Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders

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Territorial Choice

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Territorial Choice The Politics of Boundaries and Borders Edited by

Harald Baldersheim Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway and

Lawrence E. Rose Professor of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway

Editorial matter and selection © Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 2010 All remaining chapters © respective authors 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–23333–1

hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Territorial choice : the politics of boundaries and borders / edited by Harald Baldersheim [and] Lawrence E. Rose. p. cm. ISBN 978–0–230–23333–1 (alk. paper) 1. Local government—Europe. 2. Municipal government—Europe. 3. Europe—Boundaries. 4. Europe—Administrative and political divisions. 5. Comparative government. I. Baldersheim, Harald, 1944– II. Rose, Lawrence E., 1944– JS3000.T47 2010 320.1'2—dc22 2010012503 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents List of Exhibits and Figures

vii

List of Tables

ix

Notes on the Contributors

xi

Preface 1

2

xiii

Territorial Choice: Rescaling Governance in European States Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose The Danish Revolution in Local Government: How and Why? Poul Erik Mouritzen

3

Finnish Power-Shift: The Defeat of the Periphery? Siv Sandberg

4

The Swedish Model under Stress: The Waning of the Egalitarian, Unitary State? Anders Lidström

5 The Staying Power of the Norwegian Periphery Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 6

Larger and Larger? The Endless Search for Efficiency in the UK Peter John

1

21 42

61 80

101

7

Step-by-Step: Territorial Choice in the Netherlands Mijke Boedeltje and Bas Denters

8

Multiple Choice: The Persistence of Territorial Pluralism in the German Federation Melanie Walter-Rogg

138

France and Its 36,000 Communes: An Impossible Reform? Eric Kerrouche

160

9

v

118

vi Contents

10

11

12

13

Italian Regionalism: A Semi-Federation is Taking Shape – Or is It? Marco Brunazzo

180

Efficiency Imperatives in a Fragmented Polity: Reinventing Local Government in Greece Panagiotis Getimis and Nikolaos Hlepas

198

Top-Down or Bottom-Up? Coping with Territorial Fragmentation in the Czech Republic Michal Illner

214

A Comparative Analysis of Territorial Choice in Europe – Conclusions Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose

234

Bibliography

260

Index

273

List of Exhibits and Figures Exhibits 2.1 Responsibilities of Danish municipalities after 1 January 2007

30

2.2 Responsibilities of Danish regions after 1 January 2007

30

3.1 A window of opportunity: Interrelated societal and political changes preceding the Finnish reform initiative in 2005

47

5.1 Principles suggested by the Christiansen commission for future territorial reform in Norway, 1992

84

9.1 Responsibilities of French inter-municipal communities according to the Act of 1999

171

Figures 1.1 Average size of municipalities and local government expenditures as a per cent of Gross Domestic Product for 11 selected countries, 2007

5

1.2 Per cent change in the number of municipalities in 11 European countries during two periods, 1950–92 and 1992–2007

6

1.3 Strategies for territorial reform

14

1.4 Countries classified according to institutional contexts

17

1.5 Summary of the analytical framework: The process of territorial choice

19

2.1 System capacity and citizen effectiveness: Alternative trade-off perspectives

33

13.1 Analytical framework: The context and process of territorial choice

235

13.2 Alternative reform outcomes

241

13.3 Outcomes of territorial reform initiatives: 16 cases

243

vii

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List of Tables 1.1 Selected characteristics of local governments in 28 European countries

3

2.1 Distribution of Danish mayors by party affiliation, 2001

24

4.1 Distribution of Swedish municipalities according to population size, 2007

63

5.1

Distribution of Norwegian municipalities according to population size, 1951, 1974 and 1991

82

7.1 Distribution of Dutch municipalities according to population size, 1851–2007

120

7.2 Some differential implications of the Rational Argumentation Model and the Positional Interest Model in reform debates

125

8.1 Rural and urban districts, local federations, municipalities and population in Germany in 2006 and percentage change, 1990–2006

140

8.2 Distribution of local governments in West and East Germany and percentage change by size of municipality, 1968–2006

145

8.3 Territorial reform in West German states, 1968–80

146

9.1 Distribution of French communes according to population size, 2009

161

9.2 Number of local cooperative arrangements in France, 1972–2009

168

9.3 Growth and distribution of inter-municipal communities in France, 1999–2009

173

9.4 Distribution of inter-municipal communities in France, 2009

174

ix

x

List of Tables

10.1 Distribution of Italian municipalities according to population size, 2001

182

11.1 Distribution of Greek municipalities according to population size before (1996) and after (1999) implementation of the Capodistrias Plan

206

12.1 Distribution of Czech municipalities according to population size, 2007

216

12.2 Number of municipalities in the Czech Lands, 1921–2007

218

13.1 Outcomes of reform initiatives by country

237

13.2 Framing of reforms by country

244

13.3 Reform strategies by country

247

13.4 Patterns of conflict by country

250

Notes on the Contributors Harald Baldersheim is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway. Mijke Boedeltje graduated in the doctoral programme at the Department of Political Science and Research Methods, School for Management and Governance, University of Twente, The Netherlands. Currently she is director of BP-E, an independent research and consultancy bureau. Marco Brunazzo is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Italy. Bas Denters is Professor of Public Administration at the Department of Political Science and Research Methods, School for Management and Governance, University of Twente, The Netherlands. Panos Getimis is Professor of Urban and Regional Policy and Planning at the Department of Economic and Regional Development, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences, Athens, Greece. Nikos Hlepas is Associate Professor of Regional Government and Self Government at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, National and Capodistrian University of Athens, Greece. Michal Illner is a senior scientist in the Institute of Sociology at the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in Prague, Czech Republic, and is a member of its Department for Local and Regional Studies. Peter John is the Hallsworth Chair of Governance in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Manchester, UK, where he is codirector of the Institute of Political Governance (IPEG). Eric Kerrouche is CNRS Senior Research Fellow at SPIRIT, the research centre of Bordeaux Institute of Political Science, France.

xi

xii Notes on the Contributors

Anders Lidström is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Umeå University, Sweden. Poul Erik Mouritzen is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark. Lawrence E. Rose is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Norway. Siv Sandberg is a senior researcher at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Åbo Akademi University, Finland. Melanie Walter-Rogg is Lecturer at the Department of Empirical Political Research and Policy Analysis, University of Munich, Germany.

Preface Political-administrative reforms (and reform proposals) constitute an ongoing saga, a saga for which there is no foreseeable end. The explanation for this situation is quite straightforward: changes in socio-economic life give rise to conditions that were not foreseen or anticipated at the time existing arrangements were put into place, conditions that test existing arrangements and generate pressures for change. The character of these pressures and the forces they represent clearly vary, and whether they are sufficient to bring about a change is a matter that has attracted the attention of social observers and scholars of broad standing, both in terms of geographic as well as disciplinary base. That the literature on political-administrative reform is voluminous and continues to grow is therefore not surprising. A closer look at this literature, however, reveals that there are few works that have undertaken a more systematic analysis of reforms focusing on the territorial subdivision of nation states. How a geographic area is ‘carved up’ for political-administrative purposes depends of course upon a number of other considerations – foremost among these being the distribution of functional responsibilities along with financial and institutional arrangements. Hence an inquiry that focuses on the territorial dimension alone is virtually guaranteed to provide an incomplete story at best. In our minds, however, the idea of undertaking an inquiry of political-administrative reform by ‘digging’ into the processes surrounding choices of territorial boundaries and borders nonetheless constituted an appealing alternative to some of the more common approaches to studies of reform. It was with this conviction that we contacted colleagues in a number of European countries with the intent of launching a comparative research project on the politics of territorial reform proposals in recent decades. The response was positive and, with support from a small grant programme funded by the Norwegian research council, we were able to convene an initial project seminar at the Norwegian Institute in Rome in October of 2006. Following this two additional project seminars were held, the first in Umeå, Sweden, with financial support from the Swedish research council and county council of Västerbotten, and the second in Athens, Greece, with financial support from the Institute for Local Government (ITA, www.ita.org.gr) and the Central xiii

xiv Preface

Union of Greek Municipalities and Communities (KEDKE, www.kedke.gr). Support from all of these organizations, while perhaps small from the perspective of much international collaboration, was enormously helpful in bringing the project to fruition and for which all project participants are grateful. In preparing the manuscript, Julie Runde Krogstad has provided valuable help with a critical eye for important details. Members of the editorial and production staff at Palgrave Macmillan likewise deserve a special word of thanks for assistance that has been rendered in a very professional and supportive fashion, making the final stages in preparing the manuscript a less than awesome task. Our warmest thanks, however, are reserved for our wives – Anne Kristin and Leslie – who, despite having previously suffered the absence and neglect often associated with the preparation of comparative research projects and book publications, again provided support and understanding so critical to such endeavours. Harald Baldersheim Lawrence E. Rose

1 Territorial Choice: Rescaling Governance in European States Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose

Reformers of public administration are on a perennial quest for a better fit between the scale of problems confronted by governments and the scale of governmental institutions that are responsible for solving those problems. Such a fit, however, can never be a permanent one; societies change and so do the extent and nature of challenges confronting governments. Institutions, moreover, have an inbuilt inertia that often confounds reformers and leads to intractable solutions – or to surprising innovations and variations in the way problems are confronted. Nowhere are these parallel trends more visible than in the field of local and regional governance, where daring experiments often coexist with long-standing deadlocks and antiquated institutional patterns. The advantages and disadvantages of larger or smaller scale units of local government, and what is the proper size of local authorities are issues that have occupied a prominent position within the theory and practice of public administration (see for example King and Ma 2000; Keating 1995; Newton 1982 among others). The questions seem to have an inherent phoenix-like character: as soon as an answer is provided in one time and place, the question arises anew in another time or place. That this should be so is not entirely surprising. Although the questions may appear simple and quite straightforward on the surface, below the surface lurk a highly complex and convoluted set of issues. What powers and responsibilities are to be assigned to different units of sub-national government, how are the activities of these units to be financed and how many and how large (or small) should the units of sub-national government be? Further complicating the matter is what set of principles and rules should be adopted for how decisions are to be made and carried out at the sub-national level. 1

2

Territorial Choice: Rescaling Governance

Important as these questions may be, the focus of this volume is somewhat different. We do not aim at assessing the advantages and disadvantages of larger or smaller scale of local government units. Instead, we focus on the politics of territorial choice in national policymaking. The overarching research questions guiding the contributions to this volume are the following: What are the strategies chosen to achieve a better fit between the scale of governance and the scale of problems in the field of local and regional government in European countries? What are the conflicts accompanying the choice of strategies? And what are the factors that shape choices of strategies and outcomes of those strategies in different countries? In choosing this focus for the book we seek to achieve a better understanding of the persisting variation of sub-national organization across European nation states, and the variation in terms of how decisions about territorial organization are made. In an era of globalization and the homogenizing forces that this implies, why does small-scale local government persist in some countries, while sweeping change is introduced, seemingly without resistance, in other countries? May, for example, variations in patterns of change be accounted for in terms of national traditions or innovations regarding decision-making and policy styles? The book is based on 11 country studies that outline the basic features of the politics of territorial choice in the respective countries. These studies are carried out with the aim of explaining the variation and development of sub-national organization in the 11 countries covered by the book. By focusing on the politics of territorial choice we seek to identify and elaborate forces of change that contribute to new patterns of territorial organization that arise in response to problems in modern European societies. At a more general level the book also represents a contribution to the literature on public administration reforms with empirical examples from a field that provides a particularly challenging setting for theory-building and testing of hypotheses. In the following section we present our point of departure: the persisting variation of local government structures in Europe. After this we set forth our analytical framework for the study of politics of territorial choice.

Territorial variation One quite simple illustration of territorial variation is found in Table 1.1, which contains information regarding the number of municipalities found in selected countries, the average demographic size of these

3 Table 1.1 Selected characteristics of local governments in 28 European countries

Country

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland UK

Number of municipalities (2007)a 2,357 589 264 6,249 98 227 416 36,683 12,312 1,034 3,175 114 8,101 527 60 116 443 431 2,478 308 3,173 2,891 210 8,111 290 2,758 437

Average municipal size (inhabitants)b 3,510 17,910 29,090 1,640 55,480 5,930 12,660 1,720 6,690 10,750 3,170 37,310 7,270 4,340 56,570 4,080 36,890 11,010 15,390 34,380 6,800 1,870 9,560 5,430 31,310 2,700 139,480

Per cent municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitantsc

Municipal expenses as per cent of GNP (2007)d

91 14 11 96 3 80 52 95 77 53 91 37 71 91 2 81 2 55 25 20 35 95 48 85 4 89 0

7.5 6.7 7.2 11.2 32.2e 9.8 19.3 11.2 7.2 2.5 11.6 7.2 15.1 10.8 8.4 4.7 15.3 13.3 13.4 6.1 9.6 6.1 8.4 6.4 24.5 7.7 12.8

Notes: a Except for Norway and Switzerland, data for number of municipalities are from Hoorens (2008:31). b Except for Norway and Switzerland, data for average municipal population size are from Hoorens (2008:41). c Except for Norway and Switzerland, data for average municipal population size are from Hoorens (2008:41). d Data for municipal expenditure as a per cent of GDP are from EUROSTAT: available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en& pcode=tec00023 e Local government expenditure in Denmark includes old age pension payments, all of which are reimbursed from central government. When these expenditures are excluded, local government expenditure is less than that indicated in the table.

4


municipalities and per cent of all municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, as well as the relative size of municipal expenditures measured as a percentage of a respective country’s gross national product. With regard to demographic size, the countries fall into three main groups. One group consists of those countries with relatively small municipalities in which the average size is 10,000 inhabitants or less, and a preponderant majority of the municipalities are (by comparative measure) very small. In this group of countries over half of the municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. France, along with the Czech and Slovak republics – in which roughly 19 out of 20 municipalities (95%) have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants – are the most extreme examples in this group, but several other countries (Austria, Hungary, Latvia, Spain and Switzerland, to mention a few) follow close on their heels. At the other end of the continuum Denmark, Lithuania and especially the UK stand out as one group. These countries have very large municipalities with on average 55,000 or more inhabitants. The third group of countries consists of those having what by comparative standards are medium sized municipalities, the average size being between 25,000 and 35,000 inhabitants, and relatively few municipalities under 5,000 inhabitants. Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden are examples of countries found in this group. Demographic size alone, however, tells only part of the story. Also important is just what local authorities do – both what they are expected to do and what they in addition may do on a voluntary basis. Compared with Danish municipalities, for example, French municipalities have not traditionally been expected to do very much. That there are significant differences in the activities of local government authorities even in cases where municipalities are of roughly the same size, and similarities in levels of activity even when there are differences in demographic size, is evident from Figure 1.1. In this figure demographic size and a measure of relative importance of local government activity are plotted along the two axes. On the horizontal axis we have the average municipal size of each country and on the vertical axis local government expenditures as a percentage of the gross domestic product, which can be interpreted as an indicator of the importance of local governments. With regard to countries with small municipalities, Figure 1.1 suggests that there tends to be a connection between average size and relative importance. The smaller the municipalities (and the more who have under 5,000 inhabitants), the fewer the tasks that are commonly assigned to the municipalities and, as a consequence, the smaller are local expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

Local expenditure as a per cent of GDP

Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 5 50 45 40 35 DK

30 25

SE

20

FI

15

IT FR CZ

10

NO

NL UK

GE

5

GR

0 0

50 000

100 000

150 000

Average size of municipalities Figure 1.1 Average size of municipalities and local government expenditures as a per cent of Gross Domestic Product for 11 selected countries, 2007 Note: Abbreviations: CZ: Czech Republic; DK: Denmark, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IT: Italy, NL: the Netherlands, NO: Norway, SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom. Source: Based on data found in Table 1.1

Yet increased size is no guarantee for increased activity. Even in a country such as Portugal, where the average size of municipalities is roughly 35,000 inhabitants, local government activities are relatively limited, accounting for just over 6 per cent of national GDP. By comparison, in the Netherlands and Sweden, both of which were countries with municipalities of roughly similar average demographic size as that found in Portugal, expenditures by local authorities constituted roughly 15 and 25 per cent respectively in 2007. The evidence presented in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.1 – evidence that illustrates the fact that there is no universally accepted answer to the question of what may constitute an appropriate organization of subnational government – is both striking and convincing. The evidence, however, is still only part of a larger picture; it is static, referring to conditions existing at only one point in time. Equally if not more striking is the dynamic evidence relating to changes that have occurred with respect to the organization and activity of sub-national government over time. Two different facets of this dynamic picture are captured by the evidence shown in Figure 1.2.

6


1

Czech Republic Denmark

–44 –64 –80 –10 –16

Finland

0

France

–5 –50

Germany Greece

–67 –83 –1 0

Italy

4 –32 –37

Netherlands

–2

Norway

–41 1

Sweden –87 UK (England) –100

–51 –76

–50 0 50 Percent change for different periods

100

% change 1992–2007 % change 1950–1992 Figure 1.2 Per cent change in the number of municipalities in 11 European countries during two periods, 1950–92 and 1992–2007 Note: Figures for Germany pertain to West Germany for the period 1950–92 and to the former East Germany for the period 1990–2006. Sources: Martins (1995) and Hoorens (2008)

This figure depicts the per cent change in the number of municipalities that occurred in the 11 countries considered more closely in this volume during two distinct periods between 1950 and 2007. As this figure makes abundantly clear, this was an era in which countries followed substantially different policy alternatives in dealing with

Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 7

the question of how sub-national government should be organized. In some countries such as Finland, France and Italy there has been little if any change, whereas in other countries the number of local authorities has been reduced substantially, indeed in some countries quite dramatically. In West Germany, for example, two out of every three local authorities were eliminated through processes of amalgamation during the initial period, and half of the municipalities in the former East Germany were eliminated in the more recent period. In Denmark, Sweden and the UK the reduction was even greater in the initial period, and both Denmark and the UK have undertaken further reductions in recent years, while in Sweden there has rather been a slight increase due to divisions of a few municipalities. In another group of countries (the Netherlands, Norway and the Czech Republic) change was more moderate, but still quite significant during the period from 1950 to 1992, ranging from 37 to 44 per cent, whereas during the more recent period these countries have pursued different paths. The Netherlands has continued to reduce the number of municipalities while in the Czech Republic and Norway there has been little overall change of late. The conclusion, it would seem, is that that there is no close relationship between what occurred during the earlier period and events of the past 15 years. A similar lack of any clear tendencies with respect to the paths chosen is found when other measures are used – for example changes in population density, territorial size and so forth. The legacy of changes enacted from 1950 to 1992, in other words, while important in its own right, by no means determined what has happened in the subsequent 15 years.

What is territorial choice? The issue to be studied It is against this background that this book is written. It is apparent that there is no universal recipe, no Columbian egg that provides a solution to the question ‘what is an appropriate organization of sub-national government’. Certainly the lack of a more universal answer cannot be attributed to a lack of interest in the question, either practical or theoretical. On the contrary, the issue is, as Dente and Kjellberg noted in their book The Dynamics of Institutional Change (1988), of ubiquitous and ongoing relevance. In recent years the structure of local government has once again occupied a prominent position on the political agenda in many countries. The division of functions and the organization of intergovernmental relations are closely related issues in this

8


connection. These issues are brought to the fore by among other things complaints over an alleged misfit between territorial jurisdictions and the functions and responsibilities of local government. The inability to cope with ‘wicked problems’ such as degraded environments, traffic congestion, urban sprawl, inadequate water supply and decaying inner cities, for example, is often attributed to territorial and administrative fragmentation to which alternative solutions are sought. Normatively the predominant alternatives for dealing with such problems have traditionally been cast in terms of what has often been referred to as consolidationist versus public choice perspectives (cf. Ostrom 1972; ACIR 1989; Mouritzen 1989). The consolidationist position argues in favour of amalgamating small political-administrative units into larger ones, overcoming fragmented, costly, duplicative and occasionally overlapping jurisdictional boundaries. Larger units of local government are said to be in a position to take advantage of economies of scale in public service provision. By virtue of increased size, they are also said to exercise greater capacity to govern, being capable of taking on a broader spectrum of functions and redistributing economic and organizational resources more effectively, thereby achieving greater political responsiveness to citizen needs and demands. According to this point of view, in short, if local government is to function effectively, it must have sufficient size and authority (see, for example, Gunlicks 1991). Public choice advocates, on the other hand, see the matter quite differently, and argue for the value of small local authorities. A basic premise underlying this position is that the range of individual preferences and needs among the population tend to be more homogeneous in smaller political-administrative units. By virtue of their smaller size, citizens will also have greater accessibility and be better able to communicate their preferences for collective and quasi-collective goods to local authorities. Presuming that local authorities are responsive to citizen demands, then circumstances should allow for more ‘tailor made’ solutions in the provision of local goods and services. If local authorities are not responsive, then residents can more readily replace them via the ballot box or, following the argument of Tiebout, ‘vote with their feet’ and move to another local authority where their preferences will be more fully satisfied (Tiebout 1956). Thus, whereas the consolidationist position emphasizes production efficiency, the public choice position emphasizes allocation efficiency. The absence of a more definitive response to the question of an appropriate organization of sub-national government may certainly


not be attributed to the lack of empirical inquiry probing the validity of these and other points of view. The academic literature relating to issues of how sub-national government may be organized and what consequences alternatives may have is extensive – indeed almost overwhelmingly so. In a review article attempting to summarize the literature relating to determinants of public service performance, for example, Boyne (2003) examined 65 different empirical studies undertaken in various countries, and these studies could only be considered the tip of an iceberg. In a similar vein, Dowding et al. (1994) endeavoured to review and assess the empirical literature regarding the ‘Tiebout hypothesis’. The article had roughly 190 references, which were by no means exhaustive. The volume edited by Meligrana (2004) likewise demonstrates the wide variety of strategies which have been adopted to deal with the problem of encapsulated cities. The lack of a universal solution to the fundamental question should not be taken to mean that the organization of sub-national government is merely a random outcome from the toss of some unseen dice. The perspective upon which this book rests is rather that the organization of sub-national government may more reasonably be associated with, to use the terminology of Almond and Genco (1977), the working of a clock, not a cloud; it is the outcome of partly predictable movements and mechanisms, not a matter of diffuse, drifting forces. In particular the point of departure for this book is that the organization of subnational government is primarily an outcome of political processes – patterns of policymaking, debate and conflict – that in large part occur at the national level. The intent here, then, is to look more closely at how the politicaladministrative map of different countries may be redrawn or, alternatively, how attempts to redraw the map are rejected. The starting point is a recognition of the fact that such reforms tend to be controversial and difficult to carry through, often mobilizing a variety of interests that create conflicts which cut across more traditional partisan cleavages and party constellations. Yet despite such conflicts, some reforms are nonetheless adopted and enacted, whereas in other cases they are ‘stopped in their tracks’ or put on the shelf for reconsideration at a later point in time. Denmark exemplifies a country where radical reform was recently and rather unexpectedly pushed through. By comparison, Norway represents a contrasting case, where territorial reform has been on the agenda for the last 15 years, but so far not much has changed. Finland may follow the Danish trajectory, while France is pursing a course of reform that

10


has much in common with the Nordic free commune experiments of the 1980s. In undertaking a closer investigation of selected empirical cases within the European setting, two sets of interrelated research questions are analyzed. First, what are the characteristic features of the territorial reform processes observed in various countries? In some countries the approach to territorial reform seems to be changing, from instrumental-analytical approaches to more politically driven formats. Are these more universal trends that are likely to be found across all countries with the passage of time? Second, how can variations in reform strategies and outcomes across countries be accounted for? For example, why has small-scale local government persisted for so long in France, the homeland of Jacobin rationalism, while governments in the UK, a country often seen as steeped in tradition, have been able to drive reforms through with ease, ending up with the largest local authorities in Europe?

Reform dynamics: Modeling politics of territorial choice Several approaches found in the literature offer help in identifying a number of possible explanatory strands. Historical institutionalism represents one such approach. In this perspective institutions, which are conceived of as a set of formal and informal norms and rules, are seen as path-dependent and rigid (cf. Thelen 1999; Peters 2005). Once they are established, they set limits to the future choices that are available. Actors are captured by these institutions, develop vested interests and will tend to defend them if they are under threat. When facing new challenges, actors apply a ‘logic of appropriateness’ as this is defined by existing institutions, rather than considering alternatives in a more open and rational manner. Furthermore, institutions become embedded with others, perhaps at different levels, which hinders radical change, since any change might also alter the balance of power vis-à-vis these other institutions. But changes do occur, also in the historical institutional understanding of societal development. Some authors emphasize gradual change, such as punctuated evolutions (Hay 2002) or ‘slow-moving causal processes’ (Pierson 2004). Others claim that changes can be more radical and take the form of critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991), formative moments (Rothstein 1996), punctuated equilibria (Krasner 1984) or policy windows (Kingdon 1995). Some of these transformations are seen as mainly externally generated, for example through the influence of


globalization, environmental problems or fundamental value changes, while others emphasize internal imbalances within the institutions themselves as causes to change. Transformations may be the result of conscious and rational decisions involving actors who pursue specific goals, but can also be related to structural processes or be the result of more accidental events, perhaps an unintended by-product when small change through a sequence of events triggers large consequences (Pierson 2004). In seeking to understand reform dynamics we wish to combine ideas from policy theory as well as from institutional theory. A policy stages approach is taken as a useful point of departure in this regard.1 Reforms achieve a place on the political agenda of a country, become subjects of debate (and sometimes controversy), they are enacted, implemented and produce outcomes. The extent to which reform initiatives actually reach any of these stages depends on: – Policy entrepreneurs and their skills in framing policies and devising strategies that lift policy ideas out of a ‘primeval soup’ of competing possibilities (Kingdon 1995); – The capability of (a) policy entrepreneurs to form advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and (b) that of their opponents to form veto alliances; such coalitions and alliances may reveal long-standing patterns of conflict and stand-off or may represent new patterns that open up windows of opportunities for reformers (so-called punctuated equilibria, cf. Baumgartner and Jones 1993); and – The institutional context in which policy entrepreneurs operate, and which defines the legitimate opportunities and openings for stakeholders to participate in the process of decision-making; the openings may be few and narrow or wide and inclusive. In the following our analytical framework is further elaborated in the form of questions that are addressed in the subsequent chapters. Framing of policy arguments What are the arguments presented by policy entrepreneurs in favour of reforms of the territorial structure? Policy arguments typically have two main components – reasons for or justifications of why a particular policy (change) is needed and evidence and analyses presented in order to support such claims (Dunn 2004:386 ff.). Evidence or data do not on their own lead to specific policy choices, but must be connected

12


to values, goals, motives, standards or legal requirements that are seen as being unfulfilled or unsatisfactorily met. With respect to territorial choice, reasons given for boundary changes (usually amalgamations) or other measures are often that existing units are inefficient, are incapable of providing services and welfare at satisfactory levels, that territorial fragmentation leads to inefficient or uncoordinated land use, or that traffic and transport suffers. Democratic values may also be invoked in connection with territorial reforms, but are rarely given as reasons for amalgamations; democratic qualities are more frequently invoked in defense of small units and as arguments against amalgamations.2 Since the 1990s many national reforms have also been justified as adaptations to European integration or been presented as necessary consequences of integration even though ‘Requirements from Brussels’ may sometimes be a convenient excuse for national policymakers to rush through unpopular reforms, including territorial reforms. Issues of identity and community may also be considered by reformers, but are more likely to be raised by opponents of reform. The concept of ‘framing’ is intended to highlight the broader angles or biases introduced by policy entrepreneurs into policy discourses on territorial choice in order to direct attention to certain problems or objectives. The concept was introduced into policy analysis by Rein and Schön (1977) in order to get a grasp on the role of cultural factors in policymaking. According to Hajer and Laws (2006), frames contribute order to ambiguous phenomena and help policymakers make sense of messy problems and give direction to policy argumentation. Appeals to requirements claimed to stem from Europeanization, welfare provision, democracy, or efficiency are examples of frames that may turn local government borders into policy problems and also direct attention to particular solutions to the problems. Strategies Once territorial reform is on the political agenda, what are the strategies adopted by policy entrepreneurs to develop and implement policies regarding territorial choices? Strategies are, for our purposes, the procedures of decision-making adopted by policymakers in order to accommodate interests and stakeholders affected by policy initiatives. Stakeholders that represent potential veto groups are of particular interest; presumably, these will be given a privileged position in the procedures adopted. Who the veto groups are will normally depend on the institutional structure of particular countries. One way of classifying strategies is the distinction between top-down and bottom-up


procedures. The former means that decisions are made by national decision-makers and then changes are simply imposed on local government without further ado. Bottom-up, on the other hand, means that initiatives regarding boundary changes come from local authorities and are then accepted by national governments. In a less extreme version it means that there are channels of consultation through which local opinions are heard and to some extent also heeded. Often national legislation stipulates carefully how the interaction between national and local authorities (and local populations) is to be organized in cases of boundary changes. In a similar vein the Council of Europe’s Standing Conference on Local Government has even worked out a recommended blueprint for procedures regarding reforms of territorial structures. Another distinction regarding strategies is between comprehensive and incremental approaches to reform. In some cases the overall territorial structure is analyzed in one sweeping effort; recommendations are presented that encompass the whole country and affect most local units. In other cases a more incremental or piecemeal approach is chosen, under which only segments of the territory are considered. Examples of the latter include ‘roving’ commissions that travel from district to district reviewing the territorial structures of the various districts, as well as experimental approaches to change under which ‘unusual’ territorial patterns are tried out in particular areas, with the aim of learning how particular solutions work out under certain conditions. In Figure 1.3 the two distinctions have been combined into a typology of strategies of territorial reform. The typology has two dimensions, one concerning the scope of reforms, the other the room for local voice. Scope of reforms may be comprehensive or incremental, while there may little or much room for local voice. Recalling the competing factions of the French Revolution, we term the combination of comprehensive reform and little room for local voice ‘the Jacobin corner’, denoting a rational choice, top-down mode of reform. The opposite mode is called ‘the Girondin corner’, a stepwise, bottom-up approach with much room for bargaining between national and local elites. In addition to these main two strategies, an experimental mode and a mode of reserve powers can be located. The former seeks comprehensive reforms of the whole territory but relies on experimentation and learning, accommodating local forces when it comes to implementation. Territorial reform through reserve powers, on the other hand, means that the central government has legal powers to intervene and dictate the local territorial structure in cases when local actors cannot

14

Territorial Choice: Rescaling Governance Scope of reform

Room for local voice

Figure 1.3

Comprehensive

Incremental

Weak

Jacobin

Reserve power

Strong

Experiments

Girondin

Strategies for territorial reform

agree and when ‘normal’ consultative procedures reach a deadlock. Such powers may be used in individual cases, each time on its own merit, but usually not when the objective is to reform the entire system of local government. Patterns of conflict What are the typical patterns of conflict activated by territorial reform proposals? What are the advocacy coalitions? And what are the alliances of opposition? Territorial reforms are rarely carried unanimously. The more comprehensive or the more deep-going change, the more likely that opposition and resistance will occur. Comprehensive amalgamations mean that many local political systems will vanish and with them positions of power and prestige. Hence, it is not surprising that such reforms often meet with strong opposition. Opposition may of course also be grounded in rational terms; some actors may simply find the policy arguments – evidence and/or reasons given – unconvincing. Normally, policy arguments will be tailored to the prevailing pattern of conflict in a given polity. After all, the purpose of policy arguments is to convince those whose support is needed, especially the veto groups with access to the decision-making process. The prevailing patterns of conflict – particularly those found in longstanding cleavages reflected by party systems – vary from country to country, having accrued over long historical periods as layers formed during processes of nation-building (cf. Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Nevertheless, there are also common denominators across European countries. We expect that the cleavages most likely to be activated by territorial reforms are the centre–periphery and the left–right dimensions of political conflict. The constellations of advocates and opponents of reform, however, may be country-specific, depending on the precise nature of reforms and the historical traditions of the


respective countries. We are, moreover, also open to the possibility that entirely new conflict patterns may emerge around certain reform initiatives, as European societies develop into the post-industrial age. Many European countries have a centre–periphery cleavage between central cities and urban bourgeoisies on the one hand and rural, often agricultural interests, on the other. The periphery may also be characterized by a deviant culture and economic backwardness. But as noted by Rokkan and Urwin (1983), the significance of the centre–periphery split may vary across countries, being of great significance in Norway, for instance, and of little importance in the Netherlands (cf. Andeweg and Irwin 2005). Yet overall, forces of the periphery may be more reluctant than those of central places to accept large-scale reforms of local government. This may be particularly so in countries where local government is interwoven with clientelistic relationships, which tend to be more pronounced in peripheral and rural areas than in cities. The left–right cleavage is similarly prevalent if not dominant in most European countries, being rooted in the process of industrialization and concomitant labour–capital divides. In some countries the left– right cleavage is closely related to a secular–religious divide, whereas in other countries the latter conflict dimension takes on a significance of its own. Historically, the left has been seen as a force of modernization and the right a defender of the status quo, especially as regards the construction and extension of the welfare state (although Bismarck’s Germany may be an example of the opposite). Hence the expectation is that overall the left will favour amalgamations and large scale local government more than the right, especially if change is framed in terms of enhancement of welfare provisions. In some countries the left–right conflict may have later superseded centre–periphery cleavages, while in other countries the latter have continued as an important dimension of national politics. In postindustrial societies other types of conflict have also become increasingly salient. ‘New Politics’ issues such as those concerning the environment, or gender and sexual rights are quite common in this regard. But in most cases we expect ‘new politics’ conflicts to be of secondary importance in relation to territorial choice. Centre–periphery cleavages have an inherently territorial dimension that is easily triggered by territorial reforms, which typically affect balances of power between local and national elites. Such reforms may also activate distributional issues or may even be framed so as to change the distribution of services or public goods between groups or regions. The more the distributional aspects are at the forefront of reforms, the more likely they are to stimulate left–right conflicts.

16


Institutional contexts What are the main features of the institutional context that facilitate or block territorial reforms? May the fate of reform initiatives – that is, how some initiatives are organized out of the agenda while others are organized into the agenda – be explained by features of the institutional contexts (Schattschneider 1960)? Institutions are values bolstered by organizational and legal resources that may exert significant influence. In this respect it is useful to distinguish between the national and local institutional context. Using the terminology of Lijphart (1977, 1999), the national context may be conceptualized as being characterized by either a consensual or majoritarian polity. Consensual polities can be expected to be permeated by a bargaining and open style of decision-making with many opportunities for voice from stakeholders. Majoritarian polities, by comparison, may be more prone to sweeping reforms overrunning protests, offering less room for the formation of veto alliances. Thus, national contexts shape policy styles and concomitant choice of strategies regarding territorial choice. The local context refers to the characteristic features of central–local relations of the respective countries. Central–local relations can be conceptualized in terms of local government typologies, of which several variants have been devised. The simplest variant is the distinction between South and North European local government systems (Page and Goldsmith 1987; John 2001). The former is claimed to be characterized by small-scale local government with few and relatively unimportant functions, while the latter features larger municipalities with wide-ranging powers and functions, as in the cases of for example Sweden or the UK. To be sure, such a rough distinction between South and North may by now be somewhat outdated, and a number of more fine-grained distinctions have been suggested that encompass Central European as well as post-communist types of local government (cf. Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). Some typologies also include features of local power-sharing patterns, such as the shape and role of executive bodies (Mouritzen and Svara 2002; Heinelt and Hlepas 2006). The bottom line of the respective typologies, however, is an attempt to capture variation found across countries with respect to the importance of local government as this may be reflected by the scope of functions and powers allocated to local government. Thus, the local context defines the stakes of the reform process: the more the functions and the larger the budgets of local authorities, the more important it is for


central government to be able to control local decision-making and services, and the more the outcome of reforms matters to central government. An empirical measure of the importance of local government can be expressed as the proportion of local spending to overall government spending. The importance of local government shapes the pattern of conflicts over territorial reforms. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the more important local government is the more conflicts will follow a left–right continuum, since in such cases territorial reforms are likely to trigger or become entangled with distributional issues. Where local government is of somewhat lesser importance, in the sense specified here, centre–periphery conflicts may become the dominant pattern of conflict, with local against national elites, while no clear-cut partybased conflicts will appear. In Figure 1.4 the countries selected for closer inspection in the following chapters have been classified according to the two contextual dimensions outlined here.

National context Consociational

GE GR Local context

NL

(IT)

DK

Low importance

FI

High importance

NO

SE

FR UK

Majoritarian Figure 1.4

Countries classified according to institutional contexts

Note: Information used to place countries on the local context dimension is found in UCLG (2009). Information used to place countries on the national context dimension is found in Lijphart (1999:248, Figure 14.1). Scores on the federal-unity dimension and the executiveparties dimensions have been added to obtain an overall majoritarianism score, which may range from 0 to 7. The Italian case is not included in the figure found in Lijphart. Its placement is rather based on information in the same source, appendix A. The Czech Republic is not covered by Lijphart and is therefore not included in the figure.

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Outcomes What are the outcomes of reform initiatives? Solutions to problems of scale may be classified as upscaling, downscaling or trans-scaling – that is, movement towards larger units, smaller units or, alternatively, cooperation between units. We have already mentioned the classical positions with regard to solutions to territorial choice problems, namely the consolidationist versus public choice perspectives. The consolidationist position argues in favour of upscaling solutions by amalgamating small political-administrative units into larger ones, while public choice advocates favour downscaling to smaller units to achieve allocative efficiency. Of course small units may also be retained for other reasons, such as democracy, identity or simply because the road to amalgamation is blocked. Whatever the reason, retaining small-scale local government may entail a series of varied cooperative solutions that may be regarded as a reform path in its own right, which we term trans-scaling. Most countries have enabling legislation that allows small local authorities to establish cooperative ventures with neighbouring municipalities. Sometimes cooperation may take place under private company law, and sometimes various public law formats are available. In some instances, moreover, inter-municipal cooperation may be mandatory, such as has been the case in Finland with regard to hospitals and secondary schools. A further alternative to amalgamation is the establishment of regions – larger territorial units encompassing the territory of numerous municipalities. Sometimes functions may be transferred upwards from municipalities to regions, or regions may take on new functions that existing municipalities are considered too weak to handle. Typical examples of the latter are economic development or public transport for larger areas. This is another upscaling solution.

Summary of the analytical framework and an elaboration of propositions Figure 1.5 represents a summary of the analytical framework and research questions presented above. Arrows in the figure indicate our ideas regarding the interaction of different elements of the process of territorial choice. The institutional setting is expected to influence the framing and choice of reform strategies and also the pattern of conflict. The pattern of conflict is also influenced by reform strategies and related framing, while the interaction of the two elements influences outcomes. The framework represents a combination of institutional and actor-oriented analysis. An actor-oriented focus is inherent above all in the element


Framing and choice of reform strategy Institutional context

Reform outcome

Pattern of conflict

Figure 1.5 choice

Summary of the analytical framework: The process of territorial

of framing and choice of reform strategy which opens up for studies of leadership – the role of policy entrepreneurs and veto coalitions – and identification of windows of opportunities regarding territorial reform. Some propositions have been suggested above in introducing the analytical framework. These are reformulated below in a more detailed and precise manner, especially with regard to capturing the interaction among different components of the analytical framework. Strategies: • Proposition 1a: In a majoritarian polity strategies are more likely to follow a Jacobin pattern, while actors in a consociational polity are more likely to opt for Girondin types of strategies. • Proposition 1b: Polities that are not clearly consociational or majoritarian (borderline cases) will tend to adhere to either experimental or reserve power strategies. Conflicts: • Proposition 2a: In polities where local government is highly important (indicated by a large proportion of public spending) conflicts will tend to follow a left–right pattern because of the distributional importance of territorial reform issues. • Proposition 2b: In polities where local government is of minor importance conflicts will tend to activate centre–periphery cleavages, indicated by conflicts between local and national elites. • Proposition 2c: In the latter cases conflicts may also be more dominated by positional interests rather than clear-cut political party divides because of low political stakes as far as national parties are concerned.

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Outcomes: • Proposition 3a: A combination of Jacobin strategies and a left–right conflict pattern is more likely to be associated with upscaling types of reforms. • Proposition 3b: A combination of Girondin strategies and centre– periphery conflicts is likely to result in trans-scaling reforms. • Proposition 3c: Any other combination is likely to lead to failed reforms. • Proposition 3d: Experimental and reserve strategies may result in either upscaling or trans-scaling reforms but only under circumstances of consensus or low-intensity conflicts. Under any other circumstances these strategies will fail.

Selection of cases and further content of the book The cases considered in this book include four of the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, the Czech Republic and Greece. The cases have been selected with three considerations in mind: first, the countries included should have demonstrated at least some attempts at reforming their territorial structures in the recent past (that is, over the last ten years or so); second, the outcomes in terms of existing territorial structure should vary (in this respect, the UK and France may represent obvious contrasts); third, they should represent variation or contrasts regarding the contextual variables, as outlined in Figure 1.5. Each of the 11 countries selected are discussed in detail in the following chapters. The stories told in the respective country chapters constitute in turn the basis for a broader comparative perspective on the politics of territorial choice found in the concluding chapter.

Notes In writing this chapter the authors have benefited from discussions with contributors to the book and have drawn on some of their work. As such, this chapter and the entire book is a genuinely collaborative effort. 1. Despite much criticism of such an approach, it retains its value at least as a heuristic device, cf. Parsons 2005:77 ff. 2. Of course as Dahl and Tufte’s discussion (1973) of relationships between size and ‘system capacity’ as a democratic dimension makes clear, democratic values may also be used in support of larger units.

2 The Danish Revolution in Local Government: How and Why? Poul Erik Mouritzen

Danish local government is there to help you from birth to death: midwives are available before you are born, nurses visit the home after your birth, professional pedagogues take over as soon as mum and dad are back into the labour market, school dentists start a 12–15-year effort, often at the age of three, teachers will guide you through primary and secondary school, nurses and doctors – some in private practices, others at public hospitals – are available for free throughout life, home helpers will come to your house and provide cleaning, shopping and personal care when you can no longer take care of yourself, and homes for the elderly are available (although in short supply these days) when the need is there. If you or your family are poor, the municipality will take care of your burial. From that point on, however, you are on your own! On top of all this comes a plethora of income transfer programmes like sickness allowance, maternity allowance, disability pension, supplementary benefits, rent allowance and, finally, pensions for the elderly. For many years more than one-fourth of the Danish gross domestic product was allocated through decisions made by 5,000 locally elected politicians in 275 municipalities and 13 counties. No local governmental system plays a similar role in any country in the world, although some of them come close, particularly in the other Scandinavian countries. An indication of the role of local government in Denmark compared with other countries is found in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1, according to which local government expenses as a percentage of GNP amounts to 32.9 per cent. Denmark clearly stands out as the country with the largest local government sector.1 For many years the institutions built up around the local welfare state were considered to be efficient. Very little debate was 21

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The Danish Revolution in Local Government

raised and only a few of the small parties at the right side of the political spectrum raised the question as to whether three politicaladministrative levels (the municipality, the country and the state) was maybe one level too many. But everything changed when a new Liberal-Conservative government came into office in 2001. Roughly a half year after the new government took over, a reform process was initiated that resulted in a sweeping reform that took effect on 1 January 2007. This chapter describes and discusses the content of the reform as well as the process that led to the reform. Before we get to that, however, an introduction to the previous system of local government is necessary.

The local government system before 2007 After more than ten years of planning, a large-scale local government reform was implemented beginning in 1970, starting with an amalgamation reform that reduced the number of municipalities to 275 and the countries to 14. As a consequence Danish municipalities became fairly large. At the turn of the millennium municipalities had on the average close to 20,000 inhabitants, the median value being around 10,000. Following the 1970 amalgamations, decentralization of responsibility for the implementation of national programmes occurred in many areas, including education, hospitals, programmes for handicapped people, social services, maintenance of the infrastructure, collective transportation, environmental protection and physical planning. In the same period the system of intergovernmental grants was gradually changed. Most of the earmarked grants were abolished and a system of general grants with a high degree of equalization built into it was introduced. As a percentage of revenue, by far the most important source for both tiers of local government was the local income tax. The municipal rates varied between 15.5 and 23.2 per cent with an average of around 20.9 per cent (2006). The county rates varied between 11.4 and 12.5 per cent (2004). The typical taxpayer in Denmark thus paid close to onethird of his taxable income to the municipality and the county. At the same time a system of a highly professionalized staff was developed in all municipalities, with more and more university graduates entering the upper ranks of the bureaucracy. This is in contrast to the situation existing in most places before 1970, where the division between politics and administration was absent if only because there were no administrators at all. As one of the most experienced local

Poul Erik Mouritzen 23

politicians in Denmark (37 years in a local council) recalled his first year in politics: This was the time when the nine elected council members every two weeks crowded into a room under the roof of the home for the elderly and went through every single case in a fog of cigar smoke so thick that we now and then had to go outside to breathe some fresh air. Cited from Danske Kommuner no. 12 (1995:17–18) The 1970 reforms emphasized the functional capabilities of the larger units. It was argued that specialized services require relatively large populations because demand has to reach some threshold before institutional services can be provided. This was particularly an issue felt within the most important service of those days, public education. Many small localities of 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants were unable to establish a school system that met the standards of the (then) modern society. Greater size, however, may have consequences for local democracy. Larger units are able to do more; citizens are therefore able to control more (and more important) aspects of their environment. This was in fact the carrot held up by central government in the 1960s in order to have local governments accept the amalgamations. Amalgamations were presented as a prerequisite for the transfer of more tasks to local government and, as a consequence, for the strengthening of local democracy. Accordingly, larger units would improve citizens’ incentives to participate in local affairs. The sum of the reforms in the early 1970s was a highly consolidated system of local government. It was territorially consolidated because jurisdictional boundaries corresponded very much to the sociological realities of life (‘one city – one municipality’)2 and because there were very few overlapping boundaries with other political-administrative units of government. It was consolidated in programmatic terms because most public services at the local level were the responsibility of the municipality or the country. Finally, the system was functionally consolidated because policymaking, financing and service production were the responsibility of the same unit, either the municipality or the country.

The institutional and historical context of the 2007 reform Parties and mayors Local elections in Denmark are held every fourth year based on a system of proportional representation. While non-partisan lists used to play an important role in small rural municipalities, over time the national

24


political parties have gradually gained a near monopoly via their district and municipal organizations. Up until the 2007 reform only around ten per cent of the municipal council members were elected on a non-partisan list. Two parties dominate in local politics – the Social Democratic party and the Liberal (or Agrarian) party – one or other of which has (with one exception) been the dominant party in all central government coalitions since World War I. One person, the mayor, is clearly the political and administrative leader of the municipality. However, executive powers are shared: the political leader may have responsibility for some executive functions, but others will rest with collegial bodies – that is, standing committees composed of elected politicians along with the chief executive officer of the municipality. The position of mayor is considered a full-time position and is paid accordingly. The mayor is the chairman of the city council and the finance committee. He convenes the council, establishes the agenda, is responsible for the minutes, and – most importantly – he is the ‘superior, daily leader of the municipal administration’. The mayor is thus the formal head of the entire municipal administration. Not surprisingly, therefore, mayoral positions are considered as juicy titbits for the political parties. The Social Democratic party and the Liberal party used to hold about four out of five mayoral positions. The distribution of all 275 mayoral positions after the 2001 local election is shown in Table 2.1. The Social Democrats have dominated in the bigger cities while the Liberal party traditionally had its strongholds in the rural areas. In recent decades, however, the Liberals have also gained a foothold in the metropolitan area around Copenhagen. Table 2.1

Distribution of Danish mayors by party affiliation, 2001

Party affiliation Liberal Party Social Democratic Party Conservative Party Other parties Non-partisan lists Total

Per cent of mayors 50 30 10 2 8 100

The local government associations A particular feature of the Danish system of local government is the existence of two associations of municipalities and counties, one being Local Government Denmark (LGD), which organizes municipalities, the other being Danish Regions (DR), which organizes the counties (regions


after 2007). These two associations are some of the most influential Danish interest organizations found in Denmark inasmuch as they are considered legitimate negotiating partners in more or less all policy areas. Their influence manifests itself in all stages of the political-administrative process, from the identification of problems to the preparation and decision-making stage, and finally to the implementation stage. The power of the associations is due to several factors. For one thing the Danish inclination to minority governments implies an important external factor: minority governments need support. Through negotiations with the associations, bills may pass more easily through the Danish Parliament. Another factor is that the local government associations make on the one hand a point of being apolitical, while on the other hand they are dominated by two large ‘local government parties’ – the Social Democrats and the Liberals respectively. These factors give them some freedom of manoeuvre in relation to political lobbying in parliament, a freedom not very many interest organizations possess. Besides this pre-legitimization of political decisions, the involvement of the associations has another important legitimization function. Inasmuch as they have been involved in the decision-making process from an early point and have approved the outcome, it is expected that counties/regions and municipalities support the result. This subsequent legitimization rarely fails, first and foremost because the associations have built up a network through which they closely monitor what goes on among their members. This takes place through the branches in each county, through the various political committees of both the LGD and DR, and through close cooperation with the various associations of municipal chief executive officers. The role of local government associations in the political-administrative decision-making process is completely in accordance with a Danish corporative tradition. Indeed, perhaps precisely these two associations, together with the Danish Federation of Trade Unions and the Danish Employers’ Confederation, are the most striking examples of this tradition. Their important role implies that local government autonomy is not just something which is exclusively determined by government and parliament. On the contrary, through their associations local governments have the possibility of influencing the conditions under which they exist and act. Danish local government under increasing pressure In the first 20 years following the 1970 reforms, the structure of local government in Denmark was never questioned. But after 1990 a new municipal reform was on several occasions the subject of debate.

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Already at the end of the 1980s the Conservative Party questioned the need for a continued existence of the counties. The debate was particularly intense in 1995 and 1996 in connection with the work of the Greater Copenhagen Commission, the mandate of which was to reform the metropolitan area around Copenhagen (the assignment eventually failed owing to political disagreement). This commission was followed by the Public Sector Tasks Commission, which in 1998 concluded that ‘the existing task distribution between the three administrative levels basically must be considered efficient’ and that it was ‘the commission’s expectations that, also in the years to come, the foundation of the task distribution will turn out to be robust with respect to the development of demands placed on the public sector’ (Opgavekommissionen 1998:227). Not all municipalities agreed with that conclusion, however. Several groups of municipalities started discussions with a view to intensifying cooperation, in some places in the form of actual amalgamations. In one region, the island of Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, a popular referendum was held in 2001, the outcome of which led to a decision to amalgamate the five existing municipalities as well as the country into one regional authority responsible for all local government functions. The merger took effect in 2003 and resulted in a local authority with 45,000 inhabitants. Three small municipalities on the island Langeland off the coast of Fyn similarly held referenda in 2001 with a majority in each case voting for amalgamation. But in other areas of the country where amalgamations have been seriously considered the efforts have failed, primarily due to conflicts among political and administrative elites. Local negotiations between municipalities all ended in the summer of 2002 when the new Liberal-Conservative government established yet another commission, the Commission on Administrative Structure. This time most observers and also the local government associations and most municipalities and counties realized that the central government was serious, and that a reform of some sort was underway.

A reform process in three phases The preparation phase: The Commission on Administrative Structure When we look back at political decisions they often seem to be more rational and planned than they actually were. The reform of Danish local government is no exception, yet there is little reason to believe that it was planned at the time the new government took office in


November 2001. A reform had not been mentioned in the election campaign preceding the creation of the new government, it was not part of the electoral platform of any of the political parties, and it was not part of the agreement between the two parties that eventually formed the government. In fact, as late as 20 June 2002, the Minister of the Interior, Lars Løkke Rasmussen (one of the leaders of the Liberal party, which also held the position as Prime Minister), maintained in a parliamentary committee that ‘The Government has no plans for changing the municipal structure’. He also said that it is entirely ‘my expectation that the municipal structure will look different in a number of years, but not as a result of a centrally laid down, detailed thought-through elitist plan’ (emphasis added). Over a period of just a few weeks during the summer of 2002 a discussion nevertheless started in the media about the efficiency of the existing system of local government, a debate that evidently was considered, at least by the government, to represent a window of opportunity that was open for initiating a process of reform. On this basis it was decided to establish a Commission on Administrative Structure that was given the task ‘of providing a technical and expert analysis to be used as a decision basis with respect to changes of the framework for the performance of public sector tasks’.3 The commission had a rather broad mandate that involved all public sector functions found at all three tiers of government (municipality, county and state). It was possible to suggest a reduction in the number of units as well as the number of government tiers. In fact, the commission was specifically asked to ‘make an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of reducing the number of administrations with directly elected leadership from a three-tier to a two-tier structure’. The Commission had 12 members: four high-level civil servants from central government, carefully chosen so the two government parties each had two civil servants on the committee; four high-level local government administrators representing LGD, DR, the City of Copenhagen and the Municipality of Frederiksberg respectively; three members ‘with an expert knowledge of the subjects to be addressed by the Commission’, and a chairman.4 The Commission was supported by a secretariat managed by the Ministry of the Interior and Health which included civil servants mainly from that ministry as well as the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Given the scope and complexity of this work, the time frame for the deliberations was limited: only 15 months. Even so the Commission met the deadline and issued its report by the end of 2003 (see Strukturkommissionen 2004). The only major unanimous recommendation was

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that most municipalities were too small and too vulnerable given the complicated tasks that had been transferred to the municipal level over the years.5 It was found that even without further transfers of functions a minimum size ought to be around 20,000 inhabitants, while the number of counties should be reduced to somewhere between three and eight depending on the distribution of functions. The Commission did not, however, present recommendations concerning the proper structure of the future public sector in Denmark. It merely developed a number of possible models which the politicians could choose from and blend according to their wishes. One model, termed the Broad Municipality Model, implied a downsizing of the county level, leaving most non-state tasks with the municipalities. Counties were only to be left with responsibility for hospitals and a minimum number of functions that were found to be too specialized even for large municipalities. In this model municipalities should, according to the Commission, have a minimum size of 30,000 inhabitants while the number of counties ought to be reduced from 13 to around five. A second model labeled The Broad County Model was based on the idea that some functions could be transferred from counties to municipalities, while selected state functions should be transferred to the counties. The latter included state youth education, labour market education, shortand medium-term continuing education, state roads (except the general road network), regional branch lines and local railways. Municipalities would take over certain social and socio-psychiatric services and special education from the counties. This model presupposed municipalities with no fewer than 20,000 inhabitants while the number of counties would be reduced to around seven or eight. Finally the so-called State Model involved the total abolishment of the county level. This model implied that municipalities take over as many functions as possible while central government would be responsible for the functions that were by any standard too complicated for even large municipalities, the most important of which would be the hospitals. In this model it was assumed that the minimum size of municipalities would be 30,000 inhabitants. The decision phase at the central level: Quick and efficient government After publication of the Commission’s report the Minister for the Interior and Health subsequently invited a thorough and lively debate on the report, and municipalities, counties, organizations and all other interested parties were asked to submit their opinions and suggestions


no later than 7 April 2004. This was a three-month deadline. The aim was to reach a political agreement before the summer holiday. During the public hearing the machinery of government was not slow on the uptake. Three weeks after the expiration of the hearing deadline, the government was ready with its proposal, launched with the catchy title ‘The New Denmark’ (Regeringen 2004). The proposal, in all its radicalism, took everyone by surprise. In terms of the language used by the Commission on Administrative Structure the proposal could most appropriately be called a modified state model inasmuch as all county tasks except one – hospital health services – were more or less divided between the state and the municipalities. To run the hospitals five regions were established with an elected council at the top but without any independent power of taxation. From this point in time the term counties was not used any further. The government wanted to signal a major break with the past by using the term regions. Municipal mergers with a minimum size of 30,000 inhabitants were recommended, but smaller municipalities were to be permitted provided they entered into binding cooperative agreements. The opposition, headed by the Social Democrats and the Danish Social-Liberal Party, had very early on, even before the Commission on Administrative Structure concluded its work, announced that they preferred a model that largely corresponded to the broad county model, with the counties keeping most of their tasks and their independent power of taxation. On this basis – where the gap between the parties was considerable – negotiations for a broad compromise began. After one collapse of negotiations, contact was resumed only to result in yet another collapse in mid-June. Throughout the negotiations, the government made several concessions to the opposition parties with respect to the future tasks of the regions. Considerable parts of these were maintained when only six days later, without major problems, the final agreement was successfully negotiated with the Danish People’s Party.6 The agreement implied that the five future regions would continue to operate specialized institutions within the social area, would prepare plans of regional development and would be responsible for setting up transport authorities. They lost, however, their independent power of taxation. The main task, health services, was to be financed by a combination of state and local government subsidies as well as a local fee for the treatment of citizens from municipalities within the region. A detailed list of tasks resting with the municipalities and regions is found in Exhibit 2.1 and Exhibit 2.2 respectively.7

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Exhibit 2.1 Responsibilities of Danish municipalities after 1 January 2007 • Social services: Total responsibility for financing, supply and authority • Child care • Primary school, including any special education and special pedagogical assistance for small children • Special education for adults • Care for the elderly • Health care: Preventive treatment, care and rehabilitation that do not take place during hospitalization, treatment of alcohol and drug abuse, home care, local dental care, special dental care and social psychiatry • Activation and employment projects for the unemployed without insurance in job centres run jointly with the state (ten pilot municipalities undertake the task for the unemployed with insurance on behalf of the state) • Integration and language education for immigrants • Citizen service regarding taxation and collection in cooperation with state tax centres • Supplies and emergency preparedness • Nature, environment and planning: for example, specific authority and citizen related tasks, preparation of local plans and plans regarding waste water, waste and water supply • Local business service and promotion of tourism • Participation in regional transport companies • The local road network • Libraries, schools of music, local sports facilities and culture Source: http://www.im.dk/publikationer/government_reform_in_brief/kap03.htm

Exhibit 2.2 Responsibilities of Danish regions after 1 January 2007 • •

• • • •

Hospital service, including hospitals, psychiatry and health insurance as well as general practitioners and specialists Regional development, including nature, environment, business, tourism, employment, education and culture as well as development in the fringe areas of the regions and in the rural districts; secretarial service for the regional growth fora Soil pollution Raw material mapping and planning Operation of a number of institutions for exposed groups and groups with special needs for social services and special education Establishment of transport companies throughout Denmark

Source: http://www.im.dk/publikationer/government_reform_in_brief/kap03.htm

Regarding municipal size, the figure of 30,000 inhabitants was mentioned as a target, but municipalities with at least 20,000 inhabitants were to be accepted. Municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants were to


be allowed provided they entered into binding agreements of cooperation with one large municipality. On the basis of this agreement preparations for the reform went into their third phase. The political process at the local level: Who should we marry? As part of the June 2004 agreement, all municipalities were asked to report to the Ministry of the Interior by the end of the year regarding how they wanted to respond to the requirements in the agreement. Obviously municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants could go on as if nothing had happened, while municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants had two options: either find partners to merge with or enter into a detailed set of cooperative agreements with a neighbouring municipality. This set off half a year of analysis, decision-making, negotiations within and between municipalities, and finally a decision on the future of the individual municipality. For several reasons this involved a type of decision that is rarely faced by local politicians. First, the decision would obviously have major implications for both the citizenry and individual politicians, not the least a large number of mayors whose jobs were in danger. As a consequence, the decisions often involved a complex mix of economic calculations, partisan considerations, and personal ambitions along with an assessment of positive or negative images of potential future partners. Often the political parties were split in two or more parts, in many cases reflecting to which part of the municipality the individual politician belonged. Second, and maybe as a consequence of the reasons just mentioned, the decisions were in many cases left with the local citizenry. Altogether 73 referenda were held, in some municipalities involving only a particular part of the municipality where citizens wanted the municipality to be divided between two new larger units. Third, the decisions were in all cases to be approved by the three parties behind the agreement at the central level. Also, of course, the preferred marriage partners would have to say yes to the proposal. In many cases this yes did not materialize. As a matter of fact one of the central elements of the decision was a sequential process in which individual municipalities often had to start more or less from scratch in surveying new options when previous alternatives were voided by decisions made in neighbouring municipalities. Fourth, this type of decision was totally un-programmed; nobody had ever been involved in a process of this sort previously. Fifth, the decision had to be made within a short period of time and the normal option available to politicians – simply to finish the process by a non-decision – was not possible. Finally, the decision was irreversible. Maybe the choice of

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partner was wrong, but once marriage was formalized a divorce in the future was absolutely out of the question. Given all the complexities of the decision, the process was surprisingly harmonious. To be sure, dramatic and conflictual processes could be found here and there, but in most cases municipalities found their future partners after one or two iterations. Also, the government and the partners of the national agreement approved of almost all of the proposals stemming from local decision-makers. In only two cases did the central government make a decision that went against local wishes, whereas in a few cases the government decided to let local conflicts be resolved by an umpire. One could call the process ‘voluntary’ in the sense that the government did not dictate who should merge with whom, in contrast to the situation for the counties, where future borders as well as the location of the regional headquarter were decided centrally, often to the dismay of the regional politicians. However, it was not voluntary in the sense that municipalities under 20,000 inhabitants had a choice of whether or not to merge. Only two municipalities (well-off municipalities near the capital city of Copenhagen) decided to continue with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants and entered into a cooperative agreement with one of the neighbouring municipalities. So the local politicians in fact had a gun to their head and had to make a decision rather quickly. Experience from Denmark, Norway and Sweden seems to indicate that voluntary arrangements involving both questions of ‘whether to merge’ and ‘with whom to merge’ rarely lead to municipal amalgamations since local opposition and personal ambitions act as effective veto points in the decision-making process. By removing the option ‘whether to merge’ the government in effect removed these veto points.

