Syntactic Categories: Their Identification and Description in Linguistic Theories (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Syntactic Categories OX F O R D S U RV EYS I N S Y N TA X A N D M O R PH O LO G Y general editor: Robert D. Van Valin...

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Syntactic Categories

OX F O R D S U RV EYS I N S Y N TA X A N D M O R PH O LO G Y general editor: Robert D. Van Valin, Jr, Heinrich-Heine University and the University at Buffalo, State University of New York advisory editors: Guglielmo Cinque, University of Venice; Daniel Everett, Illinois State University; Adele Goldberg, Princeton University; Kees Hengeveld, University of Amsterdam; Caroline Heycock, University of Edinburgh; David Pesetsky, MIT; Ian Roberts, University of Cambridge; Masayoshi Shibatani, Rice University; Andrew Spencer, University of Essex; Tom Wasow, Stanford University published 1. Grammatical Relations Patrick Farrell 2. Morphosyntactic Change Olga Fischer 3. Information Structure: The Syntax-Discourse Interface Nomi Erteschik-Shir 4. Computational Approaches to Syntax and Morphology Brian Roark and Richard Sproat 5. Constituent Structure (Second edition) Andrew Carnie 6. Processing Syntax and Morphology: A Neurocognitive Perspective Ina Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Matthias Schlesewsky 7. Syntactic Categories Gisa Rauh in preparation The Acquisition of Syntax and Morphology Shanley Allen and Heike Behrens The Phonology–Morphology Interface Sharon Inkelas Complex Sentences Toshio Ohori Argument Structure: The Syntax–Lexicon Interface Stephen Wechsler

Syntactic Categories Their Identification and Description in Linguistic Theories

GISA RAUH

1

3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oYces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York # Gisa Rauh 2010 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number: 2010922496 Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire ISBN 978–0–19–928142–8 (Hbk.) 978–0–19–928143–5 (Pbk.) 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents General Preface Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations 1 Introduction 1.1 Categories and categorization in linguistics 1.2 Subject matter, aims, and outline 2 The traditional parts of speech Introduction The grammar of Dionysius Thrax The parts of speech in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ The traditional parts of speech in selected grammars of the nineteenth century 2.5 Parts of speech as semantic categories 2.6 Problems with the traditional parts of speech 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

3 The American Structuralists’ approach: Syntactic categories as distributional classes 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Introduction Language as an object of scientific study Towards a description of the structures of languages Identifying syntactic categories Inconsistencies and problems concerning the identification of syntactic categories

4 Syntactic categories in early Generative Grammar 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

Introduction Aspects of the Chomskyan theory of language On the organization of a Generative Grammar: two examples Syntactic categories and universal grammar Reducing the set of categories Universal vs. language-specific syntactic categories

5 Categories, features, and projections

x xi xiii 1 1 8 13 13 14 17 20 24 28

31 31 34 36 41 48 54 54 57 60 68 73 76 82

5.1 Introduction

82

5.2 A modular theory of grammar: the Theory of Principles and Parameters

84

vi

contents 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4

General theoretical considerations On determining the D-structure of sentences On deriving S-structure, LF, and PF Some important questions

5.3 X-bar theory: on X 5.3.1 The origin of X-bar theory and the identification of major (lexical) categories 5.3.2 Towards a motivation of the categorial features 5.3.3 Including minor categories 5.3.4 Identifying functional categories 5.4 Lexical and functional categories and the licensing of constituents 5.4.1 Licensing complements and specifiers of lexical heads 5.4.2 Licensing specifiers of functional heads 5.4.3 Licensing complements of functional heads vs. licensing functional heads in extended projections of lexical heads 5.4.4 A modified u-theory and the licensing of functional heads and adjuncts in projections of lexical heads 5.5 Morphosyntax and syntactic categories 5.5.1 Morphosyntax, word order, and the splitting of IP 5.5.2 Splitting CP and yet more functional categories 5.5.3 Consequences for the identification and description of syntactic categories 5.6 Features, checking, and syntactic categories 5.6.1 Introductory remarks 5.6.2 An outline of the MP 5.6.3 Syntactic categories in the MP 5.7 Feature-based representations of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP 6 Syntactic categories, functional features, and feature structures

84 87 89 92 93

93 96 98 102

107 108 110

113 115 120 120 124 127 129 129 131 136

141 150

6.1 Introduction

150

6.2 A lexical-functional approach to language

153

6.2.1 Considering language universal and language particular needs 6.2.2 On generating annotated c-structures

153 155

contents 6.3 Syntactic categories in LFG 6.3.1 Functional features and the description of lexical and functional categories 6.3.2 Conditions on c-structures and their impact on the description of syntactic categories 6.4 HPSG as a system of signs 6.4.1 6.4.2 6.4.3 6.4.4

Feature structures On deriving feature structures of type word in the lexicon Syntactic principles and rules Instead of transformations

6.5 Syntactic categories in HPSG 6.5.1 Feature structures and the description of syntactic categories 6.5.2 Some examples as illustration 6.6 Feature structures and syntactic categories in LFG and HPSG 7 Notional approaches to syntactic categories and Cognitive Grammar

vii 161

162 165 169 171 175 178 183 186

186 190 196

206

7.1 Introduction

206

7.2 Parts of speech, syntactic categories, and notionally-based categorization

209

7.3 Cognitive Grammar as a usage- and meaning-based alternative to formal grammars

214

7.3.1 General assumptions 7.3.2 Grammatical constructions: symbolization, categorization, and integration 7.3.3 Prototypical and non-prototypical component and clause structures 7.4 Towards an identification of syntactic categories in Cognitive Grammar 7.4.1 Basic and non-basic grammatical categories 7.4.2 Grammatical constructions and distribution 7.5 Some problems in the identification of syntactic categories 8 A notional-feature basis for syntactic categories in a Localist Case Grammar 8.1 Introduction

215 220 229

237 237 250 257

264 264

viii

contents

8.2 Notional features and the description of word classes

268

8.2.1 Basic word classes or ‘primary categories’ 8.2.2 Intermediate primary categories 8.2.3 Secondary categories

269 271 274

8.3 Subcategorizations and redundancies in the lexicon

279

8.3.1 Categorial selection of complements and by retro-complements 8.3.2 Functor features specifying valencies 8.4 Building syntactic structures 8.4.1 Syntactic projection 8.4.2 Building surface structures 8.5 Syntactic categories in a Localist Case Grammar

280 282 288 289 290 298

8.5.1 General assumptions, inconsistencies, and problems 8.5.2 Extensions and revisions

299 305

8.6 Notional approaches to syntactic categories and the question of category structure

313

9 Syntactic categories and language typology

322

9.1 Introduction

322

9.2 Investigating linguistic categories in language typology

325

9.2.1 Parts of speech or ‘word classes’ 9.2.2 Syntactic categories or parts of speech? 9.2.3 Lexical and syntactic categories 9.3 A grammatical model for language typology: Dik’s Functional Grammar 9.3.1 General assumptions, aims, and architecture of the grammar 9.3.2 Deriving underlying clause structures 9.3.3 Expression rules 9.3.4 Syntactic categories in FG 9.4 An alternative approach: Role and Reference Grammar 9.4.1 9.4.2 9.4.3 9.4.4

Syntactic structures Logical structures and semantic representations The linking system Syntactic vs. lexical categories in RRG

325 332 339

345

346 348 351 355 359 359 369 374 378

contents 9.5 The special situation of language typology 10 Syntactic categories and parts of speech: Two types of linguistic categorization 10.1 Syntactic categories in linguistic theories: results and conclusions 10.2 Parts of speech as cognitive lexical categories References Author Index Subject Index

ix 383

389 389 396 401 425 428

General Preface Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology provides overviews of the major approaches to subjects and questions at the centre of linguistic research in morphology and syntax. The volumes are accessible, critical, and up to date. Individually and collectively they aim to reveal the field’s intellectual history and theoretical diversity. Each book published in the series will characteristically contain: (1) a brief historical overview of relevant research in the subject; (2) a critical presentation of approaches from relevant (but usually seen as competing) theoretical perspectives to the phenomena and issues at hand, including an objective evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to the central problems and issues; (3) a balanced account of the current issues, problems, and opportunities relating to the topic, showing the degree of consensus or otherwise in each case. The volumes will thus provide researchers and graduate students concerned with syntax, morphology, and related aspects of semantics with a vital source of information and reference. In Syntactic Categories: Their Identification and Description in Linguistic Theories, Professor Gisa Rauh surveys a wide range of linguistic theories, investigating and discussing their identification and description of syntactic categories – the building blocks of sentences and the units of grammatical analysis. Her critical examination offers a systematic account of syntactic categories, provides insights into the functioning of various grammatical models, and deals with formal as well as functional theories of language and with language typology. Robert D. Van Valin, Jr General Editor University at Buffalo, The State University of New York Heinrich Heine University, Du¨sseldorf

Acknowledgements This book owes its existence to a number of people who have directly or indirectly contributed to the making of it. The first person to be mentioned is Robert D. Van Valin, Jr, the general editor of the series, who decided on its topic and its author. I am grateful to him for giving me the opportunity to write this book. It was quite a challenge but a rewarding one. Next I would like to thank Hans Thilo Tappe, whose wide-ranging and at the same time detailed knowledge of linguistic theories made him the best discussion partner I could have had concerning all linguistic matters. He has accompanied every section of this book with valuable comments and suggestions which without doubt have contributed to its quality. My thanks also go to Leah Bauke, Stephanie Goethe, and the members of various advanced linguistics classes in the English department at the University of Wuppertal who studied selected chapters of this book and in particular ensured that my discussions were clear and convincing. The comments they made were very valuable. The book has also profited from the expertise of Helga Helmich and above all Colin Foskett. Thank you for your support. For the preparation of the final version of the manuscript, my thanks go to Matthias Naumann and in particular to Boris Ku¨hne. It was a relief to know these matters were in good hands. I would also like to thank John Davey, the consultant editor for linguistics at Oxford University Press, for his friendliness, empathy, patience, support, and helpful advice while I was preparing and writing this book. I am extremely grateful to the rheumatologist Helmut E. Stierle, who immediately realized what the problem was when my right hand painfully and mysteriously refused its services. Without his successful therapy I would not have been able to physically finish this book. Last but not least, there are two men to whom I am indebted and who deserve my warmest thanks. The first is my husband, Klaus Peters. He never complained that I had to spend what must have seemed an interminable length of time at my desk. In fact, he encouraged and supported me whenever necessary and wherever possible. His interest in my work has been a constant source of the energy needed to complete a book like this in addition to my duties as a professor.

xii

acknowledgements

The second man I must thank is my former academic teacher, the late Thomas Jefferson Gardner of the University of Go¨ttingen. He was much more to his students than just a professor of linguistics, and it is unfortunate that he did not live to see this book published. I dedicate it to the honour of his memory. Gisa Rauh University of Wuppertal

List of Abbreviations A abl abs Acc, ACC, acc Act Adj, adj Adv, adv AdvP a-fns Ag Agr AgrO AgrOP AgrS AgrSP agt anim AP A-P Arg, ARG argmkp ARG-ST ARP ASP ATN Aux BV C CH

Adjective Ablative Absolutive Accusative Active Adjective Adverb Adverb Phrase Argument Functions Agent Agreement Object Agreement Object-Agreement Phrase Subject Agreement Subject-Agreement Phrase Agent Animate Adjective Phrase Articulatory-Perceptual System Argument Argument-Marking Preposition Argument Structure Argument Realization Principle Aspect Augmented Transition Network Auxiliary Bound Variable Complementizer Chain

xiv

list of abbreviations

CHL C-I cn cntn Comp, comp COMPS conj const CP CS c-selection CSR c-structure D, Det Decl DEF, def Deg deic d-fns dim dir DP D-structure dtv E ECP EPP erg EVID F F0 F1 F2

Computational System of the Human Language Conceptual-Intentional System Common Noun Count Noun Complementizer Complements Conjunction Constant Complementizer Phrase Complex Symbol Categorial Selection Canonical Structural Realization Constituent Structure Determiner Declarative Definite Degree Deictic Discourse Functions Dimension Directive Determiner Phrase Deep Structure Ditransitive Verb Event(uality) Empty Category Principle Extended Projection Principle Ergative Evidential Functor Functional Head First Functional Projection Second Functional Projection

list of abbreviations f-description FG FI Fin Foc f-selection f-structure G Go GP GPSG HPSG I IF I-language Imp infl INT, Int IP LDD LDP LF LFG loc LP LS LSC lxm M masc massn max MLC

Functional Description Functional Grammar Full Interpretation Finite Focus Functional Selection Functional Structure Grade Goal General Principle Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar Inflection Illocutionary Force Internal Language Imperative Inflecting Interrogative Inflection Phrase Long-Distance Dependencies Left-Detached Position Logical Form Lexical-Functional Grammar Locative Linear Precedence Constraint Logical Structure Layered Structure of the Clause Lexeme Modal Auxiliary Masculine Mass Noun Maximal Minimal Link Condition/Constraint

xv

xvi


Mod MOD MP MP MR N N Neg NOM non-a-fns non-d-fns NP NPIP ntr NUC Num, NUM Obj, OBJ OBLG ocv P P PART pass PER, PERS PF piv Plu pn PoCS PP PPT PrCS Pred, PRED

Modality Modifier Minimalist Program Modifier Phrase Macrorole Noun Referentiability Negation Nominal Non-Argument Functions Non-Discourse Functions Noun Phrase NP-Initial Position Neuter Nucleus Number Object Obligation Object-Control Verb Predicability Preposition Participle Passive Person Phonological Form Prepositional Intransitive Verb Plural Proper Noun Postcore Slot Preposition Phrase Principles and Parameters Theory Precore Slot Predicate

list of abbreviations PredP predp prep PRES proj Pron, pron prox prp Prt prt PSA psp ptv Q, QNT QUE, ques R RDP Rec REF, ref RESTR R-expression RLN RP RRG S scv SEM Sg, SG, sg siv SoA SOV SP Spec, SPR

Predicate Phrase Predicational Preposition Preposition Present Projection Pronoun Proximal Present Participle Particle Partitive Privileged Syntactic Argument Past Participle Prepositional Transitive Verb Quantifier Question Referent Right-Detached Position Recipient Reference Restriction Referential Expression Relation Reference Phrase Role and Reference Grammar Sentence Subject-Control Verb Semantics Singular Strict Intransitive Verb State of Affairs Subject Object Verb Specific Principle Specifier

xvii

xviii


srv s-selection S-structure stv sub Subj, SUBJ SVO SYN T TOP, Top TP Tr tu tv UG V VAL VP

Subject-Raising Verb Semantic Selection Surface Structure Strict-Transitive Verb Below Subject Subject Verb Object Syntax Tense Topic Tense Phrase Transitivity Second Person Transitive Verb Universal Grammar Verb Valence Verb Phrase

1 Introduction 1.1 Categories and categorization in linguistics This book is concerned with syntactic categories and thus with a speciWc type of categorization of linguistic items. It seems therefore appropriate to start the introductory chapter with some remarks on categories and categorization, both in general and speciWcally in linguistics. Categorizing is a fundamental aspect of how humans process reality. The formation of categories gives structure to the enormous amount of sensory input. Items that share properties are combined to form groups, and it is these groups that deWne categories. Because of the shared properties of their members, categories enable us to formulate generalizations. In the human perception of reality, the formation of categories thus serves cognitive economy. Insights and statements no longer refer to individual items, but can be generalized to whole groups which are subsumed under categories. Because of their generalizing nature, categories are indispensable in any area of scientiWc study. Any science will quite naturally systematize its object of study. This means, above all, forming categories and describing the relations between them, thereby providing a structure and thus yielding insights into the object of study. When forming categories, it is necessary to establish the basis for their formation and also what purpose they serve, thus showing what generalizations follow from the formation of categories and how these generalizations yield insights into the object of study. However, when considering what linguists say about categories, no clear picture emerges. What is immediately obvious is a variety of terminology, including the terms ‘parts of speech’, ‘word classes’, ‘form classes’, ‘lexical categories’, ‘grammatical categories’, and ‘syntactic categories’. What often remains unclear is whether these terms refer to diVerent kinds of categories or whether they are more or less synonymous.

2

syntactic categories

That the latter is the case with regard to some of these terms is claimed by Haspelmath, among others. He starts his 2001 article ‘Word Classes and Parts of Speech’ by listing ‘the ten traditional categories’ (ibid. 16538), which he calls ‘word classes’, namely Noun, Verb, Adjective, Adverb, Pronoun, Preposition/Adposition, Conjunction, Numeral, Article, and Interjection. Haspelmath continues: Besides the term word class, the older term part of speech (Latin pars orationis) is still often used, although it is now quite opaque (originally it referred to sentence constituents). The term word class was introduced in the Wrst half of the twentieth century by structuralist linguistics. Another roughly equivalent term, common especially in Chomskyan linguistics is ‘syntactic category’ (although technically this refers not only to lexical categories such as nouns and verbs, but also to phrasal categories such as noun phrases and verb phrases). (Haspelmath 2001: 16539)

According to this statement, Haspelmath considers the terms ‘word class’, ‘part of speech’, ‘syntactic category’, and ‘lexical category’ to be equivalent or at least ‘roughly equivalent’, and thus to be synonyms or near-synonyms. As far as the terms ‘part of speech’ and ‘word class’ are concerned, linguists are divided over whether these are in fact synonyms, as claimed by Haspelmath, or not. According to BloomWeld, to whom Haspelmath implicitly refers, since it was probably BloomWeld who introduced the term ‘word class’ (cf. 1914: 108), this is not the case. BloomWeld says of the relationship between parts of speech and word classes: ‘The maximum word-classes of a language are the parts of speech of that language’ (1926: 160); and: ‘The term parts of speech is traditionally applied to the most inclusive and fundamental wordclasses of a language’ (1933: 196). From this, it follows that the sets of parts of speech and word classes are not identical. Apart from the parts of speech, there are other ‘less inclusive’ and ‘less fundamental’ word classes. However, Sasse (1993) shares Haspelmath’s view, and refers to a remark on parts of speech by Lyons (1977), which runs as follows: ‘We will assume that every word-lexeme is assigned, in the analysis of any language-system to one, and only one, such class’ (ibid. 423). Sasse’s comment on this is to say ‘we will call such classes word classes’, adding ‘word classes are lexical categories’ (1993: 648). This shows that Sasse not only agrees with Haspelmath’s claim that ‘part of speech’ and ‘word class’ are synonyms, but that, in addition, he shares his view that ‘word class’ and ‘lexical category’ are synonyms.

introduction

3

Aaronson and Ferres (1984) also share this latter view and deWne ‘lexical category’ as ‘the traditional lexical category or form class of words as deWned in dictionaries (e.g. noun, verb)’ (ibid. 21). However, other linguists interpret ‘lexical category’ in a diVerent way, namely as a subset of Haspelmath’s list: e.g. noun, verb, and adjective (e.g. Chomsky 1981: 48; Baker 2003); noun, verb, adjective, and preposition (postposition) (e.g. Chomsky 1986a: 160; Chomsky 1986b: 2; Haegeman 1994: 146; Wunderlich 1996: 2); or noun, verb, adjective, adverb, and preposition (e.g. Radford 1997: 37 f; Haegeman and Gue´ron 1999: 58). These linguists contrast lexical categories with functional categories, which include, among others, complementizers, determiners, pronouns, and auxiliaries (cf. e.g. Radford 1997b: 45). The term ‘word-level category’ is used for what Haspelmath calls ‘lexical category’ in order to distinguish this category type from phrasal categories (e.g. Radford 1988: 56). The synonymy or near-synonymy of ‘lexical category’ (¼ ‘part of speech’) and ‘form class’, as is assumed by Aaronson and Ferres (see above), or of ‘part of speech’ and ‘syntactic category’, as put forward by Haspelmath, is something that BloomWeld would not have accepted. For it was above all BloomWeld – later followed by others, including Lyons (1977: 423 f.) – who took great care to distinguish between parts of speech and form-classes, the latter comprising morphological categories on the one hand, and syntactic categories on the other. This broad classiWcation is a result of the structuralists’ view that morphology and syntax form a continuum and that there is in principle no diVerence between these two domains. In accordance with this view, BloomWeld identiWes ‘numberaYxes’ and ‘Wnite verb expressions’ as examples of morphological and syntactic form-classes (e.g. 1926: 159) and provides the following characterization of a syntactic form-class in a discussion of syntax and syntactic constructions: ‘All the forms which can Wll a given position [in a construction] thereby constitute a form-class’ (1933: 185). Lyons’s characterization is rather similar, arguing in favour of a deWnition of ‘form-class’ ‘in terms of syntactic equivalence’ (1977: 424), and stating: [T]wo forms, fi and fj, are members of the same form-class Fx if and only if they are intersubstitutable (i.e. have the same distribution) throughout the sentences of the language. (ibid.)

Anderson (e.g. 1997) and other linguists would agree with this deWnition of syntactic categories as a subset of form-classes, distinguishing

4


them from the parts of speech. By contrast, Sasse, and also Haspelmath, not only considers syntactic categories and parts of speech as ‘roughly equivalent’, but apparently as ‘fully equivalent’, for he states: ‘The analysis of syntactic categories was familiar to the traditional grammarians under the title parts of speech’ (1993: 646). The same applies to Croft, who originally described noun, verb, and adjective as ‘syntactic categories’ (1984, 1990, 1991), but later gives the very same description of the very same categories for ‘parts of speech’ (2000, 2001, 2005). The examples selected here, to which others could be added, serve to illustrate that the terms employed for linguistic categories do not give a clear picture. On the one hand, diVerent category labels are used for the same set of items, and on the other, the same category label refers to diVerent sets of items. As is often the case, the confusion is not only a terminological matter. For if there were a clear deWnition for each use of a term, which allowed items and category labels to be assigned to each other, it would be a simple matter to exchange one category label for another and still know what it refers to. However, it is precisely here that one of the problems of linguistic categorization is to be found. For it is the exception rather than the rule to Wnd a clear explanation of the basis on which categories are established, the kind of generalization this categorization expresses, and the insights into language which are thereby gained. What is especially striking is the lack of a recognizable and clearly deWned basis for the categorization of parts of speech, the most traditional and most frequently discussed linguistic categories. Their names and typical representatives are familiar to anyone concerned with language, and the parts of speech roughly correspond to Haspelmath’s list. It is because of this lack of a recognizable and clearly deWned basis that it is not at all clear what generalizations these categorizations are intended to express and what insights into language can be expected. It was above all in the linguistic approach known as structuralism that the basis for categorizing the parts of speech inherited from ancient Greece was criticized as problematic. This was because the traditional criteria for category membership applied to, and by and large applicable to, European languages were not suitable for the identiWcation of analogous categories in non-European languages such as the languages of Native Americans in North America (cf. Boas 1911). Important criticism was Wnally voiced by Gleason (1965: 114 V.). On the

introduction

5

one hand, he demonstrates that diVerent criteria are employed for diVerent parts of speech – for adverbs and nouns, for example, namely the criterion of modiWcation for the former (‘An adverb is a word that modiWes a verb, adjective or another adverb’, ibid. 115) and the criterion of reference as well as the criterion of inXection for the latter (‘A noun is a name of a person, place or thing’ and ‘A noun is a word which forms a plural by adding -s or the equivalent’, ibid.). On the other hand, he shows that items that are traditionally assigned to a part of speech by no means fulWl all these criteria. Thus, although the noun table denotes a thing and is inXected for plural by adding -s, the noun handshake only fulWls the criterion of inXection and denotes an action rather than a thing; and cattle does not fulWl the inXection criterion and denotes a set of items rather than an individual thing. Based on this criticism, Gleason demands that parts of speech be identiWed and described on the basis of a uniform set of criteria. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to comply with this demand. Yet this has failed to lead to a greater degree of clarity, as there are now competing proposals, each oVering a uniform basis but incompatible with the others. Thus, on the one hand there are proposals that advocate a notional basis for the description of parts of speech (e.g. Lyons 1966), and on the other hand there are approaches that favour a syntactic basis (e.g. Emonds 1987). There is also a proposal claiming that parts of speech express discourse functions (Hopper and Thompson 1984) and another which instead identiWes them as expressions of propositional acts (e.g. Croft 2000). As a result, it has become even less clear what kinds of insights are to be gained into language by the identiWcation of parts of speech, ultimately raising doubts about the point of identifying parts of speech at all. Others as well as Gleason have noted that the traditional criteria for assigning linguistic items to a speciWc part of speech are not fulWlled by all the items that are usually included as members of this part of speech, and this has given rise to new questions instead of providing answers to old ones. One consequence is for the internal structure of parts of speech and thus for the structure of linguistic categories in general. Until the 1970s, it was taken for granted that categories should be deWned following the classical, Aristotelian approach, i.e. referring to a Wxed set of necessary and suYcient features that are exhibited by all the members of a category, with category membership determined on the basis of such a Wxed set of features.

6


Fillmore (1975) compares such a procedure to checking features on a ‘checklist’. The results of various experiments led the cognitive psychologist Rosch (e.g. 1973a,b, 1977a,b, 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975) to postulate a diVerent basis for the human categorization of the real world, and thus for the formation of cognitive categories. According to her, cognitive categories do not correspond to a set of entities featuring identical criterial properties. Instead they exhibit a prototype structure. This implies that such categories have a core, represented by the prototype, which displays the characteristic properties of this category, and is thus its best exemplar. Other members of the category are arranged around this prototype and associated with it by ‘family resemblance’. This term used by Rosch and Mervis (cf. 1975: 575 V.) is based on Wittgenstein’s statements on categorial structures and the relationship between members of a category (1953 [2001]: 27e f.), statements which had previously received little attention. ‘Family resemblance’ here expresses the idea that entities share several or only one property with each other and/or with the prototype, but that they do not share all the relevant properties. The prototype is commonly seen as occupying a central position, and entities that are located in its vicinity share properties with this prototype, while entities that are located at a greater distance from the prototype share properties with those category members that are closer to the prototype, and so forth (cf. e.g. Givoń 1989: 39). The most extreme case within such a prototype approach is that two entities do not share any property and exhibit membership of the same category only by sharing properties with other entities of that category. It is also the case that categories of this kind do not have clearly deWned boundaries. Transitions between categories are smooth, the result being that it is perfectly justiWable to claim that entities at the adjacent peripheries of two categories can be members of either of these two categories. It is above all the prototypes that are responsible for perceiving prototype categories as distinct ones. The assumption of such a type of categorization for linguistic categories was Wrst suggested by LakoV (1987: 58 V.) and then by Taylor (1989 [1995]). It is above all Taylor who discusses the categorial structure of ‘grammatical categories’ in greater detail, which according to him include ‘word classes – the traditional parts of speech’ and ‘syntactic categories like noun phrase’ (1989 [1995]: 183). He takes up the problem mentioned by Gleason (see above), namely that not all the items that are assigned to grammatical categories such as noun or

introduction

7

adverb exhibit all the properties associated with these categories, and he proposes a solution to this problem by assuming that these categories have a prototype structure. Thus, grammatical categories have ‘a prototype structure, with central members sharing a range of both syntactic and semantic attributes’ (ibid. 196). Following prototype theory, other category members can then share properties either with the central members or with one another, but in no case do they have to exhibit all the properties of the central members. This view of the structure of linguistic categories has now become widespread, but it raises new questions, since Taylor subsumes both ‘word classes’ or ‘parts of speech’ and ‘syntactic categories such as noun phrase’ under the label ‘grammatical categories’. This alignment, together with Taylor’s comments, clearly indicates that he follows Haspelmath in not distinguishing between word classes and syntactic categories that are represented by words rather than by phrases. If, on the other hand, such a distinction is made, an important question arises regarding whether or not the assumption of a prototype structure for categories, which seems at Wrst glance convincing for the traditional parts of speech, is also appropriate for syntactic categories. Can it be concluded that the formation of linguistic categories is made on the basis of prototypes because this corresponds to human categorization, as shown by Rosch’s experiments? Although this book is expressly devoted to syntactic categories rather than to the parts of speech, the fuzziness and uncertainties found with regard to the latter are nevertheless of special relevance for a number of reasons. On the one hand, as indicated above, some linguists assume that the terms ‘part of speech’ and ‘syntactic category’ are almost synonymous, i.e. that the traditional parts of speech and syntactic categories are more or less the same. On the other hand, various attempts have been made to describe parts of speech on a syntactic basis and thus as syntactic categories. Finally, as will be shown in what follows, even when expressly dealing with syntactic categories rather than with parts of speech, the names of the latter (‘noun’, ‘verb’, ‘adjective’, etc.) are used repeatedly. This creates the impression that it is in fact the familiar parts of speech that are meant, and ultimately no distinction is drawn or even recognizable between syntactic categories and parts of speech. For this reason, a book which is concerned with syntactic categories will also have to deal with parts of speech in order to show that parts of speech are not identical to syntactic categories, and perhaps also to show why parts

8


of speech play such a dominant role in the categorization of linguistic items. Last but not least, issues concerning the ways in which linguistic items are categorized are relevant to the subject matter of the present book, since one question to be answered is whether syntactic categories exhibit a classical, Aristotelian structure with the members of a category sharing all the necessary and suYcient properties of this category, or whether a more appropriate description is based on a prototype structure with a best exemplar displaying all the relevant properties of the category to which other, less ‘suited’ members of the category are associated via family resemblance. However, what is much more important in a book on syntactic categories is above all an answer to the question of what syntactic categories are and what insights into language as an object of scientiWc study are to be gained by their identiWcation and description. 1.2 Subject matter, aims, and outline The subject matter of this book is syntactic categories and their identiWcation and description in linguistic theories. Syntactic categories are part of the syntactic description of languages, and the syntactic description of languages is concerned with the structure of sentences. Sentences are complex syntactic objects that are composed of less complex syntactic objects. Syntactic tests, which are part and parcel of any introduction to syntax, show that in addition to a phonetically manifested linear order, sentences exhibit a hierarchical structure. Linear order and hierarchical structure together represent the essential aspects of the structure of sentences. This overall structure derives from the positioning of linguistic items in sentences, something that cannot be changed at will, as well as from the relationships between these items. What can in principle be changed, however, are the possibilities for linguistic items to occur in given positions. This means that it is generally not the case that a given position can be occupied by just one particular item. Instead, items in given positions are interchangeable, and where this is possible, the items form a syntactic category. This is the basis for the deWnition of a syntactic category, which Wrst of all refers to individual languages. A syntactic category is the set of linguistic items that can occupy the same positions in the structures of the sentences of a given language.

introduction

9

This is an extensional deWnition which exclusively refers to the extension of a category, i.e. to the set of its members, and for which it is suYcient simply to list these members. In contrast, an intensional deWnition is based on the set of those properties of linguistic items which enable them to be placed in the same positions in the sentence structures of a language. The latter deWnition is the more demanding and the more revealing of the two, since it requires both an identiWcation of the members of a syntactic category and a description of the properties that are relevant for category membership. Finally, such a description provides insights into which units can occur in given positions of sentence structures and which cannot, as well as into the properties that are responsible for this. Accordingly, it can be stated for which properties items must be speciWed in order to be able to occupy given positions in sentence structures. Linguistic items whose membership of syntactic categories is to be determined can be of various kinds. To begin with, they can be words. However, they can also be larger or smaller units, that is, phrases or morphemes. While these are normally units that are phonetically realized, phonetically empty units that are solely represented by semantic and syntactic features can likewise assume positions in (abstract) sentence structures, thus acquiring the status of syntactic categories. Just what units are identiWed and described as syntactic categories can depend on the particular theoretical framework. It will therefore be a major concern of this book to establish what syntactic categories are identiWed and described in the theories under consideration, above all analysing how this is done. Naturally, the identiWcation and description of words as members of syntactic categories will play a central role, since no theory can dispense with such a description of words, which are the basic units of sentences. It is the primary aim of this book to provide an overview of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in various linguistic theories. This above all entails establishing the means by which syntactic categories are described in particular theories, i.e. what the criteria are on which the categorial descriptions are based. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that such an overview could limit itself to just giving the category labels or categorial descriptions that are presented in the various theories under the heading ‘syntactic categories’. It is essential to any description of a genuinely syntactic category that items assigned to it on the basis of their description actually fulWl the requirements of being a syntactic category, i.e. such a categorial

10


description should determine the possible positions of the category members in sentence structures. It is therefore necessary to investigate whether, and if so how, in a given model of grammar based on a particular theory, linguistic items are placed in those positions in sentence structures that are appropriate, and how this is reXected in their categorial description. This requires a discussion of the basic assumptions of the theories presented, as well as of the essential aspects of the models of grammar, in order to show how sentence structures are built within these theories and what role is played by the categorial descriptions. This approach leads to another aim of the present book, which is the evaluation of the theories under consideration with regard to their ability, or at least their potential, to describe syntactic categories, i.e. to describe category membership in such a way that by applying the means provided by the particular grammar the items categorized are placed in appropriate positions. This also includes the question of the appropriateness of descriptions to categorize not only central linguistic items, in particular items from the set of words, but ideally all of them. A critical discussion of the various theories as well as of the categorial descriptions based on these theories is intended to sharpen the reader’s understanding of what exactly syntactic categories are, what they are expected to do, what status they have in a grammar and how they should be designed in order to fulWl their task. In addition, based on the observation made in 1.1 that parts of speech and syntactic categories are often equated and thus even mistaken for one another, this book not only aims to point out that the traditional parts of speech and their descriptions have little to do with syntactic categories, but also to develop an explanation as to why they repeatedly play a role in the context of the description of syntactic categories. This necessitates determining the precise status of parts of speech. The traditional parts of speech are often treated as identical with syntactic categories, and they inXuence the description of syntactic categories even where this is not the case. For this reason, chapter 2 will be devoted to them. It will examine the context in which the traditional parts of speech were developed and the role the properties assigned to them played in their original theoretical and grammatical environment. This will be done by presenting the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ of Dionysius Thrax, dating from the Wrst century BC, and the parts of speech it describes, since this is generally assumed to be the origin of the traditional parts of speech. Chapter 2 will also introduce the

introduction

11

17th-century Port Royal grammar of Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot and the description of the parts of speech in this framework, which is likewise based on ideas dating back to ancient Greece, although a diVerent perspective is taken, thus leading to a diVerent approach. What is pointed out in both cases is that the descriptions of the parts of speech are entirely independent of any syntactic properties. Chapter 3 will give an overview of how American Structuralists criticized traditional grammar and its description of language, including its basis for a categorization of words as parts of speech. Following an outline of what Structuralists considered an appropriate description of language, the approaches put forward by Harris (1951) and Fries (1952) will be presented and examined as two examples of how syntactic categories are identiWed and described as distributional classes. The fourth chapter starts with an introduction to Chomsky’s early views on an adequate linguistic theory that includes language acquisition. It then presents his Wrst two generative models of grammar, i.e. Chomsky (1957) and Chomsky (1965), as well as the descriptions of syntactic categories they provide. The critical evaluation in this chapter will also consider alternative proposals put forward, in particular those of Generative Semanticists. Chapter 5 will continue the discussion of Chomsky’s views on linguistic theory and the models of grammar developed within his framework, including a description of syntactic categories. Special consideration will be given to the Theory of Principles and Parameters and the Minimalist Program. Besides Chomsky’s own approaches (e.g. 1981a, 1986a, 1993, 1995), a large number of complementary proposals will be considered which above all tackle the issue of categorization. The sixth chapter will look at two approaches to the description of grammar that are competitors to Chomskyan views although they are also considered to belong to the formally-oriented theories of language. These are Bresnan’s Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG) (1982a,b, 2001) on the one hand and on the other hand Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG), developed chieXy by Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994). Here too, the basic theoretical assumptions and the models of grammar are considered Wrst, before analysing and discussing how syntactic categories are identiWed and described within these frameworks. The results of this analysis are then compared with those obtained from the discussions in earlier chapters. Chapters 7 and 8 will focus on linguistic approaches which, unlike those previously considered, expressly advocate a notional basis for

12


syntactic or grammatical categories. Some general introductory remarks will precede a discussion of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (e.g. 1987, 1991a, 2003), which has a functional rather than a formal orientation, including his description of grammatical categories. This will be followed by a consideration of how syntactic categories can be described in this context. Attention will then turn to Anderson’s Localist Case Grammar (e.g. 1991, 1997, 2006a, 2007) and the way syntactic categories are described here (chapter 8). Unlike Langacker’s approach, Anderson’s theoretical framework is classiWed as a formal one. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of whether a classical or a prototypical structure would be appropriate within notionally based categorial descriptions. The ninth chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories within the framework of language-typological research. After an evaluation of various approaches that show a trend in typological research, the discussion will Wrst of all centre on Functional Grammar as developed in particular by Dik (e.g. 1978, 1983, 1997), and on the description of syntactic categories it provides. This will be followed by a critical evaluation of Foley and Van Valin’s Role and Reference Grammar (Foley and Van Valin 1984; Van Valin 1993, 1995, 2005, 2008; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), including a discussion of how this framework tries to distinguish between syntactic and lexical categories. Chapter 10 will begin by taking up and summarizing developments in the description of syntactic categories as found in the approaches considered in this book, with further discussion of the basis of these approaches. This chapter will also return to the question of the status of parts of speech, presenting an analysis that distinguishes them clearly from syntactic categories but explains their role in connection with the categorization of linguistic items.

2 The traditional parts of speech 2.1 Introduction It is an astonishing fact that, despite radical changes during the last two thousand years in the way languages are described, the traditional parts of speech such as noun, verb, adverb, preposition, and conjunction, still play a dominant role in the categorization of words. What is also astonishing is that this holds true for reference grammars as well as for models of grammar based on rival linguistic theories which otherwise have little in common. Thus, for example, the reference grammars by Quirk et al. (1972, 1985), Huddleston (1984), Alexander (1988), or Huddleston and Pullum (2002) all dedicate whole chapters or subchapters to the characterization of these categories in English. And linguistic theories as different as Generative Transformational Grammar (e.g. Chomsky 1957, 1965), the Minimalist Program (e.g. Chomsky 1995; Radford 1997b), Functional Grammar (e.g. Dik 1991, 1989 [1997a], 1997b), or Cognitive Grammar (e.g. Langacker 1987), to mention just a few, also make use of these categories. The fact that different approaches often use the same label to designate different categories is to begin with unimportant, but will prove to be very significant in the course of this book. It is also remarkable that, despite their often-attested shortcomings for the description of non-Indo-European languages, these traditional parts of speech are repeatedly used here too to serve this purpose (cf. e.g. Schachter 1985; Hengeveld 1992; Croft 2000; Wierzbicka 2000).1 What is especially interesting in this context is the frequent tacit assumption that word classes like noun, verb, adverb, etc. are given units whose existence in the European languages is beyond doubt and that only two questions are of any relevance: first, what are the properties that 1 At this point it is of no importance that the definitions vary. It should only be noted that the traditional parts of speech play an essential role for the identification of word classes.

14


identify these categories and second, do these categories occur in the language under investigation or not. It is significant for the present discussion that the traditional parts of speech are also typically identified and described as ‘syntactic categories’ (cf. e.g. Emonds 1987; Zimmermann 1990) although they were not introduced into the description of grammar as such, as will be seen in the following. These observations are sufficient reason to start an investigation of syntactic categories in various grammatical theories with a consideration of how the traditional parts of speech were originally seen. In doing this, it is important to examine them not in isolation but in their grammatical context in order to determine their original role. Section 2.2 therefore starts by examining the background to the development of the grammar which introduced the parts of speech and founded the tradition that has lasted two thousand years. This is followed by a description of this grammar. Section 2.3 presents the parts of speech identified in this grammar and explains the basis of their description within it. In section 2.4, two late 19th-century grammars are used as examples to illustrate the fact that about two thousand years later, more or less the same parts of speech are identified and described in more or less the same way. One of the grammars chosen deals with Romance languages and the other with English, and it is demonstrated that successful identification and description of the parts of speech depends on the characteristics of the particular language or languages. This led to the introduction of other criteria for the description of word classes, as section 2.5 explains. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the problems related to the identification of the traditional parts of speech. 2.2 The grammar of Dionysius Thrax The identification and description of parts of speech such as noun, verb, adverb, conjunction, etc. goes back to grammatical descriptions which were developed by philosophers and philologists in Greece before the first century BC, and summed up in the grammar of Dionysius Thrax (170-90 BC), the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯. This grammar was written at the end of the second and the beginning of the first century BC2 and is considered the first comprehensive and systematic grammatical description published 2 Di Benedetto (1958-59, 2000) presents doubts about the authorship of the Te´khne¯ and about when it was written. According to Frede, however, these doubts have been removed: ‘nowadays the text is generally accepted as genuine’ (1977: 52). This view is taken by Wouters (1979: 36) and Erbse (1980) as well. See also the discussion in Robins (1993: 42 ff.).

the traditional parts of speech

15

in the western world. A student of Aristarchus (217-145 BC), Dionysius Thrax was born in Alexandria but because of political unrest later fled to Rhodes, where he taught. He was one of the Alexandrians, and was active in the Greek colony of Alexandria, where in the third century BC the famous library had been established. It was in connection with the establishment of this library that intensive philological activities had begun in Alexandria. One of the aims was to collect, restore, and systematize the great literary works of the past in order to make them accessible for contemporaries and to preserve them for future generations. This required careful work on the original papyruses and led to the development of techniques for editing, which included explanations and interpretations of the texts and thus promoted the development of literary criticism. In general, the great Alexandrians who developed these techniques were themselves writers and thus had a special relationship to the texts they edited. For an understanding of the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, it is important to know that its grammatical descriptions grew out of language studies which aimed at producing critical editions of texts. The principal aim was to preserve the purity and perfection of the language of writers from the past. It was not until later, when the development of a grammar became an end in itself and grammars were used as pedagogical instruments, that the supposed perfect language of these writers was set as the norm for everyday language use. In order to make the pronunciation of the texts easier, these philologists introduced stress marks and punctuation3 in their editions, subsequently identifying and formulating rules.4 For the formulation of stress rules it was necessary to identify and describe syllables, which in turn required an identification of the sounds of the language. In order to understand and interpret the texts it was important to identify the words which constituted the texts and to determine their meaning. And in order to determine the meaning of words it was often necessary to take into account their origin and their history, which led to the development of etymology. The study of words was a major concern of Aristophanes (257-180 BC), the fourth librarian at the library of Alexandria,5 whose Lexeis 3 Pfeiffer (1968: 180) remarks that the early Ptolemaic papyruses did not have any stress marks and that Aristophanes was the first to place them in Homeric and other texts. 4 According to Pfeiffer (1968: 219), it was Aristarchus (217-145 BC) who in his commentaries gave reasons for his practice of stress placement and punctuation and thus provided the basis for the formulation of rules. 5 The librarians before Aristophanes were Zenodot, Apollonius Rhodius, and Eratosthenes (cf. Pfeiffer 1968: 153 ff.).

16


established him as a lexicographer. It was also Aristophanes who, when collecting and describing words, discovered recurrent patterns in Greek declensions and set up general rules for their formation. According to him, the regularities discovered were based on the principle of ÆºªÆ (‘analogy’). This principle was recognized by his student Aristarchus as a general principle of language, i.e. of stress placement and morphology as well as of interpretation, and it provided an important basis for the grammatical descriptions in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, the grammar of Aristarchus’ own student Dionysius. The following brief characterization of this grammar demonstrates that the aims of these philologists in their work on editing texts and the insights into language they gained in this context strongly influenced the approach adopted by Dionysius. The Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ starts with a general characterization of a grammar and lists its constituent parts:6 Grammar is an experimental knowledge ( ØæÆ) of the usages of language as generally current among poets and prose writers. It is divided into six parts: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Trained reading with due regard to Prosody. Explanation according to poetical figures. Ready statement of dialectal peculiarities and allusions. Discovery of Etymology. An accurate account of analogies. Criticism of poetical productions, which is the noblest part of grammatic art. (T. Davidson 1874: 326 f.)

In accordance with the elements of a grammar presented above, the first part of the Te´khne¯, which comprises sections 2 to 11, is concerned with matters that relate to reading aloud and thus to aspects of the description of language relevant to its pronunciation: ‘ON READING’, ‘ON TONE’, ‘ON PUNCTUATION’, ‘WHEREIN DOES THE FULL STOP DIFFER FROM THE COMMA?’, ‘ON RHAPSODY’, ‘ON ELEMENTS’(LETTERS’), ‘ON SYLLABLES’, ‘ON LONG SYLLABLES’, ON SHORT SYLLABLES’, ‘ON COMMON SYLLABLES’ (T. Davidson 1874: 327 ff.). A second and final part, sections 12 to 20, deals with words and their categorization on the basis of ‘[a]n accurate account of analogies’ (ibid. 326). In this part, following a definition of the unit 6 The following quotations are taken from the translation by T. Davidson (1874), which is here preferred to Kemp’s translation (1987).


17

‘word’, definitions and characterizations of eight parts of speech are presented which will be looked at in detail in the next section of this chapter. It should be noted here that syntax is not part of the grammar of Dionysius Thrax since in the Greek grammar of the first century BC syntax did not play any role. In fact, it did not become a concern of grammatical description until three hundred years later in the grammar of Apollonius Dyscolus, which was a further development of Dionysius’ work.7 Without any doubt then, the parts of speech defined in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ cannot represent ‘syntactic’ categories. This, however, does not mean that they do not represent ‘grammatical’ categories, as will be seen in the following. 2.3 The parts of speech in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ In his grammar, Dionysius Thrax describes eight parts of speech: noun, verb, participle, article, pronoun, preposition, adverb, and conjunction.8 In order to give the reader of this book as accurate an impression as possible of the definitions and characterizations of these eight parts of speech, these are quoted here in his own words (as translated by T. Davidson 1874): 1. A Noun is a declinable part of speech, signifying something either concrete or abstract (concrete, as stone; abstract, as education); common or proper (common, as man, horse; proper, as Socrates, Plato). It has five accidents: genders, species, forms, numbers, and cases. (ibid. 331) 2. A Verb is an indeclinable word, indicating time, person and number, and showing activity or passivity. The verb has eight accidents: Moods, 7 This does not mean that syntax was altogether unknown at that time. Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 BC), a contemporary of Dionysius, devoted books 14 to 25 of his grammar De Lingua Latina to syntax. Of the preceding books, six are concerned with etymology (2-7) and six with morphology (8-13). Of the 25 books, only some – books 5 to 10 – have survived (cf. e.g. D. J. Taylor 2000). The completely different structure of this grammar as well as the fact that Varro – unlike Dionysius – distinguishes only four parts of speech (words with case: nouns, including pronouns and adjectives; words with tense: verbs; words with both case and tense: participles; and words without case or tense: particles) strongly suggests that there was no influence in either direction. 8 It is said that it was Aristarchus, Dionysius’ teacher, who was the first to identify eight parts of speech (e.g. Kemp 1987: 171). According to Frede (1977: 55), this claim was first made by Quintilian (book I, chapter 4, paragraph 20), who assigns the identification of eight parts of speech to Aristarchus. Frede points out, however, that it is by no means certain that the parts of speech identified by Aristarchus are identical to those listed by Dionysius since no work on parts of speech by Aristarchus exists.

18

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

syntactic categories Dispositions (voices!), Species, Forms, Numbers, Tenses, Persons, Conjugations. (ibid. 335) A Participle is a word partaking of the nature both of nouns and verbs. It has all the accidents which belong to nouns as well as those which belong to verbs, except mood and person. (ibid. 336) An Article is a declinable part of speech prefixed or subjoined to the various cases of nouns . . . . It has three accidents: Gender, Number, and Case. (ibid.) A Pronoun is a word assumed instead of a noun, and indicating definite persons. It has six accidents: Person, Gender, Number, Case, Form, and Species. (ibid.) A Preposition is a word placed before any of the parts of speech, both in Composition and in Syntax.9 (ibid. 337) An Adverb is an indeclinable part of speech, said of a verb or added to a verb. Of the Adverbs, some are Simple, and others Compound – . . . Some are indicative of time . . . . Some indicate manner . . . ; some, quality . . . ; some, quantity . . . ; some, number . . . ; some, place . . . . Some Adverbs signify a wish . . . ; some express horror . . . ; some, denial or negation. (ibid. 337 f.) A Conjunction is a word binding together a thought in order and filling up the hiatuses of speech. Of conjunctions, some are copulative, some disjunctive, some conjunctive, some præter-conjunctive, some causative, some dubitative, some conclusive, and some expletive. (ibid. 338)

In the text of Dionysius’ grammar, these definitions are followed by further information which, supported by examples, explains the terms introduced and describes the phenomena, making use of further categorial specifications. For example, the definition of ‘Noun’ is followed by an explanation of terms such as Genders, Species, Forms, Numbers, and Cases. With the help of examples, Dionysius then states which genders, species, forms, etc. have to be distinguished. Thus, three categories of Gender[s] are named: ‘masculine’, ‘feminine’, and ‘neuter’ (cf. T. Davidson 1874: 331). ‘[P]rimitive’ and ‘derivative’ are distinguished as Species of nouns and verbs (cf. ibid. 331 and 335), and ‘simple, compound and super-compound’ as Forms (cf. ibid.). The category of Number[s] is divided into ‘singular, dual and plural’ (ibid. 332), and that of Case[s] into ‘the right’ (‘nominative’), ‘the generic’ (‘possessive’), ‘the dative’, ‘the accusative’, and ‘the vocative’ (cf. ibid. 333). The verbal category of Mood[s] is divided into ‘Indicative, 9 The term ‘syntax’ at this point is an interpretation by the translator. Kemp, in his 1987 translation, uses the term ‘combination’.


19

Imperative, Optative, Subjunctive and Infinitive’ (ibid. 335), and that of Disposition[s] into ‘Activity, Passivity and Mediality’ (ibid.). Three Tenses are distinguished – ‘Present, Past, Future’ (ibid. 335) – with a further distinction for ‘Past’ into ‘Imperfect, Perfect, Pluperfect and Aorist’ (ibid.). The definitions and characterizations given here demonstrate that a division into parts of speech is first and foremost based on morphological properties (‘declinable’ (cf. e.g. T. Davidson 1874: 331), ‘indeclinable’ (cf. e.g. ibid. 334)) and – where possible – complemented by semantic ones. This holds for nouns and verbs. In both cases inflectional properties (declinable, indeclinable) are mentioned first, followed by semantic properties. Additional specifications then include inflectional properties (e.g. gender, number, case, mood, tense) as well as properties of derivation and compounding (species, form).10 Apart from their relationship to other parts of speech, participles, articles, and pronouns are exclusively characterized on the basis of morphological properties, primarily on those of inflection. In those cases where no specification of inflectional properties is possible, as is the case with prepositions, adverbs, and conjunctions, the characterization is either based solely on semantic properties (conjunctions), or on very rudimentary syntactic properties (prepositions ¼ ‘pre-positioned’). The importance of morphological properties is seen again in the characterization of adverbs, where an extensive semantic specification of various types of adverbs is preceded by the statements that an adverb is an indeclinable part of speech and that some adverbs are simple and some are compound. To summarize, it can be noted that the parts of speech introduced in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ are primarily defined on the basis of inflectional properties.11 This explains why adjectives do not occur in the list provided by Dionysius: in Greek they exhibit the same inflectional properties as nouns do and therefore cannot be distinguished from nouns on this basis. They are therefore included in the category of nouns, which altogether comprises 24 classes. Wherever possible, in addition to inflectional properties, further – analogous – morphological and semantic properties are identified. Where necessary, these are 10 No fundamental distinction is made here between inflection and derivation, as is illustrated by the mixed lists of instances of both. 11 This also holds for Varro’s grammar. However, the four parts of speech he lists are exclusively identified on the basis of inflectional properties. Neither derivational nor semantic properties are also considered (cf. D. J. Taylor 2000: 457).

20


replaced by other properties. Since Greek is a highly inflecting language, it comes as no surprise that analogy as a grammatical principle was first recognized in connection with the visible forms of inflection. In this sense, the parts of speech defined here do represent grammatical categories. Their definition is in accordance with what Dionysius and others considered the guiding principle of grammar: analogy. Analogy is here first seen in inflectional forms and subsequently – but to a much lesser degree – in derivational affixes and semantic properties, and only in the context of prepositions in rudimentary syntactic properties. 2.4 The traditional parts of speech in selected grammars of the nineteenth century The grammar of Dionysius Thrax initiated a tradition which determined the structure and the content of grammars, and not only of pedagogical grammars, up to the nineteenth and even the early twentieth century. The enormous influence of his grammar was greatly assisted by its translation into Latin and its careful application to classical Latin in Remnius Palaemon’s Ars Grammatica in the first century AD. Although this work has not survived, it strongly influenced the development of the theory of grammar in Roman times, especially the much better known and very influential grammar Institutiones Grammaticae by Priscianus (sixth century AD; cf. Arens 1955 [1969]: 32). Remnius Palaemon borrowed Dionysius’ terminology and grammatical descriptions and applied them to Latin. Like Dionysius, he identified eight parts of speech, replacing articles, which do not occur in Latin, by interjections. Except for this difference, the same parts of speech are identified on the same basis, with adjectives and nouns again not distinguished, as in Latin too they exhibit identical inflectional properties. The successful transfer of the grammatical descriptions in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ to Latin encouraged their application to other languages as well. As a result, all the European languages were eventually described on this basis and the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ determined their grammatical description for many centuries. The identification and characterization of the parts of speech in these languages followed Dionysius’ method, although due to language-specific differences, a different emphasis was often placed on the various properties. This ultimately influenced later approaches to grammar and the categorization of words, as can be seen in the following brief consideration of two examples of grammars


21

written in the nineteenth century. The first one deals with Romance languages and the second with English. It should be pointed out in advance that certain deviations from the traditional Greek approach are a result of the inclusion of syntax. Beginning with the grammars of Apollonius Dyscolus and Priscianus,12 syntax formed the third part of a grammar (after phonetics and accidence) and described the relationships between words in a sentence as well as their grammatical functions. The first example is the Grammatik der romanischen Sprachen by Diez (1836-38), which deals with Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Provençal, and Walachian, and thus with languages closely related to Latin. This grammar consists of four books, which are concerned with phonetics (‘Lautlehre’), inflection (‘Wortbiegungslehre’), word-formation (‘Wortbildungslehre’), and syntax (‘Syntax’). Except for the article, which is described in the fourth book as an element that accompanies a noun,13 thus pointing out a syntactic property, all the parts of speech are described with respect to their morphological properties. To begin with, the inflecting parts of speech are identified. These are nouns and adjectives – now distinguished on the basis of their different syntactic properties – numerals and pronouns, all of which are subject to declension, and the verb as a part of speech that is subject to conjugation. The third book lists the derivational properties of these parts of speech, and the fourth book gives their syntactic properties. Diez also identifies adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections, classifying them as particles. The fact that these non-inflecting and nondeclining parts of speech are introduced in the third book on the basis of their derivational properties confirms the view that Diez – following Dionysius – defines the parts of speech primarily on morphological 12 In addition to shorter pieces on pronouns, conjunctions, and adverbs, etc., Apollonius Dyscolus presented four books on syntax (cf. Apollonius Dyscolus). In his writings on syntax, his aim is to show that language is rule based and that it is the task of syntax to put together words in a pre-determined order to form sentences. He claims that syntax as well as the other areas of grammar is based on the principle of analogy. Blank (2000: 411) calls Apollonius’ works ‘masterpieces of ‘‘analogical’’ grammar’ (cf. also Blank 1994). Thus, Apollonius continued the tradition of the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯. This is also evident from the fact that he took over the eight parts of speech identified by Dionysius without providing a characterization of his own. Apollonius’ account of syntax, which relates to Greek, was applied to Latin by Priscianus in his grammar Institutiones Grammaticae (cf. ‘Priscianus’ in Wissowa 1954: 2328-48). 13 This exception is interesting considering the fact that the languages concerned are descended from Latin. Since Latin does not have an article, no such part of speech is described in grammars of this language.

22


grounds. This is done first of all on properties of inflection and then on those of derivation.14 In addition – again like Dionysius – Diez mentions semantic aspects, but he does so in passing and in the context of syntactic functions, which were not considered by Dionysius. The resulting list of parts of speech differs slightly from that provided by Dionysius. A first difference concerns the distinction between adjectives and nouns already mentioned, which is based on different syntactic properties. Another difference is taken over from Latin grammars and concerns the identification of interjections as a part of speech. Finally, numerals are introduced as a new part of speech whereas participles no longer appear. Diez thus identifies ten parts of speech altogether. Despite the minor differences pointed out, the enormous influence of Dionysius’ grammar on the characterization of the parts of speech is obvious: morphological properties of form are identified first of all and semantic ones only later, here introduced in the context of syntactic functions. This strong influence, even after about two thousand years, can be explained by the fact that although grammars themselves had become more and more detailed, the approach had hardly changed. It also has to do with the rich morphological properties of the languages described by Diez, which, like Greek and Latin, provide a fairly sound basis for the categorization of words. For the topic of this book it should be noted that Diez follows Dionysius in not describing the parts of speech as syntactic categories but as morphological categories for which in addition syntactic properties are identified. A comparison of Diez’s characterization of the parts of speech in Romance languages with Ma¨tzner’s characterization of the parts of speech in his grammar of English (1880-85) yields interesting results. Ma¨tzner’s grammar, which describes Modern English in three volumes, takes into account earlier stages of the language. It has a similar structure to Diez’s grammar in that the first section is dedicated to phonetics (‘Lautlehre’) and followed by accidence (‘Formenlehre’). Together these form the first part of the grammar called ‘The word’ 14 The division into inflecting and non-inflecting parts of speech and the subdivision of the inflecting ones into those subject to declension and those subject to conjugation is similar to the classification of the parts of speech by Varro (cf. notes 7 and 10). This suggests that there was some influence from this source. The structure of the grammar, however, as well as the inclusion of derivational and semantic properties (and of course the identification of ten rather than four parts of speech) shows that the tradition of Dionysius’ grammar is the dominant one.


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(‘Die Lehre vom Worte’). The second and the third parts are concerned with simple and complex sentences respectively (‘Die Lehre von der Wort- und Satzfu¨gung’). The parts of speech are introduced in the section on accidence and thus, at first sight, also seem to be described primarily on morphological grounds. In addition, Ma¨tzner identifies exactly the same parts of speech as Diez: noun, adjective, numeral, pronoun, article, verb, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection. Unlike Diez, however, Ma¨tzner begins his description of each part of speech with a semantic characterization before turning to morphological properties. Referring to inflectional properties, Ma¨tzner, like Diez, divides the parts of speech into three classes: those that are subject to declension (nouns, adjectives, numerals, pronouns, and articles), those that are subject to conjugation (verbs), and those that are subject to neither (particles: adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections). The semantic characterizations of the latter are supplemented by specifications of their derivational properties. Up to this point there are hardly any differences between English and the languages described by Diez. However, this changes where inflectional properties are taken into account. In particular, the description of the first class shows that in Modern English – as opposed to Greek and Latin and the Romance languages described by Diez – inflectional properties do not really provide a basis for the identification of the parts of speech. Thus, for example, properties of case, gender, and number are described or discussed in connection with nouns, adjectives, numerals, and articles. For English, this makes sense only in a historical context that regards Modern English as the successor of Old English and Anglo-Saxon. This is most obvious with respect to properties of gender. Ma¨tzner points out that in Anglo-Saxon nouns were distinguished morphologically as belonging to one of three genders and he claims that these are preserved in Modern English although not expressed by inflection but recognizable only through the anaphoric use of the pronouns he, she, and it (cf. Ma¨tzner 1880-85: 263 ff.). However, these specifications do not represent morphological properties of the nouns themselves in Modern English and therefore do not serve to identify or distinguish them. The description of case properties, which for Anglo-Saxon in its strong declension reveals four cases (nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative, with identical inflectional forms of the nominative and the accusative), has also lost significance in Modern English, where only a genitive

24


inflectional marker can be identified. Even the discussion of the plural shows that there is not always a specific inflectional form that identifies words as plural nouns. Ma¨tzner explains this by pointing out that some nouns belong to specific semantic classes which have a plural meaning: collective nouns occur in the singular but also have a plural meaning and agree with plural forms in their context. For example, infantry in fifty thousand infantry or fish in when fowls have no feather and fish have no fin (cf. 1880-85: 254). These examples all provide evidence that Ma¨tzner’s identification of the parts of speech in Modern English is not primarily based on morphological properties which are supplemented by semantic ones, but that it is first based on semantic properties to which – where possible – morphological properties are added. Thus, his description of the parts of speech differs significantly from those provided by Dionysius and Diez even though Ma¨tzner – like Diez – introduces them under the heading ‘accidence’, which suggests a definition based primarily on inflection. Although the approach in his grammar clearly follows the tradition founded by Dionysius, it cannot be excluded that Ma¨tzner’s definition of the parts of speech in English was influenced by a different tradition of grammatical description. This tradition is based on philosophical considerations and describes the parts of speech primarily as semantic categories. 2.5 Parts of speech as semantic categories In section 2.2 it was shown that the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ can be considered the product of the scholarly endeavours of philologists to provide critical editions of literary texts. In addition to this tradition of the study of language, a second tradition was developed in classical Greece which had completely different aims. This tradition belongs to the domain of philosophy, more specifically logic, and considers language an expression of thought.15 Its major aim is therefore an analysis of sentences as expressions of thoughts and a description of words as expressions of parts of thoughts. Thus, it is the meaning of words 15 It should be noted here that the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ itself is also based on this tradition. Given the interest of the philologists, however, it has received a different orientation and thus adopts a different view of the phenomenon language. Comprehensive overviews of the development of grammar in the classical period are provided by Lersch (1838-41), Steinthal (1890-91), as well as more recently by Robins (1951, 1993) and D. J. Taylor (ed.) (1987) or Auroux et al. (eds.) (2000).


25

which is of primary relevance and their morphological shape is relevant only in so far as it contributes to the meaning. This tradition was initiated by the Sophists in the fifth century BC. It was continued by Plato (429-347 BC)16 and further developed by Aristotle (384-322 BC)17 and the Stoics.18 It finally reached its peak in the seventeenth century with the famous Port Royal grammar, which provides a coherent and comprehensive analysis of language from the point of view of philosophy and logic, and characterizes parts of speech as semantic categories. The Port Royal grammar was written by the theologist and philosopher Antoine Arnauld (1612-94) together with the linguist Claude Lancelot (1615-95), who both worked at the abbey of Port Royal des Champs near Versailles.19 The first edition of this grammar was published in 1660. Its very title indicates its orientation and special 16 The first conscious classification of words into parts of speech is ascribed to Plato and was a division into nouns (Æ) and verbs (æ Æ). According to Plato, nouns and verbs form the two parts of a proposition (cf. Plato Cratylus 399 A-B, 426 E, 429 A, 431 B; Lersch 1838-41 part 2: 8 ff.). Robins states in this context: ‘it is of the utmost importance that the first ‘‘parts of speech’’ or word-classes were isolated on logical and not formal criteria’ (1951: 18). Concerning the characterization of parts of speech by Plato, the reader is also referred to Schmitter (1975, 2000) and Kraus (1987). 17 Aristotle took over the parts of speech ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ identified by Plato and distinguished in addition conjunctions ( Ø), which included all those words which are neither nouns nor verbs (Rhetoric, book 3, chapter 2). Since Aristotle considers parts of speech to bear meaning (cf. Rhetoric, book 3, chapter 12), only nouns and verbs are parts of speech for him in the true sense and ‘conjunctions’ are not. These only serve the function of connecting the parts of speech. On language and thought in Aristotle’s work the reader is referred to Arens (1984, 2000). 18 The most differentiated division into parts of speech before the Alexandrians is provided by the Stoics who, in addition to identifying nouns, verbs, and conjunctions, identified articles and subdivided nouns into proper nouns and common nouns. They also identified ‘secondary grammatical categories’, such as number, gender, case, voice, mood, and tense. Frede (1977) considers the works of the Stoics to be the proper origin of traditional grammar. Since the Alexandrians were able to build on the insights of the Stoics, this view is not implausible. It should be taken into consideration, however, that the analysis of language by the Stoics was designed to serve their interest in logic, whereas traditional grammar is strongly influenced by the philological interests of the Alexandrians. 19 The abbey of Port Royal is known as the home of the religious community of the Jansenists – named after Cornelius Jansen – who followed the doctrine of St. Augustine. Although the members of the community were not monks, they led a monastic existence and dedicated their lives to religion and science. The community was founded by Jean du Vergier de Hauranne, a friend of Jansen’s, who was later known as the Abbe´ de Saint-Cyran. Tsiapera and Wheeler (1993) provide detailed information on the sources and the background of the Port Royal grammar. This grammar was rediscovered by Chomsky, who acknowledges its influence on his own theory of language in Cartesian Linguistics.

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characteristic: Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé (General and Rational Grammar).20 It is a general grammar, not one related to a specific language, and it is based on rational considerations. The grammar consists of two parts: ‘Part One: The letters and characters of writing’; and ‘Part Two: The principles and reasons on which the various forms of the signification of words are founded’. These are preceded by a preface and the program of the grammar. This program briefly characterizes the orientation of the grammar and indicates a completely different approach to that of the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯: Grammar is the art of speaking. Speaking is explaining one’s thoughts by signs which men have invented for this purpose. It has been found that the most useful of these signs are sounds and vocals. But because these sounds are transitory, other signs were invented in order to make them lasting and visible; these are the characters of writing which the Greeks called ªæÆÆ (grammata), whence comes the word grammar. Thus one can consider two things in regard to these signs. First, what they are by their nature, that is to say, as sounds and characters. Second, their signification, that is to say, the manner in which men utilize them for signifying their thoughts. We will treat of the former in the first part of this grammar, and of the latter, in the second part. (Rieux and Rollin 1975: 41)

According to the view presented in this program, what is important for the signs of language, and thus also for words, is how they are used to express thoughts. Arnauld and Lancelot start their investigation with the statement that there are three types of operations performed by the human mind: conceiving, judging, and reasoning. Of these, reasoning can be considered an extension of judging and therefore be neglected in an analysis. ‘Conceiving’ signifies ‘the simple attention of the mind to things’, whereas ‘judging’ is a complex operation, namely ‘the affirmation that a thing of which we conceive is such and such, as when, having conceived of what the earth is and what roundness is, I affirm of the earth that it is 20 The following remarks and quotations are based on the translation by Rieux and Rollin (1975).


27

round’ (ibid. 66 f.). The authors then argue that in order to perform the operations of conceiving and judging, human beings consider it necessary to distinguish words into those which signify the objects of thoughts and those which signify the form and the manner or mode of our thoughts. They identify nouns, articles, pronouns, participles, prepositions, and adverbs as words of the first kind and verbs, conjunctions, and interjections as those of the second kind (cf. ibid. 67 f.). To begin with, Arnauld and Lancelot list exactly those parts of speech identified in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, adding interjections, which were identified in the Latin version. However, these parts of speech are defined on a completely different basis. Nouns, for example, are divided into substantive and adjectival nouns. Substantive nouns are said to signify substances, such as the earth, the sun, water, or wood, whereas adjectival nouns signify accidents, i.e. ‘the manner or modification of things like being round, being hard or being learned’ (Rieux and Rollin 1975: 69 ff.). Articles are said to determine the signification of common nouns (cf. ibid. 88 ff.), whereas pronouns were ‘invented’ to take the place of nouns (cf. ibid. 92). Prepositions and cases are considered to serve the same function, namely that of indicating relationships that exist between things (cf. ibid. 115), whereas the task of adverbs is to modify and determine the action expressed by a verb (cf. ibid. 121). Signifying ‘affirmation or assertion’ is said to be the principal function of verbs. Their occurrence in a discourse indicates that this is ‘the discourse of a man who not only conceives things, but who judges and affirms them’ (ibid. 122). Participles are characterized as adjectival nouns which signify the same thing as a verb but exclude affirmation (cf. ibid. 151). Conjunctions are characterized as particles which signify ‘the very operation of our minds that joins or separates things, that denies them, that considers them absolutely or conditionally’ (ibid. 168). Interjections, finally, are characterized as words which indicate the ‘emotions of our soul’ (ibid. 169). The characterizations quoted here illustrate that in this grammar semantic criteria are of major importance for the definition of the parts of speech. The reason for this is the explicit claim that it is a general grammar, not one designed for a specific language, i.e. a grammar which establishes a direct relationship between language, perception, and thought and which therefore is universal. What seems problematic in the light of this claim is the fact that in order

28


to support it, examples are taken from Greek, Latin, and French only, and that the same parts of speech are characterized as those originally identified on the basis of significant morphological properties of Greek and Latin. Therefore, it cannot at least be excluded that the identification of the parts of speech in the Port Royal grammar was greatly influenced by the tradition of the Te´khne¯, and that its two authors – because of the languages chosen for investigation – were not compelled to consider the possibility of there being other relevant semantic categories. As a result, the traditional parts of speech received an additional or alternative method of identification, one with a semantic basis and applicable also to languages which lack rich morphological systems. 2.6 Problems with the traditional parts of speech The preceding sections have shown that there are two trends in the definition of the traditional parts of speech. One initiated by philologists focuses on the form of words, and one based on philosophy and logic uses semantic criteria to form the basis of categorization. The two grammars from the nineteenth century discussed in section 2.4 and selected as representative of many others, quite clearly follow the tradition of the philologically-based Te´khne¯ grammatike¯. This is evidenced by the structure of the grammars and the emphasis placed on the morphological description of the parts of speech. However, an influence of the philosophical tradition cannot be ruled out. On the contrary, it seems highly probable in those cases where a language does not exhibit features corresponding to the morphological properties of Greek and Latin. This holds for Modern English and thus for Ma¨tzner’s grammar and other similar grammars. Such a description of the parts of speech primarily on semantic grounds and only secondarily on the basis of morphological properties can be explained as follows: grammarians have attempted to maintain the tradition that goes back to Dionysius and to describe the parts of speech primarily as morphological categories. This, however, turns out to be possible only for those languages which, like Greek, have a rich system of inflectional morphology, such as Latin and the Romance languages described by Diez. It is impossible for languages which – like Modern English – are poor in inflection. Thus the assumption handed down for centuries that traditional grammar, including the identification and description of parts of speech, is applicable to all languages


29

and in this sense universal, is not tenable. In this situation, grammarians have fallen back on semantic definitions of the parts of speech as provided by philosophical approaches, as these do not require morphological specifications. What seems problematic, however, is the fact that – as in the Port Royal grammar, which perfected this approach – the same parts of speech are then identified as in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯. This strongly suggests that these parts of speech are not identified on semantic grounds, but that semantic properties are ascribed to these parts of speech and that their identification goes back to the classical grammar of Greek. The result is that the traditional parts of speech are no longer described on a uniform basis. This is true for the same parts of speech in different languages. It also holds for different parts of speech in the same language. And it even holds for the description of the members of a single part of speech in one and the same language, as for example with respect to nouns in English, whose description for some members of the class is based on the inflectional plural marker -s and for others on the semantic property of plurality (e.g. collective nouns). This lack of a uniform basis for the description of the traditional parts of speech has been identified and criticized, in particular by Gleason (1965: 114 ff.). It should be pointed out, however, that this lack of uniformity can be identified as such only in an approach in which morphology, semantics, and syntax are considered as different, autonomous levels or components of a grammar. Originally, i.e. in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, this was not the case. There, uniformity was achieved by the general grammatical principle of analogy, which could be instantiated by different – morphological, semantic, or syntactic – properties. These properties together formed the basis for the categorization. Even in traditional grammars like those by Diez, Ma¨tzner, and others, these domains were considered integrated and complementary to each other rather than separate and autonomous. The two observations presented above, i.e. the problems related to the transfer of grammatical description, including parts of speech, from Greek to other languages, and to the lack of a uniform basis for the description of parts of speech, have had consequences for the further development of the theory of grammar and for later approaches to the categorization of words. The former led to radical changes to the concept of a grammar within the framework of structuralism, the latter to endeavours to identify categories of words on a uniform basis within this framework. As the following chapter will

30


show, it was syntax which was considered as providing this uniform basis. The conclusion to be drawn from this chapter, therefore, is that the traditional parts of speech were not described as syntactic categories, neither when they were originally applied to Greek, nor later in their application to other languages. This naturally also holds for the parts of speech in philosophically-oriented grammars which described them as universal categories on a semantic basis. It was nevertheless important to start the overview of syntactic categories with a consideration of these traditional parts of speech because, as will be seen, they will reappear again and again and often with very different characterizations. It is therefore also important to know about their original status.

3 The American Structuralists’ approach Syntactic categories as distributional classes

3.1 Introduction Towards the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century, a development in the analysis of language emerged in the United States which was to lead to a break with traditional views and to a completely new understanding of grammar. This development was initiated above all by Franz Boas (1858–1942), an anthropologist who investigated the languages of Native Americans and realized that traditional grammar was inappropriate to describe these languages. His examination of the properties of these languages convinced him that each language has its own internal structure and that it is the task of linguists to discover and describe this structure. His introductory chapter of the Wrst part of his Handbook of American Indian Languages, published in 1911, became a highly regarded manifesto of this approach and sparked oV a vigorous movement, Structuralism in American linguistics, which included a radical rejection of traditional grammar and its understanding of language.1 In the preface to the Wrst part of the Handbook, Boas emphasizes his major concern: 1 It should be noted that it was not only American Structuralism but also European Structuralism that broke radically with traditional grammar. European Structuralism was initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure, whose lectures given between 1906 and 1911 were written down by his pupils Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye and published in edited form under the title Cours de linguistique geńe´rale in 1916. The claims made by Saussure are similar to those of Boas. However, they do not lead to linguistic analyses that are comparable to those of the American descriptivists and distributionalists, whose work is the subject of this chapter.

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to call attention . . . to the essential features of the morphology and phonetics of American languages, and to emphasize the necessity of an analytical study of grammar. The object next to be attained by linguistic studies of American languages is a knowledge of their phonetic processes and of the psychological foundations of their structure. (1911: v)

Continuing, he points out the problem of trying to derive and substantiate insights into the structure of these languages using traditional grammar: knowledge of the latter has been obscured by the innumerable attempts to represent the grammar of Indian languages in a form analogous to that of the European grammars. (ibid.)

Then, in the introductory chapter, he leaves no doubt that – in addition to the lack of a systematic way to describe the phonetic systems of languages – it was the identiWcation of parts of speech developed for European languages and transferred to Indian languages that constituted a large part of the problem. On this issue, he Wrst makes the following remark: Grammarians who have studied the languages of Europe and western Asia have developed a system of categories which we are inclined to look for in every language. (ibid. 35)

Following a discussion of the grammatical properties of nouns, pronouns, and verbs in European languages on the one hand and the attempt to identify similar categories in selected American Indian languages on the other, he then presents his conclusion: We conclude from the examples here given that in a discussion of the characteristics of various languages diVerent fundamental categories will be found, and that in a comparison of diVerent languages it will be necessary to compare as well the phonetic characteristics as the characteristics of the vocabulary and those of grammatical concepts in order to give each language its proper place. (ibid. 43)

Explaining the approach applied to the description of the Indian languages in the Handbook, he then makes the following point,

the american structuralists’ approach

33

intending it also to be understood as a recommendation for similar enterprises: No attempt has been made to compare the forms of the Indian grammars with the grammars of English, Latin, or even among themselves; but in each case the psychological groupings which are given depend entirely upon the inner form of each language. (ibid. 81)

This recommendation – as well as the other recommendations and desiderata expressed in the introductory chapter of the Handbook – was Wrst taken up by Boas’s student Edward Sapir (1884–1939)2 and by Leonard BloomWeld (1887–1949). The latter, though not his student, nevertheless considered Boas his mentor.3 As a result of his numerous publications and their programmatic nature, it is BloomWeld who can be seen as the father of American Structuralism, a movement which saw its heyday in the writings of the distributionalists, among them Bernard Bloch, Charles Carpenter Fries, Zellig Harris, Archibald Hill, Charles Hockett, Martin Joos, Henry Lee Smith, George Trager, and Rulon Wells. It was these linguists who, for the Wrst time, developed a concept of syntax as a linear and hierarchical arrangement of elements, something which still today determines our understanding of sentence structure. Accordingly, it is in this context that for the Wrst time genuinely syntactic categories were identiWed. In order to be able to understand and evaluate the identiWcation of syntactic categories within the framework of American Structuralism, section 3.2 introduces the American Structuralist approach to language as a subject of investigation and to the goals of linguistic analysis and contrasts this with the traditional view. Section 3.3 outlines the development of Structuralist grammar with due regard to the methods applied and to the diVerentiation in the various levels in the description of language. This provides the basis for a closer look in section 3.4 at the identiWcation of syntactic categories as distributional classes 2 Edward Sapir, who was born in Lauenburg, Germany and who emigrated to the USA with his parents in 1889, Wrst studied Germanic philology and then received his PhD in anthropology at the Columbia University, where he met Franz Boas. Unlike BloomWeld, who had a greater inXuence on the development of linguistics in America, Sapir always saw language as a cultural phenomenon which among other things encodes cultural diVerences (cf. Sapir 1921). This view of his became known as the ‘Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis’ (cf. e.g. Sampson 1980: 81 V.). Sapir is claimed to have introduced the concept of ‘pattern’ (cf. e.g. Hill 1955: 253), a concept that was very important for Structuralism. 3 This is claimed by Fought (1995: 295). Cf. also Emeneau (1943: 35).

34


within this framework, considering the approaches of Harris (1946, 1951) and Fries (1952). In conclusion, section 3.5 discusses inconsistencies and problems related to Harris’s and Fries’s identiWcation of syntactic categories as distributional classes. 3.2 Language as an object of scientific study In the previous chapter it was shown that in the Ancient World the study of language, which led to the development of the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, had the primary aim of preserving in critical editions the purity and perfection of the language used by great writers of the past for future generations. The ‘linguists’ of that time were themselves writers or philologists with a close relationship to literature, who went on to develop their study of famous writers into teaching norms for everyday language use. This set priorities which subsequently determined the subject matter and the character of traditional grammar: the priority of written language over spoken language and the priority of prescribing how language should be used over describing how it is used. Franz Boas found himself in a completely diVerent situation to that of these ‘linguists’ of the Ancient World. As an anthropologist in North America, he was faced with completely unfamiliar languages which had no written form. There were no written texts to investigate sentence for sentence and word for word, texts in which he could analyse and describe words, the relationships between them, and the relationships between their component parts. Instead he was confronted with spoken language used by ethnic groups in their everyday lives which was perceived as a continuum of sounds without obvious sentence or word boundaries. The task of an anthropologist is therefore not comparable to that of a philologist: the former’s task is to consider utterances carefully and to make an accurate phonetic transcription so that they can then be analysed and described. Faced with this task, it was certainly very helpful that Boas had been trained not as a philologist but that before emigrating to the USA in 1886 he had studied mathematics, physics, and geography at the universities of Heidelberg, Bonn, and Kiel. He was therefore familiar with the methods of the natural sciences, including careful observation and explicit description. These were the skills which he could and did employ in revealing the grammatical properties of unfamiliar languages.4 In this situation, 4 A good insight into the career of Franz Boas is provided by Kluckhohn and Prufer (1959).


35

it was obvious that for Boas – and in contrast to the traditional approach – spoken language had priority over written language and description had priority over prescription. The Structuralists’ approach to language thus had its roots in the tasks that were necessary in this situation and in the incidental scientiWc training of a leading anthropologist, and it was Leonard BloomWeld who raised this approach to the status of a general principle of linguistic description. BloomWeld declared that it was human speech spoken by ‘small and constantly altering groups of individuals, the speech-communities’ (BloomWeld 1925: 3) that was the object of linguistic investigation. He explicitly rejected the practice in traditional grammar of investigating the written language of great writers, insisting that: [w]riting is not language, but merely a way of recording language by means of visible marks . . . always we should prefer to have the audible word.5 (1933: 21)

and adding that: [t]he linguist, on the one hand, studies the language of all persons alike; the individual features in which the language of a great writer diVers from the ordinary speech of his time and place, interest the linguist no more than do the individual features of any other person’s speech, and much less than do the features that are common to all speakers. (ibid. 22)

In a number of programmatic writings – including the articles ‘Why a Linguistic Society?’ (1925), ‘A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language’ (1926) and ‘Linguistics as a Science’ (1930), as well as in his book Language (1933) – BloomWeld stressed the status of linguistics as an independent science and emphasized the similarity of its methods to those of mathematics and physics (cf. e.g. 1925: 2, 1926: 153). According to him, the description of a language starts with the careful observation and transcription of human speech on the basis of Weld work (cf. 1925: 1). It also requires that only what is observable is described. In this context, BloomWeld discusses the advantages of a ‘materialistic’ theory over a ‘mentalistic’ one, and he uses these advantages to justify why he has excluded the description of meaning, 5 This view was shared by Sapir (cf. 1921: 17 V.).

36


i.e. because it is not observable and therefore can only be described in the framework of a mentalistic theory (cf. 1933: 22 V.). BloomWeld further claims that the scientiWc methods of linguistics require the formulation of postulates, giving the following reasons: it forces us to state explicitly whatever we assume, to deWne our terms, and to decide what things may exist independently and what things are interdependent. (1926: 153)

BloomWeld emphasizes the autonomy of linguistics, whose sole purpose for him lies in the scientiWc description of languages and their individual characteristics. In particular, he stresses the independence of linguistics from the study of literature, thus showing his disapproval of the position adopted by traditional grammar: linguistics cannot be properly viewed as a subsidiary discipline to the study of literature, or paired with it as the ‘linguistic side’ of philology, or even placed in any close connection with the study of Wne arts, of which literary history and criticism form a part. (1925: 3 f.)

These programmatic statements by BloomWeld, who as co-founder of the Linguistic Society of America (LSA)6 and as the Wrst editor of its publication Language enjoyed a prominent and inXuential position amongst American7 linguists, had a considerable eVect. They especially inXuenced the so-called ‘distributionalists’, who, after 1945 and building mainly on BloomWeld’s statements in his book Language, were engaged in producing descriptions of the structures of individual languages. 3.3 Towards a description of the structures of languages The requirements related to dealing with completely unfamiliar languages and Franz Boas’s claim that each language has its own internal form and structure which should be discovered and described, together with BloomWeld’s requirement of scientiWc precision, determined the 6 Leonard BloomWeld founded the LSA together with George Melville Bolling when they were both professors at Ohio State University. Cf. in this connection the remarks by Murray (2001). 7 For further information see Fries (1961), Sampson (1980: 62 V.), and Fought (1995: 298 V., 2001).


37

procedures for producing grammars and in general also the way these grammars were organized. Thus American Structuralists started by collecting examples of spoken language produced by native speakers. The utterances were transcribed and put together to form a corpus. Then the phonetic form of these transcribed utterances was investigated, whereby processes of segmentation and classiWcation revealed the phonological units of the language, and an analysis of the arrangements of these units revealed the phonological system. Accordingly, instructions for linguistic analyses as well as grammars resulting from these started with a treatment of phonetics and phonemics/phonology (cf. e.g. Bloch and Trager 1942; Trager and Smith 1951; Francis 1954), often supplemented by statements concerning the phonotactics or the phonological structures (cf. e.g. BloomWeld 1933; Harris 1951; Hill 1958). The analysis and description of the phonological system of a language was then followed by an analysis and description of recurring groups of phonetic units which clearly had a status of their own and were identiWed as morphemes. These morphemes were recognized as units of a second level of description which, like the level of phonology, had a system of its own with its own regularities.8 Finally, a third level was distinguished, the level of syntax, whose units were composed of simple morphemes and sequences of morphemes. The largest unit of analysis was the sentence.9 American Structuralists disagreed on how morphemes, the units of the morphological level, were to be identiWed. According to BloomWeld (1933: 161 f.), a morpheme was composed of phonemes and had a meaning, the sememe. The sememe was a constant and deWnite unit of meaning which diVered from all other meanings, including all other sememes. Thus, in BloomWeld’s view, the identiWcation of a morpheme was based on the identiWcation of a sequence of phonemes which could be assigned a meaning that was constant and diVerent from all other meanings. This was determined by tests based on questions put to 8 It should be noted here that this diVerentiation into levels was worked out in the course of time. To begin with, it was assumed that sequences of phonemes form morphemes and sequences of morphemes form sentences; as a result just one hierarchically ordered level was described. It is only through a diVerentiation of phones and phonemes as well as of morphs and morphemes that a distinction of levels can be made. 9 A sentence in this context is deWned as an utterance which represents an independent linguistic form ‘not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form’ (BloomWeld 1933: 170). The discussion in Fries (1952: 9 V.) shows that this concept of a sentence is not without problems.

38


native speakers who decided on the sameness or diVerence in meaning of recurring phoneme sequences. According to BloomWeld, the identiWcation and description of the meanings themselves was not one of the tasks of a linguist.10 BloomWeld’s view that morphemes were recurrent sequences of phonemes with a constant meaning was shared, for example, by Francis (cf. 1954: 164) and Hockett (cf. 1958: 134). However, this view was not shared by Harris (1951) or – following him – by Trager and Smith (1951) or Hill (1958). According to Harris, ‘particular tentatively independent phonemic sequences’ could be identiWed as ‘morphemic segments’ only if they occurred in diVerent environments and if they could substitute for each other in a given environment, thus forming a distributional class (cf. Harris 1951: 160 f.). He explicitly claimed that ‘meaning was not used as a criterion in setting up the morphemic segments’ (ibid. 173). Hill took the same position (cf. 1958: 89 f.), whereas Trager and Smith concede that ‘it is often convenient to use the meanings of utterance fractions as a general guide and short-cut to the identiWcation of morphemes . . . especially . . . in the case of languages that are more or less well known to the analyst’ (1951: 54). American Structuralists also disagreed on whether the levels of morphology and syntax are separate, form parts of a larger whole or should even be seen as one homogeneous system. Whereas Trager and Smith declared themselves in favour of a ‘sharp delimitation of the Welds of morphology (word-structure) and syntax (phrase-structure)’ (1951: 59), BloomWeld (1933: 183 f.), Francis (1954: 31) and Hockett (1958: 177 f.) all viewed morphology and syntax as two parts of the grammar, i.e. as two subsystems of a system between which a clear boundary could not always be drawn. Harris, however, decided not to draw a distinction at all between the two Welds and justiWed this by pointing out that the same procedure was applied to both to yield results (cf. Harris 1951: 262). Irrespective of which of the positions was taken, there was no disagreement concerning the view that complex forms were ‘entirely made up . . . of morphemes’ (BloomWeld 1933: 161). Neither did the Structuralists disagree that their arrangement was not accidental but that linearly ordered sequences of morphemes formed hierarchically ordered constructions, whereby 10 The reason BloomWeld gives is that describing the meaning of linguistic units requires ‘a scientiWcally accurate knowledge of everything in the speakers’ world’ (1933: 139). Since such knowledge is not available to linguists, it cannot – according to BloomWeld – be their task to describe the meaning of linguistic units.


39

constructions of smaller morpheme sequences were contained in constructions of larger morpheme sequences (cf. e.g. Harris 1951: 331). An identiWcation of construction types – or structural patterns – of morpheme sequences which was based on the identiWcation of form classes (cf. e.g. BloomWeld 1933; Bloch and Trager 1942; Hockett 1958), morpheme classes or morpheme-sequence classes (cf. e.g. Harris 1951) thus formed an essential part of the analysis and description of the grammatical system of a language. Form classes and morpheme classes or morpheme-sequence classes were deWned in a similar way. BloomWeld, whom Bloch and Trager (1942: 72) as well as Hockett (1958: 162) followed almost word for word, deWned a form class as: ‘All the forms which can Wll a given position thereby constitute a form-class’ (1933: 185). It should be noted that form classes could be morpheme classes or morpheme-sequence classes. Harris drew a distinction between the two, although his deWnition for both was very similar to BloomWeld’s deWnition of form classes. However, Harris’s deWnition employed the concepts of substitution, environment, and distribution, which were very important for his analytical procedure: The morphemes are grouped into morpheme classes, or classes of morphemesin-environments, such that the distribution of one member of a class is similar to the distribution of any other member of that class. These morpheme classes and any sequences of morpheme classes which are substitutable for them within the utterance, are now grouped into larger classes (called position or resultant classes) in such a way that all the morpheme sequences (including sequences of one morpheme) in a position class substitute freely for each other in those positions in the utterance within which that class occurs. (Harris 1951: 363)

The quotations show that in both cases, classes of linguistic units – form classes on the one hand and morpheme classes or morphemesequence classes on the other – were deWned in relation to the positions they can occupy. The positions were in turn deWned in relation to their environments. Form classes or morpheme classes and morphemesequence classes were thus deWned in relation to the set of their possible environments, i.e. their distribution: The distribution of an element is the total of all environments in which it occurs, i.e. the sum of all the (diVerent) positions (or occurrences) of an element relative to the occurrence of other elements. (Harris 1951: 15 f.)

40


In all cases, therefore, these classes were distributional classes. Since distributional classes that were morpheme-sequence classes had morpheme classes as their constituents and could themselves form larger morpheme-sequence classes, they could be described as hierarchical constructions which represented structures of words as well as structures of phrases and sentences. If the classes identiWed contributed to the construction of words they could be assigned to morphology, and if they contributed to the construction of sentences they could be assigned to syntax. If morphology and syntax were claimed to be two separate levels or two subsystems of one grammatical level, then two types of form classes were distinguished (cf. e.g. BloomWeld 1933: 196; Bloch and Trager 1942: 77). If syntax was not distinguished as a separate level of description, then morpheme classes and morpheme-sequence classes could nevertheless implicitly or explicitly be identiWed as belonging to the domain of syntax and thus as representing syntactic categories. The following section will be devoted to the identiWcation and description of these categories. In summary, the description of the structures of languages and the conception of a Structuralist grammar was based on a corpus of utterances of spoken language, whereby any utterance that is a sentence represented the largest unit of analysis. The description started with an analysis of the phonological units and their arrangements. This was followed by an analysis of the morphological units and their arrangements in words and sentences, resulting explicitly or implicitly in a grammar divided into the levels of phonology, morphology, and syntax. The levels of morphology and syntax were not only linearly but also hierarchically ordered in such a way that each construction consisted of a regular combination of elements at the next lower level. This not only allowed an analysis that moved from morphemes to words and to sentences but in principle also vice versa, i.e. from sentences and words to morphemes via immediate constituents. The latter direction of analysis was suggested by Wells (1947), and Harris considered this a possibility (cf. 1951: 278 V.).11 The description of linguistic structures at the various levels on the basis of observed occurrences of linguistic units and the determination of their distribution without describing their meaning followed the requirement of scientiWc methodology in 11 A discussion of immediate constituents in syntax as well as morphology can be found in BloomWeld (1933: 161, 209 f., 221 f.). The role of an analysis into immediate constituents within the framework of distributionalism is extensively discussed by Fought (2001).


41

linguistics as presented in section 3.2. The resulting grammar consisted of a catalogue of linguistic structures (cf. Harris 1951: 3) described in quasi-mathematical formulas.12 3.4 Identifying syntactic categories Whereas BloomWeld determined the direction of American Structuralism and, as far as content is concerned, prepared the ground especially in his book Language, it was above all Harris who developed the scientiWc methods required for the identiWcation and description of linguistic structures (cf. especially 1946, 1951, 1954). This section will outline these methods and will present Harris’s identiWcation of syntactic categories as morpheme classes and morpheme-sequence classes before turning to the (better known) identiWcation of syntactic categories by Fries (1952). In his book Methods in Structural Linguistics (1951: 245 V.), Harris introduces two methods that he Wrst uses for the identiWcation of morpheme classes. Both methods describe morpheme classes as distribution classes, substitution classes or position classes and are claimed to yield the same results. In both cases, the analysis starts by establishing a corpus. In the Wrst method, all the environments in the corpus are determined for each morpheme, taking as the environment the whole utterance in which a morpheme occurs. Then the set of environments of each morpheme is compared to that of all the others. If the environments of individual morphemes are identical, and the morphemes therefore have exactly the same distribution, they form a morpheme class. Since complete identity of environments is very rare and, according to Harris, only approximations to this ideal are found, he formulates conditions which must be met in order to assign a morpheme to a morpheme class. The Wrst of these is that ‘80 per cent of the environments of the one morpheme should be ones in which the other also occurs’ (ibid. 245). A second condition suggested by Harris requires that particular types of diVerence are established among the environments in which morphemes do not substitute for 12 It was often pointed out that the description of linguistic structures exhibits similarities to mathematical formulas; cf. e.g. BloomWeld (1925: 110), Haugen (1951: 213) or Harris (1954: 148). Francis states in this connection: ‘In a way, structural linguistics can be called the mathematics of language study’ (1954: 26). A statement by Joos is evidence that the similarity with mathematics was intended: ‘We must make our ‘‘linguistics’’ a kind of mathematics, within which inconsistency is by deWnition impossible’ (1950: 701).

42


each other, namely ‘that the morphemes in which the two environments diVer be themselves members of one class by the present method’ (ibid. 246). If, for example, hear and tear do not substitute for each other in the environments I’ll __ the bell and I’ll __ the paper, then they can nevertheless be assigned to the same class if bell and paper have been identiWed as members of the same morpheme class. Thus the categorization of bell and paper as N and the representation of the environments of hear and tear as I’ll __ the N cancel out the diVerences in the environments and both hear and tear can be assigned to the same morpheme class, namely V. In the second method of identifying morpheme classes, the analysis begins by selecting a morpheme in one of the utterances of the corpus. Then a set of morphemes is selected which can all substitute for the Wrst one in this environment. Next, a number of environments are selected into which all these morphemes can be inserted. The list of morphemes and the list of environments are constantly added to. Harris illustrates this procedure with an example (cf. 1951: 250): if the procedure starts by selecting the morpheme see in the environment Did you __ the stuV, then tie, Wnd, etc. can be added to the morpheme list since they can substitute for see. The list of environments can be extended by adding He’ll __ it later, __them for me, please, etc., since all these form possible environments for the morphemes in the morpheme list. Many more items are added to the morpheme list, for example burn, lift, and others, and many more are added to the list of environments, for example I didn’t __ the book or __ing pictures is a bit out of my line. If a new morpheme does not Wt into any of the environments or only into some, or if a new environment is compatible with some but not all the morphemes of the list, then this new morpheme or new environment is excluded from the list and a new list is begun, which is then extended, following the procedure just described. After repeated and detailed applications of this procedure, using various corpora of utterances of the language under investigation, numerous classes of morphemes will result which diVer in size, some of which will overlap with respect to morphemes (e.g. tie, break, etc.), others with respect to environments. Whereas the former leads to an identiWcation of homonyms, the latter is the basis for identifying various sub-classes which can be assigned to some general class. On the basis of the second method characterized above, Harris (1946: 167 V.) identiWes 35 morpheme classes for English, of which 16


43

aYx classes13 and one class of bound roots14 can be classiWed as categories of the syntax of words, i.e. as belonging to morphology. The remaining 18 are genuine syntactic categories, which comprise the following: N, V, Vb , Vc , Vd , Ve , Vf , Vg , Vh , R, have/be, A, D, T, I, P, &, and B. Of these, the categories Vb to Vh represent sub-classes, whereas the remaining eleven are general classes. The following examples illustrate Harris’s way of describing the categories: N: morphemes which occur before plural -s or its alternants, or after the or adjectives: hotel, butler, gain . . . V: before -ed past or its alternants; before -ing; after N plus should, will, might, etc: go, gain, take, think, will (‘desire’), have, do. We may distinguish several sub-classes such as those listed below, while V without any sub-class mark will be used to indicate all the sub-classes together. Vb: be, appear, become, get, keep, stay, etc. (but not have). These occur between N and adjectives other than V -ing: The stuV will stay fresh. Ve: intransitive verbs which do not occur before N: go, sleep. Vh: verbs which occur before N to V: cause, teach, dare, want (but not make, go): The other kids __ Junior to do it R: between N and V (the V lacking -ing, -ed): NRV occurs initially, or after a list of V including think, guess (I think the boy can win it): will, do, shall, can, may, must, ought (but not to). The -s of 3rd-person-singular concord does not occur with these, nor does -ing. Should can be considered as shall þ -ed, and so on.15 A: between the and N, never before plural -s: young, pretty, Wrst. D: between the and A, but not between the and N: rather, very, now, not. T: before N, or A, or DA, but not before V (unless -ing or -ed or -en follow it): a, my, some. These may all be considered as substituting for the and so forming an article-class. &: conjunctions between any two sequences: and, but (I wanted to go, but couldn’t make it.) . . . 16 B: in -NV /,/ NV or in NV /,/ NV: if, since, as, while (If you go, I won’t). (cf. ibid.) 13 Harris identiWes, for example, the following aYx classes: -Nn: -let, -eer, -er, -ess (playlet, engineer, Londoner, lioness); -Vv: past, 3rd person singular -s (rowed, rows); -Na: -ful, -ish, -th, -’s (beautiful, boyish, sixth, parent’s); and -Av: -en, -ize (darken, solemnize). 14 The category S includes the forms called ‘stems’ by Harris, such as nat- as in native, soci- as in society, or mass- as in massive. 15 In Harris (1957: 299 V.) the notation v (auxiliaries) is introduced, replacing R. 16 In Harris (1957: 298 V.) the notation C for ‘conjunction’ is used rather than &.

44


A critical examination of the categories identiWed by Harris and of their descriptions will be given in section 3.5. However, it must be pointed out here that Harris concedes that not every member of a category can occur in all the positions in which other members of the category can occur (cf. 1946: 167, fn10) although his criterion for class membership was that ‘for each class there are particular sentence positions which can be Wlled by any member of that class and by these alone’ (ibid. 167). It should also be noted that Harris admits that as well as the morphemes that are classiWed in this way, there are some that cannot be assigned to any of the categories, for example, then, now, and thus, which – according to him – can occur almost anywhere in an utterance. In addition, other morphemes such as yes or no, hello, oh, and similar ones form utterances by themselves (cf. ibid. 169 f.). Harris’s identiWcation of morpheme-sequence classes and morpheme classes yields syntactic categories which can characterize the hierarchic structure of utterances. This method can subsume wordsyntax and syntax proper or it can keep these two areas of analysis separate. His basis for identifying morpheme-sequence classes is the fact that single morphemes which have already been identiWed as members of a morpheme class can substitute for morpheme sequences. This is expressed by means of equations. The morphemesequence classes identiWed by Harris which describe the syntax of English words include, for example, N1-Nn ¼ N1 (e.g. engineer),17 A1-An ¼ N1 (e.g. darkness), A1-Av ¼ V1 (e.g. sharpen), or A1-Aa ¼ A2 (e.g. oldish), with -Nn, -An, -Av and -Aa representing classes of nominal, verbal and adjectival suYxes which combine with N or A as bases. The morpheme-sequence classes identiWed by Harris which describe the syntactic structure of utterances include the following: D A2 ¼ A2: completely false for false in That’s a __ statement. A2 N1 ¼ N1: peculiar fellow for Senator in Isn’t he a __. 17 The introduction of raised numbers is explained by Harris in the following way: ‘we assign raised 1 to each class symbol, say X, when it Wrst appears. Next time the X appears in an equation, we assign it the same number 1 if the equivalents of this X can be substituted for X1 in every equation which has so far been written. If the new X cannot be substituted for all the preceding X1 we number it X2. If we later obtain an X which cannot be substituted for all the preceding X1 or X2, we will number it X3, and so on. If some symbols never go above 1 we can dispense with the raised number for them and merely write the symbol without numbers’ (1946: 170).


