Systemic Effects of Televised Candidates’ Debates

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Systemic Effects of Televised Candidates' Debates André Blais and Andrea M. L. Perrella The International Journal of Press/Politics 2008; 13; 451 DOI: 10.1177/1940161208323548 The online version of this article can be found at: http://hij.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/4/451

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Systemic Effects of Televised Candidates’ Debates André Blais and Andrea M. L. Perrella Almost an entire generation of election survey data was pooled together from the United States and Canada to assess the systemic effects of televised debates. Four questions were posed: (1) Is there a general tendency for evaluations of candidates to improve or deteriorate after a debate? (2) Do evaluations of one candidate negatively correlate with changes in evaluations of opponents? (3) Do debates disadvantage incumbents? (4) Do debates advantage less popular candidates? Using “feeling thermometer” items to measure voter evaluations, four patterns are revealed. First, candidates generally gain points.The supposed mudslinging that characterizes a debate appears not to feed into any notion of cynicism. Instead, voters appear to gain an appreciation for the debaters. Second, a candidate’s gain is not earned at the expense of those deemed to have “lost” the match. Third, a debate does not disadvantage an incumbent. A candidate with a record to defend stands about as much chance of benefiting from a debate as a challenger. And fourth, any evaluation gaps before a debate become narrower following a debate. This final effect, which is particularly true of American presidential debates, may reflect a debate’s ability to raise awareness of less popular candidates. Keywords:

debate effects; feeling thermometers; voting behavior

The epitome of an election campaign is the candidates’ debate. No other activity is so interwoven within the very foundational principles of a democracy as an open debate in which the candidates have the opportunity to talk directly to voters, and the voters have the opportunity to listen and compare their arguments. In our modern technology-centered society, this event is televised for all potential voters to see. The televised presidential debate in the United States ranks among the most watched and most talked about event of a campaign (Hellweg et al. 1992), and the same can be said about Canada (Bernier and Monière 1992). Candidates’ debates are also the source voters rely on most for information about the election (Watts 2002). The enormity of such an event leads us to assume that they yield an important impact. Indeed, media Press/Politics 13(4):451-464 DOI: 10.1177/1940161208323548 © 2008 Sage Publications

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pundits set up the debate as the pivotal moment of a campaign, raising both the stakes among the contenders and expectations among spectators. However, there are contradictory or ambiguous findings about the actual effects of debates. Some studies indicate rather strong effects on vote intentions (Blais et al. 1999; Geer 1988; Hellweg et al. 1992), while others suggest they merely reinforce partisan leanings (Katz and Feldman 1962; Leduc and Price 1985). More important perhaps, existing research consists almost entirely of analyses of the impact of individual debates. Valid as this approach may be, particularly because each debate is unique in the issues it addresses and the political context within which it is held, this leaves open the following question: Aside from each debate’s idiosyncrasies, are there systemic effects associated with debates? In other words, are there detectable general effects of the televised debate as an institutional feature of the modern election campaign? More precisely, (1) Is there a general tendency for evaluations of candidates to improve or deteriorate after a debate? (2) Is there a general tendency for changes in evaluations of one candidate to negatively correlate with changes in evaluations of opponents? (3) Do debates disadvantage incumbents? (4) Do debates advantage less popular candidates? The current literature provides little insight into possible answers. We address this shortcoming by examining televised presidential debates held in the United States since 1976 and party leader debates held in Canada since 1988. We focus on how they affected voters’ overall evaluations of the candidates who participated. The two countries share many characteristics, especially with respect to their economy and culture. Both countries are similar in their heavy use of electronic broadcast media as the main vehicle with which political leaders communicate and try to influence voters. Both countries also place an enormous amount of attention on the political leaders of a campaign. That is, the political party and other offices (e.g., vice president, senator, district-level representative) receive far less emphasis, turning a debate in the middle of a general election into a contest among a small number of individuals.This is equally true of the presidential candidates in U.S. general elections and of party leaders in Canadian general elections. What differs between the two countries are some of the institutional parameters that define each country’s model of governance.The United States has a presidential system with a stable two-party system. Canada has a parliamentary system and a more competitive party system. Between three to five parties are represented in the House of Commons during the period covered by this study. In addition, the Canadian party system witnessed a major realignment in the 1990s, with the emergence of two new parties, the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois, and the near disappearance in 1993 of one of the two major parties, the Progressive Conservative Party, which kept only two seats