Framing: The rationale of the reform In order to understand the thinking behind the Danish reform the conceptual framework developed by Dahl and Tufte (1973:20 ff.) may be used. They distinguish between two dimensions – citizen effectiveness and system capacity. Citizen effectiveness is in essence a question of how well democracy works. Is the political systems effectively controlled by citizens, are citizens able to gain access to politicians and communicate their wishes and is the system responsive to those wishes? System capacity, on the other hand, refers to the ability of the system to solve problems and implement what citizens want in an effective way.


In many ways the Danish debate about the benefits and costs of a local government reform centered around these two dimensions. For many years it was considered part of conventional wisdom that the two dimensions were related in such a way as to present a dilemma for policymakers and reformers. It was possible to increase system capacity, but only at the cost of local democracy. Or it was possible to improve local democracy, but only at the cost of system capacity. This line of thinking is illustrated with line a in Figure 2.1. The belief in the existence of this trade-off was the major argument for the opponents of an amalgamation reform: democracy would suffer if many small municipalities were abandoned in order to improve system capacity. What effectively happened during the preparatory phase was that the validity of this argument was brought into question by a research report from the University of Southern Denmark (Kjær and Mouritzen 2003). According to this report the trade-off between capacity and democracy was almost absent, a situation better represented by line b. Before we account for the democratic dimension, however, we need to take a closer look at the capacity dimension. System capacity Capacity concerns played a major role in the report from the Commission on Administrative Structure. Four different types of capacity problems

System capacity b

a Citizen effectiveness Figure 2.1 System capacity and citizen effectiveness: Alternative trade-off perspectives

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were discussed in the report. The first, financial capacity, may be defined as the ability to encounter and survive changes in the social and financial environment (the opposite of vulnerability). The report found that especially small municipalities had become more and more vulnerable to changes in the environment, not the least because the municipalities over the years had been given more and more complicated and expensive tasks to perform. One example will suffice. Over the years more and more responsibility for disability pensions had been transferred to the municipalities. This resulted in a situation in 2002 where municipalities had the full decision-making authority to decide whether or not a citizen (for instance a 30-year-old drug addict) should enjoy a public pension for the rest of his or her life (monthly nowadays around 1800 Euro per month). With the authority, however, also came financial responsibility since the municipality had to cover two-thirds of the expenses imposed by such a decision. Obviously, small municipalities with 5,000 inhabitants could be crippled by a large number of persons on disability pensions. The ability to produce good quality and inexpensive service represents a second aspect of capacity. This phenomenon was discussed in the report under the heading of efficiency or economies of scale. Previous research as well as research conducted by the Commission indicated that the relation between size and efficiency takes the form of a curve: at the outset there are gains by going from small to somewhat larger municipalities, but gradually the gains flatten before they disappear at a municipal size of about 40,000 inhabitants in the Danish case. Above a certain threshold, however, costs start to increase again. The overall conclusion of the Commission was that there are benefits of economies of scale in municipalities of up to at least 18,000 to 25,000 inhabitants and probably more. A recent analysis shows that the benefits of economies of scale have increased over the last ten years so that the municipal size with the lowest average expenditure per inhabitant has risen from 28,000 to 34,000 inhabitants. Some of the analyses also show that there are disadvantages of economies of scale in municipalities of more than about 50,000 inhabitants. In municipalities with between 20,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, there are in any case very small differences in terms of efficiency.8 The ability to make decisions that are in accordance with professional and legal demands, and in this connection the ability to attract professionally qualified employees, is a third aspect of capacity termed professional capacity. The argument against small units of government was that a small staff was unable to specialize to the extent required by


more and more complicated tasks and cases. Somewhat related to this is a fourth aspect of capacity, which may be labeled implementation capacity. This refers to the ability of municipalities to implement legislation and policies adopted by central government. One example mentioned in the Commission’s report was new legislation that required municipalities to engage in compulsive competitive tendering within the area of home help for the elderly. It was evident that particularly small municipalities had problems in living up to the requirement of the law. Democracy As noted above, a few months before the Commission Report was published a new, comprehensive study of municipality size and local democracy was published by a group of researchers at the University of Southern Denmark (Kjær and Mouritzen 2003). The study considered local democracy based on a large number of dimensions and indicators – for example local identity, interest in and knowledge about local politics, participation in elections and other kinds of political activity, political confidence and self-confidence as well as satisfaction with municipal services. The main conclusion of this study was that large municipalities were no less democratic than small ones. Interest in local politics, identification with the municipality, knowledge about local government politics, perceptions about the ability to exert influence, and perceptions of what constitutes good local government have nothing to do with the size of the municipality. Only when it comes to individual contacting of local authorities, participation in elections, satisfaction with local services and political confidence was there a slight tendency suggesting that democracy suffers in the group of municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. However it was impossible to determine when this tendency arises. It is only possible to establish that in the range between 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants and probably up to 70,000 to 80,000 there is a small reduction in individual participation, participation in elections, political confidence and satisfaction with municipal services. Conversely, the study showed that collective participation increases slightly with increased municipal size as there is a tendency in larger municipalities for participation in, for example, political party activities to be more common than in smaller municipalities. The study obviously attached a large question mark to the assumption that a dilemma existed between system capacity and citizens’ effectiveness or democracy. Instead of line a in Figure 2.1, reality was, according to the study, better represented by line b where the dilemma is almost

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non-existent. Politically, the study effectively, albeit unintentionally, removed the major argument of the opponents of an amalgamation reform – namely that local democracy would suffer. Obviously other arguments for or against a reform were also found in the general Danish debate as well as in the report from the Commission on Administrative Structure. But they were not in any way dominant or decisive. So the rationale of the Danish reform is not in any way cast in terms of the needs arising from internationalization, globalization or Europeanization or similar processes.

The political process: Patterns of conflict The course of events can be interpreted in different ways, beginning with the consultation in the Danish Parliament on 20 June 2002, when the Minister for the Interior and Health categorically rejected a local government reform in the shape of a ‘centrally determined, detailed and carefully prepared elitist plan’ (cf. above) to the day, not quite two years later, when the same minister became the anchorman of a centrally determined, detailed and carefully prepared elitist plan, which radically transforms the administrative map of Denmark. Contrary to the local government reform in 1970, Danish society faced an extremely rapid decision process without any preceding popular debate. Prior to the 1970 reform there had been 12 years of preliminary work with several commission reports and with sufficient time to enter into voluntary municipal mergers. In 2002 the Commission on Administrative Structure was set up like a bolt from the blue. Prior to the election of November 2001, the leading government party, the Liberals, revealed absolutely nothing about such a reform being in the making were they to come into power. Nor were such considerations a part of the government programme, which was decided upon by the Conservatives and Liberals immediately after the election. Any rational minded observer would have not have predicted that Denmark a couple of years later would face a reform of this magnitude, also because amalgamations would – in terms of lost mayoral positions – obviously have one major loser, the dominant Liberal government party. Prior to the 1970 reform it was evident that there were problems in the municipal structure at that time. These were problems which had been thoroughly mapped out in investigations conducted throughout the country. Findings from these investigations suggested two main problems. First the large municipalities had spread past their boundaries. The old town centre was cramped as a municipality without any


chance of expansion, often with the affluent, working part of the population living in the neighbouring municipalities. Second, the small rural districts, of which many had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, had problems of sustainability, not least in the area constituting the greatest part of their budget, which was that of running modern primary and lower secondary schools. The local government reform was a solution to these problems. With the 2007 reform it is difficult to perceive such obvious problems. A major part of the Commission on Administrative Structure’s work was actually to map out what problems there were. Their extent and what consequences should be drawn from them were disputed. It is not an unjust interpretation that the solutions (larger municipalities and fewer, slimmer counties) in the most recent reform process came before the problems. As just noted, the 1970s local government reform was in preparation for 12 years. As a matter of fact this is an understatement. The initial reform by and large concerned only the structural and financial parts of the system. Only after 1970, in what was called the task reform, did a gradual transfer of tasks to the municipalities and counties begin. Depending on when you set the final date, it took about 20 years before the process was concluded, as changes in tasks continued to occur up through the 1990s. With a few exceptions, each of these reorganizations of tasks was the result of thorough, in-depth analyses and considerations in which research and expert knowledge as well as the interested parties involved were included. These reforms were not made without striking a blow, but at least most of them were well prepared. They came into being as true children of the Danish corporate society characterized by consensus, as it had developed throughout a century of policymaking. The processes during the 1960s and in 2002–04 are thus fundamentally different. During the second period we have a closed, short process, turning up out of nowhere, without any form of preceding popular debate. It is consistent with modern decision theory, where the term decision windows is used, that is, brief periods during which it is possible to carry out major changes, and during which it is important to act quickly before the window closes again. The principal actors in the reform process specifically used this figure of speech. Modern decision theory also talks of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ who use such windows or even create them with a view to promoting their own interests and ideas (see Kingdon 1995). The Danish Minister of the Interior certainly acted as a policy entrepreneur once the window was open. He was able to orchestrate a

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process that allowed strong interests in society to form a coalition in favour of larger municipalities. For many actors in Danish society the establishment of the Commission on Administrative Structure represented a unique opportunity allowing them to air solutions that had been hidden in the drawer for many years waiting for the right window to open or for the right problem to latch onto. For many actors a possible reform could also be seen as a solution to a problem they had perceived for many years. The Ministry of Finance, for example, had predicted a considerable pressure on public finances in the years to come and had for years perceived small municipalities as inefficient. Amalgamation could be the solution. Similarly the Conservative Party had for 15 years wanted to do away with the county level. But as the smallest party in the government coalition, the party had problems in making itself visible. Amalgamations were seen as a means for achieving this goal because larger municipalities were a precondition for removing the county level. For its part, LGD had among its members 110 municipalities who had formed their own faction consisting of poor and small municipalities. One of the requirements for becoming a member of this faction was a population of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants. Amalgamations could be the solution to the problem this created in the eyes of LGD. LGD was also concerned about the increasing degree of state intervention in the daily life of the municipalities, and saw the lack of capacity in the small units as one of the main reasons for this trend. Amalgamations were obviously the solution to this problem. Furthermore, as is the case with several other business related associations, the Confederation of Danish Industries had been eager to improve the ability of the public sector to engage in contracting out of services. Again larger municipalities were seen as a solution.9 Finally big city mayors want to expand their kingdoms. For them a reform is the solution. All these interests and several others formed a latent coalition in favour of a reform. Few actors stood in opposition. DR obviously did not want to see the number of counties reduced; far less did they want the functions of the intermediate level to be transferred to other levels of government. Similarly, many mayors from the small rural municipalities were opposed to the reform, which, paradoxically enough, was decided and implemented by their own party in central government. The opposing forces, however, were too weak to go against the reform coalition since, as already mentioned, they lost their last ammunition when the report on size and democracy was published in the fall of 2003.


Conclusions In the early summer of 2002 there were no indications that Denmark a couple of years later would face a major reform of its political administrative structure. On the contrary, the Public Sector Tasks Commission had as recently as 1998 concluded that ‘the existing task distribution between the three administrative levels basically must be considered efficient’. Then in testifying before a parliamentary committee on 20 June 2002, the Minister of the Interior had made it clear that ‘the Government has no plans for changing the municipal structure’. Very few experts in Denmark perceived of large-scale problems in the public sector that would, with any certainty, be solved by a reorganization of local government. Nor was the issue mentioned prior to the parliamentary election in 2001 that led to a new Liberal-Conservative government. And why on earth would the dominant liberal party (with the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior as well as the Minister of Finance) involve itself in a reform that would reduce its political bastions all over the country in the form of mayoral positions?10 Nevertheless Danish society faced, two years later, a comprehensive, top-down, elitist non-voluntary reform. It is a great puzzle to understand how this came about. One of the reasons why reforms of this magnitude are difficult to carry through is that they always involve confiscation of privileges in the form of money, status, positions and access, and often a major reshuffling of identities. To the extent that reform processes take place in the open, municipalities, counties, mayors, committee chairmen, associations, parties, bureaucrats as well as citizens that stand to lose such privileges will have an incentive and a chance to gather their forces. Quite commonly this enables them effectively to block any reforms. The main explanation why this ‘mobilization of the losers’ did not take place in the Danish context was that the central decision-makers let the process take place behind closed doors. They made the preparations behind what Christiansen and Klitgaard (2008) label ‘the veil of vagueness’.11 Only at a rather late stage, when a majority in parliament was secure, did the government put forward its intentions with the proposal labelled ‘The New Denmark’. The radicalism of the proposal sent shock waves through local governments, not the least the counties, which for all practical purposes were to be abolished. This way of making reform decisions may not live up to many people’s ideals of democracy. However it is effective because nobody can foresee what costs and benefits are implied by the reform. If one uses the language

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of war nobody knows (1) that those in power are preparing for war, (2) with what alliance partner, (3) against whom, and (4) what costs they are willing to inflict upon those unknown enemies. Although we are by any standard dealing here with a ‘comprehensive, top-down, elitist non-voluntary reform’, nothing has indicated that the outcome of the process was planned beforehand. The Minister of the Interior in all likelihood expressed his inner feeling in front of the politicians in the Danish parliament in June 2002. Only at a rather late stage did the government in fact decide to ‘go to war’ and decide how comprehensive the war was going to be. The 14 months when the Commission on Administrative Structure deliberated behind closed doors helped the government make up its mind in three ways. First it was able to monitor closely how public opinion was slowly but effectively primed for a grand reform. Secondly it was continuously able to take the temperature as to how drastic changes could be decided without having too large political losses vis-à-vis the public and other central actors in Danish society inflicted upon it. And thirdly, it was able to construct an agreement both within the two government parties as well as between the government and the supporting Danish People’s party. Indeed, contrary to received wisdom, the Danish case demonstrates that politics can sometimes achieve the impossible.

Notes This chapter is a revised version of a report entitled ‘Reforming Local Government in Denmark: How and Why?’ prepared for the Centre for Local Innovation, Barcelona, Spain, which is organized under the Presidency of the Barcelona Provincial Council. http://www.diba.es/innovacio/ (accessed 16 March 2010). 1. For a more detailed account of the functions of local government as well as the finance system, see Albæk et al. (1996). 2. It should be noted that the principle of ‘one city - one municipality’ was never implemented in the metropolitan areas of Copenhagen. 3. The full text of the terms of reference for the commission (in English) can be found at http://www.im.dk/publikationer/struktur_uk/index.html (accessed 16 March 2010). 4. The author of the present article was one of the expert members of the Commission. 5. The full summary of the report (in English) can be found at the homepage of the Ministry of the Interior at http://www.im.dk/publikationer/struktur_uk/ index.html (accessed 16 March 2010). 6. The Ministry of the Interior and Health, Agreement on a Structural Reform, (2004), see http://www.im.dk/publikationer/agreement/index.html (accessed 16 March 2010).

Poul Erik Mouritzen 41 7. See http://www.im.dk/publikationer/government_reform_in_brief/kap03. htm (accessed 16 March 2010) for the list and also for a more thorough discussion of tasks and financial arrangements. 8. One prominent study of economies of scale that was referred to by the Commission on Administrative Structure was Houlberg (2000). 9. Christiansen and Klitgaard (2008) report that The Confederation of Danish Industries played a very important role in the early phase with the aim of putting the whole issue of a reform on the agenda (see particularly Chapter 3). 10. As a result of the first local election for the 98 remaining municipalities, the Liberal Party went from 138 to 36 mayorships while the Social Democratic Party lost 35 of their original 80 mayoral positions. 11. See also Gibson and Goodin (1999).

3 Finnish Power-Shift: The Defeat of the Periphery? Siv Sandberg

Ever since the birth of Finland as an independent nation, and even before, comprehensive local government reform has been an explosive political issue and has constantly been on the agenda (cf. Soikkanen 1966; Djupsund et al. 1975). At the same time, political parties, local authorities and governments have deeply disagreed as to whether the drawing of territorial boundaries of local authorities is a national concern that needs concerted national political action, or mainly a local concern that should be left to the discretion of local decisionmakers. Due to this basic disagreement, political actors have avoided, circumvented and compromised the issue of territorial reform. In March 2005, however, a surprising reform initiative broke the stalemate.1 The three-party cabinet consisting of the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Swedish People’s Party initiated a reform process that would involve all the municipalities and include a comprehensive review of territorial divisions as well as of structures of local government service production. The initiative and the subsequent political activities resulted in a political compromise over the content of the reform in June 2006, and a legislative framework was adopted by the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) in January 2007. The reform legislation provides guidelines for a bottom-up process by which voluntary choices and activities of local authorities are supposed to result in amalgamations and/or new cooperative arrangements in the years 2008–13. This chapter concerns the reform initiative and its journey through the Finnish political system. What kind of issue is territorial reform in Finnish politics? What factors have traditionally blocked or enabled attempts to reform territorial structures? Which circumstances constituted a window of opportunity for a government initiative in 2005? 42

Siv Sandberg

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How did the initiative survive the political process? And what kind of outcome did the reform initiative produce?

A surprising reform initiative Local government is a major actor in Finnish politics. Finland is a decentralized unitary welfare state. Although semi-sovereign rather than actually independent, local authorities play an important role in the implementation of national policies in the fields of education, social welfare and health care. In addition, local authorities have responsibilities for the local infrastructure and general community well-being. Of the total Finnish workforce, local government employs roughly one-fifth. The system of local government is single-tiered. Ultimate responsibility for tasks such as hospitals, secondary education and so forth, usually taken care of by a secondary municipal or regional level, rests with the primary municipalities. When the reform began in 2005, the number of local authorities was 415, with approximately half of them having fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. The starting-point of the reform, therefore, is quite straightforward: small municipalities carry heavy responsibilities. Why was the initiative of March 2005 surprising? Several reasons stand out. First, the initiative was presented mid-term in the electoral cycle and was not part of the formal government agenda presented after the election of 2003. In the Finnish context, where coalition government is the rule, the government agenda agreed upon by coalition parties plays a decisive role in streaming and disciplining political action in the subsequent four years. Governments rarely present important and potentially controversial initiatives outside their formal agenda. Second, the main battlefront as to whether the national government should be active or passive concerning the number of local authorities has usually been within the governing coalition. Hence, since the 1970s, when an attempted top-down territorial reform stalled due to political disagreement, the political parties have avoided bringing up the issue of comprehensive local government reform. Third, the Centre Party has been the main advocate of local self-government, small municipalities and bottom-up strategies in reforming local government, while both the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party have favoured consolidation of local government structures. Since the late 1970s, Finnish governments have been multi-party coalitions supported by a majority in parliament. Usually two of the three large parties (Centre Party, Social

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Finnish Power-Shift: The Defeat of the Periphery?

Democratic Party and National Coalition Party) form the cabinet together with one or two of the smaller parties. Coalition government requires compromise. Finally, when viewed against the historical backdrop, the cabinet that presented the initiative for reform in March 2005 can be considered the least likely coalition to perform such an action. The three parties – the Social Democratic Party on the one hand and the Centre Party and the small Swedish People’s Party on the other hand – have represented the most divergent views on the issue of municipal structure and local self-government. The divergent views relate partly to ideology, and partly to the local power base of the political parties. Both the Centre Party and the Swedish People’s Party have strongly localized power bases, with their most important strongholds in small municipalities, while support for the Social Democratic Party is evenly distributed. In the local elections of 2004, the Social Democratic Party and the Centre Party won about 23 per cent of the votes respectively. However, due to its localized support, the Centre Party won about 37 per cent of the seats and the majority in 154 out of 415 councils. The Social Democratic Party held the majority in only one out of 415 councils. Any attempt to reduce the number of local authorities therefore automatically includes a risk of eroding the local power base of the Centre Party. Nevertheless, a cabinet with a Centre Party prime minister started a reform which at the very outset included the prospect of a radical reduction in the number of municipalities.

Lessons from earlier reforms Ever since the country gained independence in 1917 two unsolved issues have framed the debate on local and regional government in Finland. The first unsolved issue concerns the existence or absence of a secondary tier of local government, that is, a regional level with directly elected bodies and the right to levy taxes. The first constitution from 1919, as well as the new one enacted in 2000, included the possibility of establishing a secondary tier of local government, if parliament would find it necessary. Political actors, however, never reached consensus about this matter. Diverse inter-municipal bodies, which were intended to replace the directly elected secondary tier on a temporary basis, proved functional. Thus, the political costs of replacing the temporary secondary tier with a permanent one gradually increased. The other unsolved issue concerns the correct number and size of local authorities. This question had been on the public agenda even

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before the republic of Finland was established (Djupsund et al. 1975). In 1961, however, it became a matter of high-profile national political significance when the government appointed a commission to investigate the need for amalgamations of municipalities in a situation where the welfare state expanded mainly at the local level, giving municipalities extended responsibilities in the fields of education, social services and health care. In 1965 the commission presented a proposal for local government reform. This proposal, largely inspired by the Swedish reforms in the 1950s and 1960s, suggested extensive amalgamations in order to secure the system capacity of all municipalities. According to the commission, the minimum size of a viable local authority would be approximately 8,000 inhabitants (Komiteanmietintö 1965). Political resistance to the proposal emerged at a relatively late stage. In 1967, the Finnish parliament accepted the laws based on the proposal from 1965. The political parties in parliament seemed to accept the necessity of a comprehensive local government reform. It was only after regional reform commissions had presented actual plans for a new territorial division of Finland that the issue turned out to be politically explosive. The main axis of resistance developed around one of the national associations of local government interests: the Association of Rural Municipalities. At the time, there were in fact three independent organizations representing local government interests: the Association of Rural Municipalities, the Association of Cities and the Association of the Swedish Language Municipalities (mainly rural). As the association representing the largest number of local authorities, the Association of Rural Municipalities had to be sensitive to the fact that a majority of its members rejected the idea of comprehensive amalgamations. In 1970 a commission appointed to prepare the final implementation of the reform ended up presenting a conflicting proposal. Altogether there were eight alternatives as to when amalgamations could take place against the will of the municipalities, ranging from ‘never’ to ‘always’. The Association of Rural Municipalities was a strong advocate of the ‘never’ alternative, while the Association of Cities was open to the possibility of forcing amalgamation, at least in some cases (Komiteanmietintö 1970). The conflict between different local government interests eventually infected national politics, creating a cleavage between the major political parties. The strong tie between the Association of Rural Municipalities and the Centre Party made the issue of changing territorial structures inconvenient and the search for and presentation of alternative solutions necessary.

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Despite lack of agreement at the national level, reform plans resulted in a wave of voluntary amalgamations. The number of local authorities decreased from 546 to 464 during the period between 1964 and 1977. In this context the government first postponed, and finally recalled, the prospect of forcing amalgamations. The new act on territorial divisions from 1977 made voluntary bottom-up boundary changes the rule and forced amalgamation the exception. Simultaneously, the expansion of the municipal school and health care sectors continued. Legislation regulating the expansion of municipal services included strict provisions about the preconditions for establishing new secondary schools or primary health districts. If amalgamations would not take place, municipalities would have to realize the necessary capacity (8,000 to 10,000 inhabitants) through mandatory intermunicipal cooperation. Thus, although the amalgamation reform only reached the halfway point regarding the original plans, the provisions concerning mandatory cooperation resulted in a much higher percentage of alignment with the requirements.

A window of opportunity The surprising thing about the reform initiative of March 2005 was not the fact that the national government expressed its concern for the capacity of the municipalities to fulfil their tasks. Nor was it the suggestion that amalgamations and/or inter-municipal cooperation could be the solution to the problem. The issue had been on the agenda all the time and had been subject to continuous piecemeal engineering over the years. March 2005 marked rather a number of changes in priorities and strategies. The reform initiative replaced piecemeal engineering by an overall strategy, including the municipal sector as a whole, and offered a total repertoire of methods and mechanisms. The subdued issue, advocated by individual ministries, became loud and political when identified as a number one priority – ‘the reform of the century’ – by the national government. Why was this possible? According to Kingdon (1995:168–9), windows of opportunity open due to two reasons: (1) there is a change in the policy stream, or (2) new problems capture the interests of governmental officials and actors close to them. Changes in the policy stream refer for example to shifts in the distribution of seats in parliament or changes in administration. The framing and potential success of local government reform is commonly dependent on the general political situation in a country – the

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actors, coalitions and political cycles to be observed. Like administrative reform in general, local government reform initiatives depend on the methods and procedures utilized in framing and furthering reform initiatives. More than in the case of administrative reforms in general, however, local government reform is sensitive to changes concerning veto points in the reform process and the articulation of local government interests in the dialogue between the national and local levels. Examining the changes in Finnish society and the politicaladministrative system between 1977 and 2005 reveals both a number of changes in the crucial policy streams as well as in the issues capturing the interests of important political actors. Exhibit 3.1 gives a broad outline of the circumstances relating to four factors framing the window of opportunity in Finland: (1) the modernization of Finnish society, (2) change in the political centre of gravity, (3) changes in the representation of local government interests, and (4) changes in the overall strategies of administrative reform. To begin with, fundamental changes in patterns of residence have taken place between the 1960s and the beginning of the new millennium. Compared to other countries, Finland is still a sparsely populated country. Statistics Finland classifies only 2.4 per cent of the land area of Finland as densely populated. Nowadays, 80 per cent of the total Finnish

Exhibit 3.1 A window of opportunity: Interrelated societal and political changes preceding the Finnish reform initiative in 2005 Modernization • Urbanization • Demographical changes • Financial crisis and political re-orientation in the 1990s • EU membership in 1995 Changes in the political centre of gravity • From rural to urban areas • From north to south (tipping point 2003) • Re-orientation of the Centre Party (intensified 2003) Re-organization of local government interest representation • From three to one association in 1993 • Gradual power shift within the AFLA from small to large municipalities Renewal of reform strategies • New methods of reform preparation: rapid processes, preparatory work closely connected to decision-making • Combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches

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population resides in these densely populated areas. The average population density is 17.4 persons per square kilometre, but inter-municipal variation is substantial. The population density in Helsinki, the capital, is roughly 3,000 inhabitants per km2 while the density in large parts of Northern Finland is less than 0.5 persons per km2. Using a national frame of reference, urbanization occurred rapidly, especially during the 1990s. The share of population in densely populated areas increased from 56 per cent in 1960 to 82 per cent in 2000. The population living outside densely populated areas decreased at an equivalent rate, declining by roughly one million since the 1960s (Statistics Finland, ALTIKA database). The processes of urbanization and modernization have resulted in a change in the political centre of gravity in Finland. In practice, this means a power shift from rural to urban areas and from north to south. This power shift has transformed political institutions – the government, the parliament, political parties and organized interests – from within. The outcome of the 1994 EU referendum, when the ‘yes’ vote of urban areas outweighed the ‘no’ vote of the larger rural areas, is one of the most noteworthy indicators of the change in the political centre of gravity (Statistikcentralen 1994). From 1966 to 2007, the five southernmost regional councils (in practice the areas within the triangle of Helsinki–Tampere–Turku) increased their share of the seats in parliament from 81 to 104, that is, from 41 to 51 per cent. The beginning of the 2000s marked the definite tipping point in this process. In the parliamentary elections of 2003, over half (103 of 200) of the MPs were for the first time elected from the five southernmost regions. These social changes have had an impact on the political landscape. As the dominant party in terms of seats in local councils, the Centre Party is one of the key players when it comes to local government reform. Hence, any change in the policies of the Centre Party regarding municipal boundaries will likely also result in changes to national policies. Harmel and Janda (1994) have identified three preconditions for party change: external shock, change of party leaders and changes in dominant party faction. The crisis in the early 1990s, and especially the decision to join the EU, put tremendous pressure on the Centre Party (Kääriäinen 2002; Arter 2000). The cleavage between two factions – the traditional rural flank and the liberal urban flank – became obvious. The rural faction is still more numerous, including the traditional Centre Party voters in the periphery as well as many local Centre Party politicians found in the small municipalities, but among the Centre Party elite, especially among the ministers in the cabinet, the liberal-urban faction is now dominant.

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The election of a new party leader in 2003 took the ideological urbanization of the party a step further, since Matti Vanhanen, the Prime Minister of Finland since 2003, is the first Centre Party leader coming from the Helsinki area, where the Centre Party is a small political actor. According to his ideology, it is necessary for the Centre Party to dissolve the link between power and territory, since the vast majority of future voters will reside in urban areas (Vanhanen 2002:44–67). A further factor of note was the change in representation of local government interests. Triple representation of local government interests, whereby rural, urban and Swedish-language municipalities each had an interest organization of their own, was one of the most prominent factors hindering the amalgamation reform in the 1970s. The three organizations finally merged in 1993, forming the Association of Finnish Local Authorities (AFLA). Equivalent mergers had taken place in Sweden, Denmark and Norway earlier in 1968, 1970 and 1972 respectively (Page 1991:48). With the establishment of AFLA, a number of qualitative changes in the mediation of local government interests took place. First, the representation of local government interests became clearer. Second, the creation of the AFLA changed the relationship between local government interests and the political parties; whereas formerly most of the parties had strong links with one of the associations and weak links with the other two, this was no longer the case. Thirdly, there has been a gradual power shift within the AFLA, from north to south and from rural to urban areas, reflecting the general pattern in Finnish politics.2 From 1987 on, changes in overall strategies for the pursuit of administrative reforms have also taken place. Traditional preparatory commissions consisting of experts or politicians appointed by parliament are nowadays very unusual, having been replaced by preparations made by administrators or individual investigators (Helander 1997:248). Now the pursuit of reforms concerning local government usually includes a combination of top-down formulation of goals, and bottom-up investigation of the proper means. The free commune experiment at the beginning of the 1990s is the most prominent example of this reform strategy (Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 1994).

A modest proposal and its consequences The modest starting point for the reform process in March 2005 was a government statement in connection with the publication of the long-term budget for the years 2006–09. The government expressed

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its concerns for the demographic challenges facing the Finnish public sector, especially service providing municipalities. In ten years’ time a considerable share of the local authorities would face an unhealthy support ratio, meaning that the number of persons needing health and social services would exceed the number of active taxpayers living in the municipality. The answer to the challenge was structural reforms, either amalgamations of municipalities or creation of larger service producing units through inter-municipal cooperation. Comprehensive local government reform, however, was not one of the points on the government agenda presented in 2003. Thus, the initiative came as a surprise. But as noted above, a number of factors nevertheless indicated that the time could be ripe for a reform initiative. Forces connected with resistance to reform had declined, and forces connected with support for amalgamations and other structural changes had strengthened their position. In February 2005, the board of the AFLA committed itself to a parliamentary investigation of local government structures (Suomen kuntaliitto 2005). This would have been the traditional method of dealing with a complex and fundamental question. Yet after the initiative in March 2005 the reform process has been anything but traditional. The reform has written its own manuscript. Processes of preparation, decision-making and implementation – even evaluation – have been going on simultaneously. Contrary to a traditional reform process, where a government investigation report forms the platform for the development of arguments and conflicts, the reform process has been open-ended and dialogic. This has made it possible to suppress potential conflicts and increase acceptance for the reform by continuously adding elements to the reform scheme and adjusting the methods used. At all stages in the reform process, moreover, communication between the government and local authorities has played a crucial role. The preparatory phase took place from June 2005 to June 2006. Then, in the early autumn of 2005, the Ministry of the Interior presented three alternative models for a new structure of local government. The goal of the first model, strong municipalities, was to reach a local government structure consisting of fewer and larger local authorities; the minimum size would be approximately 20,000 inhabitants. The second model, service districts, would have transferred responsibilities for social and health care services to large inter-municipal districts, with a minimum of 100,000 inhabitants. Amalgamations of municipalities would be subject to voluntary initiatives. The third, and most radical, model would have turned the Finnish one-tier system upside down. The model would

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transfer the right to levy taxes and penultimate responsibility for local government services to 20 regional authorities. The existing 400 municipalities would remain or amalgamate, but with a considerably smaller degree of self-government (Regeringens proposition 2006). The three models were sketchy outlines for a debate rather than products of a thorough investigation. The following stage in the process was therefore to seek feedback from local decision-makers. During the autumn of 2005, the government organized 19 regional dialogue seminars in cooperation with the regional councils. In addition, the government expected each municipality to submit an individual response as to which of the models would be most suitable given local contingencies and political preferences. Feedback showed a moderate acceptance for the overall idea of a reform. Of the three models, ‘strong municipalities’ gained the most support. However few municipalities liked the idea of fixing the definition of the minimum size to 20,000 inhabitants. In June 2006 the cabinet and the main opposition parties reached a compromise about the reform based on feedback from local authorities. The second phase started in January 2007 when parliament finally accepted legislation framing implementation of the reform. According to the law, all municipalities had to submit a plan for the implementation of requirements in the reform legislation by August 2007. By the end of November 2007 the government had in turn responded to the plans of the municipalities. Conducting a dialogue in this manner was supposed to secure implementation of the plan during a third phase running from 2008 to 2013, with a halfway assessment scheduled in late 2009.

Framing and structuring the reform Which were the main arguments for the reform? Initiating the reform in March 2005, the government originally emphasized two interrelated factors underscoring the need for structural reform – demographic challenges and local government finances. The demographic challenges arise primarily from the growth of the proportion of elderly people in relation to the population as a whole. In 2015, according to one prognosis, 125 municipalities will face a situation where the number of 7–12-year-old children will be too low to sustain even one qualitatively acceptable comprehensive school. In roughly 200 municipalities, the median age of the population will be 50 years or higher, whereas the median age of the Finnish population as a whole is 42.5 years (Regeringens proposition 2006:52–7).

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These demographic challenges have clear repercussions for local government finance and activities. First, the growing number of elderly in need of health care and the decreasing number of taxpayers form a threat to the local tax base. Local income taxation is the most important source of local government revenue in Finland. Central government transfer systems do not fully compensate for variations in the local tax base. Second, municipal service provision needs revision. There will be a need for a gradual transfer of resources from schools and day care centres to healthcare and services for the elderly. Third, aging also will affect the supply of local government personnel. In Finland, decision-makers usually frame reforms as pragmatic solutions to inevitable factual problems (Harrinvirta 2000). The tactic of the Minister of the Interior and the other government representatives was therefore to emphasize the description of why it was necessary to do something. Maps with highlights on the problem areas – spatially covering most of the country – illustrated the severity of the problem. But the political compromise of June 2006, which in practice sealed the content of the reform, added a number of other arguments. The government placed urban areas and their problems connected to transport, housing and availability of services among the reasons for structural reform. And the act of January 2007 on implementing the reform included formulations concerning the need to strengthen democracy and local self-government. The means by which the reform was handled offers keys to understanding why it, at least by Finnish measures, turned out to be successful. The reform was a government responsibility and priority from the very beginning. A small group of actors closely connected to the Cabinet, mainly the Ministry of the Interior, formulated, advocated and implemented the first stages of the reform. Few outsiders were involved in the preparation of the reform framework. However, some fresh actors within the government organization – for example new deputy ministers appointed early in 2005 who prepared the first outline of the reform process – did come to play a crucial role in the process. Then the reform process unfolded in a dialogue between national government and the local government sector. At one level, this dialogue took place between the national government and the AFLA. At a second level, more direct communication took place between the national reform organization and individual local authorities, communication that played a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of the reform. This two-level dialogue between the government and the municipal sector revealed diverging views within the local government

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sector. While the AFLA as an organization was prepared to propose relatively radical reform, even including forced amalgamation in certain cases, AFLA’s individual members were less enthusiastic about the prospects of a reform. As noted, local government reform in Finland is primarily about strengthening the financial and professional capacity of the municipalities to fulfil their tasks. The hypothesis behind the reform is that this will happen by increasing the size of the municipalities and/or the joint local authorities producing local government services. Unlike the Danish structural reform, for example, which involved major transfers of functions between different levels of government, as well as a taxation reform (see Chapter 2), the Finnish reform does not include any fundamental changes in the tasks assigned to the municipalities. Responses from the municipalities in February 2006 indicated a preference for strong municipalities, but 75 per cent of the municipalities rejected the idea of 20,000 inhabitants as the minimum size. No municipality preferred the model with 20 regions, whereas the service district model gained mixed support, especially among very peripheral municipalities (Sandberg 2006). Disregarding the multiplechoice reform strategy, the preference for amalgamations is obvious, a preference encouraged by incentive structures that favour rapid amalgamations resulting in large units of local government. Thus, no financial rewards are available for municipalities choosing increased inter-municipal cooperation. Amalgamations, on the other hand, provide financial rewards, but the later an amalgamation takes place, the lower is the benefit.3 The incentive structure will be in place from 2008 to 2013.

The fine art of suppressing conflicts Despite changes in the Finnish political landscape, and despite the broad consensus regarding the need to do something about local government structures, the actors still disagree on how exactly this is supposed to happen. Awareness of these potential conflicts and the need for dealing with them at an early stage has influenced the whole reform process. The art of suppressing conflicts has been inclusion and compromise. One potential source of political conflict has been within the cabinet. As already noted, there is a long tradition of intra-governmental disagreement about local government reform. The question is especially

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explosive within cabinets formed by the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party. Coalitions consisting of both parties have typically remained silent about or circumvented the issue of local government reform. The changes in the political landscape, including the renewal of the Centre Party, made it easier to put local government reform on the governmental agenda, but the issue is still a political dilemma for both parties. Hiltunen (2008) classified statements made by parliamentarians from the cabinet parties in the initial parliamentary debate on the reform, using the autonomous–integrative division suggested by Dente and Kjellberg (1988). Parliamentarians of the Social Democratic Party mainly advocated integrative solutions, that is, amalgamations, while parliamentarians from the Centre Party either made unclear statements or spoke in favour of increased inter-municipal cooperation or voluntary, bottom-up, reform. Decisions and statements from the party councils, moreover, deepen rather than bridge the gap found between the views of the main parties in the cabinet. The council of the Centre Party, for example, has on numerous occasions underlined that the reform is about securing services, not necessarily about altering local government boundaries (cf. Suomen Keskustan 2007). Another potential conflict has been between the government and the opposition. The government introduced local government reform in the middle of the electoral cycle. It was a potentially unpopular reform: people generally do not like the idea of abolishing local authorities. Thus, the opposition parties could have used loud resistance against the structural reform to boost their own electoral support, but this did not occur. The first reason is ideological. Three of the parties in opposition in 2005 – the National Coalition Party, the Greens and the Leftist Alliance – have traditionally been in favour of larger units of local government. The second reason is procedural. All parties represented in the council of the AFLA were included in the preparation of the reform framework. In addition, the opposition parties accepted the crucial compromise in June 2006. Consequently, when the reform legislation reached parliament, only one party holding three seats, the True Finns, voted against it. This compromise survived the parliamentary elections in March 2007 and the formation of a new cabinet in April 2007. The new cabinet, consisting of the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party, the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party, adopted the reform scheme as such and declared its intention to continue implementation according to principles established by the former cabinet. Finally there was the potential conflict between municipal interests. The interests of small rural authorities often differ from the interests of

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large urban units. Thus, a reform proposal is likely to meet with acceptance among one group of local authorities, and result in protests among other groups of local authorities. As noted above, an earlier attempt at comprehensive reform stalled in the 1970s due to diverging interests among different groups of municipalities. The establishment of the AFLA in 1993 institutionalized conflict stemming from numerous organizations representing local government interests. The process from 2005 to 2007 included a number of confrontations between different local government interests, both in the dialogue within the AFLA and in the communication between the government and the local authorities. In both cases, however, the solution was to underline the open-ended and multiple-choice character of the reform. AFLA’s most articulate declaration of support for large-scale amalgamations in August 2005, for example, included a parallel model based upon inter-municipal cooperation. In its final shape, the reform legislation acknowledges the diverging interests of municipalities by including separate regulations concerning 16 urban areas. In fact, one weakness of the reform scheme is that it recognizes variations in municipal preferences but does not provide any efficient measure of solving conflicts of preferences between municipalities within the same area. Locally this may worsen conflicts between local authorities.

From act to action? The gradual and extended implementation of the reform legislation makes it difficult to examine the success of the reform initiated in 2005 at this stage. Municipalities still have difficult decisions to make. Changes in the reform set-up can happen once results from the midterm evaluation of 2009 are in. Conclusions about the outcome of the reform lie years ahead. In the following, therefore, outcomes of the first stage of the reform will be assessed in light of four questions: (1) to what extent did municipalities conform to the planning requirement in the reform legislation? (2) how did plans submitted by the municipalities reflect the different alternatives of strengthening the basis of local government service production? (3) how did financial incentives provided for amalgamations affect the choices at the first stage of the reform? and (4) what are the effects of the bottom-up voluntary approach to local government reform? Practically all municipalities submitted their plans to the Ministry of Interior by the end of August 2007, as required in the reform legislation. Regarding the content of the plans, the government examined

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the plans and stated its views to the municipalities before the end of November. After evaluation by three ministries (interior, health and social affairs, education), the government accepted 74 plans without any changes. In 251 cases, the government asked additional questions, mostly about details concerning the new inter-municipal bodies for health care and social affairs. In 13 cases, the government found the plans insufficient to meet the challenges of the future and the requirements of the reform legislation. Cabinet initiated bilateral negotiations with these 13 municipalities in order to reach acceptable solutions to the problems of capacity. In another dozen cases, intended cooperation or amalgamations eventually failed. Overall, therefore, about 25 municipalities – roughly 6 per cent of all local authorities – did not comply with the formal requirements in the reform legislation (Stenvall et al. 2008). The reform will alter the preconditions for, and the organization of, local government service production in about 75 per cent of the municipalities. Inter-municipal cooperation has been the most preferred solution as roughly 250 municipalities have expressed their intention to reach reform goals in this fashion. This implies that municipalities with a preference for inter-municipal cooperation formally chose the status quo; the name, boundaries and organization of the municipality will remain unchanged. In practice, however, inter-municipal bodies will take over many of the important decisions, and up to 60–70 per cent of the municipal budgets. Reluctance to amalgamation is nonetheless gradually vanishing. Since the reform process started in 2005, about 205 municipalities have been engaged in relatively serious investigations concerning possible amalgamations (Stenvall et al. 2008). Because of voluntary mergers, the number of municipalities dropped from 400 to 333 at the beginning of 2009, and a second wave of amalgamations is likely to take place in 2010–13. As noted, the government provides financial incentives for amalgamations as part of the reform framework. The incentive scheme favours rapid action as well as amalgamations of three or more municipalities. The fact that 99 municipalities decided to join amalgamations from the beginning of 2009 is partly due to the incentive scheme, partly a consequence of the electoral cycle whereby local elections were held in the autumn of 2008. Of the 32 new local authorities created as of January 2009, half resulted from amalgamations between two existing municipalities. The rest involved mergers of three or more local authorizes. A considerable number of the amalgamations involved middle-sized

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cities and their suburbs and resulted in new local authorities with over 50,000 inhabitants. Of course the reform formula – a comprehensive reform based on voluntary action – includes the possibility of random effects. First, it seems clear that the reform increases the asymmetry of the Finnish local government system. The relative popularity of inter-municipal cooperation and the enlargement of the inter-municipal authorities increase the indirect character of the Finnish local government system (Stenvall et al. 2008). Second, patterns of activity and passivity in utilizing the options of the reform do not necessarily correlate with the actual need for reform. Amalgamations are still more popular in the southern and western parts of the country than they are in the more sparsely populated areas of northern and eastern Finland. In the provinces of Southern and Western Finland, amalgamations involve roughly 31 per cent of the municipalities (89 out of 290), whereas only 8 per cent (11 out of 142) of the municipalities in the provinces of Eastern Finland, Oulu and Lapland undertook amalgamation in 2009. Municipal size, moreover, is not necessarily a good predictor of the likelihood of amalgamation. In absolute terms, municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants play an important role in the amalgamations, since 55 of the 99 municipalities undergoing amalgamation in 2009 have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, in relative terms, only 27 per cent of the smallest municipalities prefer amalgamation to independence and inter-municipal cooperation – which is roughly the same proportion as in Finland as a whole. Municipalities dominated by the Centre Party are still more inclined to remain independent and reject amalgamation.

Assessment and conclusions The Finnish local government reform initiated in 2005 is full of ambiguity and thus hard to classify according to any absolute category. On the one hand, the reform initiative and the subsequent political action marks a shift in Finnish politics. A number of changes in the relationships between political actors and in the political centre of gravity opened a window of opportunity for a reform initiative of this kind. On the other hand, traditional cleavages still apply, thus reducing the room for manoeuvre by reform entrepreneurs. In many respects, the reform has written its own manuscript, muddling its way through the political system. Depending on one’s perspective, it is possible to conclude either that the reform initiative was a success or that it was at

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least partly a failure. The success hypothesis gains support by the fact that all national political actors accepted and supported the idea of the reform. In addition, practically all municipalities have acted according to the alternatives provided in the reform legislation and the number of amalgamations will be the largest ever in Finland. The partial failure hypothesis, on the other hand, draws upon indicators emphasizing that the reform scheme is in fact a mixture of methods and smallest common denominators. A messy reform scheme, in short, produces random and asymmetric outcomes and is unlikely to solve the problems it aimed to solve. With respect to framing, the absence of a grand strategy for the reform made it possible to add arguments to the reform scheme during the course of the process. The reform initiative in 2005 emphasized a triad of interdependent circumstances: (1) demographic challenges faced in general by the country as a whole and by many municipalities more specifically, (2) a concern for local government welfare services, and (3) a concern for local government finances. Later stages in the process added a number of other arguments. The compromise in June 2006 emphasized increasing the functionality of urban regions as one important reform goal, whereas the final framework legislation also included arguments related to local selfgovernment and democracy. The reform is the function of multiple strategies. The reform is comprehensive, in the sense that it concerns all local authorities in Finland. Direct communication between individual local authorities and the government underlined the comprehensive nature of the reform. No municipality can escape the reform, but all municipalities have the right to choose how they want to implement it, the primary choice being between amalgamation and inter-municipal cooperation. Voluntary action thus plays an important role in the reform strategy. Financial incentives are available for amalgamations, but not for intermunicipal cooperation, and the incentive scheme rewards rapid action and amalgamations involving more than two municipalities. To identify conflicts in the reform, two levels of analysis are required, one on the surface, the other below the surface. On the surface, support for the reform has been almost unanimous. Both the cabinet and the parties in opposition accepted the initial compromise about the reform in June 2006. Only three out of 200 parliamentarians voted against the reform legislation bill in January 2007. Traditionally, territorial reform has been an impossible issue in Finland due to cleavages between urban and rural interests, between the Centre Party

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and the Social Democratic Party and between different advocates of local government interests. Changes in the political landscape partly pacified the potential conflicts. Urban interests have generally strengthened their position compared to rural interests, and the merger of three organizations representing local interests into one in 1993 reduced the risk of articulate conflicts between different local government interests. Changes in the profile and leadership of the Centre Party, furthermore, mitigated the party’s traditional opposition to territorial reform. Below the surface, however, cleavages and variations in preferences remain. Parliamentarians from the Centre Party may advocate the idea of a reform in general, but usually they prefer inter-municipal cooperation to amalgamations, while the Social Democratic Party behave in the opposite way. Both rural and urban local authorities deem the reform necessary, but disagree about the exact definition of what needs to be undertaken. The dialogic character of the reform process and the somewhat messy multiple-choice reform scheme are the effects of the need to suppress these potential conflicts at an early stage. Evidence from the first stage of the reform process, which will continue until 2012, indicates that the reform is likely to transform Finnish local government from one stage of asymmetry to another. The multiple-choice model creates different outcomes and results in aggregation as well as fragmentation. The reform affects a majority of the municipalities in that it changes the basic conditions for service production, finances and decision-making. Changes will lead to different outcomes depending on the choice of amalgamation vs. inter-municipal cooperation. As a result of random voluntary choices, the conditions for local government activities may diverge even more than before the reform. Given the open-ended nature of the reform, however, this is not necessarily the ultimate outcome. The final stages in the process are yet to be seen. The pattern established during the first three years of the reform nonetheless makes one thing clear: territorial choice in Finland is a joint affair where both the national government and local authorities have their roles to play.

Notes 1. Although not specifically mentioned here, details about the reform process are based upon the text of the government bill RP 155/2006, documents and web pages of the Ministries of Interior and Finance (http://www.intermin.fi, http://www.vm.fi) and the Association of Finnish Local Authorities (http:// www.kunnat.net) (accessed 16 March 2010).

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2. Eight of 15 members in the executive board of the AFLA in the years 2005–08 represented cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. 3. The direct benefit for a group of 4–5 municipalities forming a new unit of local government is approximately 10 to 20 million Euros. In addition, small changes in the system of state transfers guarantee that amalgamated municipalities will not suffer financially due to cuts in state grants.

4 The Swedish Model under Stress: The Waning of the Egalitarian, Unitary State? Anders Lidström

Territorial restructuring is once again on the political agenda in Sweden. Thirty years after the completion of a comprehensive and controversial amalgamation reform, which drastically reduced the number of municipalities, a major new reshaping of the sub-national map is under way. In February 2007, a multi-party parliamentary committee – the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities – unanimously suggested a reform of the intermediate (regional or county council) level of government. If it is carried out, it will represent an important break with the past. Not only is it the most far-reaching reform of this level of government since the seventeenth century, it also alters important features of the Swedish unitary state. One might reasonably ask how this could come about. The dominance of the past in the Swedish administrative structure complies with core assumptions in historical institutionalism. From this perspective institutions – that is, formal and informal norms, rules and organizations – are seen as path-dependent and rigid (Thelen 1999; Peters 2005). Once they are established, they set limits for the future choices that are available. Actors become socialized in these institutions, develop vested interests and tend to defend them if they are under threat. Institutions become embedded with others, perhaps at different levels, which hinder radical change as this might also alter the balance vis-à-vis other institutions. Nevertheless, changes do occur, even in the historical institutional understanding of societal development. Some authors emphasize gradual change, such as punctuated evolutions (Hay 2002) or ‘slowmoving causal processes’ (Pierson 2004). Others claim that changes can be more radical, and take the form of critical junctures (Collier and Collier 1991), formative moments (Rothstein 1996), punctuated 61

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The Swedish Model under Stress

equilibriums (Krasner 1984) or policy windows (Kingdon 1995). These transformations are seen either as externally generated, for example, through the influence of globalization, environmental problems or fundamental value changes; or as caused by internal imbalances within the institutions themselves. Transformations may be the result of conscious and rational decisions, involving actors who pursue specific goals, or they may be related to structural processes. They can also be the result of more accidental events, perhaps an unintended by-product when small changes through a sequence of events trigger large consequences (Pierson 2004). Of course whether or not a formative moment has occurred can only be established after the event has taken place. However, the territorial reforms that are currently being suggested in Sweden would be likely to qualify as such a moment, if they are carried out as proposed. They represent a comprehensive and highly significant transformation that, in important respects, breaks with a previously dominant institutional pattern. In this chapter, we will take a closer look at this reform process, investigate why the previous path was so persistent, but in particular examine why the time now seems ripe for change. The questions in focus are: (1) what are the institutional and structural conditions, (2) which are the relevant value changes and (3) who are the actors involved in making these transformations possible?

Setting the scene: Sub-national government in Sweden There are three levels of directly elected government in Sweden. Apart from the national level, there are two tiers of local government – a municipal level with 290 municipalities (kommuner) and an intermediate level consisting of 19 county councils (landsting) and two regions (regioner). The island of Gotland is both a municipality and a county council. Municipalities vary in size from 2,600 to 771,000 inhabitants, with an average of 30,200 inhabitants. The smallest intermediate level authority has 127,000 inhabitants and the largest 1.9 million inhabitants, the average size being roughly 430,000 inhabitants. The distribution of municipalities according to size is summarized in Table 4.1. Local self-government in Sweden is protected in the constitution. This includes powers to levy a proportional income tax from its citizens, although this right has at times been temporarily circumscribed by central government. Some local government functions, in particular the responsibility for welfare services, are regarded as being carried out on behalf of central government and are, therefore, more tightly

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Table 4.1 Distribution of Swedish municipalities according to population size, 2007 Population size

Number

Per cent

Less than 10,000 10,001–20,000 20,001–30,000 30,001–40,000 40,001–60,000 Over 60,000

72 101 36 28 19 34

24.8 34.8 12.4 9.7 6.6 11.7

Total

290

100.0

regulated. Other tasks, such as provision of leisure and cultural facilities and economic development, are less controlled by central government. Municipalities are in charge of a large range of welfare services, such as social services, pre-school child day care, care of the elderly, and primary and secondary schooling. They are also responsible for the local public infrastructure and make decisions about physical planning, land use and building permits. The municipal level is generally regarded as the stronger of the two tiers of local government. They have a larger range of functions and represent two-thirds of total sub-national government spending. As smaller units of government, municipalities are also closer to the citizens. At the intermediate level, the country is divided into counties (län). This division originates from a revision of the Swedish constitution in 1634, when Sweden was a great power, and aimed at facilitating central control of the country’s territory. The county structure remained practically unchanged from this time until the late 1990s when, first in 1997 the two southernmost counties merged and became Skåne län, and then in 1998 three counties in western Sweden were amalgamated to create Västra Götalands län. In each county, there is a directly elected county council or a regional assembly. These are quite unique in a European comparison inasmuch as one of their tasks, health care, is exceptionally dominant. This responsibility accounts for 80 to 90 per cent of their budgets (Lidström 1999). County councils are also responsible for public dental services, care of the handicapped and county based cultural institutions. In addition, county councils/regions support regional economic development and subsidize public transport. The two regions created in the late 1990s, however, differ from the county councils in that they are part of an experimental programme that gives them greater responsibility for regional economic development.

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The path: Previous sub-national territorial reforms in Sweden The time from 1862 to the 1940s was a period of continual societal change. At the end of the nineteenth century, Sweden was still a poor country compared to the rest of Europe, with a population overly dependent on subsistence farming. However, as new industries based on the natural resources of timber and ore were set up, modernization and urbanization took off and began to transform Swedish society. Economic and social conditions improved, partly due to the influence of strong popular movements, such as the labour movement. Thus, after the Social Democratic party came to power in the early 1930s, replacing the old poor relief system with a modern social welfare system became a major priority. It was seen as important to retain responsibility for services at the local level, but it was also considered necessary to regulate the system in order to provide equal service for citizens regardless of where they lived. For this purpose larger municipalities were required, rural municipalities being seen in particular as in need of reform. To achieve this end compulsory amalgamations were carried out in 1952, which reduced the number of rural municipalities from 2281 to 816 (Wångmar 2003). In the 1950s, during the post-war economic boom, welfare reform ambitions expanded. In addition to further improvements of social welfare, attention was now focused on modernizing the education system. At this time most Swedish children received only a basic six- or seven-year education while secondary or higher education was reserved for a minority, typically from the wealthy or middle classes (Hudson and Lidström 2002). Again, the municipalities were trusted to carry out these tasks; transferring educational functions to providers at any other level of government was not regarded as an alternative. Urbanization continued, with population losses mainly in the smallest rural municipalities. The response to these new conditions from the Social Democrats was to suggest the creation of even larger municipalities. This time the reform also included the cities. A public committee of enquiry was set up and, inspired by Central Place Theory, it suggested that each new municipality should consist of a municipal centre and a hinterland from which people could commute to various public and commercial services in the centre (Gustafsson 1980). The reform was to be voluntary for the municipalities. In 1962 parliament accepted the recommendations of the committee, although the Centre and the Conservative Parties were opposed to them.

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In the period that followed the Social Democratic government was not happy with the pace of the reform process. Under a voluntary approach there was a risk that the municipal structure would become imbalanced, with some municipalities being in a better position to handle their tasks than others. Accordingly, an act was adopted by parliament in 1969 which made further amalgamations compulsory. A new municipal structure was to be in place from 1974. This decision was taken under heavy resistance, not only from the non-socialist political opposition, but also from half of the municipalities. When the non-socialist parties won the 1976 parliamentary elections, some of the municipalities that had been most resistant to the change were allowed to split apart again. Hence, from the early 1970s, there has been a clear and lasting conflict in Swedish politics between the political parties of the left and right with regard to municipal territorial reform. Territorial reforms of the sub-national levels of government during the second half of the twentieth century follow a distinctive path. First, they tended to be comprehensive. Although cities were not included during the 1950s, as they were considered to be sufficiently large, the reform in the 1970s concerned all types of municipalities. Second, reforms were initiated from the top with a clear purpose of imposing standardized solutions. There was an obvious fear of creating imbalances and asymmetries. Third, the focus was on reforming the municipal level. Counties were left unchanged. Fourth, central government clearly trusted the municipalities and the reforms aimed at making them more able to carry out new tasks. Strong and well-integrated political parties, acting both at central and local levels, facilitated the establishment of this relationship of trust. Fifth, public welfare reform was the main driving concern. In the 1950s there was a need to replace poor relief with modern social welfare and in the 1960s the aim was to establish a basis for a comprehensive school that would make education open for everybody. Sixth, the main actor behind the change was a strong Social Democratic party, influenced by ideas of working class collectivism. This path of reform fits well with notions of Fordism as a feature of public policymaking. Originally developed as a way of characterizing the system of regulating the economy during the expansion period from the Second World War to the mid-1970s, Fordism has also been used as a label for standardized solutions in policymaking (cf. Jessop 1992, 2002; Painter 1995; Stoker and Mossberger 1995). In the Swedish case, the focus on establishing a Keynesian welfare system, ambitious planning models, top-down regulation and uniform solutions for the whole country stand out as particularly relevant in this regard.

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Evolutionary change: Gradual reformation of the intermediate level The county structure has been virtually unchanged since the middle of the seventeenth century, constituting a bulwark of state administration. By comparison the regional level in Sweden has traditionally been fragmented and weak. In contrast to the municipal and national levels, where there is just one dominant institutional actor, the regional level consists of a number of actors. These have both different but also overlapping functions and, to some extent, even different territorial jurisdictions. In addition to the previously mentioned county councils and county administrative boards that share the same territory, there are also regional branches of specialized central government agencies. Most of these have their own territorial divisions with regions that generally cover areas larger than the counties. Typically these divisions have been adjusted from time to time to fit the specific needs of the agency. Other public sectors actors at the regional level are universities, colleges of higher education and large municipalities. Against this background it is not surprising that the Swedish intermediate level is referred to as ‘the regional mess’ (Olsson and Åström 2004). There is a sharp contrast between this fragmented structure and the seeming rationality that characterizes both the municipal and central government levels. However, a weak intermediate level is not a coincidence in Sweden. Since the break up of the Kalmar union among Sweden, Denmark and Norway and the unification of the country under King Gustav Vasa in 1523, Sweden has been a unitary state, although often one with a special relationship with the local level. For most of the period until the twentieth century, kings have ruled the country in a centralized way, at times with the consent of the peasantry and in conflict with the nobility. From the nineteenth century, both conservative forces and the Social Democrats have made use of the unitary state, each for their own purposes. For the Social Democrats, for example, this was an excellent vehicle for redistributive welfare and implementation of regional policies, policies for which a strong municipal level served as an important component (Lidström and Eklund 2007; Sellers and Lidström 2007).1 As a result there has never been any significant support for a strong intermediate level in Sweden. Although there are parts of Sweden where regionally based identities are important, these are exceptions in a country where people mainly identify with the national and the municipal levels (Petersson et al. 1997). There are no ethnically based demands for

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regional territorial autonomy or any significant economic differences between parts of the country that would justify strong regional governments. Moreover all major political parties in Sweden are in favour of the unitary state. Only the Centre Party pursues some kind of Swedish federalism (Lidström and Eklund 2007). Nonetheless there is general agreement that the existing division into counties is outdated. Administrative borders originally drawn in a static society will by necessity be outdated almost 400 years later. Mobility and economic activity make these borders obsolete. This is perhaps most obvious in the metropolitan areas, but patterns of economic and social activity have changed even in rural municipalities, spawning new challenges and needs. Thus the need for reform of the county level has been apparent for many years, but it has turned out to be difficult to achieve in practice. Apart from the territorial division of the counties, the question of the division of powers between the directly elected county councils and the appointed county administrative boards also gradually entered the agenda. Especially the Centre Party was strongly in favour of strengthening the position of the county councils. In 1968 a parliamentary committee suggested that functions should be transferred from the county administrative boards to the county councils, which would be transformed into ‘regional parliaments’. Several other parliamentary committees also investigated various aspects of regional administration, democracy and self-government during the 1970s and 1980s (Wångmar 2007; Krantz 2002). For different reasons, however, these investigations only led to marginal changes until an innovation in the regionalization debate was presented by a governmental committee in 1992. Apart from the two previous models – strong central government presence in the regions, and regional parliaments – a third model involving inter-municipal cooperation was suggested. According to this alternative, county councils should be abolished and their functions transferred to indirectly elected municipal associations ( Johansson 1999). This suggestion opened up a gradually more favourable view towards reforms of the regional level by municipalities, but the main actors were divided in their views of the three alternatives: the municipalities’ own national interest organization (the Swedish Local Government Association) was in favour of municipal associations, the national organization of county councils (the Association of County Councils) wanted to have directly elected regions and the county administrative boards supported retention of a strong presence for central government at the regional level.