45

A2 A2 N1 ¼ A2 N1: . . . ambitious young, pretty dark, substitutable for funny in She is a __ girl.18 T N2 ¼ N3: the orchestra or these pointless, completely transparent jokes for butter in I don’t like __. Vb1 A2 ¼ have Vb1 -en A2 ¼ Ve2: is gone or has been gone or seems neat or is greyish for comes in He __ now. Vd2 N4 V4 (all under one sentence intonation) ¼ Vd2 N4 ¼ Ve2: know he is for know it in I __ now. The N4 V4 is thus the object of the Vd2. The V4 indicates a full verb phrase, e.g. was as well as is in the example above. (cf. 1946: 171 V.)

The examples show that Harris identiWes syntactic categories at diVerent hierarchical levels and that syntactic categories that are represented by long morpheme-sequences consist of shorter ones or of morpheme classes. Applying the procedure presented above, sentence structures are described starting with morphemes and morpheme classes, i.e. bottom-up. Harris remarks that this procedure can be reversed such that starting with an utterance, immediate constituents can be identiWed and the description of the structure of an utterance derived topdown. Using My most recent plays closed down as an example, Harris illustrates this procedure (cf. 1951: 278 f.): the utterance is divided Wrst into the categories N4 and V4. N4 is then divided into T (my) and N3. N3 (most recent plays) is divided into N2 and -s. N2 (most recent play) is divided into A (most recent) and N2 (play) and A into D (most) and A (recent). V4 (closed down) is divided into V2 and Vv (-ed). V2 (close down) is divided into V1 (close) and Pb (down). This is represented by the following analysis: at the Wrst stage, N4 and V4 at the second stage, T and N3; V2 and Vv at the third stage, T, N2, and -s; Vv, V1 and Pb at the fourth stage, T, A and N2, -s; Vv, V1 and Pb at the Wfth stage, T, D, A and N2, -s; Vv, V1 and Pb . (Harris 1951: 279)

The next chapter will show that analyses like this one demonstrate very clearly the close relationship between Chomsky’s early Generative 18 The equation is presented in this way by Harris (cf. 1946: 172). Actually it should read A2 A2 ¼ A2, since N1 (girl) is given in the environment.

46


Grammar and the description of syntactic structures by his teacher Harris. However, Chomsky in the early period (i.e. 1957, 1965) prefers a top-down analysis, whereas Harris argues in favour of a bottom-up analysis. His claim is that this approach encounters fewer theoretical problems and that it is more diYcult to Wnd formal criteria for the identiWcation of immediate constituents.19 It should have become clear that Harris’s procedure for an identiWcation of syntactic categories strictly followed requirements of scientiWc methodology. At the same time it is clear that to a large extent he used category names that are identical to those of the traditional parts of speech, e.g. N(oun), V(erb), A(djective), or P(reposition). This was something that tended to cause confusion in subsequent descriptions of syntactic categories, even in the framework of American Structuralism. This will be discussed in section 3.5. Fries (1952) applies the same procedure to identify syntactic categories as distribution classes in English, but he is careful to avoid terminological confusion and introduces new category names, as will now be illustrated. Like Harris, Fries begins his investigations by gathering a corpus of utterances. From this he selects three utterances which can be expanded if necessary and which serve as environments or frames for substitution tests: Frame A: The concert was good (always) Frame B: The clerk remembered the tax (suddenly) Frame C: The team went there (cf. Fries 1952: 75)

Words that can replace one of the words in these test frames are analysed as forming a category with that word. As a result, Fries identiWes 19 categories, of which four are called ‘parts of speech’ or ‘form classes’ and 15 ‘function words’. The categories of the ‘parts of speech’ or ‘form classes’ are called ‘Class 1’, ‘Class 2’, ‘Class 3’, and ‘Class 4’. Words that can replace concert, clerk, tax, or team in the test frames are analysed as Class 1, those that can replace was, remembered,

19 An example that illustrates the problems can be given, based on his analyses. Harris analyses the sequence ambitious young girl as A2 N1 and A2 as A2 A2. More recent approaches would analyse it as A1 and N2 and N2 as A1N1.


47

or went are analysed as Class 2, those that can replace good as Class 3 and Wnally those that can replace always, suddenly, or there as Class 4. Fries justiWes the alternative term ‘form class’ by pointing out that members of these four classes may be formally marked: Class 1, for example, by -al or -ism, as in arrival or idealism; Class 2 by en- or -ify, as in enjoy or beautify; Class 3 by -y or -ive, as in cloudy or creative; and Class 4 by -ly or a-, as in noisily or away (cf. Fries 1952: 110 ff.).20 He observes that there is no similar formal way of marking function words, which are identiWed only by their position and thus on the basis of their distribution. Fries identiWes the following categories of function words: GROUP A: words that can replace the in The concert was good GROUP B: words that can replace may in The concert may have been good; three subcategories are distinguished, which may co-occur in examples like The students may (a) have (b) had to (c) be (d) moving GROUP C: not GROUP D: words that can replace very in The concert may not be very good or still in The concert may be still better GROUP E: words that can replace and in The concerts and the lectures are and were interesting and proWtable now and earlier GROUP F: words that can replace at in The concerts at the school are at the top or The dress at the end is dirty at the bottom GROUP G: do/does/did as in Do/did the boys correct their homework promptly and The boy/s does/do not correct his/their homework promptly GROUP H: there as in There is a man at the door and There are men at the door GROUP I: words that can replace when in When was the concert good and When did the student call GROUP J: words that can replace after in The orchestra was good after the new director came GROUP K: well, oh, now, and why as in Well that’s more helpful, Oh I have another suit, Now what group could aVord it, and Why it would be nice if you would GROUP L: yes and no as in Yes I know and No they don’t arrive until eight

20 It should be noted that Fries’s deWnition of ‘form-class’ diVers from that given by BloomWeld. Whereas for BloomWeld ‘form-class’ and ‘position-class’ refer to the same thing, Fries uses the term ‘form-class’ only for those position-classes that can be marked by aYxes that are category-speciWc, such as en-, -er, or -able.

48


GROUP M: say, listen, and look as in Say I just got on Saturday another letter from P_R_, Listen did you get any shoes, and Look I want to ask you two questions GROUP N: please as in Please take these two letters GROUP O: let’s or let us as in Let’s do the inviting right now and Let us go through the list

(cf. ibid. 88 V.) Fries’s intention in consistently avoiding the traditional labels for parts of speech is to show that these are categories of a diVerent kind, namely quite clearly syntactic categories identiWed on the basis of their distribution. Fries emphasizes that the neutral notation, using numbers and letters, is intended to prevent confusion with the traditional parts of speech, although he concedes that there are similarities between Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 and nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs respectively. He nevertheless insists that they are diVerent (cf. 1952: 87 f.). Like Harris, Fries discusses a description of sentence structures via immediate constituents (ibid. 256 V.). Unlike Harris, however, he does not identify syntactic categories comparable to Harris’s morpheme-sequence classes. 3.5 Inconsistencies and problems concerning the identification of syntactic categories The identiWcation of syntactic categories by Harris and Fries and by other representatives of American Structuralism exhibit inconsistencies and problems which tend to undermine their approach. There are, in particular, two problematic issues. The Wrst one concerns the empirical adequacy of the identiWcation of categories and thus the core of the analysis. The second problem relates to the fact that the terminology used by Harris frequently leads to a confusion of syntactic categories and the traditional parts of speech. The problem of the empirical adequacy of the identiWcation of categories lies in the discrepancy between the theoretical claims and their practical implementation. Fries makes the theoretical claim that syntactic categories are made up of those words ‘that occupy the same ‘‘set of positions’’ in the patterns of English free utterances’ (1952: 74). Due to their Wniteness and accidental make-up, corpora cannot, on principle, yield general statements concerning all the possible positions in a language. However, apart from this general problem of a


49

solely corpus-based approach, there is a further criticism to be levelled at Fries’s analysis. He limits his view even further by Wrst using only three test frames – allowing expansions and some additional utterances – to determine classes of function words, and moreover inserts only those words into the test frames that occur in his corpus. This yields two types of inadequacy. The Wrst is that almost all of the categories are lists of words that can replace each other in the positions tested, but not necessarily in other positions. Two examples, to which others might be added, will illustrate this. On the basis of substitution in the test frame (The) Class 1 __ good, Fries identiWes is, feels, and becomes, amongst others, as members of Class 2. However, of these only is can occur in the following frame: __ the Class 1 good, e.g. Is the concert good, but not Feels the paper good or Becomes the boy tired. Therefore, is, feels, and becomes do not form a homogeneous distribution class or position class. The second example concerns Class 4. On the basis of his test frames, Fries identiWes, amongst others, conWdently, suYciently, longer, through, and away as members of this class, although only conWdently but not the others can be inserted in other test frames, for example, He __ took the exam. This problem cannot be solved by allowing for subclassiWcation, a solution which Fries suggests for terms like down (¼Class 4a), rapidly (¼Class 4b), and often (¼Class 4c), which can all occur in the frame The men went __ __ __. Fries did not test for membership of subclasses outside the few test frames he used, and if he had, further problems would have arisen, as will be seen below. The fact that Fries tested only words from his corpus to identify categories leads to problems of a diVerent nature. For example, Fries lists words like good, which can be inserted in two positions of the test frame (The) __ Class 1 is/was __, as belonging to Class 3. Other words in his list are necessary, foreign, new, empty, or hard. It is not clear how Fries would have classiWed, for example, former, present, or southern, had they occurred in his corpus, since these can only be inserted in the Wrst, the prenominal position but not in the second predicative one. It is also surprising to Wnd that afraid occurs in the list of Class 3 words (cf. 1952: 83, fn15) as it can only be inserted in predicative position. As a result of the two inadequacies pointed out above, it must be noted that the number of categories identiWed by Fries would be much larger than 19 (¼ 4 parts of speech and 15 function words) if his analysis followed his theoretical claims.

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A similar conclusion can be drawn concerning the number of categories identiWed by Harris who does, however, seem to have been aware of the problem. On the one hand, he claims to identify syntactic categories – or, more generally, morpheme classes – as classes of morphemes which have the same distribution, i.e. which share all their environments. On the other hand, he relaxes this claim when he points out that due to the Wniteness of corpora, morpheme classes can only be approximations to classes of morphemes with identical distribution, and that ‘rough similarities of environments’, e.g. 80 per cent overlap, is suYcient (cf. 1951: 244 f.). Even given this qualiWcation, however, the discrepancy between his theoretical claim and his analysis is problematic. Compare in this context the formulation of Harris’s criterion for the identiWcation of classes to the description of the category I, here quoted in full: [W]e shall set up the following classes of morphemes, on the criterion that for each class there are particular sentence positions which can be Wlled by any member of that class and by these alone. (Harris 1946: 167) I: before or after V, after from, before, but not after A or T or before plural -s: it, all, some, now, here. Some morphemes in this class do not occur after from, before, etc., or after utterance-initial V: he, I. Others do not occur before V unless NV precedes them: me. (ibid. 168)

This description of the category shows that it is by no means the case that ‘particular sentence positions . . . can be Wlled by any member of that class’ (ibid. 167), since the addition of a number of exceptions is part of the description. In section 3.4, it was noted that Harris adds a footnote to his formulation of the criterion for the identiWcation of morpheme classes which considerably weakens it: ‘This does not mean that every member of the class occurs in all the positions in which any other member occurs’ (1946: 167, fn10). The subsequent reference to footnote 5 shows that Harris wanted this note to refer to forms like wire, whose distribution matches the combined distributions of poem and write. By themselves neither poem nor write share all the possible positions of wire. The result is that wire is assigned to two categories, the category N and the category V (cf. ibid. 164, fn5). This, however, raises


51

new questions, especially in the light of the description of a category like D: D: between the and A, but not between the and N: rather, very, now, not. Many of these, e.g. now, occur in various positions in the utterance (after V: Don’t look now; before V: He now wishes it weren’t; at the beginning of an utterance, with a level /,/ intonation: Now, what’s up?). Some adverbs, e.g. very, do not occur in most of these positions. When we wish to indicate only the more widely-occurring ones, to the exclusion of very and the like, we write Da. In more detailed analysis, many more sub-classes of D would be necessary. (ibid. 168)

The relevant question here is this: when do diVerent distributions require new categories or classes to be set up, and when do they yield subclasses? What is it, then, that makes very and now members of a single class? Obviously it is not the criterion that they can be inserted in the same positions in sentences, because that is not the case. The reason seems to be the traditional categorization into parts of speech, for these forms traditionally belong to the part of speech ‘adverb’, one which is not at all distributionally homogeneous. In the light of this, it is interesting that Fries provides a completely diVerent categorization of the forms of Harris’s Class D and distributes them among Class 4, Group C, Group D, Group H, Group I, Group J, Group K, and Group L – as Gleason (1965: 129 f.) also noted. Applying his theoretical claims more consistently, Harris would also have identiWed more categories or classes than just one. A comparison of his approach to that of Fries shows that retaining the names of the traditional parts of speech can tend to obscure the fact that these were identiWed on a completely diVerent basis. Harris’s class D is not a distribution or position class but rather the part of speech ‘adverb’, which is obvious from his use of this term (‘some adverbs’) in his description. As will be seen in the following chapters, Harris is not the only one who – at least every now and then – confuses the two types of categorization. This confusion is facilitated by the fact that other Structuralists also call the syntactic categories that they are trying to identify ‘parts of speech’. BloomWeld does so when he states that ‘the syntactic form-classes are described in terms of the parts of speech that appear in them’ (1933: 196). And so do Bloch and Trager (1942: 66 V.) and Francis (1954: 234 V.), who all point out that they will continue to use the traditional name ‘part of speech’ but that it means something

52


diVerent. Hockett, Wnally, redeWnes the term ‘part of speech’, saying: ‘A part of speech is a form-class of stems which show similar behaviour in inXection, in syntax or both’ (1958: 220). However, re-deWnitions such as this are easily forgotten, and the traditional names potentially trigger the traditional connotations. The identiWcation of syntactic categories by the American Structuralists can be summarized as follows: their aim was to identify and describe categories whose members had the same distribution, i.e. could occupy the same positions in sentences. The method for the identiWcation of these categories is explicit. It is based on transparent discovery procedures. Uncertainties such as the meanings of linguistic units are excluded. As a result, sentence patterns are described which – following Harris’s approach – describe categorially speciWed hierarchical structures. Since this approach is applied to each language separately, diVerent categories and diVerent structures can be identiWed for each language. Harris himself demonstrates this by identifying categories for Hidatsa (1946: 175 V.) and for Moroccan Arabic (1951: 285 V.) which in both cases only partially match those for English. Thus – at least theoretically – Boas’s requirement was fulWlled, namely to do justice to each individual language and to discover its internal structure. What is problematic, however, is that the analyses were carried out on the basis of corpora, which – by their very nature – must be Wnite and therefore cannot yield general statements about a language. Another issue is the fact that if the theoretical claims had been followed consistently, the result would have been quite diVerent from what Harris and Fries present. Above all, the number of categories would have been much larger, ‘a myriad of classes’, as Croft (2000: 82) critically remarks, with many categories consisting of just one member, like Fries’s Group N and Group O. An example of a much larger number of categories is, by the way, provided by Bergenholtz and Schaeder (1977), who identify 51 syntactic categories as distribution classes for German. However, it is not the number of categories that is problematic. It is rather the fact that the descriptions of categories often include exceptions or are not derived via distributional analyses at all, thus rendering it impossible to determine the distribution of a linguistic item on the basis of its category membership. Finally, a number of Structuralists use the names of the traditional parts of speech for their distributional classes, thus obscuring the fact


53

that these are identiWed on completely diVerent grounds, and this has been recognized here as an additional problem. It should, however, be noted that the neutral terms chosen by Fries – Class 1, Class 2, etc. and Group A, Group B, etc. – did not initiate a new tradition and were almost totally neglected. The reason for this was probably their lack of mnemotechnical value.

4 Syntactic categories in early Generative Grammar 4.1 Introduction The preceding chapter has shown that the development of American Structuralism was strongly inXuenced by Franz Boas, who realized that the traditional way of describing the grammar of a language could not capture the special properties of American Indian languages. Beginning in the early 1950s, comparable insights – in this case concerning the structuralist method of linguistic description developed by Harris and its inadequacy for the description of the grammars of languages – again led to fundamental changes in the approach to language. Due to its revolutionary character and its close connection with the linguist Noam Chomsky, the new movement is often called the ‘Chomskyan Revolution’ (cf. e.g. Newmeyer 1980: 19 V.; Sampson 1980: 130). In the ‘Introduction’ (written in 1973) to The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, a book which he started in 1953 and a first version of which was finished in 1955 (although it was not published until 1975), Chomsky describes what convinced him of the inadequacy of the structuralist description of language and how he developed his own linguistic theory.1 From a very early age, Chomsky (born 1928) had close contact with foreign languages and grammars. At the age of ten, he read the proofs of a grammar of Medieval Hebrew written by his father, a Hebrew philologist.2 Eight years later, even before Noam Chomsky had started studying linguistics, Harris gave him the proofs of his

1 The information given here on Chomsky’s motivation for the development of his theory of language is based on his remarks in this Introduction (1973a: 25 V.). 2 According to Chomsky (1973a: 50, fn44), this is David Kimhi’s Hebrew Grammar by William Chomsky.

syntactic categories in early generative grammar

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book Methods in Structural Linguistics, which he studied intensively. Chomsky himself called this ‘[m]y formal introduction to the field of linguistics’ (1973a: 25), adding that while he was studying linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania as an undergraduate, Harris suggested that he should write a systematic grammar of some language on the basis of his Methods. Chomsky chose Modern Hebrew and started to construct a system of rules which modified Harris’s method of analysis and which was capable of generating the phonetic forms of sentences. Chomsky’s intention was not only to describe the phonetic forms but also to explain their distribution in sentences. He saw this as analogous to the methods used in historical linguistics to explain language change.3 Chomsky posited abstract morphophonemic representations, from which phonetic forms were derived, together with linearly-ordered rules that generated the derivation. In addition to this morphophonemic component, the grammar contained a rudimentary syntactic component consisting of phrase-structure rules that recast in a linearly-ordered system of rules the sentence formulas described by Harris in terms of morpheme classes and morpheme-sequence classes.4 It was this consideration of syntax which convinced Chomsky that the structuralists’ method and their view of language was inadequate and which then motivated him to develop his own ‘revolutionary’ theory of language. The need for a diVerent approach manifested itself in the realization that the syntax of a language, unlike its morphophonemics, relates to an infinite domain. It seemed problematic to Chomsky to equate the grammar of a language with lists of sentence patterns that were identified inductively on the basis of segmenting and classifying utterances in finite corpora. This could not adequately describe the infinite set of sentences of a language or their grammar: Obviously, syntax is an infinite system, but the inductive step that would lead to a description of syntactic structure was plainly lacking. (Chomsky 1973a: 30) 3 As Newmeyer (1980: 33) reports, Chomsky was familiar with the methods of historical linguistics from the writings of his father. 4 Chomsky submitted this first Generative Grammar, entitled Morphophonemics of Modern Hebrew and focusing on the morphophonemic properties of Modern Hebrew, as his undergraduate thesis in 1949, and an expanded version formed his master’s thesis in 1951.

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Chomsky tried to find the missing ‘inductive step’, but came to the following conclusion: The failure of inductive, data-processing procedures at the syntactic level became more obvious the more I worked on the problem. . . . It became increasingly clear to me that the methodological limitation to procedures based on substitution, matching, and similar ‘taxonomic’ operations was arbitrary and unwarranted. (ibid. 30 f.)

Chomsky therefore felt it necessary to reconsider how a linguist might discover the grammar of a language. This directed his attention to language acquisition, which led him to the conclusion that a linguist is in a similar situation to a child in the process of acquiring a language, constructing his grammar from the data he is exposed to and thus achieving linguistic competence. In particular, the following observations seemed relevant: during the process of language acquisition a child is exposed to grammatical as well as ungrammatical data since adults in everyday situations often do not finish sentences, complete them in an ungrammatical way, or repeat sentence parts. Nevertheless, the grammar of the language is acquired.5 It is also the case that the children of a speech community are not exposed to the same set of data, which, from the perspective of the structuralists, means that their language acquisition is based on diVerent corpora. Despite this, they acquire more or less the same grammar as the community to which they belong. Chomsky concluded from these observations that language acquisition is not inductive, i.e. a discovery procedure on the basis of finite corpora, and that therefore the inductive method of discovering the grammar of a language as developed by the structuralists is also inadequate.6 From these insights, Chomsky developed his own deductive theory of language, which included suggestions concerning the organization of grammatical models and which also had consequences for the identification and the role of syntactic categories in such models. This will be shown in what follows. Section 4.2 is concerned with 5 This fact concerning the defective input for language acquisition is known as the ‘projection problem’ or as the ‘logical problem of language acquisition’ (cf. e.g. Hornstein and Lightfoot 1981). 6 Skinner’s (1957) attempt to explain language acquisition on an inductive basis was reduced to absurdity by Chomsky in his well-known review (1959).


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relevant aspects of Chomsky’s theory of language, concentrating on the early phase as presented in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1955 [1975]), Syntactic Structures (1957), and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). Section 4.3 considers Chomsky’s conception of the organization of a Generative Grammar and brieXy sketches the models introduced in Syntactic Structures and Aspects. Against this background, section 4.4 focuses on syntactic categories and their characterization in these two models. Section 4.5 presents alternative suggestions to the categories identified by Chomsky, and section 4.6 provides a critical discussion of the results. 4.2 Aspects of the Chomskyan theory of language The specific character of Chomsky’s theory of language and what made it ‘revolutionary’ from the structuralist perspective stems, above all, from his conviction that the task of a linguist is comparable to a child’s acquisition of language or linguistic competence, a process in which the child mentally, though unconsciously, constructs a grammar (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1973a: 11). According to this view, the linguist can solve his task if he can explain the process of language acquisition and its final state, the linguistic competence of a native speaker.7 Thus, unlike the American Structuralist theory of language, Chomsky’s theory is a mentalistic one.8 It is not the product language as represented by corpora that forms the object of investigation but the linguistic competence of the native speaker. For such a theory it is important to identify what characterizes the process of language acquisition and the linguistic competence of native speakers. In this connection, Chomsky makes a number of observations, some of which have already been mentioned in section 4.1. Every normal child acquires the language of

7 Chomsky considers an explanation of language acquisition ‘the fundamental problem of linguistic theory’ (e.g. 1973a: 12). 8 As was shown in chapter 3 (section 3.2), Bloomfield had rejected a mentalistic theory as unscientific, and this had a decisive inXuence on the attitude of the American Structuralists. In The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory and accordingly also in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky did not present his theory of language as a mentalistic one. He remarks in this connection: ‘To raise this issue seemed to me, at the time, too audacious’ (1973a: 35). Later, in Aspects (e.g. ibid. 4, 193), he discussed this issue at length. This important aspect of Chomsky’s theory of language had, however, been brought out in Lees’s review of Syntactic Structures (1957), which received considerable attention, not least because of its unsparing criticism of structuralism.

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the speech community in which he grows up. He acquires this language even though the linguistic input contains grammatically ill-formed sentences as well as grammatically well-formed ones. And despite the fact that the input for children of the same speech community is not identical, they nevertheless acquire more or less the same grammar. When a language has been acquired, a speaker’s linguistic competence enables him to produce and understand an infinite number of sentences, including sentences that he has never heard before. His linguistic competence also enables him to distinguish grammatically well-formed utterances from ill-formed ones, whereby ill-formedness can refer to phonological deviations, such as the accent of a non-native speaker, morphological deviations, such as case errors, or syntactic deviations, such as errors in word order. Linguistic competence also includes the ability to recognize sentences such as They are Xying planes or They don’t know how good meat tastes as ambiguous and sentence pairs such as John bought this book and This book was bought by John as referring to the same situation (cf. e.g. 1973a: 30, 1955 [1975]: 61 f.). Chomsky’s conclusion based on observations like these is that the linguist’s task is to develop a deductive linguistic theory which explains the specific properties of language acquisition, including its final state of linguistic competence, and which provides a grammar as a model of this linguistic competence. Thus, a linguistic theory must answer the following questions: how is it possible that in spite of defective input every normal child acquires his language perfectly, and how is it possible that in spite of diVerent inputs children of the same speech community develop more or less the same (internalized) grammar? The latter implies the following question: how do children select one particular grammar from among the various possible grammars for their language, the one that is clearly the best grammar? Finally, in order to explain the specific properties of the linguistic competence of a native speaker, the theory must provide answers to questions concerning the properties of a grammar and its organization. Chomsky’s answers to these questions are roughly as follows (cf. e.g. 1965: 25, 57 V., 1973a: 9, 35): given the conditions as observed, the process of language acquisition can only be explained by assuming that children are equipped with a genetic disposition for language acquisition. The development of language does not start with a blank slate but with an innate initial state. Chomsky calls this innate initial state an ‘innate linguistic theory’ (e.g. 1965: 25) or a ‘universal grammar’ (e.g. 1980: 28). This innate linguistic theory determines the course


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of language acquisition, which is activated by linguistic input, and constrains the number of possible grammars for a given language. The result is that children develop perfect linguistic competence in spite of defective input, i.e. they construct a mentally-represented, internalized grammar of their language. The fact that children of the same speech community develop more or less the same linguistic competence in spite of diVerent inputs is attributed by Chomsky to the fact that they select the best one from those grammars that are compatible with the innate linguistic theory and with the data, the best grammar being the one with the most linguistically significant generalizations and thus the simplest one (cf. e.g. 1965: 37 V., 1973a: 28 f.). In order to explain the final state of language acquisition, i.e. the competence of the native speaker, the internalized grammar must – according to Chomsky – be generative. This means that it must be able to generate an infinite number of sentences and only grammatically well-formed sentences. ‘Generate’ includes both the process of production and of analysis, which means that the grammar is neutral with respect to speaker and hearer (cf. e.g. 1965: 9, 1973a: 37). In addition, the grammar must have strong generative capacity, meaning that it must not only generate sentences but at the same time assign structural descriptions to them, thus accounting for the native speaker’s ability to recognize structures and also structural ambiguity (cf. e.g. 1965: 60 V.). Comparing the task of a linguist with a child’s acquisition of language means that a linguist should construct possible grammars for a given language and select the best one. According to the theory, this grammar must consist of universal grammar plus the specific properties of the particular language. It must be generative and it must have strong generative capacity, which means that it must satisfy the requirements of descriptive adequacy.9 In addition, when compared with others, this grammar must contain the largest number of linguistically significant generalizations, i.e. it must be the simplest one.

9 Chomsky distinguishes three levels of adequacy: observational adequacy, descriptive adequacy, and explanatory adequacy. A grammar is claimed to have observational adequacy if it accepts the sentences of a language as well formed. It has descriptive adequacy if, in addition, it generates structural descriptions for each of the sentences. Explanatory adequacy is achieved by a linguistic theory which, from a set of descriptively adequate grammars, selects the one with the largest number of linguistically significant generalizations and thus the simplest one (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1964: 28 V.).

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In order to make a choice, the grammars must be comparable on an objective basis, i.e. they must be formal and explicit (cf. e.g. 1965: 4, 8, 1973a: 37 V.). Chomsky demonstrates in various publications (e.g. 1955 [1975], 1964, 1965, 1966a) what such a grammar can look like and how it can be organized internally. The following section sketches the organization of a Generative Grammar on the basis of the models of 1957 and 1965, concentrating in particular on those areas which illustrate the role of syntactic categories in these models.

4.3 On the organization of a Generative Grammar: two examples Chomsky’s fragment of a Generative Grammar for English, published in Syntactic Structures (1957) but developed earlier in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory,10 presents a model which in principle meets most of his requirements for a grammar. The model is formal and explicit, has strong generative capacity and can – if supplemented by additional rules – generate an infinite number of sentences together with their structural descriptions. The introduction of a new type of rule, the transformational rule, allows it to make a large number of linguistically significant generalizations, thus rendering the grammar simpler than those that do not contain such rules. The following outline shows the organization of this model: (1)

: Sentence: ) F: X1 ! Y1 : Phrase structure Xn ! Yn ) T1 : Transformational structure Tj ) Z1 ! W1 : Morphophonemics

10 It should be noted here that Syntactic Structures contains an abbreviated version of the 1955 model. Chomsky remarks in this connection: ‘This was a sketchy and informal outline of some of the material in LSLT’ (1973a: 3). The model is considered here because it shows more clearly than the Standard Theory of 1965 the close link to Harris’s Methods, which is relevant for the syntactic categories identified.


(3)

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Sentence qp NP g NPsing 9 T N Æ g g the man

VP wo Verb NP V g Aux V NPpl g g 9 C take T N S g g the ball

Zm ! Wm (Chomsky 1957: 46)

The model consists of the initial symbol : Sentence and three sets of rules: phrase-structure rules, transformational rules, and morphophonemic rules. Unlike the inductive method proposed by Harris, the sentences of a language are not described bottom-up, i.e. starting with their phonetic representation, then identifying morphemes, morpheme classes, and finally morpheme-sequence classes. Instead they are described top-down, starting with the category Sentence. Phrase-structure rules, which have the form of rewrite rules (see below), generate phrase-markers associated with strings of morphemes that underlie so-called ‘kernel sentences’ (i.e. simple, active, declarative, positive sentences). Obligatory and optional transformations then move constituents around, insert, or delete morphemes or morpheme sequences or combine phrase-markers. Step by step, this derives phrase-markers associated with strings of morphemes which represent kernel sentences as well as passive, interrogative, negative simple or complex sentences and their structures. Finally, the morphophonemic rules derive the phonetic representations from the strings of morphemes. The phrase-structure rules suggested by Chomsky are given as (2): (2)

: #Sentence# F: 1. Sentence ! NP þ VP 2. VP ! Verb n þoNP sing 3. NP ! NP NPpl 4. NPsing ! T þ N þ

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syntactic categories 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

NPpl ! T þ N þ S T ! the N ! man, ball, etc. Verb ! Aux þ V V ! hit, take, walk, read, etc. Aux ! C(M) (have þ en) (be þ ing) M ! will, can, may, shall, must (1957: 111)

The phrase-structure rules of this model are context-free rewrite rules which analyse simple constituents to the left of the arrow into their immediate constituents, shown to the right of the arrow. These rules would, for example, generate the following phrasemarker: In (3) the category C represents the inXectional properties of V that are specified by the Number Transformation. If the subject NP of a clause is specified as ‘singular’, then C can be replaced by ‘S’. It is replaced by in other contexts. Independently of the number specification of the subject, C can be replaced by ‘past’ (cf. Chomsky 1957: 112). Unlike phrase-structure rules, transformational rules do not operate on single categories but on strings. Transformational rules consist of two parts: a structural description of the strings to which these apply, and the structural change they produce. (4) and (5) below show the Passive Transformation, which needs to be applied to derive clauses like the ball was taken by the man, and the Auxiliary Transformation, which reverses the order of verbal inXectional aYxes and verbs. The former is an example of an optional transformation and the latter of an obligatory transformation: (4)

Passive – optional: Structural analysis: NP – Aux – V – NP Structural change: X1 X2 X3 X4 ! X4 X2 þ be þ en X3 by þ X1 (Chomsky 1957: 112)

(5)

Auxiliary Transformation – obligatory: Structural analysis: X Af v Y (where Af is any C or is en or ing; v is any M or V, or have or be) Structural change: X1 X2 X3 X4 ! X1 X3 X2# X4 (ibid. 113)


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In order to derive a kernel sentence from a phrase-marker like (3), an obligatory Number Transformation – not presented here – must first be applied which substitutes either past or S (¼3rd person, singular) for C. Then the Auxiliary Transformation must apply which moves past or S to a position behind take and inserts the word-boundary symbol #. Additional word-boundary symbols must be inserted by the obligatory Word Boundary Transformation before the morphophonemic rules transform the morphemes or morpheme sequences which occur between word-boundary symbols into phonetic representations. A morphophonemic rule changes #takeþpast# into /t¨k/, for example. This brief presentation shows that at first sight – apart from the transformational rules11 – there is a great similarity between Harris’s description of sentences and Chomsky’s model as sketched here. In both cases, sentence structures are described on the basis of morphemesequence classes (e.g. NP, VP) and morpheme classes (e.g. N, V), and in both cases the relationship between morphemes and their phonetic representations is represented. The only diVerence seems to be that Harris’s bottom-up procedure is simply reversed and cast as a rulesystem that operates top-down. However, this diVerence has considerable consequences, including consequences for the identification and the status of syntactic categories in the two approaches. This will be dealt with in section 4.4. At this point, the following should be noted: Harris’s approach started with data and discovered sentence structures by identifying categories and relations between categories on the basis of distributional analysis. In contrast to this, Chomsky’s rule system formulates hypotheses about categories and relations between categories in well-formed sentences as well as about their morphemic and phonetic representation. Thus, according to Chomsky, a grammar is a theory of the language that it generates.12 It formulates (falsifiable) hypotheses

11 It deserves mention that Harris also discussed grammatical transformations (e.g. 1952, 1957), though their status is diVerent. Rather than mapping underlying sentence structures onto (underlying) sentence structures in a formal grammar, they express an equivalence relation between two sentences: ‘we will say that sentences of the form A are equivalent to sentences of the form B, if for each sentence A we can find a sentence B containing the same morphemes except for diVerences due to the diVerence in form between A and B’ (1952: 19). And he continues: ‘N1VN2 is equivalent to N2 is V-en by N1 because for any sentence like Casals plays the cello we can find a sentence The cello is played by Casals’ (ibid). 12 Compare in this connection Chomsky’s statement: ‘A grammar of the language L is essentially a theory of L’ (1957: 49).

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about well-formed sentences and their structure. This means that the syntactic categories which are used in the phrase-structure rules and the transformational rules are not discovered inductively but postulated a priori, and that they express hypotheses about the syntactic categorization of morphemes and morpheme sequences. However, it is not clear what the status of the categories postulated in this model is intended to be. Although the phrase-structure rules which introduce categories like N, V, or T and replace them by morphemes characterize these categories as distribution classes, these cannot be of the same type as Harris’s distribution classes because the rules do not generate sentences or ‘surface structures’ but rather abstract underlying structures. The intended status of the syntactic categories becomes clearer in the Standard Theory model, presented in Aspects (Chomsky 1965). Compared to the 1957 model, this one is more elaborated and more diVerentiated. It consists of three components: a syntactic component, a semantic component – previously neglected – and a phonological component. The syntactic component is generative. It is composed of two subcomponents, a base component and transformational rules. The base component contains phrase-structure rules, but in contrast to the 1957 model, these do not substitute morphemes for syntactic categories. Instead, there is a lexicon which, together with the phrase-structure rules, forms the base component. Phrase-structure rules in combination with items from the lexicon generate the deep structures of sentences, which are interpreted by the semantic component. Deep structures together with their interpretations form the input to the transformational rules. These derive the surface structures, which are interpreted by the phonological component. A schematic view of the model is given in (6):

(6)

S Base: PS-rules Lexicon Deep structure

Semantic interpretation

Transformational rules Surface structure

Phonological interpretation


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In addition to the integration of semantics, the division into three distinct components, the separation of phrase-structure rules and the lexicon, and the highlighting of two phrase-markers as deep structure and surface structure, the model exhibits further changes which are particularly relevant for the characterization of syntactic categories. These are the introduction of subcategorization, suggestions concerning the interaction of the phrase-structure rules and the lexicon, and modifications to the phrase-structure rules. To begin with, two types of subcategorization are introduced: context-free and context-sensitive. Context-free subcategorization of the category N is described by means of the following rules: (7)

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

N ! [þN, Common] [þCommon] ! [Count] [þCount] ! [Animate] [Common] ! [Animate] [þAnimate] ! [Human] [Count] ! [Abstract] (Chomsky 1965: 82)

Context-sensitive subcategorization is described by means of two distinct types of rule: strict-subcategorization rules and selectional rules. The former take into account the possible categorial environments of a lexical category, e.g. V, restricting them to the domain of the next dominating node, which is VP in the case of V. Chomsky gives the following as examples of strict subcategorization rules for the category V: 8 9 NP (8) > > > > > > > > # > > > > > > > Adjective > > > > > > > > > < Predicate-Nominal = ˙ V ! CS= like Predicate-Nominal > > > > > Prepositional-Phrase > > > > > ˙ 0 > > > > that S > > > > 0 ˙ ˙ > > > > NP ðof Det NÞS > > : ; etc: (ibid. 94) Selectional rules are sensitive to the context-free subcategorization of nouns in noun phrases that assume the functions of subject and object in the environment of verbs:

66 (9)

syntactic categories 9 8 9 ½þAbstract Aux > ðiÞ > > > > > = < = ðiiÞ ½Abstract Aux ½þV ! CS ðiiiÞ> Det ½þAnimate> > > > > ; : ; ðivÞ Det ½Animate (ibid. 95)

Chomsky makes two suggestions on how phrase-structure rules and the lexicon interact to generate deep structures. In each case, the lexicon contains lexical entries which specify for each lexical item a phonological matrix, categorial and subcategorial properties, information concerning transformations where necessary, and semantic properties, although the latter have not yet been considered: (10) (sincerity, [þN, þDet—, Count, þAbstract, . . . ]) (frighten, [þV, þ —NP, þ[þAbstract] Aux — Det [þAnimate], þObject-deletion, . . . ]) (cf. 1965: 107) The first (9) suggests that the phrase-structure rules which generate terminal syntactic or ‘lexical’ categories such as N and V are supplemented by rules which generate complex symbols consisting of contextfree and context-sensitive subcategorization features. A context-free lexical rule then inserts the phonological matrix of a lexical entry in the position of a lexical category in a phrase marker if the complex symbol of the phrase-marker is not distinct from the feature specification of the lexical entry (cf. Chomsky 1965: 84).13 The second suggestion is that only lexical entries are specified for subcategorization properties, and all the lexical categories in phrase-markers are rewritten as D, the dummy symbol. In this case, a revised and now context-sensitive lexical rule inserts the phonological matrices of lexical entries in the positions occupied by the dummy symbols, replacing these if the subcategorization properties of the lexical entries match the structures generated by the phrase-structure rules (cf. ibid. 120 V.). The second suggestion avoids redundancies, is simpler and is therefore preferred to the first one. The following phrase-structure rules, which are more diVerentiated than those of the 1957 model, are adapted to this proposal: 13 Chomsky does not mention here that semantic material must also be inserted in the deep structure. Since, however, this is necessary for semantic interpretation, which takes place at this level, corresponding additions are needed.

syntactic categories in early generative grammar (11)

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1. S ! NP˙ Predicate Phrase 2. Predicate Phrase ! Aux˙ VP (Place) (Time) 8 ˙ 3. Predicate > 8 > Copula

9 > 9 > = < < ðNPÞ ðPrep-PhraseÞ ðPrep-PhraseÞ ðMannerÞ= VP ! V S0 > > > > ;; : : Predicate

4. Predicate ! Adjective ðlikeÞ Predicate-Nominal

5. Prep-Phrase ! Direction, Duration, Place, Frequency, etc. 6. V ! D 7. NP ! (Det) N (S’) 8. N ! D 9. Adjective ! D 10. Aux ! Tense (M) (Aspect) 11. Det ! (pre-Article˙ of) Article (post-Article) 12. Article ! [Definite] (cf. Chomsky 1965: 106 f., 122) Since these rules in combination with items from the lexicon generate deep structures which are interpreted semantically, all the information relevant for semantic interpretation must be present at this level.14 Although the transformational rules, which derive surface structures from deep structures, diVer from those of the 1957 model, these diVerences have no eVect on the identification of syntactic categories and therefore need not be considered here. What is of particular importance, however, is the requirement that transformations must not be meaning-changing. The remarks that Chomsky made in Aspects and elsewhere on his theory of language are particularly enlightening for an understanding of the status of syntactic categories in the models of early Generative Grammar. This will be seen in the following section.

14 The semantic component introduced in Aspects was developed by Katz and Postal (1964) and presented in Katz and Fodor (1963). The requirement that the semantic component must be interpretive and that all information relevant to the semantic interpretation must be present at the level of deep structure is referred to as the ‘Katz-Postal Hypothesis’ (cf. e.g. Newmeyer 1980: 79).

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4.4 Syntactic categories and universal grammar Before focusing on the status of syntactic categories in early Generative Grammar, this section will first consider the categories that are postulated and the functions of these categories in the two models sketched above. In both models the syntactic categories that are identified are introduced by the phrase-structure rules. In the 1965 model (ibid. 74), a distinction is made between categories which represent lexical items, such as N and V, and non-lexical categories such as Det, Aux, or M. The latter is characterized as exhibiting lexical as well as non-lexical properties (cf. 1965: 212, fn9). Except for the non-lexical ones, all the categories introduced by the phrase-structure rules are identified as ‘major categories’. Applying this classification to the 1957 model yields the following lexical categories introduced by phrase-structure rules: N (1957: 26), V (ibid. 39), Adj (ibid. 72), Prt (ibid. 75), Pron (ibid. 76) and Adv (ibid. 83). M and the non-lexical categories C and T15 must be added to these as well as Aux and, finally, the categories NP, VP, and PP (cf. ibid. 29, fn3) as additional major categories. Each of these categories can also be part of a transformational rule. The phrase-structure rules characterize the categories identified as linearly and hierarchically ordered distribution classes. However, the distribution of the lexical and grammatical formatives (e.g. N, V, T, C) as well as of sequences of these (e.g. NP, VP, Aux) is initially described at the abstract level of underlying structure and not – as in Harris’s model – as part of a sentence. In Generative Grammar a sentence is derived from the underlying structure by means of transformational rules (and morphophonemic rules). This leads to the following diVerences: Harris’s method identifies categories empirically on the basis of observed data of a particular language and employing distributional analysis. As pointed out above, the result is a relatively large number of categories. Chomsky, on the other hand, postulates a priori a relatively small number of categories whose distribution is related to an abstract, underlying level described by means of phrase-structure rules and whose distribution in the surface structure is derived by means of transformational rules. The interaction of phrase-structure rules and transformational rules implies the following prediction: the kind and number of syntactic categories postulated for the underlying structure is suYcient for a given language, since their distribution at the level of surface structure is derived by means of transformational rules and not the result of categorization at 15 C is a variable for verb inXection. Transformations replace C by S, , or past.


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this level. Anything that is introduced in this model by transformational rules, such as the forms have and be for the description of aspect and passive or n’t, do, or and, is excluded from categorization. It is therefore quite natural that these forms are introduced transformationally without any categorial specifications (cf. Chomsky 1957: 39, 112 f.). Thus it is obvious that the status of the syntactic categories identified by Harris and by Chomsky in his 1957 model diVers considerably. This holds, mutatis mutandis, for the 1965 model as well. The inclusion of the new categories Predicate Phrase, Place, Time, Copula, Predicate, Direction, Duration, etc. in the phrase-structure rules serves to improve the descriptive adequacy of the grammar in that it allows for a structural distinction between adjuncts and complements, which was not the case in the 1957 model. The new subcategorization rules, i.e. the context-free subcategorization of the category N as well as the strict subcategorization rules and the selectional rules of the category V, describe – as the name implies – ‘subcategories’ of the categories N and V, which are introduced by the phrase-structure rules. According to the first variant of the Aspects model, the subcategories are generated by the subcategorization rules in connection with the phrase-structure rules; according to the second variant, they are described in the lexicon. In neither case do they aVect the status of the categories described by phrase-structure rules in deep structure, as will be considered next. In section 4.3 it was pointed out that, according to Chomsky, the grammar of a language is a theory of that language. This means that the rules which constitute the grammar formulate hypotheses about this language. Consequently, as they form part of the rules, the categories are also hypotheses about a language, and one important question concerns the basis for these hypotheses. The answer is given by Chomsky’s assumption that a linguistic theory must explain language acquisition and therefore must aim at explanatory adequacy. As shown in section 4.2, Chomsky holds the view that language acquisition can be explained by assuming that a child is equipped with an innate linguistic theory, also called ‘universal grammar’ (UG). According to this view, UG in combination with linguistic input determines the child’s construction of a grammar, i.e. the development of his linguistic competence. Since Chomsky also maintains that the task of a linguist who wants to construct the grammar of a language is very much like the task of a child constructing his mental grammar, UG plays an important role in what a linguist does. Questions like the following are therefore crucial: What are the

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properties of UG? and What are linguistic universals? After pointing out in Aspects the importance of innate capacities for the construction of grammars, Chomsky therefore turns to a discussion of linguistic universals (cf. 1965: 27 V.). He distinguishes formal from substantive universals and as examples of the former, he identifies types of rules (e.g. phrase-structure rules and transformational rules) and relationships between rules (e.g. rule ordering). In this connection he states: The existence of deep-seated formal universals . . . implies that all languages are cut to the same pattern, but does not imply that there is any point by point correspondence between particular languages. (1965: 30)

With respect to substantive universals, he first remarks: A theory of substantive universals claims that items of a particular kind in any language must be drawn from a fixed class of items. (ibid. 28)

He then mentions Jakobson’s distinctive phonological features as a first example and continues: Traditional universal grammar was also a theory of substantive universals . . . It . . . advanced the position that certain fixed syntactic categories (Noun, Verb, etc.) can be found in the syntactic representations of the sentences of any language, and that these provide the general underlying syntactic structure of each language. (ibid.)

Later it becomes clear that ‘[t]raditional universal grammar’ refers to those grammars ‘whose origins can . . . be traced back at least to the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé’ (ibid. 117), i.e. the grammar that was outlined in chapter 2 (section 2.5). It also becomes clear that he agrees with many claims made in this grammar. This can be derived from his discussion in Aspects (e.g. ibid. 117 f.), from his remarks on language and mind (Chomsky 1968), and, in particular, from his book Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky 1966b). What can be inferred from this about the status of the so-called ‘lexical’ syntactic categories introduced by the phrase-structure rules is that Chomsky, following the linguists of the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé, considers them to be universal. This applies to other major categories as well, as is demonstrated by the following:


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Notice that the general significance of the definitions (11)16 depends on the assumption that the symbols S, NP, VP, N and V have been characterized as grammatical universals. (Chomsky 1965: 72 f.)17

Since the phrase-structure rule (i.e. this rule type) is considered to be universal as well, it follows that the base component of a Generative Grammar, which generates the deep structures of sentences, is itself also universal. This is claimed by Chomsky, albeit with a slight qualification, in the following: To say that formal properties of the base will provide the framework for the characterization of universal categories is to assume that much of the structure of the base is common to all languages. (1965: 117)

Chomsky describes the relationship between the base component of a Generative Grammar and a general linguistic theory, i.e. UG, which he claims to be innate, in the following way: Insofar as aspects of the base structure are not specific to a particular language, they need not be stated in the grammar of this language. Instead, they are to be stated only in general linguistic theory, as part of the definition of the notion ‘human language’ itself. In traditional terms, they pertain to the form of language in general rather than to the form of particular languages, and thus presumably reXect what the mind brings to the task of language acquisition rather than what it discovers (or invents) in the course of carrying out this task. (ibid. 117)

In the light of these remarks, the question concerning the basis of the syntactic categories in early models of Generative Grammar can now be answered: Chomsky’s hypothesis is that these categories belong to the inventory of substantive universals. Here he follows assumptions presented in the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé and it is therefore no

16 (11) contains the formal description of Subject-of: [NP, S], Predicate-of: [VP, S], Direct-Object-of: [NP, VP], and Main-Verb-of: [V, VP]. 17 It should be noted here that this assumption of Chomsky’s is not necessary. Subjects and objects could also be described structurally if a language did not have NP, VP, N, and V, but other categories instead which expressed the same grammatical functions and had the same structural relations.

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coincidence that more or less the same categories are identified, namely the lexical categories Noun, Verb, Adjective, Preposition, Adverb, Pronoun, and Particle, and the non-lexical category T or Article. Since Chomsky in addition assumes that the set of formal universals includes phrase-structure rules, i.e. rules that analyse constituents into their immediate constituents, further major categories such as S, NP, VP, PP, or PredP must be added to the list of lexical and non-lexical categories. It could be objected at this point that in the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé, as shown in chapter 2.5, the categories were identified as semantic categories and not, as by Chomsky, as syntactic ones and that therefore his reference to a shared view is inappropriate. Two points must be made in this connection. The first is expressed in the following remark about the categories identified and characterized by Chomsky as substantive universals: there is no reason to rule out, a priori, the traditional view that such substantive characterizations must ultimately refer to semantic concepts of one sort or another. (1965: 117)

Here he claims that there is more than just a possibility that the categories identified are, in the final analysis, related to semantic concepts. This may explain why the otherwise rather awkward categories Place, Time, Direction, Duration, etc. are introduced by the phrase-structure rules of the Aspects model (see above, section 4.3 (11)).18 Secondly, it should be remembered that the inclusion of a semantic component in the Aspects model required that all the information relevant for the semantic interpretation of sentences must be present at the level of deep structure. In this respect, Chomsky’s comparison of his approach with that of the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé is perfectly logical. He considers the base component of a grammar to be the universal part, the part which is relevant for the meaning of sentences and which represents the deep structures of the sentences of all languages. The diversity of languages is thus a matter of the derived surface structure of sentences

18 It was representations like these in the phrase-structure rules of the Aspects model that motivated Fillmore (1966, 1968a, 1969) to call for underlying structures which are explicitly semantic and which include deep-structure cases as categories.


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and due to the idiosyncratic properties of lexical items and to the transformational rules.19 Chomsky’s characterization of the base component as universal and as the domain of semantic interpretation prompted a number of linguists to develop alternative models to the Aspects model, which in turn had consequences for their identification of categories. This will be dealt with in the following section.

4.5 Reducing the set of categories Following the publication of Aspects, Chomsky’s belief that the linguist’s task was to explain language acquisition and the linguistic competence of a native speaker, and therefore to develop a linguistic theory that includes a theory of UG, was widely shared. A number of linguists, however – Charles J. Fillmore, George LakoV, James D. McCawley, and John R. Ross in particular – developed a diVerent view of UG and thus of the structure of the base component. In their view, the deep structures generated by the Aspects model were not ‘deep’ or abstract enough to be universal. They shared Chomsky’s assumption that the meaning of sentences should be determined at an abstract level but not his suggestions on how this should be done. Above all, they did not accept that deep structures should first be generated by purely syntactic phrase-structure rules and then interpreted by semantic interpretation rules. They rejected the purely interpretive property of the semantic component and also the syntactic categories introduced by the phrase-structure rules, which they considered not abstract enough for deep structures and thus relevant only for derived surface structure. According to their view, a universal underlying structure should be characterized by categories and structures that are semantic. Categories and structures of this kind are provided by predicate logic. These linguists therefore had a special interest in demonstrating that only those categories introduced by Chomsky’s phrase-structure rules are legitimate as universal categories of an abstract underlying structure which can be equated with categories of predicate logic, i.e. to the categories Proposition, Predicate, and Argument. 19 The postulate of a universal base may well have been a reason for preferring the second model since, compared with the first one, it is more general, simpler, and thus more likely to be universal.

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It is against this background that attempts to reduce the categories of the base component should be viewed, and such a reduction at the same time fulfilled Chomsky’s demand for a universal base that is as simple as possible. LakoV – obviously inXuenced by Postal’s comments that formed part of his lectures (cf. LakoV 1970: 115) – points out that adjectives share various properties with verbs and that therefore at an underlying level of representation both belong to the same category (cf. LakoV 1970: 115 V.). Ross (1969) argues that auxiliaries exhibit properties of (main) verbs and therefore should not be distinguished from these at an underlying level. Becker and Arms (1969) as well as Geis (1970) claim that there is evidence that prepositions are derived from underlying verbs since, like verbs, they express predicates. Bach (1968) draws attention to the fact that verbs, adjectives, and nouns all exhibit predicative properties and suggests just one underlying category, i.e. contentive. LakoV (1968) gives evidence that instrumental adverbs such as with (a knife) are derived from underlying verbs such as use (a knife). Fillmore (1966, 1968a, 1969) goes as far as to claim that no distinction should be drawn between PPs and NPs and that the categories Place, Time, Direction, Duration, etc. introduced by phrase-structure rules in Aspects do not represent syntactic categories at all. Therefore, he argues, they should be eliminated and the information they encode should be represented in a diVerent way.20 Considerations like these led to proposals for two alternative models of grammar: Generative Semantics on the one hand (LakoV, McCawley, and Ross) and Case Grammar (Fillmore) on the other. Both models posit underlying structures with categories and rules that directly correspond to predicate logic. LakoV, for example, points out the analogy between the predicate-logic representation of the verb hit in (12) and its representation at an underlying level in Generative Semantics, as in (13), and he claims that the two representations are equivalent (cf. 1971: 4)21: 20 Fillmore’s proposal is to eliminate these relational, non-categorial elements from the phrase-structure rules and to introduce deep cases like Location or Goal instead. The detailed discussion of Fillmore’s works in Rauh (1988) shows that this does not provide an adequate solution. 21 The quotation is from the ‘Introduction’ that LakoV intended to form part of his article ‘Linguistics and Natural Logic’, to be published in J. Mehler (ed.) Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. It was distributed by LakoV in his linguistics classes at Berkeley but not published, for reasons that will not be speculated on here.


(12)

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S (13) S 9 9 PRED ARG ARG V NP NP g g g g g g HIT x y HIT x y

In an underlying structure like (13), V represents not only (surfacestructure) verbs but also adjectives, nouns, prepositions, and auxiliaries. According to LakoV, the auxiliary may, for example, is represented by the modal operator à as an instantiation of the category V, may being just one of several alternatives including can and possibly:

(14)

S 3 V g à

NP g S 9 V NP NP g g g y HIT x

(cf. 1971: 4 V.) Fillmore’s model of Case Grammar incorporates deep cases, which account for semantic-syntactic relations between verbs and noun phrases, but it is similar to Generative Semantics in assuming an abstract underlying semantic structure. Fillmore suggests the following base-component rules: (15) a. S ! M þ P b. P ! V þ C1 þ . . . þ Cn (cf. 1968a: 28) ‘M’ in (15) is short for ‘Modality’, ‘P’ for ‘Proposition’, and ‘C’ for ‘Case’. Fillmore introduces Agentive, Instrument, Dative, Factitive, Locative, and Objective as possible cases. The cases are analysed into the categories K and NP, K being instantiated by a preposition, a postposition or a morphological case, depending on the properties of the particular language. C functions as an argument of the predicate V, and together they represent the logical structure of a proposition.

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Two things are significant concerning the identification and the character of syntactic categories in these alternatives to the Aspects model. The first is related to the distinction between ‘deep’ categories and ‘shallow’ categories. The assumption is that transformational rules derive surface structures from simple semantically-determined underlying structures and that the surface structures contain ‘a wider repertoire of categories’ which are not universal but specific to individual languages (cf. e.g. McCawley 1967 [1970]: 531). English, according to this view, makes use of the categories Adjective, Noun, Preposition, Adverb, and Auxiliary, which – as was shown – are all represented by the category V in the underlying structure. The second point is related to the status of the underlying categories. On the one hand, they are based on logico-semantic categories and are equated with these. On the other hand, it is emphasized that they are syntactic. In other words, at the abstract level no distinction is drawn between syntactic and semantic categories. McCawley states in this connection: I believe that . . . syntactic and semantic representations are objects of the same formal nature, namely ordered trees whose non-terminal nodes are labeled by syntactic category symbols. (1967 [1970]: 531)

And LakoV remarks: In generative semantics, the primary grammatical categories, in terms of which rules of grammar are stated, are exactly the logical categories. (1971: 10)

In summary this means that the transformational rules derive ‘a wider repertoire’ of syntactic categories from a restricted set of universal syntactic-semantic categories that are identical to categories of predicate logic, the derived categories being determined by the specific properties of an individual language and in this sense language specific. It is thus the task of transformations and the lexicon to describe the specific properties of individual languages.

4.6 Universal vs. language-specific syntactic categories The following comparisons can be made regarding the identification and description of syntactic categories by Harris and by Chomsky: on


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the basis of an analysis of the distribution of morphemes and morpheme sequences in sentence forms, Harris identifies language-specific syntactic categories as distribution classes in accordance with the conviction of American Structuralists that each language has its own internal structure (cf. chapter 3). The result is a significantly large number of mutually independent syntactic categories which may vary from language to language. Neither underlying structures nor semantics plays a role in the identification of these categories. Chomsky, however, starts from his theory of language acquisition and assumes that every language has a largely universal base, and this view is diametrically opposed to the convictions of the Structuralists. He describes this base as consisting of purely syntactic, generative phrase-structure rules and a lexicon. The phrase-structure rules operate on a relatively small number of syntactic categories which are postulated a priori and which – in accordance with the nature of the base – are allegedly universal, ‘drawn from a fixed class of items’ (Chomsky 1965: 28). In addition, they are likely to ‘ultimately refer to semantic concepts of one sort or another’ (Chomsky 1965: 117). For a specification of these categories, Chomsky resorts to the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé and essentially assumes the categories claimed as universal in that grammar. In the Chomskyan model, these categories are introduced as deep-structure categories and remain unchanged by the transformational rules, thus representing surface-structure categories as well. Unless the transformational rules introduce new categories, the set of deep-structure categories is, therefore, identical to the set of surface-structure categories. Since in the Syntactic Structures model there are no restrictions on transformations, the introduction of new categories is theoretically possible. In the Aspects model, however, every lexical item is inserted at the level of deep structure, which means that at this level every lexical item must be assigned a position whose categorial specification it must match. This excludes at least the introduction of new categories by means of transformations. There are at least two criticisms that can be levelled at this version of the Chomskyan model. Formulated as questions, the first is whether the categories introduced by the phrase-structure rules are indeed universal and the second is whether every lexical item of a language can be assigned to one of the categories identified. Since the category PrepP belongs to the set of base categories and since not every language has prepositions but may have postpositions instead or no adpositions at all, the answer to the first question must be in the negative. This is

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to be expected since Chomsky assumes the same categories as the Grammaire geńe´rale et raisonneé, which – as was shown in chapter 2 – in turn uses the same categories as the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯, which were identified on the basis of (mainly morphological properties of) Greek, i.e. on the basis of one particular language. Considering only the items of English traditionally assigned to the part of speech Adverb, such as so, very, lately, personally, fast, or there, which neither exhibit the syntactic properties of any of the categories identified nor form a single syntactic category, the answer to the second question must also be negative. Providing categorial specifications for items like these would involve either enriching the inventory of the base-component categories – which conXicts with the claim of universality – or introducing surface-structure categories by means of transformational rules. This is impossible because all lexical insertion takes place at the level of deep structure, before the transformational rules apply. Thus, the claim that the base-component categories are universal leads to a problem for the Aspects model: since lexical insertion takes place at deep structure, there is no way to account for any categories that diVer from those in the base component. It is therefore a consequence of the architecture of this grammar that the kind and the number of universal syntactic categories must be identical to the kind and the number of syntactic categories specified in the lexicon of individual languages. This seems not to be Chomsky’s intention and it does not make much sense either. Fillmore and the Generative Semanticists attempted to find their own solution to this problem. In their view, Chomsky’s base-component categories are not abstract enough to be universal. Starting from the claim that there is a close relationship between the base-component and semantics – which in Chomsky’s theory is expressed by deriving the semantic interpretation from the syntactic base-component structures – they postulate abstract base categories from predicate logic that are primarily semantic. At the same time they claim that these categories are syntactic. Various transformations specific to individual languages are assumed to derive surface syntactic categories from these underlying universal semantic-syntactic categories. This is possible in the Generative Semantics model because lexical insertion is not restricted to the deepest underlying structure but occurs at successive stages. Suggestions like these are problematic because quite clearly the concepts of syntax at the levels of underlying structure and derived


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surface structure are diVerent. Consequently the concepts of syntactic categories diVer as well. This means that at the level of derived structure, syntax concerns the relationships between units in phrasestructures that are identified applying the methods of the structuralists. At the level of underlying structure, however, syntax concerns semantic relationships between abstract and basically semantic units. It therefore became more and more evident that the base component, previously called ‘abstract syntax’, was actually purely semantic, which is expressed in the title of articles such as Keenan’s ‘On Semantically Based Grammar’ (1972), for example, and which led to the name ‘Generative Semantics’. This, however, means that de facto semantic categories are converted into syntactic categories by means of transformational rules, making the latter very powerful devices. Leaving this problem aside, the greatest challenge that Case Grammar and Generative Semantics face is the power of transformations, which must derive complex and very diverse surface structures for individual languages from very simple underlying structures. The first challenge is to formulate transformational rules which will perform this task – and this has never been achieved. What is especially problematic is the eVect that transformations would have on the evaluation of grammars. If it is postulated that a grammar is a model of the linguistic competence of the native speaker, then this includes the ability to evaluate grammars and select the best for a given language. Using a mathematical calculus, Peters (1971, 1972) and Peters and Ritchie (1969, 1973) have demonstrated – initially with respect to grammars like the Aspects model – that grammars with unrestricted, recursive transformations cannot be evaluated relative to each other and that therefore selection of the best one by the theory – or the native speaker – is not possible. As a consequence, Peters and Ritchie formulate the need ‘to search for empirically supportable restrictions on transformational grammars’ (1973: 81). Emonds’s (1976) conclusion that all transformations must be structure-preserving (apart from root transformations and local transformations) imposed severe restrictions and put an end to Case Grammar and Generative Semantics. Thus, eVorts to reduce the number of underlying syntactic categories to those categories specified in predicate logic and to equate them with these in order to demonstrate their truly universal character must be said to have failed. However, clear discrepancies between the postulated universal semantic-syntactic deep-structure

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categories and language-specific surface-structure syntactic categories, revealed in particular in the work of the Generative Semanticists, have focused attention on relevant questions concerning the nature of syntactic categories. Are they language-specific and purely surfacestructure categories, like those identified by Harris? Are they universal syntactic categories which ‘ultimately refer to semantic concepts of one sort or another’, as Chomsky assumes (1965: 117)? Are there perhaps two types of syntactic category – universal deep-structure categories and language-specific surface-structure categories? What is meant by ‘universal’ categories? Are they a small set of categories that occur in every language, or is there a large repertoire, from which each language uses just a subset, as could be understood from the already-quoted statement by Chomsky: ‘A theory of substantive universals claims that items of a particular kind in any language must be drawn from a fixed class of items’ (1965: 28)? At this point it can only be noted that the approaches considered so far in which syntax forms an essential part of a grammar have developed diVerent and even incompatible views on syntactic categories. None of these is convincing. The reasons for this diVer however. Harris and Fries intended to identify purely languageparticular syntactic (surface) categories. Yet their methods, as shown, are not without Xaws. And they did not in fact provide descriptions of categories that predict the syntactic behaviour of their members. The Generative Semanticists and Fillmore identified universal syntactic-semantic ‘deep categories’, intending to derive language-particular syntactic ‘shallow categories’ via transformations. This, however, did not prove possible. Chomsky, finally, identified (apparently) universal syntactic categories, whose properties are described by phrase-structure rules, and gave the impression that language-particular syntactic categories were derived on the basis of lexical properties and transformational rules. Since, however, in this model lexical insertion takes place at the level of deep structure, only those items can be inserted which are specified for a category label that matches one of the universal categories generated by the phrase-structure rules. Therefore, theoretically, a language-particular distinction of categories is possible only on the basis of language-particular subcategorizations of members of the categories N and V and on the basis of an application of language-particular transformations. What is excluded from sentence structures in English – and probably in any other language as well – is a large number of items which cannot be inserted into deep


81

structures under the heading of one of the universal categories, for example, forms like so, very, lately, personally, fast, or there mentioned above, which are traditionally categorized as adverbs. In addition, it is questionable how universal the alleged universal categories are, especially because they are astonishingly similar to the traditional parts of speech identified on the basis of morphological properties of Greek. The conclusion is, therefore, that the categories identified by Chomsky are too specific to be universal and not specific enough to syntactically categorize the lexical items of even one particular language.

5 Categories, features, and projections

5.1 Introduction Following the Standard Theory, Generative Semantics, and Case Grammar, the development of the theory of grammar in the 1970s was characterized by a search for restrictions. Realizing that transformations were very powerful devices, linguists Wrst focused on restrictions on transformational rules. This led to the insight that extractions are allowed under certain conditions only (cf. Ross 1967; Chomsky 1973b) and that – due to the shared properties of the transformations that had been postulated – generalizations were possible and thus fewer rules were necessary than had been previously assumed (cf. Chomsky 1977). In addition, investigations showed that most transformations were structure preserving, meaning that constituents aVected by transformational rules were moved to positions whose categorial speciWcations were identical to those of the source positions (cf. Emonds 1970, 1976). More by accident than by design, in the context of a debate on whether word-formation is a transformational or a lexical process, Chomsky (1970) identiWed restrictions on phrase-structure rules. These derived from the observation that members of the categories noun, verb, and adjective as heads of constructions share properties concerning the selection of complements and concerning whether or not a speciWer is possible. The result was the formulation of the condition on the endocentricity of phrase structures, later formalized as X-bar theory (cf. e.g. JackendoV 1977a). Finally, some transformations of the Standard Theory turned out to be meaning changing, which was incompatible with the assumption that all semantic interpretation took place at the level of deep structure. This led to various changes to the architecture of the model, and semantic interpretation was allowed to operate

categories, features, and projections

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at the level of deep structure and at the level of surface structure as well. A later requirement ensured that moved constituents left behind traces, with the result that their deep-structure positions were recoverable and available for semantic interpretation, which now took place at the level of surface structure only (cf. e.g. JackendoV 1972; Fiengo 1974, 1977; Chomsky 1976). The insights mentioned above led to various changes to the Standard Theory (Chomsky 1965), resulting in later models such as the so-called ‘Extended Standard Theory’ (EST, cf. e.g. JackendoV 1972: 4)1 and the so-called ‘Revised EST’ (Revised Extended Standard Theory, cf. Chomsky 1976: 336). They Wnally led to the development of a completely new conception of the theory of Generative Grammar and to corresponding models of grammar, and here three major trends can be distinguished. The most inXuential of these is the modular Theory of Government and Binding (GB), developed by Chomsky (1981a,b, 1986a,b; Chomsky and Lasnik 1993). This was also – and more appropriately – called the ‘Theory of Principles and Parameters’ (PPT) and formed the basis for the development of the Minimalist Program (MP, cf. Chomsky 1993, 1995, 2000, 2001). The remaining two trends are Bresnan’s Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG, cf. Kaplan and Bresnan 1982; Bresnan 1982a, 2001), which builds on aspects of Relational Grammar (e.g. Perlmutter 1980, 1983), and Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG, cf. Gazdar et al. 1985) and its immediate successor, Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG, cf. Pollard and Sag 1987, 1994; Sag et al. 2003). Compared to the Standard Theory, all three trends show a drastic reduction in the number of rules in the transformational component. In the cases of LFG and GPSG/HPSG, this resulted in their being totally abandoned and in the case of GB/ PPT/MP in the formulation of a single rule Move Æ. In each of the three trends the principle of the endocentricity of phrase structures, and thus X-bar theory or an equivalent, plays a central role as a condition on well-formedness. In addition, each of the three trends developed feature systems for the representation of syntactic categories, and dependencies between the features and the syntactic structures were described. This, however, was done diVerently in each case. This chapter is dedicated to an investigation of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories based on feature representations in 1 The label ‘EST’ is here restricted to the model current in 1972. Chomsky himself uses this term for later models as well (cf. e.g. Chomsky 2001: 5).

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the context of the PPT and the MP. Chapter 6 will be concerned with the same kind of investigation in the context of HPSG and LFG. The present chapter starts with an outline of the PPT (section 5.2). On the one hand, this will provide information about the theoretical background of feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories in this context. On the other, it will pave the way for a comparison of the PPT and the other approaches considered subsequently. Section 5.3 is concerned with X-bar theory, which is especially relevant for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in the PPT as well as in the MP, in LFG, and in HPSG, focusing on the identity of X. Various feature-based descriptions of the four ‘lexical’ categories N, V, A, and P, of some ‘minor’ categories, and Wnally of functional categories as representations of X are also examined. Section 5.4 demonstrates how syntactic categories are deWned in the PPT by the licensing of constituents in sentence structures on the basis of an interaction between lexically speciWed properties of lexical items and principles of grammar. Section 5.5 discusses insights into the relationship between morphosyntactic properties and functional categories, an aspect which inXuenced the development from the PPT to the MP. Section 5.6 Wrst presents basic aspects of the MP and then turns to the syntactic function of features and to corresponding feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories in this framework. Section 5.7 sums up and demonstrates that the feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories developed in the PPT and the MP meet empirical requirements in that they allow for a diVerentiated identiWcation and description of numerous syntactic categories. This includes such phenomena as reanalysis or ‘grammaticalization’ and ‘mixed categories’, often discussed as problematic in literature on the subject.

5.2 A modular theory of grammar: the Theory of Principles and Parameters

5.2.1 General theoretical considerations Compared to the Standard Theory, the Extended Standard Theory, and the Revised Extended Standard Theory, the Theory of Principles and Parameters exhibits radical changes. However, this does not apply to the goals of the theory nor to its fundamental aspects. As before, the major goal is an explanation of the development of a native speaker’s linguistic competence, more recently called ‘I-language’ (‘internal, individual,


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and intensional’) and characterized as a ‘state of [the] mind/brain’ (cf. e.g. Chomsky and Lasnik 1993: 507), and as before, it is claimed that because of the underdetermined nature of the linguistic input during language acquisition, this development can only be explained by assuming that the human species is genetically endowed with an initial state of language acquisition – universal grammar (UG). However, the results of research based on the successors to the Standard Theory led to a reconsideration of the properties and the structure of UG. Here, the established facts were important, namely that any child can acquire any of the world’s languages if he/she grows up in the linguistic community of that language and that language is acquired within a relatively short period of time and even on the basis of defective input. Therefore, on the one hand, UG must be complex to capture the diversity of languages, yet it must be simple on the other in order to explain the circumstances of language acquisition. Chomsky made the following claims about the requirements UG must fulWl: The theory of UG must meet two obvious conditions. On the one hand, it must be compatible with the diversity of existing (indeed, possible) grammars. At the same time, UG must be suYciently constrained and restrictive in the options it permits so as to account for the fact that each of these grammars develops in the mind on the basis of quite limited evidence. (1981a: 3)

From these considerations he inferred the following properties of the structure of UG, which could solve the paradox of UG having to be complex and simple at the same time: What we expect to Wnd, then, is a highly structured theory of UG based on a number of fundamental principles that sharply restrict the class of attainable grammars and narrowly constrain their form, but with parameters that have to be Wxed by experience. If these parameters are embedded in a theory of UG that is suYciently rich in structure, then the languages that are determined by Wxing their values one way or another will appear to be quite diverse, since the consequences of one set of choices may be very diVerent from the consequences of another set. (Chomsky 1981a: 3 f.)

The result was therefore the development of a modular theory composed of interacting subsystems or ‘modules’, each consisting of a few universal principles with a few parameters to be Wxed for individual languages, and supplemented by a few extra-modular general or

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speciWc principles and their parameters. According to this view, the grammar of an individual language consists of the principles of UG together with the parameters Wxed for this language, the ‘core grammar’, and a marked periphery speciWc to this particular language, which comprises lexical knowledge, including morphological and phonological knowledge (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1981a: 8 V.; 1986a: 147 f.). Initially the principles were identiWed as conditions on phrasestructure rules and on transformational rules. However, it emerged during the course of the development of the PPT that the interaction of the principles of the various modules replaced the phrase-structure rules completely and rendered transformational rules unnecessary except for the rule Move Æ, and determined the structure of sentences at the various levels of representation. The theory distinguished four levels of representation, D-structure (a modiWed successor of ‘deep structure’ in the Standard Theory), S-structure (a modiWed successor of ‘surface structure’ in the Standard Theory), as well as phonetic form (PF) and logical form (LF). PF, now claimed to be the genuine ‘surface structure’ (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1981a: 5, 18, 34; 1986a: 68), and LF are assumed to stand at the interface of the grammar and other components of the mind/brain which interact with the language faculty.2 For PF, these are perceptual and production systems, which determine the physical form and perceptual interpretation of sentences (cf. Chomsky 1981a: 4, 18; 1986a: 68). For LF, these are conceptual and pragmatic systems, which interact with the language faculty when thoughts are conceived and interpreted using language (cf. Chomsky 1981a: 4; 1986a: 68, 175). Schematically, the relationship between the levels of representation is represented in the so-called ‘Y-model’:

(1)

(I)

D-structure (II)

S-structure (III)

PF

(IV)

LF (cf. Chomsky 1986a: 68)

2 This assumption corresponds to the view that the mind/brain is modularized as well so that PF and LF interact with diVerent modules. See in this context e.g. Fodor (1983).


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The modules or subsystems of principles that Chomsky identiWes (1981a: 5) include the following: bounding theory, Ł-theory, binding theory, Case theory, and Control Theory. These are supplemented by the general projection principle and its extension, the extended projection principle (EPP), as well as by the empty category principle (ECP). The principles of UG, which form the computational system, and the lexicon constitute the two components of a grammar. The well-formedness of the sentences of a language is determined by the interaction of the (parametrized) principles and the lexicon at the four levels of representation. This will be shown here in order to provide necessary background information for the description of syntactic categories in this framework, focused on in sections 5.3 and 5.4.3

5.2.2 On determining the D-structure of sentences The D-structure of the sentences of a language is determined by the properties of lexical items, which are speciWed in the lexicon, by the projection principle, Ł-theory, Case theory, and X-bar theory. The lexicon consists of a list of lexical entries which specify for each lexical item a phonological matrix, semantic information, categorial features, and contextual features related to its complement structure. The semantic information, which is relevant for LF, includes the thematic or ‘argument’ structure, which determines how many arguments an item licenses, which Ł-role – for example, Agent, Patient, Goal, or Proposition – these arguments are assigned, and whether an argument is external or internal. Categorial features, which will be looked at more closely in section 5.3.3, are speciWed as combinations of the features [N] and [V] to represent the categories N, V, A, and P. Contextual (complement) features determine via c-selection the categorial realization of the internal arguments, for example as NP or PP, whereas they determine their speciWcation for Ł-roles, for example as Patient or Goal, via s-selection. If c-selection follows the canonical structural realization (CSR), which, for example, identiWes NP as the canonical structural representation of Patient, then it need not be speciWed in the lexical entry. It is also unnecessary to specify the order of the internal arguments of a lexical item since this follows from the 3 The following characterizations refer to the models in Chomsky (1981a) and Chomsky (1986a,b). Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) will not be included at this point because it contains changes which foreshadow the Minimalist Program. These will be brought into focus in subsequent sections.

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conditions of Case theory. Case theory requires that each NP must be Case marked, and this is achieved by the Case Wlter, which Wlters out at PF structures with NPs that are not Case marked. Case theory distinguishes between two types of Case assignment: inherent Case assignment, which is speciWed in the lexicon, and structural Case assignment. The latter takes place at S-structure at the latest and requires, in languages like English, adjacency of the Case-assigning and the Case-receiving units. Thus, in the context of verbs, which belong to the set of structural Case assigners, the order of complements (which can be NP, PP, and/or S) need not be speciWed because NP necessarily assumes verb-adjacent position, and other complements, if speciWed for, will follow. The projection principle is the principle that establishes the relationship between the lexicon and syntax. It requires that the representations at each syntactic level, i.e. at D-structure, S-structure, and LF, are projections as speciWed in the lexicon, meaning that the subcategorization requirements of lexical items are followed. However, the domain of the projection principle is restricted to complements and does not include subjects. The subject position is determined by Ł-theory on the one hand, and the EPP on the other. The Ł-Criterion requires that each Ł-role for which a lexical item is speciWed be assigned to one and only one argument and that each argument bear one and only one Ł-role. Assigning Ł-roles to arguments is dependent on their positions and only complement positions and subject positions are argument positions. Whereas complement positions (of lexical heads) are always assigned a Ł-role, this is not the case with subject positions. In sentences with expletive subjects like it or there, for example, the subject position is not assigned a Ł-role, and here it is the EPP, which requires that all sentences must have a subject, that determines the presence of a subject position. The structural representation of D-structure is determined by X-bar theory. X-bar theory, which will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.1, requires that phrase structures be endocentric, i.e. projections of a head X. X is Wrst identiWed as representing members of the so-called ‘lexical’ categories N, V, and A (cf. Chomsky 1981a: 48), and later also P and the so-called ‘functional’ categories: I(nXection) as the head of IP (¼S), and C(omplementizer) as the head of CP (¼S’) (cf. Chomsky 1986a: 160; 1986b: 3). In the 1981 model, projections are restricted to the head and its complements. Later, the X-bar schema speciWes (at least) two levels of projection, represented as X’, consisting of head and complement(s), and X’’ (¼Xmax¼XP), consisting of speciWer(s) and


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X’. Accordingly, X, X’, and X’’ represent categories at diVerent levels of projection. The relative order of head and complement(s) as well as head and speciWer(s) is parametrized for individual languages. In English, complement(s) follow(s) their head and speciWer(s), precede (s) it. This is expressed in the following schema: (2)

a. X’ ¼ X X’’* b. X’’ ¼ X’’* X’ (cf. Chomsky 1986b: 3)

The schema allows for multiple complements and speciWers, which is expressed by ‘*’. In particular instances, the number of complements is determined and thus constrained by the lexically speciWed subcategorization properties of the head and by the projection principle. The number of speciWers is determined by the options provided by the licensing principle, introduced in the 1986 model, which requires that every element in a well-formed structure must be licensed (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1986a: 93). The schema shows that speciWers and complements are realized by maximal projections, i.e. by X’’(¼Xmax¼XP)categories.

5.2.3 On deriving S-structure, LF, and PF S-structure is derived from D-structure by applying the rule Move Æ. Move Æ means that, in principle, any category in a syntactic representation, i.e. X, X’, or X’’, can be moved anywhere. However, empirical evidence has shown that only categories of maximal projections and heads are visible to Move Æ and that X’-categories do not move (cf. Chomsky 1986b: 4). Move Æ is constrained by bounding theory, which determines the maximal distance between the source and the target positions in that it prohibits the crossing of more than two bounding nodes. Bounding nodes are determined for a particular language by the Wxing of parameters. For English, for example, NP and IP (¼S) were identiWed as bounding nodes, and for Italian NP and CP (¼S’) (cf. Rizzi 1982: ch. 2). Move Æ is in addition constrained by the requirement that whenever a category moves, it leaves behind a trace as a phonetically empty category which is subject to the ECP. The ECP requires that empty categories be properly governed, thus allowing only upward movement. Finally, Move Æ is constrained by the requirement that it be motivated and by conditions that the resulting structures must meet. Thus, movement of NPs located in non-Case

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positions in D-structure, for example in complement positions of participles or unaccusative verbs, is motivated by the requirements of Case theory. Observing the Ł-Criterion, they move to NP-positions to which Case is assigned so that they can pass the Case Wlter at PF. The only possible target position for NP-movement is thus the subject position [Spec, I] if this position is not assigned a Ł-role and if I is speciWed as [þWnite] and therefore assigns nominative Case to [Spec, I]. Wh-phrases are moved in order to form interrogative or relative clauses. Wh-movement is triggered by the feature [þWh] and the derived structure is well-formed only if the Wh-phrase is moved to the speciWer position of a head which is also speciWed as [þWh]. SpeciWer and head then instantiate the relation of Spec-Head Agreement (cf. Chomsky 1986b: 27). Finally, if I is not realized as a modal verb or the inWnitive marker to but rather as an inXectional aYx, verbal heads, which enter the syntax uninXected, move to the I-position to pick up the aYx and thus become marked for inXection (cf. Chomsky 1986b: 86). The later version of the PPT assumes that lexical items enter the syntax fully inXected, thus changing the conditions for movement. This version requires that the inXectional features of V and I agree and thus meet the condition of Head-Head Agreement, which is checked after V-to-I movement (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik 1993: 519). S-structure is the level of representation at which the principles of the binding theory determine the well-formed distribution of types of NPs. Binding is a structural relation between referentially dependent NPs and their antecedents which is determined by government and represented by coindexing. Four types of NPs are distinguished, of which three are either phonetically realized or phonetically empty. These are anaphors (reXexive or reciprocal pronouns such as himself and each other as well as NP-traces), pronominals (pronouns such as he or they and pro, a phonetically empty NP occupying the subject position in languages that allow so-called ‘empty’ subjects), and R-expressions (lexical NPs like the man or John and Wh-traces). The fourth type is PRO, a phonetically empty category, which may occupy non-governed positions that are required by Ł-theory, and which is subject to control theory (see below). With respect to a locallyspeciWed domain, the governing category,4 the binding theory, 4 The deWnition of ‘governing category’ reads as follows: ‘Æ is a governing category for if and only if Æ is the minimal category containing and a governor of , where Æ¼NP or S’. (Chomsky 1981a: 188).


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determines that anaphors must be bound (principle A) and that pronominals must be free (principle B), whereas R-expressions must be free everywhere (principle C). PRO is special in that it behaves either like anaphors or like pronominals and thus should be bound and free at the same time. It is concluded, therefore, that PRO is not subject to the binding theory. The reference of PRO is Wxed at LF and determined by control theory. It can either be dependent on the semantics of so-called ‘control’ verbs, as the subject of an embedded clause expressing coreference with either the subject or the object of the matrix verb (e.g. eH i wanted PROi to leave; eHasked her i PROi to leave), or its reference is arbitrary and determined pragmatically (PROarb to be or not PROarb to be . . . ). In the Wrst case PRO behaves like an anaphor, in the second like a pronominal. LF as a level of representation is derived from S-structure via Move Æ. As the interface between grammar and the conceptual and pragmatic systems, LF provides the syntactic prerequisites for semantic interpretation. Thus, Move Æ includes Wh-movement and quantiWer raising, which determine scope and whose output is relevant for semantic interpretation, as is the Wxing of reference via control or binding. The licensing principle introduced in Chomsky (1986a), which requires full interpretation at this level for every item in a sentence, comprises various conditions which determine the well-formedness of LF. Amongst these are the following: An operator5 is licensed by binding a variable, from which it is not ‘too distant,’ in a certain well-deWned abstract sense. Referential dependency must meet the conditions of binding theory. An element that assigns semantic roles must have recipients in appropriate syntactic positions . . . A predicate (in particular, a VP) must have a subject, where the notions are syntactically deWned. (cf. Chomsky 1986a: 93)

These examples illustrate that the conditions aVect semantic relations but are nevertheless formulated syntactically. This conWrms LF’s status as a syntactic level of representation, something which PF is not. PF, the level of phonetic form, is a phonetic representation with labelled bracketing that reXects the properties of the S-structure from which it is derived. At PF, so-called ‘stylistic’ movements may apply, 5 ‘We will understand operators to include quantiWers, wh-phrases, or a binding NP in COMP; or deWnite or indeWnite operators as in relative clauses’ (Chomsky 1981a: 102).

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which are not subject to the conditions of Move Æ. The principle of full interpretation requires that at PF each phonetic element must be licensed by a physical interpretation, e.g. book by [bUk] (cf. Chomsky 1986a: 98). If PF contains non-interpretable elements, it is not wellformed. Since the Case Wlter applies at this level, PF is also ill-formed if it contains one or more NPs unmarked for Case.

5.2.4 Some important questions It is important to be aware of the consequences which the modular conception of the theory presented here has for the identiWcation of syntactic categories. In this connection it is helpful to remember that in the Standard Theory, demonstrated in chapter 4, phrase-structure rules generate deep structures with syntactic positions speciWed for syntactic categories which must be shared by lexical items in order for lexical insertion to take place. Phrase-structure rules are not part of the PPT. Instead it is claimed that D-structures are determined by an interaction of the properties of lexical items with the principles of X-bar theory, Ł-theory, Case theory, and the projection principle. Therefore, the identiWcation of syntactic categories in this framework involves answering the following questions: What are the properties of lexical items that interact with these principles and how does this interaction determine possible positions of lexical items and consequently their syntactic category membership? More precisely, this means: What is the inXuence of X-bar theory, Ł-theory, Case theory and the projection principle on the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories? Since the only transformational rule that has survived is Move Æ, which is subject to the restriction of structure preservation, it can be assumed that there is no diVerence between D-structure categories and S-structure categories. Nevertheless, it should be considered whether there are further principles of the theory that aVect the determination of syntactic categories. A Wnal consideration, concerning the theory as a whole, is whether the principles and parameters and their interaction with the properties of lexical items accomplish what the phrase-structure rules and the transformational rules were expected to do, i.e. to construct and license complete sentence structures (and not just phrases, for example), and whether the theory speciWes for every lexical item properties that determine its category membership and assign it a position in a sentence structure. In order to answer these questions, the next section will Wrst be concerned with X-bar theory, focusing on the question: What is X? It will provide a critical survey of approaches that suggest an answer to this


93

question. The idea is to derive the properties that specify lexical items which can serve as heads in the X-bar schema. If lexical items are licensed as X0-categories in the X-bar schema, information on the speciWers and complements they license in their projections is signiWcant for their status as syntactic categories. Section 5.4 will therefore consider which properties of lexical items interact with which additional principles in the licensing of speciWers and complements in projections of X. What is also of relevance here is how combinations of projections are licensed.

5.3 X-bar theory: on X

5.3.1 The origin of X-bar theory and the identification of major (lexical) categories It was mentioned in the preceding section that X-bar theory, Wrst formulated as a condition on phrase-structure rules and later as a principle of the well-formedness of phrase structures, was discovered more or less by chance and developed in the context of a debate on word-formation.6 Chomsky (1970) was reacting to claims put forward by Generative Semanticists, especially by LakoV,7 according to whom word-formation was a transformational process, and as a result developed his own lexicalist position. He argued that a distinction had to be drawn between productive and therefore transformationally derived ‘gerundive nominals’ on the one hand and lexically determined ‘derived nominals’ on the other. In this context, he pointed out that derived nominals and their nonnominal bases share properties concerning the selection of complements which have to be speciWed lexically. In addition, he claimed that there should be phrase-structure rules which generate these structures, namely: (3) a. NP ! N Comp b. VP ! V Comp c. AP ! A Comp (4) Comp ! NP, S, NP S, NP Prep-P, Prep-P Prep-P, etc. (cf. Chomsky 1970: 195)

6 Nevertheless it deserves mention that the resulting structures, as Chomsky admits, are ‘reminiscent of the system of phrase structure analysis developed by Harris in the 1940’s’ (1970: 211). 7 See, for example, LakoVs remarks on nominalizations and complements (1965: 125 V.).

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Given these rules, Chomsky derived a general schema for the expansion of NP, VP, and AP, which Wrst aVects the combination of the lexical category, i.e. the head, and its complement (5), and is later extended to include the speciWer as well (6) (cf. Chomsky 1970: 210):8 (5) X’ ! X . . . (6) X’’ ! [Spec X’] X’ Chomsky identiWed determiners as speciWers of N’, auxiliaries as speciWers of V’ and comparative structures and adverbs of degree, such as very, as speciWers of A’. To begin with, Chomsky identiWed only N, V, and A as ‘lexical’ representatives of X. ‘Lexical’ in this case referred to a subclass of syntactic categories which were later distinguished from ‘functional’ categories (see below).9 In his m A herst Lectures (1974, cf. Chomsky 1975: 108), Chomsky proposed a feature-based representation of these categories, introducing [N] (nominal/nonnominal) and [V] (verbal/ nonverbal)10 as distinctive features: (7) a. N ¼ [þN, V] b. V ¼ [N, þV] c. A ¼ [þN, þV] JackendoV (1977b: 31) took up these feature combinations and proposed P(reposition) as the fourth ‘major lexical category’, specifying it as [N, V] and thus Wlling the gap in the system. It was therefore claimed that P as well as N, V, and A can be the head of phrase structures that are subject to the X-bar schema. Furthermore, following the practice in phonology, the feature combinations were intended to allow for transcategorial which motivates the expression ‘X-bar’. For 8 Chomsky himself uses the notation ‘X’, reasons of simplicity and uniformity the alternative notation ‘X ’ will be used here throughout. 9 The term ‘lexical’ to characterize categories is used in the literature in diVerent ways, which may lead to misunderstandings. First, ‘lexical’ is used to distinguish an X0 category from an X - or XP-category to indicate that X0 forms the interface with the lexicon. Second, it is used to distinguish lexical from functional categories, which is the use intended here. And there is at least a third use, introduced in Rauh (2000a, 2002c), which distinguishes lexical categories, which are relevant for the lexicon and which have a prototypical structure, from grammatical categories, which are relevant for the grammar and have an Aristotelian category structure. 10 Interestingly, in the literature, this suggestion is almost always attributed to Chomsky (1970), which does not actually conform to the facts. See in this context e.g. JackendoV (1977b: 30), Zwarts (1992: 13), or Baker (2003: 1).


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descriptions of natural classes. Chomsky himself interpreted the feature [þN] as ‘nominal’ or ‘substantival’ and [þV] as ‘verbal’ or ‘predicative’. Accordingly, A and N as [þN] categories are characterized as substantival and A and V as [þV] categories as predicative (cf. Chomsky 1981a: 48; Chomsky and Lasnik 1993: 517). Thus, members of the category A are characterized as substantival as well as predicative. In Chomsky (1970; 1981a), P is excluded from the set of ‘lexical’ categories (cf. e.g. 1981a: 48).11 In 1986, however, Chomsky adopted JackendoV’s proposal, claiming that X generalizes over the ‘lexical’ categories N, V, A, and P and providing a feature representation for each (cf. 1986a: 160). It is especially the lack of agreement about the category P and the fact that P rather than the traditional category adverb is included in the set of ‘major lexical categories’ that motivates the question whether the categories N, V, A, and P here identiWed are the same as the traditional parts of speech with the same labels. That this is not the case, was Wrst exempliWed by P. Identifying P as a lexical category is mainly supported by JackendoV’s (1973) considerations which demonstrated that PPs, some adverbs such as afterward, before, or inside, and some adverbial clauses introduced by after or before exhibit the same distribution and can be speciWed by the same speciWers, including right.12 JackendoV concluded that P as a syntactic category is not restricted to the set of traditional prepositions characterized as selecting NP-complements only but that – like V – P allows for lexically determined variation in its complement selection. In addition to NPs, Ps may select PP-complements (e.g. from behind the curtain), sentential complements (e.g. before eZppo walked in ) or they may be intransitive (e.g. before, inside). Thus, some of the traditional subordinating conjunctions and some traditional adverbs are categorized as syntactic Ps. Finally, the fact that P can be speciWed by right, for example (e.g. right before he walked in), is taken as evidence of the fact that the ‘new’ category P, like N, V, and A, is a lexical category with maximal projections. What is overlooked, however – as pointed out by Rauh (1999) – is that not every member of the traditional category preposition projects a PP that exhibits the distributional properties identiWed by JackendoV (1973). This holds, for example, for those prepositions that are governed by verbs, such as on in rely on one’s 11 Note in this context Chomsky’s remark: ‘Let us refer to substantives and predicates as ‘‘lexical categories’’. So we have a system based on the features [N], [V], where [þN, V] is noun, [N, þV] is verb, [þN, þV] is adjective, and [N, V] is preposition, the Wrst three being lexical categories’ (1981a: 48). 12 See also Emonds (1976: 172 V.).

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strength. In addition, these prepositions do not have projections of their own. Therefore, in contrast to what was intended, the ‘new’ category P is not syntactically homogeneous. Section 5.4 will return to this problem. The syntactic category A [þN, þV] is not identical to the traditional part of speech adjective either. Because of their shared projection properties, it has been suggested that traditional adverbs derived from adjectives by attaching the suYx -ly, such as cleverly or independently, should be classiWed as members of the category A and that the diVerent distribution of their maximal projections should be attributed to positional variation (cf. Emonds 1976: 12). Radford also argues along these lines and provides the following examples as evidence (cf. 1988: 138 f.): (8) a. He thinks [ADVP more quickly/quicker/*quicklier than me] b. His brain is [AP more quick/quicker than mine] (9) a. Her decision was independent of mine [Adjective] b. She decided independently of me [Adverb] These examples demonstrate that of the ‘major lexical categories’ N, V, A, and P, at least P and A are not identical to the traditional parts of speech with the same label.

5.3.2 Towards a motivation of the categorial features The identiWcation of the ‘major lexical categories’ suggested by JackendoV and taken over by Chomsky, together with their feature-based descriptions, has been generally accepted in the literature on Generative Grammar without criticism. This holds at least for those works that do not focus on the description of categories. Since the feature combinations are claimed to allow for a transcategorial description of natural classes, attempts have been made to provide answers to the question of which classes are described by particular features, answers which diVer from Chomsky’s characterization of [þN] as ‘substantival’ and [þV] as ‘predicative’ in that they are syntactic or rather morphosyntactic in nature. Various suggestions have been made, some of which supplement each other but some of which contradict each other, thus casting doubt on the usefulness of these features. A selection of examples illustrates the situation. According to Stowell (1981: 22), the feature [þN] describes the class of items which in English cannot select an NP-complement and thus require an inserted of preceding the NP, as in the refusal of the oVer. Fanselow and Felix (1987: 68) claim that items speciWed for [þN] in


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languages like German inXect for case, gender, and number. Aoun (1981: 8) relates the feature [þN] to the properties ‘Case marked’, ‘not bear[ing] person markers’, and ‘its nominal argument will be [þgenitive]’ and states that some of these properties are universal and others speciWc to particular languages. Following Rouveret and Vergnaud (1980), Stowell (1981: 23) relates the property of Case assignment to the feature [N] in English. Fanselow and Felix (1987: 68) generalize this property and claim that [N]-items universally assign Case. Aoun (1981: 9) states that items speciWed as [N] exhibit none of the properties he identiWes for [þN]-items (see above). The feature [þV] was claimed initially by van Riemsdijk13 to describe items whose projections in German can be used as prenominal modiWers. This interpretation was taken over by Stowell (1981: 23) as well as by Radford (1988: 148). Aoun (1981: 8) however claimed that the case properties ‘will not be Case marked’, ‘will bear person markers’, and ‘its nominal arguments will be [þaccusative]’ are related to [þV] and stated – again – that some of these properties are universal and others speciWc to particular languages. To interpret the feature [V], Stowell (1981: 24) refers to considerations by JackendoV (1977b: 17), who points out that projections of N and P but not of A and V in English may be subject to a syntactic rule of cleft-sentence formation. This is taken up by Radford (1988: 148), whereas Aoun states that items speciWed as [V] share none of the properties he identiWed for [þV]-items (see above). The assignment of properties to the features [N] and [V] is problematic because of their heterogeneity. It leads to inconsistencies and even to contradictions, especially concerning the features [N] and [þV]. Take the property ‘Case assigner’ as a characteristic of [N] categories. If [N] denotes the property Case assignment, then those items of the categories V and P that do not assign Case should not be speciWed for this feature, i.e. intransitive forms and forms that take PPcomplements or sentential complements, and unaccusative verbs. Case-assigning members of the categories V and P should be described as [N, þV] and non-Case-assigning ones as [þV], however this analysis is never adopted. This is not to say that members of the categories V and P are never Case assigners. It only means that this does not hold for all of them and that it is problematic to link this

13 See van Riemsdijk (1983), an unpublished version of which was available in 1980.

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property to the feature [N]. Aoun’s and van Riemsdijk’s characterizations of the feature [þV] contradict each other. Projections of members of the category V can be used as prenominal modiWers in German only if they have the form of participles, and this is the claim made by van Riemsdijk (1983: 233). These forms, however, do not exhibit the properties that Aoun assigns to the feature [þV]: they are Case marked and they are not marked for person. In spite of such problems related to feature speciWcations, these are in general used to describe the categories N, V, A, and P as lexical heads of projections that are subject to the X-bar schema. This will be seen below.

5.3.3 Including minor categories In addition to the problems related to the features, there is another problem concerning the description of syntactic categories on the basis of the X-bar schema. The identiWcation and description of N, V, A, and P is by no means suYcient to assign every lexical item of a language to a syntactic category. It is explicitly restricted to the ‘major lexical categories’. There are two approaches concerned with descriptions of categories that include ‘minor categories’ as well: JackendoV (1977b) and Zimmermann (1990).14 Whereas JackendoV develops a diVerent feature system, Zimmermann suggests that the features [N] and [V] should be supplemented by similar ones. JackendoV (1977b) proposes a syntactic categorization of lexical items on the basis of the features [Subject] (¼to have or not to have a subject), [Object] (¼complements may or may not include a surface NP), [Complement] (¼ability or inability to take a complement), and [Determiner] (to be or not to be an article or a degree word) (cf. ibid. 32 f.). Applying these features, he describes for English the categories V, M(odal), P, Prt (Particle), N, Art(icle), Q(uantiWer), A, Deg(ree), and Adverb in the following way:

14 An additional suggestion was made by Reuland (1986), which will not be considered here in detail. On the basis of the features [A, 0A] and [F, 0F], Reuland developed representations of the categories C(ommon) N (oun) , I(ndividual) N (oun) , Det(erminer), dj(ective) , V(erb), P(reposition), C(omplementizer), and I(nXection). The feature A speA ciWes the property of being an argument and F that of being a functor. A positive speciWcation of a feature expresses that the property is always present, a negative speciWcation that it is never present, and a speciWcation as ‘0’ expresses that the property may be present. Reuland describes the following representations: CN: [þA, 0F], IN: [þA, F], Det: [A, F], Adj: [0A, þF], V: [A, þF], P: [A, 0F], C: [0A, F], I: [0A, 0F].