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in that election. Consequently, televised debates among presidential candidates in American elections typically involve two candidates, while in Canada, televised debates among the party leaders can include three, four, and sometimes five candidates. Aside from that, we see more similarities between the two political contexts that would enable us to ask whether televised debates yield an effect above and beyond peculiarities of space (i.e., country) and time (i.e., the salience of particular issues during an election). We first determine whether there is a general tendency for evaluations to improve or to deteriorate after a debate. Given that debates are inherently confrontational, each candidate is eager to show shortcomings of his or her competitors.Therefore, one might expect debates to reinforce voters’ deep cynicism about politicians, and as a consequence, the ratings given to most participants would go down after a debate.1 But the opposite could also be true. Debates could help overcome voters’ negative prejudice toward politicians. Voters may come to realize that candidates are more sophisticated than initially thought. In the same vein, we wish to ascertain whether debates are a zero-sum game, that is, whether in each case there is a winner, the candidate who is perceived to have performed best and whose overall rating goes up, and a loser, whose evaluation goes down. If this is a zero-sum game, it is unlikely that we would see any general tendency for evaluations to improve or deteriorate after a debate, since gains and losses will cancel out.2 We are also keen to see what kinds of candidates are more likely to witness increases or decreases in their popularity after a televised debate.We focus on two characteristics. The first is the contrast between incumbents and challengers. The former have to defend their record, which is attacked by the latter. This would put incumbents in a defensive, weaker position. If this is so, there would be a general pattern for challengers’ ratings to improve and for incumbents’ popularity to decrease after a debate. This would be particularly the case when there are many challengers, typical of Canadian debates, where two, three, and sometimes four party leaders zero in on the shortcomings of the governing administration. A second candidate trait is popularity. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the most popular candidates tend to lose most in televised debates. This could be so for a number of reasons. First, it could be that reactions to debates depend on expectations, and so relatively unpopular candidates benefit from lower expectations. Second, it could be that some candidates are less popular because they are less well known (see Blais et al. 2000) and that they gain during a debate because they become better known. Third, debates could simply be construed as a random shock that leads a good number of voters to revisit their views about the candidates. As a consequence, those with initial high ratings are bound to lose, and those with initial low evaluations are likely to gain.3

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Data

Election campaign surveys are gathered from both Canada and the United States.This includes the Canadian Election Study4 surveys from 19885 to 2006 and the National Election Study6 from 19767 to 2004.The measure used to assess the impact of debates on voters is the 0-to-100 feeling thermometer toward the candidates. This is a common survey item used to measure debate effects (Gordon and Miller 2004) and is an appropriate way to assess subtle changes in public opinion (see Lanoue and Schrott 1989b: 283). In contrast, another commonly used measure, voting intention, is more restrictive. Response to a voting intention question takes into account a wide array of factors, only one of which is leader evaluation.Therefore, voting intention items do not lend the same level of precision. Subtle changes in evaluations may set an election campaign toward a direction not automatically identified by the more categorical vote-intention item. Although the ultimate verdict in an election is the actual vote, the more direct effect of debates should be on feelings toward the participants in those debates. Average thermometer rating scores of each debater were computed for the five days prior and the five days following a televised debate.8 Debates in Canada are generally held in a set of two rounds: one in English and one in French. In this case, the five-day “after” period starts the day after the second debate. In some cases, particularly in the United States, a campaign features more than one debate (or more than one “set” in Canada). There were three presidential debates in 1976, 2000, and 2004; two presidential debates were held in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. Canada generally features only one set of debates.9 The 2005–2006 campaign was a little different, with one set held before the NewYear and a second set held in early January.When two debates take place within a short period of time, it may become impossible to sort out the specific impact of each, and so we consider only those debates that were not preceded by another debate in the previous two weeks. For that reason, the second U.S. debate in 1992 and 1996 and the second and third debates in 2000 and 2004 were dropped.10 Findings

