory State of Gtorgio ,'\g;;unbcn," Political Theory 35, no. 2 (2007): 147-74. In a powerful an.1lysis, William E.. Connolly, "The: Ethos o f So\'c:rc:tgnry," in Law 1111d the Sacred, ro. Austin Sarat, Lawrence: Douglas, and !\'[arrha Merrill Umphrey (Sta nford: Stanford Press, 1007}, 135-54, clatms rhat we need to !he: figure: '"So\•ereignry ts tiMt which deiay 18, 2001, htrp:f/www. dc:fensd in k.millspeeches/speech.aspx ?specch1d=J 56; "Transform ing lbc: Mali ra ry," Foreign Af{turs 81, no. 3 (20021: 20-32. 169. Dc:\'ji, Landscafu:s of the]i1Jad, 157. 170. For Wolfmvitz, this idc.a stems from George: Shultz, Ronald Reagan's with James Dao :1 nd ErLc Schmitr," Secretary of State; sec Paul Wolfowitz. Nf!w York Ttmes,January 7, 2001, htrp:J/WI'f-w.fas.org/news/us:J/100210 11 502 wad. htm. J 71. John Agnew, Regimes: Territoriality and Stare Aumorit)' m Is of tl1e Association of Americ<Jn GeograContempor;try \Vorld Politics,,. phers 95, no. 2 (1005): 438.

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3. Rubble !R educed t o Dust I. Kenncth J . .\st, ··ter Them F:ul: Srate Failure in Theory

and Pmctice: lmphc.uions fo.r Policy," m \WJcrr Stati!s Fail: a11d Comequencl!s, ed. Rolx:rt I. Ro tberg (Princeton, Kj.: Princeton Uni11emry Prt:M, 20041, 311. 3. Menkhaus, Somalia, 50. 4. U.S. Department of Smte, ·'Background Nore: Cyprus," 2004, hrrp:J/www. srate.go,•/rlpa/e&lbgn/5376Jum; su Terrorism Research Ccnrcr, ··Cyprus," 2.004, ntries&filc=i ndex http://www. rerrorism.comlmodules. php ?op=modlo.1d & &Yicw=65. 5. Doug Stokes, Americd's Other W'a.r, 106. 6. :\1ichad lgnatK"ff, •·Jnter\·c:ntion and St:ltc: Failu re:," Dissent 49, no. l (2002): 117. 7. :\1ichad lgnatic:ff, Rigbrs, Power, and the St:uc,,. m A1lll.:ing States Work: Failure t111d the Crisis of Gartcmarrcc, ed. Simon Chesrennan, Michael lgnatic:ff, and nokyo: United 1\'arions Univc:rsrry Prc:ss, 2.005), 65. 8. j ol1n Lc:wis Gaddis, S!trpmc, Sutmt)\ and t1u! AmericatJ &pe.rimcc (Cambndge, Mass.: Ha.rnrd Uni\'ersuy Press, 2004). 9. j ol1n Agnc:w, Regnnes: Authomy in World Polincs," Atma!s of tiJC .1\srociaflon of i\mcrican Gcogr.zpbers 95, no. 2 (2.005): 438 . of 10. The Whrrc: House, "The Karional Sc:curiry Srrnteg)' o f the Unirc:d .-\me rica, .. 2002. hnp://www.wlurehouse.go\•/nsc/nss.html, I. See also the l Defense Re\.Jc:w Report,.. published less rhan three wc:cks after brgely planned lx:fore rhar dare. 1l1is repon ma kes referSeptember II, 2001, ence to "increasing a nd thre:.1ts enunanng from the: territories of WC':lk and failing smtes. " (hrrp:l/www.defrnsdink.mil/pubslpdfs/qdr200 I. pdf, I ll, but this 1s :.1 rdatiYdy minor 1ssue in the rq>orr as a whole, a rushed add ition subsequent ro the armcksi sec: Andrc:w Cockburn, Rumsfe/J: His Rise-. fall, and CatastmpiJic Legacy (New York: Scribner. 2007), 123. B)· the 2006 rq>orr, t his 1s ::1 much more: maJor theme; see Department of Defense, Defense Review Report," 2006, hnp:J/www.ddc:nsdink.miVqdr/rc:port/Repon2.0060103.pdf, 12-14, 21, 28, 33. II. Joint Chic:fs of Staff, "'The N:1 rional Military Srrarc:gy of The: Umred States of A Strategy for Tod:Jy; A Vision for Tomorrow," 2004, hrtp:l/www. globalsc:cu rity.org/miIitary/library/pohcy/dodld20{1503 L8nms.pd f, 5. 12. Deparrmenr of Defense, 2005, Srarc:s of docl/d200503l8ndsl.pdf, 3; see