(10) V M P Prt N Art Q A Deg Adv

Subj + + – – + + + – – –

Obj + + + + – – – – – –

Comp + – + – + – – + – –

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Det

+ – + –

(ibid. 33) It should be noted that the categories P, A, and Adv are not identical to the traditional categories preposition, adjective, and adverb. As was pointed out before in connection with the major lexical categories, P comprises traditional prepositions and in addition some traditional subordinating conjunctions as well as some traditional adverbs. The category Adv is correspondingly reduced in size and in addition loses a subset to the category Deg (e.g. so, too, as). In contrast to Radford (1988), JackendoV does not include -ly adverbs derived from adjectives in the category A, as can be inferred from the projections of Adv he presents (cf. e.g. ibid. 156). Instead, these adverbs form a proper subset of Adv. This, however, renders the feature representation of Adv inadequate since some of these adverbs – like their adjectival bases – select complements, for example, independently (of me). Therefore, they should be assigned the feature [þComp]. The negative speciWcation of P and A for [Subj] is empirically inadequate as well, since members of both categories may have subjects in small-clause constructions, as illustrated by the examples in (11): (11) a. They considered [him intelligent]. b. He wanted [them oV the ship]. What is also problematic is the fact that on the one hand it is relations that form the basis for feature representations [Subj, Obj, Compl], and on the other hand it is categorial speciWcation, namely [Det]. Thus, JackendoV deserves credit mainly for his attempt to provide feature-based syntactic descriptions related to the X-bar schema not only for the major lexical categories V, P, N, and A but also for minor categories. The arrangement of categories in (10) suggests that JackendoV related certain minor categories to certain major

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categories, namely M to V, Prt to P, Art and Q to N, and Deg and Adv to A. However, this arrangement is neither substantiated nor explained. Therefore, it remains unclear what kind of relation is meant and also whether the categories identiWed may represent X. Zimmermann (1990: 864 V.) set up an inventory of seven features with the values ‘þ’ and ‘’. These features are claimed to be universal, with particular languages making use of them in diVerent ways. The features identiWed are the following: [V], [N], [A], [Adv], [Det], [Q], and [K] (¼ ‘conjunction’). Applying these features, Zimmermann describes 21 syntactic categories for German. Some of the features or feature combinations are related to syntactically relevant semantic properties and some to morphosyntactic properties. The feature [þV], for example, relates to whether lexical items include a ‘hidden argument’15 in their semantic form which allows the item to combine with adverbial modiWers or sentence adverbials. The feature combination [þV, A] indicates that the items thus speciWed combine with verbal inXection, whereas the combination [þV, þA] describes nonWnite verbal constructions. The combination [þA, Adv] identiWes items that are subject to adjectival inXection, whereas the combination [þA, þAdv] describes the corresponding uninXected forms. Only items speciWed as [þV, A] and as [V, þN, Adv] project a speciWer position, the speciWer having the feature [þDet]. [þDet] indicates the semantic property of determining the reference of its projection. Zimmermann identiWes determiners ([þDet, þN, þA]: der, dieser, jener) and quantiWers ([þDet, þQ, þN, þA]: jeder, einige) as speciWers in the projection of nouns ([V, þN, Adv]) and complementizers ([þDet]: daß, ob) as well as lexically empty characterizations of modal sentences as speciWers in the projection of inXected verbs ([þV, A]). The examples illustrate that Zimmermann not only identiWes and describes a rather large set of categories but that – in addition – she explicitly describes relations between categories, namely between speciWers and heads of projections, and motivates these on semantic grounds. However, this applies only to nouns and inXected verbs and their speciWers. No speciWers are identiWed for other categories, which is problematic as will be seen below. In addition, it remains unclear how the grammar describes the relationship between 15 The identiWcation of such a ‘hidden’ argument goes back to D. Davidson (1967). This argument also plays an important role in Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory, as will be seen in section 5.4.


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speciWers and heads and what the status of the features and feature combinations is within the grammar. Nevertheless, Zimmermann’s approach presents a systematic syntactic categorization of lexical items which identiWes natural – and motivated – relations between certain categories. The existence of a natural relationship between categories that represent lexical heads and categories that may represent speciWers in their projections is a topic focused on by Emonds (1985: 155 V.; 1987). In contrast to Zimmermann, Emonds identiWes speciWers not only in the context of N and V, but also in the context of A and P. Emonds (1987) is especially concerned with a recategorization of the traditional parts of speech as syntactic categories within the X-bar schema, describing pairs that consist of X and [Spec, X] as being mutually dependent and forming a structural unit. He claims that one member of the pair, the head, belongs to an open class and the second one, the speciWer, to a closed class (ibid. 10 f.). Emonds identiWes the four categories N, V, A, and P as possible heads of phrase structures that conform to the X-bar schema, with the category P – as suggested by JackendoV (cf. Emonds 1987) – including subsets of the traditional adverbs and of the subordinating conjunctions in addition to traditional prepositions, and A – as suggested by Radford (cf. Emonds 1987) – including not only traditional adjectives but also adverbs derived by attaching the suYx -ly to adjectival bases. He identiWes articles, demonstratives and quantiWers (e.g. a, this, both, some, any; cf. ibid. 8), as members of the category [Spec, N], ‘underived time and aspect adverbs’ (e.g. just, soon, always, again; cf. ibid. 21) as members of the category [Spec, V], ‘underived adverbs of degree’ (e.g. very, quite, rather, so; cf. ibid. 15 f.) as members of the category [Spec, A] and ‘underived intensifying adverbs’ (e.g. right; cf. ibid. 30) as members of the category [Spec, P]. This formation of pairs of categories (N, A, V, and P) and their respective speciWers by Emonds anticipates a systematic description of syntactic categories that is developed in more detail – and in part explained – with the identiWcation of functional categories and their relationship to lexical categories. This will be considered below. The answer given by Emonds and others to the question ‘What is X?’ is thus the following: X represents four lexical categories whose members form open classes and to which items which form closed classes are related as speciWers. Some of the closed classes represent minor categories as described by JackendoV and some represent categories

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described by Zimmermann. The four lexical categories are characterized by the features [þN, V], [N, þV], [þN, þV], and [N, V], whose status is however unclear. The consequences of this will be discussed in section 5.7. If lexical items are speciWed for these features, then this means that they can be lexical heads in an X-bar schema, which in general includes the property of projecting X’ and X’’ (¼XP). This property, however, may be restricted. Muysken and van Riemsdijk (1986) therefore suggest replacing the ‘bars’ of the projection levels of the X-bar schema (¼ X0, X’, X’’) by combinations of the feature [projection] and [maximal]. Accordingly, X0 is described as [X, proj, max], X’ as [X, þproj, max], and X’’ (¼XP) as [X, þproj, þmax]. This enables forms that do not themselves project but behave like forms which do project, to be speciWed as having this characteristic in the lexicon. Muysken and van Riemsdijk identify particles as examples, attributing to them properties of P except that they do not project. According to their suggestion, particles are speciWed for the feature combination [N, V, proj, þmax] (cf. 1986: 7). What needs to be kept in mind is that although it is the categories N, V, A, and P that are described by the feature combinations [þN, V], [N, þV], [þN, þV], and [N, V] respectively, these categories are not identical to the traditional parts of speech: noun, verb, adjective, and preposition.

5.3.4 Identifying functional categories It has been shown that initially the X-bar schema was identiWed and formulated as a condition on the endocentricity of phrase structures, with members of the lexical categories N, V, A, and P as their heads. Further study revealed that clause or sentence structures are endocentric too. In this connection, it should be noted that complementizers which introduce clausal complements of verbs are determined by the selectional properties of these verbs, as illustrated by the examples in (12): (12) a. He asked if they would come. b. He said that they would come. From this it was inferred that the complementizers are the heads of these complement clauses and that the clause type introduced by a complementizer, i.e. whether the clause is Wnite or non-Wnite, depends on selectional properties of the complementizer, with for selecting


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non-Wnite clauses and if or that selecting Wnite clauses. This is shown in examples (13) and (12): (13) He shouted for them to come. It was concluded, therefore, that the inXection of the verb (I) represents the head of these clauses. As a result, C and I were identiWed as the heads of CP and IP respectively, C selecting IP as its complement and I selecting VP:

(14) CP

2 C’ 2 C IP 2 I’ 2 I VP

In the case of interrogatives, the head C is speciWed as [þWh] and in the case of declaratives it is speciWed as [Wh]. This speciWcation holds for complement clauses as well as for matrix clauses. I – in English – is speciWed as [þTense] and [Agreement] in the case of Wnite clauses and as [Tense] and [Agreement] in the case of non-Wnite clauses.16 I is lexically represented by inXectional aYxes ([þTense, þAgreement]), by the inWnitive marker to ([Tense, Agreement]), or by modal auxiliaries ([þTense, þAgreement]). Subjects of clauses are identiWed as speciWers of I, and if C is speciWed as [þWh], fronted Wh-phrases are identiWed as speciWers of C. The description of I and C presented above and the identiWcation of their complements and speciWers substantiated the view that it is not only the ‘major lexical categories’ N, V, A, and P but also ‘minor lexical categories’ or ‘non-lexical’ categories that are subject to the conditions of the X-bar schema. In his seminal work on the NP in English, in which he demonstrated that there are parallels between IPs and NPs concerning possible subject positions for example, Abney (1987) identiWed an additional non-lexical category, D, the former speciWer of N, which projects phrases whose internal structure conforms to the X-bar schema: D as a head selects an NP as its complement and projects a 16 Raposo (1987) points out that in Portuguese the combination of [þAgr] and [Tense] is possible.

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speciWer position for a possible subject. Abney referred to data from Hungarian, amongst other languages, which were Wrst presented and discussed by Szabolcsi (1984), to show that in some languages the subject in the speciWer position of D and D itself are speciWed for the same agreement features, as are the subject in the speciWer position of I and I itself. In addition, and this holds for English as well, D like I is a structural Case assigner: Whereas I assigns nominative Case to its speciWer on the basis of the feature [þTense], D assigns genitive Case to its speciWer on the basis of the feature [Poss]. This Case is then realized by the inXectional aYx ’s (cf. Abney 1987: 79):

(15)

DP 3 DP D’ g 2 John D NP g g ’s book

Using combinations of the features [N] and [F], Abney then described the ‘non-lexical’ or ‘functional’ categories he identiWed as speciWed for the feature [þF] and the lexical categories as speciWed for the feature [F], which together with the shared feature [þN] or [N] yield a description of ‘four major classes of syntactic categories’ (1987: 63): (16)

F

þF

N V, Aux, P(?) I, C þN N, A, Q, Adv D (ibid.) Abney explicitly rejected the inclusion of the feature [V] because he considered the description of the natural classes A and V on the one hand and N and P on the other, which are both based on these features, to be inadequate. With respect to P, he remarked that it is unclear whether it ought to be classiWed as a lexical or a functional category. This, together with his classiWcation of Q and Adv as nominal lexical categories, is noteworthy, as coming sections will show. In addition to his identiWcation of D as an additional ‘non-lexical’ category which is subject to the X-bar schema, Abney deserves special credit for having pointed out and characterized in detail, fundamental


105

diVerences between two types of categories. These are non-lexical categories on the one hand, which he prefers to call ‘functional’ (cf. 1987: 54), and lexical categories on the other. According to him, members of functional categories form closed classes. They are phonologically and morphologically dependent, in general unstressed, and often clitics or aYxes. They select just one particular complement, which is not an argument, i.e. they do not Ł-mark it. In general, functional categories cannot be separated from their complement. They have no descriptive content, no meaning that relates to the world and they realize grammatical or relational properties rather than refer to classes of objects. In contrast, according to Abney, members of lexical categories form open classes, are independent, have descriptive content which relates to the world, and they Ł-mark their complements (cf. ibid. 64). This characterization adequately summarizes the properties that distinguish the functional categories and the lexical categories identiWed so far, i.e. C, I, and D on the one hand and N, V, A, and P on the other, and although Abney himself suggested a diVerent categorization, his work provided a solid basis for further investigations on whether lexical items not categorized so far or items which – like D – were categorized as speciWers of lexical categories should also be identiWed as members of functional categories. Subsequently, numerous items, among them some that Emonds had identiWed as speciWers, were analysed as either heads or speciWers of functional categories. Since the projections of these functional categories showed a close relationship to the projection of a particular lexical category and since they hierarchically dominate the projections of lexical categories, Grimshaw (1991) introduces the term ‘extended projections’ for functional projections. Thus, the projection of D is an extended projection of N, and C and I are extended projections of V. In the course of analysing lexical items as heads or speciWers of functional categories, the following additional functional projections were identiWed: in addition to projections of D, Q(uantiWer) (e.g. Lo¨bel 1989, 1990; Giusti 1991), and Num(ber) (Ritter 1991) as extended projections of N, Deg(ree) as an extended projection of A (e.g. Corver 1990; Zwarts 1992), and R (e.g. Zwarts 1992; Rauh 1996, 1997a,b, 2002a) alias ‘Place’ or ‘Path’ (Koopman 1993), Ext(ension) (Rauh 1996, 1997a,b, 2002a) alias ‘Deg(ree)’ (Koopman 1993; Haumann 2002), and C (Koopman 1993) as extended projections of P. As far as the

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extended projections of V are concerned, Pollock (1989) argued for splitting I into the categories Agr(eement) and T(ense), and Rizzi (1997) argued for splitting C into Force, Top(ic), Foc(us), and Fin(ite). In addition, the following functional categories were identiWed as extended projections of V: Neg(ation) (e.g. Pollock 1989; Haegeman 1995), Asp(ect) (e.g. Ouhalla 1991; van Gelderen 1993), Mood, and Modality (Cinque 1999). Cinque also motivated a split of Mood, Mod, Asp, and T into various syntactically diVerentiated categories on the basis of empirical evidence with respect to their relative positions. The resulting categories are: Moodspeech act, Moodevaluative, Moodevidential, Moodepistemic, T(Past), T(Future), Moodirrealis, Modnecessity, Modpossibility, Asphabitual, Asprepetitive(I), Aspfrequentative(I), Modvolitional, Aspcelerative(I), T(Anterior), Aspterminative, Aspcontinuative, Aspperfect(?), Aspretrospective, Aspproximative, Aspdurative, Aspgeneric/ progressive, Aspprospective, AspSgCompletive(I), AspPlCompletive, Voice, Aspcelerative(II), Asprepetitive(II), Aspfrequentative(II), AspSgCompletive(II) (Cinque 1999: 106)

The bases for the identiWcation of the various functional categories will be considered in section 5.4. Each of the functional categories is represented by features which are realized either by aYxes or by free morphemes and which may license speciWers in their projections. Languages make use of these possibilities in diVerent ways, as Cinque, for example, demonstrated on the basis of a consideration of numerous languages. And even in one and the same language, a functional category may be realized in diVerent ways. To give just one example from English: If Deg as the extended projection of A is speciWed for the feature [þgradable], it can be realized either by -est or by most or the feature can license the speciWer extremely. Given the identiWcation of functional categories, the question ‘What is X?’ can receive a more comprehensive answer than before: In addition to the four lexical categories, X can be represented by any of the functional categories. This requires that items which represent functional categories have a lexical entry. Compared to earlier models, e.g. the Standard Theory, this has the advantage that many more items are categorized and thus made available to the syntactic computational system, namely all the free morphemes which represent functional heads and which were not previously categorized, for example the inWnitive marker to or the comparative and superlative markers


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more and most in English, to mention just three. In some cases the result is a more adequate categorization, for example, in the case of pronouns. These are now analysed as intransitive determiners and no longer as members of the category N or NP, whose syntactic properties they only partly share. Another consequence is that the lexicon now lists items which are not traditionally considered lexical items, namely aYxes and features or feature bundles which, in addition to morphosyntactic speciWcations, may receive semantic speciWcations but no phonological speciWcations, i.e. are phonetically empty. In all cases, members of functional categories are lexically speciWed for features which deWne a category. For example, [past] deWnes the category T, [deWnite] deWnes D and [plural] deWnes Num. Since functional categories as extended projections have a close relationship to one of the lexical categories, van Riemsdijk (1990) and Grimshaw (1991) suggested this should be taken into account by adding to the feature representation of a functional category the representation of the lexical category to which it is related. Thus, for example, English the could be represented by [þN, V, þdeWnite] and -est by [þN, þV, þgradable]. The syntactic description of items listed in the lexicon as lexical or functional heads provides a partial syntactic determination of their category membership, and this must be supplemented by an identiWcation of the possible contexts of these items in sentence structures. It is important, therefore, to know what kinds of complements and what kinds of speciWers are licensed by these items and to know what hierarchical order of projections results from the licensing. The following section is concerned with the basis for and the consequence of the licensing of constituents in the (extended) projections of members of lexical and functional categories.

5.4 Lexical and functional categories and the licensing of constituents Section 5.3 showed that members of lexical as well as of functional categories can instantiate X0 in the X-bar schema. There are considerable diVerences, however, with respect to the manner in which members of these categories license speciWers and complements in their projections, and this will be discussed in this section.

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5.4.1 Licensing complements and specifiers of lexical heads In the PPT, as shown in section 5.2, complements of members of lexical categories are licensed in D-structure by the interaction of lexically determined properties with the projection principle, the Ł-Criterion, and the parametrized principles of Case theory. The lexical properties include the speciWcation of an argument structure which determines how many arguments an item licenses, which Ł-role they receive and whether an argument is an internal or an external one. The speciWcation of internal arguments has, since Grimshaw (1981), been called ‘s-selection’. In addition, the lexical properties contain a speciWcation of cselection, which determines the categorial realization of internal arguments unless it conforms to the canonical structural realization (CSR). Furthermore, a speciWcation of internal arguments for inherent Case is also part of the lexical properties. The projection principle is designed to guarantee that the complements determined by s-selection and c-selection are represented at D-structure as well as at the levels of S-structure and LF. The Ł-Criterion is designed to guarantee that each argument bears a Ł-role – which is also called ‘Ł-marking’ – and that it bears only one. Where complements are concerned, this is actually already Wxed, given the property of s-selection. If an argument structure contains more than one internal argument and if these arguments are not speciWed for inherent Case, then the order of these arguments is determined by Case theory. This holds for English, for example: if one of the arguments is realized by an NP then it must – due to the conditions of structural Case assignment, which takes place under adjacency – occupy a position adjacent to the Case assigning head. This shows that a speciWcation for structural Case assignment is one of the lexicallydetermined properties of members of lexical categories, which in English is the assignment of ‘accusative’ or ‘objective’ in the complement domain. This is expressed by the feature [N]. Due to the problems related to the features [N, V] – as discussed in section 5.3.2 – it was later suggested that structural Case assignment should be triggered by means of a speciWc Case feature, in this case [assign accusative/objective Case]. The above shows that in the PPT the licensing of the complements of members of (non-functional) lexical categories is determined by the lexically speciWed properties of s-selection, c-selection, and Case assignment. The following examples illustrate some of the consequences of this. If an internal argument is s-selected, an NP c-selected, and objective Case assigned, then the item thus speciWed represents a lexical head that is


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followed by an NP in D-structure which may remain in this position in Sstructure. If the head is speciWed as [N, þV] and selects an external argument, then it represents a syntactic (sub)category which is traditionally called ‘transitive verb’. If the speciWcations do not include a Case assignment feature and a speciWcation for an external argument then the item is followed by an NP in D-structure. However, due to Case requirements this NP must be moved to a position in S-structure where it is assigned Case. These feature speciWcations describe a syntactic (sub) category called ‘unaccusative verb’. If an item is speciWed as [N, V] in the lexicon, s-selects an internal argument in addition to an external one, c-selects an NP, and assigns it objective Case, then it is a member of a syntactic (sub)category traditionally called ‘preposition’. If the speciWcations do not include s-selection, c-selection, and Case assignment, then this represents a syntactic (sub)category traditionally called ‘adverb’. If there is no speciWcation for Case assignment and c-selection speciWes a CP or IP, then the syntactic (sub)category is traditionally called ‘subordinating conjunction’. This is not to say that the traditional parts of speech referred to, i.e. preposition, adverb, and subordinating conjunction, are identical to the syntactic categories with the same label that are described on the basis of feature speciWcations. The syntactic categories comprise just a subset of the items traditionally assigned to these parts of speech. An explanation of the licensing of speciWers of (non-functional) lexical categories owes much to insights presented by Sportiche (1988) and Koopman and Sportiche (1991). These are concerned with the subject position or rather the position of external arguments of verbs. Whereas it was previously assumed that external arguments are located in the [Spec, I] position in D-structure and S-structure, Sportiche and Koopman claimed that they are base-generated in [Spec, V] and then moved to [Spec, I] for Case reasons. Their claim is based, among other criteria, on word-order phenomena related to so-called ‘Xoated quantiWers’, such as all in (17): (17) The childreni [VP all ti left]. Examples of small clauses as in (18) suggest that external arguments of members of other lexical categories are base-generated in their Specpositions as well: (18) a. The professor considered [the students intelligent]. b. The captain wanted [the passengers oV the ship]. c. They made [the newcomer their chief].

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Examples like these led to the general assumption that speciWers in the projection of lexical heads are licensed by the interaction of a lexical speciWcation for an external argument and the Ł-Criterion. If, therefore, a member of a lexical category is not speciWed for an external argument, no speciWer will be licensed in its projection. This, for example, is the case with unaccusative verbs. The fact that they c-select an NP but do not assign Case to it induces the movement of this NP out of its [Comp, V] position to the [Spec, I] position, where it is assigned nominative Case. Weather verbs like rain or snow are not speciWed for an external argument either. Nor are they speciWed for an internal argument, which means that they do not license complements. This also holds for a subset of traditional prepositions, such as on in the context of rely and at in the context of good, which are governed by lexical heads and whose internal arguments they mark in a manner similar to inherent Case marking. These prepositions license neither a speciWer via an external argument nor a complement via an internal argument.17 They share with the prepositions that are speciWed for these two types of argument only the property of structural Case assignment. Apart from this, they exhibit properties of functional categories. The examples presented above show that the syntactic categorization of members of lexical categories is determined not only by their speciWcation for the feature [N, V] but, in addition, by their speciWcation for external and internal arguments, the latter being called ‘s-selection’, as well as by their speciWcation for c-selection and Case-assigning properties. As shown in section 5.3, functional categories were identiWed only in the course of the development of the PPT, and as a result insights concerning the licensing of their speciWers and their complements were gained and generalized later.

5.4.2 Licensing specifiers of functional heads The Wrst three functional categories identiWed, i.e. C, I, and D, already revealed that in well-formed constructions functional heads and their speciWers share particular functional features. Thus, C and [Spec, C] share the feature [þWh], I and [Spec, I] share the features 17 Since these prepositions are selected by lexical heads, they cannot head small clauses with their own subjects, and the close semantic relationship that holds between the lexical head and the complement of such a preposition, as in eHrelied on his intuition or eHwas good at tennis, which contrasts with the lack of such a relation between the preposition and its complement, indicates that it is not the preposition that s-selects this complement.


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[þAgreement] and [Nominative], and D and [Spec, D] share [þAgreement] and [Genitive]. Therefore, Fukui (1986: 78 V.) stated that functional heads and their speciWers are related to each other by agreement, which she called ‘SPEC-head agreement’.18 From this she concluded that the F-features of functional heads license functional speciWers via agreement. F-features, according to her, are the Case features nominative and genitive as well as [þWh] (ibid. 54).19 Chomsky (1986b: 24) noted that the ç-features (i.e. person, number, and gender) also participate in the ‘feature sharing’ of ‘SPEC-head agreement’. With the identiWcation of additional functional categories, the relationship of SPEC-head agreement was extended to include further F-features. Finally the Generalized Licensing Criterion of Sportiche (1993: 264) shown in (19), which generalizes over the Wh-Criterion formulated by Rizzi (1991 [1996]: 64) and the Neg-Criterion formulated by Haegeman and Zanuttini (1991: 244), expressed a general principle for the licensing of speciWers of functional categories:20 (19) i. A [þF] head must be in a spec-head relationship with a [þF] XP at LF ii. A [þF] XP must be in a spec-head relationship with a [þF] head at LF It is probably no coincidence that the term ‘criterion’ as well as the formulation of the principle follow the principle on whose basis speciWers of lexical categories are licensed: the Ł-Criterion. The licensing of speciWers of functional categories not only determines the syntactic category membership of functional heads by identifying their preceding contexts. At the same time, it determines the syntactic category membership of the items that are licensed as speciWers. For example, the items licensed as speciWers of a

18 Fukui remarks: ‘the relation between the speciWer position of a Functional category and its Functional head is basically an agreement relation (the ‘SPEC-head’ agreement in the sense of Chomsky (1985), see above)’ (1986: 76). 19 Fukui (1986) introduces the term ‘Kase’ for these three features and states: ‘The speciWer position of a Functional category can appear only when Kase is assigned to that position’ (ibid. 52). 20 It should be noted that the W h-Criterion as well as the eNg-Criterion describe the speciWer as an operator, which is no longer evident in the Generalized Licensing Criterion. Compare in this context the formulation of the W h-Criterion by Rizzi (1991 [1996]: 64): ‘A. A wh-operator must be in a Spec-head conWguration with X0 [þwh]. B. An X0 [þwh] must be in a Spec-head conWguration with a wh-operator’.

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[þWh]-speciWed functional head C are members of a category XP whose lexical head is speciWed as [þWh] and which – as a rule – are moved to the [Spec, C]-position by Wh-movement, thus occupying diVerent D- and S-structure positions.21 What is particularly signiWcant for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories is the application of the Generalized Licensing Criterion to the licensing of adverbs as speciWers of functional categories, which Laenzlinger (1996) suggested and formulated in the Adv-Criterion. It supports a categorial description of numerous adverbs, categorially distinguished by Cinque (1999) due to their particular positions in sentence structures and analysed by him as speciWers of functional categories, to the eVect that they are speciWed for the same F-feature that also speciWes the functional head. Some of these adverbs do not project. Since Spec positions are XP positions, they are therefore, following Muysken and van Riemsdijk (1986), speciWed as [proj, þmax] (cf. section 5.3.3). Thus, as speciWers of distinct functional categories, the classes of adverbs identiWed by Cinque and illustrated using the following English examples, represent distinct syntactic categories: (20) [frankly Moodspeech act [fortunately Moodevaluative [allegedly Moodevidential [probably Modepistemic [once T(Past) [then T(Future) [perhaps Moodirrealis [necessarily Modnecessity [possibly Modpossibility [usually Asphabitual [again Asprepetitive(I) [often Aspfrequentative(I) [intentionally Modvolitional [quickly Aspcelerative(I) [already T(Anterior) [no longer Aspterminative [still Aspcontinuative [always Aspperfect(?) [just Aspretrospective [soon Aspproximative [brieXy Aspdurative [characteristically(?) Aspgeneric/progressive [almost Aspprospective [completely AspSgCompletive(I) [tutto AspPlCompletive [well Voice [fast/early Aspcelerative(II) [again Asprepetitive(II) [often Aspfrequentative(II) [completely AspSgCompletive(II). (cf. Cinque 1999: 106) In contrast to [þWh]-speciWers, Adv-speciWers are not moved but rather base-generated in their S-structure positions, and therefore this characteristic also contributes to distinguishing between syntactic categories.

21 W hether is an exception and is analysed as an XP base-generated in embedded [Spec, C]-positions. See, for example, Haegeman and Gue´ron (1999: 175 V.).


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5.4.3 Licensing complements of functional heads vs. licensing functional heads in extended projections of lexical heads As far as the licensing of the complements of functional categories is concerned, various considerations were presented which include matters concerning the licensing of hierarchically-ordered functional projections and concerning the identiWcation of functional categories in general. An important result of these considerations was a revision of the PPT, which Wnally led to the development of the Minimalist Program. It was Abney (1987: 56 V.) who, in connection with his distinction between lexical and functional categories, was the Wrst to suggest how the licensing of complements of functional categories could be described. He referred to the licensing of the complements of lexical categories on the basis of s-selection and c-selection and, by analogy with this, introduced the notion of f-selection for the licensing of the complements of functional categories. Whereas s-selection establishes a semantic relation between a head and its complement by assigning a Ł-role and whereas c-selection may allow for complements that vary categorially, i.e. the selection of NP, PP, or CP, for example, fselection requires that the relationship between a functional head and its selected complement is purely structural and that members of the same functional category always select the same category. For example, members of the category C always select an IP as their complement, members of I always select a VP and members of D always select an NP. Just like s-selection and c-selection, f-selection is a property speciWed in a lexical entry. An advantage of this approach is that the speciWcation of f-selection not only licenses complements of functional categories but automatically determines the order of functional projections relative to each other and relative to lexical projections. Grimshaw (1991) criticized the property of f-selection as a mere stipulation which says nothing about the inherent relationship that exists between functional and lexical projections and is determined by the lexical rather than the functional head. The justiWcation of Grimshaw’s criticism is immediately obvious in view of the fact that, for example, I in English hosts aYxes at D-structure which at S-structure, after the verb’s movement from V to I, are attached to the verb as its inXection marker. In the same way, in other languages Deg and D host aYxes at D-structure which are attached to A and N as inXection markers after

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movement to Deg and D.22 As shown in section 5.3.4, Grimshaw expressed this dependency of functional categories by specifying them for the same combinations of the features [N, V] as the lexical categories they depend on and by deWning functional projections as extended projections of lexical heads. An additional feature speciWes whether an item represents a lexical or a functional category and in what order the projections are realized: F0 speciWes a lexical category, F1 the functional category forming the Wrst extended projection, and F2 the functional category forming the second extended projection. Accordingly, the relationship between V, I, and C is described as follows: (21) V [þV N] (F0) I [þV N] (F1) C [þV N] (F2) (cf. Grimshaw 1991: 4) Grimshaw thus introduced a new approach to the relationship between functional categories and their complements. The licensing is not described top-down from the perspective of the functional category, as suggested by Abney, but bottom-up from the perspective of the projecting lexical head. As a result, questions concerning the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories are put diVerently. The relevant question here no longer is: How do members of functional categories license their complements? but rather: How are functional categories licensed as extended projections of lexical categories and what explains the order of the projections? Still within the framework of the PPT, two quite diVerent approaches, which in a way complement each other, were developed as initial answers to the Wrst part of the question. The Wrst approach was based on Higginbotham’s (1985) modiWed version of Ł-theory in connection with X-bar theory and was semantically motivated. The second approach was motivated by morphosyntax, took word-order phenomena into consideration, and was based on insights concerning the tight relationship between inXectional properties of lexical heads and functional categories in the extended projections of these lexical heads. Both approaches basically established an immediate 22 An example of the realization of Deg by an aYx in English is the comparative marker -er of A and an example of the realization of D by an aYx is -en of N in Norwegian as a marker of deWniteness.


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relationship between lexically speciWed features of members of lexical categories and the licensing of functional categories to the eVect that these features were part of their descriptions as syntactic categories. There are two innovations that make Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory particularly striking. The Wrst concerns the semantic nature of the argument structures speciWed in lexical entries. According to Higginbotham, these are like argument structures of logical predicates that contain variables which have to be saturated either by replacing them by constants or by binding them by means of an operator. The second innovation concerns the introduction of an argument which in contrast to external and internal arguments is not speciWed for a particular Ł-role, but rather relates to the reference of the projection and is therefore called the ‘referential argument’. Following D. Davidson (1967), Higginbotham Wrst introduced a referential argument hE(vent)i for verbs,23 which, in contrast to Davidson’s suggestion, not only applied to action verbs but to verbs of state as well. In this case following Williams (1980), Higginbotham introduced a referential argument for nouns too, which, in line with Williams’s terminology, was later called ‘R(eferent)’.24

5.4.4 A modified Ł-theory and the licensing of functional heads and adjuncts in projections of lexical heads Higginbotham’s Ł-theory described the saturation of arguments using the verb ‘discharge’, distinguishing four modes, three of which are relevant here. The Wrst mode, ‘Ł-marking’, is equivalent to Chomsky’s Ł-marking as expressed in the Ł-Criterion, and it saturates the internal and external arguments of an argument structure by syntactically licensing these arguments. The second mode, ‘Ł-binding’, characterizes the licensing of functional categories as the binding of a referential argument. In this context, Higginbotham discusses the binding of hEi by I[þTense] and the binding 23 D. Davidson argues that the semantic representation of sentences which denote events must include an argument that represents an event. He suggests that the sentence Shem kicked Shaun should be represented in the following way: (9x) (Kicked (Shem, Shaun, x)). This he paraphrases as: ‘There is an event x such that x is a kicking of Shaun by Shem.’ (cf. 1967: 92). 24 According to Williams (1980), the argument hRi of nouns is the external argument. Higginbotham implicitly suggests that the argument identiWed by Williams is at the same time the external and the referential argument, expressed by h1i, which in the context of verbs describes the external argument (e.g. see, þV, N, h1, 2, Ei, ibid. 555). Deverbal nouns in particular show that for nouns too, external and referential arguments must be distinguished, which later led Zwarts (1992), for example, to represent the referential argument of nouns as hRi.

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of hRi by D. He thus attributes operator properties to the functional categories I[þTense] and D, which bind variables – here the referential arguments – in the argument structures of V and N, respectively. Abney aptly expresses the eVect of these properties in the following quote: The VP provides a predicate, that is, a class of events, and tense locates a particular event in time. The function of the determiner is to specify the reference of a noun phrase. The noun provides a predicate, and the determiner picks out a particular member of that predicate’s extension. (1986: 8)

Higginbotham related not only the licensing of functional categories to referential arguments in the argument structure of lexical heads but also the licensing of adjuncts, which tended to be neglected in Chomsky’s approach and which were described either as daughter and sister of X’ or as daughter and sister of XP in the X-bar schema. According to Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory, adjuncts are licensed via the mode of Ł-identiWcation, which means that the external argument of the adjunct in a projection is identiWed or ‘uniWed’ with the referential argument of the lexical head of that projection. Thus, the licensing of the adjunct at the match in (22) is based on the identiWcation of the external argument of the PP with the referential argument hEi of saw: (22) John saw Mary at the match. Semantically, Ł-identiWcation expresses a conjunction of two predicates, which for (22) yields the following result: (23) 9E [saw (John, Mary, E) & at-the-match (E)] Zwarts (1992) adopted Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory and on this basis explained the licensing of functional categories and adjuncts in (extended) projections of A and P in addition to the licensing of functional categories and adjuncts in (extended) projections of V and N. Following Corver (1990), he analysed forms like so, this, -er, and more in the context of gradable adjectives like tall or expensive as members of the functional category Deg which Ł-bind a referential argument in the argument structure of the adjectives and are thus licensed. Semantically, this claims that gradable APs describe a set of degrees (of a property) and that members of Deg choose one of this set according to their particular meaning. This referential argument


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may also license adjuncts, via Ł-identiWcation. To illustrate this, Zwarts refers to the licensing of extremely in extremely tall (1992: 64), which, however, is better analysed as the speciWer of Deg. More appropriate examples are beyond belief and in the extreme in happy beyond belief and dangerous in the extreme.25 Pronouns which van Riemsdijk (1978) called R-pronouns because in Dutch they contain the consonant /r/ and which comprise forms such as er (there), daar (there), hier (here), or ergens (somewhere) in combinations like hier in U trecht (here in U trecht ) or ergens in de zaal (somewhere in the room) are analysed by Zwarts as members of a functional category R in the extended projection of P which bind a referential argument hS(pace)i in the argument structure of P. Semantically, this claims that spatial PPs describe a set of spaces and that members of R choose one from this set according to their particular meaning. This is illustrated by (24): (24) Put the book here on the table, not there. In this example, on the table describes a set of spaces which satisfy the predicate on-the-table (S) and here and there select particular spaces in accordance with their meanings: here determines a space proximal to the encoder and there determines one that is more distant. In addition,

25 An alternative to Zwarts’ analysis of adjectives is provided by Spencer (1998, 1999). Spencer reinterprets referential arguments as ‘semantic function roles’, like Zwarts assigning a referential function to hRi and to hEi. For adjectives, however, he suggests a role hAi, which is not referential but attributive. What should be noted in this context is that he Wrst of all is concerned with attributive adjectives, describing their attributive function as a coindexing of hAi with the semantic function role of a noun, hRi (cf. 1999: 78). It is viewed as problematic here that Spencer, in addition to hAi, identiWes a thematic argument in the argument structure of adjectives which is always coindexed with hAi, hThi in the argument structure of adjectives like tall, and hAgi in that of adjectives like responsible (cf. ibid.). This coindexing is intended to capture the fact that the relation between a thematic argument and the semantic function role of the attributed noun is indirect and mediated by hAi and thus always has the character of attribution. Semantically, however, this relation cannot be processed and the constant coindexing of hAi with a thematic argument in the same argument structure simply causes one of the two to be redundant. Another problem related to Spencer’s approach is that his abandonment of hGi, the referential argument of gradable adjectives introduced by Zwarts, makes impossible a description of the operator function of deictic expressions representing Deg, for example this in this tall and so in so big, which determine the degree of the property expressed by the adjective. In section 5.7, it will be shown that Spencer’s introduction of hAi in addition to describing attribution is intended to serve another purpose.

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there is empirical evidence that the referential argument of P licenses adjuncts, as demonstrated in particular by Rauh (e.g. 1996: 193): (25) Mary put the vase [on the shelf near John’s photograph]. A paraphrase of (25) illustrates that near John’s photograph has the properties of an adjunct: (26) Mary put the vase at a place which is on the shelf and which is near John’s photograph. In conclusion, the semantic approach to an explanation of the licensing of functional categories in the extended projections of lexical categories analyses members of functional categories as operators which bind a referential argument in the argument structure of a lexical head and thus determine the reference of the projection. The reference-determining property shared by members of the categories I[Tense], D, and R is especially obvious in the feature analysis provided by Rauh (cf. 1996: 201, 1997b: 427 f.), which reveals the deictic nature of these categories: (27)

I[Tense] [def]

D

R

inWnitive a, some

somewhere/some time [þdef, deic] generic the (generic) everywhere/any present time [þdef, þdeic, þprox] deictic this/these here/now present [þdef, þdeic, prox] past that/those there/then

Even though the members of the category Deg do not instantiate the paradigm of feature speciWcations in the same way, the following examples of deictic forms show that Deg is speciWed in a similar way: (28) a. I caught a Wsh this big. b. Are you sure it really was that big? The syntactic eVects which referential arguments obviously have, i.e. the licensing of functional categories on the one hand and the licensing of adjuncts on the other, show that they are involved in determining the syntactic-category membership of lexical items in the same way that external and internal arguments are. The observation that not all the items which at Wrst glance would be assigned to a particular lexical


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category do license these constituents is an indication of the fact that they lack a referential argument and therefore are members of a diVerent syntactic category. In this connection, Rauh points out for the category P that only spatial, temporal, and scalar prepositions license the functional category R and adjuncts, whereas other prepositions, for example with, without, or pending or forms of spatial prepositions in nonspatial use like at in at a low price or in in in a loud voice, do not (cf. 1996, 1997a,b, 2002a). This makes sense because PPs with these prepositions as their head do not denote spaces, neither spatial nor temporal nor scalar ones. Therefore, on the basis of varying speciWcations of argument structures, the forms which are traditionally assigned to the category preposition have to be divided into three distinct syntactic categories, one that is speciWed for an external, an internal, and a referential argument, a second one that is speciWed only for an external and an internal argument, and a third one that is not speciWed for any argument and which in addition – as pointed out above – depends on a lexical head in the same way as inherent Case does.26 A similar syntactic categorization of traditional subordinating conjunctions is discussed by Haumann (1997). As for A, the fact that only adjectives speciWed for the feature [þgradable] license members

26 Empirical evidence which supports the dividing of traditional prepositions into three syntactically distinct categories includes, amongst other properties, the following (cf. e.g. Rauh 1996): Type 1 (‘lexical’ prepositions): 1.

a. Put the book on the shelf. b. Put the book here/right on the shelf. c. Put the book on the shelf near John’s photograph.

Type 2 (‘grammaticalized’ or ‘semilexical’ prepositions): 2. a. Bill bought the Xowers at a good price. b. *Bill bought the Xowers here/right at a good price. c. *Bill bought the Xowers at a good price for three dollars. Type 3 (‘governed’ or ‘selected’ prepositions): 3.

a. Johni put the book [near himi/*himselfi]. b. Johni talked [about himselfi/*himi]. c. Johni shaved [about himselfi/*himi].

The examples in (3) show that constructions with governed prepositions as in (3b) behave like DPs, (3c), rather than projections of lexical prepositions, (3a). They thus occupy a position in the extended projection of N and should, according to Grimshaw, be speciWed as [þN, V], whereas lexical prepositions are speciWed as [N, V].

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of Deg indicates that the presence or absence of the referential argument hGi distinguishes syntactically diVerent categories here as well. And Wnally, members of the category N also divide into diVerent syntactic categories depending on the presence or absence of the referential argument hRi. Nouns in so-called ‘Wxed phrases’, for example respect in with respect to or accordance in in accordance with, are Wxed due to the fact that no reference of the projection of N is intended. Thus they lack the referential argument hRi and, as a consequence, neither determiners nor adjuncts are licensed. The examples show that a description of syntactic category membership of lexical items which is based on feature speciWcations including not only [N, V] but also the speciWcations of external, internal, and referential arguments as well as of Case assignment properties makes it possible to take into account the syntactic diversity of lexical items and to explain diVerences in their syntactic behaviour. The semantic approach is naturally restricted to an explanation of the licensing of just one functional category in the extended projection of a lexical head, because a single variable, i.e. the particular referential argument, cannot be bound by two operators. The remaining question to be answered is therefore: How are the additional functional categories that were identiWed licensed? An answer to this question – which again has consequences for the description of syntactic categories – is provided by the approach that is motivated by morphosyntax. 5.5 Morphosyntax and syntactic categories

5.5.1 Morphosyntax, word order, and the splitting of IP Observations concerning word order and insights into the relationship between inXectional properties of lexical heads and functional categories in the extended projections of these lexical heads prepared the ground for an explanation of the licensing of functional categories on a morphosyntactic basis. Here, a paper by Pollock (1989) played an important role, in which he points out systematic diVerences concerning the order of auxiliaries, negation, particles, adverbs such as often/ souvent, and lexical verbs in English and French. In order to describe these diVerences, Pollock considered it necessary to identify more functional categories – and thus more positions – in the extended projection of V than just C and I. He therefore suggested that I should be split into the functional categories Agr(eement) and T(ense) and


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that an additional functional category Neg(ation) should be assumed. Pollock’s line of argument is sketched in the following. Within the PPT, it is Wrst assumed that I is either realized by to (¼[Agr, Tense]), by a modal auxiliary, e.g. will or would (¼[Agr, þTense]), or by an inXectional aYx speciWed for [þAgr, þTense]. Finite and thus inXected forms of lexical verbs and non-modal auxiliaries are derived in the syntax by moving the verbal stem V to I, where it becomes incorporated. In other words: V moves to I in order to pick up its inXectional aYx. If, however, I is realized by to or by a modal auxiliary, then uninXected Vs and non-modal auxiliaries remain in V. As Pollock (1989: 367 f.) showed, negative sentences and sentences with adverbs such as often/souvent present problems for this analysis, with English and French exhibiting systematic diVerences. Whereas in English as well as in French Wnite auxiliaries are located to the left of the negation particle (not or pas), this holds for Wnite lexical verbs only in French. In English, lexical verbs occur to the right of the negation particle. In addition, in order for negative sentences to be well-formed, the auxiliary do must be inserted as the carrier of the inXectional aYx: (29) a. *John likes not Mary. b. Jean (n’)aime pas Marie. c. John does not like Mary. (cf. Pollock 1989: 367) In the case of non-Wnite forms, Pollock observed that in both languages lexical verbs can only appear to the right of the negation particle ((30) and (32)), whereas auxiliaries may appear to the right or to the left in French but cannot occur freely to the left in English ((32) and (33)) (cf. 1989: 374): (30)

Ne pas sembler heureux est une condition pour ećrire des romans. ‘N e not to seem happy is a prerequisite for writing novels.’

(31) a. *Ne sembler pas heureux est une condition pour ećrire des romans. ‘N e to seem not happy . . .’ b. *To seem not happy is a prerequisite for writing novels. (32) a. Ne pas eˆtre heureux est une condition pour ećrire des romans. b. N’eˆtre pas heureux est une condition pour ećrire des romans. (33) a. Not to be happy is a prerequisite for writing novels. b. ?To be not happy is a prerequisite for writing novels.

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In the case of adverbs like souvent and often, Pollock noted that their relative position with respect to Wnite auxiliaries and Wnite lexical verbs in French and English is the same as that of the negation particle, whereas their relative position with respect to non-Wnite forms diVers in the two languages. Non-Wnite forms of lexical verbs are of special interest here (cf. 1989: 377): (34) a. Souvent paraıˆtre triste pendant son voyage de noce, c’est rare. b. Paraıˆtre souvent triste pendant son voyage de noce, c’est rare. (35) a. ‘To often look sad during one’s honeymoon is rare.’ b. *To look often sad during one’s honeymoon is rare. A comparison of (34) and (30b) shows that in French non-Wnite lexical verbs may occur to the left of an adverb but not to the left of a negation particle. Consequently, the adverb and the negation particle must occupy diVerent positions, with the Wnite verb between them. However, the description of I so far does not provide such a position. Pollock’s solution was to split I into T and Agr and to assume an additional functional category Neg. The hierarchical order he suggested for the projections of these categories is as follows (cf. e.g. 1989: 397):

(36) TP

2 NegP 2 AgrP 2 VP

The diVerences between English and French, which is a matter of whether lexical verbs can or cannot be located to the left of negation particles and adverbs, was explained by Pollock with reference to properties of the agreement features of Agr. Pollock claimed that due to weak agreement features, movement of the verbal head Wrst to Agr and then to T is impossible in English whereas strong agreement features of Agr induce this movement in French. Though it represented a landmark, Pollock’s analysis faced two problems, and the discussion of these problems together with their solution led to a further development of the theory. The Wrst problem concerned the order which Pollock suggested for the functional


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categories T and Agr. Both represent inXectional categories of the verb, which in agglutinating languages are realized separately. Following Baker (1988), movement of the verb from Agr to T is described as head movement and incorporation, which means that the verb picks up its tense and agreement aYxes. In order to generate the correct order of the aYxes, however, the order of T and Agr must be reversed, mirroring the order of the aYxes. This was pointed out by Belletti (1990), who discussed Pollock’s approach with reference to Italian examples (e.g. parl-er(future)-o`(1st person)) and to Baker’s Mirror Principle (‘Morphological derivations must directly reXect syntactic derivations (and vice versa)’, 1985: 375). Belletti proposed that the order of the two categories be reversed (cf. 1990: 27 V.). Chomsky (1991: 433 V.) took up the problem and suggested assuming two categories, one for the agreement of verb and subject and the other for the agreement of verb and object. His suggested order is the following:

(37) AgrSP

2 TP 2 NegP 2 AgrOP 2 VP

AgrO is justiWed by the fact that there are languages in which the verb is speciWed for object agreement. If this is realized by an inXectional aYx, then this aYx is closer to the verbal root than the aYxes realizing tense and subject agreement, which follow in this order. The above shows that in this approach, the licensing of functional categories and their order in the extended projection of V is explained by the interaction of the Mirror Principle and inXectional properties of verbs. Since, however, in the PPT verbs enter the syntax uninXected and are (assumed to be) inXected only after verb movement and incorporation, this mode of licensing is only hypothetical because it is unclear how the type and the order of the functional categories is determined in this approach. In addition, if inXectional properties such as subject or object agreement and tense are not realized by distinct aYxes, as is the case in non-agglutinating languages, then the description of verbal inXection as incorporation turns out to

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be problematic. As will be seen in section 5.6, solutions to these problems are oVered in the Minimalist Program, the successor of the PPT. The second problem related to Pollock’s description of the relative order of auxiliaries, negation particles, adverbs, and lexical verbs concerns his description of inXected lexical verbs in English. Since these may not occur to the left of Neg, Pollock assumes that the incorporation of T into V is not eVected by verb raising but rather by lowering the tense aYx to V. This type of movement, however, violates the ECP as the trace left behind is not properly governed. This problem too is solved in the framework of the Minimalist Program, as will be shown in section 5.6.

5.5.2 Splitting CP and yet more functional categories Whereas Pollock and following him Belletti and Chomsky were concerned with splitting up the functional category I, Rizzi (1997), like Pollock basing his arguments on word-order phenomena and inXectional properties of verbs in selected languages, motivated a split of the functional category C into the categories Force, Topic, Focus, and Fin (ite). In his seminal work on the syntactic categorization of adverbs, Cinque (1999) also took up Pollock’s investigation of word-order phenomena and the identiWcation of functional categories in connection with the inXectional properties of verbs. He began by examining possible positions of members of the traditional category adverb relative to possible positions of particular verb forms of French and Italian in the domains of CP and IP. As a Wrst conclusion, he stated that the two languages exhibit an analogous order of adverbs, and that these adverbs can be assigned to diVerent pragmatic or semantic categories. His investigation of numerous additional languages then led to the hypothesis that adverbs are indicators of the existence of a universal hierarchical order of functional categories dominating VP, with the adverbs or AdvPs as speciWers of the functional categories and each pair consisting of adverb and functional category sharing a particular pragmatic/semantic feature speciWcation. Cinque provided evidence for this hypothesis based on the properties of verbs in languages of various types. Thus he showed, for example, that in agglutinating languages like Korean, Turkish, and Chinese the partial relative order of suYxes speciWed for the same pragmatic or semantic features mirrors the order of the adverbs, which, according to the Mirror


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Principle, indicates that the verbal suYxes are reXexes of functional categories.27 With respect to some creoles and some African languages which do not inXect but realize functional categories by means of particles, he showed that the partial relative order of the particles in these languages corresponds to the order identiWed for adverbs. From these and other facts, identifying combinations of verbal suYxes and particles, Cinque Wnally derived a universal hierarchy of 19 functional categories speciWed for pragmatic or semantic features. Examples of some of the pairs that formed the basis of this hierarchy are given in (38): (38) a. b. c. d. e.

Moodspeech act > Moodevaluative Moodevaluative > Moodevidential Moodevidential > Modepistemic Modepistemic > T(Past) T(Past) > T(Future) (cf. Cinque 1999: 71 f.)

Evidence for the order in (38a) and (38b) is provided by Korean, for the order in (38c) by Korean and Turkish, for that in (38d) by Korean and Guyanese Creole, and for that in (38e) by various creoles and by Turkish. The complete hierarchy as identiWed by Cinque is as follows: (39) Moodspeech act > Moodevaluative > Moodevidential > Modepistemic > T(Past) > T(Future) > Moodirrealis > Asphabitual > T(Anterior) > Aspperfect > Aspretrospective > Aspdurative > Aspprogressive > Aspprospective / Modroot > Voice [sic] > Aspcelerative > Aspcompletive > Asp(semel)repetitive > Aspiterative (ibid. 76) Although this hierarchy is established not on the basis of inXectional properties or word-order phenomena of individual languages but rather based on the way that the properties of various languages complement each other, Cinque nevertheless postulated that this hierarchy is available in every language, provided by UG. One consequence, though a problematic one, is the assumption in this theory that verbs are in general speciWed for each of the properties in the 27 A source of inspiration for Cinque’s more extensive investigations on this matter were claims about the order of aYxes and the order of adverbs made by Foley and Van Valin (1984: 208 V.).

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order identiWed and thus have the potential to license any of the functional categories in their extended projections. The functional categories then in turn license their speciWers on the basis of SpecHead Agreement and thus on the basis of the generalized licensing principle. This explains the assignment of traditional adverbs to diVerent syntactic categories, which are analysed as speciWer positions of particular functional categories. In the framework of the morphosyntactic approach, the identiWcation of functional categories on the basis of the inXectional properties of the lexical head applies not only to the extended projection of V but also to those of N and A. As in the case of V, it was Wrst assumed that members of these lexical categories move to the positions of the functional categories in order to pick up aYxes which realize these categories. This holds, for example, for the identiWcation of Deg in English, realized by a comparative or superlative aYx, -er or -est. The speciWcations of more and most show that these are alternative realizations of the same category. It also holds for the identiWcation of D as a functional category in the extended projection of N in Norwegian, for example, where the deWnite article is realized by the aYx -en (cf. e.g. Taraldsen 1991) and attached to the noun after its movement to D. Languages like English, on the other hand, realize the same nominal properties by means of an autonomous functional head. On the basis of inXectional properties of Catalan (Picallo 1991) and Hebrew (Ritter 1991), an additional functional category Num (ber) was identiWed in the extended projection of N, speciWed for the features [plural]. Picallo also identiWed a gender phrase GenP as a functional category, whereas Ritter argued against the status of gender as a functional category. Following the assumption that the purpose of head-head movement is not necessarily to pick up aYxes but rather to check shared features (see section 5.6), additional functional categories were identiWed in the extended projection of P as well. Koopman (1993) identiWed the functional categories Place and Path, which correspond to the category R described by Zwarts (1992) and Rauh (e.g. 1996, 2002a). Koopman, however, did not describe these categories as operators but as dependent on the speciWcation of prepositions for the features [Place] and [Path]. In addition, Koopman identiWed the functional category Deg hPlacei in the extended projection of spatial Ps, which licenses e.g. right as in right behind the house or measure phrases like two metres as in two metres over the fence as its speciWers. Independently of Koopman,


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Rauh (e.g. 1996) identiWed the functional category Ext(ension) as the licenser of these expressions, whose licensing in turn requires a corresponding feature speciWcation of the prepositional head.

5.5.3 Consequences for the identification and description of syntactic categories The above shows that in the framework of the morphosyntactic approach, four lexical categories and numerous functional categories are identiWed. The identiWcation and description of functional categories is intimately related to mainly morphosyntactic properties of lexical heads, which are realized in diVerent languages as aYxes or autonomous functional heads. Alternatively, they can simply be represented as bundles of morphosyntactic features without any phonetic realization. The position of functional heads, and thus their identity as syntactic categories, is determined by the Mirror Principle, according to which the hierarchical order of functional categories mirrors the order of inXectional aYxes or, more generally, the speciWed order of the corresponding features on the lexical head. According to this view, the identiWcation and description of functional categories as syntactic categories is eVected by the interaction of mainly morphosyntactic properties of members of lexical categories and the Mirror Principle. Cinque’s approach in particular shows in addition that an identiWcation of functional categories not only reveals these to be syntactic categories but that at the same time, as a result of their licensing of speciWers, additional syntactic categories are identiWed which are determined by their speciWcation for functional features and the interaction of these with the General Licensing Criterion. This presupposes that the lexical entries for linguistic items contain speciWcations for morphosyntactic properties and that this holds for members of lexical as well as functional categories and also for items that may realize speciWers of functional categories, for example traditional adverbs. ModiWcations to this end were made at least in part in late versions of the PPT. Since the speciWcations of members of lexical categories for morphosyntactic features determine which functional categories they license in their extended projections and thus which positions the latter may assume after head movement, this speciWcation is just as much part of their determination as syntactic categories as are their speciWcations for the categorial features [N, V], for argument structures, and for Case-assigning properties.

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It should be added that the Binding Theory also inXuences the speciWcation for syntactic categoryhood. As was shown in section 5.2, the binding theory determines possible relative positions of types of NPs – or rather DPs – in S-structure, distinguishing four types: anaphors, pronominals, R-expressions, and PRO. In order to describe these types, Chomsky (1982: 78) suggested the following feature speciWcations: [þanaphor, pronominal] (¼anaphor), [anaphor, þpronominal] (¼pronominal), [anaphor, pronominal] (¼Rexpression), and [þanaphor, þpronominal] (¼PRO). In order for binding theory to apply, it is therefore necessary to specify lexically represented anaphors, (e.g. himself ), pronominals (e.g. he), R-expressions (e.g. John), as well as PRO for the corresponding features. Traces left behind by Wh-movement and NP/DP-movement must also be speciWed for the features in question: Wh-traces: [anaphor, pronominal], NP/ DP-traces: [þanaphor, pronominal]. This latter speciWcation means that syntactic category diVerentiations are generated in the syntax that do not correspond to lexical diVerentiations. It is obvious that with a description of syntactic categories on the basis of lexically speciWed features and their interaction with grammatical principles in the framework of the PPT, more linguistic items are assigned to syntactic categories and have their syntactic behaviour determined than was the case in the Standard Theory, for example, where syntactic categories were determined by the interaction of phrase-structure rules and the categorial speciWcation of lexical items. The result is, in addition, a completely diVerent set of syntactic categories which do not (mis-)interpret the traditional parts of speech and deWne them as syntactic categories. Thus, the PPT comes much closer to a description of the real syntactic properties of lexical items. This will be discussed in section 5.7, together with the results of section 5.6. It should be noted, however, that the integration of functional categories into sentence structures causes a problem which cannot be solved in the PPT: In the PPT, D-structures are determined by the projection principle and the extended projection principle in connection with X-bar theory. Since functional categories are not subject to the projection principle, they are not licensed in D-structure and therefore not represented. However, in order to insert a lexical item as a functional head into the D-structure of a sentence, to move a lexical head by Move Æ to the position of a functional head to pick up its inXectional marker, to get its features checked and to license an AdvP as a speciWer of a functional category, a corresponding position


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must be represented in the D-structure. The Mirror Principle, HeadHead Agreement, and Spec-Head Agreement, or the generalized licensing principle all formulate well-formedness conditions on structures but do not determine how they come about. As a consequence, in the PPT, lexical items are speciWed for diVerentiated syntactic categories in the lexicon but these cannot be accessed by the computational system. This simply means that no complete D-structures and consequently no complete S-structures or LFs can be constructed. It was not least problems like these that required a modiWcation of the theory which led to the Minimalist Program, and this – in a way that parallels the development from the Standard Theory to the PPT – brought radical changes to the syntactic computational system and consequently to the description of syntactic categories as well. This is the concern of the following section. 5.6 Features, checking, and syntactic categories

5.6.1 Introductory remarks The development of the PPT to the Minimalist Program (MP) (Chomsky 1993, 1995, 2000, 2001)28 continued Chomsky’s search for an adequate linguistic theory that explains the human language faculty. The goals of the theory remained unchanged. Problems of the PPT such as those pointed out in section 5.5 concerning the determination of D-structure, and insights concerning the relationships of morphosyntactic properties, functional categories, and word-order phenomena, led to fundamental changes in the concept of a grammar. Special emphasis was now placed on considerations of economy, with respect to the derivation of structures on the one hand and the representations at the various levels on the other. First of all, the necessity of D-structure and S-structure as levels of representation was examined, both of which have an exclusively theoryinternal status, D-structure as the interface between the lexicon and syntax and S-structure as the level that is derived from D-structure and from which PF and LF are derived. Chomsky (1993) demonstrated that both levels can be dispensed with, one advantage being that this solves the problems concerning the generation of D-structure. However, this has 28 It should be pointed out that the MP is not a uniform theory and that there is at least an early and a later version, Chomsky (1993, 1995) representing the former and Chomsky (2000, 2001) the latter. Even Chomsky (1993), the Wrst part of Chomsky (1995: 220–349), and the second part of Chomsky (ibid. 349 V.) represent three diVering versions. The following discussion mostly relates to Chomsky (1995).

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consequences for the modules and principles which in the PPT formulated conditions on the well-formedness of these two levels: The new theory is no longer modular. It is no longer assumed that sentence structures are determined by an interaction of modular principles and that diVerences between languages are due to the parametrization of principles. The new concept of a theory of grammar renders the projection principle and the Ł-Criterion redundant. Case theory is no longer formulated as a theory, and its eVects are achieved instead by diVerent means. The same holds for the bounding theory and the relation of Government. The domain of the Binding Theory is shifted from S-structure to LF, where it now applies just like control theory, which always operated at this level. X-bar theory remains unchanged. However, here too, eVects result from newly-formulated operations. One important condition in this context is the Binary Principle of phrase structures postulated by Kayne (1984) and strictly observed in the MP. DiVerences between languages are now ascribed to parametrized speciWcations of morphological properties and thus to parametrized functional categories. It can therefore be assumed that, as far as UG is concerned, the system of functional categories is the same for all languages. Naturally, these changes also aVect the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories. This will be shown after a brief outline of the MP. First of all, it should be noted that the MP is a program that, following its Wrst presentation in Chomsky (1993), was revised and modiWed by Chomsky himself (1995, 2000, 2001) and by numerous other linguists, whose modiWcations are sometimes based on Chomsky (1993) and sometimes on Chomsky (1995), (2000) or (2001).29 Accordingly, the picture that arises is far from homogeneous, and this also holds where syntactic categories are concerned. To begin with, the following focuses on the basic assumptions given in Chomsky (1995: 220–349), which take up the argumentation presented in the preceding section concerning the relationship between morphological properties, functional categories, and word-order phenomena and which elucidate the general consequences for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, in this framework. Where additional or alternative assumptions are included, this is indicated by referring to the relevant literature. 29 ModiWcations to Chomsky’s various versions are provided, among others, by Bobaljik (1995), Brody (1995), Armon-Lotem (1997), Collins (1997), Nash and Rouveret (1997), Uriagereka (1999), Haeberli (2002), Adger (2003), and Breul (2004).


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5.6.2 An outline of the MP In the MP, as in earlier versions of the Chomskyan theory of language, it is assumed that a language consists of two components: a lexicon and a computational system. The lexicon provides items that enter the computational system, which then – via structural descriptions – derives PF and LF, which in this framework are the only levels of representation. As in the PPT, PF and LF are characterized as interfaces with other mental systems, here speciWed as performance systems: the articulatory-perceptual system A-P on the one hand and the conceptual-intentional system C-I on the other. Both levels are subject to strong output conditions, expressed by the principle of full interpretation (FI). FI requires that PF must not contain anything not interpretable by A-P and that LF must not contain anything not interpretable by C-I. As a consequence, speciWcations of lexical items which are interpretable neither at PF nor at LF must be deleted in the course of the derivation. Since phonological properties are not interpretable at LF and semantic properties not at PF,30 this – according to Chomsky – requires a strict separation of the derivation of these two levels. Therefore, at some point in the derivation, called ‘Spell-Out’, the phonologically interpretable part of a sentence is separated from the semantically interpretable part. Assuming that the lexical items from which sentences are put together are Wrst assembled to form an array called a ‘numeration’, the grammatical model of the MP may be schematically represented as follows: (40) Numeration

Lexicon

PF Spell-Out LF

30 A diVerent view is defended, for example, by Bobaljik (1995), Groat and O’Neil (1996), and Haeberli (2002), who suggest a ‘Single Output Model’ which contains no syntactic processes that do not aVect phonological features, i.e. there are no covert movements.

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The lexical items that enter the computational system via the numeration comprise members of lexical as well as of functional categories. They are speciWed for phonological, semantic, and grammatical or ‘formal’ features. The formal features Chomsky (1995: 231, 277) identiWed are categorial features, e.g. [nominal], ç-features, i.e. [person], [number], and [gender], as well as Case features, e.g. [accusative] or [assign accusative Case]. Formal features are subdivided into intrinsic features, which are speciWed in the lexicon, and optional features, for which the items are speciWed on their way from the lexicon to the computational system. This may be either during the formation of the numeration or when the items enter the computational system. The intrinsic features include the categorial features, the ç-features [person] and [gender] of N, and the Case-assigning features [assign accusative Case] of V and [assign nominative Case] of T. The optional features include [number] and [Case] of N and [person] and [number] of V. Members of lexical categories are speciWed for sets of phonological, semantic, and formal features. Members of functional categories can be speciWed for formal features only. This holds, for example, for Agr and T, which are no longer assumed to be represented by aYxes and thus by phonetic forms. Features can be interpretable or uninterpretable, speciWed as [interpretable]. In principle, phonological features are interpretable at PF and semantic features at LF. Formal features can also be interpretable at LF, for example categorial features or the çfeatures [gender] and [number] of N. If they are not, for example Case features of N, Case-assigning features of V, or ç-features of A or V, then they must be deleted in the course of the derivation of LF. Features of members of functional categories can be either strong or weak. This speciWcation plays an important role for the derivation of PF and thus for the visible – or rather audible – form of a sentence with its particular properties of word order, as will be seen below. Chomsky himself gives no account of how the c-selection properties of lexical items speciWed in the PPT are represented in the MP, nor is he explicitly concerned with the representation or function of argument structures or Ł-roles. He only notes that Ł-theory complements Checking Theory and that Ł-roles are not formal features (cf. Chomsky 1995: 312 f.). Complementing Chomsky’s assumptions, Adger (2003: 83 V.) suggests c-selectional properties should be


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speciWed as uninterpretable formal features in lexical entries. He considers these c-selectional properties to include not only the categorial selection of complements but that of the subject as well. For the representation of argument structures or Ł-roles – which apparently are included in the semantic part of a lexical entry (cf. also Adger ibid. 90) – it should be noted that verbs speciWed for an external argument bearing the Ł-role Agent are considered complex in the MP in the sense that they consist of two parts, ‘little v’, which assigns the Agent role to its speciWer, and V, which assigns Ł-roles to internal arguments. If a verb c-selects two internal arguments, then one of them is licensed as the complement of V and the other one as its speciWer. Example (41) gives a relevant structure:

(41)

vP 2 DP v’ 2 v VP 2 DP V’ 2 V PP give

Following Adger, it will be assumed here that lexical items are speciWed for uninterpretable c-selection features as well as for semantic and thus interpretable features representing Ł-roles. Splitting verbs with external arguments into v and V requires that little v is also listed in the lexicon and speciWed for particular features. As a Ł-role assigner, little v – which is also called ‘Voice’ (Kratzer 1993), ‘Act(ive)’ (Holmberg and Platzack 1995), and ‘Tr(ansitive)’ (Collins 1997) – exhibits properties of members of lexical categories. At the same time, it can be speciWed for the morphosyntactic property [causative], which in some languages is realized by a verbal aYx, and therefore it has properties of members of functional categories. The derivation of a sentence in the MP starts with forming a numeration N from a set of items taken from the lexicon. The items enter the computational system CHL fully speciWed for inXectional properties. In a bottom-up procedure the operations ‘Select’, ‘Merge’, ‘Move’, and ‘Delete’ then derive a pair PF and LF. The operation Select selects items from N and inserts them in CHL. The

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operation Merge builds phrase-markers by combining two units, syntactic objects, to form a new unit, a new syntactic object. Syntactic objects comprise the items from N as well as any complex unit built by Merge, i.e. phrase markers. Merge is an asymmetric operation, which means that only one of the two units projects, with the label of the resulting construction corresponding to that of the projecting head. Merge is applied recursively until no items are left in N. An example of the recursive application of Merge is given in (42) with AgrS, T, AgrO, v, we, build, and airplanes as abbreviations for their respective feature representations:

(42)

AgrS 2 AgrS T 2 T AgrO 2 AgrO v 2 we v 2 v build 2 build airplanes

Due to the recursive application of Merge, the structure of a sentence is built step by step and not constructed all at once, as is the case with D-structure in the framework of the PPT. This shows that the structure-building task and the conditions of the projection principle are no longer needed. Other conditions, however, have to be met, as will be seen below. Since N comprises members of lexical and functional categories which are combined by Merge to form complex structures, the problems of the PPT concerning the integration of functional categories in D-structure – and consequently in S-structure as well – as pointed out in section 5.5, do not arise in this framework. It is also obvious that due to the asymmetry of Merge, the resulting constructions conform to the X-bar schema at least with respect to the domain of head and complement. The operation Move is triggered by formal features of the functional units of a phrase-marker constructed by Merge and serves to check these features. Checking applies in the checking-domain which, according to Chomsky, includes the speciWer position and the head


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position of a functional projection.31 Where Move operates for the purpose of checking, it either moves features of maximal projections of members of lexical categories to the speciWer position of functional items, where they replace an empty category, or it moves features of lexical heads to head positions of functional heads, adjoining these features to the heads. Since there is therefore no movement to complement positions, this achieves the eVect of the Ł-Criterion, which rules out movement to Ł-marked positions. The Ł-Criterion as such is rendered redundant. In order for structures to converge, the checking and the checked features must agree, conforming to the conditions of Spec-Head Agreement (or the Generalized Licensing Principle) or Head-Head Agreement. For this kind of movement, it is of relevance whether the features of the functional items are strong or weak. If they are strong, then the morphosyntactic features of a lexical item and its phonological features are moved as well. The result is overt movement, perceivable as a change in word order. If they are weak, then only the morphosyntactic features move, and the phonological features remain in situ. This movement is covert and thus not perceivable.32 There are no visible changes in word order. In this way, Chomsky is able to describe the diVerences between French and English (and other similar languages) pointed out by Pollock. In French, the Agr-features are strong, and therefore V-movement is overt. In English they are weak, and therefore V-movement is covert: the only features that move are the Agr-features. Apart from this diVerence, the kind of movement is the same, namely upwards. This is guaranteed by the conditions on Move. The operation Move forms chains (CH) which consist of the

31 Adger’s suggestion, according to which c-selection properties represent noninterpretable features, identiWes complement positions as well as speciWer positions of lexical categories as checking domains. Checking in these positions, however, is not related to Move but to Merge. According to this view, a constituent can only be integrated into a construction as a complement or speciWer of a lexical head by Merge if its categorial features match the c-selection properties of this head. 32 This is changed in Chomsky (2001) so that covert movement no longer applies. A new operation ‘Agree’ is introduced, which on the basis of c-command establishes a relationship between a weak feature of a functional category and a corresponding feature of a member of a lexical category and adjusts the value of this feature to the value of the feature of the functional category. This means that if, for example, in a structure the feature [tense] of T is speciWed as [past], then the value [past] is inserted as the feature [tense] on the verb. This prevents a possible ‘crash’ due to nonmatching features, contributing to the economy of derivations. Since it is only a technical variant, this change is of minor relevance for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories.

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moved item and its trace: CH¼(Æ t(Æ)). CH is subject to various conditions. One important condition is that the moved item must c-command its trace, allowing only upward movement. Thus, the ECP (Empty Category Principle) is automatically met, rendering it redundant as a principle. A further condition is that for reasons of economy only obligatory movement is allowed, i.e. movement which serves the necessary checking of features (‘Last Resort’). This is, for example, movement triggered by Case features, which moves Case features of NPs/DPs to the Spec-position of a functional head speciWed itself for Case features so that the features can be checked, replacing the Case theory of the PPT. Yet another constraint on movement is the ‘Minimal Link Constraint’ (MLC), which requires that the shortest move must be taken and that the chain formed must be uniform in the sense that the moved item and its trace must both occupy positions either of maximal projections or of heads. Since movement in this framework is triggered by features of functional categories which thus play an active part as ‘attracters’, the operation Move is also called ‘Attract’. The operation Delete is activated after the checking of features and deletes those that are speciWed as [–interpretable]. Features that are uninterpretable and therefore subject to the operation Delete include all the checking features, with the result that features of functional categories involved in the checking operation do not occur at PF and LF (cf. Chomsky 1995: 282). Features of functional categories that are not involved in the checking operation are not deleted. These include those that generate speciWers of functional categories exclusively by Merge and not by Move, for example the features of the functional categories identiWed by Cinque, which license AdvPs as their speciWers (cf. section 5.5).

5.6.3 Syntactic categories in the MP The consequences that derive from the conception of the lexicon, the numeration, and the computational system of the MP for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories are as follows: The positions that items may occupy in sentences and thus the syntactic category they belong to depends on the formal features for which they are speciWed in the lexicon and in the numeration (or later). Due to the relationship between the order of functional categories and the order of inXectional aYxes and their representations as formal morphosyntactic features expressed – and required – by the Mirror Principle, a


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speciWcation of the order of the morphosyntactic features of inXected lexical items is of relevance as well. As far as members of functional categories are concerned, which in the ideal case are speciWed for a single feature only, what is relevant is whether their features are speciWed as weak or strong. In addition, assigning items to syntactic categories depends on the conditions on Merge and Move (or Attract) and thus on the Checking Theory with its conditions of Spec-Head Agreement and Head-Head Agreement, supplemented by Adger by Head-Complement Agreement, which relates to c-selection properties. Whereas in the PPT syntactic categories are determined by an interaction of lexically speciWed features with the (parametrized) principles of UG – as shown in section 5.4 – this is achieved in the MP by an interaction of features speciWed in the lexicon and in the numeration (or later) with the various operations of the computational system and the conditions on these operations. SigniWcant diVerences result not only from changes to the computational system but also from diVerent speciWcations for the features and from the role of functional categories. Some examples will illustrate this. In the MP, as in the PPT, the four lexical categories N, V, A, and P are described on the basis of categorial features, which however are now not represented as combinations of the (problematic) features [N] and [V] but rather as [N], [V], [A], and [P] (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1995: 236 f.). Membership of lexical categories, as in the PPT, is on the one hand determined by c-selection features in connection with the speciWcation for Ł-roles. Following Adger, c-selection properties are realized in the MP by the operation Merge and the checking of the uninterpretable c-selection features. On the other hand, the membership of lexical categories is determined by their speciWcation for morphosyntactic features, which is either given in the lexicon or – in the case of optional features – emerges on the way from the lexicon to the computational system. The distinction between lexically speciWed and optional morphosyntactic features means that – unlike in the PPT – items are not lexically speciWed for all the features that determine their syntactic category. This is illustrated, for example, by the diVerent syntactic properties of inXected and uninXected verbs in English and French, pointed out by Pollock and discussed in section 5.5 above. Since, due to the necessity of checking their features, inXected verbs occupy diVerent positions from uninXected ones, these two verb forms belong to diVerent syntactic categories, the distinction being determined by optional features only.

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Another speciWc characteristic of the MP is the fact that the syntactic category membership of lexical categories is determined not only by feature speciWcations of the particular items but also by a speciWcation for the values ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ of the features of the functional categories in their extended projections. If these features are strong, then they attract the phonological features of a member of a lexical category in addition to the morphosyntactic features that must be checked, which means that in this case the item belongs to a syntactic category diVerent from the category it would belong to if its phonological features were not attracted, i.e. if the features of the functional category were weak. This is also illustrated by Pollock’s considerations. Since the Agr-features are weak in English and strong in French, inXected verbs occupy diVerent positions in the two languages and thus belong to diVerent syntactic categories. In the MP, the membership of functional categories is determined by their relationship to particular lexical categories on the one hand and by their order on the other. This order mirrors the order of the morphosyntactic features of the lexical head whose extended projection they form. As especially Cinque’s investigations show, the morphosyntactic features are identiWed cross-linguistically: What is realized in one language as an aYx need not be realized in the same way in others and can nevertheless be part of a universal set of these features and license functional categories that are syntactically relevant in extended projections of lexical categories. It is a speciWc characteristic of the MP that as syntactic categories, functional categories serve various functions. On the one hand, they provide positions for phonetically realized functional heads such as the, many, most, or here in English and thus determine the syntactic category for which these items are speciWed in the lexicon. On the other hand, functional categories serve as place holders for derived positions of members of lexical categories which are moved to these positions in order to have their features checked. In addition, in connection with Merge or Move, functional categories license constituents in their speciWer positions via Spec-Head Agreement and thus determine (in the case of Merge) or co-determine (in the case of Move) the syntactic-category membership of these constituents. The former holds for traditional adverbs which – following Cinque’s analysis – are licensed by Merge and Spec-Head Agreement in the speciWer position of Moodspeech act, T(Anterior), or Aspperfect, for example. The latter holds, for example, for constituents speciWed


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for the feature [þWh], which are licensed by Move and Spec-Head Agreement in [Spec, C]. The operation Delete aVects the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in the framework of the MP in a way which at Wrst seems rather awkward. Delete causes items to lose formal features in the course of the derivation for which they were speciWed in the lexicon, in the numeration or later. The consequences are especially drastic for members of functional categories which are speciWed for formal, noninterpretable features only, since these categories disappear completely. This is, for example, the case with the Agr-categories, and it has accordingly received special attention in the literature on the subject. Since the Agr-categories are in addition speciWed for optional features only, a situation is created whereby items have only a temporary existence as syntactic categories, with no lexical basis. Chomsky (1995: 349 V.) therefore suggests that the features of the Agr-categories and the processes related to them (AgrS: checking of the agreement features of the subject; AgrO: checking of the agreement features of the object) should be transferred to T(¼AgrS) and to ‘little v’ (¼AgrO) and that AgrS and AgrO should be eliminated as categories. Radford (1997a: 230 V.), in contrast, following Bobaljik (1995), Koizumi (1995), and others argues in favour of keeping the Agr-categories. He points out that in order to generalize over the shared properties of CP- and DP-complements of verbs like report in (43) on the one hand, and the diVerent positions they occupy on the other, it is necessary to specify AgrO as well as v as categories. AgrOP in this case should be located between vP and VP: (43) a. He reported to the police that there had been a robbery. b. He reported the robbery to the police. Radford also suggests that an additional category AgrIO should be introduced which checks the Case-features of indirect objects. Thus, Radford, unlike Chomsky, does not consider it problematic to identify syntactic categories which are there only to serve as placeholders for lexical categories and which then disappear. This view is shared by Nash and Rouveret (1997), amongst others, who introduce the term ‘proxy category’33 for categories of this kind. As a result, there is an MP-speciWc identiWcation of syntactic categories which can be 33 ‘A proxy category is an F-head created in the course of the syntactic computation’ (Nash and Rouveret 1997: 298).

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explained by the fact that the computational system in this framework, in contrast to the PPT, does not derive syntactic levels of representation such as D-structure and S-structure, but only PF and LF, with the consequence that syntactic categories are irrelevant at PF if word-order phenomena are taken care of and irrelevant at LF if the prerequisites for semantic interpretation are provided. The examples demonstrate that functional categories are very important for the determination of syntactic categories in the framework of the MP. DiVerences between languages are related mainly to diVerences between functional categories. This includes, on the one hand, the fact that languages diVer with respect to whether functional categories are realized as autonomous functional heads or as inXectional aYxes on lexical heads. On the other hand it includes the fact that the values for functional features can either be weak or strong, resulting in diVerent eVects on word order.34 It remains an open question whether the same set of functional categories should be assumed for all languages, as suggested by Cinque, or whether particular languages select particular subsets from a universal set, which is the view defended by Ouhalla (1991), van Gelderen (1997), Grimshaw (2005), and others, and which seems to be more plausible. A further unanswered question is whether functional categories are realized separately in every language or whether languages diVer with respect to fusions, as suggested by Thraıńsson (1996, 1997), who claims that T and AgrS are realized separately only in languages in which tense and agreement are realized by distinct morphs. If, however, there is fusion of morphological categories, then the functional categories are fused as well. Independently of which solution is ultimately more appropriate, it is the case that in the MP diVerent properties of functional categories, their features, and the values (weak or strong) of these leads to an identiWcation and description of diVerent syntactic categories in diVerent languages. Thus, this framework predicts what is conWrmed by empirical Wndings, namely that the categorial properties of natural languages exhibit much more variation than earlier explanations and descriptions provided for. In contrast to earlier generative models like 34 The diVerent eVects of weak and strong AgrS on languages like French and English have been pointed out. Concerning AgrO, van Gelderen (1997) remarks that languages with object agreement, such as French, Hindi, or Hopi, have strong AgrO-features, with the corresponding eVects on word order, and languages without object agreement, like English, have weak features.


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the Standard Theory, the MP makes it possible to account for the variety of syntactic categories instantiated by the set of items listed in the lexicon of a particular language. Relevant aspects of the potential provided by the PPT and the MP are discussed in the next section. 5.7 Feature-based representations of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP The above has shown that in the PPT and the MP syntactic categories are determined by the interaction of features and (parametrized) principles or operations of the computational system and the conditions to which these are subject. The conclusion of this chapter will consider what consequences this has for the description of syntactic categories in both approaches. In addition, taking into account the results and open questions presented in section 4.6, it will be discussed in what way the syntactic categorization of linguistic items in the approaches considered here diVers from the possibilities of early Generative Grammar and how this is to be evaluated. In the PPT, the syntactically relevant features which interact with the parametrized principles are represented in the lexicon. They are part of every lexical entry and include the following: . the so-called ‘categorial’ features [N, V], . argument structures alias ‘Ł-features’ (hext, int, ref ¼R, E, G, or Si),

. . . .

hexti, and hinti eventually being speciWed for thematic roles like gAent , Theme, Goal, etc., c-selection properties (e.g. _IP),35 Case-assigning features (e.g. [assign accusative Case]), operator features (e.g. [þtense], [þdeWnite] or [degree]), and morphosyntactic features (e.g. [þplural], [3 person]).

In addition, they include features like: [abstract, count, . . . ], which specify [þN, V]-items; [stative], which specify [N, þV]-items; [gradable], which specify [þN, þV]-items; and [extension, direction], which specify [N, V]-items. According to Grimshaw (cf. 1991; section 5.4.3), they also include features which distinguish lexical and functional categories as well as the relative position of

35 IP in this case is an abbreviation of the following set of features: [[N, þV], [F1], [þprojection, þmaximal]].

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functional projections to lexical projections, namely [F0] (e.g. V), [F1] (e.g. I), [F2] (e.g. C), etc.36 According to Muysken and van Riemsdijk (cf. 1986; section 5.3.3), they in addition include features which distinguish levels of projections, namely [projection, maximal]. These features are particularly relevant in case a lexical item does not project and yet occupies a position reserved for maximal projections such as whether, which occupies the [Spec, C]-position,37 or very, which occupies the [Spec-Deg]-position, and many of the adverbs analysed by Cinque (cf. 1999; section 5.4.2) as speciWers of additional functional categories. For the syntactic categorization of linguistic items this means that it is not only based on the so-called ‘categorial’ features, but rather on sets of the various features identiWed, which form a complex category label in the lexical entry and which interact with particular principles of the grammar. Thus, the categorial features and the c-selection features interact with X-bar theory, the Ł-features with the projection principle, the extended projection principle with Ł-theory and Xbar theory, and the operator features with Ł-theory for the licensing of functional heads on the basis of Ł-binding, and with the general licensing principle for the licensing of speciWers of functional heads. Functional features that are not operator features such as the AGR-features [person], [number], and [case], or features which according to Cinque specify functional heads (of categories like Mood, Modality, or Aspect) or adverbs as their speciWers as well interact with the general licensing principle. The following examples present feature-based category descriptions of selected lexical items: (44) a. tree: [þN, V]38, hRi, [abstract, þcount, animate] b. many: [þN, V], [F1], [þcount], [þplural] c. that1: [þN, V], [F2], [þdeWnite, proximal], [plural] (45) a. break1: [N, þV], [_[[þN, V], hRi, [Æprojection, þmaximal]]]39, hE: inti, [stative]

36 With the split of I and C and the identiWcation of additional functional categories in this domain, a diVerent assignment would become necessary. 37 See in this context the discussion in Haegeman und Gue´ron (1999: 175 V.), which shows that whether occupies the [Spec, C]-position, whereas if realizes C0. 38 [F0]-features are left out here, since they are considered to represent default-features. 39 This is the feature-based representation of the c-selection feature [_DP].


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b. break2: [N, þV], [_[[þN, V], hRi, [Æprojection, þmaximal]]], hE: ext, inti, [assign accusative Case] [stative] c. could: [N, þV], [F1], [þpast] d. that2: [N, þV], [F2], [wh] (46) a. tall: [þN, þV], hGi, [þgradable] b. obvious1: [þN, þV], hGi, [þgradable] c. obvious2: [þN, þV], [_ to [assign accusative Case] [[þN, V], hRi, [Æprojection, þmaximal]]], hG: inti, [þgradable] d. obvious3: [þN, þV], [_ [[N, þV], [F2], [þprojection, þmaximal], [Wh]]], hG: inti, [þgradable] e. so: [þN, þV], [F1], [degree] f. very: [projection, þmaximal], [degree] (47) a. below1: [N, V], hSl: exti, [þextension, þdirection] b. below2: [N, V], [_[[þN, V], [Æprojection, þmaximal]]], hSl: ext, inti, [assign accusative Case], [þextension, þdirection] c. of : [þN, V], [assign accusative Case] d. right: [degree], [projection, þmaximal] The feature representations in (44) to (47) describe words of English as lexical heads, functional heads or speciWers of functional heads. As it was assumed in the early PPT that lexical items enter the syntax uninXected and receive their inXectional properties in the syntax, it was necessary to provide lexical entries for inXectional aYxes as well. (48) gives examples of their feature representations: (48) a. -er: [þN, þV], [F1], [degree: comparative] b. -ed: [N, þV], [F1], [tense: þpast] In addition, it was necessary to list items in the lexicon which are speciWed for syntactically relevant features and possibly for semantic features, yet without phonological features. All these items represent functional heads, like (49), for example: (49) [N, þV], [F2], [þWh] The functional heads identiWed by Cinque and analysed as licensing various adverbs as their speciWers would have to be described similarly. It turns out, however, that the speciWcation of the [F]-feature is problematic, which will be discussed below.

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With the later assumption that lexical heads enter the syntax fully inXected – called for by the numerous irregular inXections and fused aYxes – the feature representations of lexical heads had to be supplemented by morphosyntactic features. At the same time, more phonologically empty lexical entries had to be listed, since now, for example, no separate entry for -er was needed but rather a representation of the features [[þN, þV], [F1], [degree]], which describe the (phonologically empty) functional head whose features must match those of items like taller or worse to derive well-formed structures. The examples provide individual feature representations which have the status of complex syntactic-category labels, since these features through their interaction with the principles of grammar (in the intended ideal case) together determine which position(s) items may occupy in a sentence structure. If items are speciWed for the same in this sense ‘categorial’ features, it is predicted that they may occupy the same positions and therefore belong to the same syntactic category. Thus, syntactic categorization is based on identical sets of features of the kind presented. These features, however, call for some remarks. In section 5.3.2, it was noted that the features [N, V], generally called ‘categorial’, were problematic, not least because it is unclear what they stand for. The feature representations provided above now suggest what has been claimed apparently independently of each other and for slightly varying reasons by Ramat (1999), Spencer (1999), and Rauh (2000a), namely that these features are redundant. For if lexical items are speciWed for a referential argument then it can be derived whether they are Ns, Vs, As, or Ps. This can be derived as well from the formal features [[abstract], [count] . . . ], [stative], [gradable], or [[extension] [direction]]. And whether, for example, a V c-selects an NP complement is described even more adequately by the Caseassigning feature [assign accusative Case] in combination with the contextual feature _hRi, since the latter captures the fact that such syntactic arguments must be referential, hRi being subject to Ł-binding. To dispense with the ‘categorial’ features, however, seems problematic as long as this is the basis for the licensing of functional categories in extended projections of particular lexical categories.40 This problem disappears with the speciWcation of members of 40 It should be noted in this context that Collins (2002) argues in favour of an elimination of the labels of phrasal categories such as NP, VP, etc. showing on the basis of various examples that they ‘are not needed in syntactic theory’ (ibid. 42).


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lexical categories for morphosyntactic features and the licensing of functional categories in their extended projections on the basis of matching features. Another problem is related to the features [F1], [F2], etc., which describe the hierarchical position of functional categories. When Grimshaw suggested these features, only maximally two functional categories were identiWed in extended projections. With the splitting of IP and CP and the introduction of numerous additional functional categories, it is unclear what a corresponding speciWcation should look like, particularly in case not every functional category is instantiated in a structure. A necessary although awkward consequence of the Mirror Principle may be to number the morphosyntactic features of members of lexical categories according to their order in the universal set, requiring that this order mirrors the order of the corresponding functional categories. If then, for example, of a set of four features, [F2] and [F3] are not instantiated, following Grimshaw (cf. 2005; section 5.6.3), the licensing of functional categories would be based on the features [F1] and [F4]. Apart from these uneven patches, the argumentation shows that in the PPT items are speciWed for syntactically relevant features in the lexicon and that syntactic categories are described on the basis of feature representations which comprise diVerent types of features, each type interacting with particular principles of the grammar. Due to a changed computational system and due to the introduction of the numeration as a ‘mediator’ between the lexicon and the computational system, the situation is diVerent in the MP. The features speciWed in the lexicon now only partially form the basis for the syntactic categorization of the items. These features include the intrinsic formal features – according to Adger including formal c-selection features, which determine the categorial selection of subjects and complements (cf. Adger 2003; also section 5.6.3) – as well as Ł-features which, though not belonging to the formal features, are nevertheless relevant for the syntax, since Ł-theory, to which they are subject, supplements Checking Theory, to which formal features are subject (cf. Chomsky 1995: 312 V.). Entering or leaving the numeration, optional features are added to the lexically speciWed feature representations of the items as, for example, number and Case features in the case of N-categories or number, person, or tense features in the case of V-categories. For members of lexical categories, even the sum of lexically speciWed and optional features is not suYcient

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for their syntactic categorization, since – as was shown in section 5.6.3 – this Wnally depends on whether the corresponding features of functional categories are weak or strong. Thus the syntactic categorization of members of lexical categories in this model is based on speciWcations in the lexicon supplemented by speciWcations added before or after the numeration as well as in the syntax. The syntactic categorization of members of functional categories is, in principle,41 also based on lexical speciWcations (intrinsic formal features) supplemented by speciWcations before or after the numeration (optional features) and in the syntax. Though members of functional categories are independent of speciWcations of other functional categories, they depend on the lexical heads in whose extended projections they are introduced by Merge and on the order of their features to be checked. Due to the operations Merge, Move, and Checking, in this model, as opposed to the PPT, neither a speciWcation of members of functional categories for ‘categorial’ features like [þN, V] – or alternatively [N] – is necessary, nor a speciWcation for features like [F1], [F2], etc. These features can be dispensed with because only those functional features are successfully checked in extended projections of lexical heads which match the latter’s own features, and because the Checking procedure step by step follows the order of these features. This automatically derives the mirrored order of the corresponding functional categories. Thus, the feature speciWcations necessary for the licensing of functional categories in the PPT are redundant in the context of the MP. As a consequence, as pointed out above, the ‘categorial’ features are redundant in general, since the information they provide in the context of feature representations of lexical heads can be derived from referential Ł-features as well as from formal features such as [[abstract], [count] . . . ] or [gradable]. Comparing the description of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP, it is evident that there are diVerences concerning the place where it is completed, in the lexicon or in the syntax. In addition, the description is more economic in the MP: what is described on the basis of features in the PPT, in part results from the operations of the computational system in the MP. Apart from these diVerences, the two approaches share signiWcant properties. Both are feature based and make use of the same features – inasmuch as these are not redundant. 41 The special case of the Agr-categories, which are exclusively speciWed for optional features and therefore do not have a lexical entry, was discussed in section 5.6.3.


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In both cases the features interact with the computational system, with principles, on the one hand, and with operations and the conditions these are subject to, on the other. In comparison with the description of syntactic categories in early Generative Grammar, feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories have fundamental advantages. In section 4.6 it was pointed out that in the Standard Theory, due to its architecture, syntactic categories would have to be universal and language particular at the same time. Feature-based descriptions, as those of the PPT and the MP, solve this problem in an elegant way. In these approaches, it is not categories that are claimed to be universal, but rather features, principles, and operations. The variety of categories in particular languages, which was not at all accounted for in the Standard Theory and its alternatives, as well as cross-linguistic diVerences between categories, are here described in part by diVerent selections and combinations of features, in part by diVerent possibilities for their realizations – by aYxes, fused aYxes, or autonomous heads in the case of functional features, for example – and in part by parametrized principles or conditions on operations. What is also important in this context is that in the PPT and the MP the principles and operations, unlike the phrase-structure rules and the transformational rules of the Standard Theory, do not interact with categories, but rather with features. This makes the system extremely Xexible and has the additional advantage that category membership can be explicitly described even in those cases which otherwise are considered problematic such as, for example, cases where items share properties of verbs and adjectives or of verbs and nouns and therefore are claimed to represent ‘mixed categories’ or ‘squishes’ (cf. e.g. Lefebvre und Muysken 1988; Ross 1972, 1973a). In feature-based descriptions, features of two traditional categories may form the basis of a new category of its own. Feature-based descriptions also provide the means to explicitly describe a phenomenon called ‘grammaticalization’ or ‘reanalysis’ in the literature. This phenomenon characterizes a diachronic category change of linguistic items from noun to preposition, for example (e.g. German trotz, wegen), from verb form to preposition (e.g. during, pending) (cf. e.g. Lehmann 1985; Kortmann und Ko¨nig 1992), or from a lexical preposition to a functional case preposition (e.g. on in rely on) (cf. e.g. Rauh 1997a, 2002a). The phenomenon can be described as a loss and/or a substitution of particular features. This is important not only for diachronic reasons but for synchronic

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reasons as well, since languages contain numerous items which exhibit properties of intermediate stages which – from a traditional point of view – form intermediate categories which cannot be described with traditional means but cause no problem for featurebased descriptions. The above made suYciently clear that the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP – as opposed to the Standard Theory – is not determined by the traditional parts of speech. The number of categories is much larger and allows for a categorization of numerous items which in the Standard Theory – due to the lack of an adequate category label – had no chance to be inserted into a syntactic structure. Thus, for example, the syntactically heterogeneous set of traditional adverbs is split up into numerous categories which are described as functional heads, their speciWers or as intransitive prepositions. The set of subordinating conjunctions is split up as well. Some are described as functional heads (¼complementizers), some as prepositions with sentential complements. And even the lexical categories N, V, A, and P, whose names suggest identity with the traditional parts of speech, do not correspond to these. The category V, for example, contains only lexical verbs, no auxiliaries, which in turn are split up into various functional categories, and P in addition to some – not all – traditional prepositions includes some traditional adverbs and some traditional conjunctions. Thus, the representations of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP describe integrated into elaborated grammatical systems what Harris and Fries (cf. chapter 3) have shown on the basis of discovery procedures only: parts of speech do not represent syntactic categories, even though this is claimed again and again – as will be seen in the following chapters – and even though this was suggested by the phrase-structure rules of early Generative Grammar. Comparing the characterization of syntactic categories in early Generative Grammar with their representations in the PPT and the MP, another aspect is of relevance. In chapter 4, it was pointed out that Chomsky had remarked that it could not be excluded that the categories identiWed by him ‘must ultimately refer to semantic concepts of one sort or other’. In addition, it was shown that particularly in the framework of Generative Semantics, underlying semantic categories borrowed from predicate logic were identiWed from which syntactic categories should have been derived which, however, never was achieved. What is signiWcant is that in both cases a relation between


149

syntactic categories and semantic properties was postulated, even though no description was provided. With Higginbotham’s Ł-theory (1985) and the integration of argument structures including referential arguments (R ¼Referent, E ¼Eventuality, G ¼Degree, S ¼Space; cf. e.g. Zwarts 1992: 59; section 5.4.4) into complex category labels a relationship between syntactic categories and semantic properties is explicitly described in the PPT approach. In addition, Ł-marking, Ł-identiWcation, and Ł-binding formulate semantic correlates to syntactically, i.e. on the basis of X-bar theory, licensed positions, even restricting these. Furthermore, research in semantics shows that referential arguments, such as hEi, for example, may be internally structured – in this case involving subevents – which inXuences the semantic well-formedness of the licensing of adverbials in particular positions (cf. e.g. Pustejovsky 1991; Ernst 2000; Tenny 2000). This shows that the description of syntactic categories in the PPT includes syntactic and semantic aspects, which also holds for the MP and in this case is expressed by the identiWcation of interpretable features side by side with noninterpretable features. In addition to the advantages of the feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP, there is also an essential disadvantage and this relates to the fact that the representation of the features is hardly structured. As a consequence, it is not always clear how to represent which features belong to the sets that are necessary and suYcient for the description of distinct syntactic categories, i.e. how to specify how detailed a feature speciWcation must be. For example, how are features like [tense] and [past], the former being distinctive as a categorial feature in English, the latter not, formally distinguished? A solution better than just a hierarchical order is provided by LFG and HPSG. This will be shown in the following chapter.

6 Syntactic categories, functional features, and feature structures 6.1 Introduction The criticism of the Standard Theory and the search for constraints on phrase-structure rules and transformational rules in generative theory not only led to the development of Chomsky’s Theory of Government and Binding but also to alternatives. The most inXuential among these are Lexical-Functional Grammar (LFG), developed by Bresnan in cooperation with Kaplan (cf. Kaplan and Bresnan 1982; Bresnan 1982b and as a modiWed version Bresnan 2001), and Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG), developed mainly by Gazdar and Pullum (cf. Gazdar 1981a, 1982; Gazdar and Pullum 1982; Gazdar et al. 1985). The latter model gave rise to Head-Driven PhraseStructure Grammar (HPSG), which has now replaced GPSG. LFG as well as GPSG and HPSG developed feature-based representations of syntactic categories which, Wrst of all, are important for the models themselves but which also deserve interest independently of these. This chapter will be concerned with both orientations, LFG as well as GPSG and HPSG, and in particular with their descriptions of syntactic categories. Explicitly distancing themselves from the Standard Theory, LFG and GPSG/HPSG both reject transformations. Even more radically than the PPT, they thus avoid the problem of transformations that are too powerful, although this originally was not the reason for rejecting them. In her 1978 paper on ‘A Realistic Transformational Grammar’, Joan Bresnan, a student of Chomsky’s, expressed her dissatisfaction with Chomskyan transformations, pointing out that

syntactic categories, functional features

151

psycholinguistic experiments by Fodor, Bever, and Garrett (1974) ‘tended to support the psychological reality of grammatical structures’, but not ‘the reality of grammatical transformations’ (cf. Bresnan 1978: 2). Since Bresnan considered psychological reality an important goal of grammatical theory, she argued in favour of a lexicalinterpretive model of grammar with no syntactic transformations but with a lexicon enlarged by lexical rules, some of which, for example the active-passive relationship, perform the task of transformations in the Standard Theory. Bresnan’s subsequent cooperation with Ronald M. Kaplan, who had worked on explicit computational models of grammar, especially Augmented Transition Networks (ATN), and who was interested in the computational implementation of natural language, reinforced her critical attitude towards transformations since they cause serious problems for computer programs. Together, Bresnan and Kaplan developed the Wrst model of LFG (Bresnan and Kaplan 1982; Kaplan and Bresnan 1982; Bresnan 1982b), which includes the ideas presented in Bresnan (1978) and integrates them into a coherent system. This system is intended to serve as the grammatical basis of a computationally precise and psychologically real model of human language. A further aspect important to Bresnan is later (2001) given priority, namely the claim that because of the similarity of deep structures and surface structures, the grammatical model of the Standard Theory is incapable of adequately describing typologically diVerent languages such as English and Walpiri and that the goal of developing a universal grammar via deep structure is bound to remain unfulWlled. LFG, therefore, in addition to a surface oriented c(onstituent)-structure, which is the input to phonological rules, assigns to every sentence an independent f(unctional)-structure, which has universal properties and is the input to semantic interpretation. Properties of lexical items and general as well as particular principles relate these two levels. In this process, the representation of syntactic categories, which integrates function features, plays a signiWcant role. This will be shown in sections 6.2 and 6.3 below, which focus on the more recent model of LFG (cf. Bresnan 2001). Unlike Bresnan, Gerald Gazdar, Ewan Klein, GeoVrey Pullum, and Ivan Sag, who together developed GPSG, were not convinced that a theory of grammar must claim psychologically reality. They state:

152


We make no claims, naturally enough, that our grammatical theory is eo ipso a psychological theory. (Gazdar et al. 1985: 5)

and they add: Thus we feel it possible, and arguably proper, for a linguist (qua linguist) to ignore matters of psychology. (ibid.)