Tables 1a and 1b list all debates covered in the analysis and show each candidate’s before/after debate thermometer mean score.The mean change is +1.0 in both countries. Change is more often positive than negative (sixteen pluses against nine minuses in the United States and fifteen against nine in Canada).There appears to be a weak pattern for ratings to improve more than to deteriorate. The second point that we wish to establish is whether in a given debate, one participant’s gain is the other’s loss. If this were the case, the Democratic candidate would tend to gain most when his Republican counterpart loses most and vice versa. In fact, the correlation coefficient between Democratic and

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Table 1a

Presidential debates (United States), 1976–2004 Actual Scores Date 1976: Sept. 23 1976: Oct. 6 1976: Oct. 22 1980: Oct. 28 1984: Oct. 7 1984: Oct. 21 1988: Sept. 25 1988: Oct. 13 1992: Oct. 11 1996: Oct. 6 2000: Oct. 3 2004: Sept. 30 Overall average of all candidates Average for Dem. candidates Average for Rep. candidates

Debaters Jimmy Carter, Dem. Gerald R. Ford, Rep. Jimmy Carter, Dem. Gerald R. Ford, Rep. Jimmy Carter, Dem. Gerald R. Ford, Rep. Jimmy Carter, Dem. Ronald Reagan, Rep. Walter F. Mondale, Dem. Ronald Reagan, Rep. Walter F. Mondale, Dem. Ronald Reagan, Rep. George H.W. Bush, Rep. Michael S. Dukakis, Dem. George H.W. Bush, Rep. Michael S. Dukakis, Dem. George H.W. Bush, Rep. Bill Clinton, Dem. Ross Perot, Ind. Bill Clinton, Dem. Bob Dole, Rep. George W. Bush, Rep. Al Gore, Dem. George W. Bush, Rep. John Kerry, Dem.

Before

After

Difference

64.7 60.5 64.5 60.5 62.8 58.9 54.2 56.1 55.9 61.5 58.8 60.9 61.6 57.3 60.4 55.9 51.7 55.2 39.3 58.4 50.0 58.3 58.4 51.8 51.2 57.2

62.9 61.4 63.8 59.2 60.7 61.8 50.7 60.6 60.5 60.0 56.4 62.7 64.8 57.9 61.7 58.3 54.1 55.6 46.6 60.3 53.0 54.2 58.1 55.1 54.1 58.2

–1.8 1.0 –0.7 –1.3 –2.1 2.8 –3.6 4.4 4.7 –1.6 –2.4 1.7 3.2 0.7 1.3 2.4 2.4 0.4 7.3 1.9 3.0 –4.1 –0.3 3.3 2.9 1.0

58.1

58.3

0.2

57.7

59.0

1.3

Source: American National Election Study, 1976–2004. Note: Dem. = Democratic Party; Rep. = Republican Party; Ind. = Independent.

Republican change in a given debate is almost exactly 0 (–.08),11 which suggests voters do not necessarily think in terms of winners and losers. In Canada, the negative correlation between the Liberal leader and his major competitor12 is substantial (–.81), but this is entirely due to the 1988 election, which produced an enormous gain for the Liberal leader (John Turner) and a substantial decline for his Conservative opponent (Brian Mulroney); if we exclude the 1988 debate, the correlation is nearly 0 (–.04). Our conclusion is thus that

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Table 1b

Party leaders’ debates (Canada), 1988–2006 Date 1988: Oct. 24–25 1993: Oct. 3–4

1997: May 12–13

2000: Nov. 8–9

2004: June 14–15 2005: Dec. 15–16 2006: Jan. 9–10 Overall average of all candidates Average for Lib. candidates Average for PC/Cons. candidates Average for NDP candidates Average for Ref./ All. candidates

Debaters Ed Broadbent, NDP Brian Mulroney, PC John Turner, Lib. Kim Campbell, PC Jean Chrétien, Lib. Preston Manning, Ref. Audrey McGlaughlin, NDP Jean Charest, PC Jean Chrétien, Lib. Preston Manning, Ref. Alexa McDonough, NDP Jean Chrétien, Lib. Joe Clark, PC Stockwell Day, All. Alexa McDonough, NDP Stephen Harper, Cons. Jack Layton, NDP Paul Martin, Lib. Stephen Harper, Cons. Jack Layton, NDP Paul Martin, Lib. Stephen Harper, Cons. Jack Layton, NDP Paul Martin, Lib.