National Defense Strategy o f The United o f Dc:fcnsc, "AnnuJ.l Report ro the

210

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Pre"side"nt and the: Congress," 2002.. hrtp:!Jwww.dod.mil/ex«sc:c/adr2002.Jindex .htm, U . 13. Sec-, for example, :\.tichad I. Handel, Weak Stales in the [tJJl!rtJahotJal S)'stem, nc:w edition (london: Fronk Cns;s, 1990); Robert H. Jackson., "Qu.1.si-Starc:s, Dual Regimes, and :-.fc:oclassical Theory: Imc:mationaJ J urisprudence: and the Third World," Organisation 41, no. 4 (1987) 519-49; Robert H. Jackson, QuasJ-States: SOl'l!rtlgn{); (tltl!rnatloiJaJ Relations, .md tiJI! Third \Vorfd (Cambridge: Cnmbridge Uni\'ersiry Press, 1990) 14. Robert I. Rorberg, Horn of :\Fnca and Yemen: Diminishing the Threat of Terronsm,., in Battling Te"omm in thl! 1-Iom of ,"t,frica, c:d. Robert L Rorberg, (Cnmbridge,ll.·las s.: World Puce 2005), .3. 15. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure;' Tht• Wasbiugton Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2.001): 86. 16. Rot berg, Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?., CIA Paper; 2.003, hrtp://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_ GlF_2.020_Suppon/200.3_ 11_06_j)J.pcrsl pand2_nov6.pdf, 2.-4. 17. Rotberg, "The 1-lorn of Afric.t and Yemen," 8. 18. Cerny, and the New Securit}' Dilemma, .. Nav.ll War College Revil!w 58, no. I (2004): 18-19. 19. Eri k]. Jenne, lanka: A Fragmented .. in State Fa1lure and State Weaknl!ss in a Tune of Terror, ed. Robert I. Rorberg (Cambridge, !\-tass.: World Peace Foundation, 2.00.31, 22.2. 20. Menkhaus, Somalia, 1 1. 21. Ibid., 17. 21. Rotberg, "The New Narure of Nation-State FailLLre, .. 85. 2..3. The Century Foundanon, Defeating lhl! )iluzd1sts: A 8l11eprinJ for iiCIIoll, 5; sec- !vhchael V. Bhataa, War and fntemention: !sSSies for Conl!!mporary Peace OperattOIIS tBloomfidd., Conn.: Kumarian Press, 200.3), 14 7-4.8; Cerny, "'Terror· asm and the New Securit)' Dilemma;" Michael lgn:Jtleff, The usSl!r E1'1'1: Po/it1cnl Ethics in an .-\ge of Terror (Ed inburgh: EdmbLLrgh Uni,·ersity Press, 2005 ). 24. Susan L. Cutrer; Douglas B. Richardson, and ThomasJ. \Vilb:mks, •• A Research and Anion Agenda," in The Geographical Dimemiorrs o{Terrorism, 224-25. 25. Mcnkhaus, Somalia, 50. 2.6. Cerny, and the New S-ecuriq· Dilemma," 13 . 27. U.S. Deparrmenr of State, "Fact Foreign Terrorist Organi zations," 2005, http:J/w\V'.V.5t:Jte.gov/slcrlrlsHsl37 19 l.htm; sec Co"grcssional Research Service, "For-eagn Terrorist Or-gamzarions," 2004, hnp:/1\V'.vw.fas.org/irplcrsl RU222.3 .pdf. 28. Thomas Jefferson, Pa/)l!rs of Tbomas jefferson, Volume 4: l October 1780 to 14 February 1781, cd. Julia n P. Boyd (Princ·e ton, N.j.: Pnnccton Unn•ersit)' Press, 1951), 237.

NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

211

29. Gadd1s, Surpri!U!, &om"ty, a11d thi! Americm1 Expi!ril!ll• ll, 2002, http:J/www.g looolresr:arch.ca/aniclc:s.IHER206.o\ .htm l. 92. M us harmf, ln the Line o{Fire, 264; Weinbaum, ·'Pakistan and rhe United States:," 11 7. On the North-Wesr Fronrier Prov ince generally, sc:c: S::ma Haroon, Frontier of f ,uth: /slam 111 tire lndo-1\fgiJan Borderland INt>w York: Columbia University Prcs:s:, 200 7). 93. Gunararna, Inside :\1-QtJeda, 233. 94. Abou Z a hab and Roy, l slamist Nettoorks, 6J. 95. Klcvcmann, The New Great Game, 1 34. 96. Abou Z a hab and To)', !s/amist N etworks, 64. 97. Ta riq Ali, T1Je Clasl1 of FutJdam entali$11f$, 2 99. 98. Dennis Kux, Tl1e United States an d Pakistan: Disenchanted Allies (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow \'\o'ilson CcnreT Press, 200 lj, J68; Cohen, T1u Idea of 26 7. 99. 1'\'arional lmelligence E.sumare, "The Terronsr T luem to rhe U.S. H offi('land," 2007, http:J/d n i.gov/pr('Ss_releases/200 70 71 7_releasc:.pdf. For a useful discus.sion of the contemporary situation, sc:e Robina Mohammad, .. Paklsran- An