Instead, they see the task of a linguist in developing a mathematically precise and fully speciWed theory of grammar. This is accompanied by an interest in computational implementation. Here, Bresnan and Kaplan on the one hand and Gazdar et al. on the other thus pursued similar interests, which Wnally led to an intensiWcation of the development of Computer Linguistics and also to commercial applications of linguistic research. Transformations are an obstacle to such tasks, and therefore they were rejected as being undermotivated (cf. e.g. Gazdar 1981b). The classical tasks of transformations are replaced by other ways of mapping phrase structures onto phrase structures. The approach thus postulates that structures are in principle context free. The grammatical model that Gazdar et al. developed diVers fundamentally from LFG – as well as from the PPT – in that only a single level of representation is analysed. There is neither a distinction between deep and surface structure, nor a distinction between c-structure and f-structure. Nor are there rules of interpretation. The only level of representation is similar to the surface structures of the PPT, yet – following Montague Grammar – conceived in such a way that the syntactic analyses are associated with semantic analyses and thus contain enough information to be mapped onto their denotations in a model (cf. Gazdar et al. 1985: 8 V.). In the 1980s, the ‘contextfreeness’ of GPSG turned out to be a signiWcant problem since it was shown that the theory’s generative capacity was too weak for natural systems (cf. Huybregts 1984; Shieber 1985). The development of the approach was therefore not based on its phrase-structure grammatical backbone, which had to be given up, but on its carefully constructed theory of syntactic features and feature structures, which describe syntactic categories as complex, internally structured units. This kind of description was taken over by the successor model, HPSG (cf. Pollard and Sag 1987), which oVers a


153

uniWcation-based mechanism for the processing of attribute-value matrices, whose enormous Xexibility overcomes the limitations of GPSG. What was taken over in addition was the concentration on a single level of representation whose construction, however, diVered from that of GPSG – not least as a result of the inXuence of the PPT and LFG. The representation of the semantic analysis diVered as well, and was inXuenced by the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983). This chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 outlines the essential properties of LFG, concentrating on the 2001 version, although occasionally reference is made to the 1982 model. Section 6.3 is dedicated to a presentation and evaluation of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in the 2001 version of LFG. Section 6.4 outlines the essential properties of HPSG and section 6.5 is concerned with the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in this context. The discussion here mostly follows the approach of Sag, Wasow, and Bender (2003), which is based on Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994), yet somewhat modiWed and often more speciWc in details. Section 6.6 provides a concluding evaluation of the descriptions of syntactic categories in these two approaches, including a comparison with those presented in preceding chapters. 6.2 A lexical-functional approach to language

6.2.1 Considering language universal and language particular needs According to Bresnan (2001: 5), a signiWcant motivation for the development of LFG was the realization that a theory of grammar which describes sentence structures on the basis of phrase-structure rules and transformational rules is not capable of doing justice to the universal properties of languages on the one hand and to their very diVerent individual properties on the other. She claimed in particular that it was impossible to describe the similarities and the diVerences between conWgurational languages such as English and nonconWgurational languages such as Walpiri. LFG attempts to solve this problem by assuming that languages diVer only with respect to their surface structures but have a great deal in common at a diVerent syntactic level, the level of f-structure. This level is deWned as intermediary between semantic predicate-argument structures (‘a-structures’),

154


which are part of lexical entries and represent semantic predicates and their arguments, including the latter’s speciWcations for thematic roles, and c-structures, which represent surface-oriented phrase structures. F-structures provide the input to the semantic interpretation of sentences, whereas c-structures provide the input to their phonetic interpretation. Both are regarded as parallel but not isomorphic syntactic structures. Whereas c-structures are deWned in terms of syntactic categories, terminal strings, and the relations of dominance and precedence, f-structures are composed of names of grammatical functions, such as SUBJ(ect) or OBJ(ect), for example, of semantic forms such as ‘dog’, and of symbols of inXectional markers such as NUM(ber) or CASE. Since c-structures represent the only constituent structure, transformational rules which map deep structures onto surface structures are not needed. The active-passive relationship as well as locative alternations and similar complement variations are described by means of lexical rules. In order to illustrate her assumption that sentences of languages which share the same predicate-argument structure ought to be analysed as having identical f-structures but diVerent c-structures, Bresnan provides the following example (2001: 5 V.):

(1)

a.

S qp NP eo 6 Aux VP g ei the two small children are V NP g 5 chasing that dog S

b.

NP 6

Aux g

V g

wita-jarra-rlu small-DUAL-ERG

ka-pala pres-3duSUBJ

wajili-pi-nyi chase-NPAST

NP NP NP 6 6 6 yalumpu that.ABS

kurdu-jarra-rlu child-DUAL-ERG

maliki dog.ABS

(1a) shows the conWgurational c-structure of the English sentence The two small children are chasing that dog and (1b) shows the Xat nonconWgurational structure of the corresponding Walpiri sentence.


155

The function of f-structure as a mediator between c-structure and a-structure is demonstrated in (2):

(2)

a. English:

〈

chase

agent

patient

SUBJ

OBJ

PRED

〉

S ep NP ep 4 Aux VP ... ei V NP 4 ... b. Walpiri: chase

〈

PRED

agent

patient

SUBJ

OBJ

〉

S

NP 6 ...-erg

Aux

V

NP NP NP 6 6 6 ...-abs ...-erg ...-abs

(2a) shows that in English, f-structure units are associated with structurally deWned categories (SUBJ in the case of the NP immediately dominated by S and OBJ in the case of the NP immediately dominated by VP). In Walpiri they are associated with categories speciWed for particular cases (SUBJ in the case of the NP speciWed as ERG and OBJ in the case of the NP speciWed as ABS).

6.2.2 On generating annotated c-structures The architecture of LFG is initially described by Bresnan (2001: 43 V.), where c-structures are generated by context-free phrase-structure rules which in conWgurational, but not in nonconfigurational languages,

156


are subject to the conditions of X-bar theory (cf. 2001: 44 f.; 1982b: 296 V.).1 Phrase-structure rules are augmented by speciWcations for grammatical functions, called ‘f-descriptions’ (Kaplan and Bresnan 1982: 182) or ‘functional schemata’ (Bresnan 2001: 54). (3) provides an example of phrase-structure rules that are thus augmented: ! NP VP ("sub)¼# "¼# b. NP ! DET N c. VP ! V NP NP ("obj)¼# ("obj2)¼#

(3) a. S

(Kaplan and Bresnan 1982: 184; cf. also Bresnan 2001: 53 f.) The functional schemata deWne the relationship between c-structure and f-structure in that they gain f-structures assigned to mother nodes from the uniWcation of the f-structures of daughter nodes, observing the annotated conditions. In (3a), the f-structure assigned to S is the result of the f-structures assigned to NP and VP, with the f-structure of NP being integrated as a partial f-structure into the f-structure of S and the fstructure of VP being taken over by S completely and without conditions. Thus, the annotated conditions yield an identiWcation of phrasestructure conWgurations and grammatical functions. With respect to the 1982 model, Bresnan pointed out that functional schemata (alias ‘f-descriptions’) were assigned to c-structure conWgurations on the basis of the syntactic-category membership of these conWgurations and the positions of maximal projections in immediately dominating phrases in conWgurational languages – whereby grammatical functions were assigned to maximal projections only – and that they were assigned to unordered maximal or submaximal constituents on the basis of case speciWcations in nonconWgurational languages (cf. 1982b: 296 V.). Since, however, for both kinds of language the sets of phrase-structure rules that are given cover only simple examples, the basis for assignment remains rather unclear. This holds at least for those categories and functions which do not correspond to arguments of the lexically speciWed a-structure. 1 In the 1982 model, Bresnan assumed that in conWgurational languages S is an exception in that it is not endocentric. She therefore concluded: ‘S is an exocentric category in all languages’ (1982b: 297). Having borrowed the description of S as the maximal projection of the functional category I from the PPT in Bresnan (2001), it became unnecessary to consider S an exception.


157

The version of LFG presented in the third part of Bresnan (2001: 89 V.) at Wrst sight appears to be clearer. Here rules are replaced by principles, making LFG similar to the PPT in this respect. Accordingly, c-structures are no longer generated by phrase-structure rules but are subject to tree admissibility conditions (cf. ibid. 98 f.). For conWgurational languages, one of these is the Principle of Endocentricity of phrase structures expressed in X-bar theory. Where structures are endocentric, functional schemata are assigned to c-structure conWgurations on the basis of universal principles (in the unmarked case). For the formulation of the principles, Bresnan follows the PPT in distinguishing lexical and functional categories and identiWes the functional categories C, I, and D and their projections. In addition, she classiWes grammatical functions, based on two criteria. The Wrst is whether a function is a subcategorized argument function or not (a-fns vs. non-afns), and the second is whether a function is a grammaticalized discourse function or not (d-fns vs. non-d-fns) (cf. 2001: 97 f.):

(4)

a-fns TOP FOC SUBJ OBJ OBJq OBLq COMPL ADJUNCT

non-a-fns

(5)

non-a-fns

d-fns TOP FOC SUBJ OBJ OBJq OBLq COMPL ADJUNCT non-d-fns

On this basis, Bresnan formulates the following universal principles for the annotation of c-structure conWgurations with functional schemata in conWgurational languages (cf. 2001: 102 f.). The sentences preceding the principles, in each case describe the empirical basis of the particular principle: (6) a. C-structure heads are f-structure heads. ) Annotate a projecting node in a projection of the same kind with "¼#. b. SpeciWers of functional categories are the grammaticalized discourse functions DF. ) Annotate a nonprojecting node in F’’ with ("DF)¼#.

158

syntactic categories c. Complements of functional categories are f-structure coheads. ) Annotate a nonprojecting node in F’ with "¼#. d. Complements of lexical categories are the nondiscourse argument functions CF. ) Annotate a nonprojecting node in L’ with ("CF)¼#. e. Constituents adjoined to phrasal constituents are nonargument functions AF or not annotated. ) Optionally annotate a nonprojecting node and its adjoined-to sister node with (" AF)¼# and "¼#, respectively.

In (6), speciWers, complements, and adjuncts are deWned as ‘nonprojecting nodes’, whereas heads are ‘projecting nodes’. It should be noted that this annotation of c-structure conWgurations follows the general Xbar schema and that nothing is said concerning the categorial identity of the projecting and nonprojecting nodes. Thus, in order to provide the same information as annotated phrase-structure rules, additional information is needed to describe the mapping of particular functions onto particular categories. Bresnan does not say much other than: In English, for example, core arguments [subject and object] have canonical c-structure positions which can be occupied only by NPs/DPs; noncore arguments are generally expressed by other c-structure categories (obliques by PPs, other complements by VPs, APs, or CPs, etc.).

(2001: 96) According to Bresnan, assigning functional schemata to c-structure units in languages whose c-structures are not or are only partially subject to the principle of endocentricity follows a diVerent – or additional – mode. Instead of endocentricity, she identiWes ‘lexocentricity’. Lexocentricity means that information on grammatical functions is lexically located and represented by features on words. Consequently, functional schemata are directly assigned to features for which words are speciWed. If, for example, a word that is inserted into c-structure is speciWed for accusative case, then this feature is annotated with the function ‘object’: ‘(#CASE)¼ACC ) ("OBJ)¼#’ (Bresnan 2001: 110 f.). In LFG, ill-formed c-structures are Wltered out by f-structures and the conditions they are subject to. F-structures are subject to conditions which – similar to the Projection Principle and the Ł-Criterion of the PPT – directly relate to properties of lexical items speciWed in lexical entries. These properties include, among others, a speciWcation


159

for a syntactic category (e.g. N or V), which indicates under which label items may be inserted into a c-structure, and a set of schemata which specify semantic as well as syntactically relevant inherent and subcategorizing properties as attribute-value pairs (e.g. Attribute: ("DEF), Value: þ). Subcategorization properties refer to the subject and to the complements of lexical items and – unlike the Standard Theory – are not speciWed for categories but rather for grammatical functions. Inherent properties are morphosyntactic in nature and it is important that only fully speciWed items can leave the lexicon and enter c-structure. (7) gives examples of lexical entries following Bresnan (2001): (7)

the:

D

("DEF) ¼ þ

girl:

N

("PRED) ¼ ’girl’ ("PERS) ¼ 3 ("NUM) ¼ SG

is:

I

("TENSE) ¼ PRES ("SUBJ) ¼ # (#PERS) ¼ 3 (#NUM) ¼ SG

reading:

V

("PRED) ¼ ’read h("SUBJ) ("OBJ)i’ ("PARTICIPLE) ¼ PRES

a:

D

("DEF) ¼ ("NUM) ¼ SG

book:

N

("PRED) ¼ ’book’ ("PERS) ¼ 3 ("NUM) ¼ SG

Like lexical entries, f-structures consist of attribute-value pairs, attributes being symbols such as SUBJ, PRED, NUM, etc. and values either symbols, semantic forms like ‘girl’, for example, or f-structures. The conditions to which f-structures are subject comprise the Uniqueness Condition, the Completeness Condition, the Coherence Condition, and the Extended Coherence Condition. Whereas the Wrst three formed part of the 1982 model, the last one was added in Bresnan (2001: 63). The Uniqueness Condition requires that every attribute has a unique value. The Completeness Condition requires that every function subcategorized for a PRED in a lexical entry must be present in the f-structure of this PRED. The Coherence Condition requires that no more than the lexically subcategorized functions of a PRED be

160


present in the f-structure of this PRED, and the Extended Coherence Condition requires that nonsubcategorized functions should also be adequately integrated into an f-structure (cf. e.g. Bresnan 1982b: 304; 2001: 47, 63). Since c-structures are mapped onto f-structures, only those c-structures are well-formed whose mapping onto f-structures fulWlls the conditions mentioned. Following Bresnan (2001), (8) provides an example of a (somewhat simpliWed) annotated c-structure into which the lexical items of (7) have been inserted, and (9) represents the corresponding f-structure:

(8)

C-structure IPf1 (↑SUBJ) =↓

↑=↓

DPf2 ei

I' qp

↑=↓

↑=↓

NP g

D

↑=↓

↑=↓

I

VPf3 qp

↑=↓

↑=↓

N

V

(↑OBJ)=↓

DPf4 3 ↑=↓

↑=↓

D

NP g ↑=↓

N g the (↑DEF)= +

(9)

girl

is

(↑PRED)= 'girl' (↑PERS)= 3 (↑NUM)= SG

reading

(↑TENSE)= PRES (↑ PRED)= 'read 〈 (↑ SUBJ) (↑ SUBJ)= ↓ (↑OBJ)〉' (PART)=PRES (↓ PERS)= 3 (↓ NUM)= SG

F-structure 'read 〈f2, f4〉' PRES PRES

PRED PART TENSE

f1f3

SUBJ

f 2:

PRED PERS NUM DEF

'girl' 3 SG +

OBJ

f4:

PRED PERS NUM DEF

'book' 3 SG –

a

book

(↑DEF)= – (↑PRED)= 'book' (↑NUM)= SG (↑PERS)= 3 (↑NUM)= SG


161

The designators f1 to f4 indicate which categorial projections of the c-structure have been matched onto which f-structures. 6.3 Syntactic categories in LFG The above shows that in the model under consideration, as in the Standard Theory (cf. section 4.3), syntactic categories form the interface between lexical items and syntactic structures. Lexical items are speciWed for syntactic categories and c-structures contain preterminal strings specifying positions for syntactic categories which function as placeholders for lexical items with matching categories. A signiWcant diVerence from the Standard Theory is the fact that the c-structures of LFG represent surface structures, not deep structures. As a consequence, the categories identiWed are not claimed to be universal. This is a claim which – as discussed in chapter 4.6 – led to a conXict in the Standard Theory in that the categories introduced had to be universal on the one hand and language particular on the other, since they simultaneously represented deep structure categories and surface structure categories. This problem does not arise in LFG. Here universality is claimed for syntactic functions, instead of syntactic categories, which are exclusively surface categories whose kind and number in principle may vary without limit in particular languages. However, Bresnan’s identiWcation of syntactic categories is limited to the ‘major categories’ N, A, V, and P and their projections identiWed as such in X-bar theory of the PPT, supplemented by the functional categories I, C, and D and their projections for conWgurational languages. Bresnan goes on to claim that other categories need to be identiWed for nonconWgurational languages without, however, giving examples (cf. e.g. Bresnan 2001: 98 V.).2 Since – as shown in 6.2.1 – Bresnan claimed to develop a linguistic theory appropriate for various language types and thus superior to the PPT, more variation was expected.

2 In Bresnan (1982b), the ‘major categories’ N, A, V, and P as well as S and their projections (N , NP, A , AP, V , VP, P , PP, and S ) are identiWed, accompanied by the remark that there are, in addition ‘minor categories of null or degenerate type, including DET and COMP’ (cf. Bresnan 1982b: 295). In this context, Bresnan refers to previous works which mention additional minor categories, namely: Aux (‘includes the English auxiliary verbs’), Q’’ (‘the category of quantiWers, determiners and measure-phrases’), and M (‘the English modal or tense element’) (cf. Bresnan 1977: 269).

162


6.3.1 Functional features and the description of lexical and functional categories For the description of the syntactic categories she identiWes, Bresnan suggests feature representations which, in contrast to her earlier approaches that followed Chomsky’s analysis of N, A, V, and P into combinations of the features [+ N] and [+ V] (cf. 1976: 18 V; 1977: 269 V.), are based on the categorial features [+ predicative] and [+ transitive]: (10) V P N A

‘predicative’

‘transitive’

þ þ

þ þ

verbal pre- or postpositional nominal adjectival (2001: 100)

According to this analysis, items positively speciWed for the feature ‘predicative’ ‘cannot stand alone as arguments but require an external subject of predication’, whereas those negatively speciWed do not. Items positively speciWed for the feature ‘transitive’ ‘may take an object or direct complement function’ whereas those negatively speciWed do not (2001: 120).3 Whereas the features [+ predicative] and [+ transitive] describe the kind of category, the features [0], [1], and [2] describe – following Grimshaw (1991, 1998) – the particular level of projection:

(11)

type:

0 V P N A

1 V' P' N' A'

2 V'' (VP) P'' (PP) N'' (NP) A'' (AP)

Bresnan assumes – again following Grimshaw – that functional categories are speciWed for the same categorial features as the 3 In this context, Bresnan provides the following examples of which (b) and (d) are intended to illustrate that NP and PP need no subject, whereas VP and AP as in (a) and (c) do. However, it is not obvious that the projections highlighted in the examples are in fact arguments, which renders this constraint void (cf. 2001: 121 f.): a. b. c. d.

We are nearing the meadow. eNarness to the meadow is the great virtue of our house. The house was much nearer to the meadow after the tornado. eNar the meadow, we built a house.


163

‘major categories’ to which they are closely related. The two types of categories are distinguished by a feature F, which has the value ø in the case of a ‘major category’ and which describes functional categories according to their hierarchical position, for example I as F1 and C as F2: (12) V0: VP ¼ V’’: I 0: CP ¼ C’’: DP ¼ D’’:

h[þpredicative, þtransitive], 0, øFi h[þpredicative, þtransitive], 2, øFi h[þpredicative, þtransitive], 0, F1i h[þpredicative, þtransitive], 2, F2i h[predicative, transitive], 2, F1i (2001: 100 f.)

The examples show that Bresnan’s identiWcation and description of categories is very much like that of the early PPT4 except that – following JackendoV (1977b; section 5.3.3) – she replaces Chomsky’s categorial features by features that relate to syntactic functions, which play a central role in LFG. However, Bresnan’s categorial features [+ predicative] and [+ transitive] are no less problematic than Chomsky’s [+ N] and [+ V] (cf. section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2). Thus it must be asked, for example, what to do with a feature whose value ‘þ’ is changed to an option by an informal characterization, as is the case with [þtransitive]: ‘may take an object or direct complement function’ (Bresnan 2001: 120). Clearly, this characterization is intended to express the fact that transitive as well as intransitive verbs and prepositions are speciWed for this feature. But specifying intransitive members of V and P as [þtransitive] is not at all convincing. It also is unclear how a grammar handles informal characterization. Similar problems arise for the feature ‘predicative’. To begin with, it seems odd to describe P as [predicative] since small clauses such as The captain wanted the passengers oV the ship show that PPs license subjects. One might speculate therefore that one reason for the negative speciWcation might be the restriction to ‘external’ subjects and the assumption that subjects of small clauses are internal subjects. But, what then are the external subjects of adjectives? Bresnan’s examples suggest that they are subjects in copula sentences with predicatively used adjectives, as in (13): 4 The attribution ‘early’ PPT here means that additional categories later identiWed in the context of the PPT – as shown in chapter 5 – were not considered.

164


(13) John is tall/American. If so, one may wonder why subjects of copula sentences with predicative NPs/DPs or PPs, as in (14) are not analysed as external, specifying also N and P positively for the feature ‘predicative’:5 (14) a. John is an American. b. John is in America. The decisive factor seems to be that – unlike the informal characterization of the feature ‘transitive’ – the informal characterization of the feature ‘predicative’ is that an external subject is ‘required’, not optional. Nouns and prepositions do not require a subject and their predicative use is simply an option. However, this also holds for all those adjectives that can be used either predicatively or attributively. Since it is unlikely that Bresnan intends to exclude these adjectives from the category A as well as all those that can only be used attributively because then these forms could not be inserted into a c-structure, it must be concluded that her speciWcation of A for the feature [þpredicative] accompanied by her particular informal characterization is inadequate. This is also evident from her remark that this category in addition to adjectives includes adverbs: ‘A’ is here to cover the category of adverb as well as adjective, as in Emonds (1976). (cf. 2001: 125, fn40)

It is simply not the case that adverbs ‘require’ a subject. It therefore must be concluded that Bresnan’s categorial feature representations are not appropriate to describe syntactic categories. What is interesting here is that Bresnan (1982b: 294 f.) came to the conclusion that these very same features can be eliminated from her theory altogether because the information they provide ‘can be deWned in terms of the functional primitives subj and obj’ (ibid. 294). Thus, she claimed, it is the [transitive] categories ‘which do not permit ("obj)¼# to be annotated to any symbol within the phrase-structure rules that expand the intransitive category’ (ibid. 301). Since the relevant information is given in a lexical entry, the conclusions concerning the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in the PPT in chapter 5 hold here as well: Despite what Bresnan herself claims, it is not the so-called ‘categorial features’ that describe 5 It is remarkable in this context that Bresnan (cf. 1982b: 295) described the categories P and N more appropriately as [þ/predicative]. Reasons for this change are not given but may be due to the fact that with a positive speciWcation, members of the categories V and P as well as of N and A are described in the same way.


165

syntactic categories in her framework but rather the complex feature representations provided in a lexical entry. It is on this basis that transitive and intransitive verbs, for example, are adequately distinguished: (15) a. handed: V, ("pred) ¼ ‘hand ’ l("tense) ¼ present The category description here corresponds to the feature structures composed of attributes and values with the values of ("PRED) represented by functional selection features, which describe the selection of the subject and where appropriate the selection of objects, as well as by the forms of the predicates. Unlike transitive verbs, intransitive verbs are not speciWed for the selection of an object, hence this category description corrects the description based on the categorial features. Against the background of the 1982 version, it is surprising that Bresnan (2001) again introduces the categorial features [+ predicative] and [+ transitive] for the description of syntactic categories without pointing out that they can be eliminated because they can be derived from the functional features SUBJ and OBJ. A reason for this might be that in 2001 she identiWes the functional categories not considered in 1982 and describes their relationship to particular lexical categories on the basis of these features, as the examples in (12) show. This, however, means the criticism presented above applies to the features of the 2001 model too. These features are no more informative than category names like N and V and only serve as interfaces between lexical entries and c-structure. In this model however, as opposed to what was at least intended in the Standard Theory, insertion into c-structure does not fully determine the syntactic category of a lexical item. It is fully determined only when a c-structure is well-formed. Therefore it is important to know how a well-formed c-structure is determined and, correspondingly, how syntactic categories are determined, identiWed, and Wnally described.

6.3.2 Conditions on c-structures and their impact on the description of syntactic categories In section 6.2 it was shown that ill-formed c-structures are Wltered out by f-structures and the conditions to which they are subject. Thus c-structures, although not generated by phrase-structure rules as in the 1982 model, must nevertheless conform to these since phrase-structure rules

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are interpreted as constraints on possible tree structures or as tree admissibility conditions (cf. Bresnan 2001: 51, 99). Since c-structures represent the language-particular part of the description of sentences, such phrase structures apparently must be formulated separately for each language, as some examples provided by Bresnan suggest (e.g. for Japanese, cf. ibid. 377 f.; for Spanish, ibid. 394; for German, ibid. 402). In addition, cstructures of conWgurational languages are subject to the condition of endocentricity as expressed by the X-bar schema. Well-formed combinations of projections of lexical and functional categories are determined by matching categorial features in connection with the features øF, F1, and F2. What is important in this context is that in LFG only morphologically complete words may be inserted into c-structure, this being determined by the Lexical Integrity Principle (cf. e.g. 2001: 92). LFG, unlike the PPTor the MP, thus does not permit functional categories to be instantiated by phonetically realized aYxes or by phonetically empty features in c-structure. It is therefore not possible in this framework to specify C for the feature [þWh] without realizing it as if, for example, or to specify I for features like [TENSE: PRES], [PERS: 3], and [NUM: SG] and to realize it as the aYx -s. Instantiations like these are not permitted because there are no transformations in LFG. Thus, for example, there is no verb movement which – as in the PPTor the MP – moves a verb from V to I either to pick up its inXectional aYx or to have its inXectional features checked. With respect to I, C, and D, Bresnan accordingly claims that in English they represent the category of temporal/aspectual Wnite auxiliaries and modals, of complementizers and of determiners, demonstratives, and pronouns, respectively. With respect to diVerences between languages, she only remarks that D is not realized in all languages and that in Russian I is the category of all Wnite verbs and V the category of inWnitives, whereas in English Vrepresents all verbs except Wnite auxiliaries and modals (cf. 2001: 99, 100). Finally, the well-formedness of c-structures is determined by conditions on f-structures, namely the conditions of Uniqueness, Completeness, Cohesion, and Extended Cohesion presented in section 6.2.3. Therefore, as in the PPT, syntactic categories are in principle determined by lexically represented sets of features – or feature structures, in this case – and their interaction with the well-formedness conditions for c-structures. How syntactic categories are ultimately identiWed and described in this model, however, remains largely unclear, because Bresnan does not say much concerning those well-formedness conditions for c-structures that are relevant for syntactic categories. C-structures are language-particular surface structures. For the identiWcation


167

and description of syntactic categories it is therefore vital to know which phrase-structure rules form tree admissibility conditions for particular languages and which categories – in addition to N, V, A, P, I, C, or D or their projections – they introduce and where they introduce them. Bresnan gives no information on this point. Since lexical entries do not describe selectional properties as syntactic categories but rather as grammatical functions, it is also vital for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories to specify which particular functions are mapped onto which particular syntactic categories in which particular language. Bresnan provides little information on this matter, even though such information is needed in order to construct c-structures as language-particular surface structures. It is therefore debatable whether it was a wise decision to refrain from specifying categorial contextual properties in lexical entries, since it is their very nature to list language-particular and idiosyncratic properties. Finally it must be stated that the ban on transformations in LFG has syntactic consequences that are rather problematic. In the PPT and the MP inXected verbs are subject to verb movement from V to I, for example, either to pick up an inXectional aYx or to have their inXectional features checked. Such head movement is not permitted in LFG. Alternatively, Bresnan proposes variable head positioning (2001: 126), which means that, depending on their inXectional properties verbs can be inserted either under V, under I, or under C. Theoretically, she justiWes this by interpreting lexical and related functional heads as ‘coheads’. Technically, this is made possible by specifying inXected verbs in those languages in which they would be subject to verb movement in the PPT not as V but as I or C in the lexicon. Hence the non-Wnite form of a verb is lexically categorized as Vand its Wnite form as I or C.6 Bresnan’s examples include the following Welsh ones: (16) a. weld: V ("pred) ¼ ‘see ’ b. gwelodd: I ("pred) ¼ ‘see ’ ("tense) ¼ past ("subj) ¼ # (#pers) ¼ 3 (#num) ¼ sg (ibid. 128 f.) 6 Using German as an example, Bresnan shows that even the same inXected verb form – in this case kaufte – could be both, a member of the category I (dass aKrl das Buch kaufte , cf. 2001: 403) and a member of the category C (K arl kaufte das Buch , ibid. 405).

168


Ignoring the description using the category names V and I, which arouse diVerent expectations, Bresnan’s assignment of Wnite and non-Wnite verbs to distinct syntactic categories in cases like this one corresponds to facts also described in the PPTand the MP, though by diVerent means. What is unusual, then, is not the identiWcation of distinct categories, but their description which shows that functional categories in LFG have a status that diVers from their status in the PPT and the MP. In addition, due to the Lexical Integrity Principle, which prohibits empty categories, the description of inXected verbs as realizations of I or C yields c-structures that do not conform to the X-bar schema and thus do not satisfy the Condition of Endocentricity. This is illustrated by the c-structure of the German sentence aKrl kaufte das Buch provided by Bresnan:7

(17)

CP wo

(

TOP )

NP g N g

C' ei C g kaufte

IP g VP g

Karl

(

OBJ )

DP 3

D g das

NP g N g Buch

(2001: 405) (17), which contains ‘headless’ maximal projections in which a DP syntactically represents a VP and an IP, is well-formed in Bresnan’s system. This is possible because C and I are ‘coheads’ of V and because the empty heads of IP and VP, in accordance with a speciWc economy principle 7 The annotation of grammatical functions was deliberately left out here in order to focus on c-structure.


169

(Economy of Expression; cf. 2001: 91), are not represented. The interpretation of ‘coheads’ relates to the fact that in f-structure coheads are mapped onto the same function, which can be seen in the presentations in (8) and (9) above (f1f3: f1¼IP, f3¼VP). This shows that c-structures are wellformed if the corresponding f-structures are well-formed. For conWgurational languages like German, however, this creates a conXict between the X-bar-related purely syntactic well-formedness conditions for c-structures and those mediated by f-structures. In (17) this leads to the situation that the constituent das Buch (indirectly) represents a VP, a categorization which is deWnitely problematic. It must be asked, therefore, to what extent principles like the X-bar schema can be modiWed and still serve as restrictions on the syntactic structures of sentences in conWgurational languages. The example also shows that c-structures are not independent of f-structures, contrary to what Bresnan claims (cf. e.g. ibid. 90). Summarizing, it should be noted that in LFG the feature-based descriptions of syntactic categories presented by Bresnan de facto do not describe syntactic categories. In this model – in principle similar to the PPT – syntactic categories are determined by the interaction of lexically speciWed sets of features with well-formedness conditions on cstructures which – and this is diVerent from the PPT – include wellformedness conditions on f-structures. Since well-formedness conditions on c-structures which are concerned with the identity of syntactic categories are of little interest in LFG, with the result that not much is said about them, many questions concerning the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories remain unanswered. And some solutions, as shown above, are problematic. As far as feature representations in lexical entries are concerned, it is important to note that Bresnan suggests feature structures consisting of attribute-value pairs, which allows for a strict organization of lexical information. This kind of organization of lexical information is also applied – and developed further by integrating additional information – in HPSG, which will be the topic of the following sections. It will be shown that the problems described above concerning the mapping of lexically speciWed functional selection properties onto syntactic categories are solved in this model by employing feature structures that include additional and to a certain extent diVerent information. 6.4 HPSG as a system of signs In their Wrst joint monograph on HPSG, Pollard and Sag (1987) state that their goal is to establish a theory of language as follows:

170


we will try to introduce and develop an information-based approach to the study of natural language syntax and semantics, an approach that considers the objects that make up a human language as bearers of information within the community of people who know how to use them. (ibid. 1)

The idea that linguistic objects convey information is thus linked to the goal of developing a theory of language which takes an integrative perspective on syntax and semantics rather than treating them as two distinct domains, such as c-structure and f-structure in LFG, which are separate to begin with and are then mapped onto each other on the basis of principles. To illustrate their approach, Pollard and Sag refer to de Saussure’s (1916) view of language as a system of signs in which the signiWer (signiWant), i.e. the linguistic form, and the signiWed (signiWe´), i.e. the meaning, are intimately related. However, they deviate from de Saussure in that they interpret the signiWed as neither a mental object nor as a real one – although they do consider the latter possibility. Instead they opt for a neutral position between mentalism and realism by interpreting the signiWed as ‘information’ (cf. 1987: 2 V.). Nevertheless, the concept of the sign as an integrating element remains unchanged and is a central aspect, in particular in their 1994 book: The principle type of object with which our theory is concerned . . . is the sign. (ibid. 15 V., 31)

According to this view, linguistic objects – words, phrases, and sentences – are signs of varying complexity. They are divided into two disjoint types, words as lexical signs on the one hand, and phrases and sentences as phrasal and thus complex signs on the other. Both types are represented in the same way, that is, as highly articulated feature structures which are composed of attributes and values. Each sign has at least the two attributes PHONOLOGY (PHON) and SYNTAXSEMANTICS (SYNSEM), which reXects the integrative nature of signs. The well-formedness of signs is determined by the interaction of features and constraints. Some constraints are formulated in the lexicon, where they determine the well-formedness of the feature structures of words, and some are formulated in the syntax, as grammatical principles and schemata or rules,8 where they determine the 8 While Pollard and Sag (1994) speak of ‘schemata’, the same constraints are called ‘rules’ by Sag et al. (2003).


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well-formedness of phrases and sentences. The grammatical principles and rules rely crucially on the complex lexical information encoded in the feature structures of words. The feature structures of words are generated in the lexicon. In the following, the composition of this central form of representation within this approach to grammar will be shown by giving examples of feature structures of words, including an illustration of how these are generated in the lexicon and of how the principles and rules of the grammar construct phrases and sentences on the basis of such feature structures. This will also show how the lexicon is organized and what information it contains, what principles and rules constitute the grammar, and how these construct well-formed phrases and sentences by interacting with the feature structures of words. Thus, an insight into the architecture of an HPSG will be provided, in order to then show how syntactic categories are determined and described within this context. As regards details, the following discussion broadly follows the version of HPSG developed in Sag et al. (2003), which is based on Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994), but which is more detailed and further developed in particular with regard to the lexicon.

6.4.1 Feature structures A Wrst example to be considered here is the feature structure of ‘wrote’ in (18): (18)

word verb HEAD AGR

1

plural PER 3rd NUM pl

FORM fin SYN VAL

á wrote,

ARG-ST á

SEM

SPR á 2 ñ COMPS á 3 ñ MOD á ñ

2 NPi CASE nom 1 AGR

MODE prop INDEXsi RELN RESTR á WRITE WRITER WRITTEN

,

3 NPj CASE acc

write si i j

ñ

ñ

ñ

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To begin with, (18) is a list of two units: the phonological representation, which in this case is ‘wrote’ – thus representing the value of PHON – and the feature structure of type word, which is here speciWed separately for the two attributes SYN and SEM as well as for the attribute ARG (UMENT)-ST(RUCTURE). SYN speciWes the syntactic properties of ‘wrote’, having as its value the concatenation of HEAD and VAL (ENCE),9 while SEM speciWes the semantic properties, its value being the concatenation of MODE, INDEX, and RESTR(ICTION). ARG-ST, which did not form part of the descriptions in Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994), describes the argument structure of ‘wrote’ and has as its value a list with two syntactically and morphosyntactically speciWed elements. Via the subscripts of the arguments, in this case ‘i’ and ‘j’, and the corresponding values of the semantic attributes, syntactic and semantic properties are mapped onto each other within the feature structure, with the argument structure thus serving as a mediator. The syntactic attribute HEAD indicates that ‘wrote’ has the property of a head, which can be understood in the sense of X-bar theory (cf. chapter 5.3). HEAD is assigned type verb as its value, i.e. a type which, ‘for the sake of familiarity’ (Pollard and Sag 1994: 22), is classiWed as a subtype of the type labelled part-of-speech (pos). In the case of ‘wrote’ type verb is speciWed for the features AGR and FORM. As an attribute, AGR has tag 1 as its value, which indicates structural identity with a value speciWed for the same tag, i.e. the value of AGR of NPi, the Wrst argument of ARG-ST. In addition, the value of AGR is speciWed as type plural which, in turn, comprises the attributes PER(SON), whose value is ‘3rd’, and NUM (BER), whose value is ‘pl(ural)’. FORM, which serves to distinguish word forms with diVerent inXectional speciWcations, has the value ‘Wn (ite)’. What is not represented in (18) is the fact that this value has to be given a semantic speciWcation, such as ‘temporally precedes’ (e.g. Pollard and Sag 1987: 191, fn2). The value of the attribute VAL is the concatenation of the attributes SPECIFIER (SPR), COMPLEMENTS (COMPS), and MOD(IFIER), all of which have a list as their value. The value of SPR is a list with one element, here represented as tag 2 , thus indicating structural identity between this value and a 9 VALENCE replaces the feature SUBCAT(EGORIZATION) employed in Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994, ch. 1–8). This feature was Wrst introduced in Pollard and Sag (1994, ch. 9) and described via the values SUBJECT, SPECIFIER, and COMPLEMENTS. Sag et al. (2003), which the present discussion broadly follows, dispense with describing SUBJECT as a separate attribute and subsume the items in question under SPECIFIER, as will be shown below.


173

value of the same tag, i.e. the Wrst argument of ARG-ST. Therefore the value of SPR is uniWed with the Wrst argument of ARG-ST. This argument is given in an abbreviated form as NPi, with NPi representing the feature structure of a phrase whose head is of type noun. NPi is speciWed for the features CASE and AGR, with CASE having ‘nom (inative)’, and AGR tag 1 as their respective values. Tag 1 is identical to the value of AGR of verb, which means that these two values are structurally identical and therefore uniWed. Additionally, taking into consideration the subscript ‘i’ of NP, which assigns the semantic attribute WRITER to this NP, since WRITER is speciWed for the value ‘i’, it can be concluded that SPR here corresponds to the grammatical function of ‘subject’, and that AGR describes the agreement properties of subject and verb. However, this does not mean that SPR always corresponds to the subject function. As will be shown below, SPR describes a position which can be occupied by diVerent kinds of items with diVerent kinds of functions. The value of the attribute COMPS in (18) is also a list with only one element, represented as tag 3 , thus characterizing the fact that this value is uniWed with the second argument of ARG-ST, i.e. NPj. Also an abbreviation of a phrasal feature structure, NPj is speciWed for the attribute CASE with the value ‘acc(usative)’. The subscript ‘j’ assigns the semantic attribute WRITTEN to this NP. From the description of the NP it can be inferred that this NP represents the only complement of ‘wrote’ having the function of a direct object. The value of COMPS thus expresses the number and type of the complements selected by a head. In contrast to ‘wrote’, therefore, the COMPS value for ‘put’ would be a list with two elements, represented in an abbreviated form as hNP, PPi, and the COMPS value for ‘elapse’ an empty list h i. In (18), the value of the attribute MOD is an empty list, which indicates that ‘wrote’ cannot be a modiWer. For items that can be modiWers, such as those of type adj(ective) or adv(erb), the list is not empty but contains a feature structure for the type of the items that are modiWed. According to Sag et al. (2003: 145), this is hNOMi or hNPi for adj, and hVPi or hSi for adv, the categorial speciWcations representing abbreviations for feature structures. As a lexical property, MOD hXi therefore characterizes which types of heads can modify which other types of heads. Thus, although MOD, like SPR and COMPS, is described as a value of VAL, since it also speciWes with which items the head can combine, there is a diVerence in the manner of combination. The attribute SEM in the feature structure of ‘wrote’ has as its value a concatenation of the attributes MODE, INDEX, and RESTR(ICTION).

174


In general, the value of MODE reXects the semantic mode of a linguistic sign which, according to Sag et al. (cf. 2003: 136), is a value from the set {proposition, question, directive, reference, none}. In (18), the value is speciWed as ‘prop(osition)’, thereby expressing that this feature structure of ‘wrote’ formulates a constraint to the eVect that ‘wrote’ can only be a part of a linguistic sign which expresses a proposition and which in terms of syntax is associated with a non-inverted sentence, e.g. Mary wrote a book. By contrast, the value ‘ques(tion)’ is associated with an inverted sentence, e.g. Is iKm happy? , and the value ‘dir(ective)’ with the form of an imperative, as in Be happy! MODE has the value ‘ref(erence)’ if, for instance, a form is speciWed for type noun and meets the requirements for a referring expression. In the case of expletives such as it and there, however, MODE has the value ‘none’. In (18), the attribute INDEX has the value ‘s1’. Here, ‘s’ stands for ‘situation’, and the subscript refers to a particular situation. In a well-formed sentence including a modiWer of ‘wrote’, the same subscript would also appear in the feature structure of that modiWer to indicate identity of the situation whose modiWcation is expressed. Likewise, if there was, for instance, a pronominal reference to this situation, the same subscript would be part of the feature structure of the pronominal expression. In (18), ‘s1’ in addition appears as the value of WRITE, WRITE being part of the concatenation which describes the value of RESTR. RESTR formulates the conditions which have to be satisWed in order that the expression of a proposition including ‘wrote’ can be true. Similarly, the value of REL(ATIO)N is speciWed as the relation or the predicate ‘write’. The attributes WRITE, WRITER, and WRITTEN with their values ‘s1’, ‘i’, and ‘j’ characterize the fact that the situation must be one of writing (s1), in which an entity (‘i’) participates as the writer, and another entity (‘j’) as what is written. The identity of the values of INDEX and WRITE expresses the fact that in a given sentence ‘wrote’ serves to refer to a particular situation. The identity of the values of WRITER, ‘i’, and WRITTEN, ‘j’ with the subscripts of the NP-arguments of ARG-ST, together with tags 2 and 3 , characterizes the fact that the speciWer of ‘wrote’, i.e. the subject, is assigned the semantic attribute WRITER, and that its complement is assigned the semantic attribute WRITTEN. The above gives an idea of the wealth of information encoded in the feature structure of words within the framework of HPSG. This feature structure describes the syntactic (SYN) and semantic (SEM) properties of inXected word forms as well as the relationship between these properties. The syntactic description identiWes the type of part of


175

speech of the head, represents its inXectional properties, which are thus classiWed as syntactically relevant, and of its selection of a speciWer and a complement. Moreover, the argument structure indicates the type of part of speech to which the heads of the complements and the speciWers belong and it speciWes their inXectional properties. The semantic description includes properties which characterize the linguistic meaning and which state the conditions for the truth value of an expression by formulating constraints which must be satisWed by situations in order that statements with regard to these situations can be true. Indices serve to map the syntactic and semantic properties onto each other in a feature structure.

6.4.2 On deriving feature structures of type word in the lexicon In HPSG, feature structures such as (18) are generated in the lexicon. The point of departure is a lexical entry, a list with two elements, which is generally also called a ‘lexical sequence’. This entry contains only the non-generalizable properties of a lexical item, i.e. the phonological representation on the one hand, and semantic information on the other. The set of these lexical sequences forms the basic lexicon, each of whose items are assigned to a subtype of type lexeme. According to Sag et al., the entry for the base lexeme for ‘wrote’ would be as follows: (19) stv-lxm ARG-ST áXi, Yjñ INDEX

s

áwrite,

ñ SEM

RESTR á

RELN WRITE WRITER WRITTEN

write s ñ i j

(cf. 2003: 285) In (19), stv-lxm characterizes the fact that ‘write’ belongs to the subtype strict-transitive-verb-lexeme, which is a subtype of type transitive-verblexeme (tv-lxm). Lexical sequences are organized in the lexicon according to a type hierarchy and (20) illustrates part of the type hierarchy of lexemes:

176


(20)

lexeme 10 qp infl-lxm ei

const-lxm 2 pn-lxm pron-lxm

cn-lxm verb-lxm 2 9 cntn-lxm massn-lxm siv-lxm piv-lxm tv-lxm 9 stv-lxm dtv-lxm ptv-lxm

(cf. Sag et al. 2003: 237) Each type in such a hierarchy is associated with constraints which express generalizations and which – roughly speaking – are passed down within the hierarchy from top to bottom. This means that each type is associated with constraints which consist of its own type-speciWc constraints and those inherited from its immediate supertype. As is the case with all descriptions in this model, the constraints have the form of feature structures too, which – as (18) and (19) illustrate – are organized as attribute-value pairs, with each attribute being assigned a value. The values can, in turn, be individual attributes, or concatenations of attributes, lists, or atomic units such as ‘sing’ as the value of NUM in (18). The passing down of constraints within a type hierarchy as illustrated in (20) is subject to the Inheritance Constraint: (21) If T2 is a subtype of T1 , then a. every feature speciWed as appropriate for T1 is also appropriate for T2, and b. every constraint associated with T1 aVects all instances of T2. (cf. Sag et al. 2003: 229) Since ‘write’ in (19) is of type stv-lxm, it entails that all features speciWed for tv-lxm are also appropriate for ‘write’, with tv-lxm having, in turn, inherited features from verb-lxm, and so on. Including the inherited features, the origin of which will not be discussed in detail here,11 the feature structure for the lexeme ‘write’ is then as follows: 10 The abbreviations stand for the following terms: inX-lxm:in Xecting lexeme, cn-lxm: common-noun-lexeme, cntn-lxm: count-noun-lexeme, massn-lxm: mass-noun-lexeme, sivlxm:strict-intransitive-verb-lexeme, piv-lxm:prepositional-intransitive-verb-lexeme, tv-lxm: transitive-verb-lexeme, stv-lxm:strict-transitive-verb-lexeme, dtv-lxm:ditransitive-verb-lexeme, ptv-lxm: prepositional-transitive-verb-lexeme, const-lxm: constant-lexeme, pn-lxm: proper-noun-lexeme, and pron-lxm:pronoun-lexeme . 11 Cf. in this context the discussion by Sag et al. (2003: 237–41).


177

(22) stv-lxm HEAD

verb AGR

1

SYN VAL áwrite,

SPR á AGR MOD á ñ

1 ñ

ARG-ST áNPi, NPjñ

ñ

MODE prop INDEX s SEM

RESTR á

RELN WRITE WRITER WRITTEN

write s i j

ñ

Elements of type lexeme, such as the feature structure in (22), are purely lexical elements which do not represent word forms. Word forms are of type word and are derived from lexemes by applying lexical rules of type i(nXectional)-rule. Each lexical rule then consists of two parts, an INPUT and an OUTPUT, which are both represented as feature structures. The diVerence between (22) and (18) is therefore due to the fact that (18) results from an application of various inXectional rules, i.e. the Past-Tense Verb Lexical Rule. This introduces the feature FORM with the value ‘Wn’ for verb together with the feature CASE with the value ‘nom’ of NPi, the Plural Noun Lexical Rule, which in turn introduces the feature AGR of NPi with its values. Via the Case Constraint for English (‘An outranked NP is [CASE acc]’; Sag et al. 2003: 245), the CASE feature is introduced with the value ‘acc’ of NPj. Finally, the Argument-Realization Principle (ARP) is also involved in the derivation of (18). This is formulated as a constraint on type word and ensures that the Wrst argument of the argument structure is structurally identical to SPR and additional arguments are structurally identical to the list of COMPS. This shows that as well as deWning a type hierarchy, as illustrated in (20), the lexicon also includes a basic lexicon which characterizes the speciWc properties of individual lexemes as well as additional lexical sequences which, being generic lexical entries, characterize properties of speciWc types that are passed on to generate the feature structures of

178


words in accordance with the type hierarchy. It also shows that the lexicon contains further constraints (e.g. the Case Constraint) or principles (e.g. the ARP) as well as, Wnally, lexical rules which include not only inXectional rules but also derivational and post-inXectional rules. Consequently, the lexicon is of major importance in HPSG. Many phenomena that are accounted for in the PPT in terms of the interaction between lexical information and the principles of syntax are characterized exclusively on the basis of lexical information in HPSG. These phenomena include the licensing of speciWers, complements, and modiWers and their morphosyntactic properties, the characterization of agreement properties with regard to the subject and the inXected verb, and Case assignment.

6.4.3 Syntactic principles and rules Feature structures of words such as those in (18) are the building blocks from which phrases and sentences are constructed in HPSG by applying the rules and principles of the grammar, which formulate constraints on well-formed structures. The principles include the Head Feature Principle, the Valence Principle, which replaces the former Subcategorization Principle,12 the Semantic Compositionality Principle, and the Semantic Inheritance Principle. The rules, called ‘schemata’ and subordinated to the Immediate Dominance Principle in Pollard and Sag (1994), include the Head-SpeciWer Rule, the Head-Complement Rule, and the HeadModiWer Rule. Taken together, the Head Feature Principle and the Valence Principle have a function that is similar to that of the Projection Principle of the PPT. The Head Feature Principle requires the identity of the HEAD values of a mother node and its daughter node in each phrase. The Valence Principle requires the identity of the VAL features of the mother node, i.e. the values of SPR, COMPS, and MOD, and the corresponding values of the head daughter, unless required otherwise by rule. The Semantic Compositionality Principle requires that in a phrase, the RESTR value of a mother node correspond to the sum of the RESTR values of its daughters, and the Semantic Inheritance Principle requires that the MODE value and the INDEX value of a mother node in a phrase be identical to the corresponding values of the head daughter of this phrase. 12 This suggestion was made by Pollard and Sag (cf. 1994: 348), who propose modiWcations to ‘classical’ HPSG in chapter 9 of this work.


179

The Head-SpeciWer Rule states that a phrase can consist of a (lexical or phrasal) head preceded by its speciWer. Based on feature structures, this rule is represented as follows:

(23)

Head-Specifier Rule phrase

®1

SYN [VAL [SPR á ñ]]

H SYN

SPR

VAL

á1 ñ

COMPS á ñ

(cf. e.g. Sag et al. 2003: 157) Being a phrase-structure rule, (23) describes the structural relationship of speciWer 1 and head H[ . . . ], which together form a phrase, with tag 1 ensuring that the structural speciWer has precisely those properties which correspond to the SPR value of the head. In the case of the example ‘wrote’ in (18), this means that the structural speciWer must have all the properties that characterize NPi. In this case the speciWer has the function of subject. Applied to John as a speciWer and wrote a letter as a phrasal head, (23) yields the following (abbreviated) structural description:

(24)

S

phrase SYN

HEAD VAL

SEM

4 á ñ SPR COMPS á ñ MOD á ñ

[…]

qp NP

VP

phrase

phrase

HEAD

1

SYN

noun AGR 2

3sing PER 3rd NUM sg GEN masc

HEAD 4 VAL

SYN COUNT + VAL

SPR COMPS MOD

SPR á 1

[AGR 2 ñ COMPS á ñ MOD á ñ

SEM […] á ñ á ñ á ñ

6

wrote a letter

SEM [ … ] g N word - - -

J ohn

However, speciWers can also express other functions, for instance that of a determiner, as can be seen from the following example:

(25)

word HEAD

noun AGR 1

SYN

3rd sg

det AGR 1 COUNT + INDEX k

á

SPR VAL

á letter,

3sing PER NUM

ñ ñ

á ñ á ñ

COMPS MOD MODE ref INDEX k SEM RESTR

á

RELN letter INSTANCE k ADDRESSEE m

ñ

(cf. Sag et al. 2003: 185) The value ‘ref’ of MODE characterizes the fact that ‘letter’ is a referring expression, and the value of INDEX, ‘k’, indicates that it is an entity (rather than a situation). The identity of the index values of SPR and SEM in ‘letter’ characterizes the fact that ‘letter’ can only combine with a speciWer to form a speciWer-head phrase that is speciWed for the same index. This ultimately means that speciWer and head refer to the same entity. An example of a determiner which can combine with ‘letter’ is ‘a’, which is characterized by the following feature structure:

(26) word det HEAD SYN á a, VAL

AGR

3sing PER 3rd NUM sg GEND neut

COUNT

+

SPR COMPS MOD

á ñ áNPiñ á ñ

ñ

ARG-ST áNPiñ MODE none INDEX k SEM RESTR á

RELN BV

exist k

ñ

(cf. e.g. Sag et al. 2003: 171)


181

(26) indicates that ‘a’ does not itself refer (MODE none), but that it expresses with regard to the INDEX ‘k’ that there is a bound variable (BV) for which the relation of existence is characterized. A phrase combining ‘a’ and ‘letter’ thus describes the relation ‘exist’ for an instantiation of ‘k’ of ‘letter’. This shows that SPR indeed only describes a structural position. The relation that ultimately holds between a speciWer and a head results from the feature structures of the constituents involved, with the feature structure of the head determining which properties an appropriate speciWer must (at least) have. The Head-Complement Rule states that a phrase can consist of a lexical head H[ . . . ] followed by its complements 1 . . . n :

(27)

Head-Complement Rule phrase SYN [VAL [COMPS á ñ]]

® H

word SYN [VAL [COMPS á 1 , …, n ñ]]

1 … n

(cf. Sag et al. 2003: 158) The rule in (27) shows that the feature structures of the structural complements must be identical to the feature structures of the elements in the list which are described as the value of COMPS in the feature structure of the head of type word. This means, for instance, that a phrase which combines the feature structures of ‘a’ and of ‘letter’ on the basis of the Head-SpeciWer Rule alone does not suYce to be a complement of ‘wrote’. This complement must be speciWed for CASE according to the feature speciWcation of NPj, i.e. for the value ‘acc’ in this case. In order to be inserted as a complement of ‘wrote’, ‘letter’ must therefore be speciWed for ‘CASE acc’ via a lexical rule. Likewise, the phrase ‘a letter’ must be speciWed for ‘CASE acc’ via the Head Feature Principle. Applied to wrote as a lexical head and a letter as its complement, (27) yields the following (abbreviated) structural description:

182


(27)'

VP phrase SYN

HEAD VAL

4 SPR á1ñ COMPS á ñ MOD á ñ

SEM V

qp

word

3 NP

phrase HEAD 4

SYN VAL AGR-ST á 1

SYN

verb AGR 2 FORM fin

SPR COMPS MOD

, 3

noun

6

á1ñ á3ñ á ñ

CASE nom AGR 2

HEAD

a

letter

CASE acc AGR

SEM wrote

The formulations of the Head-SpeciWer Rule and the HeadComplement Rule in (23) and (27) show that a relative order of head and speciWer or of head and complement is given, one which applies to English but can be diVerent in other languages. Linear Precedence Constraints (LPs) account for the relative order in particular languages by specifying the general Constituent Order Principle. They characterize the relative order of heads and speciWers, or complements or modiWers, but they also characterize the relative order among complements, specifying for example, that in English an NP complement always precedes a PP complement. Thus LPs correspond to the parameters of the PPT, such as the head parameter of X-bar theory, which stipulates for English that heads precede their complements, or the adjacency parameter of Case theory, which states for English that NP complements precede PP complements. These examples will suYce to give an idea of how well-formed phrases and ultimately sentences are constructed in HPSG.13 It is clear that the Head Feature Principle, the Valence Principle together 13 The Head-ModiWer Rule, which is mentioned but not presented here, will be discussed in section 6.5.2 in connection with the description of adverbs as modiWers.


183

with the Head-SpeciWer Rule, the Head-Complement Rule, and Wnally, the Head-ModiWer Rule, perform what is eVected in the PPT by the Projection Principle and the Extended Projection Principle as well as X-bar theory (cf. section 5.2.2). Moreover, the interaction of the feature structures for speciWers and complements in the feature structures of heads with the Head-SpeciWer Rule and the Head-Complement Rule serves the same purpose as Ł-theory and Case theory in the PPT. This is because these feature structures are, on the one hand, uniWed with arguments in the argument structure and, on the other hand, speciWed for all morphosyntactic properties including case properties.14 In addition, the Head-ModiWer Rule and the feature MOD interact to account for what is described via the mode of Ł-identiWcation in Higgenbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory (cf. section 5.4.4). Unlike the PPT, however, it is a feature of HPSG that the constraints on phrase structures and sentences formulated in the lexically speciWed feature structures refer to surface structures, since transformations are not provided for in the syntax. Thus, structures which are derived in the PPT by Move Æ are accounted for diVerently here, with the lexicon again playing a pivotal role. Three examples will serve to illustrate this.

6.4.4 Instead of transformations The Wrst example refers to passive constructions with a verbal passive. In the PPT, their S-structure is the result of moving an NP out of the position of an internal argument of a passive participle into the [Spec, I]-position. In HPSG, such passive constructions are accounted for in the lexicon via a lexical derivational rule, which derives a lexeme of type past-participle-lexeme from a lexeme of type transitive-verblexeme, thus altering the order and the feature structures of the elements in the ARG-ST list. The second example illustrates the equivalent of verb raising, which is eVected in the PPT or in the MP by raising the verb from the V position into the I position, with a Wnite verb in I receiving an inXectional aYx or having an inXectional feature checked. Non-Wnite verbs which appear in the context of modals or to are not subject to verb movement but remain in situ. In HPSG, Wnite verbs are speciWed for 14 It must be pointed out, however, that ARG-ST is not identical to argument structures within the framework of the PPT. This will be explained in more detail in section 6.5.1.

184


both inXectional properties and the selection of an appropriate subject via the feature SPR. By means of the Head-SpeciWer Rule, the subject and the Wnite VP combine to form a constituent, with the result that the Wnite verb occupies the position speciWed as I in the PPT, a category that is not found in HPSG. Consequently, verb raising is not required. If V is a modal, its COMPS attribute has as its value a feature structure of type verb speciWed for [FORM base]. Thus, the modal and the nonWnite verb occupy the positions that are speciWed as I and V within the framework of the PPT and the MP. One of the results of this analysis is that the inWnitival marker to, which occupies the same position as a modal verb, is analysed as a subtype of type auxiliary-verb-lexeme in Sag et al. (2003). As a result, apart from its semantic features, it has the same feature structure as can or may.15 These aspects will be reconsidered in section 6.5.2. The third example is concerned with topicalizations, relative constructions, and wh-interrogative constructions, where one constituent seems to have been dislocated. This is illustrated in (28): (28) a. Mary they say John loves _____ b. Mary, who(m) John loves _____ c. Whom does John love _____? The three constructions are examples of long-distance dependencies (LDD). To describe them, two new list-valued features are introduced and integrated into lexical feature structures, namely GAP (called INHERITED in Pollard and Sag (1987, 1994), and also subdivided into ‘SLASH’, ‘REL’, and ‘QUE’) and STOP-GAP (TO-BIND in Pollard and Sag (ibid.), again subdivided into ‘SLASH’, ‘REL’, and ‘QUE’). The feature GAP has a list as its value that contains all the parts that are ‘missing’ in a structure, e.g. in its COMPS-list16 (namely the gaps in the structure); STOP-GAP has a list of Wllers for a gap from GAP as its value. Furthermore, there is an additional principle, the GAP Principle, which deals with the content of the GAP list and its transmission within the structural hierarchy. There is also an additional rule, the

15 The analysis of the inWnitival marker to as an auxiliary verb was given by Pollard and Sag (cf. 1994: 125), who in this respect followed Pullum (1982) and Gazdar et al. (1985). To distinguish to from other auxiliaries, this marker is speciWed by Sag et al. for the head features [FORM base] and [INFþ] (cf. 2003: 383). 16 The ‘missing’ part could also be the subject, for example, and in that case the value of SPR. This is not considered here.


185

Head-Filler Rule,17 which organizes the interaction of GAP and STOPGAP lists, providing a Wller to neutralize a gap from GAP. The STOPGAP lists are empty unless the Head-Filler Rule Wlls them with content, just as GAP lists are empty in gap-free constructions. Thus the structural description of loves in (28a) is:

(29)

word HEAD

verb FORM fin

VAL

SPR á 1 ñ COMPS á ñ MOD á ñ

SYN á loves,

GAP á

2

NPj CASE acc

ñ

ñ

STOP-GAP á ñ

ARG-ST

á1

NPi CASE nom AGR 3sing

, 2ñ

(29) says that the second argument, which, after applying the ARP, would be the only element in the COMPS list, enters the GAP list from this list, and that the STOP-GAP list is empty at word level. Taking the GAP Principle and the Head-Filler Rule into consideration (cf. Sag et al. 2003: 437 f.), the following structure for (28a) – represented here in an extremely abbreviated form without detailing the individual feature structures – is well-formed:

17 A detailed presentation and discussion of these would go too far in this context. The interested reader is therefore referred to Sag et al. (2003: 435 V.).

186

(30)

syntactic categories S [GAP á ñ] qp NP S [GAP á ñ] GAP áNPñ STOP-GAP áNPñ Mary

qp NP VP [GAP áNPñ] [GAP á ñ] qp they V S [GAP á ñ] [GAP áNPñ] qp say NP V(P) [GAP á ñ] [GAP áNPñ] John

loves

(30) shows that the GAP feature originates in the feature structure of ‘loves’ and is passed up to the mother node until the Head-Filler Rule, by interacting with STOP-GAP, causes the Wller to precede the phrase which is speciWed for STOP-GAP, forming a constituent together with this phrase. Relative-clause constructions as in (28b) and whinterrogative constructions as in (28c) are variants of the head-Wller construction and are described in an analogous way. 6.5 Syntactic categories in HPSG

6.5.1 Feature structures and the description of syntactic categories As has been demonstrated above, word forms are provided with feature structures which have a concatenation of the attributes HEAD and VAL as the value of the attribute SYN, as well as a concatenation of GAP and STOP-GAP. VAL has a concatenation of the attributes SPR, COMPS and MOD as its value. With regard to the assignment of word forms to syntactic categories, it can Wrst of all be noted that the attribute HEAD of a given word form has a speciWcation for a part of speech as its value, which means that elements of type word are assigned to a part of speech. In this context, Sag et al. postulate the following types of parts of speech: noun, verb, det, prep, adj, conj, and comp (cf. e.g. 2003: 341). Apart from conj, this corresponds to the types that Pollard and Sag (1994: 22) had already identiWed.


187

However, Pollard and Sag identiWed comp(lementizer) as a subtype of type marker, to which they also assigned ‘certain other ‘‘minor’’ words’ (ibid.). These include too and very, which are analysed as speciWers of adj, or just and right, which in turn are analysed as speciWers of prep (cf. ibid. 358).18 As in the frameworks of the PPT, the MP, and LFG, Pollard and Sag also classify the parts of speech identiWed as two diVerent kinds: substantive (noun, verb, adjective, preposition) and functional (determiner, marker) (cf. ibid. 22). However, Sag et al. (2003) dispense with a corresponding a priori classiWcation, even though such a classiWcation is in fact given, as will be shown below. The speciWcation of elements of type word for speciWc parts of speech should not lead to the assumption that parts of speech are identiWed and described as syntactic categories within this system, since Pollard and Sag adopted the labels of traditional parts of speech merely ‘for the sake of familiarity’ (1994: 22). In fact, the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories is based on the entire, fullyspeciWed feature structure of SYN of each word form and on the interaction of the features or attributes and values with the syntactic rules and principles. Via the value of COMPS, which can be modiWed by GAP, and in connection with the Head-Complement Rule and the Linear Precedence Constraint, it is determined for English that complements immediately follow the head. The order of complements is determined (should the list of COMPS contain more than one element) and also what morphosyntactic properties of these complements must be assumed to ensure a well-formed combination. The HeadComplement Rule in addition says that the complements together with the head form a constituent of type phrase. Via the value of SPR in connection with the Head-SpeciWer Rule and the Linear Precedence Constraint it is determined that a speciWer precedes the head and that it must have certain morphosyntactic properties. After applying the Head-Complement Rule (also in the case of an empty COMPS list), the head is a phrase, having a word form as its head and constituting in its turn a phrase together with the speciWer. Via the value of the attribute HEAD, which speciWes a part of speech such as noun, verb, prep, etc., the morphosyntactic properties of the head are determined. These properties, following the Head Feature Principle, are identical to the morphosyntactic properties of the mother node of the word form, 18 In a later chapter (cf. 1994: 363 V.), Pollard and Sag argue that markers are nonheads. This will be discussed in section 6.5.2.

188


i.e. the phrase that is formed by the Head-Complement Rule. They are also identical to the morphosyntactic properties of the mother node of this phrase, i.e. the phrase which is created as a result of the HeadSpeciWer Rule. Generally speaking, this means that the distribution of a word form is described on the basis of the values of the attributes HEAD, SPR, and COMPS and of the corresponding principles and rules, modiWed where appropriate by a value of GAP, STOP-GAP, by the GAP Principle, and by the Head-Filler Rule. This is achieved in the following way: the values of SPR and COMPS and the corresponding rules determine possible morphosyntactically speciWed immediate environments of a word form, and at the same time its HEAD value together with the Head Feature Principle determine the contexts in which morphosyntactically speciWed phrasal mother nodes of the word form can be inserted as speciWers, complements, or modiWers. If, therefore, diVerent word forms are speciWed for the same values of the attributes HEAD, SPR, and COMPS as well as GAP and STOP-GAP, these have the same distribution, thus forming a syntactic category. Determining which syntactic category a word form belongs to on the basis of the attributes HEAD, SPR, and COMPS is possible because word forms are speciWed for these attributes: the lexeme type represented by a word form determines the part of speech of this word form as its HEAD value. This part of speech, in turn, determines the morphosyntactic properties of the word form, for example, [CASE nom] if the part of speech is noun, [COUNTþ] if the part of speech is det, and [FORM Wn] if the part of speech is verb. In addition, a general lexical entry for type word, which is inherited by all the feature structures of word forms, provides a speciWcation for SPR and COMPS whose value is a list that can be empty. In other words, SPR and COMPS form part of the feature structure of SYN even if a word form does not select any speciWers or complements. It must be pointed out here that the attributes SPR and COMPS and their relationship to ARG-ST cannot be equated with speciWers, complements, and their relationship to argument structures in the PPT. While in the latter theory arguments in the argument structure of a lexical head license speciWers as syntactic external arguments and complements as syntactic internal arguments in its projection on the basis of thematic roles (e.g. gAent , Theme, or Goal), SPR and COMPS indicate purely structural positions. The identical tags of SPR and


189

COMPS and of arguments in ARG-ST merely serve to describe the uniWcation of morphosyntactic properties. It is only by coindexing the arguments with attributes in the feature structure of SEM that a relationship is deWned that is comparable to a thematic role, or a relationship of a diVerent kind, e.g. if SPR is realized by a determiner (cf. section 6.4.3). As a result, there is little point in making an a priori distinction between lexical and functional categories, a distinction which in the PPT is accounted for by, among other things, the fact that elements of lexical categories but not elements of functional categories are speciWed for an argument structure on the basis of which internal and external arguments are licensed. In HPSG, elements of lexical and functional categories are both speciWed for purely syntactic argument structures. The syntactic position of members of functional categories in extended projections of members of lexical categories is described via a speciWcation of the SPR value of the lexical head and of the COMPS value of the functional element. The semantic relation between the lexical head and the functional element is deWned via a corresponding speciWcation of the feature structures of their SEM attributes. In other words, the distinction between the two categorial types is accounted for here too, albeit in a manner diVerent from that found in the PPT.19 Summing up, it can thus be noted that in HPSG syntactic categories are described as fully speciWed feature structures of the attribute SYN and the interaction of these feature structures with syntactic rules and principles, whereby these feature structures are partial structures of the total feature structures of word forms. As shown in section 6.4.2, these feature structures are derived in the lexicon. They are composed of feature structures describing the base lexemes of word forms and those which are inherited on the basis of the type hierarchy of lexemes and other general speciWcations (e.g. the feature structure of type word). They are Wnally the result of additions or other types of modiWcation 19 It must be pointed out, however, that the items identiWed as members of functional categories are not the same in HPSG and in the PPT. Thus in the PPT, modal verbs like may or can are described as instantiations of the functional category I, whereas they are subsumed under type verb in HPSG (see section 6.5.2). This is one but not the only reason why modal verbs provide a good example of the diVerent concepts of argument structure in the PPT and HPSG. Whereas in the PPT modals belong to a functional category and are represented as having no argument structure, Sag et al. (2003: 398 ) include ARG-ST in the feature structure of the modal can, specifying as its value a list of two arguments. The Wrst is structurally identical to the SPR value of the following verb and the second represents this verb itself.

190


brought about by lexical rules. Therefore, and as emphasized above, the fact that the value of the attribute HEAD is speciWed as a type whose label corresponds to the name of a traditional part of speech such as noun, verb, preposition, etc. should not be taken as indicating that parts of speech are identiWed as syntactic categories within this system. As is the case in the PPT, the number of syntactic categories described here is by far larger than the number of parts of speech. Thus, what is decisive for the identiWcation of a syntactic category is the entire feature structure of SYN and not the categorial type of the head. The examples considered in the following section will illustrate this.

6.5.2 Some examples as illustration To begin with, word forms of type verb will be considered. As pointed out above, the derivation starts with a base lexeme which is speciWed for a particular subtype and which subsequently inherits the feature structures of all those types to which it is subordinate in the type hierarchy. Via lexical rules this complex feature structure is then further modiWed. The subtypes for which base lexemes of type verb are speciWed include those listed in (20) to which Sag et al. add further subtypes,20 including the type auxiliary-verb-lexeme (auxv-lxm). Including the latter means that both lexical ‘main verbs’ and auxiliary verbs, which for syntactic reasons also include the inWnitival marker to, are speciWed for the part of speech verb. However, they are distinguished from each other by their feature structures, and are thus described as distinct syntactic categories. A distinction between lexical verbs and auxiliaries is, on the one hand, made on the basis of head features, including [AUX] and [AUXþ], and, on the other hand, on the basis of diVerent COMPS values. DiVerent COMPS values for word forms whose feature structures are derived from non-auxiliary verb lexemes describe these forms initially as distinct syntactic categories. This means that ‘strictly intransitive’ verbs, ‘prepositional intransitive’ verbs, and ‘strictly transitive’ verbs, etc. form distinct syntactic categories on the basis of diVerent COMPS values which require diVerent syntactic environments. Furthermore,

20 These include subject-control-verb-lexeme (scv-lxm), object-control-verb-lexeme (ocvlxm), or subject-raising-verb-lexeme (srv-lxm) (cf. Sag et al. 2003: 367 V.).


191

diVerent COMPS values distinguish word forms of non-auxiliary verbs from those of auxiliaries, as well as diVerent kinds within the class of auxiliary verbs, thus describing them as distinct syntactic categories too. The following examples serve to illustrate this: (31) a. b. c. d. e.

They watched a movie. They may watch a movie. They are watching a movie. They have watched a movie. One movie was watched by all of them.

In (31), the verb watch is speciWed for Wve diVerent values of the head feature ‘FORM’, namely for ‘Wnite’ (‘Wn’) in (31a), for ‘base’ (‘bse’) in (31b), for ‘present participle’ (‘prp’) in (31c), for ‘past participle’ (‘psp’) in (31d), and for ‘passive’ (‘pass’) in (31e). These values have an impact on the morphological properties of the word forms (which, by the way, do not yield a distinction between ‘psp’ and ‘pass’). They also have, above all, an impact on the syntactic properties. As the examples show, independent of its FORM value, watch always selects the same complement, i.e. an NP. This is indicated by the value of COMPS which has been inherited by the diVerent word forms of the lexeme type stv-lxm, to which the base lexeme ‘watch’ is assigned. In addition, the examples illustrate that the auxiliaries in (31b) to (31e) each select a diVerent complement: the modal may in (31b) selects a verb form speciWed for [FORM bse], progressive be in (31c) selects one speciWed for [FORM prp], perfective have in (31d) one speciWed for [FORM psp], and passive be in (31e) one speciWed for [FORM pass]. This is accounted for by a corresponding speciWcation of the COMPS value of the auxiliaries, which as a consequence form four distinct syntactic categories. As this simultaneously implies that diVerent forms of a lexical verb occur in the environment of categorially distinct auxiliaries, diVerent forms of the same verb are described as distinct syntactic categories as well. Hence, the base form of verbs, Wnite verbs, and the present participle, as well as the past participle in the context of perfective have and passive be, each form their own syntactic category. Interestingly, a distinction between ‘past’ and ‘present’ as possible values of ‘Wn’, which has an impact on the morphological realization, is not made here. As this distinction does not have any syntactic consequences, this emphasizes the fact that the feature structure of SYN is a syntactic one, even though the speciWcation refers to morphological properties. What should also be noted is that a description

192


of the syntax of auxiliaries and of non-auxiliary verb forms involves the uniWcation of the SPR value of an auxiliary with the SPR value of the selected verb form, accounting for the fact that the combination of auxiliary and verb form in a clause has a single subject which is semantically interpreted via the verb form’s feature structure of SEM. A similar range of syntactic categories is also identiWed for word forms of type noun. All word forms of type noun have as their HEAD value a concatenation of the features CASE and AGR. In English, CASE has the value ‘nom’ or ‘acc’, with this value being speciWed in the basic lexicon for personal pronouns, e.g. ‘nom’ in the case of he and ‘acc’ in the case of him, and by lexical rules in other cases. Since in English, the SPR value of verbs is speciWed in its feature structure for the attribute CASE with the value ‘nom’, whereas the COMPS value contains the CASE value ‘acc’ if speciWed for type noun, this means that word forms of type noun are permitted either as heads of speciWers or as heads of complements, depending on their CASE value. Thus they occupy diVerent syntactic positions and are therefore described as distinct syntactic categories. Similarly, the value of AGR is a concatenation of PER(SON) and NUM(BER). If PER has the value ‘3rd’ and NUM the value ‘sg’ in the feature structure of a word form of type noun, a noun thus speciWed is licensed as the speciWer of a verb only if the SPR value of the verb contains type 3sing as the value for AGR. In this way, such a word form is syntactically distinguished from others which, for instance, have the value ‘1st’ or ‘2nd’ for PER and the value ‘sg’ for NUM, or the value ‘3rd’ for PER and the value ‘plu’ for NUM. These are licensed as speciWers of a verb if the SPR value of the verb in question contains type non-3sing as the value for AGR. As far as this speciWcation is concerned, these various word forms are thus each assigned to a diVerent syntactic category in English. As has been shown, word forms of type noun are identiWed as speciWc syntactic categories via the values of their head features CASE and AGR, which constrain their potential for co-occurring with word forms of type verb in a sentence and their position relative to such word forms. This categorization applies to all lexemes of type noun in the same way. An additional syntactic distinction between the lexeme types is made on the basis of the values of their SPR and COMPS features. Word forms that are derived from the lexeme types pn-lxm and pron-lxm, i.e. proper nouns and pronouns, are distinguished from those derived from the lexeme types cntn-lxm and


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massn-lxm, i.e. count nouns and mass nouns, by the fact that their SPR and COMPS values are an empty list. This indicates that they select neither speciWers nor complements. However, a cntn-lxm can be derived from a pn-lxm by means of a lexical rule, with the result that a proper noun then has the feature structure of a count noun, accounting for uses such as in the Jane with whom I went to school. Count nouns are distinguished from proper nouns by the fact that their SPR value is speciWed for a word form of type det(erminer), which is, in turn, speciWed as ‘þ’ for the feature ‘COUNT’. The value of this feature distinguishes count nouns from mass nouns, whose SPR value is speciWed as ‘’. Consequently, count nouns combine only with word forms of type det that are speciWed as [COUNTþ], and mass nouns only with those that are speciWed as [COUNT]. Hence, at least two syntactic categories are identiWed for word forms of type det: one that is speciWed as [COUNTþ] and one speciWed as [COUNT]. The base lexemes of count nouns and mass nouns both have an empty list as the default value of COMPS, but unlike pronouns and proper nouns this value can be overridden by idiosyncratic properties or by the application of derivational lexical rules. Thus, for example, for the word form picture in a picture of the city, or the word form exploration in an exploration of the possibilities, this list contains the feature structure of a PP whose FORM value is speciWed as ‘of ’. The examples show that for word forms of type noun too, each modiWcation of a value in the feature structure of the SYN attribute results in a diVerent syntactic category. DiVerences in the feature structures can be traced back to diVerences which either already distinguish base lexeme types from each other or which are the result of diVerent lexical rules. Syntactic diVerences between word forms of type preposition and adjective, however, are exclusively based on diVerent types of base lexemes. In these cases the base lexemes are classiWed as constant-lexemes for English, meaning that inXectional rules do not bring about any changes to the feature structures. As lexeme types, prepositions are distinguished as predicational-preposition-lexemes (predp-lxm) and as argument-marking-preposition-lexemes (argmkplxm). These two types diVer with respect to their argument structure, with that of the Wrst type containing two arguments whereas the argument structure of the second type has only one. Furthermore, for prepositions that originate from the lexeme type predp-lxm, the value of the attribute VAL includes a non-empty MOD list which

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contains a variable ‘Y’, thus accounting for the fact that projections of this preposition can be licensed as modiWers of various categories, e.g. NP or VP. The two types are illustrated by prepositions in contexts such as (32a) and (32b): (32) a. The fence around the house was damaged. b. He talks to himself. Sag et al. describe the two arguments in the argument structure of predicative prepositions and the single argument in the argument structure of argument-marking prepositions as NP (cf. 2003: 277). From this it can be inferred that the approach is based on the traditional concept of prepositions, according to which prepositions always select an NP complement. As a result, traditional adverbs such as yesterday or before and traditional subordinating conjunctions like while or before are not described as intransitive prepositions or as prepositions with sentential complements here, as is done for syntactic reasons within the framework of the PPT. However, apart from analysing yesterday as an adverb (cf. Sag et al. 2003: 145), there are no explicit references to this eVect. Rather like verbs, adjectives are described as diVerent syntactic categories based on their COMPS values. Possible COMPS values include an empty list (e.g. tall), a list with the feature structure of a PP (e.g. fond of), or one with the feature structure of a complementizer which in its turn has as its COMPS value the feature structure of a sentence (e.g. obvious that). Adjectives are also distinguished especially by the value of a feature PRED, which accounts for predicative and non-predicative forms. Thus, forms such as ablaze, ajar, asleep, fond, etc. are speciWed as [PREDþ], and forms like mere, utter, former, etc. as [PRED], whereas forms such as red, tall, nice, etc. allow both options [PREDþ] or [PRED]. Adjectival forms with the speciWcation [PREDþ] are licensed as the complement of word forms, e.g. of be, which have as their COMPS value the feature structure of a constituent whose head is speciWed for the feature [PREDþ]. Adjectival forms with the speciWcation [PRED] are not licensed as the complement of such word forms. Little is said about the syntactic categorization of traditional adverbs (e.g. Pollard and Sag 1987, 1994; Sag et al. 2003). They are not identiWed as a type or included in the lists of parts of speech presented by Pollard and Sag or Sag et al. (see section 6.5.1). They are


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merely described as units that can be used as modiWers of a constituent whose head is a word form of type verb. This is represented in the feature structure of adverbs via the value of the attribute MOD, a list with one element which is speciWed either as a feature structure of VP ([MOD hVPi]) or of S ([MOD hSi]). The interaction of this attribute with the Head-ModiWer Rule then determines the possible position and thus the syntactic category of an adverb. However, this rule only covers a subset of the possible positions of adverbs, as is shown in (33):

(33) Head-Modifier Rule [phrase] ® H 1 [COMPS

á ñ]

COMPS MOD

á ñ á1ñ

(cf. Sag et al. 2003: 280) This rule states that a well-formed phrase consists of a lexical or a phrasal head which is followed by a compatible modiWer. In the case of the adverb today, for instance, [MOD h 1 i] is speciWed as [MOD hVPi], with VP in turn being speciWed for [INDEX s1] (cf. e.g. Sag et al. 2003: 147). The speciWcation of MOD together with the Head-ModiWer Rule determines that the ADV-position in (34) is an appropriate position for today:

(34)

VP qp 1 VP

ADV

5

[MOD á 1 ñ]

saw her

g today

It is clear that not all the items traditionally classiWed as adverbs can occupy this position and that this description covers only a subset (see especially sections 5.4 and 5.5 on how adverbs have been described). In view of the fact that the same general rule is also responsible for the positioning of adjectives as modiWers, with h 1 i representing the feature structure of a nominal head, it is immediately obvious that what is then described is only the postnominal position of adjectives, as in a student unaware of the regulations, but not their prenominal position, as in an intelligent student. Thus, the description

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of both adverbs and adjectives in HPSG leaves many questions unanswered.

6.6 Feature structures and syntactic categories in LFG and HPSG The preceding sections presented the essential aspects of LFG and HPSG relevant for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in these approaches. Although feature structures are employed for the description of syntactic categories in both approaches, the result is rather diVerent. This is discussed in the following. The remarks on LFG focused on the modiWed version given in Bresnan (2001). Major changes when compared with the original 1982 version are clearly due to the inXuence of the PPT, as can be seen from the introduction of principles for the annotation of c-structures (cf. section 6.2.2), for example, and from the adoption of the X-bar schema for the identiWcation and description of lexical and functional categories (cf. section 6.3.1). However, this inXuence leads to inconsistencies, in particular for the description of syntactic categories. According to the 1982 model, c-structures are generated via phrasestructure rules which are then annotated with syntactic functions. Apart from a speciWcation of their category membership such as N, V, A, etc., which serves as an interface to the terminal categories in c-structure, lexical entries do not contain any categorial speciWcation. Contextual properties are described not on the basis of syntactic categories but rather on the basis of syntactic functions. In principle, the appropriate insertion of lexical items into c-structures is nevertheless possible since c-structure nodes are annotated with syntactic functions with the result that contextual properties of lexical items can be checked with contextual properties of the interface positions in c-structures. Problems related to this procedure will not be considered here in detail.21 It must be emphasized, however, that it remains 21 In general, it can be pointed out here that the formulation of phrase-structure rules requires an a priori deWnition of a set of syntactic categories for which lexical items are also speciWed so that lexical insertion can take place. Since the c-structures of LFG are intended to represent surface structures, which according to Bresnan can be diVerent for each language, this implies that it must be deWned in advance for each language what syntactic categories are required. Only afterwards can a position be assigned to each of its lexical items.


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completely unclear how c-structures are constructed in the 2001 model. Initially it is suggested that, as in the 1982 model, they are generated by context-free phrase-structure rules. Then this is relativized by pointing out that phrase-structure rules do not generate structures but rather formulate ‘tree admissibility conditions’ (e.g. 2001: 51). Finally, borrowing the X-bar schema from the X-bar theory of the PPT and describing the organization of c-structures of (conWgurational) languages as endocentric, the concept of a ‘schema’ is suddenly introduced: Recall . . . that we are interpreting our c-structure schemata as tree admissibility conditions (constraints on possible tree structures), rather than as rules for rewriting, generating, or ‘projecting’ structures.

(ibid. 99) These schemata, however, are formulated in general terms and refer to the structure of XPs, i.e. of single phrases: (35) a. X’ ! X0, YP b. XP ! YP, X’ If a model contains phrase-structure rules, then such structures are generated top-down. In the PPT, the MP, and in HPSG as well, which all do without phrase-structure rules, such structures are constructed bottom-up on the basis of syntactically relevant features of lexical items and their interaction with the principles and rules of grammar. This presupposes that categorial contextual features are part of the syntactically relevant features of lexical items, which is not the case in the 2001 model of LFG where, as in the 1982 model, syntactic functions are speciWed as contextual features. The reason for this is that lexically speciWed feature structures and their interaction with principles such as the Uniqueness Condition, the Coherence Condition, or the Extended Coherence Condition Wrst of all are designed to determine the well-formedness of f-structures rather than of c-structures. The latter are of secondary importance only in that c-structures that are not well-formed are Wltered out by f-structures and the conditions to which these are subject (cf. section 6.2.3). The privileged status of f-structures has its roots in the claim that a level of representation is described which is the same for languages of various types, conWgurational, non-conWgurational, and perhaps mixed types (cf. section 6.2.1). Thus, feature structures of lexical items are immediately relevant only for f-structures. As far as c-structures and correspondingly the

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determination of syntactic categories are concerned, these only indirectly play a part. In order to play that part it is necessary on the one hand to describe the mapping of syntactic functions onto syntactic categories and to describe mechanisms for the construction of c-structures on the other, which despite Bresnan’s statements quoted above seem nevertheless to be phrase-structure rules. As pointed out in section 6.3.2, Bresnan (2001) does not provide any elucidating information on this issue, which is understandable because it is here that languages and language types exhibit their diversity. Because of this, however, and also because of LFG’s claim to be a theory which at the same time accounts for the similarities and the diVerences between typologically distinct languages, more information is necessary here. If more information were given, a severe problem related to the construction of language-speciWc c-structures via phrase-structure rules would emerge because this requires knowing in advance what syntactic categories have to be described in order to design the rules in such a way that they Wnally generate precisely these structures. This means that for each language it must be known in advance what categories this language makes use of and how these are to be described. This problem does not arise in approaches which build syntactic structures on the basis of the feature structures of lexical items, as is the case in the PPT, the MP, and HPSG. In contrast to LFG, in HPSG feature structures form the direct basis for the description of syntactic categories. Linguistic items which have the same feature structure for SYN, i.e. which have the same value for SYN and for every attribute in SYN, represent the same syntactic category. What is crucial here is that the feature structure of each item gives its own morphosyntactic properties, speciWed as the value of HEAD,22 as well as those of items in its immediate environment, realized as the values of SPR and COMPS and additionally of MOD and GAP. Starting from these features and their interaction with principles and rules such as the Head Feature Principle, the Valence Principle, the Head-SpeciWer Rule, and the Head-Complement rule, syntactic structures are constructed in a rather mechanical way, assigning linguistic items to positions in these structures and thus determining their syntactic category. If items have diVerent values for either

22 However, according to Pollard and Sag (1994), not all linguistic items represent heads and therefore not all are speciWed for head features. This will be discussed later.


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HEAD, SPR, COMPS, MOD, or GAP, then they represent diVerent syntactic categories. The result is a large number of syntactic categories, which are surface-structure categories and may vary from language to language. With its description of syntactic categories on the basis of feature structures and their interaction with syntactic principles and rules, HPSG in principle achieves what Harris failed to accomplish in the framework of American Structuralism (cf. chapter 3), namely a description of syntactic (surface) categories which predicts the syntactic behaviour of their members. It does not matter in this context that elements of type word in general have as their HEAD value a type whose name corresponds to that of a traditional part of speech. It is not the type or the name of a type that is crucial for the description of a category but rather the feature structure as a whole. In addition to its mnemonic – and therefore perhaps problematic – value, this type speciWcation has the function of associating a type and morphosyntactic head features, where this is possible. Thus, for example, type noun is associated with the head feature CASE and type verb with AUX. Both types are associated with AGR, whereas type prep is associated with none of these features. Such a description is given Wrst of all for English. Since in HPSG it is surface structures and thus surface categories that are described, it is not claimed that the same associations hold for other languages as well. Neither is it claimed that in other languages items of type word have the same parts of speech as their HEAD values. Moreover, type speciWcations simply make use of the names of the traditional parts of speech but do not refer to the same entities, as was pointed out for the inWnitive marker to, which is speciWed for type verb but certainly is not traditionally considered a member of the part of speech ‘verb’. As shown, this speciWcation is based on the fact that to behaves syntactically like auxiliary verbs. This also becomes evident when considering that a number of word forms which are traditionally assigned to the part of speech ‘adverb’, such as degree adverbs like very, too, just, right, or so, are here described as speciWers of items of type adj, prep, or adv without themselves being speciWed for any type of part of speech (cf. Pollard and Sag 1994: 358 V.). Instead, Pollard and Sag note that these items, which they call ‘markers’, do not represent heads and thus are not speciWed for head features. Their syntactic category is determined by the fact that they select the heads that they specify via a speciWcation of the COMPS value of these heads (cf. ibid. 363 V.). Thus, these items, like complementizers,

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need not be assigned to a part of speech. This too shows that the types of parts of speech of HPSG are not identical to the traditional parts of speech and secondly that in HPSG it is the feature structure in its entirety that describes a syntactic category. Thereby a part of speech as the name of a type speciWcation can be part of a feature structure, although this is not necessarily the case. In HPSG, as in the PPT and the MP (cf. section 5.7), the description of syntactic categories on the basis of feature structures allows for a description of so-called ‘mixed categories’ or ‘squishes’. These exhibit properties of two traditional parts of speech, as well as for a description of grammaticalized forms, which are characterized by a loss or a modiWcation of features (cf. section 5.7). ‘Mixed categories’ in HPSG is the concern of Malouf (2000a,b), who shows with respect to verbal gerunds how their partly nominal and partly verbal properties can be represented in their lexically determined feature structures. This is done by distinguishing between Poss-ing Verbal Gerunds (as in Brown’s painting his daughter), Accusative Subject Verbal Gerunds (as in Brown painting his daughter), and Pro-ing Verbal Gerunds (as in Brown hates loud singing). The analyses discussed by Malouf can easily be transferred to other ‘mixed categories’. It should be noted, though, that the notion ‘mixed’ category is justiWed only if N and V, for example, are in fact syntactic categories, which is not the case. Not only ‘mixed categories’ but also grammaticalized forms can also be explicitly described in HPSG on the basis of feature structures. For example, the forms during and pending would, as (albeit nowadays obsolete) forms of type verb, receive the value ‘prp’ for the feature FORM, and the value ‘base’ for the grammaticalized variant of type prep for the same feature. Moreover, the verbal variant would be speciWed for the head feature AGR, which is not the case for the prepositional variant, which would be speciWed for the feature [PREDþ] instead. A comparison of the feature structures of the original category and the target category in the context of grammaticalizations shows clearly that apart from the description of syntactic categories on the basis of the feature structure of SYN, these are also described in terms of semantic features, i.e. by means of a speciWcation of the feature structure of SEM. In the case of the examples during and pending, this implies that the feature MODE would exhibit the value ‘prop’ for the verbal variant but the value ‘none’ for its prepositional counterpart. However, the semantic interpretation provides an additional piece of information in each case and one which is not relevant


201

for the description of a syntactic category. In other words, the semantic speciWcation provides the semantic interpretation of a category that has already been syntactically described. A comparison between the description of syntactic categories in HPSG and the PPT and the MP reveals a number of similarities but also diVerences. What the approaches have in common is that in each case the description of syntactic categories is based on features which interact with syntactic principles or rules. As in the PPT, in HPSG lexical items are already speciWed for the relevant features when they leave the lexicon and enter syntax, whereas in the MP they can receive additional features after leaving the lexicon. DiVerences between the three approaches concern the type of feature, their motivation, and their organization, depending especially on the architecture of the model of grammar and thus on the particular theoretical concepts on which it is based. For example, in contrast to the PPT and the MP, the lexicon plays a pivotal role in HPSG. While the type hierarchy is intended to consider universal aspects, the development of the feature structures of word forms before these ultimately enter syntax takes into account the speciWc properties of individual languages. The speciWcation of values for the attributes HEAD, SPR, COMPS, and MOD serves to describe not only the morphosyntactic properties of a word form, but also the morphosyntactic properties of items in the environment of this word form and thus the conditions for its distribution. These are determined ultimately in terms of a small number of universal syntactic principles and language-speciWc rules. The purely syntactic description, which relates to surface structures, is complemented by a semantic description which, on the basis of co-indexation, maps syntactic and semantic speciWcations onto each other, thus being purely descriptive. The result is that items are licensed in the environment of a linguistic item which match the syntactic and semantic description in the feature structure of the item in question. This is what renders HPSG eYcient. However, it also means that an explanation of speciWc properties does not form part of the description of syntactic categories. And this is what distinguishes HPSG from the PPT and the MP, since these two approaches aim to provide an explanation of linguistic facts based on the modelling of human linguistic competence. This necessitates a focus on considerations of UG as well as on language-speciWc parameters, and results in a high degree of abstractness, reXected initially both in the PPT and in the MP by the construction of abstract underlying

202


structures from which surface structures are eventually derived by means of various types of operations. Accordingly, the identiWcation of features which constitute syntactic categories involves various subtheories (X-bar theory, Ł-theory, Case theory, etc.) in the PPT, and involves Checking Theory in the MP. The following description of determiners in these three approaches will serve as an example to illustrate the explanatory value resulting from the description of syntactic categories in the PPT and the MP in contrast to such a description in HPSG. In HPSG, determiners such as a are described as syntactic categories in terms of their own morphosyntactic properties, i.e. the values for HEAD and VAL, as well as in terms of the SPR value for a word form of type noun. The description is complemented by a speciWcation of the values for the semantic attributes MODE, INDEX, and RESTR of the determiner (cf. example (26)) as well as for the corresponding INDEX value of the word form of type noun, with the correspondence between the two INDEX values expressing the referential identity of the determiner and noun. At least as far as syntax is concerned, this description is merely stated rather than theoretically established. In the PPT and in the MP, determiners are described on the basis of their speciWc relationship to the lexical category N as items of a functional category in the extended projection of N (PPT) or with a necessary local relationship to N (MP). In the PPT, based on Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory, this is eVected by Ł-binding (cf. section 5.4.4), according to which determiners are described as operators which bind the referential argument in the argument structure of the lexical head and thus Wx the reference of the nominal expression. This not only provides a description but also an explanation of the relationship between the determiner and the nominal head, since this description is part of the syntactic categorization. The particular value of this explanation lies in its transferability to the relationship between items of other lexical categories and items of functional categories in their extended projections. Thus, for instance, tense speciWcations serve to Wx the reference of verbal expressions, which is expressed by their description as instantiations of a functional category serving as an operator that binds the referential argument <E> in the argument structure of a verbal head. It was shown in section 5.4.4 that an analogous relationship was also identiWed and described between speciWc prepositional and adjectival heads and functional categories in their extended projections.


203

In contrast to the PPT, in the MP Ł-theory no longer plays a role in the description of syntactic categories and in the explanation of the relationship between lexical heads and functional categories. As shown in sections 5.5 and 5.6, morphosyntactic properties have now moved into the centre of attention, with lexical heads being speciWed for morphosyntactic features which are checked by corresponding features of functional categories in their extended projections. Feature correspondence is a prerequisite for the well-formedness of an extended projection. These features can be realized either by an aYx attached to the lexical head or by an independent functional item. In the case of determiners, this means that nominal heads are speciWed for features such as [þdeWnite] or [deWnite]. In English, these features are realized by independent functional items, e.g. the or a, while in other languages a suYx may assume this function, for example -ja in Bulgarian, or either a suYx or an autonomous functional item, for example -et or det in Danish. An analogous relationship between items belonging to lexical categories and items belonging to functional categories in the extended projections of the former can also be found in other contexts, e.g. for verbal contexts and tense features or for adjectival contexts and comparison features. Hence, the explanatory value of the description of determiners as syntactic categories in the MP lies Wrst of all in the fact that this description is made on the basis of inherent properties of the nominal head in whose extended local environment the determiners occur. Secondly, it is due to the fact that this dependence is not an ad hoc one, but can also be identiWed and described analogously with regard to sets of other functional and lexical items. Thirdly, the description of determiners and other items of functional categories supports the hypothesis that diVerences between languages in particular concern functional categories, which is, for instance, reXected by the various ways in which they are realized in given languages. This third aspect is especially relevant for the MP’s claim that it is a universal approach. Such statements cannot be made within the framework of HPSG. The Wnal remarks in this chapter are devoted to an important common aspect of the descriptions of syntactic categories within HPSG, the PPT, and the MP. In each of these approaches, only those items that are speciWed for the same features belong to the same syntactic category, for it is only then that the interaction of principles and rules enables these items to assume the same positions

204


within sentential structures and hence have the same distribution. This implies that the features for category membership are both necessary and suYcient. And this corresponds to the classical deWnition of categories that goes back to Plato and Aristotle, a deWnition whose relevance for the description of linguistic categories has however been questioned recently. In particular this questioning has come in the wake of Rosch’s psychologically-motivated publications on prototypical category structures (cf. e.g. Rosch 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975), and following Wittgenstein’s (1953 [2001]) notions of family resemblance. The following chapters will also deal with these issues among others. There is one further aspect that must be mentioned, and this concerns the extent to which semantics is involved in the description of syntactic categories within the framework of HPSG, the PPT, and the MP. In HPSG, the semantic attributes and features in the feature structure of word forms complement the description of syntactic categories, but this description relies solely on the feature structure of SYN. Nevertheless, there is a relationship between, for example, the value of the semantic predicate MODE and the syntactic properties of a word form, even though this is not explicitly mentioned in this approach. Thus, a word form can only license a determiner via its SPR value if its MODE value is simultaneously speciWed as {reference}, and a word form can only exhibit the value ‘Wn’ for the attribute FORM if its MODE value is simultaneously either {proposition}, {question}, or {directive}. In the PPT, this indirect relationship between semantic properties and syntactic categories is directly integrated into the description by means of Higginbotham’s modiWed Ł-theory in that referential arguments in the argument structure of lexical heads license both functional categories and modiWers in their (extended) projections. Here, referential arguments describe types of referents, that is describes individuals, <E> eventualities, <S> spaces, and degrees of properties. Moreover, semantic features also play a role in the description of syntactic categories in the MP to the extent that apart from non-interpretable features such as [assign accusative Case], interpretable features such as [nominal], [person], or [number] are likewise involved in category description. On the one hand, this shows that semantic properties are included in the category descriptions. Yet, as the preceding remarks have illustrated, in no case do they suYce to


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provide a complete description of syntactic categories or even essentially contribute to such a description. In contrast to this kind of approach, those discussed in the next chapter adopt a completely diVerent view on the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories and the role of semantic properties.