Before

After

Difference

57.8 52.4 41.9 51.5 51.4 47.2 40.6 53.4 51.3 45.6 47.8 50.3 41.5 45.4 43.7 48.8 45.7 47.4 40.4 46.2 45.5 45.1 49.7 44.3 47.3

56.5 47.3 51.1 53.2 53.7 48.7 42.3 55.1 52.4 45.8 46.8 48.2 46.4 45.2 43.4 48.1 43.2 49.0 43.1 50.1 44.9 47.9 51.5 45.1 48.3

–1.3 –5.1 9.2 1.8 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.2 –1.0 –2.1 4.9 –0.2 –0.2 –0.7 –2.5 1.7 2.7 4.0 –0.6 2.8 1.8 0.7 1.0

47.4

49.2

1.8

47.6

48.7

1.2

47.3

47.7

0.3

46.1

46.6

0.5

Source: Canadian Election Study, 1988–2006. Note: All. = Alliance Party; Cons. = Conservative Party; Lib. = Liberal Party; NDP = New Democratic Party; PC = Progressive Conservative Party; Ref. = Reform Party.

ratings evolve largely independently of each other after a debate. It is not the case that popularity gains for a candidate imply losses for competitors. Our main concern is to determine whether there are general patterns in the changes that the debates produce. More specifically, we wish to test the

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Table 2

Ordinary least squares analysis of debate effects Dependent Variable: Rating after Debate (t + 1 . . . t + 5) Model 1: United States Independent Variables

Coef.

Rating .692 (t – 1 . . . t – 5) Incumbent –.006 Constant .121 .722 Adjusted R2 N 25 SEE .095

SE

Beta

Model 2: Canada Sig.

Coef.

SE

Beta

Sig.

.086

.863

.000

.755

.121

.827

.000

.045 .035

–.016 —

.886 .002

–.079 .034 .615 24 .099

.051 .029

–.207 —

.134 .253

Note: Coef. = coefficient; Sig. = significance; SE = standard error; SEE = standard error of the estimate.

hypotheses that challengers gain more than incumbents and that relatively unpopular candidates (before the debate takes place) gain more than more popular ones. We operationalize incumbency through an index made of two components. First, is the candidate a sitting incumbent (currently in office as the president or prime minister)? If yes, has the candidate served a full mandate, that is, was the candidate elected into that office at the previous general election? A score of 1 is given for every “yes” to any one of the two questions, which is then averaged into an additive index that ranges from 0 to 1.13 This approach allows us to distinguish a number of scenarios within which debates take place. For example, in 1976, the sitting incumbent in the White House was Gerald Ford, who had not been elected into that position.We feel that Gerald Ford should not be regarded in the same light as, say, Bill Clinton in 1996. For certain, both were sitting incumbents, but the incumbency of Bill Clinton cannot reasonably be equated with that of Ford. In this case, Clinton’s incumbency index score is 1, while Ford’s score is .50. In Canada, Kim Campbell in 1993 and Paul Martin in 2004 found themselves in similar situations, that is, sitting prime ministers who rose to that position before a general election. Table 2 presents the findings of ordinary least squares regressions.The setup is straightforward.The dependent variable is a given candidate’s mean rating in the five days following a debate. The two independent variables are the mean ratings during the five days preceding the debate and the incumbency index. Because ratings are bounded variables, we need to control for floor and ceiling effects, and so we use a logit transformation of candidate ratings.14

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Gains/losses in subsequent period

6 5 4 3 2 1 0 –1 40

45

50

55

60

Earlier period rating

Postdebate

Predebate

Figure 1a

Simulation of Change in Ratings among Nonincumbents, United States

Gains/losses in subsequent period

4

3 2 1 0 –1 –2 –3 40

45

50

55

60

Earlier period rating

Predebate

Postdebate

Figure 1b

Simulation of Change in Ratings among Nonincumbents, Canada

Incumbency does not emerge as statistically significant. Similar results are obtained even if we replace the incumbency index with the more conventional dummy variable version of incumbency.We can thus reject the hypothesis that televised debates systematically disadvantage incumbent candidates. Our fourth hypothesis is that unpopular candidates are prone to gain more in a televised debate than their more popular competitors. If that hypothesis is valid, it should follow that the slope of the initial rating variable will be smaller than 1, which is what we find in both Canada and the United States. The implications are illustrated in the solid line of Figures 1a and 1b.15 The usual pattern in the United States is for a presidential candidate with a thermometer score of about 40 before a debate to gain six points, while someone with a predebate

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Table 3

Ordinary least squares analysis of predebate effects Dependent Variable: Rating before Debate (t – 1 . . . t – 5) Model 1: United States Independent Variables

Coef.