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During the same period a committee of inquiry suggested regional reforms in two specific parts of Sweden where the county structure had been regarded as particularly problematic. The greater Göteborg commuting area along the western coast crossed three counties and in Skåne, in southern Sweden, the region had been artificially divided from the very start into two counties – Malmöhus län and Kristianstads län respectively. In both of these areas there were pressures not only from municipal and county council politicians to establish larger regions, but also from regional business interests. Political parties at the local and regional level were particularly important in pushing for reform and coordinating efforts in this respect ( Johansson 2006). Both different forms of institutionalized cooperation between municipalities and county councils, as well as directly elected councils, were considered. The question of the territory of the region was not controversial in Skåne but was more contested in western Sweden. Popular support for reform was at best lukewarm (Nilsson 2007). Regionalization was clearly driven by local and regional elites. The process towards regionalization was also boosted by Swedish membership in the European Union in 1995. Already prior to Swedish entry, the counties had started to adjust to the reality of a European Union that put special emphasis on the role of the regional level. Once membership was a reality there was no longer any doubt among most politicians at all levels that Sweden needed a regional level with significant powers (Lidström 2009). Against this backdrop parliament decided in 1996 and 1997 to accept the creation of two new regions. The Skåne region came into effect from January 1997 whereas the Västra Götalandsregionen was established one year later. As a way of gaining acceptance for the region, the municipalities in Västra Götaland were represented in its decision-making structure. In order to avoid a feeling that the regions would be mere extensions of their largest cities, moreover, the regional centres were located not in the main city but elsewhere. Hence, in Skåne, Kristiandstad ended up as the regional capital instead of Malmö, and Vänersborg was given this role in Västra Götaland instead of Göteborg. The reforms also consisted of an experimental programme in which regional development functions were transferred from the county administrative boards to units representing regional self-government. In addition to Skåne and Västra Götaland, two counties that were not affected by territorial change – the island of Gotland and the county of Kalmar – were also included in this experimental programme. In Kalmar, a joint board consisting of representatives of the municipalities

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and the county council was set up, and this was given responsibility for regional development matters. The experiments also promoted the use of indirect elections as a solution to the question of how regional selfgovernment could be improved. These experiments were supposed to end in 2002, but have instead been extended several times, and from 2002 the right to establish joint boards with expanded regional development functions was made available for all counties where the municipalities and county councils could reach an agreement on the establishment of such a board. At approximately the same time the county councils’ responsibility to appoint the members of the county administrative boards was transferred to central government (Wångman 2007). These gradual regionalization reforms, in particular those that were initiated from the 1990s, had a few traits in common that distinguished them from previous territorial reforms in Sweden. First, the reform path tended to be asymmetrical. Some parts of the country – Skåne and Västra Götaland – went forward when comprehensive reform failed. Second, these reforms were driven by bottom-up processes in the sense that the main pressure came from local and county council politicians rather than from central government. In contrast to what happened during the municipal reforms, local elites in certain areas were in favour of amalgamations while central authorities were against. In both Skåne and Västra Götaland, the political parties created regional coalitions that lobbied for reform, sometimes contrary to the policies of these parties at the national level. Third, the Social Democrats were reluctant to introduce general reform. Although some party branches in the country supported regionalization, there was resistance at the national level.2 Fourth, reforms were limited to the intermediate level. The municipalities were left untouched. Central government stimulated inter-municipal cooperation rather than outright amalgamations. Fifth, experiments in policymaking had been tested earlier in what was known as the free commune experiment programme during the early 1990s (cf. Baldersheim and Ståhlberg 1994). They continued to play an important role in the regionalization case, not in the sense that they improved the rationality of the reform but rather inasmuch as they made actors more open to previously unacceptable alternatives. Sixth, although the path of reform was an ongoing power struggle between levels of government and political parties, it clearly followed a snowballing logic. An opening came in 1992 with the introduction of the idea that regional self-government could consist of inter-municipal cooperation. This increased the willingness of the municipalities to accept regional reform and effectively put an end to

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the previous alliance between municipalities and county administrative boards in opposition to reform. Once the process had started, it generated its own momentum. Seventh, behind the reform was a concern with economic development and regional competitiveness rather than welfare provision, although a more efficient use of resources for health care was also an argument for larger regions. Eighth, the reforms had an exogenous component. They corresponded to the general regionalization tendencies that occurred throughout Europe, and reflected the emphasis that the European Union has put on the regional level (cf. Keating and Loughlin 1997; Keating 2004; Lidström 2007). This phase of territorial restructuring in Sweden had much more in common with a post-Fordist than a Fordist mode of regulation. This concurs with suggestions by regulation theorists that post-Fordism has generally characterized the period from the mid-1970s onwards with regard to public sector restructuring (Painter 1995). Swedish regionalization reforms emphasized asymmetry, accepting differences and solutions that are fine tuned to fit specific circumstances, and these ideas replaced previous attempts to reach uniformity and standardization. The new changes took place in a society more dominated by information, knowledge, international competition and the more individualistic values of a growing middle class than in the past. For public organizations such as regions, the task of promoting economic growth and competitiveness became of greater importance.

A possible formative moment: The Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities Rather than discussing regionalization, the debate within the Social Democratic Party was more concerned with the future of the welfare system. What could be done to ensure that the welfare model could be retained, despite the challenges that were obvious in the near future? Not only was there pressure to keep taxes at a reasonable level in order to avoid them from becoming a burden in international competition, but also demographic changes that were expected could threaten the generous system of welfare benefits and services. An aging population would place more pressure on the pension system and the provision of health and medical care at the same time as there would be fewer of working age paying into the system. Continuing urbanization, furthermore, would make the smallest municipalities more vulnerable as service providers. The alternative – to limit the public responsibility to offering a minimum level of support, and to open up for additional private insurances and

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services – would fundamentally alter the basis of the Swedish welfare model. For the Social Democrats, this was an alternative that should be avoided at all costs. The existing system of public administration was seen as containing a number of dysfunctionalities that made it less capable of handling these expected challenges. The division of responsibilities between levels of government was often unclear and the structure of local and intermediate authorities was not adjusted to future demands. Complexity had also increased as a result of EU membership. Previous adjustments were regarded as having been too patchy. In short, a thorough analysis of the entire system of public administration was needed. In January 2003, the Social Democratic government appointed a parliamentary committee – the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities – with the task of carrying out an extensive review of the division of functions between levels of government and of the structure of local and regional government. The committee consisted of representatives from all the political parties in parliament and it was led by Mats Svegfors, the county governor of Västmanlands län who had previously been the editor of the largest daily conservative newspaper. It was hoped that this would ensure that the suggestions from the committee should be acceptable for all the parties and if accepted would therefore stand a chance of being permanent. In its mandate, the Committee was commissioned to deliver a first report by December 2003. This was to contain an overview of the changes in society making revisions of the system of public administration necessary and to suggest areas that would need more thorough review. On the basis of this report, the government would then issue new terms of references that would specify the focus of the second part of the Committee’s work. The extensiveness of the task was unique. Never previously in modern times had one single parliamentary committee been charged with the responsibility for making such a comprehensive review of the system of public administration in Sweden. It was emphasized that anything was possible and that, if necessary, there was even scope for radical reform. In terms of institutional theory, this seems to suggest that the appointment of the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities could perhaps represent a policy window that might be followed by a formative moment. If carried out, radical change could be underway. As planned, the first report from the committee provided an overview of expected societal changes and challenges. It suggested that a number of issues required further analysis, including the role of the municipalities, the structure of the regional level and the organization of the

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health system (Ansvarskommittén 2003). On this basis new directives were issued by the government in June 2004. Three areas were identified as particularly important: 1. The overall mandate and structure of local government, including the number of tiers and territorial divisions 2. The regional level of government, including health and medical care and regional development 3. Central government control of public administration. This second phase of the work was to be completed by the end of February 2007. The Committee worked in an open fashion, with both the chairman and committee members reporting publicly on how the discussions proceeded. In addition, and as is usual in a Swedish parliamentary committee, the various interests that were affected by its work were invited to take part in its discussions as experts. In this case, this included representatives for the national association of municipalities and the association of county councils. These organizations, in turn, continuously informed their executive committees about developments in the Committee. The members of the Committee were reluctant to make any early commitments and during most of 2006 it was unclear whether the Committee would be able to reach an agreement at all. A key issue was the role of the regions, and there were no signs of any opening up of the previously locked positions between the political parties. The Social Democrats had been in favour of municipal cooperation as a model for regional government although, in 2005, its party congress had decided in favour of a directly elected intermediate level in Sweden (against the suggestions of the party executive). The Conservatives, on the other hand, wanted to abolish the intermediate level of self-government altogether. For many years, this party has argued that county councils were unnecessary and costly and that their functions should be divided between municipalities and central government. All of the other parties were in favour of some sort of regional parliament. Once the regional issue was settled, it was believed that the remaining pieces would fall into place. After prolonged discussion, the parties managed to reach an agreement at the end of 2006. One important contributing factor was that the municipalities’ and the county councils’ interest organizations, representing all political parties at local and regional levels, had by 2000

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already agreed upon a joint position in favour of elected regional councils. Over the course of a ten-year period, the municipalities had gradually reconsidered their previously negative view on directly elected regional authorities. As Feltenius (2008) has shown, this was facilitated by the structural transformations that were taking place in the economy and society. This meant that the municipalities gradually came to accept that patterns of commuting and economic activity required the establishment of larger units than the existing counties. They also began to believe that they could benefit from the transfer of responsibility for regional economic development from the county administrative boards to self-governing regional bodies. This view, however, was obtained only after more trusting relationships had been established between the two tiers of local government. The peak of this process was reached when the two local government associations decided to merge into the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions – Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, formally set up in the beginning of 2007. This put additional pressure on municipalities and county councils to arrive at joint positions in matters where they had previously held different views. The Committee presented a number of suggestions that would reshape the Swedish system of public administration in several ways (Ansvarskommittén 2007). Perhaps the most important was the suggestion that the present county councils and regions should be replaced by six to nine regional authorities (regionkommuner) with directly elected bodies. As a general rule, each region would have a population of between one and two million inhabitants, its own regional hospital and at least one university with significant research resources. Moreover labour market areas should not be split by regional borders. If possible, citizens should also feel that they belong to the new regions, although the question of identity had not been a particularly important criterion for the Committee. Instead, the major concern was to create a basis for efficient health and medical services and for regional development. Contrary to previous amalgamation reforms, the Committee suggested that it should be left to local and regional stakeholders to agree on the territories of the new regions. Municipalities, county councils and central government actors at regional level, together with regional business interests and political parties, should come together and try to find acceptable solutions. Local referenda are proposed as a way of clarifying citizens’ opinions. A further suggestion is that the government should provide a helping hand by appointing process managers who can support the actors in their attempts to find agreements, but not direct the

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outcome of the process. It was stipulated, however, that the final results of theses negotiations would have to be approved by the parliament. The main functions of the regional authorities were proposed to be responsibility for health and medical services and for regional development. The latter includes both coordinating the work of other actors within the region and carrying out their own developmental functions. Regional development tasks that are currently carried out by the county administrative boards would be transferred to the regional authorities. The reorganization of the regional structure of central government was to be as follows: in each region, there would be a county administrative board with functions confined to controlling and overseeing local and regional implementation of national policies, compliance with national regulation and issuing of certain permits. As now, this board was to be headed by a county governor. However, it is likely that the elected chairman of the regional authority will replace the county governor as the main spokesperson for the region. At present central government agencies with responsibility for different sectors of public administration often have their own specific regional organization. Examples of such agencies are the National Board of Health and Welfare, the National Agency for Education, the Swedish Road Administration and the National Tax Board. Generally, the regional organization of these sectoral agencies covers a territory larger than the counties. One of the suggestions of the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities is that the regional branches of central government agencies should be adjusted to be coterminous with the new regional authorities. If adopted this would mean that there would be only one territorial regional division in Sweden and this will be the same for both the regional self-governments and the various central government administrations’ regional branches. If this reform is implemented, it is expected to greatly improve coordination of all actors at both local and regional levels. With regard to the existing municipal division no reform was proposed. However, it is suggested that voluntary amalgamations, in particular of small and rural municipalities, should be facilitated. Closer cooperation between municipalities is also favoured. A further proposal is that some of the supervisory functions that the municipalities currently carry out on behalf of central government (for example health controls and animal protection) should be transferred to central government agencies. If the proposal is implemented it would mean that a stricter division of functions would be established between central government and local/regional self-governing authorities.

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It should be noted the Committee did not explicitly analyze the possible consequences for local democracy arising from its proposals. Yet it did claim that the transfer of responsibility for regional development from a central government agency at the regional level to directly elected regional authorities would improve the democratic legitimacy of regional policies. The effects of the greater distance between electors and elected that will occur when county councils are amalgamated into larger units, however, was not discussed. In particular within the area of health care, decisions that are presently taken by the county councils would be moved to an authority further away from the citizens. By necessity, each regional councillor will have to represent a larger number of citizens than the present county councillors. The Committee suggested a fairly rapid implementation of its suggestions, proposing that the government should appoint process managers to initiate the review of the regional territorial structure. In those parts of the country where local and regional stakeholders could agree on the borders of the new regions during 2008, regional councils would come into existence following general elections in September 2010. It was envisaged that the remaining regions will be established four years later – in 2014 – and central government is expected to be more actively involved in creating these. This implies that there would be some kind of compulsory final date for the completion of the reform. The proposals from the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities have a number of characteristics that differentiate them from both the traditional path of territorial reform and the more gradual regionalization process that has taken place during the last 15 years. First, a comprehensive reform is suggested that in the end is likely to affect all parts of the country. At the same time, both variations in the pace of reform and in regional structures are accepted. Second, this is clearly a top-down reform but it recognizes that the regions have to be established after consultations with local and regional stakeholders. Third, the reform is an expression of the classical Swedish belief in policy rationality. Extensive organizational changes are thought to lead to the desired results. Fourth, the reform is limited to the regional level whereas the municipalities are left unaffected. Fifth, the main motive behind the reform has been to establish a public organization that will contribute to safeguarding the quality of the public welfare systems in the future. Sixth, reform was made possible by an alteration in the position of the municipalities, who now actively support directly elected regional self-government. Seventh, in comparison with previous reforms, more emphasis is put

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on establishing clear divisions of functions between levels of government. Eighth, in contrast to regional reforms in many other countries, the establishment of just one regional structure for all forms of central government agencies is clearly an innovation. This offers unique opportunities to coordinate public functions carried out by different providers at the regional level. The suggestions by the Committee have been met with overwhelming support from the municipalities and county councils. As a part of the normal procedure after a parliamentary committee has presented its proposal, they were asked to present their views on the suggestions in the report (the famous Swedish remiss process of extensive consultations). Almost all municipalities and all county councils agree that larger units of regional government are necessary, that new directly elected regions should have powers of taxation and that they should be responsible for health care and regional development.3 Nevertheless, there are different opinions on specific matters, such as how the borders of the regions should be drawn (Dagens Nyheter 2007). In principle, all political parties apart from the Conservatives are in favour of the suggestions, but as this party is the dominant force in the four-party coalition government and effectively has a veto position, the government has been very reluctant to accept the Committee’s suggestions. However, in early 2009, an agreement was reached within the government, meaning that the Conservatives now accept that the experimental regions of Skåne and Västra Götaland, and two smaller areas, be given full regional status from 2011. Other regions may also be established, although it is unlikely that any more will come into force before 2015. Hence, the Conservatives have accepted the principle of regionalization, although it is clear that this will take place in a much more gradual and piecemeal way than proposed by the Committee. The reform suggested by the Committee seems to be a mix of Fordism and post-Fordism. As a comprehensive reform, initiated from the top and based on assumptions of policy rationality, it reminds us of a reform style from the heydays of the industrial era. At the same time, the local negotiations, openness with regard to how territorial borders should be drawn, acceptance of variation between regions and the decentralized responsibility for economic development are well in tune with post-Fordism. Interestingly, the non-socialist government opposes the Fordist elements of the reform, but finds it easier to accept the postFordist components. What the exact mix of these two ways of carrying out reform will be remains to be seen.

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Conclusions: Understanding territorial change After almost 400 years, the regional level of government in Sweden seems ripe for reform. The Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities has suggested a comprehensive regionalization reform, although choices over how the borders should be drawn are to remain in the hands of local and regional interests. The reform is framed against the background of what is claimed to be an outdated division into counties. The reformers explicitly aim at establishing a more efficient system of public administration and welfare provision. It is also emphasized that these changes would create better conditions for regional economic development that would benefit not only each region but also the country as a whole. At the same time it is noteworthy that regionalization is not framed as a reform that would improve democracy or establish a sense of community. Although it remains to be seen whether all of the Committee’s suggestions will be implemented, and whether they will be achieved within the fairly rushed time frame that has been set up, the extensiveness of the suggestions are themselves historical. Earlier attempts to break from the dominant institutional path and create new regional divisions have been blocked by different interests. For many years, the two dominant Swedish political parties – the Social Democrats and the Conservatives – were reluctant to implement sweeping change. Municipalities and the county administrative boards also joined forces against regional reform. However, with an increasingly competitive international economy and an EU emphasizing the importance of the regional level of government, pressure started to build up in parts of the country where the existing county borders were seen as particularly dysfunctional. Value changes in society created an acceptance for greater variation in Swedish society, variation between both individuals and localities. Local and regional interests in Skåne and Västra Götaland pushed for change in these regions and once the initial resistance had been overcome, other parts of the country were also prepared to consider larger regions with more extensive functions. Hence, the process started from the bottom, in the sense that it was driven by local and regional rather than national politicians, but was later accepted by national policymakers. The reform has also been carried out in a piecemeal way. Beginning in the two regions of Skåne and Västra Götaland, it has eventually gained acceptance throughout most of the country. The changed positions of the municipalities and the Social Democrats have paved way for the reform. When the municipalities saw that they could also benefit from regional government, in particular from the

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transfer of economic development functions to these bodies, they broke their previous ties with the county administrative boards and embarked on a road that eventually led them to join forces with the county councils. This mended a previous split between local and county council politicians. For the Social Democrats, resistance was broken partly as a result of pressures from their own sub-national politicians, but also as a consequence of regional reform eventually being seen as a necessary prerequisite for creating more sustainable systems of public welfare. The main opponent to comprehensive reform is the Conservative Party, although in a compromise with the other non-socialist parties it has adjusted its position and now accepts a regional level of self-government. It nevertheless favours a more voluntary and bottom-up oriented strategy than the one proposed by the committee. Hence, the main pattern of conflict in this issue is between the Conservatives, on the one hand, and the other political parties, the municipalities and the county councils on the other. As several of the local authorities are led by conservative politicians, there is also a split within the Conservative party on regional reform. This is an interesting development in that from the early 1950s onwards, territorial reforms have been left–right issues, but now this is no longer the case. The reform process has followed many institutional patterns that typically characterize Swedish policymaking. A parliamentary committee, consisting of both parliamentarians and representatives of the major affected interest organizations, was set up to investigate the matter. This was followed by an extensive process of consultation (the remiss process). Together, these provided the basis for broad, consensus-like agreement. Although everyone was not in favour of the suggestions, a powerful advocacy coalition was established. As a consequence of these changes, Sweden is taking a step towards establishing a stronger and more coherent level of regional government. If the reform is realized, the previous dominance of the national and local levels will be complemented by a regional level of self-government that not only will have significant powers of its own, but will also play a major role as a coordinator of the territorial branches of different central government agencies. This may, however, reinforce the role of traditional means of government at the regional level and reduce the scope for networks of governance. It is not likely that these reforms will transform the egalitarian unitary state into a federal one, but they may significantly shift the balance within the unitary state between the different levels of government.

Anders Lidström

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Notes 1. Presently, seven political parties are represented in the Swedish parliament. The two largest are the Social Democratic and the Conservative Parties. The parties tend to cooperate in party blocks. The socialist block consists of the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Environmental Party. The Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Centre Party belong to the non-socialist block. The non-socialist parties formed a coalition government in 2006. 2. Olle Svenning, a usually well-informed journalist and author, reports that the Social Democratic Prime Minister at the time, Göran Persson, was worried that regions, in alliance with other regions in other countries, might establish alternative sources of power that in the long run may challenge central government’s overall control over the country and the homogeneity of public welfare systems (Svenning 2005). 3. http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/24/93/074b2599.xls (accessed 16 March 2010).

5 The Staying Power of the Norwegian Periphery Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose

Local government in Norway is somewhat unique. Rather than being mentioned in the constitution and thereby being formally recognized as an integral part of the political system, local government is the subject of special legislation. The first such laws were adopted as early as 1837. Under this legislation a two-tier system of local government was established. On one level a system of municipalities was created, at a second level county councils were established. The passage of these initial laws was largely the result of efforts by local groups – primarily farmers and businessmen – who sought greater freedom from the central bureaucracy and additional rights to make decisions on matters affecting the local community according to local prerogatives. As such, a centre–periphery cleavage was apparent even at this early stage in the evolution of Norwegian democratic politics. This cleavage has proven to be an enduring feature as will become apparent in two stories regarding recent attempts at reforming territorial governance in Norway. The two stories can be seen as acts in a larger drama. The first story is about an attempt in the early 1990s to reform the municipal structure en bloc with an eye to enlarging municipalities and thus reduce their number by 50 per cent or more. This attempt stalled in 1995, and subsequent attempts to revive the process have as yet not been successful. The second story is about regional governance. In this case the goal was to transfer substantially new functions and powers to regional institutions of self-government. But reformers could not make up their minds whether the new institutions should be jazzed-up versions of existing county councils or rather large-scale regional giants. This ambiguity was one of the factors contributing to the undoing of the reform initiative early in 2008. The larger drama found in both stories, however, is that of the centre against the periphery – a drama that is part of the permanent repertoire of 80


the Norwegian polity. Actors may change, but the script and the characters remain recognizable from one decade (or century) to the next. In what follows, we begin with the first story, providing some historical background that frames discussions to this day, after which we turn our attention to the second story. In the chapter’s concluding section we bring the threads of both stories together in a summary of initiatives, actors, arguments, strategies, barriers to change, and an assessment of the present situation.

Historical backdrop: Post-war amalgamation As in most countries, the territorial structure of local government in Norway is rooted in a long history that serves to frame many of the current debates. The most appropriate starting point for considering recent developments, however, is found in the work undertaken following World War II when, in 1946, a public commission of inquiry charged with looking into the structure of local government was appointed. At the time the number of municipalities was nearly 750, many of which were demographically quite small. Working in a slow but deliberate fashion, this commission prepared and submitted a report that laid out two fundamental considerations regarding to the administrative division of local government: first, that municipalities should be communities capable of living ‘an autonomous life within the limits set by law’; and, second, that local self-government presumed a certain minimal economic capacity. The objective for all subsequent revisions of political-administrative boundaries was therefore defined as a question of establishing units that, while retaining the idea of local self-government, would provide the best possible conditions for (1) the development of economic life, (2) achieving stability in the municipal economy, (3) allowing for a geographically natural equalization of taxes and (4) the development of a professional administrative apparatus and rational, efficient administration (Kommuneinndellingskomitéen 1952:26). This report constituted the basis of a parliamentary proposition (St.prp. nr. 22 (1955)) which, following lively debate in which there were clear partisan divisions – the Labour Party supported the commission’s recommendations whereas the Conservative, Agrarian and Liberal parties favoured other solutions, especially inter-municipal cooperative arrangements – was approved in 1956. Most significantly, the measure granted central government the authority to make subsequent decisions affecting administrative divisions and boundaries without further parliamentary consideration, even in cases where local

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The Staying Power of the Norwegian Periphery

Table 5.1 Distribution of Norwegian municipalities according to population size, 1951, 1974 and 1991 1951 Population size

1974

1991

Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent

Less than 1,000 1,001–2,500 2,500–5,000 5,001–10,000 10,001–20,000 20,001–50,000 50,001–100,000 Over 100,000

87 288 229 93 38 5 2 2

12 39 31 13 5 1 * *

18 92 133 114 56 23 4 3

4 21 30 26 13 5 1 1

17 100 131 93 59 31 5 3

4 23 30 21 13 7 1 1

Total

774

101

443

101

439

100

Note: * Less than 1 per cent Source: Norwegian Social Science Data Service, Municipal Data Bank.

authorities were opposed, so long as the decisions were in keeping with the guidelines recommended by the commission. Passage of this act opened the way for a process of amalgamation that, in the course of a ten-year period, reduced the number of municipalities from 744 to 443. As can be observed from Table 5.1, the reform had a pronounced effect in terms of increasing the size of municipalities. Whereas in 1951 only 19 per cent of the municipalities had more than 5,000 inhabitants, in 1974 the comparable figure was 45 per cent. The consequences for population distribution were equally dramatic: whereas 59 per cent of the population lived in municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 1951, by 1974 this percentage was 84.

The issue emerges anew: Two initiatives going nowhere Even with these reforms, a relatively large number of small municipalities continued to exist, a matter that regularly attracted national attention. Thus in 1989, after substantial public debate, yet another public commission of inquiry was appointed to look into this issue. As is typical for such commissions, it was comprised of individuals representing various perspectives and interests – local and national politicians, representatives for central ministries (the ministries of finance, environment and local government affairs), selected interest organizations and a handful of other individuals having competence deemed to be of special relevance – 13 members in all, the leader being a county prefect.1


The commission undertook its work in a manner characteristic of many such public inquiries in Norway, adopting a systematic evaluative approach. The starting point was to assess whether or not there was a genuine need for reform, a question to which three alternative answers were possible: (1) reform was unnecessary – incremental regulatory changes would suffice; (2) more extensive inter-municipal cooperation would prove adequate as an alternative to reform; or (3) reform was necessary. Each of these answers was explored and a set of fundamental guidelines to be applied in the event that reform was deemed necessary were to be suggested.2 A fundamental assumption framing the commission’s work was that the primary purpose of local government was to facilitate the realization of overarching national goals and that the territorial division of local government should be suited to this purpose. The territorial structure of local government, in short, was not viewed as an end in its own right, but rather as a means to an end. Within this framework the activities of local government were divided into three general types: production of services, socio-economic development and democracy. Over a three year period the commission gathered evidence from various sources and made study visits to different parts of the country, as well as to Denmark, Finland and Sweden, before submitting its report to the Minister of Local Government Affairs in 1992. The majority conclusion was that a need to reform the structure of municipal and country government indeed existed, and that the benefits of such a reform would outweigh the disadvantages. As a basis for considering territorial reform, the commission advanced three primary principles and three supplemental principles. The first three emphasized geographical functionality, municipal size and physical access, whereas the latter emphasized special needs and adaptability (cf. Exhibit 5.1). The arguments advanced by the commission were largely pragmatic, with particular weight being placed on achieving a structure that would provide a viable socio-economic base for local government. Although mentioned, other considerations – such as issues of democratic participation – were deemed to be of secondary concern. In taking this position the commission stressed that the objective was one of maintaining all-purpose authorities (whereby all units of local government have similar responsibilities within a common system of public administration) rather than adopting a fragmentary, patchwork quilt system of more specialized or asymmetric local authorities. The debate is joined As is customary in Norway, the commission report was publicly circulated for comments. The list of actors invited to comment was broadly

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Exhibit 5.1 Principles suggested by the Christiansen commission for future territorial reform in Norway, 1992 Three primary principles 1. Municipalities should be delimited such that they constitute geographically functional units adapted to a common residential and labour market and the location of private and public services. 2. Municipalities should as far as possible have at least 5,000 inhabitants. 3. The area of municipalities should not be larger than that inhabitants have acceptable accessibility to the municipal center and the most important public services. Three supplementary principles 4. With municipal amalgamations the objective in general ought to be to create units with one municipal centre. 5. Unsuitable boundaries of municipalities, which only affect a smaller segment of the respective municipality’s population, should be resolved in such a fashion that the population’s own wishes with respect to municipal identity is given great weight. 6. Municipal boundaries should primarily be based on municipal activities. At the same time boundaries should provide the basis for a good division of local central government administration when this does not conflict with other principles for drawing boundaries. Source: NOU 1992:15

based, encompassing all central government ministries, all municipalities and counties as well as central associations of local government authorities, all political parties, various employer and employee organizations, commercial associations, assorted interest organizations, academic and regional research institutions, and an assortment of other institutions deemed to have potentially vested interests – nearly 600 different actors in all. In the letter inviting comments, moreover, all recipients were given the prerogative of allowing subordinate divisions and member organizations to contribute viewpoints as well, so the total number of actors given an opportunity to contribute reactions was even greater. Sent in September 1992, with a deadline for replies set to December 1993, the letter invited comments on all issues raised in the commission report. Whether various actors decide to submit comments in such circumstances, and how this is done, is a matter of discretion, and not all of the actors invited to comment did so. Of 435 municipalities, for example, 62 did not submit comments, whereas some (31 in all) chose to submit a joint response in collaboration with one or more others. A number of other actors likewise declined the invitation. On the other hand, some


actors that submitted comments had not specifically been invited to do so. Among these were business and commercial interests, regional councils, planning and development agencies, occupational and idealistic organizations, political groupings and an action group agitating against municipal amalgamation. An analysis of the comments submitted reveals a fairly wide spectrum of arguments and a good deal of diversity even among the same type of actors. Most unanimous was the sceptical response registered by municipalities: nearly 80 per cent of those expressing an independent opinion were negative to the commission report, especially the idea that all municipalities should – insofar as possible – have a minimum of 5,000 inhabitants. This, of course, was not altogether surprising given the fact that were such a recommendation to have been put into practice, over 50 per cent of all existing municipalities would have disappeared through amalgamation. Those expressing a negative view were typically small municipalities having fewer than 5,000 inhabitants located predominantly in the periphery or in close proximity to large, centrally located municipalities. By comparison, municipalities expressing a more favourable view were typically larger, centrally located municipalities in southern Norway, many of which had experienced strong population growth. Another group of more favourably disposed municipalities were coastal communities where the predominant means of transport had shifted from sea to land. Among municipalities critical of the recommendations, inter-municipal cooperation tended to be seen as a fully viable alternative. If boundary adjustments were needed, these were to be based on local considerations and circumstances, not national goals and objectives. Many municipalities also based their opposition to reform on arguments of local democracy and the adverse consequences amalgamation reforms were foreseen to have in this regard. The arguments, in short, reflected a centre–periphery conflict in which territorial reform was seen as a desire of the central government motivated by concerns with effectiveness and efficiency, and as a tactic to be imposed on local governments at the cost of local autonomy. Amalgamation, moreover, was seen as part of a strong centralizing tendency in society, a tendency that by no means was perceived to be beneficial. Few if any municipalities opposed to the recommendations used arguments relating to commerce and economic development in the comments submitted, and to the extent they did, it was often with negative connotations. Municipalities of more positive persuasion did not reject strengthened inter-municipal cooperation, but did not see this as yielding as many

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benefits as amalgamation. For these municipalities the emphasis was upon efficiencies in public service production and delivery. Great weight was placed on rational or functionally defined ‘regional’ entities with good communication and ease of access. A number of the larger urban municipalities also referred to the positive benefits which, in their eyes, were realized from the round of amalgamations in the 1960s. They also pointed to the problem of being ‘encapsulated’ by surrounding authorities, many residents of which commuted and represented free riders with regard to the urban cultural and technical infrastructure. Arguments relating to local self government and democracy, on the other hand, were noteworthy by their absence. Also noteworthy, however, was that none of these municipalities explicitly supported the commission recommendation stipulating a minimum of 5,000 inhabitants. Comments submitted by other actors were similarly varied, some being positive, others being negative, the main thrust of the comments generally representing a logical extension of concerns that were central to the respective actor’s primary interests. The Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, for instance, was favourable to the commission report, recognizing the need to have a territorial structure that best served business interests. From this perspective a functional geographic division based on principles of access and rational service provision was of foremost importance. Greater prevalence of inter-municipal cooperation was welcomed, but only as a supplement, not as an alternative, to amalgamation. The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions was less clear in its comments, but did subscribe to the idea that the territorial division of local government should contribute to the realization of national goals. Economic considerations with respect to public service provision were likewise acknowledged, but support was also given to the importance of maintaining and developing local self-government. Largely for this reason the organization was hesitant to endorse any ideal size for Norwegian municipalities. Particularly interesting to note are comments submitted by the Association of Local and Regional Authorities. The association conceded that the territorial structure of local government should be evaluated in light of ongoing socio-economic developments and recognized that central government has ultimate responsibility for deciding this structure. But it emphasized that any changes should seek to respect the will of the people, and that forced amalgamations should only be used under special circumstances. In keeping with this view, the association argued that the commission report placed too much weight on


considerations of efficiency; local government has a value of its own independent of effective and rational service provision. And the association was critical of the idea of setting a minimum number of inhabitants for municipalities. Geographic proximity, residential patterns and contact were seen as being more important than simple statistical criteria. Other national interest organizations divided in their viewpoints, although few were wholeheartedly positive. A reserved if not outright critical view was more typical. As examples here the Norwegian Association of Teachers and the National Association of Small Farmers are representative. Both were negative to the commission report, setting forth arguments relating to local autonomy and democracy, the value of allowing for diversity, and qualitative rather than quantitative dimensions in considering the territorial structure of local government. The teachers’ organization rejected outright the possibility of applying the idea of economies of scale within the educational sector and was critical to what amalgamations might imply with respect to the centralization of schools. The farmers’ association similarly rejected an approach that was strictly based on objective criteria, arguing that well-being is a subjective matter and that people are most satisfied with public service provision in small entities. The association also emphasized the value of local democracy, suggesting that marginal groups are more readily heard in small municipalities. Comments submitted by the association conclude by asserting that ‘no municipality should be amalgamated by force against the will of the local population’. A parliamentary white paper and an unanticipated outcome Once the deadline for submitting comments had passed, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development sought to summarize the various viewpoints and used them in preparing a parliamentary white paper (St.meld. nr. 32 (1994–95)), a process that lasted well over a year. The white paper took a principled approach; it raised two fundamental questions and offered answers without advancing any concrete proposals for redrawing the political-administrative map. The first question was whether the existing functional division of responsibilities, including those assigned to country government, should be maintained. The second question was whether there was a need for reforming the territorial structure of local government. The response to both of these questions was a clear ‘yes’. But in preparing the white paper the ministry toned down the commission’s recommendation that all municipalities should, insofar as possible, have a minimum of 5,000 inhabitants, the

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recommendation that had caused the greatest storm of criticism and opposition. Many of the commission’s viewpoints and conclusions were otherwise endorsed and forwarded for parliamentary consideration. The white paper was presented in May of 1995 and was sent to committee for consideration with an expectation that the proposal would be acted upon by the spring of 1996. Almost before the committee had begun its work, however, a parliamentary member made a proposal from the floor that any future municipal amalgamations should be based on a principle of voluntary acceptance by the residents of the municipalities affected. The proposal took many by surprise, and it was suggested that the proposal be sent to committee for consideration along with the parliamentary white paper. But the member insisted on a vote regarding his proposal, and, to the astonishment of many, the proposal achieved a comfortable majority (81 versus 58) without any debate. This action did not, however, stop the committee from considering the white paper. Over the course of a year, the committee arranged a series of public hearings and undertook several trips to different parts of the country before submitting its recommendations in the spring of 1996. In the debate which followed, the Labour party, which held governmental power (albeit without a parliamentary majority) took the lead in arguing for favourable action on the measure. A common thread in viewpoints put forth by several representatives was that the structure of local government is a means to an end, not an end on its own. The ends to be realized, it was argued, were first and foremost equality in delivery of high quality public services. Boundaries should therefore be functionally based with less emphasis being placed on historical and cultural considerations. Larger municipalities were also seen as a means of reducing trends of depopulation among peripheral municipalities and of combating tendencies of privatization of service production and delivery. The problem of encapsulated urban municipalities was similarly mentioned and the opposition was accused of irresponsibility in failing to come to grips with these problems. Relatively little was made of economies of scale, but the suggestion that small municipalities could be more effective than larger units (‘small is beautiful’) was dismissed out of hand. The only other party to adopt a more positive view of the conclusions advanced in the white paper was the Progress Party, a neoliberal right-wing party. While rejecting the idea of forced amalgamations, the party leader argued for a policy of inducing municipalities to merge by removing some of the central government grants provided to smaller municipalities, making financial transfers dependent solely upon objective


criteria. The intention was to force local governments to find their own optimal organization. The party otherwise used the opportunity to advance its position in favour of eliminating the intermediate county level of government with their responsibilities to be turned over either to the municipalities or to central government. For one reason or another all of the remaining parties represented in parliament stood in opposition to the government proposal. A common thread was rejection of forced amalgamations, an approach even Labour tried to disavow, but without much success. Instead values of local autonomy, democracy and traditions of identity were lauded by spokespersons for the opposition. If amalgamations were desirable, they would be proposed by residents of the municipalities themselves. The Labour government was accused of being fixated on cost effectiveness more than quality of service production, and one representative of the Centre Party, a party with strong roots in the agrarian periphery, went so far as to argue that the challenges for municipalities in the future would be to provide compassionate service delivery, something that would be best achieved in small units of local government where individuals had strong community ties. It was also argued that the government’s proposal would encourage centralization and thereby reinforce demographic flight from the periphery whereas the existing structure of local government was perceived as putting a (necessary) brake on such tendencies. Inter-municipal cooperative arrangements were seen as a preferable alternative. Yet another alternative, preferred by spokespersons for the Conservative Party in particular, was greater use of outsourcing and competitive bidding. Although receptive to arguments based on cost effectiveness and economies of scale, these representatives suggested that models used by the public commission had been too theoretical and not adequately adapted to the realities of the situation. The party also stressed the importance of individual feelings of identity and belonging, and that local residents should be allowed to exercise authority as they best saw fit. While distancing himself from private sector solutions, a representative of the Socialist Left Party likewise strongly endorsed this latter perspective; in his view any reform process needed to respect and be based upon local forces, not a process of ‘gigantic forced amalgamations’. A similar line of argument was voiced by representatives of the Christian People’s Party: more focus was needed on maintaining natural organizational units with a common social and cultural history and the bonds that these tended to produce instead of possible, although doubtful, benefits of increased effectiveness that mergers might provide.

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The parliamentary debate ended in a decision to reject the government proposal, thereby de facto making voluntary amalgamations based on acceptance by a majority of the inhabitants in all municipalities affected the official policy. In summing up after the vote, the representative from the Centre Party who had proposed this policy from the floor a year earlier called the decision a victory for the will of the people and suggested that the victory – something that purportedly occurred so infrequently – could be explained by four factors: 1. 2. 3. 4.

People generally do not like force and central direction Local self-government is a tradition with strong roots The initial public commission report included a minority position The process of policymaking took so long that the opposition had time to mobilize.

Central authorities continue to try, but with one hand tied Following defeat of the government proposal, advocates of structural reform were forced to search for other alternatives. At the end of the 1990s and the outset of the new millennium two strategies were pursued – economic carrots on the one hand and threats of the whip on the other. The carrots were offers to cover all costs incurred by municipalities willing to investigate amalgamation and a ‘guarantee’ that, should mergers actually occur, the municipalities involved would not be subject to any net reduction in the total amount of central government transfers received during the following ten years. The whip consisted of various statements suggesting means by which small, costly and ‘ineffective’ municipalities might suffer adverse consequences. One such means was a change in the system of local government finance and modification of the criteria used for fixing central government transfers – a modification that in essence would serve to penalize smaller units of government. Another means was to threaten a fundamental change in the responsibilities and prerogatives assigned to different municipalities. Rather than maintaining the principal of generalist municipalities whereby all units of local government are of equal status with the same portfolio of functions, the spectre of creating different categories of municipalities was raised, some of which would be assigned a broader range of responsibilities and exercise more authority than those with a more restricted set of tasks and responsibilities. A driving force behind this alternative was the idea that smaller municipalities, due largely to their size, often had difficulties attracting qualified professionals capable of providing specialized services such as psychiatric aid and care for juvenile delinquents.


Neither of these strategies produced revolutionary results. In the period from 1999 to 2004 proposals for amalgamation advanced to the stage where local referenda were held in 12 cases. Of these, a majority of the population in one or more of the municipalities affected voted against the proposal in six instances, whereas the proposals garnered a majority in the other six cases, but only with the slimmest of margins in three of these. In one referendum the proposal carried by only two votes, while in another the majority was four votes! Based on the outcomes from these referenda, the municipal councils nonetheless adopted resolutions to amalgamate, and merger processes were set in motion. In two instances where the proposals won majority support among the population, however, further action remains to be taken. Thus, in one instance the referenda passed with an overwhelming majority (90 per cent in favour), but on the condition that a permanent transportation link be built between the island municipality and the mainland. To date this has not been accomplished, and the merger is placed on hold. The Association of Local and Regional Authorities enters the scene – will bottom-up work better? Seeing that the line of voluntary amalgamation was slow to yield results, central authorities decided to pursue yet another strategy. In autumn 2003, in what can best be termed a bottom-up, grassroots approach, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development accepted a proposal from the Association of Local and Regional Authorities to carry out a two-year project entitled The Future Structure of Municipal Government: Municipalities with Responsibility for their own Development. All municipalities were invited to undertake an investigation of and debate conditions relating to their own situation and future prospects. Process and assessment documents, together with special funding, were provided to local project groups, and conclusions from the review processes were reported first to the county level and then on to central authorities. 413 of 433 municipalities took part in the exercise, and results were summarized in reports for each county as well as for the country as a whole. Results from the project offered a mixed picture that invited a classic case of competing interpretations: was the glass ‘half empty’ or ‘half full’. Among municipalities that took part in the project, 25 per cent responded that the status quo was their preferred choice, a little more than one-fifth indicated a willingness to consider amalgamation and were open to more in-depth investigations of the options, whereas the remaining municipalities (53 per cent) expressed a preference for the

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existing territorial structure, but saw a need for increased inter-municipal cooperation. The central steering committee of the project did not hesitate to interpret these results in the direction of a need for further reform, noting the ‘75 per cent of the municipalities do not see the status quo as an alternative’ (KRD 2005:28). This conclusion was based on a goodwill interpretation of the fact that many of the municipalities that saw more extensive inter-municipal cooperation as offering the primary solution to existing problems, held open amalgamation as a second alternative. In summarizing the results, the committee emphasized three points: 1. The existing structure of local government would potentially weaken the basis for maintaining a generalist principle of municipal government, especially in the event that municipalities should be granted even more responsibility for various social welfare policies. 2. An extensive and comprehensive form of inter-municipal cooperation offers a solution to many of the challenges to be confronted, but at the same time may serve to undercut local democracy and the ability of municipalities to act decisively. 3. The line of voluntary amalgamation requires a much stronger set of incentives if changes in the territorial structure of local government are desired. In the wake of the project, roughly 30 municipalities applied for funds to pursue further questions relating to amalgamation, but in the interim parliamentary elections had been held and a new coalition government took office in 2005. For this new government, reform of municipal government took a back seat to regional reform.

Regional reform as an alternative? The question confronting the new government taking office in 2005 was whether reform or replacement of the county councils might be a way of solving the problems that the enlargement of municipalities was meant to achieve. The two-tier system of local government established in 1837 remained largely intact until the 1960s when the amalgamation of municipalities took place. County councils were secondary authorities for the rural areas with no taxation powers of their own, and municipalities were represented on the county councils by their mayors. In the early 1950s, however, voices were also heard demanding reforms of the county councils. Far-reaching changes were proposed by the Minister for Local Government in 1954, but the proposal was rejected.


A decade later, in 1964, towns and cities were incorporated under the authority of the county councils. Urban areas had by now become so entangled with their hinterlands that the political-administrative separation of urban and rural areas was considered to be out of step with geographical and sociological realities. In what was deemed a minor revolution, the long history of the councils as organs of rural districts and the periphery came to an end. At this time county councils were given primary responsibility for secondary education and hospitals. In subsequent years county councils continued to expand and became important conduits for the implementation of ambitious welfare state programmes aiming at eradicating territorial inequalities regarding access to welfare services. The expansion of the county councils in terms of financial and functional responsibilities was not, however, reflected in democratic accountability. Only after new legislation was passed and took effect in 1976 were criteria of democracy as well as of efficiency invoked, allowing for direct elections of county councils. The councils were also granted power of levying direct taxes, and great hopes were placed in the powers of planning and coordination that were invested in the county councils. County planning proved to be a cumbersome and bureaucratic process largely neglected by state regional agencies. In the following decade the county councils suffered positive losses of functions, most painfully in the field of economic development, where a semi-independent state agency took over most responsibility. The most serious setback, however, occurred in 2002 when the Labour government decided to make hospitals a state rather than county responsibility. At the stroke of a pen 60 per cent of county council budgets disappeared and 100,000 employees were also transferred to state bodies. Subsequently, under the centre-right government that followed, child custody institutions and substance abuse programmes were also taken over by the state. The dominant cleavage in the battle over hospitals was that of territorial Norway against corporatist Norway. The county councils and the Association of Local and Regional Authorities defended county ownership of hospitals while associations of doctors and nurses supported the state takeover, and so did the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (Baldersheim 2003). The hollowing-out of county councils was accompanied by an erosion of political legitimacy. Political parties of the right began to campaign for the abolition of the county councils. ‘Two levels of government are enough’, the argument ran, echoing the lean government ideologies fashionable elsewhere in Europe.

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2001: Bottom-up initiatives – outlines of new regional constellations? As the new millennium dawned attitudes to regional governance had crystallized into those of abolitionists (parties of the right) and revivalists (parties of the left and centre). The precise options of the latter group were not yet clearly outlined. But county councils themselves did not sit quietly waiting for the future to happen. A number of councils initiated bottom-up processes of regional reconstruction, forming a series of partnerships across county borders. These included four West Coast counties, two South Coast counties, two Mid-Norway counties, and two Inland counties. A triumvirate of Buskerud, Telemark and Vestfold counties was also formed. Meanwhile the three counties of Northern Norway had a long tradition of mutual consultation and joint action vis-à-vis the central government. Some of these partnerships were delegated decision-making powers in the field of highways, and some also joined forces regarding public transport. Although these joint functions were modest, participants felt that they showed they were capable of acting together. To some extent evaluation reports substantiated such claims, but also pointed out weaknesses (see, for example, Finsrud and Hildrum 2006). It was unclear, however, whether these constellations could represent the embryos of new enlarged regions. Political parties of the left and some of those classified as belonging to the ‘centre’ traditionally supported the idea of strong regional selfgovernment. Even so, by the time of the 2005 parliamentary elections most of these parties had come to the view that the existing county councils and their territorial jurisdictions were outmoded, and promised reforms of regional governance during the electoral campaign. The idea was to replace the existing structures with larger and more powerful regional institutions. A coalition of centre-left wing parties won the 2005 election and formed a ‘red-green’ government, after which the Minister for Local Government and Regional Development immediately started preparations for regional reform. Based on these efforts a white paper was presented to parliament (St.meld. nr. 12 (2006–07)) in December 2006. The paper indicated three options regarding future regional governance: (1) ‘enhancement’ of the present county councils, meaning a certain extension of functions, (2) enlargement of counties (for example reducing the number from 19 to 14 or 15) along with some new functions, and (3) large-scale regions (5 to 9 in number) with extensive new powers. The paper stated quite clearly that the transfer of functions


and power to regions would depend on the scale of the new regions. The minister’s preferred option was clearly that of large regions while the intermediate model was ruled out as an alternative. Organizing choice Legally, the final decision concerning political-administrative boundaries – both municipal and county – is a parliamentary prerogative. Central government has been delegated the authority to make decisions regarding municipal amalgamations when all of the municipalities concerned agree. Under current legislation municipalities and counties may initiate processes of amalgamation if they so desire, and so may the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. The first step of the process is that of initiating an inquiry. Municipalities are obliged to consult their inhabitants as a part of the inquiry, but there is no similar obligation concerning county amalgamations (LOV 2001-06-15 nr. 70). There is thus legal room for initiating top-down as well as bottom-up procedures of amalgamating municipalities and counties. The procedure adopted for the municipal amalgamations of the 1960s was top-down, based on a full-scale, national inquiry. In 2006, however, the 1995 parliamentary decision on voluntary amalgamations blocked the option of unilateral top-down decision-making. With this in mind, the ‘principle’ of voluntary amalgamations was also the point of departure for the process of regional enlargement. Hence at the outset county councils were invited first to specify their preference for one of the two main options and second to indicate where they stood regarding the other option and their views regarding regional divisions. During these considerations county councils were encouraged to consult with other regional and local actors, especially regional state agencies and municipalities. The Association of Local and Regional Authorities was enlisted as a facilitator of the discussions in this regard. If these processes did not result in an overall structure that was acceptable from a national point of view, however, the central government reserved the right to intervene and to present a more suitable solution for consideration by parliament. But how would central authorities decide what a suitable solution looked like? The white paper outlined three main criteria for the determination of the appropriate scale of regions: size, functionality and identity. Without being specified very precisely, size seemed to refer to ideas about advantages of scale, underlying fiscal capacity, and requirements of catchment areas for various public functions. Functionality, by

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comparison, meant trying to create regions that formed integrated economic zones, although commitment to this goal was attenuated by statements suggesting that scattered populations might be well served by multi-core regions. Finally, the criterion of identity emphasized feelings of belonging and established patterns of political cooperation across geographical–institutional borders. In sum, the central government presented an unusually open-ended proposal on regional reform. A decidedly bottom-up procedure was initiated, at least at the second stage of the reform process. County councils were given opportunities to influence the scope of functions as well as new regional borders. Hospitals, however, were not among the functions they were invited to choose; these were to remain under state control despite intentions to the contrary expressed by one of the coalition parties (the Centre Party) before the election. The Labour Party was not willing to reverse a reform it had carried through only three years earlier. But the commitment of the Centre Party to transfer hospitals back to the regions was repeated as late as March 2007 by the party’s national convention. Thus, a latent cleavage existed even within the governing coalition. Battlefronts in 2007 Analyses of attitudes to regional reforms during the 1990s revealed a three-fold pattern of cleavages regarding the organization of territorial governance: (1) a territorial dimension with tensions between centre and periphery; (2) a corporatist dimension characterized by negative attitudes to county council influence among trade unions, professional associations and in trade and industry associations; and (3) a partisan dimension indicating a left–right cleavage (Baldersheim and Torsteinsen 2002). A similar analysis of attitudes expressed in ten regional newspapers carried out in 2007 indicated that criticism of existing county councils was still widespread; very few voices in favour of the councils were heard. It was taken for granted that they were outmoded, although little evidence was cited in this regard. Consequently, most commentators looked forward to the coming reform. Nevertheless attitudes to the announced reform were divided in all regions. These divisions followed well-known political lines already noted. Reception of the white paper was also mixed. Adherents of large-scale regions were disappointed that this option was not more forcefully pursued at the outset. Opponents of any regional government, on the other hand, were relieved that the white paper was so vague and expected the reform initiative to come to nothing. Larger cities that had hopes of


becoming the centres of enlarged regions supported the regional option, while cities that could lose out in realignment of regional borders were negative. Commentators from peripheral areas of potentially enlarged regions tended to view the new constructions as instruments of centralization. However, there were no clear-cut differences in attitudes between counties close to the capital (Eastern Norway) compared to those located farther away, say in Northern Norway or on the West Coast. The outcome – continuity, no super-regions Early in the process spokespersons for a few county councils declared a willingness to amalgamate with neighbours, others declared against. At the end of the day in December 2007 eight county councils stated they were prepared to unite with a neighbour, while 11 had decided against any amalgamations. The ‘no’ counties were geographically distributed in such a way that most amalgamations were impossible if the ‘principle of voluntarism’ was to be respected. Clearly there was not enough support among the existing county councils for the envisaged super-regions. In February 2008, the Minister for Local and Regional Government therefore chose to bury the option of regional reform. A few new functions regarding highways, environmental protection and economic development funds were scraped together for the existing county councils so that the reform would not look totally empty, but the outcome was a far cry from the ambitious visions the red-green coalition government had set out in 2005. Paradoxically, the regional reform was killed by the peripheral regions that were supposed to benefit most from the reform! And, in the face of a new round of parliamentary elections in 2009 attention once again reverted to the question of restructuring municipal government, with all but one of the major parties indicating a willingness to abandon the principle of voluntary amalgamation in favour of top-down mandatory mergers.

Discussion and conclusion The two stories of municipal and regional reform efforts recounted above can be summarized in the following points: • Advocacy coalitions: The 1989 initiative for municipal reform came from the incumbent Labour government. After prolonged public debate, the government appointed a public commission of inquiry composed of experts to analyze the problem and to come up with proposals regarding the need for and extent of potential reforms. Regional governance, by comparison, was put on the agenda in a different way.

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In this case a gradual erosion of the legitimacy of the county councils had taken place over the course of more than a decade. Two political parties on the right (the Conservative and Progress parties) argued for the abolition of county government, and both county councils and the Association of Local and Regional Authorities recognized the need for reform. So did a public committee of inquiry that reported in 2004 (NOU 2004:19). A number of county councils also took initiatives of their own to explore possible amalgamations. • Framing: Municipal amalgamations were initially motivated by the need for larger size to achieve economies of scale in service provision and by the central government’s need for reliable implementation of national programmes, especially those involving various social welfare policies. In more recent years, however, arguments concerning economies of scale have been downplayed while enhancement of professionalism and the quality of service provision have been given more attention. As for county councils, these were primarily seen as agents for economic development and regional coordination. After loss of responsibility for hospitals and other service provision functions, however, their role as service providers was deemed by some as less important. Many of the champions of larger regions had come to see regional institutions as a counter balance to the growing predominance of the area around the Oslo fjord due to population shifts. • Patterns of conflict: The national government was an important proponent of and initiator for municipal restructuring. The Labour Party and somewhat later the Conservative Party were the strongest advocates of this policy, while the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise and some professional organizations played the role of pressure groups in this respect. Of the opposite persuasion the Liberal and Centre parties were the strongest defenders of the status quo, while the Association of Municipal Employees and the Teachers’ Association voiced strong scepticism to any major reform. The Association of Local and Regional Authorities was also against the idea of a wholesale restructuring, but did play a central role in taking an initiative in which municipalities were challenged to make an assessment of their own position – a strategy that would allow the municipalities to play a more active role in defining their own future. The Association of Local and Regional Authorities played an even stronger role in putting regional governance on the agenda. The central government (after the election of a red-green coalition government in 2005) accepted the idea and started the formal procedures of reform accordingly. The lack of a more explicit


constellation of actors in opposition was largely due to the ambiguity surrounding the actual content of a final reform proposal – how many regions there would be, how the boundaries would be drawn, and what functions the new regions would have. • Strategies: The initial strategy used in pursuing structural reform of municipal government was a fairly classic policy process in which central authorities defined the agenda and framed the debate. Critical in this regard was the use of public commissions of inquiry composed of representatives of various political and organizational interests. This strategy was surprisingly upstaged, however, and has foundered in the years since passage of the parliamentary resolution endorsing a voluntary amalgamation policy in 1995. Under these new conditions central authorities have subsequently pursued strategies combining economic carrots and a whip of threatened sanctions, but to minimal avail. More recently, therefore, central authorities joined forces with the Association of Local Authorities to try a more deliberative, bottom-up strategy, but this does not appear to have changed opinions among most municipalities. In the case of county governance, a combination of top-down and bottom-up strategies was tried but with no greater success. To date the barriers to change – viz. amalgamations – are mainly of a political nature. Amalgamation initiatives tend to activate one of the central cleavages of the Norwegian political system, the centre–periphery cleavage. Actors of the periphery tend to resist amalgamation, seeing a fine-meshed institutional structure at both the municipal and regional levels as a guarantee of the continuation of a ‘just’ distribution of public resources and welfare services. Due to an electoral system that has long historical roots, representatives of the periphery are strongly (over)represented in the national parliament. As a consequence, reform measures face an uphill battle unless a majority political coalition is formed and is willing to use its position to force a reform through. But from 1985 until the elections held in 2005, no national government held a parliamentary majority, and even the red-green coalition government formed after the 2005 elections was split in its views about structural reform. At this point it is difficult to declare a winner with respect to either municipal or regional reform. The debate over municipal reform was placed on the back burner, simmering on low temperature while the main focus of attention turned to the debate over replacing county

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councils with larger regional units. But even the goal of super-regions has been (temporarily?) abandoned, thanks in large measure to scepticism among peripheral county councils. To date, therefore, the most appropriate conclusion is one that underlines the staying power of the periphery. This power, however, may face a new test in the coming years. During the 2009 parliamentary elections attention once again reverted to the question of restructuring municipal government, with all but one of the major parties indicating a willingness to abandon the principle of voluntary amalgamation in favour of top-down mandatory mergers. Should this in fact occur, a new story of territorial choice in Norway will need to be told.

Notes Trygve Christiansen and Audun Randun Johnsen contributed to background research used in this chapter. Their assistance is greatly appreciated. 1. The county prefect (fylkesmann in Norwegian) is generally a person who has had extensive public or political service before being appointed by the central government to exercise oversight and control functions on behalf of national authorities. He or she may also be called upon to serve in other official capacities, such as being a member of or chairing official public commissions. 2. This approach is perhaps best illustrated by the flow chart found in the commission’s report that serves to lay out the tasks assigned to the commission and the questions asked in dealing with the issues encountered (NOU 1992:15, 25).

6 Larger and Larger? The Endless Search for Efficiency in the UK Peter John

Local authorities in the UK are the biggest in Europe, by a large degree. But there is little debate among the political class and local government professionals about the impact these large areas have on democratic participation and their ability to represent community identities. Instead, the argument is about the best way to create even larger units in order to achieve greater efficiency of public services and to reduce the coordination problems between levels of local government. There is almost no reflection on the possible tradeoff between efficiency and democratic outcomes. This unanimity is a puzzle because the local government reorganizations that created these massive jurisdictions have few observable gains but high administrative costs. Moreover, there is no political demand for larger units and local branches of all the political parties are usually opposed to them. Given the absence of an administrative logic and political choice, these reforms must derive from something other than the outcome of a neutral exercise of policy analysis or from political demands. This is not surprising as many studies of UK government show that policymaking does not operate on strictly rationalist principles (Gray and Jenkins 1982), with the neutral taking of advice and acting upon it. No government does. Successive UK government reports that stress the virtues of large size of units of local government need to be seen in their political and intellectual contexts. They tend to produce desired policy recommendations rather than being part of a chain of reasoned causes leading to the final decision. In this respect the history of local government reorganization shows how investigating commissions follow what is in the official mind. The proposals for large units of local government reflect long-held and entrenched understandings the political 101

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and bureaucratic elites have of local government, a set of expectations and underlying principles about the role and purpose of decentralized democracy. To understand how the UK has ended up with the size and number of local government units it has, the analysis needs to probe deeply into the nature of the country’s territorial politics. The government of the periphery has been defined by a number of self-reinforcing factors that have reduced local representation and increased the tendency to stress efficiency before community. Foremost among these are the diminished role of local politics in national life; the power and ambitions of central government politicians; the centralizing culture of the civil service; the watchful eye of a powerful finance ministry, the Treasury, keen to reduce bureaucratic waste; the interests of professional officers in local government who wish to create better-run bureaucracies with well-paid posts; and the detachment of a relatively homogenous national elite from matters of territorial management, which facilitates technocratic solutions rather than those that reflect the messy and lively character of local communities and identities (Bulpitt 1983). The pattern has created a vicious cycle: weak local identity and power attracts technocratic reorganizations, these reorganizations then weaken community identity, which in turn precipitates further reorganizations. The dominance of the centre may be seen as a feature of the UK’s institutional framework, and in particular as a consequence of its majoritarian electoral system, which creates a strong and unified political executive in Westminster. The absence of veto points in the national institutional structures, which could be occupied by sub-national governments to prevent local government modernization taking place, allows the central executive to push its plans through. The long-standing centralized character of the UK and its geography, which means that localism and community-based politics is less well entrenched than in other countries, is another line explaining the dominance of the centre. But this chapter argues that the particular path the UK has followed owes much more to – a culture of thinking found among elites – reformers and thinkers alike – as much as the structural and institutional issues. And this way of thinking is found in both central and local government circles. The mindset has steered many of the elites to adopt a particular sub-national solution – the concept of a one-tier unitary system of local government – that reformers and bureaucrats could unite in supporting, if for slightly different reasons. Given this situation, however, what is even more puzzling is that in spite of the large-scale reforms and subsequent attempts to introduce a one-tier system, much of England remains with a mixture of one- and two-tier

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systems of local government. This outcome appears at least in part to be due to an endless piecemeal tinkering with the system and the absence of wholesale reform. England has produced an inconsistent and muddled structure of local government. Thus the task is to explain both the move to rationalization and the failure to achieve it. The aim of this chapter, then, is to understand the particular path down which territorial reorganization in the UK has gone, both from within the context of the general framework of local government reorganization and from the UK’s unique practice of territorial politics. To get there, the chapter sets out the basis of the unreformed system of local government; it discusses the move to reform local government in the 1960s and 1970s; it evaluates the various reorganized systems across the UK; and it then seeks to understand the attempts to unpick the reformed system in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the latest moves toward larger local government units at the start of the third Millennium. The penultimate section reviews the changes in the light of the framework of this book. Taking into account similarities and differences between the UK and other countries in Europe, the conclusion aims to find an explanation for why reformers did not adopt a systematic approach.