7 Notional approaches to syntactic categories and Cognitive Grammar 7.1 Introduction The preceding chapters (3 to 6) have focused on linguistic theories and grammatical models in which syntax plays a pivotal role and, in the models inXuenced by Chomsky, is even regarded as autonomous and thus independent of semantics. What the theories discussed also have in common is that they more or less take the same view on what syntax is concerned with. They deal with constituent structures in the tradition of American Structuralism, although – as opposed to what was originally intended – such structures may represent not only surface structures but also various kinds of abstract underlying structures. They may also be subject to various types of restrictions, such as the X-bar schema or the Binary Principle that goes back to Kayne (1984). This view of syntax necessarily involves referring explicitly to syntactic categories since such categories form an essential part of constituent structures. Moreover, assigning lexical items a position in a syntactic structure involves including speciWcations in their lexical entries for those categories which serve as interfaces between syntax and the lexicon. As has been shown in the preceding chapters, the syntax-centred approaches under consideration have accordingly either explicitly dealt with the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, or such a description can be inferred from their conception of the lexicon and syntax. Furthermore, it has been shown that LFG represents an exception here, which was attributed to the fact that – at least with regard to the 2001 model – f-structure takes precedence over c-structure. In LFG, lexical entries are directly related to f-structures rather than to c-structures, and it is unclear how c-structures come into existence at all.

notional approaches to syntactic categories

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Chomsky’s notion of the centrality of syntax, which forms part of the Standard Theory considered in section 4.3 in that Wrst of all syntactic deep structures are generated which are then interpreted semantically and Wnally converted into syntactic surface structures via transformations, is not shared by all linguists. Except for the special case of LFG, this has so far been demonstrated only in chapter 4. Representatives of Generative Semantics (e.g. LakoV, McCawley, Ross) and also Fillmore with his concept of Case Grammar (cf. section 4.5) distinguished their approaches from Chomsky’s by claiming that in order to describe language, the semantic content must be the starting point. Accordingly, they proposed models of grammar which provided for an underlying semantic structure for the description of sentences. From this a syntactic structure was then to be derived by means of transformations. The problems which this notion of grammar had to face, in particular with regard to the derivation of syntactic surface structures, and which Wnally put an end to Generative Semantics and to Fillmore’s Case Grammar, were likewise discussed in chapter 4. However, taking semantics as the basis of language and going further by basing syntax and syntactic categories on semantics has not been abandoned completely. Quite the opposite is the case, since approaches along these lines outside of theories of grammar developed or inXuenced by Chomsky are being increasingly pursued. Here, both HPSG and LFG are viewed as theories inXuenced by Chomsky. Those theories that are not and whose representatives deliberately and explicitly distinguish themselves from Chomsky’s ideas are often called ‘functionalist approaches’ (e.g. Croft 1991: 2) or theories with a ‘functionalist orientation’ (e.g. Newmeyer 1998: 7). They are thus distinguished from ‘formal approaches’ or theories with a ‘formal orientation’ (ibid.). However, those theories subsumed under the label ‘functional approaches’ are extremely heterogeneous. What unites them is above all a rejection of Chomsky’s theory, which Van Valin, following Elizabeth Bates,1 expressed as follows: [F]unctionalism is like Protestantism: it is a group of warring sects which agree only on the rejection of the authority of the Pope. (quoted from Van Valin 1990: 171)

1 Van Valin refers to Bates (1987), which is a lecture given at the University of California at Davis but, unfortunately, not accessible.

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Nevertheless, these approaches also have in common that they assume a semantic basis for language, including a semantic basis of syntactic categories. However, assumptions with regard to the nature of this semantic basis diVer. Likewise, they diVer in their idea of syntax, both from each other and above all when compared to the theories developed or inXuenced by Chomsky. The two approaches which form the centre of this and the next chapter (chapters 7 and 8) assume a semantic or notional basis for the description of language in general and in particular for the description of syntactic or grammatical categories. These are Ronald W. Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (e.g. 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991a, b,c, 2000) on the one hand and John M. Anderson’s localist variant of Fillmore’s Case Grammar on the other (cf. e.g. 1971, 1977, 1989a,b, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2006a, 2007). Of these two approaches, Langacker’s is considered to belong to functionalism,2 whereas Anderson’s, despite the important role played by functions or ‘functors’, is a formal one. Quite naturally, therefore, their suggestions concerning the description of categories diVer considerably, even though in both cases a semantic or notional basis is assumed. The typological approaches considered in chapter 9 can be classiWed as belonging to functionalism, in particular Functional Grammar as developed by Dik (e.g. 1978, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1989 [1997a], 1997b) as well as Role and Reference Grammar as developed by Van Valin and Foley. Both approaches declare typological adequacy to be one of their major goals. The present chapter is subdivided as follows: after some remarks regarding the tradition of describing syntactic categories as equivalents of parts of speech identiWed on a notional basis (section 7.2), section 7.3 deals with Langacker’s concept of Cognitive Grammar. His ideas of language as cognition and the consequences he derives from this for a grammar are presented and discussed. Section 7.4 is devoted to the ways of identifying and describing syntactic or grammatical categories within this model, and Wnally section 7.5 discusses some problems that arise in this context.

2 This view is shared by e.g. Croft (1991: 2), Newmeyer (1998: 14), and Baker (2003: 14). In contrast, Cognitive Grammar is not part of the list of functional approaches provided by Van Valin (2000: 329 V.).


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7.2 Parts of speech, syntactic categories, and notionally-based categorization For a long time the only relevant way of categorizing linguistic units was to identify parts of speech, whose identiWcation and description goes back to the grammatical description of Ancient Greek that is given in the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ of Dionysius Thrax. It was pointed out (in section 2.3) that, since Greek was a highly inXecting language, parts of speech were above all identiWed on the basis of the morphological properties of words, and that semantic properties were taken into account only as an addition to these morphological properties, where this was possible. Section 2.5 showed that, by contrast, the grammar of Port Royal in the 17th century, which was intended to be universal, focused on the semantic properties of parts of speech, which Wnally led to an identiWcation of word classes and semantic categories. Taking the example of two grammars from the 19th century, it was shown that with regard to highly inXecting languages there is a tendency to describe parts of speech primarily on a morphological basis, whereas with regard to poorly inXecting languages semantic properties are considered Wrst and foremost (cf. section 2.4). Since English, which served as an example in section 2.4, is a poorly inXecting language, it can be observed that it is especially where there is an English-speaking background that the idea that the traditional parts of speech are basically semantically deWned is widespread. This is, for instance, reXected in the following statement made by Croft: The traditional, so-called notional or semantic class analysis of parts of speech is given in (3a–c):

(3) a. Nouns denote objects (persons, things, places) b. Adjectives denote properties c. Verbs denote actions (Croft 2001: 63) This quotation serves as one example of those statements that establish a close connection between parts of speech and semantic categories to the extent that semantic properties form the basis for the identiWcation of parts of speech. However, it is not the case that the problems posed by such a connection are not recognized, for this is pointed out by Croft (ibid.) for example. In view of the fact that parts of speech were Wrst identiWed at a time when the syntax of languages was not the object of analysis, namely in

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the second and Wrst century BC, it goes without saying that parts of speech were initially not perceived as syntactic categories. It was only with constituent analysis in the framework of American structuralism that the focus of attention shifted to syntactic categories (cf. chapter 3). The structuralists themselves pointed out very clearly that the categories identiWed, and termed ‘form-classes’ by BloomWeld (1933: 185, cf. section 3.3), were not identical with the traditional parts of speech. As shown in section 3.4, Fries (1952) expressed this by introducing a new set of labels (‘Class 1, 2, 3, 4’, ‘Group A, B, C, etc.’). Others, including Bloch and Trager (1942: 66 V.), Francis (1954: 234 V.), and Hockett (1958: 220), emphasized that the new categories did not correspond to the traditional parts of speech, but they nevertheless used the labels associated with traditional parts of speech and thus obscured the diVerences (cf. section 3.5). This tradition was continued in early Generative Grammar (cf. chapter 4). Although phrase-structure rules introduce syntactic categories, category labels such as ‘N(oun)’, ‘V (erb)’, ‘Adj(ective)’, or ‘P(reposition)’ suggest that these refer to the familiar traditional parts of speech. Thus a situation arose in which two diVerent kinds of linguistic categorization were used and distinguished, but category labels suggested that they were based on the same kind of categorization. This can be seen in works which in their content clearly deal with syntactic categories but which nevertheless consistently use the term ‘part of speech’. It applies, for example, to Lyons (1966), Bergenholtz and Schaeder (1977), Aoun (1981), and Emonds (1987), which otherwise have little in common. As a natural consequence, the familiar – albeit problematic – semantic characterization of parts of speech is applied to syntactic categories too. This is done in diVerent ways and concerns on the one hand the relationship between syntax and semantics, and on the other the type of semantic characterization. As for the relationship between syntax and semantics, two diVerent approaches can be distinguished. First, there are those which proceed from an initially independent syntactic and semantic categorization and then note correspondences between the two types of categories and also allow for discrepancies. Secondly, there are those which postulate a semantic basis of syntactic categories, thus excluding discrepancies by viewing semantic and syntactic properties as two aspects of the same phenomenon. The Wrst group includes the approaches by Lyons (1966, 1968, 1977) and JackendoV (e.g. 1983, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1997), whereas Langacker’s and Anderson’s


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approaches belong to the second group. These will now be considered in turn. At least three diVerent assumptions can be distinguished on the nature of the semantic characterizations of categories3 that are postulated as corresponding to syntactic categories. First of all, a correspondence of ontological and syntactic categories is identiWed, thus establishing a link between syntactic categories and the real world. It is this type of semantic category that is based directly on the semantic characterization of parts of speech and discussed, for example, in the works of Lyons quoted above. According to this approach, the syntactic category ‘noun’ is associated with entities such as persons and things, the category ‘verb’ with actions (including events and processes), the category ‘adjective’ with properties, and the category ‘preposition’ with relations (cf. Lyons 1977: 441). Lyons counters the criticism that not all units assigned to syntactic categories can be associated with ontological categories – for instance, nouns such as handshake, perseverance, or cattle designate neither persons nor things (cf. Gleason 1965: 116) – by pointing out that the correspondences refer to subclasses which are ‘focal’ to the syntactic categories (e.g. Lyons 1977: 440) and which contain the most typical representatives of the category. Lyons considers such a characterization of nouns, verbs, etc. of special value, since on this basis ‘we can ask sensibly’ (ibid.) whether all languages have nouns, verbs, etc. However, it is also sensible to ask whether the categories thus identiWed are in fact syntactic categories; these are categories that Lyons calls ‘form-classes’, deWning them ‘in terms of syntactic equivalence’ as follows: two forms, fi and fj, are members of the same form-class Fx if and only if they are intersubstitutable (i.e. have the same distribution) throughout the sentences of the language. (1977: 424) 3 A fourth assumption that must, however, be distinguished from the other three, since it is not primarily concerned with the categorization of words, derives from Montague’s approach (1970, 1973), which is also discussed by Williams (1983) and Partee (1992). According to this approach, semantic categories are described as semantic types of intensional logic, including an identiWcation and description of concepts referring to individuals (<e>), truth values (), sets of concepts referring to individuals (, t>), sets of properties of concepts referring to individuals (>, t>), and sets of propositions (, t>). Dowty et al. (1981) have provided a comprehensible introduction to Montague’s grammar that explains his often very complex formulations. For the relationship between syntactic categories and semantic types, the reader is referred in particular to 181 V.

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A look back at chapters 3 to 5 reveals that this seems not to be the case. Another way to solve various problems of linking syntactic and ontological categories is proposed by JackendoV (e.g. 1983, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1997). This second type of characterization underlies Langacker’s ideas, whose proposals, however, diVer from JackendoV’s considerations as the following sections of this chapter will show. In identifying semantic categories, JackendoV does not proceed from the real world but from a projected world that is based on conceptual structures and encoded in language (cf. esp. 1983: 23 V.; 1987: 148 V.). These structures are projected onto the real world via language, that is, by being encoded in language, thereby creating categories that rely on language for their existence. To identify such categories, JackendoV, following Hankamer and Sag (1976), makes use of so-called ‘pragmatic anaphora’, meaning that a pro-form is pragmatically controlled, i.e. by an accompanying gesture that refers to ‘something’ in the extralinguistic communicative situation. This identiWes Wrst of all a conceptual and then a ‘projected ontological’ category. The sentences under (1) provide some examples of this: (1) a. Your coat is here [pointing] . . . b. He went thataway [pointing]. c. Can you do that [pointing]? Can you do this [demonstrating]? d. That [pointing] had better not happen again around here. e. You shuZe cards thus/so/this way [demonstrating]. f. The Wsh that got away was this/that/yay [demonstrating] long. (cf. JackendoV 1983: 49) Using this procedure, JackendoV identiWes the following conceptual categories: [THING], [PLACE], [DIRECTION], [ACTION], [EVENT], [MANNER], and [AMOUNT], to which he adds [PROPERTY] (1990: 22).4 He also calls these categories ‘major ontological categories (or conceptual ‘‘parts of speech’’)’ (ibid.). JackendoV describes the diVerence between these conceptual categories and ontological categories, i.e. between his view of semantic categories and a traditional view as represented, for example, by Lyons: 4 In fact, JackendoV (1990: 22) refers to JackendoV (1983), claiming to have identiWed the following categories there: Thing, Event, State, Action, Place, Path, Property, and Amount. This, however, is not the case.


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In the present view . . . the ontological presuppositions of natural language are far less dependent on the nature of reality. They are linked to the nature of projected reality and thus to the structure that human beings impose on the world. (1983: 36)

Accordingly, for JackendoV a ‘Conceptual Semantics’ takes precedence over a ‘Real Semantics’ (cf. e.g. 1987: 151). Langacker and those who adopt his notion of Cognitive Grammar share this view, although they do not share JackendoV’s view on the relationship between syntax and semantics. While JackendoV assumes that syntactic and conceptual structures exist independently of each other and are mapped onto each other via correspondence rules (cf. e.g. 1983: 9; 1990: 16 V.; 1997: 38 V.), with the relationship between syntactic and conceptual categories being not bi-unique but rather ‘many-to-many’ (1997: 35), Langacker and others proceed from the assumption that syntactic structures and conceptual structures are inseparably linked and that syntactic or ‘grammatical’ categories are based on cognitive categories.5 Sections 7.3 and 7.4 will deal with this issue. The third characterization of how semantic categories correspond to syntactic categories is based on an identiWcation of syntactic categories and semantic functions. Here, the term ‘semantic function’ can refer to rather diVerent ideas, as will be explained in chapter 8 in connection with typological approaches and Dik’s Functional Grammar. The view that semantic functions such as reference, predication, denotation and modiWcation provide at least a partial basis for a deWnition of syntactic categories, also discussed in Lyons (1977: 438 f.), is widespread among ‘functional approaches’. Croft (e.g. 1984, 1990, 1991) reduces these functions to the three functions ‘referring’, ‘predicating’, and ‘modifying’, which he calls ‘pragmatic’. In his view, they correlate with the syntactic categories ‘noun’, ‘verb’, and ‘adjective’, having the semantic classes ‘object’, ‘action’, and ‘property’ as their correlates (cf. e.g. 1984: 57; 1990: 248). Semantic functions or relations also play a decisive role in Anderson’s assumption of a notional basis for syntactic categories. Chapter 8 will be concerned with what these are and consider Anderson’s general approach to the description of syntactic categories. 5 JackendoV himself explicitly elaborates on the diVerences between his ideas and those of Cognitive Grammar (e.g. 1990: 16). As far as Langacker is concerned, it has to be pointed out here that he himself does not mention ‘syntactic’ categories but rather generally uses the term ‘grammatical’ categories, which includes morphological ones. This will be dealt with in the remarks below.

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It is worth noticing that at least at Wrst glance it is not quite clear whether semantically-based approaches to a description of syntactic categories really do yield syntactic categories or whether here too the elements identiWed are the traditional parts of speech. Since class membership is already known in the cases under consideration (i.e. which items are to be classiWed as nouns, verbs, or adjectives in English), parts of speech are simply reinterpreted as syntactic categories without de facto analysing the syntactic properties of the elements under discussion. The following sections will include this issue. 7.3 Cognitive Grammar as a usage- and meaning-based alternative to formal grammars The counterproposals to Chomsky’s syntax-centred linguistic theory discussed in section 4.5, i.e. Generative Semantics and Case Grammar, which both proceed from a semantic basis in their approach to syntax, had their geographical home at the University of California at Berkeley on the West Coast of the USA. It was here that George LakoV and Charles Fillmore conducted their research and where Wallace Chafe gave lectures based on a similar notion of language (cf. e.g. Chafe 1970). The rivalry with Chomsky’s MIT linguistics was therefore also seen as rivalry between West Coast and East Coast linguistics. Appropriately, it was again on the West Coast of the USA, in this case at the University of California at San Diego, that, along with the decline of Generative Semantics and Fillmore’s Case Grammar around the mid-1970s, a new counterproposal to Chomsky’s theory of language was developed, which likewise and in a much more radical way gave priority to semantics. This radical approach is Ronald W. Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, which was initially called ‘Space Grammar’. In this framework, Langacker considers language ‘an integral facet of cognition’ (1994: 590) and ‘grammar as being inherently meaningful’ (ibid.), ‘reduc[ing] to the structuring and symbolization of conceptual content’ (ibid.; cf. also 1987: 12). This view has since found many supporters worldwide. In his book Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume 1 (1987) and in various articles (e.g. 1982, 1986, 1988a,b,c,d, 1990, 1991b, 1992, 1993a,b,c, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003)6, all giving insights into and an overview of the essential aspects of Cognitive 6 These papers frequently contain repetitions and partial correspondences (e.g. 1986, 1988a). The book Grammar and Conceptualization (2000) is the result of putting together various previously published papers.


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Grammar, Langacker himself provided the basis for the spread of his ideas. This is complemented by several books. Moreover, the journal Cognitive Linguistics (Wrst issue 1990), which is the mouthpiece of the International Cognitive Linguistics Assocation founded in 1989, promotes Langacker’s linguistic theory. However, it should be noted here that the term ‘Cognitive Linguistics’ also includes approaches which basically share Langacker’s view that ‘[l]anguage is an integral part of human cognition’ (1987: 12), but which do not necessarily agree with him in all the details (cf. e.g. Geeraerts 1995). Several comprehensive introductions (e.g. J. R. Taylor 2002; Croft and Cruse 2004; Evans and Green 2006; Radden and Dirven 2007) bear witness to the popularity of Cognitive Linguistics in general, and of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar in particular.

7.3.1 General assumptions As he himself points out (cf. 1987: vi), Langacker started developing his Cognitive Grammar in 1976 because of a general and ‘[profound] dissatisfaction with the dominant trends in current [generative] theory’ (1987: v). His dissatisfaction was in fact directed against everything that constituted this theory and the notions of the architecture of a grammar that are based on it, including, amongst others, the following assumptions: . that linguistic competence forms an independent module in its own

. . .

. . .

.

right within overall human cognition and that it merely interacts with other cognitive modules such as the articulatory-perceptual system and the conceptual-intentional system; that linguistic competence rather than performance is the object of linguistic analysis; that the acquisition of linguistic competence by a native speaker is to a large extent based on innate abilities, referred to as ‘universal grammar’; that syntax is an autonomous, generative component of grammar and that there are two interpretative components, i.e. phonology and semantics; that the lexicon and syntax form two separate domains of grammar; that rules or principles of grammar are formal and explicit and generate or build syntactic structures; that rules or principles of grammar generate or build abstract underlying structures and that surface structures are derived from these via transformations; and that phonetically empty categories can also be part of the abstract underlying structures.

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Langacker contrasts these assumptions with his own, which are fundamental to Cognitive Grammar (cf. e.g. 1986: 16 V.; 1987: 11 V.). According to these, as ‘an integral facet of [human] cognition’ (see above), language is inseparable from general cognitive abilities. It is symbolic in nature in that it associates semantic and phonological representations with each other. Correspondingly, all linguistic units are symbolic units and as such bipolar. Each is composed of a semantic unit, which deWnes one of the poles, and a phonological unit, which deWnes the other. Langacker describes this by means of the general schema ‘[[SEM]/[PHON]]’ (e.g. 1986: 17). Symbolic units with the two components [SEM] and [PHON] are the only types of unit of grammatical description. This rules out, for example, the existence of units without a phonetic representation, such as empty categories.7 Symbolic units diVer with regard to their complexity and their speciWcity. There are units with minimal complexity – monomorphemic words (e.g. sharp or pencil) and inXectional and derivational morphemes (e.g. -ed or -er). There are units with a higher degree of complexity – complex, polymorphemic words (e.g. sharpener or pencil sharpener), phrases (e.g. the red pencil or on the table), clauses and sentences (e.g. the red pencil is on the table), and Wnally texts as combinations of sentences. In principle, no distinction is drawn between symbolic units of diVerent degrees of complexity, and as a result Langacker does not distinguish between the lexicon, morphology, and syntax. Instead they form ‘a continuum of symbolic units’ (e.g. 1986: 2). A distinction is however drawn in terms of speciWcity on the one hand (lexicon vs. morphology and syntax), and of the objects described on the other (words: morphology; phrases and sentences: syntax) (cf. 1991a: 45 f.). There is no explicit reference to ‘syntactic’ categories.8 Instead, symbolic units are regarded as grammatical units that represent ‘grammatical classes’ or ‘grammatical categories’, which include morphologically as well as syntactically relevant ones. Within these ‘grammatical categories’, however, a distinction is drawn between grammatical markers (e.g. inXectional and derivational morphemes), basic grammatical categories (e.g. noun, verb, adjective, preposition, etc.), and grammatical patterns (e.g. complex words, phrases, sentences) (cf. 1995: 214; 7 However, Langacker is far from being consistent in this respect, as he assumes, for example, the existence of empty indeWnite articles (zero) (1991a: 103). 8 This holds for Langacker’s own writings. By contrast, Taylor states: ‘Cognitive Grammar does not recognize a distinct level of syntactic organization. This does not mean that the existence of syntactic categories such as noun, verb, clause, subject, and the like, is being denied’ (2002: 164).


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1987: 189). Thus, it is above all the ‘basic grammatical categories’ and those ‘grammatical patterns’ that refer to phrases and sentences that are relevant for a consideration of the description of syntactic categories within this framework (cf. section 7.4). In order to distinguish between diVerent degrees of speciWcity of symbolic units, Langacker postulates a scale that ranges from ‘highly speciWc’ to ‘maximally schematic’. The two components of symbolic units, the semantic and the phonological poles, can exhibit diVerent degrees of speciWcity. The basic grammatical categories and the symbolically complex grammatical patterns are maximally schematic with regard to their semantic and their phonological pole. ‘Grammatical markers’ are ranked as phonologically speciWc and ‘semantically quite schematic (yet still seen as meaningful)’ (Langacker 1995: 107). By contrast, lexical units and instantiations of grammatical patterns are highly speciWc in terms of their semantic and their phonological poles (cf. ibid.). Langacker regards as lexical units morphemes, stems, words, compounds, phrases, and longer expressions that are learned as established units, independently of whether their formation is idiosyncratic or not (cf. e.g. 1991a: 45). This alternative to formal grammars is not intended to be a model of linguistic competence. It does not assume an innate universal grammar and it identiWes neither principles and parameters nor any formal syntactic or – general – grammatical rules. It is characterized as a ‘usage-based’ (e.g. 1987: 46) model of linguistic structure that is ‘nongenerative and nonconstructive’ (e.g. 1986: 16; 1988a: 13; cf. 1991a: 46 f.) and ‘fully reducible to assemblies of symbolic structures’ (1995: 106) or a ‘structured inventory of conventional linguistic units’ (1987: 57; 1988c: 130). This inventory includes both speciWc simple and complex expressions (lexical units, phrases, clauses, and sentences) and schemas. Schemas correspond to grammatical patterns. They are extracted as observable common features of speciWc expressions in usage events and at the same time serve as templates for the formation of new speciWc expressions, which are thus semantic and phonological instantiations of the schemas. According to this view, the internal grammar of a native speaker, his knowledge of the language, consists of a mentally-represented structured inventory of conventional speciWc and schematic linguistic units that are acquired or learned in the context of usage events. The units of this inventory are conventional in that they are considered well-formed by a ‘substantial number of individuals’ (1987: 62).

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This linking of grammar and convention does not exclude and in fact suggests that the grammars of languages of diVerent speech communities are fundamentally diVerent. The large number of ways in which grammars can develop is not limited by the principles of an innate universal grammar. In this respect, Langacker’s concept of the diversity of the grammars of diVerent languages resembles that of the American Structuralists presented in chapter 3. It diVers however from this view in that grammar is understood as a structuring and symbolizing of conceptual content. Thus, shared features and diVerences between grammars depend on what the structuring and symbolizing of conceptual content is based on and what results this produces. Structuralists explicitly regarded such considerations as irrelevant. The restriction to a ‘substantial number’ of individuals of a speech community who share linguistic conventions is for Langacker a way of expressing that even within a speech community variation is possible and indeed expected. Thus, the grammaticality judgements of native speakers often do not result in a clear distinction between ‘grammatical’ and ‘ungrammatical’ sequences, but are rather arranged along a scale of values (cf. 1987: 15, 36 f.). He therefore prefers the term ‘conventional’ to ‘grammatical’ when evaluating linguistic expressions (ibid. 66). The inventory of conventional units which make up a grammar is structured to the extent that smaller, simpler units form components of larger, more complex units. This holds for semantic units, phonological units, and the linkage between the two, i.e. symbolic units. Thus, for example, the simple phonological units [d], [O], and [g] are components of the more complex phonological unit [[d]-[O]-[g]]. Together with the semantic unit [DOG], this phonological unit forms the symbolic unit [[DOG]/[[d]-[O]-[g]] ], which in turn can form a more complex symbolic unit when combined with the semantic and the phonological pole of the plural morpheme: [[ [DOG]/[[d]-[O][g]] ]-[[PL]/[z]] ] (cf. 1987: 73). By the same token, three types of linguistic structure are distinguished, i.e. semantic, phonological, and symbolic structures, ‘each residing in the symbolic linkage of a semantic and a phonological structure’ (e.g. 2000: 1). Complex symbolic structures, which Langacker calls ‘grammatical constructions’ (1987: 82), are associated with complex words, phrases, sentences, and combinations of sentences. They are the result of the syntagmatic combination of the semantic and phonological poles of morphemes and of progressively larger units. Thus, the formation of grammatical


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constructions is not viewed as the result of formal rules, such as morphological or syntactic rules (e.g. phrase-structure rules). Instead, the abstract schemas which correspond to the patterns of the constructions have the function of rules – and therefore they are in fact equated with rules in later works9 – in that they represent the type of combination of the components within a construction by means of their internal structure. For this reason, complex schemas are regarded as ‘constructional schemas’ (1988a: 23; 1991a: 310) that specify the simpler schemas they are composed of, i.e. the schemas of their components, as well as the relations between these schemas. As the structuring of the inventory refers directly to the conventional speciWc linguistic units, there is no abstract underlying representation of structures in this grammar. Nor are there transformations to derive surface structures from underlying structures. Constructional schemas represent the structure of complex symbolic units and thus perform the function that is carried out in formal grammars by phrase-structure rules, by principles and parameters, or by other morphological and syntactic rules. Constructional schemas are abstract, that is, neither semantically nor phonologically speciWed, and therefore comparable – though not identical – to the result of applying phrase-structure rules that generate surface structures prior to lexical insertion. It is not until constructional schemas are instantiated that the grammatical constructions are semantically and phonologically speciWed and contain components that correspond to lexical units. As Langacker himself does not identify and describe syntactic categories, one relevant question is how instantiated structures come into existence that are not stored. What kind of knowledge enables a speaker to put together novel expressions that correspond to conventional patterns? This implies further questions, including the following: What 9 The reader is invited to compare this with the following statements by Langacker: ‘What about grammatical rules and constructions? These are not distinguished in cognitive grammar, but are treated instead as alternate ways of regarding the same entities, namely symbolic units that are both schematic and complex’ (1988a: 23); ‘Grammatical rules take the form of schematized constructions’ (1994: 593); and ‘No distinction is drawn in this framework between grammatical rules and grammatical constructions. Rules are simply schematizations of symbolically complex expressions, or constructions, and can thus be described as constructional schemas’ (2000: 19). 10 Langacker provides the following deWnition: ‘A ‘‘constructional schema’’ is a symbolically complex structure whose internal organization is exactly analogous to that of a set of constructions (complex expressions), but which abstracts away from their points of divergence to reveal their schematic commonality’ (1994: 593).

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properties must grammatical units corresponding to words have in order to be components in a grammatical construction? What properties are the basis on which they are assigned a position within such a construction? And what properties determine that they can form progressively larger components together with other grammatical units? Generally speaking, these are questions that concern the properties of the components of grammatical constructions and of the relations that exist between these components. The following section will deal with these questions.

7.3.2 Grammatical constructions: symbolization, categorization, and integration In order to give an adequate answer to the question of what kind of knowledge enables a speaker, in Langacker’s view, to form novel linguistic expressions that correspond to conventional patterns, it is necessary to brieXy discuss the implications of his statement that grammar structures and symbolizes conceptual content (see section 7.3.1). This will be done with the aid of an example. The example refers to a situation in which someone opens a chest using a crowbar. There is more than one way to encode this situation linguistically, which means that there is no bi-unique relation between a situation and the way it is encoded in a linguistic expression. The encoding rather corresponds to a conceptualization, hence a mental processing of the situation by the speaker, and this means that there are a number of ways to encode one and the same situation, including the following: (2) a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i.

A man opened the chest with a crowbar. A rather muscular man opened an old chest with a rusty crowbar. A man opened the chest. The chest was opened by a man with a crowbar. A man opened the chest by force. A man forcefully opened the chest. A man used a crowbar to open the chest. A man forced the chest open. The opening of the chest was achieved by a man with a crowbar.

The conceptualizations that are encoded in the linguistic expressions diVer in various ways. (2a) and (2b) diVer in that (2b) encodes more speciWc information than (2a). The speaker of (2b) thus conceptualizes more information than the speaker of (2a) and expresses this accordingly.


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(2c) diVers from (2a) in that the speaker conceptualizes the situation without the instrument and does not bother to mention it. (2d) is distinct from (2a) due to a diVerent perspective on the situation. In (2a) the referent of a man is conceptualized as being more prominent in the scene than the referent of the chest, and the NP is thus encoded as the subject, while in (2d) the referent of the chest is conceptualized as being more prominent, so this NP is made the subject. Using Langacker’s terminology, in (2a) a man is the trajector and the chest the landmark, while in (2d) the chest is the trajector and a man the landmark.11 (2e) and (2f) diVer from (2a) in that the speaker does not conceptualize and encode the use of the instrument with which the action was performed, but instead the manner of performing the action that is eVected by using this instrument. The speaker does so in diVerent ways, using by force in (2e) and forcefully in (2f). (2g) and (2h) diVer from (2a) in that, for instance, diVerent verbs are used to describe the situation, which Langacker characterizes as distinct ways of ‘proWling’ the conceptualization. (2i) diVers from (2a) and (2d) in that neither the person nor the chest are conceptualized as being prominent here, but rather the event itself, and the opening of the chest is encoded accordingly as the subject. Each of the sentences (2a) to (2i) represents a grammatical construction, and both the constructions as a whole and their individual components correspond to conventional constructional schemas. According to Langacker, constructional schemas as well as grammatical constructions as such, i.e. independently of their degree of abstractness, constitute a grammar, and therefore sentences (2a) to (2i) provide an example of how a grammar structures conceptual content. Langacker’s claim that a grammar also symbolizes conceptual content is manifested by the fact that each semantic unit, e.g. [MAN] or [CHEST], is associated with one phonological unit, i.e. in this case [mæn] and [tSest]. These two phenomena together illustrate that it is not extralinguistic situations that determine the structuring and symbolizing of linguistic units. However, this also means that a linguistic expression does not encode a purely subjective conceptualization of a situation by the speaker, but that only conventionalized structures and symbolizations can be expressed by the grammar. 11 The terms ‘trajector’ and ‘landmark’ distinguish between entities that diVer with regard to their prominence within a relation, here expressed by the verb open, with the trajector referring to the more prominent or more focused of the two. This will be explained in more detail below.

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The question to be answered now is what a speaker has to know in order to form novel linguistic expressions that correspond to conventional patterns, including sentences like those in (2a) to (2i). To begin with, a speaker must have lexical units at his disposal that symbolize aspects of the situation to be conceptualized and encoded in a linguistic expression, such as [[MAN]/[mæn]] and [[CHEST]/[tSest], which are semantically and phonologically speciWed units in terms of Langacker’s approach. Accordingly, such units must be stored in the internal grammar of a speaker and activated to form a sentence. The speaker must also have some knowledge of conventional patterns at his disposal that are inherent to the particular target sentences. According to Langacker, such patterns are stored in the internal grammar of a speaker as constructional schemas, not only as schemas for whole sentences, but also as schemas for their components, for example for phrases and words. They serve as templates or models for computing novel expressions or assessing their conventionality (cf. 1991a: 47). Whether semantically and phonologically speciWc symbolic units can be put together to form a sentence structure and hence form the instantiation of the constructional schema of a sentence depends on two conditions, which must both be fulWlled. The Wrst condition refers to the relationship between schemas and semantically and phonologically speciWed symbolic units, which is described as a relationship of categorization. The second condition concerns the syntagmatic relationship between the speciWed symbolic units, which Langacker characterizes as one of integration. According to the Wrst condition, symbolic units can only combine to form a grammatical construction if, as components of the target structure, they represent the same categories as the corresponding components of the constructional schema that serves as the template or model for the target structure. The second condition entails that semantically and phonologically speciWed symbolic units can only combine to form a grammatical construction if two or more units can be integrated, resulting in a larger symbolic unit. Only if both conditions are fulWlled can an assembly of linguistic units form a grammatical construction, which Langacker on the one hand characterizes as a complex category (cf. 1987: 410), and on the other as an ‘assembly of symbolic structures in which component structures are integrated’ (1997: 6). In order to form novel, conventional linguistic expressions, a speaker must have at his disposal not only knowledge of individual speciWc symbolic units and of schemas of various degrees of complexity, but also knowledge as to


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what speciWc units can be integrated and what categories represent simple and complex symbolic units. In order to understand what this knowledge involves, it must be established what Langacker means by ‘categorization’ on the one hand, and by ‘integration’ on the other. Categorization is a relationship which Langacker analyses in terms of schematicity and which concerns semantic, phonological, and symbolic units. He characterizes categories, i.e. the result of categorization, as complex and consisting of distinct and partly disparate units. Category membership is thus ‘a matter of degree’ and unpredictable, being ‘resistant to strict delimitation, and subject to the vicissitudes of linguistic convention’ (1987: 370). Langacker recognizes two principal types of relationship between units that are conventionally assigned to the same category: the relationship of elaboration and the relationship of extension. ‘Elaboration’ here refers to the relationship between a schema and its instantiations, while ‘extension’ refers to the relationship between prototypical and peripheral values. Hence categorization is eVected both in terms of schemas and in terms of prototypes (cf. ibid. 370 f.). In this context, a schema is deWned as an abstract characterization that is completely compatible with all the units of the category it deWnes, and a prototype is deWned as a typical instance of a category to which other instances of the category merely bear resemblance (cf. ibid.). Accordingly, categories form schematic networks in such a way that less abstract schemas are subsumed under a very abstract schema on the basis of elaboration or extension. To illustrate this, Langacker uses the example of the schematic network of the semantic category [TREE]:

(3)

TREE''

PALM

TREE'

PINE

TREE

APPLE TREE

PEACH TREE

CHERRY TREE

OAK

ELM

MAPLE

(Langacker 1987: 383)

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Of the schemas in (3), [TREE] corresponds to the prototype. The characterization of [TREE] is compatible with the characterizations of [APPLE TREE], [PEACH TREE], etc., which diVer from [TREE] in that they feature a higher degree of speciWcity. The relationship between [TREE] and these schemas is thus one of elaboration. As the schema [PINE] merely bears resemblance to the prototypical [TREE] schema, the relationship here is one of extension. If [TREE] and [PINE] are identiWed as units of the same category, this is based on the formation of a new abstract schema [TREE’] whose characterization is compatible with the characterizations of [TREE] and [PINE]. Another extension of the prototypical schema [TREE] or of the more abstract schema [TREE’] in (3) is the schema [PALM]. If [PALM] is now assigned to the same category as [TREE] and [TREE’], this categorization is based on the formation of an even more abstract schema [TREE’’] whose characterization is compatible with all the units of the category, including [PALM]. As this example illustrates, a category corresponds to an abstract schema that is composed of subschemas forming a network and between which there is a relationship of either elaboration or extension. Each of the subschemas is an instantiation of the category, and these instantiations can diVer with regard to their degree of speciWcity. As remarked above, this type of categorization applies not only to semantic units but also to phonological and symbolic units. Langacker gives the relationships of allophones to a phoneme as an example of the categorization of phonological units, characterizing a phoneme in terms of an abstract schema that represents a schematic network composed of allophones. These allophones, in turn, form subschemas within this network (cf. ibid. 388 V.). The basic grammatical categories and the grammatical constructions that are composed of these basic grammatical categories in order to form progressively more elaborate symbolic units are examples of the categorization of symbolic units. Langacker identiWes nouns, verbs and prepositions as examples of ‘basic grammatical categories’ (1990: 16), describing each of them as abstract schemas on a semantic basis, that is, nouns as [[THING]/ [ . . . ]], verbs as [[PROCESS]]/[ . . . ]], and prepositions as [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]]. ‘[ . . . ]’ refers to the fact that the phonological pole of the schema can be instantiated in various ways. According to Langacker’s deWnition of categories, each of these schemas forms a network of subschemas of varying degrees of speciWcity between which there is either a relationship of elaboration or one of


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extension. Each of these subschemas instantiates the abstract schema. Semantically and phonologically speciWed instantiations of these schemas are lexical units. Thus, [[CHEST]/[tSest]] instantiates the schema [[THING]/[ . . . ]], [[OPEN]/[’@Upn]] the schema [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]], and [[ON]/[`n]] the schema [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/ [ . . . ]]. This shows that the abstract schemas that describe the basic grammatical categories categorize lexical units of the type word. Accordingly, a speaker who wants to form novel conventional expressions from semantically and phonologically speciWed lexical units of the type word must know which abstract schemas representing the basic grammatical categories the units are assigned to. Which units can be combined to form larger symbolic units and how these larger units are categorized depends on which units can be integrated and on what the result of this integration is. Following Langacker, integration is the basis for syntagmatic combinations. It is by means of the successive integration of components that ever larger composite constructions can be formed. The term ‘integration’ means that there are correspondences both among the components of a construction and between the components and the construction. This implies that substructures of the components involved and of the construction itself are construed as being identical. This concerns both the semantic and the phonological pole of symbolic units. With respect to the semantic pole, Langacker provides the following example (cf. 1987: 279 V.). In the expression under the table, [UNDER] proWles an atemporal relation between two entities, one of which is characterized as trajector (e.g. that football in that football under the table), and the other (the table) as landmark. The terms ‘trajector’ and ‘landmark’ serve to diVerentiate between entities with regard to their prominence within a relation, the trajector being the more prominent or the more focused of the two. Both the trajector and the landmark of [UNDER] are speciWed as abstract [THING] schemas. If [THING] is elaborated by [THE-TABLE]12 as the landmark of [UNDER], as in under the table, this is a case of integration in that [THE-TABLE] belongs to the category [THING] and is thus identical with the substructure of [UNDER] that speciWes the former’s landmark, 12 It will be ignored here that [THE-TABLE] is itself already a complex construction. The same holds for the semantic units [THE-CHILD] and [DISCOVERED] introduced further below in the text.

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with the result that the two correspond in this respect. However, there is more to integration than just categorial correspondence, for the components involved must belong to the same semantic domain. This condition is fulWlled with regard to [UNDER] and [THETABLE], since [UNDER] proWles an atemporal domain of oriented space, and [THE-TABLE] has a complex matrix ‘that includes such domains as three-dimensional space (for a shape speciWcation), oriented space (for canonical orientation) and the abstract domain supporting the predication of contextual uniqueness (identiWcation by both speaker and hearer)’ (1987: 279). Thus, in the case of [UNDER] and [THE-TABLE], two units are combined, one of which belongs to the category [ATEMPORAL RELATION] and the other to the category [THING]. The question that must be addressed now is which category the structure that has been formed belongs to. In Langacker’s view, this depends on what is proWled by the new structure. Since [UNDER] proWles an atemporal relation that speciWes both a trajector and a landmark, and since only the schematic representation of the landmark has been elaborated by [THE-TABLE], the integrated structure still proWles an atemporal relation. From this it follows that [UNDER] is the proWle determinant or head of the construction [UNDER-THE-TABLE]. This illustrates the fact that there are not only correspondences among the components of the composite construction, but also between the components and the composite construction itself in that, for example, the composite construction inherits the categorial properties of the proWle determinant: like [UNDER], [UNDER-THE-TABLE] belongs to the category [ATEMPORAL RELATION]. The construction [UNDER-THE-TABLE] can now in turn combine with another unit to form a new, larger construction, for example, to form the semantic part of the expression that football under the table. [THAT-FOOTBALL] and [UNDER-THE-TABLE] can combine to form a construction, since, Wrst of all, [THAT-FOOTBALL] and the trajector of [UNDER-THE-TABLE] represent the same category [THING], and, secondly, [THAT-FOOTBALL] and [UNDER-THE-TABLE] belong to the same semantic domain. The question of the category represented by the novel construction [THAT-FOOTBALL-UNDER-THE-TABLE] can be answered as follows. Since this construction, like its component [THAT-FOOTBALL], proWles a thing (cf. section 7.4), both represent the category [THING]. Therefore, [THAT-FOOTBALL] is the proWle determinant and thus the head of the construction.


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Similarly, the construction [THAT-FOOTBALL-UNDER-THETABLE] can combine with other units to form progressively larger units and Wnally form a sentence such as The child discovered that football under the table. In this case, [DISCOVERED] proWles a process and therefore belongs to the category [PROCESS], and it speciWes a trajector and a landmark which both belong to the category [THING]. [THE-CHILD] and [THAT-FOOTBALL-UNDER-THE-TABLE] can be integrated with [DISCOVERED] as elaborations of the trajector and the landmark to form larger constructions, since each of them belongs to the category [THING] and since they both belong to the same domain as [DISCOVERED]. If [DISCOVERED] is now combined with [THAT-FOOTBALL-UNDER-THE-TABLE] as an elaboration of the landmark, a new category [DISCOVERED-THAT-FOOTBALLUNDER-THE-TABLE] results. Like [DISCOVERED], this new category proWles a process and therefore represents the category [PROCESS]. This also applies when [THE-CHILD] is added as an elaboration of the trajector to combine with [DISCOVERED-THAT-FOOTBALLUNDER-THE-TABLE].13 In all these cases, [DISCOVERED] is the proWle determinant and thus the head of these constructions. The preceding example refers initially to the semantic pole of symbolic units. However, as far as categorial properties are concerned, it can be directly transferred to symbolic units as grammatical units, since their categorial properties are determined by their semantic pole. Consequently, such symbolic units can combine to become larger ones which can be semantically integrated because they belong to the same semantic domain and because subschemas of their semantic schemas can be interpreted in the same way. The categorization of the newly formed construction is determined by the component that forms the proWle determinant, and the result is that the novel construction and this component represent the same category. These considerations lead to claims about what kind of knowledge a speaker is required to have to form novel expressions that correspond, for example, to a sentence like The child discovered that football under the table. First of all, the speaker needs knowledge relating to the symbolic units and their categorization as well as their speciWcation of the trajector 13 According to Langacker, it is of no importance which of the two [THING] categories, i.e. trajector or landmark, is elaborated Wrst. It is possible for both to be elaborated simultaneously.

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and the landmark, if they are speciWed for these. To give an example, he needs to know that [[CHILD]/[tSaIld]] is an element of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and [[UNDER]/[’çnd@]] an element of the category [[[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/ [ . . . ]]] which, as a relational category, speciWes a trajector and a landmark. What he also needs is knowledge of the semantic domain and of the compatibility of units with regard to domains, which is one of the conditions for the integration of components. Finally, he needs knowledge of the schemas of grammatical constructions of various degrees of complexity and category membership, since these schemas sanction any newly formed construction. For instance, the step-by-step formation of the construction [[THE-CHILD-DISCOVERED-THAT-FOOTBALLUNDER-THE-TABLE]/[D@ tSaIld dI’skçv@d DætfUtbO:l ’çnd@ D@ ’teIbl]] presupposes that each newly formed partial construction, i.e. [[UNDER-THE-TABLE]/[’çnd@ D@ ’teIbl], [THAT-FOOTBALLU N D E R- T H E - TA B L E ] / [ Dæt fUtbO:l ’çnd@ D@’teIbl] ] , e t c . , and the sentence structure as a whole exhibit a pattern that corresponds to a constructional schema in such a way that they are sanctioned by this constructional schema as conforming to convention. Lexical units such as [[TABLE]/[’teIbl]] and [[UNDER]/[’çnd@]] can therefore combine to form a construction [[UNDER-THE-TABLE]/[’çnd@ D@ ’teIbl]] because [[TABLE]/[’teIbl]] belongs to the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and [[UNDER]/[’çnd@]] to the category [[[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/[ . . . ]]] and since the grammar contains a constructional schema [[[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/[ . . . ]] [[THING]/[ . . . ]]] that represents the same category as [[UNDER]/[’çnd@]] and thus sanctions a construction with [[UNDER]/[’çnd@]] as proWle determinant or head. This applies in the same way to further subconstructions of the construction [[THE-CHILD-DISCOVERED-THAT-FOOTBALLUNDER-THE-TABLE]/[D@ tSaIld dI’skçv@d Dæt fUtbO:l ’çnd@ D@ ’teIbl]] as well as Wnally to the construction itself. The example sentence considered here is characterized by a grammatical construction that Langacker calls ‘canonical’ or ‘prototypical’ (e.g. 2003: 57, 50), since it features a ‘classical’ or ‘well-behaved’ constituency hierarchy (1997: 13). However, Langacker does not consider all constructions to be of this type. Instead he assumes that grammatical constructions are ‘highly varied and deviate from the prototype in myriad ways’ (2003: 57). This applies to constructions of components of sentences as well as to constructions of


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sentences themselves, whereby in the latter case it is assumed that in the framework of Cognitive Grammar there are no transformations that generate surface structures from abstract underlying structures. Instead, as is the case in LFG and HPSG, surface structures are described directly, albeit in a diVerent manner. The formation of non-prototypical constructions presupposes that the speaker has linguistic knowledge distinct from knowledge of the formation of prototypical constructions. This is, for example, due to the fact that non-prototypical constructions entail diVerent options for the positioning of lexical units. Naturally, this has direct consequences for the identiWcation of syntactic categories. Therefore, the following section will deal with the properties of prototypical and nonprototypical components and sentence structures as identiWed by Langacker, before section 7.4 Wnally focuses on the question of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in Cognitive Grammar.

7.3.3 Prototypical and non-prototypical component and clause structures According to Langacker, a ‘canonical’ or ‘prototypical’ grammatical construction that features a ‘classical’ or ‘well-behaved’ constituency hierarchy is Wrst of all characterized by its components being semantically integrated in the manner illustrated in the preceding section. It is additionally characterized by each of its components forming a phonological entity which emerges as a result of ‘temporal contiguity’ (Langacker 1997: 13). This means that in the course of the phonological realization, brief pauses are only made at the boundaries of the components. Moreover, Langacker emphasizes that prototypical constructions have the following properties, each of which applies to the grammatical construction of the example sentence considered above, The child discovered that football under the table: (i) there are two component structures; (ii) one component proWles a thing, the other a relationship; (iii) the nominal proWle corresponds to a focal participant of the relationship (its trajector or landmark); (iv) that participant is schematic, being elaborated by the nominal component; (v) the composite structure inherits its proWle from one of the two component structures.

(2003: 57)

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Furthermore, in a classical constituency hierarchy, heads, complements, and modiWers of the (sub-)constructions can be identiWed, as is the case in syntax-centred approaches. As mentioned above, the head of a construction is the proWle determinant. Complements and modiWers are described in relation to the head on the basis of conceptual autonomy and dependence (cf. e.g. 1987: 306 V.). Hence, complements such as those of a verb like discover are autonomous with regard to the head discover, since they can also be conceptualized without this head. With regard to its complements, the head itself is dependent, since its conceptualization does not presuppose the conceptualization of its complements. Therefore, the subject and the object (or the objects) of the head have complement status, that is, the child and that football under the table in the case of the aforementioned example. Unlike complements, modiWers are not autonomous but dependent with regard to the head, which in turn is autonomous with regard to its modiWers. For the example under discussion, this means that in order to conceptualize under the table as a component of that football under the table, Wrst of all that football must be conceptualized as the head of the construction. These dependence relations can also be characterized on the basis of the elaboration of substructures (cf. Langacker 2003: 57). Here, complements elaborate substructures of a head, namely the trajector and the landmark, while the head of a construction elaborates a substructure of a modiWer, which is the trajector in the present example. The properties of prototypical constructions discussed here show that Langacker characterizes as prototypical those constructions that correspond to the X-bar schema, formulated as a syntactic principle in the PPT and in the MP as well as in HPSG (cf. sections 5.3, 5.6, 6.4.3). Additionally, he includes in his characterization of this construction the condition of binary branching, as postulated by Kayne (1984) for syntactic structures, which is automatically fulWlled in the MP by applying the operation Merge (cf. section 5.6.2). It is now also clear that what Langacker represents by means of dependence relations between heads, complements, and modiWers, or the elaboration of their substructures on the basis of his conceptual assumptions, reXects precisely what is described by means of Ł-marking and Ł-identiWcation as licensing modes for arguments and modiWers in the projection of lexical heads in the PPT (cf. section 5.4.4). However, Langacker sees advantages of Cognitive Grammar over syntax-centred approaches. First of all, he does not assume any genuinely syntactic structures but instead describes his structures as being semantically motivated, and


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secondly, Cognitive Grammar, being a usage-based grammar, allows for an unproblematic description even of non-prototypical structures. Langacker considers the existence of such structures a result, among other things, of diVerent grammatical contexts and of diVerent communicative and stylistic considerations (cf. e.g. 1987: 319). Langacker (2003: 57 V.) distinguishes between three types of nonprototypical component structure. In the Wrst type, a component consists of only one single morpheme (e.g. Leave!) and thus of only one symbolic element, with the result that the construction is characterized as degenerate. As a second type, he identiWes component structures that contain more than two subcomponents. This is exempliWed by the expression smart woman with a PhD, for which he identiWes two constructions – a prototypical one with two subcomponents and a non-prototypical one with three sub-components (cf. ibid. 58). Here various possible intonation patterns, i.e. one or more slight pauses indicate either one or two component boundaries, as illustrated in (4a) and (4b), or diVerent pronominalizations are employed, as shown in (5a) and (5b): (4) a. smart woman / with a PhD b. smart / woman / with a PhD (5) a. They’re looking for a smart woman with a PhD, not one with just a masters. b. A smart woman with a PhD is happier than a brilliant one with just a masters. The pauses are indicated in (4) by ‘/’. For expressions with multiple adjectival modiWers like big ugly vicious dog Langacker generally assumes that the modiWers are ‘strung together with no indication of any particular constituency hierarchy’ (ibid. 59), expressed by slight pauses after each adjective. He justiWes this semantically by pointing out that in such cases each adjective separately assigns a property to the noun that it modiWes (cf. ibid.). The third type of non-prototypical component structure is characterized by the fact that none of the subcomponents forms the head or the proWle determinant, which is deWned as the only subcomponent whose proWle corresponds to that of the composite structure. Langacker here distinguishes three cases. In the Wrst case, the proWles of the components are identical and therefore either could be the head of the construction. Examples are appositional

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constructions with two nominal expressions such as the famous French novelist Marcel Proust, claiming that in such cases neither of the two components forms the head ‘since neither functions uniquely as proWle determinant’ (2003: 60). In the second case, the proWle of a composite construction represents a conXation of the proWles of the components but it ‘is not equivalent to any of them individually’ (ibid. 59). As an example he gives the composite local expression ‘in the garage, on the workbench, behind the electric saw’ (ibid. 60), justifying his analysis by pointing out that in this case the trajector is located with respect to three diVerent landmarks at the same time, that none of these local relations has prominence and that all three are focused. Langacker’s third case of headless constructions concerns exocentric constructions, and he gives pickpocket as an example and also a sentence from Luisenõ, a Native American language, containing two nominal expressions but no verbal expression: (6)

Wunaal ya’ash no-kaytu. (that man my-enemy) ‘That man is my enemy.’

Langacker claims that this construction proWles a relation, namely that of identity, thus having a proWle that does not correspond to either of its components, which both proWle a thing. Apart from their ‘headlessness’, the fact that both of the components proWle a thing makes constructions of this kind non-prototypical: according to their characterization (see above), prototypical constructions contain one component that proWles a thing and a second one that proWles a relation. This characterization similarly identiWes those constructions as nonprototypical whose two components proWle a relation, as is illustrated in Langacker’s example ‘move fast’ (2003: 63). According to Langacker, constructions of this kind are, however, as regular as prototypical ones and form productive patterns. These are learned in the context of usage events on the basis of data and stored in the internal grammar of speakers as abstract constructional schemas. When novel expressions are produced, these schemas are activated in order to sanction the grammatical constructions. The constructions discussed so far are restricted to structures of components of sentences. It is therefore important to consider how Langacker characterizes prototypical and non-prototypical sentence structures.


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For Langacker, prototypical sentence structures involve several conceptual archetypes that are incorporated as components in other components (cf. 1993a: 485 V.). Examples are conceptions of physical objects that are located or move in space, or that are in a state or subject to a change of state. Archetypes of this kind can combine to form a complex archetype. One of these archetypes is Langacker’s canonical event model. Here he distinguishes two components, the billiard-ball model and the stage model (cf. 1991a: 283 V.; 1993a: 285). The elements of the Wrst component are identiWed as space, time, material substance, and energy. These elements are involved in the conceptualization of a world in which objects move in space, have contact with each other, and participate in ‘energetic interaction’ (1991a: 283). The second component refers to perceptual experience, in which an observer organizes a scene in a setting that includes interacting participants (cf. ibid. 284). The canonical event model represents normal observation of prototypical activity. Sentences like those under (7) represent unmarked, prototypical encodings of this model: (7) a. Floyd broke the glass. b. Eve sliced an apple. As these examples illustrate, the prototypical encoding of a prototypical activity is represented by an active transitive sentence that expresses the involvement of two participants whose roles are that of agent and patient. Here, the agent is encoded as the subject and the patient as the direct object. The subject elaborates the trajector and the direct object the landmark of the Wnite verb, and this verb proWles the sentence. In Langacker’s approach, agent and patient are obligatory and focal participants in a prototypical activity to which other, optional participants can be added, i.e. instrument and beneWciary. The sentences under (8) provide examples of the corresponding encodings: (8) a. Floyd broke the glass with a hammer. b. Eve sliced an apple for Bill. According to Langacker, a prototypical transitive sentence expresses an action chain, and thus an energy Xow from agent to patient, with a conceptualization reXected in the linear arrangement of subject and object. This order is therefore not regarded as accidental but as symbolic, and is interpreted as an expression of form-meaning iconicity. Formmeaning iconicity is also identiWed in sentences as in (9) and (10):

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(9) a. In the kitchen, Floyd broke the glass. b. Floyd broke the glass in the kitchen. (10) a. In the afternoon, Eve sliced an apple. b. Eve sliced an apple in the afternoon. Sentence adverbials like in the kitchen and in the afternoon specify a spatial or a temporal setting of a scene. Their localization prior to or following the encoding of an event thus expresses that ‘the setting . . . wholly includes the event’ (1991a: 300). By contrast it is parts of a setting that are encoded in expressions like in a drawer in (11), which specify a locality in this sentence: (11) She put the knife in a drawer. Apart from the conceptual archetype of the canonical event model, Langacker identiWes other models for unmarked, prototypical sentence structures. One of these characterizes the archetypal conception of an object moving along a spatial path. Unmarked types of encoding in this model are represented by intransitive sentences like those under (12), in which the subject designates the mover, the verb expresses the movement, and the path is speciWed in terms of a prepositional phrase: (12) a. Rocky drove to the beach. b. An attractive woman walked into the store. (cf. 1991a: 302) A diVerent archetypal model identiWed by Langacker characterizes the conception of a static situation, in which an entity is located or assigned a property. This model is encoded by sentences like the following: (13) a. Her truck was in the back yard. b. This tree is very tall. (cf. ibid.) Langacker identiWes the role ‘zero’ for entities that are located or assigned a property, such as the referents of her truck and this tree in (13). Referring to examples like the ones presented here, Langacker concludes that languages exhibit a number of basic sentence types, each of which is associated with a conceptual archetype and can thus be


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considered prototypical. Not only the conceptions of archetypal events and states but also those of the participant roles involved are seen as archetypal. Thus an agent is a person who initiates a physical activity by exercising volitional control, a patient is an inanimate object that absorbs energy transmitted by physical contact, thereby experiencing a change of state, and an instrument is a physical object that is manipulated by the agent in order to aVect a patient (cf. 1993: 490). If the roles involved do not correspond to archetypes, as is the case in (14), a sentence encoding this conceptualization is not prototypical but represents an extension of the prototype: (14) a. The children saw a movie. b. The students enjoyed the lecture. It is above all sentences representing marked encodings of archetypal models that are considered non-prototypical. These include sentences whose marking is based on lexical properties of the proWling verbs, and also those that would be derived by transformations from underlying structures in Generative Grammar. Sentences with the verb receive provide examples of the former case. Unlike sentences with the verb give, which encode a canonical act of transfer in an unmarked way with an agent as subject, a mover as direct object and a recipient as indirect object by reXecting the energy Xow characterized by Langacker, the situation is diVerent in the case of sentences with the verb receive. Here, a recipient is encoded as subject, a mover as direct object, and an agent as indirect object: (15) a. Bill gave the book to Mary. b. Mary received the book from Bill. Langacker assumes that the marked structure is motivated by a diVerent kind of proWling based on diVerent ways of conceptualizing the same act, whereby agent and mover are focused in the unmarked case and associated with elaborations of the trajector and the landmark, while in the marked case the recipient and the mover are focused. Passive sentences and sentences that are traditionally described in terms of dative shift or there-insertion provide examples of the second case. Unlike Chomsky’s Generative Grammar (including the PPT and the MP), but like LFG and HPSG, Cognitive Grammar does not allow transformations. Instead, diVerent kinds of linguistic encoding of the same semantic content are described as encodings of diVerent kinds of conceptualization, with each one being motivated individually. Thus, a

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passive sentence diVers from an active one in the prominence given to the role of patient, which is associated with the trajector of the verb and encoded as the subject (16b), whereas this is the role of the agent in the sentence’s active equivalent (16a): (16) a. The janitor opened this door. b. This door was opened by the janitor. In a sentence with dative shift, the roles of agent and recipient are focused by associating the role of agent with the trajector of the verb and the role of recipient with its primary landmark. The role of mover is associated with its secondary landmark (17b). In a corresponding sentence without dative shift, the roles of agent and mover are focused, and the role of mover is associated with the primary landmark, while the role of recipient is now associated with the non-focused secondary landmark (17a): (17) a. Bill gave the book to Mary. b. Bill gave Mary the book. There-constructions as in (18) (18) There is a frog in the bathtub. are described by Langacker analogously to sentences like (9a) and (10a), in which an encoding of the setting appears in a prominent position, resulting in there designating an ‘abstract setting’ in this function in English (1991a: 352). Langacker characterizes unaccusative constructions like that in (19), middle constructions such as in (20), and topicalizations as in (21), as well as many other constructions, as marked and therefore as nonprototypical: (19) The door opened. (20) The book sells well. (21) Weddings, they really leave me cold. In these cases, he describes the construction as being semantically motivated as the result of speciWc conceptualizations of given situations. The constructions form sentence schemas that are acquired by the speakers of a language and stored in their internal grammar and that can be activated at any time to encode or decode conceptualizations. According to Langacker, there is no syntax that is independent of semantics in the sense that it could not be explained in terms


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of semantics. This view will form part of the discussion in section 7.4.2. The aspects of Cognitive Grammar that have been presented here are suYcient to consider how syntactic categories are identiWed and described in this theoretical framework. 7.4 Towards an identification of syntactic categories in Cognitive Grammar Although Langacker neither identiWes nor describes syntactic categories, it seems legitimate to consider how Cognitive Grammar determines why certain linguistic units can appear in given positions in a well-formed sentence while others cannot. If units can appear in the same positions, they form a syntactic category. It is irrelevant for the description of such a category whether it is semantically motivated or whether it is more or less purely syntactic. What is relevant for the syntactic categorization of linguistic units in the framework of Cognitive Grammar is, to begin with, their assignment to ‘basic grammatical categories’ as well as to other word categories, and also the distribution of words that are assigned to these categories. The following remarks will Wrst address Langacker’s characterization of ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic grammatical categories’ and then turn to a description of the distribution of linguistic units within this model.

7.4.1 Basic and non-basic grammatical categories Langacker identiWes the categories noun, verb, adjective, adverb, and preposition or postposition as ‘basic grammatical categories’ (e.g. 1987: 189; cf. ibid. 214, 242). He also identiWes the categories determiner and quantiWer in the context of the structure of nominals (cf. 1991a: 81 V., 97 V.), and the categories auxiliary (ibid. 193 V.), connector (ibid. 423 V.), and complementizer (ibid. 439 V.) in the context of sentence structures, including complex sentences. These can be considered ‘non-basic grammatical categories’, although Langacker does not himself use this term. In all these cases, grammatical categories are semantically deWned. They are described as symbolic units with a semantic and a phonological pole, with the semantic pole determining categorization. Langacker claims that all the elements of a category share fundamental properties, which is expressed by their semantic poles each instantiating a single abstract schema. What these schemas are,

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how they are motivated and what subschemas are distinguished, will be shown in the following. As far as the semantic characterization of individual grammatical categories is concerned, it must be remembered that Cognitive Grammar does not consider ontological aspects but is concerned with conceptualizations. This immediately becomes apparent when looking at the characterization of the category ‘noun’, which is characterized as a nominal predication that designates or proWles a thing (cf. 1987: 189; 1991a: 15). This is described in terms of an abstract schema with a semantic pole [THING] and a variable or unspeciWed phonological pole [[THING]/[X]] (cf. e.g. 1986: 18) or [[THING]/[ . . . ]] (cf. 1991a: 46). Here, ‘THING’ does not stand for a thing as a physical object but for something that is conceptualized as a thing and characterized as a ‘region in some domain’ (e.g. 1987: 189). Domains provide the context for the conceptualization of regions. Langacker Wrst identiWes basic domains, including three- and two-dimensional space, time, colour, temperature, smell, taste, and kinaesthetic sensations, and then other abstract domains of diVerent kinds (cf. 1987: 148 f., 190 f.). According to this characterization, the latter presuppose the existence of basic domains. For example, a kinship network which contains terms that designate people, such as uncle, presupposes the domain of three-dimensional space. Abstract constructs that organize the course of time (January, Tuesday, or hour) presuppose the domain of time, and expressions such as word, sentence, paragraph, or chapter refer to the domain of written texts. Langacker deWnes ‘region’ as ‘a set of interconnected entities’ (1991a: 15), ‘entity’ being used ‘in a maximally general sense’ (ibid. 16) and comprising conceptualizations such as objects, relationships, locations, sensations, points on a scale, distances, etc. He explains the characterization of regions as ‘interconnected entities’ as follows: Two entities are said to be interconnected when those cognitive events whose occurrence constitutes their conception are coordinated as facets of an integrated, higher-order cognitive event. (1991a: 16) Additionally, this characterization includes the groupings expressed by archipelago, forest, or army and stellar constellations. Absence can also be conceptualized as a region, as in the designata of hole, dent, pause, or intermission.


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Following Langacker, regions can be bounded or unbounded. If a region is bounded, such as the designatum of lake, the linguistic expression used is a count noun, and if it is unbounded, as in the case of water, the corresponding expression is a mass noun. Count nouns are further subdivided into singular and plural count nouns, giving rise to three classes of nouns altogether. Abstract nouns such as fear, anger, or joy are not identiWed as a separate class but as expressions that can be used either as count nouns as in (22a), where fear designates a region in emotive space, or as mass nouns as in (22b), where the same expression designates an unbounded region: (22) a. Fear is very similar to anxiety. b. I’ve noticed a lot of fear and anxiety around here. (1991a: 29) One of the consequences of these analyses is that semantically more speciWc subschemas are identiWed for the abstract schema [[THING]/ [ . . . ]], which represents the category ‘noun’ as a semantic network. These subschemas correspond to the characterizations ‘bounded region, singular’, ‘bounded region, plural’, and ‘unbounded region’, but Langacker does not oVer any representations in terms of symbolic units. Finally, (lexical) instantiations of these subschemas are semantically and phonologically speciWc, with [[DAY]/[deı]] as an instantiation of ‘bounded region, singular’, [[ [DAY/[deı]]-[[PL]/[z]] ] as an instantiation of ‘bounded region, plural’, and [[FEAR]/ [fı#]] as an instantiation either of ‘bounded region, singular’ or of ‘unbounded region’. In addition to these speciWcations, subschemas which are instantiated by nouns must be speciWed for domains, for example [[PHYSICAL SPACE]/[ . . . ]] or [[TEMPORAL SPACE]/[ . . . ]], as well as for speciWcations similar to the subcategorization properties of nouns in the Standard Theory, for example [[HUMAN]/[ . . . ]] or [[MALE HUMAN]/[ . . . ]] (cf. e.g. 1991a: 59). Langacker postulates that nouns designate types, while nominals designate grounded instances of types. A ‘grounded instance’ is deWned as ‘an instance distinguished from others and situated with respect to speaker/hearer knowledge’ (1991a: 33). Grounding is eVected by determiners or by relative quantiWers. Determiners are deWnite and indeWnite articles and demonstratives, and the forms all, most, every, and each are relative quantiWers. Relative quantiWers specify a quantity relative to a reference mass, where the reference

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mass comprises the total quantity in the default case. By contrast, absolute quantiWers are those which specify the size of the proWled instance without simultaneously referring to the maximal extension of the relevant category. Hence, absolute quantiWers are forms like few, several, or nineteen. Langacker justiWes his division of quantiWers into two categories in terms of their semantic function and his assignment of relative quantiWers to the category of determiners, described schematically as [[G]/[ . . . ]] (cf. ibid. 157), by pointing out that absolute quantiWers can be combined with determiners, as in those three dogs or the many cats I have owned, and in the ungrammaticality that results from combining determiners and relative quantiWers: *the all dogs, *that every dog. Only absolute quantiWers are therefore classiWed as true quantiWers (cf. ibid. 82 f.) and schematically described as [[QNT]/[ . . . ]] (cf. ibid. 157). For Langacker, the order determiner, absolute quantiWer, and noun within a nominal iconically reXects the conceptual layering of the semantic functions: the innermost layer is constituted by the noun, which represents the head and speciWes the type, while the determiner, which grounds an instance of that type, forms the outermost layer. An absolute quantiWer can be situated between these in order to indicate a quantity, as can one or more adjectives that specify an intrinsic property of the entity designated by the noun and are thus located in its immediate vicinity, for example ‘(those (three (black (cats))))’ (cf. 1991a: 143). This form-meaning iconicity is in Langacker’s view further evidence of the semantic basis of syntactic phenomena. Moreover, the fact that proper names represent full nominals (unless they are used as common nouns) can also be explained on the basis of their semantics. For proper names like Stan Smith incorporate speciWcations of type (male and human), of quantity (singular), and of grounding (deWnite) (cf. 1991a: 59). Thus, they express all those semantic functions simultaneously that are otherwise – i.e. in a prototypical nominal – expressed separately by the nominal head, a quantiWer, and a determiner. Comparable statements apply to autonomous ‘grounding expressions’ such as that, these, or some and to personal pronouns like he or they. These forms are not described as a further class of nouns or as determiners but as non-prototypical nominals (cf. ibid. 148 V.). Schematically speaking, they are represented as [[GROUNDED THING]/[ . . . ]] (cf. e.g. ibid. 154). Langacker characterizes adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions as atemporal relations and describes all of them in terms of the abstract schema


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[[ATEMPORAL RELATION]]/[ . . . ]], and he characterizes verbs as temporal relations or processes and describes these in terms of the abstract schema [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]]. Atemporal relations and processes both establish relationships between entities, thus specifying trajectors and landmarks. The former are distinguished from processes by a diVerent mode of perception and a corresponding conceptualization of the components of the relations in question. According to Langacker, atemporal relations exhibit summary scanning, while temporal relations are characterized by sequential scanning. Summary scanning means that ‘the processing of conceptual components proceeds roughly in parallel’ (1987: 248), whereas sequential scanning means that ‘[t]he component states are processed in series rather than in parallel’ (ibid.). Langacker compares the former of the two modes of perception to examining a still photograph and the latter to watching a motion picture (cf. ibid.). While in the case of summary scanning the components are activated simultaneously as when looking at a photograph and are combined to form a coherent gestalt, sequential scanning ‘involves the successive transformations of one conWguration into another’ (ibid.). In claiming that adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions are represented by the abstract schema [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], Langacker assigns these to the same semantic category to begin with. An essential part of the characterization of this category is the speciWcation of e(laboration)-sites, distinguished as trajector and landmark, which correspond to the entities that are related to each other by the relational expressions. Adjectives, adverbs, and prepositions are then distinguished by the speciWcation of their trajectors and landmarks. Thus the trajector of an adjective is speciWed as [[THING]/[ . . . ]], while the trajector of an adverb is speciWed as the schema [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]]. This accounts for the fact that adjectives modify nouns and adverbs modify verbs (cf. e.g. 1991a: 43). Moreover, it is assumed for both adjectives and adverbs that they specify a landmark as an abstract THING schema that is normally not elaborated. Taking the adjective red as an example, Langacker states that its landmark is ‘the region in color space designated by the nominal red’ (1987: 219), and for the adverb fast he states that ‘its landmark is a region along a comparison scale for rate, and is thus construable as a thing’ (ibid.). Both are never elaborated, thus remaining without a phonological realization. Contrary to Langacker’s explicit claims (cf. section 7.3.1), this looks like assuming empty categories.

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Traditional prepositions are distinguished from adjectives and adverbs in the way their landmark is elaborated. Although speciWed as an abstract THING schema, as is the case with adjectives and adverbs, the landmark of prepositions is always elaborated. However, Langacker’s characterization diVers from the traditional characterization of prepositions in stating for some of them that they exhibit a landmark speciWed as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], an example being before in ‘She left before I arrived ’ (1987: 219), and in stating that particles in the context of verb-particle combinations, such as on in She turned the lights on, do not represent a separate category but ‘are simply prepositions employed in grammatical constructions where the landmark happens not to be elaborated’ (ibid. 243). Langacker is thus not referring to the traditional category preposition but as in the PPT, prepositions can be transitive or intransitive, or select sentential or clausal complements. For Langacker, prepositions diVer from adjectives and adverbs in that there are two ways of elaborating their trajectors: speciWcation as [[THING]/[ . . . ]] on the one hand, and speciWcation as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] on the other, thus modifying nominal heads and verbal heads respectively. It should be noted that particles and adverbs are not distinguished in this description, since they both represent the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] and are speciWed for a trajector of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] and for an unelaborated landmark of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]]. Together with other forms, including when, while, after, because, and if, Langacker also describes before as a connector (cf. 1991a: 423 V.). Connectors establish a link between a matrix clause and an embedded clause. Semantically, they proWle relations between two schematic events or situations, which is expressed by the fact that they represent the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], their trajector being elaborated by the matrix clause and their landmark by an embedded clause. Accordingly, both their trajector and their landmark are speciWed as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]]. In Langacker’s approach, complementizers, including the forms that, to, -ing, and zero, link a matrix clause and an embedded clause in a way comparable to connectors. However, he sees a decisive diVerence between connectors and complementizers in that the latter ‘make salient reference only to a single schematic process as part of their own internal structure’ (1991a: 424), and in that they ‘are plausibly analyzed as imposing an atemporal, perhaps even a nominal construal on the structures they combine with’ (ibid. 440). As part of a complement clause, they also


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diVer from connectors in that the constructions with which they combine elaborate the landmark, for example of verbs, while constructions with which connectors combine are adverbial clauses and function as modiWers. What is unclear, however, is what consequences this characterization has for the categorial description of complementizers. If complementizers specify only a single schematic process, they cannot belong to the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], and Langacker gives no answer to the question of what alternative there is. Verbs are characterized by Langacker as symbolic expressions whose semantic pole designates a process. A process is ascribed a positive temporal proWle, which Langacker explains as follows: ‘its [i.e. a processual predication’s] evolution through conceived time is scanned in sequential fashion’ (1987: 244). Hence, the category [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]] does not describe the type of an ontological event but the mode of perception, which is characterized as sequential and thus involving a certain amount of time. Langacker distinguishes perfective and imperfective processes. Perfective processes imply change, whereas imperfective ones imply ‘constancy through time’ (ibid. 255). This distinction is, for example, relevant for the combination of verbs and aspectual forms or verbs and tenses, and for their interpretation. The examples under (23) illustrate an imperfective verb, in this case resemble, and those under (24) contain a perfective verb, here the verb kick (cf. ibid. 255 f.): (23) a. J.P. resembles his father. b. *J.P. is resembling his father. (24) a. The middle linebacker kicks his dog. b. The middle linebacker is kicking his dog. While in (24a) the present tense of kick requires a special interpretation, namely that of habituality, this is not the case in (23a). Moreover, imperfective processes are incompatible with progressive aspect (23b), whereas this does not hold for perfective aspect (24b). If an imperfective verb is used to express a perfective process, as in (25), the combination with the progressive is possible: (25) J.P. is resembling his father more and more every day. Langacker notes that there are features shared by imperfective processes that are temporally unbounded and mass nouns that designate an unbounded region, as well as by perfective processes that are temporally bounded and count nouns that designate bounded regions.

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For instance, each partial process of an imperfective process corresponds to any other part of that process just as each part of an unbounded region corresponds to any other part of that region, which does not hold for perfective processes and bounded regions (cf. 1987: 259 V.). Just as the distinction between bounded and unbounded regions leads to a subdivision of the category ‘noun’, the category ‘verb’ can be subdivided into perfective and imperfective processes. The general schema [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] can accordingly be subdivided into the more speciWc subschemas [[PERFECTIVE PROCESS] /[ . . . ]] and [[IMPERFECTIVE PROCESS]/[ . . . ]]. Processes involve participants. By designating processes, verbs therefore express relations between processes and participants. This aspect is taken up in the description of verbs to the extent that ‘elaborationsites’ (e-sites) are represented in the context of [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] whose positions are comparable to argument positions in the PPT and are schematically represented to begin with [[THING]/[ . . . ]], for example, and then instantiated or elaborated by speciWc schemas. If more than one participant is involved, the verb’s semantics proWles processes in which participants are more or less prominent, that is, more or less focused. The most prominent participant corresponds to the trajector and the less prominent one (or ones) to the landmark. If more than two participants are involved, a distinction is made between the ‘primary landmark’ or ‘landmark1’ and the ‘secondary landmark’ or ‘landmark2’. The categorial speciWcation of e-sites depends on what conceptual model is designated by a verb. In the case of the canonical event model, the trajector and the landmark are speciWed as [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and ultimately realized as nominals. If a verb designates the canonical act of transfer, involving three participants whose roles are that of agent, mover, and recipient, the verb exhibits three e-sites, i.e. trajector, landmark1, and landmark2, which are all speciWed as [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and thus realized as nominals. In the unmarked case, the role of the agent is associated with the trajector that becomes the subject, the role of the mover is associated with landmark1 and becomes the direct object, and the role of the recipient is associated with landmark2 and becomes the indirect object. If a verb designates a canonical verb of motion and therefore a participant moves along a path, two e-sites are speciWed, i.e. trajector and landmark, with the trajector that becomes the subject being speciWed as [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and the landmark that is ultimately realized as a PP being speciWed as [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]]. Verbs that designate the


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canonical model of a static situation are described in the same way. The only diVerence is that in the Wrst case the trajector is associated with the participant role of mover, and in the second case with the role ‘zero’ (cf. section 7.3.3). Since Cognitive Grammar, like LFG and HPSG but unlike, for instance, the PPT, does not allow syntactic transformations, one important question is how unaccusative or ergative verbs, such as the intransitive versions of open, roll, or crack, or raising verbs like seem are described. In the case of unaccusative or ergative verbs, the PPT assumes that an internal argument is licensed in D-structure which is moved into subject position because the verb lacks Case properties. In the case of raising verbs, the PPT assumes that the subject of the embedded clause is moved out of its D-structure position, which is not a Case position, into the subject position of the matrix clause so that it can be assigned Case: (26)

[the door]i opened ti.

(27)

Maryi seemed ti to win the race.

According to Langacker, the description of unaccusative verbs is absolutely unproblematic even without assuming transformations. He claims that transitive variants like open in John opened the door specify a trajector and a landmark, with the trajector being associated with the agent’s role and the landmark with that of the theme, and that the subject of the sentence elaborates the (agentive) trajector. The intransitive – that is, the unaccusative – variant is only speciWed for a trajector, which is associated with the role of the theme in this case and is ultimately elaborated by the subject (cf. 1991a: 387). Langacker describes the diVerence between unaccusative and unergative intransitive verbs such as walk, jump, or swim by positing that in the case of the latter the trajector is associated with the role of agent and a landmark is schematically speciWed and associated with the role of the theme or mover but not elaborated. For the verbs given here, he also notes that the trajector and the landmark refer to the same participant, which then fulWls both the role of agent and that of theme or mover (cf. ibid. 389). Raising verbs such as seem are not directly described by Langacker. However, he uses the raising adjective likely (e.g. Sheila is likely to win the race) to illustrate his general idea of a description of raising structures (cf. 1991a: 449 V.). Two related senses are assumed for likely which evoke the same conceptual content. Both take a region on a scale

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of probability as their landmark and specify ‘that a process falls within the landmark region’ (ibid. 453). In the context of the basic sense of likely (For Sheila to win the race is likely), the process that is under a nominal construal itself becomes the trajector. In the extended sense of the raising variant, it is not the process but a participant in the process that is focused and expressed by the trajector. The process itself, expressed by the inWnitive, in this case becomes the secondary landmark. Applied to verbs such as seem, two variants are also distinguished here. In the case of the raising variant as in Mary seemed to win the race, Mary is focused as a participant in the process by elaborating the trajector of seem, while the inWnitive to win the race is elaborated as a secondary landmark. Here, the trajector of win is not elaborated but is equated with the trajector of seem. As in the case of likely, a region on a scale of probability is schematically speciWed as the primary landmark, and the process expressed by the inWnitive is located within this region. As the examples show, verbs are classiWed not only as designating perfective or imperfective processes, but also in terms of the number of e-sites for which they are speciWed and in terms of how these are categorially represented, what syntactic function (e.g. subject) is assigned to them, and whether they are elaborated or are represented on an exclusively schematic basis. These speciWcations represent part of the syntactic environment of verbs and are relevant for determining the syntactic categorization of speciWc lexical verbal units. The categorial speciWcation of e-sites depends on what is focused. The examples have illustrated that this can be a THING, represented as a nominal, or an ATEMPORAL RELATION, represented for instance by a PP. Theoretically, this could be a PROCESS, elaborated as a sentence or inWnitive, with a verb identiWed as proWle determinant, as in I know she painted it or Mary seemed to win the race. However, the discussion of complementizers, including that, to, -ing, and zero (see above), showed that Langacker assumes that in these cases too they atemporalize or even nominalize processes, from which it can be inferred that the landmark is either described as [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] or as [[THING]/[ . . . ]]. By analogy with the description of nominals, Langacker also describes verbs as types that are grounded when used to describe processes. This function is assigned to the tenses, which accordingly have the same function in a verbal context as determiners in a nominal context. It is also assigned to modal auxiliaries such as may, can, shall, etc. (cf. 1991a: 241 V.). Tenses and modal auxiliaries are distinguished with reference to


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an epistemic model which speciWes four epistemic regions, namely ‘immediate reality’, ‘non-immediate reality’, ‘immediate irreality’, and ‘nonimmediate irreality’, and which assigns to the tenses and to the modals the function of grounding processes in speciWc regions (cf. ibid. 245 V.). Semantically, Langacker describes modal auxiliaries as representatives of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] which specify a landmark as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] that is elaborated by a verb type, and which also specify a trajector that is equated with the trajector of their landmark and is ultimately elaborated as the subject of a sentence. Langacker distinguishes auxiliaries that form constructions with the participle form of verbs from modal auxiliaries. While the latter are like the tenses in serving as grounding elements and thus combine with verbs in their unmarked form, the non-modal auxiliaries include: be1, the auxiliary that forms a progressive construction together with -ing; be2, which forms the passive construction together with a variant of the perfect morpheme PERF, (PERF3); and have, which forms a perfect construction with a diVerent variant of the perfect morpheme (PERF4). The morphemes -ing and PERF are initially given the function of atemporalizing a process. Accordingly, participles represent the semantic category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] (cf. 1991a: 202 V.). Langacker describes the variants of the perfect morpheme PERF1 and PERF2 as those morphemes that form the intransitive or transitive verb forms of the so-called adjectival passive (cf. ibid. 202): (28) Your jaw is swollen. (29) This car is undoubtedly stolen. The auxiliaries are described as representatives of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] which form the head of a clause or sentence and which are speciWed for both a trajector and a landmark. The landmark is elaborated by a participle and is thus speciWed as [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] with a corresponding restriction, i.e. as -ing, PERF3 or PERF4. In the case of be1 and have, the trajector corresponds to that of the verb from which the participle is derived and is elaborated by the subject of the sentence. In the case of be2, which combines with PERF3 to form a passive construction, the landmark of the verb becomes the trajector and ultimately the subject of the sentence. By contrast, the trajector of the verb is implicit and unidentiWed, which means that it is not elaborated but can be equated with the landmark of a by-phrase: The door was opened by the butler (cf. 1991a: 337).

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Langacker describes the verbal complex as consisting of a tense morpheme or a modal auxiliary combined with an unmarked verb form or an auxiliary, which in turn combines with a participle construction to express an aspect, and he notes that there are analogies between Wnite clauses and nominals (cf. 1991a: 194 V.). He also sees analogies between the function of quantiWers and aspectual markers, whose contribution in both cases is that of indicating quantity, and the function of nominal and verbal heads, which express the conceptual content of the construction. In analogy to nominals, he points out that for verbal complexes, the conceptual layering of these semantic functions tends to reXect their grammatical constituent structure iconically. This issue will be taken up in section 7.4.2. Langacker’s identiWcation and description of grammatical categories can be summarized as follows: proceeding from the traditional parts of speech of noun, verb, adjective, adverb, preposition, and conjunction, the last-named being subdivided into connectors and complementizers, Langacker describes grammatical categories as symbolic units in the form of abstract schemas with a semantic pole that determines the category and a phonological pole. The result of this description is, to begin with, an identiWcation of only three categories, i.e. [[THING]/ [ . . . ]], [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], and [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]. Each of these categories has the structure of a schematic network as illustrated in section 7.3.2 by the example of the semantic category [TREE]. The schemas and subschemas in this network Wrst of all diVer with respect to their inherent properties. As far as the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] is concerned, these are for example the properties ‘count’ and ‘mass’, and as regards the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], properties like ‘perfective’ and ‘imperfective’. Other inherent properties such as the speciWcation of a particular domain are relevant too. Categories also diVer in terms of their contextual properties, that is, in the type and the number of e-sites speciWed. Thus, schemas of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] can either specify a trajector and a landmark of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] or a trajector of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and a landmark of the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]]. For the categories [[THING]/[ . . . ]] and [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], Langacker identiWes a prototypical schema which for [[THING]/[ . . . ]] is the schema representing a physical object, and for [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] is the schema representing an asymmetrical energetic interaction involving an agent and a patient (cf. e.g. 2000: 10). The prototypical schema forms the centre of the category with which


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the other schemas of the network are connected in terms of elaboration and extension. The situation is somewhat diVerent with regard to the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], which comprises all those units that are traditionally assigned to the parts of speech of adjective, adverb, preposition, and conjunction. Apart from intrinsic properties, which Langacker scarcely considers, the units of this category diVer in the way their e-sites are speciWed. Thus, in the context of [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] a trajector and a landmark can be speciWed as [[THING]/[ . . . ]]. If both are to be elaborated, the unit corresponds to a traditional preposition, which can in this case participate in the modiWcation of nouns. If the landmark is not to be elaborated, the unit corresponds to a traditional adjective. In addition, the trajector can be speciWed as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] and the landmark as [[THING]/[ . . . ]]. If both are to be elaborated, again the unit corresponds to the part of speech ‘preposition’ and can in this case participate in the modiWcation of verbs. If the landmark is not to be elaborated, the unit corresponds to the part of speech ‘adverb’, including particles in the context of verb-particle combinations. If, Wnally, the trajector and the landmark are both speciWed as [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]], the unit corresponds to a traditional conjunction of the type that Langacker calls ‘connector’. The same speciWcation of the landmark is also assumed for units of the second type of traditional conjunction, complementizers, although here it is unclear whether there is speciWcation or elaboration of a trajector. This is because complementizers either atemporalize or nominalize those constituents that they form with their landmark. In the former case, a trajector should be speciWed, and in the latter no trajector should be speciWed. Due to the heterogeneity of the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/ [ . . . ]], no overall prototype is identiWed. Apart from the grammatical categories that correspond to the parts of speech noun, verb, adjective, adverb, preposition, and conjunction, Langacker identiWes the categories determiner and quantiWer as constituents of nominals, and modal and non-modal auxiliaries as constituents of verbal complexes or Wnite clauses. He attributes semantic functions to each of these categories, noting analogies between determiners and modal auxiliaries and also between quantiWers and nonmodal auxiliaries. Here, determiners and modal auxiliaries (apart from the tenses) serve the function of grounding an expression in a situation, and quantiWers as well as non-modal auxiliaries (together with

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-ing or a variant of the perfect morpheme PERF) serve the function of specifying the quantity of the type designated by the construction of the head. The following section will illustrate the relevance of Langacker’s description of basic and non-basic grammatical categories for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories within the framework of Cognitive Grammar. It will also address the question of what else plays a role in their identiWcation and description.

7.4.2 Grammatical constructions and distribution Questions regarding the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories within the framework of a grammatical theory focus on how a particular theory determines which linguistic items can occupy which positions in well-formed sentences. Items that can occupy the same positions, thus being interchangeable in given positions and having the same distribution, form a syntactic category. Accordingly, the following section will show how syntactic categories should be identiWed and described within the framework of Cognitive Grammar. Langacker himself holds the view that the distribution of linguistic items – linguistic ‘units’ in his terms – is not totally predictable and that therefore the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories is not possible. The reasons he gives for this view will be considered here, and a concluding evaluation of his approach will reveal that his reasons for claiming that the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories is impossible are only secondary compared to other by far more serious ones. In order to determine the distribution of linguistic items and thus to identify and describe syntactic categories within the framework of Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, the following assumptions presented in the preceding sections are relevant: well-formed sentences of a language are complex symbolic units which consist of a semantic and a phonological pole; they are grammatical constructions which correspond to complex conventional constructional schemas. They are composed of less complex conventional grammatical constructions and ultimately of simple symbolic units. Both grammatical constructions and simple symbolic units belong to grammatical categories, which are described as schematic networks and include schemas and subschemas that exhibit distinct properties and are speciWed at various levels of abstraction. Two types of grammatical construction are distinguished. There are those featuring a ‘classical’ or ‘well-behaved’ constituent


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hierarchy, which are considered prototypical, and constructions which deviate from the prototypes. As a result of this distinction, the conditions determining possible positions for linguistic items and thus for identifying and describing syntactic categories also diVer. The following discussion will begin by considering the Wrst type, i.e. prototypical grammatical constructions. At Wrst glance, prototypical grammatical constructions in Cognitive Grammar are comparable to structures that are also described or constructed in the PPT, the MP, and HPSG. Just as in these models, they are constructed bottom-up, starting from the grammatical properties of lexical units, or ‘low-level structures’ in Langacker’s terms (e.g. 1987: 414). Here, two components are combined to yield a composite structure. One of these components becomes the head of the structure in the sense that the composite structure is speciWed for the same (semantic) category as the head. And just as in the models mentioned, complements and modiWers are identiWed within a structure and described in such a way that the hierarchical structures of the composite structures satisfy the X-bar schema. However, there is a major diVerence between the structures of the PPT, the MP, and HPSG on the one hand, and those of Cognitive Grammar on the other, since in the approaches of the Wrst group these are syntactic structures which are ordered hierarchically and linearly, whereas they are semantic structures in Cognitive Grammar whose hierarchical order is described at the semantic pole. The linear order, which is relevant for syntactic structures, is described in Cognitive Grammar at the phonological pole.14 As demonstrated in section 7.3.3, prototypical grammatical structures of Cognitive Grammar are characterized by the fact that the components of the semantic pole correspond to the components of the phonological pole, which means that conceptual groupings correspond to phonological groupings. However, this does not include linear order within the components and between the components. Thus, syntactic structures, and consequently also syntactic categories, are determined in this grammar on the one hand by conditions which restrict the formation of structures at the semantic pole, and on the other hand by conditions which restrict the formation of structures at the phonological pole. These two types of conditions will be considered in turn. 14 As Langacker remarks in this context: ‘Linear order is actually temporal order in the speech stream. As such, this aspect of symbolic assemblies is speciWed at the phonological pole of each symbolic structure’ (2003: 75). See also Langacker (1997: 3).

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The most important condition on the well-formedness of grammatical constructions at the semantic pole is integration as described in section 7.3.2. This condition requires that at least one of the two components that are combined to yield a composite structure is relational, that is, either of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] or of the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], and is thus speciWed for at least one e-site. When the two components are combined, this e-site is elaborated by the other component, which is only possible if the categorial speciWcation of this component corresponds to that of the e-site. In general, this means that the semantic category for which the e-site is speciWed, for example [[THING]/[ . . . ]], must correspond to the category of the elaborating component. Since, however, structures are built ‘bottom-up’, i.e. starting from lexical units which form speciWc rather than abstract symbolic units, as shown in section 7.3.1, a speciWcation in terms of the maximally schematic level of categorization, for example [[THING]/[ . . . ]], is not suYcient for integration. If it were, combinations like . . . bake an hour or . . . since the cake would be well-formed. Langacker argues that bake and hour as well as since and cake are speciWed for diVerent types of domain. Therefore, successful integration requires a categorial speciWcation of the e-sites and of the elaborating lexical units at a lower level of abstraction within the schematic network of a grammatical category. It requires a speciWcation of subschemas which takes into account, for instance, the type of domain as well as various other semantic speciWcations which account for the compatibility of e-sites, i.e. the contextual properties of relational units, and of their potential elaborations and instantiations. Thus, for example, the e-site of think which becomes a trajector and its potential elaborations would have to be speciWed as [[HUMAN THING]/[ . . . ]], and the e-site of pregnant which becomes a trajector and its potential elaborations would have to be speciWed as [FEMALE THING]/[ . . . ]]. By determining which components can combine to yield a grammatical construction, the condition of integration and the prerequisites for successful realization impose restrictions on the distribution of linguistic units. Consequently, the semantic part of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories includes information on the grammatical category that lexical units – or linguistic units in general – belong to, and the e-sites they can elaborate. Langacker calls the Wrst kind of information ‘intrinsic properties’ and the second kind ‘extrinsic properties’ (cf. 1991a: 521). As shown above, these properties cannot be restricted to a speciWcation of the maximally


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abstract schema of the particular grammatical category involved but have to refer to more speciWc subschemas of this category. However, there is a large number of subschemas and there are many types. In addition, both are subject to constant modiWcation. The meanings of all the lexical items that are traditionally assigned to the part of speech ‘noun’, for example, have to be mapped onto subschemas of the grammatical category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] within the schematic network. The fact that the subschemas are subject to constant modiWcation is apparent from the fact that new subschemas can always be added to each schematic network that describes the semantic category of a lexical unit, for instance, by means of the process of extension. This was illustrated in section 7.3.2 with the example [TREE]. This process often includes an extension of the use of a lexical unit into a domain other than the original one. This can be seen in the extension of the use of the originally temporal since into the causal domain, or the extension of the use of head, originally related only to the corporal domain, into the domain of committees to denote a person in charge. The large number and the Xexibility of the subschemas of a grammatical category pose problems with regard to the formulation of the distribution of lexical units and thus for the description of syntactic categories, something which Langacker himself emphasizes. This issue and its consequences will be discussed later. However, it should be noted here that the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories is to a large extent co-determined by the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of lexical units, properties which are described in terms of subschemas of grammatical categories and which represent the condition for the successful integration of components and thus for the formation of grammatical constructions at the semantic pole. Further conditions on the well-formedness of grammatical constructions at the semantic pole and therefore also for the distribution and syntactic categorization of lexical units result from Langacker’s remarks on nominals and Wnite clauses or verbal complexes and his identiWcation of the semantic functions of grounding and quantiWcation in these two contexts (cf. section 7.4.1). From this it follows that a nominal is well-formed if a nominal head is combined with a determiner as a grounding expression and, optionally, a quantiWer as a quantifying expression. It also follows that a Wnite clause is wellformed if its verbal head is combined with a tense element or a modal auxiliary as a grounding expression and, in addition and

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again optionally, with a non-modal auxiliary together with a participle morpheme as a quantifying expression. Thus, the distribution of determiners and quantiWers is restricted to constructions with a nominal head, and the distribution of tense elements and modal auxiliaries as well as of non-modal auxiliaries and participle morphemes is restricted to constructions with verbal heads. What is also relevant to the distribution is the conceptual layering, which initially yields a combination of head and quantifying expression, which may be preceded by a combination of head and modiWer, and which ultimately results in a combination with a grounding expression. Conceptual layering thus accounts for the positioning of expressions within the hierarchical structure of the construction at the semantic pole. Turning now to the conditions of well-formedness at the phonological pole, the linear order of lexical units is determined on the basis of ‘temporal contiguity’ (e.g. Langacker 1997: 13; 2000: 160). Langacker does not go into detail on this subject for reasons that will become clear later, and he merely uses canonical examples to illustrate tendencies according to which the linear order of components is also semantically motivated and manifests itself as an iconic form-meaning relation. Three examples will be used to demonstrate this. The Wrst example relates to the relative order of verbs and their elaborated e-sites in sentences that express the canonical event model, the second concerns the positioning of sentence adverbials, and the third example deals with the relative order of expressions within nominals. As illustrated in section 7.3.3, transitive active sentences represent the prototypical encoding of the canonical event model. They involve an agent and a patient which both participate in energetic interaction to the extent that energy, as expressed by the verb, Xows from one participant to the other. This is reXected iconically in the sentence by the fact that the verb is speciWed for two e-sites, one of which corresponds to the agent, is prominent, and becomes the trajector that is elaborated by the subject (which precedes the verb), while the other esite corresponds to the patient, is less prominent, becomes the landmark, and is elaborated by the direct object (which follows the verb). According to Langacker, the result is an arrangement subject – verb – object (SVO) which reXects the energy Xow from agent to patient, as in Bill hit his dog. Langacker is right in merely speaking of a tendency, which he identiWes especially for English, but even here it applies only to canonical cases. A prerequisite for identifying iconicity is the SVO word order that is characteristic of English. If the word order is


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diVerent, iconicity cannot be established as easily.15 What is more, doubts may especially be expressed with regard to such an assumption in view of languages which, like German, require a diVerent word order in main and subordinate clauses. Following Langacker, examples (30a) and (30b), below, would have to be analysed in terms of diVerent ways of conceptualizing the energy Xow underlying these two sentence structures. However, there is scarcely any plausible explanation for this. (30) a. Hans schlug seinen Hund (¼ SVO). b. dass Hans seinen Hund schlug (¼ SOV). Examples (31a) and (31b) show the positioning of sentence adverbials: (31) a. In the kitchen, Floyd broke the glass. b. Floyd broke the glass in the kitchen. Langacker claims that the peripheral position of sentence adverbials is iconic in that they encode the setting of a scene, expressing the fact that the setting wholly includes the event. However, it should be noted that this view, and hence also the assumption of iconicity, can refer initially only to English. Since in German both peripheral and non-peripheral positioning are possible, as illustrated in example (32c), it should follow for Langacker that in the latter case the event is not included in the setting, or that at least a diVerent kind of conceptualization is encoded: (32) a. In der Ku¨che zerbrach Floyd das Glas. b. Floyd zerbrach das Glas in der Ku¨che. c. Floyd zerbrach in der Ku¨che das Glas. This, however, is not the case. Instead it can be claimed that (32c) is the unmarked variant, whereas (32a) and (32b) give the sentence adverbial a certain degree of prominence, which is not unusual for peripheral positions. This however, has nothing to do with the iconicity-based interpretation proposed by Langacker.16 As far as the arrangement of expressions within nominals is concerned, Langacker points out that here the conceptual layering is reXected iconically (cf. section 7.4.1). Thus, a closer conceptual relationship between 15 Here, the reader is referred to Langacker’s discussion of the universality of semantic ‘construal’ and the alignment of linguistic expressions as well as to the explanation he gives for the fact that languages are nevertheless diVerent (1993c). 16 In this context, it is interesting to consider publications that deal with iconicity of word order in typologically diVerent languages (van Langendock 1995), and in particular in German (Askedal 1995).