Rating .924 (t – 6 . . . t – 10) Incumbent –.106 Constant .058 .891 Adjusted R2 N 25 SEE .074

SE

Beta

Model 2: Canada Sig.

Coef.

SE

Beta

Sig.

.066

.965

.000

.821

.092

.884

.000

.035 .025

–.205 —

.007 .028

.022 –.018 .783 24 .082

.042 .023

.051 —

.611 .446

Note: Coef. = coefficient; Sig. = significance; SE = standard error; SEE = standard error of the estimate.

score of 59 tends to stay put. Presidential candidates with predebate scores of 60 or more suffer losses. The pattern is similar in Canada, although it is somewhat more muted. Canadian party leaders who walk into a debate with a score of 40 are likely to make some gains, but instead of a six-point gain, the typical change in Canada is more in the vicinity of three points. And somewhat different from the American case, the gain/loss threshold in Canada occurs at 53. But is this effect truly attributable to the debates? It has been noted that both in Canada and the United States, the front-runner at the beginning of an election tends to lose votes during a campaign (Campbell 2000; Johnston et al. 1992). Is this observed reduction in popularity simply a general campaign effect that would emerge in the absence of a debate? We test that possibility by examining shifts in ratings in the period preceding the debates. Ratings in the five days before the debate now become the dependent variable, which is regressed on ratings in the five previous days (from days six to ten before the debate).We include the incumbency index.The findings are presented in Table 3 and in the dashed lines of Figures 1a and 1b.The results indicate that in Canada, a similar pattern is indeed going on before the debates:The solid and dotted lines are almost parallel.The least popular leaders were improving their image as the campaign progressed even before a debate took place. And so it is not clear whether we are observing a specific debate effect or a more general campaign effect. In the United States, the pattern in the postdebate period is clearly different from the one observed in the preceding period. In the latter, the slope of lagged ratings is nearly flat. And indeed, a Chow test offers some suggestion that the coefficients are different in the two

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periods.16 In addition, a candidate is likely to lose some popularity points by simply being an incumbent. But this is only true for the period that precedes a debate. As reported in Table 2, a debate appears to nullify whatever negative impact incumbency might entail. Conclusion

We have looked at televised leaders’ debates in Canada and the United States, with the goal of finding out whether they have similar systemic effects in the two countries.The results indicate the following: (1) Candidate ratings more often improve than deteriorate after a debate. (2) Ratings of the different candidates move largely independently of each other after a debate. (3) Incumbents are not disadvantaged in these debates. (4) The popularity gap among candidates tends to decline after a debate, as less popular candidates tend to gain more. The latter effect is more evident in the United States than in Canada. Let us look at some explanations for these effects. First, the fact that debates do more to improve than tarnish a candidate’s image comes as a bit of a surprise. It must be pointed out that the actual content of each debate was not taken into consideration. But given that a debate is by nature a combative event, the likelihood of it being dominated by accusations and denials is not slim. Therefore, one would not be taking a leap of faith in stating that a debate is not generally a friendly affair and is instead a rather hostile manifestation of competitive politics. Yet debates tend to improve evaluations. This is not a validation of negative campaigning but certainly suggests that a debate is one good way for candidates to improve their images, even if they come under attack and even if they are forced to make denials. Perhaps the capacity to argue and defend a view is an attribute voters expect to see from political leaders. In this light, a debate contributes a positive element to the discourse of a democratic election. It is also highly plausible that a debate raises a candidate’s profile in the public eye, with the results here offering a suggestion that candidates get more positive evaluations as they become better known. After all, incumbents are more known than challengers; veterans are more known than newcomers. As pointed out above and reported by others (Holbrook 1999; Lanoue 1991; Lanoue and Schrott 1989a), a debate has its greatest effect on lesser-known candidates. But one common attribute among debaters at this peak of the political ladder is a generally high level of campaigning skill. Rarely does this altitude of the political system retain those who are amateurs at the debating game. Candidates for high-level office are generally accomplished and polished presenters. Many are lawyers who have spent many years honing the skill of argumentation, so it is unlikely for an event of this caliber to reveal large contrasts in debating ability. In U.S. elections, presidential candidates have gone