NOII:S lO CHAPIEA 3

215

Ungovern.able Spacd• E1wiro11ment and Pfanning D: Society mzd Space 26, no. 4 (2008): 571-81. 100. In the Lirre of Fire, 272-73; sc:e !nrernauonal Cnsis Group, Appeasing the Asia Report No. 125, 2006a. 10 I. lnrernm:lonaJ Crisis Group, ''E.Iecrio ns, Democraq•, J.nd Smbility in Pakistan," Cnsis Group Asia Reporr No. 137, 2007. 102. Richard Min iter, Shadow The Umold Story of 1-low BJ<sJJ Is \Vinning the W.1,- on Terror (Was hington, D.C.: Regnery 86. 103. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of December 7, 2005. 104. lvo Daalder, N icole Gnesono, and Pbll1p Gordon, cd., Crescerrt of Crisis: U.5.-Ettro/)eatJ St,-ait!gy fo,- the Gre11tt!r M1dd/1! East (Washingron, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,10061. 105. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of August 1, 2.01)6 . 106. George \V. Busft. spec:cn of October 6, 2005. 107. Rogers, A Wa,- o11 Terror, 48; Robert D. Burrowes, "Yemen: Political Economy and the Effort Terro.ris m, .. in BatilitJg Terro,-ism i11 tlte Hom of Af,-,w, 141-72. 108. Damd Benjamin and Ste.,·en Simon, The Age of Sacrt!d Terror: Radical lsl.'lm's .-l.merica (New York: Random House, 2003), 169. 109. Burrowes, Yemen, 17 1, n. 61 . 110. Shadow 7-8 . 111. Sh:.l)', The Rt!d Sed Terror Triarrgll!, 136. 112. Peter Woodward, U.S. foreigtJ Policy mzd tin! Hom of Af,-ica (:\ldershot, UK: Ash gate, 2.006 1, I 54. .. in 113. Shay, The Red &a Terror Tmmgle, 74-5; /\lex de Waal, lsl.7m and its Enemies itJ tiJe 1-lorrr of Africa, 2. 114. P. Woodward, U.S. Fort!ign Policy a11d tiJe 1-lorrr of A./rica, 4 7-48. 115. Benjamin and Simon, Tl1e i\gt! of Sacrt!d Terror, ill, 504-6, n. 19. 116. Cited m Timothy Came)', Sudan: Poli(icallslam and Ter.roris m,,. in Tl!rrorism in the H orn of .-Vrica, 12.5. 11 7. Carney, Sud.Se.n•ciJ 3(), no. 1 (10061: 155-76. 141. On the background to trs reconstruction efforts, St"e Orc:n B;1rok, "Lebanon: F::liJure, Collapse, o nd Resusciranon, in St' Council Rc::iOiuuon. 1701, August 11 ,2006, in rhe :\otiddle Ease." 164. T he Taif Accords, November 5, 1989, htt:p://www.mide:lstweb.org/tai f. htm; sec Tmboulsi, .-\ Htstory• of Modem Lebanon, 241-46. 165. T he report of rhe Fore-ign :\ffuirs Committee, Globul .Security: TIN! Middfe East (l ondon: The Sr.--mona r)' Office, 2.007), 50-51, prondes figures for Address," August 9, 2006, hn p:/1 166. Sayyed Hass:.1 n news.bbc.co. uk/ llhi/world/mtddle_c-:asr/4 779757. srm. 167. BBC News, ·"We blocked U.S. pla ns'-Hezbollah," jul)· 29, 2007, Imp:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/mtddlc_c-:a.st/6920908 .sttn. 168. Cite-d m lnce rnarional Crisis Group, '"l eba no n at a Tnpwue," Middle E..zst Bri4Jng No. 20, 2006. 169. Gilbert Achcar, with M iche-l W':lrschaws_ki, The 33-Dil}' War: Jswd's War on HezbollaiJ 11t Lebanon md Its Colo.: Paradt,gm, 2007), 45. 170. NasraUa h, Voice of Helho/lah, 361. 17 1. Harb and Leenders, Th)• Enemy," 191; sec Cole, Sacred Sp,lcc and 48-58; H .mk, Hezbo/Jah, Holy \Var, 182; H amzeh, In the Pat1J of chapter 6; Achcar, T1Jt! 33-Dil}' War, 25-26. 172. Grorge \V. Bu.s.h, speech of August 14, 200"6p.pec:ch of August 3 1, 2006. 