The historical context The British state gradually evolved from a monarchy running a feudal social and economic system to a democracy supervising a modern industrialized economy. The UK never had a defining moment when the central state set out the principles of territorial organization and put them into practice, such as the Napoleonic revolution in France. Instead, it moved only gradually through a series of acts of parliament to what could be described as several systems of local government. In Bulpitt’s (1983) account, the UK did not have a coherent territorial settlement. Although England developed into a centralized feudal monarchy, probably earlier than other nation states, for a variety of reasons it never developed a planned and rational territorial strategy. Compared with other countries there was less acute need to exercise control over the borders within the country. The central state was rather preoccupied with sustaining the massive economic and international dominance of London. London had a cohesive elite within the core political institutions which was largely focused on economic accumulation overseas and on taking on an international role. The centre, as Bulpitt described it, was more interested in matters of high politics and was content to leave local elites to administer

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territorial matters so long they were self-contained. This relative detachment led to various forms of decentralized administration in Ireland and Wales, and a varied system of self-running local governments in England. England’s cities and town and urban areas were run by municipal corporations, each with its own constitution, often granted back in the middle ages. To cope with rapid urbanization and new demands for public services like sanitation and public health, the UK parliament set up a range of special-purpose bodies to carry out these functions. These created a mosaic of overlapping jurisdictions and specialization of functions. The complexity of the system and the lack of a democratic element led to the passing of the Municipal Corporations Act 1835, which codified the constitutions of the boroughs and based them on elected councils. But the act still left a lot of the complexity in jurisdictional arrangements in place. In 1870, there were 3,000 authorities at town, district and county levels alongside some 25,000 smaller authorities (Hampton 1991:17). It was probably the case that such profusion was unsustainable, especially in the era of the wider electoral franchise. The concern about inefficiency and complexity ultimately led to the reorganization of 1888, in which the London County Council was created. A further reorganization in 1894 established a system of counties and districts for rural areas, and county/municipal boroughs for the towns and cities. This pattern of local government lasted for nearly a hundred years. But the division between town and country did not satisfy all, and did not provide a suitable basis for local areas to respond to industrialization as cities expanded, moving way beyond the boundaries of the old corporations. Overall policymakers had nonetheless balanced efficiency and democratic concerns in a sensible series of reforms. Legislators had rationalized the organization of local government, but had retained small units linked to settlement and economic patterns at various territorial levels. Town halls remained part of the communities, with their buildings often facing into market squares in city centres. Their proximity to natural patterns of settlement helped ensure some face-to-face contact between local rulers and their populations.1 In the way that some of the policy arguments took place, however, it appears to have set in motion thoughts in the official mind, which, when untrammelled, led to the system of larger authorities and in turn the permanent revolution of structures that has occurred since the mid-part of twentieth century. Over time the centre become more interested in the capacity of local authorities to deliver services effectively. Central government introduced

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nationally organized welfare services with local authorities as the providers. As the guiders of policy, central government departments focused on the effectiveness of the bodies that delivered the policies on the ground. From this perspective, government departments tended to favour a small number of professionally organized authorities that presumably would be easy to deal with as opposed to a large number of small jurisdictions. This central government view found its expression in the evidence given to many commissions of inquiry into local government and its organization during the twentieth century. Making for both uniformity and potential diversity, however, was the development of party politics in English local government during the twentieth century. Even though parties had been strong in local government in the nineteenth century, during the following period party voting became even more widespread based on the electoral success of Labour and the Conservative parties. These two parties extended and then retained their dominance of local government through the first-past-the-post electoral system (Gyford 1985; Gyford et al. 1989). Even though the Liberal Party has enjoyed some success in local government since the 1970s, the predominant pattern was one in which one of the two main political parties would dominate central government while the other, the national Opposition, tended to make gains in local government elections. This bi-polar tendency created a partisan character to central–local government relations, which have become highly politicized and detrimental to long-term planning. Structural reform is also party politicized inasmuch as the party in the majority at the national level frequently seeks to gerrymander local government reorganizations. Party politics also influences the structure of local government representation. In the past, local government had several representative organizations, such as the Association of County Councils, the Association of District Councils, and Association of Metropolitan Authorities, which had different parties in a majority within them. That the Conservatives tended to be in a majority in the counties and rural districts and Labour in the urban and metropolitan areas tended to influence the strategies each association pursued for local government reform. It was only in 1997 that they formed into the single Local Government Association to express the voice of local government as a whole. Scotland experienced a similar course of reform to England. In the nineteenth century, the Royal Burghs (Scotland) Act established elected councils before England; then the counties were given more responsibilities in 1889. A consolidating act of 1929 created a system that lasted until 1975.

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Ireland had a similar system, with a reforming act of 1840, a structure that was retained after the setting up of Northern Ireland in 1920 with its six counties together with county boroughs and county districts.

The reform period, 1963–74 Reformers did not like the settlement that had emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, which was regarded as too restrictive to respond to the problems of growing cities and the interdependence of cities and their surrounding areas. The planning of cities had come into vogue in the era of Fabian-style socialism (as opposed to municipal socialism), which had guided the establishment of the modern welfare state. Reformers saw a strategic role for local government, which should be the principal authority providing and guiding public services in local areas. It therefore made sense to rethink the functions and areas of local government at the same time so that a more rational form of administration could emerge. In official circles, there circulated the idea that there should be a minimum population size for local authorities. Thus the Onslow Report of 1925 recommended raising the minimum size from 50,000 to 75,000. Local Government Commissions in the 1940s and 1950s similarly deliberated on the efficiency argument. It should be noted that the reforming ideal dominated the thinking of the local government academics, particularly those who advocated local self-government. William Robson (1966), for example, in Local Government in Crisis, argued that the only way local government was going to survive was if it could be reformed to cope with the increased service burdens assigned (see the discussion in Leach 1998). The reform movement focused on London in particular. The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (Herbert Commission) was set up in 1957 to investigate the problem and it reported in 1963. This body looked at the expansion of London beyond the existing London County Council area, which implied a larger metropolitan authority. But it also recommended that the lower-tier councils should have populations between 50,000 and 250,000. While the original proposals of 52 boroughs was rejected by the government, the 30 subsequently established in a smaller than originally proposed London area eliminated a large number of local authorities. Many of the authorities that were merged had historically produced dynamic and innovative policies even for small numbers of residents. The Holborn local authority, which pioneered housing policies in a small area of central London, is one of many examples that could be mentioned in this

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regard. The new authorities amalgamated historically cohesive communities around the villages of London into large areas that had little prior identity, such as Islington and Tower Hamlets. Over and above this was the enlarged London council, the Greater London Council, which had strategic planning, transport and some housing powers, but seemed less cohesive and identifiable than the previous London County Council. With the London reforms being administratively successful, even if its longer term objective of planning for London was harder to grasp, England and Wales were the next targets for reform, where reorganization suited the modernising ambitions of the Labour Government elected in 1964 (see Wood 1976 for a history). In 1966 the government set up a Royal Commission, called (after its chairman) the RedcliffeMaud Commission, to investigate the structure of local government in England. In contrast to the short government investigations, which have been common since the 1980s, this commission took its time – four years – to consider the problem carefully, instigating research that produced a set of findings that were published in several volumes. In spite of some diversity of views within the Commission, it operated largely with a functional analysis of the problem (Sharpe 1978). The idea from this perspective is that local authorities should not operate with an economically false division between town and country, and should be of sufficient size to provide modern public services effectively. This underlying concern drove the recommendations for large units, even though the Commission and its researchers had some concern for community identity (Leach 1998:32). The Commission advocated a minimum size of population for each local authority of 100,000 people, although it did not have evidence for this supposition. Even though it had commissioned an extensive research programme on this topic, the evidence did not show an association between size and efficiency. As a result of its deliberations the commission recommended 58 single-tier authorities for the whole of England. In the end, however, the political furore and a change of government meant that a more modest version of the proposal, the Local Government Act 1972, became law. This law introduced a two-tier system of local government with counties as the first unit of local government and districts as the lower tier. These changes were seen as being inspired by partisan politics (Wood 1976), but also by a desire to retain a more local dimension in local government. Yet even the modified proposals retained large units for most service provision, and in the end created new authorities to administer the rural areas adjacent to the cities and to carve up bits of the country that did not fit this pattern. The result was the creation of

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counties encompassing areas with little prior identity, such as Avon in the area around Bristol, Bath in the West of England, and Cleveland in the North East. In addition to creating these monoliths, the act established many district councils that amalgamated several towns and the intervening rural areas with names of districts that few people could recognize. What were called the metropolitan counties covered six large urban areas of England where the districts had most of the functions of local government, but these districts often covered ill-defined areas, such as Kirklees in Yorkshire. In spite of all the tinkering that has gone on since that time and the discontent with the system, the Local Government Act 1972 remains the basis of the structure in place today, especially for the boundaries of local authorities. Recommendations in Wales took a different course. A White Paper was published in 1967 on the subject of Wales, based on the findings of the 1962 report of the Local Government Commission for Wales. The White Paper proposed five counties, and 36 districts. Implementation of reform in Wales was not immediate, pending decisions on the situation in England. The Redcliffe-Maud report led to a reconsideration of the plans, especially with respect to Glamorgan and Monmouthshire, and a March 1970 White Paper proposed three unitary authorities for south Wales, based on Cardiff, Swansea and Newport. After the 1970 general election, the new Conservative government published a Consultative Document in February 1971, at the same time as the English White Paper. The proposals were similar to the Labour proposals of 1968, which made for seven counties and 36 districts. Apart from the new Glamorgan authorities, all the names of the new Welsh counties were in the Welsh language, with no English equivalent. The names were taken from ancient British kingdoms. Welsh names were also used for many of the Welsh districts. There were no metropolitan counties and, unlike in England, the Secretary of State could not create future metropolitan counties there under the Act. In Scotland, by comparison the royal commission (Wheatley) followed the same lines as the English one, which ended up in 1975 with nine large regions and 53 district authorities. Reform in Northern Ireland was different, largely because it was not possible to separate out local government reform from the problems of governing a divided community. In the 1960s there were debates about turning the system into a unitary one like the rest of the UK. But the violent protests and nationalist terrorism focused on the unfairness of the previous system, which effectively gerrymandered Protestant majorities, and which ran highly discriminatory regimes for providing

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public services. This regime needed to end, and the government took direct control over most local government services. The single-tier idea was retained for the rest of the functions, however. In 1972 the government created 26 councils that still exist today, but have only a few functions such as rubbish collection, environmental responsibilities and burials.

Unpicking the reforms, 1974–95 No sooner had the new covers came off the reformed authorities than criticism targeted the new system, starting with Sharpe’s (1972) influential critique. Sharpe, the local government academic, was director of research for the Redcliffe-Maud Commission, but he turned against its main proposals. The criticism was that the system did not produce powerful city government for some of the most recognized urban areas like Bristol, Southampton, Nottingham and major cities outside the metropolitan areas. This was inconsistent because the large cities in the metropolitan areas, such as Birmingham and Manchester, did have these functions. The Labour government toyed with making these changes in the 1979 Green Paper by suggesting what were called organic changes, but never brought them into law. Local government structural reform did not occur during the Conservative governments of the 1980s, but the debacle over the Greater London Council, whose radical left policies attracted the ire of the Conservative leadership, prompted a rethinking of metropolitan government. Just after the 1983 election, the government published its paper Streamlining the Cities, which proposed abolishing the top tier of metropolitan government, including the Greater London Council and the metropolitan counties. This would leave the metropolitan areas with one tier of government, whereas the rest of the country had two. The government justified these plans, carried out in 1986, as cutting back bureaucracy and creating more efficiency, though commentators were in no doubt that the primary motive was political hostility to the left leadership of the Greater London Council, perhaps provoked by the physical proximity of County Hall to the House of Commons, the two buildings facing each other across the river Thames. Apart from the metropolitan areas, the governments led by Margaret Thatcher were more preoccupied with introducing market forces into local government. As part of the managerial revolution, the idea of a smaller non-service providing authority, part of one tier of local government operating in a more competitive system, did circulate

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in think tank circles for a while, but this did not come to anything. But the discontent with the existing system emerged in the governments led by John Major, which were preoccupied with efficiency and became attracted to the idea of having just one tier of local government. The Local Government Commission, which was set up in 1992 and lasted until 1996, could recommend structural change to the central government (see Leach and Stoker 1997). In fact this commission roved around the country making recommendations for reform. But the government did not put much energy behind it, and eventually this effort became mired in the many debates about local government reform in the mid-1990s. As a result, it stopped recommending unitary local government, retaining the two-tier structure with some unitary councils for major towns and cities (Leach 1997). The differing strategies were in part due to the frequent changes in minister: from the ‘gung-ho’ Heseltine, who wanted directly elected mayors and unitary government, to the more right-wing Howard who said the two-tier system could be retained in some areas, and then to the more traditional Gummer who held up the recommendations in order to maintain the historic counties. The reorganizations that followed the deliberations of the Commission took effect in 1997 and created 32 unitary councils in place of areas previously covered by counties and districts. This left the rest of the two-tier system intact, thereby adding to the confusion of territorial organization, creating different areas and powers of councils dependent upon where people lived. Ironically, it restored something of an urban–rural distinction in local government structures. It also managed to get rid of some of the most unloved creations of the 1972 reform, such as the aforementioned counties of Avon and Cleveland, leaving unitary councils in their places. By creating unitary councils, the reforms had gone back to one of the central principles of the Redcliffe-Maud proposals, which was precisely to create large unitary councils across England. But these new councils did not span the urban–rural divide. The other less noticed change of the 1990s was the revival of unitary local government in the nations of the UK, Scotland and Wales. Under the Conservatives, the government had hatched an inadvertent preparation for devolved government in Wales, which was largely pushed by Labour controlled politicians in local government. In 1996 this legislation created 22 single-tier authorities in place of the two-tier system. The same thing happened in Scotland in 1995 with the creation of 32 councils.

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Reforms under labour 1997–2009 The Labour government elected in 1997 was preoccupied with introducing regional government rather than reforming the structure of local government. But structural reform did take place intermittently. The first was the restoration of government for London in 1999, with the establishment of the Greater London Authority (GLA) and a Mayor for London. In spite of many criticisms at its outset, government of London was a success under the charismatic leadership of Ken Livingstone. The GLA introduced a number of policy successes, such as the Congestion Charge for central London, better public transport and the bid for the Olympic Games in 2012. So, after a period of moving to unitary local government outside metropolitan areas, some parts of England moved a little toward two-tier local government once again. But to show the lack of consistency, in the rest of England the proposals for regional assemblies in the 2003 Act contained a requirement for unitary government, which the population could vote on in a referendum. The government did not want to create an extra tier of administration, in distinction to other countries where regional governments have been superimposed on the existing structures of local government. Regionalization in the UK was associated with local government reorganization, which might be seen as another way of introducing a two-tier system. But in the end the general public decided by a massive majority in the 2004 referendum held in the North East that it did not want what it saw was a potentially wasteful regional tier. So the two-tier system was saved once again, possibly by politicians in these authorities who were very lukewarm, if not outright hostile, to the reforms, particularly one-tier local government, which would have disrupted their political careers (Tickell et al. 2005). The demise of the regional proposals was not the end to the unitary idea however. But the government did realize that massive local government reorganization would be politically costly. Rather like the Conservatives in the 1990s, the Labour government hit on a partial approach. The government retained its power to create unitary local government in the 1992 legislation, but decided to pursue a different strategy to the Local Government Commission. In the 2006 White Paper, it proposed inviting councils in rural areas to come forward with proposals for unitary local government (see Chisolm and Leach 2008). As with the early 1990s, the reforms leave large parts of the country with a two-tier structure. This was largely because of the vicissitudes of the implementation process. Given the uncertainties, only 26 authorities

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applied for unitary status. In July of 2007 the government said it was going to approve nine of these. The nine bids accepted were those designed to create large councils, reducing the number of councils from 46 to nine: county-wide status in Cornwall, Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire and Wiltshire; and two unitaries each in Bedfordshire and Cheshire, which came into being in April 2009. So yet again there are signs of an inconsistent pattern: large amounts of the two-tier structure untouched; a reduction of the areas to a mere nine; and different kinds of reorganizations, either giant counties or counties divided into unitaries. On the whole, however, this did not involve a massive change in the structure of local government. Rather it was just more tinkering, much as before. Then, to confuse matters once more, the very same white paper proposed arrangements for the city regions, which would be a form of governance above the single tier, with strengthened parish or community governments below the local authority level. As ever the territorial strategy of the UK government remains uncoordinated and inconsistent, with different parts of the central government machine driving the policy agenda and promoting varying and contradictory structural proposals. Ultimately it would seem that the centre has a distinct disinterest in territorial solutions. This allows these different kinds of settlement to appear, for the messy structures to continue in time, and for each attempt at uniformity to be unpicked in each decade since the attempt at a final solution in 1972.

Implications for the models of territorial choice With such a sprawling history of reform, the UK does not readily lend itself to the model of territorial choice as set out in the introduction to this volume. In fact, it is the lack of comprehensive reform in recent years that is of interest from a comparative perspective on local government reorganization. Having had the wholesale reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, the British state lost its appetite for local government restructuring. It still tinkered with the system and tried to introduce unitary local government gradually over a 30-year period. But unlike other countries in Europe, such as Norway and Denmark, which had modernized their local government structures in successive periods, it would carry out partial reforms, never quite completing them, thereby creating the conditions for further reforms. In seeking a comparative understanding of the decision-making process it is most instructive to concentrate on the last period of reform rather than the more decisive policy interventions of earlier periods. This started in the 1990s with the

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local government review, which then led to the failed attempt to introduce unitary local government in the regional government reforms of the early 2000s. The final part of this period is the offer of bids to apply for unitary status in 2007. For framing, an underlying critique of the two-tier system dominates discussions. Policymakers operated with an assumption of the benefits of unitary local government, but did not offer much evidence either for or against it. Instead, there were many who believed that local government services could be simplified and that the district level was too small to provide effective services. Efficiency criteria were at the fore, as was the belief that the simplified relationship would be better for the citizen as they could know better which council they needed to deal with. In effect there was the prior example of unitary government in some parts of England, and all of Wales and Scotland, which made the two-tier system appear to be anachronistic. Apart from the argument in favour of elected regions in England and their capacity for planning and attracting funds, there was no debate about globalization and Europe; nor was there much about demographic concerns as there had been in the 1960s and 1970s, except for a brief revival of interest in city regions in the 2000s. Against this background the choice of reform strategies in England has been incremental in this period, which contrasts with earlier periods of reform in the 1960s and 1970s and the reforms in Scotland and Wales. The government appeared to want to avoid the high costs and political fallout from a comprehensive reform, though both the 1990s reforms and the current period generated a lot of energy and debate within local government, especially from local government politicians and bureaucrats. While maintaining central control, the government has allowed an element of local selection and variation. In the 1990s, in part because of the lack of direction, the reforms proceeded at different paces and in different styles in various parts of the country, with councils representing their interests and lobbying for change. This also was a roving approach as the Local Government Commission considered different regions of England at different times. The partial attempt at voluntarism also appeared in the regional reforms whereby the citizens had a vote for change in the North East. Most of all in the unitary reforms the government invited application from authorities, which implied some cooperation between local authorities in preparing their bids but in fact led to competing bids being put forward. In this last reform cycle, therefore, the government ended up in the authoritative position by picking its desired bids for unitary status. However, there were many

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more bottom-up pressures than in earlier periods. Even so, whereas the 1990s period of reform tolerated some experimentation, the proposals of the 2000s involved the move to unitary status. That said, there was a lot of toleration of the size of the unitary bids. The patterns of conflict that have been observed are familiar ones in sub-national reform. The existing structure embedded both urban and rural conflicts in spite of the aim of the 1972 act to unify town and country. Thus the counties tended to represent rural interests as did the bulk of district councils whereas urban strong holds were the metropolitan and London counties. All these groups were contained within separate associations, which lobbied to retain their respective status. This division of local government did not assist the reform process in the 1990s. However, partly as a result of the local government review, local authorities did band together in the single Local Government Association, and have been more united and provided more of a voice to central government. In recent years differences in views of the different parts of the two-tier system – counties and districts – have arisen from time to time. Reflecting the self-contained world of local government, many of the pressures for reform were from central government departments and from local government professionals. Business organizations have tended to remain silent, focusing on the implications for business taxes. In the background the Treasury has remained a powerful advocate for cost cutting. Thus for the creation of unitary councils in the 2000s, the Gershon Review (2004) highlighted the savings to back office functions across government, often achieved by pooling resources. Local government reorganization easily fits into this agenda because a single-tier local authority system removes duplicated ancillary services in a particular area. The government has made it plain that even in two-tier areas councils are to share functions, effectively undermining the old system (See CLG 2006). The outcomes of the reform include the reduction of the number of local units as new unitary authorities have been created, especially in the latest reforms. This has been especially marked in Scotland and Wales. At the same time there has been an increase in the number of government units through the regionalization of government in London, and in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. But the regional movement stalled, which also had the effect of slowing the desire of central government to reduce the number of units of local government in the regions that were supposed to vote yes in a referendum. Overall, the system has remained complex and there is no sign of stability so long as governments are willing to keep adjusting the system.

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Conclusion – the power of the unitary ideal When standing back from the many proposals and counter proposals for structural reform since the 1960s, the ideal of the unitary authority of a large size remains dominant in professional and political thinking. It emerges most strongly in the proposals of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission, but also in many of the proposals for reform since that time, such as the Local Government Commission, regional government, the reform of Scottish and Welsh local government and the 2006 White Paper (see Leach 2009). This continuity reflects a particular critique of the supposed messiness of the existing system. Reformers have been critical of the multiplication of units in the nineteenth-century local government system or have highlighted the waste of the two-tier system since 1972. The general line of thinking seems to meet the demand for clarity in the structure of government and have wide appeal with the national political parties. Some Conservatives like a single-tier system because it allows them to streamline government and to remove wasteful bureaucracies, though other party members like the county structure and the small size of the districts. Labour, for its part, has a desire to see its urban strongholds with one council in charge and to create only one tier of government beneath regional councils. Over the years there emerged much criticism about the confusion between the two tiers of local government, which range from citizen incomprehension to disputes between levels of government. In a country where the support for local government is low, there is a desire to simplify what is there to justify its existence. But this idea is very parochial in inspiration and does not compare with local government reform in the rest of Europe, which has often meant adding structures to the existing basis of local and decentralized government, such as in France and Italy. It suggests that the development of habits of thought have promoted a belief in the permanent reform of local government. Although it is possible to find much evidence of reform using the functional argument in the rest of Europe, in particular in the Scandinavian countries, there is nothing to compare with the sheer extent and long period of reform in the UK. The UK government not only reforms local government, but regularly uproots the last reform and continually tinkers with the system. The result is that the system lacks rationale, in spite of reforms that have aimed at simplifying local government. Perhaps the reforms reflect an underlying contempt for local government and the wish to tidy it away? It certainly represents what many see as an addiction to functional arguments about local government as

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opposed to applying democratic principles. This intellectual blindness is puzzling because at some level there is a link between the size of the units of local government and the degree to which local authorities can represent communities at the sub-national level, even if the range and extent of the trade-off is much contested. Units that are too small focus on the micro-community, not much more than neighbourhoods; but when the units are too large they tend to dwarf the communities within towns and many small towns themselves. The resulting areas can create vast tracts of the countryside to administer with authorities having to invent bizarre and unfamiliar names for the areas they represent. In spite of some excessively technocratic reforms in the early 1970s, which can be explained away by the spirit of the age that big is beautiful, there is no sign of regret at the creation of these large, anonymous, unloved councils in an age when the wishes of communities is more at the heart of government thinking – epitomized in the name for the local government ministry since 2006: Communities and Local Government. To the contrary, the 1990s and 2000s find central governments seeking to create even larger councils in another attempt to chase the chimera of efficiency. But the functional argument has little evidential support, with most expert reviews denying a link between efficiency and local government, with at best a U-shaped relationship: small authorities are less efficient than medium-sized authorities, but costs reappear at the higher end of the scale (Travers et al. 1993; Martins 1995). Interestingly, a CLG-funded review has looked again at these statistics, and finds a more positive relationship than found hitherto (Andrews et al. 2006). With respect to participation, there is some evidence from the UK and other countries that small size increases some forms of participation (Larsen 2002; Greasley 2009) or that it is indeterminate (Goldsmith and Rose 2002). In spite of the power of the unitary ideal, governments have only been inspired to put this kind of system into practice incrementally and with a lack of consistency and planning. The proposals of RedcliffeMaud Commission were avoided; the organic change proposals never were implemented; the abolition of the metropolitan authorities was really the result of a political flashpoint; the 1990s produced a partial and inconsistent set of reforms; and so too have the ones of the 2006 White Paper. Ironically, where the unitary idea was implemented was in the Celtic periphery, where Wales and Scotland ended up by being more uniform than in the central state of England. As Bulpitt (1983) pointed out, the UK’s territorial strategy remains incoherent, based on both a weak disinterested centre and a weak periphery. The result is that there is no one to champion community-based local government.

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And this has occurred in the same country that produced – in J. S. Mill and others – some of the finest writing that seeks to justify the existence of local self government.

Notes I thank Steve Leach, Tom Entwistle and Colin Copus for their helpful comments, and also acknowledge those of the collaborators in this volume. 1. Community-based studies pick up this connection, for example the account of Manchester in Savage et al. (2004), in which older residents remember faceto-face contacts with locally elected representatives, which they no longer have with the post-1972 system.

7 Step-by-Step: Territorial Choice in the Netherlands Mijke Boedeltje and Bas Denters

Terms like ‘institutional sclerosis’, ‘institutional conservatism’ and ‘structural inertia’ often pop up in accounts concerning state reforms in the Netherlands (see, for example, Andeweg et al. 1983; Andeweg and Irwin 1989; Becker 2000). With respect to the territorial organization of the Dutch state, however, such a characterization is at best only partly correct. There is, to be sure, considerable continuity in terms of the basic structures of government; a three-tier system, for example, has existed since 1848, consisting at present of the national government, 12 provinces and hundreds of municipalities. Each tier has an elected legislature and an executive branch, and municipalities enjoy legal autonomy in regulating and administering their internal affairs. This legal autonomy implies that municipalities are free to define tasks and to use their powers, as long as this does not conflict with national or provincial statutes. Next to these ‘autonomous powers’ granted municipalities, the Constitution also provides for ‘co-governance’. Under this provision, central and provincial government should involve municipalities in the implementation of national and provincial legislation whenever possible. In many instances these co-governance arrangements allow for considerable ‘de facto’ autonomy (Denters and Klok 2005:66). In practice this implies highly active municipalities, which is reflected in a relatively high level of local public expenditure. Because much of this local activity is in the form of co-governance, municipalities receive a very large share of their revenues (up to 90 per cent) through general and specific grants from central government (Andeweg and Irwin 2005; Denters and Klok 2005). The provincial tier functions largely as an intermediary between local and national authorities and, because of its intermediary role, it is 118

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virtually invisible to ordinary citizens. Except for some responsibilities in environmental policy, spatial planning and transport, Dutch provinces have few direct policy responsibilities (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). One of the major provincial responsibilities, however, is the supervision of municipalities. Despite such continuities in the foundations of the territorial state, it would be a misrepresentation were one not to draw attention to some marked changes. Over the last six decades the territorial organization of the Dutch state has been under permanent discussion. The debate centres around two main concerns: the desire to strengthen the administrative capacity of municipalities through municipal amalgamations, and the goal of better coordination of governance in urban regions. Especially with regard to the first concern, major changes have occurred. Amalgamations have resulted in a drastic reduction of the number of municipalities, bringing about a considerable increase in the average size of the remaining municipalities. Large-scale municipal amalgamations started around 1950. From the 1950s onwards the main argument for amalgamations was an expectation of increased system capacity and improved municipal performance. Although this is still the most important argument, in more recent years mergers have also been considered as a possible solution to the problems of regional governance of major cities in urban agglomerations. The degree of change resulting from municipal amalgamations stands in sharp contrast to the lack of decisive action in the domain of regional governance. In this domain the last six decades have witnessed a host of reform proposals, all in their own way trying to solve problems of regional cooperation and coordination, especially in the nation’s major conurbations. Notwithstanding the zeal and energy of reformers, however, none of the reform proposals was actually implemented. Despite an enormous amount of ‘verbal action’ (Toonen 1993:123), the institutions for regional governance remained essentially unchanged and regional policies have never been implemented. Based on the developments described above, the main question of this chapter is therefore how do we explain the differences in the fate of proposed municipal amalgamations and regional reform proposals? In seeking to answer this question we develop a theoretical argument. The argument is then evaluated on the basis of evidence from a case study. Before turning to this argument, however, a general historical description of the municipal amalgamation and regional governance reforms in the Netherlands is in order.

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Step-by-Step: Territorial Choice in the Netherlands

The ‘success’ of municipal amalgamation reforms Table 7.1 bears witness to the extensive change in the municipal landscape of the Netherlands that has occurred over time. The number of municipalities has been reduced from 1209 in 1851 to 443 in 2007. Almost 60 per cent of these amalgamations have taken place in the last half-century. Against the general conclusion suggested by many analysts of Dutch public sector reforms, such a history of amalgamations may be seen as a remarkable ‘success’ story, at least with respect to parliamentary approval and subsequent implementation of amalgamation reforms. Success in this sense, however, does not tell us anything about the actual effects of the amalgamations, either in terms of their anticipated effects on the effectiveness and efficiency of local government, or in terms of possible side-effects regarding, for instance, the democratic quality of local governance. The procedures for municipal amalgamations are based on co-governance, which implies that amalgamations require a collaborative effort of the three tiers of government. By virtue of a constitutional provision, the Local Government Act permits amalgamations to be initiated by either a city council, provincial government or the Minister of Home Affairs. According to a statute enacted in 1984, provincial government bears the primary responsibility for preparing an amalgamation proposal (in the form of a ‘final advice’) to be submitted to the Minister of Home Affairs. Whether initiated by national government, one or more municipalities or the province itself, the provincial executive board prepares a draft proposal. After the board has approved of this draft it

Table 7.1 Distribution of Dutch municipalities according to population size, 1851–2007 Population size Less than 5,000 5,001–20,000 20,001–50,000 50,001–100,000 Over 100,000 Total Average size

Number of municipalities 1851

1900

— — — — —

918 179 16 4 4

1960 556 344 61 19 14

1980 246 407 114 27 17

1,209 2,507

1,121 4,557

994 11,486

811 17,375

2000 20 290 168 34 25

2007 7 182 188 41 25

537 441 29,542 36,926

Source: Castenmiller (1996) and online statistics produced by Statistics Netherlands (CBS)


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is sent to the councils of the affected municipalities for comment. In this advisory procedure residents also have an opportunity to read the proposal and to react to it. The role of the councils is actually quite limited; although they have the opportunity to make recommendations for change, the procedure does not require the consent of the councils. On the basis of local reactions, the final proposal is then decided upon at the provincial level, and this provincial advice is submitted to the Minister of Home Affairs. If the Minister approves of this proposal it is submitted to the parliament for final decision. The amalgamation process can thus be seen as a process of cogovernance, in which the national government sets out the framework and all tiers have the right of initiative. This process is neither top-down nor bottom-up, because provinces play a dominant role and municipalities do not have substantial powers. Moreover, because the procedure implies that the locus of the initiative might vary, and that the primary responsibility for making proposals rests with the twelve provinces, the process allows for variations across the country (by province) and in time (not all amalgamations are proposed simultaneously). And indeed amalgamations have not been implemented as part of one nationwide comprehensive reform, but rather as a gradual process in which amalgamations are implemented step-by-step and one area at a time (VNG 1983).

The failure of regional governance reforms Territorial reforms at the regional level have not been nearly as ‘successful’. Starting in the 1950s, numerous proposals for regional governance reform were made, all of which shared the aim of improving the governance of major conurbations. Typically conurbations cut across municipal boundaries, and many problems in such regions require joint action by various municipalities. This requires a form of regional coordination. Traditionally the Joint Provisions Act adopted in 1950 provided the institutional framework for dealing with such regional issues and problems. This act was and still is based on the principle of voluntary cooperation. The intercommunal bodies set up under this act, however, have been bound hand and foot to the municipalities in the region, thereby greatly reducing their capacity for effective joint decision-making and action (Denters and Klok 2005:69). The institutional weaknesses of these structures have as a result spurred a virtually permanent call for regional reform. Most of the ensuing reform proposals were comprehensive, topdown initiatives. In the 1950s, for example, a national government

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committee recommended the establishment of an extra-regional tier – so-called districts – but no political support could be found for this proposal. In the 1970s, instead of creating an extra tier, the ‘Den Uyl cabinet’ tried to restructure the provincial tier. This reorganization plan aimed at the dissolution of the existing provinces and the introduction of 26 ‘mini-provinces’. Yet this proposal was also rejected. Indeed, the rejection of regional reform proposals constituted a recurrent phenomenon. Again and again these plans were rejected by ever-changing ad hoc coalitions of involved interests: provinces, municipalities, national government departments and political parties (see Toonen 1993:123–6; Hendriks 1997; Denters and Klok 2005). As a consequence of the failure of previous proposals, the regional issue was still on the agenda at the beginning of the 1990s. At this point debates about institutional arrangements to cope with the problems ended in several national government initiatives to provide metropolitan regions with a form of regional government (Denters and Klok 2005). In 1994 special Regional Public Authorities (RPA) were introduced in seven of the country’s largest urban agglomerations with responsibility for economic development, infrastructure, physical planning, housing and the environment. Municipalities were the main actors in these new arenas, in which the provinces did not play a major role. The RPAs were conceived as temporary bodies that, after a period of transition, would have to be transformed into permanent, directly elected regional governments. In the years that followed, however, it became clear that this idea was unattainable. During the second half of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, the parliamentary majority for these kinds of authorities disappeared (Denters and Klok 2005:76). As an alternative a new law was introduced in 2003 whereby the RPAs were to be transformed into regional bodies that had to operate under a new legal regime codified in a revised Joint Provision Act. The Joint Provisions Act of 1950 that provided a basis for voluntary inter-municipal cooperation, and its successor of 1985, thus remains the main tool for regional cooperation and coordination (Denters and Klok 2005:69). In such an institutional setting joint decision traps that impede effective and legitimate governance are likely to occur (cf. Scharpf 1988). Hence, after more than half a century of abortive attempts to reform regional governance, municipalities in urban regions are still in search of appropriate arrangements for coordinating their efforts to deal with increasingly important crossboundary issues.


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Two explanatory perspectives To provide an answer to our main question and explain differences in the fate of proposals for amalgamation and regional reform in the Netherlands, two rival explanatory perspectives may be employed (see March and Olsen 1983; Denters 1996). These two perspectives correspond with two ‘rhetorics’ pervading the political debate about public sector reforms (March and Olson 1983). The first rhetoric echoes the professional ethos of administration theory that considers reorganizations as a way of making public organization ‘more efficient and effective through the application of some simple principles of organizing’ (March and Olson 1983:283). This ‘administrative reform rhetoric’ pervades the written and oral language in public statements and official reports about public sector reform initiatives. Although the recipes prescribed may differ from one school of thought to another, representatives of this approach share an optimistic and perhaps even naive belief in the potential of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of organizations through the invocation of prescriptions based administrative theory. An alternative way of thinking is not only pessimistic about the feasibility of achieving effectiveness and efficiency gains by implementing administrative reform, it even suggests that reorganizations are best understood in terms of political power (rather than as an attempt to rationalize public sector organizations). This approach is based on the assumption that both the formulation of reform policies and their implementation are essentially political struggles between conflicting political interests that ‘seek access, representation, control and policy benefits’ (March and Olson 1983:283). From its rather cynical angle, this ‘rhetoric of Realpolitik’ perspective tends to consider arguments about expected effectiveness and efficiency gains as essentially a veneer to make power politics look socially acceptable. These two discourses find a match in rival models of the policymaking process. Following Bendor and Hammond (1992), we can distinguish models of policymaking on the basis of four assumptions pertaining to: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The number of actors (one versus multiple actors) The goals of actors (the same or in conflict) The degree of rationality of an actor (perfect versus imperfect) The amount of information available to the actors (complete versus incomplete).

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The administrative reform rhetoric is closely related to the classical model of rational policymaking. In this model political decisions are assumed to be the act of a unified actor.1 Second, this model seeks to explain political decisions made by such a unitary actor as the result of the actor’s values and goals, and by the actor’s expectations about the consequences that different choice options will have on the attainment of these goals. The model is apolitical because, in assuming that there is only one unified actor, it assumes the absence of dissent and it implicitly turns a blind eye to possible conflicts of interests. The model, moreover, is based on the assumption that the actor is capable of ordering its options in terms of the impact these alternatives have for the realization of its values and goals, and will choose the best of these options (perfect rationality and complete information). We will henceforth refer to this model as the Rational Argumentation Model. The actor is assumed to choose the option with the maximum net value (of positive and negative consequences).2 For an understanding of political decisions it is not necessary to make any assumptions about the amount of information available. The actor might only perceive a limited number of alternatives and could have incomplete and/ or incorrect information on the consequences of these options. Alternatively, the rhetoric of Realpolitik comes close to a rather different type of model, the Positional Interest Model. This second model is based on an assumption of multiple actors (assumption 1), that are pursuing conflicting goals (assumption 2) on the basis of perfect rationality (assumption 3), but not necessarily possessing full information (assumption 4). The model focuses on political decision-making as a process in which a multitude of actors is engaged in deciding on a particular policy choice. The model also makes assumptions about the factors determining the outcome of this multi-actor decision-making process. Because the Positional Interest Model is a multi-actor model, it operates on two levels of analysis. On the actor level the model is based on the assumption that the preferences, perceptions and stands of all actors are determined by their positional interests. Because reform proposals typically touch upon the survival, autonomy and relative power of public organizations and offices, it is plausible that the position of an actor in the political-administrative system is likely to affect its stance with regard to a public sector reform proposal. On the other hand, and different from the Rational Argumentation Model, values and expectations about benign consequences of this preferred choice are not central determinants of political choice. They are only invoked post hoc on the basis of their convenience as a public justification for preconceived


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choices. At the level of collective choice, the outcome of the decisionmaking process is a function of the distribution of power among the various actors in the decision-making arena.3 Comparing the two contending models, several differences appear. The most important difference relates to their assumptions about the constellation of actors. Although the assumption about unitary actors is parsimonious and may be a justifiable simplification in answering some types of research questions, in analyzing the decision-making process on territorial reforms of local government such a unitary actor perspective is destined for a straw man’s role. For this reason it is useful to relax the unitary actor assumption in the Rational Argumentation Model and apply its logic to the actors typically encountered in arenas where the fate of public reforms is decided. Even when this assumption is relaxed, some important differences in the implications of the two second models remain (see Table 7.2). First, in the Rational Argumentation Model the choice of an actor is the result of the values it endorses and its view of the world in terms of the expected consequences of various options. In the Positional Interest Model, on the other hand, these factors are merely epiphenomena, and the actor’s belief system about alternative reform options is determined by positional interests. If the Positional Interest Model is empirically valid we should find a rather close association between judgements made about reform options on the one hand and people’s structural position in the political-administrative network on the other hand. Second, if the Rational Argumentation Model is correct we would expect that actors will more or less open-mindedly ponder both advantages and disadvantages and decide on the basis of these anticipated

Table 7.2 Some differential implications of the Rational Argumentation Model and the Positional Interest Model in reform debates* Implication Model characteristics

Rational Argumentation Model

Positional Interest Model

• Effect of positions on judgements made about reform proposals

Absent or weak

Strong

• Openness of debate and exchange of arguments pro and con

High

Low

Note: * See also Dijk (2000).

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consequences for important public values. If, on the other hand, values and anticipated effects are merely invoked to justify preconceived stands (as in the Positional Interest Model), then we would expect stakeholders to hold more biased views where they one-sidedly emphasize the advantages or the disadvantages of a particular option, depending on the effect this option is likely to have on their positional interests.

Territorial reforms in the Twente region: A case study How do these models fare in the world of territorial reform efforts in the Netherlands? To make an assessment, in the following we focus on the specific case of territorial reform proposals in the Dutch region of Twente. Twente is a region located in the eastern part of the province of Overijssel along the Dutch-German border and has about 600,000 inhabitants. The population of Twente is to a large extent concentrated in an urban agglomeration consisting of four municipalities (Almelo, Borne, Hengelo and Enschede – the so-called Stedenband). This case is interesting for two principal reasons. First, it enables us to study decision-making regarding both municipal amalgamation and regional governance reforms simultaneously. Second, the Twente case is substantively representative for the Dutch territorial reform experience. On the one hand, in line with national patterns, the municipal amalgamations of small rural municipalities in Twente were successfully implemented. On the other hand, again reflecting the national pattern, the reforms aimed at solving problems of regional governance typically failed to be implemented. We begin our discussion with the latter. Neither ‘Twente’ nor ‘Twentestad’ As already mentioned, the national cabinet introduced temporary Regional Public Authorities (RPAs) in seven of the country’s major urban agglomerations in 1994. Twente was one of these RPAs and was therefore destined to become a new independent regional province. According to plans, the province of Overijssel was to be split into two parts, one of which would be Twente. Although these national proposals had substantial support in at least part of the municipalities in Twente, they were quite unpopular in the provincial capital of Overijssel. The provincial government fiercely opposed the idea of the division of its territory. Along with the amalgamation of smaller rural municipalities, the most stunning and controversial component of the proposal, however, was the suggested merger of the two largest urban municipalities in the


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region – Enschede with 145,000 inhabitants and Hengelo with 80,000 inhabitants – and the suburban municipality of Borne, with 20,000 inhabitants, into a new municipality, Twentestad, that would then be the fifth largest municipality in the Netherlands. All in all, the proposals implied that the number of municipalities would be reduced from 21 to 11. Opinions about Twentestad were highly divided. Advocates of Twentestad, among which were the municipal government of Enschede and the Province of Overijssel, argued that amalgamation would allow for economies of scale in producing local public services and provisions, and would enable a more decisive approach to addressing issues regarding the urban segment of Twente. Furthermore they argued that Twentestad would provide better opportunities for advancing the region’s interests in national politics, resulting in more generous financial support for regional projects from The Hague. Twentestad would thus be an alternative to the regional province of Twente. Initially, the pro-amalgamation lobby (headed by the influential Christian Democratic Queens Commissioner – a former CEO at the Dutch Ministry of Home Affairs – and the Social Democratic Mayor and Aldermen of Enschede) was successful in getting support from the social democratic Minister of Home Affairs and the new Dutch Cabinet. It decided, therefore, to submit the amalgamation proposals for approval to the Dutch national parliament. In Enschede, however, not everyone supported the amalgamation. A very active action committee firmly opposed the amalgamations, and demanded a referendum in Enschede on the plans. In reaction to this internal opposition, the municipality of Enschede launched a publicity campaign in favour of the amalgamations. It was supported by a coalition of local opinion leaders, including the regional Chamber of Commerce, the chief editor of the one and only regional newspaper, and the Board of the University of Twente. The main opponent in the region was the municipal government of Hengelo, which was about to lose its autonomy. The municipality of Hengelo launched a campaign against the amalgamation reform. This campaign had two main objectives. The first goal was to mobilize the citizens of Hengelo (and more broadly the whole region) against the proposals. The second goal was to set up an effective lobby in The Hague to persuade the Dutch parliament to vote against the government’s amalgamation bill. The mobilization of opponents in Hengelo was highly successful. On 3 March 1999, during an advisory referendum on the amalgamation issue, a massive 92.1 per cent of the electorate of Hengelo voted against the amalgamation plans.4

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The referendum results in Hengelo did not impress all of the members of the Second Chamber. Even so, on 27 April 1999 Bram Peper, the Minister of Home Affairs, who made Twentestad into a matter of personal political prestige, succeeded in persuading a somewhat hesitant Second Chamber to accept the amalgamations in Twente. This was a severe blow for the opponents. But during 1999 and 2000 the tide turned against Peper and his associates. On the one hand, partly in reaction to the extra-parliamentary opposition to the amalgamation plans, opposition within various factions of the First Chamber grew. At the same time, the personal prestige and political leverage of Peper vanished into thin air because allegations were raised against him regarding improper claims of expenses in his previous office as Mayor of Rotterdam. On 13 March 2000 Peper’s position had become untenable and he decided to resign. His successor Klaas de Vries, after a short period of reflection, decided that it would be unwise to defy the likely anti-amalgamation forces in the First Chamber (including the majority of his own party) and thereby jeopardize future good working relations with the majority of the House. Hence the bill was withdrawn and Twentestad proved to be stillborn. This dénouement was all the more dramatic because very much the same players, on a different stage, had shortly before also buried the alternative to Twentestad – namely the regional province of Twente. Among the region’s municipalities, Enschede and Hengelo were again the main players, but other municipalities also held strong opinions about the reform. After long discussions in the council of the RPA, 14 of Twente’s 21 municipal councils endorsed the plans to establish a regional province. In short, a vast majority, representing two-thirds of Twente’s municipalities (including the three major cities Enschede, Hengelo and Almelo), thus supported the establishment of a regional province. Many of the small municipalities also supported the regional province because they hoped that the adoption of this alternative would make amalgamations redundant and might therefore secure their preservation. On the other hand, a minority of seven councils not only shared some of the concerns voiced by the province of Overijssel, but also expressed worries that the relative proximity of a small scale province of Twente would be a threat to the autonomy of municipalities. But, as mentioned previously, the final say about the establishment of regional provinces and municipal amalgamations rests with the national government. The provincial government of Overijssel, a fierce opponent of the dissolution of the traditional provinces, played a major


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role in this debate. Both as one of the players to be consulted about the plans for regional provinces and as the initiator of the amalgamation reforms, it made an all-out effort to secure institutional survival. In addition to the arguments already noted, the provincial government of Overijssel pointed to the divisions among Twente’s municipalities in their support for the regional province. Overijssel also pointed to the ambiguity of the stance taken by Enschede, the region’s largest municipality. Publicly the city supported the idea of a regional province, but the Enschede mayor and his aldermen did not conceal their enthusiasm for the provincial proposal for a merger of Enschede, Hengelo and Borne to create Twentestad. Enschede’s stance further strengthened the impression of Twente as a region in discord. Indeed, the image of a ‘divided region’ was one of the major weapons used by Overijssel’s opponents to shelve the proposals for the regional province of Twente. In all likelihood other factors were nonetheless more important in deciding the fate of these proposals. At the same time as Twente discussed its political-administrative future, in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam (where the national government had also proposed the introduction of a regional province) popular referenda were held about the introduction of regional reforms and overwhelming majorities rejected the proposals. Because of these referenda results, the fierce opposition of the influential League of Provincial Governments, and the lack of solid support for the introduction of these new provinces in parliament or in various other regions (including Twente), the Dutch Minister for Home Affairs decided to withdraw the plans for these regional provinces. Once again, at the end of the day all remained the same. Both Twentestad and Twente (as a separate region) were shelved, and the cities in the Twente agglomeration were thrown back to the Joint Provisions to cope with cross-boundary issues. The fate of the rural amalgamation reform in Twente5 The provincial amalgamation plans did not only involve the merger of Almelo, Hengelo and Enschede into Twentestad, but also aimed at strengthening the administrative and problem-solving capacity of Twente’s rural municipalities. What happened to this part of the reform proposals? According to the national amalgamation procedures, the province has to consult municipalities about amalgamation proposals. As was to be expected, their reactions were divergent. Fourteen of 21 municipalities indicated that a continuation of the status quo would be their first preference. They typically opted for the preservation of their

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independence, sometimes allowing for boundary changes. The exceptions are Almelo, Goor, Denekamp and Weerselo, four municipalities that were in favour of amalgamations. In the case of Almelo, Goor and Denekamp this stand presumably had much to do with the fact that these municipalities were to constitute the largest city in the newly formed units: from their perspective the amalgamations essentially came down to an annexation of neighbouring smaller units. With the exception of Weerselo, all other municipalities invariably wanted to preserve their independence and opposed incorporation into larger units.6 In some cases the provincial plans did not threaten the integrity of the municipality, and in these cases (for example Hellendoorn, Tubbergen, Wierden and basically also Losser) the municipality offered support for the provincial plans because they basically respected the status quo. The provincial plans were also supported by the municipalities whose preference for amalgamations concurred with the provincial plans. In all other instances the provincial proposals met with municipal opposition. All of these municipal opponents were convinced that the provincial arguments for amalgamations were unconvincing and one-sided. A number of municipalities – sometimes referring to relevant research (such as Denters et al. 1996) – questioned the main provincial argument for amalgamations, namely that small units would lack the administrative capacity to solve local problems adequately and provide citizens with good quality local services. Some municipalities also pointed to the one-sided emphasis on functional arguments and the lack of attention to possible democratic effects of the reforms. They claimed that increasing the scale of local government might increase the distance between local government and its citizens. These municipalities, moreover, felt that their proposed alternatives for amalgamation were rejected without careful consideration. The province was blamed for cooking an ‘amalgamation sauce’, using only well-matched ingredients (arguments pro), and then pouring this sauce over all municipalities, without considering the appropriateness of these arguments in the context of specific municipalities. If we set aside the special case of Twentestad (amalgamation of Enschede, Hengelo and Borne), the provincial proposals were essentially adopted by the national legislator. Although several municipalities tried to influence the members of the Second and First Chamber of the Dutch parliament, these last-minute interventions were essentially in vain. After the enactment of the law, the amalgamations were implemented and the number of municipalities in the region was consequently reduced from 21 to 14.


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What does the Twente case tell us about reform politics? Some of the implications of the two perspectives on reform politics that we introduced in this chapter were summarized in Table 7.2. The qualitative data presented here do not allow for a rigorous and conclusive empirical test of the theoretical arguments, but inspection of the evidence is nevertheless suggestive. The evidence from the Twente case suggests that the Positional Interest Model is in many respects useful for understanding the decision-making process relating to territorial reform proposals in the Netherlands. First, as this model implies, the reorganization of Twente can be understood as a political struggle between conflicting political interests, where the preferences, perceptions and stands of the actors involved are determined by their positional interests. In the model it is assumed that these interests are defined in terms of organizational survival, preservation of independence, and potential changes in interorganizational power balances. If we look at the positions of the actors at the local and at the provincial level, we find evidence that such concerns may have played a considerable role in defining actors’ positions and decisions in the process: 7 1. At the provincial level the stances and the decisions made by the province of Overijssel can be interpreted rather consistently as efforts to replace the current provinces with regional provinces. This is corroborated by the provincial position and its efforts to influence the national debate about the regional provinces. This is also corroborated by its successful efforts to link the debate about the future of provinces with the amalgamation debate and efforts to spread discord among Twente’s municipalities. 2. Also for many municipalities positional interests were at the heart of their stand on the issue of the regional province. Many small municipalities were in favour of this option because they hoped that after the introduction of such a small-scale province there might be no need for amalgamations. On the other hand, several of the opponents of the regional province were afraid that such a smallscale entity in close proximity might pose a threat to their municipal autonomy. 3. Likewise, considerations of organizational survival and the effects of reforms on the balance of power were prominent in the debate about the amalgamation reforms. On the one hand small municipalities, with only one exception, were primarily concerned for their survival

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as independent authorities. On the other hand, larger municipalities typically considered the amalgamation reforms as a way to increase their population size and thereby to increase the size of their organization and its potential influence in the intergovernmental network at the provincial and national levels. Second, the Positional Interest Model also implies that substantive arguments are of only secondary importance in reform debates and merely serve the purpose of legitimizing the pursuit of narrow organizational interests. The Rational Argumentation Model, by contrast, assumes that actors in reorganizations are driven by a genuine desire to improve the quality of governance and in an open debate based on an exchange of arguments pro and con try to find the best way to solve governance problems. The Twente case contradicts these expectations based on the Rational Argumentation Model in several respects: 1. The reform debate is by no means an open exchange of arguments between the different players. This becomes clear in the amalgamation debate, in which the provincial government essentially ignores the counter-arguments and alternatives proposed by the opponents of the amalgamation reforms, and limits itself essentially to a repetition of its earlier arguments. 2. As a consequence of the balance of power in the amalgamation debate, in which advocates of amalgamation – the province and the larger municipalities in the region – had the upper hand, the dominant reform discourse was rather one-sided, reiterating claims about positive benefits in terms of increased effectiveness and efficiency and ignoring counter-arguments that either questioned such effectiveness and efficiency gains or pointed to possible negative democratic effects. 3. There is a tendency among actors to engage in opportunistic argumentation. In line with the Positional Interest Model, virtually all the players have preferences for solutions that are in agreement with their positional interests. Only arguments that support preferred solutions are brought to bear, and non-supportive arguments are ignored or belittled. Even inconsistencies in positions are accepted if these serve organizational interests. Hengelo’s position with respect to various amalgamation scenarios illustrates the latter point. In its opposition to the establishment of Twentestad, Hengelo uses a wide range of arguments against large-scale municipalities. At the same time the city argues for an annexation of Borne, which would also


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imply a substantial increase in the scale of the municipality, essentially ignoring possible negative returns to scale. Third, the Positional Interest Model also indicates that the fate of reform proposals is essentially determined by the balance of power between the various interested players. The differences in the fate of the various reform proposals essentially confirm this. 1. The success of the amalgamation reforms in the rural parts of Twente (and likewise in other parts of the country) is essentially the result of the make-up of the relevant decision-arenas and the distribution of power within the relevant arenas. Because of the small-scale and piecemeal, regional approach to amalgamations, these reforms are less likely to become highly salient in the national political debate. Under normal circumstances national government and parliament accept the provincial amalgamation proposals without major amendments. The fate of amalgamation procedures is therefore largely determined in the provincial political arena, where the powers of the provincial government are decisive and the role of the municipalities is merely advisory. In the Twente case the provincial government, supported by some of the larger municipalities, was in favour of the amalgamations of the rural parts of Twente. 2. The eventual wrecking of the Twentestad proposal may appear as a falsification of the dominance of the provincial arena in the case of amalgamation reform. But on closer inspection even the decisionmaking process on this part of the provincial plans is to a large extent in line with the expected pattern. The provincial plans, after all, had already been accepted by the more important of the two Chambers of Dutch parliament without amendments. Because the second house, the Senate, rarely rejects a bill that was already approved by the Second Chamber, supporters of the Twentestad proposals already crowed. But then unexpectedly the political tide turned against the responsible but unpopular cabinet minister, Peper. Allegations of unethical behaviour put this ardent supporter of the Twentestad proposal in the deep freeze and encouraged a growing number of opponents in the Senate (also from the ranks if the minister’s own party) to persevere in their opposition. This unique set of circumstances led to the withdrawal of the Twentestad proposal. 3. The decision-making process with regard to the regional provinces also points to the relevance of the institutional framework in which decisions about reforms are made and the distribution of power in

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relevant arenas. In the case of the regional provinces, the debate about Twente’s future was embedded in a more comprehensive national debate about the future of seven major urban agglomerations. Here developments in the national political arena, largely in reaction to developments in the agglomerations of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, led to the rejection of the plans for regional provinces. The forces that had successfully opposed all previous regional reforms – the influential League of Dutch Provinces, the Association of Dutch Municipalities worried about the reform’s possible consequences for municipal autonomy, and the Ministry of Finance worried about the financial costs of the reforms – also shelved the plans for regional provinces.

Conclusion The previous section offers an answer to the main question posed at the outset, that is, how do we explain differences in the fate of proposed municipal amalgamations and regional reforms proposals? The analysis also has implications for the more general issues that are at stake in this volume. First of all our analysis indicates that the framing of policy arguments in the debate about territorial government is governed by a political logic. Thus, the debate about the rural amalgamations in the Twente case was essentially cast in terms of functional criteria, in which the main assumption was that the amalgamations would increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of municipalities. These claims were not substantiated by empirical evidence challenging the assumptions of increased system capacity, and counterclaims emphasizing alternative values (democracy rather than effectiveness and efficiency) were largely ignored. In the debate about Twentestad, the framing of the debate was more balanced, probably reflecting a more equal balance of power between proponents and adversaries. In this debate Hengelo and its allies in the First Chamber of the Dutch parliament emphasized the possible democratic disadvantages of Twentestad and pointed out that other governance structures could be just as effective and efficient as Twentestad. This suggests that policy arguments are not a driving force in the reform debate, but that they are used by parties in the debate as a public justification for preconceived choices based on institutional interests. Whether or not particular arguments are heard in a reform debate primarily depends on the balance of power between opponents and proponents of reforms.


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As for the strategy of reform, the Twente case clearly illustrates the relevance of variations in the institutional make-up. With respect to the amalgamation reforms, the statutory procedures reserved a major role for the 12 Dutch provinces. They were given the key role in preparing and deciding over the amalgamation proposals submitted to central government. Typically, the provinces were also the initiators of amalgamation reforms. Because of this, amalgamations were initiated and implemented on a piecemeal basis, region-by-region rather than simultaneously for all municipalities across the country. This reform strategy contributed to the relative ease with which amalgamation reforms are adopted in the Netherlands. The strategy used in the case of amalgamation reforms stands in sharp contrast to a more centralized strategy used for regional reforms. Both the decisions about the regional provinces and previous attempts to change the regional governance structures were typically based on central government initiatives for all (major urban) regions in the country, and required final decision-making by the national parliament. These differences in the choice of reform strategies also affected the patterns of conflict and thereby the chances of the adoption of the reforms. The amalgamation policies were prepared in the relative calm of provincial government, out of the sight of the national media. Typically, provincial amalgamation plans are supported by both the province and the relatively large central municipalities in both the urban and the rural districts. These central municipalities are often winners in the amalgamation game because they are able to incorporate their smaller neighbours, thereby increasing their organizational size and influence. The opposition to these amalgamation reforms was therefore limited to the less populous rural municipalities. Politically, none of the major political parties was willing to make a breach for these small municipalities. Even the Christian Democrats, with a strong power base in rural areas, was reluctant to do so, because in most of the provinces the Christian Democrats occupied important positions in provincial government. Moreover, even in the countryside some of the larger municipalities were in favour of amalgamation reforms. The regional governance issue, by comparison, was typically fought in the national political arena. Here the odds were very much against the reformers. The strengthening of governance structures at the regional level was likely to negatively affect both the provinces and (most of) the municipalities. These comprehensive reforms were therefore invariably defeated by oftentimes overwhelming alliances of national leagues of municipalities and provincial governments. While the Social

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Democrats, with their strongholds in the major cities, typically initiated and supported these reforms, they often met with firm opposition of the Christian Democrats. Finally, as a prototypical consensus democracy the Netherlands is a rather unlikely setting for radical reform. Broad party political support is a virtual sine qua non for the successful adoption of reform policies. The Dutch electoral system of (extreme) proportional representation implies the need for broad coalitions in which even the smallest coalition partner is able to ‘rock the boat’ in case of an unacceptable reform proposal. Moreover the legislative procedures in the Dutch system imply that major institutional changes require the consent of both houses of parliament. This is not only a time-consuming procedure; the possibility of dissimilar majorities in both houses of parliament constitutes another complication (cf. Tsebelis 1995). The continuing story of failing reforms in the regional governance system provides numerous illustrations of such difficulties. Whether by accident or intent, the strategy of depoliticization used in the case of amalgamation reforms made the acceptance of territorial reforms an assailable target. But as the case of Twentestad shows, even small disruptions such as the ministerial resignation may have grave consequences.