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through the wringer of primary campaigns, media interviews, and a series of debates. Survivors of this process are likely to possess good oratorical skills. A debate profiles the generally high level of competence among the candidates, and voters respond accordingly by giving them generally higher postdebate thermometer ratings, especially for those “undersold” candidates with lower predebate scores.Therefore, when the lesser-known candidates face off against the more recognizable, and given that both are generally highly skilled at debating, two things are likely to occur. First, both candidates do a generally good job at looking sharp, even when they grapple with awkward moments or uncomfortable questions. Second, the lesser-known and possibly lower-rated candidates are the ones most likely to make gains. It is not always the case that a debate, especially one that produces a decisive “winner,” should narrow the evaluation gap. But unless a candidate makes a huge and irreparable error, an event such as a debate is likely to function more as an equalizer. Strategists also contribute to some of the predebate media hype by positioning their candidate in a way that predisposes more positive postdebate evaluations, regardless of how the debate unfolds. Norton and Goethals (2004) note a tendency for party strategists to minimize expectations before a debate (“low pitching”), and then use postdebate “spin” to raise evaluations. This way, the debater leaves the bout looking better than expected (seeYawn et al. 1998).The data presented here suggest some validation of this line of thinking. Candidates with the greatest predebate thermometer score deficits are the ones most likely to make gains.Whether an underdog’s relatively lower predebate scores can be attributed to a low pitching strategy is another matter, but there is some basis to the expectations theory. However, this strategy may be more valid for the United States, where the long campaign cycle from the primary season to the November vote leaves voters accustomed to a context that requires constant adjustment to whatever constitutes “expectations” for a particular candidate. Another possible dimension that has not been explored here is the level of attentiveness of a voter. It would seem logical that debates yield different effects among those who bother to watch the event compared to those who tune out.We could not adequately explore such a possibility because of lack of data, although further research is warranted to address this important matter. First, not all election study surveys include a consistent measure that taps into a respondent’s exposure to a debate.17 While voters may be asked whether they watched a debate, we are not entirely sure how useful it would be to disaggregate the data set between the “watchers” and the “nonwatchers,” as both subgroups would have to be compared to the predebate scores that reflect all respondents, including those who were not intending to watch. Conceivably, we could use other measures of attentiveness, such as items that ask about exposure to campaign news or interest in the election. Here, it now becomes possible to disaggregate respondents along this dimension: the politically

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engaged and the uninterested. But then, this produces a different problem. Since our scores are based on five-day segments, further desegregation would thin out sample sizes within each subgroup to the point that representativeness would be compromised. But overall, the main purpose of our aggregate approach is to explore general effects of debates, effects that are independent of various systemic contexts, be they historical (i.e., the issues that define a particular campaign), institutional (i.e., parliamentary vs. presidential/congressional systems), or contextual (i.e., the party system). Our look at Canada and the United States was geared toward this particular general examination, and our findings do suggest some systemic patterns. Notes 1. However, citizens seem to react negatively to incivility and not to conflict as such (Mutz and Reeves 2005). 2. Of course, gains and losses need not cancel out. It is possible that the winner’s gains are more important than his or her competitors’ losses (or the reverse).And when there are many participants, there may be more losers than winners.At the end, when it comes to the vote, the election is a zero-sum game, but it makes a difference whether debates contribute to better or worse appreciation of the candidates and to greater or lesser polarization. 3. The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the point. Suppose two candidates, one with two-thirds “positive” ratings (at 60 on a 0–100 scale) and one with one-third “negative” ratings (at 40 on the same scale). If a random two-thirds of voters maintain their judgments and a random one-third changes from positive to negative or the reverse, the most popular leader will see her mean rating go down by two points (from 53 to 51) because she loses more among those who revisit downward (who are more numerous because most voters like her) than she gains among those who revisit upward.The opposite applies to the (initially) less popular leader. 4. The Canadian Election Study (CES) surveys used in this study were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The data were collected by the Institute for Social Research,York University. Please visit http://www.isr.yorku.ca/ for further information. 5. The 1988 CES used a rolling cross-section in its preelection wave, a break from its previous methodology. Prior to 1988, the CES was conducted only after the election. 6. The American National Election Study surveys used in this study are funded by the National Science Foundation. Please visit http://www.electionstudies.org/ for further information. 7. The 1976 campaign was the first televised presidential debate since the 1960 Kennedy–Nixon encounter. 8. In Canada, we exclude ratings of the Bloc Québécois leader because that party ran candidates only in the province of Quebec, and feeling thermometer questions about the Bloc leader were only asked in Quebec. 9. The French debate in 1997 was cut short because one of the moderators fell ill during the originally scheduled May 13 debate.The remainder of that debate continued on May 18, but this second remake event was not included in the analysis.