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grounding, quantifying, or modifying expressions and the head is reXected in their being positioned closer to the head. In (those(three (black(cats) ) ) ), for example, the modifying expression black has the closest conceptual relationship to the head cats and is therefore positioned closest to it. The conceptual relationship of the quantifying expression three to the head is less close, which is reXected by its more distant position. The loosest conceptual relationship to the head is identiWed for the grounding expression those, which is, according to Langacker, reXected by the fact that it is positioned at the greatest distance from the head. One only has to compare the above example with nominal constructions whose modifying expression is realized by a prepositional phrase rather than an adjective, as in those three cats with black spots, to demonstrate that closer conceptual relationship and relative positioning with regard to the nominal head are interdependent only to a limited extent. In fact, in this example the modifying and the quantifying expression seem to show equal proximity to the head, which thus has no implications for an interpretation of conceptual proximity. The fact that Langacker’s identiWcation of an iconic positioning of grounding, quantifying, and modifying expressions relative to the head is rather problematic is clear from a consideration of verbal constructions, for which Langacker claims a situation parallel to the corresponding expressions in nominal constructions. It can hardly be assumed for examples like he walked fast that the positioning of the modiWer fast in relation to the head walk exhibits a greater degree of proximity than the positioning of the grounding expression -ed. For Langacker, this observation – as well as the fact that there are other cases in which iconicity can only be identiWed to an extremely limited extent – is unproblematic, since he posits iconicity as merely a tendency anyway (cf. e.g. 1991a: 54; 1997: 9 f.), and as one applying to canonical examples (whose status is, by the way, not entirely clear). The linear order of components in grammatical constructions is ultimately determined by conventional constructional schemas or grammatical patterns, which form the equivalent of constructional rules and, taken all together, constitute the grammar of a language. These conventional constructional schemas sanction novel structures and thus ultimately represent the only conditions on well-formedness at the phonological pole. From this it follows that the distribution of linguistic items and hence their syntactic categorization in the prototypical grammatical constructions that have been considered here is


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determined on the one hand by their intrinsic and extrinsic properties, represented by categorial subschemas. On the other hand it is represented by conventional constructional schemas or grammatical patterns in which they are positioned on the grounds of these properties. This entails that the positions in the constructional schemas or grammatical patterns are speciWed not only for abstract schemas of grammatical categories such as [[THING]/[ . . . ]] but also for less abstract subschemas which correspond to the subschemas that represent the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of linguistic units. Langacker accounts for this fact by regarding grammatical constructions as well as grammatical categories and the semantic categories of lexical units as complex categories which form a schematic network. This network is composed of schemas and subschemas at various levels of speciWcity, as shown in the [TREE] example in section 7.3.3, with the schemas and subschemas being connected to each other via the relationships of elaboration and extension (cf. e.g. 1987: 409 V.; 1991a: 7; 2000: 20). As far as the syntactic conditions on the well-formedness of sentences are concerned, this implies that not only abstract constructional schemas but also speciWc elaborations and extensions of these represent rules and thus constitute the grammar of a language. 7.5 Some problems in the identification of syntactic categories The considerations above have the following consequences for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in Cognitive Grammar. The distribution of linguistic units is dependent on the one hand on their intrinsic and extrinsic properties, which are described in terms of subschemas of the schematic networks of grammatical categories. On the other hand it is dependent on constructional schemas, which are described in terms of networks of schemas and subschemas. These two factors, alongside the fact that schematic networks are variable by deWnition because of the processes of elaboration and extension, mean that it is ultimately not possible to fully predict the distribution of linguistic items (cf. e.g. 1987: 316 V., 421; 1991a: 523). Thus, syntactic categories are not fully identiWable and describable either, which Wrst of all applies to prototypical grammatical constructions. If, however, this applies to prototypical grammatical constructions, which could be termed the ‘regular’ patterns, it applies even more to those that are non-prototypical, which, as illustrated in

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section 7.3.3, deviate from the prototypical ones in various and unpredictable ways, or, in Langacker’s terms, ‘in myriad ways’ (2003: 57).17 Moreover, this implies that the number of syntactic categories will likewise increase inWnitely. As a result, syntactic categories can ultimately not be identiWed and described in Cognitive Grammar, something which Langacker does not consider a deWciency of this approach but rather a feature of natural languages. Instead he sees deWciencies in those grammars that are solely concerned with the description of regular grammatical constructions, do not give any consideration to other cases and are consequently not able to account for the sum of language-speciWc properties of a particular language. Such grammars, and Generative Grammar in particular, are characterized by Langacker as ‘reductive’ and ‘minimalist’ (cf. e.g. 2000: 91), and are contrasted with the non-reductive and maximalist nature of Cognitive Grammar as the more appropriate approach. ‘Maximalist’ in this case is equated with ‘usage-based’ and contrasts with ‘competence-based’. It refers to the fact that Cognitive Grammar respects the variability of grammatical categories and constructions, a feature that is often dependent on individual speakers and situations. However, a signiWcant objection to this view is that the stable portion of a natural language, which guarantees problem-free communication between speakers of this language, is far greater than the portion that is variable. Applied to Langacker’s conception of grammatical categories and constructions, this means that a huge number of the subschemas which he postulates as part of the schematic networks of the grammatical categories and constructions are stable and a much smaller number are variable. The variability of grammatical categories and constructions thus poses only a peripheral problem for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar. What is much more serious is the lack of an adequate basis for the description of grammatical categories and constructions. Thus, although Langacker notes that grammatical categories and constructions form schematic networks composed of schemas and subschemas at various levels of abstraction or speciWcity, he fails to provide even a single example in his numerous publications in which such a network is actually described. In fact, he does not even describe part of such a network that is 17 Examples to illustrate this can be found in Langacker (1988d: 108 V.; 1997: 22 V.; 2000: 165 V.).


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suYciently large to illustrate his analysis. The example of the semantic category [TREE] presented in section 7.3.2 and quoted here at various points gives no more than an idea of such a network, and the representation of the abstract schema [TREE’’] and the subschemas [TREE’] and [TREE] is anything but revealing. In order to describe the distribution of linguistic units, which requires correspondence of the subschemas of the components of a construction, and thus in order to describe syntactic categories, an essential prerequisite is a description of these subschemas. Yet in Langacker’s approach it is not even clear on what basis such subschemas are to be described. He suggests – presumably in order to emphasize the relevance of imagery to the analysis of language – that pictorial diagrams be used for the description of grammatical categories, with, for example, the most abstract schema of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] being represented by a circle (cf. e.g. 1987: 220; 1991b: 297). He then represents the most speciWc subschemas of the category, which represent the subschemas that describe nominal lexical units, by means of pictorial diagrams of the entities designated by these units, that is by means of schematic drawings, for instance for lamp (1986: 33; 1991b: 302), snake (1988b: 66), football (1987: 289), Wsh (1988d: 116), tree (1992: 489), man (1988d: 102), cat (1987: 95; 1988d: 102), and silverware, the latter represented by drawings of a spoon, a knife, and a fork (1988b: 57). The description of the most abstract schema as well as of some very speciWc subschemas of the schematic network on the basis of pictorial diagrams raises the question of how subschemas that can be found between these extremes are described on this basis. How, for example, are the subschemas [ANIMATE THING] (¼ [ANIMAL]), [HUMAN THING], or [FEMALE THING] represented as pictorial diagrams? For these are subschemas whose description is essential for the integration of the corresponding lexical units in order to elaborate the trajector of verbs like die or think, or of an adjective like pregnant. In addition, it is unclear what pictorial diagrams for nominal lexical units such as love, fear, time, government, and the like, or for adjectival lexical units such as nice, stupid, interesting, etc. could look like. In both cases the answer obviously must be that Langacker’s pictorial diagrams fail to provide an adequate basis for the description of schemas and subschemas of the schematic network of a grammatical category. In fact, Langacker himself admits that ‘they are very awkward’ (1987: 312). However, he does not say that they are unsuitable for their intended purpose. On the other hand, he uses a diVerent basis for the description of schemas

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and subschemas, namely the verbal representation of concepts like [THING], [TREE], or [ADULT FELINE] (cf. 1988a: 21). Although such a representation would indeed be suitable for the description of subschemas, Langacker does not employ this kind of representation to illustrate the mechanism for integrating components. In failing to do so, he gives the impression that describing the mechanisms for integrating components and thus for the formation of complex structures by starting from simple units and employing the means of grammar is no concern of his, since he expressly denies that Cognitive Grammar is a ‘constructive device’: In a sense, cognitive grammar contrasts with generative theories by placing a lesser descriptive burden on the grammar of a language per se; it does not consider the grammar a constructive device – i.e. the grammar is not responsible for assembling novel expressions out of their component parts and giving them as ‘output,’ either in the active sense suggested by the process metaphor or in the mathematical sense of recursive enumeration. (1987: 64 f.)

Instead he seems to consider it suYcient to roughly illustrate how integration works and what a speaker has to do when constructing sentences. This is suggested by the following statement: Putting together novel expressions is something that speakers do, not grammars. It is a problem-solving activity that demands a constructive eVort and occurs when linguistic convention is put to use in speciWc circumstances. (1987: 65)

This is, however, contradicted by the following remark: In sum, a language does have a conventionally determined structure that children have to learn speciWcally and linguists have to describe explicitly. (1999: 19)

Langacker has so far failed to give an explicit description of what ‘conventionally determined structure’ means both with regard to the schematic networks of the grammatical categories he identiWes and with regard to the schematic networks of even a small portion of the ‘myriad structural patterns a speaker learns’ (1999: 21). And this is ultimately the reason why syntactic categories can be neither identiWed nor described in his conception of Cognitive Grammar. There are, in addition, fundamental problems that relate to Langacker’s general approach to the description of grammatical categories.


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He presents his identiWcation of the three grammatical categories [[THING]/[ . . . ]], [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], and [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] by starting with the traditional parts of speech noun, verb, adjective, preposition, and adverb, and characterizes them on a conceptual basis corresponding to perceptual processes. Accordingly, the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] is described as corresponding to an entity perceived as a ‘region in some domain’, the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] as corresponding to a relation between entities perceived via ‘sequential scanning’, and the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] as corresponding to a relation between entities perceived via ‘summary scanning’ (cf. section 7.4.1). This description of categories is questionable, however, since it is unlikely that linguistic expressions can be used adequately on the basis of this characterization alone. That is, would a speaker categorize, for example, behaviour as in his behaviour during the meeting was awful as a member of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]] or rather as a member of the category [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]] because its designation can be perceived only via ‘sequential scanning’? And would a speaker assign adjectives like boring or interesting as in that book was boring/interesting to the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]] or rather to the category [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]] since again their designation is perceived via ‘sequential scanning’ rather than ‘summary scanning’? And last but not least, what justiWes Langacker’s description of modal auxiliaries like may or can as members of the category [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]] (cf. 1991a: 238) – except for the fact that according to him Wnite clauses focus processes and auxiliaries are heads of clauses? Numerous additional examples could be added that shed doubt on the adequacy of Langacker’s categorizations and their motivation. The problems addressed here suggest that Langacker’s categorization is determined more by his intention to assign traditional parts of speech to cognitive categories than by the particular conceptualizations he postulates for the designation of the expressions in question. For Langacker assigns all those items traditionally identiWed as nouns to the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]], all those items traditionally identiWed as verbs, including auxiliary ‘verbs’, to the category [[PROCESS]/ [ . . . ]], and all those items traditionally identiWed as adjectives, prepositions, and adverbs to the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/ [ . . . ]]. This leads to further problems as Langacker takes it for granted that items must be diVerentiated if they belong traditionally to diVerent parts of speech, even where his categorization does not support this

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analysis. On the other hand, he does not diVerentiate between items if they belong traditionally to the same part of speech, even where diVerentiation is necessary. For example, he describes adjectives and prepositions as representing the category [[ATEMPORAL RELATION]/[ . . . ]], with both specifying [[THING]/[ . . . ]] as their trajector. This speciWcation allows adjectives as well as prepositions, or rather prepositional phrases, which share the properties of their prepositional head, to be used as modiWers of units of the category [[THING]/[ . . . ]]. Given this, how does a speaker of English know that in English adjectives but not prepositional phrases are used as prenominal modiWers? Furthermore, how does a speaker know that in English some adjectives can be used only prenominally or attributively (e.g. main), others only predicatively (e.g. sorry), and others attributively as well as predicatively (e.g. tall) (cf. e.g. Bolinger 1967)? Langacker’s description allows no distinction. This holds for prepositions or prepositional phrases too, which also exhibit diVerent syntactic behaviour in that some but not all of them can, for example, be speciWed by right and can be replaced by proforms. Here, a distinction should be made at least between governed or functional prepositions such as on, in, and at in rely on, believe in, or good at, on the one hand, and lexical prepositions such as the same forms as heads of complements as in stay on/in/at, or of modiWers as in on/in/at the table on the other (cf. e.g. Rauh 1997b, 2002b). Langacker does not consider the notorious syntactic heterogeneity of the traditional part of speech adverb either. He simply states: Observe that the notion ‘adverb’ receives a very simple characterization in this framework: an adverb is a modiWer whose head proWles a relation (as opposed to a thing). (1988d: 111)

He adds that adverbs determine a trajector that is speciWed as [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]]. This, however, excludes all those items that do not modify processes, such as grading adverbs like very or rather, and those which relate to adjectives or adverbs and thus to atemporal relations in Langacker’s terms. It also excludes focus adverbs like just and even that relate to all kinds of phrases. Nor does his description distinguish between manner adverbs like correctly, modal adverbs like probably, evaluation adverbs like fortunately, domain adverbs like logically, and many others which ‘modify’ processes in diVerent ways and exhibit diVerent syntactic properties (cf. e.g. Ernst 2000;


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Laenzlinger 2000; Haumann 2007). This again leads to the question of how a speaker equipped with Langacker’s obviously insuYcient categorization is able to use such expressions adequately. Presumably, Langacker’s answer to most of these questions is simple, but not satisfactory. He assumes that the internal grammar of speakers of a language is not only an assembly of abstract schemas of grammatical constructions, i.e. that the nodes of the structures are not simply represented by abstract schemas like [[THING]/[ . . . ]] or [[PROCESS]/[ . . . ]], but that it also contains constructions of ‘varying degrees of speciWcity’. This includes highly speciWc grammatical constructions with nodes instantiated by speciWc lexical units. According to Langacker, this internal grammar is built up during the process of language learning by perceiving utterances in use, storing them and abstracting constructional patterns from structurally identical utterances. The assembly of stored utterances and their abstractions then serves to sanction novel utterances. Consequently, speakers of English would not use prepositional phrases prenominally like adjectives because they have not perceived utterances like these in language use although the abstract schematic representation is the same for both prepositional phrases and adjectives. They would not use governed prepositions with right nor replace their combinations with NPs/DPs by proforms because they have not met such data. They would also position adverbs of the various types appropriately because this corresponds to the utterances they have stored in their internal grammars. In general then, constructions that are not well-formed would not be produced because they are not part of the stored assembly of abstract and speciWc grammatical constructions that sanction novel utterances. Even without a more thorough criticism of Langacker’s quasibehaviouristic view of language learning and of the content of an internal grammar, it is evident that this answer to the questions raised above is not satisfactory. For even if languages were learnt as he assumes, he nevertheless expects linguists to describe explicitly what is learnt, although this may consist of ‘conventionally determined structures’. However, Langacker fails to provide explicit descriptions. In the following chapter John Anderson’s Localist Case Grammar will be presented and discussed, and it will be shown that notional approaches to the description of syntactic categories need not necessarily do without explicit descriptions, neither in theory, nor in practice.

8 A notional-feature basis for syntactic categories in a Localist Case Grammar 8.1 Introduction Focusing on Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, the preceding chapter was concerned with an approach to grammatical theory in which syntax and semantics are intimately related in such a way that no independent syntactic principles or rules are required. This chapter now concentrates on Anderson’s Localist Case Grammar, an approach that shares with Langacker’s the view that a theory of grammar and of syntactic or grammatical categories should be semantically based, but diVers from it in that syntactic structures are not derived from semantic or pragmatic principles. Instead, Anderson develops a grammatical model of his own with syntactic principles and rules which together with categorized items from the lexicon create sentence structures. As a Case Grammar, this model shares essential features with the Case Grammar originally developed by Fillmore. However, Anderson’s restructured variant solves major problems of its predecessor, as will be shown here. In section 4.5, Fillmore’s Case Grammar was referred to as an alternative to Chomsky’s Standard Theory. It was pointed out that, like the Generative Semanticists, Fillmore argued in favour of a semantic basis for the description of sentences, proposing a description of the deep structures of sentences that consists of a combination of a modal constituent M with a proposition P, with P consisting of the constituent Vand a Wnite set of case relations C1 to Cn (cf. Fillmore 1968a: 24). Semantic relations including, amongst others, Agentive, Instrumental, Dative, Factitive, Locative, Objective, and Benefactive, were identiWed as the case relations C1 to Cn. Besides the problem of unrestricted transformations to derive language-speciWc surface structures from underlying universal

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deep structures, as described in sections 4.5 and 4.6, Fillmore’s Case Grammar suVered from further serious shortcomings, with the result that this concept of grammar was Wnally abandoned.1 One of these shortcomings concerns the representation of cases, which are characterized as relations between verbs and noun phrases but formally represented as categories.2 In other words, case relations are described as categorial constituents, combining with a category V to form a constituent P and themselves analysed into their immediate constituents K and NP. From this it follows that relations are treated as if they were just ordinary categorial constituents in a constituent structure, which, of course, they are not. Another enduring problem of Fillmore’s Case Grammar is the uncertainty concerning the kind and number of case relations, which were subject to frequent changes in his publications. As a consequence of the shortcomings found in Fillmore’s Case Grammar, Anderson’s more recent Case Grammar is likely to be met with a certain amount of scepticism. However, his Wrst book The Grammar of Case: Towards a Localistic Theory (1971) already shows that he has solved two problems of Case Grammar, namely the problem of describing case relations as categories, and the problem concerning the kind and number of case relations. Anderson solves the Wrst problem by choosing the format of a dependency grammar, following Hays (1964), Gaifman (1965), and Heringer (1967), instead of a constituency grammar. Thus, unlike categories, case relations are not introduced by means of phrasestructure rules, since, to quote Anderson, such an approach ‘fails to capture the essentially ‘‘relational’’ character of case’ (1971: 28). Instead, he introduces dependency rules which produce graphs that resemble phrase-structure trees, representing hierarchical and linear relations between nodes in a tree structure, but using a dependency structure rather than a constituent structure (cf. ibid. 29 V., 187).3 Anderson approaches the second serious shortcoming concerning the kind and number of case relations by developing a localistic case theory, 1 A detailed discussion of the problems of Fillmore’s Case Grammar is given in Rauh (1988: 12 V.). See also Fillmore (1971). 2 This problem is discussed in particular in Rauh (1988: 80 V.). 3 It should be noted that Fillmore himself, critically reviewing his concept of a case grammar, suggests that the form of a dependency grammar would be more adequate (1971: 55).

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which is ultimately restricted to four case relations – Nominative, Ergative, Locative, and Ablative – described on the basis of localistic features. The rather confusing 1971 version with its misleading terminology4 is made clearer in his later works (e.g. 1977, 1992, 1997)5. This issue will be dealt with in section 8.3.2. The third major problem of Fillmore’s Case Grammar, namely that of unrestricted transformations, is not solved in Anderson (1971), but formulated in a way that is similar to Fillmore’s movement and deletion operations, transforming an underlying structure generated by dependency rules into a surface structure (cf. e.g. 1971: 15 f.). However, in his later works Anderson explicitly dispenses with movements and deletions (cf. e.g. 1991: 320 V.), and in this respect his approach is like LFG and HPSG, but unlike the PPT and the MP. Thus, Anderson solves three major problems of Fillmore’s Case Grammar, while preserving the basic ideas of this grammar, namely: that the grammatical relations of arguments and their ‘basic’ relative position are predictable from the case relations attributed to the arguments in a particular predication; only case relations need be stipulated in initial structures.

(1991: 315) At the same time, the development from his 1971 version of this grammar to the 1997 model, a development which the following discussion will initially focus on,6 reveals changes comparable to those found in Chomsky’s grammar in its development from the Standard Theory (cf. section 4.3) to the PPT and the MP (cf. chapter 5). For, like the PPT and the MP, but unlike the Standard Theory, the more recent version of Anderson’s Case Grammar no longer employs structure-generating rules, as the initial version did. In a way similar to Chomsky’s more recent models, structures 4 For instance, Anderson uses the term ‘Nominative’ for the most neutral case relation that is obligatory in each clause. Gruber (1965) called this relation ‘Theme’, which led to ‘thematic relations’ and Wnally to the term ‘Ł-role’ in the PPT. Thus, despite what its name suggests, Anderson’s Nominative has nothing to do with the morphological case that bears the same name. 5 A detailed overview and discussion of Anderson (1971) can also be found in Cook (1989: 91 V.). 6 Sections 8.2 to 8.5.1 will be mostly concerned with Anderson’s 1997 approach, whereas section 8.5.2 is dedicated to more recent developments, as presented in Anderson’s books from 2006a and 2007.


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are created by the interaction of lexically speciWed features with syntactic principles or conditions. Anderson calls this procedure ‘a lexicon-driven derivation, where our starting-point is a bundle of lexical entries’ (1991: 315). There are also similarities here with the construction of sentences within the framework of HPSG (cf. sections 6.4 and 6.5), and it seems that the similarity in the terms ‘lexicon-driven’ and ‘head-driven’ is more than a mere coincidence. However, Anderson’s approach is fundamentally diVerent from the PPT, the MP, and HPSG as far as the type of lexically speciWed features is concerned, which, apart from the phonological features, are claimed to be explicitly and exclusively notional. Consequently, Anderson aims at developing a notional theory in which ‘syntactic properties are projected from notional’ (1997: 4). Here there is a link to Langacker’s approach, as presented and discussed in sections 7.3 to 7.5. This is evident, for example, from the following statement: [S]yntactic categories are themselves grammaticalisations of cognitive – or notional – constructs; what follows is intended to explicate and to provide support for (particularly) this latter proposition.

(1997: 1) However, apart from this shared view concerning a notional or cognitive basis of syntactic properties, the approaches put forward by Langacker and Anderson show no common features. Unlike Langacker, Anderson distinguishes between the lexicon and syntax, and he formulates syntactic principles and conditions that are intended to explicitly describe how sentence structures are constructed. If one accepts the classiWcation of grammatical theories into formal and functional ones as presented in 7.1, Anderson’s approach belongs to the formal theories, while Langacker’s does not. The presentations and discussions in sections 8.2 to 8.4 relate to Anderson’s book A Notional Theory of Syntactic Categories (1997), which is explicitly devoted to a theory of syntactic categories and is thus of special interest in this work. This is also the reason for the detailed discussion of Anderson’s approach in general. ModiWcations to his 1997 approach which Anderson suggests in his later writings, especially in Anderson (2006a, 2007), will be considered and included in a general critical evaluation in section 8.5. In assuming a semantic, cognitive basis of syntactic categories, both Anderson’s and Langacker’s approaches lead to a question that has

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been discussed in particular by cognitive linguists, for example, George LakoV (1987) and John R. Taylor (1989 [1995]), and that is the question of category structure. Both LakoV and Taylor defend the view that syntactic categories like the cognitive categories investigated by Rosch and her team (e.g. Rosch 1977a,b, 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1985) have a prototypical structure, which means that there is a central member, the prototype, to which other members of a category are related by family resemblance in the sense of Wittgenstein (1953 [2001]). Since Anderson in his later publications repeatedly refers to prototypical members of a category and since Langacker also discusses prototypical category structures, section 8.6 will be devoted to the question of whether semantically or cognitively based syntactic categories are like genuinely cognitive categories in having a prototypical structure. 8.2 Notional features and the description of word classes Anderson’s approach is one of the few, and in fact the Wrst of the approaches under consideration here, that is expressly devoted to a description of syntactic categories which not only appears to yield a syntactic description7 but which explicitly establishes a connection between the description of syntactic categories and the distribution of the items that belong to these categories. Accordingly, Anderson formulates the aims that he pursues in his book A Notional Theory of Syntactic Categories as follows: What I am concerned with here . . . is the development of a system of notionally based syntactic categories suYcient, in principle, to subtend the expression of a range of syntactic generalisations . . . concerned with systematic aspects of the distribution of words in sentences.

(1997: 2) Moreover, Anderson is one of the few linguists who point out that a distinction must be made between ‘lexical classes’ or ‘word classes’ and

7 This is also the case, for example, with the feature-based description of N, V, A, and P via a combination of the features [+N] and [+V] in the PPTand related approaches (cf. section 5.3) as well as in LFG (cf. section 6.3). It should be remembered that, as shown with regard to the approaches mentioned here, the features given for the description of syntactic categories were not fully adequate and were Wnally replaced or complemented by others.


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‘syntactic categories’ (cf. 1997: 12).8 This is a distinction that is also called for in particular and independently by Rauh, who unlike Anderson, stresses that lexical categorization is completely diVerent in nature from syntactic categorization (cf. e.g. 2000b, 2002c). Chapter 10 will deal with this distinction.

8.2.1 Basic word classes or ‘primary categories’ When describing the content of syntactic categories, Anderson identiWes two notional features, N and P, which individually, but also in various combinations, describe lexical word classes, the latter then forming the basis for the description of syntactic categories, which, in turn, is based on further lexical speciWcations and Wnally on the interaction with syntactic principles and conditions. To begin with, the notional features N and P are related to the parts of speech ‘noun’ and ‘verb’, whose properties are considered to be of the following type (cf. 1997: 14 f.): nouns are ‘entity-speciWc’ while verbs are ‘event-speciWc’. Verbs are inherently relational, ‘they impose overt structure on (the perception of) events’ (ibid. 14) and deWne situations,9 while nouns denote elements that exhibit relative independence and typically participate in situations. Nouns are optimal arguments in predications, whose structures are determined by verbs as predicators. Accordingly, Anderson associates ‘ (perceived) referentiality, or rather referentiability’ with the feature N, i.e. the ability to function as an argument, and ‘predicativity, or rather predicability’ with P, i.e. the ability to function as a predicate (ibid.). On the basis of this characterization, Anderson develops systems of word classes or ‘primary categories’ (1997: 105) that can be languagespeciWc.10 For English, he develops the following system that identiWes six ‘basic word classes’: 8 Anderson makes the following comment on this issue: ‘A categorial distinction between ‘‘noun’’ and ‘‘verb’’ may be relevant to the syntax without being given expression in terms of lexical diVerentiation. What follows is, then, both about (syntactic) categories and about (lexical) classes, and about the extent to which they coincide’ (1997: 12). 9 Clearly Anderson does not distinguish between events and situations, a position which seems problematic in view of the fact that this is not compatible which the concept of situation introduced in linguistic semantics by Barwise and Perry (1983). 10 It is in fact Anderson’s intention to present language-speciWc systems of word classes. This would justify a consideration of his approach in the following chapter, which deals with language typology and the description of syntactic categories. Since, however, his approach is expressly concerned with a notional basis of syntactic categories, its inclusion in the present chapter was given priority. Nevertheless, some aspects of his approach will also be considered in the next chapter.

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syntactic categories {P} {P;N} {P:N} {N;P} {N} {} aux verb adjective noun name functor (ibid. 60)

According to this description, auxiliaries are capable of being predicators but not of being arguments. While this applies to modal auxiliaries, the same goes for be, have, and do only if these are used as auxiliaries. Since they can also be used as lexical verbs, they are crossclassiWed, that is, as elements of the class {P} (¼ auxiliaries) on the one hand, and as elements of the class {P;N} on the other, the latter being lexical verbs. The features P and N in the description of lexical verbs imply that these verbs or their projections can be either predicators or arguments, as in (2): (2) He saw the man leave. The semicolon ‘;’ to the right of P in the category description expresses the fact that P has preponderance over N, i.e. that lexical verbs primarily have the property of predicates but may represent arguments, though they do so more rarely. For Anderson, the decision on preponderance is based on ‘intuitive understanding’ (1997: 72). The distinction between auxiliaries and lexical verbs also includes the fact that auxiliaries in English are basically Wnite, whereas this does not apply to lexical verbs, and this aVects their distribution. Finiteness for lexical verbs is derived via redundancy rules (cf. below). If a redundancy rule has been applied to lexical verbs ({P;N} ¼>{P}), their description and therefore at least part of their distribution is the same as that of auxiliaries.11 {N} in (1) expresses the fact that (proper) names as referring expressions can only be used as arguments. Personal pronouns are also assigned to this word class, whereas deWnite and indeWnite determiners are described as transitive pronouns that take items of the word class {N;P} as complements. {N;P} itself describes the word class of common nouns in such a way that they, or rather their projections, can occur either as arguments or as predicates. The semicolon to the right of N again expresses the fact that this feature has preponderance over P, meaning that the item in question is more frequently employed as an argument than as a predicate. 11 It is only part of the distribution, since there remains a diVerence with regard to the selection of complements, as will be discussed in section 8.3.


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The combination {P:N} describes adjectives as a word class that assumes an intermediate position between verbs and nouns. Here, the colon ‘:’ signals a balanced relationship between P and N. In this connection, Anderson points to the fact that adjectives can be used predicatively, but that they can also combine with nouns, or in rare cases stand alone as arguments: (3)

a. the humble cottage b. the humble (1997: 44)

Anderson accounts for the fact that in English some adjectives can be used both predicatively and attributively (e.g. humble, tall, hungry) while others can only be used attributively (e.g. former, initial, honorary), and some only predicatively (e.g. alive, asleep, prone) as follows: the description of adjectives in (1) only applies to predicative adjectives that can also be used attributively. The attributive use is derived from this via a lexical redundancy rule that describes the adjectives as nominal modiWers and hence as attributes (cf. 1997: 302 V.). This results in a syntactic category that is derived from a word class but is distinct from it. So-called ‘attributive-only adjectives’ (e.g. ibid. 304, 307) are described as common nouns that select a common noun as their complement ({N;P/{N;P}}, ibid. 304). Thus, they do not belong to the word class adjective but to the word class noun and are described as such and in terms of a speciWc way of selecting a complement. Likewise, adjectives that can only be used predicatively are not described as elements of the word class adjective, but in view of the historical development of some of these forms (e.g. alive: Old English on life; cf. ibid. 47), they are described as functors with an internally satisWed argument structure due to an incorporated {N}. The word class of functors is represented in (1) as an empty set of features { }. In English it includes prepositions such as at, on, in, etc. that select syntactic complements, but also ‘intransitive’ prepositions like here and there, upstairs and aside, alive and asleep, which are all described as functors with an incorporated noun (cf. e.g. ibid. 37).

8.2.2 Intermediate primary categories As Anderson points out, the ‘basic word classes’ or ‘primary categories’ do not suYce to describe all the word classes of English, but only the notionally central ones. He additionally identiWes and describes ‘ ‘‘intermediate’’ primary categories’ (1997: 105), i.e. those situated between

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verbs and nouns, between verbs and adjectives, and between adjectives and functors, each contributing to the formation of a continuum. Here, he analyses, amongst other aspects, so-called categorial ‘squishes’, which Ross (1972, 1973a,b) discussed as problematic because of their syntactic properties. Anderson describes these intermediate categories as ‘second-order categories’ (cf. e.g. 1997: 73 V.), which are complex in that they share properties of two basic word classes. This is reXected by the integration of the descriptions of the two word classes involved into the description of the intermediate category. The descriptions given for intermediate categories depend on the preponderance of properties, that is, the smaller or larger proportion of properties of the basic word classes involved. In addition, Anderson postulates a dependency relation between the two integrated word-class descriptions, which he claims has syntactic consequences. The word-class description positioned on the left is assumed to be responsible for the head properties of the intermediate category, while the description on the right is claimed to be responsible for the selection of arguments or complements (cf. ibid. 82). However, this does not apply in all cases, as the following remarks will show. A consideration of the continuum between the basic word classes verb and noun and of their intermediate categories will serve as a representative example of Anderson’s description of intermediate primary categories. The other continuums which he discusses and describes, the continuum between verb and adjective as well as that between adjective and functor, will not be considered here.12 The basic word classes verb and noun with their intermediate categories are described by Anderson as illustrated in (4): 12 The continuums of verb and adjective and of adjective and functor described by Anderson have the following categorial descriptions: a. {P;N} verb

{(P;N);(P:N)} participle

{(P;N):(P:N)} {(P:N);(P;N)} verbal adjective adjectivalisation

{P:N} adjective

(cf. 1997: 99, 102 f.) b. {P:N} close due

{(P:N); } near

{(P:N): } like

{ ;(P:N)} worth

{} at (1997: 79)

The discussions that lead to these descriptions can be found on pages 94 V. and 74 V. in Anderson (1997).

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{P;N} {(P;N);(N;P)} {(P;N):(N;P)} {(N;P);(P;N)} {N;P} verb denominal verb verbal noun nominalisation noun (cf. 1997: 91, 102 f.)

Of the intermediate categories in (4) that of denominal verbs (e.g. detomb, shovel) is described in such a way that the verbal properties preponderate, while in the case of verbal nouns (e.g. riding in John’s riding of his bicycle), the proportion of verbal and nominal properties is balanced, and nominal properties preponderate in nominalizations (e.g. proposal). Denominal verbs are characterized by the incorporation of a noun, for example tomb in detomb, while otherwise both the head properties (notional properties and inXectional properties) and the selectional properties (the selection of verbal arguments including agentive as well as subjectformation and object-formation13) are verbal. As far as verbal nouns are concerned, Anderson states, among other things, that they exhibit verbal inXectional properties because of their aspectual marker -ing, but that like nouns they are not capable of subject-formation and object-formation. Accordingly, in the example quoted above, John’s is not analysed as the subject but as a kind of determinerization, and object-formation is not found here as an of-phrase is required (cf. 1997: 86 V.). Last but not least, items of the intermediate category of nominalizations have nominal inXectional properties, combine with determiners and attributive adjectives, and do not undergo subject-formation and object-formation. At the same time, they are characterized as ‘[n]otionally . . . more verbal than nouns’ (ibid. 88) because ‘they show a ‘‘verbal’’ range of argumenttypes, including agentives, and the entity they denote is typically processual’ (ibid.). When discussing verbal-nominal intermediate categories, Anderson also takes into consideration gerunds like riding in John’s riding his bicycle, for which he identiWes a primarily verbal character. He describes them as categories that are more complex than denominal verbs, whose dominating properties they otherwise share: (5)

{(P;N);((N;P);(P;N))} Gerund (cf. 1997: 103 f.)

13 Section 8.4.2 will elaborate further on the operations of subject-formation and object-formation.

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The complexity lies in the fact that (5) describes them as verbalized nominalizations of verbs and that they thus represent third-order categories. Unlike denominal verbs, verbal nouns, and nominalizations, gerunds do not form a lexical word class but are derived from the class verb by means of a lexical redundancy rule (cf. 1997: 90, 104, and section 8.3). As the discussion of the descriptions of intermediate categories illustrates, with the exception of denominal verbs, Anderson is indeed able to show that the word-class description positioned on the left is associated with the head properties of the intermediate categories, while the word-class description positioned on the right relates to properties that are connected with the selection of arguments or complements. In each case, however, these descriptions do not suYce to fully assign the status of syntactic categories to the word classes. It is rather the case that the descriptions of primary categories and of intermediate primary categories merely form the starting point for further lexical speciWcations and operations that lead to extensions or modiWcations, ultimately determining the syntactic properties of the items concerned through the interaction with syntactic principles and conditions. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 will further elaborate on this.

8.2.3 Secondary categories Besides primary categories, Anderson also identiWes and describes secondary categories that are associated with the primary categories noun, verb, and adjective and are likewise described in terms of notional features. Secondary categories can be realized either morphologically by means of inXection or periphrastically as independent syntactic units. A particular language can make use of one or the other of these two possibilities or of both. As far as nominal secondary categories are concerned, i.e. categories associated with nouns, Anderson identiWes Case, Gender, DeWniteness/ SpeciWcity, and Number, ascribing a property to each of these which explains the connection with nouns (cf. 1997: 106 V.). Thus, morphological cases as well as adpositions (prepositions and postpositions) as their periphrastic alternatives are functors that are associated with nouns, since they specify the function of nouns as primary arguments. The category Gender, which is quite broadly deWned here, including speciWcations such as ‘animate’ as well as classiWers (cf. ibid. 114),


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speciWes constant properties of entities denoting nouns. DeWniteness or SpeciWcity ensures that nouns are referential, and Number ‘allows for discrete manifestations of a name’ (ibid. 106). Tense, Aspect, Polarity, and Modality are identiWed as verbal secondary categories, the Wrst two being associated with event-descriptions, the last-named with speech acts, and Polarity with propositions (cf.ibid. 108). Finally, Comparison is identiWed as an adjectival secondary category associated with the intensiWability of adjectives and represented as {P.N} (cf. ibid. 128). Anderson describes the secondary categories he identiWes as, in general, items of a certain type that select a complement of a certain type. That is, he describes: . nominal secondary categories – with the exception of case (cf. below) – as

{N/{N;P}}, with ‘/’ expressing complement selection; . verbal secondary categories as {P/{P;N}; . and adjectival ones as {P.N/{P:N}}.

Thus, according to (1), the features {N/} and {P/} describe respectively and amongst others determiners and auxiliaries, whereas the newly introduced feature {P.N} is related to comparison and describes for instance the form more.14 DiVerent types of nominal or verbal secondary categories are distinguished by added features, such as {N/{N;P}{class Æ}} as a speciWcation of Gender or {N/{N;P}{sg}} as a speciWcation of Number. Seen in isolation, the categorial description is identical for secondary categories realized morphologically through inXection and those represented periphrastically as independent syntactic units. DiVerences are accounted for by the fact that in the former case the complement of a secondary category is described as being incorporated into this category, thus describing word-internal saturation of dependency. In the latter case an item of a secondary category selects its complement syntactically and thus the saturation of dependency occurs in the syntax. (6) gives the example provided by Anderson of an alternative description of the nominal secondary category of Gender, with (6a) illustrating the syntactic selection of a complement by a syntactically independent periphrastic classiWer, and (6b) describing the incorporation of its complement into the secondary category. This ultimately results in the morphological realization of gender properties in the narrow sense: 14 At this point it should simply be noted that the category {P.N} should therefore occur in the list in (1), since {P} and {N} occur there as well. This will be discussed in section 8.5.1.

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(6) a.

b. º

º º

{N/} {class a}

{N;P}

º

{N/} {class a} {N;P}

(1997: 113) In both cases in (6), the secondary category {{N/}{class Æ}} forms the head of the construction. Since these constructions represent dependency structures, the solid line between the node dominating {N/}{class Æ} and the one dominating {N;P} in both cases describes the dependency relation between the head and its complement, with the representation in (6b) expressing word-internal dependency. The solid line between the node dominating {N/}{class Æ} and the node above it in (6b) expresses, according to Anderson, the fact that the secondary category is realized inherently (cf. 1997: 124), which actually seems somewhat redundant since this is already captured by the internal saturation of the dependency of the secondary category. (6) illustrates the fact that secondary categories are comparable to the functional categories of the PPT (cf. section 5.3.4). For, as in the PPT, morphological inXectional properties and syntactically independent elements are described as representatives of the same category, selecting (projections of) lexical categories as complements in their function as heads, although this is realized in diVerent ways. In Anderson’s approach, the morphological realization of categories is described in terms of morphosyntactic redundancy rules (cf. 1997: 115), whereas, as in the PPT, items that realize the categories periphrastically have their own lexical entry which describes their categorial properties. According to Anderson, this description comprises two diVerent aspects, namely the description of the word class on the one hand, e.g. {N} for determiners such as the or a, and {P.N} for comparators such as more or most in English, and a speciWcation of the selection of a complement on the other hand, i.e. {/N;P}} in the case of determiners and {/P:N}} in the case of comparators. A comparison of the description of determiners as {N/{N;P}} with


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the description of the word class name in (1), which includes proper names and pronouns, i.e. {N}, reveals that determiners are described as ‘transitive names’ (ibid. 115). This shows that Anderson identiWes both transitive and intransitive secondary categories, in this case determiners as transitive variants of the secondary category {N} and proper names together with pronouns as intransitive variants of the secondary category {N}. Corresponding variants are also described for other periphrastically realized functional categories. In this respect too, Anderson’s secondary categories are comparable to the functional categories of the PPT. It is therefore not surprising but entirely consistent that he ultimately also refers to them accordingly, characterizing them as ‘a closed-class specialisation of the corresponding open class’ (ibid. 128). So far the nominal secondary category of Case, which comprises the morphological cases as well as adpositions, has been excluded from the discussion of the description of secondary categories, since its description diVers from that of the other nominal secondary categories. On the one hand, Anderson notes that adpositions select items of the category name as complements, that is as proper names or common nouns that have already combined with a determiner. On the other hand, he states that morphological cases are not only realized on nominal heads in a nominal projection, but also on determiners and – if they are part of a nominal projection – also on attributive adjectives. These two observations, taken together, lead to the general assumption that items of the category Case select items of the category name, i.e. {N}, as complements, rather than items of the category noun, {N;P}, which are selected by elements of the category DeWniteness/SpeciWcity. Since morphological cases are regarded as alternative realizations of adpositions, and adpositions as representatives of the functor category, { } (cf. (1)), this entails that morphological cases are likewise described as functors. As a result, the secondary category Case is generally described as a functor selecting the category name as its complement, i.e. {/N}. Whereas adpositions as periphrastic realizations of cases select their complement in the syntax, complement selection is eVected category-internally with regard to morphological cases, with the result that the categories dominated by {N}, i.e. determiners, nouns, and attributive adjectives, are speciWed for the same morphological case. Anderson elaborates in great detail on the question as to how this speciWcation comes about, suggesting rection as a possibility, and on how the problem that adpositions are

278


themselves speciWed for the rection of morphological cases is to be solved (cf. 1997: 110 V., 123 f.). The remarks in this section have shown that Anderson starts from the two notionally interpreted features N and P and describes categories as diVerent combinations of these features with diVerent degrees of complexity to which words can be assigned in the lexicon. According to Anderson, these descriptions represent word classes provided that they do not integrate any contextual properties, for example concerning the selection of complements. As has been illustrated, these include the ‘basic word classes’ or ‘primary categories’ and their ‘intermediate primary categories’ as well as ‘secondary’ or ‘functional categories’. Moreover, the above discussion has revealed that these word classes do not correspond to the traditional parts of speech. Even where the same labels are used, such as in the case of adjective, they are not identical. It is rather the case that, taking their distribution into consideration, the elements of the traditional parts of speech are assigned to diVerent word classes. Further distributional aspects, which according to Anderson derive syntactic categories from word classes, are described by means of additional lexical speciWcations, as will be shown in the next section. Before doing so, however, a brief look will be taken at how Anderson deals with items that are traditionally classiWed as belonging to the part of speech ‘adverb’. As pointed out above, Anderson describes traditional adverbs like here or there, upstairs or aside, as functors with an incorporated noun. Apart from degree adverbs like very and focus adverbs like only, he considers the description of adverbs as functors with an incorporated complement as generally adequate, even with regard to deadjectival forms like usually or excessively, stating that ‘adverbs are functors whose complementation is satisWed internally’ (1997: 143). The syntactic heterogeneity of adverbs is accounted for by postulating lexical speciWcation of diVerent contextual properties. A prerequisite for this is a relationship ‘retro-complementation’ (1997: 135), which he introduces for modiWers that are not complements, i.e. for speciWers and circumstantials.15 A detailed characterization of this relationship and its impact on the description of adverbs will be given in the next section. At this point it can simply be noted that a description of retro-complementation and the corresponding lexical diVerentiation 15 It must be added here that Anderson also calls complements ‘modiWers’, which justiWes the characterization ‘modiWers that are not complements’.


279

permits cross-classiWcations and is optional, especially for spatial and temporal adverbs that can be employed as complements of verbs. Anderson believes that in this way he can account for the syntactic diversity of adverbs. He concedes, however, that ‘[c]learly further diVerentiations among ‘‘adverbials’’ are necessary’ (ibid. 138), which, mutatis mutandi, should also apply to adverbs. 8.3 Subcategorizations and redundancies in the lexicon According to Anderson, the lexicon is a repository of lexical entries in which idiosyncratic grammatical and phonological properties of lexical items as well as idiosyncratic relations between these two levels of description are speciWed (cf. e.g. 1992: 10). It also contains redundancies that describe features shared by lexical items, deriving additional, more speciWc entries from stored entries by means of further speciWcations. Such redundancies refer, for example, to recurrent multiple complementation or to morphological derivations of forms, involving both inXection and derivation. The grammatical properties that are speciWed in non-derived and derived entries ultimately represent the basis for the formation of sentence structures through the interaction of these properties with the principles and conditions of the syntax. Thus it is these properties that determine the distribution of lexical items and hence their membership of syntactic categories. To begin with, the grammatical properties of lexical items include the speciWcations of word classes presented in the preceding section. Subcategorization properties that specify the contextual requirements of lexical items also belong to these grammatical properties of lexical items. These include both those properties that refer to the selection of complements by items that can form the heads of constructions and those properties that are involved in the selection of heads by items that assume the function of speciWers or circumstantials in constructions. Like the properties of word classes, subcategorization properties are also notional. With regard to the speciWcation of subcategorization properties it should be noted that Anderson’s Case Grammar is designed as a dependency grammar and not as a constituency grammar. Therefore the relationship between head and complement as well as that between speciWer or circumstantial and head is not one of constituency but of dependency. Accordingly, complements are dependent on heads. This implies, for example, that complements of verbs are not DPs or NPs as in constituency grammars but functors, that is,

280


categories which are realized as adpositions or as morphological cases. In the unmarked case, these in turn select items of the category {N} as their complement. As a result, even those functors that are ultimately associated with subjects (or external arguments from the point of view of a Chomskyan model of grammar) are complements of verbs.

8.3.1 Categorial selection of complements and by retro-complements In the preceding section, subcategorization properties were mentioned for which a number of lexical items or entire word classes are speciWed. It was shown, for example, that determiners as items of the secondary category {N} select elements of the category noun, {N;P}, as their complements, the subcategorization property being speciWed as ‘/{N;P}’. This leads to the following description of determiners as syntactic categories: {N/{N;P}}. For comparators it was shown that, as items of the adjectival secondary category {P.N}, they select items of the category adjective, {P:N}, as their complements and are therefore described as the syntactic category {P.N/{P:N}}. Just like determiners and comparators, auxiliaries – in this case verbal secondary categories – are also subcategorized as selecting complements, with the modal auxiliaries be and have each being speciWed for diVerent selectional properties. Whereas modal auxiliaries are speciWed as selecting the unmarked form of a lexical verb, i.e. as {P/{P;N}}, the other auxiliaries are speciWed as selecting verb forms that are derived from {P;N} by means of a redundancy rule. Thus, for example, be in (7): (7) He is writing a letter. selects a participle as its complement. This is derived by the redundancy rule {P;N} ¼> {{P;N};{P:N}}, and is therefore described as {P/{P;N};{P: N}}. On the other hand have selects a ‘passive’ participle {P:N};{P;N}, derived from {P;N} as its complement (e.g. has written), and is therefore described as {P/{P:N};{P;N}} (cf. Anderson 2000: 156). The subcategorization properties of items of secondary categories presented here refer to those items that are syntactic units and thus realize their complements in the syntax. If categories are realized as morphological properties, complement selection is eVected by integrating a complement into a secondary category. In formal terms, this is described in the lexicon by means of a morphological redundancy


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rule. As a result, depending on language-speciWc requirements, nominal forms are derived that morphologically realize Case, Gender, and DeWniteness/SpeciWcity as well as Number, verbal forms that morphologically realize Tense, Aspect, Polarity, and Modality, and adjectival forms are derived that morphologically realize Comparison. In other words, inXectional forms are derived in the lexicon and as such are available for the syntax. In the preceding section it was also shown that adjectives which are exclusively attributive are described as nouns that select a nominal complement: {N;P/{N;P}}. Adjectives that can be used both attributively and predicatively were presented as deriving the speciWcation for their attributive use from the speciWcation for their predicative use by means of a redundancy rule, the derived variants being described as nominal modiWers. According to this description, attributive adjectives are retro-complements that are speciWed for the selection of a nominal head. Unlike complements, retro-complements are basically optional. Anderson introduces the term ‘retro-complement’ for those units which in his terminology have the function of either speciWers or circumstantials, the distinction between the two being a syntactic one in that speciWers always precede the selected head, while circumstantials follow the head in the unmarked case, but may also precede it (cf. 1997: 135 V.). Anderson describes retro-complementation as a subcategorization property by using the symbol ‘\’. Accordingly, the redundancy rule that derives attributive adjectives from predicative adjectives has the following form: (8) {P:N} ¼> {P:N\{N;P}} As pointed out in the previous section, Anderson also describes various types of adverbs as retro-complements, including degree adverbs, focus adverbs, VP adverbs, and sentence adverbs. These diVer from other types of adverbs in various ways, including the selection of heads to which they form retro-complements, which accounts for their diVering distributions. Thus, degree adverbs like very are retrocomplements of items of the category adjective, described as {\{P:N}}. As the description illustrates, items of this category do not have a word-class description but are speciWed exclusively in terms of their selectional property. This also applies to focus adverbs such as only, which are characterized by their ability to select items of various kinds of categories as heads, as the examples in (9) show:

282 (9)

syntactic categories a. Mary likes only John. b. The water was only warm, not hot. c. You were supposed to only hold the vase, not to drop it.

Accordingly, focus adverbs are treated as retro-complements and speciWed in terms of selectional properties, for example as {\{N}}, {\{P:N}} or {\{P;N}}. Since degree adverbs and focus adverbs precede the heads they select, they belong to the group of speciWers, and are characterized not in terms of grammatical features but by a syntactic condition (cf. section 8.4.2). VP adverbs and sentence adverbs are both described as functors featuring an incorporated {N} complement. VP adverbs diVer from sentence adverbs in that, as retro-complements, they select {P;N} heads, whereas sentence adverbs select {P} heads. The former are thus described as {{/N}\{P;N}} and the latter as {{/N}\P}. Since functors are described as an empty set { } with respect to the features P and N, Anderson seems to claim that, like degree adverbs and focus adverbs, VP adverbs and sentence adverbs are not assigned to any word class. However, this is not the case, as they are functors and therefore ultimately speciWed for particular features, as will be discussed below.

8.3.2 Functor features specifying valencies The subcategorization properties considered so far all refer to categorial speciWcations of the kind presented in the preceding section. What is new is the reference to subcategorization properties which are Wrst of all identiWed and described with regard to lexical verbs and which characterize Anderson’s grammar as a Localist Case Grammar. As indicated above, in Anderson’s grammar functors are analysed as complements of verbs. Verbs are thus subcategorized for their selection of functors, and functors are realized either as adpositions or by morphological case. The discussion of secondary categories included remarks on adpositions and morphological cases that realize the nominal category Case. It is therefore this category that subcategorizes items of the category verb, {P;N} and also items of other categories, as will be shown below. Since items of the secondary nominal category Case select items of the category name, {N}, in the unmarked case, complement selection being a relationship of dependency and not constituency as pointed out above, it can be concluded that the category Case relates items of


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the category verb to items of the category name. In his Case Grammar, Fillmore Wrst called this relationship ‘case relationship’ (1968a: 21) and the individual relations ‘deep-structure cases’ (ibid.). Later he also called them ‘semantic relations’ (1968b: 381) or ‘semantic role[s]’ (1972: 2), identifying the relations Agentive, Instrumental, Dative, Objective, Locative, etc., which were above considered problematic, among other reasons because clear identiWcation was not possible. According to Fillmore (1968a: 27 V.), verbs are speciWed in their lexical entry for frame features that describe the kind of frame formed by case relations that is required in order for a verb to be inserted into this structure. For example, the frame feature for the verb open is as follows: (10) open: þ [_____ O (I) (A)] (ibid. 24) The above feature expresses the fact that the relation Objective is obligatory in the context of open, whereas Instrumental and Agentive are optional. Anderson adopts this way of subcategorizing verbs introduced by Fillmore as a starting point. The fact that verbs are subcategorized for functors means that they are subcategorized for notionally-based case relations, alias semantic relations or Ł-roles. However, Anderson reduces the number of case relations to four, absolutive (abs), ergative (erg), locative (loc), and ablative (abl), describing them – with the exception of the neutral relation abs – on the basis of localistic case components:

(11)

case relations:

abs

erg

loc

abl

PLACE

PLACE

CASE COMPONENTS: SOURCE

SOURCE (1997: 170)

As Anderson points out, case relations represent Case features or functor features that describe or combine to describe distinct instantiations of the secondary category Case. The unmarked neutral relation abs is postulated as realized in every predication (ibid. 166). It thus corresponds to the semantic relation which Gruber (1965) calls ‘Theme’. As ‘non-PLACE SOURCE’, the relation erg describes the ‘perceived source of the event or situation, physical or mental, potentially in control of it’ (Anderson 1997: 169). Following this, it is not only Fillmore’s relation Agentive that would

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be described as erg but also, for instance, his relation Instrumental, as in This key opened the door. The relation loc describes concrete and abstract localizations. In combination with the feature erg, i.e. as {erg, loc}, loc describes Fillmore’s relations Dative or Experiencer and Benefactive. Finally, the relation abl describes concrete or abstract origins or sources. A relation Goal is not described because localization and goal are claimed to be alternatives in the context of speciWc verbs, and {loc} is interpreted in the context of verbs of movement as Goal, in particular because it is also subcategorized as {abl} (1997: 173). The following examples illustrate the subcategorization of a number of verbs on the basis of functor features, which Anderson also describes as ‘verbal valency’ (cf. 1997: 149 V.): (12) a. hit : /{erg}{abs} b. know : /{erg, loc}{abs} c. receive : /{erg, loc}{abs}{abl} (13) a. roll1: /{erg}{abs}{abl}{loc} b. roll2: /{abs}{abl}{loc} (14) a. melt1: /{erg}{abs} b. melt2: /{abs} (15) a. give1: /{erg}{abs}{loc} b. give2: /{erg}{erg, loc}{abs} For verbs like those in (13) and (14), whose variants diVer in the presence or absence of a complement, Anderson suggests assuming a single lexical entry and marking the complement in question as optional, using angled brackets ‘< >’:16 (16) a. roll: /<erg>{abs}{abl}{loc} b. melt: /<erg>{abs} (cf. ibid. 156) If, however, this variation concerns entire classes of verbs, as is the case with unaccusatives and causatives (e.g. melt) then the relationship between the two variants is described more economically by means of a lexical redundancy rule: (17) {{P;N}/{erg}{abs}} ¼> {{P;N}/{abs}} 16 Here, however, Anderson still uses the term ‘neutral’ instead of ‘absolutive’, and ‘agentive’ instead of ‘ergative’.


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Lexical redundancy rules, according to Anderson, also relate variants of verbs that behave like give1 and give2, as illustrated in examples like (18) and (19) (cf. ibid. 206 V.): (18) a. John gave the book to Mary. b. John gave Mary the book. (19) a. John taught German to Mary. b. John taught Mary German. Anderson also describes verbs that exhibit variation in their complement selection, such as load in (20), by means of a lexical redundancy rule, as expressed in (21). The speciWcation ‘holistic’ in (21a) abbreviates the characterization of the class that is aVected by this rule: (20) a. They loaded hay onto the wagon. b. They loaded the wagon with hay. (21) a. {{P;N}/{erg}{absi}{loc}} ¼> {{P;N}/{erg}{loc, abs}} : j holistic {absi} b. {absi\{P;N}} j {absi} In (21), two special features are to be noted. On the one hand, the holistic interpretation of the complement the wagon in (20b) is described in the derived form in (21a) by the feature combination {loc, abs} (cf. ibid. 157 V.). On the other hand, the {abs} complement of the variant in (20a), i.e. hay, becomes a circumstantial in (20b), expressed by the second part of the rule in (21b) (cf. ibid. 201). As these examples suggest, possible alternations in the complement range of verbs that would be described in terms of syntactic transformations in Generative Transformational Grammar, such as dative-shift in the case of variants of the verb give, are in Anderson’s Case Grammar dealt with in the lexicon by means of redundancy rules. Similar observations have been made in section 6.4 with regard to HPSG. In other words, in these two approaches it is possible to dispense with syntactic transformations at least in such cases. Subcategorizing lexical verbs for Case features, which as representations of the category functor in turn are subcategorized for {N},

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leaves open the question of how the selection of sentential complements is described. Anderson suggests a categorial description of the head of the complement which implies that sentential complements do not have a semantic relation. For the subcategorization of verbs like expect, as in (22a), he suggests a speciWcation as presented in (22b): (22) a. Kate expected John to read Rasselas. b. expect: {erg, loc}{P;N} (cf. 1997: 263) The complement John to read Rasselas is thus described as a projection of the category verb, with inWnitival to as the head of the complement, analysed as a member of the category verb that selects a verbal complement, i.e. to: {P;N/{P;N}} (cf. ibid. 261). Anderson describes Case features as complement-selection properties not only in the context of verbs, but also in the context of nouns. To begin with, this holds for deverbal nominalizations such as humiliation, for which he proposes a categorial description with a verbal component, as was shown in (4). This implies that the complement selection of these nominalizations is taken over from the verbal basis and thus inherited. Humiliation is therefore described as follows: (23) humiliation: {{N;P};{P;N/{erg}{erg, loc, abs}} Besides this ‘verbal’ type of complement selection, Anderson also identiWes genuinely nominal subcategorization properties that apply to relational nouns. Here, he distinguishes two classes: ‘partitives’ and ‘inalienables’. Examples of partitives are group (a group of people), kilo (a kilo of rice), or member (a member of the committee). Apart from traditional ones like names of parts of the body (John’s leg), he considers family relationships (John’s son) inalienables. As for their subcategorization properties, he states that partitives are subcategorized for a SOURCE argument, while inalienables are subcategorized for a PLACE argument, which is also speciWed as SOURCE, i.e. {PLACE; SOURCE}, in the case of family descendants. In addition, he states that ‘with nouns SOURCES are prt(itive), the (denotative) source of the referent’ (1997: 295). This leads to the following subcategorizations for relational nouns: (24) a. member : /{prt} b. kilo: /{prt}


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(25) a. leg: /{loc} b. sister: /{loc} c. son: /{prt} Subcategorization by means of {prt} plays a role not only for relational nouns but also for other nominal expressions, since Anderson describes numerals like three and non-numerical quantiWers like many or few as also being speciWed for this subcategorization property. He analyses numerals and non-numerical quantiWers, which occur in English in the post-determiner position that is typical of attributive adjectives and which can, like adjectives, also be used both attributively and predicatively (the many books vs. the books were many), as ‘blends’ of determiners and adjectives, yielding the following description: (26) many: {{N/{prt}},{P:N}} (cf. ibid. 302) Here, the property blend is expressed by the comma between the category determiner {N} and the category adjective {P:N}. The description of the circumstantial with hay in (21b) illustrates that Case features or functor features are used not only in the description of complement-selection properties and thus contextual subcategorization properties, but also to describe inherent properties of circumstantials. This can be quite naturally derived from the fact that circumstantials in English are expressed in verbal contexts by PPs or by adverbs in the unmarked case, with prepositions being analysed as realizations of functors and adverbs as functors with an incorporated complement. Case features and functor features therefore serve to distinguish between functors and are as such inherent subcategorization features or secondary features. For example, the adverb upstairs as a ‘circumstantial’, as in He wrote the letter upstairs, is described by means of the Case feature {loc} as an inherent subcategorization feature, together with incorporated {N} and the selected head {P}:17 (27) upstairs: { \{P}}{loc} j {N} (Anderson 1997: 138) 17 Since upstairs can also occur as a complement, as in He brought the chair upstairs, Anderson provides a second description for such cases, in which the selection of the {P} head is merely omitted (1997: 138).

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From the description for upstairs, where stairs is described as an incorporated {N}, it can be concluded that Anderson would describe up as { }{loc}, that is as a functor that is inherently subcategorized by {loc}. The description { }{erg} for the preposition by can be derived from a structure like (2.192) (1997: 111). And it can be concluded from (22b) that with would be described as { }{abs}. Interestingly, classiWcations of functor features and prepositions or morphological cases are otherwise extremely rare in Anderson (1997), which is problematic, as will be elaborated in section 8.5.1. As will be seen in section 8.5.2, however, his later writings (e.g. 2006a, 2007) are more informative on this matter. Besides Case features as inherent subcategorization properties of functors, Anderson also makes use of other subcategorization properties, for example, {singular} for determiners like a in English or {count} for poet and a large number of other nouns (e.g. 1997: 296). Further speciWcations for inherent subcategorization properties can be assumed and are, in fact, necessary, and Anderson goes into this aspect in his later publications (e.g. 2006a, 2007, cf. section 8.5.2). It is not only categorial properties but also subcategorization properties, both contextual and inherent, that serve to describe the distribution of lexical items, on the one hand by formulating restrictions on their syntactic environment and on the other hand by specifying lexical items in such a way that they conform to these restrictions. Yet it is on the basis of syntactic principles and conditions that the distribution of lexical items is ultimately determined. The following section will elaborate on this. 8.4 Building syntactic structures The 1997 version of Anderson’s Case Grammar is similar to the PPT, the MP, and HPSG in postulating that syntactic structures are built bottom up, i.e. on the basis of the properties of lexical items speciWed in lexical entries and their interaction with syntactic conditions and principles. As illustrated in the preceding sections, lexical entries can be basic or derived by means of redundancies, with redundancy rules producing fully inXected forms. For the building of syntactic structures Anderson formulates a number of principles, rules, and conventions. However, the diVerence in their status as suggested by the diVerent labels is not always apparent. In this section, some of the major ‘rules’ will be presented to illustrate how structures are built in this grammar, and how syntactic categories are thus ultimately determined.


289

8.4.1 Syntactic projection Building a syntactic structure according to Anderson starts with the interaction of lexically speciWed features of lexical items with the Syntactic Projection Principle. This is formulated as follows: Syntactic projection’ a. associate a node with each primary category b. make nodei dependent on nodej iV the category associated with nodei has a value which satisWes a valency requirement of the category associated with nodej c. subjoin nodei and adjoin nodej to a newly-created nodek iV the category associated with nodej has a value which satisWes the retro-valency requirement of the category associated with nodei

(1997: 144) In order to apply the principle, lexical items with their feature speciWcations must Wrst be available. Part (a) of the principle then requires that each of the items speciWed for a primary category be assigned to a node. Empty nodes are thus excluded. According to (b), a structure can be built if there is an item that is speciWed for the contextual subcategorization property of complement selection, and if the restrictions thus formulated are fulWlled by another item. Based on this part of the principle, dependencies between lexical items and their complements are then described. Part (c) on the other hand describes how and under what conditions retro-complements are inserted into a structure. An application of this principle yields ‘wild trees’ (1997: 33), which express dependency relations rather than constituency or linearity. This is reXected by the example in (28):

(28)

a. John went to the station yesterday. b.

{\P}

{P}{past}

{erg, abs}

{P;N/{erg, abs}{loc}}

{N}

went

John

{loc}

to

{loc} {N/{N;P}}

{N;P}

{N}

the

station

yesterday

290


The structure tree, whose nodes are unlabelled for reasons of economy (cf. Anderson 1997: 9)18, is to be interpreted in such a way that the solid lines each describe a dependency, whereas the broken lines reXect the properties of lexical items. The structure shows that the contextual subcategorization requirements, that is {/{erg, abs}{loc} of the verb, {/N} of the preposition, {/{N;P}} of the determiner, and {\P} of the adverb, are all satisWed by the speciWcations of items in the context. It is also obvious that morphological redundancy rules have been applied in the lexicon, deriving the speciWcation {{P}{past}} for the verb and {erg, abs} for the proper name. The dependency structure represented in (28b) thus illustrates that the syntactic dependencies rely on the contextual subcategorization requirements of the lexical items involved. In syntactic terms, lexically speciWed complements of a lexical item represent the latter’s dependents, the lexical item as head assuming the function of their governor. Accordingly, the complements John, which is incorporated into the functor speciWed of {erg, abs}, and to the station are syntactically described as dependents of the head or governor went; the complement the station is described as the dependent of to, and the complement station as the dependent of the. For the modiWer yesterday, a new, unlabelled node is introduced as governor, thus being a metagovernor on which both yesterday and the projection of went depend (cf. the remarks below). The form yesterday itself is described as a functor with an internally satisWed dependency.

8.4.2 Building surface structures A ‘wild tree’ such as (28b) is subject to various operations that serve both the linearization of the items and the formation of constituents. A Wrst step in this direction is the formation of the subject. The subject rules, formulated as the Ergative rule and Abs rules, which select the subject from the set of {N}-categories, are obtained from the Subjectselection hierarchy:

18 This is changed in his later publications, in which nodes in tree structures are labelled (e.g. 2006a, 2007).


291

Ergative rule If subjecthood is assigned to a participant in a predication, an erg, if present, is subject Abs rules An abs participant is second only to an erg with respect to assignment of grammatical relations; and an {,abs} is preferred to an {abs} Subject-selection hierarchy erg h abs (Anderson 1997: 180)

The ‘h’ symbol here expresses the fact that the item to the left of the symbol precedes the one to the right of it, thus being higher in the hierarchy. It can be seen that the formulation of the Subject-selection hierarchy with the Ergative rule and the Abs rules is an adaptation of Fillmore’s corresponding hierarchy: If there is an A, it becomes the subject; otherwise, if there is an I, it becomes the subject; otherwise the subject is the O. (Fillmore 1968a: 33)

Here too, it is clear that Anderson’s Case Grammar follows the Fillmore tradition. Another rule suggested by Anderson concerns the selection of an object: Object rule An object is an abs denied subjecthood by an erg (1997: 176)

This rule determines that an object is selected only if a subject has already been selected and that this object must be an abs. However, in his discussion of the status of the grammatical function of the direct object, Anderson reveals that he considers the status of the direct and that of the indirect object marginal and diVuse, and this rule has no further signiWcance (cf. 1997: 211 V.). Once a participant has been selected as subject, i.e. John in (28b), the operation ‘subject-formation’ is carried out. Anderson distinguishes two types of subjects, morphosyntactic and syntactic ones. Languages that lack a subject, so-called ‘pro-drop’ languages, are seen by Anderson as allowing constructions without an autonomous syntactic subject, the morphosyntactic subject being incorporated into an inXected verb form in this case (cf. 1997: 219 V.). Italian is

292


an example, illustrated by Ho dormito bene (¼ I have slept well) as compared to Ha dormito bene (¼ He has slept well). English, by contrast, Anderson argues, always requires an autonomous syntactic subject that is phonologically realized.19 Expletive there as in There are children in the garden is analysed as a purely syntactic subject that shares its properties of subjecthood with a morphosyntactic subject, children in this case. John in (28) is both a syntactic and a morphosyntactic subject. Subject-formation here corresponds to that of syntactic subjects, the only diVerence being that the verb involved is an inXected one whose feature speciWcation has to agree with the pronominal features of the subject (3rd person singular): Syntactic-/Morphosyntactic-subject-formation

{ } { }i

‹

{|P|} {P;N}

where { }i is the secondary speciWcation of that functor which is highest on the hierarchy of semantic relations. (cf. ibid. 219, 224)

Through subject-formation a position is created to the left of the inXected verb in which the subject that has been extracted from its original position in the ‘wild tree’ is placed. For Anderson, this extraction is not a transformation but a structure-building operation (cf. 1997: 220). The newly created position is dominated by an initially empty functor that is then speciWed for an obligatory abs,

19 It should be noted here that Anderson assumes that there is no syntactic subject in ‘pro-drop languages’ like Italian. In the PPT and the MP these languages are described as having a syntactically represented subject that is not realized phonologically.


293

and attached to a new node to which the original {P}-node is subjoined. {jPj} in the general description of subject-formation expresses the fact that this node must be realized by an inXected verb. The speciWcation for abs is created on the basis of the principle of the universality of abs, which requires that every predication contain an abs: Universality of abs Every predication contains an abs. (ibid. 166)

The new node functions as a metagovernor that dominates the governor, {P}. Extracting the subject and placing it in its new position in front of {P} creates a VP constituent that is dominated by {P} and that comprises {P;N} as well as the remaining subcategorized complements of the verb:

(28)

c.

{abs}

{\P}

{erg, abs}

{P}{past}

{N}

{P;N/{erg, abs}{loc}}

John

went

{loc}

to

{loc}

{N/{N;P}}

{N;P}

{N}

the

station

yesterday

Via a Subject concord rule (cf. Anderson 1997: 220), the inXected verb is Wnally assigned the pronominal properties of the subject, which are not considered in (28c). In this way agreement or ‘concord’ between the features of the subject and those of the inXected verb is described.

294


It should be noted that the node that dominates the subject is not licensed by the principle of syntactic projection. In order to permit the creation of such a node while at the same time restricting it, Anderson formulates the following condition: Non-projectivity condition One terminal of a non-projective line must be in a basic unsubcategorised-for modiWer position. (1997: 228)

Thus, the position of the subject is licensed, since it represents a nonsubcategorized position for modiWers, the term ‘modiWer’ including for Anderson in its general use complements, speciWers and circumstantials. At the same time, the subject in this position licenses the dominating node, which would otherwise be empty, something that the projection principle does not permit. Syntactic-subject-formation determines the linearization or serialization of subject and inXected verb, with the subject preceding the inXected verb expressed by ‘h’. The serialization of the other items is eVected by a syntactic redundancy rule called ‘modiWer serialisation’, which can be diVerent in diVerent languages. This rule determines, among other things, whether heads in a given language appear to the left or to the right of their complements. Left-headedness in English is expressed by the following rule: ModiWer serialisation (English) WORDi ! WORDj ¼> WORDi h WORDj (Anderson 1997: 226)

This rule claims that in general ‘linearity follows subordination’ (ibid.), which means that an item precedes the item which it dominates. It is thus determined that the remaining complement of the verb, i.e. to in (28c), is dominated and therefore preceded by {P}. The order preposition, then determiner and then noun, as in to the station, is determined in the same way: the preposition dominates the determiner and therefore precedes it, and the determiner dominates the noun and therefore precedes it. The operation subject-formation creates a position in a structure that is not licensed by subcategorization properties. This position shares this property with the positions of speciWers and circumstantials. Since


295

speciWers, like the subject with regard to the inXected verb {P}, precede their head, Anderson analyses subjects as speciWers of the inXected verb. On the other hand, he describes the position of speciWers as being in general analogous to that of the subject. This means that in order to integrate speciWers into a structure, a new node is created with which the speciWer is associated and to which the head selected by the speciWer, i.e. its governor, is subjoined. The new node is thus again a metagovernor. (29) illustrates this:

(29)

{\{P:N}}

{P:N}

very

nice

Anderson formulates the following rule for the linearization or serialization of speciWers and their governors in English, which says that a speciWer precedes its governor: SpeciWer serialisation (English) WORDSPEC \ WORDk ¼> WORDSPEC h WORDk (1997: 229)

This rule overrides the general rule for the serialization of modiWers since it is more speciWc. Like speciWers, circumstantials such as yesterday in (29c) do not occupy a subcategorized position, but unlike speciWers, they can follow their governor. Therefore, their position is, to begin with, created like that of speciWers, that is, by introducing a new dominating node. Serialization, however, is eVected by the general rule for modiWers according to which an item follows its dominating category. If a circumstantial precedes its governor, as in Yesterday John went to the station, this is described in terms of the rule for

296


speciWers, which can also be applied to circumstantials in such cases. These examples will suYce to give an impression of how Anderson’s grammar builds simple sentence structures through the interaction of lexical features with syntactic principles or rules and conditions. Anderson’s description of complex sentences in which the matrix verb is a ‘raising’ verb in the PPT (e.g. seem) is revealing because it allows a comparison with other approaches considered here. According to Anderson, seem is described lexically as selecting a sentential complement and thus subcategorized for inWnitival to in one of its variants, which in turn is characterized as ‘a ‘‘raising’’ verb which is only non-Wnite’ (1997: 262). As an uninXected item of the category verb, to in this case selects an uninXected item of the category verb – ‘a ‘‘bare’’ inWnitive’ (ibid.) – as its complement and is thus lexically described as {P;N/{P;N}}. Following the projection principle, the ‘wild tree’ shown in (30b) is created for the sentence in (30a):

(30)

a. John seemed to win. b.

{P}{past}

{P;N/{P;N}}

{P;N/{P;N}} seemed

to

{erg} {P;N}

{N}

win

John

(cf. ibid. 230 V.) To build the syntactic structure, John is to begin with selected as the subject of to, and then moved to the position in front of to accompanied by the other operations that are required for subjectformation:

(30)

c.

{P}{past}

{abs}

{P;N}

{erg}

{P;N/{P;N}

{P;N}

to

win

{N} seemed

John

In the next step, John becomes the subject of seem, while retaining the property of being the subject of the complement, shown by the dependency line that runs from to to John:

(30)

d.

{abs} {abs}

{P}{past}

{erg}

{P;N}

{P;N/{P;N}}

{P;N}

to

win

{N} John

seemed

(cf. Anderson 1997: 234, 263)

298


The formation of the subject of seem is motivated here by the principle of the universality of abs, requiring that every predication contain an abs. As this analysis shows, seem is described as a raising verb both by Anderson and in the PPT, and as in the PPT, Anderson’s movement operations are also motivated by principles, albeit principles of a diVerent kind. According to Anderson, the fact that the operations are called transformations in the PPT but not in his approach is not simply a matter of terminology. For, while in the PPT D-structures are transformed into S-structures and both are constituent structures, in Anderson’s grammar constituent structures are created out of unordered dependency structures, that is from ‘wild trees’. In other words, the operations do not ‘transform’ but ‘build’. The aim in this section has been to demonstrate that in Anderson’s Case Grammar, lexical items receive their appropriate positions in sentence structures on the basis of their lexically speciWed properties. These properties interact with various kinds of syntactic principles, rules, etc., which means that the distribution of lexical items and hence their syntactic categorization is based on this interaction. It has also been the aim of this section to describe the types of principles, rules, etc. involved, illustrating how syntactic structures are built on the basis of their interaction with lexically speciWed properties. Following this concept, Anderson (1997) introduces numerous other principles, rules, etc. such as the ‘Strict cycle condition’ (ibid. 154), the ‘Experiencer subjecthood condition’ (ibid. 184), ‘D-command’ (ibid. 230), the ‘Role criterion’ (ibid. 252), and the ‘Category adjustment convention’ (ibid. 283), to name just a few. The purpose of these is to ensure the well-formedness of sentences; however, they will not be considered further here. 8.5 Syntactic categories in a Localist Case Grammar In the works that formed the basis for the preceding discussion, Anderson aimed at establishing a system of notionally based syntactic categories that in principle are suYcient to express generalizations concerning the systematic aspects of the distribution of words in sentences. The preceding discussion has shown that he was rather successful in doing so. There are, however, some shortcomings and problems especially regarding speciWc aspects of this approach, which require further discussion. This will be the concern of the following


299

section (8.5.1). Since Anderson developed his 1997 description of syntactic categories further in the following years (esp. 2006a, 2007), this will be considered in section 8.5.2, which is concerned with some extensions and revisions, focusing above all on whether and if so in what way the problems are solved.

8.5.1 General assumptions, inconsistencies, and problems Anderson’s approach to the description of syntactic categories, presented in the preceding sections, shows that, in principle, the procedure applied here is similar to that of the PPT or the MP on the one hand, and of HPSG on the other. Sentence structures are always built bottom-up by the interaction of lexically speciWed features of lexical items with principles, rules, etc. of the syntax, and in this way these items are assigned their positions in sentence structures. Unlike the PPT and the MP, however, Anderson’s analysis of the data of diVerent languages is not predominantly concerned with a search for abstract universal syntactic principles and parameters. Like that of various representatives of HPSG, it is instead devoted to the development of a diVerentiated and at the same time Xexible descriptive system and its application to (surface) phenomena of individual languages. This is not to say that Anderson does not formulate general ‘principles’ and ‘rules’. However, their status remains unclear, not least because of the confusing and unexplained terminological distinction between ‘principles’, ‘rules’, ‘conditions’, ‘criteria’, ‘strategies’, and ‘conventions’. In addition, the impression is created that such ‘rules’ are introduced as needed to describe the linguistic phenomena, which characterizes Anderson’s approach as inductive rather than deductive. Although there are these similarities between Anderson’s approach to the description of syntactic categories and those of the PPT, the MP and HPSG, there are also, as to be expected, major diVerences. These relate to the type of features and the description of complex, syntactically relevant feature representations as well as to the principles and rules, etc. that are postulated. They are also a result of his ‘notionally based’ descriptions of syntactic categories and of the properties of the grammatical model he favours, i.e. a Localist Case Grammar designed as a dependency grammar. It must be noted, however, that there are shortcomings and even substantial problems that concern the very basis of this approach and therefore need to be discussed.

300


An initial shortcoming concerns the features N and P, which Anderson posits as the basis of his notional description of syntactic categories. The notional part of the interpretation of these features lies in N being characterized as entity-speciWc and P as event-speciWc. Anderson then gives the description {P:N} for adjectives, postulating a balanced relationship between P and N. This means that the notional properties of adjectives are event-speciWc and entity-speciWc in equal proportions, a description that clearly fails to capture the notional core of adjectives, which is generally agreed to be property-speciWc. It is equally hard to accept the notional description of prepositions as {}. While it may be acceptable to state that they are neither eventspeciWc nor entity-speciWc, the conclusion that they are therefore nothing at all is certainly not justiWable from a notional point of view. In the same way, notionally speaking, the description of auxiliaries as {P} cannot be accepted, since, for instance, forms like may or must do not denote or perceptually structure events. This property is restricted to lexical verbs, if it applies to any elements at all. This shortcoming concerning the notional interpretability of the features N and P for the description of individual categories shows that it is the other interpretation of these features that is obviously the more decisive one for Anderson, namely that P denotes the ability to function as a predicate and N the ability to function as an argument. However, this interpretation is problematic, too. For, if adjectives are accorded the ability to function as a predicate, as in the case of sad in the boy is sad, this should also go for prepositions or their projections, for example in a bad mood in the boy is in a bad mood. And if adjectives are accorded the ability to function as an argument, as in the case of rich in the rich proWt from the stock market, then this should likewise apply to prepositions like up and down in the ups and downs of the stock market made them nervous. Another shortcoming concerns the fact that, with respect to English, Anderson gives double categorizations in a number of cases by assigning auxiliaries, determiners, and functors to both the basic word classes, alias primary categories, and to the secondary categories. Membership of the primary categories is based on the fact that items of these categories can be realized autonomously as words, expressed in the alternative term ‘basic word classes’. Membership of the secondary categories is based on Anderson’s claim that items belonging to these categories exhibit a particularly close relationship to certain representatives of primary categories. As a result, as well as being realized as


301

independent words, they can be realized in many languages morphologically as inXectional markers on items that belong to the primary categories. However, Anderson is inconsistent here in not including comparatives (more, most) in his list of basic word classes of English, even though the criteria also apply to these. One may also wonder why words like very are described only in terms of contextual properties rather than in terms of word-class properties. One possible explanation is that the list of basic word classes comprises only those that more or less correspond to the traditional parts of speech, with prepositions and adverbs grouped together as functors. If this is not the case, it is diYcult to explain why Anderson should categorize auxiliaries and determiners, for instance, in the same way as verbs and nouns, namely as ‘basic’, while at the same time also analysing the former as ‘secondary categories’ with respect to the latter. A rather substantial problem regarding Anderson’s description of syntactic categories concerns his analysis of the category functor, since assumptions referring to this category are crucial for his Localist Case Grammar. This major problem can be divided into two aspects. The Wrst one concerns the possible realizations of this category, which according to Anderson include prepositions/adpositions and morphological case markers, and also position. The second concerns the function of items belonging to this category as speciWcations of valencies, that is, of complement selection properties, which Anderson describes with respect to verbs and nouns. The Wrst problematic issue in particular concerns the unrestricted assignment of prepositions to the functor category. In doing so, Anderson follows the traditional view, which undervalues prepositions (in this case English prepositions) and assigns them to the closed class of function words rather than to the open class of content words. Other linguists assume that prepositions represent a lexical rather than a functional category (e.g. JackendoV 1977b: 80 f.; Chomsky 1986a: 160). Clearly, both classiWcations are appropriate but relate to diVerent subsets of prepositions. This is implied in Bresnan’s descriptions, for example (cf. 1982b: 300 f.), as well as those by Jolly (1991: 104 V.). It is also the central claim of a series of papers by Rauh (1990, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2002a), which discuss the results of extensive empirical studies of the syntactic properties of English prepositions and conclude that three classes of prepositions must be distinguished. Of these three classes, one class primarily exhibits properties of a functional category in the sense of Abney (1987), while another class

302


exhibits all the properties of a lexical category. The third class assumes an intermediate status. Of these classes it is above all the second one, comprising spatial, temporal, and scalar prepositions, that is problematic for Anderson’s approach since its members do not alternate with morphological cases and are thus not realizations of the category functor. Instead they form a lexical category in that they share the properties of members of other lexical categories: they have an argument structure, and they license modiWers and functional categories, i.e. ‘secondary categories’ in Anderson’s terms, in their extended projection. They are also replaceable by pro-forms, which indicates that they are referring expressions (cf. especially Rauh 1997b). Compared with the examples of nominal projections in (32), the examples of prepositional projections in (31) exhibit analogous properties typical of members of lexical categories: (31) a. Put the book on the shelf near John’s photograph. b. Put the book here on the shelf. c. Put the book here. (32) a. I want bagels with chocolate. b. I want these bagels. c. I want these. In (31a) near John’s photograph has the function of a modiWer with regard to on the shelf just as with chocolate does with regard to bagels (32a). In (31b) here serves to determine the reference of the space denoted by on the shelf just as these determines the reference of the objects denoted by bagels in (32b). And in (31c) here is used independently as a deictic expression to determine the reference of a location just as these in (32c) serves to determine the reference of objects. Thus both expressions are substitutes for the projection of a lexical category as pro-forms, more precisely, the projection of a lexical category including its extended projection. Furthermore, both cases exhibit the necessity – characteristic of deictic expressions – of being accompanied by a pointing gesture to make the act of reference successful. In addition, both prepositions and nouns can license measure phrases, which is a further argument in favour of analogous properties: (33) a. They found the treasure three feet below the surface. b. He arrived an hour after midnight. (34) a. He drank two pints of beer. b. A group of children arrived.


303

Since all these properties establish this class of prepositions as a lexical category (in the sense of the PPT), together with nouns, verbs, and adjectives, they must be described as members of a ‘primary category’ or ‘basic word class’ and thus have their own word-class features. Anderson’s approach, however, cannot distinguish this group of prepositions from the others. Nor does his system provide for a description of the licensing of speciWers and of modiWers (circumstantials) in the projection of these prepositions, since, as retro-complements, speciWers, and modiWers are contextually described for their selection of heads, these heads being speciWed for their particular word-class features. But there are no such features for lexical prepositions as heads, which are described as lacking such features: {}. In addition, this absence of a word-class description makes it impossible to describe forms such as here or there appropriately. Like the determiners this, that, these, or those, whose referential property as well as their occurrence either intransitively or transitively they share, these forms must be described as members of a secondary category whose transitive variant is speciWed as selecting a categorially speciWed complement. The analogous properties of determiners on the one hand and the deictic spatial pro-forms here and there on the other show that Anderson’s analysis of these pro-forms as functors with an incorporated {N}complement (e.g. 1997: 81) is inappropriate. The second problematic aspect of Anderson’s description of the category functor concerns the role of members of this category as speciWcations of verbal and nominal valencies. Anderson describes these valencies, i.e. subcategorizations based on complement selection, exclusively on the basis of functor features, which, according to him, ‘can be said to be the crucial characteristic of case grammar’ (1997: 149). This implies that the categorial speciWcation of verbal and nominal complements and thus their syntactic environment, something which is closely related to the description of verbs and nouns as syntactic categories, can be derived from the functor features. There is, however, what may be called a ‘realization problem’. The Wrst example concerns deverbal nominalizations like humiliation in the humiliation of Rome by Hannibal which, according to Anderson, have inherited the complement selection properties of their base verbs via lexical redundancy, yielding the following description of humiliation: (35) humiliation: {N;P};{P;N/{ntr},{agt}} (1997: 132)

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Accordingly, humiliation selects two complements, which are speciWed for the functor features {ntr} (later replaced by {abs} and by {erg,loc, abs} in the context of humiliate) and {agt} (later replaced by {erg}). The prepositions of and by are described as {}{ntr} and {}{agt}, so that these can satisfy the selection requirements of humiliation (ibid.). What is problematic for Anderson’s approach is the fact that the selectional requirements of humiliation, which are inherited from humiliate and therefore identical with those of this verb, are nevertheless realized diVerently, namely by prepositions rather than by positions: (36) Hannibal humiliated Rome. This shows that the categorial properties of selectional requirements cannot after all be derived from functor features. The next example refers to various selectional requirements of verbs. Following Anderson’s assumptions, both the verb remember and the verb think are speciWed as selecting the complements {erg, loc} and {abs}: (37) a. John remembered Mary. b. John thought of Mary. The question here is what prevents the formation of ungrammatical sentences like *John remembered of Mary and *John thought Mary. The criticism is that Anderson fails to provide any lexical speciWcation for selected prepositions. Should his answer be that such a speciWcation is indeed intended, the next problem arises. For Anderson states that post-verbal arguments of what are traditionally called ‘prepositional’ verbs (1997: 203), as in (38), are to be interpreted as ‘ ‘‘abstract’’ locational/directional’ (ibid.), which he describes in terms of the functor feature {loc}: (38) Freddie listens to the album. This shows that he describes selected prepositions such as to in this example in the same way as lexical prepositions, such as to in (39): (39) Freddie went to the station. However, these two forms are syntactically distinct, illustrated by the diVerence in grammaticality between the examples in (40): (40) a. Freddie went all the way to the station. b. *Freddie listened all the way to the album.


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Summing up, the problems under discussion here relate to mainly two aspects that are, however, central in Anderson’s approach. The Wrst concerns the supposedly ‘notional’ basis for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, which on closer scrutiny does not always deserve the characterization ‘notional’. The second aspect involves the realization of the category functor.

8.5.2 Extensions and revisions The approach to the description of syntactic categories presented by Anderson in 1997 was further developed in the following years. Apart from changes that can be considered extensions of his descriptive system or that serve the purpose of clarifying certain aspects, Anderson’s revisions show that he himself was obviously not satisWed with some of his former assumptions and was aware of problems. Two kinds of extensions introduced by Anderson (2006a, 2007) are of special importance. The Wrst is an increased speciWcation of inherent subcategorization properties on the basis of secondary features that aVect the compatibility of items in a sentence and thus their distribution. Examples of these are features such as: {human} for the description of someone (2007: 290); {fem(inine)} for the description of she/her (ibid.) and female names (ibid. 263); {loc {country}} for the description of the names of countries, such as Germany (ibid. 303); {N{def, tu}} for the description of pronouns (ibid. 241); and a subscript R, {R} for the description of proper names with a Wxed reference, yielding, for example, William {R{masc}} (ibid. 287). The second kind of extension relates to the realization or instantiation of functors, an issue on which little information was given in 1997. Anderson (2006a) Wrst discusses Latin, paying particular attention to morphological case markers and a description of correlations between these markers and functor features (cf. ibid. 186 V.). What proves to be problematic here is his general assumption that prepositions and morphological case markers are alternative options for the realization of functors, since prepositions in Latin – and in other languages – impose their own case requirements on their complements. Anderson discusses this issue under the heading ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’ (ibid. 187 V.) and suggests as a solution that prepositions exhibiting this feature be described as ‘hybrid’ and thus as complex prepositions (ibid. 197, 202). This will be considered below. The revisions introduced by Anderson in his 2006a and 2007 publications and to be discussed here concern a restructuring of the

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classiWcation of the former ‘primary’ and ‘secondary categories’ including his characterization of categories, and his new description of lexically complex categories, in particular of prepositions and deverbal nouns. The identiWcation and categorization of ‘basic word classes’, that is, of ‘primary categories’ on the one hand, and of ‘secondary categories’ on the other, as made in Anderson 1997, does not reappear in his more recent publications. Instead, Anderson draws a distinction between functional and lexical categories, as in the PPT (cf. section 5.3), and notes that the categories identiWed ‘each represents a distinct word class’ (2007: 32) in English. In his 2006a and 2007 publications he identiWes the categories Noun, Verb, and Adjective as lexical categories, describing them as he did in 1997 in terms of the notionally motivated feature combinations {N;P}, {P;N}, and {P:N} (¼ (P;N),(N;P)). A minor yet noteworthy modiWcation to his 1997 version is to be seen in the justiWcation for the description of the category Adjective as {N:P}: [W]hereas most adjectives in English take, like (derived) nouns, (non-subject) complements that are marked with an overt preposition, as in He is fond of Mary (cf. his fondness for Mary), some adjectives behave like verbs in taking a ‘bare complement’, as in She was like Mary (cf. She resembled Mary and She was similar to Mary). (2007: 27; cf. also 2006a: 297)

In addition, Anderson now deWnes the notional character of the feature P as distinct from that of N as follows: N is a notional feature that promotes perception of something as concrete, stable, and discrete, as potentially referential, while P promotes perception of it as relational and dynamic, potentially predicative. (2007: 26; cf. also 2006a: 297)

This characterization of the features makes them more applicable to adjectives than his earlier characterization, both to relational adjectives like fond of or angry at and to those referring to concrete and stable aspects such as large or red. However, the question raised in section 8.5.1 must be asked again, namely why are prepositions not given a description similar to that for adjectives? For if P involves the property ‘relational’, notionally-oriented linguists especially should relate this property to prepositions, as the example of Langacker demonstrates (cf. section 7.4.1). And the properties mentioned in the Wrst of the two quotations above, which form the basis for the description of the


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category Adjective using the features P and N, can also be identiWed in connection with prepositions. For there are prepositions taking ‘(nonsubject) complements that are marked with an overt preposition’, such as in He went out of the house, and there are prepositions ‘taking a ‘‘bare complement’’ ’, as in He stayed in the house.20 It is thus clear that Anderson’s description of prepositions continues to be problematic. This is all the more remarkable in the light of his restructuring of the classiWcation of categories, since he adopts the distinction between lexical and functional categories made in the PPT, while at the same time deviating from this by not including prepositions, or more generally adpositions, in the set of lexical categories. His comment on this runs as follows: ‘Adpositions are not a happy lexical category’ (2006a: 297; cf. also 2007: 29). This can be endorsed, but only if the statement relates to the whole set of prepositions. The functional categories identiWed by Anderson (2006a: 298) comprise ‘Operative ¼ {P}’, ‘Comparator ¼ {P.N}’, ‘Determinative ¼ {N}’ (alternatively ‘{D}’, ibid. 181), and ‘Functor ¼ {}’. The label ‘Operative’, adapted from Huddleston’s (1984) term ‘operator’ for auxiliaries, replaces the earlier label ‘Auxiliary’ for the same category, and ‘Determinative’ replaces the earlier label ‘Name’. The category ‘Comparator’ is absent in Anderson (2007: 30). Anderson characterizes functional categories in a way similar to that found in the PPT, following Abney (1987) (cf. section 5.3.4), by pointing out their tendency to form a closed class (2006a: 181), their ‘ ‘‘reduced’’ semantics’ (ibid. 298), and the alternative instantiation as independent or dependent expressions (ibid. 298 f.). Thus, his characterization of these categories includes aspects that Anderson (1997) attributed to their classiWcation as ‘primary categories’ (i.e. ‘independent expression’), and to their classiWcation as ‘secondary categories’ (i.e. ‘non-independent expression’). Consequently, there is no longer a double classiWcation of the categories concerned, a feature that was criticized in section 8.5.1. Furthermore, the distinction between functional and lexical categories means that auxiliaries and determiners, now ‘determinatives’, are no longer classiWed as ‘basic word classes’ on 20 It must be noted that the categorization of like as an adjective in the quotation is certainly not convincing. Nor is it convincing in the light of Anderson’s own remarks that describe like as an intermediate category in terms of the feature combination {(P:N): }, involving adjectives and prepositions in equal proportions (1997: 79). Anderson seems to justify his classiWcation of like in the quotation given by claiming that it can be replaced by similar to.

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the same level as verbs, nouns, and adjectives. Instead, Anderson now assigns functional to lexical categories, i.e. auxiliaries or ‘operatives’ to the category of verbs, and determinatives to that of nouns. His way of describing this in terms of the selection of a particular categorial complement by a particular functional category is reminiscent of Abney’s f-selection (cf. section 5.3.4). While Anderson (1997) associates both determiners and functors with nouns (cf. ibid. 106), he no longer does so in his subsequent publications (cf. 2006a: 299; cf. also 2007: 29). Thus, functors assume a special status among the functional categories. This as well as the problems pointed out in section 8.5.1 relating to the description of prepositions as members of this category raise the question of how Anderson describes the category functor and the items that realize this category in his more recent publications. As in his earlier works, Anderson continues to assume that the category functor can be realized by prepositions/adpositions, by morphological case markers or by position (cf. e.g. 2006a: 179; 2007: 28). In general, items of the category functor (¼ {}) select items of the category {N}, now ‘{D}’, as their complement (¼ { /{N}}, with this complement being saturated either in the syntax or word-internally. In the Wrst case the functor is realized by a preposition, in the second one by morphological case or position, which now is described as ‘absorption’ of the functor into the category {N} (cf. e.g. 2006a: 180). A modiWcation to the way the realization of the category functor is described has already been mentioned above. It relates to ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’, the fact that prepositions themselves impose case requirements on their complements. This is problematic in Anderson’s approach, since cases realize functors and functors specify the selection of complements, and since prepositions, which also realize functors, are not themselves assumed to select functors as complements. Anderson Wrst discusses this problem in detail with reference to Latin where all prepositions impose case requirements on their complements and suggests that these be described as ‘hybrid’ and thus as complex. This yields the following result: (41) a. Ab {F{loc{src}},D/{loc}} b. Ex {F{loc{src}},D{dim}/{loc}} c. In {F{loc},D{dim}/{loc/goal}} (2006a: 200)


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The ‘hybrid’ character of these prepositions is described by seeing them as functors, represented here by ‘{F}’ and the secondary functor features that subcategorize {F}, and as determinatives, represented by {D}, the former {N}. {D} may be speciWed for a dimension, with ‘dim’ serving as a ‘place-holder’ (2006a: 197). Among the examples given, this applies to ex and in, but not to ab. This description also expresses the fact that complex prepositions, like verbs, exhibit a valency that is speciWed by a functor feature. The feature /{loc} in the descriptions of ab and ex indicates that these prepositions require the ablative for their complement, while /{loc/goal} indicates the options ablative and accusative for in. According to Anderson, this solves ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’ in that now the case depends on {D}, not on the functor element (ibid. 200). However, this solution is not without its problems. For it has to be asked why half of these prepositions are determinatives, and thus apparently nominal categories. The explanation is that this {D}, as a component of a complex preposition, is a very special {D}, namely a ‘spatial determinative’ (2006a: 189). This characterization, however, raises questions concerning the identity of {D} as a syntactic category, which will be discussed below. In his discussion of ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’ Anderson refers not only to Latin but also to English, and he arrives at diVerent solutions in some cases. He Wrst considers pronominal complements of prepositions which, unlike nominal complements, are speciWed for the morphological case ‘accusative’, as in for him vs. for the boy. The pronominal example at least seems to exhibit ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’ but cannot be treated like the Latin examples, since Anderson assumes that not all English prepositions are complex (cf. below). However, pronouns in English are case-marked in the context of all prepositions. Anderson solves this problem by claiming that in English ‘ ‘‘accusative’’ has become a non-case. In such circumstances, ‘‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’’ doesn’t manifest itself’ (2006a: 209). Anderson then considers examples like from below the river with prepositions, in this case from, selecting a prepositional complement. This variant of ‘Kuryłowicz’s problem’ is solved by describing prepositions such as below as complex, like Latin prepositions, and thus as consisting of the two categorial components {F} and {D}. This yields the following description:

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(42)

{F{loc{src}}}21 {D{sub}, F{loc}}

{D} from

below

the river

(2006a: 192) According to this description, {F} and {D} exhibit their usual properties: {F} (¼ from) selects {D}, one of the components of below, as its complement and {F}, the other component of below, in turn selects {D} (¼ the river) as its complement. This example illustrates very clearly that the {D} introduced to describe complex or ‘hybrid’ prepositions has two aspects that serve two distinct purposes. On the one hand {D} is a ‘spatial determinative’ that is subcategorized for dimensions and as such does not share any properties with determinatives such as the or a, which determine the reference of nouns. This is an appropriate way to describe prepositions and to a certain extent comparable to the referential argument <Space> introduced by Zwarts (1992) for the description of prepositions and restricted by Rauh (e.g. 1997a, 2002a) to the description of lexical, i.e. spatial, temporal, and scalar prepositions. On the other hand however, describing this ‘prepositional’ determinative as categorially identical to the nominal {D} serves solely to give the impression that what is involved is not a sequence of prepositions but rather a ‘normal’ selection of a {D}-complement by {F}. The dubious status of {D} as one of the components of ‘hybrid’ prepositions and the problems that arise are evidence of the fact that prepositions, at least in English and at least some of them, do not represent a functional category but a lexical one. For the ‘spatial determinative’ that Anderson introduces is not nominal but prepositional, and as such comparable, as indicated above, to the referential argument <Space>. The two diVer, however, in addition to Anderson’s categorial classiWcation, in that according to him not every spatial preposition is complex and thus contains this determinative as one of its components. 21 This structure illustrates that Anderson now uses labelled nodes rather than the unlabelled nodes of 1997.


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He analyses at (2007: 29), for example, as well as to and from (2006a: 191) as simple prepositions. These however, are like below in licensing ‘speciWers’, as the examples in (43) illustrate: (43) a. The accident occurred right at the bus stop. b. This Xight goes/comes straight to/from London. c. The Wsh was right below the waterline. Rauh (cf. above) explains this licensing of speciWers in connection with the referential argument. A similar explanation is not possible in Anderson’s approach since these prepositions, unlike below, above, beside, etc., are not speciWed for a ‘spatial-determinative’ component, nor even for any categorial features. It is worth mentioning in this context that Anderson does not deny the existence of prepositional speciWers, and for him the speciWerhood of right as in right at the back is as ‘uncontroversial’ as that of very in very aware of the problem (2006b: 621). But for a functor element to license a speciWer is not only extremely unusual, but also problematic in Anderson’s approach, since speciWers are described in terms of the categorial features of the head they select, e.g. very: \{N:P}, but prepositions as well as speciWers do not have any categorial features. The result would have to be that an item not speciWed for any features selects an item as its head that is not speciWed for any features, namely: right: \{}. The conclusion is that the description of prepositions and also functors continues to be problematic in Anderson’s more recent writings. This is also illustrated by the following discussion, which is concerned with nominalizations. Using humiliation as an example, it was pointed out in section 8.5.1 that nominalizations with a verbal base realize the complements of the verb as PPs rather than NPs/DPs (e.g. Hannibal humiliated Rome vs. the humiliation of Rome by Hannibal), which is not captured by the lexical speciWcation of complement selection on the basis of functor features alone. Anderson (2006a: 242 V.) solves this problem by assuming that the constituents aVected, which have the status of complements in the context of verbs, represent circumstantials in the context of nouns since here they are optional. He describes this by analysing nominalizations of this kind as complex, ‘hybrid’ items consisting of a nominal and a subjoined verbal component, with the complements of the verb being incorporated and thus blocked. Therefore, they cannot be realized in the syntax and are saturated

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word-internally instead. However, they can license apposed circumstantials. Since in English circumstantials are generally realized as functor phrases with a prepositional functor, this explains the categorial diVerence between these constituents in the context of verbs and in the context of nouns. At Wrst sight this looks like an elegant solution, reminiscent of Jaeggli’s (1986) analysis of by-phrases in passive constructions. There is a small problem, however, since, as Grimshaw has shown (1990), the complements of the base verb of deverbal nominalizations are optional only if the derived form is a ‘result nominal’ or a ‘simple event nominal’. If it is a ‘complex event nominal’, these constituents are obligatory, which contradicts an analysis as circumstantials. (44a) is one of Grimshaw’s examples of a ‘result nominal’ and (44b) one of her examples of a ‘complex event nominal’: (44) a. The examination took a long time. b. The instructor’s examination of the papers took a long time. (ibid. 51) Grimshaw provides suYcient evidence for the appropriateness of this distinction (ibid. 49 V.),22 and thus Anderson’s solution cannot apply, at least not to ‘complex event nominals’. This in turn means that here too it is problematic to specify the complements of verbs and nouns in the lexicon for functor features alone and not for categorial features that determine whether the complement is realized as an NP/DP or as a PP. In spite of this criticism, which does aVect a central area of his approach, Anderson is the linguist among all those considered in this book who has provided the most detailed and the most valuable insights into the syntactically relevant properties of lexical items. The discussion of his approach, including its development from 1997 to 2007, has provided ample evidence of this. It has also shown that the assumption of a ‘notional’ grounding of grammatical or syntactic categories does not exclude a formal, feature-based description, just as the assumption that relationships between lexical items in sentences are semantic in nature does not mean that syntax can be ignored. In this sense, Anderson’s approach diVers fundamentally from Langacker’s, as presented and discussed in 7.3 to 7.5. Both approaches share, however, a 22 See also the discussion in Carrier and Randall (1992: 197 V.).