Notes 1. It should be emphasized that this is a methodological assumption. In fact this ‘unitary’ actor often consists of a multitude of individuals and sub-units with their own values and expectations. For parsimony’s sake the model abstracts from such complexities and hypothesizes that we can understand the political decision as if it is the result of choices made by one single actor. Such an as if assumption is fruitful, for example, when there is widespread social consensus on an issue or when we try to explain the political decisions when a democratically legitimized government sets out to achieve its aims. 2. In fact such a model comes close to Allison’s (1971) Model I. 3. Actually this is a rather stylized rendition of Allison’s Model III. In a revised edition, Allison and Zelikow (1999) also highlight the importance of the rules of the game in a particular decision arena. 4. Municipalities in the Netherlands are free to initiate a referendum on whatever topic. These referenda can, however, only be advisory. The Constitution and the Local Government Act reserve the right to make binding decisions to the directly elected municipal councils (Rosema 2005). In the amalgamation process too it is the council that ultimately decides on the municipal reaction to the provincial amalgamation proposal. Normally the council’s decision is in line with the referendum results, not the least because especially small municipalities typically hold these referendums to demonstrate wide popular opposition against amalgamations. But inasmuch as the final say about amalgamation


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proposals lies in the hands of higher tiers of government, not municipalities, the impact of referenda results are bound to be marginal (providing one among many arguments for or against an amalgamation proposal). 5. This section has been derived from Provincie Overijssel (1997). 6. We can observe the same pattern in the debate about the Twentestad amalgamation. Here the largest city Enschede supports the amalgamation, whereas Hengelo was anxious to preserve its independence. The position of small Borne is also motivated by a desire to retain its identity. Borne expected that this goal would be better served by inclusion in a larger whole (with both Hengelo and Enschede) than would be the case with annexation by its neighbour Hengelo. 7. The discussion here is concentrated on the provincial and municipal decisionmaking process. This is not to say, however, that the national arena cannot be important, as the fate of the Twentestad proposal conclusively demonstrates.

8 Multiple Choice: The Persistence of Territorial Pluralism in the German Federation Melanie Walter-Rogg

Since the nineteenth century several waves of territorial reforms have led to a substantial reduction in the number of municipalities in Germany. The objectives of these reforms have been to achieve a balanced relationship between land area and the number of inhabitants and, at the same time, more local administrative power, political autonomy and citizen participation in local public life (Mecking 2004; Laux 1999; Martins 1995). The amalgamation of municipalities began already at the end of the nineteenth century as many cities, in the course of industrialization, grew and required larger areas. This was especially the case in the industrial district of Northrhine-Westphalia (Ruhr area), where municipalities swelled to a size of more than 100,000 inhabitants. In more recent times, two waves of territorial reorganization have subsequently swept over Germany. The first occurred during the 1960s and 1970s in response to the shortcomings of local self-government and local administration of state laws in West Germany. Municipal and district boundaries were redrawn in the old federal states in a reform that lead to a dramatic reduction in the number of local units and a considerable effort towards decentralization of administrative functions (Gunlicks 1986:49). Then in the middle of the 1990s, following reunification, territorial reform started in the new federal states as well. Compared to the earlier reform in the western part of the country, this second reform process consisted not in a single step, but rather in a slow-moving adaptation of the former centralized administrative system (Blach and Jonetzko 1999). In the context of German reunification, proposals to redraw the boundaries of the Länder and to amalgamate several of them were also discussed, but were not followed up. Circumstances surrounding both of these recent reform waves are 138

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reviewed below. Before doing so, however, it is useful to highlight the territorial pluralism that exists at present.

Geopolitical fragmentation and administrative organization The federal nature of the German state, along with historical legacies and cultural traditions, have put their marks on the processes and outcomes of territorial reforms. Reformers have sought to achieve a unitary system of local and regional governance, but the actual arrangements found across the country vary greatly in terms of both options and outcomes. Enlargement of local units has taken place, yet overall the most striking feature of the German case at present is the prevalence of multiple choice in local governance arrangements. This diversity is evident is several respects. Compared to other European countries Germany, with 231 inhabitants per km2, has a high population density. The European Union average – 114 inhabitants per km2 – is far below this figure; only the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain are more densely populated (Hoorens 2008:29). This high population density is also reflected in a relatively dense network of big cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. After implementing territorial reforms in the last four decades, the spatial structure of Germany is now distinguished by a relatively balanced, decentralized concentration of population, workplaces and infrastructure in cities, city regions and agglomerated areas as well as by large and coherent rural areas (Walter-Rogg 2005). Even so, with 12,312 municipalities at present, the territory remains relatively fragmented, albeit less so than the US (35,933) or France (36,565).1 Apart from the city states, which consist of only one (Berlin, Hamburg) or two big cities (Bremen), the number of municipalities ranges from 52 in the state of Saarland to 2,306 in Rhineland-Palatinate (see Table 8.1). In the vertical political-administrative structure of Germany, local government constitutes the lowest level, being part of the next higher level of state-run administration.2 Local government may consist of municipalities, rural districts (Landkreise),3 independent (larger) cities, which constitute urban districts (Stadtkreise) in their own right, and associations of small villages. The latter are called Samtgemeinden, Verbandsgemeinden or Ämter (unions) and perform administrative functions of local self-government for the involved municipalities at an intermediate level. An Amt, as well as the other above-mentioned units, is subordinate to a district, and is subdivided into municipalities. Normally an Amt consists of very small municipalities; larger

Rural districts (Landkreise) in 2006

Local federations

Municipalities as of 2006

States

Brandenburg Saxony Thuringia MecklenburgWestern Pomerania Saxony-Anhalt Lower Saxony Schleswig-Holstein Bavaria Baden-Wuerttemberg Berlin Bremen Hamburg Hesse North RhineWestphalia Rhineland-Palatinate

Belong to a local federation

Do not belong to a local federation

% change 1990–06

Total

14 22 17 12

–63.2 –54.2 –51.4 –61.3

54 108 127 79

416 503 986 843

4 7 6 6

272 279 868 809

148 231 124 40

420 510 992 849

–76.6 –68.6 –42.0 –24.5

21 38 11 71 35 — — — 21 31

–43.2 0 0 0 0 — — — 0 0

94 138 116 314 272 — — — — —

1,039 1,018 1,121 2,031 1,101 — — — 421 373

3 8 4 25 9 1 2 1 5 23

1,004 735 1,024 991 921 — — — — —

38 289 101 1,065 189 1 2 1 426 396

1,042 1,024 1,125 2,056 1,110 1 2 1 426 396

–23.8 –0.5 –0.5 +0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0

24

0

163

2,294

12

2,257

49

2,306

0

Total

Belong to a rural district

Belong to an urban district

% change 1990–06

Totala

140

Table 8.1 Rural and urban districts, local federations, municipalities and population in Germany in 2006 and percentage change, 1990–2006*

Saarland Total West Germanyb East Germany

6 323 237 86

0 –24.2 0 –54.5

—

52

1,465 1,003 462

12,196 8,409 3,787

— 116 90 26

— 9,160 5,928 3,232

52

52

3,152 2,571 581

12,312 8,499 3,813

0 –23.7 –0.1 –50.0

Note: * The table is ranked by the change of municipalities between 1990 and 2006 (column 12). a including inhabited municipality-free areas; b including Berlin. Source: Statistical yearbook of German Municipalities published by the German Association of Cities; Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany published by the Federal Statistical Office.

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Multiple Choice in the German Federation

municipalities do not belong to an Amt, and are called ‘unionfree municipalities’ (amtsfreie Gemeinden). Within this assortment of arrangements, three-quarters of all municipalities – 9,160 of the total of 12,312 – are members of 1,465 local federations (see Table 8.1). Only one-quarter of all municipalities are unitary municipalities,4 which perform all local tasks in their own area of jurisdiction (Gunlicks 1986:49).

Two waves of territorial and administrative reform While territorial and administrative, or functional, reforms are frequently referred to as separate programmes, in Germany the two have typically been closely intertwined. The overall goal of both kinds of reforms has been to provide local authorities with the capacity to perform as many tasks as possible. The idea has been to increase the size of the municipalities and districts to a point where numerous functions could then be redistributed from higher to lower levels (Gunlicks 1986:54; Deutscher Landkreistag 2005:100 ff.). In the federal system introduced in West Germany after World War II, the Länder, as self-governing units, were granted a sphere of activity that they have regulated on their own authority, including the structure of local government. Local governments have the right of self-government in fields not regulated by the state or in those matters affecting the local community within the framework of existing laws (Gunlicks 1986:48). Hamburg and Bremen have long held a dual status as both state and local governments, and the same has applied to Berlin since 1946. To some extent developments in the 1950s and 1960s seemed to challenge the principles of local self-government. A rapid increase in the number and extent of state activities delegated to the local levels led to an overburdening of local government, especially of smaller local units. Increasing demands for public services within the sphere of local selfgovernment also became difficult to meet. ‘The smaller the unit of local government, the less likely it was also to be able financially or administratively to handle its responsibilities under the principle of unity of administration’ (Gunlicks 1986:49). The federal states in West Germany therefore implemented far-reaching, comprehensive administrative and territorial reforms in the period from 1968 to 1978. A second wave of territorial reform took place in East Germany following reunification in 1990. Unification gave new topicality and significance to the concern with equivalent living conditions in all parts of the country. Economic, social and ecological variations between the

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Western regions were overshadowed by disparities between the old and the new Länder. The inclusion of the eastern Länder increased the scope of regional variation considerably. As part of the attempt to come to grips with this situation, the highly centralized administrative system of the former GDR was replaced by West German models of federalism and local self-government. Since then, Germany has consisted of 16 federal states with strongly varying population sizes, social structures and levels of economic development. In the following, each of the two reform waves is discussed in great detail with an eye to the dynamics of the reform processes.

Territorial reforms in West Germany (1968–80) Contrary to the largely stable institutional conditions of local politics during the 1950s and 1960s, the following decade led to radical reforms in the western federal states. By the early 1960s a number of serious problems were perceived to exist in the spatial administrative system at both the municipal and district levels. The traditional emphasis on law and order and basic security had changed to a focus on the provision of services. But, as noted by Gunlicks, the majority of municipalities were too small to offer the range of services demanded: The lack of an adequate tax base, administrative personnel and sufficient population to make the services cost effective led to the provision of such services, if at all, by larger neighbouring municipalities or special-purpose joint authorities. This undermined local self-government in the first instance and the principle of unity of administration in the second. Local self-government was also undermined by the increasing reliance on categorical grants from higher levels to finance numerous local projects. (Gunlicks 1986:49 ff.) Another major problem was the lack of coordination among local units in big urban agglomerations. The central city usually had sufficient administrative capacity to provide the full range of services, but there was insufficient space for recreation areas, new housing and economic development. Inter-municipal cooperation existed, but increasing reliance on its various forms raised questions concerning the principle of local self-government (Gunlicks 1986:50). As the 1960s progressed, moreover, greater emphasis was placed on the importance of planning (Mecking 2004:416; Gabriel 1999:160). Federal

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and Land planning laws required rational planning units at the local level, and this meant the elimination or reduction of many small, ineffective local units and overlapping jurisdictions. Against this background some scholars and practitioners thought that there were too many administrative levels. The reduction of small units and an increase in the size and capacity of the remaining municipalities, it was argued, should make it possible for them to perform functions previously carried out by the larger units. This would relieve the district administrations, which could then assume the responsibilities of the administrative districts (Regierungsbezirk). The administrative district, for all practical purposes the third level of administration, could then be dissolved. As the reform movement progressed, however, it was decided that the administrative districts could be reduced in number but not eliminated altogether (Thieme and Prillwitz 1981). Today, experts still discuss the effectiveness or efficiency of this third level of administration (Bogumil and Kottmann 2006). In the meantime, several federal states disbanded their Regierungsbezirke – for example, Rhineland-Palatinate (2000), Saxony-Anhalt (2004), Lower Saxony (2005) – or are currently planning to do so (North Rhine-Westphalia). Others, like Baden-Wuerttemberg or Lower Saxony, reinforced this administrative level quite recently. Restructuring at the local and district level In 1968 there were 24,282 municipalities in West Germany, twothirds of which had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, and 94 per cent fewer than 5,000 inhabitants (see Table 8.2). All but 136 of the larger independent municipalities were constituent parts of the 425 rural districts (see Table 8.3). There were wide variations among the districts in terms of population and area both among and within the Länder (Gunlicks 1986:49). Reforms carried out in the course of a decade, between 1968 and 1980, reduced this number by two-thirds, to a total of 8,495 municipalities, 87 independent cities and 237 rural districts in the eight states. However, it is somewhat misleading to say that the number of municipalities was reduced from 24,282 to 8,495 insofar as 6,032 of the latter number are members of 1,041 associations of municipalities (see Table 8.3). Following Gunlicks (1986:57) it would be just as accurate to speak of a reduction from 24,282 to 3,418 local general-purpose administrative units. Table 8.3 also indicates that the states differed in the degree of reduction they carried out. Six Länder consolidated their units of local government by two-thirds or more. Three of these six – Lower Saxony, Bavaria

Table 8.2 Distribution of local governments in West and East Germany and percentage change by size of municipality, 1968–2006 West Germany 1980* Population size

West Germany 2006 *

East Germany 2006

Number

%

% change 1968–80

Number

%

Number

Less than 500 501–1,000 1,001–5,000 5,001–10,000 10,001–50,000 50,001–100,000 100,001 –500,000 Over 500,000

1,718 1,394 3,307 948 980 88 54 12

20.2 16.4 38.9 11.2 11.5 1.0 0.6 0.1

–84.0 –75.6 –47.1 +8.3 +40.9 +37.5 +15.8 +8.3

1,509 1,264 3,330 1,065 1,165 95 59 12

17.8 14.9 39.2 12.5 13.7 1.1 0.7 0.1

1,119 979 1,236 243 214 11 9 2

Total

8,501

100.0

–65.0

8,499

100.0

3,813

Germany 2006

% change 1990–06

Number

%

29.3 25.7 32.4 6.4 5.6 0.3 0.2 0.1

–70.0 –49.4 –21.5 –46.4 –16.9 –31.3 –25.0 +100.0

2,628 2,243 4,566 1,308 1,379 106 68 14

21.4 18.2 37.1 10.6 11.2 0.9 0.6 0.1

100.0

–49.9

12,312

100.0

%

Note: * Including the city states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. Sources: Federal Statistical Office 2007, Data from 30 June 1968, 31 December 1980, 31 December 1990 and 31 December 2006.

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Table 8.3

Territorial reform in West German states, 1968–80*

States

Saarland

Rural districts (Landkreise)

Urban districts (Stadtkreise)

1968

1968

1980

1980

Municipalities 1968

1980

% change

7

6

1

—

347

50

–85.6

Hesse

39

21

9

5

2,684

427

–84.1

North Rhine-Westphalia

57

31

38

23

2,277

396

–82.6

Lower Saxony

60

38

15

9

4,231

1,029

–75.7

143

71

48

25

7,077

2,049

–71.1

63

35

9

9

3,379

1,111

–67.1

Bavaria

Baden-Wuerttemberg

Remarks All of these are unitary municipalities; one of the 6 counties is the Saarbrücken metropolitan association All of these are unitary municipalities All of these are unitary municipalities 274 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder form 142 associations of municipalities (Samtgemeinden) 940 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder form 345 associations of municipalities (Verwaltungsgemeinschaften) 179 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder form 272 associations of municipalities (Verwaltungsgemeinschaften)

Rhineland-Palatinate

39

24

12

12

2,905

2,303

–20.7

Schleswig-Holstein

17

11

4

4

1,378

1,130

–18.0

425

237

136

87

24,278

8,495

–65.2

Total (without city-states)

38 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder form 163 associations of municipalities (Verbandsgemeinden) 101 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder form 119 associations of municipalities (Ämter) 2,377 of these are unitary municipalities; the remainder 6,118 form 1,041 associations of municipalities

Note: * The table is ranked by the change of municipalities between 1968 and 1980. Sources: Statistical Yearbook of German Municipalities published by the German Association of Cities 1968; Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany published by the Federal Statistical Office 1969. Data from 30 June 1968, 31 December 1980. Remarks in the final column are based on Gunlicks (1986:59).

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and Baden-Wuerttemberg – introduced federations of municipalities and achieved reductions in the number of local units with this strategy. In contrast, Rhineland-Palatinate and Schleswig-Holstein operated very cautiously and reduced their number of municipalities by only one-fifth. These amalgamations were not always achieved by voluntary initiative and acceptance, being rather adopted and implemented by force, and in some cases residents of the former municipalities remain enraged to this day. Framing of policy arguments In a broader sense, the overall aim of territorial reforms was seen by many Germans to be the fulfilment of certain provisions of the Constitution. Article 20 declares the Federal Republic to be a ‘democratic and socially just federal state’. New challenges after World War II linked to phenomena such as suburbanization and regional disparities lead to a fundamental question: ‘How could social justice and equality in living conditions become a reality when some states were considerably poorer than others and, in particular, when there were substantial differences in the administrative and service capacities among the various counties and municipalities?’ (Gunlicks 1986:50). At the end of the 1960s, therefore, practitioners and scholars advised comprehensive territorial reform to balance the disadvantages of small villages or sparsely inhabited areas and to accommodate recent social and economic developments in agglomerated areas. The sweeping financial reform of 1969 and the adoption of new or revised laws implied a new relationship between federal, state and local authorities. The achievement of equal living conditions in all parts of the federal territory was given overriding importance. As a consequence, local sovereignty in planning, financial and ordinance issues was diminished. In the following period intensive interaction between the different layers of the political system evolved. Local decision-making was increasingly affected by legislation that entailed guidelines and financial support from the federal level and the Länder (Gabriel 1999). In order to achieve social justice and equality in living conditions, reformers specified three general requirements (Thieme and Prillwitz 1981:45 ff.; Gunlicks 1986:51). First, improvements in the administrative and service capacity of the municipalities: municipalities would have to become large enough to hire professional staff that would not need counsel from supervisory authorities at higher levels. Second, optimization of the municipal political format: a professional local administration was needed to increase contacts with citizens through better information

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in order that citizen concerns could be better accommodated. Political standards were to be improved by greater transparency of the reformed structures of local government and the strengthened unity of administration. Third, adjustment of boundaries and functions to meet area or regional needs: to enhance equality in the provision of services in rural areas it was seen as necessary to place strong and weak units together in one district, which could thereby equalize service delivery in a more effective manner. A further concern was to ensure that the boundaries of special state authorities and other public institutions corresponded to the enlarged boundaries of local government units. The main goals of the territorial reforms, in short, were improved efficiency, effectiveness, subsidiarity and closeness to citizens. A reduction in the overall costs of local government was not expected. If the reformed local units were to offer more services, have more facilities, and hire more professional staff, they could hardly do so at lower cost than before. On the other hand, certain savings might be realized through economies of scale, more effective administration and a reduction in the number of joint authorities. The enactment and implementation of these territorial reforms were facilitated by the institutional structure of the Federal Republic of West Germany. As specified by the Constitution, local government reform is a matter for the Länder authorities, not the federal level. In most Länder the territorial reforms outlined above were agreed upon a bi-partisan basis, without major political opposition. It would not have been possible to engage in such a dramatic reform effort without majority support in each Land parliament. But independent of political majorities in the respective Länder, politicians followed the assessment of legal-administrative scholars and practitioners with respect to the necessity of territorial and administrative reforms (Thieme and Prillwitz 1981:61 ff.). Reform strategies The first Land government to introduce a local government reform bill was the Rhineland-Palatinate in 1965. In the following years, each Land began step-by-step, first by modifying a number of laws that would help expedite the boundary and administrative changes. These included regulating the terms of office of local officials, freezing local government positions, preventing small municipalities subject to annexation from increasing dramatically their indebtedness for new facilities, and altering local election dates so that they would not fall shortly before or after the reforms. The means of implementation varied in the different states, but in all cases affected municipalities were permitted to participate in the

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process through hearings, interest groups and political party channels. In some Länder the reforms took place incrementally, region by region, whereas in others the entire territory was reformed in one comprehensive package. Territorial reform came first in some Länder, administrative reform in others. In some Länder, the districts were reformed first, in other the municipalities, and in still other cases they were reformed at the same time (Mecking 2004; Thieme and Prillwitz 1981). A voluntary phase of territorial restructuring was typical, but even with the threat of action by the Land government, voluntary action alone was never sufficient to achieve comprehensive reform. The overall reform strategy was therefore a mixture of bottom-up and top-down approaches. The reform goals were partly achieved by voluntary agreements of the local units on how to cooperate henceforth, partly by acts of the federal states. In Hesse, for example, the reform was made in two steps. From 1969 to 1971 the government offered broad benefits in revenue equalization if the municipalities merged voluntarily. The willingness of the local units to incorporate or amalgamate was correspondingly high, with the number of local units being reduced by 53 per cent, from 2,642 in 1969 to 1,233 in 1971. This phase was followed by a period that enforced local restructuring by law with a further reduction from 1,233 to 422 local units in 1980. Hence, in toto, the number of municipalities in Hesse was reduced by 84 per cent in one decade (see Table 8.3). As already noted, states differed in the strategies chosen to reduce the number of local governments. In cases where most of the local units were small villages, the issue became one of consolidation and annexation. In North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse and the Saarland, the decision was made to form only consolidated unitary municipalities. With this solution the local units lost their political autonomy but got a professional and effective administration. In some cases of low population density, however, these unitary municipalities covered extensive areas. Other states implemented mixtures of unitary municipalities and local federations or associations. The latter were introduced to accommodate previously established regional cooperation (Laux 1999:173 ff.). Two different strategies were pursued. One involved perpetuation of autonomous local authorities and the implementation of public corporations with special tasks such as land use planning or sewage disposal. Examples of this strategy were found in Ämter in Schleswig-Holstein, Samtgemeinden in Lower Saxony or Verwaltungsgemeinschaften in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. This strategy remains contentious to this day since specialpurpose joint authorities exist alongside these structures (Gunlicks 1986:49).

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In the second strategy local government bodies were organized on two levels, both with their own representative structures and political responsibilities. Examples of this strategy were observed in Verbandsgemeinden in Rhineland-Palatinate. Thus, all together three different types of reform strategies were pursued (unitary municipalities, local administrative federation and two-tier local government) during the territorial reforms in West Germany because geographical and structural disparities stood in the way of consistent solutions (Laux 1999:174). Patterns of conflict Territorial changes in West Germany were initiated by the states without pressure from the central government. The reforms were undertaken by Länder with different political party majorities and constellations of interests in the respective Land parliaments (Landtage). And they were made with relatively little public and partisan political opposition. Indeed, there was a consensus among legal scholars, high-level bureaucrats, politicians, the mass media and the interested public that local government reforms – especially in the larger cities – were necessary. Disagreement existed primarily over the extent, timing and organizational details of the reforms, not over their desirability (Gunlicks 1986:55). The respective territorial reforms, furthermore, were initiated by the elites rather than by public pressure for change. Indeed, one of the most remarkable features of the reforms of the 1970s was the relative lack of public opposition (Laux 1999:175). This is not to say that there were no protests; there were in fact examples of citizen protest, but these were isolated and hardly typical reactions. In most cases where opposition did develop, it was expressed in legal terms in the administrative and constitutional courts. In some instances, for example in cases where indebted municipalities were merged with more solvent municipalities, the amalgamations were even rescinded. As concrete plans for comprehensive territorial reforms began to appear in the scholarly literature and in commission reports sponsored by the various Land governments, it became evident that there would be goal conflicts and that one goal might have to take precedence over another. It also became clear that there would be disagreements over which standards should apply. In the beginning the experts had to solve questions such as the appropriate size of municipalities and the strategy for establishing such municipalities. Yet in both respects a general consensus was reached very quickly. One such principle, for instance, was that a municipality should have about 8,000 inhabitants,

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depending somewhat on the Land and the density of population (Laux 1999:174). There was no opposition of principle among the respective minority parties, but in some Länder various aspects of the reform became a partisan issue among the major parties. During the 1970s, the CDU or CSU (Bavaria) had a majority in the South, whereas except for SchleswigHolstein, the SPD alone or together with the FDP held a majority in the North. The SPD put more emphasis on goals concerned with equality. This meant more equitable distribution of services achieved through large-scale annexations and consolidations, and a bias in favour of unitary municipalities. The CDU, by comparison, was more sensitive to goals concerned with freedom. This meant administrative decentralization, opposition to the argument that ‘bigger is better’ and a bias in favour of associations of municipalities and historical boundaries where possible (Gunlicks 1986:56). Especially in Bavaria, with its thousandyear-old history, the CSU argued this view, while the opposite view was most evident in the artificially created post-war SPD-dominated state of Lower Saxony. Differences in partisan majorities are one factor that explains why generally larger units emerged in the North and that there was exclusive focus on unitary municipalities in the SPD-controlled states North-Rhine Westphalia and Hesse. But all parties saw the need for some type of reform.

Territorial reforms in East Germany (since 1990) Shortly after German unification in 1990 territorial reform was initiated in the new federal states as well. But broad territorial and administrative reforms in the five new federal states faced special difficulties (Laux 1999; Wollmann 1997; Knemeyer 1992; Schmidt-Eichstaedt 1992). Adaptation to the local government system of West Germany was of overriding importance for the uniform execution of federal and state laws in the entire country. But experiences from previous territorial changes in West Germany could not be applied unconditionally. The territorial character of the system of local government in East Germany put constraints on the implementation of reforms in the eastern part of the country. In 1990 the territory of the former GDR had 7,612 municipalities, half of them having fewer than 500 inhabitants and 75 per cent having fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (see Table 8.2). So the territorial situation in East Germany at the outset was quite similar to that of West Germany in 1968.

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Restructuring at the local and district level Despite the fact that the guideline was an adaptation of the structures found in West Germany, given differences in basic conditions such as liquidity, capital and personnel resources (Schmidt-Jortzig 1992:65 ff.), a direct transfer of reform strategies to the Eastern part of the country was hardly possible. Contrary to the Western situation in the 1970s, the local system of the former GDR needed a fundamental reconstruction at the beginning of the 1990s. That meant a complete build-up of a totally atrophied system of local self-government in the new federal states. Compared to the Western part, the process consisted not in a single step, but in slow-moving adaptation of a formerly centralized administrative system. By 2006 the number of municipalities in East Germany was reduced by roughly 50 per cent, from 7,612 to 3,813 (see Table 8.1). As in the West German case, the five states in East Germany differed in the amount of reduction. Brandenburg and Saxony were much above the average of 47 per cent and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt were also clearly above that average. Thuringia came in between these two extremes. But at the end of 2005 the state government in Thuringia abandoned its resistance to territorial reforms, having been promised 20 million Euros over a two-year period for implementing the required restructuring. At first glance, the reform of the independent cities was relatively simple because the former GDR had amalgamated smaller independent cities with their counties in 1952. As a consequence, the 38 existing urban districts had a city-suburb balance that made it possible to grant them the status of independent cities in 1990. For this reason, the administrative units in the areas covered by these cities were relatively stable during the initial transition period. Funding difficulties did emerge, however, in cases where the minimal size of 100,000 inhabitants was not reached and where the municipalities were not able to fulfil their new responsibilities. This mistake had also been made during the territorial reforms in West Germany (Laux 1999:179). The new federal states also implemented reforms of their rural districts. Already at this time, and with the introduction of new local regulations in East Germany, difficulties at the district level were apparent. Serving as agencies of a centralized economic-administrative system previously, the districts had performed quite different functions in the former GDR compared to rural and urban districts in West Germany. Following the abolition of the Länder in 1952 the regime had divided the territory into 14 city districts (without East Berlin) and 217 rural districts. But

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after unification in 1990 none of the existing administrative districts corresponded to the requirements of local self-government in a democratic welfare state. Only 10 per cent of the rural districts had a population between 100,000 and 150,000 and only 15 per cent a population between 75,000 and 100,000. The problem was that the rural districts could not be disbanded immediately after unification, so these aged political structures became reinforced during the democratization process. Reform advocates had to accept this situation, even if this exacerbated the territorial reforms considerably (Laux 1999:179; Henneke 1994:145 ff.). Meanwhile, rural districts in the East conformed very much in population and size to those in the West. Already in 1995 their numbers were reduced from 189 to 86. Because of the thin settlement structure in the former East Germany, rural districts have only an average of 122,000 inhabitants – distinctly lower than their counterparts in the former West Germany, which have an average of 166,000 inhabitants.5 However, the reduction process is still going on. In 2007, Saxony-Anhalt cut the number of rural districts from 21 to 11 and the state of Saxony cut them from 29 to 10 in 2008.

Framing of policy arguments As in the West German case, reformers of the new Länder formulated a series of arguments in favour of their restructuring aims. The stabilization of local government with the implementation of a democratic party system, the hiring of qualified employees and sufficient freedom of self-contained action were of primary importance (Laux 1999:178). The former GDR did have rudimentary bodies for administrative tasks at the local level, but no efficient administrative associations for their countless small municipalities. It was the unanimous view of experts and politicians, therefore, that the viability of political and administrative local government in the rural districts could not be taken for granted (Laux 1999:179; Schmidt-Eichstaedt 1992; Scheytt 1992). The restructuring of the local level started in May 1990 with new regulations that generally followed the local government system in West Germany. Around one year later, the new federal states were installed (Wollmann 1999:153). The fundamental change of the Eastern municipalities was accompanied by extensive support from their Western counterparts (Scheytt 1993). On the one hand, the local level in East Germany lost broad functions that were derived from their involvement in a centrally planned economy in the former socialist regime. On the other hand, the Eastern municipalities were faced with new duties and

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responsibilities that required the establishment of adequate administrative structures. Especially the independent cities, but also rural districts and larger district-affiliated cities, were confronted with enormous organizational and personnel challenges with respect to their claims of assets from the trust agency (Treuhandanstalt). During this process a multitude of companies and facilities in the health, social services and recreational sectors were reclaimed (Deutscher Städtetag 1990). As a consequence, the number of municipal staff in the former administration units increased from roughly 250 to 350 persons to as many as 4,000 to 5,000 persons, and in some instances up to 10,000 (Wollmann 1999:154 ff.). Reform strategies and patterns of conflict Beside these institutional and personnel problems of local administration, there was a fundamental lack of democratic structures and stable local party systems in the Eastern states (Laux 1999:180). So it was not surprising that the process of territorial restructuring in East Germany started very tentatively compared to the comprehensive territorial reforms in West Germany in the 1970s. Immediately after reunification it was decided to do without territorial reforms of the multitude of small municipalities and to resort, instead, to the creation of inter-municipal bodies meant to provide administrative support to politically constituted local government (Wollmann and Bouckaert 2006:30). Thus, the Eastern states followed the reform strategies of Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein and implemented local federations or associations. The states of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg Western Pomerania followed the strategy of SchleswigHolstein and introduced Ämter, whereas Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia introduced Verwaltungsgemeinschaften, which are also found in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria. Saxony was the only state that created unitary municipalities from the beginning of the reform period. Subsequently, the other four states followed this strategy as well. In the middle of the 1990s, extensive territorial restructuring with broad amalgamations started in Brandenburg, the Eastern state with the strongest reduction of municipalities. In toto, 76.6 per cent of the municipalities disappeared between 1990 and 2006 (see Table 8.1). After its refounding, Brandenburg consisted in 1993 of four independent cities and 38 rural districts with 1,700 municipalities. 97 per cent of the municipalities were affiliated to 158 Ämter,6 while only 3 per cent were unitary municipalities. After the reform of rural districts and their reduction from 38 to 14, there was a pause between 1994 and 1996, during

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which time there were only a few territorial changes. Then in 1997 an intense period of reduction of municipalities started. In only eight years the number of municipalities was reduced from 1,565 to 420 (a reduction of 73.2 per cent). In the context of the territorial restructuring of local government many Ämter were disbanded (declining from 158 to 54) and the number of unitary municipalities was increased (from 66 to 148). The other federal states followed the same strategy more or less consistently. Similar to West Germany, the Eastern states introduced a voluntary phase of territorial restructuring followed by statutory regulation in the subsequent period (Deutscher Landkreistag 2005; Duve 2005; Wollmann 2006:436). Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania preferred a more thorough restructuring of the district level than of the municipal level. Between 1990 and 2006 this Land only reduced a quarter of the municipalities but more than 60 per cent of the rural districts (see Table 8.1). The next district reform was scheduled for 2009, whereby the existing 12 rural districts and six independent cities were to be merged into five districts (Deutscher Landkreistag 2005:110). However, a constitutional complaint made by several rural districts and independent cities in 2007 stopped the plans. At present, new ideas and proposals have been developed that are scheduled to be implemented in 2011. With a delay, the pattern of reform in Saxony-Anhalt was very similar, although the government parties differed in their attitudes to territorial reforms. The SPD government left office in 2002, after which the basic conditions of and territorial reform strategy pursued changed completely. The coalition of CDU and FDP reversed the measures intended to enforce territorial restructurings by 2004. They refused financial support of amalgamations during the voluntary period with the creation of unitary municipalities and local federations in the form of Verbandsgemeinden (Franzke 2002). With the end of the voluntary phase in 2009, local federations have been dissolved and the remaining municipalities will by law be restructured as unitary municipalities by 2011 (Büchner and Franzke 2007:2).

Assessment and conclusions There are few examples in the history of local government in Germany that match the dramatic reorganization of local governments in the decade between 1968 and 1978 in West Germany and since 1990 in East

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Germany. As a result of the autonomy of federal states, territorial reforms vary from Land to Land. The states could not avoid territorial reforms, but they had a choice as to their design and implementation. In consequence, reform politics differ very much concerning the strategies chosen. Some federal states reduced the number of municipalities but introduced a new administrative level such as Ämter between municipalities and districts to ensure the capacity of small municipalities. This approach was criticized as ‘overcrowding’ (Überinstitutionalisierung) by experts and practitioners (Wollmann and Bouckaert 2006:23). As a result the federal states still differ very much as to municipal size, with an average of 40,000 inhabitants in North-Rhine Westphalia and 1,600 in Rhineland-Palatinate (Wollmann 2006:435). Others like North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, the Saarland or Saxony consistently introduced unitary municipalities. Contrary to the comprehensive territorial reforms in West Germany, the process in East Germany was tentative and stepwise because of the lack of democratic structures and stable local party systems. Territorial reforms at the Eastern municipal and district levels are not as yet finished. Implementation of the reforms has taken much longer time in the five new states compared to the eight states of the former FRG, where reforms were completed within one decade. The framing of policy arguments and the conflict patterns in both parts of the country, however, were fairly similar. In both cases politicians, bureaucrats and citizens trusted the recommendation of experts and commissions that published reports arguing that territorial restructuring was unavoidable if German municipalities were to solve the upcoming challenges. Only a small minority of citizens had problems with this top-down policymaking process (Mecking 2004:418). The evaluation of the scholarly community regarding German territorial reforms is divided. The literature indicates that the feelings of actors varied from euphoria to pitiless criticism, disillusion or even planned dolefulness. On the one hand, the widespread restructuring at the municipal and district level was seen as successful and efficient (Laux 1999; Thieme and Prillwitz 1981). On the other hand, some critics argued that the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness was not verified empirically. Additionally, it is claimed that many small local units lost their identity and their political mandates. Thus, the distance between a reduced number of representatives and their voters increased, and the willingness of citizens to participate in public life decreased.

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The opposite argument (originally formulated by Dahl and Tufte 1973) sees the creation of greater local units as favourable because local politics becomes less trivial and more interesting. Furthermore, the enhancement of local units leads to greater political competition and to a growing importance of local parties. In the smallest German municipalities a style of non-political, notabilities-dominated politics was common, with fewer chances of participation for ordinary citizens. After the reforms citizens have – at least theoretically – the choice to vote between personnel and policy alternatives (Gabriel 1999:161). As a result of the territorial and functional reforms in the Federal Republic of Germany, the municipalities – and especially the rural and urban districts – belong among the strongest local government systems in Europe, next to the Scandinavian countries (Wollmann 2006:435; Hesse and Sharpe 1991). Until today, the overriding guideline for territorial restructuring has been the preservation of a certain local reference (örtlicher Raumbezug). In the opinion of experts, only this strategy assures proximity to citizens as well as visibility and provision of public services at the local level (Dietlein and Thiel 2006:4). Reform strategies have therefore sought to avoid territorial over-expansion. The establishment of strong regions was also excluded from the reform agenda (Deutscher Landkreistag 2005:112). Other experts have advocated the implementation of regional structures such as Regionalstädte or Regionalkreise, at least in large agglomeration areas, to coordinate the fragmented political-administrative arrangements found there (see the overview in Heinz 2000a:232 ff.). These proposals arise from the frequent incongruities between the increasing functional interdependence of core cities and their surroundings, disjointed political-administrative structures in metropolitan areas and growing maldistribution of burdens, costs and revenues among the encompassed municipalities (Heinz 2000b:19; Walter-Rogg and Sojer 2008). Stronger territorial reforms – especially in West Germany – could materialize in the future, although sufficient political and public support for such reforms has yet to appear.

Notes 1. Numbers based on Hoffmann-Martinot (2005:239). 2. Five states are currently subdivided into several regions – so-called administrative districts (Regierungsbezirke) – which are governed by a Bezirksregierung and led by a Regierungspräsident. In the remaining 11 states there are no such regions. 3. Of the German municipalities, 99 per cent belong to a rural district (see Table 8.1).

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4. In some federal states this is also the synonym for all district affiliated municipalities that are not part of a Verwaltungsgemeinschaft (Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt), Samtgemeinde (Lower Saxony) or Verbandsgemeinde (RhinelandPalatinate). 5. Federal Statistical Office 31 December 2006. 6. Statistical yearbook of German municipalities, data from 31 December 1993.

9 France and Its 36,000 Communes: An Impossible Reform? Eric Kerrouche

In a classic work, Albert Mabileau (1991) described French local government as a ‘homeostatic system’ because of its ability to resist any kind of reform and to return to its initial state. This characterization of French local government was mainly based on the failure of a law, passed in 1972, that was meant to reduce the number of communes drastically by amalgamating them. This failure is all the more puzzling as most of France’s European neighbours had managed to reduce the number of their own local entities by the mid-1970s. In Belgium, Denmark or Germany, for example, such a reduction varied between 40 and 80 per cent. In what follows the intent is to provide a better understanding of this failure and the outcome of other efforts to reform the territorial structure of local government in France. Before beginning a review of relevant developments and the present state of affairs, however, it is appropriate to provide a brief account of the current politicaladministrative structure of France. The chapter will outline how the commune has been able to persist in France, and why another type of reform has therefore become necessary.

Local government in the Jacobin republic France today is a decentralized unitary state, which, in addition to its central government, is made up of three administrative levels: commune, département and région. The region only became a decentralized authority in 1986 when members of the conseil régional, the regional council, were directly elected for the first time, themselves electing in turn a president, the regional chief executive, from their midst. At present France has 22 metropolitan regions, one of which – Corsica – has its own special status, and four overseas regions. As for the province 160

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(département), 96 metropolitan and four overseas provinces were initially set up in the revolutionary period by the Law of 8 January 1790. The province was subsequently organized as a territorial authority in 1871, but until decentralization the prefect was its executive. Run by a general council (conseil général) that is elected by universal suffrage, the province has, since the Law of 2 March 1982, had its own chief executive, the president of the General council, elected by members from among their midst. It is the commune, however, the basic local authority, which is the oldest of the three institutions, with roots going back to the towns and parishes of the Middle Ages. The number of communes, combined with their unique fragmentation, makes France stand out as an exception in Europe. A few figures confirm this aspect of French territorial reality. With 36,570 metropolitan communes, France at present accounts for about 40 per cent of all local authorities found in member states of the European Union.1 Of these 36,570 communes, 27,189 have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants and only 904 (about 3 per cent) have more than 10,000 (see Table 9.1). France has an average of 1,548 inhabitants per commune compared with 3,885 in the European Union, but more than 60 per cent of the French population live in communes exceeding 5,000 inhabitants. This commune ‘atomization’ also comes accompanied by another characteristic – its persistence. If the three principal French communes (Paris, Lyon and Marseille) are excluded, all municipalities are in the same situation.2 They have the

Table 9.1 Distribution of French communes according to population size, 2009 Population size

Communes

Population

Number

Per cent

Number

Per cent

Less than 500 500–999 1,000–3,499 3,500–4,999 5,000–9,999 10,000–49,999 50,000–99,999 Over 100,000

20,185 7,004 6,566 869 1,042 786 80 38

55.2 19.2 18.0 2.4 2.8 2.1 0.2 0.1

4,566,753 4,940,277 11,781,753 3,615,705 7,164,501 15,974,241 5,214,550 9,559,340

7.3 7.9 18.8 5.8 11.4 25.4 8.3 15.2

Total

36,570

100.0

62,817,120

100.0

Source: Ministry of the Interior, DGCL (Central direction for local authorities) http:// www.dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/statistiques/collectivites_locale/ (accessed 18 March 2010)

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France and Its 36,000 Communes: An Impossible Reform?

same competences, and their mayors have exactly the same prerogatives, at least in theory. In practice, however, this remains something of a legal ideal. The guarantee of a separate legal existence does not mean that true financial or political autonomy is also guaranteed. The disparity of potential fiscal income per capita varies so significantly with the size of the commune that, as Perrin (2005) pointed out, a local grocery is only to be found in communes exceeding 1,250 inhabitants, and a full range of equipment, facilities and services requires more than 30,000 inhabitants. In short, the commune, when it falls below a certain threshold, has only a purely legal stature. In this perspective, municipal amalgamation could easily be considered as a solution to bypass the difficulties encountered in establishing stronger rural bodies and in reinforcing urban areas, but this has always been a politically sensitive subject in France (cf. Borraz and Le Galès 2005:12). Yet if commune amalgamation is a key issue in French politics, it has so far been an unattainable ambition. This is so even though for more than 50 years the overwhelming majority of observers have agreed upon the archaism of the existing division of French territory, a division that no longer seems to correspond either to the needs of modern day activities or to the growing cross-institutional nature of most public issues. The issue of reforming commune borders serves, therefore, as an excellent example to illustrate the inner logic of French local government and its resistance to major reform. The following analysis of this situation begins with a study of the inability of the central state to reform its periphery. This is then followed by an analysis of the unexpected success of the legislation on inter-municipal cooperation, which has allowed local government to undergo a gentle process of transformation.

The failure of the central state in reshaping its periphery France is commonly considered as a model Jacobin state in which a restrictive interpretation of decentralization still holds strong. Although this is indeed true in many spheres of French politics, it is not the case for policies regarding territorial reforms. In this latter sphere, authoritarian logic and top-down reform processes have always come up against systematic and extremely effective resistance from elected members of local government. It has, for example, never been possible to implement a global merger policy in small towns and villages, as this runs contrary to the expectations of local government members who hold the reins of power and who have always preferred implementing more flexible policies based on mutual cooperation between communes.

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The commune as a sanctuary . . . or the inefficiency of global reform The current map of French communes has its roots in the opposition of two projects: the revolutionary one, which argued for a rational, geometrical redrawing of the parish-based fabric into 6,500 municipalities, and another opposing idea, which sought to convert the 44,000 parishes of the Ancien Régime into communes. It was the latter solution which ultimately prevailed, and on 22 December 1789 a decree was passed stating that ‘there shall be a municipality in each Town, Village, Parish or countryside community’. Since that time, none of the numerous reform projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has ever come to fruition, and it seems that the state continues to pay the price for that initial decision, the result being extreme territorial fragmentation. Although many different solutions were subsequently envisaged, none succeeded. Within a few months of the initial decision, a new decree was passed, resulting in a reduction in the number of communes (from 44,000 to 38,000). A law of 1790 recommended that small communes with fewer than 250 inhabitants should merge in the name of efficiency and the capacity to provide better local services. Even if this law was never enforced, an identical project was set up five years later: in the new Constitution de l’an III, three levels of communes were distinguished, and it was planned that every commune with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants should be merged in a ‘district municipality’. This new measure also turned out to be a fiasco. Further institutional evolutions took place during the Consulat (1799–1804) and the Empire (1805–15): the communes of 1789 were recreated, and districts were suppressed. This was to herald the ominous fate of other merger attempts in 1881 and 1837. Similar setbacks affected efforts made during the Third Republic (in 1881, 1882 and 1883) to establish a new local administrative structure – a district or a district municipality. With the exception of a law in 1942, the last real effort to restructure the commune was made in the ‘Marcellin’ Law of 1972, called after the Interior Minister at that time. Most of the projects that failed tried to bring communes together without putting into jeopardy the legal existence of each commune. Things changed, however, in 1958 at the beginning of the Fifth Republic. Under the presidency of de Gaulle, the will to modernize was translated into the necessity to make local government evolve. In this context the merging of communes rapidly appeared on the government agenda. This development was spurred on by the fact that during the 1960s and 1970s the drive towards territorial rationalization was

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effectively put into place by many other European countries. This situation explains why, at the beginning of the 1970s, the Interior Minister, Raymond Marcellin, chose to promote a new reform. A law entitled ‘Law on the merging and grouping of communes’ was introduced in 1971 and stipulated that ‘there is a discrepancy between the resources and the costs resulting from the extreme fragmentation of communes, especially in the urban areas’, and that ‘the irrationality in the creation of local facilities and services which stems from this situation needs to be resolved by a restructuration of the commune map’. Clearly the goal of the government was to create new local authorities, especially in the larger urban areas, whereas for less populated areas merging was considered to be the only viable solution. Yet even if the merger of communes was favoured, other, new solutions of inter-municipal cooperation were also promoted. Under the 1971 law, three kinds of commune were to be distinguished: (1) self-sufficient communes able to handle their own development; (2) communes located inside or outside an urban area that needed to pool their resources; and (3) communes that had to be merged. As regards the latter, the prefect had the necessary prerogatives to amalgamate them, but only if the local councils concerned agreed with such a decision. Where one or more local councils disagreed, the prefect could bypass this refusal, provided he had the agreement of the provincial council (département). If this agreement was not forthcoming, the prefect still held an ultimate weapon: he could propose a local referendum to the population concerned. As an alternative to this authoritarian process the communes could also merge on a voluntary basis. In the last resort, however, the prefect was charged with promoting new forms of inter-municipal cooperation, whether on a voluntary or compulsory basis. To compensate for such authoritarian methods, the law accorded a certain number of fiscal and financial advantages to the affected communes. According to the calculations of the Interior Ministry, two-thirds of the communes were potentially affected by the reform. Yet the result was once again a complete fiasco. Coercive measures were rarely used, and the voluntary alternative also failed. Local elected representatives used the ambiguity of a law that, despite some clear goals, never went to the very core of the problem – that is, the fundamental character of the commune. The law proved to be a caricature because of the small number of mergers, and the subsequent need to invent a ‘de-merger’ procedure in 1975. Ultimately, between 1971 and 1995, only 912 mergers took place, followed by 152 ‘de-mergers’.

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Political neutralization of the reforms In essence it has proven impossible to restructure the French communal map. All state measures bent on rationalizing territorial administrative organization have been neutralized or subverted. Despite its apparent weakness, the French system of local government has clearly shown its capacity to resist reforms. A critical consideration in this regard lies in the position of its political leaders. The ‘traditional’ functioning of the French system of local government prior to decentralization in 1982 has been extensively described by Mabileau (1991). For the present it suffices to recall its basic structure, in which territory is organized with respect to two networks. The first, administrative and vertical in nature, centres around the emblematic figure of the prefect. The second, electoral and horizontal in nature, is built around conditions of suffrage and locally elected officials. All of this has been aptly described as ‘domesticated Jacobinism’ because the system was subtly organized in terms of ‘cross-wise regulation’. While local government officials relied on the political legitimacy of the notables in order to obtain the necessary means for action from the capital, the elected representatives ‘bargained’ with the prefects over the technical and financial means to be used in achieving their political programmes and, thus, their own re-election (cf. Grémion 1976, Worms 1966). This particular ordering of local relations clarifies how mayors have been able to ‘neutralize’ municipal reform efforts. In a certain way, the fate of the Marcellin law merely reflected the particular form of French local government influence. The sociological composition of the two chambers, combined with another French specificity, the cumul (the practice of holding multiple offices – which was not subject to regulation until 1985),3 thus led to a solution in which the principle of communal mergers has largely been discredited. Palliative inter-municipal cooperation Another, more organizationally-based explanation of the persistence of communal boundary divisions has to do with the progressive establishment of multiple structures of inter-municipal cooperation. These structures allow communes to manage services – especially infrastructural services such as water, waste management and public transport – that they could not otherwise have provided on their own. To be sure, informal cooperation between communes has always existed, but since the end of the nineteenth century a variety of more formal arrangements has been introduced by legislative means.4 These arrangements have in large part been seen as a quasi-obligatory functional necessity to help

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communes that are too weak, often being completely unable either to deal with local requirements, or to cope with the demands of modernization. The first such formal institutionalization of inter-municipal cooperation came about under an act adopted in 1890. The SIVU (Single-purpose intercommunal association), the name given to this initial cooperative entity, possessed one critical characteristic – namely that both setting up a SIVU and making a decision to enter into such an association required unanimity. In establishing such associations each commune, irrespective of its size, had two delegates. This arrangement permitted each commune to keep its autonomy. The creation of such local associations stands in stark contrast to all more authoritarian attempts at forced mergers. The SIVU rapidly established itself as a widespread solution, helped in its progression by new legislature. With World War II, the number of SIVUs increased dramatically, reaching 2,200 in 1939 and 3,823 in 1953. However, even at that time the limits of such cooperation were obvious. 97 per cent of the SIVUs were found in the countryside: they were simply not suited to handling the specific problems faced by towns. This is why in 1959 the state, in planning the trente glorieuses (Glorious Thirties) post-World War II boom years, proposed new solutions to invigorate municipal cooperation. One of the first such solutions was the SIVOM (Multi-purpose intercommunal association), which was, quite clearly, a sibling to the SIVU. The only difference was that a SIVOM was able to handle a range of different needs such as firefighting, kindergartens and public transport. The SIVOM was presented as a solution for developing cooperation in technical sectors like water conveyance and distribution, and the construction and management of cultural, sporting or school facilities. Importantly, the creation of such an institution no longer required unanimity, but only a qualified majority. The early years of the Fifth Republic represented in this respect a turning point. A determined rationalizing state demonstrated its doggedness in multiplying different possibilities of cooperation. Although mergers always constituted an underlying hypothesis, the abundance of options proposed allowed a solution to the discrepancy of means and jurisdictions to be found (Sadran 1992). Significant in this connection was the creation of the so-called district (in French), a new form of local cooperation that represented an attempt to forge an innovative level of authority between communes and provinces. The goal of this new institution was to offer a global coherence and vision that neither the SIVOM nor SIVU solutions provided because

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of their weak political integration. Through some compulsory responsibilities (such as housing management and emergency firefighting) and a power of taxation, the latter being the greatest innovation, the district was, according to the law, permitted a much greater degree of integrated cooperation. Indeed, having its own powers of taxation gave this institution its autonomy in relation to the communes. The avowed goal was both to provide a new structure for metropolitan areas suffering from restrictive borders detrimental to their development, and to help boost cooperation between the central town and its periphery. What was really new and most noteworthy, however, was the fact that if a district could be created by the express will of communes (once again, with a qualified majority), this solution could also be imposed. An additional legislative step was taken in 1966 with the creation of a new form of cooperation – the greater urban community (GUC).5 Introduced by a law, the GUC was presented as a solution for the large urban areas. The level of integration of a greater urban community cannot be compared with any other available solution. In an authoritarian fashion, eleven strategic responsibilities were compulsorily assigned to these institutions.6 Four GUCs were created, that is to say imposed, in 1966 (Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon and Strasbourg). Since then, several other agglomerations have chosen this solution (Cherbourg, Le CreusotMontceau-les-Mines, Dunkerque, Le Mans and Brest). Nonetheless the GUC was not popular with local elected representatives, especially after 1972, and it was necessary to wait for an act of 1992 to give new impetus to this solution. Since all state efforts to impose more integrated solutions failed, a number of cooperation structures were proposed in the 1960s and 1970s, enabling the communes, if not to merge, then at least to work together in order to increase efficiency in providing local services. But the aggressive defence of the communes by their representatives limited the effect of this approach. Constraints in the legislation were toned down, providing the greatest possible freedom to the communes, not to the cooperative bodies, and it was generally acknowledged that not all the compulsory responsibilities needed to be fulfilled. Hence, in 1970, for example, despite a number of financial incentives, only 90 districts were to be found. (In fact, these solutions, which were originally meant for urban areas, became rather more popular in the countryside). In a nutshell, the districts did not turn out to be the instruments they were intended to be, being able to enforce a coherent policy of development.

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Even so, Table 9.2 would seem to suggest that the numerous cooperative solutions actually proved successful, at least to a degree. Indeed, SIVUs, SIVOMs and districts represent crucial solutions for those small communes that are unable to create or maintain basic local services. Aside from problems like waste disposal and public transport, which require inter-municipal solutions, the post-World War II phase of reconstruction and the provision of new local services also provided a justification for inter-municipal cooperation – at least for financial reasons. In this respect, commune cooperation is a palliative functional solution that responds to an extreme fragmentation of communes. The result is nevertheless somewhat paradoxical: efforts to cope with commune fragmentation have led to the creation of 19,000 cooperative bodies, some of which do not fulfil their mission. But such failures can also be found in the case of more ambitious instances – the urban communities. These communities, instead of replacing the existing structures, simply added another layer. Each commune retained its own identity and legal personality, together with a certain number of competences, whereas the avowed aim had been to set up new super communes. However, the incentives used proved to be a failure. The communities have tended to do fairly well in raising the general level and quality of the agglomeration amenities they handle, but have had far less success in rationalizing the administrative

Table 9.2

Number of local cooperative arrangements in France, 1972–2009

Year

1972

1980

1992

1995

1999

2002 2005 2009

Single-purpose 9,289 11,664 14,596 14,490 14,885 intercommunal association (SIVU)

n/a

n/a 11,373

Multi-purpose intercommunal association (SIVOM)

n/a

n/a 1,467

1,243

1,980

2,478

2,298

Districts*

95

147

214

324

New agglomeration associations (SAN)

—

—

9

9

2,165

305 none none 9

8

6

none 6

Note: * According to the law of 1999, the districts have to disappear and be transformed into a commune community or an urban agglomeration community depending on their number of inhabitants (see below). Source: Ministry of the Interior, DGCL (Central direction for local authorities) http:// www.dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/statistiques/intercommunalite/bilan_ statistique/bilan_statistique_20/view (accessed 18 March)

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and financial management of public intercommunal services. As regards public service management, their achievements remain unclear.

The unexpected success of the law on inter-municipal bodies Despite the fact that the municipal reform process seemed to have reached a stalemate, some progress was made in the early 1980s. The institutional dynamics born from the process of decentralization – as well as the presence of a new socio-economic context – forced local governments to rethink their notion of territory and, consequently, their practice of intercommunal cooperation. Three factors come together in explaining this renewal of interest in intercommunal relations. First, urban development and its consequences raised questions about the exercise of communal competences. Second, the fragmentation of municipalities once again came to be viewed as a handicap to the country as a whole, especially in the light of increased European and global economic competition, which left communes striving, often desperately, to attract companies and thereby increase their fiscal revenues. Third, discourse on the need to transform local structures became part and parcel of a new ideological context favouring the adoption of market rules and stressing the importance of efficiency. An appreciation of these factors helps in understanding the flexible, incremental nature of the reform process that was implemented. This process provided tangible confirmation of the triumph of a pragmatic, realist vision of territorial transformation that gave local elected members of government pride of place. Attempting a new deal – 1992 By the 1990s, with new thinking coming to the fore within the administration, it became clear that the government was willing to take an initiative in the domain of inter-municipal cooperation before the 1993 elections. New forms of inter-municipal organization were to be based on the principle of voluntary choice, and also on the recognition of ‘solidarity spaces’ allowing communes to decide to group themselves within an EPCI (Etablissement public de cooperation intercommunale), an inter-municipal body with its own specific tax system. The Law of 1992 concerning the territorial administration of the country introduced for the first time the idea of new forms of cooperation. The law had two aims regarding intercommunality: first to rationalize the intercommunal landscape, and second to move from

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a management-based form of cooperation to a project-based form focused on economic development, and town and country planning. The law envisaged a three-tier structure: a community of communes joining rural and small- and medium-sized communes; town communities for urban agglomerations of at least 20,000 inhabitants; and urban communities for urban agglomerations of more than 200,000 inhabitants. The law was, however, to prove the source of numerous disappointments. The initial project disregarded both the sheer diversity of the actors called upon to play their parts in the discussions, and the subsequent implementation of inter-municipal policies. The very detailed re-examination that was meant to lay bare the institutional framework was seriously undermined during the parliamentary debates that followed. The legislation of 1992, moreover, had counted on the development of intercommunal cooperation in an urban setting, thanks to the creation of a pooling system, and the harmonization of local taxes on business activities. But this local business tax, meant for urban agglomerations, was in fact to develop above all in rural areas and in small towns. 70 per cent of the localities adopting it had fewer than 20,000 inhabitants. As a consequence this system was subsequently amended by the act of 1999, which laid down new principles and complemented the system established in 1992. A simplification – 1999 The Act of 1999, a simplification and systematization of the framework sketched out in 1992, revolutionized the landscape of French communes. The reform, which was presented as a renovation of the communal map, showed its determination to simplify the structure of local government around three major types of EPCIs: a community of communes, an agglomeration-based community, and an urban community. Moreover, the law provided that the communes, when they created a joint community, had to abandon certain competencies that were, henceforth, to be jointly utilized by the newly formed structure. The competencies of each of the three forms of local government are indicated in Exhibit 9.1. The 1992 version of the town community had been an utter failure. The new agglomeration community category was intended to improve upon this situation by setting up agglomerations on the basis of 141 urban areas defined by the INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistical and Economic Studies. Of the local households, 75 per cent were to be found concentrated within these areas to ensure that

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Exhibit 9.1 Responsibilities of French inter-municipal communities according to the Act of 1999 Community of Communes

Urban Agglomeration Communities

Greater Urban Communities

Compulsory responsibilities • •

•

Town and country planning Actions of economic development Planning, development and management of all sorts of zones of interest to the community (provided there is one single tax for the community)

• •

•

•

Economic development Planning and development of community territory Socially balanced housing in the community area Town policy

•

• •

•

•

Development and social, cultural, and economic planning of the community area Town and country planning Socially balanced housing in the community area Town policy in the community/ Management of services of collective interest Protection and enhancement of the environment and policy concerning the living environment

Optional responsibilities Any one of the four following domains • Protection and enhancement of the environment • Housing and living environment policy • Creation, development and maintenance of the roads

At least three of the five following domains • Creation and development of community roads and car parks • Cleaning/drainage • Water • Protection and enhancement of the environment

(Continued)

172


Exhibit 9.1 (Continued) •

Construction and • operation of cultural, educational (preschool, and elementary), and sporting facilities

Construction, development and maintenance of community cultural and sporting facilities

Source: Kerrouche 2008:59

the boundaries were sound. Recognition of the ‘solidarity zone’ was affirmed anew, since the wording of the Law indicated that ‘the communes join forces within the framework of a “solidarity area” to jointly elaborate and conduct common policies of development and planning of their space’. This solidarity was primarily financial, based on a pooling of fiscal resources in the form of a single local business tax. A further sign of the determination to rationalize local government lay in the possibility of throwing off the reins of existing administrative limits by setting up an EPCI encompassing several provinces or even several regions. The wording of the law, which was the subject of much debate in parliament, represented a compromise between the central government’s will to rationalize and the desire for freedom claimed by locally elected representatives. A stiffening of constraints was in large measure due to the latitude accorded the prefect regarding both the timing of the initiative and the decision-making involved. Prefects could effectively take the initiative in creating an EPCI inasmuch as the law stipulated that it was the prefect who determined the list of communes included within the perimeter. To sweeten the pill, incentives in the form of enhanced state budgetary contributions were offered. The freedom of locally elected representatives was nevertheless real, for an initiative could equally well come from one or more municipal councils. This provision left a great deal of latitude and in some instances led to what have been qualified as ‘hostile’ takeover bids – that is, including an unwilling commune within a cooperative body provided that the proposed boundaries were finally approved by the prefect. Although the law does contain certain safeguards, these have not always proven strong enough to prevent some cases of more-orless forced inclusion.