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10. There is some merit in examining only the first debate, since, as noted by Holbrook (1999), subsequent debates do not necessarily provide new elements to a campaign. See also Katz and Feldman (1962), Lanoue (1992), and Lanoue and Schrott (1991). However, results are similar whether we include or exclude some of these nonoverlapping second or third debates. 11. This correlation is based on all eighteen televised presidential debates since 1976, including those rounds excluded from subsequent analysis because they were held too close together. 12. The major competitor is defined as the other party with the most votes in that election: the Progressive Conservatives in 1988, the Reform Party in 1993 and 1997, the Alliance in 2000, and the Conservative Party in 2004 and 2006. 13. We considered a third element of an incumbency index: whether the candidate is of the same party that currently occupies the presidency or the prime ministership. However, this third item poses some potential problems. First, this item can never apply to Canada, where the party leader of the incumbent party is, by definition, the sitting prime minister. And second, this third item may pose a problem of collinearity. As noted by Abramowitz (1988), the public mood for “a change” is related to the tenure of the party’s occupation of the White House.That is, the longer a party has been in power in the presidency, the more voters are prepared to vote for the candidate of the other party. For these two reasons, our “incumbency index” will only consider the first two items. 14. The 0-to-100 ratings were first converted to a 0-to-1 scale, which was then transformed as follows: Y′ = Ln (Y / (1 –Y)), where Y is the 0 to 1 rating score. 15. Figures 1a and 1b plot simulations generated using Clarify (see Tomz et al. 2003). The simulations are based on a model that assumes an incumbency index score of 0. 16. F(3,44) = 2.71, p < .10. 17. In the American National Election Study, for example, the question “Did you watch the debate?” was not administered in 1988, 1992, and 2004.

References Abramowitz, Alan I. 1988. “An Improved Model for Predicting Presidential Election Outcomes.” PS: Political Science and Politics 21:843–47. Bernier, Robert, and Denis Monière. 1992. “The Organization of Televised Debates in the United States, Europe, Australia, and Canada.” In Media and Voters in Canadian Election Campaigns, ed. Fred J. Fletcher.Toronto: Dundurn. Blais, André, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. 1999. “Campaign Dynamics in the 1997 Canadian Election.” Canadian Public Policy 25:197–205. Blais, André, Neil Nevitte, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau. 2000. “Do People Have Feelings toward Leaders about Whom They Say They Know Nothing?” Public Opinion Quarterly 64:452–63. Campbell, James E. 2000. The American Campaign: U.S. Presidential Campaigns and the National Vote. College Station:Texas A&M Press. Geer, John G. 1988. “The Effects of Presidential Debates on the Electorate’s Preferences for Candidates.” American Politics Quarterly 16:486–501. Gordon, Ann, and Jerry L. Miller. 2004. “Values and Persuasion during the First Bush–Gore Presidential Debate.” Political Communication 21:71–92. Hellweg, Susan A., Michael Pfau, and Steven R. Brydon. 1992. Televised Presidential Debates: Advocacy in Contemporary America. NewYork: Praeger.

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Biographical Notes André Blais has published widely in the area of electoral behavior and public opinion, and has served as an investigator of the Canadian Election Study since 1988. He currently holds a Canada Research Chair in Electoral Studies, based at Université de Montréal. Address: Université de Montréal, Faculté des arts et sciences, Département de science politique, C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, QC H3C 3J7; e-mail: [email protected]. Andrea M. L. Perrella has recently been appointed toWilfrid Laurier University, where he also serves an active member of the Laurier Institute for the Study of Public Opinion and Policy. His research includes political behavior, electoral politics and participation. E-mail: [email protected].

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