173. Sec Na.s.rallah, Voice of 4()"6-S. Anoushiravan Ehtes.hami a nd _\,fa hjoob Zwetrt, Ira-11 and tile Ri.sc of Its Ncoconsen•atil•es (London: J. B. Ta uri.s, 20071, I 0 I , pur rhc at S50 mtlhon from Iran. 174 . Nasralla h, Voice of Hetbo/lah, 395. 175. lbtd., 405-6; sec Qassem, Hhbuffah, chaprer 2. 176. C:.1iro Agreement ofthe Arab League, 1969, http://www.Jebanese-forces.org/ leba nonlagreementslca iro . htm. 177. O n the Pa lestinian refuge-es generall y, and those in Lebanon. specifica lly, sec: Schulz, wnh H ammer; Tin! Palcstim an Diaspora; and on the camps and the-ir Evcr}•day j ihad: The Rise of Mil1tant Islam among history, see Bernard Pale-sliniatls m Lcbmwn (Cambridge, Jt.h ss.: Han·ard Umvc:rsity Press, 2007). Wo rn Clashes 178. Qucxed in Duncan Campbell and Clancy Chassay, t\·(ay Spread Amid Fury at Lebanese Army," .\Ia}· 25, 2007, htt p://w ww.gua rdian. co. ukls)' rialscory/0,1087 870,00. html. 179. Grorge W. Bus h, speech of May 21,2007. 180. Q ucxed m Ma rk T ran, '"Leba nese Troops Shell Palesrinia n Refugees," f\tay 1 1, 1007, hrt:p:f/www.guardja n.co.uklsrri:J/storyl' Council Resolution 1619, .. The s1runrion concerning Iraq, .. August 11, 2005. 124. U.N. S«urit>' Council Resolution 1637, .. The s1runrion concerning Iraq,"' November 8, 2005. 125. lb1d. 126. Feldman, W1hat \VI! Owe Iraq, 12 7. 127. BBC News, " Iraq Constitution Rc:sulr," Ocrober 16, 2005, hnp:/1 news. bbc.co. u k/ llhi/world/m1ddle_easr/4 346322. srm. 128. Reponed in Sharon Bc:hn. ·'Constrrution Headed for Win in Iraq," October 17, 2005, hnp://www.was hingtormmes.com/world/2005 1016- 11 2.542-5903r.htm. 129. Zolm.J)' Khahlzad, ·'Tronscri pt of Interview with Ambassador Kh ahlz.ad,"' Lite Ed1tion, CNN, August 14, 2005, hnp:/Jiraq.usembass)'.gov/lraq/20050814_ kh.alilz:ld_cnn.html. I 30. Rory Carroll and Qais al-Bashir, ..Sunnis 111 Cns1s over Iraqi Constitution, .. August 30, 1005, hrrp:J/www.gua rd ia n.co.ukllraq/Stor)'/0,2.76J, 15589 U,OO.hrml. 131. Pc:rc:r Beaumom, "Sunnis Venture down PolincaJ Parh," October 16, 2.005, lurp://www.polirics.gua rdian.co. uk/Obse...,·er!intc:rnarional/story/0,6903,1593254,00. lltm.l. 132. Edwn rd Wong, ·'Top Shiite: Politician joms Call for Autonomous South Iraq, .. Augu.st 12, 2005, http://www. n )'ti mc:s.com/2005/08/ 12./i nternari ona.llmiddJeeast/ l liraq.hrml. 133. Glrroll and ai-Bashir, "Sunni in Crisis over Iraqi Consnruuon." 134. George \V. Bush, spc:c:d1 of October 6, 1005. 135. The: Guard1an, "/\Small a nd Frag.ilc: Step Forward." lJ6. Simon jenkins, "To&!}· We Sray m Iraq to SaYC It from Cham Is a Lie," Septc:mbc:r21 ,2005, hrtp://ww\v.guo rdian.co.uk/commemlsto[}·I0,3604, 1574478,00. html. 137. Feldman, \VI! Owe Iraq, 3. 138. Rory CarroJJ, "lrnq: :\ra.b Champion or Couldron of Civil War?n August 16, 1005, hrtp:f/www.guardjon.eo.uk/lraq/Srof}·/0,1763, 1549724,00.hlml. 139. Oxfam, "Rismg lo rhe Humamranan Challenge: m Iraq," Briefing Paper No. 105, 2007. 140. James:\. Baker nnd lee H. Ho milton, The lmq Study Group Report: Tin? \Vay Forward-A New Approach (New York: Vinr.agc:, 73; see Draper, Dead Certmrr, 4l0. 141. See Pa[rick Cockburn, "\Vho Is Whose Enc:m)·?" London Review of Books, Morch 6, 2008, 14-15; Derek Gregory, ··The Biopolitics of Bnghdad: Counterinsurgency and rhc: Counter-City." Huma11 Geography I (20081: 6,...27.