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As Table 9.3 makes clear, the 1999 reform had substantial impact, especially in terms of the creation of urban agglomerations and communities of communes. Table 9.4 shows how the different types of EPCI are distributed. Nowadays, more than 91 per cent of French communes and 86.5 per cent of the population are members of an EPCI exercising its own specific tax system. These figures bear ample witness to a considerable growth of intercommunal cooperation. The consequences of such a transformation, achieved without the traumatism associated with the implementation of the Marcellin Law, are particularly noticeable in the development of the local landscape. This is a development that marks the triumph of an incremental vision of territorial reform while at the same time recognizing locally elected representatives’ control over their territories.

An incremental rationalization The state, ever since the beginning of the Fifth Republic, has progressively tried to modify the nature of intercommunal entities. Originally meant to manage local public services, these entities were, little by little, reshaped, but the envisaged aim of redrawing the communal map was to fail, and new forms of cooperation had to be set up. The chronology relating to the succession of legislation on communal cooperation, however, should not give the impression that intercommunality has been in constant progression.

Table 9.3 Growth and distribution of inter-municipal communities in France, 1999–2009 Type of community • •

•

Greater urban communities Urban agglomeration communities* Community of communes

Total

1999

2002

2005

2009

12

14

14

16

none

120

162

174

1,349

2,032

2,342

2,406

1,454

2,166

2,455

2,596

Note: * Urban agglomerations have been created by the Law of July 1999 Source: Ministry of the Interior, DGCL (Central direction for local authorities) http://www. dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/statistiques/intercommunalite/bilan_statistique/bilan_statistique_20/view (accessed 18 March 2010)

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Table 9.4

Distribution of inter-municipal communities in France, 2009

Type of intermunicipal community •

Greater urban community • Urban agglomeration community • Community of communes • New agglomeration associations (SAN)

Number of inter-municipal communities

Number of regrouped communes

Number of inhabitants (in millions)

16

409

7.6

174

2,983

21.0

2,406

30,745

27.5

5

29

0.3

Total

2,601

34,166

56.4

Those with a single common business tax

1,263

16,964

44.3

Source: Ministry of the Interior, DGCL (Central direction for local authorities) http://www. dgcl.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_votre_service/statistiques/intercommunalite/bilan_statistique/bilan_statistique_20/view (accessed 18 March 2010)

Progress has rather been piecemeal and halting in nature. Certain measures were handed down from one text to the other, and a number of devices were left in place. Some innovations, such as the reutilization of the term community of communes, popularized by the 1976 Guichard Report, were minor; others, such as the innovations introduced by the Rocard Law of 1983 on SANs (a single common business tax, the principle of subsidiarity, and communitary interest), were major. All of these innovations became part and parcel of the mould that was to inspire the legislature in 1992 and 1999. Despite uneven progress, one permanent feature evident ever since 1959 has been a veritable injunction to cooperate. This injunction has been expressed through the panoply of solutions made available to elected representatives. But the injunction has varied in strength and intensity, and has thereby tended to perpetuate the diversity of forms of intercommunal relations. Ordinances taking effect in 1959, moreover, brought about another significant change. The groups of communes that emerged were based on territorial considerations, thereby obliging actors on both central and local levels to take the spatial dimensions of the institution into account, combining objective and subjective criteria. It was no longer possible to focus solely on matters of competences. Little by little, the territorial aspect was to become a deciding factor. Thus the

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Law of 1992, and above all that of 1999, imposed territorial continuity on the perimeters of cooperation. Over time the possibility of setting up an EPCI was also simplified. The need for unanimity, which had prevailed until the 1950s, was replaced by the far less restrictive requirement of having a majority. This solution, generalized in 1970, was applied to the progressive extension of the EPCI and to the acquisition of new competences, making these transformations much easier. Another significant development was initiated by freeing the EPCI from the financial tutelage of the communes in order to guarantee its real autonomy, thanks to the promotion and development of its own fiscal resources. This change, together with the transition from a transfer of technical competences to a transfer of political and strategic prerogatives, provided the intercommunal structure with far more scope. The achievement of a generalized transactional space The greatest achievement of the Law of 1999, however, was that it set off a movement of cooperation throughout the territory by encouraging the involvement of hitherto reluctant actors. One of the main reasons for such an achievement is financial in nature – more specifically, the considerable tax incentives promoted by the Law. Yet such ad hoc incentives cannot, by themselves, explain the setting up of an EPCI. For one thing, a specially subsidized state grant is only accorded in exchange for a serious, long-lasting commitment. Merely having such a grant, moreover, is not enough: there must be ‘projects’ to be implemented. In practice, therefore, the most important role of this incentive is transactional in nature (cf. Baraize and Négrier 2001), and it is the word ‘transactional’ that best serves to qualify the Law of 1999. Local discussions as to how to implement the Law give rise to unequalled adaptability. Indeed, under the new provisions, multiple possibilities for adjustments are accorded to the elected representatives, both when the EPCI is first being set up and, later, when it is up and running. In the initial phase of setting up inter-municipal cooperation, the potential surplus of the state grant offers a double advantage: it provides a resource for those initiating the EPCI project, while ensuring that nobody loses out when the structure is being organized.7 Negotiation equally comes into play when competences are being worked out since, even if these are defined by the Law, numerous adjustments can be made. The possibility of negotiating adjustments is also to be found when the EPCI is up and running, with certain measures turning out to be

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particularly useful in neutralizing potential operational difficulties. A solidarity allowance enables a part of any increase in the business tax revenue to be transferred to the communes, thereby ensuring that the rules of solidarity between the different communes prevail on the basis of criteria laid down by the group. Admittedly the arrangement is, except in the case of urban communities, optional, but its intent is easy to understand. Although elected representatives do not have an absolutely free hand in the matter, they can still use this measure to neutralize – or even stave off – conflicts that can arise with less well-off communes. The role of elected representatives Ever since the failure of the 1969 referendum on the region and the reform of the Senate, successive governments have constantly offered tokens to local elected representatives whose political power they have had ample cause to measure. This attitude was to become even more exacerbated after the failure of the Marcellin Law. The cumul of mandates, which has increased under the Fifth Republic, is both the condition and instrument of this resistance.8 It permits a veritable ex ante control over all bills dealing with communal reform. This power has made itself felt on several occasions, especially during debates concerning intercommunal cooperation. Thus it was that, during the discussion of the 1992 bill, the deputies obtained the suppression of much of the power that the initial wording of the bill had conferred on prefects. In fact, the development of intercommunal cooperation is now controlled by the elected representatives who hold all the trump cards in this respect, especially since the Law of 1999. The converse of this assertion also holds true: it is precisely because the creation of the EPCI is based on the freedom of communes – and of their councillors – that the lack of leadership and the presence of partisan divisions combine to bring about a definite deadlock for intercommunal cooperation. Only when leadership is present in the central town(s), or political relations are in a state of equilibrium, does it become possible to move on to a more integrated form of cooperation.

Assessment and conclusions France is a perfect illustration of the failure of the authoritarian model of reforming local government. But this failure is mainly due to its particular institutional setup. Since 1789, most of the projects that failed tried to bring communes together without putting into jeopardy the legal

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existence of each commune. The beginning of the Fifth Republic is an exception. Under the presidency of de Gaulle the will to modernize was translated into the necessity to make local government evolve, and the merging of communes rapidly imposed itself on the government agenda. Policy arguments were based on the evidence that France has too many communes and that most of them were unable to deliver local services. Amalgamation was presented as the only ‘reasonable’ solution to compensate for the weakness of the French municipal level. As a consequence of this situation, the strategy chosen was to implement the reform in a top-down manner. This situation explains the role given to the central government’s local representative, the prefect. If this strategy was easily convincing in theory, it did not take into account the duality of the French state – that is, the fact that a law has to be locally implemented – and another French feature, the plurality of elected offices. The pattern of conflict was quite obvious: it involved opposition between locally elected representatives defending the democratic virtues of small communes and a central government attempting for technocratic reasons to murder this ‘French exception’. In this context the cleavage between centre and periphery was obvious. But the periphery has an advantage over the centre: the ability of local elected members to be present both at local and national level (cumul), and the fact that the prefects, because they need to cooperate with local elected representatives, chose not to make full use of the prerogatives given them by law. This situation has led to a need to reinvent the local system – without reforming it. In this respect, the term ‘amalgamation’ has disappeared from governmental proposals, paving the way for a new strategy of reform characterized by the will to compromise. The laws of 1992 and 1999 had two essential goals: to avoid conflict and to ease oppositional tensions between the centre and its periphery. In this sense, the French inter-municipal reform is a result of a learning process based on the memory of the 1972 failure. The incremental nature of the reform is obvious, but the key to its success lies in the flexibility of its implementation. The greatest achievement of the Law of 1999 is to have set off a movement of cooperation throughout the territory by encouraging the involvement of hitherto reluctant actors. Local discussions on how to implement the law have given rise to a great variety of solutions. Thus, the solution of an EPCI, a specialized body of inter-municipal cooperation, has been retained. The utilization of the EPCI format – with its numerous legal advantages – shows equally that this is not a substitute for communes, but in fact emanates from them. This is a clear

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sign of the respect commanded by the communal entity that the state has never managed to transform on an authoritarian basis. The most astonishing characteristic of this reform is its ‘cross-party’ success. If the failure of the authoritarian 1972 reform can be put down to the Jacobin right wing in power at that time, the same right-wing politicians accepted the decentralization process subsequently set in place by the left, and the different bills on intercommunality have been received in an atmosphere of general consensus. The construction of intercommunality has, in part, allowed the institutional tensions that are to be found within French local government to be concealed. After the unexpected development of EPCIs, the debate has now evolved towards consideration of the consequences of the change in scale brought about by the partial shift taking place between communes and EPCIs. There has been a twofold advantage arising from this gradual, sliding installation of intercommunality. First, it has allowed an intermediary institutional layer to be added without having to undergo the trials and tribulations of a reputedly impossible communal reform. Equally important, despite certain fears to the contrary, the 1999 Law managed to avoid the need for any far-reaching debate as to the institutional relationships between the different strata of local authority. Intercommunality then is not, strictly speaking, a territorial reform, but rather a recreation of the territory based on what already exists. In the light of all this it therefore becomes easier to understand the various points that have not been taken into consideration, and the difficulties that still remain. One major difficulty faced by EPCIs, for example, is that links with citizens have been weakened. Community delegates have not been designated by the population, but elected by municipal councillors from within the community council itself. A second problem is due to the fact that EPCIs are not always the strong territorial authorities initially envisaged by the Law of 1999. Most studies show that the perimeters chosen when setting up the EPCIs perpetuate earlier institutional boundaries, fitting in quite naturally with firmly rooted political practices. Thus it is that certain central towns have not managed to impose an extension of the territory corresponding to the perimeter of the urban area. But a new chapter is about to be added to this evolution Against this background, it is not unlikely that another chapter may soon be added to the meandering saga of territorial reform in France. In 2008, a committee on territorial reform was set up under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (Comité pour la

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reforme des collectivites locales 2009). The committee reported in March 2009 with 20 propositions of reform, including the creation of 11 metropolitan regions and amalgamation of regions and departments, the latter to take place on a voluntary basis only. The report also outlines procedures through which inter-municipal bodies may be transformed into proper municipalities, replacing the municipalities of which they are composed, thus reducing the number of municipalities – a truly revolutionary ambition given the entrenched position of French municipalities. The fate of previous amalgamation initiatives suggests that the implementation of these measures may require the proverbial qualities of the fox and the hedgehog in combination – swiftness of foot and mind and deep knowledge of the local terrain.

Notes 1. Figures for 2009 (year of reference: 2006). Cf. http://www.dgcl.interieur.gouv. fr/sections/a_votre_service/statistiques/collectivites_locale/les_collectivites_ lo/view (accessed 18 March 2010). 2. Two Acts of 31 December 1980, known as the PLM Acts for Paris, Lyon and Marseille, have established a special system of internal devolution at the level of the arrondissement, an administrative subdivision of the commune. 3. Regulation, however, did not challenge either the principle of office plurality (cumul des mandats), or the banalization of its simple form (two mandates), which is still considered as within the norm. See Guérin-Lavignotte and Kerrouche, 2006. 4. Within the limits of this chapter only the most important forms of cooperation are considered. 5. Another attempt was the creation of the SANs (Syndicats d’agglomération nouvelle, the New agglomeration associations) in 1983. Initially, they represented a way of managing the nine new towns created during the 1970s. 6. These responsibilities had to do with establishing town-planning documents, setting up and equipping housing, creating industrial or port zones, or small industrial estates, urban transport, water management, drainage, public road networks and secondary schools. 7. Such subsidized grants only concern urban communities, agglomeration communities and those communities of communes that have chosen to exercise more competences than the minimum number required by law. 8. As of November 2003, 80.7 per cent of all senators and 90.8 per cent of all deputies were in a situation of cumul.

10 Italian Regionalism: A Semi-Federation is Taking Shape – Or is It? Marco Brunazzo

In Italy the issue of reforming sub-national government has in recent years primarily concerned regional government. Thus on 7 October 2001, Italian voters went to the polls to vote in a referendum on proposals to revise articles of the constitution concerned with relations between the central state and the regions. The reform had been introduced by the centre-left majority one year before in ‘double reading’. But according to the Italian Constitution of 1948, if parliament only approves a constitutional revision in the second reading with a simple majority rather than a qualified two-thirds majority, then the proposal may be required to obtain popular approval. In this case 64.2 per cent of those who participated in the referendum approved the amendments, while 35.8 per cent rejected them. Roughly five years later, on 25–26 June 2006, Italian voters again went to the polls to vote on a constitutional amendment reforming 57 articles of the second part of the Constitution. This part of the Constitution had been partially revised by the previous constitutional referendum. On this occasion, however, the proposed reform, approved by the then centre-right majority without the required qualified majority, was rejected by the voters; 61.3 per cent of those who took part in the referendum voted against whereas 38.7 per cent voted in favour. These two stories clearly exemplify some of the difficulties Italy has faced (and still faces) in the definition of centre–periphery relations. More specifically, they bring to the fore two problems: first a seemingly never-ending debate on the need for a Constitutional reform in order to make the Italian political system more stable and effective and, second, the difficulty of introducing bipartisan federal reforms. Even if a large majority of the political parties agree on the need to undertake fundamental institutional reform and to create a federal state, the same 180

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majority is not able to find general agreement in parliament. At the same time, these two stories allow us to ask a crucial question: why did the 2001 (quasi-federal) reform succeed and the 2006 (quasi-federal) reform fail? To answer this question, in what follows the evolution of the territorial organization of the Italian state in its unitary nature in the postWorld War II period is briefly described. After this the main features of the 2001 and 2006 reforms, their rationales and the role of political actors in these reforms are presented. Finally, more general and theoretical considerations are reviewed, looking at the policy arguments used by the political actors, the strategies adopted, the patterns of conflict developed, and the institutional context facilitating or blocking territorial reforms.

The Italian territorial system Italy has a territorial system based on municipalities (comuni), provinces (province) and regions (regioni). The former represent local-level institutions and the latter meso-level institutions. In all there are 8,101 municipalities with a population ranging from less than 100 to more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. More specifically 57.1 per cent of the municipalities have fewer than 3,000 inhabitants, and 55.5 per cent of the total population lives in municipalities with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants (see Table 10.1). Municipalities, moreover, are the main institutions of local government insofar as the number of public employees is concerned (80 per cent of the total as compared with 10 per cent each in the regions and provinces). In addition to providing social services and local police protection, municipalities are also responsible for the adoption of regulatory territorial plans and issuing building permits. The small size of municipalities has raised concerns about the need for optimizing their size, but planners are hampered by the historical resonances of municipalities, the origins of which date back several centuries. While provinces and regions are creations of the central government, municipalities constitute the natural cultural unit for many Italians. Cases of merging or suppressing municipalities are very rare. For this reason, reforms of local government have in recent years mainly focused on how municipal institutions may be made more effective. In 1993, for instance, a reform introduced a semi-parliamentarian system of government, with direct election of the mayor taking place on the same day as, but independently from, elections to the municipal council (see Fabbrini 2001; Baldini 2002). The reform also affirmed the communal council’s power

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Italian Regionalism: Towards a Semi-Federation?

Table 10.1 2001

Distribution of Italian municipalities according to population size,

Population size

Municipalities

Population

Number

Per cent

Number

Per cent

Less than 500 501–1,000 1,001–2,000 2,001–3,000 3,001–4,000 4,001–5,000 5,001–10,000 10,001–15,000 15,001–20,000 20,001–30,000 30,001–40,000 40,001–50,000 50,001–65,000 65,001–80,000 80,001–100,000 100,001–250,000 250,001–500,000 Over 500,000

846 1,128 1,679 977 721 485 1,153 448 191 181 111 43 52 23 21 29 7 6

10.4 13.9 20.7 12.1 8.9 6.0 14.2 5.5 2.4 2.2 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1

258,097 843,374 2,457,057 2,392,333 2,473,123 2,166,744 8,040,885 5,403,935 3,265,182 4,331,012 3,798,918 1,946,463 2,864,280 1,647,308 1,878,426 4,125,516 2,133,284 6,969,807

0.5 1.5 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.8 14.1 9.5 5.7 7.6 6.7 3.4 5.0 2.9 3.3 7.2 3.7 12.2

Totals

8,101

100

56,995,744

100

Source: Istat (2003)

to dismiss the executive (giunta). While promoting the personalization of the electoral campaign, this reform has been particularly relevant for introducing an unprecedented degree of stable, more effective local governments at the municipal level (Baldini and Legnante 2000). At the provincial level there are at present 107 provinces, and their number will grow in the next few years. It should be noted that the Italian Constitution does not clearly define provinces. Law 142 of 8 June 1990 provides the best definition. This law states that ‘Each provincial territory shall correspond to the area in which the majority of social, economic and cultural relations of the resident population take place . . . [and] its dimension in terms of area, demographic features, and also existing or potential productive activities shall allow development programming fostering economic, social and cultural re-balancing of the provincial and regional territory’. In recent years the functions of the provinces have grown from psychiatric assistance and limited competencies regarding education (established in 1948) to a range of new functions, such as providing assistance to socially disadvantaged

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persons, road construction, environmental control, vocational training and coordination of municipal activities in matters such as transport and territorial planning. The institutional system of the provinces is similar to that of municipalities, and it was reformed in 1993. Provinces, however, are the level of government to which Italian citizens are least devoted and a debate over their abolition has recently taken place (Brunazzo and Roux 2007). Even so, provinces are an important level with respect to the decentralized administrative services of the state. The main territorial representatives of the national government (the prefects) have their own seats at the provincial level, as do other state agencies such as the tax inspectorates and fire departments. But it is the third level of government – the regional level – that has been the object of several tentative reform efforts over the last two decades. In particular, the 2001 Constitutional reform promoted by the then centre-left government introduced a model of territorial organization with a federal dimension (Brunazzo and Roux 2004). Then in 2006 the centre-right government approved a new reform, but it was, as already noted, rejected in the subsequent confirmative referendum.

Regions as contended institutions: 1948–2000 The importance of the regional institutions created by the Italian constitution of 1948 should not be underestimated. After all, the united Italy established in 1861 immediately took the shape of a centralized system hostile to territorial specificities, impermeable to autonomist claims, and intolerant of municipal and regional ‘particularisms’ (Ziblatt 2006). It suffices to remember that when unification of Italy was proclaimed, the use of dialects was so widespread that only 10 per cent of all ‘Italian’ citizens spoke the Italian language. A well-known refrain of that period was ‘Fatta l’Italia, dobbiamo fare gli italiani’ (‘We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’). In keeping with the Napoleonic model adopted by the Piedmont’s Risorgimento elite, which drove the process of national unification, nineteenth-century Italy continued to pursue the strategy of nationalizing the country in a forceful manner. As Putnam (1993:18–19) has noted: Top local officials were appointed by the national government in Rome. Local political deadlock (or even local dissent from national policy) could lead to years of strong rule by a commissioner appointed by national government. Strong prefects, modeled on the French

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system, controlled the personnel and politics of local governments, approving of all local ordinances, budgets, and contracts . . . Most areas of public policy, from agriculture to education to urban planning, were administered by field offices of the Roman bureaucracy. The Fascist regime in the twentieth century took this strategy to its extreme, giving the central state (and the single party that controlled it) the monopoly of public authority. The Constitution of 1948 set the ideological premises for the end of the centralist tradition that had lasted for almost a century but, at the same time, political conditions to implement it were lacking. Specifically, in the Constituent Assembly that wrote the Italian Constitution, the two major parties – the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Communist Party (PCI) – had opposite views on the need to create regions. The DC aimed at creating regions in order to compensate the potential presence in the government of the anti-system party (as it was at that time perceived), the PCI. The latter was against this view for the opposite reason. From the early 1950s onwards, however, given the PCI’s difficulty in winning national political elections, the positions of the two main parties changed. The DC considered devolution a way of incrementing the powers of the PCI, which, being excluded from the national government, would be able to control the regions where support for the PCI was high, namely in central Italy. At the same time, the PCI considered regionalization a potential means to affect national policies while waiting for more successful electoral scores, and looked at the regions as a ‘testing ground’ for future national alliances (Bull and Newell 2005:156). For all these reasons, despite the Constitution, Italian territorial organization reflected for a long time a strong centralist belief. But in the 1970s the central state, in keeping with the trend towards administrative decentralization found in many democratic countries, was forced to acknowledge that the exclusive centralized management of economic and social responsibilities was inefficient and uneconomical. Gradually, therefore, Italy acquired the features of a decentralized but unitary state. If we exclude the five regions with a special statute,1 the remaining 15 ordinary Italian regions created between 1970 and 1972 were administrative institutions charged with implementing policies and decisions set exclusively at the level of the central state. The difference between ordinary and special regions is extremely important. Statutes relating to special regions have been approved through constitutional law, the change of which requires a specific procedure. These special regions, moreover, have exclusive legislative competencies

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in several matters. They were chosen mainly for their proximity to the national borders and because of the presence of significant ethnic minorities or because they are islands. By comparison, the statutes of all other regions are approved by the national parliament as ordinary laws. These regions have only concurrent legislative competencies. Despite these differences, articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution defined the internal structures of all regions, giving them the possibility of becoming autonomous only in the definition of more detailed questions (see art. 123 of the Constitution). Specifically, the Regional Council (Consiglio regionale) exercises the legislative powers of the region as well as the other functions conferred by the Constitution or special legislation. It can also submit bills to the national parliament. The Regional Executive (Giunta regionale) is the executive body of the region. The President of the Executive (Presidente della giunta regionale) represents the region, is responsible for the decisions of the executive, signs laws and regional statutes and, following instructions of the central government, leads the administrative functions the state has delegated to regions. Until 1999 all regions were based on a parliamentary model: Regional Councils, directly elected by citizens of the region, would appoint the executives and their presidents. For this reason, the latter were responsible to the councils. Moreover, because their origin in 1970 was due to a mobilization of the left and the PCI, the regions soon were constrained by rigid schemes set down by national policies. Regions were transformed into institutional actors appointed to spend the resources the central state had gathered (Bull and Newell 2005:159). This split between transfer of funds (state-controlled) and expenditure (carried out by the regions), however, gave rise to an unprecedented level of public debt in the 1980s due precisely to the political irresponsibility institutionalized in the budgetary process (Dente 1995). Thus, inasmuch as central supervision of national policies was inefficient and regions were spending more resources to build electoral consensus, administrative decentralization ended up exacerbating rather than solving the problem.

Introducing federalism: The 2001 reform From the Amato Government (1992–93) and the Ciampi Government (1993–94) onwards, the idea that fiscal federalism would be an effective means of setting the country’s finances in order gained ground. The need of having financial order was strictly linked to the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), which set the path toward adoption of the common

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European currency, the Euro, fixing at the same time the criteria required to enter the group of EU Member States adopting it. Requirements stipulated by the Treaty of Maastricht were supported by the pro-EU belief of the national political class and Italian public opinion. The idea that Italy, one of the founding Member States of the EU, should not adopt the Euro from its beginning was unthinkable. This European pressure generated a need to make serious and urgent economic reforms in order to reduce the rate of inflation, the annual government deficit, the government debt, and long-term interest rates as well as to stabilize the then national currency, the Lira, anchoring it to the European Monetary System (Dyson and Featherstone 1999:452–85). At the same time EU pressure provided the occasion – a window of opportunity according to Ferrera and Gualmini (1999) – for which the reformist part of the political elite was waiting in order to make the reforms Italy needed to compete in a global and more competitive economy. Certainly EU pressure was not the only condition contributing to a change of the Italian economic system. The crisis of the First Republic, which collapsed in 1992 under judicial investigation of bribery and corruption, also played an important role. So too did the end of the two ideological blocks represented by the DC and the PCI after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, the new political class, which was younger and more technically prepared, and an affirmation of new policy styles (the so-called concentrazione), further contributed to a change of perspective. The collapse of the First Republic also served to create pressure for change of the institutional system. In the early 1990s national political actors shared the idea that a new model of democracy was to be adopted because the consensual (consociativo) model based on coalitions built around the party occupying the centre of the political spectrum was not sustainable (cf. Fabbrini 2000). Moreover, the crisis of the PCI together with secularization of the Italian society and the higher volatility of Catholic voters (Corbetta and Segatti 2004) opened the doors to the success of new political parties, like the regionalist Northern League (Lega Nord – LN) (Ruzza 2004). If the final goals of the institutional reforms were clear (more stable and effective governments, alternation between centre-right and centre-left coalitions, more modern and less expensive administration, more political competition), however, the ways for achieving them were less clear. For example, if there was a broad and general consensus on the need of introducing a new electoral law based more on majoritarian principles, the appropriate institutional arrangements were nonetheless a matter of tough political debate for quite some time (and still are).

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Important with respect to the territorial system was the fact that new laws adopted in 1992 and 1993 initiated a reform of local and regional finances based on the principle of ‘accountability of the peripheral governments with respect to both the curbing of expenditure and the levying of own tax revenues’ (Baldi 2000:122). The centre-left Prodi Government (1996–98) went even further, persuading regions and local authorities to pledge that they would reduce public debt by 0.1 per cent in exchange for greater financial autonomy (Prodi 1998). But this was not the only significant reform of centre–periphery relations introduced by the Prodi Government. In 1997, parliament approved Law no. 59, better known as the First Bassanini Law from the name of the then Civil Service Minister. This law gave the government a mandate to transfer administrative functions to regions and local authorities in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity enshrined in article 5 of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. Then later in 1997 the parliament approved the Second Bassanini Law on ‘Urgent measures to simplify administrative practices and decision-making and control procedures’. These reforms not only redefined the administrative and financial relationships existing between the centre and the periphery; they also specified the role of the Italian regions and local authorities in development policies (Gilbert 1999). The decree enacting the First Bassanini Law established the State-Regions-Autonomous Provinces Conference consisting of the Prime Minister, the Interior Minister or the Minister for Regional Affairs, the presidents of the Regions, the President of the Union of Italian Provinces (UPI), six Provincial presidents nominated by UPI, the President of the National Association of Italian Communes (ANCI) and 14 mayors. Meetings of the Conference could also be attended by the ministers of the Treasury, Finance, Public Works and Health. One of the body’s primary tasks is to meet twice a year to inform the government on the regions’ point of view on future European legislation concerning the regions, to express opinions on transposition of EU directives into Italian law, to appoint the representatives of the regions in Brussels, and to express its opinion on the legislation needed to harmonize Italian law with European legislation. Finally, the Conference is also responsible for ensuring that Italy spends EU resources needed for economic and social modernization of the country (Di Cosimo 1998; Brunazzo 2005). If we keep in mind the distinction between regionalization (a process of decentralization supported by the central state to rationalize its activities) and regionalism (a process of politicization of the regions), one may say that EU pressure and national political crises have strengthened

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tendencies toward the regionalization of unitary or decentralized unitary state systems (Baldi 2003). In this process, European Cohesion Policy has provided strong incentives for the formation of a regional level within unitary national systems or the strengthening of this level in decentralized unitary systems. Brussels has taken the regions to be its direct interlocutors for the implementation and the monitoring of the Cohesion Policy, whereas the national central governments maintained control of their design and budget. But one can also say that European pressure has legitimated the tendency to regionalism, particularly in countries like Italy where this tendency has been justified by the poor performance of the unitary state model, also in its decentralized form, a poor performance made more visible by monetary integration. And in fact monetary integration ended up challenging many features of the functioning of the Italian state. In short, it is unquestionable that both directly (through the Cohesion Policy) and indirectly (through the Maastricht criteria) European pressures for devolution raised a meaningful threat against the unitary state precisely because these were interwoven with the mobilization of influential domestic political actors against it. Yet even strong European pressure would not have been sufficient without domestic mobilization and contingent factors. As Baldi (2000) has pointed out, the acquisition of power by the Italian regions has also been, to a significant degree, the result of a social (bottom-up) demand for devolution. Political crisis opened space for the rise of new movements, among them the LN, which pressed for a weakening of the ties between the centre and the (northern) regions. Although LN has never precisely defined its institutional project, it is quite clear that its organizational birth and electoral development were crucial factors in making territorial devolution of public power one of the priorities of the national agenda. In fact, the devolution of powers from the centre to the regions continued to be the subject of the political and parliamentary debate throughout the 1990s. Fiscal and administrative federalism was only one component of the demand for federalist reform of the Italian territorial system. A more structural question relating to federal reform of the state was one of the crucial issues addressed by the two Bicameral Commissions (in 1994 and 1997). These commissions were appointed by parliament to propose a revised text of Part Two of the Constitution (that relative to the organization of governmental, judicial and state powers). For various reasons and at various levels of detail,2 the two Commissions failed to achieve their objectives: debate on the proposal put forward by the first

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Commission was halted by the early dissolution of the legislature, while the proposal put forward by the second was rejected by the centreright opposition when it was presented to the general assembly of the Chamber of Deputies. It should be noted, however, that the federalist model has never enjoyed the full support of Italian parliamentarians or that of the country’s main political parties. Bound to a centralist culture, alarmed by the possible abolition of the Senate (with the consequent reduction of parliamentary seats) and backed by an equally centralist administrative class, many Italian national leaders and parliamentarians raised silent resistance against pressures for federal reform, using veto powers that both the unitary state and the consensual organization of the parliamentary system provided. With respect to the latter, it is sufficient to recall that the undifferentiated bicameralism of the Italian parliament, with its internal diffusion of power, gave senators a veto power to stop any undesired institutional change such as the transformation of the Senate into a Chamber of Regions (Vassallo 1998). Attempts to change the Constitution during the 1990s in Italy show that procedural changes in the administrative system, like the two Bassanini Laws, tend to be more successful than structural changes in the national territorial system, such as those proposed by the two Bicameral Commissions. Resistance to change, it would seem, is greater when it entails redefinition of power relations (in this case between the peripheral and central institutional actors) than it is when change entails the rationalization of existing power relations (among those institutional actors) (Fabbrini 2000). Matters changed radically when pressures justified by European integration benefited from an unusually favourable domestic environment in the late 1990s. Two factors in the political environment are of particular note – the mobilization of a new bipartisan regional political class with personal electoral legitimacy, and the need of the governmental majority to negate the challenge of the opposition. Regarding the former, the electoral and institutional reform of municipalities in 1993 (which introduced the direct election of the mayor) and the subsequent electoral and institutional reform of regions culminated in the 1999 reform (which introduced the direct election of the presidents of the regions who soon become authentic regional governors), creating new political and institutional actors interested in increasing the powers of the regions. The intent of these actors was to balance their increased political influence with increased powers with which to justify this influence (Fabbrini 2001).

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Hence, in the second half of the 1990s, a new cleavage emerged in Italian politics in which national and regional/local elites found themselves confronting one another. Mayors and regional governors, who by virtue of their direct election could claim personal legitimacy, started to challenge national political leaders, none of whom could claim to have been ‘personally’ elected to govern. Being supported by a broad popular consensus in their municipalities and regions, leaders of the peripheral executives mobilized their political resources and public opinion to lobby parliament and to compete with national leaders. The latter, no longer sustained by nationally rooted political parties, perceived their power position as increasingly weak. Thus, with the crisis of the national ideological parties, territorial groupings in the municipalities and regions provided new venues for access to positions in both the peripheral and national governments. Regional politics became so central in Italy that when the regional election of 16 April 2000 registered a strong success of centre-right candidates for governors, especially in the Northern regions, the then centre-left national prime minister was obliged to resign, although a new centre-left prime minister replaced him. This electoral defeat, one year before a national parliamentary election, pushed the government majority to introduce a new constitutional law to devolve power to the regions, the intention being to undercut electoral support for the opposition, especially in the more ‘federalist’ (or, in any case, ‘anti-centralist’) regions of the North. In remarkably short order (less than six months) the law was passed after two separate readings in each chamber of parliament, an action occurring after the regional election and before the upcoming parliamentary election (13 May 2001). It was this twofold pressure – applied indirectly by Europe and directly by the local and regional elites and their parliamentary allies – that gave rise at the very end of the 1996–2001 legislative session to the reform of Title V of the Constitution, that is, the part regulating relations between the central state and the regions. The reform had a federalizing aim, pushing the once unitary state (1948–70) and subsequently decentralized unitary Italian state (from 1970 onwards) in the direction of ‘something more’ than a regional state. The new articles of the constitution enumerate the legislative powers of the centre, identify the concurrent legislative powers of the centre and the regions, and thus leave to the latter ‘legislative powers on every matter not explicitly reserved to the state legislation’. Moreover, the power to set up their own Statuti (or regional Charters) was granted to the regions, although these statutes lack the dignity of a regional constitution. In sum, the constitutional articles set

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in motion a federalizing tendency, but they did not create a federal state. In fact the regions lacked two critical features: (1) autonomous sovereign rights independent of the central state and (2) their own national chamber of representation through which territorial interests might be represented. The latter is true since, much as expected, the Senate has kept its prerogatives of general, not territorial, representation contrary to a federalist imperative that would grant the power of parliamentary representation to the regions as territorial units. Several scholars have analyzed the strengths and limits of the quasifederal reform of 2001. Bull (2002) in particular considers the reform relatively coherent in its efforts to redesign the functions of the national and sub-national entities and relations between different institutional levels, since the reform preserves the unity of the nation and the superiority of the state. The reform also explicitly recognizes the principle of social and economic solidarity, as well as that of a minimum level of services for the citizens. This latter aspect is especially relevant for the citizens of the southern (and poorer) regions. The main limit of the reform is that it has not created a Chamber of the regions, a result due to the anticipated resistance with which such a reform would be met, as the centre-left coalition itself recognized. Moreover, several constitutionalists have observed that the list of the matters submitted to concurrent legislation at both levels is too long and confused. At first sight it seems that the state has the right to set the general principles and legislative parameters that should guide regional legislative autonomy. Yet the number of conflicts between state and regions has increased during recent years, revealing how state and regional interest interpret their tasks and prerogatives differently. Regardless of the merit of the reform, the Italian experience in 2001 shows the success of a reform based on a minimal, mutually acceptable content. This story is particularly different from the federal reform, the so called ‘devolution’, which the centre-left government approved in 2006, but which was rejected by the referendum held later in the same year.

Failure of a reform: The 2006 attempt Given the limits of the reform carried out by the centre-left government, the new centre-right government that came into power in 2001 proposed a new federal reform. By the end of 2001, a few months after the electoral victory of the Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms),3 Umberto Bossi, the minister of ‘institutional reform and devolution’ and leader

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of the LN (Lega Nord), issued an initial proposal of devolution which was intended to complete article 117 of the Constitution by providing regions with ‘exclusive legislative competence for the following matters: (a) health; (b) education, except the autonomy of schools; (c) definition of the elements of education programs referring to the areas of interest of the regions; and (d) local police’. The aim of this project was that of ‘making Lega Nord happy and let it perceive it reached a target it had tried to reach for a long time, especially before administrative elections due later that year’ (Vassallo 2005:142–3). LN was not adamantly against the 2001 reform, but it thought that this reform was not very ambitious. LN nevertheless found it expedient to support the new proposal because it considered federalism the reason for its own existence, and could therefore show its voters that a deep change was taking place, although this change had just started. In fact the entire centre-right coalition had to back the devolution proposal since it had to justify the electoral pact with LN, a party that seven years before had caused the fall of the first centre-right government. Moreover, for his part, Bossi needed devolution to justify LN support for a coalition whose members he had previously defined as ‘Fascists’, ‘Christian democrats’ (which in Bossi’s words sounds like ‘old style and corrupted politicians’) and ‘Golpists’. In reality, of course, the government was deeply divided on the text of Bossi’s speech. This reform missed relevant points that the 2001 Constitutional amendments failed to tackle. Bossi’s rhetoric of radical change, furthermore, was difficult to accept for parties that have always supported national unity, such as AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance). For this reason, parliament amended the initial proposal, at least from the symbolic point of view, in order to make it less controversial. For example, parliament modified the proposal to grant regions exclusive competence on local police matters. Parliament also amended and lengthened the text of the proposal, changing 57 articles of the Constitution, including those relating to the election of the Senate, and introducing premiership as a system of government. With these changes, the proposal was approved by the Senate on 25 March 2004 in the first reading (S2544) and by the House of Deputies (again in the first reading) on 15 October 2004 (C4862). Several points of the document approved by the House show that parliament was cautious in endorsing a real ‘federal’ perspective. In C4862, for example, regions are in charge of ‘general norms on health matters’, safety of employment, large transportation networks, the institutional organization of capital, norms on communication,

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professional associations and the national energy network. Moreover, parliament introduced the notion of national interest, which gives the national government the opportunity to refer to this principle against any regional law and to ask parliament to abolish the law in any case that a region resists this principle. Document C4862 similarly goes beyond the idea of ‘variable geometry’ federalism, which gives regions the possibility to exercise competences in a limited number of matters that the Constitution considers as exclusive state competence. Finally, a temporary norm (norma transitoria) states that in 2011 a large election of the House, Senate and regional councils and presidents will all take place, a measure seeking to nationalize voting behaviour. The project does not appear ambitious on the matter of federalism, but the proposal can still be considered relevant since it tackles – albeit with several limits according to Vassallo (2005) – the issue of the reform of the government system. It introduces premiership and the end of perfect bicameralism whereby the House and the Senate have equal rights; it changes the electoral system and composition of the Senate, a chamber that was supposed to represent the regions; it changes the powers of the President of the Republic; and it changes the way the members of the Constitutional Court and of the ‘Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura’ (the body of judges’ self-government) are appointed. The reform of the centre-right government ended up in a package deal, where each author could achieve one of his aims. Giovanni Sartori defined this reform as a cattle market, where every party secured at least one ‘cow’ (Sartori 2006:54–5 and 60), while Bull (2006:10) points out that the reform package offered: devolution for the LN; the premiership and safeguards against governments being toppled before the end of the legislature for FI; the reintroduction of the principle of the national interest, an aspect of ‘presidentialism’ to the executive, and the possibility of Fini becoming either Prime Minister or President for his loyalty for AN; and the possibility of going back to proportionality in the reformed electoral system for UDC. As legislative studies have shown, however, this approach to achieving an agreement does not necessarily lead to success. On the contrary, as Tsebelis (2002) stresses, the more distant policy preferences of veto players are (in this case, government parties and the two Chambers, both of which were against powers of limitation), the less is their ability to agree on changes of the status quo (namely the Constitution).

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After the final approval of the Senate on 23 March 2005, those who were against the reform started to mobilize. Before the end of the three months required by the Constitution, signatures of at least one-fifth of the senators and deputies and of 800,000 citizens where gathered calling for a referendum, although signatures of only one-fifth of the members of one Chamber and of 500,000 citizens were required. As opposed to what happened in 2001, when the referendum took place before political elections, in 2006 it was organized less than two months after the very narrow victory of the Prodi centre-left government. This led the centre-right opposition to consider a possible confirmation of the reform as an instrument to contribute to the fall of the weak government, while it pushed centre-left voters to mobilize in order to stress their confidence in the newly elected government. Such a politicization contributed to an increase in turnout but, at the same time, did not allow many Italians to realize the reason why they were called to vote. Using Bull’s words: Following the national elections (April), local elections (May) and (parliamentary) election of the President [of the Republic] (May), the referendum was, in many ways, an electoral appointment too far, as was evidenced in a lacklustre campaign and a relative absence of media attention. This was ironic because, in many ways, this could be regarded as the most significant vote Italians had been called on to make for many years. Whether they voted for or against the reforms, the outcome would have a significant bearing on the political debate, the two coalitions, and the future constitutional reforms. (Bull 2006:1) The outcome of the referendum is not altogether surprising. The small consensus the centre-right coalition had built in parliament lacked popular support. Also regions, lead by right-wing councils, were against the reform, since they were afraid that a competitive federalism favouring the richest regions would take place. Moreover, the weaknesses of a reform aimed at making all the coalition parties happy contributed to the fact that most Italian scholars of Constitutional law criticized it. These scholars published a book that was relevant for the political debate prior to the referendum. In this book, edited by the former minister Franco Bassanini (2004) and titled ‘Costituzione: una riforma sbagliata’ (‘Constitution: A Wrong Reform’), 60 of the major scholars of Constitutional law heavily criticized the reform. A detailed analysis by

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De Sio (2006) shows that ‘at the national level, the “no faction” won over the “yes faction” with a difference of 22.6 percentage points, while a much smaller difference (4.1 points) exists between the “no faction” and the “yes faction” in the last political elections’ (De Sio 2006:690). Therefore one can understand why the centre-right coalition failed in mobilizing its own voters, except for voters in three regions, Lombardia, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, where LN and FI were stronger.

Assessment and conclusions Much as in other European countries, the debate about the appropriate organization of sub-national governments has been central to Italian political life for at least the last 15 years. This debate has followed a period in which the Italian territorial structure had remained largely unaltered. In fact, even if the 1948 Constitution had set the ideological premises for a regionalized territorial system, the political conditions in favour of administrative and political decentralization were first evident in the 1970s, and the question of a federal reform seriously entered the political agenda only in the mid-1990s. Since then, Italy has gone through two important administrative reforms (the two Bassanini Laws of 1997) and a constitutional reform introducing a federal territorial system (without the creation of a Chamber of the Regions) in 2001. In 2006, a second constitutional reform, where federalism played an important role, failed, without halting the debate over the need for devolving more powers from the central state to the regions. The policy arguments used to promote these reforms can be summarized in one word: modernization, that is to say, the need to make Italian public administration more effective and efficient. In recent years, modernization in Italy has been considered synonymous with political ‘normality’. Reforms were presented as partial but feasible solutions to the political crises besetting the country at the beginning of the 1990s and thereby making Italy less politically ‘exceptional’. In addition a second argument was used for the 2001 reform – namely Europeanization. The Italian decision to join the first group of countries entering the Common Currency created pressure toward a more efficient economic system, based on regional authorities that would be more responsible and accountable for public expenditures. Europeanization has at the same time been the cause for the territorial reform and the ‘window of opportunity’ that political elites used in order to pursue necessary reforms. But in 2006 the argument of the ‘requirements from Brussels’ could not be

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used for two reasons: first, Italy had already entered European Union and, second, there was notable Euroscepticism within the centre-right coalition ruling the government at that time. Centre-left and centre-right coalitions used different strategies in promoting their reforms. Different procedures of decision-making were used in order to accommodate the interests of stakeholders affected by policy initiatives. The centre-left coalition proposed a reform based on the notion of the minimum acceptable content, whereas the centreright coalition proposed a package deal by which each party could pursue a specific aim. The first strategy proved successful because the reform, even if imperfect and not ambitious, was still acceptable even for the parties that were against it in parliament. This aspect is even more important if one considers that a constitutional reform approved without qualified majority needs to be approved through a referendum. The second strategy was unsuccessful for the opposite reason. The reform was so ambitious and inconsistent that it polarized much more the political forces and public opinion. Moreover, the centre-left coalition proposed a reform based on an incremental approach. The 2001 reform was considered a first step of a comprehensive reform of the political and institutional system. By comparison, the 2006 reform was presented as final, ambitious and comprehensive, promoting the change of both the territorial and governmental systems. For all these reasons, the two reforms created different patterns of conflict. Even if a general and widespread political agreement about the need of reforms with a federal dimension existed, political parties have used reforms (and the related referendums) as a way of delegitimizing their political adversaries. The reforms did not divide the parties along their ideological position (right vs. left), but mainly along their position in government (government vs. opposition). Thus parties in the opposition were against the 2001 reform even if they shared many of the government’s views and objectives. Between 2001 and 2006 two new cleavages emerged. The first was that between local authorities and national authorities. While the 2001 reform did not mobilize the regions against the proposed reform, the 2006 reform triggered opposition even among the regions ruled by centre-right governments. The second cleavage was that between the northern regions (which strongly supported federalism) and the southern regions (which were more in favour of centralization). As far as the institutional structures are concerned, in the two reforms one may see the consociational features of the Italian polity. Both the institutional settings and the behaviour of political actors have fostered

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the need of a bargaining and open decision-making style. For instance, use of the referendum as an instrument for achieving the final approval of a constitutional reform fosters the need for proposals that are shared by the main political actors and stakeholders or, at least, that are not strongly opposed by them. These consociational features require the adoption of any possible instrument of consultation of the main stakeholders in order to prevent veto points. Certainly the failed reform of 2006 reduced the possibility of having a new federal reform approved in a short time (Vassallo 2006). All of the parties are aware, however, of the need to complete the federal reform of 2001. This debate is therefore destined to continue.

Notes 1. Regions with special statutes are Sicilia, Sardegna, Valle d’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige (comprising the two autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and Friuli-Venezia Giulia). These regions have many similarities with Spanish regions. 2. The second Commission proposed a quasi-federal structure for the Italian state; quasi-federal because the constitutional distribution of powers between the centre and the regions was not reflected by a Chamber of the Regions at the national level. 3. The main parties of the House of Freedom were: Forza Italia (Force Italy), Alleanza nazionale (National Alliance), Lega Nord (Northern League) and Unione democratica di centro (Democratic Union of the Centre).

11 Efficiency Imperatives in a Fragmented Polity: Reinventing Local Government in Greece Panagiotis Getimis and Nikolaos Hlepas

Between 1996 and 1999 the number of municipalities in Greece was reduced from 5,825 to 1,033 as a result of forced amalgamations. This chapter seeks to provide a basis for understanding these amalgamations and the events that have occurred in their wake. At the outset the chapter seeks to establish a conceptual frame of reference that connects territorial choice to political processes. The second part of the chapter then discusses decentralization reforms during the period 1980–94, when the need for a transfer of competence to local government and broader legitimacy was predominant, after which the third part focuses upon the impact of Europeanization that was the main force underlying a shift of territorial reform orientation towards efficiency prerogatives in the period from 1995–2006. In the subsequent section, an overall evaluation of framing, reform strategies and patterns of conflict is attempted. Finally, in the fifth part, demands for rescaling territorial politics emerging in 2007 are considered, before the chapter concludes with a brief summary discussion.

Conceptual framework There is no universal recipe explaining territorial structure and change independent of political relations and socio-economic development. This chapter starts from the assumption that the organization of subnational levels of government and governance is the outcome of a political process in which the politics of territorial choice are influenced by societal arrangements and dynamics, with the balance between different interests being intermediated through political processes. Territorial rescaling, moreover, is exposed to pressures coming from supra-national (European and global) as well as national levels, the outcome being an 198

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open game depending on the main features of the socio-economic and political systems in each country. In the literature, Europeanization is often conceived as a resourcedependent process in which the European Union is a political and economical opportunity structure that changes the distribution of power between domestic actors, favouring one group over the other or increasing the mutual dependency between them. Such resource dependency approaches largely ignore, however, the ways in which the patterns of domestic interaction and policymaking processes adapt to the challenges of Europeanization. Focusing on European integration and convergence, resource dependency approaches do not take into account the divergence, the persistence, and the robustness of domestic political institutions and structures in meeting the adaptive pressures of the EU. Advocates of a more bottom-up approach argue that the different political structures of each member state operate as a filter that refracts Europeanization in different directions and styles. Authors of this approach stress the ways and the degree in which European policy has had a differential impact, with domestic responses to EU policies varying considerably across policies and countries (Knill 2001; Börzel 1999). Assumptions regarding integration that lead to the study of the vertical relations between regions, nation states and the European Union, as well as their transformation, have recently been enriched by studies focusing more systematically on the horizontal changes of domestic policy processes due to the impact of EU policy. In these approaches, significant importance has been attributed to the degree of acceptance or resistance of domestic political institutions and structures, illustrating in this context the importance of domestic factors in adapting to European principles and funding conditions (Börzel 1999). The concept of ‘goodness of fit’ between the Europeanization of policymaking, on the one hand, and the domestic (national, regional, local) institutional settings, rules and practices, on the other hand, has been developed and tested empirically in order to identify different adaptive pressures that domestic institutions and policy structures are expected to face in order to comply with European rules and practices (Cowles and Risse 2001; Börzel 1999; Börzel 2001; Paraskevopoulos et al. 2006). Moreover, different stages regarding the extent to which domestic local politics and policies adapt to European policy are elaborated. According to John’s (1994) scheme regarding the ‘ladder of Europeanization’, there are many stages before the establishment of a fully Europeanized local authority. The development of networking and partnerships as well as the incorporation of European ideas and practices into local/regional

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policymaking are crucial factors for the adaptation of local/regional politics to EU policy. A third group of scholars, rejecting a zero-sum-game approach, accepts neither the strengthening nor the hollowing out of the state but outlines the emergence of a European system of multi-level governance where European, national and sub-national actors share political power. In particular, this approach emphasizes the absence of a centre of accumulated authority. ‘Instead, variable combinations of governments on multiple layers of authority – European, national and sub-national – form policy networks for collaboration’ (Hooghe 1996:18; see also Marks 1996). Proponents of multi-level governance focus on interdependence and the networking of different levels of political organization – the European, the national and the local – and they support new types of politics that enhance the interconnections and synergies between them. Among the multitude of approaches that have contributed considerably to understanding and analysis of the complexity of the spatial dynamics of Europeanization, economic and political geography is also worth noting. Within this approach the rescaling of economic, social, political processes and state practices and structures is stressed (Brenner 1999; Swyngedouw 1997). As Brenner (1999:1) points out, ‘various dimensions of urban governance in contemporary Europe are analysed as expressions of a politics of scale that is emerging at the geographical interface between processes of urban restructuring and state territorial restructuring’. In particular, interest has focused on the social construction of territorial relations using practices such as jumping scales and negotiation, and the political importance of the process of rescaling of social practices in terms of strategies of empowerment and disempowerment of social groups. Hence the concern has been to analyse how EU policies express the shift of powers and new power relations and how policies influence the redefinition and/or construction of new spaces. For instance, certain authors explain the transformation processes and the new political order in the EU by giving emphasis to the neglected significance of civic interest intermediation and the sectoral composition of the political system (Heinelt 2002). In this context ‘participatory governance’ in a multi-level framework is examined as an alternative process that coexists with hierarchies (state) and market-led solutions (Getimis and Kafkalas 2002). The abovementioned theoretical approaches are particularly relevant for the Greek case, since the Europeanization process has strongly influenced


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territorial choice. This influence emerged in the mid-1980s and gradually became more important, if not decisive, during the 1990s. Implemented and intended territorial reforms, in short, can mainly be explained through approaches to multi-level governance and Europeanization.

Decentralization reform and the need for broader legitimacy (1980–94) The year 1980 was the starting mark for several reform efforts. The municipalities were proclaimed to be institutions charged with the task of promoting local development, while new forms of participation were introduced (directly elected neighbourhood councils and citizens’ assemblies in small municipalities, indirectly elected councils at the prefectural level. These changes were initiated by the ruling socialists who prioritized, in their political agenda, participatory and decentralization reforms of the state. They seemed to hesitate, however, in contemplating territorial reforms. The necessity of such reforms became more evident in time however. New municipal duties, limited additional funds and new modes of participation could not substantially affect the overwhelming majority of local authorities, since smaller municipalities were not able to carry out the new duties assigned to them. By 1984, it was decided to deal with this problem in two ways: by encouraging voluntary amalgamations of smaller communes through grants and other incentives on the one hand, and by creating new, ‘stronger’ types of municipal syndicates (‘development syndicates’, replaced by ‘district councils’ in 1994) on the other hand. But the results of these efforts were not considered satisfactory. Some years later, only 367 small municipalities (less than 10 per cent of the target group) had responded to the state incentives, voluntarily merging into 108 units. Neither did the new types of municipal syndicates live up to expectations. These failures were due to the fact that the socialist party was not ready to confront the existing strong localism and preferred moderate procedures on a voluntary basis that fitted into its own prerogatives favouring a bottom-up approach aiming at local legitimacy and acceptance. Furthermore, the absence of a higher (second) tier of local government deprived the municipalities of an important supporting institution, since the 54 state prefectures had proved incapable of filling this gap. Poor coordination and performance of the prefectures became even more evident when these administrative units failed to manage projects financed by the European Community (EC). It was obvious that district

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state administration needed to be reformed and the establishment of a second tier of local government seriously considered. Finally a new tier of state deconcentration emerged and the country was subdivided into 13 regions in 1987. These regions were not intended to have general powers, so there was no resistance within state administration or local government. In every region, a Regional Council was established, in which representatives of local authorities, professional associations and state administration participated. These regions were mainly set up to coordinate, plan and programme regional development, so that Greece could take advantage of EC structural funds when the structural and development policy of the European Community was transformed in 1988. Although Regional Councils seemed a satisfactory way of achieving the partnership provided for in the structural fund regulations, local representatives were primarily anxious to secure funding for their own projects, and the system did not encourage those involved to think in terms of the region as a whole. Procedures for submissions were (and still are) open and competitive, without ruling out ‘subjective criteria’. Setting up projects in a way that meets the formal eligibility criteria has been an important source of problems, and small authorities were at a distinct disadvantage here. While the constitution of a new regional level was promoted rather quickly, efforts to ‘municipalize’ the nomarchies (prefectures) failed twice – both in 1986 and 1990. In 1986, a law that foresaw the creation of a second tier of local government was initiated by the ruling socialist party, thus promoting an important part of its reform agenda aimed at enhancing democratic legitimacy and participation. However, due to the strong resistance of local MPs, high rank party cadres and state hierarchies, this law has not been enforced in practice. In 1990 a multi-party coalition, following the pressure of local government lobby, as well as of left and socialist parties, adopted a new law, promoting an even stronger second tier. But the rise of the Conservative Party, six months later, cancelled the reform. The new government denied the empowerment of local government, since the political influence of conservatives within local government remained weak. This landscape changed after the comeback of the socialists. In 1994 the 161-year-old state institution of the nomarchia was transformed into a second tier of local government (so-called Prefectural Local Government – PSG). While left parties supported the reform, the conservatives highlighted eventual risks concerning state unity and efficiency in order to oppose the reform. But this time efforts towards a new blockade


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failed: the Socialist Party enjoyed political strength deriving from a recent electoral triumph and state prefectures were declining, while state administration gradually focused on regions, thus neglecting the prefectural level. Under these circumstances, political and administrative resistance to change was restrained. Finally, another factor favouring this reform should not be neglected: while competition for succession to the leadership of the governing socialist party smouldered backstage, this new institution promised new chances to unsatisfied party cadres and local societies. More than 1,500 prefectural councillors and 56 prefects and sub-prefects were to be directly elected, while local government took over fields of power traditionally reserved for the state. Deconcentrated state administration seemed to lose ground and was obliged to withdraw and reformulate at higher levels. Since the state no longer exercised power at the prefectural level, the time had come to change the character of the regions and transform them into multi-sectoral state entities that would gather at a higher level most of the deconcentrated state administrations. Hence, just a few months after the introduction of second tier local government, a new law gave the Secretary Generals of the regions certain powers that the appointed Nomarchs (prefects) had previously exercised. These powers corresponded to state functions exercised throughout the country, including supervision of local authorities.

Europeanization and territorial reform: The demand for efficiency (1995–2004) The newly established second tier of local government did not meet initial expectations and faced difficulties right from the beginning. Most of the public servants in the former state prefectures mistrusted elected officials and feared a setback in terms of career opportunities, salaries and pensions. Most of the old staff were therefore not willing to move to these new local governments and tried by all means to return to state administrative agencies. MPs in the provinces, on the other hand, perceived the emergence of new directly elected players (especially the prefects) within their own constituency as a threat to their positions within the system of political clientelism. In addition, corporate interests and larger businesses were afraid that their influence on locally elected politicians would not be as strong as it used to be within the Ministries. Central bureaucracy and even an important part of the judiciary anticipated trends of paralyzing disintegration and the emergence of new local powers that would not be loyal to state hierarchies and order.

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In short order an uncoordinated but convergent anti-reformist alliance attacked the new institutions. There were long-lasting controversies and litigations, while in several cases the courts decided that ‘major state responsibilities’ (such as physical planning and the appointment of teachers in public schools) could not be transferred to local government. Thus the second tier lost important fields of competence. The new local leaders at the second tier soon discovered that most of their funds were coming from state grants, many of which were simply financing concrete administrative tasks that the PSGs were obliged to carry out on behalf of the state. Supervision and control responsibilities, routine duties and a lot of red tape constituted most of the workload, while the regions, the ministries and several state-controlled entities took crucial policy-decisions directly affecting the prefectures. Apart from protesting and litigating, directly elected prefects tried to claim ‘their’ part in the local political arena, not only by means of extensive use of the strong, historically rooted symbolism of their office, but also through unscrupulous clientelistic practices, sometimes even by breaking the law. In this respect the evolution of ‘prefectural’ local government in Greece seems to provide a good example of how local political representation degenerates without funds and policy options of its own. Already in 1996 and 1997 the central government responded through laws that reorganized the 13 state-controlled regions as new basic units of deconcentrated state administration and gave them wide-ranging competences in several sectors. Since PSGs were mistrusted, lacked resources, experience and know-how, the second tier lost further competences through laws that seemed to favour the regions. However, the various administrative units of the regions were (and still are) understaffed, depending on the assistance and the know-how of the ministries. Furthermore, a sort of ‘sectional spirit’ still seemed to prevail, thus reproducing the kind of ministerial or sector ‘federalism’ that is typical for many unitary states. In the years that followed special regional districts were created by several ministries (for example by the Ministry of Education in 2000), thus bypassing the 13 ‘General’ regions and increasing the complexity of public administration as a whole. It is characteristic that the main argument for all of these new institutional and functional arrangements was the pressing need for efficiency, often connected to the requirements of European policies and – implicitly – to fiscal stress. Concrete divisions of competence among different levels of public administration often proved to be unclear, however, thus creating an environment of uncertainty and frustrating political accountability.