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focus on ‘notional’ or ‘cognititve’ properties. Since it is especially representatives of a cognitive approach to the description of language (cf. e.g. LakoV 1987: 58 V.; Taylor 1989 [1995: 173 V.]), who claim that linguistic categories should be described on a prototypical rather than the traditional Aristotelian basis, the next section will be concerned with the question whether this applies to syntactic categories. 8.6 Notional approaches to syntactic categories and the question of category structure In order to answer the question of the structure of notionally based syntactic categories, that is, whether this structure is a classical Aristotelian or a prototypical one, the following discussion will Wrst of all deal with the characteristics of these two types of categorization. It will emerge that there are supporters of both views, including LakoV (1987) and Taylor (1989 [1995]) on the one hand, and Newmeyer (2000) on the other. For an evaluation of these, it is important to consider what assumptions are made concerning the identity of syntactic categories, taking into consideration the discussion of both Langacker’s description of grammatical categories and Anderson’s description of syntactic categories. It was not until the mid-1970s that there was recognition of a need to discuss the internal structure of categories. This applies to all kinds of categories, including linguistic ones. Following the classical Aristotelian approach (Metaphysics)23, category membership was determined on the basis of properties that deWne a category and are therefore both necessary and suYcient for category membership. The set of categorydeWning properties thus corresponds to what can be called a ‘checklist’ (Fillmore 1975), on the basis of which category membership of items is checked. If all the properties on the list are present, an item is considered a member of the category. If not, it does not belong to the category. On the one hand this implies that there are Wxed boundaries between categories and on the other that all the members of the category have the same status as representatives of the category. The appropriateness of a deWnition of categories on the basis of necessary and suYcient properties was questioned by Wittgenstein (1953 [2001]). Taking the example of the German term ‘Spiel’, which 23 A comprehensive discussion of Aristotle’s approach can be found in Taylor (1989 [1995: 22 V.]).

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covers English ‘play’, ‘game’, and ‘match’, he demonstrates that activities that can be considered members of this category do not share all their properties (cf. ibid. 27e). Wittgenstein refers to board games, such as chess, card games, including patience, and ball games like tennis or children throwing a ball at a wall, as well as games like ringa-ring-a-roses (cf. ibid.). His conclusion is that, although no set of properties can be identiWed that is shared by all the members, there are nevertheless ‘resemblances’. Wittgenstein compares these resemblances to those between family members, such as ‘build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc.’ (ibid. 27e). He thus introduces the term ‘family resemblances’ (ibid. 26e), and also notes that with regard to activities that can be identiWed as a ‘Spiel’, no boundaries can be identiWed: ‘We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn’ (ibid. 28e). Two major conclusions can be drawn from Wittgenstein’s line of argumentation that distinguish his approach from the classical view of categories: Wrst, categories are not deWned by means of a Wxed set of necessary and suYcient properties, and consequently category membership is not determined by the presence (or absence) of such a Wxed set. Secondly, categories do not have clear-cut boundaries. This implies that one member can show family resemblances to two diVerent categories, justifying membership of either or both categories. For instance, the activity of playing tennis can be considered a member of the category ‘Spiel’ as well as of the category ‘Wettkampf ’ (competition or tournament). Wittgenstein’s consideration of category structures, which went unnoticed for quite a while, was taken up in the Wndings of the cognitive psychologist Rosch and her team (e.g. 1973a,b, 1977a,b, 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Mervis 1980). Rosch investigated human processing of the real world, in particular with regard to the development and formation of cognitive categories. Her numerous experiments revealed that cognitive categories are not formed on the basis of a Wxed set of properties that deWne categories in such a way that only those entities are considered members of the category that exhibit precisely these properties. Instead, categories are formed around a prototype or prototypical entities that are considered the best examples of the category. These unite the properties that are representative of the category, thus forming its core. Other, less prototypical members of the category share some but not all the properties with the prototypical members as well as among each other (cf. Rosch 1977a: 36; Mervis 1980:


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286 f.). Since there can be various combinations of shared properties, the concept of family resemblance, as posited by Wittgenstein, is identiWed here (Rosch and Mervis 1975: 574 V.), with the prototypical members exhibiting the highest degree of family resemblance to other members (ibid. 598 f.). The fact that diVerent properties can be shared means that there can be members of a category that do not share any properties with each other (Mervis 1980: 286). In this case, category membership is determined by the fact that they share properties with other members, which in their turn share properties with yet other members, including prototypical ones. Unlike categories that have a classical structure, a prototypical category structure can thus include cases where members of a category do not all have the same status as representatives of that category, which consists of best, average, and poor examples of that category. Moreover, such a category has boundaries that are ‘fuzzy, rather than clear-cut’ (ibid. 287). Accordingly, poor examples of two adjoining categories can share properties (cf. ibid.), which then justiWes considering them members of either category. Traditionally, linguistic categories have been described on the basis of a classical Aristotelian structure. Examples of this include the description of phonemes based on Wxed sets of distinctive features (e.g. Chomsky and Halle 1968: 413), or the description of word meanings based on Wxed sets of meaning components (cf. e.g. Gipper 1959; Katz and Fodor 1963; Nida 1975). Attempts to provide a corresponding description for the parts of speech, the oldest and most frequently considered linguistic categories, have always failed. This is because properties that have been identiWed as being characteristic of a given part of speech, such as ‘denotes a person, place or thing’, ‘is speciWed for plural’, and ‘follows a determiner’ for the description of nouns, can only be applied to some examples of that part of speech, but not to all of them. It is therefore scarcely surprising that some linguists, and in particular those who argue in favour of a cognitive approach, questioned whether the classical Aristotelian type of categorization was in fact appropriate, or whether linguistic categorization, like cognitive categorization, should be based on a prototypical category structure. LakoV, the former Generative Semanticist and now a proponent of Cognitive Linguistics, supported this view (1987). He identiWed prototype eVects in connection with linguistic categories, pointing to examples from phonology, morphology, and syntax (ibid. 59 V.). His remarks on syntactic categories are based on Wndings by Ross.

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Ross examined the syntactic behaviour of lexical items of English, demonstrating in a number of publications (e.g. 1972, 1973a,b) that items assigned to the same category do not exhibit the same syntactic behaviour and thus that the categories are syntactically heterogeneous. He went on to show that there are items that exhibit properties of two diVerent categories, which he took as evidence for fuzzy boundaries between the categories involved. This led him to conclude that there are no discrete syntactic categories but that items rather form a continuum or ‘category squish’ (1972: 316). One of the examples he discussed in detail concerns members of the categories adjective and preposition (cf. ibid. 317 V.). Taking various syntactic processes into consideration, and also considering how these processes apply to members of these categories, he arrives at a scale, with a member uniting the highest number of adjectival properties at one end and a member uniting the highest number of prepositional properties at the other. In between, there are members that exhibit either a preponderance of adjectival or a preponderance of prepositional properties: (45) proud > opposite > near > like > in (ibid. 319) In connection with these and other comparable Wndings resulting from Ross’s investigations, LakoV points out ‘that just about every syntactic category in the language shows prototype eVects. These include categories like noun, verb, adjective, clause, preposition, noun phrase, verb phrase, etc.’ (1987: 63). He thus interprets Ross’s results in terms of prototypical representatives of the categories ‘noun, verb, adjective’, etc., with these categories having not a classical, but a prototypical category structure. From this he concludes that virtually every syntactic category of a language has a prototypical structure. Of course, the problem with this conclusion is that LakoV identiWes the categories ‘noun, verb, adjective’, etc. as ‘syntactic’, thus equating the traditional parts of speech with syntactic categories. The discussions in the present book, and in particular the discussion of Anderson’s description of syntactic categories, have however provided suYcient evidence that this is not appropriate. LakoV’s statement therefore needs to be revised to claim that it is parts of speech that exhibit ‘prototype eVects’ and thus have a prototypical structure. This view is further


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supported by the discussion provided in chapter 10. However, it leaves unanswered the question of how syntactic categories are structured. Taylor (1989 [1995]) likewise argues in favour of a cognitive approach, dealing in considerable detail with the distinction between classical and prototypical category structures and their appropriateness for the description of linguistic categories. However, he doesn’t answer the question of how syntactic categories are structured either. Unlike LakoV, but like Langacker, Taylor avoids using the term ‘syntactic category’ and prefers the term ‘grammatical category’ (cf. ibid. 183 V). In doing so, Taylor intends to express the fact that not only syntactic distributional but also semantic properties are part of the deWnition. For him, the term ‘grammatical category’ includes ‘word classes – the traditional parts of speech’ on the one hand, and ‘syntactic categories like NOUN PHRASE’ on the other (ibid. 183). Like LakoV, he discusses the category structure of grammatical categories of the type ‘word class’, referring to Ross and pointing out in particular that they illustrate the ‘fuzziness of grammatical categories’ (ibid. 188). Following a discussion of how prototype theory can be applied in particular to the description of the grammatical category NOUN and focusing on semantic aspects (cf. ibid. 191 V.), he arrives at the following conclusion: Grammatical categories have a prototype structure, with central members sharing a range of both syntactic and semantic attributes. Failure of an item to exhibit some of these attributes does not of itself preclude membership. (ibid. 196)

However, what has been said about LakoV’s remarks likewise applies to Taylor, namely that the discussion refers to the traditional parts of speech and that his term ‘grammatical categories’ does not designate syntactic categories. Newmeyer, who in contrast to LakoV and Taylor is not a proponent of Cognitive Linguistics but rather an opponent, also addresses the question of whether it is appropriate to assume a prototypical structure for syntactic categories (1998: 165 V., 2000). He refers to proposals made in particular by LakoV and Taylor, and focuses on the two aspects that identify a prototypical category structure, namely that categories having such a structure exhibit a prototype, a ‘best case’, and that these categories are ‘fuzzy’, that is, they have ‘nondistinct’ boundaries (2000: 222). Newmeyer arrives at the conclusion that the Wrst aspect cannot be

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applied to syntactic categories, since ‘best cases’ are not identiWed on the basis of the syntactic properties of members of these categories but on the basis of their semantic properties or of correlations between their morphological and semantic properties (cf. ibid. 226 V.). As regards the second aspect, Newmeyer explains, referring to Ross (1972), that the fact that there are items that can be said to exhibit syntactic properties of two categories does not necessarily imply that they are therefore to be placed between these categories. It should rather be assumed that these items belong to both categories. He therefore states with regard to near, which Ross analysed ‘as something between an adjective and a preposition’ (Newmeyer 2000: 242), that ‘near can be used either as an adjective or as a preposition’ (ibid. 243). And he infers from this ‘that near provides no evidence for categorial continua’ (ibid.), summarizing the results of his argumentation as follows: This chapter has defended the classical view, arguing that categories have discrete boundaries and are not organized around central best cases. (ibid. 245)

What is signiWcant about Newmeyer’s statements is that, like LakoV, Taylor, and also Ross, he discusses the structure of the categories of noun, adjective, verb, and preposition, apparently referring to the traditional parts of speech. However, as the above has shown, he excludes semantic and morphological properties from the properties that are relevant to category deWnition. What remains are the syntactic properties of the members of these categories, which are thus considered to be syntactic categories with the same names. However, it is not appropriate to speak of syntactic categories in these cases, as the discussion of various approaches in the present book has shown. For the number of syntactic categories far exceeds the number of the traditional parts of speech. Thus, Newmeyer’s remarks on the structure of syntactic categories cannot be taken as statements about genuine syntactic categories. In order to give an answer to the question of whether syntactic categories, especially those described on a notional basis, have a prototypical or a classical category structure, the approaches by Langacker and by Anderson that have already been presented and discussed in this chapter will be considered. Since the answer is more obvious with regard to Anderson’s statements, his approach will be discussed Wrst.


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As the discussion of Anderson’s description of categories in sections 8.2 and 8.3 has shown, Anderson distinguishes between ‘word classes’ on the one hand, and ‘syntactic categories’ on the other. The diVerence between the two types of category is that, by means of the speciWcation of subcategorization properties (e.g. {N/{N;P}}, {N;P/{N;P}}, {P;N/ {erg},{abs}}) and above all by means of lexical redundancies (e.g. {P: N} ¼>{{P:N}\{N;P}}), the feature representations of just a few ‘wordclasses’ (e.g. {P;N} ¼ verb, {N;P} ¼ noun, {N} ¼ name), which at the same time represent ‘primary syntactic categories’, serve to derive various complex feature representations, each of which provides the lexical basis for a syntactic category. What is more, even underived lexical items can, as a result of ‘intra-categorial componentiality’ or ‘hybridism’ (Anderson 2006a: 192), be analysed as syntactically relevant complex feature representations. Lexical items speciWed for simple or complex feature representations are available to syntactic principles and rules, etc., which assign them appropriate positions in sentence structures. Thus, the feature representations of lexical items together with the syntactic principles and rules, etc. deWne syntactic categories. This implies that each feature of such a feature representation is relevant to category deWnition. And this in turn implies that only those items that exhibit all the features speciWed in a feature representation are members of the syntactic category that is deWned by this feature representation. In other words, the structure of a syntactic category can only be a classical not a prototypical one. This also applies to those categories that Anderson (1997) describes as ‘intermediate primary categories’ (cf. section 8.2.2), referring to Ross’s ‘squishes’, and which LakoV and Taylor considered evidence of a prototypical structure of syntactic categories. In Anderson’s approach, each of these categories is described by means of a speciWc feature representation and thus represents a separate syntactic category. This does not exclude a continuum of categories due to resemblances. However, it implies neither that this continuum forms a single category with a prototypical structure, nor that the boundaries between the categories are not clear-cut. Even though they are based on notional properties, syntactic categories in Anderson’s approach thus do have a classical structure. Therefore, when he refers to prototypical members of a category, as he does in his more recent publications, this cannot mean syntactic categories, but rather his ‘word classes’, which are comparable to the traditional parts of speech. In fact, he uses the terms ‘prototypical nouns’ (e.g. 2007: 8),

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‘prototypical prepositions’ (ibid. 28), or ‘prototypical verbs’ (ibid.) in these cases. An analysis of Langacker’s theoretical approach to syntactic or grammatical categories (as discussed in section 7.4.2, there is no real description), in principle yields a similar result, even if this does not seem to be the case at Wrst sight. For Langacker himself does not consider either a classical category structure or a prototypical one appropriate for linguistic categories. Instead he proposes a third option, a schematic network structure (cf. e.g. 1987: 371). Although he only uses the example of lexical, conceptual categories in his discussion of such a structure, including the example [TREE] as presented and discussed in section 7.3.2, he points out that this category model ‘is applicable to any category of linguistic relevance’ (1987: 377), i.e. also to syntactic or grammatical categories. A schematic network structure describes categories as abstract schemas that are composed of a Wnite set of subschemas, or nodes, forming a hierarchically ordered network. The structure of this network is determined by ‘a set of categorizing relationships between nodes’ (Langacker 1987: 379). Vertically speaking, this means a relationship of elaboration, and horizontally speaking, one of extension. Elaboration here expresses degrees of speciWcity, whereas extension is based on the juxtaposition of properties. Such a category structure is dynamic to the extent that extensions are always possible, with the result that the boundaries of a category are both stable at a given point in time due to the Wnite set of subschemas, and also Xexible in allowing development. This means that new members can join and thus extend the category. A category with a network structure shares features with both a prototypical and a classical category. What it has in common with a prototypical category is the fact that the subschemas include some that are more prominent than others and therefore prototypical with regard to the category. Moreover, the Xexible boundaries are in a way similar to the fuzzy boundaries of prototypical categories. There is however a signiWcant diVerence between the two category types, for the most abstract schema of a category expresses a characterization that applies to all the members of this category. Unlike prototypical categories, category membership therefore is ‘not a matter of degree’ (Langacker 1987: 371). This, in turn, shows that there are features shared by categories having a schematic network structure and those with a classical structure. For if a characterization provided by means


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of the abstract schema of a category applies to all the members of this category, then this characterization is at the same time necessary and suYcient for category membership. In other words, items that form a category share at least one property. Since each subschema in a schematic network is structured internally in the same way as the most abstract schema, it is also true that there is both a necessary and a suYcient characterization for membership of a subschema or a subcategory, with the characterizations of less abstract subschemas being more speciWc than those of more abstract (sub)schemas. As regards syntactic or grammatical categories, which according to Langacker are to be described by subschemas in schematic networks, this means that they are described on the basis of a set of necessary and suYcient properties. In other words, the result is again that syntactic or grammatical categories have a classical structure. Thus both Langacker’s theoretical considerations and Anderson’s practical descriptions lead to the conclusion that syntactic categories are described on a classical basis. Indeed, this is the only assumption that makes sense if the description of a category is to determine which positions its members may occupy in the sentence structures of a particular language and if these are the same positions for the members of a particular category. This cannot be expected of a category with a prototypical structure, which even allows members of the same category to share no properties at all. It is not relevant in such cases whether or not the categorial description is based on notional properties.

9 Syntactic categories and language typology

9.1 Introduction The preceding chapters were concerned with linguistic theories which investigate human language as a system and whose aim it is to describe and explain this system. Accordingly, as shown, grammatical models are developed within these theories which suggest how sentences are constructed in natural languages and what means are used. Thus, the design of the grammars of individual languages, whose properties are understood as parametrized options of universal principles, plays an important role in the development of these grammatical models. The grammatical models developed within the various theories have made it possible to isolate and discuss the consequences for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, ‘syntactic category’ referring to the set of linguistic items that may occur in the same positions in the structures of the sentences of a given language. This chapter now turns to an area that is not predominantly concerned with entire language systems as realized in individual languages. By comparing details in as many languages as possible, language typology instead investigates shared properties and diVerences across languages and establishes typologies. Parts of individual language systems are compared which are generally investigated independently of each other and for which a description of the entire system is not necessary. Examples of areas that have been investigated from a typological perspective include word-order phenomena concerning the relative order of verb, subject, and object in the basic word order of languages (e.g. Greenberg 1963; Hawkins 1983), personal pronouns

syntactic categories and language typology

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(Ingram 1978), relative-clause constructions (e.g. Downing 1978; Lehmann 1984, 1986), the passive (Keenan 1985), negation (Payne 1985), lexical nominalizations (Comrie and Thompson 1985 [2007]), inXectional properties (e.g. Bickel and Nichols 2007), and last but not least linguistic categories identiWed and described as ‘part of speech’, ‘word class’, ‘lexical category’, and also ‘syntactic category’, which are therefore of interest here. Croft (1990 [2003: 1 f.]) distinguishes three deWnitions of language typology which he relates to three successive stages of typological analysis. According to the Wrst deWnition and corresponding to the Wrst stage, language typology is concerned with cross-linguistic comparative investigations of selected domains on the basis of which types are deWned and languages classiWed into those types. As an example he mentions investigations of morphological properties carried out in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century which led to a typological classiWcation into isolating, agglutinating, and fusional languages. A further example is the typological classiWcation of languages on the basis of word-order phenomena, which identiWes and distinguishes between SVO, SOV, VSO languages, etc. Croft calls this Wrst deWnition of language typology ‘typological classiWcation’ (ibid. 1). The second deWnition, which Croft called ‘typological generalization’ (ibid.), characterizes language typology as a subdiscipline of linguistics that investigates patterns which occur systematically across languages. A predominant aim of these investigations is the identiWcation of universals, and here, following Greenberg’s seminal publication (1963), implicational universals of the type ‘if language A exhibits phenomenon x, then it also exhibits phenomenon y’ play an important role. Croft considers typological analysis according to this deWnition as the second stage because it is at this point that the facts observed and used for classiWcation in the Wrst stage are now subject to the formulation of typological generalizations which are then explained within a coherent theory of language. Explaining observed data and the classiWcations and generalizations of the Wrst two stages is then, according to Croft, the aim of the third stage of typological analysis, for which he assumes that a functional perspective can provide an adequate basis. He therefore gives for this stage a deWnition of language typology which ‘represents an ‘‘approach’’ to the study of language that contrasts with prior approaches, such as

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American structuralism and generative grammar’ (ibid. 2). And he explains: This view of typology is closely allied to functionalism, the hypothesis that linguistic structure should be explained primarily in terms of linguistic function (the Chomskyan approach is contrastively titled formalism). (ibid. 2)

Croft calls a typology that follows this deWnition a ‘(functional-) typological approach’ (ibid. 2). Grammatical theories that follow this approach and that make suggestions for corresponding grammatical models include Dik’s ‘Functional Grammar’ (e.g. 1978, 1991, 1989 [1997a], 1997b), Foley and Van Valin’s ‘Role and Reference Grammar’ (1984, Van Valin 1993, 2001, 2005; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997), and Croft’s ‘Radical Construction Grammar’ (2000, 2001). Following the three stages and deWnitions distinguished by Croft, a discussion of the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in language typology can be related to one of these stages. This will be done in what follows, but here the Wrst two stages will be combined. What turns out to be problematic, at least concerning the Wrst stage, is the fact that it is not always clear whether it is indeed syntactic categories that are identiWed, even if the corresponding label is used. The quasi-synonymous use of the terms ‘part of speech’, ‘word class’, ‘lexical category’, and ‘syntactic category’ by the typologist Haspelmath in his article ‘Word Classes and Parts of Speech’ (2001) was pointed out in the introduction to this book. The following section (9.2) will be concerned with linguistic categories referred to by these various terms, in order to determine which of the terms refer to syntactic categories. A similar problem does not arise in the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in grammatical models which according to Croft belong to the third stage of typological research and represent examples of ‘functional-typological explanation’. This is because any model that aims to describe and explain whole well-formed sentences must be able to explain how linguistic items are assigned to appropriate positions in the structures of these sentences. This will be the concern of sections 9.3 and 9.4, which deal with Dik’s Functional Grammar and Foley and Van Valin’s Role and Reference Grammar, both typologically oriented grammars. Section 9.5 discusses the insights gained in language typology for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories.


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9.2 Investigating linguistic categories in language typology The categories most frequently investigated in language typology are parts of speech closely related to the traditional parts of speech. In order to be able to distinguish the investigation of parts of speech from that of syntactic categories, section 9.2.1 starts with a discussion of selected approaches to the identiWcation and description of the former before turning in section 9.2.2 to approaches that investigate linguistic categories referred to as ‘syntactic categories’. Section 9.2.3 will then be concerned with approaches that explicitly distinguish between lexical and syntactic categories.

9.2.1 Parts of speech or ‘word classes’ One major contribution to the typological investigation of parts of speech is Schachter’s article ‘Parts-of-speech Systems’ (1985). Schachter Wrst characterizes ‘parts of speech’ as ‘the traditional term for the major classes of words that are grammatically distinguished in a language’ (ibid. 3). He then formulates the following questions, which have become something like a programme for research on parts of speech in language typology: What, for example, can be said about the ways in which, and the limits within which, parts-of-speech inventories may diVer from one another? Which parts-of-speech distinctions are universal and which language-speciWc? What are the ways in which languages that lack a particular part of speech express the semantic equivalent? And what relations are there between the parts-of-speech system of a language and the language’s other typological characteristics? (ibid.)

To answer these questions, criteria for identifying and describing parts of speech are required. According to Schachter, these should not be semantic, but grammatical, and relevant criteria are: ‘the word’s distribution, its range of syntactic functions, and the morphological or syntactic categories for which it is speciWable’ (ibid.). Using the example Boys like girls, he illustrates his understanding of these criteria. Since boys and like cannot be substituted for each other, they diVer with respect to the criterion of distribution. They also diVer with respect to their syntactic functional range, since boys but not like can have the function of subject. Finally, they diVer in that boys is speciWed for the category number but not for tense, whereas like is speciWed for both (ibid. 4). Thus the two words belong to diVerent parts of speech,

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unlike boys and girls, which exhibit the same behaviour with respect to the three criteria. Although Schachter rejects semantic criteria for the identiWcation of parts of speech, he nevertheless uses them for heuristic reasons, starting his cross-linguistic investigation with the semantic characterizations of the traditional parts of speech. For instance, ‘[t]he label noun is assigned to the class of words in which occur the names of most persons, places, and things’ (ibid. 7) or ‘Verb is the name given to the parts-of-speech class in which occur most of the words that express actions, processes, and the like’ (ibid. 9). He then considers whether there are sets of words in the languages under investigation which conform to these semantic characterizations. If this is the case, the next step is – at least theoretically – to investigate whether these sets of words exhibit the same behaviour with respect to the criteria considered relevant, i.e. whether they all have the same distribution, can express the same syntactic functions, and are speciWed for the same morphological or syntactic categories. If they share these properties, then a part of speech is identiWed and even words which do not have the semantic characterization that provided the starting point for the investigation are assigned to this part of speech. In this way, words like handshake or accident are identiWed as nouns in English although they do not designate persons, places, or things. Following the method indicated here, Schachter analyses words or forms of various languages, starting with the semantic characterizations of nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, which he describes as ‘open classes’ (cf. ibid. 5 V.), and moving on to pronouns and other proforms such as ‘pro-sentences’ (e.g. yes, no), ‘pro-clauses’ (e.g. so in I don’t think so), or ‘pro-adverbs’ (such as thus) (cf. ibid. 32 V.). He then analyses ‘noun adjuncts’, ‘verb adjuncts’, ‘conjunctions’, and other forms like ‘clitics, ‘interjections’, ‘negators’, or ‘politeness markers’, all of which he describes as ‘closed classes’ (cf. ibid. 35 V.). Under the heading ‘noun adjuncts’ he subsumes amongst others ‘role markers’ such as ‘case markers’, ‘discourse markers’, and ‘adpositions’, ‘quantiWers’, ‘classiWers’, and ‘articles’ (cf. ibid. 36 V.), and under the heading ‘verb adjuncts’ he subsumes ‘auxiliaries’ and ‘verbal particles’ (e.g. up in wake up or hurry up) (cf. ibid. 41 V.). Among the ‘conjunctions’ he distinguishes between ‘coordinating’ and ‘subordinating’ conjunctions, subdividing the former into ‘prepositional’ and ‘postpositional’, and the latter into ‘complementizers’, ‘relativizers’, and ‘adverbializers’ (cf. ibid. 50 V.).


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Applying this method, Schachter gains a number of valuable insights into similarities and diVerences across languages which inXuenced subsequent investigations of parts of speech in language typology. These include the discussion of whether adjectives are found in all languages (cf. ibid. 14 V) and whether all languages distinguish between nouns and verbs (cf. ibid. 11 V.), i.e. whether these are universals. What is more important for research into categories than the answers to such questions is the basis for these answers. Of particular interest here is Schachter’s discussion of the universality of the distinction between nouns and verbs. He Wrst discusses claims about Nootka by Swadesh (1939) and Jacobsen (1976), who arrive at diVerent results. Whereas for Swadesh there is no distinction, according to Jacobsen there is, although it is not an obvious one. Schachter illustrates Swadesh’s position with examples showing that in Nootka verb-like and noun-like forms can occur as arguments as well as as predicates and can be speciWed for deWniteness and for tense. Illustrating Jacobsen’s position, he shows that verb-like forms in Nootka can be used as arguments only if they are suYxed. Schachter adds that Tagalog behaves like Nootka in exhibiting a distinction that is not obvious but nevertheless present, since only verbs can be inXected for aspect. What is important here is Schachter’s conclusion: Nonetheless, while languages may diVer considerably in the extent to which they make a grammatical distinction between nouns and verbs, it seems correct to say that all languages do in fact make some distinction between them. (ibid. 13)

This conclusion raises a general question, namely what is the status of theoretically formulated criteria for the identiWcation of parts of speech, and how should they be applied. Consider Wrst the criterion of distribution. To begin with, it must be noted that Schachter’s application of the term diVers considerably from its original use as ‘the sum of all the (diVerent) positions (or occurrences) of an element relative to the occurrence of other elements’ (Harris 1951: 16). What Schachter identiWes as distributional properties are instead selective properties, for example the relative positions of subject, verb, and object in the basic word order (of English) to distinguish nouns and verbs, or restricted domains such as the nominal and the verbal domain to distinguish ‘noun adjuncts’ and ‘verb adjuncts’, or the relative order of prepositions and postpositions with respect to nouns. His identiWcation of demonstratives and other ‘articles’ as a

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single distribution class is also based on restricted evidence, namely that they occupy the same position relative to nouns and other elements in a noun phrase (1985: 40). The same applies to the Wxed order of auxiliaries in those languages that allow for sequences of auxiliaries (ibid. 43). There are no statements concerning distribution that refer to whole sentences as domains. This may be the reason why no distributional properties are given for adjectives and adverbs, or for some ‘closed classes’, because this would require the consideration of larger domains. However, this means that the criterion of distribution is applied for the identiWcation of some but not not all of the parts of speech. The criterion of syntactic function also serves to identify only some but not all of the parts of speech, and here it would have been helpful if Schachter had speciWed what he understands by a syntactic function and which syntactic functions he distinguishes. It is clear that subject, object, and predicate are syntactic functions for him, and likely that this holds for modiWcation as well. ModiWcation plays a decisive role in the identiWcation of adjectives as ‘words which modify nouns’ (ibid. 13) and of adverbs, which ‘function as modiWers of constituents other than nouns’ (ibid. 20). Schachter’s identiWcation of ‘complementizers’, ‘relativizers’, and ‘adverbializers’ (ibid. 50) as subordinating conjunctions also seems to be based on syntactic functions. But most of his ‘closed classes’ are identiWed on the basis of meaning alone, and no syntactic functions are identiWed. Schachter’s third criterion for the identiWcation of word classes, speciWcation for morphological or syntactic categories, is also not consistently applied. It is not applicable at all to most of the closed classes. Thus, although Schachter posits grammatical criteria for the identiWcation of parts of speech, he does not apply them consistently. Furthermore, even where they are applied, it is only rarely that all of them are used to characterize a part of speech. As his statement on the universality of nouns and verbs illustrates, he does not regard it as unusual that of the three criteria just one can be applied, and that one only in a rather reduced form, or that languages ‘may diVer considerably in the extent to which they make a grammatical distinction’ (ibid. 13). Central aspects of Schachter’s method reappear in other approaches, with varying degrees of emphasis. Thus Wierzbicka (2000) shares Schachter’s view that the traditional parts of speech and their meanings form an appropriate starting point for a cross-linguistic identiWcation of parts of speech. Unlike Schachter, however, she posits lexical concepts or lexical prototypes together with non-lexicalized concepts or semantic


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prototypes, attributing to these the potential of forming a universal basis for parts of speech. The lexical prototypes she suggests include PEOPLE and THING for the identiWcation of nouns, DO and HAPPEN for the identiWcation of verbs, and VERY and LIKE THIS for the identiWcation of adverbs. ‘ClassiWers’ or ‘sentence particles’ (Schachter’s ‘mood markers’) have no lexical properties in her view, and she suggests semantic prototypes such as ‘I think about it like this’ for Thai classiWers (ibid. 307), and ‘I say this because’ for ‘sentence particles’ (ibid.). Wierzbicka says nothing about the grammatical properties of the parts of speech identiWed in this way. Unlike Wierzbicka, Evans (2000) follows Schachter in applying grammatical criteria for the cross-linguistic identiWcation of parts of speech, which he also refers to as ‘word classes’. He diVers from Schachter, however, in stating as a generalization that items are assigned to a part of speech even if they do not exhibit all of the properties identiWed for this part of speech. He distinguishes language-internally between prototypical and non-prototypical members of a part of speech and cross-linguistically between prototypical and non-prototypical representatives of a part of speech, for instance nouns or verbs. His summary of the prototypical properties of nouns reads as follows: Prototypically, the discourse function of nouns . . . is to refer, their syntactic function is as arguments, and semantically they designate objects: persons and other animates, things, and places. Their morphological categories typically reXect their discourse or their syntactic function. In the Wrst category come features aiding successful reference either through such characteristics of the referent as number and gender, or through contextual features such as discourse status or location relative to speech act participants. In the second category comes information about their syntactic function in the clause, preeminently case. (ibid. 710)

For Evans it is important that the various properties can be realized or not realized independently of each other. Deviations from the prototype may thus be such that their morphological or syntactic or semantic properties cannot be identiWed. This allows, for example, a distinction to be drawn between nouns and verbs in Vietnamese although the criterion of morphological speciWcation does not apply. Tagalog, on the other hand, is seen as an example of a language in which morphological speciWcation alone provides the basis for the identiWcation of and distinction between these parts of speech. Thus these languages do not have prototypical but instead peripheral nouns and verbs.

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By including the criterion of ‘discourse function’, which is not mentioned by Schachter, as one of the properties of prototypical nouns, Evans takes up a pragmatic criterion regarded by Hopper and Thompson (1984) as decisive for the cross-linguistic identiWcation of and distinction between nouns and verbs. They remark: We suggest here that the basic categories N and V are to be viewed as universal lexicalizations of the prototypical discourse functions of ‘discourse-manipulable participant’ and ‘reported event’, respectively. (ibid. 703)

They thus postulate on the one hand that noun and verb are universal parts of speech, but on the other hand that nouns and verbs, when used in their primary functions (i.e. when nouns refer to discourse manipulable participants and when verbs report events), exhibit all the semantic and grammatical properties that characterize these parts of speech. Giving examples from various languages, Hopper and Thompson provide evidence for this hypothesis, showing that nouns and verbs not used in their primary function are speciWed only for some of these properties and therefore represent peripheral rather than prototypical members of their parts of speech. On the basis of the way in which parts of speech are identiWed and characterized within language typology, two results can be derived from the approaches considered so far. The Wrst is that investigations start with the familiar parts of speech and their characterizations, which are extended or modiWed where necessary, and that then the vocabulary of various languages is analysed to establish whether these parts of speech can be identiWed and whether the number of parts of speech should be reduced or increased. As expected, this characterization of parts of speech, which does not diVer essentially from the traditional characterization, leads to the same problems in that items assigned to a part of speech do not all exhibit its properties to the same extent. As shown in chapter 3, this was one of the reasons for strongly criticizing the traditional parts of speech. A solution to this problem has been oVered especially by Rosch’s work, which allows category membership on the basis of family resemblance to a prototype (cf. section 8.6) and does not require that all the members of a category be speciWed for necessary and suYcient properties of this category. Evans as well as Hopper and Thompson, as shown above,


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explictly made use of this approach. The second result to be derived from the approaches discussed is that in language typology parts of speech are deWned as categories with a prototypical structure, identifying prototypical and non-prototypical representatives languageinternally on the one hand and cross-linguistically on the other. In the light of the discussion in section 8.6, it is clear that these parts of speech do not represent syntactic categories. Moreover, they are neither identiWed nor characterized with respect to a speciWed syntax, and even though Schachter and others refer to some of the criteria as ‘syntactic’, these criteria in fact only relate to the sequential ordering of sentence functions in the basic word order or to that of words in restricted domains. Principles that assign words positions in sentence structures play no part in the identiWcation of the parts of speech. The approach oVered by Hengeveld (1992) is a quite diVerent one. Hengeveld’s main concern is to describe typological parts-of-speech systems. He focuses on the four parts of speech Verb, Noun, Adjective, and Adverb, restricting the last named to manner adverbs.1 He analyses these parts of speech independently of morphosyntactic properties as semantic predicates to which diVerent functions are assigned, namely the function of heads to Verbs and Nouns, and the function of modiWers to Adjectives and Adverbs (ibid. 35). Their properties as predicates are deWned as follows: A Verbal predicate is a predicate which, without further measures being taken,2 has a predicative use only. A Nominal predicate is a predicate which, without further measures being taken, can be used as the head of a term. An Adjectival predicate is a predicate which, without further measures being taken, can be used as a modiWer of a nominal head. An Adverbial predicate is a predicate which, without further measures being taken, can be used as a modiWer of a non-nominal head. (ibid. 37)

Hengeveld establishes a hierarchy of parts of speech such that languages with Adverbs, the lowest in the hierarchy, also have Adjectives, 1 It is this class of adverbs that plays a role in his part-of-speech systems. Hengeveld also identiWes other classes of adverbs and discusses interjections (cf. ibid.: 40 f.). 2 The addition ‘without further measures being taken’ is intended to exclude other expressions with the same function such as relative clauses or prepositional phrases as modiWers of nominal heads (cf. ibid.: 38).

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Nouns, and Verbs, which are higher in the hierarchy, and languages with Adjectives but not Adverbs also have Nouns and Verbs, which again are higher in the hierarchy (ibid. 47). He classiWes languages as Xexible or rigid, depending on whether or not a part of speech can be used in diVerent functions, thus English is rigid whereas Tongan is extremely Xexible (e.g. ibid. 44, 47). For the present discussion it is important to point out that in this approach parts of speech are deWned cross-linguistically as semantic predicates with particular functions. Since no syntactic criteria are involved, it is obvious that here too the units referred to as parts of speech are not syntactic categories. The following section will be concerned with approaches within language typology which focus explicitly on syntactic categories. It will emerge, however, that sometimes this is only a matter of terminology.

9.2.2 Syntactic categories or parts of speech? The title of an article by Sasse (1993) – ‘Syntactic Categories and Subcategories’ – leads one to expect that this is indeed concerned with syntactic categories. One of his introductory remarks, however, casts Wrst doubts on this: The analysis of syntactic categories was familiar to the traditional grammarians under the title parts of speech. (ibid. 646)

As shown in chapter 2, the ‘traditional grammarians’ – Sasse here refers to Dionysius Thrax among others – were not concerned with syntactic categories since syntax was not part of their concept of a grammar. The following statement by Sasse also leads to confusion: In particular, there is a notorious confusion of lexical and syntactic categories, for instance by the use of the term ‘syntactic categories’ for both, as in this article. (ibid. 647)

Sasse is referring here to the fact that he uses the term ‘syntactic category’ for both syntactic and lexical categories. In the course of the article it emerges that he uses this label to refer not to syntactic but to lexical categories, for which he also uses the terms ‘word classes’ and ‘parts of speech’ (cf. e.g. 648, 650). His real concern is


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Wnally unambiguously expressed in his remark: ‘In the following we will deal mainly with word classes’ (ibid. 648). Like Schachter and Evans, he then distinguishes between open and closed classes, in his approach ‘full words’ and ‘particles’ respectively (ibid. 652), before discussing the various speciWcations and representations of nouns and verbs, adjectives, adverbs, proforms including various pronouns, conjunctions, adpositions, numerals, and interjections in various languages. His concerns are the same as those of Schachter, Wierzbicka, and Evans discussed above. Syntax hardly plays a role, not least because his discussion of syntactic criteria is restricted to syntactic functions ‘such as subject, predicate, attribute, etc.’ (ibid. 649). Another approach that shows similar terminological confusion is that of Croft (1984, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005). What is especially confusing here is that the same categories with the same characterizations are labelled ‘syntactic categories’ in his earlier writings (1984 to 1995) and ‘parts of speech’ in his later work. Croft’s particular interest is the discovery of linguistic universals, in this case to begin with universal syntactic categories. He identiWes the categories N(oun), V(erb), and A(djective) as universal syntactic categories, calling them ‘major syntactic categories’ (e.g. 1984: 53; 1991: 51) or ‘basic syntactic categories’ (e.g. 1995: 505) and characterizing them as categories with a prototypical structure. He explains the universality of these categories in terms of external motivation, which is independent of particular languages and which he describes as correlations between the prototypes of these categories and speciWc semantic classes on the one hand and speciWc ‘discourse function[s]’ (1984: 57) or ‘pragmatic function[s]’ (1991: 55) on the other. The correlations he postulates are presented in the following table:

(1) Syntactic Category Noun

Adjective

Verb

Semantic class

Object

Property

Action

Pragmatic function

Reference

Modification

Predication (ibid.)

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The table shows that according to Croft nouns are, in the prototypical case, universally used to designate objects and to express the function of reference, whereas adjectives are used to designate properties and express the function of modiWcation, with verbs designating actions and expressing the function of predication. Assuming a prototypical structure allows for numerous deviations from the prototypical situation, which Croft (esp. 1991) analyses in various languages under the heading ‘marked correlations’ (cf. e.g. ibid. 53). In addition to the ‘major syntactic categories’ Croft also discusses ‘minor categories’, identifying as such and giving English examples of ‘Prepositions’, ‘Connectives’, ‘Auxiliaries’, ‘Demonstratives’, ‘Articles’, ‘Numerals’, ‘QuantiWers’, and ‘Adverbs’. He points out that cross-linguistic parallels can be drawn between these ‘function words’ and inXectional markers (1990: 246 f.), and assigns functions to the minor categories just as he does to the major categories. There are three additional functions. The Wrst is ‘categorizing’, assigned to classiWers and gender speciWcations in the context of nouns and, with reservations, to intensiWers in the context of adjectives (ibid. 252). The second additional function he suggests is ‘situating’, which he relates to demonstratives in nominal contexts and to tenses and time (deictic) expressions in verbal contexts (ibid. 258). The third function identiWed for minor categories is ‘selecting’. He relates this to numerals and quantiWers in nominal contexts, to the iterative and to phrasal verbs in verbal contexts and to measure terms in the domain of adjectives (ibid. 270). In summary, he characterizes these three functions as follows: Categorizing provides a qualitative image of the element categorized. Selecting the entity gives a more speciWc identity to the element. Situating the entity allow [sic] the hearer to anchor the element in a background. (ibid. 274)

These characterizations as well as the categories analysed by Croft show that he is not concerned with syntactic categories but rather with the same categories that the approaches discussed in section 9.2.1 deal with, i.e. parts of speech. He obviously realized this later, because beginning with his article ‘Parts of Speech as Language Universals and as Language-Particular Categories’ (2000)3 he uses the label ‘part of speech’ for the categories he previously identiWed as ‘syntactic categories’: 3 Most of this article is identical to chapter 2 of Croft (2001).


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In the case of parts of speech, I argue that there are unmarked combinations of pragmatic function and lexical semantic class (Croft 1984, 1986, 1991): – noun ¼ reference to an object – adjective ¼ modiWcation by a property – verb ¼ predication of an action (2000: 88)

In addition he emphasizes: I believe that it is appropriate to describe these unmarked combinations of pragmatic function and semantic class with the names of the parts of speech. (ibid.)

Relabelling the ‘syntactic categories’ as ‘parts of speech’ enables him to distinguish between two types of categories in his writings from 2000 on. The term ‘part of speech’ is now reserved for conceptual units which are linguistic universals and comprise prototypical patterns of predication, reference, and modiWcation (cf. 2000: 87). According to Croft, ‘parts of speech cannot be categories of particular languages’ (ibid. 85; cf. 2005: 439). It is instead the new ‘syntactic categories’, also labelled ‘grammatical categories’ (2000: 95), that are language particular and that occur in language-speciWc, typologically marked patterns which realize the universal prototypical patterns. Croft does not identify these categories, claiming instead that they amount to ‘a myriad of classes’ (e.g. ibid. 82), and he gives only general characterizations: Syntactic categories, including those commonly labelled as parts of speech, are derivative from the constructions that deWne them. (2000: 85) Syntactic categories are language particular and deWned by constructions. (ibid. 86) Grammatical categories in particular languages are deWned by the patterns of distribution of grammatical constructions, which themselves are language particular. (ibid. 95)

What is especially revealing for a comparison with the approaches discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 8 is the following remark by Croft, not least because he more or less explicitly criticizes those approaches:

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Constructions deWne grammatical categories. But all contemporary syntactic models insist on taking these categories as atomic syntactic primitives, and deWning constructions as being made up of these atomic primitives. (ibid. 85)

The concept of syntactic categories expressed by Croft in these quotations clearly corresponds to the deWnition applied in this book and presented in the introduction. According to this deWnition, those items of a language form a syntactic category that have the same distribution, i.e. may occur in the same positions in the sentence structures of that language. Croft interprets the relationship between syntactic categories and syntactic structures or constructions to mean that it is the structures or constructions that deWne syntactic categories. The ‘contemporary syntactic models’ he criticizes make a diVerent assumption, namely that it is lexically speciWed categorial descriptions of linguistic items that – together with principles or rules – determine their positions in sentence structures. As the discussions in chapters 5, 6, and 8 have shown, these categories are not at all ‘atomic primitives’, as Croft mistakenly remarks. They are detailed and diVerentiated feature representations, each feature interacting with syntactic principles or rules of the grammar to produce sentence structures. The diVerence between Croft’s view, which he relates to his concept of a Radical Construction Grammar, and that of representatives of ‘contemporary syntactic models’ centres around the question of what is there Wrst, structures alias constructions or lexically categorized items. According to Croft, who in this respect shares the view of Langacker (cf. section 7.3) and others who favour construction grammars,4 it is constructions that are there Wrst and that are ‘the primitive units of syntactic representation’ (2001: 18). They are learnt as such and stored in the mind. Syntactic categories are derived, thus secondary and of minor importance. The representatives of ‘contemporary syntactic models’ criticized by Croft assume that it is syntactically relevant features that are the basic units of syntactic representation. There is a universal set of these features, among which particular languages can choose particular features and combine them in particular ways to specify the lexical items of these languages categorially. Sentence structures and constructions play a heuristic role here. They as well as the lexical items they contain must 4 These include Fillmore and Kay (1993), Goldberg (1995), Kay (1995), and Fillmore (1999), whose concept of construction grammar is to be distinguished from that of the socalled ‘neo-constructionists’ which will be considered in section 9.2.3.


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be analysed in order to determine what the feature combinations are in a given language and how individual lexical items are speciWed. The task of a linguist here resembles that of a child building its mental lexicon during the process of language acquisition. In the end it is the same categories that Croft and the ‘representatives of syntactic models’ identify as syntactic categories, and their number may be immense, as Croft remarks. While the latter attempt to describe these categories and to explain their contribution to the construction of sentences, Croft restricts himself to simply postulating their existence. Croft’s position here can be explained by what Gil (2000) calls ‘the ‘‘typologist’s dilemma’’ ’ (ibid. 191). What he means is that, although it is possible to compare some features ‘such as inXectional categories and kinship terms . . . across a sample of tens or even hundreds of languages’ (ibid.) without too much diYculty, certain prerequisites are necessary to determine the inventory of syntactic categories: [I]n order to determine the syntactic category inventory of a language, it is necessary, essentially, to construct a comprehensive description of the major syntactic patterns of the language in question. Only after one has ‘done’ the language pretty much exhaustively can one then take one’s labour in hand and say: Here is a comprehensive description of the major syntactic patterns of the language, and these are the categories – some semantic, some morphological, others perhaps syntactic – which must be posited in order to capture the necessary generalisations. (Gil 2000: 191)

For Gil, the prerequisites have not been fulWlled, and he expresses his view of the present situation as follows: At the present time, it is thus simply not feasible to examine syntactic category inventories of a large sample of languages, and on such basis to propose and support an empirically-grounded linguistic typology pertaining to syntactic category inventories. (ibid. 193)

Because of this, Gil concerns himself with hypothetical language types, discussing the possible formation of syntactic categories which may be relevant for empirically attested language types. In his descriptions he makes use of the assumptions of categorial grammar. His central claim is that the identiWcation of syntactic categories must be sensitive to the speciWc properties of individual languages and that approaches that take

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European languages as their starting point, as do the majority of the typological approaches concerned with parts of speech, are subject to Eurocentrism and cannot lead to proper results. The fact that the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories must be related to individual languages even if the emphasis is on typological concerns is also expressed in Anderson’s writings, which were discussed in detail in chapter 8. In addition to English, which is the focus of discussion in chapter 8, Anderson considers various other languages from a typological point of view. What is of importance here is that in his view language types can diVer with respect to their particular sets of ‘basic word classes’ or ‘primary categories’. As shown in section 8.2.1, he identiWes six basic word classes for English and describes each by means of a particular feature representation. The classes identiWed are Noun, Verb, Adjective, Auxiliary, Name, and Functor, later reorganized and in some cases relabelled as three lexical categories (Noun, Verb, Adjective) and three functional categories (Operative, Determiner, Functor) (e.g. 2007: 30; cf. section 8.5.2). The feature representations of these categories form the starting point for the description of intermediate categories on the one hand and on the other for the description of numerous categories speciWed for syntactically relevant properties in the lexicon which together with principles and rules determine syntactic categories of English. Anderson thus identiWes six basic word classes for English, but the situation need not be the same in other languages, for instance if no class of adjectives can be identiWed, or nouns, verbs, and adjectives are not distinguished as word classes, which Anderson claims to be the case in ‘contentive languages’ (2007: 32). In such languages the set of lexical categories is reduced, and the feature representations of the remaining categories are modiWed. For contentive languages, Anderson suggests a single lexical category Contentive with the feature representation {P,N} (cf. ibid. 33). Just as for English, syntactic categories for these languages are then derived via lexical speciWcations and their interactions with principles and rules, with the lexical speciWcations and principles and rules being diVerent from those required for English. Croft’s more recent writings as well as those by Gil and Anderson illustrate that in language typology too a distinction is now made between syntactic categories and parts of speech. The categories characterized as syntactic are those that determine the positions of linguistic items, especially of words, in sentence structures, and it is clear that syntactic categories must be identiWed for individual languages. However, a comparison of the claims about parts of speech in the various approaches


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considered above reveals that it is not at all clear what parts of speech are. This holds especially for a comparison of the characterizations given by Croft (e.g. 2000) on the one hand and by the approaches discussed in section 9.2.1. Chapter 10.2 will return to this problem.

9.2.3 Lexical and syntactic categories In language typology the term ‘lexical category’ is applied to diVerent kinds of linguistic categories. As already pointed out in the introduction, Haspelmath (2001: 16539) notes that it is quasi-synonymous with the terms ‘part of speech’, ‘word class’, and ‘syntactic category’. This view is apparently shared by Sasse (1993), who – as quoted above – observes a notorious confusion between lexical and syntactic categories, with the term ‘syntactic category’ being used for both. At the same time he states that lexical categories are parts of speech or word classes, meaning that each lexical item is assigned to one such category: [C]lass membership is mandatorily assigned to any given lexical item. In this sense, word classes are lexical categories. (ibid. 648)

According to the characterizations given by Haspelmath and Sasse, all lexical items are assigned to a lexical category. Lexical categories are thus like the traditional parts of speech in traditional dictionaries. However, other typologists restrict the term ‘lexical category’ to a subset of the categories to which lexical items are assigned and distinguish between ‘lexical’ and ‘functional categories’, following the distinction made in the context of the PPT (cf. section 5.3.4), of LFG (cf. section 6.3.1), HPSG (cf. section 6.5.1), and Wnally even in Anderson’s Case Grammar (section 8.5.2). In the following, selected approaches to categories in language typology will be discussed which in one way or the other are concerned with lexical categories and the relationship between them and syntactic categories. What will also be considered is the role the lexicon plays according to these approaches.5 5 This is why Wunderlich (1996) will not be considered here. Taking over assumptions from the PPT, Wunderlich identiWes noun, verb, adjective, and preposition as lexical categories under the heading ‘major categories’ and distinguishes these from ‘functional categories’ (determiners, complementisers, auxiliaries etc.) on the one hand and from the ‘minor category’ conjunction on the other (ibid.: 2 f.). He then develops feature representations for the lexical categories which replace the features [ + N] and [ + V]. Wunderlich is not concerned with the relationship between lexical and syntactic categories nor with the role of the lexicon.

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The Wrst approach considered here is Baker’s (2003). Baker distinguishes between lexical and functional categories, and identiWes verb, noun, and adjective as lexical categories. His main concern is the identiWcation and description of these categories as linguistic universals. Baker characterizes his approach to the description of verbs, nouns, and adjectives as purely syntactic, but also relates speciWc semantic properties to the individual descriptions. Members of the category verb are described as licensing a speciWer which is assigned a theta-role, ‘normally’ the theme or agent role (e.g. ibid. 190). This speciWer thus assumes the function of subject, which justiWes the general characterization of verbs ‘as licensers of subjects’ (ibid. 23). According to Baker, this description at the same time captures the fact that verbs are ‘quintessential predicates’ (ibid.), corresponding to Croft’s description of verbs as correlating with the function of predication (cf. section 9.2.2). In addition, he claims that the syntactic speciWcation of theta-role assignment expresses the natural relationship between verbs and events, which is emphasized by notional approaches such as Anderson’s since ‘[e]vents are inherently relational in the sense that there cannot be an event without there being some participant in the event that undergoes some kind of change’ (ibid. 290). Thus the syntactic approach not only provides a syntactic description of the category but allows the description of a semantic characterization to be derived. According to Baker, it has the additional advantage over notional approaches of not restricting the description of categories to their prototypical representatives but including peripheral ones as well (ibid. 14 V.). This holds for the description of verbs and the other lexical categories too. Baker describes the category noun as the set of items that bear a referential index. Syntactically, a referential index is deWned as an ordered pair of integers to which semantically criteria of identity apply (cf. ibid. 95). He adds: The second member of the index of a noun must be identical to an index of its sister (theta-role assignment) or to the index of a dependent element that it c-commands (chain-formation). (ibid. 96)

From this syntactic description, Baker derives various properties of nouns, or rather of their projections, which others attribute to this category independently of syntactic properties, e.g. Croft’s property of referring (cf. section 9.2.2) and the property of indicating ‘discourse manipulable participants’ postulated by Hopper and Thompson


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(cf. section 9.2.1). In Baker’s approach this means that nouns or their projections as theta-role receivers are arguments and occupy argument positions. What he also considers adequately captured by his description is the fact that nouns or their projections can be antecedents of pronouns and reXexives (cf. ibid. 98) and that nouns allow for individuation, counting, and measuring, which syntactically results in the licensing of determiners and quantiWers (cf. ibid. 109 V.). Adjectives are described by Baker as those items that contrast with verbs in that they do not license subjects and with nouns in that they lack a referential index. They therefore occupy those positions in sentence structures that are neither occupied by verbs nor by nouns. Baker here identiWes the positions of attributive modiWers, of complements of degree heads, and of secondary predicates of resultatives (cf. ibid. 190 V.). He moreover analyses adverbs derived from adjectives by attaching -ly as belonging to the same category as adjectives, extending the distribution of adjectives to merge with VPs, TPs, or APs (ibid. 230 V.). Baker claims that his syntactic deWnitions of verbs, nouns, and adjectives, which are formulated to Wt the framework of the PPT, provide a basis for identifying these categories in all languages and thus give an answer to questions concerning their universality. It is signiWcant that in his approach category membership is not speciWed lexically but with respect to syntactic conWgurations. It is thus irrelevant whether an item is speciWed for category membership in the lexicon as a root or via inXection, since the only thing that counts is the local syntactic conWguration of this item, i.e. ‘whether it has a speciWer, or bears an index, or neither’ (ibid. 268). Therefore, in order to Wnd out whether a lexical category is universal, the syntactic conWgurations of a large number of languages must be analysed. If the conWgurations can be identiWed, then the corresponding categories are universal, which Baker concludes to be the case on the basis of data from various languages. The following quotation referring to the category verb illustrates the way in which he draws his conclusions: Now that we know precisely what a verb is – a lexical category that takes a speciWer and the only one that can assign agent and theme roles – we can see that all known languages have instances of that category. (ibid. 94)

Baker’s claim that category membership of the members of lexical categories is not speciWed in the lexicon but rather determined by syntactic conWgurations links his approach to those that Borer subsumes under the label ‘neo-constructionist models’ (2003: 32). Although there are diVerences

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in the details, these include the approaches by Marantz (e.g. 1997), Harley and Noyer (e.g. 1997), van Hout (e.g. 1998), and Hale and Keyser (e.g. 2002) as well as Borer’s own approach (e.g. 2003, 2005a,b). They share with Baker’s approach the claim that speciWcation for a lexical category is a matter of syntax. They diVer from his approach, however, in assuming that lexical-category membership is determined by units of grammatical formatives or functional categories. Put very brieXy, this means for Borer’s approach that there is no lexicon where categorially speciWed items are listed and where morphological processes take place. Instead there are two repositories, an encyclopedia containing sound-meaning pairs, and a functional lexicon containing grammatical formatives such as [þpl], [þpst], independent forms such as and derivational aYxes such as -ation, -al and -ize (e.g. 2003: 34 V.). In the constructing of sentences, sound-meaning pairs, called ‘encyclopedic items’ (EIs), form conWgurations with grammatical formatives and thus receive a categorial speciWcation. For example, EIs forming a conWguration with become nouns and those forming a conWguration with [þpst] become verbs. This approach means that for English there is no need to decide in the case of forms like run, hit, call, wonder, sink, etc. whether the noun is derived from the verb by conversion or zero-derivation or vice versa. According to Borer and other neo-constructionists, there is one neutral form and category membership is determined in the syntax. These approaches seem especially promising for languages that seem to use only neutral roots as bases for inXectional and derivational processes or for languages that lack inXection and express relationships by means of independent forms in the syntax such as Hebrew and Chinese, languages to which Borer, in additon to English, frequently refers to support her approach (2005a,b). It is questionable, however, whether cross-linguistically the category membership of lexical categories is always determined in the syntax alone. This appears problematic even for English, since many EIs allow for both a verbal and a nominal speciWcation but by no means all of them do. Thus, see or conclude can only be speciWed as verbs and height or material only as nouns. It is also the case that the meanings paired with phonological representations may diVer depending on the speciWcation as verbal or nominal. Sink and wonder are examples of this. It is also problematic that Borer considers only nouns and verbs, which she claims to be universally categorially speciWed by the functional categories Determiner, Number, and ClassiWer on the one hand and Event, Tense, and Aspect on the other (cf. e.g. 2005a: 160 V., 2005b: 97 V.). Adjectives are considered only in connection with


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derivational aYxes, an example being -al in English, which speciWes a derived form as an adjective (2003: 37). In connection with approaches like that of Borer, there is an article by Himmelmann (2008) that deserves special attention. Himmelmann is concerned with whether, as generally assumed, Tagalog roots are always neutral or ‘precategorial’ and receive categorial speciWcation via morphological speciWcation. This should mean that each root is compatible with each morphological speciWcation. Himmelmann shows that this is not the case (cf. ibid. 268 V.). One of his examples is aYxation of the polysemous preWx ma-, which as a HAVE-marker expressing STATES (e. g. maganda´ ‘beautiful’ < ganda´ ‘beauty’) and as a BECOME-marker expressing ACCOMPLISHMENTS (e.g. magalit ‘become angry’ < galit ‘anger’) is compatible with roots which form distinct sets. This cannot be explained by claiming that roots of the Wrst set, class A, can only be used to express STATES and those of the other set, class B, only to express ACCOMPLISHMENTS. Class A roots can express ACCOMPLISHMENTS if inWxed by -um- (e.g. ganda´ ‘beauty’ gumanda´ ‘become beautiful’) and after stress shift class B roots can express STATES (e.g. galit ‘anger’ galı´t ‘angry’). It is therefore not the case that each root is compatible with each morphological speciWcation. Tagalog roots are thus not neutral but form morpho-lexical classes determined by their compatibility or incompatibility with particular morphological speciWcations. Himmelmann takes this as evidence for the speciWcation of lexical items in the lexicon. To conWrm this, he considers lexical items speciWed for ‘voice’ by aYxation. These units, which he calls ‘V-words’ (ibid. 285), can have as bases roots expressing either the conceptual category THING or ANIMATE BEING or the conceptual category ACTION. In both cases, Himmelmann claims, voice-aYxation yields a category change corresponding to the change from a nominal category to a verbal category in English. In order to show that this applies to ACTION-roots as well, Himmelmann gives a number of examples of unaYxed ACTION-roots which are nominal in character because, depending on their position and function, they express one of the following three meanings: (a) the state which ensues from the successful performance of the action (similar to a past participle in English); (b) the result or the typical or cognate object of the action (similar to object(ive) nominalisations in English); or (c) the name of the action (similar to an action nominalisation in English). (ibid. 275)

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These forms are verbal in character only after voice-aYxation. This is associated with additional morphological and semantic properties, and Himmelmann therefore identiWes ‘V-words’ as a separate morpho-lexical class (cf. ibid. 284 V.). The fact that in Tagalog lexical items are speciWed for properties which are comparable to nominal and verbal properties in languages like English is signiWcant because – in contrast to languages such as English – these speciWcations are irrelevant for the syntax. In Tagalog, as in other Austronesian languages ‘content words’ can be inserted in any position that combines with a functional category to form a phrase structure. Insertion does not depend on lexically speciWed properties. According to Himmelmann, it is function words that as heads distinguish phrases: ‘i.e. determiner phrases consist of a determiner and a content word, auxiliary phrases of a tense/aspect auxiliary and a content word, and so on’ (ibid. 262). Himmelmann regards the discrepancy between lexical speciWcation and syntactic relevance as evidence for the need to distinguish between syntactic and lexical categories. He sees syntactic category as ‘the classiWcation of lexical items with regard to the slots they may occupy in a phrase structure tree’ (ibid. 248) or ‘the category labels attached to the [terminal] nodes of a phrase structure tree’ (ibid. 258). The term ‘lexical category’ refers to ‘the classiWcation of lexical items according to grammatical (phonological, morphological, morphosyntactic) criteria’ (ibid.) or ‘the category information attached to each lexical entry in a dictionary’ (ibid. 261). He argues that there are typological diVerences in that categories of the two types may correspond, which he claims to be the case for Indo-European languages, or may be independent of each other, as for Tagalog and the language type it belongs to (cf. ibid. 264). Compared to Borer’s approach as sketched above, Himmelmann’s remarks are of special interest for two reasons. The Wrst is that the evidence from Tagalog is a counter example to the claim that there is no need for a lexicon with items speciWed for morphological properties and that it is suYcient to assume a functional lexicon and an encyclopedia containing only pre-categorial sound-meaning pairs. The second is that Himmelmann’s claim for Tagalog that content words are syntactically neutral and can be inserted to form phrases with a functional category determiner or a functional category auxiliary is compatible with Borer’s general assumptions. It is in principle irrelevant whether, depending on the functional category, content words in such a conWguration are then speciWed for nounhood or verbhood, or remain unspeciWed.


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Against the background of the approaches discussed in the preceding chapters, which – except for Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar – view the lexicon and lexical items speciWed for syntactically relevant features as the basis for the determination of syntactic categories, the approaches discussed in this section deserve special attention because all of them claim that lexical speciWcation is irrelevant for the syntactic categorization of content words alias ‘lexical categories’. All of these approaches argue in favour of categorization exclusively in the syntax. However, they all deal only with ‘content words’ in particular syntactic conWgurations and take account only of members of functional categories. It is doubtful whether such approaches will ever be able to describe the total lexical inventory of an individual language including forms that are the result of grammaticalization processes and exhibit properties of both lexical and functional categories or items that form ‘intermediate primary categories’ as described by Anderson (cf. section 8.2.2). The following section will be concerned with Dik’s Functional Grammar, a theoretical approach that does not deal with the categorization of linguistic items in isolation but represents a comprehensive grammatical model that is claimed to be applicable to all types of natural languages. Special attention will be given to how lexical items are described and how they are assigned to appropriate positions in sentence structures. 9.3 A grammatical model for language typology: Dik’s Functional Grammar The development of Dik’s Functional Grammar started from his dissertation (1968), in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with Chomskyan Transformational Grammar and made some alternative proposals. An alternative theory of language and suggestions for a comprehensive model of grammar were then presented in Dik (1978) and supplemented in the following years (e.g. Dik 1980, 1983; Hoekstra et al. 1981). ModiWcations and extensions to this approach appeared in 1989. The intention was to publish two volumes, the Wrst concerned with the basic principles of the theory and the structure of simple clauses and the second with complex sentences and derived structures. However, only the Wrst volume appeared, and the second volume – together with a revised version of the Wrst – did not follow until 1997, two years after Dik died, in a version prepared for publication by Hengeveld. The following discussion refers mainly to the 1997 version of the theory.

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9.3.1 General assumptions, aims, and architecture of the grammar In contrast to Chomsky’s theory of language, the functional theory proposed by Dik does not focus on the linguistic competence or ‘I-language’ (e.g. Chomsky 1986a: 22) of a native speaker, which enables him to generate an inWnite set of sentences, but rather on the communicative competence of a ‘natural language user’ (Dik 1989 [1997a]: 1), which enables him not only to construct and interpret linguistic expressions but also to use these appropriately to serve communicative purposes. According to the ‘functional paradigm’ (ibid. 4 V.), the system underlying linguistic expressions is therefore a functional system, and linguistic expressions can be understood properly only when their function in settings is considered. Consequently, pragmatics is seen as the ‘all-encompassing framework’ in the sense that ‘[s]emantics is regarded as instrumental with respect to pragmatics, and syntax as instrumental with respect to semantics’ (ibid. 8). Autonomy of syntax, as assumed in Chomsky’s theory of language, is thus strictly rejected. It is the aim of the theory of Functional Grammar (FG) to ‘provide the means and principles by which functional grammars of particular languages can be developed’ (ibid. 12) and which adequately and completely account for the grammatical organization of connected discourse in these languages. This theory is required to be typologically adequate and thus capable of yielding grammars for languages of any type and of capturing their similarities and diVerences in systematic ways. A functional grammar must be descriptively, pragmatically, and psychologically adequate (cf. ibid. 12 V.). An FG which conforms to these requirements consists, according to Dik, of three components. The Wrst one is the Fund, which is composed of a lexicon, containing basic predicates and basic terms, together with derived predicates and derived terms, which are the result of predicate formation and term formation, respectively. The second component accounts for complex underlying clause structures consisting of various layers formed one by one, starting with items from the Fund and adding speciWcations at each layer. The third component consists of Expression rules, which derive phonologically interpreted, ordered sequences of words that represent sentences from unordered underlying clause structures. The following Wgure provides a schematic representation of the model of an FG:


347

(2) FUND LEXICON predicate formation

derived predicates

basic terms

basic predicates

derived terms

term formation

TERMS

PREDICATE FRAMES

nuclear predication p1 s1 core predication p2 s2 syntactic functions extended predication p3 s3 proposition p4 s4 pragmatic functions clause structure

EXPRESSION RULES form order prosody

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION

(ibid. 60)

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9.3.2 Deriving underlying clause structures The derivation of underlying clause structures starts with the formation of nuclear predications, which combine basic or derived predicates and basic or derived terms from the Fund. Except for basic terms such as pronouns like he, she, they, etc. or proper names like John, Mary, etc., all the lexical items are described as predicates, speciWed either as verbal (V), nominal (N), or adjectival (A), and this speciWcation is crucial for the question of how syntactic categories are identiWed and described in this framework. Such a categorial speciWcation is justiWed by the claim that many languages have at least these categories (cf. ibid. 59). The deWnitions of these categories are based on the prototypical functions the predicates assume in the construction of predications, namely: (3)

a. AVerbal predicate (V) is a predicate which is primarily used in predicative function. b. A Nominal predicate (N) is a predicate which is primarily used as head of a term. c. An Adjectival predicate (A) is a predicate which is primarily used in attributive function. (ibid. 194)

It is assumed that these deWnitions are universal. This does not exclude that a language consistently uses the same forms to express two of these functions, e.g. those of V and A. In this case, which Dik considers exempliWed in Bahasa Indonesia, the corresponding predicates are speciWed as VA (cf. ibid. 195). It should also be noted that the deWnitions relate to prototypical functions and that other functions are not totally excluded, for example that predicates speciWed as A are used in ‘predicative function’. Predicates are represented as predicate frames, which determine the structure of nuclear predications, such as: (4) give [V] (x1: (x1))Ag (x2)Go (x3: (x3))Rec (ibid. 59) Predicate frames specify the form (e.g. give), the type (e.g. V) and the valency or argument structure of a predicate, with the arguments bearing lexically speciWed semantic functions. The argument structure of give in (4) speciWes three arguments, x1, x2, x3, bearing the semantic functions Ag(ent), Go(al), and Rec(ipient). Predicate frames can also


349

restrict the selection of arguments by specifying selection restrictions, such as for the x1 and the x2 of give. Nuclear predications are formed by inserting terms into argument positions, for example by replacing in (4) by a basic term like John or by a derived term. Derived terms are formed by term-formation rules of the following general form: (5) (øxi: 1 (xi): 2 (xi): . . . : n (xi)) (ibid. 61) In this rule ‘ø’ represents one or more operators, ‘xi’ represents the intended referent and ‘1 ’ to ‘n ’ represent predicates restricting the reference of xi and thus functioning as ‘restrictors’. Accordingly, the underlying structure of the term the green book is as in (6), (6) (d1xi: book [N] (xi)ø: green [A] (xi)ø) with ‘d1’ representing the operator ‘deWnite (d) singular (1)’ and book and green functioning as restrictors restricting the reference of xi. The nuclear predication of the sentence John gave Mary the book thus has the following underlying structure: (7) give [V] (x1: John [N] (x1))Ag (d1x2: book [N] (x2))Go (x3: Mary [N] (x3))Rec The nuclear predication is the Wrst layer of the underlying clause structure, from which the second layer, the core predication, is derived by adding a predicate operator 1 and where appropriate a predicate satellite 1. Predicate operators are operators which specify the ‘internal dynamics’ (ibid. 63) of a state of aVairs (SoA) and determine aspectual properties such as Progressive, Non-Progressive, Perfective, etc. Satellites are generally optional. At this layer they specify semantic relations such as Manner or Instrument. At the layer of core predication it is determined which constituent is speciWed for the syntactic function of Subject and which for that of Object, if there is one. The result is a perspectivizing of the SoA, deciding, for example, whether the sentence John (AgSubj) gave the book (GoObj) to Mary (Rec) or the sentence The book (GoSubj) was given to Mary (Rec) by John (Ag) is derived from (7). Extending the core predication by means of predication operators 2 and predication satellites 2 then derives the third layer, the extended predication. Predication operators determine grammatical means for the temporal

350


and spatial locating of an SoA, Tense being an example of temporal locating. Predication satellites determine lexical means, such as yesterday or at home. Extended predications in turn are extended by proposition operators 3 and proposition satellites 3 to derive propositions, the fourth layer of underlying clause structures. Proposition operators determine grammatical means of representing the speaker’s attitude towards a proposition, and proposition satellites determine corresponding lexical means, such as in my view. Propositions in turn are extended by using illocutionary operators 4 and illocutionary satellites 4, with illocutionary operators determining the illocutionary force of a sentence, for example Decl(arative), Int(errogative), Imp (erative), etc., using grammatical means, and illocutionary satellites characterizing a speech act using lexical means, such as brieXy or in short. In addition, constituents are speciWed at this level for the pragmatic functions Topic and Focus. This concludes the derivation of the underlying clause structure, which is schematically represented in (8), excluding speciWcations for semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic functions:

(8) [p4 Ei: [p3 Xi: [p2 ei: [p1 [pred [T] args] s1] s2] s3] s4] [... nucleus.... ] [... core predication... ]

[......... extended predication..... ] [........................... proposition ................... ] [ .......................................... clause ............................ ]

(ibid. 67) Ei, Xi, and ei in (8) represent variables for speech acts, propositions, and SoAs, respectively, and T stands for the type of predicate. Underlying clause structures are claimed to include all those items and relations which are essential for the semantic and the pragmatic interpretation of sentences and for their formal expression. They are characterized as a network of relational structures in which the relational status of the constituents of terms and of sentences is encoded in functional labels. They provide the (largely) universal input to the expression rules, which ultimately derive morphosyntactically realized and phonologically interpreted, ordered sequences of words as well-formed sentences, which are (largely) language speciWc.


351

9.3.3 Expression rules Expression rules are concerned with three properties of linguistic expressions: the form of constituents; the order of constituents; and prosodic properties such as tone, accent, and intonation. Accordingly, three types of rules are distinguished, formal expression rules, orderdetermining expression rules or placement rules, and prosodic rules. Of these, it is especially the Wrst and the second type that are relevant to the identiWcation of syntactic categories. Formal expression rules spell out as linguistic expressions all the lexical items, operators, and speciWcations for semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic functions contained in underlying clause structures. Except for lexical items, which are speciWed as either V, N, or A, Dik subsumes all the items under the label ‘morpho-syntactic operators (-operators)’ (ibid. 352) and gives the following general form of formal expression rules: (9)

Operator [Operandum] ¼ Value if Condition(s) (ibid. 351)

An example of a formal rule for English is given in (10): (10) pl [pred [N]] ¼ pred-/s/ if last phoneme of pred is voiceless This rule derives plural forms such as book-s, cat-s, tip-s, etc. as values of nominal predicates. The operators mentioned in (9) comprise primary and secondary -operators, of which the latter are themselves introduced by formal expression rules. Primary -operators are subdivided into -operators (term operators), -operators (predicate, predication, proposition, illocutionary operators), and semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic functions. Formal expression rules on the one hand correspond to productive morphological inXection rules aYxing nominal, verbal, and adjectival forms of lexical items.6 On the other hand, they introduce syntactically autonomous forms such as adpositions, determiners, quantiWers, auxiliaries, and particles, which serve functions analogous to those of inXectional aYxes. In this way, expressions that vary and are language-speciWc are derived from underlying -operators 6 Irregular forms are represented in the lexicon, which will not be considered here.

352


that are cross-linguistically identical and include speciWcations for semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic functions. The following examples of formal expression rules of English, Latin, and Japanese which derive diVerent expressions for the same semantic function or for the same combination of semantic and syntactic functions illustrate this (ibid. 366 f.): (11)

a. Ag[the man] ¼ by the man b. AgSubj[the man] ¼ ø the man

(12) a. Ag[vir] ¼ a þ abl[vir] ¼ a vir-o: ‘by man-abl’ b. AgSubj[vir] ¼ nom[vir] ¼ vir ‘man-nom’ (13) a. Ag[Taroo] ¼ Taroo ni b. AgSubj[Taroo] ¼ Taroo ga [*ni ga] The examples show that in English semantic functions are expressed by a preposition, in Japanese by a postposition, and in Latin by a combination of preposition and case. They also show that an additional speciWcation for a syntactic function neutralizes the speciWcation for a semantic function. A semantic function can ultimately even be expressed in diVerent ways in the same language, so that there may be no one-to-one relationship between semantic functions and adpositions or case forms. However, Dik assumes that prepositions always express semantic functions, even where they do not mark arguments but rather attributes, satellites, or predicates. Accordingly, PPs like in the garden are always analysed as terms and described as follows: (14) (d1xi: garden [N])Loc (ibid. 206) Loc speciWes a semantic function and requires a spatial preposition such as in to express this function. If a PP is used predicatively, as in The chair is in the garden, and if the language requires a copula to carry tense and agreement speciWcations, then FG includes a general rule to introduce a copula. For English, this rule is formulated as follows: (15) Copula Support in English: be-support input: predicate [Type] (x1)(x2) . . . (xn) conditions: ¼ any speciWed -operator Type 6¼ V output: be [V] predicate [Type] (x1)(x2) . . . (xn) (ibid. 199)


353

According to this rule, the copula be is inserted if a predicate occurs following a -operator, e.g. Pres(ent Tense) and is not of type V. This rule applies to predicative PPs as well as to predicative NPs and APs. It may be stated in general that except for basic and derived predicates, and terms which are provided by the Fund, all other linguistic expressions, including productive inXexional aYxes (and possibly expressions of semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic functions), are introduced into underlying clause structures by formal expression rules. Application of these rules yields sequences of word forms and remaining speciWcations for operators and functions which are only partially ordered in that the rules apply separately to terms and predicates and their operators and in that -operators und satellites belong to diVerent layers. The actual order of the constituents is derived by the second type of expression rules, the placement rules. Placement rules assign constituents of the underlying clause structure their Wnal positions and thus map underlying networks onto surface sequences. This results in constituent ordering patterns or templates which are described and explained in terms of a number of interacting and possibly competing principles and preferences. These principles are functionally motivated and allow for diVerent principles to determine diVerent orders. Thus, no language can follow all the principles simultaneously, and this leads to diVerent orders of constituents in diVerent languages. Two types of Constituent Ordering Principles are distinguished, general principles on the one hand and speciWc principles on the other. General principles should be reXected in speciWc principles, and these in turn determine the actual patterns of constituent order in individual languages. The general principles include among others the following (ibid. 399 V.): . (GP1): The Principle of Iconic Ordering (‘Constituents conform to (GP1)

when their ordering in one way or another iconically reXects the semantic content of the expression in which they occur’); . (GP3): The Principle of Centripetal Orientation (‘Constituents conform to (GP3) when their ordering is determined by their relative distance from the head, which may lead to ‘‘mirror-image’’ ordering around the head’); . (GP6): The Principle of Functional Stability (‘Constituents with the same functional speciWcation are preferably placed in the same position’); and

354


. (GP7): The Principle of Pragmatic Highlighting (‘Constituents with spe-

cial pragmatic functionality (New Topic, Given Topic, Completive Focus, Contrastive Focus) are preferably placed in ‘‘special positions’’, including, at least, the clause-initial position’).

Examples of the speciWc principles include (ibid. 405 V.): . (SP1): ‘A language makes a basic choice between PreWeld or PostWeld

ordering of dependents with respect to their heads’; . (SP2): ‘The Subject position precedes the Object position’; . (SP4): ‘There is a universally relevant clause-initial position P1, used for

. . . .

special purposes, including the placement of constituents with Topic or Focus function’; (SP5): ‘Since the Subject is the prime GivenTopic candidate, it will often be placed in P1’; (SP9): ‘-operators prefer centripetal orientation according to the schema: 4 3 2 1 [stem] 1 2 3 4’; (SP10): ‘Term operators prefer the PreWeld’; and (SP11): ‘Dem, Num, and Adj prefer centripetal orientation according to the schema: Dem Num Adj N Adj Num Dem’.

According to the assumptions of FG, individual languages select from among a set of general and speciWc constituent ordering principles, and their interaction, together with language-speciWc special features, forms a multifunctional system. This system determines the placement rules of a language and thus its ‘syntax’. (16) presents the general format of placement rules: (16) underlying structure: {a, b, c, d} ordering template: 1234 placement rules: a :¼ 4 b :¼ 2 c :¼ 1 d :¼ 3 output sequence: cbda (ibid. 70) Two simple examples will give an impression of the application of expression rules. (17a) is the underlying structure of the sentence The farmer killed the duckling and (17b) of the sentence The duckling was killed by the farmer (cf. ibid. 309). The structures diVer only with respect to the speciWcations for Subj, Obj, Top, and Foc:


355

(17) a. Decl Ei: Xi: Past ei: kill [V] (d1xi: farmer [N])AgSubjTop (d1xj: duckling [N])GoObjFoc b. Decl Ei: Xi: Past ei: kill [V] (d1xi: farmer [N])AgFoc (d1xj: duckling [N])GoSubjTop Applying formal expression rules to (17a) derives the forms killed, the farmer, and the duckling, with the combined speciWcations for semantic and syntactic functions determining that the terms are not marked by prepositions. Placement rules then determine the order of determiners and nouns inside the terms and locate the constituent the farmer in P1, due to its speciWcation as SubjTop and due to the operator Decl. Because of its speciWcation as Obj, the duckling is located in third position, following the verb. In (17b) the speciWcation of the duckling as GoSubj determines the derivation of a passive construction since only in this case can a term speciWed for the semantic function Goal be speciWed for the syntactic function of Subject. This has the eVect of assigning an auxiliary operator ‘Pass(ive)’ to the predicate (ibid. 378), which a formal rule translates into be and the Past Participle of the predicate (cf. ibid. 377 f.), Wnally deriving the form was killed. Since in (17b) the term the farmer is not speciWed for a syntactic function, the speciWcation as Agent leads to the application of a formal rule introducing the preposition by. Placement rules then Wrst derive the order of words inside constituents, yielding was killed, by the farmer, and the duckling, and then locate the duckling in P1, due to its speciWcation as SubjTop, was killed in second position, and by the farmer in third position.

9.3.4 Syntactic categories in FG Of the linguistic theories discussed in this book, FG is the only one that does not assume hierarchical structures for the syntactic description of sentences. Surface representations are described exclusively as ordered sequences of items. Consequently, in this framework it is not possible to identify and describe syntactic categories which determine positions of items in sentence structures. Syntactic categories are here restricted to positions in linearly ordered sequences. Thus, the following discussion can consider only what properties and operations determine the positions of linguistic item in the sequences that are derived from underlying clause structures. In general, these are the speciWcations of terms and

356


predicates in the Fund together with the speciWcations of the morphosyntactic operators introduced later and the interaction of these with the expression rules. As pointed out above, the Fund, including the lexicon, contains exclusively predicates that are speciWed for the categories V, N, and A – and combinations of these – and terms that are speciWed for N, with these speciWcations being functionally deWned. Thus, verbal predicates are deWned as being predominantly used in predicative function, nominal predicates predominantly as heads of terms, and adjectival predicates as being predominantly in attributive function. Clearly, these speciWcations capture only a subset of the items of a language which occupy positions in sentences. The only further way in which additional items can be inserted into clauses in Dik (1989[1997a], 1997b) is provided by formal expression rules applying to morphosyntactic operators. This introduces either inXectional aYxes marking predicates or terms of the Fund or corresponding syntactically autonomous forms such as determiners, auxiliaries, adpositions, or topic and focus particles. Language-speciWc placement rules ultimately assign positions to the resulting inXected or uninXected expressions of predicates and terms as well as to the syntactically autonomous expressions of operators in the sequences which represent the sentences of a particular language. Items assigned the same positions correspondingly form a syntactic category. However, the extent to which such categories can be identiWed in this framework is hard to judge, since too little is said concerning the placement rules for particular languages, which make up the ‘syntactic component’ of a functional grammar of these languages. Instead, two considerable problems emerge, the Wrst one related to the lexical categorization that is given and the second to the restriction of syntax to sequences. Concerning the lexical categorization of predicates, it is problematic to identify only verbal, nominal, and adjectival predicates. As pointed out above, prepositions are analysed exclusively as expressions of semantic functions, and in languages like English, prepositional predicates are described as such only when they occur in the context of a -operator, which activates the rule of COPULASUPPORT. However, prepositions are predicative in other contexts too, in small-clause constructions, for example:


357

(18) a. With the bus drivers on strike, we have to walk. b. The captain wanted the passengers oV the ship. For this reason, in languages like English prepositional predicates should be included in the lexicon. This is supported by the fact that there are speciWc prepositional operators such as here in (19), corresponding to determiners as operators of terms and to tenses as operators of verbal predicates: (19) Put the book here on the table. (cf. e.g. Zwarts 1992: 196 V.) Like Anderson (cf. section 8.5), Dik underestimates prepositions and erroneously considers them expressions of semantic functions only. Adverbs such as clumsily, extremely, remarkably are also not considered in the lexicon or in the Fund of Dik’s FG (1989 [1997a], 1997b). As shown above in section 9.2.1, Hengeveld does suggest including a type ‘adverbial predicate’, which he deWnes as a ‘modiWer of a nonnominal head’ (1992: 37). On the basis of the underlying categories which they modify, he distinguishes various classes of adverbs, namely modiWers of verbs, adjectives, and adverbs as well as of predicates, propositions, illocutions, and sentences. In these last four contexts, the adverbs have the function of satellites. Neither this distinction nor the inclusion of adverbial predicates as such means that every language has separate forms to express these. Hengeveld classiWes language types according to whether they use the same forms to express diVerent predicates, in which case they are Xexible, or whether they use speciWc forms and are thus classiWed as rigid. Possible positions of the corresponding expressions and thus their syntactic categories are not discussed in Hengeveld (1992). The approach is diVerent in Hengeveld et al. (2004), where the distinction between V, N, A, and Adv and the classiWcation of languages as Xexible or rigid is adopted and reWned on the basis of data from Wfty languages, and where a relationship between the resulting language types and word order is investigated. The authors show that in Xexible languages word order is highly restricted in the sense that certain slots in a sentence express verbal, nominal, adjectival, or adverbial properties which are realized by more or less Xexible lexemes. If these restrictions are violated, then

358


morphological marking expresses the corresponding properties. By contrast, word order is less restricted in rigid languages, as lexical speciWcations determine whether a lexeme is verbal or nominal, for example. In eVect, however, these investigations say little about the syntactic categorization of linguistic items in the languages under investigation since they refer only to the basic word order of main positive declarative clauses with two overt referential phrases, with statistical frequency taken as the criterion for identifying the basic word order (cf. ibid. 542). Like Dik, Hengeveld et al. describe the syntax of sentences exclusively as linearly ordered sequences of constituents and thus adopt Greenberg’s view of syntax as presented in his seminal work on word order (1963). They ignore fundamental insights of research on syntax, where it became evident that certain linguistic phenomena can be systematically described and explained only if hierarchical structures are assumed. This applies for example to coreferential NPs and pronouns in sentences, where the pronoun may precede the NP only if it occurs higher in the structure: (20) a. Johni phoned Mary before hei called a doctor. b. Before hei called a doctor Johni phoned Mary. (21) a. Johni watched the movie and hei liked the actors. b. *Hei liked the actors and Johni watched the movie. These observations led to the identiWcation of the hierarchical relationship of c-command, which is essential for various syntactic phenomena. Other syntactic phenomena can also only be appropriately captured by assuming hierarchical structures. The ‘discrete inWnity’ of natural languages, for example, is a result of recursive embedding, which necessitates hierarchical structures. Ignoring hierarchical structures is a general deWcit of FG and therefore genuine syntactic categories can be neither identiWed nor described. This problem does not arise in Role and Reference Grammar, a functional approach which is a rival to Dik’s FG and which was initially developed by Van Valin and Foley (1980; Foley and Van Valin 1984) and later reWned and expanded by Van Valin (1993, 1995, 2005, 2008; Van Valin and LaPolla 1997). Essential aspects of this approach, including the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, are discussed in the following section.


359

9.4 An alternative approach: Role and Reference Grammar As a functional grammar, Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) shares the essential goals of FG. Like FG, RRG aims at typological adequacy, and like FG, RRG views language as a system of communicative social actions and assumes that an analysis of communicative functions and thus of semantic and pragmatic properties of morphosyntactic structures plays a vital role in the grammatical description of languages. However, RRG diVers from FG in that the grammar of languages is considered a system ‘in the traditional structuralist sense’ (Van Valin 1993: 2), diVering from formal grammatical theories, however, by not regarding syntax as autonomous. Instead, it assumes that grammatical structure can only be understood and explained with reference to its semantic and communicative functions. Accordingly, Van Valin characterizes RRG as ‘a structural-functionalist theory’ (ibid.) which is neither purely functionalist nor purely formalist. According to RRG, the grammar of particular languages consists of two major components, a lexicon which contains entries for morphemes and words, and a syntactic inventory (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 73), also called a ‘syntactic lexicon’ (ibid. 234), in which the possible syntactic structures are stored as templates. On the basis of items from the lexicon, semantic representations of languages are formed, and on the basis of items from the syntactic inventory, syntactic representations of sentences are formed. A linking system, consisting of two algorithms, maps semantic representations onto syntactic representations, and conversely also maps syntactic representations onto semantic representations. The following discussion Wrst considers the syntactic part of RRG (section 9.4.1) and then characterizes essential aspects of its semantic part (section 9.4.2) and of its linking system (section 9.4.3). It is based mainly on Van Valin and LaPolla (1997). Finally, section 9.4.4 deals with the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories, which in RRG are distinguished from lexical categories (Van Valin 2008).

9.4.1 Syntactic structures In RRG, possible syntactic structures of particular languages are stored as syntactic templates in the syntactic inventory of these

360


languages. The templates are formally identical to structures which are generated by immediate dominance rules (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 69 V.) and have a universal basis which, like the underlying clause structure of FG, is semantically motivated and consists of various layers. The layered structure of the clause (LSC) is motivated by two fundamental oppositions which can be identiWed in all languages, the contrast between predicates and arguments on the one hand, and the contrast between arguments and non-arguments on the other. Accordingly, the following are identiWed as primary components of the sentence: the nucleus, which contains the predicate; the core, which contains the nucleus and the arguments of the predicate; and the periphery, which as an adjunct of the core contains non-arguments of the predicate, for example temporal or spatial modiWers. Schematically, the universal oppositions are represented in (22), and the resulting universal components of the LSC in (23a), instantiated by an English example in (23b) (ibid. 25 f.):

(22) PREDICATE

(23)

Non-arguments

+ Arguments

CLAUSE

a. CORE

NUCLEUS

PERIPHERY

CLAUSE

b. CORE John

ate

the sandwich

PERIPHERY in the library

The semantic motivation of the LSC is made clear by the following correlations:


361

(24) Semantic element(s) Predicate Argument in semantic representation of predicate Non-arguments Predicate þ arguments Predicate þ arguments þ non-arguments

Syntactic unit Nucleus Core argument Periphery Core Clause (¼ core þ periphery) (ibid. 27)

The syntactic units do not require their instantiations to be speciWed for categories such as NP or VP and can thus – depending on typological or language-particular properties – be Wlled by lexical items of various kinds. It should also be noted that the syntactic core arguments refer only to those arguments in the semantic representation of the predicate which are syntactically realized. Structurally, the universal part of the LSC is represented as in (25):

(25)

SENTENCE

CLAUSE

CORE

(ARG)

(ARG)

PERIPHERY

NUCLEUS PRED

XP

XP

X(P)

XP/ADV

(ibid. 31) It should be noted that PRED here dominates X(P) and may thus be Wlled by verbs or other categories. It should also be noted that this structure is not linearized. Linearization is a result of its instantiation in particular languages, as illustrated by the following examples from English and Japanese:

362

syntactic categories SENTENCE

(26) a.

CLAUSE CORE

ARG

PERIPHERY

NUC

ARG

ARG

NP

PP

PRED NP

V

Scully did not show the photo

PP

to Mulder at the office

ADV yesterday

(ibid. 32) SENTENCE

b.

CLAUSE PERIPHERY

CORE

ARG

ARG

NUC PRED

NP

PP

Taroo ga Kazue no NOM

NP uti

de hon o

V yonda ka?

GEN house in book ACC read Q

‘Did Taroo read a/the book at Kazue’s house?’

In addition to the syntactic components, two additional non-universal components are identiWed: a precore slot (PrCS), which precedes the CORE inside the CLAUSE, and a left-detached position (LDP), which precedes the CLAUSE inside the SENTENCE. PrCS is the position that hosts question words in languages in which these words do not remain in situ such as what in What did he say? in English, and LDP is the position that hosts items separated from the clause by a pause such as tomorrow in Tomorrow, they will leave for Venice. Universally, non-CORE positions can either precede or follow the CORE. Similarly, detached positions can either be left-detached or right-detached. Thus, a postcore slot (PoCS) and a right-detached position (RDP) are also identiWed. (27) illustrates the resulting possible structures. Finally, operators are identiWed as components of the LSC, and these modify various layers of the clause. Operators diVer from each other not

(27)

SENTENCE

(LDP)

CLAUSE (PrCS)

(RDP)

CORE (ARG)

(PoCS)

(ARG)

NUCLEUS PRED

XP

XP

XP

XP

X(P)

XP

XP

(ibid. 38) only with respect to their meaning but also with respect to their scope. Within the linearly unordered universal LSC they have their own projection, which speciWes their scope and is adjoined to the predicate. (28) presents an LSC with the set of universal operators which modify layers of the clause:

(28)

SENTENCE (LDP)

CLAUSE

(PrCS)

(RDP)

CORE

(ARG)

(ARG)

(PoCS)

NUCLEUS PRED

XP

XP

XP

XP

X(P)

XP

XP

NUCLEUS

Aspect

NUCLEUS

Negation

NUCLEUS/CORE

Directionals

CORE

Modality

CORE

Negation (internal)

CLAUSE

Status

CLAUSE

Tense

CLAUSE

Evidentials

CLAUSE

Illocutionary force

SENTENCE

(cf. ibid. 49)

364


In RRG it is not only clauses that are represented as layered structures but also phrases which have adpositions or nouns as their heads. It is pointed out, however, that not all languages have adpositions. Dyirbal is a case in point. Accordingly, adpositional structures are irrelevant for such languages. Languages also diVer in that adpositions can be prepositions or postpositions. A distinction is always drawn between adpositions which mark NPs and are thus case-like and adpositions which are predicates. Only in the latter case is a layered structure described similar to that for CLAUSEs in which a CORE, a NUCLEUS, and a PRED are identiWed. (29a) and (29b), with English PPs, illustrate the syntactic diVerence between predicative and non-predicative adpositional structures:

(29)

PP

a.

COREP NUCP

PP

b.

ARG

P

NP

to

Pat

PRED NP P in

the box

Van Valin (2008: 171) also suggests adding an optional constituent to COREP for the description of prepositional modiWers such as right in right under the table, namely PERIPHERY. Phrase structures with nominal heads, NPs, are described as layered structures which, like the structures of CLAUSE and of predicative PPs, have an obligatory CORE component with an obligatory NUCLEUS, which in this case however does not dominate PRED but REF (¼ reference). Optional arguments, an optional periphery and an optional NP-initial position (NPIP) are also assumed, the last named hosting, for example, English


(30)

365

NP

NP/ADV

(PERIPHERYN)

COREN

(NPIP)

NUCN

(ARG)

(ARG)

REF

PP

PP

PP/ADV

N ADJ/N

NUCN

NASP

NUCN

NUM

COREN

QNT

COREN

NEG

COREN

DEF

NP

DEIC

NP

(Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 57)

possessor expressions such as John’s in John’s son. The general schema for the layered structure of NPs (LSNP) is presented in (30). It should be noted here that Van Valin (2008: 167 V., see below) suggests replacing the speciWcation NP by RP (Reference Phrase) in order to universally allow items to Wll this position that are not lexically speciWed as N. Language-particular syntactic templates, which are stored in the syntactic inventory or the syntactic lexicon of a particular language, have a universal basis in the layered structures of the clause and of the phrases, and at the same time represent the speciWc syntactic properties of this language. The individual templates each give partial structures which are combined to represent complete sentences. (31) provides examples of such templates for English:

366


(31)

CLAUSE PrCS

SENTENCE

CORE

LDP

XP LDP Template

XP PrCS Template CORE (

NUC

CLAUSE

PERIPHERY)

ARG

CORE (

ARG NUC ARG

PRED

X(P)

PRED

NP PP/ADV Core-1 Template CORE (

NP

PERIPHERY)

ARG NUC ARG

V

X(P) PP PP/ADV Core-2 Template CORE (

ARG

PRED

NP

PERIPHERY)

PERIPHERY)

NUC

PRED

NP

PP/ADV

Core-3 Template

NP

X(P)

PP/ADV

Core-4 Template

(Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 74) (32) illustrates how two partial structures from the syntactic inventory are combined to represent the English interrogative What did Robin give to Leslie yesterday? The templates in (31) serve to describe syntactic structures of simple sentences. However, RRG is also concerned with complex sentences and distinguishes here various levels of juncture and also various types of nexus relations. In the Wrst case three types are identiWed, namely clausal juncture, nuclear juncture, and core juncture. In the second case there are again three types, namely coordination, subordination, and cosubordination. This yields altogether nine possible combinations, not all of which, however, are realized in every language. The syntactic consequences of these can either be described on the basis of the templates for simple clauses, or they require additional templates. Cases of core subordination where a CORE or a CLAUSE assumes the


(32)

367

Syntactic inventory SENTENCE CLAUSE PrCS

CORE (

CORE

ARG

NUC

PERIPHERY) ARG

PRED XP

NP

V

PP

PP/ADV

SENTENCE CLAUSE PrCS

PERIPHERY

CORE ARG

NUC

ARG

PRED NP

NP

(e.g. What did Robin

V give

PP

ADV

to Leslie yesterday?)

(ibid. 75) function of a core argument are of the Wrst kind, an example being That John left in That John left was a surprise. This is described as an ARG-node Wlled by a CLAUSE rather than by an NP. In the case of adverbial clauses too, no additional templates are needed, since here the ARG-node of a preposition is Wlled by a CLAUSE unit, as in John left after he had Wnished his lunch. However, additional templates are required for subordinations of CLAUSEs, as in Bill said that Mary left, or of NUCLEI, as in John’s winning the election shocked everyone (cf. ibid. 506). Coordinations and cosubordinations, which may occur at any level of juncture, also require additional templates, and here ‘general templates’ (ibid. 507) are formed. The diVerence between coordination and cosubordination is that in the former the linked units are daughters of a node of the next-highest layer of the clause and in the second case they are daughters of a node of the same layer (cf. ibid.). Complexity inside NPs is also analysed and described in RRG, which distinguishes, for example, between various types of relative clauses (cf. ibid. 492 V.). The structures considered so far include constituent projections and operator projections. In addition to these, RRG describes a third type,

368


focus structure projection. As pointed out above, RRG assumes that grammatical structure can only be understood and explained with reference to semantic and communicative functions. Whereas the layered structures of constituent projection and operator projection relate to semantic functions, focus structure projection relates to communicative functions. The theoretical basis for the description of focus structure projection is taken from Lambrecht’s (1994) theory of information structure. This results in the identiWcation of sentence structures or partial sentence structures as the focus structure unit SPEECH ACT and in a distinction between potential and actual focus domains within this unit. Various focus types are discussed, as well as the fact that languages diVer with respect to their identiWcation of potential focus domains and with respect to their marking of actual focus domains (e.g. intonation in English, intonation and postpositions in Japanese, syntactic constructions in Italian and French) (cf. ibid. 201 V.). Using an English example, (33) illustrates the integration of the three types of projection, with the actual focus domain in this case being described as the constituent ARG in PrCS of CLAUSE, realized by what, and the potential focus domain being identical to the unit SPEECH ACT:

(33)

Operator projection SENTENCE IF

Constituent projection SENTENCE

CLAUSE TNS

CLAUSE

CLAUSE

PrCS

PERIPHERY

CORE

CORE ARG

NUC

ARG

NUC PRED NP

V NP

What ARG

ADV

did

V

NP

Dana

give

Chris

yesterday?

ARG

NUC

ARG

ADV

SPEECH ACT Focus structure projection

(ibid. 217) All three of the projection types are crucial for assigning positions to lexical items in a sentence and thus for the identiWcation of syntactic categories.