232

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141. George W. Bush, spe«h of j:muary ](), 2.007. 143. B.aker and Hamal ron, 17u 1raq Study Group Report, 45. 144. Rqlom:d in Raben Orapc:r, Cutdlll, 351.

5. Territorial Integrity and Contingent Sovereignty

I. The srr:m:gac logics of the Cold War arc set out in NSC-6 8, Nanonal Securir:y Councal. ··Unired Sr.ues 0 biecrives and Progrn ms for Narional Security," (NSC6S), 1950. 2. Montevadco ConvC'nnon on Corwemion on Rights :md Dum·s of Srmes (inter-Am•, that the internononJ.llegal structure !hat \'IUS constructed after World 11 risks precipitating a much gmerahzcd "d1J.ot1c and bloody" world of war. 18. Israel is only a n excepnon: a consolidArion of 1967 g;Jins and a deep-rooted resist:Jnce to :1 new Palestinian st:Jte, rhetoric notwithstanding, are consistent with the O\'ero ll srrategy. Chnstopher j. Bickerton, Philip 19. For a spirited defense: of sovcnignt)', Cunliffe, and Alexander Goun:virch, eds., Pofttics withaht Swaeignl)•: ,-\ Critique of Contemportlr)' lnJertttllional Rdat1ons (london: University College london Press, 2007). Kor the leasr of irs ma ny problems is. a failure ro dis.<uss rhe territorial relation or spari:J.I aspects o f so\•cre1gnty. 20. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, 110-11. 21. Paul A. Gigot, Mark of Rove," August 13, 2007, hrrp:l/online.\vsj. com/arudo'SB 118697458949295744 . html?mod=US-Busmcss-News; see Paul White House," August U, :?.007, Imp:// Reynolds, 'Architect' leaves news.bbc.co.uk/lnli/amc:ncas/6943959.srm. See also Robc:rt G. Kaufm.111, In Defense of the Bush Doctri11e (lexington: Unl\'ersity Pr1:ss of Kc:nruck)', 10071, 155, and Timothy j. lynch and RobertS. Singh, Alter Bush: The Ca.sc for Contimttl)' i11 .".mertcan Foretgll Policy (Cambridge, J\1ass.: Cambridge Press, 1008), w hich expresses the that furure presidents wall ho ld to the Bush Doctrine.

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I NDEX

Abdd S:.l.am, A.H., 42, 43, 54, 84, 102, 106 Abou Zahab, Mari:.m, 51, 71, 75, 79 Abu Ghraib, X\'11, 55 Abu Sa)·yaf, 85 Achcar, Gilbr:n:, 93 Aden Harbor, XII Afghanistan, XII, x11i, xi\', X\•ii, xx,•iij, 2, 4, 8, 19, 21, 23, 26, Jl , 34, 59-6 1, 64, 65,69,70-77,78, 79, 8 1-82, 84, 86, 87, 93, 97, 99, 103, 107, lOS, 109, 11 L, LL3, 114, 148, 164, 165, 169, 174, 175, 176, JS4 n56, 2 13n65 Afnca, Horn of, 31, 34, 65, 8 1, 84, 101, 102, 104, 108 Ag.1mben, Giorgto, 55-61 Agnew, j ohn, ix, 61, 66, 175, IS7n92 Albright, Madeleine, 152, 160 Ali, Tariq, 37, 97 Al lrih:..ad AI lsJ:umi, 101 xxi, x-:xviii, I, 4, S, 10, 16, 18,1 9,21,3 l , JJ, J5,36, 38, 40,42,45,46,48-49, 52- 54, 60-6 1, 65, 72-75,77-8 1,83,85, 93, 99, l 02-3, I 05, 106, 109, 112, 121, 148, 175, 178. See ,dso bm Laden, Osoma

ai-Turabi, Hasso n, 4J-44, 46, 83,84 ai-Za rqaw1, Abu Muso b, 49, 120 ai-Zawahm, Arman, 33, 37, 42, 48, 5 1, 98, 101 Mont:Jser, 7, 33 Anderson, Liam, I 16 Anna n, Kofi, 155-56, 158, 164 Appadum i, Arjun, 8, 26, 29, 5 1,54 Arafn r, Yasser, 87, 168 Arrighi, G•m·n nni, xix-xx Associnnon of American (AAG), xm, 68, LS I n24 asylum, xxn• -armoterrorism," xxL Su also SIO{erdi·jk, Perer Axis of Evil, 6, 29- JO, 96 Azzam, Abdallah, 43,44 Ba'arh 124 Balib:u, [rienne, xxx, J4 Bali bombmg, xiv, 48 lknj:. min, 4, 12 1 Thomas, 6, 9, 22- 24, 28, 32, 108, 195nl41 Begin, Men:.cbem, 96 Beirur, xii, XXII, 88, 93, 94 Bhuno, lkn:J7.u, 8 1