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The need for efficiency was also the main argument for the most remarkable reform of this period, namely the ‘Capodistrias Plan’ of amalgamations that intended to restructure the first tier and create new, stronger municipalities that would be able to cope with new tasks, promote local development and offer ‘modern social services’ to their citizens, especially in rural areas. In fact, the mandatory unification of municipalities in 1998 gives us what has been up to now a unique example of a radical reform through amalgamations in southern Europe. In 1997 the general principles of a government plan for the reorganization of the first tier of local government was approved by an extraordinary congress of the single National Union of Municipalities, although the strongest parties of the opposition (Conservatives and Communists) resisted it. The Ministry of the Interior used the map of previous units of intermunicipal cooperation (some 500 units) as an official proposal for local associations of municipalities. After a controversial bargaining process the number of the new units rose to nearly 900. In pursuing this strategy, the government avoided the procedure set out for amalgamations in the Municipal Code, namely the emission of presidential decrees. The reason was that such legal acts could be attacked with legal remedies and finally be annulled by the Supreme Administrative Court (Conseil d’Etat). The government opted instead for a parliamentary law, implementing a procedure that would bring into play the dynamics of party loyalty. The official plan of amalgamations was thus approved by the ruling majority of parliament. This law was quite detailed, since it included even the names, the capital towns and the concrete new borders of the new municipalities. The Capodistrias Plan was not just a plan to merge municipalities; it was also a plan for national and regional development with a time scope of five years (1997–2001). The new local authorities would obtain the financial resources and qualified staff they needed in order to set up a ‘modern and effective’ unit of local administration that would act as an ‘instrument and a pole of development’ for their territories, thereby more easily taking advantage of EU funds. In this way, the citizens would have more influence on local politics (a ‘participatory effect’ of amalgamations), since the new municipalities would undertake a much wider range of activities. At the same time, continued representation of the old rural municipalities would be provided through local, directly elected community councils. By virtue of this act, the total number of municipalities was cut down by 80 per cent (see Table 11.1). This percentage would have been even

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Table 11.1 Distribution of Greek municipalities according to population size before (1996) and after (1999) implementation of the Capodistrias Plan 1996

Population size

1999

Number

Per cent

Less than 300 301–500 501–1,000 1,001–2,000 2,001–5,000 5,001–10,000 10,001–20,000 20,001–50,000 50,001–100,000 100,001–200,000 Over 200,000

2,043 1,180 1,357 672 337 102 48 54 24 6 2

35.1 20.2 23.3 11.5 5.8 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.03

Number 33 14 46 93 380 281 95 56 27 6 2

Per cent 3.2 1.3 4.5 9.0 36.8 27.2 9.2 5.4 2.6 0.6 0.02

Totals

5,825

100

1,033

100

Source: Ministry of Interior (2000)

higher if the metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki, with more than 160 municipalities (and half of the country’s total population), had not been exempted from the amalgamations plan. The average population of the municipalities rose from about 1,600 to more than 11,000, while the average number of municipalities in each prefecture fell from about roughly 115 to a little more than 20 units. From this viewpoint, the corresponding ‘prefectural local governments’ seemed to be too small to function as a complementary and balancing higher tier of local governance. At the same time quite a few of the new municipalities still seemed to be too small to exercise several additional responsibilities (local police, minor harbours and so forth), which were transferred to the first tier of local government. Partly in response to this situation, a new law subsequently provided for the establishment of single- or multi-purpose local associations (called ‘sympoliteia’) of municipalities that could carry out ‘demanding’ tasks, such as local police, logistics and public works, while new types of contracting were introduced. But most of these innovative forms of inter-municipal cooperation failed because they have not been used by the new municipalities. The lack of a corresponding tradition of successful inter-municipal cooperation, a political culture of polarization combined with strong localism and the fact that the state finally did not provide the necessary financial and expert assistance were some of


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the main causes for this failure. Furthermore, the new municipalities gradually lost a great part of their best staff who tried by all means to move to bigger cities – sometimes encouraged by the unfriendly attitude of conservative local societies and their patrons. Despite many difficulties and quite a few failures, there is no doubt that this major reform has already changed the landscape of local government in Greece. Within the new, larger municipalities, a new type of more professional mayor has emerged that reflects the deep changes in demography, economy, communication and culture during the last decades that tend to urbanize styles and views of life in the Greek countryside. Local peculiarities seem to fade, and even the geographic differentiation of political and voting behavior that used to be so strong is declining. Nowadays, local communities in rural areas expect much more from public administration than they used to. Consequently, the amalgamations of the 1990s were not simply the achievement of ‘radical modernizers’ or the outcome of ‘socialist dogmatism’; they also responded to an altering social environment. This could also offer an explanation of the fact that resistance against amalgamations has been (with some exceptions) less strong than expected, although the strongest political parties of the opposition resisted this territorial reform and tried to mobilize their supporters.

Framing, strategies and conflicts during two decades of reform An overall assessment of the first reform period (1980–94) would come to the conclusion that functional decentralization and new forms of participation promoting legitimacy were established, while territorial reform was neglected for several years. However, some voluntary amalgamations took place (through incentives), while the introduction of a second tier of local government was debated during the 1980s. Concerning the second reform period (1995–2004), the dominant reasons invoked to justify the amalgamation reform were Europeanization combined with efficiency prerogatives. Adaptation pressures through Europeanization (the structural and cohesion policy of the EU) and the dominant objectives of efficiency influenced by the Lisbon strategy (competitiveness, entrepreneurship, innovation) were the driving forces of the territorial reforms (obligatory amalgamations of nearly 6,000 down to 1,033 units at the municipal level). The same reasons caused the shift from a participatory orientation towards a managerial

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approach (for example gradual downgrading of regional councils in favour of purely administrative authorities at the regional level). In both reform periods strategies were elaborated in a top-down manner, being imposed by the national government and the ruling socialist party and covering, in most cases, the whole country. Neither the municipalities, nor the civil society organizations and/or grassroots movements had the capacities needed for a bottom-up process. At the same time, these new institutions of participation at all territorial levels, combined with decentralization, were able to create new arenas of politics and policies, new opportunities for careers and, above all, new possibilities for interest articulation that were particularly inviting for a wide middle class that had been excluded until 1981. There is no doubt that the reform strategies of the socialists have been comprehensive, since they referred to the whole country and to all levels of local government and state districts. Reform procedures, however, have been incrementally implemented, since comprehensive reforms followed legalistic traditions addressed to a non-Weberian public administration that could not respond properly. Consequently, local capacities were formed along clientelistic and/or corporatist networks. An individualistic political culture, along with a fragmentation of sectoral and local institutions and interests, impeded comprehensive reform implementation. Some charismatic local political leaders (mainly mayors) took full advantage of the new windows of opportunity, thus articulating inclusive local policies that incorporated broader citizen participation and enacted local development. For these reasons, the reform landscape was a divergent one. While in some cases impressive performance could be registered, in other cases failure and stagnation created the impression that ‘nothing had changed’. Concerning the patterns of conflict, the reforms of the first period (1981–94) took advantage of several persistent cleavage systems that had characterized the country since the civil war (1946–49). Indeed, the excluded left, the neglected rural areas, the under-represented lower- and middle-classes, the demoralized civil/municipal servants as well as several local politicians joined the reform procedures, expecting more influence in the decision-making processes. However, the longruling right-wing parties, urban and bureaucratic elites, traditional state and socio-economic hierarchies, and even a part of the new socialist clientele tried to block the reforms or some of their effects that were perceived as threats. During the second reform period (1995–2004) patterns of conflict corresponded, once again, to well-established cleavage systems.


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Modernization-oriented forces, encouraged through processes of Europeanization, could overcome traditionalist resistance to territorial restructuring mainly formed within the lines of conservative and communist parties, but also existing inside the ruling socialist party. Furthermore, the centre–periphery contrast was expressed through the attitude of political personnel: while the strongest opposition parties were against the reform, the great majority of local authority leaders accepted the reform because they were aware of the weak efficiency within the existing structures. Furthermore, many of these local leaders had strong expectations regarding new political career paths within local government and beyond. It is characteristic that the two major metropolitan areas (Athens and Thessaloniki) were excluded from territorial reform, since neither local leaders, nor the country’s central political elite, were willing to lose influence, favoring persistent and irrational fragmentation despite visible efficiency deficits (Getimis and Hlepas 2007). The lack of efficient administrative structures, especially in the rural areas, has been the background to several clientelistic networks dominated by local MPs and patrons. This was the main reason why several MPs strongly opposed both territorial reforms in the 1990s (establishment of a second tier, amalgamation of small municipalities) and, later on, frustrated the initial plans for even more radical amalgamations of municipalities. In this way the target-number of ca. 400 units presented by the Ministry has climbed up to more than 1,000.

The new demand for rescaling territorial politics The political landscape in Greece has drastically changed after the victory of the centre-right party (April 2004) that put an end to a long period of socialist dominance (1981–89, 1993–2004). Up to 2007, the new government seemed to be quite cautious, since it had opposed all territorial reforms promoted by socialist governments during the 1990s. There have been cases where an ad hoc response to antireformist pressures was given and local disputes have been resolved through the separation and revival of old ‘historical’ communities that were re-founded as independent municipalities. Within the governing party, neo-conservative elements seemed to convince even the liberal fraction to return to good old practices that characterized conservative administration policy during the 1950s and 1960s inasmuch as nearly all important posts were given as spoils to cadres and friends of the governing party. Several other minor changes have been promoted,

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following a legalistic and ‘proper household’ approach. Legal controls of local government have been augmented, while emphasis has been put on ‘accurate administration’ and the role of local politicians in personalizing and expressing ‘local society and local tradition’. Party politics and the political culture of the new right in Greece is based on promoting tradition as the backbone of social cohesion, while it has neglected (if not denied) aspects of redistribution and active citizen participation. Rigid rules, furthermore, have been introduced in order to constrain activities of municipal enterprises, many of which had created deficits and/or were mainly used in order to hire additional personnel. On the other hand, the government promoted public–private partnerships and supported privatization. Some important pending reforms have been postponed. Metropolitan reform, for instance, that used to be a subject of public debate after the Athens Olympics in 2004, was obviously not a matter of priority for a reluctant government (Getimis and Hlepas 2007). After the victory of the centre-right party in September 2007, things seemed to change. Some leaders of the governing party are now convinced that territorial reform is necessary, first and foremost in order to respond to prerogatives set by European policies during the Fourth Programmatic period and the need to ‘absorb’ faster and in a much more efficient way the available funds. After all, enlargement of the European Union and the strong growth of the Greek economy during the last decade mean that it will probably be the ‘last chance’ for Greece to take advantage of a generous European ‘Support Framework’. In face of these perspectives, the creation of six major ‘Programmatic SupraRegions’ has been promoted and an even more centralistic and technocratic system for the management of the corresponding European funds is being created. Pressures for territorial rescaling can also be related to major business interests and some other influential social or/and political actors that prefer to act in larger-scaled spaces. Small-scaled and multi-level structures are considered to create an extremely complex territorial environment where political intermediation, political decision-making and policy implementation are too slow and too costly. Citizen participation is often perceived as a factor that increases costs and leads to heavy and irrational procedures. In quite a few cases a common and strong argument against smaller scale is not simply the demand of efficiency, but also concrete negative experiences with local communities, mayors, prefects and other local patrons that impeded or even blocked important development projects and strategic investments. Last, but not least, newly constructed networks of transport


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and communication, combined with rapidly growing use of digital technologies, have deeply changed the social and economic geography of the country. Recently, territorial reform emerged, once again, on top of the agenda, due to the pressure coming from local government associations and the willingness of the opposition (both socialist and left parties) to create reformist pressure. Central government still hesitates to express its own views and concepts. Furthermore, many neo-conservatives, who regard local government mainly an institution of sociocultural identity and cohesion, still oppose the idea of rescaling. It is obvious that they are, once more, going to resist any territorial reform, even if they will have to depend upon backstage blockades because of formal party loyalties. At the present time a top-down reform procedure has nonetheless begun. In this process a focus on efficiency becomes stronger and legitimacy is neglected, and citizen participation is discredited. Rescaling of territorial politics is, once again, considered to be an appropriate answer to existing and easily perceivable deficits of effectiveness and responsiveness. Territorial rescaling is two-fold: the first aspect concerns statecontrolled territorial structures, whereas the second refers to both tiers of local government. The reduction of the number of regions (from 13 to 6) is expected to catch up with new objectives imposed by the Lisbon strategy referring to effectiveness, competitiveness and entrepreneurship. Amalgamation of municipalities (from 1,034 down to 400) and prefectural local governments (from 50 down to 16) will purportedly overcome existing fragmentation and meet the strategic goals of the European Cohesion Policy. Within this trend it is characteristic that the role of regional councils should be restrained in favour of bypassing mechanisms (such as ‘managing authorities of operational programs’ and privatized ‘regional development agencies’). This is certainly an option corresponding to the orientation of the ruling centre-right majority, which seems to distrust the capacities of the public sector and put aside aspects of institutionalized participation. A clear, yet not verbally expressed policy option of the ruling majority is to restrain local government from entering into partnerships that are important for making development policies. State and centralized hierarchies seek to become the privileged partners of professional and entrepreneurial interests, while local government action is held back by its small-scale capacities. This option corresponds to the traditional attitudes of conservative forces that prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s and that imposed a regime of rigid centralization combined

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with sectoralization. It is a trend that is reinforced in the public eye by rumours of mismanagement, maladministration and corruption in local government.

Summary discussion The principal elements relating to territorial reform in recent decades in Greece can be summarized in the following points: 1. Up to the mid-1990s territorial reforms in Greece focused on broadening legitimacy and offering party cadres and middle classes new chances of political careers and participation in public affairs. There were gains in consensus through expanding participation, and a learning process for societal and political actors also took place. It was obvious, however, that efficiency would, sooner or later, become an important issue of the reform agenda. 2. The shift from legitimacy to efficiency during the late 1990s was mainly due to Europeanization, fiscal stress and pressures deriving from globalization. Furthermore, a relative failure of several participatory institutions and procedures could be observed. The malfunctioning of participation was related to the main features of socio-economic and political structures, namely the fragmentation into sectoral interests, clientelistic relations, the weakness of civil society, political polarization, lack of transparent bargaining and negotiation mores, and an extremely individualistic political culture. 3. By the late 1990s, the state tried to cope with low efficiency in local government and deconcentrated state administration. Obligatory amalgamations of municipalities, combined with state restructuring at the regional level, were expected to create economies of scale and offer new possibilities for modern policies and actions in public administration. The target of ‘modernization’ has, however, been technocratically perceived, thus undermining legitimacy and the mobilization of civil society. Furthermore, a persistent sectoral fragmentation undermined efforts for territorial and participatory interest and policy articulation. In this way, territorial reform could not activate the existing socio-political capacities and, moreover, create the necessary critical mass of new forces that would cause a paradigm shift. Traditional hierarchies could, therefore, undermine the emerging dynamisms that proved to be too weak to transform the main features of the existing socio-political landscape.


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4. Instead of territorial reforms, the conservative governments originally seemed to adopt a legalistic approach in order to dominate and arrange a public administration that should be limited to traditional tasks, while results should mainly be produced either through hierarchical command and control or through public–private partnerships and privatization. Local government has mostly been perceived as a factor of identity and social cohesion, while a view of political procedures that emphasized representative local government and mistrusted citizen participation prevailed. 5. The need to respond to efficiency standards imposed by European funds and policies, combined with wider entrepreneurial and sociopolitical interests has, however, once again put territorial change on the reform agenda. The emphasis given to effectiveness, entrepreneurship and competitiveness in this fourth programmatic period of European funding, combined with the dominance of a technocratic rationale and spirit of expertise, underestimates important aspects of legitimacy, participation and the empowerment of civil society. There is a risk that the prevailing trend (new hierarchies, market oriented regional institutions), reduces and narrows the existing forms of legitimacy and loses consensus. Furthermore, there is no evidence that rescaling will necessarily lead to more efficiency. Even the effects of the amalgamations during the 1990s have not been properly and systematically assessed. Given the fact the local government in Greece is extremely poor (expenditures for both tiers represent less than 6 per cent of GDP), lacks important taxing possibilities and remains highly dependent on state and European aid, rescaling per se without a combined radical fiscal reform will not catch up with the new objectives. For these reasons, the final outcome of the current reform debate is hard to estimate.

12 Top-Down or Bottom-Up? Coping with Territorial Fragmentation in the Czech Republic Michal Illner

The story to be told in the present chapter about territorial choice in the Czech Republic offers an ambiguous picture of territorial reform. Commencing in the 1950s, it describes successive streams of change, each of which moved the territorial structure of local government in a different direction. The process started in the 1960s and 1970s when, under the communist regime, a stepwise consolidation of local government structures was decreed by central authorities. Then in the 1990s, after the fall of the communist regime, a permissive reform followed, a reform enabling and tolerating spontaneous fragmentation. Finally, in recent years, attempts at renewed consolidation of local government have once again taken place. This chapter deals primarily with the two most recent stages of this reform process. A brief glance into the history of territorial reforms in communist Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1989 cannot be avoided, however, since much of the later development has been influenced by efforts to liberate the system and territorial structure of local government from the heritage of this earlier period. But before moving ahead, let us first briefly describe the present system and territorial structure of Czech sub-national government.

The current system and territorial structure of sub-national public administration Sub-national public administration in the Czech Republic has two institutional arms: (1) territorial self-government and (2) territorial state administration. The former is an expression of the right of people living in a territory – in municipalities and in regions – to independently manage territorial affairs, whereas the latter executes responsibilities of the state at the sub-national level. 214

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The status of territorial self-government was set forth in the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic and has been further elaborated by subsequent legislation, in particular by the Law on Municipalities (the municipal system) and the Law on Regions (the regional system), both of which were adopted in 2000 and have been amended several times since then.1 In terms of territorial self-government the country is divided into regions, which are the higher level territorial self-governing units, and municipalities, which are the basic territorial self-governing units. But the system of territorial self-government is not vertically hierarchical; authorities of municipal self-government are not subordinated to those of regions and the state cannot intervene in territorial self-government except for cases provided by law and for reasons of upholding the law. The regions (NUTS III level units) – of which there are 13 plus the capital of Prague, which also has the status of a region – were established in 1997 based on geographic and political criteria. The regions are further divided into 76 districts. Between 1990 and the end of 2002 these districts were seats of general state administrative bodies – the District Offices. As of 2003, however, the District Offices were eliminated and their responsibilities were transferred to Municipal Offices in larger cities and to Regional Offices. Thus at present only some bodies of central state administration have kept their deconcentrated offices in the districts. The country is also divided into eight NUTS II level Regions of Cohesion, that is, non-governmental territorial units which play an important role in both national and European regional development policy. As of 2007 there were 6,249 municipalities, both urban and rural, and the number has not changed substantially since then. Of these nearly 80 per cent were very small places with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants (see Table 12.1). In 2007 587 municipalities had the status of towns or cities and may be considered urban in the administrative sense. They were home to roughly 70 per cent of the country’s population.2 Czech public administrative practice does not distinguish between urban and rural or small and large municipalities with respect to their independent competencies. But size and urban status do matter regarding the scope of transferred responsibilities entrusted to local authorities by the state and the size of the territory in which they are carried out. Special status is enjoyed by the country’s 23 largest urban centres, the statutory cities, which are entitled to divide their territories into administrative districts or local parts, these being quasi-municipalities with their own self-administration and a limited scope of independent responsibilities. The administrative status of the capital city of Prague embodied in a separate law is special since it is simultaneously

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Living with Fragmentation – the Czech Republic

Table 12.1 Distribution of Czech municipalities according to population size, 2007 Municipalities Population size

Population

Number

%

Number

%

Less than 200 200–499 500–999 1,000–1,999 2,000–4,999 5,000–9,999 10,000–19,999 20,000–49,999 50,000–99,999 Over 100,000

1,566 2,024 1,312 692 381 141 70 42 16 5

25.1 32.3 21.0 11.1 6.1 2.2 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.1

192,090 660,126 922,543 962,615 1,153,506 954,537 977,386 1,244,142 1,159,570 2,154,615

1.9 6.4 8.9 9,3 11.1 9.2 9.4 12.0 11.2 20.8

Total

6,249

100.0

10,381,130

100.0

Source: Czech Statistical Office (2008a)

a municipality, enjoys the position of a district, has a status equivalent to that of an administrative region and is a region of cohesion. With respect to self-government, the powers of municipalities – their own (independent) responsibilities – include matters that are in the interest of the municipality and its citizens, unless such matters are entrusted by law to regions or belong to the transferred responsibilities of the municipality (see below as regards the concept of transferred responsibilities). Municipalities also have the right to cooperate with other municipalities in the sphere of their own responsibilities and to establish associations of municipalities promoting their joint interests. A number of such associations exist in the Czech Republic, the largest and most influential being the Association of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic. The second institutional arm of sub-national public administration – the territorial state administration – carries out its responsibilities through two types of institutional structures: 1. Some responsibilities, mostly the specialized ones, are exercised by deconcentrated territorial offices of central administrative bodies 2. Other responsibilities, mostly those of general state administration, are carried out via local and regional governments to whom the state has delegated such tasks by legal acts. These latter functions are termed transferred responsibilities.

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This arrangement – the integrated or fused model of territorial public administration – has a tradition in the Czech Lands reaching back to the nineteenth century. In this chapter attention will be focused primarily on the municipal level of public administration The current system and territorial structure of Czech sub-national government described here is, however, the outcome of a combination of factors in addition to historical traditions. One such factor was the spontaneous ‘revolutionary’ change that followed the demise of the communist regime, dismantling its least acceptable heritage. Another factor was a comprehensive public administration reform implemented stepwise between 1990 and 2003, whereas the third factor was the persistent influence of the country’s settlement system and its ingrained tradition of public administration (cf. Illner 2003a, 2003b). Because of their importance in explaining recent territorial choice in the Czech Republic, the structural factors and historical antecedents will be briefly discussed in the following section.

Reforms of the territorial structure during the communist rule The settlement structure of the Czech Republic is distinguished by its ancient roots, continuity and relative stability. The contemporary network of cities, towns and villages had already taken shape in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and was stabilized in the seventeenth century. The structure is dense, consisting of a large number of villages, townships and small towns but relatively few middle size and large cities. Until the second half of the nineteenth century the number of communities, irrespective of their administrative status, remained relatively stable with roughly 16,000 in all. But in the last decades of the nineteenth century and before World War I, a period of rapid urbanization, the number declined by about one-third due mostly to incorporation of originally independent smaller municipalities into growing urban centres. The fragmented settlement structure was accompanied by a fragmented structure of local authorities: even very small villages usually had their own elected mayor. Administrative amalgamations did take place, but not on a larger scale. As late as 1950 the number of local authorities still exceeded 10,000 in a country with 8.9 million inhabitants at that time (see Table 12.2). Along with the fragmented settlement network, the rural population has traditionally had a strong attachment to the places where they live,

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Table 12.2 Number of municipalities in the Czech Lands, 1921–2007 Year 1921 1930 1950 1961 1970 1980 1989 1991 1996 2001 2007

Number of municipalities 11,436 11,796 10,877 7,557 7,308 4,571 4,120 6,097 6,233 6,248 6,249

Sources: Czech Statistical Office (2006:34) for 1921–80, 1991, 2001; Czech Statistical Office (1989:97) for 1989; Czech Statistical Office (1996:51) and Czech Statistical Office (2008b:62–3) for 2007

no matter how small they were, and has insisted on self-administration. This was why the fragmented local government structure persisted well into the mid-twentieth century, until the communist regime undertook to reform it. And 50 years on, after that regime had collapsed, the same factors contributed to a swift decomposition of the consolidated municipal structure it had created. In the years following its assumption of power in 1948, the communist regime embarked on a profound revamping of both the system and territorial structure of sub-national government. The aim of the reforms was to consolidate the new regime not only nationally, but also at the lower territorial echelons of the system. Structural changes had to facilitate displacement of the locally embedded non-communist political and administrative elites and to open space for the creation of new loyal elites. The first step came already in 1949 with a reform at the regional level and, somewhat later, at the district level – the tiers most important from the perspective of power politics. The hitherto existing division of the country into two lands was abolished, together with the land authorities, and was replaced by a system of 19 regions. A number of new districts were also created, while other ones were abolished. Then in 1950 a systemic reform of municipal government followed. Four categories of local authorities were distinguished according to the population size of the respective places, the distinction having implications for the structure and internal functioning of local administration.

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At this stage, however, there was no radical change in the territorial structure of local government. During the next 17 years three more reforms of local government took place (in 1954, 1960 and 1967), each accompanied by a new law on local government. The first one, undertaken in 1954, was less substantial, driven more by the need to tune up the functioning and the internal system of sub-national administration than by power politics. This reform introduced a distinction between urban and non-urban (‘local’) authorities and reorganized again their internal administration. The reform of 1960, on the other hand, was part of a more fundamental reform package targeting the whole system of sub-national public administration. The territorial structure of both the regional, district and local tiers was radically overhauled, competencies were extended and the internal structure of local government was modified. A law was passed that redefined the political function of local administration, extended its responsibilities and changed its internal structure. The aim of the reform was to enhance the efficiency of territorial administration by, among other things, extending its powers, but it also explicitly stipulated in the law the mantra of the communist political system – namely the ‘leading role of the Communist Party’ within sub-national government. The last of the three reforms, which was enacted in 1967, shortly before the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, reflected in its spirit the relatively liberal atmosphere of that time. It introduced some moderately democratic elements into the system of sub-national government, redefined and extended its competencies, and made a number of other systemic changes. As noted by Janák et al. (2005:451), the principles of this reform, although amended 11 times, lasted until 1990 when the soviet type sub-national government was finally abolished. The high frequency of reforms of sub-national government – six of them within the 42 years between 1948 and 1989, suggests how difficult it was for the communist regime to find a proper way of institutionalizing its administrative power on the sub-national level. The reforms also reflected the changing face, if not nature, of the regime – stern, aggressive and ideological in the 1940s and 1950s, more friendly in the 1960s, and pragmatic in the 1970s and 1980s. Beside such systemic changes, and as part of them, territorial restructuring of local government also took place: in the 20-year period from 1950 to 1970 the number of local authorities decreased by 33 per cent (see Table 12.2). Until 1960 the decline was not caused by any explicit policy aiming to consolidate local government structures. When amalgamations happened, they were rather the consequence of incremental

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changes of the settlement structure to which several factors contributed – depopulation of small rural communities in peripheral regions that were no more able to sustain their own local government, spatial expansion of cities engulfing settlements in their vicinity, strategic decisions of some municipalities to merge in expectation of developmental benefits and, last but not least, informal political pressure by the fundamentally centralistic regime for which it was easier to control a small number of larger municipalities than a large number of small ones. Massive, centrally orchestrated waves of amalgamation of municipalities that radically changed the territorial structure of local government took place in 1960 and then again in the 1970s. In 1960, as part of the above-mentioned systemic overhaul of sub-national administration, almost 20 per cent of all municipalities existing at that time were abolished at the stroke of a pen and were administratively merged with their larger neighbours (Mleziva 1997). Eleven years later, in 1971, another large-scale consolidation of local government structure was launched in connection with a campaign aiming to implement the ‘central places based settlement system’.3 The stated aim of the campaign was to simplify and stratify the country’s settlement structure and also the territorial structure of local government. All settlements were divided into five categories according to their present and intended importance within the country’s settlement structure. Depending on that, the expected scope of their further development as well as their status within the system of territorial administration was determined. A network of central settlements was deemed to constitute a backbone of the country’s settlement structure and, by implication, also of the local administration. Population growth, housing construction, economic development, services and infrastructure had to be concentrated and further developed predominantly in the central settlements where services were also to be provided for those living outside. The categorization of settlements was used by the central authorities as a pretext for initiating a campaign of administrative mergers of rural municipalities, many of them involuntary. Hence between 1970 and 1980 the number of municipalities was reduced by 38 per cent (Table 12.2). Some of the reasons motivating this reform effort – economic and administrative efficiency – were substantiated. But in addition to such legitimate reasons, the reform was also an expression of the centralism inherent to the authoritarian regime and was partly driven by the aim to facilitate better political control and easier supervision of the countryside. In retrospect, the reform was a failure. Primarily two factors discredited it, undermining its legitimacy. First, the rigid, schematic and often

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insufficiently substantiated division of rural settlements into three categories – the central, permanent and other places – carried with it implications for their developmental chances and administrative identity. The categorization was based predominantly on the size of these settlements, without sufficient knowledge of the local situation and without taking account of a less visible, spontaneous, socially and culturally anchored developmental potential. Often viable communities were stripped of their administrative independence. The other discrediting factor was the bureaucratic, authoritarian, top-down method of implementation. Amalgamation antagonized those communities that lost their administrative independence due to the reform and became just ‘local parts’ of the new integrated units. As noted by Musil (2001:266–9), during the 1980s the blueprint of the central places-based settlement system gradually lost its regulative function in spatial planning and references to it disappeared from official documents. But the damage it caused to the territorial structure of local government had been done and had to be repaid dearly in the years to come. The negative experience of the forced top-down amalgamations of local government created an effective antidote against future efforts to reopen the consolidation issue from above. It still matters many years later, long after the demise of the communist regime, when fragmentation of local government started to be questioned.4

Fragmentation of local government after 1989 The fall of the communist regime in late 1989 was followed by a wave of reforms along with spontaneous activities intending to remedy the real or perceived damages it had inflicted. The most urgent tasks regarding sub-national government were the abolition of the Soviet-type system of local and regional administration, democratization and de-etatization of local government, and restoration of local self-administration. This partial reform was accomplished by a series of legislative measures beginning in 1990 and continuing during the following years until the end of 2002, when the architecture of the new system was more-or-less completed. The first and probably most important step within this long reform process was the 1990 Act on Municipalities, which laid down the foundations of the new democratic local government system. Although the law did not pay specific attention to the territorial structure of local government, it nevertheless responded to spontaneous bottom-up demands calling for its revision, particularly for the dissolution of central municipalities, which had been artificially created during the forced amalgamations

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of the 1960–80 period. Such demands were raised by the Association of Towns and Municipalities as well as by representatives of individual local governments and were also supported by all democratic political parties and movements. A liberal clause that made it relatively easy for ‘local parts’ of the existing central municipalities to secede and become independent was incorporated in the 1990 Act.5 The law that incorporated this measure, as well as further decentralization of public administration, was accepted by all democratic political forces of that time. As a result, an unexpected, surprisingly massive avalanche of spontaneous splits of municipalities was set in motion, most of them taking place even before the Act that legalized and regulated the procedure of separation became effective in late 1990. In that year alone 1,684 new municipalities were established by splitting away from existing ones. This process of fragmentation continued at a declining rate until 2001 when it finally came to a standstill: 337 new municipalities were established in 1992, 104 in 1993 and 36 in 1994, after which from 1994 until 2001, the annual number of secessions did not exceed 15. By the end of 1995, 2,168 new municipalities had come into existence, having separated from 1,032 municipalities. The territorial changes were indeed massive: they involved about one-quarter of all municipalities that had existed in 1989, prior to the ‘velvet revolution’ (Vajdová and Cˇermák 2006a:27). After 2001 the total number of municipalities stabilized at about 6,240 with only slight oscillations around this figure since then. Although no representative survey is available regarding the motives that drove the separation, indirect data suggest that its main aim was indeed one of undoing earlier forced amalgamations and regaining administrative autonomy by the formerly abolished municipalities in rural areas. An overwhelming majority of the new municipalities were small communities; about half of them had fewer than 200 inhabitants and 99 per cent fewer than 2,000 inhabitants (Vajdová and Cˇermák, 2006a:32, Table 2.5). Other potential motives of separation were an expectation of economic gain, a desire to escape discrimination which the seceding communities had experienced within the central villages of which they had been parts, locally specific personal tensions and traditional antipathies between neighbouring villages. Also, one of the reasons for amalgamation of rural communities during the communist period – adjustment of the territorial structure of local administration with the territorial organization of agricultural cooperatives – lost its relevance after 1989 as the majority of the cooperatives broke down or were privatized.

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As a consequence of the process of fragmentation, both the total number and the size structure of municipalities have changed profoundly. While in 1989, prior to the collapse of the communist regime, 4,120 municipalities existed in the Czech Republic, their number jumped to 6,232 in 1995 – a 51 per cent increase (see Table 12.2). However, the pre-1971 level of fragmentation (not to speak of the still much higher pre-1960 level) has never been restored. It is estimated that as of 2007 a municipality consists on the average of 2.5 separate local parts which, in rural areas, will usually be separate villages. Table 12.1 presented earlier reveals the resulting size structure of municipalities. As of 2004 the average population size of a municipality was 1,653 inhabitants and the median size 382 inhabitants. Not only did one-half of all municipalities have fewer than 382 inhabitants, nearly 80 per cent were very small places with populations below 1,000, and 57 per cent below 500.

The adverse side of fragmentation and the state’s efforts to cope with it In the first years after the revolution the redress of the previously forced amalgamations and the separation of communities that did not want to remain coupled with their larger neighbours was viewed positively as a manifestation of local democracy and part and parcel of the post-communist transformation. The situation created opportunities for the manifestation of local interests and local identity. Dissolution of the composite municipalities was just one element in a general process of dismantling the prior regime’s institutional structures. Many other institutions – political, administrative, economic, and social – were also modified at the same time. As it turned out, not all outcomes of this process were positive. It took some five years, until the mid-1990s as experience with functioning of the small rural municipalities began to accumulate, for the adverse consequences of the fragmented territorial structure to become visible and to attract criticism.6 By that time the post-1989 drive for democratization of local government that had originally legitimated the fragmentation had already been more-or-less exhausted. The primary causes of concern over the fragmented structure of local government were with respect to economic sustainabilty, the administrative efficiency of small municipalities and the quality of their financial management (Government of the Czech Republic 1994). A particular source of concern was instances of incompetent execution

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of transferred responsibilities by small municipalities. Other warning signals were cases of indebtedness of small municipalities, incompetent management of their financial assets, the passage of unlawful by-laws, and the need to repeat local elections in small municipalities that were unable to sustain the minimum size of their local councils. It was also mentioned that small municipalities were not strong enough to provide good living conditions for their inhabitants who are thus handicapped in comparison with larger places and tend to migrate to cities leading to depopulation of the countryside in peripheral regions (Ministry of the Interior 2005). From the mid-1990s dissatisfaction with the adverse impacts of the fragmented local government structure and an unspecified intention to do something about it was a perspective shared by relevant national-level political actors regardless of their political colour. Technical arguments were supplied mainly by the ministries of finance and of the interior, and also by the District (and later the Regional) Offices whose duty it was to supervise the legality of local government activities. The arguments were much the same as those used to support amalgamation in West European countries and in the US in the 1990s. Of the six arguments supporting larger local governments mentioned by Keating (1995) on the relationship between size of local government, efficiency and democracy, five are more-or-less identical with those used in favour of amalgamation in the Czech Republic: economy of scale, better provision of services, distributional equity, local economic development and strengthening of local democracy. Small municipalities were often said to be economically untenable, politically unstable and unable to discharge their responsibilities competently, particularly those regarding the provision of services. Despite consensus among national politicians in their assessment of the situation, they differed in their views on how to respond to these issues. They were aware of the fact that it would be politically risky to infringe upon the autonomy of small municipalities for whom independence was a cherished outcome of the velvet revolution. The Christian Democrats, for whom a large part of their electoral support is drawn from the countryside, the Greens and also the Communists, were not inclined to support any intervention. The attitude of the Social Democrats, on the other hand, was ambivalent, while the centre-right Civic Democratic Party, with its mostly urban electorate, was inclined to support some form of consolidation.7 In general, however, the issues concerning local government were given low priority on the national political agenda of the late 1990s. Major attention was rather concentrated upon the much more salient

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and divisive issue of intermediary (regional) territorial government, an institution more relevant for the distribution of political power in the country than local authorities (Illner 2003a:76–9).8 Municipalities themselves enjoyed their autonomy and were not willing to give it away or to accept its reduction. They complained about insufficient financing and the bureaucratic nature of the state administration, but in spite of the problems that the small municipalities apparently faced, the fragmented structure of local government remained fairly stable.9 Of the 2,199 communities that became independent after 1989, by 2003 only 18 had abandoned their autonomy and merged again with other municipalities. One-half of these merged with municipalities from which they had earlier separated, the other half with different partners (Vajdová and Cˇermák 2006a:36). For its part, the influential Association of Towns and Municipalities was only willing to accept voluntary changes of the territorial structure of local government that would not infringe on the autonomy and the independent responsibilities of small municipalities. This political space facilitated passage of two amendments to the law on municipalities that tightened the rules applying to separation. The 2000 amendment stipulated that for a split to be permitted a local part intending to break away from an existing municipality as well as the municipality from which it wanted to separate must each have at least 1,000 inhabitants after the separation. Separation, moreover, must be approved by citizens of the local part which intends to separate in a local referendum and the final decision permitting separation belongs to the Regional Office. For all practical purposes these rules stopped the process of fragmentation, which had in any case more-or-less run its course by the mid-1990s.10 Another amendment made it easier for municipalities to merge voluntarily or to associate on a temporary or more permanent basis in order to carry out joint projects. While mergers rarely occurred, the possibility to associate has been used by Czech municipalities on a large scale. Further fragmentation of local government has thus been prevented but the problem of effectiveness of the already existing small local governments was not tackled by the above measures. Reintroduction of the policy of mandatory mergers (discredited by the forced amalgamations of the 1970s) was out of question, just as it was unconceivable for political reasons to reduce the scope of independent responsibilities of the selfadministering municipalities – the core accomplishment of the post-1989 democratization, or to differentiate municipalities according the extent of such responsibilities. Such measures would violate the constitutional

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principle that all self-administering communities, irrespective of their size and urban or rural character, should be equal in terms of their institutional structure, rights and responsibilities. What was feasible without infringing upon the Constitution, however, was to differentiate between municipalities according to the extent of their transferred responsibilities – the tasks of state administration the execution of which had been delegated to the municipalities by law and which they were obliged to execute on behalf of the state. Such differentiation would allow the state to entrust the more demanding tasks to large urban municipalities to execute on behalf of smaller local governments in their vicinity. A reform implementing such measures took place in 2003. Depending on their population size, centrality and geographical location, all municipalities were divided into three nested categories: 1. Municipalities of the first type. These municipalities are entrusted with none or just the basic transferred responsibilities, executing them only within their own administrative territory. Small municipalities, usually in rural areas, involving the overwhelming majority of the existing local governments, belong to this category. 2. Municipalities of the second type (Municipalities with commissioned municipal offices). This category consists of 392 urban municipalities whose municipal offices were entrusted with the execution of a number of delegated powers also in the surrounding territories (responsibilities such as the distribution of some social welfare benefits, distribution of financial support to persons who suffered from natural disasters, administrative and organizational responsibilities during local, regional, parliamentary and European elections and so forth). 3. Municipalities of the third type (Municipalities with extended powers). This category consists of 205 urban municipalities whose municipal offices enjoy a still wider range of transferred responsibilities, discharging them in larger surrounding administrative areas (‘the small districts’). This category was established in large part to take over some of the administrative powers previously executed by the District Offices – the deconcentrated territorial outposts of state administration which were abolished at the end of 2002. Again a wide variety of responsibilities was concerned – responsibilities such as maintaining registers of births, marriages and deaths, issuing identity cards and passports, managing lists of drivers licences, registering road vehicles, deciding on some issues concerning public roads, managing crises situations, administering some social welfare programmes and executing some state administrative tasks in the sphere of education.

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As mentioned by Valeš (2006:89–90) and other observers, although underpinned by neutral geographical analyses, the process of selecting these 205 urban municipalities to be endowed with extended transferred responsibilities and thus, indirectly, with a perspective of preferential development as well as with a prestigious position and influence within the surrounding regions was highly competitive and influenced by intensive lobbying. Historical animosities often surfaced and arguments referring to real or imagined old injustices that should now be remedied were sometimes mentioned by the representatives of these cities. The dispute followed the territorial structure of parliament more than its composition according to political parties. The fiercest battle took place in the Senate as senators, who are elected in single mandate districts, have closer links to concrete territories, their electorates and to municipal politicians than do the deputies. As a result of this reform, a hierarchical three-layer structure of local authorities was established. This vertical differentiation of local authorities depending on the scope of their delegated tasks and the concomitant differentiation of their administrative territories contrasts with their undifferentiated status as regards their independent powers. The reform thus challenged the integrated model of local government and created a complicated, intrinsically unstable institutional and territorial arrangement. In 2004, to cope with this situation, the Ministry of the Interior announced a plan to apply a similar reform to the independent competencies of local government – a sphere that had so far been considered ‘untouchable’. Principles of a potential bill amending the Law on Municipalities were put forth according to which municipalities would be actively motivated by the state, mainly by financial stimuli, to voluntarily associate, establishing what were termed Communities of municipalities.11 The idea was that the Communities would then take over and perform some of the independent responsibilities of member municipalities. Under the proposal, the structure and competencies of the Communities will be regulated by the Law on Municipalities (which must be amended for this purpose). As proposed the Communities will be obliged to adopt a prescribed organizational structure, accept obligatory responsibilities and rules of operation as well as a standard territorial format whereby their territories will have to be compatible (though not necessarily identical) with those of the third type municipalities. The proposal reckoned that financial stimuli, which will be offered to the Communities by the state, will strongly motivate municipalities to associate. The French system of inter-communal cooperation was explicitly

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mentioned as the inspiration of this project (Ministry of the Interior 2005; Vidláková 2007). If it materializes, the semi-voluntary Communities of municipalities would be a major revision of the municipal system introduced in 1990 and could become a ‘Trojan horse’ leading to a de facto stepwise amalgamation of smaller municipalities into larger, self-administering communities. This would not only undo the post-1989 fragmentation, but would also lead to a massive consolidation of municipalities. At present, however, further steps towards establishing a legal foundation for this project have not been taken. Reservations to the proposal were expressed by the Association of Towns and Municipalities and these reservations appear to have contributed to the delay in further action.

Bottom-up networking – a potential solution?12 Whereas the state sponsored project of Communities of municipalities has yet to bear fruit, another mechanism facilitating the cooperation of municipalities and helping them to overcome the handicaps of fragmentation has been in full swing for at least ten years. This mechanism is based on the existing Law on Municipalities. From the outset in 1990, the first Czech Law on Municipalities stipulated that municipalities have the right to enter into cooperative arrangements with a view to protect and promote their joint interests. In 2000 the new law elaborated this right, stating that municipalities are authorized to establish Unions of Municipalities intent on cooperation in the sphere of their independent responsibilities. The law elaborated the process of voluntary, bottom-up clustering of municipalities and specified the rules regulating the structure and mode of operation of the Unions of Municipalities. A wide range of interests may be promoted in this way. The law mentions the spheres of education, health service, social welfare, culture, fire protection, public order, protection of the environment, tourist traffic, waste disposal, water provision, construction of sewer systems and several other matters. A union has to be constituted by an agreement signed by the member municipalities. Such a union is considered a legal person administered by its own organs, and has its own by-laws, property and budget. Membership is voluntary: it is up to the individual municipalities to decide if they wish to join a union or, perhaps, several unions (multiple memberships are permitted). Furthermore, municipalities can join already existing unions. For the territories of the individual unions the term ‘micro-region’ has been coined and nowadays micro-regions

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are scattered across the entire map of the Czech Republic, covering twothirds of the country’s area (Ministry of the Interior 2005). Clustering of municipalities into Unions of Municipalities, which started in the 1990s, almost parallel to the fragmentation of municipalities, was most intensive around 2000 and has continued with decreasing intensity until the present time. According to the Ministry of the Interior 474 Unions of Municipalities involving 4,680 municipalities were registered in 2005, that is, more than 70 per cent of the total number of municipalities existing in the country at the time. On the average, a union embraced 11 member municipalities with 13,300 inhabitants. The smallest among the unions had just two member municipalities, the largest one 247 municipalities. It was mostly the smaller municipalities that sought membership in the unions, but also a number of towns can be found among the members.13 A survey of the unions carried out in 2004–05 by Vajdová and Cˇermák (2006b) revealed that municipalities joined forces most often in the areas of regional development, tourism and the protection of environment.14 With somewhat less frequency they also cooperated in the development of social infrastructure and the construction of power networks, in transborder cooperation, water provision, transport and waste disposal. The survey has also shown that an important motive of regional cooperation was to join forces in the drafting, submission and implementation of projects to be financed from the European regional programmes. According to Vajdová and Cˇermák (2006b:65), the unions are, along with municipal self-administration, another form of political organization of local communities emerging after 1989. Municipalities appreciate its flexibility, its voluntary character and the fact that by entering the unions they do not have to sacrifice any of their independent powers. The main handicap of the unions is a scarcity of financial means available to support their activities. Although legitimate recipients of potential financial support from different sources, most unions have to rely on the membership fees contributed by the member municipalities. Inasmuch as most members are small places with small budgets, this source is usually modest, allowing support for only small developmental projects or no projects at all (Vajdová and Cˇermák 2006b:64). No scheme exists that would make it possible to finance their projects from the state budget.

Assessment and conclusions The present territorial structure of local government in the Czech Republic is the outcome of two processes. First, it is an unintended

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by-product of a comprehensive reform that has entirely overhauled the system of sub-national public administration inherited from the defunct communist regime in 1989. Starting in 1990, this reconstruction continued until 2003, when its main objectives were realized. The reform dealt primarily with the system of local government and was not intended to change its territorial structure. While neutral with respect to the territorial structure of local authorities, the reform, by enabling easy splits of the existing municipalities, opened up for a surge of spontaneous fragmentation – an unplanned yet tolerated process that deeply reshaped the territorial structure of local authorities. Within a year the map of municipal governments had changed entirely and an extremely fragmented structure has emerged, bringing the network of local authorities nearer to the country’s settlement structure. This deconstruction of larger, mostly rural municipalities, which had been created in the 1970s by the old regime, was acknowledged as a legitimate component of the country’s process of democratization and was accepted by all democratic political parties.15 It also enjoyed strong support from the Association of Towns and Municipalities. Few political conflicts accompanied the disintegration at the national scale, whereas many occurred at the local level – conflicts between the communes that decided to break away and those from which they intended to separate. Because of its spontaneity, bottom-up character and absence of design it seems a misnomer to call this territorial change a reform. More appropriately, it can be considered an uncontrolled revolutionary change. Beginning in the second half of the 1990s, another process that shaped the present territorial structure of local government started to unfold. As experience with the functioning of the small rural municipalities accumulated, adverse features of the fragmented territorial structure of local government became visible and started attracting criticism. By this time the drive for democratization of local government, which had legitimated the fragmentation, had already been more-or-less exhausted and criteria of the economic sustainability, administrative efficiency and quality of financial management of local authorities came to the fore. It was, in the first place, the central government (irrespective of political colour), and particularly the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance, that expressed their worries most loudly. Approaches to solving the problem were sought without touching the primary taboo – the autonomy of even the smallest municipalities. Instead, at the turn of the century a three-pronged policy was chosen by the government to attack this problem: (1) prevention of further

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splits of municipalities; (2) encouragement of amalgamation and (3) concentration of the transferred responsibilities of local authorities into the hands of just a limited number of urban municipal offices. The objective of this partial reform was to increase economic and administrative efficiency of the sub-national state administration without restricting the autonomy of local government. The reform was implemented in two steps – in 2000 measures intended to prevent further splits of municipalities and facilitate their mergers were introduced, followed in 2003 by the stratification of municipalities according to the extent of their transferred responsibilities. Numerous conflicts at both the central and local levels accompanied the latter step. They mainly concerned the selection of towns and cities that were to become the administrative centres and the delimitation of their administrative areas. The fault-lines were not of a partisan political character; conflicts were rather between regionally and locally defined pressure groups. While the sub-national state administration has been consolidated by the above changes, the local authorities were on the alert, guarding their autonomy. This, however, did not prevent them from networking voluntarily and from joining forces with the intention of jointly carrying out projects of common interest. The strictly bottom-up region cooperation institutionalized in the Unions of Municipalities became a widespread form of functional integration of municipalities without encroaching upon their autonomy. Parallel to this development, the state has started to design a project with the intention of stimulating by financial and other means the formation of semi-voluntary Communities of municipalities whose members would delegate their independent powers to supra-local bodies. These two ways of overcoming the fragmentation of municipalities, one strictly bottom-up, the other using powerful top-down levers, each supported by a different lobby, can hardly coexist. The near future will therefore be instructive in terms of territorial choice for the Czech Republic.

Notes This paper received support within the framework of the Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport’s project no. 2D06006, ‘Partnership and Participation in Local Public Administration: Relevance, Practice, Promise’. 1. Law No. 128/2000 Coll., on municipalities (municipal system) and Law No. 129/2000 Coll., on regions (regional system). The law on municipalities replaced earlier legislation that had already introduced democratic local government in the autumn of 1990.

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2. To qualify as urban, a muncipality must have at least 3,000 inhabitants and meet further qualitative requirements. However, municipalities that already held urban status when the Law on Municipalities took effect are considered urban irrespective of their population size and other criteria. 3. The concept of the central places-based settlement system (first descriptive and later also prescriptive) originally proposed by Christaller (1933), suited the centralistic and manipulative ethos of the regime. 4. Just as after 1989, drafting the territorial structure reforms was also a political process of contestation in the communist era. Changing municipal boundaries, merging of municipalities, categorizing them into hierarchical levels – this all touched upon fundamental local and regional interests most vocally represented and defended by the respective Communist Party bodies and functionaries, by local and regional politicians, and by the majority of party members. But in contrast to the democratic system, the conflicts were processed and settled behind closed doors, inside the ruling establishment, and the public was only informed about the final decisions. This situation makes a retrospective tracing of the hidden decision-making processes that took place in that era difficult and demanding. 5. A municipality could split into one or more municipalities. To do so a proposal had to be submitted to the Ministry of the Interior on the basis of a local referendum. The Ministry was only permitted to reject the proposal if it was possible to prove that the new municipalities resulting from a split would be unable to fulfil their tasks as specified by the Law – an argument that could have been difficult to defend in the ‘revolutionary’ atmosphere of the 1990s. 6. The intention ‘to overcome the dysfunctional fragmentation of municipalities’ was mentioned in a programmatic declaration of the Government of the Czech Republic as early as September 1994 (Government of the Czech Republic 1994) and was reiterated in its Policy Statement of August 1998 (Government of the Czech Republic 1998). 7. The political parties mentioned constituted 94 per cent of the votes in the parliament’s Chamber of the Deputies after the 2006 parliamentary elections. The strongest in terms of electoral support was the Civic Democratic Party (35.4 per cent), followed by the Social Democratic Party (32.3 per cent), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (12.8 per cent), the Christian Democrats (7.2 per cent), and the Greens (6.3 per cent). The picture was different on the municipal level where, in the 2006 local elections, the largest number of votes (84.5 per cent) were cast in favour of candidates without party affiliation. 8. From 1993 to 2000 Czech politicians were unable to agree on the establishment of the ‘Higher level territorial self-administrative units’ – the regions – whose existence had been anchored in the Constitution of the Republic as early as 2002 but, due to lasting controversies between the political parties on this issue and to the ambivalence of the general public, did not materialize until seven years later. 9. The central government’s tax policy punished small local governments by allocating them substantially smaller per capita share of the redistributed tax revenues than to large municipalities.

Michal Illner 233 10. Only seven new municipalities were established by separation in 2000, before the amendment became effective (Vajdová and Cˇermák 2006b:28). 11. A Working Group for the problems of small municipalities including representatives of the Association of Towns and Municipalities, of the Association for the Renovation of Rural Areas, representation of regions, professional public and the Ministry of the Interior took part in preparing the proposal (Vidláková 2007). 12. The following section draws upon research done by Vajdová and Cˇermak on the cooperation of municipalities as an element of local democracy and as an effective instrument of self-government (see Vajdová et al. 2006). 13. Because of incomplete records, the statistics mentioned may not be highly reliable. 14. The survey covered 158 Unions, which had 2,345 member municipalities. 15. The 1990 Policy Statement of the then new Government of the Czech Republic devoted several paragraphs to stressing the political and social role of local communities, to the renewal of full self-administration of cities and municipalities and to the need to anchor local self-government by law. The following introductory sentences of the Policy Statement are illustrative: ‘In the spirit of our traditions, the issue of self-government is our Czech priority. We consider this issue even more important than the plurality of political parties’ (Government of the Czech Republic 1990:1).

13 A Comparative Analysis of Territorial Choice in Europe – Conclusions Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose

Choices about sub-national organization are inherently controversial. Such choices are about power-sharing in carving up a territory into smaller jurisdictions. Territorial choice may involve large choices, such as drawing up a federal constitution, or small ones such as minor adjustment of borders between two municipalities. Territorial choice may come in neat packages, such as a choice between amalgamating two or more municipalities into a consolidated unit or leaving things as they are. Sometimes choices are based on well-researched recommendations with easily grasped consequences. More often territorial choices are fuzzy affairs with numerous battlefronts and bewildering claims of benefits and pitfalls associated with the various options. Is a unitary urban authority better for a large conurbation than retaining a number of smaller jurisdictions? Better for whom, or for what purposes or functions? Perhaps a two-tier system is better for such an area, with a functional division between a larger unit and a series of smaller units? A choice between small or large local authorities may also hinge on a redistribution of functional responsibilities between state and local government: small units may mean less devolution, large units more devolution. And then there is the related issue of finances: how are jurisdictions to be delineated so that local authorities are financially viable? Territorial choice also impacts on political chances and careers. One way of carving up the territory may ensure the permanence of left-wing strongholds, another way of cutting the pie may yield right-wing bastions. The binding force of international treaties, from the EU to the WTO, adds further complications to territorial choice. State sovereignty is increasingly constrained, with concomitant constraints on power-sharing. No wonder these choices are controversial. 234


In this book we have studied territorial choice in 11 European countries. The focus is on the framing and choice of reform strategies, the reform coalitions and veto alliances that have emerged, and the conflicts that reforms and counter-proposals have engendered. Two observations of striking and somewhat puzzling contrasts served as our point of departure. The first had to do with the permanence of cross-country variations in terms of municipal size, with France and the UK representing the most obviously persisting contrasts, whereas convergence would be the natural expectation given the common pressures of globalization, Europeanization and fourth generation modernization facing all European countries. The second observation concerned the common struggle to rescale territorial government and governance seen in all the countries under study, while actual reform seemed easier to achieve and was carried through with less conflict in some countries than in other countries. Why was that? Outcomes also varied. Again, why? Figure 13.1 provides a summary of the analytical framework and research questions of the study introduced in Chapter 1. The overarching research questions were formulated in the following way: How are arguments relating to territorial reform proposals framed? What are the strategies chosen to achieve a better fit between the scale of governance and the scale of problems? And what are the factors that shape choices of strategies and the outcomes of these strategies? The arrows in Figure 13.1 indicate our ideas regarding the interaction of different elements in the process of territorial choice. The institutional setting is expected to influence the framing and choice of reform strategies, and also the pattern of conflict. The pattern of conflict is also influenced by reform strategies and related framing, while the interaction of the two elements will influence outcomes. The analytical framework represents a combination of Framing and choice of reform strategy Institutional context

Reform outcome

Pattern of conflict

Figure 13.1

Analytical framework: The context and process of territorial choice

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Comparing Territorial Choice in Europe – Conclusions

institutional and actor-oriented analysis. The actor-oriented focus is inherent above all in the framing and choice of reform strategies which opens up for studies of leadership – the role of policy entrepreneurs and veto coalitions – and the construction of windows of opportunity regarding territorial reform.

Outcomes of reform initiatives – towards a typology The classical problem of territorial choice is finding the right scale of government for pressing social and economic issues. Classical responses to larger or more complex issues have been consolidation or contracts – that is, either amalgamations or entering into formalized cooperation without changing jurisdictional borders. Analyses of the 11 countries presented here have clearly demonstrated that the classical dichotomy of choices – amalgamations or contracts – cannot capture the full range of choices actually made in these countries (cf. Table 13.1). Rather, five different types of outcomes of reform processes can be discerned: enlargement, networks, hosting arrangements, regionalization and deadlock. Type 1: Enlargement of unitary, general purpose municipalities Denmark, the UK and Greece exemplify this type of outcome most clearly. Finland and the Netherlands are also taking steps in the same direction. Greece cut the number of municipalities by 80 per cent in 1998 and Denmark reduced the number by roughly 65 per cent in 2007. In both cases the new municipalities were entrusted with more responsibilities than before. Finland threatens reluctant municipalities with loss of functions. In these cases amalgamations are presented as preconditions for functional enhancement or for keeping existing functional responsibilities. Although something of a special case, Germany also fits into this category. After unification in 1990 the West German model of local government was transferred wholesale to the East and was accompanied by a reduction in the number of municipalities (with 43 per cent to 3,292 communes by 2006). The history of local government reforms in the UK has been a series of waves of amalgamations, testifying to a belief in a ‘bigger is more beautiful’ philosophy. This belief was not seriously questioned until the Thatcher years when a distrust of local government set in, with local government being shorn of functions, some being handed over to special-purpose agencies (Quangos), others being discharged to partnerships of various types or independent bodies set up or run by ‘users’.

Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 237 Table 13.1

Outcomes of reform initiatives by country

Country

Outcome

•

Denmark

•

Finland

•

Sweden

•

Norway

•

UK

•

Netherlands

•

Germany

•

France

•

Italy

•

Greece

•

Czech Republic

Comprehensive municipal amalgamations 2007; quasi-abolition of regions 2007 Municipal amalgamations underway 2008; still no elected regions After regional experiments, comprehensive regional reform proposed 2007 (not yet implemented); debates on municipal structure discontinued Municipal amalgamations stalled 1995; nationalization of some local functions combined with a switch to inter-municipal solutions 2005; moderate regional reform 2008 Intermittent series of amalgamations since the 1960s; stop-go moves towards unitary authorities since 1990s; regional initiative for North England defeated Slow-moving incremental process of amalgamations since the 1960s. Cases: Twente municipal amalgamations implemented; Twente regional initiative failed Transformation of former GDR local government from 1991 to comply with West German pattern; comprehensive reduction in number of municipalities (similar to the reduction in West Germany ca. 1970) still ongoing Municipal amalgamations permanently blocked; inter-municipal structures spreading as substitutes; slow-moving regionalization since 1980s Municipal amalgamations permanently blocked; steps towards regionalization/federalization (second step failed in 2006); inter-municipal units of long-standing Extensive amalgamations; municipalities reduced by 80 per cent (1998) Post-communist fragmentation of municipalities and asymmetric distribution of functions/responsibilities; pre-EU accession regional reforms; inter-municipal bodies of cooperation emerge together with concentration of mandatory functions to larger municipalities; growing asymmetries

Interestingly, the reformers of the Thatcher years did not consider breaking up the large local authorities and forming smaller ones that might compete for taxpayers and business investments. The Blair government displayed somewhat more confidence in local government, but nonetheless continued the trajectory of enlargement of local government, with the unitary local authority as an objective, an objective that was only partially achieved.

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Type 2: Networks of inter-municipal special purpose cooperation When enlargement initiatives fail, enabling legislation to facilitate inter-municipal cooperation is often seen as a second-best solution. Cases that fall into this category include France, the Czech Republic, Germany and Norway, with France perhaps being the most obvious case. Amalgamation of its 36,000 communes has been given up since the attempt of 1973 failed. Instead a variety of legislation has been passed to enable cooperation across municipal borders. The outcome of events in the Czech Republic has many features in common with those of France, although the historical backgrounds of the respective cases are quite different. In the Czech case, local responses to the communist legacy of forced amalgamations grew into waves of dissolutions, resulting in a highly fragmented pattern of local government. Recognition of a problem of scale exists, but rather than insisting on forced amalgamations subsequent Czech governments have passed legislation to stimulate the establishment of joint bodies to discharge delegated state functions. A parallel, bottom-up development is also taking place, as municipalities establish voluntary bodies of cooperation for some local functions. In Norway, inter-municipal cooperation has been a long-standing practice among small municipalities. When given a choice between amalgamations and enhanced cooperation in surveys conducted by the Association of Local and Regional Authorities in 2004, moreover, most municipalities said that cooperation was preferable to amalgamation. Type 3: Hosting arrangements, or functional differentiation between municipalities Under this outcome some municipalities are allocated more functions and wider competencies than others. In some cases the extended competences may be performed by central municipalities on behalf of several smaller neighbours. This solution is most systematically elaborated in the Czech Republic, where it has been introduced in order to relieve smaller municipalities of their more demanding duties. A three-order municipal structure has emerged. Municipalities of the first order only perform basic local functions. Municipalities of the second order are responsible for delegated state functions, which are also performed for neighbouring municipalities. Finally, municipalities of the third order take over some of the functions performed by state district offices.


Through statements from the central government to the effect that smaller municipalities not willing to amalgamate or enter into contractual relations with neighbours might risk losing some of their traditional functions, this type of solution has also been aired in Finland. But so far it remains to be seen whether this threat will actually be put into practice. Type 4: Regionalization This outcome may occur in tandem with type 1 or type 2 outcomes, or without any connection to municipal reforms. Regional reforms have been put on the agenda in Italy, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Greece, France, the UK and Norway. While the Czech Republic and Greece established regions almost from scratch and clearly in response to Europeanization (for the effective dispensation of regional aid funds from the EU), regionalization in the other countries has occurred more as an attempt to manage national political tensions arising from increasingly self-conscious regional elites. Of course, such growing self-consciousness may well have been fuelled by developments often referred to by the slogan ‘Europe of the Regions’. Among the other countries Italy has become the most regionalized state. The referendum of 2001 was an important step in this direction. Had it been successful, the next referendum held in 2006 might have taken Italy towards a federation. As it turned out, the federal flame was extinguished, but Italy remains a state with strong regional features, yet small-scale municipalities. With regard to regions, the Swedish case is one of emerging asymmetrical structures. Two large regions with extended functions have been established in the south, while inter-municipal associations on a regional scale have been established in other parts of the country. These regional constructions have come about in a bottom-up fashion. A national commission has recommended enlargement of the remaining regions through amalgamations. Due to a somewhat reluctant central government, however, the process has not yet started in earnest, so the asymmetrical nature of regional reform in Sweden may become a more permanent feature. Under the Raffarin government France also started on a round of regionalization, adopting a constitutional amendment stating that France was a ‘one and indivisible republic with a decentralized organization’. An ambitious programme of decentralization experiments was launched, but after the Corsican ‘no’ to extended regional autonomy, the central push behind the reform seemed to slacken. Under the Sarkozy presidency regionalization is even less of a concern (Loughlin 2008).