369

9.4.2 Logical structures and semantic representations Considerations concerning semantic representations of sentences in RRG start by pointing out that sentences express states of aVairs that involve participants assuming particular roles in particular states of aVairs. With reference to Aristotle, four types of states of aVairs are distinguished, namely situation, event, process, and activity, and a list of ‘[c]ommonly used’ participant roles is presented that includes roles such as ‘agent’, ‘eVector’, ‘experiencer’, ‘instrument’, ‘patient’, ‘goal’, and ‘location’ (cf. ibid. 85 f.). Verbs and other predicates are then identiWed as linguistic items that express essential aspects of states of aVairs and take arguments denoting participants whose role in a state of aVairs is expressed by the semantics of the verb or of some other predicate as a particular thematic relation. Thus, the semantics of verbs and other predicates is claimed to be central to the semantic representation of sentences, and special emphasis is placed on their lexical entries. In contrast to other approaches where information in a lexical entry comprises ‘the crucial semantic, morphosyntactic and other properties which determine how a lexical item will behave grammatically’ (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 154), in RRG the heart of the entry for a verb is claimed to be its logical structure. This gives its verb class and speciWes the related matter of the number of its arguments and their thematic roles. SpeciWcations of intransitivity and transitivity are also derived from the logical structure of verbs. Basic verb classes are identiWed with reference to Vendler’s (1957 [1967]) aktionsart types – State, Achievement, Accomplishment, and Activity – which are correlated with the states of aVairs identiWed for the verbs and characterized using feature combinations: (34) State-of aVairs type Situation Event Process Action

Aktionsart type State Achievement Accomplishment Activity

[þstatic], [telic], [punctual] [static], [þtelic], [þpunctual] [static], [þtelic], [punctual] [static], [telic], [punctual]

(cf. Van Valin und LaPolla 1997: 92 f.) For each of the verb classes an additional causative variant is identiWed. Following the conventions of formal semantics and suggestions by Dowty (1979, 1991), the logical structure of lexical entries represents the various verb classes as lexical decompositions which contain

370


atomic predicates such as ING(RESSIVE), BECOME and CAUSE as modiWers of predicates. This yields the following assignments of these verbs: (35) Verb class State Activity Achievement

Logical structure predicate’ (x) or (x, y) do’ (x, [predicate’ (x) or (x, y)]) INGR predicate’ (x) or (x, y), or INGR do’ (x, [predicate’ (x) or (x, y)]) Accomplishment BECOME predicate’ (x) or (x, y), or BECOME do’ (x, [predicate’ (x) or (x, y)]) Active do’ (x, [predicate1’ (x, (y) )]) & BECOME accomplishment predicate2’ (z, x) or (y) Causative Æ CAUSE , where Æ, are LSs of any type (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 109)

Examples of the logical structure of verbs are given in (36): (36) a. b. c. d. e. f.

receive own see watch show run

BECOME have’ (x,y) have’ (x,y) see’ (x,y) do’ (x, [see’ (x,y)] [do’ (w,Ø)] CAUSE [BECOME see’ (x,y)] do’ (x,[run’(x)])

Each of the argument positions in the logical structure of a verb deWnes a thematic relation for which labels characterizing these relations are introduced, for example Experiencer for ‘Wrst argument of a twoplace predicate of internal experience’. These mnemotechnical labels thus at the same time express semantic properties of verbs, as illustrated by the following examples:

(37) Arg. of DO AGENT

1st arg. of do´ (x,… EFFECTOR MOVER PERFORMER CONSUMER CREATOR SPEAKER OBSERVER

1st arg. of pred´ (x, y) LOCATION PERCEIVER COGNIZER WANTER JUDGER POSSESSOR EXPERIENCER

2nd arg. of pred´ (x, y) THEME DESIRE SENSATION POSSESSED JUDGMENT CREATION LOCUS

Arg. of state pred´ (x) PATIENT ENTITY

(cf. ibid. 127)


371

What is crucial for the grammar, however, especially for the interface between syntax and semantics, is only the speciWcation of argument positions, e.g. ‘1st arg. of do’ (x, y)’. In RRG, the linking of syntactic and semantic representations, which will be focused on in section 9.4.3, requires the formation of generalized semantic roles, so-called ‘macroroles’, which are ultimately mapped onto grammatical relations. Macroroles subsume sets of thematic relations that behave in a grammatically similar way and realize those core arguments in a sentence which, for example, in English correspond to the grammatical relations subject and object. Two macroroles are distinguished, Actor and Undergoer. The Actor role subsumes the thematic relations effector, performer, experiencer, etc. and the Undergoer role relations such as patient, theme. In the default case, the linking of arguments in the logical structure of verbs – and thus implicitly of thematic relations – to macroroles is governed by principles (cf. ibid. 152). Exceptions are speciWed in the lexical entry. On the basis of logical structures of verbs – or other predicates for which a description analogous to that of verbs is appropriate – semantic representations of the core of a sentence can be constructed, i.e. for the predicate of the nucleus and its core arguments. In English, core arguments that represent a macrorole are ultimately realized as NPs. Other core arguments may be realized as PPs, either an argument-marking preposition and an NP as in Bill gave Xowers to Mary, or an argument-adjunct preposition and an NP as in Bill walked to the station. The choice of preposition to mark an argument is claimed to be derived from general rules such as (38): (38) Assign to to non-MR x argument in LS segment: . . . BECOME/ INGR pred’ (x, y) (ibid. 376 V.) For languages in which NPs are case-marked rather than marked by prepositions, corresponding rules are formulated (cf. ibid. 352 V.). RRG distinguishes between three types of prepositions: argument-marking prepositions, argument-adjunct prepositions, and adjunct prepositions. Whereas argument-marking prepositions are introduced by rules such as (38), the other two types have lexical entries of their own, and as predicates they have logical structures of their own. They diVer from one another in that adjunct prepositions take the logical structure of the predicate of the clause as one of their arguments whereas argument adjunct

372


prepositions share an argument with the logical structure of the predicate. (39) provides the semantic representation of a sentence with an adjunct preposition and (40) that of one with an argumentadjunct preposition: (39) a. Bill drank coVee in the garden b. be-in’ (garden, [do’ (Bill, [drink’ (Bill, coVee)])]) (40) a. Bill walked to the station b. do’ (Bill, [walk’ (Bill)]) & BECOME be-at’ (station, Bill) Whereas PPs with an argument-adjunct preposition realize an argument of the predicate and thus belong to the core of the sentence, PPs with an adjunct preposition realize its periphery. They are also described as realizations of the periphery of an NP, and in this case they modify an NP, taking it as their second argument, as in the book on the shelf: be-on’ (book, shelf). Lexical representations of nouns distinguish between non-derived forms and deverbal derived forms. The logical structure of non-derived nouns represents them as predicates, for example coVee’ (x). A more elaborated description on the basis of the qualia structures introduced by Pustejovsky (1991, 1995) is also suggested (cf. Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 184 f.). In addition, it is assumed that deverbal nouns are derived via lexical redundancy rules and inherit the arguments of the base verb, subject to restrictions (cf. ibid. 186 V.). Like PPs with adjunct prepositions, adverbs can instantiate the periphery of a sentence and thus modify the core of the sentence. Like these PPs, they are analysed as predicates that take the logical structure of the predicate of the clause as their argument, which is their only argument. Correspondingly, the semantic representation of the sentence Bill drank coVee outside can be seen in (41): (41) outside’ ([do’ (Bill, [drink’ (Bill, coVee)])]) The periphery of a clause can host multiple modifying adverbs, for example spatial, temporal, epistemic, and evidential adverbs, which are subject to a Wxed order. Semantically the eVect is that not only do these adverbs have scope over the core of the clause but that at the same time particular adverb types have scope over other adverb types. They are therefore described semantically as higher predicates and syntactically as layered structures. Adverbs can modify not only the core of a clause but also subparts of a logical structure, which they take as their argument. Manner adverbs


373

(e.g. vigorously), pace adverbs (e.g. slowly), and aspectual adverbs (e.g. completely) are examples. Syntactically these adverbs are inserted into the constituent projection of a sentence. Since their semantic function is analogous to that of operators, with aspectual adverbs correlating with aspect, and pace adverbs or manner adverbs with modality, they are at the same time integrated into the operator projection. (42) presents the (reduced) semantic representation and the corresponding syntactic structure of a sentence with a peripheral adverb, a pace adverb, and an aspectual adverb:

(42) a. Evidently, Leslie has slowly been completely immersing herself in the new language. b. evident´ ([slow´ (do´ (x,Ø))] CAUSE[BECOME[complete´ (immersed´ (x,y)]]) SENTENCE c. LDP

CLAUSE CORE

ADV

ARG

NUC ADV

ADV

NP Evidently,

ARG

ARG

NP

PP

PRED V

Leslie has slowly been completely immersing herself in the new language V NUC ASP ASP PACE TNS

EVID

ASP

NUC NUC CORE CLAUSE CLAUSE

IF

CLAUSE SENTENCE

(ibid. 165 V.)

374


Because of their semantic complexity, semantic representations of operators are not provided by Van Valin and LaPolla (1997). They are nevertheless identiWed and their relative order, which determines their particular scope, is described. (43) presents the general schema for clausal operators and (44) presents the general schema for NPoperators: (43) hIFDEChEVIDHShTNSPASThSTAREALhNEGØhMODOBLGhDIRØ hASPPERFPROGhLSiiiiiiiii (ibid. 171) (44) hDEICPROXhDEFþhNEGØhQNT9hNUMSGhNASPCOUNThLSiiiiiii (ibid. 194) Operators are not integrated into the syntactic constituent projection. They are exclusively part of the operator projection, as the examples has and been in (42c) show. In addition to semantic representations, which are characterized in this section, and syntactic structures, which were discussed in the previous section, the identiWcation and description of grammatical relations is also relevant to the positioning of lexical items in sentence structures within the RRG framework. Where appropriate, this will be discussed in the following section.

9.4.3 The linking system The linking system of RRG is bidirectional and describes the mapping of semantic representations onto syntactic structures on the one hand and the mapping of syntactic structures onto semantic representations on the other. In both cases a linking algorithm describes the individual steps, with general principles being supplemented by language-particular constructional templates or constructional ‘schemas’ (Van Valin 2005: 131), which impose language-particular restrictions on what are otherwise very general principles. Since the positioning of lexical items in syntactic structures and their assignment to syntactic categories should yield the same result, the following discussion is restricted to the mapping of semantic representations onto syntactic structures. The linking of syntax and semantics is subject to a general constraint, the Completeness Constraint, formulated as follows:


375

All of the arguments explicitly speciWed in the semantic representation of a sentence must be realized syntactically in the sentence, and all of the referring expressions in the syntactic representation of a sentence must be linked to an argument position in a logical structure in the semantic representation of the sentence. (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997: 325)

The formulation shows that linking aVects semantic and syntactic arguments. Mapping the semantic representation of a sentence onto its syntactic structure presupposes the construction of the semantic representation, which is based on the logical structure of the verb or some other predicate, combined with the logical structures of other units, i.e. of arguments and operators and, where appropriate, of modiWers. This occurs in the lexicon. The Wrst step of the linking algorithm then determines the macroroles on the basis of the general Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy (cf. ibid. 146), if these are not speciWed in the lexical entry. Then follows the determination of the morphosyntactic status of the [–Wh]-arguments in the logical structure, in accordance with the Privileged Syntactic Argument Selection Hierarchy (cf. ibid. 282). This ensures that in the default case in accusative constructions the Actor is the privileged syntactic argument and in ergative constructions it is the Undergoer (ibid. 623). The label ‘privileged syntactic arguments’ (PSA) refers to grammatical relations which are identiWed in a language if there is evidence that these relations are independent of semantic or pragmatic relations. The notion of privileged argument replaces the traditional notion of subject, and for this two reasons are given. First, the notion of subject does not distinguish between syntactically and semantically motivated subjects, and second, subjects are identiWed independently of constructions. In English, for example, this is the case not only in matrix clauses but also in want-constructions such as Sam wants to leave. It is shown, however (ibid. cf. 274 V.), that crosslinguistically as well as within individual languages, distinguishing between a syntactic and a semantic motivation and between certain constructions is essential. In order to do so, the notions of controller and pivot are introduced and a distinction is made between semantic and syntactic controllers and semantic and syntactic pivots. Pivots diVer from controllers in that they depend on

376


particular constructions, for example the want-construction in English, the purposive-construction in Dyirbal or the -kurra-construction in Walpiri (cf. ibid.), and that they are not realized phonetically. Controllers are identiWed in the other constructions and they are realized phonetically. Pivots and controllers are syntactic only if their semantic relations are neutralized for syntactic purposes, and only syntactic pivots and controllers are PSAs, which play a role in the selection hierarchy. In the next step of the linking algorithm the appropriate syntactic templates are selected on the basis of the Syntactic Template Selection Principle and subsequently the positions of [þWh]-arguments, if present, are determined as well as language-particular properties of [Wh]-arguments. This includes for [þWh]-arguments instructions like ‘assign it to the precore slot’ or ‘assign it to a position within the potential focus domain of the clause’ (ibid. 624). [Wh]-arguments are located either in appropriate argument positions or, subject to language-particular focus structure restrictions, in a pre-core or post-core slot. The Syntactic Template Selection Principle corresponds to the Completeness Constraint in that it generally requires the number of syntactic slots for arguments and argumentadjuncts within a core to be the same as the distinct speciWed argument positions in the semantic representation of the core. It also formulates the conditions according to which universally or in particular languages the number of core-argument slots may be reduced, and states that a core must have at least one syntactic argument (cf. ibid. 593). In yet another step the core arguments are given appropriate case markers or adpositions in accordance with appropriate rules, and the predicate receives agreement marking. Finally, positions are assigned to the semantic arguments which are not arguments of the core, or in the default case a position in the periphery or, depending on particular focus or topic properties, in the precore slot or the left-detached position. (45) and (46) provide simple examples illustrating the linking from semantic to syntactic structures (cf. ibid. 334 f.):


(45)

377

SENTENCE CLAUSE

PrCS

CORE

ARG

NUC

NP

PRED

NP

V

That one

I

would eat

Actor

Undergoer

do´ (1sgACV, [eat´(1sg, that one)]) & BECOME eaten´ (that oneACS)

(46)

SENTENCE CLAUSE CORE

PERIPHERY

ARG

NUC

ARG

NP

PRED

NP

PP

V Robin

saw

Pat after the concert Actor

Undergoer

after´ (concertINA, [see´ (RobinACV, PatACV)])

In RRG, the general principles of the linking algorithm are constrained by language particular constructional templates which specify unique idiosyncratic features of constructions. Such a template

378


describes (so far informally) morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of a construction, and formulates instructions for their combination. (47) is an example of a constructional template describing the particular properties of the English passive construction: (47) construction English passive (plain) syntax Template(s): Default core PSA: Pragmatic pivot (default) Linking: Actor ¼ 6 pragmatic pivot; omitted or in peripheral by-PP Undergoer ¼ pragmatic pivot (default) morphology Verb: Past participle Auxiliary: be semantics PSA is not instigator of state of aVairs but is aVected by it (default) pragmatics Illocutionary force: UnspeciWed Focus structure: No restrictions; pragmatic pivot ¼ topic (default) (ibid. 433) The discussion of the linking system in this section as well as the discussion of syntactic structures and semantic representations in the preceding sections have generally used English examples for illustration. It is therefore all the more important to note that in RRG from its beginnings and also in the texts referred to here a wide range of languages are described whose syntactic structures diVer considerably from that of English. These include Lakhota, Dyirbal, Tagalog, and many others.

9.4.4 Syntactic vs. lexical categories in RRG The discussion in section 9.4.1 showed that in RRG on the basis of universal structures language-particular syntactic templates are described


379

and combined to form simple and complex sentence structures. Accordingly, those items of a language are deWned as syntactic categories which can occupy the same positions in the sentence structures thus constructed. The question to be asked is how linguistic items enter these structures. In order to answer this question, it is essential to know what properties of lexical items are speciWed in the lexicon and what role these play for the syntactic positioning of the items. Van Valin and LaPolla (1997) consider only semantic properties. A later explicit statement on this subject – though restricted to verbs and other predicates – indicates that this is no coincidence: The lexical entry for each verb and other predicating element contains its logical structure, and for most this is all that is required. (Van Valin 2001: 211)

The following discussion attempts to infer how, given the properties of RRG as characterized above, the syntactic category membership of lexical items can be identiWed and described on the basis of their logical structure. The discussion includes considerations presented in Van Valin (2008). It will be shown, however, that a number of questions concerning the syntactic categorization of lexical items remain unanswered. The discussion of syntactic structures in section 9.4.1 has shown that the universal representation of sentence structures (examples (25), (27) and (28)) does not contain syntactic category labels such as NP or VP. Instead, nodes are described as ARG/XP, PRED/XP, or LDP/XP. This allows for two possibilities. Firstly, these nodes may be Wlled diVerently in diVerent languages, as indicated by the syntactic templates for English (31) and the syntactic trees for English and Japanese sentences (26a,b). Secondly, in contrast to other models of grammar, categorial speciWcations of lexical items and of the syntactic positions into which they are inserted need not match, since such a speciWcation does not form part of the syntactic structure. Nor is this a requirement if syntactic speciWcation is not part of a lexical entry, which is the position defended by Van Valin (2008). He refers to Himmelmann’s Wndings concerning Tagalog (cf. section 9.2.3), which show that in such languages and unlike in Indo-European languages, lexical categorial properties of linguistic items are independent of any syntactic categorization. It is possible, for instance, to insert lexically verb-like items

380


into syntactic slots for nouns that are speciWed as such by nominal functional categories such as determiners. If there is no categorial speciWcation, items can be inserted into PRED/XP in a sentence structure which are described as predicates by their logical structure in the lexicon. Van Valin shows that even in a language like English these can be items that are traditionally described as verbs, nouns, adjectives, or prepositions: (48) a. b. c. d.

Chris will see the movie. Chris is a good detective. Pat is exceedingly tall. Pat is in the house. (cf. 2008: 165)

It should be noted that an auxiliary such as be is not analysed as a predicate in RRG but rather as a form required in some languages for predicate formation if the predicate in not a verb. How this form is introduced is left open. The syntactic category of the various predicates is determined among other factors by their syntactic environments which result from linking their semantic arguments to syntactic arguments in accordance with the linking algorithm and its various principles and rules. On this basis ARG-nodes in the syntactic structure are Wlled by (case-marked) NPs or PPs with speciWed prepositions and an NP. Lexically, the NPs should be represented by items which are described on the basis of qualia structures in the lexicon, since such a description identiWes them as Ns and indicates their compatibility with those peripheries and operators that are N-speciWc rather than CLAUSE-speciWc. If semantic representations of sentences are put together in the lexicon, as stated by Van Valin (2001: 130), then such lexical compatibilities are essential. This is obvious in the case of operators, and it also holds for the realization of peripheries. For, as shown in section 9.4.3, CLAUSE-speciWc peripheries such as adverbs are described as taking the logical structure of the predicate of the clause as their argument. Conversely, predicative PPs can realize either CLAUSE-speciWc or N-speciWc peripheries and then take as their argument either the logical structure of an NP or that of the predicate of a clause. As for the predicate of CLAUSE, i.e. PRED/XP, Van Valin (2008) also postulates for ARG/(P)NP that this node can be Wlled by items of various lexical categorizations, not only by Ns, which represent the


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default case. This is justiWed with reference to Tagalog and Nootka, which allow verb-like items in these positions. Van Valin suggests changing the syntactic structure to replace NP by the syntactic category RP (¼ Reference Phrase), which is independent of lexical categorization. Consequently, either a lexical ‘verb’ or a lexical ‘noun’ can realize a syntactic argument. However, it is not clear how the semantic representation of a sentence including modiWers and operators would then be constructed since, according to both Himmelmann and Van Valin, ‘nominal’ modiWers and operators combine with lexically ‘verbal’ items in Tagalog and Nootka if the latter represent syntactic arguments. But if the semantic representation of sentences has been constructed in the lexicon, where naturally only lexical information is available, then it seems that nominal modiWers and operators can combine only with nominal items. The problem that emerges here will also be seen in what follows. For modiWers too, Van Valin (2008) suggests a syntactic phrase, MP, which can be Wlled by items that are lexically categorized in diVerent ways. He distinguishes between two default cases. In the case of an MP ‘modifying a noun’, the nucleus is adjectival, and for an MP ‘modifying a verbal nucleus or a core’ the nucleus is adverbial (ibid. 172). An MP can, however, be Wlled by something else. For nominal modiWers Van Valin gives the examples the Charles and Di syndrome and the God is dead philosophers, and for modiWers with a verbal nucleus or core he gives the examples yesterday and the day before yesterday (ibid.). What seems to cause a problem here is the fact that MPs are distinguished with respect to whether they modify ‘a noun’ or ‘a verbal nucleus or a core’, although it is postulated at the same time that RPs are realized by nouns only in the default case and that likewise predicates of clauses are also realized by verbs only in the default case. Thus, given the possibility of Wlling RP positions with verbs and clausal PRED with nouns, an adverb apparently cannot be prevented from modifying an RP and an adjective apparently cannot be prevented from modifying a verbal nucleus. Van Valin uses the introduction of RPs and MPs as syntactic categories and the description of clausal predicates as open to various categorial representations as arguments for distinguishing between lexical and syntactic categories, including the claim that phrasal syntactic categories are not projections of the lexical items that realize them. Accordingly, he explicitly rejects the X-bar schema as a universal syntactic principle. Thus, phrases are not generally considered as

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endocentric. The only exception is the case of PPs with predicative prepositions. One could argue, however, that PPs functioning as modiWers should be analysed as MPs, and thus also be exocentric. Apart from his rejection of the X-bar schema as a universal principle, it is in particular Van Valin’s proposed distinction between syntactic and lexical categories which in its present version gives the impression of not having been fully worked out, and therefore the rules governing the construction of semantic representations and the linking rules have to be adapted to the 2008 ideas. The reason for this is that on the one hand it is postulated that positions in the syntactic structure of sentences can be Wlled by various lexical categories and that on the other hand these positions receive a particular categorial speciWcation because the semantic representation of a sentence as a whole is constructed in the lexicon. This aVects above all the distinction between nouns and predicates of clauses and thus precisely those categories discussed by Van Valin (2008). To begin with, in order to construct the semantic representation of predicates and their arguments, a speciWcation of nouns (items with a qualia structure) is required. Secondly, an appropriate semantic combination of modiWers and operators with nouns on the one hand and with predicates of clauses on the other is possible only if a lexical distinction is made. However, this makes it impossible to combine, for example, lexically verbal items with nominal operators or modiWers or lexically nominal items with clausal operators or modiWers. Against the background of the concept of RRG as presented above (cf. also Van Valin 2001, 2005), Van Valin’s (2008) discussion of syntactic and lexical categories thus raises more questions concerning the syntactic categorization of linguistic items than it answers. It actually seems more appropriate to describe the indiVerence of RP and the clausal PRED towards speciWc categorial realizations as a matter of universal sentence structure and to describe the diVerences between languages like Tagalog and Nootka and Indo-European languages, and also between particular (Indo-European) languages – for example with respect to the introduction of auxiliaries like be in the context of nonverbal predicates – as a matter of language-particular syntactic templates. However, this requires the lexicon to contain corresponding information. In addition to the problems and open questions pointed out above, there are further unanswered questions concerning the syntactic categorization of linguistic items in RRG. These include questions related


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to the various types of operators. In section 9.4.2 it was pointed out that so far no semantic description has been provided. However, the syntactic structures of the operator projections of the clause and of RP/ NP identify particular positions for particular operators, and it is unclear how expressions representing these operators are assigned to their appropriate positions and how language-particular diVerences concerning the realization of operators as autonomous syntactic items or as aYxes are described. 9.5 The special situation of language typology The discussion in the Wrst sections of this chapter (9.2.1 and 9.2.2) has shown that in language typology linguistic items are initially categorized without taking genuinely syntactic properties into account, even in those cases where the categories identiWed are labelled ‘syntactic categories’. Instead, the focus is on the traditional parts of speech, and syntactic aspects – if considered at all – are restricted to grammatical functions such as subject, object, and predicate and their relative order as well as the order of parts of speech within the constituents that express these functions. Thus, it can in general be stated that a considerable number of typological investigations neglect syntactic properties, and this even holds for Dik’s Functional Grammar, where the syntax of sentences is restricted to linearly ordered sequences of words. This state of aVairs is not implausible when one looks at the history of language typology. Traditionally, language typology was concerned with isolated grammatical phenomena, which were investigated and compared in as many languages as possible in order to identify language types on the basis of similarities and diVerences. Here, traditional grammatical concepts such as parts of speech and their inXectional properties or grammatical functions turned out to be helpful and apparently suYcient. What is more, post-traditional insights into diVerentiated and especially into hierarchic syntactic structures were gained and developed in an environment whose aims and methods are hardly compatible with the aims and methods of language typology. Thus, the claim of structuralism that each language has its own system and its own structure naturally led to the aim that linguists should discover the complete systems of individual languages and not investigate isolated grammatical phenomena of a wide range of languages in a comparative manner independently of the system as a whole. In addition, the stipulation that the linguistic competence or

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I-language of native speakers includes a universal grammar, part of the deductive concept of Generative Grammar, is hardly acceptable to language typologists, whose methods include the inductive identiWcation of assumed universals on a wide empirical basis. And last but not least, it is of little help to typologists that new insights into the syntax of languages result in constant changes to syntactic theories, a fact which makes it diYcult to apply them to the description of languages in general and to typological matters in particular. All these may be reasons for the neglect of syntax to be observed in numerous typological works and thus also of genuine syntactic categories. The approaches discussed in sections 9.2.3 and 9.4 show, however, that more recent work in language typology does consider syntactic facts and identiWes genuine syntactic categories as a central concern. It is noteworthy in this context that in contrast to the approaches discussed in earlier chapters, the approaches considered here defend the view that syntactic categorization of linguistic items is independent of lexical speciWcation and takes place only in the syntax. In this view, syntactically neutral items are inserted into slots in syntactic sentence structures, and only then do they yield syntactic categories. This view is defended by Baker (2003), Borer (2003, 2005a, b), Himmelmann (2008), and Van Valin (2008), although – as shown – in diVerent ways and to diVerent extents. For an evaluation of the appropriateness of this view, two matters must be clariWed. The Wrst concerns how the syntactic structures are created whose slots determine the syntactic category membership of lexical items, and the second is whether in this way all of the items in a language are syntactically categorized, i.e whether each item is assigned its appropriate position. In Himmelmann’s approach it is not at all clear how syntactic structures are created. Himmelmann deWnes syntactic categories as ‘the category labels attached to the nodes of a phrase structure tree’ (2008: 258) and identiWes ‘terminal and non-terminal (or phrasal) syntactic categories’ (ibid. 261). This indicates that he assumes phrase structure trees as syntactic representations of sentence structures, but he says nothing about how these are produced. What is important, however, is his remark that phrases consist of grammatical markers or function words and content words, and that it is the content words that are lexically unspeciWed for syntactic properties but are assigned these properties when inserted into slots which combine with a functional category to form a phrase. It is thus the functional category Wlled, for


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example, by a determiner or an auxiliary, which determines whether a syntactically Xexible content word is interpreted as nominal or verbal (cf. ibid. 262). What is also important is the fact that Himmelmann assumes this for languages like Tagalog, but not for IndoEuropean languages. Here, he claims that a speciWcation for syntactic properties is provided in the lexicon and corresponds to the speciWcation in the phrase structure tree (cf. ibid. 263 f.). Since it is unclear how in Himmelmann’s approach syntactic structures are created, it is also unclear how the category-determining functional items enter these structures and, moreover, where they come from. It must Wnally be asked whether in languages like Tagalog there are only function words and content words, and if this is not the case, what properties other items have and how their positions in sentence structures are determined. This question applies to the approaches of Baker and Borer too. Neither is a prototypical typologist, but as generative linguists both have become more concerned with typological issues and they base their results on the analysis of a wide range of languages, including non-European languages.7 Baker (2003) discusses which categories are universal and comes to the conclusion that these are Noun, Verb, and Adjective, with these categories – as pointed out in section 9.2.3 – not being coextensive with the traditional parts of speech with the same label but instead being deWned on the basis of positions in syntactic structures which correlate with particular semantic properties. Like Himmelmann, Baker also comes to the conclusion that items are not or need not be speciWed for categorial syntactic properties in the lexicon and that in many languages they are not. However, as pointed out in section 9.2.3, in his view the category Verb is identiWed as licensing a speciWer that is assigned a theta role, which corresponds to the licensing of a subject. The category Noun is identiWed as the set of items that bear a referential index, and the category Adjective comprises those items that have neither the properties identiWed for Verbs nor those of Nouns. As a result, though these items are not assigned categorial labels such as ‘N’, ‘V’, and ‘A’ or speciWcations of these, they are nevertheless lexically speciWed for 7 In addition to English, Romance languages, and Japanese, Baker considers amongst others Mohawk, Chichewa, Quechua, Nahuatl, and Mapuche as well as various Austronesian und Australian languages. Borer bases her analyses on Hebrew, Chinese (Cantonese, Wu, Mandarin), and Japanese, as well as on various European languages.

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syntactic category membership. Thus lexical categorial neutrality only means that familiar category labels are not used. If Baker does indeed mean that no categorizing properties are assigned to nonfunctional items in the lexicon, then it must be asked how projections are produced. For Baker subscribes to the theoretical framework of the PPT (cf. 2003: 19 f.). As pointed out in chapter 5, X-bar theory is a constitutive module of the PPT, and according to this theory, phrase structures are projections of lexically speciWed properties of their head X. If there are no such properties, then no phrase structures can be projected. And even if the properties postulated by Baker were lexically speciWed, this would not be suYcient to project NPs, VPs, and APs and their respective functional projections since, according to the PPT, this would require lexical speciWcation for inXectional properties or referential arguments that license functional categories as extended projections of lexical categories. Last but not least, it is these properties which, according to Baker, are not speciWed lexically, and thus neither complete phrases nor complete sentences as combinations of these can be constructed. Baker’s discussions, especially of sentence structures that include functional categories (cf. e.g. 34 V., 48 V., 212 V.), suggest that his conception of a grammar is less compatible with the PPT than with a grammar that a priori provides templates of functional structures into which items from the lexicon are inserted which because of their particular properties and because of their positions relative to particular functional categories represent N, V, or A. In this respect his views are to some extent like those of Himmelmann. As indicated in section 9.2.3, a framework for a grammar of this kind is suggested by Borer (2003, 2005a,b). Her neo-constructionist approach postulates universal constructions of hierarchically ordered functional categories that identify a categorially unspeciWed encyclopaedic item as their lexical head as either verbal or nominal. In the Wrst case the construction is claimed to comprise the functional categories Determiner, Number, ClassiWer, and Divider together with their projections, and in the second case the functional categories Event, Tense, and Aspect together with their projections. The existence of these categories is justiWed by reference to various languages, European and non-European – including Hebrew, Chinese, and Japanese. Language-particular diVerences are explained as resulting from the fact that functional categories are realized as autonomous heads or as aYxes or that they are phonetically empty, and from the


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fact that diVerent preconditions for movement to head or speciWer positions yield diVerent word orders. What is problematic in Borer’s approach is the stipulation of two separate repositories. On the one hand, she has an encyclopaedia with items speciWed only for semantic and phonological properties, and on the other, a functional lexicon containing realizations of functional categories speciWed for categorial properties and those derivational aYxes that specify their bases categorially. The very concept of two separate repositories excludes the existence of items that share properties with items of each of these repositories. It is thus impossible in this framework to describe phenomena of grammaticalization, i.e. the change from lexical to functional items such as the change from lexical verbs to auxiliaries in English, which took place in several steps and thus requires intermediate or semi-lexical categories, something which is not possible in Borer’s system. In view of Himmelmann’s claims, it also seems inappropriate to assume for all languages and in general that items which are neither functional heads nor derivational aYxes are categorially neutral and thus stored in the encyclopaedia. According to Himmelmann, neutrality can be observed only for items of languages like Tagalog, but not in Indo-European languages. It should Wnally be noted that in many languages categorizing items as nouns or verbs with appropriate functional extensions is not suYcient, since these languages, including the Indo-European languages, have other items, for example items which are traditionally categorized as adjectives or adverbs. In contrast to Dik’s Functional Grammar, which instead of syntactic structures only describes linear sequences of words, Role and Reference Grammar, developed by Foley and Van Valin and reWned by Van Valin, is explicitly concerned with syntactic structures. In addition to universal, semantically motivated layered clause structures, language particular syntactic templates are described which are stored in a ‘syntactic inventory’ or ‘syntactic lexicon’ and which as partial structures are combined to form sentence structures based on the universal structures. Hence, those lexical items of a language form a syntactic category which can occupy the same positions in the sentence structures of this language. As shown in section 9.4.4 however, it is not always clear how lexical items are inserted into these structures. In the lexicon the items are semantically described as logical structures, which form the basis for the semantic representation of sentences. Following general principles and speciWc rules, a bidirectional linking system then accounts

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for the linking of explicitly speciWed arguments of the semantic representation and syntactic arguments of the corresponding syntactic sentence structure. What is unclear is how items which are not explicitly speciWed as arguments – operators or modifying adjectives and adverbs, for instance – are assigned their appropriate positions. It is also unclear how the diVerent syntactic positions of inXected and uninXected verbs are dealt with, since it is not at all clear where morphological properties, especially inXectional properties, are described in this grammar. The relevance of this kind of speciWcation for the syntactic categorization of linguistic items is especially evident in approaches like HPSG (cf. chapter 6), which are concerned with the description of particular languages in their entirety. Like Himmelmann, Baker, and Borer, Van Valin (2008) also defends the view that linguistic items are syntactically categorized in the syntax rather than in the lexicon. What is, however, unclear here is how lexical items not speciWed for syntactically relevant properties in the lexicon are assigned their appropriate positions in sentence structures. This includes the question of how they are prevented from occurring in positions that are inappropriate. Nevertheless, Van Valin’s discussion provides important insights and draws attention to languages which have so far received little attention and in which the syntactic categorization of linguistic items seems to diVer from that of Indo-European languages. In order to achieve a deeper understanding of these diVerences, however, more comprehensive investigations of these languages are needed which provide a broader language-particular analysis of lexical items and their properties and of syntactic sentence structures. But, this seems not to belong to the tradition of language typology, which focuses on comparative investigations of parts of the grammar of as many languages as possible.

10 Syntactic categories and parts of speech Two types of linguistic categorization

10.1 Syntactic categories in linguistic theories: results and conclusions It has been the primary aim of this book to provide an overview of how syntactic categories are identiWed and described in various linguistic theories. According to the deWnition developed in the introduction, syntactic categories are sets of items in a language that can assume the same positions in the syntactic structures of the sentences of this language. It was therefore necessary to at least outline the essential properties of the grammatical model introduced by each theory considered in order to gain insight into how sentence structures are constructed and on what basis linguistic items are assigned their positions. Only then was it possible to state what syntactic categories are identiWed and what means are employed to describe them. The results are summarized and discussed below, paying special attention to observable developments. Following this, section 10.2 will be concerned with the special nature of the traditional parts of speech and will oVer an explanation for their omnipresence in linguistic analyses. Since parts of speech, the oldest and most widespread approach to linguistic categorization, are often equated with syntactic categories, chapter 2 started by taking a closer look at the Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ of Dionysius Thrax, which presents the Wrst known and hence the traditional description of parts of speech. This chapter showed that parts of speech are identiWed and described not on the basis of syntactic properties but above all on the rich morphological properties of classical Greek, and that if these properties are not suYcient, preference is given to semantic properties. Chapter 2 also discussed another Greek

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tradition that goes back to Plato and Aristotle and saw its heyday in the Port Royal grammar of the seventeenth century. This grammar focuses on languages in general rather than on any individual language and considers language primarily as an expression of thought. In this context, parts of speech are identiWed and described on an exclusively semantic basis, with syntactic aspects playing no role. Nevertheless, both traditions have inXuenced the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories in subsequent linguistic theories. This claim applies least to American Structuralism. As was shown in chapter 3, Harris (esp. 1951) and Fries (1952) as representatives of this approach identiWed syntactic categories as distribution classes, employing substitution tests and excluding semantic properties of the items analysed. Both describe syntactic categories exclusively on the basis of their syntactic environments and independently of any inherent properties of the members of these categories. However, neither Harris nor Fries formulate any explicit syntactic rules. In view of later developments, a prominent characteristic of Fries’s approach is his distinction between four classes of ‘parts of speech’ and Wfteen groups of ‘function words’, the former exhibiting an analogy with nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. A prominent characteristic of Harris’s approach is his analysis of morphemes and morpheme sequences which combine to give hierarchical sentence structures such that his description of morpheme classes and morpheme-sequence classes implicitly supplies instructions for building sentence structures bottom-up. This approach can be reversed to give a top-down analysis. Both Harris’s and Fries’s analyses refer to surface structures or surface phenomena, and the syntactic categories identiWed may thus diVer from language to language. Chapter 3 pointed out that in both approaches there are discrepancies between theoretical claims and practical analysis in that the identiWcation of syntactic categories was not always based on distribution alone but included recourse to the familiar traditional parts of speech. Chapter 4 turned to the Wrst model of transformational Generative Grammar (Chomsky 1957) and identiWed shared features and diVerences with regard to Harris’s approach. Following Harris’s implicit instructions, Chomsky’s model provides an explicit system of rules which generates sentence structures top-down. A distinction is made, however, between underlying structures, generated by phrase-structure rules, and surface structures, which are derived from the underlying structures by means of transformational rules. Phrase-structure rules

syntactic categories and parts of speech

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include rules that insert lexical items in terminal positions of underlying structures under category labels such as N, V, A, T, etc. As in Harris’s approach, the syntactic category membership of lexical items is determined solely by their categorial environments, which here are described by the interaction of phrase-structure rules and transformational rules. The properties of the items themselves are of no relevance. This changed in Chomsky’s 1965 Standard Theory, where phrasestructure rules and the lexicon are treated as separate components, the lexicon being a list of lexical entries that specify each lexical item not only for a category label like N or V, but also for subcategorizing syntactic properties and, at least theoretically, also for semantic properties. The subcategorizing syntactic properties include context-free subcategorizations of members of the category N (e.g. [+Abstract]) as well as two types of context-sensitive subcategorizations: strict subcategorizations (e.g. [þDet—], [þ—NP]) and selectional restrictions for members of the category V (e.g. þ[þAbstract], Aux — Det [þAnimate]). Thus, although syntactic categories are again described on the basis of their syntactic environments, this description is now more restrictive, and lexical items do not just happen to occur in certain environments as these environments are co-determined by the lexically speciWed properties of items. The description of syntactic categories in the Standard Theory is based on the interaction of lexically speciWed syntactic properties of lexical items with phrasestructure rules at the level of underlying structure, and on interaction with the transformational rules at the level of surface structure. The speciWcations of context-free subcategorizations of nouns and context-sensitive selectional restrictions of verbs reveal that semantic properties are also part of the description of syntactic categories if they are considered syntactically relevant. Chomsky even explicitly refers to semantic aspects for the a priori identiWcation of the ‘major categories’ introduced by the phrase-structure rules, stating that these categories may ‘ultimately refer to semantic concepts’ (1965: 117). The Standard Theory diVers in this respect from the approaches by Harris and Fries as well as from Chomsky’s 1957 model, and these semantic considerations reveal a parallel to the Port Royal grammar in that the categories introduced by the phrase-structure rules are given the status of substantive universals. Yet it is especially here that the design of the Standard Theory turned out to be problematic, since universality is postulated for deep structures, which includes categories, and since

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lexical insertion takes place at deep structure level, there is no way to describe language-speciWc categories. This results in the paradoxical situation that the categories introduced at deep structure must be universal and language-speciWc at the same time. This problem does not recur in subsequent theories such as the PPT, discussed in chapter 5. The PPT has set the standard for other theories in crucial aspects, one of these relating to the insight that lexically speciWed properties of linguistic items are more important for constructing sentences than previously assumed. Consequently, sentence structures are no longer generated top-down by phrase-structure rules, but rather bottom-up, based on properties of lexical items. In the PPT, this process is controlled and at the same time restricted by the interaction of modularized universal principles which are parameterized for individual languages and which access particular lexical properties. Dispensing with phrase-structure rules means that a priori identiWcation of the categories introduced by these rules is no longer needed. Likewise, universality is no longer postulated for syntactic categories but instead for the features that combine to form them. In addition, category formation, which is now a matter of individual languages, is of secondary importance. What is important is the speciWcation of individual lexical items for syntactically relevant features and feature combinations. Items that share such features or feature combinations form a syntactic category. Another crucial aspect introduced in the framework of the PPT and concerning the description of syntactic categories refers to the distinction between lexical and functional categories, which is reminiscent of Fries’s distinction between parts of speech and function words yet diVerent in nature. Similar to Fries’s four classes of parts of speech, four lexical categories, N, V, A, and P, are identiWed. However, these are coextensive neither with Fries’s classes nor with the traditional parts of speech that bear the same labels, i.e. noun, verb, adjective, and preposition. They diVer essentially from Fries’s parts of speech in that they are described by means of syntactically relevant feature combinations, including inherent categorial features and argument structures which have a speciWc referential argument. Another fundamental diVerence is that a relationship of mutual dependence is identiWed between lexical and functional categories, which is described by licensing particular functional categories as extended projections of particular lexical categories. In the variant of the PPT inXuenced by Higginbotham, this licensing is based on semantic properties by describing members of


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functional categories as operators that bind the referential argument in the argument structure of members of lexical categories. However, in the MP, the successor to the PPT, it is described in terms of corresponding morphosyntactic features that are subject to feature checking. In contrast to Fries’s function words, the functional categories of both the PPT and the MP can be realized diVerently cross-linguistically and language-internally, i.e. as aYxes, as aYx fusions, or as syntactically autonomous items. In principle, the essential innovations of the PPT regarding the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories are reXected not only in the MP, but also in HPSG and LFG, as well as in Anderson’s Localist Case Grammar and, to a certain extent, even in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (chapters 6 to 8). This concerns both the assumption that lexically speciWed sets of features form the basis for building sentence structures, ultimately constructed bottom-up by the interaction of principles or schemas or rules of the grammar, and the distinction between lexical and functional categories as well as the description or characterization of the relationships between these. Nevertheless, as can be expected, since diVerent models of grammar are based on diVerent conceptual designs, the features and thus the feature combinations considered relevant and the syntactic or grammatical principles, schemas, or rules vary. Moreover, the models of grammar diVer concerning the type and number of the lexical and functional categories identiWed. This as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaches has been discussed in suYcient detail in the preceding chapters (cf. sections 5.7, 6.6, 7.5, 8.5). Thus, in linguistic theories syntactic categories are generally identiWed and deWned on the basis of lexically speciWed sets of features that interact with principles, schemas, or rules of the syntax. Lexical items that exhibit the same syntactically relevant feature combinations form a syntactic category. These feature combinations consist of various inherent and contextual features that include referential properties, argument structures and their realizations, as well as a complete speciWcation of the morphosyntactic properties of members of lexical categories, and the particular properties of members of functional categories. Consequently, lexical categories such as V do not simultaneously represent syntactic categories. Depending, among other factors, on their argument structures and their realizations, the members of a lexical category belong to sets of distinct syntactic categories. Nor does

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the distinction between lexical and functional categories mean that the description of syntactic categories is restricted to members of one of these. Combinations and/or reductions of feature representations may describe items that simultaneously exhibit properties of two lexical categories, thus forming so-called ‘mixed categories’ (Lefebvre and Muysken 1988) or ‘squishes’ (e.g. Ross 1972), and items that exhibit properties of both lexical and functional categories can be considered ‘semi-lexical categories’ (e.g. Corver and van Riemsdijk 2001) or grammaticalizations in the sense of Lehmann (e.g. 1985). Moreover, items that share the phonetic form and some semantic properties of particular lexical categories but not their syntactic properties, thus being ‘defective’ according to Ross (e.g. 1995), can be described as distinct syntactic categories that are derived via feature reduction. Categories like these have been subject to feature-based descriptions in various approaches. As shown in section 8.2.2, Anderson describes intermediate categories, alias ‘mixed categories’, that are located between the lexical categories V and N, V and A, or A and P in his Case Grammar. Descriptions of categories that exhibit partly verbal and partly nominal properties are analysed and discussed by Bresnan (1997) within the framework of LFG, and by Spencer (1999) and Malouf (2000) with reference to the PPT and HPSG respectively. A feature-based description of categories which exhibit properties of a lexical category (lexical prepositions) on the one hand and properties of functional categories (case forms) on the other is presented by Rauh (e.g. 1997a, 2002a) within the framework of the PPT. In the same framework, the grammaticalization of main verbs as modal verbs, as characterized for instance by Bybee and Pagliuca (1987), can likewise be described on the basis of feature representations, grammaticalization resulting in a loss of argument structure, including loss of the referential argument. The categorial properties of forms that Ross calls ‘defective’ can be described in a similar vein. If, for example, an item shares its phonetic representation and some semantic properties with another item that is classiWed as a member of the lexical category N but does not license determiners or modiWers, this can be explained by the absence of a referential argument in the feature representation of this item. Accordingly, this item is not used referentially. This is the case with the nominal forms in expressions like on duty, in addition, in view of, which can develop into simple lexical units, such as instead or outside.


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This discussion shows again that syntactic categories and the traditional parts of speech represent two fundamentally distinct types of categorization. Many forms that have diVerent syntactic properties but are either assigned to the same part of speech or whose assignment to any part of speech is problematic, represent distinct syntactic categories. Consequently, the set of syntactic categories by far exceeds the set of the traditional parts of speech. It is furthermore evident that for the identiWcation and description of syntactic categories a theory of language is required that provides syntactically relevant feature representations for lexical items and a syntax that constructs sentences on the basis of an interaction of principles, schemas, or rules with these feature representations. The discussion in chapter 9, focusing on approaches to categorization in language typology, showed that the view of syntactic categories summarized above is not shared by all linguists. Those of the approaches considered in this chapter which are indeed concerned with syntactic categories and which do not simply try to identify the traditional parts of speech cross-linguistically, predominantly see syntactic categorization as independent of lexical properties and as taking place only in the syntax. In general, this means that syntactically neutral items are inserted into slots in syntactic sentence structures and only then yield syntactic categories. This view is defended by Baker (2003), Borer (2003, 2005a,b), Himmelmann (2008), and Van Valin (2008), even though in diVerent ways and to diVerent extents, and in the context of very diVerent theoretical frameworks. An evaluation of the appropriateness of this view, however, requires clariWcation of several points. First, it must be clariWed how the syntactic structures are created whose slots determine the syntactic category of lexical items. Second, it must be clariWed which properties lexical items are speciWed for in the lexicon and whether these are really independent of syntactic facts. And Wnally, if there is no syntactic categorization in the lexicon, it must be clariWed whether all the items of a language are syntactically categorized and assigned their appropriate positions. The discussion in chapter 9, especially in section 9.5, has shown that here many questions remain unanswered. As far as the suggestions by Baker and Himmelmann are concerned, these are above all questions concerning the construction of sentence structures into which lexical items unspeciWed for syntactic properties are inserted. Although this aspect is clariWed in the approaches of Borer and Van Valin, Borer does not explain how and where items which are neither unambiguously

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functional nor unambiguously lexical receive their position in sentence structures, and Van Valin does not show how lexical items, for the most part represented as logical structures, are assigned their appropriate positions in sentence structures. Nevertheless, it is especially these approaches which should encourage linguists to reconsider the interface between the lexicon and syntax. 10.2 Parts of speech as cognitive lexical categories Chapter 2 showed that the identiWcation and description of the traditional parts of speech was based on morphological and semantic properties, excluding syntactic properties. This disqualiWes them as syntactic categories. The American Structuralists’ criticism of the traditional parts of speech, as discussed in chapter 3, also suggests that the basis for categorization is problematic, as criteria assumed for particular parts of speech such as ‘may be speciWed for plural’ or ‘designates a person, place, or thing’ for nouns, are appropriate for some members of a part of speech but not for all of them. However, the discussion of category structures in section 8.6 has shown that there are two ways in which categories can be formed. Category membership can be determined either on the basis of a Wxed set of criterial features or on the basis of family resemblances to a prototype. Thus, though the traditional parts of speech do not satisfy the conditions for the Wrst type of category, they seem to satisfy those for the second type. Quite naturally it has therefore recently been successfully argued that not only the traditional parts of speech of ancient Greece but also their almost identical modern-day successors are categories with a prototypical structure (cf. sections 8.6 and 9.2.1). Since syntactic categories are necessarily categories of the Wrst type (cf. section 8.6), this is further evidence of the fact that parts of speech cannot be syntactic categories. Although this is the case, the preceding chapters have shown that divergent approaches refer to the familiar parts of speech, even in those cases where syntactic categories are the explicit concern. This raises the question of what role parts of speech play in linguistic categorization and what their status is if linguists cannot do without them. The answer given here, as already in Rauh (2000, 2002b,c), is this: parts of speech not only have a prototypical structure like the cognitive categories investigated by Rosch (cf. section 8.6) but are cognitive categories. This claim is supported by the analogy, given in the following, between the characterization of cognitive categories as


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presented in the works of Rosch and her team and the properties of parts of speech. It must Wrst be emphasized that the investigations of the cognitive psychologist Rosch and her team, which yielded the insights concerning possible category structures presented in section 8.6, served the development of a psychological theory of the human categorization of the real world. Therefore the object of interest was not only the nature of cognitive categories but also the basis for their development and an explanation of their particular structure. Essential aspects of the Wndings of the researchers presented in various publications (e.g. Rosch 1977a,b, 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Mervis 1980) can be summarized as follows: the basis for human categorization of the real world is perception. Salient properties or combinations of properties, including colour, form, and function, identify entities as potential prototypes of categories to which other entities are related via family resemblances. The development of cognitive categories is supported by language in that acquiring knowledge concerning the use of category names such as chair and stool is equivalent to acquiring knowledge about the extension of the categories. Once established, cognitive categories are represented by best or prototypical, average, and poor examples, which are related to one another by greater or lesser family resemblances. The boundaries of cognitive categories are fuzzy, and poor examples of two adjoining categories could be considered members of either category. The categories are identiWed as distinct units mainly on the basis of their prototypes, which unite the properties representative of the category. Cognitive categories form hierarchically ordered systems with three levels. The intermediate level is the basic level at which categories like CHAIR and APPLE are located. Relevant categories of the superordinate level are FURNITURE and FRUIT, and KITCHEN CHAIR and GOLDEN DELICIOUS are examples of categories of the subordinate level. The development and representation of cognitive categories is part of human information processing and serves the structuring of the natural and material environment of human beings. Their prototypical structure makes it possible for two opposing cognitive principles to be satisWed, the principle of cognitive economy and the principle of maximum information. By establishing categories around prototypes, the number of categories is relatively small, which satisWes the principle of cognitive economy. By determining category membership of numerous items on the basis of family resemblances, the amount of information about individual items is

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relatively large, which satisWes the principle of maximum information. DiVerent cultural and natural environments lead to the development and representation of diVerent cognitive categories, which are therefore culture-dependent. Turning now to the traditional parts of speech, the same statements can be made. Originally, the traditional parts of speech were identiWed on the basis of perceived salient properties and combinations of properties, namely the rich inXection of Greek words, supplemented by properties concerning their function, i.e. their meaning. The set of words assigned to a part of speech included and includes words which, as its prototype, unite the properties representative of this part of speech as well as words which share only some of these properties and are related to the prototype or to other representatives of the category via family resemblances. Language plays an important role in acquiring knowledge about a part of speech and thus in its development as a cognitive category. This is particularly evident for the part of speech adverb, whose extension is established simply by the use of the term ‘adverb’. Parts of speech have fuzzy boundaries with smooth transitions. Words located at the boundary of two adjoining parts of speech can show family resemblances to both, justifying membership of either or both parts of speech. Gerunds, for example, exhibit properties of both nouns and verbs, and participles exhibit properties of verbs and adjectives. Parts of speech are perceived as distinct units on the basis of their prototypes, which unite most of the representative properties. In the case of nouns, these are items that can be speciWed for plural and that designate a person, place, or thing, and in the case of verbs these are items that can be speciWed for tense and that designate an activity. The domain of parts of speech is hierarchically organized in three levels. The intermediate ‘basic’ level contains categories like NOUN and VERB, which are included in the superordinate category PART OF SPEECH, and which in turn include subordinate categories such as MASS NOUN and ACTIVITY VERB. The development and cognitive representation of parts of speech serves to structure the vocabulary of languages, which – like the natural and material domains investigated by Rosch et al. – is part of the environment of those human beings who deal with language not only as a means of communication. Like the development of cognitive categories structuring the domain of plants by categorizing items of this domain in biology classes, cognitive categories are developed in language classes which structure the domain


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of the vocabulary of languages by categorizing items of this domain. And here too the prototypical structure of categories satisWes the two opposing cognitive principles, the principle of cognitive economy and the principle of maximal information. By categorizing words into parts of speech the quasi inWnite vocabulary of languages is partitioned into manageable and thus learnable portions, each consisting of numerous items that are related by family resemblances. That these manageable portions amount to more or less eight parts of speech is particularly instructive in the light of investigations by Miller (1956). Miller was concerned with the question of whether the magic number seven, occurring again and again in fairy tales, myths, and other contexts (e.g. seven dwarfs, seas, wonders of the world, deadly sins, days of the week), is related to human information processing. His results suggest that it is roughly this number of objects – more speciWcally plus or minus two – which humans can remember and represent in their minds without diYculty. Since the number of parts of speech generally identiWed is within this range, this is further evidence for the claim that they represent cognitive categories. And Wnally, like the cognitive categories investigated by Rosch et al., the parts of speech are culture-dependent. The formation of these cognitive categories is based on properties of Greek, which set the standards and which are more or less identiWable in the European languages described according to traditional grammar. If the parts of speech had originally been described with respect to languages like Tagalog, the result would have been completely diVerent. In conclusion, it can be said that parts of speech represent cognitive categories developed in a particular cultural area during the course of general education. They give a pre-scientiWc structuring of the lexical inventory of languages in that they unite words with family resemblances to form categories. In this sense they are lexical categories. Given this characterization, the pervasive use of the parts of speech in linguistic analyses can be explained. They form an intersubjective and, because of their cognitive representation, inescapable basis for the categorizations of words by language experts, irrespective of the purpose of categorization and irrespective of diverging preferences and beliefs concerning the properties of grammatical models. This has advantages but also severe disadvantages. It is an advantage in that communication concerning the categorization of words is or at least seems possible across theories. If, following the example of Fries (cf. section 3.4), each approach introduced new terms, then this kind

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of communication would be utterly impossible. One of the disadvantages is the fact that as a consequence of diVerent expert knowledge and depending on whether the intended categorization is syntactic or lexical, the categories representing parts of speech are restructured and reanalysed with the result that the same names refer to diVerent things. One example is the category preposition in the PPT, which diVers from the part of speech preposition by including subsets of traditional adverbs and conjunctions. This causes misunderstandings, including misunderstandings concerning the kind of categorization as syntactic or lexical. Another disadvantage is the categorization of the words of non-European languages with reference to the parts of speech, whose properties are derived from European languages. Thus, Schachter’s method of cross-linguistic identiWcations of parts of speech (cf. section 9.2.1) is comprehensible but problematic. No less problematic, however, is Croft’s suggestion that the unmarked combinations of pragmatic functions and lexical semantic classes ‘reference to an object’, ‘modiWcation by a property’, and ‘predication of an action’ be deWned as the parts of speech noun, adjective, and verb, respectively (cf. section 9.2.2), since what is involved here is not only a categorization of words. Not least because of inconsistencies like these, it is absolutely essential in linguistics – as in other sciences – that any categorization must Wrst clarify what its basis is and what purpose it is to serve, and that it must beware of simply taking over, without careful consideration, traditional categorizations such as the parts of speech. Evidence for these insights is one of the results of this book.

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Author Index Aaronson, D. 3 Abney, S. T. 103–5, 113–4, 116, 301, 307–8 Adger, D. 130 n. 29, 132–3, 135 n. 31, 137, 145 Alexander, L. G. 13 Anderson, J. M. 3, 12, 208, 210, 213, 263, 264–321, 338–40, 345, 357, 393, 394 Aoun, Y. 97–8, 210 Apollonius Dyscolus 15 n. 5, 17, 21, 21 n. 12 Arens, H. 20, 25 n. 17 Aristarchus 15 Aristotle 25, 204, 313 n. 23, 369, 390 Armon-Lotem, S. 130 n. 29 Arms, D. G. 74 Arnauld, A. 11, 25 Askedal, J. O. 255 n. 16 Auroux, S. 24 n. 15 Bach, E. 74 Baker, M. C. 94 n. 10, 123, 208 n. 2, 340–2, 384–6, 388, 395 Barwise, J. 153, 269 n. 9 Bates, E. 207 Becker, A. L. 74 Belletti, A. 123–4 Bender, E. M. 153 Bergenholtz, B. 52, 210 Bever, T. G. 151 Bickel, B. 323 Blank, D. L. 21 n. 12 Bloch, B. 33, 37, 39–40, 51, 210 Bloomfield, L. 2–3, 33, 35–41, 47 n. 20, 51, 57 n. 8, 210 Boas, F. 4, 31, 33–6, 52 Bobaljik, J. 130 n. 29, 131 n. 30, 139 Borer, H. 341–4, 383–8, 396 Bresnan, J. 11, 83, 150–69, 196, 198, 301, 394 Breul, C. 148 n. 29 Brody, M. 130 n. 29 Bybee, J. 394 Carrier, J. 312 n. 22 Chafe, W. L. 214

Chomsky, N. 2, 3, 11, 13, 25 n. 19, 45–6, 54–74, 76–81, 82–96, 111, 115–6, 123–4, 128–39, 145, 148, 150, 162–3, 206–8, 214, 235, 264, 266, 280, 301, 315, 324, 345–6, 390–1 Chomsky, W. 54 n. 2 Cinque, G. 106, 112, 124–5, 127, 136, 138, 140, 142, 143 Collins, C. 130 n. 29, 133, 144 n. 40 Comrie, B. 323 Cook, W. A. 266 n. 5 Corver, N. 105, 116, 394 Croft, W. 4, 5, 13, 52, 207, 208 n. 2, 209, 213, 215, 323–4, 333–40, 400 Cruse, D. A. 215 Davidson, D. 100 n. 15, 115 Davidson, T. 16–9 Di Benedetto, V. 14 n. 2 Diez, F. C. 21–4, 28–9 Dik, S. C. 12, 13, 208, 213, 324, 345–52, 356–8, 383, 387 Dionysius Thrax 10, 14–20, 209, 332, 389 Dirven, R. 215 Downing, B. T. 323 Dowty, D. 211 n. 3, 369 Emeneau, M. B. 33 n. 3 Emonds, J. 5, 14, 79, 82, 95 n. 12, 96, 101, 105, 164, 210 Erbse, H. 14 n. 2 Ernst, T. 149, 262 Evans, N. 215, 329–30, 333 Fanselow, G. 96, 97 Felix, S. W. 96, 97 Ferres, S. 3 Fiengo, R. 83 Fillmore, C. J. 6, 72–5, 78, 80, 207, 208, 214, 264–266, 283, 284, 291, 313, 336 n. 4 Fodor, J. A. 67 n. 14, 86 n. 2, 151, 315 Foley, W. A. 12, 125 n. 27, 208, 324, 358, 387 Fought, J. G. 33 n. 3, 36 n. 7, 40 n. 11 Francis, W. N. 37–8, 41 n. 12, 51, 210

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Frede, M. 14 n. 2, 17 n. 8, 25 n. 18 Fries, C. C. 11, 33, 40, 44–46, 47, 49, 50, 78, 143, 209, 391, 392, 393, 394, 400 Fukui, N. 111 Gaifman, H. 265 Garrett, M. F. 151 Gazdar, G. 83, 150–2, 184 n. 15 Geeraerts, D. 215 Geis, M. L. 74 Gil, D. 337–8 Gipper, H. 315 Giusti, G. 105 Givoń, T. 6 Gleason, H. A. 4–6, 29, 51, 211 Goldberg, A. 336 n. 4 Green, M. 215 Greenberg, J. H. 322–3, 358 Grimshaw, J. 105, 107–8, 113–4, 119, 140–1, 145, 162, 312 Groat, E. 131 n. 30 Gruber, J. S. 266 n. 4, 283 Gue´ron, J. 3, 112 n. 21, 142 n. 37 Haeberli, E. 130 n. 29, 131 n. 30 Haegeman, L. 3, 106, 111, 112 n. 21, 142 n. 37 Hale, K. 342 Halle, M. 315 Hankamer, J. 212 Harley, H. 342 Harris, Z. S. 11, 33–4, 37–55, 60–1, 63–4, 68–9, 76–7, 80, 93, 148, 199, 327, 390–1 Haspelmath, M. 2–4, 7, 324, 339 Haugen, E. 41 n. 12 Haumann, D. 105, 119, 263 Hawkins, J. A. 322 Hays, D. G. 265 Hengeveld, K. 13, 331, 345, 357–8 Heringer, H. J. 265 Higginbotham, J. 100 n. 15, 114–6, 149, 202, 204, 392 Hill, A. A. 33, 37–8 Himmelmann 343–4, 379, 381, 384–8, 395 Hockett, C. F. 33, 38–9, 52, 210 Hoekstra, T. 345 Holmberg, A. 133 Hopper, P. J. 5, 330, 340 Huddleston, R. 13, 307 Huybregts, R. 152 Ingram, D. 323

Jackendoff, R. S. 82–3, 94–9, 101, 163, 210, 212–3, 301 Jacobsen, W. H. 327 Jaeggli, O. A. 312 Jakobson, R. 70 Jolly, J. 301 Joos, M. 33, 41 n. 12 Kaplan, R. M. 83, 150–2, 156 Katz, J. 67 n. 14, 315 Kay, P. 336 n. 4 Kayne, R. 130, 206, 230 Keenan, E. L. 79, 323 Kemp, A. 16 n. 6, 17 n. 8, 18 n. 9 Keyser, S. J. 342 Klein, E. 151 Kluckhohn, C. 34 n. 4 Koizumi, M. 139 Koopman, H. 105, 109, 126 Kratzer, A. 133 Kraus, M. 25 n. 16 Laenzlinger, C. 112, 263 Lakoff, G. 6, 73–6, 93, 207, 214, 268, 313, 315–9 Lambrecht, K. 368 Lancelot, C. 11, 25–7 Langacker, R. W. 12, 13, 208, 210, 212–68, 306, 263 n. 14, 312–3, 317–8, 320–1, 336, 345, 393 LaPolla, R. 12, 324, 358–60, 365–6, 369–70, 372, 374–5, 379 Lasnik, H. 83, 85, 87 n. 3, 90, 95 Lees, R. B. 57 n. 8 Lefebvre, C. 147, 394 Lehmann, C. 147, 323, 394 Lersch, L. 24 n. 15, 25 n. 16 Lo¨bel, E. 105 Lyons, J. 2–3, 5, 210–3 Malouf, R. 200, 394 Marantz, A. 342 Ma¨tzner, E. 22–4, 28–9 McCawley, J. D. 73, 74, 76, 207 Mehler, J. 74 n. 21 Mervis, C. B. 6, 204, 268, 314–5, 397 Miller, G. A. 399 Murray, S. O. 36 n. 6 Muysken, P. 102, 112, 142, 147, 394 Nash, L. 130 n. 29, 139 Newmeyer, F. J. 54–5, 67 n. 14, 207–8, 313, 317–8

author index Nichols, J. 323 Nida, E. A. 315 Noyer, R. 342 O’Neil, E. 131 n. 30 Ouhalla, J. 106, 140 Pagliuca, W. 394 Partee, B. 211 n. 3 Payne, J. R. 323 Perlmutter, D. M. 83 Perry, J. 153, 269 n. 9 Peters, P. S. 79 Pfeiffer, R. 15 n. 3–5 Picallo, M.-C. 126 Plato 17, 25, 204, 390 Pollard, C. 11, 83, 152–3, 169–72, 178, 184, 186–7, 194, 198, 199 Pollock, J. K. 106, 120–4, 135, 137–8 Postal, P. 67 n. 14, 74 Priscianus 20–1 Prufer, O. 34 n. 4 Pullum, G. K. 13, 150, 151, 184 n. 15 Pustejovsky, J. 149, 372 Quintilian 17 n. 8 Quirk, R. 13 Radden, G. 215 Radford, A. 3, 13, 96, 97, 99, 101, 139 Ramat, P. 144 Randall, J. 312 n. 22 Raposo, E. 103 n. 16 Rauh, G. 74 n. 20, 94 n. 9, 95, 105, 118–9, 126–7, 144, 147, 262, 265 n. 1–2, 269, 301, 302, 310–1, 394, 396 Remnius Palaemon 20 Reuland, E. 98 n. 14 Rieux, J. 26, 27 Ritchie, R. W. 79 Ritter, E. 105, 126 Rizzi, L. 89, 106, 111, 124 Robins, R. H. 14 n. 2, 24 n. 15, 25 n. 16 Rollin, B. E. 26, 27 Rosch, E. 6, 204, 268, 312, 314–5, 396–9 Ross, J. R. 73–4, 82, 147, 207, 272, 315–8, 394 Rouveret, A. 97, 130 n. 29, 139 Sag, I. A. 11, 83, 151–3, 169–87, 189 n. 19, 190, 194–5, 198 n. 22, 199, 212 Sampson, G. 33 n. 2, 36 n. 7, 54

427

Sapir, E. 33, 35 n. 5 Sasse, H.-J. 2, 4, 332, 339 Saussure, F. de 31 n. 1, 170 Schachter, P. 325–31, 333 Schaeder, B. 52, 210 Schmitter, P. 25 n. 16 Shieber, S. 152 Skinner, B. F. 56 n. 6 Smith, H. L. 33, 37–8 Spencer, A. 117 n. 25, 144, 394 Sportiche, D. 109, 111 Steinthal, H. 24 n. 15 Stowell, T. A. 96–7 Swadesh, M. 327 Szabolcsi, A. 104 Taylor, D. J. 17 n. 7, 19 n. 11, 24 n. 15 Taylor, J. R. 6–7, 215, 216 n. 8, 268, 313, 317–9 Tenny, C. 149 Thompson, S. A. 5, 323, 330, 340 Thraıńsson, H. 140 Trager, G. L. 33, 37–40, 51, 210 Tsiapera, M. 25 n. 19 Uriagereka, J. 130 n. 29 van Gelderen, E. 106, 140 van Hout, A. 342 van Riemsdijk, H. 97–8, 102, 107, 112, 117, 394 Van Valin, Jr., R. D. 12, 125 n. 27, 207–8, 324, 262 n. 2, 324, 358–84, 387–8, 395–6 Varro 17 n. 7, 19 n. 11, 22 n. 14 Vendler, Z. 369 Vergnaud, J. R. 97 Wasow, T. 153 Wells, R. S. 33, 40 Wheeler, G. 25 n. 19 Wierzbicka, A. 13, 328–9, 333 Williams, E. 115, 211 n. 3 Wissowa, G. 21 n. 12 Wittgenstein, L. 6, 204, 268, 313–5 Wouters, A. 14 n. 2 Wunderlich, D. 3, 339 n. 5 Zanuttini, R. 111 Zimmermann, J. 14, 98, 100–2 Zwarts, J. 94 n. 10, 105, 115 n. 24, 116–7, 126, 149, 310, 357

Subject Index Abs rule 290–1 Actor-Undergoer Hierarchy 375 adequacy descriptive adequacy 59, 69, 346 explanatory adequacy 59 n. 9, 69, 202 observational adequacy 59 n. 9 pragmatical adequacy 346 psychological adequacy 346 typological adequacy 359 Adv-Criterion 112 agreement Head-Complement Agreement 137 Head-Head Agreement 90, 129, 135, 137 object agreement 123, 140 Spec-Head Agreement 90, 111, 126, 129, 135, 137–9 strong/weak agreement 122 subject agreement 123 Alexandrians 15, 25 n. 18 Ancient /classical Greek 15–6, 209, 389–90, 396 argument core argument 158, 361, 367, 371, 376 external argument 109–10, 115 n. 24, 116, 133, 188, 189, 280 internal argument 87, 107–10, 118–9, 133, 183, 245 noncore argument 158 optional argument 364 referential argument 115–20, 144, 149, 204, 310–1, 386, 392–4 syntactic argument 144, 189, 375–6, 380, 388 argument position 88, 244, 341, 370–1, 375–6 Argument Realization Principle 177, 185 argument structure 108, 115–9, 127, 132–3, 141, 172, 175, 177, 183, 188–9, 193–4, 202, 204, 271, 302, 348, 393–4 a-structure, see levels of representation Aristotelian structure, see category structure Ars Grammaticae 20 articulatory-perceptual system 131, 215

atemporal relation(s) 224–6, 228, 240–4, 246–9, 252, 261–2 atomic syntactic primitives 336 attribute concatenation 172, 173 attribute-value pairs 159, 165, 169–70, 176, 191–3, 195, 202 autonomy autonomy of morphology/semantics/ syntax 29, 206, 215, 346, 359 conceptual autonomy 230 base component 64, 71–5, 78–9 and category reduction 73–4 billiard ball model 233 Binary Principle 130, 206, 230 binding theory 87, 90–1, 128, 130 Principle A, B, C 91 bounding theory 87, 89, 130 bounding nodes 89 canonical event model 233–4, 244, 254 canonical structural realization 87, 108 Case Grammar 74–5, 79, 82, 207–8, 214, 264–6, 279, 283, 285, 288, 291, 298, 303, 339, 394 case relation(s) 266, 283 deep (structure) cases 72 n. 18, 74 n. 20, 283 Localist Case Grammar 12, 263–7, 279–98, 299, 301, 393 Case Theory 87–8, 90, 92, 108, 130, 136, 182–3, 202, 265 Case assignment 88, 98, 108–10, 120, 127, 178, 245 Case constraint (English) 177–8 Case feature 108, 111, 132, 136, 139, 145, 177, 283, 285–8 Case-filter 88, 90, 92 Case-marking 110 Case position 245 categorial continuum 272, 316, 319 Categorial Grammar 337 category or categories classical categories 317–8, 320 cognitive categories 6, 213, 261, 268, 314, 397–9

subject index conceptual categories 212–3, 320, 343 deep or d-structure categories 77, 80, 92, 161 empty categories 89–90, 135, 168, 215–6, 241 functional categories 72, 103–7, 111 n. 18, 111 n. 19, 113–7, 120–8, 138, 145, 156 n. 1, 189 n. 19, 202, 301, 308, 310, 339 n. 5, 344, 384 hierarchical order of 105, 113, 122, 124–5, 127, 145, 163, 386 in early Generative Grammar 72 in Lexical Functional Grammar 156 n. 1, 163, 166, 169 in Localist Case Grammar 301, 308 in the Minimalist Program 135 n. 32, 138, 202 in the Theory of Principles and Parameters 103–28, 189 n. 19, 202 grammatical categories 213 n. 5, 248, 250, 253, 256, 258–9, 317, 320, 335–6 basic grammatical categories 216–7, 224–5, 237, 250, 330 complex grammatical categories 257 non-basic grammatical categories 237, 250 intermediate categories 148, 272–4, 307, 338, 394 intermediate primary categories 271–4, 278, 319, 345 language particular/specific categories 52, 76, 80, 147, 161, 334, 335 lexical categories 2–3, 65–6, 94–6, 99, 103, 105, 107, 110, 114, 135 n. 32, 138, 203, 302–3, 307, 323–4, 338–9, 343–4, 349, 393–4 in early Generative Grammar 65–6 in Lexical Functional Grammar 162–5, 166–9 in the Minimalist Program 135 n. 32, 138, 202 in the Theory of Principles and Parameters 94–5, 105–7, 110, 114, 202, 302–3, 394 logico-semantic categories 73–6 linguistic categories 4–7, 204, 313, 315, 317, 323–5, 339 major categories 68, 70, 72, 161, 161 n. 2, 334, 339, 391 n. 5

429

minor categories 84, 98, 99, 101, 161, 161 n. 2, 334, 339 n. 5 mixed categories 84, 147, 200, 394 morphological categories 3, 22, 28, 140, 329 non-lexical categories 68, 72, 103–5 ontological categories 211–2 predicate-logic categories 79 primary categories 269, 271–2, 274, 278, 289, 300–1, 303, 306–7, 319, 338, 345 prototypical categories 204, 268, 315–7, 370 proxy categories 139 secondary categories 273–6, 280, 282–3, 300–3, 306–7 semantic categories 24–5, 28, 72–3, 76, 79, 124, 148, 209–13, 223, 241, 248, 251–3, 257, 259 subordinate/superordinate categories 398 surface/s-structure categories 77–8, 80, 92, 161, 199 syntactic categories, definition 8 syntactic-semantic categories 76, 78 terminal categories 66, 196 underlying categories 73, 75–6, 357 universal categories 30, 71, 73, 80–1, 147, 161, 209 Category adjustment convention 298 categorial squishes 147, 200, 272, 316, 319, 394 category structure Aristotelian/classical category structure 5–6, 94 n. 9, 203, 313, 318, 320 network structure 320 passim prototypical category structure 6–7, 204, 268, 313–8, 330, 333–5, 340, 396–400 Checking Theory 132, 137, 145, 202 Chinese 124, 342, 385 n. 7, 386 Chomskyan revolution 54–6 class, open/closed 101, 105, 277, 301, 307, 326, 328, 333 Cognitive Grammar 12, 13, 206, 208, 213–64, 310, 393 Cognitive Linguistics 215, 315, 317 coheads 158, 167–9 Coherence Condition 159–60, 166, 197 Completeness Condition 159, 166 Completeness Constraint 376 computational system 87, 106, 129, 131–3, 136–7, 141, 145–7

430

subject index

concept, lexical/non-lexical 360, 368 conceptual archetype 233–5 conceptual-intentional system 131, 215 conceptualization 220–1, 230, 233–8, 241, 255 conceptual layering 240, 248, 254, 255 conceptual model 244 conceptual structure 212–3 condition of endocentricity 166, 168 connector 237, 242–3, 248–9, 261 constituency grammar 265, 279 constituency hierarchy 228–31, 251 constituent Constituent Ordering Principle 182, 353–4 constituent structure 154, 206, 248, 265, 298 immediate constituents 40, 45–6, 48, 62, 72, 265 construction(s) composite construction 225–6, 232 exocentric construction 232, 382 grammatical construction canonical grammatical construction 228–9 non-prototypical grammatical construction 231, 235–6 prototypical grammatical construction 228–30, 233, 251, 254, 256–7 Construction Grammar 336, 336 n. 4 Neo-Construction Grammar 336 n. 4, 341–2, 386 Radical Construction Grammar 324 , 336 contentive 74, 338 content word 301, 344–5, 384–5 continuum, see categorial continuum control theory 87–91, 130 controller 375–6 core, see also argument 360, 364–8, 371–3, 376–8, 381 core grammar 86 core predication, see predication corpus 37, 40, 42, 46, 49 c-structure, see levels of representation D-command 298 deductive method or theory 56, 58, 299, 384 deictic expressions 117, 302, 334 dependence/dependency conceptual dependence 228–9

dependence relation 230 dependency relation 272, 276, 289 dependency rules 256, 266 dependency structure 265, 276, 290, 298 long-distance dependency 184 word internal dependency 276 dependency grammar 265, 279, 299 discourse function 5, 157, 329–30, 333 distribution(al) class 11, 31, 33, 38, 40–1, 46, 49, 52, 56, 64, 68, 77, 328, 390 Dyirbal 364, 376, 378 economy 129, 135–6, 168–9, 290 cognitive economy 1, 397, 399 elaboration, see schematic network Empty Category Principle (ECP) 86–7, 89, 109, 124, 136 encyclopedia 342, 344, 387 endocentricity 82–3, 102, 157–8, 166, 168 epistemic model 247 e-site 244, 246, 248–9, 252, 254 Eurocentrism 338 Experiencer subjecthood condition 298 Extended Coherence Condition 159–60, 166, 197 extended projection 105–7, 113–28, 138, 142–6, 189, 202–4, 302, 386, 392 Extended Projection Principle (EPP) 87, 128, 142, 183 Extended Standard Theory 83–4 extension, see schematic network family resemblance(s) 6, 8, 204, 208, 314–5, 330, 396–9 f-descriptions 156 feature(s), see also properties Case feature, see Case Theory categorial feature 87, 96, 127, 132, 135, 137, 141–2, 144, 146, 149, 162–6, 311–2, 392 contextual feature 87, 147, 197, 329, 393 c-selection feature 133, 137, 142, 147 distinctive feature 94, 315 f-feature 111–2 w-feature 111, 132 formal feature 132–4, 136, 139, 144–6, 312 frame feature 283 functional feature 109 functor feature 282–4, 287–8, 303–5, 309–12

subject index head feature 184 n. 15, 190–2, 198 n. 22, 199–200 inherent feature 394 inheritance feature 176, 190 interpretable/uninterpretable feature 131–3, 135–7, 139, 149, 204 intrinsic feature 132, 145 lexical feature 184, 296 localistic feature 260 morphosyntactic feature 127, 135–7, 141, 144–5, 203, 393 notional feature 264–77, 306 operator feature 141–2 optional feature 132, 137, 139, 145, 146 n. 41 secondary feature 287, 305 strong/weak feature 122, 132, 135, 135 n. 32, 137–8, 140, 140 n. 34, 146 u-feature 141, 146 feature-based description/category representation 84, 96, 142, 147, 149, 169, 268 n. 7, 312, 394 feature representations 83, 95, 99, 107, 134, 143–6, 162–5, 169, 299, 319, 338–9, 394–5 feature structures 152, 165–6, 169–81, 183–201, 204 formal approach 207–8, 216, 218, 359 formatives 68, 342 form class 1, 3, 39–40, 46–7, 51–2, 210–1 form-meaning iconicity 233, 240 French 28, 120–2, 124, 135, 137–8, 140, 140 n. 34, 232 function(s) communicative function 359, 368 grammatical function 21, 71 n. 17, 154, 157–9, 167–8, 173, 291, 383 pragmatic function 333, 335, 347, 350–4, 400 primary function 330 prototypical function 348 semantic function 117, 213, 240, 248–9, 253, 348, 352, 355–7, 368, 373 syntactic function 22, 84, 161, 163, 196–8, 246, 325–6, 244, 328–9, 333, 347, 349, 352, 355 functional approach 207–8, 213, 324, 346, 358 Functional Grammar 12–3, 83, 208, 213, 324, 345–58, 359, 383, 387 functional schemata 156–8 function words 46–9, 301, 334, 384–5, 390–3

431

functor 98, 208, 270–4, 277–80, 282–3, 285, 287–8, 290, 292, 300–1, 305, 307–9, 311–2, 312, 338 Fund 346–8, 353, 356–7 GAP Principle 184–5, 188 Generalized Phases Structure Grammar (GPSG) 83, 150–3 Generative Grammar 11, 13, 45–6, 55 n. 4, 59–68, 71, 83, 96, 210, 235, 258, 324, 384, 390 early Generative Grammar 67–8, 141, 147–9, 210 Generative Semantics 74–6, 78–80, 82, 148, 207, 214 German 52, 97, 98, 100, 147, 160, 167 n. 6, 168, 169, 255, 285, 305, 313 Government and Binding Theory (GB) or Theory of Principles and Parameters (PPT) 11, 82–120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 128–9, 130, 131, 132, 134, 137, 140, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 156 n. 1, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 178, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 190, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202–4, 230, 235, 242, 244, 245, 251, 266, 267, 268, 276, 277, 288, 292 n. 19, 296, 298, 299, 303, 306, 307, 339, 341, 386, 392, 393, 344, 400 grammar and philology 33–6 as model of linguistic competence 56–9, 69, 73, 79, 84, 201, 215, 217, 346, 385 formal grammar 60, 63, 217, 219, 267 internal(ized) grammar 58–9, 217, 222, 232, 236, 263 possible grammar 58–9, 84 prescriptive/descriptive grammar 34 reductive/non-reductive grammar 258 universal grammar, see universal grammar (UG) usage-based/nongenerative/ nonconstructive grammar 217, 231, 258 grammatical pattern 216–7, 256–7 grammaticalization 84, 147, 200, 267, 345, 387, 395 grounding 239–40, 247, 249, 253–4, 256, 312

432

subject index

Head-Complement Rule 178, 181–3, 186–8, 198 Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) 11, 83–4, 149–53, 169–205, 207, 227, 229–30, 235, 245, 251 n. 1, 266–7, 285, 288, 299, 339, 393 Head Feature Principle 178, 181–2, 187–8, 198 Head-Filler Rule 185–6, 188 Head-Modifier Rule 178, 182–3, 195 Head-Specifier Rule 178–9, 181–4, 187, 196 Hebrew, Medieval/Modern 54, 54 n. 2, 55, 126, 342, 385 n. 7 iconicity 233, 249, 254–6 I-language 84, 346, 384 Immediate Dominance Principle 178 incorporation 117, 119–20 inductive method 56, 61, 299, 384 Inheritance Constraint 176 integration vs. categorization 222–3, 225–8, 252–3, 259–60 interface 86, 126, 161, 165, 195, 206 Italian 21, 89, 123–4, 291, 292 n. 19, 368 Japanese 166, 352, 361, 368, 379, 385 n. 7, 386 juncture 367 Korean 124, 125 Kuryłowicz’s problem 305, 308–9 landmark 122, 221, 221 n. 11, 225–49, 254 primary/secondary landmark 236, 244, 246 language acquisition 11, 56–8, 69, 71, 73, 77, 85, 337 language and literature 14–6, 34, 36 language and mind 70 language and philosophy 24–5, 28 language as expression of thought 24, 390 language change 55 language types agglutinating/fusional/isolating languages 123–4, 323 configurational/nonconfigurational languages 153–7, 165–9, 197 flexible/rigid languages 332, 336, 357–8 Latin 2, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 33, 305, 307, 309, 352

level(s) of representation a-structures 153, 155–6 c-structure 152, 154–61, 164–70, 196–8, 206 annotated c-structure configurations 156–8, 160, 196 deep structure 64–92, 134, 151, 161, 207, 264–5, 285, 391–2 D-structure 86–92, 107–8, 113, 128–9, 134, 140, 245, 296, 298 f-structure 152–61, 165–6, 169–70, 197, 206 LF (logical form) 86–8, 91, 108, 111, 129–33, 136, 140 LSC (layered structure of the clause) 360–5 PF (phonological form) 86, 88, 91–2, 129, 131–3, 136, 140 S-structure 86–92, 108–9, 112–3, 128–30, 134, 140, 183 surface structure 64–8, 72–3, 76–80, 83, 86, 130, 151–4, 161, 166–7, 183, 199–202, 206–7, 215, 219, 229, 264, 266, 290, 390–1 underlying clause structure 346–55, 360 underlying structure 64, 68, 72–9, 206, 215, 219, 235, 266, 349, 354, 390–2 lexemes base lexemes 189–90, 193 lexeme types 187, 190–2 and type hierarchy 175–8, 189, 190, 201 lexical entry or entries in early Generative Grammar 66, 391 in Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar 175, 177, 188, 196 in Lexical Functional Grammar 154, 158–9, 164–5, 167, 169, 206 in Localist Case Grammar 267, 279, 283–4, 288 in Role and Reference Grammar 369, 371, 375, 379 in the Minimalist Program 133, 142, 144, 146 n. 41 in the Theory of Principles and Parameters 87, 103, 113, 115, 127, 141, 143 Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) 11, 83–4, 149–70, 187, 196–8, 207, 229, 235, 245, 266, 268, 393 lexical insertion 78, 80, 92, 219, 392 Lexical Integrity Principle 166, 168

subject index lexical-interpretive model 151 lexicalist position or lexicalism 93 lexical sequence 175, 177 lexicon in Cognitive Grammar 215–6 in early Generative Grammar 64–7, 76–8, 391 in Functional Grammar 346, 356–7 in Lexical Functional Grammar 151, 159, 167 in Localist Case Grammar 264, 267, 278–81, 285, 290, 312, 338 in Neo-Construction Grammar 342, 345, 387, 395 in Role and Reference Grammar 359, 375, 379–82, 388, 395 in the Minimalist Program MP 131–3, 136–9, 145–6 in the Theory of Principles and Parameters 87–8, 94 n. 9, 102, 107, 109, 129, 141, 143, 145 basic lexicon 175, 177, 192 functional lexicon 342, 344, 387 mental lexicon 337 syntactic lexicon 359, 365, 387 lexicon-driven derivation 267 lexocentricity 158 licensing 84, 87, 92, 93, 107, 108–20, 149, 189, 201, 204, 294 of adjuncts/modifiers 116–8, 194, 230, 302, 312 of arguments 82 of complements 93, 107–8, 110, 113–4, 138, 178, 194, 230, 245, 303 of functional heads 113–4 of lexical heads 113, 230 of extended projections 114, 125–8, 138, 204 of functional categories 115–6, 118, 120, 123, 127, 142, 144–6, 392 of operators 91 of specifiers 93, 106–7, 110–1, 136, 138, 178, 188, 192, 303, 311, 340–1, 385 of functional heads 110–2, 142 of lexical heads 108–10, 143, 149 General Licensing Criterion 111–2, 127 generalized licensing principle 126, 129, 135 licensing principle 89, 91, 126, 129, 142 linear order/arrangement 233, 251, 254, 256 linearization 290, 294–5, 361 Linear Precedence Constraint 182, 187

433

linguistic competence 56–9, 69, 73, 79, 84, 201, 215, 217, 346, 383 linguistic universals 70, 333, 335, 340 linguistics as a science 34–5 linking 359, 374–8, 387 Localist Case Grammar, see Case Grammar logical structure 75, 369–72, 375, 379–80, 387, 396 macrorole 371, 375 marker(s) case marker 301, 305, 308, 326, 376 discourse marker 326 grammatical marker 216–7, 384 inflectional marker 24 , 154 metagovernor 290, 293, 295 Minimalist Program (MP) 11, 13, 87 n. 3, 113, 124, 129–49, 166–8, 183, 184, 187, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 230, 235, 251, 266, 267, 288, 292 n. 19, 299, 343, 381, 382, 393 Minimal Link Constraint 130 Mirror Principle 123, 127, 129, 136, 145 modular theory 83–5, 86 n. 2, 130, 215, 392 Montague Grammar 152, 211 n. 3 morpheme class(es) 39, 40–2, 44–5, 50, 55, 61, 63, 390 morpheme-sequence class(es) 39–41, 44, 48, 61, 390 as hierarchical constructions 40, 44–5 as syntactic categories 39, 41–8 Move a 83, 86, 89, 91, 128, 183 movement 31, 54, 89–91, 110, 112–4, 122–4, 126–8, 131, 135, 166–7, 183, 234, 266, 284, 298, 387 covert/overt movement 131, 133 head-head movement 126 head movement 123, 127–8, 167 obligatory movement 136 stylistic movement 91 V-to-I movement 90, 113, 121, 166, 167 wh-movement 90–2, 112, 128 natural class(es) 95, 96, 104 negation (English, French) 120–2 Neg-Criterion 111, 111 n. 20 nexus relation 366 non-projectivity condition 294 Nootka 327, 381, 382 Norwegian 114 n. 22, 126 notional approach 263, 313, 340

434

subject index

nucleus 350, 360–4, 371, 381 numeration 131–3, 136, 139–40, 145–6, 260 Old English 23, 271 operator(s) 75, 91, 115–8, 120, 126, 362–3, 374–5, 380, 382, 394 auxiliary operator 355 illocutionary/predicate/predication/ term operator 349–54 modal operator 75 morphosyntatic operator 356 prepositional operator 357 wh-operator operator 111 n. 20 operator projection 367–8, 373–4, 383 ordering of constituents 182–3 rule ordering 70 parameter(s) 85–6, 89, 182 parametrization 142, 182, 200 part(s) of speech and category structure 315–9 and criteria grammatical criteria 325 morphological criteria 18–9, 21–4 semantic criteria 18–9, 22, 25–6, 325–6 and language typology 324–6, 328–39, 383, 385 and Structuralism 4, 11 and Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ 16–20, 390 as cognitive categories 397–400 as form classes 46 as semantic categories 23 as syntactic categories 4, 10–1, 13–4, 399–401 criticism of 26–7, 32 hierarchy of 331, 332 in Ancient Greek 17–20, 29 in Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar 172, 174–5 in Latin 20, 29 in a Localist Case Gramar 278 in Romance 20–1, 28 in English 23–4, 29 notional basis of 5, 209–10, 268–9 origin of 10–1, 14–8 periphery 360–8, 372, 376–7 phonological pole, see symbolic unit(s) pivot 375, 378 Port Royal Grammar 11, 25, 28–9, 69–70, 209, 390–1

pragmatic criterion 330 precore/postcore slot 362 predicate, basic/derived 346–7, 353 predicate frame 347 predicate logic 73–4, 76, 78–9, 148 as universal base 73, 79 predication, core/extended/nuclear 347, 349–50 principle of analogy 16, 21, 29 Principle of Centripetal Orientation 353 principle of cognitive economy 397, 399 Principle of Endocentricity 157, 158 Principle of Full Interpretation 92, 131 Principle of Functional Stability 353 Principle of Iconic Ordering 353 principle of maximum information 397, 398 Principle of Pragmatic Highlighting 354 profiling 21, 235 profile determinant 226–8, 230–2, 246 projection principle 87–9, 108, 128, 130, 134, 146, 178, 183, 294, 296 properties, see also features complement selection properties 286–7, 301, 303 derivational/inflectional properties 19–21, 23, 273, 323 distributional properties 95, 328 extrinsic/intrinsic properties 240, 249, 252–3, 257 inherent/contextual properties 159, 167, 191, 203, 248, 252, 278, 287, 301, 390 necessary and sufficient properties 313, 321, 330 notional properties 277, 300, 319, 321 prototypical properties 329 selectional properties 102, 132–3, 167, 273, 281–2 selective properties 327 subcategorization properties 66, 89, 159, 239, 279–82, 294, 305, 319 prototype theory see also category structure 6, 7, 317 qualia structure 372, 380, 382 realism vs. mentalism 170 reanalysis 84, 147 redundancies 66, 279–80, 288, 303, 319 referential index 340–1, 385 region, bounded/unbounded 239, 243–4 Relational Grammar 83

subject index restrictor 349 retro-complement 278–82, 289, 303 Revised Extended Standard Theory 83, 84 root 43, 79, 123, 341–3 Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) 12, 208, 324, 358–80, 382, 387 rule(s) correspondence rules 213 expression rules 346–56 formal expression rules 351–6 order determining expression rules 351 placement rules 351, 353–6 prosodic rules 351 immediate dominance rule 360 lexical rules 66, 151, 154, 177–8, 181, 190, 193, 196 linear ordering rules 55 linking rule 382 morphophonemic rules 61, 63, 68 phrase-structure rules 55, 61–74, 77, 80, 82, 86, 92–3, 128, 147–8, 150, 153–8, 164–5, 167, 179, 196–8, 210, 219, 390 context free phrase-structure rules 155, 197 annotated phrase-structure rules 158 redundancy rules 269–71, 274, 276, 280–1, 285, 288, 290, 294, 372 and the lexicon 285, 289, 372 structure generating rules 266 subcategorization rules 65, 69 term-formation rules 349 transformational rules 60–70, 73, 77–80, 82, 86, 92, 147, 150, 154, 390–1 rule of copula support 356 satellite(s), illocutionary/predicate/ predication/proposition 349–53, 357 scanning 241, 261 schema(s) abstract schema 219, 224–5, 237–41, 248, 253, 259, 263, 320–1 constructional schema 219–20, 221–2, 228, 232, 250, 256–7, 274 general schema 216, 244 prototypical schema 224, 248 semantic schema 227 specific schema 244, 259

435

schematic network(s) 223–4, 248–60, 320–1 elaboration/extension of 223–7, 230, 235, 244–9, 252–3, 257, 274, 320 selection complement selection 95, 275, 277, 280, 282, 285–7, 289, 301, 303, 311 c-selection 87, 108–10, 113, 129, 132–3, 135 n. 32, 137, 141–2, 142 n. 31, 145 f-selection 113, 308 selection restrictions 349, 391 s-selection 87, 108–10, 113 Semantic Compositionality Principle 178 semantic domains 226, 227 Semantic Inheritance Principle 178 semantic pole, see symbolic units semantic relation(s) 91, 113, 189, 264, 282–3, 286, 292, 349, 376 Sophists 25 Space Grammar 214 Split-CP/IP analysis 106, 120, 122, 124, 142 n. 36, 145, 148 Split-V analysis 133 stage model 233 Standard Theory 60, 64, 82–6, 92, 106, 128–9, 141, 148, 150–1, 159, 161, 165, 207, 239, 391 Stoics 25, 25 n. 18 strict cycle condition 298 strong generative capacity 59–60 structural ambiguity 59 structural identity 172 Structuralism 4, 29, 57 n. 8, 199, 206, 210, 383, 390 American 31–48, 54, 199, 206, 210, 324, 390 European 31 n. 1 structural patterns 39, 260 subcategorization, context-free/contextsensitive/strict 65–6, 69, 80, 88, 159, 178, 239, 279–82, 284, 286–90, 294, 303, 305, 319, 391 Subcategorization Principle 178 subject and agent 23, 235 external/internal subject 162–4 function of 173 subject concord rule 293 subject-formation 273, 273 n. 13, 292–4

436

subject index

subject (cont.) subject position 88, 90, 103, 109, 245, 354 subject rule 290 Subject-selection hierarchy 290–1 syntactic subject 291–4 symbolic structure 217–8, 222, 251 symbolic unit(s) phonological/semantic pole 216–8, 224–5, 227, 237–8, 243, 248, 250–4, 256 syntactic function, see function(s) syntactic inventory, see also syntactic lexicon 359, 365–7, 387 Syntactic Projection Principle 289, 294, 296 Syntactic Template Selection Principle 376 Te´khne¯ grammatike¯ 10, 15–7, 20–1, 24, 26–9, 34, 78, 209, 389 Tagalog 327, 329, 343–4, 378–9, 381–2, 385, 387, 399 tags 172–4, 179, 188 template(s) 217, 222, 353–4, 359–60, 365–7, 374, 376–9, 382, 386–7 constructional template 374, 377–8 syntactic template 365, 376, 378–9, 382, 387 terms, basic/derived 346, 349 Theory of Principles and Parameters (PPT), see Government and Binding Theory (GB) theta/u-theory 87–90, 132, 142, 145, 183, 202–3 modified u-theory 100 n. 15, 114–6, 149, 183, 202, 204 u-binding 115, 142, 144, 149, 202 u-Criterion 88, 90, 108, 110–1, 115, 130, 135, 158 u-identification 116, 117, 149, 183, 230 u-marking 108, 115, 149, 230 u-roles 87–8, 90, 108, 113, 115, 132–3, 137 top-down analysis 46, 61, 63, 114, 197, 390, 392 traces 83, 89–90, 124, 128, 136 trajector 221, 221 n.11, 225–30, 232–3, 235–6, 241–2, 244–9, 252, 254, 259, 262

and subject 221 n. 11, 225, 233, 236, 244–7, 254 tree admissibility conditions 157, 166–7, 197 type hierarchy 175–8, 189–90, 201 type specification 199–200 typological approach 208, 213, 324, 338 typology 12, 322–45, 383–5, 388, 396 universal grammar (UG) 58–9, 68–70, 85, 151, 215, 217–8, 384 universal(s) 70–2, 80, 323, 327, 333–5, 340, 384 , 391 Uniqueness Condition 159, 166, 197 usage-based model 217, 231, 258 v (little) 129, 133, 139 valency 284, 289, 307, 309, 348 Walpiri 151, 153–5, 376 Wh-criterion 111, 111 n. 20 wild tree 289–90, 292, 296, 298 word class 1–7, 13, 13 n. 1, 14, 25 n. 16, 209, 269–82, 300, 306, 319, 325, 328, 339 and lexical category 2–3, 323–4, 339, 341, 393 basic word class 269–72, 278, 300–1, 303, 306–7, 338 vs. lexical class 268 vs. syntactic category 269, 317, 319, 323–4, 328, 339 word form(s) 172, 174, 177, 186, 188–95, 199–202, 204, 253 word order 58, 120, 132, 135, 140, 140 n. 34, 254–5, 255 n.16, 322, 327, 331, 357–8, 387 word-order phenomena 109, 114, 124–5, 129–30, 140, 322–3 X-bar theory 82–8, 92–3, 114, 128, 130, 142, 149, 156–7, 161, 172, 182–3, 197, 202, 386 Y-model 86 zero-derivation 342

Syntactic Categories: Their Identification and Description in Linguistic Theories (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Grammatical Relations (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Grammatical Relations (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Constituent Structure (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Dependency in Linguistic Description

Maricopa Morphology and Syntax

Logical Syntax and Semantics, Their Linguistic Relevance

Information Structure: The Syntax-Discourse Interface (Oxford Surveys in Syntax & Morphology)

SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES AND PERSIAN STRESS

Language universals and linguistic typology: syntax and morphology

Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology

Cognitive Space and Linguistic Case: Semantic and Syntactic Categories in English (Studies in English Language)

Categories and Cohomology Theories

Modality (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Modality (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Reference (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Studied Flexibility. Categories and Types in Syntax and Semantics

Historical Syntax and Linguistic Theory

Historical Syntax and Linguistic Theory

Germanic linguistics: syntactic and diachronic (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory)

The Nature and Function of Syntactic Categories

Model Categories and Their Localizations

Psychologists and Their Theories

Maricopa Morphology and Syntax (University of California Publications in Linguistics)

Asymmetry in Morphology (Linguistic Inquiry Monographs)

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Volume 3, Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon

Model Categories (Mathematical Surveys and Monographs)

Asymmetry in Morphology (Linguistic Inquiry Monographs)

Syntactic Categories: Their Identification and Description in Linguistic Theories (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Grammatical Relations (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Grammatical Relations (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Constituent Structure (Oxford Surveys in Syntax and Morphology)

Dependency in Linguistic Description

Maricopa Morphology and Syntax

Logical Syntax and Semantics, Their Linguistic Relevance

Information Structure: The Syntax-Discourse Interface (Oxford Surveys in Syntax & Morphology)

SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES AND PERSIAN STRESS

Language universals and linguistic typology: syntax and morphology

Language Universals and Linguistic Typology: Syntax and Morphology

Cognitive Space and Linguistic Case: Semantic and Syntactic Categories in English (Studies in English Language)

Categories and Cohomology Theories

Modality (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Modality (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Reference (Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics)

Studied Flexibility. Categories and Types in Syntax and Semantics

Historical Syntax and Linguistic Theory

Historical Syntax and Linguistic Theory

Germanic linguistics: syntactic and diachronic (Current Issues in Linguistic Theory)

The Nature and Function of Syntactic Categories

Model Categories and Their Localizations

Psychologists and Their Theories

Maricopa Morphology and Syntax (University of California Publications in Linguistics)

Asymmetry in Morphology (Linguistic Inquiry Monographs)

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Indexed Categories and Their Applications

Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Volume 3, Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon

Model Categories (Mathematical Surveys and Monographs)

Asymmetry in Morphology (Linguistic Inquiry Monographs)

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