250

I NDEX

bm Llckn, xi- xii, 2, 4, 15, 23, 26,33,34, 36-44,45,48,51,52, 60, 7 1, 73, 74-75, 77,82,83,84, 101, 102. 184n56 Black Hawk Doum , 10, 102 Ton}·. 7, 17, 27, 8 l, 84, 86, 92, 97, 106, I 07, 11 6, 122, 147, 150, 153-55, 158-59, 16 1, 162, 164, 245n l9 1 Sidney, I 07 Bobbin, Phrlip, 163, 174 bod>· counts, 180n9 Bolmn,john, 30-3 1, 113, 161 Bonn Ag.rC'C'rnem, 73, 76 borckrs, 46, 47, 169, 174 conrrol of, 4, II, 18, 51, 69, 88, 91, 95, 108, 132, 147 dispurcs over, 106- 7 csr.tblishmcm of, xx,.·ii prcscrnnon of, ),'XX, 66, 67, 137, 146 violcnct" over, X),'X Bosni:1, II , 22, 34, 40, 48, 49, 51, 58, 63,69,71, 102, 15 1, 152,153, 167, 172 Bremer, L. P:l ul, 121, 122, 123 Brenner. :-.l't"il, xxx1 Brimmer. Esther, 4 BI'Zcezinski, Zbigniew, 6, 8- 10,22, 70 Allen, 149 Bush, Grorge H. W.• 13, IS, 150 Bush, Grorge W. xii. xiii, ll:vi- X\'iii, l- 8, I I, 15, 16, 17. 19. 24. 25. 26,27,29,30-32. 35. 38.45. 56,69, 7 1, 75, 77,79,8 1- 82. 84, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 107, 11 1, 112, 116, I 18, 120, 123, 135. 136- 38, 15 1. 16 1. 168, 175, 178, l97n l70, 18 Jn20, 188n ll Bush xiii, :>....,·iii. 4. 6. 7. 8, 11, 15, 17, 24, 26, 27, 3 1, 32, 71, 79, 96, 97, 99, Ill , 16 1, 168 Byt"rs, ,\.(ichael, 24, 27, 73, 84

calcularion, pohrics of, XX\'11, 185 n6 7 Cahpharc, 36, 4 1, 42, 43,44-49, 175 Camp David., II, 168 camps, PoiC'srinian rramm g, 96, I 0 I refugee, 94-95, 220n 177 ns spaces of exceprion, 5.5---61, 207n L58, 208n l65 rerrorisr rrn in ing, xii, 4, 3 1, 49, 5 1, 53, 55, 59, 60, 61, 65,69, 7 1, 74, 75, 76 caprralism, " ix, 19 Cmrury Foundarion, the, 5, 16, 39, 52, 68,79 Ccorny, Phil G., 68-69 Chechnya, xi''• xxii, 34, 36, 40, 42, 4 3, 48,5 !,70, 7 1, 143,148,150, 151, 153, !69, 20 1n52 Chene)•, Dick, 4,5, l l, 13, 160 Chernus, Ira, 16, 30, 38 Cherry, John, 11 6, liS China, II , 14, 19, 20, 23, 29, 35, 48, 65, 78, 118, 14 1, 146, 148, 150, 151, 152, !69, 175, 197nl8 1 Chomsky, Noam, 19 citizens hi p., 48, 94, 134 Clinton. Bill, xii, xrx, 2, 10. 1S, 16, 25, 29, 30, 7 1, 84. 96. 102, 159, 160, 168, L8 1n20, 184n53 Clinton. Hillary, 184n57 Clinton ll , «, 105. 159 Cockburn, Andr«"w. I SSn U Cockburn, Pamck, I 3 I Cold War, xv. X\'11, xxii. xxx:i, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 12, 23, 32, J4, 47, 60, 64, 70, 105, 139, 146, 147, 150. 153, 170, 17 1, 173, 175, 188nl3. 213n77,232nl ,l47nl7 colomabsm, 47, 173, 174, 246n 11 comm umsm, 7, 18, «, 171 Connolly, \'ilrlliam E., xniii, :xx ix, 15, 28, 186n88,207nl 56

I NDEX

Cooper, Roben, 20, I 77 Comdl, Drucilla, 28 coumerrerronsm, 16, 18, 69, 84, 113, 169 Cowen, Deborah, xx Cuba,31 Cyprus, 65, 148, 150, 158 Darfur. 83, 84, 85 defense plonning guidanct', 13 Ddeuze, Gilles, ckmocraq, xi, x1x, 7, 19, 26, 28, 69, 76, 95, 11 6, 121, 126, 130, 135, 143, 146, 160, 175 Dernda,Jocques, 59, 159 Rene, xxvi dett'rrirorio liz::mon. XX\'It-xxviii, 7, 11, 3 1,33,34,49,61, 169,177. S..e also reterrirorio lizonon devji, faisal, 37, 39. 47-49. 54. 60 de Waal, .-\Jex, 42, 43, 44, 54, 84, 102, 106 dis.1rmamenr, 91 , I 13 Djiboun, 82, 99, 100, 101 Domke, Qa,•id, 26, 27 drugs, wor on, 14, 139, 171 Eaglt'ton, Tt'rry, 6, 184n56. 189n28 East Timor, 63, 147, 158, 167 Edkms, Jenn)', 58 Egypt, 16, 17, 19. 33. 48, 89, 107 Ehteshomi, Anoush1ravan. 34, 79 Eritrro, 40. 43. 83, 105, 106, 114. 147.223n243 Etniopio, 82, 99, 10 I, 114, 147.223n243 European Union, 14, 20, 2 1, 35, 50, 65, l 08, 143, 152 exceprion, spaceslsr.·ues of, 5 5- 6 1 extraordinary rendinon, 55 extratcrriroriolity, 25, 59, 169

251

foiled Slates, xxviii, 10, 17, 32, 58, 6 1, 63, 67, 68, so, 99, 120, 136, 137, 163. See ..'V, 150 Somud, 3, 111 Eyal, 90, 184n5J &nk, xiii, JS, 39, 88, 89, 91, 168 \Vilkmson, Paul, xxi11 \Vilson, Wood row, 141, 142 \Volfowarz, 11, 13, 15, 25, 29, Ill, 11 2, 12.1, 2.09 nl 70 Woodward, Bob, L98n l99 \Voodword, 101 \Vorld Trade xii, xvi, J, I SOn 13, 114n89 \Vorld War I, xxa, 42, 11 4, 141 \Vorld War II, >.'VII, 29, 141, 142, 146, 169, 177, 147n 17 Yemen, xii, xiv, 2 1, 11, 26, 41, 43, 53, 6 1, 65, 82, 100, 106, 108 Yugoslavia, 150-51, 151, 154, 158, 164, 165 Z:achcr, Mark W., 147 Z:a um, Dominik, 157 Zehkow, Phalip D., LOS, 16 1, 163 Zimbabwe, 106

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STUART ELD EN is professor of political geography at Durham University.

He is the author of three prmous books, including Speakir1g Agai11st Nwnber; Heidegger, Language, mtd the Politics of Calculation (2006), and editor of four more. including most recently Henri Lefebvre, State, Space, World: Selected Essays, coedited with Neil Brenner (Universiry of Minnesota Press, 2009). H e is currently writing a historr of the concept of territory in Western thought.