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In Norway establishing stronger regions was likewise an important part of the agenda of the red-green coalition government taking office in 2005, as well as a demand by the Association of Local and Regional Authorities. In the face of lukewarm response from potential regional authorities and squabbling about appropriate regional functions within central government, however, the initiative petered out in 2008 with very moderate additions to the functional responsibilities of the existing county authorities. By comparison, as part of its drive for unitary local government, the UK government tried, in an experimental way, to introduce regional government to the North East of England. But the initiative was defeated in a popular referendum in 2004, after which central authorities seem to have lost interest in the idea of regions. Type 5: Deadlock and state takeover of local functions This outcome may occur when attempts at municipal amalgamations stall. Norway is the most clear-cut example of this outcome. Advocates of amalgamation were halted by a parliamentary vote stating that amalgamations should not be forced upon municipalities but rather come about solely through voluntary mergers. Since then, not surprisingly, few mergers have taken place. This meagre result is not for lack of trying. Central governments of various political composition have tried to stimulate municipalities to unite in many ways, but to little avail. Meanwhile, several functions (such as child protection and specialized hospital care) have been transferred from local or regional government to central government agencies. Reform outcomes – a summary As demonstrated by this brief review of outcomes, solutions to problems of scale are varied. We have classified outcomes in five categories. To this classification two further comments may be added. First, outcomes as solutions to problems of scale are not mutually exclusive and do not neatly follow country-specific lines; a country may demonstrate several of these features at the same time. In France, for example, regionalization and network developments are taking place as parallel trajectories. The same is happening in Greece. In the Czech Republic hosting arrangements have emerged alongside inter-municipal networks. Second, many of the countries show increasing tolerance of asymmetrical territorial governance structures; some authorities are enlarged or are endowed with wider competencies than others. This is evident, for example, in Italy and Sweden. By default England is likewise developing more differentiated structures


than Scotland and Wales. In the latter cases unitary local government has been introduced while England has been allowed to proceed with a mixture of unitary, district and county councils. Greece is also asymmetrical in the sense that the Athens and Thessalonika districts were largely exempted from the amalgamation reform of 1998. Czech hosting arrangements constitute a further example of asymmetrical local government. Figure 13.2 presents a simplified overview of outcomes in four categories organized according to the radicalism of the outcomes involved. The more comprehensively that territorial boundaries or divisions of powers have changed, the more radical the outcome is considered to be. The opposite end of the scale is reform by default. These are outcomes that seek to deal – often in an ad hoc fashion – with problems of scale in the absence of reform initiatives or that happen in the wake of failed reform initiatives. The growth of French and Czech inter-municipal arrangements belong to this category. Failed reforms are those that

Reform outcomes Default

Failed

Partial

Radical

Fr, Cz

It2, No1, UK2,

Sw, Nl1, UK1,

DK, Gr1, Gr2,

Nl2, No2

Fi, It1

Ge

Legend: Cz Dk Fi Fr Ge Gr1 Gr2 It1 It2 Nl1 Nl2 No1 No2 Sw UK1 UK2

Figure 13.2

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece (introduction of regions – 1990s) Greece (municipal amalgamations – 1998) Italy (referendum 2001) Italy (referendum 2006) Netherlands (First Twente amalgamation initiative) Netherlands (Second Twente amalgamation initiative) Norway (amalgamation initiatives 1990–2004) Norway (regionalization initiative 2005–08) Sweden UK (municipal enlargements 1990s) UK (regionalization initiative 2004)

Alternative reform outcomes

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have been defeated in parliamentary votes or referenda or have petered out without leaving many traces behind. Partial reforms are those that have been implemented in parts of the country or where parts of the changes intended by the reformers have been realized. The Dutch amalgamation initiative that was carried out has also been placed in this category: although not intended as a country-wide initiative, it ended up amalgamating only some of the municipalities originally considered for inclusion in the larger authority. This leaves us with four cases of radical reform: (1) the introduction of Greek regions; (2) the reduction by 80 per cent of Greek municipalities in 1998; (3) the Danish municipal enlargements of 2007 and (4) the total restructuring of local government in former East Germany. To simplify the analysis of outcomes even further we have classified outcomes into two main types – ‘upscaling’ and ‘trans-scaling’ respectively. As indicated in Chapter 1, the term ‘upscaling’ refers to reforms that result in the emergence of larger territorial units such as the amalgamation of municipalities or the introduction of regions or amalgamation of regions. ‘Trans-scaling’, by comparison, denotes developments that result in increased or enhanced cooperation across municipal or regional borders. These are developments that occur mainly to compensate for presumed disadvantages of small size. The Czech and French cases are examples of this category.1 Combining the two dimensions yields the classificatory scheme displayed in Figure 13.3, into which 16 cases of territorial reform efforts described in this volume have been placed. The main issue emerging out of the pattern identified in Figure 13.3 is why have some rescaling reform initiatives resulted in upscaling of local government, partially or radically, while other initiatives have failed or have settled for trans-scaling types of solutions? In the following we address this issue through a backwards mapping procedure, by analyzing the processes leading up to the respective outcomes, and then by relating these processes to the relevant institutional contexts.

Framing reforms: Motivation and arguments Framing is about finding a line of argumentation that will open up a window of opportunity for reform. In our sample of countries efficiency is the argument most frequently employed (see Table 13.2). Small municipalities are claimed to lack the capacities needed for efficient service provision of the quality demanded by citizens of modern societies. Democratization is a secondary argument sometimes invoked in favour

Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 243 Up-scaling

Radicalism of change (default)

No1, No2, It2, Nl2, UK2

Fi, UK1, Nl1, Sw, It1

Dk, Ge Gr1, Gr2

(failed)

(partial)

(radical)

Fr, Cz Trans-scaling Legend: Cz Dk Fi Fr Ge Gr1 Gr2 It1 It2 Nl1 Nl2 No1 No2 Sw UK1 UK2

Figure 13.3

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece (introduction of regions – 1990s) Greece (municipal amalgamations – 1998) Italy (referendum 2001) Italy (referendum 2006) Netherlands (First Twente amalgamation initiative) Netherlands (Second Twente amalgamation initiative) Norway (amalgamation initiatives 1990–2004) Norway (regionalization initiative 2005–08) Sweden UK (municipal enlargements 1990s) UK (regionalization initiative 2004)

Outcomes of territorial reform initiatives: 16 cases

of enlargement insofar as enlargement is presumed to allow more functions to be allocated to local authorities, thus bringing further spheres of government activity under citizen control through their elected representatives. However, arguments regarding democratic considerations are mostly advocated by opponents of enlargement, actors who extol the virtues of proximity offered by small municipalities. The need to preserve tradition and identity is also argued mostly by opponents of territorial reforms. Arguments that present small municipalities as more responsive to citizen demands than their larger counterparts, on the other hand, are conspicuously absent. Apparently, neither opponents nor proponents of reform believe in the benign impacts of citizens voting with their feet, as suggested by rational choice theories (cf. Tiebout 1956). Europeanization and the need to build structures to utilize European regional funds efficiently, by comparison, is invoked, mostly by those in favour of

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Table 13.2

Framing of reforms by country

Country

Key aspects of framing

•

Denmark

• •

Finland Sweden

•

Norway

• • •

UK Netherlands Germany

•

France

•

Italy

•

Greece

•

Czech Republic

Amalgamations: modernization (capacity); concern over democracy secondary and sidelined by research findings Municipal amalgamations: efficiency Municipal structure: concern over welfare provisions For regional enlargement: developmental capacity plus health and welfare service delivery Against regional enlargement: bureaucratic, superfluous For municipal amalgamations: efficiency and quality of service provision Against amalgamations: democracy, identity, doubts regarding efficiency gains For regional enlargement: developmental capacity Efficiency Efficiency Stabilize democracy; viable units of service provision; good governance model from West Germany Defence of small municipalities: traditions, identity, proximity (1970s) Regions: developmental capacity driven by Europeanization (2001) Modernization (become ‘normal’ country) Municipal amalgamations: efficiency driven by Europeanization Memories of forced amalgamations during the communist period make governments tread cautiously with regard to initiating amalgamations, although weak capacity of many small municipalities is recognized by central and local actors

establishing stronger regions. The need to stimulate entrepreneurship and economic innovation in a more competitive international climate is a related line of argument in this regard. The overall impression of the framing of the reform initiatives considered in our cases is that there is no close relationship between choice of frames and reform contents or contexts. A particular frame may be coupled to a variety of situations and reform types. The two most radical enlargement cases in our sample, Denmark and Greece, for example, were both framed in terms of efficiency concerns. The Danish initiative was presented as a road to modernization of the whole country (‘The New Denmark’). Why there suddenly was a modernization gap remained obscure, however. Democratic concerns over the possible negative consequences of larger municipalities were sidelined by


research findings that could not identify any clear relationships between size and local democracy. In the Greek case, by contrast, the demands of Europeanization were grasped by reformers as reasons to call for more efficient regional and municipal structures. Opponents of the Greek reforms tried to stem enlargement with calls for safeguards of identity and tradition, but lost out. The German outcome was also one of enlargement, although here the ensuing municipalities were on average of a smaller size than those of Greece and Denmark, and the principal motivation was of a different character – namely the creation of a more uniform system of local government. The German outcome, moreover, was in this sense more radical inasmuch as it transferred and established a completely different model of local government in the former territory of East Germany. British territorial reforms have also been driven above all by efficiency considerations (excepting Scottish and Welsh devolution). This case suggests that the quest for efficiency can be open-ended and so too the process of enlargement based on such considerations. The UK was already a country with the largest municipalities in Europe, yet still another round of enlargement was launched in search of efficiency in the 1990s, while democracy, identity or local traditions rarely entered the discourse. In Norway efficiency and service quality concerns were similarly the drivers of municipal enlargement initiatives in the 1990s as well as in the 2000s, whereas regional reform initiatives were guided by concerns with development capacities. Neither initiative was successful, however, which suggests that a framing of reforms in terms of efficiency may not work everywhere and under all circumstances. In France, for example, opponents of amalgamations have been able to present a successful case of opposition to municipal enlargement for a long period based on the sacrosanct traditions of the existing municipalities. Interestingly, Europeanization was used as the reason for putting regional reforms on the agenda in Italy, but reformers abstained from attempting any municipal reforms under this frame. And in the case of Denmark, references to Europeanization played no significant role in the Danish discourse on municipal as well as regional enlargement. Overall the most frequently used buzz words of territorial reforms are ‘modernization’ and ‘efficiency’. However these are terms that are invoked to justify quite different types of reforms – everything from regionalization to enlargement of municipalities. But the conceptions of modernization or efficiency are often so fuzzy as to justify just about anything. In this sense, many territorial reforms are conspicuously postmodern.

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Strategies: Procedures adopted for achieving reform In Chapter 1 a fourfold typology of reform strategies was introduced. The typology has two dimensions: the scope of reforms and room for local voice. The scope of reforms may be comprehensive or incremental, while there may little or much room for local voice. Recalling the competing factions of the French Revolution, the combination of comprehensive reform and little room for local voice were termed ‘the Jacobin corner’, denoting a rational choice, top-down mode of reform. The opposite mode was called ‘the Girondin corner’, denoting a stepwise, bottom-up approach with much room for bargaining between national and local elites. In between these two variants contrasting approaches based on an experimental mode and a mode of reserve powers were outlined. The former seeks comprehensive reforms of the whole territory but relies on experimentation and learning, accommodating local forces when it comes to implementation, whereas territorial reform through reserve powers means that only certain cases are considered, and each one on its own merit, but not with a view to reforming the entire system of local government. These are of course ideal types that real life reform strategies will only approximate. However, Jacobin as well as Girondin types of reform strategies can in fact be identified in our sample of countries (see Table 13.3). The Danish as well as the Greek case correspond roughly to the Jacobin model. Reforms in both cases were conceived and outlined by a national elite and implemented in a rather top-down fashion. A certain measure of local voice was introduced at late stages in the process but, especially in the Danish case, the reform was hatched under a veil of vagueness that made it difficult for opponents to gather force. And once a parliamentary majority was assembled, the surge of reform was unstoppable. Still, the patterns of local voice were distinctly different in the two cases. In the Danish case there was room for a choice of partners, which turned into a scramble for the most attractive brides, since for most municipalities remaining single was not an option. In the Greek case, on the other hand, bargaining over borders became possible, but financial incentives provided strong impetus for mergers. The Jacobin character of the strategy, however, was somewhat further diluted since central regions of the country managed to extricate themselves from the reform process. Also the German case, with a wholesale transfer of the West German model to the Eastern part of the country after reunification, must be said to belong to the Jacobin type. The respective Länder did have some choice regarding the speed of the restructuring

Harald Baldersheim and Lawrence E. Rose 247 Table 13.3

Reform strategies by country

Country

Principal strategy

•

Denmark

•

Finland

•

Sweden

•

Norway

•

UK

• •

Netherlands Germany

•

France

•

Italy

•

Greece

•

Czech Republic

Comprehensive review of local and regional structure; deadlines stipulated to stimulate amalgamations followed up by local negotiations – ‘voluntary’ choice of partners Comprehensive review of municipal structure; national incentives to stimulate amalgamations, local negotiations and search for partners Comprehensive review of overall government structure; specifics on regional amalgamations to be followed up by local negotiations, intended to end up with larger regions Early 1990s: Comprehensive review of municipal structure; intervening parliamentary decision stipulating voluntarism; process stalled 2003: New joint initiative by central government and Association of Local and Regional Authorities followed by bottom-up review process; stalled 2005: Central government initiative regarding regions with bottom-up elements, intended to end up with larger and/or stronger regions; failed 1972 and onwards: Comprehensive reviews and parliamentary discretion driven by belief in big(ger) size 2000s: top-down invitations for bids for unitary status with intermittent bidding in response; central selection of local bids The roving model; co-governance Transfer of expertise and models from the former West Germany; voluntary amalgamations in first stage; top-down in second stage Incentives to stimulate inter-municipal cooperation; asymmetric structures accepted Comprehensive, constitutional review of regional powers (2000s); proposals submitted to popular referenda (one pass, one fail) 2001: Minimum acceptable change 2006: Package deal (federal + central) Comprehensive review; mandatory amalgamations, while back-stage bargaining allowed a local say in amalgamations; top-down introduction of second tier Bottom-up cooperation; top-down differentiation of functions according to size

process, and many started with voluntary amalgamations or cooperative arrangements. In the end, however, central authorities resorted to a more firmly top-down approach.

248


As for the Girondin corner, the Dutch case is the best example. Co-governance is a term used to characterize procedures employed in the Netherlands. Merger cases may be initiated on an ad hoc basis by the central government, the provinces or the municipalities concerned. The provinces, however, play the coordinating role in drawing up the merger plans. The municipal councils involved have the right to be consulted on the ensuing plan, although their consent is not required for the final decision of parliament. The process of local consultation also normally means that residents are informed about the pending issues, and municipal councils sometimes organize referenda on proposed amalgamations. In the chapter regarding the Dutch case, local voice, along with other events at the national scene, sufficed to sink two merger proposals, while one was carried by a parliamentary decision despite local opposition. Interestingly, through a slow-moving, case-by-case process, the Netherlands has managed to reduce the number of municipalities substantially (from 1,209 to 443) since the 1960s. Norway, by comparison, is in the Girondin corner by default. The parliamentary decision of 1995 to proceed with amalgamations on a voluntary basis left matters largely in the hands of the municipalities themselves. Formal merger procedures have top-down as well as bottom-up elements, with the final decision in the hands of parliament, somewhat similar to the Dutch case. Even so, plans for comprehensive reforms have been shelved. The central government has provided financial incentives to merger candidates, but there have been few takers. The decidedly bottom-up deliberation procedure pushed by the government and the Association of Local and Regional Authorities in 2003–04 also ended without any mergers. The option of preference was instead a confirmation of existing inter-municipal arrangements. Sweden and France, on the other hand, conform to the experimental mode with regard to regional reforms. France has worked out an overall strategy for regionalization, but executes it in a piecemeal manner, trying out transfers of powers in various fields. Sweden follows this strategy in an even more clear-cut manner. In the Swedish case regionalization started from below, materializing in a series of experiments recognized somewhat reluctantly by the central government. Only at a later stage did the central government commission a more comprehensive plan of regional enhancement, the implementation of which is to be assisted by a roving ombudsman with the consent of candidate merger provinces. The UK government’s bidding procedure regarding the introduction of unitary local government in England may also be seen as an experimental type of strategy. Local authorities were invited to apply for unitary status. Twenty-six


authorities applied in 2007 and of these nine bids were accepted, which reduced the number of authorities in the area from 46 to nine. The strategy of reserve powers is exemplified by Norway between circa 1970 and 1990. In this period territorial reforms were carried out from time-to-time, but without reference to any country-wide master plan. Cases were considered on their own merits by specially appointed commissions. Merger cases were mostly medium-sized cities that were characterized by urban sprawl spilling over municipal borders and into neighbouring municipalities. These so-called over-crowded cities claimed lack of vacant land for housing, industry and infrastructure as reasons for amalgamations with their neighbouring municipalities. The neighbouring municipalities usually protested against such mergers, but in four out of five cases parliament made use of reserve powers to allow mergers to go ahead. In several cases protest parties with bases in the incorporated areas were formed to continue their protest inside the new city councils. The perceived political costs of this strategy may have been one reason for the parliamentary decision of 1995. To summarize, the traditional style of territorial choice – that of analytical review by commissions of inquiry, parliamentary recommendations passed by a governing majority and then implemented by an efficient bureaucracy – is waning. What we have seen in many of the countries of our sample is change through a more bargaining-based style, more room for local voices and sometimes a rather proclamatory style of justification with little connection between evidence and choice. Still another postmodern feature?

Patterns of conflict engendered by reform initiatives As already noted, territorial choice touches upon fundamentals of power-sharing in a society – the control over territorial jurisdictions and thus the foundations of the nation-state. Existing jurisdictions are normally the outcome of long historical evolution and sometimes also revolutions accompanied by hard fought political battles. Consequently, proposed changes in jurisdictional boundaries can be expected to trigger deep-seated patterns of conflict. The recurring cleavages in a polity reveal the historical evolution of a society and, as evolutions have varied across societies, so may patterns of conflict demonstrate distinctive features from one country to another. However, most European countries have gone through stages of nation building in which centre–periphery conflicts have left marks on the political landscape. Left–right conflict may later have superseded

250


centre–periphery cleavages in some countries, whereas in other countries the latter have continued as an important dimension of national politics. In post-industrial societies other types of conflict based on ‘New Politics’ issues, such as the environment, or gender and sexual rights, have also become increasingly salient (Inglehart 1997). New political conflicts, however, may be expected to be of secondary importance in relation to territorial choice. Rather, the two more traditional patterns of conflicts are most likely to be most pronounced with respect to territorial choice. Centre–periphery cleavages have an inherently territorial dimension that is easily triggered by territorial reform proposals insofar as they affect balances of power between local and national elites. Such reforms may also activate distributional issues or may even be framed so as to change distribution of services or public goods between groups or regions. The more the distributional aspects are at the forefront of reforms, the more likely they are to stimulate left–right conflicts. Case studies presented in this volume confirm these suggestions. In almost half of the cases considered reform initiatives have triggered centre–periphery conflicts (see Table 13.4). This is especially apparent in Table 13.4

Patterns of conflict by country

Country

Pattern of conflict

•

Denmark

• •

Finland Sweden

•

Norway

•

UK

• •

Netherlands Germany

•

France

•

Italy

•

Greece

•

Czech Republic

Association of Danish Counties vs. rest; small vs. large municipalities; government vs. opposition North vs. south; centre vs. periphery; urban vs. rural areas Conservatives vs. other parties; state county administrations vs. county councils and local councils Centre vs. periphery; urban vs. rural areas; corporative vs. territorial interests; right vs. centre and left The disinterested centre? Uninterested citizens make way for disjointed centralism Small vs. large municipalities; urban vs. rural authorities Widespread consensus on the reforms against the background of unification; some debate on the speed of reforms Systemic conflicts of the French polity (‘positional interests’); the periphery vs. the state (cumul des mandats) North vs. south; government vs. opposition; local vs. national elites Socialist vs. Conservatives and Communists; centre vs. periphery; Athens – Thessalonika; left–right has diminishing importance Competition between cities regarding choice of functionally enhanced centres


the cases of Finland, Norway, France and Greece. The conflict between North and South in Italy, thrown up by the regional reform initiative, could arguably also be considered a centre–periphery conflict, in which the affluent North would like to reduce redistributional policies that largely benefit the poorer South. In the Italian case there was also a left–right dimension to the conflict during the second reform initiative, since the reform proposals were initiated by the centre-right government and opposed by the Socialist and Communist parties. However, the partisan ideological aspect of conflict was far from clear-cut. Quite a few right-wing regional councils also opposed the second reform for fear of losing central subsidies in a more federalized Italy. Greece also had a left–right conflict over amalgamation issues, but the ideological profile of the controversy was somewhat diluted since the amalgamations were also opposed by the Communist Party. The latter was only a minor player in this battle however. One aspect of conflict not captured by the typology developed at the outset is that of opposition generated by positional interests. Positional interests, as pointed out by the authors of the Dutch chapter, are derived from the positions of actors in an institutional space. An actor’s attitude to reform initiatives can be predicted from the way the institution’s position will be affected by the initiative. Such conflicts are found in all of our cases. In the Dutch case, for example, large cities were in favour of amalgamation, while small municipalities opposed it for fear of being swallowed up. The Danish case demonstrated a comparable conflict between regions and large cities. The larger cities waited eagerly to take over functions from the regions if and when they were abolished. The regions, naturally, did not relish such a prospect. In the end, however, the latter lost out. A parallel pattern was also evident in the Norwegian case: in particular the larger cities were in favour of abolishing the regions and taking over many of their functions, while the small municipalities were in favour of stronger regions, seeing these as a guarantee of small-scale local government. Positional conflicts also characterize the Czech case with respect to the scramble to become chosen administrative centres.

Explaining cross-country variations: How important are contexts and processes? How can we account for the variations in territorial choice – the pattern of outcomes identified in Table 13.1 and Figure 13.2? Why do some

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countries end up with radical or partial upscaling of local government, while other reforms with similar intentions fail and still other reformers settle for trans-scaling solutions? In Chapter 1 two dimensions of the institutional context were introduced – the national and local context respectively. The national context was based on Lijphart’s classification of democracies into consensual and majoritarian ones, whereas the local context takes into consideration the relative position of local government in the countries under study. The strength and importance of local government was indicated by the proportion of public spending channelled through local government budgets. The national context was expected to influence prevalent policy styles and concomitant choices of reform strategies (majoritarian polity – Jacobin strategy, consensual polity – Girondin strategy). The local context, on the other hand, was expected to drive the prevailing conflict patterns engendered by reforms (low importance of local government giving rise to centre–periphery conflicts, high importance giving rise left–right conflicts). Propositions Against this background nine propositions were formulated. Strategies: • Proposition 1a: In a majoritarian polity strategies are more likely to follow a Jacobin pattern, while actors in a consociational polity are more likely to opt for Girondin types of strategies. • Proposition 1b: Polities that are not clearly consociational or majoritarian (borderline cases) will tend to adhere to either experimental or reserve power strategies. Conflicts: • Proposition 2a: In polities where local government is highly important (indicated by a large proportion of public spending), conflicts will tend to follow a left–right pattern because of the distributional importance of territorial reform issues. • Proposition 2b: In polities where local government is of minor importance, conflicts will tend to activate centre–periphery cleavages, indicated by conflicts between local and national elites. • Proposition 2c: In the latter cases conflicts may also be more dominated by positional interests than clear-cut party-political divides because of low political stakes as far as national parties are concerned.


Outcomes: • Proposition 3a: A combination of Jacobin strategies and a left–right conflict pattern is more likely to be associated with reform involving upscaling. • Proposition 3b: A combination of Girondin strategies and centre– periphery conflicts is likely to result in trans-scaling reforms. • Proposition 3c: Any other combination is likely to lead to failed reforms. • Proposition 3d: Experimental and reserve strategies may result in either upscaling or trans-scaling reforms, but only under circumstances of consensus or low-intensity conflicts. Under any other circumstances these strategies will fail.

Findings Propositions 1a and 1b regarding choice of strategies are only partially supported by our evidence, but yield some interesting insights even where wrong. There are two clearly majoritarian polities in our sample of countries – the UK and France. Of these two, only the UK has followed a somewhat Jacobin strategy of reform. However, the most clear-cut example of a consociational polity, the Netherlands, also demonstrated the kind of approach to reform that was expected – a strategy with conspicuous Girondin, bottom-up features. The two countries most clearly demonstrating a Jacobin bent – Denmark and Greece – are both among the borderline cases. They were therefore not expected to make the choice of strategies that they in fact did. On the other hand Finland, also a borderline case, made more use of a Jacobin approach than expected. Norway demonstrates an interesting pattern of choices. At the outset of the 1990s it initiated what looked like a Jacobin strategy, but then switched to a series of Girondin approaches in the period following 1995, a zigzag pattern that might be natural for a borderline case. Sweden’s choice of experimental strategies fits well, however, with its status as a borderline case. Propositions 2a, 2b and 2c are to a moderate extent supported by our cases. The countries where local government is of high importance are the Nordic countries and the Netherlands. The left–right cleavage was clearly activated in Denmark, as expected, with the Social Democrats being against the reform and the Centre-Conservative government advocating it with the support of an ultra-right party. The Swedish regional reform also became entangled in a conflict pattern

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with a left–right dimension, with the present centre-right government stepping on the brake while the Social Democrats accepted the reform. Norway can also be said to demonstrate a left–right dimension of conflict since both right-wing parties are (presently) strong advocates of municipal amalgamations, while the centrist parties and ultra-left are against. The situation is less than clear-cut, however, since the Social Democrats are split down the middle on this issue. But the dominant centre–periphery cleavage on the reform issue in Norway is clearly in contradiction to our expectations about patterns of conflict flowing from this type of polity. The Netherlands is also a deviant case compared to what we expected, with predominantly positional conflicts. Countries in which local government has low-importance, by comparison, are Greece, Italy, France and the UK. Conflict patterns in these countries demonstrated the centre–periphery divides that were expected in three of the cases (Greece, Italy and France). This was not the only dimension of conflict, since left–right conflicts were also important in the former two countries, but a centre–periphery cleavage did play an important role for the reform processes. In light of these findings, an overall assessment regarding the significance of the institutional context seems straightforward: the institutional context is by no means uniformly related to choice of reform strategies or the subsequent unfolding of conflicts over the reforms. Propositions 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d relate strategies and conflicts to policy outcomes. The combination of strategies and conflicts indicated by proposition 3a was found in Denmark and Greece, where the outcome was an upscaling of territorial units as expected. If the regional reform is implemented in Sweden, this will also be a case corresponding to the proposition. In the French case, on the other hand, the outcome is one of trans-scaling at the municipal level. Given the Girondin character of reform strategy (voluntary adoption of inter-municipal cooperation) and the accompanying centre–periphery cleavage over territorial reforms, this outcome was also as expected. In a polity imbued with a strong centre–periphery cleavage, the Norwegian outcome in the first round (1991–95) – a failed reform – was also not so surprising. The change of strategy in subsequent rounds may not have yielded the wished-for result because the left– right conflict became more conspicuous over time, which implied that the strategy was, once more, out of synch with the pattern of conflict.


Concluding reflections There are many ways of dealing with problems of scale in local government. Enlargement of local government units is only one of them. Trans-scaling solutions are increasingly common. There may be a choice of paths towards a given solution, and there are also cul-de-sacs. What works in one country may not work in another because of differences in cleavage structures. A focus on cross-border cooperation among local authorities will probably be high on the agenda of local government research for the next decade. The increasingly important role of local consortia may also have implications for local citizenship: a more multi-faced local government may also lead to more multi-faceted local citizenship. What are the implications for theories of reform? Most obvious is that the typological approach so common in comparative local government studies must be supplemented with a process approach in order to understand patterns and outcomes of reforms. Types of reforms and how they unfold do not correspond neatly to such broad classifications as South, North or Central European local government systems. There is no such thing, for example, as a typical South European reform trajectory. Both Denmark and Greece succeeded in implementing comprehensive, upscaling reforms. And in the North European context, while Denmark succeeded, a similar Norwegian initiative foundered. The analysis has demonstrated that processes of territorial choice may be more indeterminate and open than suggested by our initial analytical framework. The framework highlights institutional mechanisms in particular. These, however, give much room for actors and power games that infuse processes of choice with an almost stochastic nature that is hard to capture with the data at our disposal here. As summarized by Keating in his review article ‘Thirty Years of Territorial Politics’, the role of territory in politics is an elusive factor of changing manifestations (Keating 2008:76). As a contribution towards capturing at least some of its manifestations, we would suggest that further research should pay particular attention to the interplay of policy problems, power games and the overarching dependencies of the states in which these games take place. The reform processes that have been analyzed in the chapters within this volume are largely driven by a search for solutions to three sets of policy problems: a quest for competitive regions, better governance of fragmented urban areas, and more distributional efficiency in local service delivery. These are recurring issues on the policy agendas of all the countries under study here, but are not pursued simultaneously or

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with the same intensity in all countries. Competitive regions have been pursued against a backdrop of globalization and Europeanization. In the period under study in this volume the regional issue has been dealt with – with varying outcomes and degrees of success – in Italy, Greece, Norway and Sweden. The issue of fragmented urban areas was central to the agendas of France, the Netherlands and Germany. Typically, goals of consolidation often had to be abandoned in favour of a cooperative solutions. Distributional efficiency was a concern of particular importance in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, France and the Czech Republic. The legitimacy of the welfare state was also an issue looming in the background, especially in the Nordic countries. Solutions, or non-solutions, to these policy problems are deeply affected by the outcomes of power games which, at the end of the day, are concerned with control over the state, either directly or indirectly, through control over local electorates. Three types of power games could be discerned: those of peripheries against centres, those of competing party and corporatist constellations, and finally a third type originating in positional interests, which denotes cleavages between entrenched institutions in the public sector. The latter type was highlighted in particular in the study of amalgamations in the Twente area in the Netherlands, but emerged also out of the analysis of the French case and the effective defence of small-scale local government mounted over such a long time by French mayors and local elites. The Danish case, by comparison, was one in which a whole set of institutions lost out in such a power game – the counties were virtually abolished while the cities came out as the unquestioned winners in a game in which the national association of municipalities allied itself with the dominant governing party against the association of counties. Such a radical outcome raises questions about the nature of the leadership that orchestrated the process and indeed about reform leadership in general. The Danish analysis suggests that ‘a veil of vagueness’ was critical to the success of the government’s strategy: opponents were kept in the dark about the government’s intention until the last minute, which prevented them from gathering forces until it was too late. A further elaboration of leadership strategies in territorial reforms has a range of leadership theories and typologies to draw on (Daloz 2005). Two in particular seem of relevance here. Robert Tucker’s classic Politics as Leadership highlights the role of ideas and discourse in shaping policy agendas (Tucker 1981). This is a position close to the concept of policy framing introduced in Chapter 1 in this volume. In the Danish case, policy discourse was strongly influenced by the government’s


insistence on its reform as the road to ‘a more modern Denmark’. A more hardheaded approach is formulated by Richard Samuels in Machiavelli’s Children (2003). Samuels suggests that, basically, reform leaders have three strategies at their disposal to convince followers: through gifts of persuasion, by buying support or by applying threats. In this volume we have mostly emphasized strategies of persuasion applied by policy entrepreneurs in the framing of reforms, that is, how appealing visions of the beneficial consequences of reform are constructed. However, there are also often implied threats in the way reforms are presented. If reforms are not carried out, dire consequences may follow: the required roads for the larger district will not be constructed and traffic will come to a standstill, or the region or city will loose out in international competition or will not receive badly need European funds, and so forth. Direct threats are also sometimes made: for example, the potential loss of status as a full competence municipality and being left with just a few rudimentary functions in cases of non-compliance, or state take-over of functions. And of course support is often bought in the form of, for example, better chances of receiving European funds, by more funds being made available for infrastructural projects to connect districts within amalgamated municipalities, or promises of more attractive career paths for personnel. A further source of territorial reform lies in the transformation of the modern state. Theories of political modernization of the 1960s saw the emergence of the welfare state as a stage in the development of mass democracy and economic growth (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Reforms of local and regional government undertaken in the countries under study here between the early 1950s and the late 1970s can easily be seen to be motivated by the needs of the maturing welfare state. But advanced welfare states are in need of efficient systems for regional and local distribution. Worry about the viability of the welfare state is one of several sources of territorial reforms in recent years as analyzed here. Reforms under the designation of New Public Management can easily be interpreted as a programme to shore up the welfare state in the face of rising demands for public services. New organizational forms inspired by NPM are introduced in fragmented regions to bring qualitatively more demanding services to local areas in which it has proved difficult to establish consolidated authorities. The new organizational forms are sometimes even presented as being superior to those of traditional bureaucratic government. Today, European integration is increasingly influencing the structures of member states through mechanisms of multi-level governance

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(Marks et al. 1996) that drive changes in regional and local governance as well as presenting new opportunities for leaders at sub-national levels of government. At the European level the establishment of the Committee of the Regions, as well as the proliferation of regional lobbying offices in Brussels, are expressions of a new opportunity structure. At the regional level, and especially as regards the pursuit of development policies, the European connection has manifested itself in the spread of partnership models of development and multi-faceted patterns of regional cross-border cooperation. European integration may thus also have made regions and cities into more assertive players in national games. More fundamental changes of socio-economic and political organization are outlined under the label of network society, which entails not only a crucial role for digital technologies as drivers of change, but also new patterns of political authority in which the role of the state is largely that of place management (Castells 1997:242 ff.) – that is, creating attractive locations for investment capital and the core of its labour force, the creative class (Florida 2002). Regional development programmes derived from this theory have gained widespread acceptance among regional policymakers throughout Europe. The influential theory of Ulrich Beck on risk society (1986) and reflexive modernization (1993) has been brought to bear on the transformation of the state with the concept of the preventive state (Grande 2008). The preventive state is above all concerned with avoiding or mitigating future catastrophes. Actions in the present are legitimated through the potential disasters that could happen in the future if no action is taken in the present. The debate on climate policies comes immediately to mind and so do measures to forestall terrorist acts. This type of state might take on more authoritarian features than the mature welfare state in which we have lived for the past generation. The low saliency of democratic concerns in the territorial reform processes studied in this volume is in this respect striking. In many countries, attempts at introducing more democratically accountable regional governance have proved to be especially controversial or have come to a standstill. Regionalization initiatives in Italy, Norway and Sweden have all been thwarted. In Denmark regions were virtually abolished. Can these controversies and setbacks be made sense of in the light of the rise of the preventive state? Is there a growing reluctance in the state apparatus to let go of controls that may be needed to handle looming crises? If so, the development of European states over the next decade may take


us in directions that involve patterns of territorial governance that are democratically as well as theoretically challenging.

Notes 1. Theoretically, we could also have expected to find cases of ‘downscaling’, that is, the reduction in size of local government units through dissolution of larger units for example. However, in the period that we have chosen to focus on there are no such cases in the 11 countries covered by this book. Had we chosen to analyze a longer time period, say from 1990 onwards, the Czech case would, of course, have fitted this type of outcome.

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Index accountability 93 accumulated authority 87, 204 actor-oriented analysis 18, 236 adaptation, slow-moving 10, 138, 153, 237, 248 administrative decentralization (see decentralization) efficiency (see efficiency) logic 101 (see also logic) mergers 220 reform rhetoric 123–4 (see also rhetoric) region 216 (see also regions) theory 1, 2, 123 (see also theory) advocacy coalitions (see coalitions) agglomeration-based community 170 all-purpose authorities 83 (see also generalist local authority) annexation 9, 130, 132, 137, 149–50, 152 amalgamations advisory procedure 121 centrally orchestrated 220 compulsory 64–5, 164 forced 46, 53, 87, 89, 166, 173, 198, 221–3, 225, 228, 230 involuntary 220 logic of 119 (see also logic) mandatory 97, 100, 205, 225, 247 obligatory 207, 212 participatory effects of 205 procedure/process 129, 248 redress of 223 top-down 221 voluntary 32, 42, 56–7, 64, 74, 90–2, 95, 97, 99–100, 150, 164, 179, 201, 207, 247 arguments (see also policy arguments) efficiency 106, 109, 113, 123, 132, 157, 163, 169, 204–5, 210–11, 242

functional 115–16, 130 opportunistic 132 policy (see policy arguments) substantive 132 associations of local and regional authorities Association of Cities (Finland) 45 Association of County Councils (Sweden) 67, 72 Association of County Councils (UK) 105 Association of District Councils (UK) 105 Association of Dutch Municipalities 134 Association of Finnish Local Authorities 49 Association of Local and Regional Authorities (Norway) 86, 91, 93, 95, 98, 238, 240, 247–8 Association of Metropolitan Authorities (UK) 105 Association of Rural Municipalities (Finland) 45 Association of Swedish Language Municipalities (Finland) 45 Association of Towns and Municipalities (Czech Republic) 216, 222, 225, 228, 230 Danish Regions 24–5, 27, 39 German Association of Cities 141, 147 League of Provincial Governments (Netherlands) 129, 134 Local Government Association (UK) 105, 114 Local Government Denmark 24–5, 27, 38 National Association of Italian Communes 187 National Union of Municipalities (Greece) 205 273

274

Index

associations of local and regional authorities – continued Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 73 Swedish Local Government Association 67 asymmetric outcomes 58, 237, 239 asymmetrical local authorities/ structures 239–41, 247 authoritarian approach 164, 166–7, 177–8, 220–1 (see also logic) autonomous–integrative division 54 autonomy administrative 222 de facto 118 fiscal 162, 187 legal 118 local 25, 85, 87, 118, 128, 134, 150, 162, 166, 175, 224–5, 230–1 political 138, 150, 162 regional 67, 191, 239 backwards mapping, procedure of 242 balance of power 1, 131–4, 250 bargaining-based style 13, 16, 197, 246–7, 249 basic territorial self-governing units (Czech Republic) 215 bicameralism 189, 193 bidding procedure 248 bi-polar tendency 105 bottom-up (see also reform) approach 13, 42–3, 69, 78, 91, 94–6, 99, 199, 201, 208, 230, 238, 246–7 cooperation/networking 228, 247 definition of 13 pressure 114, 188, 221 Broad County Model (UK) 28 Broad Municipality Model (UK) 28 capacity (see also system capacity) administrative 119, 129–30, 143, 148 development 244 financial 34, 53, 81, 96 implementation 35 problems of 56 production 34, 104, 163 professional 35, 53

‘Capodistrias Plan’ (Greece) 205–6 categorical grants (see intergovernmental transfers) centre-periphery cleavages (see cleavages) centre-periphery relations 180, 187 centralism 220 central place theory 64 (see also theory) central places-based settlement system 220–1, 232 centrally planned economy 154 centre-periphery cleavages (see cleavages) change (see also reforms) administrative 149 causes of 11, 47, 219, 258 comprehensive 14 demographic 47, 70 evolutionary 66 experimental 13 (see also experimental approach) forces of 1–2 gradual 10, 61 horizontal 199 incremental 83, 150, 220 legacy of 7 major 38 minor 209 moderate 7 organic 109, 116 partisan 48–9, 53–4, 59 procedural 189 radical 10, 61, 71, 192, 219–20 regulatory 83 revolutionary 230 spontaneous 217 streams of 214 structural 50, 110, 189, 218 sweeping 77 systemic 219 voluntary 46, 225 citizen effectiveness 33, 36 citizen participation 138, 208, 210–11, 213 citizens’ assemblies 201 citizenship, local (see local citizenship) civil society 208, 212–13

Index cleavage structures 255–6 cleavages centre-periphery 14–15, 17, 19–20, 80, 85, 96, 99, 177, 209, 249–54 left-right 14–15, 19–20, 78, 96, 249–54 national-regional/local 190, 196 north-south 196 partisan 9, 14, 45, 209 secular-religious 15 territorial-corporatist 93 urban-rural 49, 59 clientelistic practices/relations 15, 203–4, 208–9, 212 coalitions advocacy 11, 14, 78, 97 veto 19, 236 co-governance arrangements 118, 120, 247–8 coercive measures 164 cohesion policy (see European Cohesion Policy) collegial bodies 24 commission of inquiry 81–2, 97 (see also preparatory commission) Commission on Administrative Structure, (Denmark) 26–7, 29, 34, 36–8, 40–1 Committee of the Regions (EU) 258 Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities (Sweden) 61, 70–1, 74–5, 77 communist legacy 230, 232, 238 reforms (of local administration) 214, 217–219, 222 Communities of municipalities 227–8, 231 competition economic 169 international 70, 257 political 158, 186, 252 Community of communes 170–1, 173–4 competitive bidding 35, 89 (see also bidding procedure) competitive federalism (see federalism)

275

competitiveness 70, 207, 211, 213 comprehensive approach 13–14 (see also change) compulsory responsibilities (see responsibilities) Confederation of Danish Industries 38, 41 Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise 93, 98 confiscation of privileges 39 consensual model/consensual polity 16, 186, 252 consensus democracy 136 consociational polity 17, 19, 196–7, 252–3 consolidation (see also amalgamation) local government 43, 150, 152, 214, 236, 256 large–scale 152, 220, 228 stepwise 214 consolidationist perspective 8, 18 constitutional amendment, revision 180, 192, 239 court (see courts) law 185, 190, 194–5 referendum 180, 261 reform (see reform, constitutional) consultation 13–14, 36, 75–6, 78, 94–5, 129, 197, 248 coordination power of 93 problems of 101, 201 (see also regional) corporative interests 203, 250 tradition 25, 37 corruption 186, 192, 212 county administrative boards 66–70, 73–4, 78 county councils 62–3, 66–9, 80, 92–8, 240, 250 county governor/county prefect 71, 74, 82, 100 (see also prefect) courts administrative 205 constitutional 151, 193 creative class, the 258 critical junctures 10, 61

276

Index

cross-boundary coordination (see coordination) cross-boundary issues/problem(s) 129 cumul des mandates 165, 176–7, 179, 250 Danish Employers’ Confederation 25 Danish Federation of Trade Unions 25 decentralization administrative 104, 138, 152, 184–5, 195, 222 functional 22, 207 political 195 decision arenas 133–6 decision theory 38 (see also theory) decision window (see window of opportunity) deconcentrated state administration 203–4, 212 de-etatization 221 defining moment 103 delegated state functions 142, 185, 216, 226–7, 238 de-merger procedure 164 democracy (see also local democracy) ideals of 40 model of 186 demographic challenge 50–2, 58, 113 change 47, 70, 89 size 2, 4–5, 81 depopulation 88, 220, 224 development syndicates 201 devolution 179, 184, 188, 191–3, 234, 245 dialogic approach (see reform) discretion of local authorities 42 parliamentary 247 disjointed centralism 250 disjointed political-administrative structures 158 dissolution (of local government) 222, 238 distributional equity (see equity) district affiliated cities 155, 159 district councils 105, 108, 114, 201

district municipality 163 domesticated Jacobinism 165 (see also Jacobin) downscaling, definition of 259 dysfunctional arrangements 71, 77, 232 economic sustainability 37, 230 economies of scale 8, 34–5, 41, 87–9, 98, 127, 149, 212 effectiveness 85, 89–90, 105, 120, 144, 211 efficiency (see also arguments) administrative 220, 223–4, 230–1 allocation/allocative 8, 18, 255–6 chimera of 116 deficits 209 economic 34 local government 27, 85, 101–2, 120, 144, 198, 219, 244–5 prerogatives 198, 207 production 8 elections administrative 192 cycle 43, 54, 57 direct 23, 93 European 226 indirect 69 local 23, 44, 57, 105, 181, 194, 224, 226, 232 parliamentary, effects of 39, 48, 54, 65, 92, 94, 97, 99–100, 190, 194, 232 encapsulated authorities 86 entrepreneurial interest 211, 213 entrepreneurship 207, 211, 213, 243 (see also policy entrepreneur) equity, distributional 224 ethnic demands 66 ethnic minorities 185 Europe of the Regions 239 European Cohesion Policy 188, 207, 211 European Union (EU) 47–8, 68, 70–1, 77, 139, 161, 186–8, 196, 199–200, 205, 207, 210, 234, 237, 239 European integration 12, 189, 199, 257–8

Index

277

Europeanization 12, 36, 195, 198–201, 203, 207, 209, 212, 235, 239, 243–5, 256 Euroscepticism 196 experimental approach 13–14, 19–20, 49, 63, 68–9, 76, 114, 237, 239–40, 246, 248, 252–3

integration (see integration) responsibilities 87–8, 93, 142, 234, 240 (see also responsibilities, division of) solution 168 fused model of territorial public administration 217

Fabian-style socialism 106 federalism administrative 188 competitive 194 fiscal 185, 188 Italian 185, 192–3, 195–6 quasi-federalism 181, 191, 197 perspective 192 reform 180, 188–9, 191, 195, 197 sector 204 Swedish 67 ‘variable geometry’ federalism 193 West German 143 federalist model 189 federalizing tendency 190–1 federations of municipalities 148 financial rewards (see incentives) financial management 169, 223, 230 fiscal stress 204, 212 Fordism 65, 70, 76 (see also post-Fordism) formative moment(s) 10, 61–2, 70–1 fragmentation administrative 8, 139 dysfunctional 208–9, 212, 223, 228, 232 local government 59, 161, 164, 168–9, 221–3, 225, 228–31 sectoral 208, 212 spontaneous 230 territorial 8, 12, 139, 163, 214 fragmented urban areas 255–6 framing, definition of 12 free commune experiment(s) 10, 49, 69 functional analysis 95, 107, 115–16, 130, 134, 165, 236 decentralization (see decentralization) differentiation 238, 250

generalist local authority 90, 92 generalized transactional space 175 geographic functionality 83–4, 86, 96 gerrymander 105, 108 Girondin corner 13–14, 246, 248 strategies 19–20, 246, 252–4 globalization 2, 11, 36, 62, 113, 212, 235, 256 goodness of fit 199 grants (see intergovernmental transfers) Greater Copenhagen Commission 26 Greater London Authority 111 Greater London Council 107, 109 hearings, (public) 88, 150 higher-level territorial self-administering units (Czech Republic) 215, 232 historical institutionalism 10, 61 historical legacies 139 hollowing out of the counties 93 of the state 200 homeostatic system 160 hostile takeover bids 173 hosting arrangements 236, 238, 240–1 House of Freedom (Casa delle libertà), 192, 197 identity administrative 221 issues of 12, 18, 73, 84, 137, 157, 211, 213 local 35, 89, 95–6, 102, 107–8, 168, 223, 243–5 implementation (see also reforms) capacity (see capacity)

278

Index

implementation – continued national policy 22, 25, 43, 66, 74, 93, 118, 170, 173, 188, 210, 248 reforms 13, 45, 50–1, 53, 55, 75, 111, 120, 149–50, 152, 157, 177, 179, 208, 246 incentives (see also subsidies) citizen 23, 39, financial 56, 58, 167, 172, 175, 201, 246–8 scheme/structures 53, 56–8, 92, 158, 175, 188, 201 incremental approach 13–14, 83, 113, 116, 169, 173, 177, 196, 208, 237 (see also change) independent cities 144, 153, 155–6 individualistic political culture 70, 208, 212 injunction to cooperate 174 institutional mechanisms 255 theory 11, 71 (see also theory) integrated model of local government 217, 227 integration European 12, 189, 199, 257–8 functional 231 monetary 188 political 167 intercommunality 169, 173, 178 intergovernmental grants/ transfers 22, 60, 89, 201, 204 categorical 143 earmarked 22, 118 general 22, 118 interest articulation 208 interest intermediation 200 intermediate level of government 39, 62–3, 66, 69, 72, 139, 181 internationalization 36 inter-municipal cooperation 46, 53, 69, 83, 85–6, 92, 143, 162, 164–6, 175, 206, 247 mandatory 18, 46 model 55, 67, 165, 169, 178, 238 voluntary 54, 122, 254

Jacobin corner 13–14, 246 rationalism 10 state 162 strategies 19–20, 246, 252–3 joint authorities, bodies 53, 68–9, 143, 149–50, 238 joint decision-making 121 joint decision trap 122 Joint Provision Act (Netherlands) 121–2 ladder of Europeanization 199 (see also Europeanization) leadership, role of 19, 27, 59, 109, 111, 176, 203, 236, 256 left-right cleavage (see cleavages) legalistic approach 208, 210, 213 Lega Nord (LN) 186, 188, 192–3, 195, 197 legitimacy democratic 75, 202 electoral 189 personal 190 political 94, 98, 165, 198, 201, 207, 211–13, 220, 256 local associations single-purpose 166, 168 multi-purpose 205–6 autonomy (see autonomy) citizenship 255 consortia 255 democracy 23, 33–6, 52, 58, 67, 75, 83, 85–7, 89, 92, 223–4, 233, 244–5 elections (see elections, local) federations 140, 142, 150, 155–6 identity (see identity, local) voice 13–14, 246, 248–9 welfare state 21 Local Government Commission (UK) 106, 108, 110–11, 113, 115 localism 102, 201, 206 logic administrative 101 of amalgamation 119 (see also amalgamation)

Index logic – continued of appropriateness 10 authoritarian 162 political 134 snowballing 69 technocratic 102, 213 majoritarian polity 16–17, 19, 252–3 principles 186 managerial approach 207 managerial revolution 109 mandatory amalgamations (see amalgamations) manipulative ethos 232 Marcellin Law 163, 165, 173, 176 merger policy 162 mergers (see amalgamations) meso-level (see intermediate level) metropolitan counties 108–9 micro-regions 228 mini-provinces 122 minimum acceptable content, strategy of 191 mobilization of (the) losers 39 modernization 155, 47–8, 64, 102, 166, 187, 195, 212, 235, 244–5, 257–8 multi-actor model 124 multi-level governance 200–1, 257 multi-purpose intercommunal association 166, 168 multiple-choice, model of 55, 59, 139 municipal cooperation (see inter-municipal cooperation) corporation(s) 104 mergers, examples of 26, 36, 57, 91, 129, 164, 231, 249 (see also amalgamations) syndicates 201 mutual dependency 199 Napoleonic model 183 neighbourhood councils 201 networking of municipalities 228, 231 network society 258 networks clientelistic 209

279

corporatist 208 governance 78 inter-municipal 238, 240 policy 78, 200 New Denmark, The 29, 40, 244 New Public Management 257 non-decision 32 Northern League (LN) (see Lega Nord) Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions 86, 93 notabilities-dominated politics 158 obligatory amalgamations (see amalgamations) ombudsman 248 one-tier system 51, 102 opportunistic argumentation (see arguments) opportunity structure 199, 258 (see also window of opportunity) outsourcing 89 outcomes, asymmetric (see asymmetric outcomes) overlapping boundaries 23 functions 66 jurisdictions 104 paradigm shift 212 package deal 193, 196, 247 parliamentary investigation 50 parliamentary model 185 participatory governance 200 partnerships cross county 94 models of 258 public-private 210–11, 213 piecemeal tinkering 103 policy agenda 104, 256 analysis 12, 101 arguments 11–12, 14, 134, 148 articulation 212 discourse 12, 256 entrepreneurs 11–12, 19, 38, 58, 236, 257 framing 11, 242 implementation (see implementation)

280

Index

policy – continued networks (see networks, policy) rationality 75 stages 11 stream 46 style(s) 2, 10, 16, 186, 252 theory 11 (see also theory) window 10, 62, 71 (see also window of opportunity) political competition (see competition) intermediation 210 logic (see logic) politics of scale 200 population density 2, 139, 150 positional interests 250–2, 256 positional interest model 124–6, 131–3 post-Fordism 70, 76 (see also Fordism) power (see also distribution of responsibilities) games 218–19, 255–6 relations 189–90, 200, 234, 241 sharing 16, 234, 249 prefect 100, 161, 164–5, 177 (see also county governor) prefectural local government 202, 204 preparatory commission 49 preventive state 258 privatization 88, 210, 213 process managers 73, 75 provincial council 164 public choice perspective 8, 18 Public Sector Tasks Commission (Denmark) 26, 39 punctuated equilibra 10–11, 61–2 qualified majority 166–7, 180, 196 quasi-federal reform (see also federalism) 181, 191 quasi-municipalities 215 Redcliffe-Maud Commission 107–10, 115–16 rational argumentation model 124–5, 132 rational choice theory 243 (see also theory)

rational policy making 124 rationalist principles 101 redistributive (welfare) policies 66 referenda 26, 48, 91, 111, 127, 164, 180, 255 reflexive modernization 258 reforms administrative 47, 123, 142 asymmetric 58, 69, 83, 237, 247 bottom-up 46, 54, 56, 58, 69, 78, 91, 94–6, 99, 142, 150, 228, 239, 248, 253 comprehensive 13–14, 39–40, 42–3, 58, 61, 65, 75–6, 92, 112–13, 121, 150–1, 196, 208, 217, 230, 237, 241, 246–8 constitutional (reform) 180 cycle 102, 113 default 240–1, 243, 248 dialogic approach 50, 59 dynamics 10–11 elitist 27, 36, 39–40 failed 197, 241, 254 far-reaching 61 federalist 188 (see also federalism) fiscal, 213 Girondin 13–14, 19–20, 246, 248, 252–4 incremental 13–14, 83, 113, 116, 150, 169, 173, 177, 196, 208, 219, 237, 246 initiative 11, 15–16, 42–3, 46–7, 50, 57–8, 80, 96, 123, 236–7, 241–5, 249–51 institutional (reform) 181, 186, 189, 192 Jacobin 10, 13–14, 19–20, 160, 246, 252–3 large-scale 15, 22, 55, 102, 220 legislation 42, 51, 54–6, 59 mandatory 97, 100, 205, 225, 247 multiple choice 55, 59, 139 open-ended 50, 55, 59, 96, 245 outcomes, typology of 230 partial 112, 221, 231, 241 piecemeal 13, 46, 76–7, 103, 133, 135, 173, 248

Index reforms – continued radical 9–10, 29, 36, 40, 44, 53, 61, 71, 136, 143, 205, 209, 219–20, 241–5 regional 45, 69–70, 76–8, 92, 96–7, 113, 121–3, 129, 134–5, 237, 239, 245, 248, 251, 253–4 regionalization 67, 77, 111, 184, 187, 239, 258 roving 13, 113, 247–8 scope of 13–14, 246 small-scale 113 stepwise 13, 157, 214, 217, 228, 246 strategy 19, 49, 53, 58, 135, 150, 156, 254 technocratic 116 top-down 39, 43, 65, 95, 121, 150, 162, 208, 221, 246 transscaling 20, 242–3, 252–5 wholesale 98, 103, 112, 236, 246 regions administrative (see administrative region) competitive 255–6 of cohesion 215–16 ordinary and special 184–5, 197 regional authorities 26, 51, 73–5, 195, 240 autonomy (see autonomy) competitiveness 70 coordination 98, 121 council 48, 51, 73, 75, 85, 160, 185, 202, 208, 211 charters 190–1 development (functions) 29, 31, 68–9, 72–6, 202, 229, 258 development agencies 211 executive 185 governance 1, 80, 94, 97–8, 119, 121–2, 126, 135–6 parliaments 67, 72 reforms (see reforms) Regional Public Authorities (Netherlands) 122, 126 regional reform proposals 45, 68, 96, 119, 122, 239 regionalism 180, 188

281

regionalization 67–70, 75–7, 111, 184, 187–8, 236–7, 239–41, 243, 245, 258 (see also reforms) remiss procedure 76, 78 rescaling, definition of 1 reserve powers 13, 246, 249 resource dependency approach 199 responsibilities, division of 1, 67, 74, 94–5, 125, 133, 199, 226, 241 reunification, German 138, 142, 155, 246 revenue equalization 150 rhetoric of administrative reform 123, 124 of Realpolitik 123–4 risk society 258 roving, case-by-case approach 113, 248 (see also reforms) commissions 13 scope of reforms comprehensive (see comprehensive approach) definition of 13 incremental (see incremental approach) scale, problem of 18, 238 sector federalism (see federalism) sectoralization 212 secularization 186 semi-parliamentarian system of government 181 settlement structure 154, 217 single-purpose intercommunal association 166–8 size, municipal amalgamation effects 6, 57, 82, 119, 132, 135, 138, 144–5, 205–6, 223 capacity 8, 20, 53, 91, 98, 162 competencies 215, 221, 226 democratic significance 23, 35–6, 116, 224, 244–5 demographic 2–5, 62, 120, 154, 157, 161, 182, 216–17, 223 efficiency 8, 34–5, 107, 116, 224 issue of 1, 44–5, 83, 95, 115, 144, 151, 181

282

Index

size, municipal – continued minimum 28–30, 45, 50–1, 85–8, 106–7, 152–3, 170 sector 4–5 territorial 7 slow moving adaptation (see adaptation) small scale local government 2, 10, 16, 18, 128, 131, 210, 239, 251, 256 snowballing logic (see logic) socialist dogmatism 207 socialist regime 154 solidarity allowance 176 solidarity zone 169, 172 solutions cooperative 18, 168, 256 fine-tuned 70 integrative 54, 167 inter-municipal 168, 237 market-led 200 pragmatic 52 private sector 89 standardized 65 tailor made 8 technocratic 102 transscaling 242, 252, 255 uniform 65 upscaling 18 spatial dynamics 200 spatial planning 119, 221 special purpose agencies 104, 236 special purpose joint authorities 143 specialized local authorities 28, 83, 178 splitting of local government (see dissolution) state deconcentration 202 State-Regions-Autonomous Provinces Conference, Italy 187 structural funds 202 (see also EU) statutory cities 215 subsidiarity, principle of 149, 173, 187 subsidies 29, 251 (see also incentives) suburbanization 148 supervisory function(s) 74 sustainability, problems of 37, 230 system capacity 20, 33–4, 36, 45, 119, 134 (see also capacity)

taxation, power of 29–30, 44, 62, 76, 92–3, 167, 169 technocratic reorganization 102 technocratic solutions (see solutions) territorial continuity 175 fragmentation 12, 163, 214 pluralism 138–9 rationalization 163 restructuring 61, 70, 150, 155–8, 200, 209, 219 (see also reforms) territorial state administration 214, 216 theory administrative 1, 2, 123 central place 64 decision 38 institutional 11, 71 policy 11 rational choice 243 three-tier system of government 27, 118, 170 Tiebout hypothesis 8–9, 243 tipping point 47–8 top-down (see also implementation/ reform) approach 13, 39–40, 49, 65, 75, 95, 99–100, 150, 162, 177, 208, 211, 221, 246–8 definition of 13 traditions cultural 89, 139, 244–5 historical 14, 217, 245 legal 208, 233 transborder cooperation 229 trans-scaling, definition of 18, 242 (see also reform) transactional space 175 transfer of functions 51, 94 transferred responsibilities of municipalities (Czech Republic) 215–16, 226–7, 231 Treaty of Maastrict 186, 188 Trust Agency (Germany) 155 Twente region (the Netherlands) 126 ff regional reform 126 rural amalgamation 129 Twentestad 126–30, 132–4, 136–7

Index two-tier system 27, 80, 92, 102, 107, 110–15, 151, 234 typological approach 255 uniform solutions (see solutions) Unions of Municipalities (Czech Republic) 228–9, 231 unitary authorities 108, 144, 237 councils 110, 114 ideal 115 municipalities (consolidated) 142, 146–7, 150–2, 155–7 system of local government 102, 111–15 state model 188 unity of administration 142–3, 149 upscaling, definition of 18 urban agglomerations 119, 122, 126, 134, 143, 170–1, 173–4 urban communities 167–8, 170–1, 174, 179 urban districts 139–40, 146, 153, 158 urbanization 47–9, 64, 70, 104, 217

283

value change 11, 62, 77 veil of vagueness 40, 246, 256 Velvet Revolution 222, 224 veto alliances 11, 16, 235 coalitions 19, 236 (see also coalitions) players 12, 14, 193 points 32, 47, 102, 197 powers 76, 189 voluntary action 57, 150 amalgamation (see amalgamation) cooperation 121 initiative 148 phase 150, 156 voluntarism, principle of 97, 113, 247 vulnerability, problems of 28, 34, 70 welfare state, model of 15, 65, 106, 257 window of opportunity 27, 38, 46, 71, 186, 242 zero-sum game